
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ESSAYS,

THEOLOGICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS,

REPRINTED FROM THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

SECOND SERIES.

INCLUDING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LATE

REV. ALBERT B. DOD, D.D.

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PREFACE.

THIS volume, like that which preceded it a year ago, though entirely composed of selections from the Princeton Review, is not made up by the Conductors of that valuable publication.

It is with no common satisfaction that the collector of these tracts presents as many as seven from the pen of the late distinguished Professor Dod. They are the articles on Capital Punishment, Phrenology, the Vestiges of Creation, Analytical Geometry, and Oxford Architecture, together with the Reviews of Mr. Finney and Dr. Beecher. These Essays are the best extant testimonial to the genius and cultivation of their lamented author.

The article on Hebrew Concordances is also a memorial of departed intellect; being a production of the late Professor Nordheimer.

Several of the remaining Essays in this volume awakened extraordinary interest at the time of their publication: among these may be named those on Slavery and Abolition, and that on the Baptist Translation of the Bible.

The rapid sale of the former volume makes us secure in regard to that which is now offered.

New York, April 15, 1847.

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ESSAY I.

THE BIBLE

A KEY TO THE PHENOMENA OF THE NATURAL WORLD.

PUBLISHED IN 1829.

The stupendous fabric of the universe, part of which we see, and part of which we ourselves are, cannot but become an object of earnest contemplation to the inquisitive mind. The great majority of men, it is true, pass through life without reflection. Their intellectual powers are so little cultivated, and they are so much occupied with objects of sense, and in making provision for their immediate and pressing wants, that they never attempt to raise their minds to the contemplation of the wonderful works by which they are surrounded: but these objects, constantly beheld from infancy, excite no surprise, and seldom call forth a single reflection. There have always been, however, among nations enjoying any degree of civilization, men of minds more cultivated than the rest, and more disposed to investigate the causes of those phenomena which they continually beheld. These sages, when they looked upon the heavens and the earth, upon themselves and other organized and living beings, have been led to inquire, Whence all these things? Have they always existed, or have they been produced? To those who have been conversant with the truth all their lives, it may seem that it would have been an easy thing for any rational mind to ascend at once from the creature to the invisible Creator; but we cannot readily conceive of the perplexity and darkness which surround the intellect of men, whom no ray of divine revelation has visited. The reasonings of such men are also impeded and perverted by prejudices, and erroneous opinions imbibed from their forefathers; and, not unfrequently, pride and other evil passions influence speculative men to adopt extravagant opinions, for the sake of their paradoxical character, or because they are naturally grateful to the feelings of depraved nature. It is, therefore, not an unaccountable fact, that men, unenlightened by divine revelation, should have fallen into so

many egregious errors respecting the origin of the world and its inhabitants.

A considerable number of those called philosophers entertained the opinion, that the universe always existed as we now behold it. They observed that, from age to age, the heavenly bodies move on in their orbits, undisturbed and unchanged; and that, on earth, the same changes of day and night, of winter and summer, of seed-time and harvest, succeed each other in regular order: and no other power being manifest to the senses but that which operates through all nature, they concluded that the universe existed without any cause of itself; and that it ever had existed, and ever would exist, as it now appears.

Some, however, observing in all things, as they imagined, a tendency to dissolution, and perceiving in our globe evidences of a former destruction, adopted the opinion, that the universe contained in itself the principles of its own dissolution and regeneration; that, after running through a period of unknown and inconceivable duration, it falls into a chaotic state, in which catastrophe all organized bodies are destroyed, and return to their simplest elements; but, from this chaos, by degrees, springs up a new order of things, or a renewal of that which before existed; and thus, while they conceived the universe to be eternal, they imagined that it is in a state of perpetual change, by a kind of circular progression, which has neither beginning nor end.

Others of those called philosophers, who seem to have paid a more minute attention to the curious structure of organized bodies, were of opinion that they must by some means have been formed or produced; but, not being able to rise to the conception of a Creator—or what is more probable, not liking to retain the idea of God in their minds—they invented the hypothesis of the eternal existence of the elements of the universe, which they supposed to consist of atoms, or indivisible bodies of all manner of shapes, and in perpetual motion among each other. These atoms, possessing various affinities, came together in every conceivable form of organized bodies, until, by degrees, and in a long process of time, the universe assumed its present aspect, and vegetables and animals of every species were produced by the fortuitous concourse of atoms.

Such a hypothesis might seem too absurd to be seriously entertained by any rational mind, and yet we find among its abettors, men of high and cultivated intellect, among the ancients. It has, however, met with less favour among modern atheists than the fore-mentioned theories; although, in point of absurdity, all systems of atheism may be said to stand on a perfect level; for no folly can be conceived greater than that which says, "there is no God."

The idea of the necessity of a cause, wherever we observe what we must consider an effect, is so deeply seated in human nature, that most men have professed themselves dissatisfied with any system

which assigned no cause, or no better cause than chance or necessity, for the existence of all things. Many have been led, therefore, to adopt the opinion, that the universe was God, believing that whatever distinctness and variety there may seem to be in the world, there existed but one substance or being, of which the heavens and the earth, vegetables and animals, are only so many parts, or rather manifestations. This theory differs from the first mentioned in this important respect, that it recognises a great first cause, which is God; but the difference, as to any useful end, is more in appearance than in reality; for, according to this hypothesis, there is still nothing in existence besides the universe itself. There is no free, sovereign, independent being, whom we should worship or obey; or in whom we can confide for help or safety. In fact it differs from blank atheism in nothing, except that it gives the name of God to the universe of creatures; and thus we come to the horrible conclusion, that we and all other things are parts of God.

Although this hypothesis had its advocates among the ancients, yet Benedict Spinoza has the credit of reducing it to a regular system, which he exhibited in the imposing form of mathematical demonstration. As this atheistical theory was published in an enlightened age, and in a Christian country, it might have been expected that it would attract but few admirers: and, indeed, the number of avowed disciples of Spinozism has been small; yet the same system, new-modelled but not improved, has become a favourite with a large number of philosophers of the present day, on the continent of Europe, and especially in Germany, under the appropriate name of Pantheism. And so great is the infatuation of some calling themselves Christians, that they have thought that this disguised atheism might be reconciled with Christianity.

A system less absurd than any of the former was, that the world has an all-pervading, active, and intelligent soul, which moves and directs all the operations of nature, as the human soul moves and governs the body.

Near akin to this, was the opinion that the planets and stars were all animated bodies, possessed of the power of moving themselves, and of intelligence sufficient to guide and regulate their own motions.

Many students of the physical sciences, in our times, seem to have adopted a theory similar to that which gives a soul to the world. They ascribe all effects to *nature*, and to the laws of nature. In all the remarkable contrivances and evidences of design, which abound in the animal and vegetable worlds, they see nothing but the plastic power of nature. The idea of a God, distinct from the world, and from whom nature derives all its powers, seems to have no place in their philosophy.

But sometimes the doctrine of *the soul of the world* has been combined with that of one supreme God, as in the sublime but mystical theory of Plato.

From what has been said it is evident that the human intellect is prone to wander from the truth; and that reason is liable to be perverted, even in matters of the highest importance; and in which the light of evidence seems to us to shine most clearly.

A just and impartial consideration of the universe cannot fail to lead the sincere seeker of truth to the opinion, that there must exist a first great cause, powerful and intelligent, who has made the world for some particular end. As sound reason would constrain us, if we should find a curiously contrived machine, evidently formed for a useful purpose, to ascribe it to an intelligent artificer, how can we refuse to ascribe the structure of the universe, in which the evidences of design are more numerous and more striking, infinitely, than in any of the works of men, to a wise and powerful architect? If a watch or steam-engine could not be formed by the accidental aggregation of particles, brought together by the winds or waves, can we suppose that such a structure as an organized animal body could be formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms? There is in a small part of the human body, more profound wisdom in designing the texture and organization of the parts for the attainment of a particular end, than in all the curious mechanism of man's contrivance. And if we should even suppose (absurd as it is) that such an organized system could come into existence without design, how could we account for the wonderful adaptation of other things, existing in an entirely separate state, to the necessities and conveniences of the animal body? Without light the eye would be useless, but when we examine the mechanism of this organ, and observe that it is constructed upon the most perfect principles of optics, can we for a moment hesitate to believe that the eye was formed by a designing agent, to receive, refract, and concentrate the rays of light, for the purposes of vision? The same adaptation is remarkable, between the air and the organ of hearing; and between the air and the lungs: the same is also true, in regard to the stomach and the food which it so eagerly craves. In these, and a thousand other things, the evidences of design are as strong as they possibly can be. If we can resist these, no other proofs would answer any purpose in removing our incredulity.

Reason, then, clearly indicates, that this universe is not God, but is the work of God, and that he must be a being of transcendent perfection. But having arrived at this conclusion, who would not wish to have his faith confirmed by some clear manifestation of this august Being? If he exists and formed our bodies, and gave us our rational powers, surely he can find out ways by which he can make himself known to us. He cannot, indeed, render himself visible to our bodily eyes, because he is a spirit; but he who indued man with the faculty of communicating with his fellows, by the use of speech, can speak to us in a language which we can understand. Now this very thing he has done, by divine revelation. By inspiring chosen individuals, and attesting their commu-

nications, he has plainly informed us, not only that he exists, but that he is the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the universe; that he is above all, and independent of all; and that all things were produced by his own pleasure, and for his own glory.

That which reason often missed, or mistook, and at best spelled out with hesitation, the voice of revelation declares with decisive authority.

Reason may vaunt herself when the discovery is made, but she owes her clearest light and firmest convictions to the voice of inspiration.

The Bible furnishes the full and satisfactory commentary on the book of nature. With the Bible in our hands, the heavens shine with redoubled lustre. The universe, which to the atheist is full of darkness and confusion, to the Christian is resplendent with light and glory. The first sentence in the Bible contains more to satisfy the inquisitive mind than all the volumes of human speculation. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Here, in a few words, is comprehended the most sublime of all truths—the production of a universe out of nothing, by the word of the Almighty. If God created the heavens and the earth, then he existed before they were brought forth, even from eternity; for he who gives beginning to all other things, can have none himself. Before the world was, this august Being existed, independent and happy, in the plenitude of his own infinite perfections. This first word of written revelation teaches us, what reason in her boldest flights could never reach, namely, that the universe sprang from nothing: not from nothing as its cause, but from the inconceivable working of almighty power, where nothing existed, from which it could be made. None of the heathen sages ever believed such a creation possible. They universally received it as an axiom, that *ex nihilo nihil fieri;* but here we learn, "That the worlds were framed by the word of God, and that the things which are seen, were not made of things which do appear." This stupendous work, of giving being to so great a multitude and variety of creatures, is often celebrated in the sublime strains of sacred poetry, and in the commanding eloquence of the inspired prophets. "Thus saith the Lord, that created the heavens and stretched them out, he that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it." "Which made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that therein is." "He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion."

"O Lord God, behold thou hast made the heavens and the earth, by thy great power."

"The Lord which stretched forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him."

The apostles tread in the footsteps of the prophets, in ascribing the creation of the universe to God alone, "The living God, which made the heavens and the earth, and all things therein."

"God that made the world and all things therein." "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."

"He that built all things is God."

With such declarations as these, coming from the mouth of God himself, how is the mind enlarged and elevated, in contemplating the heavens and the earth! How grand, how beautiful, how wise, how harmonious is the universe, when viewed through the medium of divine revelation. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work; day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night teacheth knowledge."

"O Lord our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who hast set thy glory above the heavens." "When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him! And the son of man that thou visitest him?"

Without the book of revelation, the book of nature would be as a volume sealed; but with this key we can open its wonderful pages, and receive instruction from every creature of God.

But let us descend from the contemplation of the universe, to the consideration of some of its parts. Here are the race of mankind, and multitudes of living creatures, in the earth, the air, and the water; whence have they proceeded? What can reason and philosophy answer? Had man and the other animals a beginning, or were they from eternity? If the former, from what cause, and by what steps did they arrive at their present condition? On no subject has philosophy betrayed her weakness more than in her speculations respecting the origin of the human race. It would be poorly worth our while to review the absurd theories of ancient and modern philosophers, which more resemble the dreams of the sick than the sober deductions of reason. One will give to the earth we know not what prolific power to produce men and animals; another chooses to place man, in his origin on a level with the speechless brutes, from which condition he is supposed to arise by long and assiduous exertion; acquiring for himself the use of articulate and written language, and inventing, from time to time, all the arts which now minister to the comfort of civilized life. But such theories are too absurd for refutation. The idea of the production of animals or vegetables, by what was called equivocal generation, that is, without progenitors, or organized seeds and roots, has long since been exploded. Experiments the most decisive have demonstrated the falsehood of the notions entertained by the ancients, of the generation of animated beings from mere corruption. The men and animals, now on the earth, belong to a series reaching back to eternity; or they were formed, and placed on our globe, by an almighty Being. Let us then, for a moment, look at the theory which assigns to man an existence without beginning. While the individuals die, the species is im-

mortal. If such a hypothesis does not do violence to common sense, it would be difficult to say what does. Each individual is dependent, and yet the whole series of individuals independent. The absurdity and contradiction of such a theory are concealed only by the darkness of eternity. By running back until we are overwhelmed with a subject which our minds cannot grasp, we are apt to lose sight of the unreasonableness of a supposition, which on a limited scale every one can clearly see. As if one should say, here is a chain suspended, consisting of a thousand links, each one depending on the next above it; could such a chain of a thousand links remain suspended, without anything to support it? To such a problem every child would give the correct answer. The thing is manifestly impossible. Well, suppose the number of links be increased to a hundred million, could the chain support itself any better than when it consisted of a thousand, or even ten links? Certainly not, would be the answer of every person of common sense; and such a person would be apt to say, the more links there are in the chain, the more support does it require, seeing its tendency to fall will be in proportion to its weight. But then, suppose the links so increased, that our minds can no longer conceive of the number, will such an increase, however great it may be, render a support less necessary? The answer ought to be as decisively as before, in the negative. We have seen that the increase of the number, while within the limits of our conception, did not lessen the necessity for a supporting power; and why should such an increase as goes far beyond our power of imagination be supposed to have this effect? The idea of a series of men without beginning, without any Creator to give them being, is one of the greatest absurdities which can be conceived.

Besides, when we consider the number of men; when we trace their history; when we reflect upon their small advancement in the arts and sciences; and how recent the most useful inventions are; how can we, unless we renounce our reason, believe that mankind have existed on this globe from eternity? The thing is impossible. The only reasonable hypothesis therefore is, that the human race, together with the various species of animals and vegetables, had a beginning; and that they were created by a wise and omnipotent Being, by whose care and sustaining power they are still preserved.

But man feels too little satisfied with his own reasonings to rest contented with such conclusions as he can himself deduce. He wishes to see the face, or hear the voice, of his great Creator. He wants an explicit declaration from the mouth of his Father in heaven, assuring him of the truth of his own reasonings; and authorizing him to claim the relation of a creature, formed by the power and goodness of God.

Such a desire of divine instruction is neither sinful nor unreasonable in creatures situated as we are. Who would not wish to know his own earthly father? And who would like, on such a

subject, to be left to reasonings founded on abstract principles? But how much more interesting is it for us to know our heavenly Father, to whom we owe our very being, with all its faculties and capacities? Now, this reasonable desire the great Creator has condescended to gratify. He has, in the revelation which is contained in the holy Scriptures, informed us, not only that he is our Maker, but has given us most particular information of the time and circumstances of man's creation. After the heavens and the earth, and beasts, fishes, and birds, were formed; in short, after all things on earth were created, God, speaking in the glorious council of his own being, said, "Come, let us make man in our own image, and after our own likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth." "So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him." "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: and man became a living soul." "And the Lord God said, it is not good that the man should be alone, I will make an help meet for him." "And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam; and he slept, and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from man made he a woman, and brought her unto the man; and Adam said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man."

We have somewhere met with an account of an infidel, more ingenious than wise, who proposed to put the Mosaic history to the test, by examining whether man was deficient of a rib in one of his sides. It would have been as reasonable to have examined whether every male descendant of Adam had the scar of the wound made in the side of the first man. If Adam had remained, all his life, destitute of the rib which was taken away, why should it be supposed that this defect should be transmitted to his posterity? But he laboured under no such defect, for the opening made was closed up with flesh instead of that which was taken away. The rib was not taken on account of any difficulty to obtain materials, but to show that a man and his wife were one, and that a man should ever cherish his wife as his own flesh. The word here translated *rib*, properly means, *a side:* for aught that appears, the whole side of the man might have been taken, to form the woman; but this is a matter of no consequence.

Infidels have been fond of turning this simple and beautiful history of the formation of the first man and the first woman into ridicule; but if man had a beginning, and was created by the Almighty, what account could be imagined more natural and reasonable than this? Let the scoffer produce his own hypothesis, and subject it to the test of examination—but he has none. He laughs at the Bible history, and at the same time has nothing to furnish as a substitute. But to men of sober minds, who wish to be acquainted

with their own origin, this narrative is most satisfactory and instructive. We know that man must have had a beginning, and consequently a Creator; but reason could not inform us how, or in what circumstances, he commenced his existence: *that*, therefore, which we wish to know, and need to know, is distinctly revealed, and plainly recorded in the Bible. Man, instead of being from eternity, is of yesterday; instead of springing, like a mushroom, from the putrid earth, he came from the forming hand of the great Creator; instead of being at first an ape or ourang outang, he was made in the likeness and after the similitude of God. The Bible, then, explains to us our own origin, and the origin of all creatures. It teaches that man was made out of the clay of the earth, but this clay was wrought into shape, and wonderfully and fearfully organized, by a divine hand.

The physical history of man exhibits some very remarkable phenomena; among which none have attracted the attention of the inquisitive so much as the striking variety in the complexion, hair, size, and figure of the species in different countries. Of complexion we find every shade of colour from white to sooty black; and of hair, from the silken or flaxen locks of the North of Europe, to the crisped and curled wool of the Guinea negro. In the formation and prominence of the nose, lips, and cheeks, there is also a remarkable difference in different nations. These striking and numerous varieties have led some philosophers to adopt the opinion, that mankind are not descended from one stock; but that originally there must have been parents corresponding with the several classes of men. It is an obvious objection to this theory, that the several complexions of mankind are not distinctly marked, but run into each other by imperceptible shades; so that if we suppose more species of men than one, we know not where to stop. If every considerable variety must be the foundation of a distinct species, we must adopt the hypothesis that, originally, God created a multitude of human beings of different complexions.

It is also a fact unfavourable to this hypothesis, that there are striking varieties in complexion, hair, &c., among those known to have proceeded from one stock. In the same nation, some whole families or tribes are distinguished by fair hair and a ruddy complexion; while others are equally remarkable for dark complexion, and black hair and eyes. These varieties in the same nation are known also to be transmitted from father to son, for many generations. But we are unable to account for this variety; and if such a difference may take place when the external circumstances are nearly similar, why may not the greater varieties of the human species be owing to the great difference of climate and other circumstances of the nations of the earth?

Since a more accurate knowledge has been obtained of the numerous tribes inhabiting the islands of the great South Sea, some very interesting facts have been brought to light, respecting the origin of these insulated savages. The information collected by

Dr. Prichard, and published in his PHYSICAL HISTORY OF MAN, goes far to prove, that men who have at a remote period sprung from the same stock, may so diverge from each other, in features, complexion, hair, &c., that they form distinct classes, and seem to be as widely apart from each other as almost any of the differing tribes of men. The identity of the origin of some of these islanders, whose appearance is so dissimilar, is ascertained by the radical sameness of their language; and it is a thing unknown in the history of savages to change their vernacular tongue. It is manifest, therefore, that there are natural causes in operation, whether we understand what they are or not, sufficient to produce all the varieties observed in the human species.

The diversity of features and complexion in the Jews, who have long resided in widely different climates, and who it is known do not intermix with other people, affords a strong confirmation of the same truth.

It is also as remarkable as it is obvious, that, for the most part, men of a certain complexion are found in a particular latitude, unless they have been recently removed from their own country. We do not find the black skin and crisped hair in high latitudes; nor the fair complexion and light-coloured hair under the equator. From the first glance, therefore, it would seem that there is some connexion between climate and the complexion. Whether a difference of climate is sufficient of itself to account for these varieties, need not be determined. There may be other causes combined with this, some of which may be unknown to us. Animals carried from the temperate regions, far to the north, become white, and their fur becomes much thicker and warmer. The final cause of this change is manifest, and indicates the wisdom and goodness of the great Creator, but we know not how to account for it. The fact is certain, but the process of nature by which it is brought about is concealed; at least, it has not yet been discovered. Now, there may be, in the constitution of man, a principle which accommodates itself to different climates, for purposes equally important. Indeed it is a well known fact, that black people can endure a tropical sun much better than white men.

The analogy derived from other animals and vegetables also forbids the multiplication of the human species. The changes produced in the different species of animals, which can live in climates widely different, are as great, and in some much greater, than in the human species. Take, for an example, the canine species. How great the difference between the large mastiff and the diminutive lap-dog! These varieties in animals of the same species, extend not only to their size, colour, and shape, but in a very remarkable degree to their instincts.

Seeing, then, that this is the common law of animal nature, why should we expect that the physical nature of man should be exempt from changes, induced by a diversity of climate? And when we observe that the varieties of the human race have a manifest re-

lation to the climate of the respective nations, the conclusion, upon all just principles of natural science, must be that the human species is one.

In all cases where there is a difference of species, there is a marked difference in the internal structure of the body; but among the different tribes of men, no such diversity has been observed as can be the foundation of a diversity of species. The most exact anatomical dissections have discovered no permanent parts or contrivances, in one nation, which are not found also in all others. They all have the same bones, the same joints, the same system of nerves, the same number, use and position of muscles, the same blood-vessels, glands, and digestive organs. Not only is the external appearance of the parts the same, but the interior texture and constituent particles composing the respective parts of the human body, are the same in the white man, as in the black, the olive, the red, or the yellow.

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that all men have the same external senses and the same bodily appetites, the same instincts, the same susceptibility of forming habits, and the same natural passions and desires. Those things in the constitution of man which have no resemblance in other species of animals, are found in all the nations of the earth. The risible faculty and the faculty of weeping, and especially the possession of articulate speech, all serve to prove the identity of the human species. And if from the body and its functions we ascend to the mind, here we find the same original faculties, in all the varieties of the human race. We observe in all, not only perception, consciousness, and memory, of which the inferior animals seem to partake, but the power of reasoning; the faculty of imagination; the power of association and abstraction; and what is more decisive still, the moral sense, of which there is no vestige in the brutes; and the faculty of taste; for all men perceive a difference between right and wrong, and feel moral obligation; and all men have some sense of beauty and deformity. Moreover, all men are capable of improvement, and those nations which are now the most learned and refined, were once among the most barbarous of the human race.

This perfect similarity in mind and body is sufficient to lead all impartial men to the conclusion, that the human race are all descended from one pair, and that the varieties are accidental;—the effect of a variety of causes, all of which we are unable to explore.

Some philosophers have, however, thought themselves justified in considering men of different species, not so much from the variety in their complexion and external appearance, as from the different degrees of flatness or rotundity in the skulls of different nations. On this ground, the learned Blumenbach has reduced the whole human race to five classes or species. But in the first place, the examination of human skulls has not been sufficiently extensive to furnish correct data for such a classification; and in the next place, if the difference exists, it affords no philosophical reason for supposing an

original diversity of species. The causes which have operated other changes, may as easily have produced a difference in the mere form of a skull: and those who give credit to the discoveries of the craniologists, will find no difficulty in accounting for any varieties which are found in the skulls of men of different tribes.

Some time since, a radical difference of intellect was insisted on, as a criterion to determine a difference of species: but since our acquaintance with the most degraded and stupid of the human race has become more accurate; and especially, since we have witnessed the improvements of which these are capable, and the rapid advancement of some of them in knowledge and civilization, the whole ground of this opinion is taken away.

There is another criterion of the identity of species, which by some naturalists has been considered decisive. It has been found, that although animals of different species may be made to propagate a mongrel breed, their offspring are for the most part barren, or are seldom known to propagate. But the various classes of men mingle as freely and propagate the species with as much facility as people of the same tribe. Of late, however, some doubt has been expressed respecting the correctness of the fact first stated, on which the whole argument rests. It is alleged that sufficient experiments have not been made on the subject of the natural want of fertility in mules and other hybrids; and that, as far as experience goes, they are found to be fruitful in as many cases as they are barren. Leaving, therefore, the degree of barrenness in such animals in doubt, it is clear that no new species, capable of continuing itself by propagation, has been formed by the union of animals of different species, and that there exists a natural obstruction, which does not exist in the case of men of the different classes.

But why might not a number of pairs of the same species, or exactly similar in parts and powers, have been produced as well as one? To which we answer, that although the thing is possible, yet sound philosophy never resorts to such a supposition. Naturalists always go on the principle that more causes of the phenomena of nature than are sufficient, are not to be admitted; and where every effect can as well be accounted for by supposing one original pair as by many, the hypothesis of more than one ought, on general principles, to be rejected.

Having seen that reason itself leads us to believe that all the various nations of men are derived from one stock, and form but one species, it cannot but add strong confirmation to our belief, that the sacred Scriptures clearly inform us, that when God created man upon the earth, he created them male and female;—one man and one woman—from whom proceeded all the nations of the earth.

The idea which some have entertained, that there were men before Adam, is destitute of all shadow of proof. The apostle Paul, in his discourse before the Senate of Areopagus, explicitly declares,

what reason and revelation unite in teaching to be the truth. "And hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth." One word from the inspiration of God goes further to establish our minds in the belief of the truth, than volumes of arguments depending merely on the fallible reason of man.

The Bible teaches us that every man of every tribe and of every colour, whether his skull be flat or prominent, is our brother, and has a claim upon us for all the kindness and beneficence which it is in our power to show him. The same God is the Father of us all; and the same man is our common earthly father; and we are all rapidly tending to the same judgment and to the same eternity.

But if any should, after all, be of opinion that the diversity among men cannot be accounted for by natural causes, yet it does not follow that the Mosaic history is false, or that there are several species of men entirely distinct from each other. At some period of the history of man, for some special reason, the Governor of the universe may have given a distinctive colour to one or more families of the earth. And some believers in the Bible are so fully impressed with this idea, that they have undertaken to affirm that we have an intimation of this very thing in the sacred history. While some, however, would refer the black colour of the skin to the mark set upon Cain (which is irreconcilable with the history of the deluge), others, with more probability, refer it to the curse upon Canaan, the son of Ham. As his posterity were doomed to be the servants of servants, it is thought that some peculiar mark was set upon them, which, it is presumed, was the dark colour of the skin and the crisped and woolly hair. And in confirmation of this opinion, they allege, that the black people are the descendants of Ham, and that they are the slaves of all the world, until this day.

While we are willing to admit, that for reasons unknown to us, God might have miraculously changed the complexion and features of a part of the human race; we must think that the notion that the black colour was inflicted as a disgrace and a curse is a mere prejudice. Why should not the white colour be considered as a mark of God's displeasure? for no negro from the burning sands of Africa can appear more shocking to the inhabitants of northern regions, than the white man does to the people of the interior of that continent.

It seems, moreover, to be a prejudice without foundation, that the colour of the whites was that of the first man. Much the larger part of the inhabitants of the earth are of a complexion nearly midway between the two extremes. Is it not, therefore, much more probable that our first parents were red men, or of an olive or copper colour? This opinion derives some support from the name of the first man, for the radical signification of

Adam is *red;* and if this be assumed as a fact, then it will be much easier to account for the various complexions of men from natural causes, than if we suppose that either white or black was the original complexion.

But from what has been said it will be seen that no valid argument against the truth of the Bible can be derived from the variety in the human species; whether that variety can be accounted for by natural causes or not.

ESSAY II.

GOD THE END OF ALL THINGS.

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It is natural to inquire, while surveying the extended works of God, *What is the ultimate end of this great and complicated system?* Some parts of it we can easily see were formed for others; objects that are small and insignificant, for those that are greater and more important; and, again, these for others greater and more important still. The pebble and the drop were made to constitute the mountain and the river; and the mountains and the rivers to adorn and embellish the face of nature, and in a thousand ways to minister to the wants of those who dwell on the earth. The solid earth, with all its immense quantities of matter, its diversified surface, its fertile soil, its rapid motions, its elastic atmosphere, was evidently intended to be the habitable abode of men. The extended ocean, with all its mighty expanse and unmeasured depth of waters, while it is the grand reservoir of nature and the source of evaporation, perpetually enriching the earth with fertility and verdure, everywhere distributes its watery treasures for the sustenance and benefit of the numerous tribes of animated and intelligent existence. If we extend our views to the solar system, or from the solar system to the starry heavens, in these trackless regions we behold an assemblage of resplendent orbs, spacious perhaps as the sun of our own system, and all subserving the interests of unnumbered worlds, not improbably invested, like our own, with intelligence and immortality. Matter, in all its variety and magnificence, we see, is made for mind, and one portion of this great and complicated system for another.

What, then, is the ultimate end of *all things?* The lights of unaided reason are far from fitting us to solve this high problem; and yet, so far as we are enabled to follow them, they conduct us to the same conclusion to which we are conducted by a supernatural revelation, when it so happily and explicitly instructs us, that "The Lord hath made *all things for himself.*"

When we say that God acts for the purpose of displaying abroad

the perfections of his nature before the intelligent creation—when we say that God made all things for himself, we mean, that his supreme end "is his own glory, or the most perfect gratification of his infinitely benevolent mind." The word *glory*, when applied to God, sometimes denotes the inherent and full perfection of the divine nature, and sometimes the manifestation of the divine nature in creation, providence, and grace. There is a difference between the intrinsic and the manifested excellence of the Godhead. By his intrinsic excellence, is meant his essential perfections; by his manifested excellence is meant his essential perfections, exhibited to himself and the created universe. There is a richness, a fulness of perfection which constitutes his essential glory; and there is a diffusion, a resplendency in his perfections which, if I may so speak, reflects the Deity to himself and the universe; which casts its light through all worlds, and constitutes his manifested glory. The chief excellence of God consists in his goodness. Infinite amiableness and beauty are treasured up in his perfections, because the basis of them is the most pure, permanent, universal, and perfect goodness.

This is the *glory* of his nature. But the intrinsic, or essential goodness of God does not admit of increase or diminution. God cannot possess more essential goodness than he does possess; and, therefore, cannot be made essentially more glorious than he is. When, therefore, we speak of God's being glorified, or of the advancement and promotion of his glory, we speak of the augmentation of his manifested excellence—of the expression, or gratification of his infinite goodness, in some of its forms and modifications. It is not incompatible with his immutability, that the exhibition he makes of his nature should be capable of continual growth and enlargement, and that his manifested excellence should receive fresh accessions, and be continually growing more extended and more refulgent. For all that we know, the manifested glory of God is susceptible of augmentation that is perpetually progressive. In the same proportion in which the scene opens, will the true character of God be unfolded, and his perfect goodness made known. And as the drama draws to a close, and the catastrophe of the mighty plot begins to be developed, at every step of this progressive disclosure will the heart of God be acted out, the name of God magnified, the glory of God displayed abroad, and the divine goodness infinitely and for ever exalted and gratified. This is what we mean when we say, that the glory of God is the ultimate end of all his conduct, and that he made all things for himself. It was that he might manifest the perfections of his nature, and thus exalt and gratify his infinite goodness.

This is God's ultimate end. This is the end to which all other ends are subordinate and subservient. Jehovah, the king of Israel, is "the first and the last;" he is "Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending;" the first cause and the last, or supreme end of all things. "Of him, and to him, and through him, are all things." "All things that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and

invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, principalities, and powers, all were created by him and for him. God himself often declares in his word, that he will do, or refrain from doing, "for his own sake,"—for "his name's sake,"—"for his praise,"—"for his glory,"—and, that "in all things he may be glorified." What means the sublime declaration in the Apocalypse? "And the four beasts rest not day nor night, saying, holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come. And when those beasts give glory, and honour, and thanks to him that sat on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever, the four and twenty elders fall down before him that sat on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying, thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power, *for thou hast created all things, and for* THY PLEASURE *they are and were created!*"

Whom could God ultimately regard, in the creation of all things, except himself? Before the creation there was none other in existence but God. The motives to create must, of necessity, be within himself. Is it said, that future existence itself may be an end in proposing and causing it to exist? Is it said, that the excellence of his work was an inducement to create?

But for what purpose did God propose happiness? Did he act without a motive? Or was it to express and gratify his own perfect goodness? Was it his love of happiness, his delight in happiness, that induced the purpose and the wish?

The divine glory deserves the most regard. Not only must the infinite and eternal Creator have had some end in view in the creation, but one that justifies the expressions of his omnipotence, and that is worthy of the greatest and best Being in the universe. We can conceive of many ends that might have presented themselves to his mind, but we can conceive of no supreme end short of himself, without derogating from his perfect excellence. Universal creation is but a point compared with God. Language, and figures, and comparisons, are lost in the contemplation of his being and nature. The material and intellectual universe is but a faint adumbration of what God himself is, and presents a mere shadow, an emblem of his infinite perfections. All nations, all worlds, are but a "drop of the bucket," compared with him, and no more than the small vapour to the immense ocean. Immeasurable glories and blessedness belong to Him who fills immensity. The glory of the infinite God, therefore, deserves the highest regard. And with reverence be it spoken, it became him to make this his design, as really it becomes him to give the preference to an archangel above an insect.

The use which God actually makes of his creation, shows what end it was intended to answer. It subserves the end for which it was originally intended. And what do the Scriptures and facts declare this to be? Obviously, not the happiness of all God's creatures; for they are not all happy. Human misery stares us

in the face wherever we turn our eyes. In eternity there are, and will be greater and deeper miseries than are found in time. So that if the happiness of all God's creatures be the ultimate end of creation, most certainly the divine purpose is defeated. But facts and the Bible unite in declaring that the use God makes of his universe is the promotion and advancement of his own glory. When we survey the works of creation, to what do we see them so really and so much subservient, as the glory of the Creator? "All thy works *praise thee.*" "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." If we survey the works of Providence, what do they illustrate so clearly, as the supremacy, wisdom, goodness, power, and presence of the Almighty and efficient Ruler? What grand and deep impression do they produce on the mind, if not this, that they are full of God?—that by them his name is "declared throughout all the earth"—and that through them men "may know that he is the Lord?" It will not be doubted that the glory of God is the great end of the work of redemption. Angels, when they announced it, sang "Glory to God in the highest!" The Redeemer, when he achieved it, prayed, "Father, glorify thy name!" All its promises are "yea and amen to the glory of God, by Jesus Christ." The graces, and hopes, and joys it imparts to the saints, are to "make known the riches of his glory." And the final and triumphant song it inspires in the heavenly world, is "unto him be glory!" Not only is the glory of God the ultimate end of all his goodness and mercy to the saints, but of all his justice and indignation to the ungodly. "The wrath of man shall praise the Lord." Allelujas to God and the Lamb shall ascend, when the smoke of the torments of the damned go up for ever and ever. And the close of this terrestrial scene shall declare and confirm the truth we are enforcing with a deep and memorable emphasis. A voice from heaven shall then be heard, saying, "It is done; I am Alpha and Omega!" When the great design shall be consummated, and creation, providence, and redemption shall have been brought to their final issue, and the Judge shall have pronounced the final sentence, then shall this redeeming God and King "deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father, and GOD SHALL BE ALL IN ALL;" and this surrender shall eternally proclaim to the universe, that "God made all things for himself." God shall be all in all. God shall be infinitely and for ever glorified.

But it may not be amiss to occupy a few pages in VINDICATING THE CONDUCT OF GOD IN THUS MAKING HIMSELF HIS LAST END. There is nothing which the Scriptures represent as more essential to enlarged and consistent views of truth, as well as to the great interests of vital piety, than some just conceptions of this part of our subject. There is nothing of which God himself is so jealous, nothing he regards so deeply as his own glory. This he is immutably resolved to secure and advance, and by all means, and at every step of its development, to make men see. He "will not

give his glory to another." His glory is, with him, a consideration of paramount influence, in every condition and circumstance, and in all worlds. It is second to nothing which the Infinite Mind itself has ever conceived. Holy beings in heaven and on earth have no larger wish, no greater desire, than to behold greater and brighter exhibitions of the divine excellence.

It is of the *highest importance in itself*, that God should appear in the perfect exercise and exhibition of his divine excellence. The importance of this exhibition depends on the intrinsic and manifold perfections of the divine nature. If there were no excellence in the Deity, we should be far from considering it desirable that his true character should appear; much less should we desire that the full and complete exhibition and gratification of it should be the ultimate end of all that he does. In itself considered, no matter how long, or how impenetrably, intrinsic turpitude of character lies concealed; it is deformed and disgusting to look at; it makes no one the better or happier for being familiar with it; but the more fully, the more impressively intrinsic excellence is disclosed, the deeper is the conviction of its reality and loveliness, and the more sublime and beautiful the survey and inspection of its glories. Now, it is because God is infinitely great and good, that it is desirable to "see him as he is." That immensity and majesty, that power and wisdom, that supremacy and immutability, that pure, perfect, and universal goodness, which diffuse their energy into all the divine plans, and spread such beauty and glory over all the divine works and conduct, are in him excellences of the highest kind, and immeasurable in degree. We do not appreciate the exhibition of the divine excellence, because we have such low and grovelling thoughts of God. Were this immensely great and infinitely glorious Being always viewed as he is, did we see him to be "the first fair and the first good," were we always possessed of just and comprehensive conceptions of his glory, we should entertain no doubt, that the reflection of this excellence, the progressive diffusion of these concentrated rays, is the highest and best end which the Supreme Intelligence could propose to himself in all his works. The principle on which we affirm this, is inwoven with all our common sense and moral calculations. Every man regrets, and deems it an unhappiness, when a measure of mere human excellence is hid from the public eye. When virtue languishes in solitude, when genius withers in retirement, when the heavy hand of external discouragement or internal depression bears down the rising efforts of intellectual or moral greatness, what benevolent mind does not reflect upon such calamity with pain? And if in proportion to the degree of excellence is the importance that it should be unfolded, beyond conception important is it that the matchless, manifold, infinite, and eternal excellence of the Diety should appear, and be displayed abroad in all its glory. If the king, eternal, immortal, and invisible, possesses, not the resemblance and image, but "the living features" of perfection, who

feels it not to be important that the light of his fair countenance should be lifted upon the universe he has made, and that every subject of his empire should be constrained to see, that "none in heaven can be compared unto the Lord, and none among the sons of the mighty can be likened unto the Lord?" Not only is there in this disclosure ineffable loveliness and beauty, but there is equity both to himself and his creatures. If he is a holy God, and there is beauty in his holiness, then ought it to appear that he is holy and not sinful. If he is just, and there are beauties and amiableness in his justice, then is it desirable and important that his justice should appear, and be magnified; and that he should for ever be acquitted of the imputation of cruelty, caprice, and injustice. If he is wise, and powerful, and good, then is it infinitely desirable that these perfections of his nature should be acted out, and he exalted and gratified; and that no order of beings should ever call in question the wisdom, efficacy, or benevolence of his administrations. If he is gracious and merciful, then ought all men to see "what is the fellowship of the mystery which, from the beginning of the world, hath been *hid in God*, who created all things by Jesus Christ, to the intent that now unto principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known through the Church, his manifold glory." If he is supreme, then is it desirable that his supremacy should appear, and that all should know, that he "does his pleasure in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth." And if he is in every view a being of faultless, unequalled perfection, and that every intellectual and moral excellence adorns his nature, and are the habitation and glory of his throne, then is it of the highest importance that his unblemished glory should shine forth, and that nothing mar its unrivalled beauty. There was an emphasis in the inquiry of Moses, that sinks into the soul of every godly man and every bending seraph, "What will become of thy great name?" We know that among fallen spirits, and in this world of ours that lieth in wickedness, the divine character has been subjected to the foulest stains, his government reproached, and his designs defamed; and unless his excellence *appear* in cloudless glory, dissipating the obscurity in which it has been enveloped by the ignorance, misconception, and wickedness of creatures, the stain can never be wiped away. God *must* be glorified. Every supposed blemish must be removed by the exhibition of himself. Every murmur against him must die away. "Every mouth must be stopped." And nothing short of the actual development of the divine nature can attain this end. All that God is, and all that he does, must "come to the light," that it may be approved and applauded by ten thousand tongues, and ten thousand times ten thousand consciences, and that their approbation and their plaudits may be eternal.

It is also through the bright exhibitions of his own glory, that the God of love designs to *secure and perpetuate the perfect and progressive holiness of unnumbered multitudes of his creatures.*

Some of the creatures of God were created holy, and have maintained their primeval integrity, and will maintain it for ever. Some were created holy, and fell from their primitive rectitude, and have given birth to a race of beings, fallen like themselves. Of these, a great multitude are recovered from their apostasy, and will continue steadfast in their obedience without end. And it is obvious to remark, that whether true holiness, or moral rectitude, is found among angels or men, it is advanced and perpetuated by the same means. Wherever it is found, it consists in holy love, and primarily, in love to the adorable and ever blessed God. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him." He that "loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is love." Now it accords with the Scriptures, and all the experience of good men that the love of God exists and is sustained through the knowledge of God. The Divine Spirit, is indeed, the immediate and only cause and author of this heavenly disposition; but the knowledge of God is the great instrument of it. This is the aliment of all healthful moral existence. Wherever sinful beings are made holy, it is by becoming acquainted with God. When God renews the hearts of the sons of men, and sheds abroad his love in them, they are illumined from above, and enabled to discern the supreme excellence and glory of the divine character. "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, shines in their hearts, to give them the light of the knowledge of *his glory*, in the face of Jesus Christ." And wherever holy beings see and learn most of God they become most holy. Holy affections delight in nothing but a holy object, and the most holy affections delight in nothing so much as the most holy. The highest holiness in creatures can be found only where God is best known, and loved perfectly. Upon nothing does their holiness so much depend, as the knowledge of God. It is possible for us to conceive of a *sinless* being, who knows nothing except his obligations to his fellow creatures; but it would be a rectitude without a name—an anomaly in the moral universe—a rectitude that falls far below the actual rectitude, the real moral elevation of all holy creatures. We do not see how it is possible there should be any more conformity to God, than there is knowledge of his true character. Other things being equal, the reason why one good man is more holy than another, is that he possesses more clear and comprehensive views of God. One reason why Moses, and David, and Paul, were so much more holy than the mass of good men, is that they possessed such high and extended views of God. It is necessary, therefore, to the existence of holiness in the world, and its advancement and perpetuity, and especially its strength and vividness, that there should be a clear development of the divine character, and that the great God should be exalted and glorified. It is worthy of God as the friend and patron of holiness, to select as the ultimate end of all he does, the most perfect exhibition of his own nature. This he must do, to be loved, admired, and adored to the extent and

degree in which holy beings will admire and adore his entire excellence. It is when "with *unveiled face*, they behold as in a glass, the *glory of the Lord*, that they are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." Take away from the bosom of the holy, on earth or in heaven, those strong affections which arise from their perception of the glory of the divine nature, and you abate the fervour and intenseness of their piety. You starve their graces, and well nigh transform their character. It is indispensable to the highest and best state of religious affection, that the glory of God, progressively and in all its full-orbed splendour, should shine upon the world. He made this lower world to unfold the greatness and goodness of his character, and because his greatness and goodness are and will be here so wonderfully unfolded, and the whole earth become full of his glory: it is the school of morals and piety, where the first and the last lesson is God himself, and where, by becoming acquainted with God, rational and immortal beings are trained up for perfect holiness and an eternal heaven.

This leads us to remark, that the propriety of God's making himself his ultimate end, appears more clearly from the fact, that *by the manifestation of his glory, the greatest aggregate of happiness is secured to intelligent beings.* The import of this remark will not, we think, be misunderstood. God is the first cause. All existence, all happiness, flows from him; and flows only by the exhibition of his own glory. Without some *expression* of the divine perfections, neither created happiness nor creatures would have had a being. There would have been nothing in existence besides God, and nothing besides himself to be happy. There would have been no effort of his power; no results of his wisdom; no effects from his benevolence; but his inert perfections would have been buried in the retirement of eternity, and have slept for ever in the recesses of his own infinite mind. Literally, therefore, does all created happiness depend upon the manifested excellence of the Deity. Nor is it less certain that the amount of created good is advanced by the continued and increased exhibition of the divine excellence. Had the natural and moral perfections of the Deity ceased to act, and to be illustrated immediately after the creation, or immediately after the deluge, or immediately after the death of Jesus Christ, who does not see that the aggregate of created happiness would have suffered a lamented diminution? Since no created happiness could originally have existed without some manifestation of the divine nature, so none would have continued to exist. The exhibition of the divine glory is not less essential to the increase and perpetuity, than to the original existence of created good. But it is not necessary to suppose an actual cessation in the diversified exhibitions of the Deity. Had there been a partial intermission, suspension, or limitation in the exhibition of the divine excellence, the effect, though less serious, would have been no less perceptible. In proportion to the limit imposed on the illustration,

would have been the diminution in created happiness. Had there been fewer and less impressive exhibitions of the divine power, there had been fewer and less magnificent and less exalted beings and objects created and upheld and governed by the divine hand. Had there been fewer and less impressive exhibitions of the divine wisdom, there had been, in the vast and complicated system of God's operations, an end less benevolent than that which has been selected, and means less admirably adapted to accomplish it. Had there been fewer and less impressive exhibitions of the divine mercy, it had been purchased at a cheaper rate, bestowed on fewer sinners, and those less ill-deserving, and that less freely. Had there been fewer and less impressive exhibitions of the divine justice, there had been fewer monuments of his holy displeasure against sin, and those less awful and glorious; and, consequently, a diminished confidence in God, as the moral governor of the holy and unholy. Had there been fewer and less impressive exhibitions of the divine supremacy, there had been less visible superiority and inferiority among all God's creatures, and less diversity of moral character and final allotment throughout the universe. But if the numerous and magnificent objects of creative power and directive superintendence—if the glorious end of the divine administrations, together with the wonderful adaptation of means to accomplish it—if the stupendous sacrifice made for the redemption of fallen man, the multitudes which no man can number, and those the chief of sinners, ransomed by grace unutterably rich and free—if the eternal monuments of Jehovah's displeasure against his incorrigible enemies, and the security of his government over a world of rational and accountable agents—if the wide and permanent diversity of character and condition in the present world and the world to come—if these, however fraught with evil in some of their private relations, are, on the whole, a good, and in their combination and contrast, in their wide connexions and eternal consequences, subserve the general welfare, then the conclusion is inevitable, that the manifestation of the divine glory is indispensable to the highest aggregate of created happiness. And that they are a good, will not be questioned by any who confide in the absolute perfection of the Deity. He cannot be a perfect being if the exhibition of his true character results in anything short of the highest good. We have no other idea of imperfection than that it is in its own nature bad, and that its tendency is on the whole to produce evil. But we do not thus charge God foolishly. If "God only wise" cannot err, if the attributes of his nature are in no way imperfect, then whatever evils may be incidental to their development, it cannot be otherwise than that in the final issue they should secure the greatest good.

In perfect accordance with these remarks, the experience of good men attests the fact, that the source and fulness of created good is the knowledge and enjoyment of God. There is something in the divine nature, not merely for the employment of our intellectual powers, but for the gratification of our most exalted and spiritual

affections. Whatever brings God to the view of a holy mind never fails to increase its joy. The happiest moment of the Christian's existence is when he enjoys the most enlarged and most impressive views of God, and dwells with adoring wonder on his boundless and unsearchable perfections. To enjoy this felicity was the desire of Moses when he said, "I beseech thee show me thy glory;" this was the desire of Job when he said, "Oh that I knew where I might find him:" of David when he prayed, "Lord, lift thou up the light of thy countenance upon me;" and when he says, "One thing have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, and behold the *beauty* of the Lord:" and again, when he declares, "My soul thirsteth for thee, to see thy power and *thy glory*, so as I have seen thee in the sanctuary." When you read the lives of such men as Flavel and Owen, Baxter and Edwards, Tennent and Brainerd, you cannot fail to discover that the source of their highest blessedness, their most enduring comforts, their most enraptured joys, was enlarged views of the divine character and glory. Let God be brought into view, and a holy mind will be happy; let God be withdrawn, and it will be miserable. His ineffable glory *was* once withdrawn from the holiest created mind in the universe, and the man Christ Jesus exclaimed in agony inexpressible, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Some of our readers can accord with the spirit of these remarks, and have no doubt sensibly felt that nothing could make them miserable while the glory of the divine character beamed around them.

But who, in this dark world, is fitted to appreciate the blessedness resulting from the more illustrious and transforming manifestations of the divine beauty? Eye hath not seen them, nor have they entered into the heart of man. "It may not be easy for us," says the eloquent Chalmers, "with all our imperfection, to sympathize with the rapture, the ecstasy of holy beings in their survey of the divine perfections; but it is this that is the constant and essential principle of all their enjoyment, the never-failing source of their delighted admiration." Had God withheld the manifestations of his entire excellence from angels, we do not say they would have been miserable, but we do say, they would not have been gratified. We do not say their bosoms would not have heaved with joy, but never would they have swelled with the "joy that is unspeakable and full of glory," and never would they have known that "exceeding and eternal weight of glory" which now they know. Had it pleased the Eternal to shed on them only a few broken and refracted rays of his divinity, their joys might indeed have beamed with bright effulgence, but they would have enkindled only the glimmerings of that flame, which now glows in their bosoms with unutterable fervour, and which emanates from the fulness of the Creator's glory. It is a thought very dear to us, that the glory of God and the good of the universe cannot be separated. When the glorious Being, whose name is love, acts for

his own glory he acts for the good of his creatures. His goodness cannot be gratified without promoting the highest good of the universe. Though he cannot make all his creatures happy consistently with the highest good, his own glory requires him to make them as happy as he can consistently make them. The only source of blessedness, therefore, that is commensurate with the ever-varying desires and utmost grasp of the immortal mind is found in God, and found in him from the exhibition of his excellent glory. Here are rich and endless disclosures; here is never-ceasing variety; here are glories which may be contemplated with new and ever-fresh delight, the longer and the brighter they are spread before the eye.

There is another thought which we deem of some consequence in this illustration. We may not think the Infinite One "altogether such an one as ourselves," nor would we speak of him with uncircumcised lips. "Who, by searching, can find out God? Who can find out the Almighty to perfection?" The thought we wish to be considered is this: *The perfect exhibition of the divine glory is essential to the happiness of God himself.* The Scriptures represent God as perfectly happy. They speak of him, as "God over all, blessed for ever," and as the "blessed and only Potentate." But in what does the blessedness of God consist? Does it not result from the pure and perfect benevolence of his character, which he himself sees and appreciates, and which gives infinite pleasure to his own holy mind? Would God be happy, and could he contemplate his nature with self-approbation and complacency, if he possessed a selfish and malevolent spirit? Does not his blessedness also result from the expression of his perfect benevolence in the works of creation, providence, and grace, by which he diffuses so much happiness among his creatures? Is it not thus that his benevolence is gratified, and that he makes himself happy? And does not his blessedness also result from beholding the consequences and effects of his communicative goodness, wherever they are diffused and enjoyed? With infinite delight does he behold all the fruits of his pure and perfect goodness. "The Lord shall rejoice in his works." He "rejoices over them with joy;" he "joys over them with singing;" he "rests in his love." Is it too much to say, that although God is a pure and perfect Spirit, eternal, unchangeable, infinite in his being, power, wisdom, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, that his blessedness results from the same sources which communicate happiness to the minds of all holy creatures, and differs from theirs—this is indeed a mighty difference—only as it is an independent blessedness; as it is without alloy, without interruption, without limits, and without end; or in other words, only as *he* differs from *them*. Created minds are happy in the perfect gratification of all their holy desires; and God is happy in the perfect gratification of all his desires. And since he has no desires that are unholy, all are perfectly gratified; and in this consists his perfect and immutable blessedness.

It is sometimes objected to this view of the divine blessedness, that God could not have been eternally happy. But the objection is more specious than valid. We have no doubt God was originally and eternally happy, and that his happiness always has been unmixed and uninterrupted. But why is he thus blessed? Most certainly, not independently of himself; not independently of his own desires, and of his purposes to gratify them. He was from eternity happy in the view of himself; in the view of all his purposes and creation, and all the happiness he knew would result from them, and which were present to his eternal mind, who "declares the end from the beginning, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." If God has desires to gratify, and designs to accomplish, it is no impeachment of his independence to say, he cannot be happy without gratifying them. It would be an impeachment of his independence if, in conformity with some modern notions, he *were not able* to gratify them. And this objection to their theory, the advocates of this new theology have not, so far as we know, attempted to obviate. If, as they affirm, he has desires for the salvation of men which he is not able to gratify, will they tell us why he is not miserable? Ungratified desire, disappointed purposes, whether in the mind of creatures, or the Creator, must be the source of pain; and *the more in the Creator, because his desires are perfectly holy, and infinitely ardent and strong.* Could we, without irreverence—we regret there are those who not only make the hypothesis, but insist on the fact—could we suppose the Deity to have one desire which he is unable to gratify: one purpose he cannot accomplish; to us it seems, that one ungratified desire or purpose would make him wretched. Most certainly his blessedness could not be unmixed and uninterrupted.

If there be then any force in these suggestions, who does not see that it is essential to the eternal, undisturbed gratification of all God's desires, and to the accomplishment of all his purposes, that he be infinitely and for ever glorified? It is impossible his desires should be gratified, and his purposes accomplished, without manifesting his character; without a full and combined manifestation of his essential excellence; just as impossible, as that the effect can exist without the cause. Thus to glorify himself is the consummation of his every desire and purpose. The perfect goodness of his pure and holy mind *must* be gratified; the exuberant fulness of his amiable and awful perfections *must* flow out; and if there were anything effectually to obstruct its course and oppose its progress he could not be happy.

Let us look for a moment at the consequences of a possible defeat and disappointment of some of the benevolent desires and purposes of the Deity. *What if it were* beyond his power to carry into effect the designs of his benevolent mind; what if some grand design, in the dispensations of providence, should fail of its accomplishment; what if some endeared purpose in the method of

redeeming mercy should suffer defeat; what if the gates of hell, in an evil hour, should prevail against the Church; what if many whom the Father has given to the Son should not come to him; what, as some affirm, if the hard and stony heart should prove superior to his efficient grace, and multitudes should be lost, whom God, in every view, sincerely and ardently desires to sanctify and save; what if the day of millennial mercy should never arrive, and the earth never be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters fill the sea; what if the voice of the archangel and the trump of God should fail to raise the dead, and summon the universe to his bar; what if the righteous were shut out, and the wicked received into the kingdom of Heaven; not only would every holy mind in the universe lament and wail, but God himself, no longer beholding and enjoying the joy and felicity of his people, and disappointed in the purest and sweetest desires and designs of his wisdom and love, would no longer be "God blessed for ever." Nor does it at all relieve the horror of this result, to suppose that the divine mind is indifferent to it. For, if his benevolence were so torpid as to be unmoved by such disappointment, if his desires and designs of kindness could be all erased from his mind, and he still remain unmoved and happy, if his perfections were so inactive and retired as never to be seen, and so dormant as never to be acted out, or be sensible of injury, then he would not be God.

But we have little need of hypotheses of this sort. God *is* infinitely happy, because he is, and will be infinitely glorified. Compared with the beauty and glory discoverable in the manifestation of his character, created excellence is lost sight of and forgotten; and in such beauty and glory, it is impossible but that the infinite mind should take supreme delight. He is happy because he is glorified, and he must be glorified to be happy. We venture no rash expression, we say nothing dishonourable, but what is most honourable to God, when we affirm, he would be the most wretched being in the universe, were he not glorified.

Thus would he vindicate the conduct of God in making himself his ultimate end. And let us ask, in view of this exposition, what ultimate end can be compared with this? What higher consideration, what weightier inducement, what more benevolent impulse could move the eternal mind than this? We say, *benevolent* impulse; because there is no selfishness here. Selfishness regards its own, simply because it is its own, and not because it is supremely worthy of regard. It were a novel kind of selfishness that is gratified only in doing good; and this is all the selfishness discoverable in the ultimate end of Deity. It is true, that in all his vast operations, he makes himself first, himself midst, himself everything; and the reason he does it is, that it is so unspeakably important, as we have seen, that he should be *all in all*. There is no end he could propose so benevolent as this. It is an end, which, from its very nature, cannot be accomplished without comprising

a greater amount of good, than could be secured in any other way. There is no supreme end worthy of God but this. It has been a needless indifference to the best interests of his great empire, to have aimed ultimately at anything below himself. Never does the eternal God appear so excellent, so worthy of supreme love, confidence, and homage, as when the grand object of his pursuit is seen to rise far above all the minor interests of his creation, and he himself is beheld "decked with light, as with a garment," and creating, upholding, and governing all things for his own glory.

There are several practical thoughts which we are loath to forego, though we have already greatly trespassed on the patience of our readers.

To us it appears, that the prominent truth contained in the preceding remarks, is one which ought to be frequently and faithfully exhibited. There is no principle of greater importance, either in a theoretical or practical view, than that God himself is the ultimate end of everything he does. There is no truth with which we ought to be more familiar than this, and none which is capable of being more usefully employed, either in the confirmation and illustration of truth, the confutation of error, or the presentation of the most constraining inducements to elevated and consistent piety. No man can understand the doctrines of the Gospel, or discover their beauty and consistency, who does not see them in their relation to this important and fundamental truth; and no man can be led away by the subtilties of error who does. Establish this principle, and you give a mortal wound to every heresy that has distracted the Church and the world; relinquish this, and it is of little moment to which of all the variety of errors you give the preference. Once consent to come down from the lofty elevation that God is above all creatures. and that all things were made by him and for him, and no matter how low you fall. This truth is like a "moral perspective glass," it brings distant objects near, and presents, in their true and real position, objects that are inverted. It presents also a telescopic vision of the works and ways of God, by which everything that he does is magnified, and in which he is seen forming his purposes and laying out his plans upon a scale of magnitude and grandeur, that overwhelms the human understanding. If he made all things for himself, then it became him to project and achieve a multitude of designs, the rectitude and magnificence of which, without this ultimate end, would not, and could not have been seen by mortal eyes. It became him to form all his purposes from eternity, and with the sublime view of demonstrating his own excellence and glory. It became him to give existence to a world of moral agents, and to extend his government over them through interminable ages. "It became him by whom are all things and for whom are all things," to make the captain of our salvation perfect through sufferings, and to devise a method of mercy, which, though to the Jew a stumbling-block, and to the Greek foolishness, is the wisdom and power of God to salvation.

It became him to reveal the operations of a mighty and invisible agent in the moral renovation of his people, and thus to produce impressions of the Deity upon their minds, which shall prostrate them in everlasting humiliation before his throne. And it becomes him, in his progressive administrations, to give no account of any of his matters; but to magnify his own august dominion, and make all intelligences understand, that he legislates, not for a province, but for the universe; and that he plans and governs, not for a day, but for an infinite lapse of ages. Nothing so allures a holy mind to adoring and humble piety, as the thought that God made all things for himself, and is governing all according to the counsel of his own will. "I know," saith the inspired preacher, "that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it; and God doeth it that men should fear before him." In a word, establish this principle, and you shed lustre over all the works of God; you have a clue to every labyrinth in providence, and a solution of every mystery in grace; you have the keystone of the arch, sprung by unseen hands, when they laid the beams of his chambers in the mighty waters, and stretched out the line upon the foundations of the earth.

Again: If the suggestions we have made are true, supreme selfishness constitutes neither the religion of the Gospel, nor the religion of heaven. It is very possible, that in all our religious affections, and in all our religious conduct, in all we do for God and our fellow men, we may have a supreme regard to ourselves. Not a few moral philosophers and grave divines have advocated the sentiment, that all religion consists in a well directed selfishness. But if God himself is the ultimate end of all things, this is not the religion of the Gospel, nor of heaven. It matters not how *wisely*, nor with how much *discretion* a man undertakes to exalt himself, so long as his supreme object is not to please and glorify God. It is impossible for him, from a supreme regard to himself, to love and honour God more than himself. Everything he does may be in itself lawful, it may be religious and devout, it may be very discreet and wise policy; but if self be his grand, his ruling object, his spirit will be found to differ essentially from the spirit of angels, and of the just made perfect. The mind illumined by the Spirit of God, sees things as they are, and appreciates them according to their intrinsic worth. It ceases, in some good degree, to regard those that are of no comparative moment, and has learned to estimate those that are of real and permanent importance. And since there is nothing of so much importance as that God should be glorified, the real Christian desires nothing so much as this. God has the first and highest place in his heart. And since he loves every attribute of the divine character, so he desires to behold it in its native beauty. Every new manifestation of the Deity raises the Creator in his esteem, sheds lustre around all that God is, and all that he does, and often fills his heart with joy unspeakable and full of glory. The people of God may be

frequently under the cloud; but let God appear, and the cloud vanishes away; let God be exalted, and they are happy. This is not selfishness. This is the religion of heaven. The religion which springs from selfishness never truly terminates on God. The religion of the Gospel and of heaven neither springs from self, nor terminates in self, but springs from God, and terminates in God. And the man who has the most of this spirit is the most godly man. There are those who see and rejoice that God will be glorified; and there are those that see he will be glorified, and rebel and mourn. And wide, very wide, is the difference between them! No sinful affections will amalgamate with the glory of God. No love, no faith, no submission, no hope, no joy, that has not a stronger affinity to the divine glory, than to any other and all other objects, will stand the test of that day that is to "try every man's work of what sort it is."

Again: If the leading sentiment defended in these pages be true, most certain is it that all holy beings will be happy for ever. There is no need of separating the glory of God and the eternal happiness of his people. We will not say that they are identified; for one is the effect, and the other the cause. The eternal, unchangeable Jehovah has indissolubly bound the highest and eternal blessedness of all holy beings to the manifestation of his own glory. He cannot be glorified without making those who love him happy; and those who love him cannot be happy, unless he is glorified. If you would make a good man miserable; if you would torture the spirits of the just made perfect with agony, go, tell it in heaven, that God will not be glorified. But if God is glorified, they are safe, they are happy. Nothing can disturb their serenity, nothing diminish their rapture. So long as their highest love terminates on God, and their largest desires on his glory, they shall be gratified to the full. They shall behold his glory, even the glory which the Son had with the Father, before the world was. They shall be filled with all the fulness of God.

And be it also remarked, that with equal certainty will the full manifestation of the divine glory be for ever inseparable from the perdition of all the ungodly. If God is exalted, the wicked must die. It is a most fearful truth, that God cannot be glorified without the perdition of the ungodly; and it is a truth which may well carry death to the hopes of every incorrigible sinner. If there are those who will sin, and sin incorrigibly, let them know that God is able to glorify himself by it all. Their rebellion shall never disturb God. It shall not disturb one peaceful emotion throughout his holy and happy kingdom. Though they "mean not so, neither in their hearts do they think so;" their incorrigible wrath "shall praise the Lord, and the remainder thereof he will restrain." The "expectation of the wicked shall perish," and their "triumphing shall be short." They shall sink for ever under their disappointment and shame. They will eternally rebel and mourn, because they cannot maintain a successful controversy with God. And it will

shame them, and it will fill them with despair and rage, that there is One above them who will turn all their iniquity into the means of his own and his people's advancement. This is the *Hell* to which the haters of God and the despisers of his Son are destined. And nothing can deliver them from it but the divine dishonour. No, nothing can exalt them, but what would humble God; nothing lift them up but what would cast him down; nothing save them, but what would ruin him. Oh! "it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God!" It will be a direful allotment to stand in the place of that man, on whom the great God undertakes to *glorify his justice.*

But we turn from this painful subject. Have we not, in view of the preceding illustration, the fullest assurance of the fact, that God will be abundantly and for ever exalted? "He is of one mind, and none can turn him; and what his soul desireth, that he doeth." The Infinite One must cease to be wise, good, and omnipotent, ere he abandons the paramount purpose to glorify himself. His own great mind alone is capable of appreciating the worth and importance of this mighty object. None but himself is capable of fully conceiving it. But his discerning eye has been fixed upon it from the beginning, and will be fixed upon it to the consummation of all things. Here all his ardent and powerful affections concentrate. The strength, the fervour, the zeal of his combined attributes are engaged, and publicly pledged to propel the magnificent and glorious design.

"God hath made all things for himself." And when we say this we utter a grand and awful truth. Whatever of majesty there is in the divine power; whatever of extent and resource in the divine wisdom; whatever of munificence in the divine goodness; whatever of liberality and tenderness in the divine mercy; whatever of terror and dismay in the divine justice; whatever of royalty and splendour in the divine supremacy, shall all be progressively disclosed. Every dark dispensation shall, by and by, be covered with light, and every intricate providence have a satisfactory solution. Everything shall be laid open. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain made low. The wonderful revolutions in the material, animal, and intellectual kingdoms, the various and unexpected developments of the human character, the successive periods of time, and the revolving ages of eternity, shall all be fraught with deep and impressive illustrations of the Deity.

"God hath made all things for himself." Creation shall yet more and more unfold its wonders, disclosing the hand of Deity. Providence shall yet more and more bring to light his universal agency and care, while under his omnipotent influence its mighty machinery, like the wheel of Ezekiel, shall move still more high and dreadful to the last. And the great redemption shall yet more and more spread far and wide its glories. The Father shall be exalted. Every knee shall bow before the Son, and every tongue confess to him. And the Eternal Spirit, so long retired from this

apostate world, shall be seen and honoured, and by his own mighty influence on the soul, make impressions of the Deity hitherto unknown. Ages so long pregnant with preparations for the Son of Man, shall bring forth their unexpected blessings. The benevolent exertions now making in the earth, shall be succeeded by those greater and more extended, and these by greater, till "a little one shall become a thousand, and a small one a strong nation—till the Spirit be poured from on high, and the wilderness become a fruitful field" —till these clouds of mercy, the glory of the age in which we dwell and the hope of ages to come, shall issue in one extended and long continued effusion of the Holy Spirit—till the earth shall become a temple, and time a Sabbath, and these humble notes, so indistinctly heard from here and there, a voice scattered over this wide creation, shall receive the accession of ten thousand tongues, and burst forth in one harmonious Alleluja to Him who is seated on the throne, and to the Lamb, for ever and ever.

ESSAY III.

SYSTEMS OF THEOLOGY.

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A SYSTEM of theology is a methodical disposition of scriptural doctrines, with due connexion and arrangement, so far as they are susceptible of a scientific form. Such a work may contain either a simple enunciation of truths under appropriate topics, or the body of proof by which these are sustained. But within the latitude of our definition are comprised, not only the volumes of professed theologians, but even confessions, catechisms, and other symbolical books of churches.

The origin of systems is to be sought in the laws of the human mind. The Scriptures present us with divine truth, not in logical or scientific order, but dispersed irregularly under the various forms of history, precepts, promises, threatenings, exhortations, and prophecies. It is scarcely left to the option of the reader whether he will classify these truths in his own mind; for this classification begins and is pursued, spontaneously, with regard to all departments of human knowledge. Every man, whose reasoning faculty rises above that of the idiot, is conscious of an attempt to refer each successive acquisition of knowledge to its proper place in the general fund of his recollections, and to connect it with its like among that which is already known.

It is very evident that the order of truths as they are presented in the Scripture, is not intended to be the only order in which they shall be entertained in the mind. If this were the case, all meditation would be useless, since this exercise does not reveal new doctrines, but, by giving rise to comparison of those already known, in various connexions, discovers the relations and dependencies of all. The illustration of Lord Bacon is well known: the water of life as contained in the fountain of the Scriptures is thence drawn and set before us, very much in the same manner as natural water is taken from wells. For when the latter is drawn, it is either first received into a reservoir, whence, by divers pipes

it may conveniently be conducted abroad for general use; or it is at once poured into vessels for immediate service. The former methodical way, adds this philosopher, gives origin to systems of theology, by which scriptural doctrine is collected in scientific form, and thence distributed, by the conduits of axioms and propositions, to every part.*

No primitive Christian could have answered the question, *What is Christianity?* without proceeding to systematize its truths in a greater or less degree; and every reader of the holy Scriptures undesignedly pursues the same method. For instance, the various attributes of God are revealed in Scripture, not in theological order, nor consecutively, but in various places, by means of scattered examples, sometimes figuratively, sometimes by implication, and never all at once. Now it is manifestly desirable that every man should have a connected idea of the perfections of Jehovah; and the reader of the Bible will necessarily lay together the various representations, and thus conclude that God is spiritual, eternal, infinite, immutable, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, most true, most holy, most wise, and most good. This aggregation of truths is, in fact, a system, and it is precisely thus that systematic theology has its origin. No man can converse with a Scottish mechanic, who happens to be a good textuary, without discerning that he has his heads and topics to which he refers all his scriptural knowledge, and that the doctrines which he believes are reduced to a classification more or less exact. Indeed, each of us may bring the matter to a speedy test by looking within and inquiring whether such an arrangement of our religious tenets is not constantly going forward, with the gradual increase of our settled opinions. This will be clear or obscure, logical or confused, according to the correctness and extent of our knowledge, and the sagacity and vigour of our intellect. It may be vitiated by the addition of that which is extraneous, or by false expositions of Scripture; but such a syllabus of divine truth is possessed, in memory if not in writing, by every Christian, whether wise or simple.

The association of ideas affords a natural ground for classification; though by no means the sole ground. Mere similarity of particulars may serve as a basis for technical arrangement, as in the Linnæan system of botany, but this is scarcely a philosophical method. The more any department of knowledge partakes of the character of a pure science, the greater is its susceptibility of being systematized; and this is eminently the character of divine truth. There was a time, indeed, when the question was mooted, whether theology is a science, but that time has gone by, and with it should have vanished the occasion of the present argument.

There is danger, however, that we shall be charged with disrespect to the understanding of our readers, in offering serious proof

* De Augm. Scient., lib. ix., c. i., § 3.

of a position so tenable, and which, but for party zeal, would never have been controverted. For what are all theological discussions but so many systems? Every didactic sermon is a systematized chapter of the great book of revelation. Every essay or discourse upon any scriptural truth is an attempt to arrange, under certain topics and with conclusive arguments, the scattered testimony of inspiration in favour of that truth. The only effect of banishing professed systems would therefore be, to repress all endeavours to present the subject as a harmonious whole, and to leave us in possession of schemes characterized by undigested crudity.

The logical and systematic arrangement of a science has various important uses. It affords aid to the memory; since a thousand insulated and disjointed truths can scarcely be kept in remembrance, while, in their regular connexion and mutual dependency, they may be tenaciously retained, and clearly communicated. The knowledge of a subject may be said to be adequate, only when it is thus known. The heterogeneous mass is clarified and reduced to order, by being ranged under topics according to the inherent differences of the several species, and set off into departments, with reference to the distinction of elementary, secondary, and inferential positions. Thus in the study of natural history, although the classification of the received systems is in a measure arbitrary (that is, independent of the philosophical connexion of cause and effect), those things which are homogeneous are placed together, and the mind is enabled to comprehend what would otherwise be "a mighty maze, and all without a plan." In the progress of study, as knowledge is augmented, it is highly advantageous to have a predisposed scheme, to some niche of which every new acquisition may immediately be referred, as to its proper place in the system. This is true, even when the scheme is framed in a merely technical and arbitrary manner. Such was the classification of minerals, as practised before the late discoveries in crystallography; and such the science of chemistry continues to be in many of its departments. But the advantage is immensely greater, when, as is true of theology, the subject admits of a natural, exact, and philosophical disposition. It is only under such a form of arrangement that we can be in the highest degree made sensible of the admirable and divine harmony of all religious truth, which necessarily escapes us in the examination of detached and dissociated fragments. The system, however brief or imperfect, affords a convenient test of propositions which might otherwise pass unsuspected, and a guide in applying the analogy of faith to interpretation.

But it is as affording a special facility for communicating instruction to others, that we wish to be considered as recommending the systematic arrangement of theology. The history of catechetical instruction, in every age, furnishes a commentary upon this remark. In applying ourselves to the study of any science, we have our choice between two discrepant methods. By the one, we

make a commencement, indifferently, with any separate fact or proposition, without reference to its place in the general scheme; and travelling onward from this point, through the whole, we attempt to acquire the knowledge of all the parts; traversing in succession departments the most remote and unconnected. As if, for example, one should attempt to acquire the science of astronomy by commencing with observations on the ring of Saturn, thence passing to the milky way, or the moon's libration, and then assailing the obliquity of the ecliptic. By the other method, we commence with simple, acknowledged, and fundamental principles, proceed to the demonstration of elementary propositions, and thence by regular deduction to the ramifications of the subject. The latter is the systematic method, and cause is yet to be shown why it should not hold good in theology, as well as in other sciences. The history of the Church shows us that from the earliest ages it has been deemed advisable to abstract the truths of revelation in a systematic form, for the convenience of instructers and pupils, for the aid of memory, and for the purpose of displaying the completeness and coherence of the entire plan of scriptural knowledge. In certain periods, it is true, flagrant abuses have been connected with these methods, especially during the reign of the Peripatetic philosophy: yet there has been an entire unity of opinion as to the general expediency of the plan. It may not be inappropriate here to advert to some of the predominant schools of systematic theology.

Omitting any particular notice of the patristical systems, we shall name a few of those writers who contributed to the mass of doctrinal theology before the Reformation. There are those who trace the origin of the scholastic divinity to as high an epoch as the monophysitic controversy in the fifth and sixth centuries; yet it is more usual to consider John Scotus Erigena, a theologian of the ninth century, as the founder of this method. It was, however, the Platonic philosophy by which he endeavoured to elucidate divine truth. He signalized himself as an antagonist of the Predestinarians, in the court of Charles the Bold. The Schoolmen, or Scholastics, are supposed to have been so called from their training in the theological schools of Charlemagne. This training was little else than regular instruction in the Latin version of Aristotle, the writings of Boethius and Porphyry, and the Peripapetic dialectics. Three periods are noted by Buhle: the first ends with Roscellinus (A. D. 1089), or the contest between the Realists and Nominalists; the second with Albertus Magnus (ob. 1280), at which time the metaphysics of Aristotle were generally known and expounded; the third extends to the revival of letters in the fifteenth century.* The renowned Englishman, Alexander de Hales, holds an eminent rank among the ancient

* Brockhaus Real-Worterb., vol. ix., p. 835. Buddei Isagoge, p. 326. Hornii Hist. Phil., l. vi. cii. p. 297.

scholastics, as is commonly cited as *Doctor Irrefragabilis:* until the time of Aquinas, his commentary on Lombard was a universal text-book. Thomas Aquinas, *Doctor Angelicus*, and a saint of the calendar, was the pupil of Albertus Magnus, and so close an adherent of Aristotle, that he left fifty-two commentaries upon the works of the latter. It is unnecessary to advert to the estimation in which he has ever been held by the Romanists; although it has been satisfactorily shown by Protestants that this truly great man diverged in a multitude of instances from the doctrines of the Catholic faith as they are now defined.* Next in eminence was his great competitor, John Duns Scotus, whose dialectic acumen was proverbial, and who is denominated *Doctor Subtilis.* From this rivalry of sects arose the familiar distinctions of Thomists and Scotists. During the third period flourished the celebrated Durand, called on account of his independent boldness, *Doctor Resolutissimus.* This remarkable man was bishop of Meaux, and died about the year 1333. He went out from the ranks of the Thomists, and without going over to the opposite sect became the founder of a new school. He is supposed by Staeudlin to have contributed greatly to the downfall of the scholastic system. To these may be added Occam, an English Franciscan, who opposed the papacy and encouraged a more liberal method in theology; and Bradwardin, who openly attacked the scholastic system, and maintained that the genuine or Augustinian doctrines had been exchanged for mere Pelagianism. His work, *de Causa Dei contra Pelagium*, contains much that savours of a purer theology.

This was the dawn of a brighter day for religious investigation. In looking back from this point upon all the dialectic school, we are struck with the darkness which overspread the field of theology in consequence of the multitude of sects, the introduction of foreign principles and speculations, the contempt thrown upon sound exegesis, the almost divine honours paid to philosophers and doctors, and the barbarous roughness with which every subject was handled. The bounds of human reason were overleaped, and a recondite sophistry usurped the place of candid argument. It is not, therefore, in this period that we are to seek for anything like purity in theological systems.

The Reformation gave birth to a new school of dogmatic theology. Luther, indeed, though celebrated as a logician, left no work strictly pertaining to this class; but in the *Loci Communes* of Melancthon, we have a model which might do honour to the brightest age of scriptural investigation. It is pleasing to observe with what deference this good man was regarded by his bolder coadjutors. The first edition of this earliest system reformed theology appeared at Wittemberg, A. D. 1521.† Luther characterized the work, as "invictum libellum, et non solum immortalitate, sed

* Dorschaeus. Aquinas Confessor Veritatis. † Buddeus, p. 346.

quoque canone dignum."* In the Reformed Church, we need not remind the reader of the compendious works of Zwingle and the Institutes of Calvin. The latter work has passed through innumerable editions, and has appeared in the Latin, French, Spanish, English, German, Dutch, Hungarian and Greek languages. In the Lutheran Church might be mentioned the leading names of Calixtus, Chemnitz, Striegel, Gerhard, Horneius, Henichius, Hulsemann, Calvius, and Koenig; in the Reformed Church, Beza, Bullinger, Musculus, Aretius, Heidegger, Turretine and Pictet. It would be unjust to the memory of the divines of Holland, who more than all others cultivated this field, to omit the names of Rivet, Maresius, Hoornbeeck, and the Spanheims, all of whom followed the philosophical school of Voet; and Burmann, Heidan, Wittichius, Braunius, Witsius, Leydecker and Hulsius, who pursued the system of the covenants, as marked out by Cocceius.

But time would fail us in following down the stream of systematic writers. This was the age of systems, and a lifetime would scarcely suffice to study those which it produced. Most of these last mentioned were free, to a remarkable degree, from the technical distinctions of the schools, and may be used with profit. It is at least desirable that every theologian should be acquainted with the history of religious opinion. We have fallen upon days in which works of this nature are little prized, and in which essays, pamphlets, and periodicals, are almost the only vehicles of theological discussion. Of this it is needless to complain, yet it is mortifying that so much unmerited contempt should be cast upon the learned labours of other days. There are few eminent scholars, it is true, who join in this cant; yet scarcely a week passes in which our attention is not drawn to some ignorant and captious disparagement of all productions of this kind. There are persons who never deign to mention systematic theology without a sneer, and whose purposes seem to demand that they should represent all books in this department as assuming a rivalship with the sacred Scriptures. We disavow the wish to attribute these sentiments and objections to any particular school, or to connect them with any doctrinal opinions held by our brethren; except so far as this, that they are usually avowed by those who contend for greater latitude in speculation, and who protest against any interference with their innovating projects. No very distinguished writer has presented himself as their advocate, and they are usually heard to proceed from youthful and hasty declaimers, yet the arguments even of these demand a refutation when they spread their contagion among the inexperienced; and we would gladly contribute towards a disentanglement of the question.

It would be an unwarrantable hardihood to deny that, among the volumes of past ages, there are systems which lie open to valid objections; but the faults of some are not to be attributed to the

* Luth. Op., ii., 241, Wittemb.

whole class. Thus, for instance, it is common to charge the whole of the continental theologians with the scholastic subtleties of the middle age. The systems of the schoolmen are, indeed, notoriously chargeable with dialectic refinements, and it is not strange that some of the same leaven should betray itself in the writings of the early reformers, just emerging as they were from the dreary night of barbarism. The objection lies against most of the Romish systems. Revelation is here confounded with philosophy; the Scriptures are perverted into accordance with traditions and the schools; and the questions which perpetually arise are, in a majority of instances, frivolous and ridiculous, or knotty and ostentatious. Such, however, are not the faults of our received works, and the only trait which they have in common with the former, is that they profess to communicate the doctrines of the faith, in regular connexion, with scientific order and method, and sometimes with the technical language of the then predominant philosophy. The terminology of the reformers and their immediate successors is a dialect of which no literary antiquary will consent to remain ignorant; it is a source of alarm to students who consult their ease, and even grave divines among us have been sadly disconcerted with the *materialiter*, *formaliter*, &c., of the seventeenth century. Yet the history of theological opinion can never be learned, in its sources, without some knowledge of this peculiar phraseology.

The plan or schedule according to which a system is arranged may be artificial, unnatural, arbitrary, or otherwise inconvenient. It is not every mind which can be satisfied with the method pursued by so many eminent divines, especially in Holland, in arranging the whole circle of truth with reference to the covenants. Others are as much displeased with a historical or chronological plan which has been attempted. Or the whole work may labour under a fault of an opposite character, namely, the want of method, and under the title of a system may be an unsystematized farrago. Yet in all such cases, though the objection is granted to be valid, yet the excellence of systems, as such, is no whit disparaged by the failure of special attempts; and indeed it is not upon these grounds that the exception is usually taken.

Again, the system may be objectionable, as being incautiously and hastily framed, upon insufficient testimony of the Scriptures. Every methodized body of theological doctrine may be considered as a general theory of the whole sphere of divine truth. As such, it should be deduced directly from the Scriptures, after a most careful survey and impartial comparison of all its doctrines. The work of the theologian here resembles that of the philosopher who reasons from natural phenomena. There is, indeed, this important difference, that the philosopher is mainly employed in observing the sequence of cause and effect, and in assigning all the changes in natural objects to their true causes, and to as few causes as possible; thus by induction arriving at general laws—whereas

the theologian is called to arrange isolated truths, already revealed in the form of propositions, and by reducing these to order, to discover the plan and harmony of religious science. In both cases, however, there is the same process to be observed; facts or propositions must be ascertained, generalized, placed in the same category with analogous truths, and reserved until new light enables us to refer them to more comprehensive laws or principles. Now, if in physical science it is so highly important that caution should be used in this process, so as to avoid leaping to a conclusion without a sufficient induction, how great should be the patience, self-distrust, and hesitancy of one who undertakes to pronounce upon the great mysteries of revelation. "The liberty of speculation which we possess in the domains of theory is not like that of the slave broke loose from his fetters, but rather like that of the freeman who has learned the lessons of self-restraint in the school of just subordination."* This is the dictate of sound philosophy in every investigation; it teaches us not to reject system, but to systematize wisely. It is the neglect of this rule which has given occasion to the scores of heresies with which the Church has been rent. Doctrines taken up from the superficial and apparent meaning of a few texts, have been made the foundation of theories which have possessed scarcely a trait of genuine Christianity. Yet even when a system is absolutely false, the objection prostrates only that particular scheme which is proved to be erroneous. And the question still remains open, how far systematic arrangement is conducive to the progress of sound theology.

The favourite argument of many is this: The Scriptures do not admit of being systematized. This cannot be more impressively stated than in the words of Cecil: "The Bible scorns to be treated scientifically. After all your accurate statements, it will leave you aground. The Bible does not come round and ask your opinion of its contents. It proposes to us a Constitution of Grace, which we are to receive, though we do not wholly comprehend it."† In this argument the premises are stated with sufficient clearness, but we confess ourselves unable to make the necessary deduction of the conclusion. This was the position of the Anabaptists and the Quakers.‡ It may mean either that divine truth is in its own nature insusceptible of a regular scientific arrangement, or that it is impracticable for human minds so to arrange it. We contend that so long as it is granted that the propositions contained in Scripture are so many truths, that these are harmonious and accordant, and that some flow by necessary inference from others, it follows that the doctrines of revelation may be topically arranged, exhibited, and discussed. Some religious truths do, indeed, surpass our reason, but it is a mere sophism to argue that they are therefore thrown beyond the limits of any conceivable system; for this very cha-

* Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, § 201. † Remains, p. 118.
‡ Barclay's Apology, Orig. Thes. x., § 21. Van Mastricht., lib. 1, c. i., § 6.

racteristic may designate their place among ultimate propositions. If it is asserted that the imbecility of human minds is such that they cannot arrange and classify the whole of divine truths, inasmuch as these are absolutely intractable, and refuse to arrange themselves under any of our general topics,—we reply that this would put an end to physical philosophy itself, for the same remark holds good in nature. There are exempt cases, extreme phenomena, which are as yet explicable by no laws of science, and which must remain beyond the range of all systems as elementary facts. Such are the attraction of gravitation and the principle of animated life. Still, there are a thousand truths which continue to be free from these difficulties, and which may be methodized with profit.

If it should be urged that the simple method in which God has been pleased to arrange truth in the Bible is the only proper method, and that this beautiful simplicity is vitiated by the artifice of systems, we reverently acknowledge that the order of divine revelation in the Scripture is the best conceivable for the immediate end proposed. Yet the nature of truth is not altered by a change in the arrangement of propositions; nor is its simplicity taken away by scientific disposition. Moreover, the argument destroys itself by proving too much. For, by parity of reason, all discourses and essays on theology, all sermons and exhortations of a religious kind, must equally violate this divinely prescribed order, since they cull and dispose the passages of Scripture, not in the method observed in the sacred volume, but with reference to some truth or truths attempted to be established. No one can fail to perceive the frivolity of an argument which would restrict all theology to the regular consecution of chapters and verses in the Bible.

It has been alleged, that the use of systems has had a tendency to restrict the belief of the theologian within certain prescribed limits, and thus to arm the mind against conviction from passages which, to an unsophisticated reader, would be clear and decisive; and that what is called the Analogy of Faith is a barrier against independent investigation. The application of any such analogy to the exposition of Scripture has been strenuously opposed in modern times. That the principle may be abused, is too evident to admit of denial. Yet, unless the interpreter pursues the course of neological commentators, utterly careless whether the sacred penmen contradicted themselves or not,—this rule, or something tantamount, must be applied. It is the dictate of reason that—a revelation from God being admitted—all real contradictions are impossible. Hence, when a class of truths is satisfactorily deduced, all those which do not quadrate with these, in their obvious meaning, must be interpreted with such latitude as may bring them into unison with the whole. In all interpretation of works, sacred and profane, single passages must be understood in accordance with the general tenor of the discourse. Indeed, so plainly is this a principle of hermeneutics, that we should never have heard the objec-

tion, if certain unwelcome doctrinal positions had not been involved. There are truths which lie upon the very surface of the Scriptures, and are repeated in almost every page: these taken together give origin to the analogy or *canon* of faith. The force of reasoning from such an analogy must vary with the extent of the reader's scriptural knowledge, and the strength of his convictions. Every man, however, whether imbued or not with human systems, reasons in this manner. It is by the analogy of faith that we pronounce the literal interpretation untenable in all those cases which represent God as the author of moral evil, or which attribute to him human members and passions. So long, therefore, as God "cannot deny himself," we must resort to this very principle.

The simple inquiry appears then to be, whether the use of a judicious system opens the door for the abuse of the analogy of faith. It is contended that it necessarily does so by expanding this analogy so far as to make the whole of a certain theological system a canon of faith, which nothing is suffered to contravene. There are slavish minds in which this effect will doubtless be produced; but the result in such cases would be the same if, instead of a written system, the learner availed himself of the oral effusions of some idolized errorist. And in this whole controversy, let it be observed, the choice is at last between the dead and the living, between the tried systems of the ancients and the ill-compacted schemes of contemporaries. We forget the place which has been assigned to the theological system when we hold it responsible for excesses of this kind. It is by no means a rule of faith, else were it needless to refer to the Bible. It may be compared to the map of a country over which a geographer travels, and which affords convenient direction, while at the same time the traveller does not hold it to be perfect, but proceeds to amend it by actual survey. Without it he might lose his way, yet he is unwilling to give implicit faith to its representations.

There are many problems in analytic mathematics in which the unknown quantity is to be sought by successive approximations. In these cases it is necessary to assume some result as true, and to correct it by comparison with the data. Not unlike this is the process by which we arrive at certain conclusions in the other sciences, and in theology among the rest. If in the course of our investigation we are met by scriptural statements which positively contradict any position of the system which is assumed as approximating to the truth, the consequence will be a doubt, or an abandonment of the system itself. Precisely in this way every independent thinker knows that he has been affected by the difficulties of Scripture. The case would not be rendered more favourable if he had in his hand no system. As it is manifestly impossible for any one to come to the study of the Word of God without entertaining some general scheme of divine truth as substantially correct, we can see no reason why the student should not avail him-

self of that which he esteems true in its great outline. It will be no bar to just inquiry that he is hereby prevented from hastily catching at specious error, by perceiving that it varies from his guide. Life is too short for every man to be left to the hazard of running through the whole cycle of errors and heresies before he arrives at the truth; and this is prevented only by presenting to the learner some beacon against seductive falsehoods. He may, as many have done, conclude, upon due inquiry, that his own impressions are right, and his system wrong.

We have compared the theological system to the hypothesis by which the natural philosopher directs his inquiries. The comparison is good for the present instance. The system, like the hypothesis, is not unalterable. It is to be studiously scrutinized, and even suspected; adopted if verified, and rejected if proved to be false. There is a well-known process by which natural philosophers arrive at the primary physical laws, viz. "by *assuming* indeed the laws we would discover, but so generally expressed, that they shall include an unlimited variety of particular laws; following out the consequences of this assumption, by the application of such general principles as the case admits; comparing them in succession with all the particular cases within our knowledge; and lastly, *on this comparison*, so modifying and restricting the general enunciation of our laws as to *make the results agree*."* Analogous to this is the process according to which, by the hypothetical assumption of a given system, we proceed to determine upon its truth.

But we are here arrested by an objection urged against this whole method of proceeding, which comes in a specious shape, and with the air of sincerity, and therefore demands a serious examination. We are addressed in some such terms as these: "The whole method of investigating theological truth by the advocates of systems is erroneous, because it is diametrically opposed to the principles of the inductive philosophy. Instead of framing a system *à priori*, and making it a bed of Procrustes, to which every declaration of the Bible is to be forcibly adapted, the only safe method is to reject all the hypotheses of divines, to come to the examination divested of all preconceived opinions, to consider the scattered revelations of Scripture as so many *phenomena*, and to classify, generalize, and deduce from these phenomena; just as the astronomer or the botanist uses *physical data* in framing a sound hypothesis. The study of theology should be exegetical, and the obsolete classifications of past ages should be entirely laid aside." We have endeavoured to state the objection fairly and strongly, and we shall now inquire how far it operates against the positions which we have taken. The objection assumes an analogy between theological investigation of revealed truth and physical inquiry into the system of the universe. This analogy we have already

* Herschell's Discourse, § 210.

noticed, and in reply to so much of the objection as concerns the original investigation of divine truth, we grant that nothing can be more unphilosophical or untheological than to receive any system as true, previously to examination, however it may have been supported by consent of antiquity or wideness of diffusion. This were to forsake the great principles of the Reformation, and revert to the implicit faith of the apostate Church. We ask no concession of private judgment on the part of the learner; we acknowledge that the final appeal is, in every instance, to the Scriptures themselves. We go further in meeting those who differ from us, and accept their illustration. Let the Scriptures be considered as analogous to the visible universe; and its several propositions as holding the same place with regard to the interpreter, which the phenomena of the heavens do with regard to the astronomer. Let it be agreed that the method of arriving at truth is in both instances the same, that is, by careful examination of these data, from which result generalization, cautious induction, and the position of ultimate principles. Let it be further conceded that exegesis answers to experiment or observation in the natural world, and consequently that the theologian is to consider exegetical results as the basis of all his reasonings. In all this there is not so wide a separation between us as might at first appear. We avow our belief that the theologian should proceed in his investigation precisely as the chemist or the botanist proceeds. "The botanist does not shape his facts," says a late ingenious writer. Granted, provided that you mean that the botanist does not *wrest* his facts to a forced correspondence with a hypothesis. Neither does the genuine theologian "shape his texts" nor *constrain* them to an agreement with his system. But both the botanist and the theologian do in this sense "shape their facts," that they classify and arrange the fruits of their observation, and gather from them new proofs of that general system which has previously commended itself to their faith.

There is an entire agreement between the contending parties, as to the independent principles upon which original investigation for the discovery of truth is to be conducted in every science. It is the method which bears the name of Bacon, though practised to a limited extent, by the wise of every age. It is the method of Newton, which in his case resulted in the most splendid series of demonstration which the world has ever known. Up to this point we agree, yet we have left the main question still untouched—whether in pursuing this method it is absolutely necessary to reject all the results of precedent labours. It is not merely concerning the way in which original investigation should be pursued, but also the way in which the results of such investigation are to be communicated. The former would be the inquiry how to make a system—how to deduce it from its original disjected elements; the latter is the inquiry how the general truths thus deduced may be made available to the benefit of the learner. Systems of theo-

logy are in their nature synthetical. They are the results of the toilsome analysis of great minds, and they are to be put to the test by a comparison of all the separate truths, of which they purport to be a scientific arrangement. That they are convenient helps, in the transmission of such results as have been attained by the wisdom and diligence of our predecessors—results which else would have perished with their discoverers—is made evident by reference to the very analogy above stated. In every science, it is by such synthetical arrangements that the observations and inductions of philosophers are embodied, in order to facilitate the advance of those who follow. Thus, for instance, when the Abbé Haüy, by a tedious and laborious induction of particulars, had traced up the apparently amorphous crystals of the mineral kingdom to certain clear and primitive figures, he reduced the whole of his discoveries to the form of a *system*, so that future crystallographers might with less toil follow out his inquiries, and with immense advantage take up the subject where he left it.

But lest we should be suspected of the slightest misrepresentation or evasion of the argument, let it be supposed that the gist of the objection is, not that systems are useless, but that they should not be put into the hands of learners, lest they fill their minds with doctrines unproved and unexamined, and close the door against manly and independent inquiry. Far be it from us to lay one shackle upon the chartered freedom of the theologian! We would that there were a thousandfold more independence in the search of truth—and that so many hundreds were not enslaved by the prejudice of novelty, whilst they clamour against the prejudice of authority and antiquity. To the objection, under this new phase, we reply: the only possible method of making the labours of past theologians available and profitable to the tyro. is by presenting to him the fruits of these labours in some compendious form. In every other case, the learner is despoiled of all the aids afforded by superior wisdom and learning, and reduced to the condition of one who has to build the whole structure for himself from the very foundation. But it is rejoined, "The Bible is the text-book: Theology is to be pursued exegetically; let the student, with his hermeneutical apparatus, come to the investigation of the Bible itself, to the neglect of all systems of human composition." Again we reply, that in correspondence with the analogy above suggested, exegesis is the true instrument of discovery, and the test of all pretended results. It may be compared to the glasses and quadrant of the astronomer. But is this all that is afforded to the inchoate astronomer? Let the analogy be pursued. We suppose a professor in this new school of physics to say to his pupil, "Here are your telescopes and other instruments, your logarithmic tables and ephemeris—yonder is the observatory. Proceed to make your observations. Be independent and original in your inquiries, and cautious in your inductions. You are not to be informed whether the sun moves around the earth, or the earth around the sun. This

would be to prepossess you in favour of a system. Ptolemy and Copernicus are alike to be forgotten!" What is our estimate of such a method of philosophizing? The unfortunate youth is not permitted to take a glance at Newton's Principia, lest his mind should librate from its exact poise, towards some preconceived opinion. He is reduced to the very condition of the thousands who grope in disastrous twilight for want of direction. He is called upon to be a Galileo without his powers, or a Kepler without his previous training.

To an unprejudiced mind it must commend itself as reasonable, that the beginner in any science should be furnished at least with some syllabus of its details, which may serve as a clew in the labyrinth of his doubts. In order to discover truth, it is not the safest nor the wisest plan to reduce the mind to the unenviable condition of a *tabula rasa;* although such is the assumption of certain modern writers. It is highly useful to be informed as well of what has been held to be true, as of what has been proved to be false. For lack of the latter knowledge—the knowledge of preceding errors—our improved theologians are daily venting, with all the grave self-consequence of discovery, the stale and exploded blunders of the dark ages; which the perusal of any single work of systematic divinity would have taught them to despise. The impartiality of the mind is in no degree secured by the banishment of all previous hypothesis. There is a partiality of ignorance, a partiality of self-will and intellectual pride, a partiality of innovation, no less dangerous than the predilections of system. Or, to bring the whole matter to a speedier issue, the condition of mind *in equilibrio*, which it is proposed to secure, is utterly impossible—the merest *ens rationis*—which was never realized, and never can be realized by any one in a Christian country. It is like the chimerical scepticism of the Cartesians, the creature of an overheated imagination. For when you have carefully withheld all orthodox systems of theology from your pupil, he comes to the study of the Scriptures, emptied indeed of all coherent hypotheses, but teeming with the crude and erroneous views which spring up like weeds in the unregulated mind.

The true light in which a system of theology should be viewed by one who uses it as an aid in scriptural study, is as a simple *hypothesis*, an approximation to the truth, and a directory for future inquiries. Every position is to become the subject of a sifting examination, and comparison with what is revealed. Without some such assistance, in the mind or in writing, the student might spend a life-time in arriving at some of those principles, which, if once proposed to him, would commend themselves instantly to his approbation.

But it is queried: "What if your system should be false?" Let us then go so far as to suppose that it *is* false. It would be no very difficult task to prove that, for this purpose, even a false system, if scientifically arranged, might not be without its uses. Every

one who commences the study of the Scriptures, does so with some system, true or false, symmetrical or crude, written or conceived. If he is influenced by no living idols in the world of theologians, and bows to no Calvin or Arminius, he has within him those causes of error which spring from his own character and education; or, to use Bacon's expressive terms, *idola specus et fori*, if not *idola theatri*.* When Kepler began his observations, he no doubt held the old erroneous doctrine of the sphere; but in the progress of inquiry he discovered such irregularity in the orbit of Mars, as was altogether incompatible with a circular motion. Hence he arrived at the truth that all the planetary orbits are elliptical. In this we have an example of a fact impinging upon a system, and causing it to be abandoned. The same thing may be instanced in the case of Martin Luther. It may not be too much to say, that if they had been ignorant of the opinions of their fathers, and had practised upon the rule above-mentioned, their names would never have come down to us. But all this is gratuitous. We are not bound to prove that an erroneous system may have its uses. We put into the hand of the pupil the nearest approximation to truth which we can procure, even that which we cordially believe ourselves; and then, to add new guards to the mind. we exhort him to use it simply as a history of what the Church has held; leaving it to his judgment whether it is consistent with the Scriptures. It is the method in which the study of all sciences must be begun; and as all lectures in theology are systems—indeed no other systems are enjoined to be studied in our seminaries—it is in accordance with this very method that candidates for the ministry are everywhere instructed. There may be a time, at some later period, when a method purely analytic may be attempted; but no man is competent to institute such an analysis. until he has mastered the leading hypotheses of those who have gone before him: and about one theologian in a thousand has the taste for investigations of this kind.

It is not a little surprising that the very persons whose delicate susceptibilities lead them to shrink from the contact of an orthodox system or exposition, lest they should receive some undue bias, are at the same time under no apprehensions from the contagion of German neology. There are, for instance, ministers of our acquaintance who avowedly banish from their shelves the works of Turretine, Scott, and Henry, but who daily refer to the innocuous commentaries of Rosenmueller, Kuinöl, Koppe, and Gesenius. Is it so then, that the only partialities against which we need a caution, are towards what is called orthodoxy—the system of doctrines to which we have subscribed; Are there no vicious leanings of the mind in favour of plausible heresies, lofty rationalism, or imposing novelty? Let him answer who has learned the deceitfulness of the human heart.

* Nov. Org., lib i., aph. 41.

If systems of theology are assailed upon the ground that they have usurped the place and authority of the sacred canon, we leave our opponents to try the issue with those who are guilty of the offence. We are conscious of no such wish. The formularies of our Church have borne many violent assaults; and in their turn all doctrinal works which coincide with them have been denounced. We have no hesitation in "postponing the Confession of Faith to the Holy Scriptures."* If systems of divinity have been raised to a co-ordinate rank with the Word of God, let those answer for it who are guilty of the impiety. The books themselves are chargeable with no part of it, since they unanimously declare that the Bible only is the standard of faith. Yet shall we deny to any the liberty of making any scheme of doctrine his own *confession of faith?* No constraint has been used to bring any man to such a declaration; nor have we heard of any man who has been required to conform himself to such a system, unless he had previously, of his own free will, confessed it to be a statement of his faith. We may, therefore, dismiss the cavil, as scarcely pertaining to this inquiry.

In view of the absolute impracticability of the visionary scheme now controverted, and the absence of any attempted exemplification of it, we are constrained to look somewhat further for the secret cause of the clamour against systematic theology. And when we regard the quarter from which it issues, we are convinced that the real objection is, not that systems are exceptionable *qua tales*, but that doctrine is systematized on the wrong side. Systematized heterodoxy is attacked upon its own merits; systematized orthodoxy is opposed because of its form and arrangements. The great standard works in this department are the results of labour, the monuments of tried doctrine; while the ephemeral fabrics of innovators do not live long enough to assume a regular shape. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ!* When the late Robert Hall was arraigned by a certain loyalist, as having written in favour of parliamentary reform, he replied, in terms not inapplicable to this subject: "The plain state of the case is, not that the writer is offended at my meddling with politics, but that I have meddled *on the wrong side*. Had the same mediocrity of talent been exerted in eulogizing the measures of ministry, his greetings would have been as loud as his invective is bitter." If the system is false, let this be made to appear, let its errors be exposed, but, until this is done, let no arrangement of divine truth be decried as injurious. In conclusion, we apprehend no evils to our rising theologians from scholastic systems, for the best of all reasons—they know nothing of them. The literature of the day has extended its influence to the domain of theology, and the weekly, monthly, and quarterly receptacles of religious discussion consume too much of our attention to leave opportunity for poring over the works of our ancestors.

* See Rev. E. Irving's late Letter in Frazer's Magazine.

ESSAY IV.

ON THE ATONEMENT.*

We are pleased with this volume on the Atonement, because such a work on this cardinal subject was needed; and because we are of opinion that the author has exhibited the true Calvinistic view of the atonement, as to its necessity, nature, and extent. This work is more comprehensive than any work on this subject with which we are acquainted; it embraces every point which it is proper to have discussed in a popular treatise. We consider it also a high recommendation that it is not written in a controversial spirit. The author attacks no one, but goes straight forward to his object. The style is characterized by vivacity and perspicuity. It would be difficult to find an involved or obscure sentence in the whole book. On every point the discussion is as concise as most readers will desire, and in our opinion is conducted with admirable judgment and good temper. Where the reader may differ from the sentiments of the author, he will never have occasion to censure him as deficient in Christian candour.

Mr. Symington's plan is also very judicious. He begins by an explication of the principal terms which relate to this subject. He then undertakes to answer the most common and popular objections to the doctrine. This part of his work is executed with great clearness and force. Nothing seems to be omitted which is proper to be said, and yet these objections are answered within a very moderate space. The necessity of an atonement comes next in order; and this he argues logically and conclusively, from the PERFECTIONS OF GOD—FROM THE NATURE OF MORAL GOVERNMENT—FROM THE INEFFICACY OF OTHER MEANS TO OBTAIN PARDON—AND FROM THE EXPRESS TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. The proof of the reality of the atonement is next exhibited. Under this head he avails himself of the ancient sacrifices, and particularly of those which were appointed in the Levitical law. On this interesting subject he furnishes the reader with a condensed view of all that is most important in the popular works of Magee and John Pye

* Originally published in 1836, in review of the following work: "On the Atonement and Intercession of Jesus Christ." By the Rev. William Symington.

Smith. He then considers the atonement as exhibited in prophecy: especially in the remarkable predictions of Isaiah and Daniel, concerning the vicarious sufferings and death of the Messiah.

The author now comes to the consideration of the sufferings of Christ, as the facts are recorded by the Evangelists; and considers the several conceivable ends of these extraordinary sufferings, and shows that none of these could have been the principal end, but that of making an *atonement*. The principal passages of scripture which speak of *atonement*, *reconciliation*, *redemption*, &c., are taken up and considered.

The *matter* of the atonement is now more particularly brought into view, where the expiatory sufferings of Christ are described. The *value* of the atonement is evinced from a consideration of the DIGNITY OF CHRIST'S PERSON—FROM HIS RELATIONSHIP TO MAN—FROM HIS FREEDOM FROM ALL PERSONAL OBLIGATION TO THE LAW—FROM HIS RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF HIMSELF—FROM THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS OFFERING—AND FROM ITS BEING MADE ACCORDING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GOD. The vexed subject of the EXTENT of the atonement is not omitted by our author. On this point he takes middle ground between the schemes of those who represent the atonement as indefinite and universal, and those who make it so limited as to be sufficient only for the salvation of the elect. He admits and maintains that the atonement, as to its intrinsic merit, is infinite; while, in its application, it is limited to the elect. The true point of dispute is not the intrinsic value of the atonement, but the *design* with which it was offered: and where the parties agree in relation to the doctrine of election, we do not see much room for dissension in regard to the extent of the atonement. Both parties consider it as a sufficient ground of a universal offer of Christ to all who are willing to receive him. The author maintains the definite character of the atonement, and its limitation to the elect in its design, with great force of argument, from the DIVINE PURPOSE—FROM THE RECTITUDE OF GOD—FROM THE NATURE OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE—FROM THE VERY NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT—FROM THE RESURRECTION AND INTERCESSION OF CHRIST—FROM THE WORK OF THE SPIRIT—FROM THE LIMITED APPLICATION AND REVELATION OF THE ATONEMENT—FROM THE ABSURD CONSEQUENCS OF THE CONTRARY SUPPOSITION—AND FROM EXPRESS TESTIMONIES OF SCRIPTURE. He then considers and answers the objections to this opinion, derived from its being derogatory to the honour of the Saviour—from its supposing a redundancy of merit—from the universal offer of the gospel—from universal terms used in scripture—and from the possibility of some perishing for whom Christ died.

Whether on this much disputed point the arguments in favour of a definite or general atonement preponderate, will be differently decided by readers according to their respective prepossessions. But for ourselves, we are of opinion that the author has placed the subject on the old Calvinistic ground, as *particular redemption* is

known to have been one of the doctrines in which almost all old Calvinists were agreed, and was one of the *five points* disputed between the Calvinists and Arminians, and decided in the Synod of Dort. It may, however, be admitted, that where there is an agreement respecting the vicarious nature of the atonement, and in the belief of the doctrine of election, the controversy must be rather verbal than real; for both sides hold the intrinsic sufficiency of the atonement, and both maintain that it was the design of the Father in giving his Son, and the design of the Son in dying, to save only those chosen in him before the world was. Wherein then is the difference, except in the proper mode of expressing our views? But we can see no advantage from representing the atonement to be universal; and when it is said to have been made as much for one man as another, the language is certainly inconsistent with the other parts of the Calvinistic system, and furnishes strong ground on which both Arminians and Universalists can erect their batteries to subvert it.

After discussing the extent of the atonement pretty fully, Mr. Symington devotes one section to the consideration of its *results*, which he makes to be the following: IT ILLUSTRATES THE CHARACTER OF GOD—VINDICATES HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT—DEMONSTRATES THE EVIL OF SIN—SECURES FOR ITS OBJECTS PERFECT AND ETERNAL SALVATION—OPENS A WAY FOR THE EXERCISE OF DIVINE MERCY, AND ENCOURAGES SINNERS TO RELY ON THE MERCY OF GOD, AND AWAKENS GRATEFUL EMOTIONS IN THE PIOUS—AFFECTS THE DIVINE DISPENSATIONS TO OUR WORLD—and FURNISHES AN ETERNAL THEME OF CONTEMPLATION TO THE WHOLE UNIVERSE OF MORAL CREATURES.

This concludes what strictly belongs to the atonement, but the author has very judiciously annexed a *Second Part*, containing the fullest and ablest view of the *Intercession of Christ* which we have seen. Indeed the subject of Christ's intercession cannot be separated from his atonement; for while the latter may be represented by the slaying of the sacrifice and laying it on the altar, the former is strikingly typified by the presentation and sprinkling of the blood of the sin-offering in the most Holy Place, accompanied with clouds of precious incense. The offering of Christ's body on the cross would have accomplished nothing, unless he had entered with his precious merit into the highest heavens, there to plead the cause of his people. We would particularly recommend this part of the work to the attentive perusal of the pious; it cannot be read, we think, without pleasure and profit by any sincere Christian. The topics which are introduced under this head are such as these; the *Intercession of Christ displays the love of God, and proves the Divinity of Christ—shows the efficacy of his death—affords security to the people of God.* The discourse is concluded by considering the sin of dishonouring Christ's intercession, and the duty of daily seeking an interest in it.

It is gratifying to learn that the first edition of this work was all

sold in a few days, and a second edition called for before the author had the opportunity of revising the work, or availing himself of the remarks of the reviewers. He promises, however, "if a third edition be required, to supply this deficiency." *The Christian Instructor* of Edinburgh, which has always been ably conducted, and uniformly appears on the side of orthodoxy and evangelical piety, speaks of this work in the following terms: "Mr. S. has accomplished his work in the happiest possible manner. We have not often read a work which does more credit to its author, or is better fitted to edify the Church of God. The divine and the private Christian will alike find their account in giving it a careful perusal, and we are mistaken if there be many of its readers who will be satisfied with perusing it only once." The work is also highly commended in the Presbyterian Review, published in Edinburgh.

To account for the avidity with which this volume was bought up in Scotland, it will be necessary to advert to the circumstance, that the Christian public there has been considerably agitated with the publication of new and dangerous doctrines on the subject of the atonement. It will be recollected that Thomas Erskine, Esq., who had acquired considerable reputation as a theological writer, by his work on the INTERNAL EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY, published a little work on the ATONEMENT, in which he maintained not only the universality of the atonement, but its universal efficacy in bringing the whole human race into a justified state. In connexion with this he taught that the glad tidings of the gospel was the annunciation of this fact, and that saving faith consisted in a full persuasion that we are already in a justified state; and that the condemnation of any would be for refusing to believe this merciful testimony of God. This antinomian work of Erskine was mixed up with much that was good and pious; and the author and his followers insisted that nothing so much promoted personal holiness as the persuasion above mentioned; and this they declared to be the effect of the doctrine on their own minds. Several able answers were returned to this publication. Dr. Wardlaw, so favourably and extensively known as a theological writer, took up his pen to counteract the influence of this pernicious publication. His little work has been republished in this country. Dr. Dewar, principal of Mareschall college, Aberdeen, also published a work on the atonement about this time. This subject was also involved in the prosecution carried on in the ecclesiastical courts of the Church of Scotland against Irving, M'Clean, Campbell, &c., which resulted in their deposition from the sacred ministry. The attention of theologians in that country was therefore turned to the subject of atonement; and as these errorists made the universality of the atonement the foundation of their whole system, this will show why the point has received so large a share of attention in the treatise now under review.

In this country discussions on the atonement have taken a dif-

ferent turn; for while we have too many who reject the whole doctrine with scorn, we have also a large number who have adopted a new theory of the atonement, which they persuade themselves avoids the most prominent difficulties of the old doctrine. We propose, therefore, to occupy some space in giving our own views of the atonement in relation to the existing state of opinion in this country. And we are induced to undertake this, not only because the subject is of momentous importance, but because we have never given our views at large on this subject in the pages of the Biblical Repertory.

It is a fact worthy of notice, that in the lapse of time a remarkable change takes place in the language of theology, without an apparent design entertained by any to bring it about. Words once in current use are laid aside, and new terms adopted without any important reason for the change; and without anything being gained or lost by the substitution. Of this a more striking example cannot be given than in the word *atonement*, to express the expiation made by the sufferings and death of Christ. This word was much used by the translators of the English Bible to signify the efficacy of the sacrifices and other rites of the Levitical service intended to purify from sin and ceremonial defilement: but in the New Testament, where the whole work of Christ is fully exhibited, the word is but once read (Rom. v., 11), and seems to be there used to avoid the too frequent use of the word *reconciliation*, which would certainly have been the appropriate term by which to render the Greek word καταλλαγή. But as these two words were then used, it was perfectly indifferent which was employed, for they were considered synonymous, as might be shown by a reference to the writers of that period; and as appears, indeed, from the derivation of the word *atonement*, which has a purely English original, and signifies to be AT ONE, as all the old English lexicographers inform us. For those who have been at variance to be *at one*, is evidently the same thing as to be reconciled. But as in the Old Testament the Hebrew word כִּפֶּר is almost uniformly rendered by the LXX., by the Greek word ἐξιλάσκομαι, ἱλάσκομαι or ἱλάομαι, and the noun by ἱλασμός, which words are in English constantly translated, *to make atonement*, *to atone*, *atonement*, this analogy should have been followed in the New Testament; and then we should have had the word *atonement* in our version, not where the word is used (Rom. v., 11), but in 1 John ii., 2, where we have καὶ αὐτὸς ἱλασμός ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν; *and he is the atonement for our sins.* And in 1 John iv., 10, where we read, καὶ ἀπέστειλε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἱλασμὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν; *and he sent his son an atonement for our sins.* We find the Greek verb which signifies *to make atonement*, in the New Testament, Heb. ii., 17, εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ; *to make atonement for the sins of the people.* The version of this text furnishes another proof that atonement and reconciliation were considered synonymes by our translators; for as in the former passage they used *atonement* instead of *reconciliation*, here, they use

reconciliation where *atonement* was the proper word. The word ἱλαστήριον is also twice read in the New Testament, and in one of these (Rom. iii., 25) should be translated *atonement*, ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον, *whom God hath set forth to be an atonement.* In the other passage (Heb. ix., 5) this word retains the sense in which it is uniformly used by the LXX., for the *mercy-seat* or cover of the ark of the covenant, and would be well rendered by the word *propitiatory*, or *place of atonement.*

As the phrase to *make atonement*, as the translation of the Hebrew and Greek words before mentioned, occurs nearly eighty times in the Old Testament, it may aid our investigation to endeavour to ascertain its precise meaning; and there is no passage which furnishes us with a better opportunity of accomplishing this object, than the account of the transactions of the *day of atonement* which is recorded in the 16th of Leviticus. It has frequently been asserted that the literal radical sense of the Hebrew verb is *to cover;* but as the word is seldom used in a literal sense, probably but once, where Noah is commanded to pitch the ark without and within with pitch, we think there is but slight ground for this opinion. In the figurative use of the word, though often thus employed, there is no clear allusion to this idea of *covering.* If we might infer the literal from the uniform figurative use, we should say, that the radical meaning was *to cleanse* or to *purify.* It appears from the passage referred to, and from other texts, that an atonement, though usually made with blood, consisted sometimes of other things. Thus in Exodus xxx., 15, the half shekel paid by every Israelite, is called *an offering unto the Lord to make atonement for your souls.* And in Lev. xvi., 10, the scape-goat is called an atonement. *But the goat on which the lot fell to be the scape-goat shall be presented alive before the Lord to make an atonement with him,* and to let him *go for a scape-goat into the wilderness.* But commonly atonements were made with bloody sacrifices; so on the day when the scape-goat was made an atonement by symbolically carrying off the sins of the people which had been confessed over his head, another goat and a bullock were sacrificed as sin-offerings, the one for the whole congregation, the other for the priest and his family. "And Aaron shall bring the bullock of the sin-offering which is for himself and his house, and shall make atonement for himself and for his house. Then shall he kill the goat of the sin-offering that is for the people, and bring his blood within the veil, and do with that blood as he did with the blood of the bullock, and sprinkle it upon the mercy-seat, and before the mercy-seat, and he shall make an ATONEMENT for the Holy Place, because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions in all their sins. And there shall be no man in the tabernacle of the congregation, when he goeth in TO MAKE ATONEMENT in the Holy Place, until he come out and have MADE AN ATONEMENT for himself and his household, and for all the congregation of Israel. And he shall go in before the altar of the Lord, and make an atonement

for it (or on it) and shall take of the blood of the bullock and of the blood of the goat, and put it on the horns of the altar round about. And he shall sprinkle of the blood upon it with his finger seven times, and cleanse it and hallow it from the uncleanness of the children of Israel." Here we have as distinct a view as could be desired of the nature of atonement under the Mosaic dispensation; and as these solemn transactions on the day of atonement are in a very eminent degree typical of the great sacrifice of Christ, the atonements of this day will aid us in understanding the true nature of the Christian atonement. That the solemn rites of this day were typical of Christ, we are not only informed, but the apostle expounds at large these significant ceremonies. In the 9th chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews, Paul applies the type to the antitype. "The priests went always into the first tabernacle accomplishing the service of God. But into the second went the high priest alone, every year, not without blood which he offered for himself and for the errors of the people. The Holy Ghost this signifying, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made manifest, while as the first tabernacle was yet standing, which was a figure for the time then present, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices which could not make him that did the service perfect as pertaining to the conscience. Which stood in meats and drinks and divers washings, and carnal ordinances imposed on them until the time of the reformation. But Christ being come a high priest of good things, by a more perfect tabernacle not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building. Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and goats and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the Eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your souls from dead works to serve the living God."

From this inspired exposition of the sacrifices and ceremonies of the day of atonement, we learn several things, as—

1. That the offerings and transactions of that solemn day were indeed typical of Christ and his atoning sacrifice for the sins of his people. They are called *a figure for the time then present.*

2. That the sacrifices so solemnly offered under the law had in themselves no efficacy to take away the guilt of sin. These *gifts and offerings could not make him that did the service perfect as pertaining to the conscience.* The sprinkling of this blood of bulls and calves could only *sanctify to the purifying of the flesh;* but had no power to purge the conscience from dead works. *For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin.*

3. That these ceremonies, called here *carnal ordinances*, were not intended to be perpetual but temporary, *imposed until the time of reformation;* that is, until the introduction of the gospel dispensation.

4. That the tabernacle, erected by Moses according to the pattern showed him in the holy mount, is a type or figure of that heaven into which Christ had entered.

5. That the entrance of the high priest once in the year into the HOLY OF HOLIES, with the blood of atonement, was a lively prefiguration of the entrance of Christ into heaven with his own blood, to obtain eternal redemption for us.

6. That Christ's blood and offering of himself through the ETERNAL SPIRIT is a real and efficacious atonement, by which the conscience is purged from dead works; that is from sin. And by this one offering, he perfects for ever those who are sanctified. He who appeared in the end of the world has *put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.*

In this part of holy scripture we have a clear exhibition of the Christian atonement. It is a sin-offering, or a sacrifice for sin. It is a vicarious sacrifice; for as the sins of the people were laid both upon the scape-goat who bore them away, and upon the goat which was sacrificed and his blood carried within the veil, and sprinkled on the mercy-seat; so Christ bore our sins in his own body. He was wounded for our transgressions, and was made sin for us. The atonement of Christ was an offering made through the Eternal Spirit without spot unto God to render him propitious; to purge the conscience, and to obtain eternal redemption for us. This offering and sacrifice was made by Jesus Christ in the character of HIGH PRIEST. But he infinitely excelled those high priests who ministered in the tabernacle below. These were obliged to offer their atoning sacrifices year by year, because they could not really put away sin, but significantly pointed to the one true and efficacious atonement. *They were not permitted to continue by reason of death.* "But Jesus Christ because he continueth for ever hath an unchangeable priesthood, wherefore he is able to save to the uttermost all that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them." It seems to have been on this account that he was declared to be a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec, because the sacred scriptures make no mention of his death, or that there were any others in the succession either before or after him. But again, "other priests were encompassed with infirmity, and had to offer first for their own sins and then for those of the people; but Jesus Christ is holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners." He had, therefore, no need to offer any sacrifice for himself, but only to make the one offering which has, in itself, merit enough to make atonement for the sins of the whole world. It is also mentioned, as a remarkable point of distinction, that Christ was made HIGH PRIEST by a solemn oath. He is also styled the SURETY of a better covenant, and the MEDIATOR of the New Testament. And the end of all his sacerdotal acts and offerings was that by his death, *they who are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance.*

The legal sacrifices had in themselves no intrinsic value; and

when the people made a merit and a righteousness of them, so far from being pleasing to a holy God, they were exceedingly offensive. When Christ came, therefore, he said, "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me;" intimating that these typical rites were now to be abolished to make way for the only efficacious offering which was his own pure and sacred body which had been miraculously prepared for him in the womb of the virgin. The substance being come, the shadows were now ready to vanish away. "He taketh away the first that he may establish the second." And the Son being come as a priest, and furnished with a spotless sacrifice, cries, "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God. By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ, once for all." As was before said, this priest had no need to offer more than once, *once for all.* "Other priests stood daily ministering, and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices which can never take away sin, but Jesus Christ, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down at the right hand of God."

No doctrine of the Bible is more clearly and fully expounded than that of atonement, by the apostle Paul in this epistle to the Hebrews. And having now exhibited the leading points in his exposition, nothing more would be necessary, were it not for the pride and perverseness of men, who refuse to receive the simple truth of God's word, and turn themselves every way to evade the force of the divine testimony. It is truly wonderful, after what we have seen, that any should deny that the doctrine of a vicarious atonement is taught in the sacred scriptures. We may ask such persons to tell us what more could have been said, had the apostle intended to inculcate this doctrine? But let us consider some of the arguments by which they attempt to defend their cause. And, in the first place, they object to the doctrine as unreasonable, and derogatory to the character of God. They allege that there can exist no necessity for such a costly sacrifice: that if the creatures of God sin against him, he is a merciful sovereign who can forgive them without requiring any atonement; and they assert that reason teaches us that if they repent and reform, God will receive them into favour, and remit all the punishment which was threatened.

Such reasonings might appear plausible enough, if man were a competent judge of what plans it becomes the Ruler of the universe to adopt in the government of the world; or if human reason could decide what terms of reconciliation a holy God ought to adopt for his rebellious creatures. It is a sufficient answer to all such objections, that the same mode of reasoning, applied to the state of things as they actually exist in the physical and moral world, would lead us directly to atheism. We should not find it difficult to frame plausible objections to the structure of the universe, to the constitution of man, to the providence of God, and to every principle of moral government. Why should a God of in-

finite benevolence bind his creatures by a law; and especially, why should he annex to it a penalty so tremendous as death? The acts of creatures cannot affect the infinite, Almighty Ruler of the universe.

The doctrines of divine revelation can never be brought with propriety to the bar of human reason: they are as far above reason as the heaven is above the earth. When a revelation is sufficiently attested, it is reasonable to receive every thing which it contains, however repugnant to our preconceived opinions. To act on any other principle is the height of arrogance and impiety. Why do we want a revelation but to teach us what reason does not know? But it is pretended that this doctrine of atonement is not taught in the scriptures. Then, as we said before, it cannot be taught in words. If this is not a doctrine of scripture nothing is taught in scripture. It would be almost as reasonable to assert that there are neither words nor letters in the Bible. As we have exhibited sufficient scriptural evidence of the doctrine, we might decline any further discussion of the subject. But lest these pretended Rationalists boast that reason is altogether on this side, we will descend into the arena, and contend with them on their own ground, and with their own weapons. The question which we propose first to discuss is, whether a holy God can consistently forgive sin without any satisfaction or atonement. It is agreed that God exercises a moral government over the world, and has given to man a just and good law, which all men have transgressed. That sin exists is not disputed, and it is not to be denied that all sin deserves to be punished, for otherwise it would not be sin—it would have no demerit. And if it did not deserve to be punished, it would not need forgiveness, for forgiveness is the remission of deserved punishment. If, then, sin deserves to be punished, it cannot be an evil thing, or inconsistent with the divine attributes, to inflict deserved punishment. To assert this would be to say that it was wrong for the Ruler of the universe to do right—unjust to act justly, by giving to every one his due. But this is held by no one. Even Socinians admit, that it is right for God to punish sin, and if right to punish in one instance, it must be right to punish sin in every instance, according to its demerit. Indeed, as the punishment of sin is the act of God as a righteous Governor or just Judge, we do not see how he can do otherwise than impartially punish all sin according to its demerit. How can the Judge of all the earth, who must do right, punish one sinner, and permit another equally guilty to go unpunished. Certainly reason can never teach us that he will do so. Reason cannot teach opposite things, and we have seen that it is the dictate of reason that sin should be punished according to its demerit; the same reason never can teach that in some instances it should not be punished at all. Whatever argument will prove that sin ought not to be punished in one instance, may be applied to any other case; and would go to prove that no sin could be punished in the divine government.

But we know that some sins have been and are punished; reason, therefore, cannot assure us, or even render it probable, that in a perfectly righteous, moral government, any sin will escape deserved punishment. We know that it is alleged that in those cases, in which the punishment of sin is remitted, there is a special reason for this dispensation—namely, the repentance and reformation of the sinner. Unitarians themselves maintain, that if no repentance intervene to turn aside the stroke of justice, transgressors must bear their iniquity. It follows, therefore, upon their own principles, that if none should ever repent, there could be no remission. And it would not be very difficult to show that sinners left to themselves will never repent. But we shall now proceed upon the supposition that a sinner can repent and reform his life at any time. We ask how can it be ascertained that sin will be pardoned upon repentance without any atonement? It cannot be learned from experience, for the natural consequences of intemperance, debauchery, fraud, &c., are not removed by repentance; and yet these consequences of sin are a part of God's moral administration. In civil governments the criminal who has been convicted of murder, treason, perjury, or any other crime, is never released and the punishment remitted as a matter of course, because he repents. However sincerely penitent, he pays the penalty of the law, and a contrary course would be subversive of all law and government. Suppose that God should create two moral agents of similar powers, and place them under the same law, and in the same circumstances; and suppose that one of them should continue perfectly to obey his maker, and that the other should wickedly rebel against his sovereign; can any man persuade himself that he could treat these creatures exactly in the same manner? God cannot look upon sin but with disapprobation proportioned to its malignity; and he cannot but be pleased with obedience. Unless, therefore, he should act contrary to his own views and feelings, he cannot but make a difference between the man who loves and serves him with all his heart, and him who ungratefully cherishes enmity against his Maker. This case is so plain that no man who has any perception of moral fitness can doubt respecting it. The Socinian, as well as others, feels the necessity of such a course in a moral Governor; and he does not plead for pardon to such as continue obstinate in their rebellion. He only maintains that God may remit the penalty of his law to him who repents and reforms. Let us suppose then that these two creatures had a probation of a hundred years; and that while the first fulfilled his duty to the end of his course, the other, having rebelled soon after his creation, persists obstinately in iniquity until near the close of the last year of the period of probation, and that he then repents and returns to his duty; how ought an infinitely righteous, moral Governor to treat these persons? Would it be right merely on the ground of repentance to admit this penitent to as rich a reward as if he

had never offended? And what effect would this have on other free agents when put on their probation?

If any should still be of opinion, that upon repentance, the Governor of the world may and ought to treat the returning sinner just as if he had never offended, and that this is the dictate of sound reason; it must always be known to creatures put on probation under a moral law. The consequence will be, that God gives an option to every creature whether he will obey perfectly and constantly, or sin and rebel the greater part of the time, and at last repent, for the results will be precisely the same in each case. Such a provision annexed to the divine law would completely annul it. It would in fact be an invitation to creatures to rebel, as they would be assured that they have it in their power to prevent all punishment, and to secure the same reward as if they never transgressed. If it should be said that their punishment might be remitted, and yet they not put on an equality with those who never disobeyed, we answer that this concedes the principle for which we contend, as in this case a part of the punishment would be inflicted; for whatever a man loses in consequence of sin, or whatever mark of disapprobation is set on him by God, makes a part of the punishment of his sin. How is it then an amiable virtue in men, it will be asked, to forgive those who offend them, so that such forgiveness is made a condition of asking for forgiveness? To answer this objection fully would require more space than we can afford in this review. We will therefore merely indicate the principle on which a reply may be made. Creatures have nothing to do in the punishment of sin as a moral evil; God is the only administrator of his own law. Vengeance belongeth unto him, he will repay. No creature, therefore, can be compared with God in relation to this matter. Again, when men receive injury or offence from their fellow creatures, it is reasonable that they should not undertake to avenge themselves, because this is going beyond their proper sphere, and encroaching on the prerogative of God, who takes cognisance of all offences, and knows their exact demerit. Besides, as we are all offenders against God, and can be saved from wrath only by his mercy, it is reasonable that we should not be rigid in executing punishment on those who trespass against us.

But it may be objected that, according to this view of the divine character and government, he has the attribute of justice but not of mercy; whereas all men who entertain correct opinions of the divine attributes believe that mercy is the most amiable perfection of his character. To which we reply, that it is even so, that reason knows nothing of the attribute of mercy. Reason clearly indicates that God is good to the obedient, but it cannot inform us that he will remit the punishment of any sin. Indeed it is by reason that we conclude that God will render to every man according to his deeds, and it never can teach, therefore, that in some instances he will not render to every one his due. The idea of divine mercy so prevalent among men is derived from revelation, and is intimate-

ly connected with the atonement. The very design of the atonement is to enable the righteous Governor of the universe to exercise mercy, not at the expense of justice, which is impossible, but by a complete satisfaction to justice, "that God might be just and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus." It is a radical mistake in theology to think that mercy is exercised irrespectively of the demands of justice. God cannot divest himself of his justice any more than of his being; and if his retributive justice have claims on any one on account of sin, these claims can never be set aside. Erroneous ideas on this point have been the source of many errors; the ramifications from this root are very extensive, but we cannot trace them now through all their windings.

It may be again objected, that on these principles mercy is not an essential attribute of God. If by essential be meant that which belongs to his nature, mercy is essential; all divine attributes are essential. But we admit that there was no necessity for the exercise of mercy. To suppose that there was, is to destroy its very nature. Mercy must depend on mere will. It is grace, but grace might be withheld, or it ceases to be grace, and becomes justice. As God showed no mercy to apostate angels, he might have proceeded on the same principles of rectitude towards fallen men. The very idea of mercy is derived from the doctrine of atonement, and yet an argument is derived from mercy to overthrow the atonement. Take away the atonement, and mercy and grace are blotted out with it.

We have hitherto been arguing the necessity of atonement from the holiness and justice of God; the truth and faithfulness of God furnish an argument corroborative of the same thing.

When the Ruler of the universe promulgates a law, it is not only a rule to guide the obedience of the creature, but a solemn declaration of the principles on which he means to administer his government. And when he annexes a certain penalty to his law, his veracity is pledged to execute it; for a penalty is nothing else than a public intimation to the creature what the consequence of transgression will be. Some theologians, however, to answer a particular purpose, have maintained, that although God is bound by his faithfulness to fulfil his promises, he is not in the same manner obliged to execute his threatenings. And they assign this reason of the difference, that as the interests of creatures are involved in the fulfilment of a promise, this gives them a kind of right which cannot be violated, whereas no one is injured by an omission to execute threatenings; but the contrary. The doctrine is, that God may act contrary to his own public and solemn declaration, provided no one is injured by his doing so. But if the penalty of the law was annexed to prevent evil to the public, from its neglect will not the public interest suffer? And if it does not, will such a course be for the honour of God? Shall we attribute to the God of truth a disregard to his word, which all must acknowledge would be a great moral defect in man? Certainly this ought not to be receiv-

ed as a settled principle in the divine administration without the most manifest proof. We believe, that at the first hearing of such a proposition every unsophisticated mind would revolt. The great and glorious God has claimed for himself truth and faithfulness as attributes essential to his character; and he has manifested his detestation of all falsehood in creatures by the strongest expressions. We ought therefore to be cautious of ascribing to him what would have the most distant tendency to derogate from his veracity. "Hath he spoken, and will he not do it?" It ought to be considered also, that this principle would go far to render all divine threatenings nugatory. The certainty of punishment is found to have more effect than its severity. But this doctrine renders it altogether uncertain, when a penalty is denounced, whether it will ever be executed. It spreads uncertainty over the future punishment of the guilty. Who knows but that the Judge of all the earth will at the day of judgment remit the penalty incurred by all sinners, men and angels? This principle is eminently calculated to subserve the cause of the Universalists, but we do not know that they have had the boldness to avail themselves of it. And it does away at once all necessity of atonement; for if the penalty of the law may be remitted, and is often remitted, there can be no absolute need that any one, much less a divine person, should suffer a cruel and ignominious death, to open a way for pardon.

As one consequence of this doctrine, referred to above, is, that God may, for aught we know, omit to inflict the penalty now threatened upon any transgressor, and as this is a very grave objection, we have understood that the advocates of the tenet endeavour to evade it by making a distinction between a threatening and a prediction, that while the former may be changed for good reason, the latter must be verified, for the prophecies must be fulfilled. To us there appears no difference, except that threatenings are not absolute, but conditional. In a prophecy an event is usually foretold as certain; in a threatening it is made to depend on the disobedience of the creature. A penalty is only incurred where there is transgression; but on the supposition that the law is broken, it is a prediction of what will be done with the sinner. If it is not, it has no force, and cannot be even a terror to evil doers. Besides, the reason assigned why God may omit to execute a threatening when incurred, will equally apply to a prediction. If the thing predicted be an evil, no one will be injured by omitting to bring it about.

The cases from Scripture which have been adduced to support this hypothesis, will not sustain it. The threatenings against Nineveh were obviously conditional. Within forty days this great city would have been destroyed, had not the inhabitants repented. That it should be thus understood is evident from commissioning a prophet to go and preach to them. If the prediction had been absolute, there would have been no object to be answered by preaching. And thus the king of Nineveh and his people under-

stood it: for in the hope of averting the heavy judgment which impended, they humbled themselves with fasting and sackcloth, and God was pleased to spare the city. In all this there is nothing to favour the opinion that God will not certainly execute his threatenings. If the Ninevites had not repented, and God had omitted to destroy the city, then the case would have been in point. But as it is, it furnishes no example of God's failing to execute his threatenings.

But another case of much greater importance, and to suit which it is probable the doctrine in question was invented, is that of Adam in Paradise. It is alleged and confidently asserted, that the penalty was not executed on him in conformity to the threatening, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Adam ate the forbidden fruit, but did not die on that very day, nor for centuries afterwards. If God could not consistently with his truth deviate from a threatened penalty, Adam must have died on that very day, as is evident. If it be so that God said one thing and did another, it is a serious case, not as it relates to this or that theory of Christianity, but to divine revelation. We do not know any objection which a deist could more plausibly and forcibly urge against the Bible; for it would be difficult to persuade a sensible deist that there was nothing derogatory to the truth of God in failing to do what he solemnly declared should be done. But may not the abettors of this opinion be mistaken when they assert that the threatening was in no sense executed on the very day on which Adam sinned? The word death has other significations besides the extinction of animal life. Our first parents were equally strangers to every species of death. As death is the opposite of life, they would expect the loss of life; but the noblest and most precious life which they enjoyed consisted in the image of God, and in communion with him. The mere separation of the soul and body is a trifle compared with a separation from God as the source of life. Undoubtedly by death in the threatening we should understand all penal evils of every kind and degree; for no punishment is ever inflicted on creatures which is not a part of the penalty of the law. Every bodily pain and mental pang help to make up this death. And as temporal death comes on gradually, man may be said to be dying from the moment when he became mortal. He was now also dead in law; the eternal life which God promised as the reward of obedience was forfeited, and the law, instead of a blessing, denounced death. The whole of that threatened death could not be endured in one day; it extends through eternity. It is sufficient to save the divine veracity if the commencement of death was experienced on that day. The execution of the penalty is supposed to have been suspended by the interposition of a scheme of mercy. This might have modified the circumstances of our first parents, and no doubt did, but could not prevent the execution of the sentence threatened. The Saviour finds those whom he came to save, *lost*, dead in trespasses

and sin, children of wrath, under the curse. From this he undertakes to redeem them, by dying for them. The sentence of the law was therefore executed upon our first parents on the very day of their sinning, and virtually on all their posterity, for we are all born under the sentence of that death which fell on them. We are therefore under no necessity of having recourse to this opinion so derogatory to the divine attributes, in order to explain the facts in the case of Adam.

Let us next proceed to inquire, since the penalty of the law cannot be set aside, whether the punishment of sin can be transferred from the actual transgressor to a surety or substitute. This is a vital question in Christian theology. The whole gospel system of salvation turns upon this point: all our hopes and dearest interests are suspended on it.

This doctrine of substitution and satisfaction by the obedience and sufferings of another is one of pure revelation. Reason never could have discovered that such a relaxation of the law as admits one to die in the place of another was possible consistently with the moral government of God. Indeed, if the principle of substitution could have been reasoned out by some mighty intellect, it would have answered no purpose, as certainly no created wisdom could have found a person so qualified as to accomplish the work. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the pride of human reason is offended with this doctrine, and sets itself in opposition to the plan of infinite wisdom—a plan which may be called the great mystery of the Gospel, which was hidden from eternity in the deep counsels of God, until after the fall of man it began to be developed, and still by the incarnation and death of the Son of God for us sinners, the divine economy was revealed in a blaze of light. As the whole Bible is a revelation of this method of salvation by the merit of another, who has been pleased to stand in our place and make atonement for us, to produce all the proofs of the doctrine would be to expound the whole Bible. That the punishment due to the guilty can consistently with justice be inflicted on an innocent substitute capable of enduring it, and who voluntarily takes the place of the transgressor, is the grand characteristic of the gospel system. It is a device of infinite wisdom to open a way for divine mercy, while justice receives a perfect satisfaction. Such a principle could scarcely find a place among men. It would not be proper to permit a virtuous citizen to sacrifice himself for the guilty, for by this course the public would receive a double detriment; first from the loss of a good citizen, and secondly from having the guilty person retained in the bosom of society. If a case could be found in which no evil of any kind could arise from such a substitution, all objections would cease. The case of Zaleucus, king of the Locrians, has often been mentioned with great applause. The story is related by Diodorus Siculus and Ælian; and by Plutarch and Valerius Maximus is considered a most remarkable display of justice. This king having made a law that whoever should

be convicted of the crime of adultery should have both his eyes put out; when his own son was found guilty, the whole state besought him to remit the threatened punishment. This he refused. But that the law might substantially have its demand, and justice be done, and a salutary example given, he consented to participate in the punishment himself, and while one of his son's eyes was put out, he substituted one of his own for the other. This case, so much celebrated by the ancients, Socinus speaks of contemptuously, and says that this prince ought to be classed with those rulers who deserve to be denominated weak and rash. While the rigour of the law and the inflexibility of justice were maintained, still the case is liable to some strong objections. But none of these apply to the substitution of Christ. For while the law is maintained and honoured, no injury is sustained by the public, nor eventually by the substitute. The sinner is not only pardoned but purified, and made a good citizen. The divine Mediator, though he dies, lives again, and receives an ample compensation for his humiliation and sufferings. Here, then, is a transaction which gloriously displays the divine justice and mercy; which maintains the honour of the divine law, and at the same time rescues a great multitude of lost souls from eternal misery. Why should we complain of injustice when no one is injured? The case stands thus: the justice of God leads him necessarily to punish sin, the law denounces a penalty according to justice, the sinner is found guilty and deserves to suffer. But God feels love and compassion towards him, and enters into covenant with his own Son to redeem a great multitude of fallen men. The plan is, that the son become incarnate, place himself under the law, bear its curse by dying for us, and thus render a complete satisfaction to divine justice. By such an atonement a way is opened for the exercise of mercy to the guilty; and provision is made for their regeneration and sanctification.

But the objection to an innocent person's suffering for the guilty is as strong against the Socinian scheme as against the orthodox; for they admit that Christ, an innocent person, did suffer for the benefit of men. It matters not whether you call it punishment or not. It is suffering inflicted on the innocent. Its being considered the punishment of our sins cannot add to the injustice of the transaction. If an innocent person may consistently with justice suffer for our benefit, he may endure the same sufferings as the penalty due to sin. That *guilt* or liableness to a penalty may be transferred from the actual transgressor to others connected with him, may be shown from the case of Canaan and Ham, of David and the people of Israel, seventy thousand of whom died for his sin; of Jeroboam and his descendants; of Achan and his children. But we will confine our attention to the remarkable case of Saul and the Gibeonites, where we have, with the approbation of God, seven of the descendants of Saul executed on account of a sin committed by him. When David inquired of the Lord respecting the cause of a three years' famine, by which Israel was afflicted, he received

for answer, that it was for Saul and his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites. "Wherefore David said unto the Gibeonites, what shall I do for you? and wherewith shall I make THE ATONEMENT, that ye may bless the inheritance of the Lord?" And they said: "Let seven men of his sons be delivered unto us, and we will hang them up unto the LORD in Gibeah of Saul." "And he delivered them into the hands of the Gibeonites, and they hanged them in the hill before the Lord." Now there is no evidence that these men died for their own sin; the judgments of God had fallen upon all Israel on account of Saul's breach of covenant and cruelty. But even supposing that some of them had participated in his crime; these seven were not the whole of his descendants, and yet they suffered for the whole house. Here an atonement was made to the Gibeonites by the death of seven men. These men bore the punishment of the sin of their ancestor, and the offended party was satisfied, and the divine judgments were withdrawn. Here, then, is a clear case of guilt being transferred from the father to his offspring, and of an atonement being made which reconciled the offended party, and turned away the wrath of God from the people. And this was in exact accordance with what is said in the second commandment, "visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."

As then sin cannot go unpunished, as law and justice require the execution of the deserved penalty, there can be no salvation for any sinner, unless vicarious sufferings are admitted. There was no obligation on the Ruler of the universe to relax the strict demands of the law upon the individual transgressor; he might have held him to endure the penalty in his own person. But when a divine SUBSTITUTE appears, and offers his body to be wounded and bruised for our iniquities, and his soul to be poured out unto death to make an atonement for our sins—when THE LAMB OF GOD presents himself to the stroke of divine justice, and offers to bear our iniquities in his own body on the tree—to die the just for the unjust—to give his life a ransom for our redemption, and God is well pleased with his sacrifice, and accepts it as sweet smelling savour, a full satisfaction and complete atonement—who has any right to object to the gracious transaction? Surely there is no injury sustained, and consequently there is no injustice.

But on this subject we have to contend not only with those who deny the atonement altogether, but with brethren who have invented a new scheme of atonement, which if it does not subvert the doctrine, greatly obscures and endangers it. As this theory is much more current in this country than in Great Britain, Mr. Symington has not particularly considered it; although, indeed, the principles which he has established do virtually overthrow it. But as this new theory is in our opinion exceedingly dangerous, and is defended and zealously propagated by many among ourselves, we shall be pardoned for spending some time in examining

its principles. And we here make the avowal that we charge the opinions which we endeavour to refute only on those who acknowledge them. Some have thought that between the old and new theology respecting the nature of the atonement there was a mere verbal difference, and that the controversy was a logomachy of no manner of use. It is not so, as we shall sufficiently make appear before we conclude. It is a difference so great and radical, that we candidly believe that the new theory of atonement approaches much nearer to the Socinian than to the old Calvinistic view of the nature and end of Christ's death. We do not say this invidiously to prejudice the reader, but simply with the view of calling his serious attention to the subject. We know there are many who have acquired a sickly sensibility in regard to all controversies between those who belong to the same communion; but whatever such may say or think, we must, as far as we are able, defend the truth of God, and give faithful warning of such errors as appear to us to be dangerous in their consequences; or we should be traitors to our divine Master. And as to the disturbance and contention which arise from the discussion of theological subjects, they should be attributed to those who bring in new opinions. If all who are ministers in our church did sincerely receive the doctrines laid down in our standards, in the obvious sense in which they have from the beginning been understood, there would be no contention, except with those without. But certainly it is important that all new opinions on a subject so vital as the atonement, should be thoroughly canvassed before they are received. It is scarcely credible that all theologians, until very lately, should have mistaken the true nature of the atonement.

Until very recently, as far as we know, all who believed that Christ made an atonement by his death, were agreed that he endured substantially the penalty of the law which we had broken; and that his sufferings and death were a complete satisfaction to the retributive or vindicatory justice of God; so that the word *satisfaction* was in universal use to express what is now signified by the word atonement. But of late a new theory has been invented, and is believed by many to be a real improvement in theology. They ask, why should not the science of theology be progressive as well as other sciences? According to the new theory, Christ our Mediator neither suffered the penalty of the law nor made any satisfaction to distributive justice. His death was designed to be merely an exhibition of God's displeasure at sin, and to convince the universe that he would not suffer it to go unpunished. When we first noticed this opinion, we were inclined to hope that the objection was not to the substance of the old doctrine of atonement, but to some supposed inaccuracy of the language commonly employed to represent it. We were disposed in charity to put this construction upon their doctrine, because they were accustomed to say, that Christ did not *literally* bear the penalty of the law, which they alleged to be an impossible thing,

because that penalty included remorse and despair, and required the sinner to suffer eternal death. That Christ thus suffered the penalty of the law, not one of the orthodox ever held. If, therefore, it was only meant to deny this, there was no difference of opinion but what was verbal. And when they denied that Christ offered a satisfaction to retributive justice, they were careful to add, that his death was a satisfaction to general justice; because, according to their account of distributive justice, none could satisfy it but the sinner who had broken the law. We were also for a while misled by their still using the terms *vicarious, substitution, &c.* But since we have become better acquainted with the new divinity we are convinced that these technical phrases are used by its advocates in an entirely different sense from what they bear in the theology of the old school. By *vicarious*, they do not mean obedience or suffering in our stead as strictly answering the demands of a violated law, but something done or suffered which is intended to answer the same end as the fulfilment of the law. And *substitution* is that which is admitted in the place of the execution of the penalty of the law. Whether this use of these theological phrases is consistent with perfect candour, we shall not stop to inquire. It is sufficient for our purpose that we know in what sense they are now employed by the teachers of the new doctrine.

We do not apprehend that we shall be charged with misrepresenting the new theory of the atonement by any who are familiarly acquainted with it. We have charged upon the system nothing but what its abettors avow and strenuously plead for. But for the sake of others we will exhibit some of its leading features in the very words of popular writers, who have appeared in print as its defenders. It is no part of our business to reconcile these theologians with one another, or even with themselves; nor do we attribute every sentiment of each to all who belong to that school. Let every man in this case bear his own burden, and be only answerable for his own words. A late English writer* says: "The execution of the penalty, on the principles of distributive justice, is inconsistent with the present administration of moral government, as it is a state of probation and trial. The exercise of what is called vindictive justice in the administration of the law ill accords with the present connexion between God and man." Again, "The providential government which God exercises over the world shows that threatenings can be honourably suspended, when the ends of good government can be secured by it." And, as a proof that the penalty of the law of God may be set aside, he alleges the fact that the penalty threatened to our first parents was not inflicted: "for," says the writer, "had it been literally executed there would have been no human race now existing. The penalty was, 'in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.'

* Jenkyn on the Atonement.

Adam did eat of the forbidden fruit and was spared. He did not die. The penalty was suspended and his punishment was remitted." It would be difficult to crowd a greater number of errors into the same space than are contained in the preceding citations. If God no longer governs the world on the principles of distributive justice, what sort of moral government do we live under? If vindicatory justice is entirely excluded from the administration of the law, how can God judge and punish the wicked? If God can at pleasure suspend his most positive and solemn threatenings, and that without limit, what truth was there in uttering these threatenings? If the penalty of the law was in no sense executed on Adam after he fell, then he suffered no injury by the fall, and we his posterity suffer no inconvenience from our connexion with him. If Adam would have been annihilated, had the penalty been inflicted, then eternal misery was not the penalty of the original law, and that so many are exposed to this dreadful punishment is entirely owing to the interposition of a Saviour. If men were not liable under the law to the sentence of eternal death, then Christ has not redeemed any from that curse. Upon these principles is it clear that the world has been essentially benefited by the coming of a Saviour?

A popular writer of our own country* has explicitly informed us what they mean by satisfying the demands of public justice. "In this acceptation," says he, "it has no direct reference to law, but embraces those principles of virtue or benevolence by which we are bound to govern our conduct, and by which God governs the universe." "This atonement was required that God might be just or righteous; that he might do the thing which was fit and proper, and best and most expedient to be done, and at the same time be at perfect liberty to justify him who believeth in Jesus." "The legal obstacle to man's salvation," he informs us, "was removed by the sacrifice of Christ." But how could a legal obstacle be removed by a transaction which left the penalty of the law in full force, and which had no direct relation to law? That the death of Christ had no effect in removing the penalty of the law, or in satisfying distributive justice, this writer teaches expressly. It was therefore incumbent on him to show how such an atonement as he pleads for could remove any legal obstacle to the sinner's salvation. But lest we should be suspected of misunderstanding or misrepresenting him, we will cite his own words. Speaking of the design of Christ's death he says: "The penalty of the law, strictly speaking, was not inflicted at all, for this penalty, in which was embodied the principles of distributive justice, required the death of the sinner, and did not require the death of Christ." "THE RELATION OF THE SINNER TO THE CURSE WHICH THIS LAW PRONOUNCES AGAINST THE TRANSGRESSOR IS JUST THE SAME THAT IT WAS WITHOUT THE ATONEMENT." How then, we ask

* Dr. Beman, Sermons on the Atonement.

again, could such an atonement remove the legal obstacles to the sinner's salvation? But he goes on to make the sentiment expressed above still stronger by saying, "He is the same guilty creature he was before satisfaction was made. The law has the same demand upon him. The law and justice, that is distributive justice as expressed in the law, have received no satisfaction at all." "The whole legal system has been suspended, at least for the present, to make way for one of a different character." If a doctrine which subverts or suspends the law of God is antinomian, we have antinomianism here in perfection. There is no law now in force; *the whole legal system is suspended, at least for the present.* How long this lawless state is to continue we are not informed. In another part of the same work this writer asks: "How did the atonement made by Jesus Christ, prepare the way for the exercise of mercy to sinners?" After telling us what purposes it did not answer, in stating which he sets aside all the usual ends which have been assigned by the orthodox, he concludes by declaring, "that it is a sovereign act of God as moral Governor." "Should it be asked," says he, "if the arm of distributive justice can be arrested, and if the law that threatened is not in this instance to inflict the curse, why was not this special, sovereign interposition so arranged, as not to involve the sufferings and death of Christ?" The very question which we wish to have answered; and until it is answered, we shall consider the new theory as essentially defective. Here was the point which called for all the ingenuity and reasoning powers of the author; but instead of meeting the difficulty, or attempting a full answer, he merely says, "We must recur to the doctrine before advanced and defended." Where that defence is made we know not. We believe, however, that the advocate of this new doctrine could not have better served his cause here than by observing a profound silence. The fact is that the question which he suggests is not susceptible of a satisfactory answer, on his principles. But what he adds in the next sentence is so strangely inconsistent with his own principles, that we were at first inclined to think that there must be an error of the press. The words are, "that the penalty of the law is essential to the existence and happiness of a moral government." It would, we believe, be impossible in a single sentence to express a sentiment more repugnant to the principles laid down by this writer in other parts of his work, which we have already cited. If the penalty of the law is essential to the existence and happiness of a moral government, then it must be maintained—it must be inflicted—it cannot be set aside. But in the passages quoted before he declares, that the penalty of the law is not inflicted, that the whole legal system is suspended, and that the law has the same demand upon the pardoned sinner as though no atonement had been made. But we are furnished with the following explanation. "The only method in which the execution of this penalty can be suspended is to furnish an adequate, and practical, and public substi-

tute in its place. For the end of distributive justice *must be secured*, and the substitute by which these are effectually accomplished is to be found in that atonement which is made in the gospel." This sounds so much like the orthodox opinion, that we are sorry to be obliged to think that the sense is very remote from that which we would give them, if the author had not opened to our view so fully his whole theory. The meaning is, that while the law receives no fulfilment, and its penalty is not inflicted, something else of a different character is done, which serves as a substitute for the execution of the penalty of the law. This use of the term substitution we before noticed. But the supposition of a substitute for law and justice is absurd. There can be no substitute for doing what is right, as there is no substitute for truth or honesty. If the death of Christ has no relation to the penalty of the law it can never be a substitute for the infliction of that penalty; and if the penalty remains in full force, and yet is suspended, the law is dishonoured. That opinion which derogates from the honour of the law, reflects dishonour upon the Lawgiver; for the law is the clearest expression of the holiness and righteousness of his nature. Thus to set aside the law would be to deny himself. Christ came not to destroy the law, but to magnify it and make it honourable. The exercise of mercy, which is alleged to be provided for by this scheme, is mercy at the expense of justice. By the whole theory these two attributes are exhibited as at variance, and the result is that mercy triumphs over law and justice.

Another American author,* who, perhaps, has brought out the features of the new theory more distinctly than any other, seems to find some difficulty in reconciling the atonement with the justice of God; but he relieves himself by adopting explicitly the idea that the atonement is nothing more than a public exhibition, or symbolical representation of the evil of sin, intended to produce a moral effect upon the universe. His words are, "the only difficulty is to understand how this exhibition was a display of the righteousness of God. To solve it some have resorted to the supposition that the Son of God became our SPONSOR, and satisfied the demands of the law on us, by suffering in our stead. But to this hypothesis there are strong objections"—"This hypothesis, like all others which suppose the Son of God to have entered into a close legal connexion with sinful men, and afterwards to have redeemed them, would make the atonement a legal satisfaction for sin; and then the acquittal would be no pardon at all, but would follow in the regular course of law." What else, we would ask, can an atonement for sin be than a legal satisfaction to the law which has been broken? and as to the absurd consequence supposed to follow on this supposition, it is merely imaginary. Remission and redemption by a full price are nowise incompatible. If a mediator delivers a criminal by satisfying the law, what is justice to him, is mercy to the

* Dr. Murdock.

offender. The greater the price paid, or the sufferings endured to obtain forgiveness, the more indebted is the condemned person to his deliverer: but the pardon to him is perfectly free. And whether liberation shall be conditional or unconditional, immediate or deferred, will depend upon the agreement between the judge who holds the prisoner in confinement, and the mediator. But this author, having without much ceremony rejected all idea of a *Sponsor*, a legal satisfaction, and a legal connexion between Christ and his people, brings out his own scheme of the atonement. "We must, therefore," says he, "resort to some other hypothesis. And what is more simple, and at the same time more satisfactory, than that the atonement was an *exhibition* or *display*—that is, it was a symbolical transaction." "The impression to be made was that God is a holy and righteous God; that while inclined to mercy he cannot forget the demands of justice."

Now this theory has no colour of proof from Holy Scripture. According to this view every idea of anything like *an atonement* is excluded: an exhibition or display may teach something or make an impression, but it is an abuse of language to call it an *atonement*. And as to this scheme illustrating the justice or righteousness of God, nothing could be further from the truth. According to this theory the demands of both law and justice are entirely disregarded. To remove this difficulty he says, "The justification of believers is not a justification founded on the principles of law and distributive justice." Did any one before ever hear of a sentence of justification which had no relation to the law? The very notion of justification is the sentence of a judge pronouncing a person who has been arraigned, acquitted according to law. Such a sentence may by an unjust judge be contrary to the law, but that it should have no respect to the principles of law is a solecism. "For," says he, "the operation of Christ's sacrifice was not, it appears, in the regular course of distributive justice in regard to individual transgressors. Neither did it satisfy the demands of the violated law upon him. It did not cancel any of the claims of the law on us. The atonement was not a legal or forensic transaction. It was altogether extrajudicial. It was in its nature simply an exhibition, intended to impress on all creatures a deep sense of the righteousness of God as a moral Governor." How a transaction which proceeds upon the principle of setting aside the demands of the law and distributive justice, can serve as an impressive exhibition of the righteousness of God as moral Governor, is a thing utterly beyond our conception. Certainly the difference between the old and new theory is radical. The one holds that vindicatory justice is essential to God, and that sin can be pardoned only by an adequate satisfaction being made; the other, that God may, by a sovereign act, pardon sin without any satisfaction to distributive justice. The one maintains that the threatenings of God against sin must be executed substantially; that to omit to execute the penalty of the law would be a departure from truth and faithfulness which

cannot without impiety be charged on the infinite God. They believe that Christ did actually suffer, in substance, and as literally as was possible, the penalty which we had incurred; that there existed no other reason why he should suffer at all than because law and justice demanded that the sinner should be punished. They believe that he suffered death, because death is the wages of sin; that he endured such sufferings, as, considering the dignity of his person, fully exhausted the penalty of the law, and fully satisfied divine justice for all the sins of those whom he had undertaken to redeem. They do not think that in bearing the penalty of the law, it was necessary for such a SUBSTITUTE to suffer the very same sort of pains, or for as long a duration, as would have been experienced by the sinner, if the penalty had been inflicted on himself. It was essential that the Mediator should die, and that his death should be accursed, and that he should endure inconceivable agonies of soul, arising from the pressure of divine wrath, and from the hiding of his Father's face, as well as from the cruelty and reproaches of those who by wicked hands crucified and slew him. The new theory maintains, that the death and sufferings of Christ were merely a display or exhibition of God's disapprobation of sin, but by no means a satisfaction to the law and justice of God: that this law remains unsatisfied, its claims being suspended by the introduction of another system of measures. The atonement, therefore, if it may be so called, is a device adopted to supply the place of the execution of the law: and even justification is not a justification according to the law, but an extrajudicial act, not founded upon the view of a righteousness commensurate to the demands of the law, but a sovereign act in which no regard is paid to the demands of the law. These demands remain and will remain unsatisfied in the case of believers to all eternity. The law pronounces him guilty, but the atonement, as thus understood, receives the guilty sinner out of the hands of the law, and obtains his pardon, while the justice of God condemns him to death. If these two theories are not radically different, we confess that we have no judgment in such matters. The one insists upon a real efficacious *atonement* or expiation; the other retains the name of atonement, but rejects the thing. We ask the abettors of this new scheme, if neither God's justice nor law required to be satisfied, where was the necessity of a Mediator? On these principles we are persuaded, such a necessity can never be shown. We ask again, how God can be just and holy, and suffer sin to go unpunished; for according to this theory, it is not punished in the sinner, nor in the surety. We ask what conceivable purpose Christ's sufferings and death could have answered? They tell us, indeed, that they were intended to be an impressive exhibition of the righteousness of God and of the evil of sin, and God's determination not to suffer it to pass with impunity. But it is impossible, upon their principles, that it can answer any of these ends. Instead of illustrating the justice of God, it violates it in several respects. First, it is the punishment of an innocent

person to whom no guilt is imputed. Secondly, the sinner is rescued from the demands of justice without satisfaction. And thirdly, the culprit justly condemned by the law is justified in despite of the sentence of the law. When we see a person suffering a cruel death by the appointment of some government, we learn nothing from the event until we know why he suffers. If for crimes which have merited such a punishment, we are impressed with a sense of the just severity of the government; or if we are informed that with the consent of the government he voluntarily suffers in the place of others who had rebelled against the laws, whatever we may think of the policy of the measure, we are still impressed with the inflexibility of the demands of justice, which refuses to let the guilty go free, unless some responsible person undergoes the penalty in his stead. But if we were assured that the person who suffered was neither punished for his own crime, nor as a substitute for the guilty, we should instantly pronounce the proceeding to be unjust. But what if we should be told that the government meant to make an exhibition of the righteousness of its laws, and the evil of rebellion by such an infliction? Every one would pronounce it to be perfectly absurd. The king of Moab, when he saw that his city was likely to be taken, took his own son and hung him on a gibbet from the wall in the sight of the enemy. But what did it effect? It might indeed teach his own desperation and folly, but nothing more. Such a transaction cannot prove that the wicked will be certainly punished. As far as actions speak it will make the impression, that under this government the innocent may suffer. And in the case of our Saviour, while the innocent suffers the guilty are exempt. Though deserving to die they are pardoned; and instead of their being punished, an innocent person suffers a cruel death. Surely this can never make the impression that the guilty will in time to come be punished. The suspension of a just penalty never can have the effect of convincing the universe that God is determined to execute it. The infliction of undeserved punishment upon an innocent person can never make the impression that God is righteous, or that the innocent are safe. If it be alleged, that an innocent person did suffer, and the guilty escape, as all acknowledge; we reply that according to our theory the innocent suffered the penalty due to the guilty; the just for the unjust. In this transaction the law, instead of being disregarded and its penalty set aside, was gloriously honoured. It received a perfect obedience from one such as never in any other case was subject to its authority. Christ was made under the law to redeem them that were under the law. He fully bore its tremendous penalty. The cup of wrath due for sin could not pass away from him. He therefore submitted to drink it, bitter as it was. "The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" Truly he did magnify the law and make it honourable. "Christ," says Paul, "hath redeemed us from the curse of the law being made a curse for us." Was there no

enduring of the penalty here? What is a curse but the awful penalty which the law denounces? It is a remarkable fact that the defenders of this scheme scarcely ever appeal to scripture in support of their views. They depend on their own reason to prove that the death of Christ was no satisfaction to law and justice, and in examining the objections we were struck with the fact that the advocates of the new theory make use of the same arguments and resort to the same evasions which were employed by Faustus Socinus and his coadjutors, in opposing the doctrine of atonement, in the sixteenth century. Indeed, we see not why he might not have called the death of Christ an atonement, for similar reasons with those which are alleged by the abettors of this scheme. Accordingly, John Taylor of Norwich has written a book against the orthodox doctrine, and yet retains the word, and says, "Our Lord's death took its value not from *pain* or *suffering*, *imputation* or *punishment*, but from *obedience* and *goodness*, or the most complete character of all virtue and righteousness, the noblest of all principles and the highest perfection of intellectual nature." On account of this exhibition of moral excellence, he thinks that God is pleased to pardon the sinner upon his repentance. And Dr. Sykes, who rejects all the orthodox views on this subject, still maintains what he calls the doctrine of atonement, which is simply, that Christ died to convince men that God was not angry with them, but really loved them. If the new theory may properly be called an atonement, why may not the schemes of Taylor and Sykes?

All that we plead for is that what is plainly expressed or clearly implied in hundreds of texts of scripture, be admitted to be a doctrine of divine revelation. As this is the grand peculiarity of the Christian system, we are bound to guard it from perversion, and to maintain this cardinal truth in unadulterated purity. This is our apology for occupying so many pages with our own views of the necessity and nature of the atonement.

ESSAY V.

ON REVIVALS OF RELIGION.*

We congratulate the friends of truth and order on the appearance of these publications. We have never had any doubt what would be the decision of the public mind respecting the new divinity and new-measure system of our day, if its distinctive features could be brought out to the light and exposed to general observation. History warrants us in cherishing this our confidence. The truth is, that this system contains but little that is *new*. It is mainly, if not entirely, composed of exploded errors and condemned heresies. The church has already once and again pronounced judgment upon it; and we have no doubt therefore, that the same sentence of condemnation will be repeated by the Presbyterian church of the present day, whenever the case is fairly presented for decision. The chief reason why the condemnation of this system has at all lingered, is, that its true character has not been generally known. Its advocates, when charged with teaching certain obnoxious doctrines, and, in their religious meetings, violating the sobrieties of good sense as well as of Christian order, have evaded or denied the charge, and complained piteously of misrepresentation. Much has been done to blind the minds of those who were not able to bear the things they had to say, to the undisguised character of the doctrines they have taught in the lecture room and the chapel. We rejoice, therefore, in the publication of Mr. Finney's sermons and lectures. The public can now learn what the new system is, from the exposition of one of its chief promoters. He has stated his own case, and out of his own mouth may he now be justified or condemned.

The lectures on revivals were delivered by Mr. Finney to his congregation in Chatham-street chapel, during the last winter. They were first published from week to week, in the columns of the New York Evangelist, from reports furnished by the editor of that paper. They were subsequently collected, and after having

* Originally published in 1835, in review of the following works:—"Lectures on Revivals of Religion." By Charles G. Finney.—"Sermons on Various Subjects." By Rev. C. G. Finney.

been submitted to the author for correction, published in a volume. The work, we perceive, has already reached a fifth edition. Much diligence is employed in efforts to give it an extended circulation. It is recommended as a suitable book for Sabbath-school libraries; and no pains are spared to spread it abroad through the length and breadth of the land. Its friends evidently have a strong persuasion of its extraordinary merits. Their zeal for its circulation proves that they consider it a fair and able exposition of the new system.

The sermons appear to be a monthly publication. We have obtained seven of them, which are all, we presume, that have yet been published. They discuss the several topics, "Sinners bound to change their own hearts," "How to change your heart," "Traditions of the Elders," "Total Depravity," "Why Sinners hate God," and, "God cannot please Sinners." These sermons, with the lectures on revivals, give a pretty full exhibition of Mr. Finney's peculiar views. If we may judge from the tiresome degree of repetition in these productions, the perpetual recurrence of the same ideas, phrases, and illustrations, we should suppose that he can have nothing new to say; nothing, at all events, that would materially add to, or modify, what he has already said. We may consider ourselves fairly in possession of his system. To the interpretation of that system we shall now proceed, having it less for our object to refute, than merely to exhibit its peculiarities. We shall endeavour to gather up the plain, obvious meaning of Mr. Finney's statements, taking it for granted, that there is no hidden, esoteric sense attached to them.

Of the literary merit of these productions we have but little to say. The reporter deprecates, or rather defies all criticism upon their *style*, affirming that the critic "will undoubtedly lose his labour." No doubt he will, so far as the amendment of the author is concerned. But the reformation of an offending author is not the sole object of criticism. The reporter himself (the Rev. Mr. Leavitt) says of Mr. Finney's language, that it is "colloquial and Saxon." Words are but relative in their meaning. What kind of "colloquies" the Rev. Mr. Leavitt may have been used to, we do not pretend to know; but for ourselves we must say, that we desire never to have a part, either as speakers or hearers, in any colloquy where such language is current, as Mr. Finney often permits himself to employ. If his other epithet, Saxon, means simply, not English, we have no objection to it. For, surely, it has not often fallen to our lot to read a book, in which the proprieties of grammar as well as the decencies of taste were so often and so needlessly violated; and in which so much that may not inappropriately be termed *slang* was introduced. But we have higher objects before us than detailed criticism upon Mr. Finney's style. We should not have made any allusion to it, but that we deemed it worth a passing notice, as forming part and parcel of the coarse, radical spirit of the whole system.

We proceed to examine, in the first place, the *doctrines* of this

new system. Mr. Finney does not pretend to teach a slightly modified form of old doctrine. He is far from claiming substantial agreement with the wise and good among the orthodox of the past and present generation. On the contrary, there is a very peculiar self-isolation about him. Through all his writings there is found an ill concealed claim to be considered as one called and anointed of God, to do a singular and great work. There is scarcely a recognition of any fellow-labourers in the same field with him. One might suppose indeed, that he considered himself the residuary legatee of all the prophetic and apostolical authority that has ever been in the world, so arrogantly does he assume all knowledge to himself, so loftily does he arraign and rebuke all other ministers of the gospel. He stands alone in the midst of abounding degeneracy, the only one who has not bowed the knee to Baal. The whole world is wrong, and he proposes to set them right. Ministers and professors of religion have hitherto been ignorant what truths should be taught to promote revivals of religion, and he offers to impart to them infallible information.

It is true, in his preface, he disclaims all pretensions to infallibility, but in his lectures, he more than once substantially assumes it. He tells his hearers, in relation to promoting revivals, "If you will go on to do *as I say*, the results will be *just as certain* as they are when the farmer breaks up a fallow field, and mellows it, and sows his grain." He speaks repeatedly of the "endless train of *fooleries*," the "*absurdities*," the "*nonsense*," which, up to his time, have been taught both in private and from the pulpit. He declares, "there is only *here and there a minister* who knows how to probe the church," &c. "This is a point where *almost all ministers* fail." "When *I* entered the ministry so much had been said about the doctrine of election and sovereignty, that I found it was the *universal* hiding place, both of sinners and the church, that they could not do anything, or could not obey the gospel. And *wherever I went*, I found it necessary to demolish these refuges of lies." "There is and has been *for ages*, a striking defect in exhibiting this most important subject." "For *many centuries* but little of the real gospel has been preached." "The truth is, that very little of the gospel has come out upon the world, *for these hundreds of years*, without being clogged and obscured by false theology." What can be more evident than that Mr. Finney considers himself a great reformer? He comes forth with the avowed purpose of clearing away the errors by which the true gospel has been so overlaid as to destroy its efficiency. He comes to declare new truths, as well as to unfold new methods of presenting them to the mind.

The first of these new doctrines to which we call the attention of our readers, has relation to the *government* of God. It will be remembered that a few years since, Dr. Taylor, with some other divines, publicly announced and defended the proposition, that God could not prevent the introduction of sin in a moral system. At least he was very generally, if not universally, understood to teach

this proposition. And it is strange, if not actually unprecedented, that a writer of an honest and sound mind, understanding the language he employs, and having it for his serious purpose to convey to his readers certain important information, should be misunderstood as to the main purport of his message by those best qualified, from education and otherwise, to comprehend it.

But Dr. Taylor did complain that he was misunderstood. He insists that he did not intend to teach that God could not prevent the existence of moral evil, but only that it is impossible to prove that He could prevent it. His object was to unsettle belief in all existing theories upon this subject, and then to substitute this negative one in their place; in other words, to inculcate absolute scepticism upon this point. This is the ground now occupied by the New Haven divines. We fear, therefore, that they will be alarmed by the position which Mr. Finney has taken. He has evidently neglected, since his return from his foreign tour, to post up his knowledge. He has not acquainted himself with the improvements made during his absence. He teaches, without any qualification, the doctrine which the New Haven school was at first understood to teach. He complains that sinners "take it for granted that the two governments which God exercises over the universe, moral and providential, *might* have been so administered as to have produced universal holiness throughout the universe." This, he says, is a "*gratuitous* and *wicked* assumption." It is *wicked*, then, to believe that God could have produced universal holiness. Mr. Finney further adds, "There is no reason to doubt that God so administers his providential government, as to produce upon the whole, the highest and most salutary *practicable* influence in favour of holiness." This sentiment, it is true, is susceptible of a correct interpretation through the ambiguity of the word *practicable*. But another quotation will make it evident that he means this word to include nothing more than the resisting power of the human will. "The sanctions of His law are absolutely *infinite:* in them he has embodied and held forth the highest possible motives to obedience." "It is vain to talk of His omnipotence preventing sin: if *infinite* motives will not prevent it, it cannot be prevented under a moral government; and to maintain the contrary is absurd and a contradiction." A more explicit and confident statement of this doctrine could hardly be given. It is *absurd* and *contradictory* to maintain that God could have prevented the introduction of sin into our world. The only semblance of an argument which Mr. Finney urges in support of this opinion is, "that mind must be governed by *moral* power, while matter is governed by *physical* power." "If to govern mind were the same as to govern matter—if to sway the intellectual world were accomplished by the same power that sways the physical universe, then indeed it would be just from the physical omnipotence of God, and from the existence of sin, to infer that God prefers its existence to holiness in its stead." Again he says, "To

maintain that the *physical* omnipotence of God can prevent sin is to talk nonsense." We see not the least ground for this distinction between the moral and physical power of God; nor do we believe that Mr. Finney himself can attach any definite meaning to his favourite phrase, "physical omnipotence." By the omnipotence of God we understand a power to do anything without those hindrances and restrictions by which we and all created beings are beset. It must be the same power which sways the intellectual and physical universe, unless we are to make as many different species of power as there are objects upon which it may be exerted. This distinction, however, were it well founded, would avail Mr. Finney nothing in defence of his position. The power of God, by whatever name called, can be limited in its exercise only by the laws which He has himself immutably fixed. The power of the Creator was without any limit;—the power of the Governor labours under no other restrictions than the ordinances of the Creator have imposed upon it. It is often said that God cannot achieve impossibilities, such as to make a body exist in several places at the same time. All such limitations of the divine power are found in those relations and properties of things which He has himself established. A body cannot be made to exist in several places at once, for if it could it would no longer be a body. So in the nature of man we may trace certain properties and laws, which lay a similar restriction, if so it may be called, upon the exercise of the divine power. God cannot make a sinner happy, while he continues a sinner, for He has already so made man that his happiness must come to him as the consequence of the right action of his powers, and he would cease to be man if this law of his nature were altered. Now is there any similar restriction in the nature of moral agency? Does it enter into our notion of a moral agent, and go to make up the definition of one, that he cannot be subjected to any other influence than that of motive? Suppose that God should, in some inscrutable way, so act upon his will as to dispose it to yield to the influence of motive, would such action make him cease to be a moral agent? If not, we have no right to deny the power of God to effect it It is impossible to conceive that His power can be restrained by anything exterior to himself. The only bounds beyond which it cannot pass must be those that have been established by His own nature, or His previous acts. Unless he has so made moral agents that it is a contradiction in terms to assert that they can be influenced in any other way than by motive, it is in the highest degree unwarrantable and presumptuous to deny that God can act upon them by other means. But a moral agent, while possessed of the necessary faculties, and not forced to act contrary to his will, or to will contrary to his prevailing inclinations and desires, remains a moral agent still. Would, then, the operation of any other influence than that of motive upon him, destroy his liberty of action or his freedom of will? Certainly not. And as certainly no man can deny that God can influence men as he pleases without

thereby denying His omnipotence. A more groundless, gratuitous assumption could not well be found, than Mr. Finney has made in asserting that it is impossible for God to affect his moral subjects in any other way than by motive.

Let it be observed that we use the word *motive*, as Mr. Finney himself has evidently used it, to denote simply the objective considerations presented to the mind as they are in themselves, without taking into account the state of the mind in relation to those considerations. This is the only sense of the word in which it can be at all maintained that "*infinite* motives" have been urged upon man for the prevention of sin and the promotion of holy obedience. If the state of the mind, which always determines the apparent qualities of the object, be included, as it generally is, in the term motive, then it is not true that the mind could resist "infinite motives." In this sense of the word it is self-evident that the will must always be determined by the strongest motive. An "infinite motive," by which can be meant only a motive infinitely strong, or stronger than any other we can conceive of, would of course prevail and carry the will with it. Then it would be just to infer, from infinite motives having been presented to bear man onward in the paths of holy obedience, that God had done all that he could to prevent sin. And then too it would be impossible that any sin could exist, or that sin could ever have entered our world.

But granting, what we have shown to be the gratuitous assumption, that God cannot influence men in any other way than by the objective presentation of truth to the mind, Mr. Finney has given us no reasons for adopting the opinion that, "He has done all that the nature of the case admitted to prevent the existence of sin," while we can see many reasons which forbid us to receive it. The state of the question, as we are now about to put it, in conformity with Mr. Finney's representations, does indeed involve the *three* gratuitous assumptions, that God could not have made man a moral agent and yet give him a greater degree of susceptibility of impression from the truth than he now possesses; that man being as he is, God could not have devised any external considerations to affect him, in addition to those which are actually placed before his mind; and lastly, that man and the truth both being as they are, God cannot reach and move the mind of man in any other way than by the truth. These are by no means axioms, and Mr. Finney would be sadly perplexed in the attempt to prove any one of them. But, for the sake of showing that even with these bold and barefaced assumptions he cannot maintain his position, we will admit them all. Man could not have been a moral agent had he been more yielding to the truth than he now is. "Infinite motives" to obedience have been provided; by which, as we have already shown, can be meant only that *all the truth* which could possibly affect the human mind has been revealed to it. And thirdly, man cannot be moved but by the truth. The "nature of the case" being supposed to demand all these admissions, does it

still follow that God has done all that he could to prevent the existence of sin? Mr. Finney himself shall answer this question. His theory of the nature of divine influence is, that the Spirit "gets and keeps the attention of the mind"—"He pours the expostulation (of the preacher) home"—He keeps the truth, which would else have been suffered to slip away, "in warm contact with the mind." Here is of course the admission, and we are glad he is willing to concede so much power to his Maker, that God can gain the attention of the mind, and keep before it and in contact with it, any or all of the "infinite motives" which he has provided to deter from sin. Connect this admission with another class of passages. in which Mr. Finney teaches that, "When an object is before the mind, the corresponding emotion will rise," and who does not see in the resulting consequence a glaring inconsistency with the doctrine that God has done all that he can to prevent the existence of sin? To make this more plain, we will take the case of Adam's transgression, of which Mr. Finney has, out of its connexion with the subject we are now discussing, given us the rationale. "Adam," he says, "was perfectly holy, but not infinitely so. As his preference for God was not infinitely strong, it was possible that it might be changed, and we have the melancholy fact written in characters that cannot be misunderstood, on every side of us, that an occasion occurred on which he actually changed it. Satan, in the person of the serpent, presented a temptation of a very peculiar character. It was addressed to the constitutional appetites of both soul and body; to the appetite for food in the body, and for knowledge in the mind. These appetites were constitutional; they were not in themselves sinful, but their unlawful indulgence was sin." The temptation in this case was the motive addressed to Adam's constitutional appetites. The reason why this motive prevailed was, that it was kept before the mind to the exclusion of adverse considerations. The emotions of desire towards the forbidden fruit were not unlawful until they had become sufficiently strong to lead Adam to violate the command of his Maker. If, then, just at the point of unlawfulness, the attention of Adam's mind had been diverted from the forbidden fruit to the consideration of God's excellency and His command, "the corresponding emotion" would have arisen, and he would not have sinned. But the Spirit has power to "get and keep the attention of the mind." Certainly then He could have directed the attention of Adam's mind to those known truths, though at the moment unthought of, which would have excited the "corresponding emotions" of reverence for God, and preserved him thus in holy obedience.

But though Mr. Finney holds forth the views here given of the Spirit's agency in presenting truth to the mind, it would evidently be a great relief to his theological scheme if he were fairly rid of the doctrine of divine influence. The influence of the Holy Spirit comes in only by the way, if we may so speak, in his account of

the sinner's regeneration and conversion. We will cast away this doctrine, therefore—we will grant him even more than he *dares* to ask—and still his position is untenable, that God has done all that he can to prevent the existence of sin. Before he can demand our assent to this proposition, he must prove, in the case already presented, that God could not have prevented the entrance of Satan into the garden. Admitting that the volitions of Satan were beyond the control of his Maker, he must investigate the relation of spirit to space, and prove that it was impossible for God to have erected physical barriers over which this mighty fiend could not have passed. He must show that it was impossible for God so to have arranged merely providential circumstances, that our first parents should have been kept out of the way of the tempter, or that the force of the temptation should have been at all diminished. Until he has proved all this, and then proved that his three assumptions which we have pointed out are true, we must prefer the "absurdity" and "nonsense" of rejecting his doctrine, to the wisdom of receiving it.

The argument thus far has been a direct one, and we should not fear to leave it as it now stands. But we cannot refrain from adverting to some of the consequences of the doctrine we have been examining. If God has done all that he can to prevent the existence of sin, and has not succeeded in his efforts, then must he have been disappointed. If he cannot control at pleasure the subjects of his moral kingdom, then must he be continually and unavoidably subject to grief from the failure of his plans. Instead of working all things according to his good pleasure, he can do only what the nature of the case will permit,—that is, what his creatures will allow him to do. He in whose hands are the hearts of all men, and who turns them as the rivers of waters are turned, is thus made a petitioner at the hands of his subjects for permission to execute his plans and purposes. Accordingly we find Mr. Finney using such language as this: "God has found it *necessary to take advantage* of the excitability there is in mankind, to produce powerful excitements among them before he *can* lead them to obey." He speaks of a "state of things, in which it is *impossible for God* or man to promote religion but by powerful excitements." And of course there may be states of things in which neither by excitements nor by any other means will God be able to effect the results he desires. Then may we rightly teach, as some at least of our modern reformers have taught, that God, thwarted in his wishes and plans by the obstinacy of the human will, is literally grieved by the perverse conduct of men; and sinners may properly be exhorted as they have been to forsake their sins from compassion for their suffering Maker! It is a sufficient condemnation of any doctrine that it leads by an immediate and direct inference to so appalling a result as this. We know of nothing which ought more deeply to pain and shock the pious mind. If the perverseness of man has been able in one instance to prevent God from accom-

plishing what he preferred, then may it in any instance obstruct the working of his preferences. Where, then, is the infinite and immutable blessedness of the Deity? We cannot contemplate this doctrine, thus carried out into its lawful consequences, without unspeakable horror and dismay. The blessedness of the Deity! what pious mind has not been accustomed to find in it the chief source of its own joy? Who does not habitually turn from the disquieting troubles and scenes of misery that distress him here, to "drink of the river of God's pleasures?" Who can bear the thought that the infinitely holy and benevolent God should be less than infinitely happy? We see not how any heart that loves God can feel happy itself, unless it believes him to be, as he deserves to be, infinitely blessed. Nor can we find any security for the felicity of the creature but in the perfect and unchangeable felicity of the Creator. If God, therefore, be as this doctrine represents him, unable to produce states of things which he prefers, and if his benevolent feelings are thus continually exposed to grief from obstructions to their operation, the voice of wailing and despair should break forth from all his moral subjects. We can see, indeed, but little to decide our choice between such a God as this and no God.

Another consequence of this doctrine is that God cannot confirm angels and saints in holiness. If he could not prevent the introduction of sin into our world, we see not upon what principles we are entitled to affirm that he can prevent its re-introduction into heaven. We see not how he can at any time hinder the standard of rebellion from being yet once more uplifted among the bright and joyous throng that now cast their crowns at his feet. We are perfectly aware of the answer which Mr. Finney will make to this objection. He will contend that the additional motives furnished by the introduction of sin, such as the visible and dreadful punishment of the sinner, and the display of the divine character thereby afforded, are sufficient to enable God by the use of them, together with the means and appliances previously existing, to confirm holy beings in holiness. Now, independently of other insuperable objections to this as a sufficient reply, how does it consist with that other part of the scheme, that "*infinite motives*" had been already arrayed against the introduction of sin? If these motives were infinite, then no addition could possibly be made to them. We leave Mr. Finney to reconcile this contradiction, or to admit that we have no reason to expect that the gates of heaven will be barred against sin.

This doctrine also takes away from the sinner all just ground for the dread of everlasting punishment. Its advocates, we know, have contended that it is the only position from which Universalism can be effectively assailed. But if, when man was tempted to sin by so insignificant a motive as the forbidden fruit, while "infinite motives" were drawing him back, God could not prevent him from yielding, it must surely be impossible for him to prevent the sinner in the other world from obeying the impulse of the infinite motives

which, more strongly there than here, will urge him to holiness. The sinner, then, may dismiss his apprehensions of the everlasting experience of the miseries of a wicked heart. If God could not prevent Adam from sinning, under the influence of a small motive, there is no reason to fear that he can prevent any inhabitant of hell from becoming holy, under the influence of infinite motives. We have dwelt upon this subject at greater length than was at first intended. Our excuse is, that the question at issue is a very serious and important one; and the views of it presented by Mr. Finney seem to be so dishonouring to the character of God, as well as subversive of some of the most important truths of religion, that they should be carefully examined. Had our object been simply to criticise, Mr. Finney might have been more briefly despatched. There is in his pages a surpassingly rich treasure of contradictions, which might at every turn have furnished us with an *argumentum ad hominem*, had we been disposed to avail ourselves of it. But we have felt that the matter in hand was of too grave and weighty an import to be thus managed.

We invite the attention of our readers, in the next place, to Mr. Finney's views of the *nature of sin*, *depravity* and *regeneration*. He contends that all sin consists in acts, and assures us that those who teach otherwise are guilty of "tempting the Holy Ghost," and of a "stupid, not to say wilful perversion of the Word of God." He deems it absurd beyond expression to suppose that there can be a sinful disposition prior to sinful acts; nay, he solemnly affirms that "millions upon millions have gone down to hell," in consequence of the doctrine of what he is pleased to call "physical depravity" having been so extensively taught. He seldom approaches this subject without breaking out in some such paroxysm as the following: "O the darkness and confusion, and utter nonsense of that view of depravity which exhibits it as something lying back, and the cause of all actual transgression!"

Our readers will soon be able to judge for themselves whether Mr. Finney has cleared away any of the darkness which rests upon this subject.

In the prosecution of our inquiries into the nature of sin, two questions very naturally present themselves for decision; first, whether there can exist anything like what has been called *disposition*, distinct from mental acts; and secondly, whether, if such an attribute of mind can and does exist, it may be said to possess any moral character. Mr. Finney, with much convulsive violence of language, continually denies that there can be any such thing as a mental disposition, in the sense in which we have used the word. He employs the term, it is true, but he says he means by it a mental act, and that it is nonsensical to attach to it any other meaning. His arguments against the possibility of the existence of mental dispositions, apart from mental acts, may be briefly despatched; for we do not reckon among the arguments his violent outcries of darkness, confusion, absurdity, nonsense, doctrine of devils, &c., nor

his assertions that God himself cannot lead the sinner to repentance without first dispossessing him of the erroneous notion that his nature as well as his conduct needs to be changed. All the arguments on the point now before us, that lie scattered through his many pages, may be reduced to two. It is impossible, he contends, to *conceive* of the existence of a disposition of mind; and again, if there be a disposition distinct from the faculties and acts of the mind, it must form a part of the substance of the mind, and hence follow physical depravity and physical regeneration with all their horrid train of evils. When he asserts the impossibility of *conceiving* of a disposition of mind, we suppose he means that it is impossible to frame an image of it, or form a picture in which this disposition shall stand visible to the mind's eye. It is only in this sense that his assertion is true. It is true that we cannot form such a *conception* of a mental disposition, but we will not insult the common sense of our readers by attempting to prove that this is no argument against its existence.

The other argument on which Mr. Finney relies to prove the non-existence of any disposition of mind, is that if there be any such thing it must form a part of the substance of the mind, it must be incorporated with the very substance of our being, with many other phrases of like import. Hence he charges those who teach that there are such dispositions, and that they possess a moral character, with teaching physical depravity, and representing "God as an infinite tyrant." He avers, in a great variety of forms, that their preaching has a direct and legitimate tendency to lull the sinner in his security, to make men of sense turn away in disgust from such absurd exhibitions of the Gospel, and to people hell with inhabitants. These are grave charges; and as, if substantiated, they would affect the fair fame and destroy the usefulness of nine-tenths of the ministers of the church to which Mr. Finney belongs, so, if groundless, Mr. Finney must be regarded as a slanderer of his brethren, guilty and odious in proportion to the enormity of the unsustained charges against them. In one respect at least Mr. Finney is guilty of bringing false accusations against his brethren. He continually represents them as holding and teaching all his own inferences from their doctrines. This is more than uncharitable; it is calumnious. He has a perfect right to develope the absurdities of what he calls physical depravity, and present them as so many reasons for rejecting any doctrine which can be proved to result in such consequences; but he has no right to endeavour to cast the reproach of teaching these inferred absurdities upon men who have uniformly, and if more decently yet not less strongly than himself, disclaimed them. But we contend that these absurdities do not lawfully flow from the doctrine that the mind has tastes and dispositions distinct from its faculties and acts. It is easy to show, in contradiction to Mr. Finney, that it may possess such attributes, which nevertheless will not form any part of the substance of the mind. Nay, we can make Mr. Finney himself prove it. In one of his sermons, where

he has lost sight for a brief space of physical depravity, he speaks on this wise : " Love, when existing in the form of *volition*, is a simple preference of the mind for God and the things of religion to everything else. This preference may and often does exist in the mind, so entirely separate from what is termed emotion or feeling, that we may be *entirely insensible to its existence*. But although its existence may not be a matter of *consciousness* by being felt, yet its influence over our conduct will be such, as that the fact of its existence will in this way be made manifest." Here is a state of mind recognised which Mr. Finney, with an utter confusion of the proprieties of language, chooses to call love existing in the form of volition, but which we call a disposition. But by whatever name or phrase it may be designated, it is not a faculty of the mind ; it is not the object of consciousness, has no sensible existence, and cannot therefore in any proper sense be called an act of the mind, nor yet does it form any part of the substance of the mind. It is not without an object (what it is will be presently seen) that Mr. Finney makes so queer a use of the term *volition* in the above quotation ; but the insertion of this word does not alter the bearing of the passage upon the point now in question. His subsequent qualifications show that he is describing something different from an act of the mind : and the single question now before us is, whether there can be in the mind any disposition distinct from its acts, and comprising within it tendencies and influences towards a certain course of action, which yet does not form a part of the substance of the mind. The passage quoted is clear and explicit, as far as this question is concerned. Let us hope, then, that we shall hear no more from Mr. Finney on the subject of *physical* depravity ; or at least that when he next chooses to harangue his people on this favourite topic, he will have the candour, the plain, homespun honesty, to tell them that there is not a single minister in the Presbyterian church who teaches the odious doctrine, or anything that legitimately leads to it, but that he has brought this man of straw before them to show them how quickly he can demolish it. We have a great aversion to this Nero-like way of tying up Christians in the skins of wild beasts that the dogs may devour them.

But it will be said, that the dispositions which have been shown to exist in the mind are formed by the mind itself, in the voluntary exercise of its powers ; such would not be the case with a disposition existing prior to all action. This is true, but it is not of the least moment in settling the question of the *physical* character of the disposition. If a disposition may be produced by the mind itself, which so far from being itself an act makes its existence known only by its *influence*, and which yet is not incorporated with the substance of our being, nor entitled to the epithet physical, then such a disposition might inhere in the mind prior to all mental action, without possessing a physical character. There is not the least relevancy or force, therefore, in the argument commonly and

chiefly relied upon, that if there be such an antecedent disposition, it must be physical. The only plausible argument that can be urged here, is, that experience shows us what is the formative law of our dispositions, that these are always generated by the mind's own action; and it is absurd therefore to suppose that any disposition can exist in the mind anterior to all action. The conclusion to which this argument arrives is wider than the premises. Its fallacy, and it is an obvious one, lies in extending a law, generalized from observation upon the mind's action, to a case in which by hypothesis the mind has never yet acted, and to which, of course, the law can have no application. There is here a fallacy of the same nature as would be involved in a process of reasoning like this:—All our observation proves to us that no tree can be produced but by calling into action the germinative power of its seed. The seed must be planted in a fitting soil, and be subjected to a certain class of influences;—it must decay and then send forth the tender shrub, which, in its turn, must be sustained by appropriate nourishment; and years must elapse before the tree will lift its tall head to the skies. No man has ever seen a tree produced by any other means, and the nature of things is such that a tree cannot be produced in any other way. *Therefore*, no tree could have originally come into being but through the same process. The error in reasoning is here apparent, nor is it less so in the case which this was intended to illustrate.

Here again it will be urged, and at first sight the objection may seem to gather force from the illustration we have just employed, that if there be any such antecedent disposition as we are contending for, formed previous to any action of the mind, it must be the direct effect of creative power; and if it possess any moral character, as we shall offer some reasons for believing it does, then God is the immediate author of sin. This is the form in which this objection is always put by Mr. Finney and others, and we have therefore adopted it, although it assumes what has been shown to be untrue, that a disposition of mind, in the sense in which we use the term, implies the idea either of a physical entity or a spiritual substance. It does not and cannot include any such idea, and can in no case be considered, therefore, as the effect of *creative* power. But does it follow that a primitive disposition, such as we speak of, must be the direct product of the agency of the Deity? Is it not evident, on the contrary, that this is only one out of an infinite number of modes in which it may possibly have been produced?—The first tree might have been called into being by the power of God, and sprung up in an instant, complete in all its proportions; but it might also have been produced in an endless number of ways, through the operation of some law, different, of course, from the existing law of vegetable production, but requiring as much time for the completion of its process, and removing its final result to any assignable distance from the direct interference of divine agency. So is it possible too, that a primitive

disposition of mind may be produced in an infinite number of ways; and the mode of its formation may be such that it cannot be considered the effect of the divine power in any other sense than that in which all the movements and actions both of matter and mind throughout the universe, are said to be of God.

We think we have now shown that there are such states of mind as have been designated by the term disposition; that a disposition of mind may exist anterior to all mental action; that this disposition does not form any part of the substance of the mind; and that it is not necessary to suppose that God is the author of it, in any other sense than that in which He is the author of all we feel and do.

We come now to discuss the question of the moral character of mental dispositions. Mr. Finney, with his accustomed violence and lavish abuse of those who teach a different doctrine, denies that a disposition of mind, granting its existence, could possess any moral character. Most of his arguments on this point have been already despatched by our preliminary discussion. If it be true that a disposition is sinful, then sin is a substance, instead of a quality of action:—then, too, God is the author of sin, and He is an infinite tyrant, since he damns man for being what He made him. This sentence comprises within it the substance of most that wears the semblance of argument in what Mr. Finney has said on this subject; and how perfectly futile this is has been made sufficiently apparent.

He argues from the text, "Sin is a transgression of the law," that sin attaches only to acts, and cannot be predicated of a disposition. As well might he argue from the assertion, man is a creature of sensation, that he possessed no powers of reflection. Until he can show, what indeed he has asserted very dogmatically, but of which he has offered no proof, that this text was meant to be a strict definition of sin, it will not serve his purpose.

The only other arguments worthy of notice, which Mr. Finney adduces in support of his position, that all sin consists in acts, are drawn from the considerations that "*voluntariness* is indispensable to moral character."

There is undoubtedly a sense in which it is true, that nothing can be sinful which is not *voluntary*. And in this sense of the word all our dispositions *are* voluntary. There are two meanings attached to the word will. It sometimes denotes the single faculty of mind, called will; and sometimes all the active powers of the mind, all its desires, inclinations and affections. This double meaning has proved a great snare to Mr. Finney. He either never made the distinction, or perpetually loses sight of it, and hence is often inconsistent with himself. In seeking to exhibit the meaning which he prevalently attaches to the words will, voluntary, &c., we shall have occasion to present to our readers a very singular theory of morals. "Nothing," he says, "can be sinful or holy, which is not directly or indirectly under the control of the will."

But over our emotions "the will has no direct influence, and can only bring them into existence through the medium of the attention. Feelings or emotions are dependent upon *thought*, and arise spontaneously in the mind when the thoughts are intensely occupied with their corresponding objects. Thought is under the direct control of the will. We can direct our *attention* and meditations to any subject, and the corresponding emotions will spontaneously arise in the mind. Thus our feelings are only *indirectly* under the control of the will. They are sinful or holy only as they are thus indirectly bidden into existence by the will. Men often complain that they cannot control their feelings; they form overwhelming attachments which they say they cannot control. They receive injuries, their anger rises, they profess they cannot help it. Now while the attention is occupied with dwelling upon the beloved object in the one case, the emotions of which they complain will exist of course; and if the emotion be disapproved by the judgment and conscience, the subject must be dismissed from the thoughts, and the attention directed to some other subject, as the only possible way of ridding themselves of the emotion. So in the other case, the subject of the injury must be dismissed, and their thoughts occupied with other considerations, or emotions of hatred will continue to fester and rankle in their minds." Again, in another place, he says, "If a man voluntarily place himself under such circumstances as to call wicked emotions into exercise, he is entirely responsible for them. If he place himself under circumstances where virtuous emotions are called forth, he is praiseworthy in the exercise of them, precisely in proportion to his voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence." Again, he says, "If he (a real Christian) has voluntarily placed himself under these circumstances of temptation, he is responsible for these emotions of opposition to God rankling in his heart." We might quote pages of similar remarks.

These passages would afford ground for comment on Mr. Finney's philosophy. He shows himself here, as on all occasions when he ventures upon the field of mental science, a perfect novice. But we are chiefly concerned with the theological bearings of the passages quoted. It is evident that Mr. Finney here uses the words will, voluntarily, &c., in their restricted sense; and hence we have the dangerous theory of morals, that nothing can possess a moral character which is not under the control of the volitions of the mind. But our emotions cannot be thus controlled. They rise *spontaneously* in the mind, they *must* exist when the thoughts are occupied with the objects appropriate to their production. Hence all our emotions, affections and passions, according to Mr. Finney, possess a moral character only in consequence of the power which the mind has, by an act of will, to change the object of thought, and thus introduce a different class of feelings. Now, we might object to this view of the matter, that the will does not possess the power here attributed to it. Our trains of thought are in some de-

gree subject to our volitions; but the will has by no means an absolute control over the *attention* of the mind. Attention is generally indeed but another name for the interesting character of the idea to which the mind is attending, and is no more directly subject therefore to the bidding of the will, than is the state of mind which imparts its interest to the present object of thought. The grounds and the force of this objection will be evident to any one who will reflect upon states of mind which he has been in, when his whole soul was so absorbed in the contemplation of some subject, that all his efforts to break away from the scenes which riveted his attention, only served to break for a moment their fascinating power. But we will wave this objection, not because it is not sufficiently strong to be fatal to Mr. Finney's theory, but because it lies aside from our present course.

A still more serious objection is, that upon this theory it is impossible that our emotions should possess any moral character. If they are moral, "only as they are indirectly bidden into existence by the will," then they cannot be moral at all. If it is necessary to go back to the act of will which introduced the object, in view of which these emotions necessarily arise, to find their moral character, then upon no just grounds can morality be predicated of them. If a man has put out his eyes, he cannot justly be accounted guilty for not being able to read, nor for any of the consequences which result from his blindness. These consequences, if he could have foreseen them, do indeed accumulate the greater guilt upon the act of putting out his eyes; but that act is all for which he is fairly responsible. So in the other case, it is upon the act of the will which brought the mind into contact with the objects, which of necessity awakened its emotions, that we must charge all the responsibility. All the virtue and vice, the holiness and sin of which we are capable, must lie solely in the manner of managing the power of attention. He is a perfect man whose mind is so trained that it takes up whatever subject of meditation the will enjoins; and he is a sinful man, whose mind, without a direct volition to that effect, reverts, as if by instinct, to holy themes and heavenly meditations, and adheres to them even though the will should endeavour to force it away. All the foundations of morality and religion are virtually swept away by this theory. If its assumptions be true, we should discard all the motives and means now employed to promote virtue. As it makes all moral excellence reside in the readiness and skill with which the power of attention is managed, the most efficient means for the promotion of virtue, beyond all comparison, would be the study of the mathematics. Such are the ridiculous extremes to which Mr. Finney is driven in carrying out his doctrine, that all sin consists in acts. It can hardly be maintained that we have caricatured his doctrine, or run it out beyond its intrinsic tendency. For if, as he says, a man is praiseworthy or blamable in the exercise of his emotions, only because *he has placed himself* under circumstances where these

emotions are called forth, then it is plainly unjust to charge responsibility upon anything else than the act of placing himself under the circumstances.

But without charging upon his theory anything beyond what he has developed as its admitted consequences, who does not see upon the face of his own statements absurdity enough to condemn any doctrine which necessarily involves it? A man is responsible for his emotions, he says, only when he has voluntarily brought himself under such circumstances as to call them into existence. Let us suppose then, two men, brought without any direct agency of their own under the same set of circumstances. We will imagine them taken by force and placed in a grog shop, filled with tipplers quaffing the maddening drink, and uttering blasphemies that might make "the cheek of darkness pale." Emotions are at once awakened in both the spectators. The desires of the one go forth over the scene; he takes pleasure in those who do such things; he longs to drink and curse with them; he knows that this is wrong, and endeavours to change the subject of meditation, but his sympathy with the scene before him is so strong that his thoughts will not be torn away from it, and his mind continues filled with emotions partaking of its hideous character. The heart of the other instantly revolts at the scene. Every time he hears the name of God blasphemed, he thinks of the goodness and glory of the Being thus dishonoured, and while wondering that others can be blind to his excellency, the liveliest feelings of adoration and gratitude are awakened in his heart. Now, according to Mr. Finney, there is no moral difference between these men; they are not responsible for emotions thus awakened. The one has not sinned, nor is the other praiseworthy. This is no consequence deduced from something else that he has said. It is a case put in strict accordance with his explicit statements. Such is the monstrous absurdity to which he is driven, by denying that the state of mind which would, under the circumstances above supposed, have disposed one of the spectators to descend and mingle in the filth and wickedness of the scene, and the other, to rise from it to heaven in his holy desires and emotions, does of itself possess a moral character.

Another illustration of the absurdities in which he has involved himself, is furnished by his declaration, that man is praiseworthy in the exercise of his emotions, "precisely *in proportion* to his voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence." Mr. Finney's common method of expressing the incomprehensibility of anything is by saying, "It is all algebra;" and we must really doubt whether he knows the meaning of the term *proportion*. For upon his principles, the ratio between the merit or the demerit of any two actions whatever, must be a ratio of equality. Voluntariness, in his sense of the word, does not admit of degrees. The will either acts or it does not, to bring the man under the peculiar circumstances. There are no degrees in its consent or refu-

sal; and of course there can be no degrees in moral worth, or in guilt. If two men have each received the same injury, and each by an act of will directed the attention of the mind to the injury and him who committed it, then they are equally guilty for their feelings of hatred, however much those feelings may differ in strength. There can be no difference of degree in the moral demerit of their emotions, although the one should hate his adversary enough to work him some slight injury in return, and the other hate him so much that nothing less than the murder of his victim will satisfy his thirst for vengeance. The two men were *equally* voluntary in bringing their minds under the circumstances which awaken their emotions, and must of necessity, according to Mr. Finney's canon of morality, be equally guilty.

There is indeed another class of passages in Mr. Finney's writings, in which he brings forward a further criterion of morality. He says, "When the will is decided by the voice of conscience, or a regard to *right*, its decisions are virtuous." The change of preference, or the decision of the will, which takes place in regeneration, must be made, "because to act thus is *right*." The will must decide "to obey God, to serve him, to honour him, and promote his glory, because it is reasonable, and right, and just." "It is the *rightness* of the duty that must influence the mind if it would act virtuously." And again, "When a man is fully determined to obey God, because it is *right* that he should obey God, I call that principle." In these passages, and there are many more like them, he seems to resolve all virtue into rectitude. It is evident why he does so, for he is thus enabled to require a mental decision, an act of the mind, in relation to the rectitude of any emotion or action, in order to constitute it virtuous; and thus defend his position that morality can attach only to acts. He has here fallen into the mistake, however, of making the invariable quality of an action the motive to its performance. It is true that all virtuous actions are right, but it does not follow from this that their rectitude must be the motive to the performance of them. If this be so, then the child, who in all things honours his parent, does not act virtuously unless each act of obedience is preceded by a mental decision that it is right for him to obey. Mr. Finney desired to take ground which would enable him to deny that there is anything of the nature of holiness in the Christian's emotions of love to God, when prompted by his *disposition* to love him; but he has evidently assumed an untenable position.

We could easily bring forward more errors into which he has been betrayed in carrying out his false doctrine, that morality can be predicated only of acts. But we have surely presented enough. And this exposure renders it unnecessary that we should repeat what have been so often produced and never refuted, the positive arguments for believing that our dispositions, or states of heart, including the original disposition by which we are biassed to evil, possess a moral character, and are the proximate sources of all the

good and evil in our conduct. Some of Mr. Finney's pretended arguments against this opinion we have not answered, simply because they are so puerile, that, though we made the effort, we could not condescend to notice them. All of them that had the least plausibility we have shown to be without any real force. And if any man can reject this opinion on account of the difficulties with which it is still encumbered, and adopt the monstrosities connected with Mr. Finney's rival doctrine, we must think that he strains at a gnat and swallows a camel.

As might have been expected from what has already been said, Mr. Finney denies that there is any such thing as *natural depravity*. His views on this subject are easily exhibited. We might describe them all, indeed, in a single phrase, by saying, that they are neither more nor less than the old Pelagian notions. "This state of mind," he says, describing the commencement of sin in a child, "is entirely the result of temptation to selfishness, arising out of the *circumstances* under which the child comes into being." "If it be asked how it happens that children universally adopt the principle of selfishness, unless their nature is sinful? I answer, that they adopt this principle of self-gratification, or selfishness, because they possess *human* nature, and come into being under the peculiar *circumstances* in which all the children of Adam are born since the fall." "The cause of outbreaking sin is not to be found in a sinful constitution or nature, but in a wrong original choice." "The *only* sense in which sin is *natural* to man is, that it is natural for the mind to be influenced in its individual exercises by a supreme preference or choice of any object." On reading this last extraordinary declaration, the text of an inspired apostle came to mind, in which he assures us, that we are "by *nature* children of wrath." If both those declarations be true, we have the curious result that we are children of wrath, not because we are sinners, but because we are so made as to be influenced by a supreme choice! But texts of Scripture are as nothing in Mr. Finney's way. He makes them mean more or less, stretches or curtails them, just as occasion requires. His system is a perfect Procrustean bed, to which the Bible, no less than all things else, must be fitted. An illustration of this is found in his manner of dealing with the passage, "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." This text would seem, at first sight, to present a very serious obstacle to his views. And what does he do with it? He first gravely proves that it does not mean "the substance of a conceived fœtus is sin!" He then jumps to the conclusion, "All that can be possibly meant by this and similar passages is, that we were always sinners from the commencement of our *moral* existence, from the earliest moment of the exercise of moral agency." That is, when David and the other sacred writers make these strong assertions, they only mean to inform us, that the moment we adopt the principle of supreme selfishness as our rule of action, we do wrong; or, in other words, that just as soon as we begin to sin, we sin! May we not

well say, that he has a marvellous faculty for making a text mean anything, or nothing, as suits his purpose? Another illustration of this is furnished by his interpretation of the text, "The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The carnal mind, he says, means a *minding of the flesh*, a voluntary action of the mind, a choice that is supremely selfish. While men act upon the principle of supreme selfishness, obedience is impossible. This, he says, is the reason why the carnal mind, or the minding of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. Wonderful discovery! So the apostle, in this passage, meant nothing more than the stale truism, that a man cannot be sinful and holy at the same time,—that he cannot, *in the same act*, transgress the law and render obedience to it.

Pelagians have always found a difficulty in reconciling their theory with the salvation of infants by the *grace* of Jesus Christ. Pelagius himself was sorely pressed on this point. Infants are in no way answerable for the sin of Adam, or otherwise evilly affected by it than that it brings them into circumstances of temptation, and they have no sin of nature; how then can they be subjects of pardon? What interest can they have in the atonement of the Saviour? Let us see how Mr. Finney disposes of this difficulty. "Had it not been for the contemplated atonement, Adam and Eve would have been sent to hell at once, and never have had any posterity. The *race* could never have existed. . . . Now every infant *owes its very existence* to the grace of God in Jesus Christ; and if it dies previous to actual transgression, it is just as absolutely indebted to Christ for eternal life as if it had been the greatest sinner on earth." We have no words to express our aversion to this egregious trifling with sacred subjects. The Bible teaches us that all of our race who are saved are redeemed from sin; that they are *saved*, not born, by virtue of the atonement of Jesus Christ. And when we ask Mr. Finney how this can be reconciled with his theory that there is nothing connected with infants that *can* be atoned for, he very gravely tells us that they owe their BIRTH to the grace of God!

He does not tell us why he baptizes infants. We do not know, indeed, whether he ever administers this ordinance to children previous to the supposed commencement of moral action. Certainly, upon his principles, it could have no meaning. He rejects, with utter scorn and ridicule, the idea that in regeneration and sanctification there takes place anything that can be properly symbolized by "the washing off of some defilement." The *water* of baptism then, to whomsoever this rite be applied, cannot have any emblematical meaning; and the apostle committed a rhetorical error, to say the least of it, when he wrote, "But ye are *washed*, but ye are *sanctified*." But with what propriety this ordinance can be administered to children, who, having never actually transgressed, are not sinners, who are just what they ought to be,

we cannot conceive. Surely consistency requires Mr. Finney to assign to infant baptism a place among those hated abominations, upon which he so much dwells, that the "traditions of the elders" have introduced into the church.

We shall not undertake to show in detail the inadequacy of Mr. Finney's theory to account for the sin there is in the world. This has often been done. And it still remains perfectly inexplicable why, if men come into the world with just such a nature as they ought to have, prone no more to evil than to good, and are surrounded at the same time with "infinite motives" to holiness, and "circumstances" that tempt them to sin, that they should all, with one accord, obey the force of the finite circumstances rather than the infinite motives. If this be the state of the case, we might naturally expect all mankind to become holy, excepting here and there some luckless one, who, not having sufficient skill so to manage the attention of his mind as to keep before it the infinite motives to holiness, would fall into sin. Here too we might ask, what has become of the doctrine that God has done all that he could to prevent the present degree of sin? If he can so influence some men, after their hearts are set in them to do evil, that they shall become holy, could he not have induced them, at the first, to choose holiness instead of sin?

We cannot pass from this part of our subject without developing one of the many singular results afforded by the comparison of different parts of Mr. Finney's writings. The one we are now about to present is so very peculiar that we solicit for it special attention. He rejects the common doctrine of depravity, because it makes man a sinner by necessity—it makes God the author of sin—it is a constitutional or physical depravity, and leads to physical regeneration, &c. He frequently blows off the superfluous excitement produced in his mind by this view of depravity, in sentences like the following: "That God has made men sinners, incapable of serving him—suspended their salvation upon impossible conditions—made it indispensable that they should have a physical regeneration, and then damns them for being sinners, and for not complying with these impossible conditions—monstrous! blasphemous! Believe this who can!" Now let us see how he gets rid of this *physical necessity*, which he falsely but uniformly charges upon the common opinions respecting depravity. According to his theory, the cause of men becoming sinners is to be found in their possessing human nature, and coming into being under circumstances of temptation—in the adaptation between certain motives which tempt to undue self-gratification, and the innocent constitutional propensities of human nature. But in one of his lectures, where he is endeavouring to persuade his hearers to use the appropriate means for promoting a revival, and presenting on that account such truths and in such forms as seem to him most *stirring*, he says: "Probably the law connecting cause and effect is more *undeviating* in spiritual than in natural things, and so there

are fewer exceptions, as I have before said. The paramount importance of spiritual things makes it reasonable that it should be so." In the use of means for promoting revivals, he says again: "The effect is *more certain* to follow," than in the use of means to raise a crop of grain. Now, upon his system, the efficiency of all means for promoting revivals may be traced up ultimately to the tendency of eternal *motives* to influence the mind. We have here, then, the position, distinctly involved, that *motives*, when properly presented, when so presented as to produce their appropriate effect, operate by a surer law than any of the physical laws of matter. The effect of the proper presentation of a motive to the mind is more *certain*, and of course more *inevitable*, than that the blade of wheat should spring from the planted seed, or a heavy body fall to the ground. Now he will not deny that the motives to sin, which meet man soon after his entrance into the world, are thus adequately presented; for the sad proof of it is found in the uniform production of their effect. That effect must of course be *inevitable*, beyond any idea of necessity that we can form from the operation of physical laws.

From the parts of his scheme already presented, our readers will be able to anticipate Mr. Finney's theory of *regeneration*. The change which takes place in regeneration he, of course, represents as a change in the mind's method of acting. As it originally chose sin instead of holiness, so a new habit consists in choosing holiness instead of sin. The idea that there is imparted to the heart a new relish for spiritual objects, or that any new principle is implanted, he rejects; to teach this, he says, is to teach a physical religion. which has been the great source of infidelity in the church. "It is true," he says, "the constitution of the mind must be suited to the nature of the outward influence or motive; and there must be such an adaptation of the mind to the motive, and of the motive to the mind, as is calculated to produce any desired action of the mind. But it is absurd to say that this constitutional adaptation must be a holy principle, or taste, or craving after obedience to God. All holiness in God, angels, or men, must be *voluntary*, or it is not holiness. To call anything that is a part of the mind or body, holy—to speak of a holy substance, unless in a figurative sense, is to talk nonsense." We remark here, in passing, that this is the uniform style in which Mr. Finney caricatures the opinions from which he dissents. From one form of statement he habitually passes to another, as completely synonymous, which has not the remotest resemblance to it. He assumes here that a principle, or taste, cannot be *voluntary*, whereas it cannot but be voluntary, in the only sense in which voluntariness is essential to moral character; and also that it must be a substance, or form a part of the mind or body—an assumption than which nothing can be more groundless and absurd. He adds, "The necessary adaptation of the outward motive to the mind, and the mind to the motive, lies in the *powers of moral agency*, which every

human being possesses." Understanding, conscience, and the power of choice, he supposes, are all that is needful to enable man to receive the truth of God, and act under its influence. There is nothing new in all this. It is at least as old as the fifth century. It has been broached repeatedly since the days of Pelagius, and as often shown, by arguments that have not yet been refuted, to be utterly inadequate to account for the facts of the case. We have indeed its radical unsoundness fully exposed to us by the apostle Paul, where he declares, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned." This passage of Scripture will bear no interpretation which does not place it in irreconcilable contradiction with Mr. Finney's theory. He generally asserts that the sinner knows all the truth that is necessary to induce him to make to himself a new heart, and that the only reason why it fails to produce this effect is because he will not *consider* the truth. We say *generally*, because here, as in everything else, Mr. Finney is inconsistent with himself. At one time he talks thus: "It is indeed the pressing of truth upon the sinner's consideration that induces him to turn. But it is not true that he is ignorant of these truths before he thus considers them. He *knows* that he must die—that he is a sinner—that God is right, and he is wrong," &c. But again, when he is seeking to make an impression upon the sinner, he assures us that "the idea that the careless sinner is an intellectual believer is absurd—the man that does not feel, nor act at all, on the subject of religion, is an *infidel*, let his professions be what they may." But we will leave him to explain how an *infidel* can be said to *know* that to be true, which he does not *believe* to be true. The uniform tenor of his representations, when treating of the subject of regeneration, is that the sinner wilfully refuses to *consider* known truths, and, on that account alone, has not a new heart. The apostle, on the contrary, declares the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither *can* he know them. We presume that no one but Mr. Finney himself can doubt to which of these authorities we should bow. If the testimony of the apostle needed any confirmation, we might find it abundantly in human experience. Every man knows that his perception of moral truths depends upon the state of his heart. It is a matter of familiar experience, that truths which sometimes affect us scarcely at all, will, at another time, act so powerfully as to break up all the fountains of feeling within us. And this difference is not owing to the greater or less degree of consideration bestowed upon the truth;—we may think of it as profoundly in the one case as in the other. Who has not felt that a familiar truth, occurring to the mind in the same terms with which it has often before been clothed, will suddenly display a hitherto unseen richness of meaning, which at once wakes up all the feelings of the heart? What is it that can thus modify our powers of moral perception but the state of the mind? And how can we expect, then, that the spiritual truths of God's holy word

should produce their appropriate effect upon the mind of the sinner, who is destitute not only of any fellowship with those truths, but of the disposition of heart by which their meaning is discerned? We cannot understand how the unrenewed heart, if as Mr. Finney says "it hates God with mortal hatred," can even understand the real meaning of the truth, God is love; or feel that this truth is a motive for subduing its hatred. Nor are we able to see how any of those considerations most frequently presented in the sacred Scriptures can prevail with the sinner, and produce upon him their appropriate effect, unless his mind be illuminated, his heart renewed, by the influences of the Holy Spirit.

Mr. Finney's own pages will furnish us with evidence that he himself considers the mind as needing some further adaptation to the motives of the Bible, than the powers of moral agency. This evidence is found in the fact that the motives which he most frequently and importunately urges, are not those which are commonly employed in the sacred Scriptures. He seems to have a kind of instinct of the insufficiency of the considerations presented by the inspired writers, to answer his purpose. The most common form in which he sets forth the change that takes place in regeneration, is that of a change in the choice of a *Supreme Ruler*. He divides the world into two great political parties, the one with God, the other with Satan, at its head. When a man makes for himself a new heart, he changes sides in politics—he gives up the service of Satan, and submits to the government of God. The great duty which he urges upon the sinner is unconditional submission to God. This duty, as presented by him, is very rarely intended to include submission to the terms of salvation revealed in the gospel—it is a submission to God as the great creator and ruler of the world—the God of providence rather than of grace. Now it will at once occur to every reader of the Bible, that this is not the duty which the sacred writers most frequently urge upon the sinner. They call upon men to repent, and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ. But Mr. Finney says, "It is *generally* in point, and a safe and suitable direction to tell a sinner to *repent*." Marvellous! that he should consider it generally, but not always *safe* to tell a sinner to do that which the apostles, with great uniformity, tell him to do. The other part of the apostolic exhortation to sinners, "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ," he seems to think, should no longer be given in any case save where an individual is unwilling to admit that Christ is the Messiah of God. This exhortation he considers as exclusively suitable to the days of the apostles, "when the minds of the people were agitated mainly on the question, whether Jesus was the true Messiah." "They bore down," he says, "on this point, because here was where the Spirit of God was striving with them, and consequently, this would probably be the first thing a person would do on *submitting* to God." He does indeed number among the directions to be given to sinners, that "they should be told to *believe* the gospel;" but he explains this to mean

nothing more than "that trust or confidence in the Scriptures that leads the individual to act as if they were true." Of that specific act of faith in which the soul apprehends the Lord Jesus as its Saviour, and receives pardon and justification, he seems not to have the least idea. The sole value of repentance or faith, he finds in the manifestation which they afford of the heart's willingness to *submit to the authority* of God. "Whatever point," he says, "is taken hold of between God and the sinner, when he *yields* that he is converted. When he yields one point to *God's authority*, he yields all." This is evidently another gospel. The apostles urge all men to believe in the Saviour because faith is in itself a proper and a most important duty—but Mr. Finney deems it of no importance, save as it manifests submission to the authority of the Great Ruler, and thinks it unsuitable to urge it upon any sinner therefore, unless it be one whose heart has assumed a hostile attitude towards the claims of Jesus Christ to be the true Messiah. How widely, indeed, does this differ from the gospel revealed to us from heaven, which places faith at the head of human duties, teaching us that it is the instrumental cause of our forgiveness, that it unites us to the Lord Jesus Christ, and is the mediate source of all our spiritual strength!

As the duty presented by Mr. Finney to the sinner's mind is different from that commonly urged in the Bible, so does he employ different motives to induce compliance. The chief motive upon which he relies is, that it is *right* to acknowledge God and submit to him as our Great Ruler. We can now see another reason why he assumed the strange position upon which we have already commented, that "It is the *rightness* of a duty that must influence the mind if it would act virtuously." Man in his natural state can be made to see that it is *right* for him to submit to God, but he cannot be made to perceive His moral glory, or to feel that His character is lovely. As he cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God, Mr. Finney is therefore driven to the necessity of seeking other things which he can receive. He endeavours, by developing the useful tendency of the principles of the divine government in contrast with the injurious influence of selfishness, to produce a conviction in the sinner's mind that it is right for God to reign; and upon this conviction he relies to induce the sinner to change his voluntary preference, and submit to the righteous rule of his Creator. In one of his sermons, after describing to the sinner how he must change his heart, he goes through a kind of rehearsal of the performance. He begs the sinner to give him his attention while he places before him "such considerations as are best calculated to induce the state of mind which constitutes a change of heart." In presenting these best considerations, he dwells upon "the unreasonableness and hatefulness of selfishness," "the reasonableness and utility of benevolence," "the reasons why God should govern the universe," &c. His remarks upon these topics are protracted through ten or twelve octavo pages, in the whole

of which, about as many lines are devoted to a frigid allusion to the justice and mercy displayed in the atonement of Jesus Christ. In a previous passage of the same sermon he says, "The offer of reconciliation annihilates the influence of despair, and gives to conscience its utmost power." He seems here to limit the efficacy of the gospel, to its opening the way for the operation of existing motives upon the heart of man. And his practice is certainly consistent with this low view of the gospel. The considerations which he brings forward, as best adapted to induce the sinner to change his heart, are almost exclusively such as are furnished by natural religion. We hear next to nothing of the grace and glory of God as they shine in the face of Jesus Christ, of the wondrous love of a dying Saviour, of the demerit of sin as illustrated by His death, or of the guilt of the sinner in remaining insensible to the motives which address him from Calvary Our Saviour intimates that all other sin is comparatively lost in the sin of rejecting Him; and the apostles refer to the neglect of the "great salvation" provided for man, as presenting the most odious form of human guilt. To the life and death of Jesus Christ, indeed, do they continually recur for the illustration and enforcement of all human duties. They make known nothing save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified. This is the great central source of light and heat. Whatever may be the point of departure, how uniformly do they carry us to the Cross, and bid us thence look at the character of God, and the duty of man. But when Mr. Finney professedly addresses himself to the task of presenting the considerations best adapted to move the heart of the sinner, he thinks he can find a better point of view. He takes his stand amidst the wonders of creation; he finds in the character there developed, and the relations there established between man and his Maker, the right and the duty of God to govern and man's obligations to obey—"the reasonableness and utility of virtue—the unreasonableness, guilt, and evil of sin:"—hence he charges the sinner with having "set his unsanctified feet upon the principles of eternal righteousness, lifted up his hands against the throne of the Almighty, set at naught the authority of God and the rights of man!" We do not deny the validity of these considerations, upon which he chiefly dwells; but we do deny that the truths involved in them are the peculiar truths of the gospel, or that they are those which the apostles deemed best adapted to become "the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation." Throughout his whole system indeed, it is painful to see how small a space is allotted to the Cross of Christ. Often where it might be expected to stand forth conspicuous, it seems to be, of set design, excluded. In this same sermon, when defending the reasonableness of the "conditions of the gospel," he tells the sinner that *faith* is reasonable, because "nothing but faith in what God tells him, can influence him to take the path that leads to heaven." The faith of which he here speaks is a "condition of the gospel," and yet he represents it in no other

light than as a general belief in the truth of God's word; and justifies its requirement solely on the ground of its tendency to make man holy. There is no hint of that faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, so often mentioned in the Scriptures, by which the soul commits itself to Him as its Saviour, and becomes a partaker of the benefits of his redemption—no allusion to the reasonableness of this condition, on the ground of its rendering to God all the glory of our salvation. We see not how any pious mind, accustomed to look to Jesus Christ for all its strength and joy and glory can pass through this new system, without being constrained at every step to cry out, "Ye have taken away my Lord, and I know not where ye have laid Him."

Another illustration, trifling it is true, when compared with the one we have just presented, but yet worthy of notice, of the difficulty under which Mr. Finney labours, in carrying out his views of regeneration, is found in the necessity which is laid upon him of violating the established meaning of words. A new heart is a new act. In regeneration no principle is implanted in the mind, but the beginning and end of the process is in a new act; and consequently the process of the divine life in the soul of man is a series of acts—there is no growth of anything which lays the foundation of those acts and disposes to the performance of them. He not only believes this to be true, but thinks it vastly important that others should be convinced of its truth. The world has hitherto been ignorant of the true nature of religion and the method of its progress in the heart. He expresses his doubt whether one professor of religion out of ten in the city of New York, if asked what sanctification is, could give a right answer. They would speak of it, "as if it were a sort of washing off of some defilement,"—or they would represent it as the growth of some principle, or germ, or seed, or sprout, implanted in the soul. "But sanctification," he says, "is *obedience*." Of course, to sanctify must mean to obey; and to be sanctified is to be obeyed. Now we charitably hope that Mr. Finney has underrated the number of those who could give a right answer to this question; for we presume that more than nine out of ten of the professors of religion in New York have been at school, and can read a dictionary, if not the Bible and the catechisms of their church, and surely not one, thus qualified, could ever think of giving his definition of sanctification.

We have already exposed the insufficiency of Mr. Finney's theory; and in testimony thereof have adduced his own departure, in carrying out his theory, from the instructions and motives developed in the gospel. He thus evidently betrays his own conviction that the duties which the apostles commonly urge upon the impenitent are not consistent with his scheme; and that the motives they present are of such a nature as to require a corresponding disposition of heart. The force of the objections we have brought forward, is not at all diminished by the different form in

which he sometimes states his doctrine of the new heart. He has a class of passages in which he represents the spiritual heart, as "That deep-seated, but voluntary preference of the mind which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, and from which they take their character." If by "preference," be meant such an inclination as he has elsewhere described under that name, which is not an object of consciousness, and makes itself known only by its influence over our acts; and by its being "deep-seated," that is, seated in the will itself, using the term in its larger sense, and for that reason entitled to the epithet "voluntary," we should have no objection to this account of the matter. This is precisely our idea of a disposition. But this is not his meaning. The preference which he here intends, is a conscious act of the mind. It still remains then for him to show how the mind can be induced to prefer the glory of God, as the supreme end of pursuit, when it is blind to that glory, and if we may credit the apostle, in such a state, that until renewed, it cannot know it. Another difficulty, too, is started by the passage we have just quoted from him. It seems that we are to look back from every other voluntary affection and emotion of mind to this "deep-seated preference," to find their moral character. But as this preference is itself but a voluntary exercise of mind, and differs from its other voluntary exercises only by being more deep-seated, it would seem that we ought to look back to something else for its moral character. It is impossible for us to imagine how one voluntary exercise of mind can possess a moral character, independent of the subjective motives which prompted it, while all other affections and emotions are good or evil only through their connexion with this one. Is it not wonderful that with such beams in his own eye, he should be endeavouring to pluck out motes from the eyes of others!

Mr. Finney asserts the perfect, unqualified *ability* of man to regenerate himself. It is easier, indeed, he says, for him to comply with the commands of God than to reject them. He tells his congregation that they "might with much more propriety ask, when the meeting is dismissed, how they should go home, than to ask how they should change their hearts." He declares that they who teach the sinner that he is unable to repent and believe without the aid of the Holy Spirit, insult his understanding and mock his hopes—they utter a libel upon Almighty God—they make God an infinite tyrant—they lead the sinner very consistently to justify himself—if what they say is true, the sinner ought to hate God, and so should all other beings hate him—as some have humorously and truly said, they preach, "You can and you can't, you shall and you shan't, you will and you won't, you'll be damn'd if you do, you'll be damn'd if you don't." It has been reserved, we imagine, for the refined and delicate taste of Mr. Finney to discover the *humour* of this miserable doggerel. He is obviously much delighted with it, and, like all his other good things, has

worked it up more than once. We hope the next compiler of the beauties of American poetry will pay a due deference to his commendation, and assign a conspicuous place to this precious morceau. Most professors of religion, he says, pray for sinners, that God would *enable* them to repent. Such prayers he declares to be an insult to God. He thinks it a great error to tell the sinner to pray for a new heart, or to pray for the Holy Ghost to show him his sins. "Some persons," he says, "seem to suppose that the Spirit is employed to give the sinner power,—that he is unable to obey God without the Spirit's agency. I confess I am alarmed when I hear such declarations as these; and were it not that I suppose there is a sense in which a man's heart may be better than his head, I should feel bound to maintain that persons holding this sentiment were not Christians at all." We have certainly never met with a more singularly extravagant and unfortunate declaration than the one last quoted. Who are the persons who have held and taught this sentiment, so inconsistent with Christianity? Why, at the head of the list stand our Saviour and his apostles. "No man," said Christ, "*can* come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him." And the apostles refer continually to the absolute dependence of man upon God for the necessary strength to perform his duties aright. Not one of those holy men felt that he was of himself "sufficient for these things." Their uniform feeling seems to have been, "I *can* do all things through Christ, who strengtheneth me." Mr. Finney not only believes that we *can* do all things without any strength from Christ, but he makes this one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The apostles exhorted men to be strong in the grace that is in Christ Jesus, and they prayed for those to whom they wrote, that the Lord would *strengthen* them with might by his Spirit,—that He would make them perfect, establish, strengthen, settle them. But Mr. Finney says, to pray that God would help the sinner to repent, is an insult to God; as if God had commanded the sinner to do what he cannot do. Now the Christian has at least as much ability to be perfectly holy as the sinner has to repent. God commands Christians to be perfect, and of course, when the apostles prayed that the Lord would *strengthen* them and make them perfect, they prayed "as if God had commanded the Christian to do what he cannot do." These prayers, then, uttered under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, must have been "an insult to God!" Mr. Finney cannot relieve the character of his reckless, irreverent assertions, by saying that the sacred writers meant to represent nothing more than the unwillingness of the sinner to do his duty. Beyond all dispute they represent this unwillingness under the form of an inability, and it is against those who describe it by precisely equivalent terms that Mr. F. raves with such infuriate bitterness. There is a question here, not between him and us, but between him and the apostles, whether they employed proper and safe language in describing the moral condition of man and the nature of his de-

pendence on divine aid. He may perhaps say that the language employed by the apostles was perfectly proper at that time, but as their statements have been perverted and become the source of ruinous errors, it is now necessary to employ more explicit and guarded language. We suppose this will be the nature of his defence, as he distinctly takes the ground that it will not answer to preach the same class of truths, or to exhibit them in the same manner, in any two ages of the Church, or in any two places. At each time and place the sinner is entrenched behind his own peculiar errors, and the preacher must be careful not to present any truth which he can so pervert as to fortify himself in his refuges of lies. But is it true that any such change can take place, from age to age, in the natural character or the accidental circumstances of man, as to call for any important change in the matter or manner of religious instruction? What error has ever existed that does not find its refutation in some revealed truth? It is a very dangerous principle to admit, that we are at liberty to omit such truths of the Bible as we deem unsuitable to existing emergencies, and to exhibit others in a very different light from that in which they are left by inspired writers. It virtually suspends the whole of the divine revelation upon the discretion and wisdom of man. But if true, it has no application to the case now before us. There is no evidence that the perversion of the truth which Mr. F. thinks can only be met by varying the manner in which the apostles represent man's dependence, is a modern error. On the contrary, it is undeniable that this very error prevailed in the days of the apostles. Paul met with the same objections that are now current, drawn from the divine sovereignty and human dependence; and how does he refute them? By a flat denial that man is unable of himself to do his duty? Or by a modification, a softening down of his previous statements? No—he re-asserts the perverted doctrines in the face of the objections raised against them. He does not, nor does any one of the sacred writers, affirm in a single instance that the sinner is able to obey the divine commands. Not a text of Scripture can be found in which this is declared, while a multitude can be produced which explicitly and in so many words deny it. Will Mr. F. say that the apostles urged upon men obedience to the divine commands, and thus *virtually* declared their ability to obey? Then why does he not declare it in the same virtual manner? The same reasons existed then as now for a direct assertion of the sinner's ability, and yet it was in no case made. Why, then, should he make it now, and dwell upon it, and magnify it into an important, nay, an essential part of the Gospel, so that he who disbelieves it cannot be a Christian at all?

But it is not true that in urging the commands of God, the sacred writers teach the entire and independent ability of man to obey. Mr. Finney does not pretend to bring forward a single passage of Scripture in which his doctrine is directly taught; he finds it proved in no other way than by his own inferences from such com-

mands as, "Make to yourself a new heart," "My son, give me thy heart." His brief argument for human ability is, God commands man to obey, therefore he can obey. He does not even allude to the distinction often taken between natural and moral ability. He teaches broadly without any qualification whatever, that a divine command implies the possession of all the ability necessary to obedience. Obligation and ability, he says, must be commensurate. And how does he prove the truth of this last proposition? In no other way than by repeating, times without number, that to teach otherwise makes God an infinite tyrant. But the Bible does not inform us that there is any tyranny in God's commanding men to do what they cannot do. It teaches us directly the contrary, by making known the duty of man to receive the things of the Spirit of God, while it at the same time declares, that without divine assistance he *cannot* receive or know them. He must refer, then, for the truth of this maxim, to our natural sense of justice. We might object to this reference of a case already so clearly decided by a higher authority; but we have no fear that there will be found here any discrepance between the teachings of revelation and the testimony of man's conscience, if the latter be rightly interpreted. Our natural sense of justice does indeed teach us that no obligation can rest upon man to perform any duty for which he has not the necessary faculties; and that he is not responsible for failure in anything which he was willing to do, but was hindered in the execution by causes beyond his control. When applied to such cases as these, there is a self-evidence belonging to the maxim in question which places its truth beyond all dispute. Mr. Finney's mistake lies in extending it to cases which lie altogether beyond the limits within which it was generalized. We deny that the common sense of mankind has ever required that we should possess the ability to change our *inclinations*, as the condition of our responsibility for their exercise. To illustrate this, let us suppose the case of a man under the influence of any dominant passion. Before he has long indulged this passion, it would be comparatively easy for him to relinquish it. As he gives way to its impulses, however, its power over him increases, until at length it binds in complete subjection to itself all the other affections of his nature. At each step of its progress the *difficulty* of subduing it is increased; and yet who will deny that the sin of cherishing is accurately proportioned to this difficulty? The law of continuity, which has place in moral reasoning, as well as in that "algebra" which is to Mr. F. the symbol of incomprehensibility, would teach us hence to infer that the guilt is greatest when the difficulty is greatest, and that the former has its highest form of aggravation in the insurmountable character of the latter. The language of the whole world is framed in recognition of this truth. We speak familiarly of the difficulty which men find in changing their inclinations, without ever conceiving that we thereby lessen their obligation; nay, we consider the cup of their guilt full to the brim,

when they have so destroyed their ability to become virtuous, that we may properly say of them, "They *cannot* cease to do evil, and learn to do well." When a paramount inclination, like a strong man armed, has taken possession of the heart, and, with a despotism peculiar to itself, banished all but its own ideas and emotions, how can it be dispossessed? Will it yield to a volition of the mind? We all know it will not, and Mr. Finney himself admits it. He says that our affections will not obey the bidding of the will—we cannot summon or dismiss them by a volition. This admission is fatal to him. The mind, he says, can operate upon its inclinations and affections only by changing the object of thought; and this change it certainly cannot effect in a moment. When any strong inclination is in exercise, the mind has an attraction for those ideas and considerations which tend to sustain and increase its present emotions, while it repels all others to an unseen distance, and some little time at least is necessary before it can succeed in calling up and keeping before it those objects of thought which may introduce a different class of feelings. Upon his own account of the matter, no man *can*, in an instant, change a strong inclination. And yet if that inclination be an evil one, the obligation to an *immediate* change is evident. What, then, has become of the maxim that obligation and ability are commensurate? The sinner who perceives the opposition of the divine government to his selfish plans, and whose heart is on that account filled with emotions of hatred towards God, cannot *instantly*, if at all, turn his mind to such views of the divine character as will inspire him with love. And yet the duty of immediate, instant submission is very evident. We see, then, that power is not the exact measure of obligation. One instance of the failure of the truth of this maxim is as good as a thousand, since one is enough to destroy its generality, and leave the arguments for the inability of the sinner standing in all their force, unless they can be overthrown by considerations drawn from other sources. We do utterly deny that the sinner is able, in the sense which Mr. Finney contends for, to obey the divine commands. In proof of this we say that he is dead in trespasses and in sins, and as the dead man is insensible to all things, so is he to those objects which, if rightly perceived, would be adapted to kindle within him holy desires and affections. Until renewed, he cannot know the things which he must know before he can discharge his duty. And the arguments which we urge from reason and Scripture in defence of these views, are not touched by the assertion that obligation and ability must be commensurate with each other. We have already produced one instance in which, upon Mr. Finney's own admission, this maxim fails to be true: and we are now about to bring forward another, in which he virtually confesses that it is never true when the affections and inclinations of the heart are in question. In explaining why there can be no repentance in hell, he says, when a man's "reputation is so completely gone that he

has no hope of retrieving it, in this state of despair there is no *possibility* of reclaiming him; no motive *can* reach him and call forth an effort to redeem his character." Now, in view of this admission, let it be true that obligation and ability are commensurate, and what is the consequence? Why, that when a man has become so vicious as to ruin his reputation—when he has reached such a confirmed state of iniquity that he himself and all others despair of his ever becoming virtuous—when he has severed the last link that bound him to humanity, and is floating loose from his species, a demon or a brute—then is he released from all accountability! Mr. Finney adds, that in hell "the sinner will be in despair, and while in despair it is a moral *impossibility* to turn his heart to God." But will he deny that the sinner in hell is under any less obligation to love God, on account of this admitted impossibility of loving Him? Betraying, as he here does, his knowledge of the limitations to which his favourite standard of obligation is subject, we should suspect him of a set design to deceive, when he uses it so often in its broad, unqualified sense, and takes his stand upon it to thunder out his furious anathemas against others, had he not furnished us, through all his writings, with such abundant evidence of his incapacity to take into view more than a very small part of one subject at the same time. With the exposure of the error involved in his position, that God cannot consistently command man to do that which he cannot perform, we shall take our leave of this part of the subject, for he has not brought forward the semblance of an argument in favour of the sinner's ability to regenerate himself, which does not directly involve the universal truth of this erroneous maxim.*

We have already occupied so much space, that we cannot exhibit as fully as we would wish, Mr. Finney's views of the doctrine of *divine influence*. His theory on this subject is expressed in the following extract. "The work of the Holy Spirit does not consist merely in giving instruction, but in compelling him to *consider* truths which he already knows—to *think* upon his ways and turn to the Lord. He urges upon his *attention* and *consideration* those motives which he hates to consider and feel the weight of." Again he says—"It is indeed the pressing of truth upon the sinner's *consideration* that induces him to turn." It will be at once perceived that he limits the agency of the Holy Spirit, in the regeneration of the sinner, to the simple presentation of truth to the mind. Said we not truly, that the influence of the Holy Spirit comes in here only by the way? It is strictly parenthetical, and has about as much fitness and meaning, in connexion with the rest of his scheme, as "the grace of God" has in the REX, DEI GRATIA, on the *disk* of a Spanish dollar. He maintains that the truth of God, if adequately considered, would convert the

* For a full discussion of the "Inability of the Sinner," see Biblical Repertory for 1831, p. 360, or "Princeton Essays," Series First.

sinner; and that he has a perfect and independent power to keep that truth before his mind. Surely, then, the agency of the Spirit is superfluous. It is a new cause introduced to account for the production of an effect for which we already have an adequate cause. But though he has, inconsistently we think, retained the doctrine of divine influence, he has so modified it that it has but few, if any, points of resemblance with the scriptural representations of this subject. His common method of illustrating the nature of the Spirit's agency is by a reference to the manner in which a lawyer *persuades* a jury, or an orator *sways* his audience. The Spirit merely presents the truth, and the moral suasion of the truth regenerates the sinner, or rather induces him to regenerate himself. It is not thus that the Scriptures represent it. What mind can read his frequent illustration of an advocate persuading his hearers, and then pass to the scriptural one, of a power that raises from death unto life, without feeling that the agencies which can be properly set forth under such dissimilar symbols must be specifically and widely different from each other? If he has given us the correct account of the divine agency exerted in the salvation of man, then it cannot be denied that the language of the sacred writers, on this subject, is most delusively extravagant.

He does sometimes describe the Spirit as forcing the truth home with tremendous power,—pouring the expostulation home—keeping the truth in warm contact with the mind—gathering up a world of motive, and pouring it in upon the soul in a focal blaze. Of these and similar expressions, the "warm contact," and the "focal blaze," seem to be his favourites, as he has most frequently repeated them. They are but the rays with which he seeks to conceal from his own view and that of others, his meagre skeleton of a Scriptural truth. He seems to resort to these expressions because he feels the inaptness and poverty of his plain statements. But it is as bad to lose one's self in a fog of metaphor, as in that "fog of metaphysics" which he so much dreads. His "close contact," and "warm contact," and "focal blaze," and "pouring home," mean nothing more than that the Spirit presents the truth to the mind. However the form of expression may be varied, this exhausts the subject of his interference. He does nothing to awaken the attention any further than the truth which he offers awakens it; nothing to arouse the feelings—nothing to make the scales fall from the eye of the mind that it may perceive the truth—nothing to change the disposition of the heart so that it may love the truth and feel its constraining influence. Mr. Finney expressly and warmly excludes any direct operation of the Spirit upon the mind or heart. To suppose any such agency, he says with an irreverence of which we hope but few could be guilty, is to suppose a "physical scuffling" between the Holy Spirit and the sinner! As the Spirit awakens no inclination of the heart to go forth and embrace the truth, the warm contact with the mind, into which he brings it, can refer only to its continuous presentation. When the truth is placed

before the mind, and the attention is fixed, the contact is complete, and cannot be rendered any closer or warmer but by the instrumentality of the affections, upon which Mr. F. asserts the Spirit exerts no agency. We have already shown the utter inadequacy of this account of the mode of regeneration. Whether the truth remains for a short or a long time, in cold or in warm contact with the unrenewed heart, it will feel in the considerations before it no sufficient motive for loving God.

It will be seen from Mr. F.'s account of the Spirit's influence, that the agency which He exerts in the regeneration of the sinner is the same in kind as that exerted by the preacher. Both call his attention to the truth, and neither of them does anything beyond this. If you go to a drunkard, and urge upon him the motives which should induce him to abandon his cups, you have done for him precisely what the Holy Spirit does for the sinner in his regeneration. The preacher, upon this scheme, has the same right that God has to assume to himself the glory of the sinner's salvation. Indeed Mr. F. fully admits this in answering the objection that his view of the subject "takes the work out of God's hands, and robs him of his glory." His defence is, that the glory belongs to God, inasmuch as he caused the sinner to act. And mark the meaning and force of his illustration: "If a man," he says, "had made up his mind to take his own life, and you should, by taking the greatest pains and at great expense, prevail upon him to desist, would you deserve no credit for the influences you exerted in the case?" Is it not amazing that any man with the Bible in his hands, and professing to love its sacred truths, could divide, as this passage fully does, the glory of the sinner's salvation between God and man, ascribing the work in the same sense to the Holy Spirit and the preacher, and distributing to each a similar meed of praise!

Mr. Finney seems to have a great objection to the preaching of the doctrine of divine influence in any manner. There was a tract published in New York entitled "Regeneration is the effect of Divine Power." He twice declares that, "The very title to this tract is a stumbling block." He says that, "While the sinner's attention is directed to the subject of the Spirit's influences, his submission is impossible;" and that if the apostles on the day of Pentecost had gone off to drag in such subjects as dependence upon the Holy Spirit, it is manifest that not one of their hearers would have been converted. "The doctrine of election and divine sovereignty," he asserts, "has nothing to do with the sinner's duty—it belongs to the government of God." And in another place he says, "To preach doctrines in an abstract way, and not in reference to practice, is absurd." As the doctrine of divine sovereignty then has nothing to do with the sinner's duty, we suppose that he intends that it should not be preached at all. Thus does he distort, thus would he conceal from view, a doctrine which runs through the whole Bible, is incorporated with all its revelations, and is the basement principle of so many emotions and actions!

It is obvious why he is thus hostile to divine sovereignty. This doctrine he thinks is calculated to keep men easy in their sins. If they are dependent upon God, they will be led to wait for his action upon them before they begin to act. No doubt the truth may be thus perverted. But is not his doctrine greatly more liable to perversion? He teaches the sinner that he has all the requisite power to convert himself. What more natural than for the sinner to say, I love my sins, and therefore as I can at any moment forsake them and make myself holy, I will continue to indulge myself? It is worthy of remark, that when Mr. Finney is exposing, in one of his most moving paragraphs, the unfitness of a deathbed as a place for repentance, he alludes only to the difficulty of thinking and keeping the mind in warm and distressing contact with the truth, during the agonies of dissolution. He does not refer in the most distant manner to the danger that the sinner, justly abandoned of God, may be unable on that account to change his heart. Is there no danger, too, that the sinner, so repeatedly assured that God would be an infinite tyrant if he had commanded him to do what he cannot do, should find in his own experience that he cannot of himself make a new heart, and thus be led to condemn the justice of the divine requirements? May he not also very consistently say to his instructer, It is at least as easy for you to be perfectly holy as it is for me to repent—I retort upon you your charges that I am a wicked rebel, and that my heart has been case-hardened in the fires of hell—physician, heal thyself. If it is easier for me to love God than to hate him, it is easier for you to be perfect than to remain imperfect. It is easier indeed for you to be holy, even as your Father in heaven is holy, than it is for you to walk home; to do the latter requires that you should both be willing and exert the proper muscular action, but to do the former only requires you to be willing. You must be the wickedest being in the universe, then, to refuse to perform a duty so obvious and so easy.

We here dismiss this subject for the present. As we have occupied ourselves with Mr. Finney's doctrines, we have been led to seek them chiefly in his Sermons, from which most of our extracts have been taken. We propose in our next number to examine his Lectures more particularly, and develope the *measures* and the *spirit* of this new system. As we have shown that its doctrines are not those of the Bible, so will it be seen that its *spirit* is anything rather than the spirit of Christianity.

We have not shown the discrepances between Mr. Finney's doctrines, and the standards of the church to which he belongs. This would be holding a light to the sun. It is too evident to need elucidation, that on all the subjects which we have gone over, his opinions are diametrically opposed to the standards of the Presbyterian church, which he has solemnly adopted. Many of the very expressions and forms of stating these doctrines upon which he pours out his profane ridicule, are found in the Confession of Faith. Why then does he remain in the church? He will hold up to the de-

testation of his people a man who refuses to pay his subscription to the Oneida Institute, because he conscientiously believes that institution is doing more harm than good, asserting that he is not honest, and more than insinuating that he cannot go to heaven. And can he see no moral dishonesty in remaining in a church, whose standards of faith he has adopted, only to deny and ridicule them? It is a remarkable fact that this man, thus incorrect in his doctrinal views, thus dishonest in his continuance in a church whose standards he disbelieves and contemns, should have been appointed a professor of theology, to assist in training up ministers for our churches. The trustees of Oberlin Institute had, to be sure, a perfect right to appoint him; but it seems to us very remarkable that they should have selected him, and rather more so that he should have felt willing to undertake the office of an instructer in theology. We suppose, however, that his object was to show the church the way in which her ministers should be trained. We give him credit for his good intentions. He declares it to be a solemn fact, that there is a great defect in the present mode of educating ministers, and that the training they receive in our colleges and seminaries does not fit them for their work. He assures his readers that all the professors in our theological seminaries are unfit for their office; some of them are getting back towards second childhood, and ought to resign; and none of them are such men as are needed in these days. Now is it not very kind in Mr. Finney, when the church is thus destitute of men who can adequately instruct her ministers, to step forward and take the office upon himself? No doubt the whole Presbyterian church ought to break forth in rejoicings. But we confess we would rather he should make the experiment of his ability in this line out of our church. He will, doubtless, think this very unkind and ungrateful, but we cannot help it. We tender him our thanks for the substantial service he has done the church by exposing the naked deformities of the New Divinity. He can render her still another, and in rendering it perform only his plain duty, by leaving her communion, and finding one within which he can preach and publish his opinions without making war upon the standards in which he has solemnly professed his faith.

SECOND ARTICLE.

We proceed to exhibit to our readers the *measures* recommended and the *spirit* displayed in Mr. Finney's Lectures on Revivals. We do this at the known hazard of being denounced as enemies to revivals, and friends of Satan. But it is a very small thing with us that we should be judged of Mr. Finney's judgment. We, in common with all the friends of pure and undefiled religion, have a

sacred duty to discharge in relation to this subject, from which no considerations of fear or favour should deter us. Mr. Finney, and his followers, have shown a resolute determination to persevere in their course. It is surely then the duty of those who believe that course to be detrimental to the best interests of religion, to proclaim their dissent. We believe, therefore will we speak.

Our first remark is upon the disingenuousness of which Mr. Finney is guilty, in stating the question of New Measures. These measures, he says, are opposed "on the ground that *they are innovations*." Now he knows perfectly well, and all the world knows, that this is not the ground on which they are opposed. Of the many testimonies against them, which have been published, we defy him to point to a single one in which their novelty is made the cause of their condemnation. And yet he seeks continually to make upon his reader the impression, that naught has been or can be said against them, save that they are *new*. Who, but himself, ever supposed that they were *new?* Who does not know that he has picked up his measures, as well as his theology, among the castaway rubbish of past times? The only novelty in the matter is, that these measures should be employed in the Presbyterian church, in combination with a false theology and a fanatical spirit. Why then, when Mr. Finney is professedly defending his course from the objections which have been urged against it, does he confine himself so exclusively to the single ground of opposition, that his measures are new? Why, if he felt himself equal to the task, did he not fairly and honestly meet the real objections which have been urged against him? Such disingenuous evasions always injure the cause in defence of which they are employed.

A similar artifice may be detected in his enumeration of New Measures. "They are Anxious Meetings, Protracted Meetings, and the Anxious Seat." He must have known, while uttering this sentence, that the public estimation has never ranked these three things together; and we very much doubt whether he has ever heard the term New Measures applied to the Inquiry Meeting or the Protracted Meeting. Meetings* of the kind thus designated

* We are aware that the Editor of the New York Evangelist has said that "before Mr. Finney arose, Mr Nettleton was much blamed for his irregularities and imprudence." This piece of information it seems came to Mr Leavitt, all the way round by St. Louis. Such statements are intended to cast over Mr Finney the broad mantle of Mr Nettleton's reputation; or possibly the design may be to make Mr. N. jointly responsible for the evils which are now seen to be pouring in upon the church, through the flood-gates which the modern reformers have hoisted. Whatever may be the object, it is exceedingly unfair and dishonourable to attempt to associate the name of Mr. Nettleton with a class of men, of whom we know, and they too, he has ever said, "Oh, my soul, come not *thou* into their secret!" Would it not be well for the Rev. Editor, before putting forth statements which reach him by such a circuitous route, to make some inquiry as to their truth nearer home? Mr Nettleton's life has been spent chiefly in New England, and we challenge Mr. Leavitt to produce, as authority for his statement, the opinion of any settled minister in New England, of the denomination to which Mr. N. belongs, who was not an avowed enemy to all revivals.

have been held in all parts of our church, and when wisely instituted and controlled, have never within our knowledge met with any opposition. Why then should he place the Anxious Seat in the same category with these institutions, unless it were furtively to borrow for it a portion of their admitted respectability? Doubtless he intended that his triumphant vindication of things which no one has opposed, should leave a general impression on the reader's mind, of which the Anxious Seat might receive the benefit. But does he not know, that while there are some who will be imposed upon by such chicanery, there are others who will penetrate the flimsy deception, and turn with disgust from a cause thus advocated? Or does he take it for granted, that among his "fit audience," would that we could add, "though few," there will be no discrimination of mind?

In his formal defence of his peculiar measures, Mr. Finney undertakes to establish the position, "that our present forms of public worship, and everything, so far as measures are concerned, have been arrived at by degrees, and by a succession of New Measures." His remarks under this head are so curious that we are sure they would amaze our readers. We wish we could quote them all. He descants with most admirable perspicacity and force upon cocked-hats, fur caps, bands, silk gowns, stocks, cravats, wigs, and small-clothes. He then passes on to the discussion of Psalm Books, lining the hymns, choirs, pitch-pipes, whistles, and fiddles. In the course of his profound and edifying remarks upon these topics, he relates several stories, of which the following may be taken as a specimen: "I have been told that some years ago, in New England, a certain elderly clergyman was so opposed to the new measure of a minister's wearing pantaloons that he would on no account allow them in his pulpit. A young man was going to preach for him who had no small-clothes, and the old minister would not let him officiate in pantaloons. 'Why,' said he, 'my people would think I had brought a fop into the pulpit, to see a man there with pantaloons on, and it would produce an excitement among them.' And so, finally, the young man was obliged to borrow a pair of the old gentleman's small-clothes, and they were too short for him, and made a ridiculous figure enough. But anything was better than such a terrible innovation as preaching in pantaloons." Again, he says: "I remember one minister who, though quite a young man, used to wear an enormous white wig. And the people talked as if there was a divine right about it, and it was as hard to give it up, almost, as to give up the Bible itself." We dare not reproach him for these instructive little stories in which he abounds, since he is a strenuous advocate for the propriety, nay, the necessity, of telling such stories from the pulpit. "Truths, not thus illustrated," he says, "are generally just as well calculated to convert sinners as a mathematical demonstration." But as, besides himself, "there are very few ministers who dare to use these stories," he calls upon them to "do it, and let

fools reproach them as story-telling ministers." Speaking, too, of such as contend for the dignity of the pulpit, he cries out, "Dignity, indeed! Just the language of the *devil*." We do not pretend to be as well acquainted as Mr. Finney seems to be with the language of the devil; but knowing who it is that has said, "Whosoever shall say, Thou *fool*, shall be in danger of hell-fire," we would rather abide the consequences of the malediction against those who censure "story-telling ministers," than stand in the predicament of him who uttered it. "Fool" and "devil" are in truth very hard names, but we will not be angry with Mr. Finney for employing them; we can bear them *from him*, and it would be cruel to deny him the use of his most effective weapons. We trust that we may be excused, however, from attempting to reply to such arguments. Nor can it be reasonably expected that we should answer his stories about cocked-hats, wigs, whistles, &c.; or controvert the important truths they were intended to illustrate. Indeed, so far are we from wishing to controvert them, that we will furnish him with an additional truth of like kind, and one of such vital moment, that we can only wonder how it escaped his penetrating survey. It is unquestionably true that the ministers in New England, within the last half century, were very generally in the habit of wearing long *queues*, and riding on switch-tailed horses; and if he will apply to us, we can furnish him with some instructive stories to illustrate this truth. We shall leave to him, however, the duty of explaining how the "new measure" of cutting off the *queues*, carried through like that of wearing pantaloons, black stocks, and round hats, in the face of persecution and danger, was made instrumental in promoting the purity and power of revivals of religion. We should be glad if he would inform us too, whether the men, who in the spirit of martyrs introduced these innovations, regarded conformity to them as the only credible evidence of true piety. Did any of these worthies ever say of "wearing pantaloons instead of small-clothes," as he has said of the "Anxious Seat," that it occupied the precise place that *baptism* did with the apostles? Or has the signal honour been reserved for him of discovering and introducing a measure co-equal in importance with a divine institution?

The object of Mr. Finney, in this miserable farrago, is to produce the impression that the objections which have been brought against his measures are as trivial and ridiculous as those which were urged against the innovations of which he here speaks. Whether he has succeeded, however, in making any other impression than that of pity for the man who can thus ineptly trifle with a serious subject we leave our readers to judge.

It has often been objected against the modern reformers, that granting the beneficial tendency of their measures, they unduly magnify their importance. This charge they have denied, and have maintained that they considered them important, but yet unessential, circumstances, attending and favouring the exhibition

of truth. We rejoice that evasion of this kind is no longer possible. Mr. Finney throughout his Lectures insinuates, and often directly asserts the paramount importance, nay, the indispensable necessity of the new measures. "The object of the ministry," he says, using that "Saxon colloquialism" which his reporter so much admires—"is to get all the people to feel that the devil has no right to rule this world, but that they ought all to give themselves to God, and vote in the Lord Jesus Christ as the governor of the universe. Now what shall be done? What measures shall we take? Says one, 'Be sure and have nothing that is new.' Strange! The object of our measures is to gain attention, and you *must have something new.* As sure as the effect of a measure becomes stereotyped, it ceases to gain attention, and you *must try something new.*" In the exercise of a wise economy "of our new things," he thinks public attention "may be kept awake to the great subject of religion for a long series of years, until our *present* measures will by and by have sufficient novelty in them again to attract and fix the public attention. And so we shall never want for something *new.*" All this would be abundantly unintelligible, if interpreted by the light of Mr. F.'s own definitions. On the page preceding that from which it is taken, he says, "building houses for worship, and visiting from house to house, &c., are all '*measures,*' the object of which is to get the attention of the people to the gospel." And in another Lecture from which we have made some extracts, he dignifies with the name of "measures" the several articles of the clergyman's dress, the chorister's pitch-pipe, and various other like things. As "building houses for worship" is a "measure," it must, according to his theory, soon cease to produce its effect; and the gospel cannot gain attention then unless we "try something new," such for instance as preaching in tents instead of our present church edifices. In the revolving cycle of these "measures," too, the time will come when the cocked hat, small clothes, and wig, must be restored to their former honours, or the truth cannot make any impression upon the minds of men. Will Mr. Finney calculate the length of this cycle, that the public may know when they will be favoured with the opportunity for observing the impulse which will be given to the spread of the truth by the return of these ancient observances? Admitting the truth of Mr. Finney's favourite maxim that "obligation and ability are commensurate," he cannot perhaps be considered bound to write with anything like logical precision or consistency. But we have a right to expect honesty. We are entitled to demand that he shall not use terms in one sense, when seeking to relieve his system from odium, and then artfully change the meaning to subserve his purpose. This he has evidently done in the passage above quoted. Let us assign, however, to the term "measures," in this extract, the signification which it was intended here to bear, and yet how revolting is the doctrine taught! According to this theory, the gospel, which its divine author left

complete in all its parts and proportions, and most admirably adapted to secure its destined ends, must utterly fail of its effect unless there be added to it a set of machinery of man's invention. A great, if not the chief part of ministerial wisdom is made to consist "in devising and carrying forward measures" for exciting public attention. The very perfection of Christian wisdom, the height of religious prosperity, are to be sought in that state of things in which "we shall never want for something that is *new*." How is the temple of God dishonoured by this alleged necessity for a continual shifting of its services, like the scenes of some raree-show, to attract the vulgar gaze! How is the Gospel degraded by being thus made dependent for its effect upon a kind of jugglery which shall be studiously adapted to surprise and startle beholders, and thus "attract their attention!" It is the very nature of truth to be severely simple; and in this simplicity she delights to go forth to win her victories. She leaves to error the use of stratagem and guile.

The quotation we have made is not a solitary passage in which the writer, in an unguarded moment, has claimed for his new measures a degree of importance, which, in his more sober moods, he would rather disavow. Deliberately and often does he assert the unqualified *necessity* of these new measures, to the success of the Gospel. "Without new measures," he says, "it is impossible that the church should succeed in gaining the attention of the world to the subject of religion." And again, "But new measures, we *must have*." It will be seen in the sequel, that this is only one illustration of Mr. Finney's disposition to claim infallibility and supreme importance for all his own opinions, even when the smallest matters are in question. His argument, in the paragraph from which the sentences last quoted are taken, may certainly claim the merit of originality. "There are so many exciting subjects constantly brought before the public mind, such a running to and fro, so many that cry 'Lo here,' and 'Lo there,' that the church cannot maintain her ground, cannot command attention, without very exciting preaching, and sufficient novelty in measures to get the public ear." He then proceeds to explain what these "exciting subjects" are, which call upon the church to institute specific measures for producing a counteracting excitement. They are such as "the measures of politicians, of infidels and heretics, the scrambling after wealth, the increase of luxury," &c. It should seem, then, that the church must vary the method of celebrating divine worship, and modify all the arrangements for presenting religious truth to the minds of men, according to the dainties of their tables and the elegance of their furniture and equipage, the degree of commercial enterprise among them, or the extent of infidel machinations, the number of railroads and canals in progress, and of Presidential candidates in the field. The measures we must use are some determinate function of all these variable quantities; and its form should be, in each case, most care-

fully calculated. Every change in the state of speculation, trade, or politics, must call for such a change of measures as will be "calculated to get the attention of men to the gospel of Christ," under these new circumstances. Religion must descend from her vantage ground, and on the level with all this world's concerns and by kindred arts, must she bustle, contrive, and intrigue "to get the public ear." To make use of one of Mr. Finney's own illustrations, because "the politicians get up meetings, circulate handbills and pamphlets, blaze away in the newspapers, send their ships about the streets on wheels with flags and sailors, send coaches all over town with handbills to bring people up to the polls, all to gain attention to their cause and elect their candidate," the church is bound to imitate their wisdom, and institute a similar system of manœuvres. Where then is the contrast which Paul so often draws between the weapons of our warfare, and those with which the world contends? How widely do these *ad captandum* measures differ from the direct, single-hearted course of the apostles! They evidently relied upon the truth, as the only instrument they could lawfully employ in the accomplishment of their errand. Their miracles were not intended, like the glaring show-bill of some exhibition, to attract the attention of the public; their object was to convince, not to amaze the people. They felt that they were the heralds of God, commissioned to bear a weighty message to the children of men; and while to their miracles they appealed for the proof of their commission, upon the intrinsic overwhelming importance of their message they founded their claim to the public attention. If we may credit their own statements, they "renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor handling the word of God deceitfully, but *by manifestation of the truth*, commending themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." They seem to have had no idea that they must set in operation some preliminary mechanism to awaken the attention of conscience to the truth. If this complicated and ever-shifting system of "exciting measures" is necessary to the success of the Gospel, why do we find no trace of it in their practice, and not a syllable of it in their writings? If, as Mr. F. says, "new measures are *necessary* from time to time to awaken attention, and bring the Gospel to bear upon the public mind," why has it been left for him to reveal to us these necessary means for the propagation of the Gospel?

Mr. Finney refers distinctly to the character of the present age as furnishing a special argument for the use of new measures in religion, and as determining the kind of measures to be employed. The substance of his argument is, that this is an age of great excitement, and therefore the same kind of preaching and of measures, which did very well in the days of our fathers, will not answer now; we must have something more exciting, or religion cannot obtain a hearing. From the same premises, we should arrive at a very different conclusion. This is, indeed, an age of extraordinary excitement. The great improvements in the mechanic arts, and

the wide diffusion of knowledge, have given a strong impulse to the popular mind; and everywhere the social mass is seen to be in such a state of agitation, that the lightest breath may make it heave and foam. This being the case, should religion fall in with this excitement, and institute measures for fostering it up to a certain point, that she may gain a favourable moment for presenting her claims? We had thought that one great object of religion was to allay this undue excitement of the human mind; to check its feverish outgoings towards earthly objects, and to teach it without hurry or distraction, in self-collectedness, to put forth its energies in a proper direction, and to their best advantage. This self-possession being included in the final result at which religion aims, can it be wise to commence the attempt to produce it, by exasperating the contrary state of mind? Paul was once placed among a people who were proverbial for their excitability. Their feelings would kindle and flame with the lightest spark, and, like all persons of this mercurial temperament, they delighted in excitement, and were continually seeking its procuring causes. "For all the Athenians and strangers which were there, spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some *new* thing." Here, then, according to Mr. Finney's theory, was the very people upon whom it would be necessary to play off some preparatory measures to excite them, and gain their attention to the Word. But the apostle appears to have felt that nothing was necessary beyond the simple declaration of the Word. He looked upon the truth, declared by his lips, and prospered in its course by the energy of the Holy Spirit, as amply sufficient to secure the needful attention, and accomplish the purpose whereunto it was sent. Nay, so desirous was he to prevent the surprise of *novelty*, that he represents himself as aiming, by the truth which he exhibits, merely to supply a chasm in their knowledge which they had themselves discovered. He presents Jehovah to them as the God of an altar already existing, and declared to them Him, whom they had ignorantly worshipped. Nor did this apostle ever vary his course to suit the latitude of the place he was in, or the temperament of the people around him. Among the pains-taking and thrifty Jews; the learned and witty Athenians; the dissolute Corinthians; the more phlegmatic and martial Romans, he employed but one measure, the declaration of the truth. Will it be said that, in his day, the Gospel was so novel, its truths so surprising, that the necessity for other measures was superseded, but that now, when men have become familiar with the revelations of the Gospel, something else than the "thrice-told tale" must be employed to awaken public attention? And is it conceivable, then, that the Great Head of the Church, foreseeing that the time would come when the preaching of the Gospel would lose its effect, and other means become necessary for its propagation, should leave human reason to grope in the dark for these additional measures? Such imperfection does, indeed, often mark the ways and proceedings of man, but may not

be attributed unto Him, "whose thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor his ways as our ways."

We have assumed, thus far, that the new measures cannot be defended under the pretext that they are only a particular mode of preaching the Gospel, or of exhibiting the truth, and are therefore virtually comprised in the appointed means for the promotion of religion. The measures for which Mr. Finney pleads are something distinct from the truth, aside from it, and intended to exert a separate influence. He plainly presents them as the precursors of the Gospel, to prepare the way for its coming. It is surely incumbent on him, therefore, to explain why the Scriptures make no allusion to these indispensable appendages, or rather prefixes, of the Gospel.

Pressed with this difficulty, and unable to work a miracle in confirmation of his right to supply the deficiencies of the revelation already made, will he yield the position that these new measures are necessary, and content himself with maintaining, that as they tend to favour the impression of the truth, and it is our duty to preach the truth in its most efficient form, it is both expedient and right to make use of them? Upon this ground some of Mr. Finney's fellow labourers have rested their cause, and have constructed for it a much better defence than he has made. The principle is here assumed, that it is the right and the duty of every man to make use of any measures for promoting religion that seem to him well adapted to co-operate with the truth and aid in its work; and this principle is, within certain limits, both just and safe, but when pressed beyond them it is false and dangerous. If there be no restraint upon the application of this principle, then are the means for the diffusion of Christianity left, as before, at the mercy of human discretion. Each minister should, in this case, be keen as a Metternich in foreseeing the final effect of the machinery he puts in operation; and the most eagle-eyed would often find themselves mistaken. Hence experiment after experiment must be made to try the efficacy of different measures; and the house of God becomes transformed into a kind of religious laboratory. Upon this same principle the Roman Catholic church has introduced the worship of images and pictures, and overlaid the simplicity of the Gospel with the tinsel and glare of her pompous ritual. She has cast upon religion such a profusion of ornaments wherewith to deck herself, that she has expired beneath the burden. The measures of the Catholic church, though adopted with the honest design of favouring the operation of the truth, are readily condemned by all Protestants. We might imagine, too, many other measures which would temporarily assist the impression of the truth, and which would yet meet with universal condemnation. It was Domitian, we believe, who invited some of his senators, on a certain occasion, to sup with him, and when they arrived at his palace, they were ushered into a room hung with black, and against the walls of which were placed coffins, each one, by the dim, blue

light of a sulphur lamp placed within it, showing the name of one of the horror-stricken guests. At a signal from the emperor, executioners rushed into the room, each with a drawn sword in his hand. There can be no doubt, that a homily on death, delivered just then, would have produced a wonderful effect upon the audience. But would any one recommend such measures for giving effect to the truth of man's mortality? Or would any one, save the preacher and the trumpeter who are said to have actually tried the trick, approve of stationing a man in the belfry of the church to give emphasis, by a blast from his horn, to the preacher's account of the blowing of the archangel's trump? Phosphoric paintings might be drawn upon the walls of the church, which being rendered suddenly visible by the extinguishment of the lights, at the proper point in the preacher's discourse, would most powerfully aid the impression of the truth he was delivering. A thousand devices equally effective, and equally objectionable, might be invented by the exercise of a little ingenuity. Where then shall we draw the line between what is right and what is wrong? If compelled to run this boundary line, we should make it divide between those measures which might be considered vehicles of the truth, or intended simply to provide for the exhibition of the truth, and those which are designed of themselves to produce an effect. There are various methods in which the truth may be presented, such as from the pulpit, in Bible classes, or Sunday-schools, and in private conversation. Of all such measures, if measures they must be called, those are best which are best adapted to make the truth effective. Means must also be provided for the proper exhibition of truth, such as building convenient houses for public worship, collecting children in Sunday-schools, visiting from house to house, forming Bible and other benevolent societies. To this class may be referred also protracted meetings and inquiry meetings. The design of these meetings is simply to collect the people together that they may hear such truths as are deemed suitable to their state of mind. It was never intended that the mere institution of such a meeting, or the act of going to attend upon it, should produce any religious effect. Such arrangements as these may undoubtedly be made if they are fitted to favour the operation of the truth. And this limitation will be found to include the condition that the measures themselves, the bare mechanism of the arrangements for the presentation of the truth, instead of being constructed with the design and the tendency to surprise and captivate the attention, should be so ordered as to attract no notice. The perfection of pulpit eloquence is when the manner of the preacher attracts no attention, and the truth is left to work its unimpeded effect upon the hearer; and so those are the best measures which themselves pass unregarded, and suffer the mind to be entirely occupied with the truth. The measures which are peculiar to Mr. Finney and his followers are of a very different class. The anxious seat, for instance, is

intended to produce an effect of its own. Its object is not simply to collect in one place those who are in a particular state of mind, that they may be suitably instructed and advised. No, there is supposed to be some wonder-working power in the person's rising before the congregation and taking the assigned place. This measure then, and all that resemble it in its tendency to occupy and excite the mind, we should condemn on scriptural grounds as inexpedient and unauthorized.

The distinction we have here made we think is just and important: and we could urge many reasons why it should be taken as the dividing line between right and wrong measures for promoting religion. But this position might be contested by some, and we are anxious here to reason from premises universally conceded. There are many cases where right and wrong run into each other, and the bounding line between them, like that between neighbouring states, is involved in dispute and doubt. We will grant therefore, to save all cavil, the universal truth of the principle that it is right to make use of any measures in our efforts to promote religion that are adapted to aid the truth in its operation upon the minds of men. Here then we are called upon to examine the tendency of the particular measures proposed and insisted upon by Mr. Finney; and when he shall have worn out these, and, in accordance with his Athenian notion that we must continually find something new, introduced others, we shall be under the necessity of testing them in like manner.

For reasons already given we shall throw out of consideration inquiry meetings and protracted meetings. We shall first consider what Mr. F. calls the *anxious seat*. His formal definition of this measure is, "the appointment of some particular seat in the place of meeting, where the anxious may come and be addressed particularly, and be made subjects of prayer and sometimes conversed with individually." Let this definition be well marked. It points out with sufficient distinctness the nature and design of this measure. What then will be the surprise of the reader to learn, that on the same page he implicitly admits that the real *design* is totally different from the avowed one! In defending this measure from objection, he says, "the *design* of the anxious seat is undoubtedly philosophical and according to the laws of mind:—it has two bearings." These two bearings are, that "it gets the individual (who is seriously troubled in mind), willing to have the fact known to others;" and secondly, "it uncovers the delusion of the human heart and prevents a great many spurious conversions, by showing those who might otherwise imagine themselves willing to do anything for Christ that in fact they are willing to do nothing." In defending this measure, who would not have supposed that his arguments would have been drawn from the importance of having those who were troubled in mind collected together that they might "be addressed particularly," &c.? But there is not one word of his defence that has the remotest connexion with the avowed object of this mea-

sure. He was evidently thrown off his guard; and the plainness with which he thus incautiously reveals the true in distinction from the professed design is only a new instance to illustrate the difficulty of maintaining a consistent system of deception. We have understood from the beginning the guileful character of this measure, and it has constituted in our minds a strong objection against it; but we had not expected to find so distinct an acknowledgment of it in Mr. Finney's defence. Can any measures, thus marked by insidiousness, be lawfully employed in the promotion of religion? How careful is the Apostle Paul to inform us that he did "not walk in *craftiness;*" and when some of his enemies at Corinth charged him with having "caught them with *guile*," how promptly did he repel the odious accusation! We are told too that in the Saviour's lips, "there was found no guile;" but that his enemies used *crafty* measures to ensnare him. Christian wisdom becomes worldly cunning the moment that it ceases to be united with the artlessness and simplicity of the dove. But we need not multiply arguments to prove that deception can never be lawfully employed in the support and furtherance of the truth. The only difficulty heretofore has been to substantiate the charge of guile against the new measures, and Mr. Finney has saved us all further trouble on this score.

Deception may seem, for a time, to aid the progress of truth, but its ultimate effects must always be injurious. In the case now under examination, it is easy to foresee the evil. Many will doubtless go to the anxious seat, and finding that no counsels or prayers are offered on their behalf, which might not have been delivered with as much propriety and effect while they occupied their former seats, will perceive that the apparent and professed design of this measure was intended merely as a lure to draw them within the sphere of its real operation. They will feel that they have been deceived, and there is nothing which the mind more instinctively and quickly resents than the least approach to fraud or imposition upon itself—nothing which more surely awakens its unfriendly and hostile feelings. A still larger class will see at once the deception of this measure, and will turn away in disgust from a cause which calls in the aid of such fantastic trickery—a disgust which we should not hesitate to pronounce reasonable, if the conduct which excites it were lawful and right. The best cause imaginable, on trial before a jury, would be prejudiced and probably lost, by any appearance of fraud in the matter or management of it. What impression then must be made respecting religion, when her friends employ such measures, and represent them as essential to the success of the Gospel! What multitudes will conclude, and conclude justly, if the sayings and doings of these reformers are true and right, that the cause itself thus supported, must be a bad one! The character of religion is known to the world chiefly from the conduct of its professed friends; and they cannot be too careful, therefore, to pursue such an open and honest course, as

will plainly show, that, in the strong consciousness of the merits of their cause, they reject with disdain the tortuous policy and intriguing arts of worldly men.

The substance of Mr. Finney's first argument in defence of the anxious seat is comprised in the following extract. "When a person is seriously troubled in mind, everybody knows that there is a powerful tendency to try to keep it private that he is so, and it is a great thing to get the individual willing to have the fact known to others. And as soon as you can get him willing to make known his feelings you have accomplished a great deal." The anxious seat he supposes will produce this willingness, will "get him to break away from the chains of pride," and thus "gain an important point towards his conversion." It is true that there is often found the tendency, here spoken of, to conceal the state of the feelings from public observation. But this is not always the effect of pride. However strange and inconceivable it may be to Mr. Finney, there can be no doubt that there is such a thing as a diffidence, which has its origin in modesty rather than pride. There are those, and they form perhaps a much larger class than he supposes, whose minds shrink from everything like a parade, or public display of feeling. Every refined mind possesses more or less of this retiring delicacy. Its tenderest, most cherished feelings are those which are least exposed save to the objects of them; it feels indeed, that its affections would be profaned by being laid open to the stare of vulgar curiosity. It is easy to see how such a mind will be affected by the anxious seat. In proportion ordinarily to the intenseness of the feelings awakened within a man of this mood, will be his aversion to make the public exhibition of them, which is demanded. He knows that there is, in every community, a circle of religious gossips, who are always found among the earliest and warmest patrons of the anxious seat, and who attend continually upon it, to satisfy their prurient curiosity, and gather materials for conversation from the disclosures there made of the feelings of their neighbours. And he cannot bear the thought that his most private and sacred emotions should be thus idly bruited about. After a severe struggle of mind, he will decide not to go to the anxious seat, and, as he has been taught to consider this step necessary to his conversion, there is much reason to fear that his decision not to take it will put an end to his seriousness. The spark, which, properly fostered, might have been kindled into a bright and ever-during flame, is thus quenched by a kind of rude and harsh dealing for which the word of God affords no warrant. There are others, in whom the unwillingness to make known their religious concern proceeds from the dread of ridicule. This dread has a place in most minds, and with some men it constitutes one of the strongest feelings of their nature. There are many young men who could better brave almost any danger than endure the laugh or face the sneer of their thoughtless companions. The religious anxiety of such must become deep and strong, before it will drive them to

break through the restraints which this fear imposes upon them. Can it be deemed wise or safe then to expose them unnecessarily to so severe a trial as the anxious seat? This trial may in some cases effect, so far as this is concerned, the desired result, but there is a dreadful risk incurred of repelling some, upon whom the truth had taken hold, to their former state of thoughtless unconcern. And what is the counterbalancing advantage to warrant this risk? Why, the anxious seat, argues Mr. Finney, "gets the individual, who is seriously troubled in mind, willing to have the fact known to others; and as soon as you can get him willing to make known his feelings, you have accomplished a great deal." The true state of the question is here very artfully concealed from view. The real operation of the anxious seat is not to make the individual upon whom it takes effect, willing to have his feelings known to "*others*;" it is to make him willing to display them before the *whole congregation*. And this is so far from being "an important point gained towards his conversion," that it should be deprecated as fraught with almost certain evil. It is important that some one or more should be made acquainted with his state of mind, that he may receive the instructions adapted to his case; but it is highly undesirable that the whole community should know it, lest the thought that he is the object of general observation and remark should turn away his mind from the contemplation of the truth, and call up an antagonist influence, which shall prevail over that which had begun to work within him. The risk, then, which is involved in the use of this measure, is incurred for the attainment of an end, which is of itself a positive and serious disadvantage.

In this connexion, too, we would remark, that the tendency of the anxious seat, and of the whole system of public pledging, voting, &c., or, as Mr. Finney calls it in his Saxon English, "of speaking right out in the meeting," is *to obstruct the operation of the truth*. They distract the mind and divert it from the truth, by producing a distinct and separate excitement. Suppose an individual, listening to the message of God, feels the truth manifested to his conscience. As the preacher proceeds, the truth takes deeper hold upon him, the penitential tear starts from his eye, and he resolves that he will begin to seek the Lord. When the sermon is closed, his heart still meditates upon the truth he has heard, and his feeling of anxious concern becomes each moment more intense. But now comes the call to the anxious seat. He hears himself exhorted in the most impassioned manner, to exchange the seat he now occupies for another designated one; and the vehemence with which this measure is urged upon him, and the motives and illustrations employed to enforce it, seem to imply that the salvation of his soul depends upon his taking this step. Here is a new subject presented to his mind, and one of a very agitating nature. The divine truth, which was but now occupying his mind, is forced away, while he revolves the questions, Shall I go or not? Who else will go? What will they say of me? The excitement thus produced, oblite-

rates the impressions which the truth had made, and, but for the consideration we are now about to present, it would then be a matter of small moment whether he went to the anxious seat or not.

The consideration just alluded to, is the tendency of the anxious seat *to form and cherish delusive hopes.* Mr. Finney has, indeed, assigned as his second argument, and the only additional one to that already examined, in favour of this measure, that its bearing is "to detect deception and delusion, and thus prevent false hopes." This argument would have astonished us beyond measure, had we not ceased to be startled by anything which Mr. Finney can say or do. He has worn out all our susceptibilities of this kind, and no measures from him, in argument or action, however new, could now surprise us. This case is but one out of several similar ones, in which Mr. F. resorts to the forlorn hope of reversing what he knows and feels to be the most formidable objections against him, and changing them into arguments in his favour. As might have been anticipated in every attempt of this kind, he has utterly failed. He supposes that the anxious seat operates as a test of character. "Preach," he says "to him (the awakened sinner) and at the moment he thinks he is willing to do anything,——but bring him to the test, call on him to do one thing, to take one step, that shall identify him with the people of God, or cross his pride—his pride comes up, and he refuses; his delusion is brought out, and he finds himself a lost sinner still; whereas, if you had not done it he might have gone away flattering himself that he was a Christian." This argument involves the capital error that no sinner who is truly awakened can refrain from obeying the call to the anxious seat. It assumes that to go to the anxious seat is "to do something for Christ," and that it is impossible for him who refuses to go, to be a Christian. It supposes that these things are true, and that every awakened sinner is ignorant or undiscerning enough to believe them true. Some test of this kind, he says, the church has always found it necessary to have. "In the days of the Apostles, *baptism* answered this purpose. It held the precise place that the *anxious seat* does now, as a public manifestation of their (the people's) determination to be Christians." So it appears that baptism, like all other measures, wears itself out, and must be replaced by something new. Will Mr. Finney inform the church how long we must wait before this measure will be again fitted to accomplish the purpose for which the Saviour intended it? Though he supposes that the anxious seat occupies "the precise place" that baptism did, we can by no means consent to receive it as an equivalent. Baptism was, indeed, a test of character, since obedience or disobedience was exercised in view of a divine command; but the anxious seat cannot operate thus, except by arrogating to itself a similar authority. We trust that this may be deemed a sufficient answer to Mr. F.'s argument for the anxious seat as a test of character.

The tendency of this measure to foster delusion and create false hopes is very evident. There are some persons who are fond of notoriety, and ever ready to thrust themselves forward on any occasion, or in any manner which will attract to them the notice of others. To such the anxious seat holds out a powerful temptation. This measure, if used at all, must be used without discrimination. It applies the same treatment to all, and does not permit us, according to the apostolic direction, to make a difference, "having compassion on some," "and pulling others out of the fire." While it unduly discourages, and in many cases overwhelms with despair, the timid and diffident, it invites forward the noisy and bustling, who need to be repressed. Others again will go to the anxious seat, who are not properly awakened, upon whom, indeed, the truth has produced no effect; but they go because they have been persuaded that to do so is "to do something for Christ," and that it will be "an important point gained towards their conversion." Mr. Finney agrees with us in supposing that such public manifestations will often be made by persons who have not the feelings indicated; for however irrational a man's theories may be, he cannot refrain, sometimes, out of connexion with them, from talking common sense. On one occasion, when he is out of his controversial attitude, he says to his congregation, "perhaps if I should put it to you now, you would all rise up and *vote* that you were agreed in desiring a revival, and agreed to have it now;" and he then goes on to prove to them, that nevertheless they are not agreed. Doubtless it would be so, and in like manner will many go to the anxious seat, who are not "anxious." And the great majority of all who go will go under the influence of erroneous impressions and wrong excitement. Whatever may be the theory of the anxious seat, in practice it is not used for the purpose of making visible and thus rendering permanent the impressions made by the truth, nor is such its effect. This is most fully disclosed by Mr. Finney. Those who have been affected by the truth, and who obey the summons to the anxious seat, will not go with the view of making known their state of mind to their spiritual adviser. They will ordinarily make this 'pilgrimage to Mecca,' because they have been deceived into the belief that it is a necessary step towards their salvation; and that they are rendering to Christ an acceptable service by thus attending upon an institution which is as good as baptism, or perhaps a little better. The excitement which draws persons of these different classes to the anxious seats, not being produced by the truth, and yet partaking of a religious character, must tend to conduct the mind to error and delusion. Some, no doubt, who, in the heat of the moment, have taken this step before so many witnesses, will feel that they are committed, and rather than be talked of as apostates through the whole congregation, they will be induced to counterfeit a change which they have not experienced. We have not been surprised, therefore, to learn, what is an unquestionable fact, that where this measure

has been most used, many hypocrites have been introduced into the church—men professing godliness, but living in the practice of secret wickedness. And a still greater number, through the operation of the same influence, have been led to cherish false hopes. In the mind of an individual who has gone to the anxious seat, an important place will be filled by the desire to come out well in the estimation of the multitude who have looked upon this declaration of his seriousness; and, already too much disposed to judge favourably of himself, he will be thus still more inclined to rest satisfied with insufficient evidences of a gracious change. Every extraneous influence of this kind, which is brought to bear upon a mind engaged in the delicate business of forming an estimate of itself, must tend to mislead and delude it.

The anxious seat, no matter how judiciously managed, is liable to the objection here advanced. It excites the mind and thus urges it forward, at the same time that it thrusts aside the truth, the attractive power of which is alone sufficient to draw it into its proper orbit. But the intrinsic tendency of this measure to lead the mind astray is very greatly enhanced by the manner in which it is conducted by Mr. Finney and his imitators. The ordinary course of proceeding with those who come forward to occupy the anxious seat is on this wise. They are exhorted to submit to God during the course of the prayer which the preacher is about to offer. They are told that this is a work which they can perform of themselves. They have only to summon up all their energies, and put forth one Herculean determination of will, and the work is done. A strong pull, as in the case of a dislocated limb, will jerk the heart straight, and all will be well. At the conclusion of the prayer, they are called upon to testify whether they have submitted. All who make this profession, without any further examination, are at once numbered and announced as converts. Sometimes a room, or some separate place, is provided to which they are directed to repair. Those who remain are upbraided for their rebellion, and again urged to energize the submitting volition during another prayer. And this process is continued as long as there is a prospect of its yielding any fruit. Does it need any argument or illustration to show, that the anxious seat, thus managed, must be a very hot-bed of delusion?. The duty here urged upon the sinner is not, as we have shown in our former article, the duty which the Bible urges. We are at no loss to understand why Mr. Finney presents the sinner's duty in this form. Submission seems to be more comprised than some other duties within a single mental act, and more capable of instant performance. Were the sinner directed to repent, it might seem to imply that he should take some little time to think of his sins, and of the Being whom he has offended; or if told to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, he might be led to suppose that he could not exercise this faith until he had called up before his mind the considerations proper to show him his lost condition, and the suitableness of the offered

Saviour. Repentance and faith, therefore, will not so well answer his purpose. But with submission, he can move the sinner to the instant performance of the duty involved, or, as he says in his Saxon way, can "break him down," "break him down on the spot," "melt him right down clear to the ground, so that he can neither stand nor go." In the mental darkness, consequent upon this unscriptural exhibition of his duty, and while flurried and bewildered by the excitement of the scene, the sinner is to perform the double duty of submitting, and of deciding that he has submitted. Who can doubt that, under these circumstances, multitudes have been led to put forth a mental act, and say to themselves, "There, it is done," and then hold up the hand to tell the preacher they have submitted. while their hearts remain as before, except, indeed, that now the mists of religious delusion are gathering over them? Had this system been designed to lead the sinner, in some plausible way, to self-deception, in what important respect could it have been better adapted than it now is to this purpose?

The test-question propounded to the occupant of the anxious seat is not always made as definite as we have represented. Sometimes it is proposed in as loose and vague a form as this: "Would you not be willing to vote that God should be the Supreme Ruler?" and an affirmative answer to this question has been deemed and proclaimed adequate evidence of submission, and the assenting individual filed off among the "new converts." So unbecoming and foreign from the true nature of religion have been the attempts often made by these preachers to produce an excitement; so indecent the anxiety manifested to force upon the anxious sinner some expression or sign which might authorize them to make use of his name to swell their list of converts, that we can liken it only to the manner in which the recruiting serjeant, by the display of drum and fife and banner, and if this will not answer, by the intoxication of his dupe, persuades him to accept a piece of the king's money, and thus binds him to the service and increases his own reward. The chief difference is, that the enlisted soldier soon perceives that he has been caught with guile, and bitterly deplores the consequences of his delusion, but the deceived sinner will, in many instances, remain deceived until he learns his mistake at the bar of his Judge.

Lest the proclamation, upon the most slight and insufficient grounds, that the anxious sinner is a convert, should not act with sufficient power upon his sense of character to make him counterfeit a Christian deportment, or deceive himself into the belief that he is a true disciple of Christ, there is provided an additional new measure, *the immediate admission to the Lord's Supper of all who profess themselves converts.* It will be at once seen how this measure plays into the rest of the system, and assists the operation of the whole. Mr. Finney, to perfect his system, has but to take one further step, and maintain that no church has the right to discipline any of its members who have been thrown in by the operation of

the new measures. This is evidently wanting to complete his plan, which ought to provide some method for retaining his converts in the church, as well as for their easy introduction into it. And why should he hesitate to make this small addition? It is surely more defensible than many other parts of his system. We should not be surprised to find a denial that the "set of old, stiff, dry, cold elders," that have crept into our churches, have any authority to discipline his converts, figuring at large in the neat pattern-card which he issues, of the newest fashion in measures. Mr. Finney endeavours to show that it is the duty of the young convert to apply immediately for admission to the Church, and the duty of the church to yield to this application. In Chatham-street Chapel, it seems, their practice is to propound applicants for a whole month, but the reason of this long delay is, that in a city many strangers will apply, and it is necessary for the session to have opportunity to inquire respecting them. In the country, however, the church will "sin and grieve the Holy Spirit," by debarring from the communion any who apply, "if they are sufficiently instructed on the subject of religion to know what they are doing, and if their general character is such that they can be trusted as to their sincerity and honesty in making a profession." "Great evil," he says, "has been done by this practice of keeping persons out of the church a long time to see if they were Christians." No doubt great evil has been done to the credit of his system, wherever the converts made by it have been thus tried, but this is the only evil that we have ever known to result from the practice. Under the ordinary ministrations of the Gospel there is much that springs up having the semblance of piety, but without root, so that it soon withers away. And it cannot be doubted that much more than the usual number of these fair-looking but rootless plants will start up in Mr. Finney's forcing-bed. Surely, then, the voice of wisdom and of duty calls upon the church to wait until the blossom, if not the fruit, shall have appeared. When the seeming but deceived convert has been once admitted within the pale of the church, the motives and means of continued self-deception are so greatly multiplied, as to leave but little ground for hope that he will ever be awakened from his false security until the dawning light of another world breaks in upon him. The church also owes a duty to herself in this matter. The addition of unworthy members to her communion, by rendering frequent acts of discipline necessary, will expose her to distraction within, and to scandal without. But these weighty considerations, plainly involving the eternal welfare of individuals and the true prosperity of the church, must all give way to provide for the effectual working of Mr. Finney's system. Better that the church should be filled with the hypocritical and the deluded, than that the new measures should lose their credit.

Many of Mr. F.'s opinions tend to this same point, to provide for smuggling his converts into the church, before they themselves,

or the session to whom they apply, can have had full opportunity to judge whether they have undergone a change of heart. "There is no need," says he, "of young converts *having* or *expressing* doubts as to their conversion. There is no more need of a person's doubting whether he is now in favour of God's government, than there is for a man to doubt whether he is in favour of one government or another. It is, in fact, on the face of it, *absurd* for a person to talk of doubting on such a point, if he is intelligent and understands what he is talking about." Though it might perplex a man of plain understanding to conceive how such instruction as this could be reconciled with the scriptural account of the deceitfulness of man's heart, yet its meaning and drift are perfectly intelligible. Its tendency, and it would hardly be uncharitable to say, its design, is to form a bold, swaggering, Peter-like confidence, which may preserve the fresh convert from misgivings of mind during the brief interval of a few hours, or at most days, which must elapse between his professed submission and his reception into the church. The next thing is to impress him with the belief that it is his duty to apply at once for admission to the Lord's Supper, and this is most fully done. He is told that if he waits, "he will probably go halting and stumbling along through life." No, there must be no waiting—drive on, or the tempestuous gust will die away. Then the church must be taught to throw open her doors, and this she is told to do under the pains and penalties of "grieving the Holy Spirit" if she refuse. Some examination, however, must be held, and the result of this might be to show that many of the applicants had been insufficiently or erroneously instructed in the plan of salvation. And see how beautifully Mr. Finney provides for this difficulty. "In examining young converts for admission to the church, their consciences should not be ensnared by examining them too extensively or minutely *on doctrinal points*." The meaning of the phrase, "too extensively or minutely," may be readily understood from the exposition we have given of Mr. Finney's theological system. The church session who should ask of one of these converts, what is the ground of your hope of salvation? might receive for an answer, "My submission to God:—the world is divided into two great political parties, the one with Satan, the other with God at its head; and I have energized a mighty volition, and resolved to join the latter and vote in the Lord Jesus Christ as governor of the universe." Suppose the examination to proceed a little further —Have you been led to see the depravity of your heart? "I know nothing of a depraved heart. All I know on this subject is, that ever since Adam sinned, every person begins to sin when he becomes a moral agent."—But does not David say, I was shapen in sin? "Yes, but the substance of a conceived fœtus cannot be sin, and David only meant that he sinned, when he sinned." Have you any reason to believe that your soul has been washed in the fountain set open for the remission of sin? "I know nothing of

any such operation. I have been taught that it is a great error introduced into the church by the accursed traditions of the elders, to speak as though in religion there occurred anything like the washing off of some defilement."—Upon whom do you rely for strength in the conflict which is before you? "Upon the might of my own arm."—Do you not pray to God to strengthen you and enable you to discharge your duties? "No, it would be an insult to God to pray thus, as though he had commanded me to do what I am not able to perform."—Do you believe that God is all-powerful? "Yes; that is, I believe he can do some things, and others too, if his creatures will not oppose him."—Can he preserve and promote the prosperity of the church? "Yes, by taking advantage of excitements." The session, somewhat dissatisfied, we may suppose, with this examination, resolve to question the candidate more closely on some of these points. But—Hold, hold, cries Mr. Finney, take care how you ensnare the conscience of this young convert by examining him too extensively or minutely on doctrinal points.

The way is thus laid perfectly open for the entrance of his converts into the church. But how shall they be kept there? There are two new measures proposed by him that might seem to aim at this end, but both of them inadequate. The first is, that they shall be kept in ignorance of the standards of the church they have entered. Young converts, he says, ought to be indoctrinated, but he avowedly excludes from the means of indoctrination, "teaching the catechism." This would answer if he could only keep in the first ones, until he had introduced a majority into every church who should know nothing of the catechism or confession of faith. The other measure proposed is, that his converts should not be made to "file in behind the old, stiff, dry, cold members and elders." No doubt, if they could be permitted to take the lead and manage all things in their own way, there would be no difficulty. But there is reason to apprehend, that age, combined with Christian experience and clothed with official pre-eminence, will still insist upon its right to direct the young and inexperienced.

Nothing can be more evident than that these new measures are remarkably adapted to form and propagate a false religion. Indeed, we have little doubt that the whole system has originated in a total misconception of the true nature of religion. This charge* was, in

* See a pamphlet, published in 1828, entitled "Letters of the Rev. Dr. Beecher and Rev. Mr. Nettleton on the New Measures in promoting Revivals of Religion." This pamphlet contains a masterly discussion of the subject. Though it was written before the new measures had as fully disclosed themselves as now, its allegations have been more than sustained, and all its prophecies of evil time has already converted into history. We fear that the continued press of new publications has crowded this pamphlet out of sight. It deserves more than an ephemeral existence, and we shall be glad if this notice has, in any degree, the effect of calling attention to it. It has never been answered. Mr. Finney, we are told, makes it his rule never to reply to any attacks upon him,—it should have been added, save by bitter vituperations from the pulpit. A very convenient principle this.

substance, alleged against Mr. Finney several years since, and substantiated from the only production which he had then given to the public. It was fully made out, to the conviction, we imagine, of every candid mind that examined the evidences, but its only effect upon Mr. Finney, so far as we can perceive, has been to induce him to throw in an unintelligible paragraph upon the difference between emotion and principle. "One of the first things," he says, "young converts should be taught, is to distinguish between emotion and principle in religion. . . . . By emotion I mean, that state of mind of which we are conscious, and which we call *feeling*, an involuntary state of mind that arises of course when we are in certain circumstances, or under certain influences. But these emotions should be carefully distinguished from religious principle. By principle, I do not mean any substance or root or seed or sprout implanted in the soul. But I mean the voluntary decision of the mind, the firm determination to act our duty and to obey the will of God, by which a Christian should always be governed." Does he intend here, by maintaining that our emotions are *involuntary*, to deny them any moral character? Does he mean to tell us, that the emotion of complacency towards holiness is not an adequate or proper motive for the cultivation of holiness in ourselves? Are all those actions which are prompted by our emotions divested of morality, or, if moral, are they sinful? And, then, what a definition of a *principle*, as distinguished from an emotion? A voluntary decision of mind? A man decides to do some act because he thinks it right. His decision is a principle. He has stumbled into this arrant nonsense, over his dislike to mental dispositions. But we will not puzzle ourselves or our readers in the attempt further to analyse this mysterious paragraph. Whatever may be its meaning or design, it will not turn aside the charge that the general tendency of Mr. Finney's representations is to give an undue predominance to the imaginative emotions in religion. We are susceptible of two very different classes of emotion,—the one connected with the imagination, the other with the moral sense; the one awakened by objects that are grand, terrible, &c., the other called into exercise by the perception of moral qualities. These two kinds of emotion produce widely different effects upon the animal frame. Let a predominant emotion of terror fill the mind and it will fever the blood, quicken the pulse, blanch the cheek, and agitate the whole frame. Each moment that the emotion becomes more intense, the bodily excitement increases, and it may be heightened until life is destroyed by it. But let the mind be occupied with disapprobation of moral evil, and in the intensest degree of this emotion, how feeble in comparison is its effect upon the powers and functions of animal life? This close sympathy of the imaginative emotions with the bodily frame gives them a dangerous pre-eminence. The same object often calls into simultaneous action emotions belonging to both these classes. The contemplation of his sinful life may call up at once in the mind of a man

abhorrence of sin and dread of its evil consequences, and there is reason to fear that, without great care, the latter feeling will absorb the former. Now, it is just here that we think Mr. Finney has erred, and gone over into the regions of enthusiastic excitement. He is evidently possessed of an ardent temperament, and the calm and gentle excitement attending the exercise of the moral emotions, disconnected with the imaginative, has not sufficient relish for him. It is comparatively tame and tasteless. For the same reason, he discards as "animal excitement," all the gentler feelings; such as, like the "soft and plaintive music of an Eolian harp," spread themselves through the soul and dissolve it in tender sadness or pity. He turns from these to the stronger and more boisterous emotions, which, stirring both soul and body like the sound of the trumpet, can yield the luxurious play and revel of intense sensation. When a feeling of this character is awakened by religious objects, though it should swallow up the accompanying emotion inspired by conscience, yet the imaginative mind entertains no doubt of the religious character of the passion which fills and moves it. It is in this region, where prevails the awakening din of the storm and tempest of pious passion, that Mr. Finney, as it appears to us, has constructed the chief dwelling-place of religion. For the proof of this, we appeal to the general tone of swelling extravagance which marks all his sentiments, and to the habitual tenor of his illustrations and instructions. He teaches in various places and ways, that the progress of religion in the heart cannot properly be set forth under the symbol of the growth of "any root or sprout or seed, implanted in the mind." Now it so happens that one of these figures, the growth of a seed, was employed for this very purpose, on more than one occasion, by our Lord himself, and by his apostles. And it must be acknowledged that this is a very fit and instructive emblem, if the progress of religion be dependent on the growth of *principle*—that is, of that which is the *beginning*, or which lays the ground for a series of actions, and determines them to be what they are; but inappropriate and deceptive, as he represents it to be, if religion has its origin in a "deep-seated" act of the mind, and for its increase depends on the fitful gusts of passionate fervour. To the same effect are the many representations which he puts forth, of the repugnance which the Christian will feel when brought into contact with a fellow Christian who is more spiritual than himself. This electric repulsion will take place only when their minds are under the dominion of the imaginative emotions. The Christian, whose religion is the offspring of principle, and has its range among the emotions of the moral sense, will love Christian excellence, and be attracted by it in proportion to its purity and brightness. The effect of greater holiness than his own, whether seen in men, in angels, or in God, will be to increase his admiration and draw him onward in the divine life. This repellent effect of the exhibition of greater piety, Mr. Finney supposes, will take place only in those who are considerably below it.

If those around are anywhere "near the mark," it will "kindle and burn" among them, until it has warmed them all up to its own temperature. Hence, in a prayer meeting, if a spiritual man leads, who is "far ahead" of the rest, "his prayer will repel them;" but it "will awaken them if they are not *so far* behind as to revolt at it and resist it." And again he says, "In the midst of the warm expressions that are flowing forth, let an individual come in who is cold, and pour his cold breath out, like the damp of death, and it will make every Christian that has any feeling, want to get out of the meeting." A precise account this of the operation of a kind of religion which has cut loose from principle and conscience, and surrendered itself to the emotions of the imagination. And in accommodation to this species of religion must all the arrangements of the prayer meeting be ordered. "There should be," he says, "but one definite object before the meeting." Forgetful,—perhaps we ought to say, reckless,—of the model our Saviour has given us, in which there are as many objects brought before the mind as it contains sentences, he censures and ridicules every prayer which is not confined to a single point. Unless some short passage of scripture can be found which bears upon this specific point, he says, no portion of the Bible should be read at the meeting. "Do not drag in the word of God to make up a part of the meeting as a mere matter of form,—this is an insult to God." There must be no "joyful singing." "When singing is introduced in a prayer meeting, the hymns should be short, and so selected as to bring out something solemn, some *striking* words." There must be no adoration of the Deity. Yes, incredible as it may appear, Mr. Finney proscribes and burlesques that sublimest, holiest exercise of the human mind, in which it rises to the contemplation of Infinite Excellence, and prostrates itself before it, rehearsing the perfections which it feels it cannot worthily celebrate. "Some men," he says, "will spin out a long prayer in telling God who and what he is!!" The tendency of all this is easily perceived. We have mentioned the correspondence which always takes place between the movements of imaginative emotions and of the animal frame. Mr. Finney contends that the spirit of prayer is, in its very nature and essence, a spirit of agony; and he mentions with commendation a state of mind in which "there is but one way to keep from *groaning*, and that is by resisting the Holy Ghost." Nay, he brings forward, with very special praise, the case of a man "who prayed *until he bled at the nose!!*" Another pattern is afforded by a woman, "who got into such a state of mind that she could not live without prayer. She could not rest, day nor night, unless there was somebody praying. Then she would be at ease; but if they ceased, *she would shriek with agony.*" Of himself he says, "Brethren, in my present *state of health*, I find it impossible to pray as much as I have been in the habit of doing, and continue to preach. . . . . Now will not you, who are *in health*, throw yourselves into this work, and bear this *burden*, and *lay yourselves out*

in prayer?" Again, it is well known that persons who are under the dominion of imagination soon become a prey to delusion. All their inward impressions are projected into the form of external realities. Their forebodings of mind are to them the shadows of coming events, and they assume the character and authority of prophets. This peculiarity is fully endorsed by Mr. Finney, under the name of "spiritual discernment." There was a woman, in a certain place—almost all his stories of this kind are about women—who "became anxious about sinners, and went to praying for them—and she finally came to her minister and talked with him, and asked him to appoint an anxious meeting, for she *felt* that one was needed. The minister put her off, for he *felt* nothing of it. The next week she came again, and besought him to appoint an anxious meeting; she *knew* there would be somebody to come, for she *felt* as if God was going to pour out his Spirit. He put her off again. And finally she said to him, 'If you don't appoint an anxious meeting *I shall die*, for there is *certainly* going to be a revival.' The next Sabbath he appointed a meeting." The result of course was, as in all other *published* predictions of this kind, that the oracle was fulfilled. He had several other stories to the same effect; and the expectation of these women, founded on no evidence save that of individual feeling, he calls "spiritual discernment;" and gives warrant to those who possess it to arraign their ministers and elders, and fellow members of the church, as "blind" and "sleepy." "Devoted, praying Christians," he says, "often see these things so clearly, and look so far ahead, as greatly to stumble others. They sometimes almost seem to prophesy." They do indeed not only almost, but altogether, seem to prophesy, and so has many an enthusiast before them. This disposition to put faith in spectral illusions is indeed a very common mark of enthusiasm, and the reason of it is well understood by all who are acquainted with the philosophy of the human feelings.

In like contradiction to the true nature of religion, but in perfect keeping with the false notion of it which we suppose Mr. Finney to have adopted, are his opinions respecting the absolute necessity of excitement to the general prosperity of religion in the world, and to its growth in the Christian's heart. "The state of the world is still such, and probably will be till the millennium is fully come, that religion must be mainly promoted by these excitements." His professed theory on this subject is that there must be an alternation of excitement and decline—that after a great religious stir among the people, they will decline and keep on declining "till God can have time so to speak, to shape the course of events so as to produce another excitement,"—then comes another decline, and so on. He represents this same spasmodic action as taking place in each Christian's experience. It is impossible, he thinks, to keep a Christian in such a state as not to do injury to a revival, unless he pass through the process of "breaking down" every few days. "I have never laboured," he says, "in revivals in company with

any one who could keep in the work and be fit to manage a revival continually, who did not pass through this process of *breaking down* as often as once in two or three weeks." He adds, "I was surprised to find a few years since that the phrase '*breaking down*' was a stumbling block to certain ministers and professors of religion—they laid themselves open to the rebuke administered to Nicodemus, 'Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things?'" We are surprised that any one should have been ignorant of the meaning of this "breaking down." It is very intelligible. In consequence of the law to which we have several times referred, when the imaginative emotions are strongly excited the bodily frame sympathizes powerfully with the excitement, and all the chords of the system are so tensely strung that they cannot long bear it. Hence follows reaction, exhaustion, "breaking down." If religion be founded in principle, if its peculiar and cherished emotions be those of the conscience, then can there be no call for this breaking down and jumping up—this cicadic movement. But we have dwelt at sufficient length upon this point. We were anxious to present as complete evidence of the truth of our position as our limits would permit; for we do believe that Mr. Finney's mistaken views of the nature of religion lie at the bottom of his measures, and have given to them their character and form; and that these measures, therefore, wherever used, will tend to propagate a false form of religion.

These measures might have had their origin in the "New Divinity," for they are in harmony with the theology as well as the religion of the system. Historical facts, however, have guided us in assigning their origin to erroneous views of religion. The new measures, we believe were in full action before the theology of New Haven shed its light upon the world. We recollect that it was matter of surprise to many when the conjunction took place between the coarse, bustling fanaticism of the New Measures, and the refined, intellectual abstractions of the New Divinity. It was a union between Mars and Minerva—unnatural, and boding no good to the church. But our readers will have observed that there is a close and logical connexion between Mr. Finney's theology and his measures. The demand created for the one by the other, and the mutual assistance which they render, are so evident, that we will spend no time in the explanation of them.

There is one argument of Mr. Finney in favour of the new measures which we have not noticed, and to which we should not now allude, but for a purpose which will soon disclose itself. This argument is, in true importance, on a perfect level with that drawn from the small-clothes, wigs, and fur caps. It consists in producing the names of a great number of wise and eminent men who have been prominent in introducing innovations. All this has nothing to do with the question—it is perfectly puerile indeed to introduce it—unless these men introduced such innovations as he contends for. Among these new-measure men he introduces the

name of President Edwards. And on several occasions he makes such a use of the name of this great man, as is calculated to leave upon the reader's mind the impression that Edwards had sanctioned his proceedings. He has no right thus to slander the dead, or impose upon the living. It is well known that Davenport, against whose extravagant fanaticism Edwards wrote at length, is *redivivus* in Mr. Finney, and that the same scenes over which he grieved and wept have been re-acted in our day under Mr. Finney's auspices. For one of his measures, lay exhortation, he does distinctly claim the authority of Edwards. "So much opposition," he says, "was made to this practice nearly a hundred years ago that President Edwards actually had to take up the subject, and write a laboured defence of the rights and duties of laymen." We were not surprised by Mr. Finney's ignorance in confounding Mary, Queen of Scots, with "bloody Queen Mary" of England; we do not demand from him historical accuracy; we do not look indeed for anything like a thorough knowledge of any one subject, for, should he obtain it, it would surely pine away and die for want of company. But we were not quite prepared for such ignorance of Edwards's opinions and writings. Can it be ignorance? Charity would dispose us to think so, but we cannot. In the same work from which Mr. Finney has taken long extracts, and to which he often refers, as if familiar with its contents, Edwards makes known with all plainness his opposition to lay exhortation. He expressly condemns all lay teaching which is not "in the way of conversation." He censures the layman "when in a set speech, of design, he directs himself to a multitude, as looking that they should compose themselves to attend to what he has to say.... and more still, when meetings are appointed on purpose to hear lay persons exhort, and they take it as their business to be speakers." In a published letter of his to a friend, who had erred in this matter, he tells him, "You have lately gone out of the way of your duty, and done that which did not belong to you, in exhorting a public congregation;.... you ought to do what good you can by private, brotherly, humble admonitions and counsels; but 'tis too much for you to exhort public congregations, or solemnly to set yourself by a set speech, to counsel a room full of people, unless it be children or those that are much your inferiors." These are the sentiments of Edwards, and it is hardly possible that Mr. Finney should have been unacquainted with them. Whence then this bold misrepresentation? This is one illustration of that unscrupulousness in the use of means for the attainment of his ends, which he too often manifests. With perfect nonchalance, he will make figures, facts, scripture, everything, bend to the purpose he has in hand. We have often been reminded, while reading his pages, of the calculator who, being applied to, to make some computations, asked his employer with perfect gravity, "On which side, sir, do you wish the balance to come out?" Another illustration of Mr. F.'s peculiar facility in this way is at hand, and we will give it. In one of

his Lectures, when endeavouring to persuade the people not to contradict the truth preached, by their lives, and, as usual, inflating every sentiment to the utmost degree for the accomplishment of his purpose, he says, "If Jesus Christ were to come and preach, and the church contradict it, it would *fail—it has been tried once.*" But in another Lecture, where he is labouring might and main to prove that every minister will be successful in exact proportion to the amount of wisdom he employs in his ministration, he is met with the objection that Jesus Christ was not successful in his ministry. But, reader, you do not know the man if you imagine that this difficulty staggers him at all. Not in the least. In disposing of it he begins by showing that "his ministry was *vastly more successful* than is generally supposed," and ends by proving that "in fact, he was *eminently successful.*" And no doubt, if his argument required it, he could prove that Christ was neither successful nor unsuccessful. This unscrupulous use of any means that seem to offer present help, whether for the attainment of their objects within the camp or without, was early noted as a peculiar mark of the new-measure men. Dr. Beecher says, in a letter written eight years since, "I do know, as incident to these new measures, there is a spirit of the most marvellous duplicity and double-dealing and lying, surpassing anything which has come up in my day."* And the heaviness of this accusation will not be much lightened by any one who has been an attentive observer of their movements since.

There only remains to be noticed, the argument for the new measures which Mr. Finney draws from their *success.* We shall not stop to dispute with him the position which he assumes, that the success of any measure demonstrates its wisdom and excel-

* This letter was addressed to the Editor of the Christian Spectator. It seems that there had been some symptoms of a disposition on the part of this Editor, to compromise with the new measures, from a desire to promote the circulation of his work in those regions where these measures were then burning in all their fury. Dr B. immediately writes this letter of strong remonstrance, in which in the most rousing strain, he exhorts to firm, open and decided resistance. "The more thoroughly we do the work," he says, "of entire demolition of these new measures, the sooner and safer we can conciliate." His opinion of Mr. Finney, at that time, may be gathered from the following extract. "Now, that such a man as he (Mr. Nettleton) should be traduced, and exposed to all manner of evil falsely, in order to save from *deserved reprehension* such a man as Finney (who, whatever talents or piety he may possess, is as far removed from the talent, wisdom, and judgment, and experience of Nettleton, as any corporal in the French army was removed from the talent and generalship of Bonaparte), is what neither my reason, nor my conscience, nor my heart will endure." These were Dr. Beecher's sentiments in 1827. Since that time he is understood to have patronised the Corporal, when he visited Boston; and but lately he delivered a high eulogy upon him at the West, in the course of which he says, "I have felt the beating of his great, warm heart before God," and professes to have heard more *truth* from him than from any other man in the same space of time. Dr. B.'s opinions, expressed in the letter from which we have quoted, profess to have been formed from the most full and accurate acquaintance with facts. Dr. Beecher has an undoubted right to change any of his opinions, but he cannot expect the public to give him their confidence if he makes such changes as this, without rendering a more satisfactory account of them than he has yet given of this one.

lence. No man can maintain the ground which he takes upon this subject, without denying that it forms any part of the plan of God in the government of the world, to bring good out of evil. But there is no need of discussing this matter now. We will grant him the benefit of the criterion. It is too late in the day for the effect of this appeal to success. The time was when an argument of this nature might have been plausibly maintained. Appearances were somewhat in favour of the new measures. At least wherever they were carried, converts were multiplied, and though the churches were distracted ministers unsettled, and various evils wrought, yet it might have been contended that, on the whole, the balance was in their favour. But it is too late now for Mr. Finney to appeal, in defence of his measures, to the number of converts made by them, to the flourishing state of religion in the western part of New York, where they have been most used, and to the few trivial evils which have been incident to them. Indeed, he seems to have a suspicion that the public possess more information on this subject than they did a few years since, and he pours out his wrathful effusions on the informers. He is animated with a most special dislike to letter-writing. "Some men," he says, "in high standing in the church, have circulated letters which never were printed. Others have had their letters printed and circulated. There seems to have been a system of letter-writing about the country." "If Christians in the United States expect revivals to spread, they must give up *writing letters*," &c. "If the Church will do all her duty, the millennium may come in this country in three years; but if this *writing of letters* is to be kept up, &c. . . . . the curse of God will be on this nation, and that before long." "Go forward. Who would leave such a work and go to writing letters?" "If others choose to publish their *slang and stuff*, let the Lord's servants keep to their work." Who will not feel thankful that Jack Cade's day is gone, and a man cannot now be hung "with pen and ink-horn around his neck," for being able to write his name? But thanks to these much abused letter-writers, we have received their testimony, and neither Mr. Finney's assertions nor his ravings will shake the public confidence in it. It is now generally understood that the numerous converts of the new measures have been, in most cases, like the morning cloud and the early dew. In some places, not a half, a fifth, or even a tenth part of them remain. They have early "broken down," and have never got up again. And of those that yet remain, how many are found revelling in the excesses of enthusiastic excitement, ready to start after every new vagary that offers, and mistaking the looming appearances, the "fata morgana" of the falsely refracting atmosphere in which they dwell, for splendid realities! How many more, the chief part of whose religion consists in censuring the established order of things around them, in seeking to innovate upon the decent and orderly solemnities of divine worship, and in condemning as unconverted, or cold and dead, the ministers, elders, and church-members, who

refuse to join them! From the very nature of these measures they must encounter the conscientious and decided opposition of many devout Christians, and hence wherever they have been introduced, the churches have been distracted by internal dissensions, and in many cases rent asunder. Ministers who have opposed them have been forced to abandon their charges; and those who have yielded to them have been unsettled by their inability to stimulate sufficiently the seared surface of the public mind; so that it is now a difficult matter among the western churches of New York to find a pastor who has been with his present flock more than two or three years. Change and confusion are the order of the day. New ministers and new measures must be tried, to heighten an excitement already too great to admit of increase, or to produce one where the sensibility has been previously worn out by overaction. Rash and reckless men have everywhere rushed in and pushed matters to extremes, which the originators of these measures did not at first contemplate. Trickery of the most disgusting and revolting character has been employed in the conduct of religious assemblies; and the blasphemous boasts of the revival preachers have been rife throughout the land. Mothers have whipped their children with rods to make them submit to God; and in this have done right, if there be truth in the theology, and fitness in the measures of Mr. Finney. Men of taste and refinement have been driven into scepticism by these frantic absurdities of what claims to be the purest form of religion, or they have sought refuge in other denominations from these disorderly scenes in ours. Doctrinal errors and fanatical delusions of the wildest kind have started into rank existence. The imposture of Matthias and the Perfectionism of New Haven, are monster-growths, in different directions, of this same monster-trunk.* And no one can tell what new and yet more monstrous growths it will cast out. No form of enthusiasm developes at once, or soon, all its latent tendencies. Though its present course may be comparatively regular and near the truth, no mind can predict in what erratic wanderings it may be subsequently involved. The path of the comet within the limits of the solar system can scarcely be distinguished, by the nicest observations, from the regular orbit of the planet; but it ultimately rushes off into unknown fields of space: and the course of enthusiasm while in sight, like that of the comet, will not suffice to furnish us with the elements of its orbit. To what black-

* See the history of "Matthias and his Impostures," by Col. William L. Stone. Col. Stone has rendered an important service to the public by the publication of this work. It furnishes a train of facts which will astonish those who have looked upon this noted imposture as a sudden and isolated freak of the human mind. It was our purpose to make copious extracts from this work to illustrate the opinion of its author, that the delusion of Matthias and of his victims "originated in the same spirit of fanaticism which has transformed so many Christian communities in the northern and western parts of New York, and states contiguous, into places of moral waste and spiritual desolation." But we must content ourselves with this reference. We hope the work will circulate widely. It furnishes a salutary lesson of warning to all who can learn from the past.

ness of darkness it may finally rush, we know not. We might fill a volume with describing evils already wrought by the new divinity and new measure system, and then fill many more by collating this system with history, and showing what evils are yet within the limits of its capabilities.

We would not be understood to mean that no good has been produced under the preaching of the new divinity, and the operation of the new measures. They have, doubtless, in some cases, been overruled for good, and been made instrumental in producing true conversions. But we do maintain, for we fully believe it to be true, that the tendency of this system, of all that is peculiar to it as a system of doctrine and of action, is unredeemedly bad. We have brought forward every argument which we could find in Mr. Finney's pages, in favour of his reforms, and in canvassing them have presented our own objections. And our readers must now judge between us.

We have one more objection still to present, and it would alone be sufficient to outweigh all the considerations which Mr. Finney has presented in favour of his measures. We mean the *spirit* which accompanies them. We shall be under the necessity of giving a much briefer development, and fewer illustrations of this spirit than we had intended, but we shall succeed, we think, in showing that it is the essential spirit of fanaticism.

The first feature of it to which we invite attention, is its *coarseness* and *severity*. Mr. Finney's language is habitually low and vulgar. He revels in such Saxonisms as these: "Let hell boil over if it will, and spew out as many devils as there are stones in the pavement." "Look at that sensitive young lady; is she an impenitent sinner? then she only needs to die to be as very a devil as there is in hell." "Devil" and "hell" are, indeed, familiar to him, "as household words." The young men in some of our theological seminaries, he says, "are taught to look upon new measures as if they were the very inventions of the devil. So when they come out, they look about and watch, and start, as if the devil was there." We imagine that all the young men in our seminaries know that there are *men* who are equal to these things, without any help from the devil. In condemning those who pray, "Lord, these sinners are seeking thee, sorrowing," he says, "It is a LIE." The men who had promised to pay, each, a yearly sum to the Oneida Institute, but who afterwards refused, on the ground, as one of them assured us, that the pledge under which they subscribed, that a thorough course of instruction should be established in the institution, had been violated, are rated after this manner: "Is this honest? Will such honesty as this get them admitted into heaven? What! break your promise, and go up and carry a *lie* in your right hand before God? If you refuse or neglect to fulfil your promise, you are a *liar*, and if you persist in this you shall have your part in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone." He subsequently adds, "You cannot pray until you pay that

money." In dealing with impenitent sinners, he will allow no symptoms of compassion or pity. The church, in all her conduct, must show that she "blames them." We must at all times make it plain, by our deportment, that we "take God's part against the sinner." He thinks it a dreadful error even for us to make use of our Saviour's language in praying for sinners, "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do." Every sentence and every term must be charged with fierce accusation against them. To this harsh severity all the tender amenities of social intercourse, and the still more tender charities of the domestic affections, must be sacrificed. He maintains that parents can never pray for their children "in such a way as to have their prayers answered, until they feel that their children are *rebels*." And he narrates a story to show that no mother can expect her son to be converted, "until she is made to take *strong ground against him as a rebel*." Had we space for comment here, we might easily show that no spirit can claim fellowship with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, which thus runs rough-shod over all the tender sympathies and affections of the human heart. But it is thoroughly consistent with the fierceness of fanatical zeal, which has its play among the stronger passions of our nature, and looks with contempt upon whatever is kind, tender, gentle, or compassionate.

The next feature of Mr. Finney's spirit to which we turn, is its *extravagance*. It is a peculiar mark of the fanatic that every dogma, every little peculiarity to which he is attached, is made to be infallibly certain, and infinitely important. Should he admit anything less than this he would feel the ground sliding from under him. To hold natural sentiments, and express them plainly, and with proper limitations, would be to sink all his advantage and bring himself down to a level with others. His own mind, too, is often in an uneasy and self-doubting state which needs confirmation. Hence for the double purpose of making a strong impression on others, and of strengthening himself, every opinion and sentiment are inflated entirely beyond their natural limits. To quote all the illustrations of this disposition to extravagance which Mr. Finney's lectures afford, would be to cite no inconsiderable portion of the whole volume which contains them. The minutest things are made matters of indispensable necessity. Every rag which he touches is henceforth endowed with the power of working miracles. He is himself addicted to telling stories and parables from the pulpit to illustrate the truth, and we have no objection to this provided it is done—as Mr. F. says the devil wishes it done—so as to comport with the proper dignity of the pulpit. We have known many preachers who excelled in this style of preaching. But Mr. F. is not content with maintaining that this is a good, and for some men, the best way of presenting and enforcing the truth. No, nothing less will satisfy him than that "truths not thus illustrated are generally just as well calculated to convert sinners as a mathematical demonstration." Many excel-

lent men, who have no taste or turn for this illustrative method of preaching, will be astonished and grieved to learn that to deliver a plain, unvarnished statement of scriptural truth to their congregations, is as hopeless a means of doing good, as to prove to them that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third side. Again, Mr. Finney is given to extemporaneous preaching, and of course this is not merely the best, it is the *only* way of preaching. He can find no resting place for the sole of his foot but on the broad ground that "we never can have the *full meaning* of the gospel till we throw away our notes." We do not like forms of prayer, not thinking them adapted to promote the spirit of prayer; and we shall always oppose them, unless they should be found necessary to protect us from such prayers as Mr. Finney is in the habit of offering. But we can by no means agree with him in saying that "forms of prayer are not only absurd in themselves, but they are the very device of the devil." We have seen many a pious old lady, when she had finished reading a portion of her Bible, placing a piece of paper or a string, or perchance her spectacles, between the leaves, that she might readily open to the place again, and it certainly never occurred to us that this custom was any evidence of want of piety. But Mr. Finney says to all such, "The fact that you fold a leaf or put in a string demonstrates that you read rather as a *task* than from love or reverence for the word of God." Of the prayers of pious females, who have assembled by themselves without inviting impenitent sinners to be present, he says, "such prayers will do no good—*they insult God.*" To those who are in the habit of praying with submission to the divine will, he says, "You have no right to put in an *if*, and say, Lord, *if it be thy will*, give us thy Holy Spirit; *this is to insult God.*" Mr. Finney, like all other fanatics, makes additions of his own to the scriptural code of morals. Matthias forbade his disciples the use of pork. Mr. Finney condemns tea, coffee and tobacco, evening parties, ribbons, and many other things. He is just as confident in supporting his false standard, as extravagant too in denouncing those who transgress it, and in launching against them the thunderbolts of divine vengeance, as if it had been communicated to him by express revelation. He says, "if you are not doing these things"—among which he has enumerated *the disuse of tea, coffee and tobacco*—"and if your soul is not agonized for the poor, benighted heathen, why are you such a *hypocrite* as to pretend to be a Christian? Why, your profession is an *insult* to Jesus Christ." Again, he says, "Perhaps he is looking upon it (the use of tobacco) as a small sin," and he then proceeds to prove that the sin is as gross as a merchant's clerk would commit in robbing the money drawer. He lifts up his hands in astonishment at an agent who is in the city soliciting funds for some charitable purpose, and actually uses all three of these abominations; and he enters his protest against the Home Missionary Society for aiding churches in which the members use tea, coffee, or tobacco. Again, speaking of the *minis-*

try as refusing to give up the use of coffee, he cries out, "Is this *Christianity?* What business have you to use Christ's money for such a purpose?" Matthias surely could not have raved in better style over a delinquent caught in the horrible act of eating a piece of pork. Of evening parties, even when none but "Christian friends are invited, so as to have it a religious party," he says, "this is the *grand device* of the devil." These social assemblies are often concluded with prayer:—"now this," he says, "I regard as one of the worst features about them." When there is to be a circle of such parties in a congregation he advises them "to dismiss their minister and let him go and preach where the people would be ready to receive the word and profit by it, and not have him stay and be distressed, and grieved, and *killed*, by attempting to promote religion among them while they are engaged *heart and hand in the service of the devil.*" To the young lady who wears "a gaudy ribbon and ornaments upon her dress," he cries, "Take care. You might just as well write on your clothes, *No truth in religion.*" And over this fondness for dress, tight-lacing, &c., he says, "Heaven puts on the robes of mourning, and hell may hold a jubilee." The man who stands aloof from the temperance cause has "his hands all over *red with blood*,"—he who drinks cider, beer, or anything else, until "you can smell his breath," is a *drunkard*,—and no slave holder "can be a fit subject for Christian communion and fellowship." We had marked some twenty other passages, many of them worse than any we have given, but we suppose enough has been furnished to satisfy our readers of Mr. Finney's extravagance.

We turn, then, to his *spiritual pride* and *arrogance*. We have not been able to find one sentence in his book which wears the semblance of humility. But there is arrogance and assumption beyond anything which it has ever been our fortune previously to encounter. Such a swelling, strutting consciousness of self-importance looks forth from almost every page, that we have been compelled again and again to turn from it, not in anger but in pity. Any one who should read his book and believe it, would be led to suppose that until he came forth in the plenitude of his wisdom and goodness to instruct mankind, all had been darkness. The Bible had been misunderstood, and its doctrines perverted: ministers had been preaching "an endless train of fooleries:" the pulpit had never "grappled with mind;" "very little common sense had been exercised about prayer meetings;" everything had been managed in the most ignorant and bungling way. But he comes and all things are set right, or at least would be, if his measures were not opposed. All the wise and good, however, fully agree with him. We encounter this arrogant and exclusive spirit at the very outset. In his preface he says, "But whatever may be the result of saying the truth as it respects some, I have reason to believe that the great body of *praying* people will receive and be benefited by what I have said." Speaking, in one of his Lectures, of "ministers, who by their lives and preach-

ing give evidence to the church, that their object is to do good and win souls to Christ," he says, "*This class* of ministers will recognise the truth of *all* that I have said or wish to say." In the full magnitude of a self-constituted bishop of all the churches, fully entitled by his superior wisdom to rebuke with authority all other ministers, he exclaims in another place, "I will never spare ministers from the naked truth." "If the whole church," he says, "as a body had gone to work ten years ago, and continued it, as a *few individuals, whom I could name*, have done, there would not now be an impenitent sinner in the land." The greatest appearance of modest humility which we have seen in him, is his refusing, on this occasion, to name himself at the head of the "few individuals." He claims, in no guarded terms, the exclusive approbation of God for his doctrines and measures. "They" (the church) "see that the *blessing of God* is with those that are thus accused of new measures and innovation." Desirous as he is to monopolize the favour of Heaven, we do not wonder at finding him, in another place, declaring, with great *naïveté*, "I have been pained to see that some men, in giving accounts of revivals, have evidently felt themselves obliged to be particular in detailing the measures used, to avoid the inference that *new measures* were introduced." And if the accounts of all the revivals that have occurred without any help from the new measures, were as much noised abroad as those aided by them have been, he would be still more "pained" by the more abundant evidence that the symbol of the Divine presence does not shine exclusively upon his camp. In presenting to his hearers "the consequences of *not being filled with the Spirit*," he says to them, "You will be much troubled with fears about fanaticism—you will be much disturbed by the *measures* that are used in revivals; if any measures are adopted that are *decided* and *direct*, you will think they are all new, and will be *stumbled* at them just in proportion to your *want of spirituality:* you will stand and cavil at them, because you are so *blind* as not to see their adaptedness, while *all heaven* is rejoicing in them." Again, of those that are opposed to "new measures," to "this new-light preaching," and to "these evangelists who go about the country preaching," he says, "*Such* men will sleep on till they are awakened by the judgment trumpet, without any revival, unless they are willing that God should come *in his own way*." This fanatical claim to the exclusive favour of God, this arrogant identification of all his opinions and measures with the Divine will, is very frequently put forth. After having proved that his system has been greatly prospered, that it has been successful beyond anything the world had yet seen, he says, "If a measure is *continually and usually blessed*, let the man who thinks he is wiser than God call it in question—take care how you *find fault with God*." Of the Cedar-street church, in New York, which had taken a decided stand against the new divinity and new measures, or, as Mr. Finney states it, had pursued a course "calculated

to excite an unreasonable and groundless suspicion against many ministers who are labouring successfully to promote revivals," he says, "They may pretend to be mighty pious, and jealous for the honour of God, but *God will not believe* they are sincere." Of this same church he afterwards says, in allusion to their requiring an assent to the Confession of Faith from all applicants for admission to the Lord's Supper, a step which would exclude his converts, unless their consciences should be as elastic as their teacher's, "No doubt *Jesus Christ is angry* with such a church, and he will show his displeasure in a way that admits of no mistake, if they do not repent." In the prospect of a rupture with France, he tells his people, "No doubt"—it will be observed that he never has any *doubt* about the divine feelings, when his measures are in question—"No doubt God is holding the rod of war over this nation; the nation is under *His displeasure*, because the church has conducted in such a manner with respect to revivals." The "dear fathers," who have the training of our young men for the ministry, he thinks unfit for their office, and in this opinion he is perfectly confident that he has "the mind of the Lord." "Those dear fathers," he says, "will not, I suppose, see this; and will perhaps think hard of me for saying it; *but it is the cause of Christ.*" But we have given specimens enough of this offensive self-glorification.

In close connexion with this trait stands his *censoriousness.* The passages we have already adduced, for other purposes, so far illustrate this disposition, that it will not be necessary to produce many in addition. Of those who have circulated what he calls "slanderous reports of revival men and measures," he says, "It is impossible, from the very laws of their mind, that they should engage in this work of death, this mischief of hell, if they truly loved the cause of Christ." "Hell" is with him nothing more nor less than the state prison of his system, to which all are condemned who dissent or doubt. Again he says, "No doubt the devil laughs, if they can laugh in hell, to hear a man pretend to be very much engaged in religion, and a great lover of revivals, and yet all the while on the look-out for fear some *new measures* should be introduced." And of prayers which ask "that sinners may have more conviction," or "that sinners may go home, solemn and tender, and take the subject into consideration," he says, "All such prayers are just such prayers as *the devil wants.*" This is but a common and very vulgar method of cursing. It contains no argument. It would be very easy for his opponents to reply, that the devil is thus exclusively busy among the adversaries to the new opinions and measures, because he is aware that among their friends his work is well enough done without him. And the argument would be as good in the one case as in the other. Mr. Finney has some mystical notions respecting the "prayer of faith,"—notions in which none, we believe, out of his own *coterie* agree

with him.* But here as elsewhere, he condemns without mercy all dissentients. Having spoken of a public examination at a theological seminary, in the course of which his peculiar opinions on this subject were controverted, he says, "Now, to teach such sentiments as these, is to trifle with the word of God." And he declares, that all persons who have not known by experience the truth of his enthusiastic views of this matter, "have great reason to doubt their piety," and adds, "this is by no means uncharitable." Everything which has, at any time, or in any quarter of the land, been said or done that seems adapted to operate to the prejudice of his measures, is dragged into the pulpit, and made the occasion of denunciation against the transgressors. "Some young men in Princeton came out a few years ago with an essay on the evils of revivals." We cannot see what necessity there was for Mr. Finney to tell the people of Chatham-street Chapel, that the young men in Princeton, some years before, had published their opposition to the new measures. But he does tell them, and adds, "I should like to know how *many* of those young men have enjoyed revivals among their people, since they have been in the ministry; and if *any* have, I should like to know whether they have not *repented* of that piece about the evils of revivals?" We can inform Mr. Finney, that that "piece" affords "no place for repentance," though it should be sought "carefully with tears." He tells his people again, that "one of the professors in a Presbyterian theological seminary felt it his duty to write a series of letters to Presbyterians, which were extensively circulated;" and in these letters the new measures were condemned. This incident is made the occasion of a tirade, in the course of which he breaks out with the exclamation, it is a "*shame* and a *sin* that theological professors, who preach but seldom, who are withdrawn from the active duties of the ministry, should sit in their studies, and write their letters, advisory or dictatorial, to ministers and churches who are in the field, and who are in circumstances to judge what needs to be done." And he says it is "*dangerous* and *ridiculous* for our theological professors, who are withdrawn from the field of combat, to be allowed to dictate in regard to the measures and movements of the church." We shall see whether his theological professorship will put a bridle on his tongue. It will be seen that no venerableness of years or wisdom or Christian excellence can turn aside the fulminations of his displeasure. To disapprove of his measures, no matter with what otherwise excellent qualities this disapproval may be associated, is to give decisive evidence of wickedness, and not

* It was our purpose, had our limits permitted, to notice at length his wild opinions on this subject. We the less regret the necessary exclusion of our intended remarks on this topic, as we are able to refer the reader to a very excellent discussion of it, in two Lectures, lately published, from the pen of Dr Richards, of the Auburn Seminary. Since the publication of these Lectures, Mr. Finney no doubt has another argument for proving that this venerable servant of Christ is not "such a man as is needed for training our young ministers in these days of excitement and action."

only to offend him, but to insult God. Nor is he ever startled by the number of his victims. All, whether a few individuals or a whole church, who will not fall down and worship the golden image which he has set up, are doomed to the fiery furnace. The General Assembly, a few years since, issued a Pastoral Letter, in which the new measures were condemned. But neither Mr. Finney's modesty nor his tenderness is at all troubled by the array of the whole church against him. When he saw their pastoral letter he says, "My soul was sick, an unutterable feeling of distress came over my mind, and *I felt that God would visit* the Presbyterian church for conduct like this." How to the very life is the fanaticism of this sentence,—this turning from general opposition to solace and strengthen himself in the singular prerogative which he enjoys of a back-door entrance into the court of Heaven, and of unquestioned access to its magazines of wrath. In a like spirit he says of the "Act and Testimony warfare," that "the blood of millions who will go to hell before the church will get over the shock, will be found *in the skirts of the men* who have got up and carried on this dreadful contention." And of the General Assembly, that "No doubt there is a jubilee in hell every year about the time of meeting of the General Assembly." Of all ministers, be they few or many, "who will not turn out of their tracks *to do anything new*," he says, "they will grieve the Holy Spirit away, and God will visit them with his curse." At the close of these extracts, for we must put a period to them from other causes than lack of materials to furnish more like them, we would ask, was there ever a fanatic who was more intelligible in his claim to a close relationship of his own with the Most High, or more indiscriminate and wholesale in his condemnation of those who refused submission to his peculiar dogmas? Was there ever a Dominic who was more exclusive or more fierce?

There remains one more feature of Mr. Finney's spirit to be noticed, his *irreverence* and *profaneness*. This is a topic which we would gladly have avoided. It is painful to us to contemplate this trait of character, and we would not willingly shock the minds of others, as we have been shocked by some of the passages which we must quote under this head. But it is necessary to a correct understanding of the spirit of the new measures, that this feature should be exhibited. It has been seen all along that Mr. Finney's theology is not a barren vine, and we trust it has at the same time been seen, that its fruit is the grapes of Sodom and the clusters of Gomorrah. We will now show what are the practical results of his theory of the divine government; though for reasons just hinted, we shall give no more illustrations under this allegation than are necessary distinctly to sustain it. In urging the necessity of new measures to the production of revivals, he says, "Perhaps it is not too much to say, that it is *impossible for God himself* to bring about reformations but by new measures." Here we might pause, for the man who is capable of uttering such a sentence as

this, is capable of almost any degree of profaneness. But lest it might be urged that this may be a solitary instance of unpremeditated rashness, we must furnish a few more. He says of a certain class of people that "they seem determined to leave it to God alone to convert the world, and say, If he wants the world converted let him do it. They ought to know," he continues, "that *this is impossible:* so far as we know, *neither God* nor man *can* convert the world without the co-operation of the church." Again, when speaking of the duties of church members "in regard to politics," he says, "*God cannot sustain* this free and blessed country, which we love and pray for, unless the church will take right ground." In rebuking those who do not "exhibit their light," he tells them, "*God will not take the trouble* to keep a light burning that is hid." To cast ridicule upon a certain kind of prayers, he says, that they who offer them pray in such a manner, that "everybody wishes them to stop, and *God wishes so too,* undoubtedly." And in reference to the subscribers to the New York Evangelist, who have neglected to pay in their dues, he says, "Why, it *would be disgraceful to God* to dwell and have communion with such persons." We will close these extracts with two passages of a still more extraordinary character. Speaking of the Saviour, he says, "*He was afraid* he should die in the garden before he came to the cross." And yet again, and more astounding still, he says "Jesus Christ when he was praying in the garden, was in such an agony that he sweat as it were great drops of blood, falling down to the ground;—I have never known a person sweat blood, but *I have known a person pray till the blood started from the nose*"!! Who that has ever dwelt in holy contemplation over the sacred mysteries of his Saviour's sufferings, does not feel indignant at this unhallowed, vulgar profanation of them? And what extremes can appal the mind that could perpetrate this without shrinking?

Let it be noted that the spirit which we have here pictured, is not the spirit of Mr. Finney alone. Had it belonged to the man, we should not have troubled ourselves to exhibit it. But it is the spirit of the system, and therefore deserves our careful notice. And it is seen to be, as Dr. Beecher called it eight years ago, "a spirit of fanaticism, of spiritual pride, censoriousness, and insubordination to the order of the Gospel."* It is prurient, bustling and revolutionary—harsh, intolerant and vindictive. Can the tree which produces such fruit be good? The system from which it springs is bad in all its parts, root, trunk, branches, and fruit. The speculative error of its theology and religion is concrete in its measures and spirit. Let it prevail through the church, and the very name revival will be a by-word and a hissing. Already has it produced, we fear, to some extent this deplorable result. Such have already been its effects, that there can be no doubt, if it should affect still larger masses, and be relieved from the opposing influ-

* See Dr. Beecher's Letter in the pamphlet on New Measures, before referred to.

ences which have somewhat restrained its outbreakings, it will spread desolation and ruin, and ages yet to come will deplore the waste of God's heritage. To the firm opposition of the friends of truth, in reliance upon the Great Head of the Church, and prayer for His blessing, we look for protection from such disaster.

We have spoken our minds plainly on this subject. We intended from the beginning not to be misunderstood. It is high time that all the friends of pure doctrine and of decent order, in the house of God, should speak plainly. Mr. Finney was kindly and tenderly expostulated with at the commencement of his career. Mr. Nettleton, than whom no one living was better qualified or entitled to give counsel on this subject, discharged fully his duty towards him. Others did the same. But their advice was spurned, their counsels were disregarded. To envy or blindness did he impute their doubts of the propriety of his course. He had a light of his own, and by it "he saw a hand they could not see." All the known means of kindness and expostulation have been tried to induce him to abandon his peculiarities, but without success. It is the clear duty of the Church now to meet him and his co-reformers with open and firm opposition. Let us not be deluded with the idea that opposition will exasperate and do harm. Under cover of the silence and inaction which this fear has already produced, this fanaticism has spread, until now twelve thousand copies of such a work as these Lectures on Revivals are called for by its cravings. And there is danger that this spirit will spread still more extensively. The elements of fanaticism exist in the breast of every community, and may be easily called into action by causes which we might be disposed to overlook as contemptible.

We conclude this article, as we did our former, by pointing out to Mr. Finney his duty to leave our church. It is an instructive illustration of the fact that fanaticism debilitates the conscience, that this man can doubt the piety of any one who uses coffee ; and call him a *cheat*, who sends a letter to another on his own business, without paying the postage ; while he remains, apparently without remorse, with the sin of broken vows upon him. In this position we leave him before the public. Nor will we withdraw our charges against him until he goes out from among us, for he is not of us.

ESSAY VI.

DR. BEECHER'S THEOLOGY.*

THIS work had its origin in the prosecution of Dr. Beecher upon charges of heresy, before the presbytery, and subsequently before the synod of Cincinnati. By both these bodies he was acquitted; but the synod at the same time requested him to publish, at as early a day as possible, "a concise statement of the argument and design of his sermon on native depravity, and of his views of total depravity, original sin, and regeneration, agreeably to his declaration and explanation before the synod." In compliance with this request, Dr. Beecher published his Views in Theology, which is an enlarged and illustrated edition of the defence made upon his trial. The opinions of a man so eminent in abilities and in station would be matter of public interest, independent of the peculiar circumstances which in this case imparted to them additional importance; and we intended, therefore, at the time when his work appeared, to make it the subject of examination and remark. But this purpose was then laid aside, for reasons with which it is not necessary to trouble the public; and it is now resumed, because recent events and discussions have again broken the silence which had begun to prevail in relation to Dr. Beecher and his opinions, and rendered it important to ascertain how much ground he has really given for the doubts and suspicions which many seem to entertain. We have therefore recurred to his Views in Theology, in contrast with his other publications, and the result of this comparison we are about to lay before our readers.

We cannot sympathize with Dr. Beecher in the complaints which he makes that he should be called upon to defend his orthodoxy before an ecclesiastical tribunal. He speaks of "the necessity of explanation imposed on him by *unfounded accusations*;" and compares himself with "an aged merchant of long-established reputation called upon to prove his honesty by the exhibition of his books; or a physician of age and experience to repel the suspicion of quackery by publishing an account of his cases and his practice."

* Originally published in 1837, in review of "Views in Theology," by Lyman Beecher, D.D., President of Lane Theological Seminary.

We must be permitted to say, without intending any disrespect to Dr. Beecher, that his comparisons seem to us very inapposite. In his analogous cases of hardship, the merchant and physician are called upon to prove that they possess qualities which the public estimation, founded on long observance of their conduct, has assigned to them. But we are not aware that Dr. Beecher has ever enjoyed the reputation of possessing views of theological truth that were profound, well-defined, and carefully adjusted to the standards of Presbyterian orthodoxy. A reputation he has indeed had, and well has he earned it, of a man of commanding intellect, of comprehensive grasp of mind, capable of seizing upon the great features of any subject and holding them up, covered with light, to the view of others. The reputation, too, he has had of a zealous and successful preacher of the gospel. And who has called in question his substantial merit in any of these respects? Had he been arraigned for weakness of intellect, or accused in relation to any of the matters upon which his public reputation rests, we would have been ready to make common cause with him, and lift up our voices higher even than his own, in outcry upon the injustice and cruelty of the accusation. But no such charge has been made: no one within our knowledge has sought to detract aught from the reputation which Dr. Beecher has acquired; or so far questioned the justice of the public award on his behalf, as to call upon him now at an advanced stage of life to prove that he is entitled to it. His prosecution touched upon matters entirely distinct from those excellences which public estimation has assigned to him. So far was Dr. Beecher's reputation for orthodoxy from being extensively and firmly established, as in the case of the merchant or physician which he brings forward, that, before he left New England, many were the doubts and fears entertained of him in this respect among those who had the best opportunities for ascertaining his opinions. If the accusations against him are so utterly groundless, if his defence of his orthodoxy be a mere gratuity, forced from him only by the unreasonable prejudices of others, it surely becomes him to explain the remarkable fact that he should have been so grievously misunderstood, not only by Dr. Wilson, but by Dr. Porter of Andover, and by many others in New England, who must be supposed capable of understanding even the subtlest discussions in theology, and who were under no bias save one that would dispose them to judge favourably of Dr. Beecher. The Doctor's writings are not ordinarily marked by obscurity. On the contrary, we do not know any writer who, in general, seizes more directly or illuminates more strongly any subject which he undertakes to discuss. Why is it then that the soundness of his views on the subjects of original sin, depravity, and regeneration, were called in question before he left New England by many of his brethren who were most intimately associated with him? Had these doubts of his orthodoxy arisen in some remote region, they might be supposed to have proceeded

from the misconstruction of some isolated passage in his writings, or from the erroneous reports of others upon his opinions. If the ignorant only had entertained them, we might suppose that they had been merely alarmed by some new phraseology in which Dr. Beecher was preaching familiar truths; or had they been found only among his enemies, we might conclude that prejudice had led them to torture his words into an unfavourable meaning. But these misgivings had their origin in the sphere within which he lived and laboured; among those who were most familiar with his writings, and sermons, and conversation; among men who, having been trained to theological investigation, would not be likely to mistake an old truth merely because it was presented in a new dress; and among men, too, who had been accustomed to respect and love Dr. Beecher, and whose minds would be slow, therefore, in taking up any opinion to his hurt. If he was misunderstood at the west because his brethren there were not able to draw the distinction, of which he is so fond, between a theological doctrine and the philosophy of that doctrine, why was he misunderstood in New England? He surely will not deny that there are men there, and men, too, among those who have questioned or doubted his orthodoxy, who can dive with him into any of the depths of philosophy, or ascend with him, *pari passu*, to any of its heights. Until Dr. Beecher will condescend to give some rational explanation of the origin of these doubts of his orthodoxy in New England, and the subsequent and independent origin of similar doubts at the west, we cannot but consider his complaint of "unfounded accusations" as unbecoming and slanderous. The effect of this complaint is to present his prosecutor as coming forward, in the mere gratuity of mischief, to interrupt his labours, and to distract the church with needless controversy and litigation; and it throws upon all who have expressed their doubts of his soundness, the odium of weakening that harmony and mutual confidence which ought to exist between ministers of the same church. We cannot, therefore, suffer the assertion that the charges against him were groundless to pass unchallenged. We cannot believe that so many men, as wise and good as Dr. Beecher, would permit their confidence in him to be destroyed or weakened, unless he had been imprudent enough to give them some cause for it. And we are persuaded that Dr. Beecher would have added to his reputation if, instead of bespeaking in a tone of arrogant superiority the mercy of the court for his prosecutor,* and maintaining his own entire blamelessness, he had frankly admitted, at least, that he had made use on some occasions of incautious and imprudent phraseology which had naturally given rise to misapprehension of his views. The blame of the interruption of ministerial confidence, as far as he is concerned, would, to be sure, have been fixed upon himself by this avowal; but there it must be fixed, whether he be willing to receive it or not; there, if we mistake

* See Defence before the Presbytery, p. 80.

not, public estimation has already fixed it; and his frank assumption of it would have done him good instead of harm.

So much ground has Dr. Beecher really given for misapprehension of his theological opinions, that it is no easy matter even now to understand what he really believes. If we had only his Views in Theology to consult, we could readily understand him; but when we compare certain statements of doctrine in this work with his previous writings we are perplexed beyond measure. We find him at different times avowing directly contrary opinions on the same subject. With an ordinary man, we should at once settle this difficulty, by saying that he had doubtless seen good reason to change his opinions, and that we must learn what his present sentiments are from the latest publication of them. But Dr. Beecher cuts us off from this explanation in his own case by assuring us. "that his doctrinal views have been unchanged from the beginning," "that he is in doctrine what he ever was;" and we are left therefore utterly at a loss in our conjectures, whether his earlier or his later writings contain the true exposition of his present views. There are statements in these writings, which no ingenuity of explanation can reconcile—there are discrepances which no sophistry can bridge over—and the perception of these, in connexion with his declaration that he has never changed his views, has involved us in bewilderment and doubt.

That we may not be accused in our turn of bringing forward "unfounded accusations," and thus imposing upon Dr. Beecher the necessity of further explanations, we will proceed to adduce evidence of the inconsistencies and contradictions to which we have alluded. The first subject discussed in his Views in Theology is Natural Ability; but we shall pass this topic for the present and commence with the more important one of Original Sin. This doctrine is universally admitted to be fundamental to the Calvinistic system. He who denies this doctrine, as taught in our Confession of Faith, and in the writings of the Reformers, however good a Christian he may be, cannot be a good Calvinist; a logical necessity is laid upon him to abandon most of the distinctive peculiarities of the Calvinistic system. If there is one doctrine which lies more broadly than any other at the base of this system, this is that doctrine; and if this be removed, the whole structure must fall. It might naturally be supposed, therefore, that every professed Calvinist would have his opinions on this subject so well settled and defined, that he would not be blown about by every wind of doctrine, or, when discussing it at different times, express himself in contradictory terms. The Pelagian and Calvinistic views of the effect of the fall of man upon the race, are so luminously distinct from each other, and they touch, too, upon so many points of the respective systems to which they belong, that he who makes it doubtful which of these views is his own, cannot assuredly, escape the just censure of paltering in a double sense, save under the plea of incredible ignorance. How far any of these remarks apply to

the case before us, our readers will judge for themselves, after reading the extracts which we are about to adduce.

We will first exhibit the opinions which Dr. Beecher held on the subject of original sin, previous to his impeachment and trial. In his second lecture on, "The Causes and Remedy of Scepticism," we find the following passage: "The points to which I allude, as violated by a false philosophy, are the principles of personal identity, by which the posterity of Adam are distinct from or confounded with their ancestor, and the principles of personal accountability and desert of punishment, as men are made accountable and punished for his conduct, or become liable to misery as a universal consequence. The nature of sin and holiness, considered as material qualities, or the substance of the soul, or as instincts, or as the spontaneous action of mind under moral government, in the full possession of all the elements of accountability." It is very evident which of the opposite principles here stated, the author adopts as his own. Any one who was acquainted with the theological controversies on this subject, would be led to suppose, in reading this passage, that Dr. Beecher meant to condemn, as false philosophy, the opinion that men are in any sense held responsible for the sin of Adam, or punished on account of it, and to maintain in opposition to this philosophic dogma of the dark ages, that all the sin and misery which men suffer is merely the consequence of Adam's transgression. Now this true philosophy of Dr. Beecher would not be objected to by most Pelagians. They would admit that we are involved in misery by the fall of Adam —one main hinge upon which the whole controversy turns, is whether this misery is punitive or not in its character. But punishment for Adam's sin, according to the apparent meaning of the above extract, is a figment of that false philosophy which has been employed for the exposition of the Calvinistic system, and which, in Dr. Beecher's deliberate opinion, "has done more to obstruct the march of Christianity, and to paralyse the saving power of the gospel, and to raise up and organize around the church the unnumbered multitude, to behold, and wonder, and despise, and perish, than all other causes beside."

In the other sentence of the passage quoted, the false philosophy of the nature of sin and holiness is that which considers them "as material qualities, or the substance of the soul, or as instincts," and he admits no alternative to this view, save that which restricts them to "the spontaneous action of mind under moral government." This is the very language of the New Haven school. The mode of stating the question leaves us in about as much doubt as to the theology of the writer, as we should feel respecting the political opinions of one who should assert that the parties to the controversy which has been for some years waged in our country, were the people on the one side, and the bank monster on the other. Whenever we see a statement of the question touching the nature of sin and holiness, which assumes that there is no intermediate

ground between the thoery that restricts them to acts, and that which supposes them to be physical entities infused into the mind, or created instincts of the soul, we are at no loss to name the banner under which the writer, however disguised, is doing battle upon the theological arena. It would be strange, indeed, if a Calvinist, in enumerating the true and false theories upon this subject, should omit the only one which is consistent with the doctrine of our standards respecting the corrupt and sinful nature which we inherit from our fallen parent; and not the less strange, if in giving what he intended to be the orthodox account of this matter, he should so broadly misrepresent and caricature it, as to make it absurd and repulsive. If we were compelled to choose between making sin a material property or adjunct of the soul, or limiting it to the spontaneous action of the mind, we certainly would choose the latter, since it is impossible to state the other opinion in terms that are not self-contradictory; but we would choose it with the distinct understanding, that it compelled us to abandon the Calvinistic system. It is not, in our view, more absurd to hold that sin is a material substance, than to maintain that sin is confined to the spontaneous action of the mind, and in connexion with this, that man inherits a sinful nature. The first proposition is absurd, because there is an essential opposition of meaning between sin and substance; the other two in their conjunction, are no less absurd, because a nature is not in any sense an act, and of course, by the previous definition, cannot be sinful.

Is it wonderful then, when Dr. Beecher comes forward, lisping the very shibboleth of the New Haven school, teaching that all who do not restrict the nature of sin to spontaneous acts of the mind, believe in physical depravity, that he should be considered as having abandoned the Calvinistic doctrine of original sin? Ought he to complain of his brethren because they were not willing to charge upon him the monstrous absurdity of believing that a nature is an act, and may therefore be sinful? And what shall be thought of the modesty of the man, who, having printed such sentiments, has the face to declare to the world that the accusations against him are groundless; and in the plenitude of his compassion, to beg the court before which he is tried, that they will not punish his prosecutor as a slanderer?

Our next extracts shall be taken from Dr. Beecher's sermon on the "Native Character of Man." In this sermon he makes the following assertions: "Neither a holy nor a depraved nature are possible without understanding, conscience, and choice. To say of an accountable creature, that he is depraved by nature, is only to say, that rendered capable by his Maker of obedience, he disobeys from the commencement of his accountability." "A depraved nature can no more exist without voluntary agency and accountability, than a material nature can exist, without solidity and extension." "If, therefore, man is depraved by nature, it is a voluntary and accountable nature which is depraved, exercised in disobe-

dience to the law of God." "Native depravity, then, is a state of the affections, in a voluntary accountable creature, at variance with divine requirement, from the beginning of accountability." "The entireness of human depravity consists, therefore, in the constant, voluntary refusal of man to love the Lord his God with supreme complacency and good will." All this seems to be sufficiently explicit. There is no obscurity to occasion a doubt as to the author's meaning. The terms used are such as are commonly employed in the discussion of this subject, and the statements are all so clear and precise that no commentary is needed to educe or illustrate their meaning. We doubt whether the writings of the New Haven divines could furnish an equal number of sentences, which more completely deny the actual or possible existence of a depraved nature in man prior to moral action.

Of this famous sermon Dr. Beecher has, however, given a still more famous explanation. It was written, he says, with the view of refuting the error which claims as moral excellencies the various amiable qualities and kindly feelings which are found in unregenerate men, and thus undermines the doctrine of man's total depravity. At least this is one account of the object he had in view in writing the sermon; for we shall presently show that he has given a different one. In refuting the error above named, he contends that as he had no occasion to speak of anything but actual sin, all that he says should be applied only to adult man. The substance of his defence, on this ground, consists, therefore, in interpolating the words actual and adult before depravity in all the passages where it occurs. This is so extraordinary an explanation of the matter that we feel really embarrassed to know how to deal with it. There are some things so plain that they cannot be made plainer; there are explanations and arguments sometimes adduced in the course of discussion which are so foreign to the subject that nothing can be done with them but to declare that they are impertinent. Even thus is it with this defence of Dr. Beecher; we despair of being able to illustrate its incongruity to any one who does not at once perceive it. Because the primary object of the writer was not to discuss the subject of original sin, is it therefore certain that this subject would not be incidentally alluded to? Is it considered a sound rule of interpretation to endeavour to ascertain what was the author's main design, and then to assume that every word has strict reference to this one subject? This is, in effect, what Dr. Beecher claims on his own behalf. "The sermon," he says, "was not designed to have any reference to original sin; it spake only of the present actual condition of adult mind; the question how man came into such a state was not so much as touched." Throughout* the whole of his defence of this sermon there is an

* Bishop Berkley wrote a treatise, called Siris, which had for its professed object to make known the healing virtues of tar-water, but in the course of which he goes into a discussion of the ancient philosophy, the harmonies of the universe, the nature of virtue, &c. Allowing him the same latitude which Dr. Beecher claims, he might insist upon his right to insert tar-water before virtue wherever it occurs.

assumption that no part of it includes or refers to anything beyond his original design in writing it. There is no argument beyond this assumption to show that the passages objected to do not teach what they have been supposed to teach. Because he did not intend to discuss the question how man came into his present state, therefore this question was not touched, though there are the passages in which, according to the common understanding of the English language, he has not only touched it, but decided that the present condition of man is owing to his voluntary disobedience. Because he designed to prove in the sermon that all men are actual transgressors, therefore whenever he speaks of depravity we must prefix the qualifying term, adult, no matter with what confusion of grammar or sense. The design and drift of a writer ought indeed to be consulted in interpreting obscure passages, and should decide the question between two doubtful meanings. But we have never before met with any one who would carry this canon of exegesis so far as to pervert entirely the ordinary construction and force of words, for the sake of accommodating them to the one main argument of the writer. The subject of original sin is so far germane to that of actual transgression that we should not be surprised to see it alluded to by the most logical writer upon total depravity; and in attempting, therefore, to discover the meaning of any passage in his discourse, we should be guided by the most obvious signification of the terms employed. And surely there can be no doubt what is the most obvious meaning of the passages we have quoted from Dr. Beecher. They are so plain that, if his explanation of them is admissible, we must abandon language as the means of communicating ideas, and invent some less dubious method. If a "depraved nature" means actual transgression, then black may mean white, and square may mean round, and root may mean branch, and language may be thrown aside as less explicit than dumb signs.

Let us take one of these sentences and try Dr. Beecher's explanation upon it. "Neither a holy nor depraved nature is possible without understanding, conscience, and choice." In his Defence he interprets this to mean, that "neither a holy nor depraved nature, *in respect to actual depravity*, is possible." There is no difficulty in understanding the first of these assertions. By a depraved nature in man, all the world understand that disposition or bent of mind by which he is inclined to evil, and which is the source of all actual transgression. The declaration that such a nature is impossible, without understanding, reason, and choice, can only mean that depravity cannot be affirmed of man until he has reached the period at which personal accountability commences; and this is well known to be one of the prevalent theories upon this subject; and these are the very terms in which that theory is generally announced by those who confessedly hold it. But we are utterly at a loss to divine the meaning of the phrase, "a depraved nature, in respect to actual depravity." If the term

actual is used in the sense of real, as opposed to imaginary, then it would seem to teach that the depravity which exists prior to moral action is only a kind of metaphysical fiction, holding the same sort of relation to the truth that the square root of a negative quantity does to a real expression in algebra. If he uses the word actual as opposed to potential, and means to distinguish between a depraved nature *in esse* and *in posse*, we must deny the correctness of the distinction. A depraved nature is itself the potential existence of actual transgression. Had it been Dr. Beecher's intention merely to teach that all actual sin is voluntary, it would have been very easy for him to have expressed this idea; but we cannot understand how the extracts which we have given can be made to convey it, however modified they may be by the expletives, actual and adult. The original garment refuses to receive these heterogeneous patches.

We have said that Dr. Beecher has given two different accounts of his object in writing this sermon. One of them we have already given, the other is contained in the following extract from his Defence; "The question was as to the voluntariness of the depravity of an adult man. Keep this in remembrance, and then let me explain the drift of that sermon. After proving that the depravity of man is very great, I proceed in the sermon to say that it is voluntary, and this doctrine I advance in opposition to the philosophy which represents the existence of a great black pool somewhere behind the will; I don't know how big, but which continually pours out its waters of death—waters which turn the will as if it were a mill-wheel attached to some sort of patent model, which is continually working out sin. . . . . The doctrine I meant to oppose was that of a physical, natural, constitutional depravity, totally involuntary; and as instinctive as the principle which teaches a robin to build her nest, or a lion to eat flesh and not grass. Against this notion of instinctive depravity, leading men of necessity to do nothing but sin, I composed the sermon, in which I declare that the depravity of man, implied in his destitution of religion, is voluntary," &c. We have no objection to this account of the matter, save that it is inconsistent with the one previously given. If the sermon were written to counteract the notion that men are partially holy on account of their natural amiableness, it seems to us that this by-play with the black-pool and robin-red-breast theories of the will is quite as foreign to the topic as a touch at original sin would have been. Dr. Beecher has, however, just as good a right to quarrel with this great big black pool, as Don Quixote had to fight with the windmill. And if he should see fit to exercise this right, we cannot find it in our hearts to blame him; we can only express our wonder that a man of his undoubted strength should expend it in beating the air, or in creating a big black pool, and then splashing in its dirty waters only to his own defilement. Dr. Beecher is not too old to learn. He has recently discovered to his great amazement, that the doctrine of free agency, which he had previ-

ously thought was the product of New England wisdom, has been held in all ages of the Church in connexion with the Calvinistic system. Yet it was upon this very point that he was formerly in the habit of breaking out into the most copious expressions of horror over the evils produced by that false philosophy which had been employed for the exposition of Calvinism. We have no doubt that he has since sincerely repented the injustice of which he has thus been guilty towards others, and regretted the loss of his own time, which, as he has now discovered, was wasted in contending with shadows. And as he is now upon the right track, he will probably soon discover that there are other forms of that false philosophy which he has attributed to old Calvinists, that are, in truth, nothing more than the spectra of his own distempered fancy.

We cannot see how this second account of the object of the sermon sheds any light upon the passages which we have quoted from it. Let us again take one of these extracts, and see whether there is the least relevancy in the explanation. "To say of an accountable creature that he is depraved by nature, is only to say, that, rendered capable by his Maker of obedience, he disobeys from the commencement of his accountability." This, by itself, seems sufficiently plain. It is the precise account which Prof. Fitch gave of man's depravity in his sermon on the "Nature of Sin," and which has since been repeatedly given from the New Haven school. It could hardly be made more definite than it is. And we do not see that it receives the least illustration from the author's information, that his object in writing the sermon was to drain off the big black pool which some explorers have found lying back of the will, or that his aim was to describe the depravity of adult man. He speaks here of the depravity which is by nature, and, as plainly and forcibly as words can do it, he excludes from it everything but actual disobedience.

The difficulty under which Dr. Beecher felt himself to labour in his defence, will be further perceived in the claim which he, with apparent seriousness, puts forward, that in this very sermon he does teach and establish the doctrine of original sin. And how? why, "by proving two of the fundamental doctrines always relied on by the orthodox church, and by Edwards in particular, to prove the doctrine of original sin—I mean the doctrine of total depravity, and the doctrine of regeneration." Verily the narrow portals of the Calvinistic platform must be widened, if all who teach total depravity and regeneration are to be therefore considered as good believers in our doctrine of original sin. Upon this principle, it should seem, if a man agrees with us in any one fact or doctrine, we are to assume that he agrees with us in all our inferences from it. Dr. Taylor believes and teaches that all men are sinners, that the first moral act, and all the successive acts of every man, until he is renewed, are sinful. He has urged this point quite as strenuously as Dr. Beecher. Are we therefore to conclude that Dr. Taylor believes the doctrine of original sin as taught in our standards?

We are astonished and grieved when we see a man of Dr. Beecher's high standing engaged in the attempt to palm off such wretched sophistry—it hardly deserves so respectable a name—upon the Presbyterian church.

Dr. Beecher further asserts, that in one of the very passages "claimed to deny original sin, he does expressly allude to and recognise its existence as a reality." Our readers will doubtless be curious to know what he considers a recognition of this doctrine. We quote the passage which contains it. "Whatever effect, therefore, the fall of man may have had on his race, it has not had the effect to render it impossible for man to love God religiously; and whatever may be the early constitution of man, there is nothing in it, and nothing withheld from it, which renders disobedience unavoidable and obedience impossible." There can never be any lack of believers in the doctrine of original sin, if the vague, negative allusions, "whatever effect the fall of man may have had on his race," and "whatever may be the early constitution of man," are to be considered a sufficient profession of faith. Who can withhold his sympathy from Dr. Beecher, in the affliction which he must have felt, when compelled to resort to such means as this to prove his orthodoxy? There is not a Pelagian or Socinian in the land who might not, with perfect consistency, have uttered this sentence; and he must have felt himself hard pressed before he could have been driven so far to trifle with the public, and with his own character, as to allege it in proof of his recognition of the doctrine of original sin.

We have one more extract from Dr. Beecher's writings which we shall produce in evidence of his opinions on this subject prior to his trial. We solicit special attention to this passage, since its explicitness will be seen, if examined, to preclude all evasion and subterfuge. Through some neglect or oversight, which we deeply regret, it was not produced upon his trial. Had it been, we see not how the synod could have avoided convicting Dr. Beecher of having denied the doctrine of the Confession of Faith upon this point. The passage occurs in the controversy in which Dr. Beecher was engaged with the editor of the Christian Examiner, in the year 1828.* It is in the following words:

"The Reformers also, with one accord, taught that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, and that a corrupt nature descends from him to every one of his posterity, in consequence of which infants are unholy, unfit for heaven, and justly exposed to future punishment. Their opinion seems to have been, that the very substance or essence of the soul was depraved, and that the moral contamination extended alike to all its powers and faculties, insomuch that sin became a property of every man's nature, and was propagated as really as flesh and blood. . . . . Our Puritan fathers adhered to the doctrine of original sin, as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and in a hereditary depravity; and this

* See Spirit of the Pilgrims, vol. i., p. 158.

continued to be the received doctrine of the churches of New England until after the time of Edwards. He adopted the views of the Reformers on the subject of original sin, as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and a depraved nature transmitted by descent. But after him this mode of stating the subject was gradually changed, until long since the prevailing doctrine in New England has been, that men are not guilty of Adam's sin, and that depravity is not of the substance of the soul, nor an inherent or physical quality, but is wholly voluntary, and consists in the transgression of the law, in such circumstances as constitute accountability and desert of punishment."

Here, at least, if never before, Dr. Beecher, to use one of his own expressions, is "fairly out" upon the subject of original sin. It is impossible to read this passage, and then doubt what his opinions were at the time he wrote it. Will he pretend that he was merely giving what was the prevalent doctrine in New England, and not stating his own views? The connexion in which this passage occurs precludes such a plea. The controversy which he was waging was occasioned by a note to his sermon on the Moral Government of God, in which he had denied that the Calvinistic scheme involved the opinion that infants are damned. The editor of the Christian Examiner replied to this note; and Dr. Beecher in his letter to him complains bitterly, that in maintaining his argument that Calvinists hold the offensive opinion in question, he makes use of exploded representations on the subject of original sin, instead of taking those which he knew were then generally adopted in New England. Dr. Beecher therefore, was certainly guilty of duplicity in seeking to obtain for himself what he deemed the benefit of these modified views of original sin, if he did not really hold them. But there is no doubt, there can be none, that he is here stating his own opinions. Were there any, it would be removed by the following passage which is found in close connexion with the one above quoted. "The pamphlets and treatises on this subject were written, and the subject settled, before my recollection. But I have read them, and have searched the Scriptures, and have from the beginning accommodated my phraseology to opinions which had been adopted as the result of an investigation which commenced more than seventy years ago, and has been settled more than fifty years." Dr. Beecher here declares, that the opinions which he had just presented on the subject of original sin, were his own, that he had adopted them after careful study, and that he had preached them from the beginning.

Will he urge that he is here speaking of actual or adult depravity? We should feel that we were unjust towards Dr. Beecher, in intimating the possibility of his resort to such grounds of defence, were it not for the specimen which he has already given of his wonderful capabilities in this line. But all the changes which he can ring upon the words actual and adult will not help him here. He is, in this part of his letter, professedly giving what he

deems the true view of original sin, in opposition to the old Calvinistic doctrine, from which his adversary had drawn some of his arguments. It is then of infants, not adults, that he is writing; it is of a depraved nature, existing prior to moral action, in distinction from whatever it is that he means by "a depraved nature in respect to actual depravity."

Assuming what cannot be questioned, that this passage contains Dr. Beecher's views of original sin, it suggests several very obvious reflections. We see that Dr. Beecher here, as in his other writings, misrepresents and caricatures the orthodox doctrine, that doctrine which he admits was generally held from the time of the Reformation until after Edwards. After stating correctly the doctrine which they taught, he adds his own version of it in these words, "that the very substance or essence of the soul was depraved." And in giving an account of the change which had taken place in the mode of stating the subject, he makes the negative part of it to consist in the denial "that men are guilty of Adam's sin, and that depravity is of the substance of the soul, or an inherent or physical quality," This, then, was the doctrine which had been previously taught by Edwards, and his predecessors. But he otherwise represents their doctrine as teaching that "a corrupt nature descends from Adam to every one of his posterity," or that "original sin consists in the imputation of Adam's sin, and in a hereditary depravity," or "a depraved nature transmitted by descent." Let it then be distinctly marked and held in remembrance, that when Dr. Beecher rails at physical depravity, he means hereditary depravity; when he attacks the opinion that the substance or essence of the soul is depraved, his shafts are levelled against the doctrine of a corrupt nature descending from Adam to his posterity. We have often been much perplexed in the attempt to understand what is meant by certain men, when they declaim against physical depravity, material sin, &c.; and we have sometimes been uncharitable enough to think that they had no meaning at all, and made use of these phrases merely to round a sentence or point an antithesis. But Dr. Beecher makes his meaning sufficiently plain. He uses physical depravity, and a depraved nature transmitted by descent, as convertible phrases; and he leaves no halting-place between the theory that depravity consists in a voluntary action, and that which makes it a physical quality. If this is done ignorantly—if Dr. Beecher is really unable to perceive the difference between the orthodox doctrine of a corrupt nature, and that of moral depravity in the physical structure of the soul, then he ought certainly to lay aside the office and the air of an instructer of his brethren in theology. But if the misrepresentation is made wilfully, we will venture to recommend to him the same discipline which he once advised in a similar case, the careful study of the ninth commandment. We are willing, however, in the present instance, to endure the pain of this evil report of our opinions, and even feel

grateful to Dr. Beecher on account of it, because of the key which it furnishes to the passages in which he fulminates against physical depravity, and those who hold and teach it.

We were moreover struck, while reading this passage, with the wonderful similarity between its statements and those already quoted from the sermon on the Native Character of Man. It is truly surprising that there should be such a strong likeness, a perfect identity indeed, between the two, when we consider that in the one he is describing actual depravity, or adult depravity, or a depraved nature in respect to actual depravity, and in the other, that depravity which belongs to original sin. Speaking of a depraved nature in respect to actual depravity, he says, "If, therefore, man is depraved by nature, it is a voluntary and accountable nature which is depraved, exercised in disobedience to the law of God;" and speaking of a depraved nature in respect to original sin, he says, "Depravity is wholly voluntary, and consists in the transgression of the law in such circumstances as constitute accountability and desert of punishment." We may surely be pardoned the natural error of supposing, that in these sentences he was describing the same thing. Especially do we think we may be forgiven this offence, when it is further observed that he uses the same phrases, native depravity, depraved nature, &c., in the one case to denote actual depravity, and in the other that which is not actual. And yet, further, would we plead in extenuation of our error, that Dr. Beecher informs us in this letter, that the views which it presents of original sin were those which he had held from the beginning, and to which he had always accommodated his phraseology. What then could have been more natural than for us to suppose, when we found in this letter a certain assertion made respecting "native depravity," and then found the same assertion respecting "native depravity," in a sermon written previously, that they both had reference to the same thing. If we have, indeed, erred in this supposition, we must pronounce it hazardous to attempt to interpret any production of Dr. Beecher, until he has first been tried for it, and had an opportunity to put in his explanation and defence.

Our last remark upon this exposition of the doctrine of original sin is, that the author himself cannot have the hardihood to deny that it is in direct conflict with the Confession of Faith. He expressly rejects the doctrine, whatever it was, which had been taught by the Reformers, the Puritan fathers of New England, and by Edwards, and it has never been denied or doubted that the doctrine which they taught is that of our Confession. He denies that men are guilty of Adam's sin, and thus rejects the doctrine of imputation. He asserts that all depravity is voluntary, and consists in the transgression of the law, discarding, as plainly as language can do it, the doctrine of a depraved nature transmitted from Adam to his posterity. Yet this doctrine, thus discredited, and contemptuously given over to the tender mercies of his

Socinian adversary, is the doctrine of our standards. He does not simply modify the orthodox mode of stating this doctrine, he altogether rejects the doctrine itself. In a passage following the one we have given, he says, "These (the New England divines) while they disclaim the language held by Calvin and Edwards on the subject of imputation, do, in accordance with the Bible and the Reformers, teach that there is a connexion of some kind between the sin of Adam and the universal, voluntary, and entire depravity of his posterity; so that it is in consequence of Adam's sin that all mankind do sin voluntarily, as early as they are capable of accountability and moral action." This restriction of the whole matter to "a connexion of some kind" between Adam and his posterity, in consequence of which they all sin voluntarily as soon as they become capable of moral action, does more than discard our mode of representing the doctrine of original sin, as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of man's whole nature. By denying that we are in any sense guilty of Adam's sin, and rejecting the idea of a corrupt nature transmitted by descent, while it confines all depravity to actual transgression, it removes the whole ground of distinction between original and actual sin. It is mere quibbling, or something worse, to retain the phrase, when everything that could be meant by it has been rejected. Besides actual transgression, Dr. Beecher teaches that there is nothing but "a connexion of some kind" existing between Adam and his posterity. But he certainly cannot contend for the absurdity of applying the term original sin to this connexion. Sin denotes something in the subject, not out of him. The phrase cannot be applied to the connexion itself, nor are we at liberty to affix it to the effect of this connexion upon the subjects of it, for this, he assures us, is actual transgression, not original sin. He believes that accountability does not "commence from the womb," and that the time when it does commence "is not and cannot be exactly known to any but the eye of God." Previous to this period, upon his theory, nothing more can be affirmed of the infant than that, in consequence of the sin of Adam, it is certain that it will sin voluntarily, as soon as it becomes capable of moral action. This is the utmost extent to which his doctrine can carry us; and what more gross misapplication of language is possible than to term this undefined connexion with Adam, or the certainty arising from it that the being will actually sin, original sin. This phrase should, in fairness, be thrown aside, if there can be no depravity or sin without "a transgression of the law under such circumstances as constitute accountability and desert of punishment." We should despair of being able to construct a categorical denial of every semblance of the doctrine of original sin, if this be not one.

We expressed regret that the passage upon which we have been commenting had not been produced in evidence upon the trial, but we recall this expression. We doubt whether such regret is con-

sistent with the proper degree of kindly feeling towards Dr. Beecher. No friend of his, who has beheld the pitiable plight to which he was reduced by the extracts that were brought forward from his sermon, the hopeless conflict in which he felt himself compelled to struggle with the obvious meaning of his words, and the wandering mazes of confusion and nonsense in which he was lost, can desire that his calamity should have been so much increased as it must have been had this passage been produced.

When it is considered that out of the little that Dr. Beecher had published which touched at all upon controverted points in theology, there was so much that denied the doctrine of original sin—that his sermons and conversation were said, by many competent judges who were in the habit of hearing them, to contain much more to the same effect—that he had declared, in his letter to Dr. Porter, that there were some things in which he agreed with Dr. Taylor—and that it was publicly known that during the controversy between Dr. Taylor and Dr. Tyler, in the Spirit of the Pilgrims, either as the *locum tenens* of the editor, or in some other capacity, he acted as second to Dr. Taylor—is it wonderful, when these things are considered, that Dr. Beecher should have been more than suspected of heresy? Were the accusations against him so entirely groundless, that he is entitled to assume the attitude and tone of an injured man? Truly, we think the merchant or physician who had given as much reason for suspicion of his honesty or his skill, however aged, might not only be justly called upon to exhibit his books, or give an account of his cases and practice, but that he ought to esteem himself fortunate if he escaped conviction of fraud, or quackery, and humbly resolve to amend his course, instead of censuring those who had called him to an account.

We will now take up Dr. Beecher's Views in Theology, and seek to ascertain what opinions he there avows on the subject of original sin. And here we find an account so different, so diametrically opposed to that which he had previously given, that we can hardly believe them to have proceeded from the same pen.* The voice that we hear is no longer the exulting tone of one proclaiming new and important truths in theology; it sounds like an echo from the tomb of the dead and buried orthodoxy of the Reformers and the Puritan fathers. Let the following extract be compared with those which we have given from his previous writings.

* We have indeed heard it said, that after the publication of his Views in Theology, Dr. Beecher, as if doubtful of his own identity, sought to assure himself by going on to New Haven and ascertaining whether Dr. Taylor would recognise him. It is added, that the result of the experiment was entirely satisfactory. But this story must be apocryphal. We can readily conceive that Dr. B. might feel himself in the predicament of Amphitryo when he exclaimed,

> Num formam perdidi? mirum quin me norit Sosia.
> Scrutabor: eho dic mihi, quis videor? num satis Amphitruo?

But the incredible part of the story is that Sosia recognised Amphitryo.

"What the precise errors are which I am supposed to hold I do not know; but from the evidence relied on, and the general course of the argument, it would seem that I am supposed to hold the Pelagian doctrine on the subject (original sin); that I deny that Adam was the federal head and representative of his race; that the covenant was made not only with Adam, but also with his posterity; that the guilt of his sin was imputed to them; that there is any such thing as native depravity; or that infants are depraved. That, on the contrary, I hold and teach that infants are innocent, and as pure as Adam before the fall; and that each one stands or falls for himself as he rises to personal accountability; and that there is no such thing as original sin descending from Adam by ordinary generation; and that original sin is not sin, or in any sense deserving God's wrath and curse.

"Now *every one* of these assumed errors of my faith *I deny to be my faith.* They ascribe to me opinions which I have never held nor taught, and as I shall show, there is no evidence that I ever taught *one* of them."

This confession leaves us nothing to desire on this subject. The most orthodox cannot go beyond it. Translated from its present negative into the equivalent positive form, it would read thus: "I hold and teach, that Adam was the federal head and representative of his race; that the covenant was made not only with Adam, but also with his posterity; that the guilt of his sin was imputed to them; that there is such a thing as native depravity, and that infants are depraved. I hold and teach that infants are guilty; that they are already fallen, before they rise to personal accountability; that there is such a thing as original sin, descending from Adam by ordinary generation; and that original sin is properly sin, and deserving of God's wrath and curse."

Those who are acquainted with the controversies to which the subject of original sin has given rise, will at once perceive how explicitly this confession meets and rejects every error that has at any time prevailed. We have never seen, within the same compass, so close and strict a statement of the doctrine, one which so fully yielded all that the orthodox demand, and so carefully guarded against everything to which they object. We do not believe that there is upon record a Calvinistic statement of this doctrine, which adds anything which is not included in the view that Dr. Beecher here presents as his own. It would have been entirely satisfactory, therefore, and we should have rejoiced in it beyond measure, if in connexion with this profession of his faith, he had made a recantation of his former errors. Or we should have been satisfied with the virtual recantation, implied in this profession, if he had not seen fit to accompany it with the express declaration, "Such, on the subject of original sin, are the views which I have always held and taught since I have been in the ministry." Again, he says, "My doctrinal opinions have been unchanged from the beginning." And yet again, "In doctrine I am what I have ever

been." These declarations are the source of our perplexity and our misgivings. Here he declares, that ever since he has been in the ministry he has held and taught, "that original sin descends from Adam to his posterity, by ordinary generation," or, as he again expresses it in another passage, that "it descends from Adam, by natural generation to all his race." But in his letter to the editor of the Christian Examiner, he informs us, that he has from the beginning adopted those opinions of original sin which reject the idea presented by the Reformers, "of a depraved nature, transmitted by descent." Here he professes to believe, "that the guilt of Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity;" in his letter he states his opinion to be, "that men are not guilty of Adam's sin." Here he affirms that "it (original sin) is involuntary;"* in his letter he declares that there is no depravity save that which is "wholly voluntary." Here he teaches that infants are guilty, before they rise to personal accountability, and deserving God's wrath and curse; in his letter he tells us that there is no depravity or guilt, but that which arises from "the transgression of the law under such circumstances as constitute accountability and desert of punishment." Here he says of original sin, that "it is denominated by Edwards, and justly, an exceedingly evil and depraved nature;"† in his letter he declares that he has always repudiated the views and language of Edwards upon this subject.

Here is contradiction palpable and broad. The two views presented by Dr. Beecher, in his earlier and later publications, belong to two entirely different, two opposite systems. They have no common points of resemblance, and the same man can no more hold the two simultaneously in his faith, than he can believe both in the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems of the universe. Yet Dr. Beecher assures us again and again that he has never changed in doctrine; that he has always taught that native depravity is voluntary, and always taught that native depravity is involuntary. We know not which way to turn for a solution of this paradox. We are unwilling to believe that Dr. Beecher is so obtuse in his perception of truth, that he does not see the wide and bridgeless gulf between these two systems. We are reluctant, too, to believe that pride or false shame would keep him from acknowledging a change in his views, if himself conscious that such a change had taken place. And we would fain avoid the belief that in his orthodox professions, he uses words and terms in a different sense from that which he knows others will attach to them, thus reserving to himself the liberty of retreat, under the shelter of the esoteric sense, to his former views, whenever the days of trial for heresy shall have passed by. We can conceive no other solution, save that which is afforded by one of these hypotheses;—but we are unwilling to choose between them, and will leave our readers, after this exhibition of the facts and the difficulties of the case, to form their own conclusion.

* See Views in Theology, p. 193. † See Views, p. 194.

We regret most sincerely and deeply the result of our examination into Dr. Beecher's opinions. It is painful to bring forward such charges as are implied in the exhibition we have made, against one whom we are constrained on so many accounts to admire and respect. But truth and justice are superior in their claims to personal considerations; and we have felt that under the peculiar circumstances of the case they required this exposure at our hands.

The only other topic which we intended to make the subject of extended comment, is the theory which Dr. Beecher gives of the will, in his discussion of Natural Ability. But we have already occupied so much space that we must defer our remarks on this point.

SECOND ARTICLE.

In resuming the examination of Dr. Beecher's views, with the object of discussing his theory of moral agency, we feel that we are undertaking a task of considerable difficulty. It is by no means easy to cull from the mass of heterogeneous and irrelevant matter which he has brought together, a consistent account of his peculiar opinions. When we think we have caught his meaning upon one page, the next is sure to unsettle us. At one time he seems to be contending with the Antinomian fatalist—at another, with the old-fashioned Calvinist—and not seldom, as if unable to find other antagonists worthy of his prowess, he is reduced to the necessity of fighting with himself. It might be an amusing, and certainly would be an easy exercise to answer one part of his book by quotations from another. He gives ample evidence of the correctness of the late Dr. Porter's opinion, that Dr. Beecher is no metaphysician. At every step he manifests a most singular incompetency for discussions of this nature. He seldom defines the words or phrases which he employs—and when he does, it is generally with such want of precision, that he might better have left them undefined. Where we feel the need of a clear and definite statement of the point in debate, we are treated often to an unmeaning jingle of words; and where we have a right to expect an argument we have a metaphor unexpectedly played off upon us. Instead of giving us, in a lucid train of consecutive reasoning, a defence of the opinions in debate, he deals out page after page of glowing declamation in proof of positions which no one has ever denied. There may be much good rhetoric in all this, but it is sadly wanting in logic. It might make a deep impression if delivered, *ore rotundo*, before a popular audience, but it will make no converts among those who are accustomed to study the subject which it treats.

The theory of the will, beyond all other subjects within the range of mental and moral science, demands precision in the use of language. The terms employed, being of necessity those of the fireside and the forum, possess many different shades of meaning, and cannot well serve the purposes of scientific discussion, unless they are first precisely defined, and then used in the single sense attached to them. Without the most scrupulous and vigilant care, any attempt to elucidate this subject can end only in multiplying words without knowledge. Dr. Beecher might have learned an important lesson upon this matter from an author of whom he would hardly have spoken as he has done, if he had been familiar with his writings, and from whom we quote therefore the following sentence for his benefit. "Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth hath need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs."* There are very few authors, who have written extensively upon the abstruse subject of the will, who will not be found occasionally open to censure upon this score, so extremely difficult is it to guard entirely against the snare set for them in the ambiguity of language. But there is a vagueness in the terms and statements of Dr. Beecher, and a looseness in his method of reasoning as well as his phraseology which are altogether peculiar to himself. This would have been the more surprising to us on account of the seeming consciousness of strength with which he comes forward to grapple with the difficulties of the subject, had we not long since learned to consider a manifestation of such confidence no proof of extraordinary fitness for the undertaking. "Settle," he says, "the philosophy of free agency—what are the powers of a free agent—how they are put together, and how they operate in personal, accountable action—and controversy among all the friends of Christ will cease. It has often been said that it never can be settled. I believe no such thing. The perplexities of the schoolmen are passing away," &c. It has been said by one who delved much more than we have done among the tomes of the middle ages, that it was "impossible for any mortal living to tell what a schoolman ever meant by his words;"† but there can hardly be anything in Duns Scotus or

* Hobbes's Treatise on Human Nature.

† We doubt very much the wisdom or justice of sneering by wholesale at the schoolmen The logical subtleties to which they devoted themselves, though perplexing, yet on this very account sharpened in a high degree their intellect, and quickened their powers of discrimination and argument; and it was the opinion of Leibnitz, frequently avowed, at a time when such an avowal was dangerous to one's reputation and almost to his personal safety, "that there was much gold in the impure mass of scholastic philosophy." This great man often confesses his own obligations to the scholastic writers, and his high estimate of the value of many of their works. It would be a useful undertaking, would some competent scholar, who could gain access to their productions, examine them carefully and gather from them what is worth preserving. We have little doubt that much sterling ore might be dug out from this mine.

Thomas Aquinas more perplexing than would be the attempt to educe an intelligible meaning from many of Dr. Beecher's sentences. Let the following formal definition be taken for a sample. "By natural inability, I understand *that which* an agent, though ever so willing, cannot do, from defect of capacity." According to this definition the natural inability of a loose and careless thinker would be a compact, well-digested piece of reasoning. The inability is not an attribute of the agent—it is the thing which he cannot do. And were this mistake rectified, the definition would still be incomplete. It limits natural inability to the want of power which is consequent upon "defect of capacity." But it is obvious that though the eyes of a man should be ever so good, yet if he were deprived of light, he would labour under a natural inability of seeing. So far as the applicability of the term natural is concerned, it is a matter of indifference whether the inability result from a defect in the faculties of the agent, or in any of the conditions required by nature for the appropriate exercise of his faculties.

Other instances of a like kind are not wanting. There is a vagueness, remarkable even in Dr. Beecher, attending his use of the terms, cause and effect. The following passage furnishes an example. "The supposition of accountability for choice, coerced by a natural necessity, is contrary to the nature of things as God has constituted them. The relation of cause and effect pervades the universe. The natural world is full of it. It is the basis of all science, and of all intellectual operation, with respect to mind. Can the intellect be annihilated, and thinking go on? No more can the power of choice be annihilated, and free agency remain." The power of choice, or, in other words, the faculty usually denominated the will, is certainly requisite to free agency. This we suppose no one has ever denied, since no definition of free agency can be given which does not virtually imply the existence of a will in the agent. But it is certainly a very strange use of the words to call the will a cause, and free agency its effect; and the analogical argument founded on this assumed relation is most lame and impotent. Dr. Beecher however is so partial to this analogy that he introduces it again under a subsequent head of argument. "The supposition," he says, "of continued responsibility, after all the powers of causation are gone, is contrary to the common sense and intuitive perception of all mankind. On the subject of moral obligation all men can see and do see that there can be no effect without a cause. That nothing cannot produce something is an intuitive perception, and you cannot help it. This is the basis of that illustrious demonstration by which we prove the being of a God." Though this passage occurs within a page of the one last quoted, it will be observed that the application of the analogy of material causes and effects has been changed within this brief compass. In the first, the effect was free agency,—here it is responsibility or moral obligation. There is still another passage in which he says, "Material causes, while

upheld by heaven, are adequate to their proper effects; and the mind of man, though fallen, is, while upheld, a cause sufficient, in respect to the possibility of obedience, to create infinite obligation." Respect for Dr. Beecher restrains us from employing the only becoming and adequate mode of exposing such argumentation as this. It is impossible to enter upon a serious refutation of the analogy assumed in these extracts; or to undertake, with a grave face, to prove that the will, or the mind of man, does not stand in the relation of a cause to free agency, responsibility, the possibility of obedience, or infinite obligation. These latter terms characterize abstract properties or relations which are not the object of power, and would not therefore be termed *effects* by any one who was at all attentive "to the right ordering of names." Such reasoning might be tolerated in a public oration before a promiscuous audience,—it might be overlooked in a popular sermon,—but it must leave its disparaging mark upon one who employs it in a set exposition of the subject of free agency, cleared of the perplexities of fog and mist in which the schoolmen have involved it. No one who reads the extracts we have given, or still less if he reads the treatise from which they are taken, will wonder that Dr. Beecher should have felt it necessary to inform Dr. Porter, and through him the public at large, that his method of philosophizing was the Baconian.*

There is another case of the perversion of terms in Dr. Beecher's work more serious than those we have quoted, because it has betrayed him into some erroneous opinions. The phrases natural ability and moral ability have been for many years currently employed in discussions upon the subject of the will and free agency. Their meaning has been well defined by long usage, and Dr. Beecher professes to use them in their common acceptation. We have given his own definition of natural inability. He subsequently gives, with approbation, as coincident with his own, the definitions of President Edwards. "We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing which we cannot do if we will, because what is commonly called nature does not allow of it.

* See Dr. Beecher's published letter to Dr. Porter. In this letter he gives this truly original definition of Philosophy. "Philosophy is *the nature* which God has given to things, to mind and to matter; with the laws of their operation." He subsequently adds, "If I understand my own mode of philosophizing, it is the Baconian;—facts and the Bible are the extent of my philosophy." The latter part of this sentence is somewhat obscure. He can hardly mean that his philosophy embraces only the knowledge of facts and of the Bible, without regard to the disposition of his knowledge in systematic order. We suppose he intended to inform us that he applied to facts and to the Bible, the principles of the Baconian philosophy. We have once before, in a single instance, met with the notion of improving theological science, by applying to the Bible the principles and methods of the inductive philosophy. About as fitly might one talk of getting a purer system of truth from the Bible, by applying to it the new method of boring for water. It is to be wished that Bacon were more read or less talked about. His name is getting to be so much a stalking horse for pretenders, that it is now almost a suspicious circumstance to be caught making any use of it.

Moral inability is the want of inclination, or a contrary inclination." The correlate phrases, natural and moral ability, will of course denote, the one, the ability which results from the possession of physical powers and opportunities; the other, that which arises from inclination or disposition. But Dr. Beecher applies these terms to the will itself, as well as to the agent. He speaks of the "natural inability of the will," "the natural power of choice," "the natural power of the will," &c. Had he paused a moment upon these phrases, he must have felt that they were destitute of meaning. Their absurdity is at once made apparent by substituting the word will in the definition which Dr. Beecher himself gives. It would run thus: "By the natural inability (of the will), I understand that which the will, though ever so willing, cannot do, from defect of capacity," that is, in this case from defect of will. As it is important to get light upon these phrases, if any can be had, we will try whether the definition which he has adopted from Edwards can help us to see what is meant by the natural inability of the will. "The will is said to be naturally unable to do a thing which it cannot do if it will, because what is commonly called nature does not allow of it." Now as the question is only about acts of the will, and it is very plain that if a thing is willed it is willed, the only hinderance which nature can interpose here must be by the destruction of the will itself To assert, then, that a man labours under a natural inability of will, must mean that he is altogether destitute of this faculty. It is in like manner apparent that the moral inability of the will must mean the want of will in the will, or rather that it has no intelligible meaning whatever.

It would be difficult, too, to tell what can be meant by the following remark: "The will is under no such necessity as destroys its own power of choice." We do not recollect that Dr. Beecher has defined the sense in which he uses the word will. He seems, however, usually to employ it in its common acceptation, as denoting, according to Locke, "the power or ability to prefer or choose," or in the language of Edwards, "that power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing." What then can be intended by "the will's own power of choice," that is, by the power of choice possessed by the mind's power of choice? When we assert that an agent in order to be accountable must possess the power of choice, the assertion is both intelligible and true. It means that the agent in question must possess the faculty of will. But that "the will is under no such necessity as destroys its power of choice" can convey no meaning beyond what is involved in the identical proposition that the will is no longer the will after it has been destroyed. These instances will show how easy it is in the discussion of this subject, to slide from the clear to the obscure, from the significant to the unmeaning; and the knowledge of this danger to which he is exposed should admonish every one who undertakes the discussion, to employ all possible precaution and

vigilance. Better far the endless niceties of the scholastic distinctions, than this vague, slip-shod use of terms.*

Other passages might be produced which are open to censure of a somewhat lighter kind, as manifesting an undue predominance of the imagination over the reason—passages in which the objectionable phrases cannot, in strictness of speech, be pronounced absurd, but nevertheless are so vague or hyperbolical as to be exceedingly out of place in a treatise of this kind. We quote the following specimen: "There must exist the power of intellect, perception, comparison, judgment, conscience, will, affections, taste, memory, the discursive power of thought, the semi-omnipotence of volition, and those exercises of soul which constitute personal excellence and inspire affection." We have here, among the attributes of a moral agent, the power of intellect, and then again, the discursive power of thought; the will is not enough,—he must have in addition the semi-omnipotence of volition; affections are needed, and then besides these, the exercises of soul which constitute personal excellence. One set of these phrases might surely have been spared. But Dr. Beecher is seldom satisfied with the simple, quiet statement of a truth. The boisterous exaggerations of oratory delight him far more. "The semi-omnipotence of volition," one would think could hardly be beaten. But the following sentence may at least contest the palm with it: "The will of man is stronger than anything in the universe, except the Almighty God." We thought Dr. Taylor had gone quite far enough in characterizing the will as a "giant rebel," but he is fairly outdone by Dr. Beecher. No one has ever given an intelligible account of any active power that man can exert, save to move the muscles of his body, or to direct the attention of his mind, and that only within certain limits. This beggarly power is strangely glorified when clothed in the princely habiliments of semi-omnipotence and strength inferior only to the Almighty God.

The method of argument pursued by Dr. Beecher, as might have been expected from the looseness of his phraseology, is incoherent, diffuse, and often self-contradictory. One of his heads of argument in defence of his theory of moral agency, is the following. "That man possesses, since the fall, the powers of agency requisite to obligation, on the ground of possibility of obedience, is a matter of notoriety." It would be easy to point out a defect of precision in this sentence, but it is not for that purpose we have quoted it. It asserts that the truth of his own opinions on the sub-

* We refer Dr. Beecher to the author, whose method of philosophizing he thinks he has adopted, for the following weighty sentences: "Itaque mala et inepta verborum impositio, miris modis intellectum obsidet." "Sed verba plane vim faciunt intellectui, et omnia turbant." *Nov. Organ.* Aph. 43. He will find too this instructive caution in the same author's Proficience and Advancement of Learning: "Here, therefore, is the first distemper of learning, when men study words and not matter. It seems to me that Pygmalion's phrensy is a good emblem of this fault; for words are but the images of matter; and except they have life of reason and invention, to fall in love with them, is all one as to fall in love with a picture."

ject of man's moral agency is a matter of notoriety. Then surely he might have spared himself the trouble of filling the hundred pages which follow. For evidence of its loose and declamatory style of argument, we must refer our readers to the book itself. They cannot open it amiss. We might almost say the same of its inconsistencies. We select at random an instance or two, illustrating the latter feature. The author repeatedly denies that motives are, properly speaking, causes of volition,—they are the ground, occasion, or reason, but not the cause. This is urged most strenuously. But in discussing the question whether the word of God is employed as the instrument in regeneration as well as in conversion, he has the following argument. "But why should the efficiency of God defraud the word of its alleged instrumentality, or the instrumentality of the word exclude the power of God? Is the union of both impossible? It cannot be impossible, because, unquestionably, in the government of the natural world, God's almightiness is associated with the instrumentality of natural causes, and may be just as possibly, if God pleases, in the moral world, associated with the instrumentality of moral causes" We do not intend to dispute the truth of the opinion advocated in this passage; we wish simply to call attention to the argument employed. Why is the joint efficiency of motives and of the power of God possible, in the production of a given effect upon the mind? Because in the natural world the power of God acts in conjunction with natural causes. Here the author assumes that a motive is a cause, or at least so near akin to one, that an argument may be founded on the similarity in their mode of operation,—a notion that he has been most vigorously combating all along through the previous pages. Another example in the same kind will suffice for the present. In his defence of the natural ability of man, we find the following observations. "Accountability for personal transgression does require some ability to refuse the evil and choose the good. There must be the faculties and powers of a free agent, bearing the relation of possibility to right action. Faculties that can do nothing, and powers that have no relation of a cause to its effect, in possible action, are nonentities." Again, he asks, "Do the requisitions of law continue, when all the necessary antecedents to obedience are destroyed? Has God required effects without a cause?" There is much more to the same effect. The ability to choose right is continually represented as a cause, of which the effect is variously stated to be the possibility of a right choice, or right choice itself. This power is magnified and exalted. It is made the basis of God's moral government, the essential element of man's accountableness. Let the reader peruse again the extracts we have just given, and then look at the following sop which Dr. Beecher throws to the Cerberus of orthodoxy, when he comes to discuss the subject of original sin. "The thing to be accounted for is the phenomenon of an entire series of universal actual sin; and to ascribe the universal and entire obliquity of the human will to the

simple *ability of choosing wrong*, is to ascribe the moral obliquity of a lost world to *nothing*." It is certainly impossible for a man, who has only the ordinary powers of vision, to see how the ability to choose wrong can be a mere nothing, while the ability to choose right is everything. If one of these species of ability be not a sufficient cause, ground, or reason, determining the mind to a particular kind of action, then the other cannot be; and not having the relation of a cause to its effect, it is, according to the previous account of the matter, a nonentity. Such are the mistakes and contradictions into which the rhetorician falls when he undertakes to deal with the niceties of logical reasoning. As an orator, Dr. Beecher has few equals. He excels greatly in popular appeals from the pulpit, the platform, and the press. He has uncommon powers of imagination, and great facility in gathering from all quarters luminous illustrations and bold imagery, to give to the truth a visible and substantial form. His stirring notes have often reached and aroused us, and, on fitting occasions, there is no one whose white plume we would more willingly see leading the van. But he mistakes his calling, and therefore forfeits our confidence in him as a guide, when he attempts to unravel the difficulties of that department of theology which is intersected by metaphysical science. The same qualities which raise him to pre-eminent excellence in his appropriate sphere, operate rather as a disqualification here. The orator is not called upon to use his words in a steady and determinate sense, approaching the fixed precision of mathematical terms, nor is it necessary that all his arguments be such as would bear the test of severe scrutiny. An analogy will often be as good as an argument, and a well-timed metaphor better than either. The rigorous exactness which scientific investigation demands, the cold prudence with which it rejects everything that is not strictly allied to the subject in hand, and the severe restraint which it imposes upon the imagination in its grasping after such sensible forms as may materialize the truth, are not likely to be learned in the school of oratory.

The extracts which we have as yet brought forward from Dr. Beecher's views have been adduced mainly with the view of illustrating the difficulties which must be encountered in the attempt to discover what are the opinions which he really intends to avow and defend. We have laboriously endeavoured to understand his drift; we are conscious of an honest purpose; and if the common cry of misapprehension shall be raised, we think Dr. Beecher's obscurity ought at least to divide the blame with our dulness.

To a cursory reader it might seem that Dr. Beecher means to inculcate nothing more than the common doctrine of man's natural ability. To all that he says which is strictly applicable as a defence of this doctrine we have nothing to object. There is a clear and important distinction between the inability which results from the defect of natural faculties, and that which arises from the want of inclination. According to the intuitive judgment of all

men an inability of the former kind absolves from all accountableness and guilt. No man can be under an obligation to perform any action which, though he will to do it, is yet impossible of execution. There cannot be any difference of opinion on this point, where the terms which enter into the discussion are properly understood. It will accordingly be found that in nearly all cases, where the natural ability of man for the performance of his duty is denied, there is a misapprehension of what is really meant by this form of statement; or else the objector intends merely to deny the suitableness of the language to express the thing signified. It cannot be disputed that man possesses all the faculties which are necessary to constitute him a free moral agent. But it may be disputed, and with considerable show of reason, whether the mere possession of these faculties can be said, in strictness of speech, to confer upon him the ability to change the moral state of his heart, and perform the spiritual duties required of him by his Maker. The sole question here is respecting the fitness of the term ability in this connexion. This word, in its ordinary use, always bears a reference to actual results. A machine is able to do only what it actually will do, if it be set in motion, and in forming our estimate of its power we are guided by our observation of its effects when in operation, or by our knowledge of what has been produced heretofore by such combinations as enter into its structure. Man, it is true, is not a machine, nor is he compelled like inanimate matter to exert at every instant all the power which he possesses. But while it would not be safe, on this account, to infer that an individual had, in any particular instance, put forth his whole ability, we should follow only our usual rule of judgment in declaring that man is unable to do that which no one of the human race, however favourably situated, has ever performed, and which it is admitted no one ever will perform. If another power, in addition to man's natural ability, is always concerned in his regeneration and conversion, we may safely infer that this further power is necessary to the production of the effect. And it is an obvious impropriety to call that an ability to do a given thing, which yet requires an additional power to be combined with it to render it efficient in the production of its result.* While we fully adopt, therefore, the opinions of President Edwards upon this subject, we cannot

* It is singular to observe how absurdities and errors that have been reasoned or laughed out of existence in one age are revived in another. Much of the fine satire of Pascal has as keen an edge for existing follies, as it had for those against which it was originally aimed. We quote the following detached passages, and would recommend the reader to turn to his Provincial Letters, and read all that he has written on the subject of efficacious grace.

"My good friend the Jansenist seemed pleased with my remarks, and thought he had already gained me. He said nothing to me, however, but turning to the Father, 'Pray,' said he, 'in what respects do you agree with the Jesuits?' He replied, 'In this, that we both acknowledge that sufficient grace is given to all men.' 'But,' returned he, 'there are two things in the term sufficient grace; the sound, which is mere air, and the sense, which is real and significant. So that when you avow an agreement with the Jesuits in the *word*, but oppose them in the *sense*, it is obvious that you disagree with them in the essential matter, though you accord in the term.

but consider his phraseology as eminently unhappy. However guarded and explained, it is still calculated to mislead. We need not go further for proof of its unhappy tendency than to the writings of Dr. Beecher. In his Sermon on Free Agency and Dependence he says, "The moment the ability of obedience ceases, the commission of sin becomes impossible." It will be observed that the ability which is here said to be essential to the commission of sin, is not

Is this acting with openness and sincerity?' 'But,' said the good man, 'what cause of complaint have you, since we deceive no one by this mode of speaking? for in our schools we publicly declare that we understand the expression in a sense quite opposite to the Jesuits.' 'I complain,' said my friend, 'that you do not declare to all the world, that by *sufficient grace* you mean a grace which is not *sufficient*. Having changed the signification of the usual terms in religion, you are obliged in conscience to declare, that when you admit of sufficient grace in all men, you really intend that they have *not* sufficient grace.'

"'Christians inquire of divines what is the real condition of human nature since the fall? St. Augustine and his disciples reply, that it does not possess sufficient grace, unless it pleases God to bestow it. The Jesuits come forward and assert that all do absolutely possess it. Consult the Dominicans upon this contradictory representation, and what is the consequence? They coalesce with the Jesuits. By this artifice their numbers appear so considerable They divide from those who deny sufficient grace, and declare that all men have it; and who would imagine otherwise than that they sanction the Jesuits? When, lo! they proceed to intimate that the *sufficient* grace is useless, without the *efficacious*, which is not bestowed upon all men!

"'Shall I present you with a picture of the church amidst these different sentiments? I consider it like a man who, leaving his native country to travel abroad, is met by robbers who wound him so severely that they leave him half dead. He sends for three physicians resident in the neighbourhood. The first, after probing his wounds, pronounces them to be mortal, assuring him that God alone can restore him; the second, wishing to flatter him, declares he has sufficient strength to reach home, and, insulting the first for opposing his opinion, threatens to be the ruin of him The unfortunate patient, in this doubtful condition, as soon as he perceives the approach of the third, stretches out his hands to welcome him who is to decide the dispute. This physician, upon examining his wounds, and ascertaining the opinions already given, coincides with the second, and these coalesce against the first to turn him out with contempt: and they now form the strongest party. The patient infers from this proceeding, that the third physician agrees with the second, and upon putting the question, he assures him most positively that his strength is sufficient for the proposed journey. The wounded man, however, expatiating upon his weakness, asks upon what he founds his opinion? 'Why, you have still got legs, and legs are the means which, according to the constitution of nature, are sufficient for the purpose of walking.' 'Very true,' replies the wounded traveller; 'but have I all the strength which is requisite for making use of them: for really they seem useless to me in my present languishing condition?' 'Certainly they are,' returns the physician, 'and you never will be able to walk unless God vouchsafes some extraordinary assistance to sustain and guide you.' 'What then,' says the infirm man, 'have I not sufficient strength in myself to be fully able to walk?' 'O no, far, very far from it' 'Then you have a different opinion from your friend respecting my real condition.' 'I candidly admit I have.'

"'What do you suppose the wounded man would say to this? He complains of their strange proceeding, and of the ambiguous language of this third physician. He censures him for coalescing with the second, when he was in fact of a contrary opinion, though they agreed in appearance, and for driving away the first with whom he really coincided; and then, after trying his strength, and finding by experience the truth of his weakness, he dismisses them both, and, recalling the first, puts himself under his care, follows his advice, and prays to God for the strength which he confesses he needs. His petitions are heard, and he ultimately returns home in peace.'"

Has not the time nearly or quite arrived in our church, when sober argument having accomplished all that it can do, the pen of satire becomes a legitimate and effective weapon? Is there not some Pascal among us, who will come forth to castigate the follies of the day?

qualified by the epithet natural. The declaration is as broad as it could be made; and it seems to us impossible to pen a sentence which would more palpably conflict with the plain language of the Scriptures upon this subject, or more directly tend to absolve the sinner from the terrors of an evil conscience. Every sinner knows that his ability to obey, using these words according to their ordinary meaning, is lessened by every sin that he commits. The more profligate he becomes, the less able is he to rise from the depths into which he has sunk. How comforting to him to hear that as his ability is thus diminishing his sins are becoming less criminal, and that when he has become so depraved that he can no more recover himself than the Ethiopian can change his skin, then he can no longer commit sin! Dr. Beecher would of course explain by saying that he meant only natural ability. But the sentence as it now stands is at least ambiguous, and in one of its senses, and that one in perfect accordance with the ordinary use of language, it is untrue and dangerous. It is no small objection to the use of the phrase, natural ability, that such a man as Dr. Beecher should have been led by it to preach in a style so well adapted to lead his hearers into serious error. In the same Sermon we find the following still more alarming sentence. "And most blessed and glorious, I am confident, will be the result when her ministry everywhere shall rightly understand and teach, and their hearers shall universally admit, the *full ability* of every sinner to comply with the terms of salvation." Could Edwards have foreseen that such a declaration as this would have grown out of the phraseology which he cast around this subject, he would surely have paused and sought some less beguiling words. But he could not have anticipated that from his effort to overthrow Arminianism there would arise the very error he was combating, or something worse. Had it been Dr. Beecher's intention to announce the opinion commonly held by Pelagians respecting man's ability, could he have taught it except in words of equivalent import with those in the passage above quoted? Would not the "full ability of every sinner to comply with the terms of salvation" be naturally understood to mean all ability of whatever kind that is necessary to the end in view? And if the sinner has within himself all the ability that is requisite, with what propriety can it be said that the influence of the Spirit is necessary? We quote another passage to the same effect from Dr. Beecher's Sermon on the Faith once delivered to the saints. "Men are free agents, possessed of such faculties, and placed in such circumstances, as render it *practicable* for them to do whatever God requires." It will be seen that the same doctrine of plenary ability is here taught, though in a somewhat stronger form. Without attempting to define the precise difference between the two words, practicable and possible, it will be admitted that the former conveys a lower idea of the difficulty to be overcome than the latter. No aid is ever deemed necessary to enable a man to accomplish a practicable enterprise. And if it is practicable for

man to do all that God requires, then is he cast upon his own resources, independent of any help from without. Will Dr. Beecher reply that the influences of the Spirit are necessary not to make him able, but to render him willing? We reply, that if they are in any sense, or for any reason, necessary, it is a gross perversion of language to say that the work, for the accomplishment of which they are necessary, is practicable without them. And besides this, the sinner's willingness constitutes the chief element in the practicableness of his duty. These extracts from Dr. Beecher's sermons show that he has given sufficient reason for ranking him with the modern improvers of the Edwardean theory of natural and moral ability. The characteristic mark of these improvers is that they reject, as Dr. Beecher does, the terms natural and moral, and assert without qualification that man possesses all the ability which is requisite for discharging the duties required of him. We have never heard from any of them stronger statements on this point than those we have quoted from Dr. Beecher; and if he contends that he meant to teach only the natural ability of the sinner, we take the liberty of exhorting him to be, in future, less reckless in his use of words.

If further proof is wanted that the doctrine taught by Dr. Beecher in these extracts from his sermons is not the natural ability of the New England theologians, it may easily be furnished from the writings of Edwards. Dr. Beecher teaches that the sinner must possess "full ability" to do all his duty, so that if there be anything which he has not sufficient power to perform, he cannot be under any obligation to do it. Full ability, commensurate with requirement, he represents as the only equitable foundation of God's moral government. How wide this is from the notions of Edwards on natural ability, may be inferred from the following passage, which is found in his work on Original Sin, in the course of his argument against the Pelagian opinions of Dr Taylor of Norwich. "It will follow on our author's principles, not only with respect to infants, but even adult persons, that redemption is needless, and Christ is dead in vain. Not only is there no need of Christ's redemption in order to deliverance from any consequences of Adam's sin, but also in order to perfect freedom from personal sin and all its evil consequences. For God has made other sufficient provision for that, viz. *a sufficient power and ability in all mankind to do all their duty, and wholly to avoid sin.* Yea, he insists upon it, that when 'men have not sufficient *power* to do their duty, hey have *no* duty to do. We may safely and assuredly conclude (says he) that mankind, in all parts of the world, have sufficient power to do the duty which God requires of them; and that he requires of them no more than they have sufficient powers to do.' And in another place. 'God has given powers equal to the duty which he expects.' These things fully imply, that men have, in their own natural ability, sufficient means to avoid sin, and to be perfectly free from it. And if the means

are *sufficient*, then is there no need of *more*, and therefore there is no need of Christ's dying in order to it."* The principles of the celebrated champion of Pelagianism, which are here controverted, are precisely those of Dr. Beecher. We can conceive of no jugglery upon his words which can possibly separate between them. And so far are these doctrines from being coincident with the views of Edwards, that he rejects them with abhorrence, as tending to make the death of Christ of none effect. And yet these are the doctrines for which the sanction of his venerable name is now invoked!

A careful examination of Dr. Beecher's views will make it evident that he still teaches a different doctrine from what is commonly understood by man's natural ability. While his professed object is to defend this doctrine, he slips in some important additions of his own. At the very outset of his discussion, in stating the question at issue, he places himself in direct opposition to Edwards. "The point at issue," he says, "is, *in what manner* the certainty of the continuous wrong action of the mind comes to pass? Does it come to pass coerced or uncoerced by necessity? Does fallen man choose, under the influence of such a constitution of body and mind and motive, that every volition bears the relation of an effect to a natural and necessary cause, rendering any other choice than the one which comes to pass impossible, under existing circumstances?" Again he says, "The question of free-will is not whether man *chooses*—this is notorious, none deny it—but whether his choice is free, as opposed to a fatal necessity." He contends throughout, that in order to ascertain whether man is a free agent, we must inquire into the causes of his volitions, and see whether they are necessary in their operation; and that to render him accountable it is not sufficient that his actions are voluntary—his will also must be free. Let us compare this notion of freedom with that given by Edwards. "But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called *Liberty;* namely, that power and opportunity to do and conduct as he will, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the *cause* of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom."† "Liberty is the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has of doing as he pleases, or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure, *without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is.*"‡

* Edwards's Works, vol ii., p. 515.
† Freedom of the Will. p. 39. ‡ Ibid., p. 291.

The ground of blame-worthiness too, as stated by Edwards, is essentially different from that given by Dr. Beecher. The latter requires, in addition to voluntariness, that the agent should possess the power of controlling his own choice. But Edwards says, "The idea which the common people through all ages and nations have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this; a person being or doing wrong with his own will and pleasure,"—he adds, "and this is the sum total of the matter."

A few more extracts from Dr. Beecher will show that he advocates, sometimes at least, a theory very different from that of Edwards and of Calvinistic writers in general, respecting natural ability. "Choice," he says, "in its very nature, implies the possibility of a different or contrary election to that which is made. There is always an alternative to that which the mind decides on, with the conscious power of choosing either." He states the question in debate respecting man's freedom to be, "whether it (his choice) is the act of an agent who might have abstained from the choice he made, and made one which he did not." He speaks very often of the necessity that man should possess what he calls the power of choice, with the power of contrary choice, in order to constitute him a responsible agent. "But if any man does not possess the power of choice, with power to the contrary, he sees and feels that he is not to blame; and you cannot, with more infallible certainty, make men believe and fix them in the belief that they are not responsible, than to teach them that they have not the power of alternative election." Speaking of a man committing some sin, he asks, "When he has done it, does he not know, does he not feel that he could have chosen the other way?" He affirms that man's "obligation to choose good and refuse the evil, originates in his constitutional power of choice, with power of contrary choice." He contends that the supposition, "that man is not after all able to modify and diversify his choice indefinitely, &c., destroys the credibility of the Bible as an inspired book;" since the Bible assumes "everywhere that man is free to choose with power of contrary choice." He speaks repeatedly of the necessity of determining whether "choice is free;" whether man "in his mode of voluntary action, is coerced or free," &c., in order to settle the question of his free agency and responsibility.

It is not a little surprising that in the book which contains these passages, Dr. Beecher should quote from Edwards, thus showing that he had read at least some part of his Treatise on the Will, and yet claim agreement with him on the subject of free agency. Respecting the power of the will to choose differently from what it actually does, we quote the following passage from Edwards. After the definition of liberty which we have already quoted, he adds: "And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion or form a higher imagination of liberty: let them talk of sovereignty of the will, self-determining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis, *power*

of choosing differently in given cases, &c., as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something that they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused, unmeaning words instead of things and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have, but they never can answer the challenge." And in relation to the liberty of the will which Dr. Beecher maintains to be vitally essential to free agency, Edwards has the following remarks. "In strict propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing but that which has such a faculty, power or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of liberty or the contrary as belonging to *the very will itself*, is not to speak good sense." The question whether the will itself is coerced or free, which Dr. Beecher maintains to be the only question in debate, Edwards refuses to entertain, pronouncing it to be not good sense. The power of choosing differently in given cases, which Dr. Beecher holds to be essential to moral agency, is, according to Edwards, a thing of which we can form no conception, a confused, unmeaning jumble of words. The inquiry which Dr. Beecher contends that we must institute into the causes of choice, in order to ascertain whether it be free or not, before we can attribute blameworthiness, is rejected by Edwards and by all Calvinistic writers, for the reason already given, that the question whether the will is free, is nonsense, and also because when the other conditions necessary to constitute a moral act are present, it is sufficient that the agent be voluntary to render him accountable. Whatever agreement there may be between Dr. Beecher and "the ablest writers on free agency" in the final results of their reasoning, it is apparent that there is rather a startling difference in some of their first principles.

We have shown with whom Dr. Beecher, in the extracts which we have given, does not agree. We will now show with whom he does agree. Dr. Reid gives the following definition of liberty. "By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If in any action he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the liberty of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity."* This is the definition of liberty which has been substantially adopted by all subsequent Arminian and Pelagian writers upon the will; and granting them their definition, we know not how to resist their conclusion. And we can

* Reid's Works, vol. iii., p. 326.

see no difference between the idea of liberty which is here taught, and that for which Dr. Beecher so strenuously contends. He maintains explicitly that it is not enough that man chooses, and is not hindered from acting according to his preference, to constitute him a free agent; he must possess also a power over the determinations of his will, so that in any given case he might have chosen differently. We might quote abundantly from other writers than Reid to prove that Dr. Beecher's notion of liberty is precisely that which is taught by Arminians and Pelagians in general; but we will refer, in addition, only to the writings of the New Haven divines. This same idea of liberty runs through all Dr. Taylor's writings in the Christian Spectator. It is succinctly expressed in the following sentence. "They (theologians) have supposed it to be impossible for God to foreknow the actions of a *truly free* agent, that is, of one who, whatever may be his choice in a given case, was entirely able to make the contrary choice."* It has always heretofore been supposed by the most competent judges that the notion of moral liberty, which includes in it this power over the determinations of the will, was inconsistent with the Calvinistic scheme. If Dr. Beecher has discovered their consistency, he ought, in justice to his own reputation, to withdraw the acknowledgment, which was doubtless prompted by his modesty, that "he had no new discoveries to announce." He has, in truth, made one of the most wonderful discoveries of the age. We are inclined to think, however, that it ought to be ranked as an invention rather than a discovery. And as in the case of many other inventions, though the ingenious author seems to place great confidence in it, we are disposed to see how it will work before we adopt it. In the meantime we admit and feel, that Dr. Beecher's own case furnishes a stronger argument than we had thought it possible to produce in favour of some extraordinary kind of liberty possessed by man; since he has shown by his own example that the Pelagian philosophy of the will can be held in unison with the doctrines of Calvinism.†

From the specimens which we have given of Dr. Beecher's looseness and inaccuracy in reasoning, it will not be expected that he should trace out very clearly the connexion between the different parts of his system so as to show their mutual coherency. On the contrary, such sentences and phrases as we have quoted are often found in close connexion with others entirely different in their meaning, and yet given as if they were of equivalent import. The natural ability of choice, the natural ability of the will in respect to the power of choice, and the natural ability of man, are used interchangeably, without any apparent suspicion on the part

* Christian Spectator, vol. iii., p. 469.

† A German author has recently obtained two prizes, one for an essay in defence of the medical theory of homœopathy, the other for an essay against the same theory. This exploit, however, is by no means equal to that which Dr. Beecher aims to accomplish. The German did not aspire to obtain a favourable verdict upon both his essays from the same body of men.

of the author that he is not describing the same thing by each of these phrases. The question of free agency, which he generally states to be the question whether man's will is free in such a sense that he always has power to make a contrary choice to the one actually made, is sometimes represented as involving only the inquiry whether man has liberty to act according to his will. By thus interchanging phrases of different import, and shifting the question at the proper turn, he is enabled to array upon his side a formidable list of authorities from the days of the fathers down to the present generation. Any theory of moral agency might be thus confirmed by first assuming that it is the only true or possible theory, and then quoting in its support every author who has taught that man is a moral agent.

We proceed to examine, somewhat more in detail, the peculiarities of Dr. Beecher's theory. Under the strange, and to us unmeaning head, of "fatality of choice," we have the following paragraph: "The question of free-will is not whether man chooses —this is notorious, none deny it; but whether his choice is free as opposed to a fatal necessity—as opposed to the laws of instinct and natural causation; whether it is the act of a mind so qualified for choice as to decide between alternatives, uncoerced by the energy of a natural cause to its effect; whether it is the act of an agent who might have abstained from the choice he made, and made one which he did not. To speak of choice being *free*, which is produced by the laws of a natural necessity, and which cannot but be *when* and *what* it is, more than the effects of natural causes can govern the time and manner and qualities of their being, is a perversion of language." We quote the following additional passages in connexion with this. "That choice is in accordance with the state of body and mind and character and external circumstances may be admitted, or that it is as the greatest apparent good, may be admitted; but that it is so necessarily, to the exclusion of all ability of any kind to be other than it is, cannot be admitted without abandoning the field of God's government of accountable creatures, and going to the centre of fatalism." "If obedience to commands, exhortations and entreaties, is prevented by a constitutional necessity, a natural impossibility of choosing right; and the disobedient choice is also the unavoidable, coerced result of a constitutional necessity, over which the will has no power, but of which it is the unavoidable effect; then choice is as much the effect of a natural cause, as any other natural effect." These extracts present the question in debate in the form which is usually given to it by Dr. Beecher, except when some authority is to be adduced. The inquiry raised is whether choice is free. He must of course mean by choice, in this connexion, the power of choice, or the will. We have already given the decision of Edwards respecting this question, that it is "not good sense," since liberty must be the attribute of an agent, and not of a faculty. Both Locke and Hobbes had previously made a similar remark. It would be difficult for

Dr. Beecher to give any intelligible definition of liberty which would not show the absurdity of his form of stating the question. Hobbes defines a free agent to be "he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will." And this is substantially the definition which has been given by Leibnitz, by Collins, and by Edwards, and all Calvinistic writers. We derive our notion of freedom from the dependency of our actions upon our volitions. If, when we will a particular act, the act follows, we are free. This is the primary, original notion of freedom. Liberty then can be affirmed with propriety only of agents that are possessed of a will, and in relation to such actions as are consequent upon volition. We do indeed, in common language, attribute liberty to inanimate objects, as when we say of a stone that it descends *freely;* but this is only in accommodation, and from an analogy suggested by another idea involved in the liberty of an agent, that he is subject to no impediment *extrinsic to himself.* If a man is bound hand and foot, or held by a superior muscular force to his own, we say he is not free to move; but if he is lame, or confined to his couch by disease, he does not want liberty but power or strength to move. It is in analogy with this idea that we say of inanimate objects that they act freely, meaning thereby that there is no external impediment to hinder them from acting according to their intrinsic qualities. We think it will be found, upon examination, that in every supposable case in which we can properly affirm that an agent is free, there is involved the idea that the impediment denied is without himself. If this be correct, then we may give this definition of a free agent, one who is not hindered by any extrinsic impediment from acting according to his own will. How then can we raise the question whether the will itself be free? In order to this, we must suppose each volition to be the effect of a previous volition. But we never will to will. "Proprie loquendo volumus agere, non vero volumus velle; alioqui dicere etiam possemus, velle nos habere voluntatem volendi, quod in infinitum abiret."* And besides this, whatever hinderances can be supposed to force or impede the will must be within itself, and if it labours under any difficulty therefore, it must be from a defect of power, not of freedom.

In entire consistency with this confusion at the outset, we find him in a subsequent sentence speaking of the choice itself not having power to be other than what it is, any more than effects in the physical world can control their causes! And yet again he speaks of the "disobedient choice being the unavoidable result of a constitutional necessity over which the will has no power, but of which it is the unavoidable effect." Here choice and the faculty of will are each made the effect of necessity, or else in two dependent members of the same sentence the word will in the one denotes the faculty known by that name, while in the other the

* Leibnitzii Opera, tom. i., p. 136.

pronoun which refers to it denotes not the will, but a volition or act of the will.

There are still further difficulties attending the interpretation of these passages. Dr. Beecher denies that choice (the will) is subject to necessity. When we look further to see what this means, we find it sometimes described as a fatal, unavoidable and irresistible necessity. And quite as often it is said that the will is not free if the cause which influences its volitions be a natural or constitutional cause. We should naturally be led to conclude that, in Dr. Beecher's opinion, a natural or constitutional cause established a fatal necessity. But let his readers beware how they attempt to interpret Dr. Beecher by comparing him with himself. He himself elsewhere teaches that the cause which determines man's will to a particular kind of action is both natural and constitutional. He says, "I hold and teach that such a change in the *constitution* of man was produced by the fall as creates a universal and prevalent propensity to actual sin, preventing in all men the existence of holiness, and securing the existence of actual total depravity." Speaking elsewhere of this same cause he calls it "a prevalent bias of nature." And again he says, "This impotency of will to good, according to the Bible, and our Confession, and the received doctrines of the church, includes the *constitutional* bias to actual sin, produced in all men by the fall, anterior to intelligent, voluntary action." We here have the determining cause of volition in fallen man styled a bias of nature, and a constitutional bias. The will, then, being operated upon by a natural and constitutional cause, is subject to a fatal necessity; it is not free, and no responsibility attaches to any of its acts. This contradiction is to be avoided only by the plea that the terms constitutional and natural are used in different senses in the two cases. Doubtless they are, but it is to be regretted that they should be used to convey such opposite meanings, without any notice of a change of signification, or any attempt in either case to define the sense in which they are employed. This is the more to be regretted, because when Dr. Beecher asserts that if choice be the product of a necessity *of nature*, man cannot be an accountable agent—if instead of bringing argument after argument to prove it, he had simply defined what he meant by nature, he would have saved himself all further trouble upon this point. He cannot mean that it is not in accordance with the nature of things in general, or of the will in particular, that it should be moved by the causes which act upon it. Nor will he deny that there is any less certainty, the state of mind of the agent, his susceptibilities, and all the circumstances under which he acts being known, that a particular volition will follow, than that any physical cause will be succeeded by its appropriate effect. Nature is often used to denote the settled order of things which we observe in the world around us. An event is said to be natural, or to be according to the course of nature, when it is seen to be regularly connected with its cause, and in harmony with the manner of suc-

cession which we observe in other things. And it is called unnatural when it seems, through our ignorance, to fall without the ordinary fixed course of things, or to vary greatly from the established order of similar events. But the laws which govern the will are as invariable as those which govern matter, and whatever distinction exists between them must be sought elsewhere than in respect to the regularity of their operation. But there is a sense of the word nature in which Dr. Beecher's declaration contains a truth, though certainly a very harmless one, to any conflicting theory of morals. This word is frequently employed to signify the assemblage of material causes which are continually working their effects around us. Numberless changes are every moment occurring to which the will of man contributes no influence, and the causes which produce them are characterized by the general term nature. But our own volitions are also causes of motion, and often interfere to modify or interrupt the course of events around us. Nature and choice come thus to be considered as diverse and even opposite to each other. A proposition may be constructed, founded upon this notion, of some kind of opposition between nature and choice, which shall be true, but the misfortune is, it will be too true,—it can be nothing else than a truism. But a natural cause may be distinguished from a moral cause, if we denote by the first a cause which produces its effect upon matter, and by the other a cause which acts upon the mind. This, we admit, is a usual and legitimate use of the epithet natural. Here we have an opposition between nature and choice, or rather between nature and the cause of choice, which is founded upon the difference between the objects upon which they act; the effect of the one is some change in matter, of the other, an act of the mind. There must of course be a difference in nature between these two classes of causes to adapt them to the production of their different effects. The mind cannot be directly acted upon by such causes as are comprehended in our notion of nature; it is moved by motives presented to the understanding, or by its own habitual dispositions. We should esteem it therefore a work of supererogation, to deny vociferously that a man can be responsible for a choice, which is the result of a natural cause. No correct definition of a natural, as distinguished from a moral, cause, can be given, which would not exclude choice from the sphere of its operation. Dr. Beecher is the only writer we have ever met with who seemed to suppose that the will could be moved by water-power or propelled by steam. He gives a very characteristic illustration of what he calls "the fatality of agency," in which he supposes volitions to be produced by "the motion of a great water-wheel and the various bands which keep the motion and the praise and the blasphemy agoing." This illustration he introduces, not for the purpose of showing the absurdity of the thing supposed, but to prove that no "accountability would attach to these *voluntary* praises and blasphemies produced by the laws of water-power." Now we are quite as ready to grant,

that a man is not responsible for any volition that is sucked or forced out of him by a pump, or squeezed out by a screw, as we would be on the other hand to contend, that if one of the stones that bounded up at the call of Orpheus's music, had struck and killed a man in its frantic joy, it ought to have been tried and condemned for murder. Either of these propositions we imagine would unite all suffrages, for one of them is just as true as the other. We trust this will be deemed a sufficient answer to the much that Dr. Beecher has said respecting choice being the "effect of natural causes, as really and entirely as the falling of rain, or the electric spark, or the involuntary shock that attends it."

It is evident that if we would get at Dr. Beecher's meaning we must seek it elsewhere than among these first principles of his reasoning. We will be more likely to find it a little further on in his system. The stream, which is muddy at its origin, sometimes becomes more clear as it proceeds. Dr. Beecher has obviously reasoned backward from certain ulterior truths which he wished to maintain in search of the first principles which were adapted to uphold them. One of these starting points is the position, that in every particular case a moral agent might have abstained from the choice which he made, and made one which he did not; and he seems to think that this is established when he has proved that man is not accountable for those of his volitions that are worked out of him by water-power. Thus that man "cannot but sin when he does sin, more than rivers of muddy water can purify themselves," and that he "is not able to modify and diversify his choice indefinitely," are used as synonymous expressions. The soul being "exempt from the laws of natural necessity," is assumed as equivalent with the existence "of a possibility in every case of a different or contrary choice." And in one of the passages which we have previously quoted there are found the following inquiries put, as if they were but repetitions of the same idea: "Whether it (choice) is the act of a mind so qualified for choice as to decide between alternatives, uncoerced by the energy of a natural cause to its effect;" and, "whether it is the act of an agent who might have abstained from the choice he made, and made one which he did not." There is here an assumption tacitly made, without any shadow of proof, respecting natural causes, which really involves the whole question in dispute. It is adroitly taken for granted, that any effect which is produced by other than a natural cause, might have been different from what it is. It is impossible not to admire the convenience of this mode of reasoning. It saves a world of trouble. Having proved, what it would be very foolish in any one to deny, that no man is responsible for such of his volitions as are produced "by the motion of water-wheels," there is nothing more to be done but to take possession of the ground, that a man is not accountable for his acts, unless he possesses the power of willing differently from what he does in every particular case.

We have admitted the truth of the first of these statements ;* we are not yet prepared, however, to adopt the second. Before discussing this question it will be expedient to define the terms will and volition. These words are used with considerable latitude of meaning. Under the division of our faculties, made by the earlier writers, into the powers of the understanding and those of the will, this latter term included all our inclinations, desires and passions. And the word is still often used in this large sense. According to Mr. Belsham, " every volition is a modification of the passion of desire," and Dr. Priestley asks, " is not every *wish* a volition ?" This is the popular sense of the word, as when the apothecary in Romeo and Juliet says, " My poverty but not my will consents ;" and nothing is more common than to hear people speak of doing a thing against their wills, in which nevertheless they acted voluntarily. The acts of the will are thus confounded with the desires and affections ; and the faculty of will is not to be distinguished from our susceptibility of emotion. But when we consider what passes in our minds, we find that while some of our desires remain immanent, there are others of them that are followed by action. When the idea of some action of our own, which we conceive to be in our power, is contemplated by the mind, associated with some object or end which we desire to attain, there results a determination to act, and this is followed by the action determined upon. It is this determination which is followed by some act of the body or mind that philosophers have very generally agreed to call *volition*, and the power that produces it, the faculty of *will*. Locke defines volition to be, " an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action." No definition can be given, however, of a simple act of the mind that will convey any idea of it to those who do not reflect upon what passes within them. To obtain a clear notion of what is meant by a volition, or an act of the will, we must refer to our own consciousness of what takes place when we resolve to do any particular thing—the state of mind immediately preceding the action is a volition, and the faculty or power, in virtue of which we are enabled to form such a determination to act, is the will.

The cause of any particular volition, or that which moves the mind to determine to act in any instance, is called a motive. It seems to have been the opinion of Locke that the immediate motive of every volition is some *uneasiness*. He supposes the external object to awaken desire, that this desire, while ungratified, produces uneasiness, and that to get rid of this uneasiness the will determines upon the appropriate action. It may be doubted

* The term truth is not strictly applicable to such propositions as the one here referred to. Of such an assertion as this, " a man is not bound to cultivate any of the virtues, which are square or red," we could not in strict propriety say it was either true or false, but we might very safely let it pass without dispute.

whether this is altogether a correct account of the matter. But if there be in all cases, immediately preceding the determination to act, a state of mind that is properly described by uneasiness, it is not to this that the term motive is usually applied. It is generally employed to denote either the external object or action, or the state of the agent's mind in relation to it. We associate action as a motive with object, for it is an important fact towards the solution of some of the phenomena of the will, that in its volitions the mind is often not so much conversant with the objects presented, as with its own action in relation to these objects. There are many cases in which action, simply considered, is the end at which the mind aims. It gives rise to much confusion and error, if, in speaking of the motives of volition, we leave out of consideration the state of mind of the agent. The same object which is a powerful motive to action at one time, is viewed with indifference at another, in consequence of the different state of the mind to which it is presented. The motive is not properly the external object, but the affection of the mind in relation to that object.

Let us now resume the inquiry whether, in any given case, a man might have willed contrary to what he did? And here it may be observed that the mode of putting the question virtually makes a change in the conditions under which the supposed choice took place. The only sense in which it is true that the man *might* have willed differently, is, that he might, if he had been inclined to do so. But his being inclined to will as he did, was the determining cause of his volition. The word *might* therefore implies a change in the antecedents of the particular choice in question, and is on this account inconsistent with the hypothesis that all the circumstances remain the same. If it is urged that he might have willed differently, because he might have changed the state of his mind, we reply, that to do this would require, of course, an act of the will, and that act must have a previous inclination for its motive, and so on without end. We are thus driven to hunt along an infinite chain for the first link.

Consciousness is appealed to by Dr. Beecher for proof that we always have power to will differently from what we do. We agree with him that "consciousness is the end of controversy," but it is necessary to be very careful in taking its testimony. What then is the witness of consciousness in this matter? For ourselves, in every process of volition, we are conscious only of the presence of certain views and considerations, some inclining us to will in one way and some in another, and also of a power which we possess to will *as we please*. We are not conscious of any power to will contrary to our prevailing inclination. Our consciousness concurs with other considerations in proving that a man might, in any case, have made a different or contrary choice, if he had been inclined so to do, and it proves nothing more than this.

It is now very plain what kind of power Dr. Beecher attributes to the will. His position is, that all the circumstances under which

any choice is made remaining the same, the man had power nevertheless to will the contrary. His hypothesis supposes that the views and inclinations of the mind remain unchanged, and that the man can will in direct opposition to them. This is the most disastrous power that can well be conceived of, and if any man possesses it, he ought to make it his daily prayer to be delivered from it. No man, while cursed with such a self-determining power as this, could be safe for a moment. With his whole soul bent in one direction, he might be borne, and that too by his own will, in another. With the most anxious desire to escape from danger, he might be carried immediately into it. He could form no plans for his own conduct, nor would others be able to anticipate in the least degree what they might expect from him.

But perhaps Dr. Beecher intended to exclude from the unchanged circumstances of the agent, his own state of mind. He may mean that the agent has power to will differently, because he has power to change his inclination. This involves the absurdity, already pointed out, of requiring an infinite series of antecedent volitions; or else it assumes that the will can act to modify the inclination of the mind, without any motive to determine it, and we are thus led to the common notion held by Arminians of the self-determining power of the will.

In contending then that in every given case a man might have made a different choice, Dr. Beecher contends for one of the following things. In the first place, that under the same conditions, that is, with an inclination to will in a particular direction, he had power to will the contrary. Now if man possesses any such power as this, it may on some occasions be exercised. A power that cannot be put in action is no power at all. On some occasion, then, when a man desires with all his heart to do a particular thing, there may spring up a volition to do something directly contrary, towards which he has no desire, and which he even hates with perfect hatred.* It would be very singular if such a power as this, which, if it existed, would deprive all its acts of a moral character, and render man incapable of being governed by a moral law, should yet be necessary in order to render him accountable. If this is not Dr. Beecher's meaning, then he must mean, in the second place, that in every case of volition, the man might have abstained from the choice he made, because he had the power to alter the inclination which led to the choice. And in this case we have a resurrection of the theory of self-determining power of the will, which we thought every Calvinist at least had considered twice dead and buried.

But how then, it is asked, can man be responsible for any volition, if he has not the power of willing differently? "Is not ability

* If so light a remark may be tolerated here, we would say that the only illustration with which we are acquainted of such power as the one in question, is afforded by some of our new-school brethren, who, with a great desire apparently to be orthodox, are yet continually willing the contrary.

the ground and measure of obligation?" If it is, then to be sure man must possess the power, however incomprehensible or absurd it may seem, since there can be no question that he is bound to will right. But we deny the truth of this maxim in the sense in which it is held by Dr. Beecher; and since this is one of the fixed centres around which many forms of error revolve, we will endeavour to point out its unsoundness. We have already admitted that a man cannot be bound to perform any act, which, though he be willing to do it, is impracticable. If he is deprived of his limbs, or if they have been paralysed by disease, he cannot be under any obligation to walk. He cannot be bound to fly, or, in short, to do anything which would be out of his power, provided he was willing and desirous to do it. In all such actions as are properly consequent upon volition, it is true that ability is the ground and measure of obligation. Dr. Beecher's error consists in extending the maxim to a case which lies beyond the premises within which it was generalized, and in this application of it we utterly deny its truth. We can find nothing in the Bible, or in the general judgment of mankind, to prove that a man is not responsible for his volitions, unless he possesses in each case the power to will contrary to his desires, or the power to change in an instant, by an act of the will, his inclinations and affections. The first of these powers he could not possess and exercise without ceasing to be a moral agent; and the second, it is notorious that he does not possess. There is no fact in the operations of the mind better established, than that the affections cannot be immediately acted upon by the will. No man ever loved any object or ceased to love it in obedience to a volition. If any one doubts this, we have no way of proving it but by bidding him to make the trial. If he possesses this power he can surely exercise it, and a few experiments upon the subject will satisfy him whether he has it or not. The only power which man possesses of destroying existing affections, or creating new ones, is that of directing the attention of his mind to such considerations as may be adapted to exert the required influence upon it. This is a matter of universal experience. But at the instant of making any particular choice, he has no motive to induce him thus to direct the attention of his mind to adverse considerations. To suppose this, is to suppose that he has a desire to change his existing desire, or that he has towards the same object, at the same moment, two contrary desires, equally strong, since either of them is capable of producing a corresponding choice. If this be required to render man accountable, it is very certain that there is no accountability in our world. The only plausibility which the maxim "that ability is the ground and measure of obligation" possesses, when applied to volitions and affections, is derived from its being intuitively true when referred to a different class of acts, and from the proper discrimination not being made between the two cases. Dr. Beecher appeals to the common sentiments and conduct of men to prove that "the lunatic ought not to be treated as a

subject of law," "that the poor idiot is not responsible for its acts," and that a woman, whom he knew, whose mind had lost the power of association, ought not to be required to deliver a Fourth of July Oration, and then, because she failed, "be taken to the whipping post and lacerated for that which she wanted the natural ability to do." It is from instances like these, in which he must, of course, carry universal conviction with him, that he arrives at the general truth that ability is the measure of obligation. The general conclusion, thus obtained, is immediately applied to prove that no man can be responsible for a volition, unless at the same time he made it, he had power to will to the contrary; nor for any inclination, unless, when cherishing it, he was able to divest himself of it by a single act of will, both of them cases greatly dissimilar to those which furnished the general axiom, and incapable therefore of receiving any illustration from it. The common judgment of man's conscience in relation to these cases, is that a man is accountable for every act of his will, because it is the act of his own will, and for every inclination, because it is his own inclination. The axiom that ability and obligation must be commensurate, in the extensive sense given to it by Dr. Beecher, is false and dangerous. He seems to have a special horror of fatalism, and we know no more likely way to make men fatalists than by teaching them to believe the truth of this maxim. It is not more certain that man is an accountable agent, than it is that he does not possess the power at any moment to divest himself of an evil inclination or affection by an act of his will. Teach him then that this power is essential to accountability, and the inference made, in a majority of cases, will be, not that he really has a power which all his experience convinces him he does not possess, but that, being destitute of it, he is not responsible for his evil temper. The insensibility to the difference between right and wrong which will thus be produced is the distinctive mark of the fatalist.

Dr. Beecher refers to the Bible for proof of the truth of his opinions, but it is almost needless to add that he receives from it no aid, except in establishing what no one has denied, that man possesses the powers requisite to free agency. The substance of his reasoning under this head, is to show from the Bible that man is a free, accountable agent, and then virtually to assume that the Bible maintains his peculiar theory of free agency and accountableness. He does not succeed, however, in proving the common doctrine of man's natural ability, without committing some singular mistakes. The following passage will show how little reliance is to be placed upon Dr. Beecher as an interpreter of the Scriptures.

"The manner in which all excuses are treated in Scripture, which are founded on the plea of inability, confirms our exposition. There were impenitent sinners of old, who pleaded a natural inability of obedience. In the time of the prophet Jeremiah, there were those who alleged that God's decrees created the unavoid-

able necessity of sinning. They said they could not help it. But God, by his prophet, instead of conceding the doctrine, repelled it with indignation.

" 'Behold, ye trust in lying words, that cannot profit. Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?'—*Jer.* vii., 8, 9, 10.

" Does God approve of men's reasoning, when they say, God has decreed it, and God executes his decrees, and a resistless fate moves us on to evil. Far from it. In what stronger language could the Lord speak to hardened and impudent men, who laid their sins at his door? Now the fall itself was somehow comprehended in God's decrees: and if it be true that the fall took away all man's natural ability, wherein were those Jews wrong? Their excuse was that their sins were produced by the fatality of God's decrees. They were delivered to do all these abominations. Their fathers had eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth were set on edge. By the sin of Adam they had lost all free agency, and therefore they were not to blame; all was just as God would have it; an inexorable fate drove them on, and how could they resist the Almighty? But if God did indeed require spiritual obedience from men who lay in a state of natural impotency, how is it that he frowned so indignantly, when they pleaded their impotence in bar of judgment?"

He subsequently refers to the same passage again in the following words:

" So the same opinions operated among the Jews, as we learn by the terrible interrogations of the prophet—'Will ye lie, and steal, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and come into this house which is called by my name, and say we are delivered to do all these abominations? We have no power over ourselves. We do but obey the irresistible laws of our nature. We are delivered by the constitution God has given us to do all these things.' The only difference between these ancient and modern licentious antinomians is, that the ancient denied accountability entirely; while the latter attach it to fatality, and bring in the grace of God to deliver from a natural impotency."

The whole force of this passage turns upon the words "we are delivered," and it is unfortunate that Dr. Beecher should have made so strong a use of it, and founded upon it so much rhetoric and logic, without ascertaining what the word thus translated meant. It never, in any instance of its use, has a signification at all approaching that which he assigns to it. It is the same word, and in the same tense, that is used in Isaiah xx., 6: "Behold such is our expectation whither we flee for help, *to be delivered* from the king of Assyria." It never means, *to be bound fast* by a divine decree

or by anything else, but in opposition to this, *to be free, to be saved.* In the passage quoted by Dr. Beecher, the sense evidently is, "Will ye come and say, We are free to do these abominations, we shall have immunity in the perpetration of them, we shall escape the punishments threatened by the prophets." A preterite tense, instead of the future, is used, says Michaelis, to denote the firm persuasion of safety. The grossness of Dr. Beecher's mistake is apparent. This comes of applying the principles of the Baconian philosophy, instead of the Hebrew Lexicon, to the interpretation of the Bible.

It is not necessary to follow Dr. Beecher regularly through the course of his argument and declamation. Most of his arguments go merely to prove that man is a free, accountable agent. We believe we have already replied to every consideration which he has brought forward in defence of his own theory of free agency. There is one of his topics, however, which deserves a passing comment, principally for the sake of showing how far it is safe to trust to Dr. Beecher's accuracy in matters of history. One of his heads of argument is this. "Choice, without the possibility of other or contrary choice, is the immemorial doctrine of fatalism." He is kind enough to add, "I say not that all who assert the natural inability of man are fatalists. I charge them not with holding or admitting the consequences of their theory—and I mean nothing unkind or invidious, in the proposition I have laid down, and *truth* and *argument* are not invidious." There will be observed here that adroit and confounding together of distinct things to which we have several times alluded. In the proposition, he is declared to be a fatalist, who denies that, at the time of every volition, the agent might have made a different or contrary one, and in the next sentence this is changed into asserting the *natural inability* of man. The method of argument pursued, in fixing the charge of fatalism on those who differ from him, may certainly lay claim to originality. His theme is, "That choice without the power of contrary choice is fatalism in all its diversified forms, is obvious to inspection, and a matter of historical record." For the proof of this position we might reasonably expect to find evidence produced, from a careful examination of the systems of fatalists, that they all held the precise opinion in question respecting the nature of choice. But instead of this, the author gives us a list of fatalists, for the most of whom he has manufactured a creed by the exercise of his own ingenuity, instead of searching their writings to see what they really believed and taught, and all of whom, with one or two exceptions, according to his account of them, were *materialists.* We might prove, in this way, that to believe in the existence of matter is to adopt fatalism, for it is obvious to inspection, and matter of historical record, that all fatalists have believed in it. We will now examine the value of Dr. Beecher's historical record. His list of fatalists comprises the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Gnostics, the Manicheans, Spinosa, Descartes, the French revo-

lutionary atheists, Bolingbroke, Hume, Hobbes, Priestley, and Belsham. He states, at some length, and in an oracular manner, their different systems, as if he knew all about them, and were well qualified to instruct others. For the fatalism of the *Stoics* we refer the reader to the first instance of the Enchiridion of Epictetus, where he will find as strong a statement as could well be given of the liberty of the will: and to Dugald Stewart, who is high authority in matters touching the history of philosophy, and who declares that the "Stoics, with their usual passion for exaggeration, carried their notions of the liberty of the will to an unphilosophical extreme."*

The fullest exposition which has come down to us of the system of the *Epicureans*, is to be found in the writings of Lucretius, and we refer Dr. Beecher to his Rerum Natura, lib. 2, v. 250–261, for proof that one of their avowed objects in maintaining their notion of the 'declination of atoms,' was to avoid the difficulties of fate. In this passage, Lucretius makes use of the free will of man, *libera voluntas*, to prove that each cause is not linked in with a previous cause from infinity, and that there is a principle which can break the decrees of fate, *quod fati foedera rumpat.* He expressly calls the will of man, a will set free from the fates, *fatis avolsa voluntas*, in virtue of which we go whithersoever our pleasure leads us. He declares it to be far from doubt, *dubio procul*, that each man's own will is a principle of motion and action separate and independent of fate. Cicero also, in his book *de Fato*, alludes to what he calls the "*commentitias declinationes*" of the Epicureans, as having been introduced by them for the avowed purpose of freeing "the voluntary motions" of man from the control of fate. Of *Spinosa* we know nothing save from the writings of his opponents, though we comfort ourselves here, in our ignorance, with the remark which Voltaire somewhat makes, that there are not ten persons in Europe who have read Spinosa's works. If Dr. Beecher has read them, we are willing to receive his account of what they contain; but if he has drawn upon his own imagination for his system, as he has done with most of his other fatalists, we must still hold the matter in doubt. It would be impossible for us to convey, within the limits which we can devote to it, anything like an adequate idea of the metaphysical system of *Hobbes*, though it will not be difficult to show that Dr. Beecher has done him injustice. Hobbes is distinguished beyond most authors for his sententious brevity. He is the most pithy and laconic of all philosophical writers. After he has once defined a term, or stated a proposition, he is seldom at the trouble of repeating them, taking it for granted that his readers will understand and remember everything that he has once said. Hence, though his style is remarkably clear, his language, as Sir James Mackintosh says of it, never having but one meaning, and that one never requiring a second

* Stewart's Works, vol. vi., p. 241.

thought to find, he is nevertheless liable to be misapprehended by one who reads only detached portions of his writings. Thus he denies in many passages that the affections and passions of the heart are voluntary, but his meaning is elsewhere explained. "Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions, are not called *voluntary*, for they proceed not from, *but are the will*, and the will is not voluntary; for a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word will, which is absurd and insignificant."* If careful attention be paid to his own definitions of terms, it will be found that Hobbes maintains neither more nor less than the common doctrine of philosophical necessity. He gives the same definition of freedom with Edwards. "A man is free," he says, "when, in such things as he has strength and wit to do, he is not hindered to do what he has a will to."† He first pointed out that for which Locke generally receives credit, the impropriety of affirming freedom of the will itself. "From the use of the word Free-Will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire or inclination, but the liberty of man, the which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will or inclination to do."‡ In the commencement of his letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, in reply to some strictures of Bishop Bramhall, he states the question thus: "His Lordship may think it all one to say, I was free to write, and it was not necessary I should write; but I think otherwise, for he is free to do a thing that may do it if he will to do it; and may forbear if he have the will to forbear. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech. In fine, that freedom which men find in books, that which the poets chaunt in the theatres, and the shepherds on the mountains; that which the pastors teach in pulpits, and the doctors in the universities, and that which the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man hath freedom to do if he will, but whether they have freedom to will, is a question neither the bishop nor they ever thought of." To the objection, that if liberty of will be taken away, "the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away," he makes this reply: "I deny the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceeds from our will, and be against the law. A judge, in judging whether that be sin or no which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer. Now when I say that the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will, and *necessary*, because man's will, that is, every volition or act of the will, had a *sufficient*, and therefore a *necessary* cause. An action may therefore be voluntary and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary."§ Another extract will illustrate

* Human Nature, p. 29. † Commonwealth, p. 188. ‡ Ibid., p. 189.
§ Of Liberty and Necessity, p. 478.

still further his use of the word necessary. "If there be an agent, he can do something; and if he do it, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action; and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient, and if sufficient, then also necessary, as has been proved before."* The necessity for which he contends is declared to be perfectly consistent with human liberty; he denies that it removes the distinction between the nature of virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment; or that it renders useless admonitions and counsels, promises and threatenings. We do not believe that a single passage can be produced from all his writings in which he has been led to slide into the notion of a practical necessity, or a necessity at all different from that which Edwards has since taught. But Dr. Beecher calls him a fatalist, and Dr. Beecher doubtless is a learned man! Then Edwards too was a fatalist. We have not yet done with our catalogue of errors. Bolingbroke too is included in the list of fatalists, and the peculiar form of fatalism which he held is particularly described. We are told that he supposed "motives, as the antecedents of volition, to be clothed with the coercive power of material causes to their effects, and thus destroyed the liberty of the will," &c. This rather passes anything we have had yet. Bolingbroke was one of the most rampant of all advocates *for the self-determining power of the will.* He uniformly contends for this power, and often becomes angry and foul-mouthed in his abuse of those who deny it. He speaks of "the free-will of man which no one can deny *without lying*, or renouncing his instinctive knowledge."† He says again, "To acknowledge the fatum of ancient philosophers, to hold with the Mahometans the absolute predestination of all events, with Spinosa and Calvin the necessity of all our actions, or with Leibnitz his whimsy of a pre-established harmony, would be somewhat almost as mad as to take the true history of Lucian for such."‡ "I am not unacquainted," he says, "with the various refinements of ingenious men about the freedom of the human will. Some of them have assumed it to be a freedom from external compulsion only, and not internal necessity. Others have assumed it to be a *freedom from both.* This second opinion is so evidently true, that I cannot conceive it would have been liable to any contradiction, if philosophers had not done in this case what they do in many, if they had not rendered what is clear, obscure, by explanations, and what is certain, problematical, by engraftments."§ In another passage of the same tract, after stating what the Creator has done for us, he adds, "What we shall do for ourselves he has left to the freedom of our own elections; for free-will seems so essential to rational beings, that I presume we cannot conceive any such to be without it." We should not be surprised after this to see Dr. Whitby and Dr. Taylor, the ancient and the modern, with sundry

* Of Liberty and Necessity, p. 480. † Philosophical Works, vol. v., p. 85.
‡ Philosophical Works, vol. viii., p. 280. § Ibid., p. 355.

others of like sentiments, figuring in the next catalogue of fatalists which Dr. Beecher may have occasion to draw up. But the most surprising instance yet remains. *Descartes*, too, among the fatalists! We give his account of Descartes' philosophy. "The fatalism of Descartes was the atomic theory, the fortuitous concourse of atoms—intelligence in results without an intelligent being—design without a designer—and choice, the product of the happy concurrence of *material* accidents." We are here lost in amazement. We could not have believed it possible for any man to pen such a paragraph as this of the great father of the modern mental philosophy, the man who forms an era in the history of metaphysics, physics, and mathematics, and whose opinions we had thought were somewhat known to everybody who reads at all.* Descartes a materialist, an atheist, and a fatalist! His atheism consists in assuming that, next to the existence of his own mind, the most certain and indisputable of all truths is the existence of God. His materialism is to be sought in his opinion, which Condorcet, D'Alembert, and many others, assert never had been before distinctly taught, that the mind, the thinking principle in man, is strictly and properly immaterial. And his fatalism can be found only in his many strenuous defences of man's "freedom of will." At the very outset of his *Principia Philosophiae*, he calls upon his reader to reject everything of the existence of which it is possible for him to doubt. "We can easily suppose, he says, that there is no God, no heaven, no bodies; and that we have neither hands nor feet, nor body; but we cannot thus suppose that we who think these things do not exist, for it is absurd to suppose that that which thinks, at the very time while thinking, does not exist." He thus proves the actual existence of a thinking principle, which is not characterized "by extension, by figure, by local motion, or by any property like those which we attribute to matter; which is therefore purely immaterial; and of which we have an earlier and more certain knowledge than of any material thing."† He then proceeds to establish the being and perfections of God, truths which he considers as necessarily involved in the idea which we are capable of forming of an eternal, self-existent, and perfect being. It is upon the veracity of God that he founds his whole faith in the evidence of his senses, and the conclusions of his reason. He then returns to prove by his senses the existence and properties of the material world, and to apply his reasoning powers to the investigation of truth. He repeatedly affirms, in the strongest manner, the liberty of the will. A single passage

* Condorcet, Stewart, and most metaphysical writers, agree in styling Descartes "the father of the Modern Experimental Philosophy of the Mind."

† In the second of his Philosophical Meditations, he asks, "What am I? A thinking being—that is, a being, doubting, knowing, affirming, denying, consenting, refusing, susceptible of pleasure and pain. *Of all these things I might have had complete experience without any previous acquaintance with the qualities and laws of matter.*" This is a queer way of teaching that "choice is the happy concurrence of material accidents."

will sufficiently illustrate his opinions on this subject. "It is wrong," he says, "to imagine that we can do anything which has not been fore-ordained by God. But we may readily embarrass ourselves with great difficulties if we attempt to reconcile this fore-ordination of God with the liberty of our will) arbitrii nostri libertate). But we may extricate ourselves from these by remembering that our minds are finite; but that the power of God by which he not only foresaw from eternity, but also willed and fore-ordained all things that are or can be, is infinite. And though we may so far attain the idea of infinite power as to perceive clearly and distinctly that it is an attribute of God; yet we cannot sufficiently comprehend it, to see in what manner it leaves the actions of men free. But we are so intimately conscious of the *liberty* and *indifferency* which we possess, that there is nothing which we can more obviously and perfectly comprehend. And it would be truly absurd, on account of a thing which we know from its very nature ought to be incomprehensible, to doubt respecting another thing which we perfectly comprehend, and of which we are intimately conscious."* Even the physical theory of this illustrious philosopher was not, as Dr. Beecher asserts, "the atomic theory." Descartes supposed that the material universe was a machine originally constructed and put in motion by the Deity, and that the multiplicity of effects that have since taken place may all have proceeded from one single act of his power. It was to connect the present motions and changes in matter, with the original impulse imparted to it by the Creator, that he invented his hypothesis of "vortices," in direct and avowed opposition to "the atomic theory," and thereby involved himself in a protracted discussion with Gassendi, the great defender of the Epicurean system of physics. It is strange that Dr. Beecher should have so misunderstood his physical theory; and still more strange that he should have made it the ground of charging materialism, atheism, and fatalism, upon the man, who was the first to establish clearly the distinction between mind and matter as separate and heterogeneous objects of human knowledge; who taught that we have no reason for trusting even our own senses, or our reason, save our confidence in the veracity of our Maker; and who maintained that no truth can be more certain and undeniable than the liberty of the human will.

We could easily show that there are other mistakes in Dr. Beecher's account of the fatalists, but we have sufficiently redeemed our promise. Our readers must be, by this time, satisfied how far it is safe ever to trust to Dr. Beecher's accuracy in reporting upon the opinions of others. We may now freely admit "that *truth* and *argument* are not invidious," without thereby relieving Dr. Beecher from the charge. The next time that he wishes to hurl† the calum-

* Princ. Phil., § xl.

† For a deserved reproof of Dr. Beecher on this point, as well as for a detailed refutation of the errors of his book, we refer the reader to Dr. Harvey's work on Moral Agency, recently published.

nious epithet of fatalist against those who differ from him, let him at least see to it that he chooses his ground better.

Before closing this examination of Dr. Beecher's work we wish to state distinctly, that it contains much of orthodoxy. The very errors which we have condemned, as we have already remarked, are often given as the equivalents of orthodox statements. And there are many such assertions as the following. "When this perverse decision is once made, the heart is fully set, and *incorrigible* to all motives and *immutable* in its way." "The Scriptures speak of the permanence and *immutability* of man's depravity." "It is a part of the terrific nature of sinful man, to baffle all motives, and be voluntarily but *unchangeably* wicked." We desire to be thankful that it belongs to Dr. Beecher, not to us, to show that that which is incorrigible may nevertheless be corrected, and though unchangeable, that it can be changed. In a single sentence we sometimes have the two brought together. "Nothing is better supported from Scripture than that man by nature is in fact *incapable* of recovery without the power of God specially interposed, though not an impossibility such as the sinner *cannot* overcome." We fear our readers will think that a work, in which the same thing is thus affirmed and denied within the compass of a single sentence, has already received too extended a notice. We dismiss it, therefore, with the expression of our best wishes for the author, and our sincere desire that he may in future be more cautious and guarded, should he undertake to deal with the controverted topics of metaphysics and theology.

Since the foregoing article was commenced, we have received two publications from Dr. Beecher through the columns of the Cincinnati Journal. In the first of these we are arraigned, in company with Dr. Wilson, Dr. Hoge, Mr. Nettleton, Dr. Harvey, and the editors of the Presbyterian, the Southern Christian Herald, and the Hartford Watchman, as parties to a conspiracy against him. Though he thinks these conspirators have all done him great wrong, yet he believes that "their sin and shame" may be forgiven, if they will suitably "bewail the evil they have done." The object of the conspiracy is "to write him down in reference to the present crisis in our church;" the proof of it is, that his book, and the consistency of his conduct, have undergone examination at the hands of several of the individuals named within a recent period, and that period so chosen as to preclude the possibility of a reply from him prior to the session of the late General Assembly. We have turned the subject in every possible way, and we are utterly at a loss to conceive what connexion the review of Dr. Beecher's book had with the sessions of the General Assembly. He was not upon trial before that body—he was not a delegate to it—he had no other interest in it, that we can discern, than every other Presbyterian minister had. It is useless, however, to reason with the fears of the imagination. And yet we wish there was some way to lay the phantom of evil which Dr. Beecher has

conjured up. The most miserable man we have ever known was one who was persuaded that Bonaparte was employing the whole resources of the French empire for his capture, and that if this attempt was successful, there would then be nothing to hinder the subjugation of the rest of the world. The inconvenience and suffering, occasioned by such fears, are not less than if the apprehended danger were real. We do therefore solemnly assure Dr. Beecher that our article was written without concert or collusion with any one, without a hint or suggestion from any quarter; and that the proximity in the time of its appearance to the session of the General Assembly, was purely accidental. It never once entered our thoughts that a review of his book could have any influence on the proceedings of that body.

Dr. Beecher also finds reason, from the simple fact that his consistency has been impugned, and his book in some respects censured, both at East Windsor and at Princeton, to suggest to the public whether there is not sufficient evidence of "a coalition of Theological Seminaries," for the sake of "intimidating" their pupils and others into their own theological peculiarities, and thus getting up "a second papal system." We shall make no other comment upon this note of alarm than to quote the following sentence from his Views in Theology. "And never was there a moment when a little *panic of alarm*, or impatience of feeling, may turn, for good or for evil, the life-giving or destroying waters of such a flood down through distant generations."

Dr. Beecher's second communication to the public is occupied entirely with our former article, but it will not be necessary for us to notice it at any great length. Every reader of the review and the reply will at once see that he has not touched upon the difficulties of the case. The real question is turned aside, and a new issue presented. We will merely illustrate this by a reference to the manner in which he disposes of the extract which we produced from the Spirit of the Pilgrims. In this passage it will be remembered that, after stating the opinions which had been held by the Reformers, the Puritans, and Edwards, he states that a change had taken place, and that the New England divines had long since rejected "the views of the Reformers on the subject of original sin, as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and a depraved nature transmitted by descent; that in opposition to this they held "that depravity is wholly voluntary, and consists in the transgression of the law under such circumstances as constitutes accountability and desert of punishment." We then quoted another passage to show that Dr. Beecher himself held these views which he attributed to the New England divines. And how does he dispose of this case? Even thus. "To prove that I deny the doctrine of original sin, it is necessary to prove that the standard New England divines denied it, for the change is one which they made, and my concurrence is with them. If they deny original sin, I deny it, and if they do not, I do not." Then follows a string of quotations from

New England writers, which we have not read, because they are nothing to the purpose; and moreover we do not need to be informed by Dr. Beecher that they taught the doctrine of original sin. We know they did. But what does this prove? Only what we also knew before, that Dr. Beecher grossly misrepresented them in the extract in question. We were aware that Dr. Woods and others had complained that he did not truly state the New England opinions, in this very controversy with the Christian Examiner; but we did not think it becoming, at the time, to take any notice of this misrepresentation, little imagining that he himself would lay hold of it as the weapon of his defence. The only effect of his reply is to draw down upon himself the additional charge of having misrepresented the opinions of his brethren. There stand his own words, expressly denying, on behalf of the New England divines in general, and of himself in particular, the doctrine of original sin. To prove now that they did not deny it, is only to convict himself of having slandered them. His own denial still stands in connexion with his explicit avowal of the same doctrine in his Views in Theology, and his declaration that he has never changed his opinions upon the subject.

ESSAY VII.

THE DOCTRINES OF THE NEW ENGLAND CHURCHES.*

Our readers may be somewhat surprised at seeing, in our margin, the title of a book published near a century ago. The character of this periodical, however, does not restrict us to the notice of works of a recent date. The past is the mirror of the present, as the present is of the future. What is now has been before, and shall be hereafter. It is well, at times, to look back and see how the trials of our forefathers agree with our own; to observe how the errors and disorders with which we have to contend afflicted them; to notice how the methods adopted in former ages to secure the introduction of false doctrines answer to the devices of the present day; and how signally God blessed the faithful efforts of his servants in defence of his truth, and how uniformly compromise and subserviency have been followed by the triumph of error and the decline of religion. The history of the church is replete with instructions on all these points; and these instructions are presented in the history of the church in our own country in a form peculiarly adapted to our present circumstances. The pious founders of the Congregational and Presbyterian churches in America brought with them the very doctrines which the friends of truth in those churches are now struggling to maintain; they had to contend with the same errors and disorders, and they resisted them by the same means which we are now endeavouring to employ, viz., testimony, discussion and discipline. Their fidelity produced just the same outcry about ecclesiastical tyranny, inquisitorial powers, freedom of thought, march of intellect, new discoveries, with which the ears of the public are now assailed. The same plea of essential agreement, of mere *shades* of difference, of the evils of controversy, was urged then, as now. But blessed be God, not with the same success. The men of those generations did not allow themselves to be either frightened or

* Originally published in 1839, in review of the following work:—"A Brief History and Vindication of the Doctrines received and established in the Churches of New England, with a specimen of the New Scheme of Religion beginning to prevail." By Thomas Clap, A. M., President of Yale College.

beguiled. And as long as they retained their courage and fidelity, their efforts were crowned with success.

There is another instructive feature in the history of the last century. Those who could not endure sound doctrine, would not endure sound discipline. As soon as they had departed from the faith, they got their eyes wide open to the evils of ecclesiastical authority. This opposition to supervision manifested itself in Connecticut in two ways. Some objected to the examination into the doctrinal opinions of ministers, or to the exercise of discipline for the prevailing errors; while others withdrew from the consociated churches and set up for themselves. These separatists called themselves strict Congregationalists. One of their standing subjects of complaint was the supervision of the consociation. This was found to be very inconvenient. It is readily admitted that many Christians have honestly and from good motives preferred the purely independent system of church government, yet there can be no doubt that then, as now, many who advocated that system did it because of the convenient latitude which it affords for all kinds of doctrine.

So much has been said of late years of the contentions in the Presbyterian church; such assiduous efforts have been made to produce the impression that there is either some great evil in Presbyterianism, or that its present advocates are peculiarly and wickedly bigoted, that we have thought it wise, and likely in various ways to be useful, to recall attention to one chapter of the ecclesiastical history of Connecticut. It will be seen that so long as there is a regard for divine truth and for real religion in the church, there will be controversy and contention when errorists arise and endeavour to propagate their doctrines. There can be no surer sign of degeneracy than the peaceful progress of error. If, therefore, the same or analogous errors and disorders which a century ago agitated many parts of New England to its centre, are now allowed to prevail without opposition, it will prove to all the world that the faith and the spirit of the Puritans have perished among their descendants. It is not our intention, though largely in the debt of a certain class of our New England brethren, to read them a lesson out of their own history. It is not for their benefit so much as for our own, that we bring to the notice of our readers President Clap's Defence of the Doctrines of the New England Churches. It will serve to confirm the purpose and strengthen the faith of the friends of truth in our church, to see that they are fighting the same battle which has once before been fought and won, and that on New England ground. It will serve to refute the calumny of those who represent the struggle in our church, as an opposition to genuine New England doctrines. It will show that we are now opposing what all sound and faithful Puritans ever have resisted; and that the reproaches which we now suffer were just as freely lavished on New England men a hundred years ago.

There is so little in this pamphlet which is not directly applicable to the present times, that we shall do little more than extract its contents, giving, it may be, an occasional remark by way of application or improvement.

"The great motive," says President Clap, "which induced the first planters of New England to leave their pleasant European seats, and settle in this howling wilderness, was, that they might enjoy religion in the purity of its doctrines, discipline and worship, and transmit the same down to the latest posterity. The doctrines which they believed and professed, were those which had been generally established in all ages of the Christian church; and more especially summed up, and declared in the several confessions of faith in the various Churches of the Protestant Reformation; though there were some lesser circumstances in their ecclesiastical discipline which were in some measure peculiar to themselves. For the sake of these inestimable privileges, they undertook to settle a new and uncultivated country, filled with the most savage and barbarous enemies; and nothing but these religious prospects could induce them to believe that they did not purchase it at too dear a rate. And the leaving the gospel in its purity, they judged to be a better inheritance to their posterity, than the valuable soil which they acquired with such incredible hardship, danger, and fatigue: therefore any attempt to deprive them of their religion is as injurious as to deprive them of their lands, or to change their happy form of civil government.

"Soon after their first settlement, there was a general Synod of the elders and messengers of all the churches in New England, in the year 1648, wherein they unanimously declared their sentiments in the doctrines of the gospel, in these words, *viz.* 'This Synod, having perused and considered (with much gladness of heart, and thankfulness to God) the Confession of Faith lately published by the Reverend Assembly in England, do judge it to be very holy, orthodox and judicious in all matters of faith; and do therefore freely and fully consent thereunto, for the substance; only in matters of church government and discipline, we refer ourselves to the platform of church discipline agreed upon by this assembly.' And accordingly published it as 'their Confession of Faith, and as the doctrine constantly taught and professed in these churches.'

"In their preface they say, 'that it has been the laudable practice of the churches of Christ, in all ages, to give a public account to the world of the faith and order of the gospel among them; and that it has a tendency to public edification, by maintaining the faith entire in itself, and unity and harmony with other churches.'

"Our churches, say they, believe and profess the same doctrine which has been generally received in all the reformed churches in Europe. I suppose the Assembly's Catechism was not expressly mentioned, because before this it had been generally received and taught to children.

"A few years after there was a Synod of Congregational

churches held at the Savoy, in London; wherein they consented to the Westminster Confession aforesaid; only they left out some things relating to church discipline and divorce, and amended some few expressions. This is called the Savoy Confession.

"A general Synod of the elders and messengers of the churches in New England, in 1680, approved of and consented to this confession; and the general court at Boston ordered it to be printed 'for the benefit of the churches in the present and after times.' The Synod, in their preface, say, 'That it must needs tend much to the honour of the blessed name of the Lord Jesus, when many churches join together in their testimony for the truth. That the Lord hath signally owned the Confessions of the four first general Councils or Synods for the suppression of heresies in the primitive times. That the Confessions of the Bohemians, Waldenses, and other Protestant reformed churches (which also show what harmony of doctrine there is among all sincere professors of the truth) have been of singular use, not only to those who then lived, but also to posterity, even to this day. That it must needs be a work pleasing unto God, for his servants to declare to the world what those principles of truth are, which they have received, and purpose to live and die in the profession of; nor are they worthy of the name of Christians, who refuse to declare what they believe.' They conclude with these words: 'What hours of temptation may overtake these churches, is not for us to say; only the Lord doth many times so order things, that when his people have made a good confession, they shall be put upon the trial some way or other concerning their sincerity in it. The Lord grant that the loins of our minds may be so girt about with truth that we may be able to withstand in an evil day, and having done all to stand.'

"In the year 1690, there was a meeting of the Presbyterian and Congregational ministers in England, who, agreeing perfectly in points of doctrine, compromised those small circumstantials wherein they had disagreed in church discipline. This they published under the title of *Heads of Agreement assented to by the united Ministers formerly called the Presbyterian and Congregational;* in which they declare their approbation of 'the doctrinal articles of the church of England; the Confession of Faith; the larger and shorter Catechisms composed by the assembly of divines at Westminster, and the Savoy Confession, as agreeable to the word of God.'

"In the year 1708, there was a general Synod of all the churches in the colony of Connecticut, assembled by delegation, at Saybrook, in which they unanimously consented to the Savoy Confession, and the heads of agreement before mentioned; and drew up some articles for the administration of church discipline. One principal thing wherein these articles differed from what had been before generally received and practised in the New English churches, was this, that whereas the Cambridge platform had said in general

terms, that councils should consist of the neighbouring churches, and some questions had arisen who should be esteemed the neighbouring churches, and what number should be called in particular cases: these articles reduced it to a greater certainty, that councils should consist of the neighbouring churches in the county; they forming themselves into one or more consociations for that purpose.

"These three things, viz., the Confession of Faith, Heads of Agreement, and Articles of Church Discipline, were presented to the General Court at Hartford in May, 1708; and they declared their great approbation of them, and 'ordain that all the churches in this government, thus united in doctrine, worship and discipline, shall be owned and acknowledged established by law.'

"The Synod of Saybrook, in their preface, say, that 'the usage of the Christian church, whose faith rested wholly on the word of God, respecting Confessions of Faith, is very ancient, and necessary for the correcting, condemning, and suppressing of heresy and error. For this purpose, ancient and famous Confessions of Faith have been agreed upon by Oecumenical Councils, e. g. of Nice, against Arius; of Constantinople, against Macedonius, &c. That the several reformed nations agreed upon Confessions of Faith, famous in the world, and of special service to theirs and the succeeding ages. That the faith of these churches is the same which was generally received in all the reformed churches in Europe. This Confession of Faith they say they offer as their firm persuasion, well and truly grounded on the word of God, and commend the same to the people of this colony to be examined, accepted and constantly maintained. That having applied the rule of holy Scripture to the articles of this Confession,* and found the same to be the eternal truths of God, you remember and hold them fast: *contend earnestly for them, as the faith once delivered to the saints:* value them as your great charter; the instrument of your salvation, and the evidence of your not failing of the grace of God, and of your receiving a crown that fadeth not away. Maintain them, and every of them, all your days, with undaunted resolution against all opposition, whatever the event may be; and the same transmit safe and pure to posterity; having bought the truth, sell it not: believe the truth will make you free. Faithful is he that hath promised. Let no man take away your crown.'

"In this state our pious forefathers established the pure religion of Christ in this land, and left it as the best legacy to their posterity. They were doubtless men of great piety; fervent in prayer, and assiduous in studying the sacred Scriptures, in order to find out the truth and recommend it to their posterity. They did not undertake to make a religion, but to declare it from the

* "By this is meant, not the applying those few texts of Scripture only, which are set in the margin (for it is probable they were not put there by the Assembly of Divines), but every text of Scripture applicable to these articles."

word of God: nor did they suppose that their faith or belief should be the ground and foundation of ours, but resolved all into the authority of God speaking in his word.

"Among the various means they used to propagate this pure religion to their posterity, they esteemed the erecting of colleges and subordinate schools to be the principal. To this purpose the general synod at Boston in 1679 fully express their sentiments. 'That we read of schools and colleges in scripture; 1 Chron. xxv., 8; Mal. ii., 12; Acts xix.. 9, and xxii., 3. That Samuel, Elijah and Elisha, were presidents of the schools of the prophets: 1 Sam. xix., 18. That Ecclesiastical History informs us that great care was taken by the apostles and their immediate successors, to settle schools at all places; that so the interest of religion might be preserved, and truth propagated to all succeeding generations. We have reason to bless God, who hath put it into the hearts of our fathers to take care in this matter; for these churches would have been in a deplorable state if the Lord had not blessed the college, so as thence to supply most of our churches."

"'When the people in New England were poor and but few in number, there was a spirit to encourage learning; and as we desire that religion should flourish, it concerns us to endeavour that the college and inferior schools be duly inspected and encouraged.' Thus far that synod.

"The fathers of the colony of Connecticut, from the same pious and religious design, erected a college among themselves in the year 1701: the scheme was concerted principally by the ministers, with an especial design to maintain and propagate that pure religion, which was before settled among them; as appears by sundry letters to and from those ministers who first undertook to found this school, dated before the charter, and still extant.

"The charter is predicated 'upon the petition of sundry well-disposed persons, of their *sincere regard to, and zeal for, upholding and propagating of the Christian Protestant religion, by a succession of learned and orthodox men.*' And the grant was made 'to encourage such *a pious and religious undertaking.*' At their first meeting they came into the following solemn act.

"At a meeting of the collegiate undertakers holden at Saybrook, November 11, A.D. 1701, present, the Revs. Israel Chauncey, Thomas Buckingham, Abraham Pierson, Samuel Andrew, James Pierpoint, Noadiah Russel, Joseph Webb.

"'Whereas it was the glorious public design of our now blessed fathers, in their remove from Europe into these parts of America, both to plant, and under the Divine blessing, to propagate in this wilderness the blessed reformed Protestant religion, in the purity of its order and worship; not only to their posterity but also to the barbarous natives: in which great enterprise they wanted not the royal commands and favour of his majesty king Charles the Second to authorize and invigorate them.

"'We, their unworthy posterity, lamenting our past neglects of

this grand errand, and sensible of the equal obligations better to prosecute the same end, are desirous in our generation to be serviceable thereunto.

"'Whereunto the religious and liberal education of suitable youth is, under the blessing of God, a chief and most probable expedient. Therefore, that we might not be wanting in cherishing the present observable and pious disposition of many well-minded people, to dedicate their children and substance unto God in such a good service: and being ourselves with sundry other Reverend Elders, not only desired by our goodly people to undertake as trustees for erecting, forming, ordering and regulating a collegiate school for the advancement of such an education: but having also obtained of our present religious government, both full liberty and assistance by their donations to such an use: tokens likewise that particular persons will not be wanting in their beneficence: do, in duty to God, and the weal of our country, undertake in the aforesaid design. And being now met, according to the liberties and aids now granted to us for the use aforesaid, do order and appoint, that there shall be, and hereby is erected and formed a collegiate school, wherein shall be taught the liberal arts and languages, in such place or places in Connecticut, as the said trustees with their associates and successors, do or shall, from time to time, see cause to order.

"'For the orderly and effectual management of this affair, we agree to, and hereby appoint and confirm the following rules:

"'1st. That the rector take special care, as of the moral behaviour of the students at all times, so with industry to instruct and ground them well in theoretical divinity; and to that end shall neither by himself nor by any other person whomsoever, allow them to be instructed and grounded in any other system or synopsis of divinity than such as the said trustees do order and appoint: but shall take effectual care that the said students be weekly, at such seasons as he shall see cause to appoint, caused memoriter to recite the Assembly's Catechism in Latin, and Ames's Theological Theses; of which, as also Ames's Cases, he shall make, or cause to be made, from time to time, such explanations as may (through the blessing of God) be most conducive to their establishment in the principles of the Christian Protestant religion.

"'2d. The rector shall also cause the Scripture daily (except on the Sabbath), morning and evening, to be read by the students at the times of prayer in the school, according to the laudable order and usages of Harvard College, making expositions upon the same, and upon the Sabbath shall either expound practical theology or cause the non-graduated students to repeat sermons, and in all other ways according to his best discretion shall at all times studiously endeavour in the education of the students, *to promote the power and purity of religion and the best edification of these New England churches.*'

"The founders of the college and their successors have, upon

several times and occasions, come into some further and more explicit resolves, in pursuance to the original fundamental plan; particularly,

"At a meeting of the trustees of Yale College, in New Haven, October 17, 1722: present, the Rev. Messrs. Samuel Andrew, Timothy Woodbridge, Samuel Russell, Joseph Webb, John Davenport, Thomas Buckingham, Stephen Buckingham, Thomas Ruggles, Eliphalet Adams.

"'16. Voted, That all such persons as shall hereafter be elected to the office of rector or tutor in this college shall, before they are accepted therein, before the trustees, declare their assent to the Confession of Faith owned and consented to by the elders and messengers of the churches in the Colony of Connecticut, assembled by delegation at Saybrook, Sept. 9, 1708, and confirmed by act of the General Assembly; and shall particularly give satisfaction to them, of the soundness of their faith, in opposition to Arminian and Prelatical corruptions, or any other of dangerous consequence to the purity and peace of our churches: but if it cannot be before the trustees, it shall be in the power of any two trustees, with the rector, to examine a tutor with respect to the confession and soundness of faith in opposition to said corruptions.

"'17. Voted, That upon just ground of suspicion of the rector or tutor's inclination to Arminian or Prelatic principles, a meeting of the trustees shall be called as soon as may be to examine into the case.

"'18. Voted, That if any other officer or member of this college shall give just grounds of suspicion of their being corrupted with Arminian or Prelatical principles,* or of any other of dangerous consequence to the peace and purity of our churches, the rector and tutor shall call them upon examination according to the articles of the said Confession; and in case they refuse to submit thereto, or do not give a satisfactory account of their uncorruptness, they shall suspend them to the next meeting of the trustees.'

"N. B. Five of the first founders were at this time alive, and four present at the passing of these acts.

"At a meeting of the president and fellows of Yale College, November 21, 1751, present, the Rev. Mr. Thomas Clap, President; the Rev. Messrs. Jared Eliot, Joseph Noyes, Anthony Stoddard, Benjamin Lord, William Russel, Thomas Ruggles, Solomon Williams, and Noah Hobart, Fellows.

* "By Prelatical principles, I suppose, they intend the opinion that Prelacy or Episcopacy is, by divine right, absolutely necessary to the being of the Christian ministry and church; which opinion being entirely subversive of these churches which the college was founded to support, those who endeavour to propagate it counteract the fundamental design of the college: but such as suppose that Episcopacy is only most convenient as tending to maintain unity and order, and don't nullify Presbyterian ordination (which is the opinion of the greatest part of the church of England, in England), may consistently be admitted members of our college, and to the communion of our churches too, as has been the practice ever since there have been churchmen in the colony."

"'Whereas the principal design of the pious founders of this college was to educate and train up youth for the ministry in the churches of this Colony, according to the doctrine, discipline and mode of worship received and practised in them; and they particularly ordered that the students should be established in the principles of religion and grounded in polemical divinity, according to the Assembly's Catechism, Dr. Ames's Medulla and Cases of Conscience; and that special care should be taken, in the education of students, not to suffer them to be instructed in any different principles or doctrines; and that all proper methods or measures should be taken to promote the power and purity of religion, and the best edification and peace of these churches:

"'We, the successors of the said founders, being in our own judgments of the same principles in religion with our predecessors, and esteeming ourselves bound in fidelity to the trust committed to us to carry on the same design, and improve all the college estate descended to us for the purpose for which it was given, do explicitly and fully resolve, as follows, viz.:

"'1. That the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only rule of faith and practice, in all matters of religion, and the standard by which all doctrines, principles and practices in religion are to be tried and judged.

"'2. That the Assembly's Catechism and the Confession of Faith, received and established in the churches of this Colony (which is an abridgment of the Westminster Confession), contain a true and just summary of the most important doctrines of the Christian religion; and that the true sense of the sacred Scriptures is justly collected and summed up in these compositions; and all expositions of Scripture, pretending to deduce any doctrines or positions contrary to the doctrines laid down in these composures, we are of opinion are wrong and erroneous.

"'3. If any doubt or dispute should happen to arise about the true meaning and sense of any particular terms or phrases in the said composures, they shall be understood and taken in the same sense in which such terms and phrases have been generally used in the writings of Protestant divines, and especially in their public confessions of faith.*

"'4. That we will always take all proper and reasonable measures, such as Christian prudence shall direct, to continue and propagate the doctrines contained in these summaries of religion, in this college, and to transmit them to all future successions and generations; and to use the like measures to prevent the contrary doctrines from prevailing in this society.

"'5. That every person who shall hereafter be chosen a president, fellow, professor of divinity, or tutor, in this college, shall before he enters upon the execution of his office, publicly give his consent to the Catechism and Confession of Faith, as containing a

* "The general rule of interpreting all writings is, that words and phrases shall be taken in the same sense in which they are commonly used in other writings upon the same subject."

just summary of the Christian religion, as before expressed, and renounce all doctrines or principles contrary thereunto: and shall pass through such an examination as the corporation shall think proper, in order to their being fully satisfied that he shall do it truly without any evasion or equivocation.

"'6. That since every such officer is admitted into his post upon the condition aforesaid, if he shall afterwards change his sentiments, entertain any contrary set of principles or scheme of religion, and disbelieve the doctrines contained in the said Catechism or Confession of Faith, he cannot, consistent with common honesty and fidelity, continue in his post, but is bound to resign it.

"'7. That when it is suspected by any of the corporation, that any such officer has fallen from the profession of his faith, as before mentioned, and is gone into any contrary scheme of principles, he shall be examined by the corporation.

"'8. That inasmuch as it is especially necessary that a professor of divinity should be sound in the faith; besides the common tests before mentioned, he shall publicly exhibit a full confession of his faith, drawn up by him in his own words and phrases, and shall in full and express terms renounce all such errors as shall in any considerable measure prevail at the time of his introduction; and if any doubt or question shall arise about any doctrine or position, whether it be truth or error, it shall be judged by the word of God taken in that sense of it which is contained and declared in the said Catechism and Confession of Faith; as being a just exposition of the word of God in those doctrines or articles which are contained in them.*

"'9. That every person who shall be chosen president, fellow, professor of divinity, or tutor in this college, shall give his consent to the rules of church discipline established in the ecclesiastical constitution of the churches of this Colony: it being understood that our ecclesiastical constitution may admit of additions or alterations, in such circumstances as according to our Confession of Faith are to be regulated by the light of nature and the rules of Christian prudence. And it is especially declared that if any person shall deny the validity of the ordination of ministers of this Colony, commonly called Presbyterian or Congregational, or shall hold that it is necessary or convenient that such ministers should be re-ordained in order to render their administrations valid, it shall be deemed an essential departure from our ecclesiastical constitution, and inconsistent with the intentions of the founders of this college, that such a person should be chosen in it.

"'10. Yet we would suppose that it is not inconsistent with the general design of the founders, and is agreeable to our own inclination, to admit Protestants of all denominations to send their

* "This does not make the catechism and confession the rule of expounding Scripture (as some have suggested), for the best rule of interpreting Scripture, is the Scripture itself, i. e., comparing one place with another. See Confession, chap. 1, sect. 9 It was principally by this means, the Assembly found out the true meaning of Scripture, and expressed and declared it in those composures."

children to receive the advantage of an education in this college: provided that while they are here they conform to all the laws and orders of it.

As we understand this matter these statutes were in force until within a few years. It has been said indeed that the usage of the institution, since the accession of President Stiles in 1773, allowed of considerable latitude in this subscription; that the substance of the confession is all that any officer was required to assent to. In reference to this subject the Rev. Daniel Dow of Connecticut, in the appendix to his pamphlet on the New Haven Theology, asks the following question: "Whether the ancient Confession of Faith be not a part of the constitution of Yale College, upon which the funds of the college are established. And if it be, whether the Corporation have any more right or authority to alter it, or repeal it, or to accept of any adscititious creeds as containing the substance of it, than any other corporate body has to alter the conditions of their charter?" We presume Mr. Dow had a right to ask this question. We have never heard whether he has been favoured with an answer. It would seem, however, that the Dwight Professor of Theology must be greatly straitened in order to avail himself of the liberal usage above referred to. It seems the founders of that professorship required that "Every professor who shall receive the income or the revenue of this fund, shall be examined as to his faith, and be required to make a written declaration thereof, agreeably to the following: 'I hereby declare my free assent to the Confession of Faith and Ecclesiastical Discipline agreed upon by the churches of the state in the year 1708.'" They further say: "If at any future period, any person who fills the chair of this professorship, holds or teaches doctrines contrary to those above referred to, then it shall be the duty of the Corporation to dismiss such person from office forthwith." We are no further interested in this matter than the New Haven gentlemen are in the affairs of the Presbyterian church; or than the whole Christian community is interested in the maintenance of good faith and true religion. We proceed with our extracts.

"The body of the ministers in the Colony of Connecticut, in their public conventions, have several times renewed their consent to their Confession of Faith; particularly at the general council at Guilford, in 1742, and at the general association at Fairfield, 1753, in these words:

"'We recommend it to the particular associations, that they be very careful, that the true and great doctrines of the gospel, agreeable to the Confession of Faith, be maintained and preached up, against the Arminian, Antinomian and other errors, and that especial care and pains be taken with our youth to instruct them in the principles of our holy religion and articles of our faith.'

"At a general association of the Colony of Connecticut at Middletown, June 17, 1755, present, the Rev. Messrs. Jared Eliot, *Moderator;* Benjamin Colton, John Graham, William Worthing-

ton, Solomon Williams, Jacob Elliot, Noah Hobart, Elnathan Whitman, Nathaniel Eells, Jonathan Todd, Edward Eells, Joseph Bellamy, Noah Wells, James Beebe, Izrahiah Wetmore.

"'This association apprehending that various errors contrary to the doctrines owned in the churches of this Colony, are spreading and prevailing in the land, and that it is highly necessary for ministers to bear testimony against those prevailing errors; this association earnestly recommend it to the particular associations of this colony to agree among themselves, frequently to insist upon these doctrines contained in our Confession of Faith, which are contrary to the prevailing errors of the day; and particularly that they would bear a sufficient testimony against Socinianism, Arminianism, Arianism, Pelagianism, and Antinomianism, or any other errors that may arise among us.

"'And whereas one particular association of this colony have declined coming into the proposal of a general consociation till the several associations have declared their adherence to the Confession of Faith owned in our churches; we freely declare our adherence to the doctrines contained in our Confession of Faith, and we would recommend it to particular associations strictly to adhere to the doctrines of our Confession of Faith.'

"It was the practice of the once famous French Protestant churches at every meeting of their national Synod, to read and give their assent to their Confession of Faith; and promise to preach according to it.* And it might be well if this was practised among us, notwithstanding the opposition made by those who dislike the doctrines.

"Although the Protestant churches in general, and those of New England in particular, have been thus fully fixed and established in the pure doctrines of the Gospel, yet sundry persons of late have risen up openly to oppose and deny them; and have by various means endeavoured to introduce a new scheme of Religion, and an easy way of salvation, unknown to the Gospel of Christ. To this purpose a great variety of books have been written, either expressly denying, or artfully endeavouring to misrepresent, perplex, and undermine the great doctrines of the Gospel. Although those authors do not perfectly agree among themselves, yet their scheme is, in the main, tolerably consistent with itself, inasmuch as the denying of some of the doctrines of the Gospel (amongst which there is a necessary connexion) naturally undermines and destroys all the rest.

"I shall present the reader with a general view of this new scheme of religion, as I some years ago collected it from the writings of Chubb, Taylor, Foster, Hutcheson, Campbell and Ramsey, and other books, which are by some highly extolled and assiduously spread about the country.

"'The only end and design of the creation is the happiness of the creature; and this end shall certainly be attained, so that all

* See "Quick's Synodicon."

rational creatures shall finally be happy; or at least taken together as a body, shall be as happy as they can possibly be; and if some individual should be eternally miserable, it is because it is beyond the power of God to make them happy; it being impossible that a creature should be happy against its will, and the will cannot be immediately changed without destroying the nature of the agent. God has no authority over his creatures as creator, but only as benefactor, and has no right to command his creatures, but only so far as he annexes rewards to obedience, and makes it their interest to obey: the only criterion of duty to God is self-interest; and God commands us to do things, not out of any regard to his own glory or authority, but merely because the things commanded naturally tend to promote our own interests and happiness. That he annexes penalties only for the good of the creature, and the only end of punishment is the good of those upon whom it is inflicted; or, at least, for the good of the system of moral agents in general.

"The natural tendency which things have to promote our own interest, is the sole criterion of moral good and evil, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, duty and sin. That sin consists in nothing but a man's doing or forbearing an action contrary to his own interest; and duty to God is nothing but the pursuit of our own happiness, with this view, that it is the will of God that we should be happy.

"We ought to have no regard to God, but so far as he is or may be a means or instrument of promoting our own happiness, and that to act from a view to the glory of God, his perfection, authority or laws considered as over and above, beside or distinct from our own happiness, is but a chimera; it being impossible that any moral agent can have any rational view or design, but only its own happiness.

"Since the nature of all sin consists in man's doing what he knows to be contrary to his own interest and happiness: every sin must be known and voluntary; and consequently there can be no sin of ignorance, derivation or imputation; nor any sinful nature, state or disposition. That Adam was not created in a state of holiness, but only had a power to act virtuously, that is, to pursue his own interest if he pleased: that he had in his original constitution strong dispositions and inclinations to do acts that were sinful, i. e. contrary to his own interest, and he could not refrain from those particular acts without considerable pain and uneasiness: that God gave him inclinations which he ought not to gratify, and that an inclination to sin, being the gift of God, is no sin, but is designed for the exercise of his virtue in restraining of it.*

"Every man is now born into the world in as perfect a state of

* The author of "Heaven Open to all Men" says, if our appetites are irregular, he who gave them is responsible for them.

rectitude as Adam was created; and has no more of a disposition to sin than he had; and in all respects stands as fair for the favour of God as Adam did; not being obliged to be conformed to any standard of moral perfection, but only to pursue his own interest and happiness.

"And though it should be supposed, that men have some weaknesses now, which Adam had not at first, yet nothing can be a man's duty which is not now in his power, even though he has lost it by his own fault; for the law is abated in proportion with the power to obey.

"Adam, in a state of innocence, being liable to sickness, wounds and death, there is reason to suppose that the special providence of God would interpose to preserve him from them. The present miseries and calamities of human life are no evidences of a sinful state or tokens of God's displeasure; but are primarily designed as means for the trial of men's virtue, and to make them capable of a reward.

"Every man has a natural power to prosecute his own interest, and to do all that is necessary to be done by him for his own happiness. The actions of moral agents can be neither virtuous, vicious nor free, unless they are done by a man's own power, nor unless he has also a power to do the contrary; and therefore it is absurd to suppose that God should implant grace or holiness in any man, or keep him from sin, or decree or foreknow his actions; because all these suppositions destroy the free agency of a man, and consequently his moral virtue.

"That God cannot certainly foreknow the actions of free agents, because they are not in their own nature foreknowable; they not depending upon any antecedent causes, but merely upon the free and self-determining power of the will.

"Since sin is nothing else but a man's not pursuing his own interest so well as he might, no punishment is properly and justly due to him; but only that he should suffer the natural ill consequences of his own misconduct; consequently no satisfaction is necessary in order to the forgiveness of sin; and therefore Christ did not die to make satisfaction for sin, and so there is no need to suppose him to be essentially God, but only a most perfect and glorious creature.

"The great design of the gospel, and of Christ's coming into the world, was to revive the light of nature, and to cultivate moral virtue, which had been greatly obscured by Jewish and heathenish superstitions, and to give men more full assurance, that if they endeavoured to promote their own interest in this world, they should be happy in the next, than the mere light of nature could do: and therefore there is no great weight to be laid upon men's believing Christ's divinity, satisfaction, or any of those speculative points which have been generally received as the peculiar and fundamental doctrines of the gospel (some of which are prejudicial to moral virtue), but we ought to have charity for all men, let their specula-

tive principles be what they will, provided they live moral lives, whether they be Papists, Jews, Mahomedans or heathens: or, at least, for all that say they believe the Bible, though* they put no certain meaning to it, or construction upon it; but only that they believe it to be a good system of morality, and don't profess to believe anything more about Christ, than the Mahomedans generally do.

"And some have charity for all who are willing to be happy, and have a benevolent temper towards their fellowmen, though they do not so much as believe the being of a God; yea, some extend their charity to the devils themselves, so far as to suppose, that though they are at present very much out of the way, yet they shall at length see their error, and all be finally happy in heaven; and pretend to produce plain demonstration for it in this form:

"'The ultimate end and design of God in the creation, is the happiness of the creature.

"'God's ultimate end and design never can be finally frustrated or defeated; therefore all intelligent creatures shall finally be happy.'"

Here let the reader pause. Let him review this new scheme of religion, and ascertain its leading features. He will find that what we call new now, was called new a hundred years ago, and for the same reason. The doctrines were no more new then than they are at present; but it was a new thing that those doctrines should be avowed in the midst of orthodox churches. The reader cannot fail to notice, that every doctrine characteristic of the system which is now agitating the country, is embraced in the scheme which pious and orthodox men of New England were called to oppose during the last century. These doctrines are, 1. That the promotion of happiness is the grand end of creation. 2. That self-interest is the ultimate foundation of moral obligation. 3. That God cannot control the acts of moral agents, or prevent sin in a moral system. 4. That he cannot, of course, decree the acts of free agents. 5. That all sin consists in the voluntary transgression of known law; consequently that there is no such thing as a holy or unholy nature. Adam was not created holy, but formed his own moral character; and his posterity are not born corrupt, but become corrupt by their own voluntary transgression of known law. 6. That plenary ability and full power to the contrary are necessary to the morality of any act.

There are some points embraced in the new scheme as given by President Clap, which do not belong to the new divinity of our day: as, for example, the speculations about the divinity of Christ; and there are some which belong to the new divinity, as, for example, making regeneration to consist in the choice of God, as a source of happiness, or in a change of purpose, which are not

* "These call themselves Bibliarians."

expressly stated, though they are implied in the new scheme of the last century. It would be easy and perhaps useful to point out the striking coincidence, even in language, between these two schemes, did our limits permit.* We must content ourselves here with a very few illustrations. With regard to the first point President Clap remarks: "This fundamental principle, 'That the happiness of the creature is the sole end of creation,' naturally leads to most if not all the rest." We are afraid this is too true, though many who adopt this principle, or at least the theory of virtue of which it is the expression, repudiate many or all of these consequences. It is a strange perversion to make happiness the end, and holiness but a means; as though enjoyment were superior to excellence. The theory that virtue is founded in utility; that a thing is right simply because of its tendency to promote happiness; this tendency being not merely the evidence of its excellence, but that excellence itself, is the copious fountain of speculative errors, and of perversion of the moral feelings. If happiness is the great end of creation; if anything is right that promotes happiness, then the end sanctifies the means, and it is right to do evil that good may come. If it is right for God to act on this principle, it is hard to make men feel that it is wicked for them to do so. The only difficulty is, that they may not have knowledge enough to enable them to apply the principle correctly, but the principle itself must be good. We think it might easily be made to appear that the theology and morals of the church have suffered severely from the adoption of this false theory of virtue.

That this theory is a constituent part of the new divinity is plain from almost every page of the writings of the advocates of that system. "Why is righteousness or justice," asks the Christian Spectator, "better than injustice?" After rejecting other answers, he says, "We must come back to the tendency to good or evil, pleasure or pain, happiness or unhappiness. The same relation is implied in saying that righteousness or justice is better or preferable to injustice or oppression. How better? In what respect preferable? What fitness or adaptedness has it, unless to good? and what is good, except as it tends to promote happiness?"† According to this doctrine there is no such thing as morality. Pleasure is the only good, and pain the only evil. There are means of pleasure, and causes of pain; but there is no such thing as sin or holiness. There is no specific difference between beauty and moral excellence; between a crime and a burn. There is, however, no more sense in asking, as is done by the Spectator, "How righteousness is better than injustice?" than in asking, how pleasure is better than pain. Every sentient being knows that

* This is the less necessary, however, as our readers have access to the admirable letters on the origin and progress of the New Haven Theology, from a New England minister to one at the South; to Mr. Dow's pamphlet on the New Divinity, and to Mr. James Wood's work, entitled Old and New Theology.

† Christian Spectator, vol. x., p. 538.

pleasure is better than pain; and every moral being knows that righteousness is better than injustice. No reason need be given in either case. Right is as much a primary idea as pleasure. If a man had never felt pleasure it would be impossible for him to understand it; and if a man has no moral sense he can have no conception of the meaning of the terms right and wrong. To tell him that right is the quality of any act which tends to produce happiness, and wrong of one which tends to produce pain, would make him think these words synonymous with expedient and inexpedient, agreeable and disagreeable. It would convey no idea of the specific meaning of the terms. Happiness is the mere shadow of virtue. It must always follow it. But virtue is no more defined by saying that it is that which tends to produce happiness, than the nature of a solid body is defined by saying it is that which casts a shadow.

People are very apt to imagine that they gain a victory when they ask a question which does not admit of an answer. This is a great mistake. We are no more concerned because we cannot tell an inquirer what there is in virtue besides its tendency to produce happiness, than we are because we cannot tell a deaf man the difference between a loud sound and a bright colour. The difficulty does not arise from the identity of the two things, but from a want of capacity in the questioner to perceive the difference. Such interrogations, therefore, as those of the Spectator, produce in us no other feeling than that of wonder how they can be put by any man with a moral sense.

But the plague-spot of the new divinity is the second point above specified, the principle that self-interest is the ultimate foundation of moral obligation. This is its point of alliance with the lowest form of speculative opinions on this subject, and which gives it a character which must degrade the moral and religious feelings of every human breast in which it gains a lodgment. This offensive doctrine is not only incidentally stated, or indirectly implied, it is formally propounded and vindicated in writings of recognised authority in reference to the new divinity. Thus we are told, "This self-love or desire of happiness is the primary cause or reason of all acts of preference or choice, which fix supremely on any object." And more plainly still, "Of all specific, voluntary action the happiness of the agent in some form is the *ultimate end*."* Can there be a human heart which does not revolt at such a monstrous assertion? Has every act of piety, every deed of benevolence, every attention of maternal love, the happiness of the agent as its ultimate end? The assertion contradicts the consciousness of every human being. All religion, all benevolence, all the social affections do not centre in self. Any man whose own happiness is the ultimate end of all his specific voluntary actions is a bad man. If such a being could be found, he would not deserve the name of

* Christian Spectator, 1829, p. 21-24.

a man. Every one performs a multitude of acts because they are right; and in which the happiness of others and not of himself is the ultimate end. It may be said, we do not analyse our feelings with sufficient accuracy. We have, however, no faith in this analysing one thing into another; a sense of right into a desire of happiness; self-denial into self-seeking; the love of God into the love of self. We pray to be delivered from all such metaphysics.

Lest our readers should think that we assume on too slight grounds that this doctrine is a part of the new scheme of religion of our days, we refer them to an article on moral obligation in the last number of the Christian Spectator. They will find it there taught that "the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the tendency of an action to promote the highest happiness of an agent, by promoting the highest welfare of all," p. 531. The last clause of the sentence has nothing to do with the doctrine. The ground of obligation is the tendency of the act to promote the happiness of the agent. The fact that his happiness is best secured by acts which tend to promote the highest welfare of all, is not, according to the theory, the reason of their being obligatory. And this the article teaches with abundant plainness. The nature of the doctrine taught is clear from the whole drift of the piece; and will be sufficiently indicated to the reader by such sentences as the following: "It will perhaps be said, that by making moral obligation to rest on the tendency to promote the highest happiness of the agent, we make it wholly a *selfish* thing," p. 541. "Perhaps it may here be said, if this is the evil of sin—the disregard of the agent's highest welfare—and if this oftentimes results from a state of ignorance, then the only remedy necessary is to supply the requisite knowledge—to enlighten the mind," p. 550. It is taught no less explicitly that the primary reason why we are bound to obey God is, that he knows best what will make us happy. Nay, we are told that it has been said, by at least one advocate of the new divinity, that if the devil could make him happier than God can, he would serve the devil.* It is hard to conceive how he could serve the devil more effectually than by making such declarations, which, after all, are only an irreverent statement of the doctrine of the Christian Spectator. On p. 529 the question is started, Why ought we to obey the will of God? After a good deal of circumlocution it comes out that this obligation rests on his wisdom and benevolence, that is, upon his knowing what will render us most happy, and upon the assurance which his benevolence affords, that he will not deceive us as to this point. "The rule," we are told, exists, "and what its foundation is we have seen. As a matter of fact it exists, however it may be made known, and the tendency, or bearing, or relation to happiness, whence it arises, would exist even if the rule or law was unknown. It is the province of the moral governor to make this truth known and to sustain it. The fact that he is such

* We would not state this on slight grounds. We have received it from a source on which entire reliance may be placed.

a being, that he is competent to the task, forms a reason, why he should be obeyed. In this competency, his capacity to judge what is best, what is most productive of good or of happiness, and his disposition to do it, in other words his infinite wisdom and benevolence, is the prime element to be taken into the account," p. 537. On a previous page it was said, that if there was "no feeling of gratification in the act (of obedience to God)... the force of obligation would be unfelt." And on 538, it is asked, "On what ground is obedience claimed? It is that the law is holy, just and *good*. The very reason that God assigns is, that it is *good*—that it is the surest way of making us most happy. [The words *holy* and *just*, it seems, have no meaning for this writer.] His declaration in the form of law, is the highest evidence which we have of the fact, for it is the testimony of one who sees in all things the end from the beginning, and who has no disposition to mislead us, but who, with all the sincerity of infinite love, seeks to promote our highest happiness..... Men do not distinguish between God's competency to discern and to make known to us the way of happiness, and his creating a particular line of conduct right or wrong." Again, "Does any one hold that the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, we show that this, when carefully examined, can mean nothing more than the objective ground, or the indication or proof to us, wherein our true welfare lies, so as to supply to us our defect of knowledge," p. 543. According to this doctrine there is in fact no such thing as moral obligation in the universe. A man is bound to promote his own happiness in the best way he can, and this is his whole duty. All his obligation is to himself. He owes nothing to God, or to his fellow men. It is expedient for him to observe the divine directions, but he is bound to do so only so far as they promote his own welfare. We would fain hope that such a doctrine needs no refutation in a Christian country. Its naked statement is enough to secure its reprobation.

The third specification given above is, that God cannot control the acts of free agents, or that he could not prevent the introduction of sin into a moral system. "It is a groundless assumption," says Dr. Taylor, "that God could have prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin in a moral system.... Would not a benevolent God, had it been possible to him in the nature of things, have secured the existence of universal holiness in his moral kingdom?"* "Free moral agents," says the Christian Spectator, "can do wrong under every possible influence to prevent it."† "God not only prefers on the whole, that his creatures should for ever perform their duties rather than neglect them, but proposes on his part to do all in his power to promote this very object."‡ God, it is said, determined on his present course of providence, "not for the sake of redemption in the universe, rather than have

* Concio., p. 28. † Vol. 1830, p. 563. ‡ Ch. Spect. 1832, p. 660.

a universe without sin; but for introducing redemption into a universe from which sin could not, by any providence, be excluded."* "The nature of things, as they now exist, forbids, as far as God himself is concerned, the more frequent existence of holiness in the place of sin."† "The prevention of sin did not enter into his determination because he saw it to be impracticable," p. 15. "It is to him a subject of regret and grief, yet men transgress; they rebel in spite of his wishes; they persevere in sin in spite of all which he can do to reclaim them," p. 19.

Fourth, that the assumption that God cannot effectually control the acts of moral agents, is inconsistent with the doctrine of decrees, is too evident to need remark. The doctrine is therefore rejected, though the terms, for the sake of convenience, or for some other reason, are retained. That God decrees that an event should occur, and yet "proposes to do all in his power" to prevent its occurrence, no one can believe. He may permit its occurrence, or submit to it rather than destroy the system, but to say that he decrees it, appears to be a contradiction. The statement of the doctrines of predestination and election given by the New Haven writers and others of the same school, is in accordance with this fundamental principle of their system, and is a virtual denial of those doctrines. "Whatever degree or kind of influence," says the Spectator, "is used with them (sinners) to favour their return to him at any given time, is as strongly favourable to their conversion as it can be made amid the obstacles which a world of guilty and rebellious moral agents opposed to God's works of grace."‡ In another place the writer, speaking of the influence which operates on the sinner, says, "Election involves nothing more, as it respects his individual case, except one fact—the certainty to the divine mind, whether the sinner will yield to the means of grace, and voluntarily turn to God, or whether he will continue to harden his heart until the means of grace are withdrawn." That is, God exerts an influence on sinners as strongly favourable to their conversion "as it can be made," and he knows who will yield, and this is election! To the same effect Mr. Tyler teaches, "God foresees whom he *can* make willing in the day of his power, and resolves that they shall be saved," p. 14. And Mr. Finney, "The elect were chosen to eternal life, because God foresaw that in the perfect exercise of their freedom they could be induced to repent and embrace the gospel."§ It is really surprising that the New Haven divines should still assert that they hold the doctrines of predestination and election in the ordinary sense of the terms. President Fiske, in answer to the review of his sermon in the Christian Spectator, justly complains of this unfairness. "I cannot," he says, "but express my deepest regret that a gentleman of

* Ch. Spect., p. 635.
† Sermon by Edward R. Tyler, New Haven, 1829, p. 9.
‡ See Review of Dr. Fiske's Sermon on Predestination and Election.
§ Sermons on Important Subjects, p. 25.

the reviewer's standing and learning should lend his aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language, to such a confusion of tongues. Do the words predestinate, foreordain, decree, mean in their radical and critical definition, nothing more than to permit, not absolutely to hinder, to submit to as an unavoidable and offensive evil? . . . . Why then should the reviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in the symbols of his faith? . . His mode of explanation turns the doctrine into Arminianism."

Fifth, that all sin consists in the voluntary transgression of known law. This is so much a favourite topic with the writers of this class, that it is hardly necessary to bring examples. As they explain and apply the principle, it involves the denial both of original righteousness and original sin. "Neither a holy nor a depraved nature is possible," says Dr. Beecher, "without understanding, conscience and choice. To say of an accountable creature that he is depraved by nature, is only to say, that, rendered capable by his Maker of obedience, he disobeys from the commencement of his accountability."* "It is obvious," says Mr. Duffield, "that in infancy and incipient childhood, when none of the actions are deliberate, or the result of motive, operating in connexion with the knowledge of law, and of the great end of human actions, no moral character can appropriately be predicated."† "Why then is it necessary," asks the Christian Spectator, "to suppose some distinct evil propensity, some fountain of iniquity in the breast of the child previous to moral action?"‡ "Animals and infants, previous to moral agency, do therefore stand on precisely the same ground in reference to this subject." The doctrine of "a native propensity to evil," according to Dr. Taylor, makes "God the responsible author of sin," destroys responsibility, &c., &c. See his Review of Dr. Tyler in the Christian Spectator, 1832. It is useless to multiply quotations.

Sixth, that plenary ability and full power to the contrary are necessary to the morality of any act. There are three views of the doctrine of ability. The old one is, "That man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare him thereunto." Inasmuch as the inability here spoken of is very different from that under which a man lies to create a world, and inasmuch as it results from sin or the moral state of the agent, it may properly be called moral. On the other hand, as fallen man is a free moral agent, as the things to be done do not transcend his nature as a man, there is a sense in which he may be said to have a natural ability to obey all the commands of God. So long as the expression natural ability was used in this sense, there was no con-

* Sermon on the Native Character of Man.
† Regeneration, p. 378. ‡ Christian Spectator, 1829, p. 367.

troversy as to the thing, but only as to the propriety of the terms. There are two prominent objections to this form of expression. The one is the perpetual and puzzling contradictions in which it involves the preachers of the gospel; who tell sinners in the same breath they can and they cannot; as well as the incongruity of saying that a man is able to do what it is admitted that, in another and equally true and important sense, he is unable to do. It is always an evil for the declarations of ministers to come into conflict with the consciousness of their hearers. A man may, metaphysically speaking, be said to have a natural ability to love one person as well as another, yet to tell him he *can* love all persons alike, he feels to be absurd. The other objection is, that this form of expression is unscriptural. It is not worth while for us to be more philosophical or accurate than the Bible. The word of God never tells the sinner he can do all that God requires of him, though it often presses on him his obligation. They know but little of the human heart, who so confidently maintain that a sense of obligation is incompatible with the deepest conviction of helplessness and inability.

The second view of this doctrine is the Arminian. It does not differ from the preceding except in one point. It admits that men have by the fall lost all ability of will to that which is spiritually good, but it teaches that the common influences of the Spirit, given to all men who hear the Gospel, impart sufficient strength for the performance of all duty.

The third view is that which may, with propriety and therefore without offence, be called Pelagian. It is that which President Edwards attributes to Dr. Taylor of Norwich, viz., that there is "a sufficient power and ability in all mankind to do all their duty, and wholly avoid sin;" or, that "God has given powers equal to the duties which he expects." If this is so, says Edwards, "redemption is needless, and Christ is dead in vain."* This is the doctrine of the New Divinity. "What notion," asks the Christian Spectator, "can be formed of a subject of moral government, who is destitute of moral liberty? or in other words, who in every instance of obedience and disobedience does not act with inherent power to the contrary choice."† "Choice in its very nature," says Dr. Beecher, "implies the possibility of a different or contrary election to that which is made." Again, "The question is not whether man chooses, that is notorious, but whether his choice is free as opposed to a fatal necessity." (The reader will perceive that these two sentences contradict each other.) "If a man does not possess the power of choice, with power to the contrary, he sees and feels he is not to blame."‡ The New Haven gentlemen constantly represent what has hitherto been represented as moral inability as inconsistent with free agency. Dr. Tyler had stated that there

* Edwards's Works, vol. ii., 515. † Spectator, 1835, p. 377.
‡ Views in Theology, p. 32, *et passim*.

was in man "a native propensity to evil." His reviewer replies, "With such a propensity, man has not a natural ability to avoid sin. And this is alike true, whether this propensity be supposed to be sinful or innocent." In like manner, because Dr. Tyler maintained that there was a moral change in the sinner anterior to right moral action, he is represented as teaching physical depravity, physical regeneration, natural inability, &c., &c.* "Talk not," says the Spectator, "of the distinction of natural and moral ability, you have done it for ever away. If the change in question consists in anything prior to voluntary exercise, such a change I can in no sense produce."†

It is therefore abundantly manifest that the New Divinity is, in its essential features, identical with the "New Scheme of Religion," with which the pious people of Connecticut had to contend a century ago. If it was right for them to oppose it, it is right it should be opposed now. It was the friends of evangelical religion who resisted the introduction of the New Scheme; and it is the friends of religion who now oppose the New Divinity. The history of the church may be challenged to produce a single case in which true religion, we do not say has flourished, but has survived under the operation of that system of doctrine. It has been called Arminianism. But this is a great mistake. There is fourfold more truth and aliment for piety in Arminianism than in these new doctrines: Far more truth in the Arminian doctrine of original sin, of divine influence, of regeneration, of the atonement, of justification. And what has Arminianism to do with the doctrine that all virtue is founded in utility? (So too we suppose all beauty is founded in utility, and the only reason that a cascade gives pleasure is that it is adapted to turn a grist-mill.) And more especially, what has Arminianism to do with the monstrous doctrine that self-love is the ultimate foundation of moral obligation? The churches ought not to be deceived upon this subject. The New Divinity is not Arminianism, but something far, very far worse. Those men are to be pitied who can see nothing but a *shade* of difference between this system and the common orthodoxy of evangelical churches; and still more are those to be commiserated who, for party purposes, or for any other reason, call that a shade, which they know to be a bottomless gulf. It remains yet to be seen whether the faith and spirit of the Puritans have still sufficient vigour in New England effectually to withstand the progress of this system. It has received, we trust, its death blow in the Presbyterian church.

We resume our extracts from President Clap's Defence. "The reading of this new scheme of religion will doubtless differently affect the minds of different readers: some will be filled with indignation to see the great and fundamental doctrines of the gospel

* Christian Spectator, 1832, Review of Dr. Tyler.

† Spectator, 1833, p. 661. See a full discussion of the theory of free agency on which all these representations are founded, in a foregoing review of Dr. Beecher.

thus subverted and denied: others will think it scarcely possible, that any men of sense should run into such absurd notions: others, who have been inconsiderately led into some of the principles, will start, when they come to see how naturally they lead to some other of these principles, which at present they abhor. For this fundamental principle,' that the happiness of the creature is the sole end of the creation,' naturally leads to most, if not all of the rest: for this must be the sole rule and measure of all God's conduct towards us, and of ours towards him; and it is certain that God's sole end and ultimate design never can be frustrated. Others will be grieved and provoked to see their whole scheme exposed to open view; since they find it most politic to conceal some parts of it, till they can get the minds of men pretty well riveted into the rest.

"In order, therefore, to bring men to an indifferency, and prepare them by degrees for the reception of this new scheme, sundry artifices have been used.

"That there ought to be no creeds or confessions of faith but the Bible: that there are no fundamental principles in religion, or any certain set of doctrines necessary to be believed, in order to salvation: that those which have been commonly esteemed such, are but mere disputable, speculative points, which have no influence upon practice: and that the greatest heresy is an immoral life: that public orthodoxy has been very various in different countries; and in the same country at different times; that councils and assemblies of divines, not being infallible, have no right to make or impose upon others any creeds or confessions of faith, or public tests, or standards of orthodoxy; or to fix any particular sense or meaning on the Scripture: that no man is bound to believe as our fathers believed; but every man has a right to judge for himself; and that is truth to every man which he believes to be the truth: that every man shall be saved in that way or religion which he thinks is right, let it be what it will; provided he lives according to it; that it is sufficient, if men say that they consent to the substance of our Catechism and Confession, without rigorously insisting upon every article and doctrine in it: that great condescension ought to be used, and sundry doctrines ought to be given up, either in whole or in part, or different explications allowed for the sake of unity.

"That no man ought to be so uncharitable as to exclude another from salvation, or any public office of instruction, because he does not think as he does: that men's way of thinking is as different as their faces; and to endeavour to make all men think alike, is to make them bigots, and hinder all free inquiry after truth."

That is, the "artifices" employed in President Clap's time to favour the introduction of error, were, 1. Undervaluing creeds and confessions, and subscribing them for substance of doctrine. 2. Making light of the points of difference, as mere philosophy, or matters of speculation, or modes of explanation. 3. Declaiming on the sin of destroying the unity of the church for the sake of doctrine; on the duty of charity towards errorists; on the right of

free inquiry; and 4. Concealing the truth, as he says, p. 42: "Men of this character are not always open and frank in declaring their sentiments." Such, it seems, were the devices employed by the advocates of the New Scheme of religion a hundred years ago. Cannot the reader, without our aid, furnish modern illustrations in abundance under each of these heads? Our limits do not admit of our doing it for him, and the facts are so notorious, it can hardly be necessary. A standing topic of declamation, is the folly of expecting men, who think for themselves, to join in adopting an extended creed. If the substance be adopted, that is all that can be required. And the substance is often a very small part of what is really characteristic of the formula. Is it not also a common method in our days of introducing the New Divinity, to make much of the distinction between the doctrines and the philosophy of them? to claim to hold the doctrines and differ only in the explanation, as even John Taylor professed to hold to original sin, with a new explanation? How much too have we heard of the sin of heresy hunting, of producing disturbance in the church, and of the duty of living in peace let men teach what they may? Who, however, is chargeable with the sin of controversy? the innovators, or those who defend the faith once delivered to the saints? Is there no sin in attacking brethren, who hold the faith of the very standards which the aggressors have adopted, and great sin in asserting what both parties have professed to believe? How true it is what the famous Mr. Foxcroft, of Boston, remarked of his generation, "that false moderation, which sacrifices divine revelations to human friendships, and under colour of peace and candour gives up important points of gospel doctrine to every opposer, is still consistent with discovering a malignity towards others that appear warm defenders and constant asserters of those evangelical truths."*

The grand device, however, of errorists in every age, has been concealment. They do not come out boldly and frankly with their true sentiments, but endeavour to introduce them gradually as the public mind will bear them. The reader will probably remember, when the doctrine was in these days first broached, that God could not prevent sin in a moral system, how delicately it was insinuated; it was merely said that the contrary could not be proved, or ought not to be assumed; the idea was thrown out as a hypothesis for further consideration. It may also be within the knowledge of the reader how virtuously indignant the Spectator was with Dr. Woods because he "changed Dr. Taylor's question into an assertion—his hypothetical statement into a positive affirmation."† Since that time, however, the doctrine has been asserted, interrogatively and affirmatively; categorically and inferentially. It has been assumed as the basis of argument; the denial of it has

* Preface to President Dickinson's Second Vindication of God's Sovereign Grace. Boston, 1748.

† Spectator, 1830, p. 541.

been made the fountain of all manner of heresy and blasphemies. Notwithstanding all this, the simple hypothesis is still resorted to in times of peculiar emergency.

Another favourite method of concealment adopted in past ages was the introduction of new opinions under the patronage of revered names. This may remind the reader of the numerous attempts to make Edwards, Bellamy, Dwight, and others, teach the very doctrines which they strenuously opposed, in order to gain the sanction of their names for the errors which they endeavoured to refute. And finally, as we must stop somewhere, another method of concealment is the use of ambiguous terms, or the introduction of errors under the old formulas of expression, employed in a new sense. Can anything be more seemingly orthodox than the phrase "total depravity by nature?" How little it seems to differ from natural depravity, or depravity of nature! Yet they are, as to the sense intended, the poles apart. God is said to foreordain whatsoever comes to pass. What Calvinist could desire more? Yet to foreordain turns out to mean, as it regards sin at least, to submit to its occurrence as an unavoidable evil, and to propose to do all in the power of Him who foreordains it, to prevent that occurrence. Original sin used to mean, in the language of President Edwards, "an innate sinful depravity of heart." The term is still retained by those who teach with the New Haven Spectator, Mr. Duffield, and others, that infants have no moral character. Prof. Fitch says: "Nothing can in truth be called original sin, but his first moral choice or preference being evil." Mr. Duffield says, indeed, "original sin is a natural bias to evil."* Here, to the uninitiated it would appear that two things are asserted, first that this bias to evil is sin; and second, that it is natural. But no such thing. This same Mr. Duffield says, "Instinct, animal sensation, constitutional susceptibilities create an impulse, which, not being counteracted by moral considerations or gracious influence, lead the will in a wrong direction and to wrong objects. It was thus that sin was induced in our holy progenitors. No one can plead in Eve an efficient cause of sin resident in her nature (any *prava vis*) or operative power, sinful in itself, anterior to and apart from her own voluntary act. And if she was led into sin, though characteristically holy, and destitute of any innate propensity to sin, where is the necessity for supposing that the sins of her progeny are to be referred to such a cause?" . . . "Temptation alone is sufficient under present circumstances."† Thus after all it appears that this "natural bias to evil" is nothing more than the constitutional susceptibilities of our nature, such as it existed before the

* Minutes for the General Assembly for 1837. Protest by George Duffield, E. W. Gilbert and others, against the adoption of the report on so much of the memorial of the Convention as relates to erroneous doctrines. The statement of doctrines contained in that Protest, as explained by the writings of its leading signers, is the most extraordinary example of the use of old terms in a sense directly opposite to their ordinary meaning, which we have ever seen.

† Duffield on Regeneration, p. 379, 380.

fall, yet this bias is said to be Sin. Rather than not be orthodox and hold to original sin, he makes it exist in our "holy progenitors" before the first transgression! Can this be exceeded in the whole history of theological diplomacy? Yet it is a fair interpretation of the language of the Protest, as explained by the writings of some of its authors.

We wish it were in our power to insert the whole of President Clap's pamphlet; but we have already much exceeded the limits assigned for this article. We must therefore conclude with a few citations given without remark.

"The doctrines contained in our Catechism and Confession of Faith, particularly the divinity and satisfaction of Christ, original sin, the necessity of special grace in regeneration, justification by faith, &c., have been universally received, established and taught in all ages of the Christian church: and upon all the search I have been able to make into antiquity, I can find no single instance of any public Confession of Faith, drawn up by any council, or generally received and established in any Christian country in the world, wherein any of these doctrines have been plainly and expressly denied.

"For though there have been some men scattered up and down in the world, and sometimes convened in assemblies, who have not believed these doctrines, and have sometimes endeavoured covertly to disguise them and let them drop, and by degrees to root them out of the Christian church; yet they never dared openly and formally to deny them by any public act, because they knew that these doctrines had been so universally received in the Christian church, that all antiquity would condemn them, and that such an open denial would bring upon them the resentment of all mankind."

On page thirty-seven we find the following passage: "Some will say that they own the doctrine of original sin; but they mean nothing but a contracted disposition or inclination, arising from a vicious habit or practice, and deny that any disposition or inclination to sin is naturally derived from Adam, and assert that every child comes into the world like a clean, white piece of paper.

"Mr. Taylor calls the doctrine of original sin a Scripture doctrine; and yet when he comes to explain it, with regard to Adam's posterity, he makes it no sin at all, and allows nothing but that, upon the sin of Adam, God subjected him and his posterity to temporal sorrow, labour and death:* And these are not punishments for sin, but primarily designed for the benefit of mankind, considered as innocent creatures. For, he says, that upon the occasion of Adam's sin, God appointed our life frail, laborious and sorrowful, and at length to be concluded by death, not to punish us for another man's sin, but to lessen temptation.†

"And, therefore, I cannot think that public orthodoxy in teach-

* "Page 63." † "Page 68."

ers can be sufficiently secured barely by men's saying that they consent to the substance of our Catechism and Confession of Faith, and differ only in some small circumstantials, leaving it to them to judge what those circumstantials are: for a man may suppose or pretend that the ten commandments are the most substantial part of the Catechism, and that the doctrine of the divinity and satisfaction of Christ, original sin, &c., are but mere speculative circumstantial points, upon which no great weight ought to be laid. Such persons ought at least to declare what particular articles they do except, so that others may judge whether they are mere circumstantials or not.

"But then it is difficult, if not dangerous, to give up any one proper doctrine or article of faith contained in our Confession, for all the articles of faith in a system or body of divinity have a necessary relation to and connexion with each other; whoever, therefore, gives up any one article of faith, must, if he is consistent with himself, give up another which has a necessary connexion with it or dependence upon it, and so on till he gives up the whole. Indeed, some men seem to be partly in one scheme of religion and partly in another; but such men are always inconsistent with themselves; although for want of accurately tracing their own ideas they are not always sensible of it.

"Some men will pretend to consent to an article of faith, and yet believe nothing of it, in the true grammatical construction of the words, and the meaning of the composers; e. g.: Some who pretend to consent to the thirty-nine articles, by original sin, and the corruption of human nature, mean nothing but bodily weakness and sickness; and by its deserving God's wrath and damnation, mean nothing but bodily sickness and pain, and the temporal miseries of this life.

"So the meaning of that article, according to them, is that Adam's sin is the occasion of our undergoing bodily sickness and weakness, which deserve bodily sickness and pain.

"Condescension, charity and unity, are very excellent things, when applied to promote the ends of the gospel; and therefore it is a pity they should upon any occasion be perverted to destroy it.

"But condescension has no more to do with articles of faith than with propositions in the mathematics. And though a man ought in many cases to give up his own right or interest, yet he cannot in any case give up the truth of God revealed in his word.

"Charity is but another name for love, and the consequent effects of it, in believing or hoping the best concerning any man, which the nature of the case will allow; and considering how apt corrupt nature is to intermix self-interest, passion and prejudice with matters of religion, it is a virtue which, in that view, ought to be much insisted upon: but charity no more consists in inventing or believing new terms of salvation unknown to the gospel than it does in believing a sick man will recover, when the symptoms of

death are evidently upon him. Such charity as that is the greatest uncharitableness, as it tends to lull men in security to their eternal destruction.

"Unity in a joint-declared consent to the great and fundamental principles of religion, and practice of the duties of it, is a matter of great importance: but without such a consent unity is founded upon nothing, and can never answer any of the great ends proposed in the gospel. Men must be agreed at least in the object of their worship, whether it be the eternal self-existent God, or a mere creature: and in order to maintain this unity in the Christian church, there always have been public creeds and confessions of faith (all agreeing in substance) to which all, especially the teachers, have given their joint consent.

"Neither can those who adhere to the ancient doctrines of the Christian church, be properly called a party: that odious name properly belongs to each of those particular sects, which, from time to time, oppose those doctrines, and thereby make themselves a party.

"The Bible is indeed the only foundation of our Christian faith; and all the question is, in what sense we are to understand it: but so far as any regard is to be had to the judgment of great and good men in expounding of it (and I think it is an argument of great self-sufficiency, if not self-conceit, to have none at all), yet the number and quality of those who have at any time opposed these doctrines bear no comparison to the vast number of martyrs, and other eminently wise and good men, who have constantly maintained them. And the opinion of Arius, Pelagius, Socinus, Arminius, Foster, Chubb, Taylor, and all their followers, are but as the small dust of the balance, when put into the scale against the opinion of the whole Christian church in all ages.

"But I am free, that every man should examine for himself, and then openly declare what he finds.

"For my part, I have critically and carefully, and I think, with the utmost impartiality, examined into the doctrines contained in our Catechism and Confession of Faith, and believe they are fully and plainly contained in the sacred oracles of truth, perfectly agreeable to reason, and harmonious with each other; and that most of them are of the utmost consequence to the salvation of the souls of men. And therefore look upon myself in duty bound to do all that lies in my power, to continue and propagate those doctrines; especially in the college committed to my care, since that is the fountain from whence our churches must be supplied.

"And I hope that all the ministers of this colony, according to the recommendation of former synods and later general associations, will be careful and zealous to maintain and propagate the same in all our churches: that they will clearly and plainly preach all the doctrines contained in the sacred oracles of truth, and especially the more important of them, summed up in our Catechism and Confession of Faith; that they will not endeavour to

conceal or disguise any of these doctrines, nor shun to declare the whole counsel of God. That they will be careful not to introduce into the sacred ministry any but such as appear to be well-fixed in these principles upon which our churches are established. It is a pleasure to me to observe, that no person, who has lately been licensed to preach as a candidate, lies under any suspicion of that nature."

ESSAY VIII.

CHRISTIAN UNION.*

This appears to be the work of a pious, intelligent lawyer, who was removed by death a few weeks before it issued from the press. It is dedicated to "The Reverend *David Abeel*, American Missionary to South Eastern Asia;" and breathes, throughout, a spirit of fervent attachment to the honour and kingdom of the Redeemer. No one, we think, can peruse this volume without receiving an impression of profound respect for the piety and benevolence of the author. And while we suppose it impossible for a judicious mind to adopt all his views and anticipations, we are still willing to believe that what he has written cannot be read without some profit. His apparent soundness in the faith; his zeal for the honour and spread of true religion; and the animating hope which he cherishes of the speedy union of all who bear the Christian name, can scarcely fail of warming the heart of every reader who wishes well to the progress of the religion of Christ in our revolted world.

We do not differ from our author as to the desirableness and importance of "Christian Union." If the *invisible* Church consists of all those, throughout the world, who are united to Christ by faith and love; and if the *visible* Church consists of all those, also in every part of the world, who profess the true religion, together with their children, it must, in the very nature of things, be, that each is *one*. All *real* Christians belong to the former. All *professing* Christians belong to the latter. Now, as there is but *one Christ*, and but *one true Religion*, it is manifest that the "body of Christ can be but *one*." We, *being many*, says the apostle, *are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another*. Again, he asks, *The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we, being many, are one bread, and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread. Now ye*, adds he, in the same epistle, *are the body of Christ, and members in particular.*

* Originally published in 1836, in review of "Christian Union; or an Argument for the abolition of Sects." By Abraham Van Dyke, Counsellor at Law.

Of course this unity, though in a sad degree marred, is not wholly broken by diversity of denomination. All who profess the true religion, however divided by place, by names, or by form, are to be considered as equally belonging to that great family denominated the Church. The Presbyterian, the Methodist, the Baptist, the Episcopalian, the Independent, who hold the fundamentals of our holy religion, and who, of course, "hold the Head," in whatever part of the globe they may reside, are equally members of the same visible community; and if they be sincere in their profession, will all finally be made partakers of its eternal blessings. And the more closely they hold the "unity of the spirit in the bond of peace" and love, the more decidedly they are ONE, and one in a sense more richly significant and precious than can be ascribed to millions who boast of a mere external and nominal union. They have one Head, one hope, one baptism; they "all eat the same spiritual meat, they all drink the same spiritual drink," and will assuredly all meet in the same heavenly family. They cannot all meet together in the same sanctuary here below, even if they were disposed to do so; but this is not the worst. They are not all disposed thus to meet. They are not all *willing to acknowledge one another* as fellow-members of the same body. Yet, in spite of this blindness and infatuation in regard to their own relation to each other, they are still one, in a sense, and to a degree, of which they themselves are not conscious.

We also concur with the author of the work before us in our estimate of the sin and mischief of every measure which is unfriendly to this unity, or which tends to make "a schism in the body." "Nothing," says the eloquent Robert Hall, "more abhorrent from the principles and maxims of the sacred oracles can be conceived, than the idea of a plurality of true churches, neither in actual communion with each other, nor in a capacity for such communion. Though this rending of the seamless coat of our Saviour, this schism in the members of his mystical body, is by far the greatest calamity which has befallen the Christian interest, and one of the most fatal effects of the great apostasy foretold by the sacred penmen, we have been so long familiarized to it, as to be scarcely sensible of its enormity; nor does it excite surprise or concern in any degree proportioned to what would be felt by one who had contemplated the church in the first ages. Christian societies regarding each other with the jealousies of rival empires, each aiming to raise itself on the ruin of all others, making extravagant boasts of superior purity, generally in exact proportion to their departures from it, and scarcely deigning to acknowledge the possibility of obtaining salvation out of their pale, is the odious and disgusting spectacle which modern Christianity presents. The evils which result from this state of division are incalculable. It supplies infidels with their most plausible topics of invective; it hardens the consciences of the irreligious; it weakens the hands of the good, impedes the efficacy of prayer, and is probably the

principal obstruction to that ample effusion of the Spirit which is essential to the renovation of the world."* In all this we heartily concur, and wish it were duly impressed on every mind in Christendom.

We of course, too, agree with our author in all the earnest wishes expressed by him for the perfect restoration of the unity of the Church. To every Christian heart the anticipation of that blessing is unspeakably delightful. *Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity! It is like the precious ointment upon the head that ran down upon the beard; even Aaron's beard; that went down to the skirts of his garments; as the dew of Hermon, and as the dew that descended upon the mountains of Zion; for there the Lord commanded the blessing, even life for evermore.* Yes, when the time shall come, as assuredly it will come, when the followers of Christ shall *all speak the same thing*—when there *shall be no divisions among them;* but when *they shall be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment;* then every beholder will be satisfied that it is a blessing worth all the labour and importunate prayer which can be employed for its attainment.

But when Mr. Van Dyke proceeds to the consideration of the great problem how the "Union" for which he pleads is to be brought about, and how difficulties which stand in the way are to be obviated, we cannot adopt either his confidence, or what we understand to be his plans. He seems indeed in a great measure to overlook the fact, that although the preservation of peace and harmony among professing Christians is precious, and ought never to have been interrupted; yet that the great interests of *truth and righteousness* are still more indispensably precious. He seems, though he professes the contrary, not to have had an adequate impression of the character of that "wisdom which is from above, which is FIRST PURE, THEN PEACEABLE." If we are not deceived, we desire to see the unity of the church of Christ perfectly realized, in all its beauty and power, as much as our author ever did, and as much as any of his most sanguine friends can do. Yet we could not, in conscience, recommend that all denominations of Christians, who profess to hold the fundamentals of religion, in present circumstances, and with their present views, convictions, habits and feelings, should throw down all the fences which separate them from one another, and unite all their heterogeneous materials under one name, and one organization. Even if that name and organization were our own, the proposal would still be revolting to our judgment. We should regard such an event with entire disapprobation, for the following reasons.

1. If the individuals composing this multifarious, united mass, came together without any alteration of opinion or conviction; each entertaining his own former sentiments on all the points of

* Hall's Works, vol. i., p. 289.

doctrine and order which once separated them, and still resolving to unite, at every sacrifice, however vital, for the sake of a nominal and formal union; what could be expected from such a dishonest coalition, but a curse instead of a blessing? Every attempt to reconcile differences among professing Christians, which involves the relinquishment of truth; or a compromise with important corruption, either in doctrine or worship; or giving countenance to what is deemed an injurious departure from what Christ has commanded, is undoubtedly criminal and mischievous. We are commanded to hold "fast the form of sound words" which we have received; nay, to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints;" and, no doubt, one great purpose for which a visible church was founded in our world was that it might preserve pure and entire all such religious truth, worship, and ordinances, as God hath revealed and appointed in his word; that it might bear a faithful testimony against the introduction of error, by whomsoever attempted, into "the household of faith." If so, to surrender any essential part of the trust committed to it, for the sake of peace, is to make a sacrifice which the word of God forbids. We are required "*as much as in us lies* to live peaceably with all men." But there are those with whom we cannot live in peace without offending our Master in heaven.

2. Let us suppose, however, the case to be different; and then an objection equally strong against the union which seems to be contemplated, immediately presents itself. Let us suppose that the members of all the various denominations which agree to come together, do so under the impression that all their diversities of doctrine and order, as long as they do not affect the fundamentals of religion, strictly so called, are of no account, and ought not to forbid the most intimate union. What would be the natural effect of their settling down on this principle? Would it not be to discourage the study of Christian truth; to take away a large part of their interest in "searching the Scriptures;" and to terminate at a stroke, all that "contending earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints," to which we just referred, as an expressly commanded Christian duty? We can scarcely conceive of anything more adapted to take off the minds of men from discriminating views of truth, and thus gradually to undermine enlightened piety, than unreserved union upon such principles. Show us a people, by whatever name they may be called, who in regard to doctrine content themselves with vague generalities; who are equally satisfied with Calvinistic, Arminian, and Pelagian preaching; and who think it wrong to make any difficulty, or even inquiry, respecting the theological opinions of him who is called to minister to them in holy things, and we will engage to show you a people of small and crude knowledge; of superficial piety; and liable to be "carried about by every wind of doctrine," and the "cunning craftiness of those who lie in wait to deceive." Almost every chapter of our pious author shows, that while he pleads for union with all who

hold truth enough to become instrumental in saving the soul, he would have been himself altogether out of his element in listening to any other instruction than that which accorded with the precious system of free grace through the atoning sacrifice of our divine Redeemer. But, after all,

3. Supposing that such a union of all Christian denominations could be attained without any dishonest sacrifice, and without any immediate mischief, *what would be the benefit of it?* What *solid good* would result from it, either to the body, or to the individuals who might compose it? Would mere coming together produce genuine Christian affection? Would those who were thus drawn together, necessarily, or even probably, love one another the more? We have no doubt that the profound and pious Dr. Owen, the learned Independent, spoke the truth on this subject, when he said, "I should be very sorry that any man living should outgo me in desires that all who fear God throughout the world, especially in these nations, were of one way, as well as of one heart. I know that I desire it sincerely. But I do verily believe, that when God shall accomplish it, it will be the *effect* of love, not the *cause* of love. It will *proceed from* love, before it *brings forth* love. There is not a greater vanity in the world than to drive men into a particular profession, and then suppose that love will be the necessary consequence of it; to think that if, by sharp rebukes, by cutting, bitter expressions, they can but drive men into such and such practices, love will certainly ensue." If half a dozen families should be drawn, by ardent attachment to each other, to take up their abode together in the same spacious mansion, they *might* live together in peace and comfort, because the previously existing affection which drew them together, would dispose them to overlook, or at any rate to surmount many of the difficulties of their new situation. But what man in his senses would think of prevailing on the same number of families, hitherto strangers to each other, and with no decisive congeniality of feeling, to abandon their separate dwellings, and all come under the same roof? If he were a thinking man, and at all instructed by experience, he would expect to find their peace, their real enjoyment, destroyed, instead of increased, by their local and nominal union. The fact is, Christian union in *name* and *outward form* is worthless, unless the spirit of Christian love accompany and pervade it. The nearer different denominations approach to each other without this, the more apt they will be to quarrel and fight. We have no doubt that one great feature of the "latter day glory" will be that the "watchmen on the walls of Zion," and the great mass of the people of God, will all "see eye to eye," and walk together in the love of God, and in the consolations of the Holy Ghost. But this harmony will be produced and maintained by love. Love will pervade the world, binding all its inhabitants together, and, *therefore*, all will "speak the same thing," and walk together in peace and concord. We hope that some now alive will see the day when all the different classes of Presbyte-

rians in the United States, whether of the Dutch Church, the German Reformed, the Associate, the Associate Reformed, and the Reformed Presbyterians, shall be united with those of the General Assembly. In what manner it will be accomplished, whether by our joining them, or their joining us, we cannot predict; nor do we care, provided the great interests of truth and holiness be secured in the union. But we must say, that if it were now proposed by any one to commence a system of measures for bringing about such an event at once, we should be found in the opposition; not, of course, from unfriendliness to the object ultimately aimed at; but from a deep persuasion that none of the parties are yet ready to unite; that if they could be prevailed upon to come together, at present, it would be a calamity instead of a blessing; and that no union worth attaining can ever be formed, until all the parties shall be actuated by such a spirit of love, that they can no longer be kept apart. Then, and not till then, will their union be a real blessing; and *then* arguments and importunity to unite will be wholly unnecessary.

One of the great boasts of the Romish Church is that it is one. It reproaches Protestants as broken up into sects, wholly inconsistent with unity; while it claims for itself to be a perfectly united body, and lays great stress on this alleged union, as one of the indubitable marks of the only true Church. But to what, after all, does their union amount? Is there more of real, Christian, scriptural unity among the Papists than among other denominations who bear the Christian name? Nay, is there anything like as much? We utterly deny it. There may be more verbal, nominal, technical unity among them than among most branches of the Protestant body; that is, there may be more verbal acknowledgment of a kind of deified individual; more general agreement in praising and wondering after a human idol; more fixed staring of all eyes at the great central seat of idolatry, and of unhallowed dispensations. But is there more knowledge of the truth among them? more love of the truth? more love of one another? more love to the Saviour? more holy concurrence in honouring his law, his atoning blood, his justifying righteousness, his life-giving Spirit? Is there more enlightened, spiritual communion of saints, with their living Head, and with one another? Is there more of what the Scriptures denominate, all "eating the same spiritual meat, and all drinking the same spiritual drink?" This is the "unity of the Spirit" which the Bible describes, and which alone either deserves the name, or is adapted really to bind the family of Christ together. Have the Papists more of this than the Protestants, whom they so studiously vilify? Let those judge who know what the Papacy is. This claim, like all their other claims, is founded in falsehood and deception. There is far more real Bible unity among many bodies of Protestants, with all their apparent discord, than among the members of that much larger family, who are for ever boasting that they exceed all others in Christian unity, because they are all

equally related by name to the "man of sin," the "son of perdition," who shall be consumed with the breath of the Saviour's mouth, and destroyed with the brightness of his coming."

4. But we would go one step further. Not only do we believe that different denominations of Christians would find *no real advantage* in uniting, until they shall be drawn and bound together by such a spirit of love, as will make their union a source of pleasure and edification; but we are persuaded that, as matters now stand, there are many advantages resulting both to themselves and to the civil community, from their remaining in a state of separation from each other. We hope that in attempting to maintain this position, we shall not be misunderstood. We consider every schism in the body of Christ as a sin; and of course, can never commend or rejoice in it, in itself considered. But is it a new doctrine that the infinitely wise and Almighty Governor of the world, continually overrules error, and even atrocious crimes, for good? That what ought never to have happened, yet, having happened, in the adorable providence of God, is often so bounded, controlled and disposed of as to result in much benefit on the whole? *Surely the wrath of man shall praise God, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain.*

If man were what he ought to be, it would be a great happiness to the world, if all Europe were one mighty monarchy. For then there would be one system of laws; one equitable, consistent mode of treating all mercantile and other sojourners; one uniform circulating medium over the whole continent. But taking man as he is, what a misfortune would it be to the world, if one such great overpowering empire governed that whole quarter of the globe! What systematic and wide-spread oppression would afflict the human family! Every other portion of the world would be held in terror. How the matter actually stood when our supposition was, many centuries ago, in a considerable degree, realized, all know who have any acquaintance with history. As it is, there are *many* powerful monarchies on that continent, which balance each other's power; which keep one another in check; and thus make it the interest of all to be mutually respectful, equitable and accommodating. It is true, these rival monarchies are often involved in painful and offensive conflicts. Their pride, their avarice, and their various hateful passions, lead to scenes of strife and war of the most revolting character. These are highly criminal, no doubt, and deeply to be deplored. But they are less evils than the unquestioned and gloomy reign of a giant tyranny, brooding over a continent; without check or balance; without any one even to say "what doest thou?"

A similar train of thought may be indulged with respect to the actual divisions in the Church of God. They *ought* never to have happened. They never *would* have happened had it not been for the pride, the prejudices, the selfishness, and the ambition of depraved man. They were sinful in the outset. They are sinful still. There is more or less sin in their daily continuance. Yet

all this may be so, and it may notwithstanding be certain and manifest that the Almighty King of Zion is continually bringing good out of them. They exercise a watch and care over one another analogous to that which is exercised over each other by the members of the same church. They superintend, and, to a considerable extent, influence the movements of each other. They produce in each other, in various ways, a salutary watchfulness and emulation. Who does not know that the presence and influence of Protestants when residing in large numbers, and bearing a respectable character, within the bosom of communities predominantly Roman Catholic, have been visible, though not often in converting, yet always in more or less restraining and purifying the corrupt mass around them? Who can doubt that the Bible is more studied than it would otherwise be when rival denominations search its pages day and night to find support for their respective creeds and claims? Who needs to be told that the amicable efforts and struggles of different sects to maintain their peculiar opinions, have served to keep the world awake and active, and to prevent religious society from sinking into a stagnant and pestiferous apathy? There is every reason to believe that the established Church of Scotland, ever since the rise of the Secession body in that country, has been materially benefited in various ways by the zeal, the strictness, and the exemplary piety, which generally characterized the Seceders. And Dr. John Edwards, a learned divine of the established Church of England, expressly declares that "If we would but open our eyes, we should see that we are beholden to the Dissenters for the continuance of a great part of our theological principles: for if the High Churchmen had no checks, they would have brought in Popery before this time by their overvaluing pomp and ceremony in divine worship. So that if there had been no Dissenters, the Church of England had been long since ruined."—*Preacher*, II., p. 133.

Mr. Van Dyck, after urging union among Christians by the usual popular topics, which are, on the whole, well exhibited, and always with pious earnestness and ardour, proceeds to answer *objections*. Accordingly, he takes up in order, and attempts to dispose of the objections against his scheme drawn from six sources—as, "1. That, if the proposed union should take place, the *benefit of emulation* would be lost. 2. That it would involve *a sacrifice of principle* to unite with Christians who have not the same faith. 3. That divers denominations are necessary to *preserve the purity of doctrine*. 4. That divers denominations are necessary to operate to advantage upon all classes of the people. 5. The danger of uniting church and state. 6. That if sects were abolished, the Church would soon be again divided." In reply to all these objections our author writes with unabated fluency, ardour, and confidence; but in several cases, we must say, by no means to our satisfaction. Some of these objections, we acknowledge, are not very formidable in their import; but in regard to others, we are

far from being as sanguine as Mr. Van Dyck, that they can be easily set aside. For example, what he says on the *first* objection, viz., that "if the proposed union of all sects should take place, the benefit of *emulation* would be lost," appears to us of little weight. We are not prepared, with some, to condemn all *emulation* as criminal. If we do not mistake, the inspired Paul, in more than one or two places, in his Epistles to the Churches, tries to impel Christians to increased zeal and diligence in duty by setting before them what others had done, and expressing reluctance that others should outdo them in laudable zeal and effort. *Emulation*, we suppose, like *anger*, is *lawful* or *wicked*, according to circumstances, and according to its character. The greater part of the emulation in our world, we take for granted, is unhallowed and utterly indefensible. And even the greater part of that which exists and operates among professing Christians, we feel willing to unite in condemning, as corrupt in its origin, and corrupt in its exercise. But what then? We ask again, Is it a new thing for sin to be overruled for good? Can any man who has eyes to see, and ears to hear, doubt that different denominations of Christians have been impelled to make efforts, and to accomplish an amount of labour which would by no means have been attempted, if the presence and efforts of rival sects had not operated as a continual excitement? Condemn the motive and welcome. You have, in many cases, a right to do so. But we are so happy as to live under the government of Zion's Almighty King, who can bring good out of evil, and light out of darkness. The inspired apostle seems, as we understand him, to have felt and argued thus. "Some indeed, says he, preach Christ, even of envy and strife, and some also of good will. What then? notwithstanding every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is preached; and I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Now it is evidently no part of our duty to wish that unhallowed tempers may be indulged, because infinite wisdom and power can and does bring good out of them. But if we see plainly, that one hundred thousand Christians, divided into *four parts*, will accomplish, and are accomplishing, *four*, if not *ten times as much* as the same number *would* accomplish if externally united, supposing the united body to have the same amount of *real piety* with the *best portion* of the divided body; we say, if this be manifest, while we ought to mourn over everything unhallowed both in the separation and in the exercises of the respective divisions, we may surely rejoice, as the apostle did, in the general result; and pray for the gift of the Holy Spirit, that everything inconsistent with the will of God may be taken out of the way.

But we are, if possible, still less satisfied with the manner in which our author disposes of the *second* objection, viz.: "That it would involve a *sacrifice of principle* to unite with Christians who have not the *same faith*." We are quite ready to concede that there are doctrinal differences among Christians which ought not to keep them apart; and that even some doctrinal differences not

destitute of *importance*, but short of *fundamental*, are entirely consistent with affectionate ecclesiastical communion. But still, when we find Mr. Van Dyck, after insisting on this, appearing to find no further difficulty, and to consider his argument as triumphantly made out, we must say, that thereat we do greatly marvel. The consideration of a single case, we think, demolishes all that he has advanced in support of his theory, and demonstrates that his plan is not feasible. A pious, conscientious Baptist fully coincides in his doctrinal belief with a pious, orthodox Presbyterian. They can listen to the same public instruction with cordial pleasure, and unite in the same prayers with unmingled fervour of devotion. In regard to all these things they are one in spirit, and could, without any sacrifice, be one in name and form. But the Baptist conscientiously believes that no baptism is valid but that which is administered to adults, and by immersion. He would be glad to be united with his Presbyterian brother whom he "loves in the truth," and to sit down with him at the same sacramental table. But he is prevented by a conscientious scruple which he can by no means dismiss. He verily believes that the Presbyterian is not a baptized man; and of course, according to his view of truth and duty, he cannot commune with him. On the other hand, the Presbyterian has equally serious and immovable scruples. For although he has no doubt that his Baptist friend is a truly baptized man, and can, therefore, without hesitation, admit him to occasional communion at his sacramental table; yet he is deeply persuaded that the Baptist doctrine and practice by which infants are shut out from all membership and privileges in the Church of Christ, are not merely unscriptural, and of course wrong, but amount to a most serious and mischievous error. He is honestly convinced not only that the Baptist system in relation to this point is contrary to Scripture; but also that its native tendency is to place children, who are the hope of the Church, in a situation less friendly to the welfare of Zion, and less favourable, by far, to their own salvation, than that in which they are placed by the Paedobaptist system; and that its ultimate influence on the rising generation, on family religion, and on the growth and purity of the Church, must be deeply injurious. We ask, what is to be done in this case? It is evident there can be no compromise here, if the sincere and solemn convictions of each party be such as we have supposed. And yet such cases exist in great numbers, at the present hour. What would be the consequence if large bodies of Christian professors, thus differing, were to attempt to unite in a church-state! Could they commune together? Every one sees that it would be impossible. The Baptist could not indulge, however strongly his inclination might plead for it, even in occasional communion with his Presbyterian friend, without relinquishing a deeply conscientious conviction, not about a speculative, but a practical matter. And even the Presbyterian, though not restrained from occasional communion with his Baptist friend, could not

possibly unite with him in a regular church-state, without abandoning principles which he regarded as vitally important to the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom. Upon the plan of Mr. Van Dyck, we should be utterly non-plussed by such a difficulty. And yet we see not but that such difficulties must present themselves at every turn, in attempting to carry into execution the plan for which our author so earnestly pleads. But we have not room further to pursue the train of his reasoning.

When we first heard of the publication and character of the work before us, we were forcibly reminded of a hero in the same vocation, who flourished about a hundred and seventy or eighty years ago; who devoted more than half his life assiduously to the benevolent enterprise; and whose want of success, we fear, is destined to be again exemplified in the case of the benevolent American labouring in the same field. We refer to the celebrated John Dury, a native of Scotland, who was born about the beginning of the seventeenth century, and who, from 1631 to 1674, was constantly and laboriously engaged in bringing about a general pacification and union throughout the Protestant world. He devoted himself to this object with an ardour and a perseverance altogether without a parallel. He seems to have been an honest, amiable, pious, and learned man; but by no means remarkable for the soundness of his judgment. He conceived the plan of uniting all the Lutherans and Reformed in one great body. For this purpose he laboriously travelled through every Protestant country in Europe; wrote letters; personally addressed the clergy and the people of both communions; persuaded, entreated, warned, and, by every variety of means, exerted himself to terminate the strife and conflicts of Protestants, and to bring them all together under one general name and form. He took unwearied pains to engage in this enterprise, kings, princes, and magistrates, as well as ecclesiastical dignitaries, and all others whom he could approach. Archbishop Laud at first approved and recommended his plan; but afterwards threw difficulties in his way, intending, it would appear, to use him only as far and as long as he thought he could employ him as an instrument for promoting prelacy. Bishop Hall also, and Bishop Bedell, gave him and his enterprise their countenance and recommendation, in the beginning of his career; but how long they continued to encourage him is not known. Mr. Dury was bred a Presbyterian, and received in early life Presbyterian ordination. He was a member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and signed the Solemn League and Covenant; but was prevailed upon, on the principle that it might facilitate the attainment of his grand object, to submit to a re-ordination in the Church of England. He spent more than forty years in this benevolent enterprise; travelled again and again, with wonderful perseverance, throughout Great Britain and Ireland, and from one end to the other of the continent of Europe; consulted Universities, and when their answers were favourable, communicated

them to the public. He published himself more than twenty books; some in Latin, for circulation throughout the Continent, and others in English. After making, for many years, the union of all the Reformed and the Lutheran Churches his professed object, he extended his views, and seemed to think the union of *all professing Christians* practicable! He alleged, and endeavoured to convince those whom he addressed, that all who could agree to receive the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, ought to be united in one family. And finally, appearing to adopt the opinion that all religion consisted in certain mystical feelings which might be found in connexion with almost any and every form of doctrinal belief, he seemed to consider scarcely any diversity of opinion as a sufficient ground for separation.

It is scarcely necessary to say that Mr. Dury, in this enthusiasm of liberality, found few enlightened and respectable adherents. The majority of those who favoured his plan belonged to the Reformed Churches. The great mass of the Lutheran body opposed him throughout, and many of them with warmth and even violence. John Matthiae and George Calixtus were almost the only conspicuous Lutheran divines who fell in with his plan, and appeared as his advocates. On the whole, there can be no doubt that Dury's enterprise rather increased alienation than promoted unity. He wore out his days in unprofitable toil; bore rebuffs, insults and multiplied troubles with wonderful patience, until he finally died in obscurity and poverty, neglected by those who had once encouraged him to go forward in the prosecution of his utopian scheme. Nor was this all. The influence of what was done on the Lutheran Church was peculiarly unhappy. The publications of Matthiae, under the title of the Olive Branch, were publicly condemned as pestiferous, and by a royal edict excluded from Sweden, in which kingdom the author lived. And with regard to Calixtus, while he endeavoured, as Mosheim remarks, to free the Church from all sects, he was considered by great numbers of his brethren as being the father of a new sect, that of the Syncretists; a sect which was considered as pursuing peace and union at the expense of divine truth. He became instrumental in throwing the whole Lutheran body into a most unhappy commotion, which was a long time in passing away.

Before taking leave of this work, we cannot forbear to speak of another review of it published in the month of September last, in a contemporary and highly respected periodical,* from the pen of the Right Rev. B. B. Smith, Episcopal Bishop of Kentucky.†

* The Literary and Theological Review, conducted by the Rev. Leonard Woods, Junior.

† We are aware that commenting on an *anonymous* review might be considered as unusual, and of questionable delicacy. But in the present case, as the writer gives his name to the public, we suppose there is no more impropriety in referring to it, than in animadverting on any other publication made under the author's name.

Before reading the article we felt some curiosity to see how a gentleman, once somewhat known as a low-churchman, but since advanced to the prelacy, would speak of a work by a pious Dutch Presbyterian, pleading for the union of all Christians. We had not read far, however, before we perceived that the scope and evident purpose of the whole, though ostensibly liberal, and conducted throughout with great respectfulness and delicacy, is as purely sectarian as possible; and contains, though not in so many words, yet in spirit, a kind invitation of the whole world into the Episcopal Church. On the character of this article we take the freedom to make a few remarks, not in the polemical spirit, but that the imperfectly disclosed purpose of Bishop Smith may be distinctly understood; and especially as the periodical work which contains it circulates extensively among Presbyterians.

1. Our first remark in relation to the article in question is, that one of the most striking ecclesiastical incongruities we can think of is to find a thorough-going "high-churchman" speaking with complacency, and with raised expectation, of Christian union. By high-churchmen every one will understand us to mean those members of the Episcopal Church who make high and exclusive claims in favour of their own sect; who maintain confidently that the power of ordination to the gospel ministry is *confined* to prelatical bishops; that ministers not ordained by them have no valid commission, and of course no right to administer gospel ordinances; and that, out of the Episcopal denomination, there can be no lawful ministers; no valid sacraments; in fact, no church, but all out of the appointed way of salvation, and given over to the "uncovenanted mercy" of God. That this doctrine is really held by considerable numbers, both of the clergy and laity of that denomination, will appear from the following distinct avowal, found in a manual extensively used and admired among American Episcopalians.

"The Judge of all the earth will indeed do right. The grace of God quickens and animates all the degenerate children of Adam. The mercy of the Saviour is co-extensive with the ruin into which sin has plunged mankind. And, 'in every nation, he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him.' But where the gospel is proclaimed, communion with the Church by the participation of its ordinances, at the hands of its duly authorized priesthood, is the indispensable condition of salvation. Separation from the prescribed government, and regular priesthood of the Church, when it proceeds from involuntary and unavoidable ignorance or error, we have reason to trust, will not intercept from the humble, the penitent and obedient, the blessings of God's favour. But when we humbly submit to that priesthood which Christ and his apostles constituted; when, in the lively exercise of penitence and faith, we partake of the ordinances administered by them, we maintain our communion with that Church which the Redeemer purifies by his blood, which he quickens by his Spirit, and whose faithful members he will finally crown with the most exalted glories of his heavenly kingdom. The important truth which the universal Church has uniformly maintained, that, to experience the full and exalted efficacy of the sacraments, we must receive them from a valid authority, is not inconsistent with that charity which extends mercy to all who labour under involuntary error. But great is the guilt and imminent the danger of those who, professing the means of

arriving at the knowledge of the truth, negligently or wilfully continue in a state of separation from the authorized ministry of the Church, and partake of ordinances administered by an irregular and invalid authority. Wilfully rending the peace and unity of the Church, by separating from the ministrations of its authorized priesthood; obstinately contemning the means which God, in his sovereign pleasure, hath prescribed for their salvation, they are guilty of rebellion against their Almighty Lawgiver and Judge; they expose themselves to the awful displeasure of that Almighty Jehovah, who will not permit his institutions to be contemned, or his authority violated with impunity."*

In plain English, the scope of these and similar passages in writings of acknowledged authority in that denomination, is, that the Episcopal "priesthood" is *the only authorized ministry*—that their sacraments are *the only valid sacraments*—that those who are out of the Episcopal body are no part of the Christian Church; that they have no hope founded on "covenanted mercy;" but however penitent, humble, and deeply spiritual they may be, the fact that they are not in communion with the Episcopal Church, proves that they are "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenant of promise."

In full accordance with this representation, Mr. Grant, the Episcopal high-church historian of England, does not scruple to avow the doctrine which has been stated, in all its length and breadth. "This opinion," says he, "supposes a *charm*, a *secret virtue*, by which—to state an extreme case—a *vicious* minister of the Church of England can confer something *necessary to salvation*, as a sacrament is; while the same office performed by a *pious* sectary, who has in his heart devoted himself to God, is an *absolute nullity*." After stating the case in this strong and unequivocal manner, he does not hesitate to declare that, in his opinion, the fact is really so. "*Truth* is sacred and immutable," says he, "and must be received, whatever inconvenience may attend its reception."†

There are, indeed, some high-churchmen whose mode of stating their opinions in reference to this subject, is somewhat less offensive in terms. They do not undertake decisively to exclude all others but themselves and the Romanists from the "covenanted mercies of God;" but they refuse to *acknowledge* any others. Their language is, "we *know* that *we* are right, and on safe ground; but we do *not know* that others are. We do not positively deny that they are true churches; but we cannot see our way clear to *recognise* them as such." There is still a third portion of the general class of high-churchmen, who, maintaining the Popish doctrine that lay-baptism is valid, and that any body of baptized persons may properly be called *a church*, do not deny the title of churches to Presbyterian assemblies. But while they concede this—on most erroneous ground as we suppose—they deny

* Companion for the Altar, by J. H. Hobart, afterwards Bishop Hobart, 1804, p. 202–204.

† Grant's History of the Church of England, and the Sects dissenting from her. Vol. ii., 7, 8.

that these churches have any *authorized ministers*, and contend that all the claims and acts of such ministers are usurpation and rebellion.

These are the opinions to which popular parlance has assigned the title of *high-church*. The title is just. They are not only revolting, but really schismatic in their character. We do not pretend to know how extensively such opinions are cherished by the ministers and members of the Episcopal Church in the United States. We have no doubt that many of the best of both cordially reject them, and cultivate towards other churches a fraternal spirit. Nor do we intend at present to enter into an inquiry whether these revolting opinions are correct or not. We, of course, believe them to be both absurd and unscriptural. But that is not, at present, the question. The question is, can it be considered as congruous for a man who holds these opinions to talk or think of promoting "Christian union;" of holding out the olive branch, in any intelligible sense, to other denominations, when he regards them all as out of the way of salvation? Now we happen to know that Bishop Smith freely states it as his opinion, that *non-episcopal ministers have no commission;* no authority whatever to administer gospel ordinances. *His* plan of union, then, is, that all other denominations are at liberty, if they please, to turn Episcopalians; and that, if they do, he will *then*, and *not till then*, regard them favourably, and acknowledge them as Christians. This is surely a wonderful sacrifice at the shrine of "Christian union!" The Papist could say this; and he could say no more.

2. Our second remark is, that Bishop Smith's views of "Christian union" are such that he is constrained to regret that the reformers ever separated from the Church of Rome. He is such a worshipper of the form of ecclesiastical communion, without its power, that he seriously asks, "whether one of the grand mistakes of the Reformation was not a separation *from* the Church, instead of reformation *in* the Church?" As if effort after effort to reform the Church, without going out of it, had not been actually made by one noble-minded man after another, for nearly two hundred years before that time, without success. As if hundreds of men, some of them among the best on earth, had not been hurried to the stake, for daring to whisper a doubt concerning the pure and scriptural character of the dominant Church. As if most of the Reformers had not been violently *cast out* of the Church, instead of first *departing* themselves. Nay, as if when Christ the Lord had been virtually taken away from the Headship of his Church, there was any scriptural object to be gained by continued "union" with such a body. We have no doubt that Bishop Smith in the multitude of his yearnings towards what appears to be his idol—the Episcopal succession—wishes there never had been a severance of connexion with the Church of Rome. He feels probably a little as Archbishop Laud did, when he said, "I do believe the Church of Rome

to be a true Church. Were she *not* a true Church, it were hard with the Church of England, since from her the English bishops derive their apostolic succession." For our part we think the Reformers did wisely in "coming out from among the Romanists and being separate." We cannot doubt that in abandoning the habitations of gross superstition and idolatry, they took the only feasible course. Necessity impelled them to it. Duty required it. The Church of Rome, not the Reformers, was the *real schismatic*, since she required the friends of the reformation to obey man rather than God, or go to the stake or gibbet, or go out from her pale. In this case we may say of "union" as our blessed Lord does of the holy Sabbath: Union was made for man, not man for union. It ought to be sacredly and inviolably maintained as long as it can be made subservient to the great purpose for which it was appointed; mutual edification in faith and holiness. But when it becomes an alliance to corruption, idolatry and misery, it has lost both its purpose and its value. It is, undoubtedly, a sin to sacrifice everything to the *name* when the *substance* is gone.

3. Our third remark on Bishop Smith's Review is, that he seems to hold a doctrine in regard to the *essential nature* of the "union" for which he pleads, in which we can by no means concur with him. "What sort of union" he asks, "amongst the followers of Christ should be proposed? Shall they be called upon to unite in some way or other, as they now stand divided; or are they bound to agree in one outward form of Christianity? Mr. Van Dyck, and multitudes with him, appear to entertain no other idea of union amongst Christians, than an agreement that they shall not bite and devour one another. For our part we most explicitly avow our conviction, that every attempt to put a stop to the dissensions and subdivisions which distract the Church, must for ever prove futile, until Christians are agreed IN ONE OUTWARD FORM OF CHRISTIANITY. To talk about union in feeling and spirit, whilst there is disunion in fact, is about as wise as to exhort those to love one another, between whom occasion of deadly feud actually exists."

We acknowledge that we do not take exactly this view of the subject. Conscientious and firm as our persuasion is, that the Presbyterian form of government and of worship was the form actually adopted in the apostolic Church, and which *ought* to be the universal form; yet we are very far from thinking the adoption of this form, or of any other single form, by the different existing denominations, essential to Christian union in its best sense. *We* think "THE UNITY OF THE SPIRIT" the most important part of this whole matter. We confess, indeed, that we love to see union among the followers of Christ complete in all its parts, external as well as internal. We love to find large communities of Christians all "speaking the same thing," and walking by the same rule and order. But we cannot doubt that there may be much love, much of the real precious communion of saints, where there is considerable diversity of external order. We are perfectly persuaded that there was more

scriptural, practical "unity of the spirit in the bond of peace," between the Church of England and the Presbyterian Churches of France, Holland, Germany, Geneva, and Switzerland, in the days of Bucer, Martyr, Bullinger, Calvin, Cranmer, &c., than there is at this hour between the different portions of the English establishment. What pious Presbyterian would find the least difficulty in cherishing the most delightful Christian fellowship with such men as the late Mr. John Newton, Dr. Scott, and other similar worthies of the Church of England? He would certainly take more pleasure in the conversation and ministry of such men, than in those of some men belonging to his own nominal communion, of less zeal and spirituality. We do, indeed, anticipate that when the Millennium shall open on the world, there will be greater uniformity in the outward aspect, as well as in the interior of the Church of God, than has ever yet been seen. But we do not feel quite sure that the uniformity, with regard to external order, will be perfect and universal. However this may be, we are perfectly satisfied in cherishing the assurance that the favoured believers of that age will be "of one heart and of one way," in love to the Saviour; in love to one another; in bearing one another's burdens and infirmities; and in seeking to promote their common happiness, and to glorify their common God. We do not believe that a conflict or a thought will ever arise in the minds of the Christians of that generation respecting ecclesiastical *rank* or *succession*. Let any one glance at the Apocalyptic delineations of that happy period, and say whether a single stroke of the pencil of inspiration appears to point to matters of that kind. The glory of the blessed Redeemer, and the affection of his people to him and to one another, evidently occupy and adorn the whole picture.

4. Again, Bishop Smith asks, "whether effacing the scriptural and primitive distinctions between *clerical* and *lay* officers in the church, has not, by lessening the respect for the sacred order, and fostering a spirit of misrule and insubordination, greatly tended to the multiplication of sects?" Whatever influence this thing may have had in affecting either the peace or unity of the Church, we can think of no sect to which the query more strikingly applies than to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. We know of scarcely any other denomination than theirs, in the ecclesiastical assemblies of which *laymen* are permitted to sit and give votes, which may be absolutely controlling, without the least semblance or plea, even on their own showing, for divine authority in the case. It is well known that the ruling elders of the Presbyterian Church occupy a place in all their ecclesiastical assemblies. But then they are not, strictly speaking, in our estimation, *laymen;* that is, we consider them as spiritual officers, appointed by Christ to bear rule, and therefore just as much authorized to sit and act*

* It is well known that in the early Church, soon after the apostles' days, all church officers, from the highest to the lowest, were called *clergymen*, to distinguish them from the body of the people.

in the place assigned to them, as any minister in the whole church. But our Episcopal brethren, if we understand their system, introduce into all their assemblies, from the Vestry to the General Convention, numbers of mere laymen invested with high authority, and yet in whose behalf they do not pretend to plead any divine appointment or institution. We cannot but think, therefore, that it is with a very ill grace that Bishop Smith singles out this feature in modern times, as favourable to the multiplication of sects, and the production of insubordination and disorder in the Church. If he is deliberately of this opinion, he ought to exert himself to alter, as soon as possible, the constitution of his own church. But we have no such apprehension from this source as he appears to entertain. We cannot think of any prominent sect in our land that was commenced, or even planned, by *laymen*. No, the *clergy*—we repeat it—the *clergy* have been, in almost all cases, the disturbers and corrupters of the church; and we verily believe that the greatest danger is now to be apprehended from *them*. If the *leaders* and *guides* of all denominations were all deeply imbued with the humble, charitable, disinterested, and truly benevolent spirit of their Master, we cannot doubt that the greatest obstacle to "Christian union" would be taken out of the way.

5. We have but one more remark, or rather query, to offer on the view which Bishop Smith appears to take of the subject. Assuming that there can be no valuable or effectual unity, without a concurrence *in some one external form of organization;* that this is not only important, but essential; he professes, in one place, the most entire indifference "in what *direction* these principles may guide him." "With us," says he, "it would *matter nothing* to which of the existing denominations they would conduct; or what modifications they would demand of each." Yet, he evidently, in another place, gives us to understand what denomination he thinks ought to be adopted, and would be adopted, if proper principles presided over the choice. At this partiality to his own sect, we are not surprised; nor should we be disposed to criminate him for it, had his declaration in its favour been much more pointed and positive. The leading principle which he supposes ought to regulate the choice of this universal denomination is that which he quotes from Tertullian—"whatever is first is true; whatever is more recent is spurious." We accede to the general principle; and have no more doubt that the most faithful "induction" of historical, and every other kind of testimony, would show that Presbyterian doctrine, government and worship was "first,"—was the truly primitive and apostolic form, than we have that the same "inductive" testimony would show that in the first century there were Christian Churches planted in Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, and Philippi. On this, however, we shall not insist. We will suppose for argument's sake that the Episcopal form of Church order were universally adopted in our country in all its parts; that all the denominations in the United States were prevailed upon,

without one perverse "dissenter" interposing his veto, to assume the name and adopt the government and formularies of that denomination. Suppose this to be done; and suppose the whole body, when thus united, to bear the very same character, as to piety, zeal, humility, and diffusive Christian benevolence, which the body actually distinguished by that denomination *now* bears. Would our country be the better for it? Would the interests of "pure and undefiled religion" be really promoted? Would a greater amount of evangelical labour be likely to be accomplished? Would the poor neglected wanderers "in the highways and hedges" be more likely to be brought in? Would the conversion of the whole world to God be likely to be more speedily effected? What would be its probable influence on the civil government of the country; on the rights of conscience; and on all the privileges of the citizens? Would such a community, judging from all experience, be wakeful, active and enterprising in its religious character; or sunk in the torpor and formality which usually characterize those bodies from which emulation is gone, and where there are none to call in question the course pursued? We should have no fear as to any of these points if the "latter day glory" had begun. The universal prevalence of true religion would be the best universal conservative. But the supposition is, that all sects were merged in one, and the whole remaining, in every other respct, just as they are. Would the country be safe under such a transformation? Would religion be safe? Would the interests of the world be safe? We trow not. If the denomination in question were our own, we should say, By no means.

Bishop Smith, in sketching the union, which he seems to contemplate, speaks of each denomination giving up something for the sake of harmony. It may excite a smile in some of our nonpresbyterian readers, when we say, that, in casting about, in our own minds, what peculiarity Presbyterians might reasonably be called upon and feel willing to surrender as a tribute to "Christian union," we felt deeply at a loss to specify a single particular. There is not, we will confidently affirm, a denomination of Christians in the United States, or in the world, more free from offensive claims; more ready to unite with all other denominations in communion or in effort; or having fewer peculiarities to keep us asunder from our neighbours. We freely acknowledge the churchcharacter, and the validity of the ministrations of Congregationalists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Baptists, Lutherans, and in short, of all sects who hold the fundamentals of Christianity. We repel none of them from our communion; and in all our private and public ministrations we insist, almost exclusively, on the great duties of "repentance towards God, faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and holiness of heart and of life," in which all evangelical Protestants profess substantially to agree. Where one sectarian claim or statement is made in our pulpits, we may safely venture to say that fifty are made in the pulpits and writings of our Baptist, Epis-

copal, and Methodist brethren. What then, in the proposed mutual concession for the sake of "union," shall we give up? Our exclusive claims? We have none. Our abuse of other denominations? We have none. We are everywhere loaded with calumny, but have never yet engaged in any other warfare than that of the purest *self-defence*. Even our most mild and respectful self-defence, we know, is made matter of accusation and reproach; but be it so. We cannot surrender this right. Shall we give up our endeavours to maintain a learned ministry, which was, for a long time, matter of accusation with more than one sister denomination? We cannot consent to do this. As it is, our ministry has far too little learning; and those very churches which once reproached us for our requisitions in regard to this matter are now adopting similar plans, and are following close at our heels in the maintenance of the same system. Shall we consent, for the sake of universal ecclesiastical amalgamation, to give up all our rules and efforts for maintaining *purity of doctrine?* Here again we must demur. We contend only for that precious system of grace and truth, which all the leading Reformers, both in Great Britain and on the continent of Europe, uniformly maintained. In struggling to defend and propagate the pure doctrines set forth in our venerated Confession, we contend for no new or doubtful theories. We contend for the same system of doctrine which was taught by the Cranmers, the Hoopers, the Latimers, and the Whitgifts, as well as the Luthers, of the sixteenth century, and for which several of them laid down their lives. We believe that, important as the government of the Church may and ought to be considered, the maintenance of pure gospel truth is a thousand-fold more important; and that to compromise its interests out of regard to any question of ecclesiastical order, would be a high offence against our Master in heaven, and against all the interests of his kingdom.

We think we do no injustice to any other portion of Protestant Christendom, when we say, that we are confident no denomination of Christians exceeds the Presbyterian Church in genuine Christian liberality, and in a readiness to unite in Christian effort with all classes of credible professors of Christianity. Our system is absolutely less exclusive, and more pacific than any other in our country, which admits the importance of truth at all. We are really almost the only denomination of Christians in the United States whose views of truth of the Gospel ministry, and of ecclesiastical order, present no obstacle to our communing and co-operating with any and every denomination who hold fast the essentials of true religion. Nor can we hesitate to assert that the most conspicuous and edifying examples of such union and co-operation, within the last twenty years, have been actually presented by the Presbyterian Church. Why, then, it is, that we are everywhere calumniated as eminently *sectarian* in our character; why the most mild and respectful attempts to defend our own opinions, and to show to our members our reasons for differing

from sister denominations around us, are stigmatized as violent and unprovoked attacks; and why these charges happen to be most clamorously urged by those of our neighbours whose *sectarism* is acknowledged on all hands to be the most rampant and exclusive in the land; are questions, the responsibility of answering which, we are glad does not lie at our door.

We agree with Bishop Smith in the opinion that the spirit of sect is more rife and more powerful at this time than it was some years ago. We think this has grown out of some of the very measures prematurely and unwisely adopted to produce the diametrically opposite effect. And we are persuaded that much that is now written and done, with the intention of promoting union, is adapted to retard, rather than promote, the great object recommended in the volume before us. We lament that such should be the case, but we cannot close our eyes against the fact. Were we to attempt to offer a set of counsels as to the best means of promoting "Christian union"—we should say—"Be much more engaged in cherishing a spirit of charity and concord, than in urging different denominations to come together. Let the strain of preaching be practical, affectionate, and strictly scriptural, rather than controversial. Be more intent on describing and inculcating the religion of the heart, than on pleading the cause of a particular form of external organization and order. Let each denomination maintain its own peculiar opinions with regard to doctrine and discipline, meekly and candidly, but with firmness, without compromitting a single dictate of conscience. Study to cultivate intercourse with other denominations, to converse and pray together, and co-operate in every pious and benevolent enterprise, as far as may not be forbidden by conscientious peculiarities. Be very sure that what is made a term of communion be something distinctly and clearly taught in the word of God. Let none imagine that the "Christian union," so much sought after, and so truly desirable, can be reached at once, or by rapid movements; it must be the work of time, and brought about by gentle means; just as the gradual change of a nation's character or language is effected by almost insensible degrees. And, in the meanwhile, it is not wise to be for ever harping on the duty of "union." All the world knows that if we wish to produce in any mind strong emotions, either of love or hatred, the true way to succeed is not to employ our time in directly exhorting to the exercise of this emotion; but in presenting such views of the object in question, as are adapted favourably to excite and impress. No one was ever induced to love an object by being scolded and reproached for *not* loving it. And they are surely the worst enemies to "Christian union," who, while they declaim against *sectarism*, and paint in strong colours the sin and mischief of multiplied religious denominations, are constantly "compassing sea and land" to make proselytes to their own sect, and representing all others as "aliens from the covenant of God."

That our views in relation to this interesting subject may not be misapprehended, we will close our protracted remarks by the following brief summary of the conclusions in relation to it, to which we have come, and which we regard as most scriptural, rational and safe.

1. All who profess the true religion in its essential characteristics, belong to the visible Church catholic, notwithstanding the diversity of forms and names by which they are externally separated; and ought to be so regarded by all who believe that Christ is one, and his religion one. Of course,

2. Entire concurrence in the same outward form of Christianity is not essential to Christian union, or to the real communion of saints.

3. Yet everything that tends to divide the body of Christ, or to interfere with entire harmony among the members of his body, is sinful and ought to be avoided.

4. The day is coming, and is probably not far distant, when all the professing people of God will be so united, if not in every point of external form, yet in spirit, in cordial affection, as to feel that they are "one body in Christ, and every one members one of another."

5. The *mere* quiet, formal *coalition* of all sects into one body, and under one name, would not be "Christian union."

6. We cannot look for the consummation of this desirable outward union, nor even reasonably *wish* it to take place, unless and until the *spirit* of sectarism shall be *previously* slain, and the spirit of universal charity shall become triumphant in every part of the Church. Were the union contemplated to come *before* the establishment of this, it could not live, much less diffuse its appropriate blessings. Therefore,

7. All attempts to break down the barriers which now divide professing Christians into different denominations, anterior to the pouring out upon them the *spirit of love*, will be of little or no efficacy in promoting the great object contemplated; perhaps may even retard its approach. *A community of goods* once existed in the Christian Church, and may possibly exist again, when the spirit of pure and fervent love shall pervade the Church; but if a proposal were made to restore that community *now*, when the prevailing spirit of Christendom is so remote from it, it would be considered as doing discredit, rather than honour, to the cause and the proposer.

8. Those denominations of Christians which stand aloof from other Christian Churches, or which refuse, on grounds not supported by the word of God, to commune with them, are chargeable with schism. The dominant powers in the Church of England, in *ejecting two thousand of the very best ministers of that Church* in 1662, because they refused to conform to unscriptural ceremonies, were the real schismatics, and not the ejected ministers themselves. Mr. Locke pronounces that event "fatal to the Church and religion

of England, in *throwing out* a very great number of worthy, learned, pious and orthodox divines."*

9. The volume before us has appeared a number of years *too soon* for the prompt adoption of its principles. We are not yet prepared for the "abolition of sects." When this precious blessing shall be vouchsafed to the Church, we have no expectation that it will be brought about by some great man, by discovering the *causes* of the opposite evil, and proposing some new and wonderful *remedy*. It will be the result of the same power, which, when the disciples were tossed on the heaving sea, and filled with fear, said to the raging winds and waves, "Peace, be still;" and there was a great calm. There will probably, however, be no miracle in the common sense of that word; but the same gracious agency which blesses the Church now, given in a much larger measure. Before the Christian community can be ready for a movement of this kind, the Holy Spirit of sanctification and love must be poured out upon churches to an extent, and with a power, hitherto unknown since the day of Pentecost. The spirit of those who are constantly "scrambling for proselytes;" who are far more anxious to convert men to their own denomination, than to the knowledge and love of holiness; and especially the spirit of those who "HATE THE GOSPEL, while they LOVE THE CHURCH," must be brought to yield to the genuine spirit of Christian charity. The miseries of a perishing world must bear with a hundred-fold more weight than they now do on the hearts of Christians; and they must feel, with a force and tenderness of which they at present know little, their supreme obligation to send the simple, pure gospel to every creature. They must be absorbed in the great work of converting the world to God. Then, and not till then, will sectarism gradually expire. Then, and not till then, will the exclamation of the early ages be renewed, "BEHOLD HOW THESE CHRISTIANS LOVE ONE ANOTHER!" The Lord hasten in his time a consummation so devoutly to be wished! Every Christian heart will say—Amen!

* Letter from a Person of Quality. Works, vol. ix., p. 202.

ESSAY IX.

THE DIVISION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.*

The measures adopted by the last General Assembly have now been the subject of constant discussion for more than nine months. The press has teemed with arguments both for and against their validity and justice. Almost all our inferior judicatories have subjected them to a rigid examination, and pronounced an opinion either in their justification or condemnation. It may therefore be taken for granted, that the minds of all interested in the matter are by this time finally settled on the one side or the other. We are not about to re-open the subject, or to traverse anew the ground passed over in our number for July last. Since that time, however, events have occurred which have an important bearing on the prospects of our church and the duty of its members. To some of these it is our purpose to call the attention of our readers.

It must constantly be borne in mind that according to the repeated declaration of the General Assembly, the object of the acts complained of, was the separation of Congregationalism from the Presbyterian Church. For this purpose they abrogated the Plan of Union, and declared that no judicatory composed, agreeably to that plan, partly of Congregationalists and partly of Presbyterians, can have a constitutional standing in the Presbyterian church. As Congregationalism was known to prevail extensively in four of our synods, the Assembly applied the above principle to them, and declared that they could not, as at present organized, be any longer regarded as belonging to our church. Several other synods, within whose bounds there was more or less of this irregularity, were directed to correct the evil as far as it was found to exist, so that all the churches connected with the General Assembly should be

* Originally published in 1838, in review of the following works: 1. "Facts and Observations concerning the organization and state of the Churches in the three Synods of Western New York, and the Synod of the Western Reserve." By James Wood.

2. "Legal Opinions respecting the Validity of certain Acts of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church." By Messrs. Wood, Hopkins, and Kent.

organized agreeably to the provisions of the constitution. Such ministers and churches, within the bounds of the excluded synods, as were strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order, and should wish to unite themselves with our church, were directed to apply to those presbyteries most convenient to their respective locations. And in case there were any regular presbyteries thus situated, they were directed to make application to the next General Assembly.*

It is obvious that there were three courses open to those affected by these measures. The first was to submit to them. This course was adopted by the synod of New Jersey. In obedience to the requisition of the General Assembly, they directed the only presbytery within their bounds embracing Congregational churches "to take order as soon as it can conveniently be done, to bring all churches within its bounds to an entire conformity with our standards, and to inform such churches that they can retain their present connexion with the presbytery on no other terms." "In giving," it is said, "the foregoing direction to the presbytery of Montrose, the synod have no desire to interfere with the friendly relations hitherto existing between the presbytery and the Congregational churches under its care, further than to separate them from their present connexion, so that they shall not be considered a constituent part of the said presbytery, nor be entitled to a vote or representation in it." These resolutions were, as we understand, adopted unanimously; having received the support of some of those who, on the floor of the General Assembly, had been most prominent and zealous in resisting the abrogation of the Plan of Union. The same course was open to the four excluded synods. By separating themselves from their Congregational and accommodation churches, they could, in obedience to the General Assembly, apply either as individual churches or ministers to the most convenient presbytery; or as presbyteries to the next General Assembly.

* That this is a fair exhibition of the proceedings of the General Assembly is plain from their own declarations. The Plan of Union is declared to be "an unconstitutional act," and as such it was abrogated. *Minutes of the General Assembly*, p. 421. Secondly, it was resolved, "That by the operation of the abrogation of the Plan of Union of 1801, the synod of the Western Reserve is, and is hereby declared to be, no longer a part of Presbyterian Church in the United States of America." Thirdly, it was resolved that in consequence of the abrogation of the Plan of Union, the synods of Utica, Geneva, and Genesee, "are, and are hereby declared to be, out of the ecclesiastical connexion of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America." *Minutes*, p. 444. Fourthly, the synods of Albany, New Jersey, and Illinois, are enjoined to correct the "irregularities in church order charged upon their presbyteries and churches." *Min.*, p. 497. In answer to the Protest of the commissioners from the presbyteries belonging to the synod of the Western Reserve, the Assembly say: the Assembly of 1801 "had no authority from the constitution to admit officers from any other denomination of Christians to sit and act in our judicatories; and therefore no presbytery or synod thus constituted is recognised by the constitution of our church, and no subsequent General Assembly is bound to recognise them." "The representatives of these churches, on the accommodation plan, form a constituent part of these presbyteries as really as the pastors or elders, and this Assembly can recognise no presbytery thus constituted, as belonging to the Presbyterian church. The Assembly has extended the operation of the same principle to other synods which they find similarly constituted." *Min.*, 451.

This course would indeed require submission to measures which these brethren regarded as unkind and even unjust; and might for a time have occasioned many inconveniences. But on the other hand, it cannot long be regarded either as an injustice or hardship, that the General Assembly should require that all churches entitled to representation in our judicatories, and to participation in our government, should conform to the constitution which they administer. It was submitted to the option of all the presbyteries within these synods either to separate from Congregationalism or from the General Assembly. If they refused to do the former, they cannot long expect the sympathy of the public, should they be shut up to the other alternative.

The second course open to these synods, and to those who side with them, was to act upon the conviction which they avowed on the floor of the Assembly, that the time had come for an amicable division of the church. It will be recollected that a committee of ten, five from the majority and five from the minority, was appointed to effect this object. The committee agreed as to its expediency, under existing circumstances, and differed only as to the mode, not the terms of separation. The one party wished it to be made immediately by the Assembly, the other to have it referred to the presbyteries. By acting upon their own plan, and requesting those presbyteries which agreed with them to appoint commissioners to meet and organize as the "General Assembly of the American Presbyterian Church," the division would have been effected in their own way. In this manner all contention might have been avoided, and all questions been amicably adjusted between the two bodies.

The third method was to assume that the acts in question were illegal and void, and to determine to proceed as though they had never been passed. This is the course which has been adopted; whether wisely or unwisely it is not for us to say. Without presuming to question either the motives or the wisdom of those who have advised this course, it may not be out of place to examine its probable results, and the correctness of some of the assumptions on which it is publicly defended.

Soon after the rising of the last Assembly, the presbyteries particularly interested were called together, and in most instances, resolved that they would retain their present organization; that they considered the Plan of Union a sacred compact, and therefore could not consent to the dissolution of the connexion between them and the Congregational churches under their care; that they would, as usual, commission delegates to the next General Assembly, and instruct them to demand their seats in that body. As far as we know, not a single presbytery within the four synods has consented to withdraw from their Congregational churches. Not satisfied with this separate action of the presbyteries, delegates were appointed who met in convention at Auburn, August 17, 1837, and resolved unanimously, that the acts of the General Assembly, disowning the

four synods, "are null and void;" they declared that they consider the rights accruing to the churches from the Plan of Union to be inviolable, that "an almost immemorial usage and acquiescence have committed the original confederated parties by whom the constitution itself was framed and adopted, to guarantee the validity of that important pact;" and that these churches "cannot now be dismembered and disfranchised."* That these brethren had a perfect right to take this course, no one can doubt. When it was submitted to their option either to separate from their Congregational churches, or from the General Assembly, they were certainly at liberty to make their selection. The question is, whether their refusal to submit to the abrogation of the Plan of Union is consistent with their continued or renewed connexion with the Presbyterian church? It certainly cannot be on any other ground than that the General Assembly had no authority to decree that abrogation, and to order the inferior judicatories to carry it into effect. This, however, is a position which we are persuaded cannot be maintained. It is expressly relinquished in the legal opinion given by Mr. Wood, and is virtually renounced in that of Chancellor Kent. These brethren, therefore, have their own lawyers against them. Besides, there are comparatively few persons, not connected with one or the other of the four synods, who question the right of the Assembly to abolish the Plan of Union; there are more who doubt the propriety of the act disowning the synod of the Western Reserve, and still more who disapprove of that in relation to the three synods of New York. These brethren, however, can depend on the co-operation of those only who go the whole length with them. They have selected the weakest, instead of the strongest position, at their command. To justify any one to vote that the commissioners from these synods should take their seats in the next Assembly, it is not enough that he should disapprove of the acts by which they were disowned, he must deny the right of the Assembly to decide that Congregationalists shall no longer sit and act in our judicatories, or be represented in our General Assembly. The whole controversy is made to hinge on this one point. The entire synod of New Jersey has committed itself as to this matter, by acting in obedience to the command of the Assembly, and requiring the Presbytery of Montrose to carry the abrogation of the Plan of Union into effect. Admitting the constitutionality and validity of that abrogation, the synod could not expect the commissioners from the presbytery of Montrose to be admitted to their seats in the next Assembly, had the order of the previous Assembly been disregarded. And we presume that the synods of Albany and Illinois cannot expect that the delegates from their mixed presbyteries can be allowed to sit. The Assembly has declared that "the existence of such presbyteries is recognised

* See Minutes and Address of the Auburn Convention, New York Observer, October 7, 1837.

neither in the former nor the amended constitution of the church," and that they can recognise none such. These brethren say they *must* recognise them. The controversy is thus narrowed to the smallest possible limits. Those who think that the Plan of Union is inviolable, will of course vote for the admission of the delegates from the mixed presbyteries; but those who think the Assembly had a right to set it aside, must vote for their exclusion. Here is a general principle, adopted by the Assembly, applicable not to the presbyteries of the four synods only, but to all others of a similar character. Has then the General Assembly a right to say that they will no longer recognise any presbytery composed partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists? This seems to us a very plain point. Chief Justice Ewing says, an ecclesiastical body which is not organized in the manner provided and sanctioned by the constitution of a church, cannot be deemed a constitutional judicatory of that church.* Our constitution says that "a presbytery is a convention of bishops and elders within a certain district;" these presbyteries are, to a greater or less extent, conventions of Presbyterian ministers and Congregational laymen. Beyond doubt, therefore, they are unconstitutionally organized. It has been attempted to evade this argument by assuming that the Assembly had a right to set aside the constitution; or that the original error has been so long acquiesced in, as to be now legally sanctioned; or that, admitting the right to repeal the Plan of Union, the abrogation, though it might prevent the formation of new churches under its sanction, could not deprive of its benefits those already formed. The first of these assumptions need not be argued. For nothing can be plainer than that a body acting under a constitution cannot alter it. A corporation might as well pretend to change its own charter. The second assumption is much more plausible. It is not necessary, however, to argue the question, how far long continued and general acquiescence can sanction unconstitutional acts. It is enough for our present purpose to show, that admitting all that can be demanded on this point, does not help the case. We may safely grant that the long acquiescence in the Plan of Union had given it such a sanction, that Congregational laymen had a legal right to sit and vote in our judicatories, as long as it continued in force. But how does this prove that they have the right now it is abrogated? As long ago as 1794, the Assembly formed an agreement with the Association of Connecticut, and subsequently with those of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, by which the Congregational delegates of these bodies were allowed to sit and vote in the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, even in judicial cases. This arrangement was palpably unconstitutional. And yet during its continuance, the right of these delegates to vote, sanctioned by silent acquiescence for ten, twenty, or thirty years, could not, perhaps, on a given

* Halsted's Reports, vol. vii., p. 219.

occasion, be successfully questioned. Now the arrangement is set aside, have they still this right? May delegates from all these Associations appear in the next Assembly, and vote on all the great constitutional questions which may come before it? The supposition is absurd. And it is no less absurd to maintain that because Congregationalists had, under the Plan of Union, a right to sit and vote in our judicatories, therefore they have still the right after its abrogation.

It is obvious, therefore, these brethren are driven back to the extreme position that the Plan of Union could not be abrogated, which they must maintain in the face of common sense and of their own lawyers; or they must make the scarcely less desperate assumption, that the effect of the abrogation is only to prevent the introduction of new Congregational Churches, but cannot affect our relation to those already connected with us. That is, that the repeal of a law only forbids its extension, not its continued operation. The Plan effected a union between us and Congregationalists, its abrogation dissolves that union. This is the common sense view of the case. The Plan says that Christians of another denomination may sit in our presbyteries, and be represented in all our church courts; its repeal says that they can do so no longer. Such is admitted to be the effect of the abrogation of this term of agreement with the Associations of New England. Such is the acknowledged operation of the rightful rescinding of any compact between the different states or churches. If our civil government had by law allowed the citizens of France or England certain commercial or political privileges, they might be rightfully enjoyed as long as the law continued in force, but would necessarily cease when the law was repealed. Had such citizens for a series of years been allowed to vote at all our elections, could they continue to claim the right when the law giving them the privilege was repealed? Admitting the right to repeal, there can be no question as to its operation.

We maintain, therefore, that if it be conceded that the General Assembly had the constitutional authority to abrogate the Plan of Union, everything is conceded. If the Assembly had a right to say they will no longer recognise presbyters composed partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists, then the whole case is decided; for it all turns on this one point. All that the Assembly did is included in that one declaration. They knew that all the presbyteries of the Western Reserve were thus organized, and they therefore said they could not any longer regard them as connected with the Presbyterian Church. They thought they had sufficient evidence that such was the fact also with regard to the presbyteries of the three synods in New York; and they therefore made the same declaration with regard to them. In case, however, there was a mistake in any instance as to this point, it was ordered that any presbytery that could make it appear that its organization was purely Presbyterian, should so report itself to

the next General Assembly. If the Presbyterians within these synods, chose to separate themselves from Congregationalists, they would place themselves out of the scope of the above mentioned declaration, and no obstacle was placed in the way of their being recognised.* The whole question therefore is, whether this declaration of the General Assembly, with regard to mixed presbyteries, is constitutional and valid? Can it be that such lawyers as Mr. Wood and Chancellor Kent have pronounced it to be "illegal and void;" that the General Assembly is bound, to the end of time, to allow Congregationalists to sit in our judicatories, to decide on the standing of our ministers, to form and administer our laws, pronounce authoritatively on our doctrines, while they themselves neither adopt our Confession of Faith, nor submit to our form of government? We can scarcely believe this to be possible. We are prepared to show, not that these distinguished gentlemen are bad lawyers, but that a false issue has been presented to them, and that they have consequently given an opinion which has no relation to the real point in debate. We think it can be made to appear, that admitting every one of the legal principles on which their opinion rests, the true point at issue is left untouched. The error is not in the law, but in the facts. We are not, therefore, about to enter the lists with these gentlemen as lawyers, but to show that their clients did not put them in possession of the real state of the case. It is no presumption on our part to claim to be better acquainted with the constitution of the Presbyterian church, and with the acts of the General Assembly, than the distinguished gentlemen above mentioned.

As far as we can discover, the opinions of Mr. Wood and Chancellor Kent† rest on the following principles and assumptions. 1. That the Plan of Union was not of the nature of a contract perpetually binding. 2. That the General Assembly had authority to form that plan. 3. That long-continued usage and general acquiescence forbid its constitutionality being now called into question. 4. That the revision of the constitution, in 1821, after the formation of the plan, was sufficient to sanction it; no objection having then been made to it. 5. That the abrogation of the Plan of 1801 could not affect that of 1808, and the churches formed under it. 6. That the acts relating to the four synods were of the nature of a judicial process. 7. That previous notice and opportunity of being heard are essential to the validity of any such process. 8.

* The General Assembly say, "The Assembly has made provision for the organization into presbyteries and annexation to this body of all the ministers and churches who are thoroughly Presbyterian."—P. 452.

† We do not make any particular reference to the opinion of Mr. Hopkins, for he expressly waves the great point at issue, viz., "the constitutional right of repealing the Plan of Union of 1801." However clear and just may be the legal principles which he advances, they do not, except so far as they are identical with those contained in the opinions of the other gentlemen, appear to us to have any bearing on the case.

That the repeal of a law cannot annul or impair acts rightfully done under its authority.

1. As to the first of these points, Mr. Wood is very explicit. He says the Plan of Union was not a compact, "so as to render it obligatory on the General Assembly to carry into effect the measure, OR TO CONTINUE ITS OPERATION ANY LONGER THAN THEY SHOULD DEEM PROPER. It was a measure originating with and belonging exclusively to the General Assembly." This is no doubt true. This concession is all that need be asked. The Assembly has done nothing more than is here admitted to be within their power. They have put an end to the operation of the Plan in question. On this point Chancellor Kent is not so explicit, and, we must take leave to say, is not quite consistent with himself. He, however, says expressly: "I am by no means of the opinion that the Presbyterian churches were to be always bound by such agreements, when they are found to be ultimately injurious." This certainly means that the Presbyterian church was at liberty to set this agreement aside, when it proved to be injurious. The assent of the other party, he adds, "could not be decently withheld." At most, then, there was an error as to courtesy; for no right is violated in not asking for an assent which the other party had no right to withhold. The General Assembly, however, agreed with Mr. Wood, that this was a measure belonging exclusively to themselves, and therefore did not think it necessary to make any application on the subject.

2. These gentlemen think that the formation of this Plan was within the legitimate authority of the General Assembly. As this is a point relating to the construction of our own constitution, we feel at liberty to question the correctness of this opinion. It is on all hands admitted, that the Assembly has no authority to alter the constitution in the smallest particular. Does the Plan in question effect any such alteration? The constitution prescribes one method in which churches are to be organized and governed, the Plan prescribes another; the constitution lays down certain essential qualifications for the members of our judicatories, the Plan dispenses with them; the constitution grants the right of appeal in all cases, the Plan denies it. Are not these alterations? We cannot conceive a plainer point.

3. It is said, however, that long-established usage and general acquiescence have great effect in determining the rights and powers of bodies. We admit the principle as thus stated. It is, however, liable to many limitations. In the first place, it is applicable only to doubtful cases. "Where the intent of a statute is plain," say the Supreme Court of the United States, "nothing is left to construction."* "The constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes

* Coxe's Digest of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, &c., p. 183.

the orbit in which it must move. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt that every act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is absolutely void."—P. 167. "The framers of the constitution must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said; and in construing the extent of the powers which it creates, there is no other rule than to consider the language of the instrument which confers them in connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred."—P. 177. The rights and liberties of the people could in no country be preserved, if usage and precedent were allowed to close their mouths against oppressive and illegal acts When Charles I. claimed the right to give to his proclamations the force of law, and to exact money under the name of benevolences, and without consent of parliament, he could plead, especially for the former, the usage of a hundred years. Henry VIII., Elizabeth, James I. had, over and over, done the same thing. Parliament had been silent; the people had acquiesced. Had the nation then lost its rights? Had Magna Charta become, by a contrary usage, a dead letter? Was Hampden justly condemned for refusing to pay these exactions? Nine, indeed, out of the twelve judges, decided for usage against the constitution. But did this alter the matter? Does any one now think Hampden wrong and the judges right? Under our own government it is a doubtful point whether congress have a right to establish a national bank. In this case, the decisions of the supreme court, the repeated acts of both houses of the legislature, the long-continued acquiescence of the people, might perhaps be allowed to settle the matter. But is this the fact? Does the country feel itself precluded from raising the constitutional objection? And if, instead of being a doubtful case, it were one of palpable violation of the constitution, does any one imagine that the plea of usage and acquiescence would be listened to a moment? Our General Assembly, though a representative and legislative body, was long in the habit of inviting any minister, who happened to be present at its deliberations, to sit and vote as a corresponding member. No one objected. The thing went on, year after year, until it became an established usage. At last, however, when the church was enlarged, it was seen that this custom operated most unfairly on the distant portions, and was in fact subversive of the very character of the house as a representative body. Could usage be pleaded in defence of such a rule, or against its abrogation? It was in equal violation of the constitution that the Assembly so long allowed the delegates of the New England Associations to vote in its meetings. For this agreement long usage might be urged. But does this prove either that the thing was right, or that the hands of the Presbyterian church were tied up so that they must for ever submit to it? John Randolph said he never could forget that the book of Judges stood just before the Book of Kings. We do not admit the justice of the

insinuation which he intended to convey by this remark. No country has less to fear or more to admire in its judges. But we do believe there is no principle more dangerous to the rights and liberties of nations and churches, than that usage may be set up in opposition to express constitutional provisions.

A second limitation is suggested by Chancellor Kent himself, who says, this assent must be "given understandingly, and with a full knowledge of the facts." The acquiescence pleaded in behalf of the Plan of Union was not thus given. As first assented to, it was regarded as a mere temporary arrangement for a few frontier churches. It continued to be regarded as such for a long series of years. The distant portions of the church scarcely ever heard or thought of it, or had the least idea of the extent to which it had been carried. When they came to learn that it was the basis of entire synods containing hundreds of Congregational churches, they were astonished. This was a state of things of which they had not the least conception. The churches had no means of becoming acquainted with these facts. The reports of the western presbyteries to the General Assembly, the only source of information on this subject, do not, except in a few instances, state which of their churches are Congregational and which are Presbyterian. Thus in the minutes for last year, there are, we believe, less than half a dozen churches within the three synods, reported as Congregational, when, as appears from Rev. Mr. Wood's Pamphlet, there are at least one hundred and seventy-three.* The fidelity, candour and talent with which this report of Rev. Mr. Wood is prepared, entitle it to great confidence. He has performed a valuable service in spreading the information which it contains before the public. This is the more important as there seems to be a strong disinclination, on the part of those concerned, to allow the facts to be known. The Auburn convention appointed a committee on the statistics of the three synods, but no detailed report of the result of their labours, as far as we are informed, has been published. Seeing, therefore, that the churches generally knew little on this subject, it would be most unjust to infer acquiescence from ignorance. Because the distant presbyteries long assented to here and there a solitary individual voting as a corresponding member in the General Assembly, is it believed they would consent, with their eyes open, to all the neighbouring synods thus voting? In the present case the churches were ignorant of the facts; they thought themselves assenting to one thing, which proves to be another. They thought themselves assenting to a plan for sustaining feeble churches in "new settlements;" when it turns out to be, in their estimation, a plan for permanently establishing Congregationalism in the Presbyterian Church, to the entire subversion of its constitution. The plan, with good intentions no doubt, had been monstrously perverted, both by extending and perpetuating it far

* We quote from the second edition as published in the Presbyterian.

beyond its original intention, and by an open disregard of its most important provisions. All this was done silently ; the churches knew nothing about it. Can acquiescence, yielded under such circumstances, be used either in proof of an acknowledgment of the authority of the Assembly to form the Plan, or in bar of its abrogation ? The argument from consent is used for both these purposes, though not by Mr. Wood. We are persuaded it is entirely worthless for either.

4. It is argued that as the constitution was revised and amended in 1821, and as no objection was then made to the Plan of Union, it must be regarded as constitutional. Had these gentlemen been acquainted with the facts in the case, it is hardly possible they could have advanced this argument. The Plan of Union was nothing but a series of resolutions on the minutes of the General Assembly. The revision of the constitution afforded no occasion to express any opinion on this subject. It was never alluded to. And we presume there was not a single presbytery in the whole church that so much as thought of it, when they assented to amendments proposed to them. It seems to us a monstrous proposition that the churches, in assenting to the rule that presbyteries must consist of ministers and ruling elders, are to be held to have thereby assented to their being composed of ministers and Congregational laymen. The only use that can be made of the fact referred to is, to show the church was not sufficiently aware of the danger of these unions, to lead it to insert an express prohibition against any such violations of the constitution, on the part of the General Assembly. This, however, would be so completely a work of supererogation, that were the constitution to be revised to-morrow, we do not believe the strictest man in the church would think it necessary to insert one word on the subject. The silent revision of the constitution, therefore, affords no argument for the acknowledgment of the power of the Assembly to form the Plan of Union, nor for the assent of the churches to that Plan, supposing it to be a compact. Mr. Wood uses the fact for the one purpose ; Chancellor Kent for the other.

5. The abrogation of the Plan of Union of 1801, it is said, could have no effect upon that of 1808, or on the churches received under it. This has always appeared to us the most extraordinary argument connected with this whole subject. It is not surprising that these legal gentlemen, being told that all the Congregational churches within the three synods came into connexion with us, under the latter, and not under the former Plan, should say just what they have said. But it is surprising that the assertion upon which the argument is founded, should ever have been made. The Plan of 1808, according to the extracts from the minutes of the synod of Albany, published in the New York Observer, Sept. 12, 1835, and in the Presbyterian, Sept. 16, 1837, arose out of a request of the synod of Albany to the General Assembly to sanction their union and correspondence, upon certain terms, with the

Middle Association, and the Northern Association Presbytery. To this request the Assembly acceded. The former of these bodies, according to the report of 1809, embraced twenty-one churches, the latter, as we understand, about twelve or fifteen. Here then was permission to receive, on certain conditions, two definite ecclesiastical bodies, with their thirty-three or thirty-six churches. Can any one conceive how permission to receive thirty-six churches can be tortured into a permission to receive two hundred? The number received must indeed far exceed two hundred; for almost the entire basis of three synods, embracing upwards of four hundred churches, was the Congregational churches of that region.* Yet we are gravely told that all these churches were received in virtue of the permission to receive the two bodies just mentioned, with their thirty-six congregations. We do not understand this; and those who make the assertion are bound to explain it. What do the Auburn convention mean by saying, "The WHOLE TERRITORY embracing the three synods of New York came into connexion with the Presbyterian church, so far as they were Congregationalists," in virtue of the Plan of 1808. Does this mean that the Assembly, in consenting to receive two ecclesiastical bodies, consented to receive *the whole territory* covered by the three synods, and therefore all the churches which then existed, or have since been formed upon it? If this explanation is too monstrous to be possible, what does it mean? There is no clause in the agreement which admits of its indefinite extension It refers to those two bodies as then constituted, and to no others. If, then, the Congregational churches within these synods did not come in under the Plan of 1801, there is not a shadow of a warrant for the connexion, as it relates to by far the greater portion of them. That plan is the only one which covers the whole ground. It permitted a union with Congregational churches wherever found. There is indeed a sense in which this plan does not reach the case of many, perhaps of most of these churches. It allowed of a connexion with those congregations only which were of a mixed character, and which had a standing committee as a substitute for a session. In a multitude of cases, however, churches purely Congregational have been allowed to come in under its sanction.† The stated clerk of the presbytery of Buf-

* Dr. Peters said on the floor of the Assembly, that the obligation resulting from the Plan of Union, "had now been transferred to a body twice, yes, five times as large as the Association of Connecticut. All these presbyteries and synods were not only organized on this Plan, but have called our ministers, &c." This was said in reference to the plan of 1801, when we presume he knew as little of that of 1808 as we did. We refer to the statement merely as an admission of the fact referred to in the text.

† "The Plan of Union being adapted to a state of things where Congregationalists and Presbyterians were mingled in one congregation, and there being, in fact, *in these churches, no Presbyterians*, and none who understood their peculiar discipline, the churches were not in fact, strictly speaking, admitted on that Plan. In nine cases out of ten there were no standing committees, and the only difference between their then situation and their previous one, was the fact that one of the brethren

falo says it was "an uniform rule in such cases" to wink at this irregularity, "by considering the whole church the standing committee." We think, by the way, that Chancellor Kent would admit that here was such a "new circumstance" as would justify the abrogation even of a compact; that an agreement to receive mixed churches is not an agreement to receive such as are purely Congregational. The conditions on which this Middle Association was received were, 1. That it should assume our name; though this was not insisted upon. 2. That it should adopt our standards of doctrine and government. 3. That the congregations, if they insist upon it, might manage their internal discipline agreeably to their old method, and that their delegates might sit as ruling elders. It is doubtful whether these conditions were complied with. Mr. Smith, the stated clerk of the synod of Albany, says the association acceded to the invitation (which in the first instance proceeded from themselves), "declining, however, *the terms of adopting the standards.*" This may indeed be understood of the internal government of the churches. But if it refers to a refusal of the ministers to adopt our standards, then the whole thing is void, and the union never was sanctioned. This Plan then, at most, was nothing more than the permission to apply that of 1801, somewhat modified, to two ecclesiastical bodies. That this isolated fact should be made the basis of an obligation to receive all the Congregational churches in New York, is a perfect absurdity.

Nothing can be plainer than that the General Assembly, in abolishing the Plan of Union, did, according to their own declaration, state that as the constitution does not recognise presbyteries composed partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists, they can no longer recognise them. If this declaration be constitutional and valid, it matters not now where these presbyteries may be found, whether in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, or South Carolina; nor when, nor by what means they were organized and connected with the Presbyterian church. All this debate, therefore, about the Plan of 1801 and that of 1808, as we understand the action of the Assembly, has nothing to do with the subject.

6. It is assumed that the acts of the General Assembly, relating to the four synods, were of the nature of a judicial process.

7. That previous notice and opportunity of being heard are essential to the validity of any such process. These two points may be considered together. To begin with the latter. The correctness of the general principle which it states is readily admitted. There are, however, exceptions to it. The grand object of a judicial investigation is to arrive at a knowledge of facts; and the design of the various rules directing how such inves-

occasionally went as a delegate to Presbytery, who was regularly returned in their minutes as an elder." See the Circular Letter of the Association of Western New York, N. Y. Evangelist, Nov. 21, 1836. The above statement is made with special reference to the churches west of the Genesee river.

tigation is to be conducted, is to prevent misapprehension or perversion of those facts. There may, however, be cases so clear and notorious as to supersede the necessity of any such investigation, and to free any court from the obligation to observe those rules. It is a general principle that no man can be deprived of his liberty or property but by due process of law. Yet a judge may send any man to jail without trial, for a contempt committed in open court. In like manner, were any minister to be guilty of open profaneness in the presence of his presbytery, he might be suspended or deposed by a simple vote. Or if a presbytery or synod had publicly and officially rejected the standards of the church, and avowed heresy, they might be declared out of the church by a vote of a superior judicatory. In all such cases, however, the offence must be public and flagrant. We make these remarks, not because they have any bearing on the present case, but because, having admitted the principle, it was necessary to state the limitation.

This principle can have nothing to do with the case of the four synods, except on the assumption that the acts of the Assembly in relation to them were of a judicial nature. This, however, the Assembly deny. They state explicitly that they do not intend "to affect in any way the ministerial standing of any members of either of the said synods; nor to disturb the pastoral relation in any church; nor to interfere with the duties or relations of private Christians in their respective congregations," but simply to declare in what relation they stand to the Presbyterian church. The ground of this declaration is not error in doctrine, nor immoralities in conduct, nor any other judicial offence; it is simply and solely unconstitutional organization. A General Assembly may assuredly entertain the question, whether an inferior judicatory is constituted according to the requirements of our form of government; and a decision of that question in the negative, is not a judicial decision. The Assembly first abrogate the Plan of Union, and then say they consider that abrogation as putting an end to their connexion with all bodies formed in pursuance of that Plan. This is no more a judicial process than the severing our connexion with the Reformed Dutch church, or the Association of New Hampshire, would be.

The "gross disorders" mentioned in the second resolution, in relation to the three synods of New York, are not mentioned as *the ground* of the declarative act contained in the first resolution, but merely as an inducement for the immediate decision of the whole subject. Not one word is said of erroneous doctrine, nor of any other disorders than those connected with the Plan of Union.* The Assembly simply say that the fact that the Plan has been abused, greatly increased their desire to put an end to its operation. All

* The Assembly say, "Gross disorders which are ascertained to have prevailed in those synods, it being made clear to us that the Plan of Union itself was never consistently carried into effect by those professing to act under it." The disorders referred to, therefore, were irregularities connected with that Plan.

the remarks, therefore, in these legal opinions, about the injustice of a condemnation founded on vague charges and uncertain rumours, though true and important, have no relation to the present case. These synods were not judged on the ground of vague charges, nor on the evidence of uncertain rumours. They were not judged at all. The principle that the constitution does not recognise mixed presbyteries was applied to them; and it was left to their decision, whether they would continue in this mixed condition and stay out of the church, or separate from Congregationalism and come in. They have, it appears, decided for the former.

There are two misapprehensions in Mr. Wood's opinion which ought to be corrected. He seems to think that the ground of the decision of the Assembly was the previous, and not the present condition of these churches and presbyteries. "If a congregation," he says, "at present Presbyterian, were originally infidels, that circumstance would not furnish a reason for cutting them off from their ecclesiastical connexion." Certainly not. And no church or presbytery is now cut off, because it once was Congregational. It is the present mixed character of the ecclesiastical bodies effected by the action of the Assembly, which was the ground and reason of their exclusion.

The second misapprehension is nearly allied to the former, and runs through the whole opinion. He supposes the declaration of the Assembly to relate to purely Presbyterian bodies, and to deprive them of their acknowledged rights. This, however, is not the fact. No regularly organized church is affected by that declaration except in virtue of its connexion with a mixed presbytery, and even then, only so far as to require it to seek a new presbyterial connexion. And no regularly organized presbytery is affected by it, except by being required to make its regularity known. The Assembly has not assumed the power of cutting off any regular ecclesiastical body. It has simply said it will no longer recognise mixed ones. Churches being connected with the Assembly only through their presbyteries, they can, even when regular, maintain that connexion in no other way than being connected with a regular presbytery. If their presbytery be disowned, they must join another, if they wish to continue the connexion. If a Presbyterian church, no matter how regular it may be, should put itself under the care of an Association, or any other body not in connexion with the General Assembly, it would be separated from us. And by parity of reason, if it continues in connexion with a body which the Assembly say they can no longer recognise, it forfeits its rights. But then it is its own act, not that of the Assembly.

8. Finally, it is said the repeal of a law cannot annul or impair acts rightfully done under its authority. This, too, we cheerfully admit. The law, however, must be a constitutional one; otherwise it is no law; it is a nullity. Our new-school brethren pronounce certain acts of the last Assembly null and void. If so, would it be right to deprive their commissioners of a seat in the

next Assembly, under its authority? They no doubt agree with us that nothing can be valid which rests upon an unconstitutional enactment. The principle above stated, however, has no application to the present case. The Assembly do not propose to annul or impair any acts rightfully done, even under the Plan of Union. No church or presbytery is to be cast off because it was originally organized under that Plan. The Assembly propose to act on the simple principle that the repeal of a law puts an end to its authority. It was formerly the law, whether right or wrong, that Congregationalists might sit in our presbyteries and be represented in the General Assembly. This is the law no longer. Of course they cannot now thus sit, or be thus represented. This is the whole case. It is a case with but one point in it. Has the General Assembly a right to put an end to the Plan of Union? or, is it bound to the end of time, to allow Congregationalists to be represented in all our church courts, and to make laws for us, to which they will not themselves submit? On this point the judgment of Mr. Wood is clear and explicit. "But supposing," he says, "the assent of the Association to have been indispensable: when it was given they had nothing further to do with the Plan. It then became the measure of the General Assembly alone, to be dropped, or acted upon, or modified, as they should deem advisable." It is upon this undoubted right the Assembly have acted. Nor have they gone beyond it. They have simply declared they will no longer allow what that Plan freely permitted. If therefore commissioners come up as the representatives in whole or in part of Congregational churches, that is, delegated by presbyteries in which those churches are entitled to a vote, they cannot, consistently with the abrogation of that Plan, be allowed to take their seats. Should any one deny the propriety or justice of Presbyterians thus refusing to be governed by Christians of another denomination, when they conscientiously believe their doctrines and discipline are thereby seriously endangered, he certainly is entitled to his opinion, but we cannot think it worth while to try to convince him of his error.

We think we have now redeemed our promise, to show that the conclusions at which these legal gentlemen have arrived, are founded on false assumptions as to facts.* All the legal principles which they advance may be freely admitted, without at all affecting the real question at issue. One of them expressly, the other virtually, concedes the point on which the whole case depends.

* There cannot be a clearer proof of the ignorance in which these gentlemen were left of the proceedings of the Assembly than the following remark of Mr. Wood. "The dissolution of the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia," he says, "is, I think, subject to the same objection of want of notice and opportunity of defence." This act of the Assembly is thus placed in the same category with those relating to the four synods, though it is of an entirely different character. The dissolution of a presbytery does not disconnect its members with the Presbyterian church. The erection, division, or dissolution of presbyteries, occurs more or less every year, and in the regular operation of our system.

They admit that the General Assembly had the right to disconnect itself from the trammels of the Plan of Union; to resolve that they would no longer carry it into effect; that they could not allow Congregationalists, or their representatives, any longer to take part in the government of the Presbyterian church. If this is constitutional, valid, and proper, the case appears to us to be decided. Every presbytery within the four synods is, more or less, of a mixed character. Their commissioners, therefore, must appear as the representatives of Congregationalists as well as of Presbyterians, and consequently can be entitled to their seats only on the assumption that the abrogation of the Plan of Union is illegal and void.

Supposing this first step, marked out in the course proposed by our new-school brethren, to be decided by the commissioners from all mixed presbyteries, being refused a seat in the next Assembly, what is to be the next step? This has not been very clearly stated. It has, however, been often said, and, if we understand the meaning of the resolutions of several of their public bodies, publicly intimated, that it is proposed that these commissioners and those who agree with them, should withdraw and organize themselves as the true General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States. We do not know that this measure will be attempted. It is, however, so important, that it may not be improper to inquire for a moment into its probable results. There would then be two bodies, each claiming to be the General Assembly. We are not lawyers enough to say how the point at issue between them might be brought before a civil tribunal, but we presume a question as to the ownership of some property might easily be raised, which should turn on this point. Supposing this to be done, how would the case stand?

It is on all hands admitted that the only point for the court to decide, is, to whom the property in controversy belongs. In order that any claimants should make out their ownership to the property of a religious society, or to any part of it, they must make it appear that they are members of that society. Mr. Wood tells us, "Though a religious society has an equitable beneficial interest in property held in trust for them, yet they take it, not in their individual, but in their social capacity; they take it as *members*, and only so long as they have the qualifications of members."* Again, on p. 54, he says, "An individual having an interest in property thus held, has not a vested interest. He is benefited by it in his social capacity, and when he of himself and others with him, forming a party, cease to be members, from whatever cause, of that particular society, they cease to have an interest in the property of that society." Governor Williamson, the other counsel in this case, teaches the same doctrine. "If they withdraw and

* See the Arguments of the Counsel of John Hendrickson, in a case (the Quaker case) decided in the court of chancery of New Jersey, p. 9.

establish a new society, ... they cease to be members of the original society, and they cease to have any claim to the property when they cease to be members, their claim being merely as members, not as individuals." P. 164.

What then is necessary to constitute membership? Being the majority of the individuals of which the society was composed, does not decide the point. Suppose the majority of a Protestant society should become Roman Catholics or Mahommedans, would they constitute the original society, or continue members of it? This is a point very plain in itself, and happily one on which the authorities are very explicit and united. Mr. Wood tells us, "That when a majority of a church secede . . . . those that remain, though a minority, constitute the church . . . . and retain the property belonging thereto." "The secession of the majority of the members would have no other effect than a temporary absence would have on a meeting which had been regularly summoned." P. 54. "It matters not," says Mr. Williamson, "how many go, or how many stay; if five remain, or if only one remain, the trust must remain for the benefit of that one. . . . . Suppose the majority of the meeting had become Presbyterians, would they still be the same preparative meeting, or could they take the property with them?" P. 110. "The principle of majority has never been made the ground of decision in the case of a schism in a congregation or religious society. Such a principle is not to be found in our law books or systems of equity." P. 166. If this point does not depend upon numbers, upon what does it depend? There are two things necessary to membership in a religious society, adherence to its doctrines and submission to its discipline. This also is very plain. The doctrines of many religious societies are the same; as, for example, the Reformed Dutch, the Presbyterian, the German Reformed. A member of the one is not, on that account, a member of the other. And though he maintains the same doctrines, if he disconnect himself from one society and either joins, or in connexion with others organizes another, his membership with the former, and all the rights accruing from it, cease of course. It is hardly necessary to quote authorities for a truth so obvious. When a certain portion of the Dutch church withdrew and claimed to be the true Reformed Dutch church, the case was decided against them on this very ground. They had separated from the constituted authorities of the church, and thereby forfeited their membership, though they retained their doctrines. "These persons," says Chief Justice Ewing, "after they withdrew, did not continue members of the Reformed Dutch church simply because they held the same religious faith and tenets with the members of that ecclesiastical body."*

Where there is in any religious society a regular series of depending judicatories, as in our case, the session, presbytery, synod

* See Halsted's Reports, vol. vii., p. 214.

and General Assembly, the question of membership depends on communion with the supreme judicatory. A session or presbytery, not in communion with the true General Assembly, is not a session or presbytery of the Presbyterian Church. In the society of Friends there are preparative, monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings in regular subordination; hence a preparative meeting, not in connexion with the regular yearly meeting, does not belong to that society. This was the point on which the great Quaker case, so often referred to, principally turned. J. H., the treasurer of the preparative meeting of Chesterfield, had loaned $2000 to T. S., the interest of which he had received for a series of years. In 1828, however, a schism occurred in that meeting. One party, the orthodox, withdrew, the other, being the majority, remained and appointed S. D. their treasurer. Here then were two treasurers, both claiming the right to receive from T. S. the interest on the loan of $2000. T. S. applies to the Court of Chancery to compel them to decide their claims, that he might know to whom to pay the money. The immediate question for the court to decide was, who was the true treasurer; and this of course depended on which was the true preparative meeting. To determine this it was inquired which is in connexion with the yearly meeting through the intervening links of a regular monthly and quarterly meeting? It then appeared that there were two bodies claiming to be the regular yearly meeting, the one meeting in Arch street, the other in Green street, Philadelphia. The preparative meeting of Chesterfield, of which J. H. was treasurer, was in connexion with the former; that of which S. D. was treasurer, was in connexion with the latter. The question now was, which was the true yearly meeting? the orthodox in Arch street, or the Hicksites in Green street? On the decision of this question the whole case depended. It appeared that for more than a hundred years, there had been a yearly meeting of the society in Philadelphia, continued by regular appointment. This meeting was held in 1827 at the prescribed time and place, both parties being present and participating in the business; and when it adjourned, it was appointed to meet at the same time and place on the following year. Accordingly a body did thus meet in 1828. This was the orthodox meeting. In the meantime, however, the opposite party, dissatisfied with the proceedings of the meeting of 1827, had appointed a yearly meeting to be held at a different time and at a different place from those prescribed at the regular adjournment of the yearly meeting of 1827. Agreeably to this appointment, a yearly meeting assembled in Green street, claiming to be the ancient yearly meeting of the society of Friends. Here then were two bodies laying claim to the same character. As the orthodox meeting in Arch street met agreeably to adjournment, at the time and place regularly prescribed, the presumption was of course in its favour. Those who called the other meeting, and its defenders, were obliged to assume and to attempt to prove, that the regular yearly meeting of 1827

had, by its proceedings, destroyed itself, and therefore that the meeting assembled by its direction, in 1828, was not the regular successor of the ancient yearly meeting of the society. As they failed in this attempt, judgment was given against them.

In like manner, on the supposition that our new-school brethren should organize themselves as the General Assembly, to substantiate their claim they must prove that the body from which they withdrew has forfeited its legal existence. The burden must lie on them. The presumption of course will be in favour of the body which shall assemble agreeably to the requisition of the General Assembly of 1837, and be constituted in the ordinary manner. This presumption will be greatly strengthened by the fact, that these brethren must recognise its character, by claiming their seats in it as the General Assembly. They will be driven therefore to prove that its refusal to admit them destroys its nature, so that it ceases to be what it was before that refusal, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. It matters not where the controversy about property may begin; whether it be a suit between two sets of trustees of an individual congregation, or between two men, each claiming to be the treasurer of the General Assembly; to this point it must come, and upon this hinge the case must turn. Is the General Assembly destroyed by its refusal to acknowledge the rights of the delegates from mixed presbyteries to take their seats as members? Must it continue to allow Congregationalists to take part in the government of our church, or cease to be the General Assembly?

It appears from what has already been said, that the decision of this question cannot depend upon the number of delegates who may choose to withdraw. It matters not whether they are a minority or majority; if they have a quorum behind, it is the General Assembly, unless it can be proved to have destroyed itself. As courts of chancery have the right to protect trusts and to prevent their abuse or perversion, it is certainly possible for the highest authority of a church so to act as to forfeit its claim to the property of the society which it represents. In order to this, however, it must openly renounce either the faith or discipline of the society. Had the yearly meeting of 1827, of which the Hicksites complained, and from which they separated, declared themselves Presbyterians or Episcopalians, they could no longer be regarded as the yearly meeting of the society of Friends. Majorities are not omnipotent. "They have no power," says Mr. Wood, "to break up the original landmarks of the institution. They have no power to divert the property held by them in their social capacity from the special purpose for which it was bestowed. They could not turn a Baptist society into a Presbyterian society, or a Quaker into an Episcopalian society. They could not pervert an institution and its funds formed for trinitarian purposes, to anti-trinitarian purposes." P. 53. Mr. Williamson says, "If the superior churches change their doctrines, the subordinate ones are not bound to

change theirs. If a part of the head changes its doctrines, and a part of the subordinate branches change theirs also, then those who separate and form a new head, will lose their right to the property; but if there is no dispute about doctrine, those who separate from the head will be considered as seceders, and will lose the benefit of the property. If the whole head changes its religious principles, the society which separates from it, and adheres to the religious principles of the society, will not lose its rights." P. 165. A case strongly confirming this last position is cited by Mr. Wood, p. 55. A large part of a congregation left the jurisdiction of one of the Scotch synods. But they claimed to hold the property on the ground that they were the true church, inasmuch as they adhered to the original doctrines of the church, and they alleged that the synod had departed from those doctrines. The court below decided in favour of the party who still adhered to the synod. In the House of Lords where Lord Eldon presided, the court under his advice decided, that if these allegations of the seceders were true, they were entitled to the property, notwithstanding their secession. It being determined. however, that there was no departure from the faith of the church on the part of the synod, judgment was given against the seceders. We admit, therefore, that it is possible for the supreme judicatory of the church to take such a course as to forfeit their character and authority, and to justify a portion of its members in withdrawing from it as no longer the supreme judicatory of the church to which they belong. It is obvious, however, that nothing short of such a dereliction of the doctrines or order of the church as is a real rejection of its faith or form of government, can work such a result. It is not pretended that the Assembly has departed from the doctrines of the Confession of Faith; the only question therefore can be, whether the rejection of the delegates from mixed presbyteries is so inconsistent with our form of government, that the Assembly, which decides on such a measure, ceases to be the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church? Nothing short of this will suffice to establish the claim of the opposite party. "If this new society have separated from us," says Governor Williamson, "if they have withdrawn; *if they cannot show that the original meeting was dissolved*, they can have no claim to the property." P. 164. It is not enough, therefore, that the court should disapprove of any particular act of the Assembly, thinking it uncalled for or severe; they must pronounce that it is a secession from the Presbyterian church; that it is such a renunciation of its doctrines or discipline as to justify its being deprived of its legal existence and privileges. As the simple question is, Which of the conflicting bodies is the General Assembly? the new one cannot be recognised as such, except on the assumption that the old one is destroyed; destroyed too by the exercise of an undoubted constitutional right, viz. that of judging of the qualifications of its own members. This right is inherent in every representative and legislative body, and is essential to its indepen-

dence and purity. It is a right, moreover, from the exercise of which there is no appeal. To whom can an excluded member of the House of Commons look for redress from its decision that he is not entitled to a seat? To what court can the representatives elect from Mississippi now appeal from what they regard as an unjust decision of the House of Representatives, denying them their right as members? What would our religious liberties be worth, if this privilege were denied to religious bodies? if they were not allowed to say who do, and who do not conform to the standards of their church? or if every decision of an Episcopal convention, or Methodist conference, were liable to be brought under the review of the secular courts? "While the law," says Mr. Wood, "protects individuals, it would be short-sighted indeed if it did not protect religious societies in their social capacity." They are to be protected in the maintenance of their doctrines and discipline, and in the preservation of their property. "How," he asks, "are they to be protected in these important particulars? By guaranteeing to them the power of purgation, of lopping off dead and useless branches, of clearing out those who depart essentially from the fundamental doctrines and discipline of the society." P. 5. That is, by guaranteeing to them the right of judging of the qualifications of their own members. This right has ever been respected. "In determining the great question of secession (and of course of membership) the court," says the same legal authority, "always looks to the highest ecclesiastical tribunal, which exercises a superintending control over the inferior judicatories." P. 56. He refers to a case in New York, in which it was decided "that the adjudication of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal upon this matter (the standing and membership of a minister) was conclusive on the subject." He quotes also from Halsted's Reports to prove that the dissatisfied party cannot get clear of such decision "by changing their allegiance." In the case referred to, Chief Justice Ewing says, that civil courts are bound to give respect and effect to the constitutional decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories, "without inquiring into the truth or sufficiency of the alleged grounds of the sentence." 7 Halsted, p. 220. "The decision of the church judicatory would not be final, if we may afterwards examine its merits. . . . If we ask, as we doubtless may do, by what warrant individuals exercise the powers and duties of ministers, elders and deacons (who were the trustees of the property in controversy), they may answer, by an election, appointment, or call, the validity of which has been decided and sustained by the superior judicatory to which the congregation is subordinate. Such being the fact, ulterior inquiry on our part is closed, and I think with much propriety and wisdom." P. 223. There would be no security for church property if this principle were not admitted. What would be thought of a decision which should strip Trinity Church of its property for an act sanctioned as regular and constitutional by all the authorities of

the Episcopal Church? We have in our own church many men who are avowed anti-sectarians; who think that the barriers which separate the different denominations of Christians should be broken down. It is a possible case, that men of these opinions should have on some occasion, an accidental majority in the General Assembly. Suppose they should avail themselves of the opportunity to enact a Plan of Union, by which, not the favoured Congregationalist only, but the Episcopalian, the Baptist, and even the Papist, should be allowed to sit and vote in all our presbyteries. This would be hailed with delight by many as the commencement of a new era, as the adoption of "a principle that could stand the test of the millennium." Would it then be all over with the Presbyterian Church? Must its General Assembly forfeit its existence and be deprived of all its property, should it repeal this Plan, and refuse to recognise presbyteries thus constituted? We have no fear that any decision so subversive of established principles, so destructive of the rights and liberties of ecclesiastical bodies will ever be made.

We should think the monstrous injustice of any decision which could answer the purpose of our new-school brethren, must alarm the conscience of the most obdurate man in the country. Here, in the event supposed, are two bodies claiming to be the General Assembly. The one, continued by regular succession, is the representative of those by whom almost the whole of the property held by their trustees has been contributed. The other, the representative of some three or four hundred Congregational churches, and of about an equal number of Presbyterian ones, most of which were originally Congregational. It is proposed to apply for a decision which shall declare this mixed body the true Presbyterian Church, and as such entitled to all the property collected and funded by the other party! And for what reason? Because the regular Assembly has resolved not to allow Congregationalists to vote, or to be represented in Presbyterian judicatories. We doubt not that every good man on the opposite side would rather see the property at the bottom of the ocean, than that any such decision should be made.

ESSAY X.

SLAVERY.*

EVERY one must be sensible that a very great change has, within a few years, been produced in the feelings, if not in the opinions of the public in relation to slavery. It is not long since the acknowledgment was frequent at the south, and universal at the north, that it was a great evil. It was spoken of in the slave-holding states, as a sad inheritance fixed upon them by the cupidity of the mother-country in spite of their repeated remonstrances. The known sentiments of Jefferson were reiterated again and again in every part of his native state; and some of the strongest denunciations of this evil, and some of the most ardent aspirations for deliverance from it ever uttered in the country, were pronounced, but a few years since, in the legislature of Virginia. A proposition to call a convention, with the purpose of so amending the constitution of the state as to admit of the general emancipation of the slaves, is said to have failed in the legislature of Kentucky by a single vote.† The sentiments of the northern states had long since been clearly expressed, by the abolition of slavery within their limits. That the same opinions and the same feelings continued to prevail among them, may be inferred, not only from the absence of all evidence to the contrary, but from various decisive indications of a positive character. In the year 1828 a resolution was passed by an almost unanimous vote in the legislature of Pennsylvania, instructing their Senators in Congress to endeavour to procure the passage of a law abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. In 1829 a similar resolution was adopted by the assembly of New York. In 1828 a petition to this effect was presented to Congress, signed by one thousand inhabitants of the District itself; and the House of Representatives instructed the proper committee, in 1829, to inquire into the expediency of

* Originally published in 1836, in review of "Slavery. By William E. Channing."

† It is probable that many reasons combined to make a convention desirable to those who voted for it. But to get rid of slavery, was said to be one of the most prominent.

the measure.* How altered is the present state of the country! Instead of lamentations and acknowledgments, we hear from the south the strongest language of justification. And at the north, opposition to the proceedings of the anti-slavery societies seems to be rapidly producing a public feeling in favour of slavery itself. The freedom of discussion, the liberty of the press, and the right of assembling for consultation, have in some cases been assailed, and in others trampled under foot by popular violence. What has produced this lamentable change? No doubt, many circumstances have combined in its production. We think, however, that all impartial observers must acknowledge, that by far the most prominent cause is the conduct of the abolitionists. They indeed naturally resist this imputation; and endeavour to show its injustice by appealing to the fact that their opinions of slavery have been entertained and expressed by many of the best men of former days. This appeal, however, is by no means satisfactory. The evil in question has been produced by no mere expression of opinion. Had the abolitionists confined themselves to their professed object, and endeavoured to effect their purpose by arguments addressed to the understandings and consciences of their fellow-citizens, no man could have any reason to complain. Under ordinary circumstances, such arguments as those presented on this subject in Dr. Wayland's Elements of Moral Science, and in Dr. Channing's recent publication, would have been received with respect and kindness in every part of the country. We make this assertion, because the same sentiments, more offensively, and less ably urged, have heretofore been thus received.

It is not by argument that the abolitionists have produced the present unhappy excitement. Argument has not been the characteristic of their publications. Denunciations of slaveholding, as man-stealing, robbery, piracy, and worse than murder; consequent vituperation of slaveholders as knowingly guilty of the worst of crimes; passionate appeals to the feelings of the inhabitants of the northern states; gross exaggerations of the moral and physical condition of the slaves, have formed the staple of their addresses to the public. We do not mean to say that there has been no calm and Christian discussion of the subject. We mean merely to state what has, to the best of our knowledge, been the predominant character of the anti-slavery publications. There is one circumstance which renders the error and guilt of this course of conduct chargeable, in a great measure, on the abolitionists as a body, and even upon those of their number who have pursued a different course. We refer to the fact that they have upheld the most extreme publications, and made common cause with the most reckless declaimers. The wildest ravings of the Liberator have been constantly lauded; agents have been commissioned whose great distinction was a talent for eloquent vituperation; coincidence of opinion as to the single point of immediate emancipation has

* Jay's Inquiry, pp. 157, 161.

been sufficient to unite men of the most discordant character. There is in this conduct such a strange want of adaptation between the means and the end which they profess to have in view, as to stagger the faith of most persons in the sincerity of their professions, who do not consider the extremes to which even good men may be carried, when they allow one subject to take exclusive possession of their minds. We do not doubt their sincerity; but we marvel at their delusion. They seem to have been led by the mere impulse of feeling, and a blind imitation of their predecessors in England, to a course of measures, which, though rational under one set of circumstances, is the height of infatuation under another. The English abolitionists addressed themselves to a community, which, though it owned no slaves, had the power to abolish slavery, and was therefore responsible for its continuance. Their object was to rouse that community to immediate action. For this purpose they addressed themselves to the feelings of the people; they portrayed in the strongest colours the misery of the slaves; they dilated on the gratuitous crime of which England was guilty in perpetuating slavery, and did all they could to excite the passions of the public. This was the very course most likely to succeed, and it did succeed. Suppose, however, that the British parliament had no power over the subject; that it rested entirely with the colonial Assemblies to decide whether slavery should be abolished or not. Does any man believe the abolitionists would have gained their object? Did they in fact make converts of the planters? Did they even pretend that such was their design? Every one knows that their conduct produced a state of almost frantic excitement in the West India Islands; that so far from the public feeling in England producing a moral impression upon the planters favourable to the condition of the slaves, its effect was directly the reverse. It excited them to drive away the missionaries, to tear down the chapels, to manifest a determination to rivet still more firmly the chains on their helpless captives, and to resist to the utmost all attempts for their emancipation or even improvement. All this was natural, though it was all, under the circumstances, of no avail, except to rouse the spirit of the mother country, and to endanger the result of the experiment of emancipation, by exasperating the feelings of the slaves. Precisely similar has been the result of the efforts of the American abolitionists as it regarded the slaveholders of America. They have produced a state of alarming exasperation at the south, injurious to the slave and dangerous to the country, while they have failed to enlist the feelings of the north. This failure has resulted, not so much from diversity of opinion on the abstract question of slavery, or from want of sympathy among northern men in the cause of human rights, as from the fact, that the common sense of the public has been shocked by the incongruity and folly of hoping to effect the abolition of slavery in one country, by addressing the people of another. We do not expect to abolish des-

potism in Russia, by getting up indignation-meetings in New York. Yet for all the purposes of legislation on this subject, Russia is not more a foreign country to us than South Carolina. The idea of inducing the southern slaveholder to emancipate his slaves by denunciation, is about as rational as to expect the sovereigns of Europe to grant free institutions, by calling them tyrants and robbers. Could we send our denunciations of despotism among the subjects of those monarchs, and rouse the people to a sense of their wrongs and a determination to redress them, there would be some prospect of success. But our northern abolitionists disclaim with great earnestness all intention of allowing their appeals to reach the ears of the slaves. It is therefore not to be wondered at, that the course pursued by the anti-slavery societies should produce exasperation at the south, without conciliating sympathy at the north. The impolicy of their conduct is so obvious, that men who agree with them as to all their leading principles, not only stand aloof from their measures, but unhesitatingly condemn their conduct. This is the case with Dr. Channing. Although his book was written rather to repress the feeling of opposition to these societies, than to encourage it, yet he fully admits the justice of the principal charges brought against them. We extract a few passages on this subject. "The abolitionists have done wrong, I believe; nor is their wrong to be winked at, because done fanatically, or with good intentions; for how much mischief may be wrought with good designs! They have fallen into the common error of enthusiasts, that of exaggerating their object, of feeling as if no evil existed but that which they opposed, and as if no guilt could be compared with that of countenancing and upholding it. The tone of their newspapers, as far as I have seen them, has often been fierce, bitter, and abusive." P. 133. "Another objection to their movements is, that they have sought to accomplish their object by a system of agitation; that is, by a system of affiliated societies gathered, and held together, and extended, by passionate eloquence." "The abolitionists might have formed an association; but it should have been an elective one. Men of strong principles, judiciousness, sobriety, should have been carefully sought as members. Much good might have been accomplished by the co-operation of such philanthropists. Instead of this, the abolitionists sent forth their orators, some of them transported with fiery zeal to sound the alarm against slavery through the land, to gather together young and old, pupils from schools, females hardly arrived at years of discretion, the ignorant, the excitable, the impetuous, and to organize these into associations for the battle against oppression. Very unhappily they preached their doctrine to the coloured people, and collected these into societies. To this mixed and excitable multitude, minute, heart-rending descriptions of slavery were given in the piercing tones of passion; and slaveholders were held up as monsters of cruelty and crime." P. 136. "The abolitionists often speak of Luther's vehemence as a model to future reformers. But who,

that has read history, does not know that Luther's reformation was accompanied by tremendous miseries and crimes, and that its progress was soon arrested? and is there not reason to fear, that the fierce, bitter, persecuting spirit, which he breathed into the work, not only tarnished its glory, but limited its power? One great principle which we should lay down as immovably true, is, that if a good work cannot be carried on by the calm, self-controlled, benevolent spirit of Christianity, then the time for doing it has not come. God asks not the aid of our vices. He can overrule them for good, but they are not the chosen instruments of human happiness." P. 138. "The adoption of the common system of agitation by the abolitionists has proved signally unsuccessful. From the beginning it created alarm in the considerate, and strengthened the sympathies of the free states with the slaveholder. It made converts of a few individuals, but alienated multitudes. Its influence at the south has been evil without mixture. It has stirred up bitter passions and a fierce fanaticism, which have shut every ear and every heart against its arguments and persuasions. These effects are the more to be deplored, because the hope of freedom to the slave lies chiefly in the dispositions of his master. The abolitionist indeed proposed to convert the slaveholders; and for this end he approached them with vituperation and exhausted on them the vocabulary of abuse! And he has reaped as he sowed." P. 142.

Unmixed good or evil, however, in such a world as ours, is a very rare thing. Though the course pursued by the abolitionists has produced a great preponderance of mischief, it may incidentally occasion no little good. It has rendered it incumbent on every man to endeavour to obtain, and, as far as he can, to communicate definite opinions and correct principles on the whole subject. The community are very apt to sink down into indifference to a state of things of long continuance, and to content themselves with vague impressions as to right and wrong on important points, when there is no call for immediate action. From this state the abolitionists have effectually roused the public mind. The subject of slavery is no longer one on which men are allowed to be of no mind at all. The question is brought up before all our public bodies, civil and religious. Almost every ecclesiastical society has in some way been called to express an opinion on the subject; and these calls are constantly repeated. Under these circumstances, it is the duty of all in their appropriate sphere, to seek for truth, and to utter it in love.

"The first question," says Dr. Channing, "to be proposed by a rational being, is not what is profitable, but what is right. Duty must be primary, prominent, most conspicuous, among the objects of human thought and pursuit. If we cast it down from its supremacy, if we inquire first for our interests and then for our duties, we shall certainly err. We can never see the right clearly and fully, but by making it our first concern. . . . . Right is the

supreme good, and includes all other goods. In seeking and adhering to it, we secure our true and only happiness. All prosperity, not founded on it, is built on sand. If human affairs are controlled, as we believe, by almighty rectitude and impartial goodness, then to hope for happiness from wrong doing is as insane as to seek health and prosperity by rebelling against the laws of nature, by sowing our seed on the ocean, or making poison our common food. There is but one unfailing good; and that is, fidelity to the everlasting law written on the heart, and re-written and republished in God's word.

"Whoever places this faith in the everlasting law of rectitude must, of course, regard the question of slavery, first and chiefly, as a moral question. All other considerations will weigh little with him compared with its moral character and moral influences. The following remarks, therefore, are designed to aid the reader in forming a just moral judgment of slavery. Great truths, inalienable rights, everlasting duties, these will form the chief subjects of this discussion. There are times when the assertion of great principles is the best service a man can render society. The present is a moment of bewildering excitement, when men's minds are stormed and darkened by strong passions and fierce conflicts; and also a moment of absorbing worldliness, when the moral law is made to bow to expediency, and its high and strict requirements are decried or dismissed as metaphysical abstractions, or impracticable theories. At such a season to utter great principles without passion, and in the spirit of unfeigned and universal good will, and to engrave them deeply and durably on men's minds, is to do more for the world than to open mines of wealth, or to frame the most successful schemes of policy."

No man can refuse assent to these principles. The great question, therefore, in relation to slavery is, what is right? What are the moral principles which should control our opinions and conduct in regard to it? Before attempting an answer to this question, it is proper to remark, that we recognise no authoritative rule of truth and duty but the word of God. Plausible as may be the arguments deduced from general principles to prove a thing to be true or false, right and wrong, there is almost always room for doubt and honest diversity of opinion. Clear as we may think the arguments against despotism, there ever have been thousands of enlightened and good men, who honestly believe it to be of all forms of government the best and most acceptable to God. Unless we can approach the consciences of men, clothed with some more imposing authority than that of our own opinions and arguments, we shall gain little permanent influence. Men are too nearly upon a par as to their powers of reasoning and ability to discover truth, to make the conclusions of one mind an authoritative rule for others. It is our object, therefore, not to discuss the subject of slavery upon abstract principles, but to ascertain the scriptural rule of judgment and conduct in relation to it. We do

not intend to enter upon any minute or extended examination of scriptural passages, because all that we wish to assume, as to the meaning of the word of God, is so generally admitted as to render the laboured proof of it unnecessary.

It is on all hands acknowledged that at the time of the advent of Jesus Christ, slavery in its worst forms prevailed over the whole world. The Saviour found it around him in Judea; the apostles met with it in Asia, Greece and Italy. How did they treat it? Not by the denunciation of slave-holding as necessarily and universally sinful. Not by declaring that all slaveholders were men-stealers and robbers, and consequently to be excluded from the church and the kingdom of heaven. Not by insisting on immediate emancipation. Not by appeals to the passions of men on the evils of slavery, or by the adoption of a system of universal agitation. On the contrary, it was by teaching the true nature, dignity, equality and destiny of men; by inculcating the principles of justice and love; and by leaving these principles to produce their legitimate effects in meliorating the condition of all classes of society. We need not stop to prove that such was the course pursued by our Saviour and his apostles, because the fact is in general acknowledged, and various reasons are assigned by the abolitionists and others, to account for it. The subject is hardly alluded to by Christ in any of his personal instructions. The apostles refer to it, not to pronounce upon it as a question of morals, but to prescribe the relative duties of masters and slaves. They caution those slaves who have believing or Christian masters, not to despise them because they were on a perfect religious equality with them, but to consider the fact that their masters were their brethren, as an additional reason for obedience. It is remarkable that there is not even an exhortation to masters to liberate their slaves, much less is it urged as an imperative and immediate duty. They are commanded to be kind, merciful and just; and to remember that they have a Master in heaven. Paul represents this relation as of comparatively little account. "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called. Art thou called being a servant (or slave), care not for it; though, should the opportunity of freedom be presented, embrace it. These external relations, however, are of little importance, for every Christian is a freeman in the highest and best sense of the word, and at the same time is under the strongest bonds to Christ." 1 Cor. vii., 20–22. It is not worth while to shut our eyes to these facts. They will remain, whether we refuse to see them and be instructed by them or not. If we are wiser, better, more courageous than Christ and his apostles, let us say so; but it will do no good, under a paroxysm of benevolence, to attempt to tear the Bible to pieces, or to extort, by violent exegesis, a meaning foreign to its obvious sense. Whatever inferences may be fairly deducible from the fact, the fact itself cannot be denied that Christ and his inspired followers did treat the subject of slavery in the

manner stated above. This being the case, we ought carefully to consider their conduct in this respect, and inquire what lessons that conduct should teach us.

We think no one will deny that the plan adopted by the Saviour and his immediate followers must be the correct plan, and therefore obligatory upon us, unless it can be shown that their circumstances were so different from ours, as to make the rule of duty different in the two cases. The obligation to point out and establish this difference rests of course upon those who have adopted a course diametrically the reverse of that which Christ pursued. They have not acquitted themselves of this obligation. They do not seem to have felt it necessary to reconcile their conduct with his; nor does it appear to have occurred to them, that their violent denunciation of slaveholding and of slaveholders is an indirect reflection on his wisdom, virtue, or courage. If the present course of the abolitionists is right, then the course of Christ and the apostles was wrong. For the circumstances of the two cases are, as far as we can see, in all essential particulars the same. They appeared as teachers of morality and religion, not as politicians. The same is the fact with our abolitionists. They found slavery authorized by the laws of the land. So do we. They were called upon to receive into the communion of the Christian Church, both slaveowners and slaves. So are we. They instructed these different classes of persons as to their respective duties. So do we. Where then is the difference between the two cases? If we are right in insisting that slaveholding is one of the greatest of all sins; that it should be immediately and universally abandoned as a condition of church communion, or admission into heaven; how comes it that Christ and his apostles did not pursue the same course? We see no way of escape from the conclusion that the conduct of the modern abolitionists, being directly opposed to that of the authors of our religion, must be wrong, and ought to be modified or abandoned.

An equally obvious deduction from the fact above referred to, is, that slaveholding is not necessarily sinful. The assumption of the contrary is the great reason why the modern abolitionists have adopted their peculiar course. They argue thus: slaveholding is under all circumstances sinful; it must, therefore, under all circumstances, and at all hazards, be immediately abandoned. This reasoning is perfectly conclusive. If there is error anywhere, it is in the premises and not in the deduction. It requires no argument to show that sin ought to be at once abandoned. Everything, therefore, is conceded which the abolitionists need require, when it is granted that slaveholding is in itself a crime. But how can this assumption be reconciled with the conduct of Christ and the apostles? Did they shut their eyes to the enormities of a great offence against God and man? Did they temporize with a heinous evil because it was common and popular? Did they abstain from even exhorting masters to emancipate their slaves, though an imperative

duty, from fear of consequences? Did they admit the perpetrators of the greatest crimes to the Christian communion? Who will undertake to charge the blessed Redeemer and his inspired followers with such connivance at sin, and such fellowship with iniquity? Were drunkards, murderers, liars, and adulterers, thus treated? Were they passed over without even an exhortation to forsake their sins? Were they recognised as Christians? It cannot be that slaveholding belongs to the same category with these crimes; and to assert the contrary is to assert that Christ is the minister of sin.

This is a point of so much importance, lying as it does at the very foundation of the whole subject, that it deserves to be attentively considered. The grand mistake, as we apprehend, of those who maintain that slaveholding is itself a crime, is, that they do not discriminate between slaveholding in itself considered, and its accessories at any particular time or place. Because masters may treat their slaves unjustly, or governments make oppressive laws in relation to them, is no more a valid argument against the lawfulness of slaveholding, than the abuse of parental authority, or the unjust political laws of certain states, is an argument against the lawfulness of the parental relation, or of civil government. This confusion of points so widely distinct, appears to us to run through almost all the popular publications on slavery, and to vitiate their arguments. Mr. Jay, for example, quotes the second article of the constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society, which declares that "slaveholding is a heinous crime in the sight of God," and then, to justify this declaration, makes large citations from the laws of the several southern States, to show what the system of slavery is in this country, and concludes by saying, "This is the system which the American Anti-Slavery Society declares to be sinful, and ought therefore to be immediately abolished." There is, however, no necessary connexion between his premises and conclusion. We may admit all those laws which forbid the instruction of slaves; which interfere with their marital or parental rights; which subject them to the insults and oppression of the whites, to be in the highest degree unjust, without at all admitting that slaveholding itself is a crime. Slavery may exist without any one of these concomitants. In pronouncing on the moral character of an act, it is obviously necessary to have a clear idea of what it is; yet how few of those who denounce slavery have any well defined conception of its nature! They have a confused idea of chains and whips, of degradation and misery, of ignorance and vice, and to this complex conception they apply the name slavery, and denounce it as the aggregate of all moral and physical evil. Do such persons suppose that slavery as it existed in the family of Abraham, was such as their imaginations thus picture to themselves? Might not that patriarch have had men purchased with his silver, who were well clothed, well instructed, well compensated for their labour, and in all respects treated with parental kindness? Neither inadequate

remuneration, physical discomfort, intellectual ignorance, moral degradation, is essential to the condition of a slave. Yet if all these ideas are removed from the commonly received notion of slavery, how little will remain. All the ideas which necessarily enter into the definition of slavery are deprivation of personal liberty, obligation of service at the discretion of another, and the transferable character of the authority and claim of service of the master.* The manner in which men are brought into this condition, its continuance, and the means adopted for securing the authority and claim of masters, are all incidental and variable. They may be reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust, at different times and places. The question, therefore, which the abolitionists have undertaken to decide, is, not whether the laws enacted in the slaveholding states in relation to this subject are just or not, but whether slaveholding, in itself considered, is a crime. The confusion of these two points has not only brought the abolitionists into conflict with the scriptures, but it has, as a necessary consequence, prevented their gaining the confidence of the north, or power over the conscience of the south. When southern Christians are told that they are guilty of a heinous crime, worse than piracy, robbery or murder, because they hold slaves, though they know that Christ and his apostles never denounced slaveholding as a crime, never called upon men to renounce it as a condition of admission into the church, they are shocked and offended, without being convinced. They are sure that their accusers cannot be wiser or better than their divine Master, and their consciences are untouched by denunciations which they know, if well founded, must affect not them only, but the authors of the religion of the Bible.

The argument from the conduct of Christ and his immediate followers seems to us decisive on the point, that slaveholding, in itself considered, is not a crime. Let us see how this argument has been answered. In the able "Address to the Presbyterians of Kentucky, proposing a plan for the instruction and emancipation of their slaves, by a committee of the synod of Kentucky," there is a strong and extended argument to prove the sinfulness of slavery *as it exists among us*, to which we have little to object. When, however, the distinguished drafter of that address comes to answer the objection, "God's word sanctions slavery, and it cannot therefore be sinful," he forgets the essential limitation of the proposition which he had undertaken to establish, and proceeds to prove that the Bible condemns slaveholding, and not merely the kind or system of slavery which prevails in this country. The argument drawn from the scriptures, he says, needs no elaborate reply. If the Bible sanctions slavery, it sanctioned the kind of slavery which then prevailed; the atrocious system which authorized masters to

* Paley's definition is still more simple: "I define," he says, "slavery to be an obligation to labour for the benefit of the master, without the contract or consent of the servant." Moral Philosophy, book iii., ch. 3.

starve their slaves, to torture them, to beat them, to put them to death, and to throw them into their fish ponds. And he justly asks, whether a man could insult the God of heaven worse than by saying he does not disapprove of such a system? Dr. Channing presents strongly the same view, and says, that an infidel would be labouring in his vocation in asserting that the Bible does not condemn slavery. These gentlemen, however, are far too clear-sighted not to discover, on a moment's reflection, that they have allowed their benevolent feelings to blind them to the real point at issue. No one denies that the Bible condemns all injustice, cruelty, oppression, and violence. And just so far as the laws then existing authorized these crimes the Bible condemned them. But what stronger argument can be presented to prove that the sacred writers did not regard slaveholding as in itself sinful, than that while they condemn all unjust or unkind treatment (even threatening) on the part of masters towards their slaves, they did not condemn slavery itself? While they required the master to treat his slave according to the law of love, they did not command him to set him free. The very atrocity, therefore, of the system which then prevailed, instead of weakening the argument, gives it tenfold strength. Then, if ever, when the institution was so fearfully abused, we might expect to hear the interpreters of the divine will saying that a system which leads to such results is the concentrated essence of all crimes, and must be instantly abandoned on pain of eternal condemnation. This, however, they did not say, and we cannot now force them to say it. They treated the subject precisely as they did the cruel despotism of the Roman emperors. The licentiousness, the injustice, the rapine and murders of those wicked men, they condemned with the full force of divine authority; but the mere extent of their power, though so liable to abuse, they left unnoticed.

Another answer to the argument in question is, that "The New Testament does condemn slaveholding, *as practised among us*, in the most explicit terms furnished by the language in which the sacred penmen wrote." This assertion is supported by saying that God has condemned slavery, because he has specified the parts which compose it and condemned them, one by one, in the most ample and unequivocal form.* It is to be remarked that the saving clause, "slaveholding *as it exists among us*," is introduced into the statement, though it seems to be lost sight of in the illustration and confirmation of it which follow. We readily admit, that if God does condemn all the parts of which slavery consists, he condemns slavery itself. But the drafter of the address has made no attempt to prove that this is actually done in the sacred scriptures. That many of the attributes of the system, as established by law in this country, are condemned, is indeed very plain; but that slaveholding in itself is condemned, has not been and cannot be proved. The writer, indeed, says, "The Greek language had a word cor-

* Address, &c., p. 20.

responding exactly, in signification, with our word servant, but it had none which answered precisely to our term slave. How then was an apostle writing in Greek, to condemn our slavery? How can we expect to find in scripture, the words 'slavery is sinful,' when the language in which it is written contained no term which expressed the meaning of our word slavery?" Does the gentleman mean to say the Greek language could not express the idea that slaveholding is sinful? Could not the apostles have communicated the thought that it was the duty of masters to set their slaves free? Were they obliged from paucity of words to admit slaveholders into the Church? We have no doubt the writer himself could, with all ease, pen a declaration in the Greek language void of all ambiguity, proclaiming freedom to every slave upon earth, and denouncing the vengeance of heaven upon every man who dared to hold a fellow creature in bondage. It is not words we care for. We want evidence that the sacred writers taught that it was incumbent on every slaveholder, as a matter of duty, to emancipate his slaves (which no Roman or Greek law forbade), and that his refusing to do so was a heinous crime in the sight of God. The Greek language must be poor indeed if it cannot convey such ideas.

Another answer is given by Dr. Channing. "Slavery," he says, "in the age of the apostle, had so penetrated society, was so intimately interwoven with it, and the materials of servile war were so abundant, that a religion, preaching freedom to its victims, would have armed against itself the whole power of the State? Of consequence, Paul did not assail it. He satisfied himself with spreading principles, which, however slowly, could not but work its destruction." To the same effect, Dr. Wayland says, "The gospel was designed, not for one race or one time, but for all men and for all times. It looked not at the abolition of this form of evil for that age alone, but for its universal abolition. Hence the important object of its author was to gain it a lodgment in every part of the known world; so that, by its universal diffusion among all classes of society, it might quietly and peacefully modify and subdue the evil passions of men; and thus, without violence, work a revolution in the whole mass of mankind. In this manner alone could its object, a universal moral revolution, be accomplished. For if it had forbidden the *evil* without subduing the *principle*, if it had proclaimed the unlawfulness of slavery, and taught slaves to *resist* the oppression of their masters, it would instantly have arrayed the two parties in deadly hostility throughout the civilized world; its announcement would have been the signal of a servile war; and the very name of the Christian religion would have been forgotten amidst the agitations of universal bloodshed. The fact, under these circumstances, that the gospel does not forbid slavery, affords no reason to suppose that it does not mean to prohibit it, much less does it afford ground for belief that Jesus Christ intended to authorize it."*

* Elements of Moral Science, p. 225.

Before considering the force of this reasoning, it may be well to notice one or two important admissions contained in these extracts. First, then, it is admitted by these distinguished moralists, that the apostles did not preach a religion proclaiming freedom to slaves; that Paul did not assail slavery; that the gospel did not proclaim the unlawfulness of slaveholding; it did not forbid it. This is going the whole length that we have gone in our statement of the conduct of Christ and his apostles. Secondly, these writers admit that the course adopted by the authors of our religion was the only wise and proper one. Paul satisfied himself, says Dr. Channing, with spreading principles, which, however slowly, could not but work its destruction. Dr. Wayland says, that if the apostles had pursued the opposite plan of denouncing slavery as a crime, the Christian religion would have been ruined: its very name would have been forgotten. Then how can the course of the modern abolitionists, under circumstances so nearly similar, or even that of these reverend gentlemen themselves, be right? Why do not they content themselves with doing what Christ and his apostles did? Why must they proclaim the unlawfulness of slavery? Is human nature so much altered, that a course which would have produced universal bloodshed, and led to the very destruction of the Christian religion in one age, is wise and Christian in another?

Let us, however, consider the force of the argument as stated above. It amounts to this. Christ and his apostles thought slaveholding a great crime, but they abstained from saying so for fear of the consequences. The very statement of the argument, in its naked form, is its refutation. These holy men did not refrain from condemning sin from a regard to the consequences. They did not hesitate to array against the religion which they taught, the strongest passions of men. Nor did they content themselves with denouncing the general principles of evil; they condemned its special manifestations. They did not simply forbid intemperate sensual indulgence, and leave it to their hearers to decide what did or what did not come under that name. They declared that no fornicator, no adulterer, no drunkard, could be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. They did not hesitate, even, when a little band, a hundred and twenty souls, to place themselves in direct and irreconcilable opposition to the whole polity, civil and religious, of the Jewish state. It will hardly be maintained that slavery was at that time more intimately interwoven with the institutions of society, than idolatry was. It entered into the arrangements of every family; of every city and province, and of the whole Roman empire. The emperor was the Pontifex Maximus; every department of the state, civil and military, was pervaded by it. It was so united with the fabric of the government that it could not be removed without effecting a revolution in all its parts. The apostles knew this. They knew that to denounce polytheism was to array against them the whole power

of the state. Their divine Master had distinctly apprised them of the result. He told them that it would set the father against the son, and the son against the father; the mother against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; and that a man's enemies should be those of his own household. He said that he came not to bring peace but a sword, and that such would be the opposition to his followers, that whosoever killed them, would think he did God service. Yet in view of these certain consequences the apostles did denounce idolatry, not merely in principle, but by name. The result was precisely what Christ had foretold. The Romans, tolerant of every other religion, bent the whole force of their wisdom and arms to extirpate Christianity. The scenes of bloodshed which century after century followed the introduction of the gospel, did not induce the followers of Christ to keep back or modify the truth. They adhered to their declaration that idolatry was a heinous crime. And they were right. We expect similar conduct of our missionaries. We do not expect them to refrain from denouncing the institutions of the heathen as sinful, because they are popular, or intimately interwoven with society. The Jesuits, who adopted this plan, forfeited the confidence of Christendom, without making converts of the heathen. It is, therefore, perfectly evident that the authors of our religion were not withheld by these considerations, from declaring slavery to be unlawful. If they did abstain from this declaration, as is admitted, it must have been because they did not consider it as in itself a crime. No other solution of their conduct is consistent with their truth or fidelity.

Another answer to the argument from scripture is given by Dr. Channing and others. It is said that it proves too much; that it makes the Bible sanction despotism, even the despotism of Nero. Our reply to this objection shall be very brief. We have already pointed out the fallacy of confounding slaveholding itself with the particular system of slavery prevalent at the time of Christ, and shown that the recognition of slaveholders as Christians, though irreconcilable with the assumption that slavery is a heinous crime, gives no manner of sanction to the atrocious laws and customs of that age in relation to that subject. Because the apostles admitted the masters of slaves to the communion of the church, it would be a strange inference that they would have given this testimony to the Christian character of the master who oppressed, starved, or murdered his slaves. Such a master would have been rejected as an oppressor, or murderer, however, not as a slaveholder. In like manner, the declaration that government is an ordinance of God, that magistrates are to be obeyed within the sphere of their lawful authority; that resistance to them, when in the exercise of that authority, is sinful; gives no sanction to the oppression of the Roman emperors, or to the petty vexations of provincial officers. The argument urged from scripture in favour of passive submission, is not so

exactly parallel with the argument for slavery, as Dr. Channing supposes.* They agree in some points, but they differ in others. The former is founded upon a false interpretation of Rom. xiii., 1–3; it supposes that passage to mean what it does not mean, whereas the latter is founded upon the sense which Dr. C. and other opponents of slavery admit to be the true sense. This must be allowed to alter the case materially. Again, the argument for the lawfulness of slaveholding is not founded on the mere injunction, "Slaves, obey your masters," analogous to the command, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers," but on the fact that the apostles did not condemn slavery; that they did not require emancipation; and that they recognised slaveholders as Christian brethren. To make Dr. Channing's argument of any force, it must be shown that Paul not only enjoined obedience to a despotic monarch, but that he recognised Nero as a Christian. When this is done, then we shall admit that our argument is fairly met, and that it is just as true that he sanctioned the conduct of Nero as that he acknowledged the lawfulness of slavery.

The two cases, however, are analogous as to one important point. The fact that Paul enjoins obedience under a despotic government, is a valid argument to prove, not that he sanctioned the conduct of the reigning Roman emperor, but that he did not consider the possession of despotic power a crime. The argument of Dr. C. would be far stronger, and the two cases more exactly parallel, had one of the emperors become a penitent believer during the apostolic age, and been admitted to the Christian church by inspired men, notwithstanding the fact that he retained his office and authority. But even without this latter decisive circumstance, we acknowledge that the mere holding of despotic power is proved not to be a crime by the fact that the apostles enjoined obedience to those who exercised it. Thus far the arguments are analogous; and they prove that both political despotism and domestic slavery belong in morals to the *adiaphora*, to things indifferent. They may be expedient or inexpedient, right or wrong, according to circumstances. Belonging to the same class, they should be treated in the same way. Neither is it to be denounced as necessarily sinful, and to be abolished immediately under all circumstances and at all hazards. Both should be left to the operation of those general principles of the gospel, which have peacefully meliorated political institutions, and destroyed domestic slavery throughout the greater part of Christendom.

The truth on this subject is so obvious that it sometimes escapes

* It need hardly be remarked that the command to obey magistrates, as given in Rom. xiii., 1–3, is subject to the limitation stated above. They are to be obeyed as magistrates; precisely as parents are to be obeyed as parents, husbands as husbands. The command of obedience is expressed as generally, in the last two cases, as in the first. A magistrate beyond the limits of his lawful authority (whatever that may be) has, in virtue of this text, no more claim to obedience, than a parent who, on the strength of the passage, "Children, obey your parents in all things," should command his son to obey him as a monarch or a pope.

unconsciously from the lips of the most strenuous abolitionists. Mr. Birney says, "He would have retained the power and authority of an emperor; yet his oppressions, his cruelties, would have ceased; the very temper that prompted them would have been suppressed; his power would have been put forth for good and not for evil."* Here everything is conceded. The possession of despotic power is thus admitted not to be a crime, even when it extends over millions of men, and subjects their lives as well as their property and services to the will of an individual. What becomes then of the arguments and denunciations of slave-holding, which is despotism on a small scale? Would Mr. Birney continue in the deliberate practice of a crime worse than robbery, piracy, or murder? When he penned the above sentiment, he must have seen that neither by the law of God nor of reason is it necessarily sinful to sustain the relation of master over our fellow creatures; that if this unlimited authority be used for the good of those over whom it extends and for the glory of God, its possessor may be one of the best and most useful of men. It is the abuse of this power for base and selfish purposes which constitutes criminality, and not its simple possession. He may say that the tendency to abuse absolute power is so great that it ought never to be confided to the hands of men. This, as a general rule, is no doubt true, and establishes the inexpediency of all despotic governments whether for the state or the family. But it leaves the morality of the question just where it was, and where it was seen to be, when Mr. Birney said he could with a good conscience be a Roman emperor, i. e., the master of millions of slaves.

The consideration of the Old Testament economy leads us to the same conclusion on this subject. It is not denied that slavery was tolerated among the ancient people of God. Abraham had servants in his family who were "bought with his money," Gen. xvii., 13. "Abimelech took sheep and oxen, and men servants, and maid servants, and gave them unto Abraham." Moses, finding this institution among the Hebrews and all surrounding nations, did not abolish it. He enacted laws directing how slaves were to be treated, on what conditions they were to be liberated, under what circumstances they might, and might not, be sold; he recognises the distinction between slaves and hired servants (Deut. xv., 18); he speaks of the way by which these bondmen might be procured; as by war, by purchase, by the right of creditorship, by the sentence of a judge, by birth; but not by seizing on those who were free, an offence punished by death.† The fact that the Mosaic institutions recognised the lawfulness of slavery is a point too plain to need proof, and is almost universally admitted.

* Quoted by Pres. Young, p. 45, of the Address, &c.

† On the manner in which slaves were acquired, compare Deut. xx., 14; xxi., 10, 11; Ex. xxii., 3; Neh. v, 4, 5; Gen. xiv., 14; xv., 3; xvii., 23; Num. xxxi., 18, 35; Deut xxv., 44, 46.

As to the manner in which they were to be treated, see Lev. xxv., 39–53; Ex. xx., 10; xxii., 2–8; Deut. xxv., 4–6, &c., &c.

Our argument from this acknowledged fact is, that if God allowed slavery to exist, if he directed how slaves might be lawfully acquired, and how they were to be treated, it is in vain to contend that slaveholding is a sin, and yet profess reverence for the scriptures. Every one must feel that if perjury, murder, or idolatry, had been thus authorized, it would bring the Mosaic institutions into conflict with the eternal principles of morals, and that our faith in the divine origin of one or the other must be given up.

Dr. Channing says, of this argument also, that it proves too much. "If usages sanctioned under the Old Testament, and not forbidden under the New, are right, then our moral code will undergo a sad deterioration. Polygamy was allowed to the Israelites, was the practice of the holiest men, and was common and licensed in the age of the apostles. But the apostles nowhere condemn it, nor was the renunciation of it made an essential condition of admission into the Christian Church." To this we answer, that so far as polygamy and divorce were permitted under the old dispensation, they were lawful, and became so by that permission; and they ceased to be lawful when the permission was withdrawn, and a new law given. That Christ did give a new law on this subject is abundantly evident.* With regard to divorce, it is as explicit as language can make it; and with regard to polygamy it is so plain as to have secured the assent of every portion of the Christian Church in all ages. The very fact that there has been no diversity of opinion or practice among Christians with regard to polygamy, is itself decisive evidence that the will of Christ was clearly revealed on the subject. The temptation to continue the practice was as strong, both from the passions of men, and the sanction of prior ages, as in regard to slavery. Yet we find no traces of the toleration of polygamy in the Christian Church, though slavery long continued to prevail. There is no evidence that the apostles admitted to the fellowship of Christians, those who were guilty of this infraction of the law of marriage. It is indeed possible that in cases where the converts had already more than one wife, the connexion was not broken off. It is evident this must have occasioned great evil. It would lead to the breaking up of families, the separation of parents and children, as well as husbands and wives. Under these circumstances the connexion may have been allowed to continue. It is, however, very doubtful whether even this was permitted. It is remarkable that among the numerous cases of

* "The words of Christ (Matt. xix., 9) may be construed by an easy implication to prohibit polygamy: for if 'whoever putteth away his wife, and *marrieth* another, committeth adultery,' he who marrieth another *without* putting away the first, is no less guilty of adultery: because the adultery does not consist in the repudiation of the first wife (for, however unjust and cruel that may be, it is not adultery), but in entering into a second marriage during the legal existence and obligation of the first. The several passages in St. Paul's writings, which speak of marriage, always suppose it to signify the union of one man with one woman."—Paley's Moral Phil., book iii., chap. 6.

conscience connected with marriage, submitted to the apostles, this never occurs.

Dr. Channing uses language much too strong when he says that polygamy was common and licensed in the days of the apostles. It was contrary both to Roman and Grecian laws and usages, until the most degenerate periods of the history of those nations. It was very far from being customary among the Jews, though it might have been allowed. It is probable that it was, therefore, comparatively extremely rare in the apostolic age. This accounts for the fact that scarcely any notice is taken of the practice in the New Testament. Wherever marriage is spoken of it seems to be taken for granted, as a well understood fact, that it was a contract for life between one man and one woman; compare Rom. vii., 2, 3; 1 Cor. vii., 1, 2, 39. It is further to be remarked on this subject that marriage is a positive institution. If God had ordained that every man should have two or more wives instead of one, polygamy would have been lawful. But slaveholding is denounced as a *malum in se;* as essentially unjust and wicked. This being the case, it could at no period of the world receive the divine sanction, much less could it have continued in the Christian Church, under the direction of inspired men, when there was nothing to prevent its immediate abolition. The answer then of Dr. Channing is unsatisfactory; first, because polygamy does not belong to the same category in morals as that to which slaveholding is affirmed to belong; and secondly, because it was so plainly prohibited by Christ and his apostles as to secure the assent of all Christians in all ages of the Church.

It is, however, argued that slavery must be sinful because it interferes with the inalienable rights of men. We have already remarked that slavery, in itself considered, is a state of bondage, and nothing more. It is the condition of an individual who is deprived of his personal liberty, and is obliged to labour for another, who has the right to transfer this claim of service at pleasure. That this condition involves the loss of many of the rights which are commonly and properly called natural, because belonging to men, as men, is readily admitted. It is, however, incumbent on those who maintain that slavery is, on this account, necessarily sinful, to show that it is criminal, under all circumstances, to deprive any set of men of a portion of their natural rights. That this broad proposition cannot be maintained, is evident. The very constitution of society supposes the forfeiture of a greater or less amount of these rights, according to its peculiar organization. That it is not only the privilege, but the duty of men to live together in a regularly organized society, is evident from the nature which God has given us; from the impossibility of every man living by and for himself, and from the express declarations of the word of God. The object of the formation of society is the promotion of human virtue and happiness; and the form in which it should be organized, is that which will best secure the

attainment of this object. As, however, the condition of men is so very various, it is impossible that the same form should be equally conducive to happiness and virtue under all circumstances. No one form, therefore, is prescribed in the Bible, or is universally obligatory. The question which form is, under given circumstances, to be adopted, is one of great practical difficulty, and must be left to the decision of those who have the power to decide, on their own responsibility. The question, however, does not depend upon the degree in which these several forms may encroach on the natural rights of men. In the patriarchal age, the most natural, the most feasible, and perhaps the most beneficial form of government was by the head of the family. His power by the law of nature, and the necessity of the case, extended without any other limit than the general principles of morals, over his children, and in the absence of other regular authority, would not terminate when the children arrived at a particular age, but be continued during life. He was the natural umpire between his adult offspring —he was their lawgiver and leader. His authority would naturally extend over his more remote descendants, as they continued to increase, and on his death, might devolve on the next oldest of the family. There is surely nothing in this mode of constituting society which is necessarily immoral. If found to be conducive to the general good, it might be indefinitely continued. It would not suffice to render its abrogation obligatory, to say that all men are born free and equal; that the youth of twenty-one had as good a right to have a voice in the affairs of the family as the aged patriarch; that the right of self-government is indefeasible, &c. Unless it could be shown that the great end of society was not attainable by this mode of organization, and that it would be more securely promoted by some other, it would be an immorality to require or to effect the change. And if a change became, in the course of time, obviously desirable, its nature and extent would be questions to be determined by the peculiar circumstances of the case, and not by the rule of abstract rights. Under some circumstances it might be requisite to confine the legislative power to a single individual; under others to the hands of a few; and under others to commit it to the whole community. It would be absurd to maintain, on the ground of the natural equality of men, that a horde of ignorant and vicious savages should be organized as a pure democracy, if experience taught that such a form of government was destructive to themselves and others. These different modes of constituting civil society are not necessarily either just or unjust, but become the one or the other according to circumstances; and their morality is not determined by the degree in which they encroach upon the natural rights of men, but on the degree in which they promote or retard the progress of human happiness and virtue. In this country we believe that the general good requires us to deprive the whole female sex of the right of self-government. They have no voice in the formation of the

laws which dispose of their persons and property. When married, we despoil them almost entirely of a legal existence, and deny them some of the most essential rights of property. We treat all minors much in the same way, depriving them of many personal and almost all political rights, and that too though they may be far more competent to exercise them aright than many adults. We, moreover, decide that a majority of one may make laws for the whole community, no matter whether the numerical majority have more wisdom or virtue than the minority or not. Our plea for all this is, that the good of the whole is thereby most effectually promoted. This plea, if made out, justifies the case. In England and France they believe that the good of the whole requires that the right of governing, instead of being restricted to all adult males, as we arbitrarily determine, should be confined to that portion of the male population who hold a given amount of property. In Prussia and Russia, they believe with equal confidence, that public security and happiness demand that all power should be in the hands of the king. If they are right in their opinion, they are right in their practice. The principle that social and political organizations are designed for the general good, of course requires they should be allowed to change, as the progress of society may demand. It is very possible that the feudal system may have been well adapted to the state of Europe in the middle ages. The change in the condition of the world, however, has gradually obliterated almost all its features. The villain has become the independent farmer; the lord of the manor, the simple landlord; and the sovereign liege, in whom, according to the fiction of the system, the fee of the whole country vested, has become a constitutional monarch. It may be that another series of changes may convert the tenant into an owner, the lord into a rich commoner, and the monarch into a president. Though these changes have resulted in giving the people the enjoyment of a larger amount of their rights than they formerly possessed, it is not hence to be inferred that they ought centuries ago to have been introduced suddenly or by violence. Christianity "operates as alterative." It was never designed to tear up the institutions of society by the roots. It produces equality not by prostrating trees of all sizes to the ground, but by securing to all the opportunity of growing, and by causing all to grow, until the original disparity is no longer perceptible. All attempts, by human wisdom, to frame society, of a sudden, after a pattern cut by a rule of abstract rights, have failed; and whether they had failed or not, they can never be urged as a matter of moral obligation. It is not enough therefore, in order to prove the sinfulness of slaveholding, to show that it interferes with the natural rights of a portion of the community. It is in this respect analogous to all other social institutions. They are all of them encroachments on human rights, from the freest democracy to the most absolute despotism.

It is further to be remarked that all these rights suppose corres-

ponding duties, and where there is an incompetence for the duty, the claim to exercise the right ceases. No man can justly claim the exercise of any right to the injury of the community of which he is a member. It is because females and minors are judged (though for different reasons) incompetent to the proper discharge of the duties of citizenship, that they are deprived of the right of suffrage. It is on the same principle that a large portion of the inhabitants of France and England are deprived of the same privilege. As it is acknowledged that the slaves may be justly deprived of political rights on the ground of their incompetency to exercise them without injury to the community, it must be admitted, by parity of reason, that they may be justly deprived of personal freedom, if incompetent to exercise it with safety to society. If this is so, then slavery is a question of circumstances, and not a *malum in se*. It must be borne in mind that the object of these remarks is not to prove that the American, the British, or the Russian form of society is expedient or otherwise; much less to show that the slaves in this country are actually unfit for freedom, but simply to prove that the mere fact that slaveholding interferes with natural rights, is not enough to justify the conclusion that it is necessarily and universally sinful.

Another very common and plausible argument on this subject is, that a man cannot be made a matter of property. He cannot be degraded into a brute or chattel without the grossest violation of duty and propriety; and that as slavery confers this right of property in human beings it must, from its very nature, be a crime. We acknowledge the correctness of the principle on which this argument is founded, but deny that it is applicable to the case in hand. We admit that it is not only an enormity, but an impossibility, that a man should be made a thing, as distinguished from a rational and moral being. It is not within the compass of human law to alter the nature of God's creatures. A man must be regarded and treated as a rational being even in his greatest degradation. That he is, in some countries and under some institutions, deprived of many of the rights and privileges of such a being, does not alter his nature. He must be viewed as a man under the most atrocious system of slavery that ever existed. Men do not arraign and try on evidence, and punish on conviction either things or brutes. Yet slaves are under a regular system of laws which, however unjust they may be, recognise their character as accountable beings. When it is inferred from the fact that the slave is called the property of his master, that he is thereby degraded from his rank as a human being, the argument rests on the vagueness of the term *property*. Property is the right of possession and use, and must of necessity vary according to the nature of the objects to which it attaches. A man has property in his wife, in his children, in his domestic animals, in his fields and in his forests. That is, he has the right to the possession and use of these several objects according to their nature. He has no more right to use a brute as a log

of wood, in virtue of the right of property, than he has to use a man as a brute. There are general principles of rectitude obligatory on all men, which require them to treat all the creatures of God according to the nature which he has given them. The man who should burn his horse because it was his property, would find no justification in that plea either before God or man. When therefore it is said that one man is the property of another, it can only mean that the one has a right to use the other *as a man*, but not as a brute or as a thing. He has no right to treat him as he may lawfully treat his ox, or a tree. He can convert his person to no use to which a human being may not, by the laws of God and nature, be properly applied. When this idea of property comes to be analysed, it is found to be nothing more than a claim of service either for life or for a term of years. This claim is transferable, and is of the nature of property, and is consequently liable for the debts of the owner, and subject to his disposal by will or otherwise. It is probable that the slave is called the property of his master in the statute books, for the same reason that children are called the servants of their parents, or that wives are said to be the same person with their husbands and to have no separate existence of their own. These are mere technicalities designed to facilitate certain legal processes. Calling a child a servant does not alter his relation to his father; and a wife is still a woman, though the courts may rule her out of existence. In like manner where the law declares that the slave shall be deemed and adjudged to be a chattel personal in the hands of his master, it does not alter his nature, nor does it confer on the master any right to use him in a manner inconsistent with that nature. As there are certain moral principles which direct how brutes are to be used by those to whom they belong, so there are fixed principles which determine how a man may be used. These legal enactments, therefore, are not intended to legislate away the nature of the slave as a human being; they serve to facilitate the transfer of the master's claim of service, and to render that claim the more readily liable for his debts. The transfer of authority and claim of service from one master to another, is in principle analogous to transfer of subjects from one sovereign to another. This is a matter of frequent occurrence. By the treaty of Vienna, for example, a large part of the inhabitants of central Europe changed masters. Nearly half of Saxony was transferred to Prussia; Belgium was annexed to Holland. In like manner Louisiana was transferred from France to the United States. In none of these cases were the people consulted. Yet in all a claim of service more or less extended was made over from one power to another. There was a change of masters. The mere transferable character of the master's claim to the slave does not convert the latter into a thing, or degrade him from his rank as human being. Nor does the fact that he is bound to serve for life produce this effect. It is only property in his time for life, instead

of for a term of years. The nature of the relation is not determined by the period of its continuance.

It has, however, been argued that the slave is the property of his master, not only in the sense admitted above, but in the sense assumed in the objection, because his children are under the same obligation of service as the parent. The hereditary character of slavery, however, does not arise out of the idea of the slave as a chattel or thing, a mere matter of property: it depends on the organization of society. In England one man is born a peer, another a commoner; in Russia one is born a noble, another a serf; here one is born a free citizen, another a disfranchised outcast (the free coloured man), and a third a slave. These forms of society, as before remarked, are not necessarily, or in themselves, either just or unjust; but become the one or the other, according to circumstances. Under a state of things in which the best interests of the community would be promoted by the British or Russian organization, they would be just and acceptable to God; but under circumstances in which they would be injurious, they would be unjust. It is absolutely necessary, however, to discriminate between an organization essentially vicious, and one which, being in itself indifferent, may be right or wrong according to circumstances. On the same principle, therefore, that a human being in England is deprived by the mere accident of birth, of the right of suffrage; and in Russia has the small portion of liberty which belongs to a commoner, or the still smaller belonging to a serf; in this country one class is by birth invested with all the rights of citizenship, another (females) is deprived of all political and many personal rights, and a third of even their personal liberty. Whether this organization is right or wrong is not now the question. We are simply showing that the fact that the children of slaves become by birth slaves, is not to be referred to the idea of the master's property in the body and soul of the parent, but results from the form of society, and is analogous to other social institutions, as far as the principle is concerned, that the children take the rank, or the political or social condition of the parent.

We prefer being chargeable with the sin of wearisome repetition, to leaving any room for the misapprehension of our meaning. We, therefore, again remark that we are discussing the mere abstract morality of these forms of social organization, and not their expediency. We have in view the vindication of the character of the inspired writings and inspired men from the charge of having overlooked the blackest of human crimes, and of having recognised the worst of human beings as Christians. We say, therefore, that an institution which deprives a certain portion of the community of their personal liberty, and places them under obligation of service to another portion, is no more necessarily sinful than one which invests an individual with despotic power (such as Mr. Birney would consent to hold); or than one which limits the right of government to a small portion of the people, or restricts

it to the male part of the community. However inexpedient, under certain circumstances, any one of these arrangements may be, they are not necessarily immoral, nor do they become such, from the fact that the accident of birth determines the relation in which one part of the community is to stand to the other. In ancient Egypt, as in modern India, birth decided the position and profession of every individual. One was born a priest, another a merchant, another a labourer, another a soldier. As there must always be these classes, it is no more necessarily immoral to have them all determined by hereditary descent, than it was among the Israelites to have all the officers of religion from generation to generation thus determined; or that birth should determine the individual who is to fill a throne or occupy a seat in parliament.

Again, Dr. Wayland argues, if the right to hold slaves be conceded, "there is of course conceded all other rights necessary to insure its possession. Hence, inasmuch as the slave can be held in this condition only while he remains in the lowest state of mental imbecility, it supposes the master to have the right to control his intellectual development just as far as may be necessary to secure entire subjection."* He reasons in the same way to show that the religious knowledge and even eternal happiness of the slave, are as a matter of right conceded to the power of the master, if the right of slaveholding is admitted. The utmost force that can be allowed to this argument is, that the right to hold slaves includes the right to exercise all *proper* means to insure its possession. It is in this respect on a par with all other rights of the same kind. The rights of parents to the service of their children, of husbands to the obedience of their wives, of masters over their apprentices, of creditors over their debtors, of rulers over their subjects, all suppose the right to adopt proper means for their secure enjoyment. They, however, give no sanction to the employment of any and every means which cruelty, suspicion, or jealousy, may choose to deem necessary, nor of any which would be productive of greater general evil than the forfeiture of the rights themselves. According to the ancient law even among the Jews, the power of life and death was granted to the parent; we concede only the power of correction. The old law gave the same power to the husband over the wife. The Roman law confided the person and even life of the debtor to the mercy of the creditor. According to the reasoning of Dr. Wayland, all these laws must be sanctioned, if the rights which they were deemed necessary to secure, are acknowledged. It is clear, however, that the most unrighteous means may be adopted to secure a proper end, under the plea of necessity. The justice of the plea must be made out on its own grounds, and cannot be assumed on the mere admission of the propriety of the end aimed at. Whether the slaves of this country

* Elements of Moral Science, p. 221.

may be safely admitted to the enjoyments of personal liberty, is a matter of dispute: but that they could not, consistently with the public welfare, be intrusted with the exercise of political power, is on all hands admitted. It is, then, the acknowledged right of the state to govern them by laws in the formation of which they have no voice. But it is the universal plea of the depositaries of irresponsible power, sustained too by almost universal experience, that men can be brought to submit to political despotism only by being kept in ignorance and poverty. Dr. Wayland, then, if he concedes the right of the state to legislate for the slaves, must, according to his own reasoning, acknowledge the right to adopt all the means necessary for the security of this irresponsible power, and of consequence that the state has the right to keep the blacks in the lowest state of degradation. If he denies the validity of this argument in favour of political despotism, he must renounce his own against the lawfulness of domestic slavery. Dr. Wayland himself would admit the right of the Emperor of Russia to exercise a degree of power over his half civilized subjects, which could not be maintained over an enlightened people, though he would be loath to acknowledge his right to adopt all the means necessary to keep them in their present condition. The acknowledgment, therefore, of the right to hold slaves, does not involve the acknowledgment of the right to adopt measures adapted and intended to perpetuate their present mental and physical degradation.

We have entered much more at length into the abstract argument on this subject than we intended. It was our purpose to confine our remarks to the scriptural view of the question. But the consideration of the objections derived from the general principles of morals, rendered it necessary to enlarge our plan. As it appears to us too clear to admit of either denial or doubt, that the scriptures do sanction slaveholding; that under the old dispensation it was expressly permitted by divine command, and under the New Testament is nowhere forbidden or denounced, but on the contrary, acknowledged to be consistent with the Christian character and profession (that is, consistent with justice, mercy, holiness, love to God and love to man), to declare it to be a heinous crime, is a direct impeachment of the word of God. We, therefore, felt it incumbent upon us to prove, that the sacred scriptures are not in conflict with the first principles of morals; that what they sanction is not the blackest and basest of all offences in the sight of God. To do this, it was necessary to show what slavery is, to distinguish between the relation itself, and the various cruel or unjust laws which may be made either to bring men into it, or to secure its continuance; to show that it no more follows from the admission that the scriptures sanction the right of slaveholding, that they, therefore, sanction all the oppressive slave-laws of any community, than it follows from the admission of the propriety of parental, conjugal, or political relations, that they sanction all the

conflicting codes by which these relations have at different periods and in different countries been regulated.

We have had another motive in the preparation of this article. The assumption that slaveholding is itself a crime, is not only an error, but it is an error fraught with evil consequences. It not merely brings its advocates into conflict with the scriptures, but it does much to retard the progress of freedom; it embitters and divides the members of the community, and distracts the Christian church. Its operation in retarding the progress of freedom is obvious and manifold. In the first place, it directs the battery of the enemies of slavery to the wrong point. It might be easy for them to establish the injustice or cruelty of certain slave-laws, where it is not in their power to establish the sinfulness of slavery itself. They, therefore, waste their strength. Nor is this the least evil. They promote the cause of their opponents. If they do not discriminate between slaveholding and the slave-laws, it gives the slaveholder not merely an excuse but an occasion and a reason for making no such distinction. He is thus led to feel the same conviction in the propriety of the one that he does in that of the other. His mind and conscience may be satisfied that the mere act of holding slaves is not a crime. This is the point, however, to which the abolitionist directs his attention. He examines their arguments, and becomes convinced of their inconclusiveness, and is not only thus rendered impervious to their attacks, but is exasperated by what he considers their unmerited abuse. In the meantime his attention is withdrawn from far more important points; the manner in which he treats his slaves, and the laws enacted for the security of his possession. These are points on which his judgment might be much more really convinced of error, and his conscience of sin.

In the second place, besides fortifying the position and strengthening the purpose of the slaveholder, the error in question divides and weakens the friends of freedom. To secure any valuable result by public sentiment, you must satisfy the public mind and rouse the public conscience. Their passions had better be allowed to rest in peace. As the anti-slavery societies declare it to be their object to convince their fellow-citizens that slaveholding is necessarily a heinous crime in the sight of God, we consider their attempt as desperate, so long as the Bible is regarded as the rule of right and wrong. They can hardly secure either the verdict of the public mind or of the public conscience in behalf of this proposition. Their success hitherto has not been very encouraging, and is certainly not very flattering, if Dr. Channing's account of the class of persons to whom they have principally addressed their arguments, is correct. The tendency of their exertions, be their success great or small, is not to unite, but to divide. They do not carry the judgment or conscience of the people with them. They form, therefore, a class by themselves. Thousands who earnestly desire to see the south convinced of the injustice and

consequent impolicy of their slave-laws, and under this conviction, of their own accord, adopting those principles which the Bible enjoins, and which tend to produce universal intelligence, virtue, liberty and equality, without violence and sudden change, and which thus secure private and public prosperity, stand aloof from the abolitionists, not merely because they disapprove of their spirit and mode of action, but because they do not admit their fundamental principle.

In the third place, the error in question prevents the adoption of the most effectual means of extinguishing the evil. These means are not the opinions or feelings of the non-slaveholding states, nor the denunciation of the holders of slaves, but the improvement, intellectual and moral, of the slaves themselves. Slavery has but two natural and peaceful modes of death. The one is the increase of the slave population until it reaches the point of being unproductive. When the number of slaves becomes so great that the master cannot profitably employ them, he manumits them in self-defence. This point would probably have been reached long ago, in many of the southern states, had not the boundless extent of the south-western sections of the Union presented a constant demand for the surplus hands. Many planters in Virginia and Maryland, whose principles or feelings revolt at the idea of selling their slaves to the south, find that their servants are gradually reducing them to poverty, by consuming more than they produce. The number, however, of slaveholders who entertain these scruples is comparatively small. And as the demand for slave labor in the still unoccupied regions of the extreme south-west is so great, and is likely to be so long continued, it is hopeless to think of slavery dying out by becoming a public burden. The other natural and peaceful mode of extinction, is the gradual elevation of the slaves in knowledge, virtue, and property, to the point at which it is no longer desirable or possible to keep them in bondage. Their chains thus gradually relax, until they fall off entirely. It is in this way that Christianity has abolished both political and domestic bondage, whenever it has had free scope. It enjoins a fair compensation for labour; it insists on the moral and intellectual improvement of all classes of men; it condemns all infractions of marital or parental rights; in short, it requires not only that free scope should be allowed to human improvement, but that all suitable means should be employed for the attainment of that end. The feudal system, as before remarked, has in a great measure been thus outgrown in all the European states. The third estate, formerly hardly recognised as having an existence, is becoming the controlling power in most of those ancient communities. The gradual improvement of the people rendered it impossible and undesirable to deprive them of their just share in the government. And it is precisely in those countries where this improvement is most advanced that the feudal nstitutions are the most completely obliterated, and the general prosperity the greatest. In like manner the gospel method of extinguishing slavery is by improving the condition of the slave.

The grand question is, How is this to be done? The abolitionist answers, by immediate emancipation. Perhaps he is right, perhaps he is wrong; but whether right or wrong, it is not the practical question for the north. Among a community which have the power to emancipate, it would be perfectly proper to urge that measure on the ground of its being the best means of promoting the great object of the advancement of human happiness and virtue. But the error of the abolitionists is, that they urge this measure from the wrong quarter, and upon the wrong ground. They insist upon immediate abolition because slavery is a sin, and its extinction a duty. If, however, slaveholding is not in itself sinful, its abolition is not necessarily a duty. The question of duty depends upon the effects of the measure, about which men may honestly differ. Those who believe that it would advance the general good, are bound to promote it; while those who believe the reverse, are equally bound to resist it. The abolitionists, by insisting upon one means of improvement, and that on untenable ground, are most effectually working against the adoption of any other means, by destroying the disposition and power to employ them. It is in this way that the error to which we have referred throughout this article, is operating most disadvantageously for the cause of human liberty and happiness. The fact is, that the great duty of the south is not emancipation, but improvement. The former is obligatory only as a means to an end, and therefore, only under circumstances where it would promote that end. In like manner the great duty of despotic governments is not the immediate granting of free institutions, but the constant and assiduous cultivation of the best interests (knowledge, virtue and happiness) of the people. Where free institutions would conduce to this object, they should be granted, and just so far and so fast as this becomes apparent.

Again, the opinion that slaveholding is itself a crime must operate to produce the disunion of the states, and the division of all ecclesiastical societies in this country. The feelings of the people may be excited violently for a time, but the transport soon passes away. But if the conscience is enlisted in the cause, and becomes the controlling principle, the alienation between the north and the south must become permanent. The opposition to southern institutions will be calm, constant, and unappeasable. Just so far as this opinion operates, it will lead those who entertain it to submit to any sacrifices to carry it out, and give it effect. We shall become two nations in feeling, which must soon render us two nations in fact. With regard to the church its operation will be much more summary. If slaveholding is a heinous crime, slaveholders must be excluded from the church. Several of our judicatories have already taken this position. Should the General Assembly adopt it, the church is, ipso facto, divided. If the opinion in question is correct, it must be maintained, whatever are the consequences. We are no advocates of expediency in morals. We

have no more right to teach error in order to prevent evil, than we have a right to do evil to promote good. On the other hand, if the opinion is incorrect, its evil consequences render it a duty to prove and exhibit its unsoundness. It is under the deep impression that the primary assumption of the abolitionists is an error, that its adoption tends to the distraction of the country, and the division of the church; and that it will lead to the longer continuance and greater severity of slavery, that we have felt constrained to do what little we could towards its correction.

We have little apprehension that any one can so far mistake our object, or the purport of our remarks, as to suppose either that we regard slavery as a desirable institution, or that we approve of the slave laws of the southern states. So far from this being the case, the extinction of slavery, and the melioration of those laws, are as sincerely desired by us, as by any of the abolitionists. The question is not about the continuance of slavery, and of the present system, but about the proper method of effecting the removal of the evil. We maintain, that it is not by denouncing slaveholding as a sin, or by universal agitation at the north, but by the improvement of the slaves. It no more follows that because the master has a right to hold slaves, he has a right to keep them in a state of degradation in order to perpetuate their bondage, than that the Emperor of Russia has a right to keep his subjects in ignorance and poverty, in order to secure the permanence and quiet possession of his power. We hold it to be the grand principle of the Gospel, that every man is bound to promote the moral, intellectual and physical improvement of his fellow men. Their civil or political relations are in themselves matters of indifference. Monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, domestic slavery, are right or wrong as they are, for the time being, conducive to this great end, or the reverse. They are not objects to which the improvement of society is to be sacrificed; nor are they strait-jackets to be placed upon the public body to prevent its free development. We think, therefore, that the true method for Christians to treat this subject, is to follow the example of Christ and his apostles in relation both to despotism and slavery. Let them enforce as moral duties the great principles of justice and mercy, and all the specific commands and precepts of the scriptures. If any set of men have servants, bond or free, to whom they refuse a proper compensation for their labour, they violate a moral duty and an express command of scripture. What that compensation should be, depends on a variety of circumstances. In some cases the slaveholder would be glad to compound for the support of his slaves by giving the third or half of the proceeds of his estate. Yet this at the north would be regarded as a full remuneration for the mere labour of production. Under other circumstances, however, a mere support would be very inadequate compensation; and when inadequate, it is unjust. If the compensation be more than a support, the surplus is the property of the labourer, and cannot morally, whatever the laws

may say, be taken from him. The right to accumulate property is an incident to the right of reward for labour. And we believe there are few slaveholding countries in which the right is not practically acknowledged, since we hear so frequently of slaves purchasing their own freedom. It is very common for a certain moderate task* to be assigned as a day's work, which may be regarded as the compensation rendered by the slave for his support. The residue of the day is at his own disposal, and may be employed for his own profit. We are not now, however, concerned about details. The principle that "the labourer is worthy of his hire" and should enjoy it, is a plain principle of morals and command of the Bible, and cannot be violated with impunity.

Again, if any man has servants or others whom he forbids to marry, or whom he separates after marriage, he breaks as clearly a revealed law as any written on the pages of inspiration, or on the human heart. If he interferes unnecessarily with the authority of parents over their children, he again brings himself into collision with his Maker. If any man has under his charge children, apprentices, servants, or slaves, and does not teach them, or cause them to be taught the will of God; if he deliberately opposes their intellectual, moral, or religious improvement, he makes himself a transgressor. That many of the laws of the slaveholding states are opposed to these simple principles of morals, we fully believe; and we do not doubt that they are sinful and ought to be rescinded. If it be asked what would be the consequence of thus acting on the principles of the gospel, of following the example and obeying the precepts of Christ, we answer, the gradual elevation of the slaves in intelligence, virtue and wealth; the peaceable and speedy extinction of slavery; the improvement in general prosperity of all classes of society, and the consequent increase in the sum of human happiness and virtue. This has been the result of acting on these principles in all past ages; and just in proportion as they have been faithfully observed. The degradation of most eastern nations, and of Italy, Spain, and Ireland, are not more striking examples of the consequences of their violation, than Scotland, England, and the non-slaveholding States are of the benefits of their being even imperfectly obeyed. Men cannot alter the laws of God. It would be as easy for them to arrest the action of the force of gravity as to prevent the systematic violation of the principles of morals being productive of evil.

Besides the two methods mentioned above, in which slavery dies a natural and easy death, there are two others by which, as history teaches us, it may be brought to an end. The one is by the non-slaveholders, in virtue of their authority in the state to which the slaves and their masters belonged, passing laws for its extinction. Of this, the northern states and Great Britain are examples. The

* We heard the late Dr. Wisner, after his long visit to the south, say, that the usual task of a slave in South Carolina and Georgia was about the third of a day's work for a northern labourer.

other is by servile insurrections. The former of these two methods is of course out of the question, as it regards most of the southern states; for in almost all of them the slave-owners have the legislative power in their own hands. The south, therefore, has to choose between emancipation by the silent and holy influence of the gospel, securing the elevation of the slaves to the stature and character of freemen, or to abide the issue of a long continued conflict against the laws of God. That the issue will be disastrous there can be no doubt. But whether it will come in the form of a desolating servile insurrection, or in some other shape, it is not for us to say. The choice, however, is between rapidly increasing millions of human beings educated under moral and religious restraints, and attached to the soil by the proceeds of their own labour, or hordes of unenlightened barbarians. If the south deliberately keep these millions in this state of degradation, they must prepare themselves for the natural consequences, whatever they may be.

It may be objected that if the slaves are allowed so to improve as to become freemen, the next step in their progress is that they should become citizens. We admit that it is so. The feudal serf first became a tenant, then a proprietor invested with political power. This is the natural progress of society, and it should be allowed thus freely to expand itself, or it will work its own destruction. If a tree is not allowed to grow erect and in its natural shape, it will become crooked, knotted and worthless, but grow it must. This objection would not be considered of any force, if the slaves in this country were not of a different race from their masters. Still they are men; their colour does not place them beyond the operation of the principles of the gospel, or from under the protection of God. We cannot too frequently remember, that it is our province to do right, it is God's to overrule results.* Let then the north remember that they are bound to follow the example of Christ in the manner of treating slavery, and the south, that they are bound to follow the precepts of Christ in their manner of treating their slaves. If both parties follow the Saviour of men, both will contribute to the promotion of human excellence and happiness, and both will have reason to rejoice in the result.

* If the fact that the master and slave belong to different races, precludes the possibility of their living together on equal terms, the inference is, not that the one has a right to oppress the other, but that they should separate. Whether this should be done by dividing the land between them and giving rise to distinct communities, or by the removal of the inferior class on just and wise conditions, it is not for us to say. We have undertaken only to express an opinion as to the manner in which the Bible directs those who look to it for guidance to treat this difficult subject, and not to trace out a plan to provide for ulterior results. It is for this reason we have said nothing of African colonization, though we regard it as one of the noblest enterprises of modern benevolence.

ESSAY XI.

ABOLITIONISM.*

USAGE often gives a comprehensive word a limited sense. If, in our day, and in this country, you ask a man whether he is an abolitionist, he will promptly answer no, though he may believe with Jefferson that slavery is the greatest curse that can be inflicted on a nation; or with Cassius M. Clay, that it is destructive of industry, the mother of ignorance, opposed to literature, antagonist to the fine arts, destructive of mechanical excellence; that it corrupts the people, retards population and wealth, impoverishes the soil, destroys national wealth, and is incompatible with constitutional liberty. A man may believe and say all this, as many of the wisest and best men of the South believe and openly avow, and yet be no abolitionist. If every man who regards slavery as an evil, and wishes to see it abolished, were an abolitionist, then nine tenths of the people of this country would be abolitionists. What then is an abolitionist? He is a man who holds that slaveholding is a great sin; and consequently that slaveholders should not be admitted to the communion of the church, and that slavery should immediately, under all circumstances, and regardless of all consequences, be abolished. "Slaveholding," says the second article of the American Anti-slavery Society, "is a heinous crime in the sight of God," and "ought therefore to be immediately abolished." "The question," says the Reviewer of Dr. Junkin's pamphlet, "now in process of investigation among American churches, is this, and no other: Are the professed Christians in our respective connex-

* Originally published in 1844, in review of the following works: 1. "The Integrity of our National Union vs. Abolitionism. An argument from the Bible, in proof of the position; that believing masters ought to be honoured and obeyed by their servants, and tolerated in, not excommunicated from the Church of God, being part of a speech delivered before the Synod of Cincinnati, on the subject of Slavery. September 19th and 20th, 1843. By Rev. George Junkin, D.D., President of Miami University."

2. "The Contrast, or the Bible vs. Abolitionism: an Exegetical Argument. By Rev. William Graham, Pastor of the Second Presbyterian church, Oxford, Ohio."

3. "A Review of the Rev. Dr. Junkin's Synodical Speech, in Defence of American Slavery, with an outline of the Bible argument against Slavery."

4. "Line of Demarcation between the Secular and Spiritual Kingdoms. By the Rev. William Wisner, D.D."

ions who hold their fellow men as slaves, thereby guilty of a sin which demands the cognisance of the church, and after due admonition, the application of discipline?" P. 17. This question abolitionists answer in the affirmative; all other men in the negative. Every party has a character as well as a creed. Whatever it is that holds them together as a party, gives them a common spirit, which again leads to characteristic measures and modes of action. If the bond of union is coincidence of opinion on some great principle in politics, religion or morals, then the characteristic spirit of the party will be determined by the nature of that opinion. If we look at the great parties in England, the Tory, Whig and Radical, we shall see they have each its own character, arising out of their distinctive principles. The Tory desires to see political power confined to the holders of property; the Whigs to the educated classes; the Radicals would have it extended to the whole population without regard to their intellectual or moral condition; and we see amidst the diversity of individual character, arising from a thousand different sources, a common spirit belonging to these several parties, arising from the distinctive principle of each. The correctness of this remark is still more obvious with regard to religious parties; because religious truth has a more direct and powerful influence on the character of men than mere political opinions. We not only see the great divisions of the Christian world, the evangelical, ritual, and rationalistic, exhibiting strongly-marked peculiarities, arising from the radically different views of doctrine which they entertain, but the minute subdivisions of the large classes have each its own distinctive character. It is impossible that the difference between the Calvinist and the evangelical Arminian should not manifest itself both in the state of their hearts and in outward acts. And who can shut his eyes to the influence exerted by the New Divinity, in all its modifications, as it has existed in this country? The spirit of censoriousness, of denunciation, of coarse authoritative dealing, and the whole array of new measures, were the natural fruit of the peculiar doctrines of one class of the advocates of the New Divinity, and especially of their opinion that a change of heart was a change of purpose, which a man could effect as easily as change his route on a journey. If, again, a party is constituted by a particular opinion on any question of morals, its character will depend upon the nature of that opinion. We may take as an illustration of this point the temperance society. The opinion that the use of spirituous liquors was in this age and country of evil tendency, and ought to be discountenanced by a general determination of the friends of temperance to abandon such use, had nothing in it anti-scriptural, nothing malevolent. So long, therefore, as this opinion continued the bond of union of the associated friends of temparence, their spirit was benevolent, and their measures mild. But as soon as the doctrine was embraced that the use of intoxicating liquors was in itself sinful, then poison was infused into the

whole organization. Then every man who drank a glass of wine was a sinner, and was to be made a subject of ecclesiastical discipline. Then the holy Scriptures were put to the torture to make them utter the new doctrine; and those to whose ears this utterance was not sufficiently distinct, made bold hypothetically to denounce them, and to blaspheme the Saviour of the world. Then a spirit of censoriousness, of defamation, and of falsehood, seized upon those in whom the virus had produced its full effect, making their publications an opprobrium and a nuisance.

We have in modern abolitionism another illustration of this same truth. That slavery, like despotism, in its very nature, supposes a barbarous or partially civilized condition of at least one portion of society; that it ought not and cannot, without gross injustice, be rendered permanent; that the means of moral and intellectual culture should be extended to slaves, and to the subjects of despotic governments, and the road of improvement be left open before them, is an opinion which any man may hold, and which we believe is in fact held by ninety-nine hundredths of all the intelligent and good men on the face of the earth. And that opinion may and ought to be made the foundation of wise and appropriate measures for carrying it into effect. But let a man adopt the opinion that slaveholding is "a heinous crime in the sight of God," and what is the result? Then he must regard every slaveholder as a criminal, to be denounced and treated accordingly; no matter how humble, meek, holy, heavenly-minded, just, benevolent, that slaveholder may be; no matter how parental in the treatment of his slaves, how assiduous in their religious improvement, how anxious to secure their preparation for freedom, he is, by the mere fact of holding slaves, proved to be a hypocrite, a malevolent and wicked man. Now such a judgment cannot be held without perverting the moral sense of the man who holds it. He must force himself to call evil good and good evil. The exhibition of Christian character, which ought to command confidence and affection, and in every healthful mind does command them, must excite in the mind poisoned by that false opinion disgust and hatred. A holy slaveholder is in his view as much a contradiction as a holy murderer; and he cannot therefore regard a slaveholder as a good man. But if (as what sane man can doubt?) he may be a sincere Christian, to be in a state of mind which forbids our recognising him as such, is to be morally diseased or deranged. According to genuine High Church doctrine, every man baptized and in communion with "the church," is a Christian, and no man not in such communion can be a Christian, or go to heaven. But as it often happens that many in "the church" are openly wicked, and many out of it are eminently holy, the High Churchman, if sincere and consistent, must regard the former with complacent feelings of Christian brotherhood, and the latter with aversion. It is, however, one of the most certain marks of a true Christian, to recognise and love the Christian character in others, and it is one of the

surest marks of an unrenewed heart, to feel aversion to those who are the true followers of Christ. The influence, therefore, of High Church principles on those who entertain them, must, from the nature of the case, be evil, and such all experience shows to be the fact. The fundamental principle of modern abolitionism must produce the same effect, on those who really embrace it. It must lead them to hate good men; it must cause them to shut their eyes to truth; to harden themselves against the plain manifestations of excellence. All this produces an unnatural conflict in their own minds. Their principle leads to the conclusion that the slaveholder is a "heinous criminal," they see however that he is sometimes a good man; they will not give up their principle nor the conclusion to which it leads, they are therefore forced to deny what they see to be true. This exasperates them and leads to the most unnatural exaggeration of what they call the crime of slaveholding, in order to satisfy their conscience, and justify them to themselves in their hatred and denunciation of good men. This sometimes goes so far as to produce complete moral derangement, when malice assumes in the view of the moral maniac, the appearance and character of benevolence, and cursing and bitterness sound in his ears like the accents of love. Our country has furnished more than one example of this kind, and the perverting influence of the fundamental error of the party is as manifest as day in the moral state of the great body of those in whom it exists as a practical principle.

It is no doubt true that no man's character is formed by one opinion; and therefore there are many who belong to the general class of abolitionists, who are in spirit and conduct, exemplary men. This, however, is no disproof of the evil tendency of the distinguishing principle of the party. In many minds it exists as little more than a speculation; in others its influence is counteracted by natural disposition, by the power of other and right opinions, and by the grace of God. But in itself, and as far as it is allowed to operate, it is evident that a principle which makes the man who entertains it, regard and denounce good men, who really love and serve the Lord Jesus Christ, as heinous criminals, unfit for Christian communion, must pervert the heart, and, where it has its full effect, destroy all semblance of religion. It is not invidious, nor otherwise improper, to appeal to the spirit and conduct of a party in illustration of the tendency of their distinctive doctrine, and while we admit, as above stated, that there are many good men among the abolitionists, we regard it as a notorious fact, that the spirit of the party, as a party, is an evil spirit; a spirit of railing, of bitterness, of exaggeration; a spirit which leads to the perversion of facts, and to assertions which often shock the common sense and moral feelings of the community. What but a spirit which blinds the mind, and perverts the heart, could lead, for example, to the assertion that in our country a minister, without injury to his character, could tie up his slave on Sabbath morning, and

having inflicted a cruel punishment, leave him suspended, go to church, preach the gospel, and administer the Lord's Supper, and then return to inflict additional stripes on the lacerated back of his wretched victim. To assert that a clergyman may be a hypocrite, or a forger, or a murderer, or a monster of cruelty, would not shock the common sense of men, for such things have been and may well be again; but to assert as characterizing the Christian people in our southern states, that a minister may without injury to his standing among them be guilty of atrocious cruelty, is a flagrant falsehood, which none but a fanatic could utter, and none but fanatics believe. And fanaticism, be it remembered, is only one form of the malignant passions. Speaking then in general terms, the spirit of the party, as manifested in their publications, is fierce, bitter and abusive,* as might be expected from the nature of their fundamental principle. Contrast with this for a moment the case of the early Christians. They were obliged to separate from the community in which they lived, to form a party by themselves, to denounce idolatry as a great sin, and idolaters as unfit for Christian Communion. But as their distinctive doctrines were true, the moral influence of those doctrines upon themselves was good; it did not render them as a class fierce, bitter and abusive; they were mild, kind, and conciliatory. The same thing may be said of the modern Christian missionaries in every part of the world and of every denomination. Though surrounded by the abominations of heathenism, and in continued conflict with error, they are not exasperated men, dealing in denunciations and abuse. The reason why their minds are composed, and in the exercise of benevolent affections, is that truth, and not error, is the principle which controls them. They are not called upon to do violence to their own moral judgments; they are not forced to treat the good as though they were wicked; and to justify themselves by saying that in despite of all appearances to the contrary, the men and things which they denounce, must be evil. If then it is true, that the spirit of the abolitionists, as a party, and speaking in the general, is an evil spirit, it is a decisive proof that their distinctive doctrine as a party is a false doctrine. For we are commanded to judge of things by their fruits.

Another collateral proof of the fallacy of their peculiar views, is that they have failed to command the assent of the great body of the intelligent and pious men of the country. Every great moral truth has a self-evidencing light. To the ignorant or depraved it may sometimes be difficult to communicate such

* This is substantially admitted even by Dr. Channing, who is claimed as the great ornament of their party. "The abolitionists have done wrong, I believe: nor is their wrong to be winked at, because done fanatically, or with good intentions; for how much mischief may be wrought with good designs! They have fallen into the common error of enthusiasts [fanatics?], that of exaggerating their object, of feeling as if no evil existed but that which they opposed, and as if no guilt could be compared with that of countenancing and upholding it. The tone of their newspapers, as far as I have seen them, has often been fierce, bitter and abusive."—*Slavery.* By William E. Channing, p. 183.

truths; that is, to make them distinct objects in their apprehension. But when understood or perceived they are of necessity perceived to be true. And the object of discussion on such doctrines, is not to prove them, but to state them; to present them as they are before the moral judgment of the mind; for the only way in which we can know a thing to be right or wrong is by seeing it to be the one or the other. No man was ever led to the perception of the moral evil of a thing, by arguing from its effects. He may see that a thing, indifferent in itself, is wrong under circumstances which make it productive of evil; and he may have his impression of the degree in which a thing is morally wrong, greatly influenced by observing its effects; but all things right or wrong in themselves are immediately perceived in their true character by every human mind, as soon as they are fairly presented to it, or clearly apprehended. It is indeed admitted that the moral judgment of men is often influenced by their interests, or by their previous moral condition. These causes operate, however, by either diverting the attention from the true object, so that it is not in fact properly perceived; or by affecting favourably or otherwise the sensibility of the soul, and thus modifying the moral emotions by whose light and under whose guidance the judgment of the mind is formed. The question whether heretics should be put to death, if it could be presented clearly to dispassionate men, could receive but one answer. The reason why some affirm and others deny the propriety of such executions, is, that entirely different questions are really before their minds. To a Protestant the question is, whether a man in the exercise of a discretion for which he is responsible to God alone, can justly be punished for the wrong exercise of that discretion, by those who have neither the competency nor right to sit in judgment on the case. That question every human being must answer in the negative. But to a genuine Romanist, the question is, whether a man who is guilty of an atrocious crime should be punished at the discretion of those who are infallible in judgment on such matters, and who have full authority to carry their judgment into effect. This again is a question which every man must answer in the affirmative. The fact, therefore, that men make different answers to questions involving grave points in morals, is no disproof of the self-evidencing light of moral truth; and of the legitimate authority with which it commands assent when it is clearly presented to the mind. This being admitted, we say that the fact that the great mass of the intelligent and pious men of the country reject the doctrine that "slaveholding is a heinous crime in the sight of God," is proof that it is false. For this fact cannot be accounted for by saying they do not understand the question; that the thing denied is not rightly conceived of, or is not clearly presented to their minds. Every man knows what slaveholding is; and men know what they mean when they deny that it is in its very nature criminal. Nor can it be said, that this judgment arises from want of

attention to the subject. There are many things to which even good men give an indolent assent as right, which, when they come to consider, they see to be wrong. This was the case with the slave-trade, and many other instances of a similar nature might be adduced. There are also many things which are long regarded as right, because they really are right upon the assumption of the correctness of the principles adopted by those who pronounce the judgment. Thus putting heretics to death is right, on the assumption of the infallibility of the church, and of its right to enforce its judgments by civil penalties. In the present case the judgment of the conscience of the country on the subject of slaveholding, cannot be set aside on the ground of want of consideration. The matter has been discussed in every way for a series of years, and that judgment is becoming the more fixed, the more it is enlightened.

Nor can this judgment be invalidated by attributing it to self-interest. We readily admit that if a man is personally interested in the decision of a question, he is not a fair judge in the case. The landholders in England sincerely believe the corn laws to be beneficial; the manufacturers as sincerely believe the reverse. Among ourselves, the growers of cotton honestly hold one system of political economy, and the growers of hemp another. It is hardly possible for a man, whose interests are deeply involved in any question, to avoid allowing his mind to dwell unduly upon those considerations which favour the decision which he desires, nor is he qualified to give the opposite considerations their proper weight. But we deny that the great body of intelligent and good men in this country are under the bias of interest, in the judgment which they give concerning slavery. They have no selfish interest in the matter. Those dwelling in non-slaveholding States might arrive at the conclusion that slaveholding is a sin, without endangering any of their personal interests, or disquieting their conscience in the least. They are just as free from selfish bias in the case as though sitting in judgment on the despotism of Russia. The unbiased judgment, therefore, of the great mass of intelligent and pious men in this country that slaveholding is not a crime, given after due consideration, is itself an argument not to be gainsaid, against the primary principle of the abolitionists.

It may be asked how we know that such is the judgment of the intelligent and good men of the country? The answer is, that is a conceded point. What is more common here or abroad than the assertion that the church and the clergy in this country, are the great enemies of abolition? What topic of denunciation is more frequent in all the publications of the party than the corruption of the church on this subject, and how loud the complaints that no church has yet been brought up to take ground with the abolitionists? Now we suppose no one, not even an abolitionist, will deny that the church, meaning thereby all in this great country who profess to be the followers of Christ, comprises a large portion of the intelligence and piety of the country; and as

to the educated men not included among the members of the church, it is plain that a still smaller portion belong to the ranks of abolitionism. No church (i. e., denomination of Christians) of any consideration for numbers, has adopted the principle that slaveholders as such should be excluded from Christian communion. The Congregationalists of New England, the Episcopalians, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, the Methodists, have one and all refused to sanction the unscriptural doctrine on which the whole structure of moral abolitionism rests. Now we consider it little less than preposterous to assume that a mere fraction of the great family of Christians should, on a simple question of morals, be in the right, and the great mass of their brethren, with the same advantages for forming a correct judgment, in the wrong.

But have not the abolitionists the voice of the church in Great Britain in their favour? Far from it. There is indeed a great deal of loose declamation, and no little fanatical zeal on this subject prevailing in that country. But when did any denomination of Christians in Great Britain assume the ground that slaveholders should be excluded from the church? We are not aware that the missionaries of the Church of England, or of the Church of Scotland, or of the Independents, or of the Methodists, or of the Baptists, or of the Moravians, operating in countries where slavery existed, were ever directed or authorized to act upon the principle of debarring all slaveholders from the table of the Lord. That is a step towards the subversion of the scriptures as a rule of faith and practice, yet to be taken. And the day we trust is far distant when this form of benevolent infidelity shall receive the sanction of any of the great bodies into which the church is now divided.

Strong as these arguments against the doctrine of the abolitionists, derived from its necessary and actual effects, and from the judgment of the great mass of competent judges, are, we admit they would be driven to the wind by one clear declaration of scripture in its favour. Let God be true, but every man a liar. Into this scriptural argument, however, we cannot persuade ourselves to enter at any length, because the matter does not admit of argument. It is as plain as it can be made. A few years ago, when a spirit of fanaticism seized the friends of temperance, much learning was expended in the attempt to prove that the Bible condemned as sinful even the moderate use of intoxicating liquor. Now what has become of that doctrine? The plain sense of the scripture, like a mighty stream, has borne away all the learned rubbish so laboriously raked together, and would have done so had no attempt been made, able and conclusive as those attempts were, to remove that rubbish by other means. In like manner the scriptures do so plainly teach that slaveholding is not in itself a crime, that it is a mere waste of time to attempt to prove it; and a great deal worse than a waste of time to attempt to make them teach the contrary.

It will of course be admitted that what God has at any time sanctioned cannot be evil in its own nature. If, therefore, it can

be shown that God did permit his people under the old dispensation to be slaveholders, slaveholding in itself cannot be a heinous crime. It will further be admitted that anything permitted under the old economy, and which the apostles continued to permit to those whom they received into the church, cannot be a crime justifying exclusion from Christian communion.

That God did under the old dispensation permit his people to hold slaves is proved not only by the fact that Abraham was, with the implied permission of God, a slaveholder, but especially by the fact that through Moses that permission was expressly granted, the class of persons who might be held in slavery designated, the different ways in which they might be reduced to a state of bondage pointed out, and laws enacted as to the manner in which they were to be treated. All these are plain matters of fact, admitted, as far as we know, by every man, woman and child, who ever read the Bible, until the lurid day of modern illumination. These facts are abundantly proved by Dr. Junkin and Mr. Graham in the pamphlets which stand in the margin of this article, and to which we refer any of our readers who have any doubt on the subject. We shall content ourselves with merely citing a few passages from the laws of Moses, allowing them to speak for themselves.

What however is a slave? Before determining whether slavery is recognised in the Bible, we must know what slavery is. "A slave," says the reviewer of Dr. Junkin's pamphlet, "is a human being who is made an article of property." And this is the definition usually given by abolitionists. The gravamen of the charge against slavery is, that it makes a man a thing in distinction from a person. This charge is an absurdity in the very terms of it; and yet we doubt not that it is some obscure feeling of the outrage to human nature involved in making "a man a thing," that is the source of much of the horror commonly expressed on this subject; and the reason of the ready credence often given to the doctrine that "slaveholding is a heinous crime." It would indeed be a great crime, and moreover a great miracle, if it involved making things of human beings. Under no system of slave-laws that ever existed is a slave regarded otherwise than as a person, that is, an intelligent moral agent. Those very laws, atrocious as they often are, by holding the slave responsible for his acts, suppose him to be a human being. The abolitionists impose upon themselves and others by not defining what they mean by property, and by not determining the sense in which one man can be said to be the property of another man. Property is simply the right of possession and use; the right of having and using. From the necessity of the case, as well as from the laws of God, this right must vary according to the nature of its object. If a man has property in land, he must use it as land, and he cannot use it as anything else. If he has property in an animal he can use it only as an animal; and if he has property in a man, he can use him only as a man. And as the use he may make of an animal is regulated by its

nature and by the laws of God; so his property in a man gives him no right to treat him contrary to his nature, or to act towards him with injustice. If one man has property in another he must still treat him as a human being; if he kills him he is guilty of murder; if he insults or wounds him he is guilty of cruelty; if he shuts him out from the gospel, he will find the blood of a soul upon his hands; if he keep him in ignorance, he is guilty of gross injustice. The right of property, even if admitted, gives no right to do any of the things just mentioned. It gives in some cases the power to do them, just as the right of a parent to the control of his children gives him the power of rendering them miserable, of depriving them of the gospel, and of bringing them up in ignorance. But it confers no right to do these things. It is the confused notion which they entertain of the right of property which leads the writers on this subject into most of their false reasoning. "If," says the Reviewer before quoted, "A may justly hold B as property, as he holds his land, cattle, &c.; it necessarily follows that A may justly sell B to be separated from his wife, and B's children to be separated from their parents." P. 59. He might as well say, that because a man may justly hold cattle as property, as he holds his lands or trees, therefore he may justly treat his cattle as if they were made of wood. His property in cattle gives him no right to use them in any way in which sentient creatures ought not to be used; and his property in a man gives him no right to use *him*, in any way in which a rational, immortal being, his equal in the sight of God, may not properly be used. The right of property is merely the right to have and to use a thing according to its nature; and as a man has a rational, moral, and social nature, it is no more an incident of the right of property in him, that these attributes may be disregarded, than it is an incident of the right of property in an ox or horse that their nature as sentient creatures may be disregarded. What men have the power to do, in virtue of the relation in which they stand to others, and what they have a right to do in virtue of that relation, are two very different things, which abolitionists constantly confound. As already remarked, the parental relation gives a man the power to do a thousand things he has no right to do; so the relation between master and slave, assuming it to be a perfectly righteous one, gives the former the power to do many things which that relation cannot justify. The only right of property which one man has or can have in another, is a right to his services; just as his right of property in a horse is a right to have and use him as a horse. And as the obligation arises out of ownership in the latter case, to provide for the wants of the horse, as a sentient creature, so the obligation arises out of the ownership in the former case, to provide for the wants of the man, not only as a sentient, but as a rational, moral, social and immortal being. And as the man who, on the plea of ownership, should neglect the wants of his horse, would be self condemned; so the man who,

on a similar plea, neglects the infinitely more pressing wants of his slave, as a rational creature, will be condemned by the united judgment of God and man. If abolitionists could disabuse their minds of their crude ideas on the subject of property, though they might find they had lost almost all their stock in trade, they would at least have the satisfaction of understanding what they are writing about, and might be induced to adopt wiser measures for accomplishing their object.

It follows from what has been said of the right of property, as consisting in the right of having and using, that it may be transferable. It is not necessarily so, as a man may have a full right to have and use a thing, when he cannot transfer that right to another. This is often the case when a certain property is attached to an office or a title. In other cases the right of transfer may be restricted by certain conditions; as when slaves are bound to the soil. Their owner can sell them only on condition of selling the land on which they live. The price he receives is not the mere value of the land, but the value of the land together with the value of his right to the service of those living upon it. In ordinary cases, however, the right of property is transferable. If I have a right to the possession or use of anything, I may give, or sell, or bequeathe that right to another. Of course, however, I can give only what I possess; and as my right of property in a man is and can be nothing more than the right to his services, that is all I can transfer to another; and this right must go with all the responsibilities which of necessity attach to it; the responsibility of providing for his wants as a man, who has a soul as well as a body. When, therefore, we speak of buying and selling men, all that is or can be meant is the transfer of this right of service; a right of necessity limited and defined by the nature of the being whose services are to be rendered. A man's right to the services of another may be unconditional, so that he may transfer it at any time or to any person; or it may be so limited that he can transfer it only when he transfers the land on which the man lives; or his right may extend to only a part of his time, as in the case of the old feudal tenures; or to a particular kind of service only, such as that due from a feudal proprietor to his lord, or from a subject to his sovereign. But whatever the right is, it is generally transferable, and therefore we find subjects passing from one sovereign to another, serfs from one landlord to another, and slaves from one master to another: and in all these cases, which in principle are the same, there is nothing more than the transfer of the right of service.

Another obvious remark which flows from what has been said is, that the nature of the relation between a master and his slaves does not depend upon the mode in which that relation is constituted, or upon the time it is to continue. Any man who is the property of another man, is, by the admitted definition of the term, a slave. It matters not, as far as the nature of the relation is concerned,

whether that right of property was acquired by gift, inheritance or purchase; and if by purchase, it matters not whether the man was sold by himself, or his parents, or by a former owner, or by the state in punishment of some crime. The validity and justice of a man's title to any property, do indeed depend upon the immediately prior title whence it is derived. And if the proposition of the abolitionists was that the right of property in man, unless acquired in a proper way, cannot be justly claimed or exercised, it would be perfectly harmless. It would be analogous to a declaration that landholding under a fraudulent title is unjust. But would it hence follow that landholding is a heinous crime? Their proposition is that slaveholding is a crime; and their argument is that one man cannot rightfully own another man; that from his nature man cannot be an article of property; and they attempt to sustain this argument from scripture by trying to show that the Bible, so far from authorizing one man's owning another, expressly forbids it. Having shown that ownership in man includes and can include nothing more than a right to his services, our object in this paragraph is to prove the fallacy of the above argument, by showing first that it is so broad as to include all modes of acquiring this right of property, since it condemns the thing itself; and secondly, that when they come to the scriptures, they attempt to evade their authority by resting their condemnation not on the thing itself, not on the mere fact of one man's owning another, but on the particular mode in which he acquires his right as owner, and on the length of time he exercises it But if the fundamental principle of the abolitionists is correct, it obviously makes no difference how the relation of master and slave is constituted. However ownership in man is acquired, it must, according to their doctrine, be unjust and offensive to God. If a man reduced to poverty, not knowing how to obtain a support, comes to another and offers to serve him all his life, if the law of the land recognises such a contract, he becomes a slave; he belongs to his master in the fullest sense in which one man can belong to another. This is what the Egyptians did, when under the pressure of famine, having sold everything they had, they came to Joseph and said: Buy us and our land for bread; and Joseph gave them bread and said, Behold I have bought you and your land for Pharaoh. Here is an instance of the relation of master and slave constituted by voluntary contract. And there are numerous cases of a like kind recorded in scripture on a less extensive scale. Now suppose that a man who had in this way acquired the right of property to a number of men, should, as a gift or for money, transfer that right to another, would its nature be altered by the transfer? Would the men be more slaves in the second case than in the former? Would the first master be entitled to lift clean hands to God, and the second be a man-stealer, and everything else that abolitionists call slaveholders? It is perfectly obvious that the nature of the relation or their principle, does not depend on the mode in which it is con-

stituted. If a man sells himself he is as much a slave as if sold by another man, and consequently the abolitionists cannot evade the authority of the sacred scriptures, by saying (though without evidence) that the slaves the Israelites were permitted to hold, sold themselves. Suppose they did, their masters were still slaveholders, and therefore, according to their doctrine, guilty of a heinous crime against God.

Nor does the nature of the relation between master and slave depend on the length of time for which it is to continue. A man sold for a term of years is as much a slave as a man sold for life. This is evident from the definition of the word slave, as one who belongs to another; from the usage of scripture and of human laws on the subject. In most of the states in which slavery has been abolished, it was enacted that slaves born after a certain year should be free at the age of twenty-one or twenty-five years. Until that age they were slaves; subject to all the laws relating to that class of persons. It hence follows, that if the Bible sanctioned slaveholding for a term of years, it sanctioned what abolitionists condemn as a heinous crime. The validity of the argument therefore against the abolitionists, drawn from the laws of Moses, does not depend on the question whether the slaves there spoken of sold themselves, or whether their bondage was perpetual or ceased at the year of Jubilee. If they were sold so as to belong to another man for life or for a term of years, they were for the time being slaves.

If the abolitionists turn round and say their arguments are directed against involuntary and perpetual bondage, we answer, 1. That such is not the fact. Their denunciations are directed against slaveholding, against making men property, an article of traffic to be bought and sold. But a slave who sold himself, as the Egyptians did, may be sold by his master for life or a term of years, as well as a man who was born a slave. And, therefore, their arguments are not in point of fact confined to slavery which is involuntary and perpetual. 2. In a multitude of cases in our own country and elsewhere, slaves prefer to remain the property of their masters, secure of an abundant support, when in health, and of a comfortable maintenance in sickness and old age. In all such cases, slaveholding is not a heinous crime, if involuntary bondage alone is slavery. Yet it is notorious that the class of slaveholders whose slaves prefer to remain such, are not exempted from the denunciations of the abolitionists. They are considered as holding an unlawful relation to their fellow men, as much as though they were living in adultery or in any other acknowledged crime. The very question as stated by the abolitionists is, whether those professing Christians who hold slaves are guilty of a sin which calls for the censure of the church? 3. This change of position is of course a concession that slaveholding is not in itself a sin. A man may be an article of property, he may be bought and sold, he may be a slave, provided he only consents to be so. Slaveholding, then, is like landholding, right or wrong,

according to circumstances. The propriety of both depends on the validity of the title. It is sinful for a man to keep possession of a piece of land, to which he has no other title than force or fraud; and it is sinful for one man to hold another as a slave unless he has a legitimate title to his services. The whole question now is, what is a legitimate title? Abolitionists are forced, inconsistently indeed, to admit that consent of parties confers a good title. But can such title be acquired in no other way? A full answer to that question would require a thorough examination of the origin of the right of property, and of the circumstances which rightfully give one man a claim, more or less extended, to the services of another. Such an examination, however, the present occasion forbids, and our object does not demand it. It is enough to remark, 1. That the validity of the present title of a man to his property does not depend on the validity of the title of the original possessor from whom the right is derived. That is to say, the title which the people of this country have to their farms, does not depend upon the question whether the Pope and the sovereigns of Europe had a right to take this country from the Indians, and give it to whom they pleased. Most landholders in New Jersey trace their titles to the gift by Charles II. to the Duke of York. If it be admitted that Charles had no valid right to the soil, and therefore could convey none to his brother, nor his brother to the original proprietors who purchased from him, it will not follow that the title of the present holders of the soil is invalid or unrighteous. Neither does it follow from the simple fact that the ancestors of the slaves now in this country were most unrighteously obtained, that the title of the owners of the present generation is necessarily invalid. 2. It may be remarked that the right of ownership of one man in another, that is, a right to his services, may arise from dependence. If that dependence is absolute and perpetual, so will the right of property be. If it is only partial and temporary, the right arising from it will in like manner be partial and temporary. Dependence is one of the sources at least of the obligation of children to render service to their parents; and the assumption of such dependence of feudal serfs on their lords, and of subjects on their sovereigns, is made one great ground of the claim of the latter to the services of the former. If, therefore, one man was absolutely dependent on another for support and protection, he would be his slave, that is, he would be righteously bound to render him service. This remark is made simply as indicating one of the ways in which the relation between master and slave might originate without injustice. 3. But as all slaves in this country were born such, the only practically important question is, whether a constitution of society in which one man is by birth placed in such a relation to another man as to be bound to labour for him, upon condition of having all his wants as a human being adequately supplied, is necessarily sinful? That question cannot be answered in the affirmative, without asserting that it is sinful to have the relative

position of men in society determined by the accident of birth. And this latter position cannot be maintained, without contradicting the Bible and the common judgment of mankind. By divine appointment, under the old dispensation, one man was born High Priest, the most important position in the community, another an ordinary priest, another a simple Levite, another a layman, who could never attain to the privileges of the other classes, and another a hewer of wood and drawer of water. Such an arrangement cannot in itself be sinful, because God ordained it; nor does the light of nature contradict this decision of the word of God. In some states of society this might be the best method of distributing the various classes of the community, in others it might be highly injurious. It is therefore neither forbidden nor commanded. Men are left at liberty to determine the mode in which society shall be constituted, guided by the peculiar circumstances of the community, and the immutable obligation to adopt that method which is for the general good. Moreover, neither the church nor world has ever maintained that hereditary monarchy and hereditary nobility were in their own nature sinful, so that no man can be a monarch or a noble without committing heinous crime in the sight of God. And even if the monarch were possessed of irresponsible power over the property and lives of his subjects, undesirable and impossible as such a form of government would be, in an advanced state of society, it would not in its nature be sinful. Even Mr. Birney, the abolition candidate for the Presidency, has admitted that his conscience would allow him to possess the unlimited power of a Roman Emperor, though it would direct him to use that power for the benefit of his subjects. But if the word of God does not condemn as sinful either the possession of unlimited power, or the designation by the accident of birth of the person who is to hold it; then it is admitted that it is not necessarily sinful that one man should by birth be assigned to the rank of king, noble, or master, and another to that of subject, commoner, or slave. As this diversity of condition among men has always existed, as there have always been masters and servants, if there is nothing sinful in the nature of the relation, neither is there in its being determined by birth.

Does then the word of God sanction this relation? Did it permit the Israelites to own men, to buy and sell them? If so, then no man who can bow his heart and conscience to the authority of God, can pronounce slaveholding to be a heinous crime. It is conceded that the heathen by whom these patriarchs and their descendants were surrounded, were slaveholders in the strictest sense of the term. This was the case with the Egyptians, the Midianites, and the inhabitants of Canaan. The Reviewer of Dr. Junkin allows that Joseph in the house of Potiphar was properly called a Hebrew slave, and that the servants given by Abimelech to Abraham were slaves, since Abimelech was a heathen. But on what evidence does this conviction rest that the heathen of that age were slaveholders? It rests on the fact that the Scrip-

tures speak of their having, buying, selling, and giving away men as servants. This is regarded as sufficient. But all this is recorded of the Patriarchs and of the Hebrews under Moses. Abraham is spoken of as having men servants and maid servants, they are enumerated as a part of his possessions; he is said to have received slaves as a present: Abimelech took sheep and oxen, and men servants and maid servants, and gave them unto Abraham. Gen. xx., 14. Pharaoh had before made him a similar gift, for it is said, he entreated Abram well for Sarah's sake, and he had sheep, and oxen, and he asses, and men servants, and maid servants. He circumcised "all that were bought with his money." Hagar was his bond-woman, and as such is contrasted with Sarah who was a free woman. All that the apostle says of this case in Gal. iv., 21–31, depends for its significancy on the fact that Hagar was a slave, to whom could be applied the phrase εἰς δουλείαν γεννῶσα, "gendering to bondage." How could it be said. "She is in bondage with her children," but on the assumption that she was a slave, and that the children of a slave mother were born in bondage? This is the very point of the apostle's illustration. So in later times we hear of the Hebrews having, buying, and selling slaves, for a slave is a man who may be bought and sold. In Numbers xxxi., 26 et seqq., we have an account of the distribution of the spoil taken from the Midianites, among which women and children are enumerated, and which were given in certain proportions to the conquerors. This is a narrative, which if found in any other book, would be universally understood as teaching that these captives were slaves. And there is no reason why it should not be so understood here. As we have in this case one of the ways in which the Hebrews were allowed by God to acquire slaves, so we hear of their possessing them, and buying and selling them. In Lev. xxii. 10, 11, it is said, "A sojourner of a priest, or an hired servant, shall not eat of the holy thing. But if the priest buy any soul with his money he shall eat of it, and he that is born in his house, they shall eat of it." The precision of modern language could not distinguish more accurately between a free servant and a slave, than is done in this passage. The law respecting the Passover was of the same kind. "There shall no stranger eat thereof; but every man's servant that is bought with money, when thou hast circumcised him, then he shall eat thereof," Ex. xii., 43, 44. Being thus bought, these slaves were by the law of Moses regarded as the property of their masters. They are called money, possession. If a man smote his servant, if he died under his hand, the master was to be punished; if he continued a day or two the owner was not punished, for the servant was his money, Ex. xxi., 21. The right of masters to sell their slaves is constantly assumed. It is implied in the right to buy, which supposes a sale. It is implied in the very nature of the relation as the slave was the money, the possession, the inheritance of the master. It is implied in the restrictions which are imposed upon the right, a

man could not sell a female slave whom he had humbled; "thou shalt not make merchandise of her because thou hast humbled her," Deut. xxi., 14. Nor could he sell her to a foreign nation, Ex. xxi., 8. If a master wounded a slave he could not sell him, he must let him go free without money, Ex. xxi.

The clearest and most explicit enactments on this whole subject are found in Lev. xxv., 39–46. "If thy brother *that dwelleth* by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee; thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond servant; *but* as an hired servant, *and* as a sojourner shall he be with thee, *and* shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee; *then* shall he depart from thee, *both* he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his father shall he return. For they are my servants which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bondmen. Thou shalt not rule over him with rigour, but shalt fear thy God. Both thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, *shall be* of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids. Moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land; and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit *them* for a possession. They shall be your bondmen for ever; but over your brethren the children of Israel, ye shall not rule over one another with rigour."

We do not know how this passage can be rendered plainer than it is, nor can we hope that any man, who is in such a state of mind as to prevent his seeing and admitting that it authorized the Hebrews to hold slaves, could be convinced even if one rose from the dead. It is here taught, 1. That if a Hebrew through poverty sold himself, he should not be reduced to the abject state of a slave. 2. That he should be treated as a hired servant. 3. And be allowed to go free at the year of Jubilee. This is the precise condition which abolitionists assign to the heathen servants among the Hebrews, whereas it is here declared to be peculiar to servants who were children of Israel; who could not be sold as bondmen, *venditione mancipii*, as the elder Michaelis translates it. Of the other class it is taught, 1. That they might be bought for bondmen. 2. That they might be held as a possession or property. 3. They might be bequeathed by their masters to the children as a possession; *hereditario jure possidebitis*, as Michaelis renders the phrase; or as De Wette translates it to the letter: Ihr möget sie vererben auf eure Söhne nach euch als Eigenthum. *You may bequeathe them to your children after you for a possession.* 4. This bondage was perpetual. They shall be your bondmen for ever. One of the points of distinction between the two classes was, that the former could not be sold in perpetuity—the latter might. As the land of a Hebrew could not be alienated, so his person could not be reduced to perpetual bondage. At the year of jubilee he

was to go free, and his inheritance reverted to him. In contrast with this, Moses allows the heathen to be reduced to perpetual bondage. Hebrews shall not be sold with the sale of a slave, *venditione mancipii*, v. 42; the heathen may be thus sold, is the very point of contrast, v. 46. If the former passage forbade reducing Israelites to the condition of slaves, the latter allowed the heathen to be so reduced. Again, both the Hebrew words and the construction in v. 39, are the same as v. 46. An Israelite "thou shalt not compel to serve as a bond servant;" the heathen "shall be your bondmen." What is forbidden in the one case, was allowed in the other.*

If then, men, who were the property, a possession of other men, who might be bought and sold, who could be given or bequeathed as a possession to the children of their masters, were slaves, then were the Hebrews allowed to hold slaves. The attempts made to evade this plain teaching of the scriptures are precisely similar to those which are made to prove that the Bible condemns as sinful all use of wine as a beverage, and that it pronounces even defensive war to be sinful. It is impossible to answer mere assertions. And the more extravagant the assertion, the more impossible the answer. How can a man be refuted who should say, as we know an ultra advocate of temperance did say, that the passage which speaks of John the Baptist coming neither eating nor drinking, means that he drank no water, but only milk; whereas Christ came drinking water; though he was called a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber. So when abolitionists say in reference to all the passages above referred to, that the bondmen of the Hebrews, even from among the heathen, were voluntary servants, who themselves received the purchase money paid for them, that they were in fact hired servants, receiving wages, hiring themselves for a term of years instead of for a single year, or for a day, or week, or month, who could neither be sold nor bequeathed; we know not how they are to be answered, any more than if they were to assert they were all ten feet high. Certain it is, the assertion is gratuitous. It is not only destitute of support, but contrary to the plain meaning of the words, and to the sense attributed to them in all ages. Moses found the institution of slavery existing at his day, and acted with regard to it as he did with regard to many other things; instead of prohibiting it, he made laws regulating the power of the master, and furthering the interests of the slave. He forbade any Hebrew being reduced to the state of

* We copy part of the comment of Henry as given in the Comprehensive Commentary on vs. 44–46. "They might purchase bondmen of the heathen nations round about them, or of those strangers that sojourned among them (except of the seven nations to be destroyed), and might claim a dominion over them, and entail them on their families as an inheritance, for the year of Jubilee should give no discharge to them." This he says was designed to intimate "that none shall have the benefit of the gospel-jubilee, but only Israelites indeed, and the children of Abraham by faith; as for those who continue heathenish, they continue bondmen." If Matthew Henry were living now and in this country, should we not see him threatened with deposition from the ministry for such sentiments?

perpetual bondage; he required that slaves of heathen origin should be set free whenever they were cruelly treated, and as a punishment for such cruelty, he required that the master should assume towards them the responsibilities of a parent, introduce them into the covenant of God as though they were his own children, grant them access to the means of religious instruction, by admitting them to the passover and other commemorative feasts, by which the knowledge of God's dealings with his people was principally preserved and propagated; and he enjoined that they should share in all the privileges of the Sabbath and sabbatical year. In this way, rather than by the immediate abolition or absolute prohibition of slavery, infinite wisdom saw fit, in that age and state of the world, to provide for the improvement and happiness of men. And by this means thousands from the surrounding nations were rescued from heathenism, introduced into the church of God and made a component part of his people.

We have thought it the less necessary to go into detail on the argument from the Old Testament, because we consider abolitionists as abandoning the whole ground, and conceding the whole question, when they come to the New Testament. How they can avoid feeling condemned out of their own lips, is more than we can understand. The admitted facts of the case are these, 1. That at the time of the introduction of Christianity, slavery in its worst form prevailed extensively over the world. The slaves are estimated as amounting to one-half or two-thirds of the population of the Roman Empire; and the severity with which they were treated was extreme. 2. That neither Christ nor his apostles ever denounced slaveholding as a crime. 3. That they never urged emancipation as an immediate duty. These are the facts: the inference is irresistible, slaveholding cannot be a crime. It is placed by the inspired writers upon the same ground with despotism. The possession of absolute sovereignty in the state, the exercise by one man of the supreme legislative, judicial and executive functions of government, is not in its own nature sinful. If such a sovereign is wise, just and benevolent, he may be a great benefactor, and secure the approbation of all good men. Accordingly, the apostles, though living under the reign of Nero, while they denounce all injustice and cruelty, whether in despot, master, or parent, never say a word about the sin of despotism. On the contrary, they enjoined the duty of submission to the exercise of that authority; teaching that human government, however constituted, was an ordinance of God; that the king, though such a king as Nero, was still the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath, responsible for the exercise of power, but not for the then possession of it. In like manner, though masters were invested with greater power over their slaves than any master now possesses, the apostles, instead of enjoining them to lay it aside, commanded them to exercise it properly, to be just and equal in all their dealings, remembering that they too had a master in heaven.

On the slaves they enjoined obedience, not only when the masters were good and gentle, but also when they were froward; holding up to them the example of the Redeemer himself, who patiently submitted to injury. They cautioned those who had believing masters, against despising them because they were brethren. The equality which existed between them and their masters, as brethren in Christ, was no reason why they should not render to them the honour and service due to them as their masters according to the flesh.

Such is the plain teaching of the New Testament on this subject, and it is absolutely irreconcilable with the assumption that the apostles regarded slaveholding as a heinous crime. It is here that the argument of the abolitionists breaks down entirely. We have often seen children building houses with cards; after laying a broad foundation and carrying up the structure with the greatest care and skill to the proposed height, in placing the last card in position, the whole collapses and lies in ruins at their feet. Thus these brethren begin with Abraham, and by dint of learning, ingenuity, and hard asserting, make out a tottering case; but when they come to the admission that Christ and his apostles, though living in the midst of slavery, never denounced slaveholding as a sin and never enjoined immediate emancipation as a duty, their whole laborious structure is prostrated in a moment. The concession of those facts is a concession that they differ from their Master and his inspired apostles.

The solution which they give of the facts referred to is altogether unsatisfactory. They say in substance, that the apostles concealed the truth, that they were afraid of consequences, that they acted from policy or motives of expediency.* Our answer to this is: 1. That such conduct would be immoral. For men professing to be inspired teachers of truth and duty, to appear among men living in the daily commission of "a heinous crime in the sight of God," and never once tell them it was a crime; to allow them to go on in this course of iniquity to the ruin of their souls, is a supposition which shocks the moral sense. Nothing but the explicit declaration that slaveholding was a crime, and immediate emancipation a duty, could satisfy the demands of conscience in such a case. Men were constantly coming to the apostles to ask what they must do to be saved, what God would have them to do, and if they did not answer those questions openly and honestly, according to their real convictions, they were bad men. Such conduct in any other case would by all men be pronounced immo-

* This is the ground they are forced to take. The Reviewer of Dr. Junkin's pamphlet says: "To have waged a public war against slavery, to have taken the stand and employed the active efforts now adopted by abolitionists, would have been, humanly speaking, to have drawn upon their heads immediate and utter destruction, and that without even the remotest prospect of benefiting the poor slaves."—P. 109. "We need not expect, therefore, in the New Testament, a direct declaration of the fact that man cannot hold property in man; nor that immediate emancipation is a Christian duty."—P. 110.

ral. Suppose our missionaries among the heathen, in teaching the gospel, should, from motives of policy, abstain from telling them the truth, should fail intentionally to inform them that idolatry, adultery, child-murder, or any like crime, was a grievous sin in the sight of God, would not all the world pronounce them unfaithful? Do not abolitionists condemn southern ministers for not explicitly stating that slaveholding is a crime, and immediate emancipation a duty? Would they not view with abhorrence the minister who really coincided with them in his views, and yet, through fear of the consequences, held his peace, and allowed his hearers to sin on in security? Would not, on the contrary, the world ring with their shouts in praise of the man who in fidelity to God, and in love to man, should openly preach the truth on these points to a congregation of slaveholders, even though it brought sudden destruction on his own head? We fear, however, we are only obscuring the clearness of a self-evident truth by multiplying illustrations. The conduct of the apostles is absolutely irreconcilable with moral honesty, if they believed slaveholding to be a heinous crime in the sight of God. They were either bad men, or they were not abolitionists, in the American sense of that word. 2. But again, the course ascribed to the apostles, in reference to slavery, is not only base in itself, but it is contrary to their conduct in all analogous cases. Slaveholding is the only sin familiar to those to whom they preached, and about which they wrote, that they failed to denounce. Idolatry was a crime which was more prevalent than slaveholding; more implicated in all the institutions of life, in support of which stronger passions were engaged, and in attacking which they could not look for the support of one-half or two-thirds of the community. Yet idolatry they everywhere proclaimed to be a crime inconsistent with Christianity, and a bar to salvation. The consequence was the apostles were persecuted even to death. It is not true that they kept back the truth for fear of suffering. They called God to witness that they declared the whole counsel of God, and were clear of every man's blood. It is said that the cases of idolatry and slavery are not parallel, because it was more dangerous to denounce the latter than the former. Admitting the fact, is the degree of danger attending the discharge of a duty the measure of its obligation? Must a religious teacher, in explaining the way of salvation, keep back the truth—one of the most effectual methods of teaching falsehood—because he may incur danger by inculcating it? We do not, however, believe the allegation. We believe that the apostles might have taught that slaveholding is a sin, with far less danger than that which they incurred by teaching that what the heathen sacrificed they sacrificed to devils. We need not conceive of their adopting the system of agitation, and the whole "moral machinery" of modern times. They adopted no such course with regard to idolatry. But they might doubtless with comparative safety have told slaveholders that it was their duty to emancipate their slaves.

They could as well have enjoined them to set their servants free, as to command them to render to them what is just and equal. Many men, without any great exhibition of courage, have taught and do still teach the moral evil of slaveholding in the midst of slaveholders. And even now, any man who, in a meek, sincere, and benevolent spirit, should say to southern planters that the relation they sustain to their slaves is contrary to the will of God, and incompatible with their own salvation, would meet with no greater disturbance than the Quakers have experienced in making their annual testimony against slavery.

The course ascribed to the apostles is not only insonsistent with fidelity and contrary to their uniform practice, but it is moreover opposed to the conduct of the messengers of God in all ages. The ancient prophets never failed to reprove the people for their sins, and to exhort them to repentance, no matter how strong the attachment of their hearers to their iniquity, or how powerful the interests leagued in its support. Elijah did not fail to denounce the worship of Baal, though Ahab and Jezebel were determined to kill the prophets of God; nor did John the Baptist fail to tell Herod that it was not lawful for him to have his brother's wife.

This is one of the most serious aspects of this whole discussion. The testimony of scripture is so clearly against the fundamental principle of modern abolitionism, that the most violent processes of interpretation must be resorted to, to get rid of its authority; and the example of the apostles is so opposed to the doctrine of the party, that to evade its force they are constrained to ascribe to the messengers of Christ principles of conduct which the moral sense instinctively condemns. This course cannot be pursued without weakening the authority of the word of God. When any set of men assume that a doctrine, whether it be the Trinity, personal election, or future punishment, cannot be true, and go to the scriptures with the determination to silence their testimony, or to make them speak in accordance with their preconceived opinions, they wrong their own souls, and put themselves above the word of God. Or if they assume on general grounds that the use of wine, defensive war, the holding of slaves, is in itself a sin, and place the scriptures on the rack of criticism, to make them teach the same doctrine, it is bad for them, bad for the church, and bad for the country. It of course makes a great difference whether this conflict with the Bible is associated with the benevolent or with the malignant feelings of our nature; but it is well for us to remember that we cannot be more benevolent than God, and that it is vain for us to condemn what his word allows. And if we at any time feel that the scriptures trouble us; if we wish they did not say exactly what they do say, if we should be glad to alter them to bring them nearer to our mind, we may be certain that the fault is in ourselves. The more perfectly we can sympathize with the word as it is; the more entirely our understanding,

heart, and conscience, accord with its statements, the more healthful is the state of our minds. And on the contrary, the more we rise in conflict with its obvious import, the more we feel constrained to resort to evasions and unnatural interpretations to escape from its authority, the more certainly are we in the wrong. And when the pride of our nature rises so high as to lead us to declare that if the Bible really teaches this or that, which to all appearance it does teach, we renounce it, then we become judges and not doers of the law.

We have repeatedly admitted, though we believe the fundamental principles of abolitionism to be false and its spirit fanatical, leading to a censoriousness, and evil speaking of Christian brethren, exceedingly offensive to God, yet that many good men are to be found in their ranks. It may therefore be proper to ask, How it is that on a question of morals, good men should be so divided in their judgments, one affirming, another denying that slaveholding is a crime? We think we have already intimated the true solution of this question. They have in a great measure different objects before their minds. What the abolitionists, for the most part, really condemn, the true objects of their moral disapprobation, is not slaveholding, but the slave-laws; and what the other party vindicate as not necessarily inconsistent with the will of God, is slaveholding, and not the slave-laws of this or any other country. It is the want of discrimination between these entirely distinct things, SLAVEHOLDING AND THE SLAVE-LAWS, we firmly believe is the cause of a great part of the difference of sentiment which exists on this subject. We have already adverted to one source of this confusion when speaking of the nature of property. The abolitionists constantly assume that the incidents of the right of property are the same whatever may be the nature of its object. Hence they infer that if one man may justly hold another man as property, he may justly treat him as he may treat any other article of property; if the validity of the title be acknowledged, it follows that the owner may disregard the nature of his slave, treat him as if he were not a husband, or not a parent; as though he had no social affections; or was not a rational being, and had no soul to be saved or lost. This is what they mean to condemn, and this every good man in the world would condemn; and if this was a correct view of what is meant by the right of property in man, there could be no diversity of opinion as to whether slaveholding were a heinous crime. Again, they constantly confound what a man has a right to do in virtue of his relation of master, with what the laws of the land give him the liberty to do, or even enjoin upon him. Thus the Reviewer above quoted, argues that if the apostles recognised slaveholding under the Roman laws as consistent with a Christian character, they must have recognised as consistent with that charater, all the oppressions, cruelty, and even murder, which those laws sanctioned or permitted. "The Roman law," he says, "allowed masters to put their slaves to death; to extort testimony

on the rack; to punish them with dreadful tortures; to turn out the old slaves to die on a dunghill, &c. Might the Christian master claim and exercise all these legal rights? The Roman law said, *Inter servos et liberos matrimonium contrahi non potest, contubernium potest.* A freeman may live with a slave, but not marry her. Was this legal fornication tolerated in the church?" He might have gone further, and said that the Roman law recognised no marriage between slaves, and then ask, whether the apostles recognised this prohibition of matrimony? If we understand this argument, it is, that if the apostles recognised the right of a Christian under the Roman laws to hold slaves, they thereby recognised his right to expose his slaves to die of cold and hunger, to torture them at pleasure, to forbid them to marry, or to regard their union as mere temporary concubinage. If this is a valid mode of reasoning, then the Bible, in recognising the right of kings to reign, recognised their right to throw good men to lions, or into a furnace, to persecute them for worshipping the true God, and to do all the abominable things human laws have ever permitted kings to do. Then, too, if the Bible recognises the parental relation, it recognises the right of the parent to sell his daughters as concubines, to put his children to death, or to do whatever the laws of Mohammedans or Pagans may authorize a parent's doing. One would think that the distinction between the lawfulness of a given relation, as between a king and his subjects, a parent and his children, a master and his slaves, and the laws which at any particular time or place may be enacted in reference to that relation, is sufficiently clear, to prevent the two things from being confounded. Yet this is a distinction that abolitionists will not make. When they speak of slaveholding as a sin, they mean that it is a sin to do what the slave-laws of the south permit to be done; to separate parents and children, or husbands and wives; to treat slaves with injustice and cruelty; to prevent their learning to read the word of God, or attending the preaching of the gospel. And when any man asserts that slaveholding is not a crime, they consider him as saying that it is not a sin thus to trample on the dearest rights of our fellow men. The very title of the book to which we have so often referred, is, "A Review of Dr. Junkin's Synodical Speech in *defence of American Slavery.*" Dr. Junkin's speech, however, is simply an argument to prove that slaveholding is not a crime, and therefore that "believing masters ought not to be excommunicated from the church of God." This is called a defence of American Slavery! i. e. of the whole system of slave-laws now in force in this country! There is no help for men who will act thus. May not a man in England maintain that landholding is no sin, without defending all the English laws of entail and primogeniture, which relate to lands? May he not teach that it is right to hold property, without thereby teaching that all the laws relating to property, in any given country, are wise and just? Then why may he not say, that slaveholding is no crime, and yet not defend the slave-laws

either of Rome or America? This distinction, which is so plain as to be glaring, it is of great importance should be borne in mind both in the North and South. In the North, to prevent the sin and folly of condemning all slaveholders as criminals, when the slave laws are the real objects meant to be condemned; and in the South, to prevent those who maintain that slaveholding is no sin, from thinking it necessary to defend, and from expecting others to defend the existing laws in relation to that subject.

We utterly repudiate the charge that we are the advocates of the slave-laws of the South, because we hold that slaveholding is not in itself a crime. We deny that such a charge is sustained by anything we have said; we deny that southern Christians even defend the laws which are now in force with regard to the slaves. We know, for example, that the law which forbids slaves being taught to read, is in a multitude of cases openly disregarded. Within ten days a gentleman from South Carolina told us that every slave that he had could both read and write, and that he never gave himself the least concern about the law which forbids the instruction of the blacks. To show how unreasonable is the clamour of abolitionists against those who oppose their distinctive doctrine, we will again briefly state what we conceive to be the correct view of the subject.

By slaveholding we understand one man's having the right of property in another man; and by the right of property we understand the right of having and using a thing according to its nature; and consequently the right of property in a man can be nothing more than the right to use him as a man. And as a man is not only a sentient creature, but a social, rational, moral and immortal being, it is not an incident of the right of property in him, that his wants as a social and rational being can be justly disregarded, any more than it is an incident of right of property in a horse, that the wants of the horse as a living animal can be justly neglected. On the contrary, as the possession of rights implies corresponding duties, the possession of property in a man imposes the responsibility of providing for his wants as a man. And as the wants of a man relate to the soul as well as to the body, the responsibility not only rests upon the owner, but arises out of the very nature of his relation to his slaves as their owner, to provide not merely for their comfortable support, but also for their education, for the secure exercise of their social affections as husbands and fathers; and for their moral and religious instruction. These are as plainly the incidents of the right of property in man, as the duty of support, education, and moral and religious culture, is an incident of a parent's relation to his children. So far, therefore, from maintaining that a master has a right in virtue of his ownership to prevent his slaves marrying, or to separate them when married, or to keep them in ignorance, or to debar them from the means of grace, we say that it of necessity flows from his right of property in them, that he has no right to do any of these things, but is bound to do

the direct reverse. It is here as in despotic governments. So far from the possession by one man of absolute power in the state, giving him the right to interfere with the religious convictions of his people, to keep them in ignorance, to separate the married, to take children from their parents, or in any way to hinder the social, intellectual, and religious improvement of those subject to his power, the very possession of that power imposes the strongest obligation to do all he can for their happiness and improvement.

Again, as the possession of power over our fellow-men necessarily involves corresponding duties towards them, so the exercise of that power is to be regulated by the law of God. A king is bound to exercise his power according to the rules of justice and mercy; a parent must use his authority for edification and not for destruction; and a master's power over the slave is in like manner subject to the rules of God's word. And as it is one of the rules there laid down, that labour should be rewarded, it is no fair inference from the admission of the right of possession in the master, that he may justly withhold a reasonable compensation for the labour of his slaves. And in point of fact, we believe it to be true, that the slaves of the south, as a general rule, are far better compensated than the great body of operatives in Europe. We believe also that taking them as a class, their intellectual, moral, and religious condition is better. It is not well, however, to recriminate. Americans doubtless have sinned and are now sinning greatly, in not discharging the duties which flow from their relation to the coloured people of this country as their masters; and this sin is not the less, because England has sinned and is still sinning in a higher measure, in her conduct towards her labouring population. The degradation, social and moral, into which large masses of the people have there been allowed to sink, we cannot but regard as the natural consequence of unequal laws; of laws which favour the accumulation of property in the hands of a few, and which tend to confine the benefits of education and religious privileges to the upper and middle classes. The Archbishop of Canterbury stated in the House of Lords, that there were three millions of people in England and Wales without pastoral supervision, and that church accommodation was provided for one in eight of the population, in some parts of the country, and for one in thirty in other parts. The Marquis of Lansdowne, on another occasion, stated that, with the exception of Spain and Russia, England was in education below any European nation, only one in twelve of the population being in school. A public report recently made to parliament, states that there are nearly three millions and a half of the people of Ireland living in mud hovels, having one room each, and without chimney or windows. While the mass of the population is sinking to such degradation, property is accumulating with fearful rapidity in the hands of a constantly decreasing number. In 1770 the lands of England belonged to 250,000 families; in 1815, they belonged to

32,000, and since then the process has been going on as rapidly as ever.* In 1838 it appeared from the probate of wills that the personal property of twenty-four bishops, who had died within twenty years, averaged about $300,000 each. This is exclusive of their real estates. If the eye had the power of retroversion, we should certainly be less censorious. The laws of England by which such inequality has been produced in the distribution of wealth, and such ignorance and misery entailed on the lower classes, are to Americans as much the objects of moral disapprobation, as anything in our institutions can be to the good people of England. And yet we hear of no public meetings to recommend discontinuing the use of the products of English labour, analogous to those which in Great Britain recommend, under the patronage of that very eccentric person Dr. Burns, the non-importation of American cotton. This however is a digression which we should be willing to strike out, but are also willing to let stand. We do not approve of this mutual condemnation, and only adduce the foregoing facts to show how unbecoming it appears in the eyes of Americans, for men surrounded by such crying evils at home, to exhaust their benevolence on distant objects.

As, then, the right of property in a man, while it invests the owner with power to command his services, does not exempt him from the obligation to exercise that power according to the directions of God's word, the master therefore is bound by the principle that the labourer is worthy of his hire. And the right to accumulate property necessarily follows from the right to compensation, for a man's hire is his own, and if it exceeds the necessary means of support, it is his own still. This right is generally recognised. How else could slaves purchase their own liberty, as they are allowed to do under Spanish laws, and as they so often in fact do in this country?

It follows necessarily, from what has been said, that all those laws which are designed to restrict the master in the discharge of the duties which flow from his relation to his slaves; which forbid his teaching them to read, or which prohibit marriage among them, or which allow of the separation of those who are married, or which render insecure the possession of their earnings, or are otherwise in conflict with the word of God, are wicked laws; laws which do not find their justification in the admission of the right of ownership in the master, but are in direct contravention of the obligations which necessarily flow from that right. If the laws of the land forbade parents to instruct their children, or permitted them to sell them to the Turks, there would be a general outcry against the atrocity of such laws; but no man would be so absurd as to infer that having children was a great sin. Parents who complied with such laws would be great sinners, but not parents who did their duty to their children. In all other cases,

* Edinburgh Witness, Feb. 3, 1844.

men distinguish between the relation, whether of kings and subjects, of lords and tenants, of parents and children, and the laws, just or unjust, which may be made respecting those relations. If they would make the same distinction between slaveholding and the slave-laws, they would see that the condemnation of the latter does not necessarily involve the condemnation of the former as itself a crime.

The principles above stated we believe to be scriptural, and in accordance with the enlightened moral sense of men. We believe them also to be eminently conducive to the welfare of the slaves. The principles and conduct, on the other hand, of our abolitionists, we believe to be unchristian and in the highest degree injurious. If their distinctive doctrine is erroneous, then denouncing slaveholders as such, excluding them from the church, insisting on immediate emancipation as in all cases a duty, are all seen and felt to be unreasonable; and the spirit with which this course is pursued, to be unchristian. The consequence is, that opposition and alienation are produced between those who ought to be united; slaveholders, who do not belong to the church, are exasperated, and become more severe in the treatment of their slaves, more intolerant of all means for their improvement, and the hands of God's people living among them are effectually tied. As the cause of temperance was disparaged, weakened, and in some places ruined, by making all use of intoxicating drinks sinful; so the cause of the slave has been injured beyond estimate, by the doctrine that slaveholding is itself a crime, and by the spirit and measures to which that doctrine has given rise.

Any candid man can see, on the other hand, that the scriptural doctrine is adapted to promote the best interests of the slaves. That doctrine is that slaveholding is not necessarily sinful, but like all similar relations is right or wrong according to circumstances, and when it exists gives rise to the obligation of providing for all the temporal and spiritual wants of the slaves. If a man owns another, he is for that very reason bound to feed and clothe him, to provide for him in sickness and old age, to educate him, and let the light of truth and saving knowledge in upon his mind, to watch over his rights, to exercise all the power which his ownership gives him in accordance with those rules of mercy and righteousness, which are laid down in the word of God. It is also evident that acting in accordance with these principles would soon so improve the condition of the slaves, would make them intelligent, moral and religious, and thus work out to the benefit of all concerned, and the removal of the institution. For slavery, like despotism, supposes the actual inferiority, and consequent dependence of those held in subjection. Neither can be permanent. Both may be prolonged by keeping the subject class degraded, that is, by committing sin on a large scale, which is only to treasure up wrath for the day of wrath. It is only the antagonist fanaticism of a fragment of the south, which maintains the doctrine that

slavery is in itself a good thing, and ought to be perpetuated. It cannot by possibility be perpetuated. The only question is, how is it to end? All that we are concerned with, is present duty; and that duty, inferred from the nature of the relation, and declared in the word of God, is to instruct, to civilize, to evangelize the slaves, to make them as far as we can, intelligent, moral and religious; good husbands, good fathers, as well as good servants. The consequence of such conduct must be peace, a good conscience, and the blessing of God.

If the views presented in this paper are correct, it is easy to see how this whole subject ought to be treated in our church courts. In the first place it is plain, that for such courts, under the dictation of abolitionists, to pronounce slaveholding a crime, and to enjoin the exclusion of all slaveholders from the church, would be foolish and wicked. It would be to trample on the authority of the word of God; to shock the moral sense of the great body of intelligent and pious people on the face of the earth; it would rend the church, send abroad a spirit of malice and discord, and would cut off the slaves themselves from one of the most important means appointed by God for their improvement and emancipation; the instructions and kind treatment of believing masters.

In the second place, it is plain that the church has no responsibility and no right to interfere, with respect to the slave laws of the South. Those laws are doubtless in many cases unjust and cruel, enjoining what God forbids, and forbidding what God enjoins. The existence of those laws supposes criminality somewhere; but the responsibility rests on those who made, and have the power to repeal them. It does not rest on the church. Christians who are members of communities in which such laws are in force, have their share of responsibility with regard to them, as citizens. But it is no part of the vocation of the church, as such, to interfere with civil laws. The apostles did not call a synod at Jerusalem, to denounce the Roman laws, but they laid the foundation of a spiritual society, and let the world make its own laws. We would not brook the legislatures of our States passing denunciatory resolutions against our rules of church discipline; and we should not call upon the church to meddle with the laws of the land. As citizens we have the right and duty to demand just and equal laws; but as a church, we have other and higher duties.

In the third place, it is evident that the church has an important duty to perform in relation to this subject. At the North, as elsewhere, she is bound to instruct parents in their duties to their children, and to exercise her oversight and discipline when those duties are grossly violated or neglected. She has the same duty to perform with regard to slaveholders. As she would be called upon to censure a parent, who was unjust or cruel to his children, so is she called upon to censure her slaveholding members, should they be unjust or cruel to their slaves. The church is a society constituted by God, to be governed by certain rules, and invested

with power to enforce, by spiritual means, the observance of those rules upon its members. Of course those who do not comply with the rules laid down in the word of God, as to their conduct, either as men, or parents, or masters, are justly exposed to the censure of the church, and the church is bound to inflict such censure. As to this point, we presume there is no difference of opinion. And if we could agree to act on these principles; that is, abstain from denouncing as a crime what God has not so pronounced; withhold our hands from the laws of the land, for which, as a church, we have no responsibility; and confine ourselves to teaching all classes of our members their duties, whether as parents, masters, or slaves, and enforcing the discharge of those duties by the power which God hath given to his church for edification and not for destruction, we should commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.

ESSAY XII.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.*

The subject of criminal jurisprudence has of late years attracted much attention, and the effect has been a gradual melioration of the penal codes of most civilized nations. Were it our task to unfold the causes which have conspired to produce this favourable change, we should certainly name as the very last and least among them all, that which Mr. Rantoul, the author of the Massachusetts Report, places first, the influence of Jeremy Bentham. So long as we believe that men are possessed of a moral nature, that in its workings makes them acquainted with pleasures and pains of a higher order than the gratifications of the palate or the pinchings of cold or hunger, we never can be persuaded that Benthamism can be the means of any extensive or enduring benefit to mankind. It would be such a miracle as might almost compel us into blank scepticism, if a philosophy of the lowest and shallowest order, that contemplates man only as the first of animals, and the universe only as the largest and best of machines, should supply such truths, motives, and means, as would suffice for the substantial improvement and elevation of the human race. Whenever we are satisfied that this has actually occurred, we shall deem it a fact sufficiently startling to lead us to examine anew the nature of man, and the character of the truths by which he is to live. In the meantime we shall remain in the belief, that any wise and beneficent provision for the interests of men must be derived from some higher source than a philosophy that is adequate, in its legitimate scope, only to the care of cattle.

Our object, however, is not now to trace the true causes of the reformation which criminal jurisprudence has undergone, but simply to mark the fact. This reformation has been more extensive and striking in England than in any other country. The criminal code of England, as it stood thirty years ago, attached

* Originally published in 1842, in review of the following works:—1. "Report relating to Capital Punishment, presented to the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Feb. 22, 1836."

2. "Report on Capital Punishment, presented to the Assembly of the State of New York, April 14, 1841."

the punishment of death to more than two hundred different offences, many of which were of a comparatively trivial character. Thus it was a capital felony to steal property to the value of five shillings privately from a shop, or to the value of forty shillings from a dwelling house, to steal to the amount of forty shillings on any navigable river, to steal privately from the person, or to steal from any bleaching ground in England or Ireland. A still more sanguinary act, passed under the reign of Elizabeth, made it a capital offence for any person above the age of fourteen, to associate for a month with gypsies. The latest instance of the execution of this last act, was under the reign of Charles I.; though Lord Hale mentions that as many as thirteen persons had, within this time, suffered death under it, at a single assize. When these severe statutes were enacted, it was doubtless intended that their penalties should be faithfully executed, as no sensible men would ever make laws without the design of carrying them into effect. But as the exigencies of commerce, trade, or manufactures, which had seemed to call for this bloody protection, passed away, or as experience demonstrated the inexpediency of so sanguinary a code, and an enlightened public sentiment revolted at its cruelty, its provisions fell gradually into disuse. Under the reign of Henry VIII. Hollinshed states that not less than two thousand persons perished annually under the hands of the executioner. But during the seven years, from 1802 to 1809, the average number of executions for each year was only nine and a half; and these were chiefly for the gravest offences. During this same period eighteen hundred and seventy-two persons were committed to Newgate, for privately stealing in shops and dwelling houses, but of this whole number only one was executed. The evidence of these and like facts would be conclusive to any American mind, that the English system of penal law, interpreted according to the intention of its founders, had become obsolete. But it affords a curious illustration of the conservative tenacity with which English politicians clung, more a few years since than now, to the institutions of their ancestors, that whenever it was proposed to amend their criminal laws by the light which experience had shed upon their operation, their very blunders were forthwith praised as excellences. Thus Paley exalts the wisdom which had planned a penal code by which severe punishments are denounced, while, in the great majority of cases, only mild ones are inflicted. And when Sir Samuel Romilly commenced, in 1807, his efforts to reform the criminal code by removing sundry minor offences from the list of capital felonies, where they remained for no other purpose than to illustrate the "wise provision of our ancestors," by which they had affixed to certain crimes a penalty which, in the altered state of society, it was deemed expedient never to inflict, he was visited with abundant reproach, and denounced as a rash and daring innovator who was seeking nothing less than the destruction of the entire system

of English jurisprudence. This profound jurist, by the most untiring efforts, protracted through several successive sessions of Parliament, was able to carry only three of the bills which he introduced, by which the acts were repealed which inflicted the punishment of death upon persons stealing privily from the person, stealing from bleaching grounds, and stealing to the amount of forty shillings on navigable rivers. But, in 1837, such has been the influence of the movement party in England, bills were brought into Parliament, and carried through without difficulty, by which the punishment of death was removed at once from about two hundred offences, leaving it applicable only to some aggravated forms of burglary and robbery—arson, with danger to life—rape—high treason—and murder, and attempts to murder. By a subsequent act, the crime of rape was taken out of the list of capital offences, leaving the criminal law of England, so far as the punishment of death is concerned, in as mild a form as it bears in most countries.

In our own country the only offences that are punishable with death, in the great majority of the States, are treason and murder; and as treason against a particular State is a crime that cannot well be committed so long as our present national compact survives, the punishment of death may be considered as practically attaching only to murder. The wilful and malicious destruction of human life, the greatest crime which man can commit against his fellow man, is distinguished, as it ought to be, from every other crime, by the direst penalty known to the law. No one will deny that the severest punishment which it would be right or expedient for society to inflict for any offence, should be appropriated to this greatest of all offences. But the question has been raised, both in England and in many of our own States, whether society has the right in any case to take away human life, or whether having the right, some punishment milder, and equally efficacious, might not be substituted for this dread resort. Scarcely a year passes in which petitions are not sent in to some of our legislatures, praying for the abolition of capital punishment; and of late the friends of this proposed change in our penal laws seem to have been specially active. Their efforts have produced so much effect that it is plainly incumbent upon those who are opposed to the innovation, to state and vindicate their dissent.

In canvassing the arguments of the advocates for the repeal of capital punishment, we shall confine the discussion to the case of murder. Whatever doubt may exist as to the expediency of punishing any other crimes with death, we have no doubt that it is both the right and the duty of society to accept of no price, to make no commutation for the life of the murderer. The strength of this conviction has not been in the least degree impaired by a dispassionate consideration of the reasonings contained in the two reports to the legislatures of Massachusetts and New York, both

of which strenuously advocate the entire abolition of capital punishment.

Neither of these reports contains any facts or arguments which would afford much food for thought to one who had previously read Mr. Livingston's report on the same subject to the legislature of Louisiana, in which the same views are advocated; nor would either of them commend itself by its style and manner to a truth-seeking spirit. They display more of the anxiety and heat of the special pleader, than of the calm fairness of the earnest inquirer after truth. There is in both of them, but more especially in Mr. O'Sullivan's report to the New York legislature, a confident array of mere plausibilities and an anxious grasping after everything which can be made to wear the semblance of aid to his cause, which indicate too plainly the interested advocate of a foregone conclusion. If the efficacy of the punishment of death as an example to deter others from the commission of crime is to be impeached, Mr. O'Sullivan finds no difficulty in proving that solitary imprisonment for life is really a more dreadful punishment than death; but this does not hinder him in another part of his argument from advocating the abolition of capital punishment on the ground of its needless severity. If a remote fact lying far back upon the very borders of the deluge seems to lend him any countenance, he presses it at once into his service without inquiring into its accuracy, or properly considering its relevancy to the case in hand. There is an utter want of that kind of guarded and cautious statement which ought to mark the reasons for an impartial judgment formed from a comprehensive survey of the whole question. We are persuaded that no one can read his essay without feeling as if he were listening to the intemperate and one-sided argument of a hired advocate, rather than to the candid summing up of a judge. It is not in this temper or with this spirit that great questions in jurisprudence should be approached. It is not in the exercise of such gifts as these that they can be adequately discussed, or wisely settled. He who undertakes to give utterance, through the solemn voice of law, to the sentiment of justice upon a question which affects most deeply the interests of a wide community, should make it evident that he feels himself engaged in a work too sacred to admit of that kind of trifling with truth which might be tolerated in defence of a client upon trial. He who would innovate upon an institution, established in all lands and perpetuated through all ages, may be fairly expected to show his competency for the task, by that high bearing which, resulting from consciousness of well considered aims, and the dispassionate conviction of truth, cannot subsist for a moment in connexion with the evasions and subtleties of sophistical argument.

We are persuaded that Mr. O'Sullivan has greatly underrated the intelligence and moral sense of the community, if he supposes that an argument upon one of the gravest questions that can come

before a legislative body, can maintain at one time the gratuitous cruelty of a punishment, and at another dwell upon the greater severity of the proposed substitute, without at once divesting its author's opinions of all influence with thinking men. Such inconsistency does not entitle us to charge him with dishonesty. We cannot rightfully infer that he is defending a conclusion which he knows to be wrong; or that without caring whether it is right or wrong, he is seeking to make for himself political capital, by espousing and advocating an opinion which he knows to be popular with certain classes of the community. Such unhallowed influences have played their part before now in the work of legislation. Such miserable mountebanks have climbed up into high places and pretended to utter in the ears of a nation truth that had been sought in the patience and earnestness of love, when they have really had in mind only the advancement of their own private interests. The public can receive no valuable instruction from such men; for though, through a fortunate combination of the public good with their private aims, it should happen that their teachings, in some particular case, are true, they will be wanting in the simple sincerity which marks those who only are qualified to teach, who in searching after truth have waited at the posts of her doors, and watched long at her temple gates. But the want of this sincerity may arise from other causes than dishonesty, and we are glad to believe that in Mr. O'Sullivan it has a different origin. He may belong to that class of men who seem to labour under an infirmity of mind, natural or acquired, which disqualifies them from seeing more than a small part of any subject at once. His temperament may be such as to place his reason too much under the command of his feelings. The weakness of compassion may have led him to shrink from the idea of putting a man to death even for the most horrid crime. Under the influence of this feeling he may have taken up the belief that it was wrong for human justice ever to become the minister of death, and then tasked the talent which he evidently possesses to defend this belief. But whatever may be the cause, the incompetency of any man to discuss and decide great questions in jurisprudence or morals is evident, the moment that he makes it manifest that the belief which he avows and inculcates rests upon other grounds than the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Mr. O'Sullivan's opinion is for this reason deprived of all weight as authority. His arguments do not furnish, in all respects, the true reasons for his own belief; inasmuch as it is impossible for any man to cherish the reverence which he professes to entertain for the sacred writings as a revelation from God, and at the same time look upon the Hebrew code as the work of Moses aided by his pagan father-in-law, Jethro; or to believe that imprisonment for life should be substituted for the punishment of death, because being more mild it is more in accordance with the benevolent spirit of Christianity, and being more severe it will be a more effectual restraint upon

crime. But we propose to examine the arguments which he has produced, to see what weight they ought to have with other minds. We shall confine our remarks chiefly to Mr. O'Sullivan's report, because it contains the substance of Mr. Rantoul's, and much more besides.

We do not propose to give a full exposition of the reasons for capital punishment, any further than these shall be brought out in reply to the objections urged against it. We propose no new measure. We advocate no untried experiment. He who comes forward with a novel theory respecting the best mode of preserving human life, should come prepared with the amplest defence of its grounds and the clearest exposition of its tendencies. But in maintaining an institution which has received the assent of all civilized nations from the days of Noah until now, we do all that can be reasonably required of us, when we show the insufficiency of the reasons alleged in behalf of any proposed change.

Mr. O'Sullivan attempts, in the first instance, to invalidate the argument for capital punishment derived from the sacred scriptures. In this he shows his wisdom; for if, as he states, the opinion that the punishment of murder by death has not alone the sanction but the express injunction of divine wisdom, is the basis of nine-tenths of the opposition still to be encountered in current society to its abolition, he could not expect to accomplish any good end by his argument until he had first shown the erroneousness of this very general impression. He confesses for himself that if he considered the question under discussion as answered by a divine command, he would not attempt to go further to consult the uncertain oracles of human reason; and rightly supposing that there is through the great mass of the community a like reverence for what is esteemed a divine command, his first effort is to expose the popular error on this subject. This is the weakest, and in every way, the least respectable part of his essay.

He attempts, in the first place, to set aside the argument for a divine command enjoining capital punishment for murder, drawn from the Mosaic code. This code, he contends, was framed for the government of a people ungovernable beyond all others—"a nation who at that time probably exceeded any of the present hordes of savages in the wilds of Africa or Tartary, in slavish ignorance, sordid vices, loathsome diseases, and brutal lusts"—and who could only be restrained therefore by institutions of the sternest and most sanguinary character. If the provisions of this "Draconian code" in relation to the punishment of murder are binding upon us, in the altered state of society as it now exists, then do they equally bind us to inflict capital punishment upon many other offences. Such is his argument. And though we have strong objections to the statements which he makes, copied chiefly from Mr. Rantoul, considered as an exposition of the true character and intent of the Mosaic code, yet we are perfectly willing to admit the force of his argument as an answer to those,

if any such there be, who rest the defence of capital punishment upon the statutes of this code. Nor was it at all necessary, in order to give his argument upon this point its full force, that he should stigmatize the laws of Moses as containing so many "crude, cruel, and unchristian features," and then to cover this rabid violence, reduce these laws, with the exception of the ten commandments, to a level, so far as the Divine agency was concerned in their enactment, with "any other system of laws which the Supreme Governor of the universe has at different times allowed to be framed and applied to practice among nations, by lawgivers whom we must also regard as the mere instruments in his hands." It is true that in relation to the distinction which is here drawn between the divine origin of the decalogue and the other parts of the Jewish code, the effect of which is nothing less than to make Moses an unprincipled impostor, Mr. O'Sullivan states that the committee consider it incumbent on them to present it, though they refrain from expressing their opinion respecting it. If Mr. O'Sullivan believes in the justness of this distinction why did he not frankly and fearlessly say so? If he does not believe in it why seek to avail himself of its help? We would as soon confide in a man as our adviser and guide, who would burn down his house to warm his cold hands by, as in one who to gain a small fraction of aid in establishing a favourite conclusion would not scruple to make use of arguments, not sincerely believed, the effect of which is to destroy the credibility of no small portion of divine revelation.

We have never met with an argument which professed to derive the obligation to punish murder with death from the Hebrew statutes to that effect. We are perfectly willing to admit that these statutes are of no further we ightin the argument than as a revelation of the will of God that at that time and among that people murder should thus be punished. They constitute a full and sufficient answer to those who deny the right of society to take away life in punishment of crime, but, taken by themselves, they do not prove that it is our duty now, as it was that of the Jews, to punish murder with death, nor even that it is expedient for us thus to punish it. Did the Bible shed no other light upon this question we should take the fact that among the Jews murder was, by the divine command, punished with death, only as one element in the argument by which we should seek to prove that it was expedient for us to inflict upon it the same penalty.

But there is another statute upon this subject, given long anterior to the Mosaic law, which Mr. O'Sullivan finds it much more difficult to dispose of in accordance with his wishes, though he flatters himself that he has not only "destroyed all its seeming force as an argument in favour of capital punishment, but transferred its application to the other side." We allude, of course, to the directions given to Noah, recorded in the fifth and sixth verses of the ninth chapter of Genesis.

"And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the

hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man."

Mr. O'Sullivan's comment upon this passage strikes us as an extraordinary specimen of reasoning.

"The true understanding of this important passage is to be sought in the original Hebrew text, and in a comparison of its terms with the adjacent context. Such an examination will be found to reverse directly the sense in which it is usually received, and to show that our common English version is a clear *mistranslation*, founded on an ambiguity in the original, which ambiguity has been decided by the first translators, and so left ever since, by the light, or rather by the darkness of their own preconceived views on this subject—views derived from the established barbarian practice of their time. The word in the Hebrew (*shophaich*), which is here rendered 'whoso sheddeth,' is simply the present participle 'shedding,' in which, in the Hebrew as in the English, there is no distinction of gender. And the word which is rendered 'his' (*damo*), there being no neuter in that language, may with equal right be rendered 'its.' The whole passage is therefore fully as well susceptible of the translation, '*whatsoever* sheddeth man's blood, by man shall (or may) *its* blood be shed,'—as of that which has been given to it, from no other reason than the prejudice of a 'foregone conclusion.' Several of the most able commentators on the Scriptures give the words virtually the same interpretation; and that profound and learned critic, Michaelis, of Göttingen, in his Commentaries on the laws of Moses (ch. iv., § 3, art. 274), says expressly, 'the sixth verse must be rendered, not *whosoever*, but *whatsoever* sheddeth human blood.'

"The propriety of this correction of our common English version of the passage in question will appear very clear, when we collate it with both the preceding and the following words. In the preceding verse, after having alluded to that mystic sanctity of *blood*, as containing the essential principle of animal life, which we afterwards find so strikingly to pervade the Mosaic system, the covenant proceeds:

"'And surely your blood of your lives will I require; *at the hand of every beast will I require it*, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man.

"'Whoso (whatsoever) sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his (its) blood be shed; *for in the image of God made he man.*'

"The very reason here given for the prohibition of the shedding of the blood of man, is *the defacement of the image of its Creator in the 'human form divine.'* Does this high and sacred principle lose its force or its application, because the criminal may himself have been guilty of a previous outrage upon its sanctity? Can that afford any justification for a repetition of the same outrage upon the same 'image of God?' Where is the authority for any such assumption? The distinction here drawn is plain. The beast that sheddeth man's blood, 'by *man*' may its blood be shed; but when man's blood is shed by man's brother, '*I*' will require it at his hands—by penalties, into the nature of which it is not for us to attempt to penetrate. The object of the whole passage is, clearly, to establish, on the most solemn basis, the great idea of the holiness of the principle of life, and especially human life. The destruction of animal life is permitted for 'meat,' being prohibited by implication for any other wanton purpose; while its being thus declared forfeited in atonement for the destruction of the life of man, can have no other reason—the brute being incapable of moral guilt—than to strengthen and deepen the idea of the sanctity of that life in the minds of the human race itself. What can be more absurd than an interpretation which, by authorizing the practice of public judicial murder, in the most deliberate coldness of blood, is directly and fatally subversive of the very essential idea which constitutes the basis of the whole passage! Surely, then, instead of any sanction

being afforded by this passage to the infliction of the punishment of death for any human crime—to this defacement and outrage of the 'image of God,' in the person of man—it passes against that very practice a far more awful sentence of condemnation than any which human reason could have framed, or human lips uttered."

The Hebrew scholar may form from the remark upon "*damo*" a judgment of Mr. O'Sullivan's fitness to dogmatize so confidently respecting the mistake made by our English translators of the Bible. These translators, however prejudiced they may have been in favour of any barbarian practices of their time, were at least men who knew the difference between a Hebrew noun, and its pronominal suffix. Mr. O'Sullivan quotes the authority of Michaelis for substituting "its" in place of "his" in this passage. It is true that Michaelis advocates this change, but not in the sense for which Mr. O'Sullivan contends. Mr. O'Sullivan's argument requires that the pronoun should be neuter, to the exclusion of the masculine. Michaelis was too profound and learned a critic to propose any such absurdity as this. He contends that as the original pronoun may be either masculine or neuter, it should be translated by our neuter, that it may include both. His idea of the true meaning of this passage would be accurately expressed, using the plural number instead of the singular, by the translation, "the shedders of blood, by man shall their blood be shed." The use which Michaelis makes of this translation is to extend, instead of lowering and limiting the application of this command, and both he and the readers of this report are unfairly treated when his authority is so disingenuously perverted. This profound critic was learned in the laws of nature, and of nations, as well as in Hebrew etymologies, and he expresses the earnest hope that "none of his readers entertain those new fangled notions of compassion which, by way of avoiding capital punishments, condemn delinquents to be cast into prisons and there fed."

But we are told that the "very reason here given for the prohibition of the shedding of the blood of man is the defacement of the image of his Creator," and are asked "whether this high and sacred principle loses its force or its application because the criminal may have himself been guilty of a previous outrage upon its sanctity." It is really difficult to answer such argument as this with the respect that is due to the reasoner, if not to his reasoning. If it should be proposed to punish the man who has injured the property of another by a fine, that is, by taking away from him against his will, a certain portion of his own property, would it not be thought a piece of effrontery rather than an argument in the opposer who should contend that this would be an outrage upon the same sacred right of property which the criminal had himself violated? Or would it be deemed a valid argument against punishing the crime of false imprisonment by the imprisonment of the offender, that the punishment would infringe the same inherent right to liberty, the violation

of which constitutes the offence? If in favour of such punishment there should be urged the great importance of the right of personal liberty and the heinousness of any outrage upon it, would all this be turned not aside but upon the other side of the question, by simply asking, "whether this high and sacred principle loses any of its force because the criminal may himself have been guilty of a previous outrage upon its sanctity." The understandings of our legislators must be rated at a low standard by any one who supposes that such reasoning as this can impose upon them.

The remaining part of the argument upon this passage falls to the ground with the proposed amendment of our translation, for which, in the sense contended for by Mr. O'Sullivan, there is not the shadow of foundation. Let us look at this passage, supplying the place of "his" in the sixth verse by our ambiguous pronoun, and for this purpose using the plural number. It will then read:

"And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man."

"*The shedders of man's blood, by man shall their blood be shed;* for in the image of God made he man."

We are perfectly willing to grant to the other side of the question whatever benefit may be derived from such a correction of the common translation. The passage as it thus stands, interpreted according to its obvious meaning, presents no difficulty.

The only phrase contained in it that can well give rise to any misconception in the mind of one who is not seeking to torture its meaning, is in the latter part of the fifth verse; "at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man." This is sometimes interpreted to mean, that at the hand of the brother of every slain man, that is of the whole community or society of which he formed a part, inquisition shall be made for the blood shed, from the responsibility of which they can be relieved only by the death of the murderer. We do not mean to question the truth of this opinion, but such is not the sense of the passage. The Hebrew phrase translated "every man's brother" (aish ahiv), is an idiomatic form of speech, meaning, *the one and other;* so that "at the hand of every man's brother" is, as Gesenius says, "*repetitio verborum antecedentium, haud quidem otiosa, sed emphatica,*" a repetition, not unmeaning but emphatic, of the preceding words at the hand of man." We make no attempt to sustain this interpretation by comparing parallel passages, or adducing authorities, being persuaded that it will be called in question by no one who will turn to the passage in his Hebrew Bible.

In this passage God declares in the first instance, that he will surely inquire after, that is avenge, the blood of man. He then proceeds to state from whom he will exact this responsibility; at the hand of every beast that has shed the blood of man, will I require it; and much more, at the hand of man, even at the hand of one and another, that is, of every man, will I require the blood

of the man whom he has slain; there shall be no escape on the part of any one who has stained his hands with blood from the account which must be rendered of that blood.

The next verse proceeds to state how this requisition shall be made, what punishment this crime shall incur, and who shall be the agents of divine justice in inflicting that punishment. The shedders of man's blood, by man shall their blood be shed. It is too plain for argument, that though this verse be thus translated, so as to involve the same ambiguity as in the original, it lends no shadow of countenance to Mr. O'Sullivan's interpretation. The previous verse has asserted, in general, that the blood of man shall not be shed without inquisition being made for it, and further that this inquisition shall be made from every beast and every man that has shed the blood of man. It is then added, that they who shed man's blood, by man shall their blood be shed. Who then are the shedders of blood upon whom this doom is pronounced? Michaelis contends that both men and beasts are included. Rosenmüller, on the other hand, prefers the interpretation which limits it to the human shedder of blood; the previous verse having spoken of the punishment of both beast and man for the slaughter of man, this verse he supposes to contain a repetition of the principle in its application to man, with a distinct annunciation of the kind and manner of his punishment, on account of the greater dignity of the offender. But no commentator ancient or modern has ever given to this passage an interpretation such as Mr. O'Sullivan advocates. It has not one particle of authority in favour of it. There is nothing of intrinsic evidence to sanction it, nothing in the obvious meaning of the passage to call for or even to warrant it, unless the whole question at issue be begged, by the assumption that it is impossible that God can have directed the shedding of man's blood. It is in short nothing more than the desperate resort of a reasoner who is not ashamed to descend to mere quibbles and plays upon words in support of a favourite conclusion. If it be thought by any that we have here unwarrantably forgotten the distinction which we before made between what is due to a reasoner and to his reasoning, let him call to mind that the subject of this miserable trifling is the inspired revelation of God's will, and that the professed object of it is to enlighten a legislature upon one of the most important questions which they can be called upon to settle. And let them still further read the following extract from this report:—

"If any, after this exposition of the passage, should still desire to retain the accustomed form to which prejudice may continue to cling, of 'whosoever,' it is clear that the precept thus read would require the sacrifice of the life of the slayer, in atonement for the blood his hand has spilled, on all occasions, without discrimination of circumstances—in the most pardonable cases of sudden and impetuous passion, and even in the most innocent case of accident, as well as the most heinous one of coldly premeditated murder. The terms of the command would be absolute and imperative; and however unfathomable to us might seem the mystery of its cruelty, *yet why would it be less consistent with reason than the*

punishment, upon the animal, of the act of brute unconsciousness and obedience to its natural instincts?"

The first part of this paragraph, in which the lax principles of interpretation previously proceeded upon have become so wondrously stringent, calls for no reply. It might be improved, however, and we are surprised that the thought should have escaped a mind that was acute enough for this, by adding that as the precept reads it would apply to the physician who bleeds his patient no less than to the wilful murderer, and that the penalty does not demand the death of either, since, as it reads, it may be literally and fully satisfied by the loss of a few ounces of blood from the arm.

It is for the latter part of this paragraph that we have quoted it, and yet we hardly dare trust ourselves to comment upon it. We are here informed that the punishment of a brute, which has slain a man, which the author of the report admits is directed by the divine command, is no more consistent with reason than the sacrifice of the life of a man who had accidentally slain his fellow-man. Who does not feel his whole moral nature insulted by this most outrageous declaration? Who can doubt that any man who believes this, however vigorous and discursive his understanding might be, would have yet to undergo the very birth-throe of reason? Where is the reason, though yet in its infancy, that makes no distinction between putting to death a beast that has been the means of death to a man, though it had only acted in obedience to its unreflecting instincts, and sacrificing the life of an unfortunate but innocent man? What kind of reason is it, with which it is consistent to destroy a man for every cause which is deemed a sufficient ground for taking away the life of a brute? What would be thought of the man, who in conducting a grave argument on an important question should maintain that it would be as consistent with reason to slay a man for food as to kill an unoffending beast for the same purpose? But this would not be more monstrous than the interrogatory assertion which we have quoted from this report.

We are utterly at a loss to conceive upon what principles or for what purpose this assertion was made. It is not even a legitimate inference from the unspeakably shallow and vile philosophy of the Godwin and Bentham schools, with which Mr. O'Sullivan is so much enamoured. This philosophy does indeed overlook entirely man's moral nature, and reduce him to the standing of a mere beast,—but then it admits him to be a noble beast, even the first of beasts; and having power to that end he may make such use of the inferior beasts as may best promote his good. It permits him to kill them for food, and could not therefore consistently deny to him the right to slay a beast that had killed a man, for the purpose of guarding the mystic sacredness of life, and associating an idea of horror with the shedding of human blood, for this would

be a more useful result than satisfying the appetite of a hungry man. But yet whatever principles they are which forbid the destruction of men while they allow that of animals for the purposes of food, would apply with equal force to prohibit us from making use of a lunatic or an accidental manslayer to serve a useful end by his violent death, while they permit us to use an inferior animal for such purpose. There is therefore no ground for Mr. O'Sullivan's assertion even in the principles of this beastly philosophy.

Nor can we discern for what object it is made. He is seeking in the paragraph where it is found to reduce to the absurd the common interpretation of the passage of scripture upon which he has been commenting, by showing that an abhorrent consequence flows from it, viz. that it requires us to sacrifice a man who may have innocently shed the blood of a fellow-man. But then he immediately asks why this very consequence, so abhorrent that it has just been held up as decisive against the received interpretation of the law given to Noah, should be deemed any more inconsistent with reason than the killing of an animal which he has himself contended that the law actually enjoins. Why, if this is so, did he spend so much labour in quibbles upon the meaning of Hebrew words, of which he knew literally nothing? Why did he not, with the manly openness of a fair and truthful reasoner, say at once, that this law, however interpreted, was utterly repugnant to human reason, and must therefore be discredited as a part of divine revelation? If there is a law which orders, as he maintains that this does, that to be done, which is as inconsistent with right reason as it would be to put an innocent man to a violent death, then nothing can be clearer than that this law never proceeded from the lips of divine justice. Had he but frankly said this, it would at least have furnished some excuse for his trifling manner of dealing with its interpretation.

Such are the arguments by which this report attempts to set aside the received interpretation of the law of murder as delivered to Noah. We have, in the first instance, a philological argument founded on the ambiguous gender of the participle and pronoun in the sixth verse, in which it is contended that this participle and pronoun should be translated into our neuter gender and limited by it, since any other interpretation of the passage would lead to deliberate, cold-blooded, judicial murder. That is, this limitation is to be made by the assumption that the judicial infliction of death is murder, and the only reason for this assumption is that the infliction of death in punishment for murder would violate the very principle which it was intended to guard, the sacredness of human life; a reason which would compel us to pronounce every law which imposes a fine, and every jury which assesses pecuniary damages for injury to property, guilty of judicial stealing. Let it be further observed that the only reason given for excluding man from the shedders of blood upon whom the doom of death is pro-

nounced, is one that if true would of course make it impossible that God could at any time have directed this punishment to be inflicted. And yet we find that in the only code of laws that ever proceeded directly from him, he has distinctly, and beyond all question, affixed this penalty to murder. This is of itself decisive, so far as this part of the argument is concerned. And we have in the next place an argument which commences with a *reductio ad absurdum*, that proceeds upon principles too puerile to be refuted except by the application of the same method, and which ends by a gratuitous disclosure of the principles of that bestial philosophy which looks upon man only as the head of the animal creation.

We have no fear of the effect of such argument upon the honest and humble inquirer after truth. If he is already a believer in the received interpretation of the law of murder, his faith will be strengthened, if a doubter, his doubts will be removed, by seeing how futile are the attempts to set it aside, even when conducted by the most intelligent and zealous of its opponents. The law, as given to Noah, does in its most obvious sense command that the wilful murderer shall be put to death. The most critical inquiry into the meaning of its terms only serves to confirm this interpretation. It has been so understood by all men, in all ages, until these latter days. The universal belief of all Christian nations has been that God has pronounced this doom upon the murderer; and the public conscience has everywhere, with mute awe, approved the dread award of human justice, made in fulfilment of this divine command.

But was this law intended to be of universal and perpetual obligation? We see nothing in the law itself, in the circumstances under which it was delivered, or in any changes or revelations that have since occurred, to limit its application. It is, in its terms, most general and peremptory. The reason assigned for its penalty is founded on the essential nature and relations of man. This reason is as true now as it was in the days of Noah, and ought to have the same force with all who believe in the spiritual dignity of man. If man is somewhat more than an assemblage of digestive organs, and senses, and an understanding that judges according to sense—if, in addition to these, he has any attributes which reflect however dimly the excellences of the Divinity—then he who wilfully and maliciously defaces this image of God deserves the same doom now, that like outrage deserved when this law was enacted.

Nor is there anything connected with the time or manner of its delivery to lead us to suppose that it was meant to be special or temporary. It was given in immediate connexion with that covenant of which the seal still remains in the ever-recurring bow of heaven. It was delivered not to the head of a particular tribe or nation, but to the second progenitor of the human race, not under any peculiar and pressing exigency, but at the commencement of a new order of things. It stands at the beginning of the new world

stretching its sanction over all people down to the end of time, to prevent the outbreaking of that violence which had filled the world that was swept away. It is idle to tell us that the circumstances, and, with the circumstances, the character of society have been materially changed, and that in the present high state of civilization the severe enactments which were necessary for a ruder condition of society are no longer needed. Have the essential attributes of man changed? Does he bear any less of the image of God now than he did in the days of Noah? Is it any less a crime to destroy that image now, than it was then? The law has no respect to any peculiar proneness to violence, existing at the time it was enacted, to any local or national necessities, but passing over everything that is variable and accidental, it seizes upon man's relation to God, involving the distinctive and unchanging attributes of humanity, as the sufficient reason for its fearful penalty. So long as these attributes remain unchanged, this law must stand in full force, unless repealed by the same authority that enacted it.

And where is the evidence that it has at any time been repealed? The abrogation of the specialties of the Jewish code left this prior law untouched. It had its existence entirely separate and independent of the Mosaic economy, and could not therefore be involved in its dissolution. Nor is there anything in the Bible which can be construed into an explicit repeal of this statute. It is indeed maintained, strangely enough, by Mr. O'Sullivan, that the sixth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is in opposition to this statute. He denies our right to limit this commandment, by interpreting it to mean, thou shalt do no murder; and he really expends a page of declamation upon the "absolute, unequivocal" prohibition of capital punishment involved in this precept, How is it possible that any man could descend to such argument, if he were not intent upon carrying a side, rather than on finding and defending the truth? There are, perhaps, among us legislators who do not comprehend the laws that they themselves enact, but it may surely be presumed that in this case the lawgiver understood the meaning of his own precept; and we find that in immediate connexion with it he delivers a body of laws which direct the magistrate to inflict the punishment of death, in what Mr. O'Sullivan supposes, an excessive number of cases. Or if we avail ourselves of the distinction which the report makes, but respecting which the committee refrain from expressing any opinion, and imagine that though Moses pretended to receive these laws from God, they were really of his own invention; yet we cannot doubt that Moses understood the true interpretation of the sixth commandment; nor suppose that he would have had the hardihood to deliver to the people, as coming from God, a body of laws that were in direct contravention to it. We are sure our readers will sympathize with the humiliation we feel in being compelled to expose such paltry subterfuges—sophis-

try is too respectable a name for them—in the conduct of an argument upon such a question.

But it is contended that a virtual repeal of the penalty for murder may be inferred from the general spirit of the gospel, and especially from its many precepts in which forgiveness of injuries is inculcated, and the indulgence of a revengeful spirit forbidden. We do not understand the spirit of the gospel as offering any impunity to crime. It is indeed a proclamation of mercy, but of mercy gaining its ends, and herein lies its glory, without any sacrifice of the claims of justice. But we are told that the gospel forbids us to avenge ourselves, or to recompense evil for evil, and requires us on the other hand to love them that hate us, and do good unto them that despitefully use us. If our argument were with those who are opposed to all human government, as an unauthorized interference with the rights of man, we should attempt to prove, what is undoubtedly true, that these precepts were not intended to apply to men in their collective capacity as constituting a society, and that they are perfectly consistent with another class of precepts which make it the duty of the magistrate to bear not the sword in vain and to be a terror to evil doers. And we could at least succeed in proving that the apostle Paul thought a man might be guilty of offences that were worthy of death, and was willing, if he were thus guilty, to submit to the penalty. "If," said he, "I have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die." To this class of earnest and consistent opponents we would reply seriously and respectfully. But how can we reply to the argument against capital punishment, drawn from the Christian precepts enjoining a meek submission to evil, when it is urged by those who still contend for the magistracy and the avenging sword, but only object to this one punitive infliction? What force is there in these precepts which would not tear down the penitentiary as well as the gibbet? How does the command to love our enemies, and return good for evil, forbid us to hang the murderer, if it permits us to imprison him for life? Especially, how can this be, if the imprisonment is of the character proposed by this report, "perpetual, hopeless and laborious, involving civil death, with the total severance of all the social ties that bound the convicted culprit to the world—under a brand of ignominy and a ban of excommunication from his race, than which alone it is difficult to imagine a more fearful doom,—a punishment, the anticipation of which would operate as a far more powerful control and check than the fear of a hundred deaths?" We do not assent to this relative estimate of capital punishment and perpetual imprisonment. We believe death to be the severer and more fearful doom, and we have quoted the above extract only to show how the reasoners upon the other side of the question are ready to blow hot or cold, as serves their purpose. But though we look upon death as the most dreadful of all punishments, yet the difference in severity between it and any proposed

substitute as a penalty for murder, cannot warrant us in concluding that under the mild reign of Christianity, the ancient, primeval law has been repealed. If we are permitted to punish at all, then where is our authority for superseding the original law which explicitly directs us to punish the murderer with death? What right have we, while this law stands uncancelled by the authority that gave it, to pronounce it obsolete and unnecessary.

The indirect influence of the gospel, instead of tending to the abrogation of this law, does, in truth, give to it new emphasis and force. The gospel has brought life and immortality to light. It has given distinctness and reality to those great moral truths, which lying beyond the reach of sense, and too apt therefore to appear as mere shadowy abstractions, are nevertheless the only substantial and abiding verities. It has thrown a flood of light upon the spiritual nature, the powers, and responsibilities of man. It has revealed enough of the mystery of death, to add to the fearfulness of the mystery which still remains. Above all, it has given us the highest conception we can form of the dignity of man, by revealing to us the union of human nature with the divine, and the high privileges and blessings which flow from this union. If the murderer deserved death for defacing the image of God in man, before this revelation of man's true dignity and destiny as an inhabitant of the spiritual universe of God had been distinctly made, then still more does he deserve it now. The only reason assigned for the original infliction of the penalty has derived new meaning and force from the gospel of Christ. It is perfectly consistent that an infidel philosophy, as superficial as it is vain, which degrades man into the creature of time and sense, should desire the abrogation of this penalty, since it has no faith, and can feel no reverence for the original reason on which it was founded. But let men beware how they attempt to degrade the gospel, which, by giving to this reason its fullest and most forcible development, adds new emphasis to the law which rests upon it, into fellowship with this earthly and sensual philosophy. Let the philosophers of this school confine themselves to their legitimate province. Proceeding upon principles which convert the world into a mere kitchen and cattle-stall, and man into an animal to be well fed, clothed, and lodged in this his abode, they may be competent to settle wisely and well some questions arising out of this aspect of it. But when they trespass beyond these, and attempt to decide questions that are connected with the spiritual nature and relations of man, they should be rebuked for venturing upon ground that lies higher than their principles. When the dimensions of the human soul can be taken by means of a yard measure, we will admit the competency of these men to pronounce judgment upon such questions. At least we have a right to ask of them, that they will leave the holy gospel to be interpreted by those who have too deep a reverence for it, to per-

mit them to draggle it through the dirty mazes of insincere and sophistical argument.

We have derived new faith from the examination of these attempts to invalidate the ancient law of murder. We find that this law, as given to Noah, does in terms too plain to be misunderstood, and too peremptory to be set aside, direct that the murderer shall be put to death. We find this law spreading from Noah through Gentile nations, and afterwards incorporated into the Jewish code. We find it surviving the destruction of that code, because it existed before it; existed independent of it among other nations while that code was yet in force; and existed through the demands of nothing peculiar to the Jewish nation, or incidental to any particular form or state of human society, but for reasons that are drawn from the unchanging invariable attributes of humanity. And we find that the gospel, so far from undermining the whole foundation on which this law rests, only strengthens and establishes it. From Calvary, where the dignity and importance of man, as the child of God and the heir of immortality, receive their fullest illustration, this law goes forth with increased force. Not only was man created in the image of God, but Christ the Son of God hath died for him. Let him who dares to lay the hand of lawless violence upon a being so highly born, and redeemed at so costly a price,—the depositary of such mysterious and awful interests,—undergo the doom decreed by him who alone knows the value of life, and the solemn meaning of death.

There is only one other argument derived from the sacred Scriptures against the lawfulness of capital punishment, which need claim our attention. The impunity of Cain, the first murderer, is pleaded in proof that it is not lawful to inflict the punishment of death. But why does it not prove equally well, that it is not right to inflict any punishment, and that the murderer should be left to the self-inflictions of his own conscience? This argument comes with an ill grace from those who contend for a punishment which is represented as more fearful than a hundred deaths. Nor can it be consistently urged by any who regard the law given to Noah, as in all respects of the nature of a positive institution. But we do not so regard it. We look upon this law as a re-publication, distinct and unequivocal, of a law of nature, written on the hearts of men; and this view of it receives confirmation from this very case of Cain. We do not know, we will not even attempt to surmise, why God saw fit to interfere to save the life of this atrocious criminal. But that this interference was necessary, is more for our argument than his death would have been. Cain felt that he deserved to die—he knew that others felt so too, and felt it so strongly that whoever found him would slay him—and nothing less than a mark, which could be recognised as the sign-manual of the great Author of life, was necessary to protect him from the sense of retributive justice in the hearts of those that then lived, pronouncing that the murderer deserved to die. God, the

sovereign law-giver, had an undoubted right to dispense with the penalty of this law, in that or any other case. And whenever by any similar intervention now, he sets upon a criminal a mark, significant of His will that the destroying sword of justice should pass him by, there will be none to question or murmur. The only inference that we are warranted in drawing from this case, is, that the sense of justice which demands the death of the murderer should always pause and stay its hand, whenever God makes known His will to that effect.

Here we might rest our argument. Having shown that He who holds in his hand the issues of life and death, has revealed to us his will respecting the punishment of murder, we might, without incivility, decline to pursue the inquiry upon other grounds. If the divine justice, from which human justice takes its origin and derives all its force, has decided this question, we may rightly call upon men to submit to its decision. But we have no fear of the result of the most rigid scrutiny of reason into this divine decree; and we propose briefly to exhibit the grounds of our belief in the agreement of the law of nature with the law of revelation respecting the punishment of murder.

Here we are compelled at once to join issue with the opponents of capital punishment, and with some too upon our own side of the question, respecting the true ends of the penal sanctions which accompany human law. Mr. O'Sullivan contends that the only legitimate end of punishment is the prevention of crime. And in a recent sermon in favour of capital punishment, it is admitted "that this is unquestionably the true doctrine, for it is the principle upon which God the only supreme and infallible law-giver proceeds." And carrying out the same idea, the author adds, that when "the strong arm of the law seizes upon the murderer and puts him to death, it designs to operate upon the living and to prevent the repetition of the like crime." That this is one of the ends of punishment no man can deny, but that it is the sole end will scarcely be maintained by any one who has reflected deeply upon the question, or analysed carefully the operations of his own mind. If the prevention of crime be the only lawful end of penal sanctions, then the efficacy of any proposed penalty as a restraint upon the perpetration of offences is the test of our right to inflict it. It is right, under this view of the case, to fine a man, to imprison or to hang him, if we have sufficient reason to believe that we may thereby produce a certain amount of good to the community, in the restraint imposed upon the commission of crime. Let us suppose then that the infliction of this doom, whatever it may be, upon an innocent man would prevent an equal amount of crime, would it be right to lay it upon him? Could it be certainly known that the hanging of some man, whose hands are pure from crime, would prevent all future murders to the end of time, would it be right to put him to a violent death for the good of his race? What right have we to take any man and torture him merely for the

sake of doing good to others? We have often doubted whether the English judge, who, in pronouncing sentence upon a convicted horse-thief, said, "You are hung, not because you stole a horse, but that horses may not be stolen," if there had been no real grounds for his sentence better than the avowed one, would not himself have been guilty of a much higher crime than the culprit before him had committed. What right have we to catch a man and hang him up, because we have reason to believe that he will prove a scarecrow to frighten other men from mischief? We can have no right except that which is derived from what this theory leaves altogether out of view, the intrinsic ill desert of the offender. The foundation of human punishments can never be laid, by any just principles of reasoning, in their tendency to benefit society. This attempt to found justice upon utility is only another effort of a low material philosophy, seeking to solve a problem that lies as high above its reach as the heavens are high above the earth. The idea of law is in every human mind, ignorant or instructed, an immediate derivative from the idea of duty; and this again arises at once out of the primary conception which all men form of the essential distinction between right and wrong. These ideas are the product of the reason and conscience. They are primitive, necessary, and absolute. That the criminal should be punished for his crime is not a truth summed up from the tardy teachings of experience, it is an immediate and peremptory decision of the moral sense. Whether punishment is useful to society or not, is altogether a different question, and to be decided upon different grounds. The positive penal laws, by which we punish crimes that trespass upon the rights of men and violate social order, have their origin in that sense of justice which is one of the spontaneous products of human reason. No social compact could ever give this right, no considerations of utility could ever establish it, if the ground were not laid for it in the moral nature of man. There can be no doubt that it is useful to society to punish offences which invade its peace and order, and that the consideration of this utility is real and weighty. But this consideration is subordinate to the primitive idea which constitutes the true basis of penalty. Let us suppose that this primitive idea is removed, that there is no law of the human mind by which it pronounces upon the essential demerit of crime, and demands that its decision shall be realized in every well-ordered society; and what becomes of our right to seize upon a man and subject him to disgrace and suffering, because his tortures will be an edifying spectacle to others? No exigency of local or state affairs, no extremity of public necessity, no amount of good to be produced, can ever make such an intrusion upon the sacred rights which belong to every man, anything else than an unauthorized and atrocious exertion of power. Nothing but guilt can break down the defences which stand around every moral being, and permit us to subject him to suffering for the advantage of others. It is from this prior consideration of justice

that the penalties of law derive their utility. It is because the community feel that the criminal deserves to suffer, that the example of his punishment is rendered powerful in restraining others from crime, beyond the efficacy which fear alone would possess. Punishment is not just because it is useful; but it is useful because it is just.

The penalties inflicted by human law, having their foundation in the intrinsic ill-desert of crime, are in their nature vindictive as well as corrective; and hence there are two questions to be settled, in adjusting any penalty; does the offence deserve the proposed punishment; and, does the public good require it? It is not necessary for our present purpose that we should pursue the inquiry into the relative weight to be allowed to these two considerations, since they both combine in their fullest force to sanction, and indeed to demand death as the punishment of murder.

Beyond all question the murderer deserves to die. His crime is the greatest that man can commit against his fellow man. There is no other outrage which approaches it in atrocity—there is none other like unto it. It not only stands alone, but it is separated, by an incomprehensible interval, from every other crime. Other injuries lie within the reach of our understanding. They do not surpass the limits of our experience, and we know how to form some estimate of their enormity. We sustain ourselves in prospect of other evils to come upon us, by the thought that other men have endured these same evils, and yet lived through them. Anything less than death we can comprehend. But between all else that men have borne, and death, there lies we know not what interval. None of us have yet died,—and we know not what it is to die. We can form our estimate of the pain of body and the strugglings of the spirit, which precede it,—but what is death itself? Who shall tell us what is going on within the yet breathing body at that last moment,—how snaps the thread of life—what sensations attend the breaking of the bond that unites soul and body—what strange scenes surround the disembodied spirit. We speak not now of the injury which the murderer does to the public by the destruction of a valuable member of society—nor of the indescribable agony inflicted upon the domestic circle bereaved, in the most horrible manner, of one of its inmates;—we enter into no calculation of the general consequences of this crime. We speak of it as it is in itself, a crime that stands alone in atrocity, unequalled and unapproached. Every murderer, however extenuated his crime may be, has done a deed of which he nor any other man comprehends the full enormity. It is right then that this deed should receive the severest doom that human justice has the authority to inflict. It is right that a crime of such paramount guilt, should incur an extreme and distinctive punishment. Our natural sentiment of justice, of its own accord, proclaims the law, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.

Such has been the voice of the public conscience in all ages.

Cain felt that he was in danger of death from the hand of any one that might find him. Among all nations and tribes of people, civilized or savage, Christian or pagan, justice has ever demanded blood for blood. The general conscience of the human race has taught the truth and justice of the sentiment expressed by a Roman poet,

> "Neque enim lex aequior ulla,
> Quam necis artifices arte perire sua."

From the infancy of the human race there comes down to us an unbroken line of testimony, delivering it as the universal judgment of mankind, that the murderer should be put to death.

Here we may be met with the argument, that it is impossible to prove, from the light of nature, that human society possesses the right to take away life. This argument is presented by Mr. O'Sullivan, as one which may have influence on some minds though he himself admits its unsoundness; conceding expressly that society may lawfully punish with death, and yet giving the argument on the other side to catch such minds as can be taken in by it; another illustration of the *per fas aut nefas* kind of reasoning of which we have already given so many specimens. Mr. Rantoul presents the same argument at still greater length, though he also prudently reserves the expression of his own opinion of its validity—but he gives it to pass for what it is worth. These arguments against the right of society to take away life are all of them at bottom nothing more than the well known sophism of the Marquis Beccaria. It is in substance this—"Human society is the result of a compact in which each individual surrenders to the state the smallest possible portion of his personal rights, that he may securely possess the remainder. The state therefore can have no right over the life of a citizen, since we may be sure that this is a right that he has never parted with. Besides, no man has a right to take away his own life, and therefore, could not, if he wished, give any such right to another." A full and complete answer to this subtle sophism would be given by a correct exposition of the origin of human society, and the source from which the state derives its authority to institute laws for the government of its subjects. The right to establish municipal regulations may, for aught we know, be limited by a compact express or implied, real or fictitious—but in every state the sovereign authority possesses a right to enact laws embodying the essential ideas of justice, that is dependent upon the terms of no social compact, and subject to none of its limitations. Its true source is in the ideas and laws given to us by the moral nature of man. It would not be difficult, had we space for it, to develope this theory, and show that it involves of necessity the right for which we contend.

But, setting this aside, the authority of the state to take away life, may be derived from the natural right of self-defence which is inherent in communities as well as in individuals. And it is fur-

ther sufficiently proved by the universal consent of mankind. When a plain question of right and wrong has been submitted to the conscience of men, and the same response has been returned by all men in all ages, we cannot doubt its correctness. We question whether any truth has been sustained by a more unanimous consent of mankind, than the right of society to punish the murderer with death.

The murderer deserves to die—such is the sentence that reason pronounces, in view of the enormity of his crime, and such has been the unvarying judgment of the conscience of humanity. Society possesses the right to inflict this deserved punishment upon him—such is the necessary conclusion of an inquiry, properly conducted, into the derivation and nature of the authority inherent in the state, and such again has been the universal decision of human reason. But is it expedient for society to exercise this right? This is the only remaining inquiry.

The point upon which the determination of this question rests is, whether the punishment of death operates with greater efficacy, than any proposed substitute, to restrain the crime. The other considerations which arise in connexion with the inquiry into the *expediency* of capital punishment, are all subordinate to the main one, touching its efficacy for the prevention of murder. And so far as this main consideration depends upon abstract reasoning, the principles which govern it are simple and obvious.

It cannot be denied, that, other things being equal, any penalty, provided it does not exceed what the moral sense deems a righteous retribution for the offence committed, will be efficacious in proportion to its severity. And of the comparative severity of different punishments, every man may at once form his estimate by asking of his own heart, which he would most dread; or by looking abroad and judging, from the general sentiments and conduct of man, which is suited to inspire the most fear. There are exempt cases. There are men who fear disgrace more than death. There have been men who have desired death as a relief from their burdens, being willing to fly from ills they had, to others that they know not of. It is true that there is scarcely a passion of the human heart, that may not, under some special and rare excitement, gain such head as "to mate and master the fear of death." But these are paroxysms which only briefly and occasionally disturb the usual judgments of the mind, and which always give way to any influence that recalls its habitual modes of thought and feeling. We knew a man who, intent upon suicide, had actually raised the deadly weapon to inflict it, when his hand was stayed and an entire revulsion of feeling produced, simply by the bleating of a lamb that had strayed by his side. And we have read of one, who, being met while on his way to destroy himself, by a man who threatened his life, was affrighted and fled, his habitual fear of death overmastering his determination to rush upon it.

Of all natural evils, death is that which takes the strongest hold

upon the imagination of men, and inspires them with the deepest and most prevalent fear. It is not like other evils, that we can handle, measure, and calculate.—it is dark and mysterious, confounding the sense, perplexing the understanding, puzzling the will, and thus exercising over us the power of awakening intense emotion, which must of necessity belong to that, which we see and dread, but which is so vague and vast that we cannot discern the form thereof. We are subject to other terrors, but this is the king of terrors. All that a man hath will he give for his life.

It is of no weight to tell us that this fear belongs to thoughtful and cultivated minds, rather than to the degraded and brutish class, who are most frequently the perpetrators of murder. If there be a man who has sunk so low in brutishness that he has lost in considerable measure, the fear of death, he will be still more insensible to any other fear. What to him are the disgrace, the ignominy, the ban of excommunication, the severance of social ties, involved in imprisonment for life. If he has sunk below the fear of death, the penitentiary will be to him only an asylum, where he will be sure of being fed and clothed. When was it ever heard that a criminal desired his counsel to strain a case of manslaughter into murder, that he might be put to death rather than incarcerated for life? What convicted culprit would not struggle for his life and call for help, against the avenger of blood who should waylay and attack him on his way to the penitentiary? Let men exercise their ingenuity as much as they please, in reasoning from abnormal freaks of the human mind, let them quote as many instances as there have been executions, of murders perpetrated in sight of the scaffold, it still remains a notorious truth, open and palpable as a thing of sense, that men dread death more than any other natural evil. It is therefore clear that it must possess a greater intrinsic efficacy, as a punishment for murder, than the proposed substitute.

But this efficacy, it is urged, is lessened by the uncertainty of conviction. There are in every community some men who disbelieve or doubt the right to inflict capital punishment, and others who question its expediency, and as strenuous efforts are always made to get one or more of such men on the jury, the doubt of his conviction if brought to trial, combines with the chance of his escaping detection, to embolden the criminal in the execution of his purpose. The unsoundness of this reasoning in its application to our case, is at once detected, when we call to mind that in most of our states, murder has been changed from a common-law, to a statutory offence, and that the statute, discriminating between murder of three or four different degrees, affixes death as the penalty of the first, imprisonment for life of the second, and so on. The jury, empanelled for the trial of murder, are not charged to find the prisoner absolutely guilty or not guilty, but it falls within their province to find, if guilty, within what degree he is guilty. The scruples therefore arising from a conviction of the unlawfulness, or

a sense of the horror of capital punishment, need not operate in any case to lessen the doom of the culprit below that which it is proposed to inflict in all cases. The only effect of these scruples where they exist and govern the decision of the jury, will be to make them render a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, instead of the first, and this is already, or if not it may be made so, punishable with the next heaviest sentence to death.

We recur therefore to the evident truth, that death is the fitting penalty for murder,—fitting because, in addition to its correspondence with the enormity of the crime, it must needs be more efficacious than any other in preventing its repetition. We have indeed, besides the reason which we have just shown to be utterly devoid of weight, a historical argument in disparagement of the efficacy of capital punishment. This argument is a curiosity in its way. Reflecting and thoughtful men, who love and seek the truth, will always be cautious in establishing the relation of cause and effect between consecutive historical events. The most laborious collection and collation of facts, and the most intimate acquaintance with all the circumstances affecting the result, are in most cases necessary, to enable us to eliminate what is accidental, and discover the true connecting link. But with Mr. O'Sullivan the simple principle "*post hoc, propter hoc*" cuts short all this labour. One thing precedes another, therefore it is the cause of it. Under the Roman republic there was no capital punishment, and the state was flourishing; under the empire capital punishments were inflicted, and the state fell. No better illustration is needed of the rashness of this kind of reasoning, than is afforded by the uncertainty which still exists respecting the effect of the change made several years since in the English criminal code. There were strong arguments against that code as it formerly stood, and at length upwards of two hundred minor offences were taken out of the list of capital crimes. And many who were in favour of the reform have thought and said that the effect of it has been, a diminution of crime. But from full and accurate statistical tables, kept at the Home Office and reported to Parliament, it appears that for the three years succeeding the change in the criminal law, there was an increase of no less than thirty-eight per cent. in the offences from which the punishment of death had been removed. We should be very loth however to infer from this fact the relation of cause and effect, as Mr. O'Sullivan is in the habit of doing upon grounds vastly more vague and indecisive.

But a further difficulty with this historical argument is that the facts themselves upon which it rests are, most of them, unworthy of credit. In the first instance, we have the experience of ancient Egypt under Sabaco, who during the space of fifty years, we are told, abolished capital punishment, and with much success. Whence Mr. O'Sullivan learned the success of Sabaco's experiment, we do not know. It is true that Herodotus and Diodorus both mention this monarch, and state that he refrained from pun-

ishing criminals with death, but condemned them to raise the ground about the towns so as to place them above the reach of inundation. But we do not remember that either of them has said aught of the good or ill effect of the experiment. And if they had, it would not be difficult to tell what weight ought to be attached to the testimony, when we consider that the eldest of these historians was separated by an interval of at least three hundred years from the reign of Sabaco, and that no statistical tables, official returns, or other means of accurate information, had been transmitted down to him. Mr. O'Sullivan, too, should have inquired enough, before using this alleged fact, rude as it is, for his purpose, to ascertain that Sabaco's character, his doings, and the length of his reign, are all involved in doubt. Herodotus's own account is not consistent with itself: and Manetho informs us that he burnt one man alive; and limits his reign to eight years.

The example of Rome is also adduced in illustration of the good effects to be expected from a repeal of capital punishment. For a period of two centuries and a half, we are told, that the infliction of death upon a Roman citizen was expressly forbidden by the famous Porcian law, which was passed in the 454th year of Rome. To say nothing of the trifling error of more than a hundred years in the date of this "famous Porcian law," which was not enacted until the 557th year of Rome—was the author of this report aware that this Porcian law was but a revival of the Valerian law, which had been already renewed twice before, once by Valerius Publicola, and again by Valerius Corvus; and that after its revival under the tribuneship of M. Porcius Lecca it became obsolete again, and was subsequently renewed for the fourth time by Sempronius Gracchus, after which it fell again into disuse,—and that of course the administration of criminal justice at Rome was never for any considerable period restrained by the limitation of this law? Does he know, too, that those who are most competent to form a correct opinion upon the subject, suppose that the law, while in force, only forbade the execution of a Roman citizen who had been condemned by a magistrate, and that it was not intended to apply to such as had been cast in an appeal from his sentence? If he did not know these things, we hope he will look beyond Adam's Roman Antiquities, to which he refers us for information, before he again undertakes to shed light upon our path from the history of Rome.

But we have more history still. "The Empress Elizabeth of Russia, on ascending the throne, pledged herself never to inflict the punishment of death; and throughout her reign, twenty years, she kept the noble pledge." We know that Elizabeth made this pledge, but where did Mr. O'Sullivan learn that she kept it? We have never met with any authority for it but Voltaire, who says "she kept her word;" but a man who never kept his own word, when it suited his purpose to break it, is not an unexceptionable witness on behalf of others. It is well known now, that many

executions occurred under the reign of this Empress—we do not know how many, for despotic governments publish no registers of the deaths they inflict. Mr. O'Sullivan adds, that so satisfactory was found the operation of the immunity from death by judicial sentence, that Elizabeth's successor, "the great Catharine, adopted it into her celebrated Code of Laws, with the exception of very rare cases of offence against the state." From that day to this, he informs us, there have been but two occasions on which the punishment of death has been inflicted in Russia. The code of Catharine does indeed breathe a spirit of clemency, but a clemency that extends only to the expiation of wrongs committed by one of her subjects against another. To hold such wrongs in light esteem, and make them easy of atonement, may well consist with the policy of a despotic government. Her royal clemency indicates an indifference to human life instead of a high regard for it. Whoever will take the pains to compare the sixteenth chapter of Beccaria's work on Punishment, with sect. 4, art. 10, of the Instructions of Catharine, will be at no loss to discover the probable motives which led to the institution of her Criminal Code. She has borrowed the ideas, and sometimes the very words of Beccaria, taking good care, however, to leave out everything touching the social compact, the surrender of the "*minime porzioni*" of personal rights, and the limitations of the sovereign authority.

The work of Beccaria had been recently published, and was attracting much attention. Its doctrines had been espoused by the French school of Infidels, who were at that time the savans of Europe. Catharine, who was in close correspondence with them, was ambitious of establishing a reputation in philosophy, as well as war; and, to this end, she issued her "Instructions pour dresser la Code de Russie," in which she is philosophically clement, so far as the punishment of wrongs between man and man is concerned, but sufficiently rigid in stationing the ministers of death around the throne. If this explanation is more uncharitable than Mr. O'Sullivan's, it has the merit of being more consistent with the known character of this Empress,—one of the most abandoned sovereigns that ever disgraced the seat of empire. She commenced her reign with the murder of her husband and his nephew, and filled it up with acts too abominable to be recited. But whatever may have been the motives which dictated her code, who, besides Mr. O'Sullivan, will vouch for its observance? The edicts of despotic sovereigns are one thing, and their practice another. The same caprice which enacted the law can at any time dispense with its execution; and there is nothing in the character of Catharine to lead us to suppose that she would esteem herself bound by the philosophical flourish of her "Instructions;" nor are there any sources of information from which we can learn whether justice was actually administered in accordance with the criminal code which she established. And how did Mr. O'Sullivan arrive at the knowledge of the fact

that "from that day to the present there have been but two occasions on which the punishment of death has been inflicted in Russia." It is now eighty years since Catharine ascended the throne. It would not be an easy matter to ascertain in our own free country, or in England, how many executions have taken place in the last eighty years. And who has kept statistical tables and brought in reports of the sentences pronounced and executed throughout the fifty provinces of the vast empire of Russia during this period? Travellers tell us that the code of Catharine fell, long since, into disuse. And while in force it only nominally exempted the criminal from death; since death, in an aggravated form, was the frequent result of the punishments it prescribed. We have before us now an account, from an eye-witness, of the punishment of a murderer by the knout, which is too horrible to be quoted in full. The criminal received three hundred and thirty-three blows, each one tearing away the skin to the breadth of the thong, and sinking into the flesh. At the conclusion of this terrible operation his nostrils were torn with pincers, and his face branded with a red hot iron. He was then re-conducted to his prison, to be transported to the mines in Siberia; but upon the most diligent inquiry, it could not be ascertained that any one had seen him afterwards brought out of his prison. But let all this pass. Be it so, that no capital punishments have been inflicted in Russia for the last eighty years. How are we to learn the effects of this remission? Who can tell us whether the lives of men have been safe under this system of indulgence to crime? Where is the record of the number of murders committed during this period? And where is the proof that they would not have been fewer, if even-handed justice had dealt to the murderer his merited doom? The argument from this case breaks down at every point. That cause must be sadly in want of substantial support, which is compelled thus to clutch at shadows.

We had intended to make a similar exposure of all the other historical cases referred to in this Report. But our limits forbid, and we have already devoted to this part of the argument more space than it intrinsically deserves. The cases given may be taken as a sample of the whole,—erroneous frequently in their facts, and wrong always in the conclusions drawn from them, supposing the facts themselves to be correct. And such must be the end of every attempt to establish by historical induction, the truth of that which is not, and cannot be true. This part of the discussion is a waste of words. If a man should offer to prove to us from history that the best interests of every state would be promoted by committing its sovereign authority to the hands of a cruel and unprincipled despot, we might very properly decline to follow such an argument, on a question that is already decided, upon principles that are plainer and more certain than any process of reasoning from historical facts can possibly be. And yet we will engage to make a collection of facts which shall go further in support of this

theory, than any that can be marshalled in favour of the abolition of capital punishment. The considerations which determine that death is a more effectual preventive of murder than any less punishment, are superior, in their simplicity and certainty, to all historical teaching. They lie in every man's bosom, and close around him. He need not go back to ancient Egypt, nor search abroad among the scarce civilized serfs of Russia, to find them. Let any man ask himself which he would most dread, death or imprisonment, taking his answer not from any casual mood of mind which may now and then rule him, but from his most habitual and prompt fears: let him ask any criminal upon trial, which he would prefer, a verdict which would send him to the gallows, or one which would permit him to take refuge in the penitentiary. Can there be any doubt that death is the master evil of our lot—that it is the sorest punishment that human law has the right to inflict—and that it must be, upon the known and certain principles of human nature, a more efficacious preventive of murder than imprisonment? Whatever efficacy the law exerts in restraining from the perpetration of this crime would be lessened by the proposed diminution of its penalty, as certainly as theft would increase, if the punishment of the thief were lowered to the restitution of a portion only of the amount stolen. This conclusion cannot be wrong—it is an inference so immediate, from facts and principles that are themselves so elementary and self-evident, that it cannot be involved in the error which is incident to remote deductions from doubtful premises. And if it is a just rule of reasoning, that that which is simple and certain, should be used to illustrate whatever is more complex and obscure, then this truth may lend its aid to the interpretation of historical sequences, but cannot receive its proof or its refutation from them. At least, it never can is refuted by anything less than an experiment, conducted upon a large scale, protracted through a period long enough to test and reject every other cause, and leading to results so clear and definite that they can be explained on no other hypothesis. No such experiment has yet been made. Admitting all the facts alleged on the other side, they do not constitute even the beginning of what could be considered an adequate experiment. In the meantime, instead of going back into the dim obscure of a traditional antiquity, or abroad to India, Russia, or Tuscany, to gather up loose and vague statements of facts, and reason from them upon principles which would equally well warrant us in concluding, that it is the croaking of the frog that brings back the spring, or the singing of the lark that makes the sun to rise; we shall prefer to stand fast by such principles of truth as are given to us immediately by our own nature, and by the sentiments and conduct of all around us. And if we wish the sanction of authority for our opinions, we shall seek it in some higher quarter than among the disciples of an infidel philosophy, that insults God and degrades man—a philosophy that laying aside all its higher attributes, and wandering from its palace, has

gone forth to eat grass as oxen—a philosophy which may chew its cud, and tell us what kind of grass is good, but which can do nothing better, until it regains its reason, as did the degraded monarch of old, by "lifting up its eyes unto heaven." And if we are to be influenced by imitation, if "patterns of noble clemency" are to be sought, we shall go somewhere else than to an Empress, who was twice, at least, a murderer of the foulest degree, and always a loathsome adulteress.

Our ground now is, that society has the right to take away life upon sufficient cause—that death is not an excessive penalty for murder, but, on the contrary, is pointed out by the nature of the crime, and the general judgment of mankind respecting it, as its most fitting punishment—and that this penalty is demanded as the most effectual preventive of the crime. If these several positions are established, as we think they are, then our case is fully made out. Nothing more is necessary to prove the duty of the sovereign authority in every state, to establish and maintain this penalty. Mr. O'Sullivan does indeeds demand that besides all this, we should prove that though capital punishment "does operate to produce that effect (the prevention of murder), it is not accompanied with other evil consequences, upon the general well-being of society, sufficient to neutralize the amount of advantage which it may be supposed to possess in this respect over all other modes of preventive punishment." That is, if we understand this aright, we must strike the balance upon some such calculation as this. We must find how many murders would be committed within a given territory, say the state of New York, during a definite period, under the reign of capital punishment—we must then find to what number this would be increased within the same territory and period, if capital punishment were supplanted by imprisonment for life: let us suppose that there would be three murders in the former case, and five in the latter; we should then have to weigh the murder of three men, and the hanging of the three murderers, six deaths in all, against the five murders and the perpetual imprisonment of the five murderers: there is one death more in the first case, but then this is to be off-set by the incarceration of five men for life; it must be taken into the account, too, that three of the six deaths are inflicted by the hand of the law, and we must calculate whether three such deaths are a greater evil than the two surplus murders of the other alternative; in the latter case, too, the whole five are driven out of the world into eternity without a moment for preparation, while in the former, three of the six have timely notice to prepare for death, and we must estimate the value of this consideration: after settling these and many other like points which arise immediately out of the case, we must look a little further and inquire into the effects of solitary imprisonment upon health of body and soundness of mind—into the probability that some one or more of these five culprits may be reduced to a state of insanity—into the alleged tendency of capital

punishment to produce suicide, compared with the force of the temptation which the five men, imprisoned for life, will lie under to the commission of the same crime—into the temptation, too, under which these prisoners will lie, doomed as they already are to the heaviest punishment which can be laid upon them, to murder their keepers, and escape from prison—into ten thousand other questions which no man can answer. The moment we attempt to reduce this problem of the calculation of general consequences, out of the vague form in which Mr. O'Sullivan states it, so as to get it in a condition for solution, we find that it is intricate and vast beyond the power of any human mind to comprehend. This is yet another illustration of the utter impotency of the utilitarian philosophy to discuss questions of guilt and innocence, death and life. What have these general consequences to do with our duty to prevent all the murders that we can? Out upon these calculations of profit and loss when the lives of innocent men are in question! We have no patience with this Iscariot arithmetic, which knows how to calculate so precisely the price of innocent blood. If one course being pursued, which it is right for us to take, there would be only three murders committed during the coming year, while five would occur under an altered course, then the blood of the two men whom the change would slay, calls upon us for protection, and we are blood-guilty if we refuse it.

There are two or three considerations, referable to this part of the discussion, upon which it may be expedient, in conclusion, to bestow a passing remark. The irremediable nature of capital punishment is much insisted upon by the advocates of the other side of the question. If a mistake has been committed, by the condemnation of an innocent man, it is beyond recall. And under this head we generally have an affecting narrative of cases in which men have been condemned and executed, who were afterwards found to have been innocent. An exaggerated impression is commonly produced in relation to the number of such cases. Many are given, and in such a manner as to leave the reader to infer that they are but selections from a vastly greater number which might be cited; whereas they are all, or nearly all, that the most diligent ransacking of the annals of criminal jurisprudence has been able to furnish. The most of them are given in Phillips's Treatise on Evidence, and they constitute the stock in trade of the prisoner's counsel in all murder trials. Whoever will examine these cases will find that in almost every instance, except those in which the *corpus delicti* was not found, and it appeared afterwards that no murder had been committed, the real culprit has taken away the life of the innocent prisoner by perjury, or which amounts to the same thing, by arranging and directing a set of circumstances so as to implicate him. The amount of it is that the murderer, in addition to the murder already committed, has made use of an institution of justice, instead of the assassin's knife, to perpetrate another. There is in such cases an additional murder committed,

not by the law nor by its ministers, nor yet by the State which gave them their authority, but by the wretch who has brought upon himself the guilt of a double murder to prevent the detection of one. Capital punishment may in this way occasionally add to the number of murders. This is a consideration which we feel bound to weigh, as it involves not "the well-being of society" but the life of an innocent man. What then is its true value in its bearing upon the general question? If capital punishment be the doom of murder, there may occur now and then, with extreme rarity, an instance in which a murderer will seize upon this law to commit another murder, for the purpose of screening the one already committed. But if capital punishment be abolished, and a milder substitute introduced, the diminished severity of the penalty will tend at once to increase the number of murders. It will be observed that we do not undertake to weigh the consideration under discussion, by placing over against it the imprisonment which, under the proposed change, would in like circumstances be inflicted upon the innocent prisoner, nor do we institute any inquiry into the value of the restitution that would be made, when, after years of incarceration, upon the discovery of his innocence, you release him broken it may be in health, and shattered in mind. We make no such comparisons. We weigh murder only with murder. And dreadful as is the thought, that guilty men may be able in rare cases to make use of the law, notwithstanding all the precautions which guard its exercise, to carry into effect a purpose of murder, we would still uphold the law, because we are certain that its abrogation would lead to tenfold more murders than can possibly be committed through this abuse of it.

Here too we may point out another mode in which the abrogation of capital punishment must certainly increase the number of murders. We have spoken already of the strong conviction which has always pervaded the hearts of the mass of mankind, that death is the fitting and the only fitting punishment for murder. This conviction is not the product of a passionate excitement of feeling: it has its seat in the sense of justice, and is deep and strong as the heart of man. Now just as surely as capital punishment is abolished, this conviction that the murderer ought to die will combine with the exasperated feelings of the near of kin to the murdered, and the avenger of blood will be abroad through the land. Men who would not under any other exigency trample upon the laws of the land, will take upon themselves the work of vengeance under the impulse of what they will consider a higher law written on their hearts; and murder will thus be added to murder.

> "Passion then would plead
> In angry spirits, for her old free range,
> And the wild justice of Revenge prevail."

The only other objection to capital punishment that calls for notice, is that which is drawn from its cutting short the period of

man's probation. This objection has but little weight with us, for believing as we do that God has revealed to us His will, both through the laws of reason and conscience, and in his written word, that the murderer should be put to death, we consider the arrest of the term of his probation, through the infliction of this sentence, as no less distinctly and properly the dispensation of Divine Providence, than if the criminal had been cut off by a sudden disease. But independent of this view, let us beg those who urge this objection to remember the compassion which is due to those who are to be murdered as well as to the murderer. By the abolition of capital punishment we should increase the number of murders, and thus cut short the probation of those that are murdered, and with this additional aggravation, that they are sent without notice, without a moment for thought, to their last account; while to the victim of the law we give time for repentance and preparation. This consideration meets the objection and disposes of it by presenting an evil of like kind but greater magnitude, which cannot but follow the repeal of the penalty of death. In addition to this, too, let it be borne in mind, that no man can tell whether imprisoning the culprit for life, in the manner proposed, would not as effectually interfere with the ends of his probation, as to put him to death after timely notice. Consider the case of a man condemned to death, with several weeks intervening between the sentence and its execution, perfectly certain that the hour is fixed in which he is to appear before his Judge, and placed under the strongest motives to induce him to repent and avail himself of the means of salvation,—and then contrast with this the situation in which he would be placed, if immured within the penitentiary, with a life-time before him for the spirit of procrastination to range over, cut off from the influence of public opinion, and other manifold influences which are ordinarily at work upon men,—placed under circumstances so new, and strange, and trying, that many minds have given way entirely under them and become insane,—when all these things are taken into the account how shall we determine which of these dooms would most effectually, to all intents and purposes, interfere with the probation of the criminal. Happily it is not necessary for us to determine this question, in order to learn our duty. In executing the murderer we are but instruments in the hands of Providence to effect his purposes: and we are preventing, so far as we can, other murderers from cutting short the lives of those whom it is our sacred duty to protect. They have claims upon us which the murderer has wilfully forfeited—they have rights which we cannot put in jeopardy, by an ill-judged lenity to the guilty, without incurring a heavy responsibility. It can be no part of our duty, through the weakness of a blind compassion, to clip the demands of justice upon the criminal, and thus let loose the bloody hand of violence upon the innocent.

ESSAY XIII.

PHRENOLOGY.*

In despite of all the ridicule and argument which have been levelled at phrenology, it has, of late years, made considerable advances; and it now excites more attention, and numbers more disciples than at any former period. Its advocates have abated nothing from the lofty pretensions of their favourite science; for *science*, they assure us it is, and the first of all the sciences in intrinsic dignity and importance. They claim that it is the greatest and most valuable discovery ever communicated to mankind; that it casts the only certain light upon the nature and operations of the human mind; and that it will contribute more important aid towards the education and the general improvement of the race, than can be obtained from any other source. "The discoveries of the revolution of the globe, and the circulation of the blood, were splendid displays of genius in their authors, and interesting and beneficial to mankind; but their results, compared with the consequences which must inevitably follow from Dr. Gall's discovery of the functions of the brain, sink into relative insignificance." So says Mr. George Combe, the ablest of the phrenologists.

A science which promises such wonderful results, which professes to subject the most abstruse problems in mental science to the ordeal of the sight and touch, which, from its lofty elevation, compassionates the wandering bewilderment of Locke, and wonders that Newton did not study skulls instead of stars, or that Harvey should have wasted his time in discovering the circulation of the blood, when he might have been so much more profitably employed in measuring the bumps of the cranium, deserves certainly the most respectful consideration from all who desire the increase of knowledge or the welfare of mankind. Such consideration, its friends seem disposed to think, it has not yet obtained. Mr. Combe commences the last edition of his System of Phrenology with an affecting account of the unfavourable reception which

* Originally published in 1838, in review of "An Examination of Phrenology, in two Lectures, delivered to the Students of the Columbian College, District of Columbia, February, 1837. By Thomas Sewall, M. D., Professor of Anatomy and Physiology."

most other great discoveries have met with upon their first announcement, and consoles himself and his collaborators by calling to mind the opposition, ridicule and persecution which were encountered by Aristotle, Galileo, Descartes, Harvey and Newton. Mr. Combe is not very well read in the history of the hardships endured by the pioneers of philosophical discovery, or he might have increased his catalogue by many additional names, such as ———; our readers may fill the blank with Anaxagoras, Socrates, Tycho, and Kepler, or by Symmes, Mesmer, and Perkins, according to their different estimates of the persecuted science of phrenology.

We do not feel disposed to throw ridicule upon any set of men who are labouring, with an honest purpose and a sincere love of truth, to extend the boundaries of human knowledge in any direction. We can look with something like complacency upon what would be swaggering and impudent pretension, were it not supposed to originate in the harmless enthusiasm of fancied discovery, and thankfully receive the truths that are offered us, even though we should rate them at a less value than is affixed by those who have, with great research and labour, produced them. To the untiring labours of the phrenologists, we have therefore looked with much interest, hoping that they would contribute something valuable to our knowledge of the mutual functions of the mind and body, and assured that if this hope should not be realized, we should at least have the benefit of what may be called a negative experiment, proving that there is no knowledge to be gained in the region which they have so assiduously cultivated. They have had among them some men of eminent abilities, united with keen ardour, in the pursuit of their favourite object; and sufficient time has been allowed, according to their own representations, to put their system in an available form, and complete it, except in some of its subordinate details. With the fearlessness of conscious strength, they challenge the rigorous investigations of all who are competent to form an opinion of its claims. We propose, therefore, to institute an inquiry into the validity of the grounds on which their science rests, and the value of the results it has produced.

Phrenology, as now set forth, is a modern science; but the opinion that separate portions of the brain are employed in different mental operations, is of very ancient date. Aristotle speaks of the brain, as consisting of a congeries of organs, and assigns to different parts, different mental functions. The anterior part of the cerebral mass, he apportions to common sense,—the middle, to imagination, judgment, and reflection—and the posterior, to memory. Galen seems to have been acquainted with the views of Aristotle, and to have adopted them. Nemesius, the first bishop of Emesa, in the reign of Theodosius, taught that the sensations had their origin in the anterior ventricle of the brain, memory in the middle, and understanding in the posterior ventricle. Albertus Magnus, Archbishop of Ratisbon, in the thirteenth century, drew

a head, upon which he delineated the supposed seats of the different faculties and affections. Peter de Montagnana, Michael Servetus, Ludovico Dolci, and many other writers, have published similar hypotheses respecting the locality of the various mental powers. But the most elaborate work upon this subject, with which we are acquainted, is the treatise of John Baptista Porta, or, as he is called by the Italians, Giovan Batista de la Porta, an eminent philosopher of Naples, in the latter part of the sixteenth century. He was famed for his skill in mathematics, philosophy, natural history, and medicine, and he published many works connected with these various branches of knowledge. Among these was the curious treatise to which we have alluded, entitled "De Humana Physiologia." He maintains that the character of every man, his intellectual and moral qualities, may be learned from his bodily configuration, and explains minutely the indications afforded by the different forms and sizes of its several parts, confirming his opinions by the testimony of previous writers, chiefly of Aristotle and Albertus, and by analogies between certain conformations of the "human face divine," and some of the races of brutes. In his system, every lineament of the face, and every member of the body, even the fingers and nails, bear their testimony to the qualities of the mind, but he lays the greatest stress upon the form of the cranium. The reason which he assigns for attaching so much importance to the shape of the head, is that the form of the brain depends upon that of the skull, and that a deficiency in any part of the skull, discloses therefore a corresponding deficiency in the brain, and indicates the feebleness of the faculties which have their seat in that portion. "Cerebri forma cranii formam sequitur, et si ejus figura corrupta fuerit, etiam cerebri forma corrumpetur." This is a clear and precise statement of one of the fundamental positions of modern phrenology.

It is no part of our intention, however, to detract from the originality of Dr. Gall as the discoverer of phrenology. Nothing but general hints had been thrown out by previous writers. No one had ventured further than the opinion that certain large portions of the brain were devoted to distinct classes of mental operations, and only Baptista Porta had suggested the general truth that the form of the brain might be learned from the external configuration of the skull. Dr. Gall has done for this subject what Newton did for the theory of the universe,—he has proved that to be true which before was but conjecture. The account which he has given of the manner in which he was led to make his great discovery is substantially as follows. His attention was strongly drawn, while he was yet a boy, to the various tastes, dispositions, and talents, displayed by the different members of his family. At school he observed similar differences among his companions, and in particular was led to remark that the boys who were distinguished for their retentive memories, had large and prominent eyes. When he subsequently went to the university, he found this same pecu-

liarity of feature in all the students who were distinguished for tenacity of memory. Following out the general idea which was thus suggested, he imagined that other mental qualities might have their signs in the external features, and he, at length, supposed that he had discovered certain peculiarities which were indicative of some other intellectual endowments. Afterwards, when he came to study medicine, it occurred to him that the differences in the configuration of the head, which he had observed in connexion with certain dispositions, were owing to differences in the form of the brain. This happy idea was the initiative of his whole system. It inspired him at once with the hope that with this clue he might successfully trace the windings of that labyrinth where every previous explorer had been lost, the connexion between the body and the mind, and the secret causes of that great variety which we see in moral disposition and intellectual ability. He immediately began to direct his researches to this object, by collecting animals of various kinds, and studying the relations between their external forms, and their natural instincts and dispositions. He procured, at the same time, all the skulls which he could obtain, of persons whose history or character was known. Upon hearing of any one who was distinguished for a particular mental or moral quality, he never rested until he had seen, and, if possible, felt the form of his cranium. He would then inquire diligently for some noted case of deficiency of the same trait or faculty, that he might compare together the positive and negative indications. If, on the other hand, he met with one whose head presented any singularity in shape, he spared no pains to ascertain his intellectual and moral character, and when all other means of investigation failed, he would not hesitate to inquire of the individual himself, whether he was remarkable for any faculty of mind or disposition of heart. He was also in the habit, while walking in the streets of Vienna, where he at this time lived, of collecting the boys around him, and, after observing their skulls, bribing them to confess their faults, and betray those of their companions. He would even seek to involve them in quarrels that he might learn which possessed the most courage. Upon the death of any celebrated individual, he used all possible exertion to procure his skull, and as this propensity of the doctor became known, it spread a very general alarm among the inhabitants of Vienna, not a few being haunted by the fear that their heads would hereafter grace his anatomical cabinet, instead of resting quietly in the grave. The aged librarian to the Emperor of Austria, Mr. Denis, inserted a prohibitory clause in his will, to protect his head from the keen scalpel of Dr. Gall. He contrived nevertheless to collect a large number of skulls. In the meantime he visited schools, prisons, houses of correction, and lunatic asylums, he invited companies of beggars, porters, and coachmen, from the street into his house, and then excited them to act out their characters before him; he neglected no means of observation within his reach, to acquaint himself with

the internal dispositions and the external protuberances of the skull, in all to whom he could gain access. During this lengthened period of observation, he was often involved in perplexity and confusion. The induction from many previous instances, assigning the locality of a particular faculty, would often be overthrown by a new skull, and a careful revision of all the former cases would be rendered necessary. By degrees, however, his conclusions became stable, and the multitudinous phenomena which he had observed, being all reduced within the compass of a few general laws, each comprising under it a large number of particular instances, the *science* of phrenology was the result. As in other sciences, the general law which he had proved to be true by an extended process of induction, was then applied, in the way of deduction, to the explanation of such phenomena as came within its range. In 1796, Dr. Gall considered his system sufficiently perfected to be announced to the world, and he accordingly gave a course of public lectures in Vienna, in explanation and defence of the newly-discovered science. He continued to lecture annually for five successive years, his opinions being eagerly received by many, and giving rise to much warm discussion, when, in 1802, an order was issued by the Austrian government, forbidding him to lecture, on the ground that his doctrines savoured of materialism and atheism, and were dangerous to the cause of morality and religion. The decrees of courts cannot fetter the mind. The effect of this interdict was to stimulate public curiosity, and phrenology was studied with greater zeal than before. A strong party was soon gathered on the side of the silenced philosopher, through whose influence at court, the prohibition was so far removed as to permit him to lecture publicly to such foreigners as might be resident in Vienna, the Emperor, it may be supposed, feeling little concern for the "morality and religion" of any but his own subjects. About this time Dr. Gall associated Dr. Spurzheim with him, and they laboured together for several years. They refrained from committing themselves by any publication. The first published notice of the new science was given in the *Deutsche Merkur* of Wieland, in 1798, in a letter from Dr. Gall, announcing his intention of publishing a large work upon the subject, and giving a glimpse of his theory. In 1802, an outline of his system was given in a published letter from M. Charles Villers to Cuvier. It was through this letter, and the review of it in the Edinburgh Review, that the subject was introduced into England. While the promised work in exposition of the system was delayed, surreptitious copies of Dr. Gall's lectures were circulated throughout Germany, and they excited so much attention, that he was induced, in company with Dr. Spurzheim, to visit the principal universities and cities of Germany and Prussia, for the purpose of explaining his doctrines. In 1809, these two co-labourers commenced the publication of their great work on the anatomy and physiology of the brain, which was completed ten years afterwards, in four

quarto volumes. They subsequently separated, Dr. Gall taking up his residence at Paris, and Dr. Spurzheim continuing to travel extensively through Europe, collecting new facts, and teaching phrenology wherever he could find hearers. In 1832, he visited the United States, and died at Boston, a few months after his arrival. Dr. Gall died at Paris, in 1828.

Were we attempting to give a full history of the origin and progress of phrenology, we should assign a conspicuous place to Mr. George Combe, of Edinburgh, whose writings have done far more to recommend the subject than those of Gall and Spurzheim. Edinburgh has been for several years the stronghold of this science. A monthly journal, devoted to the inculcation of its doctrines, is published there under the auspices of Mr. Combe.

In our own country phrenology has attracted much attention. The writings of Spurzheim and Combe have been extensively circulated, and we have had several "Manuals" and "Outlines" of native growth. Itinerant lecturers too, emulating the zeal of the peripatetic fathers of this sect, have travelled through the land, expounding the principles of the science, and gauging the heads of all who were willing to pay their dollar to be informed of their true character and prospects. It is not surprising that these lecturers have been popular. They find something good in every head submitted to their inspection, outside of the walls of a prison. If there should chance to be in any case a suspicious development of a wicked organ, they are at no loss to find a controlling influence in the unwonted strength of some good propensity. It is so exceedingly pleasant to be flattered into a good opinion of one's self, not by astrology, reading the character in the stars, nor by palmistry, detecting it in the lines of the hand, but by a true science, uttering its oracular responses upon indubitable evidence, that we do not wonder that Merlin, with his white beard and mystic wand, is quite out of fashion, and that the wandering gypsy has been fairly driven from the field. The cheapness too of this mode of self-knowledge renders it highly attractive. Who, that has toiled in fulfilment of the "heaven descended, *know thyself*," with much meditation and inward searching, seeking to penetrate into the recesses of his heart, and with much wearisome watching, endeavouring to detect in his actions the outward manifestation of feelings not otherwise discoverable, and after all his labour, never fully satisfied that some coming emergency may not reveal to him unsuspected weaknesses and defects of character, would not willingly open his purse to pay for a knowledge of himself, furnished upon principles as certain as those which make known to us the motions of the heavenly bodies, and so precise in its accuracy, that it will give us numerical expressions for the relative strength of all our propensities. The troublesome process of ascertaining the character is reduced to a simple operation of arithmetic. Benevolence on a particular head is five, destructiveness three, and acquisitiveness two,—how comforting to the owner

of it to know that there is a clear balance of two against the probability of his ever being led to commit murder or break windows, and a still more decided balance of three, against his committing burglary or highway robbery. But let us leave these mountebank practitioners of the art, and enter on the examination of the principles of the science.

The principles of phrenology, as given by Dr. Sewall, are ten in number. All that is essential to the system, however, may be comprised in the following propositions. 1. That the brain is the material organ of the mind, and necessary to all its operations. 2. That in proportion to the size of this organ will be the vigour of the intellectual faculties. 3. That the brain is a congeries of organs, thirty-five in number, each commencing at the medulla oblongata, and thence extending upward, in the form of an inverted cone, to the upper surface of the bran. 4. That each of these organs is the instrument of a distinct faculty, propensity, or sentiment of the mind, and that no mental operation can be performed without the aid of its appropriate organ; and further, that in proportion to the size of any organ will be the strength of the faculty which works by its means. 5. That we can judge of the size of the organs, and therefore of the character of the mind, by the external projections of the skull.

The opinion contained in the first of these propositions is not peculiar to the phrenologists. Three different theories have been held of the dependency of the mind on the body. That all the mental phenomena are the results of organization, thought being the necessary product of a material organ like the brain; secondly, that the mind is an immaterial principle, superadded to the organized structure of the body, but still requiring the intervention of a material organ for the performance of its acts; and, thirdly, that though the mind is in some mysterious way connected with the body, yet it does not employ any material instrument in carrying on its processes, except in such acts as have reference to material objects. The first of these opinions is materialism, and it can scarcely be stated in terms which do not convey its refutation. It supposes that matter, in a certain state, is capable of thought, volition, and affection. The second opinion, which teaches that the mind is a distinct principle from the body, and yet so united with it, as to require the direct instrumentality of the brain in all its manifestations, is the one which has been generally embraced by physiologists and metaphysicians, and universally by the phrenologists, to whose theory indeed it is essential. In support of this opinion it has been urged that we find no symptoms of intelligence in animals that are not furnished with a brain, and, on the other hand, that wherever this organ is found, it is accompanied by some manifestations of mind. Those creatures which stand as the frontier instances of animal life, affording the feeblest and lowest indications of its properties, are found to possess merely a nervous thread or ring. As we ascend the scale of

animal existence, we discover first a line of ganglions, or nervous plexuses; then a double column of distinct portions of nervous matter, forming a spinal marrow; this is succeeded by a cerebellum; and this again by a cerebrum, or brain proper. Each of these additions to the nervous system always includes the inferior parts. A cerebrum is never found without a cerebellum, nor the latter without the subordinate system of nervous ganglions. Commencing with the animals that possess the simplest form of the brain, we find this organ, as we ascend, becoming more complicated and perfect in its structure, until we reach the human brain; and at every step of the scale in tracing its gradual refinement, we find each successive improvement marked by some addition or enlargement of the powers of the animal. It has been moreover found that the human brain is gradually evolved from a much simpler form. Its earliest state shows no symptom of that elaborate organization which it ultimately attains. From a laborious examination of the condition of the foetal brain, Tiedemann has shown that this organ attains its complicated structure by gradual progress through much simpler forms. This might have been anticipated, for Harvey had already proved that the growth of the human foetus was not by the mere enlargement of parts already possessed, but by the evolution of successive forms of organization. Tiedemann has succeeded in proving not only that the brain is thus developed, but that it is an exact parallel between the *temporary* states of the foetal brain, during the periods of advancing gestation, and the *permanent* development of that organ at successive points of the animal scale.

The gradual unfolding of the intellectual faculties from infancy upward, corresponding with the advance of the brain from its soft and pulpy state to its perfect form, is urged as another reason for believing that this organ is the instrument of all mental manifestations. And in old age, when the brain becomes shrivelled and dry, the powers of the mind decay. These facts are deemed irreconcilable with the supposition that the exercises of the mind are the exclusive product of a spiritual or immaterial principle, since such a principle cannot be supposed capable of alteration, of growing with the growth of the body, and of decaying with its decay.

Nor are other plausible arguments wanting. Whatever destroys the integrity of the brain, impairs or deranges the mental faculties, if it do not utterly abolish them; and even a functional disorder of this organ never fails to manifest itself in the complete delirium, or at least the weakened energy of the mind. In cases of fractured skull, when a portion of bone, or the extravasated blood of some of the encephalic vessels, compresses the brain, there is a total suspension of all mental activity; and the mind awakes again from its unconscious lethargy as soon as the operation of the trephine has removed the compressing cause. When the brain has been exposed, as in the noted instance of the female cited by Richerand, the pressure of

the finger upon it has been instantly followed by a state of unconsciousness, which would continue until the pressure was removed.

The phenomena of sleep and dreaming also are supposed to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the mind acts without a material organ, while they are easily explicable, if we consider the mind dependent upon the brain, and therefore controlled in its actions by the partial suspension of the functions of this organ during these states. Since an immaterial principle is simple and indivisible, it must be incapable of any alteration of structure or disarrangement of function, and of course exempt from disease. The frequent occurrence of temporary delirium and of permanent insanity is therefore urged in further proof of the proposition that the brain is the organ of the mind.*

Such, substantially, are the facts and reasonings by which it is thought that this truth is established. Nor are they destitute of force. They unquestionably prove that there exists some connexion between the brain and the mind, in virtue of which they exert a reciprocal influence, but so may it be proved also that all the other vital organs act upon the mind, and the mind upon them. Strong emotions generally show their first physical symptom in the accelerated or retarded action of the heart. And hence some modern physiologists, particularly Bichat, who hold that the brain is the organ of the intellectual faculties, have revived the ancient doctrine of the Greek physicians, that the affections and passions have their seat in the viscera of the abdomen and thorax. And certainly if any stress is to be laid, as is usually done, in argument upon this subject, on the common sentiment of mankind, as indicated by their language, referring intellectual exercises to the *head*, we have equally good reason for affirming that the feelings have their local habitation in the *heart*.

In considering the question, whether the brain is the organ of the mind, we find a difficulty in arriving at a conclusion, from not knowing exactly what is intended. We understand what is meant when it is said that the lungs are the principal respiratory organ, or the heart the chief organ of the circulating system. The alternate expansion and contraction of these viscera produce respiration and circulation. When they are in healthy action, the presence of the air or of the blood is all that is necessary to the production of their several effects. They are, therefore, very appropriately called the organs or instruments by which those effects are wrought. So long as the vital forces animate them they accomplish their ends without the aid or concurrence of any other agent. It will not be maintained that the brain is, in this sense, the organ

* We have omitted purposely one argument urged by Mr. Combe, and repeated by others, in defence of this proposition. He asserts that "consciousness or feeling localizes the mind in the head, and gives us a full conviction that it is seated there." If Mr. Combe really has this consciousness, he needs no better evidence than it affords, that *his* mind thinks by help of his brain, but this gives no help to those of us who are unfortunately not conscious of the locality of our minds.

of thought by any but the materialists. We can see a fitness, too, in designating the eye as the organ of vision, and the ear, the organ of hearing. The eye is evidently and expressly constructed for the purpose of conveying the image of the external object to the retina of the eye, and thus producing the mental state called seeing. It is directly and causatively employed by the mind as its instrument in every act of vision. And since the eye, the ear, and all the apparatus of the external senses, communicate by their appropriate nerves with the brain, we are led to suppose that the last physical state, antecedent to the mental perception of external objects, takes place in this apparent centre of the nervous system; and this may be deemed a sufficient reason for styling the brain, the organ of sensation. A similar ground exists for supposing that the brain is the necessary instrument of the mind in executing such volitions as have for their object any change of its bodily state. The nerves of voluntary motion are connected, through the intervention of larger medullary masses, with the brain, and this arrangement, together with some corroborating facts, induces us to suppose that the motive impression of the will is propagated from the brain to the muscle in which the motion takes place.* We may consent, on this account, that the brain should be called the organ of the mind in all its states and acts which connect it with the material world. But we suppose that much more than this is meant by those who contend for the unqualified proposition that the brain is the organ of the mind. Indeed Mr. Combe illustrates the sense in which he uses these terms by a reference to the eye as the organ of vision, and asserts that "if the brain be the organ of the mind, it will follow that the mind does not act in this life independently of its organ, and hence that every emotion and judgment of which we are conscious, are the result of mind and its organ acting together; and, secondly, that every mental affection must be accompanied by a corresponding state of the organ, and *vice versâ* every state of the organ must be attended by a certain condition of the mind." We are prepared here to join issue, and maintain that we have no sufficient evidence for believing that the brain is, in this strict sense, the organ of the mind in all its opera-

* The opinion that the immediate physical antecedent of a mental sensation, or the immediate physical consequent of a volition, takes place in the brain, is by no means incontrovertible. It may be maintained, and with much plausibility, that the physical state which exists in immediate proximity to the mental one is in the nerves, while the office of the brain is to supply that influence, whatever it may be, which maintains the vitality of the nervous system. This hypothesis is equally consistent with the anatomical structure of these organs, and will explain equally well, most, if not all, the facts of the case. If the optic nerve, for instance, be divided, the power of vision is destroyed. On the one hypothesis this would be explained by stating that the image on the retina of the eye no longer conveyed to the brain the impression which must necessarily affect that organ in order to induce the mental act or state of vision. On the other, it would be accounted for by the consideration, that the nerve, being dissevered from the brain, had lost its vitality, and was therefore incapable of discharging its appropriate function in influencing the mind. It is an extremely difficult matter to establish the proximate relation of cause and effect between our mental and our bodily acts.

tions. When the mind wills to move the arm, we are ready to admit that it may employ the brain in transmitting the motive impulse to the muscle, but when we are told also that it cannot frame the volition itself, without some previous stimulus or concurrent help of the medullary substance, we are constrained to demand some further evidence than has yet been given.

The law of continuity which is said to prevail throughout the animal creation, connecting, at each point of the ascending series, a brain of more elaborate construction with higher manifestations of intelligence, is of very slender force. Such laws are at no point of the scale so likely to be interrupted by a discontinuous instance as at one of its extremities. The law of gravitation, which is true for all sensible distances, gives place to some other law when the distance between the attracting particles becomes insensible. Admitting the instrumental dependence of the mind upon the brain, in the inferior animals, are we entitled to infer from this that the mind of man is thus dependent upon a similar organ? The analogy of anatomical structure has no weight in this argument, except upon the assumption of analogous functions. Bnt is there such an analogy between the acts of a brute in the perception of external objects, or in any of its manifestations of intelligence, and the movements of the mind of man, when he reasons upon abstract truths and principles which have no relation to a material world, or when he feels the obligations which he is under to virtue and truth, that the same instrument which is employed in the production of the one, being somewhat more elaborately finished, will answer for working out the other? There is not more difference between the two acts of seeing and hearing, than exists between the highest instance of brute intelligence, and the act of the human mind in adoring and loving its Creator. But we believe that the eye, however exquisitely finished, can never become transformed into an organ of hearing; and why should we not as well believe, that the same organ which is employed by the brute creation in their low and limited manifestations of intelligence, cannot avail for the higher and dissimilar functions of the human mind? The difference in kind between these two classes of functions, would lead us, if we sought any material organ for the latter, not to look for one more exquisitely finished than that employed by the brutes, but for one entirely different. The greater complication and higher finish of the brain of man are sufficiently explained by the greater complexity of all his organs, and the higher kind of animal life which he sustains. Many vital arrangements are completed in the human body, of which we find only the first rudiments, or rough sketches, in the lower animals. We need not, however, waste words in showing the irrelevancy of the argument from the uniform proportion between the degree of intelligence and the finish of the brain in the lower animal, since the facts themselves from which the argument is generalized are insufficient to sustain it. It is not true that this proportion is observed

with sufficient uniformity to warrant the general assertion. The brain of the beaver is not more elaborate or complicated in its structure, nor larger in its proportions, than that of the sheep. And, as if in mockery of this hasty generalization, of all the animals with which we are acquainted, the bee and the ant perhaps mimic most closely "the adaptive functions" of the human understanding.

We cannot attach much importance to the other argument, drawn from the correspondence between the growth and decay of the brain, and the progress and decline of the intellectnal faculties. This argument, it will be seen, derives all its force from the synchronism between the two classes of phenomena, but this synchronism is not invariable. There have been many instances of precocity in children, whose brains presented, upon examination, the usual soft and pulpy appearance; and there have been many old men who have preserved their mental faculties to the last in an unusual degree, and whose brains have been found as dry and hard as in other cases where the powers of the mind have almost entirely disappeared. These, however, are exceptions. The general law is undoubtedly true, that while the brain is undergoing one series of changes, the mind is passing through another series. But is this sufficient, even if invariable, to establish between them the relation of cause and effect? Certainly not, if there be any other hypothesis than that of their mutual dependence, which will equally well explain the facts. There is nothing in the change that takes place in the brain, that seems to bear a natural relation to the altered functions of the mind. In infancy, when the brain is pulpy, the child is a creature of sensation; when the brain has become harder, we find the child capable of reflection; but we can discern no reason in the anatomical structure of the organ, why a hard brain is any more fitted than a soft one for the instrument of reflection; or why, when it has become hardened beyond a certain point, it should be again unfitted for this office. The structure of the organ does not, as in the case of the eye or ear, give us any information respecting its office. There is nothing but the contemporaneous occurrence of the changes in the brain and the mind, from which we can infer any relation between them. But something more than this is necessary to prove that they are connected as cause and effect. Since the changes which take place in the brain are but part of a train of changes which are going on throughout the vital economy, there must be some sufficient reason for selecting them as exclusively connected with the growth of the mental faculties. No such reason can be found. The changes in the brain, and in the mind, may both, for aught we know or are likely to know, be independent effects of some third cause. The varying state of the mental powers from infancy to manhood, and from manhood to old age, proves that the mind is so connected with the body as to be influenced by the state of its vitality. We can have no reason for believing that this influence

is communicated solely through the brain, unless it can be shown from the structure or other functions of this organ, that it has been adapted to fulfil this purpose; or unless by a series of experiments we can eliminate the changes in the brain from the other changes which take place simultaneously throughout the system. It has indeed been urged that we are acquainted with the functions of all the other organs of the body—that each part has its particular office—that the use of the brain is not understood—and that if it is not the organ of the mind, "there is left for it nothing to do, no purpose to answer in the economy, for no one has yet suspected that it has any other function than that connected with mental manifestation."* It would be a sad thing indeed to leave an organ of such rare and curious construction as the brain with nothing to do, but there have been very violent suspicions that it has some important duties to perform besides assisting the mind in its labours. Whether in partnership with the mind or not, it carries on a pretty important business on its own account. M. Legallois has published a learned essay, detailing many experiments, all going to prove that the principle which animates each part of the body, has its seat in that portion of the medullary substance whence its nerves originate; and it has been very generally supposed that what has been vaguely called the nervous influence, subserved important purposes in the animal economy. Dr. Wilson Philip has attempted to prove that secretion is due to nervous influence; and Magendie has clearly shown that the nutrition of the eye depends upon the fifth pair of nerves. Though great obscurity rests upon the functions of the brain, no one has doubted that this organ, with its associated system of medulla, spinal marrow, and nerves, distributes to the heart, the lungs, and through the whole frame, some influence necessary to the perfection of its organic life. And if this were not so, in admitting the brain to be the organ of the mind in sensation, and in producing voluntary motion, we have assigned to it an office of sufficient importance to relieve us from the necessity of finding some other duty for it to perform.

The remarks already made will be found to apply to the other arguments drawn from the suspension of the mental powers from injury to the brain, and from the phenomena of idiotcy and insanity. The brains of the idiotic and the insane have been examined in hundreds of cases, and in by far the greater part of them there has been found no peculiarity of organization, no alteration of structure, no symptom of disease. The comatose state produced by compression of the brain does not prove that the intellectual faculties depend solely upon this organ, unless it can be shown that no other part of the body suffers at the same time with the brain. The intellect may possibly be connected with the life of the body at some other point, which, by the injury of the brain, has lost the supply of an influence necessary to the healthy dis-

* Christian Spectator, vol. vi., p. 504.

charge of its functions. While we have no sufficient reason, therefore, from the coincidence between an injury of the brain and the loss of intellect, to believe that the one is the immediate cause of the other, we have, on the other hand, many facts which are hardly reconcilable with the doctrine that the brain is the organ of the mind. This organ may often receive the most extensive injury without any detriment to the mental faculties. Though the sudden effusion into its substance of a portion of blood, not larger than a pea, is often followed by the total loss of consciousness, yet in other cases, large tumours have been found in the encephalon, which must have compressed the brain for years, without producing the least mental defect or aberration. Hydrocephalous patients, it is well known, will live for years with undiminished mental faculties, though there may be several pounds of water in the skull, entirely displacing the brain, and compressing it greatly, if not absorbing the larger part of its substance. Hundreds of cases are also upon record similar to the one of which we have recently seen an account, reported by M. Nobil to the Medical Society at Ghent. A young man fired a pistol, loaded with two balls, at his own head. The balls passed through the head and came out at the same orifice, and with them came a portion of the brain sufficient to fill two moderately-sized tea cups. The wound was dressed for twenty-eight days successively, and at each dressing a portion of the brain came away. He recovered from the injury, with no other inconvenience than the loss of sight. His intellectual faculties were unimpaired, though the loss of cerebral substance amounted to not less than the whole of the left anterior lobe of the brain.* If the brain is the organ of the mind, it is difficult to understand how it can receive such injuries, occasioning in some cases the loss of even half its substance, without interfering at all with the mental operations. Neither the heart, the liver, nor the lungs, can undergo as extensive lesion as the brain has often suffered with impunity, without destroying all the manifestations of mind. It is by no means characteristic of the only material organs which we are sure that the mind employs, the apparatus of the external senses and of voluntary motion, that they can be subjected to great mechanical injury without interference with their functions. Reasoning by analogy, therefore, from the only fixed and certain point in our knowledge of the material instruments employed by the mind, we should be led to doubt whether the brain could be its chief organ.

In the total absence of any conclusive arguments against it, this doubt is greatly strengthened by the *a priori* probabilities in its favour. The mind is furnished with material organs to assist it in all its operations that are connected with matter. We can see a necessity for this arrangement. There must be some point of transition at which the impressions made by material objects shall

* New Monthly Magazine, 1837, p. 141.

pass into mental perceptions, and at which a volition to move any part of the body shall commence its physical effect. Without instruments properly constructed in adaptation to the susceptibilities of the mind and the properties of matter, we must have remained for ever ignorant of the external world, and incapable of producing any effect upon it. But we can see no fitness in the provisions of a material organ for carrying on purely intellectual operations. That the mind cannot execute a volition to move any part of the body without the aid of the brain and nerves is very certain; but we can discern no impediment to its forming the volition without help of a material organ; nay, we find it difficult to conceive that it can need any.* And it would surely be a very anomalous arrangement if the same organ should be employed for two such different purposes as that of forming and then executing the volitions of the mind.

The natural expectation which we should be disposed to form, of the independence of the mind upon the use of material instruments for its spiritual operations, is confirmed by our not finding in the body any organ which seems to be fitted for this office. All the organs of which we have any certain knowledge, have an anatomical structure and arrangement which disclose their purpose and use. But we find nothing in the structure of the brain which would lead us to infer that it was intended to assist the mind in its intellectual and moral exercises. The only safe inference which we can draw from the anatomical structure of the nervous apparatus is, that the stomach, heart, lungs, and all the vital organs, derive directly from the nerves, or through them from the brain, some influence which assists them in the discharge of their several offices; and that the nerves in like manner, either immediately or as channels of communication with the brain, are employed by the mind in the perception of material objects, and in the production of voluntary motion. These inferences from the anatomical affiliations and dependencies of the several parts of the bodily system, have been confirmed by observation and experiment; and the distinct offices performed by some portions of the machinery of the nervous system have been discovered. It has been found that there are nerves dedicated to the functions of sight, of smell, and of hearing, and that they are severally incapable of conveying to the mind any other than their appropriate impressions. If the retina of the eye, or the optic nerve, be touched or lacerated, the only sensation is that of a flash of light. It has been proved, too, by Sir Charles

* We are always glad when we can strengthen ourselves by the high authority of Bishop Butler, and we therefore quote, as pertinent to the present discussion, the following passage from his Analogy. "For though from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers—yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from the senses; and without any at all, that we know of, from that body which will be dissolved at death."

Bell, that the nerves of sensation are distinct from those of motion, and that the former communicate with the brain through the two posterior, and the latter through the two anterior columns of the spinal medulla. Except these, and a few similar facts, nothing is certainly known of the physiology of the nervous system; and of all the conjectures which have been hazarded, that which supposes the brain to be an instrument, which, by the play of its medullary fibres, or the molecular action of its globular elements, or by some other mechanical or chemical operation, enables the mind to think, to reason, and to love, is the most preposterous and the least likely to be verified in the further progress of our knowledge. It is supported by no analogy from what we already know of the functions of the brain, and of the dependency of the mind upon material organs; it is confirmed by nothing that anatomical research has disclosed of the structure and collocation of the brain, with its subordinate members; and the facts which are adduced in its favour, lend it but a questionable aid, while other facts, equally well authenticated, bear their testimony against it. It is, at best, upon the most favourable construction of its claims, but a doubtful hypothesis; and the age has passed away in which it was allowable to construct a science upon an assumed hypothesis.

We might very justly rest the case with the phrenologists here, and call upon them for further proof of their fundamental position, that the brain is the organ of the mind. But we may admit the truth of this proposition, and yet we shall find darkness and doubt gathering over the next step. It is worthy of special observation that the science of phrenology does not consist of a set of compacted truths, so articulated together as to impart mutual support, and establish firmly, by their combined strength, the system which they compose; it rests upon a series of disconnected propositions, in such a manner that the failure of any one destroys the whole superstructure. Let it be proved that the brain is the organ of the mind, this renders us no assistance in establishing the next essential doctrine, that the vigour of the intellectual faculties will be in proportion to the size of this organ. Let both of these be true, and we have yet to prove the entirely independent propositions, that the brain is composed of a plurality of organs, each one devoted to the elaboration of some particular faculty or sentiment, and working with an energy proportioned to its size. Or grant the truth of all the previous assumptions, and yet the whole science will be destroyed, unless it can be demonstrated that the form of the brain may be determined by the external configuration of the skull. Every one of its doctrines can be shown to be doubtful, if not highly improbable, though the demonstrable truth of each of them is essential to the integrity of the system. No science ever was established, nor ever can be, with such a liability to error multiplying at every step.

The doctrine that the vigour of intellect will be in proportion to the size of the brain, is supported by arguments too loose and

vague to deserve a place in a process of serious reasoning. Those of our readers who have never examined the foundations of phrenology, will be surprised to find that Mr. Combe, the great hierophant of its mysteries, can produce nothing stronger than the following arguments in favour of this important proposition. "First, the brain of the child is small, and its mental vigour weak, compared with the brain and mental vigour of an adult. Secondly, small size in the brain is an invariable cause of idiocy. Phrenologists have in vain called upon their opponents to produce a single instance of the mind being manifested vigorously by a very small brain. Thirdly, men who have been remarkable, not for mere cleverness, but for great force of character, such as Napoleon Bonaparte, have had large heads. Fourthly, it is an ascertained fact, that nations in whom the brain is large, possess so great a mental superiority over those in whom that organ is small, that they conquer and oppress them at pleasure. Lastly, the influence of size is now admitted by the most eminent physiologists." The last of these arguments we shall not examine, since we have no disposition just now to search for the conflicting opinions of eminent physiologists, and an appeal to authority is so questionable a procedure in establishing the foundations of a science, that we cannot consent to abide by its issue. The other reasons are scarcely worthy of consideration, as a proof of the influence of the size of the brain upon the strength of the intellect. Taken at their fullest value, they create only a very slender probability in favour of the opinion in question. The brain of the child, it is true, is small, when compared with the brain of the adult, but it is also true that it undergoes other changes in the progress from infancy to manhood, quite as important in character as its increase of size. In the foetus the brain is semi-fluid, in the infant it is still so soft as to be almost incapable of dissection, and it becomes gradually more consistent in its substance, and more distinctly marked with convolutions through the successive years of youth. The addition to its volume is a much less remarkable circumstance than the change in its character, and there can be no reason therefore for selecting the former as the cause of the increase of mental vigour. If the phrenologist replies that he means his assertion to be limited by the condition of "other things being equal," we have no objection so to receive and discuss it; but in this case it is strange that the comparative states of the brain and the mind, in the infant and the adult, should be brought forward as an argument, when it is impossible that the limiting condition can take place. Other things are not equal in the infant and the adult brain, and the phenomena exibited by its two states can of course have no bearing, either one way or the other, upon the doctrine that the size of this organ, *ceteris paribus*, determines the vigour of the intellectual manifestations.

But we are further told that a small brain is the invariable cause of idiocy. This information is at variance with the notions which

we should naturally form. If the brain is the organ of the mind, we should expect that the entire deficiency of medullary substance would be accompanied by complete mental imbecility, but that a small portion of it would be attended by some exhibitions of mind. Why should not a small instrument suffice the mind for working out small results? This reasonable expectation must, however, yield to experience and observation. Has it then been ascertained that, except in cases of disease, a small brain and idiocy are invariably associated together? Such has not been the result of our observation. We have seen idiots whose heads were of a very respectable size, and some even in whom this member was uncommonly large. The heads of many such have been examined after death, and no symptoms of disease in the structure or functions of the brain have been discovered; and none were visible during life, unless, by a *petitio principii*, the idiocy itself, of which we are seeking the cause, is to be taken as evidence of a diseased brain. There have been many instances, too, in which idiocy has been produced by a moral cause, as in the following case, reported by Pinel. Two brothers, conscripts in Napoleon's army, were fighting side by side, when one of them was shot dead. The other was instantly struck with complete idiocy, and, upon being taken home, another brother was so affected by the sight of him, that he was immediately seized in like manner. In such cases the size of the brain remains unaltered, and there can be no other disease than one of function. It is indeed barely possible that the mental emotion may act injuriously upon the brain, and this organ then re-act upon the mind, but it is to the last degree improbable, and there is no necessity for supposing this order of sequences to take place, except the necessity that phrenology should be true. These cases are decisive of the question, so far as the argument from idiocy is concerned. They show that while the brain has remained *in statu quo*, unchanged in size, and, so far as we have any evidence, free from any organic or functional disease, the mind has passed from a state of activity to one of complete torpor. Nor are there wanting countervailing facts at the other end of the argument. Not only do we find idiocy connected with a large brain, but we are met also by numerous instances of vigorous intellect where the brain is unusually small. In proof of this we shall content ourselves, and we presume satisfy our readers, with the testimony of Professor Warren, as given by Dr. Sewall. This distinguished anatomist has had, in the opinion of Dr. Sewall, as great opportunities for dissecting the brains of literary and intellectual men of high grade, and of comparing these with the brains of men in the lower walks of life, as any anatomist of our country, if not of the age. The result of his observation is, "that in some instances a large brain had been connected with superior mental powers, and that the reverse of this was true in about an equal number. One individual who was most distinguished for the variety and extent of his native talent, had, it was ascertained

after death, an uncommonly small brain." Dr. Sewall adds, that the experience of eminent anatomists of all times and countries, who have paid attention to the subject, will be found in strict accordance with that of Doctor Warren. But let us now grant what we have shown to be not true, that the facts of the case are as stated by Mr. Combe, and it will nevertheless be seen that his inference from them is altogether unwarrantable. Though it should be true that a small brain was invariably connected with a feeble intellect or entire idiocy, it by no means follows that the diminutive size of this organ is the cause of the mental deficiency. How can it be ascertained that the small development of the brain is not itself caused by the original feebleness of the intellect? Or how shall it be proved that the smallness of the brain and the feebleness of the intellect are not both produced by some early defect in the kind of action, whatever it may be, chemical or mechanical, which must take place in the brain to assist the mind in its intellectual operations?

Mr. Combe can hardly be considered more fortunate in his third argument for the influence of the size of the brain. All men, he asserts, who have been distinguished for great force of character, as Napoleon Bonaparte, have had large heads. If the remark is intended to be confined to men of the same grade of character with Bonaparte, we deny that we have the necessary knowledge of a sufficient number of heads to afford ground for a general induction. We presume there are no authentic casts of the heads of Alexander, Julius Caesar, Hannibal, or Mohammed. We know not how we are to gauge the skulls of the mighty conquerors of past ages; and in the present, there are not enough who can be placed in the same category with Bonaparte to warrant us in inferring any connexion between the magnitude of their heads, and the greatness of their achievements. If the assertion is not to be so strictly limited by the instance adduced, it is effectually turned aside by the testimony which we have already adduced to prove that high intellectual ability is as often found in connexion with a small as with a large brain.

But it is an ascertained fact that nations, in whom the brain is large, have always conquered and oppressed at pleasure those who were so unfortunate as to have smaller heads. When, and by whom, has this important historical fact been ascertained? The only confirmation of it given by Mr. Combe is the subjugation of the Hindoos, and the native Americans, by Europeans. Are these two instances sufficient to establish a general truth? Had the Romans larger brains than the Greeks, and the Goths still larger than the Romans? When the many nations that, in the history of our race, have stood in their pride of place, with their feet upon the necks of others, have been overthrown, and reduced to a state of dependence or servitude, has it been owing to a gradual decrease in the size of their skulls? Have we any reason for believing that the heads of the ancient Egyptians diminished after

the time of Sesostris? Were the brains of the Moors smaller when expelled from Spain than they were at the period of its subjugation? Are the heads of the Popes, since Luther's day, more diminutive than those which enabled the Urbans and Gregories to domineer at will over Christendom? If this fact be indeed ascertained, then is your grave-digger the only true historian. National pride may have led to the forgery of boastful records, but the skulls of the past generations, if we can but find them, will give us a true account of the relative position of the people to whom they belonged. The charnel house and the mummy pit are the true depositories of the secrets of the past.

Such are the arguments by which the most learned and able of the advocates of phrenology establishes one of its fundamental truths. We will engage to prove, by a train of reasoning equally sound, that any other variable attribute of the human body, the colour of the hair, or the projection of the nose, is the true original cause of the different degrees of intellect observable among men. But liberality of concession in argument with the phrenologists is so small a virtue, that, without any danger of self-elation, we may again grant all that they ask. Supposing it then to be demonstrated, beyond all reasonable doubt or captious cavil, that the brain is the organ of the mind and that its size determines the vigour of all intellectual manifestations, what light have we to guide us in our further advance?

The brain, we are told, is a congeries of organs, thirty-five at least in number, each appropriated to the service of some faculty, sentiment or propensity of the mind, and proportioned in size to the vigour of the intellectual property which is manifested through its agency. Each of these organs is supposed to be double, composed of two cone-shaped portions of medullary substance, which have their origin at the base of the brain, and thence extend to opposite points of its outer surface. In proof of this plurality of organs, we might reasonably expect to be furnished with some evidence from the anatomical structure of the brain. But it is not even pretended that any such exists. When the integuments of the brain are removed, its surface is seen to be marked by convolutions, separated from each other by grooves, more or less deep; but these convolutions have no correspondence in size, position, or form, with the organs of the phrenologists. The brain has been, in thousands of instances, subjected to the most rigid examination; chemical tests of all kinds have been applied to it, and the microscope has been called in to aid in the scrutiny, and yet there has been nothing found to warrant the belief, nor even to create a surmise, that it is composed of a number of distinct organs. Whether the brain is or is not thus divided into thirty-five organs is an anatomical fact, and it must be decided by the scalpel of the dissecting room. Mere abstract reasoning, upon general probabilities, or by analogy from the single functions of our other

organs, except it be for the purpose simply of forming a conjecture to guide in the anatomical examination, is utterly out of the question, and can serve no other purpose then to make known the stupidity of the reasoner. It is at all times a sufficient refutation of what purports to be the statement of a fact, to show that the only kind of evidence by which the fact could possibly be ascertained does not exist. And we maintain it to be utterly impossible to prove that the brain is divided, as the phrenological hypothesis supposes, in any other way than by discovering the evidences of such division in the structure of the brain. Should any one propose to examine, as indeed Flourens, Bouillaud, Rolando, and others have done, whether the cerebrum, the cerebellum, the thalami optici, the corpora striata, the medulla oblongata, had each a distinct office to perform, we should listen respectfully to the account of his experiments, and to the arguments founded upon them. These are distinct portions of the brain, some of them separated by an interposed membrane from others, and all of them capable of separate anatomical demonstration; and it is possible that they may preside over different functions. But when the phrenologist offers to explain the distinct offices of thirty-five separate organs in the brain, it could hardly be deemed an incivility if we flatly refused to hear one word of his explanation, until he had first proved the existence of the organs in question. But instead of any such proof, we are told, that since the mind exercises different faculties there must be different organs, by means of which they operate. Because of a difference between two mental affections, we are to believe that each of them has its own separate cone of the brain wherewith to work out its effects, although we have the evidence of our senses that no such conical organs exist. It is impossible for the wit of man to frame thirty-five different classes of mental phenomena, in which many of the lines of division shall not be shadowy and evanescent; and yet on the ground of these uncertain distinctions we must believe that there are thirty-five separate cones, though no symptom of the existence of any one of them can be discovered. We are not yet quite ready for this; and we hope not to be chided for our unbelief; perhaps we may be better prepared for it, after we have gone through a course of discipline in homœopathy and animal magnetism.

No traces of separate organs in the brain, not the least vestige of any internal fibrous structure at all correspondent to them, was ever supposed to exist until Dr. Gall's theory rendered it necessary to imagine them. With singular hardihood, he proceeded to map out the skull into portions answering to the termination of his twenty-eight internal cones of brain, while in the profoundest ignorance of the real structure of this organ. We are aware that we are somewhat singular in bringing this charge of ignorance against Dr. Gall. It has become quite fashionable, in controverting the doctrines of the phrenologists, to laud them for their valuable

contributions to physiological science.* We do not profess to be very learned in these matters, but in what we have said of Dr. Gall we lean upon the testimony of one, who of all living men is perhaps best entitled to speak authoritatively upon this subject. Sir Charles Bell, in the Philosophical Transactions for 1823, thus speaks of the great founder of the sect. "But the most extravagant departure from all the legitimate modes of reasoning, though still under the colour of anatomical investigation, is the system of Dr. Gall. It is sufficient to say that without comprehending the grand divisions of the nervous system; without any notion of the distinct properties of the individual nerves; or without having made any distinction of the columns of the spinal marrow; without even having ascertained the difference of cerebrum and cerebellum; Gall proceeded to describe the brain as composed of many particular and independent organs, and to assign to each the residence of some special faculty." Though Dr. Gall's successors may have better understood the anatomy of the brain, they have as yet given us no better reason than the original metaphysical necessity for believing that there are separate cone-shaped portions of matter, where our senses, however acutely exercised, cannot discover them.

And what are the reasons given, for believing, in opposition to our senses, the constituted judges of material existences, that the brain is composed of separate organs? We are informed in the first place, that the liver secretes bile, the stomach digests food, that every organ, in short, performs but a single office, and it is therefore contrary to analogy to suppose that in the different operations of the mind the same organ is employed. None but the merest sciolist need be told that analogy, in searching into the unknown process of nature, is at best an uncertain guide, and that its only use is to furnish us with hints and probabilities of what may happen, to stimulate and guide us in our search. But least of all are analogical deductions worthy of confidence, when they are applied to a department of nature widely different from the one from which they are drawn. The liver, the lungs, the stomach, and the other bodily organs, under the stimulus of the vital forces, produce their several mechanical or chemical effects. They act upon matter, and

* We have even met with an eulogium upon the phrenologists for the benefits they have rendered to the cause of education, and the general improvement of society. And to prove that there was no exaggeration in this praise, reference was made to Mr. Combe's work, "On the constitution of man considered in relation to external objects,"—surely a most unfortunate illustration. The great object of Mr. Combe in this work is to show that man has been made subject to three classes of laws, physical, organic, and those which characterize an intelligent and moral being; and that suffering is the penalty for violating any of these laws. In other words, if he steps over a precipice he will fall, and injure himself—if he overloads his stomach he will suffer from indigestion—and if he is cruel, his bump of benevolence will take offence and hurt him. Strip this book of its phrenological cant, and it will be found to contain only stale truisms, some of which are known to the child after a few of his first falls, others from the time he has been made sick by eating green fruit, and all, when he has read Butler's Sermons on Human Nature, and any elementary treatise on Political Economy.

their product is material. Can we expect these organs then to furnish us with any analogies that can shed light upon the action of an organ which does not act by itself, but in direct connexion with the mind, and which produces not a material, but a spiritual effect? We would much rather take our chance of lighting on some useful discovery, in company with the German scholar who has applied the law of gravitation to elucidate the mysteries of Greek metre.

If the phrenologists still adhere to their analogical argument, we should be disposed to try upon them the practice of another sect of German origin. The same thing that has made us sick, it is said, will make us well again; or according to the poetic mythos which first shadowed forth the doctrine, the man who has scratched out both his eyes by jumping into a bramble bush, will scratch them in again by jumping into the same bramble bush. Let us try then a similar specimen of analogical reasoning. All the organs of the body, which perform different functions, are widely different from each other in form, structure, and substance. The eye bears no resemblance to the ear, nor the heart to the lungs, nor either of these to the liver or the spleen. Let any of these, or any considerable portion of one of them, be dissevered from the rest and presented to an anatomist, he will at once identify it. What then can be more certain than that the mental organs, the separate existence of which is inferred from the difference of their functions, must, for the same reason, be dissimilar in their appearance and their internal mechanism? We have the same argument for their distinct and recognisable unlikeness, that we have for their existence. But unfortunately these organs are all alike in their form and substance. Precisely the same kind of medullary matter, and fashioned into the same shape, will work out love or murder, arithmetic and algebra, or Greek and Hebrew, veneration for the Deity or destruction to a street lamp, according to its position within the skull. Our analogy is however as good as theirs, and if they insist upon different organs, we shall insist upon a substantial difference of structure between them. Not much subtlety is requisite to involve the phrenologists in any number of like absurdities, by following their own line of argument, and without pressing it beyond the limits to which their example leads us.

The unexplained mysteries of sleep, dreaming, and somnambulism, are also pressed into the service of the phrenologist. These wonders are all easily explained by the consideration that some of the organs are active, while others are in repose, whereas, "were the organ of mind single, says Mr. Combe, it is clear that all the faculties should be asleep or awake to the same extent at the same time." It is no more clear to us that all the faculties should be awake or asleep together, than it is that all the organs should follow the same law; and it strikes us as really surprising that any man of common penetration should imagine that he had at all simplified the difficulty of this case, by stating that some of the mental

organs happen to fall asleep while others keep awake. All the facts can be as well explained, better indeed, by the imperfect action of one organ modified by the periodical state of the system, than by the hypothesis of different organs, some of which are standing sentinel over their sleeping comrades, and meanwhile playing all sorts of fantastic vagaries.

Another proof is afforded by the fact, "that genius is almost always partial, which it ought not to be if the organ of the mind were single." When bald assertions of this kind are given out as arguments, and the premises to which they lead boldly assumed, there can be no difficulty in constructing new sciences at pleasure. Philosophy may rock herself again in the cradle and dream true sciences without end. We are utterly unable to see why an aptitude for excelling in particular pursuits may not as well be owing to some peculiar condition of one organ, as to the comparative state of different organs; nor can we perceive why the diversities of talent which we observe among men, may not be still better accounted for, than on either of these hypotheses, by supposing an original disparity of mind. We have not the least ground furnished by abstract reasoning upon the nature of the mind, and surely none from observation, for believing that all minds are alike in their original susceptibilities and powers.

The phenomena of partial insanity are also said to contradict the notion of a single organ of the mind. It will not be expected, under this head, that we should discuss the adjudged case of the man who heard angels sing with one side of his head, and devils roar with the other. Nor yet that of the worthy clergyman of Spurzheim who was insane on the left side of his head, while with the right side he perceived the insanity of the left, and who, though cured, had a recurrence of this one-sided insanity whenever he got drunk. Phrenology is welcome to all the aid it derives from these cases, and they are the only ones with which we are acquainted that lend it any support. Very often, in partial insanity, a single hallucination is visible, while in all other respects and upon all other subjects the mind acts with its usual clearness and precision; and in no case that has come within our knowledge has there been anything like a complete disorder of any one faculty or set of faculties. Instead then of giving countenance to the phrenological theory, they constitute an unanswerable argument against it. If this theory be true, the insanity which affects one organ ought to affect all the operations of that organ, unless we are to suppose that every particular fibre in that organ has its separate duty, that every particle of matter is consecrated to some one thought. To carry out the phrenological explanation of the phenomena of partial insanity, we must have as many organs as there are thoughts that pass through our minds, and objects upon which we look. Insanity sometimes manifests itself in an unreasonable and unnatural dislike to a single individual, while the affections, in all other respects, seem to flow equably in their usual channels. This ought to result

therefore from the disease of an organ for loving that one person. There is a case reported by Pinel, of an ingenious mechanic of Paris, whose only symptom of insanity consisted in the belief that he had been guillotined in company with several others, and that when the judges, repenting of their cruelty, ordered his head to be replaced, the wrong head was unfortunately put upon his shoulders. He ever afterwards believed that he was wearing another man's head. The difficulty here could not have been in the organ which is imagined to supply us with the feeling of personal identity, for the man had no doubt that he was still the same person, his only mistake was in relation to the sameness of his head. We cannot account for this in consistency with the demands of phrenology, but by supposing that there is an organ whose sole prerogative it is to teach us the identity of our heads. It is singular that Mr. Combe could be so blind as to wind up his argument on this subject with the question, if there be but a single organ of the mind how comes that organ to be able to manifest one but not all the faculties? What more obvious than to ask in reply, how comes it that one of your detached organs should be able to work, on behalf of its faculty, with perfect soundness on some subjects, but not upon all? To carry out his objection, and give phrenology the advantage claimed for it, he must multiply the mental organs till they equal in number the hairs of the head.

This is not the only instance in which the phrenologists have seized upon a weak point, and attempted to convert it into a defence. The effect of partial injuries to the brain is also maintained to be in favour of their theory. The brain, as we have already remarked, may often receive considerable injury without any detriment to the mental powers, and it appears strange, says Mr. Combe, if the whole brain is a single organ, that all the processes of thought should be manifested with equal success, when a considerable portion of it has been destroyed. "The phrenologists," he adds, "are reduced to no such strait to reconcile the occurrence of such cases with their system; for as soon as the principle of a plurality of organs is acknowledged, they admit of an easy and satisfactory explanation. What that explanation is, he does not inform us, and we are left to conclude that this paradoxical trifling is put forth for the same reason that sometimes leads a man who is inly trembling with cowardice to affect the braggadocio. Nothing can more completely demonstrate the utter falsity of the phrenological theory, than the effect of these same partial injuries of the brain. Were all other presumptive evidence against it removed, that which arises from this source would be sufficient to prove its unsoundness. We have attested cases of injury of the brain in which portions of this organ, varying greatly in size and position, have been destroyed. Every one of the phrenological organs has been in turn annihilated or greatly injured, and yet in no one case does it appear that the corresponding faculty was in the least debilitated. In the list of cases drawn up by Haller, and subse-

quently extended by Dr. Feriar, and among the hundreds of like cases which have been reported by the most respectable medical authorities, we have accounts of injuries which cover the seat of all the faculties, and which have yet left the mental vigour undiminished. If it be strange then, that the brain, being supposed to be the single organ of the mind, should work as efficiently when partially destroyed as when entire, shall it be thought less strange that all the faculties should get on quite as well when their several organs are entirely gone? Nothing more conclusive need be desired. That large portions of the brain can be removed, and their loss not be at all felt, does indeed cast doubt upon the opinion that the brain is, strictly speaking, the organ of the mind; it renders more than doubtful the doctrine, that the quantity of the brain is the measure of the intellect; but it proves, beyond all question, that the fancied organs of the phrenologists have no existence.

All their explanations on this point are feeble and unsatisfactory. They talk of the difficulty of estimating the degree in which any faculty is manifested, so as to compare accurately the mental condition of the patient before and after the injury, forgetting that this same difficulty must have beset them, with ten-fold force, in making the observations which have led to the location of the different faculties, and that if it is of any avail in disparagement of the testimony in question, it must operate with equal force to impeach the credit of their whole system.

The hypothesis of double organs is also appealed to in explanation of the difficulties of this case. In many of the instances of severe injury to the brain, one hemisphere only has been affected, and the integrity of the intellectual manifestations is attributed to the duplicates of all the injured organs which remain entire in the other hemisphere, and which are supposed to be still capable of executing their functions, even as one eye answers the purpose of vision, when the other is diseased or lost. Now, in the first place, this hypothesis of a *double* set of organs is a sheer fabrication, invented for the sole purpose of meeting this very case, and upheld by no other evidence than the identical phenomena to the explanation of which it is subsequently applied. The effects of partial injuries to the brain are brought forward to establish the position that each faculty is provided with a double organ, and the duplicity of the organs is then made to interpret the same facts from which it has been inferred. This combination of the inductive and deductive process, in reference to precisely the same set of facts, is a novelty in philosophical reasoning, and it may be doubted whether it can lead to any very brilliant or useful discovery. Those of our readers who have ever witnessed the dissection of the brain, will not need to be told that this hypothesis of double organs is effectually discredited by the dissimilarity which is always found to exist between the two hemispheres of the cerebrum. The lobes on different sides of the *falx cerebri*, not only differ in different brains, but do not correspond with each

other in the same head. But, in the second place, there are many cases in which the injury has been sustained by both hemispheres, and in similar portions; and yet the faculties have continued to act with their usual vigour, though both parts of their organs have been destroyed. The decisive evidence of these cases cannot be deprived of its weight by the general imputation of inaccuracy in the observation of the injuries sustained, or of their mental effects. If the phrenologists are entitled to assume, as they in fact do, that a belief in their mysteries is an indispensable qualification for making any correct observations upon the brain or the mind, the game is, of course, entirely in their own hands. But we fear that such men as Haller, Cooper, Bell, and Magendie, will continue to speak, and that the public will receive their testimony. Still less is this evidence to be disposed of by the blustering pretence that, instead of demolishing, it really establishes the system of phrenology.

But if we grant all the propositions which we have thus far controverted, we shall find the system again giving way at the next point. Granting the existence of the phrenological organs, we are then required to believe that the size of each of them determines the degree of its energy, and imposes a limit upon the exercise of the faculty which is manifested through its agency. We are to receive this upon such evidence as the following. "An old man showed his sons a bundle of rods, and pointed out to them how easy it was to snap asunder one, and how difficult to break the whole. The strength of the bones is proportioned to their size. A tube of three inches diameter will transmit more water than a tube of only one inch. A liver of four square inches will secrete less bile than one of eight inches." The specimens which we have already given of this kind of analogical reasoning between things totally unlike, were sufficiently ludicrous; but here, as if the secretions of the bodily organs were not of themselves remote enough from the operations of the mind, the inanimate world is ransacked for analogies to illustrate the laws according to which mental effects are produced. The mechanical effects of two machines of similar construction, will be in proportion to their size, but if this is considered sufficient to prove that the mechanical or chemical energy of the medullary organs will be increased with their magnitude, how shall it be shown, in our entire ignorance of the nature of the connexion between the faculty and its organ, that when this action has passed a certain limit it does not cease to produce its greatest effect upon the mind? There are two questions here which the phrenologists have been too ignorant or too cunning to distinguish. The one respects the efficiency of the brain in carrying on its secretions, or the play of its fibres; the other, the law according to which the product of the brain influences the mind. We may admit that any of the organs will secrete a more abundant supply of its fluid, or move its fibres with greater momentum, according to its size, but where shall we find any analogies to prove that the most successful exercise of the

mental faculty depends upon the greatest possible product of its organ? It would be superfluous to attempt to show the impertinency of every effort of this kind.

We come now to consider the evidence in favour of the existence of the phrenological organs, and of the influence of size upon the manifestations of the faculties, which is said to be afforded by observation. Thousands of heads have been examined, and it has been found that those who were distinguished for any particular talent or disposition, have had a protuberance on similar parts of the skull, while those who were deficient in the same respect have had a corresponding depression. Phrenology is, therefore, a science of observation. It rests upon an immovable basis, since its principles are all inductions from a great number of facts. Its opponents are in consequence challenged to disprove the facts, or receive the inferences drawn from them. Now it would be an easy matter to collect a set of astrological facts, and frame a theory in correspondence with them, which would be quite as stubborn and unmanageable as phrenology. Time was, when learned men believed that the stars shaped the character and course of our lives; that men were made "fools, by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers, by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers, by an enforced obedience of planetary influence." By casting many nativities, and noting the character manifested for each planetary ascendency, we could construct as impregnable a bulwark of facts around the doctrine, that every variety of character may be fully accounted for by the horoscope, as is now thrown up in defence of phrenology. Who would waste his time in casting the nativities and prying into the characters of his neighbours, to obtain rebutting facts? The observers have all been phrenologists, and, like the sailor whistling for a wind, they have of course found the coincidences which they expected to find.

Whether a protuberance on a particular part of the skull is the invariable sign of some special quality of mind or attribute of character is clearly a question of fact. The phrenologists assert that, in all the instances which have come under their observation, they have found it to be true, and in illustration of it they describe the heads and characters of particular individuals. We assert, on the contrary, that we have known many excellent mathematicians who had no projection at the outer angle of the eye where the organ of Number is placed, and also many very worthy and harmless persons who had an alarming development of the organ of Destructiveness. We do not choose, however, to cite names and discuss characters before the public, and every man must therefore decide for himself whether the results of his own observation confirm our testimony or that of the phrenologists.

In the meantime it will not be difficult to invalidate the conclusions of phrenology, by showing from the nature of the subject, that it is in the highest degree improbable, if not absolutely impossible, that a sufficient number of facts can as yet have been col-

lected to establish the science. There is, in the first place, an appalling difficulty arising from the number of organs to be located. These are thirty-five in number. At the outset of the investigation, nothing was known of the situation of any one of them, and the only means of determining their relative position was by a compound observation of characters and skulls. An individual must have been selected, who was distinguished for some quality, and out of the thirty-five protuberances with which his skull was marked, the one which was the true cause of his remarkable trait of character must have been eliminated by a process of comparison with other heads. Any algebraist who will undertake to solve a problem involving thirty-five different equations, each containing as many unknown quantities, will need no other refutation of phrenology. But this would not be attended with the thousandth part of the difficulty which besets the attempt to locate the phrenological organs by observation. The problem of which the phrenologists profess to have given us the solution is of a much more formidable nature. Thirty-five different faculties are given, to determine, by observation, the signs of each of them upon the cranium. Now the possible permutations of thirty-five different quantities surpass our powers of conception; the number which expresses them contains forty-one places of figures! The difficulty of proving that any particular one out of this infinite number of possible permutations in the organs is actually marked upon the skull is so great, that we may, without presumption or discourtesy, pronounce it insurmountable. Ages upon ages of observation would be necessary to verify any particular hypothesis; and in the meantime phrenology is not entitled to assume at best any higher character than that of a lucky guess.

The impossibility of demonstrating it to be true by facts, will be still further confirmed, if any confirmation be necessary, when we consider the inherent difficulties in the way of correct and satisfactory observation. It is alleged that facts have proved that the vigour of each intellectual manifestation is in proportion to the *size* of its organ. But the size includes two elements, the *length*, measured from the medulla oblongata, and the *breadth*, estimated by the superficial area of the base; and we need no better evidence of the difficulty which must have embarrassed the pioneers of the science in determining what influence was due to each of these elements, than is afforded by the fact that we are even yet furnished with no canons upon this subject. We are told that the size of the organs must be ascertained, and that in forming our judgment of the size, we must take account both of the length and breadth, but we are not told what relative weight must be allowed to these two constituent elements. Suppose two organs are found to be to each other in length as *three* to *four*, and in breadth as *three and a half* to *four*, what proportion do they bear to each other in size? What are the mental effects of the lateral expansion of one of the organs, in comparison with its projection? Is it

the increased number of the fibres, or their increased length, or a certain determinate ratio of the one to the other, that produces the most vigorous action of the faculties? Is it even pretended that this point has been satisfactorily decided? And yet it is plainly impossible that the fundamental position respecting the influence of size can have been proved by observation, without a preliminary or concurrent adjustment of this subordinate question.

Another ground of doubt as to the value of the facts by which it is said the science has been established, is presented by the evident difficulty of measuring the dimensions of the organs. The thirty-five organs are not so detached from each other that they can be examined separately; they are all crowded within a narrow compass; and the bases of most of them are extremely limited. Not less than five are situated in the arch of the eye-brow. The projection of each of these organs, and the area of its base, are to be determined by examining the skull. This determination it is utterly impossible for any mortal to make, unless he has been gifted with such an overwrought delicacy of sense that he can feel or see what does not exist. There are no conterminous lines between neighbouring organs; no boundary marks are found engraved upon the skull like the dotted lines which, on the phrenological busts, designate their territorial extent; nor is there any rule by which the area of any organ can be estimated, from its proportion to that of the whole skull or any part of it, for this area is, by hypothesis, a variable quantity. How is it possible, then, to determine the *breadth* of the organs, except by the use of such "optics sharp" as may enable us to see things which cannot be seen? How can it be told with certainty, or what is to guide us even to a probable conjecture, where one organ ends and another begins? How, but by divination, can we learn to what extent Causality, for instance, has been encroached upon and compressed by one or more of the six organs which surround it?

Mr. Combe asserts that each organ has a form and appearance from which it is possible, by practice, to distinguish its boundaries in the living head, "otherwise phrenology cannot have any foundation." Then it is very certain that this mighty science, with its millions of facts and its more than millions of blessings for the human race, has no foundation. Though it might require much practice to distinguish accurately the several organs, it does not require much to decide whether there are found upon the skull any marks by which a distinction can be made. Every man can settle this for himself by simply passing his hand along the arch of his eyebrow, and observing whether there are any lines or marks there by which five different organs are parcelled out; or by examining a skull, stripped of its integuments, in any anatomical cabinet, and endeavouring to detect the points at which an elevation or depression merges itself in the general level, or to discover any marks whatever by which the territorial limits of the different organs are designated. No such boundaries exist, and no practice can

enable us to find them. They can be rendered evident only through some such process as that by which Dr. King proposes to make sounds visible, and show that they are of a blue colour.* Mr. Combe admits that there is much difficulty in determining the *breadth* of the organs,—that nothing more than an approximation to the truth can be made;—but he thinks that "if the opponents would only make themselves masters of the binomial theorem, or pay a little attention to the expansion of infinite series," they would be satisfied. Those who have already paid some attention to the binomial theorem, and to the development and summation of infinite series, will probably be surprised to learn that they have been accustomed to processes of reasoning which involve "a liability to error within certain very narrow limits," and that they are expected, in consequence, to be more tolerant than others of the uncertainties of phrenology. To those who have not tried this discipline, we would venture to recommend in its stead, that they should make themselves masters of Swedenborg's visions and pay a little attention to the reveries of Jacob Behmen. If they can bring themselves to believe that the spectral illusions of the one were realities, and the incoherent ravings of the other truth, they may, without doing further violence to their reason, believe that the phrenologists can feel and see things that are not, as though they were.

But supposing both the length and breadth of the organs, and the ratio in which they must be compounded to determine the size of each, to be known, we see other very serious difficulties in the way of satisfactory observation. "It ought to be kept constantly in view," says Mr. Combe, "that it is the size of each organ in proportion to the others in the head of *the individual observed*, and not their absolute size, or their size in reference to any standard head, that determines the predominance in him of particular talents or dispositions." Let it be remembered that these organs all originate at the medulla oblongata, and radiate from that point to the outer surface of the brain; and as some parts of the skull, in all men, lie much nearer this radiating point than others, that the organs in their natural state are of unequal length. Supposing, then, the relative size of two organs to be accurately ascertained, we are not yet in a condition to judge which predominates over the other. No inference can be drawn from the greater size of the one, until we have first learned the relation which they bear to each other in their normal state, or that in which their respective functions are in proper equipoise. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretence of determining which of two or more unequal quantities has the *predominance*, without any reference to the natural relations which they sustain. The laws of the equilibrium of a system of forces must be known before we can tell what the resultant will be. The phrenologists have stultified themselves by

* King's Works, vol. ii., p. 100.

pretending to determine the one without knowing the other. Suppose it to have been ascertained that Amativeness and Conscientiousness, in a particular head, are as three to four in size, how can we judge from this which will predominate, since, in every head, the latter of these organs is longer than the former? We cannot tell whether the man is likely to be more amative than conscientious, or the reverse, unless we know what is the proportion in the size of the organs, when neither of them prevails over the other. The facts of phrenology may all be set aside therefore by the simple consideration, that having failed to establish a model head, exhibiting the proportions between all the organs when in a state of equipose, they have, of necessity, failed to establish the science.

An entirely distinct impeachment of the value of the facts upon which phrenology rests, may be found in the difficulty which must have been, in most cases, experienced in determining the true character of the individual who was the subject of examination. What manifold liabilities to error beset the attempt to discriminate nicely between the peculiar talents and disposition of our fellow men? How difficult to distinguish between real and affected sentiment, to trace even with approximate accuracy the influence of different motives, and to penetrate the guise of artifice and dissimulation by which the real character is concealed? It is quite as necessary that each mental and moral quality, as well as each organ, should have "a form and appearance" whereby it may be distinguished, "otherwise phrenology cannot have any foundation." This alternative, distressing as it is, will probably be adopted by most men, in preference to believing that the founders of phrenology have been able to fix the precise shades of character which existed in connexion with each particular configuration of the skull, in a sufficient number of instances to afford a safe induction. How did they acquire this wonderful insight into human character? How were their observations conducted, themselves being witnesses? By calling upon the individual himself to confess his excellences and his faults,—by taking the testimony of his partial friend,—by gathering up the rumours of the tattling, and the scandals of the malicious,—by bribing boys with cake and sugar-plums to tell each other's failings, and provoking them to engage in pugilistic contests,—by collecting porters and coachmen, drunk and sober, promiscuously from the streets, and exciting them to talk and act, to dispute and fight.* By these and

* We find in the "Useful Transactions," No. II., a paper with the following title: "New Additions to Mr. Anthony Van Leuwenhoeck's Microscopical Observations upon the Tongue, and the White Matter upon the Tongues of Feverish Persons. In which are shown, the several Particles proper for PRATTLING, TATTLING, PLEADING, HARANGUING, LYING, FLATTERING, SCOLDING, and other such like Occasions. Communicated by Dr. TESTY."

This paper was published many years before Dr. Gall's discovery, and they who read it will find so great a similarity, both in the objects contemplated, and in the mode of observation, as to create the suspicion that the Glossology of Dr. Testy may have suggested the Craniology of Dr. Gall.

other equally doubtful means, the vast body of facts has been collected in which the phrenologists entrench themselves and bid defiance to all speculative argument. Let it be considered for a moment, how great is the exposure to error in both parts of the observation—how difficult it is to adjust all the knotty questions which arise in determining the proportionate size of the different organs,—how perplexing to ascertain the predominant dispositions and faculties,—and then how the separate errors of each of these investigations must run into each other and produce false results,—and the facts will have no value for any but those who are seeking for the proof of a foregone conclusion.

When opposing facts are presented the phrenologists are always ready with some mode of escape from the apparent discrepancy; and the outlets at their command are so numerous that it is impossible to close them all. Is Destructiveness found to be large in the head of a man who is known to manifest no destructive propensities, while another man in whom this organ is relatively smaller is a very Apollyon in mischief? Nothing can be more easily explained. We are not to consider the size of the organs as the sole cause of their power; and in the present case we must suppose,—we *must* do it, because "otherwise phrenology cannot have any foundation"—we must suppose that the smaller organ is of a finer texture, and therefore works with more vigour. Is a diminutive organ of Hope found in connexion with a cheerful and trusting disposition? There is no difficulty at all in the case. The individual is of a sanguine temperament; and if we do not admit that the *temperaments* have a great influence in modifying the actions of the organs, "phrenology cannot have any foundation." Is an uncommon development of Ideality discovered upon the skull of some Peter Bell, to whom every enamelled meadow is but a pasture ground, and every cataract a mill-seat? What can be more simple? he was doubtless compelled in early youth to bear the brunt of the hard realities of life, and we must remember that the tendency of any organ may be repressed by unfavourable circumstances. Does an individual, who has been, up to a certain point, a wasteful spendthrift, suddenly become miserly in his habits without any corresponding change in his Acquisitiveness? This may be readily explained by the supposition that his Acquisitiveness has become diseased,—a chronic inflammation has seized upon it, and will henceforth act with a vigour disproportioned to its size. "Education," too, "exercise" and "favourable events" will impart to a moderately-sized organ, the power of a much larger one. How easy it would be, with such flexible materials, to construct any system whatever? How absurd to pretend that in the face of such difficulties phrenology has been established by facts—that while the influence due to the mere magnitude of the organs may be neutralized by their quality—by the degree in which they have been exercised—by the education and circumstances of the individual—by his temperament—and by diseases which have no other

than mental symptoms—there have yet been found a sufficient number of cases, agreeing in these secondary respects, to furnish the induction that the size of the organs determines the vigour of the faculties, and to prove that out of the inconceivable number of possible combinations of these organs within the skull, a particular one has place?

The argument against this science is cumulative. Were the considerations already presented devoid of weight, its facts are all overthrown, and the whole system demolished, by the impossibility of ascertaining the degree in which the different parts of the brain are developed, by the examination of the skull. For a complete discussion of this point, we refer to the able lecture of Dr. Sewall, who has constructed upon anatomical grounds an unanswerable argument against phrenology. He shows that the skulls of some individuals are eight times thicker than those of others—that in the same individual the thickness of the skull varies in different portions—and that in some parts its internal and external tables recede from each other, forming cavities, called sinuses, of greater or less extent.

The frontal sinus, situated in the anterior and lower portion of the frontal bone, renders it impossible to form any judgment of the development of the brain behind it; and yet no less than nine of the organs are placed within the region occupied by this cavity. Eight others are covered by the temporal muscle, through which it is impossible that their size can be ascertained. Seventeen of the organs are thus placed absolutely beyond the reach of observation, nor can the size of any of the others be certainly estimated from the examination of the living head, in consequence of our inability to determine the thickness of the skull. These things being duly considered, the boastful challenge of the phrenologists to refute their facts, becomes superlatively ridiculous.

The examination of the merits of phrenology, as a theory of the mind, forms a distinct topic, upon which we cannot now enter. Their classification of the mental affections includes as paltry a collection of puerilities as was ever palmed upon the world under the name of philosophy. There are thirty-five different faculties, sentiments and propensities—we believe a thirty-sixth has been added lately—and yet some of the most important phenomena of the mind are left unexplained. The same grounds upon which many of the distinctions have been made between different faculties would lead to their indefinite multiplication; and it would be a decided improvement upon the present system, to maintain that there are as many faculties of the mind, as we have thoughts and feelings.

And the compounders of this medley of dogmatism and quackery are the men who have "opened up to mankind a career of improvement, physical, moral, and intellectual, to which the boldest imagination can at present prescribe no limits!" These are they whom posterity will honour "as the greatest benefactors to mankind!"

Benefactors doubtless they will be, though in a much humbler way than Mr. Combe supposes. The open shaft of the unsuccessful miner will at least save others from a useless expenditure of labour in the same spot. The problem of human perfectibility has not yet been so fully solved, that we can afford to dispense with the aid to be derived from observation upon the fruitless efforts and anomalous movements of the mind. Every mistake and error will contribute to the increase of our knowledge, even as useful plants are nourished by the ashes of noxious and worthless weeds.

Phrenology was born some centuries too late. Had it come into being in the days when astrology and the theory of "herbal signatures" were sciences, and the philosophers were as imaginative a race as poets, it would have gained all suffrages. Porta would have been delighted to compare together the auguries of the stars and the skull; Albertus would have availed himself of it in superadding to the talking powers of his man of brass, the gift of reason; Paracelsus would have compounded no more recipes for making fairies; and Oswald Crollius would have sought to help the imagination by squeezing the skull into a proper shape instead of applying to it the brains of swift-winged birds. The degree of popular favour which this pseudo-science has attained in the present day, is to be attributed, in part at least, to the fact, that its darkness shelters the incapacity of its professors, which could not fail to be visible in other pursuits; and that it flatters its disciples into the belief that they possess talents and excellences of which they have no other evidence. But it must soon pass to its place in the history of the follies of the human mind; and all attacks upon it would be superfluous save for the hope of accelerating, in some degree, its natural progress towards its resting-place among the occult fancies of past ages.

ESSAY XIV.

VESTIGES OF CREATION.*

We have in this work the result of the most elaborate attempt, which has been made in recent times, to establish a mechanical theory of the universe. The author, "working in solitude, and almost without the cognisance of a single human being," has presented us with the fruit of his labours in a compacted theory, for the support of which he has drawn, more or less, from almost every department of human knowledge. Astronomy, geology, chemistry, natural history, ethnography, physical and metaphysical science, are all laid under contribution for the establishment of his theory. His work gives proof of an extensive acquaintance with modern science, and of singular ability to connect together facts in real or seeming support of the superstructure which he attempts to rear. The whole is presented in a style of severe simplicity, and with such a calm confidence as might seem to be inspired by the writer's thorough mastery of his subject and complete conviction of its truth. Even in those parts of his theory which others will feel to be the most astounding, he proceeds with a step as calm and assured, as if he were dealing only with universal and necessary truths.

His theory commences, like most recent cosmogonies, with the nebular hypothesis of Laplace. This hypothesis, which Laplace gives with great diffidence, as a mere conjecture, our author puts forward with the utmost confidence, declaring that "it is impossible for a candid mind to refrain from giving it a cordial reception." That he himself has, however, but a confused and imperfect comprehension of it, is perfectly apparent. We propose to give a condensed statement of his account of the primitive condition of matter, and the successive changes it has undergone, although any attempt to abridge it must necessarily deprive it of much of its force. The plausibility which the author has succeeded in imparting to this theory depends very much upon

* Originally published in 1845, in review of "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation. New York: Wiley and Putnam."

the cumulative force of a number of particulars, no one of which possesses much weight when taken by itself.

The region of infinite space is supposed to have been originally occupied with matter exceedingly diffused and intensely heated, termed nebulous matter. Whether this matter be created or self-existent, whether its properties are to be considered as inherent, or derived *ab extra*, seems to us of small moment to one who adopts the other parts of the theory set forth in this work. It is but just, however, to state that the author, though at the expense of his logical consistency, refers the properties of the "Fire-Mist" from which he builds the universe, to the will of a designing Creator. Through the action of the active properties with which this primitive matter was endowed, all subsequent forms and modes of being, organic as well as inorganic, suns, planets, satellites, vegetables, animals, and man himself, are supposed to have been evolved by mechanical laws, without any interference of the will of the Creator. The great law of creation is that of *development*, in obedience to which matter, under certain favourable conditions, passes spontaneously from one form into another, generating systems of worlds, with all their different orders of inhabitants.

In the first instance nuclei are established at different points in the nebulous mass, around which the neighbouring matter is condensed by the attraction of gravitation. How these nuclei are formed, in the present state of our knowledge of nebulous matter, we cannot determine; but supposing them to be established, we can see how the attraction towards the centres should detach large masses of nebulous matter. And when these masses are detached, the same force which has separated them, our author contends, will have given them a rotatory motion upon an axis. He refers us for illustration of this point to "a well known law in physics, that when fluid matter collects towards or meets in a centre, it establishes a rotatory motion; see minor results of this law in the whirlwind and the whirlpool—nay, on so humble a scale as the water sinking through the aperture of a funnel." This is one of many proofs which might be gathered from this book, that the author's acquaintance with science is extensive rather than accurate. He is continually at fault when he attempts to pass from the final results of a scientific research and deal with the first principles involved. The rotatory motions of wind and water which he adduces in this instance have no relation to the matter in hand. They are produced by a hiatus and a pressure *a tergo*, and can of course shed no light upon the method by which a similar motion might have been established in a nebulous mass of homogeneous matter acted upon by a simple force. The most elementary knowledge of the doctrine of central forces would have been sufficient to prove to him that no single force acting upon the particles of an isolated mass of matter could communicate to them a rotatory motion. In such a mass curvilinear motion must necessarily be the resultant of a tangential impulse and a central

force. The single force of gravitation could give origin only to a rectilineal motion towards the centre, unless the particles were at the same time attracted by some neighbouring patch of nebulous matter. This mistake does not indeed vitiate the author's theory, but it detracts from the simplicity which is one of its chief recommendations, inasmuch as two forces must necessarily be assigned to perform the work which he ascribes to one; or a perfectly arbitrary hypothesis must be assumed of the relative size and collocation of different nebulous masses that their mutual interactions may account for the result.

The rotation having been established, there is generated a tendency in the rotating mass to throw off its outward portions. The least excess of the centrifugal force, thus generated, over the central force, would separate the outer parts of the mass which would be left as a ring round the central body, revolving with the same velocity that the whole mass possessed at the moment of separation. This process might be successively repeated, until the mass had attained its utmost limit of condensation. The excess of the centrifugal force, through which this separation takes place, is supposed to be due to the agency of heat.

The condensation of a nebulous mass around its centre is attended by refrigeration, under which the outer parts acquire a solidity which begins to resist the attractive force. The condensation of the central mass, in the meantime, going on, a point is at length reached at which it shrinks away from its outer crust, which is left, like Saturn's rings, revolving around it.

These rings, unless they are composed of matter perfectly or nearly uniform, would necessarily break into several masses, the largest one of which would attract the others into itself. The whole mass would then take a spherical form, and become a planet revolving round the sun, and upon its own axis. The rotatory motion of this planet might in turn throw off one or more rings, which by a similar process would become transformed into satellites, having a three-fold motion on their own axes, around the planet, and with it around the sun.

Such was the genesis of our solar system, which shows in the different bodies composing it, all the variations, with one exception, which this law of construction was capable of producing. It contains some planets, which when thrown off were too much solidified, or from other circumstances so conditioned that they threw off no outer crust, and are therefore without satellites, while others are attended by these secondary products of the centrifugal force, in varying numbers. And again, in the space between Mars and Jupiter, where Kepler, listening only to the harmonies of the system, which, as he expresses it, "he had stolen from the golden vases of the Egyptians," had prophesied the discovery of a planet, we have in the four asteroids an instance, which might have been expected sometimes to occur, in which the different portions into which

the planetary ring broke up were so situated that no one of them absorbed the others, and hence each became a separate minor planet. In the two rings of Saturn we are also presented with a case of what might rarely happen, in which the particles of matter composing the separated crust were so uniform, that it remained entire instead of breaking up into satellites. These varieties, inasmuch as they lie within the possibilities of the hypothesis, are deemed a confirmation of its truth. So, also, another apparently anomalous construction, that of solar systems embracing two or more suns, many of which are visible in our firmament, is supposed to render support to the hypothesis which at first sight it seems to threaten. Some of the double stars are found by careful observation to revolve round each other in ellipses, and hence it is fair to infer that they all do. A system of this kind would therefore be generated, precisely like ours, if there were given at the outset two or more nuclei, instead of one, in the diffused nebulous mass.

At this point the author again stumbles in referring the genesis of the motions in such a system to the same law which sometimes produces two or more neighbouring whirlpool dimples upon the face of a river. "These fantastic eddies, which the musing poet will sometimes watch abstractedly for an hour, little thinking of the law which produces and connects them, are an illustration of the wonders of binary and ternary solar systems." We must be permitted to say that the musing poet is much more profitably employed upon the whirling dance of these fantastic eddies, than the thinking philosopher, unless he thinks to better purpose. The one, in the subjective law which determines his musing, reaches a reality, while the other, in his scientific search after the actual law of production, finds only a shadow.*

This error of the author, however, affects his hypothesis only so far as its simplicity is concerned. He has, beyond all question, erred in supposing that he could generate the motions of a solar system, whether with one or more suns, simply by postulating in

* Another amusing illustration of the carelessness of the author, to call it by no harsher name, is found on p. 24, where he informs us that "the tear that falls from childhood's cheek is globular, through the efficacy of the same law of mutual attraction of particles which made the sun and planets round." Why did he not add that the soap-bubble preserved its spherical form from the action of the same cause which determines Saturn's ring? The attraction of gravitation has as much to do in the case of the bubble as of the tear, that is, it has nothing to do with determining the peculiar form of either, that form being due to the superficial action of the particles. Familiar illustrations of ultimate scientific principles are dangerous things in the hands of one who allows himself to think and speak loosely.

We find on p. 28 a still grosser error. "A chemist, we are told, can reckon with considerable precision what additional amount of heat would be required to vaporise all the water of our globe—how much more to disengage the oxygen which is diffused in nearly a proportion of one-half through its solids; and finally how much more would be required to cause the whole to become *vaporiform*, which we may consider equivalent to its being restored to its original *nebulous* state." This confusion of vapour with nebulous matter is a blunder too gross to have escaped a mind accustomed to accurate habits of thinking. The conception which the necessities of the hypothesis compels us to form of nebulous matter is as unlike to vapour, as it is to granite.

addition to the other conditions, the property of gravitation in the particles of nebulous matter. His postulates, thus far, are diffused masses of nebulous matter filling immense portions of space; this matter intensely heated and endowed with a tendency to throw off its heat under the process of condensation; the origination, in some unknown way, of nuclei or centres of condensation at different points in these nebulous masses; and, lastly, the existence of a property in virtue of which the particles of this matter mutually attract each other in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance. These postulates, though by no means distinctly put forth, are all embraced in the hypothesis, and it is therefore a matter of comparatively small moment that the error which we have pointed out renders an additional one necessary. But it tends to weaken our confidence in one who offers himself as our guide in tracing out the vestiges of creation, when we find him stumbling at the outset among the first elementary principles of physical science. Nor is he always consistent with himself. It has been seen that the hypothesis which he is expounding demands that the nebulous mass should be accompanied by a process of cooling, so that Uranus, the outermost planet, was formed when the heat of the matter composing our system was at the greatest, and Mercury when it was at the least. This, the author supposes, will account for the decreasing specific gravity of the planets as we recede from the sun. The outer planets having been thrown off when, in consequence of the greater heat of the mass, its particles were more diffused, would of necessity be lighter than those which were subsequently detached. The greater heat, too, which these distant planets retain, he thinks, may be sufficient to compensate for the smallness of the portion which they receive from the sun's rays. And yet in immediate connexion with this exposition he asks, "where, meanwhile, is the heat once diffused through the system, over and above what remains in the planets? May we not rationally presume it to have gone to constitute that luminous envelope of the sun, in which his warmth-giving power is now held to reside? It could not be destroyed—it cannot be supposed to have gone off into space—it must have simply been reserved to constitute at the last, a means of sustaining the many operations of which the planets were destined to be the theatre." We cannot understand why this heat may not be supposed to have passed off into space—and still less can we comprehend how it can have passed to the sun, when, by the hypothesis, the genesis of the sun, with its attendant planets and satellites, is to be explained by the continual escape of heat from the contracting mass. We see signalized here the extreme, unscientific haste with which the author frequently leaps to his conclusions. In the first instance he asks, whether we may not presume that the escaped heat has gone to constitute the luminous atmosphere of the sun, the proper answer to which would be, certainly not, unless we presume at the same time that the whole ground-work of the

hypothesis, as expounded up to the very sentence preceding this, has disappeared. And then he passes, without assigning any reason except the statement of two alternatives, which are by no means exhaustive of the possibilities of the case, to the peremptory conclusion, that this heat *must have been reserved* to constitute a magazine at the centre for the use of the system. But how reserved, and where? and how gathered around the sun after the cooling process has reached its limit?

A like gross inconsistency appears in his attempt to explain the apparent condition of the moon. The characteristics of the moon's surface forbid the idea that it is at present a theatre of life like the earth, but the author warns us against drawing the inference that it never can become so. "The moon may be only in the earlier stage of the progress through which the earth has already gone. Seas may yet fill the profound hollows of the surface—an atmosphere may spread over the whole." The rugged state of the moon is thus to be explained by the earlier stage of growth at which this body now is as compared with the earth. But it has been seen that the hypothesis requires that the moon should have been thrown off long before the earth had contracted to its present dimensions: and on the page but one preceding this we find it stated that "the time intervening between the formation of the moon and the earth's diminution to its present size was probably one of those vast sums in which astronomy deals so largely, but which the mind altogether fails to grasp." In accounting for the invariable size and temperature of the earth, he again betrays his ignorance of the elementary truths of physical science. "The central heat," he says, "has for ages reached a fixed point, at which it will probably remain for ever, as the non-conducting quality of the cool crust absolutely prevents it from suffering any diminution." It is true that there is no process of shrinking now going on in our globe, which we have any means of detecting. A very slight diminution of the diameter would affect the diurnal revolution of our globe, and it is demonstrable that the time of this revolution has not varied the three hundredth part of a second for the last two thousand years. And yet the hypothesis of the author would seem to require that the continual escape of heat from the central fires of the earth should lead to a still further condensation of its mass. This difficulty he meets, with sufficient boldness, by denying any degree of conducting power to the earth's crust, so that all the heat which existed within when the surface acquired, ages ago, this marvellous power, has been retained ever since, and is now imprisoned beyond all hope of escape. There cannot be many of our readers who need the information that this non-conducting quality of the crust is a pure fiction. If the crust be impervious to heat, why is it that after we have reached, at the depth of some sixty or eighty feet, the region of invariable temperature, we find the heat increasing upon us with every foot that we descend? It is indeed true that the crust has a very low conducting

power. Only a few years since Mairan and Bailly agreed in making the amount of heat received from the interior of the globe to be, in summer, twenty-nine times, and in winter, four hundred times that received from the sun; a calculation which gave promise of a speedy congelation from the rapid dissipation of the internal heat. But Baron Fourier succeeded in proving that the thermometric effect of the central heat upon the surface of the globe did not exceed the thirtieth part of a degree of the centigrade thermometer. The author of the Vestiges of Creation, however, is the first philosopher who has ventured to affirm that there is absolutely no escape of heat from the interior, and to assign as the reason the non-conducting quality of the crust. If the interior of the earth is, as many considerations would lead us to suppose, in an incandescent state, there can be no doubt that a portion, however small, of its heat must escape and fly off into space. The unshrinking dimensions of the earth, which would seem to be in opposition to this conclusion, might be better accounted for by supposing that the contraction in some of the elements of the mass, due to this loss of heat, was balanced by an equivalent expansion of others in passing from a liquid to a solid state; or in many other ways, rather than by denying that any heat is lost, and assigning for it a purely fanciful reason.

It ought to be stated, in justice to Laplace, that the author of this work has, in many respects, misapprehended his nebular hypothesis; and that objections therefore may be justly taken against his statement of it, which would not lie against it in the form given to it by its proposer. The method by which he explains the *shelling off* of planets and satellites, through the hardening of the outer surface and the resistance thus opposed to the attractive force of the interior mass, is absurd upon its very face, and utterly insufficient for the explanation of the facts of the case. Admitting the action of the principles stated as ruling the case, a spherical shell would be separated, and not an annular ring. The author confounds these together, speaking in one sentence of the separation of "the solidifying crust," and in the next terming this crust "a detached ring;" not only without any explanation of the manner in which the spherical shell has become transformed into a circular band, but apparently without any idea that he is speaking of two very different things. Into this difficulty he has been betrayed by introducing the comparative solidification of the crust as the cause of the separation. This separation is effected, according to Laplace's hypothesis, not by the hardening of the surface, but by the accumulation of matter in the equatorial region. In a fluid body revolving upon an axis, the matter would be heaped up at the equator; and the centrifugal force of the outer portion of the protruding belt thus formed being greater than of any other portion of the mass, a point would at length be reached at which there would be an exact equilibrium between this force and the central attraction. An annular ring would then be separated, which

might, as in the case of Saturn's rings, remain entire, or break up and re-unite in a satellite.

It would be an easy matter to multiply these special criticisms until the reader would be abundantly satisfied, that whatever may be the merits of the nebular hypothesis as expounded by Laplace, in the hands of this author it is hopelessly encumbered with absurdities and contradictions. If this hypothesis admitted of no better statement and defence, we should be compelled to dismiss it at once as one of the hasty, vague guesses so often made by unauthorized intruders upon the scientific domain. But we are willing, so far as this part of his work is concerned, to substitute the sage conjecture of Laplace for his blundering guess.

We proceed, under the guidance of the author, to trace out the vestiges of creation as they are found upon our own globe. The earth, when first separated from the solar mass, filled the moon's orbit, its diameter being sixty times as great as at present. At that time it occupied twenty-nine and a half days in rotating upon its axis. After throwing off the moon it continued to shrink and cool, until it became stationary at its present dimensions. At this period the outer crust was a crystalline rock, such as granite, which was the condition into which the great bulk of the solids of the earth passed from their nebulous state. At the same time water was condensed from the atmosphere, and covered the crystalline mass with seas and oceans. These seas, in consequence of the unevenness of the crystalline surface occasioned by local inequalities in the cooling of the substance, were of enormous depth, some of them not less than a hundred miles, however much more. A process of disintegration would, under these circumstances, commence, which would be quickened by the great heat of the water. The matter thus disintegrated would be carried off and deposited in the neighbouring depths, thus giving origin to the earliest stratified rocks, which are composed of the same materials as the original granite, but in new forms and combinations. These sedimentary rocks have not been permitted to remain in their original position. The pressure of the melted mass below has protruded them up in inclined strata, and in many cases the granite in a state of fusion has forced itself through, and cooled in irregular masses. As yet there are found no traces of organic life, but these appear when we arrive at the next series of rocks. The oldest remains are of zoophytes, mollusca, and fishes. Later in the history of the earth, and separated by an immense period from the preceding formation, for all these successive vestiges of creation are supposed to be at a vast remove from each other, land plants and animals begin to appear. As the earth itself undergoes its series of transformations, a corresponding change takes place in the prevalent forms of life. New animals are found when a new condition of things appears adapted to their support. While through vast periods in which a thousand years were but as one day, changes were

slowly wrought by the combined action of air, water, and fire, upon the surface of the earth, whenever any new pabulum of life was elaborated, a new race of animals appeared with organs fitted to the existing condition of things. Most of these races became extinct, as the progress of change unfitted the earth for their abode, and left in their fossil remains the data for this primeval history. The author traces these successive changes up to the point at which the land and sea having come into their present relations, and the former having acquired, in its principal continents, the necessary irregularity of surface, the earth became fitted for the occupancy of a tenant equipped like man.

This part of the work, like the account of the nebular hypothesis, is full of blunders. The author writes as if he had been at a geological feast, and come away with the scraps. The most recent discoveries are strangely blended with antiquated blunders, crude hypotheses are mingled with facts, and bold, unqualified assertions are made for which we have not one particle of evidence. It would be easy to sustain each of these charges by abundant specifications, but to go over the geological argument in detail would occupy more space than we can devote to the subject, and we hope to give sufficient evidence, without this, of the unsoundness of the author's hypothesis, and of his incompetency to deal with a scientific subject.

Thus far we have only the ordinary speculations of recent geologists, in accordance with which the matter composing the universe, in virtue of properties inherent, or originally implanted in it without any action upon it from without, is supposed to have passed through successive changes until it has reached its present form. But we now arrive at a startling peculiarity in this author's hypothesis, his account of the origin and development of vegetable and animal life. His position is, in brief, that life, in all its forms and with all its endowments, is evolved through the action of mechanical and chemical causes. The fundamental form of organic being is supposed to be a globule, having a new globule forming within itself, by which it is in time discharged, and which is again followed by another and another in endless succession. The production of this globule is a purely chemical process, which may be any day discovered and repeated in the laboratory. But the rudimental vesicle, which is the simplest form of organization, not only propagates itself, it gives birth also to the next higher grade of being. There is an inherent tendency in matter, working itself out through mechanical and chemical laws, to ascend from the inorganic to the organic, and then through successive degrees of organization from the lowest to the highest. The most complex form of vegetable life was evolved in a direct line of natural succession from the simplest,—the most perfect vegetable, besides perpetuating its own type, gave birth to the rudest animal, and each form of animal life again evolved a form superior to itself until the appearance of man, the foremost of animals,

arrested as yet the progress of improvement. But we have no good reason to conclude that this process is consummated. The present race suits the existing condition of our planet,—but the world is undergoing changes which may make it a fitting field of action for a higher race than the rude and impulsive one which now inhabit it. "There then may be occasion for a nobler type of humanity, which shall complete the zoological circle on this planet, and realize some of the dreams of the purest spirits of the present race."

The genealogy of man extends thus in a direct line back to the original nebulous matter of which the universe was composed. All his attributes of body and of mind are so many modifications of matter, produced without any extraneous interference, by the regular operation of natural causes. Thought is but the highest form as yet known to us of the same substance which in its rudest form composed the nebulous masses of infinite space; and the passage from one of these states to another, was effected solely by the inherent qualities of matter. What further capabilities of matter may be now lying dormant, it is impossible to say. The great law of development, in obedience to which the universe has passed from a chaotic state to its present ordered forms and motions, has not yet completed its work. New heavens and a new earth, with new races of beings fitted to occupy them, may be contained within the undeveloped capacities of the present order of things. The universe, with its organic as well as inorganic forms, has reached its present state, and will pass on through all future changes, without any creative act or guiding control on the part of its Maker. When created, it was created complete in itself.

In support of the hypothesis that the organic world has been created, as the author expresses it, by law, or in other words, that it has been successively evolved by the operation of natural causes from the primitive form of matter, we have, in the first place, the analogy of the inorganic world. We have evidence that different solar systems, with their suns, planets, and satellites, have been built up and set in motion through the inherent qualities of matter, without the aid of any directing intelligence. In like manner we see that our globe has passed spontaneously through successive changes of state, in each of which it has been tenanted by such forms of vegetable and animal life as it was fitted to support. As the construction of the earth and the different changes it has undergone, are the result of natural laws, why should we not suppose that the contemporaneous changes in the organic world were produced in like manner? "Why should we suppose that the august Being who brought all these countless worlds into form by the simple establishment of a natural principle flowing from his mind, was to interfere personally and specially on every occasion when a new shell-fish or reptile was to be ushered into existence

on one of these worlds? Surely this idea is too ridiculous to be for a moment entertained."

A presumption having been thus established in favour of an organic creation by law, the author proceeds to inquire whether science can furnish any facts to confirm it. Such facts he thinks he has found, though he admits that they are comparatively few and scattered. The character of some of these facts shows strongly the difficulty under which he felt himself to labour in this part of the subject. Crystallization, we are told, is confessedly a phenomenon of inorganic matter, and its forms have a mimic resemblance, in some instances beautifully complete, to vegetable forms.* Electricity also, in its passage, leaves behind it marks which resemble, in the positive direction, the ramifications of a tree, and in the negative, the bulbous or the spreading root. "A plant thus appears as a thing formed on the basis of a natural electrical operation—*the brush* realized." This argument of course admits of no reply. There is no reasoning against a metaphor. We should as soon think of attempting to refute the man who declared that he had such a cold in his head that it froze the water with which he washed his face. There can be no surer mark of an unphilosophical mind than this hasty grasping after vague analogies.

In collecting his few and scattered facts in support of his hypothesis, the author next adduces the production of urea and alantoin by artificial means, and infers hence the possibility of forming in the laboratory all the principles of vegetable and animal life. It is also ascertained that the basis of all vegetable and animal substances consists of nucleated cells, that is cells or globules having a granule within them. All nutriment is converted into such cells before the process of assimilation; the tissues are formed from them: the ovum is originally only a cell with a contained granule. "So that all animated nature may be said to be based on this mode of origin, the fundamental form of organic being is a globule, having a new globule forming within itself, by which it is in time discharged." If then these globules could be produced artificially from inorganic elements, the possibility of the commencement of animated creation by the ordinary laws of nature might be considered as established. "Now it was given out some years ago by a French physiologist, that globules could be produced in albumen by electricity. If, therefore, these globules be identical with the cells which are now held to be reproductive, it might be said that the production of albumen by artificial means is the only step in the process wanting." We must leave all comment upon this conclusion to the inimitable Touchstone; "Your If is the only true philosopher: much virtue in If."

The next class of facts upon which the author relies are those

* Under this head the author gives without authority, but we suppose from Brande's Journal, an account of the old and now repudiated experiment of the *Arbor Dianae.*

which go to support the doctrine of spontaneous, or as he terms it, aboriginal generation. This doctrine, exploded for many years, has been recently revived, and is of course warmly espoused by the author of the treatise under review. In support of it he contends that animalcules and vegetable mould may be produced under circumstances that exclude the presence of ova or seeds. Entozoa, or internal parasitic animals, are also found within the viscera of other animals, where it is impossible that the living animal or the ova of such as are oviparous, could have been conveyed through the blood-vessels. How can their existence be accounted for, except upon the hypothesis of their spontaneous generation? And still further, organic life has actually been produced in the laboratory. Mr. Crosse, in the course of some experiments made a few years since, had occasion to pass a current of electricity through a saturated solution of silicate of potash, when he observed to his surprise insects appearing at one of the poles of the battery. He repeated the experiment with nitrate of copper, with the same result. Discouraged by the reception his experiments met with, he discontinued them; but they were subsequently repeated, with precisely similar results, by Mr. Weekes, of Sandwich. Here then we have an instance in which an organized being has been produced by the operation of natural laws from inorganic elements. It is true this creature of the laboratory was but a microscope insect, but it is sufficient to decide the question of the aboriginal creation of a living organism.

This experiment will doubtless have all the force claimed for it by the author in its bearing upon his system, with all who can receive his interpretation of it. There is no question about the facts of the case. These no doubt occurred precisely as related by Messrs. Crosse and Weekes. That is, animalcular insects of the *acarus* kind, appeared in the different solutions through which an electric current was passed. The only question is respecting the proper interpretation of these facts. The author contends that it was a true creation of organic life from inorganic elements. This interpretation is favoured by the fact that the experiment was made by two independent observers, and in both cases resulted in the production of a hitherto unknown insect: that every precaution was taken by distilling the water, heating the substance of the silicate, and baking the wood of the apparatus, to destroy any ova which they might contain, and the atmosphere was effectually excluded during the course of the experiment; that one of the solutions employed, nitrate of copper, is a deadly poison, and would have destroyed therefore the vitality of any ova which might be contained in it. In reply to this we remark, that Mr. Crosse's experiments have been repeated by others, and without success in every instance except that of Mr. Weekes, a name known as yet to science only through this dubious experiment. The insect produced, instead of being a new one, is only a hitherto undescribed variety, among myriads, of a well-known species. The nitrate of

copper could not be expected to destroy the ovum, if the insect lived in it; and some species of the acarus are known to be so tenacious of life that they will live in boiling water, and in alcohol. These experiments moreover occupied several weeks, in one case, eleven months, for their completion. It seems to us much more rational to suppose that notwithstanding the precautions taken to destroy and then to exclude the ova of the insect, some of them lived through the heat applied for their destruction, or gained access afterwards, during the long course of the experiment, than that a result was produced not only perfectly novel, but in palpable contradiction to every other experiment upon the law of cause and effect. That a living being should be produced by mechanical causes acting upon inorganic matter, is not only a "novelty in science," without any kindred or relative phenomena lying in the same direction, but it is opposed to the whole body of our positive knowledge. That organic life can be produced only by organic life, is a law of nature generalized from innumerable instances. There is no law which rests upon a more general induction. It may possibly be found hereafter that this is but a particular case of some more general law, but no candid or philosophical mind will be prepared to abandon it for such experiments as those of Messrs. Crosse and Weekes. To invalidate it upon such slender and doubtful ground, betrays a hasty credulity or an over-anxious zeal to support a foregone conclusion, utterly inconsistent with a philosophical mind. The truth is, Mr. Crosse's manufacture of insects was one of those blunders of the laboratory, of which like instances are not wanting, in which the result was hastily announced before it had been subjected to a sufficiently careful scrutiny. It has been rejected by every man of science in both hemispheres, and we suspect that Mr. Crosse himself laid aside his creative battery, not because of the unfavourable reception given to his discovery by the scientific public, but because he himself became satisfied of its unsoundness, and was glad to abandon it as speedily and quietly as possible. We know nothing of his merits save from this one essay, but if he possesses any scientific claims, as we are rather disposed to think he may from his hasty abandonment of this experiment, he will hardly thank the author of the Vestiges of Creation for dragging it forth from the obscurity into which it was passing, and placing it in the foreground of his theory.

The passage from inorganic matter to organized forms having been thus accounted for, the author proceeds to explain and defend his theory of the progressive development of superior from inferior forms of being. There is an obvious gradation among the families of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, from the simple lichen and animalcule up to the highest order of dicotyledonous trees and the mammalia. Though this gradation does not ascend uniformly along a single line upon which all forms of life can be regularly placed, yet it is incontestable that there are general appearances of a scale beginning with the simple and ascending to the complex.

However different the external forms of animals, it is very remarkable that they are all but variations of a fundamental plan, which can be traced through the whole as a basis. Starting from the primeval germ which is the representative of a particular order of full-grown animals, we find all others to be merely advances from that type, with the extension of endowments and modifications of forms which are required in each particular case. Different organs are found to fulfil analogous purposes in different animals. Thus the mammalia breathe by lungs, the fishes by gills. In mammifers the gills exist and act at an early stage of the foetal state, but afterwards go back and appear no more, while the lungs are developed; while in fishes, on the other hand, the gills only are fully developed, and the lungs appear only in the rudimentary form of an air-bladder. In many instances, too, a particular structure is found advanced to a certain point in a particular set of animals, as feet in the serpent tribe, although of no use, but being carried a little forward becomes useful in the next set of animals in the scale. Such are the undeveloped mammae of the male human being. One species thus hints at or prophesies another higher on the scale. The higher also often bears traces of the lower from which it has come. Thus the *os coccygis* in man is neither more nor less than the bones of a tail, or as our author phrases it, a caudal extremity existing in an undeveloped state.

But the most interesting class of facts connected with the laws of organic development yet remain. It has been found that each animal passes in the course of its germinal history through a series of changes resembling the permanent forms of the various orders of animals inferior to it in the scale.

"Thus, for instance, an insect standing at the head of the articulated animals is, in the larva state, a true annelid, or worm, the annelida being the lowest in the same class. The embryo of a crab resembles the perfect animal of the inferior order myriapoda, and passes through all the forms of transition which characterize the intermediate tribes of crustacea. The frog, for some time after its birth, is a fish with external gills, and other organs fitting it for an aquatic life, all of which are changed as it advances to maturity, and becomes a land animal. The mammifer only passes through still more stages, according to its higher place in the scale. Nor is man himself exempt from this law. His first form is that which is permanent in the animalcule. His organization gradually passes through conditions generally resembling a fish, a reptile, a bird, and the lower mammalia, before it attains its specific maturity. At one of the last stages of his fœtal career, he exhibits an intermaxillary bone, which is characteristic of the perfect ape; this is suppressed, and he may then be said to take leave of the simial type, and become a true human creature. Even, as we shall see, the varieties of his race are represented in the progressive development of an individual of the highest, before we see the adult Caucasian, the highest point yet attained in the animal scale."

Thus the brain of man resembles in the early stage of foetal growth the form which is permanent in the fish. It then passes successively through stages which represent the brain of the reptile, the bird, the mammalia, until it finally takes on a form which

transcends them all, and becomes the brain of man. The heart also passes through a similar set of changes, in which it seems to rehearse the history of the process by which through a series of ages it has become transformed from the heart of an animalcule to that of a man.

We are thus led to the supposition that the first step in the creation of life was a chemico-electric operation by which simple germinal vesicles were produced, and that there was then a progress from the simplest forms of being to the next more complicated, and this, through the ordinary process of generation. It is true indeed that what we ordinarily see of nature would lead us to suppose that each species invariably produces its like. But our observation of nature covers but a limited period. The time that has elapsed since the appearance of man upon this planet, is but a small fraction of the geological periods which preceded his birth. The law that like produces its like, is in all probability only a partial generalization which would give place to a higher law upon a broader induction. We may borrow an illustration here from the celebrated calculating engine of Mr. Babbage. This machine is so constructed that while in motion it will present successively to the eye of the observer a series of numbers proceeding according to certain laws. The machine may be so adjusted that the numbers shall follow each other according to a regular law up to any assignable point, and then the next number shall vary from the law, which shall be restored again in the succeeding one. Thus it may present in succession the natural numbers up to the one hundred millionth term, the next term shall depart from this order, and the next return to it again. The observer who should watch the operation of this machine would surely conclude that the law which governed it was the series of natural numbers. The space for the induction of this law may be made of any assignable extent; it may be made to include as many particular instances as there have been of the production of organized beings since the observation of man commenced; and yet it is found that this law, instead of being the governing idea of the machine, is but a partial expression of the method of its operation. So it may be in nature. Though each vegetable and animal brings forth only after its kind, so far as our observation has extended, yet through immense periods, such as geology deals with, it is probable that one species gave birth to a different and higher one. The gestation of a single organism is the work but of a few days, weeks or months; but the gestation, so to speak, of a whole creation is a matter probably involving enormous periods of time. "All that we can properly infer, therefore, from the apparently invariable production of like by like, is, that such is the ordinary procedure of nature in the time immediately passing before our eyes. Mr. Babbage's illustration powerfully suggests that this ordinary pro-

cedure may be subordinate to a higher law which only permits it for a time, and in proper season interrupts and changes it."

As we do not wish to recur again to this mechanical illustration, we interrupt our account of the author's system to make a passing comment upon it. The introduction of this illustration for the purpose to which it is applied, is of itself enough to settle his standing as a philosopher. A man of true genius and of high attainments may sometimes blunder, but this is such a blunder as no mind accustomed to that accuracy of movement without which truth can never be discovered, though it may be occasionally stumbled upon, could by possibility have made. It is not by those who fight thus uncertainly, as one beating the air, that the cause of sound philosophy is to be advanced. In Mr. Babbage's machine, the effects produced are all alike, so far as causation is concerned in their production. Certain numbers are presented to the eye, marked upon dial plates, moved by wheels which are themselves set in motion by the action of a spring or weight. The numbers presented have no *real* differences from each other; they are distinguished by certain abstract relations which the mind establishes among them. When the varying term is presented, the *real* effect produced is precisely akin to all that have gone before it. And yet this is brought forward to prove that the law by which monkeys produce monkeys, may be only a particular instance of a more general law in accordance with which at the end of some immense period a monkey may produce a man. Let us suppose that while watching Mr. Babbage's machine, presenting to us successive numbers by the revolution of its plates, we should suddenly see one of those plates resolving itself into types, and these types arranging themselves in the order of a page of the Paradise Lost, or even of the Vestiges of Creation, is there any man in his senses who would not immediately conclude that some new cause was now at work? The argument drawn from this illustration is really too absurd for refutation. Its fallacy lies upon the surface. And it is by such considerations that men are to be persuaded to exchange the well-settled faith of ages for the great law of development!

The law of development, the author contends, is still daily seen at work, though the effects produced are somewhat less than a transition from species to species. Thus bees, when they have lost their queen, manufacture a new one by simply changing the conditions of the larva, so that it shall give birth to the insect in sixteen instead of twenty days. The same embryo will become a female, a neuter, or a male, according as it remains sixteen, twenty or twenty-four days in the larva state. Another instance, approaching more nearly to the production of a new species, is found in the changes which different tribes of the human family undergo from a change in their physical conditions. Poor diet and other hardships will in course of time produce a prominence of the jaws, a recession and diminution of the cranium, and

an elongation and attenuation of the limbs; and on the other hand, these peculiarities will disappear under favourable treatment. These facts fall indeed far short of the transmutation of species. But there is one reported case in which this has been effected in the vegetable world. It is said that whenever oats, sown at the usual time, are kept cropped down during summer and autumn, and allowed to remain over winter, a thin crop of rye will be presented at the close of the ensuing summer.

The idea then of the progress of organic life is, that the simplest and most primitive type, under a law to which that of like production is subordinate, gave birth to the type next above it, and so on to the very highest. Whether the whole of any species was at once translated forward, or only a few parents were employed to give birth to the new type, must remain undetermined. If an entire species was advanced, the place vacated would be immediately taken up by the one next below, so that the introduction of a new germinal vesicle at the bottom of the scale, would be all that was necessary to fill up the vacancy.

After attempting thus to establish his theory by facts in natural history, the author finds further confirmation in the history of the human race. He enters into a philological discussion to prove the identity of the different families of mankind, and then inquires in what part of the earth the race may most probably be supposed to have originated. Tracing back the history of each of the great human families, we find their lines converging to a point somewhere in the region of Northern India. This is true at least of all except the Negro; and, the author adds, "of that race it may fairly be said, that it is the one most likely to have had an independent origin, seeing that it is a type so peculiar in an inveterate black colour and so mean in development." We find thus that history is in harmony with the theory which generates man from the monkey, as it traces the origin of the race to that part of the world where the highest species of the quadrumana are to be found.

The race at their origin must of course be supposed to have existed in a rude and barbarous state, from which they gradually emerged and passed through the various forms of civilization which have appeared. Here as everywhere, the author makes the facts of history bend to his purpose. There is not in all history one well authenticated case of an indigenous civilization. We have instances upon instances of nations and tribes that have declined from a comparatively high state of civilization into semi-barbarism, but not one in which a savage people, without intercommunication with others, has spontaneously risen from a rude to a civilized state. But in the face of this uniform historical testimony the author seizes upon an account which Mr. Catlin has given of a small tribe of Mandan Indians who were able to construct fortifications and had made some progress in the manufacturing arts, and builds upon it his argument for the inherent

tendencies of the race to advance from barbarism to civilization. This account is given by a single observer of a tribe that has now passed from existence, and that was seen by him under circumstances which would naturally lead his imagination to make the most of the differences between them and surrounding tribes. If the facts were as reported, of which we stand in great doubt, we have no hesitation in saying that the history of that tribe, if it could be traced, would lead back to a state of still higher civilization. To this conclusion we are forced by the concurrent testimony of all history, in cases where it can be distinctly traced. That which is clearly known should be made to illustrate that which is doubtful; though this is a principle which our author continually tramples upon in his reckless grasping after support for his theory. A fanciful resemblance, an extemporaneous blunder of the laboratory, a rough guess of some early geological explorer, an exaggerated tale of some imaginative traveller, these are eagerly seized and employed to establish real relations, to oppose the most mature conclusions of scientific research, and to contradict the uniform testimony of history.

The historical argument is followed by one drawn from the mental constitution of animals. And here of course the grossest materialism opens upon us. Thought, and feeling, too, are real material existences, akin to the imponderable bodies in nature. The rapidity of mental action is explained by the velocity with which light and electricity are transmitted. The alliances between man and the brute are strongly insisted upon. The human intelligence is prefigured in the instinct of the lower creation, and is different from it in degree only, not in kind. The affections and passions of the human heart all had their previous manifestations in brutes. "The love of the human mother for her babe was anticipated by nearly every humbler mammal, the carnaria not excepted. The peacock strutted, the turkey blustered, and the cock fought for victory, just as human beings afterwards did, and still do."

There is no act of the mind, no affection of the heart, in man, which may not be found in a ruder form in some one or more of the lower animals. That which is recognised as free-will in man is only "a liability to flit from under the control of one feeling to the control of another, nothing more than a vicissitude in the supremacy of the feelings over each other."

The absurdities of phrenology, as might have been anticipated, are fully endorsed; and we are told that the system of mind invented by Dr. Gall, is "the only one founded upon nature, or which even pretends to or admits of that necessary basis." In the most unqualified contradiction to this, we assert that phrenology is the only account of mental operations with which we are acquainted that has not one particle of support from induction. It purports to be a science of observation, and yet flatly rejects all observation, and founds itself upon the purest constructions of the

fancy. It maintains the existence of nearly forty separate organs of the brain, devoted to distinct functions, when every man who has ever dissected a brain, or seen one dissected, knows that there are no such organs there. As a physiological hypothesis it is as absurd and groundless, as that one particular spot in the stomach secretes the gastric juice for the digestion of beef, another that of mutton, and so on through the whole list of digestible articles. And as a "system of mind," as our author terms it, it never has risen above contempt in the judgment of any one competent to form an opinion upon the subject. It professes to make distinction between mental acts, and assign these to their several organs, without pretending to furnish any test of the degree of difference necessary to constitute a difference of organs; and as the organs themselves have no existence except in the supposed necessity created by the great diversity of the mental operations, rendering it impossible that such different work should be performed by the same instrument, it is fatal to its claims as a system of mental philosophy that it gives us no criterion of mental acts. If phrenology be true, its truth can only be established by being preceded by a complete system of mental philosophy. No one who has made the human mind his study could be for an instant cajoled by the fooleries of this pseudo-science. There is not a single problem in the whole range of metaphysical science, upon which, if true, it would shed the least light. It has accordingly never received the sanction of one name of note in metaphysics; and it is equally destitute of authority from physiologists. It has received a certain degree of consideration from the populace, for reasons which it would not be difficult to explain to any one who has ever been in the track of one of the itinerant lecturers upon its mysteries; and it has been adopted by a few third or fourth-rate thinkers because it has furnished them a basis on which to build up a system of materialistic fatalism. But it has yet to receive its first sanction from any man, whose attainments in physiology or in mental science have placed him in the rank of those entitled to speak with authority. Its place has long since been settled by the only competent tribunal; and if in reply to this, we are referred to Galileo, Copernicus, and sundry others who were rejected by their generation, we have only to say that we accept the issue of an appeal to posterity. The fate of the true seers of the race, who have been in their day cast out and afterwards exalted to the highest places of honour, constitutes the stock in trade of all adventurers, from Mesmer down to the last discoverer of a perpetual motion; and we have no desire to deprive the phrenologists of any consolation which they may draw from it.

The author shows the grossest ignorance in dealing with metaphysical questions. His language, which is not ordinarly deficient in precision, becomes here so loose and vague as to lead us to doubt whether he has ever mastered the simplest facts in mental science. Thus he defines perception as "the *access* of such ideas (viz.: of

the external world) to the brain." With still more vagueness and barrenness of meaning he says, "Conception and imagination appear to be only intensities, so to speak, of the state of the brain in which memory is produced." And memory itself is said to be "a particular state of each of the faculties, when the ideas of objects once formed by it are revived or reproduced, a process which seems to be intimately allied with some of the phenomena of the new science of photography, when images impressed by reflection of the sun's rays upon sensitive paper are, after a temporary obliteration, resuscitated on the sheet being exposed to the fumes of mercury." More senseless jargon than this we will venture to say was never uttered respecting mental phenomena. Imagination, an intensity of that state of the brain in which memory is produced! If this be not to darken knowledge with words, we know not where it can be found. Does he mean that imagination is only a more intense kind of memory? It would seem to be impossible that any man could perpetrate such an absurdity, and yet it is the only meaning which we can educe from his words.

When the author comes to treat, at the close of his work, of "the purpose and general condition of the animated creation," he is, as might have been foreseen, sadly at fault. What has a mechanical system of the world to do with purposes? Upon what part of his theory can he graft any general or ultimate ends? How can it furnish any standard to discriminate between superior and inferior, better and worse? It is an ontology, deprived of deontology, and its highest affirmation must of necessity be, whatever is, is. The highest conception to which it can reach is pleasure; and yet if the pleasurable feeling of a sensitive being and the cloud that hangs in the atmosphere, are alike products of nature, who shall say which is better, this or that? That we may not here do injustice to the author we will quote his account of the purpose of creation.

"That enjoyment is the proper attendant of animal existence is pressed upon us by all we see and all we experience. Everywhere we perceive in the lower creatures, in their ordinary condition, symptoms of enjoyment. Their whole being is a system of needs, the supplying of which is gratification, and of faculties, the exercise of which is pleasurable. When we consult our own sensations, we find that, even in a sense of a healthy performance of all the functions of the animal economy, God has furnished us with an innocent and very high enjoyment. The mere quiet consciousness of a healthy play of the mental functions—a mind at ease with itself and all around it—is in like manner extremely agreeable. This negative class of enjoyments, it may be remarked, is likely to be even more extensively experienced by the lower animals than by man, at least in the proportion of their absolute endowments, as their mental and bodily functions are much less liable to derangement than ours. To find the world constituted on this principle is only what in reason we would expect. We cannot conceive that so vast a system could have been created for a contrary purpose. No averagely constituted human being would, in his own limited sphere of action, think of producing a similar system upon an opposite principle. But to form so vast a range of being, and to make being everywhere a source of gratification, is conformable to our ideas of a Creator in whom we are constantly discovering traits of a nature, of which our own is but a faint and far cast shadow at the best."

The author confesses the difficulty which he finds in reconciling this view with the many miseries which we see all sentient beings, ourselves included, occasionally suffering. After much talk about general laws, which has very little bearing upon the difficulty which he is seeking to relieve, he arrives at the consolatory conclusion that "the individual is left to take his chance amidst the *melée* of the various laws affecting him. If he be found inferiorly endowed, or ill befalls him, there was at least no partiality against him. The system has the fairness of a lottery in which every one has the like chance of drawing a prize." We are thus at the close fairly landed without any disguise, "in the sty of Epicurus."

We have given as full an account of this remarkable work, as our limits would permit, accompanied by such special criticisms as we wished to dispose of in passing. Our first general remark upon the system which it teaches is, that no one can be at a loss in determining its place. It is the Epicurean system defended and embellished by modern science. This system, though it has received the name of Epicurus, existed before his day, and has since continually re-appeared under slightly differing forms. We find it taking a distinct form at the earliest period to which we can trace the Greek philosophy. It was clearly taught by Anaximander, of the Ionian school, the friend and disciple of Thales. His great difficulty, like that of the mechanical philosophers of all ages, was to account for the construction of organic beings; but it appears to us that he was quite as successful in overcoming this difficulty, as our author has been with all the appliances of modern geology and chemistry. He supposes that our globe was originally composed of a mixture of land and water, and assumed its present condition from the action of the sun, evaporating a portion of the original moisture. So long as the earth was more moist than at present, the sun's action was greater; and by a process similar to what may even now be witnessed on a smaller scale in marshy regions, it produced fermentous bubbles in the humidity, which being outwardly enclosed by filmy bladders, were converted within, into living creatures by the solar heat. In progress of time these living creatures burst their shells, and came forth upon the dry ground, where, however, they lived but a short time. These first animals were rude and imperfect, and a progressive development was necessary, before higher species could be produced. Man, he teaches, did not come at once in his perfect shape and complete equipments upon the earth. He was originally a fish, and reached gradually his perfect development. The genesis of organic life was supposed to be effected by a long and composite series of natural processes; and the higher forms of life to be evolved from the lower.* And we see not why the filmy bladder of Anaximander, engendered by the solar heat, is not as good and philosophical a starting point as the germinal vesicle of the author of the

* See Ritter's History of Philosophy, vol. i., p. 275.

Vestiges of Creation, produced by a chemico-electrical operation. The same system, in substance, was taught by Anaxagoras. It was indeed the prevailing system of the Ionian school of philosophy. It would be easy to trace this mechanical theory down through history, and show that it has never been for any considerable period, without its advocates. It is one of the possible forms of philosophy, and we must expect to find it re-appearing, however often refuted, whenever any philosophical movement takes place. In more modern times its most noted defenders have been Gassendi, Hobbes, the French school of Encyclopedists, Darwin, and Lamarck. The only novelty in our author's exposition of it, consists in the diligence with which he has collected and arranged the fragments of various sciences in its apparent support.

Some difference of opinion we perceive has existed respecting the atheistic character of this work. The author cannot, we think, with propriety be branded as an atheist. He recognises the existence of a Deity. He speaks of a personal God, distinct from the active energy implanted in matter. He sometimes breaks forth into apparently truthful and hearty expressions of reverence towards the Creator. It is indeed true that in his system we can discern no ground for this reverence. We cannot see why we should be called upon to adore and praise a Being who has manifested no moral ends in our creation; who has made us for gratification only, and left us so insecure of that, that in the chance melée we fail as often as we succeed; and to whom it is impossible we can be bound in any duty. But if the author, even while expounding this heartless, bestial system, remains so far under the influence of better things that his moral feelings respond to their influence, we see not why he should be termed an atheist. That the system which he teaches, however, is an atheistic system, there can be no doubt. It has been so recognised in all ages of the world. It makes the senses the only inlet of ideas, and induction the only instrument for reaching the truth. From this beginning atheism is the necessary conclusion. When we have reasoned back from the phenomena presented to our senses until we have arrived at the primary nebulous matter, so disposed and endowed as to evolve itself into all the forms which have subsequently proceeded from it, upon what principle of reasoning are we warranted in inferring the existence of anything antecedent to, or aside from this primary matter? If we are acquainted with no phenomena but those of matter, then the hypothesis of an original matter endowed with certain forces, the nature and extent of which we learn by reasoning backward from their effects, is amply sufficient to account for the universe. As Laplace has said, "we do not need the hypothesis of a Deity." An original, uncaused, self-existent matter, capable of becoming all that we have seen it become, and of taking on in the future such forms as our science is able clearly to predict, this is the ultimate point which can be reached by the philosophy of induction, generalizing its conclusions from the phenomena pre-

sented to the senses. Every effect must have a cause, or rather every phenomenon must be preceded by an antecedent, adequate to its production; this principle will carry us back from the state of the universe to-day to its state yesterday, and so on through the teeming days of the interminable geological periods, until we have arrived at the simplest condition to which we are able to trace the complicated phenomena by which we are surrounded. Here our progress is arrested. Of a creation strictly so called we have had no experience, and it is of course impossible that it can be established by any empirical principles of reasoning. If the principle that every effect must have a sufficient cause is a general truth which we have reached by induction, nothing can be more illogical than to apply this principle under circumstances entirely different from those within which it was generalized. It was gathered from observation upon changes in existing matter; what application then can it have in explanation of the origin of matter? It is evident that the materialist cannot get beyond the reduction of the matter with which he starts to its most elementary form, except by the sacrifice of his logic.

The author of this work does indeed admit an original creation, but every intelligent reader will feel that this is a needless and bungling superfluity in his theory. If matter, during the indefinite period which has elapsed since its creation, a period only not eternal, has maintained itself in being, and by virtue of its inherent properties formed itself into systems of worlds, and clothed these worlds with vegetable and animal life, there will be no difficulty in dispensing with the idea of creation. And while we see a logical necessity for surrendering this idea, we cannot perceive any moral or other advantage to be gained by retaining it. Of what avail is it to give us the idea of a creator, if He who created does not govern us? The Creator in this system created necessarily, and all things are bound together in the necessary chain of cause and effect. The universe, in all its parts and beings, in all its processes and results, is but a stupendous machine, whirled about by its own inherent tendencies, and driving on to we know not what end. In what relation then do we stand to the Creator? Shall we magnify Him for the power and intelligence displayed in His work? But power and intelligence are not proper objects of adoration except when directed to worthy ends. Shall we praise Him for his wisdom and goodness? But of these we can find no sufficient traces. We cannot pronounce upon His wisdom, while in utter ignorance of the end of creation, and of His goodness we are left equally in the dark. Abandoned to the operation of general laws, that without any discernible purpose or feeling work out their results—left to take our chance amid the prizes and blanks, and worse than blanks, distributed by a stern undiscriminating necessity—we see not that there is any occasion for admiration, reverence, or love towards the Creator. To love Him would be, as

Spinosa says, to deny His nature. To pray to him would be as idle as a dog baying the moon.

It is instructive to observe how a pure materialism and a pure idealism meet in the same final result, though reaching it by such different roads. The system constructed by the author of the Vestiges of Creation is destitute of all moral purposes and aims—man is only a self-conscious wheel in the machine—and God can be nothing higher than the active energy which works through all. In like manner Spinosa, starting with his "*unica substantia*," a pure mental abstraction, an *ens rationis*, constructs a system in which morality is identified with gratification, and God with the principle that permeates and acts through all things.

With most of our readers we trust it would be deemed an ample refutation of any system to show clearly that it was atheistic in its essential character. But we propose to make a further examination of this system upon its merits as a scientific hypothesis. And here we have a preliminary word to say upon the relations existing between science and revelation. The author of this work affects to consider the common notions entertained of the agency of the Deity in the creation, as grossly anthropomorphic and degrading. That He should put forth his power for the creation of man, that He should be summoned to interfere whenever a new species of animalcules or zoophytes was to be called into being, this is to take a very mean view of the creative power. That the august Being, who called all worlds into existence, was "to interfere personally on every occasion when a new fish or reptile was to be ushered into existence on one of these worlds, surely this idea is too ridiculous to be entertained for a moment." It shows a singular obliquity of vision that he should not have seen that the only anthropomorphism here is in his own conception. It is not unworthy the Divine Being to have created even the minutest insects, for he supposes Him to have created them in the original act of will by which He created matter. But it is derogatory to suppose that He created them successively, by separate acts of will! Why it should be deemed so, we cannot conceive, except by transforming the idea of God into conceptions framed according to the standard of our own capacity of thought and action. From the limited nature of our faculties we are incapable of attending, without such distraction as impairs our efficiency, to more than one object at a time. Hence we feel when we see a man perpetually occupied with trivial affairs that he is acting an unworthy part, because we know that, from the infirmity of his nature, while thus employed he must be neglecting weightier matters. Shall we judge the Almighty by the same standard? Shall we conclude that while he is numbering the hairs of our head, he is failing to guide Arcturus and his sons—that while interfering to create a reptile or a fish, he is suffering some world to rush to ruin, or some angel to perish from neglect! Reason teaches us to infer at once from the idea of God, that his infinite

thought comprehends alike the great and the small, that his power and his goodness, omnipresent and almighty, act with undivided care in the production and government of the minute as well as the vast. It is only when men attempt to frame conceptions of the Divine Being from their gropings among dead matter, when they resolve freedom into necessity, will into law, the infinite into the indefinite, and the absolute into the conditioned, that they shrink from the irreverence of supposing that God notices the fall of every sparrow, and brings forth every lily of the field, and numbers every hair of our heads.

The author of this work is evidently fearful, after all his glosses, that his views will not be considered altogether consistent with the Scriptures; for he adds, "I freely own that I do not think it right to adduce the Mosaic record, either in objection to, or in support of any natural hypothesis." It is undoubtedly true that the Scriptures were not given to teach us natural philosophy; but it is equally plain that some truths of natural science are so distinctly asserted, and so interwoven with the moral system therein revealed, that they must stand or fall together. Such are the original creation of matter and the subsequent creation of man, by the fiat of the divine will. Such, too, we regard the descent of all mankind from one original pair, though the author says "this is an open question." The Scriptures not only plainly assert this as a historical fact, but it is so connected with the doctrine of the depravity and redemption of the race, that if it should be disproved it would discredit the pretended revelation which teaches it. As a general proposition, it may be granted that the Bible teaches us no physical truth except in subserving to some moral end, but some such truths it does teach us, and these we are satisfied can never be set aside by the ultimate results of any true science.

In passing the chief points of the Vestiges of Creation under review, we are led in the first place to examine the foundations of the nebular hypothesis. This hypothesis, the author says, "is supported by so many ascertained features of the celestial scenery, and by so many calculations of exact science, that it is impossible for a candid mind to refrain from giving it a cordial reception, if not to repose full reliance upon it." This he says, as we have already shown, without having mastered this hypothesis in its statements or in its principles, and while giving ample evidence of his utter incompetency to decide upon what is necessary to legitimate a scientific hypothesis. Hypotheses, as distinguished from theories, may very fitly be made by the natural philosopher to assist and guide him in his investigations. Indeed they are essential to the successful prosecution of scientific research. Without an hypothesis, by which the philosopher supposes some explanation of an observed fact by which it may be related to other facts, he could only make his experiments at hazard, instead of putting to nature the "*prudens questio*" of Bacon. If his experiments are not made at random, it must be for the purpose of testing some-

thing which he has beforehand supposed, that is, of determining the truth or falsity of some hypothesis which he has framed. The more general this hypothesis becomes, that is, the greater number of dissimilar but analogous facts it explains, the more important it becomes as a guide to further experiment and reasoning. But a sound philosopher will always preserve the just boundary between hypothesis and theory. He will never confound a supposition with a real truth, a sufficion with a substance. He will use his hypothesis only as a suggestive contrivance, which classifying together certain facts, in an artificial relation, puts him upon the search after others which may confirm or modify the supposition already made. It was only in this light that the nebular hypothesis was proposed by Laplace, and subsequent observation has tended to diminish instead of increasing the evidence in its favour. "The features of celestial scenery," which suggested this hypothesis, were the appearances presented by the different nebulæ which are found distributed through celestial space. The powerful telescope of the elder Herschel first disclosed the fact that these remarkable objects, one or two of which are visible to the naked eye, existed in immense numbers, and presented very different appearances. Some of them appear like luminous clouds, irregular in shape, and with spots of varying degrees of brightness. Others are spherical or elliptic in form, and increase in brightness towards a central point. Sir William Herschel suggested that these brighter spots were centres of condensation around which the nebulous matter was slowly collecting, and this suggestion was the foundation of Laplace's hypothesis. Assuming the existence of a nebulous mass with a condensation going on towards the centre, and a rotation round an axis, he showed that such a condition of things might exist as would lead to the separation of successive rings, revolving round the central mass; which rings might in turn break up and form into planets, with satellites, generated in like manner, revolving around them. This hypothesis pretends to nothing higher than to show the physical possibility of such a construction of our solar system. It is a brilliant imagination; and no man who understands the difficulties of the problem, of which this is a conjectural solution, would venture to give it at present any more substantial character.

It is said that the first fruits of discovery with the great telescope of Lord Rosse have been the resolution of many of the hitherto unresolvable nebulæ into distinct stars. This, if true, weakens and goes far to destroy the chief evidence in favour of the hypothesis. It was conjectured from the different appearances which these objects presented that they were composed of nebulous matter existing in different states of condensation, and undergoing changes which are but a rehearsal of what once occurred in our system. If it turns out that these appearances were fallacious, and that the nebulæ which were supposed to exhibit the successive stages of condensation are composed of distinct bodies

already formed, the ground for this conjecture is greatly weakened.

But M. Comte claims to have given a mathematical verification of the nebular hypothesis, and this claim is fully endorsed by our author. M. Comte is a bold and brilliant writer. Many of his generalizations show the divination of genius; and, on the other hand, under the show of great profundity, he is not seldom exceedingly shallow and superficial. In this matter, as in some others in his "*Philosophie Positive*," he has leaped to his conclusion. He has done nothing more by his parade of mathematical analysis than to prove, under another form, the well-known theorem, that a body revolving around another, in obedience to a central force, is affected by the mass but not by the magnitude of the central body. Kepler's law he has not proved, nor is it possible that he should, without making assumptions as to the law of density of a nebulous mass, in making which he could have no other guide than the fact to be explained by it; that is, he must reason from the facts to the conditions necessary to account for them, and then assuming these conditions offer them in explanation of the facts. M. Comte has not made the first step towards a mathematical confirmation of the nebular hypothesis; nor do we believe that the problem can ever be brought within the compass of mathematical analysis. It never can become a theory until we are in a condition to explain why so many and no more planets were thrown off,—why they were separated at the precise distances at which we find them from the sun—why the ring which separated between Mars and Jupiter formed itself into four planets instead of one—why Saturn's ring did not break up and form a satellite—why some of the planets have satellites and others not—and why some of these satellites move from east to west in orbits exceedingly oblique. And if all this were done, so as to establish it as a scientific theory, it would by no means follow that it gave us the true history of creation. Unless we can bring existing nebulæ sufficiently near to obtain our data from them, we can only arrive at the necessary data by suppositions derived from the phenomena to be accounted for. The primitive constitution of the nebulous mass to which we are thus led can never be aught else than an abstraction. If we could, by postulating a nebulous mass of defined extent, density, and velocity of rotation on its axis, show that the present solar system is the necessary result, it would assuredly be the most splendid triumph which science has yet achieved. But it would by no means prove that the system had actually been constructed after this fashion. It would be a true theory, but whether it would be truth of fact or not is an entirely distinct question. The nebular hypothesis, which our author makes his point of departure, is as yet entitled to no higher consideration than a conjecture; and should it in the progress of science be established, which seems to us impossible, it will be only an

analytical explanation of how the universe might have been constructed.

It will be found upon a careful examination of the argument drawn from geology, that our author has failed as egregiously in translating the records of the earth, as in deciphering the truths written upon the heavens. We have no intention of following him through this part of his argument. Whatever else may be proved by geological facts, it is certain that when placed in their proper order they lend no aid to the two points which he is most anxious to establish, the origination of life, by natural laws, from inorganic matter, and the transmutation of one species into another. To seek for evidence of these truths in the fossil remains of an extinct world, while there is nothing to warrant them in the living processes which are now going on, is another illustration of the singular tendency of this author to interpret the clear by the obscure. The laws of life surely ought to be sought among the living, not the dead. If it can be shown that there is no ground, in any of the living operations of the present economy, for supposing that life is ever produced by the agency of mechanical or chemical laws from inorganic matter, or that one form of life ever begets other than its like, we may rest satisfied that these conclusions will never be set aside by any reasoning founded upon the exuviae of extinct generations.

We proceed, then, to inquire into the reasons which the author has given us for believing that living organisms may be constructed from inorganic materials by the inherent properties of matter. The resemblances given by crystallization and the electrical brush to some forms of vegetable life we have already dismissed as puerile conceits in the discussion of such a subject. His next argument is that urea and alantoin have been made in the laboratory. To discern the bearing of this upon the question in debate, it will be necessary to consider with more precision than he has done what are the phenomena comprised in organization. In the lowest form of life we find two perfectly distinct operations, the production of an organic material, and the construction of the vital organs out of this material. The earliest observation which can be made of the germs of plants or of animals, presents a small globule or disc of albuminous matter, in which we can discover as yet no forms or attributes of the future being. The organs through which life is to be manifested and maintained have as yet no existence. Haller, and others after him, supposed that all the parts of the plant or animal existed already in miniature in its seed or ovum; but this is an assumption of a material existence against the evidence of the senses, the only authorized judges, and for which there is no reason except the metaphysical necessity created by a particular hypothesis of life. The most powerful microscopes have failed to detect in different seeds any such difference of structure as may furnish ground for a prediction of the genus or species which will be developed from it. This fact alone is sufficient

to destroy the theory that life is only the harmonious co-operation of the different organs of the living body, and that death is the result of their discordant action. There is in a living structure a mutual dependency of parts and functions, any serious interruption of which is the occasion of death. But to make life consist in this harmony is to put the effect for the cause. The harmonious play of the organs is itself the result of some principle which pervades and regulates the whole machine, and which must have preceded the machine, inasmuch as its agency is concerned in the construction and collocation of its different parts.

In tracing the progress of vegetable organization, we find, when the requisite physical conditions of heat, moisture, and oxygen, are supplied, that an action commences, the first observable effect of which is the appearance, in the fluid of the seed, of minute granules, among which are soon seen some of larger size and more sharply defined than the others. These increase in size apparently from the coagulation of the smaller ones around them. From these granules the cells are formed ; and the different tissues which make up the plant are all developed from the cells thus constructed. The *nuclei* formed by the aggregation of the minute granules, and the cells into which these are transformed, are each of them "a living organism, analogous in its vital attributes to the simplest forms of vegetables and animals. It imbibes or is penetrated by the surrounding *plasma* (organizable matter) that serves for its nutriment, acts on, modifies, and metamorphoses it, appropriates what is fitted to its own particular nature, and rejects what is not adapted to its nature or function as excrementitious."* The construction of all the elementary tissues of which both vegetable and animal bodies are composed is by development from cells. In some pre-existing organizable material, which may be situated either within or without a cell already formed, new cells are developed, and these cells, by various changes and transformations, are converted into the elementary tissues.

Here are obviously two processes, going on contemporaneously, which ought to be distinctly observed. The first is the formation of the material from which the different organs are made, the other the disposition of this material, the shape and collocation given to it so as to fit it to play its part in the living structure. The organizable material of which the vegetable tissues are composed is *gum*, produced directly by a formative process, or through the intermediate state of *starch*, from inorganic elements. The proximate principles of animal tissue are fibrin, albumen, gelatin, ozmazome, and fatty matter. Each particle of the elementary organ attracts to it particles which it assimilates to its own substance, and endows with its own vital properties. While this process of nutrition is going on, the organ, which is growing up, receives at the same time its shape and proportions. The princi-

* Introductory Lecture, by Samuel Jackson, M. D. Philadelphia, 1844.

ple which determines each particular organ and builds up the entire structure, with each part complete in itself and harmoniously adapted to the whole, may and ought to be clearly distinguished from the assimilating power by which the organic material is elaborated. It may admit of question whether these are different methods of operation of the same fundamental law, or whether they must be traced to distinct causes, but they are obviously very different phenomena, and any theory, physiological or metaphysical, which does not separate between them, must involve itself in inextricable confusion.

In the process of assimilation a striking change is wrought in the properties of matter. The vegetable, seizing upon carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen, converts them into its own tissues, which again furnish the proximate principles of animal organization. These are in all cases at least ternary compounds of chemical elements; and, what is singular, the most important of them, fibrin and albumen, when analysed in the laboratory, are found to consist of precisely the same organic elements, combined in the same proportion. The materials thus furnished, when taken up by the particular organs of the body, are not only assimilated to them, but receive the like power of assimilating other particles. This process of transmutation bears a resemblance to those which are effected in the laboratory. The changes wrought in the organic material furnished, may be due to nothing more than modifications made in the arrangement of its ultimate particles. We are not disposed, therefore, to deny the possibility that fibrin or albumen may be some day manufactured by the chemist, though we fear not, for reasons which we have not space now to give, to hazard the prediction that they will for ever elude his grasp. Urea and alantoin, it is said, have been thus made, and our author founds upon this a confident augury that all the proximate principles of organization will ultimately be compounded at will in like manner. His theory then quietly proceeds as if this work had already been accomplished. The absurdity of this is apparent, when it is remembered that urea and alantoin, though they are products of living organisms, make no part of the material which enters into any organic structure; they are elaborated in the production of other things and thrown off as excrementitious. Let it be marked, too, that this refuse of the organic laboratory has been imitated only by using other animal products in its manufacture; and it will be seen how much ground the author has for his augury that albumen, which, in his utter and shameful ignorance, he declares to be "a perfectly co-ordinate compound" with urea and alantoin, may any day be produced in the laboratory.

But let us suppose that the hourly expectation which our author encourages us to cherish has been fulfilled, and that "some French physiologist has given out" that the art has been reached of compounding albumen and fibrin, and all other organic elements. What progress shall we even then have made towards the organi-

zation of life? Precisely the same progress that was made towards the construction of the Parthenon when the marble was lying in shapeless masses, out of which the shapely temple was to be built. The power is yet to be evoked that shall give form to these materials, and build them up into a structure in which each part shall be fitly fashioned and placed for the discharge of its functions in its ministry to the design of the whole. From matter prepared for that purpose, a cunningly devised mechanism is to be framed, giving evidence of the highest skill in the precise adjustment of its complicated members, and their harmonious co-operation to the production of a common end. Can we suppose that the power through which this is wrought is a property of matter! We confess that nothing seems to us more incredible and absurd, though this opinion we know has been maintained by many eminent physiologists.

It should be observed, however, that the question now under discussion does not lie within the proper province of the physiologist. It is his vocation to observe the phenomena of organization, and trace the relations subsisting between them. His science deals only with phenomena, and the laws at which he arrives are, in no proper sense of the term, causes of the effects ascribed to them. They are but generalizations of particular facts. When the further inquiry is made, after the substance which underlies the phenomena, the law-giver who has established the law, and the agent by whom it is executed, the physiologist has no advantage over other men. The course of his studies may rather have tended to make him an unsafe reasoner upon these higher questions. The habit which he has acquired of explaining one material phenomenon by a reference to some other of a like kind, disposes him to rest satisfied with the complete analysis of matter, and to feel when he has succeeded in determining the law under which any given fact falls as if he had arrived at its efficient cause. Intent upon his own science, in which he traces the ever-shifting forms and states of matter, until he has succeeded in reducing them to order, by classifying them under one or more general abstract terms, he pronounces the word *law*, and declares that herein we have arrived at the limit of human intelligence. It is not permitted to man to know more; all beyond is conjecture and doubt. Physiologists are apt, in the bigotry produced by exclusive devotion to a single science, to sneer at the mazy dreams of metaphysical speculation, forgetful that the moment they undertake to pronounce what *is*, as distinguished from what *appears*, they are themselves trespassing upon the department of metaphysics. We would not debar the physiologists from the discussion of these questions, but we would have them understand that when they take them in hand they have laid aside the scalpel and the microscope, and stand only upon equal terms with other metaphysical reasoners. The "*Metaphysic*" of Bacon, which is as veritable a science as any other, and the true and proper end of all the rest,

can be reached by no man while he confines himself within his own particular department. We return therefore to the discussion of this point, unawed by the prestige of any physiological authority that may be arrayed against us.

In every organized being we have, in the entire structure, and in each member of it, a peculiar form evolved and maintained, at the same time that the material which enters into its composition is elaborated. To suppose that this peculiar material, necessary for the manifestation of life, and the wondrous shapes into which it is fashioned, each one instinct with intelligence and design, are the spontaneous products of matter, or the results of blind and unintelligent forces, seems to us in plain contradiction to every sound principle of reasoning. Wherever we find form, we have the evidence of a pre-existent idea of which it is the realization. To make matter the cause of form is as absurd as to make it the cause of its own existence. Matter as it exists in amorphous masses, or under the geometrical forms, given to us in inorganic nature, might be supposed the result of a concourse of atoms impelled by necessary laws. A blind unreasoning power is all that is necessary to account for it. But the mind at once perceives when organic forms are presented that these involve a previous intellectual conception. It is impossible for any mind that has not been bewildered by sophistry, to contemplate a plan thoughtfully, without receiving the impression of a pre-existing idea, the thought that when yet but begun in the germ it had a perfect existence somewhere, and that the elements of which it is composed, and the mechanical agencies employed in its construction, are but the instruments of a power which is itself the agent of and dependent on the organic whole. The assimilating, plastic power which transmutes the inorganic into organic matter, cannot itself be the cause of the organism, for it is one of its attributes. The dynamic forces, the chemical agencies of nature, so far from producing life and organization, cannot operate to effect organism without the presence of life, or to destroy it except in its absence. We are driven thus to the conclusion that there is a specific principle of organization of which the vital or assimilative agency is the actuating power. Whether this principle is the creative idea of Plato, the constitutive form of Aristotle, the plastic nature of Cudworth, the *anima* of Stahl, the *nisus formativus* of Blumenbach, or the vital force of some modern physiologists, it is not needful that we pause to inquire. We are desirous not to explain the best method of conceiving it, but to make manifest the necessity of conceiving it under some form.

Every theory which refers the phenomena of organization to the properties of matter must leave the principal fundamental facts unexplained. If we admit that the vital processes are carried on by a species of chemistry, we still need the chemist. If electricity, as our author contends, is identical with the nervous power, we

still need the electrician who, instead of leaving this fluid to range and burst in lawless disorder, directs it with evident purpose and infallible precision to the accomplishment of the ends of the animal economy. What reason then have we for supposing that the attractions and repulsions of inorganic nature, however directed by human skill, can ever generate the organizing power which is necessary to the construction and maintenance of a living structure? Every *à priori* presumption is against it, and all experience contradicts it. We cannot indeed prove the abstract impossibility of such a genesis of life. The mode in which the organic principle has been conditioned for its manifestation in matter we can learn only from observation. But observation conducts us to the conclusion, that the necessary condition of its manifestation is the existence of a germ, which is the product of a previous organism: and that in the absence of this the production of a living being, either fully developed or in embryo, is as strictly a creative act as the calling new matter into existence. We cannot prove *à priori* the impossibility of generating matter by transmitting an electrical current through a vacuum, or by operating on existing matter, so that it should increase by the aggregation of new particles. We cannot prove this impossibility, because we know not, prior to experience, how the will of the Creator, the true efficient cause, has conditioned the introduction of new matter into the universe. But all expereince has proved that, abstraction being made of the creative cause, *de nihilo nihil fit.* So with equal conclusiveness experience has proved that the organic power can never be called into action except by means of a germ which has been elaborated by an organized being.

To oppose this induction, which is sustained by instances without number, what has our author to produce? Mr. Crosse's experiment upon the manufacture of animalcules, already sufficiently noticed; the report given out, some years ago, by some French physiologist, that globules might be produced in albumen by electricity, and *if* albumen could be made artificially, and *if* these globules were identical with the reproductive cells of physiology, the process would be complete; and lastly, a few obscure facts in vegetable and animal economy. These facts demand a brief notice. In the first place we are told that white clover, under certain circumstances, will spring up in soils where we have every reason, except the growth of the clover itself, to suppose that there were no seeds; and that mushrooms may be made to spring up in an artificial compost in which no seeds have been sown. In both these cases the presumption certainly is that the seeds, though unsown and undiscovered, were present. It is known that seeds may remain for ages without losing their vitality—some have come down to us from the days of the Pharaohs—and as in all other cases clover and mushrooms spring from seeds, and this is seen to be the law of vegetable creation, we are led to infer that in these cases also the lime and the prepared compost do but supply the favouring

circumstances to stimulate to germination seeds already existing in the soil.

His next facts in favour of equivocal generation are founded on observations upon the production of the vegetation called *mould*, and the infusory animalcules. Into the details of these observations we cannot enter. They are to us entirely unsatisfactory. The infusoria or mould may have arisen from dried animalcules or their germs, borne in the air; the water may have contained the ova, which have afterwards multiplied rapidly; they may have found their way through some of the gases used in the experiment. The accuracy necessary to exclude such minute bodies is scarcely possible. That in all these cases the generation was by means of the pre-existing germs is rendered almost certain by Ehrenbrg's experiments. He succeeded in detecting the real germs of the vegetable mould, and thus rendered it probable that, as this substance, like all other vegetable productions, grew from a germ, in the cases of its unexpected appearance, it also arose from germs, that had been diffused through the air or water, having found the situation requisite for their germination. He succeeded too in showing that the smallest animalcules, only the two thousandth of a line in diameter, possessed a complicated stomach, and organs of motion in the form of cilia, and thus overthrew one great argument in favour of their spontaneous origin. In others he detected the ova, and the propagation by means of ova. He found also that no animalcules were produced, when in addition to other precautionary measures, the air used in the experiment was passed through sulphuric acid. The result of his experiments, conducted with a view of testing the validity of those upon which the exploded doctrine of equivocal generation was revived, was decidedly at every point in favour of the universal law, *omne vivum ex ovo*.

The only other class of facts that calls for notice is the existence of *entozoa*, or internal parasitical animals. The ova of these animals, it is said, are too large to be conveyed in the air, or to be absorbed by vessels from the food and carried to their nidus in the viscera. Such worms have even been found in the viscera of embryos. The existence of these parasitic worms is, we admit, exceedingly obscure and difficult of explanation.* In many cases we can trace the process by which the ova are introduced, and in those where we cannot, the hypothesis of their origin ought to be in analogy with all else that we know of the production of life.

We have on the one side an induction comprising innumerable instances, deciding that the fixed law of organic production is "*omne vivum ex ovo;*" we have on the other side a few obscure facts, in some of which it is difficult to trace the prevalence of this law, but not one of them of such a nature as necessarily to exclude

* "Entozoa have been found in embryos, and in the eggs of birds: so also have pins and small pieces of flint." See Dr. Clark's paper, in the Reports of the British Association, vol. iii., p. 113.

it. There can be little doubt that a sound philosophy must lead us here to pronounce in favour of the law.

The other corner-stone of our author's theory, the transmutation of species, need not detain us long. The chief fact which he brings forward in support of the supposed transmutation, is the passage of the highest forms of life through successive states that are permanent in inferior animals. We cannot now enter into the anatomical details involved in this question; but we refer to the paper of Dr. Clark, already quoted, for evidence that the author has misconstrued and falsified the facts of the case, to establish the desired resemblance. But grant the analogy to be as complete and as strict as possible, what inference are we warranted in drawing from it? Nothing more than that we find, in organic nature, gradations of an original power, manifesting different energies under different conditions, and working out results that are similar after a general plan. The resemblances traced, however close, are only the adumbrations of the unity of organic nature. To construct a history out of these resemblances is to found a science upon a fancy.

But we have one instance in nature, the author contends, of an advance in species, and that the more interesting because it is effected, so to speak, "by a prolongation of the gestation at a particular part of its course." It has been found that oats, if kept cropped down through the summer and autumn, will yield a crop of rye the next summer. In the first place we doubt the fact, and in the second, if true it is nothing to his purpose, unless it be first proved that the rye is borne by the identical roots which sent up oat stalks the previous year.

In addition to these facts we have the account of the method pursued by bees to raise a queen from the same larva, which under other conditions would have produced a neuter or a male: this needs no comment, for there is here nothing like a change of species. For the same reason we pass by the account of the changes produced in the human species by exposure to privation and hardship. It is a familiar truth that imperfect diet combined with other unfavourable physical conditions will, in course of time, affect injuriously the features and proportions of the body. But communities and tribes of men have been for ages exposed to such hardships, they have suffered through successive generations all that debasing physical conditions could inflict on them, and yet we have never seen the slightest tendency towards a loss of species. The Greenlander, and the Hottentot, and the pigmy tribes of Ethiopia, have not only kept the human heart which responds to the "touch of nature that makes the whole world kin," but they have preserved a body, in no other sense approaching to the brute, than that it is less symmetrical and perfect than it would have been under better culture.

Upon such grounds as these the author would seduce us into the belief that we who now stand at the head of creation, have grown

up from the simplest form of vegetable, by successive translations of species, until we have reached our present state. It will be seen that we have not a single fact that bears definitely and certainly upon the theory which he aims to establish, while in opposition to it we have an unvarying experience from the beginning of recorded time until now. The earth is full of seeds, the air is full of them; no sooner does the work of the coral insect, far off at sea, rise above the water and collect a soil, than it is covered with vegetation. Countless myriads of seeds are continually germinating, and yet it has never been found that the seed borne by one plant produced a species different from its parent. The same law, without exception, governs the propagation of animals. Experiments without number have been made to effect a change of species, but without success. Individual varieties have been produced, but strictly limited by the essential character of the species. There is no law of nature more firmly established than that like produces like, in the vegetable and animal world. The two points upon which the author's theory turns, spontaneous generation and the transmutation of species, are alike destitute of foundation. They are wild guesses among the possibilities of things, as far removed as possible from the prescient surmises which often point out the path of discovery. The author himself says of Lamarck's system, which differs from his only in being less conjectural and more consistent, that "we can only place it with pity among the follies of the wise." He has good reason to fear that his theory is not destined even to as long a life as is accorded sometimes to the mistakes of genius in its random divinations.

We confess that there is one argument for believing that man may have come from the brute, stronger to us than any he has adduced; it is that men exist who are capable of maintaining such a theory. The author indeed becomes quite sentimental in his censure of the common feeling that there is any degradation in such an origin; but if he will devise an explanation of how this feeling came to exist so universally, and also why it is that the nearer the brute approaches the human form, the greater is our aversion, he will be driven to a deeper philosophy than he has yet reached, and may learn to know and reverence the sacred distinction between a person and a thing. If man were the creature that his theory makes him, if he possessed no faculties except such as are found in an inchoate form in the brutes, if he were designed for nothing higher and better than gratification, though we should still reject his theory as a scientific blunder, we should feel no aversion to it.

This brings us to the true point from which this system should be viewed, the phenomena of man's intellectual and moral nature. The author finds that man is "bound up, by an *identity* in the character of his mental organization, with the lower animals,"—and he is naturally led to seek for evidence of a common origin; we also find in man a certain resemblance to the brute, but co-exist-

ing with this, in palpable contrast and most evident superiority to it, we find quite another image, even the image of God,—and we, therefore, in seeking for his origin, are driven at once to some different line of derivation from that by which the lower animals have come. His system, while it professes to render a full account of man, owes all its plausibility to the suppression of the chief facts to be accounted for. It is as if a man in constructing a theory of the vegetable world, should confine himself to an account of the material elements which enter into the composition of plants, neglecting the assimilating process by which these elements are transmuted, and the shaping power by which they are fashioned. There is a ground which is common to the organic and the inorganic world, but there is also a distinctive peculiarity by which the plant is differenced from the stone; and he would deserve small thanks at the hands of philosophy who should overlook this capital fact in constructing this theory. So in man, though there are common points between him and the lower animals, there are other features in which the only resemblance is one of contrast; and to omit these, or what is quite as bad, if not worse, to mistake their true character and debase them into bestial qualities in a theory which aims to explain the origin and destiny of man, this to say the least of it is the very extreme of ignorance. The man who in attempting to give a theory of electricity should seize only upon the fact that electrical attraction is in inverse proportion to the square of the distance, and the attraction of gravitation in the same ratio, and hence infer their identity, would justly expose himself to the ridicule which would assign him a place among the philosophers of Laputa. What better place does he deserve who sinks the attribute of free-will into a "liability to flit from under the control of one feeling to the control of another," who maintains that reason in man is nothing more than the educated instinct of a brute, who confounds obligation with interest, and makes virtue synonymous with agreeable sensations, and after this shameful degradation finds sufficient likeness between man and the lower animals to warrant the conclusion that his perfections are but the full-blown flower which in them is seen in the bud? It is indeed easy for the gypsy, after he has stained the skin of the stolen child and clothed it in rags, to establish its likeness to his own brown and tattered offspring.

The sacred Scriptures apart, which give a different account of man's origin, we should be perfectly willing now to yield every position which we have taken against this author's theory, and grant that man's body may have been derived, as he supposes, by a regular line of succession through the brute creation; still we contend that he has that within him which never could have been thus derived. It is by certain analogies existing between him and the lower animals that this descent is established, but we find that that which distinguishes man, that which constitutes and denominates him what he is, is out of all analogy with anything that

appears in the brute creation; and if we are led therefore to seek for the origin of his body, together with those qualities which are found in a less degree in irrational animals, by transmission from them, we are compelled by the same analogical argument to conclude that the higher qualities, "the nobility of reason, the infinity of faculties, the apprehension, like a god," by which he is contradistinguished from them, are to be sought, not by tracing a line of ascent from below, but a line of descent from above. If man's body with its appetites and powers came from the gradual improvement of the bestial form and nature, we must nevertheless conclude that God met this body and implanted in it a soul stamped with his image. To establish this conclusion we have only to show that man is possessed of faculties of which no rudimentary types are found in the inferior animals.

This the author denies. He carries out the philosophy of sensation to its legitimate conclusions, with fearless consistency. "It is hardly necessary to say, much less to argue, that mental action, being proved to be under law, passes at once into the category of natural things. Its old metaphysical character vanishes in a moment, and the distinction usually taken between physical and moral is annulled as only an error in terms." It is difficult to reply to such shallow dogmatism as this. It is true that there is regularity and order in human action, so that a sagacious man may often predict far-off results. It is true, as this author asserts, that statistics have shown that in large cities about the same number of mistakes is committed annually in the direction of letters; and, he might have added, that in France it has been ascertained that the number of suicides and murders is the same from year to year, and not only so, but the different methods of death by poison, strangulation, drowning, and deadly weapons, have each its nearly constant number of victims; so that in cases where we might most certainly expect to find the wildest irregularities of caprice we detect the operation of constant causes. But it is surely most extraordinary reasoning to infer from this regularity, the existence of a physical law by which it is secured. This is another instance still of the disposition which this author shows to seize upon superficial and partial resemblances in different objects, and conclude upon their perfect identity. "No man can say what may be the weather of to-morrow; but the quantity of rain which falls in any particular place in any five years, is precisely the same as the quantity which falls in any other five years in the same place." "So also, the number of persons taken in charge by the police of London for being drunk and disorderly on the streets, is, week by week, a nearly uniform quantity, showing that the inclination to drink to excess is always in the mass about the same, regard being had to the existing temptations or stimulations to this vice." We have in these cases a uniform result; and the immediate inference is, that the same law of causation prevails, and that the human heart with all its affections and passions is controlled and determined to a

specific course of action by the same kind of influence which distils the rain from the clouds. Has the author no eye for the differences between these phenomena which he so unceremoniously identifies? Are the inward misgivings of the drunkard, the awful struggles with which he attempts to break from an indulgence which he knows is destroying him, the sense of shame and self-reproach, and the dread feeling of responsibility which prey upon his soul, are these of no account in determining whether the influence which prevails over them is the same in kind with that which determines physical events? Is the difference between physical and moral to be annulled, as only an error in terms, simply because we find that in one case as well as the other, like causes produce like effects? Are the facts given us by human consciousness to be thrust aside in determining this question?

This is, after all, the ground upon which the contest between this philosophy and a higher one must be decided. It is doubtless important to detect and expose the scientific blunders of every particular system of materialism that is at any time set forth, with sufficient pretension and plausibility, to make it dangerous. But though we may thus refute one, we leave the way still open for the introduction of another. We have shown that the author of this work has failed at every point, in establishing his different positions, but we have not shown that some other explorer in the same direction may not be more successful. It is among the facts of consciousness that we must find the evidence which sets aside this, and all other systems of like kind. We are undoubtedly subject, in a degree, to the same kind of restraint which governs the physical world. We are placed within the range of the law of cause and effect, and form thus a part of nature. If we are entirely subject to this law, then we have no philosophy possible, but to etherealize matter and become ideal pantheists, or to make mind only an error in terms and run into materialistic fatalism. These are the only two courses left open to us, and it seems to us a matter of small moment which is taken. We see little to choose between the spectre world of Spinosa and the sty of Epicurus. When a man has taken away virtue from us we are not what also he takes or leaves. But if besides the world of necessity there exists also a world of freedom, and if these two worlds manifest their interpenetration in man's consciousness, then another philosophy is not only possible but necessary, and materialism and idealism are both discredited as partial and incomplete.

This author maintains that "all mental phenomena flow directly from the brain," a fact which we learn, as he says, from observation. We contend, on the other hand, that this observation, inasmuch as it is limited to the external conditions of the phenomena, without regard to their intrinsic character, must necessarily lead to an erroneous conclusion. As fitly might we conclude that the air which by its vibrations conveys some ravishing strain of

melody is the cause of music, because the presence of the one is essential to the existence of the other. Observation proves that the brain is the organ upon which the manifestation of mental phenomena is more immediately dependent, and this is all that it proves. To learn whether the brain is the proper cause of mental states, or only the necessary condition of their manifestation, we must extend our observation beyond the brain itself and consider the character of the effects of which we are seeking the explanation. The moment this is done consciousness decides the question. We feel that in every mental act a percipient agent is involved. Matter can only give us phenomena, and that which *perceives* must necessarily be different from that which *appears*. The simplest case of perception, the transformation of an external object into an act of thought or will, is sufficient to overthrow every system of materialism.

But brutes perceive no less than men. They manifest intelligence, affection, and will. Here again, if instead of confining ourselves to rude outward resemblances, we look calmly into our own consciousness, we discover abundant evidence that we possess something different, not in degree only, but in kind, from anything that is found in the brute creation. In the highest development of instinct we find nothing more than a kind of intelligence which selects and uses means adapted to secure immediate ends; and all the purposes and acts of the animal are strictly determined by its organization. The beaver, the bee, and the bird, each build according to a law impressed upon them, and if thwarted or placed under circumstances demanding some variation from the type, their contrivances are limited to an approximation to the original plan. Man too builds, but he builds after no type. He is free from all law except that which is self-imposed. He builds not only for convenience and use, but often for no purpose but the pleasure of giving expression to an idea. Instead of being restricted by types, he is himself a creator of types. Here he stands in direct opposition to the brute. If we compare together the dam of a beaver, and the Apollo Belvidere, we find the rude resemblance, that they are both constructions. But when we look more closely we find that the resemblance vanishes, and that they stand in marked contrast. The beaver builds according to a predetermined type, and for immediate use. The sculptor, without any regard to use, and in the exercise of perfect freedom, forms a conception which he feels to be beautiful, and then transfers this conception to the marble, in which the idea is so inwoven that it lives through all time, and speaks intelligibly to all hearts. In giving expression to his idea the artist is no copyist of a type that has been set him, either by previous labourers, or by nature herself. Neither the secret of his power, nor the source of our pleasure, lies in imitation. Had the sculptor who gave us the Laocoon group, copied the writhing and contorted limbs, the livid cheek, the agonizing struggles of some father, with his sons, crushed in the

convolutions of a huge serpent, we should have felt, while looking at it, such painful sympathy as the sight of the actual scene would awaken. But instead of this he has so subdued the suffering, that it becomes the translucent medium through which we see the "brave resolve of the firm soul alone;" nor is this all, but the fortitude itself is so consummately expressed that the mind rests not in that, but is borne inward until it is lost in communion with that humanity, of which fortitude is one of the attributes.

> "Here, lovely as the rainbow on the dew
> Of the spent thunder-cloud, to Art is given,
> Gleaming through grief's dark veil, the peaceful blue
> Of the sweet Moral Heaven."

Here is manifested a creative power, like in kind, though infinitely less in degree, to that which the Divine Creator put forth, when he fashioned chaotic matter into shape, weaving through it his thought, and giving it expression that made the angels sing over it for joy. It is a part of that image of God in which man was made; and he only deludes and degrades himself who seeks a kindred faculty among the brutes.

It would be easy also to show that man is contra-distinguished from the inferior animals by his possession of a faculty which gives him necessary truth, independent of all experience. He is capable not only of generalizing, from the notices of the senses, but he has intuitions of truths that are universal and necessary. We pass this, however, and ask the attention of the materialist to another fact in human consciousness. Besides the perception of the useful and the agreeable, which we have in common with the brute—the beautiful and the true, which we have in contra-distinction from them—we find ourselves possessed with the idea of the good. This idea is not subordinate to that of "gratification," as our author makes it. An act is never good because it gives us pleasure—on the contrary, it pleases us because it is good. It is written, "blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness," and not, righteous are they that hunger and thirst after blessedness. Goodness is not a means but an end. We not only have this idea, but we feel its supremacy over all our other ideas. It is for the perception and realization of goodness that we have been made and endowed with all our powers of whatever kind. Hence in connexion with this we find the feeling of moral responsibility, involving in it the consciousness of freedom of will. This is the capital distinction of man, his capacity to perceive the moral excellence and to feel its power. It is through this that he becomes a partaker of the Divine nature, and feels himself to be immortal.

Of this part of man's nature it cannot be pretended that we find any anticipative prophecy in the lower animals; and hence the difficulty is met by denying substantially the validity of moral perceptions and qualities in man. Man is made for gratification, the distinction between moral and physical is an error in terms, free-

will is a liability to flit from one feeling to another, virtue is of course but a name or a sound, and the feeling of moral responsibility a delusion of the weak and ignorant. Here is the proper turning point of this whole system. If these conclusions to which the author is driven, and which he does not hesitate to embrace, are true, then let his whole system be true. It is no longer worth a contest. But if they are false, then is his theory a falsehood and a foul libel upon human nature. If the sense of freedom which springs up amid the earliest play of our spontaneous impulses, and accompanies us onward through their regulation and control, in the exercise of which we feel ourselves standing over against nature, exempt from the law of necessity which binds all things else together by an adamantine chain—if this be a delusion, interposed to cheat us out of the knowledge that we are no more free than the river that seems " to flow by its own sweet will," then let us, like the old Egyptian, feel and cherish our brotherhood with the bat, the beetle, and the crocodile, nay with the ocean and the air, the storm and the pestilence. If the feeling that we were made for something higher than gratification is a superstition, if the visions of good that sometimes break in upon us, pure and glorious as the light of Heaven, are the unrealities of a distempered imagination, then let us dismiss our feelings of remorse, since in the perpetration of the greatest crimes we only make an unprofitable investment of capital, and the simple regret which might even be due to this as a blunder, defeats us of the happiness which might yet be at our command. But if, on the other hand, the peremptory truths of reason and conscience within us are realities—if we feel them to possess objective validity, so that we are constrained to believe in the real existence of things that are honest and fair and lovely—then the system gives the lie to our consciousness, and we know that it must be false, whether we are able or not to detect its scientific fallacies. Every man knows that the cause of his determination to any particular course of action is different in kind from that which sends the cannon ball along its path. This is a plain and decisive fact, than which none other can be more certain. By the mass of mankind it is never called in question. We never hear the criminal excusing himself on the ground that his brain was badly organized, unless he has been under the tuition of some phrenologist. It is indeed possible for a man to deny the primary truths of consciousness; he may call in question the existence of any higher virtue than prudence, and obliterate the distinction between physical and moral as an error in terms. He may do this, for it is impossible to set limits to the capabilities of a vicious theory, or a vicious life. But after he has succeeded in proving that we are subject to the same necessity which governs other creatures, and that the notions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, which are entertained by the whole human race, are but universal delusions, the *idola tribus* of Bacon, he will still, when off his guard, involuntarily betray, by his admiration of self-sacri-

ficing virtue, and his sharp indignation against wrong, his recognition of the morality which he has disproved. The denial of this power does not destroy it. At a thousand points the will, which he has thrust aside, rushes in and tears to atoms the conclusions of his puny logic.

Here, then, we leave this system, effectually discredited at the bar of human consciousness. In order to establish the derivation of man from the brutes, it is driven to overlook or to deny the very qualities by which man is constituted what he is, a rational and immortal being, and to set at naught the plainest of all facts, the most certain of all knowledge.

ESSAY XV.

ANALYTICAL GEOMETRY.*

The science of Analytical Geometry is one of the most brilliant inventions of modern times. Next to the Calculus, it is the most important contribution ever made to our mathematical knowledge. Its power, as an instrument of investigation, is unrivalled. Nor is it less remarkable for the singular beauty with which it classifies, in their proper relations, an endless number of particular results, than for the facility with which it discovers them.

No other branch of human knowledge is so entirely the product of one man's labours. Other sciences have reached their perfection by slow degrees. The surmises of one generation have become the discoveries of the next. Fractional and ill-arranged truths have preceded integral forms and scientific order. The guiding idea, or, as Coleridge would have called it, "the mental initiative," which is necessary to discover the relations subsisting between the truths which make up any science, and arrange them in their proper order, and without which there can be no science, but only an assemblage of isolated results, has been, in most cases, gradually evolved through the successive labours of many men. One approximation after another, each nearer the truth, has prepared the way for the production of the happy idea which is to crystallize an indigested mass of truths into order and beauty. Astronomy was so ripe for the principle of universal gravitation at the time of its discovery, that the bustling Hooke almost stumbled upon it, and filled the ears of the Royal Society with clamours against Newton for having robbed him of his property. And the previous researches of others, especially of Wallis, had approached so near the Calculus that Newton and Leibnitz divide the glory of its invention. The remote parentage of the Calculus of the moderns may indeed be distinctly traced to the "method of exhaustions"

* Originally published in 1841, in review of "An Elementary Treatise on Analytical Geometry: translated from the French of J. B. Biot, for the use of the Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute, at Lexington, Va.; and adapted to the Present State of Mathematical Instruction in the Colleges of the United States. By Francis H. Smith, A. M., Principal and Professor of Mathematics of the Virginia Military Institute, late Professor of Mathematics in Hampden Sidney College, and formerly Assistant Professor in the U. S. Military Academy at West Point."

of Archimedes. But there was no such preparation for the application of algebraic analysis to define the nature and discover the properties of lines, surfaces and solids. This invention is the sole property of Descartes, and it has conferred upon him an immortality which his more laborious speculations in metaphysics have failed to secure. His mathematical researches, of which he thought little, now constitute the basis of his fame.* His *Geometria*, a quarto tract of 106 pages, is one of the few treatises which mark an epoch in the history of science.

Geometry, until this time, had been confined within narrow limits. Previous to the institution of the school of Plato, it had discussed only the properties of rectilineal figures, the circle, the cylinder, the cone and the sphere. The method of investigation was that which is given in the Elements of Euclid, in which nothing is permitted to be done but the drawing of a straight line or a circle, and nothing is assumed as true but a few elementary principles, denominated axioms. The Platonic school contributed to Geometry three other curves, known as the Conic Sections, the properties of which were investigated in a similar manner. In this school originated also the celebrated problems of the duplication of the cube and the trisection of an angle, the first of which was solved mechanically by Plato, and geometrically by his pupil, Menechme, by the intersection of two parabolas.

The conic sections were a most important addition to the stores of Geometry, but the chief glory of the Platonic school is derived from the invention of the Geometrical Analysis. We have the authority of Proclus for ascribing this invention to Plato himself. According to this method, the problem to be solved is assumed as done, or the theorem to be proved as true, and from the relations established by this assumption a train of reasoning is carried on until we come to some conclusion known to be true or false, possible or impossible. A synthetical proof or solution is then found by returning from the elementary truth or construction to the original assumption. The conception upon which this method rests is a refined one, and the method itself more fruitful in the discovery

* This great man seems to have been singularly unfortunate. In his own day he was harassed by persecutions, under the charge of atheism, though he maintained that the most certain of all our knowledge, next to our own existence, is the Being of a God. And but scanty justice has been meted out to him since. Absurdities have been laid to his charge which he never taught, and others have received credit for discoveries of truth to which he is fairly entitled. His famous "*Cogito, ergo sum*," the starting point of his philosophy, has been misconstrued and derided. He has been made to teach a doctrine respecting *innate ideas* which he expressly disclaims, his true opinion on that subject being nothing more than must be held by every one who would escape from the materialism to which Locke's philosophy was carried in the hands of Condillac. And he has been accused of fatalism, though he was the first to teach the paramount authority, in all our reasonings upon the human mind, of the evidence afforded by consciousness, and to apply this principle in proof of the liberty of our action. But whatever may be thought of the value of the contributions made by him to our knowledge of the mind, he was indisputably the first to cast off the trammels of authority, and set the example of a proper *method* in mental philosophy. He was a great man among the great men of his age.

of truth than any other of the inventions of the ancients. In the hands of Apollonius and Archimedes, it led to those beautiful constructions and demonstrations which excited the astonishment of the mathematicians of the 14th and 15th centuries, who were ignorant of the means by which they were accomplished.

But the geometrical analysis of the ancients, though the only tentative method which they possessed for the discovery of truth, and the most valuable of all their inventions, is tedious and elaborate in its processes. It contains no general rules or methods of investigation. The discovery of one truth has little or no tendency to lead to the discovery of another. The preliminary constructions and steps of reasoning to be employed, must depend upon the particular circumstances of each question, and much tact is often required to conduct the investigation to a successful issue. A kind of contrivance is necessary in selecting the affections of the quantities upon which to found the analysis, and in making the proper graphical constructions, which, proceeding upon no general methods, demands for its successful practice only that sort of ingenuity which is no essential part of a philosophical mind. Lagrange or Laplace might be at fault in the solution of a mathematical riddle, which would present less difficulty to some contributor of the Diarian Repository, who had spent his life in poring over particular results instead of studying general principles; even as Napoleon, we doubt not, might have been foiled at fence by many a *petit maitre* of Paris.

The only other general method of investigation known to the ancients, was that which has been called the *method of exhaustions*, the invention of Archimedes. The general object of geometrical science being the measure of extension, it was soon found that the same methods which sufficed for determining the ratios of right lines to each other, or of the areas contained by right lines, failed when the question was respecting the length of a curve, the measure of the space bounded by curve lines, or the volume comprised within a curve surface. Right lines and rectilineal figures are compared with each other on the principle of superposition. Two lines are of the same length, when the one being placed upon the other, they would exactly coincide—two triangles. parallelograms, or other rectilineal figures, are equal, if it be shown that they can be made to occupy the same space. In the last analysis of our reasonings in elementary geometry, it will be found that they rest upon the idea of equality derived from coincidence in space. But this principle of superposition is obviously inapplicable when we come to consider curve lines, cuvilinear areas, and volumes. In a curve, like the circle, which is of uniform curvature throughout, we might take any portion of it as a linear unit and determine the ratio which it bears to the whole curve, or any assigned portion of it; but we could not thus, by means of the principle of superposition, solve the general problem of assigning the length of the circumference of a circle, or any other curve, in

terms of a right line. The same difficulty prevents the comparison of curvilineal with rectilineal spaces. It was to overcome this difficulty that the method of exhaustions was invented by Archimedes. This method essentially consists in inscribing a rectilineal figure within a curve, and circumscribing another around it, and obtaining thus two limits, one greater and the other less than the required perimeter or area. As the number of sides is multiplied, it is evident that the difference between the exterior and the interior figure, and, *a fortiori*, between either of them and the curve, will be continually diminished. In pursuing this method of approximation, it was found, in some cases, that there was a certain assignable limit towards which the perimeter or area of the inscribed figure tended, as the number of its sides was increased, and that the circumscribed figure tended to the same limit. This limit was taken to be the perimeter or area of the intermediate curve. It was thus that Archimedes proved that the area of a circle is equal to the rectangle, under its radius and semi-circumference, by proving that this rectangle was always greater than the inscribed, and less than the circumscribed polygon. Any modern mathematician would accept the demonstration founded upon this principle as sufficient, but the ancients always felt it necessary to strengthen it by means of the '*reductio ad absurdum*.' But the cases are comparatively few in which such a limit can be found. When, for instance, the length of the circumference of the circle is sought, it is impossible to determine any line which shall be constantly greater than the perimeter of the inscribed, and less than that of the circumscribed polygon. The only resource in such cases is to approximate to the value sought, by increasing the number of sides of the interior and exterior polygons, and thus diminishing the difference between them, and of course between either of them and the intermediate curve. It was thus that Archimedes, by inscribing and circumscribing a polygon of 96 sides, discovered the approximate ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, to be as 22 to 7, a result which is too great by the 800th part of the diameter, but of which, nevertheless, this greatest of the ancients was so proud that he directed it to be engraved upon his tomb.

This method of investigation, though subtle and ingenious, laboured under very serious difficulties. Like the Geometrical Analysis, it furnishes no general methods, so that the discovery of one truth puts us in no better condition for discovering another. The reasoning, too, is in all cases indirect, and the demonstrations to which it leads are so involved and difficult, that without some more compendious and effective instrument of research, science must ever have remained in its infancy. The ancient geometers succeeded in discovering and demonstrating the chief properties of rectilineal figures, the circle, and the five regular solids. When we add to this an imperfect investigation of the conic sections, the cissoid, the conchoid, the quadratrix of Dinostrates, and the spiral of Archimedes, we have the sum of the ancient geometry. But

instead of wondering at the fragmentary and imperfect character of abstract science among the ancients, our wonder ought rather to be, that with such feeble instruments they were able to accomplish so much. That their methods were not more general and powerful was a necessary consequence of the early state of science; that with these methods they were able to reach so many valuable results, is in the highest degree creditable to their skill and subtlety.

From the decline of Grecian science until the seventeenth century, a period of nearly two thousand years, geometry made no considerable progress. The Romans were incapable of appreciating what the Greeks had done, much less of adding to it; and the Arabs did nothing more than to translate the works of the Greek geometers. In the same state in which Archimedes and Appollonius had left it, the science came into the hands of Descartes, but it left them completely revolutionized. Before the time of Descartes algebra had been applied to geometry by Bombelli, Tartaglia, and especially by Vieta, in his treatise on angular sections. But they had applied it only to the solution of determinate problems, and derived from it no advantage, except in the greater brevity and power of the language with which it furnished them.* The general method of representing every plane curve by an equation between two unknown quantities, and deducing all its properties by algebraic operations upon this equation, is unquestionably the sole invention of Descartes. No hint of it is to be found in any previous writer; and they who have adduced the algebraic solutions of geometrical problems given by Vieta and others, in disparagement of the claim of Descartes, have shown thereby that they had not penetrated the real spirit of the Cartesian geometry.

In attempting to explain the fundamental conception of the modern geometry, it will be necessary, in the first instance, to establish the possibility of translating, in all cases, considerations of a geometrical nature, into such as shall be purely analytical. There is no apparent connexion at first sight, between geometrical forms and analytical equations; and yet a little reflection willl show that it is in all cases possible to substitute pure considerations

* The following illustration will put the reader in possession of the difference between a *determinate* and an *indeterminate* problem. Suppose the problem to be, "upon a given line as a base to construct a triangle, of which the other two sides shall be equal to two given lines;" it is evident that the conditions are sufficient to determine the triangle in magnitude and position; and the problem is said to be determinate. The vertex of the triangle would be at the intersection of the two circles described around the extremities of the base as centres, with the given lines respectively as radii But, if the base be given, and the vertical angle, and it be required to find the vertex of the triangle, it is evident that an infinite number of points may be found which would satisfy the conditions. Suppose the vertical angle to be a right angle, then since every angle contained in a semicirele is a right angle, if we deseribe a semicirele upon the given base, every point in this semicirele will be the vertex of a triangle which will fulfil the conditions of the problem. The problem in this case is indeterminate, and the semicircle upon which the required point is situated is called the *locus* of the point.

of *quantity* for those of *quality*, and thus bring the whole science of geometry within the range of analysis. All our geometrical ideas may be distributed into the three classes of magnitude, form and position. No ideas can enter into any geometrical question which are not comprehended in one of these three categories. The first of these presents no difficulty. The ratios of magnitudes to each other are expressed by numbers, and come properly within the scope of algebraic representation and analysis. The second class of geometrical ideas, those which relate to form, may be always reduced to the third, since the form of a body must of necessity depend upon the mutual position of the different points of which it is composed. The form of a triangle is completely determined, if the place of every point on its three sides is known; and so of any other figure. The idea of form, in its widest extent, is evidently comprised in that of position, since every affection of form may be made to depend upon an affection of place. The preliminary difficulty then, which seems to lie in the way of subjecting geometry to the analytical operations of algebra, is reduced to the simple question of representing, in all cases, considerations of position or place, by those of magnitude or quantity.

In showing how to effect this representation, and thus flashing a sudden light over the whole field of geometry, Descartes did nothing more than to generalize a method which is every day used, even by the most ignorant. Whenever we wish to indicate the situation of an object, the only means which we can employ is to refer it to other objects which are known; and this reference is made by assigning the magnitude of the geometrical elements which connect the unknown with the known. Thus we determine the place of any point on the surface of the earth by its distance from the equator, and from another fixed line chosen as a first meridian. Or if one point be determined, we can assign the place of any other, provided its bearing and distance from the known point be given. These two common methods of defining the position of a point on the surface of the earth are complete illustrations of the two kinds of construction most used in analytical geometry. The methods are obviously susceptible of universal application. Let us call the geometrical elements whatever they may be, which make known the position of a point, the *co-ordinates* of the point, the name imposed upon them by Descartes, and continued by all his successors. The co-ordinates of a point upon a plane are evidently two in number. The position of any point upon a plane is determined if we know its distances from any two fixed lines, not parallel to each other, in the same plane. These distances are the *rectilineal* co-ordinates of the point; and the two fixed lines, which are generally taken perpendicular to each other, are termed the *axes*. We may also fix the position of a point upon a plane, provided we know its distance from a fixed point, and the angle made by the line of direction of this distance with a fixed line. These two elements, the distance of the point

and the angle contained between its line of direction and the fixed line, are the *polar* co-ordinates of the point. An infinite number of other systems, besides those of rectilineal and polar co-ordinates for determining the position of a point, may be imagined, but these are the only two systems that are of extensive use. But whatever may be the system of co-ordinates adopted, it is evident that by means of them we may in all cases make ideas of position depend upon simple considerations of magnitude, since we may represent always a change of place in a point by variations in the numerical value of its co-ordinates.

Having thus shown that all ideas of position, and, consequently, all our elementary geometrical notions, may be reduced to simple numerical considerations, it will be easy to conceive the fundamental idea of Descartes, relative to the analytical representation of geometrical forms. It is at once evident, from the account which has been given of the manner of representing analytically the position of a point upon a plane, that when a line has been defined by any characteristic property which it possesses, this definition will give rise to a corresponding equation between the variable co-ordinates of the point which describes the line. If a point be supposed to move irregularly upon a plane, its two co-ordinates being connected by no relation, will be independent the one of the other. But if the point moves, subjected to such a condition as to make it describe any definable line, it is plain that its two co-ordinates will have, throughout its course, a constant and precise relation to each other. This relation may be expressed by a corresponding equation between the co-ordinates, which will be an exact and rigorous definition of the line, since it will express an algebraic property which belongs exclusively to all the points of this line. The numerical relation which, for every point upon the line, exists between its co-ordinates, may be in some cases difficult to discover; but it is clear, from general considerations, that such a relation must exist, even though we should be unable, in any particular case, to determine its precise nature, and express it by means of an equation. One of these co-ordinates we know must be a *function* of the other, though the form of this function may not be in every case assignable.* These considerations seem sufficient to show, in its widest extent, the possibility of defining any curve by means of an equation between the

* One quantity is said to be a function of another when they are so related that the value of the one depends upon the value of the other. Thus the space passed through by a falling body is a function of the time of descent: the length of the circumference of a circle is a function of its radius: and, in general, y is a function of x, if the value of y depends in any manner upon the value of x. There are many cases in which it can be shown that one quantity is a function of another, though we are not able to assign the precise form of the function, and others still in which we can determine the analytical form of the function, but are unable to find its calculable value. The object of every department of natural science is to determine the relations subsisting between the phenomena which it considers, or to discover the form of the functions which connect them. The moment this is done, the science passes into the hands of analysis, and takes a rational form.

co-ordinates of every point situated upon the curve. And this equation will so exactly and completely represent the curve, that the one can receive no modification, however slight, without producing a corresponding change in the other. Every property of the curve will be implicitly included in its equation, and may be deduced from it by proper analytical operations.

We have, for the sake of simplicity, confined the illustration of the leading principle of the modern geometry to the case of curves, all the points of which lie in the same plane. Since every such curve may be represented by an equation between two co-ordinates, the discussion of their properties is termed geometry of two dimensions. A similar course of reasoning would show that, as the position of a point in space is completely determined when we know its distances from three fixed planes, no two of which are parallel to each other, we may define any curve of double curvature, or any surface, plane or curved, by means of an equation between the three co-ordinates of every point upon the curve or surface. The definition, or the mode of genesis, of the curve or surface will express a property common to every point upon it, and the algebraic expression of this property, in terms of the three co-ordinates, will constitute its equation. We thus have a geometry of three dimensions.

We have attempted thus to state, and to justify, upon general principles, independently of its application to this or that particular case, the conception upon which Descartes founded his geometry. There is not in the whole range of science a conception that has been more fruitful in results. It would be difficult to overrate its importance in a scientific view. Immediately upon its announcement geometry passed beyond the narrow limits which had hitherto circumscribed it, and entered upon a career which can never be exhausted. Nor did geometry alone profit by this fertile discovery. The science of rational mechanics was remodelled by it, physical astronomy derived from it inestimable advantage, and it is at this day lending its aid to almost every department of natural philosophy. It has afforded substantial help to experimental science by giving the means of constructing and expressing those partial hypotheses, which, prior to the discovery of a complete theory, are necessary to classify the facts that are already known, and guide to the investigation of new ones.

In comparing together the ancient and the modern geometry, it is impossible not to be struck, in the first instance, with the great advantage possessed by the latter in its language. This advantage is so striking that some writers have been deceived into making it the essential distinction between the two methods. All mathematical language consists of two parts; the one expressing the objects themselves about which we reason, the other expressing the manner in which these objects are combined or related, or the operations to which they are subjected. In the ancient geometry

magnitudes are represented by *real* symbols, a line by a line, an angle by an angle, a triangle by a triangle, &c.; and the relations of these magnitudes to each other, and the operations to be performed upon them, are described in words. In the modern geometry, on the contrary, the magnitudes about which we reason, the relations which they bear, and the operations to which they are subjected, are all denoted by *conventional* symbols. These symbols are simple, brief, and comprehensive. Instead of a diagram, sometimes exceedingly complicated, accompanied by an enunciation of the truth to be proved, often awkwardly expressed because of the limitations by which it must be guarded, and a demonstration which brings the matter slowly and in successive portions before the mind, we have in the symbols and operations of algebra, as applied to geometry, so much meaning concentrated into a narrow space, expressed with such distinctness and force, and brought with such entireness to the notice of the mind before the impression made by one part has been weakened, that the reasoning powers cannot but be greatly aided, and guarded against error. These symbols afford us also the means of simplifying all the operations to be performed. By means of them we are enabled to reduce all possible relations between the objects of our reasoning to the simplest of those relations, that of equality; and a still more important advantage is gained in the substitution which we are able to make of the arithmetical operations of multiplication and division, instead of the geometrical method of the composition and division of ratios.

But immense as is the superiority conferred upon the modern geometry by the comprehensiveness and power of its language, it is not in this that its essential spirit resides. Without the aid of this language it never could have reached its present state of perfection; but we are not entitled therefore to infer that its peculiar character is derived from the symbols it employs. The use of these symbols, or of others possessing a like simplicity and concentration of meaning, was essential to the development of the science as we now have it, but its logical character is independent of its language. This language may be, and often is, applied to the solution of determinate problems in geometry, which possess, nevertheless, the character of the ancient geometry; and it is possible, on the other hand, to apply, in some cases, the substance of the modern method without the use of its peculiar notation. A little reflection upon the spirit of the two methods will be sufficient to show, that any independent investigation of a particular truth, whether conducted by means of graphical constructions representing by real symbols the quantities about which we reason, or by algebraic characters and processes,—that is, that any special result which is obtained in any other way than by the application of some more general truth to the particular case, belongs essentially to the ancient method in geometry. The ancient geometry is, in other words, an assemblage of particular

results; the modern geometry is a collection of general truths, each comprising under it an endless number of particulars.

We have spoken of geometry as the science which has for its object the *measure* of extension. This definition, though it may seem at first sight, by its precision, to limit the scope of geometry, does in reality require, for the absolute perfection of this science, that it should discuss all imaginable forms of lines, surfaces and volumes, and discover all the properties which belong to each form.* This statement immediately suggests two essentially distinct modes of investigation; the one by taking up, one by one, these geometrical forms, and determining separately all the properties of each; the other, by grouping together the discussion of analogous properties, no matter how different in other respects may be the bodies† to which they belong. In other words, our geometrical researches may be conducted, and the results of them arranged in relation to the different bodies which are the object of study, or in relation to the properties which these bodies present. The first of these was the method pursued by the ancients. They studied, one by one, the properties of the straight line, the circle, the ellipse, the hyperbola, &c., separating the different questions pertaining to each from those which related to other curves or surfaces, no matter how strong the analogies might be between them. This method of investigation, though simple and natural, is obviously characteristic of the infancy of science. The complete mastery of the properties of one curve affords no aid for discovering those of another, beyond the skill and tact which the previous study has imparted. No matter how similar may be the questions discussed respecting different curves, the complete solution of them in relation to one leaves us to commence investigation anew for every other. However similar a problem may be to one already solved for some other curve, we can never be certain beforehand that we shall have sufficient address to solve it under its modified form. Though we may, for example, have learned how to draw a tangent to an ellipse or hyperbola, this gives us no aid in determining the tangent to any other curve. Geometry, thus studied, is, as we have already called it, evidently nothing more than a collection of particular results, destitute of those general classifying truths which are necessary to constitute a science.

The modern geometry, on the other hand, instead of investigating *seriatim* the properties of each geometrical form, groups together all affections of a like kind and discusses them without regard to the particular bodies to which they belong. It passes over, for instance, the particular problem of finding the area of the circle, and solves the general problem of finding the area bounded by any

* For a lucid exposition of this and some other points briefly discussed in this article, the reader is referred to M. Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, *Leçon* 10e.

† We use the term *body*, for convenience sake, to designate the objects of geometrical study, lines, surfaces and volumes.

curve line whatever. Instead of investigating the asymptote to the hyperbola, and then remaining in no better condition than before for discovering whether any new curve has asymptotes or not, it puts us in possession at once of a general method for determining the asymptotic lines, straight or curved, which belong to any curve whatever. The modern geometry treats thus, in a manner perfectly general, every question relative to the same geometrical property or affection, without regard to the particular body to which it may belong. The application of the general theorems thus constructed, to the particular circumstances of this or that curve or surface, is a work of subordinate importance, to be executed according to certain rules that are invariable in their mode of application and infallible in their promise of success.

Let any new curve be proposed to one who is destitute of the resources of the modern geometry, and he must commence first by surmising, and that chiefly through the suggestive power of graphical constructions, what its properties are, and then endeavour to prove by methods altogether peculiar to the curve in hand, that it possesses the properties the existence of which he has divined, with no certainty derived from his previous knowledge that he will be able to succeed in this particular case. Foiled amid its intricate specialities he may be reduced, as was the great Galileo, to the mortifying necessity of calling in the mechanical aid of the scales to supply the defect of his mathematical resources.* Let the same curve be proposed to one who has the modern geometry at command, and he will immediately determine its tangent, its singular points, its asymptotes, its radius of curvature, its involute and evolute, its caustics, its maximum and minimum ordinates, its length, its area, the content of the solid generated by its revolution, in short all its important properties.

The brief exposition which we have given of the different methods pursued by the ancient and the modern geometry, is enough to show on which side the scientific superiority lies. In the ancient geometry special results are obtained separately, and without any knowledge of their mutual relations, though they may be, in truth, only particular modifications of some general truth which embraces them and innumerable like phenomena. The modern geometry investigates this general truth, and then applies it, in the way of deduction, to all particular cases. Had we gone on for ages in the steps of the ancients, we could have done nothing more than add to the *indigesta moles* of particular truths; and no matter how great our success there would still always remain an infinite variety of geometrical forms unstudied and unknown. On

* The only stain upon the scientific reputation of this great man is his seeking to determine the area of the cycloid in terms of its generating circle, by cutting the cycloid and the circle out of a lamina of uniform thickness and weighing them. It is a striking illustration of the power of the modern analysis that any tyro can now solve problems that eluded the forces of such men as Galileo, Fermat, Roberval, and Pascal.

the other hand, for every question resolved by the modern geometry, the number of geometrical problems to be solved is diminished, for all possible bodies. The one is a science, with its general theorems lying ready for all possible cases; the other is made up of independent researches, which, when they have gained their particular end, shed no light beyond it.

It is not our purpose to enter fully into the exposition of the peculiar logic of the modern analysis, or to contrast in detail its merits with those of the ancient geometry. Many interesting points of view could be obtained by pursuing this comparison to a greater length; but we have gained the end which we at present have in view if we have given an exposition of the subject sufficiently plain and extended to enable the reader to pronounce upon the *scientific* claims of the two methods. We entertain no doubt what will be the judgment rendered.

The superiority of the analytical methods of the moderns is so evident and vast, that there has been no attempt, since the publication of the "Geometry of Curve Lines," by Professor Leslie, to revive the ancient method. This attempt was a signal failure. Mr. Leslie avows himself the champion of a juster taste in the cultivation of mathematical sciences, but unfortunately for his success, no sooner does he enter upon any question which lies beyond the mere elements of geometry than he betrays most painfully the poverty of his resources. We have but to open his book and read of "a tangent and point merging the same contact," of points "absorbing one another," of "tangents melting into the curve," of "curves migrating into one another," &c., to make us sympathize with the humiliation which he must have felt in invoking the aid of poetry to establish the theorems of geometry. We know of no similar attempt made by any *scholar* since. It is now universally conceded that without the aid of the modern analysis, the science of geometry cannot be established upon a rational basis. And without the help of geometry, thus established and ordered, all the real sciences, excepting only those included in the department of natural history, must be deprived of their full development and perfection. The new geometry has its ample vindication in the "Mécanique Analytique" of Lagrange, and the "Mécanique Céleste" of Laplace.

In our own country, prior to the publication of the work named at the head of this article, we had but two treatises on the subject of Analytical Geometry; the one a republication of the elementary treatise of Mr. J. R. Young, which is chiefly made up from the "Application de l'Algèbre a la Géométrie" of Bourdon; the other, a more recent publication from the pen of Prof. Davies. We do not, for reasons that will be obvious enough, include among treatises upon Analytical Geometry, the Cambridge translation of the imperfect and antiquated work of Bèzout. We are glad that Prof. Smith has added his contribution to our scanty stock, by giving us a translation of the masterly work of Biot, one of the

most perfect scientific gems to be found in any language. The original needs not our commendation, and of the translation it is enough to say that it is faithfully executed.*

We regard the multiplication of text books, on this subject, as affording cheering evidence that juster ideas are beginning to prevail in our country respecting the proper scope of mathematical education. And yet there are colleges in our land that comprise, in their course of study, nothing of the geometry of curves beyond what is contained in Simpson's or Bridge's Conic Sections, that leave the study of the Calculus optional with the student, and that are compelled, therefore, to teach, under the name of Natural Philosophy, a system that, at the present day, is scarcely level with the demands of a young ladies' boarding school. The graduates of these institutions may be able to classify plants, insects, and stones; they may fancy themselves qualified to decide upon the comparative merits of rival systems of world-building in geology; but they cannot read, understandingly, the first ten pages of any reputable treatise on mechanics from the French or English press. We have grieved long over this state of things, and we hail with pleasure every symptom of a change for the better in public sentiment. If our ancient and venerable institutions of learning will not elevate their course of study into some approximation to the existing state of mathematical science, the day, we hope, is not far distant when the public will discern that they are standing in the way of a thorough education, and visit them accordingly.

* We regret to see so many typographical errors in the work, and some of them of a character fitted to perplex the student. On page 88 there is an omission of the transformation of an equation of the Ellipse, to remove the origin from the vertex of the axis to the centre of the curve, which confuses all the subsequent investigation.

ESSAY XVI.

BAPTIST TRANSLATION OF THE BIBLE.*

While the existence of different religious sects in the world opens a wide field for the exercise of Christian charity, the most rational foundation for that charity is laid in the principles of the separation. Each Protestant sect admits, and with great propriety, that a way to heaven may lie through the territories of all other Christian denominations, and that every one of the numerous forms in which the truth is held and preached, may be instrumental in producing and sustaining a saving faith in Christ. We expect to find true piety in every division and under every name of the Christian church. The various denominations of Christians, which have gained any considerable note in the world, have kept up by means of their forms of worship, doctrine and order, their broad distinctions from one another; while, as to degrees of practical piety, no one of these prominent and prosperous sects has probably varied more from the others, than the same sect has, in different times and circumstances, varied from itself. We are, therefore, as reasonably bound to cultivate a fervent charity towards the members of other denominations as towards those of our own. We know not at what point in the progress of the sincere but mistaken upholders of error, our charitable regards should stop. In this state of mingled truth and error, it is impossible for man to fix the precise line where the light of saving truth is bounded by the verge of total darkness. No mere man since the fall can be sup-

* Originally published in 1838 in review of, 1. "Constitution of the American and Foreign Bible Society, formed by a Convention of Baptist Elders and Brethren, held in the Meeting House of the Oliver street Baptist Church, New York, May 12 and 13, 1836.

2. "Proceedings of the Bible Convention of Baptists held in Philadelphia, April 27—29, 1837.

3. "Report of the Board of Managers of the American and Foreign Bible Society, embracing the period of its Provisional Organization. April, 1837.

4. "Christian Review and Translations of the Bible, Nos. 5 and 8. March and December, 1837.

5. "First Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the American and Foreign Bible Society, presented April, 1838."

posed to have held the truth in perfection, and since sanctifying grace does always co-exist with some degree of doctrinal error, who shall presume to tell the precise degree of error which limits the saving operation? Who is prepared to say how much false doctrine is the most that a man can hold and still be saved?

We make due distinction between error itself and those who hold it. To regard a heretic with charity is one thing; it is another to countenance his heresy. We do not deem it a light matter that false doctrines so widely prevail in the world, that men are so easily captivated by them, and that the church is so deeply troubled and broken into so many fragments; yet when the abettor of error evinces the Christian spirit in even the smallest degree, we are bound to receive him with kindness, and extend towards him all the offers of Christian fellowship, which may consist with the safety of those concerned. The error may be dangerous, while it still has not ruined the man. It *might* prevent his being a child of God, but does it actually prevent him? And if not, ought not the spark of life, in its perilous exposure, to be fanned and guarded, and tenderly nourished up unto life eternal?

These remarks are suggested by the view we are about to present to our readers, of the several matters connected with the documents named at the beginning; and our reasons for offering them here are these two: Because the principles stated are involved in our general subject; and because they indicate the spirit in which we propose to subject the matters before us to this public examination.

The Baptists in the United States have shared, in their measure, the general improvement which has distinguished, for the last several years, the progress of religion in this country. Their numbers have increased, perhaps, in fair proportion to the increase of other denominations; the civil regulations of some important States of the Union afford them greater facilities for maintaining their peculiarities than they could formerly command; the zeal of some portions of their body, in elevating their intellectual and religious character, has had praiseworthy development; their missionary spirit has, from several peculiar causes, been greatly enlivened, and the general results of their growing strength and activity, both at home and abroad, must be gratifying to every friend of pure and ardent piety.

In some recent acts of large bodies, representing the most important branch of the Baptist denomination in this country, they have assumed a position before the Christian public, which, as a matter of history, is new, and, in its ecclesiastical aspects, bold and startling. We allude to their late proceedings relative to the translation of the Bible.

The history of these transactions is substantially as follows:

In the year 1835, one of the Baptist missionaries wrote from Calcutta, to the secretary of the American Bible Society, inquiring whether money could be obtained from that society to aid in

printing and circulating the Bengalee Bible, translated on Baptist principles. The subject was submitted to the board on the sixth of August, 1835; it was discussed freely at that meeting, at the next regular meeting of the board on the fifth of November following, at adjourned meetings on the nineteenth of November, the third of December, and the fourth of February, 1836; and on the seventeenth of February, after the long and serious discussion above mentioned, the board passed, by a large majority, the following preamble and resolutions:

"1. By the constitution of the American Bible Society, its managers are, in the circulating of the holy Scriptures, restricted to such copies as are 'without note or comment,' and, in the English language, to 'the version in common use.' The design of these restrictions clearly seems to have been to simplify and mark out the duties of the society, so that all the religious denominations of which it is composed might harmoniously unite in performing these duties.

"2. As the managers are now called to aid extensively in circulating the sacred Scriptures in languages other than the English, they deem it their duty, in conformity with the obvious spirit of their compact, to adopt the following resolutions as the rule of their conduct in making appropriations for the circulation of the Scriptures in all foreign tongues.

"*Resolved*, That in appropriating money for the translating, printing, or distributing of the sacred Scriptures in foreign languages, the managers feel at liberty to encourage only such versions as conform, in the principles of their translation, to the common English version, at least so far as that all religious denominations represented in this society can consistently use and circulate said versions in their several schools and communities.

"*Resolved*, That a copy of the above preamble and resolution be sent to each of the missionary boards accustomed to receive pecuniary grants from this society, with a request that the same may be transmitted to their respective mission stations where the Scriptures are in process of translation, and also that the said several missionary boards be informed that their applications for aid must be accompanied with a declaration that the versions which they propose to circulate are executed in accordance with the above resolutions."

This act of the managers was approved by the American Bible Society at its annual meeting on the twelfth of May, 1836.

At the annual meeting of the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions in Hartford, April 27, 1836,* a letter was communicated from the secretary of the American Bible Society, announcing the appropriation, by the board of managers, of five thousand dollars to the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions, to promote the circulation of the Scriptures in foreign tongues; stating, however, that this appropriation was made in accordance with the resolutions of the board

* See Report of the Managers of the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions, p. 24.

above given. On this communication, the Baptist board unanimously adopted the following preamble and resolutions:

"Whereas this board, at their annual meeting, held in Salem, in April, 1833, adopted the following resolutions:

"*Resolved*, That the board feel it to be their duty to adopt all prudent measures to give to the heathen the pure word of God, and to furnish the missionaries with all the means in their power to make the translations as exact a representation of the mind of the Holy Spirit as may be possible;—*Resolved*, That all the missionaries of the board who are, or who shall be, engaged in translating the Scriptures, be instructed to endeavour, by earnest prayer and diligent study, to ascertain the meaning of the original text; to express that meaning as exactly as the nature of the languages into which they shall translate the Bible will permit; and to transfer no words which are capable of being literally translated: And whereas the board still adhere firmly to these resolutions, as expressing, in their judgment, the only true principle on which translations can be made; and as uttering what they believe to be the decided opinion of the great mass of the denomination whom they represent, therefore,

"*Resolved*, That the board of managers of the American Bible Society be respectfully informed that this board cannot, consistently and conscientiously, comply with the conditions on which appropriations are now made; and cannot, therefore, accept the sum appropriated by the board of managers on the 17th of April, 1836."

From the time of passing the above resolutions to the annual meeting of the American Bible Society, on the twelfth of May following, the interval was improved in summoning the largest possible representation of the denomination to convene in New York on that day; on the presumption that the society would approve the act of its board; and with the avowed purpose, in that event, to propose at once a separate "organization for Bible translation and distribution in foreign tongues."

The American Bible Society did, as above stated, approve the resolutions referred to. Whereupon the Baptist convention, then assembled, immediately adopted resolutions declaring that "the American Baptists enjoyed great facilities for prosecuting the work of faith and labour of love in giving the word of God to the heathen;" and resolving "that it is the duty of the Baptist denomination in the United States to form a distinct organization for Bible translation and distribution," and they appointed a committee to report a constitution, nominate officers, and prepare an address to the American public. The next day a constitution was adopted, designating the new institution as "The American and Foreign Bible Society, the single object of which shall be to promote the wider circulation of the holy Scriptures, in the most faithful translations that can be procured:" officers were appointed, and a resolution passed providing, "that the first annual meeting of the

society be held in Philadelphia, on the last Wednesday of April, 1837, and that the doings of this meeting and of the society be submitted to such of the brethren, from different parts of the United States, as may then and there meet in convention, for the purpose of securing the combined and concentrated action of the denomination in the Bible cause." The convention at Hartford, in April, 1836, postponed the whole subject to the same last Wednesday of April, which was also the time for the annual meeting of the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions at the same place.

There were, consequently, three distinct voices convoking the Baptists of the United States in Philadelphia on the said last Wednesday of April, 1837:—The committee appointed by the conference at Hartford, the first annual meeting of the embryo Bible society, and the annual meeting of the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions;—all bearing on the absorbing question of Bible translation, and altogether adequate to convene what the president called "the largest body of baptized believers in the world, by a delegation unparalleled either for number or influence among them." The occasion was deemed "a crisis" to the denomination, and the strength and wisdom of the body were put in full requisition. The organization previously formed in New York was apparently disregarded, except to be pronounced presumptuous and premature, and the question of a Baptist Bible society came up de novo. The proposal was strongly sustained, and the society was organized, and earnestly commended to the people of their connexion throughout the United States.

The design of this article requires that we here take particular notice of the views of the denomination, and of the bearings of the new society, as they were disclosed in the debates and other proceedings of that convention.

The two questions raised respected, 1st, The expediency of a distinct organization for Bible distribution; and, 2d, The extent of the object which that organization should contemplate. The alternative in the first question was, either to create a new society to do what the Baptists could not conscientiously do through the American Bible Society, or to commit that department of their enterprise to the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions. The second point brought up the question whether the new society should confine its operations to the foreign field, or engage also in home distribution.

On the first question it was argued against the new organization: That it would render their system of benevolent action needlessly complicate; that the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions had hitherto proved itself competent to conduct the work of Bible translation and distribution, which, as a part of the missionary work, belonged to that board; and to create another instrument to do a part of the proper work of that board, would imply a suspicion of malversation or incapacity in that institution, which had not yet been charged upon it; that the Baptists of the United

States had too partially expressed their wishes for such a society to warrant that body to form one: that the American Bible Society was formed rather on principles of conciliation, than by compromise of opinions, and a sectarian organization would dig the grave of great Bible society principles: that the disunion of Christians in the work of distributing the Bible, appeared ill before the world: that the American Bible Society, embracing different denominations, had been the means of joining hearts together which had otherwise been alienated: that the brethren were painfully divided on the question of separating from that society; and that such a separation was fraught with serious consequences, would prove a bar to union in all time to come, and ought not to be urged, except for very powerful reasons.

In favour of a distinct society, it was asserted: That the American Bible Society had attempted to govern the consciences of Baptists: that the Baptists were able and bound to give the true unmutilated Bible to all the world: that the Baptists in the United States had extensively expressed their desire for such a society, and that the organization would, by the increase of Baptist resources, and the progress of Baptist principles, come into increasing demand.

The reasonings against the new organization, although of a liberal tenour, savoured of no indifference for Baptist principles. They were respectful and conciliatory, implying confidence in the American Bible Society, and admitting that it afforded the Baptists ample facilities for circulating the Scriptures in a form which favoured no sectarian principles more than their own. They betrayed also the suspicion that the project of a new society verged towards the proposal of a Baptist version of the Bible in the English tongue, and alarm lest the present proceedings should occasion another subdivision of the denomination.

In favour of the new society there appeared an ardent and exclusive zeal for the peculiarities of the sect. The purpose was more than intimated of renouncing participation in Paedobaptist operations, and of pushing, at all hazards, the enterprise of making a Baptist Bible for all the world. The advocates of the measure seemed to presume that the kingdom was given to the Baptists, and that the pregnant signs of the times summoned them forth to the sure and speedy conquest of the earth. One of the most prominent speakers of the convention "would not fetter the new society, to hinder its doing soon what may not now perhaps be done;" "a precaution unworthy the majesty of truth, and unbecoming the dignity of the great denomination for which we act; the only denomination, as we profess to believe, that is willing to follow the Redeemer whithersoever he may lead, and dares to re-echo to the world the whole and whatsoever he has said."

The other and most agitating question related to the limits they would set to the operations of the new society; whether they

would confine it to the foreign field, or employ it also in home distribution.

It was argued in favour of the limitation: That the denomination called for the new organization to engage in foreign translation and distribution only; that the proposed enlargement of the society's powers was not warranted by the resources of the denomination, embracing not above 250,000 real supporters of benevolent enterprise, with literary and theological institutions upon their hands, and not a single institution endowed;* that the American Bible Society had resolved to complete the home supply, and was able to do it, and, therefore, another society with a home department would be superfluous; that the proposed extension would draw a line of broader distinction between the Baptists and the rest of the great Protestant family, and involve the interests of the Bible cause in needless complexity; that the delegates to that convention had no authority to meddle with the home distribution, having been appointed with reference to a society for foreign operations, and no other; that the foreign department was the only one in which the brethren could unite; and that restricting the society to the foreign field would counteract the impression that has gone abroad, that the denomination was about to put forth a Baptist Bible in the English tongue.

Against restricting the operations of the society to foreign translation and distribution, it was insisted: That the Baptists, ill-used as they had been, were impelled to withdraw from the American Bible Society altogether, and were now too highly incensed against the society to do anything anywhere through its agency; that such a restriction would disable the society from doing anything successfully, and imply a distrust of the denomination, lest they should at some time, and without good reasons, undertake to mend the English version of the Bible; a step which would not be taken immediately, and ought not therefore to be a source of apprehension; and that the limitation would imply that the received English translation ought never to be amended, and the real mind of the Holy Spirit on the ordinance of baptism never given to the world in intelligible terms.

We have thus sifted out all that seems to have been intended as argument on both sides, from the printed report of the long and desultory debates of that convention. The proceedings of the body, even as they appear in the printed report, remind us at every

* "Much had been said with regard to the strength of the society, and the glorious laurels that were to be gained by it. Now what were the facts in the case? We had 500,000 communicants, and no doubt the greater part of them were good people; and when he had said that, he had said all. The Baptist ministry were men of heart, and they had done gloriously. He argued, that the real supporters of benevolent enterprise in the Baptist denomination did not number more than 250,000 souls. He next adverted to the condition of the literary institutions, and theological colleges and schools, and lamented their want of funds. He mentioned as an extraordinary fact, that not a single institution was endowed." (Speech of Mr. Thresher of Boston, as reported in the proceedings of the Bible Convention.)

step of the justness of an expression of Dr. Wayland on the floor of the convention, that "it seemed as if brethren hardly knew for what they had come together." We pass no strictures here on the debates in general. Our concern is only with the arguments on the points before us. It would give no satisfaction, either to ourselves or our readers, to attempt to reconcile the dignity and weight of those discussions with the sublime idea of an assembly of Christians deliberating on the enterprise of "translating the unadulterated words of the Holy Spirit for all the nations of the earth."

In the sketch of proceedings and arguments given above, our readers cannot fail to discern the two following points under which we propose to arrange the remaining matters of this article:

I. That the Baptists are heartily weary of the controversy about the meaning of the word βαπτίζω, and have resolved to try the short method of exchanging it for some other word.

II. That their project of Bible translation presupposes the ultimate and speedy prevalence of Baptist principles in the world.

We feel no temptation to speak reproachfully or uncharitably on this subject; for neither the present position of our Baptist brethren, nor any part of their past proceedings, has disturbed our brotherly kindness towards them; and if we have any other motive in pursuing the following reflections, besides the desire for their good and the good of our common cause, it is the satisfaction of contemplating the aspect and bearing of the proceedings as a mere section of ecclesiastical history.

1. We have the strong impression that the Baptists are bent on getting rid, at all events, of the word "baptize." It is doubtless to them an uncomfortable term of theology. In translating the Scripture into foreign languages, they expect numerous and unavoidable occasions to adopt new words, and give new senses to old ones; for how can such a mass of peculiar ideas as the Bible presents be conveyed to a heathen people without the use of new and peculiar words, or of words in peculiar senses? And in most such cases they will doubtless transfer, as all translators do, and as the nature of written language often requires; or, they will appropriate vernacular terms to an uncommon use, which is in substance equivalent to transferring. But in the present case they take no choice. They seem to presume, and we think with great plausibility, that some other word may be to them a more convenient appellation for the ordinance of baptism, and may designate their form of the rite more decisively than "baptize." We are not surprised at the presumption. It is but natural that they wish to put away from their theological nomenclature a term which costs them so much disputation, requires so much learning to handle it, and yields them, after all, so incomplete satisfaction, and exchange it for a word about which there can be no controversy; βαπτίζω is not sufficiently exclusive. It does not clip the argument about the form of baptism with the requisite decision. The word undoubtedly means what they would express by it;—admit, for the pre-

sent, that their sense is its most common and prominent one; yet it draws after it such a number and diversity of ideas, that they must either cut its trail off or traffic the word itself away; and having failed to make clear work of the former, they seem resolved to attempt the latter.

To place in fair light the character of this procedure, we propose to consider the avowed intent in connexion with the unavowed bearings of the proceedings related above; the general views with which, in the minds of the Baptists, this design of translation stands associated; the philological recommendations of their course; and its sectarian policy.

The avowed design of the American and Foreign Bible Society is said, in the printed report of the society formed in New York, to be, "to give the whole world a literal translation of the Bible:"* —to create "a distinct institution among the Baptists, having for its object the diffusion of their religious principles through the instrumentality of *literal versions* of the Bible."† The sole occasion of the rupture with the American Bible Society was its declining to aid in circulating copies of the holy Scriptures in which βαπτίζω is rendered according to Baptist views. "The American Bible Society," says the address of the new society to the public, "has refused to aid us in giving the '*most faithful*' versions of our missionaries to the perishing heathen, merely because the original word βαπτίζω and its cognates have been translated." And "the Baptists, ill-used as they have been, had no other course left them to pursue but to withdraw from the American Bible Society." It is no secret, therefore, that the original word does not answer Baptist ends. Our brethren seemed apprehensive that Paedobaptist fellowship in Bible distribution was purchased by them at too dear a rate, and that the prospect of teaching the world their mode of baptism by the language of the present English Bible was a forlorn hope. The head and front of the American Bible Society's offending against the Baptists was its adherence to the very word by which the Holy Spirit chose to denote the sacramental washing; and because our brethren were determined to put that word out of their versions and substitute a word not strictly synonymous in its place, the separation was proposed.

We request special attention to this avowed occasion of their proceedings. And so do they. They renounce, with emphasis, all other causes of dissent. Because they insist on introducing into the text of their translations, their "note and comment" on the word "*baptize*," cutting off all further controversy about the word, and presenting their "four hundred millions" of readers with a term from which they may derive, clear, separate, and alone, the idea of immersion, they have created a new society, and resolved to abandon the old. Their premonitory horror of carry-

* Report, page 21. † Report, page 22.

ing the controversy about baptism among the unlettered millions of Birmah and Bengal has a natural source in the history of the rite. They are obliged to admit that under the lax restraint of the original "*baptize*," the Christian world has largely backslidden from dipping, and gone up step by step out of the water on the secondary senses of the word, till the ordinance of baptism has suffered, as they say, a general misunderstanding and perversion; and the Paedobaptist "error of sprinkling," to use their own words, "has obtained the blind and almost universal suffrage of what is called the Christian world."* It is, therefore, the avowed design of our Baptist brethren in their new Bible Society, to make the translated text of the Scriptures the vehicle of propagating their peculiar views of the mode of baptism in foreign lands.

From this declared object of our brethren, it is difficult to separate the unavowed bearing of their proceedings; the tendency towards a Baptist version of the Scriptures in the English tongue. The immediate project of an English translation was not only unavowed, but disavowed by the members of the convention. Instead, therefore, of putting, in so many words, the impertinent question, whither are they going, we will simply observe which way they have set their faces.

First, then, our Baptist brethren were aware of their being suspected of a design of "putting forth a Baptist Bible in English;" and talked of passing resolutions "to allay the apprehensions of brethren of other denominations." Second, every principle of the movement was general, and every argument of the convention went in fact as strongly for an English translation as for a Birman or a Bengalee. Third, every speaker who alluded to the matter of translation at all, seemed to look, with one eye at least, towards an English translation. The expressions were artful indeed, but significant. "*We* have no intention of originating a translation in English." "*We* think it ought not *now* to be done." One "did not think it would be done this year nor the next, nor without the approbation of the denomination." "Who knows," exclaims another, "that the forty-nine translators were such very learned men?" "Where are their learned works, their critical and extensive knowledge?" Cannot brethren "allow the possibility of forty-nine Baptists meeting together and making an amendment in the version of the Scriptures?" "Shall we hesitate to assume the name of American because it would look towards the period of a change in the version?"† Such remarks could have been naturally prompted only by a decided inclination towards the project of a Baptist translation in English. Fourth, the society, formed with express reference to translations, insisted long and disputatiously on taking the name of American and Foreign,—

* Report, page 23.

† Speech of Mr. Cone of New York, President of the American and Foreign Bible Society.

epithets which look to the sphere of its operations;—and refused to adopt the restricting clause "*in foreign tongues.*" Fifth, "The Christian Review," which we suppose to be as really a leading work of the American Baptists, as any publication can be among a people who disclaim the reproach of ever being led, had caught a rumour about an amended version of the New Testament; and in the number for March, 1837, repelled the suggestion with exemplary indignation, great vivacity, and some logic. "We proclaim," says that paper, "our sincere and unchanged attachment to the good old English version made by the order of king James I. It is our hearts' desire and prayer to God, that this venerable monument of learning, of truth, of piety, and of unequalled purity of style and diction, may be perpetuated to the end of time, just as we now have it. Let no daring genius meditate either change or amendment in its structure and composition; neither let any learned impertinence presume to disturb the happy confidence of the tens of thousands who now regard it as—next to the original languages—the purest vehicle through which the mind of the Holy Spirit was ever conveyed to mortals. Under God and with God, we feel prepared to stand or fall with this consecrated instrument, known and quoted, and familiarized, as the common standard version."* But in the number for December following, after the Philadelphia convention, and when the new version had been more than hinted at, an article appears on the "principles of Bible translation;" and the hope is expressed "that the Baptists in both countries will be enabled to persevere firmly, yet kindly, in maintaining the right principles on the subject of translations;" and the belief is asserted "that these principles must ultimately prevail." So the opposition of the Christian Review to a Baptist version, melted down into attachment to abstract principles of translation. Sixth, nature points out the course of our brethren from where they now stand; for since they make the translation of a word so awful a matter of conscience, how can they confine their good work to four hundred millions of the human race, while the field is the world. It was only by mutual compromise, that they confined their operations for one year to foreign lands. But soon the home distribution must commence; indeed at the recent annual meeting of the society in New York, they resolved to take it up at once; and then they encounter again the untranslated βαπτίζω, and after the Birman precedent of conscientiousness, what will conscience dictate then? How long will the translating society be content to translate into one language and transfer into another?

Whether, then, we may confidently look for the speedy appearance of a Baptist Bible in English, or not, it seems that our brethren have it in mind; and the full development of their inceptions towards it is probably to depend on future circumstances.

* Christian Review for March, 1837, p. 21.

The aspect of these proceedings receives a tinge from the general views of the Baptist denomination, on the subjects most nearly related to the design of the new society. We would not affront our brethren by imputing to them any theological system, which is common to all their tribes, and which can be represented by any extant epitome of Christian doctrine. The multiform views of the denomination are not reducible to any single standard. The supposition of such a standard, to be applied by ecclesiastical authority, as a test of doctrine in the churches, is irreconcilable with their theory of independence. It is doubtless from this cause that so little effort is expended in their most popular periodicals to reduce the doctrinal views of the body to uniformity on any points except baptism. We are struck with the evidence that appears no less in the publications which hail from that quarter, than in the particular effects of their dispensation of doctrines and ordinances, that the primary sensibilities of the Baptist conscience are awakened to baptism; and that the design of Christian ordinances as means of grace is liable to be frustrated among them, by exalting the observance of those ordinances into a term of salvation. We will not insist here, at length, on the Antinomian character of the practical religion which is cherished among the less intelligent classes, by the Baptist administration of truth among them. When we witness, among the phenomena of conscience, the cases of persons who "feel a burden on their spirit, and can find no rest until they have taken up the cross and followed the Saviour into the water, and were buried with him by baptism," we see what we judge to be the legitimate effects of a dispensation of religious truth which makes a particular form of baptism an essential constituent of religion. While, then, baptism constitutes so much of the Baptists' religion, the very name of the rite becomes fraught with peculiar solemnity. The ordinance must not be called, in any language, by an ambiguous name. It is but natural that a supposed error in that name should be intolerable in a translation of the Bible, and that the advantages of uniformity of translation throughout the Christian world should be freely sacrificed to a scrupulous precision in that simple term. The change of the English version it would therefore seem must come. We see no place between India and America, where such views of the name and nature of baptism will permit a consistent and conscientious Baptist, in this work of translation, to stop.

We deem it proper, then, here to consider the propriety of the course of our Baptist brethren as tested by the laws at the present state of the philological controversy.

A great part of the dispute about the mode of baptism has turned upon the meaning of the original word; and this is now as much disputed as ever. No point that favours the Baptist side of the question is now any nearer being settled than at the beginning. Our brethren, therefore, by translating the word in their sense, cut off the unsettled controversy, and abruptly leave the ground. They

take the thing for granted, which they have utterly failed to prove. We propose to present here a few such points of the argument as will place this remarkable instance of begging the question in the strongest light.

Let it be distinctly observed that we propose here not to settle, nor to make any effort towards settling, the question in dispute between the Baptists and the Paedobaptists, but merely to show that the question is not settled; and that to proceed in translation as though it were decided, is precluding argument by assuming the point to be proved.

The point assumed is that the Greek word βαπτίζω means only and always "to dip, to plunge." The only just warrant for translating the word in that sense, where it relates to the Christian ordinance of baptism, is, that, in this relation, it can have no other; and whether it can have any other sense, in such a connexion, is to be determined by its original signification, and by the circumstances of its appropriation as the name of a Christian sacrament. The position which we are now concerned to support is simply, that neither the original and classic use of the word, nor its use as a term of Christian theology, confines it to the sense which our brethren insist on giving it in their translation. So long as it admits of doubt, and especially so long as there exists so clear a certainty, that the word has ever been employed in a variety of particular senses, it will be unlawful to institute a general principle of translation which shall restrict it to any one.

Take, of the many instances which might be adduced from the classic authors, these two from a single writer, which, though not palpable, are sufficiently so for our purpose. Aristotle speaks of *baptizing* hay with honey for diseased elephants. He also speaks of certain places, beyond the pillars of Hercules, which, when it is ebb-tide, are not *baptized* (βαπτίζεσθαι), but at full-tide are overflowed (κατακλυζεσθαι). This last instance, where the word is put in synonomy with κατακλυζω, is conclusive. To deluge, to inundate, is surely a different process from dipping or plunging; in the one case, the water being applied to the subject, in the other, the subject to the water. Here is one instance in which βαπτίζω undeniably means something different from taking a body and plunging it down into water. Can our brethren then quote classic authority to justify the rendering of the word, in *every* case, by a term which denotes only the particular process of dipping a body in water?

But though the classic objection to our brethren's proposed translation is insurmountable, we propose to lay chief stress on the cases presented in the Bible. It is there only that we find the word employed to denote a religious ceremony. And in the New Testament the word βαπτίζω, except when used in a figurative sense, never occurs but with some reference to a religious rite.

We do not here follow the word back to its root βαπτω. The senses of that term can decide nothing, we think, in regard to the biblical sense of βαπτίζω, for two reasons. 1st. It is settled by the

most satisfactory research, that βαπτω was used in some senses, which are never ascribed to βαπτίζω;—in one sense, at least; that of *dying, tinging, colouring*. 2d. Βαπτω is never employed to denote the Christian rite of Baptism. If, therefore, we briefly examine some of the most prominent scriptural uses of the word βαπτίζω, we shall present the difficulty which our brethren so promptly dispose of in their plan of translation.

In Mark vii., 3, 4, the Pharisees and all the Jews are said, "when they come from the market, not to eat except they *baptize themselves*" (βαπτίσωνται Middle voice.) This baptism is defined in the verse preceding: "Except they wash their hands often" (or carefully) "they eat not; holding the tradition of the elders." We are aware that Gale and some others insist that the two cases differ from each other; that the case mentioned in the third verse, was the common washing of the hands before every meal; while the baptism referred to in the fourth verse was a bathing or immersion of the whole body, on account of the peculiar defilement contracted in the market. The first was only a washing, as they say; the other was a baptism, and hence, was designated by a term which signifies more than washing. But baptism is the word used for that washing in another place—Luke xi., 38. The Pharisee wondered that Christ had not first baptized himself (ἐβαπτίσθη) before dinner. As we have no reason to suppose that Christ had been to the market, his baptism must have been only the customary washing before every meal. It is further insisted that the hands, though they were the only parts washed, were immersed in the process, and hence the baptism was still immersion so far forth. Be it so. It follows, nevertheless, that the immersion of the hands was taken for the baptism of the person; and accordingly the language corresponded to that idea. "He marvelled that he had not first *baptized himself* before dinner." So the complete ceremony of baptism was performed in this case, at least, by applying water to a part of the body, or, if you please, a part of the body to water; and βαπτίζω therefore does mean something besides the immersion of the whole body. At least it is far from being settled that it does not. Yet we see our brethren engaged in translating the word as though it were no longer in dispute, among the best judges, whether the word should not in every case be rendered by a term which signifies the immersion of the whole body in water. "The Pharisee marvelled that he had not *immersed his whole body in water* before dinner!"

Our brethren will permit us to state our impression of the difficulty they must encounter in translating the word in some of those instances where it occurs in reference to the religious rite of John the Baptist and of Christ. Matt. iii., 11. "I indeed baptize you with water; but there cometh one after me—he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." So Acts i., 5. "For John truly baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost." In both these passages, the word is used first in a literal

sense and then in a figurative. Whether John immersed or not—a question which it is not to our purpose here to decide—we doubt not he made copious use of water, as the reference to the figurative baptism with the Holy Ghost implies. But when we compare this figure of baptism as employed to denote the future effusions of the Holy Spirit with the figures employed to describe the events when they occurred, we meet an insurmountable objection to the proposed Baptist translation of the word. And our brethren, we think, must feel it. In no case are the actual presence and operation of the Holy Spirit represented under the similitude of immersion. The Spirit falls on men, as the Scriptures express it, is shed down, is poured out on men, but never are men said to be immersed in it. "Baptize" is therefore to be taken here in a wider sense than "immerse" will bear. Admitting that John did immerse in water, it is certain that God is never said to immerse in the Holy Ghost; and that "immerse" cannot, therefore, in these cases, be a full substitute for "baptize." The idea of baptism conveyed by these two uses of the term "baptize" cannot be compressed into the smaller capacity of the word "immerse." As the translation now stands, if John be supposed to have immersed, there is between the two ideas of baptism with water, and baptism with the Holy Ghost, an incongruity demanding a latitude in the sense of "baptize" of which that word is plainly susceptible, but of which the stricter term "immerse" will not admit.

Let us suppose a Baptist missionary, with his Baptist Bible in his hand, conversing with an intelligent and sagacious Brahmin on the conversion and baptism of the Ethiopian by Philip, Acts viii., 26. He opens at the prophecy which the man was reading when Philip joined him, found in the fifty-third of Isaiah; and the first question propounded by the Brahmin will naturally be, "Of whom speaketh the prophet this?" the question put by the Ethiopian to Philip. This question leads them back to the thirteenth verse of the fifty-second chapter, and there, like Philip, our Baptist brother begins his exposition. He shows how this Scripture is fulfilled in Christ. "Behold my servant . . . . . shall be exalted, and be extolled, and be very high (his visage was so marred more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men). So shall he sprinkle many nations. He was despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; and we hid as it were our faces from him; he was despised and we esteemed him not." The Brahmin is satisfied with the Baptist's explanation of the prophecy so far as it refers to the humiliation, sufferings, and exaltation of Christ; but "where," he will say, "is the sprinkling of many nations? your Scriptures say, Ezek. xxxvi., 25, 'I will sprinkle clean water upon you.' Hence I suppose the sprinkling of many nations is to be a water sprinkling. Please to explain this sprinkling. Philip preached Jesus to the Ethiopian, beginning, you say, at this same Scripture; that is, the prophecy commencing at Is. lii., 13; and when they came to a certain water, the man pro-

posed of his own accord, as your Bible reads, to be immersed, or plunged all over under water. What part of this Scripture, as Philip probably explained it, put that sort of baptism into his mind?" We mistake if our Baptist brother would not, in such a conversation, find "baptism," a more convenient word than immersion.

Our intelligent and conscientious Baptist translators must find serious embarrassment with Rom. vi., 4—"We are buried with him by baptism into death." We adduce this passage as one in which, if they apply their principles of translation, they must beg the question twice. First, by assuming the disputed point, that baptism is, in this place, itself a figure of the burial and resurrection of Christ, and second that its figurative fitness depends on the particular mode of baptism by immersion. Baptism is understood, on all hands, to denote a profession of faith in Christ, of the hope of salvation through his death, and of our obligation and purpose to obey his commands. When we have mortified the sinful affections by the exercise of faith and hope in Christ crucified, we are said by the apostle to have crucified the old man, with Christ; and the burial is that of the body crucified. For why speak of burying, in the likeness of Christ's burial, what is not dead in the likeness of his death? Can it be supposed that such a writer as Paul would construct a figure of speech upon the resemblance between burying a dead body in the earth, and dipping a living body into water and taking it immediately out? It surely must require the prepossessions of a Baptist to perceive the resemblance, much more to justify such a use of it. That the comparison ever entered the Apostle's mind is far from being clear. We know that many, chiefly Baptists, hold that it did; and we know too that many of equal authority think otherwise, and with strong reasons; so that it is not to be hastily taken for granted, as our brethren propose to do, that the form of baptism is here referred to as an emblem of the burial of Christ. But admitting that it is, the allusion is not to the form alone, but also to the import of the rite. Now the Baptist prefers his word in this place merely to give exclusive prominence to the form, as if that alone were embraced in the figure. He insists on putting "immersion" for "baptism" here, that he may concentrate the reader's attention on the act of immersing, and on the resemblance between the act and the burial of Christ, as the only reason why the ordinance of baptism is referred to at all. He puts a living body into the water, and lifts it instantly out, and calls that act an imitation of laying out the dead body of Christ in the spacious vault of Joseph of Arimathea! And then, what a jumble of ideas follows on: Buried with him by immersion under water, that like as he was raised from the dead, so we (to keep the figure whole) should be raised up out of the water. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death; i. e. buried under water as he was buried in the tomb; we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection; i. e. we shall be raised up out

of the water! We do yet feel a confidence that our brethren will not risk their reputation as Biblical scholars amidst a nation of criticising and sagacious idolaters, upon so evident a distortion of plain Scripture and of common sense.

The case of 1 Cor. x., 2, the last we shall here mention, presents a difficulty which our brethren, as we should apprehend, would find to be insurmountable. "And were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea."

The first two verses of this chapter are generally supposed to be susceptible of only the interpretation which is, for substance, this: "To persuade you, brethren, to the greater diligence and perseverance in the Christian life, and to secure you the more against a fatal relapse into idolatry, we would remind you of the awful example of the Israelites, who all signified their belief in the true God, and in the divine authority of Moses, by committing themselves to the protection of the cloud, and marching under the direction of Moses through the Red Sea. As it is said in Exodus xiv., 31, 'And the people feared the Lord, and they believed the Lord and his servant Moses.'" This we suppose to be the true interpretation. The Israelites' solemn submission to Moses on that occasion, was a declaration of faith in God, equivalent to that which the Christian makes in submitting to the ordinance of baptism. The allusion is to one of the significations of the rite, namely, its import as a declaration of faith. There is no reference to the actual administration of baptism in any form whatever.

The Baptist Bible is to read, "And were all immersed unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea." The doctrine is, that "baptize" means only *to dip, plunge, immerse;* and it must not be taken metaphorically here, because the baptism must be made out to have been an actual event. We understand baptism to be mentioned here, instead of the thing signified by it. Being baptized unto Moses means, in our view, declaring belief in Moses. But our brethren insist that the ordinance itself, as well as the faith it signifies, was there at the Red Sea; and that there was consequently an immersion. "The cloud," says Dr. Gill, "passed from before them over their heads and stood behind them, and as it passed it poured down rain upon them," Ps. lxxvii., 17. Thus with the cloud successively before and behind them, and the wall of waters on either hand, and dry ground beneath, they were completely immersed. This was verily like plunging a person into water!

We feel strongly tempted to rally our brethren upon their supposed observance of an ordinance of Christianity, thousands of years before Christianity was introduced, and some time before any Jewish type of Christianity was established; and upon their supposed administration of that ordinance to two or three millions of people in the mass, with their cattle too, and all the appendages of that immense caravan; and upon their supposed immersion in a cloud, instead of proper water, while all stood on dry ground; and upon their not being dipped or plunged into the element, but the

element being brought and placed upon them; and, more than all, upon the baptism of thousands of children, for which the Baptist feels such instinctive abhorrence;—but considering that this is not a theme nor occasion for trifling, we proceed to state what we deem the insurmountable obstacle which the passage before us throws in their way.

To put "immersed" in the place of "baptized," and for the reasons assigned, will make the passage a contradiction of historical fact. The thing which our brethren mean by their term was not done. There is no intimation that a sole of the people's feet, or a hair of their head, was moistened during the whole of that wonderful transaction. They went through the midst of the sea "*upon dry ground.*" All our impressions of that complete preservation and deliverance lie against the idea of their having been touched by water on that occasion at all. As to the cloud, there is no proof of its having been a watery vapour; and its luminous appearance by night, together with its manifest independence of atmospheric impulse, gives strong ground of presumption that it was essentially supernatural. The thunder and rain mentioned Ps. lxxvii., 17, were more natural and probable concomitants of the violent reflux of the waters upon the Egyptians, than of the quiet and safe transit of the Israelites over the dry bed of the sea. Where then was the immersion? When the Birman reader of the Baptist Bible comes to his minister for an explanation of this passage, what explanation can be given that will consist at once with Baptist exegesis and historical fact?

It is improbable that the jealousy and opposition of an intelligent idolater will suffer such palpable discrepancies to pass unobserved. The Bible is ever to encounter the depraved ingenuity and learning of the nations to whom it is sent; its entire structure is to be repeatedly and sagaciously scrutinized, and every word disputed, which admits of plausible contradiction. Especially so, since the heathen nations are to receive the gospel in connexion with those facilities for general learning, which now exist in unprecedented fulness, and which have ever kept science far in advance of religion, throughout the civilized world. Christianity will unmake idolaters faster than it will make Christians. It will discredit idolatry; it will persuade many to abandon their false religion before they are prepared to adopt the true. Hundreds will throw off the yoke of idols before they will take up the yoke of Christ; and, free from the bondage of superstition on the one hand, and the restraints of true religion on the other, they will revel in the intellectual licentiousness of infidelity. Such men are the most formidable enemies of the Bible in heathen countries. The missionary encounters in them an obstacle, the most discouraging, perhaps, that hinders his success. Such men will abound in Birmah; and it behooves Christians to shun the needless exposure of their lively oracles to the cavils of these industrious and ingenious enemies.

We now respectfully invite the attention of our brethren of the

new society to the unanimous concessions of their own writers, as to the meaning of the word βαπτίζω. And as these concessions relate equally to this word and to βάπτω, its reputed root, we shall here take the two words together. We shall regard them as synonymous, although eminent scholars insist, and we think with some good reasons, upon a difference between them. Especially since the Baptists themselves insist on the synonymy, we are willing to yield them all the advantage of the concession. In the following remarks, therefore, we treat the two words alike.

Gale, in the midst of his quotations from classic authors (Reflections on Wall, p. 104), after adducing the most decisive passages, says: "There are other passages somewhat akin to these, which seem, however, to leave a little more room for the objections of our adversaries; where, though the word is used, it appears, by other circumstances, that the writer could not mean *dip* by it." He then quotes Aristophanes, representing an old comedian of Athens as practising the Lydian music, and making plays and (βαπτομενος βατραχειος) *smearing himself with tawny paints.* He quotes also Aristotle, saying of a certain colouring substance, that when it is pressed (βαπτει) *it stains* the hand. He represents these uses of the word as metaphorical. But how can a man of sense talk so? To smear or tincture the *mind* as Marcus Antoninus says thoughts do, and to stain the *character*, are metaphors. But to smear the face, or stain the hand, is as literal a form of speech as can be employed. To stain may be a secondary or derivative sense of βαπτω, but not a metaphorical. *To understand* signified at first merely *to stand under;* and, as a term of literature, denoted the translation or explanation of a book placed line for line under the text. By the natural progress of language, it came to be said that perceiving the nature or the meaning of a thing was the *understanding* of it. And now, if to speak of understanding a matter, is to speak in a metaphor, there is nothing but metaphor in any language; for except technical terms, and a few words of very uncommon use, scarcely any words in any language retain their original signification. To stain, then, is one of the senses of βαπτω, and by Gale's own showing, is used in a case where "the writer could not mean *dip* by it." The word, therefore, does not always mean *to dip.*

The same writer quotes from Aristotle, respecting the ground beyond the pillars of Hercules, which was not *baptized* at ebb-tide; and on that use of βαπτίζω he accords the following admission, p. 117. "The word, perhaps, does not so necessarily express the action of putting under water, as, in general, a thing's being in that condition, no matter how it comes so; whether it is put into the water, or the water comes over it; though indeed to put into the water is the most natural way, and the most common, and is, therefore, *usually* and *pretty constantly*, but it may be *not necessarily* implied." The word, then, may mean the application of water to the subject, and not of the subject to the water.

Again, page 137, he says that in the Apocrypha and the Septuagint Old Testament, the words βαπτω and βαπτιζω occur in but twenty-five places; in eighteen of which they undoubtedly mean *to dip*. Well: and what do they mean in the other seven? On Lev. xiv., 6, where a living bird, a bunch of cedar wood and hyssop and scarlet, were to be dipped in the blood of a single bird that was slain, he remarks: "We readily grant there may be such circumstances, in some cases, which necessarily and manifestly show the thing spoken of is not said to be dipped all over." P. 138.

Put together now these three concessions, and they are enough. First, the word does not always mean to dip or plunge, but may signify actions of another kind entirely. Second, it does not necessarily imply that the thing or person baptized is applied to the water, but the water may be brought up and put upon the subject. Third, it does not in all cases imply that the thing baptized is entirely covered with the water, but it may denote a partial application. That is to say, the words permit the form to be other than dipping, they permit the water to be applied to the subject, and in less quantity than to cover the body. So says a strenuous Baptist; and he concedes all that the Pædobaptists contend for; enough surely to give his brethren no small trouble in their work of translation.

This writer also found great embarrassment from the use of βαπτω by the Septuagint in Daniel iv., 33 [30] and v., 21. He is the only Baptist whom we recollect to have set himself in earnest to conquer this difficulty; and after long and bitter complaint against the license of the Greek translators, the substance of his evasion is this: page 142, &c. As the word is acknowledged on all hands to mean *primarily* and generally *to dip*, there can be no difficulty in determining its meaning in this place. For, since the Greek word commonly and properly signifies *to dip*, and is put for a Chaldee one of undoubtedly the same meaning, it must be very natural to judge that to be the true sense, and what the writer here intended. And further, as a part of Nebuchadnezzar's dominions lay in Africa where the dews were remarkably copious, he must, by lying out all night like a beast, have become drenched with dew; and the word βαπτω is used to show that he became very wet; "as wet as though he had been dipped!"

We refer our readers to the six pages which Gale devotes to this quibble, as a curiosity; and we do it with the greater emphasis, from the high authority of that writer among the Baptist denomination. He was undoubtedly a man of talents and learning. The work to which we refer won for its author a high reputation among the English dissenters of his day, and gained him great and merited influence among his own people. But we can feel little respect for an opinion which rests for any part of its support on such artifice and systematic cavil as is pursued in that book.

In short, the current qualification of the Baptist forms of speech,

in relation to the meaning of the words in question, concedes all that our argument requires. Gale qualifies his general assertions by saying "immersion is its *proper and genuine* sense. Constantine *almost* always renders it so." "In eighteen places out of twenty-five in the Septuagint, Old Testament and the Apocrypha," says he for substance, "it means *to dip*, and in the other seven it does not, to say the least, mean *to sprinkle* or *to pour*." The Christian Review for March, 1837, says, "While the English language was yet in its crude elements, *to baptize* meant *ordinarily* to *immerse or dip*." The report of the board of managers of the American and Foreign Bible Society says, "When the Anglicized Greek word *baptize* was admitted into the English language through the influence of the Roman hierarchy, it was then *almost* universally understood to mean immersion." The same report appeals "to profane Greek authors; to Josephus and Philo among Jewish writers, to all the lexicographers, to the Septuagint, and to the most learned of all the commentators, all of whom *admit the primary rendering* which we give to the word βαπτίζω."—Pp. 26, 27. The Christian Review reiterates Dr. Owen's concession, "that the *original and natural* signification of the word is *to dip*, *to plunge*, *to dye*." We respectfully ask the writer of the article from which the above is quoted, whether his eye ever fell on Dr. Owen's assertion "that *no one instance* can be given in Scripture in which the word *baptize* does *necessarily* signify either *to dip* or *to plunge*." The same work quotes also Dr. Hammond's opinion, "that it signifies *not only* the washing of the whole body, ... but *washing any part*, as the hands, by immersion in water." It appeals also to Dr. George Campbell, who "maintains that immerse is *very nearly* equivalent to baptize in the language of the gospels." "The pious and learned men," says the same work, "whose authority Booth has so copiously adduced in his Paedobaptism Examined, could see only immersion in the *primary* signification of the word." "We are of opinion" (we quote still from the Christian Review) "that the idea contained in the word baptism, as used in the New Testament, cannot be *adequately* expressed by any single word in our language. It means more than immersion." "We are prepared to show that all versions, in languages using the Roman character, were made with the express understanding, that βαπτίζω was transferred and not translated, because there did not appear to be, in those languages, words of an import fully equivalent." Carson, an eminent writer on baptism, acknowledges, that in adopting immersion as the *only* meaning of baptism, he has the lexicographers and commentators against him.

As we wish to judge our brethren out of their own mouths, we adduce only such expressions as abound in Baptist writers; and we have multiplied our quotations to show how freely they admit the thing we claim: that βαπτίζω does not exclusively signify *immerse*, and that *immerse*, *dip*, *plunge*, no one, nor all of them, in the English language, nor any word corresponding to them

in other languages, would be full equivalent for *baptize*. When the question recurs, then, on the meaning of the word as the name of the Christian sacrament, and appeal is had to the original and general senses of the term, what is the result? Is the question decided in their favour? Their proposed translation is simply an argument for their mode of baptism derived from the meaning of the term. Is the argument sound? Is its conclusion so far beyond dispute, that it may be incorporated in the translated text of inspiration, and made a part of the true and infallible word of God? Mark the logic. The Baptist admits that the word baptize means sometimes to put water on a part of the body, and then translates it by a word which signifies to put the whole body into water, and adds his assertion that this is the only rendering which the word will bear! We hazard nothing by insisting that the question is yet unsettled in their favour; that the argument against their doctrine remains in all its force, and that they hold those views of the sense of that word, as expressed in their translation, against their own free and candid concessions, and "the almost universal suffrage of what is called the Christian world."

We meet our brethren, therefore, at this point, with these two dissuasives against their course:

First, they assume the point which they have failed to prove. Their sole reason for changing the name of baptism is that their interpretation of the name has been called in question; and they must give it a new name because they cannot silence the objections to their peculiar use of the old. If baptize had only one meaning and that were undisputed, the word would suit them still. But they find their opinion disputed, refuse to argue the point any longer, and proceed to cut the Gordian knot which they could not untie. They leave us in full and quiet possession of all the ground we fought for, and quit the field in a manner not clearly compatible with dignity and self-respect. They go on to translate the word according to their views, while they leave their recorded testimony in favour of ours. For let it be remembered that the Paedobaptist doctrine on the philological point is simply that the word will not, *in all cases*, bear their sense. We do not insist that it means only *to sprinkle*. We do not contend that baptism may not be performed by immersion; but that it is not confined, by the meaning of the word, to immersion. This is the point in controversy; and our charge against our brethren is, that they first concede this point, and then assume the opposite.

Second, they propose to translate the Bible on principles which their own reasonings do not uphold. It is certainly incumbent on the Baptist to prove, or, at least, to believe himself, that baptize signifies only immerse, and neither more nor less, before he proceeds to put it, in every instance, out of the Bible, and put immerse in its place. But this he neither proves to others, nor believes himself. We hear him say, "that immerse, dip, plunge, no one of those, in the English language, nor any words corresponding to

them in other languages, can be a full equivalent for baptize." The most he claims is that these words express the *primary, original, ordinary, general* sense of the term. What then is he to do? The word must be translated, but how? On his own principles, what but a circumlocution will represent its meaning fairly. He must have a "faithful version" of the word; but he has no terms to make it of, as he himself admits, and still he persists in translating the word, though he strips it, in the process, of a portion of its sacred import.

After all, when we consider that baptize has been appropriated, and that any other word would soon become equally so, the change of terms seems unnecessary and unavailing;—unnecessary, because this term may serve the Baptist as well as any other; unavailing, because the Paedobaptist can serve himself as well with any other as with this. What forbids the Baptist's associating invariably with the word baptize the sense which he thinks it ought exclusively to retain? And suppose the change effected, in all the versions of every sect, would not the new name convey the same idea to the Paedobaptist mind as the old? The name would not define the rite, but the rite the name. Immerse, were that the substitute, would be taken from the common vocabulary, and inserted on the list of theological terms. No one would go to the classical dictionary to find its technical meaning. We should go to theological books for that; and when the Baptist has chosen his terms, the world will employ them as they do the terms now in use. If baptize means immerse, then immerse means baptize, and both will unchangeably denote the ceremony "of washing with water in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." We should no more speak of the Christian immersion in the ordinary sense of immersion, than we now speak of a baptism of hands and garments that are cleansed by washing, or of a pastor of sheep and cattle.

We tender to our brethren the fraternal admonition, that they will never satisfy any large portion of the intelligent Christian world with their reasons for shaping a religious ceremony, having its specific character and design, by the original and general sense of the term chosen to denote it. We wonder that such signal and solemn stress should have been laid on the sense of this word, as determining the form of the institution of which it is the name. How has it happened that this zeal for circumstantials has not seized on the Lord's Supper, and wrought the form and time and circumstances of its observance into minute conformity to this name of the institution? Do our brethren test the validity of their eldership by the *primary* and *general* signification of the name? How do they render ποίμην in their new translation so as to retain exclusively the original and primary sense of the word? And επίσκοπος and πρεσβυτερος? How do they translate certain names of weights and measures? "No man lighteth a candle and putteth it under a bushel." Have λυχνος and μοδιος precise synonymes in Birmese? If not, how can they translate them? We understand the Baptist

translators have borrowed many words from various languages to express their scriptural ideas in the Birman language; and particularly, that they have transferred the word ευαγγελιον entire into their version!! The Greeks translate מוּל by περίτεμνω; the Latins by circumcisio; we, by circumcision; all the translations conveying, in the primary senses, ideas which have no connexion with the Hebrew original. Perhaps the Baptist translators, in their "faithfulness," are giving us the broad Birmese and English of the rite, and making the name a literal definition of the ceremony. What but this are they proposing to do in relation to baptism? Why, in that particular instance, do they cling with such pertinacity to a particular and primary sense of the word? Is baptizing a person in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and with sole reference to a spiritual cleansing, synonymous with sinking a stone in the pool, or a ship in the sea, or plunging one's self, for health, pleasure, or personal cleanliness, into a bath? Does the resemblance require both to be called by the same name? and must the name express, in either application, only those ideas which are common to both? What would such principles make of the church, its pastors, its preaching and its other sacrament? Will the brethren tell us how, in their view, the Lord's Supper can be valid, observed in the morning or any time of day before dinner; and with the least assignable quantity of the elements, instead of the full meal which the name implies? Our respected brethren must perceive some weight in the consideration that they are translating the Bible on principles which they themselves acknowledge to have but a partial support; and to proceed on such grounds to alter the received version of the holy Scriptures, or to disturb the long settled agreement of protestant Christendom in the principles of translation, would be an act of presumption, the discredit of which they must be reluctant to incur.

Having extended our remarks on this branch of our subject to an unexpected length, we have but small space for observations on the sectarian policy of the Baptist translation.

Our remarks on this point are prompted by sincere desire for the prosperity of that portion of the Baptist denomination who hold what we receive as the fundamental doctrines of the gospel. We seek their unity, purity, and success. We make common cause with them, and should feel their adversity to be our own affliction.

The recent movements of the Baptists in this matter threaten the brethren concerned in them with *mutual alienation and division.* They are now under one of the very common temptations which beset active and conscientious Christians. They propose a measure tending to separate, not the good from the bad, the pure and the living from the worldly and dead; but brethren of equal purity and conscientiousness from one another. The measure, in its present shape, had its origin in the Baptist minority of the board of managers of the American Bible Society. Some of these

members of the board seem to have encouraged the Baptist missionaries abroad to change the Biblical terms relating to baptism, with the promise that their friends in this country would stand by them. The translations made thus in advance of the general action of the American Baptists in relation to them, presented a strong and insinuating appeal to the denomination for vindication and patronage: and the leaders in the board, from whom the missionaries seek counsel and direction, were fully committed in their favour. Many copies of the New Testament had been printed. The translations had cost great labour, and the preparations for printing them great expense. It was not, therefore, in its naked form that the question of a Baptist translation came up, but in the insidious garb of a proposition to support translations already in existence, and to sanction the arduous and self-denying labour which their devoted missionaries had already performed. A great work had been done, and the question before the people was, sustain, or not sustain. The zealous response of the Baptists throughout the land to this proposition, expressed only the instinctive repugnance of human nature to anything like retraction. The translations must go, or the mortified missionaries and their friends must retrace their steps and return to the old ways. A part of the brethren saw and contemplated the scheme of translation, apart from its disguise; and maintained the caution which is the parent of safety. Another part were strenuous to prosecute and finish what they had begun. We see, then, the deliberate and vigilant wisdom of one party pausing before the immovable objections to a sectarian version of the holy Scriptures in any language; and the pledged, impassioned zeal of the other, pressing with more success than consideration towards its mark. The tendency of such a state of things towards a final division is inevitable. That the whole power of the denomination will go for the translations we have notorious reason to doubt; that the brethren should relinquish their purpose, though by no means impossible, is opposed by the preference of human nature for its own way; and hence we perceive causes at work here, more powerful than have sufficed in other cases, to rend the bonds of brotherhood, and alienate those who once were, and ought ever to be friends.

The serious bearing of a *sound economy* upon the project is worthy of consideration. Whether regarded in their particular circumstances as a sect, or in their office as stewards of the Lord in common with all the churches, they have no means to squander. As a denomination, they have peculiar reason to husband their resources. The number of their missionaries in the field, and the expense of sustaining them, bear a larger proportion to their available means than any other denomination in the land. They have peculiar need of an educated ministry, but no endowed institutions to assist in creating one. Their zeal for a new enterprise is gathering upon their Bible society an amount of patronage which must diminish their appropriations to other objects; and

even should they sustain their other institutions with undiminished liberality, they owe it to themselves, as a sect, to bestow their means on objects more appropriately Baptist. The work of Bible translation and distribution will be an exhausting process; the same amount of work done must cost them more, and avail them in the end less, than if done by the American Bible Society.

By a Baptist version of the Scriptures they will *create a new distinction* between them and their brethren, which will be greatly to their own disadvantage. When two sects of professed Christians cease to acknowledge a common standard of appeal in religious controversy, they have nothing in common; their fraternal interest in each other loses its foundation, and the last cord that held them in mutual fellowship is broken. This remark has full illustration in the case of Catholics and Protestants. Now after long acquiescence in the received translation of the Bible, the benefits of which they have shared in a measure which themselves acknowledge to be fully equal to that of their brethren, the Baptists raise complaints against the common version, and put forth a version of their own. The reproach of this fundamental disagreement will, in all candid views, attach to the instigators of it. The rupture will require a stronger apology to justify it before the world, not to say before God;—stronger than they have yet presented, or we can invent in their behalf. Either the substituted version is fully equivalent to the one displaced, or it is not. If it is, why was the change necessary, if not, how is it justifiable? With no pertinent and conclusive answer to this natural appeal, our brethren will stand apart from their fellow believers, in a spirit and position, which may be more easily accounted for by the infirmities of our fallen nature, than vindicated by the dictates of truth and enlightened conscience.

We respectfully appeal to our Baptist brethren, whether *the spirit and the occasion of their rupture with the American Bible Society* be such as, in their own view, ought to command the approbation of the Christian world. That institution was not formed on a compromise of religious opinions. No man was required to renounce his peculiar views of truth as a condition of membership. There was a fair understanding that the different denominations composing the society should stand on common ground in regard to the copies of the Scriptures they would circulate. Hence they excluded "note and comment," and in the same spirit, confined themselves either to the common English version, or to such versions as conform to that in the principles of their translation, "at least so far as that all the religious denominations represented in the society can consistently use and circulate said versions in their several schools and communities." And what other ground could such an institution assume? We press this question upon brethren, and seriously demand an answer. Yet in the face of this vital principle of the society, our Baptist friends obtrude the proposal that their sectarian Bible be taken up and circulated

by the society at the expense, not of the money of the institution merely, which were a small matter, but of the cherished and known preferences of their brethren of the other persuasions! Having made a version differing, in their own estimation, as widely from the common version, as the Baptist denomination differs from the others, they demand for it the patronage of all the other denominations concerned in the society. And they reproach their brethren with sectarianism for withholding it! The Baptist minority in the board of the American Bible Society, in their protest, gravely charge the society's versions with "*purposely withholding the truth* by non-translation or ambiguous terms, for the sake of accommodating Paedobaptists;" and they charge the society's measure with "withholding from the heathen the word of life and suffering them to hasten to the retributions of eternity, without the knowledge of God and the way of salvation, simply because the volume it is proposed to give, contains the translation of a single term to which only Paedobaptists object,"—in other and proper words, is a Baptist bible. To which only Paedobaptists object! A trifling objection truly; made by a proportion of three to one in the board of managers, and of more than twenty to one of all the patrons of the institution. And then the "withholding:"—A single Baptist pertinaciously thrusts his dogma into the path of twenty conscientious and devoted Bible distributors, and charges them with withholding the word of life from the perishing heathen, because they prefer not to distribute his "note and comment" on the Bible. When an intelligent Christian public shall pass deliberate judgment on such a course our respected brethren will not think it unreasonable, if they fall under its pointed censure.

It may be as unnecessary as ungrateful to our brethren to be admonished that their zeal in this matter has overshot its mark. If an enemy of theirs had consulted the surest method of wasting the denomination throughout the world, he could have chosen no one more effectual than the step which they, of their own accord, are now taking. Not content with explaining the received text of the law and the testimony touching their peculiar practice, they risk the reproach of shaping the text itself to their views. Such is the aspect of their proceeding before the Christian world. So it will be understood and received. They resolve to have no longer any standard of ultimate appeal in common with the other protestant sects, and making for themselves a Bible as peculiar as their creed, propose an appeal to that as an end of all strife. And then what have they gained? Have they a better weapon for either self-defence or conquest? They before had the important advantage, which at times they triumphantly recognise, of a translation *made by Paedobaptists*, which, by its accidental and undesigned "faithfulness" to truth, has so lively a Baptist tinge, "that any reader whose mind is not warped by prepossession, discovers nothing but immersion for baptism in the New Testament;" a translation "which any person, understanding its language, and ignorant of

its origin, would presume to have been made by Baptists, and caused to speak favourably to their side."* And what, in the name of the fiercest sectarianism, would they have more? Must they be so straight as to bend the other way? Will they forego the choice advantage of a Baptist Bible made by Paedobaptists, for the low pleasure of making one of their own? We would cordially bid them God speed in their enterprise, but for the painful persuasion that they war against their own life, and the more they succeed, the more they will fail.

We are aware that most of our remarks on the sectarian policy of our brethren in their late proceedings appeal to a standard for which they feel, perhaps, little respect;—the standard of the enlightened sentiment of the Christian public; and we may be met with the reply, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." But those of our brethren who have reached the point where they presume on the exclusive patronage of the Head of the church, despise the approbation and courtesies of the Christian brotherhood, and feel themselves above fraternal counsels, are past recovery; and their future course is but too faithfully traced in the history of fanaticism in other days. We hope better things of them, though we thus speak. Not very remote from the line of history through which the Baptists trace their origin, stand the records of instructive events, bearing strong resemblance to things which seem now to be coming to pass. The light of the past sometimes reveals the future. In some awakening enterprise of a large and prosperous sect, the most ardent members go too fast and too far for the rest, and the bonds of union in the body become tensely drawn. All parties, being conscientiously committed, must hold their ground; and after long commotion, there comes forth from the agitated mass a select and close communion of the reformed. Upon its straitened faith, its expurgated ceremonies, or perhaps its "faithful version" the little band concentrates and exhausts its burning zeal; until, through an exclusive and impassioned bigotry for its distinctive article, it lets go the essential truth of the gospel and dies. The whole field of ecclesiastical history is strewed with the ashes of such dead, and no part more thickly than the quarter occupied by the Baptist denomination.

Our brethren will doubtless notice that we join the project of an English version with that of a translation for Birmah. We have taken them together, because they cannot, either in theory or practice, be kept apart. If the Baptists can consent to use the common English version in this country, while they make such conscientious ado about the foreign versions corresponding to that in the principles of their translation, we shall be forced to entertain a disrespect for their consistency which we cannot now think them capable of deserving. The objections against a Baptist version in English lie

* Christian Review, No. 5, pp. 38, 39.

with all their force against a Baptist version in Birmese. We hold that the world, to use a homely simile, is a free country. Do the brethren dream that, of all the powerful denominations of Christendom, none but the Baptists are to engage in giving the Bible to the "four hundred millions" whom they so modestly call their proper beneficiaries? And when two or more versions come out in Birmah or in China, what will hinder their being even far more mischievous than conflicting translations would be here?

To our own minds, then, the points embraced under this head seem abundantly clear: The Baptists consider themselves as now entering upon the work of giving a Baptist Bible to all the world; and in this work is, of course, embraced the project of an altered version in English; they are prompted to this step solely by their zeal for the form of one of the external rites of Christianity; they beg the whole philological question, and incur irreparable injury to themselves.

The few remaining thoughts we have to offer are suggested by the presumption of our brethren on the speedy prevalence of Baptist principles and practice throughout the world.

We judge this presumption to be general among them from such demonstrations as these: They speak of their obligation and purpose to give the Holy Scriptures "faithfully translated" to all the world. They express entire confidence that all Christians will "see eye to eye" on the subject of baptism. Their measures are professedly prospective of the rapid progress and universal prevalence of Baptist influence in both Christian and pagan lands, and they speak of preparing a Bible for the "four hundred millions," as though the whole work rested, under God, on Baptist shoulders. No one can read the declarations of their zeal and purposes, without perceiving the deep tinge which this presumption gives to all their expectations of the progress of religion.

This circumstance, above all others, proves the strength and solemnity of their denominational partialities, and the remarkable ascendency of sectarian preferences over the Baptist mind. Papists and Baptists are, so far as we know, the only existing sects who arrogate for their peculiar dogmas the dignities and destinies of "the truth;" and who mean, when they speak of the triumph of the truth, the conversion of all the world to their views. We are struck with the deep coloured ground work of the following picture from the report of the board of managers of the American and Foreign Bible Society, pp. 50, 51. "Your board of managers are deeply afflicted when they reflect, that although the Bible and parts of the Bible have been *faithfully* translated; . . . . . and every facility is possessed to distribute thousands of copies every year among the inhabitants of India; . . . . . and although it is indisputable that Baptist missionaries have translated the Bible into the languages spoken by more than one half the nations of the earth,*

* Do not Paedobaptists dispute the faithfulness of the translations, and do not the Baptists' own concessions dispute it?

and the *faithfulness* of their versions has never been disputed; yet the Calcutta, the British and Foreign, and the American Bible Societies have peremptorily *refused to aid* the Baptists in giving to those benighted nations the *unadulterated* revelation of the eternal God; without which, as every reflecting mind must be aware, thousands will be annually sacrificed upon the altars of idolatry, and sink for ever to the abodes of despair."

The *unadulterated* revelation of the eternal God is the Baptist Bible. Do the brethren mean to say that versions corresponding to the received English translation cannot enlighten those benighted nations? Probably not, upon reflection; but we give their words. Perhaps they mean to convey the idea that theirs are the only translations existing in the languages spoken by those nations, and the alternative is, to give them a Baptist translation, or leave them to perish. But who created this alternative? Suppose the converse of the case they state. The Paedobaptist majorities in those societies have conscientious objections against circulating, by their own agency, the peculiar views of the Baptists; even though the vehicle for circulating those opinions were to be what they call *literal and faithful* versions of the Bible. If now in the providence of God the Baptists stand in the Thermopylae of those "four hundred millions" of heathen, with their translations of the Bible, and refuse to give us access except on the submission of our consciences to theirs, who are they that deprive the heathen of the Word of God; that stand in the gate of the vineyard neither entering in themselves, nor suffering those who were entering to go in? If then through the delay occasioned by this controversy, thousands of heathen should perish in darkness, would not all candour assign, at least, a moiety of the blame to our brethren who so freely roll the whole upon others?

Further: "Upon their (these societies') conduct in this case, we pause not now to animadvert. To their own master they must stand or fall, in that day when every man shall be judged according to his works. 'Some years since,' say the Baptist missionaries in Bengal, 'three of the Paedobaptist brethren, unknown to us, though on the most friendly terms with us, wrote to the Bible Society in England, requesting them *not to give assistance to any Indian versions in which the word 'baptize' was translated 'immerse.'* NONE OF THESE MEN LIVED TO SEE THE REPLY TO THEIR APPLICATION."

Solemn warning! The deed and the curse of Korah! And not a hair of the head of a Baptist hurt by the visitation! How evident and awful a judgment, sent on men who sought to keep back a part of the Word of God from the perishing heathen! It is only here and there, indeed, that this large vein of Baptist fanaticism comes so near the surface; but such language shows that it belongs to the system. The italics and capitals above given are all their own.

"The board of managers are satisfied that the providence of

God has made it the duty of Baptists *to give to the whole world a faithful translation of the whole Bible;* and that, as a denomination, we cannot decline this labour of love, and yet remain guiltless. In closing their report, the board of the American and Foreign Bible Society . . . desire to feel, that if to promote the glory of God and the salvation of men, be indeed the highest aim and paramount duty of every Christian, then does no common responsibility devolve on this society."

No responsibility, that is to say, which is common to all denominations; but a peculiar one devolved, by the providence of God, upon the Baptists to give the whole world a faithful translation of the whole Bible. In other words, the Baptists are under a most awful responsibility to give the whole world the Baptist meaning of *βαπτίζω*.

"Let every talent be brought into solemn requisition, and let us resolve, in the strength of the Lord, never to cease from our work, until all nations read in their own tongue, the wonderful works of God." That is, until all nations shall have translations in which the name of baptism shall not be a foreign word. The world will never be enlightened until the ordinance of baptism is called no longer in the Bible by a Greek name. This is the evident drift of these quotations. We might quote from numerous writers and speakers to the same effect; but the specimens given above will suffice.

Now that our Baptist brethren, as a denomination, are to be the sole instrument of these beneficent achievements, is not to us a *very* clear and direct matter of divine revelation. Their assurance must rest largely on the probable tendency and progress of religious events in the world; and we proffer to them a few of the suggestions of history, as hints of Divine Providence on this subject.

One point in history on which the Baptists vehemently insist, is that the apostles and first Christians were Baptists to a man. Some assert with strong assurance, that in the days of Paul, the Baptists were the sect everywhere spoken against, as the steadfast friends of the *voluntary principle*, in whatever pertains to religion.* There was an early division of Christians into different and contending sects, the heads of which appear to have been strenuous on some points connected with baptism.† But we presume our brethren do not assign to their primitive ancestry a place among those who received Paul's genuine Paedobaptist rebuke on that occasion, and who were admonished that circumstantial differences about baptism, was no good ground of mutual dissension. Nothing is heard of these Baptist divisions, however, from that time to the reformation. The line of their history soon after its commencement runs under ground, as the river Jordan, in whose waters those first Baptists

* See speech of Rev. S. H. Cone, at the opening of business in the American and Foreign Bible Society, 1837.

† 1 Cor. i, 11–17.

were made, is said to do near its source. There are hints, indeed, of immersion during the dark ages, as in one instance, when the pope led a splendid procession at a baptismal celebration chanting the words, "As the hart panteth for the water brooks;" on which occasion *several children* were immersed three times each.* On the emersion of their history into public view at the reformation, behold almost the whole nominal Christian world had imbibed the Paedobaptist errors; and of those who bore the Baptist name, or its cognate Anabaptist, there were at least six sorts as different from each other as can well be imagined. One sort placed the essence of baptism in the virtue of the person baptized; a second, in the form of words; a third, in the virtue of the administrator; a fourth, in the consent of the subject; a fifth, in dipping; and a sixth, in the profession of faith and dipping united.† This last division of the Anabaptists were the true Baptists, from whom sprang all the subsequent modifications of the sect.‡ From that time to the present, while the Baptists have had a respectable representation in the aggregate piety of the Christian church, the modifications of the sect have multiplied indefinitely. Indeed the question of baptism has thrown the Christian world into two divisions, in both which are to be found corresponding diversities of doctrine and order almost without end. It sounds strangely therefore to our ears, to hear Baptists, as such, assume to be the exclusive proprietors of truth. Who are the Baptists? By what comprehensive term can we describe them? What system of either doctrine or practice do they hold in common? They seem to us the least adapted as a community to constitute the one spiritual body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth. That they, as Baptists, are the true and only church whose destinies are celebrated by prophetic inspiration, and to whose doctrine and practice, as truth advances, all Christendom is to conform, our brethren themselves in the calm intervals of their baptistic raptures do not pretend. The history of baptism suggests to our minds almost any other thing as strongly, as the idea of pecuilar purity of Christian principle connected with immersion. And yet this very connexion of immersion with truth and holiness is the basis of Baptist exultation and confidence. Their sanguine expectations of the future spread of Baptist principles would lead any one, who did not know better, to suppose that every candid and humble inquirer after truth and duty found the binding necessity of immersion too obvious to be mistaken; that every degree of spiritual improvement in the church was accompanied with a scrupulous submission to dipping; that in every revival of religion, each sweep of the gospel net drew its entire contents into the water; and that all the brightest rays of biblical learning and sound philology converged towards the Baptist contraction of

* Benedict's History of Baptists, i., 69. Robinson's History of Baptism, p. 65.
† Robinson's Hist. Bap., p. 453.
‡ Benedict, i., 94.

βαπτίζω. But our eyes have not yet discovered such a tendency of things; and if our brethren deliberately believe it exists, their convictions can have little to do with either argument or fact.

In connexion with this presumption of our brethren that their principles are to be the principles of Christendom, we cannot but notice a similar feature of their state of mind in regard to other points. It would be matter of amusement, were it not a case of so painful exposure to the danger of self-deception, to hear our brethren pronounce so confident judgment on the comparative merits of their versions of the Scriptures. "Our principle," exclaims the president of the American and Foreign Bible Society, "is the true one. . . . That the Bible may be an *intelligible guide*, it must be *faithfully* translated by *sound philologists*, not by selfish sectarians." In other words, it must be translated by Baptists; *par eminence*, the sound philologists of Christendom, the pure, unbiassed, unsectarian sect of all the world! Our brethren must consider that the world will take these expressions in their proper connexion with the acts of those who make them, and will not forget that the Baptists, while thus declaiming about the necessity of a sound philology in translating the Bible, are making translations professedly for all the world.

Since the preceding part of this article was prepared, we have received a paper containing the resignation of four Baptist members of the board of managers of the American Bible Society, together with a brief exposition of their reasons for resigning their places. It is a dignified document, and professedly dispassionate, and will be good authority for the principles it holds and the statements it makes in the name of the denomination. We apprise those brethren that they fail in presenting a plausible vindication of their course by complaining, as they do, that they have not stood on equal ground with the other denominations represented in the board. They plead for indulgence in regard to their version, on the ground that the society has patronized Paedobaptist translations, and without molestation from the Baptists. We have good authority for asserting that this is not a fact. The secretary of the American Bible Society has publicly denied that the society has ever intentionally patronized a single denominational translation. "A small edition," says the secretary, "of a Seneca gospel was once published, where βαπτίζω was translated to *wet* or *sprinkle*. But this was wholly unknown to the board until years after the work was issued; and, when known, was disapproved of by every member. And as to patronage bestowed unintentionally on denominational translations, our brethren must well know that many thousands of dollars had been appropriated by the board to assist in publishing a Birmese version of the Scriptures, that this version had been prepared by Baptists and according to their views, while the Baptist character of the translation was unknown to the board, until incidentally revealed to them by a letter from an English missionary in Calcutta." They have had their share then of uninten-

tional indulgence;—the only kind of indulgence granted to any denomination in the board. This part of their ground of complaint is, therefore, imaginary.

They next assert that the American Bible Society has directly violated its constitution, by adopting the English version as a standard, *in any sense*, for foreign translations. The only specification of the constitution which relates at all to their case, is: "The only copies in the English language to be circulated by this society, shall be of the version now in common use." The constitution, it seems, says nothing of the principles of translation, as though the work of translation was not contemplated by the institution. Nor does it say anything of the character of foreign translations to be adopted and circulated by the society. And how can a constitution be violated in a matter of which it says nothing? If the Baptists began to co-operate with the society under the impression that the constitution bound the board to patronize any particular foreign translations of the Scriptures, it was their unfortunate mistake. And it would better become them, now that they have learned their error, to acknowledge the correction, and go quietly on in their good work. We wonder at their great ado about the rejection of their translation. That board have no power to prevent any man or sect, from making such and so many versions of the Scriptures as they choose. If our brethren must have a Baptist version, and must circulate it, they are free to do so. It is at their option whether to give their money to the Bible Society, for the distribution of such translations as that institution patronizes, or to expend a part or the whole of their means upon versions of their own. It seems to us entirely without cause, and a great inadvertence in our brethren, that they have given the board of the American Bible Society so much embarrassment and pain, for such reasons. Nothing could more clearly prove their utter misapprehension of their claims on the American Bible Society than their comparing the resolutions in question with a papal decree. What has the society done, what can it do, what would it do, to hinder the Baptists from circulating their own Bibles, and in their own way, provided they did not enforce their measures on their brethren of other persuasions? Does the constitution of the American Bible Society bind the board to patronize the Baptist Bible? How then can the constitution be violated by their declining to do so? But, says the paper before us, "The managers' address, contemporaneous with the constitution, contemplates the circulation of the Scriptures in foreign lands, in the received versions where they exist, and in the most faithful where they are required." "On these principles, the Baptists entered most heartily into the labours of the society." Now *first*, the managers' address is no part of the constitution of the society. It stated what they deemed themselves competent to do under the constitution, in circumstances then existing. But a declaration of the board at another time, varying from that, as circumstances might require, would be equally constitutional. If,

therefore, the board *had* departed from the professions of that address, it could not easily be shown to be a direct violation of the constitution." But, in the *second* place, have they departed in this case from even those professions? "Received versions" there were none. Translations were to be prepared, and then "received;" and the condition which would hold the board to use them is, that they be "most faithful." But who is to judge of their faithfulness? Do our brethren deem themselves competent to judge in this momentous matter for all the Church? and have they the face to demand submission to their judgment from all the denominations concerned in the American Bible Society? We were never before prepared to suspect it. Do they "see themselves as others see them" in this case? To parry the force of this rebuke, they say, the faithfulness of their version has never been questioned. It *is* questioned. The known and unchanged principles of the Paedobaptist world are a standing denial of the faithfulness of the Baptist version. The Baptists' assertion is not correct, that Paedobaptists defend their views "on the ground of convenience merely, regarding the mode of an external rite as a matter of indifference." We do not defend our views on that ground merely, nor mainly. We found our opinions on what we consider just biblical exegesis. The reasonings pursued under the philological head of this article, are substantially the basis of the Paedobaptist views of the form of baptism, while the arguments from convenience, and the insignificance of the form of an external rite, are used only as the finish of the superstructure. The concessions, as our Baptist brethren call them, of our greatest scholars, are no concessions of the point in dispute. They only grant that the *leading primary* signification of the word is what the Baptists have it. The whole question still remains, whether the word has any other signification; and, if it has, whether it admits that other sense as the name of the Christian ordinance. And, pending this whole dispute, can they assert that the faithfulness of their version is unquestioned? And how can they insist on deciding so delicate a matter for the world, in the name of brethren whose opinions they are not permitted and do not pretend to represent?

They say, that the Bible Society does not deny the faithfulness of the Baptist versions, in vindication of their proceedings. It is true. Like wise men, they forbear pronouncing judgment directly on the opinions of other men, and content themselves with the ample vindication afforded them by other principles. In this forbearance, we cordially commend them to our brethren as examples.

The paper above referred to, by its grave and positive air, has convinced us more deeply than ever of the solemnity of the trouble into which our Baptist brethren have fallen. We feel painfully confident, that this step is not in advance of the previous state of the Church towards the spiritual union and glory of the latter days. It brings the Baptists to a position to which the increase of sacred learning and zeal in the different denominations

of Christendom, produces no legitimate approximation, and in which the union and fellowship of that sect with others is, by the nature of things, impracticable.

We offer these plain thoughts to such of our brethren as may read them, in the earnest hope that their effect, if they have any, may be only good. The Baptist views of baptism we do not hesitate to disapprove, and, on all proper occasions, to oppose. We believe those views to be formed on principles which, if carried fully out into all the departments of religious belief, would lead to fanatical and ruinous error. At the same time we have little fear of the increase of this spice of fanaticism in the midst of so much good sense, intelligence, and piety, as this branch of the denomination at present embraces. We heartily wish them success. Our prayers and good wishes follow them, while, even as Baptists, they preach Christ crucified to the heathen. Let them give full but judicious scope to their principles. Let them immerse all Birmah and Hindostan, and make the Meinam and the Ganges, to their converts, what they believe the Jordan was to the primitive Christians. We shall enjoy their success. As for what we deem their error, it will, we hope, for the present, cost no heathen his salvation; and if ever the time shall come when the spirit of Paedobaptist missions finds nothing better to do, than to urge its operations among the effects of Baptist labours, we anticipate no grievous obstacle from the pre-occupation of the heathen mind with the necessity of immersion. Our brethren admit a natural and general apostasy from their practices, in the early churches; and so rational and scriptural an apostasy can, in due time, be effected again. For such reasons as these, if for no others, our brethren will acquit us of the charge of jealousy, and believe us sincere in good wishes for their success in converting and immersing the heathen. We would if we could, dissuade them from their translating enterprise, for what we humbly consider their own good, as well as for the cause of truth. We do fear that they persist at their cost. The lessons of history, their own concessions, the reason and good sense of mankind, and, as we think, the dictates of truth are against them. They are disguising and obscuring the truth. They are fixing a sectarian spot on the disk of the sun of righteousness, which will destroy a part of his healing beams, and give vexatious employment to the inquisitive and searching telescopes of pagan infidelity for generations to come.

ESSAY XVII.

THE ENGLISH BIBLE.*

It is now three centuries since Miles Coverdale completed his great plan of translating and publishing the entire Bible in the English language. The sermons before us are in commemoration of this interesting event. They are sensible, well written discourses, on an important topic, and richly merit the pains that have been taken to give them an extensive circulation. From the celebration of the first English version, the authors have taken occasion to direct the attention of the public to the history and merits of the one now in use. Though very unlike in their style, they are equally admirers of this noble monument of the learning and piety of our fathers, and have done a valuable service to the cause of truth by presenting in such a forcible manner its claims to the confidence of the community. The ripe scholarship evinced by one of these sermons, the earnestness of the other, and the good sense and piety of both, will cause them, we trust, to be very generally read, and thus to be the means of correcting the erroneous opinions that are prevalent to some extent on the subject of which they treat.

These sermons are the more acceptable at this time, because a disposition has been manifested of late to disparage the received translation of the Scriptures. From a contemporary journal† we learn that the Rev. Dr. Jonathan Homer, of Newton, Massachusetts, has been some forty years "seeking to improve the text of the common version." We are not entirely certain that we understand what is meant by this *improved text.* In the ordinary

* Originally published in 1836, in review of the following work: 1. "The English Bible. A sermon by the Rev. John W. Nevin, of the Western Theological Seminary

2. "The History, Character, and Importance of the received English version of the Bible. A sermon by the Rev. William Adams, New York."

† In the Biblical Repository for 1835, is an article on the subject of English versions of the Scriptures generally, to which is appended an extract of five or six pages with the following notice by the editor: "At the close of this article, we are happy to present the following communication from the Rev. Dr. Jonathan Homer, of Newton, Massachusetts, a gentleman who has given long and indefatigable attention to this subject, and who is more intimately acquainted with it than any other individual in the country."

acceptation of that term, a perfect text of any author is one which gives the ipsissima verba of the original autograph. In no department of letters have more acuteness and industry been displayed than in the collation, for this purpose, of different editions of ancient authors sacred and profane. Labours of this kind are of the utmost importance, especially in sacred literature; and their necessity has by no means ceased since the introduction of the art of printing. The utmost vigilance cannot prevent some misprints from creeping into a work that has gone through so many hundred editions as our common version of the Bible: and each mistake of this kind is not confined, as in transmission by manuscript, to a single copy or to the few which may be transcribed from it, but is perpetuated through many thousands of copies. To remedy this evil, Dr. Blaney undertook, near the close of the last century, to publish a text which should be perfectly accurate, and might be safely followed, in all future editions, as a standard. This was issued in 1769, under the direction of the Vice-Chancellor, and delegates of the Clarendon press, at Oxford. But, notwithstanding the extreme care and labour bestowed upon this edition, there have since been discovered in it no less than one hundred and sixteen errors, some of them of importance. The most perfect edition of our translation is said to be that given in 1806, by Eyre and Strahan, printers to His Majesty. But one erratum has as yet been discovered in it. It is, therefore, probably the nearest approximation that will ever be made to an *immaculate text.* If, however, Dr. Homer has authenticated copies of all the principal editions, and has in other respects the means and the abilities for giving a more thorough revision than that of Dr. Blaney, or a more accurate print than that of Eyre and Strahan, we would be the last in the world to discourage him from his long cherished purpose of "improving the text of our common version."

But if we may judge from the materials which he has collected for his work, this is not precisely what he contemplates. His attention has been directed not to the collecting of different editions of the common version, but of copies of the different versions. Those to which he has had access, as detailed by him through several not very intelligible pages, are Matthew's Bible of 1537, Cranmer's of 1539, the Great Bible of 1541, a New Testament dated 1552, a Coverdale's Tindal of 1551 or 1561, the Bishops' Bible of 1568, and the common version made in 1611. Each of these versions, he says, renders particular passages correctly, and in accordance with the views of *the great modern critics.* His plan, therefore, appears to be, to select from each version those passages which have been rightly translated, and to combine them in one perfect whole which shall throughout express the exact meaning of the original, and be in good English idiom. That this is what he means by "seeking to improve the text of the common version" will be manifest from the concluding paragraph of this remarkable communication.

"Each translation has its special good renderings, corresponding with the best modern critics. The Bible of 1537 best agrees with Gesenius, Stuart, and the richest portions [those taken from other authors?] of Rosenmüller. It was executed by the three first Hebrew, Greek, and English scholars, and thorough Germans, ever known among the several translators. The New Testament of Rogers's Bible, 1537, and Coverdale's Tindal, 1551, and Tindale's first Testament of 1526, are in English idiom, and they are executed most in conformity to the latest and best biblical critics. From the whole, with the consulted aid of more than two hundred critical works, including the sources of each translation, I have long been seeking to improve the text of the common version."

What Dr. Homer proposes, then, is not by a collation of the different editions of our translation to give an improved text of the same, but by comparing different translations and by various other "consulted aids," to give *a new improved translation*. The ground for this bold attempt, as well as the manner in which it has been conducted, will be evident from the following passages.

"I have employed myself, for a portion of eleven years, in collating and comparing each of these Bibles and Testaments with each other, with the originals, with the principal versions and comments and lexicographers of the three last centuries, to the present date. I have compared them also with the notes which I began to collect, at the age of seventeen, from the books of Harvard College library, and which have been accumulating for fifty-eight years, following my collegiate course. Prompted by the conscientious religious motive of the venerated, learned and indefatigable German, Bengel (obiit, 1752), for about forty years, I have paid critical attention to various readings in both Testaments, of Hebrew and Greek text, and of ancient respected versions, and have examined the authorities for and against them individually. I have endeavoured, particularly, to mark those in which the old English versions and the orthodox, or those of James's creed among the learned, are agreed, with few or no exceptions. I have found as the result, that the Cranmer Bible, the Bishops' Bible, and the King James' Bible were not independently rendered. . . . King James's Bible was under the control of the very arbitrary King James and his Primate, men of strong prejudice and of no Hebrew, if any Greek learning—mere Latin scholars. It is, throughout, a version drawn from other versions and comments, not exceeding twenty. It was carried on with the felt early loss of their two greatest scholars, Hebrew Professor Lively, and the President Dr. Reynolds. . . . These two Bibles [the Cranmer Bible, and the Great Bible] differing little from each other, I have also collated in all their parts, and traced them successively to their sources—other than the original. So I affirm of King James's Bible, this is in no part a new translation taken directly from the originals. Those parts of King James's Bible which were drawn from Luther, were not taken by them from the German Bible, but by the early translators, from whom they borrowed the English version. This I have everywhere traced to the English, French, Latin or German versions, which preceded it. This circumstance I found proved by a full exploring of the New Testament in 1828. It has since been confirmed in every book of the Old Testament."

When such statements as these are sent forth to the world as the oracles of wisdom, when Dr. Webster's *expurgated* edition is recommended to the public by the high authority of the Faculty of Yale College, when even the Temperance Society cannot be advocated or the gospel preached without such constant parade of modern criticism and such frequent corrections of the received translation as to shake the confidence of the people in its accuracy,

we hail with pleasure the publication of these sermons by Mr. Nevin and Mr. Adams, and hope they will go far to counteract what we cannot but consider erroneous and dangerous opinions.

We had supposed the masterly discussions consequent upon the publication of the extravagant assertions of Mr. John Bellamy in 1818,* and the overwhelming array of evidence internal and historical then brought forward by Whittaker, Todd, Lee, Hurwitz, and Townley, and by repeated articles in the London Quarterly, Antijacobin, and Eclectic Reviews, had put the question of the competency and fidelity of King James's translators for ever at rest. We are not a little surprised then at such an unqualified impeachment of both by one who is introduced to the public as better qualified to speak on the subject than any other individual in the country, and who from his tone and manner evidently would not think the eulogy misplaced. Our translators themselves say of their version that it is "translated out of the original tongues." But Dr. Homer has discovered that this is a falsehood—that our version was drawn from "sources other than the original" that it "*is in no part a new translation taken directly from the original.*" He is so certain of this that he has even given the precise date of the discovery, "in a full exploring of the New Testament in 1828." And he not only affirms that their work was not as they say, "translated out of the original tongues," but argues that it is impossible it should be so, they being "under the control of the very arbitrary James and his Primate, men of strong prejudice, and of no Hebrew, if any Greek learning—mere Latin scholars." That is to say, the translators have published a deliberate falsehood on the very title-page of their great work: and either falsehood, or less information concerning them than we now possess, must be charged upon those of their contemporaries who have represented them as the most learned, pious, and venerable company that were ever united in any one great literary undertaking. The more we consider these assertions, the greater is our amazement. There is no fact in history better ascertained than that the men called upon in 1607

* The sources of information on this subject, and on the subject of English translations generally, are Fuller's Church History of Great Britain; Lewis's History of English Biblical Translations, prefixed to his folio edition of Wickliffe's New Testament, 1731; Johnson's historical account of the several English translations of the Bible, originally published in 8vo. 1730, and reprinted in the 3d vol. of Watson's Theological Tracts; Newcombe's View of the English Biblical Translations, 1792; Horne's Introduction, vol. 3d; Mr. John Bellamy's new Translation and notes, 1818–21; London Quarterly Review, vols. xix and xxiii; Eclectic Review, vol. 10, N. S.; Antijacobin Review, vol. liv.; Todd's Vindication of our authorized Translation, and Translators, 1819; Whittaker's Historical and Critical Inquiry into the Interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures, 1819, and supplement, 1820; Prof. Lee's Letter to Mr. Bellamy, 1821; Hymen Hurwitz' Vindiciae Hebraicae, 1821. All these between 1818 and 1821 were called forth by the misrepresentations in the Introduction and notes of Mr. Bellamy's translation. For information respecting the particular lives of the different translators, the reader is referred to Townley's Illustrations of Biblical Literature, and Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary, unless he is disposed to glean for himself from Fuller, Camden, Antony Wood, &c.

to translate the Holy Scriptures were men eminently qualified for their task, and that they did translate directly from the original Greek and Hebrew. Where they found any passages already correctly translated in any of the existing versions, conveying the exact idea of the original, and in good English, they did not of course wantonly change the phrase, and thus give unnecessary offence to the people, all whose prejudices would be in favour of that to which their ears had been accustomed, We have always admired the wisdom of that part of the King's instructions relating to this subject. The translation then most commonly in use was to be followed with as little alteration as was consistent with fidelity to the original. When it was found to vary from the original, and the true meaning had been expressed by any one of the earlier translations which were still in use, they were then to adopt its phraseology, Their compliance with this part of their regulations contributed we doubt not in no small degree to that unparalleled popularity which this translation almost immediately received, and has to this day retained; a popularity so great that all the preceding translations, though of acknowledged excellence, have gradually passed into disuse, and are now so rare that the possessor of some four or five of them, trumpets it over the land as a literary curiosity. In adopting this course, those men did what any man of sense would now do who should attempt to give a new translation of the Bible. They did precisely what Dr. Homer himself proposes to do. They adopted the "special good renderings" of each existing translation, and where they found none such they made one. This was, in full justness of speech, giving a new translation; and so is what Dr. Homer calls "seeking to improve the text of the common version." The thing aimed at in both cases is precisely the same. The only difference is, that in the present case, it is one irresponsible, unknown individual, who takes upon himself the important office, without any urgent necessity, unsolicited by any public body, and untrammelled by any established rules. In the other case, it was a numerous body of the most illustrious scholars, maintained at the public expense, enjoying the public confidence, and summoned to the work by the Head of a mighty nation hungering for the pure Word of God.

The translation of the Scriptures is not a work to be intrusted, except from imperative necessity, to any one man, however gigantic may be his attainments or his genius. *Dormitat aliquando Homerus.* Though he may give a "special good rendering" in one place, he may give a special bad one in another. Hence the number of translators employed by King James adds greatly to the authority of their work. What is overlooked or omitted by one, may be observed or supplied by another. Although fifty-four men who knew nothing of Greek or Hebrew might not have the authority of one who did: yet when, as in the case of our translators, all of them were men of learning and ability, and some of them pre-eminently

and proverbially so, the largeness of the number does give a security from mistake which nothing else can. Every one has his peculiarities of character and opinion which fit him for some particular duty, and disqualify him to a certain extent for every other. The man best suited to translate the Psalms of David would not be the one we should select to translate Paul's Epistles, nor either of these to translate those parts relating to the details of Solomon's temple, or of the Levitical ritual. Great attention was paid to this in allotting to the several translators their respective portions, each receiving that for which he was best qualified. By this means all the advantages, arising from division of labour in the execution of the details, were secured; while by another admirable regulation, by which each man's work when finished had to be submitted to the inspection and judgment of all the rest, individual peculiarities were prevented from running into extravagance, and harmony preserved throughout the whole.

The time in which our translation was made was peculiarly fitted to secure one which would become, as it has, a common standard. At the first outbreak of the reformation, the errors of the church of Rome were not all immediately dissipated. Like the mists of the morning, one error after another gradually disappeared before the steadily increasing light of day. It was a century at least before the Reformed Churches were fully purified from that polluting superstition which had equally defiled the doctrines, the rites, and the language of religion. The exasperation, likewise, consequent upon the first separation from the Church of Rome was exceedingly great on both sides, and did not soon subside. Had our version, then, been made at an earlier period, it could not so admirably have escaped the opposite dangers of being in some parts unintentionally tinctured with anti-Papal prejudice, and of savouring in others of the still existing leaven of Mother Church. The agitated waters of the Reformation had subsided, and the pure fountain of truth was left undefiled by the pollutions both of its turbid and its stagnant state.

It was, too, that precise time when the zeal of Protestants had ceased to be zeal against the Pope, and had not begun to be zeal against each other. Protestantism was still to a great extent one and homogeneous. The different sects into which it was divided were sufficiently jealous of each other to prevent the improper favouring of any one set of opinions, and yet not so widely apart as to forbid all co-operation or concurrence. The lines of demarcation were not so strong and well defined, nor the barriers so impassable as they have since become. The work, therefore, is not sectarian in its origin or its character. It is in the strictest sense a national translation. It is the acknowledged and established standard of every denomination except the Roman Catholics and some few Unitarians. No translation now made could ever become this. The Presbyterians, the Associate Reformed, the Dutch Reformed, the Lutherans, the Congregationalists, the Metho-

dist Episcopalians, the Protestant Episcopalians, the Baptists, and the Quakers, of this country; the Church of England, the Church of Scotland, and the various bodies of dissenters in Great Britain and elsewhere, speaking the English language, will assuredly never unite for this purpose; and a new translation put forth by any one denomination will never be adopted by the rest. If Dr. Homer thinks that all these will lay aside their sectarian jealousies, and that more than thirty millions of people will free themselves of their deep rooted prejudices in favour of Bible phrases to which their ears have been accustomed, out of respect to his select "special good renderings," his opinion differs greatly from ours, as to the attractiveness of an "improved text of the common version." We cannot persuade ourselves that any such improvement would gain the public confidence, even though made from the accumulated "notes" of fifty-eight years "with the consulted aid of more than two hundred critical works," and agreeing "with Gesenius, Stuart, and the richest parts of Rosenmüller."

The age in which our translation was made was pre-eminently a learned age. In science and the arts, that in which we live is, we admit, greatly beyond its predecessors. But so far as learning and scholarship is concerned, we do affirm there never has been an age equal to it. There never was an age distinguished by so many illustrious scholars in every department of classical and biblical learning. Where do we go for profound original information on Latin, Greek, or Oriental Literature? Where are the great storehouses from which our modern bookmakers draw their Lexicons, their Grammars, their Commentaries? Was Melancthon "a mere Latin scholar?" Did Roger Ascham know nothing of Greek? Were Erpenius, and Golius, and Pococke, unacquainted with Arabic? Was Hebrew a dead letter to such men as Buxtorf, Morinus, Pagninus, Arias Montanus, Tremellius, Junius, Beza, Castell, Walton, and Pool? Where is the public Library three-fourths of whose volumes on sacred philology are not dated in the 16th and 17th centuries? We find in this period among the magnates of Oriental and Classical learning, besides those already mentioned, such names as Budaeus, Erasmus, Turnebus, the Scaligers, P. Manutius, Aldus Manutius, the younger Casaubon, Fagius, the Morelets, Gesner, Fabricius, Morus, Glass, Capellus, Grotius, Usher, Lightfoot, Montfaucon, Vossius, Heinsius (father and son), Bochart, Meursius, Robert and Henry Stephens, all of them scholars of the very highest order; to say nothing of the incomparable divines, and illustrious authors of every sort and in every nation who flourished during the same period. Now though all these were not living at the time our translation was made, yet a majority of them were contemporary with the translators; and they show the general character of the age, that it was the age of great men, especially of great scholars. The eighteenth century excelled it in science and works of taste. But for men of profound erudition, beyond all contradiction there never was such a period since the

foundation of the world. The turn which the Reformation took, and the great controversies between the Papacy and its opposers, appealing at every step to the original languages of Scripture, made Greek and Hebrew what politics is now, the great absorbing topic of the world. Critical editions of the Bible and of Classical authors were published on a scale and in a style utterly unparalleled. The immense Thesaurus of the Greek language by Henry Stephens, the Rabbinical Lexicon of Buxtorf, the Arabic Lexicon of Golius, the Hierozoicon of Bochart, the twelve folio volumes of Meursius on Grecian Antiquities, are but specimens of the thorough-going manner in which the scholars of that day handled every subject which they attempted. It is impossible even to glance at their productions without a profound admiration of their scholarship, only equalled by our amazement at the effrontery which would call it in question. Their very printers were learned men. Even their books of devotion are so crowded with Greek and Hebrew that many a sciolist of these days could not read a page in them without his Lexicon and Grammar, who yet would not blush to call himself a scholar, or to attempt with some "consulted aids" to make a new translation of the Bible.

In England, especially, the learned languages became so much a matter of universal concern, that acquaintance with them was considered one of the accomplishments of the drawing-room. Fuller tells us it was one of the elegant pastimes of fashionable ladies, and of the daughters of the principal nobility, to translate select passages from the original Scriptures for the inspection of their friends. Queen Elizabeth, we know, spoke familiarly Greek and Latin. And it is said, though we know not on what authority, that some of the old Puritan divines were accustomed to use their Hebrew Bibles and Greek Testaments at their family devotion morning and evening.* Indeed, so proverbial were the leading Reformers in Great Britain, whether conformists or non-conform-

* This was originally the custom in Harvard College. "The President inspected the manners of the students thus entertained in the College, and unto his morning and evening prayers in the hall, joined an exposition upon the chapters which they [the students] read out of Hebrew into Greek from the Old Testament in the morning, and out of English into Greek from the New Testament in the evening." . . . . "The Fellows resident on the place became Tutors to the several classes, and after they had instructed them in the Hebrew language, led them through all the liberal arts." "When he [Mr. Nathaniel Mather] was but twelve years old, he was admitted into the College by strict examiners: and many months after this passed not, before he had accurately gone over all the Old Testament in Hebrew, as well as the New in Greek. . . . . He commenced bachelor at the age of sixteen, and in the act entertained the auditory with an Hebrew oration, which gave a good account of the academical affairs among the ancient Jews. Indeed the Hebrew language was become so familiar with him, as if (to use the expression which one had in an ingenious elegy upon his death) he had apprehended it should quickly become the only language." When he took his second degree three years afterwards, besides more than ordinary attainments in other branches of learning, "he had likewise made no small Proficiency in Rabbinick learning; and the questions referring unto the Scriptures, which philology is conversant about, came under a very critical notice with him." He died shortly after, aged but nineteen years and some months. See Cotton Mather's Magnalia, Vol. II., pages 9 and 133 of the Hartford Edition.

ists, for their learning, that the Romanists, when no longer able to compete with them, endeavoured to ridicule them as mere scholars. Dr. George Hakewell, a contemporary, in a work first published in 1627, says, "This latter age hath herein so far excelled, that all the great learned scholars, who have of late risen, especially if they adhered to the Reformed Churches, have been by friars and such like people, in a kind of scorn termed *grammarians*. But these grammarians are they who presented us with so many *exact translations out of Hebrew and Greek into Latin*, and again out of Latin into other languages. To which may be added the exquisite help of dictionaries, lexicons, and grammars, in this latter age, beyond the precedent, not only for the easier learning of the western languages, Latin, Italian, Spanish, and French; but especially the eastern, the Hebrew, the Chaldee, the Syriac, the Arabic. Of all the ancient fathers, but only two (among the Latins, St. Jerome, and Origen among the Grecians) are found to have excelled in the Oriental languages; this last century having afforded more skilful men in that way than the other fifteen since Christ." Now is it probable that, only twenty years before this testimony was written, the monarch of an enlightened nation, himself proud of being thought a learned man, and ambitious to effect a version of the Scriptures that might be quoted as the great glory of his reign, should not be able, out of fifty-four of the principal scholars in the kingdom, including the Hebrew and Greek Professors of the Universities, and the most distinguished heads and fellows of the several Colleges, to obtain any learned and honest enough to "translate directly from the originals?" But laying aside all probabilities, what are the known facts of the case as recorded by unquestioned contemporary historians? Who were the venerable men called by King James to this celebrated undertaking? Many of them, it is true, with the unobtrusiveness of genuine scholars, never pushed themselves much into public notice; and the most we know of their individual history is a mere catalogue of their works, and their preferments, gathered from public records, and from the incidental notices scattered through the authors of that period. But of others we have full and detailed information. And of all, we know enough to be fully borne out in the assertion before made, that a more learned and pious assembly the world never saw united in any one literary undertaking.

Some of the names about to be introduced are so familiar to scholars that it would seem necessary to apologize for dwelling upon them at all. The extracts, however, which we have given from one "who is more intimately acquainted with the subject than any other individual in the country," show that a somewhat detailed account of these men is not, as we had supposed, entirely a work of supererogation.

William Bedwell was one of the most eminent orientalists of his time. His fame for Arabic learning was so great that he was

resorted to by Erpenius, during his residence in England in 1606, for directions in his oriental studies. He was Arabic tutor also to the great Dr. Pococke. He commenced the preparation of a general Arabic Lexicon in 3 vols. folio, and having proceeded in the work for several years, he went to Holland for the greater perfection of it by a collation of the papers of Joseph Scaliger, who had made a collection of twenty thousand words in that language. In consequence of the vastness of the design, and the slowness with which he proceeded in it, he was anticipated in the publication by the Lexicon of Golius, the completeness of which made his labours abortive. Eight or nine volumes of the manuscripts of this great work were employed by Castell in the compilation of his unrivalled Polyglot Lexicon. Bedwell also commenced a Persian Dictionary, which he did not live to complete. He published an edition of all the Epistles of John in Arabic with a Latin translation, which was printed in 4to, in 1612 at the press of Raphelenigus. In 1615 he published another work entitled "a discovery of the importance of Mahomet and the Koran;" to which is appended a very curious illustration of oriental etymology and history called "the Arabian Trudgman." He left at his death many Arabic manuscripts to the University of Cambridge with numerous notes upon them, and a fount of types for printing them.

Miles Smith is remarkable as having been the penman of the "Translators' Preface." Such was his profound knowledge, especially of the languages, that he was called "a very walking library." He applied himself from early youth with great assiduity to the reading of the classics, and was very extensively read in the Greek and Latin Fathers. He was accurately versed also in Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic; and was well acquainted with Rabbinical literature generally. Having taken successively the several Academic degrees at the University of Oxford, he was finally promoted, as a reward for his eminent services in the translation of the Bible, to the see of Gloucester, which he continued to adorn till his death.

Richard Brett "was," says Anthony Wood, "a person famous in his time for learning as well as piety, skilled and versed to a criticism in the Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Chaldaic, Arabic, and Ethiopic tongues. He was a most vigilant pastor, a diligent preacher of God's word, a liberal benefactor to the poor, a faithful friend, and a good neighbour."

John Boyse was the son of a clergyman by whom he was taught the first rudiments of learning, particulary of Hebrew. His mother, whose memory he greatly venerated, appears to have been a woman of piety and information. At the beginning of a Common Prayer Book he wrote: "This was my mother's book; my good mother's book. She had read the Bible over twelve times, and the Book of Martyrs twice, besides other books not a few." With an excellent capacity, and under such parents, his progress in know-

ledge was considerable, and before he was five years old he had read the whole of the Bible; and before he was six could write Hebrew in an elegant hand. At fourteen he was admitted of St. John's College, Cambridge, where he distinguished himself by his knowledge of Greek; and applied so diligently to his studies, that we are told he would go to the University Library in summer, at four o'clock in the morning, and remain till eight in the evening without intermission. Happening to have the small-pox when he was elected Fellow, to preserve his seniority he caused himself to be carried, wrapped up in blankets, to be admitted. He was ten years chief Greek lecturer in his college, and read every day. He voluntarily read a Greek lecture for some years at four in the morning in his own chamber, which was frequented by many of the Fellows. Having received several ecclesiastical perferments, he died in 1643 in the 84th year of his age, leaving behind him a great many manuscripts, some of which were afterwards printed.

Sir Henry Saville was a learned man and a great benefactor of learning. Born to an ample fortune, he spent it all (upon the loss of his only son) in the advancement of knowledge. He founded two Professorships at Oxford, which are still called by his name. He published at vast expense many valuable works, among others the splendid edition of Chrysostom's Works of 1613, in 8 vols. folio, which alone cost him no less than eight thousand pounds. His various contributions of money, of rare books and manuscripts, of founts of type to public presses and Libraries, caused him to be considered as the great Maecenas of the age. He was at one time Greek Tutor to Queen Elizabeth: and James had such a regard for him, that he would have given him almost any preferment. Saville, however, declined, accepting only the honour of knighthood. He was Fellow, and for thirty years Warden of Merton College, in which station he acquired great reputation. He was afterwards chosen Provost of Eton College, and greatly increased its fame by the learned men with which he filled it. The kind of scholarship which he aimed at and patronized may be judged of from this: "Give me," he used to say, "the plodding student. If I would look for wits, I would go to Newgate. There be wits."

Andrew Downes was one of the learned men whose notes accompany Sir Henry Saville's famous edition of Chrysostom's works. He was Regius Professor of Greek in Cambridge University, and was accounted one of the best scholars of his time.

Launcelot Andrews made such early proficiency in knowledge as secured for him promotion almost immediately after his entrance as a student at Cambridge. When thirty-four years of age he was chosen Master of Pembroke Hall, in which station he continued for sixteen years. After that he was made successively Bishop of Chichester, Ely, and Winchester. He took a conspicuous part in the conference at Hampton Court; and was remarkable for the

seriousness of his manner, "his gravity awing King James, who refrained from that mirth and liberty, in the presence of this Prelate, which otherwise he assumed to himself." He was a most indefatigable student. The annual visit which he paid, while at the University, to his parents at Easter, was always spent in the acquisition of some new language or art with which he was previously unacquainted. By his unremitting attention to study he rose to be one of the most distinguished scholars of his age. Fuller says of him: "The world wanted learning to know how learned this man was; so skilled in all (especially the Oriental) languages, that some conceive he might, if then living, almost have served as interpreter general at the confusion of tongues."

John Laifield. "Being skilled in architecture, his judgment was much relied on for the fabric of the Tabernacle and Temple."*

Richard Kilbye was educated in Lincoln College, where he was successively Fellow and Rector, and after some ecclesiastical preferments was appointed Hebrew Professor in the University of Oxford. He was at one time Tutor to the celebrated Bishop Sanderson; and Izaak Walton, in his life of that distinguished Prelate, relates an interesting anecdote of him. "Dr. Kilbye, an excellent critic in the Hebrew tongue and Professor of it in the University, a perfect Grecian and one of the translators, going into the country, took Mr. Sanderson to bear him company. Being at church on Sunday, they found the young preacher to have no more discretion than to waste a great part of the time allotted for his sermon in exceptions against the late translation of several words (not expecting such a hearer as Dr. Kilbye), and showed three reasons why a particular word should have been otherwise translated. The preacher in the evening was invited to the Doctor's friend's house, where after some other conference the Doctor told him he might have preached more useful doctrine, and not have filled his auditors' ears with needless exceptions against the late translation: and, for that word for which he offered that poor congregation three reasons why it ought to have been translated as he said, he and others had considered all of them and found thirteen more considerable reasons why it was translated as now printed."† To how many of this day might it be said, *mutatis mutandis, de te fabula narratur.*

William Spencer, Greek Lecturer in Trinity College, and afterwards chosen to be Professor of Divinity in Gresham College, London, on the recommendation of the Vice Chancellor and several heads of Colleges at Cambridge, several of the nobility, and of King James himself, who thought it a suitable recommendation for one of the translators of the Bible.

John Harmar was Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford, for nine years Chief Master of Winchester School, and seventeen Warden of the College there. He translated Beza's Sermons into English, and several of Chrysostom's works into

* Fuller's Church History. † Johnson's Historical Account.

Latin. He was well read in the Fathers and Schoolmen, so that he held public disputations with some of the celebrated Catholic Doctors during his travels on the continent.

Thomas Holland took his degrees in Exeter College, Oxford, with great applause; at the age of fifty was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity in the same, and three years after elected Master, "being accounted a prodigy in almost all kinds of literature." He appears to have been a man as eminent for his piety as his learning. Towards the close of life he spent a great part of his time in meditation and prayer. "Come, O come, Lord Jesus, thou bright morning Star! Come, Lord Jesus: I desire to be dissolved and to be with thee," was the dying exclamation of this aged servant of God.

John Reynolds. "His memory was little less than miraculous, he himself being the truest table to the multitude of voluminous books he had read over, whereby he could readily turn to all material passages in every leaf, page, volume, paragraph, not to descend lower to lines and letters."* He was originally a Papist, and his brother William a Protestant; but engaging in disputation they mutually converted each other, which gave rise to the following distich.

> Quod genus hoc pugnae est? ubi victus gaudet uterque,
> Et simul alteruter se superasse dolet.

He was selected for his great abilities as the Protestant Champion in the famous dispute with the Popish controvertist Hart, whom he obliged to quit the field. In 1603 he was nominated one of the Puritan divines to attend the Conference at Hampton Court; and afterwards, because of his uncommon skill in Greek and Hebrew, one of the translators of the Bible. Before the completion of this laborious undertaking he was seized with the disease of which he died. He continued his assistance, however, even to the last. During his sickness, his learned coadjutors in Oxford met at his lodgings regularly once a week to compare notes. As he approached his end his whole time was spent in prayer to God, in hearing persons read, or in conferring with the translators. He died at length in the 68th year of his age, a man greatly venerated for his learning, piety, humility, and disinterestedness.

Mr. Edward Lively, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University, and said to be profoundly learned in the Oriental languages, also died before the completion of the great work.

Laurence Chaderton was of a Popish family, and by turning Protestant so enraged his father, that he not only disinherited him, but "sent him a poke with a groat in it to go a begging." Dr. Chaderton declining, from his great modesty, the mastership of Emanuel College then about to be founded, Sir Walter Mildmay, the donor, from his great esteem of the man, said, "If you will

* Fuller.

not be master of the College, I will not be its founder." He resigned the mastership after having held it with credit thirty-eight years. He was strongly opposed to Arminianism, and was one of the Puritan divines nominated by King James to attend the Hampton Court Conference. Chaderton was noted for his strictness in the observance of the Sabbath. He would never allow his servant to be detained from public worship to cook victuals. "I desire as much," said he, "to have my servants know the Lord, as myself." Being once on a visit to his friends in Lancashire, he was invited to preach; and having proceeded in his discourse full two hours he paused and said, "I will no longer trespass on your patience," upon which all the congregation cried out, "for God's sake go on, go on." He died at the extraordinary age of 103 years, and could read without spectacles to the last.

Those who wish to follow out this subject will be abundantly gratified by a reference to the works mentioned in a previous note. We had intended to give a similar brief sketch of each of the translators, but are obliged to desist. Suffice it to say, that of the twenty-five employed in translating the Old Testament, it is matter of record that thirteen were men eminently skilled in the Hebrew and Oriental languages, including six who were or had been regular Hebrew Professors in the Universities. Of the translators nearly all had received Fellowships in early life because of their great proficiency in learning. There were among them fifteen who were or had been Heads of Colleges, five Vice Chancellors of the Universities, three regular Greek Professors in the Universities, seven Divinity Professors, one Archbishop, and seven Bishops. They were remarkably aged men. One venerable father was eighty; others were upwards of seventy; and indeed the average age of all of them, so far as ascertained, was considerably more than sixty. This fact is worthy of observation as leading us to understand more fully the peculiarly venerable impress which is stamped upon every lineament of their work. This would be still further explained, could we enter into more full details illustrating their eminent piety and heavenly mindedness. But our limited space will not permit us to dwell longer on this subject. Enough has been said surely to show the egregious mistake of those who call in question the qualifications of those great men, and represent our version as the antiquated relic of an unenlightened age.

The internal evidence that this translation was made directly from the originals, that, namely, resulting from a careful examination of the work itself, is a part of the subject upon which it does not seem necessary now to enter. The fact is so clearly established, and the misrepresentations of those who have denied it have been so frequently exposed, that it seems hardly worth while to revive objections merely to answer them. Dr. Homer does indeed profess to have made some recent discoveries, having proved the contrary "by a full exploring of the New Testament in 1828." But as he has given no intimation of the proofs which led him to

this conclusion, we must decline adopting or even discussing it, although supported by the authority of one "more intimately acquainted with the subject than any other individual in the country."

The history of our version is soon told. The idea was first suggested at the Hampton-Court Conference in 1603. Dr. Reynolds, being of the number opposed to conformity, who were summoned to attend, among other things giving us a high opinion of his piety, said: "May it please your Majesty that the Bible be new translated, such as are extant not answering to the original," and he instanced three particulars. Bancroft, Bishop of London, objected. "If every man's humour," said he, "might be followed, there would be no end of translating." The King, however, seemed pleased with the suggestion of Dr. Reynolds, and said, "I profess I could never yet see a Bible well translated in English, but I think, that of all, that of Geneva is the worst. I wish some special pains were taken for an uniform translation; which should be done by the best learned in both Universities, then reviewed by the Bishops, presented to the Privy Council, lastly ratified by royal authority, to be read in the whole Church, and no other."*

James seems to have formed very just notions of the greatness of such an undertaking, and the deliberation and care with which it should be conducted. The first step after the conference was to designate fifty-four learned men upon whom the execution of it should devolve. By whom the selection was made does not clearly appear. The persons thus chosen were divided into six companies, two of which were to meet at Cambridge, two at Oxford, and two at Westminster. The work did not actually commence till 1607, the intervening four years being spent in settling preliminaries and making all the necessary preparations. That they might give themselves wholly to the business, it was necessary that they should be released as far as possible from all other engagements, and that ample means for their support should be provided in places affording the greatest facilities for the consultation of men and books. To this end the King wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury early in 1604, urging him to make every suitable provision for the translators; and requiring that the Prelates should inform themselves of such learned men in their several dioceses as had knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek tongues, and had made the scriptures a special study, and signify to them the King's pleasure that they should send their observations to one of three persons appointed for that purpose.† He gave similar instructions to the Vice Chancellors and heads of the colleges in the Universities, that if they knew of any other fit translators they should add them to the number; and that the translators should be admitted and entertained without expense,

* Fuller. † Lewis.

should receive kind usage, and while engaged in the work should be exempt from all academical exercises. On the 31st of July* of the same year the Bishop of London was directed to write to that part of the translators who were to assemble at Cambridge, expressing the King's acquiescence in the selection that had been made, and his desire that they should meet and begin their work with all possible speed; that his majesty was not satisfied till it was entered on; and that his royal mind rejoiced more in the good hope which he had for its happy success, than for the peace concluded with Spain. A letter was addressed the same day to the Governors of the University, pressing them in the strongest manner to assemble the translators, and to further the work. Also the Prelates, Deans, and Chapters, were recommended in the King's name to raise money among themselves to defray the expenses of the translators.

As an additional safeguard against mistake, discrepancy or failure, and to secure to this work every advantage which the kingdom afforded, certain rules were prescribed by the King, which were to be very carefully observed.

1. The ordinary Bible read in the Church, commonly called the Bishops' Bible, to be followed, and as little altered as the original will permit.

2. The names of the prophets and the holy writers, with the other names in the text, to be retained as near as may be according as they are vulgarly used.

3. The old ecclesiastical words to be kept, as the word *Church* not to be translated *congregation*, &c.

4. When any word hath divers significations, that to be kept which hath been most commonly used by the most eminent Fathers, being agreeable to the propriety of the place, and the analogy of faith.

5. The divisions of the chapters to be altered either not at all, or as little as may be, if necessity so require.

6. No marginal notes at all to be affixed, but only for the explanation of the Hebrew or Greek words, which cannot without some circumlocution so briefly and fitly be expressed in the text.

7. Such quotations of places to be marginally set down as shall serve for the fit reference of one Scripture to another.

8. Every particular man of each company to take the same chapter or chapters; and having translated or amended them severally by himself where he thinketh good, all to meet together, confer what they have done, and agree for their part what shall stand.

9. As any one company hath despatched any one book in this manner, they shall send it to the rest, to be considered of, seriously and judiciously; for his majesty is careful on this point.

* Lewis.

10. If any company, upon the review of the book so sent, shall doubt or differ upon any plans, to send them word thereof, note the plans, and therewithal send their reasons; to which, if they consent not, the difference to be compounded at the general meeting, which is to be of the chief persons of each company at the end of the work.

11. When any place of special obscurity is doubted of, letters to be directed by authority, to send to any learned (man) in the land, for his judgment in such a place.

12. Letters to be sent from every bishop to the rest of his clergy, admonishing them of this translation in hand, and to move and charge as many as, being skilful in the tongues, have taken pains in that kind, to send his particular observations to the company, either at Westminster, Cambridge, or Oxford.

13. The Directors in each company to be, the Deans of Westminster and Chester, for that place; and the King's Professors in the Hebrew and Greek, in each University.

14. These translations to be used when they agree better with the text than the Bishops'Bible; viz. 1. Tindal's; 2. Matthewe's; 3. Coverdale's; 4. Whitchurche's; 5. Geneva.

"Besides the said directions, three or four of the most ancient and grave divines in either of the Universities, not employed in translating, to be assigned by the Vice Chancellor, upon conference with the rest of the Heads, to be Overseers of the translations, as well Hebrew as Greek, for the better observance of the fourth rule above specified."*

The portions allotted to the different translators were as follows:

Pentateuch to the end of 2 Kings, to Andrews, Overall, Saravia, Clarke, Layfield, Tighe, Burleigh, King, Thompson, Bedwell; to meet at Westminster.

The rest of the historical books, and the Hagiographa, viz.: Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Canticles, Ecclesiastes, to Lively, Richardson, Chaderton, Dillingham, Harrison, Andrews, Spalding, Bing; to meet at Cambridge.

The four Greater Prophets, with the Lamentations, and the Twelve Lesser Prophets, to Harding, Reynolds, Holland, Kilby, Smith, Brett, Fairclowe; to meet at Oxford.

The prayer of Manasses, and the rest of the Apocrypha, to Duport, Branthwaite, Radcliffe, S. Ward, Downes, Boyse, Ward (of King's College); to meet at Cambridge.

The four Gospels, Acts of the Apostles, and the Apocalypse, to Ravis, Abbot, Eedes, Thompson, Saville, Peryn, Ravens, Harmar; to meet at Oxford.

The Epistles of Paul, and the Catholic Epistles, to Barlow, Hutchinson, Spencer, Fenton, Rabbett, Sanderson, Dakins; to meet at Westminster.

The number originally designated was fifty-four. But these

* Fuller.

forty-seven are those actually engaged in the translation. The other seven either were prevented from some cause not recorded; or, as is likely, included the four overseers before-mentioned, and three other persons who assisted in the work, viz., Bishop Bilson, who aided in the final revision, and Doctors Aglionby and Hutton who were employed in the latter stage of the business, though in what capacity is not entirely certain.

All things being now ready, in the spring of 1607, the translators set themselves to the work with the zeal and industry of men knowing the importance of the labours in which they were engaged. The premature death of Mr. Lively somewhat retarded their undertaking. "Nevertheless," says Fuller, "the rest vigourously though slowly proceeded in this hard, heavy, and holy task, nothing offended with the censures of impatient people, condemning their delays, though indeed but due consideration, for laziness." They were engaged in the translation nearly three years. Of the manner in which they proceeded they have given the following account in their preface. "Truly, good Christian reader, we never thought from the beginning, that we should need to make an [entirely] new translation; nor yet to make of a bad one a good one . . . but to make a good one better, or out of many good ones, one principal good one, not justly to be excepted against: that hath been our endeavour, that our mark. To that purpose there were many [translators] chosen, that were greater in other men's eyes than in their own, and that sought the truth, not their own praise. Again, they came or were thought to come to the work, not *exercendi causa* (as one saith) but *exercitati*, that is learned, not to learn. . . . Therefore, such were thought upon as could say modestly with St. Jerome: '*Et Hebraeum Sermonem ex parte didicimus, et in Latino pene ab ipsis incunabilis detriti sumus.*' Both we have learned the Hebrew tongue in part, and in the Latin we have been exercised almost from our very cradle. . . . And in what sort did these assemble? In the trust of their own knowledge, or of their sharpness of wit, or deepness of judgment, as it were in an arm of flesh? At no hand. They trusted in Him that hath the key of David, opening and no man shutting; they prayed to the Lord, the Father of our Lord, to the effect that St. Augustine did: 'O let thy Scriptures be my pure delight, let me not be deceived in them, neither let me deceive by them.' In this confidence, and with this devotion, did they assemble together: not too many, lest one should trouble another; and yet many, lest many things haply might escape them. If you ask what they had before them, truly it was the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, the Greek of the New. These are the two golden pipes, or rather conduits, where-through the olive branches emptied themselves into the gold. Saint Augustine called them precedent, or original tongues; Saint Jerome, fountains. The same Saint Jerome affirmeth, . . . that as the credit of the old Books (he meaneth of the Old Testament) is

to be tried by the Hebrew Volumes, so of the New by the Greek tongue, he meaneth by the original Greek. If Truth be to be tried by these tongues, then whence should a Translation be made, but out of them? These tongues therefore, the Scriptures we say in these tongues, we set before us to translate, being the tongues wherein God was pleased to speak to his church by his Prophets and Apostles. Neither did we run over the work with that posting haste that the Septuagint did, if that be true which is reported of them, that they finished it in seventy-two days: neither were we barred or hindered from going over it again, having once done it, like St. Jerome, if that be true which himself reporteth, that he could no sooner write anything, but presently it was caught from him and published, and he could not have leave to mend it: neither, to be short, were we the first that fell in hand with translating the Scripture into English, and consequently destitute of former helps, as it is written of Origen, that he was the first, in a manner, that put his hand to write Commentaries upon the Scriptures, and therefore no marvel that he overshot himself many times. None of these things: the work hath not been huddled up in seventy-two days, but hath cost the workmen, as light as it seemeth, the pains of twice seven times seventy-two days and more: matters of such weight and consequence are to be speeded with maturity; for in a business of moment a man feareth not the blame of convenient slackness. Neither did we think much to consult the Translators or Commentators, Chaldee, Hebrew, Syrian, Greek, or Latin, no, nor the Spanish, French, Italian, or Dutch; neither did we disdain to revise what we had done, and to bring back to the anvil that which we had hammered; but having and using as great helps as were needful, and fearing no reproach for slowness, nor coveting praise for expedition, we have at length, through the good hand of the Lord upon us, brought the work to that pass that you see."* When the whole was finished, three copies of it were sent to London from the three places of rendezvous, Cambridge, Oxford, and Westminster. Two persons also were chosen from the translators assembled in each of those places, to review and polish it. These six met daily in Stationers' Hall, London; where, in nine months, they completed their task, receiving each of them thirty pounds by the week while thus engaged. "Last of all, Bilson, Bishop of Winchester, and Dr. Miles Smith, who, from the beginning, had been very active in this affair, again reviewed the whole, and prefixed arguments to the several books; and Dr. Smith, who for his indefatigable pains taken in this work, was soon after the printing of it made Bishop of Gloucester, was ordered to write the preface."†

"And now [1611] after long expectation and great desire, came forth the new translation of the Bible (most beautifully printed) by a select and competent number of divines appointed for that pur-

* Translator's Preface. † Lewis.

pose, not being too many lest one should trouble another, and yet many lest in any, things might haply escape them. Who neither coveting praise for expedition, nor fearing reproach for slackness (seeing in a business of moment none deserve blame for convenient slowness) had expended almost three years in the work, *not only examining channels by the fountain, translations with the original (which was absolutely necessary); but also comparing channels with channels (which was abundantly useful), in the Spanish, Italian, French, and Dutch languages.* So that their industry, skilfulness, piety, and discretion, hath therein bound the church unto them in a debt of special remembrance and thankfulness. Leave we then these worthy men, now [1655] all of them gathered to their fathers and gone to God, however requited on earth, well rewarded in Heaven for their worthy work. Of whom, as also of that worthy King that employed them, we may say, 'wheresoever the Bible shall be preached or read in the whole world, there shall also this that they have done be told in memorial of them.'"*

Considering the attainments of these men, their high standing, their learning, piety, and indefatigable zeal, and the peculiarly favourable circumstances in which they were called to the work, it is not surprising that they should have been enabled to produce a translation which has received the decided approbation of almost all men of learning and taste from that day to this.

"The last English translation made by divers learned men at the command of King James, though it may justly contend with any now extant in any other language in Europe, was yet carped and cavilled at by divers among ourselves; especially by one,† who being passed by and not employed in the work, as one, though skilled in the Hebrew, yet of little or no *judgment* in that or any other kind of learning, was so highly offended that he would needs undertake to show how many thousand places they had falsely rendered, when as he could hardly make good his undertaking in any one." Walton.

"The vulgar translation of the Bible is the best standard of our language." Lowth.

"When the translators in King James the First's time began their work, they prescribed to themselves some rules, which it may not be amiss for all translators to follow. Their reverence for the sacred Scriptures induced them to be as literal as they could, to avoid obscurity; and it must be acknowledged that they were

* Fuller.

† This was Hugh Broughton, "a learned man, especially in the Eastern languages, but very opinionative," says Fuller, with his usual comprehensive brevity. Lightfoot, so pre-eminent for his Hebrew and Rabbinical learning, used to say "that Broughton has more Hebrew in his little finger than I have in my whole loins." He was greatly chagrined at not being chosen one of the translators. In consequence of his dissatisfaction, and having in vain attempted to shake the credit of the new translation, he went abroad, when it was wittily said of him that "he had gone to teach the Jews Hebrew." If they could afford to spare such a man, merely because he lacked judgment, learning could not have been such a scarce commodity among them as some people seem to imagine.

extremely happy in the simplicity and dignity of their expressions. This adherence to the Hebrew idiom is supposed at once to have enriched and adorned our language; and as they laboured for the general benefit of the learned and the unlearned, they avoided all words of Latin original, when they could find words in their own language; even with the aid of adverbs and prepositions, which would express their meaning." Horsley.

"The style of our present version is incomparably superior to anything which might be expected from the finical and perverted taste of our own age. It is simple, it is harmonious, it is energetic; and, which is of no small importance, use has made it familiar, and time has rendered it sacred." Middleton.

"The highest eulogiums have been made on the translation of James the First, both by our own writers and by foreigners. And indeed if accuracy, fidelity, and the strictest attention to the letter of the text, be supposed to constitute the qualities of an excellent version, this of all versions must in general be accounted the most excellent. Every sentence, every word, every syllable, every letter and point, seemed to have been weighed with the nicest exactitude, and expressed either in the text or margin with the greatest precision. Pagninus himself is hardly more literal; and it was well remarked by Robertson, above a hundred years ago, that it might serve for a Lexicon of the Hebrew language, as well as for a translation." Dr. Geddes.

"The highest value has always been attached to our translation of the Bible. Sciolists, it is true, have often attempted to raise their own reputation on the ruin of that of others; and the authors of the English Bible have frequently been calumniated by charlatans of every description: but it may safely be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the nation at large has always paid our translators the tribute of veneration and gratitude which they so justly merit. Their reputation for learning and piety has not descended with them to the grave, though they are alike heedless of the voice of calumny, and deaf to the praise which admiring posterity awards to the great and the good. Let us not, therefore, too hastily conclude that they have fallen on evil days and evil tongues, because it has occasionally happened that **an individual as inferior to them in erudition as in talents and integrity, is found questioning their motives, or denying their qualifications for the task which they so well performed.* Their version has been used, ever since its first appearance, not only by the church, but by all the sects which have forsaken her; and has been justly esteemed by all for its general faithfulness, and the severe beauty of its language. It may be compared with any translation in the world, without fear of inferiority; it has not shrunk from the most vigorous examination; it challenges investigation; and in spite of numerous attempts

* The italics are not ours.

to supersede it, has hitherto remained unrivalled in the affections of the country." Whitaker.

John Taylor of Norwich, an Arian in sentiment, but a very learned man, and author of an excellent Hebrew and English Concordance, bears a still more striking testimony. "In the space of one [two] hundred years, learning may have received considerable improvements; and by that means some inaccuracies may be found in a translation more than a [two] hundred years old. But you may rest fully satisfied, that as our translation is in itself by far the most excellent book in our language, so it is a pure and plentiful fountain of divine knowledge, giving a true, clear, and full account of the divine dispensations, and of the gospel of our salvation, insomuch that whoever studies the Bible, the English Bible, is sure of gaining that knowledge and faith, which, if duly applied to the heart and conversation, will infallibly guide him to eternal life."

"That these [Lowth, Blayney, Horsley, and Newcome] and other sound scholars have materially assisted the cause, and produced many valuable elucidations of particular passages, is gratefully acknowledged by all who are acquainted with their works. Yet with all the respect which we feel for their labours, we venture to express a doubt whether any new translation of even a single book of Scripture has appeared since the publication of the authorized version, which taken as a whole has come up to its standard, either for the general fidelity and correctness with which it conveys the sense of the original, or the dignity, simplicity, and propriety of language in which that sense is conveyed." London Quarterly.

"Those who have compared most of the European translations with the original, have not scrupled to say that the English translation of the Bible, made under the direction of James I., is the most accurate and faithful of the whole. Nor is this its only praise: the translators have seized the very spirit and soul of the original, and expressed this almost everywhere with pathos and energy. Besides, our translators have not only made a standard translation, but they have made their translation the standard of the language. The English tongue in their day was not equal to such a work; but God enabled them to stand as upon Mount Sinai, and *crane* up their country's language to the dignity of the originals, so that after the lapse of two hundred years the English Bible is, with very few exceptions, the standard of the purity and excellence of the English tongue. The original, from which it was taken, is alone superior to the Bible translated by the authority of King James." Adam Clarke.

"It is a striking beauty in our English Bible, that though the language is always elegant and nervous, and for the most part very harmonious, the words are all plain and common; no affectation of learned terms, or of words of Greek and Latin etymology." Dr. James Beattie.

"Equally remarkable for the general fidelity of its construction, and the magnificent simplicity of its language." Dr. Gray.

"We are yet disposed to object to that part [of this classification] which represents the first introduction of soft, graceful, and idiomatic English as not earlier than the period of the restoration. It is as old at least as Chaucer. The English Bible is full of it; and it is the most common, as well as the most beautiful, of the many languages spoken by Shakspeare." Edinburgh Review, no partial witness surely.*

"General fidelity to its original is hardly more its characteristic than sublimity itself . . . . it is still considered the standard of our tongue . . . . The English language acquired new dignity by it." Dr. I. White, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford.

"The language of our present version has the full tide of popular opinion strongly in its favour; it exhibits a style appropriately biblical, and is distinguished by a general simplicity of expression, which the most uncultivated mind may comprehend, and the most cultivated admire."†

To these numerous, but we trust not uninteresting testimonies, we will merely add one of cis-Atlantic growth. It is that of Fisher Ames; than whom a better writer of English has never appeared in this country. In an essay of his, urging the importance of using the Bible as a school book, he says, "In no book is there so good English, so pure and so elegant; and by teaching all the same book, they will speak alike, and the Bible will justly remain the standard of language as well as of faith. A barbarous provincial jargon will be banished, and taste, corrupted by pompous Johnsonian affectation, will be restored."

The want of pure English idiom, then, is still less apparent than the want of fidelity to the original. The Koran has not been a more acknowledged classic among the Arabs, nor Luther's Bible among the Germans, than has the English Bible been in English literature. It has done more for the English language than the whole French Academy, with their incomparable Dictionary, can ever do for the French. "It is impossible," says a sensible writer in Blackwood's Magazine,‡ "to reflect upon the incalculable influence which the free use of this noble version by a great nation in an affectionate and thankful spirit for centuries must have had upon the character of both people and literature; and further, upon what would have been the diminished value of the boon, even for those who might have enjoyed it, had it been delayed to a much later period; without acknowledging a providence in the choice of the time when, and the instruments by whose means, this benefit was conferred. As yet the language was in a gradual process of

* October, 1835, page 121, American edition.

† From an exceedingly able Tract in the first volume of the former series of the Princeton Review, on the subject of a new translation of the Bible.

‡ November, 1835, page 676.

formation. Ductile, various, and manly, confined within no acknowledged rules, and checked by no fear of criticism, it was in a state admirably fitted to become the faithful mirror of the national character, which the publication of that great work was calculated so deeply to effect." Indeed, when we reflect that it has been regarded as a model of correct expression by the ablest critics, that it has been more read than any other English book, that the nature of its subjects and the character of the people have given it more than any other book a hold upon the imagination and the feelings, we do not wonder at the extent to which its language has become the basis both of prose and verse, and even to some extent of common conversation. The Bible is not subject to the fluctuations of taste. Shakspeare may become unfashionable, as Milton is now, except in theory. But the Bible will always be read, and read by the multitude who are the great corrupters of language. Its words will always be those most upon the popular lip. Not only therefore will it remain "a well of English undefiled," but there is a certainty that its pure waters will be resorted to by all the hundreds of millions who shall be born within the reach of British and American influence till the end of time.

ESSAY XVIII.

OXFORD ARCHITECTURE.*

These works are among the fruits of the increased interest which has been felt, within a few years, in the Architecture of the Middle Ages. The singular fate which the Gothic Architecture has undergone would warrant the inference that it gives expression to no general and permanent truth, were we not in a condition to account satisfactorily for the mutations to which it has been subject. Appearing in the early part of the twelfth century, it gave such a distinct and full utterance to some general sentiment of the age, that it spread at once over the whole of Christian Europe. So rapid was its transmission through Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and England, that it remains to this day a matter of doubt where it originated, the most laborious and minute researches having failed to establish clearly a priority of date for the structures of any one of these countries.

Prior to the introduction of this style, there was no prevalent style of church architecture. The Roman Architecture, in the course of its protracted dissolution, had assumed, in the East, the form of what has been termed the Byzantine style; in Italy and Germany it had degenerated into the Lombard, and in England into the Norman style. The churches erected in these several countries prior to the twelfth century, involved no common principle. Indeed, that which chiefly marks them all is the entire want of any principle. There was no other general likeness among them than what arose from a certain resemblance in the details, and from the entire absence of any general idea by which these details might be blended into unity. The church of St. Sophia at Constantinople, the duomo of Pisa, and the Durham Cathedral, may be taken as the representatives of the Byzantine, the Lom-

* Originally published in 1844 in review of the following works:

1. "Remarks on English Churches, and on the expediency of rendering Sepulchral Memorials subservient to pious and Christian uses. By J. H. Markland, F.R.S. and S.A."

2. "A Glossary of Terms used in Grecian, Roman, Italian, and Gothic Architecture."

3. "Anglican Church Architecture, with some remarks on Ecclesiastical Furniture. By James Burr, Architect.

bard, and the Norman styles; and if these buildings be compared together it will be found that, although they resemble each other in the use of the semicircular arch as the principle of support and some other Roman elements, and hence may be classed together under the general term Romanesque, they are nevertheless exceedingly unlike in their general effect. Though they all employed substantially the same elements of construction, the round arch supported by columns fashioned in their proportions and ornaments after the classical architecture, pilasters, cornices, and entablatures borrowed from the remains of Roman art, openings in the wall whether for doors or windows that were small, comparatively few in number and subordinate to the wall, vaulted ceilings, and domes; yet as these constructive elements were subject to no law, bound together by no one principle which assigned to each its place and function, and formed them into one organic whole, it was inevitable that they should be mingled together in different combinations and proportions according to the capricious fancy of each builder. Hence each country had, with some general resemblance to others, its own peculiar style of building; and no one style was capable of transcending provincial limits, and giving law to the world, because no one rested upon any general principle of beauty or truth.

No sooner, however, did the Gothic Architecture appear than it diffused itself through all lands where Christian churches were built. This rapid and universal diffusion, however it may be historically accounted for, must find its ultimate explanation in the palpable truth of this style of architecture. Instead of being like the styles which preceded it, an aggregation of materials and forms of construction, associated and arranged upon no higher principle than that of building a commodious, shapely and convenient edifice, the Gothic style was a connected and organic whole, possessed of a vital principle which rejected everything that was heterogeneous, and assimilated all that it embraced. Hence its power and its popularity.

After prevailing for a period of about three centuries, this style was displaced by the revived classical architecture of the Italian school. Then came the days in which such men as Sir Henry Wotton stigmatized the glorious fanes which had been erected in this style as Gothic or barbarous, and Evelyn condemned it as a "certain fantastical and licentious mode of building," and the son and biographer of Sir Christopher Wren sneered at the inimitable ceiling of Henry VII.th's Chapel, as "lace and other cut work, and crinkle crankle." The architecture nicknamed the Gothic and ever since designated by that term, was then despised and cast out as whimsical, lawless, and absurd, and men began to build after a fashion that was deemed the method of the ancients. This classical Architecture had its consummation as in the cathedrals of St. Paul's at London and St. Peter's at Rome. It is distinguished, even beyond the Romanesque architecture, by the want of any general principle of unity. The Greek pediment

or something which was intended to imitate that chief and crowning feature of the Greek temple, together with columnar ordinances fitted to receive and sustain vertical thrusts, is found in connexion with round arches, domes, vaulted ceilings, cupolas and spires. That this style was capable, in the hands of such men as Sir Christopher Wren and Michael Angelo, of producing an imposing interior effect by the expansive dome hung high over head, and by the picturesque combination of the other interior elements of an immense structure, we have sufficient evidence in St. Paul's and St. Peter's; but that it was utterly incapable of producing the higher effects of architectural excellence will be equally evident to any one who will take the several parts of either of those structures, and attempt to establish the relation of unity between them. This attempt will inevitably lead to the conclusion that the different parts of the building have no mutual bond of coherence. They are held together by the law of gravitation, they are cemented by mortar, but there are no mutual relations which make them coalesce. The effects which they produce are due, in chief part, to the purely sensuous phenomena of immense magnitude, and picturesqueness of combination and arrangement. The moment that we attempt to discover that unity without which no work of art can fill and satisfy the mind, we find only discrepancies and contradictions.

The age that rejected the Gothic architecture showed thus its incompetency either to condemn or to approve. Had their censure of the Gothic been founded upon any principles truly applicable as a criterion of excellence, we should have been compelled to admit that this style of architecture expressed something that was peculiar to the three centuries within which it originated and died. The fact of its death, if it could not be shown that it was inflicted in one of those freaks of fancy which whole communities and generations of men sometimes exhibit, would of course show that however fitted it may have been to give outward expression to the mind of Europe during the three centuries of its prevalence, it embodied no universal principles. But when we examine the reasons assigned for its condemnation, we find that they rest upon conventional and affected stands of judgment; and when we look at the buildings which were thought worthy to supplant the Gothic, we see that they are in every respect, whether of constructive art or ideal perfection, immeasurably inferior to their predecessors. We feel warranted, therefore, in drawing the conclusion that the displacement of the Gothic architecture was perfectly analogous to those changes which literature has sometimes undergone, when partial and contracted hypotheses have for a season supplanted with their technical canons of criticism, a true and universal method.

It is a remarkable fact that the revival of the Gothic was contemporaneous with the restoration of the true principles of the Greek architecture; and that they both date from the period in which the re-action in the public mind from the mechanical philo-

sophy and sceptical spirit of the last century begins to be distinctly marked. No sooner was the true spirit of the wonderful remains of Athenian art comprehended, than men began to turn to the cathedrals and other structures of the Middle Ages, and find in them a transcendent beauty and power. It is now universally admitted by those who have taken the pains to acquaint themselves with the matter, that

> "In those rich cathedral fanes
> (Gothic ill-named) a harmony results
> From disunited parts; and shapes minute,
> At once distinct and blended, boldly form
> One vast majestic whole."

As each plant in the vegetable world has its principle of unity, and this principle has its signature in the root, the stem, the leaf, the flower, and the fruit, so has the Gothic architecture its vital principle infused into every part of the structure from the foundation stone to the summit of its towers and spires. The foliations of the arches, the tracery of the windows, and the scooped cells of the branched roof, are efflorescences of the same germinating principle which casts out the massive buttress, and throws up the towering pinnacle.

But it is one thing to see and feel that the Gothic architecture possesses vitality, and a very different thing to define its principle of life. It is not our purpose, on the present occasion, to attempt any exposition of this matter. All that we desire, for the end we have in view, is that it should be admitted, on the grounds that we have assigned, or through faith in those who have studied the subject, that there is a true art developed in the Gothic architecture. This being admitted, we wish to show that Puseyism displays some of its most marked characteristics in its attempts to comprehend and practise this art.

A great impulse has been given from Oxford to the study of Gothic architecture. A society has been established there for promoting its study, and a number of works on the subject have emanated from the Oxford press. Some of these are curiosities in their way. But without dwelling on the peculiarities of any, we wish to point attention to that which is common to them all.

They exhibit, as might have been anticipated, an exclusive, narrow-minded bigotry, in favour of one particular style of architecture, in connexion with utter ignorance of every other. The author of the Glossary, which is an elaborate, and in many respects, a valuable work, professes to explain the terms used in Grecian and Roman as well as Gothic architecture; but he seldom ventures beyond his beloved Gothic without betraying the most surprising and often ludicrous ignorance. We refer, for illustration, to his definition of the term *cymatium*, in which no less than seven applications of this term are given, every one of which is not only wrong, but so absurdly wrong that it is impossible to read them

with a grave face. What is still more unpardonable than this, he confounds the *echinus*, the only curved moulding that entered into the structure of the Parthenon, with the tasteless *ovolo* of the Romans, and then confounds both of these with the egg and dart sculpture with which they were sometimes ornamented. Nor have we been able to find a single article in the book upon any subject connected with Grecian architecture, which is not either grossly erroneous, or so defective as to be worthless, while upon all the details of the Gothic, it is full, clear, and for the most part, correct. The same character runs through the other works which we have placed at the head of our article. They are all one-sided. We have no right to expect that treatises on English Church Architecture, like that of Mr. Barr, should contain an exposition of the principles of Greek architecture, but we have a right to expect that in their allusions to it they would not betray such ignorance as to satisfy us that their devotion to the Gothic is a blind and unintelligent preference. He who commends to the world any particular style of architecture, and while in the act of doing so, shows that he has never appreciated the spirit of beauty that dwells in the temples of the Athenians, can scarcely hope to win the public confidence as an arbiter of taste. The exclusiveness which confines the attention of the architectural bigot to one style, must of course prevent him from fully comprehending even that one. Art is jealous of her secrets, and they can be won from her only by a fearless and catholic confidence. The man whose mind is narrowed down to the interests of a party or a sect must be content to remain ignorant of them. He who despises the Parthenon, or looks upon it with cold indifference, can be nothing but a worshipper of stones in York Minster.

Hence we should expect to find, as is the actual fact, that these works betray an inadequate comprehension of the true meaning and spirit of Gothic Architecture. In describing the separate parts of a Gothic edifice and the actual construction of English cathedrals and churches they are sufficiently accurate, but it is evident that they have failed to seize fully the law which makes the parts members of a whole. The traditional authority of the fathers of English architecture is their source of information and their ultimate bar of appeal. Thus Mr. Barr says, "when designing a church, it is by no means sufficient that we borrow the details of an old building, unless we likewise preserve its general proportions and canonical distribution." He does not here nor elsewhere venture to raise the inquiry whether the "old building" may not itself be faulty in some of its proportions; he nowhere hints at the possibility of our obtaining such an idea of the interior law of the Gothic architecture in which its essence is comprised, as may enable us to discriminate between different old buildings, and, without copying servilely any one, combine the excellences of several, or even originate a design in independence of them all. He who begs thus pusillanimously from the mighty masters of old,

no matter how magnificent may be the gifts he receives, will show his beggarly nature through them all. It is not by copying the proportions of old buildings that we can hope to rival them, but by drinking in the spirit of those proportions until a well-spring of living beauty is opened within us.

The faithfulness with which the appeal to traditional authority is carried out in these works, is truly remarkable. They talk in good set terms often of the Gothic style, and yet always return with undeviating uniformity to the authority of the fathers. Whether they recommend any particular disposition of the chief architectural members of the structure, or the use, among its minor adornments, of "the Cross, the Holy Name, the emblems of the Blessed Trinity, and other mystical devices," the reason given is not that these things flow out naturally from the great idea which governs the structure, but they "adorned our old ecclesiastical edifices."

In describing the appropriate doorway of a Gothic church, Mr. Barr says, "In England the doorways of the cathedrals and other great churches are seldom features of that magnitude and importance which they are in the same class of ecclesiastical structures on the continent, and it is always advisable to preserve as much as possible the distinctive peculiarities of Anglican church architecture." This is a fair sample of the whole. The end aimed at is not to cultivate a true and vital architecture, but to preserve the peculiarities of English architecture. The true question at issue, in the case stated, was not, what was the practice of English architects, but what would best harmonize with, and assist in carrying out the general idea of the Gothic style. In France and Germany the doorways are of such an imposing height and magnitude, that they constitute a very important feature of the west front; in England, on the contrary, they are comparatively diminutive and insignificant. Which of these two different characters ought to be given to the doorway of a modern Gothic church in England or elsewhere? If the question is to be decided by the obvious impression on the feelings, let any man compare the west front of York Minster, or Salisbury Cathedral, with that of the Amiens or Rheims Cathedral, and he will not hesitate a moment to decide in favour of the latter. But the only adequate method of deciding such a question, is to ascertain what there is common to all these structures that differ from each other in some of their details; what is it which, notwithstanding their circumstantial disagreements, gives to them all a sameness of expression; what is there in them that may be taken away, and what that may not be taken away without destroying their character. When these questions have been satisfactorily answered we shall be possessed not of English, French, or German architecture, but of the essence of them all, and we shall then be at no loss to decide between the comparative merits of those features in which

they differ. To decide, as Mr. Barr does, is to substitute authority for reason.

In like manner Mr. Markland, in urging the pious and benevolent to bestow their gifts in the erection or improvement of some particular part of church edifices, cites with approbation, in illustration of his views, the Minstrel's column in the church of St. Mary's, Beverly. This column is a pier with clustered shafts, furnished with a double set of capitals placed at a sufficient distance, the one above the other, to contain a group of figures, with musical instruments, representing the minstrels who erected it. If the Gothic architecture be nothing more than a compendium of traditional teachings, then it is only a waste of time to discuss any question connected with it; but if it have any fixed and certain principles, then surely it ought to have been shown that this "Minstrel column" was in keeping with those principles, before it was presented as an example to be imitated in the present age. We believe that the Gothic architecture has a real significancy quite other than that which is derived from any associations connected with it, and we are sure that for the expression of whatever may be its purpose, it is dependent chiefly upon its predominating vertical line. In the interior, which is of necessity the most important part of a Gothic edifice, almost its only means of manifesting this vertical tendency is through the pier shafts of the arches, and the vaulting shafts of the ceiling. To break the continuousness of these shafts for the purpose of receiving a set of statues is to destroy the only significancy of the shaft. Whatever may be its goodliness in other respects, as a part of a Gothic interior, it becomes, when thus broken, an unmeaning appendage. Such admiration as this, of the Gothic architecture, is very much akin to that of the good old lady who was so much moved by the peculiar eloquence of the word Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia was a good old word, it belonged to the time of the patriarchs, and being delivered moreover in a truly unctuous tone, it imparted a savour to the whole sermon into which it entered.

As the Tractarians rest much in outward forms, which are no necessary or rational part of a spiritual system of religion, and which, being perfectly arbitrary and conventional, cannot but hinder the mind in its progress towards the perception of any great central truth; so, in art, the same disposition is manifested to divorce the form from the substance, the body from the spirit which animates it; and then, when the whole has been disintegrated, to assign a superstitious value to each separate part. Each doorway must be made to hint darkly at some mystery, the storied windows must deliver up their venerable traditions, and the shafts and arches, the pulpit, the altar and the font, the quaint carvings and mystical devices, must all be arranged in accordance with some dream or vision. As the religion of such men must be, in a good degree, made up of outward institutions and rites, which,

having lost their only rational meaning through their disconnexion from the inner truth of the system to which they belong, have a superstitious efficacy attributed to them, so their architecture is an assemblage of parts that, having no inward principle of unity, can only exist through some mystical meaning attached to them. Their art is no living reality, but an assemblage of holy relics.

For the same reason that we should be unwilling that any man should judge of religion by the form which it assumes in the teachings and practice of the Oxford Tractarians, we would desire also, to see the noble art of architecture rescued from their hands. Architecture, properly understood, is undoubtedly, as Coleridge pronounced it, the most difficult of the fine arts, "it involves all the powers of design, and is sculpture and painting inclusively; it shows the greatness of man, and should at the same time teach him humility." It exhibits the greatest difference from nature, that can exist in works of art, and requires, therefore, thoughtful and earnest study for the discovery and appreciation of its principles. To build a convenient and ornate edifice, whether for domestic or religious purposes, is an easy matter; but to dispose building materials in such forms as shall be expressive of intellectual purposes and sentiments, this is a task that demands, for its adequate discharge, other attainments than technical rules, old traditions, and the narrow dogmas of a sect. The living and life-producing ideas of this art are to be acquired only through "the perception of those relations which alone are beautiful and eternal, whose prime concords can be proved, but whose deeper mysteries can only be felt."*

The Gothic architecture is one of the most wonderful creations of the human mind. The more we study it, the more are we lost in admiration at the skill which has succeeded in employing such an endless multiplicity of details as enter into a Gothic structure, without sacrificing the essential unity of the whole. The idea which evolved it, seems to luxuriate in the greatest abundance of forms, all of which are animated, and all in the same spirit. It is of course symbolical, as all true art must be. Any object which does not irresistibly lead the mind beyond itself, and inspire a feeling due not to the qualities of the object but to something far greater and better than is suggested by it, is no work of art. But the symbolism of Gothic architecture, as of all characteristic art, is dependent upon no accidental associations, or conventional appointments. It is not the work of a man, who, having agreed with his fellows, that certain signs shall represent certain objects or qualities, proceeds to use the power with which they have endowed him; but of one who having worshipped beside the fountain of primal beauty, has drunk in those essential principles of harmony which must speak to the hearts of all men. The forms that enter

* Goethe's Works, vol. xxxix., p. 339.

into a Gothic cathedral are a figured language, but it is a universal language.

How preposterous, then, to mix up with this natural symbolism, deriving its efficacy from that which is true as the human mind, and permanent as the race, the purely technical symbolism of any particular creed or age! How absurd to break in upon the harmony that, assimilating to itself the voice of each of its manifold parts, pours forth its choral symphonies from the whole, with the crotchets of a school or sect. The "mystic devices," for which Mr. Barr pleads, the sacred monogram, the *vesica piscis*, and other technical inventions, what have these to do in conjunction with those harmonious forms and relations, that, partaking of the very essence of beauty, are endowed with natural and indefeasible power to awe, to subdue, to exalt, to refine the human mind?

It may easily be gathered from what we have already said, that we dissent utterly from the sentiment often expressed, that the Gothic architecture is a development of Papal Christianity. It is indeed a religious architecture, as every other true style has been; it is, in some sense, a Christian architecture, but further to limit its generality is to despoil it of its glory and power. Doubtless an architecture might be devised which would be an appropriate symbol of Romanism. So also we might construct a style which would fitly represent the Protestant Episcopal Church, as its doctrines and practices are expounded by the Oxford Tractarians; but it would be widely different from the Gothic. It would be a style which, acknowledging no infallible standards, except as they are interpreted by tradition, would copy "old buildings" without daring to aspire even so high as imitation. It would of course fix attention upon external forms, rather than upon the thought within. Hence also it would limit its views of mental expression to the ideas of power and grandeur through which the mind might be overawed and reduced to an unreasoning submission. It would discourage the robust and manly exercise of the human intellect, and would care little therefore for strict unity and severe harmony, if it might so manage the details as to produce an extemporaneous impression upon the beholder, sufficiently powerful to compel him to yield a slavish obedience to authority. The deeper mysteries of art which are to be felt only by those who have understood its "prime concords," would be altogether beyond its reach. But we feel little interest in tracing out minutely the *idea* of an Episcopal art. It will be exhibited in its concrete form whenever the teachings of such architects as Mr. Barr shall have been carried thoroughly into practice.

ESSAY XIX.

A TREATISE ON EXPOSITORY PREACHING.

PUBLISHED IN 1838.

THE pulpit discourses of Roman Catholics as well as Protestants, during several centuries, have been for the most part founded on short passages of Scripture; commonly single verses, and oftener less than more. This has become so prevalent, that in most treatises upon the composition of sermons all the canons of homiletics presuppose the treatment of an isolated text. We are not prepared to denounce this practice, especially when we consider the treasury of sound doctrine, cogent reasoning, and mighty eloquence, which is embodied in productions formed on this model, and call to mind the instances in which such discourses have been signally owned of God in the edification of his church. But there is still another method, which, though less familiar to ourselves, was once widely prevalent, and is recognised and approved in our Directory for Worship, in the following words: "It is proper also that large portions of Scripture be sometimes expounded, and particularly improved for the instruction of the people in the meaning and use of the sacred oracles."* And it may not be out of place to mention here, that in the debates of the Westminster Assembly, there were more than a few members, and among these the celebrated Calamy, who maintained with earnestness, that it was no part of the minister's duty to read the Scriptures in public *without exposition*.†

It is not a little remarkable that in an age in which so much is heard against creeds and systems as contradistinguished from the pure text of Scripture, and in which sacred hermeneutics hold so high a place in Theological education, we should have allowed the methodical and continued exposition of the Bible to go almost into

* Directory for Worship, chap. vi., § 2.
† Lightfoot's Works, vol. xiii., p. 36.

disuse.* What our predecessors practised under the name of lectures is almost banished from the pulpit. It is against this exclusion that we now propose to direct our argument. And in what may be offered in the sequel we ask attention to this statement of the question as limiting our purpose. Far be it from us to decry the mode of discoursing which prevails in our churches. We freely acknowledge its many excellences and rejoice in its gracious fruits; but we plead in behalf of another and an older method, which we lament to see neglected and forsaken. With this preface, we shall proceed to give some reasons why a judicious return to the expository method of preaching seems to us to be desirable.

1. The expository method of preaching is the most obvious and natural way of conveying to the hearers the import of the sacred volume. It is the very work for which a ministry was instituted, to interpret the Scriptures. In the case of any other book, we should be at no loss in what manner to proceed. Suppose a volume of human science to be placed in our hands as the sole manual, text-book, and standard, which we were expected to elucidate to a public assembly: in what way would it be most natural to go to work? Certainly not, we think, to take a sentence here, and a sentence there, and upon these separate portions to frame one or two discourses every week. No interpreter of Aristotle, of Littleton, of Puffendorf, or of Paley, ever dreamed of such a method. Nor was it adopted in the Christian church, until the sermon ceased to be regarded in its true notion, as an explanation of the Scripture, and began to be viewed as a rhetorical entertainment, which might afford occasion for the display of subtilty, research, and eloquence.

2. The expository method has the sanction of primitive and ancient usage. In the Israelitish, as well as the Christian church, preaching was an ordinary mode of religious instruction. In both it was justly regarded as a means of conducting the hearers to the knowledge of revealed truth. As early as the time of Ezra, we find that the reading of the law was accompanied with some kind of interpretation. In the synagogues, after the reading of the law and the prophets, it was usual for the presiding officer to invite such as were learned to address the people. Our Lord Jesus Christ avail'ed himself of this opportunity to deliver one of his most remarkable discourses; and this was an exposition of a prophetic passage. The apostle Paul seems also to have made portions of Scripture the basis of his addresses in the synagogues. But it is not to be expected that the preaching of the apostolic age, when the speakers were divinely inspired, should be in all respects a model for our own times. It was their province to communicate truth under inspiration; it is ours to interpret what has thus been communicated. The early Christian assemblies naturally adopted the simple and rational

* Although the subject of this essay may, in certain particulars, run very naturally into that of critical interpretation, the writer begs leave to disclaim any special right to dwell upon this topic, as his pursuits have not led him into the field of hermeneutics, any further than the performance of ordinary ministerial duty required.

methods of the Jewish synagogues; in conformity with which it was an essential part of the service to read the Scriptures. Manuscripts were rare, and the majority of believers were poor; and hence the church assemblies must have long continued to be the chief, if not the only, sources of biblical knowledge. Justin Martyr, who is one of the earliest authorities on this subject, informs us that the public reading of the text was followed by addresses, adapted to impress the subject on the minds of the hearers.* According to Neander, who may be considered as an impartial judge on this topic, it was at first left to the option of the bishop what portions of Scripture should be read; though it was subsequently made necessary to adhere to certain lessons, which were judged appropriate to times and seasons. Bingham also concedes that the lessons were sometimes arbitrarily appointed by the bishops at discretion. Augustine declares that he sometimes ordered a lesson to be read which harmonized with the psalm which he had been expounding.†

As this is a point of history concerning which there is little room for question, we shall content ourselves with the diligent, and, as we believe, impartial deductions of Bingham and Neander. It is not to be denied, that there were, even in the early ages, several different modes of preaching, and that some of these approached very nearly to that which now prevails; yet there was no period during which the expository method was not highly prized and extensively practised. These discourses were very frequent, and often flowed from the intense feeling of the moment. Pamphilus, in his Apology for Origen, represents this great teacher as discoursing extempore almost every day. The same frequency of public address is recorded of Chrysostom, Augustine, and other fathers. Their sermons were taken down by stenographers, and in such of them as are extant we have repeated evidences of their familiar and unpremeditated character. Chrysostom, for instance, thus breaks forth, in one of his homilies on Genesis: "I am expounding the Scriptures; yet you are all turning your eyes from me to the person who is lighting the lamps. What negligence! to forsake me, and fix your minds on him! For I am lighting a fire from the holy Scriptures, and in my tongue is a burning lamp for instruction." Augustine also tells us, in one of his homilies, that he had not thought of the subject on which he actually preached, until the reader chanced to read it of his own accord in the church.‡

The two greatest preachers of the Greek and Latin churches, respectively, afford striking examples of the value set upon exposition. Augustine has left homilies upon the Psalms, the Gospel of John, and other whole books of Scripture. Chrysostom, in like manner, expounded at length the book of Genesis, the Psalms, the

* Apolog 2. † Aug. in Psalm xc., Ser. ii.—Bingham, Antiq. B. xiv., c. iii., § 3.
‡ Bingham, Book xiv., chap. iv., § 4.

Gospels of Matthew and John, and all the Epistles of Paul. His homilies consist usually of a close interpretation, or running commentary, followed by an Ethicon, or practical application. That biblical exposition was recognised as the end of preaching seems clear from such declarations as the following: "If any one assiduously attend public worship, even without reading the Bible at home, but carefully hearkening here, he will find a single year sufficient to give him an intimate acquaintance with the Scriptures."† And indeed this is so natural a result of the catholic belief that the Scriptures are the great storehouse of saving truth, as to leave us in some surprise at the neglect into which this direct exposition of the authentic records has fallen.

When we look into the history of England during the thirteenth century, we find that two modes of preaching were in use, neither of these being that which we now employ. In the first place, that of *Postillating*, which was identical with the expository method; secondly, that of *Declaring*, in which the discourse was preceded by a declaration of the subject, without the citation of any passage of Scripture. When, about the beginning of the thirteenth century, the method of preaching from insulated texts, with subtile divisions of the sermon, was introduced, it was zealously adopted by the younger clergy, and became extensively popular; while it was as warmly opposed by some of the best theologians of the age, as "a childish playing upon words—destructive of true eloquence—tedious and unaffecting to the hearers—and cramping the imagination of the preacher." Among others, it found an able opponent in the great Roger Bacon; a man whom we can never mention without amazement at his philosophical attainments, and veneration for his character. "The greatest part of our prelates," says he, "having but little knowledge in divinity, and having been little used to preaching in their youth, when they become bishops, and are sometimes obliged to preach, are under the necessity of begging and borrowing the sermons of certain novices, who have invented a new way of preaching, by endless divisions and quibblings, in which there is neither sublimity of style nor depth of wisdom, but much childish trifling and folly, unsuitable to the dignity of the pulpit. May God banish this conceited and artificial way of preaching out of his church; for it will never do any good, nor elevate the hearts of his hearers to anything that is great or excellent."†

"The opposition to this new method of preaching," says Dr. Henry in his History of England, "continued through the whole of the fourteenth and part of the fifteenth century. Dr. Thomas Gascoigne, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, tells us that he preached a sermon in St. Martin's Church, A. D. 1450, without a text, and without divisions, declaring such things as he thought

* Hom. 28, in Job.—Neander, Der heilige Chrysostomus.
† R. Bacon, apud Henry's Hist., iv., 366.

would be useful to the people. Amongst other things he told them, in vindication of this ancient mode of preaching,—"that Dr. Augustine had preached four hundred sermons to the clergy and people, without reading a text at the beginning of his discourse; and that the way of preaching by a text, and by divisions, was invented only about A. D. 1200, as appeared from the authors of the first sermons of that kind.'"

It is no part of our business to enter further into this investigation, or to determine critically at what point of time the method of preaching from insulated verses became exclusively prevalent in the church. Whatever excellences it possesses, and there are many, can derive no additional dignity from the origin of the method, which is referable to a period by no means the most glorious of Christian history. When the light of divine truth began to emerge from its long eclipse, at the Reformation, there were few things more remarkable, than the universal return of evangelical preachers to the expository method. Book after book of the Scriptures was publicly expounded by Luther, and the almost daily sermons of Calvin were, with scarcely any exceptions, founded on passages taken in regular course as he proceeded through the sacred canon. The same is true of the other Reformers, particularly in England and Scotland.

To come down to the times of the Nonconformists; while it is undoubtedly true that they sometimes pursued the textual method even to an extreme; preaching many discourses on a single verse; it is no less true, that exposition in regular course was considered a necessary part of ministerial labour. Hence the voluminous commentaries on single books with which the press groaned during that period. Let us take a single instance, as late as the latter half of the sixteenth century, in the person of Matthew Henry, whom it is difficult to refer exclusively to the era of the elder or the later Nonconformists. We may suppose his practice in this particular to be no extreme case. Mr. Henry was an able and laborious preacher from single texts, but it was by no means to the exclusion of the expository plan. On every Lord's day morning, he read and expounded a part of the Old Testament; on every Lord's day afternoon a part of the New; in both instances proceeding in regular order. During his residence in Chester he went over the whole Bible in this exercise, more than once.* Such was the custom of our forefathers; and in the prosecution of such a plan, we need not wonder that they found the body of their hearers constantly advancing in scriptural attainments. The sense of change, and change without improvement, is unavoidable when we come down to our own times; in which, within our immediate knowledge, there are not a dozen ministers who make the expounding of Scripture any part of their stated pulpit exercises. Nay, although our Directory for Worship declares expressly

* Williams, Life of Henry, c. x.

that "the reading of the Holy Scriptures in the congregation, is a part of the public worship of God, and ought to be performed by the ministers and teachers;"—that the preacher, "in each service, ought to read, at least one chapter, and more, when the chapters are short, or the connexion requires it;" yet it is undeniably the common practice to confine this service, which is treated as something almost supererogatory, to the Lord's day morning. Now while we are zealous in maintaining, that the Christian minister should not be bound down by any imperative rubric or calendar as to the portion which he shall read, we cannot but blush when we compare our actual performances in this kind with those of many sister churches, who have chosen to be guided by more strict liturgical arrangements.

3. The expository method is adapted to secure the greatest amount of scriptural knowledge, to both preacher and hearers. It needs no argument, we trust, to sustain the position that every minister of the gospel should be mighty in the Scriptures; familiar with the whole text; versed in the best commentaries; at home in every portion of both Testaments; and accustomed to grapple with the most perplexing difficulties. This is the appropriate and peculiar field of clerical study. It is obvious that the pulpit exercises of every diligent minister will give direction and colour to his private lucubrations. In order to success and usefulness in any species of discourse, the preacher must love his work and must have it constantly before his mind. He must be possessed of an enthusiasm which shall never suffer him to forget the impending task. His reading, his meditation, and even his casual trains of thought, must perpetually revert to the performances of the Sabbath. And we take pleasure in believing that such is actually the case with a large proportion of clergymen.

Now it must not be concealed that the popular and prevalent mode of sermonizing, however favourable it may be to professional zeal of this kind, and to the cultivation of mental habits, does by no means lead in any equal measure to the laborious study of the Scriptures. The text, it is true, must be a fragment of the word of God; and it may be confirmed and illustrated by parallel or analogous passages. But where no extended exposition is attempted, the preacher is naturally induced to draw upon systematic treatises, philosophical theories, works of mere literature, or his own ingenuity of invention, and fertility of imagination, for such a train of thought as, under the given topic, may claim the praise of novelty. We are aware that with many it is far otherwise, and that there are preachers who are wont to select such texts as necessarily draw after them a full interpretation of all the foregoing and following context; and such sermons are, to all intents and purposes, expositions. But we also know, that to compose a sermon upon a text of Scripture, with very little reference to its position in the word of God, and a very little inquiry as to the intent of the Spirit in the words, is a thing not only possible but common.

The evil grows apace, wherever the rhetorical aspect of preaching attracts undue attention; and the desire to be original, striking, ingenious, and elegant, supersedes the earnest endeavour to be scriptural.

This abuse is in a good degree precluded by the method of exposition. The minister who from week to week is labouring to elucidate some important book of Scripture, has this kept forcibly before his mind. It will necessarily be the chief subject of his studies. Whatever else he may neglect, he will, if he is a conscientious man, sedulously peruse and ponder those portions which he is to explain; using every auxiliary, and especially comparing Scripture with Scripture. Suppose him to pursue this regular investigation of any one book, for several successive months, and we perceive that he must be acquiring a knowledge of the very word of truth, vastly more extensive, distinct, and profound, than can fall to the lot of one who perhaps for no two discourses together finds himself in the same part of the canon. Two men practising upon the two methods, each in an exclusive manner, may severally gain an equal measure of intellectual discipline and real knowledge, but their attainments will differ in kind. The one is driven from the variety of his topics to a fitful and fragmentary study of the Bible; the other is bound down to a systematic and unbroken investigation of consecutive truths. Consider, also, how much more of the pure teachings of the Spirit, accompanied with suitable explanation, necessarily occupies the mind of the preacher in one method than in the other.

If such is the influence, with respect to the preacher himself, who, under any system, is still free to devote his mind to scriptural study; how much greater is it not likely to be with respect to the hearers, whose habits of investigation almost always receive their character from the sermons to which they listen? Perhaps none will deny that every hearer should be made as fully acquainted with the whole word of God, as is practicable. But where, by the mass of Christian people, is this knowledge to be obtained, except at church? The truth is, the scriptural knowledge possessed by our ordinary congregations, amidst all our boasted light and improvement, bears no comparison with that of the Scottish peasantry of the last generation, who, from very infancy, were taught to follow the preacher, in their little Bibles, as he expounded in regular course. If long habit had not prepossessed us, we should doubtless agree at once to the proposition, that all the more cardinal books of Scripture should be fully expounded in every church, if not once during the life of a single preacher, certainly once during each generation; in order that no man should grow up without the opportunity of hearing the great body of scriptural truth laid open. And considering the Bible as our only authentic document, this method seems so natural, that the burden of proof may fairly be thrown on such as have well nigh succeeded in excluding it. There is something beautiful in the very idea of training up a whole con-

gregation in the regular study of the holy Scriptures. And if we were called upon to devise a plan for inducing people to read the Bible more diligently, we could think of none as likely to attain the end. When hearers know that a certain portion of Scripture is to be explained on the ensuing Lord's day, they will naturally be led to examine it during the week, and will thus be prepared to listen with greatly increased advantage to what may be offered. This is precisely the exercise which Chrysostom recommends to his hearers in his first homily on Matthew.* The same Father seems also to have sometimes thrown out to his hearers difficult questions, in order that they might be stimulated to inquiry. "Wherefore," he says, "have I presented the difficulty and not appended its solution? Because it is my purpose to accustom you, not always to receive food already prepared; but often to search for the explanation yourselves. Just as it is with the doves, which as long as their young remain in the nest, feed them from their own bills; but as soon as they are large enough to be fledged and leave the nest, cease to do thus. For while they bring them corn in their bills, they only show it to them; and when the young ones expect nourishment, and draw nigh, the mother lets it fall upon the earth, and the little ones pick it up."† If Scripture difficulties are in our day often started in the pulpit, and often left unresolved, we are not prepared to say whether it is exactly with the motive avowed by this great preacher. Certain it is, that the able elucidation of dark places, and the reconciling of seeming contradictions, occupy far less room in the sermons which we nowadays preach, than they did in those which have come down to us from a former age. Not many clergymen adopt the method of Bishop Horsely, who was accustomed to select difficult texts, in order that his preaching might be, in the highest possible degree, an aid to the inquiries of his hearers. And unless scriptural doubts are resolved from the sacred desk, it is plain that the great body of our congregations are likely to remain in darkness as long as they live. But he who proposes to analyse and interpret any considerable portion of the Bible, in regular order, cannot evade this labour, but must repeatedly confront the most difficult passages, and prepare himself to make them intelligible. It would be easy to expatiate on this topic, but enough has been said to awaken some doubt as to the expediency of banishing formal exposition from the church assembly.

4. The expository method of preaching is best fitted to communicate the knowledge of scriptural truth in its connexion. The knowledge of the Bible is something more than the knowledge of its isolated sentences. It includes a full acquaintance with the rela-

* "Ωστε δὲ εὐμαθέστερον γενέσθαι τὸν λόγον, δεόμεθα καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραφῶν πεποιήκαμεν, προσλαμβάνειν τὴν περικοπὴν τῆς γραφῆς, ἵν' ἂν μελλῶμεν ἐζηγείσθαι, ἵνα τῇ γνώσει ἡ ἀνάγνωσις προσοδοποιοῦσα (ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐνόητον γέγονε), πολλὴν παράσχοι τὴν εὐκολίαν ἡμῖν.

† Vol. iii., p. 103.

tion which every proposition sustains to the narrative or argument of which it is a part. This is particularly true of trains of reasoning where everything depends on a cognisance of the links which connect the several truths, and the order in which those truths are presented. Large portions of holy writ are closely argumentative, and can be understood in their true intention only when the whole scope and sequence of the terms are considered. This logical connexion is no less the result of inspiration than is any individual statement. In some books of Scripture the argument runs from beginning to end, and the clew to the whole is to be sought in the analysis of the reasoning. As instances of this we may cite the epistles to the Romans and to the Hebrews; of which no man can have any adequate conception who has not been familiar with all their parts as constituting a logical whole. This, however, is so universally conceded as a first principle of hermeneutics, that it is needless to press it further. But it is not so generally perceived, that in the other methods of preaching this great advantage is sacrificed. It is true that a man may announce as his text a single verse or clause of a verse, and then offer a full and satisfactory elucidation of the whole context, but so far as this is done, the sermon is expository, and falls under the kind which we recommend. But this species of discourse is becoming more and more rare. In the sermons of the Nonconformists this was usually the plan of proceeding. In modern sermons, there is, for the most part, nothing which resembles it. A text is taken, usually with a view to some preconceived subject; a proposition is deduced from the text; and this is confirmed or illustrated by a series of statements which would have been precisely the same if any similar verse, in any other part of the record, had been chosen. Here there is no interpretation, for there is no pretence of it. There may be able theological discussion, and we by no means would exclude this; but where a method merely textual or topical prevails, there is an absolute forsaking of that which we have maintained to be the true notion of preaching. We can conceive of a hearer listening during a course of years to every verse of the epistle to the Hebrews, laid open in connexion with as many sermons of the popular sort, without obtaining thereby an insight into the grand scope and intricate contexture of that wonderful production. Now we say that the method which makes such an omission possible is unfit to be the exclusive method.

As a remarkable instance of what is meant, we may adduce the sermons of the Rev. William Jay, who is justly celebrated as one of the most fascinating and instructive preachers of Great Britain. In these sermons we find many valuable scriptural truths, many original and touching illustrations, much sound argument, pungent exhortation, and great unction. In themselves considered, and viewed as pulpit orations, they seem open to scarcely a single objection; yet as expositions of the Scripture, they are literally nothing. They clear up no difficulties in the argument of the

inspired writers; they give no wide prospects of the field in which their matter lies; they might be repeated for a lifetime without tending in the slightest degree to educate a congregation in habits of sound interpretation. The same remark applies to the majority of American discourses, and most of all to those which conform to the prevailing taste of New England. In occasional sermons, and monthly collections, where we have access to a number of printed discourses, we are often forcibly struck with the absence of all logical concatenation. The text is a sign or motto, after announcing which the preacher glides into a gentle train of common-places, or a series of thoughts which, however ingenious and interesting and true, have no necessary connexion, "continuous in their discontinuity, like the sand-thread of the hour-glass."

The mental habits of any Christian community are mainly derived from the preaching which they hear. It is fair to ask, therefore, from what source can the Christians of our day be expected to gain a taste and ability for interpreting the Scripture in its connexion? Certainly not from the pulpit. Among the ancient Scottish Presbyterians the case was different. Every man and every woman, nay almost every child, carried his pocket-Bible to church, and not only looked out the text, but verified each citation; and as the preaching was in great part of the expository kind, the necessary consequence was, that the whole population became intimately acquainted with the structure of every book in the Bible, and were able to recall every passage with its appropriate accompanying truths. The genius of Protestantism demands that something of this kind should be attempted. Where the laity are not expected to search the Scriptures, or in any degree to exercise private judgment, it may answer every purpose to give them from the pulpit the mere *results* of exposition; but more is needed where we claim for all the privilege of trying every doctrine by the word of God; and sermons should therefore be auxiliaries to the hearers in their investigation of the record. And we earnestly desire a general return on the part of our preachers to a method which will necessarily tend, from week to week, to open the Scriptures, and display, what is by no means their least excellency, the harmonious relation of their several portions.

5. The expository method affords inducement and occasion to the preacher to declare the whole counsel of God. No man who selects his insulated texts at random has any good reason to be satisfied that he is not neglecting the inculcation of many important doctrines or duties. This deficiency is prevented in some good measure, it must be owned, by those who pursue a systematic course of doctrines in their ordinary ministrations. But usually, the indolence or caprice which renders any one averse to the expository method, will likewise withhold him from methodical series of any kind in his discourses. There is perhaps no man who has not an undue fondness for some one circle of subjects: and this does not always comprise the whole of what he is bound

to declare. But the regular exposition of a few entire books, well selected, would go far to supply every defect of this nature.

It is the province of the minister to render plain the difficulties of the Bible, and this is not likely to be done extensively, as we have elsewhere hinted, in an exclusive adherence to single texts.

There are some important and precious doctrines of revelation which are exceedingly unwelcome to the minds of many hearers; such, for instance, are the doctrines of predestination, and unconditional election. These, the preacher is tempted to avoid, and by some they are never unfolded during a whole lifetime. It is obvious that no one could expound the Epistle to the Romans, without being under the necessity of handling these points.

Moreover, it is unquestionable that many doctrines are abhorrent to the uninstructed mind, when they are set forth in their naked theological form, which are by no means so when presented in their scriptural connexion. Here, again, is a marked superiority on the side of exposition.

There is, we suppose, no pastor, who has not, in the course of his ministerial life, found himself called upon to press certain duties, or inveigh against certain sins, which it was exceedingly difficult to dwell upon, either from the delicacy of the theme itself, or from its relation to particular classes or individuals in his congregation. Now when such topics naturally arise in the regular progress of exposition, all hesitation on this score is removed at once. The most unpopular doctrines may be stated and enforced, the most prevalent vices denounced, and the most daring offenders chastised, while not even the censorious or the sensitive can find room for complaint. For these, and similar reasons, we conceive the expository way of preaching to supply a grand deficiency in our common pulpit ministrations.

6. The expository method admits of being made generally interesting to Christian assemblies. We are aware that the vulgar opinion is just the reverse of this, and that there are those who refrain from this way of preaching, under the belief that it must necessarily prove dry and repulsive to the hearer. To this our reply is, that the interpretation of the Scriptures *ought* to be interesting to every member of a Christian community: if it is not so, in fact, the cause of this disrelish is an evil which the church should not willingly endure, and which can be remedied in no other way than by bringing the public back to the assiduous study of the Bible. It is not every sort of exposition, any more than every sort of sermon, which is interesting. He who hastily seizes upon a large portion of the text, in order to furnish himself with ample material for an undigested, desultory, and extemporaneous address, cannot expect to awaken and maintain attention. With all their blindness, in certain matters, the public are very sagacious in discovering when the minister gives them that which costs him nothing. But let any man devote equal labour to his lectures as

to his sermons, and unless he be the subject of some idiosyncrasy, the former will be equally interesting.

The observation is very common that expository preaching is exceedingly difficult. Yet the writers on homiletics, as if it were the easiest thing in the world, and taught by nature, almost without exception dismiss the whole subject with a few passing remarks, and lay down no rules for the conduct of a regular exposition. We are persuaded that if equal pains were taken to prepare for one as for the other, and if the one were as often practised as the other, this complaint would have no place.

As a matter of fact, we have observed no lack of interest in such exercises, on the part of intelligent hearers. The truth is, the Bible is made for the common mind, and as it is the most interesting book in the world, so its interpretation, well conducted, is always found to be highly and increasingly agreeable to the majority of hearers. On the other hand, there are few instances of any man's interesting large congregations, for any length of time, by discourses which were void of scriptural statements, however elegant they might be in a rhetorical point of view. The effect of mere ethical preaching has been sorely felt in Germany, where, in the greater number of places, the ancient services of the Sunday afternoon, and during the week, have gone into desuetude, and there are whole classes of persons whom one never expects to see in church, such as merchants, military officers, and savans. Teller once preached a sermon to a congregation of just sixteen persons, the intent of which was to warn them against setting too high a value on going to church. "Let any man," says Tholuck, "imagine a modern preacher—as was common in former days—to direct his congregation to bring their Bibles with them, and that they might be assured that he declared, not man's word, but the word of God, at every important point, to look out the passage cited: the remark of all elegant gentlemen and ladies would be, 'Oh! this is too simple!' *Dies ist doch allzu naiv!*" But in the days when this simple practice was in vogue, every one was interested in exposition; and it will be so again, whenever the public taste shall have been reformed by a return to what was good in the ancient methods. We rejoice to know of at least one instance, even in Germany, serving to show that ordinary Christians may, with proper care, be led back into the old paths, and that highly to their satisfaction. "I know but one preacher," says a writer in the Evangelical Church Journal, "in my native country, where there are more than four hundred churches, who practises biblical exposition with success. In his country parish, which comprises several hamlets, he is accustomed to visit each of these in turn once a month (perhaps oftener in winter), and to lecture in the school-house. The hearers bring their Bibles, and even aged and infirm persons, who cannot go to church, repair hither with eagerness and delight. They receive, neither mere fragmentary and superficial remarks on single words or clauses, nor a merely edifying address on a scrip-

ture passage, but the connected exposition of some whole book, developing as well the specialties of language and matter, as the entire scope according to its contents. The lecturer begins, at every meeting, where he left off at the previous one. In the next hamlet he interprets another book, as large numbers come in from the neighbouring villages, to enjoy the additional privilege." Would that we could witness the same thing in every congregation in America!

There is one advantage of expository lectures, in respect to interest, which must not be omitted. Nothing is more evident, than that the attention and sympathy of an audience are best ensured by a rapid transition from topic to topic. This cannot always be secured in the common method. The preacher, from a sort of necessity, hammers with wearisome perseverance upon some one malleable thought, in order to keep within his preconceived task. But where he has before him a number of connected scriptural propositions, he is not only allowed, but constrained, to make precisely such quick transitions from each point to the next, as gives great variety to his discourse, and keeps up the unwearied attention of the hearer. With faithful preparation and assiduous practice, there is probably no minister who might not find this happy effect from weekly lecturing.

7. The expository method has a direct tendency to correct, if not to preclude, the evils incident to the common textual mode of preaching. It is an ordinary complaint that the sermons of the present day, as compared with those of the seventeenth century, are meager, and often empty of matter; we think the charge is founded in truth. No one can go from the perusal of Barrow, Leighton, Charnock, or Owen, to the popular writers of our time, without feeling that he has come into an atmosphere of less density. In the mere form of the pulpit discourse, in an æsthetical point of view, we have unquestionably improved upon our model. The performances of that day were too scholastic and complicated. "The sermons of the last century," says Cecil, "were like their large, unwieldy chairs. Men have now a far more true idea of a chair. They consider it as a piece of furniture to sit upon, and they cut away from it everything that embarrasses and encumbers it." But we have gone on to cut away until we have, in too many cases, removed what was important and substantial. The evil is acknowledged, but it is worthy of inquiry, how far the superficial character of modern sermons is derived from the exclusive use of short texts. We certainly do not assert that the Puritans themselves did not carry this very method to an extreme, by preaching many sermons on the same text; but it is well known that they almost universally pursued some variety of regular exposition in conjunction with this. Still less do we contend that all the evils of sermonizing are to be imputed to the exclusive use of brief texts; the source of the evil is more remote, and must be sought in the spirit of the age. But still, there is good ground for

the position, that the prevailing method gives easy occasion to certain abuses, to which direct exposition is not liable; and hence we argue that the exclusion of the latter mode is greatly to be deprecated. This is the extent of our demand. Some of the abuses to which we refer may be indicated.

It is by no means uncommon to hear sermons which are absolutely devoid of any scriptural contents. The text indeed is from the Bible, and there may be interspersed, more for decoration than proof, a number of inspired declarations; but the warp and the woof of the texture are a mere web of human reasoning or illustration. Sometimes the subject is purely secular; and often, where it is some topic of divine truth, it is maintained and urged upon natural grounds, independent of the positive declarations of the Word. It is not merely among the Unitarians of Boston that this style prevails. There are various degrees of approach to it in many orthodox pulpits of New England. The expository method renders this exceedingly difficult: being professedly an explanation of the Bible as the ideas are there set forth. In point of fact, this evil seldom occurs in exposition; as it is both natural and easy for the preacher to open clause after clause in its true sense and its revealed order. Expository discourse can scarcely fail to be largely made up of the pure biblical material.

A still greater abuse is that of wresting texts from their genuine meaning by what is called accommodation. This is the extreme refinement of the modern method. As if there was a lamentable paucity of direct scriptural declarations, to be used as the subjects of discourse, we have proceeded to employ sacred words in a sense which never entered into the minds of their inspired writers. This is the favourite trick of many a pulpit haranguer, and deserves to be classed with the sesquipedalian capitals of play-bills, and the clap-traps of the theatre: in both cases the object is to attract attention or awaken astonishment. There can scarcely be found, on the other hand, a single man, however unbridled his imagination, who could fall into such a fault in the process of formal and professed exposition. Common reverence for the Word of God must needs forbid any one while in the very act of interpreting its successive statements, to exhibit as the true intent of any passage, sentiments which no fair exegesis can extract from it.

But even where the text is understood in its literal and primary sense, the avidity for something new, and a regard for the "itching ear" of modern auditories, seduce the preacher into such a mode of treating his subject, as renders the sermon too often a mere exercise of logical or rhetorical adroitness. Where the æsthetics of sermonizing have been cultivated with overweening regard, and the exquisite partition of the topics has been exalted to the first place, we see everything sacrificed to ingenuity. The proper basis of every discourse is some pregnant declaration of the Scripture. But in the elegant sermons which are occasionally

heard, the real basis is an artificial division, or "skeleton," commonly tripartite, and frequently of such structure as to offer a pretty antithetic jingle of terms, and at the same time to remove out of sight the true connexion and scope of the text. When this is the case, far too much stress is laid upon the division, however ingenious. This abuse has grown from age to age. It was the natural consequence of exclusive textual preaching. Among the French divines it may be said to have prevailed, but it has reached its acme among the Germans; who have almost defeated our object in these remarks by playing the same tricks of fancy with long passages. Thus the excellent Tholuck, in the ninth of his second series of University Sermons, has contrived from Acts i., 1–14, to produce a division not merely in forced antithesis, but actually in rhyme! The partition being as follows:

1. Die Stätte seines *Scheidens*, die Stätte seines *Leidens;*
2. Verhüllet ist sein *Anfang*, verhüllet ist sein *Ausgang;*
3. Der Schluss von Seinem *Wegen* ist für die Seinen *Segen;*
4. Er ist von uns *geschieden*, und ist uns doch *Geblieben;*
5. Er bleibt *verhullet* den Seinen, bis er wird klär *erscheinen.*

But as a discourse is not made expository by having prefixed to it a connected passage of Scripture, we still maintain, that genuine exposition removes in great measure the temptation to these refinements. It deserves consideration that we treat no other subjects but those of religion in this way. In all grave discussions of human science, all juridical arguments, and all popular addresses, the logical or natural partition of the subject commends itself to the common sense of mankind. Such is the judgment of unbiassed men on this point. It may not be improper here to cite the opinion of Voltaire himself, because through his sneer we discern something like the aspect of reason. "It were to be wished," says he, "that in banishing from the pulpit the bad taste which degraded it, he (Bourdaloue) had likewise banished the custom of preaching upon a text. Indeed, the toil of speaking for a long time on a quotation of a line or two, of labouring to connect a whole discourse with this line, seems a play unbecoming the gravity of the sacred function. The text becomes a species of motto, or rather an enigma, which is unfolded by the sermon. The Greeks and Romans had no knowledge of this practice. It arose in the decline of letters, and has been consecrated by time. The habit of always dividing into two or three heads subjects which, like morals, demand no partition whatever, or which, like controversy, demand a partition still more extensive, is a forced method, which P. Bourdaloue found prevalent, and to which he conformed."

But there is another evil incident to the modern method of preaching which is still more to be deprecated; namely, emptiness. Next to the want of truth, the greatest fault in a sermon is want of matter. It is not the province of any mere method, as such, to furnish the material, but the ordinary mode of handling Scripture

in the pulpit affords great occasion for diffuseness, and has brought leanness into many a discourse. A man of little thought, it is true, whether he preach from a verse or a chapter, will necessarily impress the character of his mind upon his performance ; yet the temptation to fill up space with inflated weakness is far greater under the modern method; and where this method is universal, will overtake such as are undisciplined in mind. We conceive it to be no disparagement of the word of God to say that it is not every verse even of sacred writ upon which a long discourse can be written without the admixture of foreign matter. In too many instances, when a striking text has been selected, and an ingenious division fabricated, the preacher's mind has exhausted itself. Perhaps we mistake, but our conviction is, that far too much stress has been laid upon the *analyses* of sermons. Essential as they are, they are the bare plotting out of the ground. The *skeleton*, as it is aptly called, is an unsatisfactory object, where there is not superinduced a succession of living tissues ; it is all-important to support the frame, but by no means all-sufficient, and they who labour on this, in the vain hope of filling up what remains by extemporaneous speaking or writing, "quite mistake the scaffold for the pile."

We regard the diffuseness of many ministers, however perspicuous, as even worse than obscurity. The labour of the preacher's thought is too often intermitted upon the conception of a good analysis. Our fathers of the last century used to throw out masses, sometimes rude, and sometimes fantastically carved and chased, but always solid and always golden; we, their sons, are content to beat the bar into gold leaf, and too frequently to fritter this into minute fragments. Defect of thought is a sad incentive to laboured expansion, when a man is resolved to produce matter for a whole hour. In such cases, the effort is to fill up the allotted number of minutes. Too many moments of sacred time are thus occupied in adding water to the pure milk of the word. The dilute result is not only wanting in nutritive virtue, but often nauseous. Under an admirable partition, we find sermonizers offending grossly, and this in a two-fold way. One preacher will state his topic, and then, however plain it may be, pertinaciously insist upon rendering it plainer. In this instance the heads of discourse may be likened to milestones on a straight and level highway, from each of which the traveller is able to look forward over a seemingly interminable tract. Another will, in like manner, announce his topic, and then revolve around it, always in sight, but never in proximity, until the time of rambling being spent, he chooses to return and repeat his gyrations about a new centre. There is little progress made by the haranguer, though his language or his embellishment be unexceptionable, *qui variare cupit rem prodigialiter unam.* This paucity of such matter as is germane to the subject in hand is sometimes betrayed in the attempt to indemnify for the meagerness of the argumentative part, by an

inordinate addendum in the shape of improvement, inference, or application.

The expository method, if judiciously intermixed with the other, offers a happy corrective to this fault. Here the preacher is furnished with abundance of matter, all-important, and fertile of varied thought. He is placed under compression, and compelled to exchange his rarity of matter for what is close and in the same proportion weighty. We could give no better recipe for the cure of this tympany of sermonizers, than a course of expository lectures.

One word must be added, before we leave this copious topic, upon the avidity with which both preachers and hearers seek for novel and striking texts. The most common and familiar texts have become such, for the very reason that they are the most important. It is unworthy of the minister of Jesus Christ to be always in search of fragments which have never before been handled. The practice militates against the systematic and thorough development of the whole counsel of God. We need not pause a moment to show that this is an evil that cannot exist under the method which we are solicitous to recommend.

It forms no part of our plan, in these remarks, to lay down rules for the conduct of an expository discourse, though the subject is quite as deserving of being treated in detail as any other connected with homiletics. No mistake could be more injurious to the character of such exercises, than to suppose that they demand less method or less assiduity than the most finished sermons of the ordinary kind. They are not to be used as a means of retreat from the labours of the closet, and he who thus employs them will soon find his pulpit services empty and unsuccessful. In the present state of society, when the public mind, especially in our own country, is trained by the discipline of reading and hearing the highest specimens of forensic and deliberative eloquence, it is vain to expect that any congregation can long be interested in unpremeditated addresses. We may apply to this whole subject the words of our Directory for Worship: "The method of preaching requires much study, meditation, and prayer. Ministers ought, in general, to prepare their sermons with care; and not to indulge themselves in loose, extemporary harangues; nor to serve God with that which cost them naught."* We have met with no instance in which permanent usefulness has followed the practice of delivering unstudied sermons. The preacher who attempts this is sure to fall into empty declamation, objurgatory invective, or tedious repetition. Undigested discourses are commonly of tiresome length, and proportionate dulness. Wherever we hear frequent complaints of a preacher's prolixity, we are sure ourselves that he leaves much of the filling up of his outline to the hour of actual delivery. Without being himself aware of it, such a preacher falls into a

* Chap. vi., § 3.

routine of topics and expressions, and is perpetually repeating himself, and becoming more and more uninteresting to his charge; while, at the same time, he is perhaps wondering at the diminution of his hearers, and attributing his want of success to any cause but one within himself. The assiduous study of the Bible, with direct reference to the services of the pulpit, is indispensably necessary, whatever species of preaching may be adopted.

We plead, at present, for no more than a discreet admixture of biblical exposition with the other methods of discourse. In entering upon such a course, it is not necessary that the minister should introduce his first experiments into the principal service of the Lord's day: he might make trial of his gifts in less frequented meetings, or in some more familiar circle called together for this special purpose. And even where the expository method is exclusively adopted, as some may see cause to do, the pastor is to beware of that extreme which would always present very long passages. The expository plan, wisely conducted, may be said to include the other. Where, in due course, a verse, or even a part of a verse occurs, so important in its relations and so rich in matter as to claim a more extended elucidation, it should be taken singly, and be made the basis of a whole sermon, or even more.

As a model of familiar exposition we would cite the Lectures of Archbishop Leighton on the First Epistle of Peter. The great excellency of these is their heavenly unction, which led Dr. Doddridge to say that he never read a page of Leighton without experiencing an elevation of his religious feelings. "More faith and more grace," says Cecil," would make us better preachers, for *out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.* Chrysostom's was the right method. Leighton's Lectures on Peter approach very near to this method."—"Our method of preaching," says the same writer, "is not that by which Christianity was propagated: yet the genius of Christianity is not changed. There was nothing in the primitive method set or formal. The primitive bishop stood up, and read the gospel, or some other portion of Scripture, and pressed on the hearers with great earnestness and affection, a few plain and forcible truths, evidently resulting from that portion of the divine word: we take a text, and make an oration. Edification was then the object of both speaker and hearers; and while this continues to be the object, no better method can be found."*

Such a mode of preaching is less adapted than its opposite to make the speaker a separate object of regard, and might be selected by many on this very account. It is now some years since we enjoyed the privilege of listening to the late pious and eloquent Summerfield, the charm of whose brilliant and pathetic discourses will never be forgotten by those who heard them. After having, on a certain occasion, delivered a deeply impressive sermon on Isaiah vi., 1–6, he remarked to the writer of these pages, that, in

* Cecil's Works, vol. iii., p. 312.

consequence of having been pursued by multitudes of applauding hearers, he hd been lead to exercise himself more in the way of simple exposition, as that which most threw the preacher himself into the shade, and most illustriously displayed the pure truth of the Word.

The same idea was expressed by the late Dr. Mason, in circumstances which no doubt drew from him his sincerest convictions and most affectionate counsels. The words are found in a sermon preached in Murray Street Church, December 2, 1821, on the occasion of resigning the charge of his congregation; and we earnestly recommend to every reader this testimony of one who, it is well known, was eminently gifted in the very exercise which he applauds.

In suggesting to his late charge the principles upon which they should select a pastor, he says: "Do not choose a man who always preaches upon insulated texts. I care not how powerful or eloquent he may be in handling them. The effect of his power and eloquence will be, to banish a taste for the word of God, and to substitute the preacher in its place. You have been accustomed to hear that word preached to you in its connexion. Never permit that practice to drop. Foreign churches call it *lecturing;* and when done with discretion, I can assure you that, while it is of all exercises the most difficult for the preacher, it is, in the same proportion, the most profitable for you. It has this peculiar advantage, that in going through a book of Scripture, it spreads out before you all sorts of character, and all forms of opinion; and gives the preacher an opportunity of striking every kind of evil and of error, without subjecting himself to the invidious suspicion of aiming his discourses at individuals."*

With these remarks we may safely leave the subject, commending it to the careful and impartial investigations of all who are interested in the propagation of divine truth, and particularly to ministers of the gospel, who, of all men living, should be most solicitous to direct their powers in such channels as to produce the highest effect.

* Mason's Works, vol. i., p. 366.

ESSAY XX.

FÜRST'S HEBREW CONCORDANCE.*

The appearance of great literary undertakings, whether deserving of the name from the novelty or importance of their subjects, or from the amount of patient labour or of original thought expended on their execution, may appropriately be compared to that of eminent individuals in the political world. For as these latter exert a powerful influence upon the character and conduct not only of the men among whom they live and move, but also of their posterity to distant times; so important literary achievements, while thousands of ordinary publications are suffered to sink into oblivion, remain as monuments of the intellectual prowess of the age in which they are produced, and serve as guides and helpers to future advances in knowledge, virtue, and happiness. Hence it is highly proper that their appearance and character be recorded in literary history for the benefit of posterity as well as of contemporaries, in like manner as those of celebrated men are preserved in the history of political events. These two histories unitedly compose that of mankind in general, considered both as acting and as reflecting beings.

The two principles of action and reflection, although inseparably combined in every individual of the human race, have each arrived in various nations and epochs at various degrees of development. The predominance of the former tendency displays itself in the performance of deeds of heroism, while that of the latter is exhibited in aspirations after literary distinction. This truth will be found strikingly exemplified on comparing the history of the middle ages with that of our own times.

The former of these two tendencies may be termed the *objective*, or that in which the united faculties of mind and body seek to manifest themselves in outward action; while to the latter we may give the name of *subjective*, or that in which the mental powers, having attained a high degree of development, are more

Originally published in 1839, in review of "Concordantiae Librorum Veteris Testamenti Sacrorum Hebraicae atque Chaldaicae, &c., &c." Auctore Julio Fürstio, Doct. Phil. Lipsiae. 1837–8. Sect. I.–VIII.

especially directed to abstract reasoning. Two opposite tendencies analogous to these may likewise be observed in the operations of the mind alone, which either restricts itself almost exclusively to a consideration of the objects presented to it by the world without, or, soon leaving these, proceeds to digest, to combine, and to work out new results of its own, independent of any further external influence. The former tendency is exhibited in the production of learned compilations, the latter in that of speculative and theoretical works.

As all ideas, including even the most abstract, are in the first place excited although not created by perceptions, and those chiefly of external objects, it follows that the objective development of the mind must necessarily be first in the order of time; and that only after the completion of such development can its subjective powers manifest themselves in any pre-eminent degree: or as Schiller beautifully expresses it,

> Nur durch das Morgenthor des Schönen
> Dringst du in der Erkenntniss Land;
> An höhrem Glanz sich zu gewöhnen,
> Uebt sich am Reize der Verstand.

If we desire to know the degree in which these opposite tendencies of the mind are developed in any nation or epoch, we have only to ascertain the character of its principal literary productions; and on this account, if no other, their appearance must attract the attention of those who desire to become acquainted with the history of the progress of the human mind. The work whose title is placed at the head of this article is one which we regard as presenting strong claims to consideration, on account of the extraordinary amount of mental labour both subjective and objective which its execution manifests as well as its important bearings on the advancement of biblical studies.

As this work comprises a Hebrew Lexicon as well as a Concordance to the Hebrew Bible, we will consider its claims in each of these respects separately, commencing with the former. The lexicography of Dr. Fürst does not consist in the mere introduction of improvements of greater or less consequence into the systems of his predecessors; but is founded on an original plan of his own, the result of new and most enlarged views of the philosophy of language. These views, by making higher claims on the philologist than have been heretofore preferred, give rise to such deep investigations and happy discoveries, that, although occasionally warned by a too great boldness of conjecture to be cautious in their application, we feel continually more and more inclined to adopt them in all their breadth and fulness.

On examining into the leading features of the new system of Hebrew lexicography as compared with those which have preceded it, and tracing the course pursued by this department of philological science, we obtain a full confirmation of the truth of

the axiom above laid down, that the chief tendency of the mind in its first operations is decidedly objective.

Lexicography, or that science which has for its object the elements of language, viz. words separately considered, was first applied to the Hebrew about a thousand years after it had ceased to be a living tongue. Up to that period it had been learned much in the same manner as that in which a child acquires its maternal idiom, namely, by obtaining a knowledge of a succession of phrases and entire sentences rather than of detached words. Now this synthetical mode of acquiring a language closely resembles the operations of nature in the formation of speech; for it should be remembered that the words which constitute the body of a language are created not singly and in succession, but simultaneously in the form of propositions. The same method of study is still in use among the Oriental and Polish Jews, who obtain a practical acquaintance with the entire contents of the Old Testament and even of the Talmud, without ever knowing that such a work as a lexicon exists, its place being supplied to them by living teachers, who, as it were, resuscitate the inanimate form of the language by again clothing it in living articulate sounds.

This mode of learning a dead language can be successfully pursued only when we enjoy the constant aid of a living instructor, who, by first explaining the meaning of the strange sounds through the medium of others which we have been accustomed to employ as the exponents of ideas, and by afterwards accustoming us through a long course of practice to associate our ideas with the new sounds and the signs representing them, may in time succeed in making the dead language bear to us the relation of a living one. Without such assistance the signs in which the spirit of the dead language lies embalmed must for ever remain to us a mystery, unless we can learn their signification by means of others with which we are familiar; or, in other words, unless we are furnished with books which, by explaining the etymological history and meaning of every word, in a language already known to us, may in some measure supply the place of *viva voce* instruction.

As regards the Hebrew, when we consider that the reverence in which the sacred records it contains have ever been held by the Jewish nation has caused the language to be preserved among them by tradition from generation to generation, and provision to be made for a constant succession of teachers who spend their lives in the study and explanation of the holy volume, we are less inclined to feel surprised at the fact that the attention of their learned men was not sooner directed to the investigation of single words, even when copies of the Scriptures, glosses and various readings of the text, and copious commentaries written for the elucidation of particular books existed in abundance, and were continually receiving fresh accessions to their number. And in fact it was only when, in consequence of multiplied oppressions and dispersions, the band of teachers became diminished, their schools shut up or destroyed,

nay the study of the Law itself at times prohibited under penalty of death, that some of the most intelligent men of the nation, perceiving the danger to which the holy language lay exposed of becoming at length irretrievably lost, undertook the compilation of lexicographical works, in order to prevent the occurrence of so deplorable a misfortune.

The earliest attempt in this department of literature of which we have any certain knowledge, is a collection of seventy difficult words made by R. Saadia Haggaon in the tenth century, accompanied by brief explanations in Arabic.* But the first work deserving the name of a Hebrew lexicon, was that composed by R. Menahhem ben S'ruk, about the commencement of the eleventh century, and which, although never submitted to the press,† was evidently, from the accounts we have of it, far in advance of the philological science of the day; since its author, by considering roots whose second letter is doubled or which contain a weak letter as derived from primitive biliteral themes, anticipated improvements in Hebrew lexicography which have been brought forward and developed by a distinguished scholar of our day, and are made by Dr. Fürst the stepping-stones to new and splendid discoveries. Considered however as a whole, the lexicon of Ben S'ruk was greatly surpassed by that of a Spanish physician named Rabbi Jonah. This author, while he did not neglect the traditional authority, on which, with the aid of the context, the work of his predecessor entirely rests, made an admirable use of the numerous analogies existing between the Hebrew and his mother-tongue, the Arabic. Many of the illustrations contained in his work, as well as those in the similar one of R. Jehuda ben Karish, were afterwards adopted by R. David Kimhhi, whose lexicon, the Sepher Hashshorashim, has remained the standard Jewish authority to the present time. It far excels those that preceded it both in fulness and accuracy, as well as in the number of valuable exegetical remarks with which it abounds. The roots, under which the words belonging to them are promiscuously ranged, succeed each other alphabetically, with the exception that the pluriliterals and those of the biblical Chaldee are respectively placed after all the triliterals which commence with the same letter. The grammatical order of the species and modes of verbs is usually though not invariably observed, and each word is in general supported by numerous quotations.

In the productions of these native lexicographers a prominent objective tendency is manifest throughout. They all show the acquaintance of their authors with the Hebrew to have been exceedingly familiar and minute; so that the imperfections they exhibit are properly to be ascribed to their want of insight into the philosophy of language. The earliest among these writers were

* It has been printed with annotations by Leopold Dukes in the Zeitschrift. f. d. Morgenland. Vol V.—*Ed.*

† The grammatical Introduction, with extracts from the body of the work, is given by Dukes in his Literaturhistorische Mittheilungen. Stuttgart, 1844. P. 125, seqq. —*Ed.*

firmly of opinion, with the commentators who preceded them, that as the Law of the Lord is perfect, the language in which it is contained must also be perfect, and therefore could stand in no need of aid from foreign sources for its elucidation. In consequence of this belief and of the general objective tendency of their minds, whenever they undertook the illustration of an individual word, they regarded it as it presented itself in the Bible, without referring to any other language than the Hebrew, and without attempting to discover those natural laws of speech which caused it to assume such and such a form rather than another. They supposed their task completed, when they had collected the several meanings in which, according to traditional interpretation, the word was employed in the various passages where it appeared; and when, as was not unfrequently the case, these meanings appeared entirely unconnected and even diametrically opposite, their purely objective mode of viewing the subject prevented them from seeking to trace out the primary signification of the root, a knowledge of which alone could remove these apparent discrepancies.

In a few instances, indeed, where the customary aid of tradition appears to have been wanting, we find them having recourse to a living sister dialect. Thus it is related in the Talmud (Rosh Hashshána, fol. 26), that the rabbis were ignorant of the meaning of the word מאכאתי Is. xiv. 23, until one of them heard his foreign servant say to a woman שקילי מאטרתא ומאטי ביתא "take the broom and sweep the house." So also they did not know what יהבך Ps. lv. 23, signified, until an Arab was heard to use the expression שקול יהבך ושדי אגמלאי "take thy burden and cast it upon the camel." (Meg. fol. 18.)

To the general rule however of closely adhering to tradition, and of endeavouring by means of it and of the context to make the Hebrew elucidate itself, we meet with no considerable exception until the time of R. Jonah, who first laid under contribution for this purpose the rich treasures of the copious and nearly related Arabic; an example which has been followed up with the most signal success by learned European Orientalists of the two last centuries. These scholars observed that words of the same form and bearing precisely the same meaning as the Hebrew, were of constant occurrence in the Arabic; frequently too they found the primary signification of a root still in use in the latter language which no longer appeared in the former, and were enabled by means of it to exhibit all the secondary acceptations in a beautifully logical connexion. In many instances the root itself of a numerous stock of derivatives was discovered, and thus a number of words united under a single stem which before had been supposed to belong to several. Much information was also gained on the subject of the interchange of letters, the study of which in the Arabic is facilitated by an orthography at once euphonic and etymological.

Still these investigations were not regulated by a comprehensive

philosophical view of the laws regulating the creation and development of languages, or of the essentially organic nature of the connexion existing between those of the same stock; and hence the rage for directly referring everything in the Hebrew to the standard of the Arabic, was suffered to increase to an extent the injurious effects of which are still but too apparent in our best lexicons. A full consideration of this interesting subject if undertaken here would lead us too far from our main purpose; it must therefore be reserved for a future occasion: but before leaving it we would remark, that we are far from desiring either to depreciate the value of modern labours and discoveries, or to deny the closeness of the connexion that exists between the Hebrew and the other branches of the Shemitish stock. What we do mean to say is, that when the investigation of the Hebrew shall have been conducted with a clear conception of the true sources and nature of language, and accompanied by an accurate analysis of articulate sounds and of the laws on which their mutations depend, not only will the true relations which the Hebrew bears to its sister dialects be perceived, but the language will likewise be seen extending its points of affinity far beyond these narrow bounds, and uniting with all other primitive tongues in the indissoluble bond of a community of origin.

Notwithstanding what may seem the boldness of this assertion, and the magnitude of the obstacles which the philologist must encounter who undertakes a practical demonstration of its truth, still we think that its probability at least will become evident to all who attentively consider the numerous examples given by Gesenius of strong resemblance and even identity between Shemitish and Indo-European primitives. If any fail of being fully convinced by these facts, although unable positively to deny the truth of the theory they tend to support, they should reflect that the discovery of them has proceeded rather from a partly unconscious anticipation, the result of long continued and laborious researches, than from any very profound or original views of the organic nature of language. That such is really the case, and that much more remains to be accomplished in this respect than has hitherto been performed, is incontestably proved by the multitude of striking comparisons contained in the Concordance of Dr. Fürst.

In the lexicographical department of this work its author shows a constant endeavour, excited by the distinguished success which has attended the application of the science of comparative philology to the Indo-European languages, to burst asunder the bands that for a thousand years have held the Shemitish tongues in an isolated condition apart from every other. And in truth his deeply penetrating mind and extensive knowledge of the Indo-European as well as Shemitish languages, have enabled him to bring forward a host of cogent proofs in support of his theory of the original intimate relation if not identity of those primitive languages of the ancient world to which he gives the name of Sanscrito-Semitic, and which comprise the Sanscrit family including the numerous

dialects of India, the Medo-Persic, the Shemitish, the Græco-Latin, the Teutonic, and the Slavonic.

Such being the opinion of this eminent philologist, it becomes requisite for our own satisfaction to inquire into the reason of its adoption. This is not to be sought in the mere external form of these languages, since their striking dissimilarity in this respect is that which presents the greatest obstacles to their re-union under one head, and has hitherto caused those belonging to the Shemitish family to be considered as completely *sui generis*. In fact it was something lying far deeper in the philosophy of language than this: it was the perception and acknowledgment of a constant relation between the objective sound of a word and the subjective idea which called it into existence, an idea which must be radically and essentially the same in every human mind. In consequence of this relation between a word and the idea from which it originated, and of the fundamentally uniform nature of a given idea by whomsoever entertained, it follows that even the words employed by different tribes of men must bear the stamp of a common origin; notwithstanding that discrepancies may appear, owing to the variety of ways in which the same idea may be perceived by different individuals, and still more to the many influences acting upon the sound that represents it both in its creation and during its whole existence.

This relation of a word to its originating idea is not to be looked for in all its parts as we now meet with it, or even as it was first produced; since nothing purely ideal can be endowed with a physical existence, without at the same time receiving some alloy:

> Dem Herrlichsten was auch der Geist empfangen
> Drängt immer fremd und fremder Stoff sich an.*

So that a word even in its purest and most genuine form will usually be found to contain some foreign admixture in addition to the sounds immediately related to the idea it expresses; a fact which Prof. Bopp, in following out and improving upon the views of the Indian grammarians, has developed with singular ingenuity and depth of research in his Sanscrit Grammar, when treating of the formation of words by the addition of Krit and Unâdi suffixes to primitive themes. A full and clear perception of this truth is of the greatest importance to the successful investigation of the etymological history of the Hebrew; since it affords the means both of uniting under single heads the greater part of its synonyms and of ascertaining the relations of its roots to those of other primitive tongues.

Formerly Hebrew roots were considered as indivisible totalities, each constituent part of which had an equal share in conveying the idea. Consequently each root preserved a distinct exclusiveness with regard to the rest, and was supposed to share in a peculiarity

* Göthe's Faust.

pervading all the Shemitish languages, viz. that of being composed of three original consonants. It being, however, perceived, that many verbs of the same or a similar meaning had two radicals in common, while the third was an *imperfect* letter, lexicographers at length came to the conclusion that they must have been constructed from biliteral themes by the addition of a prefixed, affixed, or inserted imperfect letter to complete the usual triliteral form. These views were further extended by observing, on a comparison of the Hebrew roots with their cognates in Aramaic and Arabic, that certain classes of letters were frequently interchanged, especially those of the same or of adjacent organs, the liquids, and the quiescents. But although the roots of the several Shemitish languages were thus brought nearer together, the great majority of Hebrew synonyms continued to be regarded as destitute of any other etymological connexion.

This supposition is successfully combated by Dr. Fürst, who has ascertained beyond doubt that the accession to a primitive biliteral may and often does consist of a *perfect* letter. The investigations to which he was led by this discovery, have not only brought the great mass of Hebrew roots into close comparison with those of numerous other languages, but have also shown an interconnexion both in form and meaning between many of the former which had been regarded as entirely independent of each other. This he accomplishes by a skilful analysis of words and their elements, in order to distinguish between those sounds which are of importance as being strictly related to the ideas they convey, and those which are adscititious and therefore of no moment. Being, however, well aware that the further the province of a word is extended and the greater the allowances made for the changes to which sounds are liable, the more imminent is the danger of running into vague speculation and conjecture, he, before pronouncing as to the essentiality or non-essentiality of any of the elements of a word, carefully compares it with its cognates in the other Shemitish dialects and with all its derivatives and synonyms. He then concludes that the elements which are common to them all, constitute the real theme, and that the remainder, being mere admixtures, may be safely disregarded in further etymological comparisons.

Having thus ascertained the root, he next traces it through the principal languages of the Indo-European stock, thus giving it a greater historical development, and as it were setting the seal to his former discoveries. By this means he often succeeds in reducing a number of existing roots to a single primitive theme; while those which are no longer to be found in the language, and which lexicographers formerly attempted to supply directly from Aramaic, Arabic, and Ethiopic sources, often in a very far-fetched and unsatisfactory manner, he clearly and naturally deduces from languages which, although less related to the Hebrew, belong indubitably to the same great class of tongues.

This analytical process he employs also in finding out the primary significations of roots, whence all their own acceptations as well as those of their derivatives naturally spring. Here too the danger of being confounded and misled by the numerous particulars which must be considered in order to arrive at correct conclusions, pointed out the necessity of establishing some guiding principle by which to regulate the investigation. Our author chose for this purpose the traditional history of the significations of each word; having detailed these at length, he adopts them as the data on which to ground subsequent inquiries, and then proceeds to develope, unite, and complete them by means of his researches in comparative philology.

The success attending the constant and faithful application of this analytico-historical method of induction, caused him to lay down, in a previous work,* the following propositions as incontestable: "1. That there is no verbal or pronominal root in Hebrew or Aramaic which is not completely identical in its primary form and meaning with those of the other Sanscrito-Semitic languages; and that consequently the frame-work and plan of all the languages included under this designation must be in effect the same. This is not a mere lifeless unity of language, but an organic one, inspired by an animating principle throughout, with development and progress, growth and decay, natural simplicity and unnatural artificiality, like man himself. 2. That the opinion maintained by the rational school, of the fossilizing (Erstarrung) of the Shemitish roots in a certain number of consonants and syllables, is without foundation; seeing that they are identical bothin form and meaning with the Sanscrit. And that the alleged incapacity for composition in the Shemitish roots is disproved by the historical comparison with those of the Sanscrit; from which it appears that a great part of them are composed of an original theme and a prepositional prefix. 3. That these prepositional prefixes which enter into the composition of the roots, and which are readily discernible by analysis in the initial non-radical syllable, have, as in the other families of tongues, strictly defined and permanent significations, which, as well as those of the themes themselves, are to be ascertained by historical comparison. 4. That this unity extends not only through the roots, but also through the primary and most predominant grammatical formations; in short, every affformative has its history."

That the dazzling results of these bold and in general happy speculations have occasionally led this indefatigable scholar to too great a length, in slighting the labours of his predecessors, we cannot altogether deny; yet it would be doing his merits signal injustice were we not to acknowledge, that the success which for the most part has crowned his exertions, clearly evinces the correctness of his views and also of the plan which they have induced him to

* Perlenschnüre aramäischer Gnomen und Lieder, Vorrede, pp. 15, 16.

adopt. Indeed we regard his work as the exposition of a new system in Hebrew lexicography, and one which we cannot doubt will in a short time carry it by the judicious application of the principles he has laid down to a degree of perfection of which no other language in the world can boast. To support these remarks by copious and appropriate examples would be an easy task, as such are furnished by almost every page; but, as we have already reached the limits assigned by us to this part of our subject, we will merely state in addition the outlines of the plan on which the lexicographical portion of the work is conducted, before proceeding to a consideration of its claims as a concordance properly so called.

Immediately under the word to be explained, and preceding the citation of the passages of Scripture containing it, is placed its etymological history and elucidation in rabbinic Hebrew and in Latin. The Hebrew part of the exposition, which is written in a pure and elegantly idiomatic style, comprises the traditional history of the word and its significations as given by ancient Jewish authorities. In the Latin part which follows, this history is further carried out by means of an extensive and most ingenious comparison with its cognates in sound and meaning among the principal languages of the Sanscrito-Semitic stock, as the Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic, Sanscrit, Greek, Latin, German, &c., together with the expressions by which it is rendered in the Chaldee Targums, the ancient Greek Versions, and the Latin Vulgate.

Before making our remarks on the work of Dr. Furst in its quality of concordance, we shall offer some observations on the *objects*, *plan*, *use*, and *history* of concordances to the Hebrew Bible.

I. The *objects* of a complete Hebrew concordance require that it should embrace the following particulars:

1. All the principal words both notional and relational contained in the Hebrew Scriptures.

2. All the forms in which they appear.

3. All the connexions in which these forms are severally to be found, with the places where they occur.

1. Every language possesses, as its material, a greater or less number of words. These consist of *notional* words, or such as convey the idea either of a material or immaterial existence, or of an action or state of being; and *relational* words, or those which serve to point out the relations which such existences and actions bear to each other. The words of the first class are divided into nouns, pronouns, and verbs; those of the second are collectively termed particles.

These words are either created immediately upon the conception of the ideas they convey, through the agency of the organs of speech, and hence receive the name of *primitives;* or they are constructed in various ways from the elements of other words already in existence and representing some analogous idea, whence they are called *derivatives.* Now as the formation of neither of

these species of words can precede the conception of the ideas which they represent, and can at most only be contemporary with such conceptions, the number of words composing a nation's language must depend entirely on that of its ideas; or, in other words, on the nature of the external world by which it is surrounded, and the amount and quality of the intellectual cultivation it may receive.

But the circumstances of a people's existence are subject to continual changes, which exert a powerful influence on the national idiosyncrasy; consequently its stock of ideas, and together with them the words which serve as their exponents, will be liable to corresponding fluctuations, such as the introduction of new terms, the attributing of new significations to the old ones, and finally the rejection of them altogether. The changes superinduced in the language of a nation by its external circumstances are not more numerous than those which result from the improvement or deterioration of the general state of its intellectual culture; for the mental faculties of a nation, like those of an individual, may either remain through neglect in an undeveloped state, or be brought by assiduous cultivation to the highest perfection. And hence, as long as a people retain the same language for the communication of their wants, feelings, and ideas, its richness or poverty will serve as an exact index to the degree of development to which the national mind has attained.

As all living languages are in this constant state of mutation, it is impossible to construct lexicons for them which shall remain even tolerably complete for more than a limited space of time. This, however, is not the case with the Hebrew, which has ceased to be a living tongue for more than two thousand years, and whose whole authentic remains are contained in the small number of books composing the Old Testament. This fact, together with the important character of the sacred writings, on the knowledge of which our temporal and eternal happiness depends, long ago suggested the idea of making a systematic collection of all the words contained in the Bible, with all their forms and connexions and the places in which they are found, to serve as a perpetual guide to the thorough understanding of the sacred volume. A concordance then differs from a lexicon principally in this, that while the chief object of the latter is the scientific exposition of the various shades of meaning which words convey, that of the former is to show where these words occur.

2. The notional words in Hebrew appear in a variety of forms, produced by changes in their vowels and consonants, and by the addition of initial and final augments. The principal changes to which verbs are subjected consist in the inflections made use of to distinguish the different species, modes, tenses, persons, and numbers, in which they are employed. Those which nouns undergo are produced by the influence of the pause-accents, by passing from the absolute to the construct state, and in forming the plural

number. Every part of speech may receive accessory letters of different kinds in the shape of prefixes and suffixes. In the concordance all the forms to which these changes and additions give rise should constitute distinct heads arranged in a proper order; so that any one of them may instantly be found, and the number of times it occurs ascertained.

3. As the significations of words are affected in no slight degree by their various connexions, it is requisite, as we have already observed, that the concordance should give these connexions also, by quoting with sufficient fulness the passages in which a word is contained; and in order that the inquirer may be enabled to turn to their places in the text for his further satisfaction, they should be accompanied by references to the book, chapter, and verse whence they are taken.

II. Having now briefly described what the objects embraced by a concordance render necessary that it should contain, we next proceed to a delineation of the *plan* on which it should be constructed so as to facilitate its use to the utmost. In the first place, then, the author must decide upon what is to constitute the governing principle of the whole arrangement—whether signification or grammatical form. He has next to determine upon the order in which to dispose the words, viz., whether to commence with the simple forms of a primitive word and its derivatives, and then give the different shapes arising from inflection and from the reception of prefixes and suffixes; or whether first to go through all the forms of the primitive and afterwards those of each derivative in regular succession. The proper arrangement of the quotations also demands some consideration; since various reasons may be urged in favour of placing the books in the order of the Hebrew Bible, in that of the Vulgate, or in that of the periods in which they were composed. These are some of the principal points which must engage the attention of the compiler of a Hebrew concordance; and on the justness of his conclusions with regard to them the utility of his work will in great measure depend.

In stating our own views on the subject we have no hesitation in giving the preference to a plan founded on the scientific principle of disposing words in the order of their grammatical development, and combining, as far as may be practicable, the advantages of the alphabetical arrangement. Thus, the verb should be divided into its several species of Kal, Niph'hal, Pi'hel, Pu'hal, Hiph'hil, Hoph'hal, and Hithpa'hel, and each treated separately in succession. The modes of each species should succeed each other in the following order: the Indicative, comprising the preterite and future tenses; the Imperative, which being formed from the future should be placed immediately after it; the Infinitive; and lastly the Participle, which as well as the infinitive is a verbal noun, and receives for the most part the same prefixes and suffixes as other nouns.

The two tenses should be subjected to a further subdivision

depending on number and person, and arranged as follows: first, the third pers. masc. sing., since it usually constitutes the root of the verb; next, the third pers. fem. sing.; then, the sec. pers. masc. sing. &c. as laid down in most grammars of the language. For the sake of uniformity the same arrangement should be observed in the future tense, since no regular disposition of the persons can be effected by observing the alphabetical order of their preformatives. The persons of each tense should be subdivided according to their vowel changes and the suffixes they may receive, and these again according to their prefixes. The imperative is to be treated in all respects like the future.

The infinitives and participles should be divided into absolute and construct, and the latter also into singular and plural. Besides these divisions, to which all other nouns are subjected, participles and adjectives are to be still further subdivided into masculine and feminine. Suffixes and prefixes give rise to new subdivisions in the nouns as well as in the verbs.

The order then in which the different parts of a verb and the nouns derived from it will succeed each other according to this method is as follows. First, we have the third pers. masc. sing. preterite Kal of the verb, as for instance קָטַל, and immediately under it the passages of the Bible in which it appears. The next is the form קָטָל which differs from the preceding only by a vowel change arising from the reception of a pause-accent; here too, as in all other instances, the quotations containing the word are placed directly beneath it. The same word is again given, accompanied by its prefixes; thus הַקָּטַל, וְקָטַל. It next appears with the pronominal suffixes, arranged in the order of the persons, first, second, and third; and each like the nude form, with its prefixes, e. g. 1. קְטָלָנִי, הֲקְטָלַנִי, וְקְטָלַנִי; 2 m. קְטָלְךָ, &c. &c. When the third pers. masc. sing. of the verb is thus disposed of, the third person fem. is treated in the same manner; and so on through all the persons and both numbers of the preterite, future, and imperative of the Kal species.

After the imperative are placed the verbal nouns belonging to the species, viz. the infinitive and participle. The infinitive is given in the nude form of the absolute, as קָטֹל, and then with ה interrogative and ו conjunctive. This is followed by the construct state, first with the prepositions בְּ, כְּ, לְ, מִן alone; and next with the personal pronouns both without and with the prepositions, thus קְטָלִי, בְּקָטְלִי, כְּקָטְלִי, &c.; בְּקָטְלֵךְ, כְּקָטְלֵךְ, &c. &c. Of the participles active and passive the masculine form is gone through first, both singular and plural, and afterwards the feminine; both numbers being subjected to a subdivision according to their suffixes and prefixes, similar to that of the infinitive.

All the forms belonging to Kal being thus exhausted, the remaining species are treated in the same manner, until the entire verb has been disposed of. The derivative nouns from the same root

are then taken up, beginning with the simplest and ending with the most complex: accordingly we have first those which are derived from the root by a mere vowel change, next those which receive a preformative or afformative letter or syllable, and lastly such as take both.

The passages quoted from the Bible should succeed each other in the order of chronology, as this will assist the inquirer in ascertaining the comparative antiquity of the various senses in which a word may be employed.

III. The above is our opinion as to the mode which should be pursued in constructing a Hebrew concordance so as to be most conveniently and profitably consulted. We have now to speak concerning the *uses* to which a properly executed work of this description is capable of being applied. In so doing, our remarks will refer to the assistance it gives, 1. to an editor of the Hebrew Scriptures, as affording the best means of restoring and preserving the purity of the text; 2. to the Hebrew lexicographer and grammarian; 3. to the interpreter of Scripture and to biblical students in general.

1. The most important service which a concordance renders to the editor of a Hebrew Bible, is that of enabling him, by consulting the fragments of the Masora, to apply at once to the original sources of information respecting the true orthography of doubtful words, instead of being under the necessity of blindly following in the track of his predecessors, perpetuating if not indeed aggravating the errors they may have committed. In order to place this fact in its clearest light, we will here give a brief account of the Masora itself.

The word *Masora* (מסורה) or *Masoreth* (מסורת), signifying *tradition*, is used to denote a collection of critical remarks relative to the text of the Hebrew Scriptures, which, according to the Talmudists, was settled by the High Synod, an assembly of the most wise and learned men of the Jewish nation, constituted immediately after the return from the Babylonian captivity, with Ezra the high priest at their head. These are said to have collected the numerous ancient traditions respecting the divisions, verses, words, letters, and points of the Bible, and to have employed them in a thorough revision of the text, undertaken with a view of restoring it if possible to its pristine purity, and of guarding against its subsequent deterioration. The mass of ancient critical remarks thus brought together, with the additions made to them by the members of the Synod, continued to be preserved and taught in the schools of Judea until about the middle of the third century of the Christian era, when the chief seat of Jewish learning was removed to Babylon. There, according to the Jewish Chronicles, it continued to flourish for a space of eight hundred years, when at length the schools were broken up, and the learned men scattered through Spain and other parts of Europe. About the beginning of the sixteenth century the fragments of the Masora were collected, revised, and published by

R. Jacob ben Hhayim in the Rabbinical Bible printed by Daniel Bomberg at Venice.

The Masora is divided into *greater* and *less;* or, more properly speaking, there are two Masoras, which respectively bear these appellations. The greater Masora, which formerly constituted a large independent work, is printed in Bomberg's Bible in the margin of the text, both above and beneath it, and likewise down the side when the brevity of the Rabbinical commentary leaves room. It states the number of times that words of uncommon occurrence are to be found in the Pentateuch or in the whole Bible; how often words appear in unusual connexions; how often they receive certain vowels and accents; and how often words usually written fully, i. e. with one of the semivowels, are to be found defective or without them, and *vice versa.* It also points out the K'ri and C'thibh, and records the number of sections, verses, words, and even letters in each book and in the entire Bible. The lesser Masora consists of extracts from the greater, and is commonly placed between the text and the Rabbinical commentaries. It is composed chiefly of numeral letters and abbreviations, showing how often certain words occur in the Bible, but without quoting or referring to the passages where they are found, except in the case of such as appear only twice. The greater Masora gives the passages but not their places.

Many attempts have been made by Jewish writers to determine the date of the origin of the Masoretic scholia, and to account for the various readings they exhibit, without at the same time impugning the integrity of the sacred text. The principal opinions broached by them on this subject are as follows:

Aphodi, in the seventh chapter of his grammatical treatise, says that "Ezra the high priest endeavoured to correct all the faults of manuscripts, as did also to the utmost of their abilities the learned men who succeeded him, in order that they might hand them down to us in a perfect state. To this end they numbered the sections, verses, words, and letters of the Bible, noting those words which were written fully, defectively, and irregularly, together with the different opinions of the learned concerning them. All these observations they collected into books, which form the fragments of the Masora; and in those places where they found mistakes or disputes, they put the various readings in the form of K'ri and C'thibh."

With this statement Kimhhi in the main agrees. In the preface to his commentary on the historical books of the Old Testament he observes: "It would appear that these words (viz. those with respect to which a diversity of opinion is expressed in the Masora) were found variously written in different manuscripts: for during the first captivity the sacred books became lost or corrupted, and the learned men died; so that when the High Synod, who undertook the restoration of the text, found their manuscripts to disagree,

they followed the majority in the text, and placed the variations in the margin."

This theory of Aphodi and Kimhhi, however, is strongly opposed by Abarbanel in the preface to his commentary on Jeremiah, where he makes the following remarks: "1st. How can any one believe and maintain that Ezra could possibly have found the Book of the Law and the Prophets defective or corrupt—that Book of which, if a single word or letter be wanting, no use can ever be made? yet according to these writers there must be wanting many letters!

"2d. If it were true that after Ezra's having found in the manuscripts corrupt or doubtful words, he, being uncertain as to which was the true reading, placed one in the text and the other in the margin, or pointed the words in the text according to a reading different from that indicated by the letters, wherefore do we always adhere to the K'ri and disregard the C'thibh? or wherefore did Ezra always point according to the K'ri? and if he considered those to be the genuine readings, why did he not insert them in the text, and place the C'thibh in the margin?

"3d. If the K'ri and C'thibh owe their origin to the corruptions that took place during the captivity, and thus be the work of mere accident, whence comes it that the same word appears in different places with the same K'ri and C'thibh? Thus, for example, we frequently find צבאים in the K'ri for צבירם in the C'thibh, נערה for נער; and always טחורים for עפלים, and רשכבנה for רשגלנה, which cannot assuredly be the result of chance."

The conclusion to which Abarbanel comes, is, that Ezra and his contemporaries found the Book of the Law in a perfect condition. He supposes that Ezra, before settling the vowel-points, accents, and the division into verses, subjected the text to a thorough revision; and that those words which exhibited some singularity of form or construction he either considered as written so intentionally and with some mysterious import, on which account he left them as they stood in the text, and placed in the margin the word or form which grammatical analogy or the context seemed to require; or possibly he regarded them as arising from negligence or ignorance of the proper orthography, in short, as errors of the prophet's own making (כשגגת הרוצא מלפני השליט), and therefore, not venturing to alter the writings of those who spoke by inspiration, inserted in the margin his corrections, in making which he doubtless only followed the opinions of antiquity which had reached him by tradition.

This writer is opposed in turn by R. Jacob ben Hhayim, the editor of Bomberg's Rabbinical Bible. Although he agrees with Abarbanel in rejecting the supposition of Aphodi and Kimhhi, that Ezra found the manuscripts to differ from each other; yet he will not allow that the K'ri could in any way have proceeded from Ezra, it being contrary to the authority of the Talmud, which declares that Moses received them on Mount Sinai. Thus R.

Gedalya, in Shalsheleth Hakkabala, says, "I am persuaded that all these things (i. e. those of which the Masora treats) were delivered to Moses on Sinai, and afterwards neglected and forgotten in the lapse of time; or else they were never committed to writing, until the members of the Great Synod performed that service, and communicated them to all Israel." The same sentiments are delivered by R. Isaac in the Mikra Sopherim.

From this, says Ben Hhayim, it is evident that the K'ri are to be considered as a series of observations on certain strange forms of the C'thibh, collected indeed and applied by Ezra, but proceeding from Moses himself; while the hypothesis of Abarbanel, that they may have originated in the carelessness of the prophets, is scarcely worthy a serious refutation. For how can it for a moment be imagined that the inspired penmen were liable to error from such a cause? and if they had suffered an occasional orthographical mistake to escape them in the ardour of composition, is it to be supposed that they would not afterwards have taken the pains to correct it? Yet we find the same K'ri and C'thibh repeatedly occurring in Jeremiah, whose prophecy contains *one hundred and thirty-three* of these various readings!

Again, in the tract Sopherim (ch. 6), it is stated that three manuscripts were found by Ezra; that in one of them was written מעון אלהי קדם, and in the other two מעונה וגו', upon which he adopted the latter reading and disregarded the former. So too he found in one manuscript ואל זשדשי בני ישראל and in the remaining two ואל אצילי בני שראל, and in like manner decided according to the majority. From this R. Jacob proceeds to argue against the opinion of Abarbanel that Ezra wrote the K'ri because he doubted the correctness of the C'thibh; for, says he, if this were true, why did he not, as in the cases just mentioned, consult the manuscripts in his possession, and follow the testimony of the majority? And if all the manuscripts agreed, why did he not show how those words are to be read in the synagogue roll, concerning which it is commanded that not one letter be pronounced which is not written? Again, if Ezra were in reality the author of the K'ri, how could the custom which now obtains ever have arisen, of reading in accordance with it and neglecting the C'thibh, which all acknowledge to have proceeded from the finger of God? In this way he comes to the conclusion, agreeable to the doctrine of the Talmud, that all the K'ri and C'thibh were delivered to Moses on Sinai, excepting the instances mentioned in the tract Sopherim, where Ezra was in doubt, in consequence of the discrepancy of manuscripts, and followed the majority.

Yet, notwithstanding the great antiquity and consequent high authority, which are thus ascribed to the Masora, we meet with a number of cases in which the Masora and the Talmud disagree. Thus we read in the tract Nidda: "In the passage והנשא אותם רכבם בגדיו (Lev. xv. 10), the word והנשא is written defectively;" but the Masora affirms it to be written fully. In the tract Shabbath,

Rabbi Huna says, "In the word מעבירם (1 Sam. ii. 24), the plural termination is defective." Jarchi expresses his astonishment at this, and declares it to be erroneous; since the most correct editions give the word fully מעבירים, and the great Masora makes no mention of its being defective. Jarchi, however, was not warranted in contravening the statement of R. Huna on this latter account, since he himself is frequently found to differ from the Masora; and in this he is by no means alone among the Rabbinical writers.

In consequence of the opinion expressed by the Talmudists relative to the origin of the Masora, to which they gave the name of סיג לתורה, or *hedge around the law*, it has for ages been regarded as an authority superior to the Talmud itself. And although we cannot concur in assigning to the Masora the high antiquity claimed for it, or in considering the various readings which it points out as indicative of certain mysterious significations, we are still compelled to acknowledge the unwearied assiduity of those men, whoever they were, who exerted their best efforts in endeavouring to remove from the written word of God the slight yet numerous imperfections by which it had gradually become defaced. The Masora in fact is a most important and useful collection of ancient critical remarks, the constant consultation of which is indispensably necessary to every editor of a Hebrew Bible who is inspired with the laudable ambition of improving upon the labours of those who have gone before him; for the mind gifted with the highest critical powers will not refuse assent to the truth of the Talmudic axiom: the older the tradition, the greater its value (כל הרשן מחבירו הוי רפה מחבירו).

But how are the secret recesses of the Masora to be penetrated, and its abundant materials rendered accessible for use? This can be accomplished only with the assistance of a competent guide, and such a guide is the concordance. By means of it the inquirer is enabled to ascertain, from the forms and connexions of the words referred to by the Masora, their places in the Bible; and is thus relieved from the necessity of relying upon the correctness and completeness of the testimony of others. The learned Ben Hhayim thus expresses his sense of the services rendered him by R. Nathan's Concordance (of which hereafter) in making use of the Masora, as well as in collecting its fragments from the different manuscripts in which it was contained:

"In performing the revision of the biblical text, the task of finding out the verses would have been impossible for me, without knowing the whole of the Bible by heart, which I do not; so that if I had not had the assistance of a book called a concordance, which a learned man, R. Isaac Nathan by name, about forty years ago composed and printed here at Venice, I must have resigned my undertaking. This is a precious work, which enumerates and explains all the members of the Holy Scriptures, placing every noun and verb with its like, and stating at the head the meaning

or meanings of each word, according to which the different passages are divided and enumerated, with references to book, chapter, and verse; so that one may find any word both quickly and easily. The advantages of such a work are incalculable, and without it the Masora cannot be made use of: for if we wish to find a verse which it (the Masora) quotes, we know not in what book it is to be sought; and should we happen to know the book, we have still to hunt out the section and the verse. Whoever possesses this book, can dispense with Kimhhi's Otsar Hashshorashim:* in short, deprived of its aid, I never could have performed what I have."

2. The utility of the concordance is not limited to furnishing good editions of the Sacred Scriptures; it likewise extends to the obtaining of an accurate knowledge of their contents. This it accomplishes in good measure by the aid it affords the Hebrew lexicographer. We shall, perhaps, make ourselves better understood, if we commence our remarks on this topic by concisely stating the objects which the lexicographer should have in view, and the means at his command for effecting them.

The principal objects then of the Hebrew lexicographer should be, to ascertain the primitive words or roots of the language; to exhibit in the natural order of their development the derivatives which spring from them; to state the primary and secondary significations of each of these classes of words; and to show the degree of relationship which the various meanings of words from the same root bear to each other and to the primitive idea.

In order to comply with these numerous requisitions (supposing him to be without the assistance of any previous work of the kind), he must begin by seeking out all the words in the Bible, and arranging them under their several roots in the order of their derivation and inflection. This done, he has next to ascertain their precise significations, in which he is aided by the meanings of words from cognate roots; the context, which frequently either settles the meaning of a word beyond a doubt, or furnishes the strongest presumptive evidence towards a decision; the ancient versions and commentaries, which often contain important traditional information, reaching back to the period when the language was yet a living one; and lastly, the cognate dialects, which the great progress made of late years in the science of comparative philology renders of immense utility.

Of all the means which the lexicographer has thus at his disposal, those afforded by the Bible itself, in exhibiting all the forms and connexions in which words are employed, undoubtedly rank the first. And it is only when this evidence has been carefully consulted, that other sources of information are to be resorted to, either for the purpose of confirming the testimony when sufficiently full and explicit, or of completing it when defective. One who,

* We have already mentioned the high estimation in which this lexicon is held among the Jews.

neglecting this fundamental precept, hastens to other quarters in search of aid, before having completely ascertained and duly considered that which the sacred volume offers for its own elucidation, runs into imminent danger להניח זרים בהיכל הקודש שלא לצורך "of leading strangers into the holy temple without need," an error which has already been too often committed, and is even now by no means of unfrequent occurrence.

In Hebrew, as in other languages, some primitive words have few or no derivatives, while from others a large number are formed in a great variety of ways. Again, in some cases derivative words are found to have survived their primitives, which can now be discovered only by analogy, or by having recourse to the cognate tongues. A word has often many different shades of meaning, which depend in a great measure on the connexions in which it is placed. The significations too of the various forms which a word assumes, as, for example, the several species of the verb, often differ essentially from each other; while those of its derivatives are still more widely separated. These derivative words and meanings, however, must all, if possible, be exhibited in a natural relation to each other as well as to the original word and its primary signification.

The means for prosecuting the inquiries necessary to the proper accomplishment of this object are abundantly furnished by the Hebrew concordance. For, besides exhibiting all the words of the Bible with their connexions and the places where found, it is also of essential service in consulting the ancient Jewish glosses and interpretations. These, although containing much that may be made available for lexicographical purposes, are yet composed with such a total want of system, that access to the valuable hints they afford respecting the etymology of words can often be obtained only by means of a concordance; the reason being that a word is often passed by several times without remark, and is afterwards commented upon when occurring in some subsequent passage.

Of no less importance is the concordance to the Hebrew grammarian. As far as relates to the doctrine of the derivation of words, and the modifications of meaning accompanying the changes in form which take place in the process, the several duties of the lexicographer and grammarian may be said to coincide. But in addition to this, the latter is required to ascertain the laws on which depend the orthographical changes arising during inflection, and to account on natural principles for the origin of such forms as may deviate more or less from those in which the genius of the language usually exhibits itself. Besides these subjects of inquiry which belong to the department of etymology, the grammarian has also to investigate the principles which regulate the use of all these forms and inflections for the purpose of expressing the various operations of the human mind, and which constitute what is called the syntax.

Now the facts from which a knowledge of these principles as relates to the Hebrew language is to be derived, lie scattered through the Bible; and they must first be collected and systematized before the grammarian can hope to obtain that comprehensive view of them, which is indispensable to his success. Thus, in order to ascertain the rules on which the inflections of nouns depend, it is necessary to trace a number of individuals of this part of speech through all the modifications of which they are susceptible. But what an expenditure of time and labour would it require, to hunt for them through a book of such extent as the Hebrew Bible? The difficulties in the way of making similar investigations with regard to the verbs, owing to the number and variety of their forms, would be, if not insurmountable, at least incomparably greater. In addition to the regular inflections of the language, the abnormal forms, as we have already observed, must also be stated and explained in the grammar; yet how is this to be done in a proper manner unless every passage be known in which a given word in any of its forms occurs? The concordance alone can give the information required.

3. If it be allowed that the concordance serves as the foundation to Hebrew lexicons and grammars, and is consequently superior in authority to them all, it follows that it must be of the greatest value to the biblical interpreter, whose success in elucidating the Scriptures depends in good measure on the extent and accuracy of his knowledge of the language in which they are contained. Moreover, the strength of the intelligent interpreter consists chiefly in bringing forward new suggestions on difficult points, and in supporting them by the appropriate citation of parallel passages, which makes the Bible its own expositor; for this the concordance is peculiarly intended. He will also find it of great assistance in turning to the productions of the ancient Jewish commentators, which, owing to their absence of method, would otherwise be exceedingly difficult to consult.

The use of the concordance in an exegetical point of view is not confined to the finished Hebrew scholar, who aims at carrying forward the science of the language; it extends also to the far more numerous class of students who have acquired sufficient knowledge of it to enable them to consult and even peruse their Hebrew Bibles, but who do not possess that familiar acquaintance with its minutiæ, which alone can confer the power of deciding in all cases with certainty respecting grammatical forms. The liability of such to error is greatest with respect to the most important part of speech, viz. the verbs, of which there are a multitude of similar and abnormal forms, the confounding of which may lead to serious errors of interpretation. A concordance in a great measure obviates these difficulties; since, by presenting the student in regular order with all the forms of every word, it affords an instantaneous solution of many a doubt, which he

might be unable to solve by means of the grammar and lexicon alone.

From the preceding observations on the utility of the concordance to different classes of scholars, it will be obvious that it constitutes the foundation of the whole apparatus of biblical learning. This has so long been apparent to those who have reflected on the subject, that even while the art of printing was yet in its infancy, and when the undertaking of large and expensive publications was attended with much greater difficulty and risk of pecuniary loss than at the present day, we find voluminous concordances in different languages issuing from the press, whose magnitude and laborious execution challenge our admiration.

4. We will now complete what we have to say on concordances in general by a short history of such works to the present time. And as our principal object in undertaking this sketch is to give an account of concordances to the Hebrew Bible, we will first briefly mention those compiled for the Latin Vulgate, previous to the publication of the first of the Hebrew concordances, and then confine our observations to the latter.

The author of the first Latin concordance, or rather of the first rudiments of one, for it appears to have been little more, was Antonio de Padua, a Spanish Franciscan, who lived during the pontificate of Gregory IX., and who, for his wonderful facility in quoting the Scriptures, received from that Pope the title of Ark of the Covenant. He died in 1231. The second concordance to the Vulgate, which indeed was the first worthy of the name, was the production of the celebrated Cardinal Hugo, considered by many to have been the author of the existing division of the Bible into chapters, and who died at Rome in the year 1262. His work included only the common nouns and verbs. The third of the kind was that of Pere Arloto, a native of Tuscany, who lived under the emperor Adolphus, about the close of the thirteenth century. With him was contemporary Conrad of Halberstadt, a German priest and professor of theology, who rendered the concordance more complete by the introduction of the particles. This department, however, remained in an extremely defective state until the year 1430, when Johannes de Segovia, a Toledan canon, published one containing the particles alone, which cost himself and an assistant five years of labour.

The first concordance to the Hebrew Bible was that composed by Rabbi Isaac* Nathan, who was occupied on the work ten years, and completed it in 1448. According to the account given by himself in the preface, it was a mere translation or counterpart of

* In the title of his work he is styled R. *Mordecai* Nathan, and in the preface R. *Isaac*. This discrepancy is conjectured by Buxtorf, with great probability, to have been the result of a severe sickness, during which he changed his name: a practice observed even among the Jews of the present day, and which is prescribed in the Talmud, with the view that the sufferer may thenceforth be regarded by God as a new being, and thus be delivered from the fate to which he appeared devoted.

a Latin concordance, which R. Gedalya in his historical work, the Shalsheleth Hakkabala, affirms to have been that of Arloto. The principal inducement to this undertaking, as R. Nathan assures us, was, that he might furnish his co-religionists with a controversial weapon which had been employed against himself by Christian theologians with the greatest effect. So high was his opinion of the value of such a work, and so earnestly did he desire to see it in the hands of his people, that he confesses himself to have hastened its publication at the expense of its completeness.

We find, accordingly, on examining the work, that it contains only the principal words of the language, the verbs and nouns. The omission of the particles he endeavours to excuse, partly on the ground of their want of independent signification, and partly on that of the immense number of times they occur, which would have rendered their insertion a task infinitely tedious and laborious. For this reason also he omits the proper names. The execution of the work does not betray those marks of haste which the author's impatience in urging it forward might lead us to expect; but we cannot say as much for its plan, which is both ill-digested and inconvenient. Of this the following sketch will suffice.

The roots are printed in large square characters without points, and accompanied by their meanings in Rabbinic Hebrew. Under each one are arranged all the words belonging to it, without any other regard to system than the placing of them according to the books of the Bible in which they are found. Thus, for example, under the root אבד is first given the heading בראשית (Genesis), and immediately after it all the passages of this book which contain any form of any word belonging to אבד, with references at the side to chapter and verse in Hebrew numerals; next follow all the passages from Exodus under the head שמות, and afterwards, in regular succession, those from the remaining books. A feature of the work which we have not yet noticed is, that whenever a root has two or more significations, each of them is made to constitute a great division, under which are placed all the passages in which, according to the author's opinion, that particular meaning obtains. In carrying out this part of his plan he appears to have experienced no inconsiderable degree of difficulty; for, besides placing words under the wrong signification, which he not unfrequently does, we find that he sometimes inserts the same passage under different heads, as though unable or unwilling to decide as to the proper one. Words which are derived from roots formed by the addition of different weak letters and liquids to a common biliteral theme, and bearing the same general meaning, are placed by the author together under the triliteral most in use; in this manner he intermingles words from ארש and אנש, from ברש and רבש, from רשב and נשב, from קרץ and קצה, &c. Since his chief object was to enable the inquirer to find a given word or passage, he takes no notice of words written fully or defectively, or of the K'ri and C'thibh.

The Hebrew Bible having not yet been divided into chapters, he makes use of the divisions of the Latin Vulgate which he found in his original; the references to them are by no means free from errors, yet they are far from abounding to the degree which might have been anticipated from the hasty manner in which the book was published.

One of the most serious faults of R. Nathan's plan is that of arranging words in the order of the places where they occur, and not according to their grammatical forms. By this means serious obstacles are presented to the ready consultation of the work even for the purpose of finding a given word or passage; for should the inquirer not know beforehand in what book it is to be found, he will probably be compelled to wade through several folio pages of quotations before obtaining the information required. These inconveniences are greatly augmented in the case of the lexicographer or grammarian, who desires to know to what derivatives each root has given birth and in what forms they are used; since to ascertain this he must examine each article from beginning to end, in order that facts may not escape him which a properly constructed concordance would exhibit at a single glance.*

The first edition of R. Nathan's Concordance was published by Daniel Bomberg at Venice in 1523; and the second by Ambrose Froben, the son of the friend and patron of Erasmus, at Basle, in 1581; this corrected some of the errors of the former, but introduced no improvements. The third was that of Mario de Calasio, Hebrew professor at Rome, which appeared in 1621 in four volumes folio. Many of the errors both in the quotations and references of the preceding editions were here corrected; yet the general plan of the work was suffered to remain untouched. Its immense increase in size was in part owing to the insertion of most of the Chaldee words in Daniel and Ezra, the appending of a Latin translation to Nathan's expositions of the meanings of the roots with additions by the editor, and the citation and explanation of cognate terms and synonyms from the Rabbinic, Aramaic, and Arabic. But what principally contributed to swell the bulk of this edition was a literal Latin version of all the quoted passages placed at the side of the text, with citations in the margin of the places in which the Septuagint and Vulgate differ from the interpretation given. The proper names of persons and places were also added in the form of an appendix.

The radical defects and numerous errors which still disfigured the Hebrew concordance caused the elder Buxtorf to undertake the compilation of a new one, which, besides being more complete and correct than either of its predecessors, should also be arranged

* What will the reader think when informed that we have now before us a prospectus lately issued in London for the publication of a concordance, dedicated by permission to the Lord Bishop of Lincoln, which is faithfully to copy the very plan we have now been deprecating?

on a more scientific and convenient plan. To this he was especially induced by the essential service the concordance had rendered him in re-editing Bomberg's Rabbinical Bible, even while his attention was continually drawn to its many imperfections. The admirable performance in which his labours resulted was published after his death under the superintendence of his learned son, at Basle, in 1632, and has been the standard work ever since. As the chief merit of Buxtorf's Concordance consists rather in its new and excellent plan than in the amount of its corrections and additions, we will describe it somewhat in detail.

The roots are arranged in the same manner as in Kimhhi's lexicon, that is, the triliterals are placed in alphabetical order, and the multiliterals are collected together at the end of each letter of the alphabet. The root is followed by R. Nathan's Hebrew exposition and its substance in Latin. The various inflections of the root and its derivatives then succeed each other in regular grammatical order. Not only every word, but also every one of its forms, whether arising from the mere change of a vowel or consonant, or from the reception of an augment, is made to constitute a separate head. These are printed in smaller characters than the root, and are accompanied by a Latin translation, and followed by the passages from the Bible in which they occur, with reference to book, chapter and verse.

The verb is given first, beginning with the Kal species in all its modes, tenses, numbers, and persons, and proceeding with the remainder in the order in which they are treated in the grammars. Each species is subdivided as follows: 1. The Preterite tense, the persons of which are placed in the order of third, second, and first; the reason, as we have before mentioned, being that the third person constitutes the root. Each person is divided into several heads according to the suffixes it receives, and these are subjected to a further subdivision depending on the prefixes. 2. The Participles, subdivided according to their numbers, genders, suffixes, and prefixes. 3. The Infinitive, in all its forms. 4. The Imperative. 5. The Future tense, divided and subdivided in the same manner as the preterite, excepting only the arrangement of the persons, which is here reversed, probably because the first commences with א. When the verb has been completed, the nouns belonging to the same root are introduced in the order of their development. These as well as the infinitives and participles are divided according to their inflections and to the suffixes and prefixes they may receive, in the manner prescribed in the portion of our article relating to the plan of a concordance.

The concordance is thus made to embrace all the verbs and common nouns of the language extant in the Bible, excepting a few that are not inserted on account of their extremely frequent occurrence. The particles, whether derived from verbs or nouns, are entirely omitted, as are also the proper names. The biblical Chaldee, added by the younger Buxtorf, is not intermingled with

the Hebrew, but is placed by itself at the end of the volume. The words of the quoted passages are in general given fully or defectively, as they stand in the text, but the various readings indicated by the K'ri and C'thibh are allowed to go unnoticed. The references to book, chapter, and verse, are given, as in the work of R. Nathan, in Hebrew letters; the order of the books adopted by the latter, which, as we have seen, is that of the Vulgate, is likewise retained.

Buxtorf succeeded in a great measure in correcting the most prominent faults of his predecessor by constructing his plan on a grammatical basis, not only separating the primitive and derivative words, but also making each form of a word a distinct heading. These improvements rendered the concordance so well adapted to the uses for which it is designed, that the work of Buxtorf retained its pre-eminence for more than two centuries, a proud testimony to the extensive learning and the praiseworthy industry of its author. When speaking of the deficiencies which the advanced state of modern science enables us to discern in the works of such men, we should do it in the spirit of filial veneration which prompted the Talmudic expression employed by himself with reference to his predecessors: מקום הניחו אבותינו להתגדר בו *our fathers have left room for improvement.*

The faults of plan and execution with which the work of Buxtorf is fairly chargeable, although comparatively few, are yet sufficiently numerous to render an improved edition desirable, and indeed necessary for the present age. The defects of its plan are seen chiefly in the lexicographical portion, and in the influence this was suffered to exert upon the conduct of the entire work. Although it is not clear that a concordance should be required to embody a lexicon within itself, yet when this is undertaken, it is to be expected that it will offer at least the results of the most important discoveries and improvements that have been made till the time of its publication. As we have already mentioned, the lexicographical remarks of Buxtorf are taken almost wholly from the meagre statements of R. Nathan respecting the significations of words as determined by their use in the Bible, or by Rabbinical commentators. This perhaps was doing as much as could be expected in the then state of lexicographical science; but as every department of philology has of late years been brought to a higher point of perfection than at any former period, Buxtorf's work has come to be regarded with all its acknowledged excellence as wanting in many important particulars.

The influence which Buxtorf's lexicographical views had upon the arrangement of the concordance was of greater detriment than their more immediate consequences, since they caused him to follow Nathan in arranging the words of each root under the several meanings assigned to it in the outset. The author's intention in so doing was doubtless to increase the value of his work to students of the Hebrew, by affording them the means of ascertaining with

certainty the literal meaning of every passage of Scripture. But in reality this was a serious defect; since by distributing passages which contain the same word under various heads, the work is rendered more troublesome to consult, and, what is worse, the chief ends of a concordance are in a great measure defeated by fettering the judgment of the lexicographer and interpreter, for whose decisions it should merely furnish the materials.

These faults in the plan of Buxtorf's work in addition to many in its execution, as for instance the omission of hundreds of citations and even entire articles, besides a multitude of typographical errors, all combine to insure a favourable reception for a new concordance designed to embody the improvements which the progress of philological science, and the accumulation of materials, have now rendered both practicable and requisite. And we feel happy in being able to state, after a careful examination of the work of Dr. Julius Fürst, that as a concordance it completely answers every reasonable demand, while its excellence in point of lexicography is such as to exceed the most sanguine expectations. This latter subject we have already discussed in the early part of our article; it therefore remains for us only to offer a few observations on the author's concordance, properly so called, as distinguished from that of Buxtorf.

He gives in the same manner and order as Buxtorf the forms of words both primitive and derivative; but by placing together all the passages which contain words agreeing in form and grammatical derivation, and differing only in use, he leaves the precise significations of words to be ascertained from their connexions, aided by his own masterly etymologico-historical illustrations, and thus avoids the grave error into which Buxtorf had suffered himself to be led by the example of his predecessor, Rabbi Nathan. Dr. Fürst has likewise endeavoured to combine the double advantages of the alphabetic and scientific modes of arrangement, by inserting in the order of the alphabet the forms of such derivatives from imperfect roots as do not contain all the radical letters. These are accompanied by references to the pages in which they regularly occur according to their etymology, and cannot but prove very acceptable to students not perfectly familiar with the niceties of formation. The insertion of the Chaldee words in the body of the work immediately after their respective Hebrew equivalents, we regard as another decided improvement, since it affords the means of readily comparing the uses of a word in both languages, which often throw considerable light on one another.

Besides these advantages in the plan of Dr. Fürst's concordance, it also excels that of Buxtorf in completeness. This is chiefly observable in the following points.

1. He inserts some entire articles, verbs as well as nouns, which Buxtorf, after R. Nathan, had omitted on account of their frequent occurrence.

2. He inserts all the particles, both Hebrew and Chaldee, which are derived from verbs.

3. He gives many hundred quotations more than Buxtorf. These he obtained partly from an examination and comparison of various lexicographical works, and partly from the collections of other scholars to which he was allowed access. Among these latter was one of more than six hundred passages noted in a copy of Buxtorf by the learned Jewish grammarian, Wolff Heidenheim. The effects of this large accession of materials soon became apparent; thus under

ואבי Buxtorf cites *two* passages, and Fürst *four*.

אבירם Buxtorf has not Gen. xxxi. 9, given by Fürst; it should, however, have been referred to xxxi. 8.

אבירה Buxtorf omits Num. xxx. 5, and Judg. xix., 3 which Fürst inserts.

אבחרהם Fürst gives three passages not found in Buxtorf, viz. 2 Chron. vii. 22, xxx. 7, 22, &c. &c.

Dr. Fürst is also more correct than his predecessor in many minor details. For example, Buxtorf places אבד Deut. xxxii. 28 under the head אבד, תסף Deut. xiii. 1 under תסף, לאבדו 1 Sam. xiii. 24 under לאבי; the form לאבי is likewise retained in quoting the passage under רעה. All these errors Dr. Fürst corrects. He also makes a better choice of the words to be included in the quotations than Buxtorf; thus under אב, instead of לברית אב מאת כל Num. xvii. 17, he gives in preference אב מטה לברית מטה.

The most numerous errors in Buxtorf are to be found among the references, which, as we have before observed, are given by him in Hebrew letters. These have been subjected to a strict revision by Dr. Fürst, who has greatly lessened the liability to the future recurrence of such mistakes, by exchanging the Hebrew numerals for Arabic figures. We will not detain the reader with a long enumeration of mistakes of this class; a few, with their accompanying corrections by Dr. Fürst, will suffice. Thus we have under אב Lam. iv. 28 for v. 3. Prov. xv. 2 for xv. 20 (this was not properly corrected by Dr. Fürst, who, not observing that ב = 2 had been erroneously put for כ = 20, omitted the passage altogether); under לאב Jer. xxxi. 8 for xxxi. 9. Ezek. xliv. 26 for xliv. 25; under אבינו Num. xxvi. 27 for xxvi. 3; Is. lxiv. 8 for lxiv. 7, &c. &c.

Over and above the improvements introduced into the body of the work, of which we have attempted to give something like an adequate idea, the following additions are promised by the author in the form of appendices:

1. An etymologico-alphabetical index of all the words in the Old Testament, with references to the pages of the Concordance where they are to be found.

2. An index purely alphabetical, with references like the preceding.

3. A tabular view of all the forms of nouns systematically arranged according to their origin and formation.

4. All the particles in alphabetical order.

5. An alphabetical list of all the Aramaic, Talmudic, and modern Hebrew words explained in the lexicographical part of the Concordance, with references to the places where they are introduced. This will be so large as to form an almost complete Aramaic and Rabbinic lexicon.

6. An alphabetical list of all Hebrew proper names.

7. The Hebrew verbal roots alphabetically arranged in a tabular form, according to the relations shown to exist between them and those of the six other families of languages belonging to the ancient world.

8. A complete collection of the fragments of the Masora, with an introduction containing a full history of it, and with notes showing the points of difference between the Masora and the received biblical text.

9. A chronological table of the Hebrew Scriptures.*

Combining such great and manifold advantages, the Concordance of Dr. Fürst may be affirmed with the greatest truth to be superior in all respects to every other that has hitherto been published, Buxtorf's not excepted. The only fault of consequence that we have detected, is a certain negligence in following out the minutiæ of the plan laid down. The different forms of words do not invariably succeed each other in the order generally observed: thus, the participle, which usually precedes the future tense, is placed after it in the Pi'hel of ברכ and sometimes the suffixes are made secondary to the prefixes in regulating the subdivision of the forms, which is contrary to the general practice. The books of the Bible are not always quoted in the same order, and in some instances they are even mingled together in a promiscuous mass, as for example under ארכ and אז. Such slight defects as these, however, cannot be considered as materially detracting from the extraordinary merit of the work. On the contrary, the talents, learning, and industry displayed by its author, with the splendid style of its typographical execution, are such as to demand the admiration of all competent judges, and do honour to the age and country in which it is produced.

* This noble monument of German Jewish erudition and diligence, was completed in the year 1840, and forms a magnificent folio of 1428 pages, exclusive of the Preface. The valuable Appendices it contains are essentially the same as were promised in the Prospectus, from which the list in the text was taken.—*Ed.*

ESSAY XXI.

THE HISTORICAL STATEMENTS OF THE KORAN.*

PUBLISHED IN 1832.

The Mohammedan imposture is, in some respects, the most remarkable of all false religions. The specious simplicity of its essential doctrines, and its perfect freedom from idolatry, distinguish it for ever from the gross mythology of classical and oriental paganism. But besides these characteristics, it displays a third, more interesting still. We mean the peculiar relation which it bears to Christianity. Whether it happened from a happy accident or a sagacious policy, we think it clear that Islam owes a vast proportion of its vast success, to the fact that Mohammed built upon another man's foundation. Assuming the correctness of the common doctrine that the impostor was a brilliant genius, though a worthless libertine, and that his book is the offspring, not of insane stupidity, but of consummate artifice, there certainly is ground for admiration in the apparent union of simplicity and efficacy in the whole design. The single idea of admitting freely the divine legation of the Hebrew seers, and exhibiting himself as the topstone of the edifice, the Last Great Prophet, and the Paraclete of Christ, has certainly the aspect of a master stroke of policy. Besides conciliating multitudes of Jews and soi-disant Christians, at the very first, this circumstance has aided the imposture not a little ever since. It relieves the Moslem doctors from the dire necessity of waging war against both law and gospel. Whatever can be cited from the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures, without disparaging Mohammed, they admit as readily as any Jew or Christian. Whatever, on the contrary. is hostile to his doctrines or pretensions, or at all at variance with the statements of the Koran, is disposed of, not by an absolute rejection of the Bible, but by a resort to the convenient supposition of corruption in the text. It is not the policy

* The citations in this article are chiefly in the words of Sale, with occasional departures from his phraseology, too minute to need specification. Where there is more than a verbal difference, the reader is apprized of it.

of Islam to array itself against the Jewish and the Christian dispensations, as an original and independent system; but to assume the same position in relation to the Gospel, which the Gospel seems to hold in relation to the Law—or, in other words, to make itself the grand dénouement of that grand scheme, of which the Old and New Testaments were only the preparatory stages. Indeed, if we were fully satisfied that the Rasool Allah* had any plan at all, we should be disposed to account for it in this way. He was acquainted with three forms of religion, Judaism, Christianity, and Paganism. Disgusted with the last, he was led, we may suppose, to make some inquiries into the points of difference between the Jews and Christians. This he could not do, without discovering their singular relation to each other—the Christians acknowledging the Scriptures of the Jews, but adding others to them, and regarding Jesus Christ as the Messiah—the Jews on the other hand rejecting the New Testament, and bitterly denying the Messiahship of Christ. This fact might very readily suggest the project of a new dispensation—a third one to the Christian, and a second to the Jew. The impostor would thus be furnished with an argument *ad hominem* to stop the mouths of both. To the Jews he could say, Did not Moses tell your fathers that a prophet should rise up in the latter days, greater than all before him? I am he. Do you doubt it? Here is a revelation just received from Gabriel. Do not all your sacred books predict the coming of a great deliverer, a conqueror, a king? I am he. In a few months you shall see me at the head of a thousand tribes going forth to the conquest of the world. If this was the ground really taken at first, how striking must have been the seeming confirmation of these bold pretensions, when Mohammed and his successors had in fact subjected, not Arabia only, but Greece, Persia, Syria, and Egypt.

To the objection of the Christians, that the line of prophets was long since completed, he could answer, Did not Jesus come to abrogate or modify the law, when its provisions were no longer suited to the state of things? Even so come I, to supersede the Gospel—not to discredit, but to render it unnecessary, by a more extensive and authoritative doctrine. So far from being antichrist (as some no doubt objected) I am the very Comforter whom Jesus promised.

That such sophistry might easily have undermined the faith of renegadoes and half-pagan Christians, is certainly conceivable. Whether this was in fact the course adopted in the infancy of Islam, will admit a doubt. Be that as it may, it is certain that the impostor considered it expedient to incorporate the leading facts of sacred history into his revelation, so far as they were known to him. That his knowledge of the subject was imper-

* The Apostle of God. We are not aware that Mohammed ever called himself a prophet.

fect, need not excite our wonder. The sources which probably supplied his information, could scarcely be expected to emit a purer stream than that which irrigates the pages of the Perspicuous Book.

Sale's Koran is a very common book, and has passed through a surprising number of editions, considering its character. The text is, however, of necessity so dull, that nobody can read it patiently for fifteen minutes, without taking refuge in the more amusing matter of the notes and preface. Were there any continuity, connexion, consistency, or unity to be discovered in it, this would be of less importance. But in such a jumble of discordant elements, it is hard to get any information by just reading on in course. Remote parts must be brought together and arranged in order to enucleate the mysteries of Islam; a task which most would look upon as vastly disproportioned to the value of the object. And yet it is important that the Koran should be better understood. It is daily growing more important, and will very soon be thought imperatively necessary. Theological students who look forward to the missionary service, are too apt to underrate one class of difficulties, while perhaps they magnify another. You will find a man hesitating whether he shall run the risk of being bastinadoed, or of dying with the plague, while he forgets that if he had a perfect security against infection and corporeal violence, he might still be disappointed and defeated in his whole design. That a man should go to convert the Moslems with an impression on his mind that they are fools or children, is not merely proof of ignorance on his part, but a melancholy omen for the cause which he espouses. It would be well, therefore, if at this time, when the Mohammedans are objects of so much attention to the friends of missions, a little preparatory study could be spent upon the Koran. It is certainly desirable that he who undertakes the instruction of a Mussulman, should know what the false opinions are which he must combat. If he expects to find the mind of his catechumen a *tabula rasa* on the subject of religion, he will find himself most grievously at fault. Such strength of prejudice has rarely been exhibited, as that which is the product of a thorough education in the doctrines of Mohammed, aggravated, as it must be, by the fixed belief of fatalism. No less erroneous, on the other hand, is the opinion, that the Moslem's creed is wholly false, and must be utterly destroyed before the truth can find admission. There are two questions, therefore, which the missionary should know how to answer: what are the peculiar dogmas of Mohammed's system? and what has it in common with the true religion? It ought to be considered as a great advantage, that the facts of sacred history are not wholly unknown to the Mohammedans. For though they may consider our intelligence as borrowed from their Book, it is, nevertheless, something to be able to appeal to striking facts, by way of illustration, confirmation, or induction. This might, as it were, present a vulnerable point,

when all the rest is shielded in impenetrable prejudice. A beginning might be made by a judicious use of facts which they believe as well as we, from which occasion might be taken to correct the errors of Mohammed's narrative, and eventually to demonstrate and explain important truths.

What are these facts, then? or, in other words, how large a portion of the sacred history has been wrought into the Koran, and thereby placed beyond the reach of cavil on the part of all true Moslemin?

There is but one passage in the Koran, we believe, where a connected account is given of the creation of the world, though it is frequently mentioned incidentally as God's immediate and almighty act. The passage alluded to occurs in the forty-first chapter, and is very brief. The amount of it is, that God made the universe in six days, two of which were employed upon the earth, two more upon its products, and the remaining two upon the heaven. The latter, we are told, were made of smoke, into which it is again to be resolved hereafter.* This element was moulded into seven distinct heavens, each having its own office. In the lowest of the seven the great lights were placed.

In glancing at this passage, we have had occasion to observe Sale's assiduity in striving to impart coherence and significancy to his author's text—not by false or loose translation, nor by sheer interpolation, but by adding something to fill up the yawning chasms of the porous and Perspicuous Book. In a word, he makes Mohammed say in English, not what he does, but what he should have said in Arabic; a harmless artifice, so far as substance is concerned, but disingenuous, so far as it conveys too high a notion of the psuedo-prophet's merits. For example, after stating the creation of the earth, Mohammed says, he blessed it, and provided therein its food, or their food (for the words admit of either sense). What says Sale? "He blessed it and provided therein the food of the creatures designed to be the inhabitants thereof." To the last eight words there is nothing corresponding in the Arabic.

One thing more in this account of the creation may deserve our notice. "He said to the heaven and the earth, come either obediently or against your will; they answered, we come obedient to thy will." This was obviously intended as a match for that inimitable sentence, "God said, Let there be light, and light was." One can hardly help smiling at the Irish sublimity of poor Mohammed's master-piece, the alternative proposed to two nonentities, and their sagacious choice. It is but just, however, to admit, that the language may be considered as addressed to the heavens and the earth after they were created, but before they were arranged and beautified.

The Genii, we are told in the chapter of Al Hejr,† were made of *subtle fire*, as Sale translates it. The original words are *nar*

* See the chapter entitled *Smoke*. Sale, vol. ii., c. 41. Lond. 1801. † c. xv.

semum,* the latter term properly denoting the hot wind of the desert called *simoom* by travellers. There is something poetical in this idea, which would, no doubt, strike the fervid fancy of a Bedouin with mighty force. The account of the creation and fall of man is scattered piecemeal through the Koran. The narrative is given, more or less completely, in the second, seventh, eighth, fifteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth chapters. By putting together the disjuncta membra, we make out this story. After the earth and angels were created, God announced to the latter his intention to create a *khalif* or vicegerent upon earth. The angels are represented as remonstrating, and saying, "Wilt thou place there one who will do mischief and shed blood, whereas we celebrate thy praise and glorify thee?" What suggested their forebodings is not mentioned. The only reply was, "I know that which ye know not."† Agreeably to this annunciation, a body was formed of black mud and dried clay, into which God breathed a spirit.‡ Adam, thus produced, was taught by revelation the names of all the animals, which were then presented to the angels with these words, "Declare the names of these, if ye are upright!" They said, "God forbid! we have no other knowledge than that which thou hast given us: thou art the Knowing and the Wise!" He said, "Adam, tell them the names of these!" When Adam had told their names, God said, "Did I not tell you that I knew the mysteries of heaven and earth?"§ The angels were then required to worship Adam. All did so except Iblis, who, Mohammed says, "was of the Genii, and resisted the commandment of his Lord."‖ From this it appears that the Jinn or Genii were included under the term Angels or Malayic. Whether they were before this *evil* spirits, we are left to guess. The prophet's notions seem to have been exceedingly confused.

In another place we find the following dialogue between the Almighty and the devil.

Allah. "O Iblis, what hindereth thee from worshipping that which I have created with my hands? Art thou elated with vain pride, or art thou really one of exalted merit?"

Iblis. "I am better than he; thou hast created me of fire, and hast created him of clay."

Allah. "Get thee hence, therefore, for thou shalt be driven away from mercy, and my curse shall be upon thee till the day of judgment."

Iblis. "Oh Lord, respite me till the day of resurrection."

Allah. "Verily thou shalt be one of the respited."

Iblis. "By thy might I swear, that I will surely seduce them all, except thy servants who shall be peculiarly chosen from among them."

Allah. "It is a just sentence: I speak the truth: I will fill hell with thee, and with such as follow thee."¶

* xv., 26. † ii., 30. ‡ xv., 25. 28.
§ ii., 30, &c. ‖ xviii., 50. ¶ xxxviii., 76–86.

The same account, substantially, is given in the seventh and fifteenth chapters. In one of these passages, Iblis is made to say, "Because thou hast seduced or deceived me (Sale says *depraved*), I will lie in wait for men in thy strait way; and I will come upon them from before and from behind, and from their right-hand and from their left, and thou shalt not find the greater part of them thankful."*

Such is the account of the apostasy of Iblis. Its immediate consequence was the fall of man, which is related thus: "God said to Iblis, Get thee hence, despised and driven away! Verily, whoever, shall follow thee, I will surely fill hell with you all. But as for thee, O Adam, dwell thou and thy wife in the garden, and eat of it wherever ye will, but approach not this tree, lest ye be of the wicked. And Satan (i. e. the adversary, as in Hebrew) whispered to them that he would reveal their nakedness which was concealed from them. And he said, your Lord has not excluded you from this tree, except for fear that you should become angels or immortal. And he sware to them, I am one of those who give good counsel. And he caused them to fall by his deceit. And when they had tasted of the tree, their nakedness appeared to them, and they began to join the leaves of the garden upon themselves. And their Lord called to them saying, Did I not forbid you this tree, and tell you that Satan was your avowed enemy? They said, Our Lord, we have sinned against our own souls, and unless thou forgive us and have mercy upon us, we shall certainly be of those who perish."† "And Adam learned words (*of prayer*, Sale adds) from his Lord, and he turned unto him, for he is easy to be turned and merciful. And God said, Go down, the one of you an enemy to the other, and there shall be a dwelling place for you on earth and provision for a season."‡ "Therein shall ye live and therein shall ye die, and therefrom shall ye be taken forth (Sale adds, *at the resurrection*)."§ "There shall come to you a direction from me, and as many as obey that direction shall be free from fear and grief; but as many as disbelieve and charge our signs with falsehood, shall be companions of hell-fire. Therein shall they dwell for ever."‖

The account of Cain and Abel is very brief. Brief as it is, however, there was room for one sheer fabrication, borrowed from the Rabbins. "Tell them the story of the two sons of Adam truly. When they offered an offering, and it was accepted from one of them and not from the other, he said (*Cain said to his brother*, quoth Sale), I will kill thee. He said (*Abel said*, id.). God accepteth gifts from those who fear him. If thou stretch forth thy hand against me to slay me, I will not stretch forth my hand against thee to slay thee, for I fear God the Lord of the Universe. I am willing that thou shouldst bear my iniquity and thine

* vii., 16, 17. † vii., 18–23. ‡ ii., 36, 37.
§ vii., 26. ‖ ii., 38.

own iniquity, and thou shouldst become one of the companions of hell-fire; for that is the reward of the unrighteous. And his soul permitted him to slay his brother, and he slew him, and become one of those who perish. And God sent a raven which scratched the earth, to teach him how he should hide his brother's nakedness. Then he said, woe is me! am I unable to be like this raven that I may hide my brother's nakedness? And he became one of the penitent. On this account, we prescribed it to the children of Israel, that whoever slays a soul without a soul (i. e., probably, *without having slain a soul*) or without having acted wickedly in the earth, shall be as if he had slain all mankind, and he who saveth a soul alive, shall be as if he had saved the lives of all mankind."* This last fine sentiment is finely countenanced by the repeated order to exterminate the infidels, and the many promises of everlasting happiness to those who die upon the field of battle.

It will be observed, that in the narrative just given, the names of Adam's sons do not occur at all, except in Sale's translation. We have no recollection of their being mentioned elsewhere. Noah, the Koran says, was sent to warn his contemporaries, and remained among them "a thousand years save fifty."† The only persons who submitted to his guidance were obscure and abject; the nobles and the wealthy stood aloof. At length it was revealed to Noah that all had believed who would believe, and he was directed to construct a vessel. While engaged upon this task he was treated with general derision and contempt. At last the appointed time arrived, "and the oven poured forth boiling water."‡ The narrative then proceeds as follows: "We said unto Noah, carry into the ark of every kind of animal one pair, and thine own family (excepting him on whom sentence had already passed), and those who believe. And there believed not with him except a few. And Noah said, embark upon it in the name of God, while it floats and while it is at rest. Surely my Lord is merciful and gracious. And it floated with them upon waves like mountains; and Noah called to his son who was separated from them, Oh my son, embark with us, and be not with the unbelievers. He said, I will ascend a mountain which will secure me from the water. He said, there is no security to-day from the decree of God except for him on whom he shall have mercy. And a wave passed between them, and he was one of the drowned. And it was said, oh earth swallow up thy water, and oh heaven withhold! And the water subsided, and the decree was accomplished, and it (the ark) rested on Al Judi; and it was said, away with the ungodly people! And Noah called upon his Lord and said, oh my Lord, my son is one of my family, and thy promise is true, for thou art the most just of those who judge. God said, Noah, he is not one of thy family; this is not a righteous work (viz., his intercession). Ask not of me that of which thou hast no knowledge, I admonish thee not to

* v., 29–34. † xxix., 14. ‡ xi, 40.

be one of the ignorant."* Noah then acknowledges his fault, leaves the ark, and receives a benediction. At the close of the history the prophet adds, as if apprehensive that some of the faithful might have been beforehand with him, "This is a secret history which we reveal unto thee; thou didst not know it, neither did thy people before this."†

With respect to Abraham,‡ there are many statements and allusions in the Koran. The substance of his history is this. While yet a boy, he was led to disbelieve in the idolatrous religion of his father and his countrymen. Having secretly renounced the worship of images, he was in doubt to what object he should pay his adorations. He first pitched upon the sun and moon, but afterwards reflected that their setting every day rendered them unworthy of divine honours. He came at last to the conclusion, therefore, that he would worship God alone.§ Having formed this resolution, he remonstrated with his father on the folly of idolatry. Ezer, however, as Mohammed calls him, rebuked his son severely and threatened him with death.‖ Even this, it seems, did not deter the young reformer from playing a bold and witty trick upon his pagan friends. Absenting himself from one of their festivals, "he went into the temple where the idols stood, and he brake them all in pieces except the biggest of them, that they might lay the blame upon that. And when they were returned and saw the havoc which had been made, they said, who hath done this to our gods? He is certainly an impious person. And certain of them answered, We heard a young man speak reproachfully of them: he is named Abraham. They said, bring him therefore before the eyes of the people, that they may bear witness against him. And when he was brought before the assembly, they said to him, hast thou done this unto our gods, oh Abraham? He answered, nay, but that biggest one of them hath done it; ask them if they can speak. And they came to themselves, and said one to the other, verily ye are the impious persons. Afterwards they turned down upon their heads (i. e. *relapsed*) and said, verily thou knowest that these cannot speak. Abraham said, do ye therefore worship besides (or instead of) God that which cannot profit you at all, neither can it hurt you! Fie on you and upon that which ye worship besides God! Do ye not understand? They said, Burn him and avenge your Gods. (And when Abraham was cast into the burning pile)¶ we said, oh fire be thou cold, and a preservation unto Abraham. And they sought to lay a plot against him, but we caused them to be the sufferers."** After this miraculous preservation, he boldly inveighed against idolatry in public, but without effect. Lot alone believed, in company with whom Abraham forsook his native country "to go to the place which the Lord had commanded him."††

* xi., 40–46. † xi., 49. ‡ Ibrahim. § vi., 74–79.
‖ xix., 46. ¶ These nine words are interpolated by Sale.
** xxi., 58–69. (Sale, vol. ii., p. 158. Lond., 1808.) †† xxix., 26.

The reader will have observed, amidst the fiction and obscurity of these details, not a few glimpses of the truth from which they were derived. We find the case the same as we pursue the narrative. The very next step brings us to a lamentable travesty of Genesis xv., 7–12. "Abraham said, Lord show me how thou wilt raise the dead. Dost thou not believe? He said, yes, but that my mind may be at ease. He said, take then four birds, and divide them, and place a piece on every mountain. Then call them and they will come to thee in haste; and know that God is mighty and merciful."*

The visit of the angels is related with laudable accuracy as to some particulars, and woful want of it in others. The object of their coming and the mode of their reception, are correctly stated. But the laughter of Sarah is made to precede the promise of a son.† This slight anachronism has occasioned an incredible deal of pains to the Mohammedan commentators, who, we need not say, are very numerous, voluminous, minute, and silly. They have attempted in vain to account for Sarah's laughter, and the ground of its connexion with the promise which ensued. The son thus promised is correctly stated to have been called Isaac;‡ and yet that patriarch is treated, both by the Koran and the commentators, as a very obscure and unimportant personage. He is only mentioned incidentally, and then but briefly. Ishmael§ is constantly brought forward as the leading character. The reason of this is plain. It was intended to exhibit his descendants, instead of the Jews, as the chosen people. The only wonder is, that he was not made the child of promise. We mention it as an instance of the clumsy manner in which Mohammed put his stuff together.‖

The account of the incidents immediately preceding the awful overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, so far as it goes, is tolerably accurate. Abraham's intercession, and the outrageous conduct of the wretched Sodomites, are stated briefly but distinctly. On reaching the catastrophe, the reader is surprised to learn that it was effected by a storm of brickbats! Sale gives it thus: "And when our command came, we turned those cities upside down, and we rained upon them *stones of baked clay*, one following another."¶

The facts in relation to the sacrifice of Isaac are stated in the thirty-seventh chapter of the Koran, without any material departure from the truth, but also without the touching simplicity and circumstantiality of the original. The last passage which we shall advert to, in the history of Abraham as scattered through the Koran, is purely Koranic, and was obviously designed to trace the imposture of the camel-driver up to the father of the faithful. We give it in the words of Sale, inserting brackets to denote interpolations. "God said, verily I will constitute thee a *model of*

* ii., 259. † xi., 71. ‡ Is-hak. § Ismail.
‖ It may have been because the etymology of Isaac's name would suggest the same idea to an Arab as a Jew, viz., laughter. ¶ xi., 82.

*religion** unto mankind : he answered, and also of my posterity ? God said, my covenant doth not comprehend the ungodly. And we appointed the [holy] house [of Mekka] to be a place of resort for mankind, and a place of security ; and said, take the station of Abraham for a place of prayer ; and we covenanted with Ismael and Abraham, that they should cleanse my house for those who should compass it and those who should be devoutly assiduous there, and those who should bow down and worship. And Abraham and Ismael raised the foundations of the house, saying, Lord, accept it from us, for thou art he who heareth and who knoweth. Lord, make us all RESIGNED unto thee, and of our posterity a people resigned unto thee, and show us our holy ceremonies, and be turned unto us, for thou art easy to be reconciled and merciful. Lord, send them likewise an Apostle from among them, who may declare thy signs unto them, and teach them the book [of the Koran], and wisdom, and purify them ; for thou art mighty and wise. Who will be averse to the religion of Abraham, but he whose mind is infatuated ?"† This last triumphant interrogatory harmonizes well with the assertion elsewhere made, that "Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but a Hanif, or orthodox believer.‡

In the passage just quoted, we find the religion of Mohammed identified with the *millah Ibrahim* or religion of Abraham. We also find the origin of the distinctive name of the imposture. The Arabic word which Sale translates *resigned*, is Moslimin, a participle. The verb Aslama means to yield one's self up unreservedly. It is used to denote entire resignation to God's will, and devotion to his service. The participle Moslim (plural moslimun, moslimin) is the proper equivalent to our word Mohammedan, which they seldom employ, and signifies one resigned and devoted. The infinitive of the same verb is Islam, resignation and devotion, the term used by Moslems to denote their own religion, and one which might well supersede the uncouth European form, Mohammedanism.

Dr. Scott says, somewhere in his correspondence, that the history of Joseph is worse murdered in the Koran, than his brothers ever wished to murder him. Comparatively speaking, this is quite too harsh a judgment. That narrative, compared with others which Mohammed gives us, is a model of coherence and correctness. There are fewer anachronisms and interpolations here, than in almost any other of his attempts at history. Joseph's dream concerning the sun, moon, and stars, and its effect upon his brethren, are correctly stated. In order to gratify their spite, they are represented as requesting Jacob to send Joseph to the pastures with them. The proposal to kill him, and Reuben's interference, are distinctly mentioned, but without the name of Reuben. They are said, moreover, to have left him in the well, and carried the

* (Arab.) an Imam. † ii., 124-130. ‡ iii., 67.

report of his death to Jacob. "And certain travellers came, and sent one to draw water for them; and he let down his bucket, and said, good news! this is a youth! And they concealed him, that they might sell him as a piece of merchandise." * He is carried to Egypt and sold. The wickedness of his mistress, and his constancy, are related with substantial accuracy; but by an awkward blunder, Joseph is sent to prison after being pronounced innocent. The dreams of the baker and butler, Joseph's interpretation of them, Pharaoh's dream, and Joseph's liberation and promotion, are given, without much deviation from the truth. He is made, however, to propose his own elevation to the chair of state.† The famine in Canaan, the journey of Jacob's sons to Egypt, Simeon's detention, the restoration of the money, Benjamin's visit, the recognition of Joseph, and Jacob's emigration, are all mentioned. Some embellishments are introduced, no doubt. Jacob is blinded by weeping for the loss of Joseph, and restored to sight by the application of Joseph's under garment. The following nonsense is put into the mouth of the venerable patriarch, on sending his sons a second time to Egypt. "My sons, enter not into the city by one and the same gate; but enter by different gates. But this precaution will be of no advantage unto you against the decree of God, for judgment belongeth to him alone." By a ridiculous anachronism, Joseph is made to reveal himself to Benjamin, before the discovery of the cup; and thus the stratagem is left without an object. Joseph's messengers, despatched to bring his brethren back, offer a reward of a load of corn to the man who should produce the cup. His brethren are made to say, "If Benjamin be guilty of theft, his brother Joseph hath been guilty of theft heretofore!"

Still, as we said before, the narrative, compared with others in the book, may be said to be consistent, continuous, and even accurate. At the same time, it should be mentioned as an interesting fact, that from beginning to end there is no approach to pathos, nor the slightest indication of that masterly acquaintance with the human heart, which shines in the inimitable and divine original. And we venture to say, that no one, after reading the Koran in its native dress, however much he may be pleased with many rhythmical and sonorous passages, will be able to recall one solitary sentence which evinces either tenderness or purity of feeling. Let those who would see this difference between a genuine and a spurious revelation exhibited in very striking contrast, read the twelfth chapter of Sale's Koran in connexion with the history of Joseph in the book of Genesis. The comparison is fair; for both are literal translations from cognate dialects. To take a single stroke from either picture as a specimen, we give the account of Joseph's making himself known, as recorded by Moses and Mohammed. "Then Joseph could not refrain himself before all them that stood

* xii., 18. † xii., 53.

by him; and he cried, Cause every man to go out from me. And there stood no man with him while he made himself known unto his brethren. And he wept aloud. And Joseph said unto his brethren, I am Joseph. Doth my father yet live? And his brethren could not answer him; for they were troubled at his presence. And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me, I pray you; and they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your brother, whom ye sold into Egypt. Now, therefore, be not grieved nor angry with yourselves, &c. &c. And he fell upon his brother Benjamin's neck and wept." (Gen. xlv.) "Wherefore Joseph's brethren returned into Egypt; and when they came into his presence they said, Noble lord, the famine is felt by us and our family, and we are come with a small sum of money: *yet give unto us full measure, and bestow corn upon us as alms;* for God rewardeth the alms-givers. Joseph said unto them, Do ye know what ye did unto Joseph and his brother, when ye were ignorant of the consequence thereof? They answered, Art thou Joseph? He replied, I am Joseph and this is my brother. Now hath God been gracious unto us. They said, Now hath God chosen thee above us; and we have surely been sinners. Joseph said, Let there be no reproach cast on you this day. God forgiveth you; for he is the most merciful of those who show mercy." (Kor. xii., Sale, vol. ii., p. 50. Lond. 1801.)

The twenty-eighth chapter of the Koran, called The Story, opens with these words; "In the name of God most merciful, T. S. M. These are the signs of the Perspicuous Book. We dictate unto thee some of the history of Moses* and Pharaoh† with truth for those who believe." And accordingly we have a very copious account of the great lawgiver, both in this same chapter and in several others. In reading it over we are struck with the illustration which it yields of the way in which these shreds of sacred history were gathered by the pseudapostle. We can perceive throughout an effort to retain as much as possible of what he had been told, without regard to the causes and connexions of events. Facts, which are stated in the Scriptures as the natural results of antecedent facts, stand here detached and unaccounted for. This would indeed be in Mohammed's favour, if he were alluding to events already known, as such—just as the allusions in the Psalms and Prophets prove that the Jews were acquainted with the Pentateuch. But such is not the case. Here, as elsewhere, he professes to reveal what was before unknown, and by so doing proves himself a liar. Our object is, to show how much of the Scripture history is borrowed, and how much new matter is interpolated. He mentions Pharaoh's tyranny, and speaks of it as general, though most excessive towards the Hebrews. He mentions the sanguinary edict with respect to Jewish children, and the signal deliverance of Moses from the water, his adoption by Pharaoh's wife (not

* Musa. † Firaun.

daughter), and his strange restoration to his mother as a nurse; his killing the Egyptian, and his flight to Midian,* his behaviour at the well, and his introduction to the family of Jethro, who is here called Shoaib. We are then told, that he served eight years for Shoaib's daughter, a circumstance borrowed from the history of Jacob, who is scarcely ever mentioned except in the history of Joseph, and in a few other cases where his name is joined with those of Abraham and Isaac. Having fulfilled the term of his engagement, he set out for Egypt with his family. While on his journey, he perceived a fire upon the side of Mount Sinai which he turned aside to, with a view to warm himself and ascertain the road.† On his approach, however, a voice commanded him to put off his shoes because he was in the holy valley Towa. The two miracles are then recorded, without any reason for them being given. That of the serpent is correctly stated, but the other is ridiculously misrepresented. The account given by Moses himself ‡ is that he thrust his hand into his bosom and drew it out leprous as snow (*m'tzoraath casshaleg*). Whether the former of these words was wanting in the copy of the law which more or less remotely furnished Mohammed with his information, or whether his Jewish teacher did not know its meaning, or whether he himself remembered only half of what he heard,—these questions must for ever keep their place among the mysteries of which he talks so much. Certain it is, however, that he says not a word of leprosy, and makes the miracle consist in his drawing out his hand *white and uninjured!*§ To make the aspect of the thing a little marvellous, the Moslem commentators tell us that Moses was very swarthy, and that his hand underwent a miraculous change of complexion! How much perplexity may be occasioned by the misconception or omission of a word! And oh, how hard, how impossible it is, for awkward imposture to ape the consistent simplicity of truth!

The fact of the prophet's hesitation and reluctance to obey the Lord's injunction, is here mentioned; but the grounds of it are strangely jumbled. "Moses said, Oh Lord, I have slain one of them, and I fear they will put me to death; but my brother Aaron‖ is of a more eloquent tongue than I; wherefore send him with me for an assistant, that he may gain me credit; for I fear lest they accuse me of imposture."¶

Pharaoh charges them with a design to dispossess him of his land by magic, and challenges them to a competition with the sorcerers of Egypt. Moses accepts the challenge, and a great feast-day is appointed for the contest.** The people assemble, and the magicians come prepared with cords and rods, which they make by their enchantments to appear like serpents. The rod of Moses swallows up the rest, whereupon the magicians publicly

* Madian. † xxviii., 1–30. ‡ Exodus iv., 6. § Koran xx., 22.
‖ Harun. ¶ xxviii., 34, 35. ** xx., 59.

acknowledge their belief in the God of Moses and Aaron. Pharaoh, enraged with this defection, threatens them with the severest punishment.

In this part of the narrative, there is a single sentence which is itself a curiosity. Pharaoh said, "Oh Haman, burn me clay unto bricks, and build me a high tower, that I may ascend into the God of Moses."* Here we have Haman burning bricks in Egypt, in the days of Moses, for the purpose of building the tower of Babel! We say the tower of Babel, because there is no notice taken elsewhere in the Koran of that striking incident in sacred history, and because the motive here ascribed to Pharaoh is so near akin to that mentioned in Genesis. Gross as the anachronism seems to us, however, the Moslems steadfastly maintain that Haman was prime minister to Pharaoh.

The Egyptians, refusing to believe on Moses, were punished by a flood, locusts, lice, frogs, and blood, distinct miracles.† These being removed by the intercession of Moses, they broke their promise and refused obedience.‡ Moses was then directed to withdraw with the Israelites at night. Pharaoh pursued them. The sea was divided into twelve parts, separated by as many paths, through which the Hebrews passed, while the Egyptians were all drowned.§ The Israelites, proceeding on their journey, came among a people who worshipped idols, whereupon they requested Moses to give them idols also. This he refused; and in obedience to the divine command fasted forty nights, after which God wrote the law upon tables, and delivered them to him. During his absence, however, the people made a calf *which lowed*, and which they worshipped. The chief agent in this business was one Al Sameri, who declared that he had given life to the calf by sprinkling on it a handful of dust from the footsteps of the Messenger of God. The calf was burnt and pulverized, and Al Sameri condemned to say to every one who met him, Touch me not. A singular speech of Aaron's is recorded here. He is made to say, on the return of Moses, "Oh, son of my mother, drag me not by my beard nor by the hair of my head."‖ In a parallel passage it is stated that Moses threw down the tables, and seized his brother by the hair.

The division into tribes, which is spoken of as arbitrary, the appointment of the seventy elders, the smiting of the rock, the giving of manna and of quails, are all recorded.¶ In connexion with these incidents we find the following, which has occasioned no small difficulty to the hapless commentators. "We said, enter into this city (no city had been previously mentioned) and eat of the provisions thereof plentifully as ye will; and enter the gate worshipping and say *Hittaton!* We will pardon your sins and give increase to the well-doers. But the ungodly changed the

* xxviii., 39. † vii., 130, 131. ‡ xxvi., 53—67.
§ xx., 94. ‖ vii., 136. ¶ ii. and vii.

expression into another different from what had been spoken, &c."* The following passages are no less valuable. "Ask them concerning the city by the sea, when they profaned the Sabbath; when their *fish* came unto them on their Sabbath day, appearing openly on the water, but on the day whereon they did not keep the Sabbath, they came not unto them * * * And when they proudly refused to desist from what had been forbidden them, we said to them, be ye transformed into *apes*, driven away from the society of men * * * And we shook Mount Sinai over them as though it had been a covering."† Having despatched the fish and the apes, we must by no means overlook the *cow*, since it has given name to one of the longest chapters in the Koran,‡ and since it affords a proof of the divine legation of Moses, which he has himself forgotten to record. The story may be gathered from the following dialogue:

"*Moses.* God commandeth you to sacrifice a cow.

People. Dost thou make a jest of us?

M. God forbid that I should be one of the foolish!

P. Pray for us unto thy Lord, that he would show us what cow it is.

M. She is neither an old cow nor a heifer, but of middle age between both: do ye therefore what ye are commanded.

P. Pray for us unto thy Lord, that he would show us what colour she is of.

M. He saith she is a yellow cow, intensely yellow; her colour rejoiceth the beholders.

P. Pray for us unto thy Lord, that he would show us further what cow it is; for several cows with us are like one another; and we, if God please, will be directed.

M. He saith, she is a cow not broken to plough the earth or water the field; a sound one, there is no blemish in her.

P. Now hast thou brought the truth."§

"Then," says the Book, "they sacrificed her; yet they wanted but little of leaving it undone. And when ye slew a man, and contended among yourselves concerning him, we said, strike the dead body with part of the sacrificed cow. Thus God raised the dead to life."‖ Among the many animals for which the Moslems entertain a high regard, none, we believe, not even Ezra's ass, nor the seven sleepers' dog, is more esteemed than this middle-aged, intensely yellow, cow.

In connexion with the history of Moses, Karun must be mentioned. He is the Crœsus of oriental history and fiction, being described in the Koran as immensely rich. Nothing more is there related of him, except that on account of his presumption and ingratitude, the earth opened and swallowed him up, which identifies him with the Korah of the Pentateuch.¶

* ii., 28, 59. † vii., 153, 156, 161. ‡ The second.
§ ii., 67–71. ‖ ii., 72, 73. ¶ xxviii., 77–83.

The only other incident related of Moses, is a purely fictitious one. It is interesting, however, in itself, and also because it has furnished the conception and the leading incidents of a well-known poem, Parnell's Hermit. Where Mohammed got it, is a matter of dispute. Lord Teignmouth, we believe, has traced it into Hindostan. The passage in the Koran occupies some pages of the eighteenth chapter.

From Moses, the false prophet takes a sweeping stride to Saul, whom he calls Talut. As if to compensate for this yawning chasm, he contrives to bring into connexion with this prince, two facts belonging to two other periods. After mentioning the application made by the Israelites to their prophet (Sale adds *Samuel*, in capitals) for a king to command their hosts, he says that they objected to the person chosen. To remove this difficulty, they were told that a proof of his divine vocation should be given. "Verily the sign of his kingdom shall be that the ark shall come unto you: therein shall be tranquillity from your Lord, and the relics which have been left by the family of Moses and the family of Aaron. The angels shall bring it. Verily, this shall be a sign unto you, if ye believe."* The word, which Sale here renders tranquillity, is *sekinah* or *sekinaton*, the Hebrew *shechinah*. To the Arabic commentators it seems to have been exceedingly mysterious.

The enemy against whom Talut led the Hebrews, was Goliath, here called Jalut. The form in which these names appear, is easily explained. It is well known, that to an elevated style oriental rhetoric makes jingle an essential requisite. This may result, in part, from organic sensibility, since rhyme is confessedly a product of the east, and since the Hebrew Scriptures furnish some examples of paronomasia.† The proximate cause of this perverted taste, however, is the usage of the Koran, that standing miracle of perfect eloquence, in which not only pages, but whole chapters, have a rhythmus and a rhyme, which to our ears is paltry, but to a Turk's or Arab's is the music of the spheres. This childish weakness leads the orientals to take undue liberties with foreign names. The Greeks, who were above this folly, had another of their own. Everything with them must have a meaning, sense or nonsense; and accordingly they tortured Persian and Phœnician simples into Attic compounds. With the Arabs on the other hand, and their disciples, sense must yield to

* ii., 247.

† We say *some* examples, for a part of those collected by Gesenius cannot be fairly reckoned as belonging to this class. His remarks upon the subject have a tendency, indeed, to make the reader think that the Bible is deformed throughout with this most offensive form of rhetorical affectation, which he calls a *Lieblingszierde* of the Hebrew language! We venture to affirm that a large proportion of the cited instances are purely accidental, and might easily be matched by German phrases from the Lehrgebaeude; and that as to the rest, they almost all occur in peculiar idiomatic and proverbial phrases, not as in Hariri, at the end of every clause of every paragraph, prosaic or poetical.

sound. Names historically cognate must likewise rhyme together. Thus in the case before us, Julat really varies very little from Goliath, the radicals being the same. But poor Saul is made to rhyme with the Philistine. *Talut and Jalut* is a combination full of beauty to an Asiatic ear. So is *Harut and Marut*, which occurs in this same chapter.* So is *Habel and Cabel*, the Mohammedan improvement upon *Cain and Abel*.

In the account of Talut's campaign against Jalut, the other misplaced incident, which we referred to, is inserted; Gideon's method of selecting his followers, by their drinking, is transferred to Saul.†

Jalut is killed by David, who is abruptly introduced for the purpose, and correctly spoken of as Saul's successor.‡ Of David we are elsewhere told, that he was a true penitent, that he was endued with strength, that he was inspired with the art of making coats of mail, that the mountains sang in concert with him, and the birds also, a notion founded probably on the frequent personifications and apostrophes in the book of Psalms.§ The passage, which we are now about to quote, is an instance of Mohammed's skill in divesting his stolen scraps of all historical, rhetorical, and moral worth. It surpasses even the example before given from the history of Joseph, as a specimen of the Koranic process for the transmutation of pathos into bathos. Let the reader turn to the exquisite parable, by means of which the prophet Nathan touched his master's conscience.‖ With that passage fresh in his mind, let him read as follows. "Hath the story of the two adversaries come to thy knowledge; when they ascended over the wall into the upper apartment, when they went in to David, and he was afraid of them? They said, Fear not, we are two adversaries who have a controversy to be decided. The one of us hath wronged the other: wherefore judge between us with truth, and be not unjust and direct us into the even way. This my brother had ninety and nine sheep; and I had only one ewe: and he said, give her me to keep; and he prevailed against me in the discourse which we had together. David said, verily he hath wronged thee in demanding thine ewe in addition to his own sheep: and many of them who are concerned together in business wrong one another, except those who believe and do that which is right; but how few are they! And David perceived that we had tried him by this parable [what parable?] and he asked pardon of his Lord, and he fell down and bowed himself and repented. Wherefore he forgave him this fault [what fault?] and he shall be admitted to approach near unto us, and shall have an excellent place of abode [in Paradise]."¶ Of this poor parody, Sale says with great sangfroid, "it is no other than Nathan's parable to David, a little dis-

* ii., 102. † ii., 248. ‡ ii., 250. § See ch. xxi., xxxiv., xxxviii.
‖ 2 Sam., xii. ¶ xxxviii., 22–26.

guised.'* A little disguised! disfigured, mangled, massacred, he surely meant to say.

That Solomon† acts a most conspicuous part in oriental fiction, is known to every reader of the Thousand and One Nights. For this distinction he is indebted, remotely to the Rabbins, more directly to the Koran. In the latter may be found the germ—the crude and shapeless elements—of that extravagant, but fascinating, species of romance, which the western Asiatics doat upon so fondly, and which, in the hands of their prolific writers, has grown up like an enchanted palace full of mysteries and wonders, of ethereal spirits and of airy tongues that syllable men's names. There is something in the eastern tales of genii and fairies, most agreeably contrasted with the sombre aspect of the Gothic legends which people our nurseries with grisly goblins. There is something gross, as well as dismal, in the latter, which offends the taste, while it agitates the nerves. The eastern fables, on the other hand, are airy and poetical. Their fictions savour of the palm-grove and the fountain, ours of the church-yard and the charnel-house. Both are equally unreal and unprofitable. But their very unreality (to coin a word) is different, Both are mere dreams. But theirs are the dreams of childish gaiety, ours are the *somnia ægri*, the visions of disease. And as to their unprofitableness, when we consider the effects of ghost stories heard in childhood, we can boldly say, that if we must have the stimulus of falsehood, we would rather have the exhilarating gas of eastern fancy than the stupefying opiate of home-brewed superstition. Of that sort of fiction, which has led us into this digression, the embryo exists in the Koranic account of Solomon. He is represented, not only as remarkable for wisdom, but as gifted with sundry supernatural advantages; as empowered to control the winds,‡ as acquainted with the language of animals;§ as possessed of a fountain which emitted molten brass;‖ but above all, as invested with absolute authority over the *Jinn* or Genii. We have said, that with respect to this class of beings there is some obscurity in the Koran. It should seem from certain passages, that they are what we call demons;¶ and yet the oriental fabulists do not exhibit them precisely in that light. The probability is, that there has been an amalgamation of the Jewish doctrine with another from a different quarter, probably from India. Accordingly, it seems to be the popular opinion in the west of Asia, that between the good angels and the devils there are two intermediate orders, the one called Peris by the Persians, excluded from heaven, yet allowed to hope; the other, whom they call Divs, unhappy and depraved, yet not condemned to hell. The Arabic word Jinn sometimes denotes the devils, sometimes the Divs just mentioned. In which sense Mohammed used it, we do not know. Most probably he did not know himself, or rather

* Vol. ii., p. 319. London, 1801. † Suleiman.
‡ xxi., 81. § xxvii., 17–19. ‖ xxxiv., 12.
¶ E. g., ch. xxxviii., 38, where the word used is *Shayatin*, or Satans.

employed it to express the vague idea suggested by his converse with the Jews on one hand, and the Magians on the other. Be that as it may, he constitutes King Solomon sole monarch of Jinnistan, the oriental Faery-land. For him the genii dived and quarried, carved and built, ard rendered other services recorded in the Koran, which we have not time to copy.* It might be a question of some interest, how far these fables may be traced to misconceptions of the Scriptures. The fountain of molten brass, and the mysterious manufacture, by unseen hands, of dishes like fish ponds, and gigantic cauldrons,† have certainly more than a fortuitous connexion with the works of Hiram as described in Scripture.

The only real incident in Solomon's history which is distinctly mentioned, is the visit of the queen of Sheba, and even that is loaded with embellishments. The marvellous account of Solomon's march at the head of an army of genii, birds, and men; the intelligence brought to him from Sheba by a lapwing; his letter to the Queen; the transportation of her throne through the air by the agency of genii; the sudden conversion of herself and all her nobles to the true religion (Islam); and other equally authentic statements may be seen at large by turning to the twenty-seventh chapter in Sale's Koran.

Some of the statements and allusions in this history are so concise and obscure that they seem to imply a previous acquaintance with the facts which they relate to on the part of those who were to read the Koran. For example: "When the *horses standing on three feet aud touching the ground with the edge of the fourth foot*,‡ and swift in the course were set before him," &c. (See Sale.) Again, "We also tried Solomon and placed on his throne a counterfeit body. Afterwards he turned unto God and said, oh Lord forgive me."§ And again, in relation to his death: "When we had decreed that Solomon should die, nothing discovered his death unto them, except the reptile of the earth which gnawed his staff."‖ This the commentators explain by saying, that the time of his death arrived before the temple was completed, and that in order to keep the genii still at work, his corpse remained in a standing posture leaning on his staff, till they had performed their task. This they did in about a year, at the end of which time a worm gnawed the staff in two, and the body fell. This gloss is favoured by the words immediately succeeding in the Koran. "Then the genii plainly perceived, that if they had known what was secret, they had not continued in a vile punishment." Sale justly observes that this story has perfectly the air of a Jewish invention.¶ But even though it had not been forthcoming from that quarter, there would have been no difficulty in the exegesis. The orthodox

* xxxviii., 38. † xxxiv., 13.

‡ The sixteen words in *italics* correspond to three in the original: of course the meaning must be very dubious.

§ xxxviii., 35, 36. ‖ xxxiv., 14 ¶ Vol. ii., p. 289. Lond., 1801

expounders of the Koran have a very easy process for solving the enigmas and salving the absurdities of the sacred text. On a single fact, or an obscure allusion, they erect a superstructure of minute details by way of explanation, descending even to dates, genealogies, and surnames. Thus Al Beidawi does not scruple to enumerate by name the Egyptian magicians, placing Simeon (Simon Magus?) at their head: though on this important point he is probably at swords' points with his brother Jallallodin; for, of course, each commentator is at liberty to manufacture stories at his pleasure, and he whose fables are the most ingenious bears away the palm. This license, notwithstanding, they prefer, where it is possible, to borrow from the Rabbins, through the medium of the Sonnah or canonical traditions.

The only other characters transferred from the Old Testament history to the Koran are Job and Jonah. The account of them is so concise that we give the substance of it in Mohammed's words. "Remember our servant Job,* when he cried unto his Lord, saying, verily Satan hath afflicted me with calamity and pain;† and thou art the most merciful of those who show mercy? And we answered his prayer and delivered him from his distress.‡ And it was said to him, strike with thy foot. This is for a cold bath and a drinking place. And we restored to him his family and as many more with them, through our mercy, and for an admonition unto those who are endued with understanding. [And we said] take in thy hand a handful [Sale adds, of rods] and therewith strike [Sale adds, thy wife]. And break not thine oath. Verily we found him a patient person; how excellent a servant was he, for he was one who frequently turned himself to God."§

Jonah is, in the Koran, called by two names, *Yunas* and *Dhul'nun*. This last denotes about the same that *Fish-man*, or *He of the fish* would in English. His story is as follows: "Jonah was one of those sent by us. He departed in a rage, and thought that we could not exercise our power over him. When he fled into the loaded ship; and they cast lots; and he was condemned; and the fish swallowed him, for he was culpable. And if he had not been one of those who praised God, verily he had remained in its belly unto the day of resurrection. And he cried aloud in darkness. There is no God besides thee! Praise be to thee! I am one of the wicked. And we answered him and delivered him from his distress. And we cast him on the naked shore; and he was sick; and we caused a gourd plant to grow over him; and we sent him to a hundred thousand persons or more, and they believed. Wherefore we prolonged their lives for a season."‖

The account of John the Baptist in the Koran, approaches very nearly to the truth. We are not told who Zacharias was, but are informed that he prayed for a son because he was afraid of his

* Ayyub. † xxxviii., 42. ‡ xxi., 82, 83.
§ xxxviii., 43–45. ‖ xxi., 87. xxxvii., 138 146.

heirs at law. An answer was brought by angels to his chamber, assuring him that he should have a son, and should call his name *Yahya* (John), a name never borne, as he was told, by any one before. Zacharias doubted and desired a sign. He was, therefore, informed, that he should not speak for three days except by gesture. He was also told that his son should be a holy man, and should bear witness to the WORD, which the Moslems properly apply to Christ, referring the name, however, to his miraculous conception, produced by the mere command or word of God. Nothing more is said of John except what follows. "[We said to him] receive the book [of the law] with resolution [to observe it]; and we gave him wisdom when a boy, and mercy, and purity, and he was devout and dutiful to his parents, and was not proud or rebellious. Peace be on him the day of his birth, and the day of his death, and the day of his resurrection."* Not a word is said of his peculiar mode of life, nor even of his office as baptizer.

The statements of the Koran, in relation to the Virgin and our Saviour, when picked out and arranged, form the following narrative. The wife of one Imran (whom Mohammed seems to confound with Amram, notwithstanding Sale's denial), in expectation of a son, devoted him to the service of the Lord. The child, however, proved to be a daughter, whom the mother named Mariam, or Mary, and solemnly commended her to the divine protection. The care of the child was, after a time, committed to Zacharias the father of John, who was surprised, when he visited the chamber, to find her supplied with food without his interference. Mary, on being questioned, answered, "It is from God. He supplieth whom he will, without measure."†

The annunciation and miraculous conception of our Lord are distinctly mentioned. God is said to have conveyed the intelligence to Mary by his Spirit, as, in another place,‡ he is said to have sent down the Koran by his Holy Spirit. Both these expressions the Mohammedans apply to the angel Gabriel, in which point they agree verbally with those Christian writers, who consider Gabriel a name of the Holy Spirit. The annunciation was in these words: "Oh Mary, verily God sendeth thee good tidings, that thou shalt bear the Word, proceeding from himself: his name shall be Christ Jesus the son of Mary, honourable, honourable in this world and the world to come, &c. He shall speak to men in the cradle, and when he is grown up: he shall be one of the righteous."§ Not a word is said of Joseph, or of any espousals. Nor are the stable and the manger mentioned. The suspicion, which by Matthew is ascribed to Joseph, is spoken of as common to her friends and relatives. One of the reproachful speeches here set down begins, "Oh, sister of Aaron!" a sufficient proof that the Miriam of the Pentateuch was stupidly confounded with

* xix., 1–15. iii., 38–40.
† iii., 35–37.
‡ xvi., 102.
§ iii., 45, 46. xix., 16–28.

the Mary of the Gospel. Yet even in the face of this strong fact, Sale is "afraid" that the charge of anachronism cannot be sustained!

"But she made signs to the child [to answer them]; and they said, how shall he speak to us who is an infant in the cradle? Whereupon the child said, verily I am the servant of God; he hath given me the book [of the Gospel] and hath appointed me a prophet. And he hath made me blessed wheresoever I shall be; and hath commanded me to observe prayer, and give alms, so long as I shall live; and he hath made me dutiful to my mother, and hath not made me proud or vicious. Peace be on me the day whereon I was born, and the day whereon I shall die, and the day whereon I shall be raised to life. This," says Mohammed, "was Jesus the son of Mary, the Word of truth concerning whom they doubt. It is not worthy of God, that he should have a son. God forbid! When he decreeth a thing he only saith unto it, Be, and it is. And verily God is my Lord and your Lord; wherefore serve him; this is the right way. Yet the sectaries differ among themselves concerning Jesus, but woe be unto those who are unbelievers, because of their appearance at the great day."* A very respectable Socinian sermon, with the exception of the concluding woe, which is rather too illiberal.

To the children of Israel, Jesus offered to perform the following miracles; to make a bird of clay and then animate it with his breath; to give sight to one born blind; to heal the leprous; to raise the dead; and to declare by inspiration what they ate, and what provision they had stored away. This last appears to strike the Mussulman with special force, as it holds a conspicuous place among Mohammed's own alleged performances. A full detail of this pretended wonder may be found in the treatise written about twenty years ago, by Aga Acber, a Mollah of Shiraz, in reply to Henry Martyn. A large part of the tract is given both in Persian and English, by Professor Lee in the "Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mahommedanism."†

Jesus also informed them, that he came to confirm the truth of the Law revealed before him, but at the same time to abrogate some of its restrictions. The Jews, however, charged him with imposture, and ascribed his miracles, as usual, to magic. Jesus then asked them who would be his helpers in the cause of God? To this appeal none responded but the apostles or Hawariyun, a word which signifies *sincere* or *candid*, but is applied by Mohammed to our Lord's immediate followers.‡

In the chapter called The Table, being the fifth in order, we find a story which was probably derived, remotely and obliquely, from the Scriptural account of our Lord's last supper, and may have been designed to account for the solemn and mysterious observance which was seen to prevail among the oriental Christians. The

* xix., 29–37. † Cambridge (Eng.), 1823. ‡ iii., 49–52 lxi., 6.

statement is, that the apostles said to Christ, "Oh, Jesus, son of Mary, can the Lord cause a table to come down to us from heaven?" He replied, "Fear God if ye be true believers." They persisted, however, on the ground that they must have some satisfying proof of his divine legation. Jesus then said, "Oh God our Lord, cause a table to come down to us from heaven, and let the day of its descent be a festival day* to us, to the first of us, and to the last of us [i.e. to us and our successors], and do thou provide food for us; for thou art the best provider." God replied that it should be done, but declared that all who withstood such evidence should inevitably suffer an aggravated punishment.† It may be well to add, that among the remarkable days in the Mohammedan calendar is one called Yd-Mesiah, or the Festival of Christ, being that on which this table is supposed to have descended.

No other of the acts of the apostles is recorded in the Koran, if we except an obscure and confused statement in the chapter called Ya Sin. We are there told that two of Christ's apostles came to a city, for the purpose of preaching, and were joined on their arrival by a third believer. The name of the city is not mentioned in the text, though Sale has inserted ANTIOCH in capitals, according to the commentators. The people, instead of hearing them, forbade their preaching upon pain of death by stoning. The apostles continued, however, to exhort them, and while they were so doing, "a man came hastily from the further parts of the city," and made a very unintelligible speech in the apostles' favour. The narrative then proceeds abruptly, "It was said to him, enter into paradise," leaving us to infer that he was stoned, which inference is introduced by Sale into the text. Here, it would seem, we are presented with the death of Stephen and that of the penitent thief in a compound state. We are informed, moreover, that the city was destroyed.§

The next passage that we shall advert to, is the famous one with which the zealous Moslem stops the mouth of Christian cavillers, and which, in his opinion, is abundantly sufficient to decide the controversy, wholly and for ever. It is as follows: "Jesus, the son of Mary, said, oh children of Israel, verily I am the apostle of God sent to you, confirming the Law, that was before me, and bringing good tidings of an apostle who shall come after me, named Ahmed."‖ All that need be said in explanation, is, that *Ahmed* and *Mohammed* are regular derivatives from one root, and are nearly synonymous, the latter meaning Praised, and the former Praise-worthy, or in the superlative, Most Laudable. Whether the pseudapostle was actually known in common life by both

* Literally, let it be a festival.

† v., 112–115. There is a remarkable coincidence between the language of the Apostles here and that of the Israelites, Ps. lxxviii., 19. Mohammed may very possibly have mingled the events. No elements are too discordant to enter into his untempered mortar.

‡ Richardson's Dictionary, p. 1038.

§ xxxvi., 13–29. ‖ lxi., 6.

names, is of little moment. To an Arab the very sound would be sufficient to identify them, even if tradition had not fixed the application far beyond the reach of oversight or error. It admits of doubt, whether this false citation was a sheer invention of Mohammed's own, or whether it was palmed upon him by his Christian accessaries. The question depends upon the general view which is taken of his character and that of his imposture. On the supposition that he was himself a dupe, in whole or in part, it seems most likely that this forged prophecy was furnished by another; for if he had manufactured it, he would probably have shunned all ambiguity by using his real, or his most familiar name. If, on the contrary, he laid his plans sagaciously, which is the common theory, this very equivoque resolves itself into a stroke of policy, a sly contrivance to elude suspicion, by affecting the obscurity which most men look for in a bona fide prophecy.

This notable prediction is of course regarded by all true believers as an accurate quotation from the uncorrupted gospel. For they admit that there was once a gospel pure and undefiled, now utterly disfigured by malicious mutilation. Here is a spot of ground on which the champion of the cross must be prepared for battle. It is easy for us, assuming all the controverted points, to laugh at the Mohammedan opinion. But on missionary ground, in actual conflict with intelligent, though prejudiced and obstinate opponents, a laugh will hardly do. Nor will a simple charge of falsehood and absurdity, however gravely urged, decide the contest. Its only result, most probably, would be a volley of Arabic or Turkish curses, and, where the necessary power was possessed, a summary reductio ad absurdum in the shape of the bastinado. How could it be otherwise indeed? To make Mohammed out a liar, you urge the very fact which they employ to prove the corruption of the Christian Scriptures. You tell them that their Book is false, because it puts words into the mouth of Jesus which he never uttered. They tell you that your Book is garbled, for it omits a most remarkable and memorable prophecy. Can such recriminations prove a point? Surely not. The only human means thatcan avail in such a case is argument, legitimate argument, logically accurate, historically just. Now, we ask, is it probable that men who cannot reason at home, will be able to reason at Cairo or Algiers? And in view of the efforts which are likely to be made for the conversion of the Mussulman, we also ask, would it be prudent, would it be right, for minds without strength or discipline, to be enlisted in this war? Let those who think that Moslems cannot argue read their subtle arguments, and bear in mind the fact, that Martyn, the first mathematical proficient in his class at Cambridge, found no cause to repent the rigid discipline of St. John's and the Senate House.*

* We take this opportunity of asking for the ground of the assertion sometimes vented, that Martyn was a man of very common-place abilities. His course of life precluded a display of brilliant talent, and his printed sermons cannot furnish a criterion, considering the light in which pulpit performances are viewed by English

We have chosen to express these opinions in connexion with the main point of controversy between Islam and the gospel.

The Moslems, it is well known, like the Cerinthians and other early heretics, deny the crucifixion of our Saviour. The Koranic doctrine upon that point may be gathered from the following quotation: "They [the Jews] contrived a plot; but God is the best contriver of plots. And God said, oh Jesus, I am about to make thee die, and to take thee up to myself; and I will cleanse [or free] thee from the unbelievers, and I will place thy followers above the unbelievers, at [*or* until] the day of resurrection."* "They [the Jews] say, We have killed Christ Jesus [Ysa the Messiah] the son of Mary, God's apostle; whereas they did not kill nor crucify him, but he was counterfeited [or personated] to them.† And those who differed respecting him were in doubt about it; and indeed they had no knowledge, but followed mere conjecture. They did not really kill him; but God took him up to himself, and God is mighty and wise."‡

To set Mohammed's unitarianism in a clearer light, we need only quote a few sentences from different parts of the Koran. "They are certainly infidels who say, that God is Christ the son of Mary. For Christ himself said, oh children of Israel, worship God, my Lord and your Lord. Verily he who gives God a companion shall be excluded from paradise by God, and the fire shall be his dwelling place. Surely they are infidels who say that God is the third of three; whereas there is no God but one God, and if they do not cease from what they say, grievous torments," &c. &c.§ "Christ Jesus, the son of Mary, was an apostle from God, even his Word, and a Spirit proceeding from him. Verily God is one God. Far be it from him that he should have a son. Christ does not disdain to be God's servant," &c. &c.‖ "When God said" [Sale renders it, *when God shall say at the last day;* but the verb is in the past tense, without anything to modify it] "oh Jesus, son of Mary, didst thou say to men, Take me and my mother for deities besides God? He replied, God forbid! I have no right to assert what does not truly belong to me. I have told them only what thou didst command me, to wit, serve God my Lord and your Lord."¶ "He is only a servant whom we have highly favoured, and set forth as an example to the children of Israel, and verily he shall be a sign of the Hour" (viz., the last).**

"Verily, Jesus, with respect to God, was just like Adam. He created him of dust, and then said to him, Be, and he was."††

Besides the denial of our Lord's divinity, the attentive reader will observe, throughout these sentences, another strong resemblance to a certain class of writers, in the clamorous assertion of

churchmen. We are acquainted with no *proofs* of his inferiority, and his standing at Cambridge is at least a presumption in favour of his powers.

* iii., 54, 55, † "He was represented by one in his likeness." Sale.
‡ iv., 155–157. § v., 74, 75. ‖ iv., 168, 169.
¶ v., 116, 117. ** xliii., 58–61. †† iii., 59.

some tenets, as peculiar to themselves—such as, that God is one, that there are not three Gods, that Jesus Christ was the servant of God—tenets which all true Christians hold as fully and as firmly as any Socinian or Mussulman on earth. It is but just, however, to repeat, that the Arab's creed breathes too much of a fire-and-fagot spirit to please the fastidious taste of a latitudinarian.

We believe we have now noticed all the fragments of the sacred history, occurring in the Koran. It must be observed, however, that some of the stories are repeated half-a-dozen times over, in as many different places. In that case, we have selected the most minute and circumstantial of the narratives, adding the facts which it omitted from the parallel passages.

Besides the statements which may thus be traced to scriptural originals, there are a number of stories and allusions in the Koran which derive their origin exclusively from profane history, rabbinical traditions, monastic legends, or the romantic fictions of Arabia itself. It is true, that even those purloined from Scripture have received embellishments from all these quarters, but we now refer to such as rest entirely upon that foundation. Of this kind are the celebrated story of the Seven Sleepers, the account of the Prophets Hud and Saleh, the obscure and scanty notices respecting Dhu'lkarnein, commonly supposed to be Alexander the Great, and other minor passages in historical form. How far some of these might be identified as mutilated fragments of the Bible and Apocrypha, we do not now inquire. At first view they have no such aspect, and our only object here has been to give a connected view of those whose pedigree is obvious.* We are aware that we have been employed upon a very humble task, in collecting and arranging the absurdities and falsehoods of an impudent impostor. Perhaps, however, we have done for our readers what they would not have been willing to do for themselves, and what some of them may find it just as well to be acquainted with. Our hasty and imperfect, but methodical synopsis will, at least, present a clearer view of the Mohammedan belief upon the points in question, than could possibly be gained by a continuous perusal of the book itself. We have also had occasion, here and there, to point out instances of Sale's strange fondness for interpolations tending to raise his author in the reader's estimation. We have often been at a loss to reconcile his scrupulous precision as a mere translator, with the disingenuousness of his latent glosses and disguised interpolations. Some one has said that "Sale was half a Mussulman;" but this we think incredible. That he was not a very zealous Christian, may be safely granted, but we cannot think it fair to push the accusation further. Our own explanation of the matter is, that he was biassed by the feelings which all scholars feel in relation to

* In doing this we have confined ourselves, in almost every instance, to the text of the Koran. The commentators explain everything abundantly, as may be learned from the specimens in Sale. We have chosen rather to exhibit its native imperfection and obscurity.

their favourite pursuits, and to the subjects of their diligent and long continued study. That Sale did study both the Koran and the commentators deeply and successfully, no one can doubt who has carefully inspected his translation. As to the rest, we suppose that he was led to interpolate a little by a natural unwillingness to look upon the object of his toils as wholly worthless. When we have spent time and labour on a thing, as valuable, we are loth to see it treated with contempt. This explanation we prefer, because we would have justice done to a distinguished orientalist, even in stripping a deformed imposture of its borrowed garments.

We shall add a few words with respect to the study of Arabic. It is highly desirable, on various accounts, that a knowledge of this noble and important language should become more common. Biblical learning and the missionary enterprise alike demand it. What we most need, is a taste for the pursuit, and a concientious willingness to undertake the task. The great deficiency is not so much in grammars as in men to study them. We observe that Mr. Smith, the American missionary now at Malta, has declined to undertake an English version of Ibn Ferhat's grammar. His views are such as might have been expected from a man of sense and learning. It may, indeed, be stated as a general truth, that translated grammars are as likely to be hinderances as helps. A grammarian cannot possibly explain the phenomena of a foreign language, except by appealing to the structure of his own, or of that in which he writes. Now, as every language has its peculiarities, both great and small, no two can stand in the same relation to a third. Latin and French agree where French and English differ. The same form of speech in Latin, therefore, which must be explained to English learners, may be as clear, without elucidation, to the Frenchman, as if founded upon some fixed law of nature. Give the latter the same comments that you give the former, and you not only do not aid him, but you really confound him. For we need not say, that the attempt to explain what is perfectly intelligible must have that effect. The same remark may be applied to any other case. For a familiar instance, we refer to Josse's Spanish Grammar, as translated by Mr. Sales of Cambridge. The original work was designed for Frenchmen, and as the translator, we believe, is himself a Frenchman, many rules and statements, in themselves just, and in their proper place useful, are wholly unintelligible to the English reader. Analogous cases will occur to every scholar, abundantly proving, that the servile transfer, not of language merely, but of rules, arrangements, proofs, and illustrations, is unfriendly to the only end which grammars should promote. While we believe with Dr. Johnson, that the practice of translating (in the proper sense, and on an extensive scale) is injurious to the purity of language, we likewise consider it injurious to the interests of sound and thorough scholarship. To avoid the former evil, we would substitute the transfusion of thoughts for the translation of words. To remedy the latter, we would have bilingual

scholars to study, sift, digest, remodel, reproduce. By this we should avoid the needless introduction of an uncouth terminology and the practical paralogism of attempting to explain ignotum per ignotius. By this means, too, a freshness would be given to our learned works, very unlike the tang contracted by a passage over sea. This too would serve to check the strong propensity of young philologists towards a stagnant acquiescence in the dicta of their text-books, which is always attended with the danger of mistaking form for substance, and forgetting the great ends of language in the infinitesimal minutiæ of a barren etymology. In Germany, that great philological brewery, the extreme of stagnation has been long exchanged for that of fermentation, and although we do not wish to see the eccentricities of foreign scholarship imported here, we do believe that much of their advancement may be fairly traced to their contempt of mere authority, their leech-like thirst for indefinite improvement, and their practice of working up the material of their learning into new and varied forms without much regard to pre-existent models. Let us imitate their merits and avoid their faults. Let us mount upon their shoulders, not grovel at their feet. Let us take the *stuff* which they provide for us, and mould it for ourselves, to suit our own peculiarities of language, habit, genius, wants, and prospects. Let our books be English, not Anglo-French nor Anglo-German. Let us not make them as the Chinese tailor made the tar's new jacket, with a patch to suit the old one.

To return to grammars—though what we said above may seem directly applicable only to those written in one language to explain another, it applies, *a fortiori*, to what are called *native* grammars, which are merely designed to reduce into systematic form the knowledge previously gathered by empirical induction. To those who have become familiar with a language in the concrete by extensive reading, such works are highly useful and need no translation. To beginners they are useless; for they presuppose the knowledge which beginners want. Besides, they are *untranslatable*, as Mr. Smith justly affirms, with special reference, indeed, to *Bahth El Mutalib*, of which we know nothing but through him. We may add, however, that even if that work admitted of translation, it would scarcely throw more light upon the subject than de Sacy's lucid digest (pre-eminently lucid after all deductions, drawbacks, and exceptions), the fruit of most laborious and long continued study of numerous authorities—a work, too, which has had more indirect influence on biblical philology than many are aware of.* When de Sacy has been mastered and exhausted, he may very fairly be condemned and thrown aside. To those who would prefer a shorter grammar and the Latin tongue, Rosenmüller's book may be safely recommended. It is Erpenius re-written, with

* No one, we think who is familiar with de Sacy's noble work, can fail to recognise its agency in giving form, perspicuity, and richness, to the famous Lehrgebäude of Gesenius.

improvements from de Sacy. Meanwhile we look with some impatience for the forthcoming work of Ewald, whose acuteness, ingenuity, and habits of research, afford the promise of a masterly performance.

It must be owned, however, that we do need reading-books, or readers, for beginners. Most of the Chrestomathies prepared in Europe appear to presuppose some acquaintance with the Koran.* For us this will not answer. Here, where the study is at most but nascent, we need an introduction to the Koran itself. We have often thought, that a selection of historical passages from that book, reduced to order, with grammatical notes and a vocabulary, would answer the ends of a chrestomathy for mere beginners most completely. It is highly important that the learner's first acquaintance with the written language should be formed upon the Koran. Amidst all the dialectic variations of a tongue which is spoken from the great Sahara to the steppes of Tartary, there is a large proportion, both of words and phrases, everywhere the same. These are the words and phrases of the Koran which religious scruples have preserved from change, and religious use made universally familiar. He who is acquainted with the language of the Koran, has the means of oral access to any Arab, and almost to any Mussulman. He may not understand as yet the many variations of the vulgar from the sacred tongue, much less the local diversities of speech ; but he has the foundation upon which these rest, the stated formula from which they are mere departures. He will also have acquired a measure of that knowledge, with respect to facts and doctrines, which no man can dispense with, who would either vanquish or convert the Moslem.

* See, for example, the preface to de Sacy's Chrestomathie Arabe, Paris, 1826.

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