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I
ESSAYS
AND
TREATISE
O N
SEVERAL SUBJECTS. By DAVID HUME, Efq; VOL. II. CONTAINING, /
An E N QJJ I R Y concerning HUMAN UNDERSTANDING;
A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS;
An ENQJJIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES of MORALS;
AND
The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.
A NEW EDITION.
DUBLIN:
Printed by J. Williams, [No. 21,] Siinner-Roiv,
/
M,DCC,LXXIX.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library
i
http://www.archive.org/details/essaystreatiseso02hume ,
ADVERTISEMENT.
IVX O S T of the principles, and reafonings, con- tained in this volume, were publifhed in a work in three volumes, called A Treatife of Human Nature : A work which the Author had projefted before he left College, and which he wrote and publifhed not long after. But not finding it fuccefsful, he was fenfible of his error in going to the prefs too early, and he call the whole anew in the following pieces, where fome negligences in his former rea- foning, and more in the expreflion, are, he hopes, correfled. Yet feveral writers, who have honoured the Author's Phllofophy with anfwers, have taken care to diredl all their batteries againfb that juve- nile work, which the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it : A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a ftrong infhance of thofe pole- mical artifices, wiiich a bigotted zeal thinks itfelf authorifed to employ. Henceforth, the Author defires, that the following Pieces may alone be re- garded as containing his philofophical fentiments and principles.
A a
THE
CONT E NTS
O F T H E
SECOND VOLUME.
An ENQJJIRY concerning HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.
Sedlion Page
I. V-/F the different Species of Philofophy 3 II. Of the Origin of Ideas 17
III. Of the AfTociation of Ideas 23
IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operati-
ons of the Underftanding 27
V. Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts 45
VI. Of Probability 61
VII. Of the Idea of neceflary Connexion 65
VIII. Of Liberty and Neceffity 85
IX. Of the Reafon of Animals 11 1
X. Of Miracles 117
XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future
State 141
XII. Of the academical or fceptical Philofohy 159
A Diflertation on the PalTions I77
An
CONTENTS.
An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES Of MORALS.
Seftion Page
I. V>/F the general Principles of Morals 215
II. Of Benevolence 223
III. Of Juftice 231
IV. Of political Society 253 V. Why Utility pleafes 261
VI. Of Qualities ufeful to Ourfelves 281
VII. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Our- felves 299 VIII. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Others 311 IX. Conclufion 319
APPENDIX.
I. Concerning moral Sentiment 337
II. Of Self-love 349
III. Some farther Confiderations with regard to
Juftice 357
IV. Of fome verbal Difputes 2^^ A Dialogue 377
The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.
Section Page
Introdudlion 401
I. X HAT Polytheifm was the primary
Religion of Men 402
II. Origin of Polytheifm 407
III. The fame Subjedl continued 410
IV. Deities not confidered as Creators or For-
mers of the World 415
V. Various
CONTENTS.
Section
V. Various Forms of Polytheifm : Allegory,
Hero-Worfhip Page 422
VI. Origin of Theifm from Polytheifm 426
VII. Contirmation of this Doftrine 432
VIII. Flux and Reflux of Polytheifm and Theifm
434
IX. Comparifon of thefe Refigions with regard
to Perfecution and Toleration 436
X. With regard to Courage or Abafement 440
XI. With regard to Reafon or Abfurdity 441
XII. With regard to Doubt or Conviction 444
XIII. Impious Conceptions of the divine Nature
in popular Religions of both Kinds 457
XIV. Bad Influence of popular Religions on
Morality 461
XV. General Corollary. 466
AN
A N
E N Q^ U I R Y
CONCERNING
HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING.
Vol. II. B
SECTION I.
Of the Different Species of Philosophy.
iVlORAL philofophy, or the fcience of human nature, may be treated after two different man- ners ; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, in(lru6tion, and reformation of mankind. The one confiders man chiefly as born for adlion ; and as influenced in his meafures by tafle and fentiment ; purfuing one objeft, and avoiding another, according to the value which thefe objeds feem to poflfcfs, and ac- cording to the light in which they prefent them- felves. As virtue, of all objcifls, is allowed to be the mofl: valuable, this fpecies of philolbphers paint her in the moft amiable colours -, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their fubjedt in an eafy and obvious manner, and fuch as is belt fitted to pleafe the imagination, and engage the affections. They fele6l the moil ilriking obfervations and inftances from common life; place oppofite chara6ters in a proper contrafl:; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happinefs, dired our fteps in thefe paths by the foundeft precepts and mofl illuflrious examples. They make us feel the difference be- tween vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts
B 2 to
4 S E C T I O N I.
to the love of probity and true honour, they think> that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.
The other fpecies of philofophers confider man in the light of a reafonable rather than an aftivc being, and endeavour to form his underflanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a fubjed of fpeculation j and v/ith a narrow fcrutiny examine it, in order to find thofe principles, which regulate our underftanding, excite our lentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular objefl, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond con- troverfy, the foundation of morals, reafoning, and criticifm; and Hiould for ever talk of truth and falfehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the fource of thefe di'fbindions. While they attempt this arduous tafk, they are deterred by no difficulties j but proceed- ing from particular intlances to general principles, they ftill pulh on their enquiries to principles more general, and reft not fatisfied till they arrive at thofe original principles, by which, in every fci- ence, all human curiofity muft be bounded. Though their fpeculations leem abftratt, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wile; and think themfelves fufficiently compenfated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can difcover fome hid- den truths, which may contribute to the inftrudi- on of pofterity.
It is certain that the eafy and obvious philo- fophy, will always, with the generality of man- kind, have the preference above the accurate and ubflrufe ; and by many v/iil be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more ufeful than the other. It enters more into common
lifei
or the Different Species of Philosophy. 5
life J moulds the heart and affeftions ; and, by touching thofe principles which aftuate men, re- forms their condudl, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it defcribes. On the contrary, the abftrufe philofophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into bufmefs and a6lion, vanifhes when the phi- lofopher leaves the fhade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles eafily retain any in- fluence over our condutl and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our paf- fions, the vehemence of our affections, diflipate all its conclufions, and reduce the profound philo- fopher to a mere plebeian.
This alfo muft be confeffcd, that the moft du- rable, as well as julteft fame, has been acquired by the eafy philofophy, and that abftradt reafon- ers feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momen- tary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to fupporc their renown with more equitable pofterity. It is eafy for a profound philofopher to commit a miftake in his fubtile reafonings ; and one miftake is the neceiTary parent of another, while he pufhes on his confequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclufion, by its unufual appear- ance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philofopher, who purpofes only to reprefenc the common fenfe of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther ; but renewing his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fen- timents of the mind, returns into the right path, and fecures himfelf from any dangerous illulions. The fame of Cicero flourifhes at prefent ; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere pafles the feas, and ftill maintains his reputa- tion: But the glory of Malebranche is con- fined
6 SECTION I.
fined to his own nation, and to his own agre. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleafure, •when Locke fliall be entirely forgotten.
The mere philofopher is a chara6ler, which is commonly but little acceptable in the v/orld, as being fiippofed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleafure of fociety ; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehenfion. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is ftill more defpifed j nor is any thing deemed a furr fign of an illi- beral genius in an age and nation where the fci- ences flourifh, than to be entirely deflitute of all relifh for thofe noble entertainments. The moft: perfcd character is fuppofed to lie between thofe extremes ; retaining an equal ability and tafte for books, company, and bufinefs ; pre- ferving in converfation that difccrnment and de- licacy which arife from po'ite letters ; and in bu- finefs, that probity and accuracy which are the natural refult of a jufl; philofophy. In order to dif- fufe and cultivate fo accompliflied a chara6ter, nothing can be more ufeful than compofitions of the eafy Ryle and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and fend back the ftudent amono; mankind full of noble fentiments and .wife precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of fuch compofitions, virtue becomes amiable, fcience agreeable, com- pany infcrudtive, and retirement entertaining.
Man is a reafonable being; and as fuch, re- ceives from fcience his proper fcod and nou- rilhment : But fo narrow are the bounds of human iinderftanding, that little fatisfadlion can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or fecurity of Iiis acquilitions. Man is a fociable,
no
or the Different Species of Philosophy. 7
no lefs than a reafonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amufing, or preferve the proper relifh for them. Man is alfo an aftive being; and from that difpofition, as well as from the various necelTities of human life, mull fubmit to bufinefs and occupation : But the mind requires fome relaxation, and cannot al- ways fupport its bent to care and induftry. It feems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as moft fuitable to human race, and fecretly admoniflied them to allow none of thefe biafles to draw too much, lb as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your paffion for fcience, fays fhe, but let your fcience be human, and fuch as may have a diredl reference to aflion and fociety. Ab- ftrufe thought and profound refearches I prohibit, and will feverely punifh, by the penfive melan- choly which they introduce, by the endlefs un- certainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended difcoveries fiiall meet with, when communicated. Be a phi- lofopheri but, amidft all your philofophy, be flill a man.
Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the eafy phiiofophy to the abftraft and pro- found, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without oppofition, his own tafte and fentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the abfolute rejefting of all profound reafonings, or what is commonly called mctaphyficsy we fhall now proceed to confi- der what can reafonably be pleaded in their be- half.
We may begin with obferving, that one confi- derable advantage, which refults from the accu- rate and abftraft philofophy, is, its fubferviency
to 3
8 S E C T I O N I.
to the eafy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a fufficient degree of ex- adnefs in its fentiments, precepts, or reafonings. All poJite letters are nothing but pi<flures of hu- man life in various attitudes and fituations ; and infpire us with different fentiments, of praife or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the objeft, which they fet before us. An artift muft be better qualified to fucceed in this undertaking, who, befides a delicate tafte and a quick apprehenfion, pofleircs an accurate know- ledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the underftanding, the workings of the paflions, and the various fpecies of fentiment which difcrimi- nate vice and virtue. How painful foever this inward fearch or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in fome meafure, requifite to thofe, who would defcribe with fuccefs the obvious and outward ap- pearances of life and manners. The anatomiil: prefents to the eye the moft hideous and difagree- able obje(5ls3 but his fcience is ufeful to the pain- ter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richeft colours of his art, and gives his figures the moll grace- ful and engaging airs ; he muft ftill carry his at- tention to the inward itrudure of the human body, the pofition of the mufcles, the fabric of the bones, and the ufe and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every cafe, advantageous to beau- ty, and juft reafoning to delicate fentiment. In -vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.
Befides, we may obferve, in every art or pro- fefiion, even thofe which moft concern life or ac- tion, that a fpirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfedion, and renders them more fubfervient to the intercfts of fociety. And though a philofopher may live re- ivjote from bufinefs, the genius of philofophy, if
carcfullv
Of the Different Species of Philosophy. 9
carefully cultivated by feveral, mufl: gradually diffufe itfelf throughout the whole fociety, and beftow a fimilar corredtnefs pn every art and call- ing. The politician will acquire greater forefight and fubtilty, in the fubdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer princi- ples in his reafonings ; and the general more re- gularity in his difcipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The liability of modern go- vernments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philofophy, have improved, and proba- bly will ftill improve, by fimilar gradations.
Were there no advantage to be reaped from thefe fiiudies, beyond the gratification of an in- nocent curiofity, yet ought not even this to be defpifed ; as being one accelTion to thofe few fafe and harmlefs pleafures, which are beflowcd on human race. The fweeteft and mofb inofienfive path of life leads through the avenues of fcience and learning} and whoever can either remove any obftruftions in this way, or open up any new profpefl, ought fo far to be efteemed a benefadtor to mankind. And though thefe refearches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with fome minds as with fome bodies, which being endow- ed with vigorous and florid health, require fevere exercife, and reap a pleafure fram what, to the generality of mankind, may feem burdenfome and laborious. Obfcurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye ; but to bring light from obfcurity, by v/hatever labour, mud needs be delightful and rejoicing.
But this obfcurity in the profound and abftradV philofophy, is objefted to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable fource of uncer- tainty and error. Here indeed lies the juftefb and moft plaufible objection againft a confiderable part of metaphyfics, that they are not properly a fcience;
but
lo SECTION I.
but arife either from the fruitlefs efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into fubjedls ut- terly inacceflible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular fuperftitions, which, being unable to defend themfelves on fair ground, raife thefe intangling brambles to cover and proteft their weaknefs. Chafed from the open country, thefe robbers fly into the forefl:, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The ftouteft antagonift, if he remit his watch a moment, is opprefled. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with re- verence and fubmiffion, as their legal fovereigns.
But is this a fufficient reafon, why philofo- phers fhould defift from fuch refearches, and leave fuperftition ftill in poflTelTiGn of her retreat ? Is it not proper to draw an oppofite conclufion, and perceive the neceflity of carrying the war into the moll fecret recefles of the enemy ? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent difappoinment, will at laft abandon fuch airy fciences, and dif- cdvtT the proper province of human reafon. For, befides, that many perfons find too fenfible an intereft in perpetually recalling fuch topics ; be- fides this, I fay, the motive of blind delpair can never reafonably have place in the fciences j fince, however unfuccefsful former attempts may have proved, there is ftill room to hope, that the indiiftry, good fortune, or improved fagacity of fucceeding generations m.ay reach difcoveries un- known to former ages. Each adventurous genius^ will ftill leap at the^arduous prize, and find himfelf ftimulated, rather than dilcouraged, by the failures of his predecefibrsj while he hopes that the glory of archieving fo hard an adventure is referved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning,
at
or the Different Species of Philosophy, ii
at once, from thefe abftrufe queftions, is to en- quire ferioufly into the nature of human iinder- lianding, and fhew, from an exaft analyfis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for fuch remote and abftrufe fubje<5ts. We mull: fubmit to this fatigue, in order to Jive at eafe ever after : And mull cultivate true metaphyfics with fome care, in order to deftroy the falfe and adul- terate. Indolence, which, to fome perfons, af- fords a fafeguard againft this deceitful philofophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiofityj and def- pair, which, at fome moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to fanguine hopes and expe6tati- ons. Accurate and juft reafoning is the only ca- tholic remedy, fitted for all perfons and all difpo- fitions ; and is alone able to fubvert that abftrufe philofophy and metaphyfical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular fuperftition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to carelefs reafoners, and gives it the air of fcience and wifdom,
Befides this advantage of rejeding, after delibe- rate enquiry, the moft uncertain and difagreeable part of learning, there are many pofitive advanta- ges, which refult from an accurate fcrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is re- markable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though moft intimately prefent to us, yet, whenever they become the objeft of refiedion, they feem involved in obfcurity; nor can the eye readily find thofe lines and boundaries, which dif* criminate and diftinguifh them. The objedls are too fine to remain long in the fame afped or fitua- tion ; and muft be apprehended in an inftant, by a fuperior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconfiderable part of fcience barely to know the different operations of the mind, to feparate them from each other, to clafs them un- der their proper heads, and to corredall thatfeem-
ins:
12 SECTION I.
ing diforder, in which they lie involved, when made the objeft of refleftion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and diftinguifhing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bo- dies, the obje6ls of our fenfes, rifes in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing ic. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delinea- tion of the diftin6b parts and powers of the mind, it is at leaft a fatisfadlion to go fo far; and the more obvious this fcience may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible ftill muft the ignorance of it be efleemed, in all pre- tenders to learning and philofophy.
Nor can there remain any fufpicion, that this fcience is uncertain and chimerical j unlefs we fhould entertain fuch a fcepticifm as is entirely fubverfive of all fpeculation, and even adlion. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with feveral powers and faculties, that thefe powers are diflinfl from each other, that what is really dif- tin<5t to the immediate perception may be diflin- guifhed by refle6lion ; and confequently, that there is a truth and falfehood in all propofitions on this fubjeft, and a truth and falfehood, which lie not beyond the compafs of human undcrftanding. There are many obvious diftincftions of this kind, fuch as thofe between the will and under Handing, the imagnation and paflions, which fall within the comprehenfion of every human creature; and the finer and more philofophical diftin6tions are no lefs real and certain, though more difficult to be com- prehended. Some inltances, efpecially late ones, of fuccefs in thefe enquiries, may give us a jufter notion of the certainty and folidity of this branch of learning. And ffiall we eftecm it worthy the labour of a philofopher to give us a true fyftem of the planets, and adjufl the pofition and order of
thofe
or the Different Species of Philosophy. iJ
thofe remote bodies; while we affect to overlook thofe, who, with fo much fuccefs, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are fo intimately concerned ?
But may we not hope, that pliilofophy, if culti- vated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its refearclies (till farther, and difcover, at leaft in fome degree, the fecret fprings and principles, by which the human mind is aduated in its operations ? Aftronomers had long contented themfelves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magni- tude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philofopher, at laft, arofe, who feems, from the happiell reafon- ing, to have determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with i"egard to other parts of nature. And there is no reafon to defpair of equal fuccefs of our enquiries concerning the mental powers and oeconomy, if profecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be refolved into one more general and univerfal : And how far thefe refearches may poflibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by thofe who philofophize the mod negligently : And nothing can be more requifite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attenti- on; that, if it lie within the compafs of human un- derllanding, it may at laft be happily atchieved; if not, it may at laft be rejefted with fome confidence and fecurity. This laft conclufion, furely, is not defirable; nor ought it to be embraced too ralhiy. For how much muft we diminilh from the beauty and value of this fpecies of philofophy, upon fuch a fuppofition ? Moralifts have hitherto been accuf-
tomedj
14 S E G T I O N I.
tomed, when they confidered the vaft multitude 9.nd diverfity of thofe aftions that excite our appro- bation or diflike, to fearch for feme common prin- ciple, on which this variety of fentiments might depend. And though they have fometimes carri- ed the matter too far, by their pafTion for fome one general principle J it mull, however, be confefled, that they are excufable in expefting to find fome general principles, into which ail the vices and vir- tues were juftly to be refolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even poli- ticians : Nor have their attempts been wholly un- fuccefsful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring thefe fciences ftill nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretenfions of this kind may juftly be deemed more rafh, precipitate, and dog- matical, than even the boldeft and moft affirmative philofophy, that has ever attem.pted to impofe its crude dictates and principles on mankind.
What though thefe reafonings concerning human nature feems abftradl, and of difficult comprehen- lion ? This affords no prefumption of their falfe- hood. On the contrary, it feems impoffible, that what has hitherto efcaped fo many wife and pro- found philofophers can be very obvious and eafy. And whatever pains thefe refearches may coft usj we may think ourfelves fufficicntly rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleafure, if by that means, we can make any addition to our ftock of knowledge, in fubjefts of fuch unfpeakable im- portance.
But as, after all, the abflraclednefs of thefe fpe- culations is no recommendation, but rather a dif- advanc«ge to them, and as this difficulty may per- haps be furmounted by care and art, and the avoid- ing of all unnecelTary detail, we have, in the fol- lowing enquiry, attemj^ted to throw fome light up- ©n fubjeds, from which uncertainty has hitherto
deterred
Of the Different Species of Philosophy. 15
deterred the wife, and obfcurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different fpecies of philofophy, by reconciling pro- found enquiry with clearnefs, and truth with no- velty ! And ftill more happy, if, reafoning in this eafy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abftrufe philofophy, which feems to have hi- therto ferved only as a fhelter to fuperftition, and a cover to abfurdity and error !
( 17 )
SECTION II.
Of the Origin of Ideas.
E
VERY one will readily allow that there is a confiderable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of exi effive heat, or the pleafure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this fenfation, or anticipates it by his imagination. Thefe facul- ties may mimic ^ copy the perceptions of the fen- fesi but they ne\^er can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original fentiment. The utmoft we fay of them, even Vv^hen they operate v/ith great- eft vigour, is, that they reprefent their obje6l in fo lively a manner, that we could almoft fay we feel or fee it : But, except the mind be difordered by difeafe or madnefs, they never can arrive at fuch a pitch of vivacity, as to render thefe perceptions altogether undiftino-uifhable. All the colours of poetry, hov/ever fplendid, can never paint natural obje<fls in fuch a manner as to make the defcripti- on be taken for a real landfkip. The moll lively thought is ftill inferior to the dulleft fenfation.
We may obferve a like diftinftion to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emo- tion. If you tell me, that any perfon is in love, 1 eafily underftand your meaning, and form a juft conception of his fituationj but never can
Vol. II. C miftakc
i8 SECTION IL
iniftake that conception for the real diforders^ and agitations of the paflion. When We refledV, on our pad fentiments and affeftionsy our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objedts truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparifon of thofe in which our origi- nal perceptions v/ere clothed. It requires no nice difcernment or metaphyfical head to mark the diilinftion between them.
Here therefore we divide all the perceptions of the mind into two claffes or fpecies, which are diilinguillied by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The lefs forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The Other fpecies want a name in our language, and in moft others; I fuppofe, becaufe it was not requifite for any, but philofophical purpofes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, ufe a little ffeedom, and call them Impreffionsi employing that word in a fenfe fomewhat different from the ufual. By the term imprej/ion, then, I mean all our more lively per- ceptions, when we hear, or fee, or feel, love or hate, or defire, or will. And imprefTions, are dif- tinguifhed from ideas, which are the lefs lively perceptions, of which we are confcious, when we ref^eft on any of thofe fenfations or movements above mentioned.
Nothing, at firfl viev/, may feem more unbound- ed than t!ie thought of man, which not only ef- capes all human power and authority, but is not even reflraintd within the limits of nature and rea- lity. To form monfters, and join incongruous iliapes and appearances, cofts the invagination no more trouble than to conceive the mod natural and familiar objedts. And while the body is con- fined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain an J difficulty; the thougli't can in an inflant tranlport us into the moft diftant regions of the uni-
verfe;
or the O R re I N of Id E AS. 19
verfe; or even beyond the univerfe, into the un- bounded chaos, where nature is fuppofed to lie in total confufion. What never was feen, or heard of, may yet be conceived 3 nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what im- plies an abfolute contradiction.
But though our thought fecms to pofTefs this unbounded liberty, v/e ihall find, upon a rearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the fliculty of compounding, tranfpofing, augmenting, or di- minifhing the materials afforded us by the fen- i'es and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two confiftent ideas, gold, and mountain^ with which we were formerly ac- quainted. A virtuous horfe we can conceive; becaufe, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and fhape of a horfe, which is an animal familiar to us. In fhort, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outv/ard or inward fen- timent : The mixture and compofition of thefe belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to ex- prefs myfelf in philofophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impreffions or more lively ones.
To prove this, the two following arguments will, 1 hope, be fufficient. Firfl, when we ana- lyfe our thoughts or ideas, hov/ever compound- ed or fublime, we always find, that they refolve themfelves into fuch fimple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or fentiment. Even thofe ideas, which, at firfl: view, feem the moft wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer fcrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, v^'ife, and good Being, arifes from refiecling on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting,
C 2 without
cio SECTION It.
without limit, thofe qualities of goodnefs an'cl wifdom. We may profecute this enquiry to what length we pleafe; where we fliall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a fimilar imprefTion. Thofe who would alTert, that this pofition is not univerfally true nor with- out exception, have only one, and that an eafy method of refuting itj by producing that idea, w^hich, in their opinion, is not derived from this fource. It will be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doclrine, to produce the imprefliork or lively perception, which correfponds to it.
Secondly. If it happen, from a defe6t of the organ, that a man is not fufceptible of any fpecies of fcnfation, we always find, that he is as little fufceptible of the correfpondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours j a deaf man of founds. Reftore either of them that fenfe, in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his fenfations, you open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving thefe objects. The cafe is the fame, if the objeft, proper for exciting any fenfation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negroe has no notion of the reliih of wine. And though there are few or no inftances of the like deficien- cy in the mind, where a perfon has never felt or* is wholly incapable of a fentiment ar palTion, that belongs to his fpecies ; yet we find the fame obfer- vation to take place in a Icfs degree. A man of iTiild manners can form no idea of inveterate re- venge or cruelty; nor can a feliifli heart eafily con- ceive the heights of friendlhip and generofity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may polTefs many fenfes of which we can have no conception ; becaufe the ideas of them have never been intro- duced to us, in the only manner, by which an idea can have acccfs to the mind, to wit, by the adtual feeling and fenfation.
There
of the O R I G I N of I D E A S. 11
There is, however, one contradiftory phrenome- non, which may prove, that it is not abfolutely im- poiTible for ideas to arife, independent of their correfpondent imprefTions. I believe it will readi- ly be allowed, that the feveral diftinft ideas of -colour, which enter by the eye, or thofe of found, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the fame time, re- fembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it muft be no lefs fo of the different fhades of the fame colour; and each fliade produces a dif- tin6l idea, independent of the reft. For if this jfhould be denied, it is polTible, by the conti- nual gradation of ihades, to run a colour infenfi- bly into what is moft remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without abfurdity, deny the extremes to be the fame. Suppofe, therefore, a perfon to ■have enjoyed his fight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular fliade of blue, for in- itance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different fhades of that colour, except that fingle one, be placed before him, def- cending gradually from the deepeft to the lighteftj it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that fhade is v/^anting, and will be fenfible, that there is a greater dillance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I 2i{k, whether it be poffible for him, from his own imagination, to fupply this deficiency, and raife up to himfelf the idea of that particular fliade, though it had never been conveyed to him b/ his fenfes ? I believe there are fev/ but will be of opi- nion that he can : And this may ferve as a proof, that the fimple ideas are not always, in every in- ftance, derived from the correfpondent impref- fions ; though this inftance is fo finaular, that it is fcarcely worth our obferving, and does not me- rit.
22 SECTION II.
rit, that for it alone we fhould alter our general maxim.
Here, therefore, is a propofition, which not only feems, in irfelf, firnple and intelligible 3 but, if a proper ufe were made of it, might render every difpute equally intelligible, and banifli all that jargon, v/hich has fo long taken poiTefiion of inetaphyfical reafonings, and drawn diigrace upon them. All ideas, efpecially abftracl ones, are na- turally faint and obfcure : The mind has but a {lender hold of them : They are apt to be con- founded with other refembling ideas ; and when we have often employed any term, though with- out a diltincl meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impreiTions, that is, all fenfations, either outward or inward, are ftrong and vivid ; The limits between them are more exactly deter- mined: Nor is it eafy to fall into any error or miftake with regard to them. When we enter- tain, therefore, any fufpicion, that a philofophi- cal term is emiployed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but en- quire, frc7n what impreffion is that Juppqfed idea derived? And if it be impoflible to aflign any, this will ferve to confirm our fufpicion. By bringing ideas into fo clear a light, we may rea- fonably hope to remove all difpute, which may arife, concerning their nature and reality*.
SECTION
See NOTE [A].
mu L' ivut 1 gyjuaauw
SECTION IIL
Of the ASSOCIATION of Ideas.
I
T is evident, that there is a principle of con- nexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mindj and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and re- gularity. In our more ferious thinking or dif- courfe, this is fo obfervable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tradt or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildefl: and mofl wan- dering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we fhall find, if we relleft, that the imagination .ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was llill a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which fucceeded each other. Were the loofeft and freeft converfation to be tranfcribed, there would immediately be obferved fomething, which connedled it in all its tranfitions. Or where this is wanting, the perlbn, who broke the thread of difcourfe, might ilill inform you, that there had fecretly revolved in his mind a fucceffion of thought, which had gradually led him from the fubjed of
converfation.
24 SECTION III.
convcrfation. Among different languages, even where we cannot fufpect the leaft connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, ex- prefTive of ideas, the moft compounded, do yet nearly correfpond to each other: A certain proof, that the fimple ideas, comprehended in the com- pound ones, were bound together by fome uni- verfal principle, which, had an equal influence on all mankind.
Though it be too obvious to efcape obferva- tion, that different ideas are connefted together i 1 do not find, that any philofopher has attempt- ed to enumerate or clafs all the principles of af- fociationj a fubjedl, however, that feems worthy 'of curiofity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, name- ly, Rejemblancej Contiguity in time or place, and Catife or Effe5i.
That thefe principles ferve to connefl ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A pidture na- turally leads our thoughts to the original * : The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or difcourfe concerning the others f : And if we think of a wound, we can fcarcely forbear refledting on the pain which fol- lows it J. But that this enumeration is compleat, and that there are no other principles of affocia- tion, except thefe, may be difficult to prove to the latisfa6lion of the reader, or even to a man's own fatisfa»5lion. All we can do, in fuch cafes, is to run over feveral inftances, and examine care- fully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never Hopping till we render the principle as general as poffible §. The
more
* Refemblance. f Contiguity. t Caufe and EfFeft.
§ For inllance. Contrail or Contrariety is alfo a connexion among Ideas : But it may, perhaps, be confidered as a mixture cf Cau/ation and Refemblance. Where two objeds are contra- ry.
I
Of the Association of Ideas. 25
niore inftances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more afiiirance fliall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire.
ry, the one deftroys the other ; that is, the caufe of its annihi- lation, and the idea of the annihilation of an objeft, implicB the idea of its former cxillence.
[ 27 ]
k
SECTION IV-
Sceptical Doubts concerning the Opera- tions of the Understanding.
PARTI.
,i\.LL the obje6ls of human reafon or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit. Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fa£l. Of the firft kind are the fciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic j and in fhort, every affirmati- on, which is either intuitively or demonftra- tively certain. That the Jquare of the hypothenufe is equal to the Jquare of the two fides , is a pro- pofition, which expreffes a relation between thefe figures. That three times five is eqiioj, to the half of thirty, expreffes a relation between thefe num- bers. Propofitions of this kind are difcovera- ble by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where exifbent in the univerfe. Though there never were a cir- cle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonflrat- ed by Euclid, would for ever retain their cer- tainty and evidence.
Matters of fa6t, which are the fecond objeds of human reafon, are not afcertained in the fame manner J nor is our evidence of their truth, hov/ever great, of a like nature with the forego- ing.
28 SECTION IV.
ing. The contrary of every matter of facft is flill pofiible ; becaufe it can never imply a con- tradi6tion, and is conceived by the mind with the fame facility and diftinclnefs, as if ever fo conformable to reality. 'That the Jim 'ujill not rife to-morrow is no lefs intelligible a propofiti- on, and implies no niore contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rije. We fhould in vain, therefore, attempt to demonftrate its falfehood. Were it demonilratively falfe, it u'ould imply a contradiftion, and could never be diftindtly conceived by the mind.
It miay, therefore, be a fubjeft worthy of cu- riofity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence, which affures us of any real exiftence and matter of faft, beyond the prefent teilimo- ny of our fenfes, or the records of our memo- ry, This part of philofophy, it is obfervable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns ; and therefore ou.r doubts and er- rors, in the profecution of fo important an en- quiry, may be the more excufable ; while we march through fuch difficult paths, without any guide or dired:ion. They may even prove ufe- fui, by exciting curiofity, and dellroying that implicit faith and fecurity, which is the bane of all reafoning and free enquiry. The difcove- ry of defetis in the common philofophy, if any fuch there be, will not, I prefume, be a dif- couragement, but rather an incitement, as is iifual, to attempt fomething more full and fa- tisfaftory, than has yet been propofed to the public.
All rcafonings concerning matter of fa<5t feem to be founded on the relation of Caujc and Ef- fetl. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and fenfes. If you were to afl< a man, wliy he believes any ijiatter of fad, which is abfent \ for inftancc,
that
Sceptical Dounrs. 29
that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reafon ; and this reafon would be fome other fad: ; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former refo- Jutions and promifes. A inan, finding a watch or any other machine in a dcfart ifland, would conclude, that there had once been men in that ifland. All our reafcnings concerning taft are of the fame nature. And here it is confl:antly fup- pofed, that there is a connexion between the prefent fci6t and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them togeriier, tiie inference would be entirely precarious. Thehear- ino; of an articulate voice and rational difcourfe in the dark afTures us of the prefence of fome perfon : Why ? becaufe thefe are the efFedts of the human make and fabric, are clofely con- nefted with it. If we anatomize all the other reafonings of this nature, we fhall find, that they are founded on the relation of caufe and eff^eCt, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and lig-ht are colla- teral effects of fire, and the one etieft may juilly be inferred from the other.
If we would fatisfy ourfelves, therefore, con- cerning the nature of that evidence, which afTures us of matters of faft, we mufc enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of caufe and effedl.
I fhall venture to affirm, as a general propofiti- on, which admits of no exception, that the know- ledge of this relation is not, in any inftance, attained by reafonings a priori ; but arifes en- tirely from experience, when we find, that any par- ticular objedls are conftantly corjoined with each other. Let an objctl be prefented to a man of ever fo ftrong natural reafon and abilities j if that ob- jedt be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the mofb accurate examination 01 its fenfible qualities, to difcover any of its caufes or ef-
feds.
3d SECTION IV.
fe<fts. Adam, though his rational faculties be fuppofed, at the very firft, entirely perfedl, could not have inferred from the fluidity, and tran- fparency of water, that it would fuffbcate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would confume him. No objeft ever difcovers, by the qualities which appear to the fenfes, either the caufes vv^hich produced it, or the ef- fefts which will arife from it ; nor can our reafon, unafllfted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real exigence and matter of fact.
This propofition, that canjes and effecfs are dif- coverable^ not by reafon, but by experience, will readily be admitted with regard to fuch ob- jedls, as we remember to have once been al- together unknown to us ; fince we muft be confcious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of foretelling, what would arife from them. Prefent two fmooth pieces of marble to a man, who has no tincture of natural philo- fophy ; he will never difcover, that they will adhere together, in fuch a manner as to re- quire great force to feparate them in a dire(51: line, while they make fo fmall a refrllance to a lateral preflfure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common courfe of nature, are alfo readily confefled to be known only by ex- perience ; nor does any man imagine that the explofion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadllone, could ever be difcove^-ed by argu- ments ^ priori. In like manner, when an ef- fect is fuppofed to depend upon an intricate ma- chinery or fecret fl:ru6ture of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will afiert, that he can give the ultimate reafon, why milk or bread is pro- per nourifliment for a man, not for a lion or a tyger ?
3 B^t
Sceptical Doubts. 31
'But the fame truth may not appear, at firfl: fight, to have the fame evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our firfl appearance in the world, which bear a clofe analogy to the whole courfe of nature, and which are fuppofed to depend on the fimple qualities of objedls, without any fecret ftruc- ture of parts. We are apt to imagine, that we could difcover thefe effe6bs by the mere opera- tion of our reafon, without experience. We fan- cy, that were we brought, on a fudden, into this world, we could at firft have inferred, that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulfe ; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pro- nounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of cuftom, that, where it is ftrongefb, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itfelf, and feems not to take place, merely becaufe it is found in the higheil de- gree.
But to convince us, that all the laws of na- ture, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, fufHce. Were any objedl prefcnted to us, and were we requir- ed to pronounce concerning the effeft, which will refult from it, without confulting paft ob- fervation -, after what manner, I befeech you, muft the mind proceed in this operation ? It mufl in- vent or imagine fome event, which it afcribes to the objed as its effect ; and it is plain that this invention muft be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never pofTibly find the effedt in the fuppof- ed caufe, by the moft accurate fcrutiny and ex- amination. For the effect is totally different from the caufe, and confequently can never be difco- vered in it. Motion in the fecond Billiard-ball is a quite diftind event from motion in the
firfli
32 SECTION IV.
firjfl ; nor is there any thing in the one to fug- ged the fmallelt hint of the other. A ftone or piece of nietal raifed into the air, and left with- out any fupport, immediately falls : But to con- lider the matter a priori, is there any thing we difcover in this fituation, which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the ftone or metal ?
And as the firft imaofination or invention of a particular efFe£t, in all natural operations, is ar- bitrary, where we confult not experience ; fo muft we alfo cfteem the fuppofed tye or con- nexion between the caufe and efFed, which binds them together, and renders it impoffible, that any other efFeft could refult from the operati- on of that caufe. When I fee, for inftance, a Billiard-ball moving in a ftraight line towards ano- ther ; even fuppofe motion in the fecond ball fhould by accident be fuggefted ro me, as the re- fult of their contad or impulfe j may I not con- ceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that caufe ? May not both thefe balls remain at abfolute reft ? May not the firft^ ball return in a ftraight line, or leap off from the fecond in any line or diredion ? All thefe fup- pofitions are confiftent and conceivable. Why then fliould we give the preference to one, which is no more confiftent or conceivable than the reft ? All our reafoning a priori will never be able to ftiew us any foundation for this prefe- rence.
In a word, then, every effed is a diftind event from its caufe. It could not, therefore, be difco- vercd in the cayfe, and the firft invention or con- ception of it, a priori, muft be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is fuggefted, the conjundion of it with the caufe muft appear equally arbitrary; fince there are always many other effeds, which, to reafon, muft feem fully as confiftent and natu- ral.
I
Sceptical Doubts. 23
ral. In vain, therefore, ihould we pretend to de- termine any fingle event, or infer anv caufe or cC- feci, without the afliilance of obfervation and ex- perience.
Hence we may difcover the reafon, why no phi- lofopher, who is rational and modell, has ever pretended to afTign the ultimate caufe of any na- tural operation, or to fhow diftinftly the action of that power, which produces any fingle effecfl in the univerfe. It is confeffed, that the utmoil effort of human reafon is, to reduce the principles, productive of natural ph^Enomena, to a greater fimplicity, and to refolve the many particular ef- fects into a few general caufcs, by means of reafonings from analogy, experience, and obfer- vation. But as to the caufes of thefe general effects, we fliould in vain attempt their difcove- ly ; nor fhall we ever be able to fatisfy ourfelves, by any particular explication of them. Thefe ultimate fprings and principles are totally fhut up from human curiofity and enquiry. Elafti- city, gravity, cohefion of parts, communication of motion by impulfe ; thefe are probably the ultimate caufes and principles which we fliall ever difcover in nature ; and we may efteem ourfelves fufficiently happy, if, by accurate en- quiry and reafoning, we can trace up the par- ticular phcenomena to, or near to, thefe gene- ral principles. The mod perfecSl philofophy of the natural kind only ilaves off our ignorance a little longer : As perhaps the mod perfe6t phi- lofophy of the moral or metaphyseal kind ferves only to difcover larger portions of it. Thus the obfervation of human blindnefs and weaknefs is the refult of all philofophy, and meets us, at eve- ry turn, in fpite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.
Nor is geometry, when taken into the afTiftance ©f natural philofophy, ever able to remedy this
Vol. II. D defed,
34 SECTION IV'.
defe6l, or lead us into the knowledge of ulti- mate caufes, by all that accuracy of reafoningy for which it is fo juftly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the fup- pofition, that certain law^s are ellabiilhed by na- ture in her operations ; and abflraft reafonings are employed, either' to aiTiit experience in the difco- very of thefe laws, or to determine thdr influence in particular inftances, where it depends upon any precife degree of diftance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, difcovered by experience> that the moment or force of any body in mo- tion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its folid contents and its velocity : and confe- quently, that a fmall force may remove the greateft weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can encreafc the velocity of that force, fo as to make it an overmatch for its antagonill. Geo- m.etry adifts us in the application of this law, by giving us the juft dimenfions of all the parts and figures, which can enter into any fpecies of ma- chine; but flill the difcovery of the law itfelf is owing merely to experience, and all the ab- flradl reafonin2;s in the world could never lead us one ftep towards the knowledge of it. When we reafon a priori^ and confider merely any ob- je6l or caufe, as it appears to the aiind, indepen- dent of all oblervation, it never could fuggeft to us the notion of any diliin6l objefb, fuch as its effeft ; much lefs, fliew us the infeparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man muft be very fagacious, who could difcover by reafoning, that cryftal is the effed of heat, and ice of cold, without being previoufly acquaint- ed with the operation of thefe qualities.
PART
Sceptical Doubts. 35
P A R T II.
But we have not, yet, attained any tolerable fatisfaction with regard to the queftion firft: pro- pofed. Each folntion fiill gives rife to a new queftion as diflicult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is aficed, What is the nature of all our reajomngs concern- ing matter of fa£l ? the proper anfvv'er feems to be, that they are founded on the relation of caufe and effect. When again it is aiked. What is the foundation of all our reafonings and conclnfions concerning that relation? it in ay be replied in one word. Experience. But if we ftill carry on our fifting humour, and afk, What is the foundation of all conclnfions from experience ? this implies a new queftion, which may be of more difficult folu- tion and explication. Philofophers, that give them- felves airs of fuperior v/ifdom and fufficiency, have a hard tafl<:, when they encounter perfons of in- quifitive difpofitions, who pufli them from every corner, to which they retreat, and who are fure at laft to bring them to fome dangerous dilemma. The beft expedient to prevent this confufion, is to be modeft in our pretenfions ; and even to dif- cover the difncuky ourfelves before it is objett- ed to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.
I fhall content myfeif, in this fection, with an eafy talk, and fliall pretend only to give a ne- gative anfwer to the queftion here propofed. I fay then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of caufe and ePieft, our conclufi- ons from that experience are not founded on rea- foning, or any procefs of the underftanding. This anfwer we muil endeavour, both to explain and to defend.
D 2 It
.36 SECTION IV.
It mud certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great diftance from all her fecrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few fuperficial qualities of objeds; while flie conceals from us thofe powers and principles, on which the influence of thefe obje6ls entirely depends. Our fenfes inform us of the colour, weight, and con- fiflence of bread ; but neither fenfe nor reafon can ever inform us of thofe qualities, which fit it for the nouriihment and fupport of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the adlual motion of bodies ; but as to that, wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lofe but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the moft diftant conception. But notwithftanding this ignorance of natural powers * and principles, we always pre- fume, when we fee like fenfible qualities, tlwt they have like fecret powers, and expeft, that efi^efts, fimilar to thofe which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and confiflence with that bread, which we have for- merly eat, be prefented to us, we make no fcruple of repeating the experiment, and forefee, with certainty, like nourifliment and fupport. Now this is a procefs of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly "know the foundation. It is al- lowed on all hands, that there is no known con- nexion between the fenfible qualities and the fe- cret powers ; and confequently, that the mind is not led to form fuch a conclufion concerning their conflant and regular conjun6lion, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to pafl Ex- ^erienccj it can be allowed to give di7'e^ and cer- tain
* The word, Power, is here ufed in a loofeand popular fenfe. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evi- dence to this argument. Se Seft. 7.
Sceptical Doubts. 37
tain information of thofe precifc objcdls only, and that precife period of time, which fell under its cognizance : But why this experience fhoiild be extended to future times, and to other objedls, which for aught we know, may be only in ap- pearance fimilar ; this is the main queftion on which I would infill. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourilhed me^ that is, a body of fuch fenfible qualities was, at that time, endued with fecret powers: But does it follow, that other bread muft alfo nourifh me at another time, and that like fen- fible qualities muft always be attended with like fecret powers ? The confequence feems no wife ne- cefTary. At leall, it muft be acknowledged, that there is here a confequence drawn by the mind ; that there is a certain ftep taken ; a procefs of thought, and an inference, which wants to be ex- plained. Thefe two propofitions are far from be- ing the fame, / have found that Juch an ohjeSl has' always been attended with fuch an effect y and I fore^ fee, that other objects, which are, in appearance^ fimilar, will be attended with fimilar effects. I Ihall allow, if you pleafe, that the one propofition may juftly be inferred from the other: I know in facl» that it always is inferred. But if you infifl, that the inference is made by a chain of reafoning, I defire you to produce that reafoning. The con- nexion between thefe propofitions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw fuch an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reafoning and argument. What that medium is, I muft confefs, paflcs my apprehen- fion ; and it is incumbent on thofe to produce it, who affert, that it really exifls, and is the origia of all our conclufions concerning matter of fatt.
This negative argument muft certainly, in pro- cefs of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philofophers fhall turn their t'nquiries this way j and no one be ever able
to
3
38 SECTION IV.
to difcover ;iny connefting propolition or interme- diate Hep, which fiipports the underdanding in this conclufion. But as the queilion is yet new, every reader may not truft fo far to his own pene- tration, as to conclude, becaufe an argument elcapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really exiit. For this reafon it may be requifite to venture upon a more difiicult tafK ; and enume- rating all the branches of human knowledge, en- deavour to flievv, that none of them can afford fuch an argument.
All reafonings may be divided into two kinds, namely demonfcrative reafoning, or that concern- ing relations of ideas, and moral reafoning, or that concerning matter of fa6t and exiftence. That there are no dcmonftrative arguments in the cafe, feems evident ; fince it implies no contradiction, that the courfe of nature may change, and that an obje6l, feemingly like thofe which we have ex- perienced, may be attended w^ith different or con- trary effeds. May I not clearly and diftindly conceive, that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other refpedts, refembles fnow, has yet the tafce of fait or feeling of fire ? Is there any more intelligible propofition than to af- firm, that all the trees will fiourilli in December and January, and decay in May and June ? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be diftindly con- ceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved f^ilfe by any demonftrative argument or abftrad reafoning a priori.
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put truft in paft experience, and make it the ftan- dard of our future judgm.ent, thefe arguments muft be probable only, or fuch as regard matter of fad and real exiftence, according to the divifi- on above mentioned. But that there is no argu- ment of this kind, muft appear, if our explication of that fpccies of reafoning be admitted as folid
and
Sceptical Doubts. 39
and fatisfadory. We have faid, that all argu- ments concernino; exiftence are founded on the re- lation of caufe and efFcvit j that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience ; and that all our experimental conclufions proceed upon the fuppofition, that the future will be con- formable to the pafb. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this lail fuppofition by probable argu- ments, or arguments regarding exiftence, muft be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in quefbion.
In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the fimilarity, which we difcover among natural objedls,, and by which wc are induced to expect efFeCls fimilar to thofe, which we have found to follow from fuch objefts. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to difpute the .authority of experience, or to rejefl that great guid^ oi human life ; it may fiirely be allowed a philofopher to have fo inuch curiofity at leaft, as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experiencej and makes us draw advantage from that fimilarity, which nature has placed among different obje£ls. From caufes, which appear fimilar^ we expert fimilar effeds. This is the fum of all our experi- mental conclufions. Now it fcems evident, that, if this conclufion were formed by reafon, it would be as perfect at firft, and upon one inftance, as after ever fo long a courie of experience. But the cafe is far otherwifj. Nothing fo like as eggs j yet no one, on account of fhis appear- ing fimilarity, expedts the fame tafte and relifii in all of them. It is only after a long courfe of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and fecurity with regard to a particular event. Now where is that pro- cefs of reafoning, which, from one infi:ance, draws a conclufion, fo different from that which
it
40 SECTION IV.
it infers from a hundred inflances, that are no- wife diiix-rent from that fingle one ? This quef- tion I prbpofe as much for the fake of infor- mation, as with an intention of raifing difficul- ties. I cannot find, 1 cannot imagine any fuch reafoning. But I keep my mind (till open to in- llru(ftion, if any one will vouchfafe to bellow it on me.
Should it be faid, that, from a number of uniform experiments, we bifer a connexion be- tween the fenfible qualities and the fecret pov/ers j this, I muft confefs, feems the fame difficulty, couched in different terms. The queftion ftill recurs, on what procefs of argument this infe- rence is founded ? Where is the medium, the in- terpofing ideas, which join propofitions fo very wide of each other ? It is confelTed, that tlie co- lour, confifbence, and other fenfible qualities of bread appear not, of themfelves, to have any con- nexion with the fecret powers of nourifliment and fupport. For otherwife we could infer thefe fe- cret powers from the firit appearance of thefe fen- fible qualities, without the aid of experience ; contrary to the fentiment of all philofophers, and contrary to pli?iii matter of faft. Here then is our natural ftate of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objefts. How is this re- medied by experience ? It only ffiews us a num- ber of uniform effeds, rcfulting from certain ob- jects, and teaches us, that thofe particular ob- jedts, at that particular time, were endowed with fuch powers and forces. When a new objedl en- dowed with fimilar fenfible qualities, is produc- ed, we expe6l fimilar powers and forces, and look for a like effetl. From a body of like colour and confiftence with bread, we expect like nouriffiment and fupport. But this furely is a Itep or progrefs of the niind, which wants to be explained. When a man fays, / have found,
in
Sceptical D o u n t s. 41
;/; nil pajl infianccs^ Juch Jcnfible qualities conjoined ivith Juch Jecret powers : And then he fays, Jimilar Jenfible qualities ivill always be conjoined zvith ftmilar fecret poivcrs ', he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are thefe propofitions in any refpecft the fame. You fay that the one propofition is an inference from the other. But you mull confefs that the in- ference is not intuitive j neither is it demonftra- tive : Of wliat nature is it then ? To fay it is ex- perimentaJ, is begging the queftion. For all infe- rences from experience fuppofe, as their foundati- on, that the future will refemble the paft, and that fimilar powers will be conjoined with fimi- lar fenfible qualities. If there be any fufpicion, that the courfe of nature may change, and that the pall may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes ufelefs, and can give rife to no inference or conclufion. It is impoilible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this re- femblance. Let the courfe of things be allowed hitherto ever fo regular j that alone, without fome new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue fo. In vain do you pretend ^to have learned the nature of bodies from your paft experience. Their fecret nature, and confequently all their eflcfts and inlluence, may change, without any change in their fenfible qua- lities. This happens fometimes, and with regard to fome objefts : Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objeds ? What logic, what procefs of argument fecures you againft this fup- pofition ? My praftice, you fay, refutes miy doubt. But you mifiake the purport of my queftion. As an agent, I am quite fatisfied in the point; but as a philofopher, who has fome fliare of curiofity, I will not fay fcepticifm, I want to learn the foun- dation of this inference. No reading, no enqui- ry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me fatisfaclion in a matter of fuch impor- tance.
42 SECTION IV.
tance. Can I do better than propofe the diffi- culty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have fmall hopes of obtaining a folution ? We fhall at leall, by this means, be fenfible of our igno- rance, if we do not augment our knov/ledge.
I mult confefs, that a man is guilty of unpar- donable arrogance, who concludes, becaufe an ar- gument has efcaped his own invefligation, that therefore it does not really exill. 1 muft alfo con- fefs, that though all the learned, for feveral ages, fhould have employed themfelves in fruitlefs fearch upon any fubje6t, it may Hill, perhaps, be rafh to conclude pofitively, that the fubject muft, therefore, pafs all human conprehenfion. Even though we examine all the fources of our know- ledge, and conclude them unfit for fuch a fub- je6l, there may ftill remain a fufpicion, that the enumeration is not compleat, or the exan^ination not accurate. But with regard to the prefent fub- jeft, there are fome confiderations, which feem to remove all this accufation of arrogance or fufpici- on of miftake.
It is certain, that the moft ignorant and ftupid peafants, nay infants, nay even brute be^s, im- prove by experience, and learn the qualities of na- tural objefls, by obferving the effects, which re- fult from them. When a child has felt the fen- fation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle i but will expeCt a fimilar efledt from a caufe, which is fimilar in its fenfible qualities and appearance. If you affert, therefore, that the underltanding of the child is led into this conclu- lion by any procefs of argument or ratiocinati- on, I may juilly require you to produce that argument -, nor have you any pretence to refufe fo equitable a demand. You cannot fay, that the argument is abflrufe, and may poffible ef- cape your enquiry ;. fince Vv^u contcfs, that it is
obvious
Sceptical Doubts. 43
obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hefitatc, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflec- tion, you produce any intricate or profound ar- gument, you, in a manner, give up the queftion, and confefs, that it is not reafonins; which eno;ao-es US to fuppofe the pad refembling the future, and to expedl fimil ir effcfts from caufcs, which are, to ajipearance, fimilar. This is tlie propofition which I intended to enforce in theprefent fetlion. If I be right, I pretendnot to have made any mighty difco- very. And if I be wrong, I mufl acknowledge myfelf to be indeed a very backward fcholar; Jlnce I cannot now difcover an argument, which, it feems, was perfectly familiar to me, long be- fore I v/as out of my cradle.
( 45 )
SECTION V.
Sceptical Solution of thcfe Doubts.
PART 1.
X HE paflion for philofophy, like that for re- ligion, feems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correftion of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclination, and pufli the mind, with more deter- mined refolution, towards that fide, which alrea- dy dra\xjs too much, by the biafs and propenfity of the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we afpire to the magnanimous firmnefs of the philofo- phic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleafures altogether within our own minds, we may, at lad, render our philofophy like that of Epidetus, and other StoicSy only a more refined fyftem of felfifh- nefs, and reafon ourfelves out of all virtue, as well as Ibcial enjoyment. While we Itudy with atten- tion the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and tranfitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all the while, liattering our natural indolence, which, hating the buftle of the world, and drudgery of bufinefs, feeks a pretence of reafon, to give itfelf
a full
46 S E C T I O N V.
a full and uncontrouled indulgence. There is, however, one Ipecies of philofophy, which feems little liable to this inconvenience, and that becaufe it ftrikes in with no diforderly paffion of the hu- man mind, nor can mingle itfelf with any natural affeftion or propenfity ; and that is the Academic or Sceptical philofophy. The academics always talk of doubt and fufpenfe of judgment, of danger in hafty determinations, of confining to very nar- row bounds the enquiries of the underfiranding, and of renouncing all fpeculations which lie not v/ithin the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than fuch a philofophy to the fupine indolence of the mind, its ralli arrogance, its lofty pretenfions, and itc fuperftitious credulity. Every palTion is mortified by it, except the love of truth -, and that paffion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. It is furprifing, therefore, that this phi- lofophy, which, in almoft every inftance, muft be harmlcfs and innocent, fhould be the fubjeft of fo much groundlefs reproach and obloquy. But, per- haps, the very circumftance, which renders it fo innocent, is what chiefly expofes it to the public hatred and refentment. By flattering no irregular paffion, it gains few partizans : By oppofing fo ma- ny vices and follies, it raifes to itfeli abundance of en,emies, Avho ftigmatize it as libertine, pro- fane, and irreligious.
Nor need we fear, that this philofophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, fliouid ever undermine the reafonings of common life, and carry its doubts fo far as to deftroy all aftion, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abflrad reafoning whatlbever. Though we fl^ould conclude, for inftance, as in the foregoing feftion, that, in all reafonings from experience, there is a ftep taken by the mind, which is not
fup-
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 47
fupported by any argument or procefs of the un- derllanding ; there is no danger, that thefe reafon- ings, on which ahnod all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by fuch a difcovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this llep, it mull be induced by fome other principle of equal weight and authority ; and that principle will preferve its influence as long as human na- ture remains the fame. What the principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry.
Suppoie a perfon, though endowed with the ftrongeft: faculties of reafon and ref^eclion, to be brought on a fudden into this world ; he would, indeed, immediately, obferve a a continual fuccef- fion of objecls, and one event follow another ; but he would not be able to difcover any thing farther. He would not, at firfl, by any reafoning, be able to reach the idea of caufe and efFed:; fince the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the fenles; nor is it reafbnable to conclude, . merely becaufe one event, in one inftance, precedes ano- ther, that therefore the one is the caufe, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and cafual. There may be no reafon to infer the exiftence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, fuch a perfon, without more experience, could never employ his conjec- ture or reafoning concerning any matter of ia6t, or be affured of any thing beyond what was imme- diately prefent to his memory and fenfes.
Suppofe again, that he has acquired more expe- rience, and has lived fo long in the world as to have obferved fimilar objefts or events to be con- Itantly conjoined together ; what is the confe- quence of this experience ? He immediately in- fers the exiftence of one obje6l from the appear- ance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of
the
4S S E C T I O N V.
the fecret power, by which the objeft produces the other ; nor is it, by any procefs of reafoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But ftill he finds himfelf determined to draw it : And though he fhould be convinced, that his underftandinor has no part in the operation, he v/ould never- thelefs continue in the fame courfe of thinking. There is fome other principle, which determines him to form fuch a conclufion.
This principle is Cuftom or Habit. For where- ever the repetition of any particular aft or opera- tion, without being impelled by any rcafoning or procefs of the underftanding ; we always fay, that this propenfity is the effeft of Cuftom. By em- ploying that word, we pretend not to have gi- ven the ultimate reafon of fuch a propenfity. "We only point out a principle of human na- ture, which is univerf.dly acknowledged, and which is well known by its effedts. Perhaps, we can puili our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the caufe of this caufe , but muft rcll con- tented with it as the ultimate principle, which •we can affign, of all our conclufions from expe- rience. It is fufficient fatisfaclion, that we can go fo far; without repining at the narrownefs of our faculties, becaufe they will carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelli- gible propofition at lealt, if not a true one, v/hen we affert, that, after the conftant conjundtion of two objedts, heat and flame, for inftance, weight and folidity, we are determined by cuftom alone to expedl the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothefis fccms even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thoufand inftances, an inference, which we are not able to draw from one inftance, that is, in no refpeft, different from them. Reafon is in- capable of any fuch variation. The conclufions, which it draws from confidering one circle, are
the
Sceptical Solutiov of thcfe Doubts. 49
the fame which it would form upon furveying all the circles in the univerfe. But no man, hav- ing feen only one body move after being im- pelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like impulfe. All infer- ences from experience, therefore, are efFe<5ls of cuftom, not of reafonino; *.
Cufcom, then, is tlie great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, vvhich renders our experience ufeful to us, and makes us ex- pedl, for the future, a fimilar train of events with thole which have appeared in the paft. "Without the influence of cullom, we Ihould be entirely ignorant of every matter of faft, beyond what is immediately prefent to the memory and fenfes. We fhould never knov/ how to adjuft means to ends, or to employ our natural pow- ers in the produ6lion of any effedl. There would be an end at once of all a(5tion, as well as of the chief part of fpeculation.
But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclufions from experience carry us beyond our memory and fenfes, and affure us of matters of fa(5b, which happened in the moft dif- tant places and moft remote ages; yet fome fad: iiHift always be prefent to the fenfes or memo- ry, from whence we may firft proceed in draw- ing thefe conclufions. A man, who fliould find in a defert country the remains of pompous build- ings, would conclude, that the country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inha- bitants i but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form fuch an inference. We learn the events of former ages from hifto- ry ; but then we muft perufe the volumes, in which this inftruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one teftimony to Vol, II, E another,
* See NOTE [BJ.
50 S E C T 1 O N V.
another, till we arrive at the eye-witnefTes SncJ fpedators of thefe diftant events. In a word, if we proceed n^ot upon fome fad:, prefent to the memory or fenfes, our reafonings would be mere- ly hypothetical ; and however the particular links- might be connetled v/ith each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to fup- port it, nor could we ever, by its means, ar- rive at the knowledge of any real exiftence. If I afis;, vv'hy you believe any particular matter of fadt, which you relate, you muft tell me fome reafon ; and this reafon will be fome other fad, connefted with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitia-n.^ you mufl at laft terminate in fome fad:, which is prefent to your memory or fenfes ; or muft allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.
What then is the conclullon of the whole matter ; A fimple one j though, it muft be confefled, pret- ty remote from the common theories of philofo- phy. All belief of matter of fa6l or real exiftence is derived merely from fome objedt, prefent to the memory or fenfes, and a cuflomary conjunftion between that and fome other objeft. Or in other Words ; having found, in many inilances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, fnow and cold, have always been conjoined together ; if fiamc or fnow be prefcnted anew to the fenfes, the mind is carried by cuftom to expert heat or cold, and to believe^ that f .ch a quality docs ex- ift, and will difcover itfelf upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necellary refult of placing the mind in fuch circumftances. It is an operation of the foul, when we are fo fituated, as unavoidable as to feel the pailion of love, when we receive benefits i or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All thefe operations are a fpecies of natural in- ftincls, which noreafoning or procefs of the thought
anci
Sceptical Solution of chefe DciucTS. rf
and iinderftanding is able, cither to produce, or to prevent.
At this point, it would be very aliov/able for us to flop our philofophical refearches. In mod queftions, we can never make a fingle ilcp fartlier; and in all qucflions, we miiO; terininate here at laft, after our moft refrlefs and curious enquiries. But ftill our curiofity will be pardonable, per- haps commendable, if it carry us on to Itill far- ther refearches, and make us examine more accu- rately the nature oi' this hliefj znd o{ the cu/lo;na- ry conjun^ion^ whence it is derived. By this means we may meet with fome explications and anjlogies, that will give fatisfa6lion ; at leaft to fuch as love rhe abfl:ra(fi: fciences, and can be entertained with fpeculations, whicr,, however accurate, may ftill re- tain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different tafte ; the remaining part of this fe6lion is not calculated for them, and the fol- lowing enquiries may well be underllood, though it be negletled.
P A- R T II.
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man ; and though it cannot exceed that original Itock of ideas, furniihed by the internal and ex- ternal fenfes, it has unlimited pov/er of mixing, compounding, feparating, and dividing thefe ideas, in all the varieties of hction and vifjon. It can feign a train of events, v/ith all the appearance of reality, afcribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as exiltent, and paint rhem out to itfelf with every circumftance, that belongs to any hiftorical faft, which it believes with the crreateft certainty. Wnerein, tlierefore, con nils the differ- ence between fuch a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to fuch a conception as commands our alTent, and E 2 which
52 S E C T I O N V.
which is wanting to every known ficlion. For as- the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fidlion, and confequently be able to believe whatever it plcafes ; contrary to what we find by daily experi- ence. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horfe ; but it is not in our povi^er to believe, that fuch an animal has ever really exifted.
It follows, therefore, that the difference between fi^icn and belief lies in fome fentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be com- manded at pleafure. It mull be excited by nature, like all other fentiments j and mufb arife from the particular fituation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juntlure. Whenever any objedt is •prefented to the memory or fenfes, it immediately, by the force ofcuilom, carries the imagination to conceive that objed:, which is ufually conjoined to it ; and this conception is attended with a feeling or fentiment, different froni the loofe reveries of the fancy. In this ccnfifls the whole nature of be- lief. For as there is no matter of faft which we be- lieve fo firmly, that we cannot conceive the contra- ry, there would be no difiercnce between the con- ception affented to, and that which is rejecfled, were it not for fome fentiment, which diftinguilhes the one from the other. If I fee a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a fmooth table, I can cafily conceive it to ilop upon contact. This conception implies no contradidion j but ilill it feels very dif- ferently from that conception, by which I reprefent to myfelf the impulfe, and the communication of motion from one ball to another.
Were we to attempt a definition of this fentiment,
we ffiould, perhaps, find it very difficult, if not an
impoffible talk; in the fame manner as if we fiiould
endeavour to define the fcelmg of cold or paffion of
3 an^rer.
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 5j
anger, to a creature who never had any experience of thefe fentimenrs. Belief is tlic true and proper name of this feeling j and no one is ever at a lols to know the meaning of that term; becaufe every man is every moment confcious of the fentiment repre- fented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a defcrvption of this fentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at fome analogies, which may afford a more perfect explication of it. I fay then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, fteady conception of an ob- jedl, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may feem fo unphilofophical, is intended only to exprefs that a6t of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for fuch, more prefent to us than fi6lions, caufes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a fuperior influence en the pafTions and imagination. Provided we ag^'ee about the thing, it is needlefs to difpute about the terms. The ima- gination has the command over all its ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways poflible. It may conceive fiftitious obje6ls with all the circumftances of place and time. It may fet them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colours, jufl: as they might have exifted. But as it is impofllble, that this faculty of imagination can €ver, of icfelf, reacii belief, it is evident, tiiat be- lief confiils not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in \kv^ manner of their conception, and in tht'w feeling to the mind. 1 confefs, that it is im- pofllble perfedly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make ufe of words, which exprefs fomething near it. But its true and proper name, as we obferved before, is belief; which is a term, that every one fufficiently underfl:ands in common life. And in philofophy, we can go no farther than aflert, that belief is fomething felt by , the mindj which dillinguifhes the ideas of the judg- ment
54 S E C T I O N V.
ment from the fidions of the imagination. It gives them more weight and influence 3 makes them appear of greater importance ^ inforces them in the mind j and renders them the governing principle of our adions. I hear at prefent, for inllance, a perfon's voice, with whom I am acquainted ; and the found comes as from the next room. This im- preflion of my fenfes immediately conveys my thought to the perfon, together with all the fur- rounding obje(5i:s, I paint them out to myfelf a? exiiling at prefent, with the fame qualities and re- lations, of vv'hich I formerly knew them poifefTed. Thefe ideas take fader hold of my mind, than ideas of an enchanted caftle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleafure or pain, joy or forrow.
Let us, then, take in the whole compafs of this doftrine, and allow, that the fentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intenfe and fteady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagina- tion, and that this manner of conception arifes from a cuflomary conjundlion of the object with fome- thing prefent to the memory or fenfes : I believe that it will not be difficult, upon thefe fuppofitions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up thefe phienomena to principles Hill ■more general.
We have already obferved, that nature has ella- blilTied connexions among particular ideas, and that no fooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and infenflble movement. Thefe principles of connexion oralTociation we have reduced to three, namely, Refemblance-, Conti^nityj and Caufation; v/hich are the only bonds, that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of refledion or difcourfe, which, in a greater or Icfs degree, takes place among all mankind.
Now
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 55
How here arifes a queftion, on which the folution of the prefenc difficulty will depend. Does it hap- pen, in all thefe relations, that, when one of the objefls is prefentcd to the fenfes or memory, the inind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a Headier and llronger con- ception of it than what otherwife it would have been able to attain ? This feems to be the cafe with that belief, which arifes from the relation of caufe and cffeft. And if the cafe be the fame with the other relations or principles of alFociation, this may be eflablifiied as a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind.
We may, therefore, obferve, as the firft expe- riment to our prefent purpofe, that, upon the ap- pearance of the pidture of an abfent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the rejemblancey and that every paffion, which that idea occafions, whether of joy or forrow,- acquires new force and vigour. In producing this efFeft, there concur both a relation and a prefent imprefTion. Where the pidlure bears him no refemblance, at leall was not intended for him, it never fo much as conveys our thought to him : And where it is abfent, as well as the perfon j though the mind may pafs from the thought of the one to that of the other j it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that tranfition. We take a pleafure in viewing the picture of a friend, when it is let before us j but when it is removed, rather chufe to confider him direftly, than by reile6lion in an image, which i$ equally diftant and obfcure.
The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be confidered as inftances of the fame nature. The devotees of thatfuperftition ufually plead in ex- cufe for the mummeries, with which they are upbraid- ed, that they feel the good effeft of thofe external piotions, and poftures, and aftions, in enlivening
their
56 S E C T I O N V.
their devotion and quickening their fervour, which otherwife would decay, if direfted entirely to dif- tant and ini.naterial objedts. We fhadov/ out the objetts of our faith, fay they, in fenfible types and images, and render them more prefent to us by the immediate prefence of thefe types, than it is pofTi- ble for us to do, merely by an intelledual view and contemplation. Senfible objects have always a greater intiuence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to thofe ideas, to which they are related, and which they refemble. I fhali only infer from thefe praftices, and this reafoning, that the effedl of refemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common ; and as in every cafe a refemiblance and a prefent impreffion mufc concur, we are abundantly fupplied with ex- periments to prove the reality of the foregoing prin- ciple.
Vv^e may add force to thefe experiments by others of a different kind, in confidering the effects of contiguity as well as of rejemhlance. It is certain, that diftance diminifhes the force of every idea, and that, upon our approach to any objecl; though it does not difcover itfelf to our fenfesj it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an immediate impreffion. The thinking on any objedl readily tranfports the mind to what is contiguous s but it is only the a6lual prefence of an objeft, that tranfports it v/ith a fiiperior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me m.ore nearly than when I am two hun- dred leagues diftant ; though even at that diftance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter cafe, both the ob- jedls of the mind are ideas; notwithftanding there is an eafy tranfition between them ; that tranfition alone is not able to give a fuperior vivacity to any
of
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 57
of the ideas, for want of fome immediate imprcf- fion *.
No one can doubt but caiifation has the fame in- fluence as the other two relations of refemblance and contiguity. Superftitious people are fond of the reiiques of faints and holy men, for the fame reafon, that they feek after types or images, in or- der to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and ftrong conception of thofe exemplary jives, which they defire to imitate. Now it is evi- dent, that one of the beft reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a faint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be con- fidered in this light, it is becaufe they were once at hisdifpofal, and were moved and affected by him; in which refpeft they are to be confidered as imper- fe6l effcAs, and as connecfted with him by a fhorter chain of confequences than any of thofe, by which we learn the reality of his exiftence.
Suppofe, that the fon of a friend, who had been long dead or abfent, were prefented to us ; it is evident, that this objefl: would inftantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all paft intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours
than
• *' Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore qoo-
•' dam, ut, cum ea loca videainus, in quibus memoria dignos
'' viros accepeiimus multum efie verfaios, magis moveamur,
'' quam fiquando eorum ipforum aut fada audiamus aut fcrip-
*' turn aliquod Icgamus ? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit
" enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quern accepimus pri-
" mum hie difputare folitum : Cujus etiam illi hortuii propin-
" qui non memoriam folum mihi afterunt, fed ipfum viden-
<' tur in confpeftu meo hie ponere. Hie Speusippus, hie
" Xenocrates, hie ejus auditor Polemo ; cujus ipfa ilia
«' felBo iuit, quam videamus. Equidem etiam curiam nof-
" tram Hostilia.m dico, non hanc novam, quse mihi minor
" efle videtur poftquam ell major, folebam intuens, Scipio-
" NEM, Catonem, L^.lium, noftriim vcro in primis avum
" cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis eft in locis ; ut non fine
" caufa ex his mcmorias dedufta fit difciplina." CiCBRt
de Finilus. Lib»v.
85 S E C T I O N V.
than tliey would otherwife have appeared to us. This is a:u)ther phenomenon, which leems to prove the principle above-mentioned.
We may obferve, that, in thefe phasnomena, the belief of the correlative object is always prefup- pofed ; without vvhich the relation could have no efTcft. The influence of the pidure fuppofes, that we believe our friend to have once exiiied. Con- tiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unkTs we believe that it really exiils. Now I aflert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the me- mory or fenfes, is of a fimilar nature, and arifes from fimilar caufes, with the tranfition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguiflies the flame. This tranfition of thought from the caufe to the efi^ecl proceeds not from reafon. It derives its origin altos-ether from cuilom and experience. And as it firfl: begins from an object, prelent to the fenfes, it renders the idea or conception of flame more flirong and lively than any loofe, floating reverie of the imiagination. That idea arifes immediately. The thought moves in- ilantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the imprefli- on prefent to the fenfes. When a fvvord is levelled at my breafl:, does not the idea of wound and pain ftrike me more ftrongly, than when a glafs of wine i^ prefented to me, even though by accident this idea fliould occur after the appearance of the latter objed:? But what is there in this whole matter to caufe fuch a Itrong conception, except only a pre- fent objeft and a cufl:omary tranfition to the idea of another objedl, which we have been accufl:omed Xo conjoin with the former ? This is the whole ope- ration of the mind, in all our conclufions concern- ing matter of fad and exiltencc; and it is a fatif- fadion to find Ibmc analogies, by which it may be
explained.
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 59
exphiined. The tranfition from a prefent object tlocs in all cafes give ftrength and folidity to the re- lated idea.
Here, then, is a kind of pre-eftablifl-ied harmo- ny between the coiirfe of nature and the fuccefTion of our ideas ; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly un- known to us ; yet our thoughts and conceptions have ftilj, we find, gone on in the fame train with the other works of nature. Cultom is that princi- ple, by which this correfpondence has been effedled; lb necelTary to the fubfillence of our fpecies, and the regulation of our condu6t, in every circumftance and pccurrence of human life. Had not the pre- fence of an object inftantly excited the idea of thofc objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our know- ledge mult have been limited to the narrow fphere of our memory and fenfes -, and we fhould never have been able to adjuft means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Thofe, who delight in the dif- covery and contemplation oi final caujesy have here ample fubject to employ their wonder and ad- miration.
I fhall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like efi'e6ts from like caufes, and vice verjuy is fo eflential to the fubfiftence of all hu- man creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trufted to the fallacious deductions of our reafon, which is flow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the firft years of infancy; and at belt is, in every age and period of human life, ex- tremely liable to error and miftake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wifdom of nature to fecure fo neceflary an a6t of the mind, by fome in- ftinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infal- lible in its operations, may difcover itfelf at the firft appearance of life and thought, and may be
independent
6o S E C T I O N V.
independent of all the laboured dedudions of the underftanding. As nature has taught us the ufe of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the mufcles and nerves, by which they are aduated ; {o has fhe implanted in us an inftinft, which carries forward the thought in a correfpondent courfe to that which fhe has eftablifhed among external ob- je6ls ; though we are ignorant of thofe powers and forces, on which this regular courfe and fucceflion of objed:s totally depends.
S E C-
( 6i ;
SECTION VI.
Of.PROBABILI TY*.
X HOUGH there be no fuch thing as Chance. in the world j our ignorance of the real caufe of any event has the fame influence en the un- derftanding, and begets a like fpecies of belief or opinion.
There is certainly a probability, which arifes. from a fuperiority of chances on any fide; and according as this fuperiority encreafes, and fur- pafles the oppofite chances, the probability re- ceives a proportionable encreafe, and begets fbill a higher degree of belief or aflent to that fide, in which we difcover the fuperiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of fpots on four fides, and with anothe*- figure or number of fpots on the two remaining fides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thou- fand fides marked in the fame manner, and only one fide diff'erent, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event
more
• Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonftrative and probable. In this view, we muft fay, that it is only probable all men muft die, or that the fun wiH rife to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common ufe, we ought to divide arguments into demonfirations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning fuch arguments from experience as leaye no room for doubt or oppoUtion.
62 S E C T I O N VI.
more fleady and fecure. This procefs of the thought or reafoning may feem trivial and ob- viousj but to thofe who confider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious fpe- culation.
It feems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to difcover the event, which may refulc from the throw of fuch a dye, it confiders the turning up of each particular fide as alike proba- ble; and this is the very nature of chance, to ren- der all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of Jides concur in the one event than in the other^ the mind is carried more frequently to the event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various pof- fibilities or chances, on which the ultimate refulc depends. This concurrence of feveral views irk one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the fentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonifl, which is fupported by a fmaller number of views, and recurs lefs frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and flronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fiftions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in fome meafure, be accounted for. The concurrence of thefe feveral views or glimpfes imprints the idea more ftrongly on the imagination; gives it fuperior force and vigour; renders its influence on the paffions and affeftions more fenfible; and in a word, begets that reliance or fecurity, which conllitutes the na- ture of belief and opinion.
The cafe is the fame with the probability of caufes, as with that of chance. There are fome c^ufes, which are entirely uniform and conftant in producing a particular eff»"d:, rnd no inftaiice has ever y^t been found of any Lilure or irregula- rity in their operation. Fire has always burned,
and
Of* Prob A B I L iTY. 6;;^
and water fuffbcated every human creature: The produiftion of motion by impulle and gravity is an univerial law, which has hitherto admitted of no exception. Rut there are other caufcs, which have been found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a foporific to every one, who has taken thefe me- dicines. Jt is true, when any caufe fails of pro- ducing its ufual effeft, philofophers afcribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but fuppofe, that fome fecret caufes, in the particular Itrutture of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reafon- ings, however, and conclufions concerning the event are the fame as if this principle had no place. Being determined by cullom to transfer the part: to the future, in all our inferences; where the pafh has been entirely regular and uniform, we exped: the event with the greateft affurance, and leave no room for any contrary fuppofition. But where different effedls have been found to follow from caufes, which are to appearance exactly fimilar, all thefe various effefls muft occur to the mind in transferring the paft to the future, and enter into our confideration, when we determine the proba- bility of the event. Though we give the prefe- rence to that which has been found moft ufuaJ, and believe that this effe6l will exift, we mufl not overlook the other effefts, but muft alFign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or lefs frequent. It is more probable, in almoft every country of Europe, that there will be frofl fome- time in January, than that the weather will con- tinue open throughout that whole month ; though this probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it feems evident, chat, when we transfer the paft to the fu- ture, in order to determine the effetl, which will
refult
64 S E C T I O N VI.
refult from any caufe, we transfer all the different events, in the fame proportion as they have ap- peared in the paft, and conceive one to have ex- ifted a hundred times, for inftance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that fen- timent which we call beliefs and give its object the preference above the contrary event, vrhich is not fupported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not fo frequently to the thought in transferring the paft to the future. Let any one try to account for the operation of the mind up- on any of the received fyftems of philofophy, and he will be fenfible of the difficulty. For my part, I fhall think it fufficient, if the prefent hints ex- cite the curiofity of philofophers, and make them fenfible how defedlive all common theories are in treating of fuch curious and fuch fublime lubje6V$,
SEC-
( 65 )
SECTION VII.
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. PART I.
X
HE great advantage of the mathematical fciences above the moral confifts in this, that the ideas of the former, being fenfible, are al- ways clear and determinate, the fmallell diiliinc- tion between them is immediately perceptible, and the fame terms are ftill expreffive of the fame ideas, v/ithout ambiguity or variation. An oval is never miftaken for a circle, nor an hy- perbola for an ellipfis. ' The ifofceles and fcaienum arediftinguiflied by boundaries more exa6t than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be de- fined in geometry, the mind readily, of itfelf, fubftitutes, on all occafions, the definition for the term defined: Or even when no definition is em- ployed, the objett itfelf may be prefented to the fenfes, and by that m.eans be fteadily and clear- ly apprehended. But the finer fentiments of the mind, the operations of the underftanding, the various agitations of the paflions, though really in themfelves diftinft, eafily efcape us, when fur- veyed by refledlion ; nor is it in our power to re- cal the original object, as often as we have occa- fion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our reafonings: Simi- VoL, IL' F lar
66 SECTION Vir.
lar obje£ls are readily taken be to the fame: And; the conclufion becomes at lad very v/ide of ther premifes.
One may fafely, however, affirm, that if we con- fider thefe fciences in a proper light, their advan- tages and difadvantages nearly compenfate each other, and reduce both of them to the ftate of equality. If the mind, v/ith greater facility, re- tains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate,, it muft carry on a much longer and more intri- cate chain of reafoning, and compare ideas moch' wider of each other, in order to reach the abiLru- fer truths of that fcience. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to fall into obfcu- rity and confufion, the inferences are alv/ays much fhortef in thefe difquifitions, and intermediate fteps^ \Vhich lead to the- concufion, much fewer than in the fciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is fcarccly a propofition in Euclid fo fimple, as not to confift of more parts, than are to be found in any moral reafoning which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind though a few ileps, we may be very well fatisfied with our pro- grefs; confidering how foon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning caufes, and redu- ces us to an acknowjedcrment of our i^rnorance.. The chief obftacie, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or m.etaphyfical fciences is the obfcu- rity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compafs of tliought, requifite to the forming of any conclufion. And, perhaps,, our progrefs in natural phiioi'ophy is chiefly re- tarded by the want of proper experiments and pha?- nomena, which are often difcovered by chance, and cannot always be found, when requifite, even by the mod ciiligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philofopiiy feems hitherto to have received'
kfs
Of* the Idea of Necessary Connexio!-j. 67
lefs improvement than either geometry or phyfics, we may conclude, that, if there be any difference in this refpeft among thcfe fciences, rhe difficul- ties, which obftruch the progrefs of the former, require fuperior care and capacity to be farmount- ed.
There are no ideas, which occur in metaphyfics, more obfcure and uncertain, than thofe of fowery force, energy, or necejfary connexion, of which it is every moment necelTiiry for us to treat in all our difquifitions. We lliall therefore, endeavour, in this fcClion, to fix, if poilible, the precife mean- ing of thefe terms, and thereby remove fome part of that obfcurity, which is fo much complained of in this fpecies of philofophy.
It fecms a proportion, v/hi,:h will not admit of much dil'pute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our imprelTions, or, in other words, that it is impolTible for us to think of any thing, which we have not antecedently feli, either by our ex- ternal or internal fenfes. 1 have endeavoured * to explain and prove this proportion, and have ex- prelTed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a-greater clearnefs and pre- cifion in philofophical reafonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well 'known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of thole parts or fimple ideas, that compofe them. But when v.'e have puHied up definicions to the moil fimple ideas, and find ftill fome ambiguity and obfcurity; what refource are v/e then polfefTed of? By what inven- tion can we throw light upon thefe ideas, and ren- der them altogether precife and determinate to our intelledlual view? Produce the imprefHons or original fentirrents, from which the ideas are co- pied. Thefe imprefTions are all flrong and fen-
F 2 fible.
* Secllon II,
6S S E C T 1 a N VIL
fible. They abmit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themfelves, bur may throw light on their correfpondent ideas, which lie in obfcurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microfcope or fpecies of optics, by which, in the moral fciences, the moft minute, and mDll: fimple ideas may be fo enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehenfion^ and be equally known with the groflcft and moft fenfible ideas, that can be the objedl of our in- quiry.
To be fully acquainted^ therefore, with the idea* ©f power or neceffary connexion, let us examine its imprefnonj and in order to find the imprelTion with greater certainty, let us fearch for it in all- the fources, from which it may polTibly be derived.
When we look about us towards external ob- jects, and confider the operation of caufes, we are never able, in a fingle infbancc, to difcover any power or n^ceiTary connexions, any quality, which, binds the effefl toy the caufe, and renders the one an infallible confequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fa6l, follow the other. The implufe of one billiard-ball is at- tended with motion in the fecond. This is the whole that appears to- the outward fenfes. The mind feels no fentiment or inward imprelTion from this fuccelTion of objecls: Confequencly, there is- not, in any fingle particular inflance of caufe and cfFecft, any thing which can fuggeil the idea of power or neceflary connexion.
Prom the firft appearance of an objeft, whene- ver can conjecfbure what effecl will relult from it. But were the power or energy of any caufe difco- verable by the mind, we could forefee the effedt, even without experience; and might, at firfl, pro- nounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere 4iint of thought and reafoning.
In reality, there is no part of matter^ that does
evcT;^-
I
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 69
ever, by its fenfible qualities, difcover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it ■could produce any thing, or be followed by any other objecl, which we could denominate its ef- fcft. Solidity, extenfion, motion; thefe qualities are all complete in themfelves, and never point out any other event which may refult from them. The fcenes of the univerfe are continually fliifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted luccefTionj but the power or force, which aftuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never difcovers itfelf in any of the fenfible qualities of body. We know, that, in faft, heat is a conftant attendant of flame i but what is the connection between them, we have no room fo much as to conje6lure or imagine. It is impof- fible, therefore, that the idea of power can be de- rived from the contemplation of bodies, in fingle inftances of their operation; becaufe no bodies €ver difcover any power, which can be the origi- nal of this idea*.
Since, therefore, external objedls as they appear to the fenfes, give us.no idea of power or necefTa- ry connexion, by their operation in particular in- ftances, let us fee, whether this idea be deriv- ed from reflcftion on the o'^cracions of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impref- fion. It may be faid, that we are every moment confcious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the fimple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An aCl of volition produces motion
in
* Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, fays, that, finding from experience, that there are feveral new produdlions in matter, and concluding that there rnuft fomewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at laft by this reafoning at the idea of power. But no reafoning can ever give us a new, original, fimple idea; as this philofopher himfelf confeiTes, This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.
70 SECTION VII.
in our limbs, or raifes a new idea in our imagi- nation. This influence of tlie will we know by confcioufners. Hence we acquire the idea of pow- er or energy; and arc certain, that we ourfelves and all other intelligent beings are poflefled of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflefcion, lince it arifes from refieding on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is ex- ercifed by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the foul.
We flialj proceed to examine this pretenfion; and firll with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may obferve, is a faft, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be forefcen from any apparent energy or power in the caufe, which connects it with the effedlj and renders the one an infallible confequence of the other. The motion of our body follov/s up- on the command of our v/ill. Of this vv'e are eve- ry moment confcious. But the means, by which this is effefted ; the energy, by which the will per- forms fo extraordinary an operation; of this we are fo far from being immediately confcious, that it muft for ever efcape our mofc diligent enquiry.
Vox firft; is there any principle in all nature more myfterious than the union of foul with body; by which a fuppofed fpiritual fubftance acquires fuch an influence over a material one, that the mod refined thought is able to a6tuate the grofleft matter ? Were we empowered, by a fecrec wifh, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extenfive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our com- prehenfion. But if by confcioufnefs wc perceived any power or energy in the will, we muil know this power; we mufl know its connexion with the efi-e6t ; we rnull know the fecret union of foul and body, and the nature of both thefe fubftances;
by
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, 71
by whrch the one is able to operate, in fo many inflances, upon the other.
Secondly^ We are not abie to move all the or- gans of the body with a like authority; though v.'e cannot affign any reafon befides experience, for fo remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will an influence over the tonf]j'je and finders, not over the heart or iiver ? This qiieftion would never cmbarrafs lis, were we confcious -of a power in the former cafe, not in the latter. We fhould then perceive, inde- pendent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumfcribed. within fuch particular limits. Being in than cafe fully acquainted with the power or force, by v/hich it operates, v.'e fliould alfo know, why its influence reaches precifely to fuch boundaries, and no farther.
A man, fuddenly ftruck with a palfy in the leg or arm, or who had newly loft thofe members, fre- quently -endeavours, at firft, to move them, and employ them in their ufual oiHces. Here he is as much cor-ifcious of power to command fuch limbs, as a man in perfeft health is confcious of power to ^.vftuate any member which remains in its natural Itate and condition. But confcioufnefs never de- ceives. Confequently, neither in the one cafe nor in the other, are we ever confcious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event confequently follows another ; v/ithout inflrutling us in the fecret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them in- feparable.
1'hirdly^ We learn from anatomy, that the imme- diate objefb of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itfelf which is moved, but certain mufcles, and nerves, and animal fpirits, and, perhaps, fome- t-hing ftill more minute and more unknown, through
v/hich
72 SECTION VII.
which the motion is fucceffively propagated, ere it reach ere it reach the member itfelf whofe motion is the immediate obje6l of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is performed, fo far from being direclly and fully known by an inward fentiment or confcioufnefs, is, to the laft degree, my[lerioas and unintelligible ? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately another event, tinknown to ourfelves, and totally diffe- rent from the one intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at laft, through a long fucccfilon, the defired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it muft' be known : Were it known, its efieft muft: aifo be known j fincc all power is relative to its efFedl. And vice verfa, if the effeft be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be confcious of a power to remove our limbs, when we have no fuch power; but only that to move certain ani- mal Ipirits, which, though they produce at laft the motion of our limbs, yet operate in fuch a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehenfion ?
We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any temerity, though with aflu- rancej that our idea of power is not copied from any fentiment or confcioufnefs of power within ourfelves, when we give rife to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper ufe and of- fice. That their motion follows the command of the v/ill is a matter of common experience, like other natural events : But the power or energy by which this is effefled, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable *.
Shall we then aflert, that we are confcious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an ai^or command of our will, we raife up a new idea,
fix * See NOTE [CJ.
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 73
fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all fidei-, and at hdl diiiiiifb it for fome other idea, when we think that we have furveyed it with fufficient accuracy? I believe the fame ar- guments vsill prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.
Firjiy It muft be allowed, that, when we know a power, we i:now that very circumRance in ihe caufe, by which it is enabled to produce the ef- fcifl: For thefe are fuppofed to b^ fynonimous. We muft, therefore, know both the caufe and etfc<5t, and the relation between them. But do -we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human foul and the nature of an idea, or the apti- tude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a produftion of fomething out of nothing: Which implies a power fo great, that it may feem, at firll fight, beyond the reach of any being, lefs than infinite. At leaft it mull be owned, that fuch a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceiv- able by the mjnd. We only feel the event, name- ly, the exillence of an idea, confequent to a com- mand of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed ; the power, by which it is produced; is entirely beyond our comprehenfion.
Secondly^ The command of the mind over it- felf is limited, as well as its command over the body; and thefe limits are not known by reafon, or any acquaintance with the nature of caufe and efFecc; but only by experience and obfervation, as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objecls. Our' authority over our fen- timents and pafiions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumfcribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to afTign the ultimate reafon of thefe boundaries, or fliow why the power is de- ficient in one cafe, not in another ?
Thirdly, This felf-command is very dijfiferent at different times. A man in health polTeiTes
more
74 SECTION VII.
more of it, than one languiHiing with ficknefs, "We are more mafter of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: Failing, than af- ter a full meal. Can we give any reafon for thefe variations, except experience ? V/here then is the pov/er, of which we pretend to be confci- oiis ? Is there not here, either in a fpiritiial or material fubftance, or both, feme fecrct mecha- nifim or ftriifture of parts, upon which the ef- fect depends, -and which, being entirely unknov/n to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknov»'n and incomprehenfjble ?
• Volition is furely an aft of the mind, with which we are fufficienr'y acquainted. Refieft upon it. Confider it on all fides. Do you find vny thing in it like this creative power, by which it raifes from nothing a new idea, and with 2 kind of Fiat, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed fo to fpeak, who called forth into exiftence all the various fcenes of nature ? So far from being conicious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience, as that of which we are poffefTed, to convince us, that fuch extra- ordinary efFeds do ever refult from a firnple a6l of volition.
The generality of manking never find any dif- ficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature; fuch as the defcent of heavy bodies, the grov/th of plants, the gene- ration of animals, or the nouriihment of bodies by food : But fuppofe, that, in all thefe cafes, they perceive the very force or energy oi the caufe, by which it is conne6led with its c{- i'ccty and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the caufe, they immediately expedt with affurance its ufual at- tendant, and hardly conceive it poflible, that any other event could refult from it. It is on- ly on the difcovery of extraordinary phceno-
mcna.
of th^ Idea of Necessary Connexion. 7^
rnena, fuch-as earthquakes, pcftilence, and prodi- gies of any kind, that they find themfelves at a iofs to aliign a proper caufe, and to explain the manner, in which the effc(5l is produced by it. It is iilual for men, in fuch difficulties, to have recourle to Ibme inviGblc intelligent principle*, as the immediate caufe of that event, which fur- prifes them, and which they think, cannot be ac- counted for from the common powers of nature. But philofophcrs, who carry their fcrutiny a little farther, iiVimediaeely perceive, that, even in the mod familiar events, the energy of the caufe is as unintelligible as in the mofb unufual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Con- jun(5i:ion of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like Connexion between them. Here then, many philoibphers think them- felves obliged by reafon to have recourfe, on all occafions, to the fame principle, which the vul- gar never appeal to but in cafes, that appear miraculous and fupernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ulti- inate and orio-inal caufe of all things, but the immediate and fcle caufe of every event, which appears in nature. They pretend, that thofe ob- jeds, which are commonly denominated caiijes, are in reality nothing but occafions \ and that the true and dire£l principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who v/ills, that fuch particular objecfts fliould, for ever, be conjoined with each other. Inftead of faying, that one billiard-ball moves another, by a force, which it has derived from the author of nature ; it is the Deity him- felf, they fay, who, by a particular volition, moves the fecond ball, being determined to this ope- ration by the impulfe of the firft ball j in confe- quence of thofe general laws, which he has laid
down
* 0Si^ CCTTO ^T^<i,n;^
76 SECTION VII.
down to himfelf in the government of the univeiTe. But philoJbphers advancing flili in their enquiries, difcover, that, as we are toZ3.\\y ignorant of the power, on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no lefs ignorant of that power, on which depends the operationof mind on bo- dy, or of body on mind ; nor are we able, ei- ther from our fenfes or confcioufnefs, to affign the ultimate principle in one cafe, more than in the other. The fame ignorance, therefore, redu- ces them to the fame conclufion. They aflcrt, that the Deity is the immediate caufe of the union be- tween foul and bodyj and that they are not the organs of fenfc, which, being agitated by exter- nal objedfts, produce fenfations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites fuch a feniation, in confe- quence of fuch a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will, in the will, that produces local motion in our mem- bers : It is God himfelf, who is pleafed to fe- cond our will, in itfelf impotent, and to com- mand that motion, which we erroneoufly attri- bute to our own power and efRcacy. Nor do philofophcrs Hop at this conclufion. They fome- tim.es extend the fame inference to the mind it- felf, in its internal operations. Our mental vifk- on or conception of ideas is nothing but a revela- tion made to us by our Maker. When we volun- tarily turn our thoughts to any objeft, and raife up its image in the fancy; it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the univerfal Crea- tor, who difcovers it to the mind, and renders it prefent to us.
I'hus, according to thefe philofophcrs, every thing is full of God. Not content with the prin- ciple, that nothing exifts but by his will, that nothing j)oire(res any power but by his concef-
fion :
of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 77
fion: They rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their depen- dence on the Deity Itill more fcnfible and imme- diate. They confider not, that, by this theory, they diminifh, inftead of magnifying, the gran- deur of thofe attributes, which they affed fo much to celebrate. It argues furely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wif- dom to contrive at firll the fabric of the world with fuch perfedl forefight, that, of itfelf, and by its proper operation, it may ferve all the purpo- fes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjufl its parts, and ani- mate by his breath all the wheels of that ftupen- dous machine.
But if we would have a more philofophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two fol- lowing refiediions may fuffice.
Firj}^ It feems to me, that this theory of the univerfal energy and operation of the Supreme Being, is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, fufficiently apprized of the weaknefs of human reafon, and the narrow limits, to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever fo logical, there muft arife a flrong fufpi- cion, if not an abfolute aflurance, that it has car- ried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclufions fo extraordinary, and fo remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the laft fteps of our theory; and there we have no reafon to trud our common methods of argument, or to think that our ufual analo- gies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too Ihort to fathom fuch immenfe abyfles. And however we may flatter ourfelves, that we are guided, in every Hep which we take, by a kind
of
78 SECTION Vll.
of verifimilitude and experience; we way be af- fured, that this fancied experience has no authority, when we thus apply it to fubjefts, that lie en- tirely out of the fphere of experience. But on this we Ihall have occafion to touch afterwards*. Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the ar- guments, on which this theory is founded. Wo. are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other : Their force or ener- gy is entirely incomprehenfible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the fupreme mind, operaces either on itfelf or on body ? Whence, I befeech you, do we acquire any idea of it ? We have no fentiment or confcioufnefs of this power in ourfelves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from refiedlion on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reafon for rejed- ing any thing, we fhould be led into that princi- ple of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grof^ell matter. We furely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive, that motion may arife from impulfe, than that it mav arife from volition ? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cafes -j-.
P A R T II.
But to haflen to a conclufion of this argu- ment, which is already drawn out to too great a length : W^e have fought in vain for an idea of power or neceffiry connexion, in all the four- ces from which we could fuppofe it to be de- rived. It appears, that, in fingle inftances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our iitmoft fcrutiny, difcover any thing but one ^v^nt following anotheri without being able to compre- hend • Seaion xir.
t See NOTE [D].
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 79
hend any force or power, by which the caufe ope- rates, or any connexion betv/een it and its fup- pofed effe<fl:. The fame difficulty occurs in con- templaiting the operations of mind on body; where we obferve the motion of the latter to fol- low upon the volition of the former j bnt are not able to obferve or conceive the tye, which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this eflx^cl. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is rot a v/hit more comprchcnfible : So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout: all nature, any one inftance of connexion, which is conceivable by us. All events feem entirely loofe and feparate. One event follows another; but v;e never can obferve any tye between them. Th^y feem conjoined^ but never connc5fcd. And as v/e can have no idea of any tlhing, which never appeared to our outward fenfe or inward fenti- ment, the necelTary conclufion feems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that thefe words are abfolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philofophicai leafonings, or common life.
But there ftill remains one method of avoid- ing this conclufion, and one fource which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or event is prefented, it is impoffible for us, by any fagacity or penetration, to difcover, or even con- jedlurc, without experience, what event will refalt from it, or to carry our forefight beyond that objed, wliich is immediately prefent to the me- mory and fenfes. Even after one inftance or ex- periment, where we have obferved a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entit- led to form a general rule, or foretel what will happen in like cafes; it being juftly efteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole courfe of nature from one fingle experiment, how- ever
So SECTION VII.
ever accurate or certain. But when one parti- cular fpecies of event has alv/ays, in all inftan- ces, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any fcruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reafonin^, which can alone afTure us of any mat- ter of fact or exiftence. We then call the one objedl, Cauje\ the other, Effe5i. We fuppofe, that there is fome connexion between them; fome power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greateft certain- ty and ftrongeft neceffity.
It appears, then, that this idea of a neceffary con- nexion among events arifes from a number of fimilar infbances, which occur, of the conftant con- junction of thefe events ; nor can that idea ever be fuggefted by any one of thefe inflances, fur- veyed in all polTible lights and pofitions. But there is nothing in a number of inflances, dif- ferent from any fingle inftance, which is fuppofed to be exadtly fimilar; except only, that after a repetition of fimilar inftances, the mind is car- ried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expeft its ufual attendant, and to believe, that it will exift. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this cuftomary tranfition of the im.agination from one objedt to its ufual at- tendant, is the fentiment or impreffion, froiTi which we form the idea of power or neceffary connexion. Nothing farther is in the cafe. Con- template the fubjedl on all fides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the fole difference between one inftance from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of fimilar inflances, by which it is fuggefted. The firfl time a man law the com- munication of motion by impulfe, as by the fhock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was conne^ed: but only that it was
conjoined
of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 8i
conjoined with the other. After he has obferved feveral inftances of this nature, he then pronoun- ces them to be connecied. What alteration has happened to give rife to this new idea of con- nexion'^ Nothing but that he now feeU thefe events to be conne^ed in his imagination, and can readi- ly foretel the fxiftence of one from the appear- ance of the other. When we fay, therefore, that one objett is connected with another, we mean only, that tJiey have acquired a connexion in our •thought, and give rife to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's exifcence : A conclufion, which is fomewhat extraordinary^ but which feems founded on fufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gene- ral diffidence of the underftanding, or fceptical fufpicion concerning every conclufion, which is new and extraordinary. No conclufions can be more agreeable to fcepticifm than fuch as make difcoveries concerning the weaknefs and narrow limits o{ human reaion and capacity.
And what ftrong-er indance can be produced of the furprifing ignorance and weaknefs of the un- derftanding, than theprefent? For fu rely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is caufe and effe6l. On this are founded all cur reafonings concern- ing matter of fact or exiftence. By means of it alone we attain any afTurance concerning obje6ts, which are removed from the prefent teftimony of our memory and fenfes. The only immediate utility of all fciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their cau- fes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every moment, employed about this relation : Yet fo imperfeft are the ideas which we form con- cerning it, that it is impofUble to give any juft definition of caufe, except what is drawn from fomething extraneous and foreign to it. Similar
Vol. II. G objeds
82 SECTION VII.
obje£ts are always conjoined with fimilar. Of this "Vve have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a caiue to be an obje^y fol- lowed by an other J and zvhere all the objecfSyJimilar to the frjly are foUozved by oujeSis fimilar to the Jecond. Or in othiir words, where^ if the firfi objetf had not been, the fecond never had exijied. The appear- ance of a caule alvv^ays conveys the mind, by a cuf- tomary tranfition, to the idea of the effed:. Of this alfo we have experience. We may, there- fore, fuitably to this experience, form another definition of caufe j and call it, an object followed by another, and whoje appearance ahvays conveys the thought to that other. But though both thefe definitions be drav/n from circumftances foreign to the caufe, v/e cannot remedy this inconveni- ence, or attain any m.ore perfefl definition, which may point out that circumllance in the caufe, which gives it a connexion with its efi^eft. We have no idea of this connexion; nor even any diilinft notion what it is we defire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We fay, for infhance, that the vibration of this firing is the caufe of this particular found. But what do we mean by that afiirmation ? We either mean, that this vibration is followed by this found, and that all fimilar vibrations have been followed by fi- milar founds .■• Or, that this vibration is followed by this found, and that upon the appearance of one, the mind anticipates the fenfes, and forms immediately an idea of the other. We may confider the re- lation of caufe and efFe(5b in either of thefe twd lights; but beyond thefe, we have no idea of it*. To recapitulate, therefore, the reafonings of this fedlion : Every idea is copied from fome pre- ceding imprelTion or fentiment; and where we cannot find any impreffion, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all fingle inftances of
the • See NOTE [E].
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 83
the operation of bodies or minds, there is no- thing that produces any imprefFion, nor confe- quently can fugged any idea, of power or ne- cefTary connexion. But when many uniform in- ftances appear, and the fame objeft is always followed by the fame events we then begin to entertain the notion of caufe and connexion. We then feel a new fentiment or impreflion, to wit, a cuftomary connexion in the thought or imagination between one objedt and its ufual at- tendant; and this fentiment is the original of that idea which we feek for. For as this idea arifes from a number of fimiiar inftances, and not from any fingle inftance; it muft arile from that cir- cumftance, in which the number of inftances dif- fer from every individual inftance. But this cuf- tomary connexion or tranfition of the imagi- nation is the only circumftance, in which they differ. In every other particular they arc alike. The firft inftance which we faw of motion, com- municated by the fhock of two billiard-balls (to return to this obvious illuftration) is exafbly fi- miiar to any inftance .that may, at prefent, oc- cur to us ; except only, that we could not, at firft, infer one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at prefent, after fo long a courfe of uniform experience. I know not, whether the reader will readily apprehend this reafoning. I am afraid, that, ftiould 1 multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more obfcure and intri- cate. In all abftraft reafonings, there is one point of view, which, if we can happily hit, we ftiall go farther towards illuftrating the fubjeft, than by all the eloquence and copious expreffion in the world. This point of view we ftiould endea- vour to reach, and referve the flowers of rheto- ric for fubjefts which are more adapted to them.
G 2
[ 85 ]
SECTION VIIL
Of Liberty and Necessity. PART I.
It might reafonably be expe^ed, in queftions, which have been canvafled and difputed with great eagernefs, fince the firft origin of fcience and phi- lofophy, that the meaning of all the terms, atleaflr, fhould have been agreed upon among the difpu- tants ; and our enquiries, in the courfe of two thoufand years, been able to pafs from words to the true and real fubjed: of the controverfy. For how eafy may it feem to give exaft definitions of the terms employed in reafoning, and make thefe definitions, not the mere found of words, the ob- je6t of future fcrutiny and examination r But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we (hall be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From, this circumftance alone, that a controverfy has beea long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided, we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguiry ia the expreflion, and that the difputants affix diife- rent ideas to the terms employed in the controver- fy. For as the faculties of the mind are fuppofed to be naturally alike in every indivi- dual ; otherwife nothing could be more fruitlefs than to reafon or difpuce together j it were impof-
fible.
86 SECTION VIIL
fible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terrr? that they could fo long form different opinion^ of the fame fubjeft ; efpecially when they com- municate their views, and each party turn them-^ felves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the vicftory over their antagoniils. It is true ; if men attempt the difcuITion of quef- tions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of worlds, or the ceconomy of the intelleclual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitlefs conteils, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the queftion re- gard any fubjedt of common IJfe and experience -, nothing, one would thing, could prcferve the dif- pute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous ex- prefTions, which keep the antagonifls ftill at a dif- tance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.
This has been the cafe in the long difputed quefbion concerning liberty and necelTityj and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much miftaken, we fhall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the fame opinion with regard to this fubjecb, and that a few intelligible dehnitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controverfy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvafTed on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiilry, that it is no won- der, if a fenfible reader indulge his eafe fo far as to turn a dt^i" ear to the propofal of fuch a quef- tion, from which he can cxped neither inilrudion nor entertainment. But the Hate of the argument here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention ; as it has more noveky, promifes at lead fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not much diilurb his eafe by any intricate or obfcure rcafoning.
1 hope.
'&•
or LiBERTv and Necessity. 87
I liope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the dodrine both of ne- cefllty and of liberty, according to any reafonable fenfe, which can be put on thefe terms ; and that the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doftrine of neceffity.
It is univerlally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceOary force, and that every natural effedl is fo jorecifely determined by the energy of its caufe, that no other eifeft, in fuch particular circumftances, could pofTibly have refulted from it. The degree and dire6lion of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prefcribed with fuch exadnefs, that a living creature may as foon arife from the fhock of two bodies, as moti- on, in any other degree or dire6lion than what is adlually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a juft and precife idea of necejjity^ wc mufb confider whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.
It feems evident, that, if all the fcenes of na- ture were continually fhifted in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any refemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before, we fhould never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of necciTity, or of a connexion among thefe objetts. We might fay, upon fuch a fup- pofition, that one objett or event has followed another j not that one was produced by the other. The relation of caufe and effett muft be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end j and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real exillence could pofiibly have accefs to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes
entirely
88 SECTION Vin.
Entirely from the uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature ; where fimilar objetls are" conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuftom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. Thefe two circumftances form the whole of that necefiity, which we afcribe to matter. Beyond the conftant conjanStion of fimilar objects, and the confequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necef- iity, or connexion.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever ailov/ed, without any doubt or hefitation, that thefe two circumftances take place in the volun- tary aftions of men, and in the operations of mind; it muft follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doftrine of necelTity, and that they have hitherto difputed, merely for not underftand- ing each other.
As to the firft circumftance, the conftant and re- gular conjunction of fimilar events; we may pof- fibly fatisfy ourfelves by the following confide- rations. It is univerfally acknowleded, that there is a great uniformity among the aftions of men,' in all nations and ages, and that human nature femain^s ftill the fame, in its principles and ope- rations. The fame motives always produce the fame a<ftions : The fame events follow from the fame caufes. Ambition, avarice, felf-love, vanity, friendlhp, generofity, public fpirit ; thefe paflions, mixed in various degrees, and dillributed through fociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and ftill are, the fource of all the ac- tions and enterprizes, which have ever been obfer\- ed among mankind. Would you know the fen- timents, inclinations, and courle of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and Englifli . You cannot be much miftaken in transferring to the former mojl of the obfervations, which you have made
v.'ith
of Liberty and Necessity. S^
■with regard to the latter. Mankind are fc much the fame, in all times and places that hiftory in- forms us of nothing new or ftrange in this parti- cular. Its chief ufe is only to difcover the con- ftant and univerfal principles of human nature, by fliewing men in all varieties of circumftances and fituations, and furnifhing us with materials, from which we may form our obfervations, and become acquainted with the regular fprings of human ac- tion and behaviour. Thefe records of wars, in- trigues, fa6\ions, and revolutions, are fo many collections of experiments, by which the politi- cian or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his fcience ; in the fame manner as the phyfician or natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external ob- jedls, by the experiments, which he forms con- cerning them. Not are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by Ariftotle, and Hippocrates, more like to thofe, which at prefent lie under our obfervation, than the men, defcribed by Polybius and Tacitus, are to thofe, who now govern the world.
Should a traveller, returning from a far coun- try, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted ; men, who were entirely divefted of avarice, ambi- tion, or revenge ; who knew no pleafure but friend- fhip, generofity, and public fpirit ; we fhould im- mediately, from thefe circumftances, dete6t the falfehood, and prove him a liar, with the fame certainty as if he had ftuffed his narration with ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and pro- digies. And if we would explode any forgery in hiftory, we cannot make ufe of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the aftions, afcrib- ed to any perfon, are diredlly contrary to the courfe of nature, and that no human motives, in fuch circumftances, could ever induce him to fuch a
condud.
9d SECTION VIII.
condufl. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be fufpefted, when he defcribes the fu- pernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on fingly to attack multitudes, as when he defcribes his fupernatural force and adivity, by which he was able to refift them. So readily and univerfally do we acknowledge a uniformity in hu- man motives and adlions as well as in the operati- ons of body.
Hence likewife the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of bufinefs and company, in order to inftru(5t us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclina- tions and motives, from their a6tions, expreffions, and even geftures ; and again, defcend to the in- terpretation of their anions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general ob- fervations, treafured up by a courfe of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and ap- pearances no longer deceive us. Public declarati- ons pafs for the fpecious colouring of a caufe. And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfe<5t difinte- reftednefs, fo often pretended to, is never expedled in multitudes and parties ; feldom in their lea- ders ; and fcarcely even in individuals of any rank or ftation. But were there no uniformity in hu- man adions, and were every experiment, which wc could form of this kind, irregular and ano- malous, it were impoiTible to collect any general obfervations concerning mankind ; and no expe- rience, however accurately digclled by retieftion, would ever ferve to any purpofe. Why is the ^ged hufbandman more ilcilful in his calling than the young beginner, but becaufe there is a cer- tain uniformity in the operation of the fun, rain,
and
Of Liberty and Necessity. 91
and earth, towards the production of vegeta- bles ; and experience teaches the old pradtitioner the rules, by which this operation is governed and dirc<fled.
We mufl not, however, expeft, that this uni- formity of human adlions fhould be carried to fiich a leneth, as that all men, in the fame circum- ftances, will always adl precifely in the fame man- ner, without making any allowance for the diver- fity of characT:ers, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from obferving the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to- form a greater variety of maxims, which ftill fuppofe a degree of uniformity and re- gularity.
Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries ? We learn thence the great force of cultom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy, and form it into a fixed and eftablifhed chara£ter. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one fex very unlike that of the other ? It is thence we become acquainted with the different characters,- which nature has impreffed upon the fexes, and which fhe preferves with con- ftancy and regularity. Are the adtions of the fame perfon much diverfified in the different pe- riods of his life, from infancy to old age ? This affords room for many general obfervations con- cerning the gradual change of our fentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims, which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence; otherwife our acquaintance with the perfons and our obfervation of their condu6t, could never teach us their difpofitions, or ferve to dire6l our behavi-
our with regard to them.
I grant
92 SECTION viir.
I grant it pofTible to find fome adions, which feem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the meafures of condiid:, which have ever been eftablijfhed for the government of men. But if v/e would willingly know, what judgment fliould be formed of fuch ir- regular and extraordinary aftions ; we may con- fider the fentiments, commonly entertained with regard to thofe irregular events, which appear in the courfe of nature, and the operations of exter- nal objefls. All caufes are not conjoined to their ufual effects, with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be difappoint- ed of his aim, as well as the politician, who di- redls the condud; of fenfible and intelligent agents.
The vulgar, who take things according to their firft appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to fuch an uncertainty in the caufes as makes the latter often fail of their ufual influence; though they meet with no impediment in their operati- on. But philofophers, obferving, that, almoft in every part of nature, there is contained a vaft va- riety of fprings and principles, which are hid, by reafon of their minutenefs or remotenefs, find, that it is at leaft poffible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the caufe, but from the fecret operation of contrary caufes. This pofTibility is converted into certainty by farther ob- fcrvation ; when they remark, that, upon an exa£t fcrutiny, a contrariety of efiefts always betrays a contrariety of caufes, and proceeds from their mu- tual oppofition. A peafant can give no better reafon for the Hopping of any clock or watch than to fay that it does not commonly go right : But an artift: eafily perceives, that the fame force in the fpring or pendulum has always the fame influence on the wheels j but fails of its ufual efl^edt, perhaps by reafon of a grain of duft:, which puts a ftop to
the
or Liberty and Necessity. 97
the whole movement. From the obfervation o feveral parallel inftances, philofophers form a maxim, that the connexion between all caiil'es and effects is equally neceffary, and that its Teeming uncertainty in fome inllances proceeds from the fe- cret oppofition of contrary caufes.
Thus for inftance, in the human body, when the ufual fymptoms of health or ficknefs difappoint our expectation -, when medicines operate not with their wonted powers j when irregular events fol- low from any particular caufe j the philofopher and phyfician are not furprized at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the neceffity and uniformity of thofe principles, by which the animal oeconomy is conducted. They know, that a human body is a mighty complicated machine : That many fecret powers lurk in it, which are al- together beyond our comprehenfion : That to us it muft often appear very uncertain in its operations : And that therefore the irregular events, which out- wardly difcover themfelves, can be no proof, that the laws of nature are not obferved with the greateft regularity in its internal operations and government.
The philofopher, if he be confident, muft apply the fame reafoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The moft irregular and un- expected refolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by thofe, who know every particular circumftance of their chara6ler and fituation. A perfon of an obliging difpofition gives a peevifh. anfwer . But he has the toothake, or has not dined. A ftupid fellow difcovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage : But he has met with a fudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an adion, as fometimes happens, cannot be particularly account- ed for, either by the perfon himfelf or by others ; we know, in general, that the chara6ters of men arCj to a certain degree, inconftanc and irregular.
This
94 SECTION VIII.
This is, in a manner, the conflant tharader of human n;itiire ; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to fome perfons, who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a con- tinued courfe of caprice and inconftancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notvvithftanding thefe feeming irregularities -, in the fame manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are fuppofed to be governed by fteady principles ; thougli not eafily difcoverable by human fagacity and enquiry.
Thus it appears, not only that the conjundion between motives and voluntary aftions is as regu- lar and uniform, as that between the caufe and efFeft in any part of nature ; but alfo that this re- gular conjundion has been univerfally acknow- ledged among mankind, and has never been the fubje6t of difpute, either in philofophy or com- mon life. Now, as it is from pad experience, that we draw all inferences concerning the fu- ture, and as we conclude, that objects will al- ways be conjoined together, which we find to have always been conjoined ; it may feem fuperfluous to prove, that this experienced uniformity in hu- man acftions is a fource, whence we draw inferen- ces concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights, we fliall alfo infill, though briefly, on this lat- ter topic.
The mutual dependence of men is fo great, in all focieties, that fcarce any human aclion is entirely compleat in itfelf, or is performed with- out fome reference to the adlions of others, which are requifite to make it anfwer fully the intention of the agent. The pooreil artificer, who labours alone, expefts at lealt the protedion of the magi- Itrate, to enfure him the enjoyment of the fruits of hid labour. He alfo expeds, that, when he
carries
Of Liberty and Necessity. 95
carries his goods to market, and oflers them at a reafonable price, he fhall find purchafers; and fhall be able, by the money he acq'iires, to en- gage others to fupply him with thofe commodi- ties, which are requifite for his fubfiftence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and ren- der their intercourfe with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their fchemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary anions, which they expedl, from the proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all thefe conclufions, they take their meafures from paft experience, in the fame manner as in their reafonings concerning ex- ternal objects ; and firmly believe, that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the fame, that they haye ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his fervants, for the execution of any work, as much as upon the tools, which he employs, and would be equally furprized, were his expedations difappointed. In fhort, this experimental inference and reafoning concerning the adions of others en- ters fo much into human life, that no man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reafon, therefore, to affirm, that all mankind have always agreed in the doftrine of ne- ccfllry, according to the foregoing definition and explication of it ?
Nor have philofophers ever entertained a diffe- rent opinion from the people in this particular. For not to mention, that almoft every a£lion of their life fuppofes that opinion ; there are even few of the fpeculative parts of learning, to which it is not efiential. What would become o( hijiory, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the hiftorian, according to the experience, which we have had of mankind ? How could politics be a fcience, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon fociety ? Where would be
the
96 SECTION VIII.
the foundation of morals^ if particular charafters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular fentiments, and if thefe fentinrjents had no conftant operation on actions ? And with what pretence could we employ our criticijm upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the condu(5l and fentiment of his a61:ors, either na- tural or unnatural, to fuch characters, and in fuch circumftances ? It feems almoft impofiible, there- fore, to engage, either in fcience or aftion of any kind, without acknowledging the doclrine of ne- cefTity, and this inference from motives to voluntary adtions ; from characters to conduft.
And indeed, when we confider how aptly yiatural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we fhall make no fcruple to allow, that they are of the fame nature, and de- rived Yrom the fame principles. A prifoner, who has neither money nor intereft, difcovers the im- polTibility of his efcape, as well when he confiders the obftinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars, •with which he is furrounded ; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chufes rather to work upon the ftone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The fame prifoner, when condufted to the fcafFold, forefces his death as certainly from the conftancy and fidelity, of his guards, as from the operation of the ax or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas : The refufal of the foldiers to confent to his efcape ; the aftion of the executioner \ the feparation of the head and body ; bleeding, convulfive motions, and death. Here is a connefted chain of natural caufes and voluntary aftions ; but the mind feels no dif- ference between them, in palTing from one link to another : Nor is lefs certain of the future event than if it were conncd:ed with the objcdls prefent to the memory or fenfes, by a train of caufes, ce- mented together by what we are pleafed to call a
fhyfical
Of L I B E R T V and Necessitv. 97
phyf:c(il ntCQ^xiy. The fame experienced union has the fame effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and adlions ; or figure and motion. We may change the names of things ; but their nature and their operation on die under- ftandino; never chano;e.
Were a man, whom I know to be honed and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friend- fhip, to come into my houfe, where I am furround- ed with my fervants, I reft afTured, that he is not to ftab me before he leaves it, in order to rob me of my filver ftandil"h j and I no more fufucil this event, than the falling of the houfe itfelf which is new, and folidly built and founded. — But be may have been feized with a Judden and unknown frenzy. — So may a fudden earthquake arife, and fliake and tumble my houfe about my ears. I fhall therefore change the fuppofitions. I fhall fay, that I know with certainty, that he is not to put his hand into the fire, and hold it there, till it be confumed : And this event, I think I can foretell with the fame affiirance, as that, if he throw him- felf out at the windov/, and meet with no obftruc- tion, he will not remain a moment fufpended in the air. No fufpicion of an unknown frenzy can give the leaft pollibility to the former event, which is fo contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A inan who at noon leaves his purfe full of gold on the pavement at Charing-Crofs, may as well expe6t that it will fiy away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reafonings contain in- ferences of a fimilar nature, attended with more or lefs degrees of certainty, proportioned to our ex- perience of the ufual condud of mankind in fuch particular fituations.
Vol. II. H I have
98 SECTION VIII.
1 have frequently confidered, what could pofli- bly be the reafon, why all mankind, though they have ever, without hefitation, acknowledged the dodrine of neceffity, in their whole practice and reafoning, have yet difcovered luch a reludlance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather fnewn a propenfity, in all ages, to profefs the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for, after the following manner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effedls from their caufes, we fiiall find, that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our know- ledge of this relation, than barely to obferve, that particular objetts are confiantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a cufiomary tranfi- t'lon^ from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclufion concerning human ignorance be the refult of the flri(fteft fcrutiny of this fubjecl, men Hill entertain a flrong propenfity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive fomething like a necefTary connexion between the caufe and the effedl. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no fuch connexion of the motive and the ac- tion ; they are thence apt to fuppofe, that there is a diflerence between the effects, which refult from ma- terial force, and thofe which arile from thought and intelligence. But beinn; once convinced, that we know nothing farther ol caufation of any kind, than merely the conjlant conjiin^ion of objefts, and the confequent inference ot the mind from one to another, and finding, that thefe two cir- cumfbances are univerfally allowed to have place in voluntary actions ; we may be more eafily led to own the fame neceffity common to all caufes. And th.ough this reafoning mav contradift the fyf- tems of many philofophers, in afcribing necelTity to the determinations of the will, we Ihall find,
upon
or Liberty and Necessity. 99
upon refleftion, that they difTent from it in words only, not in their real fentimcnt. NecefTity, ac- cordino; to the fenfe, in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejeded, nor can ever, I think, be rejefted by any philofopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, fome farther connexion be- tween the caufe and effect; and a connexion that has not place in the voluntary aftions of intelli- gent beings. Now whether it be fo or not, can only appear upon examination ; and it is in- cumbent on thcfe philofophers to make good their affertion, by defining or defcribing that neceffity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of ma- terial caufcs.
It would feem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this queftion concerning liberty and neceflity, when they enter upon it by ex- amining the faculties of the foul, the influence of the underftanding, and the operations of the will. Let them firll difcufs a more fimple queftion, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter j and try whether they can there form any idea of caufation and necefTity, except that of a conftant conjunftion of objefts, and fubfequent inference of the mind from one to another. If thefe circumftances form, in reality, the whole of that necefTity, which we conceive in matter, and if thefe circumftances be alfo univerfally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the difpute is at an end ; at leaft, muft be owned to be thenceforth, merely verbal. But as long as we will rafhly fuppofe, that we have fome farther idea of ne- cefTity and caufation in the operations of exter- nal objects ; at the fame time, that we can find nothing farther, in the voluntary aflions of the mind ; there is no pofTibility of bringing the c[ueflion t;o any determinate iflue, while we pro-
H Q, ceed
TOO SECTION virr.
ceed upon fo erroneous a fuppofition. The on^ ly method of undeceiving us, is> to mount up higher] to examine the narrow extent of fcience when applied to material caiifes j and to convince- ourfelves, that all we know of them, is, the con- ilant conjun6lion and inference above mention- ed. We may, perhaps, find, that it is with diffi- culty we are induced to fix fuch narrow limits to hu- man underftanding : But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the' a6lions of the will. For as it is evident,, that thefe have a regular conjundion with motives^ and circumftances and chara6lers, and as we al- ways draw inferences from one to the other, we mufl be obliged to acknowledge in words, that necelTity, which v/e have already avowed, in eve- ry deliberation of our lives, and in every Hep or our condu(5l and behaviour*.
But to proceed in this reconciling projefl with regard to the queftion of liberty and neceffity ; the moft contentious queftion, of metaphyfics, tlie moft contentious fcience ; it will not require many words to prove,- that all mankind have ever agreed in the dodrine of liberty as well as in that of neceffity, and that the whole difpute,. in this refpeft alfo, has been hitherto merely ver- bal. For what is meant by liberty, when appli- ed to voluntary atlions ? We cannot furely mean, that actions have fo little connexion with mo- tives, inclinations, and circumftances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uni- formity from the other, and that one afiords no inference by which we can conclude the exif- tcnce of the other. For thefe are plain and ac- knovvlcdged matters of fadt. By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of a^ing or 7iot atlingy eiccording to the deienninatioHS of the will ; that is>
if
• Sec NOTE [FJ.
Of Liberty and N e c e s s i t v. i oi
if we chufe to remain at refl, we may; if we •chufe to move, we alfo may. Now this hypo- thetical liberty is univerfally allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prifoner and in chains. Here then is no fubjefb of difpute.
Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we flioiild be careful to obferve two reqiiifite -circumllancesj firjl^ that it be confiftent with plain matter of fa6t; fecoiidly, that it be confiftent with itfelf. If we obferve thefe circumftances, and ren- der our definition intelligible, I am perfuaded that all mankind w^ill be found of one opinion with regard to it.
It is univerfally allowed^ that nothing exifts without a caufc of its exiftence, and that chance, when ftridly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power, which has any where, a being in nature. But it is pretended, that fome caufes are neceflary, fome not necef- fary. Her-e then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define a caufe, without comprehend- ing, as a part of the defijiition, a necejj'ary con- nexion with its efFeft ; and let him Jdiew difl:in6lly the origin of the idea^ cxprefTed by the defini- tion; and I fhall readily give up the whole con - troverfy. But if the foregoing explication -of the matter be received, this muft be abfolutely im- pradlicable. Had not objeds a regular conjunc- tion with each other, we fhould fiever have en- tertained any notion of caufe and efi-ecl; and this regular conjundlion produces that inference of the underftanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehenfion of. Who- ever attempts a definition of caufe, exclufive of thefe circumftances, will be obliged, either to em- ploy unintelligible terms, or fuch as are fyno- nimous to the term, which he endeavours to de- fine*. And if the definition above mentioned
be * See NOTE [G].
102 SECTION VIII.
be admitted ; liberty, when oppofed to necefllty, not to conftraint, is the fame thing with chance; which is univerfally allowed to have no exiftence.
PART II.
There is no method of reafoning more com- mon, and yet none more blameable, than, in phi- lofophical difputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothefis, by a pretence of its dangerous con- fequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to abfurdities, it is certainly falfej but it is not certain that an opinion is falfe, be- caufe it is of dangerous confequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as ferv- ing nothing to the difcovery of truth, but only to make the perfon of an antagonift odious. This I obferve in general, without pretending to xiraw any advantage from it. I frankly fubmit to an examination of this kind, and fhall ven- ture to affirm, that the doclrines, both of necef- fity and of liberty, as above explained, are not only confiftent with morality, but are abfolute- ly efiential to its fupport.
Necefllty may be defined two ways, confor- mably to the two definitions of cauje^ of which it makes an eflVntial part. It confifts either in the conftant conjundion of like objefts, or in the inference of the undcrfhanding from one objedl to another. Now necefllty, in both thefe fenfes, (which, indeed, arc at the bottom, the fame) has univerfally, though tacitly, in the fchools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to be- long to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human adlions, and that thofe in- ferences are founded on the experrenced union of like actions, v/ith like motives, inclinations, and circuinitances. The only particular, in which
a.ny
of Liberty and Nf. cessity. 103
any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refufe to give the name of neceffity to this property of human actions : But as long as the meaning is underftood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain it poffible to difcover fomething farther in the operations of matter. But this, it muft be acknowledged, can be of no confequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philofophy or me- taphyfics. We may here be miftaken in alTerting, that there is no idea of any other necelTary connex- ion in the adions of body : But furely we af- cribe nothing to the a6lions of the mind, but what every one does, and muft readily allow of. We change no circumftance in the receiv- ed orthodox fyftem with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material objefts and caufes. Nothing therefore can be more innocent, at leaft, than this do6lrine.
All laws being founded on rewards and pu- nifhrnjcntSj it is fuppofed as a fundamental prin- ciple, that thefe motives have a regular and uni- form influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil adtions. We may give to this influence what name we pleafej but, as it is ufually conjoined with the aftion, it muft be efteemed a cauje, and be looked upon as an inftance of that neceffity, which we would here eftabliih.
The only proper object of hatred Dr ven- geance, is a perfon or creature, endowed with thought and confcioufnefsi and when any crimi- nal or injurious actions excite that paffion, it is only by their relation to the perfon, or connexi- on with him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perilhingj and where they pro- ceed not from fome caufe in the character and difpofition of the perfon who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good;
nor
J04 SECTION VIII.
nor infamy, if evil. The actions themfelves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the perfon is not anfwerable for them 3 and as they pro- ceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and coniLant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impcffible he can upon their account, becom.e the object of punifhment or vengeance. According to che principle, therefore, which de- nies nccelTity, and confequently caufes, a man is as pure and untainted, alter having committed the moil horrid crime, as at the firll moment; of his b'-^h, nor is his character any wife con- cerned in his actions; lince they are not derived from it, and the wickedneis of the one can ne- ver beufed as a proof of the depravity of the other.
Men are not blamed for fuch actions, as they perform ignorandy and cafually, whatever may be the confeq.iences. Why ? but becaule the prin- ciples of thefe actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are lefs blamed for fuch actions as they perform haftily and un- premeditately, than for fuch as proceed from de- liberation. For what realbn ? but becaufe a halty temper, though a conftant caufe or principle ia the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes off any crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by afferting, that actions render a per- fon criminal, merely as they are proofs of cri- minal principles in the mindj and when, by an alteration of thefe principles, they ceafe to be juft proofs, they likewife ceafe to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of necefTity, they never were juil proofs, and confequently never were criminal.
It will be equally eafy to prove, and from the fame arguments, that liberty^ according to that
• definition
of Liberty and Necessity. 105
definition above mentioned, in which all men agree, is alfo cffential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are fufcep- tible of any moral qualities, or can be the ob- jects either of approbation or diOike. For as actions are objects of our moral fentiment, fo far only as they are indications of the internal cha- racter, pafnons, and affections ; it is impoffible that they can give rife either to praife or blame, where they proceed not from thefe principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.
I pretend not to have obviated or rcmove4 all obje6lions to this theory, with regard to ne- ceffity and liberty. I can forefee other objedti- ons, derived from topics, which have not here been treated of. It may be faid, for inftance, that, if voluntary aftions be fubjefted to the fame laws of necelTity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of neceffary caufe^, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original caufe of all, to every volition of every human creature. No contingency any where in the univerfe; no indifference; no liberty. While we adl, v,'e are, at the fame time, afted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who firH bellowed mo- tion on this immenfe machine, and, placed all beings in that particular pofition, whence every fubfequent event, by an inevitable neceffity, muft refult. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceed- ing from fo good a caufe; or if they have any turpitude, they m.uft involve our Creator in the fame guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate caufe and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is anlwerable for all the confequen- ces whether the train he employed be long or fhort ; fo v/herever a continued chain of necef- fary caufes is fixed, that Being, either finite, or
infinite.
io6 SECTION VIII.
infinite, who produces the firft, is likewife the author of all the reft, and muft both bear the blame and acquire the praife, which belong to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of mo- rality eftablilTi this rule, upon unqueftionable rea- ibns, when we examine the confequences of any- human adion; and thefe reafons muft ftill have greater force, when applied to volitions and in- tentions of a Being, infinitely wife and powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for fo limited a creature as man; but thofe imperfedi- ons have no place in our Creator. He forefaw, he ordained, he intended all thofe adions of men, which we fo raftily pronounce criminal. And we muft therefore conclude, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accoun- table for them. But as either of thefe pofitions is abfurd and impious, it follows, that the doc- trine, from which they are deduced, cannot pof- fibly be true, as being liable to all the fame ob- jedlions. An abfurd confequence, if neceffary, proves the original dodlrine to be abfurd; in the fame manner as criminal aftions render crimi- iial the original caufe, if the connexion between them be neceffary and inevitable.
This objection confifts of two parts, which we Ihall examine feparately; FirJ}^ that, if human aftions can be traced up, by a neceffary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on ac- count of the infinite perfeftion of that Being, from whom they are derived, and who can in- tend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, Secondly^ if they be criminal, we muft retrafl the attribute of perfection, which we afcribe to the Deity, and muft acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of n^uilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.
The anfwer to the firft objedlion feems obvious and convincing. There are many philofophers,
who,
of Liberty and Necessity, 107
who, after an cxaft fcrutiny of all the phaenomena of nature, conclude, that the Whole, confidered as one iyftem, is, in every period of its exiftence, ordered with perfe£l benevolence ; and that the utmoft polTible happinefs will, in the end, refult to all created beings, without any mixture of po- fitive or abfolute ill and mifery. Every phyfical ill, fay they, makes an efiential part of this bene- volent fyltem, and could not poITibly be removed, even by the Deity himfelf, confidered as a wife agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excludino; o;reater g-ood, which will refult from it. From this theory, fome philofophers, and the an- cient Stoics among the reft, derived a topic of con- folation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils, that thofe ills, under which they la- boured, were, in reality, goods to the univerfe; and that to an enlarged view, which could com- prehend the whole fyftem of nature, every event became an objedt of joy and exultation. But though this topic be fpecious and fublime, it was foon found in pra6lice weak and ineffedluai. You would furely more irritate, than appeafe a man, lying under the racking pains of the gout, by preaching up to him the redlitude of thofe gene- ral laws, which produced the malignent humours in his body, and led them through the proper ca- nals, to the finews and nerves, where they now excite fuch acute torments. Thefe enlarged views may, for a moment, pleafe the imagination of a fpeculative man, who is placed in eafe andfecurity; but neither can they dwell with conftancy on his mind, even though undifturbed by the emotions of pain or paflion ; much lefs can they maintain their ground, when attacked by fuch powerful an- tagonifts. The affedtions take a narrower and more natural furvey of their obje6t; and by an oecono- my, more fuitable to the infirmity of human
minds.
io8 SECTION VIII.
minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are aftuaied by fuch events as appear good or ill to the private fyftem.
The cafe is the fame with moral as with -phyjical ill. It cannot reafonably be fuppofed, that thofe rennote confiderations, which are found of fo little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is fo formed by nature, that, upon the appearance of certain charafters, difpofitions, and aclions, it immediately feels the fentiment of approbation or blame ; nor are there any emotions more elTential to its frame and conftitution. The chara»51:ers, which engage our approbation, are chiefly fuch as contribute to the peace and fecu- rity of human fociety ; as the chara6ters, which excite blame, are chiefly fuch as tend to public de- triment and difl:urbance : Whence it may reafon- ably be prefumed, that the moral fentiments arife, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection on thefe oppofite interefl:s. What though philofo- phical meditations efl:ablifli a difi'erent opinion or conjecture; that every thing is right with re- gard to the whole, and that the qualities, which difliurb fociety, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as fuitable to the primary intention of nature, as thofe which more diredly promote its happinefs and welfare ? Are fuch remote and uncertain fpe- culations able to counterbalance the fentiments, which arife from the natural and immediate view of the objects ? A man who is robbed of a confi- derable fum; does he find his vexation for the lofs any wife diminiflied by thefe fublime reflecti- ons ? Why then fliould his moral refentment againfl: the crime be fuppofed incompatible with them? Or why fliould not the acknowledgment of a real difl.in(5tion between vice and virtue be reconcile- able to all fpeculative fvfl:cms of philofophy, as well as that of a real difdnclion between perfonal
beauty
or Liberty and Necessity. to^
beauty and deformity ? Both thefe diftincflions are founded in the natural fentiments of the humani mind : And thefc fentiments are not to be con- trouled or altered by any philofophical theory or fpeculation whatfoever.
Whe Jecond objeflion admits not of fo eafy and fatisfacftory an anfwcr ; nor is it pofTible to explain diftindtly, how the Deity can be the mediate caufe of all the adions of men, without being the au- thor of fin and moral turpitude. Thefe are myile- ries, which mere natural and unafTifted reafon is very unfit to handle ; and whatever fyftem flie embraces, fhe mull find herfelf involved in inex- tricable difficulties, and even contradiflions, at every llep which fhe takes with regard to fuch fubje6ls. To reconcile the indifi^erence and con- tingency of human actions with prefcience ; or to defend abfolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of fin, has been found hi- therto to exceed all the power of philofophy. Hap- py, if Ihe be thence fenfible of her temerity, when fhe pries into thefe fublime mylteries; and leaving a fcene fo full of obfcurities and perplexities, re- turn, with fuitable modeily, to her true and pro- per province, the examination of common life; where fiie will find difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into fo boundlefs aa ©cean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction !
SECTION
( >II )
"l*—
S E C T I O N IX.
Of the Reason of Animals.
jr\LL our reafonings concerning matter of faiSt are founded on a fpecies of Analogy, which leads us to expeft from any caufe the fame events, which we have obferved to refult from fimilar caufes. Where the caufes are entirely fimilar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is re- garded as certain and conclufive : Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he fees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohefion of parrs -, as in all other inflances, which have ever fallen under his obfervation. But where the ob- je6ls have not fo exa£t a fimilarity, the analogy is jefs perfect, and the inference is lefs conclufive; though ftill it has fome force, in proportion to the degree of fimilarity and refemblance. The anato- mical obfervations, formed upon one animal, are, by this fpecies of reafoning, extended to all ani- mals ; and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for inftance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fifh, it forms a ftrong prefumption, that the fame prin- ciple has place in all. Thefe analogical obferva- tions may be carried farther, even to this fcience,
of
ill SECTION IX.
of which we are now treating ; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the underftand- ing, or the origin and connexion of the paflions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the fame theory is requifite to explain the fame phenomena in all other animals. We fhall make trial of this, with regard to the hypothefis, by which, we have, in the foregoing difcourfe, en- deavoured to account for all experimental reafon- ings ; and it is hoped, that this new point of view will ferve to confirm all our fonner obferva- tions.
Firfiy It feems evident, that animals, as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the fame events will alv/ays follow from the fame caufes. By this principle they become ac- quainted with the more obvious properties of ex- ternal objeds, and gradually, from their birth, treafure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, wa- ter, eanh, flones, heights, depths, ^c, and of the effedls, which refult from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly diftinguilliable from the cunning and fa- gacity of the old, who have learned, by long ob- fervation, to avoid what hurt them, and to purfue what gave eafc or pleafure. A horfe, that has been accuftomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height, which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will truft the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himfeif lb as to meet the hare in her doubles i nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occafion, founded in any thing but his ob- fervation and experience.
This is ftill more evident from the effeds of dif-
cipline and education on animals, who, by the
proper application of rewards and puniHiments, may
3 be
of the Reason of Animals. 115
be taught any courfe of a£lion, the mod contrary to their natural inftinfts and propenfities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehenfive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him ? Is it not even experience^ which makes him anfwer to his name, and infer, from fuch an arbitrary found, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?
In all thefe cafes, we may obferve, that the ani- mal infers fome fa6l beyond what immediately ftrikes his fenfes: and that this inference is alto- gether founded on pail experience, while the crea- ture expects from the prefent objecfl the fame con- fequences, which it has always found in its obfer- vation to refult from fimilar obje6ts.
Secondly^ It is impoflible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any procefs of ar- gument or reafoning, -by which he concludes, that like events muft follow like objeds, and that the courfe of nature will always be regular in its ope- rations. For ifthere.be in reality any arguments of this nature, they furely lie too abftrufe for the obfervation of fuch imperfect underftandings \ jfince it may well employ the utmoft care and at- tention of a philofophic genius to difcover and obferve them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in thefe inferences by reafoning : Neither are chil- dren : Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary a6tions and conclufions : Neither are philofophers themfelves, v/ho, in all the ac- tive parts of life, are, in the main, the fame with the vulgar, and are governed by the fame max- ims. Nature mufl have provided fome other prin- ciple, of more ready, and more general ufe and application ; nor can an operation of fuch im- menfe confequence in life, as that of inferring ef-
YoL. II. I fedj
it4 SECTION rx!.
fefts from caufes, be trjfted to the uncertain prd- Gefs of reafoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it feems to admit of no queltion with regard to the brute cfeatiort'; and the conclufion being once firmly eftablifhed in the one, we have a rtron;g prefumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be uni- verfally admitted^ without any exception or re- ferve. It is cuftom alone, which engages animals, from every objedt, that ftrikes their fenfes, to m- fer its ufual attendant, and carries their imagina- tion, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that particular manner, ^vhich we de- nominate i"^//^. No- other explication can be gi- ven of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower claffes of feafitive beings, which fall under our notice and obfervation *.
But though anitnals learn many parts of their knowledge from obfervation, there are alfo mar.y parts of it,' which they derive from the original hand of nature ; which much exceed the fliare of capacity they poffefs on ordinary occafions; and in which they improve, littl-e or nothing, by the longeft practice and experience. Thefe we deno- minate Inftinfts, and are lb apt to admire, as fome- thing very extraordinary, and inexplicable by ali the difquifitions of human underltanding. But our wonder v/ill, perhaps, ceafe or diminifli ; when we confider, that the experimental rcafon-ing itfelf, which we poffefs ia common with beafts, and on which the whole conduftof iife depends, is nothing but a fpecies of inllincl or mechanical power, that afts in us unknown to- ourJelves ; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any fuch relations or comparifons of ideas, as are the proper oi^jecfts of bur intellectual faculties. Though the infiinct be
different,
* See NOTE [H].
Of the kEASoN of Animals. 115
different, yet flill it is an inilinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire ; as much as that, vhich teaches a bird, with fuch exactnefs, the art of incu- bation, and the whole oeconomy and order of its nurfery.
1 2
1
( "7 )
SECTION X.
Of Miracles.
PART I.
T
HERE is, in Dr. Tillotfon's writings, an argument againft the real prejence^ which is as concife, and elegant, and frrong as any argument can poflibly be fuppofed againft a doctrine, fo little worthy of a ferious refutation. It is ac- knowledged on all hands, fays the learned prelate, that the authority, either of the fcripture or of tra- dition, is founded merely in the teftimony of the apoftles, who were eye-witneffes to thofe miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mif- fion. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Chrijlian religion is lefs than the evidence for the truth of our fenfes ; becaufe, even in the firft authors of our religion, it was no greater ; and it is evident it muft diminifh in pafling from them to their difciples ; nor can any one reft fuch confi- dence in their teftimony, as in the immediate ob- ject of his fenfes. But a weaker evidence can ne- ver deftroy a ftronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real prefence ever fo clearly re- vealed in fcripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of juft reafoning to give our afient to it. It contradidls fenfe, though both the fcrip- ture
ii8 S E C T I O N X.
ture and tradition, on which it is fuppofed to be built, carry not fuch evidence wirh them as fenfe; when they are confidered merely as ex- ternal evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breaft, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
Nothing is fo convenient as a decifive argument of this kind, which mull at \e^{\:/iience the moll ar- rogant bigotry and fuperflition, and free us from their impertinent folicitations. I flatter myfelf, that I have difcovered an argument of a like nature, which, if jud, will, with the wife and learned, be an everlalling check to all kinds of fuperftitious delu- fion, and confequently, v/ill be ufeful as long as the world endures. For fo long, I prefume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all hiltory, facred and profane.
Though experience be our only guide in reafon- ing concerning matters of fa£l ^ it mull be acknow- ledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in fome cafes is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, fhould expeft better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reafonjuftly, and conformably to experience j but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himfelf miftaken. However, we may ob- ferve, that, in fuch a cafe, he would have no caufe to complain of experience; becaufe it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent obfervation. All effefls follow not with like certainty from their fuppofed caufes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been conilantly conjoined together : Others are found to have been more variable, and fome- times to difappoint our expedlations ; fo that, in our reafonings concerning matter of fadl, there are all imaginable degrees of aflTurance, from the
hiofhcfw
Of M I R A C L E S. 1'j9
liighefl: certainty to the lowed fpecies of moral jevidence.
A wife min, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In fuch conclufions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expefts the event with the lad: degree of aflurance, and regards his pall experience as a fuW proof of^ the future exiltence of that event. In other cafes, he proceeds with more caution : He weighs the oppofite experiments : He confiders which fide is fupported by the greater number of experiments : To that fide he inclines, with doubt and hefitation j and when at laft he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, fuppofes an oppofition of experiments and obferva- tions, where the one fide is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the fuperiority. A hundred in- ftances or experiments on one fide, and fifty on ano- ther, afford a doubtful expeftation of any event ; though ^n hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradiftory, reafonably beget a pretty ftrong degree of afllirance. In all cafes, we muft balance the oppofite experiments, where they are oppofite, and dedu6l the finaller number from the greater, in order to know the exa6t force of the fu- pcrior evidence.
To apply thefe principles to a particular inflance: we may obferve, that there is no fpecies of realbn- ing more common, more ufeful, and even necelTa- ry to human life, than that which is derived from the teftimony of men, and the reports of eye-wit- nefles and fpeftators. This fpecies of reafoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the rela- tion of caufe and efi^ect. I fhall no! difpute about a word. It will be fufficient to obferve, that our af- furance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our obfervation of .the veracity of human teflimony, and of the ufual
conformity
lao S E C T I O N X.
conformity of facts to the reports of wltnefTe?. It being a general maxim, that no objects have- any difcoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences,: which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conftant and regular conjunction, it is evident, that we ought not to make an excep- rion to this maxim in favour of human teflimony, whofe connexion with any event feems, in itfelf, as little neceffary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree ; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a princi- ple of probity; were they not fenfible to fhame,. when detected in a falfehood : Were not thefe, f fay, difcovered by experience to be qualities, inhe- rent in human nature, we ihould never repofe the lead confidence in human teftimony. A man de- lirious, or noted for falfehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.
And as the evidence, derived from> witnefl^s and human teftimony, is founded on paft experi- ence, fo it varies with the experience, and is re- garded either as a p-oof or a probahility, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found ta be conftant or variable. There are a number of circumftances to be taken into confideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate ftandard, by which we determine all difputes, that may arife concerning them, is always derived from experience and obfervation. Where this experi- ence is not entirely uniform on any fide, it is at- tended with an unavoidable contrariety in oOr judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mu- tual deftruflion of argument as in every other kind of evidence. \\ e frequently hefitate con- cerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances, which caufe any doubt or uncertainty ; and when we difcover a fuperiority
on
of M I R A G L £ S. 121
on any fide, we incline to it ; but ftill with 1 dimi- nution of afiurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonift.
This contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe, may be derived from feveral different caufes j from the oppofition of contrary teftimony ; from the characfter or number of the witneflesj from the manner of their delivering their teftimony j or from the union of all thefe circumftances. We en- tertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneflfes contradid each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful charafter; when they have an intereft in what they affirm; when they delfver their teftimony with hefitation, or on the contrary, with too violent afleverations. There are many other particulars of the fame kind, which may diminifh or deftroy the force of any argument, derived from human teftimony.
Suppofe, for inftance, that the fadl, which the teftimony endeavours to eftablifh, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, refulting from the teftimony, admits Cf a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as the fadb is more or lefs unufual. The reafon, why we place any credit, in witneftes and hiftori- ans, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between teftimony and reality, but becaufe we are accuftomed to find a con- formity between them. But when the faft at- tefted is fuch a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a conteft of two oppofite experiences; of which the one deftroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very fame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of afTurance in the tefti- mony of witnefTes, gives us alfo, in this cafe, ano- ther degree of aflurance againft the faft, which
they
122
E C T I O N X.
they endeavour to eftablifli ; from which con"* tradiction there necefiarily arifes a counterpoize, and mutual deftruction of belief and autho- rity.
/ Jhould not believe Juch a fiory were it told me hy Catoj was a proverbial faying in Rome, even during the life-time of that philofophical pa- triot *, The incredibility of a fact, it was allov/- edj might invalidate fo great an authority.
The Indian prince, who refufcd to believe the firft relations concerning the effects of froft, rea- foned juflly; and it naturally required very llrong teiiimony to engage his affent to facts, that arofe from a ftate of nature, with which he was unac- quainted, and which bore fo little analogy to thofe events, of which he had had conftant and uni- form experience. Though they were not con- trary to his experience, they were not conform- able to it j-.
But in order to encreafe the probability againft the teftimpny of witnefles, let us fuppofe, that the fact, which they affirm, indead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and fup- pofe alfo, that the teftimony, , confidered apart and in itfelf, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe, there is proof againft proof, of which the ftrongeft mull prevail, but ftill with a dimi- nution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonift.
A miracle is a violation of the \z,\\% of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has efta- blilhed thefe laws, the proof againf!: a miracle, from the very natyre of thje fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can poffibly be ima- gined. Why is it more than probable, that all men mull die; that lead cannot, of ulelf, remain fuf-
pended
* Plutarch, in vita Catonis. t Sec NOTE [I],
Of M I R A C L E S. 123
pended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguifhed by water j unlefs it be, that thefe events are found agreeable to the lavv's of na- ture, and there is required a violation of thefe laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them ? Nothing is efteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common courfe of nature. It is no miracle that a man, feemingly in good health, fhould die on a fudden : becaufe fuch a kind of death, though more unufual than any other, has yet been frequently obferved to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man fhould come to life ; becaufp that has never been obferved, in any age or country. There muft, therefore, be an uniforrn experience againft every miraculous event, otherwife the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience a- mounts to a proof, there i§ here a direct and full froof^ from the nature of the fadt, againft the ex- iftence of any miracle ; nor can fuch a proof be deflroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is fuperior *.
The plain confequence is (and it is a general maxim of our attention), " That no teftimony is " fufficient to eftablifli a miracle, unlefs the tti- " timony be of fuch a kind, that its falfehood " would be more miraculous, than the fa6V, which " it endeavours to eftablifh: And even in that *^ cafe there; s a mutual deltruftion of arguments, " and the fuperior only gives us an aflurance *^ fuitable to that degree of force, which re- *' mains, after deducing the inferior." When any one tells me, that he faw a dead man reftored to life, I immediately confider with myfelf, whether it be more probable, that this perfon fhould ei- ther deceive or be deceived, or that the fadt, which he relates, fliould really have happened.
T weigh
• See NOTE [K].
114 S £ C T i O N X.
I weigh the one miracle againft the other; and according to the fuperiority, which I difcover, I pronounce my decifion, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falfehood of his teftimony world be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pre- tend to command my belief or opinion.
P A R T II.
In the foregoing reafoning we have fuppofed, that the teftimony, upon which a miracle is found- ed, may pofTibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falfehood of that teftimony would be a real prodigy : But it is eafy to ftiew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our conceftion, and that there never was a miraculous event ef- tabJiftied on fo full an evidence.
For/r/?, there is not to be found, in all hiftor)^, any miracle attefted by a fufficient number of men, of fuch unqueftioned good-fenfe, education, and learning, as to fecure us againft all delufion in themfelves ; of fuch undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all fufpicion of any defign to deceive others ; of fuch credit and reputati- on in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lofe in cafe of their being detected in any falfehood ; and at tl\e fame time, attefting facts, performed in fuch a public manner, and in fo ce- lebrated a part of the v/orld, as to render the de- tedion unavoidable : All which circumftances are requifite to give us a full aflurance in the teftimo- ny of men.
Secondly. We may obfcrve In human nature a principle, which, if ftpdly examined, will be found to diminifli extremely the afiurancc, Vvhich we might, from human teftimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which v/e com- monly conduct curfclves in oor realonings, is, 3 that
Of Miracles, 125
that the objects, of which we have no experience, refemble thofe, of which we have ; that what we ■have found to be mod ufual is always molt pro- bable ; and that where there is an oppofition of ar- guments, we ought to give the preference to fuch as are founded on the greateft number of paft ob- fervations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reje<5t any fa6t which is unufual and incredible in an ordinary degree ; yet in ad- vancing farther, the mind obferves not always the fame rule ; but when any thing is afKrmed utterly abfurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of fuch a fact, upon account of that very circumflance, which ought to deftroy all its autho- rity. The paffion oi Jurprize and wonder^ arifing from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a fenfible tendency towards the belief of thofe events, from which it is derived. And this goes fo far, that even thofe who cannot enjoy this plea- fure immediately, nor can believe thofe miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the fatisfaction at fecond-hand or by re- bound, and place a pride and delight in exciting die admiration of others.
With what greedinefs are the miraculous ac- counts of travellers received, their defcriptions of fea and land monfters, their relations of wonder- ful adventures, ilrange men, and uncouth man- ners? But if the fpirit of religion join itfclf to the love of wonder, there is an end of common fenfe j and human teftimony, in thefe circumftances, lofes all pretenfions to authority. A religionift may be an enthufiaft, and imagine he fees what has no reality : He may know his narrative to be falfe, and yet perfevere in it, with the beft intenti- ons in the world, for the fake of prom.oting fo holy a caufe : Or even where this delufion has not place, vanity, excited by fo ftrong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the
reft
iz6 $ E C T I O N X.
reft of mankind in any other circumftances; arid felf-intcreft with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, fufficient judgment to canvafs his evidence: What judg- ment they have, they renounce by principle, in thefe fublime and myfterious fubjedts : Or if they were ever fo willing to employ it, paffion and a heated imagination difturb the regularity of its . operations. Their credulity encreafes his impu- dence : And his impudence overpowers their credulity.
Eloquence, when at its higheft pitch, leaves little room for reafon or refledtion ; but addrefT- ing Itfeif entirely to the fancy or afFeflions, cap- tivates the willing hearers, and fubdues their un- derftanding. Happily, this pitch it feldom at- tains. But what a Tully or a Demofthenes could ibarcely effedl over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or ftationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a hi-gher degree,, by touching fuch grofs and vulgar paffions.
The many inftances of forged miracles, and pro- phecies, and fupernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been dete6ted by contrary evi- dence, or which deteft themfelves'by their abfur- dity, prove fufficiently the ftrong propenfity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought reafonably to beget a fufpicion againft all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the moft common and moft credible events. For inftance : There is no kind of report, which rifes fo eafily, and fpreads fo quickly, efpecially in country places and provincial towns, as thofe concerning mar- riages; infomuch that two young perfons of equal condition never fee each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together. The pleafure of telling a piece of news fo intereft-
ing.
Of Ml R A C L ES. liy
Ing, of propagating it, and of being the firft re- porters of it, fpreads the intelligence. And this is fo well known, that no man of fenfe gives at- tention to thefe reports, till he find theni con- firmed by fome greater evidence. Do not the fame palTions, and others ftill ftronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greateft vehemence and alTurance, all religious miracles ?
Thirdly. It forms a ftrong prefumption againft all fupernatural and miraculous relations, that they arc obferved chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admiflion to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous anceftors, who tranf- mitted them with that inviolable fan6tion and authority, which always attend received opinions. When we perufe the firft hiftories of all nations, ■we are apt to imagine ourfelves tranfported in- to fome new world; where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at prefent. Battles, revolutions, pelti- lencej famine, and death, are never the efTedl of thofe natural caufes, which we experience. Pro- digies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obfcure the few natural events, that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we foon learn, that there is no- thing myfterious or fupernatural in the cafe, but that all proceeds from the ufual propenfity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from fenfe and learnino- it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.
It is Jirange, a judicious reader is apt to fay, upon the perufal of thefe wonderful hiftorians, that
Jucb
128 S E C T I O N X,
Juch prodigious events never happen in our days. But it is nothing flrange, I hope, that men fliould lie in all ages. You mull furely have feen in- llances enow of that frailty. You have yourfelf heard many luch marvellous relations flatted, which^ being treated with fcorn by all the wife and judicious, have at lad been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be aflured, that thofe renowned lies, which have fpread and fiourifhed to fuch g, monflrous height, arofe from like beginnings; but being fown in a more proper foil, lliot up at iall into prodigies almoft equal to thofe which they relate.
It v/as a wife policy in that falfe prophet, Alex- ander, who, though now forgotten, was once fo famous, to lay the firfl fcene of his impoftures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the pe;ople were extremely ignorant and flupid, and ready to fvvallow even the groifefl delufion. People at a diflajice, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The llories come magnified to them by a hundred circumilances. Fools are induflrious in propagat- ing the impgllure ; while the wife and learned are contented, in general, to deride its abfurdity, without informing themfelves of the particular facts, by which it may be dillinctly refuted. And thus the impoftor above-mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlifling of votaries, even among the Grecian philofophers, and men of the moft eminent rank and dillinftion in Rome : Nay, could engage the attention of that fage emperor Marcus Au- relius ; fo far as to make him trull the fuccefs of a military expedition to his delufive prophecies.
The advantages are fo great, of flatting an impollure among an ignorant people, that, even though the delufion fhould be too grofs to im-
pofe
of M I R A c L E s. lag
pofe on the generality of them (zuhich, though Jf.ldom^ is Jometimes the cafe) it has a much bet- ter chance for fucceeding in remote countries, than if the firll fcene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The molt ignorant and barbarous of thefe barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correfpondence, or fufficient credit and authority to concradift and beat down the delufion. Men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to difpiay itfelf. And thus a ftory, which is univerfally exploded in the place where it was firll llarted, fhall pafs for certain at a thoufand miles difbance. But had Alexander fixed his refidcnce at At/xcns, the phi- lofophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately fprcad, throughout the whole Ro- man empire, their fenfe of the matter; which, being fupported by fo great authority, and dif- played by all the force of reafon and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true ; Lucian, paOing by chance through Paphla- gonia, had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wifhed, it does not always happen, that every Alexan- der meets with a Lucian, ready to expofe and dete(5t his impoftures.
I may add as a fourth reafon, which diminiflies the authority of prodigies, that there is no tefti- mony for any, even thofe v/hich have not been exprefsly detetled, that is not oppofed by an in- finite number of witneffesj fo that not only the miracle deftroys the credit of teftimony, but the teilimony deftroys itfelf. To make this the better underftood, let us confider, that, in mat- ters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is impoffible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, ofSiam, and of China flioald, all of them, be cftablifhed on any folid foundati-
VoL. II. K on.
I30 S E C T I O N X
on. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of thefe religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direft fcope is to eftablifh the particular fyftem to which it is attributed J fo has it the fame force, though more indiredly, to overthrow every other fyftem. In; deftroying a rival fyftem, it likewife deftroys the credit of thofe miracles, on which that fyftem was cftabliftied ; fo that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary fafts, and the evidences of thefe prodigies, whether weak or ftrong, as oppofite to each other. Ac- cording to this method of reafoning, when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his fucceftbrs, we have for cur warrant the teftimony of a few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plu- tarch, Tacitus, and, in Ihorr, of all the authors and witnelTes, Grecian, Chinefe, and Roman Ca- tholic, who have related any miracle in their par- ticular religion; I fay, v/e are to regard their tef- timony in the fame light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in exprefs terms contradided it, with the fame certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over fubtile and refined; but is not in reality different from the reafoning of a judge, v/ho fuppofes, that the credit of two witneffes, maintaining a crime againft any one, is deftroyed by the teftimony of two others, who affi'-m him to have been two hundred leagues diftant, ar the fame inftant when the crime is faid to have been committed.
One of the beft attefted miracles in all profane hiP.ory, is that which Tacitus reports of Vcfpa- fi^.n, who cured a bJind man in Alexandria, by means of Lis fpitrle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot ; in obedience to a vifion of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to h^ve
recourfc
or Miracles. 131
recourfe to the Emperor, for thefe miraculous cures. The (lory may be feen in that fine hif- torian * ; where every circumftance feems to add weight to the tcftimony, and might be difplayed at large with all the force of argument and elo- quence, if any one were now concerned to en- force the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous fuperftition. The gravity, folidity, age, and pro- bity of fo great an emperor, who, through the whole courfe of his life, converfed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and ne- ver afFeded thofe extraordinary airs of divinity aflumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The hif- torian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the greateft and moft penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity ; and fo free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of athe- ifm and profanenefs : The perfons, from whofe authority he related the miracle, of eftablifhed charadler for judgment and veracity, as we may well prefume; eye-witneffes of the fact, and con- firming their teftimony, after the Flavian family was defpoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui interfiiere^ nunc quoque memorant, pcjiquam nul- lum mendacio pretium. To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will ap- pear, that no evidence can well be fuppofed ftrong- er for fo grofs and fo palpable a falfehood.
There is alfo a memorable ftory related by Car- dinal de Retz, which may well deferve our con- fideration. When that intriguing politician fled into Spain, to avoid the perfecution of his ene- mies, he paflfed through Saragofla, the capital of Arragon, where he was fhewn, in the cathedral, K 2 a man,
* Hid. lib. V. cap. 8. Suetonius gives nearly the fame ac- count in 'vita VtSP.
132 $ E C T I O N X.
a man, who had ferved {even years as a door-' keeper, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had 'been feen, for fo long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the flump ; and the cardinal allures us that he faw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church ; and the whole company in town were ap- pealed to for a confirmation of the fa6l ; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the re- later was alfo cotemporary to the fuppofed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine chara6ber, as well as of great genius j the miracle of fo ftngular a na- ture as could fcarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnefles very numerous^ and all of them, in a manner, fpedlators of the facl,- to which they gave tiieir teftimony. And v/hat adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and may double our fur- prize on this occafion, is^ that the cardinal him- {t:\(y who relates the (lory, feems not to give any credit to it, and confequently cannot be fufpefled of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He confi- dered juflly, that it was not requifite, in order to rejecl a fad of this nature, to be able accurately, to difprove the teftimony, and to trace its falfe- hood, through all the circumitances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was commonly altogether impoflible at any fmall diftance of time and place j fo was it extreme- ly diflicult, even where one was immediately pre- fent, by reafon of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great part of mankind. He there- fore concluded, like a juft rcafoner, that fuch an evidence carried falfehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle, fupported by any huinan tefti- mony, was more properly a fubjeitof deriiion than of argument.
There
Of M r R A c L E s. 133*
There furely never was a greater number of mi- racles afcribed to one perfon, than thofe, which were lately faid to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous J anfenifl, with whofe fanclity the people were fo long delud- ed. The curing of the fick, giving hearing to the deaf, and fight to the blind, were every where talked of as the ufual effefts of that holy fepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many of the mi- racles were immediately proved upon the fpot, before judges of unqueftioned integrity, attefted by witnefles of credit and diftintlion, in a learned age, and on the moft eminent theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all : A relation of them was pubJifhed and difperfed every where ; nor were the JefuitSj though a learned body, fupported by the civil magiftrate, and determined enemies to thofe opinions, in whofe favour the miracles were faid to have been wrought, ever able diftinft- ly to refute or deteft them *. Where fhall wc find fuch a number of circumftances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fa6t ? And what have we to oppofe to fuch a cloud of witnefles, but the abfolute impoflibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this furely, in the eyes of all reafonable people, will alone be re- garded as a fufficient refutation.
Is the confcquence juft, becaufe fome human teftimony has the utmoft force and authority in fome cafes, when it relates the battle of Philippi or Pharfalia for inftance; that therefore all kinds of tefl:imony muft, in all cafes, have equal force and authority? Suppofe that the Casfarean and Pompeian fadions had, each of them, claimed the viftory in thefe battles, and that the hiftorians of each party had uniformly afcribed the advantage to their own fidcj how could mankind, at this dif-
tance,
* See NOTE [L].
♦ 134 SECTION X.
tance, have been able to determine between thenn ? The contrariety is equally ftrong between the mi- racles relai.ed by Herodotus or Plutarch, and thofe delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any nionkirti hiilorian.
The wife lend a very academic faith to every re- port which favours the paffion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himfelf, or in any other way ftrikes in with his na- tural inclinations and propenfities. But what greater temptatioii than to appear a rnKTionary, a prophet, an ambaflador from heaven? Who would ■ not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in or- der to attain fo fublime a character ? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has firft made a convert of himfelf, and entered feriouOy into the delufion; who ever fcruples to make ufe of pious frauds, in fupport of fo holy and meritorious a caufe ?
The fmalleft fpark may here kindle into the greatefl fiame ; becaufe the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus aiiiiculani'm *, the gazing populace, receive greedily, ' without examination, whatever fooths fuperftition, and promotes wonder.
How many ftories of this nature, have, in all ages, been detedled and exploded in their in- fancy ? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards funk into ne- glect and oblivion? Where fuch reports, there- fore, fry about, the folution of the phenome- non is obvious ; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and obfervation, when we ac- count for it by the known and natural princi- ples of credulity and delufion. And fliall we, rather tlian have a recourfe to fo natural a fo- lution, allow of a miraculous violation of the mofl cftablifhed laws of nature ?
I need • Lucret.
Of Miracles. 135
1 need not mention the difiiculty of deteftlng a falfchood in any private or even public hiftory, at the place, where it is faid to happen ; much more when the fccne is removed to ever fo fmall a dillance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which they can employ, find themfelves often at a iofs to diltinguilh between truth and faliehood in the mod recent actions. But the matter never comes to any iffue, if trufled to the common method of altercation and debate and flying ru- mours ; efpecially when men's paflions have taken part on either fide.
In the infancy of new religions, the wife and learned commonly efceem the matter too inconfi- derable to deferve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly deted the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multi- tude, the feafon is now paft, and the records and witnefles, which might clear up the matter, have periflied beyond recovery.
No means of detedion remain, but thofe which ■niuft be drawn from the very teftimony itfelf of the reporters : And thefe, though always fuf- ficient with the judicious and knowing, are com- monly too fine to fall under the comprehenfion of the vulgar.
Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no tef- timony for any kind of miracle has ever amount- ed to a probability, much lefs to a proof; and that, even fuppofing it amounted to a proof, it would be oppofcd by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to eftablifh. It is experience 'only, which gives authority to human teftimony; and it is the fame experience, which afllires us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, thefe two ^iinds of. experience are contrary, we have no- thing
136 S E C T I O N X.
thing to do but fubtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one fide or the other, with that afiurance which arifes from the' remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this fubftraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire anni- hilation; and therefore we may efbablifh it as a maxim, that no human teftimony can have fuch force as to prove a miracle, and make it a juft foundation for any fuch fyftem of religion.
I beg the limitations here made may be re- marked, when I fay, that a miracle can never be proved, fo as to be the foundation of a fyftem of religion. For I own, that otherwife, there may pofiibly be miracl(;s, or violations of the ufual courfe of nature, of fuch a kind as to ad- mit of proof from human teftimony ; though, perhaps, it will be impofiible to find any fuch in all the records of hiftory. Thus, fuppofe, all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from y the firft of January, 1600, there was a total
darknefs over the whole earth for eight days : Suppofe that the tradition of this extraordinary event is ftill ftrong and lively among the peo- ple : That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the fame traditi- on, without the leaft variation or contradiction : It is evident, that our prefent philofophers, in- ftead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to fearch for the caufes whence it might be derived. The decay, cor- ruption, and dilTolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by fo many analogies, that any phjcnomenon, which feems to have a tendency towards that cataftrophe, comes within the reach of human teftimony, if that teftimony be very ex- tenfive and uniform.
But fjppofe, that all the hiftorians who treat of England, fiiould agree, that, on the firft of
January
of Miracles. 137
January, 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after her death fhe was feen by her phyficians and the whole court, as is ufual with perfons of her rank ; that her fucceflbr was ac- knowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, fhe again appeared, refumed the throne, and governed Eng- land for three years: I muft confefs that I fhould be furprized at the concurrence of fo many odd circumftances, but fhould not have the leaft inclination to believe fo miraculous an event. I fhould not doubt of her pretended death, and of thofe other public circumflances- that followed it : I fhould only afTert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was, nor pof- fibly could be real. You would in vain objett to me the difficulty, and almofl impofTibility of deceiving the world in an affair of fuch confe- quence ; the wifdom and folid judgment of that renowned queen ; with the little or no advan- tage which fhe Could reap from fo poor an ar- tifice : All this might aflonifh me ; but I would flill reply, that the knavery and folly of men are fuch common phenomena, that I fhould ra- ther believe the mofl: extraordinary events to arife from their concurrence, than admit of fo fignal a violation of the laws of nature.
But fhould this miracle be afcribed to any new fyflem of religion ; men, in all ages, have been fo much impofed on by ridiculous flories of that kind, that this very circumftance would be a full proof of a cheat, and fufficient, with all men of fenfe, not only to make them rejedt the fa6b, but even rejedt it without farther ex- amination. Though the Being to whom the mi- racle is afcribed, be, in this cafe. Almighty, it does nor, upon that account, become a whit more probable ; fince it is impofTible for us to
know
13? S E C T I O N X.
know the attributes or aftions of fuch a Being, otherwile than from the experience which we have of his produftions, in the ufual courfe of nature. This ftill reduces us to paft obferva- tion, and obliges us to compare the inftanccs of the violation of truth in the teftimony of men, with thofe of the violation of the laws of na- ture by miracles, in order to judge which of them is moft likely and probable. As the vi- olations of truth are more common in the tef- timony concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fa6t; this mufb diminifh very much the authority of the former teftimony, and make us form a general rcfolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever fpecious pretence it may be covered.
Lord Bacon feems to have embraced the fame principles of reafoning. " We ought, fays he, " to make a colledcion or particular hiftory of " all monfters and prodigious births or produc- *^ tions, and in a word of every thing new, rare, *^ and extraordinary in nature. But this muft " be done with the moft fevere fcrutiny, left *' we depart from truth. Above all, every re- " lation muft be confidered as fufpicious, which " depends in any degree upon religion, as the " prodigies of Livy : And no lefs fo, every thing " that is to be found in the writers of natural " magic or alchimy, or fuch authors, who feem, ** all of them, to have an unconquerable appe- " tite for falfehood and fable *."
I am the better plcafed with the method of reafoning here delivered, as I think it may ferve to confound thofe dangerous friends or difguifcd enemies to the Cbrijlian Religion, who have un- dertaken to defend it by the principles of human reafon. Our moft holy religion is founded on Failbj not on reafon j and it is a fure method of
expofing
* Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29.
of M I R A C L E S. 139
cxpofing it to put it to fuch a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine thofc miracles, re- lated in Icripturej and not to lofc ourfelves in too wide a field, let us confine ourfelves to fuch as we find in the Pentateuch^ which we fhall ex- amine, according to the principles of thcfe pre- tended Chriftians, not as the word or teftimony of God himfelf, but as the produ6lion of a mere human writer and hiftorian. Here then we are firll to confider a book, prefented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were ftlll more barbarous, and in all probability long after the fads which it relates, corroborated by no concurring teftimony, and refembling thofe fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a ftate of the world and of human nature entirely difierent from the pre- fent : Of our fall from that ftate : Of the age of man, extended to near a thoufand years: Of the deftruction of the world by a deluge : Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favou- rites of heaven; and that people the country- men of the author : Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the moft aftonifhing ima- ginable : I defire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a ferious confideration de- clare, whether he thinks that the falfehood of fuch a book, fupported by fuch a teftimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates ; which is, howe- ver, neceflary to make it be received, accord- ing to the meafures of probability above efta- bliftied.
What we have faid of miracles may be ap- plied, without any variation, to prophecies; and
indeed.
J40 S E C T I O N X.
indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as fuch only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be abfurd to employ any prophecy as an argu- ment for a divine miffion or authority from hea- ven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Chrijlian Religion not only was at firft at- tended with miracles, but even at this day can- not be believed by any reafonable perfon with- out one. Mere reafon is infufficient to convince us of its veracity; And whoever is moved by Faith to aflent to it, is confcious of a continued miracle in his own perfon, which fubverts all the principles of his underftanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is moft contrary to cuftom and experience.
SEC-
( 141 )
SECTION XL
Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State.
X Was lately engaged in converfatlon with a friend who loves fceptical paradoxes j where, though he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve, yet as they feem to be cu- rious, and to bear fome relation to the chain of reafoning carried on throughout this enquiry, I fhall here copy them from my memory as ac- curately as I can, in order to fubmit them to the judgment of the reader.
Our converfation began with my admiring the fingular good fortune of philofophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourilhes from the free oppofition of fentiments and argumentation, received its firit birth in an age and country of freedom and to- leration, and was never cramped, even in its mod extravagant principles, by any creeds, confefli- ons, or penal llatutes. For, except the banifh- mentof Protagoras, and the death of Socrates, which lafl: event proceeded partly from other motives, there are fcarcely any inftances to be met with, in ancient Iiiftory, of this bigotted jealoufy, with which the prefent age is fo much infefted. Epi- curus lived at Athens to an advanced age, in
peace
t4'2 SECTION XI.
peace and tranquillity: Epicureans* were even ad- mitted to receive the facerdotal chara6ler, and to officiate at the altar, in the moft facred rites of the eftabliihed religion : And the public encou- ragementf of penfions and falaries was afforded equally, by the wifeft of all the Roman emperorsjl, to the profeffors of every fe6l of philofophy. How requifite fuch kind of treatment was to philofo- phy, in her early youth, will eafily be conceiv- ed, if we reflet^, that, even at prefent, when fhe may be fuppofed more hardy and robuft, fhe bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the feafons, and thofe harffi winds of calumny and perfecution, which blow upon her.
You admire, fays my friend, as the fingular good fortune of philofophy, what feems to refult from the natural courfe of things, and to be un- avoidable in every age and nation. This per- tinacious bigotry, of which you complain, as fo fatal to"* philofophy, is really her offspring, who, after allying with fuperftition, feparates himfelf entirely from the intereft of his parent, and be- comes her moft inveterate enemy and perfecu- tor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the prefent occafions of fuch furious difpute, could not pof- fibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illi- terate, formed an idea of religion more fuitable to their weak apprehenfion, and compofed their lacred tenets of fucli tales chiefly as were the objedls of traditional belief, more than of argu- ment or difputation. After the firft alarm, there- fore, was over, which arofe from the new para- doxes and principles of the philofophers; thefe teachers feem ever after, during the ages of an- tiquity, tp have lived in great harmony with the
eftabliffied
• LUCIAM aVIXTT. y., A:t/Tl9<tJ.
t LuciANi UKX'^, t id, Si Dio.
Of a Providence and Future State. 1(4^
cftabliflied fuperftition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them ; the former claiming all the learned and wife, the latter pof- fefling all the vulgar and illiterate.
It lecms then, faid I, that you leave politics en- tirely out of the qiieftion, and never fuppofe, that a wife magiilrate can juftly be jealous of certain te- nets of philofophy, fuch as thofe of Epicurus, which, denying a divine exiftence, and confequently a pro- vidence and a future ilate, feem to loofen, in a great mcafure, the ties of morality, and may be fuppofed, for that rcafon, pernicious to the peace of civil fociety.
I know, replied he, that in fa<5t thefe per- fecutions never, in any age, proceeded from calm reafon, or from experience of the pernicious con- fequences of philolbphy; but arofe entirely from paffion and prejudice. But what if I Ihould ad- vance farther, and aflert, that, if Epicurus had been accufed before the people, by any of the Jycophants or informers of thofe days, he could cafily have defended his caufe, and proved his principles of philofophy to be as falutary as thofe of his adverfaries, who endeavoured, with fuch. zeal, to expofe him to the public hatred and jealoufy ?
I wifh, faid I, you would try your eloquence upon fo extraordinary a topic, and make a fpeecli for Epicurus, which might fatisfy, not the mob of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philofophical part of his audience, fuch as might be fuppofed capable of comprehending his arguments.
The matter would not be difficult, upon fuch conditions, replied he : And if you pleafe, I fhall fuppofe myfelf Epicurus for a moment, and make you fland for the Athenian people, and fhall de- liver you fuch an harangue as will fill the urn
with
144 S E C T I O N XI.
with white beans, and leave not a black one tp gratify the malice of my adverfaries.
Very well : Pray proceed upon thefe fuppofitions.
I come hither, O ye Athenians, to juftify in your aflembly what I maintained in my fchool, and I find myfelf impeached by furious antago- nifts, inllead of reafoning with calm and difpaf- fionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right fhould be direded to queftions of public good, and the intereft of the commonwealth, are diverted to the difquifitions of fpeculative phi- lofophy; and thefe magnificent, but perhaps fruit- lefs enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more ufeful occupations. But fo far as in me lies, I will prevent this abufe. We fhall not here difputc concerning the origin and govern- ment of worlds. We fhall only enquire how far fuch queftions concern the public interefV. And if I can perfuade you, that they are entirely in- different to the peace of fociety and fecurity of government, I hope that you will prefently fend us back to our fchools, there to examine, at lei- fure, the queflion, the moft fublime, but, at the fame time, the moll: fpeculative of all philofo-
The religious philofophers, not fatisfied with the tradition of your forefathers, and do6lrine of your priefts (in which 1 willingly acquiefce), in- dulge a rafli curiofity, in trying how far they can eftablifh religion upon the principles of reafonj and they thereby excite, inflead of fatibfying, the doubts, which naturally arife from a di- ligent and fcrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the moft magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wife arrangement of the univerfe; and then afk, if fuch a glorious difplay of intelligence could pi'oceed from the fortuitous concourfe of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greateft genius can never fufhciently admire. I fhall not J examine
Of a Providence and Future State. 145
examine the juflncfs of this argument. I fhall al- low it to be as folid as my antagonifls and ac- cufers can defire. It is fufficient, if I can prove, from this very reafoning, that the quedion is en- tirely fpeculative, and that, when, in my philo- fophical difquifitions, 1 deny a providence and a future llate, I undermine not the foundations offociety, but advance principles, which they them- felves, upon their own topics, if tliey argue con- fidently, muit allow to be folid and fatisfaftory.
You then, who are my accufers, have acknow- ledged, that the chief or fole argument for a di- vine exigence (which I never queftioned) is de- rived from the order of nature j where there ap- pear fuch marks of intelligence and defign, that you think it extravagant to alTign for i'ts caufe, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow, that this is an argument drawn from efFedls to caufes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there mufb have been projedt and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your conclufion fails; and you pretend not to eftablifh the conclufion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will juftify. Thefe are your concellions. I defire you to mark the con- fequences.
When we infer any particular caufe from an effedl, we mufb proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to afcribe to the caufe any qualities, but what are exactly fufHcient to produce the effeft. A body of ten ounces raif- ed in a fcale may ferve as a proof, that the counterbalancino; weiG,ht exceeds ten ounces: but can never afford a reafon that it exceeds a hun- dred. \i the caufe, afTigned for any effedt, be not fufficient to produce it, we mufb either re- je(5b that caufe, or add to it fuch qualities as will give it a jufb proportion to the effed:* But if we
Vol. II. L afcribe
146 SECTION XL
afcribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capa- ble of producing other effedls, we can only in- dulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily fuppofe the exiftence of qualities and energies, without reafon or authority.
The fame rule holds, whether the caufe af- figned be brute unconfcious matter, or rational intelligent being. li the caufe be known only by the effedt, we never ought to afcribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precifely requi- fite to produce the effc6l : Nor can we, by any rules of juft reafoning, return back from the caufe, and infer other efFeds from it, beyond thofe by which alone it is known to us. No one, mere- ly from the fight of one of Zeuxis's pidures, could know, that he was alfo a ftatuary or ar- chitect, and was an artift no lefs fl<.ilful in ftone and marble than in colours. The talents and tafte, difplayed in the particular work before us ; thefe we may fafely conclude the workman to be pof- fefled of. The caufe muft be proportioned to the effettj and if we exadlly and precifely pro- portion it, we fhall never find in it any qualities, that point farther, or afix)rd an inference con- cerning any other defign or performance. Such qualities muft be fomevvhat beyond what is mere- ly requifite for producing the eiTedt, which we examine.
Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the au- thors of the exiftence or order of the univerfej it follows, that tiiey pofTefs that precife degree of powLT, intelligence, and benovelence, which ap- pears in their workmanfhip; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the alTif- tance of exaggeration and flattery to fupply the defefls of argument and reafoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at prefent, appear, fo far may v/e conclude thefe attributes to exift. The fuppofition of farther attributes is mere hy-
pothefis i
of a Providence and Future State. 147
pothefis ; much more the fuppofition, that, in dif- tant regions of fpace or periods of tirrif, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent cifpiay of thefe attributes, and a fcheme of admmlllra- tion more fuitable to fuch imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up fiom ihe univerfe, the effeifl,. to Jupiter, the caufe; and then delcend downwards, to infer any new ef- fe6t from that caufe; as if the prefent effeds alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes, which we afcribe to that deity. The knowledge of the caufe being derived folely from the efFe6b, they muft be exadly adjufted to each other; and the one can never refer to any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new mfe- rence and conclufion.
You find certain phasnomena in nature. You feek a caufe or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become fo en- amoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impoffible, but he m.ift produce- fomething greater and more perfed: than the prefent fcene of things, which is fo full of ill and diforder. You forget, that this fuperlaiive intelligence and benevolence are entirely imagi- nary, or, at lead, without any foundation m rea- fon; and that you have no ground to afcribe to him any qualities, but what you fee he has ac- tually exerted and difplayed in his producflions. Let your gods, therefore, O philofophers, be fuit- ed to the prefent appearances by arbitarry fup- pofitions, in order to fuit them to the attributes, which you fo fondly afcribe to your deities.
When prielts and poets, fupported by your au- thority, O Athenians, talk of a golden or filver age, which preceded the prefent ftate of vice and mifery, 1 hear them with attention and with re- verence. But v/hen philofophers, who pretend to negledt authority, and to cultivate reafon, hold
L 2 the
148 Section xl
the fame difcourfe, I pay them not, I own, the lame obfequious fubmiffion and pious deference, I aflcj who carried them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rafhly affirm, that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpofe beyond what has actually appeared? If they fell me, that they have mounted on the fleps or by the gra- dual afcent of reafon, and by drawing inferences from effedls to caufjs, 1 fti-11 infill, that they have aided the afcent of reafon by the wings of ima- gination; otherwrfe th-ey could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from cau- fes to efl'edl's ; prefum'ing, that a more perfe6t pro- duftion than the prefent world would 'be more fuitable to fuch perfecfl beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reafon to afcribe to thefe ccieftial beings any perfecftion or any at- tribute, but what can be found irl the prefent world.
Hence a!l the fruitlefs induftry to account for the ill appearances of nature, and fave the ho- nour of the gods; while we mult acknowledge the reality of that evitl and diforder, v/ith which the world fo much abounds. The obltinate and intraftable qualities of matter, we are told, or tlie obfervance of general laws, or fome fuch rea- fon, is the fole caui'e, which controlled the pow- er and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him to create mankind and every fenfible crea- ture fo imperfeeft and fo unhappy. Thefe attri- butes, then, are, it feems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greatcft latitude. And upon that fuppoficion, 1 own, that fuch conjedlures may, perhaps, be admitted as plaufible fokuions of the ill phitnomena. But lliil I aH-:; Why take thefe attributes for granted, or why afcribe to the caufe any qualities but what a<fl-uaily appear in the ef- fe(^t ? Why torture your brain tojuftify the courfc
of
Of a Providen-ce and Future State. 149
of nature upon fuppofitions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in tiie courfe ofnature?
The religious hypothefis, therefore, mull be con- fidered only as a particular method of account- ing for the vilible phiEnomena of the univerfe: But no juft reafoner will ever prefume to infer from it any fingle fa6t, and alter or add to the phcEnomena, in any Cngle particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove fuch caufes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference con- cerning the exiftence of thefe caufes. In fuch complicated and fublime fubjefts, every one fliould be indulged in the liberty of conje^lure and argument. But here you ought to reft. If you come backward, and arguing from your in- ferred caufes, conclude, that any other fad; has exifted, or will exiil, in the courfe of nature, which may ferve as a fuller difplay of particu- lar attributes i I muft admonifh you, that you have departed from the method of reafoning, attach- ed to the prefent fubjeft, and have certainly ad- ded fomething to the attributes of the caufe, beyond what appears in the efifeft; otherwife you could never, with tolerable fenfe or propriety, add any thing to the efFeft, in order to render it more worthy of the caufe.
Where, then, is the odioufnefs of that doflrine, which I teach in my fchool, or rather, which I examine in my gardens ? Or what do you find in this whole qucftion, wherein the fecurity of good morals, or the peace and order of fociety is in the leaft concerned ?
I deny a providence, you fay, and fupreme governour of the world, who guides the courfe of events, and punifhes the vicious with infamy and difappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and fuccefs, in all their undertakings. But furely, I deny not the courfe itfelf of events, which lies open to every one's enquiry and exa- mination.
I50 SECTION XI.
mination. I acknowledge, that, in the prefent order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am fen- fible, that, according to the pail experience of mankind, friendfhip is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only fource of tranquil- Jity pnd happinefs. I never balance between the virtuous and vicious courfe of iifci but am fen- fible, that to a well dilpofed mind, every ad- vantage is on the fide of the former. And v/hat can you fay more, allowing all your fuppofitions and reafonings ? You tell me, indeed, that this difpofition of things proceeds from intelligence and defign. But whatever it proceeds from, the dilpofition itfelf, on which depends our happinefs or m'lftry, and confequently our conduft and de- portment in life, is ftill the fame. It is ilill open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of paft events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a fu- preme diftributive juftice in rhe univerfe, I ought to expe6l fome more particular reward of the good, and punifliment of the bad, beyond the ordi- nary courfe of events j 1 here find the fame fallacy, which I have before endeavoured to deteA. You perfift in imagining, that, if we grant that divine exigence, for which you fo earneflly contend, you may fafely infer confequenccs from it, and add fomethingto the experienced order of nature, by ar- guing from the attributes which you afcribe to your gods. You feem not to remember, that all your reafonings on this fubjeft can only be drawn from effecls to caufes i and that every argument, deduced from caufes to effeds, muft of neceffity be a grofs fophifm ; fince it is impoflible for you to know any thing of the caufe,' but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but difcovered to the full, in the effcd:.
But
OfaPROviDENCE and Future State. T51
But what muft a philofopher think of thofe vain reafoners, who, inftead of regarding the prefent fcene of things as the fole objed of their contemplation, fo far reverfe the whole courfe of nature, as to render this life merely a paf- fage to fomething farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vaftly different building; a pro- logue, v/hich ferves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can fuch philoibphers derive their idea of the gods ? From their own conceit and imagination furely. For if they derived it from the prefent ph;Enomena, it would never point to any thing fartiier, but mud be exa6lly adjufted to them. That the divinity may poffibly be endowed with attributes, which we have never feen exert- ed ; may be governed by principles of adtion, which we cannot difcover to be fatisfied : All this will freely be allowed. But ftill this is mere pojjibiliiy and hypothefis. We never can have rea- fon to infer any attributes, or any principles of aflion in him, but fo far as we kfiow them to have been exerted and fatisfied.
Are there any marks of a diflributive jufiice in the world ? If you anfwer in the affirmative, I con- clifie, that, fince juftice here exerts itfelf, it :s fatisfied. If you reply in the negative, I con- clude, that you have then no reafon to afcribe juftice, in our fenfe of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negati- on, by faying, that the juflic^ of the gods, at prefent, exerts itfelf in part, but not in its full extent ; I anfwer, that you have no reafon to give it any particular extent, but only fo far as yo u fee it, at prefent^ exert iifelF.
Thus I bring the difpute, O Athenians, to a Ihort iflue with my antagonifls. The courfe of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the
great
152 S E C T I O N XI.
great ftandard, by which we all regulate our con- dud. Nothing elfe can be appealed to in the field, or in the fenate. Nothing elfe ought ever to be heard of in the fchool, or in the clofet. In vain would our limited underftanding break through thofe boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond innagination. While we argue from the courfe of nature, and infer a particular intelli- gent caufe, which firfl beftowed, and ftili preferves order in the univerfe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and ufelefs. It is uncer- tain i becaufe the fubjefh lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is ufelefs ; becaufe our knowledge of this caufe being derived entirely from the courfe of nature, we can never, accord- ing to the rules of juft reafoning, return back from the caufe with any new inference, or making ad- ditions to the common and experienced courfe of nature, eftablifh any nev; principles of conduct and behaviour.
I obferve (faid I, finding he had finifhed his ha- rangue) that you negleft not the artifice of the demagogues of old ; and as you were pleafed to make me ftand for the people, you infinuate yourfelf into m.y favour by embracing thofe prin- ciples, to which, you know, I have always ex- prefTed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only flandard of our judgment concerning this, and all other queftions of fad; I doubt not but, from the very faifie experience, to which you ap- peal, it may be poflible to refute this reafoning, which you have put into the itiouth of Epicurus. If you faw, for inftance, a half-finiflied build- ing, furrounded with heaps of brick and Itone and mortar, and all the inflruments of mafonryj could you not infer from the eifetl, that it was a work of defign and contrivance ? And could you not return again, from this inferred caufe, to infer
new
Of a Providence and Future State. 153
new additions to the effcdl, and conclude, that the building would foon be finiflied, and receive all the further improvements, which art could be- ftow upon it ? If you faw upon the fea-fhore thq print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had paflfed that way, and that he had alfo left the traces of the other foot, though ef- faced by the rolling of the fands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refufe to admit the fame method of realbning with regard to the or- der of nature ? Confider the world and the pre- fent life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a fuperior intelligence ; and arguing from that fuperior inteHigence, which can leave nothing imperfe6t ; why may you not infer a more finifhed fcheme or plan, which will receive its com- pletion in fome diftant point of fpace or time ? Are not thefe methods of reafoning exa6bly fimilar ? And under what pretence can you embrace the one, ■while you rejedt the other ?
The infinite difference of the fubjeifts, replied he, is a fufficient foundation for this difference in my conclufions. In works of human art and con- trivance, it is allowable to advance from the effedt to the caufe, and returning back from the caufe, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably un- dergone, or may flill undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reafoning ? Plainly this; that man is a being, whojn we know by experience, whofe motives and defigns we are ac- quainted with, and whofe projects and inclina- tions have a certain connexion and coherence, according to the laws which nature has eftablifh- ed for the government of fuch a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded from the fkill and induflry of man j as we are otherwife acquainted with the nature of the ani- mal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning
what
154 S E C T I O N XI.
what may be expefbed from him ; and thefe in- ferences will all be founded in experience and ob- fervation. But did we know man only from the fingle work or produdion which we examine, it were impoflible for us to argue in this manner ; becaufe our knowledge of all the qualities, which we afcribe to him, being in that cafe derived from the production, it is impoffible they could point to any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot in the fand can only prove, when confidered alone, that there was fome figure adapted to it, by which it was produced : But the print of a human foot proves likewife, from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which alfo left its imprefTion, though effaced by time or other ac- cidents. Here we mount from the effc6l to the caufe ; and defcending again from the caufe, in- fer alterations in the effe6t ; but this is not a continuation of the fame fimple chain of reafoning. We comprehend in this cafe a hundred other ex- periences and obfervations, concerning the ujual figure and members of that fpecies of animal, without v/hich this method of argument muft be confidered as fallacious and fophiftical.
The cafe is not the fame with our reafon* ings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a fingle being in the univerfe, not comprehended under any fpecies or genus, from whofe experien- ced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the univerfe fhews wifdom and goodnefs, we infer wifdom and goodnefs. As it fhews a particular degree of thefe perfedlions, we infer a particular degree of them, precifely adapted to the efied: which we examine. But farther attributes or far- ther degrees of the fame attributes we can ne- ver be authorifed to infer or fuppofe, by any
rules
Of aPROviDiNCE and Future State. 155
rules of juft reafoning. Now, without fome fuch licence of fuppofition, it is impolllble for us to » argue from the caufe, or infer any alteration in the effeft, beyond what has immediately fallen under our obfervation. Greater good produced by this Being muft IHII prove a greater degree of goodnefs : A more impartial diftributioa of rewards and punifliments muft proceed from a greater regard to juftice and equity. Every fup- pofed addition to the works of n.iture makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of na- ture; and confequently, being entirely unfup- ported by any reafon or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conje(5lure and hypo- thefis *.
The great fource of our miftake in this fub- jecb, and of the unbounded licence of conjefture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly confider ourfelves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occafion, obferve the fame condudt, which we ourfelves, in his fituation, would have embraced as reafo- nable and eligible. But, befides that the ordi- nary courfe of nature may convince us, that al- moft every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours -, befides this, I fay, it muft evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reafon, from the intentions and projefts of men, to thofe of a Being fo different, and fo much fuperior. In human nature, there is a certain experienced coherence of deligns and inclinations ; fo that when, from any fad, we have difcovered one 'intention of any man, it may often be reafonable, from experience, to in- fer another, and draw a lono; chain of conclu- fions concerning his paft or future condudl. But this method of reafoning can never have place
with
• See NOTE [M].
156 SECTION XI.
with regard to a Being, fo remote and incom- prehenfible, who bears much lefs analogy to any other being in the univerfe than the fun to a waxen taper, and who difcovers himfelf only by fome faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to afcribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine to be a fuperior perfe6lion, may really be adefedt. Or were it ever fo much a perfedlion, the afcribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, favours more of flattery and panegyric, than of juft reafoning and fouad philofophy. All the phi- lofophy, therefore, in the world, and all the reli- gion, which is nothing buc a fpecies of phiiorophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the ufual courfe of experience, or give us meafures of con- duct and behaviour different from thofe which are furnifhed by reflexions on common life. No new fadl can ever be inferred from the religious hypo- thefis j no event forefeen or foretold ; no reward or punifhment expefted or dreaded, beyond what is already known by pradlice and obfervation. So that my apology for Epicurus will ftill appear fo- lid and fatisfadory j nor have the political interefts of fociety any connexion with the philofophical difputes concerning metaphyfics and religion.
There is flill one circumfl:ance, replied I, which you feem to have overlooked. Though I fhould allow your premifes, 1 muft deny your conclufi- on. You conclude, that religious doflines and reafonings can have no influence on life, becaufe they ought to have no influence : never confider- ing, that men reafon not in the fame manner you do, but draw many confequences from the belief of a divine Exifl:ence, and fuppofe that the Deity will inflidl punifliments on vice, and bcftow re- wards on virtue, beyond what appear in the or- dinary courfe of nature. Whether this reafoning
of
Of a Providence and Future State. 157
of theirs be juft or not, is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduft mull ilill be the fame. And, thofc, who attempt to difabufe them of fuch prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good rcafo- ners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians ; fince they free men from one re- llraint upon their paffions, and make the infringe- ment of the laws of fociety, in one refpe6t, more eafy and fecure.
After all, 1 may, perhaps, agree to your gene- ral conclufion in favour of liberty, though upon different premlfes from thofe, on which you en- deavour to found it. I think, that the ftate ought to tolerate every principle of philofophy; nor is there an inflance, that any government has fuffer- ed in its political interefts by fuch indulgence. There is no enthufiafm among philofophers j their dottrines are not very alluring to the people; and no reftraint can be put upon their reafonings, but what mud be of dangerous confequence to the fciences, and even to the Hate, by paving the way for perfecution and oppreffion in points, where the generality of mankind are more deeply interefted and concerned.
But there occurs to me (continued I) with re- gard to yo'rmain topic, a difficulty, which I fhall juR propofe to you, without infilling on it; left it lead into reafonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether it be poPible for a caufe to be known only by its effect (as you have all along fuppofed) or to be of fo fingular and pat dcular a nature as to have no parallel and no fimilarity with any other caufe or objedl, that has ever fallen under our obfcrvation. It is only when two /pedes of objedls are found to be conflantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effed: prefented, which was entirely fingular, and could not be comprehended under any known JpecieSi I do not fee, that we could
form
158 SECTION XI.
form any conje6bure or inference at all concerning its caufe. If experience and obfervation and ana- logy be, indeed, the only guides which we can rea- fonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effe6b and caufe muft bear a fimilarity and refem- biance to other effects and caufes, which we know, and which we have found, in many inftances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own re- fiedtion to purfue the confequencesof this principle. I fhall juft obferve, that, as the antagonifts of Epicurus always fuppofe the univerfe, an effeft quite fingular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a caufe no lefs fingular and unparalleled ; your reafonings, upon that fuppofition, feenn, at leafb, to merit our attention. There is, I own, fome difficulty, how we can ever return from the caufe to the effefl, and, reafoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any addition to it.
SECTION
( >59 )
SECTION XIL
Of the Academical or Sceptical Philo- sophy.
PART I.
A HERE is not a greater number of philofo- phical reafonings, difplayed upon any fubjetb, than thofe, which prove the exiftence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheifts j and yet the moft religious philofophers ftill difpute whether any man can be fo blinded as to be a fpeculative atheill. How fhall we reconcile thefe contradidtions ? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the leaft doubt with regard to the exiftence of thefe monfters.
The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philofophers j though it is certain, that no man ever met with any fuch abfurd creature, or converfed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any fubjeft, either of action or fpeculation. This begets a very natural quef- tion ; What is meant by a fceptic ? And how far it is pofTible to pufh thefe philofophical principles of doubt and uncertainty ?
There
i6o SECTION fXif.
There is a fpecies of fcepticifm, antecedent to al! ftudy and philofophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a fovereign preferva- tive againll error and precipitate judgment. It recommends an univerfal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but alfo of our very faculties ; of whofe veracity, fay they, we muft aiTure ourfelves, by a chain of reafoning, de- duced from fome original principle, which cannot poffibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any fuch original principle, which has a pre- rogative above others, that are felf-evident and convincing : Or if there were, could we advance a ftep beyond it, but by the ufe of thofe very fa- culties, of which we are fuppofed to be already diffident. The Cartefian doubt, therefore, were it ever polfible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable j and no reafoning could ever bring us to a Hate of afiurance and conviftion upon any fubjedl.
It muft, however, be confefled, that this fpecies of fcepticifm, when more moderate, may be un- derftood in a very reafonable fenfe, and is a necef- fary preparative to the ftudy of philofophy, by pre- ferving a proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning our mind from all thofe prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rafh opinion. To begin with clear and felf-evi- dent principles, to advance by timorous and fure fteps, to review frequently our conclufions, and examine accurately all their confequences; though by thefe means we fliall make both a flow and a fhort progrefs in our fyftcmsj are the only me- thods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper ftability and certainty in our determinations.
There is another fpecies of fcepticifm, conje- quent to fcience and enquiry, when men are fup- pofed to have difcovered, either the abfolute fal- 3 lacioulhefs
Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. i6i
lacioufnefs of their mental faculties, or their un- fitnefs to reach any fixed determination in all thofe curious fubjefts of fpeculation, about which they are commonly employed. Even our very fenfes are brought into difpute, by a certain fpecies of philofophers ; and the maxims of common life are fubjedted to the fame doubt as the mofl: profound principles or conclufions of metaphyfics and theo- logy. As thefe paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in fome phi- lofophers, and the refutation of them in feveral, they naturally excite our curiofity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which they may be founded.
I need not infift upon the more trite topics, employed by the fceptics in all ages, againft the evidence o{ Jenje ; fuch as thofe which are derived from the imperfedlion and fallacioufnefs of our or- gans, on numberlefs occafions j the crooked ap- pearance of an oar in water ; the various afpefts of objects, according to their different diftancesj the double images which arife from the prefling one eye ; with many other appearances of a like na- ture. Thefe fceptical topics, indeed, are only fufficient to prove, that the fenfes alone are not implicitly to be depended on j but that we mufl: corredl their evidence by reafon, and by con- fiderations, derived from the nature of the me- dium, the diftance of the obje<5t, and the dif- pofition of the organ, in order to render them, within their fphere, the proper criteria of truth and falfehood. There are other more profound arguments againft the fenfes, which admit noc of fo eafy a folution.
It feems evident, that men are carried, by a natural inftin6t or prepolTelTion, to repofe faith in their fenfes ; and that, without any reafoning, or even almoft before the ufe of reafon, we always fuppofe an external univerfe, which depends not on
Vol. II. M our
i62 SECTION XII.
our perception, but would exift, though we and every fenfible creature were abfent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preferve this belief of exter- nal objefts, in all their thoughts, defigns, and aftions.
It feems aifo evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful inftindt of nature, they always fuppofe the very images, prefented by the fenfes, to be the external obje<5ls, and never en- tertain any fufpicion, that the one are nothing but reprefentations of the other. This very table, which we fee white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exift, independent of our perception, and to be fomething external to our mind, which perceives it. Our prefence beflows not being on it : Our abfence does not annihilate it. It pre- ferves its exiftence uniform and entire, indepen- dent of the fituation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
But this univerfai and primary opinion of all men is foon deftroyed by the flighteft philofophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be pre- fent to the mind but an image or perception, and that the fenfes are only the inlets, through which thefe images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourfe be- tween the mind and the obje6b. The table, which we fee, feems to diminifh, as we remove farther from it : But the real table, which exifts inde- pendent of us, fafFers no alteration : It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was pre- fent to the mind. Thefe are the obvious dic- tates of reafon j and no man, who reflecfts, ever doubted, that the exiftences, which we confider, when we fay, this houfe and that tree, are no- thing but perceptions in the mind, and fleet- ing copies or reprefentations of other exiftences, which remain uniform and independent. '
So
Academical or ScEPTrcALPHiLosoPHY. 163
So far, then, are we necefTitated by reafoning to contradid or depart from the primary inftindts of nature, and to embrace a new fyfteni with re- gard to the evidence of our fenfes. But here phi- lofophy finds herfelf extremely embarraflfed, when fhe would juftify this new fyftem, and obviate the cavils and objecflions of the fceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irrefiftible inftinft of nature : For that led us to a quite different fyftem, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to juftify this pretended philo- fophical fyftemj by a chain of clear and convinc- ing argument, or even any appearance of argu- ment, exceeds the power of all human capa- city.
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind muft be caufed by ex- ternal objefts, entirely different from them, though refembling them (if that be poftible) and could not arife either from the energy of the mind it- felf, or from the fuggeftion of fome invifible and unknown fpirit, or from fome other caufe ftill more unknown to us ? It is acknowledged, that, in faft, many of thefe perceptions arife not from any thing external, as in dreams, madnefs, and other dif- eafes. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body ftiould fo operate Upon mind as ever to convey an image of itfelf to a fubftance, fuppofed of fo different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a queftion of facl, whether the percep- tions of the fenfes be produced by external ob- jedls, refembling them : How ftiall this queftion be determined ? By experience furcly ; as all other queftions of a like nature. But here experience is, and muft be entirely filent. The mind has never any thing prcfent to it but the percepti- ons, and cannot poffibly reach any experience of their connexion with objedls. The fuppofition
M 2 of
164 SECTION XII.
of fuch a connexion is, therefore, withotit any foundation in reafoning.
To have recourfe to the veracity of the Su- preme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our fenfes, is furely making a very unexpe6led circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our fenfes would be entirely infalli- ble ; becaufe it is not pofTible that he can ever de- ceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in queflion, we fhall be at a lofs to find arguments, by which we may prove the exiflence of that Being or any of his attri- butes.
This is a topic, therefore, in which the pro- founder and more philofophical fceptics will al- ways triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an univerfal doubt into all fubjeds of human know- ledge and enquiry. Do you follow the inftinfts and propenfities of nature, may they fay, in af- fenting to the veracity of fenfe ? But thefe lead you to believe, that the very perception or fenfible image is the external objedt. Do you difclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only reprefentations of fomething external ? You here depart from your natural propenfities and more obvious fentiments; and yet are not able to fatisfy your reafon, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are conne6led with any exter- nal objedls.
There is another fceptical topic of a like na- ture, derived from the moft profound philofophy; which might merit our attention, were it requifite to dive fo deep, in order to difcover arguments and realbnings, which can fo little ferve to any feri- ous purpofe. It is univerfally allowed by mo- dern enquirers, that all the fenfible qualities of ob-
jeds.
AfcADEMICALOr SCEPTICAL PniLOSOPHY. 165
je(fts, fuch as hard, fofr, hot, cold, white, black, iffc. are merely fecondary, and cxift not in the ob- jefts themfelves, but arc perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they reprefent. If this be allowed, with regard to fecondary qualities, it muft alfo follow, with re- gard to the fuppofed primary qualities of extenfion and folidity ; nor can the latter be any more en- titled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extenfion is entirely acquired from the fenfes of fight and feeling ; and if all the quali- ties, perceived by the fenfes, be in the mind, not in the objeii, the fame conclufion mult reach the idea of extenfion, which is wholly dependent on the fenfible ideas or the ideas of fecondary qualities. Nothing can fave us from this con- clufion, but the aflerting, that the ideas of thofe primary qualities are attained by AhJlraElion^ an opinion, which, if we exaipin^ it accurately, we fhall find to be unintelligible, and even abfurd. An extenfion, that is neither tangible nor vifible, cannot pofiibly be conceived : And a tangible or vifible extenfion, v/hich is neither hard nor foft, biack. nor white, is equally beyond the reach of Jiuman conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither IJoceles nor Scalenum^ nor has any particular length or pro- portion of fides; and he will foon perceive the ab- furdity of all the fcholaflric notions with regard to abftradlion and general ideas *.
Thus the firll philofophical ob;c(5lion to the evidence of fenfe or to the opinion of external cxiftence confills in this, that fuch an opinion, if refted on natural inftincft, is contrary to reafon, and if referred to reafon, is contrary to natural inftintft, and at the fame time carries no rational evidence >vith it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The
fecond
* See NOTE [N].
i66 SECTION XIL
fecond objeftion goes farther, and reprefents this opinion as contrary to reafon : at leaft, if it bcia principle of reafon, that all fenfible qualities are in the mind, not in the objed. Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and fe- condary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable fomethingj as the caufe of our perceptions j a notion fo im- perfect, that no fceptic will think it worth while to contend againft it.
P A R T II.
It may feem a very extravagant attempt of the fceptics to deflroy reafon by argument and ratioci- nation j yet is this the grand fcope of all their en- quiries and difputes. They endeavour to find objediions, both to our abftradt rcafonings, and to thofe which regard matter of fadl and exif- tence.
The chief objeftion againft all ahJiraEl reafon- ings is derived from the ideas of fpace and time ; ideas, which, in common life and to a carelefs view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pafs through the fcrutiny of the profound fciences (and they are the chief object of thefe fciences) ajfford principles, which feem full of abfurdity and contradiction. No prieftly dogmas, invented on purpofe to tame and fubdue the re- bellious reafon of mankind, ever fhocked com- mon fenfe more than the dodrine of the infinite divifibility of extenfion, with its confequences ; as they are pompoufly difplayed by all geometri- cians and metaphyficians, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, infinitely lefs than itfelf, and fo on in iyijinitum \ this is an edi- fice fo bold and prodigious, that it is too weigh- ty for any pretended demonftration to fupport, becaufe it fliocks the clcareft and molt natural
principles
KY, II
Academical or Sceptical Philosopmy. 167
principles of human reafon *. But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that thefe feem- ingly abfurd opinions are fupported by a chain of reafoning, the cleared and moil natural ; nor is it pofllble for us to allow the premifes without ad- mitting the confequences. Nothing can be more convincing and fatisfaftory than all the conclufions concerning the properties of circles and triangles ; and yet, when thefe are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of contact between a cir- cle and its tangent is infinitely lefs than any refti- lineal angle, that as you may encreafe the diame- ter of the circle in infinitum, this angle of coniact becomes ftill lefs, even in infinitum, and that the an- gle of contadt between other curves and their tan- gents may be infinitely lefs than thofe between any circle and its tangent, and fo on, in infinitum ? The demonftration of thefe principles feems as unex- ceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter opinion be natural and eafy, and the former big with contradiction and abfurdity. Rea- fon here feems to be thrown into a kind of amaze- ment and fufpenfe, which, without the fuggeftions of any fceptic, gives her a difKdence of herfelf, and of the ground on which fhe treads. She fees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the moil profound darknefs. And between thefe fhe is fo dazzled and confounded, that fhe fcarcely can pronounce with certainty and alTurance concerning any one objeft.
The abfurdity of thefe bold determinations of the abftradt fciences feems to become, if poflible, flill more palpable with regard to time than exten- fion. An infinite number of real parts of time, pafTing in fuccelTion, and exhaufted one after ano- ther, appears fo evident a contradiction, that no man, one fhould think, whofe judgment is not corrupted, inftead of being improved, by the l'ciences_, would ever be able to admit of is;. Yet
t See NOTE [O].
i68 SECTION XII.
Yet flill reafon muft remain reftlefs, and un- quiet, even with regard to that fcepticifm, to which fhe is driven by thefe feeming abfurdi- ties and contradiftions. How any clear, diftind: idea can contain circumfcances, contradidory to itfelf, or to any other clear, diftinft idea, is ab- folutely incomprehenfiblej and is, perhaps, as abfurd as any propofition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more fceptical, or more full of doubt and hefitation, than this fcepticifm itfelf, which arifes from fome of the paradoxical conclufions of geometry or the fcience of quan- tity *.
The fceptical obje(5lions to moral evidence, or to the reaionings concerning matter of fadt, are cither popular or philc/cpbical. The popular objec- tions are derived from the natural weaknefs of hu- man underftanding; the contradidlory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgment in ficknefs and health, youth and old age, profpe- rity and adverfity ; the perpetual contradi(fbion of each particular man's opinions and fentiments ; with many other topics of that kind. It is need- lefs to infift farther on this head. Thefe ob- jedions are but weak. For as, in common life, we reafon every moment concerning faft and exift- ence, and cannot pofTibly fubfift, without continu- ally employing this fpecies of argument, any po- pular objeftions, derived from thence, mult be infufficient to dcftroy that evidence. The great fubverter of Pyrrhonlfm or the cxcelTive principles of fcepticifm, is adlion, and employment, and the occupations of common life. TheJe principles may flourifli and triumph in the fchools ; where it is, indeed, dilficult, if not impoilible, to refute them. But as foon as they leave tlie fnade, and by the prefence of the real objects, which acluate
our I Sec NOTE [P].
AcADEMiCALOr Sceptical Philosophy. 169
our pafTions and fentiments, are put in oppofition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanilK like fmoke, and leave the moft de- termined fceptic in the fame condition as other mortals.
The fceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper fphere, and difplay thofe philofophical ob- jedions, which arife from more profound refearch- cs. Here he feems to have ample matter of tri- umph; while he juftly infifts, that all our evidence for any matter of fa6t, which lies beyond the tef- timony of fenfe or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of caufe and efFedt ; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objefts, which have been frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewife, in other inftances, be conjoined in the fame manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but cuf- tom or a certain inftindt of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to refifl, but which, like other inflindbs, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the fceptic infifts upon thefe topics, he fliews his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weaknefs ; and feems, for the time at leaft, to deftroy all aflurance and conviction. Thefe arguments might be difplayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to fociety could ever be exped;ed to refult from them.
For here is the chief and moft confounding ob- jection to excejjive fcepticifm, that no durable good can ever refult from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only afk fuch a fceptic, What his meaning is ? And what he propojes by all thefe curious rejearches? He is immediately at a lofs, and knows not what to anfwer. A Co- pernican or Ptolemaic, who fupports each his different fyftem of aftronomy, may hope to produce
a con-
ijo SECTION XII.
a convi(5lion, which will remain conflant and du- rable, with his audien.ce. A Stoic or Epicurean difplays principles, which may not only be durable, but which have an effedl on cofidud: and beha- viour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expe6l, that his philofophy will have any conftant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to fociety. On the contrary, he muft acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life muft perifli, were his principles univerfally and fteadily to prevail. All difcourfe, all adtion would imm.ediatcly ceafe ; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the ne- celTities of nature, unfatisfied, put an end to their miferable exiftence. It is true ; fo fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too ftrong for principle. And though a Pyrrho- nian may throw himfelf or others into a momen- tary anaazement and confufion by his profound reafonings ; the firfl and mofl trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and fcruples; and leave him the fame in every point of adion and fpeculation, with the philofophers of every other fed:, or with thofe who never concerned them- felves in any philofophical refearches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the firft to join in the laugh againft himfelf, and to con- fefs, that all his objections are mere amufement, and can have no other tendency than to fhow the whiipfical condition of mankind, who muft ad and reafon and believe; though they are not able, by their moft diligent enquiry, to fatisfy themfelves concerning the foundation of thefe 'operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raifed againft them.
PART
Academical or Sceptical PHiLOSopHy. 171
PART III.
There is, indeed, a more mitigated fcepticifm or academical philofophy, which may be both durable and iifeful, and which may, in part, be the re- fult of this Pyrrhonifm, or excejfive fcepticifm, when its undiftinguifhed doubts are, in fome meafure, corrected by common fenfe and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions ; and while they fee objects only on one fide, and have no idea of any counterpofing argument, they throw themfelves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined ; nor have they in- dulgence for thofe who entertain oppofite fenti- ments. To hefitate or balance perplexes their un- derftanding, checks their paffion, and fufpends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they efcape from a ftate, which to them is fo uneafyi and they can never remove themfelves far enough from it, by the violence of their af- firmations and obftinacy of their belief. But could fuch dogmatical reafoners become fenfible of the ftrange infirmities of human underftanding, even in its moft perfect ftate, and when moft accu- rate and cautious in its determinations; fuch a reflection would naturally infpire them with more modefty and refervc, and diminifh their fond opi- nion of themfelves, and their prejudice againft antagonifts. The illiterate may reflect on the dif- pofition of the learned, who, amidft all the ad- vantages of ftudy and reflection, are common- ly ftill difiident in their determinations: And if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural tem- per, to haughtinefs and obftinacy, a fmall tincture of Pyrrhonifm might abate their pride, by fhewing them that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconfiderable,
if
172 SECTION XII.
if compared with the univerfal perplexity and con- fufion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modefty, which, in all kinds of fcrutiny and decifion, ought for ever to accompany a juft reafoner.
Another fpecies of mitigated ' (ceipticKmy which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural refult of the Pyrrhonian doubts and fcruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to fuch fubjefts as are beft adapted to the nar- row capacity of human underftanding. The ima- gination of man is naturally fublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without controul, into the moft diftant parts of fpace and time in order to avoid the objeds, which cuftom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct Judgment obferves a contrary method, and avoiding all diftant and high en- quiries, confines itfelf to common life, and to fuch fubjefts as fall under daily practice and experi- ence; leaving the more fublime topics to the embellifhment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priefts and politicians. To bring us to fo falutary a determination, nothing can be more ferviceablc, than to be once thoroughly convinc- ed of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of the impoflibility, that any thing, but the ftrong power of natural inftindt, could free us from it. Thofe who have a propenfuy to philofophy, will ftill continue their refearches; becaufe they re- fled:, that befides the immediate pleafure, attend- ing fuch an occupation, philofophical decifions are nothing but the refledtions of common life, methodized and correded. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, fo long as they confider the imperfection of thofe facul- ties which they employ, their narrow reach, and jdicir inaccurate operacions. While wc cannot
give
Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. 173
give a fatisfaftory reafon, why we believe, after a thoufand experiments, that a ftone will fall, or fire burn -, can we ever fatisfy ourfelves concerning any determination, which we may form, with re- gard to the origin of worlds, and the fituation of nature, from, and to eternity ?
This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enqui- ries, is in every refped, lb reafonable, that it luf- fices to make the flighted examination into the na- tural powers of the human mind, and to compare them with their objedls, in order to recommend it to us. We fliall then find what are the proper fub- jefts of fcience and enquiry.
It feems to me, that the only objefts of the ab- ilradt fciences or of demonftration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect fpecies of knowledge beyond thefe bounds arc mere fophiftry and illufion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely fimilar, their relations become intricate and involved j and nothing can be more curious, as well as ufeful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly diftin6l and diffe- rent from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmoft fcrutiny, than to obferve this di- verfity, and by an obvious reflediion, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in thcfe decifions, it proceeds entirely from tlie undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by jufter definitions. That tbefquare of the hypothenufe is equal to the fquares of the other two ftdeSj cannot be known, let the terms be ever fo exaflly defined, without a train of reafoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this propofition, that ivhcre there is vo property ^ there can he no in- jufiicey it is only neceffary to define the terms, and explain injuflice to be a violation of property. This propofition is, indeed, nothing but a more, imper- fect
174 SECTION XIL
fc<5t definition. It is the fame cafe with all thole pretended fyllogiftical reafonings, which nnay be found in every other branch of learning, except the fciences of quantity and number; and thefe may fafelyj I think, be pronounced the only pro- per objects of knowledge and demonftration.
All other enquiries of men regard only mat- ter of fa6t and exiftencej and thefe are evident- ly incapable of demonftration. Whatever is may not be^ No negation of a fa*^: can involve a contradiction. The non-exiftence of any being, without exception, is as clear and diftinft an idea as its exiftence. The propofition, which affirms it not to be, however falfe, is no lefs conceiv- able and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The cafe is different with the fciences, properly fo called. Every propofition, which is not true, is there confufed and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a falfe propofition, and can never be diftinftly conceived. But that Csefar, or the an- gel Gabriel, or any being never exifted, may be a falfe propofition, but ftill is perfectly conceiv- able, and implies no contradiftion.
The exiftence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its effect; and thefe arguments are founded entirely on ex- perience. If we reafon a -priorij any thing may appear able to produce any thing. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguiOi the fun; or the wifh of a man controul the planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of caufe and effect, and enables us to infer the exiftence of one object from that of another*. Such is the foun- dation of moral reafoning, which fonns the grea- ter part of human knowledge, and is the fource of all human action and behaviour.
Moral • See NOTE [ CL].
Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. 175
Moral reafonlngs are either concerning par- ticular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as alfo all difquifitions in hiftory, chronology, geography, and aftronomy.
The fciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philofophy, phyfic, chymif- try, ^c. where the qualities, caufes and effects of a whole fpecies of objects are enquired into.
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the exif- tence of a Deity, and the immortality of fouls, is compofed partly of reafonings concerning par- ticular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reajouy fo far as it is fupported by experience. But its befl: and mod folid foun- dation is faith and divine revelation.
Morals and criticifm are not fo properly ob- jects of the underllanding as of tafte and fentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reafon concern- ing it, and endeavour to fix its ftandard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tafte of mankind, or fome fuch fact, which may be the object of rca- foning and enquiry.
When we run over libraries, perfuaded of thefe principles, what havoc muft we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or fchool me- taphyfics, for inftance; let us afk. Does it contain any ahftraEl reafoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reafoning con- cerning matter of fa5i and exiflence? No. Commit it then to the flames : For it can contain nothino- but fophiftry and illufion.
( 177 )
A DISSERTATION
O N T H E
PASSIONS.
SECT. I.
,.S
OME objects produce immediately an agree- able fenfation, by the original flrudure of our or- gans, and are thence denominated Good ; as others, from their immediate diiagreeable fenfation, ac- quire the appellation of Evil. Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good j excefllve heat pain- ful and evil.
Some objects again, by being naturally con- formable or contrary to paflion, excite an agree- able or painful fenfation ; and are thence called Good or Evil. The punifliment of an adverfa- ^y> ^y gratifying revenge, is good ; the ficknefs of a companion, by affetting friendfhip, is evil.
1. All good or evil, whence-evcr it arifes, pro- duces various paffions and affedlions, according to the light in which it is furveyed.
When good is certain or very probable, it produces Joy : When evil is in the fame fitua- tion, there arifes Grief or Sorrow.
Vol.11. N When
lyS A DiS SER TAT ION
When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rife to Fear or Hope, according to the degree of uncertainty on one fide or the other.
Defire arifes from good confidered fimply; and Averfion, from evil. The Will exerts itfelf, when either the prefence of the good or abfcnce of the evil may be attained by any a6tion of the mind or body.
3. None of thefe pafTions feem to contain any thing curious or remarkable, except Ho-pe and Feavy which, being derived from the probability of any good or evil, are mixed pafiions, that me- rit our attention.
Probability arifes from an oppofition of con- trary chances or caufes, by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either fide ; but is incef- fantly tofl^ed from one to another, and is deter- mined, one moment, to confider an object as ex- iftent, and another moment as the contrary. The imagination or underftanding, call it "which you pleafe, fiuftuates between the oppofite views ; and though perhaps it may be oftener turned to one fide than the other, it is impoffible for it, by reafon of the oppofition of caufes or chances, to reft on either. The pro and co7i of the queftion alternately prevail ^ and the mind, furveying the objects in their oppofite caufes, finds iuch a con- trariety as deftroys all certainty or eftablifhed opi- nion.
Suppofe, then, that the obje6b, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either defire or averfion; it is evident, that, according as the mind turns itfelf to one fide or the other, it muft itt\ a momentary imprefllon of joy or forrow. An objeft, whofe exiftence we defire, gives fa- tisfaftion, when we think of thofe caufes, wliich produce it ; and for the fame reafon, excites grief or uneafinefs from the oppofite confideration. So that, as the underftanding, in probable queftions,
is
1
On the Passions. 179
is divided between the contrary points of view, the heart mud in the fame nnanner be divided between oppofite emotions.
Now, if we confider the human mind, we fliall obferve, that, with regard to the pafTions, it is not like a wind inflrument of mufic, which, in running over all the notes, immediately lofes the found when the breath ceafes ; but rather re- fembles a Itring-inftrument, where, after each ftroke, the vibrations ftill retain fome found, which gradually and infenfibly decays. The ima- gination is extremely quick and agile ; but the paflions, in comparifon, are flow and reftive : For which reafon, when any objedl is prefcnted, which affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other ; though the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each ftroke will not produce a clear and diftindt note of palTion, but the one paffion will always be mixed and con- founded with the other. According as the pro- bability inclines to good or evil, the palTion of grief or joy predominates in the com^pofition i and thefe paflions being intermingled by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the paflions of hope or fear.
4. As this theory feems to carry its own evi- dence along with it, we fhali be more concife in our proofs.
The paflions of fear and hope may arife, when the chances are equal on both fides, and no fu- periority can be difcovered in one above the other. Nay, in this fituation the paffions are rather the ftrongeft, as the mind has then the leaft founda- tion to refl: upon, and is toft with the greateft un- certainty. Throw in a fuperior degree of proba- bility to the fide of grief, you immediately fee that pafllon difiufe itfelf over the compofition, and tinc- ture it into fear. Encreafe the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails iiill more
N 2 and
i8o A Dissertation
and more, 'till at lad it runs infenfiblyj as the joy continually diminifhes, into pure grief. Af- ter you have brought it to this fituation, diminifh the grief, by a contrary operation to that, which encreafed it, to wit, by diminifliing the probabili- ty on the melancholy fide; and you will fee the paflion clear every moment, 'till it changes infen- Iibly into hope; which again runs, by flow de- grees, into joy, as you encreafe that part of the compofition, by the encreafe of the probability. Are not thefe as plain proofs, that the paflions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a coloured ray of the fun, pafTing through a prifm, is a compofition of two others, when, as you diminifh or encreafe the quantity of either, you find it prevail pro- portionably, more or lefs, in the compofition ?
5. Probability is of two kinds; either when the objeft is itielf uncertain, and to be determined by chance; or when, though the object be already certain, yet it is uncertain to our judgment, which finds a number of proofs or prefumptions on each fide of the queflion. Both thefe kinds of probability caufe fear andjhope; which muft pro- ceed from that property, in which they agree ; namely, the uncertainty and fludluation which they beftow on the pafTion, by that contrariety of views, which is common to both.
6. It is a probable good or evil, which com- monly caufes hope or fear; becaufe probability, producing an inconftant and wavering furvey of an objt6t, occafions naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of pafTion. But we may obferve, that, wherever, from other caufes, this mixture can be produced, the pafTions of fear and hope will arife, even though there be no probability.
An evil, conceived as barely pojjible^ fomctimes produces fear ; cfpecially if the evil be very great. A man cannot think on excefllve pain
and
on the Passionts. i8i
and torture without trembling;, if he runs the lead rifque of fuffering them. The fmallnefs of the probability is compenfated by the greatnefs of the evil.
But even impojjible evils caufe fear ; as when we tremble on the brink of a precipice, though we know ourfelves to be in perfeft fccurity, and have it in our choice, whether we will advance a ftep farther. The immediate prefence of the evil influences the imagination and produces a fpecies of belief; but being oppofed by the reflexion on our fecurity, that belief is immediately retraced, and caufes the fame kind of palTion, ns when, from a contrariety of chances^ contrary pafTions are produced.
Evils, which are certain^ have fometimes the lame effe(rt as the pofiible or impoflible. A man, in a flrong prifon, without the leafl; means of ef- cape, trembles at the thoughts of the rack, to which he is fentenced. The evil is here fixed in itfelf; but the mind has not courage to fix upon it; and this fluctuation gives rife to a palTion of a fimilar appearance with fear.
7. But it is not only where good or evil is un- certain as to its extftencej but alfo as to its kind, that fear or hope arifes. If any one were told that one of his fons is fuddenly killed; the paffion, occafioned by this event, would not fettle into grief, 'till he had got certain information which of his fons he had loft. Though each fide of the queltion produces here the fame pafTion ; that pafTion cannot fettle, but receives from tlie imagi- nation, which is unfixed, a tremulous unfteady motion, refembling the mixture and contention of grief and joy.
8. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a ftrong connexion with fear, even though they do not caufe any oppofition of paflions, by the oppofite views which they prefent to us. Should I leave a friend
in
i82 A Dissertation
in any malady, I fhould feel more anxiety upon his account, than if he were prefent j though per- haps I am not only incapable of giving him alTift- ance. but likewifc of judging concerning the event of his ficknefs. There are a thoufand little cir- cumftances of his fituation and condition, which I defire to know ; and the knowledge of them would prevent that fiu6tuation and uncertainty, fo nearly allied to fear. Horace has remarked this phsenomenon.
Ut ajfidens implumihus pullus avis
Ser-pentilm allapfus timet^ Magis relidis ; non-^ ut adfit, auxili
Latura plus praifentibus.
A virgin on her bridal-night goes to bed (u\\ of fears and apprehenfions, though Ihe expedls no-' thing but pleafure. The confufion of wifhes and joys, the newncfs and greatnefs of the unknown event, fo embarrafs the mind, that it knows not in what image or pafTion to fix itfelf.
9. Concerning the mixture of afFeftions, we may remark, in general, that when contrary paflions arife from objeds nov/ife connected together, they take place alternately. Thus when a man is af- flidled for the lofs of a law-fuit, and joyful for the birth of a fon, the mind, running from the agreeable to the calamitous objed ; with what- ever celerity it may perform this motion, can fcarcely temper the one affeflion with the other, and remain between them in a ftate of indifl'erence.
It more eafily attains thiit calm fituation, when th^Jame event is of a mixed nature, and contains fomething adverfe and fomething profperous in its different circumilances. For in that cafe, both the paflions, mingling with each other by means of the relation, often become mutually deftruflive, gnd leave the mind in perfedl tranquillity.
But
on the Passions. • 183
But fupppofe, that the object is not a compound of good and evil, but is confidered as probable or improbable in any degree ; in that cafe, the contrary paflions will both of them be prefent at once in the foul, and inftead of balancing and tempering each other, will fubfifl together, and by their union produce a third impreflion or affedtion, fuch as hope or fear.
The influence of the relations of ideas (which we fhall explain more fully afterwards) is plain- ly feen in this affair. In contrary paflions, if the objedts be totally different ^ the paflions are like two oppofite liquors in diff^erent bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objedls be intimately conneSfedy the paflions are like an al- cali and an acidy which, being mingled, defl:roy each other. If the relation be more imperfeft, and confifl: in the contraditlory views of the Jame obje(ft, the paflions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and in- corporate.
The efi^edl of a mixture of paflions, when one of them is predominant, and fwallows up the other, fliall be explained afterwards.
SECT. II.
I. Befides thofe paflions above-mentioned, which arife from a direft purfuit of good and averfion to evil, there are others which are of a more com- plicated nature, and imply more than one view or confideration. Thus Fride is a certain fatif- fadlion in ourfelves, on account of fome accom- plifliment or poflfeflion, which we enjoy ! Hu- milityy on the other hand, is a diflTatisfadion with ourfelves, on account of fome defe6t or infirmity.
Love or Friendjhip is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplifhments or fervices : Hatred^ the contrary.
2. In
l84 A DiS S ER T ATION
2. In thefe two fets of pafllon, there is an ob- vious difti nation to be made between the obje5l of the paffion and its caufe. The objeft of pride and humility is felf : The caufe of the paffion is fbme excellence in the former cafe ; fome fault, in the latter. The obje<5l of love and hatred is fome other perfon : The caufes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults.
With regard to all thefe pafTions, the caufes are what excite the emotion; the objeft is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is ex- cited. Our merit, for inftance, raifes pride j and it is efTential to pride to turn our view on our- felves with complacency and fatisfaftion.
Now, as the caufes of thefe paflions are very numerous and various, though their objeft be uni- form and fimple ; it may be a fubject of cu- riofity to confider, what that circumitance is, in which all thefe various caufes agree; or in other words, what is the real efficient caufe of the pafllon. We fhall begin with pride and humi- lity.
3. In order to explain the caufes of thefe paf- fions, we muft refle<5b on certain principles, which, though they have a mighty influence on every ope- ration, both of the underflianding and pafllons, are not commonly much infift:ed on by philofo- phers. The firfl; of thefe is the ajfociation of ideas, or that principle, by which we make an eafy tranfltion from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They ufually pafs with regula- rity, from one object, to what refembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it *. When one idea is prefent to the imagination, any other, united by thefe relations, naturally follows it, and
enters
* See Enquiry concerning Human Underftanding, Sedl. IIL
on the Passions. 185
inters with more facility, by means of that intro- duflion.
The fecofid property, which I fhall obferve in the human mind, is a like affociation of impreffions or emotions. All refembling imprelTions are con- neded together; and no fooner one arifes, than the reft naturally follow. Grief and difa,^point- ment give rife to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like man- ner, our temper, when elevated with joy, natu • rally throws itfelf into love, gcnerofity, courage, pride, and other refembling affeftions.
In the third place, it is obfervable of thefe two kinds of alTociation, that they very much affift and forward each other, and that the tranfition is more eafily made, where they both concur in the fame objedt. Thus, a man, who, by an injiry received from another, is very much difcompofed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred fubjeds of hatred, difcontent, impatience, fear, and other uneafy pafllons ; efpecially, if he can difcover thefe fubjefts in or near the perfon, who was the objeft of his firft emotion. Thofe prin- ciples, which forward the tranfition of ideas, here concur with thofe which operate on the paflions; and both, uniting in one aftion, beftow on the mind a double impulfe.
Upon this occafion I may cite a paffage from an elegant writer, who expreflfes himfelf in the following manner * : " As the fancy delights in " every thing, that is great, ftrange, or beautiful, •^^ and is ftill the more pleafed the more it finds *'^ of thefe perfections in tht Jame object, fo iti s " capable of receiving new fatisfa6tion by the af- " fiftance of another fenfe. Thus, any continual " found, as the mufic of birds, or a fall of waters, ^' awakens every moment the mind of the be-
" holder,
* Addlfon, Spedator, No. 412.
i86 A Dissertation
holder, and makes him more attentive to thfc feveral beauties of the place, that lie before him. Thus, if there arifes a fragrancy of fmells or perfumes, they heighten the pleafure of the imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the landfcape appear more agreeable ; for the ideas of both fenfes recommend each other, and are pleafanter together than where they enter the mind feparately : As the differ- ent colours of a pifture, when they are well dif- pofed, fet off one another, and receive an additi- beauty from the advantage of the fituation." In thefe phasnomena, we may remark the affocia- tion both of impreffions and ideas ; as well as the mutual affiftance thefe affociations lend to each other.
4. It feems to me, that both thefe fpecies of relation have place in producing Pride or Humili- ty, and are the real, efficient caufes of the paffion.
With regard to the firft relation, that of ideas, there can be no queftion. W|iatever we are proud of muft, in fome manner, belong to us. It is always our knowledge, our fenfe, beauty, poffef- fions, family, on which we value ourfelves. Self, which is the obje^ of the paffion, muft ftill be related to that quality or circumftance, which caufes the paffion. There muft be a connexion between them ; an eafy tranfition of the imagi- nation ; or a facility of the conception in paffing from one to the other. Where this connexion is wanting, no objedt can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the connex- ion, the more you weaken the paffion.
5. The only fubjcft of enquiry is, whether there be a like relation of impreffions or fenti- ments, wherever pride or humility is felt ; whe- ther the circumftance, which caufes the paffion, previoufiy excites a fentiment fimilar to the pal-
fion i
on the Passions. 187
fion ; and whether there be any transfufion of the one into the other.
The feeling or fentiment of pride is agreea- ble; of humility, painful. An agreeable fenfation is, therefore, related to the former; a painful, to the latter. And if we find, after examination, that every objedl:, which produces pride, pro- duces alfo a feparate pleafure ; and every object, which caufes humility, excites in like manner a feparate uneafinefsj we mull allow, in that cafe, that the prefent theory is fully proved and af- certained. The double relation of ideas and fen- timents will be acknowledged inconteftable.
6. To begin with perfonal merit and demerit, the moft obvious caufes of thefe pafTions; it would be entirely foreign to our prefent purpofe to ex- amine the foundation of moral diftinctions. It is fufficient to obferve, that the foregoing theory concerning the origin of the pallions may be de- fended on any hypothefis. The moft probable fyftem, which has been advanced to explain the difference between vice and virtue, is, that ei- ther from a primary conftitution of nature, or from a fenfe of public or private intereft, cer- tain characters, upon the very view and con- templation, produce uneafinefs ; and others, in like manner, excite x^^^^f^'re. The uneafi- nefs and fatisfaction, produced in the fpecta- tor, are effential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character, is to feel a delight upon its ap- pearance. To difapprove of it, is to be fenfible of an uneafinefs. The pain and pleafure, there- fore, being, in a manner, the primary fource of blame or praife, muft alfo be the caufes of all their effects ; and confequently, the caufes of pride and humility, v/hich are the unavoidable attendants of that diftinction.
But fuppofing this theory of morals fhould not be received; it is ftill evident that pain and plea- fure,
i88 A Dissertation
fare, if not the fources of moral diflinctions, are at lead infeparable from them. A generous and noble character affords a fatisfaction even in the furvey ; and when prefented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never falls to charm and delight us. On the other hand, cruelty and treachery difpleafe from their very nature ; nor is it pofiible ever to reconcile us to thefe qualities, ei- ther in ourfelves or others. Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleafure diftinct from the pride or felf-fatisfaction which attends it : Vice, an un- eafinefs feparate from the humility or remorfe.
But a high or low conceit of ourfelves arifes not from thofe qualities alone of the mind, which, according to common fyftems of ethics, have been defined parts of moral duty ; but from any other, which have a connexion with pleafure or iineafinefs. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleafing by our wit, good-humour, or any other accomplifhment; and nothing gives us a more fenfible mortification, than a difappoint- ment in any attempt of that kind. No one has ever . been able to tell precifely, what zuit is, and to fhew why fuch a fyftem of thought muft be receiv- ed under that denomination, and fuch another re- jefted. It is by tafte alone we can decide con- cerning it; nor are we pofTefl'ed of any other ftandard, by which we can form a judgment of this nature. Now what is this tajie, froin which true and falfe wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no thought can have a title to either of thefe denominations ? It is plainly nothing but a fenfation of pleafure from true wit, and of difguft from falfe, without our being able to tell the reafons of that fatisfaftion or uneafinefs. The power of ex- citing thefe oppofite fenfations is, therefore, the ve- ry eflfence of true or falfe wit ; and confequently, the caufe of that vanity or mortification, which arifes from one or the other.
7. Beauty
on the Passions. 189
7. Beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar de- light and fatisfadlion ; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever fubjedl it may be placed, and whe- ther furveyed in an animate or inanimate objeft. If the beauty or deformity belong to our own face, fhape, or perfon, this pleafure or uneafinefs is con- verted into pride or humility; as having in this cafe all the circumftances requifite to produce a perfedt tranfition, according to the prefent theory.
It would feem, that the very effence of beauty confifts in its power of producing pleafure. All its effedls, therefore, mufl proceed from this cir- cumftance : And if beauty is fo univerfally the fubjed of vanity, it is only from its being the caufe of pleafure.
Concerning all other bodily accompli fliments, we may obferve in general, that whatever in our- fdves is either ufeful, beautiful, or furprizing, is an objeft of pride -, and the contrary of humility. Thefe qualities agree in producing a feparate plea- fure : and ag;ree in nothino; eife.
We are vain of the furprizing adventures which we have met with, the efcapes which we have made, the dangers to' which we have been expofed : as well as of our furprifing feats of vigour and ac- tivity. Hence the origin of vulgar lying ; where men, without any intereft, and merely out of va- nity, heap up a number of extraordinary events, which are either the fi6lions of their brain; or, if true, have no connexion with themfelvcs. Their fruitful invention fupplies them with a variety of adventures j and where that talent is wanting, they appropriate fuch as belong to others, in or- der to gratify their vanity : For between that paf- fion, and the fentiment of pleafure, there is always a clofe connexion.
8. But though pride and humility have the qua- lities of our mind and body, that is, of felf, for their natural and more immediate caufes; v/e find
by
190 A Dissertation
by experience, that many other objefts produce thefe affedlions. We found vanity upon houfes, gardens, equipage, and other external objefts j as well as upon perfonal merit and accomplifli- ments. This happens when external objefts ac- quire any particular relation to ourfelves, and are aflfociated or connected with us. A beautiful fifh in the ocean, a well-proportioned animal in a foreft, and indeed, any thing, which neither belongs nor is related to us, has no manner of influence on our vanity ; whatever extraordinary qualities it may be endowed with, and whatever degree of far- prize and admiration it may naturally occafion. It mufl be fomeway aflbciated with us, in order to touch our pride. Its idea muft hang, in a manner, upon that of ourfelves; and the tranfition from one to the other muft be eafy and natural.
Men are vain of the beauty either of their country, or even of their parifh. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleafure. This pleafure is related to pride. The object or caufe of this pleafure is, by the fuppofition, relat- ed to felf, the objeft of pride. By this double re- lation of fentiments and ideas, a tranfition is made from one to the other.
Men are alfo vain of the happy temperature of the climate, in which they are born ; of the ferti- lity of their native foil ; of the goodnefs of the wines, fruits, or victuals, produced by it ; of the foftnefs or force of their language, with other particulars of that kind. Tiiefe objefts have plainly a reference to the pleafures of fcnfe, and are originally confidered as agreeable to the feeling, talte or hearing. How could they be- come caufes of pride, except by means of that tranfition above explained ?
There are fomc, who dilcover a vanity of an oppofite kind, and affedt to depreciate their own country, in comparifon of thofe, to which they
have
on the Passions. 191
have travelled. Thefe perfons find, when they are at home, and furrounded with their country- men, that the ftrong relation between them and their own nation is ihared with (o many, that it is in a manner loft to them ; whereas, that diftanc relation to a foreign country, which is formed by their having feen it, and lived in it, is augmented by their confidering how few have done the fame. For this reafon, they always admire the beauty, utility, and rarity of what they met with abroad, above what they find at home.
Since we can be vain of a country, climate or any inanimate obje6t, which bears a relation to us ; it is no wonder we fhould be vain of the qualities of thofe, who are connedted with us by blood or friendfhip. Accordingly we find, that any qualities which, when belonging to ourfelves, produce pride, produce alfo, in a lefs degree, the fame affection, when difcovered in perfons, relat- ed to us. The beauty, addrefs, merit, credit, and honours of their kindred are carefully dif- played by the proud, and are confiderable four- ces of their vanity.
As we are proud of riches of ourfelves, we defire, in order to gratify our vanity, that every one who has any connexion with us, fhould like- wife be poflelTed of them, and are afhamed of fuch as are mean or poor among our friends and re- lations. Our forefathers being regarded as our nearcft relations; every one naturally affcd:* to be of a good family, and to be defcended from a long fuccelTion of rich and honourable ancef- tors.
Thofe, who boaft of the antiquity of their fa- milies, are glad when they can join this circum- ftance, that their anceftors, for many generations, have been uninterrupted proprietors of the fame portion of land, and that their family has never changed its pofTeflions, or been tranfplanted into
any
192 A Dissertation
any other country or province. It is an additi- onal fubjeft of vanity, when they can boaft, that thefe pofTeflions have been tranfmitted through a defcent, compofed entirely of males, and that the honours and fortune have never paflTed through any female. Let us endeavour to explain thefe phse- nomena from the foregoing theory.
When any one values himfelf on the antiquity of his family, the fubjecls of his vanity are not merely the extent of time and number of anceflors (for in that refpedt all mankind are alike), but thefe circumftances, joined to the riches and cred- it of his anceflors, which are fuppofed to reflecl a luflre on himfelf, upon account of his connexi- on with them. Since therefore the pafllon de- pends on the connexion, whatever flrengthens the connexion mufl alfo encreafe the pafTion, and whatever weakens the connexion muft diminifh the pafTion. But it is evident, that the fame- nefs of the polTefTions muft ftrengthen the rela- tion of ideas, arifing from blood and kindred, and convey the fancy with greater facility from one generation to another; from the remoteft an- ceftors to their pofterity, who are both their heirs and their defcendants. By this facility, the fenti- ment is tranfmitted more entire, and excites a greater degree of pride and vanity.
The cafe is the fame with the tranfmiilion of the honours and fortune, through a fucceflion of males, without their palling through any fe- male. It is an obvious quality of human na- ture, that the imagination naturally turns to what- ever is important and confiderable -, and where two objedls are prefented, a fmall and a great, it ufually Jeaves the former, and dwells entirely on the latter. This is the reafon, why children com- monly bear their father's name, and are efteemed to be of a nobler or meaner birth, according to his family. And though the mother fhould be poiTef-
fed
on the Passions. 193
fed of fiiperior qualities to the father, as often hap- pens, the g^fieral rule prev2i'i\Sy notwithltanding the exception, according to the doiSlrine, which fhall be explained afterwards. Nay, even when a fu- periority of any kind is fo great, or when any other reafons have fuch an effect, as to make the chil- dren rather reprefent the mother's family than the father's, the general rule (till retains an efficacy, fufficient to weaken the relation, and make a kind of breach in the line of anceftors. The imagina- tion runs not along them with the fame facility, nor is able to transfer the honour and credit of the anceftors to their pofterity of the fame name and family fo readily, as when the tranfition is confor- mable to the general rule, and pafles through the male line, from father to fon, or from brother to brother.
9. But property^ as it gives us the fulleft power and authority over any object, is the relation, which has the greateft influence on thefe paflions *.
Every thing, belonging to a vain man, is the beR that is any where to be found. His houlcs, equipage, furniture, cloaths, horfes, hounds, excel all others in his conceit ; and it is eafy to obfefve, that, from the leait advantage in any of thefe he draws a new fubjed: of pride and vanity. His wine, if you will believe him, has a finer flavour than any other; his cookery is more exquifitej his table more orderly 5 his fervants more expert ; the air, in which he lives, more healthful ; the foil, which he cultivates, more fertile; his fruits ripen earlier, and to greater perfection : Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty; fuch another for its antiquity : This is the workmanlhip of a tamous artift ; that belonged once to fuch a prince or great man. All objects, in a word, which are ufeful, beautiful, or furprizing, or are related to
Vol. II. O fuch,
* Sec NOTE [R].
1 94 ADiSSERTATlON
fuch, may, by means of property, give rife to this pafTion. Thefe all agree in giving pleafure. This alone is common to them ; and therefore muft be the quality, that produces the paffion, which is their common efFeft. As every new inftance is a new argument, and as the inftances are here with- out number ; it would feem, that this theory is fufficiently confirmed by experience.
Riches imply the power of acquiring whatever is agreeable ; and as they comprehend many par- ticular objefts of vanity, neceflarily become one of the chief caufes of that pafTion.
lo. Our opinions of all kinds are ftrongly af- fedled by fociety and fympathy, and it is almoft impoflible for us to fupport any principle or fenti- ment, againft the univerfal confent of every one, with whom we have any friendfhip or correfpon- dence. But of all our opinions, thofe, which we form in our own favour, however lofty or prc- fuming; are, at bottom, the fraileft, and the moft eafily fhaken by the contradidlion and oppofition of others. Our great concern, in this cafe, makes us foon alarmed, and keeps our paflions upon the watch : Our confcioufnefs of partiality ftill makes us dread a miftake : And the very difficulty of judging concerning an objeft, which is never fet at a due diftance from us, nor is feen in a proper point of view, makes us hearken anxioufly to the opinions of others, who are better qualified to form juft opinions concerning us. Hence that ftrong love of fame, with which all mankind are poflefled. It is in order to fix and confirm their fiivourablc opinion of themfelves, not from any original paflion, that they feek the applaufes of others. And when a man defires to be prailcd, it is for the fame reafon, that a beauty is pleafed with furveying hcrfelf in a favourable looking-glafs, and feeing ihe reflection of her own charms.
Though
on the Passions. 195
Though it be difficult, in all points of fpecula- tion, to diftinguifli a caufe, which encreafes an ef- {e£ty from one, which folely produces it j yet in the prefent cafe the phasnoniena feem pretty ftrong and fatisfadlory in confirmation of the foregoing principle.
We receive a much greater fatisfaftion from the approbation of thofe whom weourfelves elleem and approve of, than of thofe whom we contemn and defpife.
When efteem is obtained after a long and inti- mate acquaintance, it gratifies our vanity in a pe- culiar manner.
The fuffrage of thofe, who are fhy and backward in giving praife, is attended with an additional re- lifh and enjoyment, if we can obtain it in our favour.
Where a great man is delicate in his choice of fa- vourites, every one courts with greater earneftnefs his countenance and proteftion.
Praife never gives us much pleafure, unlefs it concur with our own opinion, and extol us for thofe qualities, in which we chiefly excel.
Thefe phasnomena feem to prove, that the fa- vourable fuffrages of the world are regarded only as authorities, or confirmations of our own opinion. And if the opinions of others have more influence in this fubjed: than in any other, it is eafily account- ed for from the nature of the fubjeft.
II. Thus fev7 objefls, however related to us, and whatever pleafure they produce, are able to excite a great degree of pride or felf-fatisfaftion j unlefs they be alfo obvious to others, and engage the approbation of the fpeftators. What difpofi- tion of mind fo defirable as the peaceful, refigned, contented ; which readily fubmits to all the dif- penfations of providence, and preferves a conftant ferenity amidft the greateft misfortunes and difap- pointments ? Yet this difpofition, though acknow- ledged to be a virtue or excellence, is feldom the O a foundation
196 ^A Dissertation
foundation of great vanity or felf-applaufej having no brilliancy or exterior liiftre, and rather cheer- ing the heart, than animating the behaviour and converfation. The cafe is the fame with many other qualities of the mind, body, or fortune; and this circumftance, as well as the double relations above mentioned, mull be admitted to be of con- fequence in the produ6lion of thefe pafTions.
A fecond circumftance, which is of confequence in this affair, is the conftancy and durablenefs of the objeft. What is very cafual and inconftant, beyond the common courfe of human affairs, gives little joy, and lefs pride. We are not much fatis- fied with the thing itfelf; and are ftill lefs apt to feel any new degree of felf-fatisfaftion upon its ac- count. We forefee and anticipate its change ; which makes us little fatisfied with the thing itfelf : We compare it to ourfelves, whofe exiftence is more durable ; by which means its inconftancy appears ftill greater. It feems ridiculous to make ourfelves the obje6l of a pafTion, on account of a quality or pofTelTion, which is of fo much fhorter duration, and attends us during fo fmaii a part of our exif- tence.
A third circumftance, not to be neglefted, is that the objefts, in order to produce pride or feif-value, muft be peculiar to us, or at leaft common to us with a few others. The advantages of fun-fhine, good weather, a happy climate, &c. diftinguilh us not from any of our companions, and give us no preference or fuperiority. The comparifon, which we are every moment apt to make, prefents no in- ference to our advantage -, and we ftill remain, notwithftanding thefe enjoyments, on a level with all our friends and acquaintance.
As health and ficknefs vary inceffantly to all men, and there is no one, who is folely or certainly fixed in either; thefe accidental bleflings and cala- niitics are in a manner feparated from us, and are
not
on the Passions. 197
not confidered as a foundation for vanity or humi- liation. But wherever a malady of any kind is fo rooted in our conftitution, that we no longer en- tertain any hope of recovery, from that moment it damps our felf-conceit, as is evident in old men, whom nothing mortiMcs more than the confidera- tion of their age and infirmities. They endeavour, as long as pollible, to conceal their blindnefs and deafnels, their rheums and gouts; nor do they ever avow them without relucftance and uneafinefs. And though young men are not afhamed of every head-ach or cold which they fall into; yet no to- pic is more proper to mortify human pride, and make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature, than this, that we are every moment of our lives fubjedt to fuch infirmities. This proves, that bodi- ly pain and ficknefs are in themfelves proper caufes of humility ; though the cufliom of ellimat- ing every thing, by comparifon, more than by its intrinfic worth and value, makes us overlook thofe calamities, which we find incident to every one, and caufes us to form an idea of our merit and cha- ra6ler, independent of them.
We are afham.ed' of fuch maladies as afFeft others, and are either dangerous or difagreeable to them. Of the epilepfy ; becaufe it gives a horror to every one prefent : Of the itch; becaufe it is infeftious : Of the king's evil; becaufe it of- ten goes to pofterity. Men always confider the fentiments of others in their judgm.ent of them- felves.
A fourth circumftance, which has an influence on thefe palTions, is general rules ; by which v/e form a notion of different ranks of men, fuitably to the power or riches of which they an-t poffefTed ; and this notion is not changed by any peculiarities of the health or temper of the perfons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their pofTefllons. Cuftom readily carries us beyond the jujI -bounds in our pafTions, as well as in our reafonings It
198 A Dissertation
It may not be amifs to obferve on this occa- fion, that the influence of general rules and max- ims on the paffions very much contributes to fa- cilitate the effects of all the principles or inter- nal mechanifm, which we here explain. For it feems evident, that, if a perfon full grown, and of the fame nature with ourfelves, v/ere on a fud- den tranfported into our world, he would be much embarraffed with every objeft, and would not readily determine what degree of Jove or hatred, of pride or humility, or of any other paffion Ihould be excited by it. The paf- fions are often varied by very inconfiderable principles; and thefe do not always play v/ith perfeft regularity, efpecially on the firft trial. But as cuftom or pradice has brought to light all thefe principles, and has fettled the juft va- lue of every thing; this muil certainly contri- bute to the eafy produftion of the paffions, and guide us, by means of general eflablilhed rules, in the proportions, which we ought to obferve in preferring one objeft to another. This re- mark may, perhaps, ferve to obviate difficulties, that may arife concerning fome caufes, which we here afcribe to particular paffions, and which may be efteemed too refined to operate fo uni- verfally and certainly, as they are found to do.
PART III.
M. In running over all the caufes, which pro- duce the paffion of pride or that of humility; it would readily occur, that tiie fame circumllance, if transferred from ourfelves to another pt*rfon, would render him the object of love or hatred, efteem or contempt. The virtue, genius, beauty, family, riches, and authority of others beget fa- vourable fentiments in their behalf; and their vice, folly, deformity, poverty, and meannefs ex- cite the contrary fentiments. The double rela- tion
on the Passions. 199
tion of imprefllons and ideas ft'll operates on thefc paflions of love and hatred -, as on the for- mer of pride and humility. Whatever gives a feparate pleafure or pain, and is related to ano- ther perfon or conneded with him, makes him the object of our affe6lion or difguft.
Hence too injury or contempt towards us is one of the greateft Iburces of our hatred j fcr- vices or efteem, of our friendfhip.
2. Sometimes a relation to ourfelves excites affedion towards any perfon. But there is al- ways here implied a relation of fentiments, with- out which the other relation would have no in- fluence*,
A perfon, who is related to us, or connected with us, by blood, by fimilitude of fortune, of adventures, profelTion, or country, foon becomes an agree- able companion to us j becaufe we enter eafily and familiarly into his fentiments and concepti- ons: Nothinsr is Itrano-e or new to us: Our ima- gination, pafTing from felf, which is ever inti- mately prefent to us, runs fmoothly along the relation or connexion, and conceives with a full fympathy the perfon, who is nearly related to felf. He renders himfelf immediately accepta- ble, and is at once on an eafy footing with us: No diftance, no referve has place, where the per- fon introduced is fuppofed fo clofely conneded with us.
Relation has here the fame influence as cuf- tom or acquaintance, in exciting affedlion ; and from like caufes. The eafe and fatisfa6tion, which, in both cafes, attend our intercourfe or commerce, is the fource of the friendfliip.
3. The paflions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevo- lence
• The afFedlion of parents to children feems founded on an original inlHnft. The af»edion towards other relations depends on the principles here explained.
20O A Dissertation
lence and anger. It is this conjundlion, which chiefly diftinguifhes thefe affeftions from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the foul, unattended with any defire, and not immediately exciting us to aftion. But love and hatred are not compleat within them- felves, nor reft in that emotion, which they pro- duce; but carry the mind to fomeching farther. Love is always followed by a defire of happi- nefs to the perfon beloved, and an averfion to his mifery : As hatred produces a defire of the mifery, and an averfion to the happinefs of the perfon hated. Thefe oppofite defires feem to be originally and primarily conjoined with the paf- fions of love and hatred. It is a conftitution of nature, of which we can give no farther expli- cation.
4. Companion frequently arifes, where there is no preceding efteem or friendfliipj and compaf- fion is an uneafinefs in the fuffenngs of another. It feems to fpring from the intimate and ftrong conception of his fufferings; and our imaginati- on proceeds by degrees, from the lively idea to the real feeling of another's niifery.
Malice and envy alfo arife in the mind with- out any preceding hatred or injury j though their tendency is exadly the fame with that of anger and ill-will. The comparifon of ourfclves with others feems to be the fource 01 envy and ma- lice. The more unhappy another is, the more happy do we ourfelves appear in our own con- ception.
5. The fimilar tendency of compafTion to that of benevolence, and of envy to anger, forms a very clofe relation between thefe two lets of paf- fions; though of a different kind from that which was infifted on above. It is not a refemblance of feeling or fentiment, but a refemblance of ten- dency or direction. Its efl'edb, however, is the
fame.
' on the Passions. 2qi
rame, in producing an afTociation of pafTions. Compaffion is feldom or never felt without fome mixture of tendernefs or friendfliip; and envy is naturally accompanied with anger or ill-will. To defire the happinefs of another, from what- ever motive, is a good preparative to affection; and to delight in another's mifery almofl: un- avoidably begets averfion towards him.
Even where intereft is tiie fonrce of our con- cern, it is commonly attended with the fame confequences. A partner is a natural objedl of friendfliip; a rival of enmity.
6. Poverty, meannefs, difappointment, produce contempt and diflike: But when thefe misfor- tunes are very great, or are reprefented to us in very ftrong colours, they excite compaffion, and tendernefs, and friendihip. How is this con- tradiction to be accounted for? The poverty and meannefs of another, in their common appear- ance, gives us uneafinefs, by a fpecies of imper- fe(5t fympathy; and this uneafinefs produces aver- fion or diflike, from the refc;mblance of fenti- ment. But when we enter more intimately into another's concerns, and wifh for his happinefs, as well as feel his mifery, friendfliip or good-will arifes, from the fimilar tendency of the inclina- tions.
A bankrupt, at firfl:, while the idea of his mif- fortunes is frefli and recent, and while the com- parifon of his prefent unhappy fituation with his former profperity operates Itrongly upon us, meets with compaflion and friendfliip. After thefe ideas are weakened or obliterated by time, he is in danger of compaflion and contempt.
7. In refpeft, there is a mixture of humility, with the efl:eem or affe<5lion : In contempt, a mix- ture of pride.
The amorous paflion is ufually compounded of complacency in beauty, a bodily appetite, and
friendfliip
*02 A Dissertation
friendfliip or affedion. The clofe relation of thefe fentiments is very obvious, as well as their origin from each other, by means of that rela- tion. Were there no other phsenomena to re- concile us to the prefent theory, this alone, me- thinks, were fufficient.
SECT. IV.
1. The prefent theory of pafTions depends en- tirely on the double relation of fentiments and ideas, and the mutual affiftance, which thefe re- lations lend to each other. It may not, there- fore, be improper to illuftrate thefe principles by fome farther inilances.
1. The virtues, talents, accomplilhments, and pofleflions of others, make us love and eftecm them: Becaufe thefe objedls excite a pleafing fen- fation, which is related to love ; and as they have alfo a relation or connexion with the perfon, this union of ideas forwards the union of fentiment, according to the foregoing reafoning.
But fuppofe, that the perfon, whom we love, is alfo related to us, by blood, country, or friend- Ihip; it is evident, that a fpecies of pride muft alfo be excited by his accomplifhments and pof- feffions ; there being the fame double relation, which we have all along infilled on. The per- fon is related to us, or there is an eafy tran- fition of thought from him to us; and the fen- timents, excited by his advantages and virtues, are agreeable, and confequently related to pride. Accordingly we find, that people are naturally vain of the good qualities or high fortune of their friends and countrymen.
3. But it is obfervablc, that, if we reverfe the order of the pafTions, the fame effeft does not follow. We pafs eafily from love and affeflion to pride and vanity; but not from the latter paf-
fions
3
on the Passions. 203
fions to the former, though all the relations be the fame. We love not thofe who are related to us, on account of our own merit; though they are naturally vain on account of our merit. What is the reafon of this difference ? The tran- fition of the imagination to ourfelves, from ob- jedls related to us, is always eafyj both on ac- count of the relation, which ficilitates the tran,- fition, and becaufe v/e there pafs from remoter ob- jects, to thofe which are contiguous. But in paf- fing from ourfelves to objefls, related to us; though the former principle forwards the tran- fition of thought, yet the latter oppofes it ; and confequentiy there is not the fame eafy tranf- fufion of paflions from pride to love as from love to pride.
4. The virtues, fervices, and fortune of one man infpire us readily with efteem and alFedii- on for another related to him. The fon of our friend is naturally entitled to our friendfliip: The kindred of a very great man value themfelves, and are valued by others, on account of that relation. The force of the double rela-don is here fully difplayed.
5. The following are inftances of another kind, where the operation of thefe principles may ilill be difcovered. Envy arifes from a fuperiority in others; but it is obfervable, that it is not the great difproportion between us, which excites that paflion, but on the contrary, our proximity. A great difproportion cuts off the relation of the ideas, and either keeps us from comparing our- felves with what is remote from us, or dimi- nilhes the effefts of the comparifon.
A poet is not apt to tnvy a philofoplier, or a poet of a different kind, of a different nation, or of a different age. All thefe differences, if they do not prevent, at lead weaken the comparifon and confequentiy the paffion.
This
'204 A Dissertation
This too is the reafon, why all objefts appear great or little, merely by a comparifon with thofe of the fame fpecies. A mountain neither mag- nifies nor diminifhes a horfe in our eyes: But when a Flemifh and a Welfh horfe are feen toge- ther, the one appears greater and the other lefs, than when viewed apart.
From the fame principle we may account for that remark of hiftorians, that any party, in a civil war, or even factions divifion, always choofe to call in a foreign enemy at any hazard, rather than fubmit to their fellow-citizens. Guicciar- din applies this remark to the wars in Italy; where the relations between the different ftates are, properly fpeaking, nothing but of name, lan- guage, and contiguity. Yet even thefe relations, when joined with fuperiority, by making the com- parifon more natural, make it likewife more grie- vous, and caufe men to fearch for fome other fuperiority, which may be attended with no relati- on, and by that means, may have a lefs fenfible influence on the imagination. When we cannot break the afllbciation, we feel a ftronger defire to remove the fuperiority. This feems to be the reafon, v/hy travellers, though commonly lavifh of their praife to the Chinefe and Perfians, take care to depreciate thofe neighbouring nations, which may ftand upon a footing of rivalfhip with their native country.
6. The fine arts afibrd us parallel inftances. Should an author compofe a treatife, of which one part was ferious and profound, another light and humorous j every one would condemn fo flrange a mixture, and would blame him for the neglc(5t of all rules of art and criticifm. Yet we accufe not Prior for joining his Alma and Solonion in the fame volume j though that ami- ble poet has perfeftly lucceeded in the gaiety of the one, as well as in the melancholy of the
other.
\ I
on the Passions. 205
other. Even fiippofe the reader fhoiild pcrufe thefc two compofitions without any interval, he would feel little or no difficulty in the change of the palTions. Why ? but becaufe he confiders thefe performances as entirely different; and -by that break in the ideas, breaks the progrefs of the affedions, and hinders the one from influ- encing or contradi<5i:ing the other.
An heroic and burlefque defign, united in one pi6lure, would be monllrous; though we place two pictures of fo oppofite a character in the fame chamber, and even clofe together, without any fcruple.
7. It needs be^ no matter of wonder, that the eafy traqfition of the imagination fhould have fuch an influence ori all the pafTions. It is this very circumftance, which forms all the relations and connexions amongft obje6ls. We know no real connexion between one thing and another. We only know, that the idea of one thing is aflbciated with that of another, and that the ima- gination makes an eafy tranfition between them. And as the eafy tranfition of ideas, and that of fentiments mutually aflift each other; we might before-hand exped, that this principle miift have a mighty influence on all our internal movements and affeclions. And experience fufficiently con- firms the theory.
For, not to repeat all the foregoing inflances: Suppofe, that I were travelling with a compani- on through a country, to which we are both ut- ter ftrangers; it is evident, that, if the profpe<5ts be beautiful, the roads agreable, and the fields finely cultivated; this may ferve to put me in good-humour, both with myfelf and fellow-tra- veller. But as the country has no connexion with myfelf or friend, it can never be the imme- diate caufe either of felf-value or of regard to him : And therefore, if I found not the paffion
on
206 A Dissertation
on fome other objedl, which bears to one of us a clofer relation, my emotions are rather to be confidered as the overflowings of an elevated or humane difpofition, than as an eftabliihed pafllon. But fuppofing the agreeable profpeft before us to be furveyed either from his country-feat or from mine; this new connexion of ideas gives a new dire6lion to the fentiment of pleafure, de- rived from the profped, and raifes the emotion of regard or vanity, according to the nature of the connexion. There is not here, methinks, much room for doubt or difficulty.
SECT. V.
1. It feems evident, that reafon, in a ftrict fenfe, as meaning the judgment of truth and falfehood, can never, of itfelf, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but fo far as it touches fome pafllon or aff'ection. Ahftract relations of ideas are the object of curiofity, not of volition. And matters of fa5fy where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither excite defire nor averfion, are totally indifferent; and whe- ther known or unknown, whether mifl:aken or right- ly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any mo- tive to action.
2. What is commonly, in a popular fenfe, cal- led reafon, and is fo much recommended in mo- ral difcourfes, is nothing but a general and a calm pafllon, which takes a comprehenflve and a difl;ant view of its object, and actuates the will, without exciting any fenflble emotion. A man, we fay, is diligent in his profefllon from reafon; that is, from a calm defire of riches and a for- tune. A man adheres to juftice from reafon; that is, from a calm regard to public good, or to a character with himfelf and others.
3. The lame objects, which recommend them- fclves to reafon ia this fenfe of the word, are
alfo
on the Passions. 207
alfo the objects of what we call pafTion, when they are brought near to us, and acquire fome other advantages, either of external fituation, or congruity to our internal temper} and by that means excite a turbulent and fenfible emotion. Evil, at a great diftance, is avoided, we fay, from reafon : Evil, near at hand, produces averfion, hor- ror, fear, and is the object of paflion,
4. The common error of metaphyficians has lain in afcribing the direction of the will entire- ly to one of thefe principles, and fuppofing the other to have no influence. Men often act know- ingly againft their intereft: It is not therefore the view of the greateft poflible good which al- ways influences them. Men often counteract a violent paflion, in profecution of their difliant in- tereflis and defigns : It is therefore the prefent un- caflnefs alone, which determines them. In gene- ral, we may obferve, that both thefe principles operate on the will j and where they are contra- ry, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or prefent difpofition of the perfon. What we call Jirength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm paflions above the violent; though we may eafily obferve, that there is no perfon fo conftantly pofl!cfl!ed of this virtue, as never, on any occafion, to yield to the folicitation of violent afi-ection and defire. From thefe variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding with regard to the future actions and refoUitions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and paflions.
SECT. VI.
I . We fhall here enumerate fome of thofe cir- cumfl:ances, which render a paflion calm or vio- lent, which heighten or diminifli any emotion.
It is a property in human nature, that any
emotion.
2o8 A Dissertation
emotion, which attends a paflion is eafily con- verted into it; though in their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to each other. It is true, in order to caufe a per- fect union amongft paffions, and make one pro- duce the other, there is always required a dou- ble relation, according to the theory above de- livered. But when two paffions are already pro- duced by their feparate caufes, and are both pre- fent in the mind, they readily mingle and unite; though they have but one relation, and fome- times without any. The predominant palfion fwal- lows up the inferior, and converts it into itfelf. The fpirits, when once excited, eafily receive a change in their direction j and it is natural to ima- gine, that change will come from the prevailing afFecion. The connection is in many cafes clo- fer between any two paffions, than between any paflion and indifference.
Vv hen a perfon is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprices of his miilrefs, the jea- loufies and quarrels, to which that comm.erce is fo fubject; however unpleafant they be, and. ra- ther connected with anger and hatred ; are yet jfound, in many inftances, to give additional force to the prevailing paflion. It is a common ar- tifice of politicians, when they would affect any perfon very much by a matter of fact, of which they intend to inform him, firlt to excite his curiofity ; delay as long as poffible the fatisfying of it; and by that means raife his anxiety and impatience to the utmoll, before they give him a full infight into the bufinefs. They know, that this curiofity will precipitate him into the paflion, which they purpofe to raife, and will aflift the object in its influence on the mind. -A. foldier advancing to battle, is naturally in- fpired with courage and confidence, when he thinks on his friends and fellow-foldiers ; and is ftruck with fear and terror, when he reflects on
the
on the Passions. 2051
the enemy. Whatever new ennotion therefore pro- ceeds from the former, naturally encreafcs the courage; as the fame emotion proceeding from the latter, augments the fear. Hence in marti- al difciplincj the, uniformity and luftre of habit, the regularity of figures and motions, with all the pomp and majefly of war, encourage ourfelves and our allies; while the fame objc6ls in the ene- my ftrike terror into us, though agreeable and beautiful in thcmfelves.
. Hope is, in itfelf, an agreeable paflion, and al- lied to friendfliip and benevolence; yet is it able fomctimes to blow up anger, when that is the predominant paflion. Spes addita Jujcitat iras.
2. Since pafTions, however independent, are na- turally transfufed into each other, if they be both prefent at the fame time; it follows, that when good or evil is placed in fuch a fituation as to caufe any particular emotion, befides its dirett paflion of defire or averfion, this latter palTion muft ac- quire new force and violence.
3. This often happens, when any objedt excites contrary paflions. For it is obfervable, that an oppofition of paflions commonly caufes a new emotion in the fpirits, and produces more difor- der than the concurrence of any two affedtions Cif equal force. This new emotion is eafily con- verted into the predominant paflion, and in ma- ny inftances, is obferved to encreafe its violence^ beyond the pitch, at which it would have ar- rived, had it met with no oppofition. Hence we naturally defire what is forbid, and often take a pleafure in performing akflionsy merely becaufc they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when oppofite to the paffions, is not always able to overcome them; and when it fails of that effe6l, is apt rather to encreafe and irritate them, by producing an oppofition in our motives and prin- ciples.
Vol. II. JP* 4. The
aio A Dissertation
4. The fame efFc6t follows, whether the oppo- fition arife from internal motives or external ob- ftacles. The paffion commonly acquires new force in both cafes. The efforts, which the mind makes to furmount the obftacle, excite the fpirits, and enliven the paffion.
5. Uncertainty has the fame effe6b as oppofition. The agitation of the thought, the quick turns which it makes from one view to another, the variety of paffions which fucceed each other, according to the different views: All thefe produce an emotion in the mind J and this emotion transfufes itfelf into the predominant paffion.
Security, on the contrary, diminilhes the paffi- ons. The mind, when left to itfelf, immediate- ly languifhes; and in order to preferve its ardour, mufl be every moment fupported by a new flow of paffion. For the fame reafon, defpair, though con- trary to fecurity, has a like influence.
6. Nothing more powerfully excites any affecti- on than to conceal fome part of its objed:, by throwing it into a kind of Ihade, which at the fame time that it fhows enough to prepoffefs us in favour of the objcift, leaves ftill fome work for the imagi- nation. Befides that obfcurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty} the effort, which the fancy makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the fpi- rits, and gives an additional force to the paffion.
7. As defpair and fecurity, though contrary, pro- duce the fame effedlsj fo abfcnce is obbftrved to have contrary effe6ts, and in different circumftan- ces, either encreafes or diminifhcs our affeftion. Rochefoucault has very well remarked, that abfencc deftroys weak paffion, but encreafes ftrong; as the wind extinguifhes a candle, but blov/s up a fire. Long abfencc naturally weakens our idea, and di- miniffies the paffion: But where the" afteftion is fo ftrong and lively as to fupport itfelf, the uneafinefs, arifing from abfcnce, encreafes the paffion, and
gives it new force and influence.
8. When
.1
on the Passions. 211
8. When the foul applies itfelf to the perform- ance of any action, or the conception of any object, to which it is not accullomed, there is a certain un- pliablenefs in the faculties; and a difficulty of the fpirits moving in their new direction. As this dif- ficulty excites the fpirits, it is the fource of wonder, furprize, and of all the emotions, which arife from novelty; and is, in itfelf, agreeable, like every thing which enlivens the mind to a moderate degree. But though furprize be agreeable in itfelf, yet, as it puts the fpirits in agitation, it not only augments our agreeable affections, but alfo our painful, ac- cording to the foregoing principle. Hence every thing that is new, is moft affe6ting, and gives us either more pleafure or pain, than what, ftriftly fpeaking, Ihould naturally follow from it. When it often returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the paflions fubfide ; the hurry of the fpirits is over; and we furvey the objedl with greater tranquillity,
9. The imagination and affections have a clofe union together. The vivacity of the former gives force to the latter. Hence the profpect of any pleafure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleafure, which we may own fuperior, but of whole nature we are wholly igno- rant. Of the one we can form a particular and de- terminate idea : The other we conceive under the general notion of pleafure.
Any fatisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is frefh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another of which the traces are decayed and almoft obliterated.
A pleafure, which is fuitable to the way of life, in which we are engaged, excites more our defirc and appetite than another, which is foreign to it.
Nothing is more capable of infufing any pallion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are reprefented in the flrongeft and mod lively co- lour?. The bare opinion of another, efpecially
P 2 when
214 A Dissertation, &c.
when enforced with paffion, will caufe an idea to have an influence upon us, though that idea might otherwife have been entirely negledted.
It is remarkable, that lively paflions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this refpeft, as well as in others, the force of the paflion depends as much on the temper of the perfon, as on the nature and fituation of the objed.
What is diftant, either in place or time, has not equal influence with what is near and contiguous.
* * *
I pretend not to have here exhaufted this fubjedi. It is fufficient for my purpofe,- if 1 have made it ap- pear, that, in the produftion and condud of paf- fions, there is a certain regular mechanifm, which is fufceptible of as accurate a difquifition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydroftatics, or any part of ijatural phiiofophy.
A- N"
A N
E N Q^ U I R Y
CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLE S
O F
MORALS.
1
( 2'$ )
SECTION I.
Of the General Principles of Morals.
n
'ISPUTES with men, pertinacioufly obftinate in their principles, are, of all others, the moft irkfon:ie; except, perhaps, thofe with perfons, en- tirely difingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the con- troverfy, from affedlation, from a fpirit of oppofi- tion, or from a defire of fhowing wit and inge- nuity, fuperior to the reft of mankind. The fame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expedled in both ; the fame contempt of their antagonifts j the fame pafiionate vehemence, in inforcing fophiftry and falfehood» And as rea- foning is not the fource, whence either difpu- tant derives his tenets -, it is in vain to expedt, that any logic, which fpeaks not to the affec- tions, will ever engage him to embrace founder principles.
Thofe who have denied the reality of moral diftinftions, may be ranked among the dilinge- nuous difputants ; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever ferioufly believe, that all characters and actions were alike en- titled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is fo wide, and this dif- ference
2i6 S E C T I O N 1.
ference is ftill fo much farther widened, by edu- cation, example, and habit, that, where the op- pofite extremes come at once under our ap- prehenfion, there is no fcepticifm lb fcrupiilouSs and fcarce any afTjrance fo determined^ as ab- folutely to deny all diftinction between them. Let a. man's infenfibility be ever fo great, he mull often be touched Vv'ith the images of Right and Wrong ; and let his prejudices be ever fq obftinate, he muft obferye, that others are fuf- ccptible of like impreffions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonift: of this kind, is to leave him to himfelf. For, finding that nobody keeps up the controverfy with him, it is probable he will, at lail, of himfelf, from mere wearinefs, come over to the fide of commoi^ fenfe and reafon.
There has been a controverfy ftarted of late, much better worth exaipination, concerning the general foundation of Morals ; v/hether they be derived from Reafon, or from Sentirnent ; whe- ther we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immedi- ate feeling and finer internal fenfe j whether, like i\\\ found judgment of truth and falfehood, they Ihould be the fame to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, thty be founded entirely on the particular fabric and conllitution of the human fpecies.
The ancient philofophers, though they often j^ffirm, that virtue is pothing but conformity to reafon, yet, in general, feem to confider morals as deriving their exiftence from tafte and ien- timent. On the other hand, our modern en- quirers, though they alio talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have cpmiT^only endeavoured to account for thefe dif-
tinctions
Of the General Principles of Morals. 217
tinctions by metaphyfical reafonings, and by de- ductions from the moil abftract principles of the iinderftanding. Such confufion reigned in thefe fubjects, that an oppofition of th^ greatefl: con- fequence could prevail between one fyftem and another, and even in the parts of almoft each individual fyftem -, and yet no body, till very lately, was ever fenfible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftefbury, who firft gave occafion to remark this diftinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the ancients, is not, himfelf, entirely free from the fame confufion.
It muft be acknowledged, that both fides of the queftion are fufceptible of fpecious argu- ments. Moral didindbions, it may be faid, are difcernible by pure reafon: Elfe, whence the many difputes that reign in common life, as well as in philofophy, with regard to this fub- je61: : The long chain of proofs often produced on both fides ; the examples cited, the authori- ties appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies detedted, the inferences drawn, and the feveral conclufions adjufted to their proper prin- ciples. Truth is difputable ; not taile : What exifts in the nature of things is the ftandard of our judgment; what each man feels within him- felf is the ftandard of fentiment. Propofitions in geometry may be proved, fyftems in phyfics may be controverted ; but the harmony of verfe, the tendernefs of pallion, the brilliancy of wit, muft give immediate pleafure. No man reafons concerning another's beauty i but frequently con- cerning the juftice or injuftice of his actions. In every criminal trial the firft objeft of the prifoner is to difprove the fa6ls alleged, and de- ny the a6lions imputed to him : The fecond to prove, that, even if thefe actions were real, they might be juftified, as innocent and lawful. It is coafeftedly by deductions of the underftanding,
that
2iS SECTION!.
that the firft point is afcertained r How can wc fuppofe that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other ?
On the other hand, thofe who would refolve all moral determinations into Jentiment^ may en- deavour to {how, that it is impoffible for reafon ever to draw conclufions of this nature. To virtue, fay they, it belongs to be amiahUj and vice odious. This forms their very nature or ef- fence. But can reafon or argumentation dillri- bute thefe different epithets to any fubjects, and pronounce before-hand, that this muft produce love, and that hatred ? Or what other reafon can we ever affign for thefe affections, but the origi- nal fabric and formation of the human mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them ?
The end of all moral fpeculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper reprcfentations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, be- get correfpondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclufions of the underftanding, which of themfelves have no hold of the affections, or fet in motion the active powers of men ? They difcover truths : But where the truths which they difcover are indifferent, and beget no defire or averfion, they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour. What is ho- nourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes poffeffion of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool affent of the \inderftanding; and gratifying a fpeculative curiofi- ly, puts an end to our reiearches.
Extingui/h all the warm feelings and prepoffeffions in favour of virtue, and all difguilor averfion to vice: Render men totally indifferent towards th^^fe diilinc- tionsi and morality is no longer a practical ftudy,
2 nor
^i
of theGENERAL Principles of Morals. 219
nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and ac- tions.
Thefe arguments on each fide (and many more might be produced) are fo plaufible, that I am apt to fufped:, they may, the one as well as the other, be folid and fatisfaftory, and that rea- Jon and Jcntiment concur in almoft all moral deter- minations and conclufions. The final fentence, it is probable, which pronounces chara6lers and ac- tions amiable or odious, praife-worthy or blame- able j that which ftamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or cenfure ; tlist which renders morality an adlive principle, and conftitutes virtue our happinefs, and vice our mifery : It is probable, I fay, that this final fen- tence depends on fome internal fenfe or feeling, which nature has made univerfal in the whole fpe- cies. For what elfe can have an influence of this nature ? But in order to pave the way for fuch a fcntiment, and give a proper difcernment of its ob- jedl, it is often necefl^ary, we find, that much reafoning Ihould precede, that nice diftin<5lions be made, juft contlufions drawn, diftant compa- rifons formed, complicated relations examined, and general fafts fixed and afcertained. Some fpecies of beauty, efpecially the natural kinds, on their firft appearance, command our affection and approbation ; and where they fail of this effed:, it is impofiible for any reafoning to redrefs their influence, or adapt them better to our tafle and fentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particu- larly thofe of the finer arts, it is requifite to em- ploy much reafoning, in order to feel the pro- per fentiment ; and a falfe relifh may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are juft grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter fpecies, and demands the afliftance of our intellectual faculties, in or- der
420 SECTION I
der to give it a fuitable influence on the human inind.
But though this queftion, concerning the gene- ral principles of morals, be curious and impor- tant, it is needlefs for us, at prefent, to employ farther care in our refearches concerning it. For if we can be fo happy, in the courfe of this en- quiry, as to difcover the true origin of morals, it will then eafily appear how far either fentiment or reafon enters into all determinations of this na- ■ture *. In order to attain this purpofe, we fhall endeavour to follow a very fimple method : We fhall analyze that complication of mental qualities, which form what, in common life, we call Perfo- nal Merit : We fhall confider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of .ef- teem and affection, or of hatred and contempt ; .every habit or fentiment or faculty, which, if af- cribed to any perfon, implies either praife or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or fatire of his character and manners. The quick fenfibility, which, on this head, is fo univerfal among man- kind, gives a philofopher fufficient afTurance, that he can neyer ,be confiderably miflaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of mifplacing the objects of his contemplation : He needs only enter into his own breaft for a moment, and confider whether or not he fhould defire to have this or that quality afcribed to him, and whether fuch or fuch an im.p-utation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. Tjie very nature of language guides us almofl infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature ; and as every tongue pofTelTes one fet of words which are taken in a good fcnfe, and ano- ther in the oppofite, the leafl acquaintance with the idiom fuffices, without any reafoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the eflimable or blame- able
* See Appendix I.
1
Of the General Principles of Morals. 221
able qualities of men. The only object of reafon- ing is to difcover the circumilanccs on both fides, which are common to thefe qualities ; to obfervc that particular in which the eflimabie qualities a- gree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find thofe univerfal principles, from which all cenfure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a queftion of fact, not of abftract fcience, we can only expect fuccefs, by following the expe- rimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparifon of particular inftances. The other fcientifical method, where a general abftract principle is firft eftablifhed, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and con- clufions, may be more perfect in itfelf, but fuits lefs the imperfection of human nature, and is a com.- mon fource of illufion and miftake in this as well as in other fubjects. Men are now cured of their paffion for hypothefes and fyftems in natural philo- fophy, and will hearken to no arguments but thofe which are derived from experience. It is full time they fhould attempt a like reformation in all moral difquifitions; and reject every fyftem of ethics, however fubtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and obfervation.
We fhall begin our enquiry on this head by the confideration of the focial virtues, benevolence and juftice. The explication of them will probably give us an opening by which the others may be ac- counted for.
o
( ^ij )
SECTION 11.
Of B E N E V O L E N C E.
PART I.
I
T may be efteemed, perhaps, a fuperfluous talk to prove, chat the benevolent or fofter affeftions are ESTIMABLE; and wherever they appear, en- gage the approbation, and good-will of mankind. The epithets Jociahle^ good-natured, humane y merci- fuU gratefuly friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and uni- verfaily exprefs the highefl: merit, which human nature is capable of attaining. Where thefe ami- able qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and difplay themfelves in the good government or ufeful inftruftion of mankind, they feem even to raife the pofTeflbrs of them above the rank of human nature, and make them approach in Ibme mearure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, profperous fuccefs ; thefe may only expofe a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public : But as foon as the praifes are added of humane and beneficent; when inftan- ces are difplayed of lenity, tenderncfs, or friend- fhip J envyitfelfis filent, or joins the general voice of approbation and applaule.
When Pericles, the great Athenian flatefman and general, was on his death-bed, his furround- ing friends, deeming him now infenfiblc, began to indulge their forrow for their expiring patron, -by enumerating his great qualities and fuccefTes, his conquells and vidories, the unufual length
of
224 S E C T I O N IL
of his admlniftration, and his nine trophies ereft- ed over the enemies of the republic. Tou for- getj cries the dying hero, who had heard all, you forget the moft eminent of my praifesy while you dwell fo much on thofe vulgar advantages ^ in which fortune had a principal Jhare, Tou have not ohferved^ that no citizen has ever yet worn mourning on my ac- count *.
In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the focial virtues become, if poflible, ftill more eflentially requifite ; there being nothing eminent in that cafe, to compenfate for the want of them, or preferve the perfon from our fevereft hatred, as well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated courage, is aptj fays Cicero, in lefs perfecft characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more focial and fofter virtues arc there chief- ly to be regarded. Thefe arc always good and amiable f.
The principal advantage, which Juvenal difco- vers in the extenfive capacity of the human fpe- cies is, that it renders our benevolence alfo more extenfive, and gives us larger opportunities of fpreading our kindly influence than what are in- dulged to the inferior creation J, It muft, in- deed, be confeffed, that by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being emi- nent. His exalted ftation, of itfelf, but the more expofes him to danger and tempeft. His fole prerogative is to afford fhelter to inferiors, who repofe themfelves under his cover and proteftion.
But I forget, that it is not my prefent bufinefs to recommend generofity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the focial virtues. Thefe, indeed, fufRciently engage every heart, on the firft apprehenfion ot
them i
• Plut. in Pericle. 'f Cic. dc Officiis, lib. r.
X Sat. XV. 139, & feq.
\
Of BENEVOLnNCE. 22^
them ; and it is difficult to abfLain from forn^ fally of panegyric, as often as they occur in dif- courfe or reafoning. But our objecft here !ving more the fpeculative, than the pradlical part of mo- rals, it will fuffice to remark, (what will readily, I believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friend- fhip and gratitude, natural affection and public Ipirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender fym- pathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and fpecies. Thefe, wherever they ap- pear, feem to transfufe themfelvcs, in a mann'-r, into each beholder, and to call forth, in the; own behalf, the fame favourable and affectionate fenti- ments, which they exert on all around.
PART II.
We may obferve, that, in difplaying the praifes of any humane, beneficent man, there is one cir- cumftance which never fails to be amply infifbed on, namely, the happinefs and fatisfaftion, deriv- ed to fociety from his intercourfe and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to fay, he endears him- felf by his pious attachment and duteous care, fbill }nore than by the connexions of nature. His chil- dren never feel his authority, but when employed for their advantage. With him, the ties of love are confolidated by beneficence and friendffiip. The ties of frienddiip approach, in a fond obferv- ance of each obliging office, to thofe of love and inclination. His domeflics and dependants have in him a fure refource ; and no longer dread the pow- er of fortune, but fo far as ffie excrcifes it over him. From him the hungry receive food, the naked cloath- ing, the ignorant and flothful flci'l and induftry. I. ike the fun, an inferior minifter of providence,
'Vol. II. CL ^e
S26 SECTION 11.
he cheers, invigorates, and luilains the furrounding' world.
If confined to private life, the fphereof his adivi- ty is narrower; but his influence is all benign and-, gentle. If exalted into a higher ftation, mankind- and pofterity reap the fruit of his labours.
As thefe topics of praife never fail to be employ- ed, and with fuccefs, where we would infpire efteem for any one: may it not therk:e be concluded, that the Utility, refulting froni the focial virtues, forms, at leaft, a^<^r/ of their merit, and is one fource of that approbation and regard fo univerfally paid to them ?
When we recommend even an animal or a plant as u/eful and leneficial, v;e give it an applaufe and recommendation fuited to its nature. As, on the other hand, refledion on the baneful influence of any of thefe inferior beings always infpires us with the fentiment of averfion. The eye is pleafed with the profpecV of corn-fields and loaded vine- yards; horfes grazing, and flocks pafturing : BuE iiiesthe view of briars and brambles^ affording fhel- ter to wolves and ferpents.
A machine, a j^iece of furniture^ a veftment, a houfe well contrived fc>-r ufc and convenicncy, is {o far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleafure and approbation. An experienced eye is here fenfible to many excellencies, which cfcape perfons igno- rant and uninilrudcd.
Can any thing (Wronger be faid in praife of a profeflion, lUch as nierchandize or manufaiflure, than to obferve the advantages which it procures to fociety ? And is not a monk and iriquifitor enraged when we treat his order as ulclefs or pernicious to mankind ?
Ihe hiRorian exults in difplaying the benefit arifing from his labours. The writer of romance alleviates or denies the bad confequences afcribed fo his manner of compofitioo.
In
Of B E N' E V O L E N C E. ll'J
In general, what praife is implied in the fimple epithet ujefiill What reproach in the contrary !
Your God?, fays Cicero '^, in oppofition to the Epicureans, cannot jullly claim any worfhipor ado- ration, with whatever imaginary perfections you may fuppofe them endowed. They are totally ufe- lefs and unadive. Even the Egyptians, whom you ib much ridicule, never confecratcd any animal but on account of its utility.
The fceptics aflert f , though abfurdly, that the origin of all religious worfuip was derived from the utility of inanimate objeds, as the fun and moon, to the fupport and well-being of mankind. This is alfo the common reafon alfigned by hiftorians, for the deification of eminent heroes and legifla- tors J.
To plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget chil- dren ; meritorious acts, according to the religion of Zoroafter.
In all determinations of morality, this circum- ftance of public utility is ever principally in viewj and wherever difputes arife, either in philofophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the queftion cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by afcertaining, on any fide, the true interefls of mankind. If any falfe opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail ; as foon as farther experience and founder reafoning have given us jufter notions of human affairs; we retract our firii fentiment, and adjufl: anew the boundaries of moral good and evil.
Giving alms to the common beggar is naturally
praifed ; becaufe it feems to carry relief to the dif-
trefied and indigent : But when we obferve the en-
0^2 couragement
* De Nat. Deot. lib. i.
t Sext. Emp. adverfus Math. lib. viii.
t Diod. Sic. paflim.
228 S E C T I O N II.
couragement thence arifing to idlenefs and debauch- ery, we regard that fpecies of charity rather as a weaknefs than a virtue.
'Tyrannicide^ or the aflairmation of ufurpers and oppreflive princes, was highly extolled in ancient times ; becaufe it both freed mankind from many of thefe monfters, and feemed to keep the others in awe, whom the fword or pCigrtard could not reach. But hiftory and experience having, fince convinced us, that this praftice encreafes the jea- loufy and cruelty of princes, a Timoleon and a Brutus, though treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now confider- ed as very improper models for imitation.
Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of be- neficence : But when it occurs, that the homely bread of the honeft and induftrious is often there- by converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal, we foon retraft our heedlefs praifes. The regrets of a prince, for having loft a day, were noble and generous : But had he intended to have fpent it in a6ts of generofity to his greedy courtiers, it was better loft than mifemployed after that manner.
Luxury, or a refinement on the pleafures and conveniencies of life, had long been fuppofed the fource of every corruption in government, and the immediate caufe of facStionj fedition, civil wars, and the total lofs of liberty. It was, therefore, univerfally regarded as a vice, and was an objedt of declamation to all fatyrifts, and fevere moralifts. Thofe, who prove, or attempt to prove, that fuch refinements rather tend to the encreafe of induftry, civility, and arts, regulate anew our ?;;or^/ as well as political fentimen's, and reprefent, as laudable or innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.
Upon the whole, then, it feems undeniable, /Z^^/ nothing can beftow more merit on any human crea- ture
i
of Benevolence. dig
ture than the fentiment of benevolence In an emi- nent degree; and ihaf a. part, at leaft, of its me- rit arifes from its tendency to promote the intcrefts of our fpecies, and beftow happincfs on human fo- ciety. We carry our view into the falutary confe- quences of fuch a charadler and difpofition ; and whatever has fo benign an influence, and forwards fo defirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleafure. The focial virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The happinefs of mankind, the order of fociety, the harmony of families, the mutual fupport of friends, are always confidered as the refult of their gentle dominion over the breafts of men.
How confiderable a part of their merit we ought to afcribe to their utility, will better appear from future difquifitions *j as well as the reafon, why this circumflance has fuch a command over our ef- teem and approbation f.
• Seft3dand4th. f Seft. 5th.
S E C-
( ^31 )
?5
SECTION III.
of Justice. P A R T h
i HAT Juftice is iifcful to Ibciety, and con- fequently ths.< part of its merit, at leaft, muft arife from that confideration, it would be a fuperfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the fole origin of juftice, and that reflexions on the beneficial confequences of this virtue are the fole foundation of its merit; this propofition, being jnore curious and important, will better deferve our examination and enquiry.
Let us fuppofe, that nature has beftowed on the human race iuch profufe abundance of all external conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or indullry on our part, every individual finds himfelf fully provided with whatever his moll voracious appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wifh or defire. His natural beauty, we fhall fuppofe, furpaffes all acquired ornaments: The perpetual clemency of the feafons renders ufelefs all cloaths or covering: The raw herbage affords him the mod delicious fare; the clear fountain, the richeft beverage. No laborious occupation required: No tillage: No navigation. Mufic, poetry, and contemplation form his fole bufinefs : Converfation, mirth, and friendlhip his fole amufement,
It
232 SECTION III.
It feems evident, that, in fuch a happy ftatCj every other foclal virtue would flourifh, and re- ceive tenfold encreafe ; but the cautious, jealous virtue of juftice would never once have been dreamed of. For what purpofe make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough ? Why give rife to property, where there cannot poffibly be any injury ? Why call this ob- }tdi miney when, upon the feizing of it by another, I need but ftretch out my hand to pofiefs myfelf of what is equally vaiuable ? Jufticc, in that cafe, be- ing totally Ufelf-fs, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never poliibly have place in the cata- logue of virtues.
We fee, even in the prefent neceflitous conditi- on of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is be- ftcwed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave it always in common among the whole hu- man race, and make no fubdivifions of right and property. Water and air, though the mcfl neceffa- ry of all objefts, are not challenged as the pro- perty of individuals; nor can any man commit in- jullice by the mod lavifli ufe and enjoyment of thefe blefiings. In fertile extenfive countries, with, few inhabitants, land is regarded on the fame footing. And no topic is fo much infifted on by thofe, who defend tiie liberty of the feas, as the unexhauited ufe of them in navigation. Were the advantages, procured by navigation, as inexhauft- ible, thefe reafoners had never had any adverfaries to refute , nor had any claims ever been advanced ofaleparate, exclufive dominion over the ocean.
It may happen, in fome countries, at fome pe- riods, that there be eftablifhed a property in water, none in land*; if the latter be in greater abun- dance than can be ufed by the inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty, and in very fmail quantities.
Again -,
* Gencfis. chap. xiii. a.nd xxi.
Of Justice. 223
Again ; fuppofe, that, though the neceffities of human race continue the fame as at prefent, yet the mind is fo enlnrged, and fo replete with friend- fhip and generofity, that every man has the utmoft tenderntrfs for every man, and feels no more con- cern for his own intereft than for that of his fellows : It feems evident, that the Ufc of juftice would, in this cafe, be fufpended by fuch an extenfive be- nevolence, nor would the divifions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of. Why lliould I bind another, by a deed or prom ife, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the ftrongefl inclination, to feek my happinefs, and would, of himfeif, per- form the defired fervice j except the hurt, he there- by receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me ? in which cafe, he knows, that, from my innate humanity and friendfhip, I fhould be the firfl to oppofe myfelf to his imprudent generofity. Why raife land-marks between my neighbour's field and mine, when my heart has made no divi- fion between our intereftsj but fhares all his joys and forrows with the fame force and vivacity as if originally my own ? Every man, upon this fup- pofition, being a fecond felf to another, would truft all his interefts to the difcretion of every man; without jealoufy, without partition, without dif- tindlion. And the whole human race would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be ufed freely, without regard to property $ but cautioufly too, with as entire regard to the ne- ceffities of each individual, as if our own interells were mod intimately concerned.
- In the prefent difpofition of the human heart, it would, perhaps, be difficult to find compleat inftances of fuch enlarged afi^edlions ; but ftill we may obferve, that the cafe of families approaches towards it ; and the ftronger the mutual benevo- lence
.a34 S E C T I O N III.
lence is among the individuals, the nearer it ap-r -proachcs J till all diflinftion of property be, in a ^reac nieafure, lofl and confounded amono- them. Betiyeeji married perfons, the cement of friend- Ihip is by the law fuppofed fo ftrong as to abolifh all 'divifion of polTeHionsj and has often, in rea- lity, the force afcribed to it. And it is obferv- able, that,' during the ardour of new enthufiafms, when every principle is inflamed into extrava- gance, the community of goods has frequently been attempted; and iiorhing but experience of its inconveniencies, from the returning: or difo-uifed felfifhnefs of men, could make the imprudent fa- natics adopt anew the idea, of juflice and of fe- parate property. So true is it, that this virtue derives its exiftence entirely from its necefTary nfe to the intercourfe and focial ftate of man- kind.
To make this truth more evident, let us reverfe the foregoing fuppofitions ; and carrying every thing to the oppofite extreme, confider what would be the effed; of thefe new fituations. Sup- pofe a Ibciety to fall into fiich want of all com- mon necelTarics, that the utmofb frugality and in- dufbry cannot preferve the greater number from perifliing, and the whole from extreme mifery : It will readily, I believe, be admitted, t-hat the fcricSl laws of juftice are fufpended, in fuc-ii a prefiing emergence, and give place to the ftrong- er motives of neceflity and felf-prefcrvation. Is it any crime, after a fhipwreck, to feize whatever means or inftrument of fafety one can lay hold, of, without regard to former limitations of proper- ty ? Or if a city befieged were perifhing with hunger; can we imagine, that men will fee any means of prefervation before them, and lofe their lives, from a fcrupulous regard to what, in o- ther fituations, would be the rules of equity and jultice ? The Ufe and Tendency of that virtue
is
Of Justice. 235
is to procure happinefs and fecurity, by preferv- ing ordtT in ibciety : But where the Ibciety is ready to pcrilh from extreme necefiity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injufticej and every man may now provide for himfelf by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or hu- manity- permit. The public, even in Icfs ur- gent" necellities, opens granaries, without the con- lent of {)roprietars ; as jullly fuppofing, that the authority of magiflracy may, confiftent with e- quity, exttnd fo far: But were any number of men to afiemble, without the tye of laws or ci- vil j urifdicfti on ; would an equal partition of bread in a famine, though effedled by power' and even violence, be regarded as criminal or injurious?
Suppofe likewife, that it fliould be a virtu- ous man's fate to fall into the fociety of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and govern- fricntj what condu6t muft he embrace in that melancholy fituation ? he fees fuch a defperatc rapacioufnefs prevail ; fuch a difregard to equi- ty, fuch contempt of order, fuch ftupid blind- nefs to future confcquences, as mufb immediately have the mod tragical conclufion, and muft ter- minate in deilru(flion to the greater number, and in a total diflbluticn of fociety to the reft. He, mean while, can have no other expedient than to arm himfelf, to whomever the fword he feizes, or the buckler, may belong : To make provifion of all means of defence and fecurity : And his particular regard to juftice being no longer of Ufe to his own fafety or that of o- thers, he muft confult the didates of felf-pre- fervation alone, without concern for thofe who no longer merit his care and attention.
When any man, even in political fociety, ren- ders himfelf, by his crimes, obnoxious to the public, he is puniflied by the laws in his goods and perfon ; that is, the ordinary rules of juf- tice
asS SECTION III.
tice are, with regard to him, fufpended for $, moment, and it becomes equitable to inflift on him, for the henefit of fociety, what, otherwife, he could not fufFer without wrong or injury.
The rage and violence of public warj what is it but a fufpenfion of juftice among the warring parties, who perceive, that this virtue is now no longer of any uje or advantage to them ? The Jaws of war, which then fucceed to thofe of equity and juftice, are rules calculated for the advantage and utility of that particular ftate, in which men are now placed. And were a civi- lized nation engaged with barbarians, who ob- ferved no rules even of war ; the former muft alfo fufpend their obfervance of them, where they no longer ferve to any purpofe -, and muft ren- der every a6lion or rencounter as bloody and per- nicious as pofTible to the firft aggreflbrs.
Thus, the rules of equity or juftice depend entirely on the particular ftate and condition, in which men are placed, and owe their origin and exiftence to that Utility, which refults to the public from their ftrid and regular obferv- ance. Reverfe, in any confiderable circumftance, the condition of men : Produce extreme abund- ance or extreme neceflity : Implant in the human breaft perfe6l moderation and humanity, or per- fe<^ rapacioufnefs and malice : By rendering juf- tice totally ufelefs, you thereby totally defttoy its cflence, and fufpend its obligation upon man- kind.
The common fituation of fociety is a medium amidft all thefe extremes. We are naturally partial to ourfelves, and to our friends ; but are capable of learning the advantage refulting from a more equitable condu6t. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of na- ture i but by art, labour, and induftry, we can
extradt
^
or Justice. 237
extrad them in great abundance. Hence the ideas of property become neceflary in all civil fociety : Hence juftice derives its ulefulnefs to the public : And hence alone arifes its merit and mo- ral obligation.
Thefe conclufions are fo natural and obvious, that they have not efcaped even the poets, in their defcriptions of the felicity, attending the golden age or the reign of Saturn. The feafons, in that Hrft period of nature, were fo temperate, if we credit thefe agreeable fiftions, that there was no necefTity for men to provide themfelves with cloaths and houfes, as a fecurity againil the violence of heat and cold : The rivers flowed with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature fpontaneoufly produced her greateft delicacies. Nor were thefe the chief advantages of that happy age. Tempefts were not alon*e removed from nature ; but thofe more furious tempefts were unknown to human breafts, whick. now caufe fuch uproar, and engender fuch con- fufion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, felfifhnefs, were never heard of: Cordial affection, compaf- fion, fympathy, were the only movements with which the mind was yet acquainted. Even the pundtilious diltin^lion of mi?7e and thine was ba- nifhed from among that happy race of mortals, and carried with it the very notion of property and obligation, juftice and injuftice.
This poetical fiction of the golden age is, in fome refpefts, of a piece with the philofophical fi6tion of the Jiate of nature -, only that the for- mer is reprefented as the moft charming and moil peaceable condition, which can poffibly be imagined ; whereas the latter is painted out as a ftate of mutual war and violence, attended with the moft extreme neceflity. On the firft origin of mankind, we are told, their ignorance and fa- vage nature were fo prevalent, that they could
238 SECTION III.
,give no mutual truft, but muft each depend upon himfelf, and his own force or cunning for protec- tion and fecurity. No law was heard of: No rule of juftice known : No diftinftion of property regarded : Power was the only meafure of right j and a perpetual war of all againft all was the refult of men's untamed felfifhnefs and barbarity *.
Whether fuch a condition of human nature could ever exifl, or if it did, could continue fo long as to merit the appellation of a Jiate, may juftly be doubted. Men are neceffarily born in a family- fociety, at lead ; and are trained up by their pa- rents to fome rule of conduft and behaviour. But this mull be admitted, that, if fuch a flate of mutual war and violence was ever real, the fuf- penfion of all laws of juftice, from their abfolute inutility, is a necefiary and infallible confequence.
The m.ore we vary the views of human life, and the newer and more unufual the lights are, in which we furvey it, the more Ihall we be con- vinced, that the origin here afTigned for the virtue of iuftice is real and fatisfa£lory.
Were there a fpecies of creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational, were pofTelT- ed of fuch inferior ftrength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all refiftance, and could nevef, upon the higheft provocation, make us feel the effefts of their refcntment ; the necefiary confequence, I think, is, that we fhould be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle ufage to thefe creatures, but jfhould not, properly fpeaking, lie under any rcftraint of juf- tice, with regard to them, nor could they polfefs any right or property, exclufive of fuch arbitra- ry lords. Our intercourfe with them could not be called fociety, which fuppofes a degree of
equality ;
* See NOTE [S].
of J U S T I C Ei 229
equality ; but abfolute command on the one fide, and fervile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they muft inftantly refign : Our per- mifiion is the only tenure, by which they hold their poiTeirions : Our companion and kind- nefs the only check, by which they curb our lawlefs will : And as no inconvenience ever refults from the exercife of a power, fo firn^.ly cftablilhcd in nature, the rcflraints of jullice and property, being totally u/elc/s, would never have place in fo unequal a confederacy.
This is plainly the fituation of men, vv^ith re- gard to animals ; and how far thefe may be laid to poiTcfs reafoil', I leave it to others to deter- iViifte. The great fuperiority of civilized Euro- peans above barbarous Indians, tempted us to
imae;ine ourfelves on the fame footins; with re- ts o
gard to them, and made us throw off all re- itraints of jtiftice, and even of humanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations, the female fex are reduced to like flavery, and are render- ed incapable of all property, in oppofition to their lordly mailers. But though the males, when united, have, in all countries, bodily force fuffi- eient to maintain this fevere tyranny j yet fuch are the inlinuation, addrefs, and charms of their fair companions, that women are commonly able to break the confederacy, and fliare with the o- ther fex in all the rights and privileges of fo- ciety.
Were the human fpecies fo framed by nature as that each individual poffeiTcd within himfelf every faculty, requifite both for his own prefervaticn and for the propagation of his kind: Were all fo- ciety and intercourfe cut off between man and man, by the primary intention of the fupreme Creator : It feems evident, that fo folitary a be- ing would be as much incapable of juftice, as of fociai difcourfe and converfation. Where mutual
regards
i40 SECTION III.
regards and forbearance ferve to no manner of purpofe, they would never direft the conduct of any reafonable man. The headlong courfe of the paf- fions would be checked by no refleftion on fu- ture confequences. And as each man is here fuppofed to love himfelf alone, and to depend only on himfelf and his own adVivity for fafety and happjnefs, he would, on every occafion, to the utmoft of his power, challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature or of in- tercft.
But fuppofe the conjunftion of the fexes to be eftablilhed in nature, a family immediately arifes ; and particular rules being found requifite for its fubfiftence, thefe are immediately embrac- ed j though without comprehending the reft of mankind within their prefcriptions. Suppofe, that feveral families unite together into one fociety, which is totally disjoined from all others, the ruler, which preferve peace and order, enlarge themfelves to the utmoft extent of that fociety j but becoming then entirely ufeVls, lofe their force when carried one ftep farther. But again fup- pofe, that ftveral diftindt focieties maintain a kind of intercourfe for mutual convenience and ad- vantage, the boundaries of juftice ftill grow lar- ger, in proportion to the largenefs of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions. Hif- tory, experience, reafon fufficiently inftrudt us in this natural progrefs of human fentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to juftice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the cxtenfive utility of that virtue.
PART II.
If we examine the pnyticidar laws, by which juf- tice is direi^cd, and property determined; we fliall
ftill
of Justice. 241
ftill be prefented with the fame conclufion. The good of mankind is the only obje6l of all thefe laws and regulations. Not only it is requifite, for the peace and intereft: of fociety, that men's pof- lefTions flioiild be feparated ; but the rules which we follow, in making the feparation, are fuch as can beft be contrived to ferve farther the interells of fociety.
We fhall fuppofe, that a creature, pofTefled of reafon, but unacquainted with human nature, de- liberates with himfelf what RULES of juftice or property would beft promote public intereft, and eftablifh peace and fecurity among mankind : His moft obvious thought would be, to afllgn the Jargeft pofiefTions to the moft extenfive virtue, and give every one the power of doing good, propor- tioned to his inclination. In a perfedt theocracy, where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular volitions, this rule would certainly have place, and might ferve to the wifeft purpofes : But were mankind to execute fuch a law ; i^o great is the uncertainty of merit, both from its natural ob- fcurity, and from the felf-conceit of each indi- vidual, that no determinate rule of conduct would ever refult from it ; and the total difTolution of fociety mutl be the immediate confequence. Fa- natics may fuppofe, that dominion is founded on gracCy and that faints alone inherit the earth i but the civil magidrate very juftly puts thefe fub- lime theorifls on the fame footing with common robbers, and teaches them by the fevereft dif- cipline, that a rule, which, in fpeculation, may feem the moft advantageous to fociety, may yet be found, in practice, totally pernicious and deftruc- tive.
That there were religious fanatics of this kind in England, during the civil wars, we learn from hif- tory; though it is probable, that the obvious /^«- dency of thefe principles excited fuch horror in
Vol. II. R mankind,
242 SECTION III.
mankind, as foon obliged the dangerous enthu- fiafts to renounce, or at leaft conceal their tenets. Perhaps, the levelle?'S; who claimed an equal dif- tribution of property, were a kind of poliiical fa- natics which arofe from the religious fpecies, and more openly avowed their pretenfions j as carrying a more plaufible appearance, of being pradicable in themlclves, as well as ufeful ta human focie-
It muft, indeed, be confefTed, that nature is {o liberal to mankind, that, were all her prefents equally divided among the fpecies, and improved by art and induilry, every individual would enjoy ail the neceflaries, and even mod of the comforts of life ; nor would ever be liable to any ills, but fuch as might accidentally arife from the fickly frame and conftitution of his body. It muft alfo be confefled, that, wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more fatisfadion than we add to the rich, and that the flight gratificati- on of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, fre- quently cofts more than bread to many families, and even provinces. It may appear withal, that the rule of equality, as it would be highly ufe- ful^ is not altogether impra5iicable ; but has taken place, at leaft in an imperfed: degree, in fome re- publics; particularly that of Sparta; where it was attend, it is laid, with the moft beneficial con- fequences. Not to mention, that the Agrarian laws, fo frequently claimed in Rome, and carri- ed into execution in many Greek cities, proceed- ed, all of them, from a general idea of the utility^ of this principle.
But hiftorians, and even common fenfe, may in- form us, that, however fpecious thefe ideas oi fer- fetf equality may feem, they are really, at bottom, InfraoJicahle ; and were they not fo, would be ex- tremely pernicious to human fociety. Render pof- fefiions ever (o equal, men's dificrent degrees of
art.
Of Justice. 24J
art, care, and induflry will Immediately break that equality. Or it you check thcfe virtues, you re- duce fociety to the moft extreme indigence ; and inftfad of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community. The moft rigorous inquifition too is requifite to watch every inequality on its firil appearance 5 and the moft fevere jurifdidion, to punilh and redrefs it. But befidcs, that ^o much authority muft (oon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted with great partialities ; who can pollibly be poffeiTed of it, in fuch a fituation as is here fuppofed ? Perfedt equa- lity of pofteiHons, deftroying all fubordination, weakens extremely the authority of magiftracy, and muft reduce ail powernearly to a level, as well SiS property.
We may conclude, therefore, that, in order to cftablifti laws tor the regulation of property, we muft be acquainted with the nature and fituation of man j muft rejedt appearances, which may be falfe, though fpecious J and muft fearch for thofe rules, which arc, on the whoie, moft uf^ful and beneficial. Vulgar fenfe and llight experience are fufficient for this purpofe ; when men give not way to too feinfti avidity, or too exteniive en- thufi;'.fm.
Who fees not, for inft^nce, that whatever is produced or improved by a man's art or induftry ought, for ever, to be fecured to him, in order to give encouragement to ujeful habits and accom-. plifliments ? That the property ought alfo to de- fcend to children and relations, for the fame ujeful purpofe ? That it may be alienated by confent, in order to beget that commerce and intercourlc, which is fo beneficial to human fociety ? And that all contra(5ls and promifes ought carefully to be ful- filled, in order to fecure mutual truft and confi- dence, by which the general interefi of mankind is lo much proir.cted ?
R a - Examine
i44 SECTION III.
Examine the writers on the laws of nature ; and you will always find, that, whatever principles they {tt out with, they are fure to terminate here at lad, and to afTign, as the ultimate reafon for every rule which they eftablifh, the convenience and necefli- ties of mankind. A conceffion thus extorted, in oppofition to fyflems, has more authority, than if it had been made in profecution of them.
What other reafon, indeed, could writers ever give, why this muft be mine and that yours ; fince uninftrudled nature, furely, never made any fuch diftindion ? The objedls, which receive thofe ap- pellations, are, of themfelves, foreign to us j they are totally disjoined and feparated from us ; and nothing but the general interells of fociety can form the connexion.
Sometimes, the interells of fociety may require a rule of juflice in a particular cafe; but may not determine any particular rule, among feveral, which are all equally beneficial. In that cafe, the ilighteft analogies are laid hold of,- in order to prevent that indifi^erence and ambiguity, which would be the. fource of perpetual difl^ention. Thus polTeflion alone, and firil poirelTion, is fuppofed to convey property, where no body elfe has any preceding claim and pretenfion. Many of the reafonings of lawyers are of this analogical nature, and depend on very flight connexions of the imagination.
Does any one fcruple, in extraordinary cafes, to violate all regard to the private property of individuals, and facrifice to public intereft a dif- tindion, which had been eftabliflied for the fake of that intereft ? The fafety of the people is the fupreme law : All other particular laws are fubor- dinate to it, and dependant on it: And if, in the common courfe of things, they be followed and re- garded ; it is only becaufe the public fafety and in- tereft commonly demand io equal and impartial an adminiftration.
Sometimes
Of Justice. 245
Sometimes both utility and analogy fail, and leave the laws of jufticc in total uncertainty. Thus, it is highly requifite, that prefcription or long polTeflion fliould convey property ; but what number of days or months or years fhould be fufficient for that purpofe, it is impoflible for reafon alone to deter- mine. Civil laivs here fupply the place of the na- tural code, and affign different terms for prefcrip- tion, according to the different utilities^ propofed by the legiflator. Bills of exchange and promif- fory notes, by the laws of moft countries, prefcribe fooner than bonds, and mortgages, and contrails of a more formal nature.
In general, we may obferve, that all queftions of property are fubordinate to the authority of ci • vil laws, which extend, reftrain, modify, and al- ter the rules of natural juftice, according to the particular convenience of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a confrant reference to the conltitution of government, the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the fitu- ation of each fociety. A late author of genius, as well as learning, has profecuted this fubjecl at large, and has eftablillied, from thef? principles, a fyftem of political knowledge, which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts, and is not want- ing in folidity *.
What is a marHs property ? Any thing, which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to ufe But what rule hp-ve wCj by which we can diftin- guijh thefe ohje5ls ? Here we muft have recourfe to ftatutes, cuftoms, precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumftances -, fome of which are conflant and inflexible, fome variable and arbitra- ry. But the ultimate point, in which they all profeffedly terminate, is, the intereft and happi-
nefs
t See NOTE [O].
246 SECTION III.
ncfs of human fociety. Where this enters not into confideration, nothing can appear mofe whiiTi- fical, unnatural, and even fuperftitio'is, than all ormoft of the laws ofjuftice and of property.
Thofe, who ridicule vulgar fuperftitions, and expofe the folly of particular regards to nneats, days, places, poftures, apparel, have aneafytafkj while they confider all the qualities and relations of the objefts, and difcover no adequate caufe for that affedlion or antipathy, veneration or hor- ror, which have fo mighty an influence over a confiderable part of mankind. A Syrian woold have ftarved rather than tafte pigeon ; an Egyp- tian woi-.ld not have approached bacon : But if thefe fpecies of food be examined by the fenfes of fight, fmell, or tafte, or fcrutinized by the fci- ences of chymiflry, medicine, or phyfics ; no dif- ference is ever found between them and any other fpecies, nor can that precife circumflance be pitched on, which may afford a juft foundati- on for the religious pallion. A fowl on Thurf- day is lawful food ; on Friday abominable : Eggs, in this houfe, and in this diocefe, are permit- ted during Lent ; a hundred paces farther, to eat them is a damnable fm. This earth or building, yefterday was profane ; to-day, by the muttering of certain words, it has become holy and facred. Such reflections as thefe, in the mouth of a phi- lofopher, one may fafely fay, are too obvious to have any influence ; becaufe they mud always, to every man, occur at firft fight ; and where they prevail not, of themfclves, they are furely ob{lru6ted by education, prejudice, and paffion, not by ignorance or miftake.
It may appear to a carelefs view, or rather a too abftrailed reflexion, that there enters a like fuperltition into all the fentiments ofjuftice; and that, if a man expofe its objed, or what we call
property.
%
4
Of Ju STI CE. 247
property, to the fame fcrutiny of fenfe and fcience, he will not, by the moil accurate enquiry, find any foundation for the difference m.ide by moral fentiment. I may lawfully nourifh myfelf from this tree ; but the fruit of another of tiie fame fpecies, ten paces oif, it is criminal for me to touch. Had I worne this apparel an hour ago, 1 had merited the feverell punifhment ; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical fyllables, has now rendered it fit for my ufe and fervice. Were this houfe placed in the neighbouring territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell m it ; but being built on this fide the river, it is fubjeft to a dif-^ fercnt municipal law, and, by its becoming mine, I incur no blame or cenfure. The fame fpecies of reafoning, it may be thought, which fo fuccefs- fully expofes fuperftition, is alfo applicable tojuf- ticej nor is it pofliblc, in the one cafe more than in the other, to point out, in the object, that pre- cife quality or circumftance, which is the founda- tion of the fentiment.
But there is this material difference between fuperfiition zndjujiice, that the former is frivolous, ufelefs, and burdenfome ; the latter is abfolutely requifite to the well-being of mankind and exif- tence of fociety. When we abftrad from this cir- cumftance (for it is too apparent ever to be over- looked) it muft be confeifed, that all regards to right and property, feem entirely without founda- tion, as much as the groffeft and moft vulgar fu- perftition. Were the interefts of fociety nowife concerned, it is as unintelligible, why another's articulating certain founds implying confent, ftiould change the pature of my actions with regard to a particular objed:, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a prieft, in a certain habit and pofture, fhould dedicate a heap of brick and timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, facred *.
Thefc • See NOTE [U],
248 SECTION III.
Thefe refieftions are far from weakening the obligations of juflice, or diminifhing any thing from the moft facred attention to property. On the contrary, fuch fentiment muft acquire new force from the prefent reafoning. For the ftron- ger foundation can be defired or conceived for any duty, than to obferve, that human fociety, or even human nature could fubfift, without the eflablifhment of it^ and will Hill arrive at grea- ter degree of happinefs and perfedlion, the more inviolable the regard is, which is paid to that duty ?
The dilemma feems obvious: As juftlce evi- dently tends to promote public utility and to fupport civil fociety, the fentiment of juflice is either derived from our refleding on that ten- dency, or like hunger, thirft, and other appe- tites, refentment, love of life, attachment to off- fpring, and other paflions, arifes from a funple original inftincl in the human breaft, which na- ture has implanted for like falutary purpofes. If th? latter be the cafe, it follows, that property, which is the obje6l of juflice, is alfo diflinguifh- ed by a fimple, original inflin6l, and is not af- certained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of fuch an inftincl ^ Or is this a fubjeft, in which new difcoveries can be made? We may as well exped: to difcover, in the body, new fenfes, which had before ef- caped the obfervation of all mankind.
But farther, though it feems a very fimple pro- pofition to fay, that nature, by an inllinftive fen- timent, diflinguifnes property, yet in reality we fliall find, that there are required for that pur- pofe ten thoufand different infliniSts, and thefe em- ployed about objeds of the greatefl intricacy and nicefl difcernment. For when a detinition of ■property is required, that relation is found to re- folye itfelf into any poflefiion acquired by oc-
Qupation,
of Justice. 249
cupation, by induftry, by prefcription, by inhe- ritance, by contraft, &c. Can we think, that nature, by an original inftindb, inilruds us in all thefe methods of acquifition ?
Thcle words too, inheritance and contra^V, ftand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and a thoufand volumes of commentators, have not been found fufficient. Does nature, whofe in- ftincts in men are all fimple, embrace fuch com- plicated and artificial objects, and create a ratio- nal creature without trufting any thing to the operation of his reafon ?
But even though all this were admitted, it would not be fatisfactory. Fofitive laws can cer- tainly transfer property. Is it by another ori- ginal inftinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and fenates, and mark all the boundaries of their jurifdiction ? Judges too, even though their fentence be erroneous and illegal, muft be allowed, for the fake of peace and order, to have decifive authority, and ultimately to determine property. Have we original, innate ideas of prae- tors and chancellors and juries ? Who fees not, that all thefe inftitutions arife merely from the neceflities of human fociety ?
All birds of the fame fpecies in every age and country, build their nefts alike : In this we fee the force of inftinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houfes differently: Here we perceive the influence of reafon and cuftom, A like inference may be drawn from compar- ing the inflincft of generation and the inftituti-* on of property.
How great foever the variety of municipal laws, it muft be confeffed, that their chief out-lines pretty regularly concur j becaufe the purpofes, to which they tend, are every where exactly fimilar. In like manner, all houfes have a roof and walls,
windows
150 SECTION III.
windows and chimneys j though diverfified in their fhape, figure, and materials. The purpofes of the latter, directed to the conveniencies of human life, difcovcr not more plainly their origin from reafon and refleftion, than do thofe of the for- mer, which point all to a like end.
I need not mention the variations, which all the rules of property receive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination, and from the fub- tilties and abftraftions of law-topics and reafon- ings. There is no poflibility of reconciling this obfcrvation to the notion of original inftinfts.
What alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory, on which I infift, is the influence of edu- cation and acquired habits, by which we are fo accuftomed to blame injuftice, that we are not, in every inftance, confcious of any immediate re- flexion on the pernicious confequences of it. The views the moft familiar to us are apt, for that very reafon, to efcape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain mo- tives, we are apt likewife to continue mechani- cally, without recalling, on every occafion, the reflections, which firft determined us. The con- venience, or rather necelTity, which leads to juf- tice, is fo univerfal, and every where points fo much to the fame rules, that the habit takes place in all focieties; and it is not without fome fcru- tiny, that we are able to afcertain its true origin. The matter, however, is not fo obfcure, but that, even in common life, we have, every moment, recourfe to the principal of public utility, and ailc, PFhat miifi become of the worlds if fuch pra^i^ ces prevail':^ How could fociety fuhfifi under fuch diforders ? Were the diftinction or feparation of puildiions entirely ufelefs, can any one conceive, that it ever fhould have obtained in fociety ?
Thus we feem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force of that principle here in- fifled on, and can determine what degree of ef-
teem
1
Of J U S T I C E. 251
teem or moral approbation may refult from refle(flions on public interell and utility. The neceflity of juftice to the fupport of fociety is the Sole foundation of that virtue j and fince no mo- ral excellence is more highly efteemed, we may conclude, that this circumftance of ufefulnefs has, in general, the ftrongeft energy, and moft entire command over our fentiments. It mufl, therefore, be the fource of a confiderable part of the merit afcribed to humanity, benevolence, friendfhip, public fpirit, and other focial virtues of that flamp; as it is the Sole fource of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, juftice, veracity, integrity, and thofe other eftimable and ufeful qualities and principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philofophy, and even of common reafon ; where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one inllance, to afcribe to it a like energy in all fimilar inftances. This indeed is Newton's chief rule of philofophizing *.
* Princlpia, lib. iii.
( ^S3 )
S E C T I O N IV.
Of Political Society.
H
AD every man {uPn.cicnt fagacity to perceive, at all times, that ftrong intereft, which binds him to the oblervance of juftice and equity, and Jirength of mind fufficient to perfevere in a fleady adherence to a general and a diflant intereft, in oppofition to the allurements of prefent pleafure and advantage; there had never, in that cafe, been any fuch thing as government or political foci* ety, but each man, following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all others. What need of politive law where natu- ral juftice is, of icfelf, a fufficient reftraint ? Why create magiftrates, where there never arifes any diforder or iniquity? Why abridge our native free- dom, when, in every inftance, the utmoft exerti- on of it is found innocent and beneficial ? It is evident, that, if government were totally ufelefs, it never could have place, and that the Sole foundation of the duty of Allegiance is the ad- vaniage, which it procures to fociety, by preferv- ing peace and order among mankind.
When a number of political focieties are erect- ed, and maintain a great intercourfe together, a new fet of rules are immediately difcovered to be i(/efu I in that particular fituationj and accord- ingly take place under the title of Laws of Nations. Of this kind are, the facrednefs of the
perfon
254 SECTION IV.
peifon of ambalTadors, abftaining from poifoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind, which are plainly calculated for the advantage of ftates and kingdoms, in their intercourfe with each other.
The rules of juftice, fuch as prevail among individuals, are not entirely fufpended among po- litical focieties. All prince^ pretend a regard to the rights of other princes ; and fome no doubt, without hopocrify. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent ftates, which would only be fo much wafte of parchment, if they were not found, by experience, to have fome influence and authority. But here is the diffe- rence between kingdoms and individuals. Hu- man nature cannot, by any means, fubfift, with- out the afibciation of individuals; and that af- fociation never could have place, were no re- gard (paid to the laws of equity and juftice. Difordcr, confufion, the war of all againft all, are the neceflary confequences of fuch a licenti-? ous condudl. But nations can fubfift Avithout intercourfe. They may even fubfift, in fome de- gree, under a general v.*ar. The obfcrvance of juftice, though ufeful among them, is not guard- ed by fo ftrong a necefllty as among individu- als; and the moral obligation holds proportion witli the ujefulnejs. All poliricians will allow, and moft philofophers, that Reafons of State may, in par- ticular emergencies, difpenfe with the rules of juf- tice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the ftricl; obfervance of it would be prejudicial, in a confiderable degree, to either of the con- tradliing" parties. But nothing lefs than the moft extreme neceffity, it is confefted, can juftify in- dividuals in a breach of promife, or an invafi- on of the properties of others.
In a confederated commonwealth, fuch as the Achaean republic of old, or the Swifs Cantons
and
Of Political Society. 255
and United Provinces in modern times; as the league has here a peculiar utiliiy^ the conditions of union have a peculiar facrcdnefs and autho- rity, and a violation of them would be regarded as no Icfs, or even as more criminal, than any private injury or injuftice.
The long and helplefs infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the fubfiftence of their young; and that combination requires the virtue of Chaftity or fidelity to the married bed. Without fuch a utility, it will readily be owned, that fuch a virtue would never have been thought of*.
An infidelity of this nature is much more pernicious in women than in men. Hence the laws of chaftity are much ftrifber over the one fex than over the other.
Thefe rules have all a reference to generati- on; and yet women paft child-bearing are no more fuppofed to be exempted from them than thofe in the flower of their youth and beauty. General rules are often extended beyond the prin- ciple, whence they firft arife; and this in all matters of tafte and fentiment. It is a vulgar ftory at Paris, that, during the rage of the Mif- fiflippij a hump-backed fellow went every day into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the ftock- jobbers met in great crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make ufe of his hump as a defk, in order to fign their contrails upon it. Would the fortune, which he raifed by this ex- pedient, make him a handfomc fellow; though ic be confefTed, that perfonal beauty anfes very much from ideas of utility? The imagination is in- fluenced by afTociations of ideas; which, though they arife at hrft from the judgment, are not eafily altered by every particular exception that occurs to us. To which we may add, in the
piefent * See NOTE [X].
^^6 S E C T I O N IV.
prefent cafe of chaftlty, that the example of the old would be pernicious to the young; and that women, continually forefeeing that a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally advance that pe- riod, and think more lightly of this whole du- ty, fo requifite to fociety.
Thofe who live in the fame family have fuch frequent opportunities of licence of this kind, that nothing could preferve purity of manners, were marriage allowed, among the neareft relations, or any intercourfe of love be- tween them ratified by law and cuftom. In- ceft, therefore, being pernicious in a fuperior de- gree, has alfo a fuperior turpitude and moral deformity annexed to it.
What is the reafon, why, by the Athenian Jaws, one might marry a half-fifter by the fa- ther» but not by the mother? Plainly this: The manners of the Athenians were fo referved, that a man was never permitted to approach the women's apartment, even in the fame family, unlefs where he vifited his own mother. His ftep-mother and her children were as much Ihut up from him as the women of any other fa- mily, and there was as little danger of any criminal correfpondence between them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reafon, might marry at Athens : but neither thefe, nor half-brothers and fillers, could contract that alliance at Rome, where the intercourfe was more open between the fexes. Public utility is the caufe of all thefe variations.
To repeat, to a man's prejudice, any thing that efcaped him in private converfation, or to malce any fuch ufe of his private letters, is high- ly blamed. The free and focial intercourfe of minds muR be extremely checked, where no fuch rules of fidelity are ellablifhed.
Even
Of Political Society. 257
Even in repeating flories, whence we can fore- fee no ill confequences to refult, the giving of one's author is regarded as a piece of indifcretion, if not of immorality. Thefe ftories, in pafTing from hand to hand, and receiving all the ufual variations, frequently come about to the perfons concerned, and produce animofities and quarrels among people, whofe intentions are the moft in- nocent and inoffenfive.
To pry into fecrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to play the fpy upon tlieir words and looks and adlions -, what habits more inconve- nient in fociety ? What habits, of confequence, rnore blameable ?
This principle is alfo the foundation of moft of the laws of good manners -, a kind of lefler mora- lity, calculated for the eafe of company and con- verfation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed, and every thing, which promotes eafe, without an indecent familiarity, is ufeful and laudable.
Conftancy in friendfhips, attachments, and fa- miliarities, is commendable^ and is requifite to fupport truft and good correfpondence in fociety. But in places of general, though cafual con- courfe, where the purfuit of health and pleafure brings people promifcuoufly together, public conveniency has difpenfed with this maxim -, and cuftom there promotes an unreferved converfation for the time, by indulging the privilege of drop- ping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance, without breach of civility or good manners.
Even in focieties, which are eftablifhed on principles the moft immoral, and the moft def- tructive to the interefts of the general fociety, there are required certain rules, which a fpecies of falfe honour, as v/ell as private intereft, en- gages the members to obferve. Robbers and pi-
VoL. II, S rates.
ciS^ SECTION IV.
rates, it has often been remarked, could not main- tain their pernicious confederacy, did they not eftablifh a new diftributive juftice among them- felves, and recal thofe laws of equity, which they have violated with the reft of mankind.
I hate a drinking companion, fays the Greek proverb, who never forgets. The follies of the laft debauch Ihould be buried in eternal oblivi- on, in order to give full fcope to the follies of the next.
Among nations, where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil of myftery, is, in fome degree, authorifed by cuftom, there immediately arife a fet of rules, calculated for the conveni- ency of that attachment. The famous court or parliament of love in Provence formerly decided all difficult cafes of this nature.
In focietics for play, there are laws required for the condud of the game j and thefe laws are dif- ferent in each game. The foundation, I own, of fuch focieties is frivolous i and the laws are in a great meafure, though not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a material differ- ence between them and the rules of juftice, fi- delity, and loyalty. The general focieties of men are abfolutely requifite for the fubfiftence of the fpecies; and the public conveniehcy, which regu- lates morals, is inviolably eftabliftied in the nature of man, and of the world, in which he lives. The comparifon, therefore, in' thefe refpedls, is very imperfetl. "We may only learn from it the necefllty of rules, wherever men have any inter- courfe with each other.
They cannot even pafs each otiier on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and pofti- lions have principles, by which they give the way-; and thefe are chiefly founded on mutual cale and convenience. Sometimes alfo they are arbitrary,
at
Of Political Society. 259
at leaft dependant on a kind of capricious analogy, like many of the reafonings of lawyers *.
To carry the matter farther, we may obferve, that it is impofTible for men fo much as to murder each other without ftatutes, and maxims, and an ideaof juftice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace -, even that fportive kind of war, car- ried on among wreftlers, boxers, cudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Com- mon intereft and utility beget infallibly a flandard of right and wrong among the parties concern-
• See NOTE [Y],
S 2 SECT-
( 26i )
SECTION V.
Why Utility" pleases.
PART L
XT feems fo natural a thought to afcribe to their utility the praife, which we beftow on the focial virtues, that one would expefb to meet with this principle every where in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reafoning and enquiry. In common life, we may obferve, that the cir- cumftance of utility is always appealed to ; nor is it fuppofed, that a greater eulogy can be gi- ven to any man, than to difplay his ufefulnefs to the public, and enumerate the fervices, which he has performed to mankind and fociety. What praife, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts deftroy not its ficnefs for any ufeful purpofe ! And how fatisfadtory an apology for any difproportion or feeming deformi- ty, if we can fhow the necefllty of that particu- lar conftrudion for the ufe intended ! A Ihip ap- pears more beautiful to an artiil, or one mode- rately fkillcd in navigation, where its prow is wide and fwelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precife geometrical regularity, in contradidion to all the laws of mechanics. A building, whofe doors and windows were exact fquares, would hurt the eye by that very propor- tion ; as ill adapted to the figure of a human
creature.
262 S E C T I O N V.
creature, for whofe fervice the fabric was in- intended. What wonder then, that a man, whofc fiabits and condudl are hortfui to fociety, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourfe with him, fhould, on that account, be an objedt of difapproba-tion, and communicate to every Ipeftator the ftrongeft fentiment of difguft and hatred *.
But perhaps the difBculty of accounting for thefe effedbs of ufefulnefs, or its contrary, has kept philofophers from admitting them into their fyf- tems of ethics, and has induced them rather ta employ any other principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it is no juft reafon for rejed:irrg any principl-e, confirmed by experience, that we cannot give a fatisfaftory ac- count of its origin, nor are able to rcfolve it in- to other more general principles. And if we would employ a little thought on the prefent fubjedt, we need be at no lofs to account foi* the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles, the moft known and avowed in hu- man nature.
From the apparent ufefulnefs of the focial vir-- tues', it has readily been inferred by fceptics, both' ancient and modern, that all moral diftinftions arife from edacation, and were, at firft, invented, and afterward encouraged, by the in of politici- ans, in order to render men tractable, and fub- due their natural ferocity and felfiilintrs, which incapacitated them for fociety. This principle^ indeed, of precept and education, nuift lb far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it may frequently encreafe or diminilh, beyond their na- tural ilandard, the fentiments of approbation or diflikej and may even, in particular inltancesy create, without any natural principle, a new fenti- nientof this kind; as is evident in all fuperftitious
practices * See NOTE [Z].
Why XJ-tiLiTY PLEASES. 263
practices and obfervances : But that all mora! affection or diflike arifes from this origin, will never furely be allowed by any judicious en- quirer. Had nature made no fuch dillin6lion, founded on the original conftitution of the mind, the words, honourable^ and Jhameful, lovely, and odious y noble y and de/picabky had never had place in any language j nor could politicians, had they invented thefe terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be more fuperficial than this paradox of the fcep- tics; and it were well, if, in the abftrufer ftudies of logic and metaphyfics, we could as eafily ob- viate the cavils of that feft, as in the praftical and more intelligible fciences of politics and morals.
The focial virtues muft, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiablenefs, which, at firil, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the eiteem of uninftru6ted mankind, and engages their affeflions. And as the public utility of thefe virtues is the chief circumftance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, mufb be fome way agreeable to us, and take hold of fome natural affed:ion. It muft pleafe, either from confiderations of felf-intereft, or from more generous motives and regards.
It has often been aflerted, that, as every man has a ftrong connexion with fociety, and perceives rhe impoffibility of his folitary fubfiilence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all thofe habits or principles, which promote order in fo- ciety, and infure to him the quiet poflefTion of fo ineftimable a blelTing. As much as we value our own happincfs and welfare, as much muft we applaud the pradice of juftice and humanity, by which alone the fgci^l confederacy can be
main-
264 S E C T I O N V.
maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protedion and afliftance.
This deduction of morals from felf-love, or a regard to private interefl, is an obvious thought, and has not arifen wholly from the wanton fallies and fportive alTaults of the fcepiics. To menti-' on no others, Polybius, one of the graved and moft judicious, as well as mod moral writers of antiquity, has afligned this felfiih origin to all our fentiments of virtue *. But though the folid, praftical fenfe of that author, and his averfion to all vain fubtilties, render his authority on the prefent fubjedl very confiderable ; yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience feems plainly to oppofe the felfiih theory.
We frequently beftow praife on virtuous ani- ons, performed in very diftant ages and remote countries; where the utmoft fubtilty of imagina- tion would not difcover any appearance of felf- intereft, or find any connexion of our prefent happinefs and fecurity with events fo widely fe- parated from us.
A generous, a brave, a noble deed, perform- ed by an adverfary, commands our approbati- tion; while in its confequences it may be ac- knowledged prejudicial to our particular in- tereit.
When private advantage concurs with general afFeftion for virtue, we readily perceive and avow the mixture of thefe diilind fentiments, which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We praife, perhaps, with more ala- ^ crity, where the generous, humane action con- tributes to our particular intercft : But the topics of praife, which we infill on, are very wide of this circumftance. And we may attempt to bring
over
• Sec NOTE [AA],
Why Utility pleases. 265
over others to our fentiments, without endea- vouring to convince them, that they reap any advantage from the aflions which we recommend to their approbation and applaufe.
Frame the model of a praife-worthy chara6ler, confiding of all the mofl amiable moral virtues : Give inltances, in which thefe difplay themfelves after an eminent and extraordinary manner: You readily engage the efteem and approbation of all your audience, who never fo much as enquire in what age and country the perfon lived, who pof- fefled thefe noble qualities: A circumftance, how- ever, of all others, the moft material to felf-love, or a concern for our own individual happinefs.
Once on a time, a ftatefman, in the fhock and conteft of parties, prevailed fo far as to procure, by his eloquence, the baniihment of an able ad- verfary j whom he fecretly followed, offering him money for fupport during his exile, and foothing him with topics of confolation in his misfortunes. Alas ! cries the banilhed ftatefman, with what re- gret mujl I leave my friends in this city^ where even enemies are fo generous! Virtue, though in an ene- my, here pleafed him: And we alfo give it the juft tribute of praife and approbation j nor do we re- traft thefe fentiments, when we hear, that the ac- tion pafTed at Athens, about two thoufand years ago, and that the perfons names were Efchines and Demofthenes.
JVhat is that to me? There are few occafions, when this quellion is not pertinent : And had it that univerfal, infallible influence fuppofed, it would turn into ridicule every compofition, and almoft every converfation, which contain any praife or cenfure of men and manners.
It is but a weak fubterfuge, when prefled by thefe fads and arguments, to fay, that we tranf- port ourfelves, by the force of imagination, in- to diftant ages and countries, and confider the
advantage.
a66 S E C T I O N V.
advantage, which we fhould have reaped from thefe charaflers, had we been contennporaries, and had any commerce with the perfons. It is not conceivable, how a real fentiment or pafTi- on can ever arife from a known imaginary in- tereft; efpecially when our real intereft is ftill kept in view, and is often acknowledged to be entirely diftinft from the imaginary, and even fometimes oppofite to it.
A man, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the fentiment of imaginary danger aftuates him, in oppofition to the opinion and belief of real fafety. But the imagination is here aflifled by the prefence of a ftriking objeft; and yet pre- vails not, except it be alfo aided by novelty, and the unufual appearance of the objeft. Cuf- tom foon reconciles us to heights and precipi- ces, and wears off thefe falfe and delufive ter- rors. The reverfe is obfervable in the eftimates, which we form of chara6ters and manners j and the more we habituate ourfelves to an accurate fcrutiny of morals, the more delicate feeling do we acquire of the mofl minute diftindtions be- tween vice and virtue. Such frequent occafion, indeed, have we, in common life, to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no objedl of this kind can be new or unufual to us ; nor could any falfe views or prepofleflions maintain their ground againft an experience, fo common and familiar. Experience being chiefly what forms the aflbciations of ideas, it is impoflible that any aflbciation could eitablilli and liipport itfelf, in diredt oppofition to that principle.
Ufefulnefs is agreeable, and engages our appro- bation. This is a matter of fa<5t, confirmed by daily obfervation. But ufeful ? For what ? For fome body's intereft, furely. Whofe intereft then ? Not «ur own only : For our approbation frequently ex- tends
WhyUtility pleases. 267
tends farther. It muft, therefore, be the intereft of thofe, wfio are ferved by the charader or adti- on approved of; and thefe we may conclude, Jiouever remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we fhall difcover one great fource of moral diftindlions.
PART II.
Self-love is a principle in human nature of fuch extenfive energy, and the intereft of each indivi- dual is, in general, fo clofely conneded with that of the community, that thofe philofophers were excufable, who fancied, that all our concern for the public might be refolved into a concern for our own happinefs and prefervation. They faw every moment, inftances of approbation or blame, fatisfadlion or difpleafure towards charaders and aftions; they denominated the objedts of thefe fen- timents, virtues or vices; they obferved, that the former had a tendency to encreafe the happinefs, and the latter the mifery of mankind; they afked, whether it were polhble that we could have any general concern for fociety, or any difinterefted refentment of the welfare or injury of others; they found it fimpler to confider all thefe fentiments as modifications of felf-love ; and they difcovered a pretence, at leaft, for this unity of principle, in that clofe union of intereft, which is fo obfervable between the public and each individual.
But notwithftanding this frequent confufion of interefts, it is eafy to attain what natural philofo- phers, after lord Bacon, have alTe<5led to call the expsrimc'ntum crucisy or that experiment, which points out the right way in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found inftances, in which private intereft was feparate from public j in which it was even coniriry : And yet v^e obferved the moral fcntiaient to continue, notwithftanding this disiundlion of
\^ interefts.
268 S E ,C T I O N V.
intcrefts. And wherever thefe diflind: interefts fen- fibly concurred, we always found a fenfible en- creafe of the fentimenr, and a more warm affefli- on to virtue, and deteflation of vice, or what we properly caWy gratitude and revenge. Compelled by thefe in fiances, we muft renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral fentiment by the principle of felf-love. We muft adopt a more public affeiflion, and allow, that the interefts of fo- ciety are not, even on their own account, entire- ly indifferent to us. Ufefulnefs is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiftion in terms, that any thing pleafes as means to an end, where the end itfelf no wife affefts us. If ufefulnefs, therefore, be a fource of moral fentiment, and if this ufefulnefs be not always confidered with a re- ference to felf ; it follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happinefs of fociety, recommends itfelf diredlly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality : And what need we feek for abftrufe and remote fyftems, when there occurs one fo obvious and natural * ?
Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and benevolence ? Or to conceive, that the very afpeft of happinefs, joy, profperity, gives pleafure; that of pain, buffering, forrow, com- municates uneafinefs ? The human countenance, fays Horace f , borrows fmiles or tears from the hu- man countenance. Reduce a perfon to folitude, and he lofes all enjoyment, except either of the fenfual or fpeculative kind , and that becaufe the movements of his heart are not forwarded by cor- refpondent movements in his fellow-creatures. The
fisns
• See NOTE [B B].
f Utl ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflcnt Humani vultus. Hor..
i
Why Utility pleases. 269
figns of forrow and mourning, though arbitrary, affed us with melancholy j but the natural fymp- toms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to in- fufe companion and uneafinefs. And if the effefts of mifery touch us in fo lively a manner ; can we be fuppofed altogether infenfible or indif- ferent towards its caufesj when a malicious or treacherous character and behaviour are prefented to us ?
We enter, I fhall fuppofe, into a convenient, warm, well- contrived apartment: We neceflarily receive a pleafure from its very furvey ; becaufe it prefents us with the pleafing ideas of eafe, fa- tisfa6bion, and enjoyment. The hofpitable, good- humoured, humane landlord appeal's. This cir- cumftance furely mull embellifli the whole; nor can we eafily forbear reflecting, with pleafure, on the fatisfadion which refults to every one from his intercourfe and good-offices.
His whole family, by the freedom, eafe, con- fidence, and calm enjoyment, diffufed over their countenances, fufficiently exprefs their happinefs, I have a pleafing fympathy in the profpefl of fo much joy, and can never confider the fouice of it, without the moft agreeable emotions.
He tells me, that an opprelTive and powerful neighbour had attempted to difpofiefs him of his inheritance, and had long diflurbed all his inno- cent and focial pleafures. I feel an immediate indignation arife in me againft: fuch violence and injury.
But it is no wonder, he adds, that a private wrong Ihould proceed from a man, who had enflaved provinces, depopulated cities, and made the tield and fcaffold ftream with human blood. I am ftruck with horror at the profped of fo much mifery, and am aftuated by the ftrongefl antipathy againfl its author.
In
270 SECTION V.
In general. It is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever wq refleft on or converfe about, every- thing ft'ill prefents us with the view of human happinefs or mifery, and excites in our breaft a fympathetic movement of pleafure or uneafi- iiefs. In our ferious occupations, in our care- lefs amufements, this principle ftill exerts its ac- tive energy.
A man, who enters the theatre, is immediately flruck with the view of fo great a multitude, participating of one common amufement ; and experiences, from their very afpedl, a fuperior fenfibility or difpofition of being affefled with every fentiment, which he lliares with his fellow- creatures.
He obferves the aflors to be animated by the appearance of a full audience, and raifed to a de- gree of enthufiafm, which they cannot command in any folitary or calm moment.
Every movement of the theatre, by a Ikilful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the fpe6tators ; who weep, tremble, refent, rejoice, and are enflamed with all the variety of paffi- ons, which actuate the feveral perfonages of the drama.
Where any event crofles our willies, and in- terrupts the happinefs of the favourite characters, we feel a fenfible anxiety and concern. But where their fufferings proceed from the treachery, cru- elty, or tyranny of an enemy, our breads are af- fedled with the Kvelieft refentment againit the au- thor of thefe calamities.
It is here efteemed contrary to the rules of art to reprefent any thing cool and indifferent. A diftant friend, or a confident, who has no imme- diate intereft in the cataftrophe, ought, if poffible, to be avoided by the poet ; as communicating a like indifference to the audience, and checking the progrefs of the paffions.
Few
/
Why Utility pleases. 271
Few fpecics of poetry are more entertaining than pajloral ; and every one is fenfible, that the chief fource of its pleafure arifes from thofe images of a gentle and tender tranquillity, which it reprefcnts in its perfonages, and of which it communicates a like fentiment to the reader. Sannazarius, who transferred the fcene to the fea-fhore, though he prefented the mod magnificent obie<5t in nature, is confefled to have erred in his choice. The idea of toil, labour, and danger, fuffered by the fifher- men, is painful ; by an unavoidable fympathy, which attends every conception of human hap- pinefs or mifery.
When I was twenty, fays a French poet, Ovid was my favourite : Now I am forty, I declare for Horace. We enter, to be fure, more readily into fentiments, which refemble thofe we feel every day : But no paflion when well reprefented, can be entirely indifferent to us ; becaufe there is none, of which every man has not, within him, at lead the feeds and firft principles. It is the bufinefs of poetry to bring every affeftion near to us by truth and reality: A certain proof, that, wherever that reality is found, our minds are difpofed to be ftrongly affefted by it.
Any recent event or piece of news, by which the fate of dates, provinces, or many individuals is affefted, is extremely interefting even to thofe "whofe welfare is not immediately engaged. Such intelligence is propagated with celerity, heard with avidity, and enquired into with attention and concern. The intereft of fociety appears, on this occafion, to be, in fome degree, the intereft of each individual. The imagination is fure to be af- fedled ; though the paflions excited may not always be fo ftrong and fteady as to have great influence on the conduct and behaviour.
The
272 SECTION V.
The perufal of a hiftory feems a calm enter- tainment i but would be no entertainment at all, did not our hearts beat with correfpondent move- ments to thofe which are defcribed by the hifto- rian.
Thucydides and Guicciardin fupport with diffi- culty our attention ; while the former defcribes the trivial rencounters of the fmall cities of Greece, and the latter the harmlefs wars of Pifa. The few perfons interefted, and the fmall interefl: fill not the imagination, and engage not the affedli- ons. The deep diftrefs of the numerous Athe- nian army before Syracufe ; the danger, which ib nearly threatens Venice; thefe excite compalTion ; thefe move terror and anxiety.
The indifferent, uninterefting .ftile of Suetonius, equally with the mafterly pencil of Tacitus, may convince us of the cruel depravity of Nero or Tiberius : But what a differepce of fentiment ! "While the former coldly relates the fafls ; and the latter fets before our eyes the venerable figures of a Soranus and a Thrafea, intrepid in their fate, and only moved by the melting for- rows of their friends and kindred. What fym- pathy then touches every human heart ! What indignation againft the tyrant, whofe caufelefs fear or unprovoked malice gave rife to fuch de- teltable barbarity !
If we bring thefe fubjedls nearer : If we remove all fufpicion of fiftion and deceit: What power- ful concern is excited, and how much fuperior, in many inftances, to the narrow attachments of felf- love and private interefl ! Popular fedition, party zea^, a devoted obedience to fa6lious leaders; thefe are ibme of rhe mod vifible, though lefs laudable efi^ec^s of thisiocial fympathyin human nature.
The ^^rivoloiifnefs of the fubjeft too, we may ob- ferve, is not'''uieto deta'-h us entirely froin what car-
ries an imageof human fentiment and afi-'ctlion.
When
Why Utility pleases. 273
When a perfon flutters, and pronounces with difficulty, we even fympathize with this trivial un- eafinefs, and fuffer for him. And it is a rule in criticilm, that every combination of iyliables or letters, which gives pain to the organs of fpcech in the recital, appears alfo, from a fpecies of fym- pathy, harfh and difagreeable to the ear. Nay, when we run over a book with our eye, we are fenfible of fuch unharmonious compofition; be- caufe we ftill imagine, that a perfon recites it to us, and fuiters from the pronunciation of thefe jar- ring founds. So delicate is our fympathy !
Eafy and unconftrained poftures and motions are always beautiful : An air of health and vigour is agreeable: Cloaths which warm, without bur- thening the body 3 which cover, without impri- foning the limbs, are well-fafhioned. In every judgment of beauty, the feelings of the perfon af- fefted enter into confideration, and communicate to the fpedlator fimilar touches of pain or plea-^ lure *. What wonder, then, if we can pronounce no judgment concerning the character and conduft of men, without confidering the tendencies of their adiions, and the happinefs or mifery Vv^hich thence arifes to fociety ? What aflbciation of ideas would ever operate, were that principle here total- ly unaclive f.
If any man from a cold infenfibility, or narrow felfiflinefs of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happinefs or mifery, he muft be equal- ly indifferent to the images of vice and virtue : ' Vol. II. T As,
• *' Decentior equus cujus aftricla funt ilia; fed idem ve- ** locior. Pulcher afpcflu fit athlcta, cujus lacertos exercita- " tio exprelfit ; idem certamini paratior. Nunquam enim " fpecies ab utilitaie dividitur. Sed hoc quidem difcernere mo- *' dici judicii elt." Quintilian tail. lib. viii. cap. 3.
+ See NOTE [CC].
274 SECTION V.
As, on the other hand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interefls of our fpecies is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral dif- tinctions ; a ftrong refentment of injury done to men ; a lively approbation of their welfare. In this particular, though great fuperiority is obfer- vable of one man above another ; yet none are fo entirely indifferent to the interefl of their fellow- creatures, as to perceive no diflinftions of moral good and evil, in confequence of the different ten- dencies of actions and principles. How, indeed, can we fuppofe it poffible in any one, who wears a human heart, that if there be fubjefted to his cen- fure, one charafler or fyftem of conduft, which is beneficial, and another, which is pernicious, to his fpecies or community, he will not fo much as give a cool preference to the former, or afcribe to it the fmalleft merit or regard ? Let .us fuppofe fuch a perfon ever fo felfifh ; let private intereft have in- grolled ever fo much his attention ; yet in inftan- ces, where that is not concerned, he mufb una- voidably feel /ome propenfity to the good of man- kind, and make it an objeft of choice, if every thing elfe be equal. Would any man, who is v/alking along, tread as willingly on another's gou- ty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement ? There is here furely a difference in the cafe. We furely take into con- fideration the happinefs and mifery of others, in weighing the fcveral motives of aclion, and incline to the former, where no private regards draw us to feek our own promotion or advantage by the injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the prin- ciples of humanity are capable, in many inftances, of influencing our aftions, they muft, at all times, have /c;;z^ authority over our fcntiments, and give us a general approbation of what is ufeful to focie- ty, and blame of what is dangerous or pernicious. The degrees of thefc fcntiments may be the fubjedl
of
Why Utility pleases. I75
of controverfy ; but the reality of their exiftencej one fliould think, mull be admitted, in every theo- ry or fyitem.
A creature, abfolutely malicious and fpiteful, were there any fuch in nature, mult be worie than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue. All
" his fentiments mud be inverted, and dircftly op- pofite to thofc, which prevail in the human fpecies. Whatever contributes to the good of mankind, as it crolTes the conftant bent of his wifhes and de- fires, muft produce uneafinefs and difapprobation ; aad on the contrary, whatever is the fource of dif- order and mifery in fociety, muft, for the fame reafon, be regarded with pleafure and complacen- cy. Timon, who, probably from his affedled fpleen, more than any inveterate malice, was deno- minated the man-hater, embraced Alcibiades; with great fondnefs. Go on^ my boy I cried he, acquire the confidence of the people : 7'cu will one day, I fore-
fee J be the caufe of great calamities to them* : Could we admit the two principles of the Manicheans, it is an infallible confequence, that their fentiments of human aftions, as well as of every thing elfe, muft be totally oppofite, and that every inflance of
juftice and humanity, from its neceffary tendency, muft pleafe the one deity and difpleafe the other. All mankind fo far refemble the good principle, that, where intereft or revenge or envy perverts not our difpofition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happinels of fociety, and confequently to vir- tue, above its oppofite. Abfolute, unprovoked, difintereftcd malice has never, perhaps, place in any human breaft; or if it had, muft there per- vert all the fentiments of morals, as well as the feelings of humanity. If the cruelty of Nero be allowed entirely voluntary, and not rather the ef-
T 2 fed
* PtutARCH in vita ALct
276 S E C T I O N V.
feft of conftant fear and refentment ; it is evident, that Tigellinus, preferably to Seneca or Burrhus, muft have pofTelTed his fleady and uniform appro- bation.
A ftatefman or patriot, who ferves our own country, in our own time, has always a more paf- fionate regard paid to him, than one whole benefi- cial influence operated on diftant ages or remote nations ; where the good, refulting from his ge- nerous humanity, being lefs connedted with us, feems more obfcure, and aflfedls us with a lefs lively fympathy. We may own the merit to be equally great, though our fentiments are not raif- ed to an equal height, in both cafes. The judg- ment here corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it prefer ves us from error, in the feveral variations of images, prefented to our external fenfes. The fame objedt, at a double diftance, really throws on the eye a pidlure of but half the bulkj yet we imagine that it appears of the fame fize in both fuuations; becaufe we know, that, on our ap- proach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that the difference confifts not in the objedb it- felf, but in our pofition with regard to ic. And, indeed, without fuch a corre(5lion of appearances, both in internal and external fentiment, men could never think or talk fteadily on any fub- jcdt ; while their fluctuating fituations produce a continual variation on obje6ls, and throw them into fuch different and contrary lights and pofi- tions *.
The more we converfe with mankind, and the greater focial intercourfe we maintain, the more fhall we be familiarized to thefe general preferen- ces and diltinclions, without which our converfati- on and dilcourfe could fcarcely be rendered intelli-
gible
• Sec NOTE [DD].
Why Utility pleases. 277
gible to each other. Every man's intereft is pecu- liar to himlelf, and the averfions and defires, which rcAilt from it, cannot be fuppofed to affed others in a like de^rree. General lano-ua^e, therefore be- ing formed for general ufe, muft be moulded on fome more general views, and muft affix the epithets of praife or blame, in conformity to fentiments, which arife from the general interefts of the com- munity. And if thefe fentiments, in moft men, be not fo ftrong as thofe, which have a reference to private good ; yet ftill they muft make fome dif- tindlion, even in perfons the moft depraved and felfifhi and muft attach the notion of good to a beneficent condufl, and of evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we fhall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourfelves, and fympathy with perfons remote from us, much fainter than that with per- fons near and contiguous; but for this very rea- ■ fon, it is neceffary for us, in our calm judgments and difcourfe • concerning the characters of men, to neglect all thefe differences, and render our fen- timents more public and focial. Befides, that we ourfelves often change our fituation in this parti- cular, we every day meet with perfons, who are in a fituation different from us, and who could never converfe with us, v/ere we to remain conftantly in that pofition and point of view, which is peculiar to ourfelves. The intercourfe of fentiments, there- fore, in fociety and converfation, makes us form fome general unalterable ftandard, by which we may approve or difapprove of characters and man- ners. And though the heart takes not part en- tirely with thofe general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the univerfal, abftracl dif- ferences of vice and virtue, without regard to felf, or the perfons with whom we are more intimately conne6led ; yet have thefe moral differences acon- fiderable influence, and being fufficient, at leaft,
for
278 S E C T I O N V.
for difcourfe, ferve all purpofes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the fchools*.
Thus, in whatever light we take this fubjefb, the merit, afcribed to the focial virtues, appears ftill uniform, and arifes chiefly from that regard, which the natural fentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and Ibciety. If we eonfider the principles of the human make, fuch as they appear to daily experience and obfervation, we muil", a prioriy conclude it impolTible for fuch a creature as man to be totally indiiferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himfelf, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular byafs, that what promotes their happinefs is good, what tends to their mifery is evil, without any farther regard or confiderati- on. Here then are the faint rudiments, at leaft, or out-lines, of a general diftinflion between ac- tions J and in proportion as the humanity of the perfon is fuppofcd to encreafe, his connexion with thofe who are injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their mifery or happinefs ; his con- fequent cenfure or approbation acquires proporti- onable vigour. There is no necefllty, that a ge- nerous adlion, barely mentioned in an old hiftory or remote gazette, fhould communicate any ftrong feelings of applaufe and admiration. Virtue, placed at fuch a diflance, is like a fixed ftar, which, though to the eye of reafon, it may appear as lu- minous as the fun in his meridian, is fo infinitely removed, as to afic6t the fenfes, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our ac- quaintance or connexion with the perfons, or even by an eloquent recital of the cafe^ our hearts are immediately caught, our fympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmeft fentiments of friendihip and regard. Thefe fecm
neceflary
♦ Se€ NOTE [EEJ.
Why Utility pleases. 279
n^ceflary and infallible confequences of the gene- ral principles of human nature, as difcovered in common life and pradtice.
Again ; reverfc thefe views and reafonings : Con- fider the matter h pojhnori ; and weighing the con- fequences, enquire if the merit of focial virtue be not, in a great meafure, derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affefts the fpeftators. It appears to be matter of fad, that the circum- ftance of utility^ in all fubjeds, is a fource of praife and approbation : That it is conftantly appealed to in all moral decifions concerning the merit and de- merit of adions : That it is the folc fource of that high regard paid to jullice, fidelity, honour, al- legiance, and chaftity : That it is infeparable from all the other focial virtues, humanity, gencrofity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation : And, in a word, that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures.
It appears alfo, that, in our general approbation of charaders and manners, the ufeful tendency of the focial virtues moves us not by any regards to felf- inter eft, but has an influence much more uni- verfal and cxtenfive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in fociety, does always, by affeding the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the fide of the focial virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that thefe principles of humanity and fympathy enter fo deep- ly into all our fentiments, and have fo powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the ftrongeft cenfure and applaufe. The prefent theo- ry is the fimple refult of all thefe inferences, each of which feems founded on uniform experience and obfervation.
Were it doubtful, whether there were any fuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern
for
28g S E C T I O N v.
for others, yet when we fee, in nuinberlefs inflan- ces, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interefts of fociety, is fo highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle ; fince it is impoffible for any thing to pleafe as means to an end, where the end is total- ly indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubt- ful, whether there were, implanted in our nature, any general principle of moral blame and appro- bation, yet when v/e fee, in numberlefs inftances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to con- clude, that it is impoilible, but that every thing, which promotes the interefl of fociety, mufl com- municate pleafure, and what is pernicious give un- eafmefs. But when thefe different reflexions and obfei-vations concur in eflablifhing the fame con- clufion, muft they not beftow an undifputed evi- dence upon it?
It is ho ?^ ever hoped, that tlie progrefs of this ar- gument will bring a farther confirmation of the pre- fent theory, by Ihowing the rife of other fentiments of efteem and regard from the fame or like princi- ples,
S E C-
( 28i )
SECTION VI.
Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. PART I.
I
T feems cvicdnt, that where a quality or ha- bit is fubje6ted to our examination, if it ap- pear, in any refpedl, prejudicial to the perfon pofiefled of it, or fuch as incapacitates him for bufmefs and aftion, it is inftantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections. In- dolence, negligence, want of order and method, obftinacy, ficklenefs, credulity; thefe qualities were never efteemed by any one indifferent to a character; much lefs, extolled as accompli ih- ments or virtues. The prejudice, refulting from them, immediately ftrikes our eye, and gives us the fentiment of pain and difapprobation.
No quality, it is allowed, is abfolutely either blameable or praife-worrhy. It is all according to its degree. A due medium, fay the Peri-, patetics, is the charafleriftic of virtue. But this medium is chiefly determined by utility. A pro- per celerity, for inftance, and difpatch in bufi- nefs, is commendable. When defeftive, no pro- grefs is ever made in the execution of any pur- pofe : When excefiive, it engages us in precipi- tate and ill-concerted meafures and e;iterprifes ;
By
a82 S E C T I O N VI.
By fuch reafonings, we fix the proper and com- mendable mediocrity in all moral and pruden- tial difquifitions j and never lofe view of the ad- vantages, which refult from any character or habit.
Now as thefe advantages are enjoyed by the perfon poflefled of the charadter, it can never be Jelf-hve which renders the profpe6b of them agreeable to us, the fpeclators, and prompts our efteem and aprobation. No force of imaginati- on can convert us into another perfon, and make us fancy, that we being that perfon, reap benefit from thofe valuable qualities, which be- long to him. Or if it did, no celerity of ima- gination could immediately tranfport us back, into ourfelves, and make us love and efteem the perfon, as different from us. Views and fen- timents, {o oppofite to known truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the fame time, in the fame perfon. All fufpicion, therefore, of felfifli regards, is here totally excluded. It is a quite different principle, which actuates our bofom, and interefts us in the felicity of the perfon whom we contemplate. Where his natural ta- lents and acquired abilities give us the profpeft of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, prof- perous fuccefs, a ftcady command over fortune, and the connexion of great or advantageous un- dertakings; we are ftruck with fuch agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard im- mediately arife towards him. The ideas of hap- pinefs, joy, triumph, profperity, are connected with every circumftance of his characfler, and diffufe over our minds a pleafing fentiment of fympathy and humanity*.
Let us fuppofe a perfon originally framed fo as to have no manner of concern for his fel- low-creatures, but to regard the happinefs and
mifery • See NOTE [FF].
of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 283
mifery of all fenfible beings with greater indif- ference than even two contiguous fhades of the fame colour. Let us fuppofe, if the profperi- ty of nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and he were defired to choofe; that he would (land, like the fchool- man's afs, irrefolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the fame afs be- tween two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination or propenfity to either fide. The confequence, I believe, muft be allowed jud, that fuch a perfon, being abfolutely unconcerned, ei- ther for the public good of a community or tlie private utility of others, would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however benefi- cial, to fociety, or to its pofTeffor, as on the moll common and uninterefting objefl.
But if, inflead of this fancied monfter, wc fuppofe a man to form a judgment or deter- mination in the cafe, there is to him a plain foundation of preference, where every thing elfc is equal ; and however cool his choice may be, if his heart be felfifh, or if the perfons inte- refled be remote from himj there mull flill be a choice or difl:in6lion between what is ufefiil, and what is pernicious. Now this diilin6lion is the fame in all its parts, with the moral dijlhic- sioriy whofe foundation has been fo often, and fo much in vain, enquired after. The fame en- dowments of the mind, in every circumftance, are agreeable to the fentiment of morals and to that of humanity; the fame temper is fufcepti- ble of high degrees of the one fentiment and of the other; and the fame alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or by connexions, enli- vens the one and the other. By all the rules of philofophy, therefore, v/e muft conclude, that thefe fentiments are originally the fame; fince, in each particular, even the moft minute, they
are
284 SECTION VI.
arc governed by the fame laws, and are moved by the fame objects.
Why do philofophers infer, with the greateft certainty, that the moon is kept in its orbit by the fame force of gravity, that makes bodies fall near the furface of the earth, but becaufe thefe effed:s are, upon computation, found fimi- lar and equal ? And mull not this argument bring as flrong convicftion, in moral as in natu- ral difquifitions ?
To prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, ufeful to the poflefTor, are approved of, and the contrary cenfured, would be fuperfluous. The lead reflei^iion on what is every day expe- rienced in life, will be fufficient. We fhall on- ly mention a few inftances, in order to remove, if poffible, all doubt and hefitation.
The quality, the moll neceffary for the execu- tion of any ufeful enterprife, is Difcretionj by which we carry on a fafe intercourfe with others, give due attention to our own and to their cha- rad:er, weigh each circumftance of the bufinefs which we undertake, and employ the fureft and fafeft means for the attainment of any end or purpofe. To a Cromwell, perhaps, or a De Retz, difcretion may appear an alderman-like virtue, as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible with thofe vafb defigns, to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be a fault or imperfedion. But in the conduct of ordinary life, no virtue is more re- quifite, not only to obtain fuccefs, but to avoid the moft fatal mifcarriages and difappointments. The greateft parts without it, as obferved by an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner; as Polyphemus, deprived of his eye, was only the more expofed, on account of his enormous ftrength and ftature.
The bell charafter, indeed, were it not rather
too
Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 285
too perfe6t for human nature, is that which is not fwayed by temper of any kind; but alter- nately employs enterprife and caution, as each is ufeful to the particular purpofe intended. Such is the excellence which St. Evremond af- cribes to marefchal Turenne, who difplayed every campaign, as he grew older, more temerity in his military enterprifes ; and being now, from long experience, perfe6lly acquainted with every incident in war, he advanced with greater firm- nefs and fecurity, in a road fo well known to him. Fabius, fays Machiavel, "was cautious ; Scipio enterprifing : And both fucceeded, be- caufe the fituation of the Roman affairs, during the command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his genius ? but both would have failed, had thefe fituations been reverfed. He is happy, whofe circumftances fuit his temper; but he is more excellent, who can fuit his temper to any circumftances.
What need is there to difplay the praifes of Induftry, and to extol its advantages, in the ac- quifition of power and riches, or in raifing what we call a fortune in the world ? The tortoife, according to the fable, by his perfeverance, gain- ed the race of the hare, though poflefTed of much fuperior fwifrnefs. A man's time, when well huf- banded, is like a cultivated field, ofwhichafew acres produce more of what is ufeful to life, than extenfive provinces, even of the richcft foil, when over-run with weeds and brambles.
But all profpe6l of fuccefs in life, or even of tolerable fubfiftence, mull fail, where a reafon- able Frugality is wanting. The heap, inftead of encreafing, diminifhes daily, and leaves its pof- feflbr fo much more unhappy, as, not having been able to confine his expences to a large revenue, he will ftill lefs be able to live contentedly on a fmall one. The fouls of men, according to
Plato,
286 SECTION VI.
Plato f, inflamed with impure apperites, and lofing the body, which alone afforded means of fatisfadlion, hover about the earth, and haunt the places, where their bodies are depofited; poflef- fed with a longing defire to recover the loft organs of fenfation. So may we fee worthlefs prodigals, having confumed their fortune in wild debauches, thrufting themfelves into every plen- tiful table, and every party of pleafure, hated even by the vicious, and defpifed even by fools.
The one extreme of frugality is avarice^ which, as it both deprives a man of all ufe of his riches, and checks hofpitality and every focial enjoy- ment, is juftly cenfured on a double account. Prodigality J the other extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a man himfelf j and each of thefe ex- tremes is blamed above the other, according to the temper of the perfon who cenfures, and ac- cording to his greater or lefs fenfibility to plea- fure, either focial or fenfual.
Qualities often derive their merit from com- plicated fources. Honejlyy fidelity, truth, are praif- cd for their immediate tendency to promote the intereft of focietyj but after thofe virtues are once eflablifhed upon this foundation, they are alfo confidcred as advantageous to the perfon himfelf, and as the fource of that truft and con- fidence, which can alone give a man any confi- deration in life. One becomes contemptible, no lefs than odious, when he forgets the duty, which, in this particular, he owes to himfelf as well as to fociety.
Perhaps, this confideration is one chief fource of the high blame, which is thrown on any in- ftance of failure ainong women in point of chaf- tity. The greateft regard, which can be acquired by that fex, is derived from their fidelity; and a woman becomes cheap and vulgar, lofes her
rank, t Phsdo.
Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 287
rank, and is expofed to every infult, who is de- ficient in this particular. The fmalleft failure is here fufficient to blaft her character. A fe- male has lb many opportunities of fecretly in- dulging thefe appetites, that nothing can give us fecurity but her abfolute modefty and re- ferve -, and where a breach is once made, it can fcarcely ever be fully repaired. If a man be- have with cowardice on one occafion, a contrary conduct rcinftates him in his chara6ler. But by what a(5lion can a woman, whofe behaviour has once been difTolute, be able to aflure us, that fhe has formed better refolutions, and has felf- command enough to carry them into execution ? All men, it is allowed, are equally defirous of happinefs; but few are fuccefsful in the pur- fuit: One confiderable caufe is the want of Strength of Mind, which might enable them to refift the temptation of prefent eafe or pleafure, and car- ry them forward in the fearch of more diftant profit and enjoyment. Our affeftions, on a ge- neral profpe6t of their objeds, form certain rules of condu6t, and certain meafures of preference of one above another: And thefe decifions, though really the refult of our calm pafTions and pro- penfities, (for what elfe can pronounce any ob- jeft eligible or the contrary ?) are yet faid, by a natural abufe of terms, to be the determina- tions of pure reajon and refleftion. But when fome of thefe objefts approach nearer to us, or acquire the advantages of favourable lights and politions, which catch the heart or imagination ; our general refolutions are frequently confounded, a fmall enjoyment preferred, and lafting fhame and forrow entailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence, in celebrating prefent pleafure, and rejefting all dif- tant views to fame, health, or for':iinej it is ob- vious, that this praflice is the fource of all dif-
folutenefs
288 SECTION VI.
folutunefs and diforder, repentance and mifeiy^ A man of a ftrong and determined temper ad- heres tenacioufly to his general refolutions, and is neither feduced by the allurements of pleafure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps ftill in view thofe diftant purfuits, by which he, at once, enfures his happinefs and his honour.
Self-fatisfadion, at leaft in fome degree, is an advantage, which equally attends the Fool and the Wife Man: But it is the only one; nor is there any other circumftance in the condud of life, where they are upon an equal footing. Bu- finefs, books, converfation ; for all thefe, a fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemned by his ftation to the coarfeft drudgery, remains a ufele/s burden upon the earth. Accordingly, it is found, that men are extremely jealous of their charafter in this particular; and many in- fbances are feen of profligacy and treachery, the moft avowed and unreferved; none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and ftu- pidity. Dicaearchus, the Macedonian general, who, as Polybius tells us*, openly erefted one altar to impiety, another to injuftice, in order to bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well aflured, would have ftarted ar the epithet of fooly and have meditated revenge for fo injurious an appellation. Except the affection of parents, the ftrongeft and moil indifibluble bond in nature, no connexion has Hrength fufTicient to fi.pport the difgull arifing from this charafter. Love itfelf, which can fubfift "under treachery, ingra- titude, malice, and inftwielity, is immediately ex- tinguifned by it, when perceived and acknow- ledged ; nor are deformity and old age more fatal to the dominio"; of that palTion. So dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any pur-
pofe
• Lib. xvii. cap, 35.
Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 289
pofc or undertaking, and of continued error and mifcondud in life !
When it is afked, whether a quick or a flow apprehcnfion be moil valuable ? Whether one, that, at firfl view, penetrates far into a fubjedl, but can perform nothing upon ftudyj or a con- trary charafter, which muft work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a profound ge- nius or a fure judgment ? In Ihort, what charaa- ter, or peculiar turn of underftanding is more excellent than another ? It is evident, that we can anfwer none of thefe queftions, without confi- dering which of thofe qualities capacitates a man beft for the world, and carries him fartheft in any undertaking.
If refined fenfe and exalted fenfe be not fo ujeful as common fenfe, their rarity, their novel- ty, and the noblenefs of their objects make fome compenfation, and render them the admiration of mankind : As gold, though lefs ferviceable than iron, acquires, from its fcarcity^ a value^ which is much fuperior.
The defeats of judgment can be fupplied by no art or invention \ but thofe of Memory fre- quently may, both in bufmefs and in ftudy, by method and induftry, and by diligence in com- mitting every thing to writing; and we fcarcely ever hear a fhort memory given as a reafon for a man's failure in any undertaking. But in an- cient time.s, when no man could make a figure without the talent of fpeaking, and when tlie au- dience were too delicate to bear fuch crude, un- digcfted harangues as ogr extemporary orators offer to public aflemhiies; the faculty of memo- ry v/as then of the utmoft confequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at prefcnc. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in anti- quity, who is not celebrated for this talent; and
Vol. i\. \j Cicero
290 SECTION VI.
Cicero enumerates it among the other fublimc qualities of Ca:far himfelf f.
Particular cuftoms and manners alter the ufe- fulnefs of qualities : They alfo alter their merit. Particular fituations and accidents have, in fome degree, the fame influence. He will always be • mote efteemed, who poflefles thofe talents and accomplifhments, which fuit his ftation and pro- feffion, than he whom fortune has mifplaced in the part which fhe has affigned him. The pri- vate or felfifli virtues are, in this refpeft, more arbitrary than the public and focial. In other ref- peds, they are, perhaps, lefs liable to doubt and controverfy^
In this kingdom, fuch continued oftentation, of late years, has prevailed among men in aBive life with regard to public Jpirit^ and among thofe in fpectilative with regard to benevolence y and fo many falfe pretenfions to each have been, no doubt, dete(5led, that men of the world are apt, without any bad intention, to difcover a fullen incredulity on the head of thofe moral endow- ments, and even fometimes abfolutely to deny their exiftence and reality. In like manner, 1 find, that, of old, the perpetual cant of the Stoics and Cynics concerning virtue, their magnificent pro- fellions and {lender performances, bred a dif- guft in mankind; and Lucian, who, though li- centious with regard to pleafure, is yet, in other rerpe<51:P, a very moral writer, cannot, fometimes, talk of virtue, fo much boif^ed, without betray- ing fymptoms of fpleen and irony*. But furely
this
f Fuit in illo ingenium, ratio, memoria, literas, cura, cogi- tatio, diJigentia, i5c. Philip. 2.
• A|-:TMVTii«. Xttj a.au-iJi.ci.TA Xtti A)<p«S" /Lii'^axw tm (pcDVif ^nEipotrai. Luc. I'lMO . Again, Kai av\a.'/ayci\Ti^ {oKfixco-o(f.oi) ivi,eL7ra.Ty- ia jt'.fipc'.xi* TnrT=»G;oAy!!irpt,AM'TO) ttpi'Tur Tptt>&'je<fn. IcuRO-MSN» In teiiothcr place, H«-/r >ap eriv m 'a)0M/2fpi'AAJ)T(g.- ctpiTJi. k (ftcri.,-, xa; s/^rtf/u:?*)), )cai Ti/C"y em-TTi^- atx xcti kda trpap-zwaTo.) »io,«ctTa. Deor. Coacil.^
Of" Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 291
this peevifh delicacy, whence-ever it arifes, can never be carried fo far as to make us deny tlie exiftence of every fpecies of merit, and all dif- tindlion of manners and beJiaviotir. Befides dij- cretioUj caution^ enierprijcy indujlry, ajjiduity, fruga- lity ^ cfcoyiomy^ good-jenje^ prudence y dijcernment \ be- fides thefe endowments, I fay, whofe very names force an avowal of their merit, there are many others, to which the mofl: determined fcepticifm • cannot, for a moment refufe the tribute of praife and approbation. 'Temperance^ Johrietyy patience.^ conjiancy^ per/ever ajtce, forethought, confideratenefs, Jecrecy, order, inftnuation, addrefs, prefence of mind, quicknefs of conception, facility of exprejjion; thefe, and a thoufand more of the fame kind, no man will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections. As their merit confiils in their tendency to ferve the perfon, poffefTed of them, without any mag- nificent claim to public and focial defert, we are the lefs jealous of their pretenfions, and readily admit them into the catalogue of laudable qua- lities. We are not fenfible, that, by this con- ceflion, we have paved the v/ay for all the other moral exctllencies, and cannot confidently hefi- tate anv lono^er, with req;ard to difinterefted be- nevolence, patriotifm, and humanity.
It feems, indeed, certain, that firft appearances are here, as ufual, extremely deceitful, and that it is mere difficult, in a fpeculative way, to re- folve into felf-love the merit, which we afcribe to the felfifll virtues above-mentioned, than that even of the focial virtues, juftice and beneficence. For this latter purpofe, we need but fay, that whatever conduft promotes the good of the com- munity is loved, praifed, and eiteemed by the community, on account of that utility and inte- refl, of which every one partakes : And though this af^cdion and rt-gard be, in reality, gratitude, not felf-love, yet a dirtinction, even of this ob-
U 2 vious
292 S E C T I O N VI.
vions nature, may not readily be made by fu- perficial reafonersj and there is room, at lead, to fupport the cavil and difpute for a moment. But as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their pofleflbr, without any reference to us, or to the community, are yet efteemed and va- lued i by what theory or fyftem can we account , for this fentiment from fclf-love, or deduce it from that favourite origin ? There feems here a neceflity for confeffing that the happinefs and mi- fery of others are not fpe<5tacles entirely indiffe- rent to usi but that the view of the former, whether in its caufes or effedls, like fun-fhine or the profpe£t of well-cultivated plains, (to carry our pretenfions no higher) communicates a fe- cret joy and fatisfaftion ; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landfkip, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. And this conceffion being once made, the diffi- culty is over J and a natural unforced interpreta- tion of the phenomena of human life will after- wards, we may hope, prevail among all fpecula- live enquirers.
P A R T IL
It may not be improper, in this place, to ex- amine the influence of bodily endowments, and of the goods of fortune, over our fentiments of regard and efteem, and to confider whether thefe phenomena fortify or weaken the prefent theory. It will naturally be expefted, that the beauty of the body, as is fuppofed by all ancient moralifts, will be fimilar, in fome refpeds, to that of the mind; and that every kind of efteem, which is paid to a man, will have fomething fimilar in its or'gin, whether it arife from his mental en- dowments, or from the fituation of his exterior circumftances.
It
Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 293
It is evident, that one confiderable fource of beauty in all animals is the advantage, which, they reap from the particular ftrudturc of their limbs and members, fuitably to the particular manner of life, to which they are by nature def- tined. The juft proportions of a horfe, defcrib- ed by Xenophon and Virgil, are the fame, that are received at this day by our modern jockeys; becaufe the foundation of them is the fame, name- ly, experience of what is detrimental or ufefui in the animal.
Broad fhoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, ta- per legs; all thefe are beautiful in our fpecies, becaufe figns of force and vigour. Ideas of utility and its contrary, though they do not entirely de- termine what is handfome or deformed, are evi- dently the fource of a confiderable part of appro- bation or diflike.
In ancient times, bodily ftrength and dexteri- ty, being of greater ufe and importance in war, was alfo much more efteemed and valued, than at prefent. Not to infill on Homer and the po- ets, we may obferve, that hiftorians fcruple not to mention force of body among the other accom- plifhments even of Epaminondas, whom they ac- knowledge to be the greateft hero, ftatefman, and general of all the Greeks*. A like praife is given to Pompey, one of the greateft of the Romansf. This iiiftance is fimilar to what we obferved above, with regard to memory.
What derifion and contempt, with both fexes, attend impotence -, while the unhappy object is re- garded as one deprived of fo capital a pleafure in life, and at the fair*e time, as difabled from communicating it to others, Barrennefs in wo- men,
* See NOTE [GG].
f Cum alacrihus, faltu ; cu7ti njdocihiis, curfu ; cnr^ valid}: reSt ceriahat, Sali.u«t apud Vecet.
294 SECTION VI.
men, being alfo a fpecies of inutility^ is a re- proach, but not in the fame degree : of which the reafon is obvious, according to the prefent theory.
There is no rule in painting or ftatuary more indifpenfible than that of balancing the figures, and placing them with the grateft exaftnefs on their proper center of gravity. A figure, which is not jullly balanced, is ugly; becaufe it con- veys the difagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and pain*.
A difpofition or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to rife in the world, and advance his for- tune, is entitled to efteem and regard, as has already been explained. It may therefore, natu- rally be fuppofed, that the atlual pofielfion of riches and authority will have a confiderable in- fluence over thefe fentiments.
Let us examine any hypothefis, by which we can account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful: We Ihall nnd none fatisfadory, but that which derives it from the enjoyment com- municated to the fpeclator by the images of prof- perity, happinefs, cafe, plenty, authority, and the gratification of every appetite. Self-love, tor in- ftance, which fome affedt fo much to confider as the fource of every fenciment, is plamly infuf- ficient for this purpofc. Where no good-will or friendfhip appears, it is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others; though we naturally ref- pett the rich, even before they difcover any fuch favourable difpofition towards us.
We are aff^ected witli the fame fentiments, when we lie fo much out of the fphere of their acti- vity, that they cannot even be fuppofed to pof- fefs the power of fcrving us. A prifoner of war, in all civilized nations, is treated with a regard
fuited t Sec NOTE [HH].
or Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 295
luitcd to his condition; and riches, it is evident, go far towards fixing the condition of any per- fon. l( birth and quality enter for a fliare, this flill affords us an argument to our prefent pur- pofe. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one who is defcended from a long fuccef- fion of rich and powerful anceftors, and who ac- quires our efleem by his connexion with perfons whom we efteem ? His anceftors, therefore, though dead, are refpecled, in fome meafure, on account of their riches ; and confequently, without any kind of expectation.
But not to go fo far as prifoners of war or the dead, to find inftances of this difinterefted regard for riches; we may only obferve, with a little attention, thofe phenomena, which occur in com- mon life and converfation. A man, who is him- felf, we fhall fuppole, of a competent fortune, and of no profefnon, being introduced to a com- pany of ftrangers, naturally treats them with dif- ferenr degrees of refpecl, as he is informed of their different fortunes and conditions; though it is impoffible that he can fo fuddenly propofe, and perhaps he would not accept of, any pecuniary advantage from them. A traveller is always ad- mitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage Ipeak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In fhort, the different ranks of men are, in a great mea- fure, regulated by riches ; and that with regard to fuperiors as well as inferiors, ftrangers as well as acquaintancT.
What remains, therefore, but to conclude, that, as riches are defired for ourlelves only as the means of gratifying our appetites, either ac pre- lent or in fome imaginary future period ; they beget efteem in others merely from their having that influence. This indeed is their very nature or effencc : They have a direct reference to the
commodities,
296 S E C T I O N VI.
commodities, conveniencies, and pleafures of life. The bill of a banker, who is broke, or gold in a defart ifland, would otherwife be full as valu- able. When we approach a man, who is, as we fay, at his eafe, we are prefented with the pleafing ideas of plenty, fatisfadlion, cleanlinefs, warmth j a chearful houfe, elegant furniture, ready fervice, and whatever is defirable in meat, drink, or apparel. On the contrary, when a poor man appears, the difagreeable images of want, penu- ry, hard labour, dirty furniture, coarfe or ragged cloarhs, naufeous meat and diftafteful liquor, im- mediately ftrike our fancy. What elfe do we mean by faying that one is rich, the other poor ? And as regard or contempt is the natural confequence of thofe different fituations in life; it is ealily {ten what additional light and evidence this throws on our preceding theory, with regard to all moral diftintlions*.
A man, who has cured himfelf of all ridiculous prepofleffions, and is fully, fincerely, and fteadily convinced, from experience as well as philofophy, that the difference of fortune makes lefs difference in happinefs than is vulgarly imagined ; fuch a one does not meafure out deerrees of efteem accordino- to the rent rolls of his acquaintance. He may, in- deed, externally pay a fuperior deference to the great lord above the vaffai ; becaufe riches are the moft convenient, being the mod fixed and deter- minate, fource of diflindion : But his internal {en- timents are more regulated by the perfonal charac- ters of men, than by the accidental and capricious favours of fortune.
In moft countries of Europe, family, that is, he- reditary riciies, marked with titles and fymbolsfrom the fovereign, is the chief fource of diilintlion. In England, more regard is paid to prefent opulence and plenty. Each praftice has its advantages and
difadvantagcs. ♦ See NOTE [II].
of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 297
difad vantages. Where birth is refpected, unactive, fpiritlefs minds rennain in haughty indolence, and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies: The generous and ambitious feek honour ind autho- rity and reputation and favour. Where riches are the chief idol, corruption, vendity, ripine prevail : Arts, manufactures, comm..rce, agriculture flou- rifh. The former prejudice, being favourable to military virtue, is more fuited to monarchies. The latter, being the chief fpur to induftry, agrees bet- ter with a republican government. And vve accord- ingly find, that t'^ch of thei forms of government, by varying the uiiiify of thofe culloms, has com- monly a proportionable effect on the fentiments of mankind.
SECTION
( 299 )
SECTION VIL
Of QUjVLITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE tO
OURSELVES.
VV HOEVER has pafTed an evening with ferl- ous melancholy people, and has obferved how fuddenly the converfation was animated, and what fprightlinefs diffufed itfelf over the coun- tenance, difcourfe, and behaviour of every one, on the acceflion of a good-humoured, lively companion ; fuch a one will eafily allow, that Chearfulnefs carries great merit with it, and na- turally conciliates the good-will of mankind. No quality, indeed, more readily communicates it- felf to all around; becaufe no one has a great- er propenfity to difplay itfelf, in jovial talk and pleafant entertainment. The flame fpreads through the whole circle -, and the moft fullen and mo- rofe are often caught by it. That the melan- choly hate the merry, even though Horace fays it, I have fome difficulty to allow ; becaufe I have always obferved, that, where the jollity is mode- rate and decent, ferious people are fo much the more delighted, as it diffipates the gloom, with which they are commonly opprefled : and gives them an unufual enjoyment.
From this influence of chearfulnefs, both to communicate itfelf, and to engage approbation, we may perceive, that there is another fet of mental qualities, Mhich, without any utility or
any
^oo SECTION VII.
any tendency to farther good, either of the com- munity or of the polTefTor, difFufe a fatisfa6tion on the beholders, and procure friendfhip and re- gard. Their imnnediate fenfation, to the perfon pofTefled of them, is agreeable : Others enter in- to the fame humour, and catch the fentiment, by a contagion or natural fympathy : And as wc cannot forbear loving whatever pleafes, a kindly emotion arifes towards the perfon, who commu- nicates fo much fatisfadlion. He is a more ani- mating fpeftacle : His prefence difFufes over us more ferene complacency and enjoyment : Our imagination, entering into his feelings and difpo- fition, is affeded in a more agreeable manner, than if a melancholy, dejeded, fullen, anxious temper were prefented to us. Hence the affec- tion and approbation, which attend the former; The averfion and difguft, with which we regard the latter *.
Few men would envy the character, which Cas- far gives of CafTius,
He loves no play. As thou do'ft, Anthony: He hears nomufic: Seldom he fmiles -, and fmiles in fuch a fort. As if he mock'd himfelf, and fcorn'd his fpirit That could be mov'd to fmile at any thing.
Not only fuch men, as Csefar adds, are common- ly dangerous, but alfo, having little enjoyment within themfelves, they can never become agree- able to others, or contribute to focial entertain- ment. In all polite nations and ages, a relifh for pleafure, if accompanied with temperance and decency, is efteemed a confiderable merit, even in the greateft men -, and becomes ftill more re- quifite in thofe of inferior rank and character. It is an agreeable reprefentation, which a French
writer
• See NOTE [KK].
0/Qu AL 1 Ti ES immediately agreeable to Our/elves, 30 1
■writer gives of the fituation of his own mind in this particular, Firtue, I love^ fays he, without aujlerity : Pleajure^ without effeminacy : And life, without fearing its end *.
Who is not ftruck with any fignal inftance of Greatnefs of Mind or Dignity of Charadler; with elevation of fentimcnt, difdain of flavery, and with that noble pride and fpirit, which arifes from confcious virtue ? The fublime, fays Longinus, is often nothing but the echo or image of magnani- mity i and where this quality appears in any one, even though a fyllable be not uttered, it excites our applaufe and admiration ; as may be obferv- ed of the famous filence of Ajax in the Odyfley, which exprefles more noble difdain and refolute indignation, than any language can convey f.
Were I Alexander, faid Parmenio, / would ac- cept of thefe offers made by Darius. So would I too, replied Alexander, were I Parmenio, This faying is admirable, fays Longinus, from a like princi-
Go ! cries the fame hero to his foldiers, when they refufed to follow him to the Indies, go tell your countrymen, that you left Alexander compleating the conquefl of the world. " Alexander,'* faid the Prince of Conde, who always admired this paf- fage, " abandoned by his foldiers, among Barba- " rians, not yet fully fubdued, felt in himfelf fuch " a dignity and right of empire, that he could not " believe it pofiible, that any one would refufe to " obey him. Wheiher in Europe or in Afia, a- " mong Greeks or Perfians, all was indifferent to " him : Wherever he found men, he fancied he «' ihould find fubjeds."
The
• *' J*aime la vertu, fansrudefTe; " J'ainie le plaifir, fans mole/Te; *' J 'dime la vie, & n'en crains point la fin."
St. EVREMOND.
t Cap. 9, X Idem.
302 SECTION VIL
The confident of Medea in the tragedy recom- mends caution and fubmillion ; and enumerating all the diflrefles of that unfortunate heroine, afks her, what fhe has to fupport her againft her nu- merous and implacable enemies. My/elf^ replies fhe; My/elf, IJay^ and it is enough. Boileaujuft- ly recommends this palTage as an inftance of true ^ublime *.
When Phocion, the modeft, the gentle Phocion, was led to execution, he turned to one of his fel- low-fufferers, who was lamenting his own h ad fate. Is it not glory enough for yoUy fays he, that you die with Phocion f ?
Place in oppofition the picture, which Tacitus draws of Vitellius, fallen from empire, prolong- ing his ignominy from a wretched love of life, delivered over to the mercilefs rabble j tofled, buffeted, and kicked about ; conftrained, by their holding a poniard under his chin, to raife his head, and expofe himfelf to every contumely. What abjcdt infamy! What low humiliation! Yet even here, fays the hiftorian, he difcovered feme fymp- toms of a mind not wholly degenerate. To a tri- bune, who infulted him, he replied, I am Jiill your emperor X.
We never excufe the abfolute want of fpirit and dignity of chara6ler, or a proper fenfe of what is due to one's felf, in fociety and the common inrer- courfe of life. This vice conftitutes what we pro- perly call meannejs\ when a man can fubmit to the bafefl flavery, in order to gain his ends ; fawn up- on thofe who abufe him \ and degrade himfelf by intimacies and familiarities with undeferving infe- riors. A certain degree of generous pride or felf- value is fo requifite, that the abfcnce of it in the mind difpleafes, after the fame manner as the
want
* Refleftion lofurLongin. f Plutarch in Phoc.
X Sec NOTE [LL]
«f
0/ Qualities immediately agreeable to Our/elves. 30J
want of a nofe, eye, or any of the mod material feature of the face or member of the body*.
The utility of Courage, both to the public and to the perfon pofTelTed of it, is an obvious foun- dation of merit : But to any one who duly confi- ders of the matter, it will appear, that this qua- lity has a peculiar lufte, which it derives wholly from irfelf, and from that noble elevation infepa- rable from it. Its figure, drawn by painters and by poets, difplays, in each feature, a fublimity and daring confidence ; which catches the eye, engages the affe<5lions, and difiufes, by fympa- thy, a like fublimity of fentiment over every fpec- tator.
Under what fhining colours does Demofthenesf reprefent Philip ; where the orator apologizes for his own adminiltration, and juftifies that pertina- cious love of liberty, with which he had infpired the Athenians. " 1 beheld Philip,'* fays he, " he with whom was your contefl:, refolutely, while in purfuit of empire and dominion, expofing himlelf to every wound ; his eye goared, his neck wrefted, his arm, his thigh pierced, what- ever part of his body fortune fhould feize on, that cheerfully relinquifliing; provided that, with what remained, he might live in honour and renown. And fliall it be faid, that he, born in Pella, a place heretofore mean and ignoble, fhould be infpired with fo high an ambition and third of fame : While you, Athenians, (iff." Thefc praifes excite the moft lively ad- miration ; but the views prefented by the ora- tor, carry us not, we fee, beyond the hero him- felf, nor ever regard the future advantageous con- fequences of his valour.
The martial temper of the Romans, inflamed hv continual wars, had raifed their efleem of
• See NOTE [MM], f Pro corona.
;504 SECTION VII.
courage fo high, that, in thtir language, it was called virfuej by way of excellence and of dif- tindlion from all other moral qualities. The Suevi, in the opinion of Tacitus f, drejfed their hair wiih a laudable intent: Not for the purpoje of loving or being loved: They adorned themf elves only for their enemies^ and in order to appear more terri- ble. A fentiment of the hiftorian, which would found a little oddly in other nations and other ages.
The Scythians, according to Herodotus J, after fcalping their enemies, drefled their fkin like lea- ther, and ufed it as a towel ; and whoever had the moft of thofe towels was moft efteemed among them. So much had martial bravery, in that na- tion, as well as in many others, deflroyed the fen- timents of humanity j a virtue furely much more ufeful and engaging.
It is indeed obfervable, that, among all un- cultivated nations, who have not, as yet, had full experience of the advantages attending benefi- cence, juftice, and the fecial virtues, courage is the predominant excellence; what is moft cele- brated by poets, recommended by parents and inftrudtors, and admired by the public in gene- ral. The ethics of Homer are, in this particular, very different from thofe of Fenelon, his elegant imitator J and fuch as were well fuited to an age, when one hero, as remarked by Thucydides ||, could afk another, without offence, whether he were a robber or not. Such alfo, very lately, was the fyftem of ethics, which prevailed in many barbarous parts of Ireland ; if we may credit Spen- cer, in his judicious account of the ftatc of that kingdom §.
Of
f De moribus Germ. % Lib. iv. [( Lib. i.
§ It is a common ufe, fays he, amongft their gentlemen's fons,
thut.
0/ Qualities immediately agreeable to Ourfehes. 305
Of the fame clafs of virtues with cpurage is that undiftiirbed philofophical Tranquillity, fu- perior to pain, forrow, anxiety, and each aflault of adverfe fortune. Confcious of his own virtue, fay the philofophers, the fage elevates himfelf above every accident of life; and fecurely placed in the temple of wifdom, looks down on infe- rior mortals, engaged in purfuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every frivolous enjoyment. Thefe pretenfions, no doubt, when ftretched to the ut- moft, are, by far, too magnificent for human na- ture. They carry, however, a grandeur with them, which feizes the fpeftator, and ftrikes him with admiration. And the nearer we can ap- proach in practice, to this fublime tranquillity and indifference (for we muft diftinguifh it from a ftupid infenfibility) the more fecure enjoy- ment fliall we attain within ourfelves, and the iTJore greatnefs of mind fliall we difcover to the world. The philofophical tranquillity may, in- deed, be confidered only as a branch of magna- nimity.
Vvlio admires not Socrates; his perpetual fe- renity and contentment, amidfl the greateft po- verty and domeftic vexations ; his refolute con- tempt of riches, and his magnanimous care of preferving liberty, while he refufed all afliftance from his friends and difciples, and avoided even the dependence of an obligation ? Epifletus had not fo much as a door to his little houfe or ho- vel ; and therefore, foon loft his iron lamp, the only furniture which he had worth taking. But
Vol. II. X refolving
that, as foon as they are able to ufe their weapons, they ftrait ga- ther to themfelves three or four ftraggles or kern, with whom wandering a while up and down idly the country, taking only meat, he at lall falleih into fome bad occafion, that Ihail be ofTered ; which being cnce made known, he is thenceforth count- ed a man of worth, in whom there is courage.
jo6 SECTION VII.
refolving to difappoint all robbers for the future^; he fuppiied its place with an earthen lamp, of which he very peaceably kept pofTefilon ever after.
Among the ancients, the heroes in philofophy^ as well as thofe in war and patriotifm, have a grandeur and force of fentiment, which aflonifhes Gur narrow fouls, and is raflily rejected as extra- vagant and fupernarural. They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal reafon to confider as romantic and incredible, the degree of huma- nity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and other fo- cial virtues, to which, in the adminiftration of government, we have attained in modern times, had any been then able to have made a fair re- prefentation of them. Such is the compenfa- tion, which nature, or rather education, has made in the diftribution of excellencies and vir- tues, in thofe different ages.
The merit of Benevolence, arifing from its utility, and its tendency to promote the good of mankind, has been already explained, and is, no doubt, the fource of a confiderable part of that efteem, which is fo univerfally paid to it. But it will alfo be allowed, that the verv ioftnefs and tendernefs of the fentiment, its engaging endear- ments, its fond exprelfions, its delicate attenti- ons, and all that flow of mutual confidence and regard, which enters into a warm attachment of love and friendfhip : It will be allowed, I fay, that thefe feelings, being delightful in themfelves, are neceffarily communicated to the fpeftators, and melt them into the fame fondncfs and de- licacy. The tear naturally ftarts in our eye on the apprehenfion of a warm fentiment of this na- ture : Our breall heaves, our heart is agitated, and every humane tender principle of our frame is fee in motion, and gives us the pureft and moll: fa- risfadory enjoyment.
When
0/ Qualities immediately agreeable to Our/elves. 307
When poets form defcriptions of Elyfian fields, where the blefled inhabitants ftand in no need of each other's affiftance, they yet reprefent them as maintaininc^ a conflant intercourfe of love and friendfhip, and footh our fancy with the pleafing image of thefe foft and gentle paflions. The idea of tender tranquillity in a paftoral Arcadia is agreeable fiom a like principle, as has been obferved above *.
Who would live amidfl: perpetual wrangling, and fcolding, and mutual reproaches ? The roughnefs and harfhnefs of thefe emotions dif- turb and difpleafe us ; We fuffer by contagion and fympathy j nor can we remain indifferent fpedtators, even though certain, that no pernici- ous confequences would ever follow from fuch angry paflions.
As a certain proof, that the whole merit of be- nevolence is not derived from its ufefulnefs, we may obferve, that, in a kind way of blame, we fay, a perfon is too good; when he exceeds his part in fociety, and carries his attention for o- thers beyond the propor bounds. In like man- ner, we fay a man is too higb-fpiritedy too intrepid, too indifferent about fortune : Reproaches, whicli really, at bottom, imply more efteem than many panegyrics. Being accuftomed to rate the merit and demerit of characters chiefly by their ufeful or pernicious tendencies, we cannot forbear ap- plying the epithet of blame, when we difcover a fentiment, which rifes to a degree, that is hurtful : But it may happen, at the fame time, that its no- ble elevation, or its engaging tendcrnefs fo feizes the heart, as rather to encreafe our friendfliip and concern for the perfon f .
X 2 The
* Sea. V. Part 2.
t Cheerfulnefs could fcarce admit of blame from its excefs,
were
jo8 SECTION VII.
The amours and .. attachments of Harry the IVth of France, during the civil wars of the league, frequently hurt his interell and his caufej but all the young, at leall, and amorous, who can fympathize with the tender paflions, will al- low, that this very weaknefs (for they will rea- dily call it fuch) chiefly endears that hero, and interefts them in his fortunes.
The excefiive bravery and refolute inflexibili- ty of Charles the Xllth ruined his own coun- try, and infefted all his neighbours; but have fuch fplendour and greatnefs in their appear- ance, as ftrike us with admiration j and they might, in fome degree, be even approved of, if they betrayed not fometimes too evident fymp- toms of madnefs and diforder.
The Athenians pretended to the firft inventi- on of agriculture and of laws ; and always va- lued themfelves extremely on the benefit there- by procured to the whole race of mankind. They alfo boafl:ed, and with reafon, of their war- like enterprizes; particularly againfl: thofe innu- merable fleets and armies of Perfians, which invaded Greece during the reigns of Darius and Xerxes. But though there be no comparifon, in point of utility, between thefe peaceful and military honours j yet we find, that the orators, who have writ fuch elaborate panegyrics on that famous city, have chiefly triumphed in dif- playing the warlike atchievements. Lyfias, Thu- cydides, Plato, and Ifocrates difcover, all of them, the fame partiality -, which, though condemned by calm reafon and refledion, appears fo natu- ral in the mind of man.
It
were It not that difToIute mirtli, without a proper caufe or fuhjetfl:, is a fiire fymptom and chnrafleriftic ot folJy, and on that account difguftful.
O/QiTALiTiES immediately agreeable to Qurfehes. 309
It is obfervable, that the great charm of poe- try confifts in lively pidiires of the fiiblime paf- fions, magnanimity, courage, difdain of fortune; or tjiofe of the tender affecl:ions, love and friend- ship; which warm the heart, and difFufe over it fimilar fentiments and emotions. And though all kinds of paflion, even the moft difagreeable, fuch as grief and anger, are obferved, when ex- cited by poetry, to convey a fatisfaftion, from a mechanifm of nature, not eafy to be explain- ed: Yet thofe more elevated or fofter affedions have a peculiar influence, and pleafe from more than one caufe or principle. Not to mention, that they alone intereft us in the fortune of the perfons reprefented, or communicate any efleem and afFeeftion for their character.
And can it pollibly be doubted, that this ta- lent itfelf of poets, to move the pafTions, this Pathetic and Sublime of fentiment, is a very con- fidcrable merit ; and being enhanced by its ex- treme rarity, may exalt the perfon poflelTed of it, above every character of the age in which he lives ? The prudence, addrefs, fleadinefs, and benign government of Auguftus, adorned with all the fplendour of his noble birth and imperial crown, render him but an unequal competitor for fame with Virgil, who lays nothing into the oppofite fcale but the divine beauties of his poe- tical genius.
The very fenfibility to thefe beauties, or a De- licacy of tafte, is itfelf a beauty in any charafler; as conveying the pureft, the moft durable, and moft innocent of all enjoyments.
Thefe are fome inftances of the fcveral fpecies of merit, that are valued for the immediate plea- fure, which they communicate to the perfon pof- fefted of them. No views of utility or of fu- ture beneficial confequcnces enter into this fenti- ment.
JIO
SECTION vir.
ment of approbation; yet is it of a kind fimi- lar to that other fentiment, which arifes from views of a public or private utility. The fame focial fympathy, we may obferve, or fellow-feel- ing with human happinefs or mifery, gives rife to both ; and this analogy, in all the parts of the prefent theory, may juftly be regarded as a confirmation of it.
SECT-
[ 311 ]
SECTION VIII.
Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Others*.
A
S the mutual fhocks, \n fociety, and the op- pofitions of intereft and felf-love have conftrain- ed mankind to eftablifh the laws o( jujlice y in or- der to preferve the advantages of mutual afTiftance and protection ; In like manner, the eternal con- trarieties, in compmiy^ of men's pride and felf- conceit, have introduced the rules of Good-Man- ners or Politenefs; in order to facilitate the inter- courfe of minds and an undifturbed commerce and converfation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected : Contempt of others difguif- ed : Authority concealed : Attention given to each in his turn : And an eafy dream of converfation maintained, without vehemence, without interrup- tion, without eagernefs for viftory, and without any airs of fuperiority. Thefe attentions and re- gards are immediately agreeable to others, abilract-
ed
* It is the nature, and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that It IS ^ quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by enjery one, avho conjiders or contetfiplates it. But feme qunlitie. ^jroduce pleafure, becaufe they :.re ufeful to fociety, or ufeful or agree- able to the perfon himieir ; other'; produce it more imn-.ediateiy: Which is the cafe with the clafs of virtues here confidered.
312 SECTION VIII.
ed from any confideration of utility or beneficial tenilcncies : They conciliate affedtion, promote eRccm, and extremely enhance the merit of the perfon, who regulates his behaviour by them.
Many of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and cafual ; But the thing expreiTed by them is ftill the fame. A Spaniard goes out of his own houfe before his gueft, to fignify that he leaves him mailer of all. In other countries, the landlord walks out laft, as a common mark of deference and re- gard.
But, in order to render a man perfed: good com- pany, he muft have Wit and Ingenuity as well as good-manners. What wit is, it may not be eafy to define ; but it is eafy fiirely to determine, that it is a quality immediately agreeable to others, and communicating, on its firll appearance, a lively joy and fatisfaftion to every one who has any comprehenfion of it. The moft profound meta- phyfics, indeed, might be employed, in explaining the various kinds and fpecies of wit ; and many clafics of it, which are now received on the fole teitimony of tafte and fentiment, might, perhaps, be refolved into more general principles. But this is fufficient for our prefent purpofe, that it does affett tafte and fentiment, and bellowing an im.- mediate enjoyment, is a lure fource of approbati- on and affedion.
In countries, where men pafs moll of their time in converfation, and vifus, and aflcmblies, thefe companionable qualities, fo to ipeak, are of high ellimation, and form a chief part of per- fonal merit. In countries, where men live a more domeftic life, and either are employed in bufinefe, or amufe themfelves in a narrower cir- cle of acqMaintance, the more folid qualities are chiefly regarded. Thus, I have often obfcrved, that, among the French, the firfb queftions, with regard to a itranger, are. Is he polite '^ Has he ■tcvV ?
In
0/Qu A L I T I E s mmediateiy agreeable to Others . 313
In our own country, the chief praife beftowcd, is always that of a good-naturedy Jenfihle fellow ,
In converlation, the lively fpirit of dialogue is agreeabUy even to thofe who defire not to have any fhare in the difcoiirfe : Hence the teller of long ftories, or the pompous declaimer, is very little approved of But mod men defire likewife their turn in the converfarion, and regard, with a very evil eye, that loquacity^ which deprives them of a right they are naturally fo jealous of.
There is a fort of harmlefs liarsy frequently to be met with in company, who deal much in the marvellous. Their ufual intention is to pleafe and entertain ; but as men are moft delight- ed with what they conceive to be truth, thefe people miflake extremely the means of pleafing, and incur univerfal blame. Some indulgence, how- ever, to lying or fidlion is given in humorous ftories, becaufe it is there really agreeable and entertaining; and truth is not of any importance.
Eloquence, genius of all kinds, even good fenfe, and found reafoning, when it rifes to an eminent degree, and is employed upon fubjects of any confiderable dignity and nice difcernment j all thefe endov/ments feem immediately agreeable, and have a merit diftin6l from their ufefulnefs. Rarity, likewife, which fo much enhances the price of every thing, muft fet an additional value on thefe noble talents of the human mind.
Modefty may be underftood in different fenfes, even abftrafbed from challity, which has been al- ready treated of. It fometimes means that tender- nefs and nicety of honour, that apprehenfions of blame, that dread of intrufion or injury towards others, that Pudor, which is the proper guardian of every kind of virtue, and a fure prefervative againft vice and corruption. But its moft ufual meaning is when it is oppofed to impudence and arrogance^ and exprefles a diffidence of our own
judgment.
314 SECTION VIII.
ludgment, and a due attention and regard for oihers. In young men chiefly, this quality is a fure fign of good fenfe ; and is alfo the certain means of augmenting that endowment, by preferv- ing th?ir ears open to inftrjclion, and making them ftili grafp after new attainments. But it has a farther charm to every fpedator ; by flattering every man's vanity, and prefenting the appear- ance of a docile pupil, who receives, with proper attention and refpedb, every word they utter.
Men have, in general, a much greater propen- fity to over-value than undervalue themfelves ; notwithftanding the opinion of Ariftotle *. This makes us more jealous of the excefs on the former fide, and caufes us to regard, with a peculiar in- dulgence, all tendency to modefty and feif-diffi- dence; as eiteeming the danger lefs of falling into any vicious extreme of that nature. It is thus, in countries, where men's bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency, perfonal beauty is placed in a much greater degree of flendernefs, than in countries, where that is the moll ufual dcfecfl. Being fo of- ten ftruck with iniiances of one fpecies of defor- mity, men thinly they can never keep at too great a diftance from it, and wiili always to have a lean- ing to the oppoUte fide. In like manner, were the door opened to felf praife, and were Montaigne's maxim obferved, that one fhould fay as frankly, I have fenfe y I have learnings I have courage, beauty y or wit; as it is fure we often think fo ; were this the cafe, I fay, every one is fenfible, that fuch a flood of impertinence would break in upon us, as would render fociety wholly intolerable. For his reafon cullom has eflablifhed it as a rule, in common focieties, that men lliould not indulge themfelves in felf-praife, or even fpeak much of themfelves j and it is only among intimate friends or
people * Ethic, ad Nicomachum.
3
Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Others. 315
people of very manly behaviour, that one is al- lowed to do himfelf juftice. No body finds fault with Maurice, Prince of Orange, for his reply to one, who aiked him, whom he efteemed the firft general of the age, 'The marquis <7/Spinola, faid he, is the Jecond, Though it is obfervable, that the felf-praile implied is here better implied, than if it had been diredly exprefled, without any cover or difguife.
He muft be a very fuperficial thinker, who ima- gines, that all inftances of mutual deference are to be underftood in earneft, and that a man would be more efteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and accomplifhments. A fmall bias towards modefty, even in the internal fentiment, is favour- ably regarded, efpecially in young peoples and a jflrong bias is required, in the outward behaviour : But this excludes not a noble pride and fpirit, which may openly difplay itfelf in its full extent, when one lies under calumny or oppreflion of any kind. The generous contumacy of Socrates, as Cicero calls it, has been highly celebrated in all ages ; and when joined to the ufual modefty of his be- haviour, forms a fhining charadler. Iphicrates, the Athenian, being accufed of betraying the in- terefts of his country, afked his accufer, Would yoUi fays he, have^ on a like occafion^ been guilty of that crime? By no means, replied the other. And can you then imagine, cried the hero, that Iphicrates isjould be guilty * ? In Ihort, a generous fpirit and felf-value, well founded, decently difguifed, and courageoully fupported under diftrefs and calumny, is a great excellency, and feems to derive its merit from the noble elevation of its fentiment, or its immediate agreeablenefs to its pofleflbr. In ordi- nary characters, we approve of a bias towards mo- defty, which is a quality immediately agreeable to
Others :
* Quinftil. lib. v. cap. 12.
ji6 SECTION VIII.
others: The vicious excefs of the former virtue, namely, infolence or haiightinefs, is immediately difagreeable to others : The excefs of the latter is fo to the poflefibr. Thus are the boundaries of thefe duties adjufted.
A defire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is fo far from being blameable, that it feems infeparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a generous or noble difpofition. An attention even to trivial matters, in order to pleafe, is alfo expect- ed and demanded by fociety ; and no one is fur- prifed, if he find a man in company, to obferve a greater elegance of drefs and more pleafant flow of converfation, than when he paffes his time at home, and with his own family. Wherein, then, confifts Vanity, which is fojuitly regarded as a fault or im- perfedlion. It feems to confill chiefly in fuch an intemperate difplay of our advantages, honours, and accomplifliments ; in fuch an importunate and open demand of praife and admiration, as is offen- five to others, and encroaches too far on their fe- cret vanity and ambition. It is befides a fure fymp- tom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind, which is fo great an ornament in any charac- ter. For why that impatient defire of applaufe; as if you were not juftly entitled to it, and might not reafonably expedl, that it would for ever at- tend you ? Why fo anxious to inform us of the great company which you have kept; the obliging things which were faid to you ; the honours, the diftincli- ons which you met with ; as if thefe were not things ofcourfe, and what we could readily, ofourfelves, have imagined, -vyithout being told of them ?
Decency, or a proper regard to age, fex, cha- racler, and fl;ation in the world, may be ranked a- mong the qualities, which are immediately agree- able to others, and which, by that means, ac- quire praife and approbation. An effeminate be- haviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman i
thefe
0/Qu ALiTiES immediately agreeable to Others. 317
thefe are ugly becaufe unfuitable to each charafler, and dilVerenc from the qualities which we exped in the iexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The difpropor- tions hurt the eye, and convey a difagreeable fen- timent to tlie fpe(5lators, the fource of blame and difapprobacion. This is that indecorumy which is explained fo much at large by Cicero in his Offices.
Among the other virtues, we may alfo give Cleanlinefs a places fmce it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconfiderable fource of love and afteclion. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault j and as faults are nothing but fmaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneafy fenfation, which it excites in others; we may, in this in- llance, feemingly fo trivial, clearly difcover the origin of moral diflindlions, about which the learn- ed have involved themfelves in fuch mazes of per- plexity and error.
But befides all the agreeable qualities, the origin of whofe beauty, we can, in fome degree, explain and account for, there ftill remains fomething myfterious and inexplicable, which conveys an im- mediate fatisfadlion to the fpe6lator, but how, or why, or for what reafon, he cannot pretend to de- termine. There is a manner, a grace, an eafe, a genteelnefs, an I-know-not-what, which fome men poflefs above others, which is very different from external beauty and comelinefs, and which, however, catches our afFedlion almoft as fuddenly and powerfully. And though this manner be chief- ly talked of in the pafiion between the fexes, where the concealed magic is eafily explained, yet furely much of it prevails in all our eflimation of charac- ters, and forms no inconfiderable part of perfonal merit. This clafs of accomplifhments, therefore, muft be trufted entirely to the blind, but fure tef- timony of tafte and fentimentj and mull be confi-
dered
3iS
SECTION VIII.
dered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philofophy, and make her fenfible of her narrow boundaries and flender acquifitions.
We approve of another, becaufe of his wit, po- litenefs, modefty, decency, or any agreeable qua- lity which he pofleflesj although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertain-^ ment, by means of thefe accomplifhments. The idea, which we form of their effeft on his acquain- tance, has an agreeable influence on our imaginati- on, and gives us the fentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments, which we form concerning manners and characters.
SECT-
( 3^9 )
SECTION IX.
Conclusion.
PART I.
J.T may juftly appear furprifing, that any man, in fo late an age, fhould find it requifite to prove, by elaborate realoning, that Perlbnal Merit con- fills altogether in the pofTeflion of mental qualities, u/eful or agreeable to the per/on bim/elf or to others. It might be expeded, that this principle would have occurred even to the firft rude, unpra6lifed enquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence, without any argument or difputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind, fo naturally clalTes itfelf under the divifion of u/e- ful or agreeable^ the utile or the dulce^ that it is not eafy to imagine, why we fhould ever fcek farther, or confider the queflion as a matter of nice refearch or enquiry. And as every thing ufeful or agreeable muft poflefs thefe qualities with regard either to the per/on him/elf or to others, the com- pleat delineation or defcription of merit feems to be performed as naturally as a fhadow is caft by the fun, or an image is reflefted upon water. If the ground, on which the fhadow is call, be not broken and uneven ; nor the firface, from which the image is refle6led, difturbtd and confufedj a jult figure is immediately prelented, without any
arc
320 S E C T I O N IX.
art or attention. And it feems a reafonable pre- fumption, that fyftems and hypothefes have per- verted our natural underftanding ; when a theory, fo fimple and obvious, could fo long have efcaped the moft elaborate examination.
But however the cafe may have fared with philo- ibphy; in common life, thefe principles are ilill implicitly maintained, nor is any other topic of praife or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or fatire, any applaufe or cenfure of human action and behaviour. If we obferve men, in every intercourfe of bufinefs or pleafure, in every difcourfe and converfation ; we Ihall find them no where, except in the fchools, at any lofs upon this fubje(fl. What fo natural, for inftance, as the following dialogue ? You are very happy, we fhall fuppofe one to fay, addrefling himfelf to another, that you have given your daughter to Cleanthes. He is a man of honour and humanity. Every one, who has any intercourfe with him, is fure of fair and kind treatment *. I congratulate you too, fays another on the promifing expeftati- ons of this fon in-law ; whofe affiduous applicati- on to the lludy of the laws, whofe quick penetrati- on and early knowledge both of men and bufinefs, prognofticate the greateft honours and advance- ment f. You furprize me, replies a third, when you talk of Cleanthes as a man of bufinefs and ap- plication. I met him lately in a circle of the gayefl company, and he was the very life and foul of our converfation : So much wit with good manners ; fo much gallantry without afi'eftation ; fo much in- genious knowledge fo genteelly delivered, I have never before obferved in any one J. You would admire him Hill more, fays a fourth, if you knew
him
• Qualities ufcful to others.
f Qualities ufefal to the perfon himfelf.
\ Qualities immediately agreeable toothers.
CONCLUSIOM. 321
him more familiarly. That chearfulnefs, which you might remark in him, is not a fudden flafh llruck out by company : It runs through the whole tenor of his life, and preferves a perpetual ferenity on his countenance, ^nd tranquillity in his foul. He has met with fevere trials, misfor- tunes as well as dangers ; and by his greatnefs of mind, was ftill fuperior to all of them *. The image, gentlemen, which you have here delineat- ed of Cleanthes, cry'd I, is that of accomplifhed merit. Each of you his given a ftroke of the pen- cil to his figure : and you have unawares ex- ceeded all the picflures drawn by Gratian or Caf- tiglione. A philofopher might feleft this cha- radler as a model of perfedl virtue.
And as every quality, which is ufeful or agree- able to ourfelves or others, is, in common life, allowed to be a part of perfonal merit j fo no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reafon, with- out the delufive gloffes of fuperftition and falfe religion. Celibacy, fafling, penance, mortificati- on, felf-denial, humility, filence, folitude, and the whole train of monkifh virtues ; for what reafon are they every where reje6led by men of fenfe, but becaufe they ferve to no manner of purpofes neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of fo^ ciety; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increafe his power of felf-en- joyment ? We obferve, on the contrary, that they crofs all thefe defirable ends; ftupify the under- ilanding and harden the heart, obfcure the fan- cy and four the temper. We juftly, therefore, transfer them to the oppofite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any fuperftition force fufficient among men of the
Vol. II. Y world,
♦ Qualities immediately agreeable to the perfon himfelf.
J22 S E C T I O N IX.
world, to pervert entirely their natural fentiments, A gloomy hair-brained enthiifiaft, after his death, may have a place in the calendar ; bur will fcarce- ly ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and fociety, except by thofe who are as delirioas and difmal as himfelf.
It feems a happinefs in the prefent theory, that it enters not into that vulgar difpute concerning the degrees of benevoleiice or felf-iove, which prevail in human nature : a difpute which is never likely to have any iflue, both becaufe men, who have taken part, are not eafily convinced, and becaufe the phsenomena, which can be produced on either fide, are fo difperfed, fo uncertain, and fubjeft to fo many interpretations, that it is fcarcely pofTible accurately to compare them, or draw from them any determinate inference or conclufion. It is fuf- iicient for our prefent purpofe, if it be allowed, what furely, without the greateft abfurdity, cannot be difputed, that there is fome benevolence, how- ever fmall, infufed into our bofom ; fome fpark of friendfhip for human kind; fome particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame, along with the ele- ments of the v;olf and ferpent. Let thefe generous fentiments be fuppofed ever fo weak ; let them be infufficient to move even a hand or finger of our bo- dy i they muft ftill diredl the determinations of our mind, and where every thing elfe is equal, produce a cool preference of what is ufcful and ferviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and danger- ous. A moral dlftintiiorii therefore, immediately arifesj a general fentiment of blame and approba- tion ; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable averfion to thofe of the other. Nor will thofe reafoners, who fo earneft- ly maintain tiie predominant felfifhnefs of human Jcind, be any wife fcandalized at hearing of the weak fentiments of virtue, implanted in our nature. On fhe contrary, they are found as readv to maintain
the
Conclusion. 323
the one tenet as the other; and their fpirit of fa- tire (for fuch it appears, rather than of corruption) naturally gives rife to both opinions; which have, indeed, a great and almoft an indiffoluble connex- ion together.
Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all paffions vul- garly, though improperly, comprized under the denomination o( Jelf-love, are here excluded from our theory concerning the origin of morals, not becaufe they are too weak, but becaufe they have not a proper dire6bion, for that purpofe. The notion of morals, implies fome fentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the fame ob- jedt to general approbation, and makes every man, or mofl men, agree in the fame opinion or decifion concerning it. It alfo implies fome fentiment, fo univerfal and comprehenfive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and condu6l, even of the perfons the mofb remote, an obje6l of applaufe or cenfure, according as they agree or difagree with that rule of right which is eftablifh- ed. Thefe two requifite circumftances belong alone to the fentiment of humanity here infilled on. The other palfions produce, in every breall, many flrong fentiinents of defire and averfion, affedlion and hatred ; but thefe neither are felt fo mucli in common, nor are fo comprehenfive, as to be the foundation of any general fyftem and eftabliflied theory of blame or approbation.
When a man denominates another his enemy^ his rivals his antagomfi^ his adverfary^ he is underilood to fpeak the language of felf-love, and to exprefs fentiments, peculiar to himfelf, and arifing from his particular circumftances and ficuarion.But when he beftows on any man the epithets of vicioi's or odious or depraved, he then fpeaks another language, and expreil'es fentiments, in which, he expefts, all his audience are to concur with him. He mull here, therefore, depart from his private and parti -
Y 2 cular
J24 SECTION IX.
Cular lituation, and mull chufe a point of view, common to him with others : He mull move fomc univerfal principle of the human frame, and touch a ftiing, to which all mankind have an accord and fymphony. If he means, therefore, to exprefs, that this man pofTelTes qualities, whofe tendency is per- nicious to foci'^ty, he has chofen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in feme degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the fame elements as at preient, it \;ill never be wholly in- different to public good, nor entirely unaffefted with the tendency of chara6lers and manners. And though this affedion of humanity may not gener- ally be cfteemed fo ftrong as vanity or ambition, yet, being ^uTmon to aii men, it can alone be tJie foundatioi-: of mcrals, or of any general fyflem of blame or praife. One man's ambition is not ano- ther's ambition ; nor will the fame event or object fatisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one 3 and the fame objeft touches this paflion in all human creatures.
But the fentim.ents, which arife from humani- ty, are not only the fame iji all human crea- tures, and produce the fame approbation or cen- furcj but they aifo comprehend all human crea- tures j nor is there any one whofe condudl or charaft^r is hot, by their means, an object, to every one, of cenfure or approbation. On the contrary, thofe other paflions, commonly denomi- nated felfifn, both produce different fentiments in each individual, according to his particular fitu- aiion ; and alfo contemplate the greater part of mankind with the utmofl indifference and unton- cern. Whoever has a high regard and elleem for me flatters my vanity ; whoever expreffes con- itcmpt mortlries and difpieafes me : But as my name is known but to a fmall part oi" mankind, tliere are few, who couje within tlie Iphere of tliis
1 paffion.
Co NCLUSIO^. *" 325
pafTion, ■ or encite, on its account, cither my af- fedion or difgull.- But if you rcprefent a ty- rannical, infolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world ; I foon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of fuch a condud, and feel the fentiment of repugnance and difpleafure towards it; No chr.ra6ter can be fo remote as to be, in this light, wholly indif- ferent to me. What is beneficial to fociety or to the perfon himlelf mult ftill be pfeferred. And every quality or a6lion, of every human be- ing, mud, by this means, be ranked under fome clafs or denomination, exprelTive of general cen- fure or applaufe.
What more, therefore, can we afk to diftinguifli the fentiments, dependant on humanity, from thofe connefted with any other paffion, or to fa- tisfy us, why the former are the origin of mo- rals, not the latter? Whatever condud: gains any approbation; by touching my humanity, procures alfo the applaufe of ail mankind, by affecfling the fame principle in them : But what ferves my avarice or ambition pleafes thefe pafTions in me alone, and aftecls not the avarice and ambition of the reft of mankind. There is no circum- ftance of conduct in any mian, provided it have a beneficial tendency, that is not agreeable to my humanity, however remote the perfon : But eve- ry man, fo far removed as neither to crofs nor ferve my avarice nor ambition, is regarded as wholly indifferent by thofe pallions. The dif- tindion, therefore, between thefe fpecies of fen- timent being fo great and evident, language muft foon be moulded upon it, and muft in- vent a peculiar fet of terms,, in order to exprefs thofe univerfal fentiments of cenfure or appro- bation, which arife from humanity, or from views of general ufefulnefs and its contrary. Virtue and Vice become then known : Morals are re- cognized :
326 S E C T -I O N IX.
cognized : Certain general ideas are framed of huf man condu6t and behaviour : Such meafures are expefted from men, in fuch fituations : This ac- tion is determined to be conformable to our ab- ftrad rule; that other, contrary. And by fucix univerfal principles are the particular fenti- ments of felf-love frequently controuled and li- , mited *.
From inftanccs of popular tumults, feditions, fadlions, panics, and of all palTions, which are fhared with a multitude; we may learn the in- fluence of fociety, in exciting and fupporting any emotion ; while the moil ungovernable dif- orders are raifed, we find, by that means, from the flightefl and m*oll frivolous occafions. Solon was no very cruel, though, . perhaps, an unjuft legiilator, who punifhed neuters in civil wars ; and few, I believe, would, in fuch cafes, incur the penalty, were their affeflion and difcourfe allowed fufficient to ablblve them. No felfifhnefs, and fcarce any philofophy, have there force fuf- ficient to fupport a total coolncfs and indiffer- ence ; and he mull be more or lefs than man, who kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that moral fentiments are found of fuch influence in life j though fpringing from prin- ciples, which may appear, at firft fight, fomewhat fmall and delicate? But thefe principles, we mud remark, are fecial and univerfal : They form, in a manner, the farty of hinnan-kind againll vice or diforder, its connnon cnemv : And as the be- nevolent concern for others is diffufed, in a great- er or lefs degree, over all men, and is the fame in all, it occurs more frequently in difcourfe, is cherilLed by fociety and converlation, and the blame and approbation, confequent on it, are thereby rouzed from that lethargy, into which they are probably lulled, in folitary and uncul- tivated • See N O T E [NN],
Conclusion. 327
tivated nature. Other pafTions, though perhaps originally Ilronger, yet being fclfilh and private, are often overpowered by its force, and yield the dominion of our breall to thofc focial and public principles.
Another fpring of (;ur conftitution, that brings a great addition of force to moral fentiment, is, the love of fame ; v^^hich rules, with fuch un- controlled authority, in all generous minds, and is often the grand objedt of all their defigns and undertakings. By our continual and earneft pur- fuit of a chara(fter, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and confider how they ap- pear in the eyes of thofe who approach and re- gard us. This coniianc habit of furveying our- felves, as it were, in refle6tion, keeps alive all the fentiments of right an,d wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for them- felves as well as others; which is the fureft guar- dian of every virtue. Their animal conveniencies and pleafures fink gradually in their value, while every inward beauty and mo al grace is ftudiouf- \y acquired, and the mind is accompliflied in every perfecStion, which can adorn or embellilh a rational creature.
Here is the molt perfect morality with which v/e are acquainted : Here is diiplayed the force of many fympathies. Our moral fentimeac is itfelf a feeling chiefly of that nature: And our regard to a charadler with others feems to arife only from a care of preferving a chara6tcr with ourfelves ; and in order to attain this end, we find it neceflary to prop our tottering judgment on the correfpondent approbation of mankind.
But, that we may accommodate matters, and re- move, if poflible, every difficulty, let us allow all thefe reafonings to be falfe. Let us allow, that, when we refoive the plcalure, which arifes from
views
328 S E C T I O N IX.
views of utility, into the fentiments of humanity and lympathy, we have embraced a wrong hypothefis. Let us confefs it necefiary to find fome other ex- plication of that applaufe, which is paid to objefts, whether inanimate, animate, or rational, if they have a tendency to promote the welfare and ad- vantage of mankind. However difficult it be to conceive, that an objedt is approved of on ac- count of its tendency to a certain end, while the end itfelf is totally indifferent ; let us fwallow this abfurdity, and confider what are the confe- quences.
The preceding delineation or definition of Per- fonal Merit muil ftill retain its. evidence and au- thority: It mufl ftill be allowed, that every quali- ty of the mind, which is iijcful or agreeable to the perfcn himjelf ox to others^ communicates a pleafurc to the fpectator, engages his eiteem, and is ad- mitted under the honourable denomination of vir- tue or merit. Are not juftice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chaftity, efleemed folely on account of their tendency to promote the good of fociety ? Is not that tendency infeparable from hu- manity, benevolence, lenity, generofity, gratitude, moderation, tendernefs, friendlhip, and all the other focial virtues? Can it pollibly be doubted, that induftry, difcretion, frugality, fecrecy, order, perfeverance, forethought, judgment, and this whole ciafs of virtues and accomplifhments, of which many pages would not contain the cata- logue} can it be doubted, I fay, that the tenden- cy of thefe qualities to promote the intereft and happinefs of their poiletlbr, is the icle foundation of their merit ? Who can difpute that a mind, which fiipports a perpetual ferenity and chearfulnefs, a no- ble dignity and fpirit, a tender affedtion and good- will to all around i as it has more enjoyment with- in itfelf, is alfo a more animating and rejoicing fpc<5lacic, tliaii if dejeded with melancholy, tor- mented
Conclusion. 329
merited with anxiety, irritated with rage, or funk into the mod abjeft bafenefs and degeneracy ? And as to the qualities, immediately agreeable to others, they fpeak fufficiently for themfelves ; and he muft be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or in his fituation and company, who has never per- ceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affa- bility, of a delicate modefly or decent genteelnefs of addrefs and manner.
I am fenfible, that nothing can be more unphi- lofophical than to be pofitive or dogmatical on any fubjefb ; and that, even if excejfive fcepticifm could be maintained, it would not be more deftrudtive to all juft reafoning and enquiry. I am convinced, that, where men are the mofl fure and arrogant, they are commonly the moft miftaken, and have there given reins to paflion, without that proper deliberation and fufpenfe, which can alone fecure the grofleft abfurdities. Yet, I muft confefs, that this enumeration puts the matter in fo itrong a light, that I cannot, at ^refent^ be more aiTured of any truth, which I learn from reafoning and argument, than that perfonal merit confifts entirely in the ufefulnefs or agreeablenefs of qualities to the per- fon himfelf poffefTed of them, or to others, who have any intercourfe with him. But when I refiedl, that, though the bulk and figure of the earth have been meafured, and delineated, though the moti- ons of the tides have been accounted for, the order and ceconomy of the heavenly bodies fubjedred to their proper laws, and Infinite itfelf reduced to calculation; yet men ftill. difpute concerning the foundation of their moral duties : "When 1 refledt on this, 1 fay, I fall back into diffidence and fcep- ticifm, and fufpecSt, that an hypoihefis, fo obvious, had it been a true one, v/ould, long ere now, have been received by the unanimous fuffrage and con- fent of mankind.
PART
330 SECTION iX.
PART II.
Having explained the moral approbation attend- ing merit or virtue, there remains nothing, but briefly to confider our interefted obligation to it, and to enquire, whether every man, who has any regard to his own happinefs and welfare, will not beft find his account in the pradtice of every moral duty. If this can be clearly afcertained from the foregoing theory, we fhall have the fatisfadlion to reflefl, that we have advanced principles, which not only, it is hoped, will (land the teft of reafon- ing and enquiry, but may contribute to the amend- ment of men's lives, and their improvement in morality and focial virtue. And though the phi- Jofophical truth of any propofition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interefts of fociety j yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he muft confefs, leads to a pradice dangerous and perni- cious. Why rake into thofe corners of nature, which fpread a nuifance all around ? Why dig up the peftilence from the pit, in which it is buried ? The ingenuity of your refearches may be admired; but your fyftems will be detefted : And mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to fink them, at leaft, in eternal filence and oblivion. Truths, which are pernicious to fociety, if any fach there be, will yield to errors, which are fa- lutary and advantageous.
But what philofophical truths can be more ad- vantageous to fociety, than thofe here delivered, which reprefent virtue in all her genuine and moft engaging charms, and make us approach her with cafe, familiarity, and afi^cdlion ? The difmal drefs falls off, with which many divines, and fome philo- fophers have covered her; and nothing appears but gentlenefs, humanity, beneficence, afiabiiity; nay,
even.
Conclusion. jji
even, at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaity. She talks not of ufelcfs aufterities and rigours, fuf- fcring and fclf-denial. She declares, tliat her fole purpofe is, to make her votaries and all mankind, during every inftant of their exiltence, if poHlble, cheerful and happy j nor does ilie ever willingly part with any pleafure but in hopes of ample com- penfation in Ibmc other period of their lives. The fole trouble, which fhe demands, is that of jult calculation, and a lleady preference of the greater happinefs. And if any auftere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleafure, fhe eithers rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers j or if Hie admit them in her train, they are ranked however, among the leaft favoured of her votaries.
And, indeed, to drop all figurative expreflion, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice, which we confefs full of aufterity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever ferve any ufeful purpofe, unlefs it can fhow, by a particular detail, that all the duties, which it re- commends, are allb the true intercft of each indi- vidual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing fyftem feems to be, that it furnifhes proper medi- ums for that purpofer'
That the virtues which are immediately ujefnl or agreeable to the perfon poffefTed of them, are defirable in a view to felf-intereft, it would furely be fuperfluous to prove. Moraliils, indeed, may fpare themfelves all the pains, which they often take in recommending thefe duties. To what purpofe coiled arguments, to evince, that tempe- rance is advantageous, and the exceffes of pleafure hurtful ? When it appears, that thefe exceffes are denominated fuch, becaufe they are hurtful ; and that, if the unlimited ufe of Itrong liquors, for in- fbance, no more impaired health or the faculties of mind and body than the ufe of air or water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.
It
332 SECTION IX.
It feems equally fuperfluous to prove, that the companionable virtues of good manners and wit, de- cency and genteelnefs, are more defirable than the contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without any other confideration, is a fufficient motive to make us wifh for the poffeffion of thefe accornplilhments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular. All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverfe and unpliable dif- pofition. Would you have your company coveted, admired, followed; rather than hated, defpifed, avoided? Can any one ferioufly deliberate in the •cafe ? As no enjoyment is fincere, without fome re- ference to company and fociety ; fo no fociety can be agreeable, or even tolerable, where a man feels his prefence unwelcome, and difcovers all around him fymptoms of difguft and averfion.
But why, in the greater fociety or confederacy of mankind, ihould not the cafe be the fame as in particular clubs and companies ? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, ge- nerofity, beneficence, are defirable with a view to happinefs and felf-intereft, than the limited endow- ments of ingenuity and politenefs? Are we appre- henfive, left thofe focial affefbions interfere, in a greater and more immediate degree than any other purfuits, with private utility, and cannot be grati- fied, without fome important facrifice of honour and advantage ? If fo, we are but ill inftrufted in the nature of the human pafTions, and are more in- fiuenced by verbal diftindions than by real diffe- rences.
Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be fuppo- fed between the Jclfijh and Jocial fentimcnts or dif- pofitions, they are really no more oppofite than fel- fiiK and ambitious, felfifh and vain. It is requifite, that there be an original propenfity of fome kind, in order to be a bafis to felf-love, by giving a re- lifh to the objedis of its purfuit; and none more fit
fof
Conclusion. 333
for this piirpofe than benevolence or humanity. The goods of fortune are fpent in one gratification or another: The mifer, who accumulates his an- nual incoine, and lends it out at interell, has real- ly fpent it in the gratification of his avarice. And it would be difficult to fliow, why a man is more a lofer by a generous aflion, than by any other me- thod of expence; fince the utmoft which he can at- tain, by the moil elaborate felfiHinefs, is the indul- gence of fomc afTeclion.
Now if life, without palTion, mufb be altogether infipid and tirefome; let a man fuppofe that he has full power of modelling his own difpofition, and let him deliberate what appetite or defire he would choofc for the foundation of his happinefs and en- joyment. Every afFedon, he would obferve, when gratified by fuccefs, gives a fatisfaftion proportion- ed to its force and violence : but befides this ad- vantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and friendihip, humanity and kind- nefs, is fweet, fmooth, tender, and agreeable, in- dependent of all fortune and accidents. Thefe vir- tues are befides attended with a pleafing confciouf- nefs or remembrance., and keep us in humour with ourfelves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflexion of having done our part to- wards mankind and fociety. And though all men fhow a jealoufy of our fuccefs in the purfuits of avarice and ambition ; yet are we almoft fure or their good-will and good-wifhes, fo long as we perfevere in the paths of virtue, and employ our- felves in the execution of generous plans and pur- pofes. What other pallion is tlierc where we fhail fine fo many advantages unitedj an agreeable fen- timent, a pleafing confcioufnefs, a good reputati- on ? But of thefe truths, we may obferve, men are, of themfelves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty to fociety, becaufe they would not wifh to be generous, friendly, and
humane;
334 .SECTION IX.
humane J but becaufe they do not feel themfelves fuch.
Treating vice with the greateft candour, and making it all pofTible conceffions, we muil ac- knowledge, that there is not, in any inftance, the fmalleft pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to felf-intereft; except, per- haps, in the cafe of juflice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often feem to be a lofer by his integrity. And though it is al- lowed, that, without a regard to property, no fo- ciety could fubfift; yet according to the imperfedt way in which human affairs are condud^ed, a fenfible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an a<5t of iniquity or infidelity will make a confide- rable addition to his fortune, without caufing any confiderable breach in the focial union and confederacy. That honejly is the heft 'policy^ may be a good general rule; but is liable to many exceptions : And he, it may, perhaps, be thought, conducts himfclfwith mofl wifdom, who obferves the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.
I muft confefs, that, if a man think, that this reafoning much requires an anfwer, it will be little difficult to find any, which will to him appear fa- tisfad:ory and convincing. If his heart rebel not againft fuch pernicious maxims, if he feel no re- luctance to the thoughts of villany or bafenefs, he has indeed loft a confiderable motive to virtue; and we may expert that his practice will be an- Iwcrable to his fpeculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too itrong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, confcioufnefs of integrity, a fatisfadlory re- view of our own condu6t; thefe are circumftances very requifite to hapj)inefs, and will be chcrifhed
and
Conclusion. ;^t^^
and cultivated by every honeft man, who feels the importance of them.
Such a one has, befides, the frequent fatisfacflion of feeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpofe to cheat with moderation and fecrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the fnare ; whence they can ne- ver extricate themfelves, without a total lofs of re- putation, and the forfeiture of all future trull and confidence with mankind.
But were they ever fo fecret and fuccefsful, the Iioneft man, if he has any tin6ture of philofophy, or even common obfervation and refledion, will difcover that they themfelves are, in the end, the greateft dupes, and have facrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a chara6ler, with themfelves at leafl:, for the acquifition of worthlefs toys and gewgaws. How little is requifite to fupply the neceJIities of na- ture ? And in a view to ■plcajiire^ what comparifon be- tween the unboughtfatisfaftion of converfation,focie- ty, ftudy, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful refledtion on one's own condudl : What comparifon, I fay, between thefe, and the feverifh, empty amufements of luxury and expence? Thcfe natural pleafures, indeed, are really without price; both becaufe they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their en- joyment.
SECTION
( 337 )
APPENDIX I.
Concerning Moral Sentiment.
AF the foregoing hypothefis be received, it will now be eafy for us to determine the queftion firfl; ftarted *, concerning the general principles of mo- rals ; and though we poit])oned the decifion of that queftion, left it ftiould then involve us in intri- cate fpeculations, which are unfit for moral dif- courfes, we may refume it at prefent, and examine how far either reqfon or Jentimcnt enters into all de- cifions of praife or cenfure.
One principal foundation of moral praife being fuppofed to lie in the ufefulnefs of any quality or action ; it is evident, that reajon muft enter for a confiderable fhare in all decifions of this kind; fince nothing but that faculty can inftru6t us in the tendency of qualities and a6lions, and point out their beneficial confequences to fociety and to their poffeflbr. In many cafes, this is an affair liable to great controverfy : Doubts may arife ; oppofite interefts may occur; and a preference muft be given to one fide, from very nice views, and a fmall overbalance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in queftions with regard tojuftice; as is, indeed, natural to fuppofe, from that fpecies of utility, which attends this virtue f. Were every fingle inftance of juftice, like that of benevolence, ufeful to fociety i this would be a more fimple
Vol. II. Z ftate
• Se.^. I. t See Appendix III.
33S APPENDIX I.
flate of the cafe, and feldom liable to great con- trovcrfy. But as fingle inllances of jiiftice are of- ten pernicious in their firit and immediate tenden- cy, and as the advantage to fociety refults only from the obfervance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of feveral per- fons in the fame equitable condutlj the cafe here becomes more intricate and involved. The va- rious circumftances of fociety; the various confe- quences of any pra<flice j the various interefts, which may be propofed : Thefe, on many occafi- ons, are doubtful, and fubjedt to great difcufli- on and enquiry. The obje<5l: of municipal laws is to fix all the queilions with regard to juftice : The debates of civilians ; the reflexions of politi- cians; the precedents ofhiflory and public records, are all dire(51:ed to the fame purpofe. And a very accurate reafon or judgment is often requifite, to give the true determination, amidft fuch intricate doubts arifing from obfcure or oppofite utili- ties.
But though reafon, when fully affifled and im- proved, be fufficient to inflrud; us in the pernici- ous or ufcful tendency of qualities and actions ; it is not alone fufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we ihould feel the fame indifference towards the means. It is requifite ^.Jentiment fliould here difplay itfelf, in order to give a preference to the ufeful above the pernicious tendencies. This fen- ment can be no other than a feeling for the hap- pinefs of mankind, and a refentment of their mife- ry ; lince thefe are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here, therefore, reajcn inllrudls us in the feveral tenden- cifs of actions, and humanity makes a diftindlion in favour of thofe which are ufcful and beneficial.
This
Concerning Moral Sentiment. 339
This partition between the faculties of under- ftanding and fentiment, in all moral decifions, Teems clear from the preceding hypothefis. But I fnall fuppofe that hypothefis falfe : It will then be re- quifiteto look out for fome other theory, that may be fatisfadiory ; and I dare venture to affirm, that none fuch will ever be found, fo long as we fuppofe realbn to be the fole fource of morals. To prove this, it will be proper to weigh the five following confiderations.
I. It is eafy for a falfe hypothefis to maintain fome appearance of truth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes ufe of undefined terms, and em- ploys comparifons, inftead of inftances. This is particulaily remarkable in that phwofophy, which afcribes the difcernment of all moral diftinctions to reafon alone, without the concurrence of fentiment. It is impolnble that, in any particular inilance, this hypothefis can fo much as be rendered intelli- gible; whatever fpecious figure it may make in ge- neral declamations and difcourfts. Examine the crime of ingratitude, for infiance ; which has place, wherever we obferve good -will, cxprelfed and known, together with good-olfices performed, on the one fide, and a refurn of ill-will or indiffe- rence, with ill-olfices or neglect on the other : Anatomize all thefe circumflances, and examine, by your reafon alone, in what confirts the demerit or blame : You never will come to any ifTue or conclufion.
Reafon judges either of matter of fciEl or of relations. Enquire then, firfi, where is that mat- ter of fatSl:, which we here call crime; point it out j determine the time of its exiftence ; defcribe its eiTence or nature ; explain the fenfc or faculty, to which it difcovers itfelf- It refiaes in the mind of the perfon, who is ungratefu]. He mufl, there- fore, feel iL, and be confcious of it. But nothing
Z 2 is
340 APPENDIX I.
is there, except the paffion of ill-will or abfolute indifference. You cannot fay, thatthefe, ofthem- felves, always, and in all circiimftances are crimes. No: They are only crimes, when direfled towards perfons, who have before exprelTed and difplayed good-will towards us. Confequently, we may in- fer, that the crime of ingratitude is not any parti- cular individual /(3^; but arifes from a complica- tion of circumflances, which, being prefented to the fpe6lator, excites the fenlimeni of blame, by the particular ftrutlure and fabric of his mind.
This reprefentation, you fay, is falfe. Crime, indeed, confifc not in a particular /^^?, of whofe reality we are alTured by reajon: But it confiils in certain moral relations^ difcovered by reafon, in the fam.e manner as we difcover, by reafon, the truths of geometry or algebra. But what are the relations, I aflc, of which you here talk? In the cafe ftated above, I fee firft good-will and good- oifices in one perfon ; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between thefe, there is the relation of contrariety. Does the crime confift in that re- lanon ? But fuppofe a perfon bore me ill-will or did me ill-ofnces -, and I, in return were indifferent towards hiin, or did him good-ofiices : Here is f.Jie fame rclat:ic;n of contrariety j and yet my con- ilucl is often highly laudable. Twift and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never reft the morality on relation ; but muft have recouri'c to the decifions of fentiment.
"When it is affirmed, that two and three are cqnal to the half of ten j this relation of equality, I iindcrftand jjerfe6tly. I conceive, that if ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many rnits as the other ; and if any of thefe parts be compared to two added to three, it will contain as mi.ny units as that compound number. But when you draw thence a comparifon to moral relations, I own that 1 am altos;ether at a lols to underfland
you.
Concerning Moral Sentiment. 341
you. A moral action, a crime, fuch as ingratitude, is a complicated objecl. Does the mora'ity confift in the relation of its parts to each other. How ? After what manner ? Specify the relation : Be more particular and explicit in your propofitions ; and you will eafily fee their falfehood.
No, fay you, the morality confiRs in the relation of aftions to the rule of right ; and they are de- nominated good or ill, according as they agree or difagree with it. Wh.it then is this rule of right ? In what does it confill ? How is it determined ? By reafon, you fiiy, which examines the moral re- lations of actions. So that moral relations are de- termined by the comparifon of adions to a rule. And that rule is determined by confidering the moral relations of objefts. Is not this fine reafon-
All this is metaphyfics, you cry : That is e- nough : There needs nothing more to give a ftrong prefumption of falfehood. Yes, reply I : Here are metaphyfics furely : But they are all on your fide, who advance an abflrufe hypothefis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate with any particular inftance or illuftration. The hypothefis which we embrace is plain. It main- tains, that morality is determined by fentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental acl'ion or quality gives to a Jpeofator the pleafmg fentiment of approbation ; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fafl, to wit, what actions have this influence: We confider all the circumflances, in which thefe aflions agree : And thence endeavour to extraft fome general ob- fervations with regard to thefe fentiments. If you call this metaphyfics, and find any thing abftrufe here, you need only conclude, that your turn of mind is not fuitcd to the moral fciences.
II. When a man, at any time, deliberates con- cerning his own condu6t (as, whether he had bet-
342 A P P E N D I X I.
ter, in a particular emergence, ailill a brother or a benefadtor), he mud confiacr thefe fepar-^te relati- ons, with all the circiimftances and fiiuations of the perfons, in order to deccrfniiie the fup'srior du- ty and obligation : And in order to determine the proportion of lines in any triangle, it is necefiary to examine the nature of that figure, and the rela- tions which its feveral parts bear to eat h other. But notwithftanding this appearing fimilarity in the two cafes, there is, at bottom, an extreme diffe- rence between them. A fpcculative reafoner con- cerning triangles or circles confiders the Tev-e'ral known and given relations of the parts of thefe figures ; and thence infers fome unknown relati- on, which is dependent on the former. Bu in inoral deliberations, we mufb be acquainted, be- fore-hand, with all the objects, and all their rela- tions to each other j and from a comparifon of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. No new faft to be afcertained : No new relation to bedif- covered. All the circumftances of the cafe are fuppofed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any fentence of blame or approbation. If any material circumftance be yet unknown or doubtful, we mufl firft employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to alTure us of it^ and muft fufpend for a time all moral decifion or fentiment. While we are ie-no- rant, whether a man were ae2;reflbr or not, how can we determine whether the perfon who killed him, be criminal or innocent ? But after every circumftance, every relation is known, the under- llandipg has no farther room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itfelf. The ap- probation or blame, which then enfues, cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a fptculative propofition or affirmation, but an aftive feeling or fentiment. In the difquifiions of the underftanding, from known circumftances and relations, \ye infer fome new and unknown. In
I moral
CohfCERM.vG Moral Sentiment. 343
moral dccifions, all the circumftances and relations mull be previoiiQy known j and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels feme new iin- prellion of afFcdlion or difgufl, efteem or contempt, approbation or blame.
Hence the great difference between a m.iftake of fa^ and one of right \ and hence the reafon why the one is commonly criminal and not the other. When CEdipus killed Laius, he was ignor;int of the relation, and from circumftances, innocent and involuntary, formed erroneous opinions concerning the aflion which he committed. But when Nero killed Agrippina, all the relations between himfelf and the perfon, and all the circumftances of the fa<5l, were prcvioufly known to him : But the mo- tive of revenge, or fear, or intereft, prevailed in his favage heart over the fentiments of duty and humanity. And when we exprefs that deteftation againft him, to which he, himfelf, in a little time, became infenfible j it is not, that we fee any rela- tions, of which he was ignorant j but that, from the reditude of our difpofition, we feel fentiments, againft which he was hardened, from flattery and a long perfeverance in the moll enormous crimes. In thefe fentiments, then, not in a difcovery of re-v lations of any kind, do all moral determinations confift. Before we can pretend to form any deci- fion of this kind, every thing muft be known and afcertained on the fide of the objector adion. No- thing remains but to feel, on our part, fome fenti- ment of blame or approbation ; whence we pro- nounce the action criminal or virtuous.
III. This doctrine will become ftill more evi- dent, if we compare moral beauty with natural, to which, in many particulars, it bears fo near a re- femblance. It is on the proportion, relation, and pofition of parts, that all natural beauty depends j but it would be abfurd thence to infer, that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geome- trical
J44 APPENDIX I.
trical problems, confifts wholly in the perception of relations, and was performed entirely by the underftanding or intelledual faculties. In all the fciences, our mind, from the known relations, in- veftigates the unknown : But in all decifions of tafte or external beauty, all the relations are before-hand obvious to the eye ; and we thence proceed to feel a fentiment of complacency or difguft, according to the nature of the objeft, and difpofition of our or- gans.
Euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the circle ; but has not, in any propofition, faid a word of its beauty The reafon is evident. The beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, whofe parts are equally diftant from a common center. It is only the efFecft, which that figure produces upon the rriind, whofe peculiar fa- bric or ftructure renders it fufceptible of furh fen- timents. In vain would you look for it in the cir- cle, or feek it, either by your fenfes or by mathe- matical reafonings, in all the properties of that figure.
Attend to Palladio and Perrault, while they ex- plain all the parts and properties of a pillar i They talk of the cornice and frieze and bafe and entabla- ture and fhaft and architrave; and give the dcfcrip- tion and pofition of each of thefe members. But fhould you aflc the defcription and pofition of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, but refults from the whole, when that complicated figure is prcfcntcd to an intelligent m.ind, fufcepti- ble to thofe finer fenfations. 'Till fuch a fpedta- tor appear, there is nothing but a figure of fuch particular dimenfions and proportions: From his fentiments alone arife its elegance and beauty.
Again ; attend to Cicero, while he paints the crimes of a Verrcs or a Catiline -, you mufl acknow- ledge that the moral turpitude refults, in the fame
manner.
Concerning Moral Sentiment. 345
manner, from the contemplation of the whole, ■when prefented to a being, whole organs have fucll a particular itrufture and formation. The orator may paint rage, infolcnce, barbarity on the one fide: Meeknels, fuffering, forrow, innocence oit the other: But if you feel no indignation or com- panion aril'e in you from this complication of cir- cumliances, you would in vain afk him. in what confills the crime or villany, which he fo vehe- mently exclaims againft : At what time, or on what fubjecfV it firft began to exift: And what has a few months afterwards become of it, when every dif- pofition and thought of all the acftors is totally al- tered, or annihilated. No fatisfadlory anfwer can be given to any of thefe queftions, upon the ab- ftrad: hypothecs of morals -, and we muft at laft acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is no particular fadl or relation, which can be the objed of the underftanding : But arifes entirely from the fentiment of difapprobation, which, by the ftruc- ture of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the apprehenfion of barbarity or treachery.
JV. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the fame relations, which we obferve in moral agents : though the former can never be the ob- je6l of love or hatred, nor are confequently fuf- ceptible of merit or iniquity. A young tree, which over-tops and deftroys its parentj Hands in all the fame relations with Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and if morality confiiled merely in re- lations, would, no doubt, be equally criminal.
V. It appears evident, that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any cafe, be account- ed for by rea/o?iy but recommend themfelves en- tirely to the lentiments and afFed:ions of mankind, without any dependance on the intelled:ual facul- ties. Afl<: a man, zvhy be iijes exercijes ; he will an- fwer, becaiife he defires to keep his health. If you then enquire, i^hy he defires health, he will readily
reply.
346 APPENDIX I.
reply, hecaiije ficknefs is painful. If you pufh your enquiries farther, and defire a reafon, why he hates pairii it is impofTible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other objeft.
Perhaps, to your fecond quefcion, why he defires healthy he may alfo reply, that // is necejfary for the exercije of his calling. If you afk, why he is anxious on that heady he will anfwer, hecaiife he defires to get money, if you demand Why ? It is the inflrument of p leaf are J fays he. And beyond this it is an ab- furdity to afk for a reafon. It is impoflible there can be a progrefs in infinitum j and that one thing can always be a reafon, why another is defired. Something muft be defirable on its own account, and becaufe of its immediate accord or agreement with human fentiment and affe6lion.
Now as virtue is an end, and is defirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely, for the immediate fatisfaftion which it conveys ; it is re- quifite that there fhould be fome fentiment, which it touches ; fome internal tafte or feeling, or what- ever you pleafe to call it, which diftinguifhes mor- al good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.
Thus thediftinfl boundaries and offices g( reafon and of tajle are eafily afcertained. The former con- veys the knowledge of truth and falfehood : The latter gives the fentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one difcovers objects, as they really ftand in nature, without addition or diminution : The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or itaining all natural objedls with the colours, borrowed from internal fentiment, raifes, in a manner, a new creation. Reafon, being cool and difengaged, is no motive to adlion, and diredls only the impulfe received from appetite or inclina- tion, by fliowing us the means of attaining happi- nefs or avoiding mifery : Tafte, as it gives plea- fur e
Concerning Moral Sentiment. 347
fure or pain, and thereby conn:irutes happinefs or niirery, becomes a motive to adlion, and is the firit fpring or impulfe to defire and volition. From circumflances and relations, known or fuppofcd, the former leads us to the difcovery of the conceal- ed and unknown : After all circumftances and rela- tions are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new fentiment of blame or ap- probation. The ftandard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The Itan- dard of the other, arifing from the internal frame and conftitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will, which bellowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the feveral claflcs and orders of exiftence.
A P'
( 349 )
APPENDIX 11.
Of Self-love.
T.
HERE is a principle, fuppofed to prevail among many, which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral fentim.enti and as it can proceed from nothing but the moft depraved difpofition, fo in its turn it tends ftill further to encourage thac depravity. This principle is, that all benevolence is mere hypocrify, friendfhip a cheat, public fpirit' a farce, fidelity a fnare to procure truft and confidence -, and that, while all of us, at bot- tom, purfue only our private intereft, we wear thefe fair difguifes, in order to put others off their guard, and expofe them the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one mull: be pofTeffed of who profeflTes fuch principles, and who feels no internal fentiment that belies fo pernicious a theory, it is eafy to imagine : And alfo, what degree of affe6tion and benevolence he can bear to a fpecies, whom he reprefents under fuch odious colours, and fuppofes fo little fufceptible of gra- titude or any return of afi^edion. Or if we fhould not afcribe thefe principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we muft, at lealt, account for them from the moft carelefs and precipitate examination. Su- perficial reafoners, indeed, obferving many falfe pretences among mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very ftrong reftraint in their own difpofition, might draw a general and a hafty conclufion, that
all
3S0
APPENDIX II.
all is* equally corrupted, and that inen, different from all other animals, and indeed horn all other fpecies of exiftence, admit of no degree of good or bad, but are, in every inftance, the fame crea- tures under different difguifes and appearances.
There is another principle, fomewhat refembling the former j which has been much infilled on by philofophers, and has been the foundation of many a fyftem; that, whatever affeftion one may feel, or imagine feels for others, no paffion is, or can be difinterefted; that the mod dangerous friendfhip, however fincere, is a modification of felf-love; and that, even unknown to ourfelves, we feek only our own gratification, while we appear the moft deep- ly engaged in fchhmes for the liberty and happi- nefs of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of refileftion, by an enthufiafm of paflion, we feem to take part in the interefts of others, and imagine ourfelves divefted of all felfifh confiderations : But, at bottom, the moft generous patriot and moft niggardly mifer, the braveft hero and moft abjeft coward, have, in every adlion, an equal regard to their own happinefs and welfare.
Whoever concludes from the feeming tenden- cy of this opinion, that thofe, who make profeffion of it, cannot poffibly feel the true fentiments of be- nevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himfelf, in practice, very much mif- taken. Probity and honour were no ftrangers to Epicurus and his (eO:. Atticus and Horace feem to have enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by re- flexion, as generous and friendly difpofitions as any difciple of the aufterer fchools. And among the modern, Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the felfifh fyftem of morals, lived irreproachable lives i though the former lay not under any re- ftraintof religion, which might fupply the defects of his philofophy.
An Epicurean or a Hobbift readily allows, that
there
OFSelf-Love. 351
there is fuch a thing as friendfhip in the world, without hypocrify or difguifej though he may at- tempt, by a philofophical chymiftry, to refolve the elements of this pafTion, if I may fpeak, into thofe of another, and explain every afFedion to be felf- love, twilled and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the fame turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the fame direQion to the ori- ginal paflion ; this is fufficient, even according to the felfifli fyftem, to make the wideft difference in human charatlers, and denominate one man virtu- ous and humane, another vicious and meanly inte- refled. I efteem the man, whofe felf-love, by whatever means, is fo direfted as to give him a concern for others, and render him ferviceable to fociety : As I hate or defpife him, who has no re- gard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you fuggeft, that thefe characters, though feemingly oppofite, are, at bottom, the fame, and that a very inconfide- rable turn of thought forms the v/hole difference between them. Each chara6ter, notwithftanding thefe inconfiderable differences, appears to me, in praftice, pretty durable and untranfmutable. And I find not in this more than in other fubjefts, that the natural fentiments, arifing from the general ap- pearances of things, are eafily deftroyed by fubtile refleclions concerning the minute origin of thefe appearances. Does not the lively, chearful colour of a countenance infpire me with complacency and pleafure; even though I learn from philofophy, that all difference of complexion arifes from the moll minute differences of thicknefs, in the moll minute parts of the fkinj by means of which a fu- perficies is qualified to refle6l one of the original colours of light, and abforb the others ?
But though the queflion, concerning the uni- verfal or partial felfifhnefs of man be not fo ma- terial,
3s^ A P P E N D I X II.
terial, as is ufually imagined, to morality and pra6lice, it is certainly of confequence in the fpe- culative fcience of human nature, and is a pro- per objecSl of curiofity and enquiry. It may not, therefore be unfuitable in this place, to beftow a few refteftions upon it*.
The moll obvious objedlion to the felfifh hy- pothefis, is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our mod unprejudiced notions, there is required the higheft ftretch of philolbphy to eftablilh fo extraordinary a paradox. To the moft carelefs obferver, there appear to be fuch difpofitions as benevolence and generofity; fuch -afteftions as love, friendfhip, companion, grati- tude. Thefe fentiments have their caufes, effects, objedts, and operations, marked by common lan- guage and obfervation, and plainly diftinguifhed from thofe of the felfifli paflions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it muft be admitted; till fome hypothefis be difcovered, which, by penetrating deper into human nature, may prove the former affeftions to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitlefs, and feem to have proceeded entirely, from the love oi fim- flicityy which has been the fource of much falfe reafoning in philofophy. I fhall not here enter into any detail on the prefent fubject. Many able philofophers have fliown the infuriiciency of thefe fyftems. And I fhall take for granted what, I believe, the fmalleft refle6tion will make evi- dent to every impartial enquirer.
But the nature of the fubjedt furnifhes the ftrongeft prefumption, that no better fyftem will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to ac- count for the origin of the benevolent from the fclfifli affedtions, and reduce all the various emo- tions
• See NOTE [OO].
OfSELF-LoVE. J53
tions of the human mind to a perfedV fimplici- ty. The cafe is not the fame in this fjx^cies of philofophy as in phyfics. Many an hypothefis in nature, contrary to firfl appearances; hEs been fo'Jnd, on more accurate fcrutiny, folid and fa- tisfadory. Inftances of this kind are lb frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty philofopher*, has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way, in which any phrenomenon may be produc- ed, that there is a general prefumption for its arifing from the caufes, which are the leaft ob- vious and familiar. But the prefumption always lies on the other fide, in all enquiries concern- ing the origin of our paffions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The fimpleft and mod obvious caufe, which can there be af- figned for any phasnomenon, is probably the true one. When a philofopher, in the explication of his fyftem, is obliged to have recourfe to fome very intricate and refined refleftions, and to fup- pofe them eflential to the produ6lon of any paf- fion or emotion, we have reafon to be extreme- ly on o.ir guard againft fo fallacious an hypo- thefis. I'he affections are not fufceptible of any imprcfTion from the refinements of reafon or ima- gination j and it is always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, necefi^arily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, deftroys all a6tivity in the former. Our predominant mo- tive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourfelves, when it is mingled and confound- ed with other motives, which the mind, from va- nity or felf-conceit, is defirous of fuppofing more prevalent: But there is no inftance, that a con- cealment of this nature has ever arifen from the abftrufenefs and intricacy of the motive. A man, that has loft a friend and patron, may flatter him- felf, that ail his grief arifes from generous fenti- VoL. II. A a mcnts,
* Mof. FONTENELIE.
354 A P P E N D 1 X IL
ments, without any mixture of narrow or inte- refted confiderations : But a man, that grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and proteftionj how can we fuppofe, that his paf- fionate tendernefs arifes from fome metaphyfical regards to felf-intereft, which has no foundation or reality ? We may as well imagine, that minute wheels and fprings, like thofe of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the origin of paflion from fuch abftrufe refledtions.
Animals are found fufceptible of kindnefs, both to their own fpecies and to ours; nor is there, in this cafe, the leail fufpicion of difguife or ar- tifice. Shall we account for all their fentiments, too, from refined deductions of felf-intereft ? Or if we admit a difinterefted benevolence in the inferior fpecies, by what rule of analogy can we refufe it in the fuperior ?
Love between the fexes begets a complacency and good-will, very diftinft from the gratifica- tion of appetite. Tendernefs to their offspring, in all fenfible beings, is commonly able alone to counter-balance the ftrongeft motives of felf-love, and has no manner of dependance on that af- fedion. What intereft can a fond mother have in view, who lofes her health by affiduous atten- dance on her fick child, and afterwards langulfhes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the flavery of that attendance ?
Is gratitude no affedtion of the human breaft, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality ? Have we no fatisfaflion in one man's company above another's and no defire of the welfare of our friend, even though abfence or death fliould prevent us from all participation in it ? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and prefent, but our atfedtion and regard to him ?
Thefe and a thoufand other inftances arc marks
of
OFSelf-Love. 355
of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real intcreft binds us to the objeft. And how an imaginary inrereft, known and avowed for fuch, can be the origin of any paflion or emo- tion, feems difficult to explain. No fatisfaftory hypothefis of this kind has yet been difcovered j nor is there the fmalleft probability, that the future indiiftry of men will ever be attended with more favourable fuccefs.
But farther, if we confidcr rightly of the mat- ter, we fhall find, that the hypothefis, which al- lows of a difinterelled benevolence, diftindl from fclf-!ove, has really v[\ovt ftmplicity in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to refolve all friendfhip and hu- manity into this latter principle. There are bo- dily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which neceffarily precede all fenfual enjoy- ment, and carry us dire6tly to feek pofleflion of the objedl. Thus, hunger and thirft have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gra- tification of thefe primary appetites arifes a plea- fure, which may become the objed of another fpecies of defire or inclination, that is feconda- ry and intereiled. In the fame manner, there are mental pafllons, by which we are impelled immediately to feek particular objefts, fuch as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any re- gard to intereft; and when thefe objeds are at- tained, a pleafing enjoyment enfues, as the con- fequence of our indulged affections, . Nature muft, by the internal frame and conftitution of the mind, give an original propenfity to fame, ere we can reap any pleafure from that acquifition, or purfue it from motives offelf-love, and a de- fire of happincfs. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praife : If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment : If I be not an-
A a 2 gry.
356 APPENDIX II.
gry, the punifhment of an adverfary is totally in- different to me. In all thefe cafes, there is a palTion, v/hich points immediately to the object, and conftitutes it our good orhappinefsj as there are other fecondary paffions, which afterwards ariie, and piirfue it as a part of our happinefs, when once it is conft ><iteu fuch by our origi- nal affections. Were no appetite of any kind antecedent to felf-lovc, that propenfity could fcarcely ever exert itfelf; becaufe we fhould, in that cafe, have felt few and flender pains or pleafures, and have little mifery or happinefs to avoid or to purfiie.
Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewife by the cafe with benevolence and friendfhip, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a defire of ano- ther's happinefs or good, which, by means of that affetftion, becomes our own good, and is afterwards purfued, from the combined motives of benevolence and felf-enjoyment r Who fees not that vengeance, from the force alone of paffion, may be fo eagerly j^urfued, as to make us know- ingly negleft every confideration of eafe, or fafe- ty J and, like fome vindictive animals, infufe our very fouls into the w^ounds we give an enemy*? And what a malignant philofophy mud it be, that will not allow, to humanity and fiiendfnip, the fame privileges, which are undifputably granted ro the darker pafiions of enmity and refentment ? Such a philoiophy is more like a fatyr than a true delineation or defcription of human nature} and may be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad one for any ferious argument or reafoning.
APPENDIX
* Animcfque in vulnere ponur.t. ViRC.
Diini altc'ii noceat, lui negligens, fays Seneca of Atiger^ De Ira, I. i.
( 357 )
APPENDIX III.
Some farther Considerations with regard to Justice.
Ti
HE intention of this Appendix is to give feme more particular explication of the origin and na- ture of Juftice, and to mark fome differences bc' tween it and the other virtues.
The focial virtues of humanity and benevo- lence exert their influence immediately, by a di- red: tendency or inftinft, which chiefly keeps in view the fimple objedl, moving the affections, and comprehends not any fcheme or fyftem, nor the confequences refulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his child j tranfported by that natu- ral fympathy, which a(ftuates him, and which af- fords no leifure to reflect on the fentiments or conduft of the refl: of mankind in like circum- ftances. A generous man chearfully embraces an opportunity of ferving his friend ; becaufe he then feels himfelf under the dominion of the beneficent affe6tions, nor is he concerned whether any other perfon in the univerfe were ever before a<5luated by fuch noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their influence. In all thefe cafes, the fo- cial paflions have in view a fingle individual ob- je6t, and purfue the fafety or happinefs alone of
the
;558 APPENDIX III.
the perfon loved and efteemed. With this they are fatisfied : In this, they acquiefce. And as the good, refulting from their benign influence, is in itfelf compleat and entire, it alio excites the moral fentiment of approbation, without any re- flefbion on farther confequences, and without any more enlarged views of the concurrence or imi- tation of the other members of fociety. On the contrary, were the generous friend or difinterefted patriot to ftand alone in the pradtice of beneficence; this would rather inhance his value in our eyes, and join the praife of rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits.
The cafe is not the fame with the fecial virtues of juftice and fidelity. They are highly ufeful, or indeed abfolutely neceflfary to the well-being of mankind : But the benefit, refulting from them, is not the confequence of every individual fingle a6t; but arifes form the whole fcheme or fyftem, concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the fociety. General peace and order are the at- tendants of juftice or a general abftinence from the poflfeffions of others : But a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently, confidered in itfelf, be produdive of pernicious confequences. The refult of the indi- vidual a6l:s is here, in many inftances, directly op- pofite to that of the whole fyftem of aftions ; and the former may be extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the higheft degree, advantageous. Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man's hand, the inftrument of mifchief. The right of fucceffion may, in one inftance, be hurtful. Its benefit arifes only from the obfervance of the ge- neral rule; and it is fufficient, if compcnfation be thereby made for all the ills and inconvenien- cies, which flow from particular characters and fituations.
Cyrus,
Farther Confiderations with regard to Jujiice. 359
Cyrus, young and unexperienced, confidercd on- ly the individual cafe before him, and reflefled on a limited fitnefs and convenience, when he afflgned the long coat to the tall boy, and the Ihort coat to the other of fmaller fize. His go- vernor inftru<Sted him better; while he pointed out more enlarged views and confequences, and informed his pupil of the general, inflexible rules, neccffary to fupport general peace and order in fociety.
The happinefs and profperity of mankind, arif- ing from the focial virtue of benevolence and its fubdivifions, may be compared to a wall, built by many hands; which ftill rifes by each (lone, that is heaped upon it, and receives increafe propor- tional to the diligence and care of each workman. The fame happinefs, raifed by the focial virtue of juftice and its fubdivifions, may be compared to a building of a vault, where each individual ftone would, of itfelf, fall to the ground ; nor is the whole fabric fupported but by the mutual aflift- ftance and combination of its correfponding parts.
All the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil laws, are general, and regard alone fome elTential circumftances of the cafe, with- out taking into confideration the charadlers, fitua- tions, and connexions of the perfon concerned, or any particular confequences which may refult from the determination of thefe laws, in any particular cafe which offers. They deprive, without fcruple, a beneficent man of all its poflefTions, if acquired by miftake, without a good title j in order to be- ftow them on a fclfifh mifer, who has already heaped up immenfe ftores of fuperfluous riches. Public utility requires, that property fhould be regulated by general inflexible rules ] and though fuch rules are adopted as be(t ferve thie fame end of public utility, it is impofllble for them to pre- vent all particular hardfliips, or make beneficial
confe-
36o APPENDIX III.
confequences refult from every individual cafe. It is fufficient, if the whole plan or fcheme be necefiary to the fupport of civil fociety, and if the balance of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate much above that of evil. Even the general laws of the univerfe, though planned by infinite wif- dom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience, in every particular operation.
It has been afierted by fome, that juflice arifes from Human Conventions, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, confent, or combination of mankind. If by convention be here meant a pro- mije (which is the moft ufual fenfe of the word) nothing can be more abfurd than this pofition. The obfervance of promifes is itfelf one of the moft confiderable parts of jufticej and we arc not furely bound to keep our word, becaufe we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention be meant a {Qn(c of common intereft; which fenfe each man feels in his own breaft, which he re- marks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or fyftem of a<5lions, which tends to public utility ; it muft be owned, that, in this fenfe, juftice arifes from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed, evident) that the particular con- fequences of a particular aft of juftice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue, muft have an eye to the whole plan or fyftem, and muft expedl the concurrence of his fellows in the fame condudt and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the confequences of each aft of his own, his benevolence and humanitv, as well as his felf-love, might often prelcribe to him mea- fures of conduft very difterent from thofe, which are agreeable to the ftrift rules of right and juf- ftice.
Thus
Farther Confiderations with regard to Jujlice. 2^ i
Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by com- mon convention, for common intereft, without any promife or contracfb : Thus gold and fdver are made the mcafurcs of exchange; thus fpeech and words and language are fixed, by human conven- tion and ao;reement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more perfons, if all perform their part i but what lofcs all advantage, if only one per- form, can arife from no other principle. There would otherwife be no motive for any one of them to enter into that fcheme of condu<5l*.
The word, natural^ is commonly taken in fo many fenfes, and is of fo looie a fignification, that it feems vain to difpute, whether juftice be natu- ral or not. If felf-love, if benevolence be natu- ral to man ; if reafon and forethought be alfo na- tural ; then may the fame epithet be applied to juftice, order, fidelity, property, fociety. Men's inclination, their neceflities lead them to combine; their underftanding and experience tell them, that this combination is impoffible, where each governs himfelf by no rule, and pays no regard to the poflcfllons of others : And from thefe pafTions and refle(5tions conjoined, as foon as we obferve like paflions and reflections in others, the fentiment of juftice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to fome degree or other, in every individual of the human fpecies. In fo fa- gacious an animal, what neceffarily arifes from the exertion of his intelle6tual faculties, may juft- ly be efteemed natural f .
Among all civilized nations, it has been the conftant endeavour to remove every thing arbi- trary and partial from the decifion of property, and to fix the fentence of judges by fuch gene- ral
• See NOTE [PP.] t Se« NOTE [Q9J.
562 APPENDIX III.
ral views and confiderations, as may be equal to every member of the fociety. For befides, that nothing could be more dangerous than to ac- cuftom the bench, even in the fmalleft inftance, to regard private friendlhip or enmity i it is cer- tain, that men, where they imagine, that there •was no other reafon for the preference of their adverfary but perfonal favour, are apt to enter- tain the ftrongeft ill-will againfl the magiilrates and judges. When natural reafon, therefore, points out no fixed view of public utility, by which a controverfy of property can be decided, pofitive laws are often framed to fupply its place, and dire6l the procedure of all courts of judicature. Where thefe too fail, as often hap- pens, precedents are called for; and a former decifion, though given itfelf without any fufHci- ent reafon, juftly becomes a fufficient reafon for a new decifion. If direft laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and indireft ones are brought in aid ; and the controverted cafe is ranged under them, by analogical reafonings and comparifons, and fimilitudes, and correfponden- cies, which are often more fanciful than real. In general, it may fafely be affirmed, that jurif- prudence is, in this refpedt, different from all the fciences; and that in many of its nicer queftions, there cannot properly be faid to be truth or falfe- hood on either fide. If one pleader bring the cafe under any former law or precedent, by a re- fined analogy or comparifon j the oppofite pleader is not at a lofs to find an oppofite analogy or com- parifon : And the preference given by the judge is often founded more on tafte and imagination than on any folid argument. Public utility is the general objed: of all courts of judicature ; and this uti- lity too requires a ftabie rule in all controvcr- fies : But where fcveral rules, nearly equal and in- different, prefent themfelves, it is a very flight
turn
Farther Conftderations with regard to Jufi'ue. ;^6;^
turn of thought, which fixes the decifion in favour of cither party *.
We may juft obferve, before we conclude this fubje(5l:, that, after the laws of jufticeare fixed by views of general utility, the injury, the hardfhip, the harm, which refult to any individual from a violation of them, enter very much into confidera- tion, and are a great fource of that univerfal blame, which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of fociety, this coat, this horfe is mine, and ought to remain perpetually in my pofieflion : I reckon on the fecure enjoyment of it : By depriv- ing me of it, you difappoint my expectations, and doubly difpleafe me, and offend every byftander. It is a public wrong, fo far as the rules of equity are violated : It is a private harm, fo far as an in- dividual is injured. And though the fecond con- fideration could have no place, were not the former previoufly eftabliflied : For otherwife thediftinftion of mine and thine would be unknown in fociety : Yet there is no queftion, but the regard to general good is much enforced by the refpeft to particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual, is often more lightly thought of. But where the greateft public wrong is alfo conjoined with a confiderable private one, no wonder the higheft difapprobation attends fo iniquitous a beha- viour.
• Ske N O T E [R R].
( 349 )
APPENDIX IV.
Of SOME Verbal Disputes.
_^^ Othing is more ufual than for philofophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in difputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controverfies of the deepeft importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, fo frivolous and end- lefs, that I endeavoured to ftate with the utmoft caution the objedlof our prefent enquiry ; and pro- pofed fimply to colle6l on the one hand, a lift of thofe mental qualities which are the objedl of love or efteem, and form a part of perfonal merit, and on the other hand, a catalogue of thofe qua- lities, which are the objeft of cenfure or reproach, and which detra6l from the character of the per- fon, poflefled of them; fubjoining fome reflecti- ons concerning the origin of thefe fentiments of praife or blame. On all occafions, where there might arife the leaft hefitation, I avoided the terms virtue and vice ; becaufe fome of thofe qua- lities, which I claflcd among the objects of praife, receive, in the Englifh language, the appellation of talentSy rather than of virtues ; as fome of the blameable or cenfurable qualities are often called defe^Sy rather than vices. It may now, perhaps, be expedted, thar, before we conclude this moral enquiry, we fhould exa6tiy feparate the one from the other -, fliould mark the precife boundaries of
virtues
366 A P P E N D I X IV.
virtues and talents, vices and defefbsj and fliould explain the reafon and origin of that diftinftion. But in order to excufe myfelf fronn this under- taking, which would, at laft, prove only a gram- matical enquiry, I fhall fubjoin the four following reflexions, which fhall contain all that I intend to fay on the prefent fubjeft.
FirJ^j 1 do not find, that in the Englilh, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exad:ly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and de- feats, or that a precife definition can be given of the one as contradiftinguifhed from the other. "Were we to fay, for inftance, that the efteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to the appellation of virtues -, we fhould foon re- collect the qualities of courage, equanimity, pati- ence, felf-command ; with many others, which al- moft every language clafles under this appellation, though they depend little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm, that the qualities alone, which prompt us to a<5t our part in fociety, are entitled to that honourable diftindion ; it muft immediate- ly occur, that thefe are indeed the mod valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the fo- etal virtues j but that this very epithet fuppofes, that there are alfo virtues of another fpecies. Should we lay hold of the diftinftion between intelle^ual and moral endowments, and affirm the lall alone to be the real and genuine virtues, becaufe they alone lead to adion j we fhould find, that many of thofe qualities, ufaally called intelledlual virtues, fuch as prudence, penetration, difcernment, dilbretion, had alfo a confiderable influence on condutl. The diftindlion between the heart and the head may alfo be adopted : The qualities of the firfl: may be defined fuch as in their immediate exertion are ac- companied with a feeling or fentimentj and thefe alone may be called the genuine virtues: But in- duftry, frugality, temperance, fecrecy, perfeve-
rance.
Of SOME Verbal Disputes. 367
ranee, and many other laudable powers or habits, generally ftiled virtues, are exerted without any immediate fentiment in the perfon poflelTed of them ; and arrc only known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidft all this feeming perplexity, that the qucftion, being merely verbal, cannot poflibly be of any importance. A moral, philosophical difcourfe needs not enter into all thefe caprices of language, which are fo variable in different dialeds, and in different ages of the fame dialed. But on the whole, it feems to me, that, though it is always allowed, that there are virtues of many different kinds, yet when a man is called virtuous, or is de- nominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his focial qualities, which are, indeed, the moft valu- able. It is, at the fame time, certain, that any re- markable defed: in courage, temperance, cecono- my, induftry, underftanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured, honeft man of this honourable appellation. Who did ever fay, except by way of irony, that fuch a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead.^
But, fecondly, it is no wonder, that languages fliould not be very precife in marking the bounda- ries between virtues and talents, vices and defedls ; fince there is little diftin6tion made in our internal eftimation of them. It feems indeed certain, that t\iQ fentiment of confcious worth, the felf-fatisfadbion proceeding from a review of a man's own condu6t and character J it feems certain, 1 fay, that this fen- timent, which, though the moft common of all others, has no proper name in our language *, arifes from the endowments of courage and capacity, in- duftry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is not deeply mortified with refledling on his own folly and diffolutenefs, and feels not a fecret fting
Of • See NOTE [SS],
368 A P P E N D I X IV.
or compunftion, whenever his memory prefents any pait occurrence, where he behaved with ftupidity or ill-manners ? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolilh conduft^ or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him. They flill haunt his folitary hours, damp his moll afpiring thoughts, and fhew him, even to himfelf, in the moll contemptible and moft odious colours imaginable.
What is there too we are more anxious to con- ceal from others than fuch blunders, infirmities, and meannelfes, or more dread to have expofed by raillery and fatire ? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breed- ing, our eloquence or addrefs, our talle or abili- ties ? Thefe we difplay with care, if not with of- tentation; and we commonly fhow more ambiti- on of excelling in them, than even in the focial virtues themfelves, which are, in reality, of fuch fuperior excellence. Good -nature and honelly, efpecially the latter, are fo indifpenfably required, that, though the greatefb cenfure attends any vio- lation of thefe duties, no eminent praife follows fuch common inllances of them, as feem elfential to the fupport of human fociety. And hence the reafon, in my opinion, why, though men often ex- tol fo liberally the qualities of their heart, they are Ihy in commending the endowments of their head: Becaufe the latter virtues, being fuppofed more rare and extraordinary, are obierved to be the more ufual objefts of pride and felf-conceit ; and when boalled of, beget a llrong fufpicion of thefe fentiments.
It is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's cha- rafler moft by calling him a knave or a coward, and whether a beaftly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible, as a felfifh, ungenerous mifer. Give me my choice, and 1 would rather, for my own happinefs and felf-enjoyment, have a
friendly.
Of SOME Verbal Disputes. ^^9
friendly, humane heart, than poflefs all the other virtues of Demofthenes and Philip united : But I would rather pafs with the world for one endowed with extenfive genius and intrepid courage, and fhould thence expeft ftronger inftances of general applaufe and admiration. The figure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in company, the efleem paid him by his ac- quaintance ; all thefe advantages depend as much upon his good fenfe and judgment, as upon any other part of his chara6ler. Had a man the bell intentions in the world, and were the fartheft re- moved from all injuftice and violence, he would never be able to make himfelf be much regarded, without a moderate fhare, at lead, of parts and un- derftanding.
What is it then we can here difpute about? If fenfe and courage, temperance and induflry, wif- dom and knowledge confefledly form, a confidera- ble part o( perfonal merit: if a man, pofifeffed of thefe qualities, is both better fatisfied with himfelf, and better entitled to the good-will, efleem, and fervices of others, than one entirely deflitute of themj if, in fhort, the Jentiments are fimilar, wnich arifc from thefe endowments and from the focial virtues ; is there any reafon for being fo extremely fcrupu- lous about a word^ or difputing whether they be en- titled to the denomination of virtues ? It ma)", in- deed, be pretended, that the fentiment of approba- tion, which thofe accomplifliments produce, befides its being inferior^ is alfo fomewhat different from that, which attends the virtues of juftice and huma- nity. But this fecms not fufficient reafon for rank- ing them entirely under different clalTes and appel- lations. The charatler of Cicfar and that of Cato, as drawn by Salluft, are both of them virtuous, in the ftridefl and moil limited fenfe of the word ; but in a different way: Nor are the fentiments entirely the fame, which arife from them. The one is ami-
VoL. II. B b able;
370 A P P E D N 1 X IV.
able ; the other awful : We fViould wifh to meet the one charafter in a friend ; the other we fhould be ambitious of in ourfelves. In like manner the approbation, which attends temperance or induftry or frugality, may be fomewhat different from that which is paid to the fbcial virtues, without making, them entirely of a different fpecies. And, indeed, we may obferve, that thefe endowments, more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the fame kind of approbation. Good fenfe and genius beget elleem and regard : Wit and humour excite love and affedion *
Mcft people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation, affent to the definition of the elegant and judicious poet.
Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool) Is fenfe and fpirit with humanity f.
What pretenfions has a man to our generous affift- ance or good offices, who has dilTipated his wealth in profufe expences, ide vanities, chimerical pro- jefts, diffolute pleafures, or extravagant gaming? Thefe vices (for we fcruple not to call them fuch) bring mifery unpitied) and contempt on every one addicted to them.
Achasus, a wife and prudent prince, fell into a fatal fnare, which cofl him his crown and life, af- ter having ufed every reafonable precaution to guard himfelf againft it. On tiiat account, fays the hif- torian, he is a juft obje<St of regard and compiiffion v His betrayers alone of hatred and coiitcmpt ^l.
The precipitate fiight and improvident negligence' of Pompey, at the beginning of the civil wars, ap- peared fuch notorious blunders to Cicero, as quite palled his friendlhip towards that great man. in '-he fame manner -i fays he, as zvant of cleanliniifi^y dccoicyy or dijcretion in a mijtrcjs are found to aiichate cur af-
feclions.
* See NOTE [TT].
f The Art of preferving Health, Book 4.
t Poi-ytius, lib. viii. cap. 2.
of SOME Verbal Disputes. 371
jettons. For fo be exprciTcs himfeif, where he talks, not in the charafter of a philofopher, but ini that of a (latefman dnd man of the world, to his fric^nd Atticiis*.
Buc the fame Cicero, in imitation of all the an- cien'- moralidsj when he reafons as a philofopher, enlarges very much his ideas of virtue, and com- prehends every laudable quality or endowment of the mind, under that honourable appellation. This leads to the third refledlion, which we propofed to make, to wit, that the ancient moralifts, the beft models, made no material diflindtion among the different fpecies of mental endowments and defedls, but treated all alike under the appellation of virtues and vices, and made them indifcriminately the ob- je6l of their moral reafonings. The prudence ex- plained in Cicero's Offices f, is that fagacity, which leads to the difcovery of truth, and preferves us from error and mi Hake. Magnanmity^ temperance^ decency, are there alfo at large difcourfed of. And as that eloquent moralift followed the common re- ceived divifion of the four cardinal virtues, our fo- cial duties form but one head^ in the general dillri- butiori of his fubjeft J^
We need only perufe the titles of chapters in Arif- totle's Ethics to be convinced, that he ranks cou- rage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, mo- defly, prudence, and a manly opennefs, among the virtues^ as well asjufticeand friendfliip.
To/ii/inin and to abjlaiui that is, to be patient and continent, appeared to lome of the ancients ai fummary comprehenfion of all morals,
tpiftetus has fcarcely ever mentioned the fenti- ment of humanity or compailion, but in order td put his difciples on their guard againftit. The vir- tue of the iitoies feems to confift chiefly in a firm temper and a found underilanding. With them, B b 2 as
* Lib. ix. epid. lo. f Lib. i. cap. 6-
X See NOTE [UU].
37i A P P E N D I X IV.
as with Solomon and the eaftern moralifts, folly and wifdom are equivalent to vice and virtue.
Men will praife thee, fays David *, when thoo doft well unto thyfelf. I hate a wife nnan, fays the Greek poet, who is not wife to himfelf f.
Plutarch is no more cramped by fyftems in his philofophy than in his hiflory. "Where he compares the great men of Greece and Rome, he fairly fets in oppofition all their blemifhes and accomplifh- ments of whatever kind, and omits nothing confi- derable, which can either deprefs or exalt their cha- rafters. His moral difcourfes contain the fame free and natural cenfure of men and manners.
The charadler of Hannibal, as drawn by Livy jl, is efteemed partial, but allows him many eminent virtues. Never was there a genius, fays the hiftori- an, more equally fitted for thofe oppofite offices of commanding and obeying ; and it were, therefore, difficult to determine whether he rendered himfelf dearer to the general or to the army. To none would Ktafdrubal entruft more willingly the conduct of any dangerous entcrprize; under none, did the fol- diers difcover more courage and confidence. Great boldnefs in facing danger ; great prudence in the midft of it. No labour could fatigue his body or fubdue his mind. Cold and heat were indifferent to him : Meat and drink he fought as fupplies to the neceffities of nature, not as gratifications of his voluptuous appetites ? Waking or reft he ufed indif-
criminately, by night or by day. Thcfe great
Virtues were balanced by great Vices: inhum^a cruelty, perfidy more than ^//w/Vj no truth, no faith, no regard to oaths, piomifes, or religion.
The character of Alexander the Sixth, to be found in Guicciardin §, is pretty fimilar, butjufier; and is a proof, that even the moderns, where they
fpeak
* Pfalm 49th.
f M.,> an:i,-Mv ori>" «>c ctu7« !Tof^. Euripides.
X Lib. xxi. cap. 4. § Lib. i.
Of SOME Verbal Disputes. 373
I'peak naturally, hold the fame language with the ancients. In this pope, fays he, there was a fingu- lar capacity and judgment: Admirable prudence; a wonderful talent of perfuafion ; and in all mo- mentous enterprizes, a diligence and dexterity in- credible. But thefe virtues were infinitely overba- lanced by his vices-, no faith, no religion, infatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than barbarous cruelty.
Polybiusf, reprehending Timasus for his parti- ality againll Agathocles, whom he himfelf allows to be the molt cruel and impious of all tyrants, fays : If he took refuge in Syracufe, as afTerted by that hiftorian, flying the dirt and fmoke and toil of his former profefllon of a potter; and if proceeding from fuch flender beginnings, he became mafter, in a little time, of all Sicily ; brought the Cartha- ginian ftate into the utmofl; danger -, and at lafl; died in old age, and in pofleffion of fovereign dignity : Muft he not be allowed fomething prodigious and extraordinary, and to have pofielied great talents and capacity for bufinefs and attion ? His hiftorian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy ; but alfo what iriight redound to his Praife and Honour.
In general, we may obferve; that the diftinflion of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the ancients in their moral reafonings ; where they frequently treated the qucftion as very doubtful, whether virtue could be taught or not*' 'i They juftly confidered, that cowardice, m.eannefs, levity, anx- iety, impatience, folly, and many other qualities of the mind, might appear ridiculous and deform- ed, contemptible and odious, though independent of the will. Nor could it be fuppofed, at all times,
in
f Lib. xii.
* Vid. Plato in Me NONE, Se-' eca rtVo/Zoy^/. cap. 31. So alfo Horace, Virtutem doBrina, paret, Jiaturane donet. Epilh lib. i. ep. 18. .^scHiNEs SocjiATicus. Dial. 1.
574 A P P E N D I X IV.
In every man's power to attain every kind of mental, more than of exterior beauty.
And here there occurs xht fourth refleftion which I purpofed to m.ake, in fuggetting the reafon, why modern philofophers have often followed a coiirfe, in fheir moral enquiries, fo different from that of the ancients. In later times, philofophy of all kinds, efpecially ethics, have been more clofely united with theology than ever they were obferved to be among the Heathens j and as this latter fci- ence admits of no terms of compofition, but bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpofe, without much regard to the phenomena of nature, or to the unbiafled fentiments of the mind, hence reafoning, and even language, have been warped from their natural courfe, and diflindlions have been endeavoured to be eftablilhed, where the difference of the obje6t was, in a manner, imperceptible. Philofophers, or rather divines under that difguife, treating all morals, as on a like footing with ci- vil laws, guarded by the fandlions of reward and punifhment, were neceiTarily led to render this cir- cumflance, oi voluntary ox involuntary , the founda- tion of their whole theory. Every one may employ terms in what fenfe he pleafes : But this, in the mean time, muft be allowed, thu/entments are every day experienced of blame and praife, which have objects beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moralills, as fpecula- tive philofophers at leall, to give fome fatisfad:ory theory and explication.
A blemifh, a fault, a vice, a crime; thefe ex- preffions feem to denote different degrees of cenfure and difapprobation ; which are, however, all of them, at the bottom, pretty nearly of the fame kind or fpecies. The explication of one will eafily lead us into a jufl: conception of the others ; and it is of greater confequence to attend to things than to ver- bal
or SOME Verbal Disputes. 375
bal appellations. That we owe a duty to oiirfelves is confefled even in the moft vulgar fyftem of mo- rals J and it muft be of confequcnce to examine that duty, in order to fee, whether it bears any affinity to that which we owe to fociety. It is probable, that the approbation, attending the obfervance of both, isofafimilar nature, and arifes from fimilar principles; whatever appellation we may give to jeither -of thefe cxcellejncies.
A DI A-
( 377 )
DIALOGUE.
M
Y friend, Palarqedes, who is as great a: ramb- ler in his principles as in his perfon, who has run over^ by ftudy and travel, almoft every re- gion of the intelledual and material world, fur- prized me lately with an account of a nation, with whom, he told me, he had pafled a con- fiderable part of his life, and whom, he found, in the main, a people extremely civilized and intelligent.
There is a country, faid he, in the world, cal- led Fourli, no matter for its longitude or lati- tude, whofe inhabitants have ways of thinking, in many things, particularly in morals, diametri- cally oppofite to ours. When I came among them, 1 found that I muft fubmit to double pains; firft to learn the meaning of the terms in their language, and then to know the import of thofe terms, and the praife or blame attached to them. After a word had been explained to me, and the charadler, which it exprefled, had been def- cribed, I concluded, that fuch an epithet mull neceflfarily be the greatefl; reproach in the world; and was extremely furprized to find one in a pub- lic company, apply it to a perfon, with whom he lived in the ftridleft intimacy and friendlliip.
Tou
378 A D I A L O G U E.
Tcu fancy, faid I one day, to an acquaintance, that Changuis is your m-ortal enemy: I love to extinguijh quarrels, and Imujl, therefore^ tell youy that I heard him talk of you in the mojl obliging manner. But to my great allonilhment, when I rcneaned Changuis's words, though I had both remembered and under- ftood them perfeflly, I found, that they were trken for the moft mortal affront, and that I had very m- nocently rendered the breach between thefe perfons altogether irreparable.
As it was my fortune to come among this people on a very advantageous footing, I was immediately introduced to the beft company : and being defired by Alcheic to live with him, I readily accepted of his invitation ; as I found him univerfaJly efieemed for his perfonal merit, and indeed regarded by every pile in Fourli, as a perfeft charader.
One evening he invited me, as an amufement, to bear him company in a ferenade, which he intended to give to Gulki, with whom, he told me, he was extremely enamoured; and I foon found that his tafte was not fingular: For we met many of his rivals, who had come on the fame errand. I very naturally concluded, that this miflrefs of his muft be one of the fineft women in town; and I already felt a fecret in- clination to fee her, and be acquainted with her. But as the moon began to rife, I was much fur- prized to find, that we were in the midfl of the univerfity, where Gulki ftudied: And I was fome- what aihamed for having attended my friend, on fuch an errand.
1 was afterwards told, that Alcheic's choice of Gulki was very much approved of by all the good company in town; and that it was expeft- ed, while he gratified his own palTion, he would perform to that young man the fame good of- fice, which he had himfclf owed to Elcouf. It leems Alcheic had been very handfome in his youth, had been courted by many lovers ; but had
beftowed
A D I A L O G U E. 379
beftowed his favours chiefly on the fage Elcoulf; to whom he was fuppofed to owe, in great mea- fure, the aftonilhing progrefs which he had made in philolbphy and virtue.
Ic gave me fome furprize, that Alchcic's wife (who by the- bye happened alfo to be his fifter) was no wife fcandalized at this fpecies of infi- delity.
Much about the fame time I difcovered (for it was not attempted to be kept a fecret from mc or any body) that Alcheic was a murderer and a parricide, and had put to death an innocent perfon, the moft nearly connected with him, and whom he was bound to proted and defend by all the ties of nature and humanity. When I afked, with all the caution and deference ima- ginable, what was his motive for this adion; he replied coolly, that he was not then fo much at eafe in his circumftances as he is at prefent, and that he had a£Ved, in that particular, by the advice of all his friends.
Having heard Alcheic's virtue fo extremely celebrated, 1 pretended to join in the general voice of acclamation, and only afked, by way of curiofity, as a ftranger, which of all his noble actions was moft highly applauded; and I foon found, that all fentiments were united in giving the preference to the affallination of Ufbek. This Ufbek had been to the laft moment Alcheic's intimate friend, had laid many high obligations upon him, had even faved his life on a certain occafion, and had, by his will, which was found after the murder, made him heir to a confide- rable part of his fortune. Alcheic, it feems, con- fpired with about twenty or thirty more, moft of them alfo Uft>ek's friends j and falling all to- gether on that unhappy man, when he was not aware, they had torne him with a hundred wounds j and given hi^n that reward for his paft favours
apd
38o A D I A L O G U E.
and obligations. Ufbek, faid the general voice of the people, had many great and good quali- ties: His very vices were fhining, magnificent, and generous : But this adion of Alcheic's fets him far above Ufbek in the eyes of all judges of merit; and is one of the nobleft that ever perhaps the fan fhone upon.
Another part of Alcheic's conduft, which I alfo found highly applauded, was his behaviour towards Calilh, with whom he was joined in a project or undertaking of fome importance. Ca- lifh, being a paffionate man, gave Alcheic, one day, a found drubbing; which he took very pa- tiently, waited the return of Califh's good-hu- mour, kept ftill a fair correfpondence with him; and by that means brought the affair, in which they were joined, to a happy ifTue, and gained to himfelf immortal honour by his remarkable temper and moderation.
1 have lately received a letter from a corref- pondent in Fourli, by which I learn, that, fince my departure, Alcheic, falling into a bad flate of health, has fairly hanged himfelf; and has died univerfally regretted and applauded in that coun- try. So virtuous and noble a life, fays each Fourlian, could not be better crowned than by fo noble an end ; and Alcheic has proved by this, as well as by all his other aftions, what he boafl- ed of near his laft moments, that a wife man is fcarcely inferior to the great god, Vitzli. This is the name of the fupreme deity among the Fourlians.
The notions of this people, continued Pala- medes, are as extraordinary with regard to good- manners and fociablenefs, as with regard to mo- rals. My friend Alcheic formed once a party for my entertainment, compofed of all the prime wits and philofophers of Fourli; and each of us brought his mcfs along with him to the place
where
A t) I A L O G U K. 381
where we afiembled. I obferved one of them to be worfe provided than the reft, and offered hinri a fhare of my mefs, which happened to be a roafted pullet : And 1 could not but remark, that he and all the reft of the company fmiled at my fimplicity. I was told, that Alcheic had once fo much intereft with this club as to pre- vail with them to eat in common, and that he had made ufe of an artifice for that purpofe. He perfuaded thofe, whom he obferved to be worjl provided, to offer their mefs to the com- pany i after which, the others, who had brought more delicate fare, were aftiamed not to make the fame offer. This is regarded as fo extraor- dinary an event, that it has fince, as I learn, been recorded in the hiftory of Alcheic's life, compofed by one of the greateft geniufes of Fourli.
Pray, faid I, Palamedes, when you were at Fourli, did you alfo learn the art of turning your friends into ridicule, by telling them ftrange ftories, and then laughing at them, if they be- lieved you. I affure you, replied he, had I been difpofed to learn fuch a leffon, there was no place in the world more proper. My friend, fo often mentioned, did nothing, from morning to night, but fneer, and banter, and rally i and you could fcarcely ever diftinguifli, whether he were injt^ft or earneft. But you think then, that my ftorv is improbable; and that I have ufed, or rather abufed the privilege of a traveller. To be fure, faid I, you were but in jeft. Such barbarous and favage manners are not only incompatible with a civilized, intelligent people, fuch as you faid thefe were; but fcarcely compatible with human nature. They exceed all we ever read of, among the Mingrelians, and Topinam- boues.
Have a care, cried he, have a care ! You arc
not
382 A D I A L O G U £.
not aware that you are fpeaking blafphemy, and are abufing your favourites, the Greeks, efpeci- ally the Athenians, whom I have couched, all along, under thefe bizarre nannes I employed* If you confider aright, there is not one ftroke of the foregoing chara6ter, which might not be found in the man of higheft merit at Athens,- without diminiihing in the leaft from the bright- nefs of his character. The amours of the Greeks^ their marriages *, and the expofing of their chil- dren cannot but ftrike you immediately. The death of Ufbek is an exa£t counter-part to that of Casfar.
All to a trifle, faid I, interrupting him : You did not mention that Ufbek was an ufurper.
I did not, replied he; left you Ihould difcover the parallel I aimed at. But even adding this circumftance, we fhould make no fcruple, accord- ing to our fentiments of morals, to denominate Brutus, and Caffius, ungrateful traitors and af- fafTins: Though you know, that they are, per- haps, the higheft charadlers of all antiquity; and the Athenians ered;ed ftatues to them ; which they placed near thofe of Harmodius and Ariftogiton, their own deliverers. And if you think this cir- cumftance, which you mention, fo material to abfolve thefe patriots, I fhall compcnfate it by another, not mentioned, which will equally ag- gravate their crime. A few days before the ex- ecution of their fatal purpofe, they all fwore feal- ty to Cacfar; and protefting to hold his perfon ever facred, they touched the altar with thofe hands, which they had already armed for his deftruflionf.
I need not remind you of the famous and ap- plauded
* The laws of Athens allowed a man to marry his filler by the fiither. Solon's law forbid p;edcrally to flaves, as being ait aft of too great dignity for lucii mean perfons.
f Appian. Bell. Civ. lib. iii. Suetonius in vita Cxfaris.
A D I A L O G U E. 33j
plauded ftory of Themiftocles, and of his pati- ence towards Eurybiades, the Spartan, his com- manding officer, who, heated by debate, lifted his cane to him in a council of war (the fame thing as if he had cudgelled him), Strike! cries the Athenian, y////^^/ bui hear me.
You are too good a fcholar not to difcover the ironical Socrates and his Athenian club in my laft ftory ; and you v/ill certainly obferve, that it is exadlv copied from Xenophon, with a va- riation only of the names *. And I think I have fairly made it appear, that an Athenian man of merit might be fuch a one as with us would pafs for inceftuous, a parricide^ an affafnn, un- grateful, perjured traitor, and fomething elfe too abominable to be named j not to mention his ruf- ticity and ill-manners. And having lived in this manner, his death might be entirely fuitable: He might conclude the fcene by a defperate ad: of felf-murder, and die v/ith the moft abfurd blafphemies in his mouth. And notwithftanding all this, he fhall have ftatues, if not altars, ereft- ed to his memory; poems and orations fhall be compofed in his praife ; great feds fhall be proud of calling themfelves by his name; and the moft diftant pofterity fhall blindly continue their admiration : Though were fuch a ane to arife among themfelves, they would juftly regard him. with horror and execration.
I might have been aware, replied I, of your artifice. You feem to take pleafure in this to- pic : and are indeed the only man 1 ever knew, who was well acquainted with the ancients, and did not extremely admire them. But inftead of attacking their philofophy, their eloquence, or poetry, the ufual fubjetts of controverly between us, you now leem to impeach their morals, and
accufe * Mem, Soc. lib. iii. Tub. fine.-
jS4 A t) I A L O G U E.
accufe them of ignorance in a fcience, which is the only one, in my opinion, in which they are , not furpaffed by the moderns. Geometry, phy- fics, aftronomy, anatomy, botany, geography, na- vigation; in thefe we juftly claim the fuperiority: But what have we to oppofe to their moralifts ? Your reprefentation of things is fallacious. You have no indulgence for the manners and cuftoms of different ages. Would you try a Greek or Roman by the common law of England ? Hear him defend himfelf by his own maxims; and then pronounce.
There are no manners fo innocent or reafonable, but may be rendered odious or ridiculous, if mea- fured by a flandard, unknown to the perfons ; efpe- cially, if you employ a little art or eloquence, in aggravating fome circumftances, and extenuating others, as befl fuits the purpofe of your difcourfe. All thefe artifices may eafily be retorted on you. Could 1 inform the Athenians, for inftance, that there was a nation, in which adultery, both aftive and pafilve, fo to fpeak, was in the higheft vogue and eftcem: In which every man of education chofc for his miilrefs a married woman, the wife, perhaps, of his friend and companion ; and valued himfelf upon thefe infamous conquells, as much as if he had been feveral times a conqueror in boxing or wreftling at the Olympic games : In which every man alfo took a pride in his tamenefs and facility with regard to his own wife, and was glad to make friends or gain interefl- by allowing her to profti- tute her charms; and even, without any fuch mo- tive, gave her full liberty and indulgence: I afk, what fentiments the Athenians would entertain of fuch a people; they who never mentioned the crime of adultery but in conjunction with robbery and j)oifoning? Which would they admire moft, the viliany or the meannefs of fuch a conduft ?
•Should I add, that the fame people nere as proud of their llavery and dependance as the Athenians of their liberty; and though a man among them were
op])rcfled>
A D I A L O G U E. 385
difgraced, impoverifhcd, infulced, or imprifoned by the tyrant, he would Hill regard" it as the high- efl merit to love, ferve, and obey him ; and even to die for his fmallefl glory or fatisfaftion : Thefe noble Greeks would probably aik me, whether I fpoke of a human fociety, or of fome inferior, fervile fpecies.
It was then I might inform my Athenian au- dience, that thefe people, however, v^^anted not fpirit and bravery. If a man, fay I, though their intimate friend, (hould throw out, in a private company, a raillery againfc them, nearly ap- proaching any of thofe, v/ith which your generals and demagogues every day regale each other, in the face of the whole city, they never can forgive him; but in order to revenge themfelves, they oblige him immediately to run them through die body, or be himfelf murdered. And if a man, who is an abfolute flranger to them, lliould defire them, at the peril of their own life, to cut the throat of their bofom-companion, they imme- diately obey, and think themfelves highly oblig- ed and honoured by the commiffion. Thefe are their maxims of honour : This is their favourite- morality.
But though fo ready to draw their fword againft' their friends and countrymen ; no difgrace, no in- famy, no pain, no poverty will ever engage thefe people to turn the point of it againfi: their own bread. A man of rank would row in the gallies, would beg his bread, would languifh in prifon, would fuffer any tortures; and ftill preferve his wretched life. Rather than efcape his enemies by a generous contempt of death, he would infa- moully receive the fame death from his enemies, aggravated by their triumphant infults, and by the moit exquifire fufFcrings.
It is very ufual too, continue I, among this peo- ple to erect jails, where every art of plaguing and
Vol. II. ' C c tor-
386 A D I A L O G U E.
tormenting the unhappy prifoners is carefully ftudied and pradifed : And in thefe jails it is ufuat for a parent voluntarily to fliut up feveral of his children ; in order, than another child, whom he owns to have no greater or rather lefs merit than the reft, may enjoy his v/hole fortune, and wallow in every kind of voluptuoufnefs and pleafure. No- thing fo virtuous in their opinion as this barbarous partiality.
But what is more fingular in this whimfical na- tion, fay I to the Athenians, is, that a frolic of yours during the Saturnalia *, when the flaves are ferved by their mafters, is ferioufly continued by them throughout the whole year, and throughout the whole courfe of their lives; accompanied too with fome circumftances, which ftill farther aug- ment the abfurdity and ridicule. Your fport only elevates for a few days thofe whom fortune has thrown down, and whom fhe too, in fport, may really elevate for ever above you : But this nation: gravely exalts thole, whom nature has fubjefled to them, and whofe inferiority and infirmities are ab- folutely incurable. The women, though without virtue, are their mafters and fovereigns : Thefe they reverence, praife, and magnify : To thefe, they pay the higheft deference and refpefb: And in all places and all times, the fuperiority of the fe- males is readily acknowledged and fubmitted to by every one, who has the leall pretenfions to educa- tion and politenefs. Scarce any crime would be fo univerfally deteited as an infradlion of this rule.
You need go no further, replied Palamedes i 1 can eafily conje6ture the people whom you aim at. The ftrokcs, with which you have painted them, are pretty juft; and yet you muft acknowledge, that fcarce any people are to be found, cither m
ancient
* The Greeks kept the feaft of Saturn or Chronus, as well a? the Romans. SceLucian. Epift. datum.
A D I A L O G U E. 387
ancient or modern times, whofc national charafter is, upon the whole, lels liable to exception. But I give you thanks for helping me out with my ar- gument. 1 had no intention of exalting the mo- derns at the expence of the ancients. I only meant to reprefent the uncertainty of all thefe judgments concerning characters ; and to convince you, that fafhion, vogue, cuftom, and law, were the chief foundation of all moral determinations. The Athenians furely, were a civilized, intelligent peo- ple, if ever there v/ere one; and yet their man of merit might, in this age, be held in horror and execration. The French are alfo, without doubt, a very civilized, intelligent people ; and yet their man of merit might, with the Athenians, bean ob- jedl of the higheft contempt and ridicule, and even hatred. And what renders the matter more ex- traordinary : Thefe two people are fuppofed to be the mofb fimilar in their national chara6ter of any in ancient and modern times ; and while the Eng- lifh flatter themfelves that they refemble the Ro- mans, their neighbours on the continent draw the parallel between themfelves and thofe polite Greeks. . What wide difference, therefore, in the fentiments of morals, muft be found between civilized nati- ons and Barbarians, or between nations whofe characters have little in common? How fhall we pretend to fix a flandard for judgments of this na- ture ?
By tracing matters, replied I, a little higher, and examining the firft principles, which each nation eftablifhes, of blame or cenfure. The Rhine flows north, the Rhone fouth j yet both fpring from the fame mountain, and are alfo ac- tuated, in their oppofite directions, by the Ja;ne principle of gravity. The different inclinations of the ground, on which they run, caule all the difference of their courfes.
C c 2 In
388 A DIALOGUE.
In how many circumftances would an Atheniafri and a French man of merit certainly refemble each other ? Good fcnfe, knowledge, wit, eloquenccj. humanity, fidelity, truth, jiillice, courage, tem- perance, eonftancy, dignity of mind : Thefc you have all omitted ; in order to infill only on the points, in which they may, by accident, differ. Very well : I am willing to com-ply with you ; and fhall endeavour to account for thcfe differences from the moft univerfal, eftablifhed principles of morals.
The Greek loves, I care not to examine more particularly. I Ihall only obferve, that, however blameable, they arofe from a very innocent caufe, the frequency of the gymnaftic exercifes among, that people -, and were recommended, though ab- furdly, as the fource of friendfliip, fympathy, mu- tual attachment, and fidelity *j qualities efteem- cd in all nations and all ages.
The marriage of half-brothers and fillers feems^ no great difficulty. Love between the nearer rela- tions is contrary to reafon and public utility -, but the precife point, where we are to Hop, can fcarce- ly be determined by natural reafon ; and is there- fore a very proper fubje6l for municipal law or eullom. If tlite Athenians went a little too far on the one fide, the canon law has furely pulhed matters a great way into the other extreme f .
Had you alked a parent at Athens, why he be- reaved his child of tiiat fife, which he had fo late- ly given it. It is becaufe I love it, he would re- ply ; and regard the poverty which it mull inherit from me, as a greater evil than death, which it is not capable of dreading, feeling, or relent- ing J.
How
• Plat. fymp. p. 182. Ex edit. Ser.
f See Enquiry, Sed. IV.
X Plut. de amore prolis, Tub fine.
A D I A L O G U E. 3^9
How is public liberty, the moft valuable of all blel]ino:s, to be recovered from the hands of an ufurper or tyrant, if his power fliields him from public rebellion, and our fcruples from private vengeance ^ 1 hat his crime is capital by law, you acknowledge : And muft the highell aggravation of his crime, tlit putting of himfelf above law, form his full fecurity ? You can reply nothing, but by fhowing the great inconveniences of aflaf- fination J which could any one have proved clearly to the ancients, he had reformed their fcntiments in this particular.
Again, to call your eye on the picture which I Iiave drawn of modern manners j there is almoft as great difficulty, I acknowledge, to juftify French as Greek galJantryj except only, that the former ■ is much more natural and agreeable than the latter. J>ut our neighbours, it feems, have refolved to fa- crifice fome of the domeflic to the fociable plea- furesj and to prefer eafe, freedom, and an open commerce, to a Uriel fidelity and conftancy. Thefe ends are both good, and are fomewhat difficult to reconcile i nor need we be furprifed, if the cuiloms of nations incline too much, fometimes to the one iidc, fometimes to the other.
The molt inviolable attachment to the laws of our country is every v/here acknowledged a capital vir- tue :j and where the people are not fo happy, as to have any legiflature but a fingle perfon, the ftridt- eft loyalty is, in that cafe, the trueft patriotifm.
Nothing furely can be more abfurd and barbar- ous than the practice of duelling; but thofe, who juftify it, fay, that it begets civility and good- manners. And a duellifl:, you may obferve, always values himfelf upon his courage, his fenfe of ho- nour, his fidelity and friendihip -, qualities, which are here indeed very oddly direded, but which have been elleemed univerfally, fince the foundation of the world.
Have
390 A D I A L O G U E.
Have the gods forbid felf murder ? An Atheniaa allows, that it ought to be forborn. Has the Dei- ty permitted it ? A Frenchman allows, that death is preferable to pain and infamy.
You fee then, continued I, that the principles upon which men reafon in morals are always the fame ; though the conclufions which they draw are often very different. That they all reafon aright with regard to this fubjeft, more than with regard to any other, it is not incumbent on any moralift to fhow. It is fufficient, that the original princi- ples of cenfure or blame are uniform, and that er- roneous conclufions can be corrected by founder reafoning and larger experience. Though many ages have elapfed fince the fall of Greece and Rome; though many changes have arrived in reli- gion, language, laws, and cuftoms j none of thefe revolutions has ever produced any confiderable in- novation in the primary fentiments of morals, more than in thofe of external beauty. Some minute differences, perhaps, may be obferyed in both. Horace * celebrates a low forehead, and Anacreon joined eye-brows f: But the Apollo and the Venus of antiquity are ftill our models for male and fe- male beauty ; in like manner as the character of Scipio continues our ftandard for the glory of he- roes, and that of Cornelia for the honour of ma- trons.
It appears, that there never was any quality re- commended by any one, as a virtue or moral ex- cellence, but on account of its being ujeful^ or agreeable to a man him/elf^ or to others. For what other reafon can ever be affigned for praife or ap- probation ? Or where would be the fenfe of extol- ling a good charafter or aftion, which, at the fame
time,
♦ Epift. lib. i. cpift. 7. Alfo lib. i. ode 3. I Ode 28. Petronius (cap. 86.) joins both ihcfe circumftan- ces as beauties.
A D I A L O G U E. 391
lime, is allowed to be good for fwthw^ ? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be ac- counted for by the different views, which people take of thefe circumftances.
Sometimes men differ in their judgment about the ufefulnef^ of any habit or adion : Sometimes alfo the peculiar circumftances of things render one moral quality more ufeful than others, and give it a peculiar preference.
It is no-t furprifing, that, during a period of war and -difcwder, the military virtues fliould be more celebrated than the pacific, and attradl more the admiration and attention of mankind, " Flow *' ufual ivS it,*' fays Tully *, " to find Cimbrians, *' CeltiberiajTiS, and other Barbarians, who bear, *' with inflexible conftancy, all the fatigues and *^ dangers of the field ; but are immediately dif- *' pirited UF.dtT the pain and hazard of a languifh- ** ing diftemper : While, on the other hand, the ** Greeks patiently endure the flow approaches of ** death, when armed with ficknefs and difeafe ; ^' but timoroufly Hy his prefence, whe-n he attacks " them violently with fwords and falchions !'* So <iifierent is even the fame virtue of courage among warlike or peaceful nations \ And indeed, we may obferve, that, as the difference between war and peace is the greateft that arifes among nations and public focietics, it produces alfo the greateft varia- tions in moral fentiment, and diverfifics the moft our ideas of virtue and perfonal merit.
Sometimes too, magnanimity, greatnefs of mind, difdain of flavery, inflexible rigour ^nd integrity, may better fuit the circumilances of one age than thofe of another, and have a more kindly influence, both on public affairs, and on a man's own
fafety
* Tufc. Qncell. lib. ii.
J92 A D I A L O G U E.
Safety and advancement. Our idea of merit, there- fore,, will alfo vary a little with thefe variations; and Labeo, perhaps, he cenfured for the fame qualities, which procured Cato the highelh appro- biition.
A degree of luxury may be ruinous and pernici- ous in a native of Switzerland, which only fofters the arts, and encourages induftry in a Frenchman or Englilhman. We are not, therefore, to expetl, either the fame ientiments, or the fame laws in Berne, which prevail in London or Paris.
Different cultoms have alfo fome influence as well as different util'ties; and by giving an early biafs to the mind, may produce a fuperior propen- fity, either to the ufeful or the agreeable qualities; to thofe which regard felf, or thofe which extend to fociety. Thcfe four fources of moral fentiment ftili fubliil: ; but particular accidents may, at one time, make any one of them flow with greater abundance than at another.
The cuftoms of fome nations fhut up the wo- men from all focial commerce : Thofe of others make them fo effential a part of fociety and converfation, that, except where bufinefs is tran- fatled, the male-fex alone are fuppofed almoft wholly incapable of mutual difcourfe and enter- tainment. As this difference is the mofb mate- rial that can happen in private life, it muft alfo produce the greatcft variation in our moral fenti- ments.
Of all nations in the world, where polygamy was not allowed, the Greeks feem to have been the mod referved in their commerce with the fair fex, and to have impofed on them the ftri(5left laws of modelty and decency. We have a ilrong inftance of this in an oration of Lyfias *. A widow injured, ruined, undone, calls a meeting
of
• Orat. 33.
A D I A L O G U E. 393
of a few of her neareft friends and relations ; and though never before accuftomed, fays the orator, to fpeak in the prefence of men, the diftrefs of her circumftances conitrained her to lay the cafe before them. The very opening of her mouth in fuch company required, it feems, an apology.
When Demofthenes profecuted his tutors, to make them refund his patrimony, it became ne- ceflary for him, in the courfe of the law-fuit, to prove that the marriage of Aphobus's filler with Oneter was entirely fraudulent, and that, notwithftanding her Iham marriage, fhe had liv- ed with her brother at Athens for two years pad, ever fince her divorce from her former hufband. And it is remarkable, that though thefe were people of the firft fortune and diftindtion in the city, the orator could prove this fadt no way, but by calling for her female flaves to be put to the queftion, and by the evidence of one phyfician, who had feen her in her brother's houfe duri ing her illnefs *. So referved were Greek man- ners.
We may be aflTured, that an extreme purity of manners was the confequence of this referve. Accordingly we find, that, except the fabulous (lories of an Helen and a Clytemneflra, there fcarcely is an inftance of any event in the Greek hif- tory, which proceeded from the intrigues of wo- men. On the other hand, in modern times, par- ticularly in a neighbouring nation, the females enter into all tranfaftions and all management of church and Itate : And no man can exped fuccefs, who takes not care to obtain their good graces. Harry the third, by incurring the difpleafure of the fair, endangered his crown, and loft his life, as much as by his indulgence to herefy.
It
* In Oneterem.
394 A D I A L O G U E.
It is needlefs to diflemble : The confequence of a very free commerce between the fexes, and of their living much together, will often terminate in intrigues and gallantry. We muft facrifice fome- what of the ufefuly if we be very anxious to ob- tain all the agreeable qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage. Inftan- ces of licence, daily multiplying, will weaken the fcandal with the one fex, and teach the other by degrees, to adopt the famous maxim of La Fontaine, with regard to female infidelity, that if one knows //, // is but a Jmall matter 3 if one knows it noty it is nothing *.
Some people are inclined to think, that the beft way of adjulling all differences, and of keeping the proper medium between the agreeable and the ufeful qualities of the fex, is to live with them after the naanner of the Romans and the Englilh (for the cuftoms of thefe two nation? feem fimilar in this refpedt f) 5 that is, without gallantry J, and without jealoufy. By a parity of reafon, the culloms of the Spaniards and of the Italians of an age ago (for the prefent are very different) mufl be the worfl of any j becaufe they favour both gallantry and jealoufy.
Nor will thefe different cultoms of nations af- fedt the one fex only : Their idea of perfonal merit in the males mufl alfo be fomewhac different with regard, at leaft, to converfation, addrefs, and humour. The one nation, where the men live much apart, will naturally more approve of prudence; the other of gaiety. With the one
fimplicity
* Qnand on le f9alt c'ell pen de chofe : Qiiand on I'ignore, ce n'elt rien. t See NOTE [XX].
% The gallantry here meant is that of amours and attachment*, not that of complaifance, which is as much paid to the tair-fex in England as in any other country.
A\
A D 1 A L O (; U E. 395
fimplicity of manners will be in the higheft efteem i •with the other, politenefs. The one will diftin- giiifh themiclves by good-fenfe and judgment; the other, by tafte and delicacy. The eloquence of the former will fhine moll in the fenate j that of the other, on the theatre.
Thefe, I fay, are the natural effeds of fuch cuf- toms. For it muft be confefled, that chance has a great influence on national manners j and many events happen in fociety, which are not to be ac- counted for by general rules. Who could imagine, for inftance, that the Romans, who lived freely v/ith their women, fhould be very indifferent about mufic, and efteem dancing infamous : While the Greeks, who never almoft faw a woman but in their own houfes, were continually piping, finging, and dancing ?
The differences of moral fentiment, which na- turally arife from a republican or monarchical go- vernment, are alfo very obvious ; as well as thofc which proceed from general riches or poverty, union or faftion, ignorance or learning. 1 fhall conclude this long difcourfe with obferving, that different culloms and fituations vary not the ori- ginal ideas of merit (however they may, fome confequences) in any very effential point, and pre- vail chiefly with regard to young men, who can afpire to the agreeable qualities, and may attempt to pleafe. The Manner, the Ornaments, the Graces, which fucceed in this lliape, are more arbitrary and cafual : But the merit of riper years is almoft every where the fame ; and con- fifts chiefly in integrity, humanity, ability, know- ledge, and the other more folid and ufeful quali- ties of the human mind.
What you infift on, replied Palamedes, may
have fome foundation, when you adhere to the
maxims of common life and ordinary conduct.
3 Experience
39^ A D I A L O G U £.
Experience and the practice of the world readiK corre6b any great extravagance on either fide. Bu what fay you to artificial lives and manners ? How do you reconcile the maxims, on which, in diffe- rent ages and nations, thefe are founded ?
What do you underftand by artificial lives and manners ? faid I. I explain nrjyfelf, replied he. You know, that religion had, in ancient times, very little influence on common life, and that, after men had performed their duty in facrifices and prayers at the temple, they thought, that the gods left the reft of their conduct to themfelves, and were little pleafed or offended with thofe vir- tues or vices, which only affefled the peace and happinefs of human fociety. In thofe ages, it was the bufinefs of philofophy alone to regulate men's or- dinary behaviour and deporpnent ; and according- ly,, we may obferve, that this being the fole prin- ciple, by which a man could elevate himfelf above his fellows, it acquired a mighty afcendant over many, and produced great Angularities of maxims and of condu6t. At prcfent, when philofophy has loll the allurement of novelty, it has no fuch ex- tenfive influence; but feems to confine itfelfmoft- ly to fpeculations in the clofet ; in the fame man- ner, as the ancient religion was limited to facri- fices in the temple. Its place is now fupplied by the modern religion, which infpedls our whole conduct, and prefcribes an univerfal rule to our adlions, to our words, to our very thoughts and inclinations ; a rule fo much the more auftere, as it is guarded by infinite, though diftant, re- wards and punifliments ; and no infraction of it can ever be concealed or difguifed.
Diogenes is the mod celebrated model of extravagant philofophy. Let us feck a pa- rallel to him in modern times. We fhall not difgrace any philofophic name by a com- parifon with the Dominies or Loyolas, or
any
A D I A L O G U E. 397
any canonized monk or friar. Let us compare him to Pafcal, a man of parts and genius as well as Diogenes himfelf ; and perhaps too, a man of virtue, had he allowed his virtuous inclinations to have exerted and difplayed themfelves.
The foundation of Diogenes's condu6l was an endeavour to render himfelf an independent being as much as polfible, and to confine all his wants and defires and pleafures within himfelf and his own mind : The aim of Pafcal was to keep a per- petual fenfc of his dependence before his eyes, and never to forget his numberlefs wants and in- firmities. The ancient fupported himfelf by mag- nanimity, oilentation, pride, and the idea of his own faperiority above his fellow-creatures. The modern made conilant profefTion of humility and abafement, of the contempt and hatred of him- felfi and endeavoured to attain thefe fuppofed virtues, as far as they are attainable. The aufteri- ties of the Greek were in order to inure himfelf to hardfhips, and prevent his ever fufFering : Thofe of the Frenchman were embraced merely for their own fake, and in order to fuffer as much as polTible. The philofopher indulged himfelf in the moft beaftly pleafures, even in public : The faint refufed himfelf the moft innocent, even in private. The former thought it his duty to love his friends, and to rail at them, and reprove them, and fcold them : The latter endeavoured to be abfolutely indifferent towards his neareft relations, and to love and fpeak well of his ene- mies. The great objetl of Diogenes's wit was every kind of fuperflition, that is every kind of religion known in his time. The mortality of the foul was his ftandard pirinciple ; and even his fentiments of a divine providence fcem to have been licentious. The moft ridiculous fu- perftitions directed Pafcal's faith and practice ; and an extreme contempt of this life, in
compa-
398 A D I A L O G U E.
comparifon of the future, was the chief foundation of his condudt.
In fuch a remarkable contrafl do thefe two men Hand : Yet both of them have met with general admiration in their different ages, and have been propofed as models of imitation. Where then is the univerfal flandard of morals, which you talk of? And what rule fhall we eftablilli for the many different, nay contrary fentiments of mankind ?
An experiment, faid I, which fucceeds in the air, will not always fucceed in a vacuum. \Vhe;i men depart from the maxims of common reafon, and affect thefe artificial lives, as you call them, no one can anfwer for what will pleafe or difpleafe them. They are in a different element from the reft of mankind; and the natural principles of their mind play not with the fame regularity, as if left to themfelves, free from the illufions of religi- ous fuperllition or philofophical enthufiafm.
T H F
THE
NATURAL HISTORY
O F
RELIGION.
( 401 )
THE
NATURAL HISTORY
O F
RELIGION.
INTRODUCTION.
A
S every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utnnofl: importance, there are two quefti- ons in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reafon, and that concerning its origin in human nature. Happily, the firfl queftion, which is the moft im- portant, admits of the moll obvious, at lead, the cleared folution. The whole frame of nature be- fpeaks an intelligent author; and no rational en- quirer can, after ferious rcfleftion, fufpend his belief a moment with regard to the primary prin- ciples of genuine Theifm and Religion. But the other quedion, concerning the origin of religioa in human nature, is expofed to fome more diiti- culty. The belief of invifible, intelligent power has been very generally difFufed over the humari race, in all places and in all agesj but it has Vol. II. D d neither
402 The Natural History of Religion.
neither perhaps been fo univerial as to admit of no exception, nor has it been in any degree, uni- form in the ideas, which it has fuggeited. Some na- tions have been difcovered, who entertained no fentiments of Religion, if travellers and hiftori- ans may be credited; and no two nations, and fcarce any two men, have ever agreed precifcly in the fame fentiments. It would appear, there- fore, that this preconception fprings not from an original inflind: or primary imprellion of nature, fuch as gives rife to felf-love, affection between the fexes, love of progeny, gratitude, refentment; fince every inftin£t of this kind has been found abfolutely univerfal in all nations and ages, and has always a precife determinate objed, which it inflexibly purfues. The firll religious principles muft be fecondary; fuch as may eafily be per- verted by various accidents and caufes, and whofe operation too, in fome cafes, may, by an ex- traordinary concurrence of circumllances, be al- together prevented. What thofe principles are, which give rife to the original belief, and what thofe accidents and cauies are, which direct its operation, is the fubjedl of our prefent enquiry.
Se<5l. I. T^hai Polytbeifm was the primary Religion of Men.
It appears to me, that, if we confider the im- provement of human fociety, from rude begin- nings to a ftate of greater perfedicn, polytheifm or idolatry was, and necelfarily muft Iiave been, the firft and moft ancient religion of mankind. This opinion I fliall endeavour to confirm by the following arguments.
It is a matter of fa6t inconteftable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were polytheiils. The doubtful and trepticrd principles o\ a tew philofophers, or ti-c thcifm, and that too not en- tirely
The Natural History of Religion, 403
tirely pure, of one or two nations, form no ob- jection wortii regarding. Behold then the clear tellimony of hiftory. The farther we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into polytheifm. No marks, no fymp- toms of any more perfedl religion. The molt an- cient records of human race (till prefent us with that fyflem as the popular and efbabiifhed creed. The north, the fouth, the eafl, the well, give their unanimous teftimony to the fame fad. What can be oppofed to fo full an evidence?
As far as writing or hiftory reaches, mankind^ in ancient times, appear univerfally to have beer^ polytheifts. Shall we afTert, that, in more anci- ent times, before the knowledge of letters, or the difcovery of any art or fcience, men enter- tained the principles of pure theifm .'' That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they dif- covered truth : But fell into error, as foon as they acquired learning and politenefs.
But in this aflertion you not only contradict all appearance of probability, but alfo our pre- fent experience concerning the principles and opi- nions of barbarous nations. The favage tribes of America, Africa, and Afia are all idolaters. Not a fingle exception to this rule. Infomuch, that, were a traveller to tranfport himfelf into any unknown re- gion ; if he found inhabitants cultivated with arts and fcience, though even upon that fuppofition there are odds againft their being theifts, yet could he not fafely, till farther inquuy, pronounce any thing on that head : But if he found them ignorant and barbarous, he might beforehand de- clare them idolaters; and there fcarcely is a pof- fibility of his being miftaken.
It feems certain, that, according to the natural progrefs ot human thought, the ignorant multitude mult firft entertain Ibme groveling and familiar no-
D d 2 tioa
404 The Natural History of Religion.
tion of fuperior powers, before they flretch their conception to that perfeft Being, who beftowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reafonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces be- fore huts and cottages, or ftiidied geometry before agriculture; as aflert that the Deity appeared to them a pure fpirit, omnifcient, omnipotent, and omniprefent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited being, with human paf- fions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rifes gradually, from inferior to fuperior: By ab- ftrafling from what is imperfedl, it forms an idea of perfedlion : And (lowly diftinguifhing the nobler parts of its own frame from the grolTer, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and rer- iined, to its divinity. Nothing could difturb this natural progrefs of thought, but fome obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theifm, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vaft interval which is interpofed between the human and the di- vine nature. But though I allow, that the order and frame of the univerfe, when accurately examin- ed, affords fuch an argument; yet I can never think, that this confideration could have an influence on mankind, when they formed their firft rude notions of religion.
The caufes of fuch objc6ts, as are quite familiar to us, never ftrike our attention or curiofity ; and however extraordinary or furprifing thefe objeds in themfelves, they are palTed over, by the raw and ignorant multitude, without much examination, or enquiry. Adam, rifmg at once, in paradife, and in the full perfetlion of his faculties, would natu- rally, as reprefented by Milton, be aftonillied at the glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members ; and would be led to afk, whence this wonderful fcene arofe. But a barbaious, neceflitous animal (fuch as
a man
The Natural History of Rhligion. 405
a man is on the firft origin of fociety), preflcd by fuch n'-imerous wants and pallions, has no leifure to admire the regular face of nature, to make enqui- ries concerning the caufe of thofe objetls, to which from his infancy he has been gradually accurtomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfedl nature appears, the more is he familiarized to it, and the lefs inclined to fcrutinize and examine it. A monftrous birth ex- cites his curiofity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately fpts him a trembling, and facrificing, and praying. But an animal, compleat in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary fpe6lacle, and produces no religious opinion or afFeftion. Afk him, whence that animal arofe; he will tell youj from the copu- lation of its parents. And thefe, whence ? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes fatisfy his curiofity, and fet the objeft at fuch a diftance, that he entirely loles fight of them. Imagine not, that he will fo much as dart the queftion, whence the firft animal; much lefs, whence the whole fyftem or united fabric of the univerfe arofe. Or, if you« ftart fuch a queftion to him, expect not, that he will employ his mind with any anxiety about a fub- jedt, fo remote, fo uninterefting, and which fo much exceeds the bounds of his capacity.
But farther, if men were at firft led into the be- lief of one Supreme Being, by reafoning from the frame of nature, they could never poffibly leave that belief, in order to embrace polytheifm ; but the fame principles of reafon, which at firft pro- duced and diffufed over mankind, fo magnificent an opinion, muft be able, with greater facility, to pre- ferve it. The firft invention and proof of any doc- trine is much more difficult than the fiipportingand retaining of it.
There
4o6 The Natural History of Religion.
There is a great difference between hiftorical fa6ts and fpeculative opinions ; nor is the know- ledge of the one propagated in the fame manner with that of the other. An hiftorical fa6t, while it paffes by oral tradition from eye-witneffes and contemporaries, is difguifed in every fuccelTive narration, and may at laft retain but very fmall, if any, refemblance of the original truth, on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their fupine careleflhefs ; thefe principles, if not corredled by books and writing, foon pervert the account of hiftorical events i where argument or reafoning has little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth, which has once efcaped thofe narrations. It is thus the fables of Hercules, Thefeus, Bacchus are fuppof- ed to have been originally founded in true hif- tory, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to fpeculative opinions, the cafe is far otherwife. If thefe opinions be founded on arguments fo clear and obvious as to carry conviftion with the generality of mankind, the fame arguments, ".v/hich at firft diffufed the opinions, will ftill pre- ferve them in their original purity. If the ar- guments be more abftrufe, and more remote from vulgar apprehenfion, the opinions will always be confined to a few perfons ; and as foon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will immediately be loft and buried in oblivion. Whichever fide of this dilemma we take, it muft appear impollible, that theifiii could, from reafoning, have been the primary religion of hu- man race, and afterwards, by its corruption, given birth to polytheifm and to all the various fuper- ititions of the heathen world. Reafon, when ob- vious, prevents thefe corruptions: When abftrufe, it keeps the principles entirely from the know- ledge of the vulgar, who arc alone liable to cor- rupt any principle or opinion.
Sect.
The Natural History of Religion. 407
Sect. II. Origin of Polytheifm,
If we would, therefore, indulge our curiofity, in ■enquiring concerning the origin of religion, wc muft turn our thoughts towards polytheifnn, the primitive religion of uninftrufted mankind.
Were men led into the apprehenfion of invifible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never poifibly entertain any conception but of one fingle being, who bellowed exiflcnce and order on this vail machine, and adjulted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected fyllem. For though, to perfons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear al- together abfurd, that feveral independent beings, endowed with fuperior wifdom, might confpire in the contrivance and execution of one regular plan ; yet is this a merely arbitrary fuppofition, which, even if allowed polhble, muft be confefled neither to be fupported by probability nor ne- ceflity. All things in the univ^rfe ar^ evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjulted to every thing. One defign prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknow- ledge one author ; becaufe the conception of dif- ferent authors, without any diflinction of attri- butes or operations, ferves only to give perplexi- ty to the imagination, without beftowing any fa- tisfacfticn on the underllanding. The ftatue of Laocoon, as we learn from Pliny, was the work of three artifts : But it is certain, that, were we not told fo, we lliould never have imagined, that a groupe of figures, cut from one itone, and unit- ed in one plan, was not the work and contrivance of one fuatuary. To afcribe any fingle efFe<5l to the combination of feveral caufes, is not furely a natural and obvious fuppofition.
On
4o8 The Natural History of Religion.
On the other hand, if, leaving the works of na- ture, we trace the footfteps of invifible power in the various and contrary events of human life, we are necefTarily led into polytheifm and to the ac- knowledgment of feveral limited and imperfeft dei- ties. Storms and tempells ruin what is nourifhed ^by the fun. The fun deflroys what is foftered by the moifture of dews and rains. War may be fa- vourable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the feafons afflifbs with famine. Sicknefs and pefti- lence may depopulate a kingdom, amidft the moft: profufe plenty. The fame nation is not, at the fame time, equally fuccefsful by fea and by land. And a nation, which now triumphs over its ene- mies, may anon fubmit to their m.ore profperous arms. In fliort, t!ie condu6V of events, or what we call the plan of a particular providence, is fo full of variety and uncertainty, that, if we fup- pofe it immediately ordered by any intelligent be- ings, we muft acknowledge a contrariety in their dcfigns and intentions, a conflant combat of op- pofite powers, and a repentance or change of in- tention in ' the fame power, from impotence or levity. Each nation has its tutelar deity. Each element is fubjefted to its invifible power or agent. The province of each god is feparate from that of another. Nor are the operations of the fame god always certain and invariable. To-day he pro- tefts : To-morrow he abandons us. Prayers and facrifices, rites and ceremonies, well or ill per- formed, are the fources of his favour or enmity, and produce all the good or ill fortune, v/hich are to be found amongft mankind.
We m.ay conclude, therefore, that, in all nati- ons, which have embraced polytheifm, the firfl: ideas of religion arofe not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incef- fant hopes and fears, which actuate the human
mind.
The Natural History of Religion. 409
mind. Accordingly, we find, that all idolaters, having feparated the provinces of their deities, have recourfe to that invifible agent, to whole authority they are immediately fubjccled, and whofe pro- vince it is to fuperintend that courfe of aflions, in which they are, at any time, engaged. Juno is invoked at marriages ; Lucina at births. Nep- tune receives the prayers of feamen -, and Mars of warriors. The hufbandman cultivates his field un- der the proteflion of Ceres ; and the merchant ac- knowledges the authority of Mercury. Each na- tural event is fuppofed to be governed by fome in- telligent agent ; and nothing profperous or adverfc can happen in life, which may not be the fubjcdt of peculiar prayers or thankfgivings *
It muft neceflarily, indeed, be allowed, that, in order to carry men's attention beyond the pre- fent courfe of things, or lead them into any infer- ence concerning invifible intelligent power, they mufl be aduated by fom.e pafiion, which prompts their thought and reflexion j fome motive, which urges their firft enquiry. But what pafilon fliail we here have recourfe to, for explaining an efFeA of fuch mighty confequence ? Not fpeculative curio- fity furely, or the pure love of truth. That mo- tive is too refined for fuch grofs apprehenfions ; and would lead men into enquiries concerning the frame of nature, a fubjedl too large and compre- henfive for their narrow capacities. No pafTions, therefore, can be fuppofed to work upon fuch bar- barians, but the ordinary aff^e6bions of human life; the anxious concern for happinefs, the dread of future mifery, the terror of death, the thirft of re- venge, the appetite for food and other necefiaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this natjre, efpeci- ally the latter, men fcrutinize, with a trembling-
curiofity,
• beeNOTE [YY].
4IO The Natural History of Religion.
curiofity, the courfe of future caufes, and exa- mine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this difordered fcene, with eyes dill more difordered and aftonilhed, they fee the firft obfcure traces of divinity.
Sect. III. The Jam Jubje^ continued.
We are placed in this world, as in a great the-, atre, where the true fprings and caufes of every event are entirely concealed from us^ nor have we cither fufficient wifdom to forefee, or power to prevent thofe ills, with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual fufpence be- tween life and death, health and ficknefs, plenty and want; which are diftributed amongft the hu- man fpecies by fecret and unknown caufes, whofe operation is oft unexpefted, and always unaccount- able. Thefe unknown caujesy then, become the conftant objedl of our hope and fear ; and while the paflions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anx- ious expedtation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of thofe powers, on which we have fo entire a depen- dance. Could men anatomize nature, according to the moft probable, at leaft the moft intelli- gible phiiofophy, they would find, that thefe caufes are nothing but the particular fabric and ftru»5ture of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects : and that, by a regular and conftant machinery, all the events are pro- duced, about which they are fo much concerned. But this phiiofophy exceeds the comprehenfion of the ignorant multitude, who can only conceive the unknown caujes in a general and confufed manner ; though their imagination, perpetually employed on the fame fubjeft, muft labour to form fome particular and diftinct idea of them. The
more
The Natural History of Religion. 411
inorc they confider thcfe caufes themfelves, and the uncertainty of their operation, the Icfs fatisfacli- tion do they meet with in their refcarches ; and, however unwilling, they muft at laft have aban- doned fo arduous an attempt, were it not for a propenfity in human nature, which leads into a fyftcm, that gives them fome fatisfaftion.
There is an univerfal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themfdves, and to tranf- fer to every objefb, thofe qualities, with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately confcious. We find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and by a na- tural propenfity, if not correfled by experience and refleftion, afcribe malice or good-will to eve- ry thing, that hurts or pleafes us. Hence the fre- quency and beauty of the profopcpccia in poetry j where trees, mountains and flreams are perfonifi- ed, and the inanimate parts of nature acquire ^tn- timent and paflion. And though thefe poetical fi- gures and expreffions gain not on the belief, they may ferve, at leaft, to prove a certain tendency in the imagination, without which they could neither be beautiful nor natural. Nor is a river-god or hamadryad always taken for a mere poetical or imaginary perfonage ; but may fometimes enter into the real creed of the ignorant vulgar; while each grove or field is reprefented as poflefTed of a particular genius or invifible power, which inha- bits and prote(fts it. Nay, philofophers cannot en- tirely exempt themfelves from this natural frailty ; but have oft alcribed to inanimate matter the hor- r ov o( 2i vaammy lympathies, antipathies, and other afFeclions of human nature. The abfurdity is not lefs, while we caft our eyes upwards ; and transfer- ring, as is too ufual, human paffions and infirmi- ties to the deity, reprefent him as jealous and re- vengeful, capricious and partial, and, in fliort, a wicked and foolifh man, in every refpeft but his
fuperior
412 The Natural History of Religion.
fuperior power and authority. No wonder, then, that mankind, being placed in fuch an abfolute ig- norance of caufes, and being at the fame time fo anxious concerning their future fortune, fhould immediately acknowledge a dependence on invifi- ble powers, pofleffed of fentiment and intelligence. The unknown caufes y which continually employ their thought, appearing always in the fame afpeft, are all apprehended to be of the fame kind or fpecies. Nor is it long before we afcribe to them thought and reafon and pafTion, and fometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a refemblance with ourfelves.
In proportion as any man's courfe of life is go- verned by accident, we always find, that he en- creafes in fuperftition ; as may particularly be ob- ferved ofgamefters and failors, who, though, of all mankind, the leaft capable of ferious refiedliion, abound moft in frivolous and fuperftitious appre- henfions. The gods, fays Coriolanus in Dionyfi- iis *, have an influence in every afi^air; but above all, in war; where the event is fo uncertain. All human life, efpecially before the inftitutlon of order and good government, being fubjed to fortuitous accidents; it is natural, that fuperftition fhould prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the moft earneft enquiry concerning thofe invifible powers, who difpofe of their happinefs or mifery. Ignorant of aftronomy and the anatomy of plants and animals, and too little curious to obferve the admirable adjuftment of final caufes ; they remain ftill unacquainted with a firft and fu- preme creator, and with that infinitely and perfedV ipirlt, v/ho alone, by his almighty will, beliowed order on the whole frame of nature. Such a magni- ficent idea is too big for their narrow conceptions,
which,
* Lib. viil.
The Natural History of Religion. 413
which can neither obferve the beauty of the work, nor connprehend the grandeur of its author. They fuppofe their deities, however potent and invifi- ble, to be nothing but a fpecies of human crea- tures, perhaps raifed from among mankind, an4 retaining all human paflions and appetites, to"- gether with corporeal limbs and organs. Such limited beings, though mafters of human fate, be^ ing, each of them, incapable of extending his in- fluence every where, muft be vaftly multiplied, in order to anfwer that variety of events, which happen over the whole face of nature. Thus every place is ftored with a crowd of local dei- ties; and thus polytheifm has prevailed, and ftill prevarls, among the greatell part of uninflirudled mankind *.
Any of the human affeftions may lead us into the notion of invifible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliftion : But if we examine our own hearts, or obferve what pafles around us, we fhall find, that men are much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholj^ than by the agreeable pafTions. JProfperity is ea- fily received as our due, and few queftions are alked concerning its caufe or author. It begets cheerfulnefs and adlivity and alacrity and a lively enjoyment of every focial and fenfual pleafurc : And during this ftate of mind, men have little
leifure
* The following lines of Euripides are fo much to the prc- fent purpofe, thai I cannot forbear quoting them :
Of* sfiy aSiy OTirov, »T syj~o^((K, Out ixv ntuxui? -nrpot-craorla /uh -arpa^ei)' xoDtanS". ^vp^a-i i'oiv'i'oi ^ioi ■•nra,A(» Ti jcxi 'Cjfocruj, TcLfctyuov £VTi9£v/ef, as (lyycuijix litafiiY oct/lcf, Hecuba.
" There is nothing fecure in the world ; no glory, no prof- perity. ^ The gods tofs all life into confuiion ; mix every •' thing with its reverfe ; that all of us, from our ignorance and " uncertainty, may pay them the more worlhip and reverence."
414 The Natural History of Religion,
leifure or inclination to think of the unknown in- vifible regions. On the other hand, every dif" aftrous accident alarms us, and fets us on en- quiries concerning the principles whence it arofe : Apprehenfions fpring up with regard to futurity : And the mind, funk into diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourfe to every method of ap- p'eafing thofe fecret intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is fuppofed entirely to depend.
No topic is more ufual with all popular di- vines than to difplay the advantages of affli(flion, in bringing men to a due fcnfe of religion ; by fubduing their confidence and fenfuality, which, in times of profperity, make them forgetful of a divine providence. Nor is this topic confined merely to modern religions. The ancients have alfo employed it. Fortune has never liberally ^ without envy^ fays a Greek hiflorian *, bejiowed an unmixed happinejs on mankind ; but with all her gifts has ever conjoined Jome dijajirous circumjiance, in order to chajiize men into a reverence for the godsj whomy in a continued courfe of profperity ^ they are apt to neglect and forget.
What age or period of life is the moft addicled to fuperftition ? The weakeft and moft timid. What fex ? The fame anfwer muft be given. The leaders and examples of every kind of fuperfiition^ fays Strabo f, are the 'women. Theje excite the men to devotion and fupplicationSy and the obfervance of religious days. It is rare to meet with one that lives apart from the females ^ and yet is addicted to Juch pradlices. And nothing can, for this reafon, be more improbable., than the account given of an order of men among the Getes, who pra5lifed celibacy, and were notwithfiandlng the tnojl religious fanatics. A method of rcafoning, which would lead us to entertain a bad idea of the devotion of monks ;
did
• Diod. Sic. lib. iii. f Lib. vii.
The Natural History of Religion. 415
did we not know by an experience, not fo conn- mon, perhaps, in Strabo's days, that one may pradife celibacy, and profeis chaflity; and yet maintain the clofeft connexions and moft entire fympathy with that timorous and pious fex.
Sect. IV. Deities not conjidered as creators or for- mers of the world.
The only point of theology, in which we Ihall find a confent of mankind almofb univerfal, is, that there is invifible, intelligent power in the world : But whether this power be fupreme or fubordinate, whether confined to one being, or diltributed among feveral, what attributes, qua- lities, connexions, or principles of a6lion ought to be afcribed to thofe beings ; concerning all thefe points, there is the wideft difference in the popular fyllems of theology. Our anceftors in Europe, before the revival of letters, believed, as we do at prefent, that there was one fupreme God, the author of nature, whofe power, though in itfelf uncontroulable, was yet often exerted by the interpofition of his angels and fubordinate minifters, who executed his facred purpofes. But they aifo believed, that all nature was full of other invifible powers ; fairies, goblins, elves, fprights ; beings, ftronger and mightier than men, but much inferior to the celelliai natures, who furround the throne of God. Now, fuppofe, that any one, in thofe ages, had denied the exiftence of God and of his angels ; would not his impi- ety juftly have deferved the appellation of athe- ifm, even though he had ftill allowed, by fome odd cajTicious reafoning, that the popular ftories of elves and fairies were juft and well ground- ed ? The difference, on the one hand, between fuch a pcrfon and a genuine theift is infinitely
greater
4i6 The Natural History of Religion.
greater than that, on the other, between him and one that abfolutely excludes all invifible intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the ca- fual refemblance of names, without any confor- mity of meaning, to rank fuch oppofitc opinions under the fame denomination.
To any one, who confiders juftly of the mat- ter, it will appear, that the gods of all polythe- ifts are no better than the elves or fairies of our anceftors, and merit as little any pious wor- fhip or veneration. Thefe pretended religionifts are really a kind of fuperftitious atheifts, and acknowledge no being, that correfponds to our idea of a deity. No firft principle of mind or thought: No fupreme government and adminif- tration : No divine contrivance or intention in the fabric of the world.
The Chinefe, when * their prayers are not an- fwered, beat their idols. The deities of the Lap- landers are any large ftone which they meet with of an extraordinary fhape f. The Egyptian my- thologifts, in order to account for animal worfhip, faid, that the gods, purfued by the violence of earth-born men, who were their enemies, had for- merly been obliged to difguife themfelves under the femblance of beafts J. The Caunii, a nation in the IcfTer Afia, refolving to admit no Itrange gods among them, regularly, at certain feafons, affembled themfelves compleatly armed, beat the air with their lances, and proceeded in that man- ner to their frontiers ; in order, as they faid, to expel the foreign deities Ij. Not even the immortal godsy faid fome German nations to Csefar, are a match for the Suevi §.
Many
• Peter le Com pte. f Rcgnard, Voiage de Laponie.
X Diod. Sic. lib. i. Lucian, de Sacrificiis. Ovid alludes to the fame tradition, Metam. lib. v. 1. 321. So alfo Manilius, lib. iv. II Herodot. lib. i.
§ Caef. Comment, de bello Gallico, lib. iv.
The Natural History of Rlligio!?. 417
Many ills, fays Dione in Honner ro Venus Wounded by Diomede, many ills, my daughter, have the gods inflicted on men : And many ills, in return, have ir.en inflifted on the gods*. We need but open any clafTic author to meet with thelc grofs reprelentarions of the deities ; and Longinus f with reafon obferves, that fuch ideas of the divine nature, if literally taken, con- tain a true atheifm.
Some writers J have been furprized, that the impieties of Ariftophanes fhould have been to- lerated, nay publicly acted and applauded by the Athenians; a people fo fuperftitious and lb jea- lous of the public religion, that, at that very time, they put Socrates to death for his imagin- ed incredility. But thefe writers do nor confi- der, that the ludicrous, familiar im.ages, under which the gods are reprefented by that comic poet, inliead of appearing impious, were the ge- nuine lights in which the ancients conceived their divinities. What condud can be more criminal or mean, than that of Jupiter in the Amphitri- on ? Yet that play, which reprefented his gallant exploits, was fuppofed fo agreeable to him, that it was always acted in Rome by public authori- ty, when the ftate was threatened with peftilence, famine, or any general calainitylj. The Romans fuppofed, that, like all old lerchers, he would be highly pleafed with the recital of his former feats of prowefs and vigour, and that no topic was fo proper, upon which to flatter his vanity.
The Lacedemonian^, fays Xenophon §, always, during war, put up their petitions very early in the morninc-^, in order to be beforehand with theii enemies, and, being the firft folicitors, pre-engage
Vol. II. E e the
• Lib. i\'. 3S2. f Cap. ix.
X Pere Brunio, , Theatre des Grecs ; & Fontenelle, Fliflolre* dei Oracics. || Ainob. lib. vii; § De Laced. Rep<
41 B The Natural History of Religiom,
the gods in their favour. We may gather frorr; Seneca*, that it was ufual, for the votaries in the temples, to make interePc with the beadle or fex- ton, that they might have a feat near the image of the deity, in order to be the befc heard in their prayers and applications to him. The Ty- rians, when befieged by Alexander, threw chains on the ftatue of Hercules, to prevent that deity from deferting to the enemy f. Aiiguftus, having twice loft his fleet by ftorms, forbad Neptune to be carried in proccfTion along with the other gods; and fancied, that he had fufficiently re- venged himfelf by that expedient;]:. After Ger- manicus's death, the people were fo enraged at their gods, that they ftoned them in their tem- ples; and openly renounced all allegiance to them II .
To afcribe the origin and fabric of the uni- verfe to thefe impcrfe6l beings never enters in- to the imagination of any polytheift or idolater. Hefiod, whofe writings, with thofe of Homer, contained the canonical fyftem of the heathens §j Hefiod, I fay, fuppofes gods and men to have fprung equally from the unknown powers of na- ture f. And throughout the whole theogony of that author. Pandora is the only inftance of crea- tion or a voluntary produdlion ; and flie too was formed by the gods merely from defpite to Pro- metheus, who had furniflied men with ftolen fire from the ceftial regions ft- ^-^^'^^ ancient mytho- logifts, indeed, feem throughout to have rather em- braced the idea of generation than that of crea- tion
* Epifl* xii.
t Quint. Curtius, lib. iv. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. lib. xvii.
.1 Suet, in vita Aug. cap. 16 || Id. in vita Cal. cap. 5.
§ Herodot. lib. ii. Lucian. Jupiter coufutatus, de lutlu, Sa- tuf/i Sec.
n,-o,uo2jcr :^;;ctac7( :5eoi 2n;;'iojT" av5p-^7ro'. Hef. Opera & Dies, 1. iu8.
ft Thcog. 1. 570.
The Natural History of Religion. 4.1^
lion or formation; and to have thence account- ed for the origin of this univerfe.
Ovid, who lived in a learned age, and had been inftru6ted by philofophers in the principles of a divine creation or formation of the world; finding, that fiich an idea would not agree with the popular mythology, which he delivers, leaves it, in a manner, loofe and dctatched from his fyftem. ^lifquis fuit ille Deorum*? Whichever of the gods it was, fays he, that difllpated the chaos and introduced order into the uni- verfe. It could neither be Saturn, he knew, nor Jupiter, nor Neptune, nor any of the receiv- ed deities of paganifm. His theological fy- ftem had taught him nothing upon that head; and he leaves the matter equally undetermined.
Diodorus Siculusf, beginning his work with an enumeration of the mod reafonable opinions concerning the origin of the world, makes no mention of a deity or intelligent mind; though it is evident from his hifbory, that he was much more prone to fuperitition than to irreligion. And in another paffage J, talking of the Ich- thyophagi, a nation in .India, he fays, that, there being fo great difficulty in accounting for their defcent we muft conclude them to be aborigineSy without any beginning of their generation, pro- pagating their race from all eternity; as feme of the phyfiologers, in treating of the origin of na- ture, have juftly obferved. " But in fuch fub- *' jecls as thefe," adds the hiftorian, '^ wi;ich " exceed all human capacity, it may well hap- " pen, that thofe, who difcourfe the mod, know *' the leaft; reaching a fpecious appearance of *' truth in their reafonings, while extremely wide " of the real truth and matter of facl."
E e.2 A (trange
* Metamorph. lib. 1. 1. 32. f Li^- i- % I^- »btd.
420 The Natural History of Religion.
A ftrange fentiment in our eyes, to be embrac- ed by a profeffed ar^d zealous religionift* ! But it was merely by accident, that the queilion con- cerninof the origin of the world did ever in an- cient times enter into religious fyilems, or was treated of by theologers. The philofophers alone made profeflion of delivering fyftems of this kind; and it was pretty late too before thefe bethought themfelves ,of having recourfe to a mind or fu- .preme intelligence, as the firit caufe of all. So far was it from being efteemed profane in thofe days to account for the origin of things with- out a deity, that Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and others, who embraced that fyltem of cofmo- gony, pad unqueflioned ; while Anaxagoras, the firfl undoubted theift among the philofophers, was perhaps the firlt that ever was accufed to atheifm f*
We are told by Sextus Empiricus ^y i^hat Epi- cuius, when a boy, reading with his preceptor thefe veries of Hefiod.
Elded of beings, chaos firft arofe ; t^cAt earib, wide-ftretch'd, the feaf of all: the young fcholar firll betrayed his inquifitive genius, by afking, /Ind chaos whence? But was told by his preceptor, that he muft have re- courfe to the philofophers for a folution of fuch queftions. And from this hint Epicurus left phi- lology and all other fludies, in order to betake himfelf to that fcience, whence alone he expell- ed
* The fiime author, who can thus account for the origin of tiie worid without a Deity, elteems it impious to explain horn phyficnl caufes, the common accidents ot' life, earthquakes, in- undations, and tempclh: and devoutly aicribes thefe to the an- ger of Jupiter or Neptune. A plain proof, whence he derived Jiis ideas of religion. See lib. xv. p. 364. Ex. edit. Rhodo- niani.
t See NOTE [ZZ].
X Adverfus Matheni. lib. ix.
The Natural History of Religion. 421
cd fatisfadlion with regard to thcfe fublime lub- jefts.
The common people were never likely to piifh their relearchcs fo tar, or derive from reafoning their fyftems of religion j when philologers and mythologiliis, we fee^ fcarcely ever difcovered To much penetration. And even the philofophers, who difcourfed of fuch topics, readily affented to the grofTefl theory, and admitted the joint origin of gods and men from night and chaos; from fire, water, air, or whatever they eftablifh- ed to be the ruling element.
Nor was it only on their firft origin, that the gods were fuppofed dependent on the powers of nature. Throughout the v/hole period of their exiftence they were fubjefted to the dominion of fate or deftlny. Think of force of neceffity^ fays Agrippa to the Roman people, that force , io zchicb even !hc gods 7nuftfubmit^ . And the Younger Pliny f, agreeable to this way of thinking, tells us, that amidtt the darknefs, horror, and confufion, which enfued upon the firft eruption of Vefuvius, feve- ral concluded, that all nature was going to wrack, and that gods and rrien v/ere perilhing in one common ruin.
It is great complaifance, indeed, if we digni- fy with the name of religion fuch an imperfect fyftem of theology, and put it on a level with latter fyftems, which are founded on principles more jull and more fublime. For my part, I can fcarcely allow the principles even of Mar- cus Aurelius, Plutarch, and fome other Stoics and Academics J though much miore refined than the pagan fuperltition, to be worthy of the honour- able appellation of theifm. For if the mytho- logy of the heathens refemble the ancient Euro- pean fyftem of fpiritual beings, excluding God
a;.d
* Dionys. Halic lib. vi. f Epift. lib. vi.
49.1 The Natural History off Religion.
and angels, and leaving only fairies and fprightsj the creed of thefe philofopers- nnay juflly be faid to exclude a deity, and to leave only angeU and fairies.
Sed. V- Various Forms ofPdytheifm -.Allegory Hero- WorJIjtf^
But it is chiefly our pre fent bufinefs to con- fider the grofs polytheifm of the vulgar, and to, trace ail its various appeaj ances, in the princi- ples of human nature, >vh«jnce they are derived.
Whoever learns by arguunent, the exiftence of invifible intelligent poA^rer, muft reafon from the admirable contrivance of n; itural objefts, and muft fuppofe the world to ,be the workmanfhip of that divine being, the origin al cauie of all things. But the vulgar poly«:he ift, fo far from admit- ting that idea, deifies ev' ery part of the univerfe, and conceives all the cc )nfpicuous productions of nature, to be themfelve s fo many real divinities. The fun, moon, and it ars, are all gods accord- ing to his lyftem : Ff juntains. are inhabited by nymphs, and trees by hamadryads: Even mon- kies, dogs, cats, and c .ther animals often become facred in his eyes, ani J flrike him with a religi- ous veneration. And thus, however ftrong men's propenfity to believe invifible, intelligent power in nature, their pro penfity is equally ftrong to reft their attentig^i on fenfible, vifible objedls ; and in order to rec oncile thefe oppofite inclina- tions, they are led to unite the invilible power with fome vifiblc object.
The diftributipr i alfo of diftinft provinces to the feveral deitif>s is apt to caufe fome allegory, both phyfical ai^r 1 moral, to enter into the vul- gar fyftems of -f .olvtheifm. The god of war will
naturally
The Natural History of Religion. 423
naturally be reprefented as furious, cruel, and impetuous: The god of poetry as elegant, polite, and amiable : The god of merrhandife, efpecially in early times, as thievilh and dreadful. The allegories, Aippofed in Homer and other mytho- logifts, I allow, have often been fo drained, that men of fenfe are apt entirely to rejeifl them, and to confider them as the production merely of the fancy and conceit of critics and com- mentators. But that allegory really has place in the heatlien mythology is undeniable even on the lead refiedtion. Cupid the fon of Venus; the Mufes the daughters of Memory; Prometheus, the wife brother, and Epimetheus the foolifh; Hygieia or the goddefs of health defcended from iEfculapius or the god of phyfic : Who fees not, in thefe, and in many other inilances, the plain traces of allegory ? When a god is fuppofed to prefide over any pafTion, event, or fyftem of ani- ons, it is almoft unavoidable to give him a ge- nealogy, attributes, and adventures, fuitable to liis fuppofed powers and influence; and to carry on that fimilitude and comparifon, which is na- turally fo agreeable ro the mind of man.
Allegories, indeed, entirely perfeft, we ouglit not to expect as the productions of ignorance and fuperiticion ; there being no work of genius that requires a nicer hand, or has been more rarely executed with fuccefs. That Fear and 'Ter- ror are the fons of Mars is jUit; but v/hy by Venus*? That Harmony is the daughter of Ve- nus is regular; but wliy by Mare-j-j" "XX^dX Sleep is the brother of Death is fuitable; but why def- cribe him as enamoured of the Graces If? And fuice the ancient mythologies fall into miftakes fo grofs and palpable, we have no rcafon furely to expeCl: fuch refined and long-fpun allegories,
as
* Heliod. Theog. 1. 935
f Id. ibid. & Pliito. ia vita Pelop. \ Ili.-d. xiv. 267.
424 The Natural History of Religion.
as Ibme have endeavoured to reduce from their A<^ions.
Lucretius was plainly feduced by the ftrong appearance of allegory, which is obfervable in the pagan fictions. Pie firft addrefles himfelf to Venus as to that generating power, which animates, renews, and beautifies the univerfe: But is foon betrayed by the mythology into incoherencies, while he prays to that allegorical perfonage to appeafe the furies of her lover Mars: -An idea not drawn from allegory, but fiom the popular religion, and which Lucretius, as an Epicurean, could not confiftently admit of.
The deities of the vulgar are fo little fuperi- or to human creatures, that, where men are af- fed:ed with flrong fentimcnts of veneration or gratitude for any hero or public benefactor, no- thing can be more natural than to convert him into a god, and fill the heavtns, after this man- ner^ with continual recruits fiom among man- kind. Moft of the divinities of the ancient world are fuppofed to have once been men, to have been beholden for their apothecfis to the admi- ration and aifeftion of the people. The real hiflory of their adventures, corrupted by tradi- tion, and elevated by the marvellous, becam.e a plentiful fource of fable; efpecially in paffing through the hands of poets, allegorifis, and priefts, who fuccefnvely improved upon the wonder and jiftonifliment of the ignorant multitude.
Painters too and fculptors came in for their Jliare of profit in the facred myfteries; and fur- ni/hing men with fenfible reprefentations of their divinities, whom they cloathed in human figures, gave great cncreafe to the public devotion, and determined it.s objcdl. It was probably for want of thefe arts in rude and barbarous ages, that men deified plants, animals, and even brute, unor-
I ganizcd
The Natural History of Religion. 42?
ganized matter j and rather than be without a fen- Tible obje(5l of worfhip, affixfd divinity to fuch ungainly forms. Could any ftatuary of Syria, in early tmieSj have formed a juft figure of Apolio, the conic (tone, Heliogabalus, had never become the objed: of fuch profound adoration, and been received as a reprefentation of the folar deity *.
Stilpo, was banifhed by the council of Areopa- gus, for affirming that the Minerva in the citadel was no divinity i but the workmanrtiip of Phi- dias, the fculptor f- What degree of reafon muit we expeO: in the religious belief of the vulgar in other nations ; when Athenians and Areopagites could entertain fuch grofs conceptions ?
Thefe then are the general principles of po- lytheifm, founded in human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice and accident. As the caufes, which bellow happinefs or mifery, are, in general, very little known and very uncertain our anxious concern endeavours to attain a deter- minate idea of them ; and finds no better expe- dient than to reprefent them as intelligent vo- luntary agents, like ourfelvesj only fomewhat fu- perior in power and wifdom. The limited influ- ence of thefe agents, and their great proximity to human wcaknefs, introduce the various diftribu- tion and divifion of their authority j and thereby give rife to allegory. The fame principles natu- rally deify mortals, fuperior in power, courage, or underftanding, and produce hero-worfliip ; toge- ther with fabulous hiftory and mythological tra- dition, in all its wild and unaccountable forms.
And
* Herodian, lib. v. Jupiter Ammon Is reprefented by Cur- tius as a deity of the fame kind, lib. iv. cap. 7. The Arabi- ans and Perfmuntians adored alfo fhapelefs unformed ftones as their deity. Arnob. lib. vi. So much did their folly exceed that of the Egyptians.
f Diod. Laert. lib. ii.
.26 The Natural History of Religion.
And as an invifible fpiritual intelligence is an objeft too refined for vulgar apprehenfion, men naturally affix it to fome fenfible reprefentationj fuch as either the more confpicuous parts of na- ture, or the ftatues, images, and piflures, which a more refined age forms of its divinities.
Almoft all idolaters, of whatever age or coun- try, concur in thefe general principles and con- ceptions ; and even the particular chara6ters and provinces, which they aflign to their deities, are not extremely different *. The Greek and Ro- man travellers and conquerors, without much difficulty, found their own deities every where; and faid. This is Mercury, that Venus ; this Mars, that Neptune j by whatever title the ftrange gods might not be denominated. The goddefs Hertha of our Saxon anceflors feems to be no other, according to Tacitus f, than the Mater Melius of the Romans; and his conjefture was evidently jufl.
Sect. VI. Origin of 'theijm from Polytheifm.
The doftrine of one fupreme deity, the author of nature, is very ancient, has fpread itfelf over great and populous nations, and among them has been embraced by all ranks and conditions of men : But whoever thinks that it has owed its fuccefs to the prevalent force of thofe invincible reafons, on which it is undoubtedly founded, would Jhow himfelf little acquainted with the igno- rance and ftupidity of the people, and their in- curable prejudices in fiivour of their particular fuperftitions. Even at this day, and in Europe, afk any of the vulgar, why he believes in an omnipotent creator of the world; he will never
mention
* See C;t:nir of the religion of the Gauls, De bello Galll- co> lilj. xi. t ^^ moribus Germ.
The Natural History of Religion. 427
mention the beauty of final caiifes, of which he is wholly ignorant : He will not hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the fupplenefs and vari- iety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoife which they receive from the thumb, the foftnefs and flefliy parts of the infide of his hand, with all the other circum- ftances, which render that member fit for the ufe, to which it was deflincd. To thefe he has been long accuftomed : and he beholds them with lift- leflhefs and unconcern. He will tell you of the fudden and unexpected death of fuch a one: The fall and bruife of fuch another : The exceflive drought of this feafon : The cold and rains of another. Thefe he afcribes to the immediate operation of providence : And fuch events, as, with good reafoners, are the chief difficulties in admitting a fupreme intelligence, are with him the fole arguments for it.
Many theifls, even the moft zealous and re- fined, have denied a -particular providence, and have afierted, that the Sovereign mind or firfb principle of all things, having fixed general laws, by which nature is governed, gives free and un- interrupted courfe to thefe laws, and diilurbs not, at every turn, the fettled order of events by particular volitions. From the beautiful connex- ion, fay they, and rigid obfervance of eftabliflicd rules, we draw the chief argument for theifm ; and from the fame principles are enabled to an- fwer the principal objeftions againft it. But fo little is this underftood by the generality of man- kind, that, wherever they obferve any one to af- fcribe all events to natural caufes, and to remove the particular interpofition of a deity, they are apt to fufpecft him of the groffeft infidelity. J lli- tle philofophyy fays lord Bacon, 'makes 'men atheijls : A great deal reconciles them to religion. For men, being taught, by fuperftitious prejudice?, to lay
the
428 The Natural History of Religion.
the ftrefs on a wrong place : when that fails thermia and they difcover, by a little refleftion, that the courfe of nature is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to ruin. But be- ing taught, by more refle(5lion, that this very regularity and uniformity is the llrongeft proof of defign and of a fnpreme intelligence, they return to that belief, which they had deferted ; and they are now able to eftabliih it on a firmer and more durable foundation.
Convulfions in nature, diforders, prodigies, mi- racles, though the mofb oppofite to the plan of a wife fuperintendent, imprefs mankind with the ftrongeft fentiments of religion ; the caufes of events feeming then the moft unknown and un- accountable. Madnefs, fury, rage, and an in- flamed imagination, though they fink men near- efl to the level of bealls, are, for a like reafon, often fuppofed to be the only difpofitions, in which we can have any immediate communication with the Deity.
We may conclude, therefore, upon the whole, that, fince the vulgar, in nations, which have em- braced the do6lrine of theifm, ftill build it upon irrational and fuperfHtious principles, they are ne- ver led into that opinion by any procefs of argu- ment, but by a certain train of thinking, more fuitable to their genius and capacity.
It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nati- on, though men admit the exiftence of feveral li- mited deities, yet is there fome one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the objeft of their worfhip and adoration. They may either iuppofe, that, in the diftribution of power and territory among the gods, their nation was lub- jedted to the juril'ditlion of that particular deity i or reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may reprcfent one god as the prince or fupreme magiftrate of the reft, who,
though
The Natural History of Religion. 429
though of the fame nature, rules them with an authority, like that which an earthly fovereign exercifes over his fubjefts and vafTals. Whether this god, therefore, be confidered as tlieir peculiar patron, or as the general fovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to infinuate themfelves into his favoiT; and fuppofing him to be pleafed, like themfelves, with praife and flat- tery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be fpared in their addrefles to him. In pro- portion as men's fears or diftreflTes become more urgent, they ftill invent new ft rains of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predeceflbr in fwel- ling up the titles of his divinity, is fure to be outdone by his fuccelTor in newer and more pomp- ous epithets of praife. Thus they proceed ; till at laft they arrive at infinity itfelf, beyond which there is no farther progrefs: And it is well, if, in ftriving to get farther, and to reprefent a magnifi- cent fimplicity, they run not into inexplicable my- ftery, and dellroy the intelligent nature of their deity, on which alone any rational worfhip or adoration can be founded. While they confine themfelves to the notion of a perfe6t being, the creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles of reafon and true philofophy j though they are guided to that notion, not by rea- fon, of which they are in a great meafure incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the moll: vulgar fuperftition.
We often find, amongfl: barbarous nations, and even fometimes amongfl civilized, that, when eve- ry ftrain of liattery has been exhauiled towards arbitrary princes, when every human quality has been applauded to the utmoft ; their fervile cour- tiers reprefent them, at lail, as real divinities, and point chem out to the people as objefts of adora- tion. How much more natural, therefore, is it, that a limired deity, who at firft is fuppofed only
the
430 The Natural History of Religion.
the immediate author of the particular goods and ills in life, fhould in the end be reprefented as fovereign maker and modifier of the univerfe ?
Even where this notion of a fupreme deity is already eftablifhed ; though it ought naturally to leflen every other worfhip, and abafe every objeft of reverence, yet if a nation has entertained the opinion of a fubordinate tutelar divinity, faint, or angel ; their addreffes to that being gradually rife upon them, and encroach on the adoration due to their fupreme deity. The Virgin Af^r?, ere check- ed by the reformation, had proceeded, from being merely a good woman, to ufurp many attributes of the Almighty : God and St. Nicholas go hand in. hand, in all the prayers and petitions of the Muf- covites.
Thus the deity, who, from love, converted him- felf into a bull, in order to carry off Europa -, and who, from ambition, dethroned his father, Saturn, became the Optimus Maximus of the heathens. Thus, the God of Abraham, Ifaac, and Jacob, became the fupreme deity or Jehovah of the Jews.
The Jacobins, who deny the immaculate con- ception, have ever been very unhappy in their do6trine, even though political reafons have kept the Romifh church from condemnine; it. The Cordeliers have run away with all the popularity. But in the fifteenth century, as we learn from Boulainvilliers *, an Italian Cordelier maintained, that, during the three days, when Chrifl: was inter- red, the hypoftatic union was diffolved, and that his human nature was not a proper objed: of ado- ration, during that period. Without the art of divination, one might foretel, that fo grofs and im- pious a blafphemy would not fail to be anathema- tized
* HiUoirc abrcgee, p. 499.
The Natural History of Religion. 431
tized by the people. It was the occafion of great infiilts on the part of the Jacobins; who now got fome recompence for their misfortunes in the war about the imaculate conception.
Rather than relinquifh this propenfity to adula- tion, religionifts, in all ages, have involved them- felves in the greateft abfurdities and contradidli- ons.
Homer, in one palfage, calls Oceanus and Tethys the original parents of all things, conformably to the eftabliflied mythology and tradition of the Greeks: Yet, in other paflages, he could not for- bear complimenting Jupiter, the reigning deity, with that magnificent appellation J and according- ly denominates him the father of gods and men. He forgets, that every temple, every ftreet was full of the anccftors, uncles, brothers, and lif- ters of this Jupiter ; who was in reality nothing but an upfliart parricide and ufurper. A like con- traditlion is obfervable in Hefiod ; and is fo much the lefs excufeable, as his profefTed intention was to deliver a true oenealoo;y of the o-ods.
Were there a religion (and we may fufpefl Ma- hometanifm of this inconfiftence) which fometimes) painted the Deity in the moll fubiime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth ; fometimes de- graded him nearly to a level with human crea- tures in his powers and faculties; while at the fame time it afcribed to him fuitable infirmities, paf- fions, and partialities, of the moral kind : That re- ligion, after it was extinft, would alfo be cited as an inftance of thofe contradiftions, which arife from the grofs, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind, oppofed to their continual propenfity towards flat- terv and exaoi-Qieration. Nothino- indeed would prove more llrongly the divine origin of any religion, than to find (and happily this is the cafe "with Chriftianity) that it is free from a contradic- tion, fo incident to human nature.
Sect.
432 The Natural History of RELicfoN".
Sect. VII. Confirmation of this Do5frine.
It appears certain, that, though the original notions of the vulgar reprefent the Divinity as a limited being, and confider him only as the particular caufe of health or ficknefs ; plenty or want J profperity or adverfity ; yet when more magnificent ideas are urged upon them, they efteem it dangerous to refufe their aflent. Will you fay, that your deity is finite and bounded in his perfedions j may be overcome by a great- er force J is fubjed to human pafTions, pains, and infirmties j has a beginning, and may have an end ? This they dare not affirm j but thinking it fafeft to comply with the higher encomiums, they endeavour, by an affefled raviHiment and devotion, to ingratiate themfelves with him. As a confirmation of this, we may obferve, that the nfTent of the vulgar is, in this cafe, merely ver- bal, and that they are incapable of conceiving thofe fublime qualities, which they feemingly at- tribute to the Deity. Their real idea of him, notwithftanding their pompous language, is ftill as poor and frivolous as ever.
That original intelligence, fay the Magians> who is the firft principle of all things, difcovers himfelf immediately to the mind and underftand- ing alone ; but has placed the fun as his image in the vifible univerfe ; and when that bright luminary diffiifes its beams over the earth and the firmament, it is a faint copy of the glory, which refides in the higher heavens. If you would efcape the difpieafure of this divine be- ing, you muft be careful never to fet your bare foot upon the ground, nor fpit into a fire, nor throw any water upon it, even though it were confuming a whole city *. Who can cxprefs the perfedions of the Almighty ? fay the Ma- hometans.
♦ Hyde de Relig. vetcru.Ti Perfarum.
The Natural History of Religion. 433
hometans. Even the nobleil of his works, if com- pared to him, are but dnft and rubbifh. How much more muit human conc-jption fall Ihort o^ his infinite perfections? His fmile and favour re "'ers men for ever happy : and to obrain it ^or your children, the bzil method is to cut off from them, while infants, a little bit of Ikin, about hair clie breadth of a farthing. Take two bits of cloth f, fay the Rowan Cat holies y about an inch ci an inch and a half fquare, join them by the corners with two firings or pieces of tape about fixteen inches long, throw this over your head, and make one of the bits of cloth lie upon your breail, and the other upon your back, keeping them next your (kin : There is not a better fecret for recommending yourfelf to that infinite Being, who exifts from eternity to eternity.
The Getes, commonly called immortal, from their iteady belief of the foul's immortality, were genuine theifts and unitarians. They affirmed Zamolxis, their dciry, to be the only true god j and aderted the worfliip of all other nations to be addrelTcJ to mere fictions and chimeras. But were their religious principles any more refined, on ac- count of thefe magnificent pretenfions ? Every fifth year they facrificed a human vicflim, whom they fent as a mefTenger to their deity, in order to in- form him of their wants and neceJfities. And when it thundered, they v/ere io provoked, that, in order to return the defiance, they let fly arrows at him, and declined not the combat as une- qual. Such at leaft is the account, which He- rodotus gives of the theifm of the immortal Getes 4:.
Vol. II. F f Sect.
f Called the Scapulairj. % Lib.iv.
434 The Natural History of Religion.
Sect. Ylll. Flux and reflux ofpolytheifm and theljm^
It Is remarkable, that the principles of religiwi
have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rife from idolatry to theifm, and to fink again from theifm into idolatry. The vulgar, that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and iininllructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their difquifiti- ons into the fecret ftru6lure of vegetable or a- nimal bodies ; fo far as to difcover a fuprcmc mind or original providence, which bellowed or- der on every part of nature. They confider thefe admirable works in a more confined and felfiih view; and finding their own happinefs and mifery to depend on the fecret influence and unforefeen concurrence of external objefts, they regard, with perpetual attention, the unknown caujes^ which govern all thefe natural events, and diftribute pleafure and pain, good and ill, by their pow- erful, but filent, operation. The unknown cau- fes are ftill appealed to on every emergence; and in this general appearance or confufed image, are the perpetual objecls of human hopes and fears, v/ifhes and apprehenfions. By degrees, the atStive imagination of men, uneafy in this abftra6t conception of objecls, about which it is incef- fantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in fhapes more luitable to its natural comprehenfion. It repre- fcnts them to be fenfiblc, intelligent beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and facnfices. Hence the oriiiin of religion : And hence the origin of idolatry or polytheifm.
But the fame anxious concern for happinefs, which begets the idea of thefe invifible, intelligent
powers,
J
The Natural History of Ri-ligion. 43J
powers, allows not mankind to remain long in the firlt fimplc conception of them ; as powerful, but limited beings ; mafters of human fate, but Haves to deftiny and the courfe of nature. Men's exaggerated praifcs and compliments flill fwell their idea upon them ; and elevating their deities to the utmolt bounds of perfedion, at laft beget the attributes of unity and infinity, fimplicity and fpirituality. Such refined ideas, being fomewhat difproportioned to vulgar comprehenfion, remain not long in their original purity; but r'equire to be fupported by the notion of inferioi mediators or fubordinate agents, which interpofe between man- kind and their fupreme deity. Thefe demigods or middle beings, partaking more of human na- ture, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objefts of devotion, and gradually recal that idolatry, which had been formerly banifhed by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous and indigent mortals. But as thefe idolatrous religions fall every day into grofler and more vulgar con- ceptions, they ar lail deftroy themfelves, and, by the vile reprefen rations, which they form of their deities, make the tide turn again towards theifm. But lb great is the propenfity, in this alternate re- volution of human fentiments, to return back to idolatry, that the utmoil precaution is not able efFeftually to prevent it. And of this, fome theifts^ particularly the Jews and Mahometans, have been fenfible ; as appears by their baniihing a!l the avis of ftatuary and painting, and not allowing the re- jMefenrations, even of human figures, to betaken by marble or colours ; lePc the common infirmity of man- kind fhould thence produce idolatry. The feeble apprehenfions of men cannot be fatisiied with con- ceiving their deity as a pure fpirit and perfect intel- ligence; and yet their natural terrors keep them from imputing to him the leafl fliadow of limitati- on and imperfection. They fluftuate between thefe
F f 2 oppoiite
43^ The Natural History of Religion.
oppofite fentiments. The fame infirmity ftilt drags them downwards, from an omnipotent and fpiritual deity, to a limited and corporeal one, and from a corporeal and limited deity to a ftatue or vifible reprefentation. The fame endeavour aC elevation ftillpufhes them upwards, from the ftatue or material image to the invifible power; and from the invifible power to an infinitely perfe6t deity, the creator and fovereign of the univerfe.
Sect. IX. Comparifon of theje Religions^ with regard to P erf edition and 'Toleration.
Polytheifm or idolatrous worfhip, being founded entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any praflice or opinion, how- ever barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it ; and full fcope is given, for knavery to im- pofe on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled the religious fyftem of mankind. At the fame time, idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that, by limiting the powers and func- tions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods of other fedls and nations to a fhare of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ce- remonies, or traditions, compatible with each other *. Theifm is oppofite both in its advanta- ges and difadvantages. As that fyftem fuppofcs one fole deity, the perfeftion of reafon and good- nefs, it iliould, if juftly profecuted, banifli every thing frivolous, unreafonable, or inhuman from religious worlliip, and fet before men the mofl: illuflrious example, as well as the moft com- manding motives, of juftice and benevolence. Thefe mighty advantages are not indeed over-ba- lanced (for that is not poITibie), but fomewhat
diminiflied,
* Sec N O T E [AAA].
The Natural History of Religion. 437
•vliminifhed, by inconveniencies, whicli arife from the vices and prejudices of nianlvind. While one folc objedt of devotion is acknowledged, the wor- fhip of other deities is regarded as abfurd and impious. Nay, this unity of object feems natu- rally to require the unity of faith and ceremo- nies, and furnifhes defigning men with a pretence for reprefenting their adverfaries as profane, and the objecfts of divine as well as human vengeance. For as each k^t is pofitive that its own faith and worfhip are entirely acceptable to the deity, and as no one can conceive, that the fame being fhould be pleafed with different and oppofite rites and principles ; the feveral fe6ls fall naturally into animoTity, and mutually difcharge on each other that facred zeal and rancour, the moll fu- rious and implacable of all human pafTions.
The tolerating fpirit of idolaters, both in an- cient and modern times, is very obvious to any one, who is the leail converfant in the writings of hiftorians or travellers. When the oracle of Delphi was afked, what rites or worfhip was moft acceptable to the gods ? Thofe which are legally eftablifhed in each city, replied the oracle *. Even priefts in thofe a^esj could, it feems, al- low falvation to thofe or a different communion. The Romans commonly adopted the Gods of the conquered people; and never difputed the attri- butes of thofe local and national deities, in whofe territories they refided. The religious wars and perfecutions of the Egyptian idolaters are indeed an exception to this rule 5 but are accounted for by ancient authors from reafons fingular and remarkable. Different fpecies of animals were the deities of the differeht fefls among the Egyp- tians i and the deities being in continual war.
engaged
* Xenoph. Memor. lib. ii.
438 The Natural History of Religion.
engaged their votaries in the fame contention. The v/orHiippers of dogs could not long remain in peace with the adorers of cats or wolves *. But where that reafon took not place, the Egyptian fu- perftition was not fo incompatible as is commonly imagined; fince we learn from Herodotus t, that very large contributions were given by Amafis to- wards rebuilding the temple of Delphi.
The intolerance of almoft all religions, which liave maintained the unity of God, is as remark- able as the contrary principle ot polvtheifls, Ti'ic imj^ilacable narrow fpirit of the Jews is well known. Mahometanifm fet out with Hill more bloody principles ; and even to this day, deals out damnation, thous;h not hre and fao-o-ot, to all other fedls. And if, among Chriftians, the Eng- lifh and Dutch have embraced the principles of toleration, this fingularity has proceeded from the Aeady reiolution of the civil magiftrate, in oppo- fition to the continued efforts of priefts and bir gots.
The difciples of Zoroailer fhut the doors of heaven againll all but the Magians J. Nothing could more obftrudl: the progrefs of the Perfian conquefts, than the furious zeal of that nation againft the temples and images of the Greeks. And after the overthrow of that empire we find • Alexander, as a polytheiil, immediately re-efta- blifhing the worihip of the Babylonians, which their former princes, as monofheifis, had carefully aboiiflied Ij. Even the blind and devoted attach- inenr of that conqueror to the Greek fuperftition hindered not but he himfelf facrificed according to the Babylonifn ceremonies. §.
So
• Plurarch. de Ifjd. & Ofiride. f Lib- ii- Tub line.
t HydcdeRelig. vet. Perraiuui.
II Ariian* dc iixped. lib. iii. Id. lib. vii.
§ Id. ibid.
The Natural History of Rhligion. 439
So fociable is polytheifm, that the utmoft fierce- nefs and antipathy, which it meets within an oppo- site religion, is fcarcely able to difgull it, and keep it at a diRance. AuguRus prailed extreme- ly the referve of his grandfon, Caius Ca^far, when t}>is latter prince, palling by Jeriifalem, deigned not to facrifice according to the Jewifli law. But for what realbn did Auguftus fo much approve of this condiift? Only, becaufe that religion was by the Pagans efteemed ignoble and barbaroub*.
I may venture to affirm, that few corrihptions of idolatry and polytheifm are more pernicious to fociety than this corruption oftheifm-j-, when carried to the utmofl: height. The human fa- crifices of the Carthaginians, Mexicans, and many barbarous nations :|;, fcarcely exceed the inqui- fition and perfecutions of Rome and Madrid. For befides, that the efFufion of blood may not be lb great in the former cafe as in the latter; be- fides this, I fay, the human viftims, being cho- ien by lot,, or by fome exterior figns, affeft not, in fo confiderable a degree, the red of the fociety. Whereas virtue, knowledge, love of li- berty, are the qualities, which call down the fa- tal vengeance of inquifitors; and when expelled, leave the fociety in the moft Ihameful ignorance, corruption, and bondage. The illegal murder of one man by a tyrant is more pernicious than the death of a thoufand by peftilence, famine, or any undiftinguilliing calamity.
In the temple of Diana at Aricia near Rome, whoever murdered the prefent prieft, was legally entitled to be inftalled his fuc- ceflbrlj. A very fingular inftitution ! For, how- ever
• Sueton. in vita Aug. c. 93. f Corruptio optimi fejjlma.
t See NOTE [BBB].
I| Strabo, lib. v. Sueton. in vita Cal.
440 The Natural History of Religion.
ever barbarous and bloody the common fuper- fcitions otten are to the laity, they uiually turn to the advantage of the holy order. »
Sect. X. JVith regard to courage or ahajement
Fronn the comparifon of theifm and idolatry, we may form fome other obfervations, which will alfo confirm the vulgar obfervation, that the corruption of the beft things gives rife to the worft.
Where the deity is reprefented as infinitely fu- perior to mankind, this belief, though altogether juft, is apt, when joined with fuperftitious ter- rors, to finic the human inind in the loweft fub- milTion and abafement^ and to reprefent the monkiili virtues of mortification, pennace, humi- jity, and paffive fuffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to him. But where the gods are conceived to be only a little fuperior to mankind, and to have been, many of them, advanced from that inferior rank, we are more at our eafe in our addrefies to them, and may even, without profanenefs, afpire fometimes to a rivalfhip and emulation of them. Hence ac- tivity, fpirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people.
The heroes in paganifm correfpond exadly to the faints in popery and holy dervifes in Maho- metanifm. The place of Hercules, Thc-fcus, Heftor, Romulus, is now fupplied by Dominic, Francis, Anthony, and Benedict. Inftead of the deflruc- tion of monfters, the fubduing of tyrants, the defence of our native country ; whippings and faftings, cowardice and humility, abjed fubmif- fion and flavilh obedience, are become the means of obtaining ceklVial honours among man- kind.
One
The Natural History of Religion. 441
One great incitement to the pious Alexander in his warlike expeditions was his rivalfliip of Hercules and Bacchus, whom he juftly pretend- ed to have excelled *. Brafidas, that generous and noble Spartan, after falling in battle, had heroic honour paid him by the inhabitants of Am- phipolis, whofe defence he had embraced f. And in general, all founders of dates and colonies a- mong the Greeks were raifed to this inferior rank of divinity, by thofe who reaped the benefit of their labours.
This gave rife to the obfervation of Machia- vel J, that the do6trines of the Chriftian religion (meaning the catholic ; for he knew no other) which recommend only paffive courage and fufi^er- ing, had fubdued the fpirit of mankind, and had fitted them for flavery and fubjedlion. An obfer- vation, which would certainly be juft, were there not many other circumftances in human fociety which controul the genuis and charatfler of a reli- gion.
Brafidas feized a moufe, and being bit by it, let it go. There is 'nothing Jo contemptible^ faid he, hut what may be Jafe^ if it has hut courage to de- fend itjelf\. Bellarmine patiently and humbly al- lowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey upon him. We fhall have heaven^ faid he, to re- ward us for our fufferings : But thefe poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of the prejent life \. Such difference is there between the maxims of a Greek hero and a Catholic faint.
Sect. XI. With regard to reaf on or abjurdity.
Here is another obfervation to the fame purpofc, and a new proof that the corruption of the bell
things
* Arrian paflim. f Thucyd. lib. v. % Difcorfi, lib. vi. Plut. Apopth. § Bayle, Article Bellarmine.
44^ The Natural History of Religion.
things begets the worft. If we examine, without prejudice, the ancient heathen mythology, as con- tained in the poets, we fhall not difcover in it any fuch monftrous ablurdity, as we may at firfl: be apt to apprehend. Where is the difficulty in conceiv- ing, that the fame powers or principles, whatever they were, which formed this vifible world, men and animals, produced alfo a fpecies of intelligent creatures, of more refined fubftance and greater authority than the reft ? That thefe creatures may be capricious, revengeful, pailionate, voluptuous, is eafily conceived ; nor is any circumftance more apt, among ourfelves, to engender fuch vices, than the licence of abfolute authority. And in fhort, the whole mythological fyftem is fo natural, that, in the variety of planets and worlds, contained in this univerfe, it feems more than probable, that, ibmewhere or other, it is really carried into exe- cution.
The chief objeftlon to it with regard to this planet, is, that it is not afcertaincd by any juft reafon or authority. The ancient tradition, in- iilted on by heathen priefts and theologers, is but a weak foundation ; and tranfmitted alfo fuch a number of contradicftory reports, fupported, all of them, by equal authority, that it became ab- folutely impofiiii)le to fix a preference amongft them. A few volumes, therefore, muft contain all the j^olemical writings of pagan prielts : And their whole theology muft confift more of traditional ftories and fuperftitious practices than of philolo- phical arg.iment and controverfy.
But where theifm forms the fundamental prin- ciple of any popular religion, that tenet is fo con- torniable to found reafon, that philofophy is apt to incorporate itfelf with fuch a fyftem of theology. And if the other dogmas of that fyftem be con- tained in a facred book, fuch as the Alcoran, or
be
The Natural History of Religion. 443
be determined by any vifible authority, like that of the Roman pontiff, fpeculative reafo- ners naturally carry on their affent, and em- brace a theory, which has been inftilled into them by their earlieft education, and which alfo pof- fefies fome degree of confidence and uniformity. But as thcfe appearances are fure, all of them, to prove deceitful, philofophy will foon find herfelf very unequally yoked with her new affociate ; and inftead of regulating each principle, as they ad- vance together, fhe is at every turn perverted to ferve the purpofes of fuperftition. For befides the unavoidable incoherences, which mud be recon- ciled and adjufted; one may fafely affirm, that all popular theology, efpecially the fcholaftic, has a kind of appetite for abfurdity and contradi'dtion. If that theology went not beyond reafon and com- mon fenfe, her do6trines would appear too eafy and familiar. Amazement muft of neceffity be raif- ed : Myftery affedled : Darknefs and obfcurity fought after : And a foundation of merit afforded to the devout votaries, who defire an opportunity of fubduiag their rebellious reafon, by the belief of the mod unintelligible fophifms.
Ecclefiaitical hiflory fufficiently confirms thefe reflections. When a controverfy is ftarted, fome people always pretend with certainty to foretell the iffue. Whichever opinion, fay they, is moft con- trary to plain fenfe is fure to prevail ; even where the general intereft of the fyftem requires not that decifion. Though the reproach of herefy may, for fome time, be bandied about among the difputants, it always refts at laft on the fide of reafon. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the defini- tion of Arian, Pelagian, Eraftian, Socinian, Sa- bellian, F.utychian, Neftorian, Monothelite, &c. not to mention Proteilant, whofe fate is yet un- certain.
444 The Natural History of Religion.
certain, will be convinced of this obfervation. It is thus a fyftem becomes more abfurd in the end, merely from its being reafonable and philofophical in the beginning.
To oppofe the torrent of fcholaftic religion by fuch feeble maxims as thefe, that /'/ is impojjtble for the fame thing y to be and not to he., that the whole is greater than a 'part, that two and three make five ; is pretending to flop the ocean with a bull-rufh. Will you fet up profane reafon againfl facred myf^ tery ? No punifhment is great enough for your impieiy. And the fame fires, which were kindled for heretics, will ferve alfo for the dellrudion of philofophcrs.
Sect. XII. With regard to Doubt or Convi^ion,
We meet every day with people fo fceptical with regard to hiftory, that they aflert it impolFible for any nation ever to believe fuch abfurd principles as tliofc of Greek and Egyptian pagan ifm ; and at the lame time fo dogmatical with regard to religi- on» that they think the fame abfurdities are to be found in no other communion. Cambyfes enter- tained like prejudices j and very impioufly ridi- culed, and even wounded. Apis, the great god of the Egyptians, who appeared to his profane fenfes nothing but a large fpotted bull. But Herodo- tus judicioufly afcribes this fally of paffion to a real madnefs or diforder of the brain : Otherwife, fays the hiHorian, he never would h^ve openly af- fronted any eftabliflied worfhip. For on that head, continues he, every nation are bed fatisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation.
It muft be allowed, that the Roman Catholics are a very learned feft ; and that no one com- munion, but th^t of the church of England, can
difputc a
The Natural History of Religion. 445
difpute their being the mofl learned of all the Chriftian churches : Yet Averroes, the famous Arabian, who, no doubt, had heard of the Egyp- tian fuperflition, declares, that, of all religions, the mofl abfurd and nonfenfical is that, whofc votaries eat, after having created, their deity.
I believe, indeed, that there is no tenet in all paganifm, v^hich would give fo fair a fcope to ri- dicule as this of the real prejence : For it is fo ab- furd, that it eludes the force of all argument. There are even Ibme pleafant (lories of that kind, which, though fomewhat profane, are commonly told by the Catholics themfelves. One day, a priell, it is faid, gave inadvertently, inftead of the facrament, a counter, which had by accident fallen among the holy wafers. The communicant waited patiently for fome time, expe6ling it would dilTolve on his tongue: But finding that it flill remained entire, he took it off. / ivijh, cried he to the pried, you have not committed feme mif- take : I ivij/j you have not given me God the Fa- ther : He is fo hard and tough there is no /wallowing him.
A famous general,, at that time in the Muf- covite fcrvice, having come to Paris for the re- covery of his wound, brought along with him a young Turk, whom he had taken prifoner. Some of the doftor.s of the Sorbonne (who are altoge- ther as pofitive as the dervifcs of Conftantinople) thinking jt a pity, that the poor Turk fhould be damned for want of inflruclion, folicited Mufla- pha very hard to turn Chriftian, and promifed him, for his encouragement, plenty of good wine in this world} and paradife in the next. Thefe allurements were too powerful to be refifted -, and therefore, having been well inftru6led and cate- chized, he ?.t laft agreed to receive the facra- ments of baptifm and the Lord's fupper. The
pricft.
446 The Natural History of Religion.
priell, however, to make every thing fure and folid, ftill continued his inftrudlions ; and began the next day with the ufual queftion. How many Gods are there ? None at all ! replies Benedidl ; for that was his new name. How ! None at all ! cries the prieft. 'To be Jure^ faid the honeft profelyte. Tou have told me all along that there is hut one God : And yejlerday I eat him.
Such are the do6lrines of our brethren the Ca- tholics. But to thefe doftrines we are fo accuf- tomed, that we never wonder at them : Though in a futureage, it will probably become difficult to perfuade fome nations, that any human, two-leg- ged creature could ever embrace fuch principles. And it is a thoufand to one, but thefe nations themfelves fhall have fomething full as abfurd in their own creed, to which they will give a moft im- plicit and moft religious aflent. \. I lodged once at Paris in the fame hotel with
an ambafiador from Tunis, who, having pafled fome years at London, was returning home that way. One day I obferved his Moorifh excellen- cy diverting himfelf under the porch, with fur- veying the fplendid equipages that drove along ; when there chanced to pafs that way fome Capucin friars, who had never {ttn a Turk ; as he, on his part, though accuftomed to the European drefles, had never fcen the grotefque figure of a Capucin : And there is no exprelTing the mutual admirati- on, with which they infpired each other. Had the chaplain of the embafly entered into a dif- pute with thefe Francifcans, their reciprocal fur- prize had been of the fame nature. Thus all mankind ftand ftaring at one another; and there is no beating it into their heads, that the turban of the African is not juft as <TOod or as bad a fafliion as the cowl of the FAiropean. He is a very
honeft
The Natural History of KISligion. 447
bonefi mauy faid the prince of Sal lee, fpeaking of de Ruyter, // is a pity he were a Chrijtian.
How can you worfhip leeks and onions ? we fha!l fuppofe a Sorbonnift to fay to a prieft of Sais. If we worfliip them, replies the latter ; at leaft, we do not, at the fame time, eat them. But what ftrange objefts of adoration are cats and monkies? fays the learned dodor. They are at leafl as good as the relics or rotten bones of martyrs, anfwers his no lefs learned antagonift. Are you not mad, infifts the Catholic, to cut one another's throat about the preference of a cabbage or a cucumber? Yes, fays the pagan; I allow it, if you will con- fefs, that thole are flill madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of fophiftry, ten thoufand of which are not equal in value to one cabbao;e or cucumber *.
Every by-ftander will eafily judge (but unfortu- nately the by-ftanders are few) that, if nothing were requifite to eftablifh any popular fyftem, but expofing the abfurdities of other fyftems, every votary of every fupcrftition could give a fufficient reafon for his blind and bigocted attachment to the principles in which he has been educated. But without fo extcnfive a knowledge, on which to ground this affurance (and perhaps, better with- ou: it), there is not wanting a fufHcient ftock of religious zeal and faith among mankind. Diodo- rus Sicu]js -j- gives a remarkable inftance to this purpofe, of which he was himfelf an eye-witnefs. While Egypt lay under the greateft tenor of the Roman name, a legionary foldier having inadver- tently been guilty of the facriiegious impiety of killing a car, the v/hole people role upon him with the utmofl fury : and all the efforts of the prince were not able to fave him. The fenate and peo- ple
* See NOTE [CCC]. t Lib. i.
44^ The Nax'ural History of Religion.
pie of Rome, I am perfuaded, would not, then, have been fo delicate with regard to their national deities. They very frankly, a little after that time, voted Auguftus a place in the celeftial manfions ; and would have dethroned every god in heaven, for his fake, had he feemed to defire it. Prefens divus hahehitur Auguftus, fays Horace. That is a very important point : And in other nations and other ages, the fame circumftance has not been deemed altogether indifferent *.
Notwithftanding the fandity of our holy reli- gion, fays Tully f, no crime is more common with us than facrilege : But was it ever heard of, that an Egyptian violated the temple of a cat, an ibis, or a crocodile ? There is no torture, an Egyptian would not undergo, fays the fame author in ano- ther place J, rather than injure an ibis, an afpic, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile. Thus it is ftriftly true, what Dryden obferves,
" Of whatfoe'er defcent their godhead be, '* Stock, ftone, or other homely pedigree, *' In his defence his fervants are as bold, *' As if he had been born of beaten gold."
Absalom and Achitophel.
Nay, the bafer the materials are, of which the divinity is compofed, the greater devotion is he likely to excite in the breafts of his deluded votaries. They exult in their fhame, and make a merit with their deity, in braving, for his fake, all the ridicule and contumely of his ene- mies,
* When Louis the XlVth took on himfelf the proteflion of the Jelbits' College of Clermont, the fociety ordered the king's arms to be put up over the gate, and took down the crofs, in or- der to make way for it : Which gave occafion to the following epigram :
Suftulit hinc Chrifti, pofuitque infignia Regis : Impia gens, alium nefcit habere Deum. t Denat. Dcor. 1. i. || Tufc. QuelV. lib. v.
The Natural History of Religion. 449
mies. Ten thoufand Crufaders inlift themfeves under the holy banners j and even openly tri- umph in thofe parts of religion, which their ad- verfarics regard as the molt reproachful.
There occurs, I own, a difficulty in the Egyp- tian fyftem of theology; as indeed, few fyftem of that kind are entirely free from difficulties. It is evident, from their method of propagation, that a couple of cats, in fifty years, would ftock a whole kingdom ; and if that religious veneration were Itill paid them, it would, in twenty more, not only be eafier in Egypt to find a god thari a man, which Petronius fays was in fome parts of Italy; but the gods muft at lafl: entirely iiarve the men, and leave themfelves neither priefts nor votaries remaining. It is probable, therefore, that this wife nation, the mod celebrated in an- tiquity for prudence and found policy, forefee- ing fuch dangerous confcquences, referved all their worfhip for the full-grown divinities, and ufed the freedom to drown the holy fpawn or little fucking gods, without any fcruple or re- morfe* And thus the practice of warping the te- nets of religion, in order to ferve temporal in- terefts, is not, by any' means, to be regarded as an invention of thefe later ages.
The learned, philofophical Varro, difcourfmg of religion, pretends not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances: Such was his good fenfe and moderation ! But the paf- fionate, the zealous Auguftin, infults the noble Roman on his fccpticifm and referve, and pro- fcfles the molt thorough belief and ailuranre*. A heathen poet, however, contemporary with the faint, abfurdly elteems the religious fyftem of the latter fo falfe, that even the credulitv
Vol. II. G 2- of
o
De civitate Dei, 1. iii. e. 17.
450 The Natural History of Religion.
of children, he fays, could not engage them' to- believe itf.
Is it ftrange, when miflakes are fo common, to* find every one pofitive and dogmatical ? And that the zeal often rifes in proportion to the error ? Moverunt^ fays Spartian, ^. ea teyn-peflate^ Jud^i helium quod vetabantur niutilare genitalia']^.
If ever there was a nation or a time, in which the public religion loft all authority over man- kind, we might exped, that infidelity in Rome, during the Ciceronian age, would openly have erected its throne, and that Gicero himfelf, m every fpeech and ad:ion, would have been its mod declared abettor. But it appears, that, whatever fceptical liberties that great man might take, in his writings or in philofophical conver- fation J he yet avoided, in the common condu6t of life, the imputation of deifm and profanenefs. Even in his own family, and to his wife Teren- tia, whom he highly trufted, he was willing to appear a devout religionift; and there remains a letter, addrelTed to her, in which he feriouf- ly defires her to offer facrifice to Apollo and ^fculapius, in gratitude for the recovery of his health II.
Pompey's devotion was much more fincere r In all his conduct, during the civil wars, he paid a great regard to auguries, dreams, and prop!iefies§. Auguftus was tainted with fuper- itition of every kind. As it is reported of Mil- ton, that his poetical genius never flowed with eafe and abundance in the fpring; fo Auguftus obfcrved, that his own genius for dreaming never was fo perfect during that fcafon, nor was fo much to be relied on, as during the reft of the year. That
great
f Clniidii Rutilii Nuinitiani iter, lib. i. 1. 386. X In vita Adriani. || Lib. xiv. epilL 7.
§ Cicero de Divin. lib. ii. c. 24.
The Natural History of Religion'. 451
great and able emperor was alfo extremely nn- caiy, when he happened to change his fhoes, and put the right foot fhoe on the left foot*. In fhort, it cannot be doubted, but the votaries ot the eftabliflied fuperftition of antiquity were as numerous in every (late, as thofe of the modern religion are at prefent. Its influence was as uni- verfal; though it was not fo great. As many people gave their afTent to it; though that aflent was not fcemingly fo flrong, precife, and affir- mative.
We may obfcrve, that, notwithflanding the dog* ^atical, imperious ftyie of all fuperftition, the conviction of the religionifts, in all ages, is more affcvied than real, and fcarcely ever approaches, in any degree, to that folid belief and perfuafi- on which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts^ the doubts which they entertain on fuch fubiefts : They make a merit gif implicit faith; and diguife to themfelves their real infidelity, by the ItrongefL afTeverations and mofV pofitive bigotry. But na- ture is too hard for all their endeavours, and fufFers not the obfcure, glimmering light, afford- ed in thofe fhadowy regions, to equal the ftrong impreflions, made by common fenfe and by ex- perience. The ufual courfe of men's conduft belies their words, and fhows, that their affent in thefe matters is fome unaccountable operation of the mind between difbelief and conviftion, but approaching much nearer to the former than to the latter.
Since, therefore, the mind of man appears of fo loofe and undeady a texture, that, even an prefent, when fo many perfons find an intereft in continually employing on it the chiflel and the hammer, vet are they not able to engrave theological tenets with any lalting imprelfion ; G s: 2 how
o
Saeton. Aug. cap. 90, 91, 92. Plin. lib. ii. cap. 7.
452 The Natural Historv of Religioi^.
how much more mufb this have been the cafe ir$ ancient times, when the retainers to the holy" funftion were fo much fewer in comparifon ? No wonder, that the appearances were then very in- confiflent, and that mefi, on fome occafions might feem determined infidels, and enemies to the ef- tablifhed religion, without being fo in reality; or at leaft, without knowins; their own minds in that particular.
Another caufe, which rendered the ancient re- ligions much loofer than the modern, is, that the former v/cre traditional and the latter are Jcriptitral -y and the tradition- in' the former was complex, contradictory, and, on many occafionsy doubtful; fo that it could not poflibly be reduc- ed to any ftandard and canon, or afford any de- terminate articles of faith. The ftories of the gods were numberlefs like the popifh legends; and though every one, almoft, believed a part of thefe ftories, yet no one could believe or know the whole : While, at the fame time, all muft have acknowledged, that no one part ftood on* a better fcaindation than- the reft. The tradi- tions of diferent cities and nations were alfo, on many occafions, dire6lly oppofite ; and no' reafon could be aftigned for preferring one to- the other. And as there was an infinite number of ftories, with regard to which tradition was nowife pofitive ; the gradation was infenfible, fronr the moft fundamental articles of faith, to thofe loofe and' precarious fictions. The p.igan religi-* on, therefore, feemed to vp-nifn like a cloud, when- ever one approached to it, and examined it piece- meal. It couid never be afcertained by any fix- ed dogmas and principles. And tjiough this did not convert the gen.'rality of mankind from- fo abfurd a faith; for when will the peorle be reafonabie ? yet it made them faultcr and hefi- tate more in maintaining their principles, and
was
The Natural History of Religion. 453
^vas even apt to produce, in certain difpofitions of mind, fome practices and opinions, which had the appearance of determined infidelity.
To which we may add, that the fables of the pagan religion were, of themfelves, light, eafy, and familiar ; without devils, or feas of brim- (tone, or any objett that could much terrify the imagination. Vv'^ho could forbear fmiling, when he thought of the loves of Mars and Ve- nus, or the amorous frolics of Jupiter and Pan ? In this refpedV, it was a true poetical religion j if it had not rather too much levity for the graver kinds of poetry. We find that it has been adopted by m.odern bards ; nor have thefe talked v/ith greater freedom and irreverence or the gods, whom they regarded as fidtions, than the ancients did of the .real objefts of their de- -yotion.
The inference is by no means juft, that, be- caufe a fyftem of religion has made no deep imprefTion on the minds of a people, it mult therefore have been pofitively rejedled by all men of com.mon fenfe, and that oppofite principles, in fpite of the prejudices of education, were generally ^ftablifhed by argument and reafoning. I know not, but a contrary inference may be more probable. ThvC iefs importunate and af- •fuming any fpecies of fupcrflition appears, the iefs will it provoke men's fpleen and indignati- on, or engage tiiem into enqviiries concerning its foundation and origin. This in the mean time is obvious^ that the empire of all religious faith over the underllandins: is waverino: and un- certain, fubjed to every variety of humour, and dependent on the prefent incidents, which ftrike the imagination. The difference is only in the degrees. An ancient will place a ftroke of im- piety and one: offuperftition aiternatelyj throughout a
whole
454 The Natural History of Religion.
■whole difcourfe*: A modern often thinks in the fame way, though he may be more guarded in his expreflion.
Lucian tells us exprcfsly f , that whoever be- lieved not the mofl: ridiculous fables of paganifm was deemed by the people frofane and impi- ous. To what purpofe, indeed, would that agree- able author have employed the whole force of his wit and fatire againft the national religion, had not that religion been generally believed by his countrymen and contemporaries ?
Livy :|: acknov;ledges as frankly, as any divine would at prefenr, the common incredulity of his age J but then he condemns it as ft-verely. And who can imagine, that a fuperflition, which could delude fo ingenious a man, would not al- fo impofe on the generality of the people ?
The Stoics beilowed many magnificent and even impious epithets on their fage; that he alone was rich, free, a king, and equal to the immortal o-ods. They forgot to add, that he was not inferior in prudence and under- ilanding to an old woman. For furely no- thing can be more pitiful than the fentiments, which that feft entertained with regard to re- ligious matters -, while they feriouily agree with the comm.on augurs, that, when z, raven
croaks
* Witnefs this remarkable p.ifiage of Tacitus : " Prxtcr mul- " tiplices rerum humanarum talus, calo icrraque prodigia, & ** lulminum monitus $c futurorum prxfagia, iaua, inilia, ambi- *' gua, manifelta. Nee enim uni.jnaiTi atrocioribus populi Ro- " niani cladibus, magifquc juilis judiciib approbattini t-ll, non *' elle curte Diis fecuritatei-n noUrani, tiie ultionem." Hilt. lib. I. AugiiRus's quarrel with Neptune is an iullancc of ihc fame hind. Had not the emperor believed Neptune to be a real be- ing, and to have dominion over the fca, where had been tl e foundation of his anger? And if he believed it, what madnefs to provoke Hill farther that deity ? The fame obfervation may be made upon Qainiilian's exclamation, on account of the death cf his children, lib. vi. Praif.
t Philopfcudes. \ Lib. x. cap. 40,
The Natural History of Religion. 455
croaks from the left, it is a good omen ; but a bad one, when a rook makes a noife from the fame quarter. Pan^tius was the only Stok, among the Greeks, who fo much as doubted with regard to auguries and divinations*. Marcus Antoninus f tells us, that he himfclf had received many admo- nitions from the gods in his deep. It is true. Epic- tetus J forbids us to regard the language of rooks and ravens ; but it is not, that they do not fpeak truth: It is only, becaufe they can foretel nothing but the breaking of our neck or the forfeiture of our eftate ; which are circumftances, fays he, that nowife concern us. Thus the Stoics join a philofophical enthufiafm to a religious fuperfliti- on. The force of their mind, being all turned ■to the fide of morals, unbent itfelf in that of religion \\.
Plato § introduces Socrates affirming, that the accufation of impiety raifed againft him was owing entirely to his rejecting fuch fables, as thofe of Saturn's caftrating his father Uranus, and Jupiter's dethroning Saturn : Yet in a fubfequent dialogue ^, Socrates confefles, that the do6lrine of the mor- tality of the foul was the received opinion of the people. Is there her« any contradidlion ? Yes, iurely : But the contradiction is not in Plato ; it is In the people, whofe religious principles in ge- neral are always compofed of the mofl difcordant parts ; efpecially in an age, when fuperftition fate ib eafy and light upon them 4|.
The
* Cicero de divin. lib. i. cap. 3 & 7.
f Lib. i. § 17. X Ench. § 17.
II The Stoics, 1 own, were not quite orthodox in the efta- blifhed religion ; but one may fee, from thefe inftances, that they went a great way : And the people undoubtedly went eve- ry length.
§ Eutvphro. 4- Phjedo.
-I- 4- See NOTE [DDD].
4^6 The Natural History of Religiont.
The fame Cicero, who aftefbed, in his own family, to appear a devout religionift, makes no fcruple, in a public court of judicature, of treating the doc- trine of a future flate as a ridiculous fable, to which no body could give any attention *. Salluft f re- prefents Cccfar as fpeaking the fame language in the open fenate J.
But that all thefe freedoms implied not a total and univerfal infidelity and fcepticifm amongft the people, is too apparent to be denied. Though fome parts of the national religion hung loofe up- on the minds of men, other parts adhered more clofely to them : And it was the chief bufinefs of the fceptical philofophers to Ihow, that there was no more foundation for one than for the other. This is the artifice of Cotta in the dialogues con- cerning the 7iature of the gods. He refutes the whole fyftem of mythology by leading the ortho- dox gradually, from the more momentous flories, which were believed, to the more frivolous, which every one ridiculed : From the gods to the god- deflesj from the goddefles to the nymphs ; from the nymphs to the fawns and fatyrs. His maf- ter, Carneades, had employed the fame method of r^afoning ||.
Upon the whole, the greateft and mofl obferva« ble diiferences between a traditional^ mythclogical
religion,
* Pro Cluentio, cap. 6i. f Debello Carilin.
X Cicero (Tufc. Quxft.) lib. i. cap. 5, 6. and Seneca (Epifl. 24.) as alfo Juvenal (Satyr. 2.), maintain that there is no boy or old woman fo ridiculous as to believe the poets in their ac- counts of a future ftate. Why then does Lucretius fo highly ex- alt his mailer for freeing us fiom thele terrors? Perhaps the ge- nerality of mankind were then in the diipofition of Cephalus in Plato (dc Rep. lib. i.) who while he w^s young and healthful could ridicule thefe ftories; but as foon as he became old and infirm, began to entertain apprehenfions of their truth. This we may obferve not to be unufual even at prefent.
II Sext. Empir. adverf. Mathem. lib. viii.
The Natural History of Religion. 457
religion, and 3. fyjlemntical, Jcholaftic one, are two ' The fornner is often more reaibnable, as confiding ' only of a multitude of ftories, which, however groundlefs, imply no exprefs abfurdity and de- monftrative contradiction j and fits alfo fo eafy and light on men's mind, that, though it may be as univerfally received, it happily makes no fuch deep imprellion on the afFeftions and underftanding.
Sect. XIII. Impious conceptions of the divine nature in popular religions of both kinds.
The primary religion of mankind arifes chiefly from an anxious fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally be entertained of invifible, un- known powers, while men lie under difmal ap- prehenfions of any kind, may eafily b»e conceived. Every image of vengeance, feverity, cruelty, and malice muft occur, and muft augment the ghafl- linefs and horror, which opprefTes the amazed reli- gionift. A panic having once feized the mind, the a6bive fancy ftill farther multiplies the objects of terror ; while that profound darknefs, or, what is worfe, that glimmering light, with v/hich we are environed, reprefents the fpeftres of divinity un- der the moft dreadful appearances imaginable. And no idea of perverfe wickednefs can be framed, which thofe terrified devotees do not readily, with- out fcruple, apply to their deity.
This appears the natural ftate of religion, when furveyed in one light. But if we confider, on the other hand, that fpirit of praife and eulogy, which neceffarily has place in all religions, and which is the confequence of thefe very terrors, we mull ex- peel a quite contrary fyftem of theology to prevail. Every virtue, every excellence, muft be afcribed
to
458 The Natural History of Religion.
to the divinity, and no exaggeration will be deemed fufficient to reach thole perfedlions, with which he is endowed. "Whatever ilrains of pane- gyric can be invented, are immediately embrac- ed, without confulting any arguments or phse- nomena : It is efteemed a fufficient confirmation of them, that they give us more magnificent ideas of the divine objeds of our worlhip and adoration.
Here therefore is a kind of contradiction between the different principles of human nature, which en- ter into religion. Our natural terrors prefent the notion of a devililh and malicious deity : Our pro- penfity to adulation leads us to acknowledge an excellent and divine. And the influence of thefe oppofite principles are various, according to the different fituation of the human underfland-
In very barbarous and ignorant natipns, fuch as the Africans and Indians, nay even the Japonefe, who can form no extenfive ideas of power and knowledge, worlhip may be paid to a being, whom they confefs to be wicked and deteflable ; though they may be cautious, perhaps, of pronouncing this judgment of him in public, or in his tem- ple, where he may be ilippofcd to hear their reproaches.
Such rude, imperfe^V ideas of the Divinity ad- here long to all idolaters; and it may fafely be af- firmed, that the Greeks themfclves never got en- tirely rid of them. It is remarked by Xenophon *. in praife of Socrate^, that this philofopher aflent- ed not to the vulgar opinion, which fuppofed the gods to know fome things, and be igno- rant of others : Pie maintained, that they knew everv thing; what was done, faid, or even thought.
But
* Mem. lib. i.
The Natural History of Religion. 459
But as this was a ftrain of philofophy f much above the conception of his countrymen, we need not be furprifed, if very frankly, in their books and convcrfation, ihty blamed the deities, whom they worfhippcd in their temples. It is obferv- abJe, that Herodotus in particular fcruples not, in many paflages, to afcribc envy to the gods ; a fentiment, of all others, the moll fuitable to a mean and devililh nature. The pagan hymns, however, fung In public worfhip, contained no- thing but epithets of praife; even while the ac- tions afcribcd to the gods were the moft bar- barous and detellable. When Timotheus, the poet, recited a poem to Diana, in which he enu- merated, with the greatefl eulogies, all the ac- tions and alitributes of that cruel, capricious god- defs: May your daughter ^ faid one prefent, become Juch as the deity whom you celebrate *.
But aG men farther exalt their idea of their divi- nity ; it is their notion of his power and knowledge only, not of his goodnefs, which is improved. On the contrary, in proportion to the fuppofed extent of his fcience and authority, their terrors naturally augment; while they believe, that no fecrecy can conceal them from his fcrutiny, and that even the inmofl recefTes of their breaft lie open before him. They muft then be careful not to form exprefsly any fentiment of blame and difapprobation. All muft be applaufe, ra- vifnment, extacy. And while their gloomy ap- prehenfions make them afcribe to him meafures of conduct, which, in human creatures, would be highly blamed, they muft flill affcft to praife
and
f It was conficlered among the ancients, as a very extraordi- nary, philofophical paradox, that the prefence of the gods was not contincd to the heavens, but were extended every where; as we learn from Lucian. Hirmotimus Jive De /edits .
* Plutarch, de Superftit.
460 The Natural History of Religion.
and admire that condud: in the objeft of their devotional addrefles. Thus it may fafely be af- firmed, that popular religions are really, in the conception of their more vulgar votaries, a fpe- cies of dsemonifmi and the higher the deity is exalted in power and knowledge, the lower of courfe is he deprelTed in goodnefs and benevo- lence; whatever epithets of praife may be be- llowed on him by his amazed adorers. Among idolaters, the words may be falfe, and belie the fecret opinien : But among more exalted religio- nifts, the opinion itfelf contra<5ls a kind of falfe- hood, and belies the inward fentiment. The heart fecretly detefls fuch meafures of cruel and implacable vengeance ; but the judgment dares not but pronounce them perfeft and adorable. And the additional mifery of this inward ftrug- gle aggravates all the other terrors, by which thefe unhappy viftims to fuperftition are for ever haunted.
Lucian * obferves that a yoyng man, who reads the hifiory of the gods in Homer or Hefiod, and finds their fa6lions, wars, injullice, inceft, a- dultery, and other immoralities fo highly celebrat- ed, is much furprifed afterwards, when he comes into the world, to obferve that punifhments are by law inflifted on the fame anions, which he had been taught to afcribe to fuperior beings. The contradiction is ftill perhaps flronger between the rcprefentations given us by fome later religions and our natural ideas of generofity,. lenity, impartia- lity, andjufticci and in proportion to the multi- plied terrors of thcfe religions, the barbarous con- ceptions of the divinity are multiplied upon us f. Nothing can preferve untainted the genuine princi- ples of morals in our judgment of human conducft, but the abfolutc neceliity of thefe principles to the exiftence of fociety. If common conception
can * Nccyomantia. t See NOTE [EEE.]
The Natural History of Religion. 461
can indulge princes in a fyftem of ethics, fome- what different from that which fhould regulate pri- vate perfons ; how much more thofe fuperior be- ings, whofe attributes, views, and nature are fo totally unknown to us ? Sunt Juperis Jua jura *. The gods have maxims of juftice peculiar to them- lelves.
Sect. XIV. Bad influence of popular religions on morality.
Here I cannot forbear obferving a fad, which may be worth the attention of fuch as make human nature the obje(fl of their enquiry. It is certain, that, in every religion, however fublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greateft number, will ftill feek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfe6t being, but either by frivolous obfervances, by in- temperate zeal, by rapturous extafies, or by the belief of myfterious and abfurd opinions. The lealt part of the Sadder, as well as of the Pentateuch^ confifts in precepts of morality -, and we may alfo be aflured, that that part was always the leaft ob- ferved and regarded. When the old Romans were at- tacked with a peililence, they never afcribed their fufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amendment. They never thought, that they were the general robbers of the world, whofe am- bition and avarice made defolate the earth, and re- duced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a didatorljl, in order to drive a nail into a door ; and by that means, they thought that they had fufficiently appeafed their incenfed deity.
2 In
* Ovid. Metam. lib. ix. 501.
X Called Di^^ator calvis figendae caufa. T. Livii, I. vii. c. 5.
462 The Natural History of Religion.
In iEgina, one fadlion forming a confpiracy, barbaroufly and treacheroufly afTafiinated feven hun- dred of their fellow-citizens ; and carried their fury fo far, that, one miferable fugitive having fled to the temple, they cut off his hands, by which he clung to the gates, and carrying him out of holy ground, immediately murdered him. By this im- petyy fays Herodotus*, (not by the other many cruel aliaflinations) they offended the godsy and con- traced an inexpiable guilt.
Nay, if wefhould fuppofe, v/hat never happens, that a popular religion were found, in vvh.cii it was exprefsly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an order of priefts were inftituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily fer- mons, and with all the arts of perfuafion ; yet fo inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for want of fome other fuperftition, they would make the very attendance on thefe fermons the effentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The fublime prologue of Zaleucus's laws J infpired not the Locrians, fo far as we can learn, with any founder notions of the meifures of acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other Greeks.
This obfervation, then, holds univerfally: But ftill one may be at fome lofs to account for it. It is not fufficient to obferve, that the people, every where, degrade their deities into a fimilitude with themfelves, and confider them merely as a fpecies of human creatures, fomcwhat more po- tent and intelligent. This will not remove thg difficulty. For there is no man fo ftupid, as thj^j. judging by his natural reafon, he would ^^^ efteem virtue and honefty the moil valuable q^^, lities, which any perfon could pofiefs. Why ^ot afcribe the fam.e lentiment to his deity ? Why ^ot
make
Lib. vi. I To be found In Diod. Sic. lib.
Xil.
The Natural History of Religion'. 46J
make all religion, or the chief part of it, to confift in thefe attainments ?
Nor is it fatisfaftory to fay, that the pradlice of morality is more difficult than that of fuperitition ; and is therefore rejefted. For, not to mention the excefTive penances of the Brachmans 2.^6. Talapoins ; it is certain, that the Rhamadan of the Turks, dur- ing which the poor wretches, for many days, often in the hotteft months of the year, and in fome of the hotteft climates of world, remain without eat- ing or drinking from the rifing to the fetting funj this Rhamadan, I fay, muft be more fevere than the pradlice of any moral duty, even to the mod vici- ous and depraved of mankind. The four lents of the Mufcovites, and the aufterities of fome Roman. CatholicSy appear more difagreeable than meeknefs and benevolence. In fhort, all virtue, when men are reconciled to it by ever fo little pradlice, is agreeable : All fuperftition is for ever odious and burthen fome.
Perhaps, the following account may be receiv- ed as a true folution of the difficulty. The du- ties, which a man performs as a friend or parent^, feem merely owing to his ben^fador or chil- dren ; nor can he be wanting to thefe duties, without breaking: throug-h all the ties of nature and morality. A flrong mclinarion may prompt him to the performance : A fentiment of order and moral obligation joins its force to thefe natu- ral ties : And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty, without any effort or en- deavour. Even with regard ta the virtues, which are more auflcre, and more founded on. retieftion, fuch as public fpirit, filial duty, temperance, o-r integrity ; the moral obligation, in our apprehen- fion, removes all pretenfion to religious merit; and the virtuous condudt is deemed no more than what we owe to fociety and to ourfelves. In all this, a fuperftitious man finds nothing, which
4^4 The Natural History of ReLigkjn.
he has properly performed for the fake of his deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favour and protedlion. He confiders not, that the mod genuine method of ferving the divinity is by promoting the happinefs of his crea- tures. He (till looks out for fome more immedi- ate fervice of the fupreme Being, in order to allay thofe terrors, with which he is haunted. And any pradlice, recommended to him, which either ferves to no purpofe in life, or offers the ftrongeft vio- lence to his natural inclinations j that pra6tice he will the more readily embrace, on account of thofe very circumftanGes> which ihould make him ab- folutely reject it. It feems the more purely reli- gious, becaufe it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or confideration. And if, for its fake, he facrifices much of his cafe and quiet, his claim of merit appears flili to rife upon him, in proportion to the zeal and devotion which he dif- covers. In reftoring a loan, or paying a debt, his divinity is nowife beholden to him j becaufe thefe at^s of juflice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no god in the univerfe. But if he fad a day, or give himfelf a found whipping ; this has a di- rect reference, in his opinion, to the fervice of God. No other motive could engage him to fuch aufterities. By thefe diftinguifhed marks of de- votion, he has now acquired the divine favour; and may expetft, in recompence, protection and fafety in this world, and eternal happinefs in the next.
Hence the greateft crimes have been found, in many inftances, compatible with a fuperfti- tious piety and devotion j Hence, it is jufily re- garded as unlafe to draw any certain intcrence in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or ftriclnefs of his religious exercifes, even though he himfelf believe them fincere. Nay, it has
been
The Natural History of Religion. 465
been obferved, that enormities of the blackefl: dcy have been rather apt to produce fiiperftitious ter- rors, and encreafe the religious palFion. Bomilcar, having formed a confpiracy for affafllnating at once the whole fenate of Carthage, and invading the liberties of his country, loft the opportunity, from a continual regard to omens and prophecies, 'tbofe who undertake the moji crminal and moft dangerous enter- frizes are commonly the moJi Juperjiitious ; as an an- cient hiftorian * remarks on this occafion. T heir devotion and fpiritual faith rife with their fears. Catiline was not contented with the eftablifhed deities, and received rites of the national religi- on : His anxious terrors made him feck new in- ventions of this kind f j which he never proba- bly had dreamed of, had he remained a good citizen, and obedient to the laws of his coun-
To which we may add, iliat, after the commif- fion of crimes, there arifc remorfes and fecret hor- rors, which give no reft to the mind, but make it have recourfe to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its offences. Whatever weak- ens or diforders the internal frame promote* the interefts of fuperftition : And nothing i3 more deftrudtive to them than a manly, fteady vir- tue, which either preferves us from difaftrous, me- lancholy accidents, or reaches us to bear them. During fuch calm funfhine of the mind, thefe fpec- trcs of falfe divinity never make their appear- ance. On the other hand, while we abandon our- felves to the natural undifcipiined fuggellions of our timid and anxious kearts, every kind of bar- barity is afcribed to the fupreme Being, from the terrors with which we are agitated ; and every kind - of caprice, from the methods which we embrace in order to appeafe him. Barbarity^ caprice -y thefe
Vol. II. H h qUvilities,
* Diod. Sic. lib. xv.
t Cic. Catil. i. SallnH. de bello Catil.
mt
466 The Natural History of Religion.
qualities, however nominally difguifed, we may univerfally obferve, form the ruling charafter of the deity in popular religions. Even priefts, in- ftead of correcting thefe depraved ideas of man- kind, have often been found ready to fofter and encourage them. The more tremendous the divi- nity is reprefented, the more tame and fubmifTive do men become to his minifters : And the more unaccountable the meafures of acceptance required by him, the more neceflary does it become to abandon our natural reafon, and yield to their ghoitly guidance and direftion. Thus it may be allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our na- tural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root (trikes deeper into the mind, and fprings from the eflential and univerfal properties of human nature.
Sect. XV. General Corollary.
Though the ftupidity of men, barbarous and uninltrufted, be fo great, that they may not fee a fovereign author in the more obvious works of nature, to which they are fo much familiarized ; yet it fcarcely feems pofTible, that any one of good underftanding fhould rejed: that idea, when once it is fuggefted to him. A purpofe, an intention, a delign is evident in every thing ; and when our comprehenfion is fo far enlarged as to contemp- late the firft rife of this vifible fyftem, we miifb adopt, with the ftrongeft conviftion, the idea of fome intellio:ent caufe or author. The uniform maxims too, which prevail throughout the whole frame of the univerfe, naturally, if not neceflari- ly, lead us to conceive this intelligence as finglc and undivided, where the prejudices of education oppofe not fo reafonable a theory. Even the con- trarieties of nature, by difcovering themfelves tvc~ ry where, become proofs of fomc confident plan,
and
The Natural History of Religion. 467
and eftablifh one Tingle purpofe or intention, how- ever inexplicable and incomprehenfible.
Good and ill arc univerfally intermingled and confounded, happinefs and mifery, wifdom and folly, virtue and vice. Nothing is pure and en- tirely of a piece. All advantages are attended with difadvantages. An univerfal compenfation pre- vails in all conditions of being andexiftence. And it is not poflible for us, by our moft chimerical wiflies, to form the idea of a ftation or fituation al- together defirable. The draughts of life, accord- ing to the poet's fidlion, are always mixed from vefTels on each hand o( Jupiter : Or if any cup be prefented altogether pure, it is drawn only, as the fame poet tells us, from the left-handed veflel.
The more exquifite any good is, of which a fmall fpecimen is afforded us, the Iliarper is the evil, allied to it ; and few exceptions are found to this uniform law of nature. The moft fprightly wit borders on madnefs -, the higheft efFufions of joy produce the deepeft melancholy j the moft ra- viftiing pleafures are attended with the moft cruel lallitude and difguft ; the moft flattering hopes make way for the fevereft difappointments. And, in general, no courfe of life has fuch fafety (for happinefs is not to be dreamed of) as the tempe- rate and moderate, which maintains, as far as pof- fible, a mediocrity, and a kind of infenfibility, in every thing.
As the good, the great, the fublime, the ravifli- ing are found eminently in the genuine principles of theifm; it may be expected, from the analogy of nature, that the bafe, the abfurd, the mean, the terrifying will be equally difcovered in religi- ous fictions and chimeras.
The univerfal propenfity to believe in invifible, in- telligent power, if not an original inftincl, being at leaft a general attendant of human nature, may be confidered as a kind of mark or ftamp, which the H h 2 divine
468 The Natural History of Religion".
divine workman has fet upon his work ; and no- thing furcly can more dignify mankind, than to be thus felc(Eted from all other parts of the creation, and to bear the image or impreffion of the univer- fal Creator. But confult this image, as it appears in the popular religions of the world. How is the deity disfigured in our reprefentations of him ! What caprice, abfurdity, and immorality are attributed to him ! How much is he degraded even below the charafter, which we fliould naturally, in common life, afcribe to a man of fenfe and virtue !
What a noble privilege is it of human reafon to attain the knowledge of the fupreme Being ; and, from the vifible works of nature, be enabled to in- fer fo fublime a principle as its fupreme Creator ? But turn the reverfe of the medal. Survey mofl nations and mod ages. Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will fcarcely be perfuaded, that they are any thing but fick men's dreams : Or perhaps will regard them more as the playfome whimfies of monkies in human fhape, than the ferious, pofitive, dogmatical afleverations of a being, who dignifies himfelf with the name of rational.
Hear the verbal proteftations of all men : No- thing fo certain as their religious tenets. Examine their lives : You will fcarcely think that they re- pofe the fmalleft confidence in them.
The greateft and truell zeal gives us no fecurity againft hypocrify : The miOft open impiety is at- tended with a fecret dread and compun6tion.
No theological abfurdities fo glaring that they have nor, fometimes, been embraced by men of the greateft and inoft cultivated underflanding. No religious precepts fo rigorous that they have not been adopted by the molt voluptuous and molt abandoned of men.
Ignorance
The Natural History of Religion. 469
Ignorance is the mother of Devotion : A maxim that is proverbial, and confirmed by general ex- perience. Look out for a people, entirely dcfti- tute of religion : If you find them at all, be aflured, that they are but few degrees removed from brutes.
What fo pure as fome of the morals, included in fome theological fyftems ? What fo corrupt as fome of the practices, to which thefe fyftems give rife ?
The comfortable views, exhibited by the belief of futurity, are ravifliing and delightful. But how quickly vaniili on the appearance of its terrors, which keep a more firm and durable pofienion of the human mind ?
The whole is a riddle, an a^nigna, an inexpli- cable myftery. Doubt, uncertainty, fufpence of judgment appear the only refult of our moft ac- curate fcrutiny, concejning this fubjeft. But fuch is the frailty of human reafon, and fuch the irrefift- ible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could fcarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and oppofing one fpecies of fuperfrition to another, let them a quarrelling; while we our- felves, during their fury and contention, happily make our efcape, into the caim^ though obfcure, regions of philofophy.
NOTES
d
( 471 )
NOTE
T O T H E
SECOND VOLUME'
NOTE [A], p. 22.
I
T is probable that no more was meant by thofe, who de- nied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our im- prefTionsj though it muft be confefled, that the terms, which they employed, were not chofeu with fuch caution, norfo exactly defined, as to prevent all miftakes about their doftrine. For what is meant by innate ? If innate be equi- valent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind muft be allo\\'ed to be innate or natural, in whatever fenfe we take the latter word, whether in oppofition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, cotemporary to our birth, the difputefeems tobe frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, fcems to be commonly taken in a very loofe fenfe, by Locke and others ; as ftanding for any of our perceptions, our fenfations and paiCons, as well as thoughts. Now in this fenfe, I Ihauld delire to know, what can be meant by aflerting, that felf-love, or refent- _ment of injuries, or the pafllon between the fexes is not in- nate ?
But
472
Notes to the Second Volume.
But admitting thefe terms, imprejjions and ideas, in the fenfe above explained, and undertlandingby innate, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, thea may we affert, that all our impreilions are innate, and our ideas not innate.
To be ingenuous, I muft own it to be my opinion, that Locke was betrayed into this queftion by the fchool- men, who, making uie of undefined terms, dravv' out their difputes lo a tedious length, without ever touching the point in queilion. A like ambiguity and circumlocution feem to run through that philofopher's reasonings on this ^s well as moft other fubjecls.
NOTE [Bj, p. 49.
N.
OTHING is more ufual than for writers, even on moral, political, or phyfical fubjecis, to diftinguith be- tween reafon and experience, and to fuppofe, that thele fpe- cies of argumentation are entirely different from eacli other. The forsjier are taken for the mere refult of our in- telledlual faculties, which, by confidering a priori the na- ture of things, and examining the effects, that muft follow from their operaHon, eflablilh particular principles of fci- ence and philofophy. The latter are fuppofed to be deri- ved entirely from fenfe and obfervation, by which we learn what has a<ffually refulted from the operation of par- ticular objefts, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, refult from them. Thus, for inftance, the li- mitations and reftraints of civil government, and a legal conftitution may hz defended, either from reafcn, which refle£ling on the great frailty and corruption of human na- ture, teaches, that no man can fafely be truded with unli- mited authority ; or from experience and hiftory, which in- form us of the enormous abufes, that ambition, in every age and country, has been found to make of fo imprudent a conridence.
The fame diftinilion between reafon and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the Condud of life; while the experienced ftatefman, general, phyfician, or mercliant is trufted and follov.ed ; and the unprattifed liovice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglefted
and
"Notes to the Second V'olume. 4.73
and defpifed. Though it be allowed, that reafon may form very plaufible conjcdtures with regard to the confequences of fuch a particular condudt in fuch particular circumftances j it is ftill luppoled imperfed, without the alTiftance of expe- rience, which is alone able to give rtability and certainty to the ma^'ims, derived from ftudy and reflexion.
But notwithftanding that this diftin(Stion be thus univer- fally received, both in the aitiveand fpeculative fcenes of life, 1 fiiall not fcruple to pronounce, that it is at bottom, errone- ous, at leaft, fuperlicial.
If we examine thofe arguments, which, in any of the fciences above-mentioned, are fuppofed to be the mere ef- feds of reafoning and refledlion, they will be found to ter- minate, at laft, in fome general principle or concluhon, for which we can afiign no reafon but obfervation and experi- ence. The only difference between them and thofe max- ims, which are vulgarly efteemed the refult of pure experi- ence, is that the former cannot be eftablifhed without fome procefs of thought, and fome refledlion on what we have obferved, in order to diftinguifli its circumrtances, and trace its confequences : Whereas in the latter, the experienced even^ is exadly and fully fimilar to that which we infer as the efult of any particular fituation. The hiftory of a Tiberius or a Nero makes us dread a like tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the reftraints of laws and fenates: But the obfervation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is fufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the fame apprehenfion ; while it ferves us as an inftance of the general corruption of human nature, and fhews us the danger which we muft incur by repofing an entire confidence in mankind. In both cafes, it is experience wliich is ulti- mately the foundation of out inference and conclufion.
There is no man fo young and unexperienced, as not to have formed, from obfervation, many general and juft max- ims concerning human affairs and the condudl of life ; but it mud be confeffed, that, when a man comes to put thefe in pradice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience both enlarge thefe maxims, and teach him their proper ufe and application. In every fituation or incident, there are many particular and feem- ingly minute circumftances, which the man of greateft talents is, at firft, apt to overlook, though on them the juftnefs of his conclulions, and cowfequently the prudence I of
474 Notes to the Second Volume.
of his condu6l, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general obfervations and maxims occur not always on the proper occafions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmnefs and dif- tindion. The truth is, an unexperienced reafoner could be no reafoner at all, were he abfolutely unexperienced; and when we aflign that charadler to any one, we mean it only in a comparative fenfe, and fuppofe him pofT- efled of experience, in a fmaller and more imperfedt degree.
NOTE [C], p. 72.
I
T may be pretended, that the refinance which we meet with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and call up our power, this gives us the idea of force and power. It is this nifus or ftrong endeavour, of which we are confcious, that is the original impreflion from which this idea is copied. But, firft, we attribute power to a vaft number of objefts, where we never can fuppofe this reGilance or exertion of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never meets with any re- fiftance; to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effe(Sl follows immediarely upon the will, without any exertion or fummonin^ up of force; to inanimate mat- ter, which is not capable of this fentiment. Secondly^ This fentirnent of an endeavour to overcome refiftance has no known connexion with any event: What fol- lows it, we know by experience; but could not know it a priori. It muft, however, be confelTed, that the animal riptr, which we experience, though it can afford no accurate precife idea of power, enters very much in- to that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.
NOTE [D], p. 78.
I
NEED not examine at length the vis inertia which is fo much talked of in the new philofophy, and which is
afcribed
Notes to the Second Volume. 475
afcribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body at reft or in motion continues for ever in its prefent ftate, till put from it by fome new caufe ; and that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impel- ling body as it acquires itfelf. Thefe are fads. When we call this a vis inertia^ we only mark thefe fafis, without pretending to have any idea of the inert pow- er ; in the fame manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain effeds, without comprehending that zt\- ive power. It was never the meaning of Sir Ifaac Newton to rob fecond caufes of all force or energy ; though fome of his followers have endeavoured to eftablifh that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philofo- pher had recourfe to an etherial adlive fluid to explain his univerfal attradlionj though he was fo cautious and modeft as to allow, that it was a mere hypothefis, not to be in- flfted on, without more experiments. I muft confefs, that there is fomething in the fate of opinions a little extraordi- nary. Des Cartes infinuated that do£lrine of the univerfal and fole efficacy of the Deity, without infifting on it. Malebranche and other Cartefians made it the foundation of all their philofophy. It had, however, no authority in England. Locke, Clarke, and Cudworth, never fo much as take notice of it, but fuppofe all along, that matter has a real, though fubordinate and derived power. By what means has it become fo prevalent among our modern metaphyficians ?
A.
NOTE [EJ, p. 83.
.CCORDING to thefe explications and definitions, the idea oi power is relative as much as that of caufe ; and, both have a reference to an effe6t, or fome other event conftantly conjoined with the former. When we confider the unknown circumftance of an object, by which the de- gree or quantity of its effedl is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And accordingly, it is allowed by all philofophers, that the efFeiEl is the meafure of the power. But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itfelf, why could not they meafure it in itfelf? The difpute whe- ther the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the fquare of its velocity j this difpute, I fay, needed not be decided by comparing its effedts in equal or unequal times j but by a dire6l menfuration and comparifon.
As
n47<5 Notes to the Second Volume.
As to the frequent ufe of the words. Force, Power, Energy, ^c. which every where occur in common con- verfation, as well as in philofophy ; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any inftance, with the con- ne6ting principle between caufe and effedl, or can account ultimately for the production of one thing by another. Thefe words, as commonly ufed, have very loofe mean- ings annexed to themj and their ideas are very uncer- tain and confufed. No animal can put external bodies in motion without the fentiment of a nlfus or endea- vour ; and every animal has a fentiment or feeling from the flroke or blow of an external objcvfl, that is in mo- tion. Thefe fenfations, which are merely animal, and from which we can a priori draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to fuppofe, that they have fome fuch feelings, whenever they transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are ex- erted, without our annexing to them any idea of com- municated motion, we confider only the conftant expe- rienced conjunction of the events ; and as we feel a cuftomary connection between the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objedils ; as nothing is more ufual than to apply to external bodies every internal fenfation, which they occafion.
N O T E [F], p. lOo.
A H E prevalence of the doflrmc of liberty may be accounted for, from another caufe, viz. a falfe fenfa- tion or feeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our adtions. The necelfity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly fpeaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may confider the action ; and it confiils chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the exiftence or that adion from fomc preceding objefts ; as liberty, when oppofed to necelfity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain loofenefs or indifference, which we feel, in palfing, or not pafFing, from the idea of one objedl to that of any fuccecding one. Now we may obferve,
that.
Notes to the Second Volume. 477
that, though, in refleSi'mg on human atSlions, we feldom feel fuch a loofenefs or indifference, but are common- ly able to infer them with confiderable certainty from their motives, and from the difpofitions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in performing the adtions themfelves, we are fenfible of fomething like it : And as all refembling objedfs are readily taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonftrative and even in- tuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our adlions are fubjetSl to our will, on moft occafions ; and imagine we feel, that the will itfelf is fubje6l to nothing, becaufe, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it moves eafily every way, and produces an image of itfelf, (or a Velleity^ as it is called in the fchools) even on that fide, on which it did not fettle. This image, or faint motion, we pcrfuade ourfelves, could, at that time, have been compleated into the thing itfelf; becaufe, fhould that be denied, we find, upon a fecond trial, that, at prefent, it can. We confider not, that the fantaftical defire of fhewing liberty, is here the mo- tive of our a<Slions. And it feems certain, that, how- ever we may imagine we feel liberty within ourfelves, a fpe£tator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and charader ; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly ac-^ quainted with every circumftance of our iituation and tem- per, and the moft fecret fprings of our complexion and difpofition. Now this is the very efi"ence of neceffity, ac- cording to tlie foreffoino; doiSlrine.
NOTE [GJ, p. 102.
X
M. HUS, if a caufe be defined, that which produces any thing ; it is eafy to obferve, that producing is fynonimous to caufmg. In like manner, if a caufe be defined, that by luhich any thing exijh ; this is liable to the fame ob- jeifl:ion. For what is meant by thefe words, by which? flad it been faid, that a caufe is that after which any thing conjlantly exijis j we fliould have underftood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the mat- ter. And this confiiancy forms the very effence of ne- ceifity, nor have we any other idea of ir.
NOTE
478 Notes to the Second Volume.
NOTE [HJ, p. 114.
»-^INCE all reafoningi concerning fa*3:s or caufes is de- rived merely from cuftom, it may be afked how it happens, that men fo much furpafs animals in reafoning, and one man fo much furpaffes another ? Has not the fame cuftom the fame influence on all ?
We (hall here endeavour briefly to explain the great dif- ference in human underfl:andings : After which the reafon of the difference between men and animals will eafily be comprehended.
1 . When we have lived any time, and have been accu- flomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to refemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reafoning, and expert a fimilar event with fome degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumftances. It is therefore con- fidered as a matter of great importance to obferve the con- fequences of things j and as one man may very much furpafs another in attention and memory and obferv^a- tion, this will make a very great difference in their rea- foning.
2. Where there is a complication of caufes to produce any efFe6l, one mind may be much larger than another, and better able to comprehend the whole fyflem of objefts, and to infer juf\ly their confequences.
3. One man is able to carry on a chain of confequences to a greater length than another.
4. Few men can think long without running into a con- fufion of ideas, and miflaking one for another ; and there are various degrees of this infirmity.
5. The circumitance, on which the eiTe^l depends, is frequently involved in other circumftances, which are fo- reign and extrinfic. The feparation of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and fubtilty.
6. The
Notes to the Second Volume. 479
6. The forming of general maxims from particular ob- fervation is a very nice operation j and nothing is more ufual, from hafte or a narrownefs of mind, which fees not on all fides, than to commit miftakes in tiiis particular.
7. When we reafon from analogies, the man, who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of fuggeft- ing analogies, will be the better reafoner.
8. Byafles from prejudice, education, paflion, party, ^c, hang more upon one mind than another.
9. After we have acquired a confidence in human tefti- mony, books and converfation enlarge much more the fphere of one man's experience and thought than thofe of another.
It would be eafy to difcover many other circumftances that make a difference in the underftanding of men.
NOTE [IJ, p. 122.
N.
O Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a fituation quite unknown to him ; and it is impoflible for him to tell a priori what will refult from it. It is making a new experiment, the confequence of which is always uncertain. One may fometimes conjec- .ture from analogy what will follow j but flill this is but conjedure. And it muft be confeffed, that, in the pre- fent cafe of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is fuch as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold ; but when- ever it comes to the. freezing point, the water paffes in a moment, from the utmoll liquidity to perfedt hard- nefs. Such an event, therefore, may be derjoirunated ^x- traordinary^ and requires a pretty ftrotic teftimony, to render it credible to people in a warm chmate : But ftill it is not iniraculoih^ nor contrary to iiriJorm experience of the cout-fe of namre in cafes whe.x all the circum- ftances are the fame. The inhabitan.'^ of Sumatra have always feen water fluid in their owr; climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy : But they never favv water in Pvlufcovy during the wMn-
ters
4?o Notes to the Second Volume.
ter ; and therefore they cannot reafonably be pofitive what would there be the conJfequence.
NOTE [KJ, p. 123.
►Sometimes an event may not, in itfelf, feem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reafon of fome circumftances, be denominated a miracle; becaufe, in faSf^ it is contrary to thefe laws. Thus if a perfon, claiming a divine authority, fhould com- mand a fick perfon to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in (hort, fhould order many natural events, which immediately fol- low upon his command; thefe might juftly be efteemed miracles, becaufe they are really, in this cafe, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any fufpicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no tranfgreflion of the laws of nature. If this fufpicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a tranfgreflion of thefe laws ; becaufe nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man ftiould have fuch an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a tranfgrejjion of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity y or by the interpofit'ion of fome invifible agent. A miracle may either be difcoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and eflence. The raifm^ of a houfe or (hip into the air is a vifible miracle.' The raifmg of a feather, when the wind wants ever fo little of a force requifite for that purpofe, is as real a miracle, though not fo fenfible with regard to us.
NOTE [LJ, p. 133.
A HIS book was writ by Monf. Montgeron, counfellor or judge of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and character, who was alfo a martyr to the caufe, and is now faid to be fomewhere in a dungeon on account of his book. There is another book in three volumes called Recucil d(s Miracki de V Abbe Paris) giving an account of many of thefe miracles, and accompanied with prefatory difcourfes, which are very well written. There runs, however, through
the
Notes to the Second Volume. 481
the whole of thefe a ridiculous comparifon between the jniraclcs of our Saviour and thofe of the Abbe ; wlierein it is afTerted, tliat the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former : As if the teflimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God hiaiiclf, who conducted the pen of the im'pired writers. If Jicfe ■writers, indeed, were to be confidered merely as human teflimony, the French author is very moderate in his comparifon ; fince he might, with fome appearance of rea- fon, pretend, that the Janfcnifl: miracles much lurpafs the other in evidence and authority. The following circum- ftaaces are drawn from authentic papers, inferred in the above-mentioned book.
Many of the miracles of Abbe Paris were proved imme- diately by witueiies before the ofliciality or bilhop's court at Paris, under the eye of cardinal Noailles, whofe character for integrity and capacity was never contelled even by his enemies.
His fucceflbr in the archbifhopric was an enemy to the Janfenifls, and for that reafon promoted to the fee by the court. Yet 22 rectors or cures, of Paris, with infinite earn- eftnefs, prefs him to examine thofe miracles, which they aflert to be known to the whole world, and undifputably certain : But he wifely forbore.
The Molinift party had tried to difcredit thefe mira- cles in one inftance, that of Mademoifelle le Franc. But, befides that their proceedings were in many re- lpe6ts the mod irregular in the world, pariicularly in cit- ing only a few of the Janfenill -witneffes, whom they tampered with : Befides this, I fay, they foon found themfelves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witneffes, one hundred and twenty in number, moft of them perfons of credit and fubflance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle. This was accompanied with a folemn and earnelt appeal to the parliament. But the parlia- ment were forbidden by authority to meddle in the af- fair. It was at iaft obferved, that where men are heated by zeal and enthufiafm, there is no degree of human teflimony fo ftrong as may not be procured for the greatefl abfurdity : And thofe who w^U be fo filly as to examine the affair by that medium, and feek particular Vol. II. I i flaws
482 Notes to the Second Volume.
flaws in the teflimony, are ahnoll fare to be confounded. It muftbe a miferabJe impoflure, indeed, that does not prevail in thatconielh
All who have been in France about that time have heard of the reputation of Monf. Heraut, the lieutenant de Police^ whofe vigilance, penetration, activity, and ex- teniive intelligence have been much talked of. This magiftrate, who by the nature of his olace is almoft abfolute, was vefted with full powers, on purpofe to fupprefs or difcredit thefe miracles ; and he frequently feized immediately, and examined the witneiTes and fubjecSls of them : But never could leach any thing fatisfaCtory a- gainft them.
In the cafe of Mademoifelle Thibaut he fent the famous De Sylva to examine her ; whofe evidence is very curious. The phyfician declares, that it was im- poflible ihe could have been fo ill as was proved by witnelTes ; becaufe it was impoflible <]ie could, in fo Ihort a time, have recovered fo perfeitly as he found her. He reafoned, like a man of fenfe, from natural caufes ; but the oppolite party told him, that the whole was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very bell proof of it.
The Molinifts were in a fad dilemma. They durfl not affert the abfolute infufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle. They were obliged to fay, that thefe miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the relource of the Jews of old.
No Janfenifl: Was ever embarrafled to account for the cefiation of the miracles, v.hen the church-yard was fliut up by the king's cdid . It was the touch of the tomb, which produced thefe extraordinary effects ; and wiien no one could approach th.c tomb, no effcits could be cxpecled. God, indeed, could have thrown down the walls in a moment ; but he is mafter of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account tor them. He did not throw down the walls of every city like thofe of Jericho, on the founding of the rams horns, nor break up the prifon of every apoftle, like that ot St. Paul.
No
Notes to the Second Volume. 483
No lefs a man, than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer of France, of the highed rank and family, gives evi- dence of a miraculous cure, performed upon a fervant of his, who had hved feveral years in his houfe with a vifible and palpable infirmity.
I ihall conckide with obferving, that no clergy are more celebrated for ftridtnefs of life and manners than the fecular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cures of Paris, who bear teftimony to thefe impoftures.
The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the aufterity of the nuns of Port-Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece of the famous Pafcal, whofe fzntihy of life, as well as extra- ordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine gives an account of this miracle in his famous hiftory of Port-Royal, and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of nuns, priefts, phyficians, and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could be- ftow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the biOiop of Tournay, thought this miracle fo certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheifts and free-thinkers. The queen-regent of France, who was extremely pre- judiced againll the Port-Royal, fent her own phyfician to examine the miracle, who returned an abfolute con- vert. In fhort, the fupernatural cure was fo uncontefta- ble, that it faved, for a time, that famous monaftery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jefuits. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by fuch fagacious and powerful antagonifts, and muft have haftened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who can build up a formidable caftle from fuch defpicable materials ; what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from thefe and many other circumftances, which I have not mentioned ! How often would the great names of Pafcal, Racine, Arnaud, Nicole, have relbunded in our ears ? But if they be wife, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more worth, a thoufand times, than all the reft of the collection. Befides, it may ferve very much to their purpofe. For that miracle was really per- formed by the touch of an autlientic holy prickle of
I i 2 the
484 Notes to the Second Volume.
the holy thorn, which compofed the holy crown, which.
NOTE [M], p. 155.
I
N general, it may, I think, be eftablifhed as a maxim, that where any caufe is known only by its particular effe6ts, it muft be impoffible to infer any new efFefts from that caufe; fince the qualities, which are requifite to produce thefe new efFeils along with the former, muft either be different, or fuperior, or of more extenfive ope- ration, than thofe which fimply produce the effect:, whence alone the caufe is fuppofed to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reafon to fuppofe the exiftence of thefe qualities. To fay, that the new effefts proceed only from a continuation of the fame energy, which is already known from the firll effeils, will not remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the cafe (which can feldom be fuppofed), the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for it is impoffible it can be abfo- lutely the fame), I fay, this exertion of a like energy, in a different period of fpace and time, is a very arbitrary fup- pofition, and what there cannot poffibly be any traces of in the effects, from which all our knowledge of the caufe is originally derived. Let the inferred caufe be exactly proportioned (as it fliould be to the known effect; and it is impoffible that it can poffefs any qualities, from which new or different effedls can be inferred.
NOTE [N], p. 16^.
L HIS argument is drawn from Dr. Berkley; and in- deed moft of the writiiigs of that very ingenious author form the bell: lelfoas of Iccpticilm, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philofoplicrs, Bayle not excepted. He profeffes, however, in his title-page (and undoubted'y with g eat truth) to have compofed his book agaiull the fceptics as weH as againft the atheifls and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though othevvvife intended, are, in reality, merely fceptical, ap- pears from this, that they admit of no anfwcr and produce no
conviilion.
Notes to the Second Volume. 4S5
convinion. Their only effe6l is to caufe that momentary amazement and irrefolution and coafufion, which is the rc- fuJt of fcepticilhi.
NOTE [OJ, p. 166.
w,
HATEVER difputes there may be about mathema- tical points, we mufl: allow that there are phyfical points ; that is, parts of extenfion, which cannot be divided or leflen- ed, cither by the eye or imagination. Thcfe images, then, which are prefent to the fancy or fenfes, are abfolutely indi- vifible, and confequently mufl: be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely lefs than any real part of extenfion ; and yet nothing appears more certain to reafon, than that an infinite number of them compofes an infinite extenfion. How much more an infinite number of thofe infinitely fmall parts of extenfion, which are fi:ill fuppofed infinitely divifible.
NOTE [P], p. 168.
XT fcems to me not impoffible to avoid thefe abfurdities and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no fucli thing as abftra^t or general ideas, properly fpeaking j but that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attach- ed to a general term, which recalls, upon occafion, other particular ones, that refemble. in certain circumllances, the idea, prelent to the mind. Thus when the term Horfe is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourfelves the idea of a black or a white animal, of a particular fize or figure : But as that term is alfo ufually applied to animals of other co- lours, figures and fizes, thefe ideas, though not actually prefent to the imagination, are eafily recalled ; and our reafoning and conclufion proceed in the fame way, as if they were actually prefent. If this be admitted (as feems rea- fonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which mathematicians reafon, are nothing but particular, and fuch as are fuggefted by the fenfes and imagination, and confe- quently, cannot be infinitely divifible. It is fuificient to have dropped this hint at prefent, without profecuting it any farther. It catainly concerns all lovers of fcience not
to
486 Notes to the Second Volume.
to expofe themfelves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclufions ; and this feems the readieft folution of thefe difficulties.
NOTE [Q_], p. 174.
X HAT impious maxim of the ancient philofophy, Ex nihilo^ nihil fit ^ by which the creation of matter was ex- cluded, ceafes to be a maxim, according to this philofophy. Not only the"* will of the fupreme Being may create mat- ter; but, for aught we know a priori^ the will of any other being might create it, or any other caufe, that the moft whini- lical imagination can affign.
NOTE [R], p. ,93.
T
■A HAT property is a fpecies of relation^ which pro- duces a connexion between the perfon and the objedt is evident : The imagination paffes naturally and eafily from the confideration of a field to that of the perfon to whom it belongs. It may alfo be afked, how this relation is refolva- ble into any of thofe three, viz. canjation^ contiguity^ and refemblance, which we have affirmed to be the only conne6t- ing principles among ideas. To be the proprietor of any thing is to be the fole perfon, who, by the laws of fociety> has a right to difpofe of it, and to enjoy the benefit of it. This right has at leaft a tendency to procure the perfon fhe exercife of it; and in fa6l does commonly procure him that advantage. For rights which had no influence, and never took place, would be no rights at all. Now a perfon who difpofes of an objedf, and reaps benefit from it, both pro- duces, or may produce, effedts en it, and is affeded by it. Property therefore is a fpecies of caufation. It enables the perfon to produce alterations on the objecf, and it fuppofes that his condition is improved and altered by it. It is in- deed the relation the moft interefting of any, and occurs the moft frequently to the mind.
NOTE
Notes to the Second Volume. 487
NOTE [SJ, p. 238.
T,
HIS fidion of a ftate of nature, as a ftate of war, was not tirll ftarted by Mr. Hobbes, as is commonly imagined. Plato endeavours to refute an hypothelis very like it in the 2d, 3d, and 4th books de republica. Cicero, on the contrary, fupjjofes it certain and univcrfally acknowledged in the fol- low ing paffage. " Quis enim vcftrum, judices, ignorat, ita " n.turam rcrum tulifl'e, ut quodam tempore homines, " nondum neque naturali, ixeque civili jure defcripto, full *' per agros, ac difperfi vagarentur tantumque haberent " quantum manu ac viribus, per czedcni ac vulnera, aut *' eripcre, aut retinere potuiiTent? Qiii igitur primi virtute " & confilio pr2;ftanti extiterunt, ii perfpe6to genere huma- ** nae docilltatis atque ingenii, ditlipatos, unum in locum '* congrcgarunt, eoAjue ex feritate ilia ad juftitiam ac man- " fuetudinem tranfduxerunt. 7\nn res ad communem " utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula *' hominum, qu^e poltea civitates nominatae funt, tum do- " micilia conjuncla, quas urbes dicamus, invento & divino ** & humano jure, moenibus fepferunt. Atque inter hanc *' vitam, perpolitam humaniiate, cc illam immanem, nihil *' tarn interefl quam JUS atque VIS. Horum u ro uti " nolimus, altero eft utendum. Vim volumus extingui ? " Jus valeat necefTe ell, id eft, judicia, quibus omne jus '' continetur. judicia difplicent, aut nulla, funt ? Vis do- *' minetur necefTe eft?- Ha^c vident omnes." Pro. Sext. 1.42.
NOTE [TJ, p. 245.
X H E autlvor of UEfpirt dcs Lo'ix. This illuftrious writer, however, fets out with a different theory, and fup- pofes all right to be founded on certain rapports or relations ; which is a fyftem, that, in my opinion, never will be recon- ciled with true philolbphy. Father Malebranche, as far as I can learn, was the iirft that iiarted this abftracl theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by Cudworth, Clarke, and others ; and as it excludes all fentimeut, and pretends to found every thing on reafon, it has not wanted
followers
488 Notes to the Second Volume.
followers in this philofophic age. See Section I. Appen- dix I. With regard to juilice, the virtue here treated of, the inference againll this theory feems ihort and conckidvc. I'ropcrty is allowed to be dependent on civil law s ; Civil laws are allowed to have no other objedt, but the interefl: of fo- ciety ; Ihis therefore muft be allowed to be the fole foun- dation of property and jurlice. Not to mention, that our obligation itfelf to obey the rnagidrate and his laws is founded on nothing but the iniereflb of fociety.
li the ideas of juftice, ronenmes, do not follow the dif- poiitions of civil law ; we (hall tind, that thefe cafes, in- Itead of objeftions, are confirmations of the theory delivered above. Where a civil law is fo perverie as to crofs all the interefts of fociety, it lofes all its authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural juftice, which are conformable to thofe interefts. Sometimes alfo civil lavvs, for ufeful pur- poles, require a ceremony or form to any deed; and where that is wanting, their decrees run contrary to the ufual tenour of juftice j but one who takes advantage of fuch chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an honefl man. Thus, the interefts of fociety require, that contradls be ful- filled j and there is not a more m.aterial article either of natural or civil juftice : But the omiifion ot a trifling cir- cumftance will often, bylaw, invalidate a contract, hi for 0 humana^ but not in foro confcientia, as divines exprefs them- fehes. In thefe cafes, the magiftrate is fuppofed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the right, not to have al- tered the right. Where his intention extends to t4ie right, and is conformable to the interefts of fociety ; it never fails to alter the right ; a clear proof of the origin of juftice and of property, as affigned above.
NOTE [U], p. 247
/•
I
T is evident, that the will or confent alone never transfers property, nor caufcs the obligation of a promife, (for the fame rcafoning extends to both) but the will mvdl be exprefi fed by words or figns, in order to impofc a tye upon any man. The exprelhon being once brought in as iubfervient to the
will,
Notes to the Second Volume. 489
will, foon becomes the principal part of the promife; nor will a man be lets bound by his word, though he fecretly give a different dire£lion to his intention, and with-hold the allent or his mind. But though the c\- preifion makes, on moft occalions, the whole of tlv: pro- mife, yet it does not always fo ; and one who fliould make ufe of any expreilion, of which he knows not the meaning, and which he ufes without any fenfe of the coniequences, would not certainly be bound by it. Nay, though he know its meaning, yet if he ufe it in jell only, and with fuch llgns as evidently Ihow, that he has no ferious mtcntion of binding himfelf, he would not lie under any obligation of performance ; but it is neceflary, that the words be a perfeel exprelfion of the will, wihout any contrary figns. Nay, even this we mufl not carry fo far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quicknefs of underftanding, we conje«£ture, from certain figns, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his expreflion or verbal promife, if we accept of it; but muft limit this conclufion to thofe cafes where the figns are of a different nature from thofe of deceit. All thefe contradidions are ealily ac- counted for, if juftice arife entirely from its ufefulnefs to focietyj but will never be explained on any other hypothefis.
it is remarkable, that the moral decifions of the yefuits and other relaxed cafuifts, were commonly for- med in profecution of fome fuch fubtilties of reaioning as are here pointed out, and proceed as much from the habit of fcholaflic refinement as from any corruption of the heart, if we may follow the authority of Monf. Bayle. See his Dictionary, article Loyola. And why has the indignation of mankind rifen fo high againft thefe cafuilts; but becaufe every one perceived, that human fociety could not fubfift were fuch practices au- thorized, and that morals mull always be handled with a view to public intereft, more than philofophi- cal regularity ? If the fecret direction of the intention, faid every man of fenfe, could invalidate a contrafl ; where is our fecurity ? And yet a mecaphyfical fchool- man might think, that, where an intention was fup- pofed to be requifite, if that intention really had not
place.
49° Notes to the Second Volume.
place, no confequence ought to follow, and no obliga- tion be impofed. The cafuiftical fubtiltiei nr.ay not be greater than the fubtilties of lawyers, hinted at above; but as the foimer are pcrtiicious, and the latter iwwcent and even neceffrry^ this is the reafon of the very differ- ent reception they meet with from the world.
It is a do(9:rine of the church of Rome, that the prieft, by a fecret direction of his intention, can in- validate any facrament. This pofition is derived from a ftridl and regular profecution of the obvious truth, that empty words alone, without any meaning or in- tention in the fi eaker, can never be attended with any effect. If the fame conclufion be not admitted in rea- fonings concerning civil contracts, where the affair is allowed to be of fo much lefs confequence than the eternal falvation of thoufands, it proceeds entirely from men's fenfe of the danger and inconvenience of the do6trine in the former cafe : And we may thence ob- ferve, that however pofitive, arrogant, and dogmatical any fuperftition may appear, it never can convey any thorough perfuafion of the reality of its objects, or put them, in any degree, on a balance with the common incidents of life, which we learn from daily obfervation and experimental reafoning.
NOTE [X], p. 255.
\. HE only folution, which Plato gives to all the ob- jections that might be raifed againll the community of wo- men, eftablilhed in his imaginary commonwealth, is Ksaais-*
J'Otp (Jn TiiTO XttI Aflirai Kti ASAS^JXai, OT(TOyU?l' 0)^';X\U->t KCUXOY- To
Js BaaS^Pov aicr-^pov Scite enhn ijiudl~ d'lcttur &' dketur. Id quod utile fit honejlmn ejje^ qucd aiitcm inutile fit turpe ejfe. De. Rep. lib. v. p. 457. ex edit, Ser. And this max- im will admit of no doubt, where public utility is con- cerned; which is Plato's meaning. And indeed to what other purpofe do all the ideas of chaftity and modefty ferve ? Nfi utile efl quod facimus,. frujlr a efl gloria, fays Phasdrus. Kkaov twi (iActS pwv ^Jsi- fays Plutarch de vitiofo pudore. Nihil eorum quae damnofa funt, pulchrum eft. The fame was the opinion of the Stoics. C'.^ctiv cv ot
Notes to the Second Volume. 491
2Ta'()iri( aya^oY nyai O'CtihtiAr m ajt erepctv <uf?A5ittS', c^ff-sxciv far A'>f»rfj- TH> apsTid xaj Til) cnra^ot(*y -sTfct^jK. Sept. Emp. lib; iii. cap. 20.
NOTE [YJ, p. 259.
JL HAT the lighter machine yield to the heavier, and, in machines of the fame kind, that the empty yield to the loaded; this rule is founded on convenience. That thofe who are going to the capital take place of thofe who are coming from it j this feems to be found- ed on fome idea of the dignity of the great city, and of the preference of the future to the paft. From like reafons, among foot-walkers, the right-hand intitles a man to the wall, and prevents jollling, which peaceable people find very dilagreeable and inconvenient.
NOTE [Z], p. 262.
w,
E ought not to imagine, becaufe an inanimate ob- je£l may be ufeful as well as a man, that therefore it ought alfo, according to this fyftem, to merit the ap- pellation of virtuous. The fentiments, excited by utili- ty, are, in the two cafes, very different; and the one is mixed with affection, efteem, approbation, t^fc. and not the other. In like manner, an inanimate obje61: may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former ? There are a numerous fet of paflions and fentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original conftitution of nature, the only proper objedfs : And though the very fame qualities be transferred to an infenfible, in- animate being, they will not excite the fame fentiments. The beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, in- deed, fometimes called their virtues-, but this is an effect of the caprice of language, which ought not to be regarded in reafoning. For though there be a fpecies of approbation attending even inanimate objeiSls, when beneficial, yet this fentiment is fo weak, and fo differ- ent from that which is directed to beneficent magifirates or flatefmen; that they ought not to be ranked under the fame clafs or appellation.
A very
49^ Notes to the Second Volume.
A very fmall variation of the obje6l, even where the fame quahties are preferved, will deilroy a fentiment. Thus, the fame beauty, transferred to' a different fex, excites no amorous paflion, where nature is not ex- tremely perverted.
u
NOTE [AAJ, p. 264.
NDUTIFULNESS to parents is difapproved of
by mankind, 'zzrpoopcu^^ya? to ^.^aaox, ^ (JVXXoyi'(^oi^i)i*? oTj TO
ijrapccTAMtriov £xaroj?ctyT«riv rru^xLipn^ii. Ingratitude for a like reafon (though he feems there to mix a more generous regard) crt;vrtj'a,v*XT8vl«.? /wsv TO) TTSActf, a.\a,Y=.f<>y]rf.s S' ^tt' aumc TO iscLfaLTTMaiov it,ci>v v^royiyvilci TtSinoiO. -crttpExo.s'w xa xct9M)to//o©'
^vvctinia; K) ^icvfin.^. Lib. vi. cap. 4. Perhaps the hiftorian only meant, that our fympathy and humanity was more enlivened, by our considering the fimilarity of our cafe with that of the perfon fuffering; which is a juft fen- timent.
I
NOTE [BB], p. 268.
NOTE [CCJ, p. 273.
T is needlefs to pufh our refearches fo far as to afk, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is fufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We muft ftop fomewhere in our examination of caufes; and there are, in every fcience, '
fome general principles, beyond which we cannot hope i
to find any principle more general. No man is abfo- j
lutely indifferent to the happinefs and mifery of others. The firft has a natural tendency to give pleafure ; the fecond, pain. This every one may find in himfelf. ,'
It is not probable, that thefe principles can be refolv- j
ed into principles more fimple and univerfal, whatever '
attempts may have been made to that purpofe. But if it were poffible, it belongs not to the prefent fubjecl; and we may here fafely confider thefe principles as ori- ginal : Happy, if we can render all the confcquences fufficiently plain and perfpicuous !
T
AN proportion to the ftation which a man poffeffes, J
according to the relations in which he is placed; we al- *
ways expecl from him a greater or Icfs degree of good, '
3 and <
i
Notes to the Second Volume. 493
and when difappointed, blame his inutility ; and much more do we blame him, if any ill or prejudice arife from liis conduct and behaviour. When the interefts of one country interfere with thofe of another, we ef- timate the merits of a ftatefman by the good or ill, ■which refults to his own country from his meafures and councils, without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objeds, which lie neareft the eye, while we determine his charaftcr. And as nature has implanted in every one a fuperior affection to his own country, we never expeifl any regard to diftant nations, where a competition arifes. Not to mention, that, while every man confuks the good of his own community, we are fenlible, that the general intereft of mankind is better promoted, than by any loofe indeterminate views to the good of a fpecles, whence no beneficial aftion could ever refult, for want of a duly hmited object, on which they could exert themfelves.
NOTE [DD], p. 276.
J? O R a like reafon, the tendencies of adlions and characters, not their real accidental confequences, are alone regarded in our moral determinations or general judgments J though in our real feeling or fentiment, ■we cannot help paying greater regard to one whofe Na- tion, joined to virtue, renders him really ufeful to fo- ciety, than to one, who exerts the focial virtues only in good intentions and benevolent afFeftions. Separating the character from the fortune, by an eafy and necef- fary effort of thought, we pronounce thefe perfons alike, and give .them the fame general praife. The judgment corre(5ts or endeavours to correct the appear- ance : But is not able entirely to prevail over fenti- ment.
Why is this peach-tree faid to be better than that other ; but becaufe it produces more or better fruit ? And would not the fame praife be given it, though fnails or vermin had deftroyed the peaches, before they came to full maturity ? In morals too, is not the tree known by the fruit f And cannot we eafily diftinguifh between nature and accident, in the one cafe as well as in the other?
NOTE
494 Notes to the Second Volume.
I
NOTE [EEJ, p. 278.
T is wifely ordained by nature, that private connex- ions fhould commonly prevail over univerfal views and confiderations ; otherwiie our affections and aclions would be diflipated and loft, for want of a proper limited ob- ject:. Thus a fmall benefit done to ourfelves, or our near friends, excites more lively fentiments of love and approbation than a great benefit done to a diflant com- monwealth : But ftill we know here, as in all the fen- fes, to correal thefe inequalities by reflection, and re- tain a general flandard of vice and virtue, founded chiefly on general ufefulnefs.
O:
NOTE [FFJ, p. 282.
NE may venture to affirm, that there is no human creature, to whom the appearance of happinefs (where envy or revenge has no place) does not give pleafure, that of mifery, uneafinefs. This feems infeparable from our make and conflitution. But they are only the more generous minds, that are thence prompted to feek zeal- oufly the good of others, and to have a real palTion for their welfare. With men of narrow and ungenerous fpirits, this fympathy goes not beyond a flight feeling of the imagination, which ferves only to excite fenti- ments of complacency or cenfure, and makes them ap- ply to the object either honourable or difhonourable ap- pellations, A griping mifer, for inftnnce, praifes ex- tremely indujiry and frugality even in others, and fets them, in his efliimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good that refults from them, and feels that fpecies of happinefs with a more lively fympathy, than any other you could reprefent to him ; though perhaps he would not part with a fhilling to make the fortune of the induflrious man, whom he praifes fo highly.
D,
NOTE [GGJ, p. 293.
^lODORUS SICULUS, lib. xv It may not be improper to give the character of Epaminondas, as drawn by the hiftorian, in order to fliow the ideas of perfc6l merit, which prevailed in thofc ages. In other illuflri-
ous
Notes to the Second Volume: 495
ous men, fays he, you will ohfcrve, that each pofT- efTed fome one (hining quality, which was tlie founda- rion of his fame: In Epaminondas all the virtues are found united; force of body, eloquence of expreifion, vigour of mind, contempt of riches, gentlenefs of dif- pofition, and what it chlejiy to be regarded, courage and condudt in war.
A>
NOTE [HH], p. 294.
.LL men are equally liable to pain and difeafe and iicknefs; and may again recover health and eafe. Thefe circumftances, as they make no dirtintlion between one man and other, are no fource of pride or humility, regard or contempt. But comparing our own fpecies to fuperior ones, it is a very mortifying confideration, that we Ihould all be fo liable to difeafes and infirmi- ties j and divines accordingly employ this topic, in or- der to deprefs felf-conceit and vanity. They would have more fuccefs, if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned to compare ourfelves with others. The infirmities of old age are mortifying; be- caufe a companion with the young may take place. The king's evil is induftrioully concealed, becaufe it affe6ts others, and is often tranfmitted to pofterity. The cafe is nearly the fame with fuch difeafes as con- vey any naufeous or frightful images; the epilepfy, for inflance, ulcers, fores, fcabs, &c.
T,
NOTE [II], p. 296.
HERE is fomething extraordinary, and feemingly unaccountable in the operation of our pafTions, when we confider the fortune and fituation of others. Very often another's adv~ancement and profperity produces envy, which has a flrong mixture of hatred, and arifes chiefly from the comparifon of ourfelves with the per- fon. At tiie very fame time, or at leaft in very fhort intervals, we may feel the pallion of refpeif, which is a fpecies of aiiedtion or good-will, with a mixture of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of our fellowi; often caufe pity, whic'n has in it a Itrong mixture of good- will. This feiitunent of pity is neri/ly
allied
40 Notes to the Second Volume.
allied to contempt, which is a Ipecies of diflike, with a mixture of pride. I only point out the phenomena, as a fubjecl of fpeculation to fuch as are curious with regard to moral enquiries. It is fufficient for the prefent purpofe to obferve in general, that power and riches commonly caufe refpe£t, poverty and meannefs contempt, though particular views and incidents may fometimes raife the paffions of envy and of pity,
NOTE [KK], p. 300.
np
A HERE is no man, who, on particular occafions, is not affedted with all the difagreeable paJions, fear, anger, dejection, grief, melancholy, anxiety, &c. But thefe, fo far as they are natural, and univerfal, make no difference between one man and another, and can never be the objedt of blame. It is only when the dif- polition gives a propenfity to any of thefe difagreeable paiTions, that they disfigure the character, and by giving ui i.ir.^^fs, convey the fentiment of difapprobation to the fpectator.
NOTE [LL], p. 32.
T
ACIT. hift. lib. iii. The author entering upon the narration, fays, Lunicta vejie, fcedum fpeSiaculum duce- iatur, multis Increfaniibus^ tnillo inlacr'imante : aeformitas exitus mifericordiam abftulerat. To enter thoroughly into this method of thinl ing, v,e mufl: make allowance for the ancient maxims, that no one ought to prol ng his life after it became difhonourable ; but, as he had always a right to difpofe of it, it tlien became a duty to part with it.
NOTE [MM], p. 303.
JL H E abfence of virtue may often be a vice ; and that of the higheft kind ; as in the inftance of ingratitude, as well as meannefs. Where we expect a beauty, the difap- pointmcnt gives an uneafy fenfation, and produces a real de- formity. An abjednefs of charader, likewife, is difgultful
and
Notes to the Second Volume. 497
and contemptible in another view. Wlicre a man has no Icnfe of v.Uue in himfelf, we are not likely to have an; higher erteemofhim. And if the fame perfon, who ciouche - to his fuperiors, is infolent to his inferiors (as often Iiappeus), this contrariety of behaviour, inflead of correctinj the for- mer vice, aa;2;ravates it extremely by the addition of a vice llill more odious. See fe6l. 8.
NOTE [NN], p. 326.
-It feems certain, both from reafon and experience, that a rude, untaught favnge regulates chiefly his love md hatred by the ideas of private utility and injury, and has but faint conceptions of a general rule or fyftem of beha- viour. The man who flands oppofite to him in battle, he hates heartily, not only for the prefent moment, which is almofl: unavoidable, but for ever after j nor is he fatif- fied without the moft extreme punifliment and vengeance. But we, accuilomed to fociety, and to more enlarged re- fleiffions, confider, that this man is ferving lii^ own coun- try and community ; that any man, in the fame fituation, woul '. do the fame; that we ourfelves, in like ciicumftan- ces, obferve a like conduft ; that, in general, human lociety is befl: fupported on fuch maxims : And by thefe fuppofi- tior.s and views, we correct, in fome meafure, our ruder and narrower paflions. And though much of our friend- fliip and enmity be ftill regulated by private confiderations of benefit and harm, we pay, at leaft, this homage to ge- neral rules, which we are accufiiomed to refpeil, that we commonly pers'ert our adverfary's conduit, by imputing malice or injuftice to him, in order to give vent to thofe pafTions, which arife from felf-love and private intereft. When the heart is full of rage, it never wants pretences of this nature ; though fometimes as frivolous, as thofe Ironi Avhich Horace, being almoil cruihed by the fall of a tree, affefls to accufe of parricide the firft planter of it.
Vol. IT. Kk NOTE
498 Notes to the Second Volume
N O T E [O ], p. 352.
•Eneyolence naturally divides into two kinds, tii*? general and the particular. The fvrfl: is, wiierc we have no friendfhip or connexion or efteem for the perfon, bat feel only a general fymp ithy with him or a compalTion for his pains, and a congratulation with his pleafures. The other fpecies of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue, on fervices done us, or on fome particular con- nexions. Both thefe fentiments muft be allowed real in human nature; but whether they will refolve into fome nice cohfiderations of felf-love, is a queftion more curious tliaa important. The former fentiment, to wit, that of general benevolence, or humanity, or fympathy, we Ihall have oc- caiion frequently to treat of in the courfe of this enquiry ; and I aflume it as real, from genera;l experience, without any other proof.
N O T E [PP], p. 361.
T .
J- H IS theory concerning the origin of property, and con- fequently of juftice, is, in the main, the fame with that hinted at and adopted by Grotius. " Hinc difcimus, qux' *' fuerit caufa, ob quam a primsva communione rerum pri- " mo mobilium, deinde & immobilium difceffum eft : ni- " mirum quod cum non contenti homines vcfci fpon'e natis, " antra habitare, corpore aut nudo agere, aut corticibus ar- *' borum feiarumvc pcllibus vellito, vitas genus exquifitus " dclcgilTent, induftria opus fuit, quam hnguli rebus fin- *' gulis adhibercnt : Qiio minus autem fru'itus in commune *' confcrrentur, prirnum obftitit locorum, in quae homines *' difceflerunt, diAantia, d'^inde juftitix* &: amoris defei5tus, *' per qucm fiebat, ut nee in labore, nee in confumptione, *' fru6luum, qua:; dcbebat, a;qua!itas fervaretur. Simul dif- *' cimus, quomodo res in pioprietalem ivcrint ; non animi '^' a(f.tu folo, neque enim fcire alii poterant, quid alii fuuni *' elTc vellent, ut co abllincrent, & idem velie plures pote- " rant ; fed padlo quodam aut cxpreflb, ut per divillonem, " aut tacito, ut per occupationcm." Dejure belli 5: pacis. I-lb. ii. cap. 2. § 2. art. 4, h 5.
N O T E
Notes to the Second Volume. 499
NOTE [QOJ, p. 36r.
K
ATUPv AL may be oppofed, either to what is unrr- fuaU miraculous^ or artificial. In tlie two former feiifes, jurtice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as tlicy luppoic realbn, forethought, deiign, and a fecial union and confederacy among men, perhaps, that epithet cannot ftri6l- ly, in the lall fenl'e, be appHed to them. Had men lived without fociety, property had never been known, and nei- ther juflice nor injuftice had ever exifted. But fociety among human creatures, had been impoITible, without reafoii, and forethought. Inferior animals, that unite, are guided by inftinct, which fupplies the place of reafon. But all thcfe difputes arc merely verbal.
NOTE [RRJ, p. 363.
X H A T there be a feparation or diftinclion of poflVf- fions, and that this feparation be fteady and conftant ; this is abfolutely required by the interefts of fociety, and hence the origin of juftice and property. What pofTeffions are a/figned to particular perfons j this is, generally fpeaking, pretty indifferent ; and is-often detcmined by very frivolous views and confiderations. "We Ihall mention a few parti- cular^.
Were a fociety formed among feveral independent mem- bers, the moft obvious rule, which could be agreed on, would be to annex property to prefcnt pofl'elTion, and leave every one a right to what he at prefent enjoys. The rela- tion of poffelFion, which takes place between the perfon and the object, naturally draws on the relation of propert)'.
For a like realbn, occupaticn or tirft polTeinon becomes the foundation of property.
Where a man bellows labour and induflry upon any ob- jeift, which before belonged to no body ; as in cutting down and fliaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c. the alterations, which he produces, caufes a relation between him and the objedl, and naturally engages us to annex it to him by the new relation of property. "I'his caufe here concurs with the K k 2 public
500 Notes to the Second Volume.
public utility, which confifts in the encouragement given tb- induflry and labour.
Perhaps too, private humanity, towards the poflellbr,. concurs, in this inftance,, with the other motives, and- engages us to leave witli him what he has acquired by his fweat and labour ; and what he has flattered himfelfi ia the conftant enjoyment of. For though private hu- manity can, by no means, be the origin of juftice ; fmce the latter virtue fo often contradicts the former ; yet wher\ the rule of feparate and conftant pofieifion is once form- ed by the indifpenfable ncceflities of fociety, private huma- nity, and an averfion to the doing a hardfhip to another^ may, in a particular inftance, give rife to a particular rule of property.
I am much inclined to think, that the right of fucceftion. or inheritance much depends on thofe connexions of the imagination, and that the relation to a former proprietor begetting a relation to the object, is the caufe why the pro- perty is transferred to a man after the death of his kinfman, It is true ; indufcry is more encouraged by the transference of pofleftion to children or near relations : But this confi- deration will only have place in a cultivated fociety ; whereash tlie right of fucceflion is regarded even amons; the o-reateft Barbarians.
Acquiiitioii of property by nccejfioji can be explained no way but by having recourfe to the relations and connexions, of the imagination.
The property of rivers, by the laws of moft nations, and by the natural turn of our thought, is attributed to the proprietors of their banks, excepting fuch vaft rivers as tlie Rhine or tne Danube, which fecm too large to follow as an accclfion to the property of the neigh- bouring fields. Yet even thefc rivers are conndered as the property of that nation, through whofe dominions they run; the idea of a nation being of a fuitable bulk to cor- refpond with them, and bear them fuch a relation in the: fancy.
The accelTions, which are made to land, bordering uport rivers, follow the land, fay the civilians, provided it be made by what they call alluvion^ that is, infenlibly and imper- ceptibly ; which are circumftances, that allilt the imagina- tion in the conjunctioi\.
Where
Notes to the Second Volume. 501
Where rlu-re is any confiderahle portion torn at once Jfrom one bank and added to another, it becomes not his ^jroperty, whole land it falls on, till it unite with the land, and till the trees and plants have fpread their roots •into both. Before tiiat, the thought docs not fuffioiently join theui.
In Ihort, we muft ever diftinguifh between the neccfllty 'of a feparation and conftancy in men's pofTeflion, and the rules, which alhgn particular objects to particular per- lons. The rirft neceJlity is obvious, lirong, and invincible : The latter may depend on a public utility more light and frivolous, on tlie fentiment of private humanity and aver- fion to private hardlhip, on politive laws, on precedents, •analogies, and very hue connexions and turns of the ima- :gination.
NOTE [SSJ, p. 37^.
X HE term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad fenfe ; but itliis fentiment feems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to .the other circumftances which accompany it. The French '.exprefs this fentiment by the term, attiour propre, but as they alfo exprefs felf-love as well as vanity, by the fame term, .there arifes thence a gieat confufion in Rochefoucault, and many of their moral writers.
NOTE [TT], p. 371.
A^OVE and efteem are nearly the fame pafTion, and arifc •from fimilar caufes. The qualities, which produce both, are fuch as communicate pleafure. But where this pleafure is fevere and ferious ; or where its objcft is great, and makes a itron^ imprelhon, or where it produces anv degree of hu- mility and awe : In all thefe cafes, the paffion, which arifes irom the pleafure, is more properly denominated efteem than ■love Benevolence attends both : But is conne6led with .love in a more eminent degree. There feems to be ftill a «(lrongcr mixture of pride in contempt than of humility in
efteemj
502
Notes to the Second Volume.
efteem ; and the reafon would not be difficult to one, who lludied accurately the paffions. All thefe various mixtures and compolitions and appearance? of fentiment form a very curious fubjedl of fpeculation, but are wide of our prefent purpofc. Throughout this enquiry, we always conllder in general, what qualities are a fubject of praife or of cenfure, without entering into all the minute differences of fcnti- ment, which they excite. It is evident, that whatever is contemned, is alfo diiliked, as well as what is hated ; and we here endeavour to take objects, according to their moft fimple views and appearances, l^hefe fciences are too 3pt to appear abftraft to common readers, even with all the precautions which wc can take to clear them from fuperfluous fpeculations, and bring them down to every capacity.
N O T E [UUJ, p. 371.
X HE following pafHige of Cicero is worth quoting, as being the mofl: clear and exprefs to our purpofc, that any thing can be imagined, and, in a difpute, v»hich is chiefly verbal, muft, on account of the author, carry an authority, from which there can be no appeal.
" Virtus autem, quae efl per fe ipfa laudabilis, et fine qua *' nihil laudari poteft, tamen habet plures partes, quarum *' alia efl: alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim alis vir- " tutes, quae videntur in moribus hominum, et quadam " comitate ac beneficentia pofitie: alise quas in ingenii aliqua *' facultate, aut animi magnitudine ac robore. Nam cle- *' mentia, jufl:itia, l;enignita:s, fides, fortitudn in periculis ^' communibus, jucunda efi audita in laudationibus. C)mnes *' enim ha; virtutes non tarn ipfis, qui eas in fc habent, quam *' gencri hominum fruduofa; putantur. Sapientia ct mng- ** nitudo animi, qua omncs res humanas, tcni'cs ct pro *' nihilo putantur; pt in cogitando vis qua?dam ingenii, ct ** ipfa eloqiientia admirationis habet non minus, jucundi- *' tatis minus. Ipfos eniin magis \idetur, quos laudamus, '* quam illos, anud quos i.iudamus, ornare ac tueri : fed '* tamen in laudenda jungenda funt etiam ha-c genera vir- " tutum. Ferunt enim aurcs hominum, cum ilia qu-x
"jucunda
Notes to tlie Second Volume.. 503
^' jucunda ct grata, turn ctiam ilia, quae mirabilia funr iu " virtute, laudarL" De orat. lib. ii. cap. 8g.
I fuppofe, if Cicero were now alive, it would be found vlifficult to fetter his moral fentiments by narrow fyftems j or {lerfuade him, that no (}ualities were to be admitted as vir- tursy or acknowledged to be a part of perfonal merits but what were recommended by The IFhole Duty of Man.
D.
NOTE [XX], p. 394.
URING the times of the emperors, the Romans Jfeem to have been more given to intrigues and gallantry han the Englifli are at prefent : And the women of condi- tion, in order to retain their lovers, endeavoured to rix a mame of reproach on thofc who were addicted to wtnching and low amours. They were called Ancillarioli. See Se- neca de beneficiis. Lib. i. cap. 9. See alfo Martial^ lib„ xii. epig. 58.
NOTE [YYJ, p. 409.
F.
RAGILIS & laboriofa mortalitas in partes ifta digef- ** lit, infirmitatis fu^e memor, ut portioaibus quifquis co- *' leret, quo maxime indigeret." Plin. lib. ii. cap. 7. So early as Hefiod's time there were 30,00 deities. Ope^r. iff Dier. lib. i. ver. 250.' But the tafk to be performed by ithefe feems ftill too great for their number. The provinces of the deities were fo fubdivided, that there v/as even a god o^ Sneezing. See Arifi. Probl. fe6^. 33. cap. 7. The pro- vince of copulation, fuitably to the importance and dignity of it, v.'as divided among fcveral deities.
NOTE [ZZ], p. 426.
T will be eafy to give a reafon, why Thales, y^naxl- mander, and thofe early plulofophers, who really were atheiils, might be very orthodox in the pagan creed ; and why Anaxagoras and Socrates, though real theifts, mull naturally, in ancient times, be efteemed impious. The blind, unguided powers of nature, if they could produce men, might alfo produce fuch beings as Jupiter and Nep- tune,
504 Notes to the Second Volume.
tune, who being the moft powerful, intelHgent exiftences in the world, would be proper obje6ts of wor(hip. But a here a fuprenie iucelligence, the nril caufe of all, is admitied, thcfe capricious b :ings, if they exift at all, muft appear very iubordinare and dependent, and confequently be excluded from the rank of deities. Plato (de [eg. lib. x.) aJhgns this reafun for the imputation thrown on Anaxagoras, namely his denying the divinity of the liars, planets, and other cre- ated objects.
NOTE [AAA], p. 436.
E R R I U S Flaccus, cited by Pliny, lib. xxviii. cap. 2. affirmed, that 11 was ufual with the Romans, before they laid liege to any town, to invocate the tutelar deity of the place, and by promiling him greater honours than thoie he at prefent enjoyed, bribe him to betray his old friends and votaries. The name of the tutelar deity of Rome was for this reafon kept a moft religious myftery ; leil the enemies of the republic fliould be able, in the fame manner, to draw him over 10 their fervice. For without the name, they thought, nothing of that kind could be pradifed. Pliny fays, that the common form of invocation was prelerved to his time in the ritual of the pontifs. And Macrobius has tranfmitted a copy of it from the fecret things of Sammoni- cus Serenus.
NOTE [BBBJ, p. 439.
■ OST nations have fallen into this guilt of human facrifices ; though, perhaps, that impious fiiperftition has never prevailed very much in any civili/,ed nation, unlefs we except the Carthaginians. For the Tyrians loon abolilhed it. A facrilice is conceived as a prefent ; and any prefent is delivered to their deity by deltroying it and rendering it ufe- lefs to men ; by burning what is folid, pouring out the liquid, and killing the animate. For want of a better way of doing him fervice, we do ourfelves an injury ; and fancy that we thereby exprefs, at leall, the hcartniefs of our good- will and adoration. Thus our mercenary devotion deceives ourfelves, and imainnes it deceives the deity.
NOTE
I
Notes to the Second Volume. 505
NOTE [CCC], p. 447.
T is ftrange that the Egyptian religion, though fo abfurd, ihould yet have borne fo great a refemblance to the Jewiih, that ancient writers even of the greateft genius were not able to obferve any difference between them. For it is remarkable that both Tacitus aiid Suetonius, when they mention that decree of the fenate, under Tiberius, by which the Egj'ptian an<i Jewifti profelytes were baniflied from Rome, exprefsly treat thefe religions iiS the lame^ and it appears, that even the decree itfelf was founded on that fuppofition, <* Adlum & de facris .gyptiis, Judaicifque p;,lendis; " fa£tumque patrum confultum, ut quatuor millia iiber- *' tini generis ca fupirjiiiione irife<5ta, quis idonea cetas, «' in iniulam Sardiiiiam veherenLur, coercendis iilic *' latrociniis; & fi ob graviratem cceH inreriflent, vUe ** danmum : Ceteri cederent Italia, nifi certam ante diem *' profanos litus exuifTent." Tacit, ann. lib. ii. c. 85. " Externas caeremonias, JEgyptios, Judaicofque ritus *' compefcuitj coa£lus qui fupcrjlitione ea tenebantur, *' religiofas veftes cum inrtrumento omni comburere, " &c." Sueton. Tiber, c. 36. Thefe wife heathens, obferving fomething in the general air, and genius, and fpirit of the two religions to be the fame, efteem- ed the differences of their dogmas too frivolous to de- fcrve any attention.
Xi
NOTE [DDD], p. 455.
.ENOPHON's condud, as related by himfelf, is, at once, an inconteftable proof of the general credulity of mankind in thofe ages, and the incoherencies, \s\ all ages, of men's opinions in religious matters. Thai great captain and philofopher, the diiciple of Socra^.s, and one who has delivered fome or the raoft reilaed fentiments with regard to a deity, gave all the followiug marks of vulgar, pagan fuperftidon. By Socrates s ad- vice, he confultcd the oracle of Delphi, before he would engage in the expedition of Cyrus. De expcd. lib. iii. p. 294. ex edit. Leancl. Sees a dream the night after the generals were feized ^ which he pays great re-
' gard
5o6 Notes to the Second V'olume.
gard to, but thinks ambiguous. Id. p. 295. He ami the whole army regard fneezing as a very lucky omen. Id. p. 300. Has another dream, when he comes to the river Centrites, which his fellow-general, Chirofophus, alfo pays great regard to. Id. lib. iv. p. 323. The Greeks, fuffering from a cold north wind, facrifice to it; and the hiftorian obferves, that it immediately aba- ted. Id. p. 329. Xenophon confults the facrifices in fecret, before he would form any refolution with him- felf about fettling a colony. Lib. v. p. 359. He was himfelf a very fkilful aug\ir. Id. p. 361. Is determined by the vi6lims to refufe the fole command of the ar- my which was offered him. Lib. vi. p. 273. Cleander, the Spartan, though very defirous of it, refufes it for the fame reafon. Id. p. 392. Xenophon mentions an old dream with the interpretation given him, when he firft joined Cyrus, p. 373. Mentions alfo the place of Hercules's defcent into hell as believing it, and fays the marks of it are ftill remaining. Id. p. 375. Had almoit ftarvcd the army, rather than lead them to the tield againll the aufpiccs. Id. p. 382, 3S3. His friend, Euclides, the augur, would not believe that he had brought no money from the expedition ; till he (Eu- clides) facrificed, and then he faw the matter clearly in the Exta. Lib. vii. p. 425. The fame philofopher^ propofing a project of mines for the encreafe of the Athenian revenues, advifes them firft to confult the oracle. De rat. red. p. 392. That all this devotion was not a farce, in order to ferve a political purpofe, appears both from the fa£ts tliemfelves, and from the genius of that age, when little or nothing could be gained by hypoci'ify. Befides, Xenophon, as appears from his Memorabilia, was a kind of heretic in thofe times, which no political d'e^iotee ever is. It is for the fame reafon, I maintain, that Newton, Locke, Clarke, &c. being Arians or SocinhniSy were very lin- cere in the creed tliey profelfed : And I alw a) s oppofe this argument to fome libertines, who will needs have it, that it was impofTible but that thefe philofophers muft have been hypocrites.
NOTE
B
Notes to the Second Volume. 507
NOTE [EEE], p. 460.
• ACCHUS, a divine being, is reprefented by the heathen mythology as the inventor of dancing and the tlieatrc. Plays were anciently even a part of public worlhip on the moil folemn occafions, and often em- ployed in times of pellilence, to appeafe the offended deities. But they liave been zealoully profcribed by tlie godly in later ages; and the play-lioufe, according to a learned divine, is the porch of hell.
But in order to fliow more evidently, that it is pof- fible for a religion to reprefent the divinity in ftill a more immoral and unamiable light than he was pictu- red by the ancients, we fhall cite a long pafTage from an author of tafle and imagination, who was furely no enemy to Chriilianity. It is the Chevalier Ramfay, a writer, who had fo laudable an inclination to be or- thodox, that his reafon never found any difficulty, even in the dodlrines which free-thinkers fcruple the moft, the trinity, incarnation, and fatisfaftion : His humanity alone, of which he feems to have had a great flock, rebelled againfl: the doctrines of eternal reproba- tion and predeilination. He exprefies himfelf thus: ' What flrange ideas,' fays he, ' would an Indian or ' a Chinefe philofopher have of our holy religion, if
* they judged by the fchemes given of it by our modern
* free-thinkers, and pharifaical doiSlors of all fedls ?
* According to the odious and too vulgar fyflem of ' thefe incredulous fcofFers and credulous fcribblers, ** The God of the Jews is a moll cruel, unjuft, par- *' tial, and fantaftical being. He created, about 6000 '* years ago, a man and a woman, and placed them "ma fine garden of Afia, of which there are no re- *' mains. This garden was furnifhed with all forts of " trees, fountains, and flowers. He allowed them the *' ufe of all the fruits of this beautiful garden, except " one, that was planted in the midll thereof, and that *' had in it a fecret virtue of preferving them in con- *' tinual health and vigour of body and mind, of ex- *' alting their natural powers and making them wife. ** The devil entered into the body of a ferpent, and *' folicited the firft woman to eat of this forbidden " fruit; fhe engaged her hulband to do the fame. *' To punilh this llight curiofity and natural defire of *^ life and knowledge, God not only threw our firft
*' parents
508 Notes to the Second Volume.
"* parents out of paradife, but he condemned all their ** pofterity to temporal mifery, and the greaieft part *' of them to eternal pains, though the fouls of thefe ** innocent children have no more relation to that of *' Adam than to thofe of Nero and Mahomet; fmce, *' according to tlie fcholaftic drivellers, fabulifts, and " mythologies, all fouls are created pure, and infufed *' immediately into mortal bodies, fo foon as the foetus " is formed. To accomphfh the barbarous, partial de- ** cree of predeftination and reprobation, God abandon- *'' icd all nations to darknefs, idolatry, and fuperftiti- *' on, without any faving knov^rledge or falutary gra- *' ces ; unlefs it was one particular nation, whom he *' chofe as " his peculiar people. This chofen nation *' was, however, the moft llupid, ungrateful, rebellious *' and perfidious of all nations. After God had thus *' kept tlie far greater part of all the human fpecies, " during near 4000 years, in a reprobate ftate, he " changed ail of a fudden, and took a fancy for other *^ nations befide the Jews. Tlien he fent his only be- " gotten Son to the world, und-cr a human form, to *' appeafe his wrath, fatisfy his vindidive juftice, and *■' die for the pardon of fin. Very few nations, how- *' ever, have heard of this gofpel ; and all the reft, *' though left in invincible ignorance, are damned with- " out exception, or any poifibility of reraifiion. The *' greatefi: part of thofe who have heard of it, have " changed only fome fpeculative notions about God, *' and fome external forms in worlhip: For, in other " refpedts, the bulk of Chrirtians have continued as ** corrupt as the reft of mankind in their morals; " yea, fo much the more perverfe and criminal, " that their lights were greater. Unlefs it be a ** very fmall it\Q.St number, all other Chriftians, like *' the pagans, will be for ever damned ; the great fa- '* crifice offered up for them will become void and of *' no effe6l ; God will take delight for ever, in their *' torments and blafpliemies; and though he can, by *' one f.ot change their hearts, yet they will remain *' for ever unconverted and unconvertible, bccaufe he *■' will be for ever unappeafablc and irreconcileable. It ■^' is true, that all this makes God odious, a hater of •" fouls, rather than a lover of them ; a cruel, vin-
" diclive
Notes to the Second VoLtiME. 509
*< di£live tyrant, an impotent or a wrathful daemon, *' ratlicr than an all-powerful, beneficent father of *' fpirits : Yet all this is a myftery. He has fecret *' reafons for his condudt, that are impenetrable ; and *' though he appears unjuft and barbarous, yet we *' mud believe the contrary, becaufe what is injuftice, *' crime, cruelty, and the blackell: malice in us, is in *' him juftice, mercy, and fovereign goodnefs." Thus
* the incredulous free thinkers, the judaizing Chriftians, ' and the fataliftic do<Sors iiave disfigured and dilhonoured
* the fublime myrteries of our holy faith ; thus they
* have confounded the nature of good and evil ; trans-
* formed the moft monftrous pailions into divine at-
* tributes, and furpaffed the pagans in blafphemy, by
* afcribing to the eternal nature, as perfedtions, what
* makes the moll horrid crimes againft men. The
* groffer pagans contented thenifelves with divinizing
* luft, inceiil:, and adultery ; but the predeftinarian
* dodtors have divinized cruelty, wrath, fury, vengeance,
* and all the blackeft vices.' See the Chevalier Ram- fay's philofophical principles of natural and revealed re- ligion, Part 11. p. 401.
The fame author aflerts, in other places, that the Arminiin and Molinijl fchemes ferve very little to mend the matter : And having thus thrown himfelf out of all received fects of Chrilfianity, he is obliged to ad- vance a fyftem of his own, which is a kind of Origenifm^ and fuppofes the pre-exiftence of the fouls both of men and beads, and the eternal falvation and converfion of all men, beads, and devils. But this notion, being quite peculiar to himfelf, we need not treat of. I thought the opinions of this ingenious author verv curi- ous; but I pretend not to warrant the judneff ; '•em.
\
C 511 )
INDEX.
*^* The Numeral Letters refer to the Volume, and the Figures to the Page.
A:
A.
.B ATEMENT, not the natural Confequence of Poly-
theifm, ii. 440. Abflradtion, what, ii. 485, Note [PJ. Abfurdity, not always the greateft in Polytheifm, ii. 442.
, greedily coveted by popular Religions, ii. 443.
Acheans, employed Force in forming their League, i. 479.
, their Number, i. 449,
Addifon quoted, i. 93. 207. ii. 185.
^fchynes quoted, i. 341. 445.
^fchynes Socraticus quoted, ii. 374.
^tolians, their Number, i. 449.
Agathocles, the Tyrant, his Cruelty, i. 425. 558, A/i?/^[CC]
Agreeablenefs, a Source -of Merit, ii. 299.
, to Ourfelf, ibid. &c.
, to Others, ii. 311, ^c.
Agriculture, how befl encouraged, i. 276,277. 434, 435. Alcoran, its Ethics, i. 243.
Alexander the Impoftor of Lucian, his Artifice, ii, ia8. Alexander the Great, his Saying to Parmenio, ii. 301.
, his Toleration, ii. 438.
, his Emulation of Bacchus, ii. 441.
Alexandria, its Size and Numbers of its Inhabitants, i. 453. Allegiance, its Obligation, whence, i. 487. ii. 253. Allegory has naturally place in Polytheifm, ii. 422. Anacreon quoted, ii. 390. Analogies, and fometimes flight, have Influence in Jurifpru-
dence, ii. 244, 362. Anaxagoras, the firft Theifl:, and the firfl: accufed of Atheifm,
ii, 503, N'oie [ZZ]. Ancillarioli, what, ii. 503, Note [XX]. Angels, modern, equivalent to the Deities of the Philofo-
phers, ii. 421.
Animals,
512 INDEX.
Animals, their Reafon j ii. in, ^c.
Antioch, its Size, i. 453.
Antipater, the Cyreniac, his Saying, i. 188.
Appian Aiexandrinus quoted, i. 343. 393. 413. 41^. 422. 425, 429. 440. 463. ii. 382.
Aruobius quoted, ii. 417. 4215.
Aiiofto, his Chara£ler, i. 246, quoted, 94.
Ariftides the Sophift quoted, 1. 56?., Note [KKJ.
AriOocracy, Polifli, Venetian, in what refpeds different, i* 15, 16.
Ariftophanes not impious according to the Ideas of Anti- quity, ii. 417.
..-. ,„„„ quoted, i. 408.
Anftorle ;quoted, i. 227. 408. 446. 456. ii. 371. 503^
Note [YY]. Armftroog, Dr. quoted, ii^ 370. Arri an quoted, i. 132, 369, 432. ii..438. 441. Atheifm, whether poilibJe, ii. 159. Athenaeus quoted, i. 443, 444» 446. Athens, i. 99. 273. 341. 428 443, 444, 446. 478. Arhenians, on what they chiefly valued themfelves, ii. 308. Athenian Man of Merit, ii. 377, l^c. Auguftine ( Saint- 'i his Dogmatifm, ii. 449. Augudus, hiS Impiety mixed with Superftition, ii. 418. ■ — , his Superiiition, ii. 450.
, his Age compared with thtt of Camillus, i. 274.
Aunoi, Madame, quoted, i. 200.
AureHus, Marcus, his Theifm, ii. 421. his Superfiition, 45c. Auftria, Houfe of, Caufes of its Decay, i. 358. Authority of Teachers, ufeful to check, it, i. 126.
JLJACON, quoted, I. 56. 95. 223. 282. ii. 138. 267. 427. Balance of Power, i. 32. 353, ^c. — Of Irade, i. 327, ^c.
— Of Property, i. 32, 47. Banks and Paper Credit, whether advantageous, i. 301. 336. Barbarit)' an Attribute of the Deity in popular Religions, ii.
465- Bartoli*s Plans of ancient Buildings, i. 451. Bayle quoted, ii. 441. 484. Beauty, why the objedt of Pride, ii. 189. Belief, what, ii. 52, ^c. Bellarmine, Cardinal, his Siyinfii l). -141. Benevolence, i. 89. difihterefled zeAl,ii. 349. b'c. its kinds, 3 351-
INDEX. 513
351. a Virtue, 222. from its Utility, 225. from its
Agret-ablenefs, 307. Berkeley, Dr. a renl Sceptic, il. 484, iV:/^ [N], quoted, i,
223. Berne, Canton of, its Trcaliire, i. 342. Benlivoglio quoteil, i. 225. Boccace quoted, i. 190. Boileau quoted, ii. 302. Bolingbroke quoted, i. 25. 44. Boulainvilliers quoted, i. 571. ii. 43O. Brafidas, his Saying, ii. 441. Erumoy, Pere, quoted, ii. 417.
C.
/ESAR quoted, i. 419. 462. 463. 550, Note [K], ii. 416.
his Account of the Numbers llaughtered in his
c
Wars, i. 560, Note [FF].
Cambyfes, his Extravagance, ii. 444.
Capitolinus quoted, i. 491.
Caprice, an Attributcof theDeity in popular Religions, ii. 465.
Carlille, Earl of, quoted, i. 13^.
Cartes, Des, quoted, i. 259. ii. 475, A^ote [D].
Carthage, its Size and Number of its Inhabitants, i. 456.
Carthaginians, their human Sacrifices, ii. ^o^-^Note [BBBJ,
Catholics, Roman, Genius of their Religion, i. 80.
— led into Abfurdities, ii. 446.
Cato de re ruftica, quoted, i. 41 1,
Cato of Utica, his Speech to Ccefar, i. 289.
Caufe and EfiFefl its Ideas, whence, ii. 28, 29, ifc. Its Definition, 82, 477, Note [G].
Caufes moral, how far they contribute to national Charac- ters, i. 213.
Phyfical, how far, i. 222.
Ciufation, a Reafon of Alfociation, ii. 24. 56, ^c.
Cavalier Party, i. 69.
Cervantes, his Merit, i. 207, quoted, 250.
Chance, what, ii. 61. Its Influence in Society, i. 117.
Charaflers, national, i. 213, ^c.
Charles, XII, of Sweden, his Chara6ter, ii. 308.
Chaftity, its IMerit, whence, ii. 255.
Cheerfulnefs, its IMerit, whence, ii. 299.
China, its Excellence and Defecfs, i. 126.
Chriftian Relitrion founded in Faith, not in Reafon, ii. 138. Vol. II. " LI Cicero
$H I N D E X.
Cicero quofec', i. i8. 97. 102. 104. 106. 188. 364. 404 424- 433- 442- 452. 465. 551, Note [O]. ii. 56. 223' 227-. 371. 391. 448, 449. 456. 465.
City, Reafons which limit the Greatnefs of every City,i.456.
Cleanlinefs, its Merit, whence, ii. 517.
Clergy, why no Friends to Liberty, i. 66.
Cold, greater in ancient times, i. 457, 458.
Colonefi and Orfini, Parties in modern Rome, i. 57.
Columella quoted, i, 325. 403. 407, 412, 413. 460. 465. 554, Note [T].
Comitia centuriata & tributa, their different Powers, 1. 392.
Commerce, its Advantages, i. 272. foreign, its Advantages,
279, 280. Commonwealth, perfect. Idea of it, i. 523, ^c^ Companionable Qualities, ii. 312, ^c. ComparifonitsEffedl, i. 84. necelTary to forming the Tafl:e,2 54, Comte, Pere le, quoted, ii. 416. Conde, Prince of, a Saying of his, i. 124. Confucius, his Difciples Deifts, i. 79. Congreve, his Character, i. 209. Conjiln6tion frequent, conftant, the only circumftance from
which we know Caufe and Effe6i, ii. 75. 79. 83. ^c. Connexion neceflary, our Idea of it, ii. 65, &c. Conftantine, Emperor, his Innovation, i. 366. Conftitution, Britifh, i. 25. 49, &c. Contiguity, a Reafon of AflTociation, ii. 24. 54, Contraft, Original, i. 471, &:c.
Conventions, whether the Source of Juftice, ii. 360, drc. Convictions ilrongefl, but not more general, in Theifm, ii,
444» 445-
Corn diftributed In Rome, i. 451, 452.
Corneille, his Chara6ter, i. 209.
Corpus juris civLlis quoted, i. 423. 556, Note [7L],
Courage, how far national^ i. 226.
■ its Merit, whence, ii. 303.
Country Party, i. 27. 66, 67.
Court Party, i. 27. 66, 67.
Creation or Formation of the World enters not iiito the pri- mitive Religion, ii. 421.
Credit, public, its Abufes, i. 369, 370, &c.
Curtius, Quintus, quoted, i. 228. 377. 565, Note [NN]. ii. 415. 425. _ . .. o
Cuftom or Habit the Source of experimental Reafcning, ii. 4S. ■ ■■ ■ the great Guide of Life, ii. 49.
Cuftoms, fome remarkable ones, i. 387, &:c.
Cyrus boafts of his Drunkennefs, i. 228. DARIUS
D
1 N D E X. 515
D
'ARIUS I-Iyftafpcs records his Ability in Drinking on his
Tombftonc, i. 228. Datames, the only Barbarian a General, i. 292. Decency, its Merit, whence, ii. 317. Debt, public, its Advantages, i. 372.
■ itsDifadvantages, i. 573, 374.
J^eifts united with the Independents, i. 80.
Delicacy oFPalFion, how hurttui, i. 3, &ic.
of Talle, how advantageous, i, 3, 4, 5. whatitis,
249. whence its Merit, ii. 309. Democracy without a Reprefentative, hurtful, i. 14, 15. Demofthenes his Charafter, i. 109. quoted, i. 109. 341.
354. 388. 3qo. 404.408. 418.432. 445. 559, Note [CCj.
s6i,Note [HHJ. ii. 303- 393- Defire, Averlion, ii. 192. Diodorus Siculus his Charafter, i. 560, Note [EE].
■ Superftitious, yet not a Theift, li. 419.
Quoted, i. 227. 274. 341.355. 419,420. 426.
427. 429. 431, 432, 434. 438. 441. 443. 447. 449. 453.
458. 463. 469. 542, Note [A]. 543, Note [D]. 568,
Note [QQJ}. ii. 227. 414. 416. 419. 462. 465. Diogenes Laertius quoted, i. 438. ii. 425. Diiigenes, the Cynic, his Charatler, ii. 396, 397. Dion CafTius quoted, i. 324. Dionyfius Halycarnaffseus quoted, i. 205. 549, N'ote [I]. 429.
45Q. ii. 412. 421. Dionyfius the Tyrant, his Maflacres, i. 426.
his Army, i. 274. 441,
Difcretion, its Merit, whence, ii. 306.
Divifion of Property, ufeful, i. 420.
Domeftic Situation of Ancients and Moderns, i. 401, 402.
Dorians and lonians, i. 226.
Dryden quoted, i. 215. ii. 448.
Dubos, Abbe, quoted, i. 232. 333. 457. j^66.
E>
E
-CLECTICS, a Sea, i. 127. Egyptians, why perfecutors, ii. 437. Egyptian Religion, a DiiTicuhy in it, ii. 449.
— — — and Jewilli refembling, ii. 505, A'c/f [CCCJ,
Eiizribeth, Queen, whether her Rcfurre^^ion could be proved,
ii. 137. Eloqucncfj :. loi, <Scc.
L -1 a Empires,
5i6 INDEX.
Empires, great, deftruclive, i. 361.
Energy, its Idea, ii. 67, 68.
Englifh, their national Character, whence, i. 221.
Enthufiafm, defended and explained, i, 75, &c.
Envy, whence, ii. 20O.
Epaminondas, his Chara6ler, ii, 494, Note [GG].
Epidetus, his Idea of Virtue, ii. 372. his Superftition, ii. 455.
Epicurus, his Apology, ii. 181, &c.
' why he took himfelf to Philofophy, ii. 420.
Edicurean, i. 143.
Ergafluia, very frequent anciently, i. 403.
Euclid treats not of the Beauty of the Circle, i. 178,
Euripides quoted, ii. 413.
Europe, its Advantages from its Situation, i. 127.
Evidence, natural and moral, of the fame Kind, ii. 95.
Exchange helps to keep the Balance of Trade, i. 331.
Exchange, difficult to know, whether for or againft a Natr- on, i. 327.
Exiles in Greece, how numerous, i. 426.
Experience, Source of ail our Rcafoning with regard to Fa8, ii. 30, &:c.
■ ■ why wereafon from Experience, ii. 36, 37. 93.
often the fame with what we call Reafon, ii. 472,
Note [B].
Expofing Children, i. 415. approved by Seneca, ibid.
Jl act. Matters of, one Objea of Reafon, ii. 27,28. Fa6tions, violent and bloody, among the Ancients, i. 424. Fairies modern, equivalent to the vulgarDeitics of Antiquity,
ii.415. Fame, why defired, ii. 191. Fenclon, his Ethics, i. 242. Flattery, its Influence in Religion, ii. 428. Florus quoted, i. 414.
Plux and Reflux of '^I'heifm r.nd Polythcifm, ii. 434, «3iC. Fontaine, la, quoted, ii. 394. Fonteneile, Cenfurc of his Paftorals, i. 210. ' ' quotfd, i. 6, 1S8. 233. ii. 353. 41 7.
French Man of Merit, ii. 296.
iheir firft Qucrtion, with regard to a ftrangcr, ii. 3 1 2.
Fregofi and Adorni, Parties of Genoa, i. 57. Frugality, its Merit, whence, ii. 285. FuTidins, the dangerous Tendency of, i. 371.
2 GALLANTRY
INDEX. 517
'ALLANTRY of Civility, i. 135. ot Intrigues, ii. 394.
Gamefters and Sailors why fuperftitious, ii. 412,
Gaul, Numberof its Inhabitants, i. 463.
Gee, Mr. quoted, i. 328.
General Rules, their Influence, ii. 198. 255.
Genoa, its Government and Bank, i. 22.
Geles immortal, their Faith, ii. 433.
Golden Age not fufceptible of Juflice, ii. 237.
Good Senfe, how farefTential to Tafte, i. 256.
Gorgias Leontinus, his Eloquence, i. 543, Note [D].
Government, Origin of, i. 35. Perpetual ftruggle between Authority and Liberty in all Governments, 38. Violent Innovations dangerous to Government, 483 Sometimes prove happy in the Iflue, inftanced in the reign of Henry VIII, and Charles I. 484.
Greece, its Advantages from its Situation, i. 127.
its whole military Force, i. 450.
r' Numbers of its Inhabitants, i. 461, Grotius quoted, ii. 498, Note [PP]. Guelf and Ghibelline Parties, i. 58. Guicciardin quoted, i. 290. ii. 373. GuftavusVaza, i. 67.
H.
XIARDOUIN, Pere, quoted, i. 563. Harrington, his Oceana, cenfured, i. 525.
quoted, i. 47. 95-. SM-
Hcliogabalui^, a conic Stone, ii. 425,
Henry IV. of France, his Character, ii. 308.
— a Saying of his, i. 554, Note [S].
Henry the IVth and Vllth of England their Title, 1. 479.
Helvetia, its Inhabitants, i. 464.
Hereditary Right, how important, i. 511.
Herefy, Appellation reils commonly on the Side of Reafon :
Examples, ii. 443. Hero-worfhip, ii. 423.
Herodian quoted, i, 453. 462. 489. ii. 425. Herodotus quoted, i.432, 443.449. ii. 304. 416. 433. 438.
444. 459- 462. Hertha, Goddefs of the Saxons, ii. 426. Hefiod, not a Theift properly fpeaking, ii. 418. ■ ■ ■ ■ Inconfiftcncy in his Theology, ii. 431. — — 1 — quoted, i. 411. ii. 418. 423. 431. 503, Note [YY].
Hiero,
5i8 INDEX.
Hiero, King of Syracufe, his Policy, i. 357. Hirtius quoted, {,425.
Homer, his Chara.S:er, i. 248. his Ethics, i. 242. ii. 304, Inconfiftency of his Theology, ii. 431. quoted, ii. 417.
423- 431- Homer and Hefiod, canonical Books of ancient Paganifm, ii.
418. Honefty the beft Policy, ii. 334. Hope and Fear defended, ii. 178, 179. Horace quoted, i. 95. 119. 132. 139.208. 263.407.457.
566, Note [OO]. ii. 182. 268. 374. 390. HoJIiSf its Signification in old Latin, i. 551, Note [O], Human Life, general Idea of it, i. 193.
-Nature, its Dignity, i. 83.
Humility, its Caufes, ii. 186.
Hufbandmen, what Proportion they bear to Manufa6turers,
i. 272. Hutchinfon, Mr. quoted, i. 381. Hyde de Religione veterum Perfarum, quoted, ii. 433. 438.
I'
JaNSENISTS, their Genius, i. 80. ii. 481, 482, Ice, Reports of it not credible to an Indian, ii. 122. Ideas, their Anbciation, ii. 23, 24, ^c 54.
■ their Origin, ii. 17, tffr. Idolatry, its Origin from Polytheifm, ii. 423. Jefuits, their Refinement, ii. 496.
Jews, their national Chara6ter, whence, ii. 505, Note [CCC]. —— Reafon of their Infurreftion, ii. 450. Jewifh'Religion and Egyptian refembling, i\.<,0'i),Note[CCC]. Ignorance of Caufes the Origin of Polytheifm, ii. 411. Immaculate Concepiion, a popular Opinion, ii. 430. Immortality of the Son!, on what founded, ii. 151. Impiety of popiiFar Religions, Ii, 457. Imprclfions, what, ii. 18. Impotence and Barrennefs, ii. 293. Inceft, whence its Crime, ii. 256. Independents, tiieir Genius, i. 78. Indians juflly incredulous with regard to Ice, Ii. 122. Induftry, its Merit, whence, ii. 285. InftruQions to Members, i. 33. Intereft, private, how far the Foundation of Government, i.
29. public, ibid. Intered, its Lowncfs, whence, i. 315. ufeful, 321. Johnfoii, (Ben) his Charafter, i. 556, Note [ZJ. lonians and Dorians, Tribes of Greeks, i. 226.
Jofcphus
INDEX. 519
Tofcphus quoted, i. 566, Note [NN]. 568, Note [Q£L]-
Joy, Grief, explained, ii. 177.
Iphicrates, a Saying of his, ii. 315.
Ifocratcs quoted, i. 408. 427, 428,
Irifh, their Idea of Merit, ii. 304.
Italians, Caufe of their Effeminacy, i. 292.
Italy ancient and modern. Number of its Inhabitants, i. 465.
Julian quoted, i. 440.
Juftice, Source of its Merit, ii. 232. farther explained, 357.
Juftin quoted, i. 450. 465.
Juftinian x^uoted, i. 139,
Juvenal quoted, i. 132. 224. 413. 458. 466. 11. 224. 456-
JUaMPRTDIUS quoted, I. 437.
Laws of the twelve Tables, i. 122.
Laws of Juflice, whence derived, ii. 241.
— — of Nature, ii. 253.
Louis XIV. Numbers of his armies, i. 290.
Liberty and NeccfTity, a Difpute of Words, ii. 86.
Liberty, civil, its advantages, i. 91, &c, 119, 120, 121.
Liberty of the Preii, why peculiar to Great Britain, i. 9, 10,
II, 12. Lipfius, Juftus, quoted, i. 410. Livy, a fincere Religionift, ii. 454. quoted, i. 23, 57. 220.
274- 542. 356- 41^9- 4-'5- 435- »■ 372. 461. Locke, (Mr.) quoted, i. g^. 493. ii. 61. 6g. 184. 471, Note
[A].475, A^.L^[D]. Longinus quoted, i. 104. 108. ii. 301, 417. Louvellein Party in Holland, i. 67. Love and Hatred, whence derived, ii. 199. Lucan quoted, i. 414. Lucian quoted, i. 1S9. 543, Note [Z]. 559., Note [HH]. ii.
12S. 141. 290. 386. 416. 454. 459, 460. I/Ucretlus, his Chrtrai^ler; i. 209. quoted, ii. 134. 424. Luxury, its different Senfes, i. 285. its Advantages, 2S7, 2S0.
its Difadvantages, 296, 297. Luxurious Ages moll happy, i. 286. 289. mofc vireuous, ibid, I^yfias, Genius of his Eloquence, i. 1 1 2. quoted, i. 424,
425. 432. 439. 442. 445. 448. ii. 392.
M.
IVxACIMAVEL, his RcBeaion on Chriaianity, ii. 441,
quoted, i. 20, 21. 91. 262. 525. ii. 285. 447. Magifins, their Faith, ii. 432.
Maillet, Monfieur, his Account of Egypt, quoted, i. 44. 461.
Malebranche
520
INDEX.
Malebranche quoted, il. 475, Note [D]. 487, Note [T]. Malice, whence it is derived, ii. 200. Mandeville, (Dr.) quoted, i. 297. Manilius quoted, ii. 416,
Marcellinus, (Ammianus) quoted, i. 565, Note [NN], Martial quoted, i. 407. 414. 466. ii. 503, No/e [XX]. Mary, Virgin, became a Deity among the Catholics, ii.430. Malfacres, ancient, enumerated from Diodorus Siculus, i. 557,
Note [BB]. Mathematics, their Foundation, ii. 485, Note [P]. their
Advantage?, 65. Maurice, Prince of Orange, his Saying, ii. 315. Melon, Monfieur, quoted, i. 272. 553, Note [QJ. Memory, its Merit, whence derived, ii. 289. Menander quoted, i. 547, Note [H]. Merit, perfonal, how the objeQ: of Pride, ii. 187.
delineated, li. 319, &c.
Metaphyfics, what, ii. 7, 8.
Mine, Thine, ii. 244.
Aliracles, on what their Evidence is founded, li. 117, &rc.
■ • defined, ii. 122. one mentioned by De Retx. 131.
Mixture of Affe£tions, ii. 182.
Modefty, whence its Merit, ii. 513.
Moliere, i. 140.
Molinills, their Geniur, i. 80. ii. 481.
Monarch", elective, hereditary, which preferable, 1. 17.
Monarchy, and Republic, their Advantages and Difadvan*
tages vv'ith regard to the Arts, i. 129, 130, 131. Money, its continued Encreafe advantageous, i. 302.
its Diffullon advantageous, i. 306, 307.
Montaigne quoted, ii. 372.
Montefquieu quoted, i. 399. 466. ii. 487, Note [T.] Monumentum Ancyrianum quoted, i. 451. Morals, their Standard, i. 242.
— not fiUcUiating, ii. 390.
Morality hurt by popular Religions, ii. 461.
Moral Caufes, have chief Influence on Populcufnefs, 1, 40T.
Mufcovites, their Manners, i. 137.
N.
ATURE, State of, defcribed, ii. 237, imaginary, 487, Note [S]. Natural, in what Senfe Juflice is natural, W.A^gg^Note [OS-]* Navigation, ancient, how imperfect, ii. 421. Ncccfllty, its Definition, ii. 87. 102. Ncgroe?, their Character, i. 548, Note [M].
Nepos,
INDEX. 521
Nepos, Cornelius, quoted, i. 409,
Neri, and Bianchi, Parties in Florence, i. 57.
Newton, Sir Ifaac, his rule of philofophizing, ii. 251,
Newton, Locke, Clarke, Arians, and fincere, ii. 506. Note
[DDD]. Nicholas, Saint, became a Deity among the Mufcovites,
ii.430. Nifus, or ftrong Endeavour, not the Origin of the Idea of
Power, ii. 474. Note [Cj. Northern Nations, their Swarms, no Proof of Populoufnefs,
i. 462. Numatianus, Claudius Rutilius, his Contempt of the Jewilh,
and confequently of the Chriftian Religion, ii. 450.
O
o
'BEDIENCE, paffive, i. 495, ^c Obligation, interefled, to Virtue, ii. 330. Olympiodorus quoted, i. 565.
Opinion, the real Foundation of Government, i. 2g. Orange, the family of, their Partisans, i. 67. Oratoribus, Dialog, de, quoted, i. 224. Oftracifm of Athens, Petalifm of Syracufe, i. 354. Ovid quoted, i. 118. 132. 403. 459. 461. ii. 416. 419. 461
A- AINTERS, modern, unhappy in their Subjefls, i. 240. Paper Credit and Banks, whether advantageous, i. 301*,
^ 336, 337»
Paris, L'Abbe de, his Miracles, ii. 481.
Parliament, how far it fhould be independent, i. 43, i^c.
Parnel, Dr. his Character as a Writer, i. 211.
Parties in general, i. 55. perfonal, 56. real, 59, 60.
of Great Britain, i. 65, ^c.
Pafcal his Charafter, ii. 405, quoted, 489.
PafTions, their Kinds, ii. 177. their Obje£lions and Caufes,
184. Paterculus quoted, i. 342. 440. 465. Pathetic and Sublime, ii. 309. Paufanias quoted, i. 449. Pay, Proportion between Officers and Soldiers anciently,
i.418.
Pericles,
522 INDEX.
Pericles, his Eloquence, i. 113,
Peripatetics, their mediums, ii. 281.
Pcrfecution, whence derived, i. 61, 62. naturally attends the
Principle of Unity of God, ii. 437. Perfia, ancient, whether pofTefTed of an Ariftocracy, i. 541. Perfonjfy, to, natural, and the Origin of Poly theifm, ii. 41 1. Petrarch quoted, i. 266. Petronius quoted, i. 408. 459. ii. 390. Phaedrus quoted, ii. 49"*. Note f Xj.
Philip of Macedon, his Charadler in Demofthenes, ii. 303. ' his Occupation in the infernal Regions,
i. 189. Philip II. of Spain, i. 98.
Philofophy, the two Kinds of it, the obvious and abftrufe, ii.3. PhyficalCaufes, their fmall Influence onPopuloufnefs, i. 398. Pindar, his Scholiaft quoted, i. 146. Plato quoted, i. 92. 369. 442. 493. ii. 374. 388. 455. 487.
Note['$>^. 490, Note [XJ. 504, Note [ZZJ. Platonift, i. 165. Plautus quoted, i. 444. Pliny the Elder quoted, i. 137. 237. 312. 342. 412. 454.
456. 543, Note [C]. 557,A^^/^[AAJ.562, Note\lAJ\. ii.
407. 451. 503, Note [YYJ. 504. Note [AAA].
^ a Paffage of his examined, i. 563.
Pliny the Younger, his Houfe, i. 451. quoted, i. 137. 325.
ii. 421. Plutarch quoted, 1. 133, 134. 187- 189. 218.228. 302. 327.
369. 389, 390. 403. 409. 413. 415. 420. 423, 426. 431,
440. 441.446.464. 468. ii. 224. 275.302.388.421. 438,
441.459.
, A Paffage of his examined, i. 466.
Pofitenefs, whence its Merit, ii. 311.
Politics, a Science, i. 13, ^c.
Political Cuftoms of Ancients and Moderns compared, i.
415,416. Pollia and Papiria, Roman Tribes, their Animofity, i. 57. Polybius quot^id, i. 19. 733. 312. 341. 356, 357, 418. 439.
449. 459. 461.479. 541, Note [BJ. 552, Note [O]. ii.
264.288.371.373. Polygamy, its Difadvantnges, i. 195.
Polythcifm, the primitive Religion, ii. 402. its Origin, 417. Pompey, his Supcrftition, ii. 450.
Pope, Mr. his Character, i. 209. quoted, 13, 187. 23. 540. Power, what its Idea, ii. 68. 475, A'<?/d' [EJ. Pra£lice how ufeful to Tnfte, i. 253. Prefbyterians, their Charadcr, i. 67. 78.
Prcfence,
INDEX. 523
Prefcnce, real, ii. 445.
PrelFing Seamen, i. 395.
Prieft, his Chara6ter, i. 214.
IVierts, their Origin, i. '7.
Prior, Mr. quoted, i. 146.
Pride, whence it arifes, ii. 1 86.
Probabihty, what, ii. 61. 119.
Promife, what, and whence its Obligation, i. 475.
not the Origin of Government, ib.
Proof, what, ii. 61. 119.
Property, its Equality imprafticable, ii. 242. defended, 245.
why the Source of Pride, ii. 193.
Proteftant Succeflion, its Advantages and Difadvantages, i.
Providence, particular, on what founded, li. 151. Provinces, under what Government moft opprefled, i. 17. Pyrrhus, his Saying of the Romans, i. 292.
a
V^U AKERS, their Charader, i. 78, 79. Quin6iilian quoted, i. 98. 108. 21 8. ii. 273.315. 454.
R
R
.AC INE, his Character, i. 209. quoted, 265. ii. 483. Ramfay, Chevalier, quoted, ii. 507. Reafon, when it influences Adtion, only a cooler Paflion,
how far the Source of Morals, ii. 216.
Reafon and Tafte, their boundaries, i. 244.
Reafon more precarious than Tafte, i. 259.
Reafons of State, ii. 254.
Refinement, in what reipecl ufeful, i. 311.
Regnard his Voyage to Lapland, quoted, ii. 416.
Relations of Ideas, ©ne Object of Reafon, ii. 27.
Religion, two principal Queftions with regard to it, ii. 401.
its firft Principles, not primary but fecondary, ii. 4 4.
Refemblance, a Source of AfTociation, ii. 24. 55.
Retz, Cardinal de, quoted, i. 534. ii. 131.
Revolution, in 1688, no Contrad or Promife, i. 478.
Rhamadan of the Turks, ii. 463.
Rhodes, Number of its Inhabitants, i- 447.
Riches, why the Objedl of Pride or Efteem, ii. 191. 294.
Rochefoucauk quoted, ii. 210. 501, Note [SSJ.
Rome, i. 57.93. 97. 211.
Rome,
524 INDEX.
Rome, anciem, its Size and Number of Inhabitants, i. 452,
453- ■ Name of its tutelar Deity, concealed, ii. 504 Note
[AAA], Romans, when moft corrupt, i. 22. anciently Pirates, i. 552.
theirGovernmentundertheEmpirenotburdenfome, 1.30?. Roman Empire, whether advantegous, i. 466. Roundhead Party, i. 69. Poufleau quoted, i. 131. Rowe, Mr. his Tragedy cenfured, i. 239.
V^ADDER contains little Morality, ii. 461.
Sallee, Pnnce of, his Saying of De Ruyter, ii. 446.
Saii'.'ft <iuoted, i. 97. 132. 293. 425. 452. ii. 393. 370.456:
465. Saint Evremond's Charadler of Turenne, ii. 285.
quoted, ii. 30 t.
Sannazarias, Cenfure of his Paftorals, ii. 271.
Scapulaire, what, ii. 433.
Scepiicifm, ii. 27. 46. exceflive, 159, ^V. moderate, 160.
with regard to the Senfes, 161. with regard to Reafon,
166. Religious, ii. 451. Sceptic, the, i. 17 . Sciences, their Divilion, ii. 173. Sdiolafiic Religion, its ufual Abfurdity, ii. 442. Scriptures, holy, quoted, ii. 232. 372. Scriptural and traditional Religions compared, ii. 452. Selhlh and Social notoppofite, ii. 332. Self-love not the Foundation of moral Sentiment, ii. 323. Seneca quoted, i. 404. 408. 411. 415. ii. 356. 374.418. Seneca the Elder quoted, i. 413.
Sentiment, how far the Source of Morals, ii. 216. 338. Sextus Empiricus quoted, i. 415. ii. 227. 420. 456. 490.
Ncte[X]. ShafteH^ury, Lord, quoted, i. 93. 135. 391. Shakefpeare, his Artifice in Othello, i. 236. quoted, ii. 300. Simplicity in Writing, i. 207. Slavery prejudicial to Populoufnefs, i. 404.
to Humanity, i. 403.
Sneezing, God of, ii. 503, Note [YYJ. Socrates, his Character, ii. 305. Soil, very fertile, no Advantage, i, 283. Soldier, his Charae^ter, i. 214.
Soldiers,
INDEX. 525
Soldiers, what Proportion they commonly bear to the People,
1.293. ^ .
Sophocles, his Character, 1. 2(^9. Spain, ancient and modern, its inhabitants, i. 464. Spaniard, his Politenefs, ii. 312.
Sparta, its Policy, i. 273. Number of its Inhabitants, 448. Spa'tian quoted, i. 564. ii. 45 . Spencer quoted, ii. 305. Sportula, their bad tendency, i. 466. Stanian quoted, i. 342. States, fmall, their Advantage, i. 417- Stoic, the, i. 153. Stoics, their idea of Providence, ii. 107.
their SuperAition, ii. 454.
Strabo quoted, i. 369. 407, 408. 411. 438. 442. 456. 460.
463, 465. 467. 550, Note [Kl. 562, Note [i^^K]. 566,
Note [NN[. ii. 415. 439. Stuart Family, whether their SuccefTion ought to have been
retained, i. 51 1. whether reftored, 520. Subjects particular, fuir not wiih Reiinement, i. 269. Suetonius quoted, i. 19. 403. 407. 451. 453, 454. 466. 543.
NotelC\. ii. 13-. 582. 418.439.45'- Suidas quoted, i. 113. 566, Note [Q^XJ ■ Superrtition defined, i. 76, 77, ^c.
Swift, Dr. quoted, i. 329. 344, 559, Note [DD j. ii. 284- Sycophant, its original Senfe, i. 327-
Sympathy, the great Source of moral Sentiment, ii. 270. 30c- Syracufe, its Extent and Number of Inhabitants, i. 448.
L AC IT US, fomewhat fuperftitious, though profane, ii. 454. quoted, i. 10. 19. 67. 120. 134. 384. 407. 41-. 415. 422. 451. 452- 467. 482. 552, Note [PJ. 557, Note [AA]. ii. 130. 304. 426. 454- 496, Note [hh]. 505, Note [CCC].
Taflb quoted, i. 148.
Tarte, its Standard, i. 241.
Taxes, when hurtful, i. 363, 364.
do not fall ultimately on Land, i. 366.
Temple, Sir William, i. 95. 226. 364.
Tendency of A(Stions, not their accidental Confequences, re- garded in Morals, ii. 500, Note [EE].
Terence, his Character, i. 211. quoted, 135. 262.
Tertullian quoted, i. 567, xVtff«[QCi_].
Thebes,
526 INDEX.
Thebes, Number of its Inhabitants, i. 447. Theifm, its Origin from Polytheifm, ii. 426. Theifm and Polytheifm, compared, ii. 436. Theocritus, i. 439.
Thinkfers, abftrufe, how ufeful, i. 269, Ihallow, ibid. Thucydides, the firft Hiftorian, i. 439.
quoted, i. 190. 273. 341. 355. 418. 425. 433.
438. 443, 444. 449. n. 3-^4. 441 . Timon of Athens, his affection to Alcibiades, ii. 275. Timotheus the Poet, his Hymn to Diana, ii. 459. Tillotfon, his Argument againft the real Prefence, ii. 117, Toleration naturally attends Polytheifm, ii. 436. Tory Party, i. 63. their fpeculative Syftem, i. 471. Tot, Monf. du, quoted, i. 553, Note [Q,]. Tournefort, Monf. quoted, i. 200. 459. Tragedy, why it pleafes, i. 231. Tranquility of Mind, whence its Merit, ii. 305. Treafures, their Effedls, i. 336. Turkifh Government, i. 368. Tyrannicide, why blameable, ii. 228. Tyrants, ancient, their Cruelty, i, 426.
u.
u
ST ARIZ, Geronimo de, quoted, 1.400. Ufurpation, what, i. 479.
Utility, a Source of Approbation, ii. 226. why, 261. • to others, ii. 349. to ourfelves, 299.,
V ALERIUS Maximus, quoted, i. 562, Note [LLJ. Vanity, allies eafily to Virtue, i. 90. why blamed, ii. 316. Varro quoted, i. 407. 412. 413. 459, 465 ii. 449. Vauban quoted, i.334. Vega, GarcillafTo de la, quoted, i. 324. Verna, its Senfe and Inferences from it, i 555, Note [Xj. Verney, Paris de, quoted, i. 553, Note [QJ. Vcfpafian, his Miracle, ii. 130. Viiftor Aurelius, quoted, i 564. Viaor, Publius, quoted, 448 565, Note [MM]. Virgil, his Charader, i. 209. quoted, ii. 356. 293. Virtue and Vice defined, ii. 219. Vis inertiie, ii. 474, Note [DJ.
Vitelliiis,
INDEX. 527
VitcIIIus, his Meannefs, ii. 302.
Vitruvius quoted, i. ^62, Note [KKJ.
Voluntary and involuntary, why made by tli£ Moderns fo
eflential to Morals, ii. 375. Voltaire quoted, i. 1 1.
Vopifcus quoted, i. 448. 454. 566, Note [OO]. VolFius quoted, i. 399. 564.
w.
vf
ALLER, his Charafter, j. 141. Wifdom, its Merit, whence, ii. 288. Wit or Ingenuity, its Merit, whence, ii. 312. Whig Party, i. 69, their fpeculative Syftem, i. 471. WolJey, Cardinal, i. 134. Women, timorous and fuperftitious, ii. 414. Wonder, the Pafllon of, inclines us to believe Miracles, ii. 125.
X
X
ENOPHON, his Superftition, ii. 505, Aro/^[DDD]. quoted, i. 92. 100. 353, 354. 411. 4ir
427- 435- 444> 445- 447> 448. 461. ii. 293 383. 437, 458. Xerxes, his Purfuit of new pleafures, i. 144.
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