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June, 1981

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
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A N
E S S A Y
towards the
IMPROVEMENT
O F
REASON;
in the
Pursuit of LEARNING,
AND
Conduct of LIFE.

By JOSH. OLDFIELD.

L O N D O N,

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T H E

Introduction.

§ 1. **R**EASON is oft more strictly taken for the Power of Arguing and Inferring only : But what I am here Effaying to cultivate and improve, is to be understood in a larger Sense, of that discerning Faculty in Man, which is commonly made his distinguishing Character, and plainly gives him a Capacity far Superiour to that of Brutes. By this our Creator *teacheth us more than the Beasts of the Earth, and makes us wiser than the Fowls of Heaven.* By this we are capable of examining more thoroughly the Appearances of Things, to rectifie or confirm our Apprehensions about them. We can hereby form, abstract and general Notions, reflect upon the Operations of our Mind, and go beyond the sphere of Sense and Imagination, so as to carry our Tho'ts upward to God, and forward to a future Life. Finally, (to mention no more) we are hereby enabled to invent and employ fit Means to represent distinctly to others, what we our selves conceive.

§ 2. But whereas Humane Reason is naturally weak in its earlier Use and Exercise, as also darkned and deprav'd thro' evil Dispositions, and liable to be carry'd away with prevailing Error and Prejudice: It evidently stands in need of all the Advances that can from time to time be made for its Direction and Assistance. This New Essay is therefore added to the number of foregoing Efforts, for the farther Improvement of Logic, and of our Reason by it, that they may better answer the various Purposes they ought to serve, whether in respect of Learning, or for the conduct of Life. In order to which, I shall here endeavour to open, fix, and sharpen the Mind by a fit Engagement and proper Exercise of Tho't, whilst I am labouring, to furnish it with a competent Stock of the more comprehensive leading Notices, and to put it in a surer and

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nearer

nearer way of pursuing what is requisite, and of using what we have, in a prudent Manner, and to the best Advantage.

§ 3. Now, that I may prosecute so great, so useful, and so needful a Design more directly, and as thoroughly as I can, I find my self obliged, not to proceed in the beaten Road, or within the usual Containments of Logical Systems; but to vary somewhat widely from them, both in Matter and Manner; whilst yet I shall gladly fall in with them in every thing, which I conceive may be of real and valuable Service to the present Undertaking. And tho' I have not tho't it so convenient to prefix the name of *Logic* in the Title Page; yet I shall take the liberty of applying it upon occasion to this Essay, whilst I am endeavouring it may answer that Name in reference both to the interior and exterior *Reason* (or Reason in Expression as well as in Conception) and carry on the *Thing* to a farther extent, and higher degree of usefulness: Tho' I may not hope to compleat it.

§ 4. This is, however, a farther Attempt towards a System of *Logic*, or an orderly Scheme of general Instructions, peculiarly fitted to produce such an habit in the Mind, as may justly be call'd, The Art of using our Reason to the various Purposes it may and ought to serve, under the Conduct and influence of Instructions given to that end.

§ 5. *Logic*, as an *Art*, is not to be purely or principally Speculative, but Practical: Its Instructions are therefore to be adapted, directed, and apply'd to Practice, chiefly, or, however, more immediately to the exercise of the Mind for the better Conduct of our Tho'ts, and consequently of our Discourse, Behaviour, and Affairs, as occasion may require.

§ 6. The Art of using our Reason, pre supposes the Natural Faculty before describ'd, and is the Habitu (or nearer Capacity) of using it well; so as that we may more rightly, and with greater readiness, both fix and pursue intermediate Intentions, and reach our farthest End in the most advantageous Way, as he only is said to have the Art of doing any thing, who can perform it with the greater certainty, exactness and dispatch, which are most commonly owing to Instruction and Exercise.

§ 7. The *using of our Reason*, is not only, tho' it may be chiefly, what we call reasoning : *i. e.* the deducing one thing from another, or confirming it by another ; but it also takes in divers other ways of employing it ; some of which we shall specify as needing, deserving, and admitting the help of solemn Instructions.

§ 8. Now the principal *Instructions* here, will be either *Rules* to lead us in a right way of using our Reason, or *Helps* to render it more accountable and easie by what may be offer'd, either previously or pursuant to the Rules, to let us into the Reason and Intendment of them ; or to assist us in applying them to Use. And hither may be refer'd whatsoever else has a tendency to induce and satisfy, or to furnish, enlighten, and enlarge the Mind.

§ 9. The Rules and Helps are to be of a general Nature and Use ; most of them common to the differing Subjects of divers Arts and Sciences : And for such of them as may be more peculiarly related to any one, (suppose to Ethicks or Theology) they will not, however, descend to the lower Subdivisions thereof ; but shall be only some of the more principal, comprehensive, leading Points, and such as are conceived essentially requisite to the general design of this Essay ; more especially that it may lead, not only to a nice and critical, but to the truly wise and prudent Use of Reason : And that it may serve as a kind of Master-key to let us more readily into the several Apartments of useful Knowledge, whether in order to a summary View of the principal Parts, or to the more accurate Survey of this or that in particular, as occasion may require.

§ 10. Knowledge in the most lax and comprehensive Sense may be consider'd either *Objectively*, as propounded (suppose in Writing, or otherwise) to the Mind, or *Subjectively*, as possessed by it ; the former to be us'd, as a Means in order to the latter, as its End. And this consists either in the transient Act, or in the fixed Habit, which is the more immediate Capacity of repeating and improving that Act at any time, upon occasion, with ease and readiness ; and it is most commonly acquir'd by an attentive and reiterated view of the Matter known, together with frequent Exercise in relation to it. 'Tis not knowledge, but Error and Mistake, if there be not a right apprehension of the Object,

(or Tho't agreeable to the Thing) so far however, and in such manner as the thing (or object of Tho't, is presun'd or suppos'd to be known, whether in whole or in part, perfectly or imperfectly, as 'tis really in it self, or as the Humane Mind is capable of taking it. We may be said to know this or that, either by the Testimony of others, (which is more properly *believing* than knowing) or by our own immediate Observation or Consideration: And we may justly be more or less Dubious, or altogether Certain, according as the Testimony it self and the sense in which we take it, on one hand, or the Observation we have made, and the consideration we have used on the other, are more or less to be depended on.

§ 11. As for the Matters to be known, I might reduce them to three general Heads, *viz.* (1.) *Things*, for the principal Objects of Tho't, to which Words and Notions are related and subservient. (2.) *Words*, or the Expressions of Tho't, in reference to any of its Objects whatsoever; and, (3.) *Notions*, by which is here design'd the leading and more general Observations and Remarks about Things or Words, or even about Notions themselves. Nature seems commonly to lead Men to begin at the first of these, as they can; to proceed with the second, and to reach at last to the last. And as they attain to any more general Notions, to lay them up, and use them in reference to Things, or Words, or other Notions.

§ 12. Somewhat in each of these kinds is here presupposed, as already laid in; but more especially some competent Acquaintance with Words, and their Meaning; and yet we may need more of the Logical Notions and Instructions about the Expressions of Tho't, as well as its more principal Objects to carry us farther into the respective Nature and Use, both of Words and Things, and even of general Notions themselves.

§ 13. As to the more special knowledge of Words, its Foundations may seem to be most fitly laid (as *Comenius* hath shewn) in a summary Account of the more easie and obvious Things, gradually taking in the Grammatical Notions and Instructions in the way of Practice; and proceeding to those of Rhetorick in reading proper Authors.

§ 14. The more special account of things may be deliver'd, either wholly in the way of *Speculation*, or in that which directly and professedly leads to *Præctice*, or with the intermixture of both: As is actually done, where Theorems (or Mathematical Points to be known) and Problems to be perform'd are interwoven, as in *Pride's Geometry*. And certainly the Notions in Logic should not be barren and empty Speculations; but Notions originally drawn from *Practice*, and according y both fitted and applied to lead us to it, and help us in it; as a Path once trac'd from any place, may after serve to make our way thither more certain and ready.

§ 15. The more special points of *Speculation*, are either *Matters of Fact*, whether they lie open to common view, or only to a more-curious Observation; or else *rational Enquiries and Accounts*, in reference to Beings themselves, and what relates thereto; more particularly some of their Attributes abstractly consider'd, as Measure, Number, Sound, &c. Hither we may chiefly refer Geography, History, Civil and Natural, some parts of the Mathematicks, Natural Philosophy, Pneumatology, &c.

§ 16. The more special points of *Præctice*, are either only *Matter of Skill*, whether in the vulgar and mechanical Way, or in that of Learning; or else *Matter of Duty*, in respect of God, our selves, or others, according to the Light and Law of Nature, or of Scripture; or the more peculiar Laws of particular Civil Societies. Hither we may refer the Mechanical and Liberal Arts or Disciplines, as Politicks, Ethicks, Theology, &c.

§ 17. The more general Notions of Logic are to precede our solemn Application to the mentioned Points of Speculation and Practice, to open and prepare the way, and may, not unfitly, come after them too for the farther improvement of them. And tho' Logic might seem to have little or nothing to do with inferior Employments, which require but few Instructions, and those more particular and plain, as resting almost wholly upon Example and Exercise; yet many of those, who are or may be so employ'd, might be capable of some considerable Benefit by this Essay; at least by the Observations and Instructions, which are more directly sui-

ted to the prudent ordering of our selves, our Enquiries, Undertakings, and Pursuits.

§ 18. Now in order to produce the mentioned Habit of using our Reason in a better way, and to better purpose, endeavour will be us'd, that the Instructions here may be indeed *peculiarly* fitted to that end ; so as their tendency to it may be more direct and full than that of the Mathematicks, Metaphysicks, Law, or even of the common Logicks, which yet may all be of Service to render the Mind more Attentive, Accurate, and Acute.

§ 19. But that the Mind may be brought, and continu'd under the *Influence and Conduct of such Instructions*, how proper soever they may be, it is of absolute Necessity. (1.) That they be well understood, and for this the greatest part of Learners will need a fit Instructor. (2.) That the principal Matters be carefully recollected and remember'd (especially such as are more suited to our State and Circumstances) so that they may lie ready in the Mind for Use: Nor should this be done by Learners only ; others might, perhaps, do well to revise some such Tract as this, even as some great Men have tho't fit to review their Grammar, once a Year. And this were the rather to be done in regard we do often miss it, not so much from the want of Knowledge, as thro' our not remembering, or attending duly to what we know : And therefore this Essay may be allow'd to do the part of a Remembrancer to those, who need it not as an Instructor. (3.) That the Instructions be reduc'd to Exercise and Practice, and it were best for Learners, that it should be under a proper Inspector, either as he may specially Order, or as this Essay it self may more particularly direct, towards the close thereof. And some such Method should be carry'd on, till the Learner come to an habit of using his Reason, with ease and dispatch, agreeably to the Rules deliver'd, without a formal Reference to them, or actual thinking of them, as Artists in other Cases are wont to do, without attending to the Measures by which they first attain'd their Skill: And it would be indeed pedantic to make Ostentation of our Acquaintance with Logic, by affecting those Terms of Art, which like the Workman's Instruments, are only to be us'd, not shewn.

§ 20. As to the Method of this Essay, I shall first give the *Apparatus Logicus*, or Logical Furniture, which I conceive to be previously requisite towards the directing or assisting of our Reason; and then what I may call the *Usus Logicus*, or Logical Use of it in treating of some more observable purposes, wherein our Reason is to be directed and assisted. The former will make the first Part of this Treatise; and here I shall speak somewhat of Tho'ts as leading to Things, and then of Things as they are the Objects of Tho't: And shall first endeavour to set forth the whole compass of Things, under the more obvious and common Notions, and afterwards, according to a more Nice and abstract Consideration, whether in their Elements, or the Resultances from them: I shall then draw out some of them, which appear to stand fairly connected or disjoin'd, in certain Positions, which will be either Principles, or the nearer Deductions from them.

§ 21. When I come to treat of the Uses and Purposes, which are to be serv'd by Reason: I shall first speak of such, as may be subservient to the rest, *viz.* Rightly to take what others deliver, and justly to express what we our selves intend; and then shall proceed to those which may be thereby serv'd, as, (1.) Rightly to make and pursue Enquiries. (2.) Rightly to discern, whether that which lies before us, be a matter proper for us to proceed upon, or how far it may be so. (3.) Rightly to assign what place this or that ought to have in our Attendance, and what proportion of it. (4.) Rightly to estimate the Apprehensions of Things as they are singly taken. (5.) Rightly to judge and pronounce of Things in affirming, or denying. (6.) Rightly to apprehend and admit what is sufficiently Evident. (7.) Rightly to discern what danger there may be of Mistake in any Case, and of what importance a Mistake would be: And these, together with the subservient Uses of our Reason will make up the second part of this Essay.

§ 22. I shall conclude the whole with those farther Uses of our Reason, which are somewhat more Special, and come nearer to common Service, *viz.* (1.) Rightly to estimate Proof, and to assent accordingly, so far as the Proof will warrant, and justify. (2.) Rightly to make out what may be fitly suppos'd True, but appears not yet sufficiently Evident,

dent, by such Proof as the Matter will admit, and the occasion requires. (3.) Rightly to infer, so as what is inferr'd, may evidently appear to be a just Consequence of that, from which it is deduc'd. (4.) Rightly to direct and apply to Use and Service what ought to be, or is capable of being so directed and apply'd. Lastly, and more at large, Rightly to conduct our selves, and our Affairs, more particularly in the way of Learning.

A N
E S S A Y
For the Improvement of
R E A S O N, &c.

P A R T I.

C H A P. I.

§ 1. **F**OR the better directing and assisting of our Reason and Tho't, It seems highly requisite, if not altogether Necessary; that first of all, we be led into some general and orderly Acquaintance with the various matters of Tho't, as being the Objects about which Reason is Conversant. It may be therefore given as a previous and preparatory Rule for the present Exercise and Improvement of Reason, in order to the farther Use thereof; *That we furnish our Minds with a methodical Set of general and approved Notions, about the different Sorts of Things, which may come under Consideration.*

§ 2. We were not Conscious that our Minds began to Work, till they were excited, whether by Supernatural Touches upon them; or by the inward feeling we had of Pain or Pleasure, springing within; or the Notices drawn by sensible Perception from without; all which have been slowly improv'd by growing Observation and Experience, together with Discourse and Reading, as we became capable of them, and were engaged in them: And yet perhaps all
has

has not hitherto amounted, nor would in a much longer time, to a every extensive, tho' but superficial Acquaintance with Things: And what we commonly have is far from being orderly digested; so that the several sorts of Notions we have got might be readily gone to; but, as they came in Accidentally at various Times, and on various Occasions, so they have been thrown together, as it happen'd, without any thing of Method or Order. I shall therefore offer the requisite Help, for observing the forementioned Rule, and begin with some Remarks about Tho't it self, as leading to Things. Now here it may be usefully observ'd.

§ 3. (1.) That the exercise of our Minds in *Thinking*, and the *Tho'ts* therein form'd, and presented to our Consideration, are the most immediate Objects of the Understanding, whereof we are Conscious, and cannot doubt, but know them intuitively without Reasoning, and certainly beyond Question, both that they are, and are such, as we perceive them to be; when yet we cannot enter farther into the Nature of them, than by conceiving them generally and indistinctly, as Attributes or Modes, *i. e.* Somewhat appertaining to, and depending upon something else in us, which does so act, or is so affected, as we inwardly feel; and perhaps both at once, in differing Respects: For such may be the make of our Souls, as that being acted, or mov'd, they Act, and when excited do exert their Power of Thinking.

§ 4. (2.) By *Thinking*, is therefore Understood, that Action or Impression, whereby the Mind is put under such a Mode, and by *Tho't*, the Mode it self so produc'd; neither of which we can justly explain, but might illustrate by the Motion of the Body, suppose in sitting down, and its continued Posture of sitting afterwards. Now the Mind can reflect, or turn its Observation upon it self, as it is mov'd in Thinking, or modified in formed Thought, almost as if it were another Mind distinct and separate from it self: And this it seems to do by virtue of that wonderful power of Memory, which serves to retain or to recover foregoing Tho'ts, and to set them before us as in a Glass to be observ'd and consider'd.

§ 5. (3.) It is sufficiently plain, or even self-evident to our inward Perception, that whatever we think of, is presented in Tho't, by our Minds to themselves. And where we seem most immediately to lay hold on Things themselves, by their grosser Substance, as when they are taken into the Mouth, or grasped with the Hand; yet what we do first and most directly attend to, is the sensible Perception we have by the Taste or Feeling. It is very certain, that we know
nothing

nothing of Things, but as we consciously Perceive, Imagine, or Conceive them ; since our knowing Things is indeed nothing else, but our perceiving, imagining, or conceiving them, with consciousness that we do so.

§ 6. (4.) These Operations, or impresses of the Mind, as they are consciously felt, or inwardly perceiv'd, are so many different ways of *Thinking*, and kinds of *Tho't*. For we cannot properly be said to perceive any thing by the outward Senses, or inwardly to imagine any sensible Object, or to conceive of what is intellectual, and falls not directly under Sense or Imagination, unless we attend thereto by Thinking, of the thing perceiv'd, imagin'd, or conceiv'd. And we may conceive of Things as certain, in what is call'd Knowledge more strictly, or in well assured Faith ; as probable, in Opinion, or in a more inform Belief, as Doubtful, in Conjecture ; as Dark when we enquire into them, as some way observable when we Contemplate or consider of them. Our sensible Perceptions are commonly distinguish'd according to the various bodily Organs, by means of which our Souls do perceive : We might call them all, Feeling, either by what is common to the whole Body, *viz.* An inward Skin spread thro' it, and the Nerves which terminate therein ; or by what is peculiar to some more curious Parts, as the Eye, the Ear, Mouth, and Nostrils, with the more observable Nerves belonging to them ; and perhaps some other Parts might also be reckon'd as particular Organs of Sensation. Our Imaginations are no other than the inward Representation of sensible Perceptions, in absence of the sensible Object ; or when, without using the outward Organ, we are inwardly affected, in some measure at least, as if we saw, or heard, or otherwise perceiv'd the sensible Object.

§ 7. (5) A single Tho't may give rise to many more by way of reflexive Consideration, Enquiry, Conjecture, Inference, Argumentation, and Resolves about it : For, besides the consciousness we have of our Thinking, when we do so, we may be excited, or can set our selves, to take a more Solemn and design'd review of our precedent Thinking, or Tho't, by various Acts of reflect Thinking and Tho'ts therein form'd ; as we may of these again by farther Reflection, and so might proceed endlessly, in a continued and manifold Series.

§ 8. (6.) Tho't may be consider'd, either absolutely in it self, as what is consciously known, or relatively, as what is understood to refer to some-what else, whereof it brings the Representation or Report to our Minds : And this is the
more

more usual way of considering it, for we do generally refer our Tho'ts to Things; or rather,

§ 9. (7.) We commonly overlook the Tho'ts, and our Minds run directly to the Things whereof we think, so that Tho'ts are generally to our Consideration instead of the Things themselves; and we suppose our selves to consider this or that Thing in it self immediately and directly, when as we cannot possibly take any Cognizance thereof, but under those sensible Perceptions, imaginative Representations, or intellectual Conceptions, which are to us the Natural and Internal Signs of Things, as they are, some way or other objected to our Minds, and sometimes, only, by the Operation of the Phantasie, or by the Intellect, conjoining, dividing, and variously disposing, what has been otherwise taken in, or else by Impressions made upon us, in a Supernatural or Preternatural way, by God, or Angels, or by some accidental and uncommon Motions of the Blood and Spirits.

§ 10. (8.) Our Perceptions doe not always resemble the Things to which they relate, nor ordinarily serve by themselves to let us far into the Nature of them; they are commonly no more than Notices and Intimations of somewhat or other in the Make of the sensible Object, or attending it, with which we are so Affected. Flat superficial Figures, as of a Triangle, Circle, Square, Trapezium, &c. seem to be the only Things which our Sight can exactly take, as they are in themselves: What is Concave or Convex may be represented by disposing lighter and darker Colours accordingly upon a Flat; They are not therefore discerned by the Eye in their own proper Nature, but the Object is judg'd to be such, upon comparing together our differing Perceptions of the same Thing, as by the Sight and by the Touch, or else by our Reasoning, tho' perhaps unobservedly, upon the visible Appearance in our nearer approaches, or in our viewing the several parts successively, and in differing ways. In short, 'tis only the superficies, not the substance of Bodies we see; tho' by a quick procedure of Tho't we may, as it were, in a moment, travel all over the Object, and thro' it, so as to apprehend somewhat of that substantiality, which we cannot perceive by the Eye: Nor will the other Senses by themselves inform us, what there is in the several Bodies, which so affects the Ear, the Smell, or Taste, or Touch.

§ 11. (9.) The imaginative Representations of the Phantasie, which they call the common and internal Sense, cannot of themselves instruct us farther about the nature of Objects, than

than our sensible Perceptions could, being generally a kind of Repetition of these, as has been shewn.

§ 12. (10.) Our intellectual Conceptions cannot give us (however in our present State) the intuitive Knowledge, or the immediate and assuring View, as it were, of what is in or about the Object distinct from our Idea or Tho't: Yet we may hereby, (1.) Apprehend somewhat in relation thereto as Self-evident, and, (2.) Reason out somewhat farther with sufficient certainty. (3.) Collect somewhat farther still, as highly probable. (4.) Conjecture yet more, as not unlikely. (5.) We may, perhaps, conceive a great deal farther, as no ways inconsistent or impossible. And finally in a negative way (6.) We might always observe a multitude of Points, which possibly, probably, or certainly do not, it may be cannot, belong to this or that.

§ 13. (11.) Tho' it appears not that we have any innate Ideas, or formed Notions or Principles laid in by Nature, antecedently to the exercise of our Sences and Understandings; yet it must be granted, that we were born with the Natural Faculty, whereby we actually discern the agreement or disagreement of some Notions, so soon as we have the Notions themselves; as that we can or do Think, that therefore we ourselves are; that 1 and 2 make 3, that Gold is not Silver, nor Ice formally Water; that the whole is greater than its part, &c. and if we should set our selves to do it, we cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. This we may call intuitive Knowledge, or Natural Certainty wrought into our very Make and Constitution. Now,

§ 14. (12.) It is to us intuitively certain, or by a very short and easie Deduction, that contradictory Points cannot both be True or both False; as for a Thing to be, and not to be at once, and in the same respect; but if one be false, the other must be true, or if that were true, the other must be false: And it is farther alike certain, that where the Case is such, *that* part of the two must be so long taken for True, which upon strict Examination approves it self to be more like Truth than the other.

§ 15. (13.) That there are Things about us really existing, whether we or others think of them or no, must, according to these indisputable Measures be taken for True, if it had but ever so little more to be rationally said for it, than can be offer'd for the contradictory Point, *viz.* [that there are not real Things without us, with which we are to affected, but that they are all presented to our Minds by delusive Imagination, as in Dreams] when yet it must be
own'd,

own'd, that we never did our selves awake from our clear and well examin'd sensible perceptions, or self evident and approv'd Conceptions, so as to detect them to have been but Dreams and Illusions; nor could we never hear of any other Man who did: But on the contrary, all the Reason and Argument lies on the affirmative side, and there is scarce any thing against it but the paultry Cavil, of a meer supposed possibility to the contrary, such as Atheists commonly take up against the being of a God; and irreligious Persons against a future State: Whenas we cannot reasonably suppose it possible, that we, with all Men before us and about us, have been in a continual Dream; nor without the blackest Imputation upon our Maker, as if he could be so grossly deficient, in Wisdom, Power or Goodness, as to lay us under an inevitable necessity of being continually deceived.

§ 16. (14.) Upon the whole, how absurd were it to call the reality of those things in Question, which do so really and unavoidably to our feeling, either Accommodate or Incommode us in our present State: To us therefore they must be real, whether we would or no, as being of real Concernment. And it were Ridiculous to doubt of their being so for no better Reason, than because we are not surer of it, than God saw fit to make us naturally capable of being, or there was any need we should be, for any valuable end or purpose incumbent on us to pursue.

§ 17. I shall therefore make no doubt of proceeding from the Account thus given of Tho'ts, to that of Things, about which they are employ'd, and shall be very careful to offer only such Notions about them, as may approve themselves to Humane Senses and Minds in their proper State, as they are more generally found, and in that regular use of them which common Observation and Experience direct; and which will appear right (if not at first view, yet) upon a little Consideration, or however, as they will be supported with Proof, or inferr'd from sure Principles, so that we may take them safely and with Satisfaction, for a firm Basis to our farther Consideration of Things, and an useful Fountain of Solution to a multitude of Enquiries about them.

C H A P. II.

§ 1. I Shall now consider Things in the largest Acceptation, as Themes, or Objects of Tho't: And, *First*, in a more familiar and less notional Way; in order to somewhat of a general, tho' but overly Acquaintance with them, and to subserve some valuable Purposes, to which the following Account may be apply'd, and will (in part however) be directed in the procedure, or afterwards.

§ 2. What I am here endeavouring, is a plain, short, and summary Representation (1.) Of what we may call the Intellectual, or Ideal, and *Lesser World*, which yet is in some fort capable of taking in the Greater: I mean, the various *Ways of Thinking*, which we either actually have, or may, and ought to use upon Occasion, whether in reflecting upon these very *Modes of Tho'ts* themselves, or upon the *Matter* of them, so as to consider (*e. gr.*) what our Notions or Ideas in themselves are; to what Object they refer; whether, and how far, they may be reasonably judg'd, agreeing or disagreeing thereto, &c. and, (2.) Of that which may be term'd the objective, real and *greater World* about us, as it may be fairly collected from what we consciously know, and can rationally conclude, as has been shewn in the close of the preceding Chapter: So that we may well take the greatest part of Things about us to have a real Correspondency to the Ideas, in which they are, and have been constantly presented to the generality of Mankind, and that no good Reason can be given, why we should not acquiesce therein, as well as they.

§ 3. The more general Use and Service of the Representation here may be to bring our Minds into a more intimate Acquaintance with their own ways of Working and Capacities, as also to fix and further the Knowledge of other Things; and by all, to lead them up to God the Father of our Spirits, and Maker of the Universe; That they may center in him as the Chief and Ultimate Good. Now we may here Observe.

§ 4. 1. That *our Tho'ts*, both as they are forming or framing, and also as actually form'd and objected to our Mind, are matter of Tho't, as being what we may and do, and are often greatly concern'd to think of: But that has, 'tis hop'd, sufficiently appear'd in the former Chapter, as also;

§ 5. 2. *That other Things* cannot be tho't of by us, but as they are *inwardly presented* in some or other Idea, viz. As perceiv'd, imagin'd or conceiv'd : So that the more immediate Object of our Consideration is not properly the very Thing it self without us, but the inward Apprehension we have of it : Tho' by comparing one way of perceiving the same Object with another, and by reasoning upon the Matter, we have easily come to know, that there is generally an Object really without us, as well as an Apprehension of it within ; as when we see a Book, which yet we cannot feel without putting out our hand to reach it, we are better assur'd, both, that there is a real Object, and that it is without us.

§ 6. 3. There is commonly some good degree of Correspondency (so far as may be needful for us) betwixt internal Ideas, and external Objects ; *i. e.* somewhat in *these* naturally fitted so to affect us in producing *those* ; tho' it may, or perhaps must considerably differ, as the *Draught* or Picture of a Globe from the Globe it self.

§ 7. 4. Whilst we think, we cannot but be *sure* we do so ; as likewise that we think *this* or *that* in particular of this or that.

§ 8. 5. Oftentimes we may be equally *sure*, that we have so Tho't or did so think at such a time on such an Occasion, and by the same reason that we did Hear, See, Read, Speak, or Act, this or that. And this is what we call a perfect or certain Remembrance proceeding from a Faculty absolutely necessary for the carrying on of Tho't, Discourse, or Business ; and much more for resuming any of them after an Interruption or Intermission ; and it ought certainly to be cultivated with great care on many accounts (which I cannot stay to mention) ; and so much the rather, because,

§ 9. 6. In many Cases Memory is in danger to fail us, so that we may be *uncertain*, or may very *slow*, and with difficulty recollect, whether a Matter were so or not : And more especially as to what is *loose* without rational Connexion, (as Names, &c.) Nice and Critical, so that a small Mistake may make a great Alteration (as in accurate definitions, &c.) *confus'd*, not put into any good Order, so as one thing might lead to another ; *long*, consisting of many Parts, or Points ; *less-minded*, as conceiv'd to be of no concern or little to us ; not much affecting us with Pleasure or Pain, &c. and farther, what we have *not lately call'd to Mind*, or *not so often* as the difficulty of Remembring might require ; Lastly, (to mention no more) What *occurs to us in old Age*, when the Spirits are lower, and the Mind, perhaps, deeper engaged otherways ;
when

when as some Things, which fell out much longer since are well remember'd, as having then made a great Impression, and ~~this~~ it may be since often renew'd by the frequent recollecting and repeating of such Matters: But,

§ 10. 7. *Writing down* some Minutes, and Hints at least, of what we would preserve, is altogether Necessary for all Persons in some Cases; and in all much safer than trusting wholly to Memory: And besides that our *writing* Things may often be a means to *imprint* them deeper upon our Minds; the frequent Review is, however, sure to do so; and even a glance of the Eye upon some leading Words or Passages may *prompt* or help us easily to recollect the rest without reading it on: And,

§ 11. 8. There are divers other helps to Memory; as by *Referring* what we would remember to somewhat else, which we are very Conversant with, and imagining we saw it written here or there; by some notable *Token*, i. e. either some very observable Circumstance attending what was said or done, or somewhat unusual to our selves, as a Thread or Ring put on a Finger, where we do not commonly wear one, to mind us of something to be said or done. Again, by *using* what we would retain in Converse or otherwise; as also using Memory it self, frequently and with gradual Advances, but not over-loading it: It may likewise be helpful to *Place* what we would remember, in several Divisions upon a paper separated by Lines, and that some leading Words or Sentences be very remarkably writ in differing Characters, or with Ink of differing Colours, and that then we set our selves to imagine the Writing as if it were a Picture: Also the *closing*, or however the *fixing* of our Eye, may be of use to fix the Mind, and help the Memory: Committing things to Memory over Night, and recollecting them in the Morning, with divers other Methods might be mentioned, but we must pass on.

§ 12. I proceed therefore to more special *Modes* of Thinking, and *Matters* of Thought, or *How* Men think, and of *What*: and shall here labour, as far as well may be, to *comprize* and take in the whole of these, but must *Contract* the Account into as narrow a compass as will consist with the intendment of it: And whilst every Thing may not be expressly mention'd, shall endeavour to *Select* and draw out what may be of greatest Use, *disposing* them in such Order, as may help the Understanding and Memory, and *Treating* them more or less briefly, as may best answer the special Purposes here design'd, viz.

§ 13. That the Reader may find some or other Head, whereto he may refer whatever manner of Thinking, or Matter of Tho't he is acquainted with already; and that having thus refer'd, and as it were lodg'd his present Store, he may the easier review it upon any peculiar Occasion: As also for the better securing and retaining what Knowledge he has; and that he may have fit Heads to proceed upon, and Trains to pursue, with Queries to be put, and some Hints to help towards the Answering of them, when he would use his own Skill for the enlargement of his Stock: And that in case he has any particular Argument in hand, he may here look out and try what ways of Thinking the Matter will admit or may require; as also what may be here suggested; which can help him to descry the Kind or common Nature, the Sorts or differing Natures, the more noted Marks or distinguishing Characters, the Parts which go to make up the whole, the Relatives, or what other Things are refer'd, to what he has under Consideration; and more particularly what is like or unlike in this or that respect; what the Matter from, or of which it is made; what the Form or most fundamental Distinction; by what Agents and means produced, for what end; and what the Thing it self either constitutes or produces. And whereas in some Cases more may arise than were Necessary, or fit to be made use of, He may draw out of the mentioned particulars, what will be likely best to answer his Purpose.

§ 14. In all kinds of Tho't, we mind, observe, or attend to somewhat, either more or less; and also have some or other Apprehension, Notion, or Idea, whether it be right or wrong, perfect or imperfect, clear and distinct, or dark and confus'd.

§ 15. In perceiving our Souls attend to some Impression made in the Brain by the Motion of the Spirits or Nerves (or both) leading thither from the several Organs or Instruments of Sensation; which either serve to the more general and common way of Feeling, unusual Motions arising from Causes within, or Objects without, by means of some inner Skin made of the Nervous Fibres, (which may be affected thro' the outer Skin) or to the special Modes of Sensation, which are peculiar to the Tongue and Palate in Tasting; to the Nostrils in Smelling; to the Ear, with its Tympanum or stretched Skin, and inward Furniture in Hearing; and to the Eye, with its various Coats and Humors in Seeing.

§ 16. In *imagining*, we attend to some like Impressions or Motions in the Brain, as if we felt, tasted, smelt, heard, or saw, when we really do not, but either do by design, inwardly to our selves, *represent* sensible Things more or ; less perfectly ; when we know they are not actually present or by mistake *Conceit* them to be present, when they really are not ; or designedly *Feign* and present to our Minds, somewhat of a sensible Kind, which we did never see, hear, &c. ; by compounding, dividing, or otherways altering the Ideas, we have some time or other taken in by Sense ; or else *Dream*, when we attend to certain Motions in the Brain, whilst the use of the outward Senses is intermitted thro' a general Relaxation of the Nerves ; whereupon the contained Spirits being less compress'd are less elastick, and so more unfit to transmit any Impression from external Objects.

§ 17. Properly and strictly to *Conceive*, is an Act more purely *Intellectual*, proceeding from a Faculty Superior to those of Sense and Phansie, or Imagination, which are limited to corporeal Things, and those *determin'd*, as all particulars must be, to this or that Place, Time, Manner, &c. When as that Higher Power in Man, which we may call the *Mind*, can form Apprehensions of what is *not Material* (*viz.* of Spirits and the Affections of Bodies, which fall not under Sense) and also can frame *general* Ideas or Notions, or consider of Things in a general way without attending to their particular limited Circumstances, as when we think of length in a Road without observing its determinate Measure.

§ 18. As to what is yet more Special in the Modes of Thinking ; some Tho'ts may be said to *start* or rise in the Mind as it were of themselves, and to *recur* or return again upon us, when we sought them not, as also to *follow*, and as it were, hang upon us when we would rather be free of them, or to *flie* from us when we would hold and fix them. And these might seem to be always, as they may really be sometimes injected, *cast in* and stirred up by some invisible Agent without us, who can either more immediately work upon our Minds, or, however, move our Animal Spirits ; or to be by like means *impressed*, continu'd and enforced ; or *withdrawn*, hindred, and diverted : But we may rather suppose 'tis more generally from such *accidental* and less usual *Motions* of the Blood and Spirits, as the Brain is affected withal in common Dreams, when 'tis so *dispos'd* before hand, as to be more capable of receiving such Impression.

§ 19. But the greatest part of our Tho'ts may be said to be more properly our own, as being consciously *Formed by us* as well as in us: For even when we *rove* we carry our Tho'ts thro' a variety of Objects, tho' without a methodical Procedure or formed Intention so to do. In *glancing*, we make no stay upon what is before us, and do but slightly observe its first and general Appearance: Whilst *poring* is a continued Thinking of some one thing, commonly without any special Design, and to no good Effect; for the avoiding of which, we should endeavour to *turn* or transfer our Tho'ts to somewhat else. We *Scan* Things by considering them intently as it were on all sides, and at all Points; and thus we may come to *detect* or discover what lay hid before under some differing (and commonly, better) Appearance. We first take in Things by a more direct and *simple View*, or Attendance to them; but may afterwards *reflect* thereon, and consider both the manner of our viewing them, and the Apprehension or Idea we thereupon had of them, or come to have upon farther Tho't. And here,

§ 20. We may *refer* one Thing to another, as some way or other appertaining or related to it. We may *compare* one way of perceiving, imagining, or conceiving with another: Also the Idea taken in one way with what we have otherways; and likewise one external Object with others, to see how they agree or disagree: We may *abstract*, or distinctly and separately consider what cannot be actually separated (as the length of a way may be observ'd without attending to any thing of Breadth, tho' it must of Necessity have some or other Breadth): We may, either at Pleasure, or from some Analogy of Things and Words assign a *Name* to this or that, or determine of some other *Sign* to express it by. We may also *disjoin* this from that, or *connect* and join Things together, where there is no inconsistency in our Imagining or Conceiving them as if they were really so connected or disjoin'd.

§ 21. We should *distinguish* of Things which any way differ, tho' it were only, as this is not that, however they do or might agree; And also of Words or other Signs, when they have differing Sense; that so we may *fix* and settle the present Meaning, or what is the matter design'd; which we may *describe* by any sort and set of Characters that are not else where to be found together; or more accurately and briefly *define* by a summary Account of the common Nature and grand fundamental Difference betwixt *this* and *that*, which comes nearest to it amongst the Things which differ considerably from it: And we may then proceed.

proceed to *divide* it, or to reckon up, as near as we can, all the Sorts or Parts which go to make it up.

§ 22. What we would lay down as a Principle, a Demand, a general Rule, or as the Point in Dispute, &c. is to be carefully *stated*; so as to make it neither too lax nor too strait, neither taking in what is unsafe or needless, nor yet leaving out any Point which is Necessary, or would be Advantageous. What is clear and Self-evident we may *See*, or know to be right without farther opening, or however, without proof by immediate Intuition (as that the whole is greater than its part): And some Things which we cannot thus See, yet we may, or perhaps ought to *hold*, and take for right, as being known to have been well consider'd and made out (as the Being of God, &c.) and yet it may be highly requisite to *Arm* and fortifie our Minds as to some such Points, with the strongest Evidence we can against the Assaults that may be made upon us, whether within or from without.

§ 23. There are some other Points, which from probable Marks, we may reasonably *deem* to be right (as where competent and impartial Judges are mostly of that Opinion) yet we should not therefore hold them as certainly True, till we have surer Evidence. Where we can find nothing that may fairly render one side of the Question to us more probable than the other, we can but merely *guess*, and yet may sometimes find our selves under a necessity to proceed upon the one or the other side as Right; Whilst yet we cannot but be altogether in *doubt* whether it be so or not: And where there is any thing to be said for and against it, we should (however if concern'd in the matter) set our selves to *Argue* the Point both ways; and having so done to *weigh* the Arguments on one side against those on the other, with a Mind as indifferent as possibly we can, before we adventure to *decide* or determine the Question one way or other: And till this can be done to *Suspend*, obliging our selves not to fall in with this or that part, and if it might be not to lean this way or that in our Inclinations.

§ 24. But when a Point has been well examin'd by us, and that we have settled our Judgment about it upon solid Argument, it would be a Weakness not to *stand* and abide in such a Sentiment: And yet without resolving, we will never *change* our Mind, which is more than we can well undertake, and may be in some Cases what we should do ill to perform: Since 'tis possible somewhat may be *objected* sometime or other by our own Minds or otherwise; which if

we cannot *Solve* or Answer (nor get a good Solution of) should oblige us to give up the Point if it overthrow the only Foundation on which that Point can stand or incontestably prove the contradictory to it to be Right; but there are some Objections which we may very reasonably *Slight*, tho' neither we nor others for us can solve them; *i. e.* meer Difficulties with which Truth may be incumbred, when they are oppos'd to substantial Argument on the other side. What is either Self-evident, or has been well made out, we should *apply* to the good Purposes which may be thereby serv'd.

§ 25. We are not only to regard the Reason and Evidence of Things, but to *believe* what is credibly testify'd by such as are knowing and Faithful; especially what God, or any of the ever blessed Trinity can be known to Witness to us; which is always to be receiv'd according to the Nature of the Matter testify'd; and therefore must engage the *Consent* of our Will, when not only an offer is made, but our Acceptance requir'd according to the Tenor and Terms thereof: And that therefore we should *depend* upon what is declar'd, that in the appointed time and way it will be made out to a Title: Nor should we *mistrust* or question the Wisdom, Power, Good-will, or Faithfulness of God, or any way *dis-sent*, as Persons disinclined to his prescribed Methods; but *aiming* at the Favour and Fruition of God as our end, we should fixedly *Eye* his Word, as the Rule of our Principles, Words, and Actions, and the Lord Jesus, as our Principal Example, looking with enlarged Desire, and raised Expectation to Him, as the Author and Leader, the Finisher and Rewarder of our Faith.

§ 26. There is, we see, a Practical, as well as Speculative Use to be made of our Thots; for we are to *Judge*, not only whether this or that be true, but whether it be Good, Lawful, and convenient; and that not only in the general, but whether it be so to us at this time, and in these Circumstances: We are then to *rate* or estimate how far it is so, and in what degree, whether more or less than the omission or contrary Act would probably be: And we are accordingly to *Will* and Chuse, or to *Nil* and Refuse.

§ 27. The Passions or Affections are to be govern'd by the deliberate Judgment, Estimate and Will, whilst we *like* or *love*, *dislike*, hate, are angry at, or displeased with any Person or Thing, and either *fly* them, as wishing they may not approach us on the one hand, or wish and desire them on the other, and accordingly either *fear* the event or *hope* it; and where difficulties lie in the way, either *trust* that we

can surmount them, or *despair* of doing it; and finally, either *joy* and rejoice in present, or expected Good, and in our deliverance from present or threatening Evils, or else *grieve* and lament upon the contrary Accounts.

§ 28. The *designing* or resolving what we conceive to be in our own Power; or hope we shall be assisted to perform, is plainly an Act of the Will; and may seem to imply that there is also some-what of affectionate Desire to the doing of it; especially when we *adhere* to the resolution against all that would divert us from it.

§ 29. We *pitty* others, when from good Will to them we are grieved at their Troubles, and would help them if we could; but *Envy*, on the contrary, is grieved at the good of others; and proceeds from a deficiency, at least, in the good Will we should bear to others, whom we are thence prone to *charge* either unjustly, too deeply, or without a sufficient Call to do it; Whilst we are commonly too backward to the judging of our selves, tho' there may be great occasion for it; too ready to *acquit* and clear our selves on any slight pretext: Tho' perhaps we will not pardon others upon Repentance and Amendment: We are also naturally prone to *approve*, if not *admire* what we our selves do when there may be little Reason for it, but rather cause to *admire* it as unaccountably Strange, that we should be so partial to our selves.

§ 30. The Mind of Man do's in some Cases, and at some Times, *presage* and strangely conjecture some future Events, which are altogether contingent, and cannot be foreseen by him in their Causes: This might seem to arise from some superior Agency, especially when the Presage arises to a kind of absolute and certain fore-sight. The *recalling* to Mind what we have almost wholly lost is often very difficult; but there is always, when we go about it, some or other Character, tho' dark, remaining by which we endeavour, by the various turning of our Tho'ts, to find out somewhat more of the Matter, and perhaps it would more easily *present*, if we had a set of Queries ready to propound to our selves, or others, to be consider'd and answer'd in relation to the Matter we are seeking, which, when found, is easily known by its answering, and corresponding to what we have already: and thus in the *seeking* out of New Inventions, we *propound* somewhat to be perform'd, and endeavour to *find* by what means it may be done, and what is the most commodious way to do it, and so *persue* the Design from one step to another, unless being wearied, discouraged, or otherways taken off, we be forc'd or induc'd to *retire* and leave it.

§ 31. We do often *suppose*, or put the Case that this or that be so, and sometimes when we know it to be otherwise, that we may *infer* or draw some Consequence from it; whether to lead us or others to some farther Truth; or to correct a *Mistake* by shewing some Absurdity which would follow from it: But in order to *take things right*, and apprehend them as really they are, perhaps there is nothing more necessary or useful, than that we should *enquire*, especially if we be furnished with a convenient Set of Enquiries, and have something before us, as in the Summary here undertaken, which may help to suggest fit Answers.

§ 32. Now as Enquiries may be made and pursu'd, not only in our own retir'd Tho'ts, but in *Converse* with others, and looking into Books; so divers others of the forementioned Ways of Thinking are capable of being drawn forth into Words, and perform'd in Speaking and Writing, as well as Thinking; as may easily appear upon reviewing the Particulars: And some of them do likewise admit of *Action* as well as Expression: Since we may (*e. gr.* *move* with the Eye and Feet as well as in Tho'ts or Discourse: But there are a multitude of other Matters that may *employ* us divers ways, and particularly may find work for our Tho'ts: Those I have endeavour'd to sum up in some following Chapters, not wholly in *distinct* and *peculiar Terms*, but sometimes laying diverse Things together under *Synonymous* Expressions: And for the most part they are closely *crucid* in *general Terms*; yet sometimes the more considerable Sorts are drawn forth under their common Head, and I shall here and there give some *brief Explication* upon some of them; designing and endeavouring to place it upon Matters of greater *Note*, and more observable, or of greater *Use* to us, or *Worth* and Value in themselves.

C H A P. III.

§ 1. **W**E proceed to those Matters of Tho't, which may be peculiarly call'd *Things*, not only in contradistinction to the particular Tho'ts employ'd about them, but to Tho't in general as being in their own Nature, not Tho'ts, but a far differing kind of Things, and shall begin this account with Beings themselves, and after proceed to their Appendages. Those Beings which furnish the Universe or World, are Spirits,

rits, distinct Bodies, and the compounds of these, or of both the sorts together: And,

§ 2. I. *Spirits* are indivisible, self-moving, penetrative Beings. These do consciously, and certainly know, that they *Think* (in all or some of the mentioned ways) that they are *pleas'd* or delighted, *pain'd* or troubled, do themselves *move*, and *move* other Things, and therefore cannot doubt of their own Existence, tho' it may be question'd as to some of them, whether or how far they may reflect upon it, or know themselves: Yet they, with others, may be known both that they *are*, and of what *sort*, together with their peculiar *Genius*, *Disposition*, and *Capacity*, by such *Operation* and *Effects* as we cannot reasonably ascribe, either to gross Matter or its finer Particles of whatever Make, or in whatsoever Circumstances, whether at Rest or in Motion, Single or Combin'd, in this or that Position, &c.

§ 3. And whereas *Scripture* has appear'd so undeniably true by an agreeable course of Things, particularly in the fulfilling of its Prophecies, we may well be allow'd to confirm our selves from it, as to the being of God, good and bad Angels, the Souls of Men, &c. and also thence to inform our selves farther about them: But the Beings which appear to lie more open to us, and with which we are more conversant in our present State are

§ 4. II. *Bodies*, which are (at least in Conception) divisible and of themselves inactive, nor can penetrate one another, whilst they are all penetrated by that infinite Spirit, in whom we live, and move, and have our Being, whether they be so minute as to escape the naked Eye, or sufficiently large to be observ'd by it, either distinctly or confus'dly.

§ 5. Bodies that are of a competent bigness may be *felt* by us as heavy or pressing hard; or light, whose pressure we scarcely perceive; as hard, soft, moist, dry, hot, cold, &c. and they may give us Pain or Pleasure as they are suited or unsuited to the Make and temper of our Bodies. Some of them may also be *tasted* by the Tongue and Palate, as sweet, bitter, sharp, &c. And some do affect the Nostrils in their near approach by invisible Particles issuing from them, agreeably or disagreeably, as sweet, or stinking, musty, &c. Some Bodies being struck, are so tremulously moved, and do so move the Air, as that striking upon the Drum of our Ear, it is perceiv'd in what we call Sound, as acute, or grave, pleasant or unpleasant, inarticulate or formed into Letters, Syllables, Words, &c.

§ 6. But

§ 6. But *Sight* gives us the most particular discovery of Bodies, especially by the help of Glasses, and here we may first observe the general *Shew* or Appearance, either by that *Light* which some Bodies do of themselves afford, or which shines upon them from some other, and which they reflect to our Eye; By means whereof we may observe their *Shape* or *Figure*; their *size* and bigness (if we make due allowance for its being lessned in appearance by its greater distance from us) as also their *hue* or colour, according as the Surface is variously disposed and reflects the Light; but the inward *Texture* or compofure of Particles is not so easily known, nor the *Pores* or small void spaces intermixed amongst them. There are also *Parts in Motion*, as the Spirits and Blood which are not *fast* or firmly joined, but *loose*, and may be easily separated from the rest of the Body, which may have, besides its natural covering, some accessory *Garb* (as Cloaths, Armour, &c.) and not only the whole have this or that different *Site* or placing in respect of other Things about it, but also its parts may be variously placed one to another, as in standing, sitting, kneeling, lying, &c.

§ 7. III. As to *Compounds*, Bodies are generally such: and tho' some are more simple, uniform and similar than others, yet ev'n these are really compounded of Particles or little Bodies into which they may be resolv'd. But what is here design'd, is either those works of Art which are *made* up of Bodies plainly distinct, and less curiously join'd, or those natural Beings which are *made* of Spirit, or Soul and Body vitally united so, as that the Soul not only actuates the Body, but is sensibly affected by or through it; they are *unmade* or dissolv'd when the organized Body is rendred unfit for the uses of Life, and is thereupon deserted by the Soul, which in animated Brutes may, perhaps, according to the Order of Nature then cease to be, or may be removed to animate the Embrio of some other Brute.

§ 8. To these three Kinds (Spirits, Bodies, and Compounds) all Natural and Artificial Beings are reducible, and tho' I cannot here descend to their lowest *Sorts*, yet I may touch upon some of the higher, together with their more considerable *Parts*, principal *Marks*, and Characters, and the chief *Appendages* belonging to them, in treating briefly of the Works of Nature, those of Creatures, and of Divine Providence, and also of some considerable Humane Affairs, Inquiries to be made, and Points to be specially attended to, with general intimations how the account may be farther carried on.

§ 9. As to the Works of Nature, it is observ'd by the
justly

justly celebrated Author of the *Principia Mathematica*; that the several inanimate Bodies of this visible World are mutually attracted by each other; or do gravitate and *incline* towards each other, in proportion to their Bulk and Distance; so much the more as the former is greater and the other less; that is, according to the Cubes of their Diameters, which give the proportion of the Matter they contain, (supposing them equally dense or compact) and the Squares of their Distances, the increase of which does accordingly lessen their Gravitation. This Natural Conatus or Propension, communicated by the Divine Power and Wisdom, may seem to determine the respective places of the several parts of the Universe, particularly the *Orbs* of the heavenly Bodies with their various *Motions* and the *Lines* wherein they move as that admirable Treatise shews.

§ 10. We may here consider the several *Heavens*; that above the Stars, and *those* wherein they move in higher and lower Spheres (reserving that below the Moon to the following Head): *Who*, or what Inhabitants there may be in any of them. The differing *Magnitudes* of Stars, as they appear to us, with those in the milky Way, which cannot be distinctly seen without a Telescope; such as are not *form'd* into Constellations, and those which are, being long since call'd by the *Names* of *Arcturus*, *Orion*, &c. importing what they no ways resemble; yet from thence it might seem Judicial Astrology has taken the occasion to ascribe to them and the Planets such or such *feigned Powers*, as of rendring those who are born when they were in the Ascendant, and in such position, either good or bad, happy or unhappy, and of discovering other particular Secrets. The most noted Constellations are those of the *Twelve Signs*, more commonly known and spoken of than the rest, *viz.* Aries, Taurus, Gemini, Cancer, Leo, Virgo, Libra, Scorpio, Sagittarius, Capricorn, Aquarius and Pisces, which lie in the Eccleptick or that Line, which the Sun is conceived to describe by his yearly Course (if it be indeed he that moves) Anciently beginning with the first Degree of Aries upon the Equinoctial Day; but in a long tract of Time Aries, with all the other Constellations, have very *slowly gone backward*; so that now the Sun is enter'd upon *Taurus*, when the Days and Nights are made equal.

§ 11. The supposed Motion of the Heavens implies two opposite Points call'd *Poles*, on which they turn; the North Pole, which appears to us being near the hindmost Star in the Tail of the little Bear, thence call'd the Polar Star. There are also higher and lower *Orbs*, conceiv'd, to answer the
greater

greater and less distance of the several Planets from us; as also the *Points*, wherein they are farthest North or South, and seem to be Stationary, not moving observably Northward or Southward for some time; whence they are afterwards, plainly returning back again towards the North or South, from whence they came; and that are all this while proceeding really onward in their place or course; and do every day appear upon the same *Meridian or Southern-line* of this or that place, near the time, and not far from the Spot, in which they were seen the foregoing Day, and each of the Planets recovers again the same most Northernly Point, it had before, at a set and certain Period: Thus the *Moon* does after Twelve Lunar Months, with 11 Days towards the thirteenth, which Number is the first Epact after the Sun and Moon have set out together, as 22 is the 2d, and 33 would be the 3d, but thirty being set aside, as making a full Month, only 3 is retain'd, so that the 4th Epact is 14, the 5th 25, the 6th 6, the 7th 17, and so on till in a Course of 19 Years (the Cycle of the Moon) it come to be again 11, as at first; but there is besides 5 Hours, 12 Minutes to be added to the 365 days of the Year to finish the Sun's Course, which piece of a day does every fourth Year make up near another day to be added to the Leap Year, but not being fully a Day, the Account in length of Time comes to need rectifying, which has given Occasion to the New Stile going now 11 days before ours.

§ 12. The Moon has an Epicycle (or smaller Circle upon her greater Orbit) in which she is mostly a little beside the Sun in her New, and beside the interposing shadow of the Earth, when she is full; that she might not Eclipse the Sun every New, nor be eclipsed by that Shadow, every Full, to which she returns again thro' all her differing Forms after 29 Days, 12 Hours and 3 quarters, which is the Lunar Month, and what they call her Synodical Period.

§ 13. Saturn, the highest of the Planets, is observed by the Telescope to be girt or encompassed about at some distance with a bright Arch or Circle, and to have five smaller Planets, call'd his Satellites, or Guards (which are conceiv'd to be as Moons) attending him; his Period is 30 Years, or 10950 days: Jupiter, the next Planet, has four, which accompany him in his Course of 12 Years; Mars requires to go thro' his almost 2 Years; Venus performs hers in 224 days and two thirds; and Mercury (which is nearest to the Sun) finishes his in less than a quarter of a Year.

§ 14. *Comets* are but rarely seen, and it is matter of curious and difficult Enquiry, *what* they may probably be, how made to appear with such kind of Hair (as they call it) or Beards or Trains, *what Motion* they have; *whence* they set out, and *whither* they retire, if they were before in Being, and continue after they cease to appear to us; and finally, *whether* or no they may be designed to forehew any great Events approaching.

§ 15. Below the Moon there may be first *Aether* or purer Air, and then what is *grosser* and more suited to the Creatures which live and *fly* in it, whether such as have *Feathers*, or only Wings of *Skin* (as Bats, Flies, &c.) Here are the dryer earthy *Fogs*, dewy *Mists*, and less discerned *Steams* or *Vapours*, which the *Heat* of the Sun-Beams darted upon the Water or moist Land *forces* up till meeting with a *Colder* Air above (where the Sun's reflected Rays are weaker) they are *condensed* so as to become *Clouds*, which are driven by the *variable* or the more *stated* Winds that blow at certain times in such or such parts of the Ocean (being probably the rarifi'd and *thin'd* Air *shooting* out as it can find passage and room). There may be not only watry but *Nitrous* and *Sulphureous* Particles therewith mixt, which taking *fire* by some rapid Motion, striking them one against another, may (somewhat like Gunpowder) flash out in *Lightning*, rending the Clouds and Air, and causing them, as it were, to roar and *roll* along in *Thunder*: But *Rain* may easily be conceiv'd, as it oftner does, to proceed from the compression of Watry Vapours, and *thin'd* becoming thence too heavy for the Air any longer to support, which then must fall in Rain; unless its dewy Particles being *frozen* in passing the cold middle Region of the Air turn to Snow, or its bigger drops to *Hail*; and that what should be a Morning-dew is also by Cold turned to *Hoar-frost*.

§ 16. What we commonly call *shooting* or *falling Stars*, *Ignes fatui*, and the like *Night-Fires* are probably nothing but some *oily* or *sulphureous* Vapours, drawn from fat and fenny Ground) which being laid as a kind of Train in the Air do by Motion take Fire and *run* or dance along (according as the Train lay) till it be spent. The *Beams* of Light being reflected (as it seems likely) from a number of watry or icie Particles in the Air; as also variously intermixed and interwoven with each other by a manifold Refraction, produce *Halos* or party Colour'd Circles about the Sun or Moon, as also *Rainbows*, and the Appearance of divers *Suns* or *Moons*.

§ 17. *Our Earth* has long been accounted as a kind of *Globe* or *Ball*, the highest Mountains being but trifling Inequalities, compar'd with the Dimension of about seven Thousand Miles Diameter: But upon later Observations and Consideration, it is rather thought to resemble a *Bowl*, being flatter near its Poles, and rising higher about its *Æquinoctial*, or the middle-most parts between them. But the great Question with some, is, whether or no it turn round its *Axis* once in 24 Hours, so fetching Day and leaving it by turning still onward towards the Sun, and from him Successively, and whether once a Year it do compass the Sun (as a fixed Center) still keeping its *Axis* constantly pointing towards the Pole-Star, whilst it proceeds thro' a vast Curve, which is not a just Circle, but Elliptical, so that it is one part of the Year nearer the Sun, and another part farther off; and yet so vast a compass must be only as a *Point* compar'd with the Starry Heaven, or otherwise the *Axis* of the Earth, being always parallel to itself must point beside the Poles of the Heaven when the Earth is on this or that side of her yearly Circuit.

§ 18. The *Clines*, or *Climates* are, one *torrid* between the two Tropicks, where the Sun is at one time of the Year just over head, and two *frozen* ones within the Polar Circles, at which they begin to have a day of twenty four Hours, and just under the Pole a day of six Months, and as long a Night: And lastly, Two *temperate* *Climates* or *Zones*, which lie betwixt those before mention'd; where the *longest Day* is less than 24 Hours, and so the *longest Night*. The *Sea* has differing Names, mostly according to the Countries on which it Borders: Some Shoars have been discover'd where the Land is yet *unknown*, (as the *Terra incognita Australis*, &c.) The *Earth* has its Hills and Mountains, Vallies and Plains, with Promontorys or Points running out into the Sea, this has its Bays running into the Land, also its Rocks and Sands with shallow Water: *Isles* are incompass'd with Sea, whilst *Continents* are large Tracts of Land, either not so bounded or not known to be. The four main parts of the World, *Europe*, *Asia*, *Africa* and *America*, lie so and so (as may be seen in general Maps) to each other, are so bounded on this and that side, have such and such Parts with their particular Boundaries: This or that place has such a *Latitude*, or lies so many Degrees (or 360th parts of its Meridian or North and South Line) wide of the *Æquinoctial*, and on the Northern or Southern side thereof: It has also such *Longitude* or has its Meridian so many Degrees remov'd from that which passes thro' the *Isles Azores* reckoning Eastward from thence upon the *Æquator*.

§ 19. *The Tide*, or flowing and Ebbing of the Sea is apprehended to be from the Tendency, or *Inclination* of it towards the Moon, which therefore rises where she is in the Meridian over it, while the *opposite* part of the Sea (being then about 7000 Miles farther from the Moon, and tending therefore less towards Her) *hangs back*; so as to be left rising also on that side at the same time; thus the Sea swells *twice* in the same place within 25 Hours; and it rises *higher* in the New and Full of the Moon, when she and the Earth are very near *in the same Line* with the Sun, towards whom the Sea does also gravitate or incline, but more weakly in regard of his greater distance; however *this* Tendency does now fall in with *that* to the Moon, so as to make the Spring-tides greater than those they call Neap-tides, when the Inclination of the Sea towards the Sun falls not in with that towards the Moon, but passes just *across it*, so as to draw away somewhat from the Tides to that Part, where the Sun is then distant a Quadrant (or quarter of a Circle) from the Moon. The Tide rises *highest* a little after the Autumnal *Equinox*, and again before the Vernal in the New and Full of the Moon; because the Water then inclines more strongly towards the Sun, as being *nearer it* in the Winter-perigæon, and when he is so near the *Equinoctial* Points; but then there are also the *lowest Ebbs* in the first and last Quarters of the Moon; because there is then a stronger Tendency of the Water towards the Sun (as being so much nearer) just *cross ways* to its Gravitation towards the Moon. 'Tis *High-Water* at Sea, where the Moon is over it in the Meridian (as it is at Noon-day, when we count it New, and at *Midnight* when we reckon it Full, but it reaches not *London-Bridge* till *three hours* after the Moons Southing, and is every day about *three Quarters* of an Hour later than it was the day before: But there are a great *many Things* which may make the Tide *earlier or later* in differing places, and may sometimes alter it, even in the same place, as at *London*; such as violent Winds and other Accidents, besides the distance from the Sea, the differing Make and lying of several Channels, the meeting and interfearing of Tides from several Parts, as particularly at *Tunking in China*, where there is no Tide when the Moon is near the Equinoctial; and at other times only one Flux and Reflux in 24 Hours.

§ 20. Some Countries (as *Africa*) have *Black Men*, whilst the generality living in cooler Parts are *White*: Some are *Rude*, Barbarous and Unpolish'd; whilst others have Learning and Arts flourishing amongst them: Some are *Heathens*,

thers, others Mahometans, Jews, Christians, Papists, Protestants, &c. some under absolute, others under limited Monarchy; others are States, &c. Some Countries have *Store*, not only for Use, Convenience and Pleasure, but to *Export* in the way of Merchandize: Yet most want something, either *Necessary*, or at least *Desirable*, which they are to fetch from abroad. *Ports* and Harbours for Shipping, where those of a considerable Burden may pass and lie safe, are a great Accommodation. Such Matters as are already mention'd, and those which follow (tho' they be natural Works of Nature) are to be enquir'd after, if we would acquaint our selves well with a Country; and to be treated, of if we would describe it, *viz.* What *Lakes*, Rivers and Bridges; what sort of *Land* or Soil; what Medicinal *Baths* or *Spaws*; what Towns, how Built; what publick, or other extraordinary Buildings; what Courts, and how order'd; what *Antiquities*, or what of later Fame; what sorts of *Provision*; what Fish and Fowl; what Cattle; what Insects, or other less considerable Creatures; what Reptiles, especially such as are more observable; what sort of Wild-Beasts or other Creatures for *Game*; what there may be which is *rare* to be found elsewhere, or strange in its Make, whether Natural or præternatural; *Nice* or Curious, either of the forementioned or following Kinds, *viz.* Of the several sorts of *Grain*, Shrubs, Trees, Fruits, Herbs, Drugs, Minerals, Metals, or Stones; In which we may consider how the Sorts agree, what is their most material *Difference*; what *Uses* they do or may serve; what *value* is there put upon them; what Methods there are of *getting* or procuring them, of *applying* them to service, or of turning them in any other way to Advantage, and what *Profit* may be made of them in this or that way.

§ 21. More particularly *Plants* and *Animals* are to be consider'd in the various Divisions and Degrees of less and greater Perfection, so as to observe what we may call the *Scale* of Nature, especially in this Noble Division thereof. And here we may consider how they are respectively *Organiz'd* or furnish'd, not only with differing Parts, but with Vessels and Instruments serving to the Animal or Vegetable Life; and particularly what *Difference* attends the observable *Analogy* or Correspondency betwixt Animals and Plants; as the *Head* of a living Creature, how far answering to the *Root* of a Tree, and yet how greatly differing from it: So the *Trunk* and *Limbs* of both; the Leaves and Rind to be compar'd with the *Skins* and Hair or Nails, as also the *Fibres* and

and Nerves on both sides : The *Sap* and *Chyle* which nourish the one and the other : The Seed and Fruit with Buds and Blossoms on the one hand ; the Eggs with Embrios forming in them, and the Coats which cover and supply them, on the other hand : What there is on one side and on the other, *-serving to take in* proper Nutriment, to fit and prepare it, to strain and separate what is unsuitable from what is suitable ; to pass away the former ; to convey and distribute the latter : what there is peculiarly, for using the Air, and circulating the Juices, and especially for the *Blood* in Animals, whose *Veins* return it so continually to the Heart, whence the *Arteries* receiv'd it. And *this* being so much the Band of the Animal Life, it ought to be consider'd, what has a tendency to render it *Bad* or *Good* ; as *e. gr.* the *Birth* or Constitution, thence deriv'd from Parents ; the *Air*, which ill or well agrees ; the *Food*, which is improper or proper ; the *Rest*, which is too little, too much, or well adjusted ; the *Motion* which may be unfit in the Sort or Measure, or both ways right ; *Tho's* spending or refreshing ; *skilful Applications*, or *Failure* therein, whether by defect, excess, or improper Means ; and finally, *Accidents*, which may externally befall us, Bruises, Cuts, Frights, &c. with the Consequences thereof ; all which may affect our Blood in a *Mechanical* way of working, according to the stated and fix'd Laws of Matter, Motion, &c. There are also in Animals, the *Flesh*, Bones, Joints, Guards, (such as Gristles, &c.) Ties, Ligaments, and Tendons, also the Muscles, and especially the *Brain* ; where, if the Soul be not lodg'd, yet it certainly has there and from thence those Animal Spirits which are of so *great Use*, even in our *Reasoning*, whilst we are in these Bodies, as well as for *Motion* and *Sense* ; these we appear to have in common with Brutes, however with the more perfect amongst them ; and somewhat very like Reason they seem to have in relation to sensible Things as well as we, but the Capacity of knowing God and enjoying him Eternally, is Mans chief and sure Preheminence above them.

C H A P. IV.

§ 1. **T**HUS we have taken some Account of the Works of Nature: As to those of *Creatures*, they all borrow from Nature the *Matter* they work upon, as well as the *Powers* by which they give it some differing Turn, and a new kind of Make or Manner, whether by *joining* or *disjoining*; putting Nature under some kind of *Force* or *Restraint*; making an *effectual Application* of Actives to Passives, as in placing a Wind-mill where the Wind is wont to blow frequently and freely. *Wax*, *Combs*, and *Honey*, are the known Produce of the industrious Bee; *Silk* of the Worm, which has its name from thence; *Cob-webs* are a nice and curious Production of the Spider: Divers Animals provide themselves Burroughs, as a kind of House in the Rock or Earth, and Birds do place and form their Nests with wonderful Contrivance.

§ 2. Man himself can scarcely match some of the mentioned Artificers at their peculiar Business; but then he outdoes them far in some other Works, and goes a much greater compass, as in devising and making *Glass* (especially as 'tis employ'd to assist the Eye in *Microscopes*, &c.) *Cloths*, *Armour*, &c. contriving and erecting admirable Buildings; Devising and preparing a very great Variety of Furniture and Utensils; dressing and ordering Fields, Gardens, Trees, and Food; Framing Machines of various kinds, and some of them for noble purposes (as the Press, Clocks, Watches, &c.) Studying and Writing useful Books, finding out and preparing effective Medicines; and in a word, providing himself with such kind of *Instruments* as may render his Working feasible, easie and accurate; or for Divertisement: All this in Man is plainly *Art*; but we cannot so certainly determine as to the other *Creatures* mention'd, whether they act with conscious Design and Contrivance, or are carry'd on as in a beaten Road by some kind of Natural *Instinct*, which we know not how to account for. But as to ourselves, it is certainly a great and requisite act of Prudence, when we are designing any more than ordinary Work, to consider well what *Thot* it may require, as also what Help, Matter, Labour and Cost; and what is the *Benefit* we propose from it; what Credit, Service or Profit to our selves or others; and thereupon to calculate, as well as we can, what *likelihoood* there may be of obtaining our Aim, and whether it would be like to *answer*, if we do.

§ 3. The

§ 3. The Works of *Providence* are in general God's Acting so or so towards his Creatures, and being most largely taken it comprehends also the withholding of his Influences from them: Tho' the Beings which are made, sustain'd, &c. have been reckoned Works of Nature, yet they are to be referr'd to Providence, as *made* at first in the extraordinary way of Creation, or since in that of Natural Production, and also as *sustain'd* in being or acting, as *redeem'd* and put under the more immediate Conduct and Government of Christ; as *us'd* or employ'd in the producing of Effects by second Causes; as *ru'd* by Influence, Direction or both; as *born* and suffer'd in the Contrariety and Opposition, which is still chargeable on some of them, or was however so long: All this, by and according to a most *powerful Will*, whereby God can do all that He actually Wills, or can will to do by a Will so *good*, so *Wise*, so *Just* as that he can only will what is *so*, and may serve to *such* purposes; so *fixt* as that he cannot alter or run counter to what he has *so* determin'd; but after all, there may well be Determinations and Procedures, of which we can give no other Account than the *Sovereign Will* of God, whatever Reasons he himself may have for them. And in these his Will cannot be concluded absolutely, or altogether, Absolute; but is certainly under the Conduct of his other infinite Perfections; and not less free for its being so; since 'tis the very Nature of Rational Liberty to follow what is reasonable.

§ 4. There are some *Works* of Providence which appear *Strange* and extraordinary, not only to the Ignorant, but to the knowing and skilful in such *Affairs*; and if they be of such a *Kind* as is not unbecoming God (especially when plainly suitable to his Goodness, Justice, Truth, &c.) and also are of a *Force Superior* to any that is oppos'd to vie with 'em, and that the *Design* to which they are directed, is not disagreeable (especially when 'tis plainly agreeable) to the Divine Perfections, we may safely look on them as true *Miracles* or singular Works of God, attesting the *Truths* of God: In some of these the Order of *Nature* is *inverted* (as when the Waters of the Sea were made to stand as a Wall, &c.) but common Providence *maintains* its more usual *Course*, therein also *fulfilling* God's Word according to the true *Meaning*, which may be known if it be duly consider'd, tho' not always according to the first Appearance, which some are apt to catch and run away with. And this is universally done, in the *Heavens*, (which afford us the promised Seasons of Seed-time and Harvest; Summer and Winter, Day and Night):

in the *Air* (particularly the Rainbow there, sufficiently frequent to keep up the Remembrance of God's Promise, that the World should be no more drown'd): as also in the *Water* and *Land* by a continued Series of innumerable instances of Promises, Threatnings, and other Declarations; particularly whilst *L* he produces its *Like* by Seed, Grafts, or Slips, and amongst Animals by what we may call *Eggs* either *laid* by some to be afterwards Hatch'd, or *retain'd* by others (which are term'd Viviparous, and bring forth what is actually Living) to be form'd in the Womb; and thus they are fruitful, and multiply, according to the Divine Benediction.

§ 5. Where *Lots* are us'd by any special Intimation of the Divine Will, they may be accounted *Sacred*, and to be under the disposal of a particular Providence: Yet they may have a *Civil* and ev'n *Ludicrous* Use, where such Matters cant be so well manag'd without them; but then we ought to look on them as order'd by a more common Providence, as many other Things are, which really follow the Natural Tendency of *Causes* less known or observ'd, and therefore seem to us no other than uncertain *Chances*: Which may also in some sort befall *Persons*, Families, Sacred and Civil Societies, together with the various Forms and Politics, or the Manner and Methods belonging to them; in respect of their *Rise*, or first Appearance, the *Turns* and Alterations passing upon them, as also their Falls and final Periods; all which may come to pass wholly or in part, either by more *Obvious Means* lying open to common or special Observation, or by some *Energies* and Influences that are *hid* from Humane Sight; as is the more inward Work of God in putting *restraints* upon the Spirits of Men by suggesting or enforcing fit Considerations or otherwise, or in *renewing* and restoring them to somewhat of the Divine Likeness (as habitual and abiding) as also in *moving* and exciting them to exert themselves, in guiding and assisting them; and when He does wisely, holily, and justly permit Men or Angels to take their own Evil Course, yet limiting and *over-ruling* it to serve some or other Purposes worthy of himself. Providence generally *Spare*s those who humble themselves for their Offences; but as to those who *harden* themselves in their Evil Courses, It sometimes deals with them in this World, to *bow* them to the Will of God, or *break* and destroy them by the Tokens of his just *Indignation*; such as Earth-quakes, Storms, Fire, Sword, Plague, with other Sickness, Dearth, or Scarcity, Inundations, &c.

§ 6. We may find in Sacred Writ, the only Account of the *Creation*, and the surest History of many other Admirable Scenes of Providence, especially in relation to the *Church of God*, together with *prophetical Discoveries*, some of them cleared up by their Accomplishments as the rest will also be in due time. Only some very few Points I shall here very briefly touch, leaving them with the rest to be gathered more certainly and fully from the Scriptures themselves, where we may learn how *Adam and Eve* (the common Parents of Mankind) were made, how seduc'd and led away to the eating of the forbidden Fruit; how they with *Theirs* (the Posterity Naturally springing from them) did thereby fall from an Holy and Happy State, under the Taint and Guilt of Sin, came to have the Sentence of Death upon them, with the Seeds thereof in them, and to be justly liable to the *Hellish* State of fixed Separation from God, good Angels and good Men, and to be shut up with the bad under a degree of Misery suited to their State, and Proportion'd to their Guilt: How the *Seed of the Woman* (by the more immediate Power of God, without the Man) has been *foreshewn* by Promises, Prophecies, Types, and prefiguring Institutions; how the Humane Nature of the Son of God has been *bruised*, and having by a most intire Obedience, ev'n to the accursed Death of the Cross, (thro' the Dignity of his Divine Person) repair'd the Honour of God and his violated Laws, was *raised* the third Day from his Grave, and after Forty Days, to Heaven, where, as Mediator, he is next to the Most High. Thro' him fallen Man may be freed, not from the Bonds of Duty (which as his Priviledge are some way made stronger upon him) but from being bound under a *Curse*, either for his past Offences, or to a future perfect Obedience, as also from the Dominion of Sin, the Sting of Death, and Danger of Hell, whatever Troubles and Chastenings may befall him (which will be blest'd to recover, secure and forward him) in his Passage to Heaven, whither he is certain to be *Advenc'd* at last in the way God has appointed, *viz.* That of Practical Believing, Penitential Amendment and sincere persevering Obedience according to the various Degrees of Light and Capacity Men have or may attain.

§ 7. We may farther observe how, thro' the *Word*, accompany'd with the *Spirit* of the Father and the Son, in his Miraculous Operations, together with his other Gifts and saving Graces, the *False Gods* of the Heathen World lost by Degrees the greatest part of their Adorers; their Oracles being struck Dumb, and their Temples for the greater part

demolished. And even the Mystical Worship and Ceremonies which God himself had appointed by *Moses*, having receiv'd their Accomplishment in our Saviour, and being render'd impracticable by the Destruction of *Jerusalem* and the Temple, which he had foretold, gave way to *Christianity*, which spread far and wide thro' the then known World, and farther since: And however neglected or oppos'd by remaining Heathens, obdurate Jews, deluded Mahometans, or Antichristian Romanists, yet it shall finally prevail according to Scriptural Prediction; which also acquaints us in how Glorious and awful a manner *Christ* shall come and judge those, who shall then be *Living* upon Earth (who shall not die, but be changed) and the *Dead*, whose rais'd Bodies shall be reunited to their Souls: How he shall dissolve this World, and the present Frame of Nature, *Crowning Saints* with everlasting Joy and Glory, *crushing* the guilty Head of the Serpent and all his wicked Adherents with an endless insupportable Vengeance.

§ 8. I now proceed to some Account of *Humane Affairs*, and here the grand Enquiry may justly be, What is *Man's chief st Good*? Whether it be *Health*, or *Stores* (an abundance of external Provision) or *Friends*, (whether otherwise unrelated, or related) or *Honours* (places of Dignity, or Marks of Esteem, real or supposed) or *Ease* (freedom from Toil, or Pain) or the various *Pleasures*, which either meer *Phantasy* creates, (as in imagining our selves to be what we are not, &c.) or *Sense* perceives, or the *Mind* conceives (as in Knowledge, &c.) or that it be *Virtue*, or diverse, or *all of these* together? But certainly the *Favour of God* must be indeed our chief Good, and it must be our main Concern to *secure* that, which will secure all other Things, that are indeed *good for us*; and enable us *well* to bear the *Evils*, we may not hope altogether to escape in this World; nor only so, but will turn the *worst Evils*, that befall us here to the greatest Advantage to us; and upon the whole make those Enjoyments sure, which are inconceivably *better* than all this World can afford us.

§ 9. 'Tis of great Importance, that we should know, and pursue the best and surest way of forming the *Judgment*, that it may rightly lead, and *Will* that it may readily follow such a Judgment, not only in general and distant Purposes or Resolves, but in particular Cases, when it comes to Practice; and likewise so to dispose the *Passions* (whether by Moral, Medicinal, or other Methods) that they may be under the Conduct of a Judgment and Will so form'd. And whereas we cannot hope for Perfection in this Life, nor should pretend to it, We may at once animate our Endeavours; and keep
down

down Presumption by considering, that Divine Goodness does on the account of our Saviour, and *that* alone can esteem our *sincere* Aim at Perfection, and Endeavours towards it to be *truly good* whilst they are not thoroughly *so*, nor can therefore bear the Eye of Stricter Justice; since there is somewhat wanting, that ought to be in them, or added, which ought not to be; and that so long they cannot claim Acceptance with God on their own Account, how well soever our Actions be *manag'd* in other respects, or on our account, how well soever we might carry our selves in other Points; for 'tis plain we owe all *this*, and *that* besides, which is otherways wanting.

§ 10. We ought to be well appriz'd, what *Mean* or Middle *that* is which *Prudence* (the great intellectual Virtue and Directress of Moral Actions) teaches from the Consideration of Persons and Things with the *Circumstances* attending, foregoing, or following, and especially from those important Enquiries; What are the various *Ends* we may well propose to our selves in this or that Action, Which are the *best* of them when we can't reach them all, and by what means or in what way we may reasonably hope *best* to reach those which are really the *best*; How it may be most fully done, and at the same time most frugally, with the least expence of Time, Cost, &c. How the Mean is to be kept in our acting without straitning the Practice of *Virtue*, and infringing the *Happiness* we might attain by a more Heroic Exercise thereof; for tho' we must not be prodigal, we cannot be too Liberal in a right and prudent way of giving, no more than we can *stand* too safe, or thrive too well by *devising* *Liberal Things*.

§ 11. *Moderation* must be duly plac'd, and is undoubtedly then a considerable Virtue, tho' Lukewarmness be not so in a Matter that deserves our Zeal. We should generally moderate our Esteem of *Men and Things*, as this World commonly goes, and are the liker to do them *Justice* in so doing; but especially we should take care to set an *Humble and Modest Rate* upon our own Parts, Grace, Performances, Acquirements, Birth, Reputation, and Condition; not that we are to lessen our selves, but to consider how little Esteem is *due* to what is really so low in some or other, perhaps in many respects.

§ 12. As to the Virtues mention'd, and the greater Number which follow, it greatly concerns us, not only to know them, but to know how we may hope to come by them; What kind of *Tho't* and Considerations we should use, how we should *Pray*, and how conduct our selves in re-

spect of Faith, Hope, Fear, Care, Food, Physic, Business, Expences, &c. as also what sort of Company we should keep, that we may learn to be Contented with what we have, and with our State, not Covetous or Ambitious; *Frugal*, not wasting what may well be sav'd, not Lavish or Profuse; *Temperate*, in respect of Meat, Drink, Sleep, Recreations, &c. not Luxurious or indulging to Appetite, Ease, or Pleasure; *Chast*, not loosing either Body or Mind to any thing irregular or excessive, in what relates to this or that Sex; *Fix'd* and Constant in what is right and good, not wavering and unsettled; *Watchful* and Observant, not heedless or unwary; *Industrious*, not slothful or trifling; *Patient*, not fretful, in bearing Evils, or hasty in the desire of Good; *Bold*, to follow a just call into Dangers and Difficulties; neither Timorous and diffident on the one hand; nor rash and presumptuous on the other; *Brave*, as detesting what is Base, Sordid or Treacherous; *Pious*, as having the highest Veneration for God, with a just and affectionate Regard for our Parents and Country; *Kind*, wishing well to others, rejoicing in their Prosperity, and condoling their Troubles; *Meek*, not easily provoked, or immoderately Angry; *Courteous*, having a due regard even for our Inferiors, and expressing it in our receiving of others and Converse with them; *Faithful*, carefully answering the Trust reposed in us; *True*, using Words, or other agreed Signs, according to their genuine Meaning; not expressing our selves otherwise than we think, and especially that we do it, not with an injurious Aim or Tendency.

§ 13. We should farther endeavour to have a largeness of Mind, a somewhat more than Publick Spirit, an universal Concern for the good of Mankind; as also an *Impartial* Upright Mind, not to be bias'd by any Considerations or Regards that enter not the Merits of a Cause; but at the same time, a Mind strongly propending and inclin'd to what is *Fit* or *becoming* us in our Place, Station and Condition; *Grateful*, and expressive of the Sense we really have of Kindness receiv'd; so as it should be to us (in some Cases) a piece of Self-denial, not to make a Return even beyond what we may be well Capable of; and yet our Inclination should go farther to what is *Free* and unprompted, to shew Kindness where we are not so preoblig'd, and without the Mercenary Aim of drawing more again, or as much from others; but we may by no Means fail of being constantly and unalterably bent to the rendering to every one what is his respective *Due*, to this we must be nevertheless inclin'd, even tho' we be disabled; but as to the Justice of punishing, it must only respect some good

good End to be that way pursu'd, otherwise *Mercy* should triumph over strict and rigorous *Justice*; and to *that* we should strongly incline as to a Point of *Justice*, forgiving as those who our selves need forgiveness; Giving, as those, who account it an indeterminate kind of *Due*; pitying however and helping where we can, as we our selves would and might justly expect from others, were the Tables turn'd betwixt us and those in *Affliction*.

§ 14. There have been, and yet are *Laws* which may be peculiarly called *God's Laws*, either, as expressing his positive Will; or however, as being specially revealed by him; some of which are also the *Laws of Nature*, as being imply'd in the *Nature*, *Relations*, and *Condition* of *Persons* and *Things*; and amongst these, some concern *Nations* one towards another, and are in a manner tacitely agreed amongst them: But there are also *Laws* peculiar to this and that *Realm*, *Time*, and particular *Place*; and besides what may be written, there are oft *unwritten Rules*, by which Courts proceed, and *Customs* which are a kind of *Common*, as the others are *Statute Law*: All refer to some or other *Case*, or *Set of Circumstances*, and *command* or *forbid* something, appoint publick *Taxes*, are enforced with certain *Pains* and *Penalties*, do sometimes contain *Grants*, *Immunities*, or *Privileges*, and always imply some *Benefits* upon the observing of them. For applying the general *Laws* to particular *Cases* there are *Courts of Judicature* (*Ecclesiastical* and *Civil*), *Terms* or set *Times* of trying *Causes* betwixt *Parties* (*Complainant* or *Plaintiff* and *Defendant*) upon *Proof* made by *Writings* and *Oaths*: *Bills of Indictment*, (or of *Petition* in *Chancery*) as also *Declarations* are *Exhibited*, *Pleas* and *Answers* made or given in; and *Writs* (or *Authoritative Writings*) issu'd out; *Forms* of *Law* and *Formalities* observ'd; *Covenants* of two or more *Parts* with their *Causes*, *Considerations*, *Conditions*, and *Limitations*, made, *Executed*, *Witnessed*, *Pleaded*; *Wills* (*viz*, such are the last *Will* and *Testament* of this or that *Person* deceased, and who had power to make and ordain them) prov'd and enter'd, *Letters of Administration* thereupon taken out: *Gifts* and *Legacies* paid after reasonable *Funeral Expences* and real *Debts*, which may be secur'd with *Personal Security* (as *Notes*, *Bonds*, &c.) or *Real* (as *Mortgages*, &c.)

§ 15. *Summons* (by *Warrant*, *Citation*, *Subpæna*, or otherwise) is given: Upon an *Arrest*, the *Person* must satisfy the *Demand*, or go to *Prison*, or put in *Bail* to answer the *Suit* and stand *Trial*; but *Trials* do also refer to *Criminal* (as

(as well as *Nisi prius*) Causes; and there are those who *pre-*
side as Judges, *assist* as Council, *attend* as Officers, Attor-
 neys, Solicitors, Proctors, &c. besides the Grand Jury of
 17, 12 of which must agree to find and bring in an Indi-
 cument as *Billa vera*, or throw it out by returning *Ignoramus* upon
 it: But the Petty Jury of 12 must all agree in their Verdict
 to *clear* or *cast* the Prisoner, who yet in some Cases may Pray
 and be admitted to the Benefit of his Clergy to *Read*, as the
 Ordinary shall appoint, and thereupon to come off with his
 Life, tho' not altogether without Penishment. The Judge
Condemns, and may for some short limited time *Reprieve*,
 but to do this longer, or to *Pard n*, belongs to the Sovereign;
 to *inflict* or execute the Sentence to the Sheriff and his under
 Officers. In Actions a certain *Dammage* is laid or try'd for,
 with *Costs* of Suit, but only so much of either *giv'n* upon
 carrying the Cause, as is tho't Reasonable. Justice ought not
 to be *delay'd*, much less *den'd*, as possibly it may sometimes
 be, thro' Favour, Ill-will, or upon Interest. The Letter of
 the Law is to be in some Cases *soften'd*, in others *supply'd* by
Equity, but both as near as can be according to what may
 be fairly suppos'd agreeable to the Mind of the Legislature, if
 such Case had been before them, and the Procedure in Chan-
 cery is to be regulated by some known Rules and Methods.

§ 16. The more Publick Affairs and Concernments of
 Civil Societies are the common *Liberties* (or a due Freedom
 of acting in Secular or Spiritual Matters) and *Properties* (or
 every ones just Claim and Possession to be secur'd and peace-
 ably enjoy'd) for which purposes *Authority* is by common
 Agreement or Submission lodg'd in some or other Hand or
 Hands. Some only *claim*, but enjoy not the Exercise of it,
 or may, perhaps, have it, when they have not a rightful and
 lawful Claim thereto: Some have the Sovereign or Supreme,
 others only a *Subordinate* Authority, and may be said to *serve*
 the Publick in Ecclesiastical or Civil Affairs, in such particu-
 lar *Station* and Degree: As to each of these it may be con-
 sider'd how they are *made* or constituted (by Descent, Choice
 or otherways; what the *Names* and Titles belonging to
 them; what *Marks* and Badges of their Dignity or Place;
 what *Work*, Business or Charge lies upon them; what the
Expence of such a Station, and what *Revenue* to Support it;
 what stated *Pay*, Salarys and *Perquisites*, or what *Fee* appoin-
 ted, usually given, or commonly expected.

§ 17. *Leagues* are made betwixt Sovereign Powers, and sometimes have other Princes as *Guarantees* to secure the Performance. *Treaties* may be set on foot, and carry'd on in reference to some particular Agreements, ev'n in a State of War: *Embassies* are a sort of solemn Messages from one Sovereign Power to another: *Peace* is the quiet Enjoyment of our Liberties and Properties, and is often the Result of an Agreement for that Purpose, which gives an Opportunity and Security to *Traffick* or Trade betwixt the Countries so agreed. *Arms* or *War*, suppose the Peace broken by Injuries done, and that thereupon War is denounc'd or proclaim'd; *Men* rais'd and list'd (*i. e.* common Soldiers under Superior and Subordinate Officers) *Money* provided, together with *Stores* of Arms, Ammunition and Provisions, *Forts*, or Fortifications, *Camps* to accommodate and secure Armies in the Field, *Ships* or Men of War with their Furniture: Action is either *Fights* and Skirmishes or *Sieges* with Trenches, Mines, Countermines, Batteries, &c. nor is all to be done in a more open way, but much by *Wiles* and *Stratagems* in order to the easier and surer *Victory* which yet is not wont to be carry'd without somewhat of *Harms* and *Losses* ev'n on the Conquering side, but they are commonly much greater on the other.

§ 18. *Mens* private *Dealings* with each other in relation to matters of Property may be either *fair*, as they themselves would be dealt withal; or *foul* in the way of *Tricking*; or downright *false* and deceitful, whether in *Buying* or *selling* for Money, or in *Bartering* and changing away one Thing for another; when *Trust* or *Credit* is given, 'tis but reasonable somewhat be allowed for the *Use* of the Money, of which diverse *Returns* might perhaps have been made, whilst it lay dead and unimprov'd: *Notes*, *Bills*, or other Payments may be abated, according to *Discount*, so much as the Interest comes to, when they are paid before they come due: *Sure Pay*, tho' it be slow, may be born; but *Ready-Money* is to be chosen, tho' with less Profit. The *Time* for which Apprentices are *Bound*, must either be *serv'd* out, or *giv'n* in order to their being *Free*: Journey-men and other Servants may be *hir'd*, as also Lodgings, Houses, Horses, &c. Publick Revenues are sometimes *Farm'd* at a certain yearly Rate, as Land also is, which is commonly let for some Term of Years, or for *Lives*; where besides *Harriots*, or the best quick Goods to be given to the Land-Lord upon the falling of a Life, there is a *Fine* or present Summ to be paid to him, at the taking or renewing of a *Lease*; but then the yearly *Rent* ought to be proportionably Easier: A *Free-hold* Estate should be

be wholly Rent-free ; when as Copy-hold pays somewhat to the Lord of the Mannor ; and with us, tho' it exceed Forty Shillings a Year, yet it does not usually qualifie to Vote for a Member of Parliament. *Wagers* laid upon this or that Point are *Won*, when it proves according to what was laid upon ; *lost* if otherwise. Neglected Payments run Men into *Arrears*.

§ 19. *Wares*, or Commodities are vended, either by *Whole-Sale* in larger Quantities, or by *Retail* in smaller ; and may be *bad* or faulty, *good*, right, and as they ought to be, or the *best* of the sort, and *cheap* or *dear*, as there is greater or less Plenty, more or less Demand for them ; and however it be, the *Weight*, or *Measure*, or *Tale*, and Number ought to be what is pretended to, and agreed upon. *Partners* join their Stocks, bear their Charges in common, and share the Product according to Agreement ; *Accounts* of what is disbursed, owing to us, or received by us ought to be carefully kept, cast up, and *stated* at fit Seasons, and to be brought to a clear Result or *Ballance*, so as we may know what is *gain'd* or *lost* upon the Whole ; and what lies in *Danger* to be lost : We may *ensure* Houses in Case of Fire, also Ships and Merchandize for a *Premium* of so much in the Hundred : Stock, or the Interest we have or are suppos'd to have in this or that Bank or Company, may be sold in *Stock-jobbing*, as also parts of Mines, &c. In case of *their* Breaking, with whom we Deal, so as they are not able to discharge the Whole, we may *Compound*, and take a part instead of it, or use *Forbearance*, and allow them farther Time for Payment.

C H A P. V.

§ 1. *S KILL*, and good Management may be *learnt* by the By, even in Points, that are not solemnly or professedly *Taught*, as by observing and imitating *Patterns* and Examples, as also by aiming and *Practising* ; but good *Rules* and Directions, when they can be had, may together with those expedite and forward our Learning, whether it be alone, or in Company, and perhaps at School : In some or other of the mentioned ways, Men come to *Read*, *Write*, cast Accounts, Measure, Sail, Work this or that Manufacture, Trade in Buying and Selling, Sing and Play, Dance, Fence and Ride with Skill ; as also to be vers'd in Games, in
Tongues,

Tongues; in learned Sciences and Arts; and to get the way of *Teaching* others; of *Reading* with Advantage by themselves, and to others; of *Noting*, *Extracting*, common placing, &c. of ordering well their course of *Studies*, of *Praying* regularly and usefully with others; of *Discourfing* to them or *Disputing* with them; of *Civil Behaviour*, and good Manners; of regulating the *Voice*, together with the *Gesture* in *Speaking*; as likewise of *Conducting* our felves in refpect of our Judgment, Will, Affections, Expreffions, Company, Recreations, Expences, &c. And,

§ 2. Men may alfo be led into the *Care and Conduct* of the Church, or any Sacred Society, the State or Civil Affairs; An Army, or Navy, a Company, or Incorporation, a particular Buſineſs and ſpecial Undertaking, ſome or other Perſon (as a Guardian, Tutor, &c.) or a Family, as the Head and Governour of it; And finally (to inſtance no farther) the differing *Practice* in *Law*, as a Judge on the Bench, Council at the Bar, or in his Chamber, a Clerk in Chancery, Clerk of the Peace, &c. a Solicitor, Attorney, &c. and in *Phyſick*, that of a Doctor or an Apothecary; in *Surgery*, thoſe of Bone-ſetting, Diſmembring, Curing Hurts, &c. Now in all ſorts of Buſineſs, the *Skill* and *Care* and *Faithfulneſs*, which have approv'd themſelves upon the moſt conſiderable *Trial*, do ſtrongly recommend a Perſon, as fit to be employ'd; and yet ſome who have not as yet had the Time or Opportunity of ſo far approving themſelves, can, and will make up, in a more *diligent Attendance*, what might be farther deſir'd in ſome other reſpects.

§ 3. *Number and Meaſure* (which are the Buſineſs of Mathematicks, whether pure or mixt) deſerve and require a ſpecial Conſideration, ev'n as they may be join'd with Sounds, and Words, and particularly with the *Notes* of Muſick, higher and lower; the *Parts*, as harmonious or diſcordant; *Airs* of all ſorts, whether flat or ſharp (according to their Key, or manner of Cloſing, in a greater or leſſer Third) ſoft or loud; And finally the *Time* as it is common or Triple, ſwifter or ſlower, with Reſts and Fuges or without. Number and Meaſure are likewise apply'd to *Time* in the more uſual Senſe, as alſo to *Weight*, and very remarkably to *Motion*, in reſpect of what it is, that *drives* or *draws* (whether it be of a fixed unaltering Meaſure, or that in driving it Shrinks, and Stretches in drawing); what *Stops* or *Guides*; what *takes* off from the Motion by taking part of it, or *turns* and reflects it (whether that be yielding or not, and how far); as alſo in reſpect of the *Force* moving, what degrees it has, the *Body*
mov'd

meas'd, of what Weight and Figure; and the Medium or Way how far it is, and how fill'd: The *Laws of Motion* are determin'd by the Number of Degrees in the Force and Weight, and by the Measure of Bodies in other Respects: But Number and Measure are yet more evidently apply'd to *Sight* in Opticks; to the Sun, and Stars, and Dials fitted to them, in Astronomy; to the Land and Sea, in Maps and Charts, as also in Travelling and Sailing; to the directing of Machines, Fortifications, Architecture, and in a Word to whatsoever is any ways affected with *more* and *less*, so as to be more so, or less so than somewhat else with which it may be compar'd.

§ 4. Number and Measure are altogether *abstracted*; when we attend only to those Attributes, whatever be the Subjects of them; as when, in *Arithmetick*, we read into Words what is writ in Figures, or Note or set down in these, what is given in those; when we Subtract, Add, Multiply or Divide, whether Lines, Figures, Bodies, *Squares* (rising from the Multiplication of a Number by it self, as 3 by 3 makes 9) *Cubes* (from the farther Multiplication of the same Number again by it self: So 9 by 3 makes 27) or *Ratio's*, i.e. the Proportion of Numbers, as when the first is so often contained in the second, as the third is in the fourth; or does so oft contain the 2d, as the 3d does the 4th; thus 3 is to 9, as 9 is to 27; or as 9 is to 3, so is 27 to 9, the *Quantity* being alike on both sides, i.e. three times containing, in this latter Instance; three times contained, in the former: But all this while we are ty'd to this or that particular Instance; as we likewise are in *Vulgar* and *Decimal Parts* or *Fractions*, and in the latter sort the parts are always so many Tenth's or Hundredths, or Thousandths, or Ten-thousandths, &c.


§ 5. And we are still ty'd to particulars in the Making

* Geometrically, being so often contain'd, as 1 is in 10	Numbers.	Logarithm.	Arithmetically, as differing each from other by 1.000,000
	As	and as	
	1	0.000,000	
	is to	is to	
	10	1.000,000	
	so is this to	so is this to	
	100	2.000,000	
	and this to	and this to	
	1000	3.000,000	
	and this to	and this to	
	10000	4.000,000	
	&c. *	&c.	

and Using of *Logarithm-Sines*, *Tangents* and *Numbers* as we have them in *Brigg's* and other printed Tables. Logarithms proceed in what they call *Arithmetical Proportion*, by fix *Differences*, answering to Numbers in *Geometrical Proportion*, or in that of *Quantity*; so that, whereas 10 times 10 is 100, and 10 times

100 is 1000; therefore if you give to 10 the Logarithm-Number 1.000,000, you must give to 100 the Logarithm 2.000,000, and to 1000 the Logarithm 3.000,000, as in the Margin: And hence you may, by the help of Tables prepar'd, *Multiply* two Numbers by *adding* the Logarithms assign'd to them in the Table; and then seeking out the Logarithm produc'd by Adding, in the Table, you will find against it the Number produc'd by the Multiplication of the giv'n Numbers: You may also divide a Number by *Subtracting* the Logarithm of the Divisor from its Logarithm, the Remainder will be the Logarithm of the Quotient sought. You may also extract the *Square Root* of any Number (so far as your Tables go) by *taking half* its Logarithm, which will be the Logarithm of its Square Root; as a *third* of the Logarithm of any Number will be the Logarithm of its *Cube Root*; thus, whereas 2.000,000 is the Logarithm of 100, its half 1.000,000 is the Logarithm of 10, the Square Root of 100; for ten Multiply'd by 10 is 100: And whereas 3.000,000 is the Logarithm of 1000, its third 1.000,000 is the Logarithm of 10, the Cube Root of 1000; for tentimes ten is 100, and ten times 100 is 1000.

§ 6. But if we would get out a general Point, we must go to *Geometry* or *Algebra*. As if, for Instance, it were to be shewn, that a straight Line falling, in any manner whatever, upon another straight Line, will make two Angles with it, which taken together shall be equal to 2 Right Angles: The *Geometrical Demonstration* of this general Theorem (or *Speculative Point*) will arise from the *Definitions* of an Angle, and of a Right one; from the *Demand and Grant* (as being, what cannot be deny'd) that such a Line be made, or suppos'd to be, at right Angles with that, on which the given Line fell; and finally from the *Self-evident Axiom*, that all the Parts taken together are equal to the whole. Let the Line *ab*, in the annexed Scheme, fall at adventure upon *cd*; I say, that the two Angles it makes therewith are equal to two right Angles: For if the prick'd Line *eb* is made, or suppos'd to be, at right Angles with *cd* (*i. e.* that the Angle toward *c* is equal to that towards *d*) the Angle *f* will be it self one right Angle, and the Angles *g* and *h* do together make up another (being all its parts) and therefore the Angles which *ab* made with *cd* (that is *b* on one side and *a* on the other) were together equal to two right ones *Q. E. D.*



§ 7. *Algebra* may likewise help us to general Points and Resolutions, whilst it teaches to put differing Marks, (commonly Letters) for the several Terms (usually Consonants for those, that are known, and Vowels for the unknown) and then to state the Matter in hand, according to its Tenor, with those Marks instead of the particular Quantities thereby design'd; drawing out *Equations*, substituting one Equal in the place of another, working *Ratios* into an Equation by multiplying the Terms, which are *so many* times greater, by those, which are *as many* times less, than their Fellows respectively, and thus the Product of the Extremes (or first and last Terms) will equal *that* of the mean or middle Terms, *i. e.* the second and third; whenever they are so placed (whether Originally or by Transposition, or otherwise) that the first is to the second, as the third is to the fourth, either containing its Corresponding Term, or contained by it as many times on the one hand as on the other.

§ 8. *Algebra* farther shows, how we may reason on from one Placing of proportional Terms, and also from one Equation to another, in the way of *transposing*, or putting that quantity, which stands with a *Plus* (or \dagger the Note of Addition) on one side of the Equation, to stand on the other with a *Minus* (or $-$ the Note of Substraction); and this may be carry'd on to the placing of all the Terms on one side, as $=$ (Equal to) a , on the other; there may be likewise an *Expunging*, or striking out of like Quantities, when they stand on one side with \dagger , and on the other with $-$; also if there be one or more Quantities divided by any Quantity, as b by a (which is thus express'd $\frac{b}{a}$) all the other Quantities may be multiply'd by that Divisor, which is express'd by the Sign \times , put betwixt the Marks, (thus $d \times a$ is d multiply'd by a) or understood, whenever divers Marks are put together without any Sign betwixt them, and thus da is d multiply'd by a : There are many other Rules and Methods for deducing one Equal from another, till we may find somewhat *known* on one side equal to what is unknown and sought, on the other; and however, that the Matter be brought to such a State, as has a genetal *Canon*, or Method directed for the Resolution of it.

§ 9. It must here suffice to instance in the Foundation, and Working of the Golden Rule, or Rule of Three, which is of so common use in Business. Now let b, c, d , stand for three given Quantities; and the Question be this, what Quantity will bear a like Proportion to b , as c does to d , or
if

if d give c , what must b give? Put a for what answers, and the matter will stand thus, a is to b , as c is to d , and may be thus express'd, $a : b :: c : d$, therefore $a d = b c$ (that is the Product of the first and last Terms multiply'd together, is equal to that of the middle Terms); and therefore $\frac{b c}{d} = a$ (i. e. b multiply'd by c , and the Product divided by d , will give a for the Quotient): for if you multiply a by d , it will be as before, $a d$, and it's all one, as if you had divided $a d$ by d , for that $d a$ was found equal to $b c$. Now if d were 1 l. 5 s. (or 25 s.) and bought c i. e. 2½ Yards (or 5 half Yards) b , i. e. 5 l. (or 100 s.) will buy a , i. e. 20 half Yards, or ten Yards of the same Silk; for $b c$ (i. e. 100×5) = 500, and this divided by d , i. e. 25, will give 20 for a ; and $20 \times 25 = 500 = 100 \times 5$.

§ 10. Amongst Humane Affairs, *Language* is of no small Importance to us, particularly, as it may serve us, both to learn other things, and to teach them. We are concern'd therefore to know *what is the Tongue* spoken or written, because the same Word for *Sound* and *Writing* may have differing Senses in several Tongues, as *no* is, in *Latin*, *I Swim*; in *English* it only denies. We must also know *what the words are*, whether Substantives, Adjectives, Verbs, &c. *how us'd*, for what Idea; What their *Accidents* of Number, Case, Gender, Mood, Tense, &c; which the Nominative to the Verb, the Substantive to the Adjective, &c; What Cases are govern'd by such or such a Verb, or other part of Speech, &c: We may also critically enquire, how and whence the *Language Sprung*; what *Changes* it has undergone; how this or that may be justly *turn'd* or translated into such or such other Language.

§ 11. But in Words, that are suppos'd to be Coherent, the great Question must be, What is the *Sense*, or Meaning, and of *what Kind*? As whether it consist of one or more *Sentences*; whether they be *distinct* one from another, or conjoin'd; whether *intire* and absolute in themselves, or imperfect and depending upon somewhat understood, or express'd in what goes before, or follows after; whether this or that Point be *Self-evident*, or *granted*, or already *prov'd*, or such as *wants Proof*; whether the particular Sentence, or the continu'd Discourse be short or long, comparatively with some other, or with what it might, or should have been; whether it be *Dark* or *Clear*, as to its meaning and manner of Expression; *loose* or *close*, *Verbose* or *Concise* in more or fewer Words; whether it be *False* or *True* (or not apparently either); *Weak* and *Insignificant*, or *Wise* and *Instructive*; whether it be deliver'd in *proper and literal*, or *Figurative* Terms;

and whether it might be purposely done to render it less obvious to such as would not duly attend, or more to instruct and affect.

§ 12. What *Parts* or *Branches* a Discourse has; *what Points* (as Commas, Colons, &c.); *what Marks* (of Interrogation, Admiration, Sections, References, &c.); and *what Numbers* or *Figures*, especially that are set to the Divisions and Subdivisions; What this or that Clause *refers to*, and how; whether as *Question* or *Answer*; *Supposition*, or a Case put; *Motives to draw or deter*, *Proof*, to Convince or Confirm the Judgment, that it is or should be so; *Reason* to satisfy the Mind, whence it is so, or why it should be so; *Inference* to improve what was averr'd, or disprove what was only suppos'd; an *Elucidation*, or Opening; a *Similie* or *Resemblance* to illustrate the Thing, or affect the Persons we may be concerned with.

§ 13. But besides Language, and the usual way of writing it, there are some other *Signs* and Expressions of Tho't, as Characters, Pictures, Gestures, &c. And here we may consider of *what sort the Key* (or that which should lead us into the Sense) must be, that we may better seek out *what it is*, particularly for *Emblems* and *Figures* (which may be some Inscription, Usage, Likeness, &c.), for this or that *Short-hand* (some peculiar Alphabet, Symbolical Marks, &c.) and for *Cryptography*, somewhat specially agreed on before hand, betwixt or amongst the Parties concern'd.

§ 14. Thus there has been given some Account of a good Number of Things; but because very many Themes or Objects of Tho't have been ev'n designedly *pass'd by*, and that we may need much *more Light* as to those mention'd, than could well be given here, the following *Inquiries* may be put and pursu'd in fit Ways. *Whether* the Matter be at all, or *if so?* *Who*, or what Person, God, Angel, Fiend, or other Spirit, Man, Woman, Child? *What* Thing, of what Kind, Sort, &c. *Which* of the Kinds, Sorts, or Particulars? *Where*, in what Place or State? *Whence*, from what Place, Cause or Reason? *Whither*, to what Place, State, End or purpose? *Why*, for, or from what Reason? *When*, at what time? *How long*, for what time? *How*, in what Manner? *By whom*, what Person employ'd? *What Warrant*, Allowance or Authority? *What Right*, or Title to this or that? *Whereby*, by what Instrument or Means? *With whom*, in what Company, with what help? *What Count*, i. e. what Number or way of Numbring; what Reckoning or way of Beckoning (as from
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the Creation, or the Birth of our Lord, by the Old or New Stile, now eleven days before the Old: The Longitude Eastward from the Teneriff or the Azores, &c. *What Powers*, whether *Capacities* of being such or such, so or so influenc'd; or *Abilities* of bearing or doing this or that? *What Bent*, Inclination of, Will, or Tendency of Nature? *What Rest*, of the whole or part; Stiffness of Body, or Quietness and Satisfaction of Mind? *What Change*, what Motion of the whole or parts in or from their place; or what other Alteration? *What Relation* or Reference this Thing or Person has to others? *What Tie* or Obligation thence arising? How the Relation and Obligation might be *caus'd*, or what the Foundation of it? *How held* or continued? *How Null'd* or dissolv'd? *How fail'd*, as to what appertains thereto, or is thereupon Due? *How answer'd*, in either or both respects?

§ 15. What the Matter and Manner of what is *done*, *said*, *born* (endur'd or undergone) *had*, as belonging to this or that Person or Thing, or as possess'd by such Person, or finally *refer'd* to, either in thinking or speaking of them; more especially as to Persons, *What Habits* (what readier Powers or Propensions) we or others once had or now have, of *Virtue* (as before specify'd) or the contrary Vices, or of *Skill* (which do's not denominate morally Good or Bad) whether they be of the *Mind* as quickness of Apprehension, Invention, Memory, &c.) or of the *Tongue* in this or that manner of Speaking, Singing, &c. or of the *Feet* in Going, Running, Dancing, &c. of the *Hand* in Writing, Working, &c. How the Habit was *come by*; whether extraordinarily given or got in this or that way (as by Exercise, &c.) how it is or may be *kept*, *advanced*, *lessened*, *quite lost*; and if so, whether, and how to be *regain'd* and *recover'd*?

§ 16. As to Actions, or Undertakings, we may enquire what *leads* and induces, or at least goes before; what *attends* or accompanies; what has *ensu'd* in like Cases; *what do's* in the present, or certainly *must*, or probably *may*; or, at least, *possibly*: What Events (or other Things) are to be look'd on as *Common*, what as *Rare*, what as *Old*, or *New*, *Natural*, or *beside* the usual Course of Nature, what *against*, or *above* it. What this or that Persons *Judgment* or Sentiments are; what the *Inclinations* of his Will; what his Predominant or observable *Passions*, and whether they are strong and vehement, unruly or under Government: What the Things, which are *pleasing* and agreeable, or which are *grievous* to the Body, and *offend* the Mind; *in what* respect they are so, *whence* it comes to pass; what *Remedy* in the Case, or how it may best

be born; and what the *Recompence*; or Advantage which either is certain, or may accrue.

§ 17. Amongst all the Matters of Tho't (whenas we can't take in all, nor far pursue what we have;) We should *mainly bend* our Minds to what is more *Needful*, or like to be more *Useful* to our selves or others, and where we can't, perhaps, determine so well of that, we should however give a peculiar Attendance to what is in it self more *Excellent*: Now I have endeavour'd to single out some such Points in what here follows, *viz.*

§ 18. That we should, in what's our special and stated *Business*, Vie with those, who are the *Chief* in that way, and endeavour to equal or outdo them, if we can: That we go as far as well we may, in searching out the Nature of *Plants*, *Beasts*, and *Men*, especially as to their Production; also in what Way and by what Means they live, thrive, change and alter, fail or decay, and die at last: Likewise carefully to inform our selves about *Phantoms* and Apparitions by strictly examining the Accounts that go of them; and as to *Souls* in conjunction with the Body, and in their *separate State*; about good and evil *Angels*; but especially as to the *most High*, *viz.* the *Three*, that are *One*: Enquiring diligently into the Nature of this infinite, and those finite Beings, their widely differing State, (or Condition) Powers and Capacities; what they do, with what Aim and Design; particularly how far, and what way they do any of them, Concern themselves with Men, here on Earth; finally we should make it our great Study and Endeavour to be thoroughly acquainted with the *Super Tology*, in which the Wisest and Best, and *that* even among those, who differ in lesser Matters, are agreed, still bringing it to the *Divine Light* of Sacred Scripture; and in the Use of all fit Means within our Reach, depending on the *Divine Illumination*, (thence to draw out the best, i.e. the fullest, clearest, and most Efficacious) *Discovery*, what *Spirit*, what *Faith*, what *Course* of Tho'ts, Affections, Words and Actions will not fail to lead us up to celestial Thrones of inconceivable and Eternal Happiness.

§ 19. And now at last to supply and *fill up* the Account, which has been made as general and short, as the Matter could well bear: We may on any Special Occasion set our selves to observe, *what* this or that Point in the foregoing Summary *implies*, as comprized in it, or connected with it, and also *what* *to do* upon it, as being of like Nature with it, or lies in direct *Opposition* to it, and finally what may be drawn from any one, or more of the mentioned Particulars, as a

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Fiction, or Supposition by mental Division, Composition, or Alteration; or as a *farther Notion* by some higher Abstraction; or as a *Realitie* omitted, which yet has been, perhaps, one way or other Suggested, if not by any single Point, yet by the Conjunction of divers.

§ 20. And whereas Plants and Animals, with many other comprehensive Heads, have been here but very briefly touch'd, in the most general Way; They who would acquaint themselves with the differing Sorts, so as to know somewhat of their common, and distinguishing Characters, may have recourse to the elaborate Tables of Plants, Animals, &c. in that Learned and Ingenious *Essay towards a real Character and Philosophical Language*, by Dr. *Wilkins*. And they, who cannot reach so far, may somewhat enlarge their Acquaintance with Things, as well as Words, by the help of *Commenius* his *Janua Linguarum*, a piece of greater Worth than is commonly apprehended, and which might certainly be of much greater Use, than is generally made of it.

C H A P. VI.

§ 1. **H**AVING thus gone thro' the Compass of Things, according to their more obvious and common Ideas, we now proceed to some farther Considerations about them, which arise from *those*; and are mostly such, as they call Second Notions, more general, abstract, and Nice. I shall, at present, take them singly, without affirming or denying one of another, beginning with *Thing*, or *Somewhat*, and those higher Notional Subdivisions or Sorts thereof, which are Fundamental to the rest, and may be call'd *Elements*, or leading Points; and afterwards shall treat of the *Resultances* from them, under some other Notional Considerations; all which may serve to render our Tho't more Subtle, and Nice, and to guide us into some more general Notices, in order to our farther search after special and particular Natures, or that we may proceed upon any Subject in a more accurate manner.

§ 2. The most general Object of our Tho't is that of *Thing*, or *Somewhat*, which, in its largest Sense, is the same with *Theme*, intending whatsoever is, or may be propos'd to the Mind to be consider'd, or observ'd. This most universal Idea is form'd, when either we know not, or attend not to

any distinctive Character at all, but only to that one common Attribute, that the Thing, whatever it be otherwise, or in it self, is, or may be the Object of Consideration; and this is only an extrinsecal, relative Denomination, and enters not at all into the Nature of the Thing; but is certainly right, so far as it goes: For whatever I can think of, is undeniably matter of Tho't; nor can I possibly be mistaken about it, whilst I form no farther Notion of it. In this Sense the Act of Thinking and formed Tho't are plainly *Things*; so are also Chimæras, Fictions, and meer Suppositions, that have no Existence, but in Tho't; as also the parts of a Contradiction, separately taken; and 'tis only *these*, when we would put them together, that amount to *Nothing*; for they cannot in *that* way, be tho't of since the one part removes the other by denying, and, in a Logical Sense, destroying it: *A Light*, I may in some sort apprehend, and what it is to be *Dark* or without *Light*; but of a *dark Light* I can have no Idea, it being all one, as a *Light* that is no *Light*: But,

§ 3. Whatever any one can *think* of, is with us, in some sort, a *Thing*; and so they are *distinct Things* of which *distinct Tho'ts* can be form'd. Nor is there any danger of mistake here, so long as by Thing we understand only what is subject to Tho't. But we must take great heed of making our Tho'ts not only the Signs, but the Measure and Standard of Things; so as to account whatever we can really and truly think of, a *real Thing*, either actually existing, whether any one think of it or not; or indeed so much as virtually, and potentially, in the Natural Causes, which may produce it, in an ordinary way: nor may we presently conclude, that the Things, or Objects of Tho't, are in themselves *really distinct*, of which we can form Tho'ts really and truly distinct, and differing. The Truth is (as I conceive) that our Minds were never fitted, or design'd to penetrate to the bottom of those Things, which are not properly and intirely its own Work, as Arithmetical and Geometrical Abstractions are, which take in no more of Beings, than what the Mind could take up by a clear and distinct Apprehension, as their being so many, so great, or so form'd.

§ 4. As to that famous Question, whether the *Modes* of Things (or the *manner* of their being) be themselves *Things*; I, for my part, must answer, They are so far *Things* to me, as that they can, by themselves, employ my Tho't; so Number and Measure, for Instance, plainly can: But I cannot therefore allow them to be in themselves Beings really distinct from that, which they modify; and yet I must own, they

they seem not to be the very Substance it self, nor any part thereof, in all Cases: Nor does it fully satisfy, to say, they are certain Determinations or Denominations of that, to which they belong: For it may farther be ask'd, is it Nothing, that so Determines or Denominates; or can it well be said, that the very Being of the Thing modify'd, does it for it self? Methinks, the fairest and most ingenious Answer were to say, that so far our Minds are fitted to go, that they may, with good Reason, take the Modes of Things for distinct Subjects of Tho't; but are not capable, it should seem, of making a deeper Judgment of them, in themselves; no more than of the Substance, determin'd by them, in its Fundamental Nature. And is it not enough for us to know, that we can reasonably form such and such differing Considerations in relation to Beings? And may it not answer the purposes of Life as well as if we were more inwardly and thro'ly acquainted with their Essence, or is it not really more for our highest Advantage, if it serve but, as it ought, to make and keep us Humble; whilst, at every turn, we meet with our *Ne plus ultra*; plainly finding our selves to be finite and limited, not Capable of going fully through, even with the Modes of Things; how much less with the Things themselves, to which they belong? But after all, our Reason plainly tells us, we must not allow *Modes* to be *Things*, in the same Sense, or of the same Class, as the Subjects are, to which they appertain.

§ 5. All I shall here farther attempt as to the Fundamental Consideration of our most general Idea, and indeed, of *all* the rest, as they fall in with *that*, will be to point out amongst the various Objects of Tho't, *which* may be fairly judg'd to lye nearer to the Supreme and Infinite Being, and *which* to be farther remov'd; so as to be *Things* in an higher or lower, in a more or less, eminent Sense: As may appear by the just Account, I shall endeavour to give of Things, or Matters of Tho't, according to the higher and lower Place, which may seem to belong to them, in respect of their greater or less Reality; or as the very Notions of the *Theme* may disclaim any pretensions thereto, as *that* of Privation, Negation, &c will appear to do.

§ 6. As to *Things* in that most comprehensive Sense, which has been given; They certainly appear, *to us*, innumerable; for the differing Objects of Tho't are plainly *so*: Yet they may be reduc'd under some general Heads, as they agree together in some respects, whilst they differ in others: And somewhat will here be essay'd in a brief and general Way,

both, as to their Agreement and distinguishing Characters; for the several Objects of Tho't are *formally* distinguish'd (as we may farther show) as having this or that Idea, not another: Yet some of those divers and differing Themes may be so much alike, as to be accounted of the same *Sort*, and to differ only (as Logicians express it) *Numerically*, so as *this* is not *that*; tho' it should be as like as one Egg, or as one Guinea, may be to another: But other Themes, differing more considerably, than they agree, may be fitly accounted Things of divers *Kinds*, or at least of differing *Sorts*.

§ 7. The intire Nature of this or that (whatever it be in it self, and to him, *before whom all things are naked and open*) is to us the Collection of all those various Objects of Tho't, which go to constitute or make it up intire and full as it is in it self, in every respect. And those we may fully comprehend, when the thing under Consideration is no more, than what the Mind has clearly taken up of this or that Object: Suppose it were the *Length* of a Way, an *Acre* of Land, the *Number* of Shillings in a Pound, the *Virtuousness* or *Viciousness* of such a Person or Action, the *Mechanism* or artificial *Make* of a Clock, &c: But where we take in the Work or produce of Nature, together with *that* of our Mind or Hand, there seems to lye somewhat still hidden from us, or but very confus'dly apprehended by us; so that the *Work of God* appears to be to us in one respect or other, always *unsearchable*: And we are forc'd to help out our general and indistinct Idea thereof, as we can, with a *Set* of Attributes. And such of *these*, as we conceive to make up the principal *Stamina*, and summary Account of a Thing. or to be the Epitome of its intire Nature, and without which it cannot *be*, or be *such*, is with us the *Essence* of that Thing.

§ 8. Now *Essence*, in relation to God, must involve a *necessary Existence*; for we cannot in any measure duly conceive, *what He is*, without conceiving, *that He is*, and indeed *cannot but be*. The Name He takes to Himself is, *I AM*, (or *I WILL BE*): This is the Contraction of that larger Name, *I AM WHAT I AM*, (or *I WILL BE WHAT I WILL BE*), which may seem closely to conjoin God's unquestionable, necessary *Existence* with his unsearchable, boundless *Essence*.

§ 9. Things, or the Objects of Tho't (in their separate State, without affirming or denying one of another) may be reduc'd to the following Scheme: *First of all*, The *τὸ πρῶτον τῶ θεοῦ*, that which may and should be known of *the unlimited necessary Being*, whom we shall briefly consider apart, by himself, as infinitely transcending all those Beings, from
which,

which, by the way of Analogy, we draw our affirmative Conceptions of God, making them out, as we can, by the Negation of Limits, and other marks of Imperfection belonging to Creatures. And then, as to Things that are *Limited and Contingent*, they may be consider'd, either, as *Primary and Leading*, in the Fundamental Scale, which are a kind of *Elements*; or as *those*, which follow in the Secondary Scale containing a *Set of Resultances*. In the former some Things will be *Real*, and existing (whether they be tho't of or not) potentially at least, in their Natural Causes; others will be more purely *Notional*, depending upon Tho't, for what sort of being they have: The Real will be either Positive or Negative; and even these may be actual and true: The Positive will be either more Permanent and Stable, or Transient and Fleeting: The Permanent will be either what sustains, (*viz.* *Substance*) or what is sustain'd, and this either more immediately by the Substance it self, which I shall call *Accident*; or mediately by somewhat intervening, and I shall term *that a Mode*, which is distanced from the Substance by one Attribute only; but if by more than one, *the Mode of a Mode*: What is Real and also Affirmative, but transient, may be call'd, in the general, Motion, and this either moving, in *Action*; or receiv'd, in *Passion*: What Really is, but is Negative, is either a *Privation* or meer *Negation*: Finally, what is in it self only Notional, either has a Foundation, and is bottom'd, in Nature, and may be nam'd, a *Formality*; or else borrow'd from it as a meer Supposition or *Fiction*.

§ 10. The absolutely Necessary and infinitely perfect Being, the only true God, is indeed the highest and most concerning Object of our Tho't; but infinitely beyond the utmost reach thereof, *as he is in himself*. And whereas our limited Minds are under a Necessity of conceiving the Divine Nature by way of Analogy, chiefly to *that* of our Souls, we ought to know, that strictly speaking every thing of God is so far transcending all Created Being and Perfection, that it may be justly said, to be in him quite another kind of Thing, than in us, or in the highest Creature: as *e. gr.* that God not only knows infinitely more than any Creature; but that he knows Things in a Manner, which we cannot possibly conceive, as it is in God. There is at the Bottom, and as the Ground-work of all those Glorious Attributes, under which we are forced to think and speak of God, an *Infinite Being*, or *Essence*, which we cannot otherwise apprehend, than that there is somewhat, which has the Characters of
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every way Perfect; really and necessarily *Existing*, whether Tho't on or no; altogether *Undepending*, Immutable, Eternal, and Immense; infinitely surmounting all the Being, that is in the World besides, which makes not any more Entity of the same kind or Class; has in Comparison, no Reality; and plainly bears no Proportion to *that* of God. This transcendent Height leading down to the Scale, we are here designing, may be faintly shadow'd out by the highest degree of a *Tangent*, which keeps within no Bounds, but infinitely excurs, as running parallel to the Tangent Line, and therefore never meeting with it.

§ 11. The Divine Essence has the *Nature* of a Spirit, not that of Body; is *as such* indivisible; penetrates all other Beings (whilst God causes and admits them *in him to live, and move, and have their Being*); is continually Active in the never ceasing Exercise of Understanding and Will; most powerful, Wise, and Good, *i. e.* Holy, Just, True, and Kind; and tho' these Attributes are in some sort communicated to the more perfect Creatures: yet never, as they are in God himself, infinitely, eternally, and unchangably. The Divine Being and Nature cannot be multiply'd, so as there should be more distinct Gods, but it is intirely *one*, so far as *Unity* may be in God a Perfection: Yet, upon the Divine Testimony, it must be acknowledg'd, that there are *Three*, the Father, the Word, (the *Logos*, or the Son) and the Spirit; *Mat.* 28. 19. and that these Three are one, not *etc.* but *i. e.* *One Thing*, or Being, *1 John.* 5. 7. These are, no doubt, essential and necessary to the Divine Being (else they could not have been at all but so, as that we could not distinctly know them without Supernatural Revelation: Nor may we pretend *now* to conceive of them as they are in God: But only by some faint and very broken Analogy to what is found among Creatures, or may be consistently suppos'd; As the Souls being a threefold Principle in Man, *viz.* of Reason, Sense, and Motion; or that it attuates at once the Heart, the Head, and Hand; or if we might suppose one Soul to animate three distinct Bodies.

§ 12. The internal and immanent Acts of God we conceive, as unchangable Counsels and Purposes, not Necessary to him, but chosen by him; who, if he had so pleased, might have resolv'd upon other Sorts, or a different System and Course of Things: God's External and transient Acts may seem to be no more than the terminating of his Decrees, which according to the several Points of Time therein design'd respectively take place, without any thing farther, in the Works

Works of Creation and Providence. From these arise the Relations, wherein God stands to his Creatures, as of Creator, Grand Proprietor, Protector, and Preserver, Ruler, Benefactor, Redeemer, Sanctifier, &c. with other extrinsecal Denominations, as the God of *Israel*, &c. Our Idea of God thus form'd may be accounted Right, *i. e.* such as we are Capable of; and which, with due Attendance to Supernatural Revelation, may be sufficient for us, and accepted of God; if we consider it as carrying only some faint Resemblance to him, and falling infinitely short of him.

C H A P. VII.

§ 1. **WE** proceed to the Fundamental Scale, or Gradation of what is *Finite and Contingent*, which has had God himself at the Head of it, but so inconceivably transcending the very highest part thereof, that it was by no means fit to include him in it, whom even *the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain*. All the following sorts of Things will be consider'd as Individuals, under the Notion of *this* or *that* (which may still be apply'd to any) *Particular* of the Sort. I shall begin with what lies nearer to the Supreme Being, tho' at an infinite distance, descending to what may seem to be farther and farther still removed from him. And here we have,

§ 2. **I**, This or that *finite Substance*; by which is not here intended, this or that Substance, as it exists compleat and finish'd; for so it involves likewise the Accidents, Modes, &c. which go to make it up: As *Alexander*, *Bucephalus*, and *London-stone* comprize a Number of Accidents, Modes, &c. which are generally requir'd to make up a *Man*, or an *Horse*, or a *Stone* respectively; and yet more, or more peculiar ones belong to that *particular* Man, or Horse, or Stone. But the only Thing design'd, at present, is *that* in the particular Being, which is to be consider'd, as the Basis, and Ground-work of it; which with such peculiar Make or set of Accidents, Modes, &c. is, or makes up that Being.

§ 3. And whereas our Idea of the Substance, in it self consider'd, is very dark and indistinct, being only, that general one of Thing or Somewhat, and this amounting to no more than that it is an Object of Thought; therefore to help out the Idea, as we can, we consider, that whatever *the Substance* be

be in it self, it has unquestionably these general Characters, viz. (1.) That it stands, as a Being of it self, not subjected in another (tho' still depending upon God); and (2.) That it sustains the Form or Make, whereby it is a Being of such a kind, or sort, and also the farther, and more peculiar Make, whereby 'tis this or that particular Being: And chiefly from this 2d Character the Name of *Substance* is taken; *q. d.* *That which stands under the Accidents and Modes.* Now Substance has Entity in a measure and manner infinitely below the Supreme Being; and yet in a far higher Sense, than what we have next to consider, viz.

§ 4. II, This or that *Accident*, which has its Being (whatever *that* is) thro' and by means of the Substance, wherein it is subjected, or to which it appertains. That the self-same Substance may admit of various and differing Turns cannot be doubted; now the inadequate, partial, and imperfect way of conceiving Things, to which we are accusom'd, and seem to be confin'd, leads us to consider *first*, somewhat, which receives this or that Turn; and *then* somewhat farther, as the Turn or Make it receives: But if we would more justly take the Matter, as it seems to lye in Nature, we should always consider the *Make* together with *somewhat* in the general, which is so *made*, in the Concrete rather than the *Somewhat* by it self, and the Make by it self, more abstractly: But if we take the latter by it self, we must, by no means, conceive it as a Being of the same Rank and Class with Substance, if at all distinct from it. The Summ of the Matter, once for all, seems to be this, as we consider Things not so immediately in themselves, but in the Ideas we have of them, so we may distinguish of our Tho'ts about them, and ought to do it, without determining, that the Things are so divided in themselves, but only observing, that there is indeed some Foundation or Occasion in and from Things themselves, for the Ideas which we may call *Substantial*, *Accidental*, *Modal*, &c.

§ 5. Our Idea of Accident (if we rightly understand our selves) gives no such kind of Entity to Accident as was attributed to Substance: And yet created Substance has a less considerable Entity in respect of the Creatour; than Accident, in respect of Substance; for it contributes nothing at all to the compleating of him, as Accident may be conceiv'd to do to Substance, whilst yet it is more than equally depending on him.

§ 6. By *Accident*, is not *here* to be understood only what is accidental, or happens to this or that Substance (for to Substance in general, this or that special Accident is indeed what may or may not be): nor yet must we take in *all* that may *accidere* or *accedere*, happen or be superadded to this or that Substance: For that might be another distinct Substance; as when Silver-wire is gilt with Gold, how small soever it may be drawn, and consequently how thin soever the Gilding might be, so as not to be capable of bearing the Air, by it self alone, without the Silver Wire within to support it; yet the Gilding may be conceiv'd, as a very small hollow Tube, that had no such inner Support: Whenas Accident as 'tis here design'd cannot be conceiv'd with the denial of any Substance to Support it, tho' it may well be consider'd without considering this or that Substance; but not clearly or distinctly without any at all, for the very Notion of Accident implies some or other Substance to which it belongs; and the Name is here design'd, in a limited Sense of such Attributes only as are refer'd immediately to the Substance without any thing intervening, as Extension is to Matter; but Figure seems to belong more immediately to Extension, and to be in our way of Thinking a Mode of that Accident.

§ 7. It is here to be observ'd, and remembred, that in this Scale the Names, *Accident*, *Mode*, and *Mode of a Mode*, are limited to somewhat Subjected, and Supported, which is not only *real*, and *affirmative*, but also *permanent*, *i. e.* standing, and abiding more or less in one State: Tho' the *Transient*, the *Negative*, and the more purely *notional* Objects of Tho't might likewise be call'd Accidents or Modes in the larger and more usual Acceptation of those Terms; as perhaps they have been also us'd in this Essay, or may be sometimes, but then, 'tis hop'd, it may appear by what accompanies them in such places. But to proceed, the next descending step is,

§ 8. III, This or that *Mode*, understanding it of that, which more immediately determines this or that Accident as before explain'd: To this it more nearly appertains, and might seem to be in a manner subjected in it, according to our Model of Thinking and Speaking, as it is in Substance. And thus the Accident seems to be consider'd, as a kind of secondary Substance, and its Mode, as a secondary Accident; when yet we do well know, 'tis only the proper Substance, which is the Fundamental Subject and Support of Modes, without which they cannot exist, nor would be rightly conceiv'd

ceiv'd, if we should deny their relation to it. When we think or speak of this or that Stone, as *hardly divisible*, [hardly] imports the mode or manner of the Accident [divisible]; and farther refers to the Substance of the Stone, which is divisible, but with difficulty.

§ 9. IV. This or that *Mode of a Mode* is a farther remove from Substance; and there may be yet more distant Removes under the same Denomination; or for distinction, we might call the Mode of a Mode a *Second-rate-Mode*, and so on, as occasion may require: And tho' we are not to apprehend so many distinct Entitys heap'd one upon another; yet there are plainly, in our imperfect and broken way of conceiving; so many distinct Modes of Being, or a sort of cumulative Attribute made up of an Accident with the Train of Modes it draws with it.

§ 10. By way of Instance, if we would very distinctly and nicely consider [the most extensive usefulness of a right Habit superadded to the reasoning Capacity of that Thinking Power, wherewith this or that Soul is endow'd], we have here, (1.) A particular Substance, *this or that Soul*. (2.) An Accident belonging more immediately to that Substance, *viz. a Power*. (3.) A Mode which specifies and distinguishes that Accident, *viz. Thinking*, so that the Power is capable of that Act, whether it exert it self in actual Thinking or no. (4.) A Mode of that Mode, (or Second-rate-Mode) *viz. a Reasoning Capacity*, more immediately belonging to Thinking, as 'tis one way of Thinking. (5.) A Mode of the last foregoing Mode, (or 3d-rate-Mode) *viz. an Habit* superadded. (6.) A Mode of this, (or 4th-rate-Mode) *viz. that the Habit be right*. (7.) A farther (which we may call a 5th-rate) Mode, *viz. the Usefulness* of that Rectitude, or of the Habit as right. (8.) A yet farther, or 6th-rate-Mode, *the Extension* of that Usefulness: and, (9.) The finishing Mode, *i. e.* the degree of that Extension, as highest, the *most* extensive. And tho' such a Length as this is very seldom or never run; yet it is not infrequent to have the Subject, the Power, the Habit, and the Degree of that Habit under consideration. What we have had hitherto, how minute soever the Mode of a Mode might be, is yet consider'd as permanent; but the two next Objects of Tho't will be of a *transient* and fleeting Nature, as consisting in Motion: And we have,

§ 11. V, This or that *Action*, whether it be a proper Local Motion of the whole Being from or in its place, or of a part only; or be somewhat Analagous thereto, which we cannot so easily or clearly conceive; as suppose it were the set-

ting and applying our selves to Study some Point, or to put the Body into such a Posture. But whatever it be in it self or in other respects *proper* Action has always this Character; that it proceeds from an internal, intelligent, and elective Principle, and strictly taken it seems to belong only to Spirits; so that a Stone is rather mov'd, than moves, downward; and tho' it might appear to take that way of it self, yet 'tis really from a Force, wherewith it has been originally impress'd, or which is at present put upon it, agreeably to the Nature and Make of the Stone it self, as being compact, and which operates according to the differing Medium thro' which the Stone is to fall; for it passes with greater difficulty, thro' a very thick Medium, than thro' that which is very thin. Now the Counter-part of Action is Passion; whensoever the Object whereon it terminates is capable of being mov'd, alter'd, or any way affected by it: for,

§ 12. VI, This or that *Passion* is either Motion consider'd as impress'd, or some other Alteration, as, and whilst it is produc'd and receiv'd: For we here intend the Affection, as it is *in fieri*, not in *facto esse*, as 'tis producing, not when it is actually produc'd; for so 'tis *permanent* and abiding more or less; not transient and fleeting, as Motion is. 'Tis *Passion*, when the Eye, together with the Animal Spirits and Brain are mov'd and affected by the Rays of Light reflected from some visible Substance, and the Mind thereupon excited to attend and observe; but that its Attendance and Observation is also meer Passion cannot so well be allow'd; tho' 'tis not to be doubted but the Mind may be sometimes constrain'd thereto, as in the Impressions that are more than ordinarily agreeable or disagreeing, also in strong Impulses, &c. For certainly God can powerfully impress the Mind with this or that Tho't, and give it even a New Turn of Inclination, when he sees fit; but when it sets it self to consider of any Thing, or to form an imaginative Representation, &c. this is much rather to be taken for Action than Passion: Yet still our usual Perceptions appear to be in the first and second instant of a passive Nature, whilst the Organ of Sensation is mov'd, and the Mind thereupon excited to attend.

§ 13. It seems to be but improperly call'd Passion, when there is no sort of Motion or Alteration in the Subject, to which the Action is refer'd: *e. gr.* to be *Tho't on*, or *Spoken of*, is in it self properly no Passion; tho' a Person may be some way or other affected thereupon, in case he know, that he is well or ill Spoken of, or Tho't on by such, as he is concern'd withal, or for whose Sentiments he has a regard: But then

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'tis his being pleas'd or displeas'd, which is properly the Passion; not the being prais'd or disprais'd, which in and by it self do's not affect the Person at all, but only as he may consider of it, and according to the Reflections he makes upon it agreeably to the Temper and Disposition of his Mind or Body, or of both together. A Man's being Spoken of, Thot on, Lov'd, Fear'd, &c. are indeed in themselves only so many relative and extrinsecal Denominations or Considerations about him, not any thing of Passion subject'd in him as when he receives Instruction, or Correction, Reward or Punishment, &c.

§ 14. Thus far we have observ'd only what is of an affirmative or positive Nature; we proceed to what is Negative, and here we have;

VII, This or that *Privation*, or the absence of what ought to be in this or that Substance, Accident, Mode, &c. according to the usual course of Nature, or the Rule of Duty: As *Blindness*, i. e. the total want of Sight, or a *Deficiency* therein, in Man at any Age whatsoever, or in some other Creatures after they are so many Days Old; Culpable Defects as the total or partial want of such good Principles or Inclinations, as ought to be in Angels or Men. Now, tho' Privation be not an affirmative Thing; yet it is plainly a very considerable Subject of Tho't, as drawing with or after it no small Consequences in relation to what is so or so Defective; an humane living Body without Sight or Hearing, Hands or Feet, and especially without all of them must be far differing from what it should be by the usual Course of Nature; and so the Mind without some degrees of Knowledge and Virtue, must be disagreeing to the Rule of Moral Obligation, and lye expos'd many ways to Sin and Sorrows. Privation may be consider'd as something (i. e. some Object of Tho't) subject'd in, or rather, appertaining to the Substance, Accident, &c. which is so depriv'd of what it might and should farther have.

§ 15. VIII, This or that *meer Negation* is simply the Absence of this or that Substance, Accident, Mode, &c. where it is not requir'd either by the course of Nature or any Rule of Duty: As in the Characters of *not-a-Spirit*, *not-living*, *not-hearing*, *not-seeing*, &c. apply'd to this or that Stone; *not-learned*, *not-pious*, &c. to a Brute-Creature. These, and other Negatives may be matter of Tho't, and even *Nothing*, it self may have abundance of Notions form'd about it in the way of Negation; since every positive Thing whatsoever, may be deny'd of, or (which comes all to one) affirm'd with,

a Negation, as that *Nothing* is not God, or an Angel, or Man, &c. or that it is not-God, not-an-Angel, not-a-Man, &c. not all, or some of these together, in short that it is not quite so considerable as Privation, but meerly and simply a Negation of Entity, and indeed of any positive Idea whatsoever.

§ 16. Yet it may deserve to be noted, that in affirming a Negative we often seem to intend somewhat farther than in denying the Affirmative, as in saying a Stone is *not-living*, or as Logicians give it in Latin, *non-vivens*, we seem at least to mean that it is some positive Thing or Being, which tho' it have not Life, yet has some other affirmative Attributes: But in this Sense 'tis not to be reckon'd a meer Negation, but rather an indeterminate (which they usually call an *infinite*) Affirmation attended with a Negation.

§ 17. And we may sometimes use the Affirmation of a Negative, as the most comprehensive way of affirming, as if I say, *Omne naturaliter non-audiciens est etiam naturaliter non-loquens*, ev'ry not-hearing Being, that is naturally such is also naturally a not-speaking Being; I design by the Term, *not-hearing*, a multitude of positive Beings, as Earth, Water, Stone, and indeed whatever else is naturally without Hearing; but by the other Negative, *not-speaking*, I intend not to affirm *any other* Action, much less every one besides that of speaking.

§ 18. Oftentimes by a Negative-term we aim at somewhat Affirmative, which we cannot perhaps better express, or distinctly conceive; as in applying, *infinite* to God, *immortal* to our Souls, *irrational* to Brutes, &c. In such cases what we do more distinctly Speak or Think is Negative, but what we are aiming at is rather an Affirmative of which we want the more clear and distinct Idea.

§ 19. Even the *mere Negation* which we here design, is consider'd in our way of Thinking, as if it were somewhat, not barely as it can be thought of, but as it gives the Mind a differing Idea of the Thing propounded with the Negation; and the Thing is indeed thereupon really differing from what it would otherwise be, yet not by adding any thing to it but by taking somewhat from it, and it may be sometimes by the imply'd, or supposed Substitution of somewhat else in its place, as *not-well-bred*, leads the Mind to think of what is opposite to good Breeding, and to conceive a Man with that Negative Character is to give him that of *Clownish* or *Rude*: But thus 'tis indeed somewhat more than meer Negation; yet ev'n *this* we conceive as a kind of Attribute belonging to the

the Subject; but should take heed of placing it higher in the Scale of Things than we ought.

§ 20. Nor should we ordinarily use a Negative to determine any Subject, but where there is danger it would else be tho't to have what it really has not belonging to it, as in saying an Ape is *irrational*, or *not-rational* as Man; Such a one is *not Wise* tho' he be *Learned*. To say, this or that is *impossible* is the strongest kind of Negation; and to be *inconsistent* is indeed to be impossible; as that God who is Holy, should be the Author of Sin: Or that he, who is Just, should constrain his Creatures to Sin, and then condemn them for sinning.

§ 21. Privations and Negations really and truly are, whether we think of them or not: But there are Subjects of Tho't, which depend upon Tho't, as,

IX, This or that *Formality*, or special Consideration relating to this or that Thing: Of these there may be divers, and sometimes very many belonging to the self-same Thing; for each distinct Attribute may be distinctly consider'd, and tho' it will still be *materially* the same Thing when conceiv'd or represented with *this* Attribute, as with *that*; yet its Attributes in their own proper Nature and Idea will be *formally* differing, yea, tho' they should be just alike: as in a Cube or Dye, the Body consider'd *as long* differs from the same consider'd *as broad*, or *as deep*; and the Length, Breadth, and Depth, are not the same Thing, nor have the same Idea, tho' they be exactly equal; so that any one side may be taken for the Length, any other *adjoining* side for the Breadth, and that which is adjoining to them both, for the Depth or Thickness.

§ 22. 'Tis of absolute Necessity, that in Thinking or Speaking, we attend to what in Logic or Metaphysics is call'd the *Formalis Ratio*, i. e. the formal and distinct consideration under which a Thing is taken; we cannot else think or speak appositely to the Point in Hand; nor indeed so much as justly and accurately take what is nicely offer'd upon any Argument. When a Way is spoken of as measur'd, we must consider it *as long*, not *as broad*; Man may be tho't or spoken of either *as to his substantiality* in general, or as to the Materiality of his Body, or the Spirituality of his Soul, or his Thinking Power, or actual Tho't, or as to his peculiar Disposition, or Age, or Relation, &c, and accordingly such or such things are to be affirm'd or deny'd of him. And here let it be carefully noted, that there is a formal Difference between *Substance* in Man and the *Substantiality* of Man, and
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so betwixt his *Matter*, and *Materiality*, and that Substance is not Substantiality it self nor Matter, Materiality it self; the long way is not the very Length of the way consider'd Abstractly from it.

§ 23. X. And Lastly, This or that *Fiction* or mere Supposition, which may be either our Error and Mistake, when we do not intend it *so*: or else formally and properly a Fiction or Supposition when we so design: *This* latter is more commonly observ'd and given forth *as such*; but the former more usually, as in Parables, and Fables, deliver'd without express or direct Notice of its being a Fiction; and yet may carry in and with it sufficient Marks of its being intended for no other; else it were to be counted a Falshood, and where the Expressions that have been tacitely, at least, agreed to be us'd in such a Sense do in that Sense misreport and contradict the Apprehension of him that uses them, I think it may be call'd a *Moral Untruth*, or *Lye*; tho' the thing so deliver'd should happen to be true; and 'tis generally agreed it must be so, where we were antecedently obliged to acquaint him we speak to with our real Sentiment.

§ 24. The matter of Suppositions and Fictions is always taken from what is some where or other, one way or other in Nature; tho' they are not properly founded in Nature as the formalities are of which we spoke before. We cannot consistently carry up Supposition or Fiction to the Supreme Being, so as to feign another Supreme, which would imply a Contradiction; none can be truly God who is not the *same* God: Nor can we consistently suppose him not to be, or to be other than he is, who necessarily both *is* and also *is what he is*. But whatsoever implies no Contradiction in it self, or to any thing else which necessarily is, or is such, may be suppos'd as if it did exist; and sure it might, if God saw fit, for we cannot consistently think beyond what he can do, nor indeed so far as his Omnipotence can go.

§ 25. Our Idea of a Fiction or Supposition, objectively taken, is then right, when we rightly conceive what are the Things or Matters of Tho't, how they are put together or divided; and that 'tis *but* a Fiction or Supposition, not what really is, or is really so. The Use of it is for Illustration, Instruction, Incitement, and Advantageous Delight, and sometimes for Confirmation, or for Confutation, when the Point to be confuted may be shown, upon the Supposition thereof, to infer somewhat certainly false or absurd.

§ 26. It is to be observ'd, that Action, Passion, Privation, Negation, Formality, and Fiction may each have their Modes, and Modes of those Modes; but then they will be suited to the Subjects, whereto they respectively belong, and for distinction, may be call'd Active, Passive, Privative, Negative, Formal, and Fictitious: And also the following *Resultances* may have their peculiar Modes and farther Modes suited to Combinations, Separations, Abstractions, Relations, and Expressions, which may be call'd Combining Separating, Abstracting, Relative and Expressive Modes.

C H A P. VIII.

§ 1. FROM the foregoing Scale or Gradation of such Things, as we might call *Elements*, there are farther matters of Tho't arising, which we may term, as before *Resultances*, in the mentioned ways of farther and more observable *Combination, Separation, Abstraction, Relation, and Expression*: I say, farther and more observable, because there was somewhat of these in the preceding Scale; Essence being combin'd with Existence in the several Particulars there refer'd to; Substance mentally *Separated*, or rather *abstracted*, from its Accidents Modes, &c. as also these from it and from each other; yet so as still to imply a mutual *Relation*; nor could any of them be deliver'd without employing *Expression* for that purpose.

§ 2. Now these very Ways and Methods of taking Things are in themselves Objects of Tho't: And besides *these* they have already furnish'd, will afford us many more from the foregoing Heads, and from among themselves in those which follow; especially in regard of the farther and farther Combinations, Separations, Abstractions, Relations and Expressions which may arise; as for Instance *Expressions* may be drawn from all or most of the mentioned Heads, and also may be heap'd one upon another in the farther and various Expression of Expressions: For as Tho'ts are the Signs of Things, so articulate Sounds are the most usual Expressions of Tho't, common writing of those Sounds, and Short-hand of that Writing; besides that some Words are us'd to express or explain the meaning of others, and one Language to interpret another. And after all we can say or think of Substance Accident, &c. or of Combinations, Separations, &c.

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who can tell what farther Advances might be made by unsearchable Wisdom and Almighty Power? But to proceed, we may endeavour, as we can, to consider,

§ 3. 1; This or that *Combination* of whatsoever farther Degree, *viz.* The Things conjoin'd, and also the way and manner of their Conjunction: Suppose it were two or more particulars of the former Scale, or of this, or of both together, whether under the same or differing Heads in either, as they may be apprehended thro' Mistake, supposed with Design, or found in Reality existing together in some Being, or Set of Beings, or other Objects of Tho't. As if it were erroneously held that there are three distinct Souls, the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational, in one Man; or one Soul, for a faint Illustration of the Blessed Trinity, supposed to animate three distinct Bodies; or lastly a Body and Soul conceiv'd as united in the Humane Nature. As to *mistaken* Combinations, what we have to do is to detect, evict, and reject them; as to the *suppos'd*, to see they be not inconsistent, and then to improve them: But 'tis of those which *really exist*, I would chiefly speak.

§ 4. Now to the making of finite Beings, or some of their Appendages and Appurtenances, there is at least, according to our imperfect way of conceiving them, a real Combination, suppose of this or that Substance, it may be of divers, with a Set or divers Sets of Accidents, Modes, perhaps with farther Modes, Actions Passions, Privations, and certainly not without manifold Negations at least imply'd in the positive Nature, and those might all be summ'd up in that one comprehensive Negation [Nothing more], which if added, would be indeed a finishing stroke, but commonly it must be too bold as implying we had before given a perfect Account of all that was any way compriz'd in such Object, or belonging to it.

§ 5. By way of Instance, This or that Man may be conceiv'd, as a *Combination* of two differing Substances; the one, *viz.* his Soul, having such Powers, improv'd or deprav'd by such Habits, these rais'd or fall'n to such a Degree, so acting, so affected, with such Natural and Moral Defects, and with a multitude of Negative Attributes, some of which perhaps were fit to be mention'd, as suppose he were truly Wise, tho' not very Witty; not Sad, tho' Serious, &c: as to his other Substance, the Body, we may conceive it to be of such a Nature, to have such inwards Parts, and outward Shape, Deform'd or Comely, and that to such a Degree, fit to be employ'd in such Action, so or so mov'd, it may be wanting

some part, or having somewhat redundant, not Beautiful, tho' Handsome, not Strong, tho' Big, &c. But it would be too adventurous to say, there is no farther particular Accident or Mode, &c. belonging either to his Soul or Body.

§ 6. As to the way and manner of Combination, it appears in some Cases to be somewhat alike in Nature and Art: As, (1.) By Comprehension or Comprizal of various and distinct Things, as in the same common Receptacle, suppose in the infinite, or in some finite Mind surveying them at once; in the same Book, or House, or Cabinet, or in the World as 'tis the Comprehension of all Things, or at least of all finite Things. (2.) By Concidence or Agreement in some Attribute, as being of one Place, Age, Kind, Sort, &c. (3.) By Concurrence, as of Bodies tending to a common Point and gathering about it; or of Men joying in Civil or Sacred Society; being of the same Opinion or Party; having the same Interest, &c. (4.) By Contiguity, as the Particles in Water, or an Heap of Sand. (5.) By Commixtion, whether of grosser parts, as of Stones, Metals, &c. in the Earth; or of finer Particles, as in a Medicinal Compound, or in the Blood. (6.) By Colligation, as in a Fagot, or in a Bud. (7.) By Contexture or Interweaving, as of Threads in Cloath, and Fibres in the Leaves of Trees. (8. To instance no more in this kind) by Complication, or the Twining and Twisting together of long and tough Parts, as in Thread and Cords; in the grosser Nerves and Ligaments, &c.

§ 7. But there are Combinations yet more considerable, as (1.) By the Continuity and Consistency of smaller Particles holding together, so as to make up larger Bodies. (2.) By the Coalition of Things, which according to our Model of Apprehension are in themselves very differing, and yet fall in together into one Being, as Substance and Accidents, Force impress'd and Motion with the Thing, which is mov'd, &c. (3.) By the Conjunction and vital Union of such differing Substances as the Soul and Body in Man, so as they should in such manner mutually affect and be affected by and thro' each other. And if we may here touch upon what is Supernatural. (4.) The Mystical Union of Christ and Believers as partaking of the same Holy Spirit. (5.) The personal Union of such differing Natures as those of God and Man in our Saviour; and (6.) The Substantial Union of the Three, whom we commonly call Persons in God.

§ 8. Our Apprehension of Combinations, is so far right as we rightly understand what are the Things combin'd, and what the manner of their Combination. And hence it is, that we are so much in the Dark as to those complicated Natures, which furnish out the Universe ; because we know so very little of the Particulars, combined in them, or how they are puttogether : And yet, no doubt, we do, or may know, what is needful and convenient for us in our present State. What we have next to consider is,

§ 9. II, This or that *Separation*, of whatever Degree : *What* is disjoin'd, and the manner *how*. What is here apprehended by Mistake, should be search'd out and rectify'd ; what is designedly suppos'd or feign'd must be consistent with it self and other Things, that it may be rightly conceiv'd and apply'd to some fit purpose ; but our main Business here is with Separations really made, or which at least may be so conceiv'd, as when some part or degree of a Thing is *indeed* sever'd from the Residue, not as Substance from Accident, Mode, &c. or these from it or one another, whilst they cannot be rightly conceiv'd, as existing without the Subject to which they belong.

§ 10. The Separation here design'd, is more than an Abstraction, or the Considering of somewhat without considering somewhat else, when yet it cannot be so much as consistently conceiv'd to be without it : But what we are here considering, is what either actually is, or really may be sever'd and taken away, as (1.) One intire Thing from some other, with which it was some way combin'd, as one Stone from an Heap, or one Friend from another by Alienation, Distance or Death. (2.) Some Part or Particle of a Body from the rest, as in the wear of Utensils, or in Dismembring. (3.) Some Attribute lost whilst the Subject continues, and is perhaps otherways the same as it was. (4.) Some degree of an Accident, Mode, Action, Passion or Privation gone, whilst the rest continues, and the Substance is not diminish'd ; but remains intire and undivided, and is it may be in its own Nature indivisible. Water may become less Hot without being less'n'd in Quantity, and the Mind less contented, tho' it cannot, in Substance, be less than it was.

§ 11. And yet farther, (5.) Some sort of Attributes cannot be divide without their Subject, yet with it, they easily may : As the Weight and Figure of a Body may be divided with it, tho' not otherwise : So the number of Soldiers in an Army, with the Army. (6.) Abstract quantity may be separated into the parts of which it was made up ; Magnitude,

Number, Duration, and the Degrees of Intention may be taken by parts. (7.) Other Complex Ideas may be resolv'd into the several distinct Notions therein compriz'd: and (8.) Many, even of those Ideas, which may be call'd, comparatively, Simple, have yet their common and distinguishing Characters: The Perception we have of Light may be consider'd, as it comes by or thro' a sensible Organ, and particularly by the Eye, and tho' we can't accurately define we may describe it, as a Perception we take in chiefly from the Sun, being pleasant if not too intense, serving to the discovery of Colour, &c.

§ 12. By what has been offer'd, it may seem, that the Separation of which we speak is not always (tho' it may be in divers Instances) the Reverse or Resolution of the Combination before treated of, particularly when there is only some Degrees of an Accident abated, but whilst those are lost, the rest continue still combined with the Subject.

§ 13. As to the way and manner of Separation, (1.) There may be an Idea of *this* Separate from the Idea of that, and without implying any Relation to it in very many Cases, and indeed, whenever we consider Things that are Absolute, *as such*, in themselves: The Idea of *Philip* as the Father of *Alexander* is indeed distinct from that of *Alexander*, but not strictly separate from it as the Idea of King *Philip's* Person is from that of *Alexander's*. (2.) We may consider this or that as if it were actually separated, tho' it be not whilst we know 'tis possible to be so: The living Body, that has now its Arms and Legs, may be conceiv'd as if it were actually without them. These two Sorts may be term'd in some sense Mental-Separations, but especially the latter: We proceed to what is Real in one way or other, and

§ 14. (3.) There may be in the same intire Body a lineal Separation, as by a Line drawn on Paper, or the Appearance of a Crack in firm and solid Marble. (4.) We may take up only some part of what lay together, in a Tho't, a Sentence, a Book, an House, an Age, or in the World, to be the Subject of our Consideration or Discourse. (5.) The parts or ev'n smaller Particles of a Body may be locally distanc'd from each other. (6.) Where they remain still Contiguous to each other, yet the Band or tye of Union may be taken away, as in unglewing or otherways unfast'ning what was some way fast'ned together: Yea, (7.) The Continuity of a Body may be dissolv'd as in Breaking, Cutting, Rending, &c. and (8.) Some inward Particles may be sever'd from the rest, as in Distilling and drawing off Spirits, &c. (9.) The Band of Life

Life may be broken, and the Vital Principle in Brutes (whatever that be) discharg'd, as in separating the Blood from the Body. (10.) The Humane Soul may be dislodg'd and disjoined from its Body: Tho' neither Death, nor any thing else shall separate those who are truly join'd and adhere to Christ, from the Love of God.

§ 15. (11.) There may be (as has been intimated) a Partition of some Accidents or Modes, together with their Subject, *viz.* when they depend upon the Bulk or Figure of it; and this may be call'd a double Separation perform'd at once, as when we part the weight of any Stone, or the Virtue and Force of a Load-stone with the Stone it self. (12. And in the last place) Where Accidents or Modes, &c. are such as may be intended or remitted without increasing or diminishing the Substance of their Subject, in such Case there may be a lowering the Degree of such Attributes without otherwise affecting the Subject: We may well conceive only a separated part of the Heat to remain in the Water, when it has begun to cool; and only some degree of former Learning to abide in the Mind, when the rest is forgotten and lost.

C H A P. IX.

§ 1. I proceed now to treat much more largely of the three remaining Heads; and shall in the next place consider,

III, This or that *Abstraction* of whatsoever other Sort or farther Degree, than has been yet observ'd, or insisted on in this Essay. And we are here to consider *What* is abstracted, and in *what* way. Now *that* is abstracted, which is taken by it self to be consider'd or apply'd alone, tho' it could not be consistently judg'd, that it do's or can exist alone: For if that might be, it ought to be accounted, as has been shewn, rather a Separation than Abstraction.

§ 2. The former Scale was indeed, according to this account, made up of Abstractions and by Abstraction; for this or that *particular* Substance was abstracted from its Accidents, Modes, &c. as also this or that *particular* Accident, Mode, &c. from the Substance, and from each other: Yet we did not there consider the *Particularity* under its distinctive Characters *formally*; but rather *materially*, i. e. what is a particular

particular Substance, Accident, &c. but rather *as a Substance Accident, &c.* than *as a particular one*; for we did not there set our selves to observe the *This-ness*, or *That-ness* of it, if I may be allow'd to speak in *English*, as Logicians have long taken the Freedom to do in *Latin*.

§ 3. And tho' we took up the Common Nature, or rather the common Idea of Substance, Accident, Mode, &c; yet we did not then oblige our selves to attend so directly to its *being common*; but apply'd it to some or other particular Substance, Accident, Mode, &c, without setting our selves there to observe that the Idea might, *as a common one*, be apply'd to any Substance, Accident, &c. respectively: I say, the *Idea or Notion*, for indeed there is no such thing as a common Nature; but if we will speak properly and strictly the Nature of this or that Substance, Accident, &c. do's so peculiarly belong to the individual Substance, Accident, &c. that it cannot in that way belong to any other, how like soever it might be; for still it is not the self-same, nor has the self-same Nature or Attributes, tho' they may be represented by the same Notion or Idea, if we take not in the *particularity*, i. e. its being this or that Substance, Accident, &c. not another.

§ 4. But we are now to consider more at large, *whatever* may be abstracted and *how*. To begin with the former, *whatsoever* is truly distinguishable by a distinct Idea, yet not separable, so much as in Notion, (as has been shewn) may be abstracted: and therefore, (1.) The *individuality* or *particularity* of this or that, whatever it be; or the consideration of its being *this* or *that*, not any other, but differing from all others of the same Sort, and even from such, as may exactly resemble it, yet are none of them the self same with it. (2.) The *Species*, or *Sort*, which may be abstracted (as shall be shown) from the Particularities in an Idea, which may agree to such particular Beings or Things in common. (3.) The *Genus*, or *Kind*, from the differing Sorts in a more common Idea comprehending and containing no more, than what may extend and agree to all the Sorts, and all the Particulars under them. (4.) The yet *higher and more general Kinds*, from the lower, which in respect of them, are but *Sorts*; tho' they be also *Kinds*, as having not only *Individuals*, but *those* of differing Sorts, under them,

§ 5. We may likewise abstract, (5.) any *Attribute*, or *Set of Attributes*, whether they make the distinguishing Character of the Individuals, or of the Sort, or Kind, or higher Kind: Or that they be Properties, or common Accidents; for indeed any one or more Attributes together may be abstracted from the Subject to which they belong, how inseparable soever they might be really, as Properties always are; tho' none of them can be so much as conceiv'd without a Reference, at least imply'd, to some or other Subject, and indeed to this or that particular Subject, whenever a particular Accident, Mode, &c. is abstracted: *This Whiteness* is the Whiteness of *this Paper*, and of *this very Piece*.

§ 6. As to the way and manner of Abstraction, I shall explain it, *First*, In reference to Particularity, or the Individuating Character, which determines the Thing to be *this* or *that*, not another. And here we do not so directly attend to the Nature it self; but take up certain distinguishing Marks, which may be nothing more than some extrinsick and accidental Denominations belonging to the Nature; as *the Man whom I saw at such a time, in such a place*, &c; whatever were that Humane Nature, which I ascribe to him, 'tis his *being so seen by me*, which I now attend to abstractly; yet not denying the Nature, but referring to it, and indeed to the particular Humane Nature of that Person.

§ 7. The Particularity of *Adam*, by way of Instance, may be thus abstractly set forth, One, whose Body was immediately form'd out of the Dust, and into whose Nostrils God breath'd the Breath of Life, whereby he became a Living Soul: Or, in a more general way, *Adam* might be pointed out by his *beginning to exist at such precise Time in such precise Place*, and thus the Particularity of any Man, and of very many Things may be *fundamentally* Stated; since only this or that *one* began to exist exactly at such a Moment of Time, and in this or that determinate Compass or Point of Space: I have said, *Fundamentally*; for indeed the *formal* and *intire* Particularity consists of all the Parts and Attributes belonging to the Subject consider'd as *particular*; e. gr. *This Body, this Soul, such Time and Place of beginning and continuing to be, such particular Parents, such Inclinations, Actions, &c*; but all the other individuating Marks do still attend what I gave before, *viz.* the beginning to exist at *such time* and in *such place*.

§ 8. And now, *Secondly*, as to the *Species* or *Sort*, the Abstraction is made by observing what is the Principal and Summary Account of this or that, not as to its Existence, but its Essence or Nature in it self consider'd, and consequently, what is the Principal and Summary agreement of such Individuals, as we may fitly reckon to be of one *Sort*. But to this important Point, I shall speak a little more particularly, and here.

§ 9. (1.) In relation to Man; we may consider what Beings about us, do resemble our selves in the most material Respects, and indeed agree with us in the Summary Account of what we our selves are, as in having a Capacity for Religion, together with an Organiz'd Body: And thus we may (rightly enough for our Use however) form the Idea of Man's *Specifick* Nature, or of that Species and sort of Being, which we call Man, *viz.* that he is, or (as we use to express it) has an Embodiy'd Soul capable of Religion, or more Logically, that he is an Animal endow'd with such Reason, as makes him capable of Religion. This Idea, we conceive, takes in no Beings, that are Improper to be taken in, neither the Spirits above us, nor sensitive Creatures below us; nor yet leaves out any on Account of their Bodily Deformity, or the Deficiencies of their Mind, where we have Reason to believe there is such a Natural Capacity, and for this Character in Infants, we depend upon that Law of Nature, which do's so commonly appear to hold, *viz.* that Like do's produce what is, or would come to be its Like in the most material Respects, *i. e.* those which are such in a Physical, Natural Consideration, whatever unlikeness there may be on Moral Accounts. What therefore is the living Off-spring of Humane Parents is (I think) to be accounted Humane, but the Productions of Brutal Mixtures (if any be) with Humane Kind are not (as I conceive) to be so Esteem'd, but are rather to be destroy'd than preserv'd.

§ 10. (2.) The other Sorts of Animals, or Living Creatures may, perhaps, best be distinguish'd by their Origin, and refer'd to that sort, from which they Spring, for that it seems to be a legible Character imprinted on them by their Creator's Appointment and Blessing, that as they were Created, each after their Kind, so they should be accordingly Fruitful and Multiply; and it has been observ'd, that the Mixtures of one Kind with another, prove Improlifick and Barren, or carry not on their Uncouth and uncreated Likeness, as *e.g.* the Mule procreated of an Horse and an Ass. But when the Original of a Living Creature is not certainly known, we

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can only Guess or presume the Species, from the Shape, the Size, (at full growth, or when they can Propagate) and their Genius, so far as it can be observ'd.

§ 11. (3.) As to Plants, the same Rule may be of Use; since God made also the Herbs and Trees after their Kind, with such a Seed, or propagating Principle as might Produce their Like; but here should be added, what may be observ'd touching the Medicinal Virtues; as well as the Make and Form of Plants: And here, tho' Art may somewhat alter the Individuals, it appears not that Humane Skill can make a new Species, such as may Propagate or Perpetuate its Like, for however the Slips of such alter'd Plants may prove for a while, yet they are found Verging to their former Natural Sort, and it may be Queried, whether the Seed (more Properly so call'd) be not altogether of the Original Kind.

§ 12. (4.) As to Beings of a less perfect and unorganized Make, they are to be distinguish'd (as we can) by the most Notable Accidents, Modes, &c. which are found together and alike in some good Number of Individuals, omitting those Variations, which are less considerable than the Agreement.

§ 13. And thus we may proceed, by Degrees, to the most observable Amassments of Matter here below, viz. that of the Earth, and of the Water, *This* Fluid, the other more Firm and Stable, which are both very considerable, as they seem to afford the Matter to all particular Bodies; whilst the two other perceptible Elements (as they have long been call'd) *Air* and *Fire* seem only to assist in the Forming, Actuating, Altering, and Abolishing of them at last. But the farther Pursuit of these Things we shall leave to Natural Philosophy, when we have briefly observ'd that,

§ 14. (*Thirdly*), From the Sorts thus Collected and Stated, we may (perhaps conveniently enough) abstract the Kinds of Beings, by considering, wherein they agree with each other: as, (1.) Amongst Living Creatures, that a Number of the Sorts agree in this or that way of Various, and (as it might seem) Spontaneous Motion: The less Perfect as Oysters, Cockles, &c. (if we may number them with Animals) move not out of their Place, but in it, by opening, perhaps at Pleasure; whilst others Creep, or Swim, or Fly, or Go, and some Use differing Motions.

§ 15. And (2.) As to Plants, they may be gather'd into Kinds, by considering the hardness or softness of their Substance, as also the Form of their Trunk or Stalks, with their Branch-

Branching, Leaves, Flowers, Fruit, Root, &c: But it were best of all, if their Virtues, with the several Degrees of them, were better known, and made to be, the Principal Distinctive Characters, both of their Sorts and Kinds.

§ 16. (3.) The yet lower and less perfect Sorts, (which are Unorganiz'd, and are much more Similar) as Stones, Metals, &c. are to be Abstracted into Kinds, by omitting those Things, wherein several Resembling Sorts are found to differ, and taking up that wherein they Agree, as *e. g.* that the several Sorts of what we call Metals, are Malleable, and may be Melted. And now, in the next place.

§ 17. (4.) The like Course is to be taken, for the yet more abstracted Kinds, and so we may proceed to still higher and higher Abstractions, till we arise to those of the Fundamental Scale; or might Ascend above it, to *Thing* or *Something*, were it not that this would not be *Univocally* the highest Kind, since it agrees so very Unequally (as we have observ'd) to the Sorts or lower Kinds which are under it.

C H A P. X.

§ 1. **T**HUS I have given some Light towards the right forming of Abstracted Natures, or Ideas, namely, of Individuals, as such, and likewise of the Sorts, Kinds, and higher Kinds of Things. and all but the Abstraction of Individuals may be call'd Universals; since the Idea of every Kind, higher or lower, and of every Sort, agrees to all the Divisions and Subdivisions under it: So that of Living Creatures (such as can move Variously and Spontaneously) agrees to the Humane Nature, and to every particular Man, as also to the several Kinds of Brutes, and to the lower Kinds, or Sorts, as they might be distinguish'd, by the various manner of their Moving, whether in or out of their Place, together with their differing Forms and Origin; Particularly to the lowest Sorts, which are, as it were, so many Clans, Propagated down from their several Heads at first Created; and finally, to every Individual, under each of these.

§ 2. Thus the universal Idea may be consider'd as to its *Extension*, or the Reference it has to all the Kinds, Sorts, and Individuals, subject'd or plac'd under such general Head; but it may be yet otherwise consider'd in respect of

its *Comprehension*, or of what such Idea contains in it, which is always less than what is contain'd in the Adequate Idea, of any Kind or Sort next under it, and this again contains less than the Idea of a yet lower Sort, as this does finally less than that of an Individual under it: So that whilst the Universal Idea, is call'd an Universal Whole, and said to be divided into lower Kinds and Sorts, and Individuals, (tho' rather it might be said to be divided *unto* them, as agreeing to each of them) these are indeed more properly the Wholes, and the general Idea is but an Abstracted Part, and is accordingly nam'd a *Formal Part*, of the lower Kind, or Sort, or Individual, which is the *Formal Whole*.

§ 3. The Adequate Idea of an Individual contains in it, (1.) The Nature of the highest Kind under which it is, or what Answers the Idea thereof in its Comprehension; so *Adam* had the Nature of Substance, *i. e.* of *this Substance* to which the general Idea of Substance agrees, if we Abstract from its being taken as General. (2.) All the several Natures of the lower Kinds or Sorts, leading directly down to that Individual; as *Adam* had those of Body, of Living Creature, and of Man, not indeed as General and Common, but as Particular and Proper to himself. And even thus it appears, that the Individual has, (3.) The Individuating Nature and Character, which may be consider'd, either as Numerical only (as in *Adam this Substance, Body, Animal, Man, not another*) or as being also differing in one or more Attributes, and so even the like: Twins must be, as they were Born one after the other: But there are commonly a considerable number of Accidents, Modes, &c. which if they be not singly and severally differing from those of other Individuals, yet make up together a differing Combination. (4. and Lastly) the Individual, as having all the forementioned Natures, must have all the Logical Parts of which they are severally made, *viz.* their several Materialities, and Formalities, or what is Common, and what is Peculiar in each of them. Thus *London-Stone*, hath what is common to both the Sorts of *Substance*, together, with what is Peculiar to *Body*; also what is common to *Bodies*, and what is Peculiar to the *Inanimate*; what is Common to *These*; and what is Peculiar to *Fossils*; again what is Common to *These*, and what is Peculiar to *Stone*; farther, what is Common to the *Sorts of Stone*, and what is Peculiar to *this Sort*; Lastly, what is Common to *Stones of this Sort*, and what is Peculiar to that Individual *Stone*, as to be *this*, not another, how like soever it might be, to hold a Place which no other *Stone* does, and

to have such a Shape, Size, Colour, and Ornament about it, as, probably, do not all meet together any where else.

§ 4. Now if to a common Nature, or Idea, we add those Attributes, which make the several Subordinate Peculiarities or Differences; they do, together, Explain that Inferior Nature to which they Lead, and in which they Terminate. So Substance, divisible, Organiz'd, Artificial is what we commonly mean by an Engine, or Artificial Machine.

§ 5: And whereas Accidents, Modes, &c. have so very great a share in forming our more distinct Ideas, (tho' they are often only imply'd in a Substantive, which is us'd for the comprisal of all the Superior abstracted Natures and Characters: we shall, a little, open some of the more Remarkable Attributes, which serve to divide, or distinguish the Kinds, and Constitute or make up the Sorts, or the Individuals; and whilst we find it more Convenient to express them in the Concrete (*i. e.* with the Connnotation of a Subject) it will not be Difficult, to abstract the Attribute, in taking it up alone by it self, omitting the Intimation of any Subject to which it belongs. Thus *Simplicity* is the bare Attribute abstracted from *Simple*, which designedly presents to the Mind some or other Subject, together with the *Simplicity*, which gives it the Denomination of Simple.

§ 6. The Attributes of Things might here be consider'd, either as affecting Substance it self, and that either immediately in in self, or mediately thro' the Accidents, Modes, &c. which affect it, whether Internally, or Externally: Or else as if they affected only some Accident, Mode, &c. without any formed Consideration had of the Subject, tho' the Abstract Notion, to which (as if it were a Substance or Being of it self) we ascribe this or that farther Attribute was indeed Originally taken from some or other Substance. As *Humane Reason*, which we are here endeavouring to Guide Right, and to make more Ready; as also the *Virtues* and *Vices* treated of in *Ethicks*; the Forms, Relations, and management of Civil Government, in *Politicks*; the Kinds and Sorts of Natural Being in *Physicks*; what belongs more generally to Being or its primary Distinctions in *Metaphysicks*; the Nature of Diseases, Herbs; and Drugs in *Medicine*; Number, Measure, and Figure, in *Mathematicks*; the way of performing this or that Operation in *Mechanical Arts*, or other like Occupations; and whatever Objects there may be besides of *Science* or *Arts*, whether Learned or Vulgar; in all these we form to our selves Abstractions, from what is existing
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in some or other Being, and having so done, we consider and treat of them, as if they were distinct Beings of themselves: But the Discoursing of these and the like Abstractions belongs to the several Disciplines, which have them for their Objects or Subjects.

§ 7. What I shall farther do, as to the Attributes of Things, is only to speak very briefly of some other observable Abstractions, as they may stand connected with each other, and some of them leading on to others. What seems first and most inwardly to affect Substance and other Subjects of Tho't, are the abstracted Accidents of *Simplicity* or *Composition* with the various Modes thereof, which may be seen (at least some of them) under the Head of Combinations. That there is a sort of Substance compounded of Parts, and Particles we well know, and may Reasonably, or indeed must, believe, there also is Simple and uncompounded Substance; this we call Spirit, the other Body: This therefore is perpetually *Divisible* at least in Conception, that altogether *Indivisible*, or *Indiscerpible*.

§ 8. *Infinite*, or *Finite*, belong to Being and Attributes; the latter Imports a *non-ultra*, or Bounds, the other, that there is still somewhat endlessly farther.

§ 9. *Activity* and *Passibility*, are also distinctive Characters; the first belonging to some Creatures, the latter to all, and to them only, for the Creator cannot be any ways alter'd by any Creature or by himself; whereas the most Active Creatures come Passively into Being with their various *Abilities* for Moving, or otherwise Acting, and *Capacities* for being mov'd or otherwise alter'd.

§ 10. These are call'd *Active and Passive Powers*, both which (we conceive) belong to Finite Spirits, which are able to move themselves and some other Beings, and are also capable of being mov'd by some more Powerful Agent, for they may surely be constrain'd or drawn to quit their Place, as also to Perceive, Consider, Remember, &c. and can likewise freely set themselves so to do. But Body seems only to have a *Passive Power or Capacity*, tho' often said to move some Thing else; and 'tis true, other Things may be mov'd by means of a Body thrust upon them, or drawn with them, if it be fastned to them.

§ 11. Much of what we conceive in External Sensible Objects, or internal Ideas objected to our Minds, as a Power of so Affecting us, is really nothing but a Capacity or Fitness, to be so Perceiv'd, Imagin'd, Remembred, Conceiv'd, or Consider'd by us, when our Minds are, or have been excited

to attend thereto, by some Motion of the Exterior Organ, together with the Spirits, Nerves and Brain, by means of the Sensible Object, or somewhat proceeding from it.

§ 12. What passes in us, which we consciously know, or may reasonably conclude, is not to be conceiv'd as an Attribute of the Sensible Object, but of our own Bodies and Minds; and such things are indeed Affections and Actions belonging to our Natural Capacities, and Abilities, but we can by no means Distinctly or Intelligibly describe them, to one that hath known nothing of them, nor any Thing like them.

§ 13. As to what there may be distinct from us, which is the Cause or Occasion of the Affection or Action within, it may be either, (1.) The Active Power, or Effective Will of God, which can so Affect us, and put us on so acting when he pleases, either by himself immediately, or by second Causes, and sometimes, perhaps, it may be. (2.) The Agency of some created Spirit, which, by God's Commission, or Permission, may move our Spirits, affect the Brain, and excite the Mind to attend, and may also present certain Appearances inwardly to the Imagination, or outwardly to the Eye, Ear, &c, and thereby to the Mind; or, (3.) Sensible Objects themselves, having a Natural Capacity and Fitness to be so variously perceiv'd by us, either by reason of some difference to us inexplicable in the matter of their smallest Particles; or if (as it is more generally thought by the Learned) all Matter be Fundamentally and in it self alike, the occasion of our being so variously Affected with it must then be either some Presence and Power of a Spirit attending it, or (which we take to be the Truth) only the various Shape and Size of the Object, and of its Compounding Parts and Particles; the various ways of their Being put together (as in Water, Metals, Stones, Flesh, &c.); their various Motion or Rest (as in Water, or a piece of Ice), together with the various Accession or other Contingencies which may happen inwardly amongst the Particles, or outwardly to the Surface of the Sensible Body.

§ 14. And here there are, (1.) The various Effects of Light Refracted and Reflected from the Object. (2.) The Vibrations, or Undulations of the moved Air, or the Repetition (as some will have it) of Cracks and Pulses therein, by reason of a tremulous Motion in the Sonorous Body. (3.) Subtile and Spirituous Particles omitted, or rather forced out by the Moved Air, or Wind from Odoriferous Bodies. (4.) The Separation of Saline Particles by the Tongue from Bodies,

Bodies, that have Savour or Relish. (5) The Occasion of our Feeling may be either some Parts or Particles in our own Bodies uncommonly Mov'd, or otherwise affected, as in the sensible Pleasure or Pain, which proceeds not from without; or else the various Application of our Bodies, to the gross Substance of the Tangible Object, or of that to our Body, as in Touching, Pressing, Grasping, Bearing, &c. on the one Hand, or in Piercing, Cutting, &c. on the other. We have here express'd the more immediate Cause, and intimated the more Remote, by virtue of which, Sensible Bodies are capable of being so or so perceiv'd.

C H A P. XI.

§ 1. **T**HE Sensible Qualities in Objects, or appertaining to them, are certainly the same in themselves; and yet they do not affect all Men alike (or even the same Man at all Times) by reason of the various Disposition of Body and Mind: Yet the greater part are commonly so far alike as generally to have like Perceptions of sensible Things, so far as they can be compar'd; and we must therefore account ours to be Right, when they fall in with the generality of such Persons, as appear to be in good Health; and of sound Understanding; tho' perhaps we cannot be absolutely Sure, that others mean exactly the same Internal Perceptions, as we do by *White, Sweet, Smooth, &c.*

§ 2. And we can less certainly Judge, what are the very Attributes in Things themselves, or about them, wherewith others, or we our selves, are so affected; tho' 'tis highly Probable, they may be Reduc'd to some or other of the foremention'd Heads; but it is left to Natural Philosophy to search out, and Determine more Particularly, what Contexture of sensible Bodies themselves, or what Accession or Contingency about them, may be the Cause or Occasion of this or that Effect in us, which may be said in some sort, to belong to the sensible Objects, as it is depending on them, tho' not existing formally in them,

§ 3. But there are certainly belonging to Matter or Body such as the following Attributes, *viz.* (1.) *Extension*; or a sort of Quantity which has its parts continued or conjoin'd; and permanent or existing together at once; and whereby that which is extended, has one Part without or beyond

another, so as to reach farther than a Point: It is commonly call'd Magnitude, and account is usually taken of it by a determinate Measure drawn from somewhat in Nature as a *Foot*, a *Palm*, or *Hand*, &c. Now if the Extension be consider'd, as reaching only length-ways, 'tis Linear or a Line, and *that* either *straight*, as proceeding still directly onward by the straightest way from the first Point to the last as $a—b$ or Curve as Declining continually from, or drawing towards that nearest way, as $c—d$, $e—f$, or mix'd, which partly keeps in that way, partly goes off it as the Hyperbolical Line $g—h$, the hooked Line $i—k$, &c. If the Extension be consider'd as reaching, not only length-ways, but breadth-ways too *i. e.* transverse, or sideways from the Length, 'tis then *Superficial*, or a Surface, which is either Plain and Flat, Convex and Swelling towards us, Concave and Sinking from us, or Compounded, whether of two, or of all the three Sorts: But when the Extension is consider'd, as running out transverse or sideways from the Surface, it is *that* of Body, or of Space at least, consider'd as reaching so far in Length, so far in Breadth, and so far also at the same time in Height, or Depth, or Thickness, according as the third Dimension may be somewhat diversely observ'd, as from this side to that, from the Bottom to the Top, or from the Top to the Bottom: Hither may be refer'd,

§ 4. (2.) *Solidity*, where the matter of the Body it self reaches thro' the Space, which contains it, or that the Pores and Hollows are however less observable; *Concavity* where it is otherwise, as in a Bottle, Drinking-Glass, &c. and which are near a Kin to Solidity and Concavity. (3.) *Fulness*, where there is some sensible Matter filling up the Space; and *Vacuity*, where there is none, or what is not so observable.

§ 5. (4.) *Figure*, which is Magnitude so or so terminated and bounded; and it is either *Superficial*, as in Triangles, Squares, &c. or *Solid*, as in Cubes, Globes, &c. Now Measure and Figure may be consider'd, either as to an intire Body, or as to its grosser Parts, or finer Particles, and in respect of these, there is also belonging to Body,

(5.) The way and manner of Composition and Contexture, whether by *Contiguity*, as in Water, or *Continuity*, which may be either more or less firm, with a tougher or more brittle Texture, without or with Pores, and these more or fewer, uniform or differing, greater or less, &c.

6. Position, either of the whole Body in respect of something else; as Eastward, Opposite, Sideways, &c; or of the Parts among themselves, as in Sitting, Standing, &c, or of the Particles towards each other.

§ 6. We have before observ'd, that there are Abilities or Active Powers belonging to Finite Spirits. Our Minds, with which we are better acquainted, than with other Spirits, have not only the *Capacity* of being mov'd and Affected by means of the Body, but also the *Ability*, or *Active Power* of Moving and Affecting; as also of designed Thinking, Enquiring, Forming, and Objecting Ideas to it self, and Reflecting thereon, Acquitting or Condemning our Selves, Turning from this Object to that, committing to Memory by repeated Tho't, or otherways, and calling more distinctly to Remembrance, what we do in part Remember, Acquiescing in what is Evident, Questioning the Truth or Goodness of Things, and suspending its Assent or Consent, Considering, and Concluding, Choosing, Refusing, and Resolving; Exciting, Moderating or Suppressing the various Affections or Passions of Complacency and Dislike, Desire and Aversion, Hope and Fear, which may arise into Assurance and Dispair, as has been observ'd. Now these several Powers of our Souls may be consider'd as so many Accidents with their various distinguishing Modes, and their several Exercises.

§ 7. By way of Participation, the Body also may be said to have certain Powers; amongst which, that of Propagation is most considerable, depending upon a differing Make of Body in Male and Female, and seems to be ordinarily attended with somewhat of a differing Temperament and Genius; there is also the Power of Speaking, Singing, Writing, &c; Tho', strictly speaking, the Bodily Organs and Parts, have only the Passive Power or Capacity of being so us'd, whether by some Agent without us, or by the Soul within.

§ 8. And whereas in this latter Respect, some of the Capacities here mention'd, are someways Improvable, there are therefore *Bodily Habits*, as of Speaking distinctly and readily, Singing Tunably, Writing Fairly or Swiftly, Moving Gracefully, Working Artfully, &c: And there are yet more considerable *Habits*, *Intellectual and Moral*, belonging more directly to those Powers of the Soul, which are capable of Advance, in their becoming more Perfect, Easie, or Ready; as *e. gr.* to the Apprehension, Invention, Memory, Judgment, Conscience, and Choice, to the three last of which, do chiefly belong the Habits of Virtue and Vice.

§ 9. And as the Powers in themselves may be more or less Perfect, so likewise the Habits have their Various Degrees, as well as differing Originals, for they may be either given more immediately by God, in our Creation, at our Birth, or Afterwards; or else be acquir'd (some of them at least) by our using proper Exercise, and other Means: The Tendency towards a fixed and confirmed Habit may be call'd a Disposition.

§ 10. There are farther belonging to Spirits, as well as Bodies *Ubity*, or Place, whether *Actual* where they are, which is either Indefinite as *somewhere*, or determin'd by reference to somewhat before known, or now declar'd, as *Here, There, Near, Far off, at York, &c.* Or else *Potential* Noting the Term, *whither* they tend, or *whence* they are, as *Hence, Thence, to York, from York, &c.*

§ 11. There is also belonging to created Spirits and Bodies *Time*, i.e. either the time *When*, which has relation to some Point of Time before known, or now declar'd; or *How long*, which Notes Duration, and refers to some known Measure of Time, most commonly to some certain and equable Motion, as of a Clock, Watch, or the Heavenly Bodies, or of the Earth, and this is call'd *continued flowing Quantity*, as Magnitude is call'd *Permanent*.

§ 12. There is also Number, for Angels and Souls may be counted as well as Bodies, and this is call'd *Discrete Quantity*, as being made up of unconnected Parts, which here are Unites, but even *One* it self may be consider'd as a Number, answering to the Question, *how many*, as Really as one Thousand. Number may be said to be *Potentially Infinite*, as being infinitely Increasible, but for that very Reason, a Number cannot be given which is actually Infinite, since it will always admit of an Addition forward, as well as Diminution backward from one to $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, &c. It may be Noted, that in whole Numbers and Fractions, the Unites are of differing Natures and Value from each other.

§ 13. There is, yet farther, *Habit*, or (if I may so speak) *Habition*, which is or may be us'd to denote only the Relative Denomination of Possessing, being invested with, or otherwise having this or that Substance, and is express'd by the Extrinsic Denomination, which arises thence, as being Cloth'd, Cover'd, Guilded, &c. and even an Angel may be said to be Habited, suppose with an Aery Vehicle, or to be Hous'd, as really as a Man: And the Soul to be Embodied, as well as the Body Animated. Finally, *Local Motion*, or the affect of being mov'd *in* or *from* the Place where the Body,

Body, or Finite Spirit is, Upward, Downward, Hither, Thither, &c.

C H A P. XII.

§ 1. **WE** are next to consider, IV, This or that *Relation* of whatever farther Degree, *i. e.* what is refer'd, and the manner of Reference. Now the Subject of a Relation may be any Thing whatsoever, under any of the foregoing or following Heads; for every Thing may be refer'd to every Thing besides, and even to it self, as otherwise consider'd.

§ 2. As to the ways of Reference, they are vastly Numerous, and in some sort Infinite, since every Particular Being and part of it, every Sort, every Kind, and every farther Kind, in respect of every Thing in them, or any ways belonging to them, may be refer'd severally and jointly to every other Particular Being or Part of it, to every Sort, Kind, farther Kind, and even to themselves, and that in respect of every Thing in them, or any ways belonging to them, severally and jointly. All we can here Undertake, is *first* to observe somewhat of Relation or Relative Denomination in General, and *then* of the Kinds to which all or most of them may be reduc'd.

§ 3. *Relation* (suppose of Like, Unlike, Equal, Friend, Foe, Master, Servant, &c.) is not any Thing formally existing in the Subject, or Relative, which is refer'd to the *Terminus*, or *Correlate*; yet it is virtually there, in the Substance, Accident, Mode, &c, which is the Ground, Foundation or Reason upon which it may be refer'd to this or that, under such Consideration and Relative Denomination, as Like, or Unlike, Equal, &c. All there is of these in the Subject, is only a Capacity and Fitness, whether Immediate or Remote, for its being so or so Consider'd and Denominated, upon comparing it with, or refering it to this or that.

§ 4. Relation is therefore a kind of a Potential or Virtual Mode, which the Mind represents to it self, as if it were actually in the Subject; whereas there is only, as we have said; a Capacity or fitness for its being so consider'd; which is no other than somewhat, which either goes to constitute the Subject, or is some farther Accession to it; and whilst it is, in its self, but one and the same, yet may afford

Ground for many very differing, and even contrary Considerations and Denominations; as of Equal to this, Unequal to that, Like, Unlike, &c. We must therefore, by no means, Imagine that the *Relative* has any Diminution, Addition, or Alteration at all upon its being conceiv'd as Less or Greater, Like or Unlike, Father, Master, Son, or Servant, &c; but that the Subject of such Relations may be in its self just the same as before.

§ 5. And yet Relation, how little soever there may seem to be in it (if any thing at all of Physical Entity) is no doubt a Subject of Tho't, and that not of the lowest, but often of the highest Consideration and Use for directing our Estimate and Carriage. Thus God's being related to us as our Creator, tho' it no ways alters him, yet is of mighty Consequence for the Directing and Engaging a fit Behaviour towards him. Our Duty to God and Man, together with the value and use of Things, do's mightily depend upon Relation, and that even whilst the Relation it self, does often depend upon somewhat Transient, and that perhaps actually past, as upon Action in the Efficient Cause, and Passion in the Effect; where the Relation abides whilst the Relative and its Correlate continue, tho' the Ground of it be not now otherwise in Being, than as it is Tho't of and Consider'd.

§ 6. The Subject, or what is refer'd, under its Character *as refer'd*, is the Relative; The Term, or that to which the Reference is made, under the Character in respect whereof the Reference is made to it, is the Correlate. Those Characters on each hand, imply the Ground and Reason of their being so refer'd, or referable, that to this, and this again to that. When we consider *Alexander* the Great, as the Son of *Philip*, *Alexander* is the Subject of the Relation, imply'd together with its Ground by [Son], which intimates his having been begotten by *Philip*, and imports the *Son-ship* therein founded; and whereas *Philip* is referable back again to *Alexander*, under the Character of [Father] this Intimates his having begotten *Alexander*, and together with that the *Paternity* therein founded.

§ 7. Relations may be only *Implicite*, viz. such as are less directly attended to, whilst the Things themselves to which they belong are more directly and chiefly observ'd; as in this or that Substance, Accident, Mode, &c. 'tis the Absolute Thing we principally mean, when yet there is a Relation imply'd together with it, by the very Nature of the Thing, or at least in our manner of Conceiving it, for whereas, we cannot enter far (if at all) into the absolute Essence of Things,

Things, we supply that Deficiency, as we can, by considering them in a way of Reference to somewhat else.

§ 8. These implicate Relatives seem to be design'd in what Logicians call *Relata secundum dici*, *q. d.* Relatives, that may be so call'd; but it seems, that there is somewhat more in the Case, and that they must, or should be so call'd, if we look into them, since for instance, the Nature of Finite Substance, Accident, &c. implies a Relation, which is, perhaps less attended to: And in all Attributions there is involv'd a Reference to some Subject, to which they belong; tho' it may be obscur'd with an absolute Name: Thus Wisdom, Power, Goodness, &c. as well as Wise, Powerful, Good, &c. imply some fit Subject to which they belong, and also proper Objects which they Respect: Combinations, Separations, Abstractions, Expressions, do also imply a Reference to the Things which are Combin'd, &c.

§ 9. But besides these, there are more explicite Relations, wherein the Reference and respect of Things is more directly and chiefly attended to, whilst the Things to which they belong, are but indirectly and less Principally regarded. And these are either of a more *Peculiar*, or *Common* Nature. By *Peculiar*, I intend Personal Relations, which also are of two Sorts; for there are some, which we may call *Similar*, when the Relation is mutually alike on both sides, tho' perhaps not exactly, as betwixt Friend and Friend, Enemy and Enemy; and here, tho' the Ground of Reference, and the Reference it self be alike, and have the same Denomination, yet it is not the self same. Thus Friendship (the *Abstracted* Relation), and, its *Concrete*, *Friends* (*i. e.* Persons, together with the *Abstract* Relation) are founded in Special and Mutual Intimacy, Affection, and Trust; *Neighbours*, in Nearness of Habitation; Strangers in Non-acquaintance; Enemies in Mutual Disaffection; Contemporaries in their being of the same Age, or Time; Fellow Students in pursuing like Studies together; Brethren and Sisters in being Sprung of the same Parents, &c.

§ 10. There are other Personal Relations, which we may call *Dissimilar*, where the Foundation is differing on each Hand, and consequently the Relation from the one to the other, *e. g.* that of *Creator* and *Creature*, founded in Absolute making on one side, and being so made on the other; Parents and Children, in the Natural producing and being so Produc'd; here the Relations are founded, as in many other Cases, in Transient Action and Passion, which (as we observ'd) is actually over, when yet the Relation continues;

tinues; That of *Sovereign and Subject, Teacher and Learner, Master and Servant, &c.*, are founded in Consent, and Obligation to the various Duties on either side, only the Consent is not always that of the Person for himself, but may be by such, as have Right to Transact for another, whether by *his* Appointment, or *that* of some Superior Authority.

§ 11. There are also *Common Relations*; which may refer either Persons or Things to each other. And we may here consider, first of all, *Identity and Diversity*; *Identity*, or *the same* (which is the Identity with its Subject) is when that which is one Thing in it self (at least in the Main) is under differing Circumstances, or Attributes refer'd to it self, and consider'd as being (nowwithstanding such difference) the same, or self-same, not another. As *Peter*, in Age, is the same Person, who was sometime Young; *London-stone*, the same now in the Street, as it was before in the Quarry. Things which we call the same, as agreeing in their Kind, or Sort, or in some other Respects are rather to be consider'd as Like; and tho' they should Resemble each other, not only in all that is Essential, but also in what is Accidental (as two or more Guineys may do) yet they are not to be accounted properly the same, but divers and *Differing* as Logicians speak) *in Number*, since they may be counted so many (viz. two or more) as well as if they were unlike, whether in respect of various Accidentals only, or also of Essentials.

§ 12. There is a sort of *Diversity* belonging even to Identity; for the Considerations and Formalities are diverse from each other in respect of which, the same Person or Thing is compar'd with it self. *Peter*, as a Child is not the same with *Peter* as a Man, but diverse and differing from him. But there is a greater diversity of Persons and Things (as we have intimated) which only resemble one another, how great soever the Resemblance be, since the one of them is not the other.

§ 13. The mentioned sorts of Diversity might be accounted the lowest Degrees of *Opposition*; since even the differing Considerations and Formalities belonging to the same Subject do not agree to it at the same Time, or however, not in the same Respect: And those may be call'd *opposites*, whereof the one is not the other; nor can they agree to the same Subject at the same time in the same Respect and manner, but Logicians commonly reckon only the following sorts of Opposites, (1.) *Relatives*, viz. Such as are more direct and explicite. And here even Like is oppos'd to its Like, and Friend to his Friend, as well as Dissimilar Relatives, such as Prince to his People, Less to Greater, &c. (2.) *Dissimilars*,

parates, where one is equally and in the same manner oppos'd to diverse, as a Man to an Horse, Lion, &c. 3. *Contraries*, where only one Affirmative attribute is oppos'd to another; and these are diametrically opposite, as being the most remote Sorts under the same Kind: Some of which have one or more middle Attributes betwixt them, *partaking* of both Extremes, as Hot and Cold, have Lukewarm; Black and White, have Green, Yellow, &c. But some admit of no such Mean, as Odd and even Numbers. 4. *Primitive and Positive* affections, as Blindness is oppos'd to Sight; and here as in diverse of the foregoing Oppositions, there may be a *Medium of Negation*, or what is not reducible to either Extreme, as Motion is neither Sight, nor Blindness. 5. An *Affirmative and Negative*, which admit of no Medium, either of Participation or Negation, as *e.gr.* either it is Day or not Day; a Man or not a Man, &c.

§ 14. The Terms in Opposition are mutually and equally Opposite to each other, which Men, who differ in their Sentiments and Interests ought so to consider as to Moderate their Resentments towards each other.

§ 15. Farther, to shew how some observable Relations are Founded, *Equality* and *Inequality*, are commonly understood to respect Quantity, *i. e.* Measure, Number, Duration, or Degree, (as of Heat, Weight, &c.) but they are sometimes extended to Condition, Character, &c: Things are also consider'd as being in a *Lax Sence*, *Like or Unlike*, upon these or any other Account whatsoever, wherein they Agree or disagree; but these Relations more strictly taken, refer only to Quality, *i. e.* to such Accidents, Modes, &c, as make their Subject to be of such or such a Nature, not of such a Size or Degree. *Near or Distant*, are Relations founded in Place. *Collateral, Parallel, Converging*, (or inclining) &c, in Posture, *Simultaneous*, or *Cotemporary*, in Time, and all Relatives *as such* are indeed Coexisting with their Correlates; Parents and Children do begin and end their being *such* together.

§ 16. Relations, which have the same Name, and are founded in somewhat common, are not the self-same; nor always just alike, tho' resembling each other; it might seem that the distance of two Places, since it is the self-same Ground lies betwixt them, must be all one either way, when-as from that to this it may be Uphil, from this to that Downhil; easie to find forward, and yet difficult back again by Reason of the Turnings which may go off Acutely: As there is no danger of missing the Way from *b* to *a*
but

but only from *a* to *b*, in regard of the Turnings that go off acutely, or near the straight Line. $a \approx \approx \approx b$

§ 17. What is absolutely expres'd, may yet be Relatively design'd as *Great*, i. e. Greater, and it is ordinarily understood much Greater, than what we have in View. *Little*, i. e. Less; a Mouse is Little, if I think of a Mountain, Great, if I think of a Mite; a Peer is Great in respect of a Peasant, Little to a Sovereign Prince; here the Relation is founded in Condition, or (Civil) Quality, there in Quantity or Magnitude: *Many*, or *Few*, (i. e. More or Fewer) in Number, *Long*, or *Short*, (i. e. Longer or Shorter) in the Measure of Time, or Way, or other Extension, *High* or *Low*, (i. e. Higher or Lower) in Scituation or Condition: *So*, *Heavy*, *Light*, *Cold*, *Hot*, *Strong*, *Weak*, *Wise*, *Foolish*, &c., are to be understood as being considerably more so in Comparison with some other Subject of present Discourse or Tho't: But in such Cases the Correlate is not distinctly attended to.

C H A P. XIII.

§ 1. I Shall a little more fully consider the Relative Notions of *Accidental*, *Essential*, and *Proper*, where there is on one hand the Subject of such Attribute, and on the other the Attribute it self. This is refer'd to that, as being *Accidental* (or *Contingent*), *Essential* (or *Constituent*), *Proper* (or *Consequent*), and the Subject may be back again refer'd to the Attribute, as being thereby *Affected* so or so; and (if I may so speak) *Accidentated*, *Essentiated*, or *Propriated* by it.

§ 2. *Essential* and *Accidental* are Relative Modes, Expressing what is beside or belonging to the Subject of our Tho't or Discourse precisely taken, as it was perhaps Stated, or Design'd, or at least as it should have been: That may be consider'd as only *Accidental* to this or that Thing, which yet may generally belong to the Sort, and is, perhaps, Naturally Inseparable from it; but however the Subject may be well conceiv'd without it: Whiteness is indeed *Essential* to a White-Swan, when we consider it *as such*, yet not so *Essential* to a Swan, as if it must cease to be that sort of Fowl, if by Miracle, Art, or otherwise its Colour should be chang'd.

§ 3. That

§ 3. That is *Essential* to any Thing which belongs to the Principal, Fundamental, and Summary Account thereof, and without which it cannot be rightly conceiv'd: As the *Matter* of which a Thing is made, and the *Form*, whereby it is distinguish'd from other Things, which have the same sort of Matter: *This* in a Shilling is Silver-Money, and its Form the Weight, whereby it differs from all Silver-Coin of a lower and higher Value: In Man the Organiz'd Body is his Matter, and a Soul capable of Religion, his Form, when he is Physically consider'd according to the Natural Parts of which he is made up; but in a Logical and more Notional way, taking what he has in common with Brutes, whether in Body or Soul, we call him an *Animal*, or Living Creature; and considering what do's chiefly distinguish him from Brutes, we may say, that he is *capable of Religion*: The former expresses his *nearest Kind*, the latter is his *Specifick Difference*.

§ 4. What is *Proper* to this or that, may be either, (1.) Every Particular belonging to it in respect of its Particularity; for tho' Substance, Accident, &c. be not proper to this Man, yet *this* Substance, *this* Accident, &c. are so. Or, (2.) Such a Combination of the Sorts of Substance, Accident, &c. as is no where else to be found: Or, (3.) Somewhat less Complex, which is indeed Peculiar to this or that Kind or Sort, but not belonging to all the Sorts of that Kind, or Particulars of that Sort; as the Power of Walking to Living Creatures, or being a Printer to Man, or, (4.) What is Peculiar, and at some Time or other actually belonging to all the Sorts and Particulars: Or, (5.) What is always so belonging, and this must be either Fundamentally Essential (which might be call'd Proper) or necessarily connected with what is so, and it is this last which Logicians call *Proprium Quarto Modo*, and is commonly understood to be the *Property* of this or that; as *e. g.* The incomparable heaviness of Gold; and that a Right-lin'd Triangle has its three Angles equal to two Right ones.

§ 5. A farther observable sort of Common and Dissimilar Relations (is that of *Prior*, and *Posterior*, or Foregoing and Following. Now Things are *so*, either in respect of Time, or Dignity, or Value, or Disposition, (i. e. the placing of them) or their appearing to us, or in the Nature and Constitution of Things themselves, as the Cause is before its Effect in order of Nature, however it be in Time; and the more general Natures or higher Attributions, before the more Special and Particular; The separate Things before their Combination,

bination, (tho' they might be created together); The Total Effence before its Part, *as such*; The Thing signified before its Sign; and that which is related, before that which is consider'd as its Correlate: The Former of all these being *Pre-suppos'd* to the Latter.

§ 6. *Subject*, and *Adjunct*, are a farther sort of Relatives, the Adjunct is an Accession to the Effence of that Thing, which is the Subject; but not when it is consider'd as being the Subject thereof, for so *that* Adjunct is Essential to it, as Adjunct in General, is to Subject in General. Now the *Adjunct*, either, (1.) agrees to the entire Subject, or else, (2.) Only to a Part of it Properly, when yet it might be said of the whole, in case that part were very considerable. Man is absolutely speaking, *Mortal*, his Frame being dissolvable, when we consider him as compounded of Soul and Body, yet may be conceiv'd as *Immortal*, when we consider him with an Eye to his Soul: and here, what we may Ascribe to the whole, understanding it in Reference to a Part only, must not however be ascrib'd to the other Part: We may not conceive the Body Immortal, tho' the Man be so in some Respect.

§ 7. The Adjunct may be, (3.) An Accession *in* the Subject, as this Whiteness in this Paper; or (4.) *Out* of it as this Paper is the Adjunct or Object of my Sight: Reason is the Object or Subject about which I am here Employ'd.

§ 8. (5.) A Sign may be consider'd as adjoin'd (*viz.* by its resembling Nature, by Appointment, or by common Usage) to the Thing signified, which therefore it brings to Mind. (6.) A Circumstance is conceiv'd as lying without the Subject, and not entering its Effence, and yet may be in the General Necessary to it, as *some* Time, *some* Place, *some* Gesture is, *e. g.* to Baptism, whereas the Sign of the Cross is a Ceremony, not a mere Circumstance, much less a Necessary Circumstance.

§ 9. Lastly, We may here consider *that* so Eminent Relation of the *Cause* (by means of which somewhat is) and *Effect*, or the Thing Caus'd: And here one Thing may sustain both Relations under differing Respects; the *End* (the Thing for which, and it may have a Person for whom; as an House is for Habitation, and this for an Inhabitant) is a Cause as it is design'd, and Excites to Action, but an *Effect* as it is obtain'd. The *Matter* from which a Thing is produc'd (as Plants from Seed) or of which it consists, and also the *Form* (that which distinguishes this from that) are Effects as they are introduc'd and laid together, Causes only as their

Effence,

Essence, not any Active Influence of theirs, Enters and Constitutes the Effect.

§ 10. The *Effect* has this Name from the Principal sort of Cause, the *Efficient*, by the more proper force whereof the Thing first is, or is *Preserv'd*, or *Alter'd* or *Abolish'd*, and in this last Case, the Effect is either merely the *not-being* of the Thing, when 'tis Annihilated, or together with it the *Being* of somewhat else instead thereof, As an Heap of Rubbish upon the blowing up of an House; here the Form or Fashion only is destroy'd, the matter Remains.

§ 11. God is the *first and Absolute Efficient*, as his Glory is the Ultimate Final Cause: Creatures are only *Secondary and Depending Causes*, amongst these, some are more *General Efficients*, Concurring to many very differing Effects at once, as the Heavens and Sun. *Remote Efficients* do immediately Produce only that which is the Cause, or perhaps only the Cause of that Cause, &c, and they do but give Occasion to the farther Effect, unless they did indeed produce the proper and direct Causal Force, whereby that Effect was after Produc'd, as *Adam* propagated Men with a Power of Propagation.

§ 12. He is an *Accidental Efficient*, who Effects what he did not intend, and the Thing is also so call'd, which Effects somewhat besides its Natural Tendency.

§ 13. He is a *Principal Efficient*, Physically, who has a Principal part in working the Effect, as an Architect or a Master-Workman; and *Morally* he may be so call'd, who employs Men as his under Agents, and perhaps other Instruments, which are then said to be *less Principal Causes*, and these last do not properly *Act*, but are *Acted*, as those also are, which they call *Necessary Causes*, but indeed less observably, for we discern not by what Means the Fire is forc'd to Burn the Fuel.

§ 14. He is a *Natural Coefficient*, who directs, or otherwise assists, he is *Morally an Efficient* (so accounted, and to be dealt with accordingly) who perswades another, and may be call'd *Causa Procatartica*; that which inwardly Disposes and Incites, *Proegumena*; as the Desire of Gain in a Workman.




§ 15. To all these Relations we may here subjoin those of *Analogy or Proportion*, wherein one Relation is compar'd with another Relation, and said to be *like* (e. gr. as a Pilot is to a Ship, so is a Governour to his Province) or to bear such *Proportion*, whether *Arithmetically*, where the difference is the same (as 2 is to 4, so 3 to 5) or *Geometrically*, when

one is so often contain'd in another, thus, as 2 to 4, so 3 to 6.

C H A P. XIV.

§ 1. IT remains that we consider, V, This or that *Expression*, i. e. both *what* is or may be us'd for that Purpose, and in *what Way*, or with what kind of Significancy, and whence it is. And here we may, by Mistake, apprehend our selves to express, what really we do not; for our Mind, being possess'd, with the Sense we are designing, is in Danger to take up with almost any way of Expression, to which we our selves can affix that Sense, without attending, as we ought, to the Laws and Rules of Speaking, according to which others are like to proceed in taking our Meaning: To avoid this, is a Matter of so great Consequence, that I have design'd to treat more solemnly of it, when I shall come to shew how we may be helped, not only rightly to take what others deliver, but *justly* to express what we our selves intend: And that the way may be better opened towards both those Purposes, I shall here consider,

§ 2. I, What may be the *Matter* of Expression, or Things employ'd to Express other Things: And indeed the various Matters both of the foregoing Scale, and of that we are here upon may serve to that Purpose. Perceptions, Imaginations and Conceptions are, to us, the Internal, Natural, and primary Signs of other Things; and what Men go to express in Words, or otherways, is but some or other Apprehension formed in their Minds: But then they may endeavour to set it forth either by some *Substantial* Representation, as *that* of a material Image resembling the Body; or the Soul of Man, as it may bear some faint Resemblance to God; or by some *Accident* as the Divine Understanding and Will may be shadow'd out by what we find of that sort in our selves; or by some *Mode*, as of the moved Air in Speaking, or of Lines so form'd in Writing; or by the *Mode of a Mode*, suppose some particular Posture of this or that Figure, as if we should express Stability by a Cube Horizontally plac'd, or Instability by a Triangle standing upon one of its Angular Points, or the Year (as usually) by the Figure of a Snake turned round; or else Things may be express'd by *Action*, as in our forming Imaginations, or Conceptions, to our selves;
pointing

pointing the way to others, &c; or by *Passion*, as in the Imaginations, or Conceptions impress'd upon us, or an Involuntary Change of the Countenance thro' Fear, Guilt, &c, or by *Privation*, as if I would express unfinish'd thus,  by three Lines Triangularly plac'd, but the Angles not form'd, or thus  by a Ring unclos'd; or by *Negation*, as if I make a Line that is not so long, as another under it = to signify unequal, or two Lines not inclining to express Parallel thus, ; or by some *Formality*, as when the greatness of Divine Love is set forth by Breadth, and Length, and Depth, and Height, *Ephes.* 3. 18. or else by Supposition, or *Fiction*, as if Divine Providence were represented by an Hand, with an Eye in it, issuing from a Cloud; and in this Instance we have both a *Combination*, and also a *Separation* employ'd.

§ 3. The matter of every Sign, is always the Subject of a *Relation* to the Thing Signify'd; and all our common Ideas (which are Internal Signs) are plainly so many *Abstractions* from the distinguishing Forms and Characters of Things: Finally the Pictures us'd in Hieroglyphical Representations (as in those above, of the Year, and of Providence are doubly Signs, whilst the Things so represented, are design'd to signify somewhat farther; and it has been observ'd, that Short-hand Letters are the Signs of those, which are more commonly us'd to signify Sounds, and our Meaning by them; or the Things we Mean.

§ 4. External Expressions are such as are designedly presented and offer'd to Sense, or which do, however, lye open to it, and they may affect either, (1.) The Smell, as if some fragrant Spice were offer'd to give us some Idea of the Smell of such a Flower; or, (2.) The Taste, as if one sort of Food were presented to acquaint us in some measure with the Relish of another; or, (3.) The Touch, as if I jog another; so expressing my Design to awaken him, or to excite his Attention, or speak to a Deaf Man in the Dark by Motions upon his Hand and Fingers; or, (4.) The Hearing, whether by Sounds that are Inarticulate, and of a less distinct Signification, as in Sighing, Shouting, &c; or Articulate as in formed Speech, the most usual Expression of our Thoughts; or, (5.) The Sight, and this either by what is more Natural, but of less distinct Signification, as in Weeping, striking the Breast, lifting up the Eyes and Hands, Pointing, &c; or else by what is Artificial, and here it may be by a more obscure Intimation, as in Hieroglyphicks, and in the Cryptical ways of Writing, which require some peculiar Key to Explain them.

§ 5. But the more clear and usual Expression to the Eye, is by Marks that are more commonly known, however in this or that Country, and to them who can read the Language, to which such Marks are accommodated; and these are either of less frequent Use, as in what we call Short-hand or Characters, expressing Letters, or whole Words (as Bp. *Wilkins's* Universal Character) or, perhaps, Sentences; or else the more usual, in Long-hand, which is distinctly adapted to the several parts of Articulate Sound, in so many Letters as make up the Alphabet, or intire Set in this or that Language; and of these either singly taken, or variously put together, fewer or more of them, with Repetition or without, are made Words, Clauses, Sentences, Periods, Paragraphs, (or Sections) Chapters, Books, Volumes, and entire Treatises, without any danger of exhausting the Numberless Words, which may be drawn out of the 24 Letters in the *English* Tongue, or out of fewer in some other Languages.

§ 6. Now single or double Vowels in Speaking, are Form'd by divers ways of opening the Mouth; and Consonants along with them by the various Moulding of the Vocal Breath, or Air employ'd in Speech, by means of the Throat, Palate, Tongue, Teeth, Lips, and Nostrils: In Writing they are made of Straight, Curve or Mixed Lines, Printed or otherwise mark'd upon Paper, Parchment, Metal, Stone, or other fit Materials, and of Old, upon an *Egyptian* Reed, or Waxed Tables.

§ 7. Writing, and especially Printing, has in some Respects the Advantage of Speaking: In Printing, when once the Letters are Set, or Plate Engraven, a Number of Copies are easily and speedily Wrought off, containing the same Words, Letters, Figures, Points, Lines, and other Marks, all of the same Size and Shape: What is Printed or Written is capable of abiding, whereas the Sound in Speaking, is a Transient Thing: There are also some differing Words, which are not distinguish'd barely by the Sound, but are differently Written, as *Wills* (to *Write*) *Right* (Claim) *Rite* (or Ceremony); nor can we, by Speaking, communicate our Mind at a greater Distance, or without the Privy of those within Hearing: But then,

§ 8. In Speaking, our Sense is more easily and readily Communicated and Receiv'd, as also in some Cases better Apprehended, and more Impressive, since the Accent and Manner of Delivery may often serve to determine the Sense, and to enforce it; besides that, the well modulating of the Voice,

Voice, and a becoming Gesture in Speaking, may render what is said much more acceptable than otherwise it would be. Having thus touch'd upon the matter of Expressions, We may proceed to consider,

§ 9. II, What is the Form of Expressions or Signs *as such*: Now this is the expressive Force or Significancy, which belongs either to *Things*, as Images, Pictures, Models, Writing, Sounds, &c. or to *Tho'ts*, when they are us'd by the Mind it self, or utter'd in Words, which seem to be more immediately expressive of *Tho'ts*, even when they are farther design'd to lead to *Things*. Musical Notes added to Words may be sometimes expressive of suitable Affections, or of a desire to excite and engage them: But as many other Sounds carry no design'd or determinate Sense, so there might be a Number even of Articulate ones without meaning; but they would be capable of having Ideas affixed to them by Usage or Agreement.

§ 10. The most Proper and Regular Use of Words is to express the inward Sentiments we really have, and to inform others what we apprehend of Persons or Things; and they are therefore *morally True*, tho' they should not be *Physically* so, not representing Things, as really they are in themselves, but only as we conceive them to be. But Words, or other agreed and determinate Signs, are capable of being abus'd to express Matters otherwise than we apprehend, and still they may be call'd Logically True, if they do but truly represent what we design'd to Express, tho' not what we really Tho't.

§ 11. The parts of Words, as parts, do not signifie. [*Ascribe*] might be taken in pieces so as to make *A Scribe*; but *a-in Ascribe* is not the Note of Particularity, nor *Scribe*, the Name of an Office; only the entire word is Significant.

§ 12. Signs have their expressive Force, either, (1.) From their own *Nature*, (*viç.* more Remotely), where there is somewhat in or belonging to them antecedently to the Usage or Appointment, which fits them to signifie some other Thing, as being, either the Counterfeit and disguised Resemblance thereof; so falsify'd Coin, is really but a Sign, tho' intended to pass for the Thing it self; or the appearing Representation, whether it be Artificial, as a Picture, or Natural, as a Cloud may resemble Wool (from such as these are drawn Metaphors, wherein like is put for its Like); or else some other Relative, as implying its Correlate, thus the containing Cup, is us'd to signifie the Liquor contain'd, and the Author's Name put for his Book, &c. This Rhetor-

ricians call a Metonymy, but neither this nor the foregoing Trope is to be us'd where there may be danger of Mistake, and that we could be suppos'd to mean the very thing we mention.

§ 13. Or, (2.) From *Institution*, more immediately, as the Water in Baptism expresses the Virtue, or Justifying and Sanctifying Influence Proceeding from our Redeemer's Death; And its being apply'd to the Body by an Authorized Hand, signifies God's conferring the Benefits of Redemption on the Person Baptiz'd upon the Terms, and according to the Tenor of that Covenant, which Baptism has Relation to, and is the Confirmation of: Thus also the Subscribing, Sealing and Delivering of Writings are Signs, by Law appointed, to express and ratify the Consent of Parties, touching the Matters therein contain'd, and to oblige, even those for whom a Consent is regularly given, tho' incapable of Consenting for themselves.

§ 14. Or at least, (3.) From *Usage*, which comes in a while to have somewhat like the Force of Institution, or rather to be a kind of Tacit Agreement, among such as cohabit in the same Country, or use the same Language; so that, in Speaking or Writing to each other, they do at least make a shew of Expressing their Minds according to the *known and usual Import* of the words in *such Language*, and in *such Circumstances*; for 'tis not only the Sound and Spelling of Words, but also the Accent in Speaking (as in *Ironical Expressions*) and Manner of Writing, and in both, the Persons Speaking and Spoken to, the Subject Matter, the Scope, &c. which are to be regarded as helping to Determine the Sense, according to what is usual in those Respects; unless there should be a Peculiar and Express Agreement, between some Persons at some time to vary from the common Usage, and betwixt themselves (suppose it were) to put *yea* for *no*, &c: or else that there be some Peculiar Reason, which is also fairly suppos'd to be known on both sides, which may in some Cases draw the words us'd to an uncommon Sense: Thus it may be queried, whether in Law, and at a Trial the Meaning of [Guilty or not Guilty] be not only this [dost thou confess thy self Guilty or not?] since upon pleading [not Guilty], as if the Prisoner should say, [I do not confess my self Guilty] 'tis then ask'd [by whom wilt thou be Try'd] and also that the *Oath ex Officio* has been taken away, as standing in opposition to the known Maxim, that no Man is bound to accuse himself.

C H A P. XV.

§ 1. **WORDS** may be, as to their Sense and Meaning, either *Principal*, such as express the Sum and Substance of our Ideas, or *Accessory*, and less Principal, which intimate only some smaller Appendage thereof, which yet may be in some Cases of very great Importance: Such are a Number of *Particles*, which in our *English* Tongue may be seen with the various ways of using them in a very useful Book, compos'd by Mr. *William Walker*: Particularly there are the *Articles*, [*a*, and *an*] mostly noting an indeterminate Particularity or Unity; [*the*] commonly determining the Kind or Kinds, Sort or Sorts, Particular or Particulars: as also *Prepositions* importing some or other way of referring this to that; but [*of*] is sometimes only a Note of Explication or Specification, as in saying the *City of London*.

§ 2. The more Principal Words employ'd to express either our Single Apprehensions, or the Judgments we make about them, may be reduc'd to some or other of the Chief amongst the following Sorts. (1.) *Noun-Substantives*, which express what is or may be the Subject of some Attribute, *viz.* Substances, as also, Abstracted Attributes, and Concretes consider'd, as if they were a kind of Substances, and which are (in our way of conceiving Things) the *Substratum* and Support of some farther Appendages. *Thing*, *Being*, *Somewhat* express our most Fundamental Ideas; *God*, *Substance*, *Accident*, *Mode*, &c. take in some Attributes together with the foregoing, which yet are not to be conceiv'd as equally belonging to all of these: *World*, *Book*, &c. express Combinations of Things, as *Head*, *Feet*, &c. their Separations; and *Paternity*, *Greatness*, &c. their Relations. Abstractions, *viz.* the Kinds and Sorts of Things, are express'd by *Appellatives*, as *Man*, *Horse*, *Stone*, &c. and Individuals, either by *Proper Names*, as *Adam*, *Bucephalus*, *Towser*, &c. or the Appellatives someway limited and determin'd, as *this Man*, *that Horse*, *the Man who*, &c.

§ 3. (2.) *Pronoun-Substantives*; as *I*, *ye*, *it*, &c. which serve instead of the Substantives, to which they relate. These two sorts signify by themselves alone, most other Words must be join'd with the one or other of them, either express'd or understood; because they signify the Attributes of Things in Concrete, or the Modification of those Attributes, or the differing ways of joining Things or Attributes

one to another, as will more particularly appear under the following sorts, such as,

§ 4. (3.) *Noun-Adjectives*; which distinctly express only the Attributes of Things in the Concrete, with a general Intimation of some Subject to which they belong, as *Male, Hard, Three, &c.*

§ 5. (4.) *Pronoun-Adjectives*; which are either *Relative*, calling over again what was before mention'd, as *who, which, this, that, &c.*; or *Possessive*, expressing Possession or Title, and intimating the Subject thereof, as either speaking or spoken to, or spoken of; as *Mine, Ours; Thine, Yours; His, Hers; Its, Theirs.*

§ 6. (5.) *Participles*; a kind of Verbal Adjectives, which give a Peculiar sort of standing Denomination, from Action or Being, whether Absolute (as, *existing*); or some way determin'd (as *Lov'd, Fear'd, Read, &c.*) intimating withal, the Time, Past, Present, or Future, together with some or other Subject sustaining such Denomination.

§ 7. The Sorts hitherto mention'd, do, by Virtue of their *Singular* and *Plural Number*, express or agree to one or more; the *Greek* and *Hebrew* have also a *Dual*, which signifies precisely two. *Oblique Cases* (*viz.* the *Genitive, Dative, &c.*) serve to intimate some of the various *Habitudes*, and *Relations* of one Thing to another. *Genders* are to express the Sex, as it may be *Male, Female, Undetermin'd, Common, or Doubtful.* The *Neuter* should belong to all things that have no Sex, but Custom has almost unaccountably given the *Masculine* to some of them, the *Feminine* to others; to some both; to Adjectives (not without Reason) all the several *Genders*, under one, two, or three *Terminations.* The *Articles* beforemention'd belong to Nouns, and have been in some Measure explain'd.

§ 8. (6.) *Verbs*, which do plainly and directly *Affirm*, either the Action or Being (whether Simple and Absolute, or someway determin'd) of what is consider'd, as *Speaking, Spoken to, or Spoken of* in Past, Present, or Future Time; They do also insinuate, or are adapted to a certain manner of *Affirming*, *viz.* Absolutely by the *Indicative*; conditionally, intentionally, eventually, or intimating Obligation, Ability, or Desire, by the *Subjunctive, Potential* and *Optative*; Authoritatively, or Persuasively by the *Imperative*; Indeterminately by the *Infinitive*, which is, as it were, unbounded, *i. e.* not limited to this or that Person, &c. all this, or more, *Latin Verbs* do signify by the various *Terminations* of their *Voices, Persons, and Numbers, Moods, and Tenses*; which
in

in *Greek* are yet more Numerous and Nice, where there is a *Dual Number*, a *Middle Voice*, and *more Tenses*, than in *Latine*; yet the *Hebrew Verbs* do still in some Respects exceed the *Greek*, as passing thro' *divers Conjugations*, with so many differing Turns of their Import, and intimating, in some of their Personal Terminations, whether the Subject design'd were *Male*, or *Female*.

§ 9. The *English*, *French*, and other Living Languages, do mostly supply the want of such Variations by the *Auxiliary Verbs*, *Am*, *Have*, *May*, *Can*, &c. The Latin *Gerunds* seem to be a sort of Participles in Oblique Cases; and their *Supines* a kind of Substantives, or else Variations of the Infinitive Mood. The Verb Substantive [*Am*] doth generally express Absolute Being, or else Identity, or being the same; as when we say, *God is* (*i. e.* God is existing); *God is Good* (*i. e.* the same with what is good, or a good Being).

§ 10. (7.) *Adverbs*; which express some farther Mode superadded to what is imported by the Verb, Adjective, Participle, or other Adverb to which they are join'd, *i. e.* a more Definite Time, Place, Degree, Manner, &c. There are also Adverbs of affirming, and denying, which serve instead of repeating the Verb and Sentence Affirmatively or Negatively (as, *Yes*, *i. e.* *it is so*, *No*, *i. e.* *it is not so*).

§ 11. (8.) *Prepositions*; which intimate this or that Reference of one Thing to another, and help to supply the want of Cases in some Languages, and of more Cases in others.

§ 12. (9.) *Conjunctions*; which signify the Combination, or Separation of single Themes, and of the Judgments made about them (as, *and*, *or*, &c); or some various Relations of the one to another, *viz.* by way of Identity or Explication (as, *viz.* *Name'y*, &c); likeness or Proportion (*like as*, *so as*); Opposition or Exception (as, *but*, *except*, &c); Condition or Supposition, (as, *if*, *suppose*, &c), Causality (as, *for*, *because*, &c.) Consequence (as, *now*, *then*, *therefore*, &c); Order (as, *First*, *Second*, *next*, *after*, &c): It may be observ'd, that some Words, which commonly pass for Adverbs, are rather to be Accounted,

§ 13. (10.) *Interjections*; which express some less common Motion of the Mind in a Compendious Manner, as, *Oh*, *i. e.* *I am hurt*; *'t*, hold your Peace, &c.

§ 14. This Variety of the sorts of Words saves the Trouble of Inventing and Remembling an almost endless Variety of particular Words, which would be Necessary if there were only three Sorts, *viz.* a Number of *Noun-Substantives*, Sufficient to express all possible Subjects, that are

to be Tho't or Spoken of, under all their various Relations and Considerations; *Verbs* to answer all that could be Tho't or said of them; and *Conjunctions* to express all the possible References of one Sentence to another.

§ 15. Words are taken, either *Materially* for the Sound or Writing, or *Formally* for the Thing or Tho't, thereby intended; and there may be one thing more *directly* meant, and at the same time another connoted *more Obliquely*, as *Just* intends him that hath Justice more Directly, Justice it self Obliquely.

§ 16. Again, Words are taken, either *Largely* or more *Strictly* (and so the *World* may signify only *Men*); *Literally*, *Properly*, and *more Usually*; or *Tropically* and *Figuratively*, whether for want of proper Words, or else the more to Affect or Please.

§ 17. Farther, Nouns Appellatives may be Understood, either *Collectively* for all of that Name, or *Distributively* for each, or for some of all the Kinds (and thus all Creatures were in *Noah's Ark*) and also either *Absolutely* or *Simply*, for the Nature expres'd by a Word which is common to all of the Kind or Sort, or else *Respectively* for the Nature, as it is common, so *Man* is a Species, and *Adam* in that Sense is not a Man, as not being the Species, or common Nature, but an Individual.

§ 18. Appellatives may signify more Things, either *Univocally* and *Equally*, just in the same Sense, or only by *Analogy* and *Unequally*: as *Being*, when we Affirm it of God of Creatures, Substance and Accidents, &c.

§ 19. Some Words in most of the abovemention'd Sorts are Ambiguous, having differing Senses, and are in Effect so many several Words; sometimes by the more Common and *Literal* usage of them as a *Crab* for the Fruit, and *Fish* so call'd; often by *Figurative* Acceptation, and thus the same Words *Ironically* us'd may signify the quite contrary to what they commonly do, as, *Orare Man, you have taken good care indeed!* But very often they have a differing Sense, as when the Eye is call'd the *Light* of the Body; and *Virgil* the *Sun* among the Poets.

§ 20. Some differing words are *Synonymous*, having the same Sense, and are in Effect one Word, as, *God, Deus, &c.* &c. but there are comparatively few, even in several Languages, which do so Exactly and Adequately answer each other, as not to leave out or take in some or other differing Attribute, whilst they agree in the main; much less are there many in the same Language, that are exactly of the same Import.

§ 21. Words

§ 21. Words are also either *Simple*, or *Compound*, i. e. made up of the Simple; but put together commonly with some small Variation, that they may Sound the better: Their Sense is, or should be likewise compounded, but Usage often carries it otherwise; so that an *Ink-horn* may be made of other matter besides Horn, if it serve but for the like Purpose.

§ 22. Again, they may be *Primitive*, or *Derivative*, and this either, as to the Matter or Form, the Sound or Sense: The more Abstract Word is in this latter Consideration the Primitive; thus *Wisdom* is the Primitive of *Wise*, *to be Wise*, and *Wisely*; which are Words of the same Stock or Kindred, and may be call'd *Conjugates*, or *Paronyms*.

§ 23. It is to be observ'd, that Words do not signifie so much according to their Notation or Etimology, as Usage; so that you may sometimes give an Account of the Word, without mentioning the Thing, and there is however, a defining of the Name, which is but a kind of pointing out the Thing thereby intended, without explaining it, so that it may be Necessary that the Thing designed should be afterwards distinctly open'd and explain'd.

§ 24. As to the *Syntax* of Language, or the way of putting Words together into Sentences, it serves only to intimate by *Corresponding* Cases, Numbers, Persons, Genders, &c. how the Words and Things therein signified are to be refer'd to each other; that so we may find the Principal Subject or Thing spoken of, with what belongs thereto, as also the Predicate or Attribute spoken of it, with its Appendages; which, together, make up the Proposition or Sentence, wherein we expressly pronounce one Thing of another, and of which I shall farther speak hereafter.

§ 25. Thus we have gone thro' those Principal Heads of Matter to some or other of which we conceive every Subject of Tho't, at least as they are singly taken, may be reduc'd, and have endeavour'd to guide the Mind into right Apprehensions about them: And thus also we have consider'd Things *Logically*, as the Objects of Humane Tho't, which when it cannot grasp them at once, is constrain'd to take them, as it can, under the differing Faces and Appearances they carry to our Inadequate and partial Views.

C H A P. XVI.

§ 1. I have been thus far endeavouring to lay in some Furniture of those Ideas, wherein there is nothing expressly affirm'd or deny'd of any Thing: But single Notions without Connexion or Disjunction, are like to be of little Use, unless we have also some Principles of Reasoning to proceed from and recur to. I would therefore farther add a Scheme of general *Principles*, together with some nearer *Deductions* from them; or a *Set of Positions*, which may be, 'tis hop'd, of considerable Service towards the using of our Reason more readily, as well as rightly.

§ 2. Now some of these might seem to be already giv'n us, with the Intuitive Faculty, whereby we are capable of discerning an Evident and undoubted Agreement or Disagreement betwixt some of our Single Ideas and others; as also a plain and undeniable Consequence or Inconsequence from what is affirm'd or deny'd to the affirming or denying of somewhat farther.

§ 3. That we should have such a Power is altogether Necessary; and that the Author of Nature hath accordingly bestow'd it on us is equally certain by general Experience and Observation. Yet it follows not thence, that we brought along with us into the World those complex Notions or Principles, which we can Form or Apprehend, as unquestionable, so soon as we are acquainted with the Simple Terms, and have them together in our View; no more, than that the visible Appearances were *Innate*, or born with us, which the open Eye can so early take in and represent to the Mind, when the Objects are before us.

§ 4. And tho' we virtually have the first Principles of Knowledge, in the mentioned Power, yet it follows not, that nothing of these should be expressly laid before us; but that it should be altogether left to the intuitive Faculty, either to form them, as there might be Occasion, or to proceed, without them, upon the immediate discernment we may have in particular Instances, as a Child will very soon apprehend, that the half of an Apple, offer'd him, is not so much as the whole, and that both the halves together are All of it, without considering or having first known the general Principles, that a Part is less than the Whole, and that All the Parts together are equal to it.

§ 5. But

§ 5. But certainly such general Positions are a Nobler kind of Truths, much more extensive, and at the same time no less Sure or Satisfactory for their being so: They are also Eternal and Immutable, whereas the created Instances had their beginning and may cease to be; and tho' in viewing these, we may indeed be sufficiently sure, that the Matter is so, yet we may not be equally satisfied, as when the general Principle is apply'd to the particular Case: And *that* in the mention'd Instance would plainly tell us, it is not the less capacious Figure of the Half-Apple, or its being just a Moiety, nor any other Reason, but its being only a Part, which makes it to be less than *its* Whole.

§ 6. The *Positions* here design'd, may not only serve as the finishing Strokes, and fastening Points of our Reasonings, but as so many Inlets to Argument, and as it were Keys, that may open to us large Treasuries of Knowledge, if once we can but dextrously use and improve them, so as to deduce a manifold and continu'd Series of Consequences from a single Position; such as may be drawn from some of those at least, which will here be selected, and set in Order.

§ 7. Now the general Principles here offer'd, with some nearer Deductions from them are so many several Positions, which will be severally mark'd with one or more Letters of the *Alphabet* in a continu'd Order thro' the whole Set, for the greater Convenience of referring to any of them, if Occasion require, and also for inserting any others in any place, where they would most properly come in, by adding a Number to the Letter or Letters; as if the Reader should see fit to add a Position after that which is mark'd (H), he might mark the new one, thus (H₂); and if he would add another after that, he might mark it (H₃), and so on: If he should add any farther Positions after (Km) he might mark them, Km₂, Km₃, &c.

§ 8. The Positions here, will be either of a more extensive, or of a more limited Kind: The more extensive will be in a sort Universal, and some of them a kind of common Measure to divers of the more limited ones; we may call them *PRELIMINARY*, such as those which follow.

(A) We must *begin* with something, that we may *proceed* to something farther; and particularly in pursuit of Knowledge, something must be *presuppos'd*, or nothing can be *pro'd*, i. e. something must be taken as right and sufficiently certain without Reasoning, or nothing can ever be made out, as certain, by it.

(B) There

(B) There must be Steps in every Procedure, which lye so close together, as to admit of no intervening Step between them: And as to the Progress of Knowledge, there must be some Positions so connected or disjoin'd in reference to each other, as to admit of nothing intermediate to make out the *Consequence*, or *Inconsequence* from the one to the other. Now, in the foregoing and present Point, it is plainly imply'd, that

(C) There are some Positions, which must be taken as True, and others as False; and also some Consequences to be admitted as Good, and others to be rejected as Bad, purely upon their own account, without any Proof needful or possible to shew the Truth, or Falshood of the Position, the Goodness or Badness of the Consequence: Therefore

(D) We may reasonably demand something which must be *granted* by those with whom we converse upon any Point; nor is there any discoursing with them, who will admit of nothing as fit to be granted, but insist upon having Proof for every thing whatsoever; when at this rate there could neither be any Beginning in the way of Inference, nor any End in that of Proof; no going forward from any Principle, or backward to it. And therefore,

(E) Men should see they be *agreed* in Something, either more nearly, or distantly relating to the Matter in Hand, before they go to *Dispute* or *Discourse* about it.

(F) Things must be taken as right or wrong, and either way as sufficiently certain, where neither we nor any one else (so far as appears after due Consideration and Enquiry) can see any Reason to the Contrary; or so much as seriously to doubt thereof.

(G) Whilst any thing *is*, or *is such*, it necessarily *is*, and is also necessarily *such*, nor can it be, *so long*, otherwise. So that,

(H) Every Thing is the *Self-same* Thing with it self. And,

(I) The *same* Thing has at the *same* time all the *same* Attributes. And, on the contrary,

(K) That must not be the same, but another Thing, which hath at the same time any one *differing* Attribute.

(L) What is any way related, must relate to something. Therefore,

(M) Every Relative, *as such*, supposes its Correlate, or somewhat to which it is related. And therefore,

(N) There

(N) There is no Attribute, but *as such*, implies a Subject capable of it, to which it is or may be attributed. A Suit of Cloaths does imply (not indeed as they are Cloth, but as Cloaths) some or other Body, on which they are or may be put.

(O) An inhering Attribute *as such* implies an agreeable Subject wherein it must inhere.

(P) An existing Attribute, *as such*, must have a Subject that actually exists. Yet,

(Q) An inhering Attribute may be consider'd without our considering the Subject wherein it inheres : As Length, without the Way, or Cord, &c. that is long.

(R) The self-same Attribute cannot inhere in two differing Subjects at once.

(S) The self-same inhering Attribute can't pass out of one Subject into another. And from this with the foregoing, it follows, that

(T) Where there is any one Attribute the self-same, at the same time, there must be likewise all the other cotemporary Attributes of the same Thing.

(V) That must be taken for the same Body, which is either not chang'd at all, or only by a slow Succession of smaller Parts or Particles.

(W) Every Position must be either true or false, and cannot be both at once under the same Consideration. (*Vid. G*)

(X) What is not altogether true may be called false, as it really is in such or such respect. But,

(Y) What is in some sort False, should not be call'd True without mentioning in what respect it is so.

(Z) No Position or Inference can rightly be both affirm'd and deny'd at once, and in the same respect. We cannot truly say both, that the Sun now Shines upon this Spot, and that it do's not ; or that from the Sun's Shining here, it follows both, that it is day here, and that it is not so. Therefore,

(a) Contradictious Positions, (wherein the same thing is affirm'd and deny'd of the same and in the same respect) must be one of them true and the other false. But,

(b) We cannot safely determine, which part of a Contradiction is True, and which of them is False ; till we have sufficiently examined the Matter, where need requires, on the one side, or on the other. Yet,

(c) When it is Necessary or Requisite to proceed upon the one or other part of a Contradiction, we must go upon that as true, which appears to have the greater Weight of Argument

gument for it, and may suppose the other to be consequently false. Now,

(d) To the greater weight of Argument it is not requir'd, that there should be a greater Number of Proofs or Reasons, but only that they should be such, and so many, as may justly be esteem'd to have the greater Force. And,

(e) We must look upon that, as sufficiently made out, where the kind and cogency of the Proof is agreeable to the Nature of the Thing, and Exigence of the Case, and that it can't be reject'd without admitting some Absurdity.

(f) As to Contradictious Inferences, tho' one of them must be in it self a Truth, the other a Falshood, yet neither may be Good or Just, but both of them inconsequent and impertinent.

(g) In what is *True*, all Things do indeed agree to each other, however it might seem: But *Falshood* may admit of somewhat really inconsistent, even under a seeming Agreement.

(h) From Truth, nothing *really* follows, but what is True. But,

(i.) Truth may sometimes be *deduced rightly* from Falshood.

(k) It do's not sufficiently prove the truth of a Notion, or Narration, that there is nothing inconsistent in the Matter, nor any thing which is false deduced from it: But yet on the contrary,

(l) There must be so much, at least, of Falshood, as there is of Inconsistency, and that must be someway false, from which any thing that is so can be *regularly* drawn.

(m) What carries its own Evidence with it, and needs no Proof may not yet be clear without attentive Consideration; nor perhaps without being explain'd, and illustrated to Persons of lower Capacity, or who are not sufficiently acquainted with the Words, or Matter.

(n) Where Proof is needful, it is to be given by something more Evident, than what we would prove, or at least, which may, and accordingly must, be made so.

(o) What is known by those, we would Satisfie, to have been sufficiently prov'd, may be employ'd for the proving somewhat farther; tho' not back again in a Circle for the making out of *that*, which was brought to prove it; however not to the same Person, on the same Occasion, and without other sufficient Proof: As when the Papists pretend to argue first the Infallibility of their Church from Scripture, and then assert the Bible must be taken for the Word of God, and so understood

understood upon the Infallibility of their Church so prov'd (as they would perswade us) by Scripture.

(p) Proof may be either *Fundamental*, without which a Point cannot stand, or only *accessary* by way of farther Confirmation.

(q) The Confuting somewhat of a Proof is not the Overthrow of what was thereby prov'd, unless that Proof were Fundamental and absolutely Necessary to it.

(r) Meer difficulties, tho' they can't be solv'd, disprove not that to which they are objected. But,

(f) What is really absurd or false, proves that to be wrong, from which it follows, (*Vid. h*)

(t) Mathematical Principles, or those which relate to abstracted Quantity may be accommodated to things of a very differing Nature, in respect of their Habitude, Number, Figure, Measure, Degree, Value, or other Consideration, which is of a Quantitative sort, or some way corresponding thereto.

(u) Nothing can be *One and More* in the self-same Respect, or under the same Consideration. But,

(w) What is *more* in some Respect may be but *One* in some other: And on the contrary,

(x) What is but *One* under some Consideration may be *more than One* under some other. The Triangle, which is but One, as a Figure, is yet three-fold as to the Angles and Sides belonging thereto: and the Humane Soul, tho' but one Spirit, is yet a three-fold Principle, in respect of Growth, Sense, and Reasoning; and might, perhaps, be supposed to be all this in Relation to three distinct Bodies.

(y) Not only every Thing, but every Part and every Point thereof, may be severally refer'd to every several Part and Point of the same Thing, and also to every other Thing, and to every Part and Point thereof. The Center respects every part of the Circumference and Interspace, as these again respect the Center: The Head is refer'd to every part of the Body, and the several Parts of this to that.

(z) A Boundary, *as such*, is no part of the thing bounded by it, as a Point, of the Line; or a Line, of the Square; or an Hedge, of the Field.

(Aa) The greatest Part of any thing is less than the Whole. As 11 d. $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{8}$ and so onward, will always be less than a Shilling, tho' it come always nearer to it.

(Ab) All the Parts taken together are equal in *Quantity* to the whole, tho' not always in Value or Use.

(Ac) All

(Ac) All the Parts agreeably united, are the Thing it self.

(Ad) Things may be said to be of the same lowest Sort, whose Agreement is more considerable than their Difference ; as a straight and curve Line ; an obtuse and acute Angle ; Adam and a Female Infant.

(Ae) That which comprehends less of the Nature in any Kind, is or may be extended to more Sorts or Particulars of that Kind. A Line belongs to every Magnitude ; an Unite to every Number ; existence to all that actually is ; and Thing to whatever is not altogether nothing.

(Af) One Equal or Like, may *in reasoning* be substituted or put for another, in the Respect wherein it is Equal or Like.

(Ag) Things do so far agree together, as they severally agree to the self same Thing, or to Diverse in the respect wherein these agree.

(Ah) Things are differing in *that* Respect and Degree, wherein any of them do agree to somewhat else, whilst the other disagree.

(Ai) The greater Quantity in any Kind contains the lesser of that Kind, whether it be Measure, Number, Weight, Degree, Value, &c.

(Ak) Things that are *alike* affected, retain their Inequality or Equality, Likeness or Unlikeness, as before ; whether they were affected with a like Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, Division, or other Alteration.

(Al) Persons or Things may be made Equal by taking off from the Greater, so much as it exceeds, or by adding to the Less so much as it falls short ; or else by transferring one half of the Excess from the Greater to the Less : But if the whole be transferr'd, this will become so much greater as it was before less.

(Am) Persons or Things unlike may be reduc'd to Likeness by the Alteration either of one, or of the other, or of both, so far as to meet in some intermediate Point.

(An) There can be nothing greater than what is every way Infinite. But,

(Ao) Where there is only no end of the Divisibility, Duration, or Advancement of divers Things, there may yet be in reference to some of them an earlier or greater Beginning, so as that which is only in some respect Infinite may be some way exceeded by what is likewise Infinite in some respect only : the Duration of the first Soul may exceed that of the last, which shall come into being by many Thousand Years,

Years, when yet the Duration is endless, and in that respect Infinite on both Hands; yet it must be own'd, that the difference bears no Proportion to the Agreement.

(Ap) What one or more do attest in Matter of Fact may be taken for right, where there is not sufficient Ground of Suspicion.

(Aq) What many Persons of differing Interests, Sentiments, and Circumstances do severally Report, is to be depended on as morally Certain.

(Ar) Words must be taken to signify according as they are generally us'd in such Circumstances, or as they may be otherways Specially determin'd. And,

(As) It may be demanded, that Words be understood in such a Sense, as is expressly given to them: But then,

(At) The Sense given to any Word or Phrase, ought to be still held to by him, that hath so determin'd it, unless he shall some-way fairly intimate; that he would afterwards have it otherwise understood.

(Au) The most obvious and usual Meaning is to be taken, where there is no sufficient Evidence, that the Word or Phrase was intended otherwise. But,

(Aw) What is really design'd by any Expression, is always to be taken for the Sense thereof, where that can be any way sufficiently known, tho' it were not the most usual or proper Import of the Words.

(Ax) Every one must be allow'd to know best, what he meant by this or that Expression. And,

(Ay) Every Man's own Explication of what he himself hath said, is to be admitted as his Meaning, where there is no good Reason to the contrary, from the Nature of the Thing, Connexion of the Words, Character of the Person, or other Circumstances.

(Az) There may be many differing Names or Denominations belonging to the same Thing under differing Considerations or Relations: And on the other hand,

(Ba) The same general Name or Denomination, may belong to many differing Things, under the Consideration or Relation, that is common to them. And farther yet,

(Bb) The same Special Appellation may be given to divers Persons, or to Things of differing Sorts, either arbitrarily, or upon some Resemblance, Analogy, or Relation amongst them.

(Bc) Differing Words in differing Languages, and sometimes in the same, may be us'd to signify the self-same Thing. Yet,

(Bd) Words that may be us'd to signify the same thing for Substance, do often import some differing Mode, together with it.

(Be) Words have the more precise Détermination of their Sense from the Language and Dialect, to which they belong, the Discipline and general Matter they refer to, the Person which uses them, and manner of using; together with the Circumstances of the Occasion, Time, Place, &c.

(Bf) To justify an absolute Denomination, there must be a sufficient *Intension* or degree, *Extension* or Extent, and *Protension* or Continuance of that which denominates.

(Bg) To justify a Comparative Denomination it ought to hold *generally* and between the *Corresponding* Sorts, Parts, Actions, &c. Women may be rightly said to have a weaker Constitution and stronger Affections; tho' it hold not of some particular Women compar'd with some Men; if it be but true as to the generality, and in comparing together those of the highest Class, or the most observable in those respects on either hand, and so to proceed with the Middle and the Lowest.

C H A P. XVII.

THE more limited Positions do either lead towards the Knowledge of Things, or contain some fundamental Points thereof: And as to the former, which may be call'd *INTRODUCTORY*, these here following are offer'd.

(Bh) Only that which is one way or other *Somewhat*, and *as it is so*, can be truly said, to have, or do, or suffer, or belong to, or to be any thing, or so much as properly to *be* at all.

(Bi) What is actual or existing can only be attributed to what actually is or exists.

(Bk) I am unquestionably *someway* affected, even in doubting; and therefore I unquestionably am.

(Bl) Nothing of it self could ever rise into something. Therefore,

(Bm) There never had been any thing at all, if there had not always been Something. And,

(Bn) My Being and Faculties, which have not been always, must be from some pre-existing Cause or Successive Causes which will carry us up to *somewhat Uncaus'd*.

(Bo) No-

(Bo) Nothing can really produce what is of a Nature Superiour to its own.

(Bp) What is produc'd must be someway suitable to the Nature, or however to the Power, that produces it.

(Bq) Where somewhat of a differing Nature is produc'd, it must be inferiour to that which produces it.

(Br) Whatever we find excellent, or truly valuable in our selves, must be from somewhat corresponding in the Nature or Power which has Originally produc'd it, but is Superiour to it in every Point, wherein they differ.

(Bs) What is uncaus'd must have a Necessary Essence and Existence, and cannot therefore cease to be or suffer any real Change.

(Bt) Upon consideration, we cannot but apprehend, that our Maker must be Powerful, Wise, Good, and every way Excellent, beyond what we can comprehend.

(Bu) We cannot consistently suppose that our Almighty, Alwise, and infinitely kind Creator could have any Interest to serve, or Inclination to gratifie, either by laying us under a Necessity of being always deceiv'd, or allowing us no Means of knowing, whether we be or no.

The Positions, which contain some of the fundamental Points of Knowledge (considered in themselves) do either only inform the Mind, or guide the Man. As to the former sort, which are more purely *SPECULATIVE*, I have singl'd out such as follow :

(Bw) Our Mind, Imagination, and outward Senses, in their proper State and Use, may serve to inform us rightly of things, in such manner and measure as God saw fit.

(Bx) The proper State of our Mind, Imagination, and outward Senses, is their being free from such Disorders and Impediments, as would disturb or hinder the Natural Use and Exercise thereof.

(By) Our Mind, Imagination, and outward Senses are fitly us'd about their proper Objects, and in the way which Reason, Observation, and Experience direct in such or such Case.

(Bz) Wit seems to lye in the apt and ready Assembling of Ideas, and using some of them with reference to others in a way that is generally taking.

(Ca) Judgment seems chiefly to consist in penetrating into the Nature and Causes of Things, in accurately discerning their Agreement or Disagreement, especially where it is less observable; and exactly distinguishing the thing it self from what is very like it.

(Cb) A limited Mind cannot comprehend what is unlimited, or perfectly know even Finite Beings, just as they are in themselves, and by their inmost Essence.

(Cc) Imagination cannot, in a Natural way, represent the Objects of any Sense without our ever having had the use of that Sense.

(Cd) What is Indiscernible, Self-moving, and some-way knowing we may call *Spirit*, in contradistinction to *Matter* or *Body*.

(Ce) *Spirit* is a more perfect sort of Being than *Body*. And therefore,

(Cf) God must be conceiv'd by us as a Spirit.

(Cg) The Actings, which we are Conscious of in our selves, and observe in others may sufficiently Evince, that there is in Man a Spiritual Being.

(Ch) There may be also Spirits without Body above us, and embodied ones below us.

(Ci) The unlimited Spirit must penetrate all other Spirits as well as Bodies; in whom they are admitted, at his Will and Pleasure only, to live, and move, and have their Being.

(Ck) The Divine Immensity is its own Eternal and unchangeable Place, and affords Place to whatever is besides.

(Cl) Body, or Matter made up of Parts and Particles, is the Object of Senses, or the Thing sensibly perceiv'd.

(Cm) The self-same Matter may admit a Multitude of various Forms, and under them may be so many divers Things.

(Cn) The Organs of Sense by means whereof we sensibly perceive are themselves Material.

(Co) One Body or Portion of Matter can't be in the self-same place with another. Therefore,

(Cp) We cannot, by Sensation, penetrate into, or go fully thro' the Objects of Sense.

(Cq) God has not seen fit that the Humane Mind should be capable of proceeding very far by meer Intuitive Knowledge, without Reasoning; or that it should know much of things that are distant, or future, or however of Contingencies, at least in our present State.

(Cr) Our Maker has seen it best for us not to fit our Senses to perceive what is very minute, or to take in, at once, what is very large, or to discern things aright otherways than under certain Conditions relating to the Object, Medium, Distance, &c.

(Cf) Divine

(Cf) Divine Providence may deny Men some of the Means and Helps to Knowledge. But then,

(Ct) Our Reason, if well apply'd, is capable of telling us, however, upon Observation and Experience, what we may expect from our Mind, Imagination, and outward Senses in such a Case, and such kind of Circumstances. And we may rest assur'd, that,

(Cu) Our wise and kind Creator hath allow'd us in every respect what he saw convenient or needful for us in our present Condition.

(Cw) There is a *System* of things about us, which we call the *World*, and a Course of Nature or settled order of Causes, Effects, Antecedents, Concomitants, Consequents, &c, from which the Author of Nature, we may be sure, will not vary without weighty Reason.

(Cx) Nothing can properly act, by it self alone, upon any thing which is at a distance from it.

(Cy) The Course of Nature is depending on, and Subject to, the Powerful Will of God, who is present with it. And,

(Cz) God can, without breaking in upon the settled order of Things, easily give an effectual Touch upon the Minds of Men, restraining or changing their Inclinations; or giving such a turn to their Thoughts as may subserve, or comport with, what he is otherwise pleas'd to do in the way of his Providence.

(Da) What plainly appears to be above the Power of Natural Agents, or contrary to the well known Course of Nature, or very remarkably differing from what is usual in such Case, may be look'd on as a Divine Interposal, either in the way of Miracle, or of Special Providence; when it is not in any Manner or to any Purpose, unworthy of God.

(Db) Our usual and natural way of knowing God and Nature, is by ascending from Effects to the Cause of Causes.

(Dc) Any Thing, which was not before, or which begins anew must be counted an Effect.

(Dd) There can be no Effect without an Efficient Cause, whichever now is, or at least has been.

(De) Every Natural Being; and all that is good belonging to it, together with Evil that is only Penal, is from God, either immediately, or mediately.

(Df) Culpable Evil (at least, as completed) is from the rash, or ill-consider'd Choice, or Adherence of the defectible Creature left to his own Free-Will by the Creator, who made

him. Capable of a Law, and of observing it, but stood not oblig'd to afford him the farther Aid for his Security, which was neither promis'd by God, nor asked of him.

(Dg) The second and more immediate Causes of Things are oft not easie to be found out, or ascertain'd.

(Dh) What goes before, may be very far from being the Cause of what follows after.

(Di) That which *only gives* the Occasion, without which this or that would not have been, much more that from which the Occasion is *taken* when it was not given, is not properly the Cause.

(Dk) Nothing can be, in any Sort, the Cause of this or that, which is incapable of contributing any thing towards it. And,

(Dl) That cannot be the only Cause which is not capable alone of producing the Effect.

(Dm) That must be the Material, Formal, Final, or Efficient Cause, which answers the general Character belonging to any of them respectively. *Vide Chap. XIII. § 9.*

(Dn) We cannot determine of the Effect from a Partial Cause, tho' it were the Principal, much less from what is otherwise. And therefore,

(Do) Whatsoever Influence the Stars, or the Position of the Heavens may possibly have upon Affairs below; yet they can never determinately show those Events, whereof they can be no more than a General, Partial, and less Principal Cause.

(Dp) We cannot certainly know particular Effects, by considering the Causes, that operate freely, or variously in like Cases.

(Dq) The like Natural Causes, or like causal Influence, and indeed the same, will variously work upon differing Subjects, that are more or less Capable, or even upon the same, as it may be more or less dispos'd.

(Dr) Like *Natural* Causes, will have like Effects in like Cases; and proportionate Causes will have proportionate Effects, where nothing intervenes on either hand to determine them otherways.

(Ds) If we would make a Judgment in relation to an Effect, we should consider the several Causes, how they do, or would severally work, how they promote or hinder one anothers Working, and what there is in the Subject or about it to forward or obstruct their united Influence.

(Dt) To search out the probable Cause, we should carefully observe, what is the Nature of the Effect, and consequently what kind of Cause it must have; and what there is of such a kind, that is any way capable of producing such an Effect, or contributing thereto, which either precedes or attends it.

(Du) If only the Effect be taken away, somewhat of the like Sort may be expected to follow, whilst the Cause remains with a like Disposition and Causal Force. But,

(Dw) Where the Cause is taken away on which any thing do's necessarily depend, the Effect must cease.

(Dx) We may look upon this or that particular Thing to be either the Infinite Being, or Finite Substance, or Accident, or to fall under any other Head, either of the fundamental Scale, or that of Resultances, according as it answers the Character there given respectively. Chap. 6, 7, &c. to Chap. 15. *Vide (As)*

(Dy) Our sensible Perceptions can't be explain'd to such as neither have had, nor can have any thing like them, to which we may refer the Persons we would instruct about them.

(Dz) Our own Apprehensions of the same Object may considerably differ according to the various Disposition of the Body, or Mind.

(Ea) That is *possible* to be, the like whereof hath been, and which carries no contradiction in it self, nor Inconsistency with any thing else that must of necessity be. But,

(Eb) There is no Consequence to be drawn from a mere Possibility to the actual Existence of this or that thing. Tho'

(Ec) We may safely conclude, that is not, which indeed cannot be.

(Ed) The Actual Existence of a Thing, must either be concluded upon Observation, or sufficient Testimony; or else reason'd out from the necessary Connexion it has with somewhat else, the Existence whereof we are well assur'd of.

(Ee) Truth is in general an Agreement with its proper Measure or Rule. And more particularly,

(Ef) That do's truly and *really* exist, which hath, as it is *such* a Place in the World, whether it be thought on or not: Thus only Individuals truly are, and common Natures (suppose that of *Man*, or of a *Proposition in general*) do not truly exist *as such*, but only as *Thots*; or *Notions* in the Mind.

(Eg) That is truly and *indeed* such or such a Thing, which do's not only resemble it, but hath the very Nature and Essence of it, *i. e.* the Principal *Stamina*, or main Ingredients, which God hath put together in such Work of his, or Creatures in such of theirs: He is truly a Man, who hath not only the outward Shape, and somewhat like Humane Action, and Speech, but who has an organiz'd Body together with a Mind capable of Religion. That is truly and indeed a Proposition, Book, Clock, Honey-comb, which hath such kind of Parts, and so put together.

(Eh) Tho't is so far True and *Just*, as it agrees to its Object, or to what we think of.

(Ei) An External Sign is so far true and *suitable*, as it Corresponds to what is design'd, or fairly supposed to be thereby signify'd.

(Ek) Narrations and Predictions are so far true and *right* as things are therein declar'd agreeably to what really is, or was, or shall be at the time to which they respectively refer.

(El) Expression is so far True and *Proper*, as it is fitted to convey what is intended by it.

(Em) We are so far true and *veracious*, as we design to speak agreeably to what we think.

(En) We are so far True and *Sincere*, as we do seriously desire and endeavour to have in reality the Virtues, which we would appear to have.

(Eo) We are so far True and *Faithful*, as we are heartily desirous to answer our Trust and Obligations, particularly our Promises, so far as lawfully we may, in Kind or Value.

(Ep) Our Mind is capable of Satisfaction or Pleasure, and also of Pain and Trouble in the way of intellectual Conception, imaginative Representation, and sensible Perception.

(Eq) Satisfaction or Pleasure is an Affection agreeable to the Mind, which upon its own account, we could wish continu'd, at least if it would not some way turn to our greater Hurt. On the contrary,

(Er) Trouble or Pain is an Affection disagreeable to the Mind, and which on its own account, we could wish removed, at least if it would not some-way turn to our greater Good.

(Es) In *Wishing*, we desire somewhat, which we conceive, either to be beyond our own Power, or that the Acceptance or Pursuit thereof on such Terms or in such way, is not to be resolv'd upon by us, or not at present.

(Et) In

(Et) In *Willing*, we determine upon some-what, as eligible, which we conceive to be within the Power we have, or may hope to attain.

(Eu) That which moves us to Will is a comparative and prevailing Dissatisfaction with what we are, or have, or do, or undergo at present, or at least our fixed Preference of somewhat farther.

(Ew) The higher Satisfaction, or Trouble belongs to the higher Operations of the Mind.

(Ex) The Pleasure or Pain, Satisfaction or Trouble, we feel, is truly such to us, whether the Ground thereof be real; or supposed only,

(Ey) Contrary Affections may arise from the same Object; and attend upon like Ads in Persons of a differing Make as to the Mind or Body, and even in the same Person under differing Circumstances.

(Ez) That is a Natural Good to us, which affords Pleasure or Satisfaction, or has a tendency thereto; and that a Natural Evil, which puts us to Pain, or gives us inward Trouble, or is like to do so.

(Ez 2) We are not commonly so much affected thro' the Nature or Condition of Objects in themselves, as by reason of the Interest we have, or seem to have in them, and their Agreeableness or Unfavourableness to us.

C H A P. XVIII.

THE Positions which are in themselves more practical, and serve to guide the Man, are either more directly binding, or but consequentially. As to the former they may be termed *MORAL*, and some of these are here set down.

(Fa) That is to be chosen, as good for us, whatever it may be otherwise, which at last, and upon the whole Account will afford us the highest Satisfaction and Pleasure.

(Fb) That is to be shun'd, as Evil to us, whatever it may seem, or be for the present and on lower Accounts, which at last and upon the Whole will draw upon us the most insufferable Pain or Trouble, or has a tendency so to do.

(Fc) From an Estimate of Satisfaction or Pleasure, Trouble or Pain, truly and justly made, we might take our Direction what we ought to Embrace, and what to avoid: Yet we

we should not proceed upon that as our only or principal Reason. For undoubtedly,

(Fd) The pleasing of our Maker, ought in Reason to be our farthest Aim. Yet,

(Fe) In pleasing God, we are to seek, and shall assuredly find the truest and highest Pleasure. For,

(Ff) God will be chiefly honour'd and pleas'd in our being most highly pleas'd and delighted in Him. Now,

(Fg) God himself can undoubtedly give us the best and surest Account how we may please him at present, and come to be unspeakably delighted in him, and with him Eternally. And he hath done it; for,

(Fh) That Book must be from the Creator Himself, which could not be from any Creatures Good or Bad, consistently with their being so: And if it could be suppos'd that God would so long bear such an Usurpation of his Name and Authority, yet certainly he would never have so appear'd to own it, not only by extraordinary Acts to confirm and preserve that Book; but also in a whole Series of Providence, agreeable to its Predictions, and other Declarations.

(Fi) There can be nothing in the Word of God *really* Contradictory to the Reason, which God himself hath given us; But,

(Fk) It is highly *Reasonable* to admit that Supernatural Revelation should go beyond our Natural Reason, in shewing us both what we must believe, and do.

(Fl) The Holy Scriptures must undoubtedly be suited both in their Matter and Manner of Expression to their professed End of making us wise unto Salvation; and they must also be sufficient for it without any thing of additional Revelation.

(Fm) We ought to be most concern'd about Things which are of the greatest Importance to us.

(Fn) Lower Matters must all be manag'd as far as may be in subserviency to our highest End, and however, as may not be inconsistent with it.

(Fo) Our Inclinations and Aversions are naturally guided by what appears, or what we apprehend to be, at present, good or best for us. But,

(Fp) We may often have very good Reason to believe that to be really good or best for us, which for the present might appear to be otherwise. And,

(Eq) Tho' we cannot so directly and immediately govern our own Apprehensions, and command our Belief, yet in many Cases it may be consequentially and mediately done. For,

(Fr) The

(Fr) The Apprehension we have, even of Duty, is not to be presently follow'd without due Examination in Matters about which Wise and Good Men do or may differ. Yet,

(Ff) We must comply with our own Consciences, where we cannot have a reasonable Satisfaction to the contrary. And,

(Ft) Men are not to be driven against Conscience (or the Apprehension of their Duty) on pretence of bringing them by Incapacitys, or other Penal Methods to consider better. Whenas,

(Fu) The direct Tendency and proper use of Civil Coercion, and its penal Methods, is to bring Men to act what Conscience, or common Sense either do's, or may easily, tell them is their Duty without much considering of the Matter.

(Fw) Whatever is really due from us to our selves or others, is more remotely and ultimately a Point of Duty toward God. And,

(Fx) We should render to all their due (whether they may seem to deserve it from us or no) with an Eye to God, who requires it.

(Fy) The greater Abilities of Parents, together with their Natural Affection, are to supply the deficiencies of Children, during their Minority, in such a way of governing them for their good, as may, and accordingly should, be suited to their differing Age, Disposition, and Circumstances.

(Fz) The Magistrate is to be observ'd as the Minister of God, in reference to what he is in any way authoriz'd by God to require or forbid.

(Ga) The Magistrate has an undoubted Authority, as to what is really Necessary for the Civil Peace, and Common Welfare.

(Gb) The Magistrate is to be own'd and Honour'd as *the Minister of God to us for Good*, whilst his Administration is, at least in the Main, for the Publick Good; and that he is not manifestly attempting any thing, which plainly tends to the Ruin of it.

(Gc) What we may innocently let alone, we should not do, whilst we are in doubt about it; nor admit of Scruples or Suspensions against what may appear our Duty upon Grounds, which are really holding in Cases of such a Nature.

(Gd) Only such Actions and Affections as do some way fall under Judgment and Choice, are proper to be Commanded or Forbidden.

(Ge) Only such Actions and Affections as are commanded or forbidden by the Law or binding Rule, we are under, are to be accounted actually good or bad.

(Gf) That is left Indifferent, which is in no way, either commanded or forbidden.

(Gg) What is altogether Indifferent, not only in it self abstractly, but also in relation to its Circumstances, Attendants, and Consequents, may not be made Necessary unless by an Authority, which is justly absolute and unlimited.

(Gh) An Authority otherways wholly unlimited and absolute should have infinite Wisdom and Goodness to conduct it.

(Gi) Where there is no just Property or Claim, (or however none from such Person, or of such thing in Particular) there may be Kindness or Unkindness; but there cannot be anything of strict and proper Justice or Injustice.

(Gk) Charity is Justice under a more general and indeterminate Consideration.

(Gl) To be free or unforc'd, belongs to the very Essence of the Will, or of the Mind, as it is said to will, which is indeed to choose this or that, either Simply in its self, or as a Means to somewhat else.

(Gm) To stand inclin'd to what is Virtuous, and Averse from what is Vicious is the Moral Rectitude of the Will, and the proper Freedom of a reasonable Mind. But,

(Gn) Liberty, as it is more commonly understood in relation to the Man or Person, is not the Inclination or Power to Will as he ought, but rather a Freedom for acting as he will. Yet even in this respect,

(Go) A Vicious Man is in a Sense not Free; since he is so frequently carried in particular Cases by the Bias of evil Inclination contrary to what he saw best and fittest; and so might be said to will at a distance, and in the general.

(Gp) That may be call'd in some sort morally good or bad, tho' it fall not under present Will or Choice, which hath a Tendency to what is such in a higher and more proper Sense. Therefore,

(Gq) Our Nature, Habits, or Dispositions are very early good or bad, as they have a tendency towards Actions, that are so.

(Gr) The Moral Good, which falls not under present Choice, may yet entitle Men to the Advantages which are *naturally* Consequent thereupon. As on the other hand,

(Gs) The

(Gf) The Moral Evil which falls not under present choice may justly Subject us to the Disadvantages, which are *naturally* Consequent thereon.

(Gt) That only is more strictly and properly good, which is every way agreeable to the Rule of our Duty. And,

(Gu) That in a rigorous Sense is bad, which deviates from the Rule of our Duty in any Respect or Degree whatsoever.

(Gw) What is any ways deprav'd cannot in that respect be pleasing to God who is exactly discerning and altogether Pure; yet it may be accepted by him, who is also infinitely Merciful and Gracious, not upon its own Account, or ours, but for his own Names sake, and for our Saviour's, where there is a sincere and living Faith.

(Gx) To allow our selves, in Words or other *agreed* Expressions, to give out that *as True*, which we know, or suppose to be *False*, is in it self and in its Grounds injurious to God, whom we ought to imitate and reverence, to trust in and submit to: it likewise is of a depraving Nature, and dangerous Consequence to our selves and others; if not altogether fatal to Civil Society. Yet,

(Gy) Where we stand not Specially engag'd, Truth is not always to be spoken, much less the whole Truth, tho' nothing but the Truth should ever be deliver'd as true.

(Gz) We may, without Falshood, vary from a declar'd Intention, which was not given out by way of Promise to any Person; or where the Party, to whom a Promise was made, regularly may and do's release it.

(Ha) Promises are to be kept, where the Matter of them is lawful, when it comes to be perform'd; tho' it should be *detrimental* to our Secular Interest. But,

(Hb) We may not Lawfully promise what we see would be *injurious* and unwarrantably hurtful to the Publick, or to some Particular Person; nor can we lawfully perform what appears to be so, when we come to see it. Yet,

(Hc) An ill Promise should commonly, in Point of Honour and Fairness, be as plainly revok'd as it was given, and that as early too as well may be.

(Hd) Threatnings do not always bind the Person that threatens; especially where they might reasonably be understood with some known Exception: Nor do they indeed give any proper Claim to the Party threatned. But,

(He) The God of Truth will not vary from what he has foretold, as well as threatned.

(Hf) Not

(Hf) Not to offend should be our first endeavour; but it must be our Business, when we have offended, speedily to Repent; ask Pardon; make Reparation, if it may be; and to take greater Care for the future.

(Hg) It is very foolish to do what is in it self an unreasonable thing, and when we know, the best that can come of it is, that it be undone again, so far as possible; and that we should sometime account our selves Fools for doing it. But,

(Hh) It is extremely dangerous to venture upon the doing of what we know should be undone again; when by doing it, we are like to be less capable of amending, and more backward to it.

(Hi) It is highly Criminal to allow our selves in what we know to be disallow'd by him, who Created and Maintains us, hath redeem'd us, and would save us; and that this should be done against all the Remonstrances made by our own Reason and Conscience, by others, by the Providence, Word, and Spirit of God, representing Sin as the most disingenuous, perfidious, and provoking Opposition (the most effectual we can make) to his Honour and Government, to his Glorious Perfections, to his Blessedness, and indeed to his very Being: And all this to the present Damage, and farther Danger of the World about us; to the Displeasing, and, if it could be the disturbing that above us; and finally, to the most unnatural wounding, and utter undoing of our Selves, without that Mercy and Grace, which we do thus in so daring a Manner, contemn, pervert, affront, and put away from us. And therefore upon the whole,

(Hk) It is highly absurd and dangerous as well as Criminal to allow our selves in Offending, upon the Hope of Repenting afterwards. Especially when tho',

(Hl) True Repentance is indeed never too late; yet it may be greatly doubted whether late Repentance be commonly true.

(Hm) We are oblig'd as reasonable Creatures for the Honour of our Creator, as also for the Good of others, and our own, as we can, to get and use the truest Measures of Prudence.

C H A P. XIX.

THE Positions which are but consequentially binding, do either guide us by more certain Rules, or by rational Conjectures: The former may be call'd *PRUDENTIAL*, and some of these are given here by way of Specimen.

(Hn) *Prudence* is the due Consideration of Things, and of all their Circumstances, together with the Critical Discernment, and careful Observance of what is agreeing or disagreeing thereto.

(Ho) We have great and continual need of Prudence for the better ordering of what is in it self our Duty, and also of those Things, which abstractly consider'd are of a more indifferent Nature.

(Hp) The more Special Intention of Prudence is to manage things with the truest *Decorum*, and to the best *Advantage*.

(Hq) That is to be accounted *decorous and becoming*, which may innocently recommend the Person or his Condition, Behaviour, Discourse and Actions, with their more abiding Effects, to the most, or however to the Wisest and Best.

(Hr) That is *advantageously managed*, which is so perform'd, as may answer the most or best Purposes it is well capable of; and *that* with the least Expence of Time, Tho't, Pains and Cost.

(Hs) It is fit we should once at least carefully examine those Points of Truth and Duty, we are capable of and concern'd with, about which Men of Reputation for Wisdom and Integrity are known to differ. But,

(Ht) We should not undertake the Examination of more doubtful and difficult Matters, till we have laid in what is previously requisite, and are come to some Maturity of Judgment. And,

(Hu) When we go to examine a Matter, wherein there may be Interest, Inclination, or any thing else to bias us, we should first endeavour to bring our Minds to an even Temper in reference to such Things, as do not properly enter the Merits of the Cause. And also,

(Hw) We should endeavour first to remove the stronger Prejudices, which may probably lye in the Minds of others against what we would convince them of, or perswade them to, before we offer our Arguments for such Purpose. Yet,

(Hx) Where

(Hx) Where the Prejudices others may lye under, carry in them any thing dishonourable, we should endeavour to remove them by such kind of Methods as may be pursu'd without any thing like Reflection upon the Persons or Party we would convince or perswade.

(Hy) Our Method for convincing and perswading, should be suited to the Capacity, Disposition, and Circumstances, of those with whom we have to do.

(Hz) The Sense or Authority of others may more especially be urg'd, where *that* is more regarded, than the Reason of Things. And,

(Ia) Mens own Apprehensions, tho' mistaken, where they are tenaciously held, may be argued from, tho' they must not be allow'd as right. And farther,

(Ib) Men may be urg'd in some Cases to admit the Reasons offer'd, where they cannot shew better, or as good to the contrary. But,

(Ic) Arguments are especially to be drawn from what is most agreeable to the Natural Temper, Necessity, or other inducing Circumstances of those, with whom we have to do.

(Id) In Points that are difficult, we should for some time rather chuse to hear, than speak, if it may be; or to speak in the way of Enquiry or Proposal, rather than in that of Determination or Dispute.

(Ie) In disputable Matters what we offer should more generally be in the Name of others, what they do or might say, rather than in our own, what we our selves think.

(If) We should thoroughly consider what we our selves or others are capable of, so as to govern our own Attempts, or Undertakings, and to direct theirs, accordingly.

(Ig) Our Regard to Persons or Things is chiefly to be govern'd by our greater or less Concernment with them, and we should accordingly proportion our Diligence in relation thereto.

(Ih) Not the Number of particular Advantages or Disadvantages, nor the greatness of some among them, but the Amount of all together is to determine us. But,

(Ii) Where the Advantages or Disadvantages are equal on both Sides, there even the slightest Consideration super-added ought to carry us this way or that.

(Ik) Of Advantages otherwise equal, the more Certain are to be chosen, and of Future ones the more likely. But,

(Il) A *far greater* Good, tho' somewhat less likely may be chosen and pursu'd.

(Im) An

(Im) An Evil bears equal Proportion to a Good, where the one is as much hurtful, as the other Beneficial: And in such Case it must be altogether indifferent, as to the Thing it self, whether we shun the one, or pursue the other.

(In) Where it is in it self Indifferent, whether we should more directly set our selves to pursue an Advantage, or avoid an equal Disadvantage, we are to determine our selves, if it may be, by any preponderating Circumstance, which attends on either hand.

(Io) We should not presently conclude that to be Practicable or Impracticable, which may so appear in Speculation, without a fair Attempt. Yet,

(Ip) We should see some good Reason for a Trial, before we go to make it; and *then* we should carry it on, till we come to see thro' the Matter, if it may be prudently done. But,

(Iq) We should before hand set just Bounds to Attempts and Experiments, that are not altogether Necessary; nor should we easily be induc'd to go beyond those Bounds.

(Ir) We should not reject or neglect any real Advantage we might have, where we cannot have, or hope for, all we could desire. And therefore,

(Is) We should not *so* reach at all, we could wish, as to hazard our falling short of what we might otherwise attain.

(It) We must take heed of staying in the Means instead of reaching the End; or of losing this, whilst we are considering of those, or pursuing some nearer Intention with too great Application.

(Iu) We should not pursue an Advantage of short Continuance, which must be necessarily follow'd by as great a Disadvantage of longer, or but equal Continuance, or one that is smaller, but of very long Continuance.

(Iw) We should, where there is occasion, submit to a faultless Evil of short Continuance, which will be followed by an equal Good of longer, or but equal Continuance, or by one that is smaller of a very long Duration.

Divers of these Points may be resum'd and apply'd in the following Parts of this Essay, and some may be added upon particular Occasions, which will be more peculiar to them; especially under the concluding general Heads.

C H A P. XX.

WE now come lastly to those Positions, which as they are applicable, and should chiefly be applied to Practice, may be said to bind us *consequentially*, whilst they serve to guide us by rational Conjecture. They may be fitly call'd *PROBABLE*: And I shall conclude the whole Set of Positions with some few Instances of these.

(Ix) *Probability* is, when a thing is liker to be, or to be so, than otherwise.

(Iy) Measures of Probability might indeed be given or applied to Matters of meer Speculation; but they would not there be so Necessary or Useful, as in reference to some practical Points. But as to these,

(Iz) We ought not to take up with mere Probability, where Certainty is Requisite, and may conveniently be had. Yet,

(Ka) We may go upon Probability, where the Matter is not of very great Consequence, and would not answer the trouble of looking after a greater Certainty. And,

(Kb) We must go upon Probability, when a Matter, that is necessary will bear no longer Delay.

(Kc) We may reasonably proceed upon what one, who is a Competent Judge of the Matter, and withal a Credible Person solemnly says, especially what he Swears, and above all, if it be confirm'd with Circumstances, and if the Nature of the Case could not well admit of farther Evidence.

(Kd) What two several Persons do severally report, may be taken as highly probable, especially if they should agree in a great number of Particulars, as to the Sense, but with a different way of expressing themselves; and most of all if they shall seem to contradict one another, but what they say shall be found reconcileable upon Consideration.

(Ke) We may proceed upon that *Hypothesis* as more likely, which goes the farthest toward giving a good Account of the several things belonging to such a Science.

(Kf) Where the Extremes are neither of them certain Truth or Duty, it is best to take the Middle way.

(Kg) Mode-

(Kg) Moderation is commonly liker to hold than Extremes, whether in Opinion or Practice.

(Kh) Like Causes are likest to produce like Effects, where the Case is little differing.

(Ki) 'Tis likely, *that* may be the Cause of a thing, which is wont to precede or attend it; and that there is no Instance of its having been without it.

(Kk) 'Tis not probable, that very great Alterations in Men or Things should come to pass, as it were, in an Instant, without any foregoing Token or preparatory Tendency.

(Kl) Men are likest to act as they have been wont to do in Circumstances, that are like or not very differing. And,

(Km) Things are likely to go as they have been wont, where there is no Appearance to the contrary. Yet,

(Kn) The Promises and Threatnings of God in reference to the Things of time are likely to have an Accomplishment one time or other in this World, either in the very kind or somewhat answering to it.

(Ko) A general Point confirm'd by many Instances, and not contradicted (so far as appears, upon due Enquiry) by any do's probably hold.

(Kp) A steady Belief, or strong Affections, naturally express'd, are likely to beget somewhat of that kind in others.

(Kq) Such as are not wont to falsifie, and where there is nothing extraordinary to induce them to it, do probably speak true.

(Kr) Where there are more Means, that are severally capable of producing an Effect, or more ways of its coming to pass; it is then liker to be: And therefore on the other hand.

(Kf) Where there are fewer Means or Ways, none of which would necessarily produce an Effect, it is less likely it should come to pass; as that in a Lottery, a Man should have a Prize; especially, where either the Blanks, or the ways of producing them are much more numerous. As if upon Six Dice the extreme Chances, as 6, 7, 8, &c. and 36, 35, 34, &c. be appointed for Prizes, and only a smaller Number of the middle Casts for Blanks, these would be liker to come up, than the other; since they might be produc'd by a far greater Number of differing Combinations.

Thus we have gone thro' the Set of Positions, in which some of the forementioned Simpler Themes do at least *appear* to stand fairly connected or disjoin'd ; I have not offer'd or design'd them all as Principles or Axioms ; and if some of them should not be tho't so much as just Deductions by every Reader, yet they may, 'tis hop'd, come near the Truth, and afford some Help to such as are searching after it.

The Second Part.

CHAP. I.

§ 1. **H**AVING laid in the Furniture, which might be Antecedently Necessary, or Serviceable, in order to the better using of our Reason; I now proceed more directly to speak of several Ways, wherein it is to be us'd; that I may give the best Direction and Assistance I can, as the differing Occasions may severally require.

§ 2. I begin with such Uses of our Reason, as may be Subservient to the rest, and particularly to those, which will be afterwards treated of in this Essay. What is here design'd, is, that we may *rightly* take what others deliver, and *justly* express what we our selves intend: Both of these do most directly and immediately relate to Words, or other Ways of Expression, but with reference to the Tho'ts, they are suppos'd or design'd to express.

§ 3. Man is a Sociable Creature, endow'd with a Capacity of opening his Mind, and imparting his Tho'ts by Signs fitted, and, tacitely at least, agreed upon for that purpose; He is also Capable of apprehending what others Mean, when they express their Sentiments in a way, with which he is already, or may come to be, acquainted.

§ 4. Our attending to what is truly and fitly deliver'd by others, is one of the first and easiest Natural Means of acquiring and improving the more considerable Points and Parts of Knowledge: But then we must rightly take the Meaning, which they are suppos'd justly, or at least intelligibly, to express. And it is requisite, that even Learners and Enquirers should be able in some Measure justly to express themselves, at least as to what they would enquire, and how they conceive of what lies before them.

§ 5. Grammar is indeed helpful for putting Words together in such a sort, as to show the Reference they have to each other, as that *this* is the Nominative, and *that* the Verb related to it; *this* the Substantive, and *that* its Adjective, &c: and also there is some Intimation given, *which* Word is design'd to express the Thing Spoken of; and *which* is intend'd for the Thing affirm'd of it, or deny'd; *which* is for the

Substance or Subject, and *which* for an Accident or Adjunct, &c. And thus they make up a kind of *Grammatical Sense*, or Verbal Congruity, where yet there may be no *Logical Sense*, or consistent Meaning: As if it were said, [the Cold and thirsty Sun-Beams freeze the Continuous or cohering Sand into Atoms of Fire, which may be subdivided into Mountainous Mole-hills] instead of saying [the Dry Cold Winter-Air Freezes the discontinuous or incoherent Water into a Floor of Ice, which may be broken into lesser Parts and Particles]. Now Logic should help us to chuse our such Words, and put them *so* to gether, that they may carry a Meaning consistent in it self, and likewise agreeable to the Thots we would express.

§ 6. In Languages already form'd to our hand; we must first endeavour to understand aright, what is said by others, either as they might really design, or as their Expressions are to be reasonably taken; before we can well hope so to express our selves: I therefore begin with the former, as being commonly the easier of the two, and fitly leading to the other. Now that we may be directed and assisted,

§ 7. I, *Rightly to take what others deliver*, there are some Things to be observ'd and attended to, which are indeed *extrinsecal* to the Matter Discours'd, and yet may sometimes be of Necessary Use to get out, or better ascertain the Meaning, as well as other Things *internally belonging* to what we would endeavour to understand, either as it might be intended, or as such Expressions in such Case and Circumstances ought in Reason to be construd.

§ 8. As to what is extrinsecal to the Discourse it self; the following Points are to be regarded, *viz.*

I, Who it is that Speakes or Writes; if it be in a Case, where *that* may be of any Consequence: And in most Cases it is certainly of Moment to know, if God be the Author, whoever were his Instrument; since he neither can be deceiv'd, nor would go to deceive us. We safely may, and must indeed, take what God has immediately dictated, or specially Superintended to be really consistent with it self, suited to the Purpose, and that it is to be understood according to such fair and just Rules and Measures of Interpretation, as impartial and unbiass'd Reason may Suggest, or cannot but approve.

§ 9. We may not *so* depend on a Creature, that is not only Fallible, but Fahn, and has no Supernatural Assistance or unerring Conduct; Here we must be more upon our Guard, both as to the Matter and Expression: Since we cannot be altogether

altogether sure, either that he intended to express his real Sentiment, or that he has rightly express'd, what he did intend, so as we may come at it by the just Rules of Interpretation; and it may yet be more doubtful, whether he himself understood the Matter as indeed it is: Yet we may much farther depend upon one that is well acquainted, both with the Subject he is upon, and the Language in which he Treats it; and who is also a Person of approv'd Integrity; than upon one of a differing Character.

§ 10. We must farther observe, whether he who Writes or Speaks, do it in his own Person, or in the Person of another; so as to deliver, not his own Sense but anothers: And this is the more carefully to be minded, because often times no Express Notice is given in such Case, but it is left to be collected from the Nature and Circumstances of the Matter, as in the *Song of Solomon* throughout, where the Author is generally allow'd to Personate sometimes Christ, sometimes the Church; and sometimes others.

§ 11. And it must be likewise observ'd, whether the Person were Skilful and Accurate in the Matter of which he Treats, or in the way of expressing himself; whether he were Learned or Unlearn'd, &c:

§ 12. And also of what Opinion, or Party he is, where that may give any Light about his Meaning, for *Truth*, and *Orthodoxy* must be very differently understood according to the differing Sentiments of them, who use those Words.

§ 13. It should be likewise consider'd if there be any other Circumstance relating to the Person, which may be of Use to determine his Meaning: For it may be suppos'd, that Men commonly speak according to the Circumstances, wherein they stand, which therefore are to be Enquir'd out, where their Sense or Meaning may, in any sort, depend thereon.

§ 14. It may here be usefully directed, that we should endeavour to have what is deliver'd, from the Person himself, if it may be; more immediately, rather than at second-hand, or in his own Words however, rather than anothers, and therefore, in the Original, rather than a Translation; at least *this* ought to be compared with *that*, and we should doubtless choose (if it may be) to compare them our selves, or however; as well as we can, to examine what is this way done by others.

§ 15. We should also take what Care we can to have the most correct Copies, and best Editions, and after all, must make allowance for such Mistakes, as might easily be made in Transcribing, or by the Press.

§ 16. We ought to have the various Readings of Sacred Writ; and may safely allow, that in Matters, which are not of Necessary Importance to *Make us Wise unto Salvation*; there may possibly be some Mistakes permitted by Divine Providence for Purposes best known to God, as in some Points of Chronology, or the like.

§ 17. II, We must consider the Persons apply'd to by one that is Prudent, and considers the Capacities, Inclination, and other Circumstances of those he would instruct or move; for many things are to be Understood, as deliver'd agreeably to those Views, rather than as they would have been express'd had they been design'd, or address'd to others: Thus when 'tis said, that the Molten Sea belonging to the Temple, was Ten Cubits over, and that a Line of Thirty Cubits compass'd it about (1 Kings 7. 23); 'tis not to be understood that it was but just Thirty Cubits, but that this account was near the Matter, and sufficiently right for those to whom it was chiefly design'd.

§ 18. Here we ought accordingly to understand, *what* is said to Superiors, *what* to Inferiors, or Equals, *what* to the Learned, or to the Vulgar, *what* in common to all, or only with a peculiar design to some, who are in such Case or Circumstance.

§ 19. III, We should observe the Purpose or End design'd, which gives a direction to the Means, and amongst others both to the Matter deliver'd, and to the Manner of Expressing it. He who plainly designs not to sift out the Truth, but to carry his Cause, whether it should happen to be right or wrong, must be understood to deliver not always what he himself is fully satisfied in, or looks upon as firm and cogent, tho' he offer it as such.

§ 20. And it is to be suppos'd, that the Matter hath some fitness, or at least a designed Tendency towards the intended End, whether it were only to Instruct, or to persuade, &c. and therefore it is to be understood, not altogether simply and absolutely, but as related to that End.

§ 21. Now the real Design is not always to be taken from what is profess'd, but from what appears most probable upon Consideration of Persons and Circumstances; for some may purposely seem to aim at one End, whilst they are really designing another.

§ 22. IV, We must consider the Age, or Time, and Place, or Country, wherein a Treatise was written, or a Discourse, which we have on Record was deliver'd. It is plain, that in various Ages and Countries of the World, there is a great variety of Sentiments, differing ways of Expression, and other Circumstances, which may greatly alter the Sense from what such Expressions might import in some other place, or at some other time. Therefore,

§ 23. It must be of great and Necessary Use for the right understanding of Authors, who have written in Distant Times, and Places, to acquaint our selves, as far as we can, with the Genius, Disposition and Manners of the Men, as also with the Affairs and Customs of such Age and Country; and likewise with the *Topography*, or Geographical Description of the Place, and with the *Chronology* of such a Period.

C H A P. II.

§ 1. **N**OW as to what is Intrinsic to the Discourse itself, we should take Care, 1. That we be beforehand competently furnish'd with the Knowledge of that Language, or other way of Expression, wherein any Matter is deliver'd, and not have it then to seek, when we should use it; we ought therefore to have some good Measure of Acquaintance with most, or however the most usual Words, and their more general Import; as also with the common way and Manner of putting them together, to express such or such a Sense; and lastly, with the *Idioms*, and *Phraseology*, or Turns of Expression peculiar to this or that Language: Nor should we have these ordinarily to search out from Vocabularies, Grammars, Idiotisms, or elsewhere; whenas they ought to have been previously laid in by our being before well grounded in Grammatical Learning, Reading approved Authors, Translating the Language we would understand, and turning others into it, and it deserves to be distinctly Noted; That,

§ 2. 2, We should not neglect proper Means for getting a more exact and thorough Acquaintance, even with our Native Tongue, which we are not ordinarily like to have without divers of the foremention'd Means; nor doth it appear, that any of them can well be spared here; unless it should be that of Translating, which yet were an Exercise highly tending to make Persons more accurate Masters of their own Tongue,

Tongue, whilst they are endeavouring to join some other with it ; and it may be with good Use sometimes to turn the Sense of an Author into other Words of the same Language ; especially if he had not deliver'd himself so Justly, Clearly, or Elegantly.

§ 3. Certain it is, that a thorow Acquaintance with our Mother-Tongue, *i.e.* amongst us, with the *English* Language, as it hath been formerly us'd, and as now it stands alter'd, enlarg'd, and improv'd, must be of great Advantage, and perhaps of greater Consequence to most Persons, in most Cases, than the critical Knowledge of other Languages can ordinarily be ; since not only our daily Converse runs in this Channel, but also Matters of greatest Importance are generally this way to be transacted ; particularly in the more Publick and Solemn Conversations and Debates, and in what is deliver'd in Parliament, on the Bench, at the Bar, in the Pulpit, and mostly from the Press.

§ 4. It is not to be deny'd, that great Inconveniencies, Contentions, and other Mischiefs do often arise from the not having or not using a Critical and Just Discernment as to the Import of Expressions in our own Language. And whereas not very many do *therein* express themselves Justly, and Clearly, it will require the greater Application to Spell out the Meaning of some from inaccurate and obscure Discourses.

§ 5. 3. Proverbial Sentences, and Figurative ways of Speaking must also be studied in order to our better Understanding of Authors, or even of common Discourse, and for this Purpose some good Books, which treat of them are carefully to be read ; and Logic is in a sort Necessary to give us a right Apprehension of Rhetoric.

§ 6. 4. When any more Solemn Discourse is, or may be refer'd to some general Head of Knowledge, as to some Art or Science, it must be of great Use that we have some previous Acquaintance therewith, and that we do in some good Measure understand the Principal Matters thereto belonging, together with the particular Terms of such Art or Science, and the peculiar Sense *therein* given to words which may be otherwise common ; nor should we have these to seek in *Technical* Vocabularies, or elsewhere, when we ought to use them, but they should rather be laid in before-hand. And,

§ 7. 5. In order to our being competently furnish'd with the mentioned Prerequisites the most will need proper Instructors to lead them first into the Grounds and Elements of the several Arts and Sciences ; and because it is a matter of great

great Importance that they be carefully chosen, it may be of Use here to give the Character of such as should be sought, *viz.* Persons of clear Apprehension, and Expression; strict Examiners, and Impartial Lovers of Truth; ready to own it in their Antagonist, and careful to sift out what there may be of it, even from Error; such as will Encourage Learners in useful Enquiries; and carefully weigh Objections, but detect and despise mere Cavils, that may be advanc'd against solid Argument; such as can distinguish Nicely, and use it wisely, not to cloud but clear up Things, and particularly to discover and shew what there may be of real Difference or Agreement, where there is a strong Appearance of the contrary; in short, such as are no Captious Disputers, but candid Interpreters, and cautious Assertors.

But in the want of such help, we should get the plainest introductory Treatises, we can, to read; and if it may be to converse and confer upon them with such as are knowing in the Matter, or at least, if we can, to take other Learners along with us, in order to mutual Assistance. But after all,

§ 8. 6. Whereas scarce any Man can be fully prepar'd, and ready at all Points, it will be requisite, that we have the several foremention'd Helps at hand (*viz.* Dictionaries, Idiotisms, Treatises of Proverbs, Historical, Geographical, and Technical Vocabularies, &c), to be consulted and us'd upon occasion; or that we supply the want of them as well as we can by Consulting such Persons, as may be like to inform us in any particular Doubt or Difficulty; and if we have not such present with us, it were best to note down the Matters of Enquiry in a Pocket Book under the Head, to which they belong, and to take the first Opportunity, we can, to get them resolv'd either by Persons, or from Books, when we meet with them.

§ 9. But to make the best use we can of the Knowledge already laid in for the right understanding what we farther read, or hear,

7. We must endeavour to get out, what is the Argument or Subject Matter, if it be not plainly declar'd; this we must take to be the thing profess'dly discours'd of, if it shall not appear otherwise; for some may pretend to treat of one thing, when they are intending, or do unawares slide into another. Where there is opportunity for it, the readiest and surest way may be to enquire of such as can and will inform us, what is the Subject of this or that Discourse: Otherwise we must carefully observe the Title, and Argument, or Contents of Books, Chapters, or other Subdivisions, yet
not

not so intirely depending thereon, as to neglect the best Observation we can make, by considering what is the main Thing Defin'd or Describ'd, Distinguish'd, Divided, or otherwise Handled, or what is more frequently resum'd, tho' perhaps under several Names, but of like import; especially what the Discourse in its Procedure appears ultimately to be referred to in the whole, tho' perhaps not immediately and directly in every Part thereof.

§ 10. If there be a Scheme, Analysis, or the general Heads and Branches of a Treatise laid together, it may be best to begin with that; or else we must ordinarily read such Book or Division as may deserve a more careful Perusal, first more cursorily over, in order to take a more general View of its Matter and Design, before we proceed to read it with a nicer and closer Application. And Men are generally to be heard out, before we pretend to understand them fully, or even to make proper Enquiries about the Matter Discoursed.

§ 11. 8, The Argument, or Subject Matter, when we have it ascertain'd, must be kept in Mind, and carried along with us, as that which is to give some light to the Discourse it self, as well as to receive farther Light from it; and it is to be a kind of general Measure for our better understanding the Words and Phrases peculiar to such Argument, or which in treating of it may have a peculiar Sense; and also we may judge of the Appositeness of a Discourse or Treatise, by observing, whether the Matter undertaken or attempted were still kept in View, and pursued, or some other Point started and follow'd, which was not to the present Purpose, but impertinent.

§ 12. 9, We must never fly to a less common or Figurative Sense of Words or Phrases, without sufficient Reason to enforce, or at least to induce thereto; as, that the Sense will not otherwise comport with the Subject, or agree to what is more plainly said, or generally confess'd about it; Thus the Eyes, Ear, Mouth, Hands, Feet, &c, of God and his Seeing, Hearing, &c, in Scripture are necessarily to be taken for somewhat in him answering to such Parts, or Powers, or Acts in Man: And the *Song of Solomon* must be extremely Uncouth, and Unnatural, as well as unfit to have a Place amongst those Books, which are confessedly inspir'd, if we shall not allow it a Figurative, and Allegorical Construction, in reference to Christ and his Church: As also the Prophecies of Scripture must be Tropically understood, for the most Part, to represent their Meaning suitably to the Divine

vine Wisdom, to other Parts of Scripture, and particularly to those Prophecies, which appear to have been already undeniably fulfill'd.

§ 13. 10, Nothing absurd is to be ascrib'd to any Person without good Evidence, and a kind of Necessity, in that he cannot be otherwise understood without a manifest force upon his Expressions, and the very Tenor of his Discourse; for otherwise, what looks like an Absurdity, may and should be often so understood as to carry in it some more sublime and forcible Sense: And Men should be generally suppos'd to have some intelligible Meaning in what they say, and some Appearance, at least, of Reason for it; and tho' they express themselves unhappily, yet we ought not to make an Advantage of that, but rather fairly to state what we may reasonably conceive them to Design.

§ 14. 11, If the Sense should be left doubtful in any Point, we must first Endeavour to see, whether it were not designedly so deliver'd, which must be judged by the Circumstances of Persons and Things; and we may reasonably suppose it, where he that speaks, is not antecedently Bound, nor hath expressly undertaken to inform us about the Matter; especially if it be such as he might probably judge less fit to be more determinately communicated to such Persons in particular, or to the World in general.

§ 15. But where there is no sufficient Reason to suppose the mentioned Design, we are to consider what are the various Senses, which may be put upon the Expression, and here to take in help from what is said about the differing ways in which Signs may be taken (P. 1. C. 15. § 15, &c.) as Materially, Formally, &c; and then carefully to observe, which of those Senses may best agree with the Argument and Design, with what precedes and follows, as also with the Person, and his known Opinions.

§ 16. 12, What is universally or generally said must often be taken with Restriction, according to what is commonly allow'd, and agreeably to what is otherways more particularly and distinctly said by the same Person; and it would be Captious and Unfair to take an Advantage upon this or other like ways of Speaking, where the Intendment is, or may be easily known:

§ 17. 13, What is deliver'd by the By, is to be interpreted agreeably to what is offer'd, when the Matter is more designedly handled; and especially where it is controverted and therefore more carefully stated and examin'd.

§ 18. 14, What is only once or rarely mention'd, must be understood agreeably to what is more frequently deliver'd; unless there should be some considerable Distance of time, and that it may be reasonably judg'd the Person hath alter'd his Mind upon farther Consideration and Experience, or however has thought fit to profess a differing Sentiment.

§ 19. 15. We must enquire, whether in some Cases there may not be something fairly *Understood* to compleat or determine the Sense, either from what precedes or follows; or where there is a manifest Passion rendering the Discourse abrupt or broken; or that in the known Usage of such Language, some Words are wont to be omitted, which yet are to be understood.

§ 20. 16, What sufficiently appears to be Divinely Inspir'd, or deliver'd under the Special Influence, and Conduct of the Spirit of God, must always be so understood, as to consist with it self, and with every thing else, which God hath reveal'd: And even Men of sound Intellectuals must generally be suppos'd in what they say about the same Matter, in the same Discourse, or at the same Time, to have a consistent Meaning; unless either their particular Expressions, or however the Tenor and Tendency of their Discourse about such a Point will not, without manifest Violence, admit of a Sense agreeable to what they must as unquestionably mean by somewhat else, which they have said: As in those Popish Philosophers, who having attributed Extension to Body, and allow'd it to take up Space, yet to maintain the Doctrine of *Transubstantiation* (to which they have unhappily ty'd up themselves in the Council of *Trent*) will suppose that absurdity which in contradistinction to *Quantitative Extension*, they are pleas'd to call *Entitative*; whereby they contradictiously hold, that the distinct Parts of Matter (as the Head, Trunk, and Limbs of our Saviour's Body) may be all of them together without their distinct Places.

§ 21. But commonly, where there is no such Bigotry of Opinion, nor a Turn to be serv'd, seeming Inconsistencies may and should be reconcil'd by some allowable Distinction; such as those which follow, or the like; namely. (1.) That *this* is said according to common Opinion, *that* which appears, or is perhaps really Opposite to it, is offer'd with a Design of stating and declaring the Matter more nicely and exactly as it is, or as it is conceiv'd really to be. (2.) That *this* is given, as a Person's own Sentiment, *that* as anothers, who is only Personated, or brought in *so speaking*, without any Notice

Notice expressly given, that it is the Sentiment of another. (3.) That *this* is, or may be design'd to Persons of such a Character, *that* to those of a differing Sort, with a differing Meaning suited to them. (4.) That *this* refers to things of such a Sort, *that* to those of a differing Kind, tho' they may pass under the same Denomination.

§ 22. Or, (5.) That *This* is intended to relate to one Time, *That* to another; whence arises that Rule *Distingue Tempora, & non errabis*, Distinguish but the Times, and you shall not so easily run into Misapprehensions. (6.) That *This* is meant of a thing in one Respect, or under one Consideration; *That* of the self-same thing indeed, but in some other Respect, or under some differing Consideration: We might here add, (7.) That *This* may be intended in a Proper, *That* in a figurative Sense; and more particularly, the *one* Seriously, and the *other* only in Jest, or by way of Irony and Irrision, as may be discern'd by the Accent, or Tone of the Voice; or by the Gesture and Countenance of the Person speaking; or by considering what sort of Person he is, what he says, in what manner, to whom, and with what design; but we leave the farther Prosecution of this matter to Rhetorick, and also the more peculiar Measures for interpreting the Sacred Scriptures to those, who purposely treat thereof.

§ 23. For the better understanding, what may be the Design of *Representations* by Picture, Carving, or the Like, we should before hand know, how the Virtues, Sciences, Countries, &c. have been usually Figur'd out: And we should carefully observe, what there is of Similitude and Resemblance to any thing, which is known to have pass'd, or to be now passing in the World, or to be usual, and more particularly in such Part or Place, to which the Representation may refer; but especially, if there be any *Lemma*, or Inscription; we should endeavour to improve and use it, as a Key to the Import and Design of the Historical or Emblematical Figures.

§ 24. As to *Cryptical* and Secret Writing; that may be suspected for such, which, (being from, or by, or to suspicious Persons, at a Time, and in a State of Things, which may seem to require it), carries a dubious and unaccountable Import, or conceals its meaning in uncouth and unusual Characters: In such Case, if there be Occasion and Authority for it, Persons and Parties, that may appear any ways concerned should be examin'd, as to the writing it self, and all the various Circumstances relating in any Wise to it: The Key or Direction for Reading it is to be sought; and if it is

not otherways to be got, we must endeavour to guess out the Vowels, or other Letters, or Words, which do most frequently occur in the known or supposed Language, by observing, what are the *Marks* most frequently repeated in the Writing.

§ 25. And whereas there is still, as well as in *Daniel's* Time a *God, who revealeth Secrets*, whenever he pleaseth, it may not be a tempting or provoking of him, in some very singular Case, with humble Submission to seek the help he can easily give by almost insensible Touches upon our Minds, whilst we are setting our selves in the likeliest way we can to search out the Matter; but we should take great Care that we be not carried by a needless and unallow'd Curiosity into any Manner or Method of Enquiry, which may be justly suspected as unwarrantable.

C H A P. III.

§ 1. **WE** now proceed to the farther subservient way of using our Reason, wherein it is to be directed, and assisted, *viz.*

II. Rightly or *justly to express what we our selves intend*, especially in the more solemn ways of Speaking or Writing. It has been observ'd, that Grammar do's by it self properly teach only congruous Words, not consistent Sense in any Sort, much less to deliver this or that particular Meaning; nor do's Rhetorick so directly concern it self about the propriety of Expression; but, presupposing *that*, it proceeds to shew, how it may be made more Pleasing or Pungent, more Copious or Elegant, &c.

§ 2. Whenas *that*, which is suppos'd to be already attain'd, is not so easie a Matter, as is commonly tho't, nor so justly perform'd as is generally presum'd; whilst the far greater part of Writings and Discourses go upon what is for Substance previously known, or allow themselves so great a Compass in what is out of the common Road, that there is less need of accurate Expression, whilst one Sentence supplies the Deficiencies of another, or helps to limit and fix its Meaning.

§ 3. Yet, after all, Men seem to be commonly much in the Dark about each others Meaning, taking that in one Sense, which was designed in another; and oft contending about *Words*, where they are really agreed about *Things*, but know it not, or attend not to it. And as Expressions are often left undetermin'd and unguarded in Matters, that are Critical and Difficult, it requires more Understanding and Candor to take them right, than is generally to be met withal: And whereas we shall always inevitably need so much of these, it concerns us to make as little Work for them, as possibly we can.

§ 4. We should therefore endeavour to find out *such* Words, and put them *so* together, as that Persons of a Moderate Capacity, who have the requisite Furniture, giving due Attendance to the several Words employ'd, and to the way of using them may, or indeed must, apprehend the designed Import; nor can any way alter it without wresting the Expressions, or not observing them carefully, or at least, not regarding the Contexture, or such other determining Circumstances as have been mention'd under the foregoing General.

§ 5. I shall not here trouble the Reader with any thing farther about Historical or Emblematical *Representations*, than that Natural Similitude, and known Usage be carefully follow'd, and some Intimation (if it be needful and proper) given of the Design by some apt and concise Inscription. As to *Cryptography*, the Method, or Key, which has been communicated to our Correspondent is to be, by us, exactly pursu'd and observ'd.

§ 6. But it is the more usual ways of Expressing our selves, as in Speaking or Writing, which I would here direct and assist, in order to the just Representing of our intended Sense. Now the Principal Means to attain or improve so happy a Faculty must be frequent exercise upon *Things*, that are nice and hard to be accurately express'd; and this to be attended with heedful Observation, whether, and how far we are rightly understood; but in Conjunction with *that*, the following Directions may be of Use. And,

§ 7. (1.) We must get as perfect an Acquaintance, as well we can, with the Language, in which we would Speak or Write; its various Words; the various Import and Use of such, as we may have more frequent Occasion for; also the Critical Difference of those, which signify much alike for the Main; the different ways of using them, so as to signify this or that; Idioms, or Forms and Modes of Speaking peculiar

culiar to the Tongue we are pursuing; likewise Proverbial Sentences, &c.

§ 8. (2.) We should attentively hear, and heedfully read such as Speak and Write properly; observing how Words of a various Import are fix'd and determin'd by the way and manner of their using them, to Translate some such Authors might be an Exercise of great Advantage to make us more intently Observant of their Manner, and better to retain the Impression thereof.

§ 9. (3.) We must make sure the Words and ways of Speaking we use will, at least, bear the Sense we design, however in such Case, and Circumstances, without any Strain or Force put upon them: And, (4.) We are farther to consider, whether they will not as well admit of some other undesigned Construction, without any palpable wresting of them: And in this Case, (5.) We should change the Ambiguous Word or Clause for what is in it self determinate, or will be so in the present way of using it; but if this cannot well be done, then we must add what shall restrain and determine the Sense: And here,

§ 10. (6.) We may put in some Noun or Verb with a Conjunctive or disjunctive Particle so, as that the several Words *thus* put together may plainly appear to be designed, not for divers Things, but for the same, thus diversly express'd by Words, which separately taken would be otherwise Understood, but being us'd together, for the same Thing, will offer to the Mind that Sense only, wherein they agree, exclusive of the farther or other Import wherein they differ. As if I should say, a *Crab*, or *Fish*, the Meaning would be what we sometimes express by *Crab-fish*; since the one Name so limits the other, that the *Crab* cannot be taken for the Fruit so call'd, nor *Fish* for any other than the Fish so call'd. If I say, *Dipping and Dying*, the Dipping is limited by Dying, and *this* again by *that*, so that both are understood in relation to colouring of Cloth. The Sense of an Ambiguous Word or Clause may also be otherways determin'd: For,

§ 11. (7.) We may add some other Term or Expression which more plainly declares the Meaning; as if I say, *the Crab has Claws*. He lives by *Dying Cloth*: Or we may, (8.) Once for all Define or Describe the Subject we Speak of, or the Attribute given to it, or Explain and open the Position, of which we would Discourse. But,

§ 12. (9.) Whilst we deliver our Meaning with all the Care and Guard, which may be requisite to clear and secure it, we should heedfully avoid the putting in of what is not Necessary to those Ends, but might raise an Apprehension of some other Intendment, than that, which would have shew'd it self sufficiently Plain and undeniable without any such Addition: As if I should say, *Minds, which are indiscernible, are thinking Substances*, instead of saying, *Minds are thinking Substances*; the added Clause would falsely intimate, that I supposed there were *Minds* which might be torn in pieces, and that some *Minds* were not thinking Substances.

§ 13. (10.) Since *Particles* are of so great Significancy, and have such differing Senses, it is highly requisite to be accurately Skill'd therein; and, for that end, not only once to Read, but sometimes to Review the most approved Treatises relating to them: And tho' I know not of any, that have been purposely compos'd for those of the *English* Tongue; yet *Cole's Dictionary*, or *Walker's Particles*, may very well serve to give their differing Acceptations, whilst they direct us how to render them in Latin according to their various Import.

§ 14. (11.) Care is to be taken in the Use of *Relatives*, that they be not too far removed from the more Principal Words, to which they relate (commonly call'd their *Antecedents*); but especially that it be not left doubtful to what they refer; which should therefore be the nearer Substantive, unless it may be safely carry'd to one that is more remote, as being plainly so determin'd by its Number, or Gender, or by what is said of it afterwards: As in saying *England* is happy in so Excellent a Princess, the Best of Queens and Sovereign Princes; and *it* is like to Flourish; while *She* Reigns with such Wisdom and Temper, whatever *they* do in *their* respective Dominions.

§ 15. But, (12.) When there may be danger of Mistake or Ambiguity in using the Pronoun Relative, we should rather repeat the intended Noun to fix and secure the Sense, if it be said, there are yet two distinct Kingdoms in *England* and *Scotland*, which is ready to fall in with its Neighbouring Kingdom: The Sense is not here so evident and certain, as if it were said, *Scotland* is ready, &c.

§ 16. (13.) It may be of very considerable Use, both to the present Intention; and to other valuable Purposes, that we should accustom our selves to write down our Thoughts, or at least the Result of them, with its Grounds and Reasons, upon any Subject of Importance; especially such as is Nicely

and Difficult; and that at some distance of Time we should review it, observing whether our Expressions will then give us any clear Idea of the Matter; if not, we should endeavour, as well as we can, to recollect it, and to rectify the Account thereof. But,

§ 17. (14.) To make it yet more Sure, that our Expressions do truly and justly represent our intended Sense; we should enquire of others (as was before intimated, but is now to be farther open'd) *whether*, and *how* they understand us? Nor should we ask of such as are of extraordinary Capacity, or who know before-hand the very Notions, we would impart; tho' they ought indeed, to have some more general Acquaintance with the Subject, nor should they be Ignorant of any thing relating to the Words or Matter, which our way of treating it supposes them to be Furnish'd with, in order to their taking rightly and easily what we farther lay before them, by way of Experiment to see whether it be justly express'd.

§ 18. Thus somewhat has been endeavour'd towards the Direction and Assistance of our Reason, in reference to the two leading and Subservient Purposes: We are now to proceed to such as may be thereby subserv'd; for Hearing, Reading and Discouring with others, and especially the writing down of our own Tho'ts, Reviewing, Imparting, and farther considering of them, should in Reason mightily tend to the furnishing, preparing, and disposing our Minds better to manage the several following Purposes.

C H A P. IV.

§ 1. **A**Mongst the farther ways of using our Reason, which may receive some Light and Help from those which have been treated of, I shall begin with such as are of a more general Nature, and here shall endeavour, that Reason may be effectually directed and assisted,

I, *Rightly to make and pursue Enquiries.* When something lies before us, with which we are little or not at all acquainted, it must be of use to be guided in our Enquiries about it, and indeed for the more thorow searching out of what we may already know in some good Measure: Some farther Assistance will therefore be offer'd (beyond the brief and general Intimations already given, Part 1. Chap. 5. § 14, 15, 16.) for

for the *Raising*, and towards the *Resolving* of fit Enquiries upon the various Kinds of Subjects, which may fall under Consideration.

§ 2. It seems to be one great part of the Business of *Logic* to suggest *proper Questions*, and to give us Aim, what *sort of Answers* we should look for, and how to seek them: And for such Purposes the general Notions and leading Notices, therein given, should lye always ready in our Minds to prompt Enquiries, and point out the Resolutions by such Marks and Characters, as may be of some Use towards our searching them out, in the particular Instance, by the Light of what has been said in general of *Substance*, *Accident*, &c, as also of *Combinations*, *Separations*, &c. And thus we may be not only led to Enquire, but help'd rightly to determine, whether this or that be a Substance, Accident, &c; whether it be single or combin'd, and how; whether a whole or part, and how separated, &c; whether absolute or relative, and of what sort; whether a Cause or Effect, &c. And,

§ 3. Whereas we have in this Essay some Account of Things themselves, Part 1. Chap. 2, 3, 4, and 5. as well as the Logical Notions about them, we may, with greater Ease and Dispatch, run thro' the Summary there given, or such Branch thereof as we are more directly concern'd withal, to see what may be there found or thereby suggested, which will answer to the general Mark and Character of a Subject or Adjunct, Cause or Effect, &c. in relation to the particular Matter before us; and may therefore be taken and consider'd, as being accordingly related to it: And we might not unfitly call this Treatise *Promptuarium Logicum*, as being a kind of Store-house, whence we might draw Matter, and also Measures for proceeding upon it; the former chiefly from the first part, the latter from the rest.

§ 4. If any one having heard of such a place as *Rome*, would here, at *London*, acquaint himself with it, he would be for enquiring a great many things about it; suppose for Instance, whether it really be? What it is? (whether a Country, or City so call'd) where it is; or in what part of the World? How big it is? Of what sort it is? (whether it be the Seat of a Sovereign Prince?) &c.

§ 5. Now in order to the raising of fit Enquiries, it must be of Use to guide us right, and make us ready; If we have a Set of Questions prepar'd; or be, at least, prompted, what to ask, by some more general Notices; and it must be farther useful, if we know how to follow on the more general Questions with such particular ones, as must lead to the

easier and clearer Resolving of them: As if, for Instance, we are furnish'd with some Notions about Quantity; we are then prompted to Enquire of the Length and Breadth, and Compass of *Rome*.

§ 6. And it is farther of Use, to have some aim, what kind of Answer we are to look for; as, that the Answer in the mention'd Case (if proper) must be made by what we call Lineal Quantity or long Measure, not Superficial or Solid Measure; not so many Tons, or Acres; but so many Miles, Furlongs, Paces, or Feet.

§ 7. And finally, it is above all Useful to have it suggested (at least in general), where we should seek the particular Answers to our Enquiries, or how we may attain them: As, suppose we are told, we must consult those good Authors, who have written of the Modern or Present *Rome*; or such knowing Credible Persons, who are well acquainted with Geographical Writings, or who have themselves been at *Rome*, &c.

§ 8. But if we would, our selves, go to *Rome*; here again many Questions might be fitly mov'd; as, how far it is? whether we must cross the Seas, &c. Now we shall here give some distinct Sets of brief Enquiries in relation to the Various Matters, which may lye before us. And,

§ 9. I, As to the *Sign* or Signs more immediately presented, by which we are led to something else thereby notify'd to us: Enquiries are here more especially to be made, when Signs are in themselves to be Consider'd; as if we would make our Observations upon the Ideas, or other Representations of Things, at least before we proceed to what is so represented.

§ 10. Here it may be enquir'd, (1.) What it is we consciously know and inwardly feel, whether it be the transient Motion of Thinking, or the more fixed Mode of formed Tho't presented in and by the Mind to its own Consideration. (2.) Whether such Thinking and Tho't be Intellectual and abstracted from the Senses, or ally'd thereto? and here, (3.) Whether more remotely, as in our imagining the absent Sensible Object, and representing it to our selves, in some Sort, as if it were present; or more immediately, as in our perceiving it, when really present, thro' the Organs of Sense?

§ 11. And when at first the Object so appears to us, we may sometimes have Reason to enquire, (4.) Whether the Object be indeed present, as it seems, or that there is only some Appearance thereof? And, (5.) Whether *that* be from pure

pure Imagination, while the Organ, proper to such kind of Object is not employ'd, as in Dreaming, or very deep Musing; or that it is by means of the outward Sense? And here, (6.) Whether the Appearance be Somewhat objected externally to the Sense, as a Shadow, Picture, Airy Composure, and the like, or only an Affection of the Organ itself: And,

§ 12. (7.) Whether that Affection be more Transient, as when the Eye is struck, and thereupon Sparkles appear to move before it; or more fix'd and abiding, as in the Case of the Jaundice, and other Distempers of the Eye, or Disorders of the Palate, Hand, &c.

§ 13. We may also enquire, (8.) Whether one or more Senses are affected, and in what particular Manner? as likewise, (9.) In what Degree, whether more or less intensely and observably?

§ 14. It may be yet farther enquir'd, (10.) Whether what we conceive, imagine, or perceive, be not the Sign of Somewhat else? And, (11.) of what Sort the Sign is? (*vid.* Part 1. Chap. 14.) and also, (12.) Whence it comes to signify; whether from its own Nature, or by Appointment? And, (13.) Whether the Appointment were implicate or express?

§ 15. (14.) How it signifies, whether such a thing Simply, or with the Connnotation of somewhat else? And, (15.) Whether the Sign do Represent, Illustrate, Convey, or Confirm? (16.) Whether its Import be less or more distinct? (17.) Whether it be Articulate, or at least referring to that, which is so; as the Marks in Short-hand?

§ 16. If Articulate, (18.) *what* it is more Specially; whether written Characters, or, (19.) Vocal Sound? And either way, (20.) Whether it be a Letter, Syllable, Word, Clause, or Period? And if written, we may enquire yet farther; (21.) Whether it be a Paragraph, Section, Chapter, Volume, or Book?

§ 17. If it be a Word, (22.) of what Grammatical Sort, and what its Logical Nature? If a Clause, or Sentence, (23.) What the chief Nominative or Subject; what the principal Verb or Attribute; what the Appendages of each; how related to their Principals, and among themselves?

§ 18. Last of all and chiefly, (24.) Whether the Sign or Signs are in the present Case, to be consider'd only absolutely in themselves, or relatively to what they signify; and what that is, or of what Sort?

C H A P. V.

§ 1. **AND** now, II, As to the more general Nature or Condition of that to which the Sign or Signs do ultimately refer we may Query, (1.) Whether it be a mere Notion, or somewhat in Nature? If the former, (2.) Whether only a Fiction, or that which has a Foundation in something Real? If the first of these, (3.) Whether it be contradictory, or consistent with it self? And either way, (4.) of what it is made up, whence drawn, and how put together?

§ 2. As to the Notion, which has a Foundation in somewhat Real, (5.) Whether it be only some Notional Remark (as that *Adam* is an *Individual*) or an abstracted Nature? As *Adam's Individuality*. (6.) Whether the Abstraction be more or less general, and from what it is taken?

§ 3. III, As to what is not actually existing, but only Possible, as carrying with it no Inconsistency, we may enquire, (1.) Whether it *has* been, or only *may* be, or is *like* to be, or certainly *will* be, or necessarily *must* be? As to this last, (2.) Whether of absolute Necessity, or only upon Supposition of somewhat else? And as to any of the forementioned Points. (3.) Whether only by Supernatural Agency, or in a Natural way, by second Causes? (4.) What Assurance or other Evidence there is in relation to any of them?

§ 4. IV, As to the *Existence* of what actually is; we may enquire, (1.) Whether its Existence be absolutely Original or someway deriv'd? (2.) Whether from mere Will and Pleasure; or in a Natural and Necessary way? And as to this, (3.) Whether from what is in it self altogether Necessary, or in some respect Contingent? (4.) Whether the Contingency be primary and immediate, as in what is produc'd at Pleasure by some Voluntary Agent; or Secondary and Mediate in what may necessarily flow from those Productions, and yet might not-have-been, since those Productions were themselves Contingent?

§ 5. (5.) Whether what we have under Consideration, has always been or only for some time, and for how long a time? Again, (6.) Whether it must of absolute Necessity continue always, or that 'tis possible it should sometime

cease to be? And here, (7.) Whether it has a Natural tendency in it self to do so, or is only liable thereto?

§ 6.(8.) Whether it may cease to be thro' the Influence of any Creature, or of the Creatour only? If the former, (9.) of what Creature? and in what way? if the latter, (10.) Whether God has declar'd, that he will, or will not put an end to the Existence of this or that? or which of the two is most likely?

§ 7. Now what exists may be either Collective or Single: And,

V, As to any *Collection* of distinct and separate Things presented together under one Idea, or what may be so taken: As when we read, or hear, or think of *Notions*, or *Men* Plurally; or of an Army, a Troop of Horse, an Assembly of Men, Women and Children; we may here begin with the Collection *as such*, but then our Enquiries should afterwards proceed more distinctly upon the several Sorts or Denominations; and, if it might be, singly upon every separate Particular.

§ 8. As to the Collection it self, it may be consider'd, (1.) Whether it be without any regular Order, or orderly dispos'd? (2.) In what *kind* of Order, and more particularly *how*? (3.) Whether the Things collected be number'd, or unnumber'd? And, (4.) whether more easily or difficultly to be numbred. (5.) Whether the Collection contain things of one Kind, or Sort, or Denomination only, or of more? And then, (6.) Whether of all the Kinds, Sorts, or Denominations, or only some of them? And, (7.) What Kinds or Sorts, or Denominations particularly? And, (8.) Whether One or More under any of them? (9.) Whether they are nearer together or farther from each other? (10.) In what way and manner the Combination is made, *vid.* Part 1. Chap. 8. § 6, 7. And, (11.) Whether it be abiding or altering?

§ 9. And now to proceed upon the several parts of those Collections, we may farther enquire:

VI, As to some *general Characters* belonging to the Essence of this or that, or to the main and Summary Account thereof. (1.) Whether the Essence include Existence; or that the Thing may be conceiv'd without conceiving it to be, or exist. (2.) Whether the Essence comprizes the whole Thing; or that there is somewhat of it, which is not strictly of its Essence, nor so Necessary to it, but that it may actually be, or however be conceiv'd without it.

§ 10. (3.) Whether the Essence be of the highest Kind, and have all sorts of Excellencies agreeable thereto; or of an inferiour Nature, having only some of a lower Sort? (4.) Whether the Excellencies it has be Infinite or Finite? Again, (5.) Whether there is nothing Mutable in respect of Being, or Will belonging to it; or that in these regards it admit of Change. And, (6.) Whether it be altogether Independent or someway depending?

§ 11. (7.) Upon the whole, whether it be uncreated or created? (8.) Whether it be the *Divine Nature* in its self Simply consider'd; or one of the *Three* therein Subsisting? (9.) *What* it is of the former, or *which* of these latter, whether the Father, Son, or Spirit? Or, (10.) What it is otherwise appertaining to that, or any of these, or to all of them in Common? And here we may Enquire of what soever is farther belonging to the uncreated Being, as his immanent and transient Acts, Relation to his Creatures, &c. (Part I. Chap. 6. § 8, &c.)

§ 12. The following Enquires are limited to what is Created; And here,

VII, As to the *Common Nature*, wherein this or that Essence observably agrees with some other Essence, which is yet observably differing from it in some other respect; It may be enquir'd, (1.) Whether the Essence do import, that the thing is subsisting of its self, or imply its Inhering, or being subjected in somewhat else: And here, (2.) Whether immediately in the Substance it self, or thro' the Intervention of what is inhering therein? And, (3.) Whether it be at the first, or some farther Remove, as in the Mode of a Mode.

§ 13. (4.) Whether it stand in Action or Passion? (5.) Whether in Privation or mere Negation? (6.) Whether it be Real or Notional? And, (7.) Whether the latter be founded in Nature, or altogether feign'd; and if so, whether by Design, or Mistake? (8.) Whether the Essence be more Simple; or that it is a manifest Combination? (9.) Whether it be the Essence of a Whole, or of a Part? (10.) Of what Parts the whole is made up, or into what it may be divided, or distinguish'd? And, (11.) What Proportion the part bears to its whole; and whether it be more or less Principal, or Necessary?

§ 14. (12.) Whether the Thing be consider'd, as subjected in something; or as Abstracted from it. (13.) What are the several common Natures or *Kinds* above the Thing we are considering; and what the *Sorts* below it, into which it may be distributed; or *what* the *Particulars* under it?

(14.) Whe-

(14.) Whether it be Absolutely, or Relatively taken; of what Sort the Relation is; what its Foundation; What, or who the Correlate; what continues or dissolves the Relation, and how 'tis answer'd or fail'd? (15.) Whether what we have to consider be a Sign *as such*; or contradistinguish'd thereto?

§ 15. (16.) Whether it be such as we can fully and clearly comprehend being only what the Mind has it self determin'd to take up of this or that Matter (suppose it were the Concave globular Figure of the Heavens); or that we have but an obscure and indistinct Idea, as to somewhat in it? And consequently, (17.) Whether it be intirely the Produce of our Mind, or rather our way of considering Things; or that there is somewhat of the Work of God taken in, which has always something at the Bottom unknown to us?

§ 16. VIII, As to the peculiar and *distinguishing Nature*, or what the Essence under Consideration has observably differing from some other Essence, which do's yet observably agree with it in other respects; here the Enquiries are to proceed on from what we had before taken Notice of as Common; and we may go thro' the Division or Subdivisions, or the several Kinds and Sorts, as they each have their differencing Character till we come down to that, which compleats the Essence of what we are considering, and distinguishes it from such other Essence, as comes the nearest to it, among those, which are not of the same Sort with it.

§ 17. Now if the common Nature did import, that the thing was subsisting of it self; we may enquire, (1.) Whether it be Indiscernible, and self-moving, which we call Spirit; or Discernible and of it self unactive, which we understand by Matter? As to the former, (2.) Whether it be unrelated, or naturally related to some gross Body; and be less or more limited as to its Activity and Reach? (3.) Whether it be out of such Body, or in it? If in it, (4.) Whether naturally capable of existing separate from it, and of acting, even at present, in some sort without it, or not?

§ 18. As to what is Material, (5.) Whether it affect our Senses, or not? If it do, (6.) Which of them, and how? If the Object be visible, (7.) Whether to the naked Eye, or by the help of Glasses, &c. (8.) What the Shape, Size, Colour, &c. see Part 1. Chap. 3. § 6. (9.) Whether it be Uniform and Similar, or dissimilar and observably various. (10.) Whether the various Matter be more Simple, or Organiz'd. (11.) Whether the Organs serve only for Nutrition, or Sensation? And, (12.) Whether these subserve to Imagination only, or to the more proper Intellectual Operation?

C H A P. VI.

§ 1. **A**S to what do's not subsist of it self, but is subjected in somewhat else, on which it is depending, or some way appertaining thereto, I shall offer some Enquiries under the farther Heads following. And,

IX. As to *Active Powers*, (1.) What there is, either for Local Motion, or Apprehension? As to the former, (2.) Whether it be for moving only something else observably, as the Load-stone do's the Iron; or for the moving of it self? And here, (3.) Whether only in its Place or from it? 4.) What is the degree of the Motive Force, and what its Manner of moving.

§ 2. As to Apprehensive Power; (5.) Whether it be limited to Sensible Things, or extend to such as are purely Intellectual? (6.) Whether it be Intuitive, discursive, or both? (7.) Whether it stop in knowing, or proceed to somewhat farther? And here, (8.) Whether to doing, or desiring only? (9.) Whether the Desire stay in *Wishing*, or come up to what is properly *Willing*? (See Part 1. Chap. 2. § 28.) And, (10.) Whether *this* be more Simple, or *Passionate*, as agitating the Blood and Spirits? (See Part 1. Chap. 2. § 27.) Here it may be enquir'd, (11.) On what sort of Occasions? And, (12.) In what Manner? Whether in respect of outward Appearance, inward feeling, or what is any other way Concomitant or Consequent?

§ 3. X. As to *Passive Capacity*, we may Enquire, (1.) What this or that is capable of Becoming, or Being, and in what Way? (2.) Whether and how far it is fitted to resist, or to receive this or that Influence? More particularly, (3.) To be Moved in its Place or from it; (4.) To be so or so Dispos'd, or Imprest; (5.) To be Dispos'd of, used or employ'd in this or that way; (6.) To be continu'd, or discontinu'd; (7.) Annihilated or alter'd; and this, (8.) for the better, or for the worse?

§ 4. XI. As to what may be any way *Proper* and *Peculiar*, attending or following the Essence, tho' not strictly of it, *Q^y*. (1.) What can be duly infer'd from any thing of the Essence, which is not so plainly included in it; as that a right lin'd Figure, which has but three Angles, must have them all together equal to two right ones, or to a Semicircle. (2.) Whether that which is so infer'd can be infer'd from nothing
else

else, but from such Essence only? (3.) Whether this or that belong only to such particular Thing, or only to those of such a sort, or of such more general Kind? And, (4.) Whether it agree thereto always, or only at such Times or on such Occasions?

§ 5. XII. As to *Habits*, which may, in some Cases, heighten or lessen the abovementioned Powers and Capacities. *Qu.* (1.) Which of these, and which of either Sort in particular the Habit do's affect? (2.) How? whether for the better, or for the worse? (3.) In what degree, more or less? And, (4.) Whence it is, whether from Creation, or Generation, Supernatural Infusion, or Acquirement? See Part 1. Chap. 5. § 15.

§ 6. XIII, As to *other internal Attributes*, which likewise are not only Accessions, but Accidental to the Essence. *Qu.* (1.) What there may farther be of such a Kind? And, (2.) Whether they belong directly and immediately to what can subsist of it self, or to what must inhere and be subjected in somewhat else? (3.) Whether they be of an Intellectual Nature (as a Triangle without any particular Measure or Manner ascrib'd to it); or sensible, as this or that particular Triangle before our Eyes? (4.) What Sense it belongs to; and, (5.) What kind of Impression it makes? Again, (6.) Whether it be more Simple or Complex, and resolvable into several Attributes; as Happy or Happiness, which comprizes whatsoever is regularly desirable, and actually desir'd in any Kind. And, (7.) Whether it be more generally found in such a Subject, or less frequently? (8.) Of what Measure or Degree it is, and of what Duration?

§ 7. We leave all the foregoing Enquiries to be farther carried on, as there may be occasion; and shall but mention the following Heads of Enquiry, which may be more easily pursu'd.

XIV, As to the *Parts* of compounded Things; *Qu.* How many, what they are, and how put together?

XV, As to the insensible *Particles*, and *Texture* of what is Material, *Qu.* Of what Figure or Figures; in what Proportion to each other; with what Pores or Interstices; whether in Motion or at Rest; whether only Contiguous or Continuous; and whether more loosely or firmly Cohering?

§ 8. XVI As to *Privative Deficiencies*, the Enquiry may be directed by considering, what is Naturally, or Morally belonging to such a Kind of Subject, as we have under Consideration, and in such Circumstances.

XVII, As to any *Negative Restrictions*, which the Matter may seem to require, for it would be endless and useless to attempt the taking in of *all*, See Part I. Chap. 7. § 15, &c.

XVIII, As to *extrinsecal Denominations* (e. g. being in such place, or so Posited, Cloathed, Adorn'd, Possessing this or that, &c.) the matter is plainly obvious to Sense, or may be drawn from credible Testimony.

§ 9. XIX, As to *Relative Considerations*, which are of very various and almost infinite Kinds: We may enquire whether and how the Person or Thing may be taken as related to it self under differing Considerations; what there may be of personal Relation, and what of Real; what of Similar, or of Dissimilar, and how founded; what sort of Opposites there are; and also as to Subjects, Adjuncts, Causes, Effects, &c. See Part I. Chap. 12, & 13.

XX, As to distinct, but *adjoining Appendages*, they are easily observ'd; as for Instance, the exterior Place, the Cloathing it self, the Guilding, Painting, or other Ornaments themselves, &c, as belonging to this or that.

XXI, As to what is only some other way *Appertaining*, but not appending (as Possessions, Lands, Houses, Reverfions, and whatsoever Rights or Claims, &c.) they may be either observ'd by our selves, or enquir'd out from such as know them.

§ 10. Thus far the Enquiries have proceeded upon what may be suppos'd to fall under our own more immediate Observation; the same Questions may be put in reference to what we have by Report from others: But there is still somewhat more peculiarly requisite here, we may therefore be directed to enquire, not only, (1.) What might be the *Thing observ'd* by others, according to the forementioned Particulars, or such of them as may be more Necessary; but also, (2.) Whether the Person, we enquire of, had the Matter only by Report, or by his own Observation; if in the former way; (3.) From how many; From whom; From what sort of Persons? how far they were Capable and Credible; how they themselves had it; how long since; with what Circumstances of Time, Place, &c? And,

§ 11. We may farther Enquire, (4.) In what manner it was observ'd, whether by the By, or Solemnly, and Industriouslly? (5.) Whether by one Person only, or also by others? And here, (6.) Whether in the same place together, or in divers? (7.) Whether at the same, or differing Times? (8.) Whether severally, without having the Matter suggested, or being put upon minding it? (9.) Whether
later,

later, or longer since? (12.) In what Place; and more Specially, (13.) Whether it were observ'd nearer Hand or farther off?

§ 12. (14.) Of what Age and Capacity the Person might be when he observ'd it? (15.) How he might be dispos'd, whether his Mind and Senses were in order, or disorder'd? more particularly, (16.) Whether he were well awake or under Drowsiness? (17.) Whether he had the requisite Furniture and Help for observing rightly? (18.) Whether the Observation continu'd for some time, and how long?

§ 13. As to the Effect of what was observ'd, *Qu.* (19.) Whether it were Pleasurable or Painful? (20.) Whether intense or remiss? (21.) Of what Duration? (22.) What Part was affected? (23.) In what manner? (24.) What the final Issue thereof?

§ 14. Lastly, as to any thing acted or perform'd, *Qu.* (25.) What it was? (26.) By whom? (27.) In what Manner? (28.) Whether by some Person alone, or with what Help? (29.) Whether by Accident, or Designedly? (30.) With what Design? Farther Enquiries may easily be added to these upon Occasion, and such as the particular Occasion may Specially dictate.

§ 15. There are divers considerable Matters of Enquiry, which I have tho't fit to pursue more fully, under the following General Heads, and to endeavour the Resolution of them, or at least to point out the best way I could towards it; as whether we *do*, or how we *may* rightly Discern, whether that which lies before us be a Matter proper for us to proceed upon, or how far it may be so? Again, whether we *do*, or how we *may* rightly Assign what place this or that ought to have in our Attendance, and what Proportion of it? And so, as to the other ways of using our Reason mention'd in the Introduction, § 21, & 22.

§ 16. We now conclude the present Head with some more general Directions in order to the *farther* Raising, Pursuing, and Resolving of Enquiries, as there may be Occasion, And,

1. We should early and continually read the Bible with heedful Observation, enquiring of such Persons, and consulting such Authors, as may help us to Understand it. This would insensibly furnish us with many Positive Notices, and farther matter of Enquiry, not only about Divine Things, which are of Principal Concern to us; but also in reference to a Multitude of other Matters, which are touch'd upon, tho' not solemnly treated of, in Sacred Writ.

§ 17. 2. We should do well to acquaint our selves, as early as we can, with some brief and general Account of the whole System of Things; suppose it were, at first, only with such a one as *Comenius's Janua Linguarum*. That or some like Account should be made very Familiar by often reading it, not barely for the Words, but Things contained in it.

3. We should choose a fit Instructour, together with the most Knowing and Communicative Company we can have, and improve it by heedful Attention and diligent Enquiries on all proper Occasions; and we must,

§ 18. 4, Endeavour to Recollect what we have heard, read, or observ'd, relating to the Matter in Hand; and should proceed, if there be Occasion and Opportunity, to Tryal and Experiment, Reasoning as far as we can upon the Whole. But whereas our own Furniture, and Reach may be short, we should,

5, Betake our selves to such Treatises as professedly handle the Matter we have before us; and to such Persons, who have had the best Opportunities and Help, together with a Capacity for acquainting themselves with it. But withal,

6. We must not forget, or neglect, whereas we always lack Wisdom, to ask it seriously and constantly, and with Expectation from God.

C H A P VII.

§ 1. **T**HE next Use of our Reason, wherein it is to be directed and assisted, is,

II, *Rightly to discern, whether that which lies before us be a Matter proper for us to proceed upon, or how far it may be so?*

Certain it is, that we are bound as Reasonable Men, wholly to abstain from some Pursuits, and to desist from others; and that God hath given us Understanding sufficient to discern, that many things are of that Sort, about which some do vainly puzzle themselves and others. I will not say, we can always presently or easily know, that this or that particular Matter is such, which yet may be found really so after fruitless Attempts to Understand or Effect it: But certainly the Reason of Man might serve him, farther than it commonly do's, for the earlier Discovery of what lies without his Com pals; and to apply his Mind to this Point, might
have

save him abundance of vain Trouble, and reserve a great deal of wasted Time and Tho't, and perhaps Expences too for better Purposes, more especially in the way of Learning.

§ 2. Now, to guide and assist us in Judging, whether this or that particular Matter be a proper Subject for our Reason to be employ'd upon, the following Question is to be put and pursu'd,

Whether the Matter before us be not in it self Contradictious and Absurd; or however, such as we are plainly incapable of, or unconcern'd with?

§ 3. I shall say very little to the first Branch of the Question, *viz.* Whether the Matter propos'd be not Absurd and Contradictious: The Meaning is, whether it be not such as is, in it self, Unintelligible or Impracticable, by Reason of its implying a Contradiction, or being inconsistent with it self: As, suppose, to apprehend or make out a Trinity in the Divine Nature, consider'd as absolutely and every way Simple; or to extract the Root of what we call a surd Number, as 5, 6, 10, &c, that is to give the Root, where there never was any, or to resolve a Number into Principles, of which it was not made: And, to instance no more; suppose it were requir'd to form a right lin'd Triangle, whose Angles, together, should make more or less than two right Angles.

§ 4. In such Cases, Reason hath nothing to do, but if it can, to detect the Inconsistency and Contradictious Absurdity, and to dismiss the Matter, when once we can come to see that which is propos'd to be Apprehended, Acted, or Effected, do's at least imply the Denial of somewhat, which is or must be affirm'd; or the affirming of what is, and must be deny'd, as to give, or conceive a Number actually infinite; *i. e.* what is actually Number'd, and yet cannot be Number'd.

But even in order to the Discovery, it will oftentimes be Necessary to enquire into the Nature and Condition of the several Terms or Points, which are laid together in the Matter before us, and carefully to observe, whether some one of them do not imply the Denial of some other among them, or of something else, which certainly is and must be so: As if it were propos'd, to prevent somewhat, which God has undoubtedly foretold shall be; now if once this be plainly found, the Attempt, how consistent soever and easie it might otherways be, would carry with it the absurd and Contradictious Endeavour of over-powering Omnipotence,

Disparaging Omniscience, or Disproving Unblemish'd, and unalterable Veracity.

§ 5. The Question, as to what remains, is to be put, as it is here given *Negatively*, rather than *Affirmatively*; because our Pursuit is to be Diverted, or stop'd, only upon discerning our Incapacity, or that we are not concern'd: Nor are we always to stay, till we can plainly see, that we are Capable of a Matter and Concerned in it, before we attempt it; those are ordinarily to be suppos'd, where the contrary doth not appear; otherwise we shall be in danger to stop at every Difficulty, and set too narrow Bounds to our selves.

§ 6. It seems proper that here it be first enquir'd, whether a Matter propos'd be not such, as we are plainly *Unconcern'd with*, since this may be of somewhat easier Discovery, and fitly leading to the Inquiry about our Capacity, in Case it shall not otherwise plainly appear, that we are unconcern'd; as it must, when our Application to this or that is neither charged on us by any proper Authority vested in Parents, or others for such Purpose; nor advis'd by Wise and Faithful Friends: And also,

§ 7. That the Thing it self is at the same time apparently such, as that our knowing or effecting it, do's no way Tend to any present or future Good, either more immediately to our selves, or to others, whether in respect of real Profit, valuable Reputation, or innocent Entertainment. But however the Matter stand in those Regards, we may justly reckon our selves so far Unconcern'd with it, as we are unavoidably incapable of it; *viz.* in Part, or at the Present, or even altogether, if the incapacity be Natural, Absolute and Total: For surely our Wise and Kind Creator has given us, at least, the Fundamental, and remote Capacity, for what we are really concern'd to know, or do.

§ 8. Now there can be no doubt, but we are incapable of some things Naturally and Absolutely as of looking with the Eye into Bodies, that are Dense and Opac, or closely Compact and Dark; of other things Accidentally, and in some Respect only, as suppose, (1.) Thro' want of Natural Bodily Organs, as of the Eye for knowing Colours; Or, (2.) For want of fit Age and Experience; Or, (3.) By Reason of some present Indisposition of the Body or Mind; Or, (4.) Upon our being otherwise Employ'd; Or, (5.) Engag'd to apply our selves otherways; Or, (6.) In that we have not laid in what is previously Necessary, nor taken the Steps by which we must advance to this or that farther Point of Knowledge, or Practice, as if one should go upon the dividing

ding of a very large Number into 78, or 89 Parts, before he had learn'd the Notation, Multiplication, and Substraction of Numbers, all which must ordinarily be employ'd in the performing of such a Division.

§ 9. What we are *thus* incapable of, we are *so far* also Unconcerned with: and if *such* Accidental Incapacity be not our Fault, we may be sure, that so long we are not concerned, either in respect of Duty, or of our highest Interest, with the Matters, whereof we are *so* incapable. They, who by their incurable Dulness, or other unavoidable Impediments are limited, (E. G.) from pursuing this very *Art* of using their Reason, may well look upon themselves as not concern'd to have it: And thus there may be very many Things, of which we are accidentally, and innocently Incapable; not only a number of Mechanical Arts, but even some Parts of Learning, and indeed whatsoever Points are of so abstruse Speculation, or difficult Performance, as that our Genius, Age, Present Improvements, or other Innocent Circumstances will not admit of them.

§ 10. But besides that, which I have call'd *Accidental Incapacity*, there is yet farther a *Natural Incapacity*, which may seem to belong to the common Make of Intelligent Creatures; or of Men, at least in their present State. And I shall here give some Account of those Sorts of Things, whereof we are *Naturally Incapable*; if not wholly, yet in a very considerable Degree. And,

§ 11. 1, What is Infinite, *as such*, and in that Respect, our Finite Minds cannot comprehend: We may certainly know, that there are such things, when yet we cannot fully Understand, what they are: Thus we must own, that there has been a kind of vast Duration without beginning, (*viz.* *that* of God; for if he had not been always, he could not have been at all), but when in a way of positive Conception, we have heap'd Ages upon Ages backward, there must have been before them all a Kind of Duration, which we cannot conceive, unless it be confus'dly, and in a Negative way; so that it may well be said, *Canst thou by searching find out God?*

§ 12. 2, We cannot Naturally attain to a certain and determinate Knowledge, as to the inward Actions of Free Agents, which are not discover'd to us: What depends upon the Will and Pleasure of such Agents, and especially the unrevealed Purposes of God, must be to us unsearchable, together with what is depending on those Purposes. *What Man knoweth the Things of a Man, save the Spirit of Man, that*

is in him: even so the things of God knoweth no Man, but the Spirit of God.

§ 13. 3, We cannot certainly reason out Things, that do not depend upon known and certain Causes: And such are most Matters of Fact, as to Time past, or in distant Places beyond the reach of our Senses; and most Events for the future: Here it would be a vain Attempt, even as to past, or distant Contingencies, to go to Ascertain them only by Reasoning; whenas they might be so, or otherwise: And 'tis not so much our Reasoning Faculty we must here depend upon, as careful Observation, approv'd History, well attested Report, and inspir'd Prophecie: *What we have seen with our Eyes, or our Ears have heard, and our Fathers have credibly told us, or the Spirit of Prophecie certainly has foretold.*

§ 14. 4, Wherever the Humane Nature has no Organs of Sense, or other Faculty, fitted to acquaint us with such Things, or to Effect them, we must be naturally incapable of those things: And thus the invisible World of created Spirits, as also those parts of the visible World, which are beyond our Compass, cannot be farther known by us, than as they may be specially reveal'd, or reason'd out from such Revelation, or from some uncommon Appearances; and to presume beyond this, must be an *intruding into those things we have not seen*, and the Indication of *a fleshy Mind vainly Puff'd up.*

§ 15. 5, We cannot penetrate into the very Substance and inmost Essence of those Beings, with which we seem best acquainted: Of Substance we seem to have no other than this obscure, indistinct Idea, that it is somewhat (we know not what) which (*c. gr.*) Thinks, or hath divisible Parts; nor doth it appear that we have any Capacity of looking farther into this Matter, as it is Certain we have no farther Concern: It is the Creator's Prerogative, to have *all things, not only naked before him, but opened to him.*

§ 16. 6, The First Elements of Things, the least Particles of Matter actually existing, together with the Natural Means of their Cohering and making up a continuous Body, seem to be beyond our Reach; and that we are not furnish'd with Powers to discover these and the like *Arcana* of Nature: Nor do's there appear any Ground to hope for such Artificial Assistance, as may enable our Eye to discern the Texture (*c. gr.*) of Water, or its Compounding Particles; *God's Works are, in such respects as these, past our finding out.*

§ 17. 7, The Explaining of our sensible Perceptions (as of White, Sweet, &c.) so as to make them better understood, than they are by Sensation, appears unfeasible to us: And that however, we can never give the Idea of those Things to such as never had the Perception of them, or any thing like them. *It is the Mouth alone tasteth Meats, and the Ear trieth Words*, in this respect.

§ 18. 8, I may here add, that we should vainly (as well as needlessly) endeavour the Proof of a Position or Connexion, which is Self-evident, and of which we cannot seriously doubt, if we would: To attempt such a thing, would be indeed to *darken Counsel by Words without Knowledge*. If some will say, we may be, for ought we know, all our Lives long in a Dream (as we justly reckon our selves to have been, when awaking, we find nothing of what we dream'd, to have really been, but that it was all a delusory Imagination), instead of going to Argue with such, I would only ask, whether we are any ways concern'd to be surer of our being Awake, than we are; since we find our selves Happy or Wretched, to our own unavoidable Feeling, by what passes, whether real or not, and that therefore we must take it for real, whether we would or no.

C H A P. VIII.

§ 1. **T**HOSE Things, which our Reason is not capable of, have been in some Measure pointed out; but lest we should too much narrow the Province of Humane Reason, I shall briefly shew, that it may and ought to be someway prudently employ'd, even about the Matters before-mention'd: And tho' we cannot accountably attempt the very Points therein, of which we have appear'd to be Incapable: Yet where we are not plainly Unconcern'd, much more where we are evidently Concern'd in point of unquestionable Duty, or of some considerable Interest, we should Reason as far as we can about those very Matters, which we cannot thro'ly penetrate, nor are concern'd to do it. And,

§ 2. 1, We should Labour to apprehend what we can, and are concern'd with of that, which is Infinite, whilst we cannot comprehend the Infinity it self. We ought certainly to form the best Ideas we can of God, such as Reason

must tell us are true (so far as they go) tho' not Adequate, or Accurate; endeavouring they may have, at least, such a sort of Likeness and Analogy, as God himself allows to our weak Apprehensions; and which may well serve to engage and guide our Duty, and to secure our Felicity; we may not indeed imagine that God hath an Eye like ours; but must believe he certainly knows all things, without such an Eye, by the help of what we may call his Understanding, which we must own to be Infinite, but may not reasonably attempt to comprehend its Infinity, or to Account for the Manner or Means of God's knowing infallibly what his Creatures will do, as well as what he himself resolves.

§ 3. 'Tis a very fit and proper use of Reason, in reference to what is Infinite, to restrain our Tho'ts from endless and fruitless Enquiries and Pursuits; contenting our selves with what may be known and conceiv'd by Finite Minds, without going to limit what we allow to be unlimited: In short, we should form our more positive Ideas, by the most perfect Finite Models, with which we are acquainted; but still supplying their Deficiency by just and fit Negatives; as when we conceive the Divine Knowledge to be most nearly resembled by what we call *Intuition*, but not limited as ours is to one or to a few Objects at a time, or to any of the Differences of Time past, present, or future; but reaching every way at once, and to every thing, that has been, is, and shall be, or that might be.

§ 4. 2, As to the undiscover'd inward actings of Free Agents, and particularly the unrevealed Counsels of God, many Points may be truly known, and with sufficient Evidence; whilst yet we cannot ascertain the very Things therein determin'd; as (*E. G.*) that the Decrees of God are not, nor indeed can possibly be, any ways Contradictory to his known Nature; or to what he has in other Cases reveal'd of his secret Counsels.

§ 5. As to the Principles and Ends of Free Agents, we are capable of making probable Conjectures; and it highly concerns us, in some Cases, to make the best we can about them; which may ordinarily answer some good Purpose to our selves and others, tho' we should sometimes fall into a Mistake: And it will always become us in point of Modesty and Prudence, not to take our Guesses for infallible Certainties, nor to proceed thereupon without some Provision in case we should be mistaken.

§ 6. 3, As to the Contingencies of past or distant Facts or Futurities our Reason may be us'd to find and pursue the best Method of inquiring them out; to make the best Judgment we can, what is an Observation, History, Report, or Prophecie fit to be depended on, and thence to draw only just and certain Inferences.

§ 7. And here we may find our selves oftentimes oblig'd to guess, as well as we can, at the Facts or Futurities, which neither our Reason, nor any other Help within our reach can assure us of; and it may be a Matter of great Importance, that we should, if possible guess right; and that therefore we should go upon the most probable Grounds, and make our Conjecture according to the most likely Measures; but laying in at the same time for Mistakes and Disappointments.

§ 8. 4, Where we are destitute of Natural Organs or Faculties, in relation to this or that sort of Objects, our Reason must yet serve us to Judge of any extraordinary Notices we may have, whether they are to be depended on; that we be not abus'd with such Notions, as are really Fanatical and Enthusiastick: We are also (as it hath been intimated) to Reason from Revelation, so far as that may safely and usefully lead us.

§ 9. We may also draw what Light we can from such Extraordinary sensible Appearances and Effects as are in Fact undeniably Certain; and of which no other Cause can be reasonably assign'd, but some invisible and intelligent Being: These Matters are to be very severely examin'd by Reason, as to the Possibility, perhaps also the probability of the Matter reported, and the Credit due to the Reporters; and after such Examination somewhat may be, probably at least, Infer'd.

§ 10. 5, Even about Substance, somewhat may be known by Reason, whilst the very Substance it self, in its proper Nature, remains unknown; *E. Gr.* That this Substance or piece of Matter, which is in this Place, is not the self-same thing with that, which at the same time is in another Place; again, that the Substance, or Matter, may, and often doth remain to be the self-same; tho' it be under very different Accidents, and Alterations of its Modification and Appearances to us; as Water turned into Ice, &c.

§ 11. And whilst we cannot penetrate into the innermost Nature of Substance, yet allowing that to lye quiet in the Dark; we may get such an Acquaintance with its various Attributes, whether more common or Peculiar, as may suffi-

ciently answer the Purposes of Life, and be withal entertaining to our selves and others ; nor are we so much concern'd to know what it is, as what its Properties and Accidents are.

§ 12. 6, As to the first Elements, and sinallest Particles of Bodies, with their Connexion, Reason may certainly find a very pleasant and improving Exercise, in its Inquiries and Conjectures, so as to give us and others a very good Entertainment, to sharpen our Minds, and to carry us into the Admiration and Praise of God, where we cannot arrive at a certainty about his Work.

§ 13. And in such kind of Conjectures we cannot dangerously Err, if we abstain but from pronouncing too confidently, according to this or that Hypothesis, and be not taken up in such Matters, to the Neglect or Prejudice of our greater Concernments.

§ 14. 7, Reason can tell us somewhat about our sensible Perceptions, as (*E. Gr.*) that many of them are to be accounted the Effect of some unknown Make and Texture of the sensible Objects, together with some impressed Force, rather than that they should be generally taken for the Representations or Resemblances of what is subjected in the Thing perceived, or immediately resulting from it ; and yet that some of them, especially the Ideas taken in by the Eye, may well be tho't in some sort to represent the Object, particularly as to the External Figure and Shape of the visible Body.

§ 15. And here our Reason must contrive, how to excite the Ideas, which others are capable of ; as suppose by our pointing them to somewhat in that respect like, which is happily present, or already known ; as to Sugar, when we would raise the Idea of that Sweetness, which is in Honey ; and Reason may instruct us here to enter some such Caution as this, that the sweetness of Sugar is not altogether like that of Honey, this being higher and more Luscious. It can also put us in the way to recall and revive the Ideas, which we or others sometime had by Sight, or hearing, or Taste, &c ; as by calling to Mind the particular Time, Place, Company, and other Circumstances, wherein such Ideas were actually present. Our Sensible Perceptions are likewise subject to be examin'd as Reason may direct ; and so, what appears Evident to us, by one Sense, may be try'd sometimes by another, or by the Consideration and Verdict of Reason and Judgment, as in the Case of seeing the Sun and Stars so little at so great a Distance ; we do or may thence conclude them vastly greater than they seem. And Finally,

§ 16. 8, What

§ 16. 8, What appears Intuitively certain and self-evident to us at one time, may be reasonably view'd over again at another, and when we are in far differing Circumstances of Body and Mind; we may likewise reasonably enquire (in some Cases), where some have Confidence to Dispute the Matter, whether it do not appear alike Evident to others also, even to Multitudes; and whether indeed it be now *seriously* and deliberately contested, or ever were by any, who had the right Use of their Understandings?

§ 17. We might here add more expressly (what hath been intimated before) that even in Matters pretending to Divine Revelation, and challenging our Faith, Reason may and must Examine, Whether there be the true Marks of such Revelation, and whether we have the true Meaning of what is really such, which we must search out by the approved Rules of Interpretation, and may be sure it will never be *indeed* Contradictory to undoubted Reason, since this, as well as Revelation is from the same Fountain, and *Father of Lights, with whom is no Variableness*, no saying of one thing by the certain Evidence of Sense or Reason, and the contrary by Revelation: Nor can these Words of Scripture [*This is my Body*] be taken literally, as if it had been said, [*This thing is really my Body, not figuratively*] without going contrary to the acknowledged Rules of Interpretation, by which ev'n the *Romanists* themselves proceed in a multitude of other Places. Neither is it said, that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are Three Persons, and yet but one Person; or that God is every way Simple, and yet some way Triple. And doubtless the Scriptures never say nor mean what is *really* Contradictory to Reason, whether we can precisely fix their Meaning or not; nor ought we to pretend thereto in a Matter of such acknowledged depth, tho' we may conceive so far of it, as is sufficient for us, at least in our present State.

C H A P. IX.

§ 1. **W**HEN, upon Consideration, it appears not that the Matter before us is to be dismiss'd as a Contradictory Inconsistency, or as what we are plainly incapable of, or wholly unconcerned with; the next Business of our Reason, wherein it is to be directed and assisted is,

III, *Rightly to assign what place this or that ought to have in our Attendance, and what Proportion of it.* The just Determination of this mainly turns-upon the Nature and Measure of our Concernment in that, which lies before us, and of our Capacity for it.

§ 2. 'Tis undeniable, that I ought to allow all necessary Attendance, to what I am most plainly and deeply concern'd in: And here I must be suppos'd to have the Fundamental and remote Capacity at least (otherwise I were oblig'd to what's absolutely impossible, and so must be inevitably Miserable); but if in such Case, I be under an accidental, curable Incapacity, I am bound with the greater Application to search out and use all likely Means for the removal of it: and according to my Concernment and Capacity, consider'd together, I am to attend on this or that, sooner or later, more or less; and therefore must endeavour to issue this Question, *What sort and degree of concernment have I in the Matter before Me, and what Capacity for it?*

§ 3. Now, that I may give some help towards the resolving of this Enquiry, I shall (1.) more at large consider the various Importance of things to us, and afterwards very briefly touch upon the following Points, *viz.* (2.) The certainty of that Importance. (3.) The reach of our Capacity, and, (4.) The probability of its Advance, or Continuance. Upon the first of these Heads, I shall endeavour, not only justly to state, but establish and enforce the general Measure of Importance; and then proceed a little more distinctly to open it; adding some Remarks, that it may be the better apply'd; and lastly observe, What Gradation there may be according to that Measure, and those Remarks.

§ 4. 1. As to the differing Importance of Things, which may lie before me, it must be of the first and highest Consequence to me (as being fundamentally Necessary for the right Conduct of my self) to have a *just Measure*, whereby to estimate my Interest and Concernment in the various Matters, which present themselves to my Mind, or are laid before it, and it may be pressing at once upon it. Now that Measure must undoubtedly be taken from the Tendency and force things have towards making me Miserable or Happy, *i. e.* towards sinking me into the deepest and most lasting Trouble; or raising me to the highest and most abiding Satisfaction. That the well, or ill Behaving our selves, hath such a Tendency and Force is on all hands confess'd, and most Persons who have liv'd any considerable time in the World, have found somewhat of it in their own Experience; whilst

whilst *their Tho'ts have* (as the Apostle speaks *Rom. 2. 15.*) *accused or excused one another*; and that Conscience hath condemn'd or acquitted them so much to their Disquiet or Contentment, that they have never known the like on any other Occasion; so as *that of the Divine Poet* hath been often found to hold, even in this present Life,

*If thou dost ill, the Joy fades, not the Pains ;
If Well, the Pain doth fade, the Joy remains.*

§ 5. If therefore some would absurdly Question the Supreme, Invisible Being, who hath *clearly shewn his Eternal Power, and God-head by the things that are made, so as to leave the Heathen World without Excuse*; Yet there is a kind of Divine Presence and Tribunal within us, before which we are some times constrained to stand, and to be Judg'd according to the Dictates of Reason, that *Work of the Law written in our Hearts*, where Men are either destitute of a Superior Revelation, or despise it. To this inward Observer, and Judge of our Behaviour we are undeniably concern'd to approve our selves, as we would be secur'd against the insupportable Burthen of a *wounded Spirit*; and as we would enjoy that inward Peace, which can make us at least comparatively easie in the midst of outward Dangers or Troubles, according to that known Passage of the *Lyric Poet*,

*Hic Murus abeneus esto,
Nil conscire sibi, nullâ pallescere Culpa,*

which might be thus rendred in *English*,

Be this my strong, impregnable Defence,
A Conscience clear, undaunted Innocence.

§ 6. But even the *Fools which say in their Hearts there is no God*, cannot deliberately Judge, or conclude it in their Minds. They who impiously, and foolishly enough (tho' wisely, as they think) *Wish, it were so*; yet cannot seriously or steadily *Believe, it is so*; and when they have taken the Course to lay Conscience fast a Sleep, yet they cannot but dread its awaking at last, more terrible than before; and that *for all those evil Practices*, whereby they stupifie their Minds (rendring themselves Brutish, and almost unfit for Humane Society) *God will bring them to Judgment*: Now such Apprehensions must render them in some degree uneasy to themselves.

§ 7. Upon the whole, Men cannot have any Rational and holding Satisfaction, but in approving themselves to a well instructed Conscience, and so far also to him, who made

and

and manages the Universe, who can do more against, or for us, than all the World besides; and if pleas'd with us, he certainly will employ his Wisdom, Power, and other Attributes, not against, but for us; so that, *all things shall work together for our Good*, and turn unspeakably to our Advantage in the end, however they may at present appear.

§ 8. Our being therefore accepted of God, and approv'd of our own Minds, must unquestionably be of the utmost Importance to us; and therefore the Concern we have in this or that particular Matter will be best determin'd by a just Resolution of the following Enquiry, *Whether, and how far God will be pleas'd, or displeas'd; And a well inform'd Conscience satisfi'd or dissatisfi'd?* Towards the answering of this important Question, somewhat will here be offer'd in a general way, but farther Help is to be sought elsewhere, *viz.* from the Sacred Scriptures, and other Books agreeable thereto, which treat of that Matter more particularly; and from Men of approved Knowledge and Integrity.

§ 9. As to the Measure so far settled, it is of mighty Consequence to us, that it be firmly *Believ'd*, considering the Attacks, that are like to be made upon us in this Point, not only by a subtle Tempter, and a degenerate World without, but also by our own depraved Nature within: It had need likewise to be entertain'd with the highest *Acceptation*, and held as a Maxim fully suited to our Nature and Condition as Reasonable Creatures, and that it should be embrac'd, as being of the most friendly Import and Tendency; whereas we are sure to be best accepted of God, when we do most *show our selves Men indeed*, and pursue our truest Interest in the surest way: Nor can we ever fall under any Necessity or Temptation (as those who seek the favour of Earthly Princes may sometimes) to do any thing Base, Unreasonable, or Unworthy of our selves: Finally, we should have the Measure thus given always *at hand* and ready for Use.

§ 10. Our Minds ought therefore to be thro'ly tinctur'd with this Principle, and under the continual Influence of it, that our great, and (in a Sense, cur) only Business in this World is the Pleasing of God, and that our own Interests are thus to be most effectually secur'd. It do's most highly concern us to use all proper Means for the better fixing of this Point; and, in order thereto, to converse much with such Authors, and Company, and above all, to engage such help from above, as will not only establish us in it, but mind us of it.

§ 11. Now more distinctly to open the mentioned Rule and Measure of Importance :

1. We are not to suppose, that properly God is pleas'd or displeas'd *with us* for any thing which hath no kind of reference to any Law or Rule of Duty, and therefore those Perfections, or Defects of Mind or Body, which are merely Natural, much more the State of Things about us, do not render us morally Pleasing, or Displeasing to God ; nor are they, by any means, of such Importance to us, as they are commonly suppos'd to be : Our Business is to *be*, and *Act*, as God would have us, and to leave the rest intirely to him, depending on his Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, for such Issues and Events, as shall finally prove of the greatest Advantage to us : We are not oblig'd, for the pleasing of God, eventually to secure all those Ends, at which we are yet bound to aim ; but only to take the best way we can towards them, that so it may not be our Fault, if we be not (*e. gr.*) Healthful, Useful, &c.

§ 12. 2. We may reasonably think, that some things of a Moral Nature, are equally pleasing or displeasing to God. 'Tis, I conceive, fairly supposable, he could have equally satisfy'd himself in making some other System of Things, or managing them some other way ; and that God was not by any Necessity ty'd up to this individual Frame of Nature, and Course of Providence ; Nor can we doubt, but there are now several Pieces in Nature, and Scenes of Providence, which appear to the Divine Wisdom, equally good and perfect : And if divers of God's own Performances may bear the self-same Estimate with him, 'tis reasonable to Judge, that some of our Actings may do so too. We are not therefore to expect that every several Matter, with which we are concern'd, should have a different Degree of Acceptation with God, and so must demand an higher, or only a lower Regard from us : Whenas 'tis most plainly undeniable, that some Actions of ours must be altogether equal, and alike ; as suppose whether I should choose, and take this or that piece of Gold, if both were exactly alike, and offer'd under like Circumstances.

§ 13. 3. There may yet be many more things, about which we cannot, or at least are not requir'd to, determine, which is more pleasing or displeasing to God. It would not in many Cases be worth the while ; and in some it might prove Matter of Temptation to us, rather than Advantage : Where therefore the Determination is evidently difficult, and the Consequences on the one hand, or the other appear not likely to bear a just Proportion to the Time and Thot, which would

would be required : Such Matters are to be taken for equal, and indifferent ; especially, when we have not the Capacity or Opportunity to examine them farther.

§ 14. 4. To follow the best Light we have, or can well attain, considering it as that which God would have us do, must be in the main pleasing to him ; tho' we should happen, notwithstanding our Precaution, to fall into some Mistake : Whenas on the other hand to go against our Light and Conscience must be both displeasing to God, and disquieting to our own Minds ; for in so doing, we should certainly *condemn our selves in the thing, which we allow*, and could expect no other, than that God should condemn us too ; whose suppos'd Authority would in such case be really contemned by us ; tho' we might possibly happen to take that way, which in it self were Good and Right.

§ 15. 5. That only is to be accounted good in a strict and proper Sense, which is intirely so, as being in all respects whatsoever agreeable to the Rule of our Duty ; what varies from it in any sort or Degree, is so far Evil ; and in strictness, were to be accounted simply bad ; yet what is deficiently good, is notwithstanding accepted by God, when it answers his Will in what he absolutely and indispensibly insisteth on, as in Reason he must, upon sincere Intentions, and by the Gospel he plainly do's upon a living Faith in Christ. But,

§ 16. 6. Where there is what God absolutely disallows, or is wanting what he indispensibly requires, no Accession, or Alteration whatsoever, which doth not correct the Matter in *those* Respects, can render it upon the whole pleasing to God ; tho' they may possibly make it less displeasing ; and it must be allow'd, that he is always so far pleas'd, as there is any thing of real Good (which is indeed Originally from himself), when yet, upon the whole, neither the Person nor Performance may be properly accepted.

C H A P. X.

§ 1. **W**E now proceed to such Remarks, as may farther help us better to apply the Measure before given : And,

1. A present Opportunity and Occasion for what is apparently Lawful, and in some degree Useful is a sufficient Incentive, that we then may or ought to attend it, if it intere-

ferre not with what is more our Duty, and concern at the same time, or at least more plainly so.

2. That is to have our greater Regard, which is recommended to us by any single Consideration farther or more valuable, whilst the things compar'd are alike or equal in all other Respects; for any little Addition on either hand ought to turn the Scale, where the weight was even before.

§ 2. 3. Justly to determine what is pleasing or displeasing to God, but especially what is more or less so, will commonly require our considering, not only the Substance of Things, but their concurring Circumstances, which may be unspeakably various, and variously combin'd, so as to render the decisive Judgment very difficult to us in a multitude of Cases; when yet we must determine in order to Practice, and it is perhaps apparently of great Importance to us, that we do it rightly: This we may not ordinarily hope to do, but upon farther, and deeper Consideration; upon Consultation and Advice; upon our serious imploring the Divine Guidance, and duly waiting for it, so long as the Matter will well bear, reserving our selves for such farther Light, as may spring in our Minds or otherwise present it self, and resolving we will at last govern our selves by what shall appear most pleasing to God.

§ 3. 4. Where one side of the Question upon due Consideration appears more evidently safe, the other dangerous to our highest Interest, we ought certainly to take the safer side, so as to omit that which we cannot suppose to be our Duty, or not with like Evidence, as we have to suspect it Sinful; and on the other hand, to do that which we cannot suspect to be Sinful; or not with like Reason, as we have to suppose it our Duty: *E. Gr.* If any would have Simple Fornication to be Lawful, or Family-Prayer no Duty: they had need be surer of it, than they can reasonably be, whilst there is so much to be said to the contrary, as they can never fully answer to their own Minds upon cool and mature Deliberation: And it can never be fairly pretended however, that the former is a Duty, the latter a Sin; so that the Performing of *this*, and Refraining from *that*, must be the safe side without Question; and the other manifestly Dangerous at least, if no more could be made out, which yet may be certainly done in the mentioned Cases: But if there were only greater Reason for Suspicion, than Security, that Rule must hold, *Quod dubitas, ne feceris*, what thou doubtest, do not. Yet,

§ 4. 5. We may justly esteem it pleasing to God, that mere Scruples should be disregarded (if they cannot be removed) rather than cherish'd and indulg'd, when once we can come to see, that the main Force of Argument lies on one side, and only some unsolved Difficulty on the other, which creates in us a Suspicion contrary to right Reason: for *this* instructs us to yield to the manifest Over-weight of Argument; tho' some Cavil should still remain unanswer'd, or some Difficulty not fully clear'd. For instance, it seems to be no other than a scrupulous Weakness, if some dare not own the present Government, which they know hath been settled by common Consent and Advice, upon such Grounds and Reasons, and so much for the Publick Good, only because it is not made fully clear to them, that the pretended *James* the 3d had not a Right to the Crown by Descent, or that such a Right is not indefeasible, whenas they can never be so sure of his Right, as in Reason they should be before they espouse it against such a weight of Argument to the contrary: Nor do's it appear other than a Scruple, if some shall not dare to assert the Natural and Christian Right they have (or indeed not dare to answer the *Prior*, and plain Obligation, they are under) to use the best Judgment they have, or can attain to, in choosing a Guide, and Help for their Souls, as well as a Physician for their Bodies, lest they should violate a supposed Authority, of which, in relation to that Point, they are not (and I conceive cannot be) equally sure, as they are, or easily may be, of the mention'd Right and Obligation. But,

§ 5. 6. As to what is pleasing or displeasing to God, and what is more or less so, our *Principal* Light is to be drawn from the plain Declarations, and fair Intimations God himself hath given us of his Mind in that Book, which we have abundant Reason to believe is in a peculiar and extraordinary way from him. Now, according to *this* it is certainly the Mind of God, (1.) That we should follow and imitate him in whatever is suitable to our State and Condition, particularly that we should aim at recovering our Original likeness to God, in point of Knowledge, Holiness, Righteousness, and Goodness. That therefore we should Labour rightly to know what concerns us; that we should be intirely devoted to the Pleasing and Honouring of God; that for this purpose we should render to all, as far as may be, what we owe them; and farther yet should do all the good we can: And in order to this it is the Will of God,

§ 6. (2.) *That we should be thoroughly furnish'd unto all good Works, 2 Tim. 3. 17. And that whatsoever things are True, whatsoever things are Honest (or Honourable,)—Just,—Pure,—Lovely,—of good Report ; if there be any Virtue, and if there be any Praise, we should think on these things (following good Instructions, and imitating good Examples, as what will be pleasing to God ; for) if we thus do, the God of Peace will be with us, Phil. 4. 8, 9. In short, that denying Ungodliness and worldly Lusts, we should live Soberly, Righteously, and Godly in this present World ; looking for that blessed Hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all Iniquity, and purifie unto himself a peculiar People, zealous of good Works, Tit. 2. 12, 13, 14.*

§ 7. (3.) Where God hath more particularly express'd or intimated his Pleasure, it is to be heedfully regarded, charg'd upon our selves, and as far as possibly we can, comply'd with ; especially in the Points he hath more absolutely insisted on, and more earnestly recommended to us. Here not only Commands and Prohibitions, with the Sanction of Promises and Threatnings are to be attended to ; but all the other Methods, whereby Divine Wisdom hath insinuated the Mind and Will of God, as by Doctrinal Declarations, together with Historical Narrations, Parables, &c. We are also to observe with what Degree of Earnestness this or that is recommended, whilst God directs us about it, Encourages, Exhorts, Expostulates, &c.

§ 8. (4.) 'Tis certainly the Mind of God, according to Scripture, that whatever makes against the Salvation of our selves or others should be solicitously avoided ; what makes for it, diligently attended, and in such a degree, as the tendency one way or the other is greater, or less ; surer, or more uncertain : And in the general, that what would be like, *all things consider'd*, to produce a greater Mischief, or prevent a greater Good, is to be shun'd with so much greater Caution ; what is like, *all things consider'd*, to prevent a greater Mischief, or produce a greater Good, to be pursued with so much the greater Application : When 'tis said, [all things consider'd] it is evident the Glory of God, to be obtain'd in our consummate Happiness must be taken into the Account : And that therefore (as it is strongly intimated. *Rom. 3. 8.*) *No evil is to be done, that good may come ;* since whatsoever Good may be supposed any way to come of known and allowed Evil, it must be plainly over-balance'd by the Dishonour done to God (as if he needed, or warrant'd such Means) ;

together with the Damage, and Danger thence accruing to Men.

§ 9. Now if the general Measure of Importance be apply'd in particular Cases, according to the Intimations here given, or the fuller Directions in Sacred Writ, and other agreeable Composures, it will for the most part direct our greater and less Attendance according to the following Gradation.

It must plainly be our first and most pressing Concern, that our *chosen State* be *not* such, as is *displeasing* to God; since *that* would not only be a great Provocation, but a continual, standing one, and we should so long abide under the Wrath of the Almighty.

§ 10. Next to this, on the contrary, 'tis highly our Concern, that our State, so far as we can order it, be such, as is *well pleasing* to God; so that besides our being deliver'd from under the Curse, which would make us really (tho' as yet perhaps not sensibly) Miserable, we may be under the Blessing, which alone can render us truly Happy: And as not to be Miserable is Naturally and Necessarily the first Wish of a Reasonable Creature, so to be positively Happy is the next.

§ 11. We are therefore deeply concern'd to *know* so far as well may be, what State of ours will be pleasing or displeasing to God; and as we can to acquaint our selves with all fit *Means*; and to use our best *Endeavours*. (1.) That our Minds be not ill-principld, or ill-affected: (2.) That they be furnish'd with needful and useful Knowledge, together with a right Temper and Disposition: (3.) That our Bodies be not through any Mismanagement, or Neglect of ours disorder'd, or indispos'd for what lies upon us; but that (4.) They may be in the best Condition for Service, especially for that which is of highest Concernment, or which is more peculiarly our stated Business and Employment. And,

§ 12. (5.) That our manner and way of Living be not hurtful or unprofitable, as *that* of the pretended Religious Orders among Papists, and of too many of our Gentry among Protestants, who apply not themselves to any accountable Method of Usefulness: But that, (6.) Our stated way of Living be suited, as near as we can, to the demand there is of Service, and to the best of our Capacity for it; so as not to betake, or confine our selves to a less useful Post, when we are really fitted for greater Service, and regularly call'd thereto.

§ 13. Next after the Concern of our State, that *it* be pleasing to God, follows *that*, which relates to our *Actions*; and here, (1.) That we avoid whatever in this kind would be displeasing to him, who cannot but abhor Bad Men the more, and love even Good Men the less, for their Evil Doings; for which, as he may justly Punish them, so 'tis to be look'd he should ordinarily do it one way or other, sooner or later, even in this World; especially for what is more Gross, more Wilful, more deliberate, or otherways aggravated: We should therefore *cease to do Evil*, but take heed of stopping here, for we must also *learn to do well*: And it lies upon us in point of Interest, as well as Duty.

§ 14. (2.) That we always do in one kind or other the things that are pleasing to God, who at the lowest will be less offended, even with Bad Men, upon their doing what is Good for the Matter of it, tho' they fail in the Manner or End; and is sure to be more highly pleas'd with Good Men upon their *doing* what is truly, tho' but imperfectly Good; and as *these* cannot lose their Labour, so even *those* have often some temporal Advantage by the very Nature of the thing, or thro' the over-flowing Goodness of God.

§ 15. Now to be free from pressing Troubles is what we do generally and most earnestly covet, to compass positive Advantages, is commonly our second Care, and tho' the latter may seem to be *in it self* of greater Value than the former; yet *this* may be reasonably first pursu'd, as a Matter of greater Importance, since it is of greater Necessity, *to us*; for we can easier bear the meer Absence of what is desirable, than the Pressure of what is Disagreeable, supposing it were in a like Degree and Kind; for otherwise we can better endure a small Inconvenience, than the want of some great and needful Enjoyment.

C H A P. XI.

§ 1. **B**UT to descend a little farther into the Consideration of Actions, and the several Degrees of Importance belonging to them (whenas we did but generally touch upon them in the foregoing Chapter, we are here concern'd to know as far as well may be, what Actions of ours, and what in them may be pleasing or displeasing to God; and also as we can to acquaint our selves with all fit Means, and to use

our best *Endeavours*. (1.) That we may avoid all such Actions, as upon due Consideration appear to us certainly Evil, and here it may be commonly sufficient and most convenient to caution our selves and others by general Marks, without the particular mention of some Evils, or rather of the ways wherein they are Practis'd ; as, *e. g.* That in way of Trade, or Dealing we use not any Methods of Imposing upon others to their Disadvantage.

§ 2. (2.) That we may rightly discharge what we deliberately judge to be our Duty ; about which it is ordinarily best, that we be more particularly Instructed ; as, *e. g.* In reference to Prayer, that our Praises, and Thanksgivings, Confessions and Petitions, for our selves and others, are to be solemnly presented to God, thro' Christ, by the help of the Holy Spirit, in Publick, in Families, and in Secret, with Faith and suitable Affections, as oft as may well consist with the answering our other Obligations.

§ 3. (3.) That we may shun what we reasonably suspect : And, (4.) Do what we have cause to think could not be innocently omitted by us. (5.) That we run not needlessly upon any thing that has the Appearance of Evil, tho' it were no more ; or do what is of ill Report, unless it should happen to be plainly our Duty in some rare and singular Case : And (6.) That we neglect not what is Acceptable and of good Report, when there is Occasion and Opportunity for it, and no plain Obligation upon us to the contrary.

§ 4. We are certainly oblig'd, both in Duty and Interest (if it be rightly understood) at all times carefully to avoid all moral or culpable Evils of whatsoever Kind or Degree ; but since neither our Minds nor our Bodies can continually bear the utmost Intension, we are more solicitously to watch against the greater Evils, and such as we are in greater danger of, as being led thereto by our Constitution, or Condition, or by some special Occasion. A Crime that is otherways equal to another must be accounted greater or less according to the Character of the Person offended, *directly* ; and of the Party offending *reciprocally* (for here 'tis ordinarily greater, as he is less ; also as 'tis against an higher or lower Authority ; as it is against both or one of them alone ; as 'tis against a Natural, or merely positive Law ; as 'tis in Substance or Circumstance only ; as 'tis Open, or Secret ; Repeated, or Single ; tempting others, or tempted by them, &c.

§ 5. As to good Actions, we are plainly Insufficient for the greater Number of that Kind (nor are they in all Cases our Duty); and therefore 'tis more our Concernment to discern, what may be incumbent on us, according to our Condition and Circumstances; as also what is apparently of present, or more pressing Obligation; yet it is of little Service, or indeed rather hurtful to puzzle our selves or others about the nicer, and less discernable Differences: But, where there is no special Reason to over-balance, and carry it otherwise, good Actions are to be esteem'd of greater or less Importance, as they are more or less absolutely bound upon us; as requir'd by an higher or lower Authority; by both together, or only one of them alone; as they answer a Natural or merely positive Law; as they are the inward, or only the outward Acts of Piety and Devotion; as Acts of Justice, Charity, Liberality, Decency, &c.

§ 6. And farther, good Actions are more or less considerable, as they respect Universal or Publick Good, or what is only Private or Personal; as they tend to the Security of those, who are apparently more useful, or of such as are less Valuable; as they concern Life, Health, Good Name, or Estate; as there may be a Tendency to greater or farther usefulness, or only some present and particular Service; as they refer to usefulness in general, which is the end of Life, or barely to Life it self; as they may relate to Virtue and Innocence, or only to the lower Concernments of Life, Health, Estate, &c: Finally, as they may refer to serious Business, or only to some innocent and becoming Divertisement, which ought to render us fitter for Business.

§ 7. The Gradation here Essay'd may be of some Use to facilitate our Determination, when there is no Special, and weighty Consideration to carry the Matter otherways; but in such Case we must vary from the more usual Order, *e. g.* Tho' an ill State or habit of Mind, suppose *Covetousness*, be worse than a single Act of Extortion thence arising; yet an allow'd Act of Malice, or Revenge must undoubtedly be much more Criminal than the disallow'd habit of Coldness in Religion.

§ 8. Having spoken thus largely of the various Importance of Things to us according to the general Measure laid down for that purpose, it remains, that I add somewhat briefly upon the other mentioned Heads: And,

II, As to the *Certainty* of that Importance, or of God's being pleased or displeased more, or less, or equally upon our being or acting so, or so. Now where the Importance of Things appear'd upon due Consideration to be otherwise equal, there the greater Certainty, if it can be seen, claims our first and closer Attendance. And,

§ 9. (1.) We must take our Concernment and the several Degrees thereof to be certain, when it is Self-evident without Proof, so that we cannot seriously doubt of it, or when the Proof may amount to Demonstration, and leave no room for Cavil; or finally, when there is a manifest overweight of Reason for it; as certainly there is in what the approved Word of God delivers, whether expressly or by good Consequence, as to his being pleas'd or displeas'd with such a State or Action; and *that* clear Judgment of Reason, which stands uncontradicted by Divine Revelation, is justly to be taken by us for a sufficient Ground of Certainty. But,

§ 10. (2.) Where the Reasons on each hand appear almost equal, and that the Scale turns less apparently on this or that side, we can then only call it Probability, which is however to be follow'd, when we must determine one way or other, and may not farther deliberate.

§ 11. (3.) If we can discern nothing at all of overweight on either side, 'tis then an utter Uncertainty, whether the thing be displeasing or pleasing to God, or whether it be more or less so; and in such Case we must either take the opposite Parts of the Question, for equal or indifferent, and proceed by a meer Arbitrary Determination, or which may be ordinarily Safer, or better (where it can well be done) to divert our Attendance to somewhat else, wherein God will be certainly or more probably pleas'd.

§ 12. (4.) If upon Consideration, it appears only, that such a Matter may possibly be of Importance, more or less, but improbably, we are then to account it of little or no Moment; tho' the thing it self should otherwise be very considerable, as respecting the Preservation of Life, or even the saving of our Souls, and accordingly it should have the last and lowest Place, if any at all in our Attendance.

§ 13. III, We may farther consider our Capacity; and here if we find our selves to be really at present incapable of what would be more truly or more highly pleasing to God, our Business then is to aim at it, and to be pressing towards it, by such Means, and in such Methods as we hope *will*, in some Measure please him. Here we may, and indeed must, take the Steps that are possible to us, towards what

will

will be more pleasing to God, whenas we cannot hope to come at it otherwise : And,

§ 14. (1.) In reference to what is of absolute Necessity, or of very great and evident Concernment to us, the less our Capacity is, the greater must be our Application, in such way, and by such Steps, as are most likely to reach our End, as in preparing our selves for some stated Service in this World, and for Salvation in the other. But, (2.) As to what is of a lower Nature, and less needful, the want of a Genius, or the weakness of our Capacity may be look'd on as our Discharge from attending such Matters, or at least from pursuing them farther, than we can do consistently with what is more incumbent on us.

§ 15. IV, (And lastly) Somewhat is to be observ'd upon the Prospect we may have, as to the Advance or Continuance of our Capacity, and, (1.) That it is generally so ill assur'd, and altogether uncertain, as that in necessary things we are highly oblig'd to present Application and the greatest Diligence; and in other Matters too, with what speed and dispatch we can, according to the sacred Advice and Charge given us, *Ecclesj. 9. 10. Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might, &c.* Yet there is here some small room left to distinguish between the probable and improbable Advance or Continuance of our Capacity: So that,

§ 16. (2.) What is not of necessity to be now attended, but may probably be done hereafter with greater Ease, with more Dispatch, or to better Effect, may reasonably be postpon'd, and delay'd in hopes of that fitter Season. Young Persons must therefore be allow'd to proceed by fit Steps, and slower advances towards the higher and more difficult Improvements, which are not of present Necessity, in hopes they may be hereafter more capable of them. But,

§ 17. (3.) Where the Advance, or even the Continuance of our Capacity is improbable, we must use the very speediest and closest Application, we can, to what is of greatest Importance; as suppose a Person were under Sentence to die the 3d Day, or otherwise apparently threaten'd with Death, or with the loss of his Understanding and Senses in a little time. Yet even here what cannot, to any good purpose, be farther pursu'd to Day, may and must be left till to morrow.

§ 18. Upon the whole, a more Important and more certain Concernment in any thing, when there is but a weaker Capacity for it, and more doubtful or improbable as to its Advance, or even its Continuance doth certainly require us

to give such Matter an earlier and fuller Attendance: What is less Important, and the Importance less certain, whilst the Capacity is greater and like to advance, seems to demand only a lower Place and less Attendance from us.

§ 19. But there are besides, a great Number of other Combinations, which may direct the Order and Degree of Application and Attendance: For we might carry the Consideration or Character of [greater Importance] thro' those of [greater and less Certainty]; and under each of these thro' the farther Considerations of [greater and less Capacity]; under each of these again thro' the Considerations of [its Advance, and of its bare Continuance]; and lastly, under each of these we might take in the Considerations of [Probability and Improbability]: And in like Manner we might carry the other main Character, *that* of [less Importance] thro' all the Divisions and Subdivisions mention'd, which might be an ingenious exercise of Thought and Judgment, but perhaps of more Trouble and Niceness than of Use.

§ 20. I therefore conclude this momentous and difficult Head with the following general Instructions; which, if they be understood agreeably to what has been more specially deliver'd, may be of ready and continual Use.

Ends are to be thoroughly consider'd, *Means* deliberately chosen, and the best *Way* of using them carefully sought out before we enter upon Things.

Our *farthest End*, is to have the first and deepest Consideration, and to be still attended to in all we go about: *Intermediate Intentions* are to be more regarded, as they have a more necessary, direct, and near Subserviency to that End.

Our *Stated Business* is to be carefully Chosen, and as early as well may be; the *Method of Prosecution* is to be laid with deliberate Consideration; and each part to be carry'd on with *diligent Application*, especially what more Affects the Whole.

We ought to take the first fit Season for what is *Necessary* or *Requisite* to be done; and the present Time, where it cannot be so certainly, or so well done hereafter.

Farther Instructions to this Purpose may be found amongst the *Moral, Prudential, and Probable Positions*, Part I. Chap. 18, 19, 20. and under the concluding General Head about Conduct.

C H A P. XII.

§ 1. **W**HEN that which is before us, appears not, after due Enquiry, to be an improper Object for us to proceed upon, and that we have at least taken some Aim at the Regard we ought to give it, we are then to use a proportionable Care as to the more simple Idea of such Object, for it is the next Business of our Reason.

IV, *Rightly to estimate the Apprehensions of Things, as they are singly taken,*

Our single Apprehensions or Ideas are such, as we may call our first, or however our foregoing Notions; and they are some or other of them, presuppos'd to what may be formally and expressly pronounc'd afterwards of things by way of Affirming or Denying, whether only in our Minds, or otherwise.

§ 2. Single Apprehensions, consider'd as such, are form'd (*uno Actu & Idtu*) by a kind of single Act of the Mind, and as at one stroke, tho' most of them may be Notionally at least, resolvable into the Parts of which they are, at least Notionally compounded: For *that* general and obscure Idea of Thing or Somewhat, goes towards making up a very great Number of our more particular and distinct Apprehensions, which yet we may term single ones, as we call it one single Body, which is compounded of the Head and Members, or one (only) Soul, which nevertheless we conceive under the compounded Idea of a *Thinking Substance*.

§ 3. But taking what is thus Compounded, as a single Idea, of which nothing is formally and directly pronounc'd, we may affirm or deny somewhat of it, which is not strictly Included, in that Idea or Notion, as when I say or think, that *the Soul* (which I now conceive, as a Thinking Substance) *is of a Spiritual Nature*: But if I affirm or judge that *a Soul is a thinking Substance*, the Idea I then form to my self of Soul, may be that of a Thing or Somewhat, which *English-Men* commonly intend by that Name.

§ 4. That of which any thing is affirmed or deny'd, may in such Case be conceiv'd or describ'd in any other proper way, but under the very Notion or Attribute mention'd in relation to it: As when I say, *The Soul is a thinking Substance*, Soul may be here conceiv'd under any other true Character, but that of a *thinking Substance*. It is not to be suppos'd, that

that I here intend to represent to my self or others, that the Soul (consider'd as a Thinking Substance) is a Thinking Substance, which were only to affirm the same Idea of it self, and would be as impertinent and insignificant, as to say, a Spade is a Spade, unless we should suppose the Meaning and Design to be this; That the Soul, which I and others conceive to be a Thinking Substance, is really such.

§ 5. Now, altho' our Idea is consider'd as Single, when 'tis what we pronounce of somewhat else, or is that of which we pronounce somewhat else; yet it may be really a Conjunction of several Ideas, whereof one is *Virtually*, tho' not *Formally* affirm'd of some other, or rather of that Thing, to which also the other belongs; and the single Ideas are accordingly capable of being drawn out into one or more Affirmative Positions: When I say, *This particular Soul is a Principle of Voluntary Motion*, understanding by that Soul *this Thinking Substance*, tho' it be here consider'd as only a single Apprehension, wherein nothing at all is formally pronounc'd, yet it is virtually more than one single Judgment.

§ 6. The Idea of *this Soul*, conceiv'd as *this thinking Substance*, may be drawn out into the following Positions. (1.) The Thing we call, *this Soul* is a Real Thing, *i. e.* somewhat existing, not in Notion only, but in Nature, whether any one think of it or not. (2.) That Real Thing is distinct from all others of the Kind, as being *this* only not another. (3.) This Real and distinct Thing is a Substance. (4.) This Real Distinct and Substantial Thing, is a thinking one: Nor is the mentioned single Apprehension Right, unless all these Points be true: We may here see what is requir'd to make our more Simple Ideas right, *viz.* That the several imply'd Affirmations be true, beginning as in the Instance given with *Real*, where that is intended (or substituting *Notional*, where that is meant); and proceeding on to affirm still somewhat farther and farther, till we have gone thro' the whole Idea.

§ 7. I shall endeavour to settle a true Rule of Judgment when our Single Apprehensions are to be accounted right; and to direct what may be helpful towards forming them accordingly. Now in order to make a true Judgment about them, the following Question may be put, and is to be pursu'd to a satisfactory Resolution, *Whether our single Apprehensions be such, as we must or may take to be truly agreeable to the thing therein design'd, or suppos'd; and that in such manner as is* *design'd, or suppos'd?*

§ 8. The Object of such Apprehension, or the thing so apprehended may be (1.) What we our selves design; as if we should lay our Hand upon somewhat, or point to it, or look at it, or Represent it in our Imagination, or otherwise determine what it is to which we affix the Apprehension or Idea; thus I may affix that of a thinking Substance to Soul, hereby designing that part of Man, which is invisible. In my conceiving of *this* or *that* Man, I may design only what do's Fundamentally, or at least truly, tho' not fully distinguish him from all other Men; as he who has this or that particular Soul, or outward Shape, &c. And my Idea is to be taken for Right, if it may be reasonably Judged to answer the designed Object.

§ 9. Or, (2.) It may be only supposed by us, as what we conceive others to Look at, Point to, Speak or Think of, and then our Idea may be right, as to what we Suppose, and yet wrong as to the thing by them intended; or to speak more properly, the Idea it self may be right, but the Supposal wrong: As if hearing of a Crab, I rightly form the Idea of the Fruit so call'd, when as the Crab-Fish was the thing intended.

§ 10. As to the *Manner* of our Idea's agreeing, it must be so far wrong, if it were design'd, or suppos'd to agree Essentially and Necessarily, when it did indeed truly agree yet but Accidentally: As if it were suppos'd that the Idea is Adequate, when it agrees indeed truly, but takes not in the whole Compass of the thing, to which it was referr'd.

§ 11. Finally, there may be Ideas which I *must* take for right, or which I reasonably *may*, when yet, perhaps they are not absolutely so, but in such sort, and to such a degree only, as the Natural Faculties bestowed on Man are fitted to afford us, when yet it may be an Angel ought not to take them for right, but to form them yet more exactly, according to the clearer Discernment which belongs to him; and it is certain, God may charge the Angels with folly (or short-sightedness) and do's by his infinite Wisdom form those Ideas absolutely perfect, which even the Angels cannot fully reach.

§ 12. We have no other possible way of judging, whether our Apprehensions be right, but by reflex thinking of them, and applying some of our Tho'ts as Measures and Standards for the trying of them. What we are immediately to judge of is Tho't, as has been shewn, Part I. Chap. 1. §. 5. what we are to judge by, is our farther Tho't, and what we are to judge according to, or our Rule of Judging,

is some or other Tho't, which we are to take as well assur'd : Therefore some of our Perceptions, Imaginations, and Conceptions, are to be look'd on as right, in order to our judging of others.

§ 13. What we have more immediately to consider of is, (1.) Our direct Act or Affection of Thinking, or else the direct Tho't therein form'd, *e. g.* The actual Thinking of what we See, Hear, &c. as we are some way affected and mov'd by it: I might call this the Perception *Perceiving*; and there is also the formed Tho't, which is commonly call'd the Idea of what we See, Hear, &c. and which I may call the Perception *Perceived*. The Act or Affection of Thinking seems to be the Mind's putting it self or its being put by somewhat else, into, or under some Mode of Being, which it had not before: And the Mode it self may be consider'd as the formed Tho't.

§ 14. Again, (2.) The Reflex Act of Thinking upon the foregoing Act of Thinking or Tho't; and the reflex Tho't herein form'd: But when this reflex Thinking or Tho't is objected to the Mind, in order to our considering thereof by a yet farther reflex Act of Thinking or Tho't therein form'd, these might make a 3d Class: And if these again were objected to the Mind, in order to their being consider'd, they would make the 4th Class: And thus we might proceed on infinitely, if our Capacity would serve, by subsequent reflex Thinking and Tho't. Suppose *a*, to be the direct Act of Thinking, and *α* the Tho't form'd, I may go on to *b*, [the actual reflex Thinking on, *a*, or *α*,] and to *β*, [the reflex Tho't on either of them] and thence to *c*, [the farther reflex Thinking] and to *κ* [the farther reflex Tho't upon the foregoing] and so on.

§ 15. That whereby we consider is, (1.) The reflex Act of Thinking, and the Tho't herein form'd. (2.) A farther reflex Thinking or Tho't upon the foregoing, &c. as may be farther seen in the last Section.

§ 16. As to the Rule or Standard, which is to be apply'd by our reflex Thinking, or formed Tho't, to the direct, or to some foregoing reflex Act of Thinking, or form'd Tho't, it is, (1. The Conscious Knowledge we have of our Perceiving, Imagining, or Conceiving, and of the formed Perception, Imagination, or Conception, that is, the Certainty we have, of somewhat passing, or as it were lodging in our Minds, which we may call by those Names.

§ 17. (2.) Those Ideas, which are the Conscious Representation, Combination or other designed Alteration of our preceding Apprehensions, which we so remember, as to know that we do indeed remember them: And here can be no Error, unless it should be by an unobserved slip of Memory, which can scarce befall us in a very short Time, and in Ideas that are not much compounded; for in such Case we shall at least be Conscious, that somewhat of *the Idea* has slip'd us, tho' perhaps we may not always be able presently, if at all, to recover it.

§ 18. (3.) The Sensible Perceptions, and Intellectual Conceptions, about which there is no reasonable Ground of Suspicion, after due Examination; what that is, I shall endeavour to shew, when I give the designed Helps for our forming right Apprehensions. (4.) Whatever Ideas are so deduc'd from any of the foregoing, or reducible to them, that we cannot Rationally doubt of the Connexion, if we would.

C H A P. XIII.

§ 1. *SUCH* Tho'ts as those before mention'd, are to guide us in judging of others, which may be justly doubted of, or wherein we would wish to be farther confirm'd; But to help us in applying the Measures given in the preceding Chapter, it will be of use to subjoin several Distinctions about right Ideas; then to shew how Signs in general may be said to be right, and lastly to give some Special Directions, which may be of Peculiar Service towards the right forming of our single Ideas.

§ 2. Now the Apprehensions of Things, consider'd singly, may be, (1.) Either *Absolutely* Right in respect of the Things themselves, or *Relatively* in reference to our Natural Faculties, when our Ideas are such, as we were fram'd for by our Wise and benign Creator; who knew what was fittest and best for us, in the Circumstances, wherein he was pleas'd to put us: We may be said to See right, when yet a well drawn Picture, at some distance, appears as if it were the solid Body it is intended to represent, because our Eye do's rightly Perform the Part for which it was appointed; and so do our Minds, when they apprehend things in such a way, as they were fitted for, and which we may believe, is most convenient for us, at least in our present State.

§ 3 (2.) Our

§ 3. (2.) Our Ideas may be such, as we must or may proceed upon, either as certainly Right, or as probably so, or as altogether Doubtful. Where upon Consideration it appears needful or requisite so to do, we may proceed, even upon a doubtful Idea either way, as if it were right, according as a just Occasion may require: *e.g.* I know not whether the Apprehension I have of this Guinea's being bad is right or no; yet I refuse it as bad, if I can have it chang'd, or take it as good, if I cannot; But where my Apprehension of its being good, is much liker to be right than otherwise, I account, and take it as such without more ado.

§ 4. Of some Ideas we are altogether sure, as that we do rightly apprehend our own Sense and Meaning (supposing we have one in what we Speak or Write); as also our own Design and End in what we do. Nor can the veriest *Pyrronist*, or *Sceptick* doubt that he is somewhat, and do's somewhat which we call Thinking, when yet he may pretend to be sure of nothing, and absurdly demand, a sort of Evidence and certainty against which he cannot possibly make any kind of Exception, *i. e.* such as is neither needful, nor would, perhaps, in all respects, be so convenient for us, for which God has not thought fit to frame our Natural Faculties, and which he will not ordinarily give us (tho' he could do it) in a Supernatural way.

§ 5. There are certainly Ideas, which we cannot disprove, nor fairly question, nor possibly correct; as for Instance, that there is such a Being as we call the Sun, that it affords Light, Heat, &c. such Points as these we must hold and proceed upon as certain: But we must take heed of raking our sensible Perceptions to represent Objects just as they are in themselves, and as to some things we may be sure we do not apprehend them just as they are: For we may easily know we cannot conceive the Divine Perfections, as they are in God, but in the way of Analogy: Yet some such Apprehensions may be taken as Right, provided we account them no more than faint Resemblances of those Perfections, as they are in God.

§ 6. (3.) Our Ideas may be either *Adequately* Right, as they take in the whole of the thing therein design'd or suppos'd; or but *Inadequately*, as they reach only to a Part of it. They commonly take in only somewhat of Things, as they are in themselves, but always comprehend the whole of such merely Notional Ideas as we abstract from them; For my abstracting is the Work of my Mind, with which I cannot
but

but be acquainted, nor can I indeed properly abstract, but by conceiving what I abstract, separately from the rest, and yet I may have but a confus'd Notion or Conception of somewhat which I take in, as I can, together with my clearer Abstraction: The Number of things I may perfectly apprehend, and yet be far from having a clear or just Idea of what is Number'd.

§ 7. (4) Apprehensions that are in a sort adequately Right may be but *Fundamentally*, and *Virtually*, or *Formally* and *Explicitely* such; but these latter are perhaps hardly possible to our narrow Comprehension, except in those Abstractions which are purely the work of our Minds, and in the repeated Apprehension of our own Ideas; where we may easily take in all we had before in our Idea, tho' not all belonging to the thing; for who can so form his Idea of a straight Line, or even of a Point, as to make sure it shall explicitly take in all that may any ways appertain thereto.

§ 8. But as to the Fundamental Attributes of Things, we may more easily take them all in, and so form an Idea which implies a great deal more than it directly contains; as e. g. that a Point may be the Center of a Circle, the beginning or end of a Line, the Apex of an Angle, &c; since those Attributes are virtually included in its being a Point, and in my Idea of it as such.

§ 9. If I would rightly form the Idea of a Particular Man which should be fundamentally Adequate, as to his particularity, I may conceive one, who was born at such precise Time, and in such precise Place, since Twins of the same Mother, in all ordinary Cases must be born one after the other. Now the mentioned Idea of this Individual or Particular Man, implies all that farther belongs to such a Person, as his being of such Parentage, his having such a particular Soul, and such a Body continued by a Succession of Particles, and never shifted all at once, and finally, whatsoever did or should any Time after appertain to him, *who was so born*.

§ 10. (5.) Our Ideas may be *clearly* and *distinctly* Right, or *darkly* and *confusedly* so: 'Tis certainly a very dark and obscure Notion we have of *Thing* or *Somewhat* in general, and for that Reason, amongst others, there is, however at bottom, something of Obscurity in most of our Ideas; yet I can form a clear and distinct Idea, e. g. of a right Lin'd Triangle since it is not only an abstracted Notion, but such a one into which I take nothing, but what I clearly conceive, viz Three straight Lines, so dispos'd, as to that in a Space, which has three Angles.

§ 11. I here pretend not to say with some Modern Philosophers, that every clear and distinct Idea is right, for may I not have such an Idea of a Rect-Angle Triangle, and yet misapply it to some three corner'd Figure, that is not such a Triangle? If it be reply'd, that in this Case; I had not a clear and distinct or exact Idea of the Triangle so misjudg'd, I easily grant it, but yet I seem'd to my self, to have it, when I made the Misapplication. Therefore all which I have here design'd is, that some right Apprehensions are clear and distinct, when as some others that are not fully so, may, or must pass for right, *i. e.* for such as our Humane Faculties can attain to.

§ 12. (6.) Our Ideas may be *Essentially*, or *Extraessentially* Right, and also (which is near a Kin to this, tho' not every way the same) they may be *Necessarily*, or *Accidentally* agreeing to the thing intended or suppos'd. The Essence of Things is made up of that common Nature wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive Nature by which it is form'd, this latter is commonly understood when we speak of the Formality or *formalis Ratio* (the formal Consideration) of things; and it is look'd upon, as being more Peculiarly the Essence of things, tho' it is certain, that a Triangle is as truly made up in part of Figure its common Nature, as of the Three Lines and Angles, which are distinctive and peculiar to it.

§ 13. The Idea that agrees to any thing *as such*, or as it is the very thing intended or suppos'd, is *Essentially* Right and *Necessarily* so; as when I conceive Man to be a living Creature, capable of Religion, understanding by living Creature, what they commonly mean by *Animal*, *i. e.* an Animated Body: But if I conceive Man, as Capable of Celestial Happiness, my Idea is indeed Right and *Necessarily* so; yet not *Essentially* in the strictest Sense, since it only necessarily follows from the forementioned Essence, but is not consider'd as a Part of it.

§ 14. The Essence of a Thing most properly and strictly is, what do's first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that only is strictly *Essential*, which is either the whole or some part of the constituent Essence, as in Man to be (as before) a living Creature. or to be capable of Religion; his being capable of Celestial Happiness, may be call'd *Essential* in way of Consequence, or *Consecutively*, not *Constituently*.

§ 15. The Standard of what is to be accounted Essentially or Extraessentially Right, Necessarily or Contingently so, is the stated or designed Essence of Things, which in some Cases may be arbitrarily design'd, but in others, is suppos'd to be duly stated: I may consider our present Sovereign only as a *Queen*, intending a Person of the Female Sex, who has the Supreme Administration of Government, within certain Dominions; and here I may equally intend that which is as it were the common Matter in my Idea [a Person of the Female Sex] together with that which follows as its Form: Or else I may single out *the having Supreme Administration*, &c. as what I mainly, if not only design'd, and I may hereupon, conceive, *Great Britain* in particular, as Extraessential, or Accidental to Her Majesty as a *Queen*, tho' some or other Dominions be Essential, and Necessary to Her as a *Queen*, and great Britain to *the Queen*, or this *Queen*. I may farther consider Her Majesty as the present Queen of Great Britain, intending more precisely this Island, and I may then conceive, that *Ireland* is not constitutively Essential to Her *as such*; but yet must allow that it is consecutively so, as being an Appendage to Great Britain.

Again, I may consider the same Person, as the Queen, who has lately, from the Throne, most graciously express'd Her hearty Concern for the Welfare of all Her People; and may now call it Essential and Necessary to Her, under this Consideration, to have had the Power of so expressing Her Self, and especially the Gracious Inclination to do it, but it was Extraessential and accidental to have done it on such particular Day, and with so peculiar a Grace.

§ 16. In these and like Instances, that which we made the Essence and Measure of Essential, Extraessential, Necessary and Contingent, is drawn forth at Pleasure, but the difficulty is to form a Right Idea, not so much of *what is* taken for the Essence, as of what *ought* to be so taken; as suppose for that of a *Queen*, or of *the Queen of Great Britain*; whether it ought not to be understood as including *Ireland*, &c. not only inferring it, as also what common or Special Powers and Prerogatives it includes.

What I shall offer in the close of this General Head, will serve to give some farther Light, towards the right forming of our Essential Ideas, so as not only to state what we design, but that our design may be also well laid, according to the Nature of the Thing, so far at least as we are capable of reaching it.

§ 17. Some Ideas are not to be accounted properly right according to any of the Distinctions here given, and yet may be admitted to be in some sort right, according to common Acceptation and Allowance, as being suitable to our Circumstances, or sufficient for our Purpose, tho' they be not such as were reasonably to be expected from Persons that are or ought to be better Skill'd; or such as would be requisite, in order to nicer Reasonings, or a more accurate Performance, that Idea of the Diameter of a Circle, which makes it the 3d part of the Circumference, may be allow'd right enough for an inferiour Practitioner, and for most ordinary Purposes, but not for a Mathematician, or to give the Content of a Circle with any great Exactness.

§ 18. But it were no better than Trifling to be very solicitous about an Accurate Idea, where it is not reasonably expected from us; and that there is no Occasion for it, but that one less exact will, as well or better, serve for the dispatch of Business.

C H A P. XIV.

§ 1. **W**HAT was farther undertaken, is to shew how Signs in general may be Right: Now they are either to Represent and Resemble Things, or only to intimate and suggest them to the Mind: And our Ideas being the Signs of what is intended or suppos'd therein, are in such sort, and so far right, as they do either represent and resemble the Object of Tho't, or as they do at least intimate it to the Mind, by Virtue of some Natural Connexion, or proper Appointment.

§ 2. The design'd Repetitions of our own Ideas are just Resemblances, and as it were exact Copies of them, if our Memories fail us not in repeating them; and it is highly probable, if not altogether certain, that by the Eye, (supposing it no way disorder'd) we have the true *Figure* of a Superficies, presented to it in a proper Manner, *i. e.* Parallel and Concentral to the Eye, as one Wheel is upon the same Axis posited to the other), also at a convenient Distance, and thro' a fit Medium: In such Case, a Round, an Oval, a Triangle, a Square, &c. will appear such to us; whereas a Round will seem Oval, or an Oval Round, &c. if they be objected a Slant or Sloaping from the Eye, not Parallel and Opposite to it.

§ 3. Our

§ 3. Our Intellectual Conceptions may duly represent what is properly Intellectual, *i. e.* our Minds may conceive their own Work, and Produce just as it is; what I have abstracted, I can ordinarily take up again, and as it were Copy over; but my Ideas or Apprehensions of Colours, Tasts, Touches, or the Motions caused or occasion'd in me by certain Objects as Colour'd, Tastful, Tangible, &c. do not properly represent, but only intimate somewhat in the Objects wherewith I am so affected, which is the Cause or Occasion of such Ideas in me, and of the Pleasure or Pain (if any be) attending them.

§ 4. Signs whether they Represent, or only intimate Things, may be either Primary referring immediately to them; or Secondary, which refer immediately to the primary Signs, and thro' them to the things thereby signified; or they may be yet more remote, referring to some distant Sign, by that to the nearer, and thro' them all to the Thing it self; *e. g.* Writing in any particular Language, has its Parts adapted to the parts of Sound us'd in that Language, for this or that Sense; as [MAN] has its Parts or Letters, not at all adapted to the Parts of a Man, but to the Parts of that Sound, for which the Letters were fram'd: And I may read a written Word into its Sound, before I can read it into its Sense or Meaning.

§ 5. What we call Characters or Short-hand-marks, refer first to Words as written at length, by those to the Sound or Words as spoken, by these again to the Tho'ts or Ideas usually affixed to those Sounds, and thro' all these finally to the things which are suppos'd, or design'd to be represented, or otherwise intimated to the Mind by such Ideas, only it may be observ'd, that the Mind being once well accusom'd to such Characters needs not, or does not (at least observably) go by those several Removes from them to the Tho'ts thereto chain'd by those intermediate Links.

§ 6. And we may here observe, by way of Instance, what is the Justness of these several Signs in reference to what is nextly signified by them, *viz.* (1.) The Character for a Word is right if it consist of those Short-hand Letters well made, and duly plac'd, which are assign'd to signify such common Letters; or if it be any one continu'd Mark appointed for that purpose.

§ 7. (2.) The Word written at length is right if it consist of the usual Letters commonly employ'd in such Country or Language to express the intended Sound, or such as may well enough be allow'd instead of them, as sufficing for the Sound, and to secure the Sense.

§ 8. (3.) *That Sound*, or the Word spoken is right, if it be what is so us'd, *i. e.* to signify such a Tho't and Idea. (4.) And finally, the Idea is right, if it be such as represents the Thing, or however intimates, or Connōtēs it, agreeably to what God has design'd, Humane Senses and Minds in their Natural Make, and regular Use should give.

§ 9. In the General, a Sign of whatsoever Sort or Degree is to be accounted so far right, as it answers what it is more immediately refer'd to, at least to secure its being taken for what is intended by it.

§ 10. It remains to conclude this Head with some very brief Directions, what Course may be taken for the better securing just Ideas, And,

1. We should endeavour to free our Minds from what might mislead us, and to furnish them with what may help to guide us right. We ought therefore to examine our first Apprehensions; not to depend on a fallible Authority, where we may be capable of judging for our selves: We should likewise enure our Minds to such kind of Studies, and such Application of Tho't, as may render them more acute and penetrating: We should also lay in the best and surest Notices we can; above all, we shou'd endeavour, that the Brain and Spirits may be in such a State, as shall best subserve the Mind in its Consideration and Enquiries, taking care they be not disturb'd and disorder'd by irregular or vehement Passions and Affections, or by immoderate or unfit Eating, Drinking, or Sleeping, &c.

§ 11. 2. We must use our Organs of Sense under the Direction and Correction of Judgment guided by Experience, Observation and well assured Information: We should therefore examine Objects by more than a single Sense, where it can be done; we should make the nearer approaches if it may well be, yet keeping withal the Distance, which may give us a clearer Perception; using likewise the best Means we can for assisting our Senses: We ought also to make several Trials at somewhat distant times, and in differing Circumstances, comparing our Observations with those of other Persons; making the Allowances which are fit on account of Distance, or of the interposed Medium, or other Incidents: And finally where there is any Cause of Suspicion, we should carefully examine, whether the Organ be not disorder'd by some Distemper or other Accident, using the best Means we can to rectifie and keep it right.

§ 12. 3. We should take our Ideas in pieces, and examine them by parts, and see that the Examination be re-form'd by more simple Notions, that have been well adjust'd, e. g. when we apprehend the Sun to be a Round, Bright, Hot and moving Body, we should severally examine the Apprehension we have of its being a Body, of its being a round one, bright, &c. according to such Notions as have been well adjust'd in reference to each particular; and here,

§ 13. 4. We should pursue, as near as we can, that Order wherein one Point may fitly lead and give Light to another, making the foregoing as Clear, as well may be, before we proceed farther: And,

5. We should take up nothing, as yet certain, of which we can reasonably doubt, nor indulge to Suspicions without any rational Ground.

§ 14. 6. We should carefully state and preserve by writing what has appear'd upon Examination, that it may be afterwards Review'd; and that, if it shall approve it self to repeated Consideration, we may proceed upon it as a Foundation in our farther Enquiries.

§ 15. 7. We should gather what we can from the most approved Observations, and Writings of others, as to the internal Nature and just Notions of things in any kind.

8. We should admit of no single Apprehension as Right, which is contradictory to any unquestionable Truth.

§ 16. 9. But whatever is a Natural and Necessary Consequence from certain Truth, is to be concluded Right. And,

10. We should make the farthest improvement we can of the Principles and Deductions, or any other Positions in this Essay, which approve themselves to deliberate Thot, both for examining the Notions we have, and inferring others.

C H A P. XV.

§ 1. **F**ROM the more Simple Apprehensions, wherein we do but implicitly and undesignedly, if at all, pronounce one Idea of another, or join it with another; I now proceed to treat of those, which in Logic are commonly named Complex Themes, wherein it is done more expressly, and with Design: And it is the farther Business of our Reason,

V, *Rightly to judge and pronounce of Things in affirming or denying*: Or rightly and fitly to affirm or deny, whether it be in Conception only, or expression.

§ 2. I am not here designing to speak of Mental and Verbal pronouncing (or of internal Judgments and external Enunciations) asunder, but together; Since the latter are but the Expressions of the former, and Corresponding to them: only there may be Occasion to remark somewhat more Special, as to the way of expressing this or that Sense, particularly in our own Language, and this the rather, because so little of this Nature has been written in *English*.

§ 3. Whenever we do formally judge or pronounce, there must be something of, or concerning which we do it; and somewhat farther, which is the thing expressly judg'd and pronounc'd thereof: The former is call'd the *Subject*, and may be any Thing whatsoever, which can be any way the Object or Matter of Tho't and Discourse, under whatsoever Notion or Consideration it may be taken, when we go to judge or pronounce any thing farther of it; the latter is call'd the *Predicate*, or Attribute, and it may be any Thing or Consideration, which can be affirm'd or deny'd of the Subject.

§ 4. That something may be truly deny'd of somewhat else, it is requir'd that the Subject and Attribute be not the same thing in any of the Sorts or Senses properly belonging to them, at least as they are us'd and intended in the present Case and Circumstances; It may be truly said, *a Dog is not a Fish*, if we were speaking of Creatures that Bark, since not any one of these is any sort of Fish; tho' there be indeed what they call a Dog-Fish; It cannot be truly said of *Judas*, who is distinguish'd from the other, as being, *not Iscariot*, that he was not *Judas*, since he was one of that Name; and yet it might be rightly said, *he was not Judas, who betray'd our Lord*, since he did it not in any Sort or Sense; as also of *Peter*, that *he did not desert our Saviour*, since he did it not in the more proper Sense, wherein that Word is commonly taken, tho' his denying of him, was a kind of deserting him, in part and for a time.

§ 5. To make an Affirmation true, it suffices that the Subject and Attribute be the same thing (tho' under differing Considerations) in some or other of the Sorts or Senses properly belonging to them in the present Case and Circumstances. *Some Men*, if we speak of Mankind, *are indeed Children*; for some of those, who have Humane Nature, are some or other sort of Children, viz. Babes, Boys, or Girls.

§ 6. We

§ 6. We cannot truly affirm of any thing what is not the very thing it self, tho' it be otherways consider'd, since to affirm is indeed to say expressly or implicitly, *this is that*: As when 'tis said, *God is good and does good*, the Import is, *God is the very same thing, as a Being which is good and does good*; but he is first consider'd, perhaps, only as a Being call'd by that Name, and then as the same Being, having such a Nature, and so Acting.

§ 7. The formal Notions of differing Things are not the same, and therefore they cannot be affirm'd, *as such*, one of another: Substance is not Accident, or Mode, or Mode of a Mode, or Action, or Passion, &c; nor are any one of these the same with any other: Yet Substance has Accident, Mode, &c, or is the same thing as a Being posselt of these; and these belong to Substance, or are the same things as Appurtenances or Appendages of Substance. In short, one thing cannot be formally and in it self the same with another; yet it may well be the same to which another some way belongs, and so may be affirmed to be the same *in the Concrete*, i. e. the Accident or other Adjunct together with its Subject; thus *Man is Rational*, or that which is design'd by the Name, is the same which has such a Nature.

§ 8. Tho' we can only affirm that which *is* the same, that we may pronounce truly of things, yet we are not to affirm it *as* the same, which would be no better than Trifling: If it should be judg'd or said, that the Sun (consider'd as a Luminary) is the Sun (so again consider'd) it would be certainly and evidently true, but of no Use or Service; and if in some sort it were *rightly* pronounc'd, yet not *fitly*, since it would be to no Purpose.

§ 9. By a *Predicable* Logicians have intended only what may be rightly affirm'd, not deny'd; and whatever can be *so* predicated of any Subject must be indeed (as we have seen) the same thing with it, but attributed under some differing Consideration, and together with it in the Concrete: And it is either of the very Essence of the Subject, or only some Accession to it.

§ 10. What is of the Essence, or goes to make up the Principal and Summary Account of the Subject is either more dark and confus'd, or more clear and distinct: Under the former is the most general and indeterminate Nature, that of *somewhat*, or something, together with its relative Attribute or Character, that it is *capable of being thought of*.

§ 11. The more clear and distinct Essential Predicables, are either common or more peculiar: The former are the several abstracted Natures, or common Ideas leading down from the highest *equivocal Kind* to the Subject of which we are judging or pronouncing; as also the several *abstracted Characters*, which compleat and distinguish those several Natures or Ideas: What may be call'd more peculiar, is either the *entire Essence* of the Subject, or the *finishing Essential Character*, which serves to compleat and distinguish it *as such*.

§ 12. The Predicables, which are only an Accession to the Essence of the Subject, are either Necessary, being such as follow the Essence, *viz.* the *Propertys* respectively belonging to any of the foregoing Natures or Characters, or else contingent to the Subject *as such*, *viz.* those *accidental Attributes*, which may be actually absent from it, or denied of it, without contradicting its Nature; and these may be either Inhering or Appending; and this either upon somewhat in or appertaining to the Subject, or only in the Mind that so conceives it; the former we may call *Relative Attributions*, the latter *mere Denominations*.

§ 13. It appears therefore, that what ever is a Predicable, and can be affirm'd of any thing may come under one or other of the following Heads.

1. The *most General and equivocal Nature*, or the most common, but dark and indistinct Idea, whereby any Subject, we can think of, may be said to be *something*. What we perceive in looking at the Sun, or conceive in a Fiction is somewhat; and even the latter is not purely nothing.

§ 14. 2. The *most common Character* of every Subject, which relatively expounds the mentioned indeterminate Nature, *viz.* the *Capacity of being tho't of*, or consider'd; as the Sun, or Fiction before mention'd may be.

3. The *several Abstract Natures*, or less common Ideas, which may intervene betwixt *that* above nam'd, and the Subject whereof we would Judge or Pronounce; Thus the Sun is a Reality, a Substance, a Body, a Luminary, an Original, a Sun; for we may at least suppose others in other Parts and Provinces of the Universe, which appear to us only as fixed Stars, but may be so many Suns to such respective Districts of the World.

§ 15. 4. The *several Essential Characters*, which compleat and Distinguish the several intermediate Natures and common Ideas before mention'd: Thus it may be said of the Sun, that (as being a Reality) it exists, whether tho't of or not;

not; as a Substance, it Subsists of it self; as a Body, it is partible; as a Luminary, it affords Light from Heaven; as an Original it has Light in and of it self; as a Sun, it makes Day in its respective Sphere and Province.

§ 16. 5. The *entire Effence* of the Subject, or the Definition which may be reciprocated with it: And this is not necessarily that of the lowest Species or Sort, but may be that of some Kind or higher Kind, or of an Individual, according as the Subject whereof we predicate it is any of these. Thus of a Luminary, we may say, it is a Body affording Light from Heaven; of a Sun, that it is an Original Luminary, which makes Day in its respective Sphere; of the Sun, or this individual Sun, that it is the Original Luminary, which makes Day in this Part of the World, or to us.

§ 17. 6. The *Essential Character* of the Subject, which serves to compleat and distinguish it *as such*: And this is not always the Specifick Difference, but may be that of a Kind, or of an Individual, according as the Subject is of a particular Nature, or of that, which is more or less General: Thus it may be said a Luminary affords Light from Heav'n, a Sun makes Day in its respective Sphere; and the Sun or this Sun makes Day in this particular Sphere.

Whatever may be farther affirm'd of any Subject must needs be only an Accession to its Essence. And,

§ 18. 7. Whatever follows any of the foremention'd Natures, or Characters, as a *Property* Necessary to them, Inseparable from them, and which belongs only to such Nature or Character, and to those lower Sorts and Individuals, which have that Nature or Character. Thus whatsoever is a Property of *somewhat*, or of the *Capacity of being tho't on*; the Property of a *Reality* or of *Existing, tho' untho't of*; of a *Substance*, or of *subsisting by its self*; of a *Body*, or of *being partible*; of a *Luminary*, or of *affording Light from Heav'n*; of an *Original*, or of *having Light in and of it self*; of a *Sun*, or of *making Day* in its proper Sphere; of *the Sun*, or of *making Day here*: All these Properties may be affirm'd of the Sun, or of our particular Sun; the two last Sorts, as being proper to the particular Subject; the other, as proper to somewhat or other which is Essential to this Sun, tho' not appertaining to it alone, but to other Suns with it, if others there were, or be, as likewise to other Originals, Luminaries, Bodies, &c. together with this. There are yet farther,

§ 19. 8, *Inherent Accidents*, which are contingent, in respect of the Subject, so that it might be, and be Essentially what it is without them: As Body without this or that particular Shape; which yet, whilst it is, may be predicated of it; Luminary without this degree of Light; there might also be a Sun which were not altogether so great, so bright, so distant as ours; and even this particular Sun might be some ways alter'd, if God saw fit: Yet all the present Accidents, whilst they continue, may be truly affirmed of it; and if it were alter'd, it might nevertheless be always truly said, that the Sun has been so great, or that it is still the same Being, which sometime had those Accidents.

§ 20. There yet remains what is appending to the Subject: And,

9. *Relative Attributions*, which are not properly inhering in the Subject, tho' bottom'd upon somewhat in it, or appertaining to it: As that the Sun is in Appearance greater than a Star, and certainly less than the Sphere, to which it belongs; that it is seen, tho't, or spoken of; and this fitly leads to our last Predicable, *viz.*

§ 21. 10, *Mere Denominations*, taking their Rise wholly from the Mind, which gives, or takes them up when given, as that this Thing or Being should be, *i. e.* be call'd שמש, סליל, Sol, Soleil, Sun, &c.

Negative Attributions may be consider'd sometimes as affirm'd: Thus it may be said, *the Sun is a Body not-flat*, and here [not-flat] may be fitly enough said to be a Negative Term affirm'd, together with [Body], of the Sun; but if it were said, *the Sun is not flat*, we must call it the denying an affirmative Attribute [flat] of the Sun, not the affirming of a Negative [not-flat].

C H A P. XVI.

§ 1: **H**AVING shewn what is requir'd to a Negative, and what to an Affirmative Judgment, to make them true; and also what sorts of things there are, which may be truly affirm'd, I shall endeavour to give some more Special Assistance, *first*, that we may rightly judge and pronounce of Propositions themselves (*viz.* of their common Nature and differing Sorts); and *then* of the Subject in and by them.

§ 2. As to Propositions themselves, we do *therein* put together our more Simple Apprehensions by Affirming or Denying this of that (as when we judge or say, *The Sun is a fiery Body, The Moon is not a fiery Body*) ; Or at least in Questioning, whether this or that be so or not ; and even here there is a tacit Affirmation, that the Parts of such a Disjunction are to be consider'd and compar'd in order to the surer Determination, which of them is true, or more like to be so : *E. Gr. Whether the Sun or the Earth move ; i. e. This is propos'd to be consider'd.*

§ 3. The Matter of Propositions is the more Simple Ideas, which are therein put together, in one or other of the Mentioned ways, as *the Sun and a fiery Body*, also *this* again with *the Moon* ; likewise *Motion* to be consider'd in reference to the *Sun* and to the *Earth* : The *Form* of a Proposition is, that the more Simple Ideas be put together in such manner, as to be pronounced one of another, either as a Point concluded or to be consider'd : 'Tis not putting them together in any way whatsoever, that makes a Proposition ; The *Ideas* of *Body* and *Fiery*, are indeed put together, yet not so as formally to pronounce any thing ; not so much as that *some Body is Fiery* ; those of the *Sun* and of the *Earth*, are likewise put together in the same Sentence, yet not so as formally to pronounce either that the *Sun is the Earth*, or that the *Earth is not the Sun* ; nor so much as to propose either of these Points to Consideration.

§ 4. That is an *Objective* Proposition, which is propos'd to us as an Object of Tho't ; and that a *Formal* one, which we our selves form, or however take up, and adopt as our own Sense, or which at least we use as our own Words : When we read a Book, we do not Necessarily adopt what is there said, or make it our own Saying, tho' it should run in the first Person, and happen to express withal the very Name of him that reads it, as if one who is called *Paul* should read out to others *that* of the Apostle, *Gal. 5. 2. Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be Circumcis'd, Christ shall profit you nothing* ; yet it would not be the saying of him that Reads, but of him, who wrote or order'd it : Nor must we necessarily make those Expressions our own, which we utter in Singing Psalms, or other Composures ; our Concern with them is to consider them, as the Author's Words, or theirs who may be performed by him, so as to instruct or excite our selves by them ; not to make them our own, unless we see Reason to do it.

§ 5. The Subject and Predicate are call'd the *Terms* of the Proposition or Enunciation; and the Predicate, the *Major Term*, as being suppos'd to be of greater Extent than the Subject or *Minor Term*; and so it often is, but not always: for if it be said, *The Sun makes Day*, making Day belongs only to the Sun, not to any other Light; but if it be said *England is a Christian Nation*, 'tis only one of those that are so, and to be *such*, agrees to divers other Nations.

§ 6. The Import of Denying or Affirming is (as has been observ'd) that the Subject is the *same thing* with the Predicate *Materially*, tho' they *formally* differ, as it is taken under differing Considerations. Such *Identity* or Sameness is the very Point more precisely deny'd or affirm'd; which are often expres'd by [is not], or [is]; this is call'd the *Copula* or Tie of the Subject and Predicate: And it is not always expres'd, but may be imply'd and understood in some other Verb, as when we say *Time passes*, and *Tide stays not*, 'tis all one Sense, as if it were said *Time is passing*, and *Tide is not staying*; only this way of speaking is often, as in the latter Instance, less usual and proper. When nothing is pronounced of the Subject but [is], or [is not] the Import is, as when we say, *God is*, i. e. *is existing*; or *yesterday is not*, i. e. *is not now in being*.

§ 7. Things cannot be said to *be* that abstracted Attribute which they may be said to *have*. The Sun has Substantiality, Corporeity, Brightness, &c. but is not any of them; nor can we truly say it is *Reality* it self in the Abstract, tho' we may call it a *Reality*, i. e. what has Reality, or is real, in the Concrete: And it is also a Substance, a Body, a Luminary, &c; Substantial, Corporeal, &c, i. e. a Subject, which has the Attributes of Substantiality, Corporeity, &c, as also that it Shines, or is Shining, i. e. somewhat which is so; thus there are Substantives, Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles which being Concrete Words, i. e. taking in and implying a Subject together with the Attribute, may be Predicated of, or identify'd with the Subject, which is sometimes consider'd, as what is tho't of, seen, shewn, and often only as what has this or that Name; and 'tis commonly no more that Children mean, when they ask what is this or that, being content if only the Name be told them.

§ 8. If the Negative Particle affect not the Copula, or Note of Identity, but one of the Terms only, the Proposition will then affirm a Negative Term, or rather what there is affirmative imply'd or expres'd therein, as if it be said, *the Earth is a not fiery Body*, or a Body not fiery: It is here affirm'd,

firm'd, that the Earth is indeed a Body of some sort, tho' it be not fiery, when as in a Negative Proposition, as *the Earth is not a fiery Body*, there is nothing at all Affirm'd; since the Earth, for any thing here said, may neither be *Fiery*, nor a *Body*, and is plainly deny'd to be both together: But if it were said, *This Man is a Non-such*, it is fit to take it affirmatively, that he is such as there is none besides.

§ 9. In Affirming this of that, it is not always intended, that the Subject really is, or exists in Nature, whether it be tho't of or no: The Meaning more commonly is only, that the Predicate belongs to the Idea or Notion of the Subject, or that when this exists it is join'd with that; where this is, that likewise is: When I say, *every Man is Rational*, I am far from intending, that every Man is now in being, when as the far greater part of Men consists of such as are already deceas'd, or not yet Born.

§ 10. But when I absolutely Affirm what is accidental to the Subject, it is then commonly, but not always necessarily understood, that the Subject Exists, and is also such as I affirm it, *some Men are learned*, i. e. some Men are in being, who actually have that Attribute: In a Negative Proposition, it is not intended to deny the Existence of the Subject, but only to say, that the Attribute belongs not to it; unless when we Simply say this & that is not, exists not, or the like.

§ 11. An *Incidental Proposition* only describes the Subject or Predicate, but doth not *certainly* Affirm or Deny any thing of them, as existing: So in saying, *A Private Man, who hath the absolute command of his Passions is greater than the Prince, who hath an universal Empire without it*, 'tis by no means Affirm'd, either that there is such a Private Man, or such a Prince; but only that the Idea or Character of the former excels that of the latter; and that the first should be accounted greater then the other, if there be, or were such Person in the World: But,

§ 12. When the Matter of an Incidental Proposition is neither Impossible, nor Improbable, and that the Subject is an *Individual*, 'tis commonly taken for an Intimation, that there is actually what is so describ'd, as if I say, *The Planets, which we can see are a kind of Stars, which we conceive to have a various Motion*, I am here fairly supposed to intimate, that there are such Planets, Stars, and Conceptions about them; but still what I should be judg'd more Certainly and Mainly to intend is only, that such Planets, if they were or be, are Stars of Such a Sort: And this is what they call the *Principia Propo-*
tion,

sition, to which the Descriptions or Intimations are *Incidental*, and with which they fall in, and which they sometimes *limit*.

§ 13. The more Plain and Obvious *Verbal Enunciations* are those wherein the Subject goes before the Predicate; and that the former be a Noun-Substantive in the *Nominative Case*, and the latter a Verb of the *Indicative Mood, Present-Tense*, or a Noun connected with the Subject by such a Verb: But the Order may be inverted, and therefore we must judge, which is the Subject, and which the Predicate rather by the Sense than Placing; and there are other ways of speaking, which are Enunciations, and may be reduc'd to the Common Form, according to the following Instructions and Instances. And,

§ 14. (1.) The Subject is to be rightly stated. Suppose in discoursing or thinking of *Physicks*, I should say or conceive, that *the Consideration of Natural Bodies, belongs thereto*: It may and ought to be reduc'd to some such Proposition as this, that *Physicks consider or treat of Natural Bodies*: For the Subject, I had in Pursuit, was not *Consideration* it self, nor *Natural Bodies*, but *Physicks*, which I explain'd by attributing thereto the Consideration of Natural Bodies: That is therefore to be accounted the Subject of a Proposition; which is the thing explain'd, divided, or otherwise treated of: The Predicate, or some part of it, may indeed afterwards become the Subject of farther Discourse, or Consideration, as if I should add, that Natural Body Comprehends all those Sorts of Material Substances, which God has made, or that are produc'd in the Course and Order of Nature by him settled.

§ 15. (2.) The *past* and *future* Time is to be reduced to the *Present*, as in the Examples following; *Adam did sometime live upon the Earth*, i. e. *Adam* is rightly conceived with the Attribute of living upon the Earth, as sometime actually belonging to him, tho' now it do not. *The Sun hath often Set; and yet hath Risen again*, i. e. The Sun is rightly conceiv'd, with the contrary Attributes of Setting and Rising, as what have actually and often Successively belonged to him, whether now they do, or not. *The Day of Judgment will come*, i. e. it is now rightly conceiv'd with the Attribute of Existence, as what will hereafter belong to it, tho' now it do not. *When it hath, or shall have, done Raining it will be fair*, i. e. the Air or Heavens are even now rightly conceived with the Attribute of *Fair*, as what will actually belong thereto, after that yet future Moment shall be past and over, wherein the Rain will Cease. Thus a Verb of other Tenses, than the present gives

gives the Qualification of past or future Time to the Attribute, which is Predicated by it.

§ 16. (3.) Other Moods are to be reduc'd to the Indicative, as in the following Examples: *Go thou*, i. e. I command or desire thee to Go, or thou art bid to go. *If, or O that thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy Day, the things which belong unto thy Peace!* i. e. Thy Application, tho' but now at last, to the things which concern thy Welfare, and thy Practical Acquaintance with them had made thee Happy and been highly pleasing to me. *I must Work the Works of him that sent me*, i. e. I am obliged (by my Undertaking, &c.) so to do. *The Father hath committed all Judgement to the Son, that all Men should Honour the Son, even as they Honour the Father*, i. e. He hath done and declar'd it to that End, as an Inducement and engagement so to Honour the Son. *If I go, I will send the Comforter or Paraclete*, that is, I promise to send him, upon Condition or in Case of my going away. *To subvert a Man in his Cause, the Lord approveth not*, i. e. that Action is disapprov'd of God.

§ 17. (4.) Interrogations are to be reduced either, (1.) into an Appeal with stronger Affirmation, when the Question is Negatively put in a Matter, that is, or is supposed, Evident to such as we speak to, or at least, that it would be so upon their considering; *E. Gr. Is it not so?* i. e. I appeal to your Knowledge or Consideration, that it is so; Or, (2.) with stronger Denial, when the Question is Affirmative, *Canst thou by searching find out God?* i. e. I appeal to thy Knowledge or Consideration, that thou canst not; or, (3.) into an Expression of Desire to be inform'd as *Are You willing?* I desire to know, whether you be or not. *Is it so? or is it not so?* i. e. I desire to be Inform'd by you, of the Truth of the Matter; or that you should declare, what you think about it: or (4.) into a real or supposed disputableness of the Point so propos'd; or at least, that it is capable of being farther confirm'd; and thus, instead of down-right Asserting or Denying, we often put things by way of Question, as *whether there be Planets Inhabited?* i. e. I doubt or offer it to Consideration. *Whether there is a God?* i. e. I propose it for farther Confirmation.

§ 18. (5.) What is *Ambiguously expres'd*, must be distinguish'd into its various Senses, or the Design of it Stated, and determin'd; Such was that doubtful Answer given by the Oracle of *Apollo* to *Pyrhus*.

Aio te Æacida Romanos vincere Posse.

I say, the Romans you may over-come.

i. e. You

i. e. You may overcome the *Romans*, or the *Romans* overcome you :

Such also was that Sentence, which Bp. *Tarleton* is said to have sent to those, who had King *Edward* the 2d in Custody,

Edwardum occidere nolite timere bonum est.

To seek to shed King *Edward's* Blood

Refuse to fear I count it Good.

i. e. refuse to fear, or refuse to shed it, for I account it Good to shed it, or good to fear the shedding of it : But the Keepers took it as it was most probably meant, and murder'd the King.

§ 19. (6.) When the same thing is intended to be severally Affirm'd or Deny'd of divers Subjects, or divers things of the same, there are so many Simple Propositions to be drawn out of the Complex, or Compounded Enunciation : But if divers Things are severally meant of divers others, and of each of them a part, the implied Simple Propositions are so many times so many, besides what may be considered, as more explicite, i. e. that all together are plainly said of all together : *E. G. the Sun and Moon are to us great Lights* : Here it is to be understood, (1.) that the Sun is a Light : (2.) The Sun is to us a great Light. (3.) The Moon is a Light. (4.) The Moon is, to us, a great Light ; and farther yet, (5.) The Sun and Moon together are Lights ; and, (6.) Both are to us great Lights. Our thus drawing out all the several Propositions, is requisite, not only in order to take the Sense more fully and distinctly, but also that we may better judge whether the Complex Proposition be altogether right, or how far, and in what respect it may be wrong.

C H A P. XVII.

§ 1. **T**HUS I have shewn how to pronounce or judge of Propositions, as to their Make and Import : And now, better to secure the Pronouncing rightly in and by them, we should make such Enquiries as these, whether what is judg'd or said be not altogether Insignificant, at least to the Purpose intended ? Or whether it be not certainly Untrue ? And on the other hand, whether it is what we may reasonably take for true ; or as making such Approach towards the Truth, as we are capable of, or is sufficient for the present Purpose.

§ 2. I

§ 2. I might here mind the Reader of what help has been already given towards our Pronouncing rightly concerning Tho'ts, and the Things they are employ'd about, and likewise as to the meaning of other Mens Discourse, and what we our selves intend, what Enquiries may be made about things, as also touching our Capacity for them, and Concernment with them, and of their greater or less Importance to us: But I shall here endeavour yet farther to shew, as to the several sorts of Propositions, when we may fairly suppose this or that to be rightly pronounc'd, *i. e.* so far as we are capable, or as is aimed at, or pretended to in the present Case. And here,

§ 3. 1. Rightly to Affirm, the whole Predicate must at least in some or other of its Sorts agree to the whole Subject, or else to its Principal, or most considerable, or more observable Parts: So Man is rightly said to be Rational, Corporeal, Mortal. That a Quality may be rightly affirm'd, there must be of it *Satis intensivè*, a sufficient Degree; *satis extensivè*, a sufficient Extent; And also *Satis protensivè*, a sufficient Continuance and Duration: A Face is not rightly pronounced Red, if it hath only such a Mixture thereof as is requir'd to a common Flesh-Colour; or if it has a deeper Red, but only in the Cheeks; or only a transient Blush all over.

§ 4. For the right affirming one thing of another, it suffices, after the mentioned Precautions, that any Sort thereof can be truly Affirm'd; as for Mans being a living Creature, it is enough that he be some sort of living Creature. It may be usefully noted, that Epithets which come to be merely Titular, and as a sort of Name, may be rightly given, tho' the common Sense of the Words do not otherwise truly belong to the Person, as it may be said *Lewis XIV*, is the *Most Christian King*; *i. e.* the King, who hath that Title; tho' he do's not answer it.

§ 5. 2. Rightly to deny, the Predicate must in no proper Sort, or Sense thereof, agree to the Subject, nor to any very observable Part of it, however not to what is most considerable in it, and which usually denominates the whole according as it self is such or such; and therefore it cannot be rightly said, Man is not Rational, when as he hath a Reasonable Soul; nor that he is not Visible, whilst he has a visible Body. Some Attributes are commonly deny'd of the whole, which belong to the Principal part, as that Man is not Invisible, tho' his Soul be so; yet generally it is otherwise, but there are some less accountable Usages in speaking, which must be observ'd from Custom. However,

§ 6. We judge sufficiently right in our Conceptions, if we Affirm or Deny with an eye to this or that Part, or Consideration of the Subject; and in Speaking too, if we take care to express the Limitation or Respect we have in View; which is to be done, whenever there might be danger of Mistake, or Objection, as suppose in saying, *Man is, as to his Soul, Invisible and Immortal*; or that, *As to his Soul, Man is not Visible or Mortal*: The former Proposition Affirms those which Logicians call *Infinite Terms*, which usually imply somewhat Positive; and here somewhat positive that is not visible or Mortal: The latter is the Negation of Affirmative Terms; for that the Negative Particle doth here affect the *Copula*, or Note of Identity whenas in the former Enunciations it affected only the Predicates.

§ 7. Affirmative and Negative are call'd the *Quality* of Propositions; they have also a sort of *Quantity*, in respect of which they may be called Universal, or Particular which is always understood to be not only *fewer than all*, but also *indeterminate* Indefinite, or Total. *Few, Many, Most, all but one, or two, and the like*, are reducible to the Head of Particular, as being Indeterminate and Fewer than all.

§ 8. Quantity is commonly understood, as belonging only to the Subject; whenas it doth as really appertain to the Predicate also, which might likewise have a Note of Quantity: And it is however always to be understood *universally* of the whole Kind, or *Totally* of the whole Person or Thing in a Negative Proposition; and *Particularly* of some Sort, or of some Particulars only, in an Affirmative Proposition (as has been intimated, unless by Accident the Predicate be just of the same Extent with the Subject, as all right Definitions and true Properties are); e.g. Every right-lin'd Triangle, is a right-lin'd Figure, whose Angles taken together are equal to two right ones; where the Attribute is indeed of no farther Extent, then the Subject, but it might be otherwise for any thing here said or intimated about it: And therefore the Predicate is to be taken Particularly, if it hath no express note of Quantity added to determine it otherwise; or be not a Total, i. e. either a determinate Individual, or else the Nature Simply taken, as when we say *Adam is a Man*, i. e. has that singular Humane Nature, which belongs to him.

§ 9. As to the Quantity of the Subject, which is the thing commonly understood by Quantity here, we do rightly Judge and Pronounce,

(1.) *Universally*, when the Predicate is duly Affirmed or Deny'd of the Subject in its whole Extent or of all its Sorts; but the usual Note of Universality [*all*] is sometimes taken only for a great Majority, at other times for some of all the Sorts; as when our Lord saith, *I will draw all Men unto me*; and sometimes not *distributively* for each, as it should be to make the Proposition Universal, but *collectively* for All together; in which Cases it makes the Proposition rather Total than Universal. That may be justly counted Universal, as to the rest, where there is a Determinate Exception: As Mankind except *Adam* and *Eve*, are born of Woman: But where the Exception is indeterminate, the Proposition is to be reckon'd Particular, as if it had been said, all Mankind, save two, are born of Women; the Reason is, because it is left doubtful, who those two are.

§ 10. (2.) We rightly Pronounce *Particularly*, when the Predicate is duly affirm'd or deny'd only of some undetermin'd Sorts or Individuals.

And, (3.) *Indefinitely*, when neither Universality nor Particularity is expres'd, but the Quantity left in Suspence; when yet by the Nature of the thing, or Usage of Words, the Indefinite is perhaps reasonably to be understood Universally; as in the Doctrinal Propositions of Arts and Sciences: So if we say in Mathematicks, *Triangles have three Sides*, it is to be understood, that all have; or else the Indefinite Proposition is to be ordinarily taken Particularly, *viz.* in Historical Narrations, or common Discourses; where 'tis usually intended, that the Matters are Generally, or Mostly, tho' not always so; as when we give the Characters of Nations in General.

§ 11. But besides the mentioned Sorts of Indefinite Propositions, which are only such in Expression, there may be Propositions, which are also *Indefinite in Sense*, and cannot be reduced either to Universal or Particular Enunciations; as if it be said, *Man is one species of living Creatures*; when it cannot be said that *all Men*, (i. e. every Man), or *some Men*, or *this Man is one Species of living Creatures*: But the Meaning is, that the Abstracted Humane Nature is a Species or Sort of Living Creatures.

§ 12. (4.) In the Propositions, which we call *Total*, the Attribute is refer'd to a Singular, i. e. to a Determinate Individual; as in saying, *Christ is God manifested in the Flesh*. Now these fall in with Universal Propositions as they refer to the entire Subject, when yet the Attribute is not therefore to be taken as always belonging to every Part thereof; but it is enough, if it so appertain to any, as *fairly* to give a De-

nomination to the Whole. The two first mentioned sorts of Quantities are commonly express'd, where they are intended.

§ 13. As to the Truth or Falshood of what is pronounc'd in any of the forementioned ways, or those which follow, it may be often times better discern'd by considering the Contradictory Proposition, which takes away what was conceiv'd or said by denying what was before Affirm'd or Affirming what was Deny'd. Nor is it needful for this Purpose, that every Part or Point of what was said should be contradicted, which would make it a *Contrary* Proposition, whenas to the Truth of a *Contradictory*, it sufficeth, that some Part or Point of the other may be justly gain-said: As that *the Sun is not Hot and Moist*, truly contradicts the saying, that *the Sun is Hot and Moist*; and so it do's, if we say the Sun is not Moist tho' it be Hot, but to say the Sun is *neither Hot nor Moist*, is a Point blank *Contrary*, and more then *Contradictory* to its being *Hot and Moist*, A Proposition which is *only contradictory*, do's no more than affirm the *Copula* or Note of Identity, which was deny'd, or deny that, which was before affirm'd.

§ 14. An *Universal* Proposition, as such, is overthrown by contradicting the *Universality*, whether expressly by flat Denial, or contrary Affirmation; or Implicitely by an Exception, whether it be one undetermin'd Particular, or a Determinate Singular; as that, *all Men are just*, is contradicted and overthrown, if it appear that, *Not all Men are just*, or *all Men are not just*; but *some Men*, or *some sort of Men* (as *E. Gr.* the Covetous) or *this particular Man is not just*: But to say the quite Contrary, *no Man is just*, is more then a Contradiction, and runs into the contrary Extreme, so as to hazard a falshood on that Side, when we would avoid it on the other: For,

§ 15. Contrary Propositions may be both False, tho' they cannot both be True; since the one is a Contradiction to the other, and more then so. But it may well be held that *some Man is just*; if the Contradictory thereof, *viz.* that *no Man is just*, has less to be said for it: And at the same time it may be true, that some (*viz.* some other) *Man is not just*.

§ 16. Those seemingly contrary Propositions, *viz.* *some Man is just*: and *some Man is not just*, are call'd *Subcontrarious*; and do not really contradict each other, as not being spoken of the self-same Subject; nor would they, if meant of the same Man at differing times, or in respect of divers Actions: For Contradictory Enunciations must always Affirm or De-

ny, either expressly or in Effect, the same Attribute of the same Subject at the same time, and in the same Respect.

§ 17. A *particular Affirmative* is contradicted by an Universal Negative, and a *particular Negative* by an Universal Affirmative. *Some Men are immortal, or some Man is immortal*, are contradicted by saying, *No Man is immortal, or all Men are mortal, or every Man is so*. And by the Instance here given it appears, that if the Attribute which was affirm'd, imply a Negation, as [immortal] imports [not Mortal], the particular Affirmative may be contradicted by the Universal Affirmation of the Contradictory Attribute: Thus, that *all Men are Learned, and some Men Unlearned*, are plainly Contradictious, tho' they be both Affirmative; because the one affirms, that which is contrary to what the other affirms.

§ 18. A Proposition which is *Indefinite*, is to be contradicted according to the Sense it bears, either as an Universal, or as a Particular, or as an Indefinite in Sense; and this last is contradicted by only adding a Negative Particle, or removing it; thus *Man is a Species*, and *Man is not a Species*, are Contradictious to each other: And so are these which follow, The Nature of Man is sufficiently differing from that of Brutes, tho' we should allow them to have some kind of Reason; on the contrary, The Nature of Man is not sufficiently distinguish'd from that of Brutes, if we should allow them to have some kind of Reason.

§ 19. A *Total* or singular Proposition is contradicted by only changing the Affirmation into a Denial, or this into that: Where a Predicate is a Negative Term, it may be done by casting away the Negation; as *This Man is a non-Angelical Creature*, is contradicted by saying, *This Man is an Angelical Creature*.

Now whereas it is Evident, that the two parts of a Contradiction cannot both be true or false at once; we must take *that* Part for true, which upon due Examination appears to be liker Truth.

C H A P. XVIII.

§ 1. **WE** proceed to some farther Sorts, or other distinguishing Characters of Propositions; but still with this View, that we may better discern, when that, which is therein pronounced, is right and true, and that we our selves may pronounce accordingly.

A *Modal Proposition* is, when the manner of Agreement or Disagreement between the Subject and Predicate is specify'd to be such or such, viz. *Possible, Impossible, Necessary, or Contingent*, which are the only *Modes* commonly observed by Logicians: But,

§ 2. There might be other Modes added to those already mention'd, such as *Improbable, Probable, Certain; Once, sometime, seldom, often, always, never*, yet may not be Necessarily so, as the Swan is never Black, but always White, and yet *might be* still a Swan, tho' it turn'd Black.


It plainly expresses a Mode of the Predicate's agreeing or disagreeing to the Subject, at least as to our Apprehension about it, if we say, 'Tis *improbable* the Sun moves so vast a Compass, and so exceeding Swift, as he *Necessarily must*, if it be his Motion round the Earth, which makes Day and Night; but on the other hand, 'tis *probable*, the Earth rather do's it, as she *possibly may*, by moving a far less Compass and more slowly; *It is not certain*, that the *Terra incognita*, or unknown part of the Earth, is uninhabited; since 'tis no ways *Impossible*, but *might happen* it should be now inhabited, as well as *America* was before we found it out.

§ 3. The other mentioned ways of Affirming or Denying, do likewise import a manner of Agreement or Disagreement betwixt the Subject and Predicate; as if it be said, *It once* was known, that a Man and Woman were not Born, but immediately Created; he out of the Earth, and she out of him. It is *sometimes* observ'd, that the Sun Shines out, when yet it Rains; but, *seldom*, that it then Rains very long together; 'Tis *often* seen, that a fair Day follows a cloudy Morning; *always*, that there are Clouds when it Rains or Snows, or Hails; but *never* any of these, when the Sky is fully Clear. And there might be, no doubt, divers other Modes added to those we have instanced.

§ 4. Such kind of Propositions consist of something *said*, which Logicians call the *Dictum*, and the Manner of saying it, which they call the *Modus*, and this is to be consider'd as the Predicate, or what is farther said of the thing said: To make the Modal Proposition true, it is not always requir'd, that the *Thing said* be really so, simply in it self; but often suffices, if it do but hold as to the manner in which it is said; as in the Instance before, it is not intended, that the *Terra Incognita* is, or is not, uninhabited; but only that its being uninhabited, is not certain. This holds, unless the Mode be such as do's it self imply Affirmation or Negation: As if I say Man is *Necessarily* Rational; or that, *it is of Necessity*, Man be Rational: And here the *thing said* [Man's being Rational] must be in it self true as well as the *manner* of it, that is *Necessary*. But if it be said, Man is *Contingently* Learned; or *it is Contingent*, that Man be Learned; 'tis by no Means intended, that he is always Learned, but only that when ever he is, he is but contingently so; for he might have been, and yet may be, otherwise.

§ 5. The *Mode* being consider'd as the Predicate in Modal Propositions, they are contradicted by denying the Mode when it was affirm'd, and affirming it when it was deny'd: E. Gr. if it were said, *it is not Necessary the Sun should rise to-morrow*, 'tis contradicted by saying, *it is Necessary that the Sun rise to-morrow*; and it would be more than a Contradiction to say, *It is Necessary, that the Sun rise not to-morrow*. Here follows a Scheme of Modal Propositions, with the Synonymous, Subalternate, Contradictious, and Contrary Enunciations, according to the Modes, that are commonly taken notice of in Logic.

§ 6.



§ 7. A *Subalternate Proposition* expresseth some part of that which is designed in the more Comprehensive Proposition, to which it is Subalternate; as *Necessary to be*, is at least *not Necessary not to be*, or *Possible to be*: What is *Subcontrarious* is so far from being contrary, that it is not so much as contradictory, yet carrys somewhat like contrariety in the Expression, whilst the Sense do's well agree. Where there is no Mode apply'd to the *Dictum*, i. e. to what is said, the Proposition is commonly call'd *Pure*; it might be called *Positive*, or rather *Unmodify'd*.

§ 8. In *Copulative Propositions*, there are two, or more of one Term to one or more of the other, and those join'd together by a Conjunction Copulative, or Disjunctive: And to Pronounce rightly in such Propositions there must be an Agreement or Disagreement of all that is Predicated to every Subject severally (unless it were only meant of them collectively taken, i. e. not of each singly, but of all together): It were not strictly true, that *Paul* and *Silas* were in Prison, and Sung Psalms at Midnight, unless both could be said of each: Or that neither Death nor Life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor Powers, nor Things present, nor Things to come, nor Height, nor Depth, nor any other Creature shall be able to separate us from the Love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord, unless it could be severally denied of each: And therefore,

§ 9. Barely to contradict such sort of Propositions, the Copulative only is to be contradicted, as if it could be truly said, *Paul* and *Silas* were *not both* in Prison, and *also both* Sung Psalms at Midnight: Or, that some one, or more, of the mentioned Particulars might be able to separate real Christians from the Love of God in Christ; but to say, that *any* one of them whatsoever, i. e. either Death, or Life, or Angels, &c. may be able to do it, would be directly contrary, and more than a bare Contradiction.

§ 10. The Propositions which are call'd *Disjunctive* are, when we either predicate a Disjunctive Attribute, or of a Disjunctive Subject, or both at once: And here we affirm or deny only some one Branch of some one, not determining which, as in saying, *Either Chalk or Silver, is either Stone or Metal in the Oar*: Where 'tis only intended that one or other of the former is one or other of the latter: And it is contradicted by saying, *Neither of them is either*. Such Propositions are right, when the Parts assign'd do truly belong to the Matter in Hand in one or other of its Sorts or Branches, also that they do not fall in with each other, and that

that there is no other Branch assignable in the present Case: *E. gr.* the Air is either moist or dry. In Fight, Men must either Conquer, or fall, or be taken, or Flee. Either the Sun moves round the Earth, or the Earth round the Sun.

§ 11. Propositions of this Kind may be accounted trifling and foolish, if it can be shewn either, that the Distribution is not wholly to the Point (as if it were said, that a Number is thick or thin, odd or even) or else, that two or more of the Branches fall in together (as in saying, Man is either a Substance, or Spirit, or Body, or Accident). They are contradicted by denying the Disjunction, as in saying, 'tis not either so or so; and the Contradiction is confirm'd by asserting somewhat else, as what is, or may be in the Case: Thus it may be said, Water is not either Hot or Cold; since it may be Lukewarm.

§ 12. *Conditional Propositions* are right, when the Consequence holds, whether the Antecedent, or Point suppos'd, and consequent, or what is inferr'd, taken absolutely and apart, be true or not. *E. gr.* If in this life only, we have hope in Christ, we are of all Men most miserable: Tho' Christians have not in this Life only hope in Christ, nor are of all Men most Miserable; yet it might hold, that they would be so, if their Case were such. They are contradicted by denying the Consequence; as in saying, Tho' in this Life only we had hope in Christ, yet were we not of all Men most Miserable.

§ 13. *Causal Propositions* are rightly and truly Contradicted by denying the Cause, when it is not rightly assign'd, tho' the Point, to which it is brought, should be true. If it were said, Adam fell because God foreknew he would fall, it might be well contradicted by saying, Adam did not fall, because God foresaw he would: other *Relative Propositions* are contradicted truly, by denying the untrue Relation: As if it were said, Silver has Dross in it altogether as Lead has; it may be truly gain'd, by saying Silver has not Dross in it altogether as Lead has; since it has it not in such Proportion.

§ 14. *Discretive Propositions* affirm and deny Contrary or Disparate, and differing Points; and sometimes do either affirm or else deny them, on both hands, with an adversative Conjunction, such as *not only, but also*: And they are right when the several Propositions are *so*, into which they are resolvable; they are contradicted by denying either of them, Tho' God be infinitely Merciful, he is also just: Tho' God be infinitely Merciful, impenitent Sinners shall not escape his Righteous Judgment.

§ 15. As

§ 15. As to that common Instance from the Poet,

Non Formosus erat, sed erat Facundus Ulysses.

(Not Fair, Ulysses was, but Eloquent.)

Apply'd to our Famous Ben. Johnson, in a kind of English Hexameter, thus,

Not Fair-faced he was, but he was Fair-spoken Ulysses,

Here one Point is deny'd, the other affirm'd; and there are divers ways of Opposition to such kind of Discretives, as if it were said in the present instance, he was not only not fair, but also not Eloquent; or that he was not only Eloquent, but also fair; or that he was fair, but not Eloquent; now this last is directly contrary in both Parts, whereas the two foregoing Propositions fall in with one Point, and contradict only the other.

§ 16. *Exclusive, Exceptive, and Restrictive Propositions* are right, when the Point, which is more Express, and that which is imply'd are both true, as when we say, God only is Omnipotent: All Men, but our Saviour, are Sinful; An *Ethiopian* is White in respect of his Teeth; *i. e.* He is in some Respect White, and it is in that Respect: such Propositions are contradicted by denying them as they are Exclusive, Exceptive, or Restrictive, as in saying, The *Ethiopian* is not White in respect of his Teeth; It would be a contrary Proposition, to say or judge, he is not White at all.

§ 17. *Propositions which import Beginning, or Ending,* are right, when the express Affirmative, and imply'd Negative are both of them true; the *Contradictory* disallows only the latter; the *contrary*, both of them. Our Lord Jesus began his Publick Preaching after his Baptism, and ended it at his Death; *i. e.* he publicly Preach'd after his Baptism, and not before; he did it before his Death, not after.

C H A P. XIX.

§ 1. **T**HE Foundation of Judging and Pronouncing rightly is laid in the right forming of our single Apprehensions; for what we judge or pronounce, is always somewhat drawn out of these, which we would have to be distinctly observ'd for some special Reason or Purpose, to which it may serve; and therefore what Rules and Helps we have before given for the right forming of our single Apprehensions

hensions are here also to be attended to and improv'd But we shall yet farther suggest somewhat about the Faults to be avoided, and Measures to be observ'd in our Judging and Pronouncing.

§ 2. To say just the same thing of the same (as has been noted) is indeed plainly enough True, but Useless and Trifling; unless it were meant, that the thing is certainly what in it self it is, whether it so appears to us or not. Yet the Names of Things should be ascertain'd or (as they call it) defin'd, and this is rightly done by any Method, which may serve to assure others, what are the things intended; as by Synonymous Words of the same or some other Language, better known; or by the Etimology of the Words; or by pointing to what is thereby design'd; or any way describing it, so as it may be known, what is the thing meant, tho' the Nature of it be not explain'd.

§ 3. Of what is in it self Contradictious or Inconsistent, nothing can be rightly Judg'd, or Pronounc'd, but that it is so, together with what is consequent thereupon; as that it cannot possibly exist, or so much as be conceiv'd, &c. e. g. Erroneous Wisdom is not rightly judg'd Hurtful, or Dangerous; but that rather (properly Speaking) there neither is nor can be any such thing.

§ 4. What is in it self Contradictious or inconsistent cannot in a *proper Sense* be said of any thing; as that any Person is an unskilful Artist.

§ 5. Terms Contradictious to, and Inconsistent with each other, cannot be affirm'd, but must be deny'd each of the other, if taken in a Literal and Proper Sense; as that Light is Darkness, or Darkness Light; yet seeming Contradictions and Inconsistencies may hold in a Figurative Sense, or in differing Respects; as in that of our Saviour, *If the Light that is in thee be Darkness, how great is that Darkness?* For the Faculties and Principles which as Light should serve to guide us, and do so in some Cases, may yet be really thro' our Neglect and Abuse, as Darkness, hiding things from us and imposing upon us in other Respects.

§ 6. Considerations that are formally divers and differing, cannot *as such* be one truly affirmed of another; Youth is not Manhood: Height, as such, is not Depth; Length, as such, is not Breadth; Nor is any thing properly long *as* it is broad, &c. Substance is not Accident, nor Action, Passion, &c. *Peter*, a Youth, is not *Peter* a Man; nor is *Peter* denying our Saviour, *Peter* Repenting, tho' he was still the same Person. But it may well be said, that the thing which
has

has one Form has also some other, and is the same thing, which also has the other, tho' not *as having* it; for that under one Consideration it cannot be properly said to be the same, as under another: Yet things which have differing Formalities may be said, one of them to belong or to be appertaining to another; accident belongs to Substance; It being the same thing, which is belonging to Substance, with that which is called Accident or consider'd under any other of its Characters. No one thing is properly another thing, how like soever, yet that which has one Attribute, may be the same with that which also has another, tho' the Attributes should be very differing, provided it be no inconsistency, that they should so belong to the same Subject; as that the Dark New-Moon should be then brightest, *viz.* on that side which is towards the Sun, and nearer to him than when she is Full.

§ 7. The Concrete is justly affirm'd of that, to which the Abstract belongs, so as rightly to denominate the Subject, which has it, (*Vide* Chap. 15. § 7.) and of that only; for we cannot call the Black-more *simply* White, because there is somewhat of whiteness belonging to him: But Substance is rightly said to be either divisible, or thinking, as it has either divisibility, or the Power of Thinking intimately appertaining to its Essence or Nature; and here the known usage of Words falls in with the Reason of Things; but it must guide and govern *verbal* Attributions, tho' it should follow no certain Rule in some other Cases, *Vide* Chap. 17. § 5.

§ 8. That is rightly said to be Essential, not Accidental, which goes to the Constituting of a thing *as such*, either, as being common to it, with other things of the same Kind or Sort, or peculiar and distinguishing. Attributes are commonly said to be Necessary, *κατὰ πάντας, καὶ αὐτὸν*, and *καὶ ὅλας τὰς μορφὰς*, as belonging to *all* of the Sort, to them *as such*, and that *Entirely and Primarily*: The more common Attributes have only the two former Degrees (as they call them) of Necessity: And the Accidental Attributions, which yet are Naturally and commonly Universal, have only the first Degree, as that Crows are Black. But now more properly,

§ 9. That is rightly said to be Necessary, which cannot be otherwise, either in respect of the Being, or well being of some Person or Thing; and *absolutely* Necessary, when 'tis from the Nature of the Person or Thing it self, as that God *is*, and *is every way Perfect*, that Men *desire their own Happiness*; *Hypothetically*, and *Consequentially*, when 'tis only upon some Suppo-

Supposition, as that whilst a Creature is, it cannot but be, and whilst it has such a sort of Being, cannot but be such.

§ 10. *Logical* or *Metaphysical* Necessity is, when the contrary implies a Contradiction, as to say there is, or may be no God, were in effect to say, that tho' there are Beings plainly depending; Yet there is no fit or proper Being on which they depend: *Physical* Necessity is, when things are so according to the settled Order of Nature; and yet by Miracle it might be otherwise, as the Fire in the *Babylonian* Furnace was restrain'd from burning the three Men cast into it. *Moral* Necessity is, when the Understanding, and Natural Make of an intelligent Creature does unalterably lead to this or that Point, as to Self-Preservation, and the Desire of Happiness.

§ 11. What is Accidentally, Absolutely, in some Respect, Certainly, Probably, Doubtfully Agreeing or Disagreeing, is rightly affirm'd or deny'd, if it be but conceiv'd and express'd accordingly: As that the Sun is Accidentally (or as it now happens) over-clouded; Absolutely (and in it self) a Luminary; in some respect risen or set. (namely to this or that Place); Certainly a fiery Body; probably Globular; and but doubtfully of such a precise Diameter.

§ 12. There are some peculiar sorts of Propositions, such as Distinctions, Divisions, Definitions, &c. which require and deserve a more special Consideration. A Name or Character is rightly *distinguish'd*, when its differing Senses are truly and fully assign'd, so far however, as may serve the present Occasion to prevent Mistake, and better clear up the Sense we fix upon, whether what is under Consideration be properly or figuratively, strictly or largely taken, according to vulgar and common Usage, or as it is peculiarly understood in some particular Art or Science.

§ 13. A thing is rightly *divided*, when the Parts or Sorts are proper and truly belonging to it, different each from other, all of them together making up the whole, and also the manner of the Division such as may help the Understanding, not perplex it, or oppress the Memory with too many Collateral Branches, or too numerous Subdivisions; if this Inconvenience can be avoided in dividing and subdividing still into two Parts only, it is commonly to be prefer'd. as rendring them clearer by so direct an Opposition of one Branch to the other: But we shall consider this Matter farther under the Head of Conduct, where amongst other things we shall direct somewhat about the ordering of our more solemn Discourses:

§ 14. A thing is (according to our Model) rightly *defin'd*, when its nature (whatever that be) is summarily and Distinctively explain'd by the most Comprehensive and Primary Attributes. The thing defin'd must be *explain'd*, either by what is before better known, or afterwards opened; for tho' the first were to be chosen, yet this latter way must of Necessity be admitted in many Cases, where we are not drawing down the Account of Things from the first and simplest Principles, which are self evident, but are forc'd to go backward towards them, as far as the Occasion may require.

§ 15. The Explication must be *Summary*; drawing in the whole thing. Comprizing it as briefly as may well consist with its being somewhat of an Explication in it self, and serving as a Foundation for the farther opening of the Matter by such parts of its Character as may fitly lead to, and thro' the whole. A Definition must also be *Distinctive*, so as it shall agree only to what is defin'd.

§ 16. The Attributes are to be, as near as we can, the most *Comprehensive*; as in saying Man is an *Animal*, which comprehends his being Somewhat, Real, Substantial, Compounded, Organiz'd, Sensible, and the Subject of other numerous Accidents, Modes, &c. thus we Comprize the several Characters of the Superiour Kinds under the Name of that which lies nearest to the thing defin'd; and whereas this is only the comprizal of what the thing has in Common with all of its Kind; We must in defining add the *Primary Distinctive* Attribute, viz. that (as near as we can) which lies at the bottom of other distinguishing Marks, which (*E. gr.*) in the definition of Man may be [reasonable] provided it be understood of what renders him capable of Religion.

§ 17. Now, wherever *such* Attributes are known, or can be found by us, the thing may be properly enough defin'd; tho' it be an *Aggregate* as an Army, or *Incomplete* as an Embrio, or an *Individual*, as *Adam*, &c. provided they be summarily and distinctively explain'd, so as to exclude every thing else, and to include the whole thing, or all of the Sort or Kind defin'd, whilst the other Essential Attributes are either contain'd in those assign'd, or deduced from them, or some way reducible to them.

§ 18. But besides the more *Notional* and Logical way of defining Things by their *nearest* Genus or *Kind*; and the Specific Difference, or the *distinctive Character of the Sort*, there is also a more *Natural*, or Physical way by assigning the most remarkable Parts, of which things are made up, and into
which

which they may be resolved by real Separation, so as that somewhat of them, at least, may exist alone without the rest. Thus it may be said, that Man consists of a Reasonable Soul vitally join'd with an organical Body; that a Plant consists of a Root, together with a Stalk, and what springs from it.

§ 19. What we cannot nicely define, we may yet rightly *describe* by some less considerable Attribute, or a Set of Accidents which in such a Conjunction belong only to the thing describ'd, and to all of that Kind and Sort, as that Man has a Body Naturally Erect: Oratorical and Poetical Accounts of Things, are usually made up of a Number of Accidents, which are not elsewhere found together.

§ 20. What is rightly said in Division, Definition, Description or otherwise, may be also rightly inverted, if we observe but how the Predicate was design'd, whether Universally, Particularly, Indefinitely, or Totally, and take care to give it the same Quantity, when we make it the Subject of that Proposition, into which we convert the Former: *E. g.* Men are either Learn'd, or Unlearn'd; and some Beings which are Learn'd or Unlearn'd, are Men: No Man is a Stone; and no Stone is a Man: Some Men are Wise, (*i. e.* in some considerable Respects); and some Beings, that are Wise (in some considerable Respects) are Men. The Ground whence it is *that* Propositions hold true, when they are thus Converted, is that the Identity of things must needs be Reciprocal, so that if *this* be Identified with *that*, *that* may be back again Identified with the other.

§ 21. Generally speaking, that only is to be accounted right, which may be reasonably taken for true, so far at least as is Judged or Pronounced: Yet where Truth as to the Matter it self is not pretended to, that may be said to be rightly pronounced, which is Instructive, and to the Purpose intended; as in reporting truly what others *falsely* say or suppose: And in the due stating of Errors; as also in Parables, Fables, &c, which are consistent with themselves and leading to Truth, as their Scope and End, provided they be so delivered, as not to misguide us into an Apprehension, that the Facts themselves were design'd for Historical Truth, nor to leave us unavoidably deceiv'd.

§ 22. That is rightly pronounc'd, as to the Nature of the thing spoken and manner of speaking, which is in both Respects agreeable to the Occasion and Circumstances, and suited to the Capacity and Condition of those to whom we apply our selves; as if we say in common Discourse, that the Sun Moves, Rises, or Sets; that the Earth is like a Ball

or Bowl; or in Philosophy, to Learners, and to the Learned; that it is probably the Earth, which Moves to make Day and Night, not the Sun; that the Earth is Globular, or a Sphæroid.

§ 23. Finally, wheresoever this or that Attribute is truly affirmed or deny'd, the Matter is *so long* Necessarily, and therefore also certainly so or so, with (what they call) *Objective* certainty, or that of the thing, as really it is in it self; and there is also a *Subjective* certainty of it in the infinite Mind; which beholds all things immediately in themselves, and exactly as they are by intuitive Knowledge; when yet those things may appear to us only Possible and Doubtful, or Probable, or Certain, whether in themselves or by Means of some assuring Evidence and Proof.

Therefore what our Reason has next to consider, is the Condition of things in respect of their Certainty as to us; and first, of what is to us sufficiently Evident.

C H A P. XX.

§ 1. **T**HE primary Measure of our Apprehensions and Judgments is the Self-evidence of some Points, by which others are confirm'd, or from which they are Collected thro' the help of Connexions and Disjunctions that are intuitively certain to us without our Reasoning about them; For we neither usually do it, nor indeed can to any Purpose, but instead of that are unavoidably oblig'd to take them for granted, and to Reason from them about other Matters, which are not yet sufficiently Evident. And therefore,

VI, It is the farther Business of our Reason, *rightly to apprehend, and admit what is sufficiently Evident*, either in it self, or by its connexion with what is Self-evident; so as to acquiesce and rest Satisfy'd in it, without indulging to doubt, or vainly seeking Proof, where there is indeed neither Occasion, nor Room for it.

§ 2. Now it is here imply'd, that we rightly understand, what is to be taken for Self-evident: And by this we mean, that which plainly appears to be undeniably so or so, without the help of Argument or Proof; so as that the Terms, thus understood, or the Ideas we have of them, are rightly certainly and evidently Conjoin'd or Disjoin'd in their being affirm'd or deny'd of each other: Thus three and one together

ther are four; and four is three and one together; three are not four, and four are not (only) three.

§ 3. 'Tis presuppos'd to Self-evidence, that the Terms, of which we Speak or Judge, are determinately understood; since 'tis the Identity or Diversity of Ideas, to which that Evidence refers. That may be therefore Self-evident to one Person, or at one time, which is not so to another Person, or to the same at another time, by Reason the Terms are not so well understood, or the Ideas of them so Just and Clear, as is requisite to make their Connexion or Separation *evidently* Right, without farther opening and stating. That a Figure of three Sides, has also three Angles, and no more, is Self-evident to such, as have just and clear Ideas of a *Figure*, of its *Sides*, as also of an *Angle*, and of the Number *Three*, and to such Persons only. But,

§ 4. We do not here mean, that Persons must be able accurately to define all the Parts and Points belonging to this or that Matter before they can apprehend what is Self-evident about it: 'Tis enough, if they can truly describe them; or if they do but know them, when they see them, or have them clearly open'd; but till they are at least thus far advanc'd in Acquaintance with the things conjoined or disjoin'd, and the Intendment of their Conjunction or Disjunction, we ought not to wonder, that what is, to us, Self-evident should be deny'd, disputed, or doubted by others: Now,

§ 5. In this Case Reason suggests, that we should try whether the several Points be rightly and clearly Understood; that we may explain them so far as the Occasion requires, inculcating the Explication, if need be, and waiting, as we sometimes must do, with Patience, till it appear to be rightly apprehended by those we would instruct. And this is certainly the Method to be taken, instead of perplexing our selves to prove what is, to us, Self-evident; whereby we should but tempt others to expect and demand Proof, where 'tis neither needful, nor possible; and, it may be, teaze and weary them to apprehend and admit, *as Proof*, what is really no such thing.

§ 6. As to Self evidence, we must keep a due Guard and Watch against the two Extremes of supposing it, where it is not, and over-looking it, where it is. And,

1. We must not admit every thing that looks like Self-evidence to be really such: as, (1.) Unexamin'd Perceptions by our Senses; *e. g.* we ought not to take it for Self-evident, that the Sun is but about a Foot over; that the Earth is a Flat; that what we perceive is always formally, as well as virtually, in the Objects themselves, because we seem to See, or Taste, or Feel it there. It is indeed Self-evident to me, and not to be doubted, that this or that appears so to me; but I ought not thence hastily to conclude it Self-evident, that it is in it self really so, as it appears: And farther,

§ 7. We are not to depend, (2.) Upon our unsuspected Imaginations, as if what we strongly conceit, or have inwardly felt, were really, as to us it evidently seem'd; whenas there might be in the Case nothing of what did so appear, tho' there was indeed somewhat occasioning such Appearance, *i. e.* some Affect and Motion of the Humours, and of the Spirits in the Brain; and it must be allow'd, that some sort of Illness, which is call'd Phausie, is in it self a real Disorder, and tho' it be not what it is tho't to be, yet as it has real Causes, there may be just Occasion to use some proper Method of Cure; and tho' perhaps it should not ordinarily be a Course of Physick, yet it may require the Advice of a Physician. But farther yet,

§ 8. We are not to depend, (3.) upon our unweigh'd Conceptions, and Presumptions, which we never misdoubted, only because we never went about to examine them: But first catch'd them up, and still carry them on upon Trust from others, or from our own first Tho'ts of the Matter; whenas every thing, which can admit of being examin'd, and wherein we are concern'd, should once at least be look'd into, and well consider'd according to the Measure of our Capacity for it, and Concernment with it, how strongly soever others or we our selves are perswaded of it: But let it here be carefully noted, that,

§ 9. It is by no means intended, we should formally doubt of the most generally confessed Points, much less of every thing; but rather that we should believe such Matters, wherein Wise and Good Men are so generally agreed, will bear Examination, and be better establish'd by it: With this Apprehension and Expectation we may fitly proceed to examine them, where we can find any Place or Occasion for it; and it may be allow'd as a very good and sufficient Occasion, if we really need it, and may hope to be thereby more confirm'd in such Points. But then,

§ 10. 2, We must allow, that some Things are to be taken as Self-evident, and that they neither need, nor indeed can be reason'd out or confirm'd, so as to be made more Evident than they are upon their being justly and clearly apprehended: Such things there must of Necessity be; for we could never come to know any thing by reasoning, did we not first know something as undeniably certain without it, as it has been observ'd, and laid down as an undoubted Principle, *Vid.* Position, (A) Pag. 99.

§ 11. Now we must acknowledge a real Self-evidence, where, upon setting our selves to examine the Matter, we can find no place seriously and with Reason deliberately to doubt, but it is really so; and that nothing can be found to make it more certain than it is. As that I now do somewhat which we call Thinking; that whatsoever now Acts, or is Affected any way, really is, or exists, whether it be tho't of or not; that therefore I really am, who really act: or that I am somewhat real, who really do somewhat (*vide* Position, (Bh) &c. pag. 106): And in the Instances given, it appears, that there are three sorts of Self-evidence, *viz.* that of Conscious Knowledge, undoubted Principles, and undeniable Consequence. And,

§ 12. 1, Conscious Knowledge belongs to such Matter of Fact, as is inwardly perceiv'd by us, so that we have no Liberty for calling it in Question, or at least of concluding the contrary; thus all our sensible Perceptions, Imaginative Representations, and Intellectual Apprehensions are to us, who have them, Self-evident: For it is unquestionable to us, that they *are*, and that they *are such*; as we inwardly perceive them; tho' 'tis not always equally Certain, to which of the formentioned Sorts they should be refer'd; as whether I should take this or that Appearance for a sensible Perception of somewhat without me, or only for an Imaginative Representation form'd within; yet that there is somewhat, at least within. if not also without, I cannot question, if I would; nor that there was somewhat, whilst I firmly and clearly remember it. In short, tho' I can doubt of almost any thing, if I set my self so to do, yet I can no ways doubt that I think, when I do so.

§ 13. 2, Undoubted Principles are such Propositions, as may be call'd Primary and Fundamental Truths, Maxims, Axioms, &c, from which other Truths may be first rais'd, and into which they may also be finally resolv'd. As that what is not, so long cannot act, or be affected any way; that what is at all must be either in us, or somewhere about

us, or both within us and without us; that all the Parts of a thing taken together are equal to the whole: That the same thing cannot at once be and not be in the same respect; or, that the two Parts of a Contradiction cannot both be true, nor both false, &c. In such Propositions the Conjunction, or Disjunction of the Terms, their Identity or Diversity, cannot be deny'd with any Reason, nor so much as seriously and deliberately question'd. Amongst these may be reckon'd Self-evident Distributions or Disjunctions, which are of great use in the handling of Subjects, and Reasoning about them; as that Number is either Odd or Even; that every Proposition is either true or false, &c: Nominal Definitions (which only Assign such Words to signify such Things) are to be taken as a kind of Principles.

§ 14. 3, Undeniable Consequence refers to divers Propositions which are evidently conjoin'd; so that one is an incontestable Inference from the other. As that, since nothing cannot act, it cannot therefore rise of it self into something; and that therefore there must necessarily be somewhat eternally existing without Beginning. Thus the Process of Discourse or Argument should be connected, and should however be brought at last to an Evident Connection with what is Self-evident; so as there may be no farther Room for serious Denial or Doubting: We should carry on our Point till we bring it to some undoubted Principle; and when the Matter is brought to such an Issue, our Reason instructs us to acquiesce without indulging to doubt: Since not to do so: Were,

§ 15. (1.) To weary our selves or others to no Purpose, for we are then come to our *Nepus ultra*, and neither they nor we can possibly proceed any farther: But suppose we really see not the Self-evidence of that Point, which is offer'd as such by a Candid and Intelligent Person, all we should desire is the farther and clearer Explication of the Terms, that we may come either to see the Matter Self-evident, or may be capable of evincing the contrary from some Principle, which shall appear undeniable even to our Antagonist: But to insist upon the Proof of what is indeed Self-evident; were,

§ 16. (2.) To cut off our selves from all possibility of Satisfaction in any thing: Since nothing can ever be made certain to us, if somewhat be not first admitted by us as certain; for that we must proceed endlessly in proving or confirming one Point by another; if we allow not that some things need no Proof: And to judge otherwise were,

§ 17. (3.) To

17. (3.) To render our acting any thing unaccountable, or to put in a Bar against acting at all: And so it ought to do, if we would be consistent with our selves in maintaining the Sceptical Humour and Notions. For shall we go to Act, we know not why, we know not what, and indeed (according to that Doctrine) not knowing, whether we Act or no, or whether it may be to any Effect and Purpose? But this were

§ 18. (4.) To cast a gross Reflection upon our own Make, and upon our Maker too; as if our discerning Faculty were of no Use; as if he were defective in Wisdom and Power, or in Faithfulness and Goodness, who should give us such a Frame and Constitution, such Powers and Faculties, as were capable of knowing nothing with Certainty.

§ 19. I have before given a considerable Number of Select Principles and nearer Deductions from them, which are ('tis hop'd) sufficiently Evident: It would be a vain Attempt, should I go about to enumerate all the more general Positions which might fairly be accounted so; and as to the more Special Axioms of other particular Arts and Sciences, they are not here to be expected, but in the proper Disciplines to which they belong.

§ 20. Thus far we have consider'd what may be call'd sufficiently Evident, more absolutely and in it self, where there must always be an intuitive Certainty, either of the Thing immediately in it self, or of its Connexion with what is certain: There may be also a sufficient Evidence *comparatively*, i. e. in respect of the Contrary Evidence; but *that* must be accounted sufficient only so long as there is an evident Preponderation or Over-weight on one side of the Question; for upon farther Views, the Scale may come to turn on the other side: And yet at present the Evidence may be sufficient for us to proceed upon, whilst there is no opportunity of looking farther into the Matter; or where there is not much depending on the Determination; or that, if we should make it wrong, it may be afterwards well enough rectify'd. Evidence Comparatively sufficient is what suffices to justify us before God and Man in proceeding upon it; yet not always in concluding absolutely that the Matter certainly is, as at present we take it to be.

§ 21. This General Head has been chiefly design'd to guard against the Scepticism, which seems to prevail amongst some, who pretend to more than ordinary Sense; tho' there are really no Practical Scepticks in Secular Affairs: For Men will not forbear to Eat, and Drink, and Trade, &c; because they may possibly, as they say, be in a Dream; yet most do too much neglect the Concerns of the future Life upon a real, or pretended, Doubt about it.

C H A P. XXI.

§ 1. **W**HEN things appear not Evident in themselves, nor evidently connected in the several Steps of their Proof, with what is so, we may well reckon there is at least a Possibility of Mistake: And in such Cases it is the Business of our Reason,

VII, *Rightly to discern what Danger there may be of Mistake in this or that Case, and of what Importance a Mistake would be.*

§ 2. We ought not indeed to look upon every Possibility of our mistaking to import what may be properly call'd a Danger of it, which implies somewhat Momentous in the Point it self; and especially some reasonable Ground of Doubt and Suspicion about it: But these Marks are not always to be found, where yet the Matter may not appear to us Unquestionable. It is not to us undeniably Certain, that the Sun is a Globular Body, it may possibly be otherwise; yet the Point seems to be of so small Importance, and there appears so little Reason for calling it in Question; that we can scarcely say, there is here a Danger of mistaking, no more than there appears a Danger to us in our mistaking: Nor should any Man be alarm'd upon finding such a sort of uncertainty in many Cases, as may leave room for a Possibility that the Contradictory, if not Contrary, Proposition may be true.

§ 3. What

§ 3. What is commonly call'd *Moral Certainty* should in Reason suffice to lay the Apprehension of Mistake, *viz.* when the Matter cannot fairly be suppos'd otherwise; but that in supposing it so, we must admit what is altogether Improbable, and next to Impossible: As, *e. g.* that so many Persons, of differing Places and Circumstances, should agree in reporting and believing there is such a City as *Rome*, if there were no such Place. We are certainly to conclude, that wheresoever there appears upon due Consideration a manifest overweight of Evidence, there is really nothing which can be fairly call'd a Danger of Mistake, since one part of a Contradiction must always be true, and we must take that for Truth, which appears most like to be so. But,

§ 4. There is real Danger of our mistaking in many Cases which may be of some Concernment to us, as

1. In determining of Points, which are in their own Nature, or however to us, unsearchable: Such as those before mentioned, Chap. 7. *e. g.* if we should undertake to State the Divine Unity and Trinity, as in themselves they are; or such other Matters as are plainly above our Capacity, or are at least so for the present. Here we are not only in manifest Danger of Missing, but may be in some Cases greatly endanger'd by it.

§ 5. 2. Wherever we want what is previously requisite to the making a right Judgment; as (1.) a just and clear Understanding what is the Thing spoken of, or what is said about it: Or, (2.) Matter of Fact truly and certainly stated, which therefore should be always carefully drawn out by proper Enquiry: Or, (3.) The Measure, or Rule by which we must judge in such Case; as suppose it were some Point of Divinity, Law, &c. upon which the Matter turns.

§ 6. 3. In every Case of manifest Difficulty, especially if the Determination must be speedy, and admit not of Deliberation, or Consultation, or at least not of our Reviewing and Reconsidering what hath appear'd Right at one time, but might not perhaps at another: Whenas in difficult Cases there is commonly occasion for second Thots; and therefore the first may be justly suspected. More particularly,

§ 7. 4. In Describing, and much more in Defining; for there may be great Danger of missing the just distinctive Character, and of making the Description or Definition, either to take in what it should not, or to leave out somewhat that should be taken in. We are farther in danger of Mistaking,

§ 8. 5. Under Indisposition of Body or Mind, which ordinarily give some Disturbance to the Thought and Judgment: and here we are more especially to suspect our Sentiments under vehement Passions and Affections; since that saying do's too commonly hold, *Peit Judicium, cum res transit in Affectum*, Reason must not give Judgment, where Passion tries the Cause.

§ 9. 6. In Matter of doubtful Report taken upon Trust from common Fame, or from such as are not of approved Capacity and Integrity, or who have not had Opportunity of well observing what they report: And tho' a Report may come to us from many and good hands, yet it is to be doubted of, whilst we know not, whether it took not its Rise only from one, and *that* a Person deceiv'd, or willing to Deceive.

7. In Matters of common Opinion, or singular Sentiments, before either of them are well examin'd; for there are, both, Vulgar Errors, and Learned Presumptions, wherein Men have follow'd one another almost blindfold.

§ 10. 8. In the Perceptions, Imaginations, and Conceptions, which we have taken up without due Consideration, or upon Partial Examination; as suppose at too great a Distance, and under manifest Disadvantages; or by one Sense only, where others might be employ'd upon the same Object; or by the Senses only without the Use of our Judgment: or by mere Natural Reason without the help which Supernatural Revelation might afford; or by some part of Divine Revelation, not compared with such other Points of it, as might farther give Light and Help to determine the Sense; much more if we should examine things by some pretended Revelation without the help of that which is undoubtedly Divine, or of that Reason, whereof God is likewise the Author, and which is presuppos'd to our entertaining Revelation and Understanding it.

§ 11. 9. In following our Education as to the Matters about which Wise and Good Men are not agreed; which therefore cannot safely be taken upon Trust from our Parents or Progenitours, but ought to be once at least well examin'd, when Children are grown up to a Capacity, and have pro-

per Furniture for that Purpose. There must be so much the greater Danger of Mistake in following our Ancestors in such sort of Points, as there are many ways of Mistake to one that is Right and True.

§ 12. 10. Where our Sentiments fall in with Natural Inclination, Personal Affection, or Secular Interest, for in such Cases the Judgment is in great Danger to be bias'd and sway'd to that side; and therefore we are not here to begin with weighing the Arguments on each hand; but rather first to observe what might prejudice us for or against either side, that we may settle and confirm our Minds against that: this being as necessary, as to make the Scales even, before we go to weigh any thing.

§ 13. 11. Where there appears nothing more on one side than on the other; but the Matter looks altogether doubtful, when yet one side only can be right; Here the Determination must be ticklish, and we are upon the Brink of Error on one Hand or the other, unless it should be in some of those few Cases where the Matter is plainly indifferent.

12. Where the over-weight of Argument appears very small, and hardly discernible; for such Appearance is easily counterfeit, and in danger to lead to a Mistake.

§ 14. Now as to the Importance of a Mistake, it is to be measur'd chiefly by the Moment of that, about which we make a Judgment; and therefore we are to look back into the Discourse on that Head, Chap. 12, 15, &c: yet we shall here suggest somewhat very briefly, which may be useful and improvable: And,

1. The Importance of a Mistake must be greater, where we are under Special Obligation to acquaint our selves with the Truth, and have Opportunity, with Means for that Purpose, as in Matters relating to our own peculiar Province, Business or Undertaking.

§ 15. 2. In respect of more general Principles and the nearer Deductions from them: For that one Errour there may lead to Thousands, which will Naturally and justly follow, if once a leading Falshood be admitted.

3. As to Practical Points, since they are commonly of greater Consequence, than mere Speculations.

4. In fixing the End or Point and Scope at which we would aim in any Undertaking; forasmuch as that is to direct our Choice and Use of Means.

§ 16. 5. In our first setting out into the World, or upon any particular Affair: For every one knows that he is like to go far wide of his Journey's End, who sets out wrong at first; and in Proportion, every mistake is of so much worse Consequence, as it do's more affect what we are finally designing.

6. In relation to Moral Action; since we are there under an Obligation of Duty, and liable to Punishment in Case of such Mistake as might be avoided by due Care, and the use of such Means as are within reach.

§ 17. 7. And finally, the Importance of an Errour is so much more Considerable, as its Influence would be greater and more extensive; reaching to many Points, Persons, Families, or to a whole Country, &c. but especially where it extends not only to the Interests of the present Time, but of future Ages, and above all where it is like to have an Influence upon our everlasting Concernments.

Now according as there is greater Danger of our mistaking; and at the same time a greater Mischief in it; we are to employ a proportionable Care for the avoiding of it, and therefore the Rules and Helps, which may serve to that Purpose, are to be so much the more attended to.

The Third Part.

CHAP. I.

§ 1. **T**HE Method laid down in the Introduction brings us now to such farther ways of using our Reason as are somewhat more Special, and come nearer to common Service: And here,

I. *That we may rightly estimate Proof; and assent accordingly, so far as the Proof will warrant, and Justifie.*

Proof being relative to what is prov'd, must be estimated chiefly from its being really fitted, and duly apply'd to make out the Point to which it is offer'd: *i. e.* to Convince or Confirm the Mind, that this is truly affirm'd or deny'd of that; as that it is here day, or that day is here present, because the Sun is above the Horizon of this Place.

§ 2. There is just Occasion for Proof, when, after the Terms of a Proposition are well understood, according as they are therein design'd, it do's not yet appear, whether that more simple Theme which is consider'd under *such a Character*, as the Subject, may or may not be consider'd also under *that* farther Character, which the Predicate imports; as, whether the Sun (by which is here design'd the *Being* so call'd) may be farther consider'd, as a Fiery Body, or as Watry: As to the latter, it would be found, that the *Sun is not a Watry Body*: But as to the Former, that *the Sun is a Fiery Body*; and of this Point, Proof may be given by some farther Character belonging to *one* of the Terms, but not to the other, to shew that *the Sun is not Watry*; and by one belonging to both, to shew that *the Sun is a Fiery Body*: *E. g.* the Sun do's not moisten things, as Watry Bodies do; but heats them, as Fiery Bodies are wont to do.

§ 3. That the Occasion and Use there is for Argument, and also the Way of Arguing may better appear, they may be illustrated from the following Figures *G, H, I*, which are designed to represent so many Solid Bodies exactly alike, having each of them Six like Sides, (mark'd with the Letters *a, b, c, d, e, f,*) but somewhat differently placed to our View,

fo

(i.e. *quod erat probandum*, which was to be prov'd): And the Proof here given rests upon that Principle, *Things, which agree to the same, do also agree among themselves*; but it is a little more nicely and fully deliver'd in the Position (*Ag.*, pag. 104, thus, Things do *so far* agree together, as they severally agree to the self-same Thing, or to divers in the Respect wherein these agree. In the Case before us, we have the self-same Argent-sided Body, or however we have two such Bodies exactly agreeing as to all their Sides: And whereas these, which so agree, or indeed the same Argent Body has OR on one side and SABLE on the other adjoining to it upon the same Body, it therefore must needs be, that the Body, which is in one respect OR, must in another be also SABLE, which was the Point to be prov'd.

§ 6. That which was brought for Proof; (*viz.* the *Argent-side* to shew the Agreement of the OR & SABLE to the same Body, since each of these do plainly agree to that same Body, to which the Argent belongs) may fitly enough be call'd, as the Argument generally is in Logic, the *Middle Term*, as lying betwixt the two other Terms, which therefore may be named, the *Extremes*: And on some Accounts it were (I think) best placed in the middle betwixt them, thus,

The Body G, which is OR, is likewise ARGENT;

But the same ARGENT-Body is also SABLE:

Therefore the Body G, which is OR, is also SABLE,
Q. E. P.

As to this unusual way of placing the Propositions I shall afterwards offer somewhat farther: In the mean while it may be of Use to remark some other Points from the Instance now before us. And particularly,

§ 7. That the differing Considerations, under which the Body G is or might be taken, can't be rightly pronounced one of another; for we cannot truly say, that OR is ARGENT, or that the Argent-Side is the Sable-side of the Body G: but we may therefore well say, that the Body posited as at G is not (formally) the same thing, as in the Position at H; tho' it be the self-same Body, only diversly posited to the Eye; or briefly that G is not formally H, and it may be thus made out,

What is consider'd, as differing in any respect is not (formally) the same;

The Body at G is consider'd, as differing in some Respect from that at H:

Therefore the Body at G is not (formally) the same as at H.

Now

Now the first proposition is of it self sufficiently Evident, and the next may be thus prov'd,

The Body which is consider'd, as shewing it self in a differing manner from that at *H*, is consider'd, as differing from it in some respect ;

But the Body at *G* is consider'd, as shewing it self in a differing manner from that at *H*:

Therefore the Body at *G* is consider'd as differing in some respect from that at *H*.

And Consequently,

The Body at *G* is not (formally) the same as at *H*. *Q. E. P.*

§ 8. To carry the Instance before us yet farther, let it now be suppos'd, that *G* and *H* are two distinct Bodies, and so fix'd in differing places, that we cannot immediately compare them together, but have the moveable Body *I*, which we may compare with each of them: We may then prove them to be just alike, thus,

Bodies that are severally just like the same Body are just like each other ;

But *G* & *H* are Bodies, which are severally just like the same Body :

Therefore *G* and *H* are just like each other.

Now that *G* and *H* are severally just like the same Body appears thus,

The Body *I* is the same Body with it self, (*Pos. (H) p. 100*);

But *G* and *H* are severally just like the Body *I*:

Therefore *G* and *H* are severally just like the same Body.

That *G* and *H* are indeed severally just like the Body *I*, may thus appear,

If *G* and *H* have each of their Parts like those of *I*, and so put together, as in *I*, then they are severally just like the Body *I*;

But *G* and *H* have each of their Parts like those of *I*, and so put together as in *I*:

Therefore *G* and *H* are severally just like the Body *I*.

The Consequence rests upon the Self-Evident Position (*Ac*) pag. 104.

And that *G* and *H* have each of their Parts like those of *I*, and so put together as in *I*, must be made to appear by a particular Survey, and Comparing of them.

§ 9. Only once more, Suppose we would prove that some one or other of the Bodys, *G, H, I*, has a Side that is *VERT* (i. e. in Heraldry *Green*), which is not yet Evident by what appears of them; but we are credibly told, or do well remember, that every one of them has an *AZURE* (or blew) Side, and that one of the Azure Sides joins another, which is *GVLES* (i. e. Red), and that this is adjoining upon a Side which is *VERT*: We may then Argue thus,

All the Bodys, *G, H, I*, have one Side *AZURE* (as *dd* in *I*);
But one or other of the *AZURE* sided Bodys has also a side that is *VERT* (as *ff*):

Therefore one or other of the Bodys *G, H, I*, has a Side that is *VERT*.

And the Argument is Conclusive, tho' it be not agreeable to the Rules allow'd of in the Schools: If now it be doubted, whether any of the *AZURE* sided Bodies amongst *G, H, I*, be also *VERT*, it may be thus made out,

One or other of the *AZURE*-sided-Bodies *G, H, I*, has also a Side adjoining that is *GULES* (as *ee*);

But that which has a Side *GULES*, has likewise one adjoining to it, that is *VERT*:

Therefore one or other of the *AZURE*-Sided-Bodies has also a Side that is *VERT*.

And Consequently,

One or other of the Bodies *G, H, I*, has a Side that is *VERT*. Q. E. P.

And this Argument, as well as the former, is conclusive, tho' it be not agreeable to the Measures commonly prescrib'd in Logic.

§ 10. Now Proof is to Evince the Agreement or Disagreement, either of two Enunciations by the means of a third, or of two single Terms, whether it be by another Enunciation, or by a third Term, fitted and rightly appli'd to that Purpose. And,

I, As to the former way of Proof, it ought to be by an Enunciation fairly and plainly imply'd, and in a sort offering it self in the Connexion or Disjunction of the two Enunciations, which is to be clear'd by it: It should not therefore lie far out of Sight, nor should there need a second Enforcement: But,

§ 11. The Proof of the Connexion or Disjunction, ought to be dispatch'd at once, as if I were to prove, that if the *Sun be risen*, or where the *Sun is risen*, it is Day. 'Tis here fairly imply'd; as the Basis of the Consequence or Connexion, that the Sun's being risen makes Day; and if this be true, there can remain no reasonable Doubt, but that in Case the Sun be risen, or where it is risen, it must be Day; so that the only remaining Question is concerning the assum'd Enunciation, whether the risen Sun makes Day or no; and not at all about the Consequence from *that* to its being thereupon Day.

§ 12. It may be observ'd, that in proving the Connexion or Disjunction of Enunciations, we do not usually mention the double Hypothetical Proposition, which yet is understood; as here, If the risen Sun makes Day, then in Case the Sun be risen it is day; since the Consequence brought for Proof, is or ought to be so firm and evident, as that it cannot be fairly deny'd; but that if it be, a Reason may well be demanded, upon which the Dispute may farther proceed by shewing *that* Reason to be either a Falshood in it self, or not to the present Purpose, if true.

§ 13. But tho' the Hypothetical Proposition be not commonly express'd in such a kind of Proof, yet it is refer'd to, and really deny'd, when the Respondent denies the *Consequent*; as in this way of Arguing (which is call'd an *Enthymeme*) the Risen Sun makes Day; therefore if the Sun be risen, or where he is risen, it is Day, so deny the *Consequent* were in effect to say, that tho' the risen Sun makes day, yet 'tis not here day, tho' the Sun be, or if he were, risen here; which if any one should be so absur'd as to say, the Ground of his doing it might justly be demanded, nor could any thing be here assign'd, which would be both true and to the Purpose.

§ 14. Certain it is, that the Connexion of Enunciations lies too open, where there is no such Point imply'd and assignable, as will suffice to confirm it at once, provided it be but true in it self: And in making *that* out (which is call'd the *Antecedent* of the *Enthymeme*) the reasoning may proceed without Intricacy and Perplexness, which must else be involv'd and almost unintelligible, if the *Consequent*, or a second Consequence were to be prov'd.

§ 15. The

§ 15. The Proof of Enunciations Connected may be duly made by contracting both into one, which carries in it the Force of both; as, in the Instance given, to prove, that if the Sun be risen it is day, we have said, the Risen Sun makes Day. The Inconsequence or Disjunction of Enunciations, may be likewise made out by an Enunciation, which contracts both into one, which is Negative; thus, tho' it be Light, it is not therefore Day: for any Light whatsoever does not make Day: But,

§ 16. We must distinguish betwixt the Negation of a Consequence, and the Consequence of a Negation: That this which is call'd an Ink-horn, is *not therefore* made of Horn, is right and true; but it would be very false to infer, that, if it be call'd an Ink-horn, it is *therefore not* made of Horn.

The Negation of a Consequence is made by putting the Negative before the Illative Particle, but after *this* it would make a Negative Consequent.

§ 17. There may be a Conjunction or Disjunction of Negatives, or of those which they call Infinite Enunciations: Thus, tho' such a one be not Wise, yet it does not therefore follow, that he is not Rich; for those, who are not Wise, may yet be Rich: But if he be not Wise, it follows, that he is not fit to give Advice; for they must be Wise who are fit to do it. Those Enunciations in which Infinite or Negative Terms are affirm'd or deny'd, may likewise be joined or disjoin'd in the way of Inferring: Thus, he is come to such a Pitch in his Non-age, that he is therefore a Non-such: Or he is not in his Non-age, yet is not therefore a Non-such.

§ 18. The Proof of such Connexion or Disjunction is sometimes well made by a Proposition shewing that the Terms of one Enunciation, have, or have not the like Habitudo or Respect to each other, as those of the other Enunciation; *E. Gr.* If 2 give 4, 3 will give 6; for 6 is the double of 3, as 4 is of 2; but tho' 2 give 4, 3 will not give 7; for 7 is not *only* the double of 3 as 4 is of 2.

C H A P. II.

§ 1. **W**HAT lies farther before us here, is to consider how Proof may be Estimated in Relation,

II, To the Agreement or Disagreement of single Terms; which may be made out either in taking them both together or severally.

In the former way of proving, the Proposition on which we ground is Conditional or Relative, made up of a New Enunciation, together with the entire Question, or its Contradictory: And here the Enunciation brought for Proof, must be true, and its Connexion firm and good, to make the Argument so.

§ 2. Thus it may be prov'd, there are but a few true Friends: If a true Friend should be ready, on fit Occasion, to die for his Friend, there are then but a few true Friends; for there are but a few so dispos'd; or thus, there are but few dispos'd to die for their Friend; therefore, but a few true Friends; If every true Friend should be ready, on fit Occasion, to die for his Friend: or else (in the most formal way prescrib'd by Logicians, but seldom us'd in Speaking or Writing) thus,

If a true Friend be ready, on fit Occasion, to die for his Friend, there are but few true Friends;

But a true Friend should be ready, on fit Occasion, to die for his Friend:

Ergo (therefore) There are but few true Friends.

Or to save the Trouble of repeating, 'tis usual in the Schools to say, in such a Case,

But the Antecedent, or the former is true:

Ergo, so is the Consequent, or the latter.

§ 3. In all the ways of Arguing out this Point, there is somewhat first suppos'd, as connected with the Question or Point to be prov'd, and then aver'd, as what is Self-evident, or has been prov'd, or at least may be, *viz.* that a true Friend should be dispos'd to die for his Friend, and thereupon it is undeniably concluded, there are but few true Friends, provided the thing aver'd be true, and its Connexion with the Question right: The latter is here easily made out, by farther Averring what lies as the imply'd Foundation of that

Connexion, viz. that there are but few so disposed ; and therefore, if true Friends must be so dispos'd, there are but few of them. The former Remains to be otherwise made out, viz. that a true Friend must be so dispos'd.

§ 4. The same Point might be prov'd by supposing its contradictory and loading it with somewhat which is false, but necessarily consequent upon it : Thus, if there be many true Friends, there are many who are ready to die for their Friend on fit Occasion ; but there are not many who are so : E. There are not many, or there are but few true Friends. And thus we see the Argument holds from the Contradiction of the Consequent, or latter Part to the Contradiction of the Antecedent, or foregoing Part, as well as from the Averment or Asserting of the former to that of the latter.

§ 5. And this may be farther seen in the following Instances :

Where Envyng and Strife is, there is Confusion and every Evil Work ;

But in many places there is Envyng and Strife :

E. In many places there is Confusion and every Evil Work.

Or we may thus Argue from the Relative Position,

But in Heaven there is not Confusion and every Evil Work (nor indeed any) ;

E. In Heaven there is not Envyng and Strife.

Again,

If the Dead rise not, then Christ dy'd in vain ;

But Christ dy'd not in vain ;

E. The dead shall rise.

Farther, our Saviour hath said,

If I be lifted up, I will draw all Men to me ;

But he was lifted up :

E. He draws to him all Men, Gentiles as well as Jews.

§ 6. But the Argument will not hold from the Contradiction of the Antecedent to that of the Consequent, or from the Averring of *this* to the Averring of *that* ; unless we do, or at least might add a Term of Restriction to the Antecedent, as in that of the Apostle, *If ye live after the Flesh, ye shall die, (or Perish Eternally), but if ye, thro' the Spirit do mortifie the deeds of the Body, ye shall live (or be Eternally blessed) ;* where

it might be said on both hands [only in Case] you do so or so, you shall fare so or so : Upon which it might be assum'd and concluded,

But ye are not tending to Eternal Death :

E. Ye live not after the Flesh.

Or on the contrary,

But ye are tending to Eternal Death,

E. Ye do live after the Flesh.

And as to the other part of the supposed Case, it might be argu'd,

But ye are in the way to Eternal Life :

E. Ye do thro' the Spirit mortifie the deeds of the Body.

Or on the Contrary.

But ye are not in the way to Eternal Life :

E. Ye do not thro' the Spirit mortifie the deeds of the Body.

§ 7. The Ground and Reason of this whole Matter lies thus: If the Antecedent be a *Certain Cause* or *Effect*, or *Concomitant* of the Consequent then in Case the *former* be, the *latter* must also be ; or if *this* be not, neither is *that*, and if the *former* were indeed an *only Cause*, a *necessary Effect*, or *inseparable Concomitant* of the latter (so that it might be truly said [only if], or [only where], it is thus or thus, it must be likewise so or so: or on the other hand [only if], or [only where] 'tis not thus or thus, neither must it be so or so': in such Case, if the former be not, neither is the latter; and if the latter be so, so must also the former. All this will more plainly appear by the following Instance.

§ 8. If *q* be always follow'd by *u* in the same Word, then in the same Word, where *q* is, there must also be *u*; and where no *u* is express'd or understood, neither must there be *q*: and whereas it may be truly said, *only* where there is an *u* (express'd or understood, there is also a *q*: therefore it may be subsum'd,

But in the Word [King] there is no *u*, therefore neither is there a *q*; or thus, but in [QUEEN] there is a *q*, and therefore there is also an *u*: But it cannot be truly said, *only* where there is a *Q* there is an *U*; therefore it can't be rightly argu'd that in [DUKE] there is no *q*; therefore neither is there an *u*; or that in [Duchess] there is an *u*, and therefore also

also a *q*; since 'tis not *Q* alone, which is follow'd, or accompany'd with *U*.

§ 9. In this sort of Proof, there should be due Care taken, that the Consequence or Connexion lie not too open; but that if it be not Self-evident, it may at least be made good at once, without proceeding to prove that farther Consequence, by which the first Consequence, or Connexion is made out, as may sufficiently appear by what has been said: And upon the whole,

§ 10. An *Hypothetical* or *Relative* way of Arguing (which may be call'd *Conjunctive*, as it takes the Terms of the Question both together) is not ordinarily to be chosen, but rather that, which they call *Categorical*, which is more Absolute and Direct; but this is not under present Consideration: As to what we are now upon; it may be observ'd, that Relative and Conditional Arguments are much of the same Nature; they may be often readily turn'd, either of them into the other; and tho' they begin somewhat differently, yet they both proceed alike.

§ 11. What has been here observ'd, may be plainly seen in the following Instances.

Because I live (says our Saviour), ye shall live also;

Or, *If I live, ye shall live also;*

But *I live*: Therefore *ye shall also live*;

Again,

Where I am, there shall also my Servant be;

Or, *If I be in Heaven, so shall my Servant also be;*

But *I shall be in the Heavenly State of Happiness and Glory*:

E. My Servant shall be in the like State with me.

On the other hand,

If upon my not going away the Comforter will not come; but that, if I depart, I shall send him unto you;

It is then expedient for you, that I go away:

Or, *Where the Case is such, that upon my not going away, the Comforter will not come; but that upon my departing, I shall send him unto you; it must there (or in that Case) be expedient for you, that I go away:*

And from either of these Ways of delivering the Proposition the Assumption and Conclusion will be both as follows,

But upon my not going away, the Comforter will not come; whereas upon my Departure I will send him unto you:

E. It is expedient for you, that I go away. Q. E. P.

§ 12. A Conditional or Relative way of reasoning may be reduc'd to that which is more Absolute; where the Conditional, or Relative Enunciation consists but of two or of three distinct Terms; both or one of them being repeated to make up four. Thus instead of saying,

If \mathcal{U} always follow \mathcal{Q} , then \mathcal{U} may well be understood in \mathcal{Q} ;

But the former is true: And therefore so is the latter.

The same Point may be thus argu'd,

A Letter, which always follows another, may well be understood in that other;

But the Letter \mathcal{U} always follows the Letter \mathcal{Q} ;

E. The Letter \mathcal{U} may well be understood in \mathcal{Q} .

And instead of saying,

As *Abraham* was justify'd, so we must be justify'd;

But *Abraham* was justify'd by Faith (*Rom. IV.*); yet not altogether without Works, (*Jam. II. 21, 22, 23*);

E. We are to be justify'd by Faith, and yet not altogether without Works:

It may be said,

Abraham, and we, are to be justify'd in the same way;

But *Abraham* was justify'd by Faith, yet not altogether without Works:

E. We are also to be justify'd by Faith, yet not altogether without Works.

§ 13. But where there are four several Terms in the Conditional, or Relative Proposition (the Enunciation, which is added in order to Proof, being wholly distinct from that, which was to be prov'd); in such Case the Reasoning cannot easily, if at all, be reduc'd to the more absolute Categorical Form; but it must generally remain Conditional or Relative, because the two assumed Terms cannot be apply'd at once, as one common Measure to the Terms of the Question severally,

to shew their Agreement or Disagreement: And yet they may be perhaps apply'd one after the other in two distinct Arguments, as may be shewn in our Procedure upon the present General Head. And in some Cases at least,

§ 14. There may be a way of comprizing the two Terms of the New Enunciation in one that is complicated, as in the forementioned Instance it might be said,

That which infer'd the Comforters not coming, was not expedient for our Lord's Disciples;

But his not going away infer'd the Comforters not coming to them:

E. Our Lord's not going, was not expedient for his Disciples.

On the other hand,

That which infer'd the Comforter's being sent was expedient for our Lord's Disciples;

But his Departure infer'd the Comforter's being sent unto them;

E. His Departure was expedient for our Lord's Disciples.

C H A P. III.

§ 1 BESIDES the more *Simple* Conditional or Relative way of Arguing, there may be in this Kind, what is more *Compounded*, where the Proposition is either such as we may call *Collective*, or *Distributive*, And,

1. When it is *Collective*, 'tis usually term'd an *Induction*; and gathers in all the Sorts, or Parts, or Cases, that it may infer somewhat as to the Kind, or Whole, which is first suppos'd, and then aver'd of every Part or Sort.

§ 2. This Kind of Argument holds, when the Induction or Enunciation is full, or however made out, by some or other Supplemental Phrase, as *E. gr.* [and all the rest], or [and there is no Instance to the Contrary]: provided also, that what is Suppos'd and Aver'd of the Sorts or Parts do really agree or disagree to them, *Materially* taken in respect of their Nature, not *formally* as they are Sorts or Parts. The concluding Force of such Argument lies in this evident Principle, that what can be so affirm'd or denied of each, may be accordingly pronounc'd of All, or of the Whole:

R 4

§ 3. Thus

§ 3. Thus it holds, that,

Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and the other Parts of our Bible are of Divine Original: *E.* So is the Whole.

And again,

Scholars, Traders, and Soldiers, are Mortal; nor can any sort of Men, or any one Man be produc'd, that is not so:

E. All Men are Mortal.

But what agrees to the Sorts or Parts, as they are contradi-
stinguish'd to the Kind or Whole cannot agree thereto: And
therefore it will not hold good, that since,

The Head, Trunk, and Limbs are each less than the Body:
Therefore the whole is so.

because *that* was said of them as Parts formally consider'd;
but it might be said,

The Head, Trunk, and Limbs are made up of separa-
ble Particles:

Therefore the whole Body is made up of such Particles.

§ 4. It is to be observ'd, that Inductions are commonly
deliver'd, as in the mentioned Instances, in the Form of an
Enchymem, or Argument, wherein one Enunciation is to be
understood as reserv'd (*pro se*) in the Mind of him that
offers it, and easily supply'd by others: In the present Case
the Proposition wanting to make the Argument entire and
explicite is of this Nature,

If (or where) each several Part or every Sort or Case is
so or so, the Whole must likewise be so or so.

As in the following Example,

If not only Personal but Real Securities, not only when
we have to do with Men that are Unable or Dishonest,
but with such as are both Able and Honest, be liable to
some Hazard; then all Securities are liable to some
hazard:

But Personal and Real Securities from Men, who are
both Able and Honest, as well as from those who are
either Unable or Dishonest, are liable to some Hazard:

E. All Securities are liable to some Hazard.

§ 5. 2. When the Conditional or Relative Proposition is *Distributive*, the Distribution must be proper and full (as hath been shewn, Part II. Chap. 18. § 10.) and then the Argument proceeds, either by simple Averring, or else with a Reason subjoin'd to each Member of the Disjunction: And here,

(1.) That which simply Avers, do's either assert the Antecedent to infer the Consequent; or reject the Consequent, that it may also reject the Antecedent, either, or both of which may be Disjunctive: Here the Disjunction must be rightly made, and also the Antecedent or Consequent rightly asserted, or rejected:

§ 6. Thus it may be seen in the following Instance,

If the Money paid were of the largest usual Coin, Gold, or Silver, or both; it must be either Broad-pieces, or Guineas, or Crowns, or of two of the Sorts, or of all three.

But the former is true: *E.* so is the latter,

Or, But the latter is false: *E.* The Former is so too.

And whereas it may be truly said, that *only* in such Case the Money paid must be of such Sorts; we may *thereupon* farther Argue thus,

But the Money paid was not of the largest usual Coin, Gold or Silver, or both:

E. It was not Broad-pieces, Guineas, or Crowns, or of two of the Sorts, or of all three.

Or else thus,

But it was in *such* Pieces: *E.* So paid.

§ 7. (2.) What is commonly call'd a *Dilemma*, but may consist of more Branches than two, subjoins a *Reason*, or Enforcement to the several Branches. 'Tis granted indeed, that a *Dilemma*, properly so call'd, may ordinarily carry with it clearer Evidence, since a Disjunction of two Parts only, must make them more directly Opposite, and better to illustrate each other; but the Argument is no less firm, whenever the Disjunction is right, and the Enforcement sufficient to the Purpose in hand.

§ 8. In this kind of Argument, when all the Parts and Cases belonging to the present Matter are taken up, and each of them sufficiently refuted or confirm'd, the Conclusion must be good, in relation to the Whole: *E.* *Gr.*

Happiness is not reasonably to be expected in this Life :
For that here Things must go either altogether ill, or
well, or with a Mixture of both :

If Things go altogether *ill*, we are plainly Wretched
and Uneasie ;

If altogether *well*, we may reasonably fear a Change for
the Worse ;

If there be a Mixture of *both*, our Satisfaction must be
mix'd, and allay'd with its Contrary.

And again,

We shall be completely Happy in the Heavenly State :
For either we shall there have no farther Desires, or we
shall have them :

If not, then we shall enjoy a continual, full, and present
Satisfaction ;

If we shall have farther Desires, we shall have withal the
joyful Experience of finding them continually answer'd
or outdone, together with the most assured prospect o
its being always so.

§ 9. Thus we see this manner of Arguing, serves not only
for a Negative, but an Affirmative Question, for Confirma-
tion, as well as Confutation ; and there is always a Condi-
tional or Relative Proposition understood, tho' it be very sel-
dom, if ever, express'd ; but it might be said in the Instance
above, that if things must here go either altogether ill, or
well, or with a Mixture of both, we cannot reasonably look to
be happy in this World : Whether we shall have farther De-
sires in Heaven, or not have them, we shall either way be Happy
there ; as has appear'd by the Reasons added to the several
Branches in both Examples.

§ 10. In the more Absolute and Positive way of Reason-
ing, the Terms of the Question are in some sort alter'd, the
Question not being taken just as it stood before : And its
Terms are placed either in the same Enunciation or in sever-
al : When the Terms of the Question are some way alter'd
and yet put in the same Enunciation, the Argument is what
they commonly call *Disjunctive*, from its first Proposition.

§ 11. In the Disjunctive Proposition, we affirm positive-
ly and directly (not Conditionally or Relatively), yet not any
one thing determinately, but only one or other of the men-
tioned Attributes of one or other of the mentioned Subjects
when both the Terms of the Question are Disjunctive.

§ 12. In this kind of Argument the Predicate of the Question, together with one or more assumed Terms are disjunctively affirm'd of the Subject, and then the newly assumed Part is either deny'd, to infer what was before affirm'd, or else affirm'd, to infer what was before deny'd: Or, there may be one or more New Terms Disjunctively added to the Subject of the Question; and the Predicate deny'd of those newly assumed Subjects, in order to its being Affirm'd of the other; or else affirm'd of an assumed Subject, in order to its being deny'd of that, which before was the Subject of the Question.

§ 13. To make this way of Arguing hold, the Disjunction must be right, *i. e.* Proper and Perfect; and what is affirm'd or deny'd as to the part assum'd must also be true: As in the Argument following, to shew that Man is compounded of a Soul and Body,

Man is either only a Spirit, or a Body alone; or else
Compounded of a Soul and Body,
But he is not only a Spirit, nor a Body alone:
E. He is compounded of a Soul and Body.

The Disjunction may be put upon the Subject thus,

Either the Sun, or the Moon, or something else is the
created Fountain of Light.
But neither the Moon, nor any thing distinct from the
Sun and Moon is the Created Fountain of Light.
E. The Sun is that Fountain of Light.

§ 14. When both parts of the Proposition are Disjunctive, the Conclusion must have either a Disjunctive Subject or Predicate;

Either Silver or Gold is the heaviest or lightest of Metals;
But Silver is neither the Heaviest nor the lightest:
E. Gold is either the heaviest or the lightest of Metals.

And it may be carry'd on to what is determinate, thus,

But Gold is not the lightest of Metals:
E. It is the heaviest.

Or we may conclude the foregoing Argument with a disjunctive Subject, in this Manner,

But neither Silver nor Gold are the lightest of Metals:
E. Either Silver or Gold is the heaviest Metal.

And to bring the Matter to a Point,

Silver is not the heaviest Metal: E. Gold is so.

§ 15. It is sufficient that the Subject or Predicate of the Question make a part of the Disjunction in Sense and Meaning, tho' it be not express'd therein; as here,

It (i. e. the Time) is one of the Twelve Hours;

But it is none of the Nine first: *E.* One of the Three last,
Or, None of the Three last: *E.* One of the Nine first.

Instead of saying more explicitly,

It is either one of the Nine first Hours, or of the three last;
But it is None of, &c. ————— as before.

The Predicate of the Question, or Point to be Concluded, was to be found expressly mention'd only in the Conclusion of the foregoing Argument; yet it was imply'd in the Proposition, when it was said, *It is one of the twelve Hours*, for all the Twelve comprize both the Nine first, and Threelast.

C H A P. IV.

§ 1. **W**HEN the Terms of the Question are so far alter'd as to be separated from each other, and placed in distinct Enunciations; there are either two Enunciations only, or more than two to infer the Conclusion.

When there are more than two Enunciations to infer the Conclusion, there is one or more intervening betwixt that, which has the Subject of the Question subjected in it, and that which has the Predicate of the Question for its Predicate; and here the Predicate of the foregoing Enunciation is still made the Subject of the following, till we come to the Conclusion, wherein the last Predicate is attributed to the first Subject.

§ 2. This way of Reasoning is commonly call'd a *Sorites*, as being a heap of Syllogisms laid together; but (it plainly appears) not without Order and Connexion; and therefore it might rather be term'd, a Chain of Enunciations, wherein the following do (*qu.*) take hold of the foregoing, and all together draw after them the Conclusion: And here every immediate Connexion should be either Self-evident, acknowledged, or otherways confirm'd; and besides this, every Predication must respect the Subject reduplicatively, *as it is such*.

§ 3. And thus it is in that Instance, *Rom.* 8. 29, 30. Those who are fore-known of God (as being so) were predestinated; These (as such) are call'd; These again (as being so) are justified; And finally, these (as such) are Glorified; and therefore those who are foreknown of God are sure to be Glorify'd by him.

§ 4. The Force of this kind of Argument lies in that every following Term is connected with the foregoing directly and according to its Nature, not Obliquely and by Accident; as when they say, he that drinks well (meaning largely, and to Excess) Sleeps well (and even here is no certain or direct Connexion); he that Sleeps well, thinks no Evil; He that thinks no Evil is a good Man: *E.* He that Drinks well (as before) is a Good Man.

§ 5. A Sorites (or Chain of Syllogisms) is resolvable into a Train of common Categorical Syllogisms, as in *Rom.* 8. That *the foreknown of God, are sure to be glorify'd* is thus deduced and Confirm'd. The Justify'd are sure to be Glorify'd; but the foreknown of God are justify'd: *Ergo*, The foreknown of God are sure to be Glorify'd. Now 'tis taken as sufficiently Evident, that *the Justify'd are sure to be Glorify'd*: And that *the foreknown of God are justify'd*, is thus made out, the Call'd are Justify'd; but the Foreknown of God are Call'd: *E.* These are Justify'd. That the Call'd are Justify'd is here suppos'd to need no Proof, or to have been prov'd, or to be granted: That *the Foreknown of God are call'd*, is thus evinc'd, the Predestinated are Call'd; but the Foreknown of God are Predestinated: Therefore the Foreknown of God are also Call'd. Now 'tis here suppos'd, that neither of the two former Enunciations requires any Proof, and therefore, that the whole Argument is finish'd, and the Point first intended sufficiently evinc'd, *viz.* that the *Foreknown of God are sure to be Glorify'd*, since the Justify'd are sure to be Glorify'd, the Call'd are certainly Justify'd, the Predestinated certainly Call'd, and the Foreknown certainly Predestinated.

§ 6. When there are only two Enunciations to infer the Question 'tis what may be call'd a *Simple Categorical Syllogism*, in which a new Term, brought for Proof, is placed with the Predicate of the Question, or *Major* (because commonly the larger) Term in the *Major Proposition*, which is usually first plac'd, and suppos'd to be so always by the Rules commonly given; the same New Term is also put together with the Subject of the Question (or *Minor Term*) in the *Minor Proposition* or Assumption.

§ 7. The Middle Term is as a kind of Measure, which must agree to one Term of the Question at least, and being apply'd to the other Serves to shew the Agreement or Disagreement of the Subject and Predicate; which do in such sort and so far Agree with each other, more or less, and also more or less certainly, according as they do both Agree with the Middle Term; or else they disagree one of them from the other, according as one of them is disagreeing from the middle Term, in such respect wherein the other is agreeing thereto.

§ 8. And as this new assumed Term is subjected or predicated, the Syllogism is said to be in this or that *Figure* according to the Memorative Verse.

Subjice, pre; bis pre; bis sub; pre, sub dato quartæ.

Which may be thus rendred in a sort of *English Hexameter*,

Subject, pre; twice pre; twice sub; pre, sub to the fourth
give.

The Meaning is, that the middle or assumed Term should be made the Subject of the Major Proposition, and Predicate of the Minor in the first Figure; that it be Predicated in both for the second Figure; twice subjected in the third; and that it be first Predicated then subjected for the fourth.

This last concludes as well as the rest, tho' ordinarily that manner of placing the middle Term, be not so well suited to the common way of Speech, and therefore appears unnatural, and is usually said to be indirect, whenas some sort of Matter will as little bear to be put into some other of the Figures, so as to appear Natural and Direct.

§ 9. We are commonly, tho' insensibly led by the Matter of the Question, and Usage of Speech to form our Argument, in this or that Figure, into which it falls more readily, and it might seem that the first Figure, if we alter the placing of the Premises, putting the Minor Proposition first, would be more easie and ready than the ways of placing now us'd in the Schools: Thus the Subject of the Question would lead, and the Predicate follow after, as they do in the Question it self, and the Middle Term would be repeated in the Middle Place betwixt them: As in the Instance here giv'n,

Some Troubles do us Good;
What do's us Good is Good:
E. Some Troubles are Good.

§ 10. This way of Arguing is made up partly of the first Figure, and partly of the fourth, the Middle Term [doing us Good] being so Subjected and Predicated, in reference to the Terms of the Question, as is requir'd by the first Figure; and yet first Predicated, and afterward Subjected, as the fourth might seem to direct. The only Fault, which I have observ'd in this way of placing the Premises (*i. e.* those Enunciations from which the Conclusion is drawn, and which are wont to be put before it) is, that *The Proposition*, which is the Foundation of the Argument, is made to follow the other.

§ 11. In the Instance before given, [*What do's us Good is Good*], is indeed the Principle or Position from or upon which we Argue, and therefore might seem to Challenge the first place in the Argument, and yet in common Discourse and Writing, it is generally placed last by way of Reason; thus, *Some Troubles are Good; for that is so, which do's us Good:* Or thus, *Some Troubles are Good; for they do us Good.* In the former, the Minor Proposition is Understood, in the latter the Major: Nor are both the Premises wont to be express'd, either in Discourse, or Writing; since the Mind is best pleas'd to have somewhat imply'd, and left to it to supply, and that the fewest Words are best, so they do but sufficiently convey the Sense.

§ 12. In Argumentative Discourses, where any Proposition appears very Questionable, it may be oftentimes convenient immediately to subjoin its Confirmation by way of Reason in the Procedure of our Discourse: This Method of Reasoning some call an *Epichirema*, as giving a Proof out of hand, and by the way, as in the following Argument,

That which is not absolutely Good, is not to be absolutely desir'd; for we should not so desire what *may* do us Hurt:

But outward Prosperity is not absolutely Good; for it may do us Hurt, as in making us Proud, Secure, &c:
E. Outward Prosperity is not to be absolutely desir'd.

§ 13. But if we should transpose the Premises putting the Minor Proposition first; the *Technical Words* invented to express the Quantity and Quality of the three Enunciations in a Syllogism, must also have their two first Syllables transpos'd, unless they should happen to have the same Vowel, as in *Barbara*, *Daapti*, and *Barbari*, the Design of which, together with the rest, will be shewn, when we come to speak of the *Moods*, or Modes and Ways of Arguing, which will hold in the several Figures.

§ 14. But

§ 14. But the long fixed Custom of the Schools will scarce admit a New Manner of placing the Premises, unless it could insensibly slide in; I shall therefore content my self with that which has so long obtain'd; and taking the Memorative Terms of Art as I find them, shall shew the Grounds upon which they stand, also what other Modes might be in some Cases at least Conclusive, and what may serve instead of them all.

C H A P. V.

§ 1. **E**VERY of the Three Enunciations in a Syllogism of whatsoever Figure must be either Affirmative or Negative, and they are accounted Particular, or Universal, according as the Subject in them is taken Particularly or Universally; to this last the Total or Singular, and what is properly Indefinite must be reckon'd, as being of a like Nature with it, and to be directed by the same Rules and Measures: As to an Enunciation, which is undetermin'd only in Expression, it must be accounted according to its true Intendment, either Universal or Particular, as was shewn, Part II. Chap. 17. § 10.

§ 2. The Predicate of each Enunciation, is always suppos'd to be *Universally* taken, if deny'd; and *Particularly*, when affirm'd; so that in this latter Case, it ought to have a Note of Universality added, if it be Universally design'd, as it may be in attributing a Property, and must be in giving a just Definition, or a right Description, for these ought to be made Universal when the Proposition is Converted, and such Predicate put in the place of the Subject.

§ 3. Now where the affirmed Predicate is thus Universally taken, the Argument will certainly admit of being otherways form'd, then according to the usual allow'd *Moods*, or *Modes*, which are express'd for brevity, and for the sake of Memory by certain Artificial Words, wherein the *Vowel* of each Syllable shews whether the Enunciation, to which it relates (as being in the usual placing 1st, 2d, or 3d,) is to be (in the Figure to which that Mode belongs) Affirmative or Negative, Universal or Particular, understanding them according to the Memorative Rule, thus,

*Afferit a, negat e; verum generaliter ambo:
Afferit i, negat o; sed particulariter ambo.*

Which may be thus given in *English*,

A do's affirm, and *E* deny;
Both Universally:
I do's affirm, and *O* deny;
In Part, Uncertainly.

§ 4. The allowed Modes of the first Figure (wherein the Middle Term, is subjected to the Predicate of the Question, and Predicated of its Subject) may be remember'd by the Technical Words in the following Verse,

BARBARA, CELARENT, DARII, FERIO, to
Sub, and *Pre* :

Those of the second (wherein the Middle Term is Predicated of both the Terms of the Question) by a like sort of Words in this,

CESARE, CAMESTRES, FESTINO, BAROCO,
to twice *Pre* :

Those of the Third (wherein the Middle Term is subjected to both the Terms of the Question); and also the Modes of the Fourth (in which the Middle Term is predicated of the Predicate, and subjected to the Subject of the Question) may be more easily call'd to Mind by the Artificial Words in the three following Verses,

FELAPTON, DISAMIS, DATISI, BOCARDO,
FERISON,

Give with *DARAPTI*, to twice *Sub*: But to *Pre*, and
Sub,

BARBARI, CALLENTES, DIBATIS, FESPAMO,
FRESISOM.

§ 5. In and by the Memorative Terms it may appear, that in the first Figure the Minor Proposition is Affirmative, and the Major Universal: In the 2d, that one of the Premises is Negative, and the Major Universal: In the 3d, that the Minor is Affirmative, and the Conclusion Particular: In the 4th, that when the Major is Affirmative, the Minor is Universal; when the Minor is Affirmative, the Conclusion is Particular; and that the Major is Universal, when the Question or Conclusion is Negative.

§ 6. Now whereas it's commonly said the Enunciations must be so and so (as in the Technical Words before mention'd), and that there can be no more concluding Moods in such respective Figures, it must be understood to be so upon the foremention'd Suppositions, as to the quantity of the Predicate; for otherwise, where this is universally Affirm'd, there may be (*E. Gr.*) such a Mode as *ITALI* in the first Figure; thus,

I- } *Aliquod Trilaterum est Equangulum;*
 TA- } *Omne Triangulum est (Omne) Trilaterum;*
 LI, } *E. Aliquod Triangulum est Equangulum.*

In *English* thus,

I- } Some Three-sided-Figure has Equal Angles;
 TA- } Every Triangle is every Three-sided Figure:
 LI, } Therefore some Triangle has Equal Angles.

Other Modes might, no doubt, be instanc'd, which would conclude in such or such peculiar Matter; but it is granted, that only these first mention'd will hold, at all Adventures, in whatsoever Matter.

§ 7. It may farther appear in the Technical Words before, that in any Figure whatever, if the Premises be Particular or Negative, the Conclusion is also so, following what they commonly call the Weaker Part; and also that the Premises are not both of them Particular or Negative.

§ 8. The Foundations of all these Canons and Rules (so briefly compriz'd or secur'd in the Memorative Words above) are such as these,

1. That the Middle or New Term must be the self-same; and therefore must be once at least Universally taken: And so it was in the New Mode [*ITALI*] when it was said, every Three-sided-Figure, tho' it were Affirmatively said, of Triangles; and had it been understood only *some* Three-sided-Figure in the Minor, as it was express'd in the Major, it might then have meant two distinct things, and so they might have been two differing Measures: And therefore,

§ 9. A Middle Term, if it be twice particularly taken, cannot ascertain any thing about the Terms of the Question, which are severally Measur'd by those, perhaps, differing Measures: Whenas if you take a Number of Measures, and be able to say, that *all* of them agree (*i. e.* every, or any one of them agrees) to *This*, and *some* of them to *That*, it must then be certain that the self-same Measure agreed both to the one and to the other, and consequently that they were both alike in that Respect.

§ 10. 2. The

§ 10. 2. The Middle Term must agree to one Term of the Question at least, else 'tis not at all to the Purpose, nor can shew either their Agreement or Disagreement; for tho' it be the self-same Measure, yet if it agree not to either of the things Measur'd by it; they may be equal or unequal, like or unlike, for any thing which thence appears: And therefore one at least of the Premises must always be Affirmative.

§ 11. 3. To conclude an Agreement of the Terms, *i. e.* to prove an Affirmative Question, or infer an Affirmative Conclusion, the same Middle Term must agree to both, so that both the Premises must be Affirmative, where the Conclusion is so; And *this* must be such, when both of those are such. On the other hand, to infer a Negative Conclusion, the Middle Term must agree only to one Term of the Question, and therefore one of the Premises must be Negative, and always where one of them is so, the Conclusion must be so too; because, that which agreed to one of the Terms did not agree to the other; and therefore, neither must *they* agree in such Respects. But from two Negative Premises, nothing can be concluded any more, than from two Enunciations, wherein the Middle Term is twice particularly taken.

§ 12. 4. The *Medium*, or Middle Term, must Agree or Disagree to the self-same Terms, and those respectively so understood in the Premises, as they are in the Question or Conclusion: But they may be taken with a differing Quantity, so it be not more largely than they were taken in the Premises; for the less may certainly be concluded, where the larger might: *i. e.* we may safely Conclude that of *some*, which we might of *all*, provided they be taken on both hands *Materially*, not *Formally*, as *some*, or as *all*; if *Barbara* in the first Figure do conclude, so must *Barbari* in the same, tho' it infer not *all*, which might be infer'd.

§ 13. 5. A Predicate when deny'd, is always to be understood Universally, and in its full Extent; for we do not indeed deny this of that, unless we deny every Kind and Sort, as has been shewn, Part II. Chap. 17. § 5.

To those Grounds of Categorical Argumentation, which have been Specify'd, it is commonly added by Logicians, who take notice of the Quantity of the Predicate, as a safe Supposal; that,

§ 14. 6. A Predicate when Affirm'd is taken Particularly, and *so* at the least it always is, but may in some Cases be understood (as it hath been shewn) Universally. It is in like manner suppos'd for the greater Security, that,

§ 15. 7. One of the Premises must always be Universal; yet in some sort of Matter, both may be Particular, as appears by this Instance,

Aliquod Nutritivum est Panis;

Aliquis Panis est Durus;

E. *Aliquod Durum est Nutritivum.*

In English thus,

Somewhat Nourishing is Bread;

Some Bread is Hard:

Therefore somewhat Hard is Nourishing.

And thus we might have a New Mode [FILII] of the 4th Figure; and another which we might call [SIMILIS] of the 2^d, only by inverting the Minor, thus, *some hard thing is Bread*: But here it falls out, that in the present Matter, the affirmed Predicate *Bread* in the Major is universally taken for any Bread whatever; and it must be own'd. that, according to the more usual way of Speaking, it should rather have been said, all Bread is Nourishing; yet it holds as truly, tho' not so Naturally the other way.

§ 16. A Syllogism must be right as to its Form, in whatever Mode or Figure, tho' not allow'd in the Schools; if we make but sure to compare both the Terms of the Question, with the self-same Middle Term; *so* joining them by Affirmation, as they both agree with it, or disjoining them by Negation, as one of them disagrees in that Respect, wherein the other agrees.

C H A P. VI.

§ 1. **W**E have seen the Grounds from which the several foremention'd Rules may be demonstrat'd: and upon which so many of the 64 possible Modes are rejected, as either not concluding or not so regularly. That there might otherwise be 64 in all, may easily thus appear *A* (importing an universal Affirmative Proposition) might be follow'd by *A*, *E*, *I*, or *O*, importing such or such a Minor Proposition

position or Assumption: And again, *E* might be follow'd by *A*, *E*, *I*, or *O*; so likewise *I* and *O*: Now all these would amount to 16 several Combinations in each Figure; and therefore to 4 times 16, or 64 in all:

§ 2. If we would alter the placing of the Premises, so as to put the Minor Proposition before the Major, the Number of Modes might be doubled and encreas'd to 128: But even of the 64 above Specify'd the far greater part is rejected, some upon one, some upon others, of the forementioned Grounds; so that they are reduc'd to four in the first Figure, as many more in the second, six in the third, and five in the fourth; amounting only to 19 in all. The pursuing and demonstrating of these Matters might be a good Exercise, and may be seen at large in *Ans Cogitandi*.

§ 3. In that Treatise there is recommended one general Rule for discerning the Goodness of a Categorical Syllogism, without having recourse to the mentioned Terms of Art, or the Logical Canons imply'd therein, viz. by observing whether one of the Premises contain the Conclusion, and the other shew, that it do's so by applying it:

God Commands us to Honour our Rulers;

But Queen *Anne* is our Ruler:

E. God Commands us to Honour Her.

Here the Major Proposition contains the Conclusion, as the Minor shews by applying it to the Queen; for She being our Ruler, God Commands us to Honour Her in Particular, whilst he charges us to Honour our Rulers in General.

§ 4. But we conceive it may be a Direction of somewhat clearer Import, or at least of farther Use, that we should see to the Truth of the Premises (whether they be both express'd, or one of them imply'd) and likewise observe whether the *Medium*, or that assumed Parr, which is not in the Conclusion, be once at least extensively taken, and really have that Identity or Diversity, in reference to what is truly design'd in the Conclusion, which by the Argument is pretended or suppos'd.

§ 5. Now in the forementioned Proof, that we should Honour Queen *Anne*, it will be found, that both the Premises are in themselves true, and we may likewise observe, that *Rulers* or *Ruler*, which are the *Medium*, being not mention'd in the Conclusion, are indeed identify'd, as the Argument Supposes; with what is truly design'd in the Conclusion: For first, *all our Rulers* in General are identify'd with such as God Commands us to Honour, or are the same whom God Com-

mands us to Honour: And then *our Ruler*, or one of our Rulers in Particular, is identify'd, or is the same with Queen *Anne*, so that upon the whole, for God to Command us to Honour all our Rulers, *i. e.* each of them, is indeed the same thing, in other Words, as to Command us to Honour Queen *Anne*, who is, at least one of them: And to say, *we should not depend upon what is uncertain*, is in some Sort the same thing as to say, *we should not depend upon Ancient Oral Tradition; since it is uncertain.*

§ 6. Upon this way of Identification it appears, that an Argument must be good (whatever be the Matter or Manner of it otherways) where the Term or Terms, which are not in the Question, are or may be *truly* and *fitly* Substituted instead of the Principal Subject, or Predicate, or both, which are in the Question.

§ 7. In order to the right Application of this Rule, we must observe, that what is of the same Kind, and at least once taken in its full Extent, or what is duly related to the Principal Terms of the Question, with a just Correspondency likewise to the rest, or to what is incidental in it, may be fitly substituted: As if discoursing of what is hard and brittle, and of its being melted; I should say, Experiment shews, that what is so (*i. e.* somewhat that is so), may be melted, and that this appears by the instance of Glass.

§ 8. The Proof here is good: For it may be observ'd,
(1.) That tho' Experiment be mention'd in the Question, yet that was not the Point treated of, but incidentally brought in.
(2.) That *somewhat hard and brittle* was the Principal Subject, and a Capacity of being melted, the Principal Attribute.
(3.) That Glass may be *fitly* substituted instead of something hard and brittle, as being somewhat of that Kind.

§ 9. And (4.) That Glass is also *truly* substituted *here*; for it can be truly said of Glass, that it may be Melted, and (5.) It is here taken once, at least, Universally, for all Glass is hard and brittle, and indeed may also be Melted: And Finally, (6.) That the Substitution is in a way of Correspondency to Experiment, both in Point of *Fitness* and *Truth*; for it appears, by Experiment, that Glass is hard and brittle, and also, that it can be melted.

§ 10. A double Substitution may be us'd as a Compendious way of Arguing, which contracts two Categorical Syllogisms into one *Enthymeme*, or the Question with its Confirmation, thus it may be said, God Commands us to Honour Queen *Anne*: For he Commands us to be subject to the Higher Powers (*i. e.* to each of them). Now one of these

these Powers (included in the general Word) is fitly Substituted instead of *Queen Anne* (the Principal Subject in the Question) as being of that Kind ; and also *our being Subject* is fitly put instead of *Honouring* (the Principal Predicate), that being one way at least of Honouring ; there is also a true Connexion betwixt each of the substituted Terms, and the other Term of the Question, to which they are not substituted ; and finally a Correspondency to the incidental Proposition, in that our being Subject to the Higher Powers, as they are describ'd, *Rom. XIII. 1, 2, 3, &c.* is there commanded of God.

§ 11. Now this contracted Argument may be form'd into an Hypothetical Syllogism ; thus, if God Command us to be subject to *such* Higher Powers, he Commands us to Honour *Queen Anne* ; but he Commands us to be Subject to *such* Higher Powers : E. He Commands us to Honour *Queen Anne*.

§ 12. The same contracted Argument may be drawn out into two Categorical Syllogisms in this Manner, *such* Higher Powers as those described, *Rom. 13.* are by God's Command to be Honour'd ; But *Queen Anne* is *such* : E. She is, by God's Command, to be Honour'd. And to Confirm the Major, those we are by God's Command to be Subject to, are by his Command to be Honour'd ; But *such* Higher Powers, we are, by God's Command, to be Subject to : Therefore *such* Higher Powers are, by God's Command, to be Honour'd.

§ 13. Thus we see how, at least, some Hypothetical Syllogisms of four Terms, may yet be reduc'd to Categorical at twice, tho' not at once, and of this I shall here add one farther Instance, in the following Argument ; *The Sea does not boil ; for the Fish in it are not boil'd.* Here is now a double Substitution upon the Ground of a fit Relation, *viz.* of the Fish in the Sea to it, and of being boil'd to boiling.

§ 14. This Argument may be made Hypothetical, thus.

If the Sea boil, the Fish in it must be boil'd ;
But the Fish in it are not boil'd :
E. The Sea it self do's not boil.

§ 15. The same Argument may be drawn out into two Categorical Syllogisms in the manner following,

What boils, must boil that, which in it is capable of being boil'd by it ;

But the Sea does not boil that in it, which would be capable of being boil'd by it :

E. The Sea do's not boil.

To confirm the Miner,

The Fish in the Sea would be capable of being boil'd by it, if it boil'd ;

But the Sea do's not boil the Fish in it :

E. It boils not that in it, which would be capable of being boil'd by it.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1. FROM what has chiefly respected the Manner of Arguing, I now proceed to some general Remarks about the Godness of Proof, as it depends rather upon the Matter than the Form or Disposition of the Argument, in which Regard it has been found very various, and yet equally Conclusive, tho' not equally clear, but certain it is, that our Mistakes do generally arise from mistaken Positions, or a mistaken Application of such as are right in themselves.

§ 2. In judging therefore of Argument, our chief Business is to see, that the Position on which it is Grounded, be true in it self, and really to the present Purpose (i. e. to the Point most immediately in hand); which may be in some Measure estimated by what has been said about Identification and Substitution: And this seems to be the most Natural and ready way to determine of a Proof, without having recourse to other Logical Forms and Rules. This duly us'd and apply'd, might serve for the detecting of fallacious Arguments; but to give what farther help I can, it may be of Use, that we should briefly touch upon some Principal Heads, whether of *Sophistical*, or of *mistaken* Arguing. And,

§ 3. 1. From unstated or ambiguous Words or Phrases: As when we pass without our own Observation, or without Notice given to others, from one Sense of such Words or Phrases to another; as if one should Reason thus, *the love of Money is the Root of all Evil*: Therefore it is not at all to be desir'd; for whatsoever Measure or Kind of desire there may be,

be, it doth still proceed from Love to the thing desir'd : Now Love is here differently taken, for the Natural Affection, either irregular or regular, in the latter place ; when as it was intended of Inordinate Affection in the former.

§ 4. 2. From a Proof, that goes beside that which is the very Point in Question, and do's rightly conclude only as to somewhat relating thereto. This Sophism or Mistake, is commonly call'd, in Logic, *Ignoratio Elenchi*, as missing, that which is the Point on which the Question turns ; as if in arguing for the Overthrow of Popery, one should go to disprove the Doctrines of Transubstantiation, Purgatory, &c., instead of shewing that there is no decisive Power in Matters purely Religious vested by Christ in any Man, or Number of Men, which if it were, must presuppose an Humane Infallibility, and might bid fair towards the warranting of Persecution (or what some will call only Prosecution) for Conscience sake.

§ 5. Or Suppose, to prove Diocesan Episcopacy, it should be shewn, that there was anciently a Bishop over Presbyters in the same Congregation ; or where they had however one Altar ; i.e. one place only within such a District for Celebrating the Lord's Supper together, tho' they might meet sometimes in several places for other parts of Divine Worship : Or suppose in arguing for or against the Baptizing of Adult Persons only ; no Proof should be brought to shew, either that there were or were not Instances of Baptism deny'd or delay'd, 'till the Children should become Capable of making their own Profession ; and this, for that very Reason : Whenas this is the Point upon which the Matter turns as to Scriptural Instances. To detect this Fallacy or avoid it, the very Point in Question should be carefully sifted out, and separately stated from what is not in Dispute.

§ 6. 3. From a Proof, which supposes the Matter in Dispute, as if it were evident, or had been before prov'd. This they call *Petitio principii*, or begging the Question. Thus many take it first for granted, All should be of one way in Religion, or that they can't otherwise Live quietly, or Consult together ; but that even Civil Affairs must undoubtedly suffer in the hands of such, as have some different Sentiments in Matters of Religion : And thence would pretend, that either all must be forc'd into one way, or all but one sort be excluded from Publick Affairs. Nor is any thing more common then for some to speak of *Orthodox* Principles, as fit to be maintain'd and encourag'd, presuming still their own to be such, without giving sufficient Proof, or considering that another

another may think himself Orthodox; and that he is as capable of proving it.

§ 7. 4. From Causes ill assign'd: Thus what truly springs from Self-confidence, as if we were our selves Infalible, and from a selfish persecuting Spirit, which, together, make up *that* of Popery, is commonly ascrib'd to the difference of Sentiments in Religion, and brought as an Argument, that they are not to be tolerated: Nor is any thing more common than to assign what is only an Occasion, as the proper Cause of this or that.

§ 8. 5. From partial and imperfect Views, or incomplete Enumerations: When Men first presume such and such Parts make up the Whole, or that the Matter must be either so or so; and then conclude accordingly; whenas there may be some part over-look'd, or some omitted Case, and the Truth may happen to lie there.

§ 9. 6. From what is only accidental, and not arising from the Nature of the thing; Suppose, that the Passions are wholly to be Eradicated, as being Perturbations; whenas they are not absolutely or necessarily so; but only when they are not duly govern'd. Thus some cry out against the other Sex, or against Wine, or Money; because they prove hurtful, when they are not right in themselves, or not regularly us'd.

§ 10. 7. From what is well put together, to what is ill divided; or from what is well divided to what is ill put together: God indeed justifies the Ungodly: Our Lord made the Blind to See, &c; but not whilst they are or were such: Unbelievers shall not see Life, but the Wrath of God abideth on them; yet it doth not therefore hold, as to the Persons, when once they are no longer Unbelievers.

§ 11. 8. From a limited Sense, to what is larger or absolute: As if we should say, an *Ethiopian* is White, in respect of his Teeth; therefore he is simply White; such a Man is Learn'd in some few Points or Parts of Literature; therefore he is a Learned Man.

§ 12. 9. From some to all; whenas a few Instances will not certainly conclude a general Point; nor indeed will many, whilst there may yet lie out of sight some Exception to it; but it is very Natural for Men (as the Great Lord *Verulam* has observ'd) to hasten into general Determinations, before they have thoroughly enough survey'd particular Instances. Of the like kind is an Argument from a Part to the Whole, without shewing that there is a like Reason of both: As that because a thing may be well done once, or rarely, or upon

upon Special Occasion; therefore it may be done constantly, or frequently, or without such Occasion: Or because some Part and Points may be comply'd with; therefore the Whole of what is requir'd in this or that Case; and on the contrary, because this or that may not; therefore nothing may.

§ 13. 10. From the Reason of Things in this or that Particular Case, to what is allow'd or forbidden by Law in such Case; or from what should be in Reason (as we think) the meaning of the Law, that therefore its meaning is actually so; whenas the Letter must chiefly be follow'd in stating the Intendment of a Law.

§ 14. 11. From a Similitude or Parable, to argue beyond what the Likeness or Scope will justify: Whenas they ought rather to be first reduc'd to some general Position, and that to be made the Ground of Argument. And yet,

§ 15. 12. There may be a Fallacy or Mistake in pretending, or supposing a difference of Cases, where there is none, as to the Point in hand. This Men are apt to run into, when they are press'd with unanswerable Argument, couch'd under a Similitude; and which (it may be) could not have been so well express'd another way.

§ 16. 13. From a true Consequent to the Truth of the Antecedent, whereas Truth may follow from Falshood, tho' this cannot from that: As if it should be said, Learning makes Men Contemptible, Ignorance is Learning. *E.* Ignorance makes Men Contemptible. Where the Conclusion is really true and well infer'd, but very ill prov'd, because the Premises are false: So if we should say, Angels are Excellent Creatures; Men are Angels: *E.* Men are excellent Creatures: Or, whatever can be broken may be melted: Silver can be broken. *E.* It can be melted; and this being true; therefore Whatever can be broken, may be melted, which is nevertheless False.

§ 17. 14. From some Point or Punctilio being false, to take Advantage of denying the Truth join'd with it; this may indeed be done without downright Falshood, but oft it is not so consistent with Candour: And in Arguing, it may be very dangerous to the Point we would maintain, for that when we wholly deny a Proposition, as if it were altogether false, we give an Advantage to the Opponent, to make it out against us, in the Sense wherein it is True; and so in Appearance to carry his Cause against us: We should therefore be very careful to deny only with distinction, where a Proposition is in some Sense true.

§ 18. 15. From bad Proof to the badness of the Cause, whenas all that can be that way infer'd is only, that the Point is not well made out by such Argument, and yet may nevertheless be true, and otherways well prov'd; unless the Argument brought were Fundamental, and indeed the only Foundation on which that Point can stand; as in the following Case: What is of a positive Nature in Religion, not being put upon a Reason in the thing it self, ought to have a positive Institution, either express or imply'd, either more immediately from God, or from those who are Authoriz'd by him for such Purpose: If therefore nothing, which can be brought of *that* Kind will hold, other Arguments will be all in vain; suppose it were, that this or that has been an Ancient Usage in the Church, or has generally obtain'd, &c: when these and the like, are but a kind of Secondary Proofs, which may do well by way of Accession, and as a sort of Buttresses; but need somewhat more Fundamental to make them firm and Valid.

§ 19. 16. It may be of good use (finally) to observe how Men are often carried wrong, (1.) By unexamind *Appearances*, (2.) Insufficient *Authority*, (3.) Uncertain *Report*, (4.) Mere *Antiquity*, (5.) An Espous'd *Hypothesis*, (6.) A Bias of *Interest*. (7.) *Partial Affection*. (8.) *Self-Conceit*: The four last are not wont to be openly profess'd; but are yet the implied Force and Meaning of some less observed Reasoning in the Minds of Men; and carry them perhaps unawares to the searching out all that can plausibly be said for such Opinion or such Actions, and to take it for conclusive Argument.

§ 20. I shall Close the present General with some Remarks, about the differing Nature and Kinds of Proof.

1. What we call Disproving or Confuting, is commonly no other than proving the Contradictory Position, or what implies it, unless it should be where the only Foundation of some Point is remov'd, by refuting the Proof given of it.

§ 21. 2. Proof may be either Probable or Certain, according as the Position, or its Application is, from which 'tis drawn, and when either of them is only probable, it will justify no more than an *Opinion*, that the Matter is so, whether it be bottom'd upon a Reason or Testimony, which are but probable, tho' Logicians do commonly distinguish between *Opinion*, and *Humane Faith*; but there is a sort of Humane Faith justly arising to what they call *Moral Certainty*, when the Matter cannot be tho't to be otherwise, without admitting plain Absurdities: And it is certain that Humane Testimony has various Degrees of *Credibility*, according as the

the *Persons* attesting are, (1.) More or less *knowing* in the Matter, (2.) More or less *Honest*, (3.) More or less *impartial*, and (4.) As they are Originally *fewer or more* in Number, who testify of their own Personal Knowledge; especially if (5.) they be of *differing* Times, Places, Interests and Opinions; particularly, (6.) if they be interested to the contrary; and (7.) if it appear, they have not concerted their Testimony; as it may be reasonably judg'd, where there is a seeming Disagreement, or perhaps a real one in some less material Circumstances, whilst yet they agree in the Main.

§ 22. The firmest Humane Testimony, may give us a *sufficient Certainty*; but most of all, that which is, and fully appears to be *Divine*, by the Nature of the thing testify'd, together with other *concurring Arguments* about it, and amongst them more especially *Miraculous*, or very *extraordinary Works* (not counteracted, or shewing themselves plainly Superior), as also *Predictions* of contingent Events *apply'd* to the confirming of what is declar'd as from God: This Evidence do's or should produce what they call a *Divine Faith*, and makes the Matter no less certain, than if we had the clearest and strongest Reason from the Nature of the thing it self, which would beget (what Logicians call) *Science*; and of which they say, 'tis only a more Evident, not a more certain Assent than Divine Faith; but this has as evident a Reason, as that, tho' not internal to the thing it self, or arising from it: The Ground of Science is Demonstration; and,

§ 23. 3. Demonstration is commonly distinguish'd into that of the *in*, and *ex in* or Demonstration, *that* the thing is so, and *whence* or *why* it is so. The former is all that Mathematicians do commonly concern themselves about: And it may be made from any Position relating to the thing it self, which is certainly true, and well apply'd, tho' it be not drawn from the very Nature and Essence of the thing, but from some or other *Necessary Antecedent, Concomitant, or Consequent*.

§ 24. As to the *Demonstration whence* or *why* a thing is so, it do's not conclude more than *that it is so* (and therefore it should rather be call'd the Demonstration by the *sign* than of it); but only proves it from the Cause and Reason, *why it must be so*, or from the End and Purpose for which it is; thus, *Man is capable of Learning*, because he is Rational: The Chrystalline Humour in the Eye, must it self be void of Colour, as being to admit all Colours.

The former sort of Demonstration gives equal Certainty about the Thing ; but the latter a greater Satisfaction to the Mind, in shewing, not only that it is so, but why it is so, or whence it comes to be so.

§ 25. 4. Proof may be either Compleat or Inchoate, which must be farther carried on 'till it be brought, either, (1.) to a *Self-evident* Point, or (2.) to somewhat *before prov'd*, or, (3.) to what is *commonly own'd*, or at least, (4.) to what is held or own'd by those you would Satisfie : But the two last ways of Arguing, do not properly make out the thing ; but are only fitted to convince *such* Persons whilst the thing may perhaps be false.

5. It is either Single or Complicated ; and it must be complicated in a Multitude of Cases, wherein several Arguments to the same Point must be taken together, as not being any of them sufficient alone, which may appear in the Account a little before given of Divine Testimony : Again,

6. It may be direct or indirect, as when we shew the Absurdity of the contradictory Point ; or that the Matter cannot reasonably be taken any other Way.

§ 26. 7. There is Absolute and Comparative Proof : For we must, in very many Cases, compare the Evidence on both parts of the Contradiction, and take that for Truth, which appears to have the Over-weight after due Examination : And whereas no certain Mark can here be given, which will Universally, or even Generally hold, Men should carefully State and Argue both parts of the Contradiction, and carry the Matter, by Prayer to God, that he would please to guide them in judging which way the Scale turns, or limit them by his Providence.

8. And Finally, Proof may be accounted either Simply or Respectively Good ; Not being perhaps what might be wish'd, but such as can be had or receiv'd ; and may be call'd either Proof to the *Matter*, such as it admits, or to the *Man*, as being adapted to his Capacity, and other Circumstances ; diverse Things, which will be offer'd under the next General, may be here also of Use, and particularly what will be said about Proof, which is purely Rhetorical, not strictly Logical.

C H A P. VIII.

§ 1. **S**OME Points that are to us sufficiently Certain by the Proof we have had of them, yet may not be so to others; tho' the Terms be competently understood: And many, which appear probably true to our selves or others, may need a Confirmation of their Truth, or the Confutation of that appearing Probability: And further yet, some of the more approv'd and confirmed Truths may require various ways of Proof, to suit the various Capacity and Furniture of so many several Persons as are to be satisfy'd; and perhaps also a more abundant Evidence to carry the Mind against an impetuous Stream of Opposition: Our Reason is therefore farther to be directed and assisted,

II. *Rightly to make out what may be fitly suppos'd True, but appears not yet sufficiently Evident, by such Proof, as the Matter will admit, and the Occasion requires.*

§ 2. Proof may be consider'd, either as *Rhetorical* only, or as strictly *Logical*; the former, as 'tis commonly us'd, do's but (*Disere Colores*) Colour Matters with some kind of plausible Discourse, which may give them the Appearance of True or False, Good or Bad: I say, as 'tis commonly us'd, or rather abus'd; for Men might Argue Rhetorically and Logically at once, making the Matter and Form of their Argument Logically conclusive, as well as the Manner and Dress Rhetorically taking: But the very *Topicks* (or Heads of Argument) recommended for furnishing out (*e.g.*) Praise, or Dispraise in Rhetorical Discourse, are some of them plainly Inconclusive; as suppose from a Man's Parentage, Country, Fame, &c.

§ 3. The Institutions of Rhetorick do not indeed usually put us upon chusing such Arguments only, as will hold; nor yet do they allow us to shew where they fail and fall short; but rather lead us to deliver them as altogether Cogent and Valid, tho' perhaps, with a Artificial Insinuation, that we pass them over, or insist not on them; when yet the Design may be to carry Men more effectually by that side-Wind than we could with one that is foreright, or by the Arguments we Profess to lay more stress upon. It may indeed be allow'd, by way of Exercise, to set off a bad Cause as well as we can; and also in the way of serious Business, to give those farther Recommendations to a good Cause, which tho' they

they are not fully Conclusive, yet may be better adapted to the Capacity and Disposition of those with whom we may have to do, than such as are really more Cogent, which yet are by no Means to be omitted, even in such Case.

§ 4. There is no Question to be made, but the truest Logic may well consist with the best Rhetorick, or rather is a necessary Requisite to it: For a just Rhetorical Discourse ought, certainly, to have Strength of Reasoning, as well as Fineness of Expression; but where *this* is employ'd to cover and carry a Cause that is really bad, 'tis the Business of Logic to detect the smooth and plausible, but Weak and Insufficient Proofs of such Harrangues; and by stripping them of their Gaudy Plumes, and reducing them to naked Argument, to expose them to just Contempt. All this while 'tis readily granted that Logic it self allows of probable Evidence in many Cases; but then 'tis to be us'd and admitted only as Probable, nor as incontestable Proof or Demonstration.

§ 5. But leaving Rhetorical Invention, Disposition, and Ornament to Rhetoricians, what I would here endeavour is a more Severe and Difficult Matter, Namely, to put our Reason in some convenient way for the readier finding out, and regular using of proper Arguments. It must undoubtedly be confess'd, that a great and masterly Genius will do more in this, as well as other Respects, without Logical Instructions, than some can ever attain to by them; nor is it here pretended to supply the want of Knowledge and Judgment by Artificial Rules and Helps; but supposing them to be already in some competent Measure attain'd, 'tis hop'd they may be assisted and improv'd by what is here attempted in a more Natural Method, then what I have been able hitherto to meet with in Logical Directions, which are (I think) commonly laid aside, and utterly neglected by such as have gone thro' them; but 'tis hoped somewhat farther may be done in this Matter, tho' not all that were to be desir'd.

§ 6. I shall *first* of all shew, what sort of Positions are not, or are to be attempted, and how far; *Secondly*, It will be briefly intimated, what has been already done in this Essay towards the suggesting of Proof in divers Points, that are of some Importance; *Thirdly*, Some Remarks will be offer'd upon some Principal Forms of Enunciation, in Reference to Proof, which must be made agreeably to those Forms; *Fourthly*, I shall proceed to consider the various Subject-matter of Propositions, and endeavour to State, what sort of Proof they Require, or will admit; and *Finally*, shall shew what Method of Procedure may be fitly us'd towards the finding out of Arguments. § 7. I. To

§ 7. I. To the first of these, we may observe,

1. That it is Labour lost, or worse than so, to attempt the proving what is inconsistent with it self or otherways evidently False, unless it should be merely and professedly for the Exercise of Wit and Fancy, or for trying the Judgment of another; and even this might be very Dangerous or highly Inexpedient in some Cases, and in respect of some Persons, especially in Points of Morality, and Reveald Religion, where Men may be prone to take Infection from a Colourable and Plausible, but Fallacious kind of Arguing: Here 'tis only the contradictory Truths, which if need be, are to be prov'd or confirm'd; I say, if need be; for,

§ 8. 2. What is Self-evident, is not to be attempted: All that needs, or can here, be done for others, is but to open the Terms, or to give the Matter some various Turns of Expression, that it may better shew it self to such as would not otherwise discern its undeniable Evidence. And,

3. We are not at every Turn to be proving what has been well prov'd; for tho' it might perhaps admit of farther or clearer Evidence, yet it would commonly too much Embarrass the Procedure of Discourse, and render some Arguments endless, should we go upon the proving of all that falls in our way. We must generally content our selves with referring to Proof, otherways given of some very Important Points; as, that there is a God, that the Scriptures are his Word; That there is a Providence, a Judgment to come, and a future Life, &c. Nor are great Matters ordinarily to be attempted by the By, least we wrong them by too slight and weak Evidence; but they are rather to be solemnly argued in fit Season; and at other times are to be taken for granted, however amongst those who professedly own them. For that,

§ 9. 4. Confessed Points are commonly to be pass'd over without Proof; tho' even such, where they are of great Moment, are sometime or other to be industriously made out; especially to those, who may have taken them up without Consideration, or upon slight and insufficient Grounds; and so are in danger to give them little Regard, and perhaps to let them go as easily as they took them up. But,

§ 10. 5. Points that appear Doubtful (supposing a Capacity for them, and Concern with them) are chiefly to be attempted, and indeed to be attempted only; for we are not absolutely to undertake the proving of them, unless it were by way of Exercise, as in the Schools, where Disputing is made a Tryal of Skill, and ordinarily of Sharpness and Quickness; rather than Solid Judgment: But all Serious Arguing
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should be either for the Confirmation of what we have already good Reason to take for True, or else an Attempt both ways, as to what is doubtful to discover on which side the Truth lies; instead of undertaking to make out or refute either this or that part of the Contradiction. And,

§ 11. When we are upon that, which is to us Probable, tho' an Attempt may be made for proving or confirming it; yet it should be with due Reserve and careful Observation, as we proceed therein, whether the Truth may not yet lie on the other side; not with a fixed Resolution of going on to prove what we have Undertaken: And indeed it were best not to undertake professedly before others, what appears but Probable; however to undertake for no more than its Probability, and to submit the Reasons upon which we think it so; not engaging our selves farther, than that we may make an easy, safe, and Honourable Retreat.

§ 12. 7. As for what we take to be certainly so, whilst yet there may need the farther Proof, which such a sort of Matter will admit, the Confirmation of such a Point may be more absolutely attempted; nor should we so easily give it up; but when Objections present, which we cannot immediately solve, we should take them professedly into farther Consideration, rather than either yield the Point, or pretend to solve them off hand: in the attempting of which, we may be in Danger to strengthen them by a weak Solution, and to weaken a Cause, which should be maintain'd, and might perhaps, upon after Deliberation, if not by answering the Objection; yet by shewing there is no Necessity it should be answer'd for the supporting of the Matter in hand. But here we should Modestly admit, that we may possibly be deceiv'd, even whilst we cannot well see how we should be in the wrong.

§ 13. 8. As to what we deliberately judge to have been undeniably prov'd, we may yet more boldly attempt, and strenuously endeavour the Confirmation of it, when Occasion requires; and ought to hold it still, tho' neither we ourselves nor others (it may be) can answer all Cavils against it, or clear up all the Difficulties about it; for such a Point ought, nevertheless, to be constantly maintain'd, unless the very Foundations were over-thrown, on which it stood; and indeed the only Foundation on which it could possibly stand.

§ 14. II. As to what help has been already laid in towards the present Undertaking, it may be of some use to observe that in the Treatise thus far carried on, besides a good Number of Principles and nearer Deductions from them, which have been given, several other Positions have been clear'd, which may serve as a kind of Secondary Principles or Deductions for the Proof of many important Truths: And more particularly 'tis hoped Light and Proof may be drawn, in a Number of Questions, from what has been said,

1. About the Nature of our Thoughts, and the Real Existence of Things without us, Part. I. Chap. 1. as also about the various ways of Thinking, and other Matters of Thought in a more Familiar and less Notional way: Chap. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

§ 15. 2. In Relation to Entity, Thing, or Somewhat in General; especially the Creator himself, Chap. 6.

3. As to the various Degrees and Kinds of Created Beings in the fundamental Scale of Things, Chap. 7. which may be of some Use towards our more distinct Apprehending the Terms of the Question, so as to discern what there is of Substance, Accident, Mode, &c. according to the Account there given of them.

§ 16. 4. In Reference to Things, as they do more commonly exist in our Ideas, or in the World; here the Secondary Scale, or that of Resultances may be of use, and will serve to the Questions, which may be rais'd about Combinations, Separations, &c. *Vide* Chap. 8. — 15.

§ 17. 5. The Set of Positions and more immediate Deductions (which are deliver'd, Chap. 16. and in those which follow to the end of the first Part) must be of great and manifest Use for the drawing out of *Arguments*, or closing the Prosecution of them, which if carried thro', must often terminate in some or other of the Positions or Deductions mentioned; and here Somewhat farther may probably start in our Minds, upon considering those Positions, and observing, whether any of them will serve to the proving of what we have in hand.

§ 18. 6. What is said about the right Apprehending of others (Part II. Chap. 1, 2.) may be of Use to make out the Sense we would accordingly put upon their Expressions. And,

7. What is offer'd to direct the right Expressing of our own Intendment (Chap. 3.) may serve to evince the Sense deliver'd by us against any, that would misconstrue our Words.

8. The Set of Enquiries, which are given, Chap. 4, 5, 6. may be very likè to suggest Matter of Argument, when they are apply'd to the Terms of the Question.

§ 19. 9. It may be not only in General made out, that some things are to us Incomprehensible, or Unconcerning; but of what sort they are; and even in Particular, that this or that is so, by the help of what is offer'd, Chap. 7. And, That nevertheless there are some Points, even about those things, of which we are or may be Capable, and with which we are or may be concern'd; as may be made to appear from the Instances given or intimated, Chap. 8.

§ 20. 10. The various Importance of the Things, we are capable of and concern'd with, may be evinc'd by the help of what is deliver'd, Chap. 9, 10, 11. where there are divers Points of Prudence suggested, and so far also made out, as that the proving them more fully, may be no great Difficulty.

§ 21. 11. What is said about single Apprehensions, and the Helps given towards forming them aright, may serve as Arguments to make out those Enunciations, which only draw them out into a more explicate Form; and it is besides the very Fund and Fountain of Evidence in other Cases, for that a Just and clear Apprehension of the Terms in many Questions will shew their Agreement or Disagreement without more adoe; or will, however, often suggest other Arguments which may do it. *Vide* Chap. 12, 13, 14.

§ 22. 12. What is offer'd about right Judging and Pronouncing must undoubtedly help towards the Evincing and Confirming what is so Judged and Pronounced, whether of Enunciations themselves, or of the Subject in and by them, viz. that such an Attribute do's, or do's not belong thereto, as it may, or may not be reducible to one or other of those ten Heads, that shew what sort of Things they must be, which can be rightly affirm'd; and as the Matter of the Affirmative or Negative Positions is agreeable to the Rules and Remarks there given: *Vide* Chap. 15———19.

§ 23. 13. What is deliver'd about Self-evidence, and our Acquiescing therein, may serve to furnish us with Argument in divers Cases, at least, to shew that we do not need, nor should attempt to give farther Proof; and it may also help us upon good Reason to reject what some would perhaps obtrude upon us as Self-evident, when yet it do's not answer the Account given, Chap. 20.

14. The Danger of Mistake, and its Importance, as they are stated and shewn, Chap. 21, may afford Argument for the doubtfulness of such Matters, as also for our using great Care about them, and insisting upon very good Evidence and Proof in relation to them.

§ 24. 15. What is said about estimating Proof, and assenting accordingly may suggest Reasons, why we or others should, or should not, admit what is offer'd as Evidence to this or that Point; as also why we or they should be thereby carry'd thus far, and no farther in our Assent; and it may likewise afford some Assistance towards the finding out of proper Arguments, so far, however, as to put us in the way of enquiring after *such*, and that we may more readily discern them upon the first Appearance; nor yet be impos'd upon by a meer Appearance: But it must very plainly guide us in the way of using such Arguments aright in this or that Form, and Caution us against the fallacious and insufficient ways of Arguing, which are mention'd in the preceding Chapter.

C H A P. IX.

§ 1. **A**Ccording to the differing Make and Manner of Enunciations, the Attempt or Undertaking to prove them may import a differing Aim and Design: Now that this may be more distinctly apprehended, and closely attended to, it may be of use in the next place.

III. To offer such Observations about some of the various Forms of Propositions, as will shew what kind of Proof they require, or what is the very thing we have to do, when we go to prove this or that sort of Enunciation. And,

§ 2. 1. In an Hypothetical, or Relative Proposition, where there are two Enunciations conjoin'd or disjoin'd, our Business is not to Prove or Disprove either of them, but only their Conjunction or Disjunction: And we are here to consider, what there is certainly Antecedent, Concomitant, or Consequent to the Fundamental Point, which necessarily infers the other; or what is any way belonging to *the latter*, which presupposes *the former*: But to evince that there is no Connexion of the two Enunciations, we must either, (1.) shew, by way of Induction, that there is nothing certainly appertaining to the foregoing Enunciation, which does necessarily infer or presuppose the following; or else (2.) That

there *is*, or at least *may be* somewhat belonging to the one Point, which cuts off the Consequence, or the Presupposal of the other.

§ 3. *E. Gr.* If there be a God, there is a Providence; for he certainly has that Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, which do together infer it, since his Wisdom must unquestionably Direct, his Power enable, and Goodness incline him to manage and take Care of the World he has made: But on the other hand; tho' there be a Providence (or Divine Management), which must be, as God himself is, Powerful, Wise, and Good; yet this do's not necessarily infer the present and open rewarding of Good Men, or punishing of the Bad; since there may be a Secret or Future Reward and Punishment sufficient to render the whole Conduct of Affairs taken together suitable to the Divine Wisdom, Power and Goodness.

Tho' the Sea be Brackish, its Fish must not therefore be Salt; for the brackish Water of the Sea do's not necessarily enter, as an Ingredient, into the Composition of the Fish; but the Saline Particles may be separated in Concoction or otherways.

As to the Proof of such Enunciations, some farther Light and Help may be drawn from what has been said of them, Chap. 1. § 10, &c, of this 3d Part.

§ 4. 2. As to Disjunctive Propositions, first of all the Disjunction it self, whether of the Subject or Predicate, or of both (if need be), is to be made out or attempted by shewing, that it is Proper and Full, or at least sufficient to the present Purpose; and then each Branch of the Disjunctive Subject is to be essay'd in reference to every Branch of the Disjunctive Predicate, but only some part thereof to be prov'd: And therefore the Disjunctive Proposition is to be resolv'd into single Enunciations, which are to be severally attempted, and some or other of them prov'd, as the Matter or Occasion may require.

§ 5. For the Proof of this, that *E. Gr. Either Gold, Silver, or Lead, are the heaviest Metal, or the basest*, we must shew, (1.) That *Metal* is fitly attributed to each of the Subjects, Gold, Silver, & Lead; for they are all of them Malleable, or may be hammer'd out) and can be Melted; (2.) That *Heavy* may be ascribed to some or other Metals at least; and (3.) so may *Base*; (4.) That the Enumeration in the Predicate is at least sufficient for the Purpose to which it is brought, supposing that the Weight and Worth of Metals were all that was enquired after or treated of; and (5.) The Enumeration, in the Subject of the

Question, is also sufficient for the Purpose to which it is plainly brought ; for that there is a Subject to answer one Member of the Disjunctive Predicate at least, and as here the Matter stands, there is one to answer each of them ; for (6.) Gold is truly the heaviest of Metals, as appears upon comparing its Weight and Bulk together, with those of Silver, Lead, &c ; and (7.) Lead is indeed the Basest, as appearing by Experiment to be more Drossy, and by common Estimate, less valued than any other Metal : But before these two last Points came to appear, or for the assuring of them, it might be attempted, (8.) Whether Silver were the heaviest Metal, and (9.) Whether it were the Basest, as also (10. Whether Gold were the Basest as well as heaviest ; and, Lastly, whether Lead were the heaviest, as well as Basest Metal : And thus all the Points couch'd in the Disjunctive Enunciation would be fully attempted, and so much prov'd as is requisite, or indeed more then is of absolute Necessity.

§ 6. 3. As to Conjunctive Propositions, every Subject must be attempted in relation to every Predicate, and should be prov'd (if need be) to make the Enunciation evidently true. E. G. *Gold, Silver, and Copper are Metals, and us'd in our Current Coin* ; here we must thus proceed, (1.) Gold is a Metal ; for it is Malleable and may be melted ; so is (2.) Silver, and (3.) Copper, for the same Reason ; (4.) Gold is us'd in our current Coin ; so is (5.) Silver, and (6.) Copper, as is well known by common Observation, and thus the Conjunctive Enunciation is prov'd to be true.

§ 7. But if *Lead* had been added to the mention'd Proposition, it would upon the Attempt have appear'd, (7.) That Lead is indeed a Metal as well as the rest ; but (8.) That it is not us'd in our Current Coin, since no good Testimony can be produc'd for its being so us'd ; and upon this single Failure the Enunciation, *That Gold, Silver, Copper and Lead are Metals, and us'd in our Current Coin*, must have been rejected as False, being so put together ; tho' all the Points but one contain'd in it were True.

§ 8. 4. A Proposition that is partly Disjunctive, and partly Conjunctive, must be resolv'd and essay'd according to its Compound-make. If it were said, *Either Glass or Iron is both Malleable and Fusible* (or may be Hammerd out and Melted) ; here is a Disjunctive Subject with a Conjunctive Predicate : And in proving the Enunciation, we must attempt both the Predicates, in Reference to each of the Subjects ; and make it out, that the Predicates are both found together in one of those Subjects : Now in the present Case,

(1.) Glass is fusible, or may be melted; but (2.) it is not Malleable; and therefore, (3.) Both the mention'd Attributes belong not to it: But, (4.) Iron is Malleable, (5.) It is Fusible; and therefore (6.) it has both the Qualities together, as appears by Experiment: We are thus to carry our Proof to all that is Conjoin'd, and only to some part of what is Disjoin'd.

§ 9. 5. A Proposition otherwise compounded is to be resolv'd into the several Enunciations of which it is made up, each of which is to be attempted, and all to be prov'd to make the whole as it stands together a just and measur'd Truth. E. Gr. *Learning is highly to be valued as it renders Men capable of more eminent usefulness*: In resolving such complicated Enunciations, we must begin with what is Fundamental and Principal, proceeding to what lies next it, and so on thro' the whole; as here (1.) Learning renders Men capable of usefulness, as may be prov'd by instancing in several Parts of Learning, & the uses to which they serve; (2.) The usefulness of which Learning makes Men capable, is more Eminent than what they could ordinarily attain to without it, for that it reaches to more and Nobler Purposes than could well be serv'd otherways; (3.) That which gives a Capacity for usefulness is to be valu'd, since Usefulness it self, and the Capacity for it are valuable Things; (4.) What gives a Capacity for *Eminent* Usefulness, is *highly* to be valued, since the more *Eminent* Kind and Degree of usefulness, and of Capacity for it, is *proportionably* valuable.

§ 10. Let it be observ'd, that where there are indeed many distinct Points of an Enunciation, which might be gone thro' and prov'd or attempted, yet it will not be always Necessary or Requisite to take them severally; forasmuch as some of them may be Self-evident, others before prov'd, and others granted, at least by those with whom we are concern'd, and 'tis commonly some one Point only in the Compound-Proposition, which requires to be prov'd or attempted: Now in such Case, *that* must be carefully singled out, and it were best it should be separately stated, as may be more distinctly shewn afterwards.

§ 11. We now pass from the Manner or Form of Enunciations to some Remarks,

IV, As to the Matter of Propositions, according to which the Proof may or must be differing; This will require a larger handling. And,

1. In Reference to the Signification of Words and Sentences the Proof is to be drawn, in the Dead Languages, from their Use in approved Authors, or from the Analogy and Proportion, which they bear thereto; In the Living Tongues it may be farther taken from common Usage, in such Case and Circumstances, or from a more express Agreement among such as may coin new Words and Phrases, or use the old ones in an uncommon Sense.

§ 12. When the Meaning of any Expression is declar'd by what is previously understood or agreed, it becomes a kind of *Postulatum*, or a Demand not to be deny'd, that it be so taken in the present Discourse, at least till there be some fair Intimation given of a differing Intendment by it: And what we here say of Words is to be duly apply'd in reference to other Expressions of the Mind.

§ 13. 2. As to a Man's Tho'ts and inward Sentiments, every one is to be credited, that they are so or so, as he seriously professes, unless there be some apparent Reason to the contrary, either from a Person's general Character, or somewhat in the particular Case, which may render the Profession Incredible, Improbable, or Unsafe to be depended on.

§ 14. 3. As to second Notions, in relation to the first, their Agreement or Disagreement is to be prov'd or disprov'd by the Account given of those second Notions, as it is for Substance generally agreed amongst Logicians; *E. G.* That a *Genus* or Kind is a common Nature, or rather a common Idea, which do's or may agree, to several *Species* or Sorts; the *Lowest Sort* a common Idea, which do's or may agree to divers Individuals or singular Beings: The *Singular* as such, that which neither do's nor can, agree to more then one, so as to be strictly Identify'd with them in every Respect. These Notional Ideas, even when they relate to the self-same Being, under a differing Consideration, are not in themselves the same: Nor is our Idea of the same Divine Nature, *as variously subsisting* in the Father, Son, and Spirit, strictly the same; Neither would the Idea of one Soul, as animating three several Bodies be wholly the same.

§ 15. More directly to the present Purpose, it might here be shewn, that the mentioned second Notions do respectively agree to Living Creature, to Man, and to this or that Man; for that [Living Creature] is design'd to express such a common Idea, as Logicians intend by a Genus or Kind; [Man] such, as they design by a Species or Sort; and [this or that Man] such, as they mean by an Individual or Singular. Now I call Living Creature, Man, and this or that Man *first Notions*,

ous, as being the more immediate Ideas of Things themselves, not farther Notions advanc'd upon such Ideas.

§ 16. But the main and most material Questions, which are more fully to be treated of are,

4. About the Agreement or Disagreement of our first Notions, or more immediate Apprehensions of Things themselves: *E. G.* Whether this or that Particular Being is to be accounted, what we mean by a *Living Creature*, or by *Man*, or by *this or that Man* (suppose *Adam* or *Moses*) Yea or No? Whether this, that, and every other Triangle (that is or might be) have all its Angles together equal to what we mean by two right ones? Whether the taking what is another's, without his Consent, must in every Instance be what we intend by *Stealing*, or unjust and injurious Taking? Whether the Lord Jesus Christ be *God* in a strict and proper Sense?

The three foregoing sorts of Questions we might call *Verbal*, *Mental* and *Notional*; this fourth may fitly be named *Real*, and it requires a much larger handling; we shall therefore proceed upon it in the following Chapter.

C H A P. X.

§ 1. **WHAT** I shall here endeavour, is to direct the Evidence proper to the various Kinds of Questions which may be call'd *Real*; and they are chiefly *Mathematical*, *Moral*, *Natural*, and *Supernatural*; but I shall first observe the more General Affections, whereby some Points are contingent, others Necessary, and that their Proof may or must be accordingly.

1. As to what is plainly of a *Contingent* Nature so as it might be or not be, might be thus or otherwise, our Proof must either stop at *Possibility*, or may often go on to *Probability*, or sometimes farther advance to *Certainty*.

§ 2. (1.) To evince a *meer Possibility*, 'tis enough to shew, that there is no Contradiction, or Inconsistency in the Matter: *E. G.* That the Moon may possibly be inhabited, for there is nothing appears in its Make, or Place, or otherwise inconsistent with its being so: And here it may be fit to begin our Enquiry and Proof in Points, which appear doubtful; but, when we once see the possibility of them, we may then proceed or attempt farther. And,

§ 2. (2.) P. 160

§ 3. (2.) *Probability* is made out by shewing, that there are the *usual* Antecedents, Concomitants, or Consequents of this or that ; That there are Causes fitted and dispos'd so to Work ; Matter fit to Work upon ; proper Means, sufficient Inducements, and the like ; or other usual Marks of Truth, Duty, &c. when a Matter comes to appear probable, we may in some Cases carry our Proof yet farther. And,

§ 4. (3.) *Certainty* is either more *Absolute*, or else what they call *Moral Certainty*, which is altogether sufficient in its Kind. *Absolute Certainty* may be evinc'd by shewing that there are the Necessary Antecedents, Concomitants, or Consequents, Causes, Effects, &c. of this or that ; or that there is an infallible Testimony of it, *Moral Certainty* (as hath been shewn) concludes that it is so or so, either upon Reason, which cannot fail, but in some very rare singular and unlikely Case ; or else upon Testimony, which, tho' it be not Infallible, yet cannot be tho't False without admitting gross Absurdities.

Most Matters of Fact are contingencies, and what is said about them, whether by way of *History*, *Report*, or *Prediction*, must fall under one or other of the forementioned Heads.

§ 5. As to a *Single History of Remote Times and Places*, unless it be Divinely Inspir'd, we must look for little more Proof, than that the Matter carries in it self no manifest Absurdity or Improbability ; and that there is nothing sufficient to the Contrary. Where there are *more Histories* (not extracted one from another) relating to the same Matter, their Agreement in the Main, especially if there be some Circumstances differing, and seemingly disagreeing, may farther confirm our Assent to those Points in which they concur, but more especially if they were written by Intelligent, Honest, and Impartial Persons, in or near the Places, and not far from the Times to which they refer ; it greatly Confirms them, if Publick Records, and the like Authentick Testimonies be produc'd.

Sacred History has yet more to be said for it, as having been so long and wonderously preserved, being attested by such Monuments and Miracles credibly related, and own'd by that very People, on which it do's so often and so highly reflect.

§ 6. The Reports that are given as to *Matters of Fact* of late or present Time, but perhaps distant Places, may admit of sufficient Evidence from Living Witnesses of undoubted Credit, and the Concurrent Testimony of such, who could not conspire together, nor could indeed have any Interest to impose upon us in the Matters they Report ; especially when their Account is given by them separately and apart, in differ-
ing

ing Terms, with somewhat differing Circumstances, and that there is no Credible Testimony to the Contrary.

§ 7. *Predictions* are then put out of Doubt, when they are fulfill'd, at least if they be intirely accomplish'd, not only in their first and Literal Meaning, but in the farther and more Mysterious Import, which some of them appear to have in sacred Writ; in the mean while their absolute Certainty depends upon the Marks they carry with them of Divine Inspiration, as also in the Matter, Attestation, and Tendency of them: What is but Humanly Presag'd or Conjectur'd may yet appear Probable upon the Consideration of the present Posture and Tendency of Things, especially when there are Judgments Impending according to Divine Threatnings, or Blessings assur'd by the Word of God, which yet may not be altogether certain in the very Kind, tho' sure to be fulfill'd in value one way or other.

§ 8. 2. As to what appears to be of a *Necessary* Kind, yet not Self-evident; but that if it be at all, it necessarily is, or if it be indeed *so*, it is necessarily *so*; such sort of Points may be prov'd, or at least are to be attempted from the Nature of Things; and tho' Proof may be otherwise given, yet this kind of Evidence is certainly Preferable, as not only evincing, that the Thing is *so*, but letting us into the Ground and Reason of its being *so*. Now what is *Necessary*, may be either *Absolutely* or *Conditionally* such; and the Condition may it self be either *Necessary* or *Contingent*. And,

§ 9. 1, When the Thing suppos'd, is in it self a *Contingency*, what is necessarily connected with it has only a lower sort of *Necessity*, and may be call'd in a Sense *Contingent*, tho' it be *Necessary* upon the Supposition of somewhat else: 'Tis altogether plain, that the most Accidental Things *Necessarily* are whilst they are; and necessarily are such, whilst they are such; for a Thing can't possibly be and not be, or be *so* or not be *so* at once. Queen *Anne* is *Necessarily the Minister of God to us for good*, while She Reigns with *so Happy a Temperature of Justice and Clemency*; and yet She is not *Necessarily such*, but of *Choice*; since 'tis not of *Natural Necessity*, but from Her Gracious and fixed Inclination, that Her Administration is such: And yet with that Inclination it cannot be otherwise.

§ 10. 2. When the Thing suppos'd is in it self *Necessary*, there is an higher Kind of *Necessity* in what is necessarily connected with it; thus, upon the Admission of a *Trinity* in the God-head, *Divine Honour* will be necessarily due to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as being each of them

them God : And that it must be Necessarily due upon that Concession, appears from the Nature of the Thing, but that there are necessarily those Three in One, appears not without Supernatural Revelation ; yet this appearing thence *to be*, it thereupon farther appears from the Nature of the Thing, that it *must Necessarily be* ; for what God is in himself, he Necessarily is : And upon Supposition, that he is, who indeed cannot but be, he also is most Holy, Wise, Powerful, Just, and Good ; for these Perfections are Necessary to the Nature and Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.

§ 11. 3. What is absolutely Necessary has a Necessity of the Highest Kind, and if such a Point be well understood, it may be prov'd by the most Direct and cogent Reasoning ; as that *God has always been, is, and shall be*, may be thus evinc'd or confirm'd : If any thing now is something always has been ; for nothing could not of it self ever rise into being ; that something now is I cannot doubt, who consciously know, that I my self Act, and am equally sure, that whilst I Act (tho' it were but in Thinking) I am ; for that nothing can't possibly do any thing : And farther, if there be now an Intelligent Being, that Understands and Wills, as I consciously know there is, then there always has been a Being of that Kind ; for somewhat more Excellent could not arise out of what was less Perfect : Again, What could not but be, cannot but still be ; for such Being could not nullifie himself without being Superiour to himself, nor indeed without his Existing and not Existing at once, nor could he be nullify'd by any thing inferior to himself, or but equal, if any such could be.

§ 12. Such manner of Proof may (I think) be call'd Demonstration, tho' it be not of a Mathematical sort, since it leaves no Place for our calling the Matter in Question without running counter to what we cannot possibly doubt of, when we attend thereto : And yet, after all, we may doubt of the Thing so prov'd, suppose the Being of a God ; whilst we attend not to its Evident Connexion with some Self-evident Point ; or it may be observe not the Self-evidence thereof ; as even a Mathematician might Question, Whether the three Angles of a right lin'd Triangle be equal to two right ones, if he had forgot, or whilst he attends not to, the Demonstration ; or retains not the firm and undoubted Remembrance of his being clearly and fully satisfied, when he saw it Demonstrated.

§ 13. I shall now offer somewhat farther as to the sort of Proof, which may be admitted or is requir'd by the Principal

attend only to its having Three straight Sides, and Three Angles, not to its particular Shape or Size; I say, that the Three Angles e, i, a , taken together are equal to two Rights, or make up 180 Degrees, that is half a Circle: For the proving of this, let DF be parallel to GH by Construction, or (which comes all to one) let it be drawn with a like Inclination to the Cross Line BH , or GG , as GH , has; for so DF must be parallel, or not inclining to GH , when neither of them is more inclining than the other to the same Third Line: Now the Angle a is *therefore* equal to α , and i to ι for the same Reason; and the Angle e is equal to ϵ , they being the Vertical or opposite Angles made by the Lines BH , and GC ; for in this Case either of those Angles added to what lies between them (*viz.* e added to α , and so likewise ϵ added to the same α) make up two Rights: But the Angles α, ϵ, ι , are all of them together equal to two right Angles (*viz.* those made by the Line Re with DF , *Vide* Part I. Chap. 5. § 6.) ; and therefore the Angles i, e, a , which have been found respectively equal to ι, ϵ, α , are likewise equal to two Right Angles.

Quod Erat Demonstrandum, Which was to be Demonstrated.

There is yet farther.

§ 16. (3.) Another way of Demonstration, call'd *Algebraical* (which is in a Sort compounded of the Arithmetical and Geometrical): Herein the unknown Quantity in a Question is express'd by some Mark, and therewithal the Work proceeds according to the Condition and Tenor of the Question, till somewhat known is at last found equal to what was unknown: See Part I. Chap. 5. § 7, &c. I shall here add the Algebraical Working of this Question, What is that Number, to which if you add as many, half as many, two and an half, it will just make up Twenty: Put a for the Number sought, $2b$ for 2, and c for 20; then, according to the Tenor of the Question, the Matter will stand thus,

$$a + a + \frac{a}{2} + 2b + \frac{b}{2} = C,$$

And if both Sides of the Equation be doubled, to take out the Division by two, they must be equal still; and therefore,

$$5a + 5b = 2c,$$

And by Transposition, to bring the known Quantities together

ther on one Side of the Equation, it will be

$$5a = 2c - 5b,$$

That is, according to the Numbers for which b and c were put,

$$5a = 40 - 5, \text{ or } 5a = 35,$$

and therefore,

$$\frac{35}{5} = a, \text{ and } a = 7:$$

Now $7 + 7 + 3\frac{1}{2} + 2\frac{1}{2} = 20$: And thus it appears, that there is such a Number as was requir'd, and that the Number 7 answers the Conditions of the Question.

§ 17. There are a few Self-evident Principles, Definitions, and some other *Postulata*, or Demands, to which Mathematical Demonstrations (if completerd) do finally run back, or from which the Points to be prov'd may be drawn by Successive Inferences, as we may shew under the next General Head. Somewhat may be farther seen to these Points, Part I. Chap. 5. § 6.

§ 18. 2. As to *Moral* Questions: We are in these enquiring and determining of what is Good or Bad; *i. e.* Just or Unjust; Right or Wrong: The Proof arises here out of right Principles carefully apply'd, according to the General Reason of Things, with fit Allowance for the differing Circumstances of Persons, Times, Places, as also for the doing a Thing once, seldom, often, wholly, or in Part, &c. which frequently vary the Matter from Good to Bad, or from Bad to Good; only this last is not done, but when that which is superadded, do's either supply a blameable Deficiency, or alter some Point by Reason of which the Matter was before Morally Evil. To take that which is another's without his Knowledge, is not always Evil; for his reasonable Consent may fairly be presum'd, tho' it could not be ask'd, in some Cases, and Circumstances: Here it should be noted, that Moral Good arises only from all the Necessary Causes duly conspiring together; but Evil from whatsoever Deficiency as to what is Right and Just.

§ 19. 3. As to *Natural* Questions, touching the Being, Manner, Powers, Causes, Effects, &c. of Natural Things, whether as they are found in Nature it self, or as model'd by Art; There is here (as well as in the foregoing Matter) plainly such a Mixture of Things unknown with what we know; as makes a very great Difficulty of Reasoning in many Cases:

Cases: For Physical Questions we had need be furnish'd (as the Great Lord *Verulam* has shewn) with a large Natural History of Observations and Experiments carefully Made, and faithfully Reported; and also with no small Skill to Argue rightly from them, as the same excellent Person farther shews in his *Novum Organum*.

§ 20. In such Questions we must, (1.) Use our own Senses according to the Dictates of Rational Observation and Experience; (2.) We must give Credit to knowing and Honest Persons in the Regular Use of theirs; yet taking great Care how far we follow them in the Credit they may have too freely given to others: And (3.) We should search out what there might be singular in the Experiments from which we would Argue, and we must make fit Allowances in our Reasoning from them.

§ 21. 4. As to *Supernatural* Questions, which may be call'd in the strictest Sense Theological, we must make Supernatural Revelation our Ground, judging what is so by the surest Marks we can, and Reasoning thence in dependance upon the Divine Aid in a regular way, but especially in our Reasoning about such Points as we can less comprehend.

C H A P. XI.

§ 1. SOME farther Assistance may be given in the present Matter by offering somewhat,

V, As to the *Method*, which may be us'd in order to the finding out of Proof and carrying it on 'till we have brought it to what is Self-evident, or to what is already made out, or at least to what is confess'd: And we may here,

1, Observe whether the Question Propounded be not plainly such, as cannot, or need not, be argued; or else whether it is only to be attempted; or that the Proof of it may be undertaken: *Vide* Chap. 8. § 7—13:

§ 2. 2. We should carefully determine and State, what is the very Point in Question, to which we should direct our Attempt or Undertaking: And in doing this,

3, It will be of Use to narrow the Question, as far as the Matter and Occasion may well admit; so that, having less to prove, it may be the easier and better made out, and our Point more thoroughly secur'd, whilst the Lines of Defence are not too far enlarg'd: Yet nothing must be left out of the Question; which is Necessary to what we would attempt or maintain in relation thereto.

§ 3. 4. We may then observe (if such Help be needful to us) whether the Point in hand, or any of its Parts, or any thing relating thereto, be touch'd on in this Essay, or Discours'd else where; And briefly, what may be found here or any where to put our Tho'ts a working, when they are at a stand, and to give some Light and Assistance towards our Reasoning about the present Matter. Some will commonly need to Read and Consult, as well as to Consider. And it may sometimes be requisite to carry the Subject and Predicate of the Question thro' the *Topicks*, or Logical Heads of Things and Positions; Taking in what Light we can about it from the ways of Thinking, Part I. Chap. 2. and from the other Matters of Tho't, Chap. 3, 4, 5; Remarking also what there is of Substance, Accident, Mode, Mode of Mode, &c. in the present Case: What of Combination, Separation, Relation, &c; And Finally, what Alliance the Question in hand may have with any of the Principles or Deductions, Chap. 16. &c.

§ 4. What has been here directed, is to be done by those who have real Occasion for it, not to put them off from Thinking, but rather to lead them into it, and help them in it, by bringing such a Variety of Things and Notions under View, which can scarcely fail to suggest somewhat, that may set the Mind to Work and carry it on, till it meet with what may fitly serve our Purpose: Yet it is to be done, not so much in quest of Particular Arguments, as to give us a better Acquaintance with the Terms of the Question, upon a just and clear Apprehension whereof, Arguments will commonly present and offer themselves, or it may be there may need no more to make out the Point: But where there is Reason and Occasion for Proof, it may be of Use to look also forward

forward into the next General Head, about Inferring; since *that*, from which we can rightly deduce any thing, must be an Argument for it. Farther,

§ 5. 5. We may consider the Manner and Form of the Question in order to the settling what sort of Proof will be requisite in this or that Case, as has been shewn, Chap. 9. But,

6. We are especially to observe the Matter, not only, that we may better know what Proof it is capable of, or may require (as has been shewn) but also, that we may be directed, where and how to seek the previous Requisites to our Arguing such Point, according as the Question may be either *Mathematical, Moral, Natural, or Supernatural*. Nor indeed is it Reasonably to be tho't a Person should ordinarily be able to argue well about the more difficult Points in any of these Kinds, till he has more solemnly studied the Respective Disciplines to which they belong.

§ 6. 7. It may be of Use to go with some Deliberation over the Principal Heads or Kinds of Argument, at least in our Minds, according to the following Scheme, wherein, for the sake of Memory, they are put in measur'd Lines, and under the several Letters of their common Title, *MIDDLE TERMS*, which shew the Connection or Disunion of the Subject and Predicate in the Question; *viz.* that the latter is rightly affirm'd, or deny'd of the former.

§ 7. But lest the Memorative Lines here given, might be of themselves too Dark; the Sense and Design of them is farther deliver'd in the Notes, that follow them, to be read continu'dly with every several Verse, after this Manner,

Mending the *Question's* Phrase, or less convenient State—
Making it, if need be, clearer, shorter and easier to be argu'd.
Measure, apply'd, and so on.—

But there is no Necessity of charging the Memory with any thing more than the Measur'd Lines, when they are once fully Understood by the help of those Notes.

The SUBJECT by these MIDDLE-TERMS
by these claims or disclaims the PREDICATE.

[§ 8] What is here added to each of the foregoing Lines may help to render them more Plain and Useful.

Mending the *Question's* Phrase, or less convenient State. Making it, if need be, clearer, shorter, and easier so be argu'd.
Measure, apply'd, containing; Tale, Weight, Principle. Trying the other Term of the Question by that, which agrees to one.
Instance, what may or must be, shews, in the like Case. What has happen'd once may again: what could not be avoided can't
Induction proves the Whole from all Sorts, Cases, Parts. That must be agreeable to these: vid. C. 3. § 2, 3. In like Circumst.
Disjunction says 'tis *this*; since 'tis no *so*, nor *so*.— This holds, when the Matter must needs be either *this*, or *so*, or *so*, &c.
Distinction clears, or guards by shewing how Points hold. 'Tis neither Clear, nor Safe, to hold, or deny without Distinguishing.
Deductions rightly Made from unconnected Grounds.— What is so drawn must be granted, as that is whence 'tis drawn.
Demands, which fairly claim, that this or that be *so*.— As that such Word be so taken; such a Line or Angle so suppos'd, &c.
Larger proves Less; Like Attributes, Things *so far* like. The greater includes the less of that Kind: Like is made & limited
Law given, or declar'd by Fit Authority.— Hence Lawful, unlawful, indifferent; Duty; Sin; Crime, &c. [by like Attr.
Explained Words, or Things, which to the Point relate. The Word agrees, where 'tis Import'd's: & the Thing, where 'tis Desig.
Terms of each Art are fix'd & proved by their Art. [§ 9] So Logic shews what's a Genus, Mode, &c.,
Tification by Sufficient Evidence.— As by Credible Persons, Authentick Records, Writings, &c.
Experience, What to us, or others hath occur'd.— This proves to us, or them, what we or they have so known.
Experiment well made, and warily apply'd.— It now it has been carefully observ'd, we must cautiously Reason from it.
Reason of Things the same, or some way Differing.— Somewhat like may be infer'd from like Respect, Proportion, &c.
Relation shews its Ground; this, that: Rule w't is Right. What's Right agrees to its Rule. The Relation & its Reason must go to-
Memory, when found, assures what clearly it retains. W't may be said to know, w't we so remember. [Gebber, P. I. C. 12, 13.
Memorials prove the very Facts, or Somewhat like.— These must have been exploded, if these had not been.
Sense; what w't Conscious of, or certainly Perceive. That I think, fear, joy, see, hear, &c., right in the due use of mine ear, &c.
Supposal: whence is drawn what touches the Debate. The Question suppos'd so shew its Adjuncts; or w't may infer its Truths

Claims, or Disclaims
the PREDICATE.]


Much more may be seen in the Scheme of Inferences under the next General Head; which may also serve to the present Purpose.

§ 10. 'Tis not design'd by this placing of the Middle Terms with the Subject and Predicate of the Question, that the several sorts of Arguments here mention'd, are all to be employ'd upon one Point; much less, that they are to follow one another in such Order as they are here set down; yet it has falln out happily enough, that we are hereby minded to begin with the *Mending* of the Question, if there be Occasion for it; and of this somewhat farther may be said, at least by way of Example: And also that we should in the next place carefully see to it, that we have a *Measure* of some of the mentioned Sorts, which is right in itself, and fit for our Purpose, as agreeing to one Term of the Question; and therefore capable of shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement of the other.

§ 11. But the Meaning is by these mentioned Heads of Argument, which may easily be carry'd in the Mind, to lay before it some good Number of the more considerable ways of proving, as by *Instance*, *Induction*, *Disjunction*, &c. that we may not easily miss of finding one or other sort of Middle Term, which may suggest a particular *Medium* for the present Occasion; and that, if the Medium we have taken should lie so remote from one or both the Terms of the Question (*i. e.* if its Agreement or Disagreement therewith be so far disputable) as to require farther Proof, we may then go over the Set of Middle Terms again in quest of another Medium (whether of a differing Sort, or of one, we had taken before) to prove the *Major Proposition*, or *Minor*, or both as there may be Occasion; and thus to proceed, 'till we have bro't the Matter to such an Issue, as that it requires no farther Proof.

§ 12. The Manner of *the Procedure*, as it might in some Case happen, is represented in the following Scheme; wherein the S, which is repeated Five times in a sloping Descent on the left hand, is for the Subject of the Question; and the P so repeated on the right hand, for its Predicate: The oft repeated E stands for that Middle Term, which follows E in the Line [Explained Words, or Things, &c.] § 8, And it is understood to be the Explication or Definition of the Subject, or of the Predicate (either of the *Word* or of the *Thing*) first placed on one hand with the Subject of the Question, and then on the other with its Predicate: But in the next descending Step, 'tis put with the Middle Term D (*i. e.* either Disjunction, Distinction, Deduction or Demand) on one side, and with R (*i. e.* either Reason, or Relation) on the other, to make out one of the Premised Propositions in each of those Syllogisms respectively; the other Proposition being made up of S and D in the former, of R and P in the latter.

[§ 13]
S, the Subject of the Question with its Predicate, P,
may be concluded
from



§ 14. The Middle Term, which is always Repeated in the Premises, is once to be taken in its full Extent, that it may not fail to be the self-same Measure tho' it should be once particularly taken: And, observing

ing this Caution, we may safely place it in the Middle, first as the Predicate of the leading-Proposition, then as the Subject of that which follows; as is done in the foregoing Scheme.

§ 15. The best Method of Procedure in Arguing is to take such a Middle Term, if it may be, as lies so-near either to the Subject, or to the Predicate of the Question (*i.e.* which may be affirm'd or deny'd with such Evidence) as to require no Proof on one Part; that so we may proceed still forward in our Argument, as having only one of the Premises to be prov'd, and thus we shall not need to go back again for the Confirming of the other, as we must, if it were left doubtful. Thus if R, P in the Scheme before, were the Terms of the Question to be prov'd, we might first take M for our Argument concluding R and P from R and M, with M and P; Now let R and M be supposed to need no Proof; To make out M and P, we take S and conclude it from M and S with S and P; and now supposing neither of these to require Proof, the Point in Question is then fully concluded.

§ 16. That Manner of Arguing, which some call the *Socratical* way, uses not any formed Syllogisms; but proceeds by stating, Explaining, and Confirming, as there is Occasion: Yet it do's not less need what Assistance may be given by the foregoing Scheme, or otherwise, for the finding out of proper Argument.

C H A P. XII.

§ 1. **T**HAT the Instructions given, may be made plainer and carry'd somewhat farther still, by the help of an Instance, let us suppose the Question to be, that *Every Man, who has the Nature, as well as Name, being adult and of sound Mind, has the more Immediate Power of Reasoning about Future and invisible Things.* Now,

1. There appears not any thing of Inconsistency or Falseness in the Point, which yet is not Self-evident, but seems to be such as we may not only attempt, but endeavour to confirm.

§ 2. 2. Tho' it be not formally argu'd in this Essay; yet some Light and Help may be thence probably drawn towards the Arguing of it; By reviewing, if need be, the more obvious Account of Things, and the twofold Scale

of Single Terms, with the Set of Principles, and more immediate Deductions, to see what there may be of the Matter it self, in its first and more common Notions; as also what of Substance, Accident, &c; or of Combination, Separation, &c, in the Terms of the Question; and whether there be any Principle or Deduction, which may shew, or help towards the shewing, their Connexion; as suppose it were the Positions (Cr) and (Cu) Pag. 109.

§ 3. 3. The Proposition in hand being plainly compound-ed may be, for the more distinct Consideration of it, resolv'd into the more simple Enunciations, which it implies; as that somewhat has only the Name of Man (suppose a Corps, a Picture, or Statue); somewhat has also the Nature (as a living Man); some such Man may be Adult, and of sound Mind; he may have the Power of Reasoning, and that about Future, and about Invisible Things, and Finally, that in such Case he has the immediate Power. And,

§ 4. 4. Whereas the Mentioned Particulars do chiefly belong to *Natural Philosophy*, largely understood, so as to take in *Pneumatology*, and *Natural Theology*; therefore we may have recourse to those Sciences, to make our selves more fully Masters of the Point in hand: Or rather we should be previously furnish'd with the whole compass of Learning in some Measure, before we go about to argue such kind of Points; Nor are there many besides Mathematical Questions, that are confin'd within one Art or Science only. But.

§ 5. 5. And more directly to the Present Design, we may use the following Method of Procedure: Namely,

1. To observe what is the entire Thing spoken of, and and the whole that is said of it, that we may be sure to know respectively, both what the Proposition says, and whereof it affirms or denys: Now the entire Subject is [*every Man, who has the Nature, as well as Name, being Adult, and of sound Mind*]; And the whole Predicate is that he [*has the more immediate Power of Reasoning about and Future Invisible Things*].

2. To Remark what is Principal and what is Accessory in the Subject and Predicate; here *MAN* and *REASONING* are Principal, as being indeed the Basis and Ground Work of all the rest on either hand.

§ 6. 3. To cast what is Accessory into an Order and Method, noting what sort of Reference the several Appendages respectively have to their Principals. And,

MAN is here set forth, as having, (1.) That *Name*, and being usually signified by that *Sound*, or those *Letters*, amongst us; and (2.) Together with it the *Nature* most usually intended by it, whatever *that* be; And farther, (3.) Such *Age*, as that he may be call'd *Adult*, ordinarily about 14; 15, or 16 Years; and likewise at such *Age* (4.) a *Sound Mind*, or the free Use of his Understanding, the Brain not being craz'd or disorder'd, as in violent Fever-Fits, or by a more continued Indisposition; and finally, (5.) That it is *Every such Man*, of which the Question Speaks, without excepting any one.

§ 7. The like is to be done as to the Predicate: And *REASONING*, as an Act, is here set forth, (1.) by the Matter upon which it proceeds, *viz.* *Future Things* consider'd before hand, as what may or shall be; and *Invisible Things*, whether Future or Present, but not discernible by Sight, or other Corporeal Sense: (2.) By the Source or Spring of that Act, the *Power* of Reasoning; whatever it be, which is, or gives a Capacity for that: And, (3.) This Power has the Attribute of *Immediate*, as it either do's not admit, or at least do's not absolutely need, any thing to intervene betwixt it and the Act. (4.) This Attribute has the Mode or Character of *more* intimating a Comparison betwixt the Power, of which the Question is intended, and some other, which lies farther remov'd from the Act, as (*E. Gr.*) the Reasonable Soul it self, which do's not Naturally enable Men to such Reasoning without the Intervention of a fit Age and Soundness of Mind: (5.) And lastly, *Some* is here imply'd as the Note of Quantity design'd, i. e. *some* more Immediate Power, &c. *viz.* some, or other, not every Degree.

§ 8. 4. To Cut off what serves barely to expound, not at all to limit, the Sense of that to which it is added; and so we may reduce the present Question thus, *Every Man being Adult and of Sound Mind has the more immediate Power of Reasoning about Future and Invisible Things*; only we must heedfully keep to the Meaning which was directed by the incidental Explicatory Proposition, so as not to argue about a *Man*, that has only the Name, as a Corps, Picture or Statue.

§ 9. 5. If there had been any Thing in the Question Propounded inconsistent with somewhat else, it must have been thrown out; and also whatsoever had been altogether Synonymous, or plainly included, were better omitted, than retain'd: if therefore it had been said, *Every Humane Creature, Man, Woman, and Child being Adult, &c.*; the Question ought to have been reduc'd to what it now is; [*Child*] being inconsistent with [*Adult*], and the rest being plainly contain'd in [*Man*].

§ 10. 6. We may (however for the present) leave out such part of the Question, as is plainly carry'd, if we make but out the rest: And thus we might leave out *Future Things*; since it will so naturally follow upon the Proof relating to those which are *Invisible*, that such a Man must be likewise Capable of reasoning about the Future Things, which are here design'd in Conjunction with those that are invisible.

§ 11. 7. We should make sure we are well appriz'd of the very Point in Question; since to and by *that*, Proof must be specially directed: And the rather, because *E. gr.* in the present Case, some Person might possibly design to have it prov'd, that the Power of Reasoning about invisible Things, which every Man being Adult and of Sound Mind is allow'd to have, is indeed the *more immediate* Power, or whether his being well awake, and excited from without, be not yet farther requisite: But here the *Distinction* and *Relation* imply'd may solve and satisfy the Question, for whatever may be said as to Man's being well awake or excited from without, it will still hold, that his being Adult and of sound Mind gives a *more immediate* Power than what he had before in his meer Fundamental Capacity for such a sort of Reasoning.

§ 12. Another might, perhaps, design the same Point, as if he had more appositely put the Question [*Whether the more immediate Power of such Reasoning in Man do's generally presuppose his being Adult and of sound Mind; or whether these be necessary to that*]. In short, almost any Point of the Question before propounded might be unskillfully; or less heedfully, design'd for the very Point in Question; and therefore it might be requisite, if there were Opportunity, to ask what is the very Thing whereof Proof is desir'd or expected: Or else we must judge of that, as we can, by the Tendency of the foregoing and following Discourse, or by the known Sentiments of those with whom we have to do, or by any Circumstances of Time, Place, &c, which may serve to guide us: And if need be, we should accordingly rectifie the State of the Question, as has been shewn in some Instances here; and if there be divers Points in Question at once, it may be commonly best to State and Argue them severally. But,

§ 13. 8. We must pursue the proper Construction of the Question, as it is propounded; where there is no sufficient Evidence of any other Intendment than what is therein express'd or fairly imply'd, and thus the Point in hand will be a complicated Question, made up of the several foremen-
tion'd

tion'd Particulars; § 3, in the order there set down: Our Proof must therefore take them all in, even as far as the Notes of Quantity express'd or understood, if any be. Yet this hinders not, but that

§ 14. We may endeavour the *Melioration* or mending of the Question, by putting it into any Form or Method, which may render it easier to be prov'd: And here, upon considering the *Reason* of Things, we may alter it thus. *Every Man, who has the more perfect use of his Understanding, may reason about Things, which fall not immediately under Sense.* Here we put the common *Reason*, for which [Adult] and [of Sound Mind] were added to [Man] instead of the Characters themselves, and [Things which fall not immediately under Sense] instead of [Future and Invisible] *that* being the common Nature of them, and the Reason of their being mention'd in the Question. For *Invisible* was also so intended as well as Future Things; now this Turn of the Question lies closer and readier for Proof. Or else,

§ 15. We may pursue the Question, as before Propounded under several Propositions, gradually proceeding, till we come up to the whole, as it stands; thus, (1.) The Word [Man] is commonly understood of such a Manner of Being as Adam and Eve were, and their Posterity are, as may easily be made to appear by sufficient *Testification*, or good Authority. (2.) The *Being* intended by that Name has really a Nature endow'd with the Power of Reasoning, as may be shewn from a Number of Middle Terms; not only that it may be so, by a multitude of particular *Instances*; but that it is so, by an *Induction* of both Sexes, all known Ages of the World, with all the Conditions and Sorts of Men; also by *Disjunction*, either Man must have the Power of Reasoning, or be merely acted by some Rational Agent, but he is not so acted; therefore he has *that* Power; And by *Distinction*, for the *Mind*, which is peculiarly the Man, has the Power of Reasoning, tho' the Body has not; and again, by *Deduction*, thus, something cannot spring from nothing; therefore an Act supposes an Agent endow'd with the Power of so Acting; and therefore Man performing the Act of Reasoning, must have the Power whereby he might be capable of such an Act: Now that he performs that Act, and consequently has the Power, may appear many ways, and indeed very plainly by Argument drawn from *Law*, being given by God to Man, that he should govern himself by the Dictates of Reason and Religion; as also from *that*, which is given, or declar'd by some Men to others.

§ 16. That Man has the Power of Reasoning, may be made out divers other ways, as by *Explaining* the Terms *Man*, *Reasoning*, *Power*, according to the usage of those Words, and the Nature of the Things designed by them; and it might be made to appear abundantly by the *Testification* of *Multitudes*, both that the Words are of such Import, and that Man do's accordingly Apprehend, Prove, Infer, &c, which is strongly confirm'd by the *Experience* Men have in themselves, and the *Experiment* they make on others by Discourse, Enquiries, &c: It is also plain by the *Reason* of Things Man must have the Power of Reasoning; since he performs what could not be done without it; and this may be shewn by the *Relation* which Rational Productions have to the Act of Reasoning, and this again to the Power, as Effects presupposing a suitable and Sufficient Cause.

§ 17. Those Rational Productions, which evince the Act and Power of Reasoning in Man, do fully appear, not only by Authentick *Memorials*, and undoubted *Memory*; but also by present *Sensation*, both inward in the Conscious Knowledge Men have of their own Internal Discourses, and outward in their sensible Observation of the External Actings and Performances of others: And if we make but a *Supposal* of the Contrary, how many and great Absurdities would it infer; but on the other hand, how many Suppositions may we easily make and maintain, which will strongly prove, that Man has the Power of Reasoning? *E. Gr.* If he were made after the Image of God, in Knowledge; if he is capable of Mathematical Demonstrations, &c: But in *that* he was made, and of *these* he is Capable, therefore he has the Power of Reasoning.

§ 18. Thus we have brought in most of the forementioned Sorts of Middle Terms; and some at least of the rest might be added, for we might argue, even the present Point from the *Larger* to the *Less*, (or a *Majori*, as Logicians are wont to speak); thus, if Man be Capable of Religion, he certainly has the Power of Reasoning, but the former is true: And therefore so is the latter. Had Man been truly resembled to any Thing, the Likeness might have been shewn by *like Attributes*; or if it had been said, Man is a *Species* of Living Creatures, or that he is a *Combination*, &c, Those *Terms of Art* might have been open'd and prov'd of him from the Account given of them in this Logical Essay; Finally, if it had been said, that Man is not ordinarily Seven Foot high; nor commonly weighs three hundred Weight, but is usually too big to be contain'd in a Quart Pot; or that there are

are more Men in the World than Hairs upon any one Man's Head; there had then been Occasion for *Measure* of differing Sorts: And in the present Case, we may measure the Truth of the Assertion by that known Principle, that where there is the Act, there must also be the Power of so Acting; and finally, that this be taken for granted is a fair and reasonable Demand.

§ 19. Now at length, to proceed yet forward towards the Proposition here undertaken, we must add, (3.) That *the Power of Reasoning in some Men reaches to Future and Invisible Things*, or to what falls not immediately under Sense: And this might easily be shewn by divers of the forementioned Middle Terms, as by *Instance, Induction, Disjunction, Explication, Testification, Experience, &c*: (4.) The mentioned Age of the Man, and State of Mind must, according to the *Reason and Relation* of Things, plainly contribute to carry Mens Reasoning higher and farther, which might be made to appear from divers other Topicks. And,

§ 20. (5.) Mens having the more perfect Use of their Understanding must evidently give them the *more immediate* Power of such higher and farther Reasoning; so that there needs nothing more to intervene as a Power subjected in Man. (6, and lastly) *All* Men whatsoever, having the more Perfect Use of their Understandings have the more Immediate Power of Reasoning about Things which fall not immediately under Sense: This might appear even by *Mathematical Mensuration*, viz. by *Tale or Count*, if we knew but every such Man; and may upon Mending the State of the Question thus, *There is no such Man, who hath not, &c. Or no Instance can be brought of such a Man, who hath not, &c.* Also an *Induction* may here be made, as before, of both Sexes, and all Sorts: And again, it may be prov'd by *Disjunction*, for either *all* such Men have the more Immediate Power, &c, or there is *some* such Man, who needs a farther Power subjected in himself; but there is no such Man, who needs a farther Power subjected in himself; therefore no such Man but has the more immediate Power of Reasoning about Things which falls not immediately under Sense, and particularly about Future and Invisible Things: And thus from most of the Specify'd Middle Terms we might proceed to make out the universality of the present Question.

§ 21. Finally, if these Methods should not suffice, it may be of Use in order to the more thorough understanding of the Question, and arguing upon it, to take up the several Particulars mention'd § 6, 7, in the Order as they there stand,

stand ; and, so far as there is Occasion, to make such Inquiries upon them, as these, (1.) What is the Meaning of the Word, as here it stands ? (2.) To what Thing is that Word affixed ? Where we should take Care to ascertain the Subject more especially by some obvious Mark, which tho' it declare nothing of the Nature, yet fixes the Name to something certain, (3.) What is the Nature of the *Thing*, to which it relates ? (4.) What is there necessarily *Antecedent*, *Concomitant*, or *Consequent*, which may serve to make out the Relation and Consideration, wherein the thing intended here stands ? And, (5.) In Reference to these several Enquiries, we should endeavour to call to Mind what we have observ'd, or Read, or credibly heard ; and, if need be, should not only discourse with knowing Persons about them, but get the best account we can how we may be more fully instructed.

Some farther help towards Proving may be drawn from the General Head about Inferring, which we are next to go upon.

C H A P. XIII.

§ 1 **F**OR the farther Improvement of our Reason, it is to be directed and assisted,

III, *Rightly to infer, so that what is infer'd may evidently appear to be a just Consequence of that from which it is deduc'd ; whether it be immediately or more remotely.*


§ 2. As to the Usefulness of Inferring rightly, and the good Purposes to which it may be apply'd, it is evident,

1. That it must furnish out all Hypothetical Arguments, which plainly contain an Inference or Deduction, that should ordinarily be either evident in it self, or capable however of being prov'd at one Remove by a farther Consequence, which is so ; lest we run into the Confusion, which has been caution'd against, Chap. I. § 10—14.

§ 3. 2. It might in many Cases save the greater Trouble of seeking out Arguments for the Proof of such Points as might be drawn out by Inference ; at least by lengthning the Process thereof. This Method seems to have been aim'd at in Geometry, but is not prosecuted, as perhaps it might be with Advantage ; suppose in some such way as this ; let it be a *Definition*, or *Demand*, that

The Angles made by one right or straight Line falling upon another, so as not to incline more towards one end of it than to the other, are Right Angles :

Therefore, where *such* a Line is taken or supposed *so* to fall upon *such* other Line, the Angles are also to be taken, or suppos'd to be Right Angles: Therefore, if (*E. Gr.*) *eb* is suppos'd to be a Right Line, and *so* to fall upon *cd*, another Right Line, the Angle *f* is then to be taken for a Right Angle, and the Angles *g* & *b*




together for the other Right Angle: Therefore the Line *ab* makes two Angles with *cd*, which are together equal to two Rights; since the Angle *o* contains the Right Angle *f* with *g*, which is part of the other Right, and that the other Angle *b* is the remaining part of it: And therefore the Angles made by *any* Line falling in *any* Sort whatsoever upon a Right Line, must be always equal to two Rights; since they must either be themselves Right Angles, or admit of a Line, which shall divide the greater Angle into one Right Angle, and part of another, and that the lesser Angle will then be the remaining part of the other Right Angle, as it is in the Diagram refer'd to; and would be still, tho' we should suppose *ab* to be a curve Line.

§ 4. To give another Instance of Mathematical Deduction.

Let it be laid down as an *Axiom*, that those Quantities are in themselves equal, which, being severally added to the same or to equal Quantities, make up equal Compounds :

Therefore *so* are *such* Measures, Angles, Figures, Weights, &c; and omitting the rest at present, we may proceed in relation to Angles, thus, Those Angles are therefore equal, which being severally added to the same Angle do on each hand make up two Rights :

Therefore the Opposite Angles made by two Right Lines



crossing each other are equal, since being severally added to the Angle or Angles lying betwixt them on one side, they do severally therewith make up two Rights; as for Example ϵ taken together with a , and e taken together with the same a : Now this has appear'd in the Deduction of the foregoing Section; And thus

whatever was duly infer'd in any preceding Deduction, may be refer'd to, if need be, to make out the Consequence in any Step of one that follows.

In some such manner we might carry on a Deduction, till we bring out the Point, which has been Demonstrated upon this Diagram, Chap. 10. § 15. and somewhat of a like Method might be taken in some Questions, that are not Mathematical.

§ 5. 3. Farther Points of Knowledge may, by Inferring, be gain'd from the more general Principles, and nearer Conclusions, Part I. Chap. 16, 17, &c; as also from whatever else is already prov'd, or justly granted; and the Process may be drawn out from each of those into a manifold Train and Series of Consequences, whereof some may be New Discoveries to our selves or others, and some others of them may be Points happily call'd to Mind, with this Advantage, that they are at the same time confirm'd by their being infer'd.

§ 6. 4. Such a Method of discoursing Matters, if it be rightly manag'd, may preclude and foreclose Opposition; so as to build up Truth, like *Solomon's Temple*, without the noise of Axes and Hammers about it. And,

5. It may serve to lead Persons more easily, and if need be unawares, into the Acknowledgment of that, against which they might be prejudic'd, and ready to Cavil upon whatsoever Argument should be professedly brought in Proof or Defence thereof; whenas in the way of Successive Inferences prudently manag'd, you may, in Effect, carry the Point you have in view, before you mention it, or refer directly to it.

§ 7. 6. Nor can we in this way easily slide, or be carry'd, into any Thing False or Erroneous; if we look but well to it, that the Discourse do really proceed from some indubitable Principle or certain Conclusion by unquestionable Inference or evident Connexion in every several Step.

§ 8. 7. (To add no more) It is a known and approved Method of overthrowing plausible Falshoods to load them with more manifest or acknowledged Falshood and Absurdity duly infer'd from the Tenets we oppose; but then great Care is to be taken, that we fix them only on those Tenets themselves, not upon the Persons, who may perhaps innocently hold them, without discerning whither they tend; or, it may be, without seeing the Consequence, even when 'tis shewn them: And this we should always charitably suppose of honest Men, unless the contrary do too plainly appear; but especially when they seriously profess the Denial, or even Detestation of such consequent Falshoods and Absurdities.

§ 9. As to the matter of Inferring, we may consider what is presuppos'd; what is thence infer'd; the Illation or Inferring, in it self; the particular Ground or Reason of it; lastly, and more at large Rules and Helps for the better performance thereof. And,

1. As to that, from which the Inference is drawn, we may call it the Antecedent; and do here consider it only as presuppos'd; for it is not necessarily laid down as Truth, but may be indeed a Falshood which we are designing to disprove (as has been shewn by the False or Abjur'd Consequences arising from it. There is commonly no more than one Proposition or Antecedent express'd, but there may be sometimes more than one expressly laid down; as if we say, Gold is Yellow, Snow is White, and Grass is Green; therefore Gold, Snow and Grass are divers Things; or therefore they are all colour'd Objects. Now what is presuppos'd, is indeed the Antecedent of an Enthymeme, or one of the Propositions of a perfect Syllogism, the other being understood as we shall after observe.

§ 10. 2. What is infer'd, is the conclusion of an Enthymeme, which might be made a perfect Syllogism: And it may consist either wholly of the same Terms with the Antecedent, but otherwise dispos'd, as in the way of Inversion; or of two Terms, which are both differing from those of the Antecedent; or else of one new Term, together with one taken from the Antecedent, and this kind of Inference is to be hereafter commonly understood, where there is no Inti-

mation given of any other : Now the two latter sorts of Inference may be manifold, even in the first Degree or Step of Illation, much more in the farther Process : For as the same Position may often be infer'd from several Suppositions, or prov'd by divers Arguments ; so, many differing, tho' not contrary, Conclusions may be immediately drawn from the same Supposition.

§ 11. 3. The Illation, or the Inferring of one Point from another, which is usually express'd by [therefore] in *English*, imports the Connexion of the Antecedent and Consequent ; which must always be Necessary, and should be in it self undeniable, tho' the Matter infer'd be, perhaps, only probable ; or, it may be false, according as the Antecedent is ; but the Conclusion however, if false, or if but probably true, must be a Falshood, or a Probability *or necessary following* from such Antecedent ; and it may well be said, there is no Consequence at all, where it is not Necessary, as if we should say some Persons have an Antipathy to Cheese, therefore it must be really hurtful to their Bodies ; now it may indeed be so for that Reason, if they know it, and perhaps if they do not ; yet it do's not necessarily follow from their having an Antipathy to it ; since 'tis highly probable it might be so mixt and compounded with other Ingredients, as to have no ill Effect at all : For that even Poison it self may be made harmless, or indeed useful by being fitly Temper'd and Corrected. Every just and immediate Inference might seem to be altogether Self-evident, since we attend not to any Point as a Ground or Reason of the Consequence ; and yet upon closer Consideration it will be found, that,

§ 12. 4. There is another Enunciation always understood to every Inference, besides that from which 'tis expressly drawn : For there is a Reason or Confirmation of the Inference imply'd, tho' not always observ'd, as a kind of Band or Tie betwixt the Antecedent and Consequent, which as such is involv'd in the illative Particle : And it is indeed the other Proposition of a perfect Syllogism, but such as is commonly suppos'd to need no Proof : 'Tis in the Force and Virtue of this imply'd Enunciation together with that, which is express'd that the Conclusion or Inference is drawn : In the mean while its Connexion with them, or Resultance from them both together, is or should be Self-evident. When we said, Grass is Green, Snow is White, and Gold Yellow ; therefore all of them are Coloured Objects, it was understood (as needing no Proof), that whatever is Green, or White, or Yellow, is a Coloured Object : Or if we infer,
that

that therefore Grass, Snow and Gold are divers Things, 'tis then imply'd, that the things which are of differing Colours are divers Things. Therefore,

§ 13. The way of examining an Inference is to supply the latent Enunciation, and to observe, whether it be indeed a true Axiom; or however some Position, which really needs no Proof (for else the Inference is not, as it would seem, an immediate one); or at least, whether it can be prov'd, for otherwise there is not so much as a distant Consequence in the Case: And altho' we may allow a remote Inference to be good in it self, yet it is not so Proper or Convenient in a continued Series, where every Step should be fully Evident in it self, without the help of an intervening Proof: And so it will be, where the Inference stands upon two Enunciations, whereof *that* imply'd do's no more need a Proof, than *that* which is express'd, is suppos'd to do.

§ 14. For Instance, if it be said, The Shadow of the Earth may reach that Face of the Full-Moon, which is towards us; therefore she may be to us Eclips'd. There is no need to prove (to such as understand the Matter), that the intervening Shadow of the Earth must Eclipse the Moon to us: But if it were said, a Bird may fly, or a Cloud interpose betwixt us and the Moon; therefore she may be Eclips'd, 'tis no Consequence at all, because such Interposure cannot make what we design by an Eclipse: It would not be an immediate Inference, if we should say, the Sun, Earth, and Moon may be in a Line; therefore the Moon may be Eclips'd: For the Consequence needs this Proof, that when they are in a Line the Shadow of the Earth will reach the Moon.

§ 15. What has been said about the way of filling up an Enthymeme, and turning it into a complete Syllogism, may be sufficient to put us in the way of supplying the Enunciation, which is imply'd in the collecting of an Inference; The Short whereof is, that such Term of the Antecedent, as is not found in the Consequent, must be combin'd with *that* Term of the Consequent, which is not found in the Antecedent; and Care must be always taken, that the Term, which thus will be repeated, be at least once taken universally: But if both the Terms of the Consequent be differing from those of the Antecedent; the Antecedent and Consequent are then to be put together in an Hypothetical Enunciation.

§ 16. In the infer'd Inversion of the same Terms, there is always suppos'd some such Axiom as this [if Connexions and Disjunctions of any two Terms be mutual then

they may be inverted]. Thus *E. Gr.* If no Man be a Stone, it follows, that no Stone is a Man: And if every Living Creature have somewhat of free Motion; then at least somewhat, which has free Motion, must be a Living Creature.

§ 17. Let it be always remember'd, that in the way of Inferring, where the Syllogism is not perfected, only one Leg is shewn; but that there is really another, upon which the Point infer'd must stand, and we should therefore look well, that the hidden Leg be not unsound; or that there be not a kind of a Cloven Foot, whilst that, which is expos'd to view, is very firm and entire; for we may reasonably expect, that in Arguing, the best Leg will be set forward to Sight, and the worse, if any be, conceal'd.

C H A P. XIV.

§ 1. **T**HE propounded Method leads us to consider in the last place, and much more largely,

5. Some Rules and Helps, which may direct and assist us to infer, not only rightly, but with greater readiness: And here somewhat may be first observ'd, in relation to the *MIDDLE TERMS* under the foregoing General Head about Proof.

§ 2. Now whatsoever can be confirm'd by any Argument may be also collected from it, and accordingly is in Fact whenever the Argument is form'd, and the Conclusion drawn, which is plainly an Inference from the Premises; and *as such* it is always undeniable, as being necessary and unavoidable in a well form'd Syllogism, tho' the Premises might be but probable, uncertain, or evidently False: For, as it has been suggested, an Inference may be *just* when it is not *true*; e. g. The Sea burns; therefore the Ships in it are all on Fire: Again, it may be also True where the Antecedent is False; as if it should be said, *Jeb* was an Hypocrite; therefore Subject to so great Calamities: And farther, it must always be *consequently* certain, tho' the Antecedent might be in it self uncertain; as all Matter whatsoever is in it self the same; therefore all Bodies are the same Matter variously Modified.

§ 3. It must always be remembered, when we go to infer any Thing as a Truth, from any of the forementioned Middle Terms, That nothing is to be laid down as the Antecedent, nor may be so much as imply'd, but what is true and needs no Proof,

Proof, as being either Evident in it self, or already prov'd or granted, or at least suppos'd; because, that in drawing Inferences, we ought still to go forward, and cannot regularly take up any thing again to be confirm'd, when we have once pass'd it over.

§ 4. All the mentioned sorts of MIDDLE TERMS must plainly afford Inferences, when us'd as Arguments; but our present Question is, what sort of Inferences they will yield; or what kind of Points they are respectively fitted to argue, and the answering of this, will not only subserve our present purpose of inferring, but also that of rightly proving, as it may give us Aim under which Head of the *Middle Terms* we are more especially to seek the Proof of our Question according as the Nature of it may be. And,

§ 5. 1. Tho' in strict Propriety 'tis indeed the Question it self, as it might be less commodiously worded or stated, which is to be infer'd from the same, as better adjusted; yet *this* is rather to be collected from *that*, in order to an happier Procedure, whether in proving or inferring: Since no Man should draw a worse State of any Point from a better, but may well endeavour to introduce a better for the making out, or improving of a worse, when it was so laid before him: And we may sometimes reasonably proceed, as by the way of Inferring from a shorter to a larger State of the Question, or to any way of putting it, which might lie readier for Proof or Inference.

§ 6. 2. Measure or Mensuration must infer or conclude somewhat Mensurable, as being of a Mathematical kind, or however admitting of [more and less]: It will serve to conclude Things *Equal* or *Unequal*, *Greater*, *More*, *Fewer*, *Less*, &c.

§ 7. 3. An *Instance* will at least infer the Possibility, that a thing may be so, and that there is no Inconsistency therein in like Circumstances.

4. From *Induction* may be infer'd, that the whole is of such a Nature, as the several parts are found to be.

§ 8. 5. Upon a right *Disjunction*, we may collect that what is of such a kind must belong to one or other of the Sorts, Branches, or Parts, and cannot properly fall under two or more of them at once.

6. Upon a just *Distinction*, we may infer what is agreeable to the Sense duly stated and reject whatever is disagreeing. Man properly understood is a Living Creature; therefore has Sense, &c: Man improperly taken, may be an Image or Picture, and therefore as such is without Sense, &c.

§ 9. 7. From a *Deduction* rightly made, we may proceed to whatsoever other Deduction can be made according to some Rules, which will be given in the farther prosecution of this General Head.

8. Upon the fairness of a *Demand*, we may collect not only what is so demanded, but also whatsoever is apparently connected with it.

§ 10. 9. From *Law* given, or declar'd by proper and fit Authority, that so the Matter stands, or is like so to issue; that this or that Person is Obnoxious, or Clear, &c.

10. What is *Less* may be infer'd from what is *Larger* and comprehends it: And the *Likeness* of Things from *Like* Attributes belonging thereto

§ 11. 11. Upon a right *Explication* of the Terms of the Question we may collect whatever is imply'd therein, or connected therewith.

§ 12. From a sufficient *Testification*, we may gather either, that the thing is so; or that however the Apprehension of the Credible Persons, who so testify is such; and that it should be either Receiv'd or Disprov'd.

13. From *Terms of Art*, determin'd by the Art to which they belong, may be collect'd, that in this or that Place or Manner of using they are well or ill us'd, rightly or wrong.

§ 13. 14. From *Experience*, that the Matter is possible, and may be so again, or is like to be so in such like Circumstances.

15. From an *Experiment*, well made and stated, that the Cause of such a thing is (at least probably) so, or the Effect such, as appear'd upon Trial.

§ 14. 16. Upon a like *Reason* on both sides, we may so far infer, even from a Similitude; or from some like Case a like Determination; and contrariwise from the Contrary.

17. From *Relation*, that there is a Correlate together with the proper Ground of such Relation.

§ 15. 18. From a remarkable *Memorial*, that there was some Occasion for it, and in all probability such as it imports, whether by its Make or some Inscription, or the general Tradition about it.

19. From certain *Memory*, that the thing was really so, or at least that it so appear'd to us


§ 16. 20. From *Sensation*, that there is somewhat or other distinct from that, which perceives; that it is suited to the Sense by which we perceive it, and is to be accounted such as we perceive it, where there is no sufficient Reason to the Contrary.

21. A *Supposition* may be made of any kind whatsoever, so the Matter be not inconsistent with it self and the Inference thereupon will be generally according to some or other of the foregoing or following Suggestions.

§ 17. What here follows, may be a kind of general Rule for Inferring, *viz.* Things that are under such Considerations identify'd with each other (as being indeed in some sort the same Thing, only diversly consider'd) may likewise be identify'd under any other Considerations belonging to them: If *this*, which is so nam'd be like to *that*, which is so nam'd (i. e. if *it* be the same thing with *what resembles*, or *what resembles* be the same Thing with *it*); then it follows, that what is *here* is like to what is *there*: What is perhaps *bigger*, yet resembles what is *less*: Again, also, that *this* is not *that*, (*i. e.* is not the self same thing with it, tho' it be same with what resembles it, and indeed because it is so): And farther, that what is subjected in this is therefore not subjected in that: What touches this, do's not therefore touch that; yet still the Thing touched by a third resembles that which perhaps is not touched by it: And (to instance no more) that which is, it may be, divers ways unlike is yet some way like.

§ 18. The Sum of the Matter, as to the foregoing Rule, is this, that the Things design'd in the Terms of the Question may be any other way set forth, on either hand successively, or on both at once; so we keep but to the same Things, which were first consider'd so or so in the Subject, and so or so in the Predicate. This may be better conceiv'd by casting our Eye upon the Figures in the Margin, the same which were employ'd for the Illustrating of Proof, Ch. I. pag. 228, &c. where the Terms of Heraldry made Use of, *viz.* OR, ARGENT

&c. are Explain'd: Now let G, H, and J be so many several Bodies just like each other, only differently turned to the Eye; the Sides Mark'd with e, being *Gules*, as the Figure e, e, is;



and those mark'd with *f Vert*, as *f, f* is: The Propositions or Antecedents, from which we would infer, may be such as these, (1.) *G* and *H*, are each of them just like *J*. (2.) *e, e*, has somewhat of Likeness to each of these Bodies; and (3.) so has *f, f*, &c. The Conclusion or Consequences may be such as these from the first Antecedent, *G* and *H* must be just like each other, tho' they appear not so: Things that *shew not* just like each other may yet *be* just like a third: That which shews *OR* as *G*, is nevertheless just like that which shews nothing of *OR* as *J*: And, those which shew no *AZURE* (as neither *G* nor *H* do) are yet just like one that shews an *AZURE-Side*, as *J* do's: Again, The Upper Bodies are just like that which is placed under them; or rather, those which are farther from the Eye, are just like that which is nearer.

§ 19. From the Second Antecedent, *viz.* that the Parallelogram *e, e*, has somewhat of Likeness to the Bodies *G, H, J*, (since they are suppos'd each of them to have one Side *GULES*, as *e, e*, is it may be infer'd, that a mere Surface may some way resemble a Body: And, where nothing of Likeness appears to us, there may yet be some Resemblance: These, and the like Conclusions might also be drawn from the third Antecedent relating to *f, f*: And farther from the two first Antecedents together, we might infer such Points as these, Things that are just like one another, may be only somewhat like to some other Thing: And the comparing of *those* with *this*, can only shew, that they agree so far, not that they are just alike. And whereas the same Conclusion may be drawn from the first Antecedent together with the third, therefore from all the three together it may be collected, that it's all one, whether we compare divers Things with the same, or with those which agree: And that even a mere Relative Agreement may sometimes suffice, tho' the things differ in themselves, as here *e e* is *Gules*, and *f, f Vert*; but they agree in being each of the same Colour with some one Side of the Bodies *G, H, J*.

§ 20. It may be added as a farther General Rule for Inferring, that whatever the *Consideration*, under which the Predicate is taken, do's contain, or has certainly Antecedent, Concomitant, or Consequent to it, may be agreeably infer'd in relation to the Subject, and *that*, under whatsoever *Consideration* belongs thereto: As in the Example before:

G, H, and J are just like each other;

E. Each part of *G, H, and J* respectively are just alike:

Or, One of them easily might be taken for another:

Or, Some Things that are just alike, may appear somewhat differing:

Or, Things just alike are *not therefore* the same:

Or, *G, H, J*, are *therefore not* the same.

The last of these is the Consequence of a Negation; *G, H, J*, being alike, are therefore not the same: That next foregoing is the Negation of a Consequence from Things being just alike to their being the same.

§ 21. I now proceed to some more Special Rules and Helps wherein I shall endeavour to give the more needful and useful Directions, for drawing Inferences, in certain measur'd Lines, or blank Verses (being generally without Rhime) under the several Letters of the Word INFERENCEs; that they may be more easily remembred, and so lie ready at hand to suggest what sort of Inferences may be drawn from Points of this or that Nature.

The Sense and use of the ensuing *Canons* will be more fully shewn in some following Chapters, where the Elucidations are given in the Sections, which are set under their Chapter, and against that Line of the Table here given to which they relate.

§ 22.

Chap. 15.
Section

- I** { Infer what, well apply'd, Sure Points import. 1.
 { Inverted Terms, as meant before, will hold. 2.
 { Included from Inclusive follows right. 4.
 { Imply'd from what implies is justly drawn. 5.
 { Impellible from Inconsistency. 6.
 { Inclind Men are, as their main Course inclines. 7.
- N** { Not infers No—: Nothing, all Negatives. 8.
 { Name, Notion, Nature should together go. 9.
 { Notation opens, fixes not, the Sense. 10.
 { Narrations, not Suspicious, hold for True.

- F** { Form infers Matter; Both, the Thing so Form'd. 11.
 { Foundations by what's Built thereon appear; 12.
 That, of what Sort, and sometimes what they are.
 { Foretold by G O D, Foreknown, and so Fulfill'd. 13.
 { Free] what he will may do; at least consents. 14.
- E** { Effects each other, as before, respect, 15.
 When a Like, Change do's each of them affect.
 { Efficients, Pow'rs, Acts and Effects declare, 17.
 Not only that, but what they were, or are.
 { Efficiency, not barr'd, has Like Effects. 18.

§ 23.

- R** { Right, what agrees unto its proper Rule. 19.
 { Related things infer their Relatives; 20.
 And neither Side, as such, first is or longer lives.
 { Resemblance argues, where the Reason holds. 20.
 { Ratios in various ways Right Points infer. 21.

Chap. 16. Section

- E** { Ends have or seem to have an Excellence. 1.
 { Expedient] what well answers a Good End. 2.
 { Effectual] what nought can, or do's obstruct. 3.
 { Equals, just fit; and have, as such, the same. 3.
 { Exceeding] has, as such, some greater Claim.
- N** { Necessary's from Nature; Will, not forc'd; 4, 5.
 { Neutral sometimes, and absolutely Free; 6.
 Led mostly, but sometimes by mere Necessity. 7, 8.
 { Needless] what may as well be let alone. 9.
 { Never infers a full Eternity. 10.

§ 24.

Chap. 16. Section.

C	Concrete with Abstract; Conjugates agree.	11.
	Contradictorious Turns change False with True.	12.
	Contrarious Things, as such, Contraries claim.	13.
	Conscience must be comply'd with, or convinc'd.	14.
E	Ever] a long full Time, or strict Eternity.	15.
	Existence argues Essence certainly;	16.
	Consistence thence, hence Possibility.	
	Essentials make to be, or to be such.	17.
	Examples teach, warn, lead, convince, excite.	18.
S	So All, what one, as such. Adjuncts and Modes	19.
	Subjects and Substance suitable infer;	20.
	Subsistence this, completed, has: Modes, Acts	21.
	Suppositum [so Reasoning, Person] claims.	22.
	Streams of themselves rise not above their Spring.	23.
	Such in it self more such. No Like, the Same.	24.
	Similitudes infer but what's their Scope.	25.
	Signs have the Sense, which they, who use them, fix.	26.
	Superior Names include Subordinate:	27.
	Subordinate Natures all Superiour join.	28.
	Study'd] well search'd, set, suited, short'ned well.	29.
	Sufficient] should not need, or has Supply.	30.

§ 25. This Table of *Inferences* differs in Design from that of *Middle Terms*, which were to be apply'd more variously, and in such Cases amongst others, where one or both of the Premises might need to be confirm'd by farther Middle Terms; but the Rules and Helps here given for Inferring are intended to be, or to imply so many undeniable Positions or Demands at least, by the Light and Force whereof Inferences may be undeniably drawn in a number of particular Cases; The Position or Demand it self, serving to make one of the Premises; Namely, that which is imply'd; whilst the express Antecedent is such an Application thereof, as is either Self-evident, before prov'd, or granted, or suppos'd, so that we may thence proceed to a farther Deduction without staying to Confirm either of those Premises, on which our present Inference is bottom'd. And,

§ 26. It may be farther noted, that the Meaning of Words is a kind of Demand, which cannot be deny'd us, whilst we only set down what Notion we or others have determin'd to express by such a Word: Divers of these Demands we have intermix'd in the foregoing Table, endeavouring to chuse out some useful Terms, and to give their
Explica-

Explication by way of Sample, leaving it to any, who may judge it requisite, to enlarge the Number.

C H A P. XV.

§ 1. **T**HAT the foregoing Table may be more thoroughly understood, and the Method of Infering farther carry'd on, the Rules and Helps so very briefly suggested are now to be open'd and illustrated in this and the following Chapter. And,

1. The leading Canon in the Table before directs, that we ground our Inference upon some sure and certain Point, such as those which follow are suppos'd to be (to which a Multitude might, no doubt, be added) and that the Point be well apply'd to our present Purpose in the Antecedent; as also that its Import be closely pursu'd in the Consequent or Deduction: Suppose we take it for a Certain and Evident Truth, that, What we reasonably would, others should not do to us, we may not reasonably do to them: Now this would not be well apply'd in the Case of Punishment for Immorality, which a deliberate Judgment and Conscience must disallow, yet it may well be thus apply'd,

We reasonably would, that others should not attempt to carry us, by penal Methods, against our deliberate Judgment and Conscience in Matters that are plainly consistent with Civil Peace:

Therefore, we cannot reasonably do so to others.

And in this Conclusion 'tis plain we infer only what is the manifest Import of that implied Point, by the Light and Force whereof we draw this Inference; thus the first and principal Rule is here observ'd, which we are still to pursue in all that follow.

§ 2. 2. As to *Inversion* 'tis the putting of the Subject in the place of the Predicate, so far at least as may consist with due Form, and with the just Meaning of the Proposition which is to be inverted or reciprocated so, that it may hold good as an Inference from its direct Antecedent: The Ground of this Rule is, that, when two things are identify'd by affirming or diversified by denying one of the other, they must needs be *mutually* the same one with the other, or divers one from the other, according to the Measure or Quantity intended (tho' it might not be express'd)

express'd) and according to the Form and Manner of speaking, which has obtain'd, or which the Nature of the Thing may plainly require: Thus, Man is Rational: *Ergo*, Somewhat Rational is Man, or has the Humane Nature. Glass is not Metal (properly so call'd): *E.* No Metal is Glass, or has the Nature of Glass. Some Living Creatures have Fins instead of Feet: *E.* Somewhat at least, which has Fins instead of Feet, is a Living Creature, or is some sort of Living Creature.

§ 3. In some Inversions, only a part of the Predicate is to be transpos'd, as a Star resembles a Spark: *E.* A Spark resembles a Star; and thus in some other Similar Relations, particularly such as are of a voluntary Nature; for it will not hold, that since *A* is a Friend or Lover of *B*: Therefore *B* is a Friend or Lover of *A*; but even here the Inversion may be rightly made by way of Correspondency, thus, *B* has *A* for his Friend or Lover. Dissimilar Relatives are to be inverted by the Mention of the Corresponding Relation, thus, *Alexander* was the Son of *Philip*: *E.* *Philip* was the Father of *Alexander*; and there is always somewhat reciprocally answering to whatever can be directly Predicated.

§ 4. 3. As to what is *Included* 'tis plain it must follow from what includes it: What is a part of any Negative or Affirmative may be also it self affirm'd or deny'd. If all Men are Rational, then some Men are certainly so: If Gold be the heaviest Metal, a Guinea must be the heaviest Coin of that size; But what is said of the Inclusive Point, *as such*, cannot be infer'd of what is included; nor indeed can any one of the mentioned Points in the Table of Inferences be collected from its Correlate, *formally* consider'd, but only *materially* as the thing which has such a Denomination: A Whole concludes all the Parts; but a Part, being not the Whole, cannot do so: Yet if the Whole be of such a Nature, each Part must partake somewhat of that Nature: Man includes Body and Soul, therefore even the Body has, or is, somewhat that belongs to Man.

§ 5. 4. As to *Implication*, there are several of the more noted Branches belonging to it specify'd under the following Heads: But it was tho't fit to give it also thus in the general to supply what might otherwise be omitted: Now that may be said to imply a Point, which intimates and suggests it to the Mind, by reason of some or other Relation, or Connexion: As if it be now Nine of the Clock, 'tis intimated, that Eight has been past a whole Hour, since it so long precedes Nine.

§ 6. 5. Whatsoever is *Inconsistent* in it self, must needs be impossible both as to its Existence and Essence or Idea : It can neither be, nor be conceiv'd, since the one Part of it denies, and Logically destroys the other. Thus an Entitative Extension without Quantitative (such as the Papists ascribe to the Body of our Saviour in the least Crumb of a Consecrated Wafer) is impossible ; since it must be an Extension without Extension.

But there is also a relative Inconsistency, whence it may be infer'd, that the Thing is impossible to be in such or such Circumstances with which it is inconsistent.

§ 7. 6. *Mens Inclinations* may very justly be collected from what they most commonly Act or Speak, especially when they are left to take their own Course ; but it would by no Means follow, that a Man is habitually Temperate or Charitable, because he may sometimes perform an Act of Temperance or Charity.

§ 8. 7. Every *Negative* necessarily imports, that the Subject is not such in any proper Sort or Sense ; if a Person be not Learned, he must have no sort of Learning usually so call'd : But if indeed [learned] were taken, as it often is, for one that is generally and eminently so ; then the Inference can only be made, that he wants some *such part* of Learning, or *such a degree* at least, as should make him eminently Learned.

8. Whereas *Nothing* neither is, nor has, nor can do, nor suffer any thing ; all that can be said of it, must be Negative, and is in a manner endless ; since every thing whatsoever may be denied of Nothing.

§ 9. 9. The *Name*, if proper and rightly given, infers the *Notion* or *Idea*, which has been affix'd thereto ; and this, if rightly form'd, that the *Nature* of the Thing or Object is in some good Degree corresponding thereto. 'Tis certain those three should go together and infer each other. And tho' thro' the Abuse or Deficiency of Language, and Imperfection of Man's Understanding, 'tis often otherwise, yet the Inference will always hold, that wherever there is *such a Nature*, we ought to have, as near as well may be, *such a Notion* ; and to express it by a *Name*, which may fitly lead to that Notion and Nature : And also, that every Name or expressive Word must have some Notion belonging to it ; and the Notion, some Nature actual or possible, to which it relates.

§ 10. 10. The *Notation* or *Etymology* of a Word, may be of Use for our better understanding both the Name it self, and Nature of the thing, or somewhat about it; yet we are not thence *only* to take our Measures as to either; but rather to understand the Word, as usage has alter'd, enlarg'd, or restrain'd its Import; thus [Protestant] is not whoever do's protest in whatsoever Case; but, according to Usage, it is one, who owning Christianity protests against Popery. An *Inkhorn* is for *Ink*, yet is not always made, as it might at first more constantly be, of *Horn*.

11. Whatever *Narration* is given in History or otherwise, will infer, that the thing was probably so, where there is no Reason to suspect the contrary.

§ 11. 12. There can be no *Form* or distinguishing Character, where there is no *Matter*, or common Nature to be thereby distinguish'd; nor can there be such a sort of Form, where there is no Capable Matter: Yet it follows not that God must have something in his Nature, which is just of the like Kind with ours, but only that we are under a Necessity of so conceiving him: And it seems as if indeed nothing, whereof we have any clear and distinct Idea, could, according to our manner of Apprehending, be without a common distinguishing Nature, and therefore our most simple Notions appear to be indistinct and imperfect.

§ 12. 13. Whatever must, as a kind of *Foundation*, necessarily be presuppos'd to any Point is justly inferred from it; that there are the Necessary Grounds and Reasons of a Thing may be collected from the Thing it self: And as, where there is a Building, we may conclude that there is a Basis or Foundation, and *that* such as is sufficient to support it whilst it stands; so we may conclude there is to every Truth, which is not Primary and Self-evident, some or other Fundamental Reason on which it stands, such as can support it, and that it is never quite overthrown till its Foundation be destroy'd. Sometimes we may collect *what* is the *very* Ground of this or that from the Thing it self; as, If *this* be a Transgression, then there is a Law against it.

§ 13. 14. Tho' it will not always hold amongst Men, or perhaps Angels, that what is *foretold* was therefore properly *Foreknown*, tho' it should fall out accordingly (for it might in them be only a Conjecture; yet it holds in reference to God, that he must have certainly foreknown whatever he foretells; and that it shall always be in such way and manner *justified* as it was foretold or foreknown; whether in a way, which to us appears Contingent, or which is Voluntary. or altogether

altogether Necessary, or made up of these together: As also what is literally foretold, or mystically, or both at once, is sure to be accordingly fulfill'd: And thus it may be collected, that Impenitent Sinners, living and dying such, *shall be destroy'd with an everlasting Destruction, from the Presence of the Lord, and the Glory of his Power*; because this is not only threatened to them, but foretold concerning them; 2 *Thess.* 1. 8, 9.

§ 14. 15. *Freedom* or *Liberty* is most commonly understood as belonging not so much to the Will of Men, as to the Men themselves, who will or chuse; A Man may be well enough satisfy'd to continue with the Company, where he is shut in, and not Free or at Liberty to leave it, if he would. The more absolute Freedom is that of being unrettain'd from acting this thing or that, this way or that, as we please; but such a Liberty falls to the Lot of very few, and in some Sense to no created Being whatsoever; and therefore the Freedom of Creatures is mostly founded in their free Consent to such Restrictions or Obligations, as they are under.

Free-Will, or Moral Freedom seems to be, when the Will stands inclin'd to follow the more deliberate Apprehension, as to what might appear just and right in the Case; and that it ordinarily yields not it self to be carry'd otherways by a present Determination, which is not so duly and impartially weigh'd.

§ 15. 16. The several *Effects*, or various Produce of a like *Efficiency* have the same Habitude and Respect towards each other, which the Things themselves had before the Change so passing on them; whether it were that of Unlike, or Like, Equal or Unequal, Better or Worse, Greater or Less, &c. in respect of each other. Thus, if equal or unequal Numbers have the same Number added or subtracted, they will agree or differ as before; and also if they be multiply'd or divided by the same Number they will still hold the same Proportion to each other; 4 is a third of 12, so is twice 4 (*i. e.* 8) a third of twice 12 (*i. e.* of 24): and also half 4, or 2, is a third of half 12, or 6.

§ 16. Nor will this Rule hold only in Numbers, Lines, Superficies, Bodies, or other things of a Mathematical Nature; but if prudently apply'd, it will serve in a multitude of other Cases: A Learned Man is preferable to a Man unlearned, supposing them otherwise equal; therefore such a Person rais'd to an Estate, or Post of Honour, is also preferable to the other so advanc'd.

§ 17. 17. Where there is an *Effect*, or a New Thing (which before was not), there must be, or at least must have been an *Efficient*; an *Act* do's also infer an Agent, and *Power*, to be or have been: Likewise the *Efficient* and *Power* must be, or must have been suitable to the *Effect* and *Act*, and sufficient to produce them, as being Equal at least, if not Superior to them. Thus *Effects* and *Acts* discover and declare the respective *Efficients* and *Powers*, both, *that they are* or *were*, and somewhat also of their *Nature*, or of their *Character*. Yet,

§ 18. 18. An *Efficient* do's not always produce an *Effect* of its own *Nature* or *Kind* (instead of that it may be much inferior, tho' it cannot be Superior); nor have like *Efficients* always like *Effects*: But the *Efficiency*, or *Energy* and *Force*, together with the *Way* and *Manner* of applying it, must undoubtedly produce *Effects like*, or answering to, it self; and *like Efficiencies* will have *like Effects*, viz. such as shall resemble each other, if there be no sufficient Bar or Hindrance in the way: A more perfect manner of working will otherways bring forth what is more Perfect, and a defective Operation, that which is deficient.

§ 19. 19. Whatever agrees to its proper *Rule* and *Measure* must be in such Sort *Right*: And as such may be infer'd; that is in a Sense *Lawful*, which is according to *Law*; *Just*, which is agreeable to *Justice*, &c.

20. Whatever do's in any *Kind* import *Relation* or *Reference* to somewhat else, always supposes there is somewhat to which it stands related and refer'd: This *Rule* may serve for a general Supplement as to what may be here omitted, in particular, of the *Logical Notions* and *Respects*, under which *Things* are consider'd. 'Tis certain, that no *Relative*, so consider'd, can be without its *Correlate*; and therefore he who is a *Father* has a *Child*; nor was he a *Father* till he had one, tho' he did exist before: Nor are the *Persons*, who survive their *Parents*, any longer to be accounted properly *Sons* or *Daughters*.

§ 20. 21. 'Tis commonly said, that *Resemblances* or *Similitude* do only illustrate and *Explain*, but will not serve as *Arguments* to make out the *Point* to which they are bro't; and 'tis so far *True*, as that there is indeed no reasoning from them, but where there is a like *Reason* on both *Sides*: If *Virgil* be as the *Sun* among the *Poets*; he must far excel the rest; for there is plainly suppos'd a like *Habitude* of the *Sun* to other *Luminarys*, and of a more excellent *Poet* to such as are far inferior; yet it will not follow, that other *Poets*

borrow from *Virgil*, because some other Luminaries certainly do so from the Sun; for here is not a like Reason, since it was never intended to compare *Virgil* and the Sun in all respects whatsoever.

§ 21. 22. The Ratios or Proportions of Things will afford Right Inferences in many various ways of Turning them: As by Multiplication the first and fourth Term will produce what is equal to the second and third (See Part I. Chap. 5. § 8, 9 : The same Proportion will continue, if all the Terms be doubled, or halv'd; tripled, or thirdded, &c; suppose a is to b as c to d , it will follow, that

$4a : 4b :: 4c : 4d$; and that

$$\frac{a}{4} : \frac{b}{4} :: \frac{c}{4} : \frac{d}{4}$$

We may likewise infer by Transposition divers ways, and may see the Reason of the Consequence, if we consider a as the Whole, b as its Part, and also c as another whole, d as its like Part, whether it were an half or third, or any other; and the Truth of each particular Deduction may easily be shewn in particular Instances by putting Numbers of such Proportion (e. gr. $4 : 2 :: 6 : 3$) instead of the Letters :

$a : b :: c : d$; Therefore $a : c :: b : d$;
and $b : a :: d : c$; and also $b : d :: c : a$;
and $c : a :: d : b$; likewise $c : d :: a : b$;
and $d : b :: c : a$; and lastly $d : c :: b : a$;

There are many other Methods of inferring, some of which may be seen in the following Instances, $a : b :: c : d$; therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} a + b : b :: c + d : d, \text{ and } a + b : a :: c + d : c; \\ a - b : b :: c - d : d, \text{ and } a - b : a :: c - d : c; \\ a + b : a - b :: c + d : c - d \end{aligned}$$

Each of these may have their Terms transpos'd, as before, so that the five Inferences may be rais'd to $8 \times 5 = 40$. Also New Terms might be assum'd, and divers Methods pursu'd with them which we shall not stay to mention.

The remaining part of the Elucidations upon what yet remains of the preceding Table of Inferences will be given in the following Chapter, wherein the Fundamental Positions or Grounds upon which the Inference goes, are to be still number'd on.

C H A P. XVI.

§ 1. **N**OW to proceed upon the mentioned Positions.

23. Whatever is propos'd as an *End* is always presum'd to have somewhat in it desirable, and to equal or *excel* the Means which are us'd for obtaining it. This may therefore still be concluded, when a Man is prosecuting any Design, that, if he consider of it, he reckons, it would, when obtain'd, answer his Care, Cost, and Trouble.

§ 2. 24. To make a thing *Expedient*, it must be fitted to reach some really good *End*, and must answer it *well*, that we may not be Losers upon our obtaining it in such a Way; as we must always be in the Use of ill Means, because what can be got by them, will never countervail the Damage we must thereupon sustain in forfeiting the Smiles of Heaven, and perhaps the Peace of our own Minds.

25. *Effectual* Means or Operations are such as reach their *End*; but especially those which cannot fail of doing so, whilst there is no sufficient Power, that can or will oppose them.

§ 3. 26. *Equality* must imply exactly answering; tho' likeness do's not infer exactly like: What is in any Degree greater or less, cannot be justly call'd *Equal*.

27. *Equal's* must needs have, in the Respect wherein they are so, the *same* Parts or Degrees; and also the *same* Things must be equal, or unequal to each of them: Nor is there any Latitude in Equality; Things can't be more or less equal.

28. Whatever *Exceeds* any thing, must have, in that Respect, more or greater Parts or Degrees; but it will not certainly hold, that it must therefore be of greater Weight, or Worth, or Use; yet it must outdo other things in such Regards, as are either included in, or certainly conjoin'd with that, wherein it exceeds them.

§ 4. 29. *Necessity* may some way or other be infer'd from Nature: As, that the Thing or Person is, by means of the Natural Make or Essence belonging thereto, certainly determin'd this way or that: *E. Gr.* Fire has such a Nature as that being put to proper Fuel, it burns; and the Fuel is of such a Nature as to be burned by it, if laid thereto; where there is nothing to obstruct, or over power the Tendency of Nature; and tho' free Agents do not act this or that under

absolute Necessity, yet they may Naturally incline so to act; and, upon Supposition they do act, will be like to do it in such a Sort; from such Principles, for such Purposes, and in such a Manner, as their Natural Disposition leads to, where there is nothing of sufficient Power to carry them otherwise.

§ 5. 30. *Voluntary Agents* (as has been intimated) are not under any proper Force or Constraint in their Actings, but choose for themselves, either more absolutely, or upon such a kind of Choice as the State of the Case affords; and a Man may be said in some sort, willingly to cast away his Goods in a Storm at Sea, who chooses to do so for the Security of his Life: But what we most properly choose, we stand inclined to, in and for it self, without any such Enforcing Circumstances, or however, without being purely moved by the Consideration thereof.

§ 6. 31. There may be in some Cases a mere *Liberty* or *Freedom*, however, according to common Apprehension, where there is indeed nothing at all, or nothing observ'd to incline the Choice this way rather than that; he that acts in such a Case has an Arbitrary Power of doing this rather than that, for no other Reason, but because he will. There seems to be in perfect *Neutrality*, or not inclining either way, the most Absolute Freedom (as if I were offer'd two Guineas just alike, of which I must take only one); but it is not the most Easie or Eligible sort of Liberty, wherein I am put to Act Arbitrarily without Reason to guide me. But,

§ 7. 32. The *Will* (or rather, he who *Wills*) is more generally *led* by some real or appearing Good; nor is therefore the less Free; since its *Natural Liberty* seems to stand in a Man's choosing, as for the present he thinks fit: Tho' there is somewhat more requir'd to a *Moral*, or Theological Free Will, whereby a Man is capable of guiding and governing his Choice according to Judgment and Conscience; so as not to be carry'd by present Appearances and inordinate Affections contrary to his more cool and deliberate Sentiments, and perhaps against his former Purposes or Resolutions.

§ 8. 33. The Will may be sometimes *led* by a kind of *Necessity*, i. e. when we would not chuse what is in it self, and otherwise undesirable, were there not some Circumstances pressing us thereto, as has been instanc'd, for some greater Advantage to our selves or others.

§ 9. 34. Whatever may be *as well* let alone, is most apparently *needless*, and absolutely so; many other Things may be comparatively needless, and *as well* let alone, in order to this or that Purpose; as some at least of the Ornaments of Speech, where a Man's Business is only to instruct.

§ 10. 35. If it be said, this or that shall *never* end, it may be justly collected, that it shall hold not only for a very long Time, but to a proper and *full Eternity*: Thus, *Where their Worm dieth not, and the Fire is not quenched* (Mark 9. 44, 46, 48.) could not hold, if after a long time *this* should be quenched, and *that* should die.

§ 11. 36. Wherever there is the *Abstract*, or qualifying Attribute, there must be the *Concrete*, or qualify'd Subject; and where this is, *that* must always be: He, that has Piety, is Pious: And who is Pious or Godly, must have Piety. There may be Concrete and Abstract, where the Words us'd are not Conjugates, tho' the Sense be of Kin; as if I say, he that has Prudence is a Wise Man. This leads on to another Rule of like Nature, but larger Extent, *viz.* that,

37. *Conjugates*, or Words of the same Stock, have some Agreement in their Sense and Meaning; as being indeed fundamentally the same, but variously Form'd: The most notable are the Abstract Substantive; the Concrete Adjective, or Substantive; the Verb, signifying with Time; and the Adverb some way qualifying and determining the Signification of the Verb, or Noun: And these are link'd together, so that one is wont to draw or infer another; He, who has *Wisdom*, is *Wise*, and *as such*, Speaks and Acts *wisely*.

§ 12. 38. *Contradiction*, or the denying of what is affirm'd, and affirming of what is deny'd, if it be not carry'd up into flat Contrariety, always turns a Truth into a Falshood, or *this* into *that*; since both Parts cannot be at once either True or False: That all Men are Honest is a Falshood; Not all Men are Honest, or some Men are not Honest, is a Truth; but if we should say, no Man is Honest, 'tis more than a Contradiction; and may be as false, as that all Men are so.

§ 13. 39. What is *Contrary* has, *as such*, *Contrary* Affections, Effects, &c: Heat, *as such*, implies Motion; therefore Cold, *as such*, infers Rest: The *former* tends to dilate and separate; therefore the *latter*, to contract and consolidate.

§ 14. 40. What a Man, after just Deliberation, do's in his *Conscience* apprehend to be his Duty; he must do; unless he can come to see otherwise; for he would else condemn himself in that which he allows. Yet Men may be restrain'd from acting injuriously, contrary to the Light, which they may be reasonably suppos'd to have, or very easily might attain; but such Supposal is very cautiously to be made, both as to the Act being really Injurious, and also as to its being contrary to such Light, since 'tis to be made at the Peril of him, who so Supposes.

§ 15. 41. *EVEN* is not always us'd to signify a proper and *strict Eternity*; but sometimes to express only a *long and full Time*, i. e. to the end of some far distant Period. See what has been said about *NEVER*, Numb. 35. § 10.

§ 16. 42. Nothing can *Exist*, which has no *Essence* or Nature to exist; but there may be an Idea or Consistent Nature, which doth not therefore exist: Yet,

In whatever exists, or where there is an Essence, which can be conceiv'd, there is certainly a *Consistency*; for Contradictory Things can neither be, nor be conceiv'd together. And,

43. Whatever Nature is *consistent* with it self, and with what else must of Necessity be, may also *possibly exist*; for to this there needs no more, than that one Part of the Thing do not impugn or destroy another, and that it *may* be consistently with that which *must* be.

§ 19. 44. That may be infer'd as *Essential* to any thing, without which it cannot be conceiv'd, however, not under this or that Consideration: Thus the Soul is plainly essential to Man: And Blackness no less Essential to a Natural *Ethiopian*, as such.

§ 18. 45. What is well *Exemplify'd* is thereby open'd, and easier to be apprehended: Examples of what is Censur'd or Punish'd, ought to warn us; Those of what is Commended or Rewarded, should incline and lead us; both the Sorts may infer, that we should be exci'd and mov'd to avoid the Evil, or follow the Good Example.

§ 19. 46. From one consider'd as *such* an Inference will hold to *all that are such*; (*a Quatenus ad Omne valet Consequentia*); therefore what any One *AS SUCH*, either *is*, or *says*, or *do's*, or *undergoes*, may be concluded of *ALL*, *that are SUCH*.

§ 20. 47. An *Adjunct*, not only infers a *Subject* to which it must belong, but a *Subject Suited* to, and Capable of such an *Adjunct*: Acts of *Clemency* and *Grace*, in strict Speaking, belong to Sovereign Princes, not to Subjects.

48. What has the Nature of an *Accident* or *Mode*, must at the bottom be supported by some *Substance*; and it must be such as is *suit'd* and agreeable to the *Accident* or *Mode*, and that even where the *Mode* may immediately belong only to some *Accident* or *Mode*: Thus, *Liberty*, tho' sometimes ascrib'd immediately to the *Will*, has yet a *Substance*, and *this* (as we have good Reason to conclude) a *Spirit* for its Basis and Support.

§ 21. 49. A *Substance*, which is *completed* and finish'd, or (as the Schools call it) *ultimated*, is said to *Subsist*, as well as to *Exist*, having all that, which belongs to its complete Existence.

§ 22. 50. A subsisting *Substance*, which is otherwise call'd a *Suppositum*, receives the Denomination of whatever the Being has or do's, tho' it may be only in or by a Part of it self: Thus a *Clock* has *Teeth*; tho' they belong immediately to no other Part but its *Wheels*; and it is said to move or go, tho' a considerable part of it stands still; and in that Sense it might also be said to stand, or keep its place, whilst it goes.

51. A *Suppositum*, or subsisting *Substance*, which can *so Reason* as Man do's (i. e. *so*, as to be capable of Religion) is what we call a *PERSON*: And therefore we allow not *Brute Creatures* (tho' they should have some kind of Reason) to have a *Personal Subsistence*: The *Person* receives the Denomination arising from what he has, or do's; tho' it were only in or by a *Part*: Thus the *Man* is said to be *Strong*, when his *Body* is firmly compacted; and to *strike*, tho' he perform it only with his *Hand*; nor is striking usually attributed to the *Hand*, but to the *Man*.

§ 23. 52. As *Streams*, literally taken, rise not higher than the *Spring*, or *Fountain Head*, without external Force; so neither do other Causes produce what is more Noble and Excellent than themselves; if they be not carried above themselves by some Superior Influence; As when Men do certainly predict contingent Futurities; or, in a Sense, perform what is Miraculous: We may be sure there can be no Perfection in any Creature, but there is somewhat equal or higher then it in the Creatour; since there could be no Superior Influence to advance his Work above himself.

§ 24. 53. That, which is *such in it self*, may well be accounted *more such*, than what is so, by vertue of somewhat else. Thus Wine is stronger than the Water, which it makes in some degree strong by mixing with it: And Fire it self hotter than the Red-hot Iron, tho' this burn things more forcibly; Since 'tis from the Fire it has its Burning Quality, tho' inforc'd and strengthen'd by the Solidity of its Matter, when some parts of it are once put into such a Motion.

54. *Likeness*, and even Parity or Equality supposes the things compar'd to be divers in some or other Respect; and tho' they might be the *same* numerical Being continu'd, yet they are diversly consider'd, when compar'd: As the Paper written upon has some likeness to what it was before; but is compar'd with it self under differing Considerations.

§ 25. 55. Parables, Fables, or other *Similitudes* are not to be drawn beyond the *Scope* and Design, for which they were brought: Since no Similitude must necessarily run (as we commonly say) upon all-four; tho' it must indeed have somewhat to stand upon; and so far it may be reason'd from.

§ 26. 56. To get the *Sense* or Meaning of a *Sign* is only to find out what the Person using it intended by it, or how Men have, tacitely at least, *fix'd* and agreed the Import of it. And when this is found there can remain no farther Dispute, unless it were, whether it be a Commodious way for the expressing of such a Meaning.

§ 27. 57. Men have invented general and *Superior Names* and Terms, wherein they have intended to comprize divers others in one; and therefore when the more general Term is us'd, the *Subordinate* are included: Thus, he that speaks of Silver, meaning Silver Coin, is to be understood as comprehending whatsoever pieces are usually Coin'd, Crowns, half-Crowns, Shillings, &c.

§ 28. 58. Every *Subordinate Nature* (viz. that of some lower Kind or Sort, or of the Particulars under them) infers all the *Superior*, or more general Natures, that are directly in the Line above it. *E. Gr.* This particular Shilling has the Nature of Coin, of Silver, of Metal, of mix'd Body, of Matter, of Substance, and of somewhat real and existing.

§ 29. 59. We may conclude, that to be a *well study'd Writing* or Discourse, where the Matter has been *Searcht* and sifted out, as far as well might be; what is deliver'd so *Set*, and methodiz'd, as that one Point may give Light and Strength to another; likewise both the Matter drawn forth and the manner of declaring it, *suit'd* to Persons and Occasions;

Occasions; and Finally, that no more is said than was requisite in the Circumstances, and yet nothing Material omitted, which was so; whilst he that Speaks or Writes has well consider'd what not to say, as well as what to say.

§ 30. 60. That may be justly accounted *sufficient*, which is such, both in Quality and Quantity, that in Reason there needs nothing more, tho' it may be some sort of Men must have more, that it may be Satisfactory or Effectual to them, if indeed any thing would be so: But besides, the Grace or other Provision may be call'd sufficient, which tho' it will need a continual *Supply*, yet has that supply assur'd by Promise, in the regular Use of proper Means.

§ 31. Thus I have endeavour'd to single out, as near as I could, those Rules and Helps for inferring, which might be less Subject to Objections, and of greater Use, out of many more which might have been added, and may at Pleasure be sought in Logicks or other Tracts, which deliver the more general Canons, Axioms, or Principles; but some of them so embarras'd as hardly to carry any undisputed Sense worth our inserting here; yet no doubt but some of those we have mentioned may be liable to some Exception; and many others might be added to good Purpose; but that must be left to other Hands.

C H A P. XVII.

§ 1. **W**HAT has been once well Prov'd or duly Collect-ed, or that is acknowledg'd, or held by others, and indeed all other Matters, are (so far as we can) to be improv'd to some good Purpose: And therefore our Reason is to be guided and help'd;

IV, *Rightly to direct and apply to Use and Service, what ought to be, or is capable of being, so directed and apply'd.* And indeed there is scarcely any thing, of whatsoever Kind, but is improvable to some or other good Purpose; if we set ourselves to consider it, and take in requisite Help for the directing and applying it accordingly.

§ 2. In the General, by *Use and Service*, here is meant whatever may appear, when all things are duly consider'd, to be of Real Advantage in it self, or really tending to what is so: *Rightly to direct* thereto, is to determine justly, both, of what Use or Service this or that may be, and also in what
Way:

Way: And *rightly to apply*, is actually to employ it upon Occasion, so as may best answer that Use or Service.

Now some Things undoubtedly *ought to be* so directed and apply'd, when there is a fair Occasion and fit Opportunity; whereas others may seem to remain at Liberty, and that we are not however so plainly oblig'd, in Point of Duty to God, our selves, or others. But,

§ 3. Sometimes things are capable of serving even some good Purpose, to which they cannot be innocently employ'd, since they cannot answer it, but in a way that is faulty, or, at the best, to be justly suspected: And what might be *lawfully* directed or apply'd, not only to such a Purpose, but in a way, that wou'd reach that End, yet may not always *prudently* be so directed or apply'd; whenas our directing others about it, may be perhaps inconvenient, or the applying it inexpedient, either in respect of the Purpose, which may not answer the Cost, or Time, or Trouble; or else of the way to attain it, which may be inconvenient in it self, or draw some Inconvenience after it greater than the Advantage, which is like to accrue.

§ 4. Having taken this general Survey of the present Matter; we proceed to consider it more distinctly; *First*, as it may be pursu'd more at large, and *then* with particular Relation to this Essay.

Under the former Branch, some Light may be given as to the Course we should take in an Affair of such Consequence and Compass, that we may be able in some Measure rightly to direct and apply Things to their proper Use and Service; also, whither these are to be refer'd, namely, to what Person, or to what farther Purpose; then of what Kind the Use and Service is to be; lastly, and more particularly, what Sort of Things ought to be, or may be so directed, or apply'd, and to what Special Purpose.

§ 5. I. As to the way, wherein we may come to some Faculty of directing and applying things rightly to Use and Service: We shal be in a very likely Method to attain it,

1, If we shall endeavour by continual, fervent, and believing Addresses to the Throne of Grace, to engage the best of Monitors and Helpers for so great a Purpose; even that Spirit, which *searcheth all things*, who easily can, and will (so far as God sees fit), infallibly guide and powerfully assist us, both, in directing and applying every thing to it's proper Service, in the fittest Season, and to the best Advantage. But then, as he requires us, we must join to such Prayer the Use of other suitable Means. And therefore,

§ 6. 2. We should have often in our Mouths, and oft'ner in our Tho'ts, upon every fresh Occasion, that short, but important Question *CUI BONO?* [*To what good End, or for what good Use is this or that?*] which, as it would call us off from many vain Amusements, so it might often serve out of the Eater to bring forth Meat, and to recover somewhat worth our while from the great Devourers of our Time and Tho't: The very Flint, thus struck, might afford both Light and Heat; and even the Rock, so smitten, would sometimes pour out Streams to accompany and accommodate our Passage through this Lower World to that above. And,

§ 7. 3. We could not easily mis of somewhat worth our Pains, if at sometime we would but set our selves more solemnly to answer the mentioned Enquiry, upon some such Occasions, as may be most considerable, either by their Continual Presence, or Constant Returns, or more than common Circumstances.

Our Sins, our Wants, our Natural Faculties, as well as the Poor and Afflicted in this World, are always with us; and if we had well fix'd some Material Improvement, by way of Instruction, or otherwise, to be made upon these and the like standing Occasions; how small soever it might seem, yet as a continual Stream, it would be of unspeakable Service.

§ 8. We have the Anniversary Circle of Spring, and Summer, Autumn, and Winter; the monthly Circuit of the New and Full Moon, with her first and last Quarters; and indeed the daily returns of Midnight, Morning, Noon, and Night; together with the hourly Passing-bell of Time departing from us, for as such we may, not unfitly, consider the striking of the Clock: Now if to each of these, and other like Occurrents, we did but affix some one Instructive Remark, or Accountable Use, how mightily would the Stock be growing still upon our Hands, together with our Skill for the farther Improvement of it! And,

§ 9. To these should be added a more than ordinary Consideration of what is more singular and uncommon, as it may present it self, or is passing within the compass of our Knowledge in the World; whether Abroad or nearer Home, amongst Friends, or in our Families, or perhaps in our Bodies, or in our Minds. And if thus we do, to how great an Amount must it arise, within the Age of Man, or even in some few Years? And in some such way, how probably might we come, as by a kind of Natural Instinct to imitate or outdo the Skilful and Industrious Bee, in gathering the purest Honey, not only from every Flower, but even from the most noxious

noxious Weeds? And of this we may give some little *Specimen* under one of the following Heads: But to finish that we are now upon,

§ 10. 4. We should carefully commit to Memory, or rather if it may be to Writing the more considerable Use and Service of this or that, in order to our reviewing it often, till the Mind should be deeply possessed with it, and even habituated to it, upon such or such Occasion: And thus, whatever is observable Standing or Passing either in the lesser World within us, or in the greater about us, might serve as a Monitor and Remembrancer to us of somewhat useful to be thereupon consider'd, or said, or done by our selves, or to be recommended to others.

§ 11. We proceed in the next place to consider,

II, *Whether* the Use and Service of Things is to be refer'd; i. e. to what Person, or to what farther Purpose: and certainly it should be designed every way, so far as may be; especially for such Persons and to such farther Purposes, as we are more peculiarly obliged to regard. We should undoubtedly do all the good we regularly can; and make every thing, we are concerned with, as extensively Useful as it is well Capable of being, or we of making it.

Now various Persons and Purposes may be serv'd, without Interfering one with another, where they are Subordinate and Subservient some of them to others. or that they are otherwise Connected, or at the least Consistent one with another. Thus,

§ 12. Whatever is a real acceptable Service to the Honour and Interest of God, is so far a Service also to his Universal Church; and even to that Happy part thereof which is Triumphant above, as well as to that which is yet Militating here below against the World, the Flesh, and the Devil: The subduing or weakning of *these Enemies* is an undeniable Advantage to it, and unquestionably pleasing to God, to Good Angels, to glorified Spirits, and to Good Men, so far as they are such and do rightly understand the Matter: 'Tis also of real Advantage to Mankind in general, as well as to particular Societies and Persons, whether they see it or not.

§ 13. He that truly serves the Publick, is really serving his Private Interest too, at least more distantly, and in the Main. A real Service regularly done for a Man's Family, or Friend, or for the Poor, or to Strangers, nay even to Creatures below him, may or will some way or other redound to his Personal Advantage.

Every,

Every one is indeed nearest to himself, and principally charg'd with his own more immediate Concernments; yet it was the Language of an accursed *Cain*, to say, *Am I my Brother's keeper*, and as no Man, or Society of Men, do's or can stand alone, it is incumbent both on every Man, and on every Body of Men, to *look not on their own Things only, but also on the things of others*: Yea in some particular Instances, and at some times, they must in a sort overlook their own things in looking to those of others; and this, that they may more effectually look also to their own, in the final Issue, and in the Main. We should therefore carry things to the highest and farthest Use which may be well attain'd.

§ 14. But, whereas we must often be limited by the Nature of Things themselves, and by our own Incapacity, or want of Opportunity; we ought therefore first and Chiefly to direct our Aim, as we stand more Specially oblig'd; referring the Use and Service of things to such Persons and Purposes, as are in themselves more Valuable, where we are at Liberty to make our Election; or otherwise, to those we are more concern'd with, in Point of Relation, Condition, or other Indication of our Duty.

§ 15. III, As to the Use or Service it self, at which we are to aim, it must be some good Purpose, whereof the Thing is Capable in a Lawful and Prudent Way. That is undoubtedly a good and valuable Purpose, which will serve to the best and greatest, (*viz.*) the Pleasing of God, so as to have at present a real and well assured Interest in his peculiar Favour, and that we may come at last to the full Enjoyment of it in endless and inconceivable Felicity.

§ 16. I shall here briefly mention some general and more observable Purposes, at which we ought to aim, or at least may, where there is nothing to render it unlawful or inexpedient. And,

1. The more immediate Honour of God in Representing him to our selves or others most worthy to be Admir'd, and Ador'd; to be Lov'd and Fear'd; to be Follow'd and Submitted to; to be Hoped in and Depended on; in a word, to be taken as our Guide, and Ruler; as our Defense, and Saviour, as our Portion, and Happiness, upon the Terms declared in his Word.

§ 17. 2. The more Special Honour of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as they stand related to each other, so far as we may be capable of apprehending the Union and Distinction amongst them; but more especially, as they are represented, as having severally some peculiar Relations to us, and Concernment with us.

§ 18. 3. Retrieving, Securing, and Promoting the Interest of God, and of the ever-blessed Trinity, as far as we can in the World by all fit means and Methods; using none that are like to do more Hurt than Good; as the Attempts to *draw*, but especially to *drive*, Men against their Conscience or beside it commonly are, where their Practice is not plainly one of those Evils, which the Civil Power is fitted and appointed of God to Punish or Restrain; nor do's the *Principle* really held manifestly lead to any of them: And here instead of such unwarranted, hurtful, or dangerous Means (which ever have and are ever like ten times to deserve the Truth for their serving it once, if *really* they ever did, or can do it at all) we should first employ preparatory Counsel and Caution, then Clear and Cogent Arguments, together with all the Winning Methods, which are fair in themselves, and fit in such a Case; that Men may be carried, not only into an outward Compliance, but inward Persuasion and right Principles. Here we must direct our Aim, and suit our Arguments with other Means, to the recovering, confirming, and advancing that *Kingdom of God, which standeth not in Meats or Drinks* (whether to be observed or avoided); *but in Righteousness, and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghost.*

§ 19. 4. The Common Good of Man-kind; *i. e.* not only their Salvation, which has been already touch'd on; but also their Temporal Safety, Peace, Prosperity, and Improvement.

5. The Publick Good of the Civil Society; as also the Welfare of any lesser Subordinate Body, to which we may more particularly belong, and this in all the forementioned Respects.

6. The more Private and Personal Improvement and Advantage of our selves and others, in respect of Mind, Body, Estate, Interest, Reputation, &c.

§ 20. 7. The easing of Pains and Trouble; the saving of Time and Charges, &c. in performing what lies upon us or others to do. And to name no more.

8. The regular Entertaining and Diverting our selves or others: And we should here observe, that the Use or Service, which is of greater Concern is to be prefer'd according to the light which may be drawn from Part II. C. 9, 10, 11.

§ 21. Upon the whole, we are to improve Things for the *regular* Preventing, Removing, or Abating of whatsoever Evil, whether *Moral* and Culpable or *Natural* and Penal; as also for the *lawful* Attaining, Securing, or Advancing of whatsoever real Good, whether Moral or Natural, for the Present, or for the Future.

C H A P. XVIII.

§ 1. **T**HE Method propounded, leads us now to Consider,

IV, What ought or may be improv'd; and to what Use or Service more particularly: 'Tis certain, every thing that can lawfully and prudently be directed and applied to such and such Purposes, should be accordingly us'd; but especially what is more peculiarly intrusted with us for Improvement; and where any Special Improvement is charged upon us by a competent Authority.

§ 2. I shall here mention some observable Instances of Things, with some more Singular Use, to which they may be directed and apply'd. And,

1. Even Sinful Dispositions, Actings, Omissions, and Defects, ought to be observ'd, and improv'd to make and keep us Sensible, what need we have of pardoning Mercy, of renewing and preserving Grace, and of all the Means thereof: what Cause there is to be Penitent, Believing, Humble, Watchful, Prayerful, Diligent, Self-denying, Patient, Forbearing, and Forgiving

2. What appears of the like Nature in others, should serve to shew us how ill it looks, how unbecoming, for the exciting a just Indignation against such kind of Evils, especially in our selves; and at the same time to move our Compassion towards others; to engage our Prayers and Endeavours with, or for them, or both ways; as also, that we should, so far as may well be, keep a safe and fit distance from Contagious or Scandalous Company; likewise to use due Guard and Caution in the Converse and Concerns, we have even with such, as we may justly believe, or must charitably hope, are truly Good.

§ 3. 3. Nat 1-

§ 3. 3. Natural Deformities or Deficiencies in our Selves, may lead us to consider, with Shame and Grief, the first mentioned Evils, that are so much worse than these; and whereby we have deserv'd much worse at the Hands of our Maker. They should also stir us up to supply and balance what is amiss or wanting in that kind, by some more than common Acquirements and Improvements otherways: And certainly they should teach us rather to pity than deride or despise others upon any such Account.

4. What there may be in others of a like Nature, should make us the more Contented, if any thing of such a kind has falln to our Lot also, and the more Thankful, where it is otherwise: But especially we should be excited, as we have Opportunity and Capacity for it, to the Relieving and Helping those, who labour under such Disadvantages

What has been said upon the two last Heads, may be easily apply'd and carry'd much farther in relation to whatsoever other Troubles may actually be upon our selves or others.

§ 4. 5. What only threatens us, should put us upon the best Methods for Prevention, or Mitigation; or else that we may be more capable of Bearing and Improving what may come upon us: But we should not here forget *that* so benevolent Caution and Charge of our Blessed Saviour, that *we take no* (perplexing) *Thought for the Morrow*; nor *that* other by the Apostle, that *we should be* (solicitously) *careful in nothing*; but in every thing by Prayer and Supplication with Thanksgiving, *should make known our Requests unto God.*

6. As to others in the like Case, we may use the time of their Danger and Fear, as well as that of present Distress or Trouble, to oblige them by Expressions and Instances of our Concernment for them; as also, to move them upon such Occasion, or at such Time, to what is proper and fit to be done, especially to such good Actions, as they would more hardly, if at all, be perswaded to at other Seasons.

§ 5. 7. Whatever of Good there may be in us, or done, or enjoyed by us, should be improv'd into the farther Apprehension of Divine Goodness, and a more firm Belief that God is in Christ; as also into all fit Methods of acknowledging the Obligations we can never fully answer to God, and likewise those we may lie under to such as he has made the willing Instruments of his Kindness to us; and so has recommended them to our Love and Gratitude.

8. What there is of the same kind, with others, should carry the mentioned Apprehension and Belief yet farther with us; and ought to be improv'd with them, as there is Opportunity; for the Purposes before Specify'd.

What there is Praise worthy in others, we should own and endeavour to Imitate, with just Allowance for what there may be of differing Circumstances between us and them.

§ 6. 9. Fit and proper Use both may and should be made of those, who are at our Command, or under our Influence; especially to serve such good Purposes for which they stand fitted and inclin'd, or any other to which they fairly may be over-ruled or perswaded.

Particularly Servants are to be kept in their Place and to their Business, yet not to be treated like Slaves; nor even Slaves themselves, as if they had not Humane Souls.

§ 7. 10. As to Time, it should be carefully fill'd up with somewhat, which may be Accountable; and therefore we should be frequently calling our selves and others under our Care to an Account about it: And it may be highly requisite every Morning, so far as we can, to lay out the Business of the following Day, and every Evening to review, what has been done, and in what Manner.

11. As to Opportunities, they should be speedily embrac'd, for the good and requisite Purposes, to which they are respectively suited.

§ 8. 12. As to Estate, We should Honour God with our Substance, in some fit Proportion to what we do and may allow our selves to lay out, in other ways, or to lay up for our selves or ours.

More particularly as to Money, we should see that we lose not the Improvement of it, lest we should be known to have it, or for fear of losing it; unless it were in some uncommon Circumstances.

As to Goods, that we keep them not only for Shew, instead of Use, so as to want them whilst we have them.

13. As to Furniture, that we really want not in Stock or Money, what we may, perhaps, have in Jewels, Plate, or other Utensils; especially if they should be such as are unsuitable to us or needless for us.

§ 9. 14. As to inferiour Living Creatures about us, that we abuse them not instead of using them agreeably to their Nature and Place; or that we our selves be not enslav'd to them by an excessive Estimation, and Attendance, instead of being served by them; yet not to be Tyrants over them or Egyptian Task-Masters.

§ 10. 15. As to our Natural Powers, that the Eye, Ear, Tongue, Hands, Feet, and also our Understanding, Judgment, Conscience, Will, and Affections, Phantasie, Memory, &c. lie not Idle when there is just Occasion for them, and that they be not employ'd to unwarrantable, inferiour, or unsuitable Purposes, when they might and should be us'd for the serving of Ends, which are not only Good in themselves, but such as are more Noble, or however, fitter for us, or better suited to the Time, Place, and other Circumstances.

§ 11. 16. As to Good and useful Habits, that they be not lost or damag'd for want of Use, nor prostituted to any ill Purposes by Abuse.

17. As to the Knowledge and Notions we have, particularly such as we take to be more certainly Right; That they be not impar'd or lost for want of being imparted, and improv'd according to what may be grafted upon them, when once they are thoroughly Establish'd; or as to the real Advantage which might be made of them in our Acting agreeably to them.

§ 12. 18. As to what we observe or hear of Publick or Private Occurrences, that are in any kind considerable; that we fail not to make the best Remarks we can thereon, and to preserve such as may be of Future Use, by minuting down so much of them, as may bring them to mind upon the Review, which we should oblige our selves to take of them at some fit Seasons.

§ 13. 19. As to our Converse with others; that we still endeavour to be gaining somewhat from them of what they may be knowing in, or improving both our selves and them by imparting to them.

§ 14. 20. In the last place, As to what we Read; that we employ some Tho't upon it, as it may require and deserve: That we lay up for Use what is worth the storing, taking Care to review it at proper Times, and to use it upon Occasion. But as to the Use of Books, I shall speak more particularly when I come to treat of the stated Pursuit of useful Knowledge under the concluding General.

C H A P. XIX.

§ 1. **WHAT** has been farther design'd, as to the present Way of using our Reason, is more specially to shew how this Essay may be rightly directed and apply'd to Use and Service: And as to the whole of it we may find somewhat in the Introduction more particularly, § 19. page vi.

The first Part of it is to be read, review'd, and as far as well may be remember'd, that we may be furnish'd with a Methodical Set of General and approved Notions about the different Sorts of Things, which may come under Consideration, *Vid.* P. I. C. 1. § 1. pag. 1.

§ 2. The more general Use of the Account given of Tho't and Things, Part I. Chap. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. is briefly shewn, Chap. 2. § 3. pag. 7. and what is there deliver'd, § 8, 9, 10, 11. may serve more particularly for Instruction, Caution, and Assistance in relation to Memory.

Some more Special Service, to which the Account of Tho'ts and Things is applicable, may be seen, Part I. C. 2. § 13. pag. 10. somewhat of that kind is also intimated, not only in Relation to those, but likewise with Reference to the more Abstract Notions, which follow them (Chap. 6, &c. to the 15 inclusively. *Vide* P. II. Ch. 4. § 2, 3. p. 141. and indeed more or less thro' the whole General Head about Enquiries; and of what Service they may be in relation to Proof is more expressly shewn, P. III. Ch. 8. § 14, 15, 16. p. 267. and Ch. 11. § 3. p. 282.

§ 3. As to the Use of the Positions, deliver'd, P. I. C. 16, 17, &c. somewhat is there briefly suggested, Ch. 16, 6. p. 99. and P. III. Ch. 8. § 17. p. 267. as also, Ch. 11. § 3. p. 282.

The General Heads, P. II. and III. which shew the several ways of using our Reason; wherein they are to direct and assist (*Vide Introduction*, § 21, &c. p. vii.) do plainly tell us the peculiar Service, to which they are mainly design'd and fitted; yet what is deliver'd upon them may likewise be applicable to some other Purposes, and more particularly to that of Proof, as is shewn, Part III. Chap. 8 § 18, — 24. page 267, &c.

What we are now upon, plainly enough declares the Use to be made of it, and so will the several Branches of that comprehensive General, which is to finish this Essay.

§ 4. But I would endeavour yet more directly and distinctly to shew in what way this Treatise might be most advantageously perus'd; and how a Learner might employ himself upon it, or about it, so as to have it sink deep into his Mind, and there to be so firmly retain'd, that it may be thoroughly digested, and insensibly slide as it were into the Veins and Arteries, Nerves, and Muscles; so as it may serve with the Divine Concurrence, to give a regular strong and vigorous Pulse, and Motion to our Reason, in the various ways of using it, which have been hitherto mention'd, and will be, under the concluding Head, and indeed to all, which might be farther specify'd.

§ 5. As to the most Advantageous way of perusing this Essay it may seem to be thus,

1. That the Reader be well appriz'd of its more general Nature and Design, together with its Method, by going first more cursorily, and after (if need be) more deliberately, over the Introduction; then taking (in a loose Paper, or rather in a Table-Book, which may lie before him afterwards, when he is reading forwards) some *Memorandum* of what was not clear to him: And this may be usefully done at the second Reading of any following Division. For,

§ 6. 2. He may so read over again each distinct Portion of this Essay where he finds Occasion, either for the better understanding, or fixing of it) before he proceed to that which follows: And this is to be done, if it may be, before the Matter is worn off his Mind; tho' he should not perhaps immediately return upon it, so soon as ever he has got once through it; but rather, when his Mind is fresh.

The Chapter about Tho'ts, as leading to Things, may be thus distinctly read and review'd (*viz.* Chap. 1.) and so Chap. 2. about the various ways of Thinking; likewise Chap. the 3d the 4th, and the 5th may be perus'd in the same manner, or however, such distinct parts of them as may require it: Chap. the 6th, or somewhat of it, may perhaps demand more than one Review, as opening the way to all that follows in the first Part; yet if some Things in it should still remain Dark, they may be better understood, when he has gone forward.

§ 7. 3. The Reader should carry along with him the Remembrance, that in the Chapters following to the 16th, the Matters treated are the *more Notional Considerations*, under which Things may be taken, either fundamentally and partially in the *Notional Elements*, which go to make them up (Chap. 7) or formally and totally in the *Notional Character*, which belongs to them as they may be observably, either *combin'd*, or *separated*, or *abstracted*, or else *related*, or finally, *Expressive* of somewhat else: The two first Characters may be read and review'd, if there be Occasion, in Chap. 8. both together; and the latter, each of them severally, in the Chapters respectively belonging to each: And perhaps it might be most convenient to take the Chapters, each by it self, revising one, before he proceed to another, in regard of that Variety of nice and critical Matter, which some of them at least contain.

The like Advice may be not unfitly given in reference to the Five Chapters of Positions which conclude the first Part.

§ 8. 4. As to the General Heads relating to the several ways of using our Reason, wherein it is to be directed and assisted, it were best, that one of them be read through, before it be review'd, tho' it should make divers Chapters; unless it be very long, and consist of Branches that are very distinct and clear of one another; as the Case will be in the following Head about Conduct, and may be found in *that* we are here upon, as also in some of the foregoing: It may then be more convenient, (especially if there were a considerable Variety of critical Matter, or what should appear less plain) to return upon one distinct Branch of such General Head, before the Reader go forward to another; that so the Mind may be in some measure possess'd of the foregoing Points, and better prepar'd to take in those which follow. And indeed,

§ 9. 5. It would not be convenient to proceed farther at once than that the Mind may be Capable of giving a close Attention without too much Fatigue.

6. It might be commonly best to read so much as is fit, towards Evening, and to review it next Morning, without staying at all the first time, or very long upon the second Reading, to muse upon what may still be obscure; but only taking some Account of it (as has been directed), at least, where it is; that it may be farther consider'd in fit Season.

§ 10. 7. If the Reader shall meet with the Explication of any Term, which was before Dark or Doubtful to him, it might be of Use to note it down together with the Place, which clear'd the Sense thereof to him, that he may have recourse to it, if there should be Occasion: And it would certainly be of Advantage, that he should take some Memorandum of any thing Material, which occurs to his Mind upon his reading this or that Passage, referring it to that which it has Relation to, that it may be farther consider'd, when he shall return again to that Place. For,

§ 11. 8. After he has gone over the whole Essay in such manner, as has been directed, it may be requisite to peruse it all onward, as it lies before him; more particularly considering what was not clear to him, either upon his first reading or revising, and taking, withal, peculiar Notice of what might seem more remarkable in it self; or of greater Use to him, drawing out some such Instructions, and applying them to use as Occasion may offer.

§ 12. 9. It may be of Advantage, upon farther reading to take Occasion from the References, which are made in some parts of this Treatise to others to call over the Matters refer'd to, at least some of the principal Strictures of them, as far as may well be done by Memory; or however to review such Passages, as have been either marked in the Book or drawn out of it.

§ 13. 10. Some Parts or Passages might be to good Purpose, and with no great Pains, committed to Memory, in order to their lying readier in the Mind for Use: Such I mean, as contain in a very few Words, what would be of important and continual Service, especially to one who is in such or such Circumstances; as some of the Positions well chosen out might certainly prove, and also some Sets of Heads to this or that Point, suppose it were that succinct Account of Moral Virtues, Part I. Chap. 4. § 10, 11, 12, 13, p. 31, 32. or the Set of Enquiries as it may be found, P. I. C. 5. § 14, 15, 16. p. 42. especially if that and this be reduc'd to a few Memorative Lines, as the Tables of *Middle Terms* and *Inferences* are.

§ 14. 11. It will undoubtedly turn to Account; if the Reader shall oblige himself to take all the Opportunities and Occasions he fairly can, to be looking into such Parts of this Essay, as the Matter may direct, and trying what it may suggest to the Point or Purpose in hand: It has been confin'd within such narrow Limits for this amongst other Reasons, that being portable, they who would, might have it

still at hand to fill up the Vacancies of Time, and to be Consulted upon emergent Occasions; and tho' 'tis by no means to be expected, that it should be capable of furnishing a ready Answer to every Question; yet somewhat may probably be got by it, tho' we miss of what we seek for. But to conclude this Point.

§ 15. 12. It must be still a farther Improvement for such as have Capacity and Leasure to make their Animadversions and Remarks, both upon the Expression and Matter, in Writing, that they may be afterwards farther consider'd, corrected, and carry'd on to greater Perfection: Thus what is dark in this Essay might be clear'd and illustrated; what is doubtful, fix'd; what is mistaken, set right; what is right and true, farther confirm'd; what is wanting, supply'd; what is superfluous retrench'd; farther Deductions might be made, and Suggestions improv'd to the rendring this Work much more Complete, and the Person so employ'd upon it yet more Accomplish'd; for such an Exercise of Tho't about so great a Variety of Matters, that are certainly difficult and momentous could not fail to do it, how well soever he might be furnish'd already; or how ill soever they may be treated here.

This fitly leads to what was farther design'd in reference to this Essay, and is to be prosecuted in the two ensuing Chapters.

C H A P. XX.

§ 1. **WHAT** I would farther do as to the present General Head, is to shew, how a Learner may be employ'd upon this Essay, or with reference to it, so as to improve himself by it. Now 'tis beyond Question, that it is a much easier and speedier way to the understanding of this Treatise, for a Learner to be engag'd in hearing it read to him, than that he should be put to read it first himself; yet a more than ordinary Capacity, with more than common Application, might certainly master it in time, and make it more his own by how much the greater Pains he would bestow upon it. He ought in that Case to pursue the Method prescrib'd in the foregoing Chapter as fast and as far as he can, and should take in what Help he can by Technical Vocabularys, and by Enquiries of others as he has Opportunity.

§ 2. He, who has farther Assistance, should improve it by hearing attentively, taking Minutes at Lectures, or after; reviewing and recollecting: And he would do well to draw out what he supposes himself to understand, in his own Words, charging upon his Memory only principal Heads, or briefer hints of the Matter; but,

At a farther going over, he should endeavour to understand the Whole, and to get all the *Stamina*, or the entire Scheme into his Mind; however to proceed therein as far as he well can. And,

§ 3. After this he may, for Exercise, pitch upon somewhat, first in this Essay; and then in other Treatises of various Kinds: Suppose it were such Parts or Paragraphs as may appear more Material than others for him to be thoroughly acquainted with, in order to a clearer Understanding, surer Remembrance, better Imitation, or other valuable Use thereof.

§ 4. I shall, by way of *Specimen*, refer to the *Introduction* of this *Logical Essay*, since it is fit the Learner should well apprehend, what he is aiming at, upon what Grounds, in what Way, and with what kind of Prospect. This I shall rather do, that I may not only more Specially direct the practical Use of several Parts of this Essay, but that the Reader may be led, as it were, by the hand, to apply them accordingly: as I shall show by way of Instance. And,

§ 5. 1. As to what more immediately presents it self, we may enquire what it is, and whether, and how far we may proceed upon it? And here it may be observ'd,

1. That we Consciously know, nor can doubt of it if we would, that we are someways affected, when we are so; Suppose in thinking of some Intellectual Subject, or imagining to our selves some or other Sensible Attributes, or in more immediate Perception by one or more of the Organs of Sense: But then it is to be consider'd in which of these ways we are affected in the present Case; as *E. gr.* If I think of the mention'd *Introduction*; or if I should designedly set my self to imagine that I felt the Paper with my Hand; or saw it, and the Writing on it with my Eye; or heard it read out to me: Or Finally, that I am *so* affected (as I verily believe) in and through the present use of my Touch, or Sight, or Hearing, nor would it be difficult to determine by which of these. And in such Case,

§ 6. 2. We may readily and strongly conclude, that we really are, who are some way affected, and that we are or have Beings capable of such Impression or Motion: So that, upon our Considering *e. gr.* of the *Introduction*, or setting our selves to Imagine it, or perceiving it by some outward Sense, we may fitly reflect upon our selves as real Beings, endow'd with the Powers or Faculties of considering, Imagining, and Perceiving, as we call them. But then,

§ 7. 3. It might (according to the Sceptical Notions, which some do rather profess than believe) admit of Question, whether there be any thing really distinct from the Beings that are so affected; or however, whether there be any thing existing without us, upon the Presence, or by Means whereof, we are so affected; And in the present Instance, whether the Paper we seem to feel, or the Writing we believe our selves to see, or the sound we suppose our selves to hear, be things really existing, or only a kind of Dream or Visionary Appearance: The contrary whereof is in the General argued, P. I. C. 1. § 13, &c. p. 5, &c. and may be easily here apply'd. Yet,

§ 8. 4. There may be a much more Reasonable Enquiry, whether our Perceptions, Imaginations, or Conceptions do indeed represent things, as they are in themselves, or only notify to us, that there is somewhat or other distinct from those inward Notices, and that by Means of the Object we are so or so affected, according as our Creatour saw fit to frame our Exterieur Organs, or Internal Faculties: And in the present Case the Question would be, whether the Intellectual Matter, or Meaning, of the *Introduction*, be in it self really such, or only so conceiv'd, agreeably to the Natural Make of our Minds? And whether the Paper and Letters thereon have indeed such Colour and Figure, or are only so perceiv'd or imagin'd according to the Make of our Eye, or Temperature of the Brain: Now to this and the two first Points, as well as to that Immediately preceding, somewhat may be easily drawn from the mentioned Chapter, § 10, 12, &c. However,

§ 9. 5. All due Care must be taken, that our Conceptions, Imaginations, and Perceptions may be genuine and agreeable to Nature, no ways distorted or altered: And therefore that the Distance, Medium, exterior Organ, Brain, or Mind, be not in any such manner ill-dispos'd, as that the Object must, or probably would be misjudg'd in such Case and Circumstances: We should not therefore go to take an account of the Paper it self by Feeling, if it were newly fanded, or our Hands numm'd with Cold; nor of that, and the

the Writing upon it, with an Eye infected by the Jaundice; or through a Glass, that is variously cut; or at a Distance, which is, at least for us, too small or too great: Nor should we pretend to an exact Representation of it by Imagination, when we have not seen it perhaps of a long time, or have seen since that a multitude of printed Papers somewhat like it, yet differing from it: Nor Finally should we take upon us to determine of the Style or Sense in a Language, or about a Matter, which we are not sufficiently acquainted with; or when we were drowdie or delirious. And here we may have recourse to Part II. Chap. 14. § 10, &c. page 188

§ 10. But when we find the Appearance to be such as we and others, so far as we know, are generally led and limited to by the Make of Humane Nature, we then may safely proceed upon it, and indeed must of Necessity, if we will go any farther with the Matter: And therefore taking the Object as we discern it, we may consider it under the Sensible, Imaginative, or Intellectual Appearance. And,

§ 11. We are in the next Place to Consider,

II, The sensible Appearance (if any such there be) of the Object, or what Preception we have of it by the outward Senses; and whereas this is represented, and in a Sort repeated, in the Imaginative Idea, so far as it is right, there is therefore no need to take any distinct Account of this; but only of that from which it is Copy'd: We are therefore here to attend to what is actually discover'd or may be yet farther discoverable by any of the Senses. And,

§ 12. (1.) By the Smell where there may be any thing proper for it to take notice of; (2.) By the Taste, where that may be fitly, safely, and to purpose us'd: But there is nothing in the present Instance, *viz.* that of the *Introduction*, observably suited to either of these; and therefore we proceed, (3.) By the Touch, where that can be well us'd; nor is there any thing more in the present Case discoverable by it, besides somewhat of the Make of the Paper, and Manner of the Leaf.

§ 13. We go on therefore to examine the Object, (4.) by the Ear; and thus the *Introduction*, or other part of this Essay, if it were plainly and properly read out to us, would be found to consist, *as audible*, in a number of Articulate Sounds, with various Pauses, Accents, and Cadencies: And, (5.) by the Eye we should find in the same Object, *as visible*, some considerable variety of Marks, *viz.* differing Letters, Points, and Figures; and a far greater Number of particular Combinations made of them in the several Words, Clauses, Periods,

riods, Sections, &c; of the Introduction; or suppose it were of the concluding General Head.

§ 14. III, The Intellectual Appearance, or Consideration of Objects, will carry us into a far greater Length than either of the foregoing Heads, tho' we should limit our selves only to the Instance of *Discourse*, and by way of particular Specimen, to the Introduction, or to the finishing part of this Essay. And 1. It may easily appear to one that is in some good measure acquainted with the Language, and Argument treated of, that the forementioned Marks were indeed *Signs*, which had their more immediate Reference, by usage, to articulate Sounds, as those again to Notions or Ideas, and these to the things we so conceive P. I. C. 14, 15. p. 88, &c.) and that the several Letters or Words so put together (*e. gr.*) in the Introduction or Conclusion, do with the Points and Numbers make a Discourse. Therefore,

§ 15. 2. We may go upon the several Words of the Discourse propos'd, giving the Logical Notions belonging to their Grammatical Names respectively, as the Word may be an Article, Noun-Substantive, &c; and sometimes more than one of these, if taken by it self alone. Here we may Consult and use the Logical Account given of Words in the foremention'd Chap. 15. page 93. And,

In the present Example, the Word [Reason] separately taken, without the Reference or Connexion it has in the very beginning of the Introduction, § 1. page 1. may be either a Noun-Substantive, expressing what is or may be the Subject of some Attribute, or else a Verb, affirming Something, &c. See the mentioned Chap. 15. § 2, 8.

§ 16. Again [is] separately taken, may be either a Verb-Substantive affirming Existence; or a Verb-Adjective, intimating the Addition of some or other Attribute to some Singular, not Plural, Subject; and which is a Subject spoken of, not such as is suppos'd to speak, or to be spoken to.

Thus the Words may at first be taken all of them in order, as they lie; and after some time, only the Sorts, which have less frequently occur'd, may be *Logically* accounted for.

In this kind of *Praxis* or Exercise, the Learner may proceed till he has made the Logical Notions of the several Sorts of Words very ready and familiar to him.

§ 17. 3. We may resume the several Words, still separately taken, and consider them according to the particular and various Meaning they have, or might have; referring them to their proper place in the Account of Tho'ts or Things as consider'd in themselves, P. I. Chap. 2, 3, 4, 5. or according

ding to a more Notional Consideration of them, Chap. 7, 8, &c. to 15, inclusively. And,

This Manner of Praxis may serve very much to enlarge our Apprehension, as to the various Import, which the same Word may have in different Places, under the same or differing Grammatical Names.

§ 18. Thus, *E. Gr.* [Reason] the Verb, may signifie to Reason out or Infer; to Reason or Prove; to Reason with or perswade; to Reason against or Confute. And these are so many various Actions which may be refer'd to P. I. C. 7. § 11. p. 51. Also [Reason] the Noun-Substantive, may signifie the Faculty or Reasoning Power it self; or the Produce thereof, a Reason, or the Objective Evidence, as when we say this or that has Reason in it; or else Mathematically, the Proportion of one Quantity to another; or Physically, the Cause whence this or that is so; or Morally the Principle from which a Man Acts, or the end for which: These may be variously refer'd to this or that Head of the first or second Scale; and there may be perhaps farther Senses of the Word under both the Grammatical Considerations. But,

§ 19. Tho' we cannot easily think of every various Import, nor perhaps be able to find them all in any Vocabulary, or Dictionary; yet it must be not a little improving to the Learner, to go as far as he can this way for the present; and he would thus find the Stock continually growing upon his Hands, so that he might be like to attain a much greater Readiness and Exactness both in Understanding, and using the Words of that Language wherein he should so Exercise himself: And tho' it were commonly best to try how far we can go without the help of Vocabularies, yet they may be at least afterwards usefully consulted; especially upon Particles, and other Words, with which we are not so well acquainted.

§ 20. 4. When any Word occurs, whereof we have little or nothing more at present besides the *Grammatical Name*, and *Logical Notion* belonging thereto, we may try if the Set of Enquiries Part II. C. 4 § 14, &c. p. 143.) will suggest any thing farther; or we may consult Dictionaries, Lexicons, &c. and particularly, as to Terms of Art, the *Lexicon Technicum Magnum*, compos'd by the Ingenious Mr. Harris; or else apply, if we have Opportunity, to Persons themselves, who are more generally knowing in such Language and in such kind of things, according to the Direction, Part II. Chap. 6. § 18. p. 152.

§ 21. Suppose

§ 21. Suppose it were the Word [Scheme] in the Introduction, § 4, about which we were at a loss, and all we knew of it was only, that, being a Substantive, it must in general signify either a Substance, or what is consider'd however as somewhat, which do's or may, in a manner, subsist under some or other Attribute, as there it is put with that of [orderly]: Now we may try whether the mention'd Enquiries will intimate any thing suitable to the Place or Circumstances, wherein the word there stands; or else we may endeavour otherways, as above, to inform our selves more particularly about the Sense or Senses it may have; but especially we should see what Light may be drawn as to the Meaning of it in that place, from any thing there preceding, attending, or following it: *Vide* Part II. Chap. 2. page 129, &c.

§ 22. 5. Upon our having some competent Apprehension as to the Import of the several Words, we may proceed towards making some Judgment about such of the things thereby signified, as appear to be more considerable; endeavouring to State and Determine, as near as we can, the following Points in reference to them.

(1.) Whether this or that single Theme be not above our Reach, according to what is deliver'd, Part II. Chap. 7. page 152, &c. As *e. gr.* *Man* and *Brutes* (mention'd in the Introduction, § 1.) in respect of their inmost and fundamental Essence, or of that Being which lies unknown at the bottom of all the Attributions thereto given; and much more our Creatour, (there also mention'd) as to his Infinite Perfections.

§ 23. (2.) What there may yet be even in such Things, or about them, that lies within our Reach, *viz.* certain Relations, or other Attributes belonging to the mentioned Subjects; as Reason, Arguing, Inferring, &c. to *Man*, somewhat like, but of a far lower Nature to some, at least, among the *Brutes*; Creating, Sustaining, &c. to our Creatour, *Vide* Part II. Chap. 8. page 157, &c.

(3) Whether we have a Concern to Understand or Effect this or that; As, to comprehend either our *Creator*, or perfectly to understand *Man*, or any of the *Brute Creatures*, or that we should endeavour to make any such kind of Being.

§ 24. (4.) Of what Importance, that may be, which we are not altogether incapable of, or unconcerned with: And here we may attempt to lay the Uses of our Reason (mention'd in the Introduction, § 1, and 21, 22) as near as we can in order, according to the differing Importance they may be of: And this we may do either descending from the highest,

or ascending from the lowest, still applying the Rule and Reasons given, Part II. Cap. 9, 10, 11. page 161, &c.

And farther, by way of Exercise, we may more particularly State and prove, of what Importance it is, that our infirm and depraved Reason should have all the farther Direction and Help, which can be given it by this Essay, or otherwise; as is intimated in the Introduction, § 2.

C H A P. XXI.

§ 1. **T**HUS far we have taken words with their Import separately; But that we may better understand continu'd Discourse, we now proceed,

6. To consider Words in their Logical, as well as Grammatical, Connexion: And here we may either take all the Words before us, as they are, or might be plac'd in the plainest Grammatical Order; and we may sometimes vary the Form of the Clause or Sentence, in compliance with the more proper Logical way of delivering that Sense: Or else we may single out here and there some Principal Words to be explain'd and stated, according to the Sense in which they ought to be taken, where they stand so connected and refer'd. And we may here proceed by the following Steps,

(1.) We should give an Account of the Words as they stand in Conjunction with others, what is their determinate Import; and why they should be so understood, which may be done in some such way as this, upon the *Introduction*,

§ 2. [Reason] must here mean the Power, or Faculty of Reasoning, not the Act or Effect; since it is so limited by its being Nominative to the Verb, and especially by the following Explication: [is] being a Verb of such Number and Person, affirms of Reason, that which follows, (*viz.*) its being [taken], or understood, not indeed always, but [oft], or in the more frequent Use of the Word, [more strictly] *i. e.* in a narrower Sense, or which is however so, compar'd with what is afterwards mention'd, [for] *i. e.* as signifying [the Power] *viz.* that particular and determinate Ability or Capacity [of], *i. e.* which can produce the Act of [arguing] or proving some Point by some other, [or] *i. e.* if not that Act then the following, (*viz.*) that of [Inferring], or deducing one Point from another, [only] *i. e.* the one or other of the mentioned Acts, without any other which is not included in one of those.

§ 3. Here

§ 3. Here we may pass over the Adversative Particle [But]; and should vary the Form of that which follows next, and instead of [what I am here attempting], we may give the Sense in a more Logical Form, by putting that, which is really the Subject of the Proposition, first, and more expressly, thus, [Reason, which I am attempting to cultivate and improve, is here to be taken more largely for that discerning Faculty, &c.] And upon the Sense thus express'd, we may go on with the Praxis, as before; laying before us what is offer'd, Part II. Chap. 1, 2. page 125, &c. about taking rightly what others deliver. We should next proceed to draw out the several Points affirm'd or deny'd. And,

§ 4. (2.) We may draw out the more express Enunciations, adding the Characters respectively belonging to them; Thus, that [Reason is taken oft more strictly for the Power of Arguing or Inferring only] is a Proposition Affirmative, Indefinite, Complex, according to Part II. Chap. 16, 17, 18. page 194, &c. Again, that [Reason which is attempted here to be cultivated, and improv'd, is to be understood in a larger Sense] is another like Proposition, but which has an Incidental one in it, describing and determining Reason, the Subject of the Enunciation, as being the Object about which we are Conversant in this Essay, to cultivate and improve it: Here we may refer to Part II. Chap. 16. § 11, 12. page 197.

§ 5. (3.) Complex Enunciations may be resolv'd into the Simple Propositions, which are contain'd and couch'd in them; as that [Reason is taken oft more strictly, than in some other Cases,] that [Arguing or Inferring, whether either of them alone, or both together, carry a stricter or narrower Sense than the Word *Reason* sometimes is to be taken in]; Particularly that [such a Sense of it is stricter than that, which is here given to it]; for that [Reason is here taken for the discerning Faculty, &c.]; And again, that [Reason, so understood more at large, is the Subject or Object, about which this Essay is Conversant]; and that [the cultivating of Reason, so taken, is the thing here design'd], &c.

§ 6. (4.) Some at least of the simple or of the more complex Propositions, may be open'd, by shewing distinctly, what is the Subject or Thing spoken of in them; what the Predicate; of what Words and Ideas this or that is made up; And lastly by what and how they are conjoined or disjoin'd; *i. e.* what is the Copula deny'd or affirm'd.

I shall only touch by way of Example upon the Subject in that Complex Proposition, [What I am here attempting, &c.] or as it should rather be Logically varied [That, which I am here attempting, &c.] Now the Subject must be not [I], as it might seem, but [Reason], this being the Matter in Hand, and to be understood in the Relative [What], or [that which], and it is here describ'd and determin'd, as being the *Object* of an Attempt, which (Attempt) is *here* made, *i. e.* in this Essay; the Design and End whereof is to cultivate, &c. Thus one Word, and Notion with it, is superadded to another, to make up the intended Subject. We may now proceed,

§ 7. 7. To take the Enunciations in pieces, and to look into the several Terms thereof, with relation to the more Simple Ideas intimated or understood in the Subjects and Predicates of the Discourse under Consideration; In what Sense, and how far they may be accounted right, according to Part II. C. 13. § 2, &c. p. 181, &c. And farther we may here endeavour, as accurately as we can, to form our own single Apprehensions of the several more considerable Things or Objects of Tho't, mention'd in what we are upon.

And here we may take Notice, where it is that we have little or nothing more than the dark and general Apprehension, that this or that is a Being or Somewhat; and also where the Ideas are Inadequate or Adequate, Essential or Extra-essential, &c. according to the mentioned Chap. 13.

§ 8. Now a *Praxis* of this kind might be made, upon the more observable Simple Themes in the Introduction, after the manner here following,

Reason] is the Principal Subject, or the Theme mainly Treated of, § 1. the Import of the Name is distinguish'd into a stricter Sense, wherein the Word is frequently taken, and a larger which is here design'd (*Vide* Part II. Chap. 19. § 12. page 213.). The *Thing*, as here intended, is not strictly defin'd, but rather describ'd (*Vide ibid* § 14—19), by the Character of its being a *Faculty* or Power (whether Active, Passive, or both together, *Vide* Part I C. 10, § 9, 10. p. 73). and that Faculty *discerning*, minding and observing things (Part I. Chap. 2. § 14. page 10; Reason as here design'd is farther describ'd by divers Relations it has, *viz.* to Man, as subjoined in him, *commonly made his distinguishing Character*, and plainly gives him a Capacity far Superior to that of Brutes; as also to the several Acts mention'd as produced by means thereof, *viz.* Examining, Rectifying, Confirming, Reflecting, &c.; *Vide* Part I. Chap. 13. § 3, 9. page 85, 86.

§ 9. If in our Praxis we would give an Account of *Reason*, in the more Notional way; we might say, 'tis a simple Theme, and as such, a *Thing* (or Subject of Tho't) separately taken; that it is *Real*, *Positive*, and *Permanent*, yet is not the Substance of the Mind, but an *Accident* belonging to it, by means whereof it can produce those Acts, or *transient Accidents* before mention'd, together with the more *permanent Effects* thence proceeding, such as habitual Knowledge, Treatises, &c. Here see Part I. Chap. 6. § 9. page 48, 49, with Chap. 7. § 2, 4, 11, 12, and Chap. 13. § 9, 10. page 86. *Reason* is also here an *abstracted Attribute*, and the *Object* about which this Essay is conversant. *Vide* Part I. Chap. 10. § 6. page 72.

§ 10. In some such way we might give an Account of *Man*, either more plainly, according to what is said of Spirit, Body, Compounds, Plants and Animals, P. I. C. 3. § 2, 4, 7, 21. p. 17, &c; or more Notionally, P. I. C. 9. § 8, 9. p. 68. and Chap. 8. § 5. page. 61: Likewise of *Brutes*, according to what is said of Animals, Part I. Chap. 3. § 21. page 25; and Chap. 9. § 10. page 68.

Some Account may be given of *our Creator* from what is offer'd, Part I. Chap. 6. § 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. page 48, &c: and likewise of *Examining*, *Rectifying*, *Confirming*, *Abstracting*, *Reflecting*, with other *Operations of the Mind*, as also of *Sense* and *Imagination* from what is suggested, Part I. Chap. 2. page 7, &c. and elsewhere in divers places, lastly, to name no more, of the *Means invented and employ'd* to represent our Conceptions to others, much might be drawn out from Part I. Chap. 14, 15. page 88, &c; and from Part II. Chap. 1, 2, 3. page 125, &c.

Thus the *Praxis* might be carry'd on upon all the considerable single Themes throughout the Introduction or other part of this Treatise; or thro' some Select Portions of the Classic Authors or others.

§ 11. 8. We may now farther proceed to make a Judgment, as we can upon the Matter of the Enunciations express'd or imply'd in what we are upon. And,

(1.) Which of them may be sufficiently evident, and to be acquiesced in, according to Part II. C. 20. page 216, &c.

Here we may observe, whether any, and which of the Principles, or nearer Deductions (Part I. Chap. 16, &c), are brought in, or built upon: Thus when 'tis said, we are *Capable of Examining*, &c, and that, *we can form abstract and general Notions*, reflect, &c, it is all along suppos'd, that we sometimes do so; that what we actually do, we must be capable

of doing, since there is no Attribute, but as such implies a Subject *Capable* of it, to which it is or may be attributed, *Vide* Position. N) page. 101.

(2.) We should also see whether any of the Enunciations is to be rejected as apparently False, and needing no other Confutation, than what it carries in it self, at least upon its being open'd by a just Explication, which we should accordingly give.

(3.) We are likewise to observe, where there may be a danger of Mistake in what is said, and of what Consequence the Matter is, if mistaken, according to Part II. Chap. 21. page 222, &c.

§ 12. 9. We may next consider the Particles, which shew the Relation of one Clause, Period, Paragraph, &c. to another; Taking Notice sometimes of their various Import, and explaining them according to the determinate Sense, they ought to have in this or that way of using them.

Thus in the beginning of the Introduction, [and] notes, that *Reason* is taken for the Power of Arguing as well as for that of Inferring, or for the Power of performing *both* those Acts, tho' without admitting it to refer to another, or however without attending to it, that it do's so: [but] intimates, that it is not here taken in so narrow a Sense, but on the contrary with a larger Import: [and], as it is next after us'd, intimates, that, besides the Design of Cultivating or bettering the Use, we may already have of our Reason to some Points, there is also in this Essay, a farther Aim at improving it to some other Purposes. [But], which begins the next Section, shews, that notwithstanding the Account given of Humane Reason in the foregoing Paragraph, there still need'd help to draw forth the mentioned Power and Capacities into Exercise, or to bring them to perform better; and [whereas], which immediately follows, intimates, that the natural Weakness of our Reason in its earlier Use, together with its being so dark'ned, and deprav'd, and so liable to be carry'd away, &c, give sufficient Evidence and Proof, that it stands in need of all the Advances that can from time to time be made for its Direction and Assistance: And [Therefore] shews that the Apprehension of this need induced the Author to add this New Essay to the number of, &c.

Here the Account of *Conjunctions*, Part I. Chap. 15. § 12. page 95, may be of some Use; but there may yet be Occasion to consult Books that Treat more designedly of Particles.

§ 13. 10. The Clauses, Periods, Paragraphs, &c, to which the mentioned Particles are apply'd, must be accordingly estimated in Relation to each other, as being sometimes Equipollent and Synonymous; sometimes contrary; P. II. C. 18. § 6. sometimes they are to be consider'd, one as the Question, the other as the Argument or Proof; And sometimes one as the Position, the other as an Inference from it, nor need we farther to exemplifie this Matter.

§ 14. 11. If Proof be any where offer'd in Logical Form, we may observe the Sort and Manner of the Argument, according to what is deliver'd, P. III. Ch. 1. § 10, &c, page 231, &c, Ch. 2. § 1, 4, 6. Ch. 3. § 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13. Ch. 4. § 1, 4, 6: And as to the *Categorical* Form, &c, the Figure, § 8; and what the Mood or Mode, Ch. 5, 6, 15. more especially, whether the Rules be as are given, § 8—15, at least the true of them; or however that one Character, § 16: or the Rule laid down, Ch. 6. § 3, or else *that*, which there follows, § 4, 6.

If the Argument be not in Logical Form, it may be an Exercise of some Service to put it into Form; or to bring it to *that*, which is accounted more perfect; as by filling up the Enthymeme (*Vide* Part III. Ch. 3. § 4. page 240, and Ch. 13. § 15. page 299), by turning the Relative, or Hypothetical Argument into Categorical (*Vide* Part III. Ch. 3. § 12. page 238, and Ch. 6. § 11—15. page 255: and by drawing out the *Series* into a Train of common Syllogisms, as is done, Part III. Ch. 4. § 5. p. 241.

But the main Business, in respect of Proof, is to see to the Matter of it, whether there be not some Fallacy or Mistake, particularly whether any, and which, of those that are specify'd, Part III. Ch. 7. p. 256, &c.

It may here be consider'd from what Logical Head, the Proof was taken; whether it were any, and which, of those that are given, Part III. Ch. 11. § 8, 9. p. 281.

§ 15. 12. Inferences are likewise to be well Consider'd: The reasoning or Syllogism they depend on is, if need require, to be filled up; And the Deduction judged of, and accounted for, according to Chap. 13, 14, &c.

And here it may be usefully observ'd, whether this or that Inference were drawn according to any, and which, of the Rules that are specify'd, P. III. Ch. 14. § 22, 23, 24. p. 306: or by any of the Middle Terms, Ch. 11. § 8, 9.

§ 16. 13. Where Proof appears needful, or farther Proof requisite, or even by way of Exercise, we may try what we can do at proving this or that Point; and at carrying our Proof upon various Questions, if not upon the same, thro' all the sorts of Middle Terms mention'd, P. III. Ch. 11. § 8, 9. p. 284. And also we should set our selves to disprove, where it may be needful or convenient.

Here we may see whether some of the Positions in the Introduction, Conclusion, or elsewhere may not be reduced to some or other of the Principles or nearer Deductions, P. I. Ch. 16, &c.

§ 17. 14. We may lastly farther make Trial how many several Points we can Infer more immediately from this or that; and how far we can carry on this or that particular Train of Deductions; noting down, at least, what more considerable Positions we meet with in this way. And this is an Exercise highly requisite for those who are design'd to the more Learned Professions, and even for Men of more than ordinary Business.

Here we may Practice upon the directive Rules for drawing Inferences, P. III. Ch. 14. § 22, 23, 24. p. 306. as they are explain'd in the Chapter and Section there refer'd to; And also we might proceed upon some Select Positions of P. I. Ch. 16, &c. to see how far we could carry them; *i. e.* to how many several Points, and to what length of Deduction upon some of those Points.

§ 18. It might be less Irksome, and probably not less Useful, or (perhaps) more for the Learners Advantage in some Respect, that divers Parts or Passages of this Essay should be singled out here and there for the Subject or Ground work of the several Exercises here recommended, and they should be such as more deserve or need to be very distinctly consider'd: or else, that he should take some such Parts as he would more especially apply to Use, that he may afterwards review them more deliberately.

§ 19. To all that has been directed, I might add, that it would certainly be for the Learners Advantage, that he should add Examples to the several Positions, as is already done to some of them; P. I. Ch. 16, 17, &c. Also, that he should frequently try how he can carry some or other Single Theme through all the Predicables, P. II. Ch. 15. § 13—21. p. 192, &c. as he may there find it exemplify'd in the Instance of the *Sum*: And lastly, that he should be exercis'd in setting down the various good Uses and Purposes to which this or that may be apply'd, and in what way it may best answer them.

§ 20. And

§ 20. And whereas the great Use and Service, to which we should direct and apply whatever can be so improv'd, is that of *Good Conduct*, I shall conclude the whole Essay with that most practical and extensive General.

C H A P. XXII.

§ 1. **O**UR Reason is in the last place here to be directed and assisted more at large, that it may better serve this great Purpose,

V, Rightly to conduct Our selves and our Affairs; more particularly in the way of Learning. And,

Here I shall briefly Treat of the several following Points, *viz.* First, of Conduct in General; then of Conducting our selves, as also the common Affairs of Life, and Special Undertakings; more particularly the stated pursuit of useful Knowledge, with other Improvements, and the drawing of them out in regular Discourses and other Solemn Performances.

§ 2. Under this General Head of Conduct are laid together several Things of a very differing Nature; and which would each of them require a distinct Treatise, to handle them fully, yet it's hop'd, the more brief Intimations, which are all that can be pretended to here, will be *in themselves* of some Use, and it may be some way the more, for their being so short and few: They may however carry the considering Mind a great way farther, than they go themselves; and must be at least a fit Preparative for Conversation upon such Heads, and a proper Introduction to the reading of such Authors, as may Treat of them purposely and more largely.

§ 3. I shall not here confine my self within the Compass of what is commonly accounted to appertain to Learning; nor will the Use of Reason, in divers of those Matters, which are to be consider'd, proceed upon the more common Logical Notions. But surely Men of Letters, as well as others, should not be un instructed for common Conversation, and the prudent Management of those Affairs, which will fall upon them as well as others; and which none can, or will ordinarily attend and order for them, with that Application and Advantage, as they might for themselves: And it is plainly of continual Concernment, that we should be able rightly and readily to lay and pursue the Affairs of this Life,

whether they be Matters of daily, or of less frequent Occurrence.

§ 4. Men of Learning, without somewhat of Skill this way, will be like to fall under the Reproach of being *mere Scholars*, almost unfit for common Converse, incapable of affording Advice or Help to those about them, and unfurnish'd for managing themselves and their Affairs with competent Discretion. And tho' it is true, that such as are vers'd in Business will be like to outdo those, who may have the best Rules and Helps, without like Exercise and Experience; yet, as it may not be unpleasing to *the former*, to see some of their own Measures collected, more distinctly stated and confirm'd, and laid before them by way of Remembrance; so it will not be unprofitable to *the latter*, to have some general Aim given them towards the more prudent and becoming Conduct of themselves, and the Affairs they may have in common with others. Nor can it more properly be done in the way of general Intimations, than in such an Essay as this.

§ 5. Now, I, That is right Conduct in the general, whereby we steadily pursue the best End we can fitly propound to our selves in any Matter, by the best Means, and according to the best Measures. And,

(1.) There can be no proper Conduct at all, without first fixing an End; else whatsoever may come of our Management is all Contingency and Chance, not the Effect of Conduct and Design: Nor can our Conduct be right, if we have not an Eye to the *best End*; Our farthest Design in every thing must be that which is absolutely best, the Glory of God in our own Felicity; and even our nearer End must be the *best* in that kind, the best which is attainable in such Case or Circumstances: And here it is fairly imply'd and intended, that it should be not only seemingly, but really *good*, i. e. Just and lawful in itself, and like to be of real Service to our selves or others; at least in the Issue, if not for the Present.

§ 6. (2) The Means we use for attaining such End, must also be *good*; absolutely *so*, i. e. Just and Lawful, in themselves, and likewise relatively good, i. e. proper and fitted to reach our End; and they should be indeed the *best*, that can be had or us'd in such Case and Circumstances, *viz.* the surest, the most effective, the speediest, the easiest, and least expensive; These Characters are to be distinctly consider'd, and in the Order wherein they are given: No sinful Means are ever to be us'd; since, tho' they might perhaps answer

some

some lower Design, yet it would not be without the Damage or Hazard of our higher Concernments: Amongst Means that are Innocent, we should observe, which are surest or likest to reach our End; amongst those that are equally sure, or like to reach it, which are most Effective, and like to do it most thoroughly; of these again, which will be the speediest; of these, which the Easiest; and finally, amongst these, which will be least Expensive: Yet this Order of Enquiry should be somewhat alter'd in some Cases, and by some Persons; *E. Gr.* a Man, who has but little to lay out, must be more sparing of his Money than of his Pains.

§ 7. (3.) Means are to be us'd according to the *best Measures* we have, or can attain; without losing our Opportunity, or bestowing more Pains, Time, and Cost, than will probably be answer'd. We are to apply the Means in such Way and Manner, at such Time, in such Place, and other Circumstances, as that they may be most like fully to reach our End, and *that* with the best Advantage, taking in all that can well be compass'd, and serving higher Purposes, as far as may be, whilst we are prosecuting lower Ends.

§ 8. Before we proceed to the several Parts of Conduct specify'd: I shall here farther add some general Rules, which may be common to them all. And,

1, We should make sure to begin, proceed, and end, with God: So to do is not less the using of our Reason for it, being a Dictate of Religion; nor is it unfit to appear in Logic, because it has its Principal Place in Theology; whereas it is undoubtedly the Voice of Reason it self, that we should use our Reason and other Faculties in Subordination to him, *in whom we live, and move, and have our Being*; i. e. with his Leave and Allowance; as also with Dependance on him for his needful Assistance; and finally, with due Regard to the pleasing of him by our serious Desire and Endeavour to promote his Honour and Service.

§ 9. How easily, and to us insensibly, can the Author of our Beings throw in some useful Suggestion, or give an happy Turn to our Tho'ts, and also to theirs with whom we are concern'd? This we may reasonably Hope, and he will certainly do, so far as he sees fittest and best; if we be careful to approve our Designs and Undertakings to him; and that we both lay and pursue them with a regular Dependance on him, a real Desire to engage him with us, and sincere Concern, that we may not fail to please him: Whereas, on the contrary,

§ 10. They who *entirely* lean to their own, or other Mens Understandings, and *wholly* rely on the settled Course of things, have the justest Cause to fear their being altogether left of God to take up Mistakes, and to proceed thereon; and that they should reason so much, worse to the Point in hand, as they may reason better and more justly from mistaken Grounds: But if such kind of Persons should happen or be help'd rightly to lay and pursue their Designs, they may therein prove much more unhappy, than if they had been brought by Disappointment better to know themselves, and the God in whose hand is their Breath, and whose are all their ways.

§ 11. 'Tis very well known, that Natural Reason led even Heathens to say, *Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχαίμεν*, and *A Jove Principium*, That they ought and would begin with God: Shall not Christians go farther yet, so as to proceed, and end with him too? Do's it not apparently and highly concern us to Practice agreeably to that Excellent Prayer, which is so frequently us'd in the Liturgy and Worship of the Church of England,

“ Prevent us, O Lord, in all our Doings with thy most
 “ Gracious Favour, and further us with thy continual Help;
 “ that in all our Works begun, continu'd, and ended in
 “ thee, we may glorify thy Holy Name, and finally, by thy
 “ Mercy, obtain everlasting Life, thro' Jesus Christ our Lord.

§ 12. The Sacred Scriptures do plainly tell us, that *of God and thro' him, and to him, are all things*, who therefore do's indisputably claim that *to him should be Glory for ever*; and to him it will undoubtedly be, whether we design it or no; but little to our Comfort or Advantage, unless we have made it our serious Aim, and diligent Endeavour, that it might be so.

The Method here recommended, is not to hinder, but rather to excite, engage, encourage, and enable us to the best Use we can any ways make of our Reason, and of the fittest Means and Measures, in laying and pursuing honest Designs; since only in this way we regularly can, and in this we justly may, depend on God for his Assistance, who is the Author of universal Nature, and will have us use the Powers he has given us, and the Helps he affords us; but not without an Eye to himself.

§ 13. 2 It is a farther Dictate even of common Reason, that they, who have such a Book as the *Bible*, or can procure it, should heedfully Consult it, and those (if need be), who may help them rightly to understand and apply it, and thus

to do, not only upon particular Occasions, but in a more continued Course of Reading and Attending it with the Special Observance, which is due thereto, according to the proper Inscription put by a Worthy Minister deceas'd upon his Bible,

Alios Libros ut Judex lego, hunc ut Judicem.

(Of other Books I Judge, this as my Judge regard.)

And that he did so indeed, may be seen in the Account given of Mr. *John Oldfield*, in the Abridgment of Mr. *Baxter's* Life, by the Judicious Mr. *Calamy*.

§ 14. It might here be of Excellent Service to draw out, or at least to mark, what we find more suitable and needful for us, in respect of our Condition and Affairs, frequently reviewing what we have so noted, and applying it to Use, as Occasion presents: More particularly the Book of Proverbs should be consider'd, as affording a number of instructive Remarks about Men and Things, and even of Secular Affairs, as well as those of Religion: Some few of which, with other observable Sentences of Sacred Writ, are here and there produc'd, in this Essay, by way of Instance.

§ 15. And, whereas Reason tells us, that God is to be regarded in all our Management, Scriptural Revelation should lead us to regard the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit more distinctly, and yet jointly, without perplexing our selves about the Accurate state of that inscrutable Unity and Triplicity, which belongs to them: More particularly, that we should have an Eye to the Father, as the Original and Spring of all Good Things, so as peculiarly to seek them from him, and to depend on him for them; as also to the Son of God, who is likewise Man, as our Mediator and Way to the Father, *doing all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving Thanks to God and the Father by him*; Nor may the Holy Spirit be neglected or resisted, but is to be earnestly and believingly asked of the Father, for the sake of Christ; and must be heedfully regarded by us in the Sacred Scriptures, and what is agreeable thereto.

§ 16. What Reason it self says upon this, and the preceding Head, has been solemnly own'd with Shame and Grief, at last, by some, who had bent their Wit and Parts against it, as may be seen in the Account of the late Earl of *Rochester*, and particularly in the Paper Signed with his Hand, as follows,

“ For

" FOR the Benefit of all those, whom I have drawn into
 " Sin by my Example and Encouragement, I leave to the
 " World this my last Declaration, which I deliver in the Pre-
 " sence of the Great God, who knows the Secrets of all
 " Hearts, and before whom I am now appearing to be
 " Judged,
 " That, from the bottom of my Soul, I detest and abhor
 " the whole Course of my former wicked Life; that I can
 " never sufficiently admire the Goodness of God, who has
 " given me a lively Sense of my Pernicious Opinions, and
 " vile Practices, by which I have hitherto liv'd without
 " Hope, and without God in the World; have been an
 " open Enemy to *Jesus Christ*, doing the utmost despite to the
 " *Holy Spirit of Grace*; and that the greatest Testimony of
 " my Charity to such is to warn them in the Name of God,
 " and, as they regard the Welfare of their Immortal Souls,
 " no more to deny his Being, or his Providence, or despise
 " his Goodness; no more to make a Mock of Sin, or condemn
 " the Pure and Excellent Religion of my ever blessed Re-
 " deemer, thro' whose Merits alone, I, one of the Greatest of
 " Sinners, do yet hope for Mercy and Forgiveness, *Amen*.

Declar'd in the Presence of

Anne Rochester,

Robert Parsons.

J. ROCHESTER.

I might add the Penitential Letter by Sir *Duncomb Colchester*,
 which, to his lasting Honour, is made Publick: But I shall
 only Subjoin some part of a Letter from the Earl of *Marl-*
borough, who dy'd in a Sea Fight, *Anno 1665*, to Sir *Hugh*
Pollard.

SIR,

" ————— I am in Health enough of Body, and
 " thro' the Mercy of God, in *Jesus Christ*, well dispos'd in
 " Mind. This I premise, that you may be satisfy'd, that
 " what I write proceeds not from any fantastick Terror of
 " Mind, but from a Sober Resolution, &c. —————
 " there is a certain Thing that goes up and down in the
 " World, call'd *Religion*, dress'd and presented Fantastically,
 " and to Purpose bad enough, which yet by such evil Dealing
 " loseth not its Being. The Great and Good God hath not
 " left it without a Witness, more or less, sooner or later,
 " in every Man's Bosom, to direct us in the Pursuit of it;
 " and for the avoiding of those inextricable Difficulties and
 " Entangl'e-

“ Entanglements, our own frail Reason would perplex us
 “ withal, God in his infinite Mercy, has given us his Holy
 “ Word——— I confess to God and you, I have
 “ been a great Neglector, and, I fear, Despiser of it (God
 “ of his infinite Mercy, Pardon me that dreadful Fault ;
 “ but when I retir’d my self from the Noise and deceitful
 “ Vanities of the World, I found no true Comfort in any
 “ other Resolution, than what I had from thence. I com-
 “ mend the same, from the bottom of my Heart, to your
 “ (I hope, happy) U’se. Dear Sir *Hugh*, let us be more
 “ Generous, than to believe we die like Beasts that Perish ;
 “ but with a Christian, Manly, brave Ambition, let us look
 “ to what is Eternal.—— The only Great and Holy God,
 “ Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, direct you to an happy End
 “ of your Life, and send us a joyful Resurrection.

This Letter He, in a Postscript, desir’d might be commu-
 nicated to his Friends and others.

*Old James, near the Coast of Holland,
 the 24th of April, 1665.*

§ 17. Now taking along with us the only Wife God and his
 infallible Word, we shall be the more capable of proceeding
 to what follows. And,

3. We must apply our selves carefully to state what is the
very thing we are more immediately aiming at in any Design,
 and in every part of our Conduct and Management, at the
 same time heedfully observing whether it be morally Good,
 or at the least lawful for us to pursue, *i. e.* whether it will
 plainly subserve our highest Interest, as being pleasing to God,
 or that it is however undeniably consistent with it, as being
 no way displeasing to him.

And, we are yet farther to consider whether it be Necess-
 sary to our Principal End, or such as may be omitted without
 any Danger thereto ; and likewise without present Damage
 in any Kind ; or if not, whether any thing may be sub-
 stituted in the place thereof, which, with less Trouble and
 Time, or with less Cost and Pains may equally serve to
 guard against the Dangers or Damage which would accrue by
 our omitting such Undertaking.

If the Design be not Matter of certain Duty or evident
 Necessity, but only of sensible Pleasure, or Secular Advan-
 tage, we should consider well, if what can be reasonably ex-
 pected from it, will be like to answer what there must be
 laid out of Time, or Cost, or Pains upon it ; otherwise we
 should either wholly desist from it, or wait some happy Jun-
 cture

cture for it, which may render it more easily attainable : And thus we may also Postpone such other Designs as will bear a Delay, where it may give some probable Advantage.

§ 18. 4. When, upon Consideration, it appears that the Design is such as innocently may, or which ought to be pursu'd, our next Business is to adjust the Importance of it, according to what has been laid in for that Purpose, P.II. C.9, 10, 11 ; as also what Danger there may be of our mistaking about the Matter, and of what consequence a Mistake would probably be: Here we are to take in Light and Help from what has been farther laid in, Part II. Chap. 21. These Points are to be duly settled, that we may Proportion our Care and Pains, as the Matter deserves and requires.

And here we should observe, that what is our more peculiar Business must be mainly intended and pursu'd ; yet even *that* must not so far engross our Time and Thot as to exclude what is otherwise Incumbent on us, or of Concernment to us ; no, nor such Relaxation from the present Affair, as may be convenient for us. 'Tis a great Point of Prudence and good Management to shut out nothing which ought to be attended, and to give to every thing its proper Place in our Attendance and just Proportion of it.

§ 19. 5. Upon a just and determinate State of the *very* thing, which is and ought to be intended, and of its Importance, we should proceed to fix such main subordinate Intentions, as may reach our farther Aim, and if it may well be, serve some other good Purpose also by the way. Here,

(1.) We should look to it, that we have still in our Eye a just and determinate State of what we do, and innocently may, Design ; since the End must direct both the Means to be used, and also the Measures of using them : And if *that* should be mistaken in any Respect, it may be like, *so far*, to misguide us in choosing or applying them ; and so much the more, as we shall better Judge what is most adapted to such mistaken Purpose ; or if we have not a very clear, distinct, and determinate Apprehension of what we are designing, all our Procedure must be dark and confus'd ; and so much liker to be wrong than right, as there are more ways of missing our Point, than for obtaining it. He that would go to *Newcastle*, must know whether it be that *Under-Lyne* in *Staffordshire*, or that upon the *Tyne* in *Northumberland*. We should take all possible Care that we be not (as Men oftentimes are) so eagerly bent upon our Designs, as to rush into the Pursuit before we have carefully stated and determined

what

what is the *very thing* we would be at: Nor should we think it wasted Time to make the Matter very clear and distinct to our own Minds, and to fix it upon them.

§ 20. We may then safely proceed, (2.) To the subordinate Intentions, which must of Necessity be pursued, or should be, for the better obtaining of our End, or for taking in some Advantage by the way, which may be either Subservient to our farther Purpose, or at least consistent with it. He that would go to *Newcastle upon Tyne*, must allow Time and lay other Matters accordingly; he should also fix convenient Stages, and especially the Places, where he may have any valuable Occasions, whether lying directly in the way, or which may be taken in consistently with his Design for *Newcastle* and Business there.

Here we should well consider, what are the Inconveniences, or Dangers incident to the pursuit of *such* a Design, or of this in particular, and how we may guard against them; also what Advantages may be drawn in, and how we may hope to compass them But,

§ 21. (3.) 'Tis only the *main* subordinate Intentions we are to fix at once, before we enter upon actual Pursuit; to aim at more would endanger Confusion, as well as if we did not fix so much: Nor (4.) should these Intentions be so unalterably fix'd, as not to be vari'd, upon just Occasion, and unforeseen Emergencies; whether for the avoiding some considerable Inconvenience, or for the compassing some valuable Advantage by the way; whenas we may and ought to desist, even from our farther Design, where it is not of absolute Necessity in it self, nor a Duty incumbent on us in such a State of things, and that our proceeding in it would be like to do more Hurt than Good.

§ 22. 6. In Matters of great Importance, the Design it self, with the Scheme and Train thus laid, should be review'd and reconsider'd (if the Case will allow it) at some distant Time, when our Tho'ts are more cool and sedate; and it may be requisite sometimes to Consult upon it: Now for such Purposes as these it might be best to write down some Minutes about it, with Queries thereupon, and Reasons on either side to be deliberately weigh'd by our selves and by others likewise, if it be convenient.

§ 23. 7. When we enter upon actual Prosecution, we should consider only the first nearest Intention, as if it were all we designed; that so we may have but one thing to attend at once. Yet,

8. We must carefully see, that neither such nearer Intention, nor the Means for attempting it, be any ways unsuitable, either in themselves or in our manner of using them, to any of our farther Intentions; much more, that they be not detrimental or dangerous to our farthest and principal End. It must always be ill Conduct to use any Politicks disagreeing to Honesty; since we should thereby endanger our highest Concernments in the pursuit of somewhat lower. And here,

9. We should take Care, we do not proceed upon any thing as a Principle or Measure, before it have been, sometime or other, well consider'd, and examin'd.

§ 24. 10. We should take in what Help may be well had from Men of Skill in what we are designing, and well affected both to it, and us; as also from the best Authors, which purposely treat thereof; and from any occasional Intimations: We should likewise endeavour to procure whatever Agents, or Instruments may serve to expedite the Matter, or to perform it with Advantage.

Here let it be remembred, that much Reading and Converse, with Observation, tends to make a Man *Full*; much Writing, with Care, to render him *Accurate*; and often Speaking, especially before his Superiors, to give him *Assurance*, and to make him *Ready*.

We should also Exercise our Memory in ways that are safe and useful; It may be both try'd and improv'd by calling over without Book, what we have noted down; but we should not trust thereto more than we must needs.

§ 25. Upon the whole, our Conduct must be allowed to be good, and such as will reach the farthest End (*viz.* the Divine Favour, and our own Fidelity therein), whether we compass our more immediate Aim or not; if, with an Eye to our being accepted of God thro' Christ, and with a regular Dependance on him to assist us by his Spirit, we carefully see to it, that what we allow our selves to design, and pursue, be at least innocent, and also *such* as we ought, or reasonably may, both *so* Design, and *so* Pursue; And, *that if we miss of our Aim, it be not thro' any Fault of ours, common Infirmities excepted.*

§ 26. Here it is to be observ'd, that we may be oblig'd, even in Duty, to attempt and endeavour what we are not, in that respect, oblig'd to Effect; and therefore may very well acquit our selves in respect of Management, where yet we fail of Success. But let it always be remembred, that where we fall short of what is our unquestionable Duty, not only

only to design, but also to attain (suppose it were the Command of our Passions or the like); there must certainly be somewhat faulty on our Part: Either we do not use a right Conduct for that Purpose, or perhaps we defeat it by allowing our selves in something else which is displeasing to God, tho' it may not be observed by us.

§ 27. We must therefore take heed, that we do not *any way* provoke God, that he should leave us to Disappointments, and that we do not either stir up others, or open a way for them to obstruct our Proceedings by carrying on, or for want of due Caution in reference to them, whether in our being too open, and trusting them too far, or otherwise.

C H A P. XXIII.

§ 1. **H**AVING been so large upon Conduct in General; I shall not attempt any thing in reference to the following Heads, farther than to give some Light and Help towards the stating and determining, what is to be *pecially design'd* under each of them; and to suggest some of the more Necessary subordinate Intentions and principal Means for the *better Prosecution* of such Design.

§ 2. Our Affairs are not like to be so rightly manag'd, if we do not regularly govern our selves, both under a more Absolute and Relative Consideration. Now to proceed,

II, As to the Conduct of *our selves*, under a more absolute Consideration, what we are here to aim at, is *regular Satisfaction*, with *reasonable Acceptation*, and *real Usefulness*.

Satisfaction to our selves, is what we may, and cannot but, design in the Conduct of our selves; only it must be a *regular Satisfaction*, of which a good Account can be given; it must be such, as is consistent with it self, wherein we go not about to satisfy our selves in some particular and for the present, tho' it be with the Certainty or Danger of drawing upon our selves a greater Dissatisfaction.

§ 3. For the same Reason, as well as in point of Duty, we should aim at *Acceptation* with others: For will they not else be like to disquiet us, if we study not their Quiet? And must they not be very capable of doing it, who are so many to one, or to the few, whom we do perhaps alone regard, yet we should not aim at other Acceptation, than what is *reasonable*, both in the *Measure*, and especially the *Matter* of it:

Yea,

Yea, we may reasonably abate of our Inclination, and in some Points even of our Interest, that we may be the better accepted. He that is for getting all he possibly can, tho' in a way which is not dishonest, will be almost sure to get somewhat more than he Desires, I mean the Envy and Ill-will of many: *Every one of us should please his Neighbour* (Rom. 15. 2.) but it must be *for his good to Edification*, not for his hurt, or in any tendency towards his Ruine or Destruction, much less to our own.

§ 4. *Usefulness*, is therefore to be mainly design'd, in order, not only to reasonable Acceptation with others (since *for a good, and useful Man, some would even dare to die*, Rom. 5. 7), but also for regular Satisfaction to our selves (and thus, *a good Man shall, in some respect, be satisfied from himself*, Prov. 14. 14¹); But then it should be *real Usefulness*, such as is truly to the Honour of God, and of some real Advantage to our selves or others: 'Tis indeed an Apostolick Canon and Command, *that if any would not work, neither should he eat*, (2 Thess. 3. 10); and, *that Christians learn to maintain good Works for necessary Uses, that they be not unfruitful*, Tit. 3. 14.

§ 5. Here somewhat more general is first to be offer'd, before I proceed to Particulars: And,

1. We should make sure to keep the *Mean*, where there may be *Extremes*; yet rather inclining towards that Extreme, which appears, when all things have been duly weigh'd, to be less faulty and more safe. This is a Rule which, if well understood and carefully pursu'd, may be of almost infinite Service, not only as to things of a Moral Nature, but in those of a very differing kind. For there are very few things, which admit not of extremes, both in Defect and Excess; and tho' we cannot love God, or really serve him too much, yet we may possibly overstrain both Body and Mind in our Endeavours this way; But this will certainly be less faulty and more safe, than if we should allow our selves to incline towards the other Extreme of loving and serving him below the utmost of our Power.

§ 6. The *Mean*, which we are here upon, is not the very Middle betwixt the Extremes; nor will the same Extreme be always less faulty or more safe; but sometimes the one, and sometimes the other, as Circumstances alter. Health is to be more or less regarded, according as the danger of it appears to be greater or less, upon Consideration of the Air, Diet, Business, and other Circumstances: But where we may hope to reach some very valuable End by taking less care

care of our Health, *that* is in such Case the less faulty and safer Extreme, tho' commonly 'tis the other, which is so.

§ 7. 2. We should carefully redeem the Time from need-
less, and less valuable Occasions, which may be let alone ;
as also by Diligence and Dispatch in what is incumbent on
us. They are to this Purpose very instructive Mottos which
were put upon two Dials, by the forementioned Minister ; the
one in *Latin*,

Emere non potes ; potes Redimere.

(You cannot Purchase Time, but may Redeem).

The other in *English*,

To SHEW, is mine ; to USE, is thine,

We should therefore take care to have somewhat useful
and diverting still in hand, and every where ready (if it may
be) to fill up the Vacancies of Time ; some such Employ-
ment neither Men of Letters nor of Business can easily want,
if they will but carry with them a Table-Book to write in,
or somewhat portable to read. And,

3. Opportunity must be diligently watch'd and improv'd,
viz. such Seasons and concurring Circumstances, in which
we may best perform what we have to do : *Tide* stays not
for any Man, no more than *Time*.

§ 8. 4. We should endeavour so to accustom our selves,
that we may need as little in any kind as possible ; esteeming
it a greater Happiness not to want some things, than to have
them, as the Philosopher, who passing thro' a Market, was
pleas'd to see so great a Variety of Things, whereof he had
no need. We should therefore carefully avoid the making of
any thing necessary to our selves by Custom : He, who uses
himself so nicely and tenderly, as to need all he has, is in
very great Danger, on many Occasions, not to have all
he will need ; and that of the Pious Mr. *Herbert* should not
here be forgotten,

The Man, who needs five hundred Pounds to live,
Is full as Poor, as he that needs but five.

We may do well in the ordering of our selves to use some al-
lowable Variation ; tho' we must usually proceed by Rules,
which are fit to be commonly observ'd ; suppose it were *that*
of eating at set Hours, and so many times a Day ; but it
might prove very inconvenient to be so ty'd up by Custom to
such Rules, that we could not easily vary from them upon just
Occasion.

§ 9. 5. Our Suspensions are to be us'd as true, yet bridled as false; for we should not take them as certain our selves; much less should we report them as such to others; or indeed so much as mention them without Necessity: And yet we should provide, as well as we can, without too great Observation, against what may be reasonably suspected.

§ 10. 6. That of *St. James*, Chap. 1. ver. 19. is indeed an Admonition of excellent Use, *Let every Man be swift to Hear*, (comparatively) *slow to Speak*, *slow to Wrath*, which would give a mighty Advantage to an Antagonist: But, if we must speak before we have heard others, yet it were best, where it may be done, to indent for Liberty to resume and amend what we have said, if Occasion be.

7. We should forbear to speak, where it can probably do no Good, but may do Hurt; or is like to do more hurt than Good. Our common Discourse should rather be of *Things*, than of *Persons*; and as to these, rather the *good*, that can be truly spoken of them than the *bad*: But Silence is more commonly our Security; for a Man to hold his Tongue, is indeed to hold his Peace in a farther Sense, than is usually given to this *English* Idiom.

§ 11. 8. We should watchfully avoid what is really Humour and Fancy; as *E. Gr.* being mightily pleas'd or displeas'd with trifling Matters, and laying great weight upon them; which would tend not only to disparage us; but also to expose us to be play'd upon by such as would perhaps humour us to serve their base or ill Designs upon us: Yet,

9. Some things of smaller Consideration in themselves, are to be greatly regarded for the sake of what may be depending thereon; such as the due Composure of the Countenance; becoming Gestures of the Body; courteous Behaviour; a civil and handsom way of Speaking; a Voice well modul'd; a just Pronunciation and Orthography, and the like: Which are generally much esteem'd; and some of them perhaps beyond their intrinsic Value.

Now the better to secure such Points as these, and others before mentioned,

§ 12. 10. It may be requisite, as early as we can, to engage some prudent and careful Monitour; Authorizing him to use some kind of Severity, if needful, towards us; and always thankfully accepting from him his faithful Discharge of the Trust reposed in him.

Many other Observations of general and extensive Use might be added; but I leave them to be collected, either from this Essay, or others, or from the more solemn Discourses, which refer to the Conduct of our selves; and shall add only some few strictures upon the Particulars, which remain to be spoken to.

§ 13. Now the right Conduct of our selves, under the more absolute Consideration we are here upon, do's mainly or wholly consist in the well ordering of our Bodies, of our Minds, and of both together in respect of external Circumstances.

We may reasonably endeavour to relieve or secure, as also to gratifie or recommend our selves in respect of our Bodies, or Minds, or outward Condition, by all such Means and Methods as are not Evil in themselves, nor like to do more Hurt than Good, to others, or to our selves, in point of certain Damage, real Danger, inward or outward Disquietment; or however in respect of Dis-reputation, as exposing us justly to the Censure or Suspicion of the Wisest and Best. This General Rule may be apply'd in a multitude of Cases; but I shall offer somewhat farther in relation to the following Particulars.

§ 14. What is for external Ornament should be within the Compass of our Station and Condition; avoiding whatsoever may be any way Scandalous.

Our Cloathing should be rather comely and Commodious, than over Curious or Costly; free from Sordidness and affected Singularity.

§ 15. Our Food should be carefully, tho' not scrupulously, guided by heedful Observation, and repeated Experience, with the general Advice of a Physician, who is Skilful and Faithful, and such an one, if it may be, as has been well acquainted with our Constitution and Case for some considerable Time.

Our Diet should be suited, both in respect of Quality and Quantity, to the strength or weakness of our Constitution, to our more active or sedentary Life, as also to the Climate, Air, Season, and other Circumstances: Some Diseases, even of the Mind, are to be in part corrected in the Body, and in some Measure by proper and suitable Food.

A simpler and plainer Diet is commonly to be us'd, rather than that Variety and those sorts of Mixtures, which may be like to prejudice Digestion, whilst they carry the Appetite beyond it in Quantity, and may be like to render the Quality likewise less agreeable to Nature; for that so many differing

sorts may require differing Degrees of Digestion. The Great Lord *Verulam* commends the interchangeable Use of Moderate Eating, Fasting, and full Feeding: But ordinarily that which follows here will hold,

Sæpe, parum, lentè, nunquam satè, Aurea Lex est.

Eat oft; but sparingly, and slowly feed;
Ne'r cloy thy self, a Golden Rule indeed,

§ 16. Here the Inscription put by the Minister who has been more than once mention'd, upon his Knife may be a good *Memento*,

Non ut edam, vivo; sed ut vivam, edo

(I live not to eat, but eat to live).

And we should endeavour to manage it so, that we may not only Breathe, but *Live indeed*, viz. in Health and Strength, free from tormenting Pains, and noisom Distempers, with manageable Vigour, and useful Activity; that our Bodies may be the ready and obsequious Instruments of our Minds, for all good Purposes; but especially those to which we stand peculiarly oblig'd, whether in the Active or Contemplative Life; and *this last* undoubtedly requires a good Supply of Spirits; tho' it will hardly admit the more gross and plentiful sort of Feeding: Yet a due Relaxation of the Mind, and the Use of moderate Exercise, before our Principal Meals, and after them; together with a cheerful Spirit (*giving Thanks in every thing*, according to the Charge, 1 Thess. 5. 18.) may greatly help both the Appetite and Digestion.

§ 17. Sitting Diversions may seem to be more proper and useful for those, who are commonly engaged in stirring Business; but such as consist in Motion, for the Sedentary; and therefore tho' Chess may be very agreeable to the Genius of a Scholar, yet Walking, Bowling, &c, are much better fitted for relaxing the Brain, and stirring the Blood.

But certainly Recreations ought not to engage the Mind too deeply about Winning or Losing; and therefore Men should content themselves to play for little or nothing; however for what is so to them: And it were best, if they would endeavour to find out (as oftentimes they might) some very agreeable Business, which might be to them a suitable Pastime, without the loss of Time: More particularly,

§ 18. Gentle

§ 18. Gentlemen, who are not under the Necessity of supporting themselves and Families by their own Industry, should take Care they make not meer Divertisement their Business, and so a very Toil of Pleasure, in a worse than the proverbial Sense; whenas they might and ought to fix upon somewhat Useful and Generous, for their stated Employment; which would make for the Improvement of their Minds, Encrease of their Estates, the Good of their Neighbours, the Advancement of Knowledge and Virrue; and be of common Service to their Country, or to the World.

§ 19. Physick and Surgery should be sparingly us'd, yet with convenient Speed, when first it appears probable to the skillful and Faithful, that Nature cannot well relieve it self without them; for *that* is otherwise the best Helper; especially if it be but freed from some Impediments, and prudently assisted in the way, wherein it frames to Work, for its own Relief, provided that be not Excessive: But, when we see need of somewhat farther still, we should take Care to go, as near as may be, to the bottom of the Case, so as to complete the Cure, and prevent a more dangerous Relapse: But if this should befall us, the utmost Care must then be speedily us'd: And it may be a good Instruction with reference to Health, that we be not Ill too late, nor Well too soon.

§ 20. As to our Minds, we should endeavour to furnish the Understanding and Memory with useful Knowledge; not neglecting what may give us Acceptation with others: especially we should more thoroughly acquaint our selves with that, which most concerns us in respect of the present and future Life.

An Acquaintance with History and Geography, and with the present state of Affairs, as also a good Collection of instructive Fables, with their Morals, and of the best Proverbs in divers Languages, with the just Explication of them, (where that is needful), may be of singular Use, and no small Accomplishment: And even some proverbial Sentences, which appear Extravagant at first, may yet have some thing at the bottom worth our Notice; thus, [a Young Saint, an Old Devil] may speak the Danger of Young Men's declining from what is Good, whither it tends, and where it's like to Issue.

Some competent Knowledge of the Laws under which we live may be requisite, both for our own sakes, and for the Service of our Friends and Neighbours.

§ 21. The due regulating of our Inclinations is a Matter of the highest Importance; nor is Light alone (as I conceive) sufficient for that End; the Force of Reason and Argument, how cogentsoever, has often prov'd, by it self alone, ineffectual; nor yet will a mere constrained Exercise of Virtuous Actions rectifie an Evil Disposition; nor finally, *that*, which is chosen *only* upon some lower Design than the pleasing of God, and being happy in his peculiar Favour.

§ 22. There must be a Principle within, capable of the truest Discernment, and of being mov'd by the Fear and Love of God, enabling us to *chuse the things which please him*, and so to *take hold of his Covenant*, and, therewithal, of his omnipotent Strength; that we may be able to stem the impetuous Tide of our own irregular Desires (not only those of the Flesh, but likewise of the Mind), to move against a Stream so very strong and violent, as is the *Course of this World*; and *that* in direct Opposition to the Storms and Tempests, which may be rais'd against us, both within and without by *the Prince of the Power of the Air*; and besides, against the inveigling Allurements, which often prove of greater Force than those: We shall therefore plainly need a *greater Spirit* with; and *in us*, than he, *that is in the World*.

§ 23. For *that* we must believingly and earnestly Pray; *to that* we must readily yield our selves, and seriously endeavour to co-operate therewith by Consideration, Hearing, Reading, serious Converse, diligent Attendance on every Divine Institution, together with suitable Practice; and in all by the Exercise of Faith in our Great Mediatour.

§ 24. We must press upon our Mind and Conscience the higher Arguments, which ought to move us; taking in all the good Considerations, that will in any Measure do it; with becoming Shame and Grief, if the former can scarcely stir us at all, and that both together should carry us no farther; but trusting in the Divine Goodness and Faithfulness, that we shall yet be more fully assisted and succeeded in our waiting upon God; and certainly be accepted, through his Infinite Mercy, for the Merits of our Saviour, so as at the last to be openly acquitted, and solemnly call'd to *enter, as good and faithful Servants, into the Joy of our Lord*.

C H A P. XXIV.

§ 1. **SOME** Intimations have been given, how we should order our selves more *absolutely*; before I proceed to shew how we should Manage our Affairs and Undertakings, we may next consider,

III. How we should *relatively* conduct and behave our selves in some Special Respects; and that, Particularly,

1. We must solemnly oblige our selves, and use our utmost Care, and best Endeavours to carry towards *GOD*, as becomes us to a Being of Universal and Infinite Perfection, who is our Creator, our Absolute Owner, our Supreme Ruler, our most Gracious and Merciful Benefactor, our Chief Good, and ultimate End; paying, withal, such peculiar Regards to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as may respectively answer their Special and distinct Relationsto us, and Concernment with us, according to Scriptural Revelation; which is to be observ'd, as the most certain, and complete Rule, both of Natural and Instituted Religion.

§ 2. 2. As to good and bad Angels, we are to judge of them according to the Scriptural Discovery; and agreeably thereto we must Honour and Love the former, detest, resist, and as far as may be avoid the latter: Yet neither may we rail on *these*, or charge them without sufficient Evidence; nor yet pay any thing of Divine Homage or Honour to *those*; nor are we to seek our Help from either of them.

As to departed Souls, we are neither to determine any thing about them, nor concern our selves with them, but as the Word and Providence of God may plainly lead, upon strict Enquiry, together with just Deliberation, and the best Advice we can have.

§ 3. 3. A due Behaviour towards our selves consists in Thinking rightly of our selves, and therefore humbly, yet not injuriously; also in Speaking, as is right and fit, both of, and for our selves, upon just Occasion; and farther yet, in acting every way towards our selves, and upon our own Account, as may best promote our real Interest, in order to our highest Felicity; or however consistently with it.

§ 4. 4. As to other Men; we must love our Neighbour, tho' not always equally with our selves, yet as truly as our selves; and therefore must Think, and Speak, and Act agreeably in relation to him, as it has been shewn we

ought to do in reference to our selves ; observing that excellent Caution of the Moralist, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*: Do not to others, what you (reasonably) would, they should not do to you, *q. d.* Injure not any, whereas you reasonably would, that none should Injure you ; nor should you suffer them to do it, when you can fairly prevent them : But here it must be observ'd, that, what may be call'd an Harm, is not always an Injury, nor is always reasonably to be nill'd by us to our selves. Yet,

§ 5. That approved Rule, which is so plainly a Dictate of the Law of Nature, do's (I conceive) as plainly forbid the using any penal Method to drive Men from what they apprehend to be their Duty towards God, or even to put them (as some would have it) upon considering better ; whilst their Conscience do's not evidently lead to any such manifest Injury either to God or Man, as might rank them amongst the *Evil doers*, intended, *Rom. 13.* who are to be punish'd or restrained by the Magistrate ; nor yet brings them within the true Reason of the only Penal Law about Religion, which God himself saw fit to enact and entrust in the hands of Men ; viz. against gross Idolatry, and such as should entice others thereto ; which, under the *Jewish Theocracy*, must be the renouncing their Allegiance to God, who was so peculiarly their King, and indeed their Civil Lawgiver ; who appointed that Nation to be thus visibly distinguish'd from the rest of the World, 'till *SHILOH* should come, and that peculiar Form of Government, together with the Special Occasion and Use thereof, should thereupon cease.

§ 6. Now who Man can find the Man, or number of Men, to whom he can even at present judge it reasonable to say [If I should happen, how Conscientiously soever, to differ, in a Point that is purely Religious, from what you do, or sometime may, take to be a Certain and Important Truth ; spare not to endeavour my Conviction by Incapacities, or other Penal Methods] ; whenas he knows, that no Natural Force, or Civil Authority, or greater Learning, or Number, no nor unfeigned Piety, can render them Infallible ; and also, that, if he should really need to be set Right, such a Method would be more fitted to make him an Hypocrite than a real Convert, and so. rather hateful to God than accepted by him. We should not therefore take upon us, if we were in Authority, without plainer Commission from God, than has been yet produc'd (for that of *Job 31. 27, 28.* and other like Allegations, may be fairly Answer'd), to use that Method with others, which in our very Consciences we would judge unfit,

unreasonable, and plainly Injurious, not only to us, but to the Divine Prerogative, when it should be bro't home to our selves.

§ 7. But our blessed Lord has carry'd the forementioned Caution yet higher in *that* so Divine Command, *Whatsoever ye would that others should do to you, do you even so to them*, which he confirms by adding, *for this is the Law and the Prophets*; q. d. the Sum and Substance of what they charge upon us in relation to our Neighbour: The meaning plainly is, that we should suppose our selves to be in the Case of another, and thereupon well consider, what we might *reasonably* expect from him, were he in our present Case; and that we should act accordingly.

As to the Special Duties of particular Relations, I shall not enter into them more distinctly, but leave them under the Direction of the General Rules, that have been mention'd here, and to the Special Instructions, which are to be found in the Sacred Scriptures, and Treatises agreeable thereto. And, to proceed,

§ 8. 5. We should make our Converse useful and agreeable, as far as innocently and prudently we may, to our Company, not only admitting, but inviting and drawing in every one to bear a part in Conversation, and to speak of what may be most agreeable to themselves and to the rest.

To make Converse more useful it were commonly best, it should be directed to some particular valuable Point of Knowledge or Practice, and not run loose; nor go too hastily from one thing to another, before we have brought the Matter in hand to any Issue; neither should we ordinarily let things pass, which we conceive to be wrong, without a modest and prudent Opposition; nor yet (which would be much worse) set or allow our selves to Wrangle about every thing; or absolutely to take this or that side, without endeavouring to help out our Antagonist, as they should do, who heartily design to find out the Truth, and fix it, rather than to carry their Point.

§ 9. 6. We should not make even the meanest Person needlessly our Enemy; and where we must oppose others, we should not farther provoke them, than is altogether Necessary. As to the Resentment of what others say or do against us injuriously, we should carefully remember and observe, that to be easily provok'd, and never, or very hardly reconcil'd is Diabolical; to be easily provok'd, and easily Reconcil'd is Humane; but to be hardly provok'd and easily Reconcil'd is Divine: We should not take any Offence, where that which is said or done may as well be taken by a
better

better Handle as by a worse ; nor always appear to be mov'd, where there may be indeed just Cause, but it would be like to do more harm than good ; yet ordinarily we may softly intimate, that we see the ill Treatment, but can easily pass it by, where the Matter is tolerable ; and that we are inclin'd, upon reasonable Terms, to forgive what is otherwise, and so to forget Injuries, as not to return them, nor carry ill to others, whilst yet we retain a cautionary Remembrance of them, so as not to subject our selves to the like or greater, where we may fairly avoid them.

§ 10. 7. Reproof is to be given only where there is some Hopes of doing good thereby ; at least for the vindicating of our own Character, and that others be not farther hard'n'd by our Silence : And we should make it as gentle as will consist with faithfulness. Penal Corrections are more sparingly to be us'd, yet doubtless ought to be employ'd, where other Methods prove ineffectual ; since *We must not suffer sin upon our Brother*, if in any fit way we can reclaim him, nor should run the manifest hazard of *bearing sin for him* (as the Marginal Reading is) upon our Neglect.

§ 11. 8. We must always be ready to pay what Respect may be due to others ; modestly declining what plainly belongs not to our selves, and courteously receiving what it may become us to admit of.

As we should not easily accept all Offers of Kindness, so neither should we despise the lowest, nor refuse any without a thankful Acknowledgment, nor yet receive them without making such Returns upon fit Occasions, as may be proper for us towards the Person who confers them : 'Tis a known saying, *Qui accipit Beneficium, perdidit Libertatem*, He that receives a Courtesie, has, in some degree, sold his Liberty ; and I may add, He that makes a suitable Return, has redeem'd it back again, by quitting Scores.

The farther Direction of our Behaviour towards others, may be given in part under that Branch, which will refer to our Conducting of such as may be specially committed to us ; but must otherwise be left to Treatises of Divinity, Ethicks, Politicks, &c.

§ 12. 9. As to inferiour Creatures about us in any Kind, God has indeed given us a Dominion over them, and we should by no means set up any, or all of them together, as our *Lords* ; much less should we make them our *Gods*, by loving, fearing, or depending on them, (or indeed on any Superior Creatures) as if they were more than Creatures : Yet on the other hand, our Dominion over them is not to be
altogether

altogether Arbitrary, being limited by him, who is the only absolute Lord over us and them. We must therefore use them as his, for his Honour and Service; for real Good to ourselves and others, especially for the common Advantage, according to what God has fitted them for; not tyrannizing over the Brute-Creatures about us, but carrying it towards them, as the *Righteous Man, who regardeth the life of his Beast*, Prov. 12. 10. (and this the Sacred Scriptures intimate, as a Point of Morality, tho' they undertake not Philosophy); we should therefore allow them convenient Food and Rest; defending them also from such Insults of their fellow Creatures, as would serve to no good Purpose, rather than merely to divert our selves therewith: Tho' it is not to be doubted, but a lawful Use may be made of the Natural Enmity in some of them towards others, and that it may afford some useful Observations and Remarks.

§ 13. 10. Our External Circumstances may be (1.) such, as are determined for us by an over-ruling Providence; and here our business is to fall in therewith, quietly to submit to seeming or real Inconveniences, where there is no *clear* way for our avoiding them; and we should indeed believe they may be so long needful or fittest for us: In the mean while we are gratefully to observe, accept and use what we other-ways have that is agreeable, or may serve in an innocent way to alleviate our Troubles. But,

Whilst we set our selves to make the best we can of our present Condition, we are yet submissively to seek, and cheerfully to take, what Course would really make for our Deliverance; but carefully shunning what may probably lead into farther and greater Inconvenience.

§ 14. In Circumstances, that are justly pleasing to us, we should be thankful to God and to the Instruments he makes use of for our good; but suspicious of our selves, lest we should pervert a prosperous Condition to our own or others Hurt; or set our Hearts too much on present things or think of resting in them: We should rather look and provide for Vicissitudes; but without the disquieting Sollicitude which would rob us of our present Comfort, and God of the Praises due to him. Here that needful Admonition, *Psal. 62. 10. is to be carefully minded, If riches encrease, set not your hearts upon them*; together with so wise and kind a Charge, as that of our Redeemer, *Mat. 6. 34. Take no thought for the Morrow; for the Morrow shall take thought for the things of it self: sufficient unto the Day is the evil thereof.*

§ 15. Again, (2.) Our Circumstances may in some Cases be such as are allotted or allowed to us by Men; who may either have a just Authority over us, and such as comes fully up to the particular Case; here we are unquestionably to submit as to a Divine Appointment and Disposal: or else they may usurp a Power which belongs not to them; and this either without any real Title to govern us at all; and they are then to be regarded no farther than Prudence may require, for the averting some greater Evil, or procuring some greater Good to our selves or others: Or else they only want a proper and just Authority for the ordering of such particular Matter, or for the doing it in such a Manner; and here, tho' we may not be bound to yield in Point of Conscience, as to a Disposal by Divine Commission; yet we may be under an Obligation, even of Duty, quietly to submit in Deference to the Person, and more general Commission of the Magistrate; supposing him still to maintain the Character of being, in other Respects, and upon the whole, *the Minister of God to us for good*, or such however to the Publick, the Peace whereof we neither safely can, nor indeed lawfully may go about to disturb upon an Account that is merely Private: And to such Submission we are bound in Duty to the Civil Society, whereof we are Members, and to which we have engaged our selves, to secure and promote the Publick Tranquillity and Welfare, tho' we might happen to fall under some personal and private Hardships.

§ 16. Yet farther, (3.) There are Circumstances, whereof we our selves have the Ordering, at least in some good Measure; as *E. gr.* the chusing of our stated Business, the Place of our Abode, and some of our Relatives; as namely, for Service, or in Marriage.

Now we are here to govern our selves upon the due Consideration of all that is Material in reference to any of these, by the forementioned Intentions of regular Satisfaction, reasonable Acceptation, and real Usefulness; fixing upon what is likeliest to answer these nearer Purposes in subserviency to, or consistently with, our farther and higher Interests.

§ 17. As to our stated Business, somewhat has been said already in the General, Part II. Chap. 10. § 12. page 170. But it may be observ'd a little more particularly, that we should Consider, whether we have strength and fitness of Body, or a Make, and Capacity of Mind, for this or that Business; whether we have laid in the requisite Furniture, or may hope to do it in fit Time, whether it lie not so very cross to our Inclination, as that it must be like to prove a
[continual

continual and intolerable Burthen; more especially, whether we may hope to be Safe and Useful in such way of Living; and that it may be like to afford what is Needful and Convenient for us.

§ 18. The Place of our Abode is mainly to be determin'd by the Consideration of real Advantages and reasonable Satisfaction to our selves and those we are obliged Specially to regard in a Case of that Nature: The Place should be as near as we can suited to our Constitution in Point of Health, as also to our Condition and Business; a suitable Neighbourhood and Society is much to be desir'd; but we should by no means pitch, where we may not hope to Enjoy the Presence of God in some good Measure.

Such are to be chosen for Servants, as are like to prove Faithful, Skilful, Tractable, and Quiet; how we should carry towards them may be seen in part, Chap. 18. § 6: page 329.

§ 19. As to the Choice of a Person for Marriage, which should not be too early, I shall insist somewhat farther; since it is a Matter of so very great Consequence, both in respect of this World and the other. We should therefore take heed of being entangled before we have well considered; In case of being suddenly taken with any one, it were most advisable, first to cool a little upon the Matter, before it be pursu'd; and then not to pursue it hastily beyond a Safe and Honourable Retreat; but carefully to avoid rash and Solemn Engagements; and indeed to take what Care we can that Affections be not engag'd on either hand without the Concurrence of our Father in Heaven, and Parents upon Earth, who tho' they may not impose their own Choice upon Children, yet may fairly claim a Negative upon *theirs*, where they see plain and weighty Reason for it.

We should be very watchful that we sell not our selves for secular Advantage; and that we be not ruin'd in point of Estate, Reputation, or solid Contentment, for the pleasing of our Fancy with Beauty, or Wit, or Titular Honour.

§ 20. We must always remember, a good Wife (or Husband) is from the Lord by a more peculiar Providence; that the Divine Omniscience alone can sufficiently guide our Choice; and that his Presence alone can make it happy, how wisely soever it might seem to be made: Both Parties should therefore carefully see to it, as far as possibly they can, that they be indeed *God's and each other's Choice*; not only each others Choice without constraint on either side, but each of them likewise chosen out for the other by the Special Providence

Providence of God; and it were greatly to be desir'd, they should be such as *he has chosen for himself.*

§ 21. We should endeavour to be reasonably sure of a good and suitable Natural Disposition, together with somewhat of an agreeable Education, Opinion, and manner of Living; and that the Person be such as we can truly love for Reasons, which we need not be ashamed to own.

A Wife should have Prudence enough to submit, as becomes her, when her Reasons have been modestly offer'd: An Husband should be qualify'd to Govern as becomes him, with Affection, Prudence, and Gentleness.

The Conversation, in order to Marriage, ought carefully to be manag'd with inoffensive Freedom; and so as to keep our Minds open to farther Light, and that we may submit our Desires to the manifest Leadings, and Sovereign Disposals of Providence.

§ 22. It remains, that something be specially added as to that Conduct of our selves, which has relation to those we are peculiarly engag'd, or would endeavour, to Conduct: And here, upon a right state of the Design we would pursue, we should carefully see, that it be not only good in it self, but that it can be made *plainly* to appear *such* also to them, so as none may see Cause, or have the Confidence to persuade them otherwise; and even where it may be requisite to conceal from them what we are really designing, yet we should take all possible Care it may not have an ill Appearance to them, if discover'd, but especially when attain'd.

We must carefully endeavour, not so much in Words, as by our Carriage, that those whom we would Conduct may be fully satisfy'd of our Integrity and good Affections towards them, and as far as may be also of our Ability and Prudence.

§ 23. The Means and Measures we would use ought to be adapted, as near as we can, to their Capacity, Genius, Inclination, and acknowledged Interest, or at least to what is truly so: And we must Work, as far as well may be, by the Principles, Notions, Acquaintance, and Confidants they have already; yet without approving them, where they are really bad; but rather endeavouring by the surest Steps, tho' perhaps they must be slow, to draw them off from those that are such, chiefly by substituting *better* in their Place, and using fit Endeavours to carry them by degrees to admit of such as are truly *best*, or rather to embrace them, as of their own Accord.

§ 24. We must take heed of pretending to an Authority we have not over others, or of straining what we have; yet this must be studiously, but cautiously maintain'd; sparingly us'd, but resolutely insist'd on, when once we have engag'd it; unless there should appear some weighty Reason to the contrary, which then we should produce, if we fitly may, as the Ground of our departing from what we had insist'd on; but that is to be done so far only and in such a sort as will best consist with the securing of our Authority, and other valuable Ends.

A strict Impartiality is to be generally observ'd in our Behaviour towards such as may stand in like Relation to us, or who may seem to have a like Claim from us; and particularly towards Children, Servants, Scholars, or Subjects.

§ 25. The Business, Learning, or other Matters, in which others are to be conducted, should be made as easie and pleasant to them as well may be. The harder and easier Parts should be interwoven, that both the Mind and Body may be alternately intended and relax'd: All is to be manag'd with as little Severity as well may be. And therefore the more gentle Methods are first to be try'd, such as Advising, Encouraging, Expostulating, Charging, Reprimanding, and Threatning; if these alone will not do, we are then to join some of the severer Methods with them in the way of a gradual Advance: Here Shame is to be first try'd; then the withholding, or withdrawing what would be pleasing and encouraging; Blows are not ordinarily to be us'd without the last Necessity; nor is mere Weakness to be punish'd, but Wilfulness, or palpable Negligence and Carelessness; nor is every Fault, that might deserve it to be presently charg'd and punish'd, but rather to be remember'd and call'd over upon Occasion of some greater Offence; and then Instruction should both precede and follow Correction; this should be begun in due Time, that there may need the less of it; and lesser Faults are to be suitably chastiz'd for the prevention of greater. But then,

§ 26. What is well ought to be observ'd, own'd and encourag'd; and we should, as far as possible, engage all about us to carry towards those who are under our Conduct, as we our selves see requisite to do: But great Regard is to be had of the differing Tempers of those with whom we are concern'd; and diligent Observation to be made what sort of Methods work most kindly and effectually with this or that Person.

In our Reasoning with those whom we would conduct, the higher and more generous Motives are first and frequently to be try'd ; but if they will not reach the good Purpose at which we aim, or not so fully ; those of a lower Nature must be added, and the Compliance is to be approv'd, on whatsoever *allowable* Grounds it might proceed : Yet we are to be still recommending to them those which are preferable, as being truly the noblest and best.

C H A P. XXV.

§ 1. FROM the Conduct of our selves, we proceed to that of our secular Business and Concerns. Now,

IV. As to the *more common Affairs of Life*, Management seems chiefly to respect the stated ways of Getting, Securing, Improving, and Employing what we may call our Estate, or Means of Subsistence in this World.

Here we should be careful to set due Bounds to our Desires, Pursuits, and Cares, remembering that of *Solomon*, Eccles. 5. 10. *He that loveth Silver shall not be satisfied with Silver, nor he that loveth Abundance with Increase*; and also that of a greater than *Solomon*, Luke 12. 15. *Take heed and beware of Covetousness: for a Mans Life consisteth not in the Abundance of the things, which he possesseth.*

§ 2. We should account our selves in some sort *Rich*, when we have more than for Necessity; especially if we have to live, and to give; nor only to lay out, but somewhat to lay up, proportionably to our Rank and Station.

In order to this we should have some stated way of Business, and ought to use Diligence therein: We should not do by another hand what we may well enough do by our own; nor delay till to Morrow what might as well be done to Day: Nor should we despise smaller things, either in Point of Loss, when it might as well be avoided; or of Gain which might as well be had.

We should not spare what might be spent with probable Advantage; nor spend what may be spar'd without Sin, or Shame, or greater Loss, or manifest Hazard.

§ 3. We must not make our Adventures beyond what our greater Certainties may be like to support, in case the other should miscarry.

We are to count the Cost of expensive Undertakings, and that with such farther Allowances as experienced Persons have found to be requisite: And our expected Gain ought to be computed with some like Abatement. We should, in Prudence as well as Duty, *leave off Contention before it be meddled with*, Prov. 7. 14. before we be solemnly engaged in it; and this in respect of Law, as well as in the Conflicts of other Kinds; we should be willing even to buy our Peace, and reckon it no ill Penny-worth at what the Contest would be like to cost us, preferring, what they call a Lean Agreement, to a Fatter Verdict, if it were sure to be got.

§ 4. We ought to use our Credit sparingly, and to answer it, as near as may be, punctually; appearing however at our time to answer for any unavoidable Delay.

Our Promises should be slow, but our Performance sure; and if it may be speedy too. The Favours we have to bestow should be kept free and unengaged, as long as conveniently may be, whilst yet we may intimate our kind Intentions, but with Care we make not Enemies by raising Expectations, which we might be in Danger not to Answer.

§ 5. We should purchase Service, where we can have it at a moderate Rate, rather than sell our Liberty by accepting it gratis; yet neither must we be so very shy of admitting it, as to create a Suspicion of our being Haughty, or ill-natur'd, or backward to do the like for others.

As near as well may be we should Buy with, and Sell for, ready Money, contenting our selves with a small, but certain, Profit, as knowing that lighter Gains, with quick Returns, are like to make the heavier Purse: If by means of our greater Stock, or other Advantages, we could under-sell all about us, and so engross the Business to our selves, we should take care we go not about, in this or other ways, to raise our selves upon the manifest Ruin of others: tho' we may indeed reduce them to a fair and reasonable way of Dealing.

§ 6. We should be ready to give all fit Assurances in Law, and to do it early, that we may create the greater Confidence in others, and that we may also take the like with the better Grace from others; yet looking still upon approved Honesty, together with Ability, as the only firm Security; but whilst we may, and should profess chiefly to depend on those; yet the uncertainty of his Life to whom we give Credit, and of their proving altogether like him, who may happen to come in his Place, may be a very reasonable and inoffensive Ap-
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gy for our desiring the speediest Security, in Case it should not be offer'd.

§ 7. All our Appointments, especially in the way of Business, should be cautiously made, (with fit Allowance for the Difference of Clocks, or Watches); and they are to be carefully observ'd: Nor should we easily let in, or continue a Discourse, which would be like to shut out Matters of Importance, or however to straiten them in point of Time.

As to what may not be so fitly reckon'd amongst the more common Affairs of Life, somewhat may be offer'd under the next Head. And.

§ 8. V. For the right Conducting of any more Special and Solemn Undertaking, I shall *fi p* give some Directions in common, and *then* proceed to what may be more peculiar to some particular Matters, and especially such as relate to Learning. We must here see that we neglect not the most General Instructions, *viz.* those about Engaging God with us, about stating the very Point at which we would or should more precisely aim, as also about Subordinate Intentions, &c; also that we take along with us such of the more Special Intimations already given, as may be requisite to attend our Undertaking, and we should farther observe some such Measures, as those which follow.

§ 9. 1. Let our Design, tho' we suppose it really good and fit to be pursu'd, should yet be misconstru'd, disguis'd, expos'd. or oppos'd, it is not to be opened farther than the Matter plainly requires, in order to proper Advice, and needful or convenient Assistance.

Where Secresie is requisite, we should keep the safest distance, we well can, from any Discourse of that Affair; or however must look that we come not any way near to the Point we would conceal: Therefore should endeavour early to prevent or divert such Enquiries or Discourse, as might border upon it, or lead to it: But Care must be taken, that we create not a Suspicion by appearing Shie; rather we should frankly communicate what may be safe and fit, with an Air of unreserv'd Openness; yet passing withal smoothly away to what may be sufficiently remote, as by a fair Occasion from some thing which was said, or that otherways accidentally presents.

§ 10. It might be somewhat of a Guard and Security against having our Silence, or Refusal to answer, justly constru'd into a certain determinate Sense; if we take all fit Occasions to profess, and make it frequently our Practice, to leave the World to conjecture, or presume, as they please; where

where we easily could, and may appear really concern'd to resolve the Question, for the gaining of Reputation, avoiding Reproach, or upon some other manifest Reason.

But if Truth cannot be conceal'd without speaking what we know to be False, we ought to submit, as to the Providence of God, committing the Issue to him, whilst we are complying with his Charge to *show all Appearance of Evil*, 1 Thess. 5. 22. *Id.* Position (Gx) and (Gy) p. 117.

§ 11. 2. Ev'ry thing is not to be presumed Easie or Feasible, which may so appear in Speculation; whereas some such Things may be found quite otherwise, when it comes to Practice: Nor yet on the other hand should we despair, or despond about ev'ry thing which may seem extremely Difficult, and hardly possible; as some things have shewn, till they have been try'd and pursu'd in some repeated Attempts. For who could easily have perswaded himself that it were possible to have printed off so many Broad-sides of the very smallest Letters; or so many Copies of the largest and finest Copper-Cuts, without so much as a single Blot, or any thing of a Blank, when yet we may see it often so in Fact?

We should here make the best Enquiries we can of Persons, who are conversant in Affairs of such a Nature as *that* may be to which our Design relates, that so we may the better discern, what may be prudently attempted, and where we ought to desist; but then we should see, as near as may be, that those we Consult have no Bias of Interest, or Inclination to suggest what might guide us wrong.

§ 12. 3. The actual Prosecution of our Undertaking should be delay'd, as long as may be Safe and Convenient, for the taking in what Light we can, before we enter upon it, yet some Hazard is to be run, where there would probably be more Harm or Danger in our Delaying, than in adventuring to begin before we have fully satisfy'd all the Enquiries we would desire to make.

§ 13. 4. When we enter upon some difficult and doubtful Undertaking, we should endeavour, if it may be, to secure to our selves a way of Retreat, with Safety and Honour, or however, with as little Inconvenience, as the Case will admit; and therefore we shoud not ordinarily appear to be fully bent upon s^{ch} Design: but rather to be making only some Trial and Essay; and indeed we should be really willing to retreat; if some weighty Reason should present upon our beginning or proceeding to act, which we could not, or however did not see before.

§ 14. 5. Fit Allowances are to be made, both in the laying, and pursuit of our Undertakings for unforeseen Difficulties and Obstructions, in respect of the Time, Cost, Pains, and Help, which may be found needful beyond what we could certainly determine beforehand. Our Computation in these Respects ought not to be too strait, nor our Undertaking too large: for it would be Imprudent to expect, that ev'ry thing should fall out just as we could wish, or as we suppose might be reasonably hop'd; we should therefore provide for the worst that probably can be, and if it fall out better, the Harm will not be so great as on the other hand.

§ 15. 6. We should beforehand set due Bounds to our Experiments and Attempts, and observe them afterwards with steady Resolution (unless there should be very manifest Reason to the contrary), that we be not drawn in, and carry'd on, too far in the eagerness of Pursuit, and merely thro' unwil'ingness to suffer a Disgrace or a Defeat: Yet.

7. A very great probability of retrieving our Disappointment may be allow'd to carry us into some farther Attempt provided it be not like to overstrain, or sink us beyond recovery in Case it should miscarry.

§ 16. 8. We should not, professedly or openly however, carry our Aim and Endeavours beyond what we may hope to obtain from others, lest we fall short of what might be had by reaching at more. We must take care not to disoblige those whom we may have Occasion to apply to, by making our lesser Suits too frequent, or pressing the greater too far, or in an unbecoming Manner. Nothing is to be ask'd of any one, but what may probably be within the compass of his Power and Skill; nor is any thing ordinarily to be requested, or expected from Great Men, other than what their Inclination and Interest, with the particular Designs they have in View, may lead them to do, or heartily to endeavour: Yet what is not certainly *so* may sometimes be warily attempted with them, by fit Persons, in the most agreeable way, and at proper Seasons (*the mollior Tempora Fuit*, when they are likeliest to give the Matter a fair Hearing); but it is not to be too vehemently solicited; nor should we appear too deeply to resent its being neglected, tho' perhaps undertaken; especially where our Resentments would be to them insignificant, or would be like to turn, equally at least, to our own Disadvantage.

When we move only what it is their Interest to fall in with, we should make sure, as far as well we can, that it be so apprehended, whilst yet we are to seek it as a private Favour, or publick Service, or the like; and now and then upon fair Occasions they may be softly reminded by some Intimation of our Dependance on them, or that we are pursuing their Directions, &c. those we must follow; or desire their farther Instructions upon what may be strongly Objected, or upon any new Emergencies: We must, ourselves, be fully Masters of what we would represent, and should so prepare the Matter, that we may make it as easie and short as possible, laying it, if need be, in writing before them, and putting no more Trouble upon them than what is unavoidable.

§ 17. 9. What can be conveniently done more immediately by our selves (as has been intimated before) should not ordinarily be committed to another, nor our Matter opened farther than the Occasion do's plainly require. But,

Where the Undertaking cannot be carry'd so certainly, and advantagiously, or easily, by our selves alone, we should take in the fittest Help we can have, *i. e.* the most honest and best affected to the Matter it self, and to our selves among such as are intelligent Persons, Men of Interest and Influence where the Case requires it); and who are considerate, steady, and diligent; nor are we to use a greater Number than is needful, in order to sure Advice, and effectual Prosecution.

10. Where we have others to assist us, we should carefully divide the Undertaking, if it may be, so that we our selves and our Partners may be severally charg'd with the Part for which we and they are really best fitted; and tho' one is not to enter into anothers Province, yet they should both steadily meet together, and occasionally confer with each other, as the Case may require.

§ 18. 11. Where we are to consult or otherwise transact any Matter by an *Internuncius* or *Agent*, we should chuse amongst the forementioned Associates, or other like Persons, one or two who by Inclination, Interest, and other Circumstances will be like to prove intirely Faithful to us, and as acceptable as well may be to those unto whom we would apply; but, if it may be, not depending on them, or expecting from them, on account of himself or others: We must not say or do any thing, which might import a low Esteem, or Suspicion of the Person we employ; we are not to interfere, or unnecessarily to join our selves with him in what is

committed to him, much less to set him quite aside in any Part thereof without some such Reason as might be satisfactory even to him, or that the using him farther would probably be of worse Consequence than the dismissing of him. Yet,

§ 19. 12. That we lay not our selves, or our Friends any way liable to be practis'd upon by our Agent, or thro' him by such, as may have the Ascendant over him, it may in some Cases be fit, with all due Caution and Prudence, to seek or take a fair Opportunity and Occasion to represent our own Matter more immediately by our selves, that we may *also* see with our own Eyes, and hear with our own Ears, as well as those of our Agent; or if this cannot so conveniently be; then to use some farther way of Intercourse; Suppose by Occasional Discourse with some Intimate Acquaintance of the Person, to whom we are applying, but without an express Desire, that he should address him for us, yet intimating, that we are sensible of the good Correspondence betwixt them, and expressing only such things, as we may deliberately wish should be carry'd by the Confident to his Friend, for the Service of our main Design: But here we should duly consider what Particulars are the fittest to be thus entrusted, and in this way convey'd; and when there has been Time and Opportunity for *that*, we should farther converse about the Matter before Discours'd, observing and improving what may be for our Purpose; and watchfully looking that we be not plaid upon.

But it were probably best to let our Agent know from the first, that for the carrying of our Point more effectually thro', we may perhaps make our Application by more than one single Hand, as opportunity may fairly present, but that our chief Dependance is upon his Negotiation.

§ 20. Where an Affair is to be issu'd by a Body of Men, or however by a considerable Number, we must make as sure as we can of such as are the Leading Persons amongst them, endeavouring to engage them to use their Interest with others, yet not neglecting, after that, to make a distinct Application, if it may be, to every one of the rest; whose Presence and Concurrence may be Necessary, as well as that the proper Persons should move and argue the Matter: Here we should labour to secure a good Majority, and to see, when the Time comes, that they fail not to attend; nor should he, whose Affair is in hand be out of the way, unless there be Special Reason for it; tho' in things of this Nature, he may generally find it requisite to employ some Number to Sollicit, who
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are acquainted with those we would engage, and know the fittest Manner of applying to them.

C H A P. XXVI.

§ 1. **WHAT** was more particularly Design'd is now to be consider'd, *viz* The stated pursuit of useful Knowledge with other Improvements, and the drawing of them out more solemnly in regular Discourse, or other suitable Performances. And,

VI. *As to the stated Pursuit of useful Knowledge with other Improvements:* By useful Knowledge, is to be understood such an Acquaintance with Words, and Things, and Persons as may be like more immediately to serve some valuable Purpose, and also to subserve the best and greatest; such kind of Knowledge as may in some way or other answer the Time, and Cost, and Pains bestow'd about it.

§ 2. By the *stated Pursuit* thereof, is design'd a more fix'd and orderly Application to the use of proper Means and Methods for getting, securing, and enlarging such kind of Knowledge.

There are, besides this, other and farther *Improvements* both of Mind and Body, such as the useful and commendable Habits of Virtue, and of Art; and however those, *which accompany Salvation*, are not so properly acquir'd by Industry and Exercise, yet they are in this way to be attain'd; nor can it be regularly expected, that the Giver of every good and perfect Gift should communicate them to the Slothful and Negligent: Neither are such as these like to compass even those lower Accomplishments, which do so plainly require a diligent and continu'd Pursuit.

§ 3. But whereas Knowledge is a necessary Requisite to other Improvements, and that it lies more fully in our way, I shall speak more directly to that, and only glance at others in some Suggestions, which easily may be apply'd to the more immediate Pursuit of those other Attainments, to which useful Knowledge has at least a more distant Tendency. It must here unquestionably be of the greatest use very heedfully to consider what is delivered by Solomon, but certainly from a Greater than himself, Prov. 2. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. *My Son, if thou wilt receive my Words, and hide my Commandments with thee, so that thou incline thine Ear unto Wisdom, and apply thine*

Heart to understanding ; Yea if thou cryest after Knowledge, and liftest up thy Voice for Understanding ; If thou seekest her as Silver, and searchest for her as for hid Treasures : Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God : For the Lord giveth Wisdom ; out of his Mouth cometh Knowledge and Understanding ; He layeth up sound Wisdom for the Righteous ; He is a Buckler to them, who walk uprightly.

§ 4. What has been already offer'd about Conduct is here to be review'd ; and much of it may be certainly accommodated and apply'd, without any great Difficulty, to the Purpose now in hand ; I shall therefore proceed to something more peculiar : And,

1. The Foundations of Knowledge, with other Improvements, are to be carefully laid ; and that as sure and large as well may be. It is altogether fit that the undoubted Principles of Religion be taken in early by all. And even those who are not fitting for a learned Employment, should yet be led into some Acquaintance, if it might be, with the Elements and Rudiments of a more extensive Knowledge ; such however as have the prospect of greater Estates, or are designed to more than common Business, ought not to want the Grounds of Language in General, nor somewhat of the particular Languages, which may be of Special Use. It is highly fit, they should be acquainted with the Globe and Maps, and with something farther than those can shew about the Principal Countries and Places thro' the World, or however nearer Home, as to their present State, Religion and Government, and likewise some Leading Points of History, together with the Series and Course of its principal Parts, such as the Scriptural, and that of the four Grand Monarchies ; as also what we may be specially concern'd to know, as to our own or some other Country ; and the more observable Divisions in Chronology are here to be taken in. The Celestial Globe or Sphere, is likewise to be consider'd ; also somewhat of Astronomy and Navigation, Arithmetick and Geometry, together with some principal Structures of the other Learned Sciences and Arts, are to be learn'd and fix'd in the Mind.

§ 5. It has been endeavour'd in this Essay, to lay in those common Foundations of Knowledge, which may serve in some Measure both to furnish, and farther to prepare the Mind for a more extensive Improvement : But the whole of what is here deliver'd, is not by Learners to be grasp'd or attempted at once ; only the general Scheme, with some of the more remarkable Particulars are to be fixed on at first ; and this according to the best Direction he can have for the Singling of them out.

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They, who would go upon any other kind of Improvement, which falls not so directly under our present Consideration, ought to endeavour first to get the more general Grounds of it, before they proceed to the finishing of some particular Branch or Part.

§ 6. 2. The Foundations of Knowledge and other Improvements ought to be always carefully secur'd, tho' they are not to be laid again, and indeed for this very Reason, that there may be no Occasion for it. It would therefore be Requisite to allot some time on purpose for the reviewing of them; and, as has been intimated that it shou'd return within a reasonable Compass, as in looking over some proper Abstracts or Epitomes once a Year.

§ 7. 3. The Superstructure is to be carry'd on, equally, if it may well be done, to some farther Degree; so as to make an Advance upon the several Parts and Points of Knowledge we have gain'd. But very few can ordinarily hope to carry on a very large compass of Knowledge to any considerable Height; the most will be obliged to limit their farther pursuit with a special Eye to what they are designing for, and are like to be more peculiarly engaged in. Yet,

There are some, who may and ought to proceed upon the whole Foundation, to carry on their Improvement still some Degrees higher towards perfecting the Languages, as also to get a more particular and exact Acquaintance with Geography, History, Chronology, Mathematicks, &c.

§ 8. There seems to be a threefold Gradation commonly requisite to the finishing of what we would Complete; as in Painting, the main Sketches and Master-Lines are first to be struck out, then the dead Colours laid on, and lastly the Live-touches and finishing Strokes are to be added: But if our Circumstances will not admit of taking so large a Compass, and advancing so far upon it, we must then content our selves to stop at the second Degree for the most part, and only to proceed in what is like to be, *to us*, of greater Necessity or Use; suppose in relation to Divinity, Law, Medicine, or what else we are designing. And,

Such as intend Divinity should make sure to be very much Conversant with the Bible, and *that* in the Original *Hebrew* and *Greek*; as those who are for Law must employ the greater part of their Time upon Statutes, Records, Cases, &c; and such as are for Medicine and Surgery, upon the Consideration of Humane Body, Herbs and Drugs, Methods of Operation, and those particular Accounts in the way of Practice, which

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are faithfully and judiciously given: But a good Measure of Logical Acuteness and Judgment appears highly requisite to them all, and that therefore the more general Improvement of our Reason is to be carry'd to some considerable Height; together with that, *Ethicks* are to be more thoroughly pursu'd, in order to *Theology*; the *Civil Law*, to prepare the way for *our own*; and a Mathematical *Natural Philosophy* with Experiment, in order to *Medicine*.

§ 9. 4. As to the Choice of Instructors, and the Attendance to be given to them (which must be absolutely needful for most, and may be very useful for all Beginners); they should commonly be divers for things that are very differing; since few or none are sufficiently furnish'd or fitted for the Provinces and Parts of Knowledge, which lie far wide of each other.

Now Instructors must be at least competently Skilful, not only in the Matter to be taught, but especially in the Method of teaching; they are to be such as both can and will apply themselves with Diligence and Concern, to effect what they Undertake, adapting their way, as near as they can, to the various Dispositions and Capacities of those they Instruct; who therefore should not be so very Numerous; but that they may admit of being more distinctly observ'd and attended to.

Where the Learner is to Live, or to be very Conversant, with the Teacher, particular care should be taken, that, if possible, there might be nothing in him, or about him, which would be of ill Example, or like to create a prejudice in the Learner. Somewhat more particular has been already offer'd in Reference to such Instructors, as are to carry Persons on to the higher Parts of Learning, and Points of Knowledge, *Vide* P. II. Chap. 2. § 7. page 130.

§ 10. The Learner should attend both constantly and carefully; but when he may happen to be unavoidably hindered, he must endeavour to retrieve the Loss, and fetch it up again by a doubled Industry afterwards. He should heedfully listen to his Instructors, and be willingly led by more experienced Guides; so far, however, believing them, as to resolve upon the Trial or Consideration of the Matter, and to go through with it, before he presume to determine against them, as if he were already so much Wiser than they, that even at the first View, or upon a very little Thot, he could discern the Insignificancy, Weakness, or Mistake, of what is offer'd by his Teacher, perhaps after long and repeated Consideration, strict Observation, and his own Experience. The Learner should employ and exercise his
Memory,

Memory, but not rely too much upon it; how good soever it may be, he ought to commit the principal Instructions given him to writing or at least so much thereof, as may bring them to Remembrance; and he should carefully review the Minutes, whilst the Matter is fresh upon his Mind, drawing out what is most considerable more at large in his own Words, as he apprehended the meaning; conferring upon it with his Instructor or Associates; and finally setting down the clearest Result he can come to, that he may have recourse thereto afterwards to examine, apply to Use, or improve it farther.

§ 11. The Heads, which follow, are of so great Consideration in the Affair of Learning, that I shall chuse to rank and number them on with the principal Branches of Conduct. And,

VII. As to the Choice and Use of Books in the pursuit of Knowledge and other Improvements; it may perhaps be of service to lay before us the Catalogues of some famous Libraries, as of the *Bodleian*, &c; or rather of the more Curious Collections, that are reasonably esteem'd to have been made with more than common Judgment; but especially the most just and impartial Catalogues of the Principal and Select Authors in this or that Kind, upon this or that Matter, and to this or that Point; not barely that we may know and be able to inform others, that there are such Books, but that we may, upon Occasion, have recourse thereto: We should yet more particularly acquaint our selves with the Authors, that are generally reputed to give a fair and true Character and Account of other Authors and their Writings: We should also confer, as we have Occasion and Opportunity, with those who may be like to inform us, about the Character of this or that Writer, the Nature and Manner of his Writing, the Matter of such particular Treatise, the way wherein 'tis manag'd; and what there is in this or that Book more observable; but we may commonly farther depend upon the Report as to Matter of Fact, than in Point of Judgment, Opinion or Censure; here great Allowances are generally to be made, for the Capacity, Sentiments, Disposition and Judgment of the Person, who gives the Account; and perhaps also for the regard he might have to those who receive or hear it: And therefore, if we our selves have Skill and Leisure sufficient, it must be commonly surest and best for us, to see with our own Eyes, and even then we should take all possible Care to bring them as clear as may be of Prejudice and Prepossession to the scanning of what we should look into,

§ 12. Some

§ 12. Some guesses may be ordinarily made at the Import and Design of a Book by its Title, and sometimes at the Manner of it; which may perhaps be confuted, or carry'd farther, upon perusing the Preface, or what is Introductory; and farther yet by the Contents, if any be; but it will be much surer still, if we shall look into the Book it self, here and there, as we may be pointed to somewhat observable by what we may find in the *Index*, or Titles of Chapters, or in the Margin; or, where we want such Direction, we may try the Book by divers Openings at Adventure, observing, whether we more generally fall upon somewhat valuable, or what is otherwise; and probably it must be but an indifferent Book, which affords but one *Prize*, especially if that should not be very Considerable, to divers *Blanks*, and it may be some down-right *Blot*, as of manifest Error, Ignorance, Dulness, Inaccuracy, Sophistry, Railing, &c.

§ 13. Dictionaries, with other Books, which are Alphabetically dispos'd, are for the most part only to be consulted upon Occasion, and so the generality of Commentators, whether upon the Sacred Scripture, or other Authors; for it must be less biasing and more improving to the Mind, first to try by its self what we can make of the Text, and after to consult Commentators in order to correct, supply, or confirm our Apprehensions,

§ 14. Those Books, which we may call *Fundamental*, are not only to be more carefully read, but review'd as has been intimated. The more *Common Systems* of the Arts and Sciences are ordinarily to be once at least perus'd, tho' they might seem less useful, that so we may not appear wholly to despise, nor yet be ignorant of, what is generally known: But then we should be sure to take in also the *best* we can meet with besides, and *that*, as far as well may be in the Principal various Forms of Logick, Ethicks, Physicks, Medicine, &c.: Nor should we be bigotted to New or Old, to this or that, so as to imagine, ev'ry thing must be altogether right, or altogether wrong in either; nor should we indeed reject or embrace any thing purely for its being Antient or Modern, agreeable to this or the contrary *Hypothesis*, to this or that fallible Author, &c.: We should rather endeavour to cull out from any of them whatever may approve it self right upon impartial Consideration.

Perfect Systems are scarce to be expected in any Art or Science; nor are those that pass under the name to be too far depended on *as such*; and whilst the Writings, that are call'd Essays, pretend not to completeness, yet they are not
there;

therefore to be neglected ; but rather to be heedfully read, as what may afford some hints at least, which are valuable, and may be sometimes more considerable, than what we can find in the more set and solemn Treatises upon this or that Subject.

§ 15. Books that give an Occasion, and withal some assistance, to Tho't, may be really of greater Use to us, than those which Discourse Things more diffusely, and at large, leaving little or nothing to the Mind, but only cutting out Work for the Memory ; which yet can worse retain, what we have barely read without finding just Occasion to consider or think about it : And therefore those Writers seem fittest to be chosen, at least by Men of Tho't, who appear by their Conciseness, Clearness and Strength to have given the Result of deep and deliberate Tho't, rather than those who seem to have put down the very Course and Train of their Thinking upon a difficult or important Subject ; for one, that has gone to such a Place thro' various Windings, may afterwards find and be able to direct a shorter and plainer Way. On such Accounts, as well as to spare time for farther Purposes, some shorter Tracts are much to be prefer'd to some of the more Voluminous Treatises ; but then they must be read with heedful Attention and Observation.

§ 16. Where it will be like to answer the Time and Pains, larger Books may be Epitomiz'd or abridg'd, perhaps by a Method more Contract, but ordinarily that of the Treatise it self is to be preserv'd ; we must draw out only what is more Material, in brief Intimations, or in such general Terms, as may comprize, at least, the chief Particulars ; and if the Epitome should be too obscure to instruct others, yet it may be capable of reminding those, who have read the Author at large, or however the Person himself, who has so contracted it.

§ 17. Some Books, or particular Passages, that are obscure, may be worth the Time and Trouble of an Explication or Paraphrase, in order to their being more clearly understood, and the sense of them more fully taken by others ; or that we may set the Meaning more plainly before our selves, and fix it better in our Minds ; or even by way of Exercise, that we may get the happy Faculty of delivering our Tho'ts with the greatest Clearness : Now an Author is to be explain'd by substituting Words or Phrases, that are better known, and of more determinate import, taking it need be, a greater compass of Expression ; and opening the less evident or more difficult Connexions of one Clause, Sentence, or

Section with another. This may be done either more loosely for our own Use, or with greater Exactness for others. And often times instead of a continu'd Explication or Paraphrase, or else together with this latter, we may make Notes here and there, either in the Margin of our Author, or rather in one that is purposely interleav'd, or in some other Book provided for that Use.

§ 18. Books, that require and may be like to answer it, are first to be cursorily read, and then more deliberately; and in some Treatises we should not stay to Master every Difficulty at the first going over; some of which perhaps would vanish of themselves upon a second Reading: But what we cannot *then* reach may be mark'd, or rather drawn out into a Table-Book, as matter of after-consideration or Enquiry.

Where the Method of a Book or Discourse is Cryptical, or not laid sufficiently open, or that we desire to acquaint our selves more thoroughly with the Matter and Way of Management therein, we may set our selves to draw an *Analysis* of it, or a Table of the Divisions and Subdivisions, on which it proceeds; and in order thereto, we must first go thro' the whole, or however some distinct Branch thereof, to make our selves so far Masters of it, that we may comprize it in our Minds, and observe, what is the principal Point or Argument, how the Discourse upon it is divided, or upon what distinct Heads it goes: as also how these are severally prosecuted, *viz.* under what Distributions, from what Heads of Explication, Illustration, Confirmation, &c; and finally what distinct Points are deduc'd from any of them, or to what Purposes they are severally directed and refer'd.

§ 19. All these, from the Argument or Subject it self, down to the lowest Particulars, are either only to be mention'd as falling under such Divisions, Subdivisions, and farther Distributions respectively (as may be seen P. I. Chap. 6. § 9. p. 48. and P. II. Chap. 15. § 10, &c. p. 191); or else to be plac'd in a formed Scheme (somewhat after the Manner; as *that* in P. III. Chap. 11. § 13. p. 286), with Brachets of so large an extent at the first and in the nearer Divisions, that there may be Room for the utmost Branches at last: And they may be lay'd out by the help of a Black-Lead Pencil; the Marks whereof may be alter'd, and if need be finally taken out by rubbing with the Crumb of Bread.

§ 20. What is in it self Remarkable, or capable of being us'd as a Principle, Example, Proof, Illustration, &c; or in the way of Council, Caution, or the like, should be drawn into a *Common-place-Book*; and it is at least highly requisite to be done, for some considerable time however, in the Course of our Studies.

And for this purpose it has appear'd, upon long Consideration, and frequent conferring about it, not without some Experience of it, the most convenient Method, that we should be provided with a kind of Universal Index (such as may be shortly publish'd upon Writing-paper, with somewhat of a *Specimen*, and brief Instructions shewing how it is to be us'd) and that in a distinct Book we should continually take what we think fit out of the Author we are reading, or out of divers, if we have more in hand at once, making one or more References, in the mentioned Index, to this or that particular Matter noted in our *Common-place-Book*; and this may be very readily done in the way, which will be directed, and easily apprehended from the Index and *Specimen* design'd, to which I refer the Reader.

§ 21. In this way of common-placing, what we take out of the same Book will all be together, and may be at any time review'd, so as to bring to Mind the Substance of it, or the principal Matters contain'd in it; thus it may be (if we see fit) Epitomiz'd or Explain'd, and yet we shall be able to find things under their several Heads in the Index, whence we may go to as many Authors as we have made Collections from, or have refer'd more immediately to in the Index it self.

If, whilst we have one Author in hand, we would also be collecting from another, 'tis only leaving room at a guess for the former; but rather too little than too much; since we can easily refer this forward to some other part of the *Common-place-Book*, if need be, for the finishing of it.

§ 22. Books which have very particular Contents or good Indexes will less need to be abstracted, or *Common-plac'd*; and if we be strait'n'd in time, we may enter somewhat of the Index it self more immediately into our general Index: And in reading such Authors, it will not be ordinarily proper to draw out more than some remarkable Passages, to which the Index of the Book it self would not lead us by the Titles, under which we may fitly put them in our *Common-placing* of them; for the same Thing will often be capable of being well refer'd to divers other Points and Purposes besides that for which it was brought by the Author;

and the way of Reference is therefore made so very ready, that we might not be at a stand, under what one Head of the General Index, to place this or that Passage, but might easily put it under the several Titles, which offer themselves to our Mind.

Some Pages in our Common-place-book may be assign'd to what occurs, that is remarkable, in Conversation, or occasional Reading, or that otherways presents it self to our Minds.

Till Judgment be well ripened it were best to offer our Observations and Collections to be perus'd by the most proper Judges we can engage, in order to their being alter'd and amended, before we enter them into our Common-place-Book.

§ 23. It would generally be convenient to have stated times for this and that more solemn kind of Study, leaving such Reading as we may call a Pleasure or Divertisement, rather than our Business, to fill up Vacancies.

It is fit we should get some Taste of Poetry by reading and observing well some select Poems of the Moderns, as well as of the Ancients, Which may serve to enliven and elevate Thot; and to prevent our being grossly impos'd upon, or exposing our selves, by what is really contemptible, in that kind. But,

We must take heed of running into a kind of *Poetical Style* instead of what is truly *Oratorical*: We should endeavour to form our Expression by being very Conversant with Authors; who speak justly, properly, gracefully, and with Spirit, but without Affectation; yet we must rather aim at correcting what is any way certainly faulty in our own Manner of Expression, than at the direct Imitation of another's, how taking soever, to which our Genius do's not lead; lest we should but *ape* it, and expose our selves.

§ 24. Books that are really dangerous to our *Morals*, and and especially where we may be more dispos'd to take the Infection from them, are carefully to be shun'd; nor should we affect the *Knowledge*, both, of *Good and Evil*; such an over-prying Curiosity was the Snare of our first Mother Eve, and the Bane of Humane Race; and 'tis commonly the way of becoming Wise too late.

The dark and unaccountable Methods of *Astrology* are much rather to be let alone than tamper'd with; since by themselves they neither can effect, nor determine any thing (see the Positions (Dn) and (Do), p. 110); and, where there is neither a Natural Aptitude, nor a Divine Institution, it would look too
like

like the inviting of Diabolical Assistance, by using his Mysteries, and consulting his Oracles: If any Help be this way got, or Knowledge gain'd, it must be too dear, or however too dangerous a Purchase; and he that thus *increaseth Knowledge* oft *increaseth Sorrow* by coming to know what had been more happily unknown, and perhaps had otherwise never been.

It is highly requisite Men should first be well acquainted with what is generally acknowledg'd for Truth, as also that they should be otherways competently furnish'd, and their Judgment ripened, before they lanch into the reading of Controversie; nor then should they too hastily determine for this Side or that; but especially they should very carefully see they be not bias'd by Education, Friends, Inclination, or Interest, to Read, or mind, only what makes for such an Opinion or Party.

C H A P. XXVII.

§ 1. **F**OR the more thorough and effectual Pursuit of useful Knowledge, and other improvements, we are farther to consider somewhat,

VIII, As to the Choice and Use of *Exercise*: It is certain we come to know things more perfectly and to better Effect by Practice, than we could ever do by mere Speculation; Reading, or Discourse: We are therefore to be making fit Attempts, in order to our being more thro'ly Skill'd, especially in what is of a practical Nature.

Nothing is plainer than that by Speaking we learn to Speak; by Writing to Write; by Disputing to Dispute; and in a Word, to perform things well by proper and repeated Endeavours so to perform them: But Care must be taken, that neither the Mind nor Body be over-acted: And tho' it may be of very good Use to put them sometimes upon exerting themselves to the farthest, yet neither of them must be kept continually bent, nor should be at any time over-strain'd; That of the Poet is to be well consider'd and observ'd,

*—Versate diu, quid ferre recusant;
Quid valeant Humeri.*—

Your Force and Genius carefully Survey:
See what they cannot Answer; what they may.

§ 2. Exercise is indeed highly Requisite, or altogether Necessary, to be intermix'd with Instructions, but then it should be duly suited to the Learners Ability and Attainments, as they may be advancing from time to time: *New Wine is not to be put into old Bottles*: Young Beginners are not to be put upon too difficult Service; yet neither are they to keep at a Stay, but must be going still onward to Perfection.

§ 3. To instance a little in the Matter of Language; after we have some Acquaintance with the principal Points of the Accidence and Grammar, and have got a competent Stock of the most usual Words, with Skill enough to search out the rest in a Dictionary, we may take Words that are joyned in *Syntax*, and try to resolve them back into their Themes; or the Themes themselves, as they are put together in the *Vestibulum Technicum*, and form them into Concord, first in Writing and then in *extempore* Reading. After this, plain verbal Translation may be usefully practis'd, first from some other Language into our Mother-Tongue, and then the Translation back again into the former Language, and into the same Words, as near as may well be done by the conjoined Force of Memory and Judgment.

§ 4. Examples may next be compos'd, or sought out, by the Learner to answer those principal Grammar-Rules, with which he is acquainted; and he may after proceed in like manner with those that remain; which are suppos'd to be of less frequent Use.

He is then to acquaint himself with the Idioms and proper Use of Particles, which may be done partly by some General Rules and Observations about them, but chiefly from approv'd Authors; and here the Sentences of that kind, collected from them in the Latin and Greek Tongues, may be render'd forward and backward, till they are made very familiar; and then some other Instances may be compos'd agreeably to them.

§ 5. By this time at farthest the Learner should be essaying, as there is Opportunity, to converse in the Language he would get, and if it may be with such as can speak it better than himself.

In reading approved Authors, he may, with Advantage, draw out, or mark the most expressive and elegant Turns; and should endeavour in his Discourse and Compositions, afterwards to use or imitate what he has thus lay'd in, but without Affectation or unnatural Straining; rather contenting himself for the greater part with what is plain, so it be but proper and expressive.

§ 6. In-

§ 6. Inventive Exercises are not to be impos'd, nor very far attempted, till somewhat of a competent Furniture has been first laid in by Converse, Observation, and Reading; for we may not hope to create or form Discourses out of nothing pre-existent in the Mind: And what we call Invention can generally be no other than the Dividing, Compounding, or otherwise Ordering of the Notions we have taken in: But, when Persons are come to be Ripe for this; they may begin with Dialogues in Imitation of *Epictetus*, *Lucian*, &c; and then proceed to familiar Epistles, after the Copies of *Textor* and *Cicero*.

§ 7. Little is to be done at making Verses, unless there be somewhat of a peculiar Genius for it; nor is much to be made of particular Arguments in the way of Themes, as they are commonly call'd, or Orations, without more of Furniture and Judgment, than commonly falls to the share of School-boys; besides, that somewhat of Logick seems altogether requisite for the well-performing of them, as it confessedly is for the forementioned Exercises of Explaining, Paraphrasing, Abstracting, and Collecting, which have been opened under the foregoing Head, as properly belonging to the Use of Authors.

§ 8. As to the practical Use of this Essay, a great deal has been already said, Chap. 19, 20, 21. page 331, &c: and yet it may not be unfit to mention here very briefly, some peculiar sorts of Exercise upon the several general Heads of which it treats: As (1. to exemplify the various ways of Thinking, P. I. C. 2. 2.) to refer all the Matters in some short Discourse to their proper place, *first* in the more obvious Account of Things, C. 3, 4, 5; and afterwards in that which is more Notional and Nice, C. 6, — 15. (3.) To exemplify the several Positions, C. 16, &c. (4.) To apply what is deliver'd, P. II. C. 1, 2. to the interpreting some Portion of an obscure and difficult Author, and to express some Nice and difficult Matter in a plain and obvious Manner according to C. 3. (5.) to sift and canvas a Point propounded, by proper Enquiries, as in C. 4. &c. (6.) to state how far the several Themes in a Discourse may lie within our Compass, and how far without, as C. 7, 8, and 7.) to lay them as near as we can in order, according to C. 9, 10, 11. (8.) to estimate what Account is given, or what Idea we have of any of them, as C. 12, 13, 14. and to pursue the Directions giv'n, p. 188, 189, as far as may be in reference to this or that in particular, (9. to give an Account of the several Positions in a Discourse according to the Vth, VIth, and VIIth,

General Heads, C. 15—21 : or to carry some single Theme thro' all the Predicables, p. 192, &c. (10.) To estimate Proof offer'd in a Discourse, according to P. III. C. 1, &c. (11.) To make out, confirm, or disprove what may require it as, C. 8. &c. or to carry one or more Points thro' all the sorts of middle Terms; p. 284. (12.) To give an Account of Inferences according to C. 13. &c; reducing them, if it may be, to some Head in the Table of Inferences, p. 306, 307. (13.) To shew some or other Use or Service to which the Things or Point mention'd may be directed, and in what way, according to C. 17, &c. (14.) Specially to oblige our selves to the observing this or that particular Branch of Conduct, as it has been, or may be directed, under the present General Head.

§ 9. Exercises, in whatever kind, are generally no other than Essays and Attempts towards the Performing what we have in Design; and they are then likest happily to succeed, when they are made by Parts, and in the way of gradual Advance, by repeated and continued Acts 'till one step be so far master'd and gain'd, that we may safely proceed to another; still endeavouring to do the very best we can at present, and emulating those, who perform that part better than we have yet attain'd to do.

§ 10. Few Persons are wont to proceed with the like Dispatch and Ease all alone by themselves, as in proper Society: Something is therefore to be said,

IX, As to the Choice and Use of Company in the pursuit of useful Knowledge, or other Improvements; 'tis certain, *He that walks with Wise Men*, not of mere Necessity, but Choice, is already so far *Wiser*, and like to grow daily *Wiser*; he that Converses with the Skilful will be getting Skill; and, He that chooses to accompany with the Virtuous and Good, *as such*, has himself somewhat of Virtue and Goodness at present, and is in the ready way to improve it.

For the getting or perfecting of Language, we should be very conversant with such as are very perfect in it; or however with those who are aiming at it, and bent upon it, with such we should be discoursing, not only of it, but in it too, as much as well may be.

§ 11. Having lay'd in some general Notions, or Enquiries about the most considerable Subjects, we may then be capable of engaging those, who are more expert therein to be speaking of them; nor should we despise those Matters which are of an inferior Nature, but may be nevertheless one way or other of singular Use.

§ 12. We should endeavour to have always somewhat or other to impart, which may be agreeable and useful to those, with whom we converse; and we should be, in this respect also, willing and ready to communicate; which will not only fix and improve what we our selves had before, but may serve, as water pour'd into a Pump, to draw out more from others; and we should shew our selves at least equally willing to hear as to speak.

§ 13. Two or three, who are impartial Lovers of Truth, who will speak and keep to the Point in hand, and are desirous to help one another in finding out the Truth, clearing it up, and confirming it, may be greatly useful to each other, in the sifting out of doubtful Questions, the assaying of Difficulties, the Starting and Arguing what is Nice and Curious; as also in Rectifying, Clearing, and Confirming each others Apprehensions; whilst each of them lies open to Conviction, and is ready to acknowledge as right what he can see to be so; being likewise careful and capable to discern what is really so, when it comes to be set in a proper Light.

§ 14. A larger Conjunction of hands, that are competently fit may be easily Capable of a much greater Dispatch in the pursuit of Knowledge; if they shall (somewhat like the *Royal Society*) distribute amongst them the several Parts and Points thereof, to be more thoroughly searched out, and if it may be to have two or three severally engaged upon the same Matter, and all to be employ'd according as the Genius, Capacity, and Condition of each may lead: The Discoveries or Improvements made by any of them, to be subjected to the Consideration of all, as far as well may be, before they should be publish'd, if at all; for perhaps it were better to reserve some Things, till they might be farther ripened and improv'd into some thing, which would better bear the Publick View.

§ 15. Finally the reading a considerable Number of Authors, especially to this or that Point, may be done with greater Dispatch, with greater Ease, and with more Advantage too, by a number of fit Persons, who should each of them take his Author and communicate to all, what he finds most observable: And also one and the same Book, which might need or deserve it, would be probably read to better Purpose, if several Students should severally peruse it, and bring their Observations in Writing to be laid before some Person, who were a Master both of the Argument and of that Author; or however, those who have read it should, together,

ther, confer upon the several Observations, and agree, at least by a Majority of Voices, which of them should stand, which should be altered, or what were to be added, that so they might each insert them after such Amendments into their respective Common-place-Books; where every one would still have the Liberty of expunging altering or adding, if he should see manifest Reason to vary from the Majority of those, who had together with him inspected the Observations.

C H A P. XXVIII.

§ 1. **T**HE Method propounded, brings us now to consider of drawing out useful Knowledge, and other Improvements more *solemnly* in the way of *Regular Discourse*, or other *like Performances*.

Besides the Occasional Exercises requisite for the Attainment of Knowledge and other Improvements, there is afterwards a more solemn Use of them, when they are in some good measure attain'd, and which also tends to a farther Advance therein; for they are not, even then, come to an absolute Perfection.

§ 2. Our Knowledge and other Improvements are more *solemnly* drawn out, when upon Special Occasion, and with Special Application, we are using them in the higher Degree we have attain'd. Now Knowledge is more especially drawn out in Discourse, as other Improvements may be in other suitable Performances. By *Regular Discourse* is here intend'd, such as follows the Rules of Art or those Leadings of Nature in its highest Advances, from which such Rules are taken; And this is what I shall here directly treat of.

§ 3. As to other *like Performances*, which are also solemn and regular tho' perhaps they may not have such particular settled Rules, I shall, at most, but obliquely glance upon them; or rather leave them to what Light and Help may be drawn from the Account of Conduct in general, with other Suggestions under the several Branches of it, thus far deliver'd; and especially from the Treatises, which may refer more directly to them, or the Persons, who are peculiarly vers'd and Skilful in them; as, E. G. in the Publick Administration of Justice, the Leading of an Army, the Directing of a Siege, the Disposing of an Attack, Laying the Design and Plan of a Battle,

Battle, as also the more Heroick Acts of Piety and Virtue, the more Eminent and Curious Works of Art, &c.

§ 4. Discourse may be consider'd, either as internal (that of the Mind) or external (that of the Man): This latter is generally performed, either by the Tongue, or by the Pen; and in several differing Kinds, which may be either for more Private Use, or Publick View. And now,

X, As to *Internal Discourse*, or that of the Mind alone, what I here design, is the solemn Application of our Tho'ts to this or that Matter in the way of more fixed Consideration, Study or Meditation: And even thus the Knowledge, which was before latent in the Memory, or in the Habit (which is not just the same thing with that, tho' nearly ally'd, and greatly aided by it) is drawn out into Act and Exercise, and some way set forth in View before the Mind it self, either that it may get out something from that Stock in reference to what we have under present Consideration; or for the better fixing and improving what is already known; it may be likewise, in order to suitable Affections, as also for exciting, engaging and encouraging correspondent Actions: To these several Points and Purposes, we may consider of some Argument or Subject, either for our selves alone, or for others, or for both.

§ 5. Now *that* must be the best way of thinking upon any Subject, which is likest to reach the Purpose, or Purposes (as some of them may lie in order to others), which we do or should propound to our selves in our considering of it.

Some Points may seem to be sufficiently answer'd in their being barely known; and we must perhaps content our selves to look no farther than *that*, whilst we are searching them out: Yet there may be fit Reason and Occasion for thinking farther of them, with a direct Aim at the raising or promoting suitable Affections; so the Works of Nature and Mysteries of Scripture are to be consider'd.

§ 6. And where the Subject-matter of Tho't may seem to call for nothing beyond the Affections; nor should we, perhaps, be looking farther, whilst we are intent upon moving or heightning these; yet even such things may, and in due Season ought to be consider'd, in order to some or other suitable Action: Thus the Goodness of God in the Works of Creation and Providence, the Love of Christ in those of Redemption and Intercession, together with the Gracious Condescensions of the Holy Spirit in Scriptural Revelation and Spiritual Regeneration, are more immediately fitted, upon their being duly consider'd, to raise Admiration, Shame,

Love, Hope, &c; yet they are farther to be contemplated in order to such a Carriage and Practise as may thereupon appear to become us. 'Tis certain that Action, especially such as is less agreeable to us in our depraved State, will not proceed so well, unless the Affections be in some degree stirr'd and engag'd; nor will these be any thing steady, abiding, or effective, unless they are bottom'd in a solid and well grounded Knowledge.

§ 7. There are some very differing Ways of managing our Tho'ts in what is commonly known by the name of *Meditation*. One is the attempting to find out, or at least to pursue some Method of thinking, not only with a more particular Design, but also upon some determinate Subject; this appears to require a much greater Capacity, Skill and Furniture, or a farther Assistance, than is commonly to be found, or perhaps ordinarily to be expected.

Another way may be our endeavouring to lay together whatsoever various Tho'ts are fitted to answer the designed End; this has indeed somewhat less of difficulty than the former, yet seems to require at least a Stock and Furniture beyond what is to be generally looked for amongst Persons of lower Abilities or greater Avocations: But,

§ 8. There is yet another sort of Meditation, which seems to be much more practicable by the Generality; and may be, no doubt, of excellent Use to them and others, 'tis that of setting our selves to make fit Enquiries and Remarks upon what we see, or hear, or read, or remember, joyning therewith a serious Endeavour to turn it to the best Improvement we can, for our own and others Good: Thus we take in the Help of what might be call'd a *Compass* for the easier steering of our fluctuating Tho'ts. And this, when apply'd to Religion, seems to be no improper Account of the good Man's Character, who is said to have his *Delight in the Law of the Lord, and therein to meditate Day and Night*.

§ 9. Yet the other Ways, before mention'd, may be usefully attempted; first, the latter of them (as more easie), and then the former; provided the Brain or Mind be not therein press'd beyond what they can well and safely bear; nor the Conscience ensnar'd, as if ordinary Persons were commonly and absolutely bound to such Extraordinary Methods: Which might perhaps be more succesfully Essay'd by some, if taking a Pen or Pencil, (and this last might be done even Walking), they shall put down Hints of what may occur to their Minds upon the Matter propos'd, and afterwards review them with Endeavour to amplify and improve them farther.

This

This is a Method which may (I conceive) be recommended as needful or useful for the greater part of Students, the better to fix and intend their Tho'ts; as also to carry them farther on in their Pursuit of this or that Point.

I shall not here add any thing farther as to internal Discourse or Consideration; since it has thus far been the great Business of this Logical Essay to guide us in Thinking.

§ 10. As to *External Discourse*, it may be either more free, or fixed and set: And here,

XI. The *Discourse*, which is to be *more free and lax*, may yet require, or well admit of some few general Directions, tho' it should not too nearly resemble a more set Composure. 'Tis certain we should be well acquainted with the Matter of which we would speak in such Expression, as may then occur without being previously fix'd; yet we may and should, if there be Opportunity, determine and consider beforehand of some fit Heads to proceed upon: But we should take a very Special Care that the Mind and Body may be in a fit and suitable Disposition to what we are going upon.

§ 11. I shall here a little more particularly speak about the way of *Reading* proper Authors to others: Now the Author to be thus read, should be such, as may deserve and need it: And in relation to the Arts and Sciences it ought commonly to be what is not very long in the whole, but however it should be short and concise in what is said upon Particulars.

In *Reading*, an Account is to be given of the more material Words, and Ways of Speaking; what is dark is to be opened, and also illustrated, if need be, with Examples, &c; the Sense of what might appear dubious is to be fix'd; what is over concise is to be drawn out more at large; where various things are closely laid together, they are to be taken in pieces and opened by Parts. Yet,

What is more diffuse, or copiously handled is to be contracted and summ'd up; and what has been long in going thro' should be re-capitulated, or briefly call'd over, as to the Main of it: Where any thing useful and observable is imply'd, it ought to be more expressly drawn out.

§ 12. What is most material in it self, or for the Learners, is to be particularly recommended, and indeed press'd upon them, where it is of great Importance. The Strength and Cogency, or Weakness and Deficiency of Reasons and Arguments offer'd should be made plainly to appear: What is wanting in respect of Proof or Matter is to be observ'd, and supply'd; what is Right, to be Confirm'd; what is Wrong, Confuted.

Also

Also the Use of things is to be directed and exemplify'd; the Method and Order, with the Goodness or Defects thereof, where it may be of Service, is to be shewn; and a Scheme thereof to be given by him that Reads, or rather attempted by the Learners, where it may be worth the while.

Finally differing Editions, or other noted Authors may be compar'd with that, which is in hand, by way of Elucidation, Confirmation, or farther Improvement.

§ 13. But the Thing here mainly design'd, is to give some general Direction about formed Composures: And I shall conclude this Chapter with somewhat which I might call Preliminary to the rest. Now,

XII. Logic is certainly to have a very considerable hand in the Composing of Discourses, tho' not without the concurrent Assistance of other Disciplines, and often times of some very differing Furniture, besides, from the Knowledge of Men and Things.

The Superiour Part, or what I might call the *Soul and Life* of a more Noble Composure is indeed from Moral Philosophy, or rather from Theology; whilst the Bones and Sinews, Blood and Spirits, together with the Disposition and Order of the Whole, are from Logic; A Variety of Observations, Reading and Experience may, or should come in to Flesh, and fill it up; finally Grammar must cover it all over as with an outer Skin; and Rhetorick is in some Cases to be employ'd to give the Features and Colour, Mein and Gesture, which may render it outwardly beautiful and taking.

§ 14. The particular *Matter*, the *Method*, and the *Manner* of a Discourse are to be carefully adapted to the more simple or complex *Design* we have, or ought to have, agreeably to the *Subject* we take in hand, and the *Obligations* we are under, in point of Duty or Interest, if not to undertake it, yet however, upon our Undertaking it: Whether the Design be to *Instruct*, or *Entertain*; to *Confirm*, or *Refute*; to *Convince*, or *Perswade*, &c; or that divers of these Purposes are to be serv'd at once or some of them in order to others; whether in a more *Private*, or *Publick* way; and this either with the *Mouth*, or by the *Press*: Somewhat is to be observ'd in reference to each of these Points.

§ 15. As to the *MATTER* of a Discourse, it must be suitable to the *Subject*, and selected with a Special Eye to the *Design*: Now we can scarcely fail of some Choice of Matter, if we shall set our Thots to Work upon the Subject we take in hand in such of the ways of Thinking (mention'd P. I.

Chap. 2.) as it may plainly require, or will admit, or that we can manage; and if going into the more obvious Account of Things (Chap. 3, 4, 5.) we try what something or other there may suggest; and farther, if we see what Light may be drawn from the more Notional Consideration of Things in the Chapters following to the 15th; or from the Positions, thence to the end of the first Part.

§ 16. If our Subject were a Sentence taken from some Author, it may be somewhat might arise from, P. II. Chap. 1, 2; or, whatsoever it might be, from the Head of Enquiry, Chap. 4, &c, or from *that*, which shews where we cannot proceed, and how far we may, C. 7, 8: or we may adjust the Importance of our present Argument from C. 9, &c; and Estimate the Apprehensions we or others have of it from C. 12, &c: Farther we may go thro' the various Heads of Things, which may be predicated or affirm'd, either of the entire Subject all together, or separately of its Parts, C. 15, and judge of what is pronounc'd, from this and some following Chapters: Also the sufficient Evidence of the Matter, or danger of Mistake about it may be shewn from C. 20, 21: If there be any thing of Reason or Proof assign'd, it may be estim'd from P. III. C. 1, &c: or Proof and Inferences may be drawn from the general Heads about them, especially from the Tables of Middle Terms and Inferences, p. 284, and 306: Some or other Uses of the present Subject may be assign'd from C. 17, 18: but the Choice and Use of Books, Company, &c, directed under the Head of Conduct, cannot miss of affording Matter to the Argument in hand.

§ 17. Thus when we have carefully fix'd and stated the Design, we would and should pursue in the Management of such a Point, and in such Circumstances; we may acquaint ourselves with the Argument or Subject, by Observing, Considering, Reading, and Conversing about it: And we should then endeavour to form the general Plan and Scheme, laying down, however, some leading Notions and Notices, with some of the chief Divisions and Subdivisions of what we are going upon; which yet we must be willing afterwards to alter for the better, as much as may conveniently be done.

§ 18. And now under some of the Principal Heads, we should endeavour to lay in a good Collection of proper and suitable *Matter*, answering the Subject, and comporting both with our main Design, and with the other several Views we have, and which we may reasonably take in along with *that*; We should therefore minute down whatever of that Nature may any ways Occur: But then we must prudently consider,

der, not only what to say, but what not to say ; and therefore should omit what may be spar'd without spoiling, or engendering our Design ; especially what could scarce be added without the hazzard of its being thereby embarass'd and encumber'd.

C H A P. XXIX.

§ 1. **W**HAT has been only touch'd upon towards the close of the foregoing Chapter, in reference to more solemn Composurés is in this, and those which follow, to be distinctly consider'd : And here,

As to *METHOD*, the *Word* is originally Greek, and imports an *ordered Way*, wherein one Part regularly follows another : And, agreeably to this Etimology of the Name, *Method* (as to the *Thing* it self) is not the putting things together as it may happen, without Contrivance, or with design to render the Matter perplex and intricate (tho' the Word might be improperly and abusively so taken), but it may be thus *describ'd*, that it is such a Disposition, or laying of Things, as answers some Relation they have to each other, and may be of use to carry on the Point in Hand more easily and effectually, and particularly in a Discourse to help the Understanding and Memory : It may be in some sort *defin'd*, [the convenient Placing of Things in relation to each other]

§ 2. Method may or must be somewhat various according to what is upon our Hands and in our Eye : That Disposition of our Matter is in general to be chosen, which best will serve to prevent needless Repetitions, and Prolixness ; as also to lay things in the Order, wherein they may give the fullest Light, and greatest Force, to each other ; and which may help the Memory to retain them more firmly, and to recollect them more easily.

Beauty, Pleasure, and Surprize are but of lower Consideration, that may very well be attended to, where the Matter we are upon is of less Importance, or that higher Aims may be subserv'd, or at least not obstructed, by our varying from a stricter Method, more or less, as the Orator, Poet, or other Author may see fit.

§ 3. Orators are more commonly to give some general Aim as to the Method, wherein they design to proceed; But Poets, in their *Epic* Poetry especially, must rather studiously conceal it; that so they may render their Matter more surprizing, and the Readers Mind more eager, whilst he can scarcely guess what he is to look for next; and that he may afterwards admire the Structure and Contrivance. But,

§ 4. The Stricter Method lays things in the Order wherein it finds them to lie (*Vide* Part. I. Chap. 13. § 5. p. 85). E. G. either downward or upward (as in the Genealogy from Abraham down to Joseph in St. Matthew; and in that from Joseph up to Adam in St. Luke): forward or backward (as *a, e, i, o, u*, or, *u, o, i, e, a*); and this may be either (1.) as Things lie in Nature, or as they may be one above or below another; and so we may proceed from Inferior Creatures to the Superior, or from these to those; as if we should treat of God, Angels, Men, Brutes, &c, or in the contrary Order: As also from Causes to their immediate and remote Effects, or backward from the latter to the former; *I will bear the Heavens*, says God, *and they shall bear the Earth, and the Earth shall bear the Corn and the Wine, and the Oyl, and they shall bear Israel*: Again, from the Substance to the Accident, Mode, &c, or from the latter to the former: And, to name no more, from the whole to the Divisions and Subdivisions, or back again; as from a Guinea to an half Guinea, Crown, half-Crown, Shilling, Six-pence, &c; or from the lower to the higher.

§ 5. Or else we may proceed, (2.) as things lie in *Notion*, or in the way of Conception, forward or backward: Suppose it were from Individuals, consider'd as such, to the Sorts and Kinds, and Higher Kinds of things, or from these downward to those: From what was counted first, onward to the last; or from thence backward to the first: From the End and Subordinate Intentions onward to the lowest Means, or from the latter to the former: And all this may be called *Natural Order*: But,

That which is termed *Arbitrary Method* shifts this placing, and takes, it may be, first what lay in the Middle, then goes perhaps to the end, and thence backward to the Beginning, as the Tho't, Occasion, or Design may lead.

§ 6. Method may be consider'd, in relation to the Matter which is to be dispos'd and order'd, as that which has been commonly suppos'd more agreeable to Speculative, or to Practical Things.

What is of a Speculative Nature is commonly deliver'd in that, which they call the *Synthetical* Method, descending from Generals to Particulars, as from a kind of Principles to the things Compounded of them: But it were very possible, without breach of good Order, to proceed otherwise; as, *E. gr.* in Physicks to begin with an Individual Man, suppose *Adam*; and to observe what he had peculiar to himself; what in common with other Men; what they have in common with other Animals; and these again with inanimate Creatures, &c. And,

It might deserve some Consideration, whether this Way would not carry more of Plainness and satisfactory Evidence with it, than to begin with Generals, which perhaps are not well adjusted, or do not, however, sufficiently appear to be so: Certainly, what we have instanc'd is the more Natural Way; and that which must first have been taken, to form the Abstract Notions of Sorts, and Kinds, and higher Kinds.

§ 7. The *Analytical* Method, which proceeds from the End to the Subordinate Intentions, and to the lower Means, is, and ought to be, observ'd in fixing the more general Points, when we treat of Practical Matters; yet there will be found a very plain Mixture of what is otherwise: And that we neither commonly do, nor ought to lay things altogether backward from the farthest End to the lowest Means, tho' every thing is or should be laid with an Eye, both, to the nearer and farther Designs, we have in View; and it were fit the nearer should be commonly mention'd, that we may still know, not only what we have to attend, but why, and for what Special Purpose: Nor can a Man well begin with the Means and nearer Intentions, till he has taken a more general Survey of the Matter from Beginning to End.

§ 8. To make this matter more plain and obvious by a familiar Illustration, Who could tell whether he must go to *Barnet*, thence to *St. Albans*, *Dunstable*, &c; unless he first knew, whither he were lastly design'd; and had some general Apprehension, as by a Map, or otherwise, of some Principal Places in the Way; as suppose he were intending to *Nottingham*, and found by a general Map of *England*; or upon Enquiry, that *Dunstable*, *Northampton*, and *Leicester* lay in the Road to his Journeys End: Yet he would not, after he had fix'd these Principal Stages, first begin to search out, or enquire more particularly, the farthest part of his Way, as from *Leicester* to *Nottingham*, but rather the nearest: And hereupon, asking the way, or looking into some more Particular Map, he would find that *St. Albans* was his way to *Dunstable*; nor
would

would he then first enquire from *St. Albans* thither, but rather from *London* to *St. Albans*; where he would find *Barnet* in his way; and now we may suppose him first of all to take the most particular Account of his way thither, and that he would thereupon determine to *Holloway*, *Issington*, *Highbury*, &c.

And if he were to direct another, he might most conveniently do it by mentioning, first of all, the Principal Stages of the whole Journey; then the most notable Towns of the first Stage, and so onward to the last. And,

§ 9. Somewhat after this kind of Procedure, the Method of any Special Undertaking, particularly that of a solemn Discourse, is first to be more generally laid in some of the main Subordinate Points, beginning with the farthest Design and Proceeding from what lies nearer to it to what is more and more remote from it, according to the Order of *Intention*: But the finishing of the several Parts, is to be afterwards carry'd on in the Order of *Execution*, beginning with that, which is first to be effected; only if this, or any other Branch of the Undertaking should appear to be of a large Extent, it would then be requisite to take a general Survey thereof, and so to fix the intermediate Points, as before, in the Order of *Intention*; but when once we can easily see what is first to be done, what next, and so on, for the reaching some nearer Design, we must then proceed accordingly. But then,

§ 10. In our Procedure we should be able to see, and it may sometimes be requisite to shew, the Reference, and Suitableness of each particular Means to the next foregoing Intention, either among those, which we first of all settled, or of those, which might next be fix'd, towards the finishing of this or that more general Part: And it should always be remembered, that so much the greater Exactness is to be us'd, according as the intermediate Points are more remote from what is ultimately design'd; and we should take all possible Care, that every particular Means do indeed lie, as directly as well may be, in the way to that End, which in the present Undertaking, we have ultimately fix'd.

§ 11. To treat this Matter a little more particularly, What we would Discourse of may be introduc'd, for the greater Solemnity, or by way of Inducement, if Occasion be, with somewhat, which may be both Acceptable, and like to serve our Purpose: And then the Argument in hand is to be first more briefly opened in the General, both as to the Words, and Thing it self; and we are also to distinguish thereupon,

thereupon, if need require: The very Point we undertake, or essay must be accurately and precisely stated, then more fully opened; and where there might be danger of Mistake, such Points as ly very near, and look very like it, are to be expressly set aside, as not being our present Business, nor belonging to the Matter under Consideration: We should next proceed to some more general Division of the Argument, or of the Discourse upon it, or of both; either expressly declaring or fairly suggesting, the more general, or principal Branches of our Intended Method; that we may be better apprehended in our after Procedure, and what we offer therein more easily remember'd.

§. 12. We are then to enter upon the first of those Branches, giving what may be requisite for the Opening, and Arguing thereof in general, before we go to divide it, (if need be) or to declare the Method of pursuing it; and this is not commonly to be done at all, when we come to the lower Subdivisions; since it will scarce be necessary then, and might rather prejudice than please, or profit the most of those, who may be some way concerned with the Discourse: So much we should every where say in the general, as may save the Time and Trouble of repeating it under the Particulars; or that may serve to give such an Apprehension of the Matter, as is proper for our Purpose; but if we should proceed on still to farther Particulars at a considerable distance from the more general Heads to which they belong, it may be very requisite to refer more expressly to what has been said before; and it may be here and there fit to recapitulate; or however briefly to touch upon what was most Material in the foregoing Discourse, especially where there would be danger that the Reference, we have thither, might otherwise be overlook'd, and that this would be prejudicial to the Matter in hand.

§ 13. Things that are less Complex should more generally go before the more Compounded; the Easier before the Harder; and the Slighter before the Greater and more Weighty, unless the Nature of the Design should require it to be otherwise; as if we would engage Men to abstain not only from some Greater Evil, but also from what is Less, yea from the very Least, and indeed from all Appearance of it; or when we would persuade them not only to Greater, and more Manifest Duties, but even to the Least, and to such Things as are safer and better done than omitted, tho' it might seem that the Absolute Duty or Necessity thereof were not sufficiently made out,

§ 14. But

§ 14. But even in such Instances there is still a real Advance, if the Matter be duly consider'd; for 'tis a yet greater thing, if we add the avoiding of lesser Evils to that of the greater; and the discharge of less, or less certain Duties to others; for it is plain, that the least thing superadded to the greater, or substracted from it, makes a Procedure onward, in the one or other Way: But *that* less which is included in the greater, that precedes, would be very ridiculously mention'd after; as if it were said, He gave a Guinea, an Angel, a Crown, an Half-Crown, a Shilling, yea a Six-Pence; unless it were intended, that the latter were so much more, still added to the foregoing.

§ 15. Most of the Rules of Method must, upon Occasion, give way to what is more Material, or that is so, however, to our Purpose; and where I can reasonably hope to prevail on some, it may be on most, by a weaker Motive, more than by what is much stronger in it self, I may or ought to put the weaker last, in order to its being better remembred and regarded.

Where little depends upon the placing, it might look best; and be in some respects the most Convenient, to put that last of all (at least to do so in a lower and more particular Set of Heads), which requires the largest Handling, and especially if it must have any considerable Number of Subdivisions: But,

§ 16. We should carefully avoid too long a Train of Divisions, and Subdivisions; and therefore should for the most part only to refer to the several Subordinate Branches of a *Dichotomy* (which is on some Accounts preferable to a Division into more than two parts), whilst we are passing along in one and the same Set of Heads, still number'd on (as may be seen by comparing § 9. in Chap. 6. Part I. with the ten Heads in Chap. 7: and also in the ten Predicables, Part II. C. 5. § 10—21.); or in a more continued Series of Discourse (as in the Account, which has here been given of *Method*); this is indeed more Oratorical, and commonly more pleasing, but the express numbring of distinct Matters is generally more Usefull, as it may serve to engage Observation, and help Recollection; yet Care should be taken that we do not exceed either in the Number of the several Sets of Heads, or in that of any one.

It may be an Exercise of no very great Difficulty, and of some good Use, if the Learner shall observe, what is the *Method* of this Chapter about *METHOD*, adding the Figures that were purposely omitted in it; and especially, if he draw

a Scheme of it with Brachets; *Vide* Chap. 26. § 18, 19. page 390.

C H A P. XXX.

§ 1. **T**HAT which remains, will require a fuller Consideration, and another Chapter besides this: now under the last General Branch of Conduct, it is to be observ'd,

As to the *MANNER* of a Discourse, which we might call its Dress or Garb; or the way of Address, when 'tis directed to any Person; Care must be taken, that the Sense we would convey be express'd truly and justly; easily and clearly; and as far as well may be acceptably; but however suitably to those Considerations, that are chiefly to guide and govern it. Now we must see,

1. That the Sense we would convey be *truly and fitly* express'd; that if Possible, what we deliver might not lie open to Misconstruction, at least when it comes to be duly weigh'd and consider'd; we should therefore take care to make our selves Masters (to a good Degree however), both of the Matter it self, whereof we would treat, and also of the Language, wherein we would do it, at least in relation to that Matter: This must be done by *Conversing, Reading, and Writing* much about it. And,

§ 2. It is almost absolutely Necessary, in order to the just expressing of our Tho'ts upon any considerable Subject, that we should have frequently set our selves to put at least the Result of them into Words, not only in Speaking, but in Writing; offering it to others, and trying whether the Expression would lead them into the Tho'ts thereby design'd; as also reviewing it our selves at some considerable distance of time; or at least, when we had cool'd upon the Matter: and both these Ways were fit to be taken, if it may be, with our solemn Discourses; in which we are to strike out Ambiguous Words and Phrases, or well to fix their Meaning; and otherwise to alter or add; till we and others may reasonably conclude, that the intended Sense is effectually secur'd, and can hardly be miss'd, by such as shall be really desirous, or willing, to take us right: But this Point has been already treated somewhat more particularly in the II^d. Part of this Essay Chap. 3. And whereas there may be some danger of

obscuring

obscuring the Sense, we would so fully guard, and are endeavouring to secure and ascertain; therefore we must farther see,

§ 3. 2. That our Meaning be *easily and clearly* express'd, so far as the Matter and Circumstances will admit; that it may be readily taken, if possible, by those of very mean Capacity, and who knew beforehand little or nothing of the Matter; we should therefore accustom our selves to converse about it with such, and to try, whether they understand, what we take to be plainly express'd, or where, and at what they stick, and how we can help them over the Difficulty.

Terms of Art, and Words of uncommon Usage, are by no means to be affected, rather to be industriously avoided; but where they must be used, they should be either formally explain'd, or however join'd sometime with such Expressions as may carry even those who knew them not before into the Meaning of them.

§ 4. We should take heed of running into very long Periods; and ought cautiously to use such Particles, as refer to somewhat forward, and it may be far distant, as *since, whereas, forasmuch as, &c.*, some of which are seldom allowable, but in the Forms of Law: Nor should we commonly place any longer Clause betwixt the Parts of a Sentence, but rather throw it into a distinct one, by it self; we should not needlessly hold the Mind in suspense, by referring a greater number of Clauses to some following Verb, or Noun, &c, which might have been put first, or in the middle; and a *Prozeugma*, or a *Mezzeugma* is easier taken than a *Hypzeugma*.

§ 5. We are farther to shun the Use of Relatives, which would lie far distant from that to which they relate; especially where they would be dubious too by reason of some nearer Antecedent, whereto they might be refer'd; in such Cases the Noun it self should rather be repeated.

Tho' we may or should often leave to the Mind what it can *easily* supply; yet we must take heed of over-bold Omissions; and also of using Sentences too Concise, by laying a great deal of Sense very close together, where it may well be avoided.

Yet after all, we must take heed of making a Discourse less plain to some, or however too prolix for most, by endeavouring to bring it down to every ones Capacity.

§ 6. 3. The Manner of a Discourse should be made as *Acceptable*, as can well consist with what is more to be regarded. To entertain Men for their Advantage is much to be desir'd and endeavour'd. 'Tis a very Just, as well as known, Observation of the Poet,

Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci.

Who makes Instruction please, and Pleasure teach,
All Ends and Purposes do's fully reach.

And if some things will not admit of Ornament, as the same Author has well remark'd,

Ornari Res ipsa negat, contenta Doceri.

Some Things, for Ornamental Dress unfit,
Instructive Plainness only will admit.

Yet there may be no necessity of being Rude and Barbarous, even where it might look Ridiculous to aim at being Quaint and Elegant: There may be a sufficient Plainness without Rustic Homeliness, and familiar Expression, without flatness of Tho't.

§ 7. Even the Arts and Sciences themselves may, some of them at least, admit of such kind of Instances, and Illustrations, with occasional Observations, Citations, &c, as may somewhat enliven Discourses of that Nature: And where there is no Room or Scope for the making some sort of Arguments pleasing; yet they may be made however less displeasing to the most, or to the Wisest and Best, by our avoiding what would needlessly offend; and, in that Respect, be like to do more Hurt than it would otherways do Good.

But after all, we should take Care that the Sauce and Garnishing spoil not the Meat; as may seem to be intimated by that Excellent Remark of the celebrated Orator, if I rightly remember, *Merito suspicanda est Oratoria, quæ Sui facit Admiratorem, potius quam Argumenti*; 'Tis a sort of Oratory justly to be suspected, which, instead of carrying the Mind into Things, rather detains it in fruitless or unseasonable Admiration of the Words: and, where the truest Eloquence has that Effect, it is really hurtful, according to that of Seneca, *Noceat illis Eloquentia, quibus non Rerum facit Cupiditatem, sed sui.*

§ 8. 4. And lastly, We are especially to see, that the Manner of our Discourse be duly suited to what should chiefly Guide and Govern it, more particularly,

1. To the Person speaking in it, whether it be the Author himself, or some other who is introduced by him: He must consider what will become his Character, or may be however well consistent with it; since that may come well from one, which will not from another. We should not affect Imitation too far, but cultivate the Style, to which our Genius leads. If another be introduc'd, he must be made to speak like himself; but we must take heed of Personating too far, what is Profane or Immoral.

§ 9. 2. Discourse must be suited, as far as well may be, to those, unto whom it is more directly address'd, and even to such as may observe it: Too much Care and Pains about Accuracy in *Matter*, or *Method*, or *Manner*, would indeed be worse than lost upon some; for it might be like to render a Discourse so much the less accepted with them; we must however labour to approve our selves to the highest Judge; as also to our own Minds, and to those who may be proper Judges; And by what is more Judicious and Correct somewhat may be done in Time, by slow degrees, towards altering of Mens Taste and Relish for the better. In the meanwhile we must endeavour, as far as well may be, to suit our Discourses to the generality of such as are like to be concern'd with them, always remembring, that those of an higher Form may more easily stoop, than those of a lower can rise; yet we may allow our selves, at some times, in some Cases and Particulars, to shoot a little over the Heads of the latter to the former. But,

§ 10. We are to consider, not only the Size of Mens Understandings, but also the Bias of their Education, Inclination, and real or supposed Interests; more particularly their Special Case and Condition.

We may at some Times, and in some Cases, address our selves more peculiarly to Persons of such a Degree, such kind of Business, such Relation, Age, or Condition, &c, with some peculiar Advantage, in that they will be like more carefully to attend, and to take themselves more nearly concern'd in what is so specially directed to them. Also some sort of Characters may be so drawn to the Life, in fit Particulars, as that some Persons cannot but see their own Faces in the Glass; but then they must scarcely be the worst of Characters, or not drawn at the very worst; however, not so as to expose them to others, lest the Persons most concern'd, instead of getting any good thereby, should only be exasperated so as to break the Glass, or Spit upon it, and to fall foul on him who holds it to them.

§ 11. 3. We must prudently suit our Discourses to the Circumstances of Time, remembring that of *Solomon*, Eccles. 3. 11. *Every thing is made beautiful in its Time*. And however the present Mode may not be, perhaps, really best in it self, yet it may be fittest in many Cases for those of the present Age: Nor will antiquated Words or Phrases be so well understood; Our Expression is therefore to be model'd according to the present way of speaking. And it is plain that the present state of Persons and Things may often afford a very convenient Handle, and give us a very peculiar Advantage for some good Purposes.

§ 12. 4. Nor must the Place be altogether unconsider'd: We may commonly use somewhat more of Freedom, at a Distance than upon the Spot, or with what lies nearer hand; yet still remembring, that Great Men have often the peculiar Faculty of Hearing, and reaching others too, a great ways off.

As to the particular Place in which we speak, or Country where we write, much may depend thereon, in reference to the *Matter*, since it may in some sort direct what is fit and proper; but there may be much more in respect of the *Manner*, that is to be us'd, both in regard of the Customs or Facts to which we may refer, and also of the Language or Dialect, in which we should express our selves.

§ 13. 5. The Argument or Subjects we are upon, ought to be more particularly regarded, as to their differing Nature, and the various Degrees of their Importance, also as they may be more or less Serious, or Certain, or Safe, &c; and likewise in respect of the more peculiar Forms or Phrases, which may belong thereto, and must ordinarily not be omitted there; tho' they are sparingly to be us'd elsewhere.

§ 14. When we are to lay the first Foundations of any particular Knowledge or Practice, it should be done with all the Plainness, Strength, and Evidence which the *Matter* can well admit of: And it may be of Use to lay in the surest and clearest Principles, which are peculiar to any of the Arts or Sciences in the Entrance of each of them respectively. The Superstructure is to be firmly laid on such Foundations; nor must we attempt the finishing of the Whole, or even any considerable Part, without a becoming Modesty and Diffidence, as those who know there is nothing altogether perfect.

§ 15. Mathematical Points are to be treated with the utmost Accuracy and demonstrative Evidence; those of a Moral Nature with a prudent Consideration of Circumstances, comparing the weight of Argument on either side: Natural Things are to be Discours'd from Observation and Experiment, agreeably to the Nature and Evidence thereof; Historical Matters, from Authentick Monuments and good Authority; those of Medicine, from Anatomy and Experience, with the severest Reasoning thereupon; those of Law, from Statutes, Institutions, Precedents, Cases, Reports, Records, Writings, Witness, &c.

§ 16. Finally, to mention no more, Points of Divinity are to be treated according to the Books of Scripture and Nature without us, together with Reason and Conscience within; and we are to take in what Light we can from the best Antiquity, Ecclesiastical History, Councils, Fathers, Schoolmen, Commentators, Casuists, Polemical and Practical Writers, &c.

But that which must more particularly govern and determine the Manner of a Discourse requires much more to be said to it, and is to be the Argument of the following Chapter, which will conclude this Essay.

C H A P. XXXI.

§ 1. **T**HE *Design* and End of a Discourse is here to be more particularly consider'd, as what is chiefly to direct the Manner of it. Now,

6. The End or Design may be either that of the Discourse it self, or some farther Purpose to which we may refer it; whether it be what we openly profess therein, or what we may see fit to keep more Private; whether it be our main Design, or somewhat which is taken in along with it: All these must have the Consideration respectively due to them according to their Place and Value.

Here I would bring down somewhat of the more General Suggestions already given to several considerable Purposes, which may be design'd, and shall perhaps add somewhat more peculiar to them. And,

§ 2. 1. For *Instructing* or informing rightly and well, it is highly requisite, that what we offer should be thoroughly weigh'd and examin'd, not slightly taken up; and we are carefully to see, that we our selves have indeed a clear Apprehension of the Matter, we would impart to others: We should make as sure as we can, that the Terms we use be plainly open'd, and justly limited; and also, that the Things intended by them be so *describ'd*, as to distinguish them from what would be likest to impose upon others; and, if it may be, so *defin'd*, as that the Summary Account and Fundamental Attributes thereof may be clearly and briefly set forth.

§ 3. Where there may be Occasion for it, we should take the Matter in pieces, and speak to it by parts, yet not forgetting the Relation one part has to another. We should endeavour to deduce the Positions, we assert, from plain and undeniable Principles, by easie and evident Consequences; however, that nothing be represented, as altogether Certain, which is not so made out, or has not been; tho' we may recommend some Points as very probably true, where either *this* must be so, or *that* contradictory Position, which is plainly less probable.

We should see, that what we offer be indeed to the Point in hand, and be made to appear so; that in the several Parts and Procedure, one thing serve to prepare and open the way for another; that our intended Sense be justly and clearly deliver'd: And in all, we must have a special Eye to the more general Capacity and Attainments of such as are to be Instructed.

§ 4. 2. For *Entertaining*, there should be somewhat, which is, or may appear to be, New, and, as far as may well be, *agreeably surprizing*; if not in the Things, or Notions themselves, yet in the way of our bringing them in, or of our Explaining, Illustrating, Exemplifying, and Using, or Applying them: Somewhat there should be, here and there, not too continu'dly, or over frequently, which may awaken and engage the Mind afresh, in some or other of the following Ways (where the Matter and other Circumstances will admit of them, as by some observable Sentence, History, Parable, or Fable; some Singular and extraordinary Remark; or a more than common *passage*, and Vehemency of Expression upon fit Occasions.

We may venture sometimes, when the Matter will plainly bear it, upon the raising of an Expectation, whether by the more direct undertaking of somewhat very Considerable, or by a manifest Procedure towards it; but here a singular Care must be taken, that what we have to bring out may be like fully to answer the raised Expectation; and more especially, if we should hold the Reader or Hearer any thing long in Suspence.

§ 5. 3. As to the *Confirming* or *Refuting* a particular Sentiment or Opinion, I might refer the Reader to what has been said before about proving and disproving: But for the doing it in a solemn Discourse, and in relation to some other, somewhat more peculiar is to be directed; and here we must make our selves Masters of the Discourse we would confirm, or refute by Reading, and if need be Reviewing it; also by Recapitulating, and, where there is Occasion, referring the Matter of it to fit and proper Heads, which may be done without much copying, only by References to the Pages and first Words.

We must accurately state the Point we would confirm or refute, where our Author may have neglected it, or mis'd in doing it. In our passing along, we should carefully observe what are the Principles, or Principal Arguments, upon which the Author Proceeds; how they are pursu'd, and what there is which may be reduc'd thereto: Nor should we engage our selves too hastily or too far, whether in Confirming or Refuting.

§ 6. Where we may see Reason to undertake the Confirmation, or Vindication of a Discourse, tho' it were indeed our own, we should generally do it only for the Substance and in the main Design. And here must endeavour to supply the want of Proof, where it is Needful; also to carry on what is left Imperfect, and clear up what is Dark; shewing the Force of what might appear less Cogent; and dismissing what might be Improper, or Inconclusive, with the best Interpretation and Apology it is capable of; as by shewing how plausible the Appearance was, or what might be the thing intended, and how little mis'd: But we should never go about to justify what is really a Mistake, whenas a Frank and Ingenuous Acknowledgment would in the main commend the Person and his Cause to all fit Judges, rather than cast a Blemish upon either; whilst both would be like to suffer by a weak Defence.

§ 7. In order to refute or overthrow a Discourse, we should carefully observe, whether there be not something wrong at the bottom, which our Antagonist proceeds upon, as if it were an undoubted Principle; or where and how he misconstrues or ill-applies what is otherways Right; as also where things are taken for granted, which ought to have been proved, or that what is offer'd for Proof is not to the Point, or is Inconclusive.

We should not commonly follow an Author, at least if he were not very Methodical, step by step; nor fall to peeling the Bark, or lopping off Branches, instead of striking at the Root, by speaking to that, on which he grounds and bottoms his Discourse: And we should help out his Meaning and Design, where we can see it, rather than catch at slips of Expression. Nor should we trouble the World, or our selves with Remarks upon what do's little or nothing affect the Principal Merits of the Cause; unless it might be reasonable and fit we should endeavour to expose our Antagonist as Weak, Insolent, or Unfair, where the Reputation or Appearance of his having a better Character might be of mischievous Consequence: 'Tis certain, however, we our selves should carefully abstain from any thing, which might be Impertinent, Insolent, or Unfair.

§ 8. 4. Where we may reasonably aim, not only at Refuting, but *Convincing*, we must be sure to fall in, as far as well and safely we may, with those who differ from us, commending what is right and well; giving every thing the best Construction it will bear; excusing, what is mistaken, as far as we fairly can; observing what might probably mislead, even a Person of Judgment and Integrity in such a Case; not imputing to *them* the Absurd or Ill Consequences of *their Opinion*, where they are either disclaim'd, or not evidently held; nor laying greater Strefs upon the difference betwixt them and us than it really will bear; upon the whole, using the softest Expressions we can, together with the strongest Arguments, and making it appear, that we differ not from them out of Choice, but upon a kind of Force, as being constrain'd by the Evidence of Truth. But,

§ 9. If Education, Reputation, Secular Advantage, or any other Consideration, which is forreign to the Merits of the Cause, lie against us; it is highly requisite we should endeavour to obviate such powerful Prejudices in the most effectual, but inoffensive way: And it would be very impudent to proceed, as if nothing more than the Reason and Evidence of things were needful to convince Men in such a Case.

Case. Now it may, perhaps, be least offensive and most effectual, if we can truly represent what method we our selves have seen requisite to take with our own Minds, to poize and ballance them against whatsoever prejudice might sway them this way or that; that so we might be capable of making a more impartial and unbiass'd Judgment upon the Reason and Argument on either Side of the Question; and that, when we were come to such a Temper, as that we could submit to whatever Inconveniencies might attend the changing of our Sentiment, we still found our selves oblig'd to abide by it upon that over-weight of Argument, which we offer to be consider'd with some like Precaution, so far however as there may be like Occasion for it.

§ 10. 5. For the *Affecting* of others in any Kind, we should endeavour to be, and to shew our selves affected in like manner, according to that of the Poet,

————— *Sicis me flere, Dolendum est*
Primum ipsi tibi —————

Which we may thus enlarge to our present Purpose.

Who would my Passions move, his own must raise,
 And give them vent in Nature's usual Ways.

We should therefore use the most Natural Ways of speaking in such Case, so far as they may consist with the Nature and Solemnity of our Discourse; here especially remembring, (*Artis est celare Artem*), that it is the Principal Art to Conceal our Art.

Descriptions ought, for the moving of Affections, to be made as near the Life as may be, by our copying from the Life such kind of Circumstances, as have been more observable and moving upon like Occasions: But this Matter is left to the Institutions of Oratory, which are likewise to be consulted upon the following Head. And,

§ 11. 6. As to *Perswading*, tho' it has to do chiefly with the Judgment; yet we should endeavour, that the Affections of Hope and Fear may be brought to comport with the Nature of the Thing it self to which we would perswade, or from which we would dissuade; and likewise with a due Consideration of the *Principles*, and the *Attendants*, and *Consequents*, which are certain or probable in such a Case. Nor must we use only the Arguments, which ought in Reason to Work best, but also those which are likest to have the desired Effect upon the generality of them we have to do withal, as of such a Temper, and in such Circumstances; provide!

vided still, we use no Motives, which carry in them any thing Dishonest or Dishonourable.

§ 12. The Interest, which lies nearest both in Point of Time, and to the Persons themselves, or to their Families and Friends, is commonly like to move them most; tho' it might be far from being most considerable, either in it self, or in its Consequences, to them who are so affected with it: we should argue from the nearer Interest, as far as the Case will bear; and where *that* may lie against our Design, we must draw in all we can, from every Point and Quarter, towards the balancing of it with somewhat, that is at least equally near; and where we still fall short, we are to Labour so much the more to bring Men up to a lively Apprehension of the greater Advantage or Damage at a distance, and to a just Perswasion of its being altogether Certain, or very likely to accrue.

§ 13. The most forcible Examples, which will ordinarily be those that come nearest to the Person and Case, should be set before him, and improv'd by the strongest and clearest Reasoning from them.

Such Objections, as Men are generally sure to make, must be expressly taken up, justly Represented, and solidly Answer'd; others commonly ought not to be so much as mention'd; and we must always take care of raising a Difficulty, we cannot effectually lay.

Finally we should endeavour to find, if there be any more tender Part in respect of Conscience, Honour, &c, and should bring our Reasoning, if it may be, to touch and fasten there. But the farther Prosecution of these Points we must leave to such as treat of them more professedly, and distinctly.

§ 14. As to those solemn Discourses, which are to be deliver'd by the Mouth, we must carefully endeavour that they be compos'd with the greatest possible Clearness; that so they may be readily taken, and apprehended, as fast as they are spoken; and for this Reason they should not be too Concise or Set, but open and free: But then, being here more limited in time, we must very carefully Select what is of greatest Necessity and Use; omitting much that might otherwise be said. Since, even in Discourses from the Pulpit, an intire Subject often must be finish'd at once; and it is highly fit, that at least some considerable Branch should always be dispatch'd in a single Sermon.

§ 15. A very singular and early Care should be taken that the Voice be well form'd; that our Pronunciation be clear, and conveniently strong, but not unbecomingly loud; that Pauses and Cadencies be duly observ'd, that is naturally and agreeably to what Men generally use in their common Conversation; as also that Accents be rightly plac'd, and the Emphasis laid where indeed it lies, according to the true Sense and Design of the Matter.

Our Gesture and Behaviour must be no ways Uncouth or Odd, nor yet too Formal and Starch'd; but Natural, Easie, and Becoming.

§ 16. For the better securing such Points as these (which tho' they seem little in themselves, yet may be very great in their Consequences) it is plainly requisite, not only to attend with Care to such particular Rules as may be given about them, but that we should bespeak the strict Observation of some prudent and faithful Monitor, especially upon our first setting out, and for some time after.

§ 17. As to what we wou'd publish to the World, it should generally be something uncommon, and well study'd, according to that Memorative Line, which is the last but one in the Table of Inferences, C. 14. § 24. p. 307, and the Explication given of it, C. 16. § 29. p. 320. Discourses that are such, in some Measure, seem to be in a sort due to Mankind, or to our Country.

The Argument of which we Write, and the Manner of treating it should be agreeable to the Genius of the Age, as far as well may be; yet not without some prudent Endeavour, where there is great and manifest Occasion, softly and insensibly to carry Men into juster Sentiments, and a better Disposition; not opposing our selves too directly to general Misapprehension, but rather using all the innocent and safe Compliance, which may enable us more easily and effectually to correct it, tho' by slow Degrees.

The more material Substantives may be begun, according to the Modern way, with Capital Letters, and also the most considerable Adjectives, but Verbs with small; unless in some peculiar Case: The Change of the Character into what is altogether CAPITAL, or to *Italick*, or from *this* to Roman, or into English, is to be sparingly us'd, that so it may be more observ'd when 'tis employ'd to mark out some Principal, or very Material, or distinctive Words, or a more important Emphasis.

§ 18. A free and easie way of Writing is justly to be endeavour'd; a moderate Stay is commonly to be made upon what is observable, that the Reader may more certainly, as well as easily, take the Tho't, and that it may be more deeply regarded, and more firmly retain'd: But we are not ordinarily to hang very long upon a Point; rather it should *so* be treated, that the Mind may leave it, or even immediately return upon it, with an Appetite; and that what is offer'd to it, may be like to put the Readers Tho'ts in Motion, and carry them yet a good way farther in the present Matter. In short, the more immediate Tho'ts ought to be smoothly and easily convey'd, without Shock or Trouble to the Mind, and yet should not be barren or empty, but pregnant with Sense, and leading to farther Notions relating to the Point in hand.

§ 19. The Particulars we deliver upon any more General Head should rather be well chosen, than numerous; but yet some Choice is to be offer'd, and this is to be done in Writing, rather than in Speaking; since the Reader easily may (tho' the Hearer cannot) either wholly pass, or slightly run over, what he cares not to concern himself withal: And it has been with this Consideration, that divers things have been put into this Essay, which some might be incapable of; as also what others would not need; together with some Things, which some may perhaps despise, or disrelish: Yet surely that Guest would not be over-civil to himself, but guilty of intolerable Rudeness to every Body else, who should find fault with the Variety of Dishes at a Feast, where a numerous Company were to be entertain'd, besides himself.

The World should be very sparingly troubled with Controversial Appeals; but especially with the Personal and Private Matters, that are too commonly drawn in upon such Occasions.

§ 20. Where the Sentiments and Affairs of others are undertaken to be represented and transacted for them, or that they have at least a common Concern in the Matter of a Discourse, it seems to be a piece of Justice, and is certainly a point of Prudence, that before it be publish'd it should be communicated to some fit Persons, who are so concerned in it, if there be not some peculiar Reason to the contrary.

And in most Cases it is altogether fit we should pursue that excellent Advice given by the Poet,

*Si quid tamen olim
Scripseris, in Metii descendat Iudicis aures,
Et Patris, & Nostras: Nonumq; prematur in annum:
Membranis intus positis delere licebit
Quod non edideris: Nescit Vox missa reverti.*

which may be thus Paraphras'd,

Let some just Critick, what you Write Survey,
And Friends well pick'd: To publish long delay:
The private Copy still admits your Pen,
As you see Cause, to change, dash out, put in: }
But what's once got abroad knows no way back agen }

§ 21. Things that are Difficult, especially when they are like-wise of Moment, should not be offer'd to the Publick in the way of positive Determination, but rather in *that* of Enquiry and Attempt, with the Use of proper Methods for engaging friendly Remarks to be privately transmitted to us, in order to such Amendments and Improvements, as we may see fit; which we are to promise, if there be Occasion and Opportunity, in the way of Supplemental Observations, for the Accomodation of those who shall have the Treatise it self, as publish'd at present.

It may sometimes be proper and convenient to signify to the World beforehand, that we shall be ready to welcome any farther Light, which may be offer'd, tho' it should be in the way of Publick Animadversion; and even publicly to acknowledge any considerable Mistake, we can come to see; if we have a fit Opportunity, and can apprehend it like to do more Good than Hurt, upon the whole Account: And in some Cases it may be prudent to add, that we shall not think fit to trouble the World, or our selves with Answering to what may appear evidently Captious or Trivial, if any thing of that Nature should be publish'd in Opposition to what we have advanc'd.

§ 22. And now, to shut up all, that None may be lost or bewilder'd in so great a Variety of Matter, or of the Suggestions offer'd, thro' this whole *Essay*, to so many several Points and Purposes, it is earnestly recommended to the Reader, that he should carefully single out, from time to time, as his Circumstances and Occasions may require, such Observations and Instructions, as may be to him of greater
Necessity

Necessity or Service than the rest; taking all fit ways to make them as far as possible his own, and that he may have them continually at hand for Use: Always remembering, that a few Notions well improv'd, and some few certain Rules, duly apply'd and heedfully observ'd, are much to be prefer'd to a far greater Number, even tho' we should suppose them also better, lying by him unregarded and neglected.

*DEI GRATIA,
DEO GLORIA.*

LIGHT
FROM GOD FLOWS;
MAY IT TO
GOD
ASCEND:
HIS
GRACE, THE AUTHOR;
AND HIS PRAISE,
THE END.

A Version of the foregoing Inscription, line by line, attempted in the Form of an Ode, without Rhime.

Under th' Auspicious REIGN of ANNE the most Serene,
The Glorious Trophies of Her Conquering Arms,
And Influential Beams,

HONOUR AND SAFEGUARD

Are the humble Pray'r, and Hope

Of this new LOGICAL ESSAY,

Which, after GOD, is Sacred to HER Majesty;
To REASON yet submitting with all just DEVOIR,
To be by THAT Correct;

Whose Voice DIVINE, with GOD's, commands the QUEEN;
By which alone the QUEEN do's, under HEAV'N, command.

This WEAK ATTEMPT, but for GREAT REASON's AID,

Where 'tis subservient to that POWER OPPRESS'D,

May it not meet A FROWN from HER, who is

TH' ETERNAL REASON's AWFUL SUBSTITUTE;
REDEEMING WISDOM's FOLLOWER, STILL THE SAME:

A WOMAN, who with more than MANLY REASON acts;

GREATER than HAUGHTY LEWIS stil'd THE GREAT:

REASONS of State at HOME, and EUROPE's Grand AFFAIRS

Who doth so justly ARBITRATE:

To REASON'gainst all TYRANNOUS INSULTS

Th' INVINCIBLE PROTECTRESS:

The Band, Head, Soul of UNION, REASON's great Refuk;

Blessing, with Forreign STATES and POWERS,

Her KINGDOMS of our Fortunate BRITISH Isle,

Which, at Her Call, and by Her Conduct, now

Are fully Joyn'd at last, and grow entirely ONE:

For REASONS great and good ELIZABETH REVIV'D,

Crown'd with yet larger Power and more Success,

Her Reign and Virtues more Correct (Surprizing Prodigy!)

Hence by ALL HERS, whom REASON guides, ADOR'D:

All Dutiful Regard She to her FATHER bore,

Yet more to HEAV'N, and REASON not UNJUST to FAITH;

DEFENDER OF THE FAITH by REASON JUSTIFY'D:

A SISTER Worthy of the late Blest PAIR,

With REASON's Full, Free VOTE

Filling the THRONE, from which They to a HIGHER rose;

WILLIAM and MARY both UNITED are in ANNE,

Who more than EMULATES the GLORIES of their Reign.

Sub ANNÆ SERENISSIMÆ Auspiciis,

Lauris ejus Victricibus,
Vultuq; simul Propitio,
DECUS ET TUTAMEN

Supplex petit, speratque
TENTAMEN hoc LOGICUM,

EJUS Majestati, post DEUM, Sacrum;

Se tamen castigandum

Subjiciens (quò par est Obsequio) RATIONI,

Quæ, cum DEO, sola imperat REGINÆ;

Quâ, sub DEO, solâ suis imperat REGINA.

Opusculum hoc RATIONI Subsidia ferens,

Quatenus eidem non fuerit absconum,

Ne dedignerur

IMPERATRIX ÆVITERNÆ RATIONIS VICARIA;

SEMPER EADEM SOSPITATORIS ΛΟΓΟΥ IMITATRIX.

Fœmina RATIONE pollens plusquam Virili;

LUDOVICO Magno longè MAJOR:

RATIONUM inter BRITANNOS Civilium, et EUROPÆ simil,

ARBITRA ÆQUISSIMA,

RATIONIS contra Tyrannidem omnigenam

PROPUGNATRIX INVICTISSIMA

UNIONIS, cum RATIONE, Vinculum, Caput, Anima,

Non Exteris tantum GENTIBUS,

Quin et Suis BRITANNIÆ Regnis,

Ejus Motu ac Ductu

In Unum penitus Consolidatis, et Coalescentibus;

ALTERA tandem, Rationibus benè multis, ELIZABETHA;

Regno autem et Victoriis AUCTOR,

Imò Virtutibus et Regimine (quis non stupeat?) EMENDATOR,

Hinc Subditis, RATIONE sanâ utentibus, ANTIQVIOR habita:

PATRIS ut maximè Amans, atque Audiens,

Magis tamen DEI, et RATIONIS FIDEI non dissonæ;

FIDEIQUE exinde RATIONI consonæ, DEFENSOR:

GULIELMO et MARIA Soror DIGNISSIMA,

Ac EORUNDEM, summâ cum RATIONE, SUCCESSOR;

Cum sit UNA UTRIUSQUE

Plusquam ÆMULATRIX Felicissima.

A N

APPENDIX.

WHAT has been offer'd somewhat more largely about *Things*, as the Objects of Tho't, in the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Chapters of the First Part of the foregoing Essay, is here most contractly deliver'd in the following Measur'd Lines; which ('tis hop'd) may be easily apprehended, after the Perusal of the larger Account in Prose, or at least, upon a more immediate Consulting of the Places here refer'd to, in the Margin: And 'tis not doubted, but the following Hints may suffice for the calling over a much larger Inventory of Things and Notions, than was attempted or design'd in the mentioned Chapters.

Some peculiar Branches and Parts of the Summary here subjoin'd, may be committed to Memory, particularly, that about the *Ways of Thinking*, together with the *Set of Enquiries*, and Five or Six Lines about *Spirits, Bodies and Compounds*; to which such other Paragraphs may be farther added, as any one shall conceive to be of greatest Use to Himself. But by a frequent Review the Whole may be made Familiar, tho' no part of it should be charg'd upon Memory.

It will however, in this most contracted Form, lie somewhat readier to be us'd upon Occasion, as is directed in the Abstract it self, which may be had by it self alone, if some should desire to have it always at hand, as a Promptuary: And for the like purpose the Memorative-Lines about *Middle Terms*, and *Inferences* are here subjoined to it.

THE less and greater *World in Miniature*, 2
 That to it self, and this more fully to Enure; 3
 And to that *CENTER draw*, where it shall *REST secure*.

OUR Thoughts themselves, and Things, as in those Draughtes 4
 Within presented, are the Objects of our Thoughts: 5,6

That we then think, and What, we then well know: 7

And, often, can Repeat; but are less Sure, more Slow: 8

In what's Loose, Nice, Confus'd, Long, Minded less; 9

Not late, or oft, Call'd o'er; in Age, what is more fresh: 10

Writing supplies, imprints, prompts Memory; 11

So Reference, Tokens, Use, Place; or a clos'd, fix'd Eye. 12

HOW, and OF WHAT Men think, we here would show, 13

Comprize, Contract, Select, Dispose, and Treat them so; 14

That we may Lodge, Review, Secure our Store; 15

Use Heads, Train, Queries, Hints, here giv'n, in quest of more; 16

The Ways of Thot to this, or that apply; 17

Its Kind, Sorts, noted Marks, Parts, Relatives descry, 18

Like, Unlike, Cause, Effects; and what suits best may try. 19

We some way mind, and apprehend, whilst we 20

PERCEIVE what Sense conveys [feel, taste, smell, hear, or see, 21

By proper Organs, Nerves, and Spirits there]; 22

Or by like inward Motions, as if so it were, 23

IMAGINE [represent, conceit, feign, dream] 24

Or properly CONCEIVE some Intellectual Theme, 25

Not of such kind, or not determin'd so, 26

As those must always be, which Sense or Phansie show; 27

Whilst Mind can Incorporal Things, and General know. 28

What Starts, Recurs, Follows, or Flies us, seems, 29

Cest in, Impress'd, Withdrawn, or, as in common Dreams, 30

Owing to casual Motions in the Brain, 31

So predispos'd: but Thots are, by us, for the main 32

Form'd, whilst we rove, glance, pore, turn, scan, detect, 33

Nor only simply view, but on those Views reflect; 34

Refer, compare, abstract, name, sign, disjoin, connect; 35

Distinguish, Fix, Describe, Define, Divide; 36

State, SEE, Hold, Arm, Deem, Guess, Doubt, Argue, Weigh, Decide, 37

Suspend; Stand; Change; Object, Solve, Slight; Apply: 38

Believe, Consent, Depend; Mistrust, Dissent; Aim, Eie. 39

Fudge, Rate; Will, Nill; Like, Dislike; Flie, Wish; Fear, 40

Hope; Trust, despair; Joy, Grieve; Design, Adhere; 41

Appendix.

Book III.

Chap. II. Section

Pity, Envy; Charge, Acquit; Approve, Admire: } 29
 Presage, Recal, Propound; Seek, Find; Pursue, Retire; } 30
 Suppose, Infer; Mistake, and, to Take right, Enquire. } 31
 This last, with divers others, may be done } 32
 By Words, and some by Actions; not in Thought alone:
 What farther may employ us, here you'll see,
 Either in Terms distinct, or by Synonymie;
 In Generals couch'd, or Specially drawn forth;
 Some briefly Op'n'd, as of greater Note, Use, Worth.

Chap. III. Section

SPIRITS well know they Think, are Pleas'd, Pain'd, Move: 1, 3
 Scripture, and what they do, their being, Sorts, Genius prove.
 BODIES how Felt, their Taste, Smell, Sound, Shew, Light, 4, 5, 6
 Shape, Size, Hue, Texture, Pores; Parts mov'd, fast, loose; Garb, Site.
 COMPOUNDS of both, or one, how made, unmade: } 7
 All Beings these Kinds comprize, whose Sorts are here essay'd; } 8
 Their Chief Parts, Marks, Appendages together laid.

The Works of Nature, Creatures, Providence: }
 Humane Affairs, Enquiries, Points of Eminence }
 Here follow, with Aim giv'n, what may be drawn out hence. }
 Bodies, as are their cub'd Diameters, 9
 And Distance Squar'd - (but here the greater less infers)
 Tend to each other, taught by Skill Divine;
 Whence the Worlds parts each keep their place, Orb, Motion, Line.
 What HEAV'NS; WHO there; Stars greater, less, confus'd, 10
 Unform'd, or form'd in Sets, with various Names long us'd,
 Feign'd Shapes, and Pow'r's; chiefly the twelve known Signs,
 How with the rest gone slowly back: Poles, Orbs, Points, Lines. 11
 Conceiv'd, as what the Stars and Planets show,
 Whilst they are seen now here, now there; some high, some low:
 Yet daily on the same South-Line appear,
 Near the same Time and Place, as last before they were; }
 And each, at their set Periods, in the same Point there. }

Twelve Moons, eleven Days, five Hours, one fifth
 The Sun requires: The MOON, when New, do's mostly shift 12
 To let his Beams pass by; when Full, evade
 Her own Eclipse from Earth's projected, threat'ning Shade:
 Four Weeks, and thrice twelve Hours, with three fourths more,
 Repeat her Varying Forms all over, as before.
 Girt Saturn, how with five he rounds the Skie, ——— } 13
 Jove with four Guards; and how Mars, Venus, Mercury. }
 Comets (rare Sight) what, how made, mov'd, whence, whither, w } 14

Appendix.

Chap. III. Section

Æther, and grosser AIR; what in this flies, 15
With Plumes, or Skinny Wing: Fogs, Mists, and Streams that rise,
Forc'd up by Heat, condens'd in Clouds by Cold
(Driv'n by thin'd Air, which shoots in Winds, that shift or hold),
Full fraught sometimes with Nitrous Particles,
Whence Sulphur, by some smart Collision fir'd, expells
Fierce Light'nings, with loud Thunders rolling Voice;
But oft'ner Clouds compress'd, o'ercharg'd, without such Noise,
Dissolve to Rain; which, freezing, falls in Snow,
Big Drops in Hail; Hoar-frost from dewy Mists may grow.
How shooting Stars kindle, run on, expire; 16
With falling, wandring Lights, and other, like, Night-fire;
Whence, their Sulphureous, or Oily Steams.
How Light's reflected, intermix'd, refracted Beams,
On Icie Air above, and Dewie Rain,
Paint Halos, Rain-bows, and new Suns, or Moons do feign.

Whether our EARTH be like a Ball, or Bowl, 17
Which round its constant Axis, and the Sun doth roll;
Whose Turn to Him makes Day, or from Him Night;
Whilst yearly She surrounds that central fixed Light,
In a vast Curve; which yet, to Stars on high,
Must be but as a Point, or Earth Heav'n's Pole must fly.

What Climes, what longest Day, what Seas, what Lands, 18
Known or unknown; what Hills, Plains, Pointes, Bays, Rocks, or Sands;
Isles, Continent: How Europe, Asia,
How parched Africk lies, and how America:
What Parts each has, how bounded, how far Wide
Of th' Æquinoctial-line, its North or Southern Side;
What Longitude of this Meridian-line,
Counting due East, from that, which th' Azores define.

How S E A, next under, to the Moon inclin'd, 19
While that just Opposite, more distant, lags behind,
Twice in five times five Hours do's, both ways, rise;
Springs high'r, when Sol to th' New, or Full draws not cross-wise,
As in Neap-Tides, but in one Line; still high'r,
When He's on Winter's Brinks, near th' Equinoxes, nigher;
And so with Full and New more strongly do's conspire;
But sinks the Quarters more: Past Southing Moon,
(At Midnight, when she's counted Full; when New, at Noon)
Three Hours to London-Bridge High-Water brings,
Three Quarters later still each Day; but various Things
Alter elsewhere the Tide, and here sometimes;
Which varies yet far more in some far-distant Climes.

What

VI. *What MEN (White, Black, rude, form'd) Faith, Polity, Store, 20*
For Use, Delight, and to export abroad; what more
Or needful, or desirable; what Ports,
Lakes, Rivers, Bridges, Land, Bath, Spaw, Towns, Building, Courts;
What else of Ancient Note, or later Fame;
What Sorts of Fish and Fowl, Beasts, Insects, Reptiles, Game:
What's rare, strange, nice, which this or that Place owns,
What Grain, Shrubs, Trees, Fruits, Herbs, Drugs, Minerals, Metals,
How they agree, how differ, what their Use; [Stones.
How valu'd, got, apply'd, improv'd; with what Produce.

Plants, Animals, of this and that degree, 21
How Organiz'd, what difference, what Analogie:
Root, Head; Trunk, Limbs; Leaves, Rind, Skins; Fibres, Nerves;
Sap, Chyle; Seed, Fruit; Buds, Blooms, Eggs, Embrios, Coats: what
To take, fit, strain, pass Food, Air, Juices, Blood; [serves
Which Veins to th' Heart return, thro' Arteries drawn; Bad, Good;
As Birth, Air, Food, Rest, Motion, Thought may cause;
Skill, Failure, Accidents, by fix'd Mechanick Laws:
Flesh, Bones, Joints, Gards, Ties, Muscles, Brain; where, whence,
What serves the Humane Soul in Reasoning, Motion, Sense;
Which GOD may know, enjoy; its chief, sure Excellence.

The Works of Creatures, all, from Nature take 1
Their Matter, only give some differing Turn, or Make;
Whilst they join, separate, force; nor barely try,
But Actives, with Effect, to Passives do apply.
Hence Wax, Combs, Honey, Silk, Web, Burrough, Nest:
Clothes, Glass, Piles, Furniture; Fields, Gardens, Trees, Food, draft; 2
Machines, Books, Med'cines, Instruments; by Art,
Or some strange Instinct form'd, which Nature doth impart.
Here Thought, Help, Matter, Labour, Cost requir'd
Weigh with the Credit, Service, Profit thence desir'd; }
How like to be obtain'd; what Ballance, if acquir'd. }

Beings Made, Sustain'd, Redeem'd, Us'd, Ru'd, Born still, 3
By the most Pow'rful, good, wise, just, fixt, Sov'reign Will.
Strange Works, whose Kind, Superior Force, & sign 4
Speak them true Miracles, and Proofs of Truth Divine.
Nature inverted, or, its Course maintain'd; ————— }
GOD's call Word fulfill'd, i'th' Heav'ns, Air, & Water, Land; }
Like from its Like by Seed, Graft, Slip, Eggs laid, retain'd. }
Lots, that are Sacred, Civil, Ludicrous; 5
What else sure Causes has, tho' it seem Chance to us.

Appendix.

Chap. IV. Section

The Rise, Turns, Falls of Persons, Families, Sacred, or Civil Bodies, Forms, and Politicks, By what more obvious Means, or hidden Energies; Whilst God restrains, renews, moves, guides, helps, sits At Helm to over-rule, what Ill be well permits; The Humbled spares, the Harden'd bows, or breaks; Whilst Earth-quake, Storm, Fire, Sword, Plague, Death just Anger ADAM with EVE, how made, seduc'd, sin'd, fell, 6 [speaks. By Fruit forbid'n, with THEIRS, a Prey to Sin, Death, Hell; Yet thro' the SEED foreshewn, bruis'd, rais'd, they may Be freed, advanc'd at last, in God's appointed way. How thro' his Word and SPIRIT false Deities Lost their Adorers; how Mosaic Mysteries, Finish'd, gave way to Christian Light, which spread, And shall prevail; how CHRIST shall judge the Quick and Dead, Dissolveth this World, Crown Saints, and Crush the Guilty Head.

What's Man's CHIEF GOOD; Health, Stores, Friends, Honor, Pleasures of Phansie, Sense, Mind, Virtue, or all these? 8 [Ease, God's Favour how secur'd; which will secure What's good for us, nor only help Ills well t'endure; But turn the Worst to Best, and make what's Better sure. Judgment how form'd, that it may rightly lead, Will follow ready; both by Passions be obey'd. How Goodness counts as Good, what is Sincere; Tho't can't, as thoroughly such, the Eye of Justice bear; Whilst aught is wanting, or Ill-join'd thereto; However manag'd else; what'er besides we do.

What MEAN true Prudence shews, from what attends, Leads, Follows; Persons, Things; what best may reach best Ends. How kept in Acting; while there's no Excess, In real Virtue, more than in true Happiness.

A just and therefore Moderate Estimate Of Men and Things: A due, thence humble, modest Rate Of our own Parts, Grace, Acts, Acquirements, Birth, Name, State. What Thought, Prayer, Conduct, Company's like to make Contented, Frugal, Temperate, Chaste, Fix'd, Well-Awake, Industrious, Patient, Bold, Brave, Pious, Kind, Meek, Courteous, Faithful, True; a large, impartial Mind, To what's Fit, Grateful, Free, Just, Merciful, Enclin'd.

God's, Nature's, LAWS of Nations, Realm, Time, Place, What written or unwrit Rules, Customs; in what Case:

Appendix.

Chap. IV. Section

What's Bid, Forbid; Tax, Pains, Grants, Benefits; 14
Courts, Terms, Cause, Parties, Proof, Oaths, Bills, Pleas, Answers,
Forms; Cov'nants, Wills, Gifts, Debt, Securities; [Writs;
Summons, Arrest, Pris'n, Bail; Suits, Trials; Who, in these, 15
Preside, Assist, Attend, Clear, Cast, or Read;
Condemns, Reprieves, Pardons; Inflicts: What Damage laid,
What giv'n; what Costs: Justice deferr'd, deny'd;
By Equity the Law is soft'ned, or supply'd.

Liberties, Properties, Authoritie 16

Who claim, have, serve, in what Sort, Station, or Degree;
How made, their Names, Marks, Work, Expence, Support, Pay,
Leagues, Treaties, Embassies, Peace, Traffick; Arms, 17 [Fee-
Men, Coin, Stores, Forts, Camps, Ships, Fight, Siege, Wiles, Victory,
Harms.

Dealings fair, foul, false; bought, sold, chang'd away: 18
Trust, Use, Returns, Notes, Discount; sure, slow, ready Pay:
Bound; Time serv'd, giv'n; Free, hir'd; Farm'd, let for Years,
Or Lives; Harriots, Fines, Rent; Free-hold; Laid, Wen, Lost, Arteais.
Wares, Wholesale, Retail; Bad, Good, Best, Cheap, Dear; 19
Weight, Measure, Tale; Stocks join'd; Accounts kept, stated, clear,
Gain, Hazard, Loss; Ensure, Stock-job; Compound, Forbear.

Chap. V. Section

What's Taught, and Learnt, by th' by, or solemnly; 1
By Pattern, Practice, Rule; Alone, in Company:
To Read, Write, Count, Mete, Sail, Work, Trade, Sing, Play,
Dance, Fence, Ride; Games, Tongues, Sciences, and Arts; the Way
Of Teaching, Reading, Noting, Study, Prayer,
Discourse, Dispute, Behaviour, Voice, Self-Conduct; Care 2
Of State, Church, Army, Navy, Company,
This or that Special Business, Person, Family;
The differing Practice in Law, Physick, Surgery.
Try'd Skill, Care, Faithfulness do Men commend;
But some, as yet less us'd, can and will best attend.

NUMBER and MEASURE join'd with Notes high, low; 3
In fit, harsh Parts; Ains flat, sharp, soft; Time, swift, or slow:
Apply'd to Time, Weight, Motion, (what drives, draws,
Steps, guides, takes off, turns; Force, Things mov'd, Way gives its Laws)
To Sight, Sm, Stars, Diats, Land, Sea; to direct 4
Machines, Forts, Buildings, to what else [more, less] affect:
Abstracted, when are Count, or Measure we respect,
Read, Note, su, si, add, multipl, dividu,
Lines, Figures, Bodies, Squares, Cubes, Roots, with Raties try'd

To *thm* or *that*) **Parts Vulgar, Decimal;**
Make, use Sines, Tangents, Numbers Logarithmical;
Which in fit Difference, answering Quotity,
Subtracted will Divide, and added Multiply,
Twice taken, Squares; thrice, Cubes; halv'd, thirded, Roots deserv.
But General Points Geometry must show,
As they from Axioms, Grants, and Definitions flow;
Or Algebra, which with Marks for Terms unknown, — } 7, 8, 9
States, equates, Substitutes, Works Ratios, reasons on;
Till what was sought may be from Somewhat equal shown. }

What TONGUE (what Words, how us'd, their Accidents) 10
How Sprung, Chang'd, Spoke, Wrot, Turn'd; What and What kind of
One, or more Sentences, distinct, entire, [Sense: 11
Self-evident, granted, prov'd, or such as proof require;
Short, long; dark, clear; loose, close; false, true; weak, wise;
In proper, lit'ral Terms, or Figurative Disguise:
The Parts (with Points, Marks, Numbers); which refer, 12
As Question, Answer, Case put, what should draw, deter;
Proof, Reason, Inference, Opening, Similie; —
What other Signs of Tho't; what sort, and what the Key; } 13
How sought for Emblem, Short-hand, or Cryptographie. }

The following QUERIES make, if need require, 14
On Themes pass'd o'er, or where you farther Light desire.

Whether, Who, What, Which, Where, Whence, Whither, Why,
When, How-long, How; By Whom, What Warrant, Right, Whereby,
With Whom, what Count, Powers, Bent, Rest, Change, Relation, Ty,
How caus'd, held, null'd, fail'd, answer'd; what, and how 15
Done, said, born, had, refer'd: What Habits once, what now,
Of Virtue, Vice, or Skill, Mind, Tongue, Feet, Hand;
How come by, kept, advanc'd, or lessened, lost, regain'd?
What leads, attends, has, do's, is like t'ensue, 16
Or must, or may at least: What's Common, Rare, Old, New;
With Nature, or beside, against, above:
How Judgment stands, how Will inclines, and Passions move;
What pleases, grieves, offends; wherein, and whence;
How remedy'd, how endur'd, and what the Recompence;

Amongst all these, Tho't should be mainly bent 17
On Points, that are more Needful, Useful, Excellent.

In what's our Business with the Chief to Vy: 18
To know how Plants, Brutes, Men rise, live, thrive, change, fail, Dy:
Phantoms; join'd, separate Souls; Fiends, Angels; the most HIGH,
Three-One; their Nature, differing State, Capacity, —
Work, Aims, Concern with us: from sure Theology,
And Light Divine to draw the best Discovery,
What SPIRIT, FAITH, COURSE lead up to reign eternally.]

To fill th' Account, look what each Point implies; 19
 What borders; fronts; or may from one, or more arise,
 Of Fictions, farther Notions, or Realities.

The Table of MIDDLE TERMS, or Heads of Argument, which has some brief Notes added to it,
 P.III. Chap. II. § 8, 9. Page 284.

The SUBJECT by these MIDDLE-TERMS
 by these words claims or disclaims the PREDICATE;
M Mending the Question's Phrase, or less convenient State.
I Measure, apply'd, containing; Tale, Weight, Principle;
D Instance, what may or must be, shews, in the like Case.
D Induction proves the Whole from all Sorts, Cases, Parts.
D Disjunction says 'tis thus; since 'tis not so, nor so. —
L Distinction clears, or guards by shewing how Points hold.
L Deductions rightly Made from uncontested Grounds. —
E Demands, which fairly claim, that this or that be so. —
T Larger proves Less; Like Attributes, Things so far Like.
T Law given, or declar'd by fit Authority. —
E Explained Words, or Things, which to the Point relate.
R Terms of each Art are fix'd, and proved by their Art.
M Testification by Sufficient Evidence. —
S Experience, What to us, or others hath occur'd. —
 Experiment well made, and warily apply'd. —
 Reason of Things the same, or some way Differing. —
 Relation shews its Ground. This, that; Rule, what is right.
 Mem'ry, when sound, assures what clearly it retains.
 Memorials prove the very Facts, or Somewhat like. —
 Sense; what we'r Conscious of, or certainly Perceive.
 Supposal; whence is drawn what touches the Debate.

Claims, or Disclaims
 the PREDICATE.

The Table of INFERENCES, or Grounds, whereon they proceed, which are explain'd in the 3d Part of the foregoing Essay, in the Chapters and Sections here refer'd to.

Chap. 15. Section

I { Infer what, well apply'd, Sure Points import. 1
 { Inverted Terms, as meant before, will hold. 2
 { Included from Inclusive follows right. 4
 { Imply'd from what implies is justly drawn. 5
 { Impossible from Inconsistency. 6
 { Inclind Men are, as their main Course inclines. 7

N { Not infers No—: Nothing, all Negatives. 8
 { Name, Notion, Nature should together go. 9
 { Notation opens, fixes not, the Sense. 10
 { Narrations, not Suspicious, hold for True. 11

F { Form infers Matter: Both, the Thing so Form'd. 11
 { Foundations by what's Built thereon appear; 12
 { That, of what Sort, and sometimes what, they are.
 { Foretold by G O D, Foreknown, and so Fulfill'd. 13
 { Free] what he will may do; at least consents. 14

E { Effects each other, as before, respect, 15
 { When a Like Change do's each of them affect. 16
 { Efficients, Powers, Acts and Effects declare. 17
 { Not only that, but what they were, or are, 18
 { Efficiency, not barr'd, has Like Effects. 19

R { Right, what agrees unto its proper Rule. 19
 { Related things infer their Relatives; 20
 { And neither Side, as such, first is, or longer lives.
 { Resemblance argues, where the Reason holds. 21
 { Ratios in various ways Right Points infer. 22

Chap. 16. Section

E { Ends have or seem to have an Excellence. 1
 { Expedient] what well answers a Good End. 2
 { Effectual] what nought can, or do's obstruct. 3
 { Equals just fit; and have, as such, the same. 4
 { Exceeding] has, as such, some greater Claim. 5

N { Necessity's from Nature; Will, not forc'd; 4, 5
 { Neutral sometimes, and absolutely Free; 6
 { Led mostly, but sometimes by mere Necessity. 7, 8
 { Needless] what may as well be let alone. 9
 { Never infers a full Eternity. 10

Appendix.

Chap. 16. Section

C	Concrete <i>with</i> Abstract; Conjugates <i>agree</i> .	11
	Contradictorious Turns <i>change False with True</i> .	12
	Contrarious Things, <i>as such</i> , Contraries <i>claim</i> .	13
	Conscience must be comply'd with, or convinc'd.	14
E	Ever] <i>a long full Time, or strict Eternity</i> .	15
	Existence <i>argues Essence certainly</i> ;	16
	Consistence <i>thence, hence Possibility</i> .	
	Essentials <i>make to be, or to be such</i> .	17
S	Examples <i>teach, warn, lead, convince, excite</i> .	18
	So All, <i>what one, as such</i> . Adjuncts and Modes	19
	Subjects and Substance <i>suitable infer</i> ;	20
	Subsistence <i>this, completed, has</i> : Modes, Acts	21
	Suppositum [<i>so Reas'ning, Person</i>] <i>claims</i> .	22
	Streams <i>of themselves rise not above their Spring</i> .	23
	Such <i>in it self more such</i> . No Like, <i>the Same</i> .	24
	Similitudes <i>infer but what's their Scope</i> .	25
	Signs <i>have the Sense, which they, who use them, fix</i> .	26
	Superior Names <i>include Subordinate</i> :	27
	Subordinate Natures <i>all Superiour join</i> .	28
	Study'd] <i>well search'd, set, suited, short'ned well</i> .	29
	Sufficient] <i>should not need, or has Supply</i> .	30


F I N I S.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which are arranged in a columnar fashion. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are written in a more formal, printed style. The list includes names such as "John Smith", "Mary Jones", and "Robert Brown", along with their respective addresses in various cities and states.

2. The second part of the document is a series of short, handwritten notes or entries. These notes are written in a cursive script and are arranged in a columnar fashion, similar to the list of names and addresses. The notes appear to be related to the names and addresses listed in the first part, possibly providing additional information or details about each individual.

3. The third part of the document is a series of short, handwritten notes or entries. These notes are written in a cursive script and are arranged in a columnar fashion, similar to the list of names and addresses. The notes appear to be related to the names and addresses listed in the first part, possibly providing additional information or details about each individual.

DAILY



*The more considerable Mistakes, which have been observ'd,
may be thus Corrected,*

I	Numbers to be apply'd to the right-hand-side of the Pages from the Top-Rule above the Title, to point out the Distances here mention'd.		
2		In the Introduction,	67, Distance 41 individuating
3		§ 1. Line 11 r. form ab-	72, D. 6 In-D. 28 in it self
4		stract	73, D. 43 objected
5		P. ii Distance 22 Scheme	74, D. 44 emitted
6		In the Essay,	79, D. 37 Capacity D. 39 refer-
7		Page. 2, D. 3 to a very	90, D. 25 Curve, [ring
8		3, D. 12, 13 Thinking of	134, D. 32 Quantitative
9		D. 16 infirm D. 17 them;	139, D. 32 Sovereign
10		5, D. 23 Think ;	143, D. 35 read (21)
11		9, D. 23 retain, in	181, D. 2, 3 Repetition
12		D. 25 helpful,	185, D. 14 hereupon conceive
13		10, D. 37 Feeling unusual	Great
14		11, D. 5 more or less	193, D. 12 Heaven;
15		D. 6 perfectly,	196, D. 11 Subject is not, or is
16		D. 6 Present ;	198, D. 2, 3 incidental, with
17		D. 36 times, injected,	which D. 5, 6 Predicate ;
18		cast in, or stirred	the former being a
19		14, D. 3 Point, if D. 4	201, D. 20 protensive
20		stand, or	202, D. 14 Identity.
21		15, D. 23 do, D. 34 re-	232, D. 36 absurd
22		maining,	237, D. 39 Case is
23		19, D. 40, 41 Sun has not	250, D. 34 tho' it was
24		left <i>Pisces</i> , when	256, D. 23 Goodness
25		<i>strike out</i> is enter'd	263, D. 39 an Artificial
26		upon Taurus,	277, D. 16 now is,
27		20, D. 19 Years (the	284, line 7 'tis not so,
28		21, D. 28, 29 Vapours,	line 20 know, what
29		becoming	288, Dist. 31, 32 of, and the
30		<i>strike out</i> and <i>thin'd</i>	D. 37 about Future and
31		24, D. 11 be not all	294, D. 41 lengthening
32		31, D. 3 can, D. 18 these	303, D. 16 be the same
33		34, D. 4, 5 Jury, a Ma-	313, D. 38, 39 Similitudes
34		jority of which	327, D. 44 Scandalous
35		<i>dash out</i> of 17, 12	338, D. 10, 11 or if we were
36		D. 22 Legislators	363, D. 9 absolute D. 27 our
37		43, D. 7 of Will	Cloathing
38		48, D. 11 differing	364, D. 13 Memento
39		49, D. 19 intervening :	368, D. 30 Now who can
40		58, D. 45 Difference	D. 31 he could even
41		59, D. 3 Substantiality it	395, D. 20, 21 Paraphrasing
42		self;	397, D. 24 (somewhat
43		61, D. 44 inward	400, D. 46, 47 improve
44		62, D. 8 Comprisal D. 13	403, D. 22, 23 estimated
45		Coincidence Dist. 10	404, D. 3, 4 endangering
46		joining D. 24 Cloth	406, D. 36 whither
47		63, D. 42 divided	409, D. 29 only refer
		66, D. 2 Ec. tho' rather	410, D. 15 Garb





