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THE ESTIMATES OF MORAL VALUES EXPRESSED IN CICERO'S LETTERS

A STUDY OF THE MOTIVES PROFESSED OR APPROVED

A DISSERTATION

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PREFACE

This study has grown out of the author's coincident interest in Cicero's letters and in ancient ethics. The question asked on approaching the correspondence has been simply: What does Cicero represent as being worth while? In view of what good or goods does he himself profess to act? On what does he base his appeals to others, and his approval or disapproval of others? An attempt has been made to present systematically the answers yielded by this examination of the letters, permitting the material itself, so far as possible, to suggest the categories and manner of treatment to be employed. The requirements of each case have determined the extent to which the treatment of the several topics should be chronological. The correspondence has been studied as a mirror of the Roman ethical consciousness, rather than as a source of evidence regarding the character or the consistency of Cicero. Still, no account has been taken of the letters addressed to Cicero. In general, the discussion has been limited to goods which are in the text presented as motives. This involves the deliberate exclusion of a considerable body of interesting incidental ethical judgments, which the author may make the subject of a supplementary paper. The question of the genuineness of the letters admitted to the editions of Müller and of Tyrrell has not been raised. References to passages cited, included within parentheses, have been placed in the body of the discussions, in the belief that they will there be of most service to the student of Cicero, while the general reader can readily pass by everything within the parentheses.

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W. S. G.

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INTRODUCTORY

Rational human action springs from motive. Something immediate or remote, individualistic or social, specific or abstract, is thought or felt to be a good. Every such estimate of value is a factor in shaping conduct. In proportion as we understand the distinctive goods of a man, a people, or an epoch, will the conduct of that man, people, or epoch be intelligible and significant. Sometimes the conduct is itself the only clue to the goods, again, various artistic and literary expressions of life give glimpses of the ideals behind conduct. Some forms of art and literature may be said to reflect life. Others may more justly be characterized as segments from the life itself. To the latter class belongs in a peculiar sense a familiar correspondence such as Cicero has left us.

Historians, biographers, and antiquarians have pointed out the rare value of Cicero's correspondence for their several objects. For the history of the practical ethical consciousness this body of material is no less promising. Cicero's splendid talents and varied culture, the focal epoch during which he lived, and the genius and prominence of many of his contemporaries have often been emphasized. Furthermore, Cicero must have been, for a Roman, peculiarly inclined to ethical reflection, as is indicated by his unique service in popularizing for his fellow-countrymen so large a body of contemporary Greek philosophy, predominantly ethical. And surely no Roman could more clearly and adequately express his ethical reflections than this man to whom is due so much of the world's subsequent philosophical terminology.

Not only were the times in which Cicero lived focal for history, but they were exceedingly perplexing. Precedents and traditions supplied no solution for the problems that were arising—problems of which our author might well say that they were "baffling and insoluble; and yet a solution must be found" (*A.*, 8, 3, 6).¹ The strongest motives usually found cooperating would be directly opposed to each other. These were surely circumstances adapted to stimulate the balancing of values, the examination of the goods in view of which choices are made.

No alleged characteristic of Cicero, save vanity, has brought upon him a greater amount of hostile criticism than his indecision, his vacillation.

¹In this discussion, *A.* designates the collection of letters *Ad Atticum*; *F.*, those *Ad Familiares*; *B.*, those *Ad Brutum*; and *Q. F.*, those *Ad Quintum Fratrem*.

His difficulty in reaching a conclusion is patent, however we may account for or judge it; and this very trait increases the value of his correspondence for our present purpose. If he had been able quickly and instinctively to grasp the most feasible solution of a tangled question, we should have been given only the conclusion, or at best a subsequent justification which might or might not represent the original logical process. But Cicero appreciated so keenly the force of so many conflicting considerations, and was so desirous of reaching the conclusion that would represent the true resultant of the forces involved, that the process of decision was deliberate and labored. Deliberate as the process was, its various stages would not be available for study, were it not for his unparalleled frankness in his letters, especially those to Atticus. This frankness he himself presents in these terms: "So often then do you change your opinion? I talk with you just as with myself; for who does not, especially in so important a matter, argue the different sides of a question with himself?" (*A.*, 8, 14, 2).

This, then, is the situation: A man of subtle and reflective mind, a man temperamentally inclined to defer decision until all the conflicting considerations are carefully estimated and balanced each against each, is placed in situations of peculiar perplexity, and as an aid in reaching his conclusions communicates to intimate friends from hour to hour the varying phases of the debate within.

Now, it is the purpose of this study to examine the correspondence of Cicero for its estimates of moral values, using the term "moral" in its most inclusive sense. What objects does Cicero in these letters present as worthy to determine a man's choice? In other words, in view of what good or goods should a man, according to our author, act? From the multiplicity of practical judgments we seek to define and correlate the implied ideals. If the estimates of a given aim expressed at different times and under different circumstances harmonize with each other, that fact should appear. If they do not harmonize, it is pertinent to seek in the circumstances reasons for the differences. In any case, the aim will be to present systematically the articles of the professed ethical creed found in the letters. If historical or biographical matter is introduced, it will be because it seems necessary for the interpretation of the estimates of value. It is no part of our purpose to discuss the soundness of Cicero's application of his doctrines in estimating men and measures. Neither are we primarily concerned with the consistency of Cicero's conduct and character, one of those perennial enigmas the solution of which seems to depend almost as much on the interpreter's temperament and personality as on the intellectual interpretation of the objective data. Nor is it vital to determine in every case

the sincerity of our author in the judgments expressed, for any misrepresentation of his own sentiments would be due to the pressure of surrounding sentiment. The data have a bearing for the Roman popular consciousness independently of this issue.

While a study of the ethical material contained in the correspondence of Cicero promises results valuable and valid, apart from the controverted biographical questions with which the material has chiefly been associated such an investigation ought incidentally to shed light upon those personal questions. Points of view may be gained from which actions seemingly inconsistent with one another will appear in a more favorable light. On the other hand, incongruities between professions and conduct, as well as prejudiced variations in the application of principles, may be brought into clearer relief.

Students of Cicero's philosophical works should be aided by a systematic presentation of the ethical ideas which he expressed in compositions so spontaneous and informal as are the letters. The Greek originals on which his philosophical works were based have for the most part been lost. To what extent had Cicero assimilated the theoretical works which he at various stages of his career studied? What is the relation of the moral judgments given with approval in his formal works to the judgments of his every-day thought? Upon these questions, which have been the occasion of controversy, some light may perhaps be gained from the results of such a study as that here undertaken.

CHAPTER I

INDIVIDUAL GOOD

That individual welfare and safety—life, health, possessions, and pursuits—were objects of endeavor to Cicero and his contemporaries may be assumed without detailed proof. In our investigation we may properly seek evidence as to the relative prominence, emphasis, and rank given to the respective elements of individual welfare, and to these individual considerations, taken collectively, in comparison with the social and the ideal.

One's estimate of welfare or safety is disclosed in the presence of danger affecting these objects. Cicero professed to have for danger neither contempt nor excessive fear (*A.*, 2, 24, 4). He claimed none of the martyr spirit. Fruitless peril he would, if possible, avoid (e. g., *A.*, 7, 23, 2). In spite of an occasional confession of timidity (e. g., *F.*, 6, 14, 1), he usually claimed courage, as when he wrote that his peace policy would bring him greater credit than did that of Hortensius, since it could not be attributed to cowardice (*F.*, 2, 16, 3). The following is a deliberate and significant formulation of his own professed attitude toward danger, and by inference of the attitude which he would commend: "So I whom those gallant and philosophical gentlemen of the stamp of Domitius and Lentulus used to call afraid (*timidus*)—and I really was, for I feared the occurrence of what actually did happen—I now fear nothing, but am ready against any event. So long as any precaution seemed possible I was distressed that it should be neglected; but now that there is no profit from planning, since all is ruined, the only way seems to be to bear serenely whatever comes" (*F.*, 6, 21, 1; 45 B. C.). This general statement, applied to the matter of personal safety, would claim that clear apprehension of peril, and distressed effort to devise a remedy, so long as a remedy is possible, are consistent with an untroubled contemplation of evils which one is unable to avert, and compatible with real courage.

The most instructive utterances which we find in the letters regarding the relation of personal welfare to other considerations were occasioned by three or four perplexing crises in Cicero's life: just before and just after the exile, when he was in a measure compelled to choose between the triumvirs and the senate; in 49 and 48, when the choice was between Cæsar and Pompey; and in 44, when the issue was between retirement and active opposition to Antony.

In 60, feeling for various reasons the need of strengthening his position (*A.*, 1, 19, 6), he secured an understanding with Pompey. He meets or forestalls objections to this action by frequent declarations that it is more beneficial to the state than to himself, and that his loyalty to the senate is unshaken. "It does not concern me . . . as much as it does the state" (*A.*, 1, 19, 7); ". . . it is assuredly far more beneficial to the state than to me that the assaults of base citizens upon me be checked . . ." (*A.*, 1, 20, 2); "From the senate nothing will separate me, either because that is right, or because it is most in keeping with my interests, or because I am interested in my standing with the senate" (*A.*, 1, 20, 3); ". . . you must not imagine that I have joined him for my own protection, but the situation was such that great dissensions must necessarily break out in the state, should there perchance be any disagreement between us" (*A.*, 2, 1, 6). His implication in such passages is that he was justified in seeking personal protection only in so far as this was consistent with the interests of the republic, and the quoted expressions are all from letters to Atticus, his other self.

The renewal of the understanding between Cæsar and Pompey in 56 made it necessary for Cicero again to define his attitude toward them. In two respects the exile had caused a marked change of tone. What he regards as the treachery of the optimates (*A.*, 4, 5, 1) has estranged him from them. At the same time, his distressing experience has quickened his sense of danger and of the necessity of guarding against it. These two influences conspire to give to personal safety a position of relatively greater prominence than at any other period represented by the letters. He has not forgotten his standing (*dignitas*), but concludes that some account should be taken of safety as well. Both might easily be conserved, if only the ex-consuls were faithful and firm (*F.*, 1, 7, 7). Experience has taught him that neither position nor safety should be sought apart from the other (*F.*, 1, 7, 10). To this period belongs a remark depreciating fame in comparison with safety (. . . *multum enim interest, utrum laus imminuatur, an salus deseratur*, *F.*, 1, 7, 8). He admits that his agreement with Pompey and Cæsar, a course to which personal expediency and loyalty to individuals have led him, involves a certain abandonment of sound political principles (*F.*, 1, 8, 2). Notwithstanding this, he maintains to the same correspondent that this course is expedient for the state as well as for himself, and that it should be followed entirely apart from personal considerations (*F.*, 1, 9, 21).

Whether from differences in the outward circumstances or from a difference in Cicero's temper, or both, we find in the crisis of 49-48 an admitted

conflict between personal safety and other motives. This increases the tension and lifts the question to a higher plane.

His realization of the personal peril is no less keen than previously. To Tiro he writes (*F.*, 16, 12, 1) that his own safety and that of all good citizens and of the state are so imperiled that the only hope lies with some god or with some chance. The lesson of the exile evidently abides, for he frankly admits that he is refraining from taking the lead in a civil war, not from consideration of the merits of the case, but because a course less meritorious formerly brought him disaster. He fears the hostility of Cæsar (*A.*, 7, 26, 2). He remembers that if he had at a former crisis, heeded the advice of Atticus to adopt plans looking somewhat toward safety, as well as toward glory, trouble might have been averted (*A.*, 8, 12, 5). From one epigrammatic summary we might judge that the alternative courses involved equal peril: "If, leaving duty out of question, account is to be taken of danger, there is danger from one party if I do wrong, from the other if I do right" (*A.*, 10, 8, 5). The detailed analysis given in *A.*, 8, 3, 2-5, seems to indicate that the greater danger is involved in following Pompey. We may formulate the case thus:

I. In case of remaining in Italy:

- a) Cæsar as a victorious despot may be dangerous even to his supporters.
- b) Pompey, victorious, would take vengeance.

II. In case of joining Pompey:

- a) The chances of Pompey's victory are slight. (This involves the probability of vengeance from Cæsar, cf. *A.*, 9, 12, 3.)
- b) Cæsar is now in position to make withdrawal from Italy difficult and dangerous.
- c) Cæsar would assail the interests of the absent Cicero.

As long as possible Cicero put off committing himself, expecting that there would be a reconciliation, in which case he hoped to retain undisturbed the friendship of both chiefs (*A.*, 10, 8, 5); but as time went on it became more and more evident that choice must be made, not only between perils, but between peril and other considerations.

How, then, at this time of eager scrutiny and weighing of values, did the element of personal safety appear when related to other motives? At one time Cicero protests against being driven by public sentiment to take a course harmful alike to himself and the state (*A.*, 9, 1, 3); at another time he would be glad to suffer grievous injury at the hands of the Cæsarians as a demonstration that he was the object of the tyrant's hatred (*A.*, 10, 12a, 1); that is, he wavers as to the relative value of personal safety and the approval of others. In a politic letter to a Cæsarian he expresses sur-

prise that he should be thought so short-sighted as to choose a desperate cause instead of a promising one (*F.*, 2, 16, 1); but when writing to Atticus he disclaims making personal safety the prime consideration (*A.*, 7, 13, 3; cf. 7, 12, 3); and, further, he can express himself as ready to suffer the greatest personal disaster (*F.*, 2, 16, 4) in behalf of his country. Yet, while thus testifying to the supreme claims of patriotism, he does not court needless sacrifice. He wonders whether his former services and sufferings for his country may not justify his withdrawing from a struggle against odds and planning for the safety of himself and his family (*A.*, 9, 4, 2). He has made exceptional sacrifices for the state, and is exposed to exceptional perils which he ought to avoid if he can honorably (. . . *si honeste vitare possem*, *A.*, 8, 11D, 7; to Pompey, 49 B. C.). "Suppose I can do this safely, as many urge me, can I do it honorably?" (*A.*, 7, 22, 2; cf. 7, 23, 3) is a question presenting the same antithesis, and definitely subordinating personal safety to higher ethical considerations. This will be more fully illustrated when we come to consider the social motives. The fact that at this crisis Cicero did take the course involving most danger, did reject Cæsar to his face (*A.*, 9, 18, 1) and turn in the direction prompted by reputation, gratitude, and political consistency justifies us in taking him seriously in this ranking of motives.

A brief and less intense period of perplexity, over the question of withdrawing from Italy after the assassination of Cæsar, involves elements similar to those already considered. It occasioned an interesting summary of motives (*A.*, 14, 13, 4):

- I. In favor of going to Greece:
 - a) Escape from threatened massacre.
 - b) Opportunity to look after his son's welfare.
- II. In favor of remaining in Italy:
 - a) Opinion of people.
 - b) Opportunity to be of use to the state.

It should be noticed that in this case also the final decision was in favor of danger, reputation, and public service.

Passing to the specific elements of individual good, we may first inquire what rank Cicero assigns to physical life. Life is frequently referred to in the letters as not the greatest good, and death as not the greatest evil. Such statements naturally have for their primary purpose the emphasizing of the compared good or evil, and in these statements we must recognize a large rhetorical element. Yet even the rhetorical recognition of the idea that life may be of less importance than the demands of friendship, gratitude, patriotism, or right has its significance for our present purpose.

“No wise man (or philosopher, *sapiens*) has considered death a lamentable thing even to the prosperous (*F.*, 6, 3, 3). The banishment of the fear of death secures independence; “For what man is a slave who has contempt of death?” (*A.*, 9, 2a, 2, quoting from a lost play of Euripides, *τίς δ' ἐστὶ δούλος τοῦ θανεῖν ἄφροντις ὄν* ;). Particularly may one be freed from this anxiety who has rounded out his life with years and deeds and fame (*F.*, 10, 1, 1). If the prosperous should view death with complacency, those in the opposite situation ought even to welcome it (*F.*, 5, 21, 4). The lot of the murdered Mucianus was rather to be chosen than the torturing perplexity of the year 49 (*A.*, 9, 12, 7). Under the wretched despotism of Cæsar it seems a misfortune, nay even a crime, to remain alive (*F.*, 4, 13, 1-2; 46 B. C.) Cato deserves praise for the steadfastness that prompted him to die rather than see this situation (*A.*, 12, 4, 2). Likewise in the thick of his last fight Cicero writes: “All whose sentiments are sound prefer death to slavery” (*F.*, 10, 27, 1).

Expressions of willingness to die in another's behalf vary considerably in tone. “If I should yield up my life in defense of your position, I should clearly not have begun to repay you,” written to Lentulus (*F.*, 1, 4, 3), sounds rather conventional. Far differently does Cicero weigh his words in writing to Atticus of Pompey (*A.*, 9, 5, 3). He has reason to be angry with Pompey both on political and on personal grounds; but he considers what Pompey has done for him. Nothing less than Pompey's death is the aim of his foes. Achilles was ready to die with his friend. This man has been both friend and benefactor; besides, he stands for a noble cause. Life is not too great a price to pay in return for such services.

Themistocles did right to choose death rather than to make war on his country (*A.*, 9, 10, 3). So Cicero professes to love his country better than life (*F.*, 11, 5, 3). To die in and for one's country is a glorious thing (*præclarum*, *A.*, 8, 2, 2; 49 B. C.); and if he should lay down his life in his efforts to preserve the safety and freedom of his fellow-citizens, he would consider his lot a glorious one (*præclare actum mecum putem*, *F.*, 9, 24, 4; 43 B. C.). Cæsar's unconstitutional course is declared to involve violation of the right and honorable (*honestum*). A thousand deaths, even death by crucifixion, is a less evil than even to have conceived such a deed (*A.*, 7, 11, 2-3).

Connected with the estimate placed on life is the matter of suicide. Cicero's letters from exile contain many expressions of regret that he did not take his own life rather than leave Italy. His one false step was in not letting his life go with his honors (*F.*, 14, 4, 5). There were two reasons why he should have died; it would have been the most creditable course,

and the best means of escaping unendurable troubles (*Q. F.*, 1, 4, 4). He regrets that the entreaties of his friends kept him from taking his own life at the most creditable (*honestissimum*) time (*A.*, 3, 7, 2), but if there is no hope of a change, he will do at an inopportune time what at the fitting time was not permitted (*A.*, 3, 9, 2). From these and similar passages it is clear that in Cicero's opinion credit would have been gained if he had chosen to die rather than to submit to the humiliation of exile. By once submitting to this degradation he forever lost the opportunity of showing effectively that he held life without the approval of his fellow-citizens a worthless and unendurable thing. But his present life is worthless and unendurable, and suicide will be the only means of escape. He does not in the least seem to question his right to take his own life. His attitude is rather one of apology for having let the entreaties of family and friends hold him back from the appropriate deed.

After the defeat of Pompey he wrote that he saw no reason why he should inflict death on himself, though there were many reasons why he would welcome it (*F.*, 7, 3, 4). We have seen his unqualified praise for Cato's resolute death.

With regard to the right of a man to end his life Cicero was evidently not influenced in his practical attitude by Plato,¹ whose devotee he professes to be;² how is it as to the question whether life ends with physical death? Let us look at characteristic expressions. To Torquatus he wrote: ". . . if now I should be summoned to life's end, I should not be torn from a republic the loss of which I should feel, especially since that would be entirely without consciousness" (*sine ullo sensu futurum*, *F.*, 6, 4, 4; cf. *sensu omnino carebo*, *F.*, 6, 3, 4). "But since there is more evil in fear than even in the object of fear, I refrain, especially as that threatens which is not only painless, but is the end of pain" (*F.*, 6, 4, 4). In building a shrine for Tullia, "that long period when I shall not be (*cum non ero*) influences me more than this brief span which still seems to me too long" (*A.*, 12, 18, 1). He endures with composure whatever comes, "especially since death is the end of all things" (. . . *praesertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum*, *F.*, 6, 21, 1). Certainly there is no hint here of conscious life after physical death. There may seem to be explicit denial of such life, but it is probably more just to say that the thought is limited to physical, mundane life, and that the question of immortality is not raised.

¹ *Phædo*, 61 ff.; *Laws*, 873 C. Note, however, in the latter passage the implication that circumstances may justify or excuse suicide.

² E. g., "deus ille noster Plato" (*A.*, 4, 16, 3), and "ille quidem princeps ingenii et doctrinae, Plato" (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 29).

The "consciousness" from which he is freed and the "all things" of which death is the end concern the embodied life of the dweller of the imperial city. Any other possible life is not so much denied as ignored, and that under circumstances making reference to it unusually natural, if the conception were present with any vitality. He can, however, raise the possibility of immortality as something of which he has "often read and heard; that there is no evil in death; for if consciousness persists, it should be considered immortality and not death; but if consciousness is lost, that ought not to seem an affliction which is not felt" (*F.*, 5, 16, 4). The entire context indicates that we have here the perfunctory repetition of a conventional argument without indication of personal conviction. The immortality of fame will be considered in another connection.

The career of a Crassus indicates that in ancient as well as in modern times material possessions could form a prominent element in individual good. If, however, the accumulation of wealth occupied a conspicuous place in Cicero's thought as in itself a good, the letters do not reflect the fact. He welcomes affluence if it comes, but does not make it the object of his quest (*Q. F.*, 2, 4, 3). It is more creditable to be anxious about one's friends' money than about one's own (*F.*, 13, 14, 2). The failure of a legacy does not matter, provided health is retained (*Q. F.*, 3, 9, 8). We shall find Cicero during his governorship constantly maintaining that he rejects all opportunities for personal enrichment. The province shall not bear a farthing of his expenses (*A.*, 5, 20, 6, etc.). None of the plunder won in battle shall be touched except by the agents of the Roman people (*F.*, 2, 17, 4). The surplus from the appropriation for administrative expenses is to be handed over to the proper officers, notwithstanding the disgust of his staff (*A.*, 7, 1, 6). In all these cases reputation is to be considered rather than gain. On the other hand, the correspondence with Trebatius shows no repugnance to the plan of that young lawyer in joining himself to Cæsar in the province, with the primary, if not exclusive, aim of finding opportunities for pecuniary gain. "I hear that there is neither gold nor silver in Britain. If that is the case, I advise you to capture a chariot and speed back to us as soon as possible" (*F.*, 7, 7, 1). "Do not stand in your own light [by haste to return]. Delay your coming, provided you come more heavily laden" (*F.*, 7, 9, 2). "If Cæsar is likely to do anything for you, prolong your stay; but if your enterprise is fruitless, come home" (*F.*, 7, 11, 2).

If Cicero does not show anxiety to accumulate a fortune, he does express the need of, and the satisfaction in, objects requiring large expenditure.

An early letter to Quintus mentions simultaneous building operations on three sites. He adds: "I am living on a little better scale than formerly; it became necessary" (*Q. F.*, 2, 4, 3). He seems to have enlisted the aid of his friends to secure a house befitting his rank (*A.*, 1, 13, 6). His anxiety to have his confiscated house restored after the exile (e. g., *F.*, 14, 2, 3) may well have been quite as much for the sake of retaining a favorite site and removing visible reminders of his humiliation, as on account of the money value of the property involved.

The improvement of his villas claimed keen personal interest (e. g., *A.*, 1, 6, 18; 4, 10, 2). Statuary was a favorite means of adorning them (*A.*, 1, 9, 2; 1, 10, 3, etc.). A Herm-Athena was particularly appropriate for his "Academia" (*A.*, 1, 4, 3); but he belabors the agent who had no more sense of fitness than to buy for him Bacchæ because forsooth they were little beauties—where will he put them?—and a Mars for the man of peace! He is delighted that there was no Saturn in the lot. A Mercury should have been included, if they are ever to be paid for (*F.*, 7, 23, 2).

When the power of the triumvirs made free political activity impossible, Cicero turned for delight and comfort to these rural estates (*Domus me et rura nostra delectant*, *A.*, 4, 18, 2; *me otium villaque delectant*, *Q. F.*, 3, 9, 2); and when civil war was breaking out, his real affection for these havens shows itself in his desire once more to make the circuit of his villas (*circum villulas nostras errare*) which he has given up the hope of ever seeing again (*A.*, 8, 9, 3).

While Cicero seems often to have been in debt, he had a keen sense of the importance of financial credit. The most earnest references which we find to money matters in the letters are entreaties to Atticus as his agent to arrange by loans or collections for the payment of his obligations and the preservation of his financial standing (e. g., *A.*, 5, 5, 2; 11, 1, 1-2).

We have seen Cicero's interest in fitting up his "Academia" with appropriate statuary. It is but a step to the consideration of his interest in the liberal arts—in study and in writing, in philosophy, in history, in literature.¹ The passages in the correspondence bearing directly or indirectly on this subject are to be numbered literally by hundreds. Of the various questions upon which this body of material throws light we are concerned in this investigation merely with the value which Cicero assigns to pursuits of this sort as an element in life.

That the study of literature and philosophy formed an important part

¹ For a suggestive discussion of the continuity of Cicero's interest in philosophy see Ried's introduction to his edition of the *Academica*.

of Cicero's education is a commonplace. That, when overtaken by political disappointment or domestic bereavement, he turned to these pursuits for employment, is equally well recognized; but what indication do the letters give of an independent abiding interest in such studies? With the consulship of Cæsar in the year 59 before our era Cicero was checked in his independent political career. For our purpose, therefore, the few extant letters from the period of unimpaired political prosperity possess especial value.

In the first year of the correspondence, 68 B. C., he wrote to Atticus who was in Athens: "I should be glad to have you consider, in accordance with your promise to me, how you can secure me a library. On your kindness depend all my hopes of the satisfaction which I want to take when I have leisure" (*A.*, 1, 7). Here we have eagerness to secure Greek books at a time when disciplinary training was past and the struggle for position keenest. The assigned motive is, not the desire to secure material for speeches, but personal satisfaction when leisure should permit. A similar request, belonging to the following year, is aptly rendered by Mr. Tyrrell as follows: "Do not on any account betroth your library to anyone, no matter how eager a suitor for it you find. I am hoarding up all my gleanings (savings) to buy it as a support (resource) for my old age" (*A.*, 1, 10, 4). Do not the metaphors here employed reflect the common feeling of the book-lover who can scarcely think of congenial volumes as belonging altogether to the category of things? It is like his later statement, that since his books have been arranged a soul seems to have been imparted to his house (*A.*, 4, 8, 2; 56 B. C.). To return to the earlier period, he wrote in 67: "Be sure not to let anyone have your books; save them for me as you suggest. I have the greatest eagerness for them" (*A.*, 1, 11, 3); and again: "Keep your books and do not give up the hope of my being able to make them mine. If I accomplish this, I shall be richer than Crassus, and shall look down on everybody's country seats and meadows" (*A.*, 1, 4, 3; 66 B. C.). Six years later, just before the clouding of his political sky, we find the same desire keen—how keen quotation can best indicate. A legacy of books has been left to him, and he writes thus: "As you love me and have assurance of my affection, use every effort through your friends, your clients, your guest-friends, your freedmen, and finally your slaves, that not a sheet be lost, for I have most urgent need (*mihi vehementer opus est*) of those Greek books which I suspect and the Latin ones which I know he left" (*A.*, 1, 20, 7; 60 B. C.); ". . . see that they are preserved and sent to me; nothing can be more welcome" (*A.*, 2, 1, 12).

To this same period of political prosperity belongs the defense of Archias, with its familiar encomium on liberal pursuits, the chief features of

which find close parallels in the correspondence. In the first chapter of the *Pro Archia*, for example, Cicero declared that no period of his life had been destitute of the liberal arts. Similar claims are made at various stages of the correspondence; for example: ". . . learning, to which I have devoted myself from boyhood" (*F.*, 3, 10, 7); ". . . my old friends, my books" (*F.*, 9, 1, 2); ". . . learning and letters, which I have always pursued" (*quibus semper usi sumus*, *F.*, 6, 12, 5; cf. *quibus semper studui*, *F.*, 6, 4, 3); ". . . all art and liberal learning, and especially philosophy, has been a delight to me from early life" (*a prima aetate*, *F.*, 4, 4, 4).

Now, at the very first check to his public activity in 59 we find Cicero turning to literary pursuits with such expressions as these: "Meanwhile I shall with equanimity, nay even with gladness and willingness, seek satisfaction in the company of the Muses" (*A.*, 2, 4, 2; April 59); and, "But why do I concern myself with these [political] matters, which I desire to lay aside, devoting myself heart and soul to philosophy. Such in fact is my purpose. I should have been glad to do so at the beginning, but now that I have found how vain are those objects which I thought were glorious, I plan to have dealings with all the Muses" (*A.*, 2, 5, 2; April, 59). It should be clear, in view of the facts already considered, that this turning to literature is no sudden afterthought, but is entirely in keeping with tastes and desires expressed from the very beginning of the correspondence about ten years before. Not less carefully should we notice how definitely and comprehensively Cicero thus early in his career expresses his purpose to substitute literature for unsatisfactory politics. The large number of such expressions in the letters of the years 46 and 45 tends to create and foster the impression that at that late date Cicero abruptly turned back to the studies of his youth as a convenient means of diversion. But such expressions as those quoted above from 59 form a link connecting the expressions of literary interest distributed through the first ten years of the correspondence with those recognitions of the consolations of literature and philosophy found with increasing frequency in the letters of the last fifteen years.

The question of the continuity and vitality of our author's interest in liberal pursuits from 58 to 43 may best be illuminated by a survey of his estimates of them expressed during the period, taking account both of chronological distribution and variations in tone.¹

The exile was so paralyzing a stroke that "neither wisdom nor learning" had "sufficient power to be able to support such sorrow" (*Q. F.*, 1, 3, 5;

¹ Of forty-six of the more important passages of this nature belonging to the period in question, eight are distributed through the ten years from 58 to 49 inclusive, thirty-two belong to 46 and 45, and four to the following year.

58 B. C.). The group of passages belonging to 55 and 54 are similar to those of 59. Cicero feeds on literature, devours the library of Faustus, professes satisfaction in literary retirement, but eagerly inquires about the details of Roman politics from which the activity of the triumvirs and his self-respect exclude him (*A.*, 4, 10, 1; and 4, 11, 2). He can show a bold front and declare that he is turning from oratory to the gentler Muses, which have especially delighted him from early youth (*F.*, 1, 9, 23); or in a burst of confidence to his brother he can confess that he is pained at the shattering of his cherished ambitions for political eminence, and that his literary work is but a substitute for the activities that should be his.¹ With reasonable allowance for varying moods, there is no inherent inconsistency in the two statements.

The perplexing political situation in 49, like the exile in 58, brought Cicero into a frame of mind in which "neither books nor literature nor learning" was of any avail (*A.*, 9, 10, 2).

After the struggle was over, even defeat, submission, and political extinction brought calm. In the letters of 46 the references to satisfaction in liberal pursuits are not only more numerous than in those of any other year, but they are of unusual serenity and comprehensiveness. The very hopelessness of the political situation enabled Cicero to give himself to letters with a completeness that previously had been impossible, however much he had declared his intention of making literature his one aim. These pursuits were his refuge (*F.*, 6, 12, 5 and 5, 21, 2). They can never be taken from him while life lasts (*F.*, 7, 3, 4). They are serviceable and delightful in prosperity, and indispensable when other occupations fail (*F.*, 4, 3, 3-4, suggesting the *secundas res ornant, adversis perjugium ac solacium praebent* of *Pro Archia*, chap. 7). To Varro he playfully writes that he has become reconciled with his old friends, his books. He had dropped their society, not through anger, but because he felt shame at having made such poor use of their practical maxims. They forgive him now and summon him back to the former intimacy (*F.*, 9, 1, 2). He loves every lover of knowledge, which is the one thing by which the mind is nurtured (*A.*, 12, 6, 2). The greatness of his need has enabled him to find in the arts a richer fruitfulness and a greater potency than in better days (*F.*, 9, 3, 2).

Early in 45 Cicero was plunged into keenest distress by the death of his daughter Tullia. This circumstance colors most of his references to the

¹ . . . "nostrumque hoc tempus aetatis, quod in illa autoritate senatoria florere debebat, aut forensi labore iactari aut domesticis litteris sustentari, illud vero, quod a puero adamaram . . . totum occidisse . . ." (*Q. F.*, 3, 5, 4; cf. 3, 9, 2).

satisfaction of literature during this year. There is no change in the estimate of these pursuits. They are still the embellishment of prosperity and the support of adversity (*F.*, 5, 13, 5). But the emphasis is on their inadequacy to afford any real remedy for this grief; at best they are a palliative (*A.*, 12, 38, 1; *F.*, 5, 15, 3-4). Still, writing comes nearer affording relief than does anything else (*A.*, 12, 14, 3; cf. 12, 44, 4; and 13, 10, 1). Even with his studies he scarcely cares to live, but without them no grain of desire would remain (*Mihi vero cum his ipsis vix, his autem detractis ne vix quidem*, *F.*, 9, 8, 2). On the other hand, he protests against the impression that his sorrow has reduced him to morbid helplessness. The severe and exacting nature of the subjects which are claiming his attention should refute such a suggestion. He should receive credit for having chosen for the alleviation of his grief that means which is most noble and most worthy of a scholar (*quae maxime liberalis sit doctoque homine dignissima*, *A.*, 12, 38a, 1).

As after the "Ides of March" political interests took precedence over literary, this completes a historical survey which may justly be summarized in the words of Cicero himself: "For although from youth all art and liberal learning, and particularly philosophy, have been my delight, still this pursuit daily assumes greater importance (*ingravescit*), on account, I presume, of my having reached the time of life suited to reflection (*aetatis maturitate ad prudentiam*), and on account of these evil times, so that nothing else can afford my mind relief from trouble" (*F.*, 4, 4, 4). Here are brought together the essential elements of the foregoing presentation, continuous interest in liberal pursuits from early life—an interest which grew naturally with the maturing of Cicero's mind, which was increased by enforced withdrawal from public life, and which finally rendered learning the incomparable solace for political and domestic disaster. Learning as an interest in Cicero's letters does not rank above successful politics. It is nevertheless a real and continuous interest, with independent development and highest value.

In this survey no attempt has been made to distinguish between the study of philosophy, the study of literature, and the work of composition, or between the various grounds for the desirability of each or all of these. The example of Cicero himself has been followed in treating as a unit the desirability of the group of pursuits. The passages before us show that they were regarded primarily as pursuits, worthy and delightful in themselves, affording congenial occupation in the absence of other employment, and diverting the attention from what otherwise would be absorbing and crushing trouble.

Besides this value of learning as an occupation, there is recognition of the educational value of liberal arts in preparing for the duties of citizenship, as when Cicero writes his brother that whatever they have accomplished has been due to a training the sources of which are Greek.¹ In the same paragraph this practical value is used to forestall the Roman objection that such studies involved indolence and triviality (*inertiae aut levitatis ulla suspicio*). Many years later the same apologetic note was still sounded. Those scholars who have preferred the life of retirement to that of political activity have perhaps done so improperly, but who could criticise us for gratifying our scholarly tastes "when our country is either unable or unwilling to employ our services" (*F.*, 9, 6, 5; 46 B. C.).

Philosophy consoles and fortifies by the direct content of its teaching, as well as by affording congenial and interesting employment (e. g., *F.*, 6, 1, 3-4). A spirit of endurance should be imparted by the mere physical presence of Athens, the birthplace of philosophy (*F.*, 6, 1, 6), where the very walls of the houses seem able to give forth philosophical comfort (*F.*, 6, 3, 3). The gods have given man no greater gift than philosophy. Others have associated it with leisure, but Cicero claims fellowship with Cato in bringing it into public life (*F.*, 15, 4, 16).

Yet while Cicero thus gives full recognition to the practical service of learning to the individual or to the community, his own interest seems rather rooted in the Hellenic conception, expressed incidentally in words to Atticus already cited: "I love every lover of knowledge. . . . You desire to know, and this is the one thing by which the mind is fed" (*Amo enim πάντα φιληδέημονα . . . Scire enim vis; quo uno animus alitur*, *A.*, 12, 6, 2).

¹ ". . . nos ea, quae consecuti sumus, iis studiis et artibus esse adeptos, quae sint nobis Graeciae monumentis disciplinisque tradita," *Q. F.*, 1, 1 28.

CHAPTER II

SEMI-SOCIAL GOOD

The opinion of others and its various manifestations form a class of goods at once social and individualistic. The individual thinks of his reputation, his promotion, his honors, and his station as personal possessions; yet they are possessions without meaning, or even existence, apart from his fellows in some social group. Merely to care for the opinion of others as in itself a good or an evil involves deference to society. Besides, it is usually on the ground of some social ministry that the coveted approval is granted. Hence, if no deception is practised, possession of this approval indicates a certain conformity to the collective sense of right—the performance of some measure of social duty. Further ethical force is given to the terms for popular approval by the readiness with which in speech and in thought the transition is made from the honored to the honorable, from the praised to the praiseworthy, and from the trusted to the trustworthy. This group of motives may accordingly be named semi-social, and given a place midway between duty and strictly individual good.

During the crucial period of 49–48 B. C. the opinion of others was with Cicero a factor of considerable prominence. Yet he was not at this time so much occupied with the thought of reputation and glory in general as with a dread of adverse criticism from the optimates. The general terms for glory, fame, and honor, so common in other parts of the correspondence, in large measure give place to the most concrete expressions for the approval or disapproval of his fellows, and the element of party loyalty is seldom entirely absent.

His strongly expressed feelings of obligation to Pompey we have good reason to consider genuine, yet, when smarting under the lash of criticism, he could write (*A.*, 8, 16, 1): “So it is not he [i. e., Pompey] that influences me, but the speech of people as reported to me in a letter from Philotimus. For he says that I am being flayed by the optimates.” After the smart has been mitigated by two days’ time, a recantation follows (*A.*, 9, 1, 4) to the effect that not to the talk of the worthless optimates, but primarily to Pompey, he will make the concession of withdrawing from Italy. A little later we have the motive of gratitude and that of respect for public opinion united in the statement: “. . . I fear the charge of an ungrateful spirit” (*. . . ingrati animi crimen horreo*, *A.*, 9, 2a, 2). In the following section

we find: "Nor in fact shall I be able to endure the talk of those people, whoever they are, for they certainly are not what they are called—the good."

At least three times during this crisis (*A.*, 7, 1, 4; 7, 12, 3; and 8, 16, 2) Cicero expresses his dread of disapproval by quoting *αἰδέομαι Τρῶας*, "I am ashamed before the Trojans," the rest of the verse being "and the long-robed Trojan matrons." These are the words twice attributed to Hector (*Il.*, 6, 442, and 22, 105) when urged, first by his wife, then by his mother, to seek within the city walls protection from the dreaded spear of Achilles. The quotation is thus particularly appropriate to express a conflict between personal safety and public opinion. Cicero in one of these passages (*A.*, 7, 1, 4), as in a letter written ten years before (*A.*, 2, 5, 1), refers in this connection to Hector's dread of the reproach of Polydamus: "Ah me, if I shall enter the gates and the walls, Polydamus would be the first to cast a reproach at me . . ." (*Il.*, 22, 99-100). In the earlier reference, Polydamus is "our friend Cato, who by himself has with me the importance of a hundred thousand others;" in the later reference it is Atticus whose censure is feared. The Trojans in all these passages are, as we should expect, the optimates.

The sting of the reproaches of the optimates was clearly in large measure due to the implication of dishonorable lack of party loyalty and consistency: "To remain is surely the more prudent course, to cross over is *considered the more honorable*. I sometimes prefer that the many regard my course imprudent, rather than that the few think it dishonorable" (*A.*, 8, 15, 2). He is willing to endure whatever lot fortune brings, rather than seem to be out of harmony with those, who are called "the good" (*A.*, 8, 1, 3). The suspicion of being at fault causes him more pain than all his other troubles (*A.*, 9, 13, 3). Conversely, the assurance that his course thus far meets the approval of "good men" is a source of joy (*A.*, 9, 7, 6). He is comforted in his anxiety by the belief expressed by Atticus that so far he has committed no fault, but he hopes that his friend will persuade others that such is the case (*A.*, 9, 10, 10). Yet when he reflects that public sentiment is forcing him to a course dangerous alike to himself and to his country, he impatiently and ironically exclaims: "So then I had better yield, and in order to be a good citizen make war on Italy by land and sea, and again stir up against myself the hatred of the base" (*A.*, 9, 1, 3).

In courting the favor of Cæsar after Pompey's fall, Cicero puts forward inability to withstand the speech of people as his reason for leaving Italy, passing over other motives in silence (*A.*, 11, 12, 1). In writing to another, however, a little later, personal gratitude to Pompey is given the prominence it regularly has in the correspondence of 49-48, and the writer professes

to have been influenced "either by duty, or by the talk of the optimates, or by shame" (*F.*, 6, 6, 6).

Passing from this period of greatest stress, we next examine representative expressions showing Cicero's attitude toward public opinion at other important stages of his career.

Early in the extant correspondence—60 B. C.—we find an elaborate essay (*Q. F.*, 1, 1) addressed to Quintus, and treating of the policy and aims of a provincial governor. Quintus is earnestly exhorted to strive to be well spoken of—to devote all his powers to gaining a brilliant reputation (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 3). Later in the letter the admonition is repeated in language even stronger, if possible (1, 1, 41), and toward the close he professes an unquenchable thirst for his brother's renown (1, 1, 45). It is throughout implied that this renown is to be gained by genuine service, by honest devotion to the public good. Yet the prime motive of the admonition here is to stimulate a policy that will enhance the standing of Quintus and Marcus in the commonwealth, the point of view being quite different from that of the letters of 44 and 43, when Cicero was promising reputation as a reward to those who would support the cause for which he was straining every nerve.

The formation of the triumvirate or coalition by Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus brought out in 59, as we have seen, Cicero's earliest reference to being ashamed before the Trojans; that is, he dreaded the criticism of Cato and the optimates in case he accepted at the hands of the triumvirs a "free embassy" as a means of escaping an embarrassing situation and at the same time gratifying his desire for travel (*A.*, 2, 5, 1).

In the year 51, about nine years after formulating for his brother the ideals of provincial administration, Cicero found himself in charge of a province. A characteristic utterance of this period is: "I shall by my self-restraint and diligence maintain my reputation" (*A.*, 5, 3, 3). The programme proposed for himself is precisely that commended to Quintus. Reputation is to be gained through service. The reality of the service is constantly emphasized in the most familiar and confidential, as well as in the more formal and politic, of the letters. Indeed he goes so far as to write to Atticus (*A.*, 5, 20, 6), in connection with an exuberant account of the purity of his administration: "Nor is it the fame, great as that is, but the facts themselves that delight me." Yet it is clear that this delight does not reconcile him to remaining in the province to serve when once the fame has been secured. Witness the letters to Cælius, where, in giving reasons for desiring an early return from the province, he intimates that such is his reputation already that there is less reason for seeking an increase than for

dreading some unfortunate setback (*F.*, 2, 11, 1). To Atticus he writes, in a similar vein (*A.*, 5, 17, 5), that a brief term promises more glory than a long one.

After the death of Pompey we find Cicero expressing anxiety lest public opinion should not approve his return to Italy and submission to Cæsar (*A.*, 11, 6, 1-2). The most effective remedy for his troubles would be the assurance that he has not absolutely lost the good-will of the optimates (*A.*, 11, 7, 3); and this although he has no misgivings as to the propriety of his withdrawing from the war (*A.*, 11, 6, 2), and although the optimates whose opinion is concerned are now discredited and politically helpless.

The next crisis was after the assassination of Cæsar. Cicero was planning to withdraw to Greece. "I think I am escaping no small danger from an impending massacre," he writes to Atticus (14, 13, 4), "but I am likely to incur more or less criticism for forsaking the state at so serious a crisis." Besides popular sentiment; the possibility of being of use to the state was mentioned as an argument for remaining. The interests of young Marcus, concerning whose gay Athenian career disquieting rumors were being received, reinforced the argument of personal safety in favor of withdrawing (*A.*, 14, 13, 4). This was in April. In June he wrote (*A.*, 16, 1, 3): "I am glad that my departure is approved; approval must be gained for my sojourn." In August, while delayed on his voyage to Greece, he heard that Brutus and Cassius had issued a call to the ex-consuls and ex-prætors to attend a meeting of the senate on the first of September. "They added that I was missed and somewhat criticised" (*me desiderari, subaccusari*, *A.*, 16, 7, 1). Note the combined call of duty and public opinion. "When I heard this," he continues, "I without any hesitation abandoned the plan of the journey, which I assure you did not even before give me much pleasure."

While references to reputation as a desideratum abound in the succeeding letters, they are usually in appeals to others, the aim being to stimulate them in the service of the republic. Accordingly, the survey here given will serve to indicate the place which Cicero professed to give to the opinion of others in determining his own course at various critical periods.

Besides explicit statements of the influence of the opinion of others, the correspondence of Cicero abounds in passages mentioning fame or reputation, with the implication that it is something valued as a good.

He acknowledges that others have helped to secure for him *gloria* (*A.*, 5, 17, 2), *existimatio* (*A.*, 11, 1, 1), or *laus* (*A.*, 7, 4, 1). Again, Cicero asks others to aid in securing his *existimatio* (*F.*, 15, 13, 3), or *laus* (*F.*, 2, 6, 4). Under various circumstances he claims to have acted in behalf of

others' *amplitudo* (F., 10, 1, 3), *gloria* (F., 12, 7, 1), *honor* (F., 3, 13, 1), or *existimatio* (F., 3, 4, 1); or he promises in the future to strive for their *laus* (F., 11, 5, 3), *fama* (F., 12, 22, 2), or *honestas* (F., 5, 8, 4). In a letter of congratulation the wish is expressed that Curio's tribunate may redound to his everlasting praise (F., 2, 7, 1). Such is the variety of terms for approval and its expression, and such the variety of circumstances under which these incidental references are introduced.

Reputation is regularly represented, not only as a natural, but a commendable motive. The assumption seems to be that society takes a man at his real value, so far as social service is concerned. To seek reputation is to be controlled by the broader social considerations, rather than by considerations of immediate personal or material gratification or acquisition. Venal jurors are contemptuously referred to as those whom hunger (*fames*) rather than reputation (*fama*) influences (A., 1, 16, 5). The desire for the greatest possible praise from both individuals and community is a commendable endowment bestowed by nature on noble souls (F., 13, 12, 2). To Lentulus, Cicero wrote (F., 1, 7, 9): "But from affection as well as gratitude I both entreat and urge you to pursue with all care and diligence all the glory for which from boyhood you have had a passion, and never to suffer your high spirit, which I have always admired and always loved, to be humbled by anyone's injustice." "Splendid are those natures whose guiding star is glory" (*Praeclara illa quidem ingenia quae gloria invitantur*, B., 1, 15, 9), is a sentiment presupposed throughout the correspondence. Modern practical ethics has been so influenced by the Christian thought of the absolute supremacy of duty that by contrast fame has come to be thought of as individualistic and ignoble, scarcely higher than the pursuit of pleasure and wealth. It therefore becomes interesting to notice the distinctions and applications by which Cicero maintains the social and ethical rank of this motive.

In the course of a letter asking Cato to favor a public thanksgiving in honor of the writer's victories in his province, there is an explicit contrast between praise that is genuine and that which is empty or vain (*vera laus* and *inanis laus*, F., 15, 4, 13). Cicero in his consulship, as he claims in this letter, aimed at that "from which genuine praise might spring;" that is, deeds that would naturally inspire the gratitude of his fellow-citizens. The provincial government, with its promise of a triumph and a priesthood, both of which he renounced, seems to stand for empty praise. The distinction is the same as that between the contrasted *iudicium bonorum* and *insignia gloriae* of F., 10, 13, 2. In the letter to Cato Cicero implies that the desired thanksgiving, if sought as a good for itself, would be empty

like the honors he previously renounced; but now he is in need of some special mark of approval to offset the stigma of the exile. The distinction here made is of value in spite of the consideration that Cicero in this letter to Cato is minimizing his interest in official praise. Similarly, the glory involved in a spontaneous and enthusiastic demonstration in the orator's honor during the struggle with Antony is called "sound and genuine" (*solida veraque*, *B.*, 1, 3, 2). The unanimous thanks and congratulations move him "because," he writes, "it is a glorious experience for me to be popular in a matter concerning the welfare of the people." There may also be a reminiscence of the distinction between true and empty praise in his statement that there is nothing vain (*inane*) in him, introduced in connection with an expression of gratification at true (*vera*) glory.

In a famous letter to Luceius, Cicero asks that, in case his consular administration does not seem as praiseworthy as he has represented it, the historian bestow even higher praise than perhaps his judgment justifies, thus departing from the principles of history and bestowing on friendship a trifle more than truth allows (*F.*, 5, 12, 3). How is this to be interpreted? If we take Cicero literally at his word, we must say that his undoubted love of credit has here led him to ask for what to Luceius will be a deliberate falsification of history. He would thus express, not in an informal burst of confidence to his "other self," but in a most carefully elaborated letter, sentiments quite at variance with what he usually not only says, but implies. This, rather than the low estimate of historical honesty involved, is the chief difficulty with this interpretation. That he desired and valued the praise cannot be doubted. That he actually believed the most emphatic praise to be well deserved is quite consistent with his habitual references to his consulship. The request to depart from truth is introduced by the hypothesis: "What if those deeds do not appear to you worthy of such emphatic praise?" Did Cicero consider this a serious possibility? Did it occur to him that either Luceius or other expected readers of the "really pretty" (*valde bella*, *A.*, 4, 6, 4) letter would think his consulship unworthy of the most lavish praise? Probably no more than Horace imagined that his playful reference to leaving his shield on the field of battle would ever be interpreted as a serious confession of cowardice. If this view of the conditional clause is correct, the following request becomes mere rhetorical byplay.

The public man has no right to claim moral superiority on account of his choice of a career. The private citizen may excel in the "genuine praise of uprightness, diligence, and loyalty" (*A.*, 1, 17, 5); that is to say, a man in private life may have credit for those virtues which are at the basis of genuine fame.

Plancus has been praised for what he proposes to do against Antony. "But that honor which can truly be called such is not a temporary inducement, but a reward for sustained merit" (*F.*, 10, 10, 2). By this appeal in varied forms Cicero tried to keep the defenders of the republic at their posts. "The one path of glory . . . is that of successful public achievement" (*F.*, 10, 3, 3). "Nothing is more glorious or illustrious in human experience than to deserve well of the state" (*F.*, 10, 5, 2). "Despise all imitations of glory, consisting of the most empty tokens of distinction; consider them short-lived, fleeting, and fading. True glory depends on virtue which is pre-eminently displayed in great services to the state" (*F.*, 10, 12, 5). Throughout the closing months of the correspondence we find duty thus presented as the condition of true glory which all are assumed to crave.

Praise is given grades of value according to the character as well as the prominence of the bestower. The opinion of a Cato is worth that of a hundred thousand others (*A.*, 2, 5, 1). It is not only Cato's conspicuous position that makes his commendation valuable, but his "impartial and accurate judgment" (*F.*, 15, 6, 1). The praise of Luceius is sought as that of an illustrious and great man, as well as an able literary artist (*F.*, 5, 12, 7). While not explicitly stated, the natural inference is that Luceius' political experience is thought of as making him a competent judge as well as a conspicuous advocate of merit in statesmanship. In the expression "the verdict of the good" (*iudicium bonorum*), *F.*, 10, 13, 2) the word "good" seems to be used with its ordinary meaning, and not to designate the optimates. So in these passages we find recognized, with varying degrees of explicitness, the idea that approval is to be valued according to the competence and character of the judge.

It is not enough to have the approval of worthy contemporaries. The opinion of unborn generations is considered. The expressions "eternal glory" (*F.*, 10, 14, 2), "undying glory" (*A.*, 1, 19, 6), and "everlasting praise" (*F.*, 2, 7, 1), had probably become more or less stereotyped and conventional, but there are many indications that the idea of an immortality of fame had with Cicero a real vitality. The glory of his achievements shall not be taken from him even at death (*F.*, 7, 3, 4). He used to hear the Homeric summons: "Be valiant that some one even of those late born may speak well of thee" (*F.*, 13, 15, 1, quoting *Od.*, 1, 302); he writes to Cæsar in a painfully jocose vein. He has now learned not to heed Achilles' words: "At least let me not die without a struggle or ingloriously, but in some great deed of arms-whereof men yet to be born shall hear" (*Il.*, 22, 304-5, Myers' tr.). His appeal to Luceius is that he wishes fame with contemporaries as well as with posterity. He cares much more for the

opinions of men a thousand years hence than for the chit-chat of those who live today (*A.*, 2, 5, 1). Most interesting is the reference to a qualitative difference between the judgment of contemporaries and posterity (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 43). The latter will be more fair; they will be free from detraction and spite. It is evident that we have here at least the germs of a relatively high standard of social ethics; so live that your conduct will meet the approval of the wisest and best men of your time, and of an impartial posterity free from the prejudices that warp present judgment.

An altruistic application is given to the pursuit of fame by the suggestion that the interests of one's family as well as of one's self are involved. Quintus is urged to remember (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 44) that he is not seeking glory for himself alone, but for his brother, and for their sons to whom this legacy should be handed down. To be indifferent under these circumstances is to act grudgingly toward one's own. Similarly, ten years later Cicero writes to a friend (*F.*, 2, 16, 5) that in case the state is preserved he will in the memory of his name leave his son an estate sufficiently large.

Reputation, when in any measure gained, creates a standard of expectation on the part of the community, and the individual feels a new form of social pressure. Hence the necessity of effort to retain reputation. This thought has its most elaborate statement in the essay-letter to Quintus on the provincial governorship (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 41-43). If we had only average reputation, achievements would be demanded; "but now, on account of the magnificence and importance of the enterprises in which we have had a part, unless we can gain the highest renown from your province, it seems that we can scarcely avoid the severest censure" (*nisi summam laudem ex ista provincia adsequimur, vix videmur summam vituperationem posse vitare*, *Q. F.*, 1, 1, 41). The contest is not for fresh laurels, but concerns those already won, the protection of which is even more important than was the original acquisition (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 43). Deeds are referred to as worthy of one's name (*F.*, 7, 33, 1) or worthy of one's glory (*F.*, 12, 2, 3). Cicero fears that in attacking Hortensius he will show less self-restraint than formerly (*A.*, 4, 6, 3). He assures Atticus that his course will not be such as to permit his former deeds to appear accidental (*A.*, 1, 20, 3). The implication is that credit is given, not merely for the deed, but for the character from which the deed springs. If the original estimate was correct, other similar deeds will follow. These failing, the conclusion is that the former act was fortuitous and no index of the real man. The former credit is then canceled; perhaps with the addition of resentment at the deception. This is really an aspect of the demand for consistency, which we consider in another place.

Thus far social service, when it has come into relation with the opinion of others, has appeared primarily as a means to an end—an indispensable means, to be sure, and one that distinctly elevates and enriches the conception of the fame which it conditions, but nevertheless logically subordinated. A further step brings us to a class of passages in which fame is introduced as co-ordinate with or subordinate to duty, conceived as an independent good.

Cicero will follow the senate either because it is right, or because it is to his interest, or because he values the opinion of the senate (*A.*, 1, 20, 3). He was moved to follow Pompey “either by duty, or by the talk of the optimates, or by shame” (*F.*, 6, 6, 6). Tullia desired her father “to act rightly and to be well spoken of” (*A.*, 10, 8, 9). Messala in joining Brutus was at the same time performing a duty and following after renown (*summam laudem*, *B.*, 1, 15, 2; cf. also *A.*, 14, 7, 2, and 6, 2, 8).

In enumerating the elements of his life in the year 44 (*F.*, 10, 1, 1), there is at least a formal disparagement of fame in comparison with deeds, and all personal considerations are subordinated to the interests of the fatherland. Cicero’s ringing refusal to render an unjust decision at the earnest request of Marcus Brutus, supported even by Atticus among others, does not, it is true, express a strict antithesis between duty and the opinion of others, since reputation in the broader sense was on the side of right; still, when all allowance is made, the declaration is noteworthy both on account of the exceptional weight with Cicero of the men whose displeasure he risked, as well as for the fine universal form in which his independence was announced: “So let him be angry who will; I will bear it, for the right is on my side” (*Itaque irascatur qui volet; patiar. Τὸ γὰρ εὖ μετ’ ἐμοῦ*, *A.*, 6, 1, 8, incorporating Aristoph., *Acharnians*, 659). “Nor does the fame, great as that is, delight me as much as does the achievement itself,” he had written to Atticus in connection with a glowing description of his provincial administration (*A.*, 5, 20, 6).

From a letter written in the year 45 (*A.*, 13, 20, 4) it appears that Cicero could speak of the relative rank of fame either on a popular or on a higher ethical plane. Atticus had evidently taken him to task for writing that nothing is better than reputation. Cicero repudiates the offending statement, which he had made inadvertently (*stulte*). He then quotes a philosophical sentiment making strict adherence to right (*recta conscientia*) the standard, adding this challenge: “Do you think that it is in vain that I am busy with these [i. e., philosophical] subjects? I wish you would not be troubled over such a trifle.” He seems almost impatient that Atticus should treat a loose popular phrase as a serious formulation of fundamental

ethics; much as a believer in Divine Providence today might protest at being called to account for a careless reference to fate, fortune, or the weather man.

A passage near the close of the correspondence admirably co-ordinates the various references to the rank of glory. "Is any prætorship," he asks Furnius (*F.*, 10, 26, 3), "sweeter to you than *duty which the few or glory which all follow?*" Duty and glory alike may incite men to act for the good of the community or commonwealth rather than for strictly individualistic ends. Glory appeals to all but the very basest. It is effective with the many, while the noblest souls are keenly susceptible to its stimulus—and creditably so. A few, however—the Catos, the moralists, and the true philosophers—recognize the paramount authority of duty. To this select group Cicero, when really challenged, claims to belong, however much under ordinary circumstances he may lapse in speech or even in thought.

So far the opinion of others has been considered as a unit. We now turn to consider specifically public honors and offices as expressions of this opinion.

If one may with credit frankly profess praise to be his goal, we should naturally suppose that an ambition for such public and official expressions of praise as complimentary resolutions, periods of formal thanksgiving, and triumphs, might be professed with equal frankness. Yet we have already seen several cases where such official honors were classified as vain or empty praise, in contrast with the approval on which they were supposed to be based (pp. 29 ff.). Cicero's earnestness in desiring official honors for his services in the province is indicated by the long and elaborate letter to Cato (*F.*, 15, 4) directed to this single end, as is the briefer supplementary letter (*F.*, 15, 6); it is expressed in letters to the consuls and to Appius Claudius (*F.*, 15, 10; 15, 13; 15, 1; 3, 9) and repeatedly in letters to Atticus. Along with the evident eagerness for the honor, there is a frequently occurring note of apology for the desire. A single word of appreciation from Cato fulfils his highest ideal of praise; he cares not for empty glory and the speech of the crowd; yet the stigma of the exile places him in exceptional need of public approval—and this plea is not without reason (*F.*, 15, 4, 13). A Cato's praise is more valuable than laurels or a triumphal car (*F.*, 15, 6, 1); but when Cato sees fit to grant the greater, while withholding the less, Cicero writes to Atticus: "He has been shamefully spiteful toward me. He has given testimony to my honesty, justice, mercy, and good faith—something I was not seeking; what I asked for he has refused" (*A.*, 7, 2, 7). A supplementary reason given to Atticus for desiring official honors was

that such honors were, with the support of Cato, being sought by Bibulus, Cato's son-in-law, a man whose personality Cicero represents as offensive and his services to the state as petty (*A.*, 6, 8, 5). To honor Bibulus over Cicero was an affront (*dedecus*) to the latter (*A.*, 7, 2, 6). After returning to Italy, Cicero admits that the canvass for a triumph interferes with his political independence and activity. He is willing to renounce the honor, if that is his duty (*A.*, 7, 3, 2; 9, 7, 5). Yet for two whole years—years so filled with momentous events and absorbing interests—we find him shadowed by his troublesome lictors, never able to bring himself quite to the point of dismissing them (e. g., *A.*, 11, 6, 2; 11, 7, 1).

Twice in the correspondence Cicero defines his attitude toward official praise in practically equivalent terms. Regarding the triumph he wrote to Atticus (6, 9, 2): "You will find me neither vain (*κενός*) in seeking it, nor apathetic (*ἀτυφός*) in rejecting it." To Cato he wrote (*F.*, 15, 6, 2) that the honor should not too earnestly be coveted (*non nimis concupiscendus*), but still, in case it should be offered by the senate, it should by no means be rejected (*minime aspernandus*). In these statements he is apparently expressing what he considers the normal and approved attitude of a citizen toward such honors. As spontaneous expressions of approval they are to be valued; still any manifestation of eagerness for them, or any direct efforts to secure their bestowal, may expose one to the charge of vanity.

If we had only instances where Cicero refers to honors proposed for himself, we might be uncertain how far the tone was affected by the assumed modesty of the petitioner; but we find the same implication where the honors are for others than the writer. The most complimentary resolutions had been passed by the senate to honor and encourage Plancus. In reporting this action, Cicero, with the evident intention of being complimentary, wrote to Plancus: "Although I have learned from the letters which you sent me that you take more pleasure in the approval of the good than in the tokens of praise, still I thought that we ought to consider how much the state was indebted to you, even if you made no demands" (*F.*, 10, 13, 2). When Cicero was called upon to defend the granting of this honor and similar honors, his plea was that, while those are illustrious natures that are led on by glory, still the senate is wise in using any honorable means by which it thinks anyone may be induced to aid the state (*B.*, 1, 15, 9). These passages clearly imply that it is a credit to a man not to seek these rewards, and not to value them as highly as the simple approval of his fellows.

If we seek the reason for the difference in the feeling toward the two quests, we shall probably find it in the fact that efforts to gain the approval

of the good regularly consist of acts of social service, beneficial to the community; while efforts to gain specific honors after the service is rendered consist of purely self-seeking machinations without social value.

Public office as a motive does not occupy a position of prominence in Cicero's letters corresponding to its probable rank in his thought. Several reasons for this are apparent. Most of the letters were written after he had attained the highest offices under the Roman constitution. His prestige in the commonwealth, though largely founded on former official position, is spoken of as an independent good which, as we shall see, he seeks to retain and enhance. Furthermore, the importance of offices under the Roman republic depended upon the integrity of the republican constitution, which was being impaired by the growing power of the triumvirs; hence much that Cicero says of the value of the republic and the constitution may well have its animus in his appreciation of office and official activity.

Writing to Atticus of their respective careers, he says (*A.*, 1, 17, 5) that ambition impelled him to a zeal for office. Far from implying that any apology is due for this ambition, he is, in generous mood, denying that this choice of an official career proves any superiority of character over his friend who made the legitimate choice of honorable private life. His law practice was first undertaken (*A.*, 1, 17, 6) to help his political prospects, and was later continued that he might secure grateful supporters of his position. A letter to Quintus in 54 expresses what must have been his constant regret at the narrowing of legitimate official activity by the domination of the triumvirs (*Q. F.*, 3, 5, 3-4). He has no thirst for the offices or the glory that Cæsar promises. He is filled with grief that there is no longer any republic, and that at the time of life when he ought to be at the height of his senatorial career he is worried with legal practice or driven to seek the support of literature, while that which from his boyhood has been the ideal of his heart, "To be by far the best and others to excel" (*Il.*, 6, 201), is now a dream of the past (*Illud vero, quod a puero adamaram . . . totum occidisse*).

Some supercilious remarks of Appius Claudius, who felt that Cicero did not enough defer to a man of his august lineage, was the occasion of a dignified statement of Cicero's estimate of the relative value of high birth and high office (*F.*, 3, 7, 5). He does not place any "Appiism" (*Appietas*, coined from the illustrious name Appius) above personal merit. Even before he gained "those distinctions which are in the opinion of men most honorable" (*amplissimi*), he revered, not the great names, but the great men who bore them; but after he had gained and held the highest positions

of authority, so that there seemed no further height of honor and renown for which to strive (*maxima imperia, ut mihi nihil neque ad honorem neque ad gloriam adquirendum putarem*), he trusted that he had become, not at all the superior, but the equal of members of the old families. If Appius dissents, he will not go amiss in further informing himself on the subjects of high birth and nobility.

It is true that Furnius is urged (*F.*, 10, 25; and 10, 26) not to sacrifice the opportunity to serve the state and win lasting fame for the sake of gaining an immediate prætorship; but against seeking office in general we find no such disparagement as in connection with seeking public honors. Why this should be it is difficult to see, unless, with all the self-seeking of the candidate for office, his ambition was assumed to have a sanctifying element of patriotism—of desire to serve the commonwealth as well as himself.

Of the terms used to denote the good which comes to a man through the favor of his fellows none is more conspicuous, by reason either of frequency or emphasis, than *dignitas*. Various considerations seem to make its separate treatment desirable. It is less transparent and simple than the related terms which we have been considering. In the letters it evidently has a wide range of application. What were the chief associations that the word had for Cicero and his correspondents? What is the central core of meaning giving unity to the various uses? The lexicons reflect the variety of usage which we find in the text, but their account of the connection of the various meanings is discredited by disagreements among the etymologists.¹ Further difficulty arises from the nature of the English words "dignity" and "honor." Sometimes they are very appropriate, almost necessary, renderings of *dignitas*, but like it they are words of various and elusive meanings, with associations and implications for us which cannot well have inhered in Cicero's *dignitas*.

So much for the problem. If we examine a considerable number of cases where the grounds of this desired good are definitely indicated, we find one class in which *dignitas*, like the approval of others, is represented as the direct consequence of performing duty. If Plancus will devote himself to the support of the republic, he will secure all *dignitas* for the

¹ If *dignus* and *dignitas* are to be referred to the root *dec*, and are connected with *decet* and *decus*—Brugmann's first suggestion, *Grundriss*, 2, 136—then *dignus* has kept near the primary meaning, while *dignitas* has almost passed, by metonymy, from "worth" to "the results of worth." If, on the other hand, they are referred to *dic* or *deic*, and are connected with *δεικνυμι*, *zeigen*, and the Old Icelandic *tigenn*, distinguished—Brugmann, second suggestion, and Fick—then *dignitas* in the sense of "distinction," "rank," is nearer the starting-point than is *dignus*, "worthy."

remainder of his life (*F.*, 10, 3, 2-3). In this same promise is involved *gloria*, the term of most richly elaborated content of those which we considered together as designating the approval of others. Cornificius is assured that to devote himself with all zeal to the republic is in keeping with the hope which he ought to have of increasing his *dignitas* (*F.*, 12, 24, 1). Of numerous passages connecting *dignitas* with the defense of the state, these just given are particularly valuable as leaving no possible doubt that this good is actually gained or increased by the service. Here at least it is not an independent something merely finding its natural and consistent expression in the service. In the same way we are doubtless to take such expressions as, "You will have regard (*consules*) both for the public interest and your *dignitas*" (*F.*, 10, 27, 1); "It very greatly advances your honor and reputation" (. . . *dignitati et existimationi tuae maxime conducere* . . . *B.*, 1, 18, 2); "It concerns (*pertinet ad*) the commonwealth and your *dignitas*" (*B.*, 1, 2, 4)—all of which expressions were used in urging men to public service. Loyal political sentiments and the approval of good men are explicitly made aspects of *dignitas* in Cicero's own case (*F.*, 4, 14, 1), and the governor Thermus is declared greatly to have increased his *dignitas* by his uprightness and clemency (*F.*, 2, 18, 1). It concerns the *dignitas* of Lentulus to hand over his province promptly, though he may have a technical excuse for retaining it (*F.*, 1, 9, 25). It is further explained that he will in this way escape the suspicion of greed. The case is interesting from the fact that here official position is less essential for the retention of *dignitas* than is the direct approval of fellow-citizens.

Another explicitly recognized ground of *dignitas* is official compliment. This is clearly and fully stated in a letter to Plancus (*F.*, 10, 13, 1). "As soon as an opportunity presented itself of enhancing your position (*augendae dignitatis tuae*), I neglected no means of honoring you, as concerns either rewards for gallantry or complimentary expressions." The resolution which was a direct transcript of Cicero's proposal will give evidence of his zeal. Doubtless the element of public or official blame accounts in part for the loss of *dignitas* involved in Cicero's exile (e. g., *A.*, 3, 20, 1). So the *dignitas* of Appius Claudius is imperiled in his prosecution upon returning from his province (*F.*, 3, 10, 1). Cicero had written to the same Appius, expressing delight at the latter's prospect of a triumph. The reason for this delight is his interest in the *dignitas* and *amplitudo* of Appius (*F.*, 3, 9, 2). He thanks Appius for offering to aid him in anything affecting his *dignitas* (*F.*, 3, 9, 1); then, claiming the fulfilment of this very promise, asks support for his *supplicatio* (*F.*, 3, 9, 4).

A third and larger group of passages recognizes offices and political

activity as the ground of *dignitas*. It arises in connection with magistracies. Cicero first practiced law for the sake of gaining office, afterward that he might secure gratitude as a support for his position (*ut dignitatem tueri gratia possim*, *A.*, 1, 17, 6). The *dignitas* seems clearly to be what was gained by the magistracies, culminating with the consulship, which he held only two years before writing this letter. A recently elected ædile is congratulated on his present and prospective *dignitas* (*F.*, 2, 9, 1). *Gradus dignitatis* (*F.*, 10, 6, 2) in a phrase used to designate the steps of official promotion.

The term is repeatedly used to designate something which the provincial governor derived from his office. Amid the conflict of authority in 43 several provincial governors were threatened with recall through the influence of Cæsarians. This situation occasioned statements in Cicero's letters to these men to the effect that he was defending their *dignitas* (e. g., *F.*, 12, 7, 1).

The public activity of the senator, the opportunity of having a part in deciding important issues, involved *dignitas*. The complaint is that under the domination of Pompey all distinction, so far as senatorial debate is concerned, has been taken away (*F.*, 1, 8, 3); there is no constitution, no senate, no courts, no distinction for any one of us (*nullam in ullo nostrum dignitatem*, *Q. F.*, 3, 4, 1). The *dignitas* which was lost in the exile (*A.*, 3, 20, 1) and restored upon the recall (*F.*, 3, 10, 10; and 1, 7, 8) must have included this opportunity for public activity and its accompanying prestige, as well as that public approval which exile formally withdrew.

Keeping in mind this survey of the grounds assigned to *dignitas*, we shall be helped to a provisional definition by Cicero's reply to congratulations upon regaining his *dignitas* after the war between Cæsar and Pompey. "If *dignitas* consists in having sound political sentiments and securing for those sentiments the approval of good men, then I enjoy *dignitas*; but if *dignitas* consists in being able to carry out your sentiments in act and defend them with independent speech, not the slightest trace of distinction has been left us" (*F.*, 4, 14, 1). We shall not, I believe, do violence to any of these passages if we assume that *dignitas* represents the distinction, the position, the prestige, accorded to a man by his fellows, either directly in consequence of approval of his character and conduct, or by a more complex process involving the bestowment of public honors or official position; that it is an inclusive term for the status conferred by social approval in any or all its forms of manifestation.

The fact that the bestowment of offices and honors to such an extent depends upon the favor, influence, and efforts of others accounts for the

great number of passages of the type, "I am the supporter of your position," or, "You are the supporter of my position." On the other hand, the implied basis of social approval for social service makes natural at any time the same ethical application and emphasis which we have met in the case of similar terms.

Other uses of *dignitas* relate themselves naturally to the meanings already considered, whatever may have been the historical connection. It may indicate position or rank in general, with no implication as to ground or grounds. To support the position of Crassus in his absence (*F.*, 5, 8, 5) is almost the same as to support Crassus. The hope is expressed that the consular administration of Marcellus (*F.*, 15, 7, 1) and that of Paullus (*F.*, 15, 12, 1) will be in keeping with the position of themselves and of their ancestors. The word is even used as a quite colorless term for class; as when, expressing his anxiety for Terentia, Cicero refers to "other ladies of her class" (*illa dignitate*, *A.*, 7, 14, 3).

Dignitas is without doubt used in the letters where status is not directly involved, as where Cicero says that he wrote to Cæsar "familiarly and with dignity" (*cum dignitate*, *Q. F.*, 2, 10, 5); yet even here a suggestion of the more common meaning is entirely appropriate. He wrote in a manner consistent with his position. Not infrequently where the word at first sight seems to indicate quality rather than status, comparison with other cases leads to a change of interpretation (e. g., *F.*, 15, 1, 6, to be considered below). If we recognize in the letters the rare meaning "worth" (e. g., *F.*, 13, 57, 2, where a favor is asked *pro causae veritate et pro sua dignitate*), the logical relation between "distinction" and "worth" is quite analogous to that between the meanings "praise" and "merit" in the case of *laus*.

If distinction is based upon the "recognition of merit," it may be preserved not only by courting the support of friends and insisting on all the deference due one, but by conduct inherently consistent with one's high position. From this latter point of view the preservation of *dignitas* has the same ethical and social significance as the preservation of reputation. Regard for their own standing on the part of the staff of Quintus seems to serve as a sort of conscience, making it unnecessary for their chief to watch them (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 10). Here probably belongs the striking statement at the close of Cicero's provincial report to the magistrates and senate: *Utinam saluti nostrae consulere possimus! dignitati certe consulemus* (*F.*, 15, 1, 6). Here we have the habitual collocation of *salus* and *dignitas* in which *dignitas* regularly indicates status (e. g., *F.*, 15, 7, 1, *matris tue erga salutem dignitatemque meam studia*). Cicero wishes to assure the

senate that, whether or not his forces permit him to meet the impending invasion with the prospect of safety to himself, his course will be such as to bring no discredit to the man who once was hailed the father of his country. Referring to his motive in entering the civil war he wrote (*F.*, 6, 1, 3): "We thought we were following duty, righteous and sacred, and due to the commonwealth and to our position" (. . . *officium iustum et pium et debitum rei publicae et nostrae dignitati*). That is, the performance of highest duty is demanded as a debt by his illustrious past not less than by considerations of patriotism.

In the case of *dignitas*, as in that of *laus* and similar words, the emphasis of the element of service rather than the element of recognition gives the terms a higher ethical sense. Cæsar is striking at his fatherland for the sake of his honor (*dignitas*), but where is there any honor (*dignitas*) in the absence of the honorable (*honestas*, *A.*, 7, 11, 1)? Offices (*gradus dignitatis*—ordinary plane) apart from patriotic services will be mere names and not marks of (true) distinction (*dignitatis insignia*—higher plane). Nay, under these circumstances not only will these splendid titles of honor be devoid of (real) distinction, but they will involve the extreme of disgrace (*summa deformitas*, *F.*, 10, 6, 2-3). The sufficiency of worth, apart from recognition, as constituting true distinction, is carried well toward the point of stoicism in a letter to Lentulus (*F.*, 1, 5a, 4), whose position was threatened by a movement to recall him from his province. The passage tells its own story: "It is the part of your wisdom and loftiness of spirit to consider that all your honor and distinction (*dignitas*) rest on your worth and achievements; and that if the treachery of any shall take away any of those gifts which fortune has bestowed upon you, this will be a greater injury to them than to you."

If *dignitas* in the letters regularly designates that distinction which is conferred by any or all forms of social approval, it is an appropriate symbol to summarize the entire class of goods considered in this chapter. The phrase *salus et dignitas* would add to the summary the strictly individualistic goods. The collocation is frequent. It is worth while to see how Cicero used it. We cited above an instance where he credits a lady with zeal for his "safety and position" (*F.*, 15, 7, 1). Cicero wrote in similar terms to the father of the former correspondent (*totam denique domum vestram vel salutis vel dignitatis meae studiosissimam cupidissimamque cognovi*, *F.*, 15, 8, 1). Lentulus cared for safety in the past; he will care for standing in the future (*F.*, 1, 9, 22). Cicero's excuse for not presenting himself to support a certain measure in the senate during the domination of the Cæsarians was that he could not do so safely or with self-respect;

hence he craves regard for his safety and his dignity (*salutis et dignitatis meae*, *F.*, 10, 2, 2). After the lesson of the exile he determined to remember *salus* as well as *dignitas* (*F.*, 1, 7, 7), concluding that neither should be sought to the neglect of the other (*F.*, 1, 7, 10). He prefers to speak of the prosecution of Appius Claudius as affecting the latter's *dignitas* rather than *salus* (*F.*, 3, 10, 1; cf. 3, 10, 11). We have seen how he assured the senate that, while he hoped he might take account of his *salus*, he surely would of his *dignitas* (*F.*, 15, 1, 6).

The interests of that composite individual, the commonwealth, are summarized in the same terms. As long as possible he strove for the *dignitas* of the state, but when that was lost—in the conflict between Pompey and Cæsar—he wished to maintain its *salus* (*F.*, 6, 21, 1); while the charge against the rival captains was that they had subordinated the *salus* and *dignitas* of the fatherland to personal interests.

As *dignitas* is linked with *salus* to summarize the goods involving the individual element, so it is linked with duty to summarize those involving the social element. A perfect counterpart to the group just examined is found where Cicero writes (*A.*, 7, 17, 4): "But if there shall be a war, I shall prove false neither to my duty (*officium*) nor to my position (*dignitas*)."
 Liberal provision for his son's needs concerns his duty (*officium*), reputation (*existimatio*), and standing (*dignitas*, *A.*, 14, 7, 2). Governors are asked to confer favors so far as consistent with their honor and their position (*fides* and *dignitas*, *F.*, 13, 53, 1; 13, 61, 1). Here *fides*, honor, good faith, faithfulness, like *officium* above, represents the higher social consideration, which may also be represented by public interest or commonwealth (*res publica*); for example, *Consules et rei publicae et dignitati tuae* (*F.*, 10, 27, 1), and *Facis ex tua dignitate et ex re publica* (*B.*, 1, 2, 2)

This phraseology is quite in keeping with the foregoing analysis, and confirms the conclusion that Cicero thought of *dignitas*, and the group of goods which it represents, as forming a mean between duty and interests strictly personal, giving us the series *salus, dignitas, officium*.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL GOOD

The Epicurean Atticus had evidently expressed great delight in the daughter born to him in his mature years. Cicero uses this conceded experience of the reality and power of the parental instinct to controvert the individualistic ethics of the Epicureans. We have here, he argues, the ultimate bond that unites man to man and makes human society possible. The Epicureans are wrong in referring everything to self and denying the existence of altruistic motives. The so-called goodness, which is based on individual utility instead of natural right, is not goodness at all, but only shrewdness.¹ This is the same derivation of the social virtues from the natural love of offspring which we find elaborated in Cicero's philosophical works (e. g., *De Fin.*, 3, 19, 62-64; 5, 23, 65-67). Beginning with the family, the concentric circles ever widen, until all mankind are recognized as being bound together with natural ties, so that even on the ground of a common humanity the interests of all are to each an essential good (*propter se expetendi sint*, *De Fin.*, 5, 23, 67); nay, the bonds reach farther than mere humanity, they embrace a cosmic commonwealth of gods and men in which the individual unit is, by reason and by nature, bound in his actions to take account of the all (*De Fin.*, 3, 19, 64).

Each social unit—family, friends, state, or race—presents itself as a good in at least three aspects which may logically, and sometimes practically, be distinguished, but which frequently tend to intermingle and coalesce. Friendship, for example, as a spring of action may be my desire for fellowship—my appreciation for what the friend is to me; or I may so far identify myself with my friend as to desire his welfare as an independent good without conscious thought of his ministry to my social needs; or, finally, the motive may present itself still more abstractly as duty to seek the welfare of the friend. The first and least altruistic of these aspects is still to be distinguished from what Cicero opposes as the Epicurean type of friendship—devotion to one for what he contributes other than himself; for example, when support or influence rather than fellowship is the object

¹ "Lucius noster et Patro, qui cum omnia ad se referant, numquam quidquam alterius causa fieri putent et cum ea re bonum virum oportere esse dicant, ne malum habeat, non quo id natura rectum sit, non intellegunt se de callido homine loqui non de bono viro" (*A.*, 7, 2, 4; 50 *B. C.*).

(cf. *F.*, 3, 9, 2). The third aspect, that of duty, might be treated as an abstract rather than a social good; but as the duty is the abstract form whose content is made up of concrete social relations, this aspect may properly, as well as conveniently be treated in connection with those relations.

I. THE FAMILY

In considering Cicero's practical estimates of social goods, it is appropriate to follow the order of treatment which he has himself outlined, and to proceed from the family.

Cicero recognizes the fellowship of the family circle as a delight. "I have no peace except the time I spend with my wife and daughter and dear little Cicero," he wrote to Atticus (1, 18, 1). This fellowship, while more satisfying than the hollow so-called friendships of public life, appears, however, to be scarcely a substitute for the company of men with whom he has close sympathy—his friend Atticus or his brother Quintus. Between the brothers the relation is so intimate that neither has any real delight without the other (*Q. F.*, 1, 3, 3). An exiled friend receives commiseration for the hardship of being separated from his children, than whom nothing can be more delightful (*festivus, F.*, 6, 4, 3). Perhaps the reference here is to that charming gayety which he recognizes as the most delightful characteristic of children (*A.*, 16, 11, 8, where a kiss is sent to Attica, *quoniam, quod optimum in pueris est, hilarula est*). Another exiled friend is comforted by the suggestion that the loyal affection, the character, and the diligence of his son, are his possessions, absent as well as present (*F.*, 5, 17, 4). "And especially our children" are the words with which Cicero closes an enumeration of the sources of his comfort at a period of dulness in politics (*Q. F.*, 3, 9, 2).

Delight in the fellowship of kin is also indicated by expressions of pain or regret when that fellowship is broken off by absence, alienation, or death. This is conspicuous during the period of exile, as a few examples will indicate. "This is the greatest of all my miseries," Cicero wrote regarding the difficulty of having an interview with Quintus (*A.*, 3, 7, 3). "My Pomponius, strive that I may have the privilege of living with you and with my family (*cum meis*), . . . I am overwhelmed with grief and with longing for all my own, who have always been dearer to me than myself."¹ In Quintus he misses one who is at once brother, son, and father to him. He misses his daughter, so loyal, so modest, so talented, his very likeness in features, speech, and temperament. He misses his charming boy, the

¹ "Premor luctu, desiderio omnium meorum, qui mihi me cariores semper fuerunt" (*A.*, 3, 22, 3).

delight of his heart, as well as his nephew, his son's loved comrade. Finally he misses his wife, so faithful, so unhappy, whom he has not permitted to follow him, but has left to guard their children (*Q. F.*, 1, 3, 3, abridged). However much significance there may be in the mention of Terentia after the others, it is worthy of note, in view of the later estrangement, that at this period Cicero seems to refer to her with genuine sympathy and affection, and when addressing others as well as herself. The letters to Terentia during this period contain the most ardent expressions. She is his "life," and her image is before his eyes night and day (*F.*, 14, 2, 3). No object is or ever has been dearer (*F.*, 14, 3, 5). He longs to see her as soon as possible, and die in her embrace (*F.*, 14, 4, 1). This same letter refers to his most precious daughter and to Cicero the remnant of his hopes (*mea carissima filiola et spes reliqua nostra Cicero, F.*, 14, 4, 6).

Pain at alienation is an index of delight in fellowship now broken. During the period of Cicero's alienation from his brother his letters express pain rather than ill-will. That Quintus should accuse him to Cæsar is a more grievous (*acerbum*) trouble than anything in the civil war (*A.*, 11, 8, 2). He is prostrated with grief (*A.*, 11, 9, 2) and wishes he had never been born, or else that he had never had a younger brother (*A.*, 11, 9, 3). Further reports of the hostility of his brother and his nephew bring an increment to his heavy load of grief (*ad meas incredibiles aegritudines aliquid novi accedit*). Their course will cause Atticus pain (or indignation, *dolor*); to Cicero it is torture (*A.*, 11, 10, 1). A bitter letter from his brother calls out the statement that there is no conceivable evil which he does not suffer (*Nihil fingi potest mali quo non urgeat, A.*, 11, 15, 2).

However the responsibility for the rupture with Terentia may be distributed, Cicero seems to have looked back at the episode with distress, although references are not as frequent as in the case of the trouble with Quintus. He wished Atticus to effect some financial settlement with Terentia without dragging him into the business. His trouble does not seem to arise from the financial considerations involved, for in case of doubt he prefers that Terentia rather than himself should have the advantage (*A.*, 12, 21, 3), and Atticus is commissioned, if possible, to make such terms as will satisfy her (*A.*, 12, 28, 1); still he writes: "In that you lay upon me the whole burden of the dealing with Terentia I do not recognize your usual kindness. For those are the very wounds which I am unable to touch without the deepest groan."¹

The most conspicuous of these indirect tributes to the delight of family

¹ "Ista enim sunt ipsa vulnera, quae non possum tractare sine maximo gemitu" (*A.*, 12, 22, 1; cf., 12, 23).

fellowship is the grief of Cicero at the death of Tullia. "My grief surpasses the power of any comfort" (*A.*, 12, 14, 3); "I sometimes think that in doing this [controlling grief] I am doing wrong; again it seems a wrong not to do so. Solitude is of some help, but it would be of much more use to have you here" (*A.*, 12, 14, 3); "The lamenting I have checked, the sorrow I have not been able to, nor would I if I could" (*nec si possem vellem*, *A.*, 12, 28, 2); "Long, long, have I been ruined, Atticus, but now that I have lost the one link that bound me to life, I confess my ruin" (*A.*, 12, 23, 1); "I had in former troubles a place to which I could flee for refuge and for peace; I had one in whose charming society I could cast aside all my anxieties and troubles. Now, however, at this so grievous wound those which I thought were healed break out afresh" (*F.*, 4, 6, 2). Here we see the chief features of Cicero's experience in the first half of 45—inconsolable grief, moderated in expression, but frankly justified, the craving for solitude or the presence of an intimate friend, and the sense that the chief remaining prop of his life was removed. His refuge from public disaster had been the home. In an earlier chapter we have seen how from this domestic disaster he sought a refuge in literature. An additional palliative occupied much of his thought for several months. He would discharge a sacred obligation to the departed (*A.*, 12, 18, 1) by building, adorning, and consecrating as a lasting memorial to her name a shrine (*janum*). This would be better than a tomb (*sepulchrum*), because it would not only be exempt from the provisions of a certain sumptuary law, but would involve an approach to divide honors (*ἀποθέωσις*, *A.*, 12., 36, 1; etc.). The plan was never carried out; yet it is most interesting as a proposal to do literally what is involved in our metaphorical expressions "idolize" and "worship" as applied to members of one's family.

There is an advance in the altruistic scale when the *welfare* of kin rather than *gratification* from kin is the controlling thought. This higher attitude is amply illustrated in the letters.

"I am so disturbed about Quintus that I cannot come to any conclusion," wrote Cicero to Atticus early in the exile (*A.*, 3, 8, 3). A reason for renouncing the satisfaction of an interview with Quintus, who was returning from his province in the East, was that Quintus' interests required a prompt return to the city (*A.*, 3, 9, 1). He exclaims that he has been the cause of his brother's ruin (*Q. F.*, 1, 3, 1). He is more distressed at Terentia's misfortunes than at his own (*F.*, 14, 4, 6). Apprehensions for his family fill him with keenest anxiety (e. g., *F.*, 14, 4, 3). Among the most vehement expressions of that troubled period are his regrets, not only that his family have fallen into such troubles, but that he who should have been their pro-

tector is the occasion of it all.¹ Similar sentiments are found in the letters which he sent to Atticus bespeaking his support for Quintus, Terentia, and the children.² That this interest in the welfare of others was so strongly and so frequently expressed, at the time when more than at any other he was prostrated by personal trouble, has direct bearing upon the sincerity of the sentiments. Quite consistent with the foregoing is the comfort long after sent to an exiled friend: Torquatus should remember that the members of his family are maintaining their position as well as if he were present, and that they are in no personal peril (*F.*, 6, 1, 1).

We should expect the various interests of Tullia to receive frequent mention as matters of concern at various periods, and such is the case. Now it is her property (*A.*, 11, 9, 3), now her health (*A.*, 11, 6, 4), and now her numerous marital troubles (e. g., *A.*, 11, 24, 1; 11, 3, 1). The tone of these passages may be judged from this message to Atticus, written during Tullia's trouble with Dolabella: "A second reason why I am unwilling to go away is Tullia's calling upon you for aid, as you write. Alas! Alas! (*O rem miseram!*) What shall I write or what shall I desire? I will be brief, for I am suddenly overcome with tears. I leave the matter with you, you must plan; only make sure that at this crisis no harm befalls her. Pardon me, pray, I cannot for grief and tears dwell longer on this theme. Only let me say that nothing gives me more pleasure than your regard for her" (*A.*, 11, 7, 6).

This passage introduces us to the dilemma of 49-48, and shows that at that crisis the welfare of family was a vital consideration. A single paragraph (*A.*, 7, 13, 3) summarizes the chief aspects of the domestic problem at this time. Cicero is uncertain what course will best advance the interests of his son and nephew, sometimes thinking that they should be sent to Greece.³ With regard to Terentia and Tullia, the first consideration is that of safety, whether the protection of Dolabella will secure them from violence at the hands of Cæsar's forces in Rome; the second consideration is that of honor, whether public opinion will justify them in remaining after the general flight of the optimates.⁴ This giving to safety precedence over

¹ "Conficior enim maerere, mea Terentia, nec me meae miseriae magis excruciant quam tuae vestraeque. Ego autem hoc miserior sum quam tu, quae es miserrima, quod ipsa calamitas est utriusque nostrum, sed culpa mea propria est; etc." (*F.*, 14, 3, 1-2; cf. 14, 1, 1).

² Examples are *A.*, 3, 13, 2; 3, 23, 5; 3, 19, 3.

³ Cf. *A.*, 10, 4, 5; also 6, 7, 2, where the welfare of the boys seems a reason for retiring to Rhodes.

⁴ Cf. *F.*, 14, 14, 1, and 14, 18, 1.

reputation is justifiable in planning for one's family, however the case may be in planning for one's self (*aliter enim mihi de illis ac de me ipso consulendum est*). This principle, that the safety of one's family and one's own safety occupy different planes as proper motives for action, is likewise recognized in the exclamation: "Would that my decision affected my own person only" (*A.*, 10, 9, 2)!

The freedom of Athenian student life, joined with a liberal allowance for expenses, seems to have presented temptations too strong for the self-control of the young Marcus. Even before the assassination of Cæsar, Cicero had contemplated a "free embassy" to Greece for no other reason, he asserts, than to look after his son (*A.*, 14, 13, 4). After the "Ides of March" prudence supplied a further motive for the journey, but the domestic interest was still emphasized: "It is very important for my son, or for me, or in fact for both of us, that I drop in upon his studies" (*A.*, 14, 16, 3). The reports as to his progress were very ambiguous. The father is inclined to give the boy the benefit of the doubt, and even has declared himself willing to be deceived (*A.*, 15, 16, 1); still the journey to Athens will give an opportunity to be of service to Marcus, or at least to judge how far he is capable of improvement (*A.*, 16, 3, 4). In an earlier section we have seen how this journey was begun and broken off.

In connection with effort for the welfare of kin, the idea of duty is frequently present by implication and sometimes present explicitly. It was Cicero's duty (*officium*) to have saved his family from trouble (*F.*, 14, 3, 1); and duty is to determine his dealings with Terentia after the divorce (*A.*, 12, 21, 3). The sacred character of this bond of duty between kin is seen in the fact that it receives the same term, *pietas*, which designates allegiance due the gods. Its binding force is recognized even when it leads others to unwelcome action; for example, the ill-natured attack of Metellus on Cicero is excused because prompted by *pietas*; i. e., resentment at a fancied wrong to a brother (*F.*, 5, 2, 6 and 10); and the offense of joining Antony is, in one case, to be condoned because due to *pietas*; i. e., gratitude for a father's restoration (*F.*, 11, 22, 1). The same high estimate of the bond is shown by the strong terms used to characterize its violation. The act of Quintus, father and son, in denouncing Cicero to Cæsar is repeatedly called a *scelus*, a crime, an enormity (*A.*, 10, 7, 3; 11, 21, 1; cf. 11, 9, 2). In one passage (*F.*, 4, 14, 3) *scelus* seems to include some treacherous act on the part of Terentia as well as of Quintus.

Certain distinctive duties Cicero more or less explicitly connects with the specific relationships of family life. The relation of brothers permits great frankness of criticism (*Q. F.*, 1, 2, 13), but anything approaching

anger is unbrotherly (*parum fraterne*, *Q. F.*, 1, 2, 12). Between brothers difference in policy or lack of agreement in domestic affairs of common interest is unseemly (*A.*, 13, 41, 2). Cicero questioned whether it was a loyal act to leave Quintus as his representative in a post that might prove perilous (*A.*, 6, 3, 2). He claims that after he knew the fact, though not the extent, of Quintus' alienation, he wrote to Cæsar exculpating his brother from all responsibility for his, Marcus', withdrawal from Italy. Such an act would illustrate the spirit of fraternal *pietas* (*A.*, 11, 12, 2).

The same term *pietas*, "loyal affection," summarizes the duty of the child to the parent. An exile is congratulated on the *pietas* of his son (*F.*, 5, 17, 4). Young Cicero's lack of *pietas*, in turning to Cæsar against his father's will, is a source of pain (*A.*, 10, 4, 5). Quintus, the younger, is commended for the *pietas* which he showed by his grief on accidentally learning of his father's design to divorce Pomponia (*A.*, 6, 3, 8); and afterward in effecting a temporary reconciliation (*A.*, 6, 7, 1). A few years later Cicero seems skeptical about the sincerity or consistency of his nephew's filial sentiments, for just before the divorce resentment against his mother, to whom nevertheless he continues to write in affectionate terms, is his ostensible motive for shunning his father's house (*A.*, 13, 38, 1; 13, 39, 1); while after the divorce sympathy with his mother seems the ground of the young man's trouble with his father (*A.*, 14, 10, 4).

The father's duty to provide for and protect his children has already been illustrated. We are several times definitely told that it is a matter of duty and reputation for a father to make liberal provision for a son's expenses (*A.*, 14, 7, 2, etc.). At the same time excessive indulgence will render a youth difficult or impossible to control (e. g., *A.*, 10, 6, 2). It is always Quintus and not Marcus who is in danger of spoiling his son by indulgence, if we are to trust the latter.

Husband and wife owe each other courtesy. This is made prominent in connection with the relations of Quintus and Pomponia. It is Quintus' spirit (*animus*) toward Pomponia that is the subject of intercession (*A.*, 1, 5, 2; 1, 6, 2). It is on the basis of courtesy, as shown in voice, manner, and facial expression, that Cicero contrasts the pair to the disadvantage of Pomponia (*A.*, 5, 1, 3-4). Cicero's conception of the marriage relation may further be illustrated by occasional references to the circumstances of entering into it. Young Quintus is to marry and settle down according to the plans of his family. The colloquy between Cicero and his nephew, in *A.*, 13, 42, 1, might almost be from the close of a comedy by Plautus or Terence. The youth needs money, which seems to have been withheld by way of discipline. But now he is very meek. He will marry as the

family think best. The time is a matter of indifference. He even seems to assent to his uncle's proposal for an immediate wedding. The betrothal and marriage of Tullia to Dolabella during Cicero's absence in Cilicia seem to have been arranged by Terentia and Tullia without waiting for word from the head of the house (*F.*, 3, 12, 2-3). "The ladies, I understand are very much pleased with the agreeableness and courtesy of the young man," the father later wrote (*A.*, 6, 6, 1). A probable reference to a candidate for the hand of Attica includes more comprehensively the qualifications of a desirable suitor: "I heartily approve of the man, his family, and his means" (*valde probo hominem, domum, facultatem, A.*, 13, 21, 7).

II. FRIENDSHIP

From the prominence of friendship in ancient life, the composition by Cicero of one of the world's classics on that relationship, and the fame of his intimate and unbroken friendship with Atticus, we should expect to find personal attachment between man and man conspicuous among the motives recognized in the letters. This natural expectation, as one studies the correspondence of Cicero, is fulfilled.

The various grounds assigned for friendship or intimacy fall into two general classes—common experience and reciprocal ministry. To the former may be referred certain forms of inherited intimacy,¹ long personal association (*F.*, 13, 10, 2), common intellectual pursuits (*F.*, 3, 10, 9; 5, 15, 2), common professional or class affiliations (*F.*, 13, 10, 2), membership in a common board, and connection with a common friend (*F.*, 3, 10, 9-10). Among forms of ministry are personal characteristics, such as the loveliness and wit of Pætus (*F.*, 9, 15, 1-2), or the quiet refinement of Tiro (*A.*, 7, 5, 2), as well as the serviceableness of the same freedman friend for business or study (*ibid.*), and all the varied forms of ministry which in the relations of life one man has opportunity to give to another (e. g., *officiis, F.*, 10, 10, 2). The letters of recommendation (*F.*, 13) supply numerous illustrations of these grounds of intimacy, which as illustrations are valid whether or not the particular friendships were deep and genuine; for where the purpose was to create the impression that the beneficiary was the friend of the writer of the letter, circumstances would be cited which were generally recognized as appropriate grounds for genuine friendship.

That Cicero took the utmost delight in the fellowship of friends is a fact so well recognized that it may be assumed with the citation of a few of its clearest and most comprehensive expressions. With reference to

¹ For example, *F.*, 10, 3, 2, "Necessitudinem constitutam habui cum domo vestra ante aliquanto, quam tu natus es."

Atticus there is no substitute for the classic heart-cry which epitomizes much that is most characteristic in the twenty years' correspondence between these friends (*A.*, 1, 18, 1; 60 *B. C.*): "Be assured that I lack nothing so much as someone in whom to confide all the things that give me anxiety, someone who loves me, who has sense, one with whom I can talk without pretense, disguise, or concealment . . . Metellus is not a fellow-man, but 'shore and air and empty waste.' But you who have so often relieved my care and my anxiety with your speech and counsel, you who are my partner in public interests and my confidant in personal affairs, the sharer of all my conversations and deliberations, where, pray, are you? . . . For the spurious friendships of politics have a sort of glitter in the public eye, but they yield no genuine comfort. So when my house is filled to overflowing at the morning hour, and when I go down to the forum thronged about with troops of friends, I cannot find one in all the crowd with whom I can jest freely or breathe a familiar sigh. Wherefore I look for you, I long for you, I now even summon you. Many things trouble and harry me, but I think that if I could get your ear, I could clear them all away by having a single walk and talk with you." When everything was stripped away by the exile, Cicero still had confidence that his friend had cared for him, not his: "This only I beg, that, as you have always loved my own self, you continue in the same love, for I am the same. My enemies have taken away what was mine, not my own self" (*A.*, 3, 5, 1).

To the student of the letters there is particular interest in expressions of satisfaction in the mere act of writing to the absent friend, without immediate reference to the significance of the message written or to the desire for a reply: "Although I have nothing to write to you, still I write because I seem to be talking with you" (*A.*, 12, 53; cf. 7, 15, 1, and 8, 14, 1). To Atticus the writer makes the hyperbolic claim that he confides more boldly in his friend than in himself (*A.*, 12, 36, 1). No charge of inconsistency, he claims, can be based on the fact that in successive letters to Atticus he favors opposite courses; for these letters are like the soliloquies of a man who talks over with himself the pros and cons of an important matter before deciding (*A.*, 8, 14, 2).

But Atticus is not the only friend whose fellowship Cicero values. In a letter to Pætus he shows himself a charming advocate of the dinner party as a social institution. Association with congenial friends is a most notable element in human happiness. The distinctive and delightful thing about the banquet is not the physical pleasure of eating, and drinking but the human fellowship and the refreshment of friendly converse.¹ How

¹ "Sed mehercule, mi Pæte, extra iocum moneo te, quod pertinere ad beate vivendum arbitror, ut cum viris bonis, iucundis, amantibus tui vivas. Nihil est aptius

independent this human interest was of conventional barriers is indicated by the letters to Tiro. Notice, for example, the one beginning with the assurance that Tiro is missed more seriously than had been anticipated, and closing with a contrast between affection and longing (*desiderium*), of which the former would defer Tiro's home-coming in the interest of his recovery, while the latter clamored for the earliest possible return (*F.*, 16, 1; cf. also 16, 18, and 16, 20).

There rests upon friends a special obligation to deal sincerely and frankly with each other (*vere*, *F.*, 12, 22, 4; *aperte*, *F.*, 5, 7, 3). Cicero professes to welcome not only admonition, but even reproof, if accompanied by judgment and good-will (*A.*, 16, 11, 2). It is not only a privilege, but a specific duty, for a friend to offer his friend comfort in time of trouble (*F.*, 5, 17, 3; 6, 10, 4). Whether or not he succeeds in consoling his friend, he has the satisfaction of having done his duty in making the attempt.

Cicero accepts the general principle that every man ought to look after the interests of his friends (*suos enim quisque debet tueri*, *A.*, 16, 16C, 1). This is a sentiment which all recognize as social and moral when applied to the sphere of individual effort and sacrifice, whatever complications may arise upon its application to political life. Even the letters of recommendation (*F.*, 13) include unexceptionable personal requests addressed to friends in behalf of friends. Its rare tactfulness makes conspicuous a letter requesting Memmius to respect the sentiments of Atticus' Epicurean friends and grant them possession of a spot sacred to them from having once belonged to Epicurus (*F.*, 13, 1). Equally innocent seems the plea that a governor give "a high-born, talented, and upright young man" opportunity in his province to display his merits (*F.*, 13, 64, 2). It happens, however, that many of the letters of Cicero which actively seek the welfare of his friends are requests for favorable administrative or judicial decisions. For example, a group of letters (*A.*, 16, 16A-16F) were sent to Plancus and others near to him to secure a favorable decision for the people of Buthrotum, so that they could repay Atticus borrowed money. The apparently coordinate grounds on which the plea is based are the justice of the cause and Cicero's common friendship for Atticus and Plancus. There seems to be no consciousness that there is any impropriety or inconsistency in thus putting personal favor along with justice as a motive for administrative decision. This type of request is frequent among the letters of recommendation. Nothing is needed but a decision in accord with the propraetor's *vitae, nihil ad beate vivendum accomodatus. Nec id ad voluptatem refero, sed ad communitatem vitae atque victus remissionemque animorum, quae maxime sermone efficitur familiari. . . .*" (*F.*, 9, 24, 3).

established policy (*F.*, 13, 55, 2). Nothing is asked that will be inconsistent with right and honor (*F.*, 13, 61; 13, 63, 2). Of course, the judge, as he is in honor bound, will follow his established edict in the decision, but will he not out of friendship for Cicero grant the man's rights cheerfully (*F.*, 13, 59)? Perhaps the most striking example of this sort of request is a letter to the legate Valerius (*F.*, 13, 5). Cicero begins by saying that he would not have personal considerations interfere with the legate's faithful performance of his difficult duties. He next sets forth the justice of his friend's claim, breaking off with this statement, remarkable even if not intended to be taken too seriously: "But I am unwilling to speak at length about the justice of the contention, lest I seem to have won on the merits of the case rather than through favor." These requests all assume that friendship may have a proper influence on the decision of administrative and judicial questions which are supposed to be under law. There is reiterated assurance that law and right are strictly to be observed. Where, then, is the sphere for the operation of personal influence? Is it the inference that without such considerations the governor would not act justly? But this would be an insult that ought to ruin the petitioner's case. The only consistent alternative seems to be that within the domain of properly administered law and justice there lies a discretionary zone where the governor may be controlled by considerations of friendship. This Cicero probably would not seriously claim. The fact seems to be that, by reason of the corrupt political customs of his time and his genuine desire to advance the interests of his friends, he was betrayed into a position logically and morally inconsistent.

In considering the requests which his friends made of him during his own governorship, he insists on giving right and reputation precedence over friendship. Cælius wished Cicero's provincials to hunt panthers for his games at the capital, as well as make a money contribution for the same purpose. Cicero regrets that his policy is so little understood at Rome. His friend should realize that such exactions are improper (*A.*, 6, 1, 21). He admits that he is supporting Appius Claudius, but in a way consistent with honor (*honeste tamen*, *A.*, 6, 2, 10). Brutus, with the support of Atticus, sought Cicero's aid in making collections from the provincials under oppressive and unjust conditions. Cicero declares that he will not violate his edict and be a party to oppression, although he is ready to give all proper aid in collecting rightful dues. If Brutus is not satisfied with this, his friendship may go, if necessary (*A.*, 5, 21, 10-13). The displeasure of Brutus will be a source of sorrow; disappointment in Brutus will be a much greater grief (*A.*, 6, 1, 6). Atticus concedes too much to

his friendship for Brutus when he urges Cicero to act dishonorably in Brutus' behalf (*A.*, 6, 2, 9).

The motives of friendship and of patriotism, now and then, are brought into formal comparison. The friendship between Cicero and Mattius seemed imperiled on account of the latter's devotion to the memory of the slain dictator. The circumstances called out one of those matchless letters of conciliation in which our author's varied powers of mind and heart are so happily displayed. Tactfully and delicately, while seeming to excuse the attitude of Mattius as dictated by loyalty to one held dear, he suggests an opposing view as held by certain people: "But a man so clever as you are cannot overlook the fact that, assuming Cæsar to have been a tyrant—as for my part I decidedly hold—two views may be taken of your duty: either the one which I am wont to support—that your loyalty and sympathy in loving your friend even after his death are praiseworthy; or the one which some support—that the freedom of your country should have been valued above the life of your friend" (*F.*, 11, 27, 8). That Cicero at heart sympathized with the latter of the contrasted views seems a fair inference from his approving reference to Labienus as one who had for the sake of the republic pronounced a man who was his friend guilty of crime (*A.*, 7, 12, 5). Just before returning from his province Cicero, in a letter to Cælius compared the claims of friendship and of patriotism, apparently giving precedence to the latter. The passage is also valuable as a deliberate statement of his own attitude, while yet free from the emotional stress under which a few months later he viewed the political situation: "Public affairs cause me great anxiety. I am well-disposed to Curio. I want Cæsar to take the right course. I am equal to dying for Pompey; but still nothing is dearer to me than the republic itself, in which you are not particularly active, for you seem to me to be embarrassed by being at once a good citizen and a good friend" (*F.*, 2, 15, 3; 50 B. C.). An incidental remark to Planus (*F.*, 10, 5, 1) is not without psychological interest in this connection: "Love of country is in my opinion the supreme consideration, but affection and personal attachment surely come closer to the heart" (*plus certe habet suavitatis*).

We have met the principle that services are a ground for friendship. This brings gratitude and friendship into such close connection that they must almost necessarily be treated together, especially as the two conceptions are so fused in the case of the relations of Cicero and Pompey, the most conspicuous instance of friendship as a motive in the correspondence which we are studying.

The recipient of services from another is under solemn obligation both

to feel thankful and to render in return similar services as occasion may offer. This principle is often expressed as a general proposition and in concrete instances as well where the writer has been the beneficiary as where he has conferred the favor. A particularly disinterested profession of gratitude is where Cicero tells Terentia of kindness received while journeying into exile: "I remained in Brundisium thirteen days at the house of M. Lænius Flaccus, a most excellent man, who out of consideration for my welfare disregarded the peril to his own fortunes and person and was not, by the penalty threatened by an execrable law, deterred from proffering the rights and offices of hospitality and friendship. I hope I may be able sometime to show my gratitude. Certainly I shall always feel it" (*F.*, 14, 4, 2). The letters to Lentulus (*F.*, 1, 1-9) abound in expressions of grateful appreciation for personal services. He may meet the standards of others in showing devotion to Lentulus; his own he never meets. Lentulus never ceased efforts in his behalf until the desired good was reached. Nothing short of similar success in Lentulus' behalf will pay the debt (*F.*, 1, 1, 1; cf. 1, 4, 3; 1, 5, 1). Gratitude to the state for his recall imposes new obligations beyond the common duty of a citizen (*F.*, 1, 9, 4). Even the debt of the Roman world to Greece for the arts of civilization should win for that land particularly considerate treatment from its governor (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 27).

Cicero expected others to show, in view of his services, the same gratitude which he professed toward others. In writing to his former colleague in the consulship, he frankly urges services rendered as the reason why his requests should be heeded (*F.*, 5, 5, 3); though on another occasion he did acknowledge that to a modest man it is embarrassing to ask a favor of one to whom he is under obligation (*F.*, 2, 6, 1). While gratitude in others is commended (cf. *F.*, 5, 11, 1; 10, 19, 1), nothing is more indignantly denounced than ingratitude. It is a vice which includes all possible evil (*in quo vitio nihil mali non est*, *A.*, 8, 4, 2). He feels more bitter over the opposition of Bursa than that of Clodius, because he had defended the former (*F.*, 7, 2, 3). The commonwealth collectively may be guilty of ingratitude. After the period of the exile, Cicero felt that Rome had been ungrateful to him, notwithstanding the recall (*F.*, 7, 32, 3; 1, 9, 5). "It is the characteristic of a people in general, and particularly of ours, to abuse their liberty most of all in dealing with the man through whom they have gained it" (*F.*, 11, 12, 2). This sounds like the traditional ingratitude of republics.

In cases where it is the reputation for ingratitude rather than the ingratitude itself which is presented as the object of dread (*Q. F.*, 2, 4, 1, and frequently in the case of Pompey), we have simply the recognition of society's

estimate of the vice. When in letters of recommendation the gratitude of the beneficiary is emphasized (*F.*, 13, 65, 2, and frequently in 13), the suggestion is practical rather than ethical. Favors granted a man of grateful disposition will prove a good investment.

It has been intimated that the most significant group of judgments regarding the weight of friendship and gratitude as motives are connected with Cicero's attitude to Pompey when hostilities broke out in 49. A notice of the phases of Cicero's personal relations with Pompey, as reflected in the correspondence prior to this crisis, will make more intelligible the group of statements in question.

We clearly have here not a relation, like that with Atticus, based primarily on personal fellowship. Mutual services are mentioned as a prominent ground of the connection. Personal and political expediency are reasons for its cultivation, and yet the terms of personal attachment are freely applied. A letter to Pompey in the year after Cicero's consulship illustrates several of these points. He remonstrates with Pompey because his public letters do not contain clearer expressions of regard for himself. Pompey is hardly making adequate return for what Cicero has done for him, yet the writer is content to let the balance remain on his side. Public policy should unite them, if gratitude does not. Cicero's consulship is so generally approved that when Pompey returns he will be content to take the place of an Africanus, accepting Cicero as his Lælius, bound by both political and personal ties (*F.*, 5, 7, 2-5; April, 62). As Pompey should cultivate Cicero's friendship from considerations of state, if for no other reason, so Cicero claims that in seeking his intimacy he is moved by the consideration that disagreement between them would lead to public dissensions. He will not forsake his own political principles, and perhaps he can check Pompey's popular tendencies (*A.*, 2, 1, 6). That a desire for personal protection from enemies was an element in his motive for cultivating Pompey he acknowledged: "Since those who have no power reject my friendship, I will seek to win the regard of those who have power" (*A.*, 4, 5, 2).

There were, from Cicero's point of view, at least two unquestioned grounds of antagonism toward Pompey. Pompey was reserved and secretive, so that Cicero hardly ever felt confident that he knew his real sentiments: e. g., Pompey has urgently remonstrated with Clodius, "as he himself informs me, *I have no other witness*" (*A.*, 2, 22, 2); and, "I still think Pompey is shamming" (*Q. F.*, 1, 3, 9; cf. *A.*, 4, 15, 7). Evidently others shared in this opinion of the great man's lack of openness, for Cælius asks Cicero (*F.*, 8, 1, 3) to find out and report Pompey's ostensible and his real design, adding, "for

he usually says one thing and thinks another, but has not the ability to conceal what he desires." The second ground of hostility was Pompey's association with Cæsar in a plot to repress the political activity of the citizens of the Roman republic. It is to the period immediately following this bargain with Cæsar that the rather unfriendly nicknames are applied to Pompey, as "Epicrates" (*A.*, 2, 3, 1), "Sampsiceramus" (*A.*, 2, 14, 1; 2, 23, 1), and "Arabarches" (*A.*, 2, 17, 3). The hostility of this same period is reflected in the remarks that, however it may be in town, the country cannot endure tyranny, and that the name of "Magnus" is growing stale (*A.*, 2, 13, 2).

Despite all this, we find, even mingled with the bitterest complaints, expressions of personal regard for Pompey. Cicero is filled with grief at the humiliation of the man who used to be his ideal (*nostrî amores*). Friendship keeps him from fighting a cause which he could not oppose without belying all his past (*A.*, 2, 19, 2). Popular demonstrations against Pompey move him to tears. His fall from the heights seems rather the result of mischance than of deliberate purpose. As Cicero sees him whom he has in the past painted in such brilliant colors now suddenly disfigured, his grief is such as Apelles would feel at seeing his Venus befouled with mud. Though Pompey's support of Clodius might properly cancel his friendship, his affection for him has been such that no wrong can blot it out (*A.*, 2, 21, 3-4). These expressions are significant as coming before Cicero's gratitude was awakened by Pompey's part in his recall, and as pointing to a devotion to the ideal Pompey, portrayed, for instance, in the speech for the Manilian Law. On the other hand, we find in a letter assigned to 61, before the animosities of the triumvirate, a comprehensively disparaging reference to "your friend"—apparently Pompey, though no name is used—who is represented as pretending to esteem, love, and praise Cicero, while secretly envying him. There follows an estimate which Mr. Tyrrell aptly renders: "No courtesy, nor candor, nor political highmindedness; no brilliancy, resolution, nor generosity" (*A.*, 1, 13, 4). If this was Cicero's deliberate judgment of Pompey in 61, there seems little room for personal regard between them. Yet it is by no means certain that we have here a deliberate characterization. It opens with the charge of insincerity—a blemish which we have found frequently ascribed to Pompey. The rest may be an exaggerated and rhetorical outburst, springing from a mood of impatience at what the writer felt was duplicity on the part of Pompey.

At the time of his exile Cicero naturally felt that Pompey had abandoned him (*Q. F.*, 1, 4, 4, *defectio Pompei*), yet after some wavering¹ we find him

¹ "Plenus sum expectatione de Pompeio, quaenam de nobis *velit aut ostendat*" (*A.*, 3, 14, 1).

placing his chief reliance in the good-will of Pompey.¹ As soon as the recall was made effective, we find rather surprising readiness on Cicero's part to enter into confidential relations with Pompey (e. g., *A.*, 4, 1, 6-7; *F.*, 1, 1, 2); yet the old grounds of suspicion and resentment persisted (e. g., *F.*, 1, 1, 5*b*, 2; *Q. F.*, 3, 1, 15).

In the summer of 51 occurred an incident which seems to have had most important effect on the personal attitude of our author toward the triumvir. On his way to Cilicia, Cicero had an interview of several days with Pompey at Tarentum. As he was uncertain whether Atticus was still at Rome, the account of the conference written to this friend is brief (*A.*, 5, 6, 1-2). To Cælius he wrote more in detail: "I spent several days with Pompey in conversation limited to the political situation. What was said neither can nor ought to be reported. Only be assured that Pompey is an admirable citizen (*civem egregium*), and is prepared both in disposition and in understanding to take the precautions which the public welfare demands. Therefore devote yourself to the man; believe me, he will receive you warmly. Now his views as to who are good and who bad citizens are the same as we are wont to hold" (*F.*, 2, 8, 2). It would be most interesting if we could know more of the content of those days of converse. It is, however, easy to see how such a conference would operate to break down the two great barriers which had separated these men. Pompey had impressed Cicero as frankly and minutely communicating his political sentiments. So, while freeing himself from the charge of secretiveness, he had likewise shown that he was the friend, not the foe, of the aristocratic party. Hence it can be no mere coincidence that from this time we find in the letters warm expressions of gratitude and personal devotion. Delightful fellowship and tokens of affection, especially frankness in communicating everything, are assigned, along with gratitude, as reasons for devotion to Pompey (*F.*, 3, 10, 10). True, Cicero is here writing a conciliatory letter to a kinsman of Pompey's, but at about the same time he wrote to Atticus of Pompey as one whom he esteems more highly every day (*quem mihi plus plusque in dies diligo*, *A.*, 6, 2, 10). The earlier charge of insincerity he definitely retracts (*A.*, 6, 1, 11), and not long after he wrote to Cælius (*F.*, 2, 15, 3) that he would die for Pompey—a statement repeated and emphasized in the following months.

The political considerations which contributed to Cicero's perplexity in 49 and 48 will be examined later. We shall see that, when the issue was joined between Cæsar and Pompey, the possibility of supporting the former was never seriously considered. The issue was between neutrality and

¹ "Id erit firmum si Pompei voluntas erit" (*F.*, 14, 2, 2; cf. *A.*, 3, 22, 2).

more or less active support of Pompey. The vital question was whether personal obligation to Pompey, reinforced by the opinion of the optimates, required him to support, at personal risk, a cause the success of which would be scarcely less disastrous to the Roman people than would the triumph of Cæsar himself.

Sometimes the personal relation is explicitly defined as gratitude; again the general terms of friendship are employed, with or without a context indicating that the friendship is based on services. Friendship and gratitude are clearly co-ordinated when he says: "The eminent services of Pompey directed to my welfare and the intimacy existing between us, as well as the very interests of the commonwealth, bring me to the belief that my policy or my fortune should be united with his" (*A.*, 8, 3, 2). It is by his duty as a friend (*amici officio*) that Cicero is constrained, in spite of the interests of his children and his disapproval of Pompey's policy (*A.*, 7, 12, 3). The three reasons for considering such an extremity as abandoning Italy were "the friendship of Gnæus, the cause of the optimates, and the disgrace of joining a tyrant" (*A.*, 7, 20, 2). Pompey himself is assured that in Cicero he will never find lacking the spirit of a friend (*A.*, 8, 11D, 8). Yet, when exasperated at the abandonment of Italy, Cicero refers his devotion to the Pompey of the past or of his dreams (*A.*, 8, 7, 2). But the feeling that he was under obligation to stand by Pompey, even in the face of conflicting duties, will not down. "I see how great and how pernicious this war will be. But one man moves me; the companion of whose flight and the partner in whose attempt to restore the constitution I think I ought to be" (*videor esse debere*, *A.*, 8, 14, 2). To Pompey personally he owes a debt, enhanced by the theoretical soundness of his cause—a debt which neither the interests of Quintus nor the wretchedness of Pompey's policy can neutralize.¹

From first to last, during the period under consideration, gratitude specifically and emphatically is presented as giving validity to this debt. Typical examples are: "Pompey alone influences me, and by kindness done, not by weight of influence" (*beneficio non auctoritate*, *A.*, 8, 1, 4). In accordance with the advice of Atticus, he has cultivated Pompey on account of the valuable services which he had rendered (*quia de me erat optume meritis*, *A.*, 7, 1, 2); "I am influenced by his services, not his cause" (*Beneficium sequor . . . non causam*, *A.*, 9, 7, 3); "These services, I think, should be paid for with my life as the price" (*haec officia mercanda vita sunt*, *A.*, 9, 5, 3).

¹ "Dabimus hoc Pompeio, quod debemus . . . Uni, uni hoc damus" (*A.*, 9, 1, 4).

Atticus suggests that the apparent obligation is based rather on Cicero's proclamation of the services than on the services themselves, and Cicero assents (*A.*, 9, 13, 3). This goes beyond the simple relation between man and man created by the services, and recognizes the social pressure to conform to the standards of gratitude in the minds of others. This aim for the reputation of being grateful, which we have noticed before, has in the letters of the period very definite illustration: "I shudder at the charge of an ungrateful spirit." This and not fear of any vengeance at the hands of Pompey is his motive (*A.*, 9, 2*a*, 2): "I do not dare incur the charge of ingratitude" (*A.*, 9, 7, 4). An even clearer recognition of the opinion of people in general is a passage (*A.*, 9, 19, 2) where, speaking in rather disparaging terms of the obligation to Pompey, Cicero expresses an impatient resolution to follow him out of Italy, not with any hope of helping the republic, but simply "lest someone may think me ungrateful to him."

Whatever were Cicero's real feelings for Pompey, he certainly professed to be moved by friendship as well as by gratitude. Hence, so far as professed motive is concerned, we are justified in applying the term "grateful friendship" to the motives in question. If we should conclude that Cicero was really without personal attachment for Pompey, then it would follow that gratitude alone, and not grateful friendship, was Cicero's real reason for giving such prominence to Pompey's welfare and the obligation due him. To the writer it does not seem possible entirely to eliminate the element of personal attachment from this relation, however great were the obstacles to friendship in the fullest sense.

The rank of grateful friendship as a motive is effectively brought out by the arguments in which Cicero maintains now this and now that side of the question at issue, thus revealing the process by which he arrives at his conclusion (cf. *A.*, 8, 14, 2). The obligation to give Pompey active support is weakened by his support of the adoption of Clodius, by the tardiness of his defense of Cicero, and by a long list of political blunders, or worse, which contributed to the final crisis (*A.*, 8, 3, 3; cf. 9, 5, 2). But in view of the plots against Pompey's life, these personal grounds of resentment are forgotten, and his services are remembered. Achilles was willing to die with his friend, but Pompey has been benefactor as well (*A.*, 9, 5, 3). He regrets not being with Pompey, whatever his policy has been (*A.*, 9, 6, 4). He pardons past delinquencies and wishes gratitude for service to blot out their memory (*A.*, 9, 9, 1). The abandonment of Rome and then of Italy impressed Cicero as a wretched and shameful act. The noble thing would be to die in defense of the fatherland (*A.*, 8, 2, 2); nevertheless to gratitude is assigned sufficient weight to modify the judgment of what under the

circumstances is for him the proper course.¹ Is one under obligation to share the peril of friends and benefactors, when not approving of their policy (*A.*, 9, 4, 2)? This question becomes more urgent in view of the consideration that Pompey plans a Sullan despotism (*A.*, 9, 7, 3). Cicero desires to fulfil the obligations of gratitude, but he professes to recoil from taking part in a baleful war against Italy (*A.*, 9, 13, 3). The issue seems definitely joined between gratitude and patriotism. It is probably in view of this issue that Cicero declares that he never desired to be partner in Pompey's victory, but would prefer to share his defeat (*A.*, 9, 12, 4). But the issue is resolutely faced. Pompey and Cæsar alike threaten Italy. Apart from the consideration of gratitude, right would prompt the endurance of any fate at home, but gratitude turns the scale (*A.*, 9, 7, 4). Others are justified in observing strict neutrality. His case, however, is different; obligation constrains him, and he cannot be ungrateful (*A.*, 10, 7, 1). The context shows that here some progress has been made in harmonizing duty to state and to friend, for he hopes to discharge his debt to Pompey without engaging actively in civil war. He will show his disapproval of Cæsar by withdrawing from Italy to some retired spot.

When Cicero comes to write directly to Cæsar a letter which is evidently intended to be most conciliatory, this debt of gratitude to Cæsar's enemy is emphasized as a reason why the writer should be permitted to retain an independent position. "I beg and entreat . . . that by your generosity I may be a man, good, grateful, loyal in fact, in view of the memory of a great kindness." Cicero has shown gratitude to Cæsar; Cæsar recognizes and appreciates the quality; hence he should be willing that the same gratitude be shown to Pompey (*A.*, 9, 11A, 3). That Cicero should expect such a plea to conciliate rather than irritate shows that he assumes Cæsar to cherish so high an estimate of gratitude in the abstract that he will be moved to honor it, though its object is his bitterest enemy. This only reinforces the impression which the references to gratitude as a whole make—that we have here a motive recognized as of the very highest dignity, one which may maintain its effectiveness even in the presence of such motives as the welfare of fellow-citizens and the duty to fatherland. This, as we may remind ourselves, remains true apart from the genuineness of the particular feelings which were the occasion of the statements in question. Still, with regard to the genuineness of these feelings it is pertinent that when the victorious chief in a personal interview strove to win Cicero's active

¹ "Itaque mihi dubitanti quid me facere par sit permagnum pondus adfert benevolentia erga illum, qua dempta perire melius esset in patria quam patriam servando evertere" (*A.*, 9, 9, 2).

support, the latter stoutly maintained that, if he should come into the senate, he must give full expression to his sympathy with Gnæus. This, of course, would be impracticable, so what must have been tremendous pressure was resisted, and Cæsar was denied the support that he sought (*A.*, 9, 18, 1), Cicero's withdrawal from Italy, and his active or passive resistance to the dictator until the death of Pompey, were a natural sequel, quite consistent with what he had declared to be his duty. And after the struggle was over, Cicero, notwithstanding the disagreements of the eastern campaign, wrote as his final estimate of Pompey: "I cannot fail to grieve over his fate, for I have known him for a man of uprightness, purity, and worth" (*A.*, 11, 6, 5).

III. THE STATE

The state has incidentally appeared as a source of motive in connection with several earlier topics. Some material of especial value from more than one point of view will be reintroduced at the risk of apparent repetition. Some classes of passages may be passed with slight notice as having been already sufficiently examined.

Official position and the consequent prestige have been considered as expressions of the opinion of others. They are likewise elements of the value which the state has for the citizen. The republic as a political system, offering opportunity to the citizen for varied public activity, has been shown to have been for Cicero a highly prized good (e. g., *Q. F.*, 3, 5, 3-4). He was thinking of the state as in this sense a good, when he sought to comfort a friend for the loss of a son by reminding him of the condition of the state. It is not a great evil to be snatched away from a commonwealth that gives no place for the display of talents and virtues (*F.*, 5, 16, 3-4). Exiles too were assured that their condition was no worse than that of those at Rome in the evil time of repression (e. g., *F.*, 4, 8, 2). The keenness with which Cicero felt the loss of opportunities for political activity has also appeared in connection with the solace which he sought in literature and family life (e. g., *F.*, 6, 12, 5; 4, 3, 4; 4, 6, 2).

The relative rank of the welfare of country, considered as something more than the mere satisfaction derived from political relations, has appeared incidentally in connection with the evaluation of other motives. Thus we have seen grateful friendship alone frankly conceded a rank approaching parity with public welfare; for even at the period when personal safety was given greatest relative weight the claim was made that the course prompted by prudence was also for the welfare of the republic (*F.*, 1, 9, 12).

We have already traced chronologically the rank assigned to personal safety as compared with other motives, especially welfare of the state (pp.

12 ff.). In general, these two motives are emphasized in an inverse ratio. For example, in spite of expressions of gratitude to the state for recall from exile (*F.*, 1, 9, 4), fear for personal safety and resentment at his abandonment by the senatorial party, which Cicero almost identified with the state, cooled patriotic ardor (*F.*, 1, 9, 5), even prompting such an expression of disgust and indifference as *A.*, 4, 18, 2. Here he says, in effect, that he does not trouble himself about the wreck of the aristocratic state, when he reflects how smoothly the ship sailed while he was at the helm, and then considers what sort of recompense has been rendered him—a tone scarcely paralleled in the entire correspondence. In 51 and 50 Cicero was absorbed in showing what provincial administrations should be like. With 49 came the period of suspense, which has given us an exceedingly comprehensive, and at the same time homogeneous, body of references to patriotism as a motive. The triumph of Cæsar is followed by calm but earnest expressions of grief at the downfall of the state, as: "I have now mourned for my country longer and more grievously than any mother for her only son" (*F.*, 9, 20, 3); and the remark that it is a question whether to live is a gain, if a man is to survive his country (*F.*, 9, 17, 1). Then, after the brief delusion that the death of Cæsar meant the restoration of the constitution, there comes the discovery that "tyranny lives, it was the tyrant [only] who fell" (*A.*, 14, 9, 2). How after a brief period of uncertainty he decided, from considerations of personal and family welfare (*A.*, 14, 13, 4), to visit Greece (*A.*, 16, 6, 2); and how at the coincident summons of public opinion and public welfare (*me desiderari, subaccusari, A.*, 16, 7, 1) he returned to Rome, throwing himself unreservedly into the final struggle with Antony, we have already seen (pp. 14 and 28). The last fifteen months of the correspondence is the period of most frequent reference to patriotism as a motive; yet the letters are perhaps second in interest to those of 49, as being the uniform professions and exhortations of a man who is fully decided regarding his own course, and who only wishes to persuade others to act with him.

Enough has been said to explain the method to be followed in presenting this topic. Aspects already incidentally treated need not be examined again in detail. In the presentation of what is characteristic in Cicero's professed doctrine of the place which the welfare of the state should hold as a motive, use will be made primarily of the letters of 49 and 48, illustrated and supplemented by material from the other years, especially 44 and 43.

The political unit is variously designated. It is *fatherland* (*patria*) and *parent*, calling for filial piety (*A.*, 9, 9, 2; 10, 4, 4). It is *civitas*, the collec-

tive body of citizens (*A.*, 8, 11, 2). Again it is the *citizens* (*cives*), considered concretely, whose welfare is to be sought (*F.*, 9, 24, 4). It is *this city*, of which Cicero has been called preserver and father, and *Italy*, that is in danger of famine and devastation (*A.*, 9, 10, 3). Pompey nominally represents the *Roman people* (*A.*, 10, 7, 1). *Res publica*, a more ambiguous term, is used with great frequency and with a considerable range of meaning. It is used in the literal sense of common welfare, as where Cæsar is assured that it concerns his honor and the public good to leave Cicero in an independent position (*A.*, 9, 11A, 3). The term *res publica* is also without question freely used of the commonwealth, the fatherland. Cicero asks advice as to where he can be of most service to the republic (*plurimum prodesse rei publicae*, *A.*, 8, 12, 4). Expressions are used which seem to imply much the same personification as in the case of *patria*; for example, when reference is made to the prestige and safety of the commonwealth (*res publica*, *F.*, 6, 21, 1), or the commonwealth is spoken of as the object of duty (*F.*, 6, 1, 3), service (*F.*, 10, 5, 2), and affection (*F.*, 2, 15, 3). In other cases *res publica* must mean the constitution, or a republican constitutional government, as where the prediction is made that if either Cæsar or Pompey survives there will be no *res publica* (*A.*, 9, 7, 1), or where Cicero writes to his brother that there is (in 54) no *res publica*, adding, apparently by way of amplification, "no senate, no courts, no political standing for any of us" (*Q. F.*, 3, 4, 1; cf. *A.*, 4, 18, 2; *Q. F.*, 3, 5, 4). These three typical meanings—public welfare, commonwealth, constitution—are certain; but in practice there is such blending and fusion that certain classification is difficult, if not impossible; yet the very fact that doubtless contributed largely to this ambiguity diminishes its practical importance; for to Cicero the Roman state was almost identified with the constitution of the aristocratic republic, and the preservation or restoration of that constitution was the chief element of common welfare for which the citizens could strive.

Cicero distinctly recognizes the fact that by virtue of a man's connection with the political unit, however conceived, he enters a definite sphere of motive and duty. For this the most general term is, "a citizen's duty," "a man's duty as a citizen," *civis officium* (*A.*, 7, 12, 3; *F.*, 9, 16, 5). An ideal of political virtue is that the state never find lacking in one the spirit of a citizen (*civis animus*, *A.*, 8, 11D, 8). A criterion for judging rival propositions is to ask which is the part of a better citizen (*A.*, 9, 6, 7). As we have seen, the term "fatherland" (*patria*) suggests the filial aspect of the duty to one's country. It is an impious crime to fail to support one's parents, "but our captains, in dealing with our most venerable and inviolable parent, the fatherland, are planning to starve her to death" (*A.*, 9, 9, 2).

Cæsar's war upon his country is called "parricide" (*A.*, 10, 10, 5); and "parricides" was the term for the party of Antony in 44 (*B.*, 1, 15, 5).

The content of public duty in the case of the ruler is summarized as seeking the happiness of the citizens. This happiness, in defining which Cicero quotes from his work *De Re Publica*, upon which he had recently been engaged, is to include elements ranging all the way from virtue down to material possessions.¹ The course of Pompey as well as that of Cæsar is tested by this criterion and found wanting. A happy and virtuous community has not been the aim of either leader, but rather personal power, *dominatio*. On Pompey's part this is carried to the point of willingness to lead against Italy savage tribes in arms (*A.*, 8, 11, 2). The welfare and honor of the fatherland must not only be an aim of the public man, but an aim to which personal power and private advantage must be subordinated. For failure here, both Cæsar and Pompey are condemned as neither virtuous nor honorable nor happy—another philosophical touch which is a reminiscence of Cicero's *De Re Publica* (*A.*, 10, 4, 4). The picture which he gives of his own activity in a letter to Pætus in 43 apparently embodies his ideal of a citizen's duty: "Be assured, my dear Pætus, that night and day I do nothing, care for nothing, save that my fellow-citizens be safe and free. . . . In short, my feeling is such that, if the task of directing this movement should require the sacrifice of my life, I should esteem my lot glorious" (*F.*, 9, 24, 4).

The duty of the citizen is represented as being modified by circumstances. The obligation may be increased by the reception of favors from the state. Cicero after his recall thought he ought at least (*certe*) to show the state the spirit which he had previously shown merely from the ordinary duty of the citizen, without special occasion for gratitude (*F.*, 1, 9, 4). So the guilt of Lepidus in turning against the senate was greater in view of the honors conferred upon him by that body (*B.*, 1, 12, 1; 1, 18, 2). On the other hand, there were times after the exile when the ingratitude of the state seemed a reason at least for relaxation of effort in her behalf; for example: "I prefer to make a bad voyage with someone else at the helm, rather than to steer successfully with such ungrateful passengers" (*A.*, 2, 9, 3). Even in 49 his past services for the state and the hardships suffered in consequence are suggested as possibly purchasing exemption from further hazard (*A.*, 9, 4, 2). That from which, in this case, he wishes to be excused is a struggle against odds; and the hoplessness of an enterprise, according to Cicero, is, and should be, an important consideration. "Will you take the most

¹ "Beata civium vita . . . ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit" (*A.*, 8, 11, 1).

hazardous action and still be of no service to the republic, which you will be able to serve if you remain?" (*A.*, 9, 10, 5) was a suggestion which he accepted as sound. He was frankly a practical politician as distinguished from an idealist. Results rather than doctrines should determine the action of the citizen. The conclusion that a conviction is impossible is a reason for relaxing the vigor of prosecution (*A.*, 1, 16, 2). The desirability of preserving the harmony of the orders is a reason for supporting the bad case of the *equites* against an anti-bribing measure (*A.*, 1, 17, 8). Cato is criticised as being more honest than discreet in harassing the publicans (*A.*, 1, 18, 7). Cato sometimes with the best of intentions injures public interests, for he votes as if in the republic of Plato and not in the Roman rabble (*in Romuli jaece*). It is better to purchase the support of the *equites* by concession than to lose it (*A.*, 2, 1, 8). The good cause makes it necessary to side with the publicans against the interests of Asia and the merchants (*A.*, 2, 16, 4). These examples are from the earlier letters, but the doctrine was strikingly expressed as late as 45. Everything in Cicero's letter to Cæsar could, it is claimed, appropriately be written by a most loyal citizen, "but by *one most loyal in such a way as is permitted by the times*, conformity to which all political authorities enjoy."¹ The most elaborate statement of the principle is in the long letter to Lentulus, defending Cicero's attitude toward the triumvirs in 54. There is no virtue, he tells us, in stubborn persistence in a policy when the circumstances have changed. It is the part of the skilful navigator to give way to the storm, even if such action temporarily takes him away from his harbor. It would be foolish for the sailor to incur peril in holding to his original course when he can safely make his harbor by a detour. So in statesmanship the goal should always be the same, peace with honor; but while having this one object in view, it is not necessary always to employ the same terminology (*F.*, 1, 9, 21). The distinction between the ultimate goal and the means employed to reach it could scarcely be more clearly stated. Cicero insists that in judging the loyalty of an act the end rather than the means should be considered.

Again and again Cicero asserts that nothing is dearer to him than the state (e. g., *F.*, 2, 15, 3), even life (*F.*, 7, 28, 3). The city—that is, his fatherland—he loves (*urbem, id est patriam amamus*, *A.*, 9, 6, 2). His anxiety in 54 is rather for the general condition of the commonwealth than for his personal interests (*Q. F.*, 3, 9, 3; cf. *F.*, 10, 1, 1). It is perhaps needless to continue the citation of the numerous passages available to show that Cicero habitually spoke of the state in terms of affection and solicitude.

¹"Nihil est in ea nisi optimi civis, sed ita optimi, ut tempora; quibus parere omnes πολιτικοί praecipiant" (*A.*, 12, 51, 2).

The advantage of the state is frequently assigned as a motive. A rupture between Cicero and Pompey would be a very great evil to the state (*A.*, 7, 6, 2; cf. 8, 3, 2). To leave Italy is not expedient for the state (*rei publicae utile*, *A.*, 8, 2, 4). Cæsar's honor and the public welfare require that Cicero be left free to work for peace (*A.*, 9, 11A, 3). The question asked with all apparent earnestness in *A.*, 8, 12, 4 is: "What part should I take, and where do you think I shall be most serviceable to the state?" (*plurimum prodesse rei publicae*; cf. *A.*, 7, 3, 3). He would most gladly purchase for the republic immunity from peril at the cost of personal disaster (*F.*, 2, 16, 4). A reason for hesitating to visit Greece in 44 was given thus: "I suspect there is a possibility of my being able to be of use to the republic" (*A.*, 14, 13, 4). Later Cicero speaks of the day when he first conceived the hope of liberty, and laid the foundations of the republic (*F.*, 12, 25, 2). "All my desires," he writes, "are for the sake of the republic" (*F.*, 10, 19, 2). It was his love for his country that hindered him from abandoning it in time of need (*B.*, 1, 15, 5).

Cicero appealed to others to act from the same patriotic motives which he claimed as his own. A few characteristic appeals follow: "Free the republic forever from despotic rule" (*F.*, 11, 5, 3); "Think of the republic and your honor" (*F.*, 10, 27, 1); "Come to the rescue of the fatherland" (*F.*, 10, 10, 2); "So fly hither and save the republic from destruction" (*B.*, 1, 10, 4). If Brutus has any regard for the republic for which he was born, he must at once bring his army to Italy; "In the name of the gods, therefore, come to the rescue" (*B.*, 1, 14, 2). How skilfully the love of glory was made to reinforce the appeal of patriotism has been shown (pp. 31, 38).

In our author's statements of his own motives, as well as in his appeals to others, the claim or the implication is that the welfare of the commonwealth should be the decisive consideration. How does he apply this principle to the issue between Pompey and Cæsar? If he had admitted that either chief represented the real interests of the Roman people, consistency with his profession would have compelled unhesitating support of the public champion; but Cicero uniformly maintained that there was no such public champion. It is worth while to see just how he defined the position of the two rivals with reference to the public welfare. Cæsar's cause is bad without mitigation. There is no uncertainty on this point. Later we shall see in greater detail how he was the *tyrannus* in the fullest sense of that odious word. His power rested on an utterly unconstitutional basis. His supporters were those whom Cicero habitually called the bad or base. His desperate course was in keeping with his position (*A.*, 10, 4,

2). Everything indicated that violence, cruelty, and an intolerable despotism would follow his victory (e. g., *A.*, 9, 2*a*, 2; 10, 8, 2; 10, 12, 6). This is all very simple, and there is never any suggestion that either the personal or the political welfare of the Romans can be furthered by espousing the cause of Cæsar.

Pompey, however, stands in a twofold relation. He stands for the name of the Roman people (*A.*, 10, 7, 1); his war is not without justice; it is even necessary (*A.*, 10, 4, 3); the cause which he represents is the best (*A.*, 9, 7, 4); that is, Pompey is technically the representative of the constitutional party. Cicero, however, distinguishes sharply between Pompey's professed political creed and the results, actual or prospective, of his campaign. As a leader he is utterly incompetent (*A.*, 7, 13, 1-2; 7, 21, 1 and 3). His victory would mean devastation, slaughter, and proscription for Italy. The technically good cause will be managed most outrageously.¹ He is preparing a baleful war (*A.*, 9, 13, 3), one recalling the wars of Sulla, Marius, and Cinna; a war in which Goths, Armenians, and Colchians will be summoned to ravage Italy (*A.*, 9, 10, 3; 9, 11, 3). However righteous Pompey's cause may be theoretically, however disastrous the victory of his rival, his own victory would as truly be disastrous to his fellow-citizens (*A.*, 10, 4, 3). Not only would Pompey's victory be disastrous to the lives and fortunes of the citizens, but it would involve the wreck of the constitution, the destruction of all that Cicero and his party stood for politically, the annihilation of the interests of which Pompey was technically the defender. Men are engaged in a combat for their own supremacy at the peril of the republic (*A.*, 7, 3, 4). Each desires to rule as king (*A.*, 8, 11, 2). It is no longer a question of constitutional right, but a strife for royal power (*A.*, 10, 7, 1). This is the ground of the declaration (*A.*, 9, 7, 1) that the survival of Pompey as well as of Cæsar is inconsistent with the existence of the state, and that the state is already lost (*A.*, 9, 5, 2; cf. *F.*, 4, 1, 1). To recapitulate: Pompey is the nominal standard-bearer of the constitutional party, his cause being to this extent "good;" but this is offset by three considerations: he is incompetent as a leader, his policy involves ruthless destruction of life and property, and, most weighty of all, his ultimate aim is personal unconstitutional power.

This antithesis between the theoretical and practical position of Pompey must constantly be kept in mind, if we are to estimate correctly the place given to public welfare by Cicero in this entire discussion. The

¹ "Causa igitur non bona est? Immo optima, sed agetur, memento, foedissime. Primum consilium est suffocare urbem et Italiam fame, deinde agros vastare, urere, pecuniis locupletum non abstinere" (*A.*, 9, 7, 4).

issue is between active support of Pompey and neutrality. The theoretical Pompey represents public welfare; but when the practical Pompey is under consideration, public welfare demands neutrality rather than a share in his atrocities. Thus public interests are divided, the balance inclining toward neutrality (*A.*, 10, 7, 1); and the field is left comparatively open to such motives as friendship, gratitude, reputation, and personal welfare. This analysis has value quite apart from the validity of Cicero's estimate of Pompey—quite apart from any temperamental or personal inclination of Cicero toward the neutral course.

Two specific elements of a country's welfare—peace as against civil war, and republican constitutional government as against arbitrary rule—are given such prominence among the objects which the citizen should choose that they call for separate treatment.

Mere frequency of reference indicates that peace was a conspicuous object in Cicero's thought. "Everything must be done to prevent a clash of arms" (*A.*, 7, 6, 2); "I never cease urging peace" (*A.*, 7, 14, 3); "I preferred nothing to peace" (*A.*, 8, 11D, 7)—these are strong expressions. Peace, even on unfavorable terms, is not to be spurned (*F.*, 16, 12, 4; *A.*, 7, 18, 1), though there is a degree of disgrace for which peace is scarcely a compensation (*A.*, 7, 18, 2). There are expressions of regret when hope of peace recedes (*A.*, 7, 20, 1); particularly when peace negotiations fail (*A.*, 9, 13, 8; 9, 14, 2). As long as there is hope of peace Cicero will refrain from any act committing him to one of the rivals. Is this due merely to the caution that studies to avoid needless danger? Cicero himself presents another and different explanation. All readers of Cicero know how he prided himself on his powers of diplomacy and conciliation. The union of the orders, no less than the crushing of Catiline, was in his eyes a glory of his administration. We have seen that he feared everything from a victory of Cæsar, and hoped for little or nothing from a victory of Pompey. Besides the wrecking of the constitution, war meant slaughter and devastation for Italy. The lifetime of the state stretches beyond that of any man. If the clash can only be postponed long enough, these individual disturbers will have passed away and the commonwealth will stand unharmed (*A.*, 9, 10, 3). Does not this situation present the supreme opportunity for the man of the toga to save the state with his own familiar arts? To leave Italy while any hope of peace remained would be finally to renounce this office of mediator. His presence with Pompey will be helpful if there shall be a discussion of peace.¹ When from a letter of Cæsar's, as interpreted by a

¹ *A.*, 8, 2, 4, has this general force, whether we read, with Tyrrell, *projecturus* from *proficio*, or, with Müller, *promptissimus*.

Cæsarian, Cicero conceived the hope that his mediation would be acceptable, the cry to Atticus was: "O that I might, in this pitiful crisis of the commonwealth, perform a service worthy of a statesman" (*A.*, 9, 11, 2)! At this time a reply was written to Cæsar himself, and a copy sent to Atticus (9, 11A). The writer is not certain what Cæsar meant by saying that he desired to enjoy the advantages of his favor and assistance, but hope has led him to the interpretation that Cæsar desires negotiations "looking toward peace, toward a settlement, toward harmony among citizens." Assuming this to be Cæsar's purpose, the writer confidently offers himself as mediator. Both his character (*natura*) and the part he has played and still maintains in the state (*persona*) make him second to none in equipment for such an office.¹ This is amplified by the claim that both with Pompey and in the senate he has been the consistent advocate of peace, that he has taken no active part in the war, and that he is the sympathetic and grateful friend alike of the two leaders. If, in the interest of conciliation, he exaggerates the friendliness of his personal attitude toward Cæsar and his cause, the fact does not discredit his estimate of the desirability of peace or of his own fitness to act as mediator.

The strong expressions regarding the necessity of securing peace at almost any sacrifice suggests the question whether we have here the doctrine of peace at any price, and whether the attitude toward peace and war here taken is consistent with that taken by Cicero earlier and later in his career.

It is not so much war as war that he deprecates, as it is civil war — war between Roman citizens. This is suggested by the context of at least two of the strongest passages already cited. After, "I never cease urging peace" (*A.*, 7, 14, 3), we find, "even the most unrighteous peace is more expedient than the most righteous war *with fellow-citizens.*" "I preferred nothing to peace" (*A.*, 8, 11D, 7), is followed by, "not that I did not fear the same things as they, but I considered them more endurable than *civil war.*" The same unqualified condemnation of civil war appears in a letter to Tiro (*F.*, 16, 12, 2): "I for my part, upon reaching the city, continually devoted all my thought, speech, and action to furthering harmony; but a strange madness had seized, not only the base, but also those who are considered the good, so that they were eager for war, though I kept urging that nothing was more wretched than civil war." The utmost complacency,

¹ "Ut te . . . de otio, de pace, de concordia civium agi velle arbitrabar, et ad eam rationem existimabam satis aptam et naturam et personam meam . . . magis idoneum quam ego sum ad eam causam profecto reperies neminem, . . ." (*A.*, 9, 11A, 1-2).

therefore, to Rome's foreign wars is consistent with this extreme aversion to contests between citizens, with the attendant horrors associated with the names of Marius, Cinna, and Sulla.

But a few years later we find Cicero vehemently urging senate and army to withstand Antony with force: Antony's troops are miserable brigands; peace is to be considered only in case they lay down their arms or are vanquished; it is no time for parleying (*F.*, 10, 6, 1, to Plancus); peace is to be sought, "not by laying down our arms, but by dispelling the dread of arms and of slavery" (*F.*, 10, 6, 3). To Lepidus these words were written in 43: "I am pleased that you are eager to secure peace among fellow-citizens. If you consider a peace that does not involve slavery (*eam si a servitute seiungas*), you will have regard both for the public good and your own position; but if that peace of yours is to restore a desperate man to the possession of unbridled despotic power, be assured that all sound men are resolved to prefer death to slavery" (*F.*, 10, 27, 1). Brutus desires peace; but under present circumstances peace is to be gained, not by words, but by arms (*B.*, 2, 5, 1).

Is there anything in Cicero's earlier pleas for peace between Pompey and Cæsar to prepare one for his advocacy of war against Antony? "We need peace," he wrote to Atticus during the earlier crisis (7, 5, 4), "for from a victory, besides other ills, a tyrant will certainly arise." This suggests that even civil war is to be feared rather for its consequences than as an absolute evil. If we recall how Cicero represents Pompey's cause as related to public welfare, we shall see the conditions which made civil war so much to be dreaded in the one case, but which did not equally prevail in the contest with Antony. Pompey's inefficiency rendered success improbable; but until late in the contest with Antony his overthrow was considered feasible (e. g., *F.*, 10, 20, 3; 11, 14, 3). The ruthlessness of Pompey promised widespread proscriptions; but Cicero naturally expected the triumph of *his* party to be free from such a reproach. Finally, and most important of all, Pompey was a potential tyrant whose victory would bring, not the establishment, but the overthrow, for the time at least, of constitutional government; while a decisive victory of the senatorial forces over those of Antony was to be a real victory of the republic, freeing it from the perils that had been threatening its very existence (*F.*, 11, 5, 3). These differences in the circumstances—differences clearly implied in the letters—go far toward explaining the differing attitude toward the two civil wars. One may speculate as to whether there is a further psychological explanation in the difference of Cicero's situation in the two contests; in one case wavering between the two sides, in the other thoroughly decided and committed;

in one case left outside the confidential counsels of the chiefs, in the other himself foremost in counsel and leadership.

We have already seen that republican constitutional government held an exalted position in Cicero's hierarchy of public goods. It was with reference to this element of common welfare that the nominal leader of the senatorial party was condemned, with reference to this that so dreadful an evil as civil war received its bitterest sting or its sufficient justification. Violation of constitutional right is the cardinal sin of the citizen—final, absolute, unmitigated. The letters contain no fiercer denunciation than that directed against Cæsar at the outset of his unconstitutional career. His crime is defined as consisting in "having an army without public authority, seizing the cities of citizens, . . . being a tyrant." For this he is called a mad and wretched creature, wholly without honor or virtue (the *καλόν* or *honestum*). "I should rather die a thousand times than once entertain the thought of such a course;" and later: "I regard even the possession of such a wish a more miserable lot than crucifixion. Only one lot is more miserable, the attainment of the wish" (*A.*, 7, 11, 1-2). References to unconstitutional action regularly are occasions for emphatic language, apparently indicating strong feeling. *Tyrannus*, a word occurring in *A.*, 7, 5, 4, and 10, 1, 3, and very frequently applied to Cæsar in later letters, must have had especially opprobrious associations for men familiar with the Greek writers. The same would be true, from the Roman point of view, of the derivatives of *rex*; for example, *regnum*, *regnare*, and *regnandi* (*A.*, 8, 11, 2; 10, 7, 1). The subjects of the tyrant are slaves (cf. *servire*, *A.*, 7, 7, 7). *Dominus*, "lord," another term for the unconstitutional ruler, would necessarily grate upon republican ears (*A.*, 8, 16, 2). To be associated with a tyrant involves a taint of disgrace (*A.*, 7, 20, 2), and it is a serious question whether even a good purpose can justify entering a tyrant's counsel (*A.*, 10, 1, 3). Cæsar will, if victorious, establish a kingdom intolerable to a Persian, to say nothing of a Roman (*A.*, 10, 8, 2). But (10, 8, 6-8) Plato's omens will not fail; the power of the tyrant must soon collapse by the acts either of enemies or of the tyrant himself, who is his own worst enemy. Cicero evidently regards the autocrat's position as inherently weak. In a little time he will pass away. The possibility of a permanent Roman monarchy is not here imagined. Cicero may or may not live to witness the collapse. That matters little to him. He evidently believes that his reputation will be in the hands of a republican posterity, who will honor the memory of the resolute foe of revolutionists and tyrants.

During the brief period of submission to Cæsar's supremacy it was, according to Cicero, a problem how to live subject to the power of one, that

one being wise and liberal (*F.*, 4, 6, 3). It is disgraceful even to live under Cæsar, to say nothing of flattering him. While this sentiment seems to have been elicited by a rebuff, it is contained in a familiar letter to Atticus (13, 28, 2; cf. *F.*, 7, 30, 1). Halfway freedom may be secured by silence and retirement (*A.*, 13, 31, 3).

But it was after Cæsar's assassination that the pent torrent of indignation burst forth, and the vehemence of the approval of the deed is an index of the intensity of the disapproval with which Cicero viewed Cæsar's unconstitutional position. The brief note written to one of the conspirators on the very Ides of March sounds like a series of breathless exclamations.¹ Congratulations are showered upon the assassins (e. g., *F.*, 12, 2, 1, to Casius; *F.*, 11, 5, 1-2, to Decimus Brutus; *B.*, 2, 5, 2, to Marcus Brutus). "The Ides of March" is used as a technical designation for the glorious deed which is his comfort, and in which he wishes he had had a share (e. g., *A.*, 14, 4, 2; *F.*, 12, 4, 1). The doers of the deed are "heroes" or "demigods" (*A.*, 14, 4, 2, etc.), nay even "gods" (*A.*, 14, 11, 1). "Tyrannicides" *tyrannoctoni*, *A.*, 14, 6, 2) and "liberators" (*A.*, 14, 12, 2) are other terms for the slayers of Cæsar, while "tyrant" is the habitual designation of the dictator, particularly in the letters to Atticus (*A.*, 15, 20, 2; 14, 6, 2; 14, 14, 2, etc.). "O ye good gods! The tyranny lives, it was the tyrant who fell!" (*A.*, 14, 9, 2) seems the expression of genuine surprise. The Ides of March "have secured for our friends, those inspired heroes, an entrance to heaven; but have not secured liberty for the Roman people" (*A.*, 14, 14, 3). This discovery prompts the oft-repeated suggestion that the work was not thorough enough, that it was a fatal mistake to leave Antony alive: "O glorious deed, yet-ineffectual!" (*A.*, 14, 12, 1); "I wish you had invited me to your banquet on the Ides of March; there would have been nothing left over" (*F.*, 12, 4, 1; cf. *A.*, 14, 21, 3; *F.*, 12, 3, 1). In all this there is not the slightest suggestion of any moral or legal objection to the killing of a tyrant. His unconstitutional position makes him an outlaw with no more rights than the noisome reptile.

This opposition to arbitrary power was referred to broad principles. Everything is uncertain where law is abandoned and the future made to depend upon the will or caprice of another (*F.*, 9, 16, 3). Cicero is himself anxious to comply with the letter of the law, though that letter is no fetish when higher interests of the state are involved. In case of an invasion of the provinces by the Parthians he will remain on guard beyond his legal time of office, and thus act "contrary to the decree of the senate" (*A.*, 6,

¹ "Tibi gratulor; mihi gaudeo; te amo; tua tueor; a te amari et quid agas quidque agatur certior fieri volo" (*F.*, 6, 15).

6, 3); yet he declares it is an insane suggestion that he be sent by Pompey direct from Cilicia to Sicily, as being already in possession of the *imperium*; "For neither did the senate decree, nor the people bid me, to exercise the *imperium* in Sicily" (*A.*, 7, 7, 4). The ambition of Octavius, his ostensible ally, to obtain the consulship under illegal conditions occasioned a most notable protest against the rule of force rather than law: "Each demands for himself power in the state in proportion to the force which he commands; neither reason, nor moderation, nor custom, nor duty, has any weight; neither judicial decision, nor public opinion, nor respect for posterity" (*B.*, 1, 10, 3).

Loyalty to party is closely connected with loyalty to state. This loyalty manifests itself in various aspects—adherence to the political doctrines which the party profess, desire to be consistent with former party affiliations, support of the specific policies which the party advocate, and regard for the individuals composing the party. It must be evident that the first two do not necessarily involve the others.

The senatorial party are to Cicero "the good" (*boni*). Even at the time of the greatest alienation from the party he wrote to Lentulus: "But you realize how difficult it is to lay aside one's political sentiments (*sensum in re publica*), especially when they are right and thoroughly settled" (*F.*, 1, 8, 2; 56 B. C.). If a variously interpreted sentence of a few months earlier¹ be interpreted in view of this passage, it may naturally, with this, be taken as an acknowledgment of the soundness of the political doctrines of the optimates, at the time when resentment against the leaders of the party was keenest. Incredible treachery, according to Cicero, has been shown by these men, who wish to be leaders, and who might be if they had a particle of good faith. Spurned by these discredited leaders, Cicero will cultivate the good-will of those who have power (*A.*, 4, 5, 2-3; cf. *F.*, 1, 7, 7). So far as party loyalty is here concerned, the professed conflict is primarily between the worthy doctrines and their unworthy exponents. During the contest between Cæsar and Pompey, while there is less personal resentment toward the members of the senatorial party, they are, with exceptions, pronounced unworthy of the doctrines and traditions of the party: "I do not understand whom you call 'the good.' I myself know of none; that is, if we look for classes of 'the good;' for there are 'good' individuals" (*A.*, 7, 7, 5); "I have no confidence in your optimates" (*Optimatibus vero tuis nihil confido*, *A.*, 9, 5, 3). Once he mentions "the good," to add "none of whom exist" (*A.*, 9, 1, 4), and again refers to those who are called "the good" (*A.*, 9, 2a, 3).

¹ "Sed valeant recta, vera, honesta consilia" (*A.*, 4, 5, 1; cf. the entire letter.)

But even when thinking of those who are truly loyal to constitutional principles, Cicero objects to their policy of pushing the war. Should one cast in his lot with "the good," even if he disapproves of their policy (*A.*, 9, 4, 2)? How this question was debated down to the death of Pompey we have already seen. When Cicero accepted Pharsalus as the end of the war and returned to Italy, submitting to Cæsar, he had no less reason for disapproving the policy of those who, like Cato, chose to fight on. This policy could only mean utter ruin to the remnants of the republic (*F.*, 15, 15, 1); or, if by any unexpected chance the Pompeians should win, Cicero would be placed in a decidedly awkward position (*A.*, 11, 13, 1).

Yet, in spite of strictures upon the members and the policy of the senatorial party, that party is frequently mentioned in Cicero's serious estimates of value. In the autumn of 48 he craves assurance that he has not altogether sacrificed the good-will of his party (*iudicium bonorum*, *A.*, 11, 7, 3). Passages of this type have already been examined. We may put beside them his direct expressions of desire to share the fortunes of the *boni*, or regret at being separated from them. He would aid in their victory or share in their defeat (*A.*, 7, 3, 2; 50 B. C.); "As an animal follows the herd, I will follow 'good men,' or whoever shall bear the name of 'good,' even if they rush to ruin."¹ The cause of the optimates (*causa bonorum*) urges him to retire from Italy (*A.*, 7, 20, 2). Later he regrets that he is not with "the good," however rash their undertaking (*A.*, 9, 6, 4). In certain moods he is distressed that he did not after Pharsalus go with the "many loyal men" who continued the struggle in Africa (*A.*, 11, 7, 3), although he stoutly defends the wisdom of his course rather than theirs (*F.*, 15, 15, 1). He was alive to the anomaly of a position that made his personal interests demand what he had always deprecated, i. e., a defeat of the *boni* (*A.*, 11, 13, 1). If our analysis of party loyalty was correct, this hold of the party upon Cicero, in spite of estrangement from its membership and repudiation of its policies, is largely to be attributed to sympathy with its doctrines and a desire for consistency.

IV. SUBJECTS, SLAVES, AND FOREIGNERS

The interests of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, as estimated by Cicero, have been reviewed. It remains to inquire what weight he gives to the interests of fellow-men who are outside these special groups.

Our knowledge of Cicero's estimate of the welfare of provincials as affecting the policy of the provincial governor is mainly derived from two

¹ "Ut bos armenta, sic ego bonos viros aut eos quicumque dicentur boni sequar etiam si ruent" (*A.*, 7, 7, 7).

distinct bodies of material in the letters—the comprehensive letter to Quintus (*Q. F.*, I, I), to which reference has already been made (p. 27), and the letters which about ten years later Cicero wrote from his own province. The two series of judgments so separated in time and circumstance present an interesting parallel.

We have seen the happiness of citizens made the proper goal of the ruler of the state (*A.*, 8, II, I). The principle is extended to apply to the subjects in the provinces as well. In some sense it is to apply even to slaves and dumb beasts (*Q. F.*, I, I, 24).¹ The whole province should recognize that the welfare of all, their children, their reputations, and their fortunes, are precious in their governor's eyes (*Q. F.*, I, I, 13). The reputation of the governor and the welfare of the provincials are placed side by side as entirely consistent aims. The reputation is to come from the public recognition of an administration that secured the welfare of the subjects (see pp. 29 ff.). Accordingly, we find Cicero repeatedly urging his brother to pursue fame (e. g., *Q. F.*, I, I, 30; I, I, 41; I, I, 45). As governor he professes the same motive for himself (*A.*, 6, I, 8; 7, I, 6).

To be respected, the provincial courts must be free from all suspicion of partiality (*Q. F.*, I, I, 20). Justice and impartiality are claimed for Cicero's own administration (*Nihil ea iuris dictione aequabilis*, *A.*, 5, 20, I; cf. *F.*, 15, 4, I; *A.*, 5, 21, 5). More significant is a declaration of principles called out by actual pressure to support unfair demands. To comply would be to abandon the platform of principles which he had laid down for his administration, and would besides utterly ruin his province (*A.*, 6, I, 5). He will not confer a prefecture upon Scaptius simply to enable him to use legalized force in collecting the debts of Brutus. He will not recognize the claim for interest at the rate of 48 per cent., 12 per cent. compound interest being the legal maximum. The collection of the debt by legal methods and with legal interest has Cicero's hearty support. No personal influence, not even that of Brutus seconded by Atticus, can induce him to do more (*A.*, 6, I, 5-8; cf. 5, 21, 10-13; 6, 2, 7-9).

The province can demand of its governor security and impartial taxation (*Q. F.*, I, I, 25). The mere fact of taxation cannot reasonably be considered a grievance. Roman rule brings security from foreign war and internal strife, a security for which the tribute is only a fair compensation (*Q. F.*, I, I, 34). The great difficulty which the governor encounters is the task of holding the balance between the *publicani* and the provincials, so that the former shall not be alienated, nor the latter oppressed (*Q. F.*, I, I, 33-

¹ "Est autem non modo eius, qui sociis et civibus, sed etiam eius, qui servis, qui mutis pecudibus praesit, eorum, quibus praesit, commodis utilitatique servire."

34). It is precisely this that Cicero claims to have accomplished by a happy expedient in Cilicia (*A.*, 6, 1, 16). Quintus is congratulated on having freed Asia from burdensome tributes for the support of the *ædiles'* games in Rome (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 26). When Cicero's friend Cælius asked panthers and apparently money from Cilicia for his games, the occasion was used to emphasize the fact that in that province only debts were collected, and that no hunting expeditions at public expense were countenanced (*A.*, 6, 1, 21). So far did Cicero carry this principle that he refused to accept the legalized traveling expenses for himself and his staff (*A.*, 5, 10, 1). He trusts that in the entire year the province will not contribute a farthing for his personal expenses (*A.*, 5, 20, 6; cf. 6, 2, 4). Atticus had evidently advised this course (*ex præceptis tuis*, *A.*, 5, 15, 2). It is evident that the lawful traveling expenses might easily be made the pretext for oppressive exactions. Cicero hopes his staff will be as scrupulous as himself, but he has some apprehensions (*A.*, 5, 14, 2).

A suggestion is made that the man who offers a bribe be treated as severely as the man who accepts it (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 13). An end is put to the custom of receiving payment from communities that wish to avoid having soldiers quartered among them for the winter (*A.*, 5, 21, 7). A well-managed household is presented as the model for provincial administration (*A.*, 6, 1, 2). All this suggests that the problems connected with securing government in the interest of the governed have changed little with the centuries.

The best intentions on the part of the governor are useless unless his subordinates co-operate to carry out his policy (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 10). A distinction is recognized in the responsibility of a governor for subordinates assigned him by the state and his personal appointees. The latter should be most strictly held to account. Perniciously self-seeking activity on the part of the former, considering the lax standards of the time, may best be checked by limiting their opportunities for mischief (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 11-12). We have seen the hopes which Cicero had for the self-denial of his staff at the outset (*A.*, 5, 14, 2). At the close of his term of office he is forced to exclaim over the difficulty of virtue or of its continued simulation. There is a surplus from the appropriation for the year's administrative expenses; and his staff are so selfish as to complain because, instead of distributing the sum among them, he intends to hand it over to his successor; and yet he has conferred all possible honors upon them (*A.*, 7, 1, 6). There is warm praise for one of the staff who has so far come to himself as to value honors at Cicero's hands more highly than any amount of money (*A.*, 7, 3, 8).

The governor of a province must have self-control in the matters of

money, pleasure, and the indulgence of anger, the last-mentioned evidently being Quintus' besetting sin (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 7-9, and 37-40). Self-restraint (*abstinentia, continentia*) is claimed as a characteristic of Cicero's own administration (*A.*, 5, 16, 3; *F.*, 15, 4, 1); yet self-control, he assures Atticus, is hardly the proper term for a policy which is in itself a source of genuine pleasure (*A.*, 5, 20, 6).

There is, besides, in both periods insistence on the gentler virtues of mercy, courtesy, and accessibility—virtues which conciliate favor and temper needed severity (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 20-25; *A.*, 5, 16, 3; 5, 21, 5; 6, 2, 5).

The welfare of the provincials is throughout presented as the fundamental aim of a proper provincial administration. At the same time, the strongest emphasis is placed, not upon that welfare as *per se* a good to the governor, but upon the admirable administration, conceived abstractly or contemplated like a beautiful work of art. We have noticed the emphasis upon the reputation to be won for the governor by such an administration.

We have just met the statement that the ruler even of slaves should consider their happiness (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 24). The sentiment would have more weight as an expression of regard for humanity, were not dumb beasts included under the same rule. There is in the passage no recognition of the slaves' rights as grounded in their common humanity. The statement that intimacy with slaves detracts from the prestige of a public man simply registers public opinion, and refers to social intercourse rather than to rights as men (*Q. F.*, 1, 2, 3). At the time of the exile Cicero made an arrangement whereby he expected that, in case of the confiscation of his property, his slaves would be regarded as freedmen, but would remain slaves in case there should be no confiscation. To give any attention to such a matter, while so occupied with his own troubles, implies a certain interest in the slaves; yet in referring to the matter in a letter to Terentia he dismisses it as unimportant (*minora, F.*, 14, 4, 4). A confession of grief at the death of a slave, while indicating the writer's tenderness of heart, closes with an apology: "The circumstance disturbed me more than it seems the death of a slave ought" (*A.*, 1, 12, 4). The tone is practically such as one might use in speaking of the loss of a favorite animal. Still the warm personal regard expressed for Tiro shows that it was possible for Cicero personally and practically to recognize the fellow-man and friend in the slave and freedman.

What was the attitude of our author toward the gladiatorial butcheries of his time? It is obvious that he often speaks slightly of the games. The important question is concerning the ground of the disparagement. Once we find Cicero hastening to Antium, and eagerly leaving behind the

gladiatorial show of Metellus (*A.*, 2, 1, 1). Again, although he has intended to take Tullia to see games—gladiators are not specified (*A.*, 2, 8, 2)—he gives up the plan on the ground that it would be somewhat incongruous for one who wishes to avoid all suspicion of luxury (*deliciae*) to undertake a journey for the sake of amusement, and foolish amusement at that (*non solum delicate sed etiam inepte*, *A.*, 2, 10). On another occasion, the extension of the games for an additional day is a reason for being content to spend that day quietly at one of his villas (*A.*, 4, 8a, 1). While others are sweltering at the games, Cicero is refreshing himself with the rare beauty of the scenery along the river at Arpinum (*Q. F.*, 3, 1, 1). He discourages Curio from giving gladiatorial funeral games in memory of his father. Other means which involve talent and character are more effective for gaining popularity. Games are merely a matter of money, and everybody is tired of them anyway (*F.*, 2, 3, 1). While in Cilicia he rallies his friend Cælius for filling letters with gladiatorial gossip which no one would venture to tell him at Rome (*F.*, 2, 8, 1). Still he expresses a friendly interest in the gladiators of Atticus (4, 4a, 2; 4, 8, 2), and suggests that Tiro witness a gladiatorial exhibition (*F.*, 16, 20). These incidental references are in general keeping with the detailed discussion of the subject in the letter consoling a friend for his inability to attend the games (*F.*, 7, 1), though in such a letter we should expect the attitude of disparagement. "The games were splendid, but not to your taste" (*F.*, 7, 1, 2)—this is the keynote of the letter. The elaborate stage accessories were vulgar; e. g., six hundred mules in *Clytemestra* or three thousand goblets in *The Trojan Horse*. Cicero approaches the subject from the point of view of taste. So, speaking of the fighting of men and beasts, he says (*F.*, 7, 1, 3): "But what pleasure can there be to a cultivated man when a weak man is mangled by a powerful beast, or a fine beast is pierced with a hunting spear?" The sacrifice of the man and that of the beast are spoken of in the same tone.

So far as we may judge from the letters, gladiatorial contests were not to Cicero's personal liking, vulgarity and extravagance being the assigned grounds of his disfavor, rather than immoral disregard for the life and happiness of fellow-men. Here, as above, we look in vain for any recognition of the rights of the slave as a man.

In Cicero's accounts of hostilities in Cilicia, in the most matter-of-fact, businesslike tone he tells of laying waste the enemy's country (*F.*, 15, 4, 8-9), or selling the captives into slavery (*A.*, 5, 20, 5), giving no indication of humanitarian sentiments of pity for the enemy to differentiate him from his contemporaries.

CHAPTER IV

ABSTRACT GOOD

There is no fixed line between abstract and concrete goods. Devotion to literature and philosophy might have been treated as the recognition of knowledge as an ideal. The aim to secure the welfare of others might have been discussed as an expression of the virtue of justice. So the attitude toward personal danger and the self-control especially needed by the provincial governor might have been considered under courage and temperance. But in all these cases it seems more in keeping with the spirit and character of our material to place the emphasis upon the concrete ends at which the doer aims, rather than on the abstract qualities of the doer as shown by these aims. Still Cicero in the letters not infrequently emphasizes the quality of the agent or of the act, as in itself a good or an evil.

In presenting types of character as admirable or the reverse, Cicero makes little use of the traditional categories of the cardinal virtues. By examining his complimentary enumerations of the characteristics of various men, we get a clue as to what qualities or virtues he emphasizes as desirable. The comparison of ten such prominent characterizations reveals two practically constant elements—some term or terms for stability, firmness, or spirit, usually balanced by some expression for gentleness, mercy, or courtesy.¹ The terms of the first are, in order of frequency, *constantia*, *gravitas*, *magnitudo animi*, *severitas*; those of the second group, *humanitas*, *clementia*, *suavitas*, *lepos*, *benevolentia*. From this it would seem that, to Cicero, the proper balance between stability and the gentler qualities was a prominent element in an admirable character. What the collocation of terms in other instances suggests is in two instances definitely stated. Concerning a friend recently deceased Cicero writes to Atticus (4, 6, 1) that they have lost a man in whom were mingled in due proportion high spirit and gentleness.² Thirteen years later he writes that such is the balance of a friend's character "that the greatest seriousness is united with the greatest kindness."³ Here we find, as a matter of practical, everyday thinking, the ideal

¹ The passages in question are: *A.*, 4, 6, 1; 7, 2, 7; 12, 4, 2; 14, 17A, 5; *F.*, 2, 6, 4; 10, 3; 11, 27, 6; 12, 27; 13, 55, 2; *B.*, 2, 5, 3.

² "Virum bonum et magnum hominem et in summa magnitudine animi multa humanitate temperatum perdidimus."

³ "Est autem ita temperatis moderatisque moribus, ut summa severitas summa cum humanitate iungatur" (*F.*, 12, 27).

which Plato elaborated, particularly in his *Politicus*. As between the sturdier and the gentler element, we observe that Cicero places the emphasis on the former. This forms the basis of character. The gentle and the kindly element is an admixture, tempering and making attractive what otherwise would be forbidding and harsh. To the ruler especially, as we have seen, courtesy is valuable as a means of conciliation, reconciling the governed to necessary acts of severity (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 21). The Stoics are approved for making courtesy (*urbanitas*) a virtue (*F.*, 3, 7, 5). A discourteous call (*A.*, 15, 15, 2) or letter (*F.*, 7, 27, 1-2) meets prompt resentment. A letter protesting against the discourtesy of the freedman Dionysius contains some instructive details as to the demands of courtesy. The freedman has curtly refused to act further as young Cicero's tutor. His language was such, Cicero writes, "as I never used to anyone whose case I declined. For I always said, 'If I am able, if I am not hindered by some case previously undertaken.' I never to any defendant, however obscure, however shabby, however guilty, however much a stranger, gave so abrupt a refusal as he without disguise or qualification gave me" (*A.*, 8, 4, 2).

The two terms most frequently occurring in what we have called the sturdier group are *gravitas* and *constantia*. These same terms are frequently used in a complimentary sense throughout the letters. The two terms show a tendency to appear together, as in four of the ten cases cited above, including *B.*, 2, 5, 3, where the adjectives *gravis* and *constans* take the place of the abstract nouns (cf. *F.*, 3, 8, 6).

The literal meaning of the two words is obviously similar, as weight suggests stability, steadiness, firmness. When used together in general commendations, where they receive no special color from the context, they may well have been felt as together forming an amplified expression for the idea of stability of character. So when Metellus is said to have, at the time of his exile, surpassed everyone in firmness and resoluteness (*constantia et gravitate*), the expression is used to balance the phrase "of a crushed and humiliated spirit" (*fracto animo et demisso*, *F.*, 1, 9, 16).

Cicero after the death of Pompey characterized him as *gravis*—a man of weight of character, of importance, of worth (*A.*, 11, 6, 5). It is a natural transition from the conception of weight of character or influence to that of conduct or manner consistent with such weight. Cicero writes that it is inconsistent with his friend's *gravitas* to mourn excessively (*F.*, 5, 16, 5). *Gravitas* requires that Cicero and his brother both take the same attitude toward young Quintus (*A.*, 13, 41, 2). When we are told that Cicero retained his *gravitas* in his interview with Cæsar (*A.*, 9, 19, 4), we have an example of the farthest stage of this development.

Levitas, the literal antithesis of *gravitas*, is used of the contrasting type of character. For example, it is applied to the instability, fickleness, unreliability, of contemporary Greeks as a class, the accompanying attributes being deceitfulness, obsequiousness, and the time-serving spirit.¹

Lepidus by forsaking the cause of the senate for that of Antony brings upon himself the charge of *levitatem et inconstantiam* (*B.*, 2, 2, 1; *F.*, 12, 8, 1). This combination of terms, we notice, is both verbally and in application the exact antithesis of *gravitas et constantia*. *Levis*, "unstable," "unreliable," "fickle," "worthless," seems a favorite term with which to characterize Lepidus after his peculiarly exasperating defection (cf. *F.*, 12, 10, 1; *B.*, 1, 15, 9). The use of the terms *gravitas* and *constantia* in connection with their common opposite *levitas* frequently indicates consciousness of the literal meaning and the common associations of the terms; note *F.*, 1, 7, 7, where the three terms occur in the same paragraph, and *F.*, 5, 2, 10, in which *animo mobili* and (*animo*) *stabili* are contrasted where *levis* or *levitas* and *constans* or *constantia* might well have been used.

We have seen *constantia* used with *gravitas* in the sense of stability or firmness of character. This use of *constantia* and the related adjective *constans* may be illustrated from letters widely separated in time. Metellus upon assailing Cicero discovered that he had to contend with a brave and resolute man (*ut sentiret sibi cum viro forti et constanti esse pugnandum*, *F.*, 5, 2, 8; 62 B. C.). The senate is an Areopagus; nothing could be more determined, more austere, or more valiant (*nihil constantius, nihil severius, nihil fortius*, *A.*, 1, 14, 5). Cicero tells of conducting himself "with firmness and independence" (*constanter et libere*, *A.*, 4, 18, 1). While adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the opposition, he still maintains firmness in the interests of the state (*ut rei publicae constantiam praestem*, *A.*, 1, 19, 8). In a letter of recommendation assigned to 51 he expresses the hope that he may not by repeating his request seem to have forgotten the *constantia* of the man petitioned—"the stability of your character," as Mr. Shuckburgh admirably renders it. In a letter of 43 we find the same use of *constantia*. Octavius while co-operating with Cicero is described as of "fine natural gifts, and admirable stability of character," and yet he is now listening to those who would incite him to the hope of gaining an unconstitutional consulship (*B.*, 1, 10, 3).

Constantia is also used as a term for consistency. In view of the prominence which the idea of consistency has in the letters—an idea which recurs

¹ "Propter hominum [i. e., Graecorum] ingenia ad fallendum parata . . . Quae feci omnia, non quo me aut hi homines aut tota natio delectaret; pertaesum est levitatis, adsentationis, animorum non officii, sed temporibus servientium" (*Q. F.*, 1, 2. 4).

so persistently under varied circumstances and with varied terminology—it is important to determine, if possible, the relation in Cicero's thought of consistency and steadfastness. The secret of provincial administration, we are told, is that the governor have *constantia* and *gravitas* to withstand, not only influence, but even the suspicion of it (*constantia est adhibenda et gravitas, quae resistat non solum gratiae verum etiam suspicioni*, *Q. F.*, 1, 1, 20.) Here it is quite possible to take *constantia* and *gravitas* together with the usual meaning of the steadfastness and firmness which withstand all pressure to pervert justice at the promptings of personal favor; but stability of character manifesting itself under such circumstances might appropriately be called consistency. In the interest of a friend, Cicero wrote: "I have no doubt that, though formerly [you showed him favor] for my sake, you will continue to show the same favor and generosity to preserve your character for consistency" (*F.*, 13, 41, 2), to quote the translation of Mr. Tyrrell, who in general is jealous of admitting *consistency* as a rendering of *constantia*. But in accepting the rendering *consistency*, do we pass to a distinct conception, which by some half-forgotten train of association has become connected with the same symbol as that for stability? In this particular case Culleolus has been kind to Lucceius at Cicero's request. The argument is that to refuse to continue the same favors under the same circumstances would bring Culleolus' consistency into question. This consistency, the practice of performing similar acts under similar circumstances, is simply one way in which stability of character manifests itself; or since another's character is known only through its manifestations, we may say that consistency in such a case is but an aspect of stability of character. It is stability of character, seen under certain circumstances which the context supplies. The same analysis applies to Cicero's statement to Crassus: "The defense of your position which I undertook in your absence I will maintain in the interest of my consistency as well as of our friendship" (*F.*, 5, 8, 5); or to the similar statement to C. Antonius: "In what I have hitherto done in your interest I have been actuated, first by good-will, then by considerations of consistency" (*voluntate sum adductus posteaque constantia*, *F.*, 5, 5, 3). "The reproach of inconsistency" (*famam inconstantiae*, *F.*, 1, 9, 11), carries similar implications. Variations in conduct not satisfactorily accounted for by variations in circumstances argue instability in the actor's character which will subject him to reproach.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that consistency, at least in passages of the type here examined, is thought of primarily as stability. It is not to be referred to some Hellenic notion of harmony, symmetry, and æsthetic congruity, as might at first be supposed; but it is an aspect of that conception

of steadfastness which we think of as distinctly Roman, and which is so conspicuous in the enumerations of practical virtues which we have been considering.

As we examine further applications of the idea of consistency, we may note that what is urged is consistency with the worthy and social element in a man's past. The admonition is practically: "Be true to the noblest and most unselfish elements of your past."

What a man should do in a given situation may depend upon what he has done in the past; that is, consistency with our past deeds is, according to Cicero, a real object to be aimed at in determining our course. He did not approve of the course of the triumvirs, for to do so would be to condemn all that he had himself ever done (*A.*, 2, 19, 2). In opposing Pompey he showed himself forgetful of his interests (*temporum*), but mindful of his past career (*actionum*, *F.*, 1, 9, 8). The example of others cited to show Cicero what he should do in 49, he pronounced inconclusive; "for what brave deed of theirs in public life has ever been conspicuous? or who expects from them anything worthy of praise?" (*A.*, 8, 14, 2); "But their opinions influence me less, for they have given fewer pledges (*pignora*) to the state" (*A.*, 8, 9, 3); that is, having once adopted an unusually patriotic course of action, he may properly be judged by a severer standard than that applied to ordinary citizens. The suggestion that with Pompey he be a party to leading foreign troops against Italy causes him to exclaim that once he had been called preserver and father of the city (*A.* 9, 10, 3). The revolutionary party of Cæsar he thinks of as those against whom the senate (in his consulship) armed him with special power to keep the state from suffering harm. Hence he must not yield to them (*A.*, 10, 8, 8). Even to withdraw from Italy does not seem the part of a man who has been so eminent in public life (*A.*, 8, 3, 2).

In urging others to adopt a particular course Cicero frequently bases his appeal on their former deeds. Of this nature, for example, is an appeal to Decimus Brutus in *F.*, 11, 5, 1-3. The deed done demands other deeds. "If you reflect by day and by night how great a deed you have done, as I am confident you do, you surely will not forget how great deeds you ought still now to do. . . . Free the state forever from tyrannical rule, that the end may be in harmony with the beginning" (*ut principii consentiant exitus*). While we have here the statement of fact that the death of Cæsar necessitates the struggle with Antony, the more general doctrine that achievement calls for achievement is clearly stated. Somewhat different are appeals based on past deeds which are more or less apocryphal. "In inciting and spurring on it is very effective to praise the

man whom you are exhorting" (*F.*, 15, 21, 4), is a frank statement of a principle which receives striking illustration in a letter to the rascally Dolabella during his brief antagonism to the party of Antony. The following is the paragraph of the letter which best illustrates the appeal to past achievement: "Therefore with what appeal shall I urge you to devote yourself to honor and renown? Shall I hold before you the example of illustrious men, as is the practice of those who admonish? I have no one to cite more illustrious than you yourself; you should imitate yourself, vie with yourself. Now after such achievements it surely is not permissible for you to fail to be like yourself" (*Ne licet quidem tibi iam tantis rebus gestis non tui similem esse, F.*, 9, 14, 6).

We have seen how prominent a place the opinion of others occupied in Cicero's thinking. The necessity for consistency between his past and his present acts was therefore naturally at times presented from the point of view of the observing public. It was necessary for him, he claims, to withstand with spirit the attacks of the brother of his friend Metellus, for otherwise everyone would think that in his consulship he had been brave, not by design, but by chance (*F.*, 5, 2, 8). So in the weightier matter of favoring the triumvirs at the risk of displeasing the senatorial party, Cicero assures Atticus (1, 20, 2-3) that the steadiness of his course will be such that his past deeds will not seem to have been fortuitous. This introduces an idea already noticed in another connection (pp. 32)—the preservation and defense of reputation. The suppression of the conspiracy indicated bravery. Subsequent brave deeds would confirm this estimate of Cicero's character. Timidity or wavering on his part would indicate that the earlier acts should be attributed, not to settled character, but to mere caprice.

In connection with the matter of party loyalty (pp. 74, 75), we have seen how Cicero shrank from changing his political affiliations, and how sensitive he was to criticism from those with whom he had acted. A typical expression is: "Shall I change my views (*aliter sensero*)? I am abashed not only before Pompey, but before the Trojans and the Trojan dames" (*A.*, 7, 1, 4; Tyrrell's punctuation). We have also seen his eagerness to show that, in spite of apparent change, his aims are still the same as they always were (e. g., *A.*, 1, 20, 2-3; *F.*, 1, 9, 6-8). All this, with the elaborate plea for the sailor who makes a detour when necessary, rather than risk all in a stubborn attempt to hold to his course (*F.*, 1, 9, 17-21), is a recognition of the demand for consistency and stability—in this case consistency with the general policy which a man has once adopted.

Another aspect of consistency to which we find reference in the letters

is that between a man's acts and his former writings. Balbus is exhorted to remember his writings, in which he has always manifested a lofty spirit, resolute and ready for all exigencies. Now that he is devoting himself to recording the deeds of brave men, he ought by all means to show himself as like as possible to those whom he is praising (*F.*, 6, 12, 4-5). The greater number, however, of the references to consistency between deed and book are found in letters written to Atticus in 50 and 49, and testing Cicero's own conduct by the principles laid down in the *De Re Publica*, which was published at about the time when Cicero went abroad to his province. The tone of these passages may be indicated by citing several in order. As a reason for refusing the improper requests of Brutus he writes: "Especially since I have bound myself, as if by sureties, by the six books your decided approval of which gives me joy" (*A.*, 6, 1, 8). Referring to the same temptation he wrote: "And shall I ever have the hardihood to read or even touch those books which you approve, if I do any such deed as that" (*A.*, 6, 2, 9)? Later the assurance is given that Cicero's administration is worthy of these same books (*A.*, 6, 3, 3). He carefully points out how a proposed gift to Athens does not fall under certain strictures in "my books" (*A.*, 6, 6, 2). Upon returning from the province he writes that, if he were not hampered by his canvass for a triumph, he would very nearly come up to the measure of the character delineated in his sixth book (*ne tu haud multum requireres illum virum, qui in sexto libro informatus est*, *A.*, 7, 3, 2). Early in 49 Cicero thanks Atticus for an admonition to remember his deeds, words, and writings, but suggests that there is room for difference of opinion as to what the right and worthy course is (*A.*, 8, 2, 2). Because he is doing nothing to help the situation, he fears that he will be a disgrace to his studies and his writings (*ne . . . etiam dedecori sim studiis ac litteris nostris*, *A.*, 8, 11, 1). For one thing, it is clear that Cicero took the opinions expressed in his *Republic* seriously. Here is one at least of his philosophical works which he did not consider a mere epitome of current speculative views for which he was not particularly responsible. To such an extent did he feel himself sponsor for the opinions expressed in this work that not only his subsequent statements, but his subsequent acts as well, must be subject to comparison with them. The book professes to give the author's beliefs as to the proper aims and policies of government. If his acts did not coincide with these expressed convictions, he could not escape the charge of inconsistency. Past deeds are pledges (*pignora*); past statements are bondsmen (*praedes*). They seem to occupy the same plane, so far as binding subsequent conduct is concerned.

Sometimes the appeal is for consistency with character and training.

The most explicit examples of this appeal are found in consolations. To Plancus, for example, Cicero wrote in 46: "What is worthy of a brave and discreet man, what is demanded of you by your seriousness and elevation of spirit, what by your past life, what by the studies and pursuits for which you have been conspicuous from youth, you yourself will discern" (*F.*, 4, 13, 4); and to Cæcina: "Therefore in the first place be brave and high-spirited; for such is your birth, such your training, such your learning, such your reputation, that you are under obligations to do this."¹ Titius is told that it does not comport with the seriousness and wisdom (*non est iam gravitatis et sapientiae tuae*) which he has displayed from childhood, to bear certain trouble immoderately; "For you have always shown yourself such a man, in affairs both private and public, that you should have regard for your dignity and let your stability of character prevail" (*F.*, 5, 16, 5).² In these cases the character or training of the man is held up before him as a reason why he should now act in a particular way. He is not only encouraged by past steadfastness to hope that he can again be firm, but his character as shown in the past is represented as creating an obligation to act now in a manner consistent therewith.

In *F.*, 4, 13, 4, this obligation of consistency was expressed by the adjective *dignus*, "worthy," later so amplified as to make the meaning entirely clear.³ This circumstance, as well as the general appropriateness of the interpretation, connects with the group just examined passages in which without amplification, conduct is commended as being worthy of one. Examples are: "So you were afraid you would appear a substantial (*gravis*) citizen, that you would appear too brave, too worthy of yourself" (*ne nimis te dignus videres*, *F.*, 12, 28, 1); "You do not agree with me as to what in this case is right and worthy of me" (*honestum meque dignum*, *A.*, 8, 2, 2); "They thought this course base and unworthy of me" (*turpe et me indignum*, *A.*, 9, 6, 4); and "So far I have avoided all active service, especially since nothing can be done in a manner suitable to my character or my circumstances" (*ut mihi et meis rebus aptum esset*, *A.*, 11, 4, 1).

In so far as character is presented as a good in itself, apart from the objective goods at which a man should aim, we have in this steadfastness,

¹ "Ita enim natus, ita educatus, ita doctus es, ita enim cognitus, ut tibi id faciendum sit" (*F.*, 6, 5, 4).

² The words are: "Etenim eum semper te et privatis in rebus et publicis praestitisti, tuenda tibi ut sit gravitas et constantiae serviendum."

³ "Quid sit forti et sapienti homine dignum, quid gravitas, quid altitudo animi, quid acta tua vita, quid studia, quid artes, quibus a pueritia floruisti, a te flagitent, tu videbis."

associated especially with the terms *gravitas* and *constantia*, the cardinal trait emphasized in the letters of Cicero. As applied to a man's performance of his part toward others in the various relationships of human society, it appears as loyalty and faithfulness, expressed in such terms as *pietas* and *fides*.¹ As applied to a man's attitude toward danger and trouble, it appears as courage and fortitude. Fortune "as a trivial and feeble thing should beat as harmlessly against a strong and steadfast spirit as a wave beats against a rock."² Lucceius in return for a letter of condolence is congratulated on holding himself superior to the vicissitudes of human affairs, and being well armed against fortune; the greatest achievement of philosophy is its doctrine of self-sufficiency and its refusal to reckon a life good or bad on grounds outside the man (*F.*, 5, 13, 1). Cicero evidently is here using the language of Stoic philosophy. But a little later he continues to the effect that the spectacle of Lucceius' strength and steadfastness of spirit is a greater comfort than the formal consolations which he has presented (*F.*, 5, 13, 3). This is quite in keeping with the ordinary language of the letters; but the significant thing is the essential harmony of the philosophical and the non-philosophical.

This same quality, steadfastness of spirit, as applied to the temptations of pleasure, anger, or greed, is self-control. As to anger, we find the reflection that to hold the tongue when angry sometimes seems no less a virtue than never to be angry at all, for the latter may sometimes be the result, not of stability, but of apathy.³ Note the implication that calmness in order to be a virtue must be an expression of *gravitas*. It is noteworthy that financial integrity is regularly represented as an aspect of self-control, lust of gold in this connection being placed on a plane with other desires. "You withstand the allurements of money, of pleasure, and of the desire of all manner of objects," Cicero wrote to Quintus (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 7). It is a noble record that "neither statue, nor painting, nor vessel, nor raiment, nor slave, nor the beauty of anyone, nor proffered money"—objects in which Asia abounds—has caused Quintus to swerve from his integrity and self-control (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 8). Cicero's numerous references to his own self-

¹ In *F.*, 1, 7, 7, *fides*, in the sense of "good faith," appears coupled with *gravitas*, their common antithesis being *levitas*. In *F.*, 11, 29, 2, *fides* is similarly joined with *constantia*. *Fides* is the term which Cicero applies to his loyalty to Appius Claudius in the latter's absence, *F.*, 3, 9, 1. Other examples of *fides* in the sense of "faithfulness" are in *A.*, 16, 7, 2; *F.*, 13, 55, 1; and *A.*, 7, 2, 7.

² "Quam existimo levem et imbecillam ab animo firmo et gravi tamquam fluctum a saxo frangi oportere" (*F.*, 9, 16, 6).

³ "Nam illud est non solum gravitatis, sed non numquam lentitudinis" (*Q. F.*, 1, 1, 38).

restraint¹ in his province must refer primarily to property. A striking claim for the rank of the virtue of self-control was made in a letter to Cato from Cilicia: "In all ages the men found able to conquer their own desires have been fewer than those able to conquer the forces of the enemy."²

In several of the summaries of desirable traits of character noted at the opening of this chapter there were included terms for wisdom or ability; e. g., *ingenium* (A., 14, 17A, 5), *consilium* (F., 11, 27, 6), *prudencia* (F., 10, 3, 1); and power to foresee the future (A., 12, 4, 2). Passages where wisdom is incidentally mentioned as a desideratum could be further cited; and we have seen how emphatically Cicero in various crises expressed his desire to decide wisely. Still in reflections upon character the importance of wisdom is rather assumed than emphasized or amplified. We have also seen how the milder virtues of courtesy, gentleness, and mercy are enjoined as a counterpoise to keep the more stalwart traits from being harsh and forbidding.

If, then, we should venture to summarize in a definition the conception of desirable character reflected in the correspondence of Cicero, it would be something like this: *Desirable character is steadfastness in the pursuit of proper aims—a steadfastness resting upon wisdom and limited by gentleness.*

The satisfaction arising from the approval of one's own acts or purposes is frequently in this correspondence represented as a good. In the earlier letters, as compared with the later, the expressions of self-approval are more direct and objective, as where Cicero declares that he is free from fault in the matter of his exile (e. g., *Q. F.*, 1, 4, 1), or where he assures the captious and complaining Appius Claudius that his own correct conduct toward him is a matter of great satisfaction (F., 3, 6, 3). While governor in Cilicia, Cicero expressed direct satisfaction in his fine administration; for example: "I did not understand myself, nor did I realize what I could accomplish in this line; I am properly puffed up" (A., 5, 20, 6); and, "Nor does the reputation, great as it is, so much delight me as does the thing itself" (*ibid.*).

¹ E. g., *continentia*, A., 5, 3, 3; 5, 20, 6; F., 15, 4, 1; *abstinentia*, A., 5, 21, 5; 5, 16, 3.

² "In omnibus saeculis pauciores viri reperti sunt, qui suas cupiditates quam qui hostium copias vincerent" (F., 15, 4, 15) This reminds one of Horace's:

Latus regnes avidum domando
 Spiritum quam si Libyam remotis
 Gadibus iungas et uterque Poenus
 Serviat uni (*Od.* 2, 2, 9-12);

and, "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city" (Proverbs 16:32)

The more reflective and abstract references to self-approval—cases where it is the *consciousness* of having done right that is dwelt on as the good—are found chiefly in the letters of the later years. Some belong to 49 and 48, but the greater number were written in 46 and 45, being consolations addressed to friends, or self-justifying reflections upon his own career, suggested by the disasters that had befallen the party of the republic. The self-sufficiency of virtue is a philosophical idea which we shall find introduced more or less explicitly in connection with these consolations and reflections.

The question naturally arises whether the late predominance of the more philosophical form of the doctrine of conscience is due primarily to the circumstances in which Cicero and his party were placed in the later period, or to his philosophical studies during these years. We may gain some light on this question from a letter written to the exiled Sittius in 52, before the composition of any of Cicero's ethical works, except the *Republic*, and at a time when he was not using abstract terms for his approval of his own course. Sittius should find comfort in the character and affection of his son, in the loyalty of his friends, and especially in his own conscience (*animi tui conscientia*), when he reflects that his troubles have not come upon him by his deserts, and that it is the part of a wise man to be troubled by disgrace, not by disaster, and by his own fault, not by others' wrongdoing (*F.*, 5, 17, 4-5). Here we find reference to conscience in the most general terms, joined with a statement of the sufficiency of virtue. In 49 right in general, or specific duties and interests, are the goods aimed at; but when Cicero turns to review the more or less immediate past, we find various expressions for self-approval: "I am comforted by what you write, concluding that so far I have done nothing wrong" (*A.*, 9, 10, 10); "So I presume that he [Cæsar after his overtures were rejected] is not satisfied with me. But I was satisfied with myself (*ego me amavi*)—a thing which has not happened for some time" (*A.*, 9, 18, 1); "Therefore I shall never regret my resolve [to abandon the struggle after Pharsalus]; my method of carrying it out I do regret" (*A.*, 11, 6, 2). Far more important for our purpose is a letter of 49 in which Cicero gives a detailed comparison between his own career and that of Cæsar and of Pompey, in the course of which he remarks: "I am therefore supported by a clear conscience when I reflect that I have either, where possible, served the state efficiently, or else at all events I have entertained for it none but loyal purposes."¹ This passage, as well as *F.*, 5, 17, 4-5, considered above, antedates Cicero's

¹ "Praeclara igitur conscientia sustentor, cum cogito me de re publica aut meruisse optime, cum potuerim, aut certe numquam nisi pie cogitasse" (*A.*, 10, 4, 5).

distinctly ethical works; yet both present conscience abstractly; both look back upon past acts which from external indications seemed ineffectual. Sittius is in exile, Cicero is without his old-time political power. *But* each may find consolation by reflecting that his aims and motives have been worthy. Now, this was just the situation of Cicero and his fellow-optimates in 46 and 45, when the abstract references to conscience were most numerous. A natural conclusion seems to be that, while the tone of the passages in question may reflect the philosophical studies of Cicero's later years, yet the circumstances in which he and his correspondents in these years were placed supplied independent reasons for such consolation.

We note how, in the passage last cited (*A.*, 10, 5, 4), loyal sentiments are placed on a plane with efficient services as a ground of satisfaction. To different friends he writes of the comfort which he has in the consciousness of his former plans (*F.*, 9, 16, 6; 4, 3, 1; cf. 6, 21, 1); and to Luceius: "For you give me pleasant reminders of the good conscience which is mine, and of the deeds which I did especially upon your advice" (*F.*, 5, 13, 4). That the purposes, independently of outcome, is a matter for congratulation is again emphasized in a letter to Torquatus. There is no greater comfort for their common ills than the consciousness of good intentions (*bonae voluntatis*). They are free from fault, the one great evil, in that their sentiments were most loyal. It was the outcome of their plan rather than the plan that is open to criticism (*F.*, 6, 4, 2).

Thus does Cicero profess to find comfort for himself; though the purpose of his declarations, as in the last case, may be the comfort of another. This same comfort is directly commended to others. The consciousness of past deeds and counsels should console Cæcina and Trebianus (*F.*, 6, 6, 12; 6, 10, 4). The *liberatores* will have as a comfort the consciousness of their great and glorious deed, although they have not really freed the citizens by killing the king (*A.*, 14, 11, 1); they will always be blessed in the consciousness of their act, but their fellow-citizens will still be in bondage (*A.*, 14, 12, 2). Here too, in what might at first seem congratulation, there is the contrast between the good intention, the consciousness of which brings happiness, and the failure of that good intention to gain its practical objective end. A word of cheer to Torquatus presents the familiar consolation of conscience, and at the same time with peculiar emphasis states the ethical doctrine of the sufficiency of right expressed in language which a Stoic might use: "For if to purpose well and act rightly suffice for the good and happy life, I fear lest it be monstrous to call him wretched who can sustain himself with the consciousness of noblest motives." It was duty that led us to leave fatherland and children and fortunes, and to

enter war. We took into account the possibility of defeat. There is no occasion for dejection. We are free from fault, and that is all we should claim in life (*F.*, 6, 1, 3-4). We have already seen Cicero's reply to the protest of Atticus at a seemingly undue exaltation of fame. It was an inadvertence to speak of fame as if nothing were better. He still professes an aim consistent with his philosophic pursuits, not to swerve a hair's breadth from the dictates of a good conscience (*A.*, 13, 20, 4; cf. 7, 3, 11).

From the passages examined above it must be clear that Cicero freely speaks of "right" and "duty" as abstract terms, without specifying the particular interests involved.

Apart from the unambiguous *rectum*,¹ the terms most frequently thus employed are *officium* and *honestum*. We have found the word *officia* applied to the specific services which Pompey rendered to Cicero (*A.*, 9, 5, 3). Again *officium* has stood for the type of service which one normally renders in some particular relationship; as the duty of a friend or the duty of a citizen (*nec solum civis, sed etiam amici officio revocor, A.*, 7, 12, 3). Then "duty" without qualification is assigned as a reason for following Pompey (*F.*, 6, 6, 6). The limit of the series is found where *officium* is used of duty in the most general sense, as where Cicero writes of "duty which the few, or glory which the many, follow" (*F.*, 10, 26, 3). This is the term which Cicero selected as the best Latin equivalent for the general term in Greek for duty, yet the appropriateness of the translation seems to have been questioned by Atticus, for Cicero writes: "But, to pass to another point, I have no doubt that what the Greeks expressed by *καθήκον* we express by *officium*. And now why do you question the appropriateness of the word as applied to political relations? Do we not say 'the duty (*officium*) of the consuls, the duty of the senate, the duty of a general?' It corresponds admirably; or else suggest a better term" (*A.*, 16, 14, 3).

Honestum is also a word which appears in the letters with several grades of meaning. In some cases it means "tending to confer or win honor," as where Cicero writes of having a report so rendered as to contain what was *honestum et utile* for his correspondent; that is, to his *credit and advantage* (*F.*, 5, 20, 2). For *honestissimo* in *A.*, 9, 7, 3, Tyrrell suggests, "that which involves least personal humiliation." Cicero is here contemplating the acceptance of that one of the many threatening perils which involves least

¹ For this use of *rectum* see *quod ita rectum sit* (*A.*, 1, 20, 3), given as a reason for adhering to the senate; *si erit rectius* followed by *quod honestius* (*A.*, 7, 3, 2); so *A.*, 8, 11, 4; 8, 12, 3; 8, 15, 3; 9, 7, 3. Notice that these appeals to "right" are chiefly from the correspondence of 49.

discredit. From "tending to honor" the transition is natural to "worthy of honor", "honorable;" and it is doubtless this use that led Cicero to choose the word to express the highest abstract right. In his philosophical works he defined *honestum* as that which "even if praised by no one is by nature worthy of praise" (*De Officiis*, I, 4, 14). So in the *De Finibus* (II, 14, 45) the *honestum* is an object "such that apart from all utility, without any compensations or fruits, it can for its own sake justly be praised." It is difficult to believe that the term would have been chosen for such service in the ethical works, were it not generally recognized as a word naturally designating what by nature is admirable—the honorable in the best sense; and it is certainly so used in the letters, as where Cicero tells Atticus that he will give up the hope of the triumph upon which he has set his heart, if canvassing for it will interfere with his usefulness as a citizen; he will take the course which is *honestius* (*A.*, 7, 3, 2). *Honestas* and *honestum* must certainly have their high ethical force in the vehement denunciation of Cæsar a few days after he crossed the Rubicon. Cæsar claims, forsooth, to be acting for the sake of his honor (*dignitatis causa*), but where is honor (*dignitas*) apart from right (*honestum*)? Is it right (*honestum*), then, to ride roughshod over the constitution, devising numberless iniquities, including the crowning one of tyranny (*A.*, 7, 11, 1)? There should, then, be no presumption against the higher ethical meaning of *honestum* and *honestas* where the context calls for it; still the meanings "conducting to honor," "creditable," "respectable," "honorable," "right," so blend together that more than one of them are often appropriate to a given context. The regular antithesis of *honestum* in practice is *turpe*, the "ugly," "base," "dishonorable," "wrong."¹

The fact that Cicero in his letters uses *rectum*, *honestum*, and *officium* as general terms of approval does not require detailed proof. It is, however, important to determine whether we have in the appeal to right a distinct motive, with sanctions distinct from the obligations already considered; or whether we have simply these same obligations stated in more abstract terms.

In the first place, careful scrutiny fails to show in the letters the slightest recognition of a supernatural sanction for right and duty. The only references to religious considerations as affecting action apply to purely ceremonial matters; Terentia is to offer certain sacrifices in view of her husband's

¹ This is clearly shown by such an antithesis as "nihil esse bonum nisi quod honestum, nihil malum nisi quod turpe sit" (*A.* 10, 4, 4); cf. "turpe et me indignum" (*A.*, 9, 6, 4), as the correlative of "honestum meque dignum" (*A.*, 8, 2, 2); and, "O rem turpem et ea re miseram! Sic enim sentio, id demum aut potius id solum esse miserum quod turpe sit" (*A.*, 8, 8, 1).

recovery from some indisposition (*F.*, 14, 7, 1); a way is suggested by which Ptolemy may be restored to his throne without violating the oracle (*F.*, 1, 7, 4); and certain references are made to the familiar manipulation of auspices for political ends (e. g., *Q. F.*, 2, 4, 4-5). To Terentia he wrote, while on his way into exile: "Neither gods whom you have piously revered, nor men to whom I have always devoted myself, have made us any return" (*F.*, 14, 4, 1). Possibly his liking for rhetorical antitheses had something to do with the form in which this family division of labor is stated.

If we examine the application of these terms, we find that the acts to which they are specifically applied are acts of social service. *Officium* we find given as a reason for seeking the interests of son (*A.*, 14, 7, 2), wife (*A.*, 12, 21, 3), or friend (*F.*, 6, 6, 6), as well as of commonwealth (*F.*, 15, 2, 1; 6, 1, 3; 10, 26, 3); or the reference may be to the combined or conflicting interests of country and friend; as, *Officium me deliberatio cruciat* (*A.*, 8, 15, 2). *Honestum*, as we have seen, is so colored with associations of social approval that it is difficult to fix the point at which it becomes an absolute term. We find it coupled with *rectum* repeatedly in 49 to designate the course commended by loftiest considerations (*A.*, 8, 2, 4; *F.*, 5, 19, 1; 4, 2, 2). During the same crisis *honestum* without *rectum* is similarly used (e. g., *A.*, 10, 4, 4; 7, 11, 1; 8, 2, 2). The same term is applied to the patriotic course under other circumstances (e. g., *A.*, 7, 3, 2; 14, 7, 2; *F.*, 10, 25, 1-2). So it is in connection with duty to state or family or friends, as contrasted with immediate individual interests, that the conspicuous instances of *rectum* or *honestum*, assigned as a motive, are found. One of the reasons for adhering to the senate in 60 is "because it is right" (*A.*, 1, 20, 3). In 50 Cicero will give up the hope of a triumph, if right shall dictate that course (*si id erit rectius*, *A.*, 7, 3, 2); that is, if he finds that the canvass for the triumph seriously hinders him from doing his duty as a citizen. Most of the remaining instances of *rectus* in this sense which we have noted occur in connection with his attitude toward Pompey's cause in 49. "What is right and what I ought to do?" is a question which Cicero wishes time to consider (*A.*, 8, 12, 3). He tells us that he remained in Italy instead of following Pompey because, among other reasons, the balance of right was on that side (*hoc juit rectius*, *A.*, 8, 11, 4). It is better (*rectius*) to suffer anything at home rather than join in an assault on Italy (*A.*, 9, 7, 4).

We have to do, then, with terms primarily connected, so far as these letters are concerned, with a man's duty to his fellows, but not, so far as the letters indicate, connected with any supernatural sanctions. Have we in the correspondence any definite and affirmative data as to how Cicero

would relate his thought of the right and honorable with, for example, the assumption that the citizen should strive and make sacrifices for the welfare of his country?

The facts presented in our second chapter indicate how powerful an influence, practically, the opinion of others was to Cicero and his contemporaries in the enforcement of social service. The relatively high rank assigned to reputation and glory indicates an ethical stage when social pressure was frankly acknowledged, as well as powerfully felt, to be a prominent sanction for conduct. The selection of *honestum*—a word so intimately connected with social approval—to express the most general idea of right, points in the same direction.

At the beginning of our third chapter (p. 43) we considered a passage of the greatest importance for our present question (*A.*, 7, 2, 4). Cicero incidentally, and under circumstances which indicate seriousness and sincerity, seeks to impress upon Atticus the Academic view of virtue. He argues for a goodness which is *right by nature*—*natura rectum*. This seems to include all that is in the *honestum* and *rectum* now in question. The specific example which Cicero here gives of how right should be derived from nature, rather than from individual utility, is an unfolding of the implications of natural parental instinct and the attending disposition to cherish offspring. From this beginning in the family are derived natural altruistic bonds holding together with mutual obligation the members of the various social units. We saw how this brief passage coincided with the theory repeatedly approved in Cicero's ethical works. It sketches a doctrine of social virtue which harmonizes with what we have found throughout the letters. It makes social virtue independent of the pleasure or whim of the individual, without being supernatural or mystic. Right conduct rests upon nature; that is, it is determined by the requirements of those social relationships which spring from the nature of man; and the relationships which actually have arisen among men are assumed to be the natural outgrowths of man's constitution.

If this represents Cicero's point of view, the question, "What is it right to do?" as applied to social relations means simply; "What do the interests of those associated with me in this unit, or in various social units, demand of me?" To make *honestum* the primary consideration is to consider not merely individual interests, but the interests of family, friends, party, and fellow-citizens as well. Such conduct is evidently likely to coincide with the dictates of popular sentiment within the several groups concerned.

The antithesis between right and expediency is the antithesis between

individualistic and social conduct. Cicero recognizes that in the ordinary sense of the language such an antithesis may exist—a man's immediate individual interest may be counter to the promptings of patriotism; but at the same time he maintains that in a higher philosophical sense a man's truest interest must coincide with his duty. The two points of view are brought into formal comparison in two letters written to different correspondents at about the same time in 49 (*F.*, 4, 2, 2, and 5, 19, 1-2). In both cases the dictates of right are said to be clear, and those of expediency uncertain. In both cases the popular language is corrected by the statement of the philosophical doctrine, definitely referred to as philosophical.¹ From the precedence regularly given to social as against individualistic good we should expect generalized statements of the supremacy of right, such as, "But do not doubt that the more honorable course is the one to which I shall give precedence" (*A.*, 7, 3, 2); or the exhortation to Furnius during the final struggle (*F.*, 10, 25, 2), "For what is more honorable, or what is to be esteemed more highly, than the honorable?"

The passages which so exalt abstract right as to leave little place for any other good have their epitome and explanation in a passage already cited. The desperate political situation is admitted. It is called a great evil. Whatever philosophers may say, each man is thrown back for comfort upon his own natural powers of endurance. Then the philosophical comfort is introduced by the proviso: "For if loyal sentiments and right actions suffice for living well and happily . . ." In a philosophical sense men cannot be called wretched while they have virtue, and with this reflection Cicero, "in view of the loss of all things," seeks consolation (*F.*, 6, 1, 3-4). Nothing really terrible can happen to the man who is free from blame (*F.*, 5, 21, 5). Freedom from fault is the one great comfort (*F.*, 6, 3, 4); all else can be borne with a brave heart (*F.*, 12, 22, 2). This might be but an emphatic statement of the relative importance of right—a doctrine common both in Cicero's letters and in his ethical works. Sometimes, however, he goes farther and employs Stoic language inconsistent with his usual position. To Cornificius he writes in 44 that nothing from which fault is absent should be counted among ills (*F.*, 12, 23, 4). So in 49 (*A.*, 10, 4, 4) he quoted approvingly from his *De Re Publica* the sentiment that nothing is good save what is virtuous (*honestum*), and nothing evil save what is morally base (*turpe*). Such utterances, probably to be taken rhetorically, are altogether sporadic and apart from what Cicero regularly maintains.

¹ "Quid rectum sit apparet; quid expediat obscurum est, ita tamen, ut, si nos ii sumus, qui esse debemus, id est, studio digni ac litteris nostris, dubitare non possimus, quin ea maxime conducant, quae sint rectissima" (*F.*, 5, 19, 2).

The right and honorable (*honestum*) is the supreme, but not the exclusive, good. The morally base (*turpe*) is the deepest, but not the exclusive, evil.

A survey of the motives expressed or approved in this correspondence indicates that its writer and the people from whom, and in great measure for whom, he spoke, recognized as the good, the possession of which was happiness, no single principle of the philosopher, but the varied elements entering into the complex of man's individual and social life. Life, health, pursuits, and possessions; the variously expressed approval of one's fellows; the welfare of kindred, friends, fellow-citizens, and fellow-men; character, conscience, and right in its most general and abstract forms—these are the ends which we find presented as worthy of man's endeavor. Our study yields no specific formula, but its end has been attained in proportion as it exhibits in true perspective and relation the varied aims presented in this unique transcript of ancient thought and feeling.

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