ETHICAL ADDRESSES.

FIFTH SERIES.

BY THE

LECTURERS OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES

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

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

CONTENTS.

THE ETHICAL CULTURE SOCIETY AS THE MEETING GROUND OF GENTILES AND JEWS.*

BY FELIX ADLER.

THAT is a bitter moment in the lives of two brothers when they become aware of the existence between them of an irreconcilable difference, the cumulative result of many previous disagreements, and decide that it will be better for them no longer to attempt to maintain their fraternal relations. Thenceforth they pursue separate paths. But, though they may experience a momentary sense of relief, due to the removal of the strain to which their dissensions have subjected them, there will yet abide in the heart of each a feeling of pain, a feeling that something is wrong in the economy of his life; that the tie of fraternal unity ought not to have been broken, ought somehow to be restored, though he may not see his way to restoring it. A feeling somewhat of this kind has marked the relations between Jews and Gentiles. They, too, in the deeper sense, are brothers. For many centuries now they have traveled along separate paths. But there has never been absent the lurking

* A lecture given before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, December 5th, 1897.

conviction that the separation can only be temporary, and that some time the lost unity will be re-established. The Ethical Movement offers an opportunity for genuine reunion.

For what can be the basis of cordial unity between Gentile and Jew? Can business relations be the basis? Undoubtedly, the pursuit of gain, the exigencies of traffic and barter, are a means of bringing people together. The spirit of commerce is cosmopolitan and free from racial, sectarian, or, indeed, bias of any kind. The nations of Europe at the present day are vigorously competing to sell their goods to the dusky inhabitants of Africa. The color of the African's skin does not in the least weaken their desire to enter into profitable relations with him. The same applies to English, German and American competition in the markets of the far East. And, in like manner, between Gentiles and Jews, there exists a perfect willingness on either side to enter into trade relations with the other, in obedience to what is called the economic motive, without regard to sentiment. It is true that personal qualities always tell, and occasionally it happens that men who first met in the course of business, having gained an insight into each other's character and learned to respect and esteem one another, become intimate friends. But, on the whole, the sort of union brought about by business transactions is partial. Such contact as exists is for business purposes only, and is, in the main, confined to business hours. Men who meet on the pleasantest footing during business hours, sometimes hardly recognize one another at other times. There is frequent complaint that this should be so. But, after all, it seems natural.

Self-interest can never make more than a temporary bond between men. We must touch each other at deeper points if we are really to be brought closely together.

Next, shall common participation in public movements, political or philanthropic, be the basis of union? Here, in a modified form, we meet with the same difficulty, explained by the same reason. The friendly relation is formed for a specific purpose and usually does not extend much farther than is necessary for the prosecution of that purpose. The two elements combine well enough in a committee-room. But the moment they are released from the controlling pressure of a common object, their affinities for one another seem to cease. Even politics, even philanthropy, do not touch us deeply enough to overcome the inveterate differences to which I refer.

Is, then, culture the bond? Culture is a rare and exquisite thing. It implies an assemblage of numerous graces and perfections. It implies open-mindedness, many-sidedness, rich and varied virtuosities, knowledge made musical, habitual refinement of thought and feeling. There is, in particular, one significant trait that brings culture, though it be an esthetic concept, very nigh to the border of the realm of morals. The cultivated man, aware of his unavoidable limitations, seeks to supply what is lacking in himself by drawing as much as possible upon the attainments of others. In the spirit of the ancient philosopher, he says: "I wish to be a complete man, and therefore nothing human shall be alien to me." Hence the foreigner, if he move on the plane of culture—that is to say, if he be capable

of freely communicating, as well as freely receiving—is treated with peculiar distinction and welcomed with every sign of pleasure and satisfaction. The cultivated man is like an ambitious gardener, who seeks to stock the soil of his mind, if possible, even with exotic plants —with plants and flowers and fruits of every zone and clime. There exists a sort of free-masonry among the cultured classes of all countries. The man of culture may go wherever he will—to the north, or south, or to the remote lands of the Orient—and, among persons of corresponding station, however different their type, he may be sure of a hearty and hospitable reception. A man of culture needs no passport. His personality, deportment, the very accents of his speech, pave the way for him everywhere. If this be true of cultivated people in general, why should it not be true of cultivated Gentiles and Jews in their relations with one another? It is true. The difference of type is but an added attraction. Hence culture is a bond, and a very substantial one. But, unfortunately, the number of really cultivated persons, the world over, is not very large. Wealth alone does not beget culture. Mere learning does not produce it, and even moral integrity does not always broaden out into it. There are thousands of honest and worthy persons who find themselves excluded from the gracious fellowship in which culture unites the exceptional few. And culture, taken in the sense of mental and esthetic refinement, cannot, therefore, adequately solve our problem.

Shall, then, religion be the bond? But religion has been the very apple of discord, the perennial source of alienation. Which of the two parties, it may be

asked, is at fault? Is it the Jewish religion that is to blame? The Jewish religion is often described as narrow, particularistic, ungenial, cold to advances from without, lacking the element of universality that gives breadth and sweep to Christianity. Christianity, on the other hand, is characterized as the universal, the all-inclusive religion, that withholds its benefits from none—indeed, urges them with something like importunity, upon all. The contrast drawn, in this rough way, between the two religions is not just. Ethical religion was born among the Jews, was the unique gift of the Jewish people to the world—understanding by "Ethical religion" a religion in which the Ethical element is paramount. And Ethical religion was, from the outset, universalistic in tendency—could not but be so, seeing that the notion of brotherhood is so thoroughly implied in morality that the rise of a moral religion which should not lay stress on brotherhood would be inconceivable. Indeed, for hundreds of years before the advent of Jesus the soul of Israel had been haunted by a wonderful dream, the dream of world-wide international fraternization. This dream was expressed in the promise given to Abraham that, through him and his seed, all the nations of the earth should be blessed. The blessing here pronounced was not to be restricted to the Jewish nation, but, through them as agents, was to be extended to all the peoples of the earth. And in the writings of the Hebrew prophets the same hope is clothed in the most poetic imagery and burns with a transcendent radiance. The prophetic vision centers about Jerusalem. In one passage we read that a mighty cedar

shall grow up on Mount Zion, in whose shadow all the birds shall rest. In another passage a picture is drawn of a great banquet that shall be spread on the Mountain of Jerusalem, a great love-feast, in which all the nations shall participate. Elsewhere it is said that the very throne of Jehovah will be erected on the Mountain of Jerusalem, and that all the nations of the earth will be ranged around it. Again, it is said that the root of David shall be as an ensign to all the peoples, and that under that ensign they will gather. In Isaiah, chapter ii, we read: "And it shall come to pass, at the end of days, that many nations will say, 'Come, let us go up to the Mountain of the Lord, and He will teach us of His ways, and we will walk in His paths.' For from Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of Jehovah from Jerusalem. And the nations will beat their swords into plough-shares and their spears into pruning-hooks. People shall not raise the sword against people, nor will they learn war any more." And, in another passage (Isaiah xxi, 24), the idea of international fraternization is brought out in the clearest form. "On that day," it is said, "shall Israel be associated as a third, with Egypt and Assyria, to become a blessing in the midst of the earth." Egypt and Assyria are mentioned as being the two mightiest empires of the ancient world, whose confines bordered on Palestine. "And the Lord of Hosts shall bless them, saying: 'Blessed be my people Egypt, and my handiwork Assyria, and my heritage Israel.'" In that day, also, justice is to have unobstructed sway over the whole earth. No one will hurt any more; no one injure another. The Lord will

wipe away the tears from every face, and sorrow shall cease. All these ideas were connected with the glory of the future Jerusalem. Am I not right, then, in saying that the note of universality was not wanting in the Hebrew religion? The rebuilding of Jerusalem, in more than its pristine splendor, was to be the signal for the ushering in among the nations of a reign of universal peace, universal right and universal happiness. But, this being granted—as it must, in fairness, be granted—we are bound to consider with equal fairness the conditions under which, according to Hebrew notions, this universal amity was to be achieved.

I began my remarks with the simile of two brothers who have become estranged, and who, while pursuing their separate ways, are still secretly hoping for reunion. It is just this desire for rennion, coupled with the terms on which it is insisted that it be consummated, that prevents the reunion. The elder brother says: "Why does not my younger brother return to me? Why can he not live in harmony with me? He could easily do so if he would only act in the right way;" which means in the way that the elder brother thinks is right. And the younger brother takes exactly the same attitude, saying: "How beautiful is it when brothers dwell together in peace. Why cannot my elder brother dwell in peace with me? We could so easily get along together, if he would only act in the right way"—that is, in the way which the younger brother considers right. Each one wishes reunion, but on his own terms. And so it has been with the Synagogue and the Church. Judaism has always desired reunion with the Gentile world on its

own terms. The Church has always desired reunion with the ancient household of the Hebrews, on its own terms. And it was of course the circumstance that neither would accept the terms of the other that has embittered their relations. But if there had not been the desire for reunion, the antagonism, due to the balking of the desire, each throwing the blame on the other, would never have been so pointed.

Now, on what terms, according to the Hebrew view, is the new relation between Jew and Gentile to be consummated? Plainly stated, on the basis of the acceptance, on the part of the Gentiles, of the Hebrew religion. The adherents of this religion to-day constitute a small minority of the human race. They expect to be, some day, the majority. Nay, they expect eventually to convert mankind. Of course, they are supported in this view by the conviction that their religion, the religion of absolute Monotheism—the belief in a personal spiritual Ruler of the Universe—is not only the highest actual, but the highest possible expression of the religious consciousness; that, however long the human race may exist on earth, its religious development can never transcend in principle the point attained by the authors of the Old Testament. Hence, since Israel was believed to be in possession of the absolute truth, its mission has always been taken to consist in rigid, inflexible adherence to this truth. No matter what the cost might be; no matter though fidelity to the faith might mean to invoke the enmity of every other nation; no matter though it might mean the loss of home and fatherland; or death in its cruelest forms, or a life of ignominy and indignity, less tolerable even than death—the duty of

Israel was conceived to be to hold fast to its own until the time should come when other nations would be willing to recognize the supremacy of Israel's belief and become proselytes to it. The Gentile must accept what the Jew has to offer, in the matter of religion. On no other terms, such has been the traditional view, is reunion admissible. Now, it is easy to explain and to justify this attitude at a time when Israel's religion really was so unspeakably superior to the various forms of Nature-worship that prevailed in the world that a comparison between it and them was out of the question. And this attitude was not only justifiable, but sublime, in the days of persecution. But it seems to me, I must admit, neither justifiable nor sublime when it continues to be maintained in advanced, civilized communities like our own.

And what shall we think of the counter-claim on the side of Christianity? Christianity is a scheme for achieving universal brotherhood. So is Judaism. But the mere fact that universal fraternity is the end kept in view does not mean that the religion which proclaims, is competent to attain it. Possibly it may insist on conditions of fraternity to which vast numbers of men cannot conform, and thus, by the very conditions it imposes, stand in the way of the end it proposes. Has this been also true of Christianity? Of course, when we compare the Christian Church with the Jewish Synagogue, so far as power in the world goes, and extent of influence, the former seems like a giant and the latter a mere dwarf. And it might seem preposterous to compare them at all, were it not that Christianity owes its existence to Judaism—is, in great part, an efflorescence of it. But, great as has

been the influence of Christianity, it is very far from having accomplished what it set out to accomplish—namely, the inclusion of the whole human race among its believers. It has not won over the vast populations of China and India. In point of numbers Buddhism is said to outstrip it. Among Western nations large numbers of the educated class have ceased to be Christian except in name. In place of achieving universal fraternization, it has not even succeeded in winning the majority of the human race to its side. It has not succeeded in achieving the universal brotherhood precisely because it made it a condition of receiving men into the fraternal fellowship that they must accept the doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus and the other doctrines that depend on this.

Such is the position of the orthodox Jew and of the orthodox Christian respectively. The orthodox Jew longs to come into union with the Gentiles; but first he wishes them to be reasonable and accept Jewish Monotheism. The orthodox Christian has tender yearnings toward the lost sheep of the House of Israel; but first he wishes them to cease to be obdurate and to accept orthodox Christianity. Is either event likely to happen? There are no signs of it. But how is it with the so-called Liberal Jew, and the Liberal Christian? Substantially the same barriers exists in their case as in the case of the orthodox. The most liberal Jew—I am speaking, of course, of those who are Jews by religion, and not merely by birth—still maintains the prerogative of Israel, the essential finality of religious truth as revealed in the Old Testament. The most liberal Unitarian, in some form or other, still claims for Jesus, if not

divine attributes, at least an exceptional position in human history, unlike that of even the greatest of human teachers. If he does not make this claim, surely he has ceased to be a Christian.

That these two great religions have been potent factors in promoting the moral progress of mankind, who that is not blind to the facts would deny? The plea for righteousness enunciated by the prophets of the Old Testament, will have its far-reaching reverberations in the breasts of men so long as the human race shall last. The sublime pattern of personal virtue, held up by the New Testament in the life of Jesus, will be a source of strength and peace to the individual seeker after virtue so long as that search shall not be abated. Both religions set forth vital, moral truths, with this difference: the Hebrew religion proclaims the brotherhood of nations. In its scheme of universal salvation, nations are the units. It is the nations that will gather around Jerusalem. It is by witnessing the faithful living out in practice of the ethical code prescribed for one nation, that the other nations are to be saved, as nations. The Christian religion, on the other hand, stands for the universal brotherhood between men as individuals, and it is by contemplating the exemplary life of an individual—Jesus—that other men, as individuals, will be won. But this idea of brotherhood, in its two-fold form, has, hitherto, been coupled with provisos: the national prerogative of Israel, in the one case; the Divinity of Christ, in the other.

Now, it is the law of brotherhood, without provisos, that makes the substance of Ethical Culture. Here, the provisos, that have so long proved bones of contention

and walls of division, are to be eliminated. It is the human brotherhood, pure and simple, that we would teach. And it is upon this ground, and this ground alone, that Jew and Gentile can join in unity. On the broad ground of our common manhood we can stand together. But let us hasten to add that it is not easy to occupy this ground. Traces of ancient prejudice remain. Embers of Old World antagonisms and aversions are still glowing under the ashes, in all but a very few. On which side the feeling is most pronounced it is hard to say; but it exists on both sides. And there is needed some spiritual force, some force stronger than business interest, or comradeship in public movements and the like, to overcome this mutual repulsion. How, then, can it be overcome? My answer is, by a true understanding of what is meant by brotherhood. The phrase "human brotherhood" has come to sound like a glittering generality. And it is no more than that, trite and tedious, when used in a superficial sense. But, when understood in its depth, it stands for what is finest and strongest in the inner life. What, then, does it mean? It means that a fundemental likeness—yes, a fundemental identity—subsists between all human beings. And the profound view differs from the superficial in the right perception of what that likeness, that equality, as it is called, consists in. We are not like each other because we have all the same erect human shape. That is a mere external resemblance, and would not lead us to regard each other as brothers. The fact that other human creatures have the same shape as themselves has never prevented the strong races from subjugating those others and then using them as slaves. Nor, in the second

place, is the sort of likeness on which brotherhood can be founded the one of which Shylock speaks when he pleads: "Has not a Jew eyes, and hands, organs, affections? When he is pricked, does he not bleed? When he is poisoned, does he not die?" In other words, is he not a sentient being like yourself? Does he not feel pleasure and pain, as you do? This fact of common sentiency has never been enough to establish close relations between men. It does influence us to this extent that we do not wish a human being sentient like ourselves to perish of disease, uncared for. We build hospitals for the sick. We do not wish a human being sentient like ourselves to starve. We send grain even to distant India, when there is famine. We do not refuse our support in some form, though it be in the form of prison food, even to the criminal. But pity may be mingled with contempt, and often is. And relations founded on like susceptibility to pleasures and pain, may leave quite undisturbed the feeling of touch-me-not superiority, on the one hand, and of inferiority on the other. Nor is the common possession of intelligence a magnet to draw men's hearts together, because the degree to which some possess intelligence is widely disparate from the degree to which others possess it. Intellectual equality can only promote intercourse among the equal, but serves, on that very account, to separate them all the more from the mass of the uncultivated. I do not say "This man is my brother" because he has the same shape that I have. I do not say he is my brother because he feels pleasure or pain as I do. Even the beasts, to some extent, do that. I do not say he is my brother because intellectually we

are on a level? Probably we are not. But I do say we are brothers because the moral nature in him is the same as in me. It is only on the moral likeness which exists between men that the sense of brotherhood can be securely established; on the fact that with respect to the elementary struggle against the passions, we are on the same plane with the humblest; that we are tempted as they are, though our temptations may take a different form—that we stumble as they do; and that we have in ourselves the same regenerative power which they have.

It is therefore at the deepest point of our nature, in the moral part of us, that the identity exists. And those who feel this moral identity have the right conception of brotherhood. Not all men feel it to the same extent. Some feel it but dimly, others hardly at all. But there are those who have the conception of brotherhood fully and fairly developed. And among them, and on the basis of the clearly conscious idea of brotherhood, the new unity of the spirit can be established. They are persons who earnestly strive toward moral improvement, toward spiritual growth. And wherever they find a human being, striving like themselves, they recognize a comrade in the prosecution of life's greatest task. And, in the joy of that comradeship, it is an easy thing for them to overlook and forget all lesser differences — differences of education, of bringing up, of manners—yes, even of culture. We human beings are pilgrims, traveling along a common road to a common goal. It is the thought of the common road, the common goal, that can make us one. And so here in truth a power is discovered strong

enough to obliterate the ancient prejudice, the age-long aversions. It is the power of earnest striving for moral betterment. If the spirit of earnest striving exists sufficiently in our midst, then it cannot fail but that we shall draw to us, in time, the earnest souls in the community around us. *The force of that attraction cannot be withstood.* They will feel at home with us and we with them. It must be because the spirit of earnest striving does not yet exist among us to a sufficient extent, that we have, thus far, not succeeded better. Philanthropy alone is not enough. The proclamation of humanitarian ideas alone is not enough. It is the earnestness of the personal life alone that can avail. The way of union is along that line and no other.

And let me add that Jews and Gentiles have much to learn from one another. Though the moral nature in all men is the same, yet different sides of it are often more highly developed in one race than in another. The Jews have been especially distinguished for the attention they have paid to the domestic virtues, for the "holiness feeling" they have about the home. And they are also distinguished by the appreciation of what may be called corporate morality, by the consciousness that there is such a thing as collective guilt, as collective duty. The races that have come under the influence of the Christian teaching, on the other hand—I speak, of course, of the best exemplars, in either case—are peculiarly distinguished by their sense of the inextinguishable worth of the individual's personality, its sacredness, its dignity, its indefeasible title to respect. These two types of morality need to be joined—so joined that each shall be suffused by the other; personal ethics

widened into its social radiations; social ethics centralized around its personal focus. And thus may we hope to gain an ethical outlook deeper even than that of Judaism, larger even than that of Christianity; an ethical outlook fit to inspire us in the great task of social and individual regeneration that constitutes the mighty problem of our time.

WHAT IS OF PERMANENT VALUE IN THE BIBLE (THE OLD TESTAMENT)?*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

THE revolutionary view resulting from the modern scientific study of the Bible is that Israel became clearly marked off from the other Semitic peoples who were her neighbors and began that wonderful development of moral idealism which constitutes her claim to distinction, with the prophets in the eighth century B. C. On the surface the Bible belies such a view. We find noble moral ideas in the very first books of the Bible, supposably written by Moses himself, and going back to the beginnings of the world! Deuteronomy in particular, the so-called fifth book of Moses, is often as elevated as the prophets themselves, and contains passages that sound like the prophets. How can this be explained? In a very simple way.

There is no evidence that the so-called books of Moses existed when the prophets first appeared in Israel.

* This and the lecture that will appear in the ensuing number of *Ethical Addresses* are the conclusion of a course on "The Bible from a Modern Standpoint," given in Philadelphia and Chicago. The earlier lectures—"Moses, the Legendary Founder of Israel," "David, the Hero-King of Israel," "Isaiah, the Latter-Day Prophet of Righteousness," "Jesus and the World to Come," and "Paul, the Apostle of the New Tidings"—may be found in *The Cause* (1519 West Adams street, Chicago) from December, 1897, to May, 1898.

Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Nahum—none of them refer to them. The first reference to any one of them is toward the close of the seventh century (a hundred years after the fall of the northern kingdom), and then simply to the Book of the Law, which without much doubt was substantially our Deuteronomy. The other books of the Pentateuch came later—some much later. Jeremiah, at the beginning of the sixth century, makes Yahweh say that he gave no commands about burnt offerings and sacrifices to early Israel *—an assertion that would have been impossible if Leviticus and Numbers had then been in existence. The fact is that the Hebrew sacred books throughout are more or less touched with the ethical spirit of the prophets, because they arose after the prophets and were largely written by men who were under their influence. They have a substantial moral sameness, because they had substantially the same moral inspiration. Sometimes old traditions are preserved with tolerable faithfulness; occasionally an old piece of literature has been handed down to us in its original shape (like "Deborah's Song"), but almost everything has been re-edited—recast—so as to serve, as far as possible, moral and religious purposes. In special instances the editing has gone so far as to make the accounts quite unreliable—as in the "Chronicles," which are supposed to be far inferior to the "Kings" in historic worth. There are, it is true, two or three books (Ruth, the Song of Songs, and, possibly, Ecclesiastes) that might have been written had the prophets never existed; but, aside from these, the

* vii, 22.

prophetic (or priestly) hand of the later religion of Israel is visible from Genesis to Malachi.

And now in turning to cast up the value of this literature, it must be admitted to be rather absurd to attempt this in a single lecture. It can be only the barest outlining that I can accomplish; and for brevity's sake, too, I must be pardoned a little assurance in speaking on particular points.

First, it may be well to say where the real value of this literature does not lie. It is not, for instance, as history. Genesis is no more history than Homer is. The later so-called historical books were written centuries after the events they describe; they are traditions rather than strict history (though not without historical value). Eye-witnesses of the times they describe we have only in the prophets. So, to anticipate, the Gospels are not history as Thucydides or Tacitus is history. They give us the traditions current about Jesus in the second, third or fourth generations after he died. Here, too, documents written casually and not as history—the letters of Paul—are of more historical value than anything else in the New Testament (unless, possibly, a portion of the book of "Acts").

Nor does the value of the Bible consist in its being a book of science. Its account of the creation is now ordinarily taken as a poem. No man of science thinks of looking into it for instruction.

As little can it be seriously taken as a revelation (in the ordinary sense of the word). If it gives us a more or less mixed account of events in this world, how strange becomes the idea that it infallibly discloses the things of another!

As literature the Bible is certainly not without eminence. There are touchingly beautiful Psalms, there are a few sublime descriptions in them, there are single noble passages in Amos and Isaiah, there is deep questioning and subtle argumentation in Job, there are some sayings and parables of Jesus that have become classical, there are passages of singularly moving eloquence in Paul; but in the technical sense in which the Greek tragedies are literature, or some of Plato's Dialogues, or the Æneid of Virgil, or Dante's Vision, or Shakespeare's Plays, it must be admitted that there is not much of literature in the Bible. We rarely find the perfection of form which is the mark of literature. The legends, in this respect, will hardly compare with Homer's legends—interesting as they are and often morally superior. The fact is, the Bible does not set out to be literature (unless it be Job and the Song of Songs and a few of the Psalms). The so-called historical books are ordinary prose narratives. The prophecies are usually disjointed speeches or orations, full of fire or of pathos often, but making their appeal to us on moral grounds and not on account of any perfection of literary form. Whatever art Isaiah and Amos, for instance, have is an art above art—springing from their own violent or tender emotions, from the passion of their convictions.

The real distinction, the high value of the Bible, lies elsewhere. If it is not literature, it is not that it is less, but in one way more. If it is not history or science or revelation, it may be said to be something more practical still. Its value is in its giving us a certain insight, in its reading of a certain law of cause and effect in the world,

in its showing us where to place our reliance in life. And thus I am led to begin with what is a stumbling-block to many in interpreting, or anywise feeling at home, in the Bible. I refer to its pronouncedly religious cast. We speak of it sometimes as a book of ethics. But how different is it (or any part of it) from Aristotle's *Ethics*, or any treatise on morals to-day!

There is an earnestness about it—perhaps some would say a fanaticism, and some do say a superstition—that is foreign to the calm, philosophical, air of ordinary ethical writing. It is a "Thus saith Yahweh," and a "Do this or die;" and this language and the whole scheme of rewards and punishments, running through the Bible, strike us strangely. Just as it stands, the Bible cannot, perhaps, be of much help to some people. The true things in it, the elevated things, are so connected with things that seem unreal, that they lose half their power. These persons would rather read Marcus Aurelius or some writer of to-day. And yet there is a pity about this. The Bible does need interpretation; there is required some effort to read ourselves into unaccustomed modes of thought that we may understand it. But when we do exercise a little historic imagination, when we can put ourselves into the places of men who lived two and three thousand years ago, we find that it is alive with meaning, that it deals with realities of which we may be cognizant every day—and deals with them often in a most penetrating and powerful way.

The presupposition of all religion—not only of the Hebrew, but of every other—is contained in those

familiar words of a Psalmist of Israel, "It is he that has made us and not we ourselves"—that is, that there is other power in the world than we ourselves, and other conditions than those we have fixed. The peculiarity of Israel was in seeing perhaps more clearly than any other ancient people on what conditions the favor of the outside power was to be got. At first those conditions were supposed to be personal homage and adoration. Food, drink, incense—these were the things that were thought to secure his favor, as similar things were thought to be pleasing to the gods of antiquity generally, who were all at first somewhat rudely, even physically, conceived. But in course of time it was discovered that other conditions than these existed—yes, that these other conditions were of prior importance, and so imperative that the conditions of sacrifice fell into relative insignificance. It was seen by men who loved Israel that the nation was weak despite all the offerings that went up—weak because the members of it were quarreling with one another, doing wrong to one another, taking advantage of one another, and because their private morals, or rather lack of morals, their looseness and licentiousness, were sapping the nation's health, soundness and vigor. It was not that Yahweh was out with the people and it was necessary to offer him goat's blood and the flesh of bulls to appease him, but that the real conditions of his favor had not been known of old. Let the people curb their sexual passions, let them put a rein on their desire for wealth and power, let them care for justice and the common interests of all; then the nation would be sound in body and soul and would be capable of standing like a solid

phalanx against its enemies. But till that time sacrifices were of no avail. Sometimes Yahweh is represented as even spurning them, and as saying flatly that he has no need of them, since the beasts of the forests and the cattle in the mountains (*i. e.*, away from the settled places) were at his disposal, and if he were hungry he would not tell men. The hard lesson had to be borne in on the unwilling minds of the people that the things they thought little of, the things they imagined they could do as they pleased about, the things they called private matters, were the things in which (however unconsciously to themselves) the fate of the nation was wrapped up.

The old reliances (the old, simple, trusting faith of the nation in its god) were threatened in this way, and it is no wonder that the people opposed the new teaching. Most graphically are the new and old views brought together in a passage like the following: *

"Hear this; ye heads of the house of Jacob
And ye leaders of the house of Israel, who abhor justice,
And pervert all equity, who build up Zion with blood,
And Jerusalem with iniquity!
Her heads judge for reward,
And her prophets divine for money,
And her priests teach for hire.
And yet they lean upon Yahweh, saying,
'Is not Yahweh in the midst of us? No evil can come upon us.'"

Here is the nation unsound to the eye of the prophet and yet safe and secure in the ordinary apprehension. And the speaker has so little deference to the old trusting reliance on Yahweh that he straightway

* Micah iii, 9–11.

adds that Zion is going to be plowed like a field, and Jerusalem to become heaps of stones. There is absolutely no safety, or security for Israel, according to the new thought, outside of moral obedience. This is the insight to which men whom we call the prophets attained (though there were plenty of "prophets" who did not attain to it); and more or less generalized, it is the insight that characterizes the whole Bible. Call it political insight, call it moral insight, call it religious insight—it does not matter much what name we give it; perhaps it was all in one. But it was an insight too deep for the average Israelitish statesman (concerned with forts and armies and chariots and foreign alliances), too deep for the average moralist and repeater of wise laws—and an insight that was both opposed by the old religious authorities and that brought a revolution in religion after it.

Let us linger for a few moments over this idea and be sure it is real to us. There are conditions of life—that is the first thing. Life is not a haphazard thing, capable of existing after any fashion; certain things must be, that life may be the result. This is true of the individual—it is also true of the social aggregate with which (almost invariably) the life of the individual is bound up (on the principle that that which is bad for the hive cannot be good for the bee—as Marcus Aurelius said). There must be a certain harmonious blending of elements, for instance, in the individual; there must be a certain harmonious blending of individuals, a certain fellow-feeling, in the aggregate. The second thing is that these are conditions we do not ourselves fix. We are not our own creators, any more than we are of

the outward world. We cannot determine on any conditions of life we choose. We have to choose those already laid down. We do not determine the laws of society any more than those of an individual life or of the most rudimentary speck of protoplasm. In all this we are in face of a not-ourselves, of a power and a law more than human, of an unalterable, and to all practical intents and purposes, almighty power—since there is nothing, no will or thought or scheme of man, that must not bow to it. What we call this *not-ourselves* is more or less a matter of accident and training—we may say commonly to-day, nature; the Greeks said, Zeus; the Hebrews said, Yahweh; sometimes "God" is used. The point is not what we call it, but whether we think of it, really think of it, realize it and forever reckon with it. Practically Yahweh is about as good a name as any other; and if we see this, not only need we take no offense at the word as it is used by the prophets of Israel, but behind it and through it we may perhaps see the reality for which it stands more clearly and feel it more sensibly and profoundly in certain passages of the prophets than anywhere else in ancient (or, for that matter, modern) literature.

Here were men to whom morality was no dead custom or shadowy ideal or transcendental abstraction, but part of the process of life—that on which the fate of men and nations turned. For my part I find infinite refreshment in reading their words. I feel as if I were touching the solid earth, in immersing myself in their point of view—that earth from which, perhaps, all health, spiritual as well as material, comes. The Deuteronomist represents Moses as saying to the people of

Israel, "I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil" * [the two, it is to be observed, in closest connection, so that "good" might be almost called that which serves life, and "evil" that which brings death after it], and Moses urges the people to keep Yahweh's commandments, *that they may live and multiply*. It is but an echo of Amos' appeal, "Seek ye good and not evil, that ye may live." † For this is the meaning of all the commandments (the prophetic, that is, as opposed to the mere ritualistic)—they are simple reminders of those conditions on which life (private or social) depends. Men love life (that goes without saying), but they do not always love the conditions —and so it is in these conditions that they become particularly sensible of the power not themselves; and in large parts of the Old Testament Yahweh seems almost identical with the warnings or commandments relating to them. To reconcile oneself to Yahweh, to fear and to love him, means standing in reverence of these conditions, accepting them, even becoming attached to them as no foreign or vain thing, but our life ‡—instead of slighting or ignoring them or attempting to override them. Loving Yahweh in the prophetic teaching is never a riot of emotions; it is loving the law. This is why it has such fruitful consequences; it is a part of cause and effect in the world. Trusting in Yahweh and in him alone means putting our confidence in these Yahweh-appointed laws of life, and not in the short-cuts and make-shifts we may devise out of our own heads. Men think they can pull through and accomplish their designs by some other means than those of

* xxx, 15. † v, 14. ‡ Deut. xxxii, 47

truth, uprightness and justice; but it is a delusion. A nation permeated by this spirit perishes.

"A king is not saved by the numbers of his forces,"

sings a psalmist.*

"Trust not in extortion; place no vain hopes in rapine!
If riches increase, set not your heart upon them,"†

is another warning. Isaiah says that those who trust in oppression and perverseness and lean thereon, shall be broken like a potter's vessel.‡

"Though thou lift thyself up as the eagle,
And though thou set thy nest among the stars,
Thence will I bring thee down, saith Yahweh,"

is another prophetic utterance.§ This is but saying that there is only one way to get a thing and have it securely—and that is by right; for in the right the Power of Powers hides Himself.

This is how it is folly to say there is no God. The thing most patent of all to the observing and the thoughtful is that wrong is forever insecure in the world. And since the wrong-doers are often on top and surely would not defeat their own desires, how is it that they are insecure? Because the nature of things is against them; because the world is so constituted that that alone is stable which has righteousness for its foundation. "It is not within the power of man that walketh to establish his steps," said Jeremiah.‖ Man proposes, a power above man disposes. As a psalmist picturesquely puts it:

* Ps. xxxiii, 16. † Ps. lii, 10. ‡ xxx, 12–14. § Obadiah i, 14. ‖ x, 23.

"Promotion comes neither from the east, nor from the west, nor
from the south;
But it is God that judges;
He puts down one and sets up another." *

It is the same thought as in those more familiar lines:

"Except Yahweh build the house,
The builders labor in vain.
Except Yahweh guard the city,
The watchman walks in vain.
In vain ye rise up early and go to rest late,
And eat the bread of care."†

Apart from those Yahweh (naturally)-appointed conditions, there is no safety or secure tenure of life anywhere. "Deliver the poor and destitute," once cried a prophetic voice.‡ "Save them from the hand of the wicked! They are without knowledge and without understanding; they walk in darkness: therefore all the foundations of the land are shaken." That is the insight for which ancient Israel stands—the insight into the organic connection of righteonsness, of a justice that goes to the furthest bounds, with the life and security of communities.

Would we see how wide is the sweep of the righteousness which Israel saw the place and necessity of? Let me give a few instances, which go quite beyond the letter of the Ten Commandments.§ There are commands, for example, not to harden one's heart but to lend to the poor man and not to charge him interest; to pay wages at the end of the day and not to hold them back; not to afflict widows or fatherless chil-

* lxxv, 6, 7. † Ps. cxxvii, 1, 2. ‡ Ps. lxxxii, 4, 5.
§ These are to be found, for the most part, in Deuteronomy.

dren; not to take a widow's clothing for a pledge; to be kind and not rude to those who are physically defective (like the deaf and the blind); not to reap the corners of the field but to leave them for the poor; not to cultivate or gather the fruits of one's land at all once in seven years, but to let the poor have what comes. There are commands not to cherish hatreds or grudges; not to let one's enemy's ox or beast go astray, as one might be tempted to. There are commands to consider slaves and not to return escaped ones—yes, to free all Hebrew slaves after six years. There are commands not to vex a stranger, but rather to treat him as a kinsman, and to love him as one does oneself—yes, there are commands even to be kind to animals, and the Sabbath rest is for them as well as man. There are commandments, too, to those in trade to have just balances and just weights; and to judges to be equitable in their decisions and not to be influenced by the person of those who come before them (not to countenance a poor man in his cause on account of his poverty any more than to favor the rich man because of his wealth); and not to take gifts. There are also warnings not to do wrong simply because others do it—*i. e.*, not to attach too much weight to public opinion. And to almost all these injunctions there is attached, "This do that ye may live;" that is, the acts are viewed as parts of the life-building, life-fortifying process—the failure to do them bringing trouble, insecurity, misery, even destruction, in its wake.

In the light of this interpretation it cannot be obscure what is meant by Yahweh's loving and hating, rewarding and punishing. These are but anthropomorphic

descriptions of literal fact. One sort of conduct Yahweh (nature) blesses, another sort he curses and undoes. Right and wrong are as far apart as life and death. When one psalmist says, "Yahweh's eyes are upon the righteous, but his face is against evil-doers," * or another that he hates all that do iniquity,† or when the Deuteronomist says that he repays those that hate him to his face, to destroy them,‡ they do but state the biological or sociological fact. Life is only for those who will find out and obey the laws of life. It is not that Yahweh hates people in themselves considered, it is not that he takes pleasure even in the death of the wicked,§ but that it is simply impossible to bless save on the conditions that he has laid down.

Yet as inevitable as trouble and unrest are for those who are *off* the way of life, so naturally and normally does a certain assurance come to those who are in it. It is like falling into the true orbit of our being. A certain rest comes over us.

> "The effect of righteousness shall be peace,
> And the fruit of righteousness quiet and security forever,"

says Isaiah ‖—and it is a beautiful saying.

> "Great peace have they who love thy law"

is another like it. In this confidence one somehow feels no danger:

> "I will lay me down in peace and sleep,
> For thou, Yahweh, makest me dwell in safety."

A perfect, a classical expression of this confidence is the

* xxxiv, 15. † v, 5. ‡ vii, 10. § Ezekiel xxxiii, 11.
‖ xxxii, 17.

Psalm beginning, "Yahweh is my shepherd." These words are often nowadays most irreverently used; they are appropriated by anyone when sick or sad, as if feebleness or loneliness gave one a right to them; but a prophet of Israel would have said that they were only for one who was himself an obedient sheep of Yahweh, who knew his voice and implicitly followed it. It is a tremendous pretense for a selfish, self-centered man or woman to repeat that Psalm. But for those who do follow Yahweh there comes an assurance so deep that it seems as if they could walk through the valley of the shadow of death with him.

Yes, not only peace, but joy comes to those who have this sense of being one with the law of their being.

> "Light is sown for the righteous,
> And joy for the upright in heart," *

And the height of attainment is when one does himself take delight in doing the will of Yahweh, when the law is no longer an alien thing but dwells in his heart.† So great is the possible ascent from the primitive type of man who does not brook restraints on his freedom if he can help it, who is bent on being a law to himself, and does not know that only by obedience to a higher law does man really begin to live!

"Righteousness tendeth to life!" ‡ It is a great truth, and Israel deserves immortal remembrance for having so powerfully stated it to the world. Of course, it is not the only truth, and when it is pressed one-sidedly it may breed perplexity and confusion. It does not follow that the righteous man will always prosper in

* Ps. xcvii, 11. † Ps. xl, 8. ‡ Proverbs xi, 19.

the world or that the unjust man will always find an early grave. It does not follow that Yahweh will always preserve him who regards the poor and keep him alive, as one Psalmist suggests,* or that such a one's wife will always be like a fruitful vine in his house, and his children like olive branches round his table, as another assures us.† One must have had scant experience in life who has not sometimes seen or heard of righteous men who were forsaken and of offspring of theirs who were obliged to beg for bread.‡ There are causes *and* causes in the world, and each will breed their proper fruit; and there is no one set that will take the place of all the rest. Because I am virtuous, I am not therefore intelligent; and because I am intelligent, I am not therefore free from the realm of accident and unpreventable calamity. Men make a problem *for themselves* when they ask, Why should the righteous suffer? I know the problem is sometimes very pathetically stated —is in some of the Psalms, for instance, and in the book of Job—but the presupposition of it is that righteousness is a peculiar thing that gives one a claim against all suffering; and I do not see that this is true. Let us not be extravagant and shut our eyes to facts. Moral conditions are not the only conditions of life and happiness. The real God of the world wants not only righteousness—he wants knowledge, judgment, practical sense and skill; all the qualities, mental and physical, as well as moral, that go to make up the complete man. "Why should the righteous suffer?" Why, I ask, should they NOT suffer, if the conditions that produce suffering have not been known to them, or if

* xli, 1, 2. † cxxvii, 3. ‡ xxxvii, 25.

knowing them they had not the power to change them? Because a man does right, is a miracle to be worked in his behalf? This is not the way of the world.

And yet all such admissions do not affect the verity of Israel's message. To judge of truth here as elsewhere we have to be abstractionists. The world and life are very complicated affairs. The righteous do sometimes suffer; sometimes an accident lays them low; sometimes a disease falls upon them; sometimes they go early to their grave. And then the scoffer may say, See how much righteousness amounts to! But the scoffer does not discriminate; he is something of what the Bible calls a fool. For had righteousness anything to do with these effects? Or were they the fruits of other causes? Does not doing what is right of itself tend to build up a man and to fortify and make happy a society? Where individuals do right by themselves and by others, is not everybody's life securer and the chances for happiness increased twice and ten-fold over? Righteousness does, then, tend to life; it is one of the indispensable conditions of life; it is one of the commandments of the Most High to men; and because it is not the only commandment, does not in the slightest impugn its reality or imperative importance. In themselves pride, wantonness, hardness, injustice, are always destructive; they do not build up human society, but make it troubled, miserable; those who practice these things are often themselves like the troubled sea, which cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt,* and whether or no, they are an affliction to society and tend to lay it low.

* Isaiah lvii, 20.

Moral unsoundness seems, indeed, to act more fatally on a society than anything else. If it becomes widespread there is no hope for it. Ignorance, inexperience, can better be endured than this—for they can easily be improved upon. But moral unsoundness requires some powerful agent to act upon it to change it—and it is always possible that it cannot (at least, will not) be changed and that it will only grow riper and riper for destruction. For the kingdom of Israel, the prophets came too late; for Judah, the prophets came too late. Yes, for Rome, Christianity came too late. All these had to die; only in this way could the world's atmosphere be cleared and a chance given to other peoples to make a fresh start. On the other hand, the spirit of love and justice seems to make all things possible in a society; they are a sort of fountain of perpetual youth; they give cheer, hope, courage, to everyone; under these Saturnian skies all good things blossom, and men make mistakes only to grow wiser and try again. In fact, if love and justice could only thoroughly get into the world, there is no telling what the world might become. It would be a new world, a transfigured world, and a practically infinite progress in civilization and in all the arts and refinements of life would be possible; while now societies and states only go a little ways and then stop and slowly (or suddenly) droop and die upon their thrones.

So of the great states of the past. And have the states of the modern world any other destiny? Are the conditions of permanence among us? What are the conditions of permanence? Friends, they are the same to-day as they were for Israel centuries ago. The

same great God of the world exists now as then, and the essential conditions of life for a modern society are the same as they were for an ancient society. We may have schools and universities and art museums and churches and courts and armies and presidents or emperors or kings, but if private morality, and if social justice are absent from the daily lives and intercourse of the people, there is no safety or security of tenure for us. Yahweh—or whatever name we give to that power who holds the Pleiades and Orion in his hands and at the same time weighs the nations in a balance—wants righteousness from us, ordinary, everyday, secular righteousness, and if we do not give it to him, though for other reasons he may allow us to stand for an interval, sooner or later we shall go the way of the nations before us. We shall fall, when we have not the coherency to stand; and righteousness (love and justice) alone knits a nation together. Other causes co-operate, but I think moral causes are the primary ones in the rise and fall of nations. And so, whether we stand or fall, whether any of the modern nations stand or fall, we shall equally illustrate the great insight attained in ancient Israel. If we stand, it will not be without righteousness; and if we fall, it will be, in part at least, for lack of it.

Yet the hope breeds inextinguishable in the heart that what is so organic in the world will yet be made manifest in the world—that at last mankind will learn its lesson. This hope is not so radiant in the Old Testament as in the New, yet it sends out some light even under the darkest clouds. I can only hint at it now. Sometime Yahweh's demands would be met. Some-

time the sun would yet shine on a righteous nation—yes, on a righteous world. Meantime we must wait for it. This attitude is freshly and powerfully taken up in the New Testament and in dealing with that later I shall consider it in all that it implies. It is not without reason that the Old Testament is commonly called the Law and the New Testament the Gospel—though the Law is certainly at the foundation of the Gospel, and had there been no great demand, no great ideal, created by the Law, the Gospel would never have arisen. Enough to-day if I have in some measure brought out the meaning of the law, if I have shown something of its scope, and something of its deep vital place in the scheme of human things. The Deuteronomist represents Moses as saying of it, "It is no vain thing for you; because it is your life." And that is the unforgettable lesson from the religion of Israel. MORALITY (to use the secular expression)— is our life; this is the meaning of the ancient lesson for us to-day. And this morality is not the ordinary religious morality—with its worship and its rites and its sacrifices and its holy days and its thousand and one petty scruples—but the morality of every day, the morality of secular human society, the morality for the parent and child, for the husband and wife, for the judge, for the tradesman, for the citizen, for the man as man. It is natural human morality, by which society is saved; and it is by this morality, and by this alone, that Yahweh, the Eternal God, is served.

WHAT IS OF PERMANENT VALUE IN THE BIBLE (THE NEW TESTAMENT)? *

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

THERE are many who think that if we only go back to the New Testament, and particularly to the teachings of Jesus, we find something which we can accept *in toto*. But I need not say to those who have followed these lectures that this is hardly the case. Paul, and Jesus himself, were not free from illusions. We cannot accept their religion just as they taught it. A not uncommon attitude is thence to reject it altogether. But this is to throw out the child with the bath, to cast away the husk and the kernel, too. The task is to find out what is sound, vital, elevating in the Christian teaching, and to hold on to it—hold on to it for our own sake and for the world's sake.

The great insight to which ancient Israel attained was that righteousness is a condition of life for men and societies. Wherein lies the value of the New Testament? If I might venture to sum it up in a sentence, I should say it was in the expectation that pervades the New Testament of a righteous order of human life that will finally be. The attitude of John the Baptist, of Jesus,

* See the lecture, "What is of Permanent Value in the Bible (The Old Testament)?" in the preceding number of *Ethical Addresses*, and the explanatory note at the beginning.

of Paul, of all the early disciples, was one of expectancy—they were all looking ahead to a great consummation. They had good news, good tidings, a gospel—they were consoled by it themselves and they were publishing it to the world. This is the characteristic mark of the New Testament—not an insight, but a promise; not a commandment, but the vision of a time when the commandments would be obeyed. Undoubtedly there was a new publication of the commandments by Jesus and Paul, but it was new to the time rather than to the best spirit of the old religion as expressed by psalmist and prophet. Contriteness, humility, also belonged to the old religion; "the meek shall inherit the earth" stands written in one of the Psalms.* Inwardness, spirituality, belonged to the old religion; what can surpass the cry, "Create in me a clean heart and renew a right spirit within me"? All religion tends to formalism—Christianity itself does—but in its essence the later (*i. e.*, the prophetic) religion of Israel was as spiritual as any. The notion of love and sacrifice, of love even to enemies and to foreigners, the idea of a time when all men and all nations should be united in one great brotherhood under one leader and one God—even these were not foreign to the old religion, nor did Jesus say anything on this score that a liberal rabbi like Hillel would have objected to. It was not a new morality or a new idea of God which Jesus brought to the world, but simply, in this relation, the best of what had been said and thought in the olden time, though it was all freshly conceived by him, and freshly uttered from a stress of inward feeling.

The new thing, the distinctly Christian thing (so to speak) in his teaching, is the proclamation that the ideals of the past were about to come true. It is one thing to have an idea; it is another to definitely expect its victory in the world. There is no change in the thought; there is in the attitude. It is the difference between thinking of a journey, and making preparations for it; between dreaming of some great happiness, and actually looking forward to it. Expectancy is a mood by itself—it is not knowledge, and it is not mere hope; it is looking for something, standing and waiting as if there were no question that it was to come. When Jesus, for example, came into the synagogue of his native town and opened the scrolls of an ancient prophet and read, "Yahweh's spirit is upon me, he has anointed me to bring good tidings to the afflicted, to bind up the broken-hearted, and to proclaim liberty to the captives;" and when he added, "Now is this scripture fulfilled," he was evidently in this attitude of expectancy toward some coming event; he uttered what I will call the characteristically gospel message. There was a graciousness, a charm about him, that won the hearts of those who heard him. It is always so with those who are expectant toward great and beautiful things.

Undoubtedly this attitude of expectancy had existed more or less in the old religion; if it were not so Jesus could not have quoted the prophets as he did and linked himself so closely to them; yes, it was just this old attitude of expectancy that, asserting itself afresh and going out to a purely ethical ideal, *made* Christianity. Christianity *is* that breath of life which, more or less slumbering, or else fitfully awakening, in Israel since the

time of the prophets, awoke in Jesus and in Paul with an energy unknown before. Had the people of Israel gone with Jesus there would have been no break between the two religions. The very term Messiah, or Christ, after which Christianity is named, belongs to the old circle of religious ideas. The kingdom of heaven, the judgment—the most essential conceptions of Christianity—were more or less current before Jesus was born. Christianity was new, as everything new is so in a world of evolution; new, as taking up freshly some element or feature of the old; new, as a tree is new that develops from some vigorous sprout or branch of an old tree. How close the connection between Christianity and its predecessor was is indicated in what a Jewish scholar and rabbi of to-day has recently said: "Had the Jews of that time," he says, "been able to read the inscription on the wall; had they looked at the hand on the dial, they might have reclaimed the world with the ethics, their own ethics, lived and taught by Jesus of Nazareth; they might have gone forth and brought to the thirsty the water, to the hungry the bread of life. But they would not, as to-day they will not. The times were ripe; Judaism neglected the opportunity, Paul embraced it." * It was because the people of Israel would not go with that wave of expectation identified with the the names of Jesus and Paul that the separate thing we call Christianity came into being. In the old days, the kingdom to the north had not heeded the word of the prophets—and, for its fate it had transportation to Assyria and dispersion through the world. Judah, too, had not listened to Jeremiah—and there followed the

* Dr. E. G. Hirsch, *Unity*, 5 July, 1894.

captivity in Babylon. And now what remnants of the old people of Israel there were could not go with Jesus, though he was bone of their bone, and flesh of their flesh, and a living interpreter of their highest ideas—and one of the results was that their religion became narrower, harder, more racial than ever, and the chance of its ever becoming a world-religion went by forever. Christianity really—I do not mean the Christianity of to-day, but the Christianity of Jesus and Paul—is the flower, the choicest fruit, of Judaism; it is that in Judaism which is of universal significance. Rejected in the land that gave it birth, it went out by the hand of Paul into the Gentile world and bore aloft the spirits of men in strange lands on the wave of a mighty hope and expectation.

That righteousness should reign, that wrong should come to an end in the world, that Jew and Gentile, that men the world over, should be knit together in the bonds of love, justice and fraternity, that what had been a dream was about to become a reality—this was the substance of Christianity; Christianity *was* expectancy towards such a consummation. The old religion had learned that righteousness was a condition of life; the new was the faith that righteousness was going to rule. Or, in other language, the old had found out what the will of Yahweh was; the new was the assertion that this will was to be done. Hence the elevation, the buoyancy of soul, that went along with the early Christian faith. The contrast of the ideal with the sad realities in the world about them was a temporary thing to those who looked ahead to the time when the "kingdom of God" should come. They might be cast down,

but they were not forsaken—troubled on every side, as the Apostle Paul once said, yet not crushed; perplexed, but not in despair. In a deep sense, they were saved by hope; for it was by hope that they realized the consummation on which they had set their hearts. It was not yet—it was to be.

This attitude, to my mind, is the innermost heart of Christianity. I am well aware that in some ways it suffers by contrast to that which makes the vital contribution of old Israel to the world—the insight on which I enlarged in a previous lecture. That seems a solid possession. It is borne out by science. We can verify it by experience, by observation of the course of the world. Men may forget it, but they cannot deny it. They may ignore it, but only as they ignore the laws of health, by their own undoing. Righteousness is a condition of life—it is an elemental truth. Gravity is not surer. But hope, faith, expectancy—how fragile in comparison! How little can they be proved, demonstrated! The very fact that we say we hope shows that we do not know; the very attitude of expectancy implies that the good is still beyond us, existing to the mind's eye, not as yet in reality. Yes, history obliges us to admit that the Christian expectancy was mistaken—at least in just the form it took, and those sayings in the New Testament to the effect that the night is far spent and the day is at hand,* that some even would not fall asleep till the great change had come,† those entreaties, "Come, Lord Jesus, come quickly"‡ have a pathetic interest for us, as we recall that the night so soon to end has lasted even down to the present time, that genera-

* Romans xiii, 12. † I Cor. xv, 51. ‡ Rev. xxii, 20.

tion after generation of believers has fallen asleep without witnessing that for which their hearts yearned, that for eighteen centuries "the heavens have made no pathway for the coming judge." Nor does the Christian hope win any greater assurance for us when, as is so often done, it is transferred to another world, and a triumph of righteousness in other scenes takes the place of the triumph that is needed here. If there is no room for hope in the world we know, how foolish is it to indulge it in relation to a sphere of which we do not know! And so I can imagine the disposition to part company with Christianity altogether, to say that apart from a beautiful morality it is all illusion.

And yet, friends, I dare take my stand with the early Christian believers. I dare pluck out the soul, the essence, of the Christian attitude, and say that it was not only justified then, but is justified now and will ever be justified till indeed the end come; till the shadows flee away and the "Kingdom of God" be here. The essence of the Christian expectancy was toward the victory of the good, the just, the human—not toward this as happening at a particular time, or by some particuiar instrumentality. If one, as he thinks of those things, thinks of them as things that will be — he is still kindred with the early believers, though he knows that years and centuries and ages must elapse before they attain the victory that is their right, and though he expects absolutely nothing from the interposition of a supernatural hand. The contrast to the Christian attitude is presented by the man who grants that they are beautiful ideals, but who says that after all they are im-

practicable, impossible—or who perhaps does not respect them or think of them at all, saying, rather,

> "To eat and drink your daily food and drink,
> This is the creed of sober-minded people,
> And not to fret yourself."

But he who honors the ideals, and is not untouched with reverence and awe as he thinks of them, since he knows the fate of men and nations turns on obedience to them, and who is also great-souled enough to believe that, given time enough, the race will learn its lesson, has at bottom the same attitude which those men and women of long ago had who looked to see Jesus come again in the clouds of heaven to establish the good and put an end to wrong.

Do you think hope and expectation are no vital factors in the world? You are mistaken. Do you think we only want facts—facts under our eyes, and nothing that could possibly be spoken of as dreams and fancies? Well, let me answer that in accordance with this philosophy, we do not even know how some facts come to be. Think of a boy who starts with nothing (save a clear head and clean hands) and gradually makes his way in the world. What sustains him and carries him along? Before he wins success what makes him work for it? What is it but faith that he can get it and hope that he will? Strip from him this expectation, this steady, confident looking to the future, and what is left of him? Of course there must be action, and wisdom in action, but the soul of the action is just in this undercurrent of forward-looking desire. Now, so different factors are men in general in the world according as they hope or do not hope for the victory of the good, as they

are expectant or non-expectant toward the triumph of justice and fraternity in society. If you expect something, you will work for it; or, if your expectation is of something coming to you from without, none the less will it not fail to influence you and modify somewhat the conduct of your life. Contrast the old Roman world and the obscure but gradually swelling band of Christian disciples in its midst. The Roman had no ideal. His golden age was in the past, not the future. Even a virtuous man like Marcus Aurelius seemed to have no sense of a goal to which the world was tending. "He who has seen present things," he says, "has seen all, both everything that has taken place and everything that will be."* There is a vein of sadness, a restraint even in desiring what is good, in his *Meditations*. But to the Christian was given the vision of a kingdom of heaven, and that which mortal eyes had never seen was yet to be. Infinite hope animated his breast, while of the average Roman (the Roman not like Aurelius, but of commoner mould) the picture which Matthew Arnold draws is hardly exaggerated:

"In his cool hall, with haggard eyes,
The Roman noble lay;
He drove abroad, in furious guise,
Along the Appian Way.

"He made a feast, drank fierce and fast,
And crown'd his hair with flowers—
No easier nor no quicker pass'd
The impracticable hours.

"On that hard Pagan world disgust
And secret loathing fell.
Deep weariness and sated lust
Made human life a hell."

Meditations, vi, 37.

And because the Roman world had no ideal (beyond that of pleasure and power and the pride of life), therefore it had no future; degeneracy and disintegration crept on apace within it; and at last it fell when it had not the strength, the coherency to stand. But in the Christian community were the seeds of life. Here was the energy, the buoyancy, the joy, that betokened a new birth of society; though ignorance and superstition were rife, though the reign of right and love and peace were only to be introduced by a divine wonder, yet right and love and peace themselves exercised a spell upon its members, and war and slavery and poverty and want were all mitigated under its influence as had never been the case before. So great is the difference in the practical effect of a noble expectation, or of lack of one, on the energy and life of a people! Things do not happen of themselves in the world; progress does not take place of itself, particularly moral progress; the best things, the highest things, the holiest things, come because we want them, because we stand in an attitude of expectancy towards them.

For my part, I find it of infinite importance to keep the old Christian mood and attitude. I think they are of more importance than anything even the Greek world has bequeathed to us—just as the appetite for life is of deeper consequence than any special knowledge as to how to live. The appetite for justice, the longing for a righteous ordering of human life, the desire to see men organized in one great loving brotherhood—yes, the expectation of it, as if it were a normal thing and simply had to be: this is deeper than anything else as a force in social progress—and where does it so live and glow

as in the New Testament? I do not find it in Aristotle, or in Plato, or in the words of Socrates, as I do on the lips of Jesus and in the epistles of Paul. The very resort to supernatural agency is a proof of the intensity of it; it is in straits men call for invisible help, and the desires and unsatisfied longings of Greek thinkers were not keen enough or passionate enough to put them in straits. I say that we should keep the Christian attitude, for on it the higher life and progress of the world depend.

And may I state where to my mind the greatest danger to the world now lies? It is that in the breaking down of the old religious faith society will have a relapse into a sort of paganism. I see it more or less already among those who have left the churches or the synagogues and have found nothing to replace the softening and idealizing influences that were there exercised upon them. Easily do they come to look on the world as a movement nowhither and on life as a game of profit and loss. They want comfort, amusement, social position, but they care feebly for anything beyond. They easily become hard to those who are unsuccessful in the struggle for these things. They take little stock in reforms, in movements, and easily label any ideas that would make things different from what they are Utopias. This lowering of the tone of life is what is going on outside the old circles of religious influences—yes, often in these circles, for religion is often a formal thing, and Jesus and Isaiah are honored in name while their thoughts are forgotten. Against this degradation and materializing of life, we need to bring all the influences we can lay hold of. And surely no one who has caught

the spirit of the ancient prophets of Israel, no one who has been brought to feel any sympathy with the life of Jesus, can fail to find in himself such a counteracting influence. These voices from the ancient world are a bulwark against the degrading tendencies about us. No one who really hears them can fail to have a high and serious view of life; can refuse to own that the world must be formed and reformed, till it is brought into harmony with ideal requirements; can refuse to make himself a part of the wave of expectancy going out to the triumph of all righteous and just causes.

Let us see and make real to ourselves just what this attitude would be in the circumstances of to-day. First, it would mean recognizing that the order of the world is one of change, that so far as things are wrong they cannot last. It would mean just the opposite of the ordinary notion that there is a certain amount of selfishness and evil in human nature, which always has been and always will be. It would mean that some time love and justice were going to have the upper hand—it would mean steadfastly looking forward to such a consummation. It would mean parting company with the pessimist, parting company with the mere conservative. It would mean welcoming new things, new bold ventures in the direction of a higher social state, co-operating with them, making oneself a servant of the race. It would not exclude, of course, wise judging as to time and place and circumstances, striving for this now and for that later on; it would not be inconsistent with the perception that one step is practicable in one set of conditions and another in another; it would rather call for this higher worldly wisdom, but all to the end that the goal, an ever higher

and higher social state, may be reached. And here is one thing that is always to be borne in mind: The early Christian looked to a higher *order of society*. The very phrase, Kingdom of Heaven, stands for a social conception. Those who say to-day that the thing is to be virtuous and holy yourself, and that social movements are outside this primary circle of duty, are off the track. They are not in line with those who aspired to a kingdom of God eighteen centuries ago. Those who keep to the heart of the Christian tradition must work for social reform as well as for personal reform.

Yet in connection with the point just mentioned there is undoubtedly a great difference between historical Christianity and the attitude of those who distinguish between substance and form and who cleave to the substance of the Christian faith in the altered form made necessary for those who heed the light of to-day. For it cannot be denied that the agent counted on to produce the great social change expected by Jesus and the apostles was not man or society, but the power behind nature which old Israel called Yahweh and which people to-day more or less vaguely call God. The Christian expectancy went out to a Divine interposition, to Jesus coming again in Divine glory and with Divine pomp and power, to overthrow wrong-doers and establish the righteous kingdom. And all this had its effect on the temper and mood of Christians. It still has its effect, though many have given up the old idea of looking for Jesus in this world and put his victories in another. They think their only, or at least chief, duty is to purify their own hearts—for the righting of the evils and wrongs of the world at large is for a higher Power.

This mood was the more excusable in the ancient Roman world because of the helplessness and sheer powerlessness of the Christians to gain political influence and direct the general fortunes of society. Their only recourse was to a Power mightier than the state, and only by confidence in that Power could they (so little were they aware of the course which history was to follow) keep their faith and their vision alive.

But how different are the circumstances now! What is it but mere habit that makes Christians continue to declare, "We believe that thou shalt come again to be our Judge"? Who really believes that Jesus is going to come again to judge the world and accomplish a reorganization of society? Who among Christians themselves, I mean? But if they do not believe so, why not turn about face and take the task of reorganizing society on happier and juster principles into our own hands? This is the only enlightened, the only honest and earnest way for men who live in the light of to-day to proceed. Our faith in Jesus, in the ordinary sense, our faith in God, in the ordinary sense, is a blind trust—it is a poor, broken reed. Christianity is only doing anything to-day as it throws it away—as it calls on men themselves, in their organized communities, through their laws, through all manner of public and private expedients, to bring about or bring nearer that kingdom of God for which the ages have vainly prayed.

And here we see the value of that discriminating treatment of Christianity and the Bible which I have attempted in these lectures. Make no discrimination, treat Christianity as an absolute necessary unity, and you have got to reject it. So with the Bible; if it is

all or nothing, then you have got to go either with Mr. Moody on the one hand (which no man with his eyes open can do), or on the other with those who call it false or foolish. But when we get down below the surface, when we find out the impulses, the deep underlying thoughts and motives that animated the religion of Israel and the religion of Jesus, then we see that, though we disown and forget much, there is a heart of truth and of ideal aspiration that we would not disown if we could and could not if we would. Then the task is to take the heart of Christianity and put it into a modern form, to preserve its great soul of expectancy and yet cherish the expectation in a rational and sober manner.

Let me sum up three things that appear to me to be needed for a working religion for to-day. First, the thought that human welfare depends in large part on moral causes, that private virtue and public justice are indispensable conditions of happy societies and states. Second, an attitude of hope and expectancy toward a time, an order, in which virtue and justice will reign in the world. Only by believing in such a consummation can we make it come to pass. And third, putting our own brains and our own hands to work to devise and carry out ways and means, measures and laws and institutions, by which the happy consummation may be reached. To the first thought corresponds the religion of the Israelitish prophets. With the attitude of hope and expectancy must forever be linked Christianity. But the third thing is a modern product. To it corresponds science, with its sense of law, of cause and effect, of orderly continuity in social evolution.

The true attitude of men to-day, then, is not one of

rejection toward the old religions, but one of sympathy —sympathy with their essence. The true mission of science is not to overthrow Christianity, but to fulfil it—or at least indicate the methods by which it may be fulfilled. The dream of Isaiah, of Jesus, is not an alien thing—it belongs to man and the constitution of society. Every finite thing works to more and more perfect forms, and justice and fraternity are the perfection of society. As we are men, we long for them; as human beings, we should be sick at heart, did we not imagine that things could be different from what they are. But let science be our instructor as to how changes can be accomplished. Prayers may have a soul of good in them, but the Mohammedans have a saying that an hour of justice is worth a thousand years of prayer. There is no help but in ourselves, and the faith of faiths is faith in ourselves—faith that we can rise to the level of the eternal laws; faith that the divine power is within us as well as without us; faith that human society can by its own will, laws and institutions, more and more transform itself, establish the good and destroy the bad, until it becomes the fair, spotless image of the eternal ideal.

THE PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN.*

BY FELIX ADLER.

I HAVE remarked in a previous discourse that we should act as the physicians of our enemies and seek to cure them of their wrong doing. How much more, then, should this attitude be taken towards those whom we love—towards our children, if we find their characters marred by serious faults.

In discussing the subject of punishment I do not for a moment think of covering the innumerable problems which it suggests. Many books have been written on this subject; prolonged study and the experience of a life time are barely sufficient for a mastery of its details. I shall content myself with suggesting a few simple rules and principles, and shall consider my object gained if I induce my hearers to enter upon a closer investigation of the delicate and manifold questions involved.

The first general rule to which I would refer is never to administer punishment in anger. A saying of Socrates deserves to be carefully borne in mind. Turning one day upon his insolent servant, Speucippus, who had subjected him to great annoyance, he exclaimed: "I should beat you now, sirrah, were I not so angry with you." The practice of most men is the very opposite; they beat and punish because they *are* angry. But it is clear that we cannot trust ourselves to correct another while we are enraged. The intensity of our anger is

* This is the first of a series of three lectures on "The Punishment of Children," given before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, in February, 1886. The other two lectures will be printed in the May number of *Ethical Addresses*.

proportional to the degree of annoyance which we have experienced, but it happens quite frequently that a great annoyance may be caused by a slight fault, just as, conversely, the greatest fault may cause us only slight annoyance, or may even contribute to our pleasure. We should administer serious punishment where the fault is serious, and slight punishment where the fault is slight. But, as I have just said, a slight fault may sometimes cause serious annoyance, just as a slight spark thrown into a powder magazine may cause an explosion. And we do often resemble a powder magazine, being filled with suppressed inflammable irritations, so that a trivial naughtiness on the part of a child may cause a most absurd explosion. But is it the child's fault that we are in this irascible condition? To show how a slight fault may sometimes cause the most serious annoyance, let me remind you of the story of Vedius Pollio, the Roman. He was one day entertaining the Emperor Augustus at dinner. During the banquet, a slave who was carrying one of the crystal goblets by which his master set great store, in his excitement, suffered the goblet to fall from his hand so that it broke into a thousand pieces on the floor. Pollio was so infuriated that he ordered the slave to be bound and thrown into a neighboring fish pond, to be devoured by the lampreys. The Emperor interfered to save the slave's life, but Pollio was too much enraged to defer even to the Emperor's wish. Thereupon Augustus ordered that every crystal goblet in the house should be broken in his presence, that the slave should be set free, and that the obnoxious fish pond should be closed. The breaking of a goblet or a vase is a good instance of how a slight fault, a mere inadvertency, may cause serious

damage and great chagrin. In the same way an unseasonable word, loud conversation, a bit of pardonable mischief which we should overlook under ordinary circumstances, may throw us into a fury when we are out of sorts. When we have urgent business and are kept waiting, we are apt, unless we keep a curb on our tempers, to break forth into violent complaints, which indeed are quite proportional to the amount of annoyance we experience, but not necessarily to the fault of the person who occasions it. Our business is to cure faults, and in order to accomplish this end, the punishment should be meted out in due proportion to the fault. Instead of following this principle, the great majority of men when they punish are not like reasonable beings, selecting right means towards a true end, but like hot springs which boil over because they cannot contain themselves. We ought never to punish in anger. No one can trust himself when in that state; an angry man is always liable to overshoot the mark; we must wait until our angry feeling has had time to cool. Do I then advise that we administer punishment in cold blood? No; we ought to correct the faults of others with a certain moral warmth expressed in our words and manner, a warmth which is produced by our reprehension of the fault, not by the annoyance which it causes us. This, then, is the first rule: never punish in anger.

The second is that in correcting a child we should be careful to distinguish between the child and its fault, we should not allow the shadow of the fault to darken the whole nature of the child. We should treat the fault as something accidental which can be removed. Vulgar persons, when a child has told a falsehood, say: "you liar." They identify the child with the fault of lying,

and thereby imply that this vice is engrained in its nature. They do not say or imply: "You have told a falsehood, but you will surely not do so again; hereafter you will tell the truth;" they say: "You are a liar; *i. e.*, lying has become part and parcel of your nature." In the same way when a child has proved itself incapable of mastering a certain task, the thoughtless parent or teacher may exclaim impatiently: "You are a dunce," that is to say, "You are a hopeless case; nothing but stupidity is to be expected of you." All opprobrious epithets of this sort are to be most scrupulously avoided. No one should say even to the worst offender: "You are such and such," but, "you have acted thus in one case, perhaps in many cases, but you can act otherwise; the evil has not eaten into the core of your nature. There is still a sound part in you; there is good at the bottom of your soul, and if you will only assert your better nature you can do well." We are bound to show confidence in the transgressor. Our confidence may be disappointed a hundred times, but it must never be wholly destroyed. For it is the crutch on which the weak lean in their feeble efforts to walk. Now, such language as: "You are a dunce, you are a liar," is, to be sure, used only by the vulgar; but many parents who would not use such words imply as much by their attitude toward their child; they indicate by their manner: "Well, nothing good is to be expected of you," or, "No spark of intelligence will ever come from you." This attitude of the parents is born of selfishness; the child has disappointed their expectations, and the disappointment instead of making them more tender toward the child makes them impatient. But this is not the attitude of the physician whose busi-

ness it is to cure evil. We must give the child to understand that we still have hope of its amendment; the slightest improvement should be welcomed with an expression of satisfaction. We should never attach absolute blame to a child, never overwhelm it with a general condemnation. And in like manner we should never give absolute praise, never injure a child by unlimited approbation. The words, "excellent, perfect," which are sometimes used in school reports, are inexcusable. I have seen the object of education thwarted in the case of particularly promising pupils by such unqualified admiration. No human being is perfect, and to tell a child that he is perfect, is to encourage a superficial way of looking upon life, and to pamper his conceit. The right attitude is to say or to imply by our manner: "You have done well thus far; go on as you have begun and try hereafter to do still better." Such words as these fall like sunshine into the soul, warming and fructifying every good seed. On the other hand, to tell a child that he is perfect induces him to relax his effort, for having reached the summit he may be excused from further exertion. We should correct faults in such a way as to imply that not everything is lost. And we should praise merit in such a way as to imply that not everything is yet achieved, that, on the contrary, the goal is still far, far in the distance. Everything, as I have said, depends upon the attitude of the parent or instructor. Those who possess educational tact, a very rare and precious quality, adopt the right attitude by a sort of instinct. But those who do not possess it naturally can acquire it, at least, to a certain degree, by reflecting upon the underlying principles of punishment.

The third rule is not to lecture children. One feels tempted to say to some parents: "You do not succeed as well as you might in the training of your children because you talk too much. The less you say the more effective will your discipline be. Let your measures speak for you." When punishment is necessary let it come upon the child like the action of a natural law—calm, unswerving, inevitable. Do not attempt to give reasons or to argue with the child concerning the punishment you are about to inflict. If the child is in danger of thinking your punishment unjust, it may be expedient to explain the reasons of your action, but do so after the punishment has been inflicted. There are parents who are perpetually scolding their children. The fact that they scold so much is proof of their educational helplessness. They do not know what measures of discipline to apply, hence they scold. Often their scolding is due to momentary passion, and the child intuitively detects that this is so. If the parent is in ill humor, a mischievous prank, a naughty word, an act of disobedience sometimes puts him into a towering passion; at other times the same offence, or even worse offences, are passed over with a meaningless "don't do it again." The child perceives this vacillation, and learns to look upon a scolding as a mere passing shower, hiding its head under shelter till the storm has blown over. Other parents are given to delivering lengthy homilies to their children, and then often express surprise that all their sound doctrine, all their beautiful sermons, have no effect whatever. If they would pause to consider for a moment they could easily see why their lectures have no effect, why they pass "in at one ear and out at the other." Their lectures

on right and wrong are generally too abstract for the child's comprehension, and often do not touch its case at all. Moreover, the iteration of the same ding dong has the effect of blunting the child's apprehension. A stern rebuke is occasionally necessary, and does good, but then, it should be short, clear, incisive. A moralizing talk with an older child sometimes does good, but then the parent should not indulge in generalities, but, looking over the record of the child for the past weeks or months, should pick out the definite points in which it has transgressed, thus holding up a picture of the child's life to its own eyes to reinforce the memory of its faults and stimulate its conscience. In general it may be said that the less the parent talks about moral delinquencies the better. On this rule of parsimony in respect to words particular stress is to be laid.

The next rule is quite as important as the preceding ones. It is that of undeviating consistency. Were not the subject altogether too painful, it would be amusing to observe how weak mothers—and weak fathers, too—constantly eat their own words. "How often have I told you not to do this thing, but now you have done it again." "Well, what is to follow?" secretly asks the child. "The next time you do it I shall surely punish you." The next time the story repeats itself; and so it is always "the next time." Very often foolish threats are made, which the parents know they cannot and will not carry out; and do you suppose that the children do not know as well as you that the threat you have been uttering is an idle one? We should be extremely careful in deciding what to demand of a child. Our demands should be determined by a scrupulous regard for the child's own good, but when

the word has gone forth, especially in the case of young children, we should insist on unquestioning obedience. Our will must be recognized by the child as its law; it must not suspect that we are governed by passion or caprice. There are those who protest that this is too stern a method, that gentle treatment, persuasion and love ought to suffice to induce the child to obey. Love and persuasion do suffice in many cases, but they do not answer in all, and besides I hold it to be important that the child should sometimes be brought face to face with a law which is superior to the law of its own will, and should be compelled to bend to the higher law, as expressed in its parent's wishes, merely because it is a higher law. And so far from believing this to be a cruel method, I believe that the opposite method of always wheedling and coaxing children into obedience is really cruel. Many a time later on in life its self-love will beat in vain against the immutable barriers of law, and if the child has not learned to yield to rightful authority in youth, the necessity of doing so later on will only be the more bitterly felt. The child should sometimes be compelled to yield to the parent's authority simply because the parental authority expresses a higher law than that of its own will. And this leads me to speak incidentally of a subject which is nearly allied to the one we are now discussing.

It is a well known trick of the nursery to divert the child from some object which it is not to have by quickly directing its attention to another object. If a child cries for the moon, amuse it with the light of a candle; if it insists upon handling a fragile vase, attract its attention to the doll; if it demands a knife with which it might injure itself, call in the rattle to the res-

cue. And this method is quite proper for baby children, but it is often continued to a much later age with harmful results. As soon as the self-consciousness of the child is fairly developed, that is, about the third year, this method should no longer be employed. It is important that the will power of the young be strengthened. Now the more the will is accustomed to fasten upon the objects of desire, the stronger does it become, while, by rapidly introducing new objects the will is distracted and a certain shiftlessness is induced, the will being made to glide from one object to another without fixing itself definitely upon any one. It is far better to allow a child to develop a will of its own, but to make it understand that it must at times yield this will to the will of the parent, than thus to distract its attention. If it wants a knife which it ought not to have, make it understand firmly, though never harshly, that it cannot have what it wants, that it must yield its wish to the parent's wish. Nor is it at all necessary every time to give the reasons why. The fact that the parent commands is a sufficient reason.

The rules thus far mentioned are, that we shall not punish in anger, that we shall not identify the child with its fault, that we shall be sparing of admonitions and let positive discipline speak for itself, and that, while demanding nothing which is unreasonable, we should insist on implicit obedience.

There is one question that touches the general subject of punishment and reward which I have reserved for the end of this discourse because it is in some sense the most important and vital of all the questions we are considering. It throws a bright light or a deep shadow on the whole theory of life, according to the point of

view we take. I allude to the question whether the pleasures of the senses should be treated as a reward for the performance of duty. A parent says to his child: "You have been good to-day; you have studied your lessons; your deportment has been satisfactory; I will reward you by giving you sweetmeats, or by taking you on a holiday into the country." But what connection can there possibly be between the performance of duty and the physical pleasure enjoyed in eating sweetmeats? Is not the connection a purely arbitrary one? Does it not depend upon the notion that there is no intrinsic satisfaction in a moral act? We ought to see that it is radically wrong to make such enjoyments the reward of virtue; we ought to have the courage to make application of our better theories to the education of our children, if we would develop in them the germs of a nobler, freer manhood and womanhood. I admit, indeed, that a child is not yet sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet morally, and that its virtuous inclinations need to be supported and assisted; but we can give it this assistance by means of our approbation or disapprobation.

To be in disgrace with its parents ought to be for a child the heaviest penalty. To have their favor should be its highest reward. But simply because a child is most easily taken on the side of its animal instincts, are we to appeal to it on that side? Should it not be our aim to raise the young child above the mere desire for physical gratification, to prevent it from attaching too much importance to such pleasures. The conduct of many parents, however, I fear, tends to foster artificially that lower nature in their offspring which it should rather be their aim to repress. By their method of be-

stowing extraneous rewards parents contribute to pervert the character of their children in earliest infancy, giving it a wrong direction from the start.

But, it may be objected, is there not a wholesome truth contained in St. Paul's saying that "he who will not work, neither shall he eat?" Is not our conscience offended when we see a person enjoying the pleasures of life who will perform none of its more serious duties? And should we not all agree that, in a certain sense, virtue entitles one to pleasure, and the absence of virtue ough to preclude one from pleasure. To meet this point let us dwell for a moment on the following considerations. Man is endowed with a variety of faculties, and a different type of pleasure or satisfaction arises from the exercise of each. Pleasure, in general, may be defined as the feeling which results from succcessful exercise of any of our faculties—physical, mental or moral. A successful rider takes pleasure in horsemanship, an athlete in the lifting of weights. The greater an artist's mastery over his art the greater the pleasure he derives from it. The more complex and difficult the problems which a scholar is able to resolve, the more delight does he find in study. And the same is true of the moral nature. The more a man succeeds in harmonizing his inner life, and in helping to make the principles of social harmony prevail in the world about him, the more satisfaction will he derive from the exercise of virtue. But the main fact which we are bound to remember is that it is impossible to pay for the exercise of any one faculty by the pleasure derived from the exercise of another; that each faculty is legitimately paid only in its own coin. If you ask a horseman, who has just returned from an exhilarating ride, what compensa-

tion he expects to receive for the exercise he has taken, he will probably look at you in blank amazement, with grave misgivings as to your sanity. If you ask a scientist what reward he expects to receive for the pursuit of knowledge, he will answer you, if he is an expert in the use of his intellect, that he expects no ulterior reward of any kind; that not positive knowledge so much as the sense of growth in the attainment of knowledge is the highest reward which he can imagine. And the same answer you will get from a person who is expert in the use of his moral faculty—namely, that not virtue so much as growth in virtue, not the results achieved by the exercise of the faculty, but the successful exercise itself is the supreme compensation. I have used the word "expert" in all these cases, and precisely "there's the rub." The reason why many persons cannot get themselves to believe that the exercise of the mental and moral faculties is a sufficient reward is because they are not expert, because they have not penetrated far enough along the lines of knowledge and virtue to obtain the satisfactions of them. But the same applies to the tyro in any pursuit. A rider who has not yet acquired a firm seat in the saddle will hardly derive much pleasure from horseback exercise. An awkward, clumsy dancer, who cannot keep step, will get no pleasure from dancing. There is no help for the tyro, no matter in what direction he aims at excellence, except to go on trying until he becomes expert. But, in the meantime, while he is making his bungling attempts, I do not see what sense there is in proposing to reward him with a cake.

I have said that each faculty is sovereign in its own sphere, that each provides its proper satisfactions within

itself and does not borrow them from the domain of any of the others. Nevertheless, we are constrained to admit the important truth that is contained in the saying of St. Paul. And this truth, it seems to me, may be formulated in the words that, while physical pleasure is not the reward of virtue, virtue ought to be regarded as the condition *sine qua non* of the enjoyment of physical pleasures—at least, so far as the distribution of such pleasures is within the power of the educator or of society. And this proposition depends on the difference in rank that subsists between our faculties, of which some are superior and others inferior, the moral and intellectual faculties rightfully occupying the top of the scale. We do inwardly rebel when we see the indolent and self-indulgent living in luxury and affluence. And this not because the enjoyments which such persons command are the proper compensations of virtue, or because physical pain would be the proper punishment of their moral faults, but because we demand that the lower faculties shall not be exercised at the expense and to the neglect of the higher, that the legitimate rank and order of our faculties shall not be subverted. And, applying this idea to the case of children, I think it would be perfectly proper to deny a child that has failed to study its lessons or has given other occasion for serious displeasure the privilege of going on a holiday to the country or enjoying its favorite sports. Everything, however, will depend—as so much in education does depend—on the manner; in this instance, on what we imply in our denial, rather than on what we expressly state. The denial, it seems to me, should be made on the ground that there is a proper order in which the faculties are to be exercised; that

the higher, the mental faculties, should be exercised first, and that he who will not aim at the higher satisfactions, neither shall he, so far as we can prevent, enjoy the lower. On the other hand, by making physical pleasures—sports, games and the like—the reward of study, we exalt these satisfactions so as to make *them* seem the higher, so as to make the satisfactions of knowledge appear of lesser value compared with the satisfactions of the senses.

In an ideal community, every one of our faculties would be brought into play in turn, without our ever being tempted to regard the pleasures of the one as compensation for the exercise of the other. The human soul has often been compared to an instrument with many strings. Perhaps it may not be amiss to compare it to an orchestra. In this orchestra the violins represent the intellectual faculties. They lead the rest. Then there are the flute-notes of love, the trumpet tones of ambition, the rattling drums and cymbals of the passions and appetites. Each of these instruments is to come in in its proper place, while the moral plan of life is the musical composition which they all assist in rendering. What we should try to banish is the vicious idea of extraneous reward, the notion that man is an animal whose object in life is to eat and drink, to possess gold and fine garments, and to gratify every lower desire, and that he can be brought to labor only on condition that he may obtain such pleasures. What we should impress instead is the notion that labor itself is satisfying—manual labor, mental labor, moral labor—and that the more difficult the labor, the higher the compensating satisfactions.

THE PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN.*

(SECOND LECTURE.)

BY FELIX ADLER.

In my last address I endeavored to combat the notion that physical pleasure should be offered as a reward for virtue, and physical pain inflicted as a punishment for moral faults. To-day we are in a position to apply this conclusion to some special questions which it is proposed to take up for consideration. The first of these relates to corporal punishment.

It was in that period of history which is so justly called the dark ages that the lurid doctrine of hell as a place for the eternal bodily torture of the wicked haunted men's minds, and the same medieval period witnessed the most horrible examples of corporal punishment in the schools and in the homes. This was no mere coincidence. As the manners of the people are so will their religion be. Savage parents who treat their children in a cruel, passionate way naturally entertain the idea of a god who treats his human children in the same way. If we wish to purify the religious beliefs of men, we must first ameliorate their daily life. There was once a schoolmaster who boasted that during his long and interesting career he had inflicted corporal punishment more than a million times. In mod-

* The first lecture on "The Punishment of Children," was published in the April number.

ern days the tide of public opinion has set strongly against corporal punishment. It is being abolished in many of our public institutions, and the majority of cultivated parents have a decided feeling against availing themselves of this method of discipline. But the mere sentiment against it is not sufficient. Is the opposition to it the result possibly of that increased sensitiveness to pain which we observe in the modern man, of the indisposition to inflict or to witness suffering? Then some stern teacher might tell us that to inflict suffering is sometimes necessary, that it is a sign of weakness to shrink from it, that as the surgeon must sometimes apply the knife in order to effect a radical cure, so the conscientious parent should sometimes inflict physical pain in order to eradicate grievous faults. The stern teacher might warn us against "sparing the rod and spoiling the child." We must not, therefore, base our opposition to corporal punishment merely on sentimental grounds. And there is no need for doing so, for there are sound principles on which the argument may be made to rest. Corporal punishment does not merely conflict with our tenderer sympathies; it thwarts and defeats the purpose of moral reformation. In the first place it brutalizes the child; secondly, in many cases it breaks the child's spirit, making it a moral coward, and thirdly, it tends to weaken the sense of shame, on which the hope of moral improvement depends.

Corporal punishment brutalizes the child. A brute we are justified in beating, though of course never in a cruel, merciless way. A lazy beast of burden may be stirred up to work; an obstinate mule must feel the touch of the whip. Corporal punishment implies that a rational

human being is on the level of an amimal.* Its underlying thought is: you can be controlled only through your animal instincts; you can be moved only by an appeal to your bodily feelings. It is a practical denial of that higher nature which exists in every human being. And this is a degrading view of human character. A child which is accustomed to be treated like an animal is apt to behave like an animal. Thus corporal punishment instead of moralizing serves to demoralize the character.

In the next place corporal punishment often breaks the spirit of a child. Have you ever observed how some children that have been often whipped will whine and beg off when the angry parent is about to take out the rattan: "O, I will never do it again; O, let me off this time." What an abject sight it is—a child fawning and entreating and groveling like a dog. And must not the parent, too, feel humiliated in such a situation! Courage is one of the noblest of the manly virtues. We should train our children to bear unavoidable pain without flinching, but sensitive natures can only be slowly accustomed to endure suffering, and chastisement, when it is frequent and severe, results in making a sensitive child more and more cowardly, more and more afraid of the blows. In such cases it is the parents themselves, by their barbarous discipline, who stamp the ugly vice of cowardice upon their children.

Even more disastrous is the third effect of corporal

* It is an open question whether light corporal punishment should not occasionally be permitted in the case of very young children who have not yet arrived at the age of reason. In this case, at all events, there is no danger that the permission will be abused. No one would think of seriously hurting a very young child.

punishment, that of blunting the sense of shame. Some children quail before a blow, but others, of a more obstinate disposition, assume an attitude of dogged indifference. They hold out the hand, they take the stinging blows, they utter no cry, they never wince; they will not let the teacher or father triumph over them to that extent; they walk off in stolid indifference. Now, a blow is an invasion of personal liberty. Every one who receives a blow feels a natural impulse to resent it. But boys who are compelled by those in authority over them to submit often to such humiliation are liable to lose the finer feeling for what is humiliating. They become, as the popular phrase puts it, "hardened." Their sense of shame is deadened. But sensitiveness to shame is that quality of our nature on which, above all others, moral progress depends. The stigma of public disgrace is one of the most potent safe-guards of virtue. The world cries "shame" upon the thief, and the dread of the disgrace which is implied in being called a thief acts as one of the strongest preventives upon those whom hunger and poverty might tempt to steal. The world cries "shame" upon the law-breaker in general, but those who in their youth are accustomed to be put to shame by corporal punishment are likely to become obtuse to other forms of disgrace as well. The cry, "shame upon you," will fall on dull ears. And the same criticism applies to those means of publicly disgracing children which have been in vogue so long—the fool's cap, the awkward squad, the bad boy's bench, and the like. When a child finds itself frequently exposed to ignominy it becomes indifferent to ignominy, and thus the door is opened for the entrance of the

worst vices. There is one excellence, indeed, which I perceive in corporal punishment: it is an excellent means of breeding criminals. Parents who inflict frequent corporal punishment, I make bold to say, are helping to prepare their children for a life of crime; they put them on a level with the brute, break their spirit and weaken their sense of shame.

The second special question which we have to consider relates to the mark system. As this system is applied to hundreds of thousands of school children, the question whether that influence is good or evil concerns us closely. I am of the opinion that it is evil. The true aim of every school should be to lead the pupils to pursue knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and to preserve a correct deportment in order to gain the approbation of conscience and of the teacher whose judgment represents the verdict of conscience. I object to the mark system because it introduces a kind of outward payment for progress in study and good conduct. The marks which the pupil receives stand for the dollars and cents which the man will receive later on for his work. So much school work performed, so many marks in return. But a child should be taught to study for the pleasure which study gives, and for the improvement of the mind which is its happy result. I know of a school where the penalty for a certain misdemeanor consists in the forfeiture of twelve marks. One day a pupil being detected in a forbidden act, turned to the teacher and said: "I agree to the forfeit; you can strike off my twelve marks," and then went on openly transgressing the rule, as if he had paid out so many shil-

lings for an enjoyment which he was determined to have. As if the outward forfeit could atone for the anti-moral spirit by which the act was inspired. But how is it possible by any external system of marks to change the anti-moral spirit of an offender? I object furthermore to the marking system because the discriminations to which it leads can never be really just. One boy receives an average of ninety-seven and one-half per cent., and another of ninety-five. The one who receives ninety-seven and one-half thinks himself superior to, and is ranked as the superior of the one who has received only ninety-five. But is it possible to rate mental and moral differences between children in this arithmetical fashion? And above all I object to this system because it appeals to a low spirit of competition among the young in order to incite them to study. "Ambition is avarice on stilts," as Landor puts it. Of course it is better to try to outshine others in what is excellent than in what is vicious; but if the object be that of outshining others at all, of gaining superiority over others, no matter how high the faculties may be which are called into exercise, the motive is impure and ought to be condemned. There is a general impression abroad that men are not yet good enough to make it practicable to appeal to their better nature. But it is forgotten that by constantly appealing to the baser impulses we give these undue prominence, and starve out and weaken the nobler instincts. Whatever the truth may be in regard to later life, it seems to me culpable to foster this sort of competition in young children. Now the mark spirit does foster such a spirit in our schools. It teaches the pupils to work for dis-

tinction rather than for the solid satisfaction of growth in intelligence and mental power. Doubtless where the method of instruction is mechanical, where the atmosphere of the class-room is dull and lifeless, and the tasks are uninteresting, it is necessary to use artificial means in order to keep the pupils to their work; it is necessary to give them the sweet waters of flattered self-esteem in order to induce them to swallow the dry as dust contents of a barren school learning. But is it not possible to have schools in which every subject taught shall be made interesting to the scholars, in which the ways of knowledge shall become the ways of pleasantness, in which there shall be sufficient variety in the program of lessons to keep the minds of the pupils constantly fresh and vigorous, in which the pupils shall not be rewarded by being dismissed at an earlier hour than usual from the school, but in which possibly they shall consider it reward to be allowed to remain longer than usual? And, indeed, requests of this sort are often made in schools of the better kind, and in such schools there is no need of an artificial mark system, no need to stimulate the unwholesome ambition of the pupils, no need to bribe them to perform their tasks. Rather do such pupils look with affection upon their school; and the daily task itself is a delight and a sufficient reward. I do not, of course, oppose the giving of reports to children. Such expressions as "good," "fair," and "poor," which formulate the teacher's opinion of the pupil from time to time, are indispensable, inasmuch as they acquaint the parents and the pupil himself with the instructor's general approval or disapprobation. I only oppose the numerical calculation of merit and demerit, and the

vulgar method of determining the pupil's rank in the class according to percentages. Under that method the pupils, having pursued knowledge only as a means to the end of satisfying their pride and vanity, relax their efforts when they have gained this ambitious aim. They cease to take any deeper interest in the pursuit of knowledge the moment they have achieved their purpose. The notorious failure of the system, despite all its artificial stimulants, to create lasting attachment and devotion to intellectual pursuits condemns the whole idea of marks, to my mind, beyond appeal.

We pass next to the method for correcting the faults of children which has been proposed by Herbert Spencer in his collected essays on Education. These essays have attracted great attention, as anything would be sure to do which comes from so distinguished a source. I have heard people who are ardent admirers of Spencer say: "We base the education of our children entirely on Mr. Spencer's book." All the more necessary is it to examine whether the recommendations of his book will wholly bear criticism. I cannot help feeling that if Mr. Spencer had been more thoroughly at home in the best educational literature of Germany he would not have presented to us an old method as if it were new, and would not have described that which is at best but a second or third rate help in moral education as the central principle of it all, the keynote of the whole theory of the moral training of the young.

The method which he advises us to adopt is that of visiting upon the child the natural penalties of its transgression, of causing it to experience the inevitable consequences of evil acts in order that it may avoid evil, of

building up the moral nature of the child by leading it to observe the outward results of its acts. Mr. Spencer points out that when a child puts its finger into the flame, or when it incautiously touches a hot stove, it is burned; "a burnt child shuns the fire." When a child carelessly handles a sharp knife it is apt to cut its fingers. This is a salutary lesson; it will be more careful thereafter; this is the method of nature, viz., of teaching by experience. And this is a kind of cure-all which he offers for general application. He does indeed admit, at the close of his essay, that, in certain cases where the evil consequences are out of all proportion to the fault, some other method than that of experience must be adopted. But in general he recommends the method of nature, as he calls it. For instance, a child in the nursery has littered the floor with its toys, and after finishing its play refuses to put them away. When next the child asks for its toy box the reply of its mother should be: "The last time you had your toys you left them lying on the floor and Jane had to pick them up. Jane is too busy to pick up every time the things you leave about, and I cannot do it myself, so that as you will not put away your toys when you have done with them I cannot let you have them." This is obviously a natural consequence and must be so recognized by the child. Or a little girl, Constance by name, is scarcely ever ready in time for the daily walk. The governess and the other children are almost invariably compelled to wait. In the world the penalty of being behind time is the loss of some advantage that one would otherwise have gained. The train is gone, or the steamboat is just

leaving its moorings, or the good seats in the concert room are filled; and every one may see that it is the prospective deprivation entailed by being late which prevents people from being unpunctual. Should not this prospective deprivation control the child's conduct also? If Constance is not ready at the appointed time the natural result should be that she is left behind and loses her walk. Or again, a boy is in the habit of recklessly soiling and tearing his clothes. He should be compelled to clean them and to mend the tear as well as he can. And if having no decent clothes to go in, the boy is ever prevented from joining the rest of the family on a holiday excursion and the like, it is manifest that he will keenly feel the punishment and perceive that his own carelessness is the cause of it. But I think it can easily be made clear that this method of moral discipline should be an exceptional and not a general one, and that there are not a few but many occasions when it becomes simply impossible to visit upon children the natural penalties of their transgressions. In these cases the evil consequences are too great or too remote for us to allow the child to learn from experience. A boy is leaning too far out of the window; shall we let him take the natural penalty of his folly? The natural penalty would be to fall and break his neck. Or a child is about to rush from a heated room into the cold street with insufficient covering; shall we let the child take the natural penalty of its heedlessness? The natural penalty might be an attack of pneumonia. Or again, in certain parts of the country it is imprudent to be out on the water after night-fall owing to the danger of malaria. A boy who is fond of rowing insists upon

going out in his boat after dark; shall we allow him to learn by experience the evil consequences of his act and gain wisdom by suffering the natural penalty? The natural penalty might be that he would come home in a violent fever. To show how much mischief the application of the Spencerian method might work, let me mention a case which came under my observation. A certain teacher had been studying Herbert Spencer and was much impressed with his ideas. One wet, rainy day a number of children came to school without overshoes. The teacher had often told them that they must wear their overshoes when it rained; having neglected to do so their feet were wet. Now came the application of the natural penalty theory. Instead of keeping the children near the fire while their shoes were being dried in the kitchen, they were allowed to run about in their stocking feet in the large school hall in order to fix in their minds the idea that as they had made their shoes unfit to wear they must now go without them. This was in truth moral discipline with a vengeance. It is in many instances impossible to let the natural penalties of their transgressions fall upon children; it would be dangerous to health, to life and limb, and also to character, to do so. Pray, understand me well; I do not deny that the method of natural penalties is capable of being applied to advantage in the moral training of children. Namely, as the German philosopher Herbart pointed out many years ago, it can be used as a means of building up the confidence of children in the authority of their parents and educators. The father says to his child: "You must not touch the stove or you will be burned." The child disobeys his

command and is burned. "Did I not warn you?" says the father, "do you not see that I was right? Hereafter believe my words and do not wait to test them in your experience." The comparatively few cases in which the child may without injury be made to experience the consequences of its acts should be utilized to strengthen its belief in the wisdom and goodness of its parents, so that in an infinitely greater number of cases their authority will act upon the mind of the child almost as powerfully as the actual experience of the evil consequences would act. Mr. Spencer himself admits, as I have said, that there are what he calls extreme cases to which the system he recommends does not apply. In these he falls back upon parental displeasure as the proper penalty. But parental displeasure, according to his view, is an indirect and not a direct penalty, and to use his own words: "The error which we have been combating is that of substituting parental displeasure for the penalties which nature has established." Yet he himself in regard to the graver offenses does substitute parental displeasure, and thus abandons his own position. There is, moreover, a second ground on which I would rest my criticism. The art of the educator sometimes consists in *deliberately warding off* the natural penalties, though the child knows what they are and perhaps expects to pay them. So far is the method of Spencer from bearing the test of application that the very opposite of what he recommends is right in some of the most important instances. Take the case of lying, for instance. The natural penalty of telling a falsehood is not to be believed the next time, but the real secret of moral redemption consists in not inflict-

ing this penalty. We emphasize our belief in the offender, despite the fact that he has told a falsehood, we show that we expect him never to tell a falsehood again, we seek to drive the spirit of untruthfulness out of him; by believing in him we strengthen him to overcome temptation. And so in many other instances we rescue, we redeem, by not inflicting the natural penalty.

The task of moral education is laid upon us. It is not a task that can be learned by reading a few scattered essays; it is often a heavy burden and involves a constant responsibility. I know it is not right *always* to make parents responsible for the faults which appear in their children. I am well aware that the worst fruit sometimes comes from the best stock, and that black sheep are sometimes to be found in the best families. But I cannot help thinking that if these black sheep were taken charge of in the right way in early childhood the results might turn out differently than they often do. The picture of Jesus on which the early church loved to dwell is the picture of the good shepherd who follows after the lamb that has strayed from the fold, and brings it back and carries it tenderly in his arms. I think if parents were more faithful shepherds, and cared for their wayward children with deeper solicitude and tenderness, they might often succeed in winning them back. But even apart from these exceptional cases the task of training children morally is one of immense gravity and difficulty. And how are most parents prepared for the discharge of this task? Why, they are not at all prepared. They rely merely upon impulse, and upon traditions which are often altogether

wrong and harmful. They do as they have seen other fathers and mothers do, and thus the same mistakes are perpetuated from generation to generation. Such parents, if they were asked to repair a clock, would say: "No; we must first learn about the mechanism of a clock before we undertake to repair it." But the delicate and complex mechanism of a child's soul they undertake to repair without any adequate knowledge of the springs by which it is moved, or of the system of adjustments by which it is enabled to perform its highest work. They thrust their crude hands into the mechanism and often damage or break it altogether. I do not pretend for a moment that education is as yet a perfect science; I know it is not. I do not pretend that it can give us a great deal of light; but such light as it can give we ought to be all the more anxious to obtain on account of the prevailing darkness. The time will doubtless come when the science of education will be acknowledged to be, in some sense, the greatest of all the sciences; when among the benefactors of the race, the great statesmen, the great inventors, and even the great reformers will not be ranked as high as the great educators.

THE PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN.

(CONCLUDING LECTURE.)

BY FELIX ADLER.

In order that a parent shall properly influence a child's character, it is necessary for him to know what that character is, and what the nature is of each fault with which he is dealing. I feel almost like asking pardon for saying anything so self-evident. It seems like saying that a physician who is called to a sick-bed, before beginning to prescribe, should know the nature of the disease for which he is prescribing, should not prescribe for one disease when he is dealing with another. I do not know enough about physicians to say whether such mistakes ever happen among them; but that such egregious mistakes do occur among parents all the time, I am sure. There are many parents who never stop to ask before they punish—that is, before they prescribe their moral remedies—what the nature of the disease is with which their child is afflicted. They never take the trouble to make a diagnosis of the case in order to treat it correctly. There is perhaps not one parent in a thousand who has a clear idea of the character of his child, or to whom it even so much as occurs that he ought to have a clear conception of that character, a map of it, a chart of it, laid out, as it were, in his mind. The trouble is that our attention is not usually called to this important matter of the mapping out of character. I

propose that we make it the special subject of this concluding address.

I am prepared at the outset for the objection that the case against parents has been overstated. There are parents who freely acknowledge: "My child is obstinate; I know it has an obstinate character." Others say; "My child, alas, is untruthful;" others again: "My child is indolent." But these symptoms are far too indeterminate to base upon them a correct reformatory treatment. Such symptoms may be due to a variety of causes, and not until we have discovered the underlying cause in any given case can we be sure that we are following the right method. Take the case, for instance, of obstinacy: a child is told to do a certain thing and it refuses. Now, here is a dilemma. How shall we act? There are those who say: in such cases a child must be chastised until it does what it is told. A gentleman who was present here last Sunday had the kindness to send me during the week a copy of John Wesley's sermons, and in this volume, under the head of Obedience to Parents, I read the following words: "Break your child's will in order that it may not perish. Break its will as soon as it can speak plainly—or even before it can speak at all. At any rate, as soon as a child is a year old it should be forced to do as it is told, even if you have to whip it ten times running; break its will in order that its soul may live." But by following this line of treatment we may obtain a result the very opposite of that which we intended. Obstinacy in many cases is due to sensitiveness. There are some children as sensitive to impressions as is that well-known flower which closes its quivering leaves at the slightest touch.

These sensitive children retreat into themselves at the first sign of unfriendliness or aggression from without. The reason why such a child does not obey its father's command is not, perhaps, because it is unwilling to do as it is told, but because of the stern face, the impatient gesture, the raised voice with which the parent accompanies the command, and which jars upon the child's feelings. If such a parent, incensed at the child's disobedience, becomes still more severe, raises his voice still more, he will only make matters worse. The child will shrink from him still more and continue its passive resistance. In this manner obstinacy, which was at first only a passing spell, may become a fixed trait in the child's character. To be sure, we should not, on the other hand, treat these sensitive children only with caresses. In this way we encourage their sensitiveness, whereas we should regard it as a weakness that requires to be gradually but steadily overcome. The middle way seems the best. Let the parent exact obedience from the child by gentle firmness, by a firmness in which there shall be no trace of passion, no heightened feeling, and with a gentleness which, gentle as it may be, shall be at the same time unyielding. But while obstinacy is sometimes due to softness of nature, it is at other times due to the opposite—to hardness of nature, and according to the case we should vary our treatment. There are persons who having once made up their mind to do a thing cannot be moved from their resolution by any amount of persuasion. These hard natures, these concentrated wills, are bound to have their way, no matter whom they injure, no matter what stands in the way. Such persons—and we notice the beginnings of this trait

in children—need to be taught to respect the rights of others. Their wills should occasionally be allowed to collide with the wills of others, in order that they may discover that there are other wills limiting theirs, and may learn the necessary lesson of submission. In yet other cases obstinacy is due to stupidity. Persons of weak intelligence are apt to be suspicious. Not understanding the motives of others, they distrust them; unwilling to follow the guidance of others, they cling with a sort of desperation to their own purpose. These cases may be treated by removing the cause of suspicion, by patiently explaining one's motives, where it is possible to do so, by awakening confidence.

Again, let us take the fault of untruthfulness. One cannot sufficiently commend the watchfulness of those parents who take alarm at the slightest sign of falsehood in a child. A lie should always put us on our guard. The arch fiend is justly called "the father of lies." The habit of falsehood, when it has become settled, is the sure inlet to worse vices. At the same time not all falsehoods are equally culpable or equally indicative of evil tendency, and we should have a care to discriminate the different causes of falsehood in the young child, in order that we may pursue the proper treatment. Sometimes falsehood is due to redundant imagination, especially in young children who have not yet learned to distinguish between fact and fancy. In such cases we may restrain the child's imagination by directing its attention to the world of fact, by trying to interest it in natural history and the like. We should especially set the example of strict accuracy ourselves in all our statements, no matter how unimportant they may be. For instance,

if we narrate certain occurrences in the presence of the child, we should be careful to observe the exact order in which the events occurred, and if we have made a mistake we should take pains to correct ourselves, though the order of occurrence is really immaterial. Precisely because it is immaterial we show by this means how much we value accuracy even in little things. Then, again, falsehood is often due to the desire for gain. Or it may be due to fear. The child is afraid of the severity of the parent's discipline. In that case we are to blame; we must relax our discipline. We have no business to tempt the child into falsehood. Again, untruthfulness is often due to mistaken sympathy, as we see in the case of pupils in school, who will tell a falsehood to shield a fellow pupil. In the worst cases falsehood is inspired by malice. It may be said that the proper positive treatment for this fault is to set the example of the strictest truthfulness ourselves, to avoid the little falsehoods which we sometimes allow ourselves without compunction, to show our disgust at a lie, to fill the child with a sense of the baseness of lying, and above all to find out the direct cause which has tempted the child in any given case. As a rule falsehood is only a means to an end; children do not tell untruths because they like to tell them, but because they have some ulterior end in view. Find out what that ulterior end is, and instead of directing your attention only to the lie, penetrate to the motive that has led the child into falsehood, and try to divert it from the bad end. Thus you may extract the cause of its wrong doing.

Thirdly, let us consider the fault of laziness. Laziness is sometimes due to physical causes. Nothing may

be necessary but a change of diet, exercise in the fresh air, etc., to cure the evil. Sometimes it is the sign of a certain slow growth of the mind. There are fruits in the garden of the gods that ripen slowly, and these fruits are often not the least precious or the least beautiful when they finally have matured. Sir Isaac Newton's mind was one of these slowly ripening fruits. In school he was regarded as a dullard and his teachers had small hopes of him. Laziness, like other faults of character, sometimes disappears in the process of growth. Just as at a certain period in the life of a youth or maiden new faculties seem to develop, new passions arise, a new life begins to stir in the heart, so at a certain period qualities with which we had long been familiar, disappear of themselves. We have very little light upon this subject, but the fact that a great transformation of character sometimes does take place in children without any perceptible cause is quite certain, and it may be offered as a comforting reflection to those parents who are over-anxious on account of the faults they detect in their children. But again, on the other hand, laziness or untruthfulness or obstinacy may be a black streak, coming to the surface out of the nethermost strata of moral depravity, and taken in connection with other traits may justify the most serious apprehension, and should then be a signal for immediate measures of the most stringent sort.

I am thus led to the second branch of my subject. I have tried to meet the objection of the parent who says: "I know the character of my child; I know my child is obstinate," by replying, if you only know that your child is obstinate you know very little; you need

to know what are the causes of his obstinacy, and vary your treatment accordingly. Or if anyone says : "My child is untruthful," I reply, you need to find out what the cause is of this untruthfulness and vary your treatment accordingly. Or again, in the case which we have just considered, I have pointed out that laziness in a child may have no serious meaning whatever or may give just cause for the most serious alarm, according to the group of characteristic traits of which it is one. On this point I wish to lay stress. If you desire to obtain a correct impression of a human face you do not look at the eye by itself, then at the nose, then fix your attention on the cheeks and the chin and the brow, but you regard all these features together and view them in their relations to one another. Or let us recur to the simile of the physician. What would you think of the doctor who should judge the nature of a disease by some one symptom which happened to obtrude itself, or should treat each symptom as it appears separately, without endeavoring to reach the occult cause which has given rise to the symptoms, of which they are all but the outward manifestation. And yet that is precisely the incredible mistake which every one of us, I venture to say, is apt to make in the treatment of children's characters. We judge of them by some one trait, as obstinacy, which happens to obtrude itself on our attention, and we prescribe for each symptom as it arises ; we treat obstinacy by itself, and untruthfulness and indolence separately, without endeavoring to get at the underlying cause of all these symptoms. The point I desire to make is that in the education of our children it is necessary not only to study individual traits, but

each trait in connection with the group to which it belongs. Take for an illustration the case last mentioned—that of laziness.

There is a well known type group or group of characteristic traits, of which laziness is one. The chief components of this group are the following: The sense of shame is wanting; that is one trait. The will is under the control of random impulses, good impulses mingle helter-skelter with bad. There is an indisposition on the part of such a child to prolonged exertion in any direction, even in the direction of pleasure. That is perhaps the most dangerous trait of all. If you try to deal, as people actually do, with each of these traits separately, you will fail. If you try to influence the sense of shame you will meet with no response; if you disgrace such a child you will make it worse; if you whip it you will harden it. If you attempt to overcome indolence by the promise of rewards that will be useless. The child forgets promised rewards just as quickly as it forgets threatened punishment. This forgetfulness, this lack of coherency in its ideas is particularly characteristic. The ideas of such a child are imperfectly connected. The ties between causes and their effects are feeble. The contents of the child's mind are in a state of unstable equilibrium. There is no point of fixity in its mental realm. And the cure for such a condition is to establish fixity in the thoughts, to induce habits of industry and application by steady, unrelaxing discipline, and especially by means of manual training. The immense value of mechanical labor as a means of moral improvement has been appreciated until now only to a very imperfect extent. Mechanical labor wisely directed

secures mental fixity because it concentrates the child's attention for days and often for weeks upon a single task. Mechanical labor stimulates moral pride by enabling the pupil to produce articles of value, and giving him in this way the sense of achievement. Mechanical labor also overcomes indolence by compelling settled habits of industry, whereby the random impulses of the will are brought under control.

The type group which we have just considered is one of the most clearly marked and easily recognized. It is a type which we often meet with among the so-called criminal classes, where its characteristic features can be seen in exaggerated proportions. Without attempting to analyze any additional types (a task of great delicacy and difficulty), the truth that the underlying fault of character is often unlike the symptoms which appear most conspicuously on the surface may be further illustrated by the following example. I have known of a person who made himself obnoxious to his friends by his overbearing manners and apparent arrogance. Casual observers condemned him on account of what they believed to be his overweening self-confidence, and expressed the opinion that his self-conceit ought to be broken down. But the real trouble with him was not that he was too self-confident, but that he had not self-confidence enough. His self-confidence needed to be built up. He was overbearing in society because he did not trust himself, because he was always afraid of not being able to hold his own, and hence he exaggerated on the other side. Those who take such a person to be in reality what he seems to be will never be able to influence him. And if we find such a trait in a child, and simply treat it as if it

were arrogant, we shall miss the mark entirely. We must find the underlying principle of the character, the occult cause of which the surface symptoms are the effects.

Our knowledge of the great type groups is as yet extremely meager. Psychology has yet to do its work in this direction, and books on education give us but little help. But there are certain means by which the task of investigation may possibly be assisted.

One means is the study of the plays of Shakespeare. That master mind has created certain types of character which repay the closest analysis. The study of the best biographies is a second means. The study of the moral characteristics of the primitive races—a study which has been begun by Herbert Spencer in his work on Descriptive Sociology and by Waitz in his "Anthropologie der Naturvölker"—is perhaps another means; and honest introspection, when it shall have become the rule among intelligent persons, instead of being the exception, will probably be the best means.

I am afraid that some of my hearers from having been over-confident as educators in the beginning may now have become over-timid. From having said to themselves: "Why, of course we know the characteristics of our children," they may now, since the difficulties of studying character have been explained, be disposed to exclaim in a kind of despair: "Who can ever understand the character of a single human being?" A perfect understanding of any human being is indeed impossible. We do not perfectly know even those who are nearest and dearest to us. But there are means of reaching at least approximate results, so far as children are con-

cerned, and a few of these permit me to briefly summarize: Try to win the confidence of the child so that it may disclose its inner life to you. Children accept the benefactions of their parents as unthinkingly as they breathe the air around them. Show them that your care and untiring devotion must be deserved, not taken as a matter of course. In this way you will deepen their attachment, and lead them to willingly open their hearts to you. At the same time enter into the lesser concerns of their life. Become their comrades, their counselors, stoop to them, let them cling to you. Observe your children when they are at play, for it is then that they throw off their reserve and show themselves as they are. Some children, for instance, will not join a game unless they can be leaders; is not that a sign of character? Some children will take an unfair advantage at play, and justify themselves by saying: "It is only in play." Some are persistent in a game while others tire of any game after a little while. Others are sticklers for a strict observance of the rules. Observe how your sons or daughters are regarded by their companions; children are often wonderfully quick to detect one another's faults. Try to find out what the favorite pursuits and studies of your child are, by what it is repelled, by what attracted, and to what it is indifferent. Above all, keep a record of your child's development. Do not shun the labor involved in this. You know very well that nothing worth having can be obtained without labor. Yet most parents are unwilling to give *sufficient* time and attention to the education of their children. Keep a record of the most significant words and acts of the child. Thus after a while you may have a picture

of the child's inward condition before you, an assemblage of characteristic traits, and by comparing one trait with another, you may find the clue to a deeper understanding of its nature.

What I have said about children applies equally to ourselves. I started out by saying that not one parent in a thousand knows his child's character. I conclude by saying that not one man or woman in a thousand knows his or her own character. We go through life cherishing an unreal conception of ourselves which is often inspired by vanity. I am well aware that it is difficult to know one's self, but there are helps in this direction also. We can look over our own past record, we can honestly examine how we have acted in the leading crises of our lives, we can summon our own characteristic traits before our minds—the things that we like to dwell upon, and the things which we would gladly blot out of our memories if we could—and by comparing this trait with that, we may discover the springs by which we have been moved. It is difficult to attain self-knowledge, but it is imperative that we should try to attain it. The aim of our existence is to improve our characters, and clearly we cannot improve them unless we know them.

I have undertaken to-day to grapple with a most difficult subject, but I shall have accomplished the purpose which I had in mind if I have awakened in you a deeper desire to ask yourselves, first, what is the character of my child; second, what is my own character? The most serious business of our lives is to try to find the answers to these two questions.

THE ETHICS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN.*

BY S. BURNS WESTON.

When my subject was first announced six weeks ago, "The Moral Aspect of the War Spirit," a war cloud was distinctly visible on the political horizon. Since then important historical events have taken place in rapid succession, and the cloud has grown more threatening and extensive, until it has covered with its sinister darkness our whole political sky, and its latent pent-up violence has at last broken forth.

In some respects this is a most unsuitable time to speak upon the ethical bearings of our war with Spain. While we are in the very midst of so much public excitement, it is difficult for any one to be calm enough to judge fairly the real merits of the issues involved. The popular feelings which flame up so vigorously in a crisis like the present irresistibly affect us, and it requires all one's moral strength not to be swept away by the tide of the general sentiment, in whatever direction that may turn. In order to judge accurately of the true significance of events, a certain historic perspective is necessary. The next generation therefore will be far better able to see the rights and wrongs of this unhappy international conflict than we are. Indeed, history will record with an unerring hand the ethics of our war with Spain.

* A lecture given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, Sunday, May 8th, 1898.

But, as witnesses and actors in this international tragedy, we surely must have some convictions in regard to it; we must know where our sympathies lie, and we must have some reasons for them, at least in those calmer moments when we rise above the passions of the crowd and yield ourselves to sober reflection.

One of the objects of these Sunday morning meetings is to afford an opportunity for the serious consideration of those vital moral questions which affect every-day life; and we would approach every subject in an attitude of unprejudiced investigation and of calm, philosophic reasoning. But freedom of thought is one of our fundamental principles; and consequently I stand here today, not as the mouthpiece of the Society, but to express my own convictions as to the moral aspects of this terrible war in which our country is engaged.

In order to appreciate the full gravity of this conflict, let us consider at some length *the terrible nature of war*. The first thing that impresses every one is its inhumanity—its horrible and brutal sacrifice of human life. War is the very incarnation of evil and stands in direct opposition to the highest precepts of reason and morality, of philosophy and religion. It gives no heed to the inherent sanctity of human life. It sets men to murdering each other and bestows upon the most successful murderers the palm of victory in a contested right. It is an appeal to brute force, instead of to reason, to settle questions at issue between man and man. It turns away from the methods of civilization and adopts those of barbarism.

Furthermore, it sacrifices in the most cruel manner conceivable the best manhood of the time. The

younger and stronger men of the country, many of them just starting out into life with the promise of a career of great usefulness before them, are summoned to leave home and friends, to abandon the work for which they have fitted themselves through years of preparation and labor, and to take up arms and fight against men with whom they have no personal enmity whatever. In this direful business the harvest of death is always great, and on both sides innumerable homes that were once happy mourn the loss of those who have sacrificed their lives in battle.

But apart from its utter brutality and the loss and sorrow it means to so many homes, think of its wholesale destruction of the resources of the world. Think of the families which, through losing those upon whom they relied for support, are forced into a condition of poverty and destitution and made dependent upon the charity of individuals or of society. It is thirty-three years since our Civil War was brought to a close, and yet the pensions which are paid by the government to the families of the wounded and the dead now amount to about $140,000,000 a year. There is a well-grounded suspicion abroad that this includes many fraudulent claims, but it nevertheless represents one item of the great cost of our late Civil War, the running expenses of which were $1,000,000 a day during the first year and $3,000,000 a day during the last year of the war. The present annual expenses of so-called Christian Europe for military purposes, even during times of peace, run so high up into the hundreds of millions that the imagination fails to grasp the amount, and about three million men are kept standing in arms.

Imagine what it would mean if all that is now paid to keep the different nations in readiness to fight with each other could be devoted to the peaceful pursuits of civilization, to the promotion of science and art and education! Imagine what a gain to humanity it would be if the physical and moral strength of all those who waste their lives in European barracks could be applied to those various fields of useful activity for which their talents are fitted! While the different European nations are by profession the followers of him whose fundamental teaching was the doctrine of human brotherhood, yet in practice, owing to the intense military spirit that prevails, they are followers of the Prince of Evil rather than the Prince of Peace. Not Christ but the Devil is the patron saint of militarism.

If any one needs to be convinced of what a diabolical business war is, let him read what some of the experienced generals of the past have said of it. "Ours is a damnable profession," said an old British general. "War is the trade of barbarians," said Napoleon, in one of his reflective moods. "War is hell!" said General Sherman. Could anything be more condemnatory? The testimony of many of the best minds of modern times is to the same effect. "Put together all the vices of all the ages and places," said Voltaire, "and they will not come up to the mischiefs of one campaign." "Will nations never devise," said Jefferson, "a more rational umpire of differences than force? War is an instrument entirely inefficient towards reducing wrong, and multiplies, instead of indemnifying, losses." "There never has been," said Franklin, "nor ever will be any such thing as good war or a bad peace." Among the

advocates of peace as opposed to war and the war spirit may be counted such names as Thomas à Kempis, Leibnitz, Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, as well as those early Christian fathers, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen and Basil, and the modern Quakers led by George Fox and William Penn.

But notwithstanding the testimony against war given by active generals and quiet thinkers, by the primitive Christian and the modern Quaker, wars have been going on in every age and still continue. A glance into history shows that in the process of nation-building the whole pathway of civilization has been reddened with the blood of conflict. Yet some progress has been made. In the so-called civilized countries war would no longer be tolerated for many of the offences which were formerly thought to justify it. The conscience of mankind has almost entirely outgrown its sanction of the private duel, and is shocked if two men attempt to settle their dispute by a deadly conflict. But when the individuals are displaced by battalions, and the dispute to be settled is not between one man and another but between two nations; when, in a word, the duel has assumed an international proportion and the instruments of war used are such as can destroy in a moment not one life but thousands; then the conscience is smothered, and the bloody spectacle is called by both sides an act of the highest patriotism. Alas, that in the name of patriotism such inhuman barbarism could ever be justified!

One of the strangest paradoxes in history is the frequency with which the religions of the past have invoked the war spirit. Among the ancient Greeks no

gifts to the gods were thought to be so acceptable as the trophies of war. Mohammedanism has always claimed the right to spread itself by means of the sword. Stranger still is the support that has been given by so many Christians to war. "We may look in vain," says Lecky, "for any period since Constantine in which the clergy, as a body, exerted themselves to repress the military spirit." This is explained by the fact that most ecclesiastics have believed that a special Providence watched over and guided the affairs of their own nation, and war has been looked upon as a means of carrying out the Divine Will. That this superstitious idea still prevails may be seen from the reports of many recent pulpit utterances. Even a liberal-minded minister of this city said last Sunday morning, in speaking of the war with Spain (if the report in one of our most reliable papers is correct), that he "was convinced that it is the will of God that we are standing to-day arrayed against each other with drawn swords and murderous guns, and not of our own free choice." This reminds me of an opinion expressed by one of the pious early chroniclers of the Indian wars in New England who, after telling of a battle in which several hundred Indians were killed with the loss of only a few white men, said: "There never was so much of God and so little of man seen in any business of that kind before." Yet one of the incidents related was that a number of white men tied an Indian prisoner to a tree by one leg and with a rope tied to the other pulled him to pieces! The hand of God was not evident to the poor Indian. If those ministers of religion who talk about war being "God-ordained" would call it devil-inspired they would be far nearer the truth.

Would it not be far wiser in our pious chroniclers and modern ministers to be less modest about mankind's ability to conduct its own affairs and, instead of ascribing so much to Providence, to accept human responsibility for the way things go with us in this world?

It is we human beings who are responsible for the existence of every war. If political education and morality were higher, if the different nations had in their Congresses and Parliaments and as their Chief Executives men who fully comprehended the true significance of the idea of a State and were conscious of its high moral functions, the arbitrament of force would no longer be resorted to for settling international differences. But human society, it must sadly be admitted, has not reached that high level. Even in the most advanced countries many barbarianisms still remain, and one of the worst of these is the war spirit.

In order to bring about the entire cessation of war, and the peaceful solution of all international questions, it is not enough that one side in any important dispute should have reached a high state of political and international morality; it is also necessary that the other side shall have advanced to somewhere near the same level. Otherwise, occasions will now and then arise when there seems to be no other alternative but war. Was this the case in our controversy with Spain? Was the war inevitable? Is it justifiable?

The moral character of the American people is now on trial. The attention of all the world is directed towards the unhappy conflict in which we are engaged. We are being watched in every step of this great crisis, and the significance of every national act is being

weighed by the people of other nations. What their verdict may be is of little importance compared to the testimony of the conscience of our own people, and whether that is such as will harmonize with the verdict of the future enlightened conscience of mankind. In what spirit then and for what cause are we now engaged in this awful conflict with Spain? What justification can there be for this frightful international tragedy at the close of the nineteenth century?

This is a question that cannot be answered categorically according to our mere sentiments in regard to war. There are many things to be taken into account, and some of the most important of these afford us just that historical perspective which is so essential in deciding upon the final merits of the contentions made by the two sides in this conflict. It may not be possible for us to render a final verdict upon the stirring events of the present, but the events of the past are written on the pages of history which are accessible to all. To some of the facts of history bearing on this subject let us now turn our attention.

In looking at our own past relations with Spain, the first thing that strikes the attention is that it was Spanish enterprise that led to the discovery of this continent. At one time Spain had vast territorial possessions on this side of the Atlantic; but, for one cause or another, those possessions kept diminishing, until at last her only important foothold was the fair island of Cuba, which has practically been in her possession ever since it was discovered by Columbus. On the other hand, our own possessions have steadily increased during the larger part of the century and a quarter of our national exist-

ence, until we now cover a territory which extends from the great Northern Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico and stretches from ocean to ocean. During all this time our relations to Spain have been of a friendly character.

An important fact in our history that has a direct bearing on the subject before us is that our country has hitherto followed the policy, first enunciated by Washington, of not allowing ourselves to become entangled in European politics. And, as a corollary to this, the doctrine has been well established, now known as the "Monroe doctrine," that no European country shall be allowed to disturb the political affairs of this continent by the acquisition of any new territory. While we have thus held aloof from meddling in the political affairs of Europe, we have made ourselves sponsors, so to speak, of the political destinies of America. From this point of view, and because Cuba lies close to our own territory, we naturally have some concern in her peace and prosperity, and a very decided responsibility to prevent that country from being continually devastated by wars brought on by constant oppression and misgovernment.

Here, then, we strike the real root of our trouble with Spain. It is not Spain's relations to the United States, but her relations to Cuba; it is the past three-quarters of a century of misgovernment and abuse, culminating in the reconcentrado act—an act of eternal dishonor to our century; it is this that has brought on the present armed conflict. It was only after acquainting myself with the main facts of Cuban history, that I came to see the full gravity of the situation and the justification of the course our different Presidents have pursued.

Ever since the early part of the century Spanish gov-

ernment in Cuba has been absolutely despotic, accompanied with enormous financial burdens laid upon the people, largely for Spain's own benefit. The Cuban debt is now said to be $522,000,000! Besides paying interest on its vast debt, there have been heavy taxes, a large part of which for many years went into the pockets of dishonest custom-house officers. All public offices were filled by Spaniards and high saleries were paid: for instance, to the Captain-General, $50,000 a year, besides a palace and various other expenses; to each of the Governors of the six provinces (and bear in mind that all Cuba is not quite as large as the State of Pennsylvania), $12,000 a year; to the two Archbishops, $18,000 a year and to the other officials accordingly. Moreover there has been no home rule, no freedom in religion, no general public school system, no internal improvements to speak of, and no steps allowed that would tend to develop a national consciousness and a national life. The island has been Spain-ridden, and that means despot-ridden and priest-ridden, and all the time matters, instead of improving, have steadily grown worse. No people with a spark of liberty in their breasts would long endure such a state of affairs.

And, as a matter of fact, the Cubans have been in revolt again and again during the greater part of the century. Insurrection after insurrection has broken out and war after war has been going on. An insurrection in 1868 led to a war that lasted over ten years, and was only then brought to a close by the promises of reforms that were never fulfilled. The present insurrection has already been in active operation for over three years, and not even the 200,000 or more soldiers transported from

Spain have been able to subdue it. Indeed the conflict which has been going on in that island between those aspiring for freedom and those determined upon despotism and oppression is by its very nature an *irrepressible* one. A people that has once caught the idea of a free and representative form of government will never permanently endure such oppressive rulership as Spain has given to Cuba. On the other hand, a country that has had the deadly virus of haughty despotism working in its national arteries for centuries will fight to the last rather than yield its sovereignty over one of its colonies. Between Spain, therefore, and any nation actively espousing the cause of the down-trodden Cubans war was, perhaps, inevitable.

I cannot see how any one who believes in the Revolution of 1775, and in the principles of the Declaration of Independence which were proclaimed in yonder historic Hall in 1776, can fail to sympathize with the Cuban cause. And however strongly we may disbelieve in war, we must not forget that the destinies of this country have been shaped by two momentous military conflicts of vast proportions. We must not forget what it cost to lay the foundations of this republic, and what we owe to the armies led by Washington in those trying years from the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill to the siege of Yorktown. Neither can we ever forget that when our country was in danger of being rent asunder, the national integrity of the republic was saved and the States recemented into a lasting and inseparable union, by the Federal armies that were in active service from the time of the battle of Bull Run to the final surrender of Lee's sword to General Grant at Appomattox.

Frightful as was the cost of those two wars, they were worth to humanity all they cost and more. Whenever and wherever one people is subjected to long and continued oppression by another, it finally becomes unendurable and they rise up in their might, and others rise up with them, to throw off the yoke of the oppressor. The moral instincts of mankind are invariably on the side of such an uprising. The moral spirit rebels when the rights and freedom of a people are systematically crushed year after year and decade after decade, and justifies revolution, even if war be its inevitable consequence. For, though war in itself is one of the greatest of evils, it is one that cannot always be avoided in our present stage of civilization.

For more than a quarter of a century our government has been warning Spain that the wretched state of affairs in Cuba could not be allowed to indefinitely continue. In the autumn of 1875 the Secretary of State under President Grant wrote to our Minister at Madrid that "the instincts of humanity demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba." Later on in the same year President Grant, in his annual message, intimated that intervention might have to be seriously considered. In his last annual message President Cleveland distinctly warned Spain that our patience in waiting for her to pacify the island could not last much longer, and that intervention might become our duty. In the same spirit the present administration took up the matter and dealt with it in a manner that won universal approval.

Pending these last negotiations, the whole civilized world was startled and shocked by the destruction of

the "Maine." This of course greatly aggravated the situation. Under the circumstances, suspicion was naturally directed against Spanish officials as being in some way responsible for that terrible affair. Many believed and still believe that that was a sufficient *casus belli*, and that the real ground of the present hostilities is to avenge the death of those who lost their lives that fatal night of February 15th. But is this a justifiable attitude? In the light of the report made by our own court of inquiry, which, while stating that it believed that the "Maine" was destroyed by a submarine mine, said that no evidence was obtainable to place its responsibility upon Spanish authorities; in the light of the fact that the government of Spain offered to submit the matter to arbitration, there is certainly no just basis for the present war on account of the "Maine" affair. Under all the circumstances of doubt and mystery that surround it, that was an eminently fit subject for an impartial court of arbitration; and the submission of it to such a tribunal would have been the course which the conscience of the country would have demanded, if that matter could have been disposed of separately.

I have more faith in the moral character of our people than to believe that an affair, however terrible in its destruction of life and property, the real cause of which was uncertain, and which the party under suspicion had offered to arbitrate, could effectually awaken in the people at large the demon of war. No, it was not the "Maine" affair, but the heart-sickening condition of men, women and children starving and dying by the thousands in Cuba; not the "Maine" affair, but the fact that a brutal war which has been going on for years and seemed in-

terminable, had culminated in such a ghastly spectacle as was witnessed and reported by Senator Proctor and a number of our consuls in different parts of Cuba; not the "Maine" affair, but Weylerism was the real cause which led our country, on pure grounds of humanity, to intervene to put a stop to a state of things which the President well said had become intolerable. If any one can read the reports which were submitted to Congress without being filled with burning moral indignation against the Spanish Government, his heart must indeed be made of stone, his soul composed of clay.

If I believed that intervention was brought on merely to aid the sugar and tobacco trusts and bondholders; if I believed that it was the result of that sort of jingoism which is ever ready to imflame the war spirit with a view to territorial aggrandizement; if I believed that it was a mere scheme to further partisan political ends and to influence the next election; I would denounce the government and throw whatever influence I possessed against the prosecution of the war, even though I knew it would be called treason and that I would be denounced as a traitor. I am not one of those who interpret patriotism to mean blind devotion to one's country in any and every course it may pursue, whether right or wrong. I have no sympathy with the sentiment attributed to Commodre Decatur: "Our country may she always be right; but, right or wrong, may she always be victorious." True patriotism does not require the indorsement of such a sentiment. It calls us rather to look after those things which are the real foundation of national stability and national progress, and it is as true now as in the days of the Hebrew prophets, that right-

eousness alone exalteth a nation; that the ways of wisdom are the ways of peace; that the abiding strength of a nation lies not in the amount of her territory, but in the character of her people.

Let us not be misled either by the bombastic jingo oratory of certain Congressmen or by the attitude of the so called "yellow journals." Let us think better of our country than to believe that they had much influence on the sober second thought which Congress and the administration gave to the present crisis. Let not our utter hatred of war blind us as to the true causes of this one; let not our sentiment override our judgment. It was the recital of the terrible conditions which existed close to our own territory that aroused the conscience of the entire country, and made the voice of the President literally the voice of the American people, when he said that this state of things must now come to an end.

But if there are any who cannot conscientiously support the government in its present course; if they see in this conflict with Spain only the basest political motives, they should be allowed to give free expression to their convictions without being called traitors or unpatriotic. This is a free country and not a despotism. It would not be free if all were not allowed to give full expression to their honest convictions. The minority always has rights as well as the majority, and those rights must be guarded. They are essential to a republican form of government; they are the very core of its existence. Whenever a republic attempts to throttle free speech, it strangles its own life. Some of the papers seem to think that those who in all honesty cannot

justify or support our war with Spain have no right to give expression to their views. If the government itself took such an attitude it would be a national calamity of the gravest kind. It need not be feared that expressions of disapproval of the war by some will weaken the strong moral convictions of the great majority as to the justice of intervention, or diminish the patriotic fervor with which they will respond to any calls which the exigencies of the time demand.

No government is infallible. There is none which, however high its motive, is not liable to make mistakes. And I say frankly that I believe our government made a mistake in not waiting until every resource of diplomacy had been exhausted before presenting our final ultimatum to Spain. When the Spanish Government saw that we were really in earnest and meant what we said, then, at the eleventh hour, it began to make concessions and promised reforms. If it be said that Spain has hitherto made promises of reforms in Cuba only to be broken; yet it was possible for us to keep our eye directly upon her and to take steps at forced intervention, if within a given time her pledges were not made good. If it be said that her concessions and promises came too late, I answer that in this respect, too, the moral law applies to nations as well as to individuals; that in the old adage, "it is never too late to mend," and that it would have been much wiser and far more humane to have given Spain one more trial to make her promises good than to have totally disregarded them, and adopted a course which could mean nothing else than a declaration of war. To suppose that Spain would submissively yield to such an ultimatum as was framed by Congress

was to be absolutely blind to the proud, sensitive Spanish nature, and indeed to human nature everywhere. Very likely Spain would never have been willing to give up all that she would have been obliged to, in order to pacify the insurgents and put the island in a condition of permanent peace; yet as long as there was the remotest chance of such a possibility, we should have given Spain, with all her broken promises, the benefit of the doubt, and made every effort to avert the terrible consequences of a resort to the arbitrament of force.

But, while I am an ardent advocate of the principles of peace and the settlement of all national and international difficulties by arbitration, I am not one of those who believe in peace at any and every price. There are certain principles of humanity which we are bound to maintain at any cost. There are some things that are more sacred than life itself. Who will say that the lives laid down for the cause of American Independence were not a glorious sacrifice? But those who have been struggling so long for Cuban Independence have just as noble a cause. Indeed the Cubans have stronger reasons for their revolt against Spain than our Colonies had for revolting against England; and I say that we are not worthy of the heritage bequeathed to us by the heroes of the Revolution, if we have no sympathy for those who have been laying down their lives for Cuban Independence.

Ah! but 'tis said that Cuba is entirely outside of the limits of the United States, that she belongs to Spain, and that Spain has a right to do as she pleases with her own. This, it seems to me, is a fundamental mistake. Our nation could no more be justified in allowing such

Spanish atrocities to go on as have recently existed in Cuba, than would a strong man to see a child being brutally beaten without taking any steps to prevent it. With Spanish forms of government, with her mediævalism and ecclesiasticism, we have nothing whatever to do. That is no vital concern of ours. But with Spanish inhumanity at our very door and in our constant sight, we are irresistibly compelled to concern ourselves. That is our affair, because it is the affair of humanity on this continent. It was our special duty to put an end to it, as it was the special duty of the Christian nations of Europe to interfere and put an end to the Armenian atrocities—a duty which, to their everlasting disgrace, they neglected. Those who adopt the individualistic, *laissez-faire* attitude that no amount of inhumanity—not even the extremest measures to exterminate those who are rebelling against intolerable oppression—would justify interference, take a position that is neither tenable on grounds of morality nor in harmony with the true progress of civilization.

I deprecate as much as any one the final haste and unseemly manner in which our ultimatum was presented to Spain. And yet the decision of our government *to intervene in the interests of humanity* will, I believe, be amply justified by the tribunal of history. It was not for Cuban territory, it was not for any mercenary or materialistic motive, that we have signified our willingness to pour out our treasures and, if need be, our very lives in behalf of Cuba. Our motives are disinterested. Spain cannot see this; the greater part of Europe may not yet admit it; but they, it must be borne in mind, have not been used to disinterested motives in interna-

tional affairs, They naturally think it is a mere grab game on our part, in order to extend the territory and importance of the United States. But rather may this whole country be sunk beneath the level of the sea than that such a view should be verified. If we have brought on the present international crisis with the profession of humanity on our lips and territorial greed in our hearts, we deserve no better fate. As a nation, we are guilty of no such thing. But many American citizens are heartily ashamed of the manner in which Congress forced the hands of the President.

And now, whether through wise measures or grievous mistakes, the conflict has come, and may it be carried to a speedy and victorious end. All honor, therefore, to those who are volunteering their services to the country in this present crisis! All honor to the heroes of 1898! Their patriotism cannot be questioned. The motives which are inspiring them to respond to the President's call are as noble as ever led men into the field of battle. They are breaking away in sorrow from the strong ties of home, for no selfish purposes. And whether they lose their lives on the Pacific or on the Atlantic, on our own coast or on Cuban soil; or whether they escape that unfortunate fate and return to their homes and occupations, the future will, I believe, rise up and bless them for the task they have set themselves to accomplish.

May the present war be conducted on our part in as humane a manner as anything so diabolical can be. Let us not retain trophies or prizes which have been taken from private, unoffending individuals, either on sea or land; and when the final account is made up, let us be generous to Spain, and prove to her and to the

world that we have no base ulterior motives of territorial conquest; that our one object is to see that those great evils in Cuba which have been such an offense to humanity shall cease, and that human rights and human life shall henceforth be regarded on that island.

But has not our course made matters far worse for the poor reconcentrados? This is surely one of the saddest aspects of this bad business. Yet our object in intervention was not merely to relieve those who are now suffering in Cuba, but to do away with the causes which made such a state of things possible, and which might lead again to similar conditions. We are acting not merely for the present, but for the future. The probing of such a cancerous spot in our civilization necessarily entails, for the time being, much suffering.

And again, have we not enough to do, it is asked, to look after our own national shortcomings, without attempting to right the wrongs of another country? Are we not enduring a sort of political despotism ourselves, and being ruled in city, state and nation by corrupt, self-seeking politicians? And should we not give attention to these things instead of to the affairs of Cuba? But because we have so much political corruption at home is no more reason why we should not make an effort to right grievous wrongs on a neighboring island, than that a man should not do the heroic act of saving the life of another just because he was leading a bad life himself. Such an act loses none of its nobleness because of any ignobleness of the doer. And it may be that that very act will prove to be a regenerative force in all that man's after life.

While the present conflict lasts many reforms now

needing urgent attention will, it is true, be overlooked or laid aside, and the agents of corruption will have a freer hand. But if our motive in intervention is what I believe it to be, then this great sacrifice we are now making for the cause of humanity will in the end react beneficially, not only on our own national life, but upon international politics.

The state, as well as the individual, is a moral organism, and the commandments of morality are no less applicable to the former than to the latter; and may the United States take the lead in showing to the world what such an organism should be. May it stand for the idea that the true interests of one country are the true interests of all. May it act on the principle that the progress of the future lies in the direction of a great commonwealth of nations, in which war between the different members will be as impossible as a duel between two brothers. To be sure, such a consummation is as yet only a mere dream; but it is a dream, or a prophecy, which, in the natural course of civilization, is bound in time to be fulfilled, if the law of evolution and progress has any meaning whatever.

The hand on the dial of time seems to-day to be turning backward, and to be pointing toward medievalism rather than toward the end of the nineteenth century, toward barbarism rather than toward civilization. While this military conflict lasts we might almost imagine ourselves in the darkest part of the dark ages. The very stars seem to have lost their luster and the sun its brightness, so appalling is the conflict, so heavy is the heart that seriously contemplates the sad spectacle which the world is now witnessing. While we ear-

nestly hope that our armies and navies will be as victorious in every battle as was brave Commodore Dewey at Manila, yet each victory is an occasion for tears rather than for joy, for we know that every conflict results in many wounds and the shedding of much human blood. And let us remember that the heart of a Spanish mother is as tender towards the son she loses in battle as that of any American mother. Yes,

"Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn."

Let me, in conclusion, express the hope that our war with Spain will be the last armed conflict in which our nation will ever engage. Sixty years ago Emerson said: "War is on its last legs, and a universal peace is as sure as is the prevalence of civilization over barbarism, of liberal governments over feudal forms. The question for us is only, how soon?" The time has not yet come, but I believe it is coming, and that the present war with Spain will in the end be conducive to that result. It has already brought us and the Mother Country into a closer union, and this may prove to be a permanent step towards a great international federation of states—a World Republic, and help on the time

"When the war-drums throb no longer, and the battle-flags are furled
In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World."

THE PLAN OF AN ETHICAL SUNDAY SCHOOL.

BY W. L. SHELDON.

I.

In venturing to give this outline of a scheme of instruction for an Ethical Sunday school, I shall simply undertake to describe the system we have been working out in connection with our Ethical Society in St. Louis.

It was our intention to reverse the process customary in the average Sunday school, letting the teaching concerning "religious conceptions" come in at the end of the course, about the time when the young people are passing on into young manhood and young womanhood; on the other hand, *beginning* the course of instruction with the elements of morality. It has not been our purpose in any way definitely to antagonize so-called religious beliefs. But instead of beginning our teaching with talks about "God," this comes in as the last step, with which we close our course of instruction for the young, just before they leave our charge to enter the larger School of Life.

At the same time, I am well aware that we can never have a satisfactory Sunday school of any kind until fathers and mothers shall send their children with the same seriousness of purpose with which they send their children to the day-school. In so far as we must hold

the young only by pleasing them we can never accomplish the full purpose we are striving for.

I believe, for my own part, in a Sunday school. It offers a line of instruction quite unlike, in spirit, that ordinarily given in the week-day school. And it is my conviction that we should have a separate time for this special class of work, so that it could be distinguished in the minds of the young from that form of instruction which is given them chiefly in order that they may be able to earn their living. The laws of life, or the ideal purposes for which we are to live, ought not to be associated in the thoughts of young people with the rather dreary study of reading, writing and arithmetic.

It was with this thought in view that, some years ago, we began to set apart a portion of each Sunday morning exclusively for the young, in connection with the work of our St. Louis Ethical Society. It was our intention to divide the hour and a quarter appropriated for this purpose into two portions. In the first place, we wished to have something that would take the place, for the young, of the so-called "religious service" and appeal to the receptive side of their natures. We desired to work on the sentiments, to touch the *heart* in certain directions. The opportunities for reaching this side of the growing soul in its younger days are great enough. In this part of the work, it is vitally essential that what we offer the young people should give a certain pleasure. To a degree, they must like it, or else the effect for the most part is lost. If they will not take what is offered, we must find something else that will appeal to them.

These general exercises which I have thought of as a kind of "religious service" for the young, have been held in part before the class-work, and in part after-

wards. The study-time, during which we ask the young people to *think*, or be *active* with their minds, comes in, therefore, between the two series of general exercises.

The foundation of our school is a short "catechism" or Responsive Exercise. I know the objection to what is termed a "catechism." We understand only too well what mischief has come from undertaking to teach children by rote. And yet, on the other hand, I am convinced that it is worth while to lodge at once in the minds of the young the few main, fundamental principles underlying our whole scheme of instruction. Nearly all that we have to give throughout the long course from seven up to sixteen years of age, is but an illustration or working out of these few principles.

I will submit this Responsive Exercise, in order that our first principles may be understood at the outset. We place this catechism on a large scroll before the eyes of the members of the school where it can be read from time to time. It will be seen in what way we use it. The questions or citations are rendered by one or another of the teachers, the responses being read in concert by the children, the Superintendent beginning and ending the reading with the refrain: "Truth is the strong thing: let man's life be true." We do not read this every Sunday, as we should not want the young people to grow tired of it. We do not undertake to analyze it or explain it, but just let it stand for what it is worth in the minds of the pupils. We assume that little by little it will unfold itself in the course of instruction we give them, so that by the time they are fifteen or sixteen years of age they shall *feel* what it means, without anything definite by way of explanation having been said in regard to it:

RESPONSES.

Superintendent:

"Truth is the strong thing, Let man's life be true."

The School:

The Sense of Duty we should place above everything else in the world.

Superintendent:

"Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong."

The School:

The Good Life for its own sake, without thought of reward, is what we should most care for.

One of the Teachers:

"Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

One of the Teachers:

"Though the cause of evil prosper,
Yet 'tis truth alone is strong."

Superintendent:

COMMANDS WE ARE TO OBEY.

The School:

1. Thou shalt not lie.
2. Thou shalt not steal.
3. Thou shalt do no murder.
4. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
5. Thou shalt not covet what belongs to another.

One of the Teachers:

"The Eternal seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Eternal looketh on the heart."

One of the Teachers:

"Whoever fights, whoever falls,
Justice conquers evermore,
Justice after as before."
We should all love justice.

Superintendent:

COMMANDS WE ARE TO OBEY.

The School:

1. Thou shalt obey thy conscience.
2. Thou shalt revere the soul in thyself and in all others.
3. Thou shalt honor thy father and thy mother.
4. Thou shalt respect the laws of thy country.
5. Thou shalt make thyself of service to thy fellow man.

One of the Teachers:

"Look not outside of yourself for a refuge; be a refuge to yourself."

One of the Teachers:

"To thine own self be true;
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

Superintendent:

WHAT WE ARE TO LOVE.

The School:

We are to love the Good with a supreme love.

We are to love knowledge, and to seek Truth wherever it may be found.

We are to love the Beautiful; but even more we are to love the Good and the True.

We are to love these as if they were one: the True, the Beautiful and the Good.

One of the Teachers:

"The Soul itself is the witness of the Soul, and the Soul is the refuge of the Soul; despise not thine own Soul, the supreme witness of men."

One of the Teachers:

"I do nothing but go about, persuading old and young alike, to care first and chiefly for the greatest improvement of the soul."

Superintendent:

WHAT WE ARE TO DO.

The School:

1. We should think first of our father and mother.
2. We should labor for the welfare of our own home.
3. We should help those who are weak or in trouble.
4. We should work for the good of our country.
5. We should believe in the Brotherhood of Man.

One of the Teachers:

"He that is greatest among you shall be as one that serves."

May we always be ready to serve.

One of the Teachers:

"Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love."

Superintendent:

WHAT WE ARE TO STRIVE FOR.

The School:

To be true to ourselves, true to our home, true to our country, true to our fellow-men. We are to strive to be true in everything.

Superintendent:

"Truth is the strong thing, Let man's life be true."

Along with this responsive exercise, or "catechism," as I term it, we have songs. We do not care to have a large selection. Forty or fifty songs ought to be enough for the school, as it is important that the children should gradually come to know them by heart and to sing them with spirit. Unfortunately it is not an easy matter to find just the selections suitable for our purpose. For the most part they ought to grow out of our work. It goes without saying that we use a portion of Dr. Adler's "City of the Light." Then we take such lines as

"The rose is queen among the flowers;
None other is so fair;
The lily nodding on its stem
With fragrance fills the air;"

which are sung to the air of "Auld Lang Syne," and the walls fairly ring with the music, as the words are rendered in that old tune which the children are so fond of. Or we take a portion of the beautiful poem:

"So here hath been dawning
Another blue day:
Think, wilt thou let it
Slip useless away?"

To please the youngest, we may have the following words, wanting in poetry, but with a *ring* to them that leads the little ones to sing them with a glee almost wild in its delight:

"Do it, do it with a will,
Do it right away;
If you've anything to do,
Do it right away."

If we are desperate, in order to arouse the children we can always fall back on a song of that kind, and the

little ones are always tempted to rise and leap up and down as they half sing it, half shout it forth.

Then, too, we may strike a deeper chord, with a faint touch of solemnity in it, as we introduce a song dealing with the experience of stern, inevitable toil by which men must earn their subsistence, reminding us of the injunction laid upon the whole human race: ". . . In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat thy bread:"

> "You cannot pay with money the million sons of toil;
> The sailor on the ocean; the peasant on the soil;
> The laborer in the quarry; the heaver of the coal;
> Your money pays the labor: it cannot pay the soul."

It is not to be expected that the full significance of these songs will come at once. But if they are rendered often enough, it is to be assumed that, gradually, something of their meaning will sink into the hearts of those who sing them, and that the sentiments in such lines may eventually blend with the more serious course of instruction we are pursuing. All this naturally belongs to the effort we are making, to reach the young on the *receptive* side.

Along with the songs, before the class work begins, we usually aim to have a five-minute talk to those present, either by the Superintendent of the school or by a guest invited for the occasion, on the "Beautiful Thought" chosen for the day, of which each member of the school has received a copy to be committed to memory.

Once in every few weeks it is the plan to give the school a picture-talk as a feature of the introductory "religious service." We wish to reach the hearts or minds of the young through beautiful faces, beautiful buildings, beautiful scenes from nature or works of art.

For this purpose we naturally make use of the lantern slide. If the picture-talk deals with faces, we can use some of the rare pictures of the old masters, and through the instinctive sense of beauty we may begin to reach the ethical side of human nature. I cannot help thinking that a great result is accomplished just by letting the young sit quietly for a few moments looking at the face of one of the beautiful Madonnas by Raphael. Not much needs to be said; the young people are only to look and feel, taking in the effect, which to them, so far as they are conscious of it, is just a delight to the eye. Yet, while it is to them *consciously* only a delight to the eye, those radiant, majestic faces must somehow sink deep within the growing souls of those who are looking on, and leave an "after-glow" not easily erased.

So, too, I believe we can attain something of the same effect through pictures of sculpture. Some of the antique works of Greece and Rome, such as the head of Pallas, the beautiful face of the Hermes, or the bold figure of the Apollo Belvidere, are objects of eternal beauty and always suggest feelings of the ideal.

By such picture-talks we reach or touch the vague sense of the Infinite lurking in the minds of the young, while we are spared from trying to give them positive conceptions at the outset as to what the "Infinite" means, and by this mistaken method practically destroying the very sense of the Infinite altogether.

In another way, for instance. this result might be accomplished through a short talk about the pyramids. We can tell in a general way how old they are; what time and labor were required in building them; what majesty of size, or beauty of proportion they suggest—

without even alluding to the word Infinite or mentioning any religious conceptions at all. By this means we may gratify the instinctive interest in the grand, the majestic, or the sublime, without torturing or perverting the dawning intellectual side of the child nature by endeavoring to inculcate conceptions utterly beyond its grasp or comprehension.

It is our desire to associate the sentiments belonging to the Eternal, the Infinite, the Absolute, with the distinctions between Right and Wrong, with the thought of the Moral Law—but not to use these words so that they shall become hackneyed, before the child-mind has begun to have any conception at all as to what these words stand for.

All this is intended as a background of sentiment, in connection with our course of Ethical Instruction. If it stood by itself, it might have comparatively little value. Its significance comes in only when we connect it with the other work.

In place of the picture-lecture, once every few weeks we insert a form of musical service. The song, the piano, the violin, the cornet—almost any form of music or any instrument pleasing to the young, is made use of. To them *consciously*, it is of course, as we have said, only a delight to the ear. And it would be this and nothing more if it were not that we connect it definitely with the other portion of the morning's work, so that the two belong together. The sense of the Infinite aroused by a combination of beautiful sounds, is reached in this way also. By this other means, we may help to associate the solemn, mystical feelings about the "Eternal" the "Absolute," with the teachings of morality. We desire that all that sanctity which in the con-

ventional Sunday school has been connected with the word "God," should surround the thought of the Moral Law. It is the Moral Law which should sanctify the thought of God, rather than that the thought of God should sanctify the Moral Law. All this may seem rather dreamlike than an actual possibility. But it must be remembered that we ask the privilege of influencing the young only little by little over a period of eight or nine or ten years. From the receptive side we expect that much of this effect will be unconscious. To the young, as we have intimated, in so far as they *think* about it, a good deal of this "religious service" will be merely *a pleasure to the eye or a pleasure to the ear.* In our purpose it means a great deal more.

I have spoken of the "Beautiful Thought" for the day. We select from classic literature, from the best thinkers or the great Bibles of the Old World, here and there stray sentences that we desire to have lodged in the memories of the young. We use this method only as a minor feature, knowing only too well how futile much of the bare memorizing has proved in the conventional Sunday school. And yet there are gems of thought or sentiment crystalized in a few terse words coming down to us from the past, in such simple, beautiful forms that all people ought to know them. If we put off committing these sayings to memory until we are "grown up" the chances are that we shall never know them. Even if, now and then, such a thought or sentiment is beyond the grasp of the child, we can sometimes lodge the words there—not trying to explain them, but assuming that some time in later years these sayings may come back to the mind, with the meaning given to

the words through the long personal experience which each one must have after entering the arena of life. For the most part, the choicest of these sayings pertain to human life and contain the wisdom gained from ages of human experience. As an illustration I give the list of "Beautiful Thoughts" we have used for one year:

No man securely doth command, unless he hath learned readily to obey.—*Thomas a' Kempis.*

If thou faint in the day of adversity, thy strength is small.—*Proverbs of Solomon.*

If you wish for anything that belongs to another, that which is your own is lost.—*Epictetus.*

How long I shall live depends upon accident; but it depends upon myself how well I live.—*Seneca.*

Men are created for the sake of men, that they may mutually do good to one another.—*Cicero.*

Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall.—*St. Paul.*

The superior man thinks of virtue; the small man thinks of comfort. The superior man thinks of the sanctions of law; the small man thinks of favors which he may receive.—*Confucius.*

Nothing that does not enter my mind and get within me, can ever hurt me. Let me hold to this and I am safe.—*Marcus Aurelius.*

There is no condition of life that excludes a wise man from discharging his duty.—*Seneca.*

Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thy heart be glad when he is overthrown.—*Proverbs of Solomon.*

Neither the evening nor the morning star is more beautiful than justice.—*Aristotle.*

Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.—*Ecclesiastes.*

Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love. This is an old rule.—*Buddha.*

Create in me a clean heart and renew a right spirit within me.—*Psalms of the Hebrews.*

Let us therefore cast off the works of darkness and let us put on the armor of light.—*St. Paul.*

The reward of doing one duty is the power to perform another.—*Ben Azai.*

Choose the best life, and habit by and by will make you like it the best.—*Epictetus.*

What fools say is pleasure, that the noble say is pain; what fools say is pain, that the noble know as pleasure.—*Buddha.*

Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains, is there known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from an evil deed.—*Buddha.*

The evil bow before the good; and the wicked at the gates of the righteous.—*Proverbs of Solomon.*

The man whom reason guides is freer, when he lives in a community under the bond of common laws, than when he lives in a solitude where he obeys himself alone.—*Spinoza.*

A man should say: "I am not concerned that I have no place; I am concerned how I may fit myself for one. I am not concerned that I am not known; I seek to make myself worthy to be known." —*Confucius.*

Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good.—*St. Paul.*

He who lives looking for pleasure only, the tempter will certainly overthrow him, as the wind throws down a weak tree.—*Buddha.*

Now I go the way of all the earth, therefore be thou strong and show thyself a man.—*King David.*

After the lesson hour, during which the young people have been assembled in their respective classes, and when they come back once more for the second portion of the general exercises or "religious service," the "Beautiful Thought" for the day is recited by a member chosen from each class for that purpose, beginning with the youngest. One of the little ones rises and repeats the words; then one from the next older class, and so on back until we come to the class of adults, when the sentence is finally recited by the entire school in unison. If any of those present have not committed it to memory at the outset, they are quite sure to know it by heart before the time comes when they all repeat it together.

After this we usually have a recitation from one of the young people. It has been our desire that, little by little, they should come to know by heart some of the

rarest gems of ethical-religious thought or sentiment in prose or verse. We may select for the youngest ones the short poem about "The Daisy" from Wordsworth; or for the older boys and girls, possibly, such words as Clough's noble lines:

"... Say not the struggle naught availeth;"

or perhaps a chapter from the teachings of the "Path of Virtue" of Buddhism; or the solemn and heart-stirring words:

"... He was despised and rejected of men,"

from the prophet Isaiah. We also ask the members of the adult class to give recitations, and they may render from time to time such selections as Matthew Arnold's "Self Dependence;" or the "Apostrophe to Duty" by Immanuel Kant, or a passage from the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Then, perhaps, the leader of our school may read a short story, taking not more than five minutes—something that shall, as it were, "let the minds down" from the high level we have been endeavoring to keep them on during the study time, while giving something concrete from human life which the young can carry away with them.

Naturally, we end with a song, or else with our responsive exercise or "catechism."

It is only when we come to the active side of the child's mind and endeavor to reach or develop the ethical side of his nature by making the mind think for itself, that we have the more serious problems confronting us. Little by little we have been sketching the outlines for a series of studies covering a period of nine

years, from the age of seven to about sixteen ; and I shall endeavor in as terse a way as possible to give some idea of what kind of work we are trying to do in this course of instruction. It is the more important part of the work of the school, and the harder part. It means *work*, not only on the part of the young, but even more on the part of the teacher. It is not surprising that those who undertake to use such methods for ethical instruction should find difficulties in the way, and assert only too emphatically that the old method in the conventional Sunday school was much easier and gave more immediate results.

With the youngest of the children, from the ages of seven to nine years, we begin with the Bible stories of the Old Testament, from the account of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden down to David and Solomon and the establishment of the kingdom of Israel in Palestine. We do not undertake to have these taught in the conventional way, using the exact language of the Bible and giving *all* that we find there. The main point is to select such stories or tales as may have a meaning to the little ones and carry some sort of an ethical lesson. We tell these stories, as we have already said, not for the purpose of teaching the child about God, but about *man*, and what man has learned of life and about right and wrong through long ages of history and experience.

These tales are told as "stories," with no special discussion as to whether they are true or not true, whether they are history or not history. Problems of this kind may arise with adult classes dealing with the Bible ; but at the outset we have another purpose in view. I think that anyone can see why all children

should learn the stories of the Bible in one form or another; if for no other reason, because these stories are the basis of the literature of Christendom. Many a grown man nowadays is humiliated to find that he cannot understand some of the simplest allusions in what he reads, because of his ignorance of the stories from the Bible. The young ought to know them, if on no other grounds, just because everybody all over the world is *expected* to know them. Fathers and mothers cannot afford to submit their children to the possible humiliation in later years of being ignorant on subjects about which all cultured persons are supposed to know at least something.

But the advantage is that these stories from the Bible are not mere "stories." They are not like the tales from Homer, or like most of the other stories from the classical literatures of the world. These tales from the Bible, beginning with Adam and Eve, down to David and Solomon, can be told in an interesting way as illustrating the simple elements of morality. But it will be found that we cannot always read these stories to the young *exactly* as they stand in the Bible. Such a statement may be a shock to orthodox minds. And yet it is surprising how many orthodox minds are coming to admit this fact and to realize that the Bible as it stands, is to be read by the adult mind, and not by the child. Still, the moral thread is there, and it is this moral thread that we undertake to preserve and make use of by telling these stories or tales in simple language, leaving out such portions as are irrelevant, or such stories as may have no ethical import or may give a shock to the moral sense. As to the supernatural side, we do not have to talk about it. Where it becomes necessary for us to introduce it, we

can just let it stand and read it as a part of the tale. For myself, however, I prefer, in using these stories, to preserve the old Hebrew name of the Deity, "Yahweh," throughout, not positively connecting it with the higher conception of "God" such as comes out later on in the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah.

I may give a single illustration of one of these lessons, showing how we use these tales from the Bible, although the selection has to be made somewhat at random. Take, for instance, the story of "The Tower of Babel:"

It was a long while ago, just how long I cannot say, and over in another part of the world, after the time of the great Flood—it may have been hundreds of years later, when Noah was no longer alive and there were again a great number of people on earth. They had begun to build cities. They had riches once more, and they were giving themselves over to having a good time—seeking only after pleasures, and just those kind of pleasures which satisfy people for the moment and leave nothing behind.

They had so much wealth and they had been so successful in building their cities that they were overcome with pride. I suppose you know what that feeling means? In those days it seems that every man somehow felt as if he were better than any other man. So now I am going to tell you of something extraordinary that took place. What put it into the people's heads I do not know. It is never quite easy to explain the strange ideas or plans which some persons have. But be that as it may, the people at that time thought up the strangest sort of a scheme. As to the sense of it all, you must decide for yourselves. But they got it into their heads that they would build a tower. It was not to be just the ordinary kind of a tower, but something great and mighty; greater than anything which had ever been built before. It was to be high. "How high?" you ask. Why, they meant to make it go on up until it touched the sky. I suppose they did not know in those days just what the sky was, or how high it was up there. At any rate, they thought they could do it; in fact, they were sure of it.

They talked and talked a great deal about that tower, and how they would build it. And so at last they set to work and laid the

foundations. You can be sure these foundations were solid and strong. They were not going to have their tower tumble over; it was to stay there forever. "What did they do it for?" you ask. Well, I do not quite know. It may be that they did not know themselves. People do not always have the best of reasons for the plans they have. All I know is that they wanted to build a tower, and that it was to be something very large indeed. In fact, they wanted to see just what they could do. They had an idea that they could do almost anything, and they were quite sure they knew almost everything. They had stopped trying to learn anything more because they were so satisfied with themselves, thinking they knew it all, or all that ever could be known.

This tower then, I suppose, was to show how clever they were. They could look at it after it reached the sky and think what a big thing they had done and how much superior they would show themselves to any other human beings who ever lived before them, or to any people who might come afterwards. What sort of a feeling do you call this? "Pride," do you answer? Yes, that was it. These people were just *proud*. They evidently wanted, as we would say nowadays, to "show off."

You see the world was young then. There had not been very much history, and people had not found out "what they did not know." Sometimes it happens, as you may be aware, that the more ignorant a person is the more he thinks he knows. He likes to talk about himself, to think about himself; and he likes to have other people look at him and admire him and talk about him.

These strange people lived on what was called the Plain of Shinar, away over in Asia somewhere; and they began to build their tower. Just as soon as the foundations were laid, thousands of people would come out every day to look at it, and the more they looked at it the more esteem they felt for themselves, and the more sure they were that no people would ever be able to do anything so great or achieve anything so extraordinary as this tower was going to be. It kept on going up, higher and higher. At first it only reached to the tops of the doors of the houses; by and by it was as high as the roofs; then it went on up above the walls of the city, and soon it was higher than anything else in the country. Yet it kept on going up, and they made more brick and brought more stone and built it higher and higher, and as they watched the sky they kept wondering how long it would be before their tower would touch that great blue dome up there.

If they had been proud before they laid the foundations of that

tower, they grew more and more proud every day. They spent pretty much all their time admiring themselves. I suppose if there had been any books in those days they would have stopped reading them. Why should they read books when they "knew all about it"? What reason did they have for going to see other parts of the world when they were so superior themselves? Yet, all the while, up went that tower, and it did almost look as if it were going to touch the sky. "What sort of name did they give to it?" you ask. Well, I think I should have called it the "Tower of Pride"; but that was not the name they gave to it themselves.

But by and by something happened. Usually when people get too proud something does happen. Do you think that the tower fell down? No, it stayed there—at least, for a while; just how long I do not know. But there was a fall of another kind for the Tower of Pride.

It seems that Yahweh, the Ruler of the World, got to thinking about it, and he did not altogether approve of what was going on down there on the Plain of Shinar. He was quite certain if the human race went on in that way they would think they knew everything and that the world would come to a standstill. Now Yahweh wanted the human race to go on improving, and he knew that the one great vice which would keep the people from improving was Pride.

There was no other way. Those people there on the Plain of Shinar had to be taught humility; their pride must have a fall; in some way they must be brought back to their senses. I almost wonder that Yahweh did not despise these people altogether and decide not to have any human beings on earth at all if they were going to be so vain. But no; he felt pity for them because they were young, and they had not had much experience; and so he thought he would try another way to teach them humility.

The people had almost fancied that their tower was just about to reach the sky. It was higher than anything else in the world, and they were growing more and more supremely satisfied over it. I suppose there must have been thousands of men at work there.

But one morning there was trouble. All the work came to a standstill. Yahweh had decided to interfere. And what do you suppose he did? Well, it is said, you know, that people in those days all talked alike. Nowadays we have any number of languages among the races scattered throughout the world, hundreds of languages, I suppose.

But from what we are told, up to that time people talked only one language, and all men could understand each other. This

may have been one reason why they thought they knew everything. But at any rate, one morning the work stopped. Thousands of men had come together to work on the tower, when all of a sudden they found they could not understand each other. One man was talking in one language, and another was talking in another language. Just how many languages they were speaking I do not know; but I fancy it must have been hundreds or thousands.

There they were. What could they do? One man would give a direction and the other man could not understand it. The whole plan fell to pieces. They could not talk; they could not direct each other; they could not explain to each other what they were trying to do. It was the end of that tower. As far as they were concerned it was just as if that great structure had tumbled down upon their heads. It was there just the same as it was the day before; but they could not go on with it.

And as they tried to talk to each other and found they could not understand what others were saying, it struck them that perhaps, after all, they did not know everything; otherwise there would not be such a wild and stupid confusion everywhere. It was an awful blow. A blow to what, you ask? Why, to their pride, I should say. They came to realize that they were not so great as they thought they were; that they did not know as much as they thought they did; that they were not nearly as superior as they had fancied.

What a state of mind the people must have been in, there in that great city! They looked up at their tower and they felt ashamed.

It no longer added to their pride; and they wished they could pull it down. It all seemed very childish now, the effort they had made to "show off." They wished they had never begun it. It struck them that perhaps, after all, the human race was young, and that if they were to start out and scatter over the world, they might go on improving and learning a great deal more.

They left their tower and it crumbled away. They abandoned their city, those speaking one language going one way, others speaking another language going another way. But as they departed they had quite a different look on their faces from what they had had a few years before when in their pride they had laid the foundations of that great building. The Tower of their Pride had fallen, and they had learned humility.

In this way we can tell the stories of "Noah and the Flood," "The Sacrifice of Isaac," the "Marriage of

Isaac and Rebekah," of "Joseph and his Brethren," of the "Plagues in Egypt," of "Moses and Mt. Sinai," of the "Crossing of the Jordan," of the "Victories of Joshua over the Canaanites," the "Struggle between the Israelites and the Philistines," of the brave young David and his battle with Goliath, and his beautiful friendship with Jonathan, and so on to the great King Solomon and his court at Jerusalem.

These are told, as I have said, as *stories*. The main point is that the little ones should know them or know about them, and at the same time catch a glimpse of the great moral principles underlying all human history. We do not ask these youngest children to think much for themselves. We wish mainly to have them gain a permanent knowledge of these tales. It is a delight to see how the little ones cluster around their teacher and how fond they become of these stories from the Bible when told in the right way. This is the only consecutive series of tales or stories we make use of in the school, mainly because they are about the only series in ancient literature having a conspicuous thread of moral teaching running through them. When these tales passed their final revision at the hands of the priests or prophets among the Israelites, it was evidently intended that they should not be merely history or biography, but that they should teach the elements of ethical truth; and this is what gives them their value, although sometimes the ethical truth may be rather crude and still in need of revision.

In so far as we use stories or biographies elsewhere in our course of instruction they are introduced incidentally, only by way of illustration, or in order to bring out some special point. For this other purpose it

is possible to collect illustrative material from all the great literatures of the world.

At about the age of nine years we begin the systematic work we are outlining in our Course of Instruction. The first year is devoted to a study of the "Habits." The teacher takes up one habit after another, talking it over with the boys and girls, seeing what impressions they may have concerning it, what they have learned about it for themselves out of their own experiences and observations, and then adding to this the wisdom which the older mind can impart.

It is necessary at the outset to have a general talk about habits, and what they mean; distinguishing them from instincts, so that the young may realize how they themselves *acquire* habits and are responsible for them, and therefore what an important part in life is played by the habits one acquires.

Then the teacher may devote a morning to a talk about the habit of "Exaggeration," for instance, asking the boys and girls what they know about it; how they would describe it; what examples they have seen of it among themselves. Then comes the question: "What leads people to exaggerate?" Do people, for instance, consciously tell a lie? If what they tell is not a lie, what does it mean, or what leads to it, or what are the motives inspiring it? Along with this must go the problem as to the effect on a person's whole life or character from the habit of exaggeration; how it comes that he cannot be trusted, and cannot even trust himself, so that by and by he does not even know, himself, whether he is telling the truth in what he may be saying.

Or it may be a talk about "Being Saving." Why

should it be worth one's while not to be wasteful with the money one has, whether little or much, why is it that so few people are saving, and what makes the habit so difficult to acquire?

There can be a talk as to the mistake in regard to the habit of saving, illustrated by the proverb "penny wise, pound foolish," and the teacher may close the morning's study by having all the members of the class repeat in concert, as one of the great reasons for being saving, the familiar lines:

> "Not for to hide it in a hedge,
> Nor for a trained attendant,
> But for the glorious privilege
> Of being independent."

It will be readily seen that in the study of the habits to what advantage we can put the familiar *proverbs* that have come down to us, using them as means of illustration and also as a help in the analysis, and at the same time lodging the proverbs in the minds of the young definitely in connection with certain special experiences, rather than as random thoughts which may mean much or little according to the accident of circumstances.

I will give just one sample of this series of lessons. In most respects the method is the same throughout all the notes. They are intended as fanciful conversations carried on between the teacher and the children. I take, for instance, the one on "Being Conceited:"

Did you ever hear anything about "being conceited?" Do you see any sense in that? What would it mean to you if you heard it said of anybody?

What would conceited people do? "Talk about themselves," you say? Yes, but how much? "Oh," you answer, "a good deal." Then you think, do you, that being conceited would mean talking about one's self a good deal?

But suppose a person should keep saying how much he wished he was able to do something, or keep lamenting because he was not strong enough to do it; suppose he went on repeatedly saying how much better some one else could do a certain thing than himself. That would be talking a great deal about one's self, would it not? Do you think that would necessarily mean self-conceit?

"No, not exactly," you answer. But why not? That certainly is talking about one's self? "Why," you say, "self-conceit mean's talking about one's self in a bragging sort of way." Oh, is that it? I ask. But what do you mean by bragging?

"Why," you say, "bragging means telling how smart we are, and how much we can do."

But is that all there is to bragging? What if one were to tell how much one could do, but at the same time admitted that some one else could do it a great deal better—would that be exactly bragging? "No, not quite," you say?

What would be the difference? "Why," you answer, "bragging would mean trying to show how much smarter we are than other people, boasting over others, talking about ourselves as superior to others."

Then that is what you mean by being conceited, is it—always talking about one's self as being smarter or better than other people? And you call that "bragging," you tell me.

I suppose, then, you mean that a person who never talked about himself could not be conceited. Is that what you mean? "No," you say; "for a person could be conceited even if he did not talk about himself."

Then what would be going on in his mind if he were a conceited person, and yet did not talk about himself? What would he be thinking about? You say, "he would be thinking to himself how much smarter or better he was than other people."

And so it is your opinion, is it, that merely thinking to one's self about one's superiority would mean being "conceited"? Yes, I agree with you there.

How do you think such a conceited person, who did not talk to others about himself, would act? Do you think there would be any way of people knowing we were conceited, if we were conceited in that way? Would anybody find us out? "No, you think not," you tell me. But why? "Because," you say, "we would keep our thoughts to ourselves; we wouldn't tell of the feelings we have."

Now, do you think you could really do that? Do you suppose

that you could deceive in that way and not show it by your conduct, even if you said nothing about it?

Take, for instance, two boys or girls, one of them very conceited, and the other not so. How would they act when trying to improve themselves? Which one would be going to others seeking for information, or trying to learn from other people? Would it be the conceited one?

"No," you say, "it would not be the conceited one." But why not? Would he not want to improve himself just the same? "No," you answer; "he would be thinking that he knew it already, fancying that he could not learn anything from anybody else." Have you ever come across boys and girls who acted as if they knew more than their teachers did? Don't you think they were rather ridiculous? Are such boys and girls conceited, do you think? "Yes, decidedly," you say.

Then which class of persons, do you suppose, are most likely to go on improving themselves—those who are very conceited, and think they "know it already," or those who are rather doubtful about how much they know and try to learn from others? You think, do you, that "the conceited boy or girl would not improve so much?" Yes, I agree with you there.

How do you think a conceited boy or girl would act toward other people in the way of helping them? If he felt that he knew more and was smarter than they were, then he would try to help them, would he not, and make them as smart as himself, or make them think they were—would not that be his way?

You smile at that, I see; but what makes you smile? Why should that seem ridiculous? "Oh," you say, "he would feel himself so much superior that he would have a kind of contempt for them and would not try to help them."

As a rule, do people like us or dislike us, if we are conceited? "Oh, they dislike us," you answer. But can you explain that? Why should others dislike us if we show self-conceit? "Why," you say, "they would dislike us because we should be showing that we had a feeling of contempt for them; we should not be trying to help them when they needed our help." "We should be inclined to 'show off,' to them," you tell me.

But why should people mind our trying to "show off," as you say? "Oh," you answer, "people who do that are tiresome." You think, do you, that we get tired of people who are all the time talking about themselves? I am afraid you are right, there.

And you think, do you, that people can even show off without

talking? That is what you meant when you said that a person could be conceited without constantly speaking of himself?

Do you mean to say, for example, that a person who never talks of himself could constantly call attention to himself? "Yes," you say. How? I ask. He does not say to you, "look at me." "Oh, yes," you answer, "but he acts that way."

Why, how could a man act that way, if he did not say anything? "Oh," you tell me, "he could show it by the way he walks, how he holds his head, by the way he smiles."

Now, as to a proverb about self-conceit, let me give one thought that is two or three thousand years old. Think what it means when I read it to you:

> "Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit?
> There is more hope of a fool than of him."

What sense is there in that saying? What do you mean when you say that there is no hope for a man wise in his own conceit, or that you could do more with a fool than with such a man? Does it imply that the man has no hope for himself? "Oh, no," you answer, "he has a great deal of hope for himself; he thinks he is going to do wonderful things." Yes, I think you are right.

You mean, do you, that other people are hopeless about him. But why do they feel that way? What did we say about the conceited man improving himself? Did you tell me that he was more, or less, liable to improve than the man who was not conceited? "Less so," you answer. Then you see, do you, why there is little hope for a self-conceited man—he thinks he knows it all and will not improve—is that what you have in mind? "Yes," you say.

Already, then, two or three thousand years ago, people knew that even the most stupid person had more chance of improving than the conceited person. The trouble would be that a conceited person might also be stupid and not know it; or, even if he were smart at the beginning, the stupid man might pass ahead of him by gradually improving. And so there is a great deal of wisdom in this old proverb.

What are the points that we have learned now about being conceited?

In the first place, that conceited people may talk a great deal about themselves.

In the second place, that they may *feel* or *be* very conceited, and yet not say it in words.

In the third place, that a conceited person can show it by the way he acts.

In the fourth place, that a conceited person is not so liable to improve, because he feels that he knows it already, and will not try to learn from others.

In the fifth place, that a conceited person is not liable to be helpful to others, but rather contemptuous toward them.

And then we had the talk about the proverb.

Each lesson is worked out in this manner for the teacher. It will be readily seen why we make use of this special form of dialogue. These are notes exclusively for the teacher, prepared in this way in order to *suggest* the method to be pursued and the points to be elaborated. We take it for granted, however, that each teacher will introduce the questions in his own way and draw out the answers in any manner he finds most feasible. The members of the class do not see these notes and really should not know of their existence. The aim is, as far as possible, to get the boys and girls to see the points of the lessons as coming out of their own experience, leaving *them* to give the answers wherever this is possible, and so having them feel that what is being taught them may really come to them through what is going on in their own lives.

To be sure, this method may be carried too far, and the teacher ought always to make the young feel that he knows more than they do. At times the method of instruction should be dogmatic. We may be obliged to say that we *know* this to be true, because it has been found out through hundreds and thousands of years in the experience of other people.

In this way we can go on with one habit after another, as, for instance, "Generosity" or "Stinginess;" habits of "Borrowing," "Being Lazy," "Swearing,"

"Being Studious," "Pride," "Perseverance," "Order," "Humility," "Self-Denial," or "Procrastination."

We may discuss such a habit as "Consideration for Others." Any amount of talk can be aroused over what such a habit really means. We begin, for instance, with an illustration of a young man in a crowded street car, where an old person, feeble in health or strength, comes in, together with a beautiful young woman; and the man gives his seat to the young woman, leaving the old person standing. Was that true consideration for others? If not, why? What was wrong with the motive? Then we can show the various reasons for displaying true consideration for others, and the methods of doing it. A fine opportunity is offered in such a theme for discussing what the word "gentleman" or "gentlemanlike," "lady" or "ladylike," really means; so that the boys and girls may get some definite idea of these terms in their earlier years, and may be able to see that the spirit of the "lady" or "gentleman" is shown, not by the mere *forms* in dealing with others, but by a true consideration for people's feelings, inasmuch as conduct of this kind is concerned with what is on the *inside*, rather than what is on the *outside*.

We may go on with the habits of "Bravery," of "Play," "Cheating," "Teasing," "Frugality"—distinguishing between the habit of "being saving" with money, and the larger frugality of being saving in the way of using one's time or employing one's efforts. A very successful lesson—especially with the boys—deals with the subject of "Being Soldierly," and what advantages are offered for developing a broader and higher idea of chivalry; at the same time the elemental feature

of becoming "soldierly" involved in the idea of *drill*, opens up the whole subject as to the method for acquiring good habits, and how such habits can be strengthened only by a slow process of drill, so that a man may acquire the habit of courage, of truth, or of generosity only by the same sort of drill or discipline by which one becomes a good soldier.

Then, about the age of ten or eleven, we pass on to a series of studies connected with the "institutions," or what we might call "institutional life," taking up from year to year, first the "Home," then "Citizenship and One's Country," and afterwards the "Self," or "The Duties to One's Self."

We begin with the Home as the simpler study, and a subject most easily understood by the young. Naturally we do not talk to them of "institutions" or "institutional life." To them it is just *home*. The teacher at the outset, talking about the subject for the years' study, may have a bird's nest in his hand, and introduce the subject of "home" with a talk about the "nest." There is the question as to what makes home. Is it the house we live in? the place? the locality? or the people? What constitutes "home?" In what way is home unlike any other place in the world? And here the point comes out that in the home, more than anywhere else, we belong together. We do not work for pay, nor do we share, in the home, according to what we *do* but rather according to what we *need*. The young can see how it is, therefore, that in the family there is a "clinging together" that exists nowhere else in the world.

Along with this must come the study of the relations between the different members of the home, beginning, naturally, with the relation of the child to the father and the mother. There comes the query what the young owe to their fathers and mothers. "Obedience," for instance, is the answer. Then, what does obedience mean? There must be a series of lessons telling about the subject of obedience and submission to father and mother. There comes in the old illustration about "eye-service" and obeying in the letter and not in the spirit, with some of the reasons why the young should obey father and mother. Then there should be a talk about what father and mother do for their children. The children are to name over everything they can possibly think of that is done for them by their parents. But when the final question comes as to *why* one should obey, this theme always ends with the one crucial answer: *Because they are my father and mother.* These words are to be lodged with a fixity in the mind as if beyond analysis or explanation.

Then there is to be a talk concerning obedience in the larger sense, and what it means. The young are to understand that they are not to obey simply because they are young, but because obedience is a great, universal rule of life, and that all persons of all ages are obliged to obey. They can see from their school-life how their teacher, whom they have to obey, must submit to the rules prescribed by the principal of the school; how the principal must submit to the rules of the school board, and how the school board must submit to the rules laid down by the city government or by the people; and it can be shown how, in the work we have to do, whatever employment we have, while we

may be in a position to command certain persons, there are others who are in a position to command us. The wage-earner must submit to the man in the office; the man in the office to the president of the company; and the president to his board of directors.

One very important lesson is concerned with what we owe to our fathers and mothers when we are grown up, and it is to be shown how mean and base those people are who neglect their aged parents.

As an illustration of these various lessons I select from the course of the year's study a portion of the one dealing with the "Meaning of Obedience":

Did you ever hear of the phrase "eye-servant"? "No," you say, "you have never heard of it."

But can you guess what it would mean?

Suppose I give you an example. Have you ever known a pet dog to take food from the family table when no one was in the room, although he would never do it if anybody were present? "Some dogs would not do it," you say. Yes, that is true, but how about all kinds of dogs?

"Oh," you answer, "there are other dogs which would steal in just that way." And so you really call it stealing, do you? But why was it that the dog dared to take the food when nobody was present? "Why," you answer, "he somehow felt that nobody was seeing him, and so that nobody would know anything about it." You mean, do you, then, that he was a dog who would obey when somebody had an eye on him?

Do you begin to see what is meant by an "eye-servant"? What sense is there in that kind of a term? "You know now," you answer? Well, what does it mean? "Oh," you say, "it means anybody who obeys when he is being watched, and disobeys when nobody can see him." Yes, I suspect that you have found out what is meant by "eye-service."

Did you ever see any persons working harder when somebody is near looking at them—when, for instance, their teacher or father or mother is near—and then working more carelessly when nobody is near? What is the difference between such conduct and the dog we have talked about? "It is pretty much the same," you say.

Then what would you call such persons? "Eye-servants?" Yes, that is the word; we should call them eye-servants.

And do you think people who follow rules in that way can say that they are obedient? Is that real obedience, or is it "make-believe"? You answer, "it is make-believe."

What is it, then, that you lose in the mind of your father and mother when they discover your disobedience? You have answered that question already in the other illustration. "Their confidence and trust," you say. Yes, that is just it.

Then when a person disobeys under those circumstances, he has done something else besides showing disobedience, has he not? He has shown, besides, that he cannot be trusted.

But do you think that this sort of disobedience ever takes place among grown people? Perhaps you don't understand my question, as you don't answer.

But if, when you are grown up and there are a number of you working together, and you have agreed to work according to certain rules; then suppose that only one of you should be present at the work for a time, and he should break the rules because it would be easier, although it would make more work for the rest of you when you came back.

Now when you found that other one out, what would he have lost in your respect? "Your confidence," you say? Exactly. And what would you be inclined to call that man; would he not be like the dog you have described? How would you name him? "An eye-servant?" Yes, that would be it, exactly.

Do you think then that a boy or girl who would do that way with a father or mother might have the same habit when grown up, and dealing with other people? I wonder if you can think of another term for that sort of disobedience. Suppose you write it down, I will spell it for you.

There is the word—"Cheating." Is not such disobedience a kind of cheating towards your parents when you are children, or toward grown people when they are grown up?

You said, however, that if one acted in this respect towards one's father or mother and were found out, one would lose their confidence. But suppose one were not found out, then would it make any difference? "Not so far as father and mother would be concerned," you say. But would it make any difference at all? "Yes," you answer, "it might lead one to do it again, and so be found out next time." But suppose you would not be found out next time, yet in that case you would lose something; can

you think what it is? Self——what? "You don't know?" Well, write it down—I will tell you—Self-respect! You would lose your own self-respect.

Talking of this subject of obedience leads me to one other rather curious question. I suppose you admire courage; we all do. Does it take more pluck or courage to obey or disobey?

For instance, when a boy or girl says "I won't," does that show that he is weak or strong?

"Oh," you say, "it shows courage; he is bold; he is able to say that, even if he is going to be punished."

Then you would admire him, would you, when he says "I won't"?

But if, when you ask him a favor, suppose at that moment he should say "no, I won't"; would that show courage on his part? It would be boldness and defiance. "No," you answer, "it would be mean."

When we talk about courage, do we usually understand by the word doing easy things or hard things? "Why," you say, "it usually means doing hard things, perhaps doing things that we don't like to do."

Now which comes easier, when a man has something disagreeable before him that he has been told to do, to say "I won't," or to go and do it? "Why," you say, "it is easier to say 'I won't.'" Then which is the courageous course?

I wonder if you ever knew of a boy or girl who was laughed at because he was going to do something which he had been told to do by his father or mother. What if he had given in to the laughter of the other boys and girls and not shown obedience, would that have been courage or cowardice? "Oh, that would have been a kind of cowardice," you say.

Then it looks, does it not, as if showing obedience, after all, meant showing courage, and that it is the coward who tries not to obey, or who tries to sneak out of what he has to do?

Talking of grown people, of those who become strong, powerful men, do you think, as a rule, they were the kind of boys who were obedient or disobedient—which?

We go on into a study of the relation between the children themselves in the home, what they owe to each other, and what is the fundamental principle underlying such a relationship. Sometimes, in answer to a question of this kind, we give them a word or phrase

which they are permanently to remember. Each of our classes has a small blackboard at hand, and when there are any special terms or phrases that we care to lodge permanently in the minds of the boys and girls, we have the word or phrase written on the blackboard by one of the members of the class. It is to stay there for a time before their eyes, and by this means to receive special emphasis.

In this way we give the young the term "mutual service" as something they are always to remember, describing the relationship between brothers and sisters in the home, what this relationship has to be at the outset, and what it should be all through life.

We must go into some discussion as to the feelings that may develop among boys and girls in the home; what leads to bad feelings; how, to some extent, those feelings can be avoided. We may raise the question, why in one home brothers and sisters are fond of each other, and in another home do not seem to care for each other at all;—why, again, when boys and girls grow up, in certain families a feeling of "mutual service" continues all through life; whereas, in other families, this seems to die out altogether. The question as to the relationship between brothers and sisters when they are grown up cannot be too strongly dwelt upon. They must see that it may be necessary for them to use special effort in order to preserve the relationship of mutual service among themselves as brothers and sisters in the way it prevailed in the earlier years of their home-life.

In the study of the home there must be a talk about the "Family Table," and what it means; why we have a family table; what reasons there are for taking our

meals together; what are the common courtesies at the family table; the reasons for refinement in table manners; why it is that people take their meals together, rather than each one eat as he pleases or when he pleases. The opportunity is afforded here of contrasting the way animals eat, with the family table of a refined, civilized home.

Anyone can see the importance of having a talk about "Sickness and Sorrow" in the home, and how we ought to conduct ourselves under these circumstances; as to what can be done to be of service at such times; how we can be of assistance to those who are sick; and in what way we can try to be less selfish if we happen to be sick ourselves. This subject also carries one far beyond the study of childhood, and the main thought of the lesson should rather be directed further ahead to the time when the young will be grown up and have to consider how they should conduct themselves in homes of their own when there is illness there, or when they themselves are the afflicted ones.

In connection with the study of the Home as an institution, we introduce a series of lessons explaining the meaning of Festivals. It adds a little variety or charm to what may seem like the monotony of the subject. Hence, for instance, in this special series of lessons, the Sunday after "Thanksgiving Day" is devoted to a talk about that festival, what it means, how it arose, what sort of significance it may have, or what it stands for.

So, too, during the holidays, a Sunday morning is devoted to a talk as to the meaning of the Christmas festival.

One other Sunday morning in the year is given in the

Home studies to a talk about "Birthdays;" why we commemorate birthdays; the sentiments connected with them; what reason there may be for recognizing each other's birthdays, or the birthdays of great men. In this connection, some idea may be given to the young of what we mean by "Memorial Days," and why we have them in connection with famous persons who have been of service to the world.

At Easter-time, of course, we must give one lesson to an analysis of the Easter festival. We wish naturally to give a wider significance to it than it receives in the conventional Sunday-school; and so we connect it with the universal "Spring Festival;" with the thought of the renewal of the life of Nature. And the lesson may be connected with some "Nature poetry."

In dealing with this study of the Home, the teacher is sure to find that, ere long, the members of the class become a little weary of the theme. Before the season ends one or another of the children is quite sure to be overheard saying "Oh, I am tired of the Home." And yet we wish, as far as possible, to avoid having this feeling arise. As a result of such experience, we have introduced another feature in connection with these Home studies, and one that has worked quite happily in avoiding the monotony of just one theme for a whole season.

Along with the study of Home, or Family Life, we have a series of studies telling of the home or social life in the great Animal Kingdom. In a way, this part of the lesson can also be made subsidiary to the main theme, while adding charm and variety to it. It will be very readily found that the children would be only too glad to employ the whole lesson hour throughout the year talking about animals and telling animal stories.

We need take only from ten to fifteen minutes of the morning lesson for this purpose, perhaps studying the home or social life of one type of animal each Sunday.

At one time it may be the home life among birds; then again, among fishes, and we tell about sticklebacks and their nests. Another Sunday there may be some talk about the termites and the colonies or homes which they build for themselves. Here and there we can introduce beautiful stories dealing with animal life, as, for instance, making use of Kipling's "The White Seal." Then, too, we can go into some little account of the home and social life of the larger animals; to what extent they live by themselves; how they take care of their young; to what extent they have separate homes, or live in herds or colonies. At the same time, we take the greatest care that these animal stories shall not be of all sorts and kinds, just with the idea of amusing or entertaining the children. We adhere rigidly to our theme, and nothing is to be introduced or talked about in these animal studies save in connection with the home, family or social life of animals. On the other hand, this study affords an opportunity of showing the superiority of human beings over the whole Animal Kingdom, in that they preserve the family relationship all through life; whereas, for the most part throughout the Animal Kingdom, it is only a relationship between parent and child during the early portion of life when the young cannot take care of themselves.

THE PLAN OF AN ETHICAL SUNDAY SCHOOL.

BY W. L. SHELDON.

II.

At about the age of eleven or twelve we make a break in the series of institutional studies, and introduce a study of the "Life of Jesus." We do not undertake to deal with the "Christ-Life" in its completeness. The supernatural side, with its doctrinal problems, is left for the mature mind to grapple with. We want to use this wonderful life for the special purpose of imparting ethical principles or ethical truths. We tell it, with this purpose in view, *as a life*, a beautiful and noble life, the most beautiful, the noblest that ever was lived. We want the young to separate this life in their minds from all other lives, and never to think of it in the same connection with the lives of others. On the other hand, as to what is history and what is tradition we do not discuss. That point we do not touch upon. The "miracle-side" is passed over or omitted. We are dealing with the life of Jesus as the story of the man who "went about doing good;" and who did it, we are told, with a more beautiful spirit and in a nobler way than any other man who has ever lived, all for the sake of others, suffering martyrdom at the hands of the people he was trying to serve, and dying for those who hated him.

But more than all, we want to use this life for the purpose of lodging in the minds of the young some of the

ethical truths which have come down to us in connection with the life of Jesus. No other literature gives these truths in such beautiful form. They are the rarest jewels of ethical experience that the moral nature of man has ever evolved. If we hope to educate the young ethically, we want to have these jewels somehow strung together in the minds of the young and *lodged* there, committed to memory, explained in as simple a way as possible, and to remain as a lasting possession in the heart.

We keep these sayings separate from the other "Beautiful Thoughts" which we use in our general exercises. They are to stand off by themselves. Are there any fathers or mothers who would not like to have their children know by heart such jewels of wisdom as: "It is more blessed to give than to receive;" "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also;" "The kingdom of heaven is within you;" "He that is greatest among you shall be as one that serves;" "He that is faithful in that which is little, is faithful in that which is much;" "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another"?

I can illustrate the manner in which we use this life of Jesus, by taking at random the chapter on "The Beatitudes":

Jesus was now the teacher of a new gospel. "What could it all mean?" One and another heard of it; people talked of it together in the street at the end of the day, or in the market. "Who is this new teacher?" they said. "Is he to be our new leader? Will he relieve us from our oppression? Will he make us once more so that people will think of us as the most wonderful nation in the world? What can he mean by this kingdom of heaven?"

They crowded out of the cities, they left their homes, they went into the country to hear him, hundreds of thousands of people,

all hoping that perhaps now their deliverer was at hand, their much longed-for Messiah, their expected Prince of the House of David.

They found him on the hill-side. Around him and close by stood the twelve friends he had chosen. Near to them were gathered men and women in crowds along the sloping hill-side, waiting in expectation. What would he say? Was it really he? Had their prince come at last?

And as the people stood around him—men, women and children, young and old—with trial and hardship written on their faces, he rose up before them to speak.

He began with the famous "blessings," which we call the "beatitudes." He looked out before him; he saw the people; he knew that many of them were hungry and wanting food; he perceived that some of them were clothed in rags and had many a time shivered with cold. He saw their stooping shoulders, their forms bent with the weary burdens of life. He looked into their longing eyes and startled them with a sudden outburst which they had never heard before: *Blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.* They gazed at him in wonder. What was he saying? "Blessed are we the poor, for ours is the kingdom of heaven?"

He looked again on their faces. He saw the expression of those who were sorrowing in the loss for loved ones whom they would not see here again. He noticed their bowed heads, their unhappy faces, the longing for comfort when they felt that there was no comfort to be had. And as it was borne in upon him for a moment what they wanted, he startled them as he said: *Blessed are ye that mourn.* They raised their bent heads and gazed at him with strange eyes. They asked in wonder: "What is it that he says? Blessed are we that mourn! What can that mean?"

He looked out on others; he saw lips pressed together, hands clenched. He heard whisperings of muttered words that told of anger. He saw in the eyes of some the desire for revenge, the wish to beat down the oppressors, to stamp on them with hate, to triumph over those who were doing them wrong. He saw in them the wish to do the ill to others which others had done to them. Then he astonished them by saying: *Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.* The look of anger on their faces changed to wonder. "What is it that he is saying? Blessed are we the meek, for we shall inherit the earth? What does that mean?"

Again he looked out. He saw the excitement increasing, the disappointment growing. He knew what they wanted; he ob-

served that they longed for better things to eat, better clothes to wear, better homes to live in, more pleasure and less toil. He saw that this was what many of them cared for more than anything else; he knew that some of them cared for nothing else at all. And as he thought of this he spoke again: *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.* They looked at him wondering. "What did he say?" they asked one another. And it was whispered among the crowds, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled." They said to one another, "What can all that mean?"

He looked out once more. He saw faces of men who were hard and had no feeling of pity. He looked at them and saw that many of the very ones who suffered from outside oppression had also been trying to oppress one another. He saw the poor who had tried to make something or to take something from those who were still more poor. And so, as they stood waiting, he exclaimed: *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.* They glanced around and stood wondering. "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy?" Who had ever thought of that before? What could it mean?

Again he looked into their eyes. He seemed to see into their very souls. He observed how much they cared for all that was outside of them, how fond they were of homage and respect from their neighbors, how pleased they were if only other people thought well of them. He could see the self-satisfied faces all around him of those who believed that whatever wrong was done, it was not done by them. And he burst out with the cry: *Blessed are the pure in heart.* They turned around and gazed at one another. What was that he said? "Blessed are the pure in heart!" They did not know what that meant.

Again he looked out. He saw down below the mountain, in the distance, the soldiers of the Roman emperor, standing guard at the city gates. He could perceive the way the people felt as they passed out and came down the road; he knew how they, too, would like to be soldiers, and even to go to war against their fellows; how many of them would enjoy strife just for the mere pleasure of strife! He saw them coming slowly up the hill-side and draw near. His eye ran over the crowd until it fell upon them. Then he exclaimed: *Blessed are the peacemakers.* They strained their ears to catch the words. Did they understand? They turned to their neighbors. "What did he say? 'Blessed are the peacemakers?'" What could that mean?

And then at last his eye rested upon them all without distinc-

tion. Every man, woman and child among them bore the marks of suffering; not one in that vast multitude who had not felt and tasted hardship! They stood there before him, a great crowd of people, over whom he knew was hanging the sword of injustice. He could see the scars which it had left on the faces of the people. As one of the number he wore this scar himself. Then in the presence of them all, with eye reaching to every living person in their number, he exclaimed: *Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.* And then the whole crowd stood before him as one single person. They seemed to be trying to make out what he had said, "Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven?" Alas, they did not altogether understand.

But they had at last heard it all. Blessings on the poor, on those that mourn, on the meek, on those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, on the merciful, on the pure in heart, on the peacemakers, on those who have been persecuted for righteousness' sake. And, as they listened, there dawned for the first time in their minds what this new teacher meant with his strange idea of the true kingdom of heaven.

Then, at the age of twelve or thirteen, we come to the second phase of institutional life — "citizenship," or "one's country." We are to talk of love of country as we talked of love of the home, at the same time discussing all the relationships and obligations involved in citizenship. We begin with the beautiful lines by James Russell Lowell:

"O Beautiful: my country: ours once more:
What words divine of lover or of poet
Could tell our love and make thee know it
Among the nations bright beyond compare?
What were our lives without thee?
What all our lives to save thee?
We reck not what we gave thee;
We will not dare to doubt thee,
But ask whatever else, and we will dare."

Our first lessons are to be about what love of country really means. We are to compare citizenship with the home life, and to see wherein they resemble each other and wherein they differ. A good deal could be said as to what we mean by "country" or "one's country"; why we use that language; what is involved in it or implied by it; to what extent it is the same as one's native land. We are to talk about patriotism; the meaning of the word and its origin, and what is suggested at the outset by "Fatherland." There comes the great question: "What does our country do for us?"

Naturally, at the outset, the boys think at once of "soldiers" and "war," and they say: "It protects us in time of war." And thus we are introduced to the whole subject of soldiers and warfare in connection with the love of country.

But the next question arises: "Suppose there is no war, what if there should be no war again to the end of the world, should we have any need of a 'country', or would our country do anything for us or be of any service to us?" "Yes," comes the reply, "there is war on the inside between man and man, even if there is no longer any war among nations." And the point comes out that our country or our state protects us — alas — from each other; *it punishes crime.*

In this connection it is designed to have the pupils acquire some definite knowledge of how crime is punished. It may seem a gruesome subject and not suitable to be talked over with the young. But after all, boys and girls, at least in city life, do talk about it; they are brought face to face with crime all the while. And it is well that they should think of their country exercising

a sovereign arm and punishing crime. It may be well, too, that they should have some idea how bad conduct is punished, with some knowledge of the positive *laws* concerning crime. In these tender years the young should have stirred in their minds a sense of awe for their state or their country as a sovereign power over them. They may as well know, and feel the effects of the knowledge, that the state or nation may put a man to death in punishment for the crime of murder.

Furthermore, the young must be brought to see that the state, or rather the nation, is something more than "policemen" and "soldiers." They must learn that their country is a great co-operative institution serving in an endless number of ways; by the post office, for example, or the public schools. The young must come to look upon the state or the nation as, in a sense, a larger family, having the same sort of sanctity as the family institution.

Then there comes the other side: What we have to do for our country. The old thought always has been that we are to be ready to die for our country by serving as soldiers in time of warfare. The great point to bring out on our part in this class of ethical instruction is rather that we are to *live* for our country. Few persons may be called upon to die for it; all men should live for it. In what way, then, do we show our devotion by living for our country? In this connection there comes a talk about votes and the ballot, and how we serve our country by the way we use our ballot. Then follows a talk about "taxes and taxation;" what all this is for; what comes to us in return for what we give to our state or our country in the way of taxes.

More than all, we are to show how we serve our

country supremely by respecting its laws. Every possible method should be tried to start in the minds of the young a respect and veneration for the word Law—even the word—and then, for what law means. The day is approaching when we must find a new sanctity for the principle of law, and this sanctity ought to be given to it in the Sunday schools. We should talk about this on Sunday mornings, and not merely teach the children there, about the "Bible" or about "God."

For an illustration of the lessons on the theme of "Citizenship," I give one of the lessons dealing with "Love of Country":

We ended our study last Sunday by talking about love of country as meaning "being ready to die for one's country."

Suppose, now, we talk a little more about caring for our country when no war is going on, and when we should not be called upon to make that greatest of all sacrifices.

I wish you would tell me whether love of country is the same as the love you would feel for a personal friend. "You think it is just the same," you answer.

Wait a moment, now. Suppose, for instance, that you had been fond of somebody, and thought of him as a friend; but suppose that you found out that you had been very much mistaken in him, that he had been guilty of some very bad acts, done great wrongs, made you feel ashamed of him, would you then have the same fondness for him, or feel the same devotion to him as before? "You are afraid not," you answer.

What would happen under those circumstances? "Why," you say, "you would begin to care less for such a person, not want to be so much in his company, and not take so much pains to please him, and not care so much about doing things for him." Yes, that is probably true.

And now, how is it with one's country? Suppose that the country to which we belong commits an act of injustice, does something wrong, is guilty of bad conduct toward some of its own citizens, or toward other nations, would it be just the same then as with the feeling we had for the friend we had been mistaken in? Would the love for our country die away altogether? Should we

cease to want to do anything for our country, or cease to be willing to make sacrifices for it?

You hesitate about that? "You don't know," you say? Would you feel indignant? "Yes; you would feel indignant," you say. But would you dislike or despise your country? "No; not exactly," you answer.

But why, under those circumstances, would you not despise your country? "Oh," you say, "we belong to the country nevertheless, and if we despised it, that would mean almost the same thing as despising ourselves." Yes, I understand you there. Somehow we do not despise our country, even when it has done wrong. And perhaps you have given the true reason. It may be that it is because we are a part of the country, or that it is a part of us.

When a man does something he is personally ashamed of, which he regrets and wishes he had not done, does he despise himself? "Not exactly," you say? Then what is the feeling?

"Why," you tell me, "he wishes somehow that he had not done it and would like to change and keep from doing it again."

You see then, do you, that just because our country is a part of ourselves, when the country does wrong we do not turn against it, but we may try all we can to have our country improved, and to keep it from committing any more acts of injustice.

Sometimes, do you know, men have died, not in war, in order to save their country from attacks on the outside, but just for the sake of improving the character of their country on the inside. They wanted to have a better, nobler country; they desired to have the people improve the laws of their country. Then, perhaps, the people became angry, turned against such men and even put them to death.

So, you see, a man may be a soldier in the cause of improving his country, as well as in the cause of defending it from the attacks of other countries.

Now let me ask you further why it is that people love their country.

Have you ever noticed how people become fond of something which they have had to give a great deal for, make sacrifices for, or look after a great deal? for instance, even with a pet animal where we have brought it up from birth, and had to take a great deal of care of it, where it has given us a great deal of trouble, somehow we feel more fond of it than if the pet animal is given to us after it is grown up.

You may not have noticed this, but those who are older than

you are will often mention the fact. We care more for something when we have had to make a sacrifice for it, when it has cost us something. You do observe, do you not, when we have paid more for something in money, that usually we value it more? "Oh, yes," you say.

Now I wonder if you can see that this points out one reason why people are devoted to their country. It may be because of the sacrifices which have been made for it. It has cost a great deal.

Do you know, for instance, how the life of countries usually begins? Do they usually start out prosperously and peaceably? "No," you answer, "it is usually with war."

Yes, you are right; most countries have to make a great struggle in their early history, in order to come into existence. There is usually war and great sacrifices. What war was it, for example, that laid the foundation of the United States? "The Revolutionary War," you answer.

Must there not have been a great deal of suffering and sorrow in those days? Just think how many had to die in that war! Think of the women who lost their husbands, and of the children who lost their fathers, of the families who lost all their possessions! Think how hard it was to live in those days, even to get enough to eat and drink!

Some of those people may have been our own forefathers. Would we not, naturally, then, love a country for which our forefathers made such awful sacrifices?

Now let us go back to what you said in another lesson about love of country first suggesting the willingness to die for one's country. How else can we show that love?

What if there were no more wars; what if there should be no danger from the attacks of other countries, what if we did not need to have soldiers or ever become soldiers ourselves; then would there be any other way of knowing whether people really loved their country?

How could you tell, under those circumstances, whether a man really cared for his country and was a true patriot?

"Yes," you say, "you think there would be a way of knowing or judging whether he really cared for his country." But how could you tell; in what way would you judge? "Why," you answer, "perhaps we should know by observing whether he did anything for his city or the community where he lived, or whether he just cared only for himself and his own family."

Suppose, for instance, that a man was very busy making money,

getting wealthy, and the citizens wanted him to go on a committee, or hold some office where there was no special honor, but where there would be a great deal of work: Do you think the man would accept the office and do the work? "Not all men," you answer. No; decidedly not.

But would some men do it? "Yes, perhaps, a few." What sort of men would they be? "Why," you answer, "they would be men who cared for their country, or loved their country."

Then, you think, do you, that there is another way of showing love for one's country besides being soldiers and risking one's life for it? How else could we show such a feeling?

"By living for it," you answer. Yes, that is it. You see, when there is peace and no call for soldiers, a man can live for his country, instead of being ready to die for it.

Now, what would living for one's country really mean, what sense would there be in it? Would you say that such a man would never care about his own family, never care about earning his own living, but would be all the time thinking of nothing else but his country? "Oh, no," you answer, "not quite that." "If he did not earn his living and take care of his family he would not be a good citizen," you answer. Yes, that is true.

But what would you mean, for instance, if you are very fond of a person, and were to say that you just lived for that person? Would it imply that you would not care anything about yourself, never thinking about your health, or earning your living, but solely about that other person? "Oh, no," you answer, "not exactly that."

Then what *would* it mean? What sense would there be in your words when you say you just live for a person? What would you be trying to do for the person? "Why," you say, "we should be on the lookout for ways of helping him; or, if he is in trouble, standing by him, being faithful to him when he needs us; all this, besides enjoying his companionship."

Now, cannot living for one's country mean the same thing? We may have to take care of ourselves, think about our health, and look after our home, and earn our living. But besides this we have our country to live for. What the various things are which we have to do for our country we will talk about at a later time. Let us now just fix that one thought in mind—loving one's country means living for one's country, as well as being ready to die for one's country.

Do you know the term we use in reference to patriotism or love of country? When we point to the stars and stripes, to the flag

of the United States, what do we say that we should be to it? "Loyal," you answer. Yes, that is the word, *loyalty*. It is a beautiful word, and one that you should remember.

Do you see, now, that being loyal to the stars and stripes, to the flag of our country, does not mean merely decorating the graves of the soldiers, or becoming soldiers ourselves; but also striving to serve our country by our lives in public service. Note these words: *public service*. We shall see that we all have to render some public service for our country.

But is there anything more implied in love of country besides living to serve our country where such service is necessary? Suppose, for instance, a man were quite ready sometimes even to give up his own interests in order to do what is asked of him for the public good. Yet suppose he knew nothing whatever about the history of his country. What if he showed no care when the names of the great men who have lived or died for his country are mentioned? What if he made no effort to know about such men? What if he had no feeling at all about the past history of his country? Would you say that he still loved his country? "Yes," you answer, "he would show that he loved his country by the service he was willing to render it."

But what if some person says he is very fond of you, so that when you are in trouble he is willing to help you in any way? Yet, if he takes no interest in you personally; does not care where you live, who your father and mother are, what you have done in the past, or anything about you in that way, would you feel exactly as if he were very fond of you? "No, not quite," you answer.

Why not? As you say, he is willing to serve you in any way. "Oh, yes," you answer, "but you want the *feeling*, too; and if he had the feeling he would be more interested in you personally, and in knowing about you."

Now may not this be equally true about love of country? Don't you think that if we really care for our country we ought to show it by wanting to know about its history, about its great men? Should we not like to display it by commemorating the great events in its past history? "Commemorating" is a long word, but you know what it means.

You see, then, do you not, that love of country means being interested in its history, trying to know about its past, and liking to commemorate the great events in the history of one's country.

We go on, entering a little into history; how there

came to be states; what led to the development of national life and government. We want to do away with the old, crude conception about "government being a necessary evil," by trying to have the young see in their national life a certain element of sacredness, an element, of which, as we have already said, they may be dimly conscious in their own home life. Then we have a talk about the "Ship of State," and give one lesson to an analysis of the lines of Longfellow, beginning:

"Thou too, sail on, O Ship of State. . . ."

It is a beautiful theme and the children like it. It may take their thoughts away for a time from "voting," "taxes" and "policemen," and arouse their deepest sentiments as connected with "citizenship" and "one's country."

In order to give a more concrete effect to this study of citizenship, we turn aside and devote a series of Sunday mornings to a study of the history of the city in which the children live. For *our* school four to six lessons are therefore about "St. Louis." By such a study we endeavor to call forth a sense of civic pride. We begin with a lesson about the "Mississippi River and the Mound Builders;" then coming to the first settlements on the banks of the Mississippi, where our city is located, and the gradual development of the institutions of St. Louis down to the present time. At the conclusion of this study of civil government we take the class to the rooms of the Historical Society and show them the relics that are preserved there; for instance, the handwriting or signature of the first white man who ever set foot upon the soil where their city is now located.

At the close of this year's work we bring the pupils back to the general subject, "Love of Country." There is a morning devoted to a talk about our national hymn, "My Country, 'tis of Thee." They go over it line by line, thought by thought, sentiment by sentiment, seeing what each part to it means, and then putting the whole hymn once more together. Why is it, for example, that we talk of our country as "the sweet land of liberty"? Why is it spoken of as the "land of the pilgrim's pride," and what does the allusion to the "pilgrim's pride" mean there? What sense can there be in calling on the "rocks and hills" to join with us in our song of love and praise for our native land?

And finally we have one lesson touching on the universal or ideal side, looking beyond one's own city or one's own country, to the possible "City of the Light," as we dream of the time to come in future ages, far, far distant, when all cities and all states and all countries are to unite in one great, universal, human brotherhood.

As to the methods for illustrating these lessons on citizenship, that must depend upon the teacher. We use here and there instances of heroic deeds or brave lives. At the end of the chapter or lesson dealing with "Respect for Law," we would tell about the death of Socrates; how he might have escaped from prison, but would not do so, believing as the law had decided against him, he should die to obey that law. We can tell the story of Washington at Valley Forge, showing how a man may serve his country best where he can do no fighting, by just keeping up his courage.

In connection with the studies on citizenship, I should, of course, use the American Flag. It should be hung in a conspicuous place every Sunday morning in the

special room where this class assembles. It is to be before their eyes in concrete form, standing as the symbol of "one's country;" and, as we have intimated all along, we are to try and give a new conception of loyalty to that flag, so that the young shall feel that by the way they vote or pay their taxes they are showing a loyalty to that flag, just as much as if they were dying for it on a field of battle and cheering it as they died.

We come, in our next series of studies, to the subject of Self—"Duties to One's Self." How is a man to treat himself? what does he owe to himself? in what way is he to develop himself? In a sense, we are obliged to give to the young the *elements* of a pyschology. We take up this theme with the young of about fourteen or fifteen years of age, although perhaps it should come in a little later. We start out with a talk about "Self." Can a man care a great deal about himself and not be a selfish man? If so, why? That is our beginning. We keep to the old distinctions in psychology between the body and the mind, and between the feelings, the thoughts and the will. Whether this may be good or bad psychology does not concern us. For our purpose, in order to implant the ethical principles we are dealing with, it is quite serviceable.

The body is on the outside, as it were; the mind on the inside. We begin, therefore, by suggesting the distinction between the body and the mind, or between the inside and outside life we all possess. Naturally our main purpose is to make the members of the class feel that the mind-life is higher and of more consequence than the life of the body. They can see that animals have merely a body-life, while we have also a mind-life.

And yet they are not to despise or ignore the body.

We adhere to the old thought about the body being the "temple of the soul," and as such, we discuss the true culture of the body; its beauty; why one should care to have beauty of body, and in what the higher beauty of the body consists. We are led to see how, at first, beauty of the body may seem to consist in mere form or feature; and then we notice how, sometimes, people who have plain or unattractive features gradually come to seem to us truly beautiful; showing that beauty is connected with the mind as well as with the body.

Then comes the subject of "Dress"; to what extent it is right to dress just for the sake of *decorating* the body; how far dress may add to the real beauty of the human form or the human face, or, on the other hand, be a disfigurement. We can discuss the value of jewelry; to what extent it is merely extravagance and waste and make-believe, or to what extent, in simple forms, it may add to the charm and beauty of life. We can go into the history of dress from its crudest forms, showing something of tattooing, the ludicrous dress of savages, and tracing the development down to civilized forms of dress.

We pass on to a discussion of the senses, dwelling on the importance of exercising full control over the appetites, lest the body may be made to become more important than the mind; and yet, on the other hand, recognizing the rights of the sense of taste up to a certain point. From this we can move on to the higher senses, the eye and the ear, trying to make the young see how the pleasures of these other senses are of a higher character and of more lasting value than the pleasures of taste or smell; showing how we are inclined to admire those who have "good taste" *for the beautiful*,

and how we rather look down on persons who keep talking or thinking of "taste" as applied to mere food and drink.

The second and more important part of our study of "Self" is begun when we reach the subject of the Inner Life. The main purpose of this part of the study naturally centers around the analysis of the *feelings*, as being the root of motives and the starting point of conduct. As an illustration of the way we would deal with this subject I may give the notes of a single lesson on the theme, "The Importance of the Feelings:"

I am thinking of taking a "text" for the lesson to-day. Do you know what I mean by that? Have you any idea what one has in mind in saying that he will take a text for what he is going to say?

"Oh," you answer, "it means the subject for a talk or a sermon." Well, is it a long subject usually or a short one? "Why," you answer, "it is a short one."

Is it something that one makes up for one's self, or that one finds in a book somewhere? "The latter," you think, do you? "It is a quotation from somewhere," you say. Yes, you are right. And usually, though not always, such texts come from the Bible.

Now, this is my text for to-day, and I wonder whether you will see what it means. I will write it down so that you can all read it:

"Out of the heart the mouth speaketh."

You can all read it and repeat it. Did you ever hear of it before? "Some of you," you say? And some of you not, I suppose.

Well, it is a pretty old text, and, like many of the others, it does come from the Bible. But the trouble with such texts is that people may hear them often and have no idea what they really mean. I wish you would just tell me now exactly what you understand by these words.

What sense is there, for instance, in talking about the mouth speaking from the heart? "Why," you answer, "it means that we say what we feel." Do you mean by that that we say *everything* that we feel? "Oh, no," you answer, "not quite that; we usually have some feelings that we never tell about."

Then you have not quite answered my question what it means, "Perhaps," you say, "it means that whatever we say, starts from the heart." Oh, that is it, is it?

But do you mean quite that? You don't wish to say, do you, that there is a direct connection between your mouth and the heart beating in your breast?

"No," you smile at that. "You mean," you say, "that it is the *feelings* we have which lead us to say what we do." Good. Now we have come to just the meaning of our text.

Do you suppose, for instance, that people who had no feelings would talk very much? "You doubt it," you answer. Yes, I doubt it, also; I fancy that if a person had very little, or no feeling at all, he would very rarely say anything.

He might go on thinking, might he not? "Yes," you say, "he might think, but probably he would not speak; he would be silent most of the time, unless a feeling arose that led him to say something."

But, do you mean to say, for instance, that a person always says exactly what he feels? I have been told, on the contrary, that some people try to hide what they feel and say something else exactly opposite to what they are supposed to feel. In that case are they speaking out of their hearts?

"Yes," you insist, "you think they are just the same, only there is another feeling there besides the one they are hiding, and that feeling leads them to try to hide the other feeling."

Then it would seem as if there always had to be a feeling of some kind before we said anything.

Suppose, for instance, you wanted to find out the sort of attitute or relationship—although that may seem rather a big word—that a person takes toward you. Now if you could get inside the person, and wish to find this out, which would you rather judge by or know, the thoughts about you there, or the feeling the person had about you? "Why," you say, "you would rather know the feelings he has."

Why? I ask. What difference would it make? "Well," you say, "somehow you suppose that the feelings would tell you a little more exactly what you are after; you would be especially desirous of finding out how he felt about you, as if, in that way, you got a little nearer to his real attitude."

Then you assume, do you, that the feelings are, somehow, closest to a man, as it were, controlling him, more than almost anything else does? You mean, do you, that if you knew how he *felt*, you would know what kind of a man he was? Is that it?

"Yes; that is about it," you answer. Then to get at a person's feelings is to get at the person, you would say, I suppose?

Now let me ask you another question, although it has come up in another way in an earlier lesson. Where do our feelings come from? "Oh," you answer, "they come from ourselves, of course."

Yes, but that is not what I mean. How do we happen to have them? "Well," you reply, "they are born in us, of course; we get them just as we get the shape of our body or the expression of our face."

All of our feelings, do you mean, every one of them; are they all born in us? "No; perhaps not quite all of them," you say, "but some of them, at any rate." Yes; you are right; some of them are born in us.

But where do the others come from, if they are not born in us? "Why," you answer, "they come by growth, little by little, according to what we think or say or do."

I wonder if I understand just what you mean there, about feelings growing up in us, or not being exactly born in us. You said, did you not, that the shape of our bodies, and the expression of our faces were born in us. Do you mean that, altogether? Does it come from the mere accident of birth—how we walk, the look we have on our faces, or the shape of our bodies? "No; not altogether," you say. Well, what makes the difference?

"Oh," you answer, "the shape of the body or the habits of the body, the way it looks or the way it acts, may depend a good deal on how *we* conduct ourselves, how we deal with the body, what sort of characteristics we encourage, and what sort we try to check, or keep down and discourage."

Yes; that is all very interesting. It strikes me, then, what you first said was not quite true, that everything pertaining to our bodies came from the way we were born, as if we were "made that way." Suppose, for instance, a person was born with some muscles very weak and others very strong; is it necessary that those weak muscles should always be weak and the others always strong? "No," you say.

But why not? "That is plain enough," you answer, "we may develop the muscles that are weak, and not use the ones that are strong, and so quite change their conditions from what they would have been if they had been left to themselves."

Then how is it with the feelings, would you say? You began to think that some of them, at least, did not come from our birth. How does it happen that certain feelings that were very weak in

us at the first, became very strong, and other feelings which were very strong became weak and seemed to die away?

"Well," you answer, "that depends somewhat on the way we conduct ourselves, on what we do, what sort of experiences we have." Can you give me an illustration of what you mean?

Do you suppose, for instance, it ever happens that a person who seems to be born with a good temper, as we say, with no special disposition to be irritable or to become angry—do you think it might happen that such a person later on in life might have a bad temper, be inclined to be cross or out of sorts, to show anger or to be irritable?

"Yes," you say, "it might happen." And how about the other side? Do you consider it possible that a person might be born with a bad temper, inclined to be cross, irritable with everybody, and yet, when the person grew up, really not to have such a temper at all? "Yes," you reply, "that might be possible; although you don't think it happens very often."

Which happens more often, do you suppose—the change where a person loses a bad temper; or where a person not born with it, acquires a bad temper? "Oh," you answer, "probably it more often happens that a man gets a bad temper, instead of losing it." I am afraid that you are right. At any rate it appears, after all, that all the feelings we have do not depend wholly on the feelings we were born with; some of them we get ourselves.

Now, can you see any connection in all this with the text we started to talk about—"Out of the heart the mouth speaketh"? What has that to do with the way we have of judging people by their feelings, or the fact that some of the feelings are born in us and some of them grow up gradually?

"Why," you say, "it shows, at any rate, how important the feelings are, and how much our whole life is influenced by them."

Do you think, for instance, that other people judge in the same way with regard to *us* in thinking about the way we feel in regard to them, or what we think about them, or that they would care more about how we *feel* concerning them?

"Oh, yes," you say, "it is the same thing." Do you suppose, for instance, that one could think good thoughts about a person and yet dislike a person? "Yes," you answer, "that could happen." Well, how could it happen? I ask.

"Oh," you say, "somebody might suggest the good thoughts in regard to the person, tell them to you, and then you would have to think about them." Yes, that would be one way; but would there be any other way?

"Why," you answer, "perhaps our conscience would somehow make us have the good thoughts, even about a person we dislike."

But do those good thoughts take away dislike? "Not altogether," you say. It means, then, does it, that the feelings more than the thoughts, show just how we stand toward those persons?

Which would you rather have, for instance—would you prefer a person should say nice things about you, and perhaps not like you at all or even dislike you, or would you prefer to have them feel kindly toward you; or be very fond of you, even if they did not say nice things about you?

"There is no doubt about that," you answer; "you would much prefer in the long run that the person should have the kindly feelings, or be fond of you." But why? I ask. What is the reason for that? what made you put in those words, "in the long run"?

"Oh," you say, "if the person really disliked us, we could never depend on him; he might not *always* say nice things or speak kindly; we should not feel as if he really meant what he said; it would not be as if those words really came from *him*."

Evidently, then, you attach an immense amount of importance to the feelings. That much I can see from what you say yourself. And so I begin to suspect that you, too, think, like the text, and agree with it, that out of the heart the mouth speaketh.

We talk about the "moods," showing how one may fall under the control of moods; how they can influence our thoughts, so that when we fancy that what we are thinking comes from study, as a matter of fact it may come from our moods or from the state of the weather. It is easy enough to make the young see how a person can have his notions about all sorts of subjects influenced by the feelings of the body—how, for instance, indigestion may cause pessimism and lead to pessimistic moods.

We take up the subject of pleasure, and have a discussion of the good and bad kinds of pleasures. Probably the most important part of this whole year's study of "Self" is involved in trying to give the young some idea as to a right gradation in the values of pleasures; to bring them to understand that there are low pleasures

and high pleasures; some that are worthy and some unworthy; some, of value to the whole of our lives; and some, on the contrary, which may spoil our whole capacity for the enjoyment of the higher pleasures.

We can go into a discussion about some of the evil feelings. There is a wide field for analysis in connection with jealousy, for instance; how it starts; what it feeds upon; how it poisons the whole life. One after another of the bad feelings could be taken up in this way, being illustrated through history or literature.

But, most of all, we want to leave the point in the minds of the young as to how far the feelings can be controlled. The first answer that they will probably give is that the feelings cannot be controlled at all. If a feeling starts, it is there as a part of one's self. But if we can lodge the one single point in the minds of the young as to the way they can control their feelings if they choose to do so, it will make the whole year's work on this subject worth the while. The issue turns around one point: They should see that feelings are connected with what we think about, and that we control these feelings by what we allow our minds to dwell upon. We can shut out one subject by calling up another, and in that way shut out a bad feeling by calling up a good one. It is of vital consequence that we make the young feel in this way that they are really responsible for what is in their minds.

Naturally, we shall want to go on to a study of mental culture; touching on the love of knowledge; in what way the love of knowledge shows itself; what is its value; how men have served and can serve the world through a love of knowledge. The young can recognize how they seem compelled to admire one who

loves knowledge; and what a different feeling exists toward one who cares only for food and drink. The gradation is manifest in our instinctive admirations; how we despise a glutton, and yet what a feeling of awe we have for the man who spends a great portion of his life in quest of knowledge, or in spreading knowledge among others.

At the end of this series comes the study of the *will* as a culmination of the analysis of Self. We need not touch on the metaphysics of the subject; but every boy or girl can understand the great thought involved in Self Mastery. We may bring to an end this series of studies concerning Self as a phase of institutional life by a hint as to what we mean by "ideals," showing how a man may have an ideal of life which he maps out for himself in earlier years, and how, by having the right kind of a strong will, he can pursue this ideal to the end of his days.

We have now reached the series of studies which closes the course of instruction, in so far as our work deals exclusively with the young. We take the boys and girls at the critical time between fifteen and sixteen years of age and introduce them to the subject of *religion*. It may be that their minds are not ripe enough to grasp the points we have to give. But it is not safe to wait any longer; else we may lose our hold upon them; and then it becomes wholly a matter of chance what views they may take or what notions they may adopt on a subject of such vital consequence.

It is not our plan to give them definite beliefs, or a creed of any kind. We wish, rather, to start certain *tendencies* of thought or belief, and to leave those tendencies to work themselves out in the course of time.

I am aware that many a father or mother might prefer that their children should think this subject out for themselves, and chose according to their own best judgment later on. But, as a matter of fact, we know only too well that most people do not give a great deal of thought to subjects of this kind. They are influenced very largely by the people they are thrown with; so that when the boy or girl passes on to young manhood or young womanhood, one or the other may go off in a direction utterly contrary to what the father or mother would have liked or anticipated. If they are thrown in contact with people atheistically or materialistically inclined, they may become out-and-out atheists or materialists. Or, on the other hand, if they come under the influence of certain of the crude, fantastic theories of supernaturalism, of the kind which are now being offered as substitutes for the conventional religious beliefs, then these young people may go off on a side-track and return to a supernaturalism that suggests the fetich worship of thousands of years ago.

If they are not taught *something* on this subject, then, as I have said, it becomes a sheer matter of chance what fantastic line they may follow later on. For these reasons we aim to introduce the young people to what the word, "God," has stood for in history. We trace it from its lowest forms up to the last thoughts upon it by the latest and best Science. We aim to give history, rather than our own theories.

We have a general talk about "religion," and find out what the word suggests to these young people. We draw out any ideas they may have formed on this subject. Then we aim to bring together what ideas the world at large usually associates with religion—such

as the ideas about "Right and Wrong"; about "God"; about a "Bible" or "Bibles."

As an introduction to the main theme we begin with the "Bibles," having before us on the table a copy of the "Path of Virtue" of the Buddhists; a volume of translations from Confucius; the "Koran" of the Mohammedans, and the Bible of Judaism and Christianity. We read selections from each one of these books; discuss why it is that different races or countries have fixed upon one special volume, or set of volumes, as more important than all others, and as containing for them the best wisdom of life. We aim to arouse in the young a special regard for these Sacred Books; so that the boys and girls shall feel that there is a rare and peculiar wisdom to be found there, of a kind which cannot, as a rule, be found in other books or in other literature.

We make a brief study of the ages of history, beginning with a talk about the fanciful "Golden Age"; then saying something about the Stone Age; the Bronze Age; the Iron Age; the Age of Hunting; the Pastoral Age and the Age of Agriculture. In this way we have laid the foundation on which we can build some sort of historic superstructure concerning a belief in "gods" or in "God."

We are brought then to a study of "supernatural beings." We may speak of the childhood belief in Santa Claus, and show what a variety of notions people have about supernatural beings of every kind at the present time. We pay some attention to the child's belief in fairies; we read what Shakespeare has to say about "Queen Mab" in "Romeo and Juliet," talking this over to see what the boys and girls can make out of it. After this we go back to the very starting point

in the history of the subject, showing how the human mind has advanced, little by little, from the lower forms of belief about gods or about God. We talk over with them the subject of the early Nature-Worship in Fetichism of the lowest kind, or the belief about the tree or the stone or the river as being alive. We go on to a discussion of Sun-worship and Star-worship. We raise the question how man ever came to have such ideas about stones and trees, the sun and the stars.

We consider the changes which gradually took place in such beliefs. We place before the members of the class a picture of the Aztec god of the ancient Mexicans, and the head of Zeus, as found in the Vatican at Rome. We ask the young people to compare the two faces, noting critically the resemblances and the differences, until they form some idea of the tremendous advance in the world's history which has been made from the time when the people believed in that Aztec god, up to the time when the most thoughtful people of the world had for their conception of Deity this "Zeus" of the Greeks.

And so we take the young people from crude Nature-worship or Fetichism, up to the later conception of Deity as an Invisible Power. We point out again how it may have been that the first beliefs about the gods in earlier times really laid the foundation for actual *thought* later on. We show, on the other hand, how people were misled by mistaken ideas about gods, and we tell the young people something about magic and witchcraft, as well as about astrology. We point out the "survivals" from the crudest beliefs in religions of early times, in the wearing of amulets nowadays, or in the beliefs with regard to omens and presentiments.

The theme of "fetichistic survivals" can be used for highly educational purposes in dealing with boys and girls of this special age. We show how, in the course of time, beliefs underwent a change from "Gods-as-Many" to "Gods-as-One," and then from "Gods-as-One" to "God-as-Law."

As an illustration of this series of studies on "Religion" I may introduce a small portion of the notes dealing with the subject: "From Gods-as-Many to Gods-as-One:"

What name did we give to that belief in "Gods-as-Many"? "Polytheism," you say. Yes; Polytheism,

But what do you suppose ever led people to the idea that there was only one God, instead of many gods? "That is a pretty big question," you answer.

But where did the belief come from, I inquire; who started it? "Why," you say, "we came upon it in that 'Speech on Mars' Hill,' by St. Paul."

And what religion did St. Paul represent; what great religion, therefore, teaches this belief in one God? "Christianity," you tell me. Yes; and what other religion closely connected with Christianity?

"Judaism," you add. Yes; Judaism, also. And with what country do we associate Judaism and Christianity? "Palestine," do you say?

But was it only in Palestine that this belief in one God arose? Did it not start anywhere else, also? What was the name of that great philosopher in Athens who, as I told you, also began to think in this way? "Plato," you tell me? Yes, it was Plato.

And in what country was Athens, where Plato lived? "Greece," you answer. Then this belief in one God arose in Greece, also, did it not? "Quite true," you say.

But what other country have we talked about where two great religions appeared, far away over there in Asia? "India," you answer. Yes; I am thinking of India. In that country, also, there seems to have been a growing belief in the oneness of God.

Then in what three countries have we found that change taking place from gods as many to gods as one? "Oh," you tell me, "in Greece, in Palestine and in India." And what name did we

give to this belief in gods as one? "Monotheism," you say? Yes, we call it Monotheism.

But is there any other of the great religions of the world which has taught monotheism? How about that book we called the Koran? "Why," you say, "it, too, teaches the belief in one God."

But did Mohammed, who wrote the Koran, work out this belief by himself, do you suppose? "No," you tell me, "he got it, probably, from Judaism, or Christianity."

But now I come back to my first question: What led people to this change of mind? Do you think it may have been just the other way around; that men may have first believed in gods as one, and then, later on, have changed their minds, and come to believe in gods as many—so passing from monotheism to polytheism? What do you say to this?

"Oh, no," you answer, "that does not seem probable, at any rate." Why not? I ask. What is it that makes people begin by having many gods, rather than by having one God?

"Why," you say, "it is because a belief in one God is a more advanced belief." But what do you mean by "a more advanced belief"?

"Oh," you suggest, "we mean the kind of belief which would require more thinking, more mind, or one which would come rather to grown-up people, than to people in the childhood of the world."

You assume, then, do you, that there would be a sort of *tendency* for the human race, when advancing, to pass from stone-worship, or fetichism, to the belief in higher gods, such as Zeus or Apollo, and, then, from those higher gods, to the belief in one God.

"Yes," you answer, "that is what we should expect would take place." And what do we call that sort of a change or advance such as you have described? "Why, growth," you say, "growth in thoughts or beliefs, growth in people's ideas about gods or about God."

Do you think it would be possible for a man to have come to believe in one supreme God, and then afterwards to change his mind and come to believe in many gods? "No," you add, "that would seem impossible."

Why? I ask. "Because that would be going backward," you answer; "if he had once known better, he could not very well act as if he did not have that knowledge." Then, you mean, do you, that a belief in one God has come with the growth of knowledge? "Yes; it looks that way," you suggest.

But, do you fancy that this belief in God as one came first as a thought; or, did the people, in the first place, begin to have it as a sort of feeling—as if, somehow, behind all the many gods, there must be one power, one spirit, one God?

"Oh," you tell me, "probably it came first as a feeling." Then I want to find out what led to this sort of feeling.

Suppose a child looks up at the sky, sees the clouds there and the sun, would it all strike him as being *just one* up there? "No," you say, "at first he would fancy the sky was made up of pieces or parts."

And what about the night when he looked up at the stars? Would it seem all "just one" up there to him? "Probably not," you answer. "He would somehow think that the sky was made up of parts or pieces, just as he would in the daytime."

But now, when an older person looks up at the sky in the night-time when the stars are shining, or in the daytime when he sees the clear blue overhead and the sun shining there, does he feel as if the sky were made up of parts, or what sort of a feeling would he have?

"Oh," you answer, "to the older person somehow it would look as if it were all just one up there, a vast overhanging dome, one sky." Then is it possible that merely looking at the sky and having the feeling about it as of one great dome, should have suggested a feeling that perhaps there was just one spirit ruling there? "Yes?" you say.

Now, again, what is this plant I have before me? "Oh, it is a geranium," you answer. Of what parts is it made up? "Why," you tell me, "there are the roots, the branches, the leaves and the flowers."

Now, if I cut off a single leaf or one of the flowers and let it lie there by itself for a time, will it keep alive? "No," you suggest, "it will wither away." But, why? I ask. "Because," you answer, "the flower or the leaf belongs to the whole plant as one life."

Then, as you look at this little geranium here, first at the various parts and then at the whole plant taken together, what word does it suggest to you? "Unity," you answer—"oneness of some kind."

But, do you think that this idea about unity or the oneness in a plant would come to a little child if he were looking at it? Would he know that the leaf would die if it were cut off? "Oh, no," you say, "he would suppose that it would go on living just the same."

You mean, then, do you, that as we go on finding out about things more and more, we are led to notice how one part depends upon another part, and how all the parts somehow hang together as if they could not live without each other.

Now can you see how this discovery might be connected with the belief in gods or a God. "Oh, yes," you add, "surely."

In what way? I ask. "Why," you say, "if the parts of the world somehow depend on each other as if they all belonged together, then one would be led to think there must be some sort of unity to the powers or power making this world or ruling over it."

You mean, do you, that the unity in what people see has led them to feel as if somehow there must be a unity in what they do not see; that there must be unity everywhere?

Let me read you some portions of a beautiful old poem entitled "The Seasons":

> "These, as they change, Almighty Father, these
> Are but the varied God. The rolling year
> Is full of thee. . . ."

I should advise you to look up this beautiful poem when you go home and read it all from beginning to end. You can think of it as a poem about "Nature" or about "God."

Naturally the culminating point of this whole study centers around *Deity as having stood for Justice and Right.* We make a short study of the growth of civilization from the prehistoric ages, when the principle ruled of "every man for himself," down to the present time when we have organized society and a great system of "mutual dependence and mutual service." We note how the first idea of the gods was as of beings who did just as they pleased. Then we trace out the changes, until we come in various parts of the world to the idea of a God of Justice. We introduce a talk about the "Judgment Day," observing how, in certain countries or in various religions, this belief has arisen; pointing to a general conviction that the universe somehow punishes wrong and sustains the right. In order to give a concrete idea to this subject, we go back to

the "Bibles." We show the young people the Egyptian "Book of the Dead" and the picture there of the Judgment Day and the principles according to which the deceased person had to be judged. Then we read the description of the Judgment Day in the Koran of the Mohammedans. We point out how this belief had developed among the Greek people and appeared in allegorical form in the philosophy of Plato. We read the description of the Judgment Day in the New Testament—doing all this so as to emphasize on the minds of the young the importance which the growing mind of man has been inclined to lay, on the distinction between "Right and Wrong" or "Good and Evil." We pass on from a belief of "Gods-as-One," to the later belief of "One Mankind." Our whole point has been to show how, in the course of a hundred thousand years through the history of these beliefs about gods or about God, human nature has come to feel or believe that in one way or another the Universe or the Power behind it, supports the Cause of Right.

Our two years' course on the subject of religion closes with some lessons on the theme: "From the God who speaks on the outside to the God who speaks on the inside." In this way we are brought to the great subject of Duty, and what Conscience and Duty should stand for. We have not definitely told the children to believe in one personal God, nor have we said positively that there was such a Being. The final answer to that question we can leave to the fathers and mothers at home. If those fathers and mothers prefer to tell their children that the Power we have been talking about is a living, personal, Supreme Being, they can do so. Or if, on the other hand, the fathers and mothers prefer to leave

on the minds of their children the impression that this Power is impersonal, as a mighty force in some way helping the cause of Right or Justice, but too grand, too lofty, to be described by any one word or any one name, they are free to take this course. The final answer to this question does not rest upon us in adhering strictly to the scheme of an Ethical Sunday school. As for us who may give the teaching, we fall back on the beautiful thought of Emerson:

"WHEN THE HALF-GODS GO, THE GODS ARRIVE."

N. B.—If a number of teachers should at any time desire to possess the manuscript notes of all the series of lessons mentioned in the above account, it may be explained that Mr. Sheldon expects to have ready in October some complete sets in revised form, covering nearly two thousand pages of type-written manuscript, and that one of these sets could be furnished for the sum of $20.00, by addressing Mr. Sheldon, at 4200 Morgan Street, St. Louis, Mo.

Series of Lessons: (I.) Stories from the Old Testament. Age—7 to 9. (II.) Habits. Age—10. (III.) The Home. Age—11. (IV.) Life of Jesus. Age—12. (V.) Citizenship. Age—13. (VI.) Duties Concerning Oneself. Age—14. (VII.) History of Religious Beliefs. Age—15 to 16. It is to be understood that the ages are only approximate.

Declaration of the United States Congress, April, 1898:

"The United States hereby disclaims any disposition to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island [Cuba], except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Charles D. Sigsbee, Captain of the "Maine," at the Jubilee Banquet, Chicago, October 19, 1898:

"I suppose it will be expected that I shall say something about the 'Maine,' but I shall not say much. I will only say, since I am a very interested man, that it accords perfectly with my sentiments that the issue of the 'Maine' was not used as a political cause of war. I have too high an opinion of my own country, its education and its good intention, to want to go to war for revenge. We shall all of us live to see the day when we shall thank God that the policy of this war has been directed in the right channel. We have heard a great deal about the sentiment, 'Remember the "Maine."' I trust that the 'Maine' always will be remembered in the right sentiment, in the right way, but never for revenge. A nation may go to war to punish, but never to revenge—not this nation. There is a general belief throughout the country that our fleets and vessels have gone into action flying the signal 'Remember the "Maine."' It is absolutely untrue. No vessel of any fleet or squadron of the United States has gone into this war flying the official signal 'Remember the "Maine."' I, as captain of the 'Maine,' glory in it."

President McKinley at the Jubilee Banquet, Chicago, October 19, 1898:

"With no feeling of exultation, but with profound thankfulness, we contemplate the events of the past five months. They have been too serious to admit of boasting or vainglorification. They have been so full of responsibilities, immediate and pros-

pective, as to admonish the soberest judgment and counsel the most conservative action. This is not the time to fire the imagination, but rather to discover in calm reason the way to truth and justice and right, and when discovered to follow it with fidelity and courage, without fear, hesitation or weakness.

"The war has put upon the nation grave responsibilities. Their extent was not anticipated and could not have been well foreseen. We cannot escape the obligations of victory. We cannot avoid the serious questions which have been brought home to us by the achievements of our arms on land and sea. We are bound in conscience to keep and perform the covenants which the war has sacredly sealed with mankind. Accepting war for humanity's sake, we must accept all obligations which the war in duty and honor imposed upon us. The splendid victories we have achieved would be our eternal shame and not our everlasting glory, if they led to the weakening of our original lofty purpose or to the desertion of the immortal principles on which the national government was founded and in accordance with whose ennobling spirit it has ever since been faithfully administered.

"The war with Spain was undertaken not that the United should increase its territory, but that oppression at our very doors should be stopped. This noble sentiment must continue to animate us, and we must give to the world the full demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose.

"Duty determines destiny. Destiny which results from duty performed may bring anxiety and perils, but never failure and dishonor. Pursuing duty may not always lead by smooth paths. Another course may look easier and more attractive, but pursuing duty for duty's sake is always sure and safe and honorable."

A NEW NATION AND A NEW DUTY.*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

A FEW months ago this nation, unable to contain any longer its indignation at the incompetence and inhumanity of Spanish rule in Cuba, took up arms against Spain. It was in itself an ennobling act. Those who believed in peace under all circumstances might not feel this, and also those who felt obliged to be cynical in interpreting the motives of the nation ;† but for the mass of the people, whose hearts had begun to burn within them at a spectacle of wrong so nigh our doors, it was a moment of exaltation when the decision was reached to put an end to it. A Harvard professor‡ has called this an inglorious war. But if one will use words with that nice precision which may be expected from a university professor, it is the one glorious war in the nation's history. The war with Mexico was shameful—whatever its results. The Revolutionary War and the War for the Union were at best necessary. But this war was to

*A Lecture before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago, in Steinway Hall, Saturday, Oct. 23d, 1898.

† I mean those who urged that selfish commercial interests were at the bottom of the war. I do not deny that these played their part, but it was a subordinate one. The fact must not be forgotten that it was just such commercial centers as New York and Boston that particularly opposed the war, so far as opposition was made anywhere. This was a war of the common people, with old-fashioned American ideas about "liberty" and "oppression." They were first really awakened by Senator Proctor's revelations.

‡ Professor Charles Eliot Norton.

break the chains that fettered another people. It was not necessary for us—and if "glory" ever applies to our poor human actions, it does to one like this.

Our action has brought its consequences—not only without, but within. The pulses of the nation beat more quickly than before. Not for nothing is the enthusiasm, or even the frothy patriotism. Where there is froth there is generally ferment below. There is a new national sense—I mean a new sense that we are a nation. From acting as a great organized body we have come to feel anew that we are members of that body. Not as individuals, but in our corporate capacity as the nation we took up the Cuban cause, planted the flag on Santiago's heights and far across the seas. Dewey, Hobson, Schley, Sampson, Roosevelt, Wood, Capron, the living and the dead, acted for you and me —or rather, not for you and me, but for all conceived of as that great unity we call the American State. Who has not followed the fortunes of his country during the last four months? Who has not been alternately lifted with admiration and humbled with shame as he has heard of the brave exploits of our soldiers and sailors, and on the other hand of the miserable failures of the War Department to care for our sick and dying, owing in no small measure to the spoils system, that still lingers and festers in our body politic as an unclean thing?

And now the question is, What shall the nation do in the face of the new and unexpected situation in which it finds itself placed? We have broken the power of Spanish arms in distant islands of the East and in Porto Rico, as well as Cuba. Once in the war it was but natural and necessary that we should assail the enemy wherever we could. Had a decisive battle been fought

at once on Cuban soil the war would have ended. The island would have been set free, and as soon as its people had set up an orderly government, our responsibilities would have ceased. A question of the Philippines and Porto Rico would not have arisen. But fate or Providence (to use pictorial terms) would have it otherwise. It was not deemed wise to attack the Spanish citadel in Cuba—Havana—at the outset, and while those in control were making up their mind where else on the island to strike a blow, the guns of Dewey sounded in Manila Bay. In course of time came the victory at Santiago—close following, the occupation of Porto Rico. When, therefore, the peace negotiations were begun, the entire West Indian possessions of Spain were in American hands, and the Philippine Islands (or the most important of them) were virtually, if not actually, in the same condition. This was the new situation that confronted us. What should we do with these unexpected fruits of victory?

Two observations here occur to me. The first is that the very fact we raise the question, that the whole country is raising it, that it is being considered, pondered over, by so many minds, shows that the world (or a part of it) has reached a new stage in moral evolution. Customarily, in the history of the race, such a question as I have raised answers itself. What a people wins, that it keeps. Conquest gives right. Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, would have considered themselves fools not to hold all they could get. But we are forced to question. And it is our consciences that force us.

The other observation is that the Chief Magistrate of this nation gave us the right point of view when he declared only the other night in Chicago, "Duty determ-

ines destiny." There is an irresponsible way of looking at men and events. People say—have said more or less in all periods of history—things are going so and so, and we can't help it. They fold their arms; they have no opinions; they acquiesce. Far be it from me to contend that the human will can control everything; yet the area of human liberty is large, and to say that in this present juncture there is any "manifest destiny" controlling us, that we cannot have our thoughts of what is best, that these thoughts, according as they are clear and strong, cannot have power, and that every one as an individual, and as an individual among individuals, cannot help decide what the issue shall be, seems to me to be sinking into a fatalism worthy only of Orientals. "Duty determines destiny" is a braver word. It is, indeed, a sublime saying, worthy of the head of a free and mighty people. It calls us to ourselves—it clears the atmosphere—it is an appeal to the intellect and conscience of the people to take the rudder and not allow the ship of state to helplessly drift as wind and wave determine.

Putting our conscience, then, to work, what can we say? My hearers, I will not conceal from you at the outset my conviction thatthere is nothing else at bottom for this nation to do than to keep on the same exalted levels of sentiment to which we rose at the beginning of the war. Not for conquest, but to extend the bounds of human liberty, did the nation call its sons from their homes and firesides and ask them to risk their lives in battle. To conquer Cuba, or to annex her, you could not have raised a regiment. To win opportunities for trade in the Philippines, you could have found few to fight (outside, of course, professional soldiers, and those poor wretches who, such are the cir-

cumstances, will do anything to get a crust of bread). The spirit of the spring time in our national awakening we must keep on to its riper autumn days. "Tell him when he is a man to reverence the dreams of his youth," once said Schiller; and the charge is to nations as well as individuals. The critical problem, I make bold to say, for America now, is whether in the flush of success, in the exaltation of victory, it can still remember the inspiration that visited it at the start, and keep that exalted mood, nobler than the exaltation of victory, that makes nations capable of sacrifices and of heroic tasks.

At the outset, then, I submit this proposition: It is impossible for the American nation to enter on a career of conquest—impossible, that is, and have any of the American spirit survive. You may extend the American body, but you kill the American soul. An ambitious, self-seeking, unscrupulous republic will sow the seeds of its own downfall. America can choose its course, but if it chooses the wrong one, its doom is sealed.

Putting conquest, lust of dominion, and mere pride of bigness out of our minds, what then? What, if we must ask, as to Cuba herself? To this question, the only answer is a simple one: If there is any honor in this nation—I do not say elevation of mind, but simply honor—we must keep our word, and leave Cuba, now that we have freed her, to determine her own destiny, only making sure that in the meantime disorder does not rule there. How long before a properly constituted and really representavive government can arise in that long unhappy island remains to be seen. It may be a short time, it may be a considerable period. No reasonable person can construe our pledges to mean that

we must withdraw at once, whatever the practical anarchy into which the country might be thrown. In the interregnum between the old Spanish rule and the new self-rule we have rather the duty to see that life and property are protected—if need be, to protect them ourselves. The Cubans could not have freed themselves; they perhaps cannot at once rule themselves. We should stand to them as a strong elder brother, ready to help, to counsel, but with no selfish thoughts in our minds, helping only to make them capable of self-help. We should do this without fee or thought of reward. If we were ready to risk the lives of our sons in an effort to make them free, and openly declared that no thought of national aggrandizement was in our minds, we can surely give them some unbought thought and time and energy in the task of setting up a free, orderly and responsible government.* Do not call these utopian suggestions. There are few elements in Cuba that will not recognize our disinterestedness if we show it. Brotherliness need not be officiousness. Every thoughtful Cuban must recognize that unless the Spaniards leave the island *en masse* the task of establishing political institutions representing the whole people is immense—and those who are not thoughtful will not resent our temporary offices, if we discharge them not only with firmness but with equal consideration to all concerned. Any contempt for the native Cubans or any part of the population is sure to work harm. True,

* By this I do not mean that the mere expenses of our temporary occupation may not be borne out of Cuban revenues. Nor by emphasizing the fact that we did not go into the war for gain do I mean that we may not have a rightful claim to indemnity from Spain for the mere money cost of the war. Should we waive a claim, this would be out of magnanimity, not from right.

we were disappointed at the numbers of the Cuban forces during the war, and we may be still more disappointed at the political capacity of parts of the population now. Tyranny has done its work—but the more occasion for patience, benevolence and emancipating justice from us.

"Work and despair not."

This line of Goethe's is the word for the nation. What we can do for Cuba is shown in what General Wood is already doing in Santiago. During our temporary occupancy we can set an example of just and humane government that the Cubans in their own interest will hardly fail to remember. But if we are in Cuba to rule, or, if in the course of time, tendencies to rule develop in our administration, if schemes of favoritism to this party or that or to this American syndicate or that begin to disclose themselves, or if plans of annexation begin to be laid, then we shall be laying up trouble not only for the natives, but for ourselves—and the whole world will have a right to jeer at free America. Fancy a situation in which we should be ourselves fighting the Cubans, fancy us calling them rebels—because, forsooth, they wished to rule themselves! Twould be a sight to make the heavens weep. Ah, friends, we have a trust, you and I have a trust, by voice and pen, to forfend such a fearful possibility.

But the critical question is, What is the right attitude for this nation to take toward Porto Rico and the Philippines? I *take for granted* that the nation has not forgotten and will not forget its solemn pledge to Cuba. Evidently our honored Chief Magistrate has no notion of forgetting; the Peace Commission in Paris bases our refusal to assume the Cuban debt in part upon the fact

that we claim no sovereignty there; and not a party platform nor a prominent public man has ventured to suggest that we go back on our pledges. But the question of Porto Rico and the Philippines is an open one*—and, just because it is, the fineness of the nation's temper will be judged by the way it deals with it. We have no literal pledges, we shall be judged by our spirit. Shall we keep what we have gained?†

If the question were an abstract one, if we left out of account specific circumstances, the honorable instinct, it seems to me, would be, inasmuch as we did not go into this war for conquest or for pelf, to restore these possessions to their original owner—in any case not to keep them for ourselves. This is not the way of the world; but, then, to wage war with the sole motive of setting another people free is not the way of the world—and to work for freedom *and for profit* is an inharmonious mixture.

In this connection my mind reverts to a legendary incident in the history of ancient Israel. That powerful sheikh, Abraham (so the story goes), hearing that the King of Sodom had been worsted in a battle with some neighboring kings, and that his own kinsman, Lot, a subject of the King of Sodom, had been captured along with the rest, bore down one night with his

* It may be said that as to Porto Rico the question is closed by virtue of the instructions given to our Peace Commissioners. But nothing is really settled till Congress acts. Hence there is an interval for public opinion to form itself.

† To be accurate, this is the way the question must be put. Not, Shall we grab? but, Shall we keep what we already have? So far as I know no question of grabbing is now before the American public (there may have been before the annexing of Hawaii, and there may be in the future, if the jingoes get the upper hand among us—but there is not now).

armed men upon the hostile kings, and rescued not only Lot, but the goods and the men of the King of Sodom, too. The King of Sodom appeared before him shortly, and requested simply the return of his men, and said that Abraham should keep the goods as the natural trophies of his victory. But Abraham replied, "I raise my hand to Yahweh, the highest God, maker of heaven and earth, and swear that I will take nothing of what is yours, not a thread or a shoe-latchet." He had done a generous act; he scorned to profit by it. The spirit of that old legendary hero is the spirit for all time. As a Senator from this Commonwealth said a month ago (and I hope he will not forget it), if we are to be good Samaritans, it does not become us to carry a bag on our backs wherein to deposit the profits of our holy calling.* I am not now saying just what we should do, but if we fail to act in this spirit, if, having gone into this war for freedom we come out of it for conquest, we prove ourselves after all to be what Napoleon contemptuously called the English, "a nation of shop-keepers," not of men—yes, worse, of hypocrites, a charge rarely set down against blunt, bluff Englishmen.

Should we then return Porto Rico and the Philippines to Spain? If Spain were a colonial power like England, I think the answer would be, yes. But there's the crux. I do not wish to say injurious words against the Spanish people—they belong to the brotherhood of man; but no one, not even Spaniards themselves, will defend the methods of Spanish rule. Until there is a political rebirth in Spain, it is hard to believe in her competency to rule a colony. This was the fatuousness

* Senator W. E. Mason, as reported in the Boston *Evening Transcript*, Sept. 26th, 1898.

of those who wanted our government to wait last spring, and let the new policy of autonomy in Cuba be tried. It was a sham autonomy, and those who had their eyes open and were not guided by sentiment, knew it. The simple fact is that official Spain has not the will and has scarcely the mind to rule in accordance with modern ideas. Much of Spain's best blood was long ago winnowed out as if it had been chaff by religious fanaticism. It is a depleted stock. The best friends of Spain will wish her to concentrate herself on the work of interior purification and leave for the time world-tasks alone. America has done a service to humanity and progress in causing her dead hand to be lifted from her colonies, from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific. Misrule may not have been so bad in Porto Rico as elsewhere, and yet the Porto Ricans seemed to have greeted our armies when they landed there as they would an emancipator. How any one, indeed, can propose to return the territory in question to Spain, with whatever asseverations and promises of amendment on her part, passes my comprehension; it would be to turn the hands backward on the dial of time. They are free—let them stay free.

To my mind, the United States should take the same attitude to them as to Cuba. Let us be to them not a ruler, but a deliverer—and a friend. Let us, if necessary, maintain order till they prove capable of maintaining order themselves—and then let them rule themselves, be masters of their own destiny, we withdrawing our protecting hand, as England did from the Ionian isles in the middle of the century. We are not bound by the letter of the law to act in this way, but only in this way are we in harmony with the spirit which animated us at the start. Technically we are free to do otherwise, to

annex and to keep; morally and in honor we are bound. In making war on Spanish rule in Cuba, we solemnly declared that no thought of self-interest was in our minds—and to say now, "No, we make no conquests in Cuba, but we do elsewhere," is much like quibbling. This is not the way to make the name of America honored in the world. But to set Porto Rico free and to set the Philippines free is only to carry a step further our original mission; we might not have done it, save in this unanticipated way, but doing it involves no violence either to the letter or the spirit of our first proposal.*

Yet, I am not unaware that even the provisional duty I have suggested goes beyond what many will allow. It does mean a measure of responsibility—and some will say we should take no responsibilities outside our own borders, or at least that we have saddled a sufficient number of them upon our shoulders in taking temporary charge of Cuba. I have parted company with the Imperialists (if that word has any definite meaning, and I am not sure that it has); but there are those on the

* In the above argument I leave to one side the question whether these islands might be kept by us on the ground of a rightful claim on our part to an indemnity of some sort for the money expenses of the war. If the islands should be retained in this way, the reasons would be totally different from those arising out of the "right of conquest." It is only motives and principles that I am discussing in this lecture—and motives and principles may powerfully determine not only the complexion but the very nature of facts in the long run. At the same time I incline to the view that magnanimity is the true policy in dealing with the question of indemnity, and that our relation to Porto Rico and the Philippines should be determined (as urged above) by considerations of duty rather than of interest, however natural and legitimate, humanly speaking, considerations of interest may be deemed to be. In formulating the general view of the text I wish to express obligations to a high-minded statement by my old teacher, Professor John W. Burgess, in the *Chicago Record*, August 13th, 1898.

other hand who say we have enough problems at home, who point to all the manifest abuses in our politics and our industrial life, and urge the setting our own house in order before we undertake to help others in doing the same. The logic of this would have forbade meddling with Cuba, save in so far as it was a nuisance at our doors and the disorder affected our own interests. And, if we were where we were six months ago and the abstract question were before us, Shall we go out and free Porto Rico and the Philippines, and help the peoples upon them to self-rule? no one can doubt what the answer would be—just as no one can doubt what the answer would be to a proposal to embark on the general task of liberating and educating savage peoples now. The trouble is, we have broken the Spanish power in those islands already, and are in possession of them; the question is not, Shall we go to them? but, Shall we leave them? Whether we are badly off at home or not, there we are—and the situation hardly leaves us free to do altogether as we choose. Every one will say, if we leave, it is only with one of three alternatives—either to turn the islands back to Spain, or to intrust the interests of order to some other Power, or to leave the islands in complete independence. And if the first and third are out of the question (above all in relation to the islands most in dispute, the Philippines), then to what Power shall we intrust the keeping of order? The only Power whom we could think of asking, because the only Power that is liberal in spirit and acts on the principle of the "open door," is England. But would England take the Philippines—not to rule, but to prepare for self-rule? There would be no question of duty in her case, as there is in ours—and it is

likely she would only takes the Philippines as a colony. But, in whatever way she took them, every one who knows the European political situation at the present time must admit that the taking of them would in all likelihood bring on a European war. The only Power that can hold the Philippines now, whether to keep as a colony or to provisionally maintain order in and educate, is America.

One of the greatest statesmen England ever had, one of the few to whom the world still goes for wisdom, Edmund Burke, said: "The situation of a man is the preceptor of his duty." The same is true of nations. Considerations that determine duty in one situation fail of application in another. What is duty here and now, in these existing complications of fact? This is the only way to get duty at all. All else is abstractions—abstractions, it may be, very well worth considering, like those of my honored colleague, Dr. Adler, in the last *International Journal of Ethics*, but still abstractions, because they do not visualize (to use a rather barbarous technical word), concretely picture, the existing situation. Dr. Adler might say all that he does (and on general principles I should say nearly all of it after him), and yet admit that the American authority being planted in Manila and the facts in regard to Spain and in regard to Europe and in regard to the insurgents being of the peculiar sort they are, there is no honorable way out for America save to stay and to maintain order and to gradually educate the natives, with the distinct object in mind of making them finally a self-governing people. Grant that aristocratic England might do better than we are likely to do at first, granting even that there would be a danger to democratic

institutions in having anything to do politically with inferior races (which in fact I could not at all admit in reference to such a species of protectorate as I am now advocating), granting further that the cause of social reform might temporarily suffer among us (which, however, I do not think would be the case), granting still other untoward possibilities, which after all would be only possibilities—yet the question is, and cannot be put by, What are we to do now in face of the definite facts that confront us, and of the responsibilities that inevitably grow out of those facts? One palpable immediate duty is worth a dozen possibilities, and as for the problems that often arise for men and nations in the pathway of duty, and that may gather thick and make the way dark at times for us in the future, I like to think of an old Biblical saying, in which John Bright used to take comfort, that "to the upright there ariseth light in the darkness," and also of what the Chief Magistrate of this nation said the other night, "Destiny that results from duty performed may bring anxiety and perils, but never failure or dishonor." *

As matter of fact and in calm reason, what do the difficulties amount to that are urged against such a course as I have proposed? The real difficulties are against a course of conquest and forcible annexation—*i. e.*, against "Imperialism" (if this is the meaning of the word). About this I have already delivered myself with probably sufficient distinctness. Yet some of the

* If the question were one of embarking on a colonial policy simply from considerations of national interest, apart from any pressure of duty, I should think most of Dr. Adler's argument quite pertinent. The *advantage* of colonies to America may be seriously questioned. See Mr. Bryce's thoughtful article in *Harper's Magazine* for September on that phase of the subject.

objections to Imperialism equally apply to a policy of temporary Protectorates such as I have suggested. This, too, would undoubtedly involve us in increased military and naval expenditure, though it must be said that far heavier taxation than we now have could be easily borne if it were rightfully apportioned. This, too, would involve the possibility of our being drawn into the complications of European politics—*i. e.*, of being a Power among the Powers of the great world, instead of a nation set off here altogether by ourselves. If we could in honor avoid this, for a little longer space, I for one should be glad; and if peaceably England could be given in charge of the Philippines, the respite could be had. I think few Americans *want* the Philippines, except traders, who could in any case trade as freely under the British flag as under the American. And yet, sooner or later, so small is the world becoming, we shall be a Power among the Powers anyway. We might as well begin to learn the arts of diplomacy now. We cannot forever plead youth and inexperience as a reason for being allowed to grow undisturbed, quietly, in a corner. Already we are not weak, and we are not incapable, and we really belong to the family of nations, and the great world-problems, including the problems of "inferior races," are for us to solve as well as them. It is said, democracies are not as fitted to be as helpful in this particular way as aristocracies or monarchies. Democracies are based on the principle of self-rule; they are by nature unfitted to rule others—so the argument goes. What a satire on democracy! We ordinarily think that a man who rules himself is fitted on this very account to exercise wise management over others. If so of an individual, why not of a

people? And if the final destiny of the so-called "inferior races" is self-rule, who so adapted to conduct them to this goal as those who believe in self-rule themselves? True, democratic theories must not be visionary; they must recognize gradations of human progress. Because all men are equal in certain respects, it does not necessarily follow that they are in all; democracy need not be quite lacking in practical sense. As I understand essential democracy, it is a working principle for some and a faith for all; and the faith has never been better expressed than in the language of a great German, Alexander von Humboldt: "There are some races more cultured and advanced than others; more ennobled by education. But there are no races more noble than others. All are equally destined for freedom." This is the great essential idea that democracy—may I not proudly say American democracy?—is to carry to the world. If we accept our charge in the Philippines (supposing we find we cannot commit it to any other), if we accept it in Porto Rico, if we accept it in Cuba, shall it not be everywhere alike, not to rule, save as a provisional passing necessity, but to educate, to elevate, to fit for self-rule? Oh, happy country, if thou shalt choose that course!

The one serious, immediate difficulty is, that we have no experience in doing this sort of work, that we have no machinery already devised for doing it, that we have no civil servants such as England has, that instead we have the spoils system still more or less in vogue, and that Manila and Porto Rico and Havana would only be fresh fields for us to batten in. At first sight it seems like folly to do what we are not prepared to do. But if we have to do a thing, we shall prepare ourselves.

Happily we have already a start. The work will naturally fall largely at the beginning to the army and navy, and it is just in these branches of the public service that civil service principles have a hold—above all in the navy. Here promotion or advancement is based on seniority alone. When a vacancy occurs, it is stated, a captain steps from the head of his grade to the bottom of the list of commodores, and no official power can either retard or hasten his upward movement.* The system is not so rigid in the army, and "political pulls" are hence more or less in order—and the result is seen in the contrasted leaderships in the army and navy in the late war. The remedy is to make the army like the navy, and to make our whole civil service like both. We can do this if we will, and nothing is more likely to make us will than to take a new departure and to feel a new necessity. Sound civil service principles are making headway in the community every year anyway; it is the set of the tide; the spoils system demoralizes parties, it demoralizes individuals, it makes our management of the Indians a national disgrace—even our practical men among social reformers are beginning to see that there is little hope of social amelioration that does not begin with its abolition. With the army and navy, already more or less graded and disciplined, in the lead, we may hope that fresh demands arising from the necessities of a new situation will lead to an improved civil service for the country all along the line. Doubtless we shall show our inexperience and blunder more or less at the start; doubtless we shall perfect our machinery gradually—but the simple injunction not to go into the water because we have not learned to swim will per-

*So H. L. West in the *Forum*, Oct., 1898, p. 174.

haps not be found much sager counsel now than ordinarily in the past. Is it really necessary to say to our wiseacres that the only way to learn to do a thing is to do it—and that, according to all the laws of mathematics, there must be a first time?*

The bottom fact is, that what this country needs more than anything else is interest in public affairs. "Our politics have become sordid and corrupt chiefly because the general attention has been withdrawn from them."* One writer attributes this in part to the very fact of "our long freedom from entangling alliances, and our ability to conduct our affairs with little danger of collision with other powers."† We have got easy-going and indifferent to purity and effectiveness in governmental administration. We think little of the nation and much of ourselves. It is possible that the new interest in national affairs, the new sense of the nation as such, the new attachment to it and glory in it, will be one of the levers by which the national life will be raised. Once before in America there was an "era of good feeling." It was after the assertion of the Monroe doctrine. A student of our history, and teacher in one

* It may be said after these explanations that the plan of a protectorate differs after all not so widely from that of an actual colony, since governmental machinery of some sort must be used anyway. But all would depend on the purpose and ultimate motive lying back of the machinery. It would not do to say, the facts being the same, the motives would be indifferent. Here the motives would in the end determine the fact. Under the colonial idea there would be an easy consciousness of possession from the very start; under a protectorate there would never be a consciousness of possession, but rather the sense that some day, unless the unexpected happens, our duty would have an end. Taking down the flag would have as much honor as raising it, if it meant a duty done, a task disharged.

* Professor John Bascom, quoted in *City and State*, Sept. 15, 1898.

† Professor W. McDonald, in the *Forum*, Oct., 1898, p. 183.

of our universities, has remarked that it is difficult for us now to picture to ourselves the enthusiasm aroused by the foreign policy of the early '20s; the people accepted the idea of leadership in American affairs, and even of a kind of "guardianship over the rights of the new world," and this deeply-rooted conviction gave a moral elevation and dignity to the political life of the Monroe administration which it has not again attained. It is the ideals of the nation, he concludes, after observing how futile have been the attempts in recent years to raise the level of our political life by appeals to the selfish instincts—it is the ideals of the nation rather than the reason and calculation of the individual that constitute the source of civic strength and activity.* If this is true, those are making a sorry mistake who are poohpoohing the new national feeling that is rising now. In the same elevation of mind with which the country went into the late war and is now beginning to contemplate the novel responsibilities that have been thrust upon it, it may be led to face the problems that lie unsolved within its own borders. With the strength with which it equips itself for its tasks in Havana and Porto Rico and Manila, it may also assail misgovernment and set up decent and righteous government in Chicago and New York, in Springfield and Albany, and hunt the money-changers out of the temple in Washington itself. It is seriousness, gravity, elevation, that the American people most need, the sense of something more than our own private selves and our own private tasks, the consciousness that we are parts of a greater stream and a greater life. A great nation—*i. e.*, a nation with great tasks, and great-minded citizens go together;

* Dr. Leo S. Rowe, in *Chicago Record*, Aug. 26th, 1898.

if the national life is mean and paltry, do not expect the individual to make any sacrifices for it.

I see the signs of a new nation about me now—it is new because it has trusted its instincts and dared to sacrifice for a sister people's liberty. The awakening is indissolubly bound up with its sense of the claims of humanity out and beyond its own territorial lines. Unexpectedly and yet honorably it can serve the cause of humanity more widely yet. A new and larger duty than it first dreamed of thence confrons it. Not lightly, not vaingloriously, but gravely, humbly, I might almost say solemnly, when I recall the mood in which the President has spoken, I see the nation stepping forward to accept that duty. A flush is on its face, not the flush born of a consciousness of triumph, but the flush of ardent resolve, the flush of forward-looking expectation, the flush of a youth who takes up a task that he knows will try his powers. Go on, brave heart, and never strike sail to a fear. Go on,

> " . . . and let thy Fortune be
> Forgotten in thy Destiny."

THE CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL ASPECTS OF ETHICAL RELIGION.*

BY PERCIVAL CHUBB.

THE broad, sweeping generalizations of common speech serve often as molds in which our thought becomes hardened and intractable. This is the more unfortunate, because they seize hastily only the salient and striking features of things. It is therefore a first condition of just thinking that we should free ourselves from the tyranny of catch words and popular classifications. For instance, in the phraseology of the marketplace, men are either good or bad—sheep or goats, geese or swans; whereas to the discerning mind they are seldom either good or bad, but are rather subtle admixtures of the two qualities in varied proportions of light and shade. Among the common classifications that so obscure important distinctions is that of Conservative and Liberal, or—if a stronger term is preferred—Radical. These epithets conceal almost as much as they reveal. By the Conservative is generally understood the man who is wedded to things as they are, and is skeptical of change; by the Liberal or Radical, the man who is eager for any change that seems to make for progress. These interpretations are vague and undiscriminating. There are many types of both Conservatism and Liberalism. Among the former we may note,

* The substance of a lecture before the Ethical Culture Society of Philadelphia, May 1st, 1898.

first, the Conservatism of Selfishness, which fears change because it may endanger vested interests or personal convenience. Then there is the Conservatism of Inertia, which, moving contentedly along in the large ruts and tracks of custom, resents what it terms "the fussing" of the reformer; and is uncomfortably disturbed by any ruffling of the smooth surface of settled life by the stir of importunate ideas. We have, again, the Conservatism of Disenchantment, which has resigned itself to the second best as alone attainable by man; such a Conservatism as flares in angry heat in Tennyson's second "Locksley Hall," wherein the poet casts to the flames the illusions of a youth of starry hopes. Finally, we have a more normal and wholesome Conservatism that has its basis in a loving attachment and deep veneration for familiar things and places, persons, institutions and customs. This is the Conservatism that is not without its philosophical justification. It is the Conservatism of a Walter Scott, let us say, enamored of the good old times and the splendors of an imagined golden age of heroism that lies behind us. One sees its strength in its reverence for the greatness that is deep-rooted in the past, and has stood the shocks of time; its weakness, in its blindness to the new, strange types of excellency that glorify our life to-day.

Similarly, we may distinguish many types of Liberalism. It, too, of course, has its ignoble type in the Selfish Liberalism which hopes to glean its harvest from improvements, novel enterprise ("yellow" journalism, e. g.), and what not. Then there is the Liberalism of Unrest, which springs from a dramatic love of change, joined often with a dramatic thirst for applause. We

have, too, the Liberalism of Optimism, of which type Rousseau may be taken as the classic exemplar. This is the Liberalism that makes exaggerated claims on behalf of man, as he is supposed to come free from the hands of nature, as yet undegraded by social influences. According to this view, men, and in some eyes, women more especially, have been through the centuries the victims of unjust laws and institutions; and might realize Utopia to-morrow, were only the clutches of a vampire minority, the privileged class, relaxed. Lastly, we have the saner Liberalism to which George Eliot gave the name of "meliorism," which, while leaning decisively to the side of hope, yet tempers that hope with a recognition of the fact that man, instead of having fallen away from some high estate, has been "moving upwards, working out the brute," and is much nearer coming by his deserts than the Utopian supposes. It differs from a cautious Conservatism because, while it recognizes the steady march of human progress, it declines to set a limit to the rate at which progress may hereafter be achieved. It believes in the transforming power of great ideals, and in the possibility of lifting men, as upon some great ninth wave of enthusiasm, to unexpected levels. It holds that, as there are moments in the life of an individual when a man undergoes a change of heart and a new birth, or, in the language of the pulpit, is converted and saved; so in the history of nations and peoples there are eras of social enlightenment and enthusiasm, when society takes a long stride forward. It is this spirit of expectancy which ranges the Liberal on the side of generous—sometimes quixotic—attempts to win

men to those higher ideals which seem to the Conservative to be beyond the reach of poor, mediocre human nature. As Tennyson in his prime was the poet of slow, cautious change, and the champion of "freedom, slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent"; Browning, on the other side, voices the belief in those sudden accessions of insight, those turning points of development, whereby men enter upon new phases of life and new eras of growth.

But, after all, these are abstract types, rather than the flesh and blood realities we know. In most of us conservative and liberal tendencies are subtly commingled, although the one or the other of them usually preponderates. One might name a good many distinguished men and women — Washington, Franklin, Newton, George Eliot, Gladstone, Carlyle, Ruskin—in whom a bold liberalism in certain matters coexisted with a stanch conservatism in others. Sometimes the Liberal in politics meets the Conservative in religion; the Conservative in social affairs, the revolutionist in politics.

This admixture of tendencies is further illustrated in the movements of history. In all great reform struggles of the past, we find a species of Conservatism united with the daring that risks unvoyaged seas for new dreamt-of Americas. From one point of view, what was the Renaissance but a movement to conserve and revive the admired civilization of antiquity? What was the American Revolution but an attempt to conserve and give new effect to the time-honored rights of the English commoner? Aye, what was the French Revolution but an almost frenzied effort to assert more universally those sacred rights of the individual that were proclaimed by

Christianity and had struggled into vigorous being during the Reformation? All these movements, while they were liberal by reason of the lofty trust in man which motived them, were at the same time conservative as making for the fulfillment of certain maturing tendencies of human nature. They attempted the removal of obstacles that thwarted the growth of freedom. As it may be said of every great reformer that he came "not to destroy but to fulfill"; so it may be said of the great progressive movements of history, that they were at heart constructive, and conservative of some precious growth of time.

With such an understanding of Conservatism and Liberalism, it will not be difficult to show that the Ethical Culture Movement combines a sturdy Conservatism with a strenuous Liberalism. Its Conservatism is scarcely less urgent than its Liberalism; for it springs from a fear that the disintegration which the creedal basis of religion is undergoing, may spread from the husk of church dogma to the life-giving kernel of ethical conviction which it enwraps. There are numerous signs that this is what is actually taking place. Men, in abandoning the creeds of the churches and sects, are abandoning also something of the lofty seriousness which these communicated to their lives. In rejecting dogma, they are rejecting, sometimes unwittingly, the eternal verities of the moral life which these dogmas seemed to support and consecrate. That they are rejecting dogma, that they are leaving the churches, that the unchurched are, in our great cities at least, increasing apace in numbers, is too commonly asserted and lamented to call for proof. We most of us feel, I think, in the social atmosphere, a decided relaxation of moral tension; a lack of moral ideal-

ism exhibited all too obviously in our political and social life.

Various causes are assigned for the dissolution of religious faith. Perhaps the so-called higher criticism comes in for most of the blame. This is an age of doubt, it is said; and that doubt is fed by the relentless criticism to which the Bible is being subjected, and by means of which its authority is being undermined. This explanation is partial and superficial. The skepticism of the age is a more fundamental matter than this. The fact is, that supernaturalism generally—the supernatural sanctions of morality—miracles, special revelation, special schemes of redemption, and so on—are failing us, not so much because we have developed an acuter logic, not so much because of any arguments of refined biblical scholarship; but because they cannot live with our modern scientific habit of mind and with modern scientific ways of regarding the universe. It is becoming as unnatural to the modern mind to believe in the miracles of Christian history as it is to believe the legends and myths of Greece and Rome. We are outgrowing the race's early mood of wondering acceptance. To us miracle is the poetry of the world's childhood; a beautiful and suggestive symbolism. Slowly but surely the modern mind is adjusting itself to that Copernican view of the world which relegates this earth to a small space in the immensity of worlds,* instead of making it the

* How slowly the imagination accommodates itself to the heliocentric view is suggested by Mr. John Burroughs, I think, when he points to Tennyson's lines, "Move eastward, happy Earth," as the one striking embodiment of it in English poetry.

center and a pivot of the universe, especially cared for by a unique plan of redemption. Slowly but surely is the idea of a fall of man giving way to an illuminating and inspiring conception of man's ascent from the low levels of brutishness to higher peaks of manhood under the reign of law. Slowly but surely is the older view of history, according to which its continuity was broken by the advent of the Christ, giving way to a view which reposes on a conception of continuous and explicable progress, and which regards man's changing creeds and Gods, his Heavens and his Hells, as the means whereby he has bodied forth his changing ideals of life. Yes, supernaturalism is failing us because the spirit of the age is against it; because it is a jarring, perplexing note in that general conception of life which we have formed on the basis of modern knowledge and modern habits of thought. It is becoming more and more insecure and even treacherous as the basis of the religious and moral life of man; and the danger we have to face as a consequence is, that the skepticism in regard to the supernatural sanctions of morality may not stop short at these sanctions, but may undermine morality itself.

It is to arrest this dissolution of the ethical content of religion, along with its supernatural scaffolding, that the religion of Ethical Culture comes forward with its message of hope, its glad tidings of a deeper, securer faith. So conceived of, its task is a task of conservation and of rescue. It is bent upon preserving and quickening with a breath of new and ruddy life that ethical element of the religious life which has at all times played a leading part in human history.

To this work of conservation, then, the Ethical Cult-

ure Movement brings the passion of an earnest Conservatism, the keynote of which is a profound reverence for the rich ethical and spiritual legacy of the ages. It stands with veneration before this most wonderful of inheritances :—the great ethical ideals by which men have been swayed in the past; the institutions and laws and customs which embody these ideals; the memories of the seers, the prophets and the martyrs who lived and toiled and suffered to uplift and purify the life of man. It dedicates itself to its task of cherishing, interpreting and enriching this inheritance, feeling that it has to obey a charge delivered with inspiring reiteration, above the clash of creeds, by the mouths of prophets, heroes and saints; a charge to love righteousness and depart from iniquity; to worship the eternal in the beauty of holiness; to seek perfection, and to realize it upon the earth.

It must be frankly recognized that to many this view will have the taint of heterodoxy upon it. The mere affirmation that the moral life and the ethical passion have an independent value not conferred upon them by any creed with which they have been connected, will cause emphatic disapproval and protest. In defending the position so taken we are brought face to face with the Liberal aspect of ethical religion, of which an explanation and defense must now be made.

That the life is larger than the creed; that the man is greater than the creeds which have grown out of him—this is the starting point from which we may set out. This conviction often expresses itself in common life. The hero is a hero regardless of his creed. Do we withhold our admiration or our praise of him until we

know to what church he belongs? Assuredly not. By his heroism he is raised above critical considerations of creed, race, nationality. We may try to explain his heroism by his creed; but then other heroisms will be explicable by quite other kinds of creeds. The creed rather receives glory from the deed than sheds glory upon it. The value of a creed or of a philosophy is best estimated by the quality of the life through which it finds expression. The true function of a creed is to give meaning and support to the moral life. All creeds and all philosophies must, in the last resort, appear for judgment at the bar of ethics, and stand or fall as they aid or thwart, invigorate or weaken, ethical development.

This emphasis put upon the good life, upon character, at what may seem to be the expense of creed, may lead to a misunderstanding which we must guard against. It does not imply any slighting of creed, nor any opposition between creed and character. To set up such an antithesis would be a serious mistake, because a man's creed is undoubtedly an important factor in his life, and does powerfully influence and shape his conduct. Creeds we must have; the mind craves them; life lacks unity, and "hangs patchy and scrappy," without them. We must distinguish, of course, between the ready-made creed to which a man strives to accommodate his mind, or which he mechanically accepts at the hands of a sect or a church, or his forefathers; and the creed which he toilsomely makes for himself out of his experiences, his reading and his painstaking thinking. Only the latter will be vital, and alone need be taken into account in our discussion. The possession of such a creed

is both a test and a condition of character. But it is not the core of character, and must not tyrannize over the other elements to their weakening. The core is rather the temper of earnestness which leads a man on his difficult quest for a creed in order that he may live resolutely and effectively. He wishes to know what is true in order that he may do what is right; in order that he may love what he sees to be noble, and may live out his love. This set and bent of his life, this attitude and disposition toward practice, is the fundamental matter. It has been truly said that what a man believes is less important than how he believes it; which is another way of saying that a man's creed gets its value from its close relation to the other elements of his character; the high aim of his life, the purity and strength of his heart, the energy of his will.

This may be called a Liberal, or if you will, a Radical position to take up; but in itself there is nothing very new in it. It was a cardinal doctrine with Jesus of Nazareth, who affirmed that the way to know the true doctrine was to live the righteous life; and that the vision of the highest should come to him who was pure of heart. It is really the standpoint of every-day life; it being the exceptional business of Sunday to develop our sectarian differences. In life a man stands or falls by his character; no plea of creed will save him in the eyes of his fellows when he does a mean act. He is judged by what he is; by the fruits of the spirit in conduct.

What is new, then, in Ethical Religion? Its consistent and enthusiastic recognition of this primacy of the ethical factor in religion. It is not that the Movement breathes a less bracing intellectual atmosphere, and re-

laxes the effort of the mind to gain a commanding and inspiring outlook upon life; on the contrary, by its freedom, by its encouragement of individuality—backed as it is by a conviction that each man's philosophy must, to be worth anything, be his very own, earned by his eager yet circumspect thinking—it stimulates freedom of thought. No, it is not that it is less vigorous on the intellectual side, but that it is more vigorous and more insistent on the ethical side. Its members meet on a plane of ethical aspiration and devotion, not on one of intellectual uniformity; and they do not expect to be agreed upon matters of philosophy which lie beneath this plane in the depths of personal conviction. They recognize that they may be led to a common meeting-ground of ethical purpose by many divergent roads of philosophic thought. Their thinking cannot be controlled. A man thinks, when he thinks honestly, as he must. He has no choice. When he resigns himself as a thinker, and hands himself over to a church or a creed, he is ceasing to think, or at least he is trying to do so. Free thinking is the only kind of thinking there is; any other kind involves a contradiction in terms. Men cannot, that is to say, unite upon a determination to think alike; but they can unite upon an aspiration to live a noble life.

The assumption that this unity in ethical aim may be realized despite disagreements as to the way of reaching it, is warranted by the facts of history. There is among the great masters of ethical insight an impressive agreement as to what, in the broad issues of life, is noble and what is base, what is right and what wrong. Confucius, Buddha, Æschylus, Socrates, Jesus, Paul, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Dante, Spinoza, Kant,

Wordsworth, Carlyle and Emerson would agree not only upon the Ten Commandments, but probably upon a good many of the Beatitudes; and equally among men to-day there is a general agreement as to what is, broadly speaking, worthy and unworthy, heroic and unheroic. When it comes to the deeds and the life of a Florence Nightingale or a Father Damien, a Garibaldi or a Mazzini, a Lincoln or a Gladstone, a Cardinal Newman or a Bishop Brooks, there are among the informed no sharp divisions of opinion predetermined by creed. There is a greatness about these men and women that transcends any limitations we think they may have had on the religious side. We admire them on the score of their total manhood and character. That manhood found its nutriment in varying soils of creed and culture. The ethical convictions and sentiments held by them in common would be justified in very different ways; but we cannot say that one way was right and all the others wrong. We must rather recognize that the moral life has found and still finds its sanctions and its sustenance in varying philosophical systems and views of the world; some illogical and superficial; others well-knit and deep-rooted.

In the last resort, what a man thinks, or at least what he firmly believes and not merely opines, is the outcome, more or less formulated, of what he is. The well-knit, consistent creed will have behind it the well-knit, single-minded personality. In other words, in order to think to good purpose, a man must have lived to good purpose. He must be something before he can have a creed that is worth anything.

This is to understand by a man's character something

larger than is generally understood by the word. A man's character is not to be measured merely by what he does, but must include what he genuinely aspires to do and to be. We must have regard to his possibilities and potentialities, as well as to his achievements. We must remember what Browning is continually reminding us of, that man—we may understand by this the individual as well as the race—man only partly is, and wholly hopes to be. We must include, that is to say, a certain incalculable element in a man's character, that element for the recognition of which another great poet, Emerson, was always pleading—

> "Unknown to Cromwell as to me
> Was Cromwell's measure or degree."

Did we not give this width of meaning, this depth of content, to the concept of character, we should undoubtedly be in danger of laying an insufficient foundation for the view I have been advancing. A man must bow before the mystery of his own personality before he can either reverence himself aright or deal with himself aright. He must realize that in the depths of personality as nowhere else are summed up the inmost secrets of being, if only because he is the summit and summary of the known order of things. He must recognize himself as the seat of sacred forces, immeasurable, and, in the last resort, unknowable; forces that at times play lightning-like about him and reveal in flashes the dark corners and unplumbed depths of life. The task he has to undertake is to evoke these forces, to unfold these mysterious, incalculable powers, and, guided by reason and urged by love, to use them with beneficent effect. How one interprets these and all the wonderful facts of

the inner life ;—what he thinks the self in him to be in its ultimate reality and how related to the universe—is not now our question. Be the explanation Hegelian or Darwinian, Spencerian or Kantian, as it may, the philosophical interpretation is secondary in importance to a living realization of the facts themselves. He must first be able to say : "I have known ; I have felt ; I am greater than I comprehend."

If such an outlook on the moral life is taken, man's character will be regarded as something forever in the making. He is here to grow, and to produce out of himself an endless harvest of helpful deed and benign influence. Hence it follows that, as he grows in character, he will grow in insight. His creed will expand and deepen with his general growth, and will therefore never be a finished product. He must so hold it as to allow of its modification and enlargement. Once let him regard it as a finished product, as a finality, and the life-blood will begin to dry up in it. When it ceases to grow, it begins to die. He must feel that the perfect, full-orbed truth is a far-off possibility to-wards which he must keep pressing. His mood must ever be that of Lessing, who, imagining a choice being offered to him at the hands of God, between the full and perfect truth and the quenchless yet hopeful thirst after truth, reverently chose the latter. "A man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's Heaven for?" exclaims the poet ; and we may, with him, regard this forward reaching after a Heaven of the unattained and never wholly attainable as the true mark of spiritual vitality.

When once a man has lived into this attitude, out of

an attitude of reliance upon supernaturalism, he becomes conscious of a liberation from the trammels of something that is alien to the realities and verities of his own deeper experiences. The joy of a new discovery is in him. It is the discovery that the moral life is its own witness, and bears with it the stamp of authentic supremacy,—bears it, too, under the stormiest stress of suffering and disaster. It needs no prop of supra-mundane or extrinsic sanction and commendation. He sees, with a sense of having reached a mountain peak of vision, that it is the essence of the ethical life to be acceptable in and for itself. There is nothing foreign to it that can, from above, confer a value upon it other than what it has of its own nature. If we reflect, we shall see that no supernatural sanction or behest can make good what is not in itself good according to the laws which govern human welfare. Goodness is a quality altogether relative to human ends and human standards. It is clear, too, that he who is good for reasons or upon constraint, has not reached the point at which the moral life becomes fully significant to him. Hence, then, it is with a sense of deliverance from unnecessary impediments, that a man rids himself of those supernatural sanctions, so-called, by which various religions have sought to win approval for themselves. Returning now to the fact noted at the outset, that supernaturalism is failing us, we need not lament it. Rather let us rejoice at the prospect of having the meaning and inherent glory of the moral life revealed in its true fullness. The loss may be turned to gain; and so to turn it is the mission of the Ethical Movement. Its Liberalism or Radicalism may be said to consist in a more liberal and radical interpretation of

the moral and religious life than has formed the basis of any movement of the past.

Looked at in relation to such movements it may be regarded as fulfilling the purpose of Protestantism; for Protestantism bade men hold by the inner light, and allow nothing to interpose between them and the divine. Each man bears within himself, said Protestantism, the light that must illumine the darkness of the world. Even supposing, as it supposed, that the Bible marked out his path through the tangled darkness, yet the key to the Bible lay within his own breast. In the same way Ethical Religion counsels, "Look within. Seek refuge there, in the 'temple cave of thine own self.' Only there, as the Ancient Seer of the modern poet says, shalt thou meet (if thou meetest it anywhere) the Nameless One." But no more than the Protestant of the Christian faith, need the adherent of the new faith go unaided upon his pilgrimage. He, too, has his Bible, his Old and New Testament; that greater Bible of the race, penned by the seers and prophets of all ages and peoples. He, too, has his brotherhood of saints to companion him on his difficult and trying journey—those great lovers of man and of truth and goodness, who strove to the uttermost, even to death, to free man from the dominion of false gods and of the enemies of freedom and of his closest enemy, his baser self.

We have heard much of late—we heard it at the Congress of Religions held at the Columbian Exposition—of the possibility of an all-embracing world-religion. The idea has a certain fascination, but it has also its graver dangers. The greatest of these is that

such a religion would be a rather loosely-stitched patchwork or picturesque scrap-album of religious beliefs. Ethical religion aims at no such eclecticism, nor any such Pantheon of the creeds. Its Conservatism, in short, is no such formal and external matter; and that, because it is linked with a Liberalism of Protestant lineage, the Liberalism of personal insight, which requires that a man shall develop from within. It is one thing, with the creeds of the past before one, to select from them their best common elements and to unite these with all possible skill; it is quite another, in the endeavor to live truly and to get at the meaning of life in order to do so, to seek aid and inspiration from those teachers and religions of the past that promise help in need. One of these teachers wrote that a man can be wise only with his own wisdom; which is as much as to say that the wisdom of others can avail him only so far as he makes it his own. This he will do only if he assimilates it in a moment of genuine hunger, when it meets an urgent need of his own. It is worse than vain to overload oneself, as a mere collector of old wares, with the riches of the past. What we cannot use, what we cannot assimilate so that it becomes the very tissue of our own mental being, is, if not a serious menace to our spiritual health, at least a taxing superfluity.

These considerations indicate the relation of the Conservative side of Ethical Religion to its Liberal side. It would conserve the moral conquests of the past and that legacy of ethical enlightenment and practice upon which, as the substratum of civilization, the best life of to-day is based; but it would do so because of the discovery, which each man must make for himself, that

they may meet needs of his nature as they met and grew out of men's needs in the past. While there must be no hasty spirit of rejection, but rather an initial reverence towards all survivals from the past, yet these must all be brought to the touchstone of individual inquiry and insight.

"Let the dead bury their dead;" that was spoken in a mood of impatience with a conservatism that stifled the life of the spirit. Such a mood is often justified in those who are eager to free men from the useless and cumbersome burdens of the past. These are often so heavy upon us that, like soldiers who recklessly cast away even their rations in the desire to move freely, we angrily thrust them wholly from us. At certain epochs in the world's history such a proud spirit of rejection has filled those reformers who felt that the men of their time were hopelessly weighed down by useless tradition, routine and custom. We recall Montaigne, Rousseau and Emerson as men of this type. It was in a high mood of revolt against the despotism of the past that Emerson began his career, when in his first work he upbraided his age because it was slavishly retrospective, building the sepulchers of the fathers and busily chronicling the past instead of assuming its own original relation to the universe, and living by a poetry and philosophy of insight wholly its own. Such a temper of jealousy towards a usurping past it would seem necessary at all times to keep alive in us; and yet not to the exclusion of that other mood of respect and pupilage towards a past whose children we are, whose young heir is the age in which we live. "Let the dead bury their dead;" but let us

not bury the living with the dead. And assuredly the mighty deeds and heroes of the past do still live; and its master-builders cry out for helpers to continue the work which their hands are now powerless to complete. We are born into a world of their uncompleted tasks; and unless, like Nihilists, we would clear the ground and begin anew (as we fancy), our first duty is so to comprehend the tasks left by them as to be able to carry them forward—aye, and to comprehend them so well that we may avoid their mistakes, amend their plans and improve their methods. We may try to ignore the past, to be sure, by leaving, like anchorites, the world of civilization; but, living in that world, we must perforce understand it as an epitome of the past and an evolution from it. We must call upon the conservative in us to do justice to it by the exercise of imaginative sympathy.

But such an interest in and feeling for the past becomes harmful when it ceases to be the servant of a dominating endeavor to live in the present. The fountain of life gushes from the Present of flesh and blood reality; and a fresh, receptive, impassioned attitude towards it is the first condition of health. He who loves not his brothers whom he has seen, how shall he love his departed brethren of bygone centuries? Yes, a man is fully and sanely alive in so far as he can draw joy and inspiration from the breathing life of humanity and nature which surrounds him. Changing our point of view in this way, we may say that the past must borrow its life from the present before it can in turn enrich the life of the present.

Again, then, we reach the conclusion that Ethical

Religion, rooted as it must be in the desire to cultivate character—and meaning by character the power to relate oneself vitally and nobly to the living world about one —Ethical Religion must perforce use the creeds of the past in a free and liberal way as instruments to promote the growth of character. Character is the soil out of which all that we think and feel and do must grow; the soil that must be wisely fertilized, even by the decaying mold of the past.

Lest such a reasoned plea as I have made should seem to present character in a too exclusively intellectual light, let me close by trying to correct any such misunderstanding. I have already edvocated a larger conception of character than that which ordinarily prevails; and it only remains to insist that the determining factor of character is Heart. "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life," counseled the seer; and Ethical Religion would pay first heed to that counsel. More heart;—more warm, human love; more robust yet tender sympathy and sweetening fellowship—these are what it calls for as the vitalizing qualities of character. At the base of any edifice of the intellectual life must be the insight, the inspired immediacy of vision, that is born of love—love not in the abstract, but the intensely real love of man for man; love of those nearest—wife, children, kindred, neighbors—broadening out in ever widening circles until it includes mankind.