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# ETHICAL ADDRESSES.

#### NINTH SERIES.

# LECTURES GIVEN BEFORE THE AMERICAN ETHICAL SOCIETIES.



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## CONTENTS.

"THY COMMANDMENT IS EXCEEDING BROAD;" OR, THE SCOPE	
OF MORALITY. William M. Salter	I
THE GOOD SIDE TO ADVERSITY. Walter L. Sheldon	15
MOHAMMED. Felix Adler	37
CHILDREN'S QUESTIONS: How Shall WE Answer THEM?	
William M. Salter	61
THE MORAL VALUE OF SILENCE. Felix Adler	77
THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM OF TO-DAY, I. Walter L. Sheldon	93
THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM OF TO-DAY, II, Walter L. Sheldon .	113
Non-Christian Teachers and Jesus: Whom Shall We Follow?	
William M. Salter	133
THE ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. David Saville Muzzey .	149
THE PHILIPPINE WAR: Two Ethical Questions. Felix Adler	171

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# "THY COMMANDMENT IS EXCEEDING BROAD;" OR, THE SCOPE OF MORALITY.

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

Morality begins with simple duties, but it does not end with them. Time begins for us with the present moment -when we are children we hardly realize anything else; but we soon feel that it stretches into the past and on into the future—that the present moment is but an insignificant part of an immense totality. Space means at first to us the here, it is the familiar ground around us; but we soon see that there is ever more and more space—that it goes out and on, and that there is really no limit to it, that this familiar spot is but a part of a vast infinity. 'Tis practically so with matter: the little bit of solid ground we tread is a part of the round earth, the earth is a part of the solar system, our system is but one of many systems for distances beyond all power of definite conception, the realm of matter extends. It somehow dignifies us to feel that we belong to wholes so vast.

The thought of duty has a similar expansiveness. For the little child goodness means doing as others would have it do—or obedience. For the boy or girl in school, it means more. For the young business man or the young wife, it means still more. Every fresh relationship in life enlarges its significance. As a citizen, there are certain duties beyond those of business. As a member of the great human brotherhood, there are obligations beyond those of citizenship. As a member of the struggling advancing human race, there are duties to future genera-

tions as well as to those now on the scene. The good is not thus any one finite thing; to any single shape in which it may be presented to us, another may always be added—practically it is always ahead of us, as space is beyond us; any special round of virtue we settle down in, we sooner or later wake up to see has another round circling about it, just as there are systems on systems of planetary motion in the heavens.

This thought of the compass of duty, that it is a large and far-reaching instead of a petty thing, has often been borne in on the minds of men. It affected an unknown Hebrew writer of many centuries ago, whose words I take as a sort of text for my remarks to-day. To him duty was the will of the Invisible Power who made the world and ruled human life; it was the Divine commandment or law-and his language is, "Thy commandment is exceeding broad."\* Most striking are the words that immediately precede it. "I have seen an end of all perfection," he says. That is, as I understand the words, that which deems itself final or perfect is not so. The perfect, that which men think so, that which they content themselves with, that which they rest in, has always something beyond it; it is not really perfect at all. "I have seen an end of all perfection"—there is a touch of irony in the language; 'tis as much as to say to those who boasted or were satisfied, "Your perfection is imaginary. You do not realize the sweep and vastness of the Divine requirement; you do not see that the commandment is exceeding broad." It is a thought that we may well take home to ourselves, a very practical thought.

Let us bring before us some of the ways in which men become contented with themselves.

<sup>\*</sup>Psalm cxix. 96.

There are those, for instance, who become satisfied when they do what the world ordinarily requires. So powerful is public opinion that there is no shame like that which comes from a knowledge that the public condemns us, and if the public finds no fault with us, we are very apt to think we are good enough. Private conscience is not a very strict quantity, and others' estimates of us we easily take for our own. Hence if we stand right in the eyes of others, why may we not take our ease? we say. Many, I suppose, practically feel in this way, particularly those in comfortable circumstances, who have been brought up to regard the decencies and common moralities of life and have scarcely known what the temptation is to do otherwise. They may not boast or be anywise elated, but they are quietly and unobtrusively contented with themselves. There is no reproach upon them, why should they reproach themselves? So they have a sense of finality about themselves; they would not say they are perfect, but practically they feel so—that is, they have no feeling of any imperfection. Their very goodness, such as it is, constitutes a barrier to further progress.

Yet how far from perfection such people may be! Everyone would admit, I suppose, that the worth of morality depends on how much root it has, on whether it is more or less independent of favoring circumstance, on whether it is grounded in principle. Jesus once described the difference between those who had a solid basis for their good actions and those who had not. In the one case (according to the well-known illustration) though the rains descended and the floods came and the winds blew, the house did not fall; in the other, the blows of circumstance had their effect—the house fell and great was the fall thereof. The same sort of a house and the

same circumstances, but a different result, because in the one case the house was built on a rock and in the other on sand. The difference might never have been revealed but for the stormy trial, but the difference was real all the while; one house, one fair life, was grounded in principle, was the expression of character, the other, equally fair to all outward beholding, was but a happy accident, and an accident could lay it low. How can a man tell which is true in his own case? No sore trial may have come to him, how can he know till it does come?-till want comes to him, for instance, and poverty tempts him, or till some passion sweeps through him to which he is now a stranger? Till such a time, how can he fail to be uncertain about himself, troubled at the possibility that he might go wrong, anxious ever and ever to renew and confirm the good choices in his soul, and to make sure that they are choices and not mere good feelings and vague aspirations?

Yet all this is the end of a contented consciousness. One is now aware that the fact he did nothing wrong yesterday or last year counts for little or nothing, that the fact that life may go smoothly another year counts for little or nothing, that all that he may have rested in is but an uncertain prop, a poor, partial, surface thing. Then one understands the cry of the Hebrew psalmist for a clean heart and a right spirit—then one understands that the whole question is not whether he does right in the eyes of the world, but whether he can have the approval of an inward judge—of one who searches the thoughts and tries the reins and the heart, whether he call it conscience or God. Hence the meaning of the appeal for inward righteousness, for a spiritual as opposed to a formal religion—hence the ground of the distinction between

God's judgments and the world's judgments—all profoundly true—and grounded in the very nature of morality, which is a disposition, a fixed choice, of the secret will or it is nothing. Real morality is nothing that is seen or can be seen—and all that is seen or can be seen is but the effects of it and may be exactly copied by something that has no kinship with it—it belongs to an unseen, spiritual, realm.

The contentment I have described is the mistake of "good, moral," people, so called, whether in or out of the church. They do their business, and pay their debts, and take care of their families, and do all that the world ordinarily calls right, simply because that is what respectable people do generally about them. They are satisfied never be. They may die as they lived, simply respectable—and their satisfaction may be broken up and it may members of society.

But there is a mistake of a very different class of people. They are those who feel the insufficiency of merely outward standards of morality, who strive and perhaps pray for clean hearts and a right spirit—but who after all live mostly in themselves, who think that morality is entirely a private, domestic, matter, who are kind to everyone they meet, but whose thoughts of social duty do not go beyond this, who think that politics and business and questions of popular right and justice are outside affairs with which they need not concern themselves. These are the persons who say they believe in spiritual religion, that they want help in their daily lives and in their inward struggles-but who see no right and wrong beyond this realm, who view all other spheres of life as secular and think that topics connected with them are hardly in place in a religious or ethical discourse. They

may even acquire a saintliness in a narrow way, may be most sensitive about certain weaknesses and failings—may desire to be perfectly good, as they understand the good; and yet their vision of good may be so limited!

It is a strange thing—these limited conceptions of goodness and virtue that are now extant. To the ancients, civic duty, obedience to the laws, coöperation with others for public ends, willingness to sacrifice one's self for the common defence, was a part of the ideal of goodness. A good man and a poor citizen would have been a contradiction to them. Virtue itself was originally identified with manly strength—and was most commonly applied to the endurance and bravery of soldiers. Nor do we find the social and political virtues excluded from the ideals of the ancient Hebrews. Above all were the prophetic warnings directed against greed and against the oppression growing out of it. "Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field" (i. e., to those who have the grasping spirit), said Isaiah. "The plunder of the poor is in your houses," he again exclaims. "What mean ye, that ye crush my people, and grind the faces of the poor?" Yes, not the prophet alone, but the Eternal who spoke through him, was conceived to say these things The God of Israel was one who called for social righteousness. To his sincere worshipers it was impossible to look on the procuring of unjust gain or the having one's heart intent only on gain, as things with which his law had nothing to do. "Let justice flow forth as water and righteousness as a mighty stream,"—this was his word to men. And the religious part of the nation ever looked forward to the time, when justice would reign, and when those who treasured up rapine and robbery in their palaces should be laid low. Religion became thus largely a social expectation—and to be a faithful Jew meant to look forward to a new earth and a new heaven, wherein a perfect son of Yahweh, the Messiah, would reign.

It must be admitted, I suppose, that Christianity has had something to do with the contracted notions of duty that are now so widely current. Sooner or later in the development of the Christian movement, the notion came to be that the reign of justice, the kingdom of heaven, which the Jew anticipated and Jesus announced, was not to be expected in this world. It was to be elsewhere, and the main thing in life was to prepare for it, and the things of this world sank into insignificance in comparison. An indifference to everything outside one's self was thus bred; the extremes of such an attitude we see in those who took to the deserts or to mountain life-whose aim was not to save the world, or to promote a heavenly order here, but to save their own souls against a hereafter. It is, I suppose, a lingering remnant of such a mode of thought and feeling that to-day spirituality is often separated from social duty, and the aspiration after social perfection. Even those who do not have the old notion of saving their souls think that there is a spirituality about struggles with their own selves that there is not about struggles for justice in society. They feel the Divine within, but not without. They do not see God advancing with every incorporation of greater reason and equity in our laws, with every institution of humaner and juster business usages, with every humiliation of proud and grasping men, with every lifting up of the down-trodden and the poor. They do not see that the just, the equal, the right and the Divine are all one-that righteousness makes every cause sacred and spiritual with which it can be associated. Their eyes are blind to these things. They

are content with that which they should not be contented with; they stop short of the sweep of the Divine commandment.

Yes, Christianity itself taken in its original spirit was against the interpretation which has been put upon it. Jesus announced a social law and the coming of a Divine Society. The principles he announced implied, and would create if they were carried out, a practical living human brotherhood. He never conceived of men's saving their souls alone; he knew that to lose one's life was to save it, that to give one's self up in loving service to others was the way to come nearest God and to be most a man. He said the time would come when this would all be true; he pointed men to the new earth, wherein old-time selfishness and wrong would be overthrown and love should reign. The truth is, those who labor for an era of social righteousness now are those who are working in his spirit. Those who, though they say little or nothing of another world, tell us that this world ought to be human and just, are his real successors. And the forlornest of all, the least like Jesus of all, are those who while they have lost faith in another world have also no hope for this. All the more, if you doubt that things will be righted elsewhere, are you bound to try to see them right here. Hence the place for political and social reform. Hence the call for new laws, new institutions, new usages of every kind. Hence we see that the very law of the world is change. Hence we feel with the poet:

> "Meet is it changes should control our being, Lest we rust in ease."

Hence we find it only natural, and we contemplate it with a holy expectation, when—

"The old order changeth, giving place to new, And God fulfills himself in various ways, Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

For this is the sad thing in life, that the good should oppose itself to the better, that the good once attained should tend to make the world stationary, that men should stop short of the fullness of the Divine law, that they should not remember the saying of old, "Thy commandment is exceeding broad."

The mistake I have just spoken of is the mistake of religious people and of others who, though they may have not the old beliefs, have something of the old-time temper and spirit. They are, or may be, very intense about a certain range of duty, but beyond it they are nebulous or have no ideas at all. The third class of whom I shall now speak make the very opposite error. They have a deep sense of the necessity of social and political changes, they are ardent and devoted in marking out the new paths which the feet of man must tread, but in their zeal they are in danger of forgetting some of the old truths which humanity has already learned. What I mean principally is the necessity, the absolute indispensability, of pure private character. This is one of the unhappy results of the separation between religion and secular life-that those earnest for the principles on which private character is founded are often indifferent to social reform, and those eager for social reform are apt to place too slight an emphasis on individual morality. The latter are apt to say, "You see what mere moral teaching amounts to, look at the world to-day after eighteen hundred years of it-what we need is a change of the social system and morals then will take care of themselves." They do not see that the characters of men are causes as well as effects—yes, causes

in a far deeper sense than they are effects; they do not see that you may put a man in the most favorable circumstances and yet not make him any the better, that you must change the man and the laws or institutions he lives under at the same time. Take any of our schemes of social justice, and if realized what would they be but opportunities? The taxation of land values would doubtless increase the opportunities to labor for many men. But how many there are who do not use the opportunities they now have -who are lazy, shiftless, thinking only of to-day and how to get through it most easily! This reform, too, would lessen the restrictions and burdens on capital-but suppose capital keeps the mind, which so much of it has now, to fight the labor that serves it instead of making itself a brotner to it, and also to squeeze the public whenever it gets the chance? What are land and capital but opportunity, means, machinery, the usefulness of which depends largely on the character of the men who have them? Or think of any socialistic measures—measures which within limits and with due regard to circumstances seem to me equally sound with the measure of taxation just referred to. Suppose, for example, our municipalities should have their own gas or electric plants, instead of looking to private individuals or corporations to do these services for them. Sometimes this is urged by conservative people and newspapers-oddly enough even by those who are fighting socialism, on the theory, I suppose, that the left hand should not know what the right hand doeth. And yet supposing we had the new system, what a difference it would make whether we had men of capacity and of sterling character to administer it—or whether we had the sort of men of whom we have too many in public office already!

So with every step in the direction of the socialization of industry-if you have not public spirit and the oldfashioned virtues of steady and faithful industry and of thinking more of the work than of the reward for it, each will be but an indifferent success and will always raise the question whether the simpler method of private management would not serve society as well or better. Get all society organized on cooperative principles, have work and maintenance assured to every man, and unless the cooperative spirit is in men's hearts, unless they give loyal service, unless they submit willingly to necessary restraints (unless, for instance, they keep population within bounds), unless they advance merit ungrudgingly and kill out envy from their minds, unless in brief they acquire a greatness of soul matching to the greatness of the ideas incorporated in their social system, the system will fall sooner or later to the ground. The commandment that will be coextensive with the march of the future is exceeding broad, and those who think that any measure of taxation or any new form of industrial life are finalities and will bring perfection of themselves are much mistaken. Justice is a thing in the air without just men; brotherhood is a dream, until you have those who in their hearts love others as they do themselves. There is no magic about laws or institutions that can save men from themselves: there is no fairest fabric of human hands that will not be weakened or undone by defects of private character. And when I see these questions of private character slighted, I am grave in my thoughts of the future. When I see working-people ready to take advantage, if they can, even if circumstances are such now that ordinarily they are taken advantage of, the prospects do not seem altogether bright for real social advance. When I see enjoyment the

first and only thing in men's minds and not a new love, a new duty, and a new life, I know that the good time coming is going to be a very mixed affair. When I hear reformers quarrel, when I see how uncompromising they are with one another, and how proud and stiff each in his own way, I know that the day of reconciliation and of harmonious coöperation is still far off. They too have to learn the lesson that the other classes of which I have spoken need to learn, that duty is not a simple thing, but a very large thing and that it is not easy to come to the end of it. If I may slightly change the poet's language:

"Our little systems have their day,
They have their day and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou, O Truth, art more than they."

There is a certain energy and vehemence in narrowness and we should excuse anyone who makes an earnest contribution to man's advancement, however he despises other things; but the lack of fairness and sanity brings its corresponding penalty all the same. There is nothing I have spoken of to-day that is not good in its way. These people, well-born and well-bred, of whom I spoke at first, are a great advantage to the smooth working of the machinery of society. Those who, up to their lights, live a faithful private life, have a value all their own. Our reformers, even if they forget one side of life, are none the less a benefit to the world. But how differently the world would go, if each remembered the truth it ignores! How even, how harmonious, how beautiful would be the advance, which now is so one-sided, so vigorous in some ways and so feeble in others, which is accompanied by so many heart-burnings, and in which somehow what has

right on its side sometimes contrives to make itself so unlovely and unlovable! How many lapses, how many retreats, how many failures there must be and should be till men learn to see life steadily and to see it whole—till men gain the large outlook, till they learn the philosophic mind, till they get temperance and tolerance and the practical wisdom that comes from experience and the hard-bought lessons of defeat.

But enough. I have given certain illustrations of my text. Others of a different sort might have been given. The principle in all would be the same. It is really that we live in an infinite universe and are under an infinite law. It is not easy to find a stopping place. Of this and that duty which seems the end, we may say what Epictetus said of the inn which travelers bring up to on their journey-not to it, but through it. We are all on a journey, life is a journey. The universe, as Whitman said, is a road for traveling souls. To sit down and imagine we have reached perfection is to get out of touch with the sweep and urge of the Divine forces in the world. think it is enough to be a respectable member of society, to think it is enough to live a pure private life, to think it is enough to establish just laws and institutions, or to dwell on any one virtue or excellence and be forgetful of others -is a sad, and, when we think of the possible scope of men's thoughts, a dreary mistake. There are those who slight the virtues of the intellect, who think that goodness can atone for narrowness and prejudice. But no one thing can make up for the lack of another. As no single atom can be spared from the universe without disturbing the balance of the whole, so there is no type of virtue and no form of good but goes to make up the balance and the beauty of the moral world; there is none without which that world is not incomplete. O, to give up our placidity and contentment, O, to feel that we are not at the end but only at the beginning, O, to get a sense of the large calling of man and of the large destiny of society, to have a sense of the "increasing purpose" that through the ages runs, to be willing participators in that Divine plan of evolution by which the "thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."

The soul of man demands large thoughts to live by. Suppose you have been shut up for days beneath the roof of your house. What liberation is there is once more standing under the ample dome of heaven! Or suppose you have only glimpses of the blue through the walls of city streets. What relief, what joy to stand in country fields under the whole broad expanse!-to feel one's self the citizen of a universe to which the eye can see no bounds! 'Tis so with the good, the visions of our souls. The goodness of many people tires me. So much possible, I say, and is this all? No unrest, no perturbation, no Divine dissatisfactions, no reaching out after a good they do not see? It is a relief to turn from such to the great souls of the past, to those who were great because they had a sense of greatness above and beyond them, to the psalmists, the prophets, to Jesus who said there was only one who was good, to Paul with his sense of things unattained, to St. Augustine straining his eyes to a Divine consummation still far away, to all those now who are struggling and striving, though with but indifferent success, to make themselves better and to lead the world onward. They are they who bring home to me the meaning of those ancient words of which I am speaking, "I have seen an end of all perfection, for thy commandment is exceeding broad."

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#### THE GOOD SIDE TO ADVERSITY.

#### BY WALTER L. SHELDON.

ADVERSITY may be wholesome. But people do not like it. The number of people who go out of their way in order to get a little more in their lives of the element of adversity, is not overwhelmingly large. The preponderance in numbers would certainly be in favor of those who try to escape it or dodge it, rather than in favor of those who give it a welcome.

It is of the "wheel of fortune" that I am speaking, touching on the element of chance in human life. It turns now one way and now another. We all get some good fortune and some bad fortune; but the proportion is never quite the same in any two lives; and what is equally sure is, that if the amount of the two kinds of fortune could be placed in the scales and weighed out as it came to any one person, the scales would never exactly balance. So far as my own observation goes, in talking with men and women here and there as I meet them, the vast majority of them feel that the balance has been on the side of bad fortune. Supply and demand do not balance well as regards the wants of man for the good things of life.

The degree to which the element of chance plays a role in the affairs of each individual person is undoubtedly exaggerated. It is in accordance with the very instincts of human nature to throw the blame on chance for every kind of adversity. The greatest success usually comes to the class of men who are the least given to this habit,

and in their experiences are the least inclined to blame chance for their own mistakes.

But the element of chance is there,—a good and an evil fortune. Some of that evil fortune we cannot dodge: and some of that good fortune we cannot get, no matter how hard we try for it. And what good can there be in adversity? one may ask. What service can it render to have a path winding around in a zigzag fashion, instead of being along a straight line? Have we not been told by the laws of geometry that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points? And it would seem as if we were going contrary to this very law in assuming that there could be any advantage in a crooked path or in a hill to climb over or in a big stone wall which cannot even be climbed. But we must put this question in the large before applying it to ourselves personally, asking it as a problem for mankind as a whole. The first element of good fortune is: that one should have an adequate amount of the necessaries of life, food and drink and clothing. And those who have not the necessities to an adequate degree are on the side of adversity, whether they have themselves or chance to blame for it.

We all know of the vast numbers of the banana-eating people in the tropics. Bananas grow easily; they are easily picked and easily consumed. What is more, they are immensely nourishing. They grow, too, where people are plentiful. Furthermore, down there the supply of clothing is usually adequate to necessities. On the score of death by cold or starvation probably far more perish by this means in our climate, among the bread-eating people, than among the banana-eating people.

And yet I ask bluntly: Where would we rather have

been born; among the "banana-eating people" in the tropics, with enough to eat and no menace from cold winters, frosts and snow; or among the "bread-eating people," where the struggle for existence is much harder and where adversity is far more liable to strike us on this score than if we were born in the tropics? I suppose we would answer without a moment's hesitation: "Put us, of course, among the bread-eating people." But why? I insist. If we believe that there is no good in adversity, in so far as the necessities of existence go, in so far as keeping alive is concerned, the chances would be more favorable to us down there among the banana-eating element, than up here amongst those who must have bread and wear cloth of wool to keep out the chill of cold air and winter.

It is not quite so sure, therefore, that we may not be actually inclined to choose the adversity side.

Furthermore, it is also plain that strong characters, the men of force, of will, of energy, of great capacity, of achievement, practically never come from the bananaeating element. It is not because of the peculiarity in the nourishment of bananas. By no manner of means! But this circumstance would seem to have something to do with the fact—that among the latter element the necessities of existence come a little too easy. Not enough effort is required for getting the food-supply. Great achievements in the human race have not come from the tropics.

By the law of history, therefore, adversity has had its good side. It may all depend, of course, on just how much adversity enters into the problem. But I believe the fact I have mentioned shows once for all that bad fortune, up to a certain degree, is essential to progress. Where there is no struggle, there is no advance. And it is also a law of nature that if we are not moving forward, we are always slipping backward. There is no such thing is nature as exactly standing still.

All this may be of little cheer to those who may feel that their lines are hard; that they have not been born to the good things of life; that good fortune is not on their side; and that they have been obliged most of their days to eat the bread of adversity. The fact that they happened to be living in that part of the world where the greatest achievements come may not be a powerful solace to them in what they are going through.

Pictures of the millennium usually have to deal with hopes of a time where every man shall have his lines falling in pleasant places, and where the supply of good things shall be adequate to demands.

And I shall have to say at the outset that such a millennium cannot come on this side of the Great River. Whether it will come on the other side must depend on whether a certain class of wants is cut off. In so far as material circumstances are concerned, and what the world has to offer in this regard, we may as well accept the fact now, once for all, that nature's supply is limited But on the other hand, we are confronted with the appalling fact that there is no limit to the extent to which human wants may develop. The possibilities there are infinite.

Hence it would look as if by the law of nature the degree to which the human race would have to face adversity in the future would steadily be on the increase. The moment that a human soul is brought up to a certain

degree of development in the story of evolution, the wants begin to multiply very fast. They do not come gradually, but develop, as we say, "geometrically." And the time is about to come when each individual will only be satisfied if he can have the whole earth and its supplies exclusively for his own uses and to be adjusted to his own sweet will. That is the direction toward which human nature may be said to be tending. Give a slight education to any one of the senses—to that of taste, to the eye, to the ear-and immediately the craving for variety becomes almost intense. The ear educated to good music hungers with a kind of despair to get what it wants, and not once perhaps in a thousand instances is it really wholly satisfied. Our caterers to-day are striving with might and main to develop varieties of food in order to satisfy the elaborate taste of the epicure. Yet I do not exaggerate when I say that the chances are that persons rising from a dinner which has cost forty dollars a plate may be more critical of what has been served them than those who snatch a hasty lunch in town at noonday, when they are so busy that they scarcely know what they eat. The caterers may as well surrender to the inevitable; for the class of persons they are endeavoring to satisfy have reached the limit of infinity in their demands. The people who expect a dinner at forty dollars a plate from this time on must face the side of adversity in so far as eating and drinking goes. And what is more, odd as it may seem, it is adversity. It is a rankling feeling of disappointment, such as the man who depends on a hasty noonday lunch would not be conscious of. We probably do not feel a very profound sympathy for that kind of agony of mind. But it is a reality nevertheless.

It is the old story with regard to music. When people hear fairly good music for the first time they like it and are enthusiastic over it. After a little while, without understanding the reason why, they grow critical. It means that hearing fairly good music has given a sudden, rapid development, perhaps, to the music-sense, and the wants on that side increase enormously, far outrunning the supply. We wonder a little with regard to the stupendous price paid to great singers or to great performers, as if there were something abnormal about it. But no. It is according to nature; it is by this very tendency I am speaking of, according to which demand rapidly runs in the direction of infinity, and if one sense is developed acutely it will pay enormous prices to get a gratification for it.

On the physical side, therefore, in so far as sense-life is concerned, or what we ordinarily term the good things of life, the tendency is now more and more for the demand to outrun the supply.

More and more people in modern times are being born into what we term "easy circumstances." They are educated up to the point of enjoying the good things of life. But they cannot have them, nor one-quarter of them. If they are not resigned, they will only increase the adversity side for themselves and add to its miseries or misfortunes.

We have got to settle it with ourselves, once for all, and answer to ourselves the question: Would we rather be educated up to the point of a keen appreciation of the best things of life, even while we may only get driblets of them, with a constant, gnawing sense of hunger from the lack of supply to our cravings; or would we rather remain with senses and soul uneducated or less developed,

without the refinement of taste or higher cravings, but on a smoother plane of life and with far more equanimity of mind, in so far as supply and demand for our cravings are concerned?

That is the one question almost every living soul who thinks at all must answer for himself. We can dodge a great deal of adversity by keeping on an inferior level of mind and heart. If we undertake to move up to another level we must face the consequences. It is just this issue that people do not like to confront. Instead of answering the question squarely to themselves, they tend to go on in life with one loud, long, determined protest. And in that protest they only add to their own misery, as well as to the worry and misery of other people.

One is confronted oftentimes nowadays with men who chafe over the routine of commercial life and want to enter the intellectual professions, where, as they think, there is play for the mind. Hence it is that such professions are overstocked. We hear a great deal about the underpaid teachers' profession. Men near middle life in some of our large universities may be earning a thousand a year or less. But the market there is over-supplied. It comes from that class who want to lead an intellectual life and who look for it in that direction. Yet they might get it more satisfactorily out of a business career. Few young men may realize that success in the intellectual world falls not so much to the man who hungers for intellectual things as to the man who in that very sphere is capable of the same sort of routine and drudgery as may fall to others in the commercial world.

The tendency of things is not to multiply happiness, but to develop strength or force of character. It is the strong people, rather than the happy people, in the long run who survive. And there is no doubt whatever that adversity is the test of strength, and that the stumblingblock is what makes muscle—either muscle for the arm or muscle for the brain and soul, but it is muscle all the same.

In so far as prosperity is concerned, what it does is to let out all the good as well as all the evil latent in the man. On the other hand, I should say that the direction in which adversity works is on the nerves. Its effects are on the will, and the whole problem comes right there: as to whether it nerves a man or unnerves him. If it permanently unnerves him, he is nowhere. As an individual he is sidetracked in the process of evolution. If it nerves him, then after the experience is over, he is far more of a man than he was before.

This does not imply that a shock of adversity in one form or another should not unnerve even strong men. As a matter of fact, the very nerviest, most capable individuals may be upset for a while by a stroke of calamity. No system can be so perfectly adjusted as to meet any kind of shock without a temporary disarrangement. The strong man is not necessarily the man who does not cry out under a sudden experience of physical pain. Some of the bravest men may shriek at such moments. They must have time to gather themselves together. There may be a temporary collapse, if they are at all high-strung. Ine real test comes a little later in determining whether they have a reserve supply of force by which to pull themselves together after that shock of pain.

What I am saying would apply to almost any kind of calamity which upsets one's plans or purposes in life.

Many a man has marked out a career for himself and then seen it go all to pieces through some stroke of adversity which he had not counted on, and for which he is not responsible. It is a terrific test to which a man may be put. Thousands under those circumstances go to the wall and never recover. They drop to the side and stay there. But when a man under such adverse conditions does recover, faces about, and forms a new line or a new course for himself, it is one of the greatest triumphs of soul or spirit the experience of man has to offer. And beyond a doubt, such an individual is the stronger for it in the end. While he is going through it, however, he is not usually conscious of the strength he is gaining. He has simply set his teeth and goes ahead, and the teeth have to remain set for a long while. Only when he is able to look back on the experience can he measure what he gained by it. But at the time there is no use. His teeth are set and his eye or mind is on the one immediate purpose before him in order to get through it as best he

A man who faces adversity or calamity with all the strength he has got is usually the stronger for it in the end. But the man who faces such an experience with about half his strength is more often the worse for it. And such persons are to be pitied from the bottom of our hearts. We cannot always tell for this reason whether or not a man is going to pull through after a blow has come to his plans. We do not know whether he is putting forth all his strength, or only half of it, to meet the emergency. If it is only half his reserve force, then woe betide him!

One of the saddest kinds of adversity, the most heart-

rending, is seen where one man is forced to be carrying the load for another or for others. Calamity may have struck him where he was not responsible at all. The load may have suddenly dropped on his shoulders almost before he was aware of it; and it is a terriffic experience for a man to go through—a test which tries the fibres of the strongest characters. Many and many an individual has in despair succumbed, broken down and collapsed; while others throw the burden off and refuse to carry it. But if there is anything inspiring, it is to see an indivdual in this way carrying the burden of another which has fallen on his shoulders, and carrying it with a face of cheer. The world may not appreciate it. But that fact is recorded somehow and somewhere at the core of things.

In so far as adversity is to be a strength-giving element, there must, of course, be a proportion between the blow and the latent strength there. The stumbling-block of a certain height may be just enough to give the man nerve. The path he may have to cut around a wall may be just of that length which is needed to add the additional strength of muscle to his arm. But let the wall be a little too high or the stumbling-block be a little too heavy, so that the man cannot move it or get around it, and then the outcome is sad in the extreme. This does happen again and again. It is conspicuous with regard to the development of races under social or climatic conditions.

Up to a certain point, therefore, according to the individual or according to the race, adversity, by placing stumbling-blocks in the way, or walls of difficulty to go around, actually increases strength and adds to the final achievements. But if it goes beyond a certain limt it works the other way. There is decline and what we call "being sidetracked" in the process of evolution.

The peculiar term specifying certain events as being "acts of God," as used nowadays in law or commerce, has a real significance. It implies, so far as human handiwork is concerned, the element of chance, where individual responsibilty does not enter for what has taken place.

In the face of those so-called "acts of God" there is nothing for a man to do but just to set his teeth and hold on. It is like being caught on the edge of an avalanche and going down with the debris. There may be nothing that one can do but just wait. There is a great deal in just being able to set one's teeth in the face of calamity and wait. It is that sort of grit which carries a man through a crisis coming from those circumstances over which he has no control. To give way to despair may only intensify the calamity, and one may have still less resistance power for the next blow when it comes. We must get it out of our heads that the universe has been tuned in key to our small systems. We shall do much better to try and tune our systems to the key of the great universe.

One good that comes from adversity lies in the fact that it does make a person *think*, and, what is more, *think hard*. And I can assure you, if you have not been aware of it already, that human nature is very much averse to thinking. It takes an excitement in order to get the brain into full activity. The tendency is for the blood to go to the muscles rather than to the head.

When one's calculations are all upset, then one's brain is in a turmoil as one begins to ask the what or the why or the wherefore. Under these circumstances some

persons are led to cynicism and others to despair. But if one escapes either of these two catastrophes as an outcome of his adversity and his new thinking, he does get a quickening of his inner life and a wider horizon than he ever had before. He realizes, perhaps, for the first time that he is a part of a system of things and that he must bend his will to the great system of which he is an atom or a member.

I am speaking mainly of the element of chance, partly for the reason that the element of chance more often brings adversity than prosperity. Our own personal efforts are usually in the direction of good fortune. The feature of chance, therefore, is what upsets us and confronts us with the adverse side by overthrowing our calculations. And it brings up the question as to whether we are more in control of circumstances and less subject to chance nowadays than the human race was in former times. The main thought which comes to me here is that the causes leading to an upsetting of one's calculations nowadays are quite different from what they used to be. Go back a few hundred years, read of the conditions of those times, and one sees that at any moment, without being aware of the outcome, calculations of a lifetime could be overthrown by a war in a few days. It was war, perhaps, more than any other influence, in former days, which introduced the element of chance into human calculations. It upset the plans of the man in commercial life; it overthrew the schemes of the individual who was politically ambitious; or it brought calamity and death, destroying whole households or whole cities.

And all this was liable to come at any time because it

was happening, one might say, all the time. If the element of chance did not enter from that source, it came from the convulsions of nature.

On the other hand, to-day I should say that the element of chance entered less from the side of physical nature, less from the side of war or political convulsions, and more from the peculiarities of the social structure itself.

It is as with a nicely made watch, with its complex mechanism, which has cost hundreds of dollars, and months, if not years, of labor in its manufacture. A watch like that has to be handled with care. The slightest disturbance may upset it, put it out of order, and then it stops. The cheap watch may not keep as good time. But one may let it drop on the floor with equanimity and not be worried about it in fear lest it will not be going when one wakes up in the morning.

And the social structure of modern times is a good deal like the mechanism of an expensive watch. In the commercial world, for instance, in spite of all the efforts a man may make on some business scheme in his own city, the whole plan may miscarry, owing to something which occurs over in Calcutta.

What applies to the commercial world in a certain sense applies to all other relationships. The mechanism of society is complex. And the element of chance may overthrow our best-laid schemes or destroy our dearest, most cherished hopes, until we lie prostrate and wonder where we are. Men who have bold schemes, those who have dear and cherished hopes on which they stake a great deal, must be prepared for severe shocks in proportion to the stake they have put up.

The element of chance will always be a determining factor in the face of any kind of calamity. There are some men, as we say, who literally cannot be killed. They are like the traditional "cat with nine lives." Nothing can hold them down. No possible calamity, save death, will stop them altogether. And when instances of this kind come before us they are always inspiring to contemplate.

Sometimes reading is a tonic to the mind under blows of misfortune. It does help somewhat to read and know by heart such a poem as that on "Fortune" in the little song by Tennyson. It braces one like a tonic, to say over those words: "With thy wild wheel we go not up nor down." It helps one merely to assert: I have the strength, and can face it, and will.

But everyone knows that a limit is there. Beyond a certain point we do go up and down with the "wild wheel of fortune." Yet I wish all the English-speaking world could commit that little song of Tennyson's to memory and know it by heart. Tonic elements of that kind are a staying force when adversity comes; and we have all to take a certain share of it, even if the share in all cases is not alike.

But still more I wish I could persuade every English-speaking man and woman to read over a number of times the great essay on "Compensation," by Ralph Waldo Emerson. On the whole, it is perhaps the finest contribution to the world's literature made by an American genius. It stiffens the muscles of the soul just to read it, cause it is such a peculiar blending of modernity with antiquity, of ancient stoicism with American common sense.

In speaking of the element of chance, and the extent

to which it enters into human life, one is forced to admit that it does have more to do with the life of woman than the life of man. This may be less true nowadays than in former times. But it holds nevertheless. Far more latent force or capacity is stifled or never gets to the light in woman's life than man's.

It is the great law of nature laid down by St. Paul a long while ago that in marriage "they twain shall become one flesh"; and the woman must follow the fortunes of the man as those fortunes go up or down. The opportunities she will have for giving vent to any latent capabilities, any intellectual powers, any qualities of character in reserve, will depend on the accident of the position which comes to the one with whose life her own is bound up.

Hence it is that one is led to reflect far more often in the case of woman than of man on this point and to think to one's self: What an amount of latent gift in such a person never got to the light! We see many a woman held down to the routine of daily drudgery, with scarcely a moment's time for the "higher life," as it is called, and yet we may have been aware of gifts and powers which, if that woman had been placed under other circumstances, would have made her an influence on a wide circle of acquaintances and a natural leader among those around her. Perhaps not one particle of this may ever get a chance to show itself through all her days.

It is far easier for a man to carve his own position than for a woman. All is uncertainty when she begins life and is joined to another as to what will be the position of that other ten or twenty years hence. It may go up or it may go down. With the man it may be capacity or the lack of capacity. But with the woman it is more often the element of chance. She is held there for a life-time.

Once and again I have been reminded of this in watching instances of young women among the wage-earning class. Here and there I observe cases of persons who by all their instincts have a natural, superior, womanly refinement, with latent gifts, by which, if they had been born under other circumstances, would have made them persons of force and influence on all around them. And vet one knows what must be the outcome. The iron rule of custom will keep that woman in the humblest circumstances all her days. She may have rare, most unusual gifts. But they are not of the money-making kind. She will be tied down inevitably to the daily toil, and her influence will probably never get much beyond her own threshold. I do not mean to say for a moment that the sphere there is not a great one and a noble one. I only wish to say that among persons who have exceptional gifts of endowment it is sometimes a misfortune that those gifts have no chance for free play. And when it comes to the exceptional natures, I think history has shown that they do not come from any one class more than another.

When in the case of a man there is partial failure I think one's instincts usually are to blame the man, and feel that, even if chance entered to some extent, yet he had opportunities by which also to some extent he might have conquered chance.

In turning for a moment, by contrast, to the influence of *good* fortune on human character, we are forced to raise the question as to what have been the circumstances which bring on an era of good fortune. When I look

back over the past, I see, for instance, that the prosperity of Athens in the days of Pericles came not from the efforts or labors of the citizens of that country. The wealth had poured into that city through war and conquest. It was war-money which built the Parthenon on the Acropolis at Athens; wealth sucked from the lifeblood of those who had no share whatever in that beauty or that prosperity. The good fortune of that city rested on injustice. And in their heart of hearts I believe the citizens of Athens knew it all the while. And to my mind, out of that more or less conscious fact that their prosperity rested on injustice came those microbes which ate out the pest vitality of the people and brought on their ruin.

It was just the same story with Rome and the Roman Empire. That city did not begin to enter on its decline until the people had stopped working; until practically all the citizens were living on the wealth stolen from conquered races elsewhere. And the people knew it. The best minds were sadly conscious of it. The city of Rome was living, almost to a man, on stolen goods. Its existence rested on a principle of injustice. Conscience had to decay, and the decline was inevitable. The nature of things was working out one of the great laws of history.

And now I apply this truth to our own century. And here comes the point of contrast. There may be injustice; undoubtedly there has been any amount of it in our day and generation. But the phenomenal prosperity of the nineteenth century does not rest fundamentally on injustice. It comes from an utterly different source than that from which the prosperity of those other countries developed.

In a sense, perhaps, the prosperity of our country is a matter of luck or good fortune. I do not mean to say that luck or good fortune has been the only element there. But what it implies is, that we are sharers, by chance, as it were, in the great results which have come from the labors of a few persons. It has been the inventive genius of one small class of men, and the discoveries as to the laws of nature on the part of another class of men, which, more than anything else, have given us the age of prosperity of the nineteenth century. It is chance to many of us that we are the lucky heirs of it. It is an element of fortune so far as we are concerned. But it was not chance in so far as those few individuals achieved the first results. In a word, the prosperity of the nineteenth century came rather as a conquest over physical nature—by contrast with the prosperity of former ages, which came more often by conquest of one people or nation over another people or nation.

And this is the element of hope and cheer in the outlook for the future. I believe in my heart of hearts that the nature of things—a power which goes under many names, God, Providence, Law, the Universe; it is all the same, whatever the name may be—does work out, by a slow process; certain results from fundamental ethical laws. And this is one of them. The good fortune of one man which comes mainly from the ill fortune of another is in the end a vicious fortune and means decay. And the good fortune of one country which necessarily comes from the ill fortune of another country, or of one race from another race, is a vicious fortune, which, in the end, will act like a boomerang on the people who share in it. This is the law of history.

And to-day it may be that many and many an individual rests his good fortune on the ill fortune of others. But in so far as the prosperity of the world at large is concerned, and in so far as the past century was an age of prosperity, its good fortune did not rest chiefly on that fact, but rather by the conquest over physical nature. We have come to the point where a man cannot keep his good fortune long to himself. If he makes an accidental discovery he can only hold it for his own purposes for a few years. Then the rest of the world shares in it. We denounce monopolies, and they may be a vicious, most vicious, element in modern times But those monopolies can last only about so long. Then the discovery or invention becomes common property.

A conquest over nature, unlike the conquest over our fellowmen, must by the very law of the nature of things in the end redound to the good of all mankind. A bounty has been placed on such conquest. In order to get the good out or it a man must share it. But there is no such bounty in the higher realm for sheer conquest on the part of one man over another man, or one race over another race—as was the custom by which people sought prosperity in former times.

And the ideal for the future, so far as prosperity is concerned, must more and more point in that direction by which the good fortune of one shall come from a man's own efforts or from conquests over nature, or from those blessings that arise where a man, in seeking a good for himself, achieves a good for the rest of the world also. And more and more, on the other hand, do we hope that the other kind of prosperity will decline.

We are all glad for the good luck that strikes any hu-

man creature, if only it has not come from the ill-luck of some other human creature. In a certain sense, fortune is never good fortune which has come from the ill fortune of another. A man who gets what he calls good fortune by that means can never enjoy it with the same heart as when it has come by honest effort or by circumstances which have not brought ill fortune to others.

It is just here, perhaps, that we see what may be the influence on character from good fortune or prosperity When it is of this other kind, which has not been in any way an injury to another, it leaves the heart and conscience free. But where it has really come out of the ill luck of another it must hold the man down.

We may say that good fortune fosters vice and crime, and that ages of prosperity have been ages of crime and vice. And so they have. But they have also been ages of virtue and moral force. The same good fortune which developed the gladiatorial shows in Rome called forth the Stoics and the Stoic philosophy. The same good fortune which led to the vice of Athens called forth a Socrates and a Plato. And the prosperity of to-day, which leads to such shocking exhibitions of vulgar extravagance in a great metropolis, also gives us the exhibition of a locomotive engineer found dead under his engine with his hand still on the throttle.

In a word, there is a good side to prosperity, just as there may be a good side to adversity. We overshoot the mark in saying to young men that fortune will have absolutely nothing to do with their careers. You might as well say that a man with a hundredweight tied to his heels could walk as fast as the man with free limbs. Can the tree growing in one of our streets, in the choking,

smoky, sooty atmosphere around us, with a pavement packed hard with stones and brick, so that the moisture may not soak through to the roots—can this tree expand and develop as it would if it had abundance of fresh air above and moisture at its roots below, out in the open country? Of course, circumstances must have something to do with what comes out of every living child. The will may do something. But it cannot do everything. We can handle the forces of nature up to a certain point But beyond that they constitute the element of "fortune." And so it is true of the amount of strength we inherit, the vitality, the force, the vigor. There are limits beyond which the will cannot go.

What prosperity does, or may do, as we have said, is to give vent to all that is in the human creature for good or ill. If there is vice there striving to get an outlet, good fortune is just the chance it wants and it takes it. If there is strength of character latent there, force of will, power for human service, then good fortune, if it comes at the right moment, gives this other power a chance to let itself out. Only, however, as a man can honestly feel that his good fortune is the good fortune of others too, or that it has not come from the ill-luck of other men, can the best that is in him find a vent. Only under those circumstances will the good side be stimulated. There is good and evil in every man. And if he feels that his good fortune has come from the ill of others, itwill rather tend to call forth the evil side in him, or to enervate the strong, manly side of his nature. Prosperity that comes out of the ill-luck of others, I believe, is enervating, when not brutalizng. It saps the best vitality and fosters the weaker, more sensual side. But the good

fortune which has come from honest effort, from the conquests over nature, the good fortune which is shared by others as well as by one's self; which is, in a word, the fortune of the age rather than of any one person; this is something which one can enjoy with a will and make use of to the utmost for all that is best within him.

And I believe that there has been more of this prosperity in the past hundred years than in any other previous century since the beginning of civilization.

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# MOHAMMED.\*

#### BY FELIX ADLER.

THE personality of Mohammed was unique: a man of excellent gifts and of fatal defects; withal, a king in the spiritual realm whose sway in the past has been vast and is still extending. It has been said that Mohammedanism has never given up a position which it once occupied, or retired from a conquest which it had made, except Spain. Twice the host of Islam came near overrunning all Europe: once when it was checked by Charles Martel, and a second time when it was repulsed by John Sobiesky. It is still all-powerful in many quarters of the earth, in India, in China, above all on the continent of Africa where it is constantly widening its sphere of influence and carrying on an active and effective propaganda. We are too apt to identify in our thought the condition of Islam with the condition of Turkey, the so-called "sick man." Islam itself is not a "sick man." Many of the people that have embraced Mohammedanism are active, virile, endowed with unspent vigor, and the destinies of mankind are likely to be largely affected by the future development of these peoples and this religion. The total number of Mohammedans, at present, is estimated at about 150,-000,000. You perceive, therefore, that, in treating of Mohammed and the faith he founded, we are not indulging a mere vein of curiosity, or dealing with a question of purely academic interest. In contemplating the future

<sup>\*</sup>An address before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, December 16, 1900.

of the world, it behooves us to understand, if we may, the motives which have influenced and are likely still to influence so large a portion of the earth's inhabitants.

Who was Mohammed? He is described to us as a man of middle height, with massive, well-developed head; black, waving hair streaming down to his shoulders; the face oval; the nose slightly aquiline; brilliant, dark eyes gleaming from beneath long eye-lashes; teeth regular and pearly white; hands soft and satiny as a woman's; his gait elastic, and having a certain majesty. He was taciturn by nature, and knew how to observe long stretches of silence which, however, were at times broken by streams of fiery eloquence. He was, withal, gracious in manner, affable, courteous, and a lover of little children.

Mohammed was born in the year 571, the offspring of a noble house in the sacred city of Mecca,—sacred long before his advent, but sacred to idolatrous divinities. His father died before he was born, his mother while he was still a child. Later utterances of his in the Koran, show how deeply he felt the desolation of his orphanhood. He was adopted, first, by his grandfather, the head of the tribe of Koreish, later on, by his sturdy uncle, Abu-Talib, a splendid type of old Arabian chivalry, who never had the least confidence in the new doctrines preached by his nephew, but who, by his loyalty to the obligations of consanguinity, preserved him from an untimely death.

It has sometimes been the fashion to speak of Mohammed as an impostor. Luther pays his respects to him in the words: "Oh, fie, you horrid devil, you damned Mohammed." And Melanchthon says that he was inspired by Satan. But Mohammed was not an impostor. His family, the Koreish, were the guardians of the ancient sanctuary at Mecca. Their revenues were derived

from the crowd of pilgrims who came to worship and to trade at this shrine; for the altars and temples of the gods in Arabia and elsewhere became, in early times, the commercial centres of the countries or districts in which they were situated. Fairs were held at such places owing to the security provided by the presence of the god, and the interests of business and religion went hand in hand, in more senses than one. Mohammed belonged to the honored guardians of this ancient shrine, and yet he had the courage to denounce it and the practices connected with it as abominations. How, then, can he be charged with imposture? He opposed his own interests and those of his tribe. How, then, can impure motives be charged upon him? If one of the priests connected with the shrine of a miracle-working, weeping image of a saint were to arise and expose the fraud, should we call him an impostor? If a member of the aristocracy of England were to propose the abolition of aristocratic privilege, should we be inclined to suspect his honesty? It must be remembered that Mohammed was not merely one who antagonized the ancient Arabian religion from the outside, but he was one of those who profited by the maintenance of that religion which he opposed. He directly went counter to the interests of his tribe, and, so far, his own self-interest, in entering on the path of innovation. This alone should make us hesitate before we ascribe imposture to him. But, quite apart from this, no one can follow his career, no one can, above all, read his own utterances, and maintain that opinion for a single instant. It was the blind, fanatical bigotry of rival sectaries which invented this charge, and it was shallowness of mind that supported it.

His family, however, though noble-and the Arabs are

very proud of their pedigree—had become impoverished through the lavish hospitality of Mohammed's grandfather, and the orphan boy was forced to do menial service in order to obtain the means of subsistence. He tended sheep, as Moses and other prophets had done. Then he entered the service of a wealthy widow, Khadidjah, and found favor in her sight. He married her, though she was some fifteen years his senior, and never ceased, even after her death, to acknowledge the debt of gratitude he owed to her. She, his motherly wife, became his first convert; the next were an emancipated slave, and his young cousin Ali, a mere boy. These three formed the nucleus to which hundreds of millions have since been added.

There are some men, illustrious in human history, who do their best work, produce their best fruit, in early manhood. Alexander, the great conqueror, died at thirty-three. Jesus, a greater conqueror, also died at about the same age. There are others whose mind matures slowly, who do not show the power that is in them until they are near the top of the hill, or are already beginning to descend the downward slope. Mohammed was of the latter class. He was sixty-two when he died. He was forty before he began to see his marvelous visions, to dream his marvelous dreams. All the interest of his life was crowded into the last two decades of it.

The late Col. Ingersoll, some years before his death, delivered an address before this Society on "Shakespeare." Some of you may remember with what emphasis he announced the fact that this greatest of poets was not an educated man in the technical sense, was not college-bred. With what delight would Col. Ingersoll have signalized the same circumstances in regard to Mo-

hammed, a man whose opinions and sentiments have so largely influenced the destiny of the human race. He repeatedly speaks of himself as "the illiterate prophet." It is quite agreed that he could not write, and it is generally supposed that he could not read books. But there were two books which he did read: the Book of Nature, the azure scroll of the nightly heavens with the golden letters inscribed thereon, and the scroll within. When about forty years of age, as we have said, he began to see visions. A favorite asylum, at that time, was a cave amid the crags of Hira, near Mecca. This was a rocky eminence rising from the white, blazing sands of the desert into the glaring noonday sky, "shadowless, flowerless," with no rill to moisten the bare, burning cliff, or to comfort the parched lips of the traveler. Hither Mohammed came for solitude and meditation, and here he went through the initial agony of his prophetic career. The thought of his mission came to him in anguish and terror. It seemed to him as if a heavy load had been laid upon him from which he could not escape. He fell into convulsions. Streams of perspiration ran from his brow. His eyes burned like glowing coals. Again and again, he was on the point of leaping from the brink of the precipice in order to end his misery by suicide. But as often as he approached the verge, the legend says, the Angel Gabriel appeared on the bounds of the horizon, and wherever he turned he still saw that tall figure, and it said to him: "I am Gabriel and thou art the apostle of the Lord." And so, after a time, the haunting fear that he was losing his reason or possessed by evil spirits left him, and the conviction definitely lodged itself in his mind that he was one of the chosen few, commissioned to do the work of God on earth, the bearer of a message which

men must heed at their peril. He announced his message; he was derided, despised, persecuted. His first followers—for the most part slaves and people of the humblest class-were driven out and compelled to seek refuge in Abyssinia. He himself and his whole clan were ostracized and nearly starved. At last, when all these methods of attack failed, a conspiracy was hatched to assassinate him. He fled to Yathrib, since known as Medina, i. e., the city of the prophet, in the year 622, and this year—the year of the flight or the Hedirah,—is the beginning of the Mohammedan era. From the time that he entered the city of Medina his fortunes changed. He manifests entirely new qualities. Hitherto a preacher he now assumes the role of ruler, law-giver and conqueror and in his new role he manifests the weaker sides of his nature. In several small encounters with armies sent from Mecca he is successful, and finally enters the ancient city in triumph. As he grows in strength he becomes vindictive, revenges himself upon personal enemies and does not hesitate to adopt a policy of persecution. It is significant that this change in his nature is coincident with the death of his wife. With her he seems to have lost the better part of himself and yet even in the latter part of his career he shows himself to be the born leader of men and a strong believer in the truth and justice of his message. the 8th of June, 632, he died. His genius had forged the weapons by means of which the caliphs who came after him, in a rapid succession of conquests, subjugated the greater part of the civilized world and formed an empire wider even than that of Rome in the extent of territory that it embraced.

But it is time now to consider the nature of his mes-

sage, the idiosyncrasy of the new faith which he preached. There are those-for instance, Emanuel Deutsch in his "Literary Remains,"—who speak of the religion of Mohammed as if it were a kind of modified Judaism; Jewish monotheism with the acknowledgment of the special prophetic mission of Mohammed superadded. there are others, like Carlyle, who in his book on "Hero Worship," calls Mohammedanism a confused Christianity. Both of them are distinctly in error. The Koran is full of stories borrowed from the Old Testament, or from the later rabbinical literature of the Jews. The Jewish tribes in Arabia were Mohammed's near neighbors, and of them he was, at first, a patient learner. In the beginning he directed that the Kiblah, the place toward which the face should be turned during prayer, should be Jerusalem. Later on, significantly enough, he substituted Mecca. He himself was not clear as to his originality. He claimed that he was only the last of the prophets, of whom his greatest predecessors had been Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. The Koran is also full of references to the life of Jesus, the son ot Mary. He, too, is recognized as a great Prophet; but the divinity ascribed to him is considered blasphemous; so also the doctrine that he is the son of God, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Mohammed endeavors to go back of Christianity and Judaism to a common source from which he believes them both to have sprung, which he calls the religion of Abraham. He professes to teach the religion of Abraham. It was his own conception, unbeknown to himself, which he presented under this guise.

Every religion has its keynote. This we must seize, or we shall miss the meaning of it all. We may know a hundred details connected with its creed, its ceremonial

observances, its laws; but, if we fail to grasp the dominant note, we have yet failed utterly to comprehend it. We fail to see the forest because of the trees. What was the dominant note of Confucianism? Reverence, respect for the fixed order of nature, and the attempt to create a social order which should be as permanent, as calm and unbroken as the revolution of the heavens. The dominant note of Confucianism is expressed in the idea of order. What was the dominant note of Zoroastrianism? It is the idea of life, and the antithesis of life to death. The Good God is the principle of life; the Evil God the principle of decay. So we ask—and this is our chief question—what is the dominant note of Mohammedanism? It is contained in the idea of resistless might. God is conceived of as the Irresistibly Mighty One. The whole world,-man, nature, everything, are regarded from the point of view of their subjection to Omnipotent Power. The creation is like a field of grass swaying before the sweep of a mighty wind. God is that Wind sweeping through everything. Among the names of Allah-Allah, "the strong" being the generic name of God-mentioned in the Koran are these: he to whom everything is subject; the Lord of the worlds; the Lord of the creatures; the Lord of the magnificent throne; the Lord of East and West. When the blind Mueddin from the minaret sends forth, through the silent perfumed night of the Orient, his call to prayer, the exclamation on his lips is: Allah Akbar, God is Mighty. When the host of the pilgrims at Mecca move from point to point of the sacred circuit, ever and again they break forth into the cry: Labaik Allah, at thy service, subservient to thee, God. The name of the religion itself is Islam. Its professors call themselves Moslems, a word derived from Islam; and Islam means "yielding one's self up to the sway of the mighty World Power." The religious attitude is that of the willow that bends; the irreligious attitude that of the oak that resists the blast of God. Mohammed saw the world under the aspect of power, interpreted it under that sign. This is the keynote.

Mohammed was impressed with the might of God. Strange and somewhat unfamiliar, but easily comprehended, are the signs of that might that chiefly force themselves on his attention and produce this impression on his mind: the creation of heaven and earth, the story of which he had received from the Jews; the sending of rain; the annual reproduction of life when dead nature clothes itself anew with verdure; the generation of man, the miracle of the growth of the human embryo; the vicissitude of day and night. He says: "You might have been placed in a world in which there was only night, and never day, and then how would you have performed your labor? Or in a world in which there was only day, and never night, and then how would you have found the needful rest?" I have never discovered in any other religious book, except the Koran, this special singling out of the interchange of day and night as a mark of the power and wisdom of the Author of things. He also alludes to the circumstance that men are able to traverse the sea in ships, that winds blow across the waters which waft them to their destination, and that they can take advantage of these winds; and to the fact that animals have been created, like the camel, on which they are able to ride, as a sign of God's wonderful power of contrivance. Other circumstances that impress him are the variety of human faces and the great diversity of human language, and the diversity of the colors of nature,—both of inanimate nature, and especially of the plant world. The field of Mohammed's thinking was not broad, but it was plowed over and over unnumbered times by this deep meditator. And the signs that convinced him of the actual existence of the Resistless Power are the ones that I have mentioned. They recur again and again in successive chapters of the Koran.

Allah Akbar, Labaik Islam: these are the watch-words. And to a soul thoroughly convinced, as Mohammed was, of the actuality of a supreme, sovereign Maker, Ruler, God was to him far more actual than stones and rocks and trees and fellow human beings. To a soul wrapped up in this belief there would come, as necessary corollaries, certain other beliefs. In the first place, that idolatry, the worship of any other gods except the one, supreme, and only real God, is a horrible sin. He calls it the unpardonable sin. Why unpardonable? Because it is lèse-majesté. Those who worship any other gods, except the one God, are like the subjects of the autocratic Czar, who should set up pretenders to the throne—poor, ineffectual, little princelings-and offer to these the homage due to their supreme Emperor or King. How will the supreme King act when such lèse-majesté has been committed? He will gather together his forces and will destroy those pretenders and visit fearful penalties upon those treasonable subjects of his who have turned from him and bestowed their allegiance on his inferiors. Such, according to Mohammed, is the attitude of God toward idolaters. Hence his cry, repeated so many millions of times by his followers: "La Illah Ila Allaha." "There

is no God but God, Allah, the irresistibly Mighty One." Christianity says: "God is a Spirit, and they who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." Judaism says: "God is the Holy One. His sacrifices are a pure heart and a contrite spirit." Islam says, primarily: "God is Power." Idolatry is the unpardonable sin because it is lèse-majesté. And there is also another kind of lèse-majesté. The Lord of the worlds, the Lord of East and West, the Lord of the magnificent throne, like a human sovereign, has, from time to time, expressed his will in certain edicts, decrees, laws. To attempt to thwart his will by disobeying those laws is also lèsemajesté. What those laws are I shall briefly point out when we speak of the ethical precepts of Mohammed. At present, I wish to direct attention to the fact that disobedience to the moral and other commandments is regarded as treason-treason to the Sovereign who has issued those commands.

There are four articles in the doctrinal system of this religion which stand out pre-eminent. The first two we have considered. We are now in a position to understand the third, namely, the unique role assigned to Mohammed himself, the prophetic character ascribed to him. The place he occupies is unlike that of Moses in Judaism, of Buddha in Buddhism, of Christ in Christianity. It is *sui generis*. It is determined by his sense of the mission which he was called upon to fulfill. What was that mission? He does not weary of assuring his followers, "I am only a man like the rest of you." He does not claim divine honors. "God forbid," he says, "that any one should set up companions by the side of the High and Mighty One." "I am not an angel," he says. "I am not

a miracle-worker. I am frail and liable to error." "I cannot avert evil from myself and secure good." "I am simply a denouncer of threats and a bearer of good tidings to those who believe. I am an apostle, a prophet, the seal or the last of the prophets." Every nation has its prophets to admonish, to warn, and to encourage them. He felt himself to be peculiarly the prophet of the Arabian nation. He regarded himself as one of those speaking-trumpets through which the Divine Power made heard his voice across the waste of the waters of life. He earnestly and sincerely believed at the outset of his career that he was the recipient of a revelation from on high. But he did not assert—on the contrary, he denied that the revelation which had been vouchsafed to him was exhaustive, that he had fathomed the mystery of things. The Koran is compared to a thunder cloud. The awful tones of the thunder represent its warnings, the flashes of lightning the gleams of insight it contains. But the darkness of the cloud represents the unsolved mysteries which remain. He says, in a certain passage, in the 31st Sura: "If all the Seven Seas were changed into ink and all the trees of the earth were changed into pens, yet would they not suffice to write out the secret things of God." Only so much of revelation had he received as was adequate for a special purpose. What was that purpose? To denounce threats and to bear good tidings to those who believe. What threats and what tidings? I have said that we are now in a position to understand. He reasoned with himself that an Omnipotent King, a Lord of the magnificent throne cannot, for long, patiently permit pretenders or idolatrous deities to be set up and worshipped in his place, and cannot for long, or patiently,

permit his human subjects to disobey his commands; that there must speedily come a day of reckoning. The very power of the Supreme King made it certain that that reckoning could not long be postponed. He felt therefore—and this accounts for his belief in himself as a prophet—that some one (he himself, above others, because he was so profoundly convinced of these truths), must go forth among men and warn them of the terrors of the Day of Judgment and bring good tidings to those who should square their accounts in season.

Hence, the fourth of the main articles which are included in the doctrinal system of Islam, the belief in the meeting with God, as he puts it, in the last day, or the Day of Judgment. Unless we realize the importance of this belief and its connection with the starting-point of Mohammed's faith, the doctrine of God's omnipotence, we shall fail to adequately gauge the strength of the impulse that sent him forth on his prophetic career.

The descriptions of the Last Day are fervid, charged with intense color, and though the material that enters into them has, for the most part, been borrowed from elsewhere, it bears, none the less, the stamp of Mohammed's original way of thinking and feeling. Indeed, this is true of his entire religion. The material is borrowed but it is shaped, stamped anew, and becomes the expression of his mind. On the Day of Judgment the trumpet shall sound and the graves give up their dead. On that Day no soul will be permitted to intercede for another, not the father for his child, not the son for his father. Every burdened soul must bear its own burden. The books will be opened in which is written every secret act, all the good that a man has wrought, all the evil, even

though it have only the weight of an ant. The good shall be rewarded in excess of their deserts; the evil shall be punished in accordance with their deserts. On that Day a man going forward toward the Judgment Seat will meet on the way a horrid, frightful-looking object, and he will turn from it in fear and disgust and say: "Avaunt, thou loathsome thing!" But it will reply: "I am thy own conscience." And it will leap upon his neck and ride him like an incubus. On that Day the fraudulent buyer will have tied to his neck and be compelled to drag after him all the goods which he has fraudulently purchased. Think of the tons of oil, and the barrels of sugar, and the yards of cloth which some men will be compelled to drag after them toward the Judgment Seat! On that Day the faces of the wicked shall be black and they will lie on their knees around Hell gate, until they are driven forward in troops. And the smoke and the fire will be around them like a pavilion, and out of the flames they will cry to the keeper of their prison-house, praying for annihilation. And he will tell them that they shall die a thousand deaths, but yet shall never die. And when they ask for respite, they shall be given to drink boiling water and molten metal, and be transported from extreme heat into regions of icy cold. This, then, shall be the punishment of the wicked, of those who have committed lèsemajesté, of those who have offended the Lord of the magnificent throne by setting up rivals against him and by disobeying his commands. On the other hand, the worshipers of Allah and the obedient will be conducted into the Mohammedan Paradise, which it is needless to describe. Although it is painted in sensuous imagery, it is not as sensual as may appear at first sight. It is described, indeed, as a place where there are gardens through which rivers ever flow, where the boughs of the trees are laden with delicious fruit, where there is cooling shade, and where the virgins of Paradise attend the faithful. But it is also described as a place in which grudges shall be extracted from every heart, where they shall hear no vain discord and where their salutation shall be "Peace."

These, then, are the four chief articles of the creed: the supremacy of the Omnipotent, the prohibition of idol worship, the prophetic office of Mohammed, the meeting with one's God. But there is one attribute of the Deity which is almost invariably coupled with the invocation of him, and which I have thus far omitted. The first chapter of the Koran, often called the Lord's Prayer of Islam, from the frequency with which it is repeated and the importance attached to its contents as a kind of summary of the faith, begins with the words: "In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful. The compassionateness of God is accentuated almost equally with his omnipotence. This being so, was it correct to ignore this feature till now? Was it just to speak of omnipotence as the keynote, seeing that compassionateness is so intimately joined with it? My contention is that the mercy of God is such as the strong, whose superior strength is unchallenged, exercise toward the weak, the pity and consideration that an adult would show toward a child, that a chivalrous man would show toward a defenceless woman. My contention is that the ethical attribute of mercy as revered in God, is derivative from the other attribute of omnipotence which I have singled out for chief prominence. He is merciful because he is omnipotent. Nay, I would go farther and say that the whole moral system of the Koran is largely, if not wholly, deduced from the central, aboriginal idea of God's power. A brief summary of the moral rules on which Mohammed laid chief stress may now be given.

Be kind to the poor. Almsgiving is the one moral duty that is placed side by side with the strictly religious duties. Confession of the unity of Allah, prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and almsgiving, are the five chief commandments. He who gives publicly does well; he who gives secretly does better. Self-denial heightens the value of charity. Give of that which thou lovest, and not of that to which thou art indifferent. Do not oppress the feeble; especially do not oppress orphans. Practice self-restraint. Be deliberate in thy movements; do not hurry along in unseemly haste. Speak in a low tone of voice. Bridle thy wrath. Be patient in adversity. Requite evil with good. Though to this is added the sad proviso "so far as the interests of the faith may permit." Be just. Use just weights and a just balance. Swear truthfully, though it be to the hurt of thy kin and to thine own hurt.

These are rules which constitute no mean or contemptible ethical code, which, if carried out, will produce a worthy and honorable type of character and which good men the world over will approve of. And yet, it must be observed that moral acts, outwardly the same, may yet have a very different meaning and a different value according to the principle from which they are derived, and the reason for the sake of which they are performed. In the background of the ethical conscience of the Moslem there is ever the reference to Allah, the Supreme. Op-

pression of one's fellow-men is prohibited because it is a sign of arrogance, of the vaunting of one's own puny strength in the presence of the One who alone is strong. Kindness to the poor, to orphans and to the weak generally, is commanded because we thereby conform to the wishes of One who, in the plenitude of his strength, is compassionate. We are to treat others as our equals because, before Him, the dignities, ranks and distinctions which divide us disappear. The littleness of man, the overwhelming might of God is the thought which tinctures the Mohammedan ethics, as it determines the Moslem creed.

Mohammed died on the 8th of June, 632. When the news spread deep consternation ensued among his followers. As the story goes, Abu Bekr, the closest of his companions, sprang up and cried: "Those who believe in Mohammed, let them know that he is dead. But those who believe in Mohammed's God, let them know that He liveth and never dies." And, indeed, the God of Mohammed lived and lives to this day in the hearts of innumerable human beings. What the effect of Mohammed's thought has been upon the civilization of the world is a question that naturally rises to our lips. It would require volumes to answer that question fairly. The debt of gratitude winch we owe to Islam for transmitting the treasures of Greek philosophy and letters, for preserving the light of culture at the time when Christian Europe was plunged in barbarism; the contributions of Islam to chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, history, etc., the effect it has had in originating new and beautiful forms of art, of which perhaps the Alhambra is popularly the best known instance—who can do justice

to these things? Who, in the brief time at our disposal, can even enumerate them? But let me attempt to state succinctly, at least a few of the main results of Mohammed's influence, good and bad, naught extenuating, nor setting down aught in malice.

The good results: He made the Arabian people capable of entering on the stage of history and playing their part there. Belief in the unity of God made them a united people. They had been torn by incessant bloodfeuds and interminable jealousies. The common religion extinguished these dissensions and made them capable of common actions.\*

Mohammed was one of the most effective, if not the most effective preacher of temperance the world has ever seen. He expressed his own nature, his own temperamental disposition in the Koran. The Koran, unlike other religious books—the Old Testament, the New Testament, the Avesta, and so on, in which many authors collaborated—is altogether the offspring of one mind, the mind of Mohammed, from beginning to end his sole production. Everything in this religion is pitched in the key of unity. God is one. The Prophet stands out in unique pre-eminence. The Scripture is unified. Mohammed, by temperamental disposition, was averse to the use of strong

<sup>\*</sup>There had preceded a change in the system of consanguinity, from that which traces descent in the female to that which traces descent in the male line. The effect of this change in the system of consanguinity upon the religious and social development of mankind has nowhere as yet been properly estimated. I regard it as one of the capital facts in human evolution; and it seems to me that, in particular, it paved the way for Mohammed's doctrine, and also accounts for the hold which polygamy at that time had, and still has, upon the Mohammedan nations.

liquors. He forbade them in the Koran. This prohibition has been of immense service to the nations who accepted his teaching.

Next, he promoted cleanliness by the frequent daily ablutions which he enjoined. A competent observer has said that the Mohammedans contrast favorably with the unsavory state of Eastern peoples of other creeds, and that there are few Christian nations that can compare with the Persians and Turks, for instance, in point of personal cleanliness. So the "unspeakable Turk" is not so entirely unspeakable after all.

He also inculcated the humane treatment of animals. "The beasts and the birds," Mohammed says, "are a people like unto you"; and the current belief is that they, too, will be raised to life at the Resurrection. No Arab maltreats his horse. "Cruelty to animals," says Mr. Lane, in his standard book on "The Modern Egyptians," "is unknown, except in cities overrun by Europeans." "The mountains and the birds," says Mohammed, "praise Allah in their own language." And, as illustrative of this point, I may mention the fact that in the Turkish cemeteries there is usually a slab covering the grave, at the four corners of which are little cavities in which the dew and the rain collect, and which are intended to attract the birds, so that they may come and satisfy their thirst and sing their song over the place where their elder brothers sleep. There is good to be found in every religion. There are virtuous qualities to be met with in every people, and there are defects.

The principal charges brought against Islam are three: the toleration of polygamy and slavery, fatalism and the use of force in propagating the faith. And these charges

cannot be denied. They are true. Mohammed, indeed, did not invent polygamy and slavery. They existed before his day; and it is to his credit that, in several important respects, he materially improved the position of women, by preventing sudden and capricious divorce, by enjoining upon husbands equity in the treatment of their wives, and kindness. He regarded woman, indeed, as an inferior being. So did St. Paul. "Woman is a crooked rib. If you attempt to straighten her she will break. Therefore, be kind to her." And as for slaves he recommended to masters the emancipation of their slaves as a meritorious action. They are, as a rule, treated with consideration, are regarded almost as members of the family, and it has become customary in Turkey that when a male slave has served faithfully for seven or nine years, he is given his liberty. In the sacred month of Ramadan the pulpits ring with admonitions to carry out the injunctions of the Prophet with respect to the slaves. Nevertheless, polygamy and slavery continue to exist and to them more, perhaps, than to any other cause is due the corruption which has set in among the more advanced of the Mohammedan nations. Slavery and polygamy are cancerous tumors in the body politic that inevitably produce degeneration wherever they are allowed to grow, for they prevent social progress. The fault of Mohammed was not that he admitted these institutions into his system. He could hardly have avoided doing so. The time was not ripe for their elimination. The fault or, rather, the evil was that, owing to the inspirational theory applied to the Koran, the moral standard of the Desert in the seventh century was consecrated for all time to come; that any advance upon that standard was discouraged among Moslems, because it was believed that Mohammed, the last of the prophets, had revealed the absolute truth. But this criticism applies to all the revealed religions. The moral standard of the Bible, too, has been petrified, and the ethical advance of the Western nations has been hindered in much the same manner.

The second great defect, fatalism, is, in like fashion, an obstacle to progress. No man can die unless by permission of God, and the time is fixed beforehand. Nor can any man escape death when his hour has come. "Death will overtake you where'er you be, though you be in lofty towers." The sense of the inevitable pervades the Moslem mind. It is related, in the account of the famous night-journey of Mohammed, that, of a sudden, there appeared to him the Angel Gabriel and clothed him in a garment and a turban of light, and he mounted the steed Borak, whose name means lightning, whose breast is like a ruby, whose back is like a pearl, and whose wings stretch from horizon to horizon. And on this steed he was transported, in the twinkling of an eye, to the temple of Jerusalem, where all the apostles and prophets of former days and Christ received him. And from thence he was carried upward through all the seven heavens, passing the sentinel angels that guard the celestial spheres, and all the wonderful sights are related which he saw there, and the endless chanting of myriadfold praises which accompanied his transit, until, at last, he had reached beyond the highest heaven, and the marvelous lotus tree, called the tree of limit, beyond which even Gabriel might not go. But he proceeded, and veil after veil and curtain after curtain was raised before him, and dropped behind him, until at length he found him-

self in the presence of the Everlasting Throne. And perfect stillness reigned there, broken only by the sound of the reed, as the Recording Angel wrote down the fates of men. Now this fatalistic doctrine (consistent though it be with the recognition of free will to a certain extent, all the good that happens being ascribed to God, all the evil to man himself) has produced brave, reckless soldiers, especially since the Moslem who dies in battle is assured of immediate entrance into Paradise; "victory or martyrdom" being promised him. But it acts like a narcotic upon the efforts of man to improve the social conditions of the world in which he lives. If all is decreed beforehand, if not a leaf falls to the ground without God's coercive foreknowledge, what is the use of forestalling or vainly striving to hinder that which is bound to he?

And the last defect is the use of force in propagating the faith. This is a perfectly logical inference from the main principle of the religion. If God is the Omnipotent, if the chief quality celebrated in him is his resistless force, it is but natural that his subjects should attempt to extend his sway by using force on their part. And this has been done by the Moslems from the very beginning. Their theory is that the whole earth belongs to the Moslems, that the Head of the faithful, the Caliph, or, at present, the Sultan, is the true owner of all kingdoms and principalities, and that if other kings are allowed to reign it is on sufferance. Christianity, too, has used force, as St. Bartholomew's Night, the slaughter of the Albigenses, and many other painful instances prove. The use of force, though adopted by priests, is contrary to the spirit of Christianity which, in its sacred scripture, indicates

moral suasion as the true method; whereas, the employment of force is congenial to the spirit of Mohammedanism. "Compassionate shall ye be to one another," Mohammed is reported to have said, "fierce shall ye be to the unbelievers." There is always a tendency, however, it must be admitted, on the part of Christians to fall back upon the more drastic methods, and, at the present day, those Christian preachers who favor the imperialistic policy, on the ground that Christianity must be spread with the help of guns and bayonets, have, in effect, apostasized to Mohammed, have become followers of the Arab and have deserted the standard of Christ. There are many disciples of the preacher of Mecca, at the present day, in church and pulpit.

In conclusion, if I were to give a crystallized statement of my conception of Islam, I would put it as follows. Religion has been defined as "the sense of one's dependence on God." This definition is not exhaustive, does not properly characterize the highest forms of religion in which the sense of man's moral independence is equally important. But the definition perfectly describes Islam. The sense of one's utter and absolute dependence on God—that is Islam. The figure of God bulges out so large as completely to dwarf and minimize man. The Sultan is called "the shadow of God"; but all men are merely the shadow of one Light. And yet, Mohammedanism has fulfilled, and is still fulfilling an important educative function in the world. If not the highest type of religion, it has been and still is helpful to many.

At the present time, the Mohammedan world, very much resembling in this the Roman Catholic world, is divided into a multitude of believers and an increasing number of infidels. What the outcome shall be, how those who have learned to lean upon the Koran as their prop may be helped to support themselves in the trials of life without that prop,—that is the great problem of the twentieth century, a problem which concerns not only the Mohammedans, but the whole civilized world. We are accustomed to consider the loss of belief in our Scripture as a difficulty peculiarly affecting ourselves. Perhaps it would widen our horizon and lead us to estimate more truly the gravity of the issues that await mankind in the coming years, if we recognize how the same difficulty applies to those millions on millions of human beings in Eastern lands, who can no longer find their salvation in following the crescent, as we cannot find it in following the cross.

As, in the development of the individual, there is a stage when he is not yet able to understand the reasons upon which moral rules rest, and, being still a child, must accept them and obey them because they are the will of a superior being whose strength he cannot resist, namely, the parent; so there has been a stage in the development of mankind—and this stage is not yet left behind by the uncivilized races of Africa and of the interior of Asia when men need primarily to be brought under the discipline of obedience, to learn self-restraint by yielding to the will of a Power greater than themselves. It is to this stage in human development that Mohammedanism corresponds. And, considered in this sense, we may well admit that Mohammed, imperfect as his character was, sinful man as he admitted himself to be, was, nevertheless, in very truth, a prophet, a messenger of the Lord of the Daybreak.

# CHILDREN'S QUESTIONS: HOW SHALL WE ANSWER THEM?\*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

#### The General Method.

THE attitude that is often taken to children's questions shows that the current view of life is not always a very serious one, and that the current views of good and bad are not always very extended. I am afraid there are parents part of whose idea of a good child would be, "One who doesn't ask questions." "Don't bother me, that is a good child"-how often such an expression escapes the lips of worthy people! They hardly realize how much countenance they thereby give to the sceptical view that "good" is, after all, only a name for what is convenient or comfortable to ourselves! In the schoolroom the code seems sometimes to be (according to a recent writer): "Sit still, ask no questions, learn and recite your lessons." Even Froebel, it is said, overlooked the great value of the child's desire to question as a means of developing reason and judgment.

<sup>\*</sup>An address first given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago, October 31st, 1897; afterwards printed in *The Ethical World* (London), August 27th, September 3d and 24th, 1898. On the whole subject I should like to refer to Dr. Rudolf Penzig's book, "Ernste Antworten auf Kinderfragen." (Berlin, Ferd. Dümmler's Verlag; 1897; 248 pp.; price 2m. 80 pf.)

Yet I venture to think that the best instruction we human beings ever receive is in answer to some want we experience, and more or less clearly formulate. Knowledge may be poured in on us from without—and it is surely better to have it in this way than not to have it at all—but it becomes a part of us when it is craved and sought. I know it myself—I suppose anyone would say the same: ideas communicated to me that do not relate to problems I personally feel are as easily forgotten as learned. They may be quite true, they may be important ideas; but if they are not important to me, if they do not work up into my mental structure, they get no hold on me, and easily slip away. The sense of a problem, curiosity, questioning—this is the natural method of the mind's advance.

If this is true, how can parents who look seriously on the little lives growing up under their care fail to note and heed the first questions that rise from their lips? The talks we give to uninquiring children, the things we tell them because we think they ought to know them, may fall on dead ears—or, at the most, may be impressed on their minds with great labor. But with the things they ask for, how different! The force that asks will be a force to retain. An impressionable, docile child is excellent in its way, but far better, if we set our immediate comfort to one side, is the child that inquires and is restless till it understands things; such an one is likely to have a centre of its own, and be a fresh factor in the world.

I urge that we give true answers to children's questions—or as nearly true as we can make them. It is singular that people should be so unserious as to imagine that any answer will do for a child. What must be the

effect on the child when it discovers that it has been so treated! Inevitably it must be tempted to think lightly of itself, since so plainly others do. By no means do I object to fairy-stories, or all the pretty tales and nonsense that have been told to children from time out of mind. They represent the play-side, the fancy-side of a child's mind; and the child should be as free to indulge its imagination as we older people are to indulge ours. Who does not love a good yarn? Who, however sedate, objects even to a little nonsense now and then? I only fail to see why the nonsense should be told as fact, or the yarn as truth. It is a mistake to say that children cannot enjoy a fairy-tale unless they believe it to be true. They can take wings very easily into the land of imagination, and feel quite at home there; though they know very well that it is different from this actual world, and is, indeed, a no-man's land. Let tales be told as tales; but when a child asks a question as to fact, let him be given an answer in the realm of fact. It is impossible to believe that the mind proper, the understanding, is ever fed, nourished, by an illusion. If we are to live in a world of reality, every interest of ours lies in knowing reality; and the more and sooner the child comes to such a knowledge, the better.

I know the theory is sometimes broached, particularly in the sphere of religious education, that the child should go through successively all the experiences which the race has traversed in the past. As the body, while still in embryo, passes through the various phases of the evolution of living things, so, it is urged, should the mind be allowed to be fetichist, polytheist, monotheist, and so on, in turn. According to the same logic, I suppose that a child should be first a genuine little savage in morals and manners, then a barbarian, and last and late a civil-

ized being. But it is surely one thing to say that something of this sort happens inevitably, and another to aim at it and make it the basis of a method in education. Because one's ancestors made mistakes hardly seems a ground for purposely repeating them. They may have been strictly necessary once, but, if they are not necessary now, their saving grace may be gone. A procession has always, of course, to start somewhere; but what should we think of one that was always going back and retracing its steps? Why should not the race be wiser now from its past experiences, and this wisdom be communicated to a new generation as fast as it can appropriate it? As a matter of historic knowledge, our children may well be told the story of the gradual and often painful ascent of the race; all the early customs, ideas, and beliefs of men may well be brought clearly to their minds; perhaps only in this way can the notion of progress in the world become a vivid possession to them. But as for trying to have them in turn think, feel and act as man has in the successive stages of his past evolution,—the idea comes near being preposterous. Let us, I say, give true answers to our children's questions, as true as we can make them; and let erroneous and unworthy ideas come into their heads only by way of contrast, or in connection with instruction in history. Only thus does progress become possible in society,-later generations being saved the time and effort which earlier ones have expended, and beginning afresh on the vantage-ground that has been reached.

Questions About Nature and Natural Happenings.

The child sees the moon at night or the sun rising in the sky in the morning. "What is that?" he asks; "and what makes it shine and go from place to place?" Many and picturesque are the answers that have been given to these questions in times past, and that have been handed down in the form of mythical and legendary lore. There can be no harm in entertaining our children with these stories; but to give them as serious answers to their questions is another matter. I should give rather the best light of to-day. I would say (what a Greek philosopher once came near losing his life for saying) that the sun is a ball of fire. I would show a child a live coal, giving out light and heat; I would say, the sun is like that, only many times larger, hotter, and further away. As to the motion, I would explain that it is the earth that moves, that the earth is really a round body moving through space, and that we are not aware of its motion, just as on a smoothly running train of cars we may be hardly aware that it is moving unless we look out of the windows,everything being quiet and still within. Yes, just as the earth and the trees seem to be moving when we first look out of the windows, so with the sun. The simple facts about the moon can also be given—that its light is a reflected light, that it is not hot, that it was once a part of the earth, and was thrown off, just as pieces of mud may fly off when a mud ball is swung in the air.

In a word, parents should have clear scientific ideas about things, and be ready to communicate them as fast as the child raises the questions to which they are the appropriate answers. Sometimes this may involve a clearing up of a parent's own mind; but what happier thing than to have such a motive for self-education, what is sweeter than to learn and grow with one's child? If the point is one about which our minds are hazy, let us frankly say: "I don't just understand that myself, but I

will find out, and then I will tell you." The child's confidence will not be diminished, but increased by such a confession. Suppose, for example, a child, unsatisfied with the information above referred to, asks, "Well, what makes the earth move?" we may not be able to answer at once; and straightway we go and consult books on physics and try to clear up our mind as to gravitation, the nebular hypothesis, and so on; and, at last, we find ourselves able to give in simple language a picture of how it all probably came to be. Science is being written for the unscientific nowadays, and it is not difficult to learn how our solar system probably started and evolved. Instead of a lot of pre-scientific ideas (whether from Greek mythology, the Bible, or elsewhere) that the child will inevitably have to unlearn, I would give the scientific truth at once -saying, that is what the wisest think at least, though it may be possible to become even wiser later on. And please observe this little qualification, for the child might just as well know at the outset that nobody knows everything, that truth is progressively discovered in the world. and that ideas have often been corrected from time to time. The notion of fixed, final, absolute authority should be banished from a child's mind, or, rather, never allowed to arise; and the notion that we are all free to learn, and must be ever learning, put in its place. It is not parrots, or submissive pupils, but free minds, that we want to train up.

So with questions about physical happenings of whatever sort. The phenomena of life are undoubtedly more intricate, more wonderful, than those just referred to. Yet in regard to them what a questioning child ordinarily wants is a natural explanation. If he can see the process, if there is nothing sudden, startling, if one step leads to

another, his questions are not apt to go beyond. A flower, where the day before there was none, surprises him; but if he has been led to see the blossom, and how the petals are folded within it, his surprise abates. Something from nothing is unintelligible to a child or to anybody; but a change of form, a further degree of growth, an unfolding of what was present but hidden, soon comes to seem natural. Now, the whole process of life, from the seed or egg to the fully-developed creature, can be made plain to a child—can be in a plant, in a chicken or bird. "What makes it grow?" Why, it is its food or nutriment that makes it grow. As this is absorbed or taken into the living substance that already is, more is made. "What enables the chick or bird to move?" Why, it is the living force within the body that comes from food. Cannot a child tell the difference himself after he has eaten somethingbefore, perhaps, not feeling like doing much of anything, and afterwards even finding it hard to keep still? What drives an engine? Let a child see the coal, the water, the steam. For any living being moves from essentially the same causes.\*

It is along this pathway of natural explanation that the answer seems to lie to those disturbing questions which children sometimes raise as to where they come from. The answer is in giving a child an understanding of the

<sup>\*</sup>The above statement needs not only enlargement, but correction. I have been led by Dr. Edmund Montgomery's researches to question the view that muscular power is derived from the combustion of food-ingredients. See his article "To be Alive, What is It," in *The Monist*, January, 1895, and various articles by him in *Mind* (London), and also *The Popular Science Monthly*, September and October, 1878. I have given a fresh popular statement in *The Open Court*, October, 1901 (article, "What is Life?").

elementary truths of biology, and making him see that the human species is but one branch of the great tree of life. I would say (in substance): There is nothing peculiar about the way human beings are born. Every living thing has its seed in itself, and each successive living thing in turn comes from a seed. A plant was once a little seed, and so was the biggest kind of a tree, and so was a bird or a horse or a man. Everything starts from beginnings so small that they are hardly visible. And the beginnings are always in the body of the parent. Every seed is at first nourished, protected there, until it is far enough on to have a life of its own. And its leaving the body of the parent is what we call (at least, in the case of animals and men) birth. Every little boy or girl was once born; before that it was carried and fed and kept out of harm's way in its mother's body; since, it has been out in the light of day, and is learning (or should be) ever more and more to care for itself. Moreover (I would explain), seeds do not always grow of themselves. Two of them ordinarily unite, and become one, before either comes to anything. Sometimes the two seeds are in the same body; more commonly they are in two separate bodies; but they have to come together for either to really live and grow. So of the same sort of being there are what we call the male and the female, each having its own kind of seed; but both are necessary, and the two must come together, that any seed may grow, and become in time a fish, or a bird, or a human being. And so, (I should say to a child) we have fathers and mothers in the world, and among men we call fathers and mothers husbands and wives, because they live with one another and stay by one another and take care of one another, and at the same time take care of the children born to them.

In some simple, unsentimental, matter-of-fact\* way like this I should answer those questions which parents sometimes find so embarrassing. Making a mystery of the matter is about the last thing I should do-for unsatisfied curiosity easily makes one morbid, and, as matter of fact, owing to the thoughtlessness and prudishness that are so common, there are probably more morbid boys and girls, and morbid men and women, on this subject than on any other under the sun. I would have this information given to a questioning† child long before that critical age when it is passing into manhood or womanhood, and new thoughts and feelings are stirring, and new temptations naturally arising. Before the passions arise, let the knowledge be given in a cool, scientific, perfectly objective manner; then much of the danger of this transitional period may be avoided. I know well-meaning people deprecate curiosity on this point. Sometimes they even speak of an "improper opening of children's minds," and seem to regard the curiosity as another sign of children's natural depravity. But the depravity, I fear, lies elsewhere. Why is this an improper subject? Why is it not as sweet and clean as any other? Why is not birth a holy thing, and motherhood and fatherhood an equally holy thing? Reverence for a thing, and a sense of its uncleanness, are incompatible feelings. I plead for a healthy, natural reverence for this sacred relation of life-and real reverence is based only on knowledge and understanding.

<sup>\*</sup>A little too much sentiment is, perhaps, the only thing that mars Margaret Warner Morley's books, "A Song of Life, Life and Love" (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.), which are the best I know of in English on the subject.

<sup>†</sup>I say "questioning," for I am not now advocating set instruction on this or any other topic.

Those who cannot bear to talk of this subject to their children should not forget one thing-that there are those who are quite ready to talk, and that a normally-constituted boy or girl is pretty sure to learn the truth anyway. If we do not give the information in open, honorable fashion, it is likely to be got in ways that are dark, and, perhaps, disgraceful. An educator, after saying that this knowledge exists in two forms—the one "scientific, true, and clean," and the other "morbid, false, and dirty," adds a fearful statement—viz., that at least nineteen-twentieths of American children draw their information from the latter sort of knowledge. In back alleys, he says, on the way to school, in the servant's room, or from an older comrade, they master this forbidden lore.\* Whose fault is it? I don't wish to bring railing accusations against anyone, and I know how helpless and confused many persons feel; and yet I fear the evil is more to be traced to the ignorance and prudishness, the mental and moral incapacity, of the average parent, than to any other cause. Parenthood is a task—I might say a profession; and one should bring one's wits, and all the wide-awake sympathy and loving thought one can command, to the discharge of its high and sacred duties.

#### Questions About Duty and God.

What should we say when a child asks as to why he should do this or that? It seems to me necessary to distinguish between two kinds of motives prompting to these questions, and to act quite differently according as one or the other is the real motive in a given case. On the one hand, the child may not want to give up what he is at the moment doing, though for others' good or his own he

<sup>\*</sup>Prof. Earl Barnes, in Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. II., p. 199.

ought to, and he may know it. Here it is his will or wish that is at fault. On the other hand, he may not understand some request made of him-i. e., its reasons, and with the natural instinct of an intelligent being may ask, Why? When a motive of the latter sort is behind a question, it is entitled to as much respect as one about any natural occurrence. Duty, real duty, is an understandable thing; and surely most of the duties incumbent on a child may be explained to a child. To my mind it is as much a part of a child's education to understand duty as to come to understand anything else. For a parent to say, when an inquiry of this nature is made, "Do what I tell you," is brutal. Rather should a loving care be in a parent's mind to make clear, rational, everything he or she asks of a child (so far as the child asks for a reason why), and, instead of resenting a question, the parent should be glad of it, as showing that the child has his own intellectual faculties, and gives promise of being something more than a mere blind follower of custom, tradition, or authority in the world.

But, on the other hand, when the question indicates not the need of intellectual satisfaction, but a mere reluctance of the child to give up his own will, then the case stands different. When the child simply wants to do as he likes, motives to the will rather than explanations to the reason are in order. The child's natural love to a parent may be appealed to; "do this because Mamma or Papa wants you to." Surely every parent who has made a child feel the love he or she bears it must have a lever of this sort to work upon. One who cannot by a grave and gentle face and an earnest, perhaps beseeching word, touch the springs of the better nature in a child either fails as a parent, or else has an exceptionally hardened child.

There are those who use and urge the motive, "God would have you do so and so," or, "Jesus loves children who do so and so"; but, if a child cannot be moved by the thought of a mother's love, I doubt if a thought of any other person is likely to affect him. In extreme cases I see not why authority may not be used-authority, that is, on the side of reason and not taking the place of it, and calling for a subjection simply of the will. When the question "why" means a spirit of querulous disobedience, obedience may be called for in emphatic fashion. "You shall" and "you shall not" are forms of speech that have still their legitimate place. Pains and penalties have their place. And they should be as regular as the recurring disobedience, if they are to have any educational value. Punishing in temper, by fits and starts, is the most demoralizing of experiences for a child. If we are to supplement nature's training with our own, we must have something of nature's dependableness. Fire always burns; so should displeasure at a mean act always be shown, if by displeasure we wish to influence a child.

A few concluding words about the theological questionings of children. I am afraid some of these questionings would never arise were they not put into their heads. The notion of God as some great person up in the skies, or so large that, as one child said, "he could stand with his feet on the ground and touch the clouds with his arms upraised"; the notion of Jesus as seeing and observing all that children do; the notion of heaven as a distant place, high above the clouds, and of the soul as traveling on wings, or on angels' wings, thitherward (so that a seven-year-old boy could say of his little twin sister, who had died two days before: "Well, I suppose she has got to heaven by this time")—all these ideas, which doubtless

have their picturesque side, and yet give birth to numberless questionings, are put into children's heads. And if a word must be said about them-since we live in an atmosphere laden with them, and, though we never mention them, some good aunt, or grandmother, or nurse, or Sunday-school teacher will infallibly communicate them —I would frankly treat them as the sort of fairy tales they are. I would say to a child that in all probability, if you went all the way from the earth up to the sky, you would never come across this venerable being people tell you about; no more, by climbing ever so high, would you reach the beautiful place called heaven—and people, when they die, do not fly away through the air, as the pictures represent. I would say that all the difficulties and questions which hence arise might just as well be laid to rest, because the ideas are not true. I would make children familiar with the old Greek ideas about the gods on Mount Olympus, about Tartarus, and the Styx, and the Elysian Fields; I would show how such ideas arise and I would not pour contempt on them, but show the sympathetic tolerance for them that is due to all that is human. And yet I would make it plain that they and the mythology now current about us belong to the same category.

Real theological questionings start from a different basis. I do not know that very young children ever have them. They imply a certain maturity of mind—an acquaintance with what natural science can teach, and yet a certain pressing, or reaching out, beyond. For example, two little five or six-year-olds come into a yard where the lawn has recently been sown, and hold a dialogue:—

First boy: "See how the grass grows!" Second boy: "What makes it grow?"

First boy: "God does."

Second boy: "He don't. It's the manure they put on the ground."

Plainly the second boy is right, and the sort of God the first boy had in mind is a part of the fairy tale, the "Aberglaube," of popular theology. The scientific explanation of things takes the place of "popular theology." The God children are commonly taught about becomes unnecessary, when the falling rain, the thunder, the light of the sun, the growth of a plant, or the birth of a child all take their place as natural happenings, following, according to a regular sequence, the things that have gone before them. And yet one may-and even children may-press back for an ultimate explanation of things. Suppose, for instance, after a child has come to see that no end of movements in the world are the operations of the one law or force of gravity, he happens to think and ask: "Well, what is this law or force of gravity?"suppose he fixes his attention on it as a thing by itself, and seeks for some intelligible account of it. Or suppose, after seeing that all the phenomena of life may be traced back to some simple laws of chemical attraction and combination-growth, birth, and death being explicable in this way—he asks: "What is chemical attraction, and how wonderful that things unite in just these definite and exact proportions, and build up the symmetrical and beautiful structures that I see?" Or he may be prompted to question about his own inner being, feeling dimly somehow that he is other than the things he sees and touches; and may ask whether birth and death, as physical happenings, account for the origin and destination of the somewhat he knows as his feeling, thinking self.

These are the really theological questionings, and it is

always possible that some vague sense of them mixes with those misplaced questions of which I have before spoken. It is not "God" that makes the rain fall, or the thunder roll, or the grass grow, or brings little children into the world; the falling back on "God," in this sense, is but a sign of our scanty knowledge of nature. Yet, in a deeper sense, it may be there would be no fall of anything, no growing of anything, no birth and no death, but for the operation of forces that no science can lay hold of; it may be that this whole realm of what we see calls for an explanation beyond itself, and pushes us into a realm we do not see. It may be, too, that the ultimate power beyond us has what is most kindred to itself in the thinking mind within us; that its love of order is similar to our love of order; that it is dependable just as we become dependable—by the exercise of a strong will; it may be that we and it are so kindred that we do not absolutely die when we die, but that the invisible part of us goes on to work somewhere else

"In the sounding labor-house vast Of being."

But this, it may be said, is getting far away from the circle of children's questions; and I do not know but that it is. Yet we may easily underrate the penetrating quality which the question or glance of a child may sometimes have. I can only say we must ourselves judge whether the question is to be met by a physical or a metaphysical answer. If the child is satisfied by natural explanations, the metaphysical is out of place; as yet he has no need for it. I would give the physical, would explain unfamiliar by the familiar, first every time. But if a child sees and recognizes the value of whatever may be said in this way, and yet, putting the familiar and un-

familiar in one category, asks what does it all, all alike, mean, and how does it all, all alike, come to be, then does he show himself ready for that far flight, the flight to that unknown and unnameable power, which underlies and is the explanation of the whole world of phenomena, from which we in our deepest being come and to which we go, which is the object of theology (πρώτη ψιλοσοφία) in the nobler sense of that word. Very willingly would I admit to a child, when the admission is capable of being appreciated and appropriated by him, that there is more and other in the world than what we see, though what this Power or Agency is we can only dimly define to ourselves. Such an admission may not be enough for prayer, and our thought of the constancy of nature's laws may make prayer out of place; but it is enough for reverence and for a reverent heeding of those laws or conditions of our own life in which the Supreme Power is most immediately and practically revealed to us. Religion in the sense of awe before that which our hands have not made—and which if we disregard no work of our hands can prosper—has still its place.

Thus would I go through the whole gamut of questions, physical, moral, and metaphysical, or theological, which a child can raise. And my leading thought for parents is: We must educate ourselves; we must make ourselves masters of at least the rudiments of science, morals, and metaphysics; we must take our task seriously, in a religious spirit—must feel that, after a modest provision is made for our own and our children's material necessities, there is nothing we must so much think of and lay to heart as how to meet and grow up with our children, and lead them on to the fair fields of knowledge, intelligent virtue, and discriminating reverence.

### THE MORAL VALUE OF SILENCE.\*

#### BY FELIX ADLER.

PYTHAGORAS, among the ancients, united men in voluntary association for the purpose of realizing, through such fellowship, the moral end of life. He made it a condition that every one who desired to join his Order, before he could be admitted, should attest his worthiness by preserving silence during five years. Nay, he allowed no one to see his face who had not successfully passed through this trying novitiate. In the Monastery of La Trappe, France, and in its affiliated Monasteries in this and other countries, there prevails the rule of perpetual silence, broken only by the voice of prayer and of brief and solemn salutation when the brothers meet.

Without going to any such lengths, without attempting to depreciate the kindly offices of human intercourse through the medium of the spoken word, I yet maintain that some of the holiest, loveliest things in life are best preserved when kept in the casket of reticence, when the seal of silence upon them remains unbroken.

If an instrument could be devised to record the words that are spoken on the face of the globe, this instrument

<sup>\*</sup>An address given before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, Sunday, February 6, 1898, and printed in the *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1898.

would need to be in constant operation. For the stream of human speech is never still. When one-half the world is quiet, the other half is talking. But, of all the words that are spoken, how few can be regarded as successful expressions of thought and feeling. How few are remembered after they have been uttered, or deserve to be. The art of using language is one which everybody practises from babyhood upward. And yet it is one in which only an exceedingly small number become proficient. To what precisely is the difficulty due? It is due not merely to our awkwardness in using the tool of language, but to certain defects in the tool itself. The difficulty consists in this,-that there are few words in language that express a particular thing and nothing else, but that words for the most part designate classes of objects, and that it is only by combining these class terms, by partly blocking the meaning of each by the help of the others, that we can indicate more or less satisfactorily the particular thing we wish to say. The trick of speaking is like a trick sometimes practised in the hunting of wild animals. The wood or thicket in which the animal is concealed is surrounded, a cordon of hunters is drawn closer and closer, the circle becomes smaller and smaller. until at last the quarry is brought to bay and transfixed with the spear. So, in endeavoring to find a suitable expression for our thought, we are engaged in a kind of mental chase, and the words we use are a series of concentric circles, growing narrower as we proceed, until at last the sense is trapped, brought to bay, as it were, where it can no longer escape us, and transfixed on the keen point of speech. It is difficult enough to produce

this specification of meaning, even where visible and tangible objects are concerned. If you read the account of a botanist about some species of plant that you have never seen, you will at once realize how hard it is to form a picture of what is described merely from the descriptive terms used. But the difficulty is immeasurably increased when an attempt is made to express, by means of language, something that is not tangible, not visible, a purely inward occurrence, an idea, a state of feeling. The vocabulary at our service for such purposes is limited indeed.

Here, then, we have one reason why silence is often better than speech, because certain things-and these the greatest, the highest, and the most inward-are actually inexpressible, incommunicable, ineffable in their very nature, and because the attempt to clothe them, nevertheless, in words belittles them. I mention, as a first instance of the unspeakable, gratitude. Of course, we can express our thanks for the lesser benefactions which we receive at the hands of our fellows; to one who has helped us by a timely loan, for instance, when we happened temporarily to be in need of financial assistance; to one who testifies, honestly and truthfully, in our favor, without, however, incurring any great sacrifice himself by so doing; to one who lends us his influence in procuring employment, to which, by our talents and attainments, we are entitled. To these and such as these we can express our thanks, and we can, occasion offering, return their favors by similar services on our part. But the moment the benefactions, of which we are the recipients, involve self-sacrifice on the part of our benefactors-especially great self-sacrifice-we are speechless, utterly unable to find words in which to express our thankfulness. That is to say, when infinite thanks are called for, we find ourselves to be poor in thanks, not because we do not feel the gratitude, but because the instrument of human language cannot convey what we feel. And at such times to use the current phrases in which thanks are apt to be expressed seems to us like a profanation of our feeling, so far short do they fall of what we should like to say; so paltry and pitifully inadequate do they seem. We are reduced to the necessity of falling back on the language of gesture, and of indicating by signs and tokens, by the pressure of the hand, by the eloquence of the eye, what the tongue is incompetent to frame into words. Can you thank the physician who, by constant attendance, by unremitting watchfulness and solicitude, by the exercise of his highest skill, by selfforgetting patience and care, has saved the imperilled life of your child? You can indicate your gratitude by signs. For the acts in which you try to express it are only valuable as signs of what you feel. But you can never express it in any set form of language. All the forms of speech that suggest themselves for the purpose are at once rejected as cold, trivial, worthless. Neither can a child ever thank its parents in words for all that they have done for it. Nor can lovers thank one another for the infinite tenderness, delicacies, and ministries of love. Gratitude of the deep sort, then, is one instance of a content too volatile to be confined within the forms of words; or, better, of a freight too heavy for the vehicles of language to transport without their giving way

beneath it. Our richest spiritual joys and our profoundest sorrow are other examples. Indeed, all our deepest feelings have about them this characteristic, -of being incommunicable. We try, in stammering utterance, by tokens and symbols, to give a hint of what we feel; but when the feeling has become so profound as to take complete possession of us, even that resource fails us, and then the realm of utter silence is our only refuge. We think with contempt of the chatterer who can talk glibly of his gratitude or his love; we judge that his nature is shallow, that his emotional life is superficial. The very fact that he talks so freely about what he feels is proof of that. We say of the grief that vents itself in sighs and groans, in cries and lamentations, that though it may shake the soul like a tempest, like a tempest it will pass away. Those who mourn their friends loudly and violently, as a rule mourn briefly. A year, perhaps, will pass, and we shall find that they have formed new friendships, new affections. On the other hand, we stand in awe of speechless sorrow, for we know that it has taken hold of the roots of the soul, and that a long time must pass before its poignant pangs can be mitigated. Silence, then, is forced upon us by the defects of language as an instrument of expression. It is forced upon us because there are inward experiences that simply cannot be put into words.

In the next place, silence is the right attitude in the case of those things which might, indeed, be spoken, but ought not to be. Of these, I mention the following examples. First, charity. The violet of charity blooms in hidden nooks, and its charm is inseparable from its secre-

tiveness. "Charity," it is said, "vaunteth not itself." And why not? Because its value is altogether dependent on the motive by which it is inspired,—the motive of pure, unselfish love for another being like ourselves. The publication of one's charities to the world is so unpleasing and repellent because it gives color to the suspicion that the actuating motive was the vainglorious desire for admiration and praise. A frankly selfish act is revolting indeed, but is by no means so obnoxious as selfishness parading under the mask of unselfishness: self-love that pretends to feed another's need, but in reality aims only at pampering its own conceit. "Charity vaunteth not itself;" for the moment it vaunteth itself it ceases to be charity. Charity executes its mission of mercy under the ægis of silence, in such a manner that its own right hand shall not know what its left hand doeth. Secrecy is the bloom of charity. If you brush that away from it, you have despoiled it of its richest beauty. The silence that marks true charity is required to guard the purity of the motive. Any act is capable of manifold interpretations. A seemingly kind act may be prompted by an evil motive; and a seemingly unkind act may be prompted by a lofty motive. It is only the spirit that inhabits the act that makes it fine. But how shall we judge of the spirit? In the case of charity we have a sufficient mark to go by. If the act is obtruded upon the attention, the spirit is not fine. If the act is withdrawn from view, performed almost shamefacedly, the spirit is fine.

I have used the word "shamefacedly;" and this leads me to suggest another reason why charity deserves to be called the Daughter of Silence. There is really a distinct feeling of shame mingled with our charitable deeds. Shame is a complex attribute. It by no means always implies the sense of guilt. It is often the sensitive protest against the unveiling of sanctities, the sign of innocence and not of evil. And so, we often feel ashamed when we bestow our help upon a worthy object of charity, not on our own account, but on his account; we are vicariously ashamed for his sake. For we cannot help regarding it as something pitiful, something to be covered up, that a being invested with the dignity of humanity, a being so great in destiny, so worthy of reverence as every human being ought to be, should have fallen to so law an estate as to be deprived of food or shelter, or other necessaries of life, and dependent for these upon the aid of his fellow-beings. It is this pathetic sense of the contrast between what the man's condition ought to be, and the actual condition in which we find him, that awakens in us the desire to shield him as far as possible from the exposure of his needs to the world's eye, and leads us to throw the mantle of silence—in this case the mantle of true charity—over his nakedness. He who is not silent as to his charities is deficient in a fine moral sense. His charity is of a questionable sort.

There are these two reasons for reticence in the case of charity: the one relating to the purity of our own motives, the other to the protection of the self-respect of those whom we assist. I wish to add that what I have said applies to private charity. There are, however, certain forms of collective effort in charity, in which publicity of action is not open to the same objections. A body of people acting in concert for the support of phil-

anthropic institutions have a right to make known to the public what they are doing, or propose to do, for the sake of obtaining the public support. And, for the same reason, it is often best that those who contribute should do so openly, for the sake of influencing others to follow their example. The distinction between collective and private charity appears to me to be a valid one, inasmuch as the former is rather an act of public spirit than of charity proper, and is directed to the public well-being rather than to that of particular individuals, while the latter is, or should be, the outgrowth of a relation between individual and individual, a ray of sunshine falling from one human face upon another.

The silence of gratitude and the silence of charity have been mentioned. Let us consider next the silence of privacy; the law of silence that protects whatever specifically concerns ourselves from the prving curiosity of others. There are certain intimate thoughts which we express only to our intimate friends; nay, certain thoughts which perhaps we do not divulge even to these. which even our nearest ones must content themselves to guess at, to divine. There is, or ought to be, for every one, a certain territory which he may properly fence in against all comers. The right to be uncommunicative, with regard to certain matters, has been slowly acquired. and the extent to which it is conceded may be regarded, as a measure of civilization. Children, among themselves, do not tolerate incommunicativeness at all. To keep anything secret they consider an offence. Among primitive races there seems to be the same lack of seclusion, the same denial of the right to be incommunicative.

As property is often held in common, as many families often live under the same roof, so the inner life of each member of the tribe is the common property of all. Under the existing law in the State of New York it is provided that, on Sundays, in the liquor-shops, the shades shall be raised and the windows shall be free from obstruction, so that the police-officer may, at any time, look in and see what is going on. So, among uncultivated people, the windows of the mind are required to be kept free from intervening curtains or obstructions of any kind, in order that the public, if it choose, may look in at any moment and see what is going on within. Slowly, gradually, with much difficulty, the right to curtain off our inner world has been won in civilized communities. And even in these communities the subjects to which the benefits of the rule of privacy apply require to be further extended. This precious privilege of keeping one's own counsel as to matters which others have no right to know, simply because they cannot comprehend, because they cannot be expected to have the insight, the intellectual sympathy, necessary to enter understandingly into the niceties of our feelings and our way of thinking,-this precious privilege, I say, requires to be further extended. That it would be an impertinence to ask a man how large his income is, or to touch on other private subjects of like nature, is conceded by everybody. But, in regard to one subject, the right to remain incommunicative has not yet been established, particularly in the United States. Persons otherwise fairly well-bred have no scruples in asking a comparative stranger to what church he belongs; that is to say, what opinions he may hold on the very

highest questions of life; opinions which he may find it extremely difficult to express to others in such a way that they shall comprehend, and which he ought, therefore, to be particularly privileged in withholding. The reason why a question which is so intimately related to the very core of personality can be thus abruptly put, why there is such want of delicacy in regard to religious opinion, is probably to be found in the circumstance that certain cut-and-dried doctrines have hitherto formed the basis of religious fellowship, and that the right of individual difference in matters of religion has not been recognized as it ought to be. The more Ethical truths are recognized as the foundation of the spiritual life, the more religious opinions are relegated to the sphere of individual intuition and insight, the more, we may hope, will a reverent reticence in regard to religious convictions come to be regarded as a mark of genuine culture.

The rule of silence applies to the things that cannot be communicated, to the things that might be said but ought not to be. It applies also to those things which may be ripe for communication after a time, but are not yet ripe. Under this head are included our intentions, our plans for the future. The dignity of a rational being is compromised by the premature announcement of what he intends to do. And the reason is that what he proposes or resolves to do he may never be able actually to carry out, and that he will then appear in the unenviable light of a maker of vain speeches which he has not had the ability to convert into corresponding facts. But, just as we are bound to speak the truth,—that is, to make our words correspond to facts,—so also are we bound,

as far as is at all possible, to make the facts correspond to our words, and to say nothing, to make no announcement of which we have not a reasonable expectation that we shall be able to translate it into reality. For the world we live in is a real world, and our mission is to be real factors in it, and the worth of life is proportionate to the amount of reality which we import into it.

The wisdom of mute lips furthermore appears in those situations when right, justice, and reason are assailed by passion, by prejudice, by fanatical hate that is too deaf to hear, too blind to see. The rule I have tried to indicate is that reticence should be observed when the likelihood is wanting that what is said will have its due effect. And from this point of view we can understand the silence of Jesus in the presence of his enemies. We read in the Gospel that when he was accused of the chief priests and elders he answered nothing. "And Pilate said unto him: Hearest thou not how many things they say against thee? And he answered him never a word, insomuch that the Governor marvelled greatly." He wrapped himself round with silence. He could not doubt, indeed, that the power of truth would assert itself in the long run, even over the hostile forces then arrayed against him. But he knew that at the time when the tempest of the passions is raging in men's breasts they cannot, if they would, understand the truth. Truth reflects itself upon the mind only, then, when the surface of the inner waters is smooth: in the stillness of the soul we see it.

But the principal thought I have wished to place before you remains to be stated. The highest moral value belongs to those ellipses, or intervals, during which is being revolved and matured in the mind the right utterance that is to come afterwards. The enemy of morality is impulse. Only to a very limited extent do we ever succeed in rationalizing our impulses,-that is, in training them to move along the grooves which reason prescribes. Even when we applaud impulse, we do so only when, by consummate training, it has ceased to be wayward. The really moral person is one who keeps perpetually before his eyes the outspread world of the moral relationships, that is to say, who sees what his relations ought to be as in an ideal landscape; who sees especially the striking differences that distinguish the duties which he owes to different persons; sees how differently he ought to act towards a superior and towards an equal, towards a person of the same sex and a person of the other sex; towards a person of the same age and a person of tender age; towards members of the same social class and members of a different social class. The moral man, I say, is one who sees before his eyes the chart of his relationship to others, and especially the differences of the duties which he owes to others, and who tries to conform his speech and his action to the directions of this chart. And it is evident that a man who tries to do this often must allow intervals of silence to elapse before he acts or speaks, during which he considers the actual situation in the light of his ideal chart. So that it is not too much to say that the morality of a person can be gauged by his reflectiveness, by the degree to which he has acquired the habit of seeing the invisible moral entities, and deriving thence his bearings.

And the moral importance of letting silence intervene before speaking or acting—silence that is not vacancy, but crowded with thought—becomes particularly plain on certain occasions. For instance, when a child or a friend, or any one close to us, has done or said anything which we are disposed to resent, how infinitely precious, at such moments, is the habit of preserving silence. The mere fact that the impulse to speak is repressed allows the wave of wrathful feeling that threatens to sweep away self-control to subside. And then reflection steps in. We revolve inwardly what the cause of this offence may have been; whether we ourselves have, in any way, given provocation; where the fault of the offender lies; and thus we gain time to shape our words in such a way that they shall have a medicinal effect. Perhaps the words we decide to speak may be stern. Sternness may be called for. But, if we do speak sternly, it is because on careful reflection we have decided that stern language will have a curative effect; we do not merely vent our passion, as a geyser vents its scalding flood. And at other times, the answer will be gentle, if, on reflection, we find that it is the genial influence that is needed. There is one feature that especially characterizes the reflective type of morality, which I claim is the only true type,namely, that the medicinal acts or words often, at first sight, seem to have no connection with the occasion that calls them forth. There appears to be a gap between the occasion and the consequent behavior; and we can only establish the connection if we succeed in supplying the intervening train of silent reflection. For instance, a child has told a falsehood; and the parent, instead of

venting his feelings by vehement denunciation, after a brief reprimand, arranges that the child shall receive instruction in natural history. The parent, having come to the conclusion that the falsehood was due to redundant imagination, seeks to overcome this tendency by engaging the child's interest in the real objects which surround him, and by training his mind in accurate observation. A young criminal is brought to the Reformatory and, instead of merely being locked up in a prison-cell, is subjected to systematic physical culture, in the belief that his degenerate physique has much to do with his evil habits, and receives a thorough course of manual training. on the ground that the growth of the criminal instincts is often due to a lack of the power of consecutive thinking, and that manual training, for a certain type of mind, is the best means of developing that power. And so in other ways.

There is a decisive change that separates those who may be called "spiritually minded" from those who are not. Among Christians this is known as the "change of heart." I believe that in the moral field, too, leaving entirely out of account theological ideas, there is such a change. Those may be called "spiritually minded," in the moral sense, who do not suffer themselves merely to rebound from the occasions of speech and action, as a ball rebounds from a wall, but who, under the blessed ministry of silence and of the meditation that accompanies it, consider the scheme of moral relationship; consider what their place in it is; consider what the place in it is of the person to whom they are to speak, or towards whom they are to act; and consider the choice of means

by which they can restore the right relation between themselves and others. Any one who has undergone that change, from reacting impulsively to acting and speaking *medicinally*, has experienced the decisive change of heart, has become, in the moral sense, regenerate.

A few years ago, during a visit to the Gallery of the Brera, in Milan, I found myself in the Hall of Sculpture. The works of art surrounding me were all the products of the modern school, and bore upon them the impress of strain, vehemence, intensity, which are characteristic of that school. They seemed to me all like a glorification in marble of the merely passionate nature of man, of that side of human nature which I have just characterized as intrinsically unmoral. Not far from the Hall of Sculpture, in the Hall of Paintings, I paused before a picture of the Cinque Cento. It was by Bartolommeo Montagna, the famous Master of the School of Vicenza, and represented the enthronement of the Madonna. What peace, what beauty seemed poured out over this canvas! What a relief, after the nightmare of excited fancy, which I had just left behind me! It was not, indeed, the Madonna herself, nor the angels that seemed to play their viols so melodiously at her feet, but one of the attendant saints, St. Ursula, that particularly arrested my attention. Her face was slightly upraised. It was a face perfectly lovely to look upon. The light shone upon it from above, and another light transfigured it from within. What utter calmness and serenity had settled upon those features! You could not help noticing that, with her wide-open eyes, she saw things fair, and great, and holy, and tranquillizing to the spirit. So may those look who see spread out before them the world of the moral ideal that rises, in its purity and beauty, above this nether sphere of dust and tumult, and whose life is hallowed by the task they set themselves,—the task of copying, under the conditions of space and time, to some slight degree, the glory of that divine original.

I have reached the limits of this address. And yet, the thought is capable of being extended and enlarged upon in many ways. Out of the silence have we come, and into the silence shall we pass. A silence not empty, but, have the star-sown canopy of night, replete with light, and power, and law. Vainly, as I think, do men seek to frame the meaning of the Universe into a word. Let us desist from such useless efforts. Let us deepen in ourselves the sense of the infinitude and the majesty of it all, and revere the radiant mystery in a silence like its own!

## THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.\*

BY WALTER L. SHELDON.

T

What light does the history of marriage throw on the problem of this institution to-day, and the ideal for it in the future?

We are not to assume for a moment that the human race, even in our part of the world, has reached as yet the complete ideal in this direction. Advances along one line have been connected with relapses along another line. The marriage relationship is as yet a very imperfect institution.

In a survey of the history of the marriage institution over past ages, we may, however, recognize certain facts or positions as pretty clearly established, at least as tendencies, in the story of the human race. Some of these we may give as follows:

I. It is apparent that this has not been a fixed institution, inaugurated in a definite form at the outset in the life of mankind. It has been an evolving institution. The ideals or standards for it have come in gradually over long periods of time. We must, therefore, always keep in mind that in urging an ideal for the future, we are not dealing with a state of relapse from what was once the normal standard.

<sup>\*</sup>An address before the St. Louis Ehtical Society.

- 2. It is evident that as the human race emerges from the dawn of pre-historic times, there has been a tendency in the direction of monogamy, the union of one husband and one wife, constituting the marriage relationship, with a growing conviction that a plurality of wives is abnormal or contrary to nature. This is now practically the standpoint everywhere among the races we consider as on the plane of advanced civilization.
- 3. By the study of anthropology, carrying our inferences over many thousands of years, we see a tendency to a prolongation of the period during which that union between husband and wife shall last, with a gradual limitation of the conditions under which a dissolution of the tie may take place. The advance to the highest civilization has been connected with a tightening of the knot in the marriage relationship.
- 4. There has been a growing conviction that the union has in it elements peculiar to the human creature, quite unlike the relationship that exists in the animal kingdom, as if somehow it were also a spiritual relationship, more or less vaguely connected with the tradition concerning man as having been made "in the image of God." It is manifest also in the circumstance that nearly everywhere in the world certain rites or ceremonies have been connected with the inauguration of the marriage union.
- 5. The evolution has been strikingly marked by the growth in the freedom of choice on the part of woman before marriage, and in emancipation on her part from a condition of abject slavery after marriage. The change in this direction has been conspicuously greater for woman than for man.
  - 6. The advance has been marked on the other hand for

man by a growing respect or regard for woman herself, not merely as pertaining to her rights or privileges, but for her spiritual personality and for her position as a wife. For woman, therefore, it has been rather an objective change, while for man the change has been of a more subjective kind.

- 7. We see that marriage has been linked most intimately with the development of the institution of religion, with a growing sentiment that the vows or professions uniting man and woman in this relationship were not of an ordinary kind, but required the witness or sanction of a Spiritual Authority; with the further supposition that a violation of these vows involved an act of guilt, not only toward the other member of the union, but toward the Most High who had stood witness to the original pledge.
- 8. The institution has come to be intimately connected by a long process with the State, from a growing sentiment that marriage is not, even so far as simple human-relationships are concerned, a private contract in which two people alone are involved, but implicates all the members of a commonwealth. It has come little by little to be an accepted standpoint, therefore, that while there shall be freedom of choice, under given conditions, in forming the union, only by the consent of the commonwealth shall that union be dissolved. And lastly:
  - 9. We see that the evolution of marriage has been a part of the story of the emancipation of the human creature, as an individual personality, from the tyranny of social forces, as if he existed for an institution, instead of the institution existing for him. And in this way it has come to be recognized at last that marriage and the family were also made for man, as well as man for mar-

riage and the family. This is perhaps the most important step in the entire story of the transformation which has been going on. While of course it applies both to woman and man alike, in this respect the change has gone further, as yet, for the man than for the woman.

I dwell on these tendencies, not as manifest over the last thousand years, but as growing out of the experience of the last hundred thousand years. All that we have here suggested has to do only with tendencies. But we get at least this much out of the study of the history of the institution of marriage.

As regards our hopes or fears for the ideals of the future on this subject, we must take into consideration long periods of time. A single generation or even a century will not be enough to give us a measure or gauge of what is coming by and by.

But while we make these inferences from what has been going on in the past, we are painfully aware that development, even as regards the phases of one institution, is not along a straight line. The advance in one direction may leave a standstill condition in another. And hence it is that we are face to face all the while with anomalies which are perplexing in the extreme.

In view of these positions as historic tendencies, what explanation have we to offer as to the prevalent feeling of unrest concerning the stability of the marriage institution? Taking into consideration the problem of marriage as it is being discussed by thoughtful people at the present time, we are conscious of the fact that there is a sense of disappointment, as if somehow the human race had made a mistake somewhere, or as if we were not getting the right sort of happiness or satisfaction out of this relationship. It is not supposed to be fulfiling all

the mission which it ought to fulfill. A feeling exists that there should be a radical change or amendment of some kind. With all our advance in civilization, it is asserted that we are not happy as a people in this relationship, as it is now established. The human race is in a rather disconsolate mood over all its institutions, but perhaps most of all over that of marriage and the family.

Have we learned nothing from history? What is responsible for this sense of disappointment? Does it suggest the necessity for a revolution?

What is to be the outcome of all this, now that the human race is at last at its Age of Enlightenment?

The answer is explicit enough on the part of certain philosophers. From their standpoint it is asserted most emphatically that mankind has been under the tyranny of custom or tradition. The happiness of the individual has been sacrificed to the welfare of the species. The happiness of the species has been sacrificed for the sake of institutions. Man has got his soul; then give him his freedom. Let him live out his life as his nature prompts, according to his inmost cravings, as a free man. If he chooses to form a marriage tie and then wearies of it, let him dissolve it. Give him the privileges of his emancipation. Cut the institution of marriage loose from Church and State alike. Why hold man and woman to a bond one or the other does not care for? Why should not the human creature be allowed to act as he pleases in that very direction where his own interests are most deeply involved?

It is asserted that the State and Church alike are interfering with the rights of the individual, that they are adding to the pain and wretchedness inevitable to human life, through the tyranny of a theory. Why should an individual be held to a state of misery when he might escape from it without necessarily in a direct way doing any wrong to another? Why must he be held fixed to a relationship which gives him pain, or where he is getting no satisfaction, just because of custom? Why not begin over again, in a new way, making a new trial?

Statements of this kind are not necessarily intended to be an attack on the institution of marriage, but an improvement on certain of its features. They are offered as suggestions for the higher welfare or larger happiness of the whole human race. And they must be weighed and considered. This is not the standpoint simply of the crank or the doctrinaire, but the calm, dispassionate statement of the philosopher. I need only cite the instance of one of the eminent scholars of France, Letourneau. It is his theory "that a future more or less distant will inaugurate the régime of monogamic unions, freely contracted and at need freely dissolved by simple mutual consent." From this standpoint, as we see, religion and the State would practically be eliminated from any connection with the institution of marriage. This is the sober opinion of a philosopher.

The same general attitude is being urged in one form or another at the present time by thoughtful people, in the effort to amend the laws according to which the marriage tie may be dissolved. A clergyman of position from another city said to me, within the last twelve months, that he would favor a law permitting two people by mutual consent to marry for one year and then to dissolve the relationship, if they felt that they were incompatible with each other.

How much of all this will be tried, or put into application for a time, we cannot as yet say. It has certainly made many people very uneasy. But it is the application of one of the positions I have mentioned, carried to the extreme. If marriage is for man as much as man for marriage, why then should he any longer be the slave of an institution? Why should it not be adapted to his actual requirements as they exist to-day?

We may not put this attitude aside with scoffing or scorn, inasmuch as it is urged as a conscientious solution by honest thinkers. I can only say, however, that in my conviction, it is going against ten thousand years of human experience. It is a mistaken supposition that a custom which has prevailed over vast periods of time necessarily continues on by the tyranny of tradition. It may remain, on the other hand, as the acquired experience of the human race. The facts or positions we have indicated as manifest from a study of the history of this institution, would seem to point in the direction of emphasizing the life-long permanence which should normally characterize this union. Religion and the State alike are instruments to help on nature's work. They exist because the human race has need of them. To eliminate their authority from all connection with marriage, implies going back on the experience of ages of time.

We must assert, therefore, that any changes or reforms in any of our institutions, in order to be lasting, must be along the lines already inaugurated by the process of natural selection or by the course of evolution. We may help on these processes and make the advance more rapid. But if we go contrary to them, we merely inaugurate a change which will, ere long, be brushed aside and cause a check to the advance that might otherwise have taken place.

I have said on another occasion that I believed that the

family, as an institution, was safe for the future, because it would be cared for and preserved by the very nature of things. And what, it has been asked, is the "nature of things"? Is it anything more than an abstraction? Yes, it is a good deal more. It stands for those lines along which the world is moving by what we call nature's processes. I do not think that any theorizing on the part of philosophers, or even any fantastic legislation on the part of the State, can, in the long run, upset the experience of ten thousand or one hundred thousand years,-although they may cause a terrific upheaval for a time, and add to the evil situation as it already prevails. We may go through some tragic experiences in the next half century, from the disposition on the part of human nature nowadays to try experiments, or tamper with the manifest course of nature. But I believe that all the most careful study goes to show that those types of races or peoples will be the most liable to survive, where the tendency continues in the direction of tightening the knot of the marriage-relationship, or where, at any rate, that relationship has of itself a tendency to be an abiding one, lasting until the separation of death. And I am convinced that any people or race or country or nation which is inclined to play fast-and-loose in its laws or customs with this relationship, will experience a set-back and will be side-tracked in the march of events, not only in this one direction, but along other lines as well.

In saying this, I am not urging, by any manner of means, that the commonwealth should insist that the knot shall be tied, without possibility of dissolution, as long as life shall last. I do not urge that there should be no possible interruption in the marriage relationship. On a previous occasion, I have maintained as an ideal for

the future, that in the strictest sense such a union is a union for life. But this does not imply that one or another person should continue in hell all his days, by abiding under the subjection of such a union, all for the sake of a theory. The fact that the tie may not be dissolved, does not necessarily mean that the two have got to live together under the same roof through all possible conditions of abject misery. This surely would be an extreme of the old doctrine that man existed for marriage and not marriage for man. It is only suggested that while circumstances might in the end require that they live apart, the tie itself had been formed and still existed; they had taken on those vows and, in the strict sense of the term, they had taken them for life. On the records of eternity they were registered husband and wife, and an erasure could not occur there, save by the death of one or the other.

It is another question, however, as to whether such persons should be permitted to remarry. And yet on this score, too, we may have only been thinking of a future ideal which as yet, one must admit, is beyond human nature. It may be legitimate under existing conditions that the commonwealth for certain extreme causes should dissolve that tie and, as far as the law can do this, so free them from each other. Even where the law of the State does not intervene, it may be allowable for one member of such a union to refuse to occupy the same home with the other, if the other be a fiend or a brute. But I contend that, in a spiritual sense, the tie remains. And, if one could carry out the standpoint in theory, my attitude would be that, for those cases where the law sanctions a breaking of the tie, the person who had been set free as the innocent party, should be allowed to form a

new tie of marriage by the law of the State, according to the civil forms, but that the new union should not have the religious sanction or be carried out by the solemn rites of religion. On the spiritual side, I would insist that marriage holds until death dissolves it.

But, on the other hand, it is almost grotesque, at the present time, that by the law of certain States the guilty party, who is responsible for the breakdown in the union, should be allowed to form a new tie of marriage. This is an outrage on the institution and an outrage on human nature. It is one of the glaring contradictions or inconsistencies of our present system, owing to the fact that we are again in a transitional age with reference to all the old established institutions. If there is any reform called for at the present time in connection with marriage, it is in this one direction. There should be a national divorce law which shall forbid the guilty party to remarry. And unless this is done, the sanctity of the institution will be completely obliterated. We have now practically, by our present system, owing to this laxity in our laws, an arrangement according to which the union may "be freely made and freely dissolved," although in theory it is not so intended. It is only necessary that one party shall make no contest and let the suit go by default. If, with this loophole, the situation is growing temporarily worse, what would it mean if the authority of the State were taken away altogether and unions might exist as "freely made and freely dissolved," according to the theory of the philosopher?

On the other hand, as a result of all this, there is a growing feeling as if the institution of marriage and the family were in a very serious danger. I think, myself, it is menaced temporarily, especially for the educated

classes. Yet I have little or no anxiety with regard to the ultimate future of the institution. It is true that the percentage of separations may be on the increase, according to the records of the courts. But the actual percentage, while it may be great in number seemingly, yet, to judge from another standpoint, is very small indeed. Suppose that in a few years ten per cent. of all the marriages contracted in this country prove failures and are dissolved; that not more than ninety per cent. of the unions will last for life. But think for a moment what that means. Instead of fixing our attention on the ten out of the hundred who have made a failure of it, where the tie has been dissolved, let us consider the ninety out of the hundred where there may have been relative peace, and a union which lasted to the end. Why, I assert that ninety unions out of the hundred is an enormous proportion in favor of the institution and of its permanency. There was a time unquestionably in the history of the human race, when the figures stood exactly contrary. Not many thousand years ago, probably ninety per cent. of the unions were of a temporary character, scarcely ten per cent. lasting for life. In the early days, in all probability, the union for life was an actual exception, possibly not one out of the hundred, not ten out of the thousand. If even one-quarter of all the marriages were failures, I should say that this would be a relatively small proportion and not indicate that the institution itself were permanently menaced or a failure.

We must judge of this by periods of thousands of years of time. It is a stupendous advance to arrive at a point where three-quarters of the unions in marriage in the civilized world last for a lifetime. If this has come about as a tendency in one short ten thousand years, what

may we not hope for in the next ten thousand, as an advance along the same line?

We do not mean to imply for a moment that any reaction here may not be ominous and disturbing in the extreme. We may be very unhappy over it and be called upon to contend with it. But it is not an argument in favor of the doctrinaire or of the philosopher, who, on this account, assumes that we should even hasten on the process by doing away with restrictions and allowing human nature to follow its own free course.

Once and again it is necessary to be reminded of the fact that happiness leaves little or no record of history behind it; whereas misery always gets recorded. History, therefore, is made up for the most part of wars, of strife. But this does not imply that there may not have been conditions when there were no wars and no strife.

It is the instances of failure in marriage, which attract our attention. Misery or unhappiness is there; it gets recorded; these records pile up until they seem to constitute the whole history of the institution. But what about those other unions where there has been no dissolution, no excitement to which the eye of public attention has been drawn—those calm, serene, peaceful relationships by the thousands and hundreds of thousands? The story of these is not in the courts, nor in the newspapers, nor in books. But for every marriage case which gets into the courts, there may be nine which do not get there. Shall these nine not be considered in our regard for the future, in our anticipation as to what shall be the ultimate outcome for marriage and the family?

I must remind you also that the whole discussion on the problem as to whether marriage is a failure, is obscured by mistaken theories which are broadcast nowadays and which are misleading in the extreme. The impression could not have arisen at all, even as a theory, if it had not been from an error in the way the problem is stated. It has come through an exaggerated sentimentalism which is much to be deplored. The poets have been in part responsible for it. And it is also a feature of what I have called the romance-period in the history of marriage. I may at first shock you in what I shall say on this point by going against traditional theories.

As it runs in the minds of most people to-day, I venture to assert that the problem would stand about in this way: Given two people, man and woman, exactly fitted and adapted to each other by nature in every particular, always unselfishly devoted to each other; how shall they get the most satisfaction, or the most pleasure, the most happiness, the most completeness of life, by the union of marriage? Now I wish to say, once for all that, in my opinion, there is no use putting the problem in this way, because such an instance has probably never occurred in the whole history of the human race. If the case has been stated correctly, then I can only answer that every marriage that has ever existed, without a single exception, has been a failure. No two people from this standpoint have ever in a single case, over all the hundreds of thousands of years since the human race appeared on earth, got exactly what they expected, or found all the happiness that they would have been led to anticipate, from this attitude.

It has come from a sentimental age of theories on the love passion. It may be that religion has carelessly sanctioned the tendency, in order to help spiritualize the institution. It has been sweet and beautiful, I suppose, to talk about "two souls with but a single thought, two

hearts that beat as one." And yet I am not sure but that the music of that pretty thought has played sad havoc by its misleading influence on the young. Never has there been an instance of this sentiment existing in full reality. No two hearts ever did beat exactly as one; no two souls ever throbbed with but a single thought. It has not been, and it could not be, because it would be contrary to nature.

We have had it taught us when young that somehow or somewhere for each individual man there is a womanheart exactly made or adapted to his nature, if only by searching the world over he may find it; and that for every woman on earth there is somewhere the man exactly made or adapted by nature or disposition to satisfy her heart's yearnings, if only by chance-waiting he may arrive. We are assured that man or woman can love but once, if it is the true passion. This standpoint does really prevail; it is encouraged and fostered; it is the tone of our poetry, the sentiment of the stage, and the suggestion of our literature; it throbs in the music which is sung to us. I assert here that story and stage are alike misleading us and telling us a lie. There are not two people on the face of the earth to-day exactly fitted or suited to each other in every particular. Nature has not made it this way, and such could not be the divine intention. There are not two people on the face of the earth to-day absolutely, unselfishly devoted to each other; because there is not an unselfish heart anywhere. We are not made that way. We all have our streaks of imperfection somewhere.

It is not true that man or woman can love but once. Instances are on record by the thousands to the contrary. The profound insight of George Eliot in her

studies of life, led her to point out the situation plainly enough. The second love of "Adam Bede" for "Dinah" was as real as his first for "Hetty," and infinitely deeper and richer.

Furthermore, man and woman were made for something more than just for themselves or the marriagerelationship. The whole being does not merge in the institution of marriage either in the case of woman or in the case of man. In each one there is a separate personality with its own independent yearnings or aspirations, and along certain lines it must walk alone until the end. We each come into this world as an individual self, besides being man or woman. We come into this world as citizens of a State or a commonwealth, besides being members of a family. We enter life as members of a brotherhood of the human race, besides being an independent self, a member of a family, a man or a woman, and a citizen. For each and all these aspects of life, we have our endowments. One relationship cannot supplant or fulfill that of another. The man who is husband and father, but not a citizen, is only half a man. So, too, he is only half a person who completely surrenders his identity in the relationship of a citizen or as member of a family.

Theory to-day has gone to the other extreme on the sentiment side, so far as the teaching of literature to the young is concerned, as if somehow man and woman found the full realization of their lives in the marriage institution alone and as if all other relationships were incidental to it. This is practically the standpoint of much of our poetry, of the stage, of literature, and even of our music, at least of the opera. But it is misleading in the extreme. From this standpoint, it is true, marriage is a

failure, always has been and always will be a failure. People will never get one-quarter or one-tenth of what they expect out of it, if they enter into the relationship with any such theory.

Suppose now, on the other hand, we state the problem, not according to these fantastic sentiments of recent times, but according to human nature. And it would run, as I conceive, about in this way: Given two people, man and woman, each imperfect by nature, each with certain elements of possible affection in their hearts and possible surrender for the good of the other, but each also endowed with elements of selfishness or caprice, carrying in themselves by inheritance all the evil as well as all the good in the lives of their forefathers; well-adapted to each other along certain lines and more or less ill-fitted along other lines, yet somehow feeling themselves peculiarly drawn together by an impulse which they themselves cannot explain,-how shall they, through the union of marriage, make the most out of this imperfect relationship, and get the most happiness in spite of the crossing of purposes which will be inevitable? How shall they each tone off their own imperfections in the effort to help the other to more life and happiness? How shall they most completely live out their lives in union, in spite of each other's imperfections, because such a union is according to nature and what their natures require?

Put in this way, we may understand how it is that nine out of ten unions may not have been failures. Not one of a hundred thousand will be an absolutely perfect relationship, because of the imperfections of human nature. A certain degree of incompatibility has existed in every union that was ever formed. But from this standpoint, thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, may realize in-

finitely more than even they had anticipated. This is the kind of marriage which is brought before us, not from poetry, art, music, or the theorizing of the present time, but from a study of the history of the institution and from a study of the history of human nature. People have gone daft on theories at the present time. Their standpoint is not based on a history of the institution, but on fantastic doctrines.

According to the sentiment-theory of the present time as to what the institution means, we might say frankly and beyond any question that in three-quarters of the cases, if not in nine-tenths of them, it is all involved in a period of one or two or three years, perhaps only the few months before marriage and the few months after. This makes up the total of the experience, in so far as the standpoint of the poet or the artist to-day is concerned. And it is grotesque in the extreme.

Until we are able to shake this new theory to its foundations, break it up in art and literature, and get another standpoint before the minds of the young, I feel confident that the talk about marriage as a failure will increase in extent and that the number of so-called unhappy marriages will be ever greater, and what is more, that this calamity will strike the very class of persons who would be expected most of all to escape it, the cultured or the educated. It will be among this class that the number of dissolutions of the marriage relationship will increase. The sentiment which the poet tells us of and which is sung to us or presented to us in music, or which is pictured to us in the story, is simply the portrayal of a spasm in life,-beautiful and entrancing as it may be. It is not by any means the only lofty aspect of the love-passion or of the love union. That spasm may be only a short phase

through which the deep feelings may have to pass,-or it may not be an essential part of the experience at all. Over and over again, after the passion has subsided, it has seemed as if the union were at an end. But where it was an actual attachment, something more than a mad ebullition of passion, there has come little by little another and steadier sentiment which has gradually found its place and held on to the end. Again and again there has been a tragedy because the two people have not waited for this new phase of affection to arise. They had thought their love was dead only because the transient excitement was over; whereas in reality the real love-sentiment may be only just getting started. Many of the happiest unions which have ever existed have probably been between people who went through this experience of disappointment because of the illusions which had been fostered mistakenly in their youth. Time must be given for a further reunion to arise on a spiritual plane, but where prose and poetry must jostle together in the daylight of stern reality. In that second experience, it is no longer the sentiment-standpoint of two souls with a single thought or the two hearts that beat as one—a fantastic impossibility—it is an awakening to the actualities of life, and to all its possibilities. An affection may then arise which can admit of imperfections in the one for whom it exists, which can cling in spite of weakness and selfishness and caprice. And in this kind of an affection where the two may be only imperfectly united, there is a possible realization of each in the other by which the life of each does become more complete in the other. And that very completion and fullness may come in putting up with the other's imperfections, by a union for better and for worse.

In all candor, I am bound to say that I believe our literature, our poetry and the stage are working sad mischief on the marriage relationship by an erroneous presentation of what the tie really means. It has concentrated all the interest of heart and mind on that transient "spasm" which is of only a few months' or a few years' duration, as if the whole creature lived for this and died for it, instead of concentrating the interest on the feeling which may last over all the months and all the years and grow deeper and more tender to the very end. For this reason much evil has come from the exaggerated theory as to what the real love-tie means, or what it is that should draw young people together. The more I see of life the more I lose faith in the sentiment-standpoint of the poet, who expects two people from the ends of the earth to find each other by a single pulse-beat of the soul, and know each other forthwith as made for each other; and the more I come to have faith in the marriages which grow out of comradeship or friendship, where the two people may not be absolutely sure that they are altogether adapted to each other, or that there may not be some other individual somewhere else in the world more suited to themselves, and yet who know each other's worth or understand each other's characteristics, the good points and the bad points alike, and who nevertheless feel that their lives may be more complete by a union in marriage, working together in a spirit of comradeship all their days. In many and many such experiences, an affection develops as deep, if not deeper, than that mad love-passion which is talked of so much by story-writer or poet. There may be mistakes; mismating can occur. Yet on the whole. I am not sure but that in the long run it would be the safer course to pursue.

At the same time, it is equally true that no such unions should be encouraged among the very young. It should be only after the first bloom of life is over, or the first taste of all the beauty of life has been experienced, only after there has come a real knowledge of the world. It should be several years after the man has entered on his life-work. But I believe to-day that such unions in the long run might be happier for the woman who has passed twenty-two or twenty-three and the man who has reached twenty-eight or thirty. They would know what they were doing; they would have had a little experience of life, and would not be in danger of suddenly being led off by a caprice after marriage.

I can fancy the cold shiver which may be passing over one or another at what I am saying. It will seem so unromantic or so coldly philosophical. But I am speaking not merely from life as I see it, but life as I have read of it. I judge by the records of by-gone ages, as well as by the records to-day. The most beautiful unions have not always been of the kind that began with a flare, as if the earth were on fire. Because there has been a calm through it all, shall we say there has been no history there? Usually it is the surface currents which make the commotion. But because currents at the bottom run steadily, does it mean that they have no force and are not a reality?

In place of the spasm-theory of marriage, as I have termed it, with its erroneous interpretations of the heart's experiences, I urge, therefore, the "comradeship" standpoint. This is the union "for better and for worse." It is the type of union inaugurated by Nature or by God.

(To be Continued.)

## THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.

(Concluded.)

BY WALTER L. SHELDON.

## II.

Ideals are always ahead of the reality. But they hover before us as possibilities in view of the past experience of the human race. Mankind as yet has no fixed type or standard for the marriage institution. It would seem, however, as if there were developing a possible type which may ultimately become universal. It is suggested as the out-growth of the experience of those races most advanced in civilization.

If I were to sketch this type as an ideal, it would have about ten phases. It would involve, as I interpret it, in the first place, the thought of two persons of mature years, drawn together by a consciousness of a certain spiritual affinity, such as they had not felt for any other human being, offering to each other the clean heart and the clean hand, and taking a solemn vow of loyalty and devotion to each other in the marriage relationship. It would involve, in the second place, a thought of these two persons continuing throughout life faithful to each other, with no other possible side-attachment ever coming up to interfere with the serenity of that union, the tie between the two lasting until "death should them part." It would involve, in the third place, the thought of an abode of some kind, giving the privacy of a home where they two might live

together, shut out in a certain degree from all the rest of the world. It would involve, in the fourth place, the growth and beautiful expansion of that home with young lives there, instituting the further relationship of parent and child, with the new words, father and mother, sister and brother, as a feature of the home and the family. It would involve, in the fifth place, the thought of those young lives receiving their support or subsistence and their protection against the outside world more especially from the father, and the tender nurture and loving care or brooding watchfulness from the mother. It would involve, in the sixth place, the thought of that mother as mainly the centre of the home, presiding over the affairs of the home life and the abode, while the father may be occupied outside in those affairs connected with the necessity of earning the family livelihood. It would involve, in the seventh place, the thought of those children growing up, stepping forth into the world, leaving that home, taking new ties for themselves like those assumed earlier by the father and mother of that home; while they two remain behind, still having each other, still being devoted to each other, clinging to each other with the same loyalty, while their cares lessen as age comes on. It would involve, in the eighth place, the thought of these two people seeing their own young life repeated in the family home of their own children as new young faces and voices appeared to lisp the words, "grandmother" and "grandfather." Also it would involve, in the ninth place, the thought of a tender care on the part of the sons and daughters for the father and mother now passing on into old age, but still united to each other. And in the tenth place, it would involve the thought of the children and the grandchildren assembled together to pay the last rites

when death had set its seal upon that long and beautiful union. I am the seal upon that long and beautiful

In discussing the problem of marriage, I am raising the question why it is that mankind at the present time fails to realize this standard; or why, in the effort to live up to it, the human race does not get the satisfaction out of it which is to be expected. There are certain tendencies seemingly in opposition to it, which make the institution apparently fail of its own mission.

The evil I am speaking of has come in part because it was natural, if not inevitable, that the romance-period in the history of marriage, which has arisen in the last few hundred years, should go to its extreme. It was to be assumed that the new standpoint according to which marriage is for man and not man for marriage, should work havoc until it is brought into connection with all the other phases of advance in the history of the institution. The tendency has been the very contrary to what we might anticipate from the influence of the lovepassion. It was to be supposed that this sentiment would be the force which should take the human creature out of himself in the spirit of devotion to another, and in this way annihilate self-interest or self-love. But for a time it has been working the other way. It would seem to make people even more madly self-centered than before. The whirl of the emotion is what the individual seems to care for. This may be self-interest rather than self-surrender, totl and and a sid tograd as tograms

Wordsworth in his beautiful poem, "Laodamia," has touched on the mission of the love-passion in the history of the human race, and he has divinely pictured it as rendering the service "that self might be annulled." How shall we explain the fact, then, I ask, that the tendency

at the present moment seems to be in the other direction? How is it that this noble passion is defeating its own purposes? The very institution of marriage now oftentimes actually fosters a spirit of exacting selfishness.

The sum and substance of it is that a person tacitly enters the relationship as if he were saying: I formed this union for the satisfaction it would give me, for the completion of my own life. It is the me-side which stands out conspicuously in this whole attitude.

The extravagant theories of poetry, opera and the stage, have emphasized the sentiment-side, or the transient passion-side of marriage, rather than its responsibilities or more permanent aspects. The literature of today fosters in the minds of the young to an abnormal degree the emotional phase. One reads it with the possible expectation of sometime getting all that intense experience just for one's self, as though it were the one sole purpose of the marriage institution. The thought has been too much, not what can I do to make a beautiful home for my comrade either as husband or wife, not on how I may fulfill my mission as man or woman in this relationship, but how much can I get for myself out of the new home and the new comradeship. What I am urging is that in this spasm-theory, as I term it, which characterizes the romance-period in the history of marriage, we have had the very antithesis to what the institution should accomplish, by which each individual would be supposed to forget his or her own happiness and secure it by thinking rather of the happiness of the other.

Furthermore, in applying the experiences of the whole history of this institution to the problem as it exists today, we must also bear in mind that evolution in its various phases does not run along parallel lines. It pauses on one and goes ahead on another. In so far as the emancipation of woman from her original position as a slave in the household is concerned, the advance has been erratic in the extreme. And this, I think, more than anything else, explains the disturbance we feel at the present time over the success or failure of the institution of marriage. The change has been far more rapid for woman than for man; but it has been an uneven change. Taking it altogether, over the last few hundred years, it strikes me there is every reason to believe that in our part of the world, man as man has grown more stable in the marriage relationship. I must remind you again that I am speaking now of the course of events not over a few years, but over a few hundred years. At this very moment, judging from the last one or two decades, what I am saying would perhaps seem contrary to experience.

It is woman just now who constitutes the unstable factor in the whole problem. I am speaking not of her conduct, but of the restlessness of her temperament in the institution of marriage as it prevails at the present time. This is owing chiefly to the unevenness or irregularity in the lines along which, as yet, the emancipation of woman has taken place.

I need only cite the fact, for instance, that whereas there has come a freedom in the disposal of her hand before marriage, and the abolition of slavery after marriage, there is still to a large extent a dependence, on the economic side, which does practically hold woman to a position of serfdom. It is, perhaps, the most painful experience through which the average woman must undergo, who has no income of her own, when, after the first year of marriage and the two have settled down to an equilibrium of existence, she finds herself compelled to resort to a multi-

tude of petty artifices in order to secure the small sums essential for her personal needs or requirements. This has stifled the budding soul of more women than almost any other experience. And the man may discover it only when it is too late. It may perplex him why his marriage-life has grown prosaic; why the charm has been vanishing out of his home life.

There is a certain degree of dependence which may be ennobling on the character. But if it is carried beyond a given point, its works in precisely the contrary way; the nature is stunted or dwarfed. And this dwarfing process is going on in thousands of families all over our land, because the wife is subject to so much of this exacting humiliation. The man himself may suffer indirectly even more from this than the woman. He has lost something out of his married life which cannot be replaced. Instead of the wife and comrade, little by little he discovers that he has only a housekeeper or a mother for his children. And the responsibility for it may lie altogether at his own door. He has failed to treat his wife as a comrade; and they are both victims of his mistake, its given as a double are both victims of his mistake, its given as a double are both victims of his mistake, its given as a double are both victims of his mistake, its given as a double are both victims of his mistake, its given as a double are both victims of his mistake.

Exactly how this problen is to be worked out, we cannot as yet prophecy. It may be that ultimately the State will have to step in and establish a system of its own in order to obviate this evil. It does this now in the matter of inheritance after death. It also goes so far as to require that the husband shall at least provide the means of subsistence for his wife. But when it comes to assigning her a certain portion of the family income; according to which she may have the resources by which to enlarge her own life or follow the bent of her choice, then it is another matter. For a large number of cases nowadays,

the situation is one of extreme economic dependence. If woman is to be truly emancipated, if the fact of slavery is to be utterly abolished, if her rights as an individual personality are to be truly recognized, then, in order to complete the ideal of the marriage relationship, the time will have to come when the wife shall be entitled to the disposal of a certain percentage of the income of the family, as much as if she had earned it herself. But the final system here to which civilized man may ultimately come, cannot be sketched until one or another method has been tried.

There is, however, another factor I care still more to dwell upon, as it involves a situation more easily dealt with, if we fully grasp its significance. The emancipation of woman in the marriage relationship from the position of the slave, which has come in very gradually indeed in the more recent period of the world's history, and even now has been achieved only in the civilized part of the world, has to a degree set her capacities free, without as yet having furnished a normal scope for those capacities. As the chattel slave, the housekeeper, the homemaker, established as such by the sovereign will of the husband, she was not even allowed to be aware of any other capacities seeking for an outlet. To-day, she may be conscious of them, overwhelmingly so,-or, on the other hand, they may be stirring within her without her being aware of them. The very restlessness of the situation has brought on an abnormal development of what we call society-life, as the easiest outlet for these pent-up forces.

I am not going to make an onslaught upon the social world, as if it had no place. The dinners, the receptions, the balls, the theatre parties, the entertainments, the elab-

orate toilets; all of this has its place. Human nature craves it and is entitled to it.

But beyond any doubt, as we look back over human history, this particular feature of human life has been going to an extreme nowadays, which has had only one parallel, in the decadence of the great Roman Empire. For the time-being, it is the most disturbing of all the factors in the marriage institution. If it were to go on in this way for another hundred years, I almost feel as if it would tear this institution into shreds and bring on a revolution. We need not, however, anticipate any such an outcome, because it may be only a transient phase in the effort of the suppressed capacities of woman to find an outlet, at a time when the resources for their vent have been woefully inadequate.

It is woman, practically, who has made the conventional society-world of to-day. For the average *man* it is a weary burden, both to his flesh and to his spirit. He endures it, but he does not love it.

But the effect of it has been to take away from the beautiful simplicity of home and marriage life of former times. The home is forced to serve a function for which it is not adapted. Instead of existing for the sake of those who live there, for the sake of its members, it is constructed largely for the sake of the outside world. The sanctity of the home is invaded, upset, and may even be lost entirely.

I believe there is to-day a certain blight settling down on the house and home-life of thousands of families all over our country, owing to this special circumstance. The beauty and the simplicity of home-life is sacrificed because the conditions there are arranged so much with regard to the world outside. I am speaking now, of course, only of a tendency. But it pervades every class of society. Walk along some of the obscure streets of any of our cities and note, for example, how the humble woman who has cultivated some house plants for the decoration of her home, will turn the flowers to the window and not toward the inner sanctuary. It may be good for the flowers to get the sunlight; but the resident of the home may get little of their bloom and charm. The one who enjoys them is the passer-by. I use this circumstance as an illustration because I believe it is descriptive of a spirit more or less characteristic of large circles of the world at the present day. We choose and arrange our homes, we dress and decorate ourselves, not so much for the sake of pleasing those who are in the home, the members of our own family, as for the sake of the outside world. The very luxuries we expend our money upon, may not be of the kind we should choose for ourselves, but of the kind which accords with conventional demands.

It is a curious fact how instinctive it is among a great many people nowadays to try and get away from their homes, and to get to the woods again where they can be themselves.

To care for dress for its own sake as an object of beauty is normal and right. Decoration of the home for its own sake, in order to add to the charm of the home, is something we should all be interested in. We have a right to love the beautiful and to wish to surround ourselves with objects of beauty. There is no reason why money in large sums should not be expended on the architecture of our households, if the money is there and if those who expend it can appreciate the architecture.

But it would not be an extravagant statement to say

that three-quarters of the money disbursed for dress, household decoration, or beautiful homes, at the present time, does not have this purpose in view in any sense whatsoever. It is a lavish waste in the spirit of rivalry and competition. The element of actual love of beauty in itself, is in reality a side issue. Our homes are not of the kind we should make instinctively for ourselves, if we thought only of the home for its own sake. Our dress is not of the character we should wear, if it were put on for the sake of its own beauty or in order first of all to please the eye of each other as members of the family.

And who is responsible for all this? My statement may jar upon many people. But at the present moment, I think it must lie at the door of the woman-world. It is not as if she wanted all this or as if it were natural to her. Precisely the contrary! It is a something to which temporarily she herself has become a slave.

The point I am coming to is this. On the side of the man, there is a growing sense of homelessness. The household is not a place where he feels that he can be himself; it is no longer his castle; it is not the place in which he may retire from the world. He comes to it only to find it built, as it were, with an eye to the street, to the very "world" he may wish to escape from. The men are inclined to feel as if they were half strangers in their own parlors. The guests are more at home there than the ones who are rightful owners.

I believe that in all this there has been a grave mistake, especially on the part of the woman and the wife. Odd as it may seem, it strikes me that the man of the family, the father, the husband, is being neglected in his own home. The wife has been tempted to construct the house-

hold too much according to her own inclinations, according to the way it may look to the outside world, rather than according to what will make it home-like to the husband when he enters there. Our homes are women's homes where the man himself feels only half at-home.

To be sure, he is there only for a short period of time; evenings, it may be, or Sundays. But if on those occasions he does not feel that it is his "castle," his place of retirement from the world, the one place where he can supremely be his natural self, inevitably he will become estranged.

And precisely in the same way, I am inclined to assert that the wife dresses too much with an eye to the outside world, rather than with a thought as to what will please the husband's eye. She may wonder why he does not take more interest in her toilet, and may not be aware of the fact that her husband's taste may not be that of her conventional women friends. What might charm him would perhaps be simplicity, while the world outside asks for display. Why is it that a wife thinks less about the charm of her dress at her private dinner-table to the one pair of eyes opposite to her, than she does about the dress she is to wear if there are to be guests at the table? Why is it that the world's eye in this regard may become of even greater importance than the eye of the husband?

The outside world dominates the sanctity of our homes. This is the appalling circumstance which menaces the institution of the family. The conventional world has temporarily been tending to reduce woman to a new slavery. In a word, she has not yet got used to her freedom.

I am asserting, therefore, that woman is restless in the marriage relationship because she has confused two

spheres of life and has not kept them distinct. And for just this reason, a kind of estrangement may set in between husband and wife, making the tie between them prosaic and common-place. Each is a little disappointed in the other, partly for the reason that they have thought too little about pleasing each other in the home and about having the home and home-life just for the sake of themselves.

It is my conviction that the woman, who, if she followed her own spontaneous inclinations, would be the home-maker and care supremely to have a perfect home for its own sake, has for a time been carried out of her own most instinctive disposition, through a transient submission to conventionality.

If, as is true to-day over many parts of the world, the wife is little by little growing disappointed in the husband, as being prosaic and not caring for the family or for herself in the way she had hoped, I believe one of the causes for it lies right here. The man, the husband, does not feel at ease or at home in many parts of his own house. He does not feel at home even with his own wife. He is vaguely conscious that the woman of his choice belongs not only to him but to a great show-world outside. Down in his heart, there is a lurking disappointment. The home does not seem to come overwhelmingly first in the thought of his wife.

Perhaps the worst feature of all this lies in its unfortunate effects upon the young. They, too, are made slaves to the conventional world before their own souls have assumed a normal shape. At the same time, they take the standards of the world. The home to them has not the beautiful simplicity which it had in former times for the younger members of the family. The daughter, who is

to have such an enormous influence in shaping a family life of her own in the future, is started at the outset in the wrong direction. Inevitably, by our present standards, she will be led to think in the future not so much with regard to the home she will make for her husband, as with regard to the position she will take through that home among her social acquaintances. She may be launched upon a plane of comforts or of luxuries as a daughter which becomes a standard for her requirements all her days.

And here perhaps we have the very basis of much of the unhappiness in the marriage-relationship as it exists to-day in the experience of woman. There has to be such a "come-down" in many instances in her married lfie from the requirements in which she may have been educated. The standard which has been given her, has not been the standard of a home, but of a conventional world. The effort to "keep up" with that standard after marriage has worked as a blight on thousands of households. What is more, it works like a blight on the husband as well. He may slave in order to sustain that standard, to give the wife and home those requirements, while down in his heart he may half despise them.

More than this, it works pathetically in making it inevitable that only those persons accustomed to the same plane of luxuries in their homes may join in the marriagerelationship. The man most adapted to a woman by nature of gifts, may not dare to think of her, because he is in humbler circumstances and would not be able to sustain her on the plane in which she has been living. It limits the actual freedom of choice according to which people really by nature suited to each other might come together. What wonder if there is mismating in the extreme nowadays! The two most suited to each other may never find each other. They cannot meet or associate. They would perhaps not even know each other if they stood face to face.

It may seem as if what I am saying applied only to people of large means. But that is a mistake. It concerns homes and households from the humblest to the wealthiest. The artisan class may be as much infected with this as those with large incomes and houses of their own. It is only a matter of degree. The tendency of the day is to launch the young woman into a show-world, to give her surface standards of measurement both as to the character of the men to whom they may give their hands and still more as to what is going to give married life its value. And if men pass those first years during which they are inclined to rush into marriage blindly, then they think twice ere they are willing to venture on a step where they may have to ask a woman to live according to an inferior standard of luxuries than the one to which she has been accustomed. Many a woman may be willing enough to do it and do it nobly. But the man may hesitate whether he is ready to ask the sacrifice.

I can only repeat that it looks to me at this moment as if the so-called society-world were the greatest menace to the future of the marriage institution. And I believe it is woman who regulates the society-world. It will be only according as she is able to defy its sanctions, that we shall be able to return to the old-time simplicity of home and family life.

I do not think that in the average home to-day, the man or the husband is enough considered. I do not believe that the wife takes him enough into account, owing to the fact that he is so little there. If, to-day, woman

would dress to please her husband and not the world, shape the house and home for the sake of her husband and not the world, she would experience a beauty and serenity and peace in her home life which, in many instances, she finds no longer there, because her husband appears somehow estranged or perhaps a trifle "bored."

"What is the matter with the men?" is a question which is being asked honestly and frankly all over the world to-day by the wives. It is as if the man-world had grown prosaic. He cares only for his business or his newspaper, is the assertion. And I can only say that one cause for this is the loss on his part of the home-feeling. It is the prose itself in his own home life which has taken possession of him. The trouble is that not enough attention is paid to the man by woman in the arrangements and management of the home.

Of course there are thousands of exceptions to what I am saying. I keep asserting that all this is an observation applying only as a tendency. But a little of it may characterize hundreds of thousands of families, where they are not even conscious of the fact, save through a vague sense of disillusion concerning the whole marriage relationship.

The same point applies, too, in another direction. And here I shall come most sharply of all against the presuppositions of others. I am inclined to assert that now-adays the husband is often neglected by the wife for the sake of the conventional outside world. Every mother will be up in arms against me at this point. Can a woman do too much for her children? If answer, yes, especially where the service for the children may not apply to their actual needs, but be rendered incorder to keep up to a

conventional standard. In this way, too, the man is led to feel as if he has a house and home, not for himself, but for his children. The tendency here has gone to an extreme. In the old days it was otherwise. Wife and children were all neglected for the sake of the head of the family. He was the sovereign and it was a brutal sovereignty.

To-day, the situation is precisely the contrary. The needs of the child come first. The mother asks it and the father and husband grant it from a sense of duty, if for no other reason. But in many a man, at the present time, there is developing on this score a spirit of rebellion. The wife may not be conscious of it because of her devotion for her children. Later on she becomes aware that something has happened in the lack of interest displayed for herself or the home on the part of the husband. The cause for this, however, may never dawn upon her, because the change took place in those years when she was completely rapt up in her little ones.

The coming of the first child into the home has again and again wrought a quiet tragedy there. Up to that time the husband has stood first in the heart of his wife. Then it may all change. The home may become transformed. The mother instinct may surpass even the wifeinstinct. It will be natural to her, perhaps inevitable. But the consequences to the beauty and charm of life in marriage may be dire. The whole household may then become completely modified. It is a home for the children. The wife merges her identity in their interests. But this is what the husband cannot do. He wants the same wife and the same home. But he finds the household constructed for them rather than for him.

Still more tragic it may become as the children grow

older and the conventional standards are more firmly established. The requirements may not be according to their actual needs but according to what the world outside has set up as the customary essentials for the young. They are expected to have the same kind of education as the children in other families, whether it be adapted to them or not. They are to be dressed like the children of other families, whether it can be afforded or not, or whether it means waste of time or not. Slowly but inevitably the charm of the union of husband and wife is lost or decays in the effort to do for their children what the world exacts of them, but what may not be essential for their needs.

And here again, I believe that if the wife could only know this in advance and appreciate it, could only enter into the mind of the man as the husband and understand what he experiences, she might save herself some of the disappointment which will come by and by when, as the children grow older, she turns once more to the husband for the same old affection, and finds that the romance is gone, because he has long ago acquiesced in the inevitable.

We are certainly at an Age of Enlightenment. We can face the problem and deal with it if we choose. But we can do this only as we are willing to admit that human nature, even in an age of enlightenment, is capable of great mistakes. You may be all the while thinking of exceptions to the assertions I have made, while I am speaking only of averages or of tendencies. Unless we get back to an old-time simplicity in our home and family life, there is a tragedy ahead for the institution of marriage.

And what I am saying is that the future of it, for the

next hundred years, really depends upon the course taken by woman more than upon the course to be taken by man. She can save it or she can wreck it. She holds its destiny in her hands.

I repeat that my anxiety does not apply to the ultimate future or the ultimate outcome. I have faith in woman and faith in man. It is the history of the institution on the whole which gives us our encouragement. This debauch on the conventional and social-world side had to come as an inevitable step in the first period of the emancipation from the chattel slavery of the woman and the wife. And it was to be expected also that we should have had an age of theorizing, with the assertion on the part of certain temperaments that marriage was an unfair limitation to the life of woman, that it cramped her soul, and that she was entitled to the same free development as man. It has led to the supposition that woman is entitled to a career outside of the household! Now and then we hear a tone of pity expressed, where a woman surrenders the possibility of a career for the sake of being a wife, who me sample appropriate the same

On this point, I am old-fashioned and conservative. I amostill convinced that there is the loftiest possible opportunity for a career on the part of woman just simply in the effort to help her husband to achieve a career. And whether this be a mistake or not, of one fact we are sure,—and that is that the women who do this, as a rule, are the ones who get the most satisfaction out of life, in spite of all the disappointment which may cone.

Of one other fact it would have been interesting to speak, in connection with the enormous influence on the nature of this institution which is to be exerted by woman in the way she exercises her choice. It is the man who

sues, but the woman who chooses and decides, as far as the marriage tie is concerned.

The conventional standards have played havoc here as well. If we go back to the old-time simplicity, it will be because woman changes in the methods according to which she accepts or rejects those who seek her hand. The influence on the future here cannot be overestimated. She can lift the tone of the next generation in its manner of living to a higher and loftier plane, or she can drag it further down.

We are living in a commercial age. Money-making is the one dominant ambition. There has been no parallel to it in the history of the human race. Is it possible that woman to a degree is responsible for this? Can it be that she may have set this standard in a transient slavery to the conventional world? It is man's desire to live up to the ideal set for him by woman. Would he be the slave of money-making and the commercial spirit to-day; if woman did not encourage and foster this?

It is a solemn question and I hesitate to answer it. But I do believe that woman could make it otherwise. If we go back to simpler forms of living, to higher standards, if the man turns in the direction of loftier aspirations and the commercial spirit receives a set-back, it will be because of the course taken by woman. She holds the destiny of the human race in her hands by her power of choice before marriage and in her control over the life of the home after marriage.

To-day, I believe, if we want to see the real instances of happy union, where marriage is not a failure, we need to go rather to the rural districts where life is on a simpler plane; where the conventional or artificial measurements may not yet have won their way; where the

home can have a spirit of freedom and naturalness; where the children may run a little wild; where the wife does not have to be harassed in mind lest she can dress exactly like her neighbors or have a drawing-room fitted up like that of other people; where the mother need not wear herself out in perplexity lest her children be dressed like others, or lest neighbors passing by shall see dirt on their hands and faces, if it is the healthy dirt of the soil; where the house from cellar to garret is home for husband and wife and children alike; where the spirit of affection has taken the place of the early glow of passionate excitement; where comradeship has knitted the two together for better or for worse, through good fortune or through ill fortune; where prose and romance must blend together; where there is work in plenty for both; where the very burdens of life prevent either of them from having the time to fret over the disappointments of their union or over each other's imperfections; where they toil together, live together, experience the ache of heart and hand together, die together, and rest under the same unpretentious sod at the end, with no big conventional monument hovering over their heads to disturb the peace of the grave.

We may come back to this by and by. I believe the history of the institution points that way. But I wish we could make some effort to bring it about.

## NON-CHRISTIAN TEACHERS AND JESUS: WHOM SHALL WE FOLLOW?\*

## BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

We have been brought up in a religious tradition which looks with a kind of disdain upon a large part of human kind. The ancient Jews thought they were a peculiar people. Christianity thinks it is a peculiar religion. The feeling has a certain basis in both cases—almost all pride has some superiority behind it; yet it may as well be admitted that the feeling is pride, and that like all pride, it involves a certain amount of blindness and of injustice. The Greeks had a similar feeling when they called the rest of the world barbarians. As matter of fact there was civilization in Egypt and in China before the Greeks were heard of. So beyond the people of Israel and outside the world of Christianity there have been those who witnessed for the higher truths on which the souls of men and nations live.

Speaking for myself, there has been a kind of pleasure in going out beyond the bounds within which we of Jewish and Christian birth ordinarily confine ourselves. It is the sort of pleasure one has in going to foreign lands or into strange cities—the world is bigger thereafter; our souls are enlarged. We unlearn our provincialism—and that is the trouble with the ordinary Jew or the ordinary Christian now; he is a provincial—not a citizen of the wide world.

<sup>\*</sup>This address followed a series on "Greek Teachers Outside Christianity"—the subjects being Confucius, Buddha, Socrates and Marcus Aurelius. The addresses were given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago, Dec., 1901-Jan., 1902.

The man who has the consciousness of allies in his efforts toward the good in China, in India, in Greece, has far more ground for hope than he whose whole faith is based on what was said or done in Palestine. The broader the base of our pyramid, the higher it can rise—and be at the same time secure.

This does not mean that all the higher voices are alike —but that they are all higher voices, that now in one way and now in another they open out paths of advance for man and beckon him on. Perhaps only at bottom is all religion one—namely, as a sense of ideal things, a craving for something which man has not and yet would have. It is a part of the process by which man expands—by which he rises to a larger quantity and higher quality of being. Those who are contented are never religious. It is those who are ill at ease, those who see something wrong, those who have a pitiful sense of what is lacking in the world, that have the spur to ideal effort. Yet one person may see one thing wrong or awry and another another; and one person may devise one way of surmounting the evil and another another; and so various types of ideal effort or religion may arise. They are alike in leading man upward and onward; they differ in the direction they take and in the means or way. They are like men climbing a mountain from different approaches; they resemble one another only in that they climb. Or, they are like pilgrims traveling from many lands toward a sacred shrine—their routes are different and their means of transportation are different; they are alike only in that, whether from the east or the west, from the north or the south, whether over seas, or over the land, they move toward one goal.

Perhaps in this manner of speaking you already antici-

pate my answer to the question: "Non-Christian Teachers and Jesus, whom shall we follow?" I do not attempt a special address on Jesus. I have spoken of him at different times in the past. Recently a vivid and realistic portrait of him has been drawn by a recognized authority in Biblical subjects.\* I must take for granted that his main ideas are understood by those in the habit of coming here. Jesus belongs among the prophets and social dreamers of the race. The kingdom of heaven which he announced as near at hand was a social ideal. It meant a righteous order of human life on the earth—one in which those crushed in the ruthless competitive struggles of society would have a chance. It was to be a day of recompense for the sorrows and sufferings and inequalities of the world. The valleys should be exalted and the mountains made low. Jesus continued the strains of the Hebrew prophets. His difference was that that which they longed to see he said was at hand. He took an affirmative tone. He inspired wondrous hope. He founded a movement. He created a church. And yet there was a very vital difference from any political or social movement such as might arise from a similar impulse now. Jesus looked for nothing from the state. He expected nothing from laws or changes in laws. Rather did he anticipate opposition from the state—he spoke of persecution and prison and death which his followers might have to face. His movement was to rise in a hostile world. Moreover, the new society which Jesus announced was an intensely moral one-I mean that he did not have in mind any mere external order, but one in which the hearts of men would be changed, in which not only justice would be done, but men would be just-yes, in which

<sup>\*</sup>Professor Nathaniel Schmidt, of Cornell University.

love and brotherliness would surpass all that ordinary justice demanded. Precedent to admission to his movement was confession of sin, and repentance—his church was to consist of those born again into a new life and dedicated to it. This interior character, this sense of a needed revolution in the heart and life, of a call to be perfect, pure and holy in the springs of one's being, is what takes the movement of Jesus into the realm of religion, rather than of social reform, with which otherwise it has much in common. For such a new and righteous order, an order of which love should be the law and in which love should be the impulse too, Jesus believed the earth was destined. The struggles with the old disorder, with selfishness and cunning and might, would not last forever. A hand mightier than man, mightier than the state—a hand from out the unseen-would intervene and lay low the powers of evil. The earth would be purged—the goodly wheat would be garnered, the chaff and the stubble burned up and destroyed. Then would the earth itself be transformed: no longer should there be death or dying; no longer should there be mourning or crying or pain—all things would become new; the heavens would be new, the earth would be new—the dream of a perfect society, of a perfect world, would come true.

Such was the substance of the thought of Jesus. In his own person he experienced the hostility of the existing religious and political order. He was put to death after a career of only two or three years—faring differently from Confucius, Buddha or Socrates, each of whom continued his activity to a ripe old age. The very pathos of his early death touched the hearts of his followers to an unusual degree, and won for him a pitying, adoring love such as history hardly gives another example of.

Christians find it self-evident that we should follow Jesus—and I can never bring up the thought of him myself without an act of reverence; I have more in common with those who worship him than with those who defame him or make light of him. And yet as for taking him as one's sole master—it is, for those who sympathize with the thought and attitude of to-day, impossible.

And I think we have to say the same of all the teachers I have been considering. None of them quite gives the rounded whole of an ideal of life such as we seek. Men who live in the light of to-day cannot throw themselves at the feet of yesterday—great as are the figures that loom up there. Few have stated the attitude which I think we must take more impressively than Walt Whitman. Referring to the "old times," the "great masters," he says:

"I dare not proceed till I respectfully credit what you have left wafted hither,

I have perused it, own it is admirable (moving awhile among it), Think nothing can ever be greater, nothing can ever deserve more than it deserves,

Regarding it all intently a long while, then dismissing it, I stand in my place with my own day here."

Infinite receptivity, infinite appreciation, yet remembering that we have our own situation, our own tasks, our own minds now—that is the true attitude; "into the Future fuse the Past and the world's flowing fates in our own mould recast"—that is our duty. Some think, for whom the Christian dogmas have dissolved, that we can be Buddhists: we can no more be Buddhists than we can be Christians (i. e., in the historic, exclusive senses of those words).

Let us briefly see the deficiencies in each of the movements referred to—and then try to bring together the positive elements of truth, the lasting principles, which each set of teachings contains, and to mould them, in connection with the thought of to-day, into a higher unity.

First, Confucius. The deficiency is not so much in anything he taught-though he did not rise to the level of Marcus Aurelius and of Jesus with respect to the treatment of injuries—as in the fact that his teachings are not lit up with hope and a forward-looking prospect. Somehow Confucius's eyes were turned mainly to the past. There, we are made to feel as we read his words, are the great examples of wise kings and happy states. But there is a kind of fatality for any people in putting its "golden age" behind it. It need not affect the insight—that may even be perfect—but it does somehow the mood and temper, what the Germans call the "Stimmung," of a people. There is something else beyond knowledge, or even earnestness, in the world; buoyancy, cheer, what the French call "élan," enthusiasm, are important factors. The misfortune of the Chinese people is that they are retrospective, and Confucius did not rise above the national habit. This conduces to calmness, to wisdom, to stability, but it is hardly a spring of progress. Your eyes can scarcely look longingly backward and forward at the same time. China is an illustration of the peril of making an advance and then stopping. It is like a man who once having done a good thing thinks with so much satisfaction of it that he does little or nothing more. At a very early period China attained a relatively high stage of civilization, and was blessed with rulers who were almost sages as well. Let me speak of but one thing. The importance of the family as a unit in society was strongly felt. "Honor thy father and mother" is one of the great commandments of Chinese morality. But yet there may come great crises in

social development when this cannot be taken as an absolute law. There may be situations in which a higher allegiance is called for than that to father and mother. Jesus said, "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." Superficial critics charge it against Jesus that he thus made light of family ties. But if father and mother are to bind us, when causes beyond their appreciation or understanding appeal to us, how can advances be made? Filial reverence makes for stability in society and in all ordinary cases is a duty, but if it is an absolute duty-it means social stagnation. When the past rules the present, then the present cannot go beyond the past. Confucius, as I have said, shared the national limitations. So extraordinary was his misjudgment of things on this account, that he set most store by a book of historical annals that he wrote—saying that by this he should be known and by this be condemned; a record of the past purely—and a dry record at that. It is important that we know the past—important for every people; but it is the thought of the future that gives high inspiration—it is the daring spirit that is ready to venture on new paths that is the parent of enthusiasm. Yes, we do not get at the real secret of the triumphs of the past, save as we are ready to go beyond them. As Wendell Phillips put it, to be as good as our fathers, we have to be better. If we do not go beyond them, we all too easily fall behind them. The lack of a sense of this, the lack of horizon, the lack of a daring forward look, is the deficiency of Confucius and Confucianism.

Second, Buddha. Buddha's view of life is a strange one to us—so strange that I had to spend the greater part of my address on him in trying simply to make it credible. On account of the change, the impermanence, the insub-

stantiality in life,—health passing into sickness, pleasure into pain, youth into old age, life into death-Buddha sought to wean men from the love of life, from the craving for pleasure—to detach them, to cut them loose, so that all these things-sickness, pain, life and death, existence and non-existence—should be as nothing to them, and they rise into an exalted state of calm, even of bliss and rapture, to which the name "Nirvana" was given. There is a profound truth here—Buddhism is a magnificent assertion of the power of the human spirit over the impulses and cravings that are usually thought to be essential to it—and yet the lurking one-sidedness and deficiency become manifest as we contemplate the practical working of the religion which Buddha founded. For the Buddhist disciple proper—I do not speak of those who do not take the strict obligations of the religion—is a mendicant; he lives on the gratuitous gifts of others. Ordinarily -and having in mind the Eastern world in which Buddhism had its birth-the Bhikku (or mendicant) takes his bowl of a morning and quietly goes from house to house, uttering a pious wish on behalf of the giver if something is put into it, and if not, passing silently on. It is a life without care, without the distractions and pre-occupations that most men have—a life favorable to that disentanglement from earthly things which makes the Buddhist ideal. For most of us to be homeless, propertyless, dependent on the good-will of others, would seem a lot, hard, forlorn and scarcely consistent with self-respect; to the Buddhist there is a kind of joy in the very freedom of it-it is the beginning of his emancipation. "In high joy we live, without striving and grasping among the striving and grasping." "In high joy we live, calling nothing our own -we are like the bright gods who feed on happiness"-

such are ancient exclamations of Buddhist happiness. And yet, if we stop to think, what does the Buddhist manner of life imply? Evidently, a more or less orderly state of industrial society, in which at least the necessary means of life are provided. The Bhikku goes from house to house, and gets the sustenance that he has not himself produced. His life could not be without that other life from which he seeks to be emancipated. If all men should rise to the Buddhist ideal, sustenance for man, save fruits or roots-and they might need plucking and digging-would fail, and Buddhism or any other religious theory would perish of inanition. It is not noble and it is hardly honest to place in low esteem that which we really need-whether it be things or people. The Buddhist must then admit the significance of the material pursuits of men after all. Sowing and reaping, plowing, digging, even striving and grasping and buying and selling and protecting and ruling (in any stage of society short of communism), in brief the whole of industrial and civil society, acquire a certain relative necessity and justification; they must be justified, and men engaged in them must be capable of being sanctified, if there is to be a plan of salvation broad enough to embrace all mankind. The Buddhist ideal is, then, a partial thing. The Buddhist seeks to take himself out of the struggling, striving world, and yet is supported by it. Instead of trying to give a more orderly and reasonable and beneficent form to the industrial and political efforts of men, he turns away from them.

Third, Socrates. The deficiency of Socrates appears in the fact that he is not properly to be classed among religious founders at all. He represents rather the search for truth than any settled doctrine,—much less any propagation of it or establishing of a religious community or church. Individually, morally, Socrates attracts an unlimited admiration; and he communicates to us powerful impulses—no one can be quite the same after he has read and studied him (as portrayed by Xenophon and Plato) —but the impulses are to think, to define, to know, and to know what we know and distinguish it from what we do not know, and as we know to live as we know, but not in the direction of any one theory of life or any one mode of life. Socrates represents the free life of the intellect. But the intellect is not the whole of man—and sometimes men can be more occupied in analyzing and defining the good than they are in practising it. The intellect, too, must ever lead to the truth; its search must yield us something—yet when truth is found, when it stands out clear, then comes the work of religion in organizing it into life, in inspiring men and communities to shape their conduct and their institutions after its image. Socrates is rather an inspirer than a teacher, and his inspiration is greatest in times of transition, when old ideas are breaking up and men are hazy and inclined to be two things at once, or when new ideas are formulating themselves and in need of criticism and the clearest possible statement. But when we are craving definite truths, when we want an outcome of human searchings, when we ask, what is the world then, and what is my life, and what is my duty, Socrates hardly pretends to answer; though he offers some things tentatively, he mainly says, Search yourselves, know what you know and distinguish it from what you do not know; and be very sure that you are not deceived. This is not to make light of his great service—but only to say that it is not the only kind of service of which man stands in need.

Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, has a body of ideas. The intellectual quest which Socrates started or inspired has reached a very tangible result. And a noble body of doctrine it is-I can hardly conceive of a nobler treasure-house of living, practical ideas than those jottings in camp or court that are familiarly known to the world as his "Meditations." They show the full soul and heart of the man. And yet with all that is profound and beautiful and affecting, there is something lacking in Marcus Aurelius. He gives us very large views and he makes us very tender of our kind-I think one who took to heart what he says would be as good as if he had read almost anything from Jesus or from Paul; and yet somehow there is an air of sadness about him. And when I analyze this and look for its causes, they seem to me to lie in the conception of the universe which he had formed, according to which while there was a continuous round of changes in the world, there was really no progress. Let me quote a passage or two: "He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which has taken place from all eternity, and everything which will be for time without end, for all are of one kin and of one form."\* Again, "Those who come after us will see nothing new . . . . but in a manner he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails, all things which have been and all that will be."† It was such a conception, it seems to me, that cast a kind of shadow over this beautiful spirit perhaps, all unconsciously to himself. There is an air of resignation in his pages rather than of joy and of faith. There is no presentiment of a transfigured world, such as

<sup>\*</sup>vi. 37. † xi. I.

lights up the pages of the New Testament, and indeed dawns in the prophecies of the Old. The universe is not hastening on to some grand event, human history is not moving toward some sublime climax, as in the conception of Jesus, but instead he might almost have said with the author of Ecclesiastes: "All things are full of weariness . . . . that which hath been is that which shall be; and that which hath been done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun." The deficiency of Marcus Aurelius resembles that of Confucius-only it is not from retrospection and conservatism, but from a certain philosophic conception of the whole system of things. We do not get hope and daring faith from his pages; though his views are almost a religion, it is not a religion that can satisfy those who have been touched with the Christian (and old prophetic) spirit, whose souls have leaped with the prospect of great and sublime things to be.

However much then we honor and revere the great teachers whom I have been considering, I see not how we can be unquestioning followers of any of them. And I must say the same of Jesus. The deficiency of Jesus lies in the lack of a scientific sense of cause and effect. He puts a sublime goal before the race, he interprets history and life as a movement thitherward—but he thinks we are to attain the goal at last by a sort of leap, by a sort of Divine tour-de-force; and this was just because he was without the scientific habits of thought that he might have learned of a Socrates, a Plato, or an Aristotle. The home of science is not Palestine, but Greece. And our Palestinian religion has ever suffered from this lack. Witness the descriptions of the coming of the kingdom of heaven by Jesus and by Paul. "The sun shall be darkened,

the moon shall not give her light, the stars shall fall from neaven—and then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven; and all the tribes of the earth shall mourn, and they shall see the Son of man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory; and he shall send forth his angels with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his chosen ones from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other"—so Jesus is reported to have said.\* And now Paul: "For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first; then we that are alive, that are left, shall together with him be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air; and so shall we be with the Lord."† It is all sheer miracle. But for the augustness and sacredness of the subject, it might be taken as a transformation scene from a fairy-tale. Things do not happen in this way in the real world. There may be changes in the future as there have been in the past. Think of the evolution of our earth from the fiery mist, think of the dawn of life, of the origin of man, of the evolution of great states! What prodigious developments, yet all gradual, silent, natural. There may be prodigious developments in the future, we cannot tell what shall be, we may hope for the highest, this mortal may even put on immortality,—but we must suppose that all future changes will be gradual, silent, natural, too. The scientific point of view is lacking in Jesus-he looks to supernatural agencies to accomplish what must come from the working of

<sup>\*</sup>Matthew, xxiv: 29-31. There are many passages of the same tenor.

<sup>†</sup> I. Thessalonians, iv: 16, 17.

the natural, inborn forces of nature and of man. It is accordingly an entire change of attitude toward the great social ideal which scientific thought requires. Prayer goes with the old attitude—prayer and waiting; creative work is the demand of the new.

In what I have been saying I have already anticipated the positive constructive ideas which these various teachers of the past have bequeathed to us. From far-away China we learn that the great practical task for man is political and social transformation, based on a rectification of the thoughts and of the hearts of men-only, the standard and the ideal are too much taken from the past. From India we learn to rise above the love of self, above the love of pleasure, even above the love of life—we learn how to master those passions, those lusts, those cleavings and insistences that are at the root of so much of the disorder, the wrongs, the oppressions of the world, we learn how to keep our souls in a state of peace and of love to all our kind; only with Buddha, this leads to a withdrawal from the active world, instead of to an attempt to interpenetrate it with a diviner spirit and to reorganize it. From Greece we learn the lesson of the duty of thinking, of the significance of the intellectual life; and whenever we are befogged, whenever we are tempted to rest in traditional notions, whenever we think our prejudices, or our assurances, or our inspirations are good enough, we may all listen to the Socratic summons to clear up our minds and know ourselves-only Socrates tells us to seek for illumination, he does not always give it. From Rome we get the great illuminating idea of a world-wide brotherhood of the race, of a world-state in which all are citizens, of the respect and consideration and tender love we owe to all. It is a more comprehensive conception than that of Confucius; it is a conception into which the all-loving Buddha might have thrown himself, could he have avoided his extreme of asceticism—and yet it is all over tinged with melancholy, for living hope toward it, joyous expectation of its triumph, are wanting. It is this needed note of triumph, this confident, forward-looking expectation, that Jesus brings. Unscientific as he was, unable to stand a Socratic cross-examination as he doubtless would have been, mistaken as he proved to be as to ways and means, he gave a bright and shining goal to men whose feet would otherwise have wandered in darkness and gloom. It was hope that Jesus gave to the world—this was his greatest gift. Sometimes I think it is the seed of all the virtues—for with hope gone, how can men or nations live?

The deficiencies of Jesus, it is the task of modern scientinc thought to supply. This it will do not only by the idea of cause and effect, but by its conception of evolution. This conception of evolution—the fruit of geological and biological and historical study—is a modern product. It was unknown to Confucius, unknown to Buddha, unknown to Socrates and Marcus Aurelius and Jesus as truly as to the author of Ecclesiastes. It signifies more than order—mere cause and effect—its signifies progress, the unfolding of effects whose causes were latent and hidden before. The world is not ever the same—if it is, how happens it that there are suns and planets now where ages ago there were none? The old idea was that the earth, like the "everlasting hills" upon it, had always been. Life is not ever the same—it is ascending. Man is not ever the same—at happy junctures, new races have been born. History need not always repeat itself. Dowered with reason and social feeling, man has within him the possibilities of indefinite advance. It is in the make of things that the possibilities of progress lie. Why is not then a world-state in which all are brothers, a "kingdom of God," conceivable? In the face of the magnificent story of evolution in the past, who will set limits to its future course? If the diviner order of which Aurelius and Jesus dreamed would be the cap and crown of things, what hinders us from actually anticipating it? Why not say with that most scientific of modern imaginative writers, George Eliot—

"I too rest in faith
That man's perfection is the crowning flower,
Toward which the urgent sap in life's great tree
Is pressing,—seen in puny blossoms now,
But in the world's great morrows to expand
With broadest petal and with deepest glow."

And so I see a new faith rising in the hearts of men and organizing itself in human society. It will have the human interests, the practical sense, the sanity of Confucius, but in the service of the grand ideals of an Aurelius or a Jesus; it will with Buddha loosen the cords that bind men so tightly to the earth and master all other loves than the love of right and the love of love and yet it will seek to organize right and love in the daily work of the world and no service to man shall be so material or so low that it may not also be holy; it will with Socrates inspire to all science—but the darling effort of science shall be to find out the way to those far and shining heights that shall be anew the object of the aspirations and worship of men, to ascertain the laws and true methods of advance. Under the stress of the new faith, wrought organically out of the present and the past, men will again look beyond themselves, will again be sanctified, will again feel a glow in the heart and feel themselves happy in contributing ever so little to so divine a result.

## THE ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.\*

BY DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

Mr. John Morley, in his life of Richard Cobden, says that "great economic and social forces flow with tidal sweep over communities that are only half conscious of what is befalling them." The same sententious truth may be predicated of the great moral and religious forces. In one age the tide of thought sets strongly towards a transcendent theology and metaphysics; in another generation the irresistible attraction of lofty moral ideals brings the human consciousness back to an absorbing interest in ethical theory. As we dwell attentively on these great tidal oscillations in the spiritual experience of the generations of mankind, it almost seems as if they each came in turn as a corrective to what was exaggerated and excessive in the consciousness of the age preceding. The infinite toil of history is but the giant swing of the pendulum of human consciousness and human activity, ever seeking and anon destroying the ideal poise of equilibrium—final peace of mind and heart, final justice, final brotherhood. Out of anarchy has come despotism in politics: Napoleon, the monstrous offspring of Jacobinism—and after the absolutism of Napoleon and the last of the Bourbons, new anarchy. In philosophy the pride of one generation becomes the shame of the next, and we wonder how men whose days

<sup>\*</sup>Given before the Philadelphia Ethical Society, Sunday, April 27, 1902.

our fathers can remember had the power to gather thousands around their now deserted banners. The literature of one age leaves the firm ground of real experience to soar to the heights of fantastic idealism, and the requiting nemesis of the next compels us to consort with the idealless marionettes of a contented worldliness, or to toil through dark places in a world of woe where the star of hope has never risen.

Religion, as well as politics, philosophy, and literature, is affected by this rhythmic process of history, and our highest concerns of spirit (realized as they must be, if at all, in the forms of activity and the formulæ of thought which we have actually to hand) are dependent ultimately for their form and content on the spiritual trend of the age. This is a deeper truth than the vast majority of the religious world realize, and than some of our religious leaders even wish to acknowledge. The common assumption of the great multitude is that religion is something fixed and eternally changeless, an objective thing which generation after generation appropriate as they appropriate the laws of Physics; that this thing religion has its component parts of faith, revelation, ecstasy, morals, mysticism, etc., forever in static harmony like the attributes of God. But the man who diligently peruses the history and evolution of religion will soon perceive how shallow and false such a popular judgment is. There have been ages of mysticism without morality, and of morals without faith; there have been generations consumed with the fever of theological speculation and system-building, and at the same time so devoid of the elementary principles of ethics as to torture and burn their fellow-men; while to them generations have succeeded, which, "perplexed in faith but pure in deeds," have returned to humanity to find the true God in his reflection in every least creature of his. Alexandria, Constantinople, Carthage, Rome, Wittenberg, Geneva, Whitehall, Salem—what varieties of spiritual (and unspiritual) life those names recall! what sweeps of the religious pendulum from doctrine to ritual, from ritual to morals, from morals to mysticism, from mysticism to dogma!

And we too are seeing every year and almost every day more clearly that the religious world of our own generation is moving towards the most purely ethical interpretation of religion that mankind has ever seen. The first half of the nineteenth century saw the culmination of that transcendental movement in philosophy of which Hegel may be called the representative—the apotheosis of pure metaphysics. Since then the will and the emotions have been asserting their claims in almost equal measure. Contemporaneously with this development in philosophy has gone the development in religion. Our grandfathers wrote or read great tomes of speculative theology, Berkeleian, Kantian, Hegelian, which are not only being forgotten to-day, but, what is far more significant, are not being superseded by other tomes of theology. To-day we are having hand-books, essays (literally, "trials") in theology, to sound our generation so far removed from the charms of an absolute metaphysics, and to see how much of old doctrines is really vital: that is, transmissible, viable, evolutionary. In our theological schools and seminaries the systematic theology, which two generations ago was the all-absorbing study, is to-day the least patronized. It is becoming hard

to find a good man to fill a conservative chair of theology in our seminaries, and when the chair is filled its incumbent succeeds in just such measure as he proves himself able to interpret inherited dogmas in terms of ethical experience. The pulpit and the religious press of all denominations are emphasizing the ethical aspect of religion to-day as never before. The grand doctrine of the Hebrew Prophets is superseding the ritualistic code of Leviticus, and the majestic moral precepts of the great Teacher of Nazareth are making their way to clearer appreciation against the myths and metaphysics of his Godhead. We are more concerned to right the dreadful havoc of sin than to find a theory which obviates it; we believe more in fighting perennial evil than in speculating on the original fall; we care more to understand and emulate our saviors than to defend their supernatural titles or to wrangle over their respective rank in the world's pantheons. We are not so sure as some past generations have been that we understand just what the terms "reconciliation," "justification," "election," "salvation," and the like mean, but we do believe that we are learning a little better all the time what sympathy and justice and soundness and nobility of character are-and we begin to realize that the cultivation of these virtues, with humility, is enough of a spiritual task for these three score years and ten. In short, we believe in ethics. We believe that all our concern is with ethics. And we believe that any theological dogma or philosophical tenet or religious emotion that does not realize itself in the ethical disposition and the moral deed is in danger of degenerating into scholastic subtlety of intellect or barren ecstasies of emotion. The great Judge of all flesh in our present

day doctrine asks not, What dost thou believe? or, How dost thou worship?—but, What art thou doing to help and to persuade men and women to value the high and eternal things of life, and to leave what is low and mean? How art thou living a witness to the divine truth of human brotherhood, spending and being spent, if perchance thou mayest drop the seed of new life into some deadened soul or raise the drooping flower of hope in some stifled bosom? Art thou envious of those who are richer or more gifted than thou, so letting the canker of invidious misconduct eat out thy soul; or dost thou cheerfully accept thy station, thy means, thy gifts, thyself, in short, realizing that the noble soul is the only true wealth and a high character the highest accomplishment under heaven?

If then our age is waking to the absolute claims of the ethical life, as we believe that it is, it becomes doubly interesting and important for us not only to review the types of ethical theory in which humanity has expressed its ideals of conduct, but also much more to revert to the world's great charters of ethics—those documents in which the moral tasks for generations to come have been set down under the fresh impress of the world's spiritual masters: documents like the ethical papyri of old Egypt, the precepts of Confucius, the sermons of the Buddha, the Psalms of Israel, and above all the ethical message of the Hebrew Prophets, progressing in majestic splendor of righteousness until it reaches its culmination in the Gospel of Jesus of Nazareth. The New Testament is our most precious religious inheritance, and the ethics of the New Testament our highest spiritual ideal.

But just here I am conscious that the words "Ethics

of the New Testament" need careful definition-not definition in the ordinary loose sense of explanation or commentary, but definition in the strict literal sense of limitation. How can we speak of the ethics of the New Testament as if we were dealing with a single treatise, a well-ordered system from a single brain, consistent in all its parts, clear in its central thought? The New Testament is not a book; it is a collection of books. It is not the work of a single ordering mind; it is a group of doctrines and systems. There are letters and sermons in it, there is history and prophecy; there is a Pauline theology and a Petrine theology and a Johannine theology. There are interpretations of the life and work of Jesus varying from the terse, pragmatic Gospel according to St. Mark to the sublime spiritual flights of the Gospel according to St. John. Ethics of the New Testament! Where are the "ethics" in St. Paul's deprecation (almost imprecation) of the married state in the first Corinthian Epistle, or in the enforcement of the Noachian Commandments by the Jerusalem Council in the Acts of the Apostles, or in the quarrel of the Apostles at Antioch, or in the miracle of the Gadarene swine, or in the colored horses of the Apocalypse! How can we speak of the ethics of the New Testament as of a single piece? Where can we find a consistent principle in this group of writings which we may call the ethical soul of them?

That is the single question I should like to attempt to answer this morning: for beside it, I consider the simple enumeration of instances of love, mercy, faith, justice, and the like, which we find filling the pages of the New Testament, but a gratuitous and facile exercise. Unless we can find some integrating principle of ethics

in the New Testament, we have no more right to speak of the ethics of the New Testament than we have to make any arbitrary compilation of ethical or religious books, and speak of the ethics of the collection.

Now I thoroughly believe that we do find such an integrating principle in the writings of the New Testament, and that we are justified in speaking of the ethics of the New Testament. For, despite their variety and their diversity, despite the amount of extraneous and irrelevant matter they may contain, the writings of the New Testament do faithfully embody and reflect a great movement with a central inspiration in it and an integrating principle through it. We can speak of the ethics of a great movement.

For example, towards the middle decades of the nineteenth century there was a school of philosophy in England which quite held the ascendency in British thought. It was a distinct movement, having for its ideal the wider extension and the holder realization of human contentment through the application of a certain theory of life. Its great central inspiration was the conviction of the final value of the happiness of the individual. Its integrating principle was the doctrine that, each man working for his own happiness, all must eventually be happy. So the Utilitarians all stood for a common ideal, and despite the inevitable variation in style and treatment due to the personality of the writers, we may class the works of Bentham, Grote, and the Mills together, and speak of the Ethics of Utilitarianism. About the time the Utilitarian philosophy was at its height, there was begun a movement in theological and religious circles of England which is known as the Oxford Movement. The

object of this movement was to stem the tide of rationalism in religion which was perhaps generated by the double influence of German Biblical criticism from without and a materialistic ethics within, and which had so far invaded the councils of State as to threaten the disestablishment of the English Church. The great central inspiration of the Oxford Movement was the imposing spectacle of a sacred institution, descended through eighteen centuries, resisting attacks from without and revolution from within, outlasting dynasties and philosophies. The integrating principle of the Oxford Movement was the doctrine of the continuity of the power of this mighty institution through the channels of grace opened by its Founder and his Apostles. So we may speak of the Ethics of the Oxford Movement, and we may find the doctrine in the works of Newman or Pusey or Kebel or Froude. The Germans from the Baltic to Bavaria, divided and deluded, at the close of the first decade of the nineteenth century were languishing in disgraceful subjection to the terrible Corsican, whose armies had crushed the governments of central Europe. Two years later, after the pitiable remnants of the Grand Army, lighted by the flames of burning Moscow, had found their way back to Poland and Prussia, Germany rose from its stupor of slavery, and smiting Napoleon's armies before Leipzig, drove them across the Saale, across the Rhine, across the Marne, across the Aube, to the gates of Paris. The War of Liberation was a great national movement. Its inspiration was the vision of a free, united Fatherland. Its integrating principle was the duty of every German soul, peasant, priest, or prince, to remember his heritage of freedom and to lay down his life for this

high ideal. "How is it with your boys," asked the Prussian King in the camp after Leipzig, of a farmer who had brought his four sons with him to the battle. "It is well," answered the peasant, "they have all fallen today for Your Majesty." "Nay, not for me, in God's name, not for me," cried the King, tears filling his eyes; "say rather for our bleeding Fatherland!" We can speak of the Ethics of the German War of Liberation, and we can find the doctrine in the state papers of Stein, in the harangues of Schill and York, in the sermons of Schleiermacher, or in the stirring lyrics of Arndt and Koerner.

In a like manner we may speak of the Ethics of the New Testament. The movement for which the literature embodied in the New Testament stands is the emancipation of the spirit from moral and religious bondagebondage to the remorse for past evil, or to the despair of present incompleteness, or to particularism in creed, or to formalism in worship. The great central inspiration of the New Testament is the person of Jesus. And the integrating principle of the literature of the New Testament is the doctrine that both the duty of making his spiritual life conform to the life of Jesus and the call to communicate that spiritual life to his neighbor in every relation of intercourse are imperative upon every member of the human family. Of course, this estimate of the New Testament as essentially a call to spiritual freedom through the imitation of the spirit of Jesus will appear to the upholders of traditional Christianity as very superficial and deficient. It leaves out of the count what was apparently the inspiration of the Apostles and the early Christians who established the new religionnamely, the miraculous resurrection and ascension of

Jesus, and his bodily appearance to the disciples. It passes over the chapters in the Pauline theology to which Christendom in all its history to the present has attached far more import than to the Gospel of Jesus. It regards as only a beautiful piece of symbolism the gates of pearl and streets of gold of the Apocalypse. But nevertheless, all these things, the miracles, the theology, the symbolism, are not and cannot be the inspiration of the new movement; therefore the Ethics of the New Testament cannot have its heart in them. They are but the accessories of the spirit, interpretations of the real power of the New Testament, adjustments of the new conviction to inherited doctrines, or projection of it into the future in prophetic vision. The real inspiration of the New Testament, the heart of its ethics, is the person of Jesus alike for evangelists, theologian, historian, and seer. And the ethics of the New Testament appear whenever there appears the trace of that integrating principle which appeals to men to imitate and emulate the spirit of Jesus. There personality touches on personality, life on lifeand it is only out of that contact that ethics can come. Everything else, shaping a doctrine or dreaming a vision, is only of relative import, only a means to the clearer conception of personality in its high endowment of virtue and its absolute duty of brotherly love.

I hardly need to bring proof from the authors of the New Testament that the person of Jesus is the ultimate inspiration of all their work. The Gospels, of course, are his biographers; the elaborate theology of Paul is the attempt to find a justification in the Jewish Law for abrogating the law in the presence of this compelling personality; and all the imagery of the Book of Revela-

tion is conceived or adapted to portray the everlasting exaltation in glory of the son of the carpenter of Nazareth. But striking as this testimony is, a still stronger witness to the central position of the person of Jesus in the whole ethical theory of the New Testament is his own conception of his mission. Leaving to one side entirely the vexed questions of Messiahship, vicarious atonement, and the like, we must recognize that Jesus, more than any other religious leader the world has ever seen, put himself in the center of his doctrine. He asked men to be what he was, to pray as he prayed, to think of God as he thought of God, to do unto others as he did unto them. His doctrine seemed to come out of his deeds. He performed the act—the sermon was only the commentary. He forgave, and then told what forgiveness was; he healed, and then told what healing meant; he loved universally, and then preached on universal love; he gave himself unreservedly to the world, and then talked of sacrifice. It was not primarily his words that made the impression of divine power on his disciples; it was his matchless self-a living doctrine.

Now there are two corollaries flowing from this main doctrine of a central and commanding personality in the writings of the New Testament which seem to me to contain the very essence of the ethics of the New Testament. They are, first: The absolute value of the conviction of righteousness and truth over against all expediency, convention, or tradition of creed; and second: The transcendent worth of the human soul itself when compared with any of the temporal accidents of life. Let us examine these two corollaries a little more nearly.

First. The absolute value of the conviction of right-

eousness and truth over against all expediency, convention, or tradition of creed.

Heine once said that a religion was doomed when it wrote a creed. The deep truth underlying his exaggeration is this, that if in any religion the consent of the intellect to a series of articles is substituted for the allegiance of the heart to a set of principles, the soul of that religion is dead, and it has ceased to be ethical. For there is no such thing as a credal ethics. Now as I apprehend the doctrine of the New Testament, there is (even in the theological letters of St. Paul) a minimum call for the consent of the intellect to a series of articles, and a maximum demand for the allegiance of the heart to a set of principles. Jesus, to be sure, set his person in the center of his doctrine; but not as a theological proposition to be reconciled with the Jewish Scriptures, nor as the middle term in a Trinity, to wait three centuries for its proper statement at the hands of an Alexandrian bishop. Jesus set his person in the center of his doctrine as the actual living embodiment of that doctrine; and so far was he from wishing any allegiance to his person except as the embodiment of an ethical principle that he rebuked any approach to fulsomeness on the part of his disciples. When, for instance, he spoke of the sufferings and death which awaited him in consequence of his preaching, and one of his followers cried, "Spare thyself, Lord"-Jesus turned on him and said, "Get thee behind me, Satan." When the sons of Zebedee wished to call down the fire of vengeance from heaven to consume the villages of Samaria which had refused to listen to their Master, Jesus rebuked them, saying, "Ye know not of what spirit ye are." And again, when the beloved

disciple John, mistaking an all-inclusive love for an exclusive monopoly of righteousness, interfered with a man who was doing good, but was not of the personal following of the Nazarene, Jesus said: "Forbid him not." To read the ancient Fathers or the mediæval Schoolmen, on the person of Jesus, one would say that he must have sat down among his disciples and taught them saying: "I am the uncreated essence of the Father, pre-existent from all eternity, begotten not made, sent to earth to repair the fall of Adam. I demand honor and worship from every mouth and by every knee. I have laid aside my celestial glory for a moment to consent to suffer on the cross to appease the just wrath of God towards men. My sacrifice done, I ascend again to my glory, where I sit eternal judge of all flesh. They that have believed me of one substance with the Father shall be raised to reign with me in glory, while they that have believed me of like substance only with him shall perish in fire." Instead of that, however, we find him saying: "I am bread to the hungry and water to the thirsty. I am the way, the truth, and the life. Blessed are the pure in heart, the peace-makers, the merciful, the humble, the afflicted, and the meek." The person of the Schoolmen and the creeds is a fiction, an abstraction. The person of the Gospels is a fact, a character. The latter only can be the inspiration of an ethics. Not that the writings of the New Testament are consistently faithful to that real and vital conception of personality which Jesus embodied and preached. A pure and high ideal comes to its expression only in the frail and faulty medium of this or that specific human life with all its limitations from without and from within. Men wrestle with spiritual

truth just because they have within them both welcome and repugnance to that truth, both apprehension and misapprehension of it. So with the ideal of deliverance from evil and the root of evil through a complete personality, which Jesus preached; that ideal so magnificently summed up by the Apostle in the phrase, "a new creature." The pure ethical value of that ideal was obscured even in the writings of the New Testament. Much that was irrelevant, some even that was directly antagonistic to the doctrine of Jesus, was mixed with these earliest and most faithful documents of Christianity; and the Church, by a mechanical dogma of inspiration has consecrated the whole mass of the New Testament as of equal and binding value. Jesus' simile is already illustrated in respect to the writings which contain his teaching: the wheat and the tares must grow together until the harvest. Yet the touchstone of discrimination is there for those who can use it. The personality of the Great Teacher, the divinity that claimed to be not what no other man could be, but what every other man should be, the absolute confidence in the final worth of righteousness and truth—this is all in the New Testament, and this is the Ethics of In this the New Testament posthe New Testament. sesses a vital and perennial principle which will save it from ever becoming simply the charter of a creed or of a Church. It is open to the world, and its great central figure belongs to the world. And as often as the universal figure of Jesus is dishonored to be made to serve the pompous particularism of any sect, the broader, better sense of humanity will rise in protest—as it has risen in protest in the past-and force the conventicle to liberate this Jesus from the narrow bonds of a theological

system, and restore him to humanity entire. So is the true ethical person of the New Testament, in a long, painful evolution, fighting his way, with all his grand but lesser companions, to be freed from the local and accidental, the artificial and the temporal, and to stand before mankind resplendent in the virtues of perfected brotherhood. The finally universal person, the finally divine person, is the finally ethical person—we feel sure of that: else we must grope in the darkness of a moral scepticism or seek a distracting comfort in some dogma of supernaturalism. The New Testament apprehends (if it does not comprehend) such a person. Out of that apprehension its lofty ethics have sprung. And continuing true to that apprehension, the sympathetic reader of the New Testament will always find in it an immediate ethical inspiration.

The second corollary that follows from the main truth of a central and commanding personality in the writings of the New Testament is the doctrine of the transcendent worth of the human soul itself when compared with any of the accidents of life.

Jesus was continually concerned with the antithesis of the temporal and the eternal, the worldly and the heavenly. Yet not to draw that sharp line between the now and the hereafter which the Church has so generally made the guide-line of its doctrine; but rather to emphasize the true value of the higher ethical and religious life here and now and always. He saw the potential worth in man, even the lowest man, and to that worth he always appealed. There was no gain, no rank, no worldly success in his eye which could for a moment recompense a man for missing the supreme end of existence—the perfec-

tion of a godlike character: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own life?" Whatever temporal interests were sacrificed to this imperative demand of the life of righteousness (he called it the Kingdom of Heaven), were trivial when compared to the blessings which requited their loss. The spiritual horizon is widened to all eternity in Jesus' doctrine. Deeds, plans, thoughts acquire an eternal significance and are viewed under an eternal perspective—"sub specie æternitatis." Expediency, gain, adjustment to environment, survival, and success are all seen in this perspective to be far different things than when viewed with the unethical eye of selfish passion. Jesus taught that apparent defeat may be real victory—and his life proved his doctrine, as always. The truly successful life in his ethics was the life which realized to the full its high qualities of spirit-faith, hope, love, cheerful activity, humble receptivity, universal charity; while the wasted life was the life which had starved or stifled its soul in the pursuit of lower goods—the goods of wealth, ease, self-gratification, and luxury.

In this clear and consistent distinction between the higher goods and the lower goods of life, Jesus advanced far beyond the ethical doctrine of classical antiquity on the one hand, and put the crowning stone on the majestic moral edifice of the Hebrew Prophets on the other. The feature of the ethics of Jesus which gives it its immeasurable superiority to the doctrine of classical antiquity is its spirit of universal love. In reading the "Ethics" of Aristotle, the "Republic" of Plato, the "Discourses" of Epictetus, or the "Thoughts" of Marcus Aurelius—those noblest moral treatises of the ancient world—one is

elevated far above the materialism of the Graeco-Roman civilization, and made to thrill with the emotion of consent. Virtue is there celebrated as the very end of existence, and the love of humanity as highest excellence of the soul. But when we come more attentively to inquire what is the virtue which these sages exalt, what is the humanity which they love; we are met with a poor, pedantic theory which does little honor to the terms which it employs. The virtue of the old philosopher was moral self-gratulation, and humanity for him was the free-born citizen of his state, his equal. Such divine qualities as compassion for the weak and the fallen, or forgiveness for the erring brother, or contrition for the erring self, appeared to him as unworthy of the citizen of a great state. His moral horizon was fixed in the "omnipotent present," with all its pride of military ascendency. Beyond the supreme dignity of "Greek" or "Roman" nobility of soul could not advance. A type of manhood going on from glory to glory towards a perfection which "eye had not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived," never entered into the vision of the ancient sage. His ethics were Promethean: self-assertive to the uttermost. He became so fortified in his cold, hard pride of soul that at last he saw a brother only in a philosopher. Aristotle, for example, the master mind of Greece, and, in large measure, the source of the ethical systems of antiquity, regarded man's duty to man as absolutely limited by the boundaries of Hellas. And the shocking reason that he calmly advances in his "Politics" why freeborn citizens of Greece must not become mechanics, merchants, or farmers, is that all these classes must be excluded from the possibility of being virtuous! What a constrast to the man who was reviled as a devil and a Samaritan because he insisted on seeing a brother in the Publican and a sister in the harlot!

Moreover, as the ethical doctrine of Jesus far transcended the moral philosophy of the Greek and the Roman by its vital motive of universal love, so did it put the crown on the ethics of the Hebrew Prophets by completing that emancipation of ethics from national bonds which had been foreshadowed in the greatest of the Prophets, Isaiah and Jeremiah. Not a people, not a tribe, not even a faithful remnant was to be henceforth the pledge of redemption for the human race; but the purely individual ethics of love to God and love to man—that is, of character and service—were recognized, preached, and lived as the final moral truth of existence.

In thus widening the ethical horizon beyond the materialistic limits of present expediency, fame, or gain; in this lifting of the barriers of pride which severed class from class and nation from nation in the ancient world; in this announcement of the absolute value of character in distinction to the ficticious values of blood, wealth, and might, which have so generally convinced the world, in spite of all ethical teaching, even to our own day; Jesus furnished the writers of the New Testament, and, through them, the world, with an inexhaustible source of inspiration. I for one confess that I do not see how the essence of ethics could be more truly conceived than in these two corollaries which flow from the main doctrine of the central and commanding personality of the New Testament. They contain in themselves the germ of perpetual self-renovation and self-purification. The firstthe absolute value of righteousness and truth over against

all credal formula or institutional dogma—must always come to revival, as it is coming to revival to-day, when our spiritual manhood is threatened with the old grave-clothes of ecclesiastical control. The second—the transcendent value of the human soul itself, apart from all accidents of race, rank, or station—would forever preserve religion from becoming narrowed to the limits of a favored people or institution, and keep it what it must be to be real: a universal inspiration to higher character, deeper humility, and truer brotherhood—a perfect ethics.

Now I am well aware that in the development of these two corollaries which flow from the central position of Jesus in the New Testament, and which seem to me to contain the very essence of ethics, only the Gospels have been under consideration, only the teaching of Jesus has been emphasized. But this treatment is not so unfair to the title, "Ethics of the New Testament" as might at first sight appear. There are, to be sure, problems of ethics attacked by the writers of the New Testament quite beyond the matter of the Gospels. Yet after all, in so far as these problems are solved with a solution valid and convincing, the inspiration for that solution was drawn from these well-springs of ethical theory which we have been considering. The norm, in short, by which we must judge the writers of the New Testament, and by which they judged themselves, is the spirit of Jesus as it appears in the Gospels.

And, again, if that seems a faulty treatment of the ethics of the New Testament which does not enumerate the specific ethical problems of our own day and land—the relation of man to man in the industrial world, the political world, the family, etc.,—noting whether they

were broached or not in the New Testament, and seeking some text which might be coaxed or forced to yield an answer to them; I should reply that such treatment of the New Testament would be sacrificing the spirit of it to the letter. It is true that Jesus did not discuss politics, except to give his followers the brief warning to "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's." He shunned the rôle of arbiter, endeavoring rather with his whole power to encourage in the souls of men that mutual consideration and charity which should make them agree by the arbitration of brotherly love. He did not decide cases; he inculcated principles. He did not institute an Inquisition or compile an Index; but he summoned the souls of men to stand forth, unclothed of any sophistry or worldly immunity, and be measured by the impartial standard of an uncorrupted conscience. In the "Paradise" of Dante, the spirit of the great lawgiver of the Eastern Empire, divested now of the purple and the diadem, stripped of all titles except the name he had received at the baptismal font, speaks to the traveler in that line of wonderful power:

"Cesare fui, e son Giustiniano." (I was Cæsar, I am Justinian.)

Such is the spirit of the confession that comes from the heart of every man that stands in honest sobriety before the ethical ideal of Jesus of Nazareth.

The New Testament is a pitiable instrument in the hands of the man who makes a fetish and an idol of it, seeking to preserve the letter by artificial dogmas of inspiration, and losing the spirit of it through his own poverty of spiritual insight. In the hands of such men

it has been invoked to sanction most unholy doctrines and to excuse most cruel practices. An Augustine has wrested Jesus' words, "Compel them to come in," to mean. Torture and kill the heretic: and the Church obeyed St. Augustine for a thousand years. Martin Luther, when he condoned the bigamy of a Protestant prince of Germany who was a tower of strength to the Reformation party, laid this balm of sophistry to his suffering conscience, that "Christ is silent on the subject of polygamy." And the clergy of our Southern States found an argument for slavery in the fact that it was practiced in Tesus' day and not condemned by him. So murder, uncleanness and inhumanity, with many another curse of the soul, have found their champions in the "saints" who have fallen back on the letter (or the absence of the letter) of the New Testament to justify their immorality.

Meanwhile the spirit of the New Testament, that is the spirit of Jesus, lives on in its pure ethical inspiration, a leaven, as he said it would be, gradually permeating and purifying the life on which it touches. It is not of the sect or the Church. It burst the bonds of sect and Church when the priests drove it from the Temple. belongs to the world now, without the sacrificial mediation of the Mass or the episcopal hand of consecration. With creed or with no creed, with theology or with no theology, with revelation or with no revelation, with hope of immortality or with no hope of immortality, theist, pantheist, or atheist—so long as we believe in the beauty of holiness and the ugliness of sin, so long as we will to heed a trained conscience, so long as we lose our life in the great cause of human brotherhood, so long as the

springs of sympathy are unchoked in our hearts, so long as we carry in our breasts the banner of the highest and purest ethical ideal—so long will this marvellous volume of the New Testament, by its witness to the power of a sublime and final personality, have its inspiration for us too.

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# THE PHILIPPINE WAR: TWO ETHICAL QUESTIONS.\*

#### BY FELIX ADLER.

- I. Is it treason to condemn a war waged by our country while the war is still in progress?
- 2. Are civilized nations justified in adopting uncivilized methods of warfare?

Treason! The word has an ominous sound and carries with it the most odious reproach. It is disloyalty in its extreme form. It may appear in private as well as in public relations. A friend may deal treacherously with his friend; a disciple with his teacher. Judas Iscariot betrayed his Master, and his name has become the synonym of infamy. And so, in an eminent sense, a citizen may commit treason against his country. In former times the crime was more frequent or, at any rate, the range within which the term applied was wider. The punishments also were terrible. In England, for instance, the wretch convicted, whether justly or unjustly, of high treason was cruelly executed, his body decapitated and quartered, his property confiscated, his blood attainted. The range within which the notion of treason

<sup>\*</sup>An address before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, April, 1902, reprinted from the June *Forum* by permission of the editor.

applies has become much more restricted. The penalties have been mitigated; but the horror connected with the name lasts on. A sense of the peculiar heinousness of the crime remains. An accusation of this kind, therefore, should not be bandied about lightly or be advanced without the most cogent and sufficient cause. Those who are the objects of such a charge may not be in actual danger of hanging. But the charge itself, if it be unmerited, is a grievous injury. To be branded as a traitor in the eyes of one's countrymen, without adequate reason, is to suffer an unpardonable outrage.

Recently the statement has been made by a general of our army who seems to allow himself considerable latitude in employing that freedom of speech which he would refuse to others, that those persons who are publicly condemning the war in the Philippines and who plead for the independence of the inhabitants of those islands are guilty of treason and deserve to be hanged. Disregarding the hostile animus of the accusation, let us inquire whether there is any truth in it. Is it treason in a citizen of the United States to condemn the objects for which and the methods by which a war is conducted by his country, while this war is still in progress? My contention is that in certain cases it might be, and that in certain other cases it clearly cannot be, and that those who bring forward these accusations are confusing the two sets of cases. If an attack were made upon us by a foreign power, if the territorial integrity of the United States, and, still more, the life of the nation itself, were in danger, then no matter how wantonly the war might have been provoked by us in the first instance, no matter how unjust the object for which it was originally undertaken, it would, in my opinion, be the duty of every citizen to protect the national territory, to save the national existence, and it might be treason at such a time to promote disunion and to break the force of the defence by raising the question as to the original right or wrong of the objects for which the contest was begun. I can conceive of a loyal Frenchman, living under the Second Empire, as strenuously denouncing the war undertaken by Napoleon III against Germany. I can imagine this same high-minded citizen, in case the French had actually crossed the Rhine and had gained victories on German soil, continuing to denounce the war and to demand the immediate termination of hostilities. And yet I am quite convinced that the moment the tide of war rolled back across the Rhine, the moment France itself was menaced, this same patriotic son of France would have been found among the first to join Gambetta's levies. I can imagine Theodore Parker, who denounced the iniquity of our Mexican war in such virile and plainspoken terms, himself shouldering the musket to defend the boundary of the United States, in case the Mexicans, by any chance, had prevailed.

The love of one's nation is no mere instinct of gregariousness. It is, at its best, a spiritual passion. It is a high ethical duty. We are embedded in the nation to which we belong. We are related to it as the finger to the hand, as the hand to the arm, as the arm to the body. The national language, the national literature, the national laws, the national temperament and character exercise over each one of us a controlling influence. They con-

stitute the frame within which our individuality plays. To spring to the rescue of our nation when it is threatened with dismemberment, or when its very existence is imperiled, is to obey the duty of self-defence. For our nation is our larger self, the greater organism of which we are members. To defend it against destruction is to raise the hand to ward off a blow aimed against the whole body. We are that hand. The nation is that body. The right and duty of protecting our country against attacks from without is the right and duty of self-defence. And if the discussion of the objects for which the war was commenced tends to breed disruption at a time when unity is indispensable for salvation, then to give rise to such a discussion, to denounce the primary objects of the war, is in my opinion indeed treason, and may be dealt with as such.

As a matter of fact, during our Civil War, when the existence of the Union was at stake, President Lincoln strained to their very limit the powers of government entrusted to him. The writ of habeas corpus was suspended. The liberty of the individual was curtailed, men being forced into the service by process of conscription. And—the point here pertinent—the freedom of the press was seriously restricted, the Postmaster-General having issued an order closing the mails to certain newspapers in sympathy with the rebellion, and confiscating copies of one of them in order to prevent the spread of the opinions which it advocated. Such and other measures like them were sustained by the people. "Inter arma silent leges" (amid the clash of arms the laws are silent). Or, rather, in times of extreme peril to the state there is

a single law that supersedes all others. It is the law of national self-defence, of national self-preservation.

But the case stands very differently when there is no attack from without, no danger to the integrity of our country, when our country is itself engaged in waging war upon other countries, wars possibly of aggression, wars possibly unjustifiable, like the Mexican war, when the question perhaps is one of power, and not of selfpreservation at all. In such cases, the right of free speech at home may not be violently interfered with. He best loves his friend who seeks to dissuade him from committing a wrong, and who, when his friend has entered on a course of wrong-doing, endeavors by every means in his power to persuade him to desist and retire from the false position in which he has placed himself. Shall he stand by and wait till the wrong is completed, till irreparable mischief is done, till it is no longer possible to avert the disastrous consequences? And, in like manner, he loves his country best, he is the true patriot, who would dissuade her from doing a wrong, and who, when she has entered on a course of wrong-doing, would seek by every legitimate means in his power to persuade her to desist and to withdraw from the evil position in which she has placed herself. And it makes no difference whether, in the case I am supposing, the citizen be correct or be mistaken in regard to what he denounces as wrong. If he be actuated by a patriotic motive, if he sincerely believe that the policy contemplated or in process of being carried out is pernicious, it is his right and duty to speak out. In a republic, in a country governed by public opinion, free and ample discussion is the only means of sifting

out the wrong and right of alternative policies. To stifle discussion, to attempt to terrorize those who raise their voices in honest protest, is the part of tyranny, is intolerable under democratic institutions.

But treason is defined as "levying war against the United States and adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." And it may be asked: Are not those who in their speeches assert that we should grant to the Filipinos independence at the earliest possible moment adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort? Is there any question, for instance, that citizens of the United States who should furnish rifles and cartridges to the Filipinos and supply them with money to carry on the struggle would be guilty of treason? And is there any difference in principle between furnishing them with material assistance and lending them that moral support which will encourage them in their struggle, and give them hope and heart to continue it? It seems to me a strange perversity of intellect to fail to distinguish between the two cases. He who supplies arms and ammunition to the forces that are engaged in war with his own country adheres to its enemies. He places power in their hands which they may use for good or ill. He could justify his action only by expatriating himself and identifying himself wholly with those whom he assists, thus acquiring the right and the opportunity to determine the uses to which his aid shall be put. But he who seeks to prevent his own country from doing what he believes to be a wrong, to stay the hand that is already outstretched to do the wrong, he who pleads with his fellowcitizens to recall them to considerations of justice and

highest expediency, he adheres to his country and not to its enemies. The effect of his action may, indeed, be to give comfort to those who are treated as enemies, though they have never deserved to be so treated. But this effect is incidental, unavoidable. By the purpose he has in view he is to be judged, and his purpose is patriotic, noble, loyal, in the best sense of the term. Says President Schurman, in a recent article:

Even if free speech and unlimited discussion in the United States had the effect throughout all the Philippine archipelago of rendering the natives dissatisfied with our present military and semi-military government, and inspired them with the love and hope of liberty and independence, so that larger armies would be needed to keep them in colonial subjection—that, aye, and more than that, would be preferable, and infinitely preferable, to our renunciation of the principle of free speech, of the sovereignty of public opinion, of government of the people, for the people, and by the people, which is the soul and glory of our republic.\*

That, and more than that, I add, would be preferable to our renunciation of the right, by means of free speech, of showing that highest love for our country which consists in preventing it from doing a wrong. If this charge could be sustained, then it would equally apply to the brave Englishmen who feel and express sympathy with the Boers; then it would apply to Burke and the others who lifted up their voices at the time of the American Revolution on behalf of the rights of the colonies. Life is not the highest good. Bloodshed, horrible as it is, is not the greatest evil. Even if more blood should be shed in consequence of the attempt to prevent our country

<sup>\*&</sup>quot;Philippine Fundamentals," in Gunton's Magazine, for April, 1902.

from doing a wrong, even if the war should be prolonged, it is better that men should continue to perish on either side, on both sides, so that the great principles of civil and political liberty may be perpetuated. It is treason by discussion to raise dissension when our country's life is imperilled. It is not treason to condemn a war even while it is still in progress, if that war is sincerely believed to be unjust, and if, by so doing, there is any hope that we may succeed in preventing our country from continuing a wrong.

This, then, disposes of our first question. Let us proceed now to consider the second.

Is it justifiable for a civilized people to adopt uncivilized methods of warfare? War is a terrible evil under any circumstances. When we pass over a battlefield, a field of carnage, after the fight is over, when we note the sights and sounds that meet us on every hand, the horrible mutilations inflicted by ball or shell, the glazed eyes of the dead, the torn and bleeding fragments of humanity that are strewn about, the piteous wail of the wounded; and when we turn away, shuddering, to shut out this scene from the mind, we may be tempted to ask whether there is any such distinction as that between civilized and uncivilized warfare, whether the best thing to try for is not to end a war as sharply and speedily as possible, using almost any means to that end—almost any means.

Observe that we are compelled, in expressing our thought, to introduce the qualifying word "almost." We cannot, even in the privacy of our own thought, say "any means," but are forced to add "almost"; and as

soon as we introduce this word "almost," we concede the difference between civilized warfare and uncivilized warfare. There are certain means which may not and shall not be used even if they should serve to bring a war to a speedy termination. There is something worse even than war, namely, the degrading of humanity to the brutal level of using abhorrent means to stop a war. In former times poison was sometimes administered or assassination was employed as a means of cutting off the life of the commander of the enemy's army, especially when his ability was the chief obstacle to success. Poisoning and assassination are prohibited in modern warfare. And yet it cannot be denied that if a conspiracy had been formed during our Civil War to take off secretly the leading Confederate generals-Robert E. Lee and Johnston and a few others-and if it could have been carried out successfully, the result might have been to cause the speedy collapse of the Confederacy, thus deprived of the strategic skill requisite for the leading of armies. By the sacrifice of a few lives tens of thousands of lives might have been saved and incalculable suffering prevented. And yet, in what frame of mind do you suppose would McClellan, or Grant, or the President, or the people of the North have received the proposition to end the war by assassinating the ablest commanders on the other side? And this shows that the speedy termination of the struggle, at any cost, is not the sole, nor the supreme, rule that should govern action; that there are certain means which, however they may conduce to that end, we dare not use because they are unhallowed and infamous. And the distinction between civilized and uncivilized methods is just this distinction between the sort of means which a civilized people will permit itself to use and that which it will not permit itself to use.

There are, perhaps, three points of difference, characteristic of civilized warfare, to which special attention may be called. First, the restriction of the evils incident to war, as far as possible, to the combatants themselves, the protection accorded to non-combatants, especially to women and children. Their lives are to be held sacred. Their property, when taken, is to be paid for. And let me say right here that while civilized nations tend to respect this primary rule in their wars with one another, no sooner does a civilized nation make war upon a less civilized people than even this clearest command of humanity tends to fall into disuse. A war of the civilized on the uncivilized or the less civilized seems to have for its effect to drag the former down rather than to lift the others up. Heart-rending instances of this sort have come to our knowledge recently not only in the case of the conduct of the European soldiers in China, the indiscriminate shooting, the pillage, and the worse than pillage, but also in the case of the atrocious crimes perpetrated by British officers in South Africa-crimes, it is true, which have been punished, but of which the punishment cannot efface the fact that they were perpetrated; the fact that they were perpetrated showing the tendency of which I speak. And now come the revelations that touch us as Americans, in connection with the courtmartial of Major Waller, who admits the killing of natives in cold blood, and seeks to justify himself on the plea of the barbarous orders issued by his superior. The first rule of civilized warfare, as I have said, is to protect non-combatants. Even this rule is tending to fall into disuse in the dealings of civilized with uncivilized peoples.

A second all-important point of difference is that the means used should be fair. In General Orders, No. 100, approved in 1863 by President Lincoln, published for the government of the armies of the United States in the field, and now in force, we find, under Rule 16, the following statement: "Military necessity admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy." A distinction is drawn between "deception" and "perfidy." As in a game of chess, so in the game of war, one of the players may endeavor, by a feint, to divert attention from the movement actually contemplated and to lull his opponent into a false security. A feint is a common device of strategy, is a legitimate act of deception. War is a struggle in which the instrumentalities used are physical: guns, swords, the physical strength of the combatants wielding them. But the struggle is redeemed from utter brutality by the moral forces involved: the courage, the daring, the scorn of death, the discipline, the solidarity, and the fact that the physical forces operate under the direction of mind. A battle between human beings, horrible as it may be, is, after all, not like a battle between tigers, because of the moral and mental factors that enter in.

But whenever means are resorted to against which courage is powerless, and which, in their nature, are such that the mind cannot deal with them, that foresight and calculation are of no avail with respect to them, then the employment of such means becomes an act of perfidy,

as contrasted with deception. A stab in the back is perfidious, because we have no eyes in the back of our head and cannot be on our guard against it. A blow beneath the belt is a foul blow, because it is aimed at a part of the body which the defence of the arms cannot cover. Assassination and poisoning, as mentioned, are acts of perfidy for the same reason, because no personal courage and no alertness of the intellect can sufficiently provide against them. The use of dynamite falls under the same condemnation. And so also is the employment of the enemy's flag or uniform, without distinguishing marks that can be seen at a distance, prohibited and justly prohibited for the reason that no one can, even by utmost circumspection or intrepidity, divine the foe behind the mask of a friend, or protect himself against armed assailants when approaching in such disguise.

Now the capture of Aguinaldo was consummated by means of daring exposure to risk and hardship, but also with the help of such prohibited acts. A band of soldiers, under American officers, penetrated the enemy's lines, professing to be themselves insurgents transporting American prisoners. The uniforms of the enemy were used to allay suspicion. Forgery was perpetrated. Decoy letters were forwarded. And when the troops had arrived within eight miles of Aguinaldo's headquarters, and their provisions failed them, and they were too weak to proceed, they sent to Aguinaldo asking for food, and he sent them food, and they ate and strengthened themselves for the work they had in hand. I have wondered how that food must have tasted in their mouths. I have wondered whether it did not stick in their throats.

The third and last point of difference between civilized and uncivilized warfare which I shall mention is this: that civilized war is ever a public act. It may be extenuated, if not justified, on the ground that it is waged in order to bring to triumph some great principle like national independence or political freedom; or, in other less defensible cases, that, at least, it is intended to enhance the power and grandeur of some state which is supposed to be a representative of civilization. Civilized war is a public act in the real or supposed interests of civilization. But whatever tends to import into the conflict an element of barbarity, whatever tends to lower the standard of humanity, to retard the progress of civilization, is in flagrant contradiction to the objects for which civilized war is deemed permissible, and subjects those who are responsible to the reproach of engaging in uncivilized warfare. It is for this reason that, in Rule 16 of the General Orders approved by President Lincoln, we read: "Military necessity does not admit of torture to extort confessions." Torture may seem to serve its purpose. It may seem the only means of extracting information necessary to the speedy termination of a war. But, whether it does or not, like assassination, like poisoning, it is a means which we dare not touch.

But, it may be asked, is it then possible that there can be any question of such a thing? Is it possible that torture can have been used in the Philippines by American soldiers, under the eye of American officers, beneath the hallowed banner of the Stars and Stripes, the very appearance of which, in distant lands, should be synonymous with justice for every wrong and hope for the oppressed?

I have been just as loath to believe it as anyone. For weeks, though strongly solicited to speak on this subject, I have held my peace. I have refused to credit these shameful, these fearful accusations. But certain facts, it seems, are now so clear as to make it impossible to escape the conviction that torture has been employed, though the extent to which it has been employed is uncertain. Lieutenant Hagedorn feeds three prisoners on salt food and denies them water for forty-eight hours; subjecting them to the pains of agonizing thirst, under the fierce heat of the tropical sun, in order to extract information. He is not court-martialled; he is not punished. It is merely said of him that he has made a mistake. General Hughes, in his testimony before the Senate committee, admits that he knew of one case in which the water-cure torture was attempted by American soldiersattempted, he says, but rejected. But it was attempted. Were those who attempted it punished? There is no evidence of such punishment.

And now, within the last few days, there has been published, not to speak of other numerous statements which have appeared, an official report by a military officer, Major Gardener, who has acted as Civil Governor of the province of Tayabas. And who is Major Gardener? Is he some untried, inexperienced, unknown, subordinate officer? Is he a malcontent, a person who indulges in passionate rhetoric without regard to truth? Governor Taft says that "he has been a successful military commander, a good governor, and that he would believe implicitly anything stated of Gardener's own knowledge, but that, because of the great friction between Gardener

and the officers who succeeded him, charges based on the evidence of others ought not to be acted on without giving the accused an opportunity to be heard." If this is a correct rendering of Governor Taft's telegram, it is difficult to understand. That charges should not be acted on without giving the accused an opportunity to be heard goes without saying, in any case. On the other hand, if a man is to be implicitly believed in whatever he says of his own knowledge, it follows, to my mind, that he will not bring forward the most serious charges, the most damning charges, unless he himself is strongly convinced of their truth. And this is what he says:

Of late, by reason of the conduct of the troops, such as the extensive burning of the barrios, in trying to lay waste the country... the torturing of natives, by so-called water-cure and other methods, in order to obtain information, the harsh treatment of natives generally, etc., the favorable sentiment above referred to is being fast destroyed, and a deep hatred toward us engendered. The course now being pursued is, in my opinion, sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution against us hereafter, whenever a good opportunity offers. We are daily making permanent enemies If these things need to be done, they had best be done by native troops, so that the people of the United States will not be credited therewith.

It will be observed that he refers to torturing by watercure and other methods, just as to the extensive burning of barrios, as matters of common occurrence and within the range of every one's knowledge. He even leaves it an open question whether these practices are advisable or inadvisable. He only says: "If these things need to be done, they had best be done by native troops," that is, by agents who will execute such barbarities for us, for whose deeds we should, of course, be morally responsible, while yet in the eyes of the natives we should not directly appear, that so we might be able to screen ourselves behind our emissaries. Major Gardener does not review the facts from the standpoint of the moralist at all. He writes as one who evidently believes in maintaining our sovereignty in the Philippine Islands, as a servant of the Government of the United States, warning them that outrages, even when reported to the military authorities, often remain unpunished; that the sentiment of the high military officers in Manila is unfavorable to the setting up of civil governments; and that the burnings and the torturings "are sowing the seeds of revolution hereafter, whenever opportunity shall occur; are daily making permanent enemies of them." And what is this water-cure treatment, of which we hear so much? The native is thrown on the ground, his arms and legs pinioned, the mouth (in one case of which I have read) bloody because of the bayonet which had been inserted to keep it open. Then water is poured in, one gallon, two gallons, sometimes as many as five gallons, until the body is ready to burst, and the pain becomes agony. Then the water is squeezed out. And, under threat of renewal of the procedure, the native is urged to confess. Sometimes the process has to be repeated. In one instance it was repeated thrice and the victim died.

I ask myself, why is it that we have become immersed in this slough? Why is it that we are called upon to consider accusations of extreme barbarity, on the part of American soldiers, the mere suggestion of which, three years ago, would have seemed impossible? It is because we are trying to do a thing which is contrary to the spirit

of our institutions, to our traditions, to our ideals as Americans. We are going to extreme lengths just because we know that we have become for the moment alienated from our true self, that we are bidding defiance to the sentiments which are most congenial to us. Just as a kindly and humane person, when he is betrayed into resorting to cruelty, is apt to force the pace, is apt to become for the moment ten times more cruel than the more sullen and callous natures. We are engaged in trying to break the soul of a people, of a people that values good government, but rightly values self-government even more than good government, of a people that revolts against the idea of colonial subjection to us or to any other power, of a people that, however divided in other ways, is united in the demand for independence.

At first we were told that it was the ambition of Aguinaldo that prolonged the war. Aguinaldo as a factor in the situation has been removed, but the war still goes on. And Major Gardener tells us that we are sowing the seeds of revolution hereafter that will break out whenever an opportunity occurs. We were told that it was the ambition of a Tagalog oligarchy to acquire control of the archipelago that prolonged the war. But it seems that the Visayans are as stubborn in their resistance as the Tagalogs. No; it is not Aguinaldo, it is not a Tagalog oligarchy, it is the awakened national consciousness of a people that opposes us, a spiritual force which survives defeat, which the dispersion of organized armies cannot disintegrate, which, like a fire, goes on smouldering beneath the ashes, breaking out anew ever and ever again until either it achieves its aim or those who harbor that

aim are exterminated. And torture is used, as a last attempt, to overcome by excessive physical pain that impalpable spiritual force, just as it was used in the Middle Ages to overcome heresy, with this twofold result: the extermination of the heretics, in the wars of the Albigentians, and the triumph of heresy in the Protestant Reformation.

Hear what President Schurman, the head of the first Philippine commission, says. Surely his testimony should be considered of weight:

You could not find in all the islands a single Filipino who favors colonial dependence on the United States. If the Filipinos come to believe that our jingoes and imperialists represent the mind of the American people, they will, like the Boers, fight until they are annihilated: our crowning victory would be their utter extinction. [And this is precisely as one who represents them has recently put it: "independence or annihilation." | Our assertion of sovereignty is supported at the present time only by the federal party, who are numerically small, who are held together by the cohesive force of public office, and who, worst of all, are animated by the delusion that the Philippine Islands will be admitted, first as a Territory and then as a State, into the American Union. Apart from this exception, which rests on a misapprehension, the Filipinos are opposed to us and unanimously demand independence, . . . . The Christianized Filipinos of Luzon and the Visayan Islands number about six and a half million souls. Formerly divided into rival communities, they have been solidly unified by the events of the past few years, and the new-born national consciousness clamors loudly and incessantly for independence. . . . They are fairly entitled to it; and, united as they now are, I think they might very soon be safely entrusted with it. In their educated men, as thorough gentlemen as one meets in Europe and America, this democracy of six and a half million Christians has its foreordained leaders. . . . The American people cannot be democratic at home and despotic in Asia: and independence is the only alternative to despotism in the Philippines, except the admission of the islands as a State in the American Union, which is forever impracticable.

The Philippine question is still an open one, as President Schurman steadily reiterates. Congress is not yet finally committed; the President is not; the nation is not. Why, then, should we not now give to the Filipinos the pledge which we gave the Cubans, but which we have studiously refrained from giving them—namely that we will recognize their independence, under reasonable guarantees, at the earliest possible moment? If this pledge had been given at the outset, in all human probability this whole wretched war could have been avoided. If it were given now, there is every hope that it would pave the way for peace.

This has been a bitter subject to dwell upon. But the facts must be made known, and public attention must be fixed upon them. We have no right to turn away from the contemplation of such facts because they are horrible, because we do not wish to believe them, because it mortifies our national self-esteem to entertain them. We have no right to regard the charges as to the conduct of the war as mere sensational news which we do not care to investigate, on which we have not the time to dwell, distracted as we are by the multiplicity of our other interests. If we have undertaken to interfere, as we have, in the destinies of another people, it is the duty of every one of us, of every citizen, of every man and woman, to weigh the evidence as it becomes accessible, to try to arrive at an impartial conclusion, and to influence public opinion so that justice may be done.

And there is above all this immediate duty: to demand that the facts be made known, all the facts, whether they be damaging or not, that nothing be concealed. And of this, I, for one, am well assured, that whatever the commercial interests or the ambitions of individuals or of corporate bodies may suggest, the American people, as a whole, do not desire, even for the sake of the golden prizes of the trade with the Orient, or of a favorable station near the wealth of China, to march over the prostrate body of a people whose sole offence is their desire for liberty; that the American people do not desire, and will not permit, that the methods of the Spanish Inquisition, which we had believed to be a thing of the past forever, shall be revived under the sacred banner of this great Republic.





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