


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PROGRESS OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT.*

BY S. BURNS WESTON.

IN May, 1876, the year when our National Centennial was being celebrated, what is distinctively known as the Ethical Culture Movement began.† In the single span of a generation it has developed into a world-wide movement, not through any forced propaganda efforts, but solely by an inward necessity and a natural and healthy process of growth.

When we organized our Ethical Society here in Philadelphia, twenty years ago, there existed only the original Society for Ethical Culture in New York, and its first offspring in Chicago. For seven years previous to the organization of the Chicago Society the parent society, through its leader, has been proclaiming a message which, like a seed, was sown broadcast by the winds of the spirit, and took root, first in Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, and afterwards in London, Berlin, Vienna, and Tokio; and in other cities of other lands.

Though in a true sense we speak of the Ethical Movement as having begun hardly a generation ago, in another sense its beginnings reach as far back in history as the

* Introductory address at the Convention of Ethical Societies in connection with Twentieth Anniversary of the Philadelphia Society for Ethical Culture, Sunday, May 14, 1905.

† The address given by Professor Adler at the meeting called to organize the first Society for Ethical Culture, on May 15, 1876, will be reprinted in another number of ETHICAL ADDRESSES, as it has been out of print for some time.

moral aspirations of man. In this larger sense, we claim as belonging to the same cause as ours not only such ethical thinkers as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Immanuel Kant in modern times, but the moral leaders of the Reformation, and the great preachers of the Middle Ages and of the early Church—such as Chrysostom, the golden-tongued, whose lips were touched as with a divine fire when delivering his powerful sermons on the moral condition of the times—and not only them, but the Founder and early apostles of Christianity as well, and farther back still, the prophets of ancient Israel and the moral philosophers and teachers of ancient Greece, who were all advocates of the same moral cause that the Ethical Movement is advocating to-day. We do not claim that the ethical spirit itself is new. We know that it has been manifesting itself through the ages. And yet we know also that the ways of the spirit are manifold and have varied greatly; that the institutions and ceremonies which have grown out of it have differed widely. Spirit without form is void. It must incarnate itself to be a real living thing to living men and women, and these incarnations are the measure by which its intrinsic character and value are judged in any given age. All outward manifestations of the spirit have their natural process of growth and decay. They arise, serve their usefulness, and pass away, and the spirit clothes itself anew. Thus it happens that in the progressive unfoldment of man's ethical and spiritual life, new movements and new institutions—new expressions of the spirit—have again and again become necessary.

The Ethical Culture Movement arose out of such a demand. The time had come when, in order to satisfy the needs of rational thought, and to guide and nourish the higher promptings of practical endeavor, a different type of religious organization was required than had hith-

erto existed: one that would not only allow perfect freedom of thought on theological matters, but that would lay supreme emphasis on ethical principles and ideals as the safe guide for conduct and the equally safe basis for one's faith. The Societies for Ethical Culture have attempted to meet this need; and every year of growth and expansion has made it clearer that they have a great mission before them in firmly establishing and widely proclaiming their rational and democratic faith—the religion of ethics.

While the Ethical Movement imposes no doctrinal creed, while it allows different speculations, different beliefs and hopes in regard to the ultimate nature and government of the universe and the final destiny of mankind, it teaches with no uncertain emphasis that righteousness is demanded here and now, whether we are to live only for a limited time or eternally. It says that whether there be a personal God and a future life or not, the incentive and duty to live justly and to walk humbly with our fellow-men are as strong and binding on our moral and spiritual nature, as essential to our higher well-being, as the taking of food is to our physical system, and that to say or to act otherwise is to blaspheme against the moral nature, the moral divinity, if you please to call it so, that is implanted in each one of us.

But the fuller and deeper meaning of the Ethical Movement I leave to those who are to follow me to unfold. I wish to point out very briefly on this occasion some of the signs of the progress of this movement.

First, there is a growing clearness of understanding of the cause we are enlisted in, and a widening recognition of its value. I have already referred to the fact that the Ethical Movement has gained, in less than three decades, recognition and acceptance in various countries. The proof of this is not only the Ethical Societies that have

been organized in those countries, but the numerous personal testimonies that have come through a wide correspondence.

Another cause for deep satisfaction is the fact that this movement appeals to young men, and has begun to enter the universities. The fact that more young men have joined our Philadelphia Society during the past year than in any previous year, is to me an auspicious and encouraging sign.

But, it may be asked, does the Ethical Movement sufficiently appeal to the emotional side? does it satisfy the more spiritual nature of women? An answer to this is that in all the Ethical Societies women have taken an active and prominent part, and have been among the most earnest workers we have had. Of great significance in this respect is the fact that an earnest woman has recently become one of our ethical leaders and lecturers.

Still another great gain is the establishment, in connection with nearly all our Ethical Societies, of Sunday-schools, which serve, as it were, as a Church or Ethical Society for the young.

I might go on to speak of progress in other directions, particularly of the great educational work of the New York Society, which has had such a marked influence throughout the country, of the splendid work done among wage-earners in St. Louis, of the permanent foundation being laid for social neighborhood work among the poor in Chicago, of the work of the English Ethical Societies in behalf of unsectarian moral instruction, of the readiness with which university professors and even clergymen of the advanced school of thought speak on our platform and at our various weekday meetings, or otherwise cooperate in our work, and of the widespread circulation of our literature.

But I will only say in conclusion that the occasion of the tenth convention of the American Ethical Societies and the twentieth anniversary of our own Society is one for profound gratitude at what has been accomplished, for serious resolve in regard to the work before us, and for earnest hope as to the future. We rejoice to-day, especially, that the founder of the Ethical Movement is still in the full prime of his mental and moral vigor. May his inspiring leadership be vouchsafed to us for many years to come! We rejoice not only that the ranks of the ethical leaders who were organized into a fraternity over twenty years ago remain unbroken by death, but that new leaders have come forward to pledge their strength, their enthusiasm, and their lives to the noble cause this movement represents.

WHAT THE ETHICAL IDEALIST HAS TO FIGHT FOR *

BY WALTER L. SHELDON

Lecturer of the Society for Ethical Culture of St. Louis.

TWENTY years ago this last winter, Mr. Weston and myself were at work in New York, serving our apprenticeship in the cause of an Ethical Movement. In the spring of that year, he came to this city and laid the foundations of this Society. Twelve months later, I went out in the same cause to a field in St. Louis.

As we come together again in public conference after this lapse of time, the question confronts us: What is the outlook? In answer to this each one of us must speak according to his own personal experience.

The standpoint upheld by me then had not come to me out of my own thinking, but had been suggested to me by the teachings of another. It had met a response in my temperament, and seemed to answer the hunger of my religious consciousness for a religion to live by and work for. I liked it because it was something practical, with its watchword, "Deed, not Creed." I liked it because it gave me my intellectual freedom and yet gave me the elements of a religion.

My feeling had been that the one chief stumbling block in the way of spiritual progress lay in the dogmas, the "I believes," of the conventional church. Once set the mind

* An address before the Convention of Ethical Societies at the Twentieth Anniversary of the Philadelphia Society for Ethical Culture, May 14, 1905.

of man free from such shackles and lead people to think in that other direction,—and, as it looked to me then, the religious millenium would begin to draw nigh.

So it was, in my young and fervent enthusiasm, that the redemption of the human race seemed already in sight. There was a message with which to go forth and to conquer. I may even have thought that it was something new and have looked upon myself as the bearer of a new gospel. It was as a fledgling that I went forth and lifted my voice, untrained and untried in the school of life, wearing for the most part the garments of another and using forms of language that were not my own. My faith lay supremely in human reasoning and in the achievements of science. Theology had failed me in my need and left my soul unsatisfied in its yearnings.

Now, in middle life, after a long period of quiet, uneventful, public service in a distant section of the country, and for a cause so dear to my heart, I am here with my colleagues from the other Ethical Societies to speak at your twentieth anniversary—this time with a religious faith made over in the depths of my own consciousness, kneaded and shaped in the pain and struggle of personal experiences with myself and the world. It is no longer for me the teaching of another, but a religion essentially my own. What may be said by me to-day, or what I now believe in, is what life and my own consciousness have been disclosing to me,—however it may agree or disagree with the convictions of others.

I ask myself the solemn question: has the faith to which my adherence had been given, been winning its way? Is ethical religion on a triumphal march over the world? Do I see the signs of spiritual advance for the human race? Shall my voice be raised in notes of cheer

and encouragement over the outlook to-day? Does it seem as if my brother men on two hemispheres were any nearer the goal of my dreams? Is my heart still buoyant with the hopes of my youth and is the kingdom of ethical idealism nearer in sight?

And, for my part, to all this it must be answered: No. As I see it, the world is much farther away than it was twenty years ago, from all that is dearest and highest and most precious to me. The cause I believe in—in the larger sense—has lost ground and been on the wane since my hand was one of those to take up its standard. My words refer, of course, not to the special Ethical Societies with which my life has outwardly been connected, but to that invisible ethical movement for which thousands of us may have been working, though of many creeds or many churches. Spiritually, as it seems to me, the human race is on a lower level than it was two decades ago, and the decline has been appallingly rapid. The ethical millennium looks a good deal further off to me than it did then. To-day I am face to face with facts and not theories. What has been going on during this interval has not made me jubilant with hope for the speedy regeneration of the world.

It is doubtful whether in all history the human race has ever reached quite as low a level of groveling materialism as it has reached at this precise moment. The conditions were bad enough twenty years ago; but they are worse to-day. There have been other periods, when special classes of men have fallen low in their ideals. In our age it is no longer a matter of class, for the whole human race would seem more or less infected.

You will understand that it is not of political or commercial corruption that I am thinking. In this respect

the pendulum has already begun to swing on its backward curve and there is light ahead. But these manifestations are all on the surface. The root of the evil lies far deeper. The earth has opened up its riches as it has never done before and may never do again. The change has come suddenly, almost as it were in a night. At the beginning of the twentieth century the race of man has waked up to find itself possessed of hoards of treasure such as even the Aladdin of earlier times never dreamed of. And the temptation has been too great for the soul to withstand.

The human race has become convinced at heart that satisfaction is to be had out of "the world and the things of the world." It is determined to feed its senses with all that is to be had out of this life and the next one too. Mephistopheles is playing a deep game and his stake is high. Each class is exasperated that the other classes will not practice ethics and have ideals, while *it* continues to practice the pursuit it likes and to get what it pleases. Men are virtuous enough on behalf of their neighbors;—but this is not a method which will make the world ethical in a day, or even in a year.

We are aware that on the surface some of the signs are otherwise. Never before have men expended so much for the externals of religion. We count the sums as we do the wealth of our millionaires. One would suppose the Almighty himself took pleasure in round figures when disbursed in his service. So, too, we worship in much better form than people did two decades previous. The senses are less shocked in our effort to show piety. What is more, atheism is on the decline and "Ingersolism" is a thing of the past. Men have been getting back their God,—*but* have they been getting back the *soul*? At this point I hesitate. My response again would be: No.

Can it be that conventional religion has also become infected? Men have been softening and paring away the sternness and severity of the old teaching. And why? I ask. They have been giving up the belief in hell. Is it because this is ethically objectionable, or rather because it was an uncomfortable doctrine to believe in? Is it possible that the law of economics holds here as well, that supply adjusts itself to the demand? If men will have an easy-going religion, somebody will supply it. And to-day, seemingly, people are getting the thing they are asking for. They want a comfortable religion, a soothing religion, one that shall make them feel safe in this world and safe for the next—a religion that shall give them a sense of after-dinner comfort for body and soul alike.

The creeds are on the wane and it is a waste of effort to attack them. But the soul of man has not been set free. There was a flaw in my theory somewhere. We have been getting art, a sensuous art, in the guise of religion, and an irrational mysticism in the place of creeds. This is not ethical religion. It is not the teaching of the stern old Isaiah with his "Thus saith the Lord," nor is it the burden of the message of the "meek and lowly Jesus."

Be all this as it may, the human race is determined to try its chances and play the game. All the teaching and preaching in the world cannot stop it. The pendulum must swing to the end of the arc. Mankind has never before had the opportunity to get a full taste of the earth's riches,—eat them, drink them, wear them, parade in them, murder with them, glut itself with them. We can only learn from experience. The present generation must pay the death penalty with the rope around its neck, whereby future generations may take home the lesson and find their soul.

If it is true that it takes three generations to make a gentleman, it may take twice that number to make a *man*. Not until the trial has been made will men admit their mistake. Not until the cry goes up from one end of the earth to the other, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity,"—not until then may we begin to look for the real spiritual revival.

One sees a good deal deeper after twenty years of active service in a cause. Ethical religion has another meaning for me now. The abolition of creeds will not of itself set men on the new pathway or lead to man's spiritual regeneration. Talking about good deeds will not necessarily make men hunger after righteousness. I have grown a little tired of the word *practical*. There may be as much of formalism and conventionality, of make-believe and subterfuge in a religion of deeds as in a religion of creeds.

So, too, I have grown a trifle weary of the picture of the "little old red school-house" and all it is supposed to imply. It has turned out money-making Yankees by the myriads. But about the *men* it has turned out I am the least bit dubious. Can it be that there was too much of the "practical" about that old red school-house? Here, too, was a flaw in my theories. Perhaps I may have wanted too much of the practical in religion. It may be that honesty does not make up the whole of ethical piety.

Behind the deed as well as behind the creed there must go a faith of man in himself, in his own spiritual nature. Without this, his honesty and rectitude are only mechanical, like the good behavior of the dog which growls at his feet. It has its value, but it is not religion. When, however, in the presence of the whole animal kingdom, in the presence of the dust he treads on, yes, in the pres-

ence of the whole physical universe, he can say and feel, "I am better than thou,"—at that moment he stands on another plane and his conduct acquires a meaning it did not have before.

The richest gift of the religious consciousness has not been the faith in a God, nor the hope of heaven, nor the decrees of conscience, but rather the *belief in soul*,—yours and mine, soul anywhere and everywhere. It took the human race a hundred thousand years and more, to grow up to this conception. All the burden of all teaching of all religion of all time has centered in that one query: What shall a man give in exchange for his soul? At the present moment the human race is bartering its spiritual nature for *simple dirt*.

It is the soul of man we are called upon to rescue, whatever our creed may be or distrust of creed, whether our religion be that of an Ethical Society or of the established Church, whether we are atheists, agnostics, theists, Jew or Christian. It is not the God-belief, the Christ-belief, the belief in heaven which is menaced to-day, but just this faith in the human soul, in the worth of man's spiritual nature. I may be tolerant of many creeds or many systems of philosophy, but for one attitude I have no toleration, and that is the thing called materialism. Toward this my feeling is one of disgust and loathing, and I mean to fight it till I die. The horror of it on my part lies deeper than any intellectual disapproval.

Materialism has subsided as a distinct system of philosophy only to reappear in a more insidious guise. It has clothed itself in the language of art, of religion, yes, even of science. It is eating at the very vitals of our civilization.

And so it is that I give my answer as to the direction in

which every earnest religious teacher is called upon to throw the emphasis of his efforts. He must put up a new fight for the human soul. A bread-and-butter religion of simple philanthropy will not do. There is something worse than starving or aching bodies. There is something higher even than feeding the hungry or clothing the naked. If we do anything for men's bodies, its ultimate purpose is that we may reach the spiritual nature and build up the soul.

If we are mere animals of a larger growth, I do not care much for our common brotherhood. A soup-kitchen religion in itself does not appeal to me. My animal kinship with my fellows does not stir me very much. But if there is a kinship in a kingdom of souls—as I feel there is—then it is another matter. It is for this we are to labor, for this we are to work.

But in making this appeal I am not pleading for that crude "monism" which calls everything soul and deals with everything as if it were physical matter. Nor are we thinking of that precarious something to be rescued by beating tom-toms at the street corners. No, we mean that whole spiritual scaffolding on the inside which each one is conscious of, while no other eye sees it. This is far more real to us than the cells of the brain which the physiologist may be probing in the name of psychology.

I have not surrendered my belief in my spiritual freedom and will not do it at the bidding of scholars who put more faith in physical law than they do in themselves. It is this inner subjective spiritual scaffolding with its own measure of values, which is the real me, the real man.

Yet for the vast majority of the world to-day it is the outside thing, the thing of dirt, to which faith clings and for which the appetite yearns—those apples of Sodom

which are at first sweet to the taste but leave behind them the taste of ashes.

I have no use for the monism which unctuously leaves everything to be worked out by physical law. The attitude for labor in a spiritual kingdom is a fighting attitude. In the ethical kingdom it is dualism and not monism that prevails. We have our freedom to earn, to acquire; and it is going to be hard work clear to the end.

Will my attitude here seem that of pessimism? For those who deal in salves and nostrums, yes. Happily for the world those be things of human invention, and as far as we can see, the Almighty does not deal in them. A comforting and comfortable assurance in the satisfactoriness of things as they are, does not become the true religious teacher. His attitude should be stern and relentless. His visions of the kingdom of righteousness are always in the future as he goads men on toward these ideals.

At the end of these twenty years have I turned pessimist and is the only outcome of my faith a negation? No, no; a thousand times, no. I have been getting my bearings, that is all. Now I want to begin, for now I have a gospel of my own. It is a gospel as old as the hills. There is nothing new in it, for it is the kernel of all religion. But it is new to me because it has been borne in upon me through my spiritual experience.

I still hold to my ethical religion. But it has acquired an inwardness it did not have for me two decades ago. The deed like the creed must have its roots in the living soul.

My mind and heart are still ready to bend all convictions to the laws of human reason. What is absolutely irrational cannot be true. And yet to-day I am not quite so sure about the theories of science as I was when a

fledgling, nor have I quite as much confidence in the all-wisdom of the men of science. It has struck me that even they can err, that even they can have their prejudices and their *fixed ideas*. I have come to believe that we may *feel* our way toward certain truths which the *mind* of man cannot altogether grasp or explain. I am strong in hope still, but it lies deeper now. My expectation is, in some form to fight on till I die.

We fight for a kingdom of spiritual forces and the battle may go on for eternity. It is for each man to do his part, until for him the heavens shall be rolled together as a scroll, the dust of earth sink into its own nothingness and his work on earth is done.

A MORAL "CREDO."*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER

Lecturer of the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago.

A "CREED" has come popularly to mean a set of beliefs binding on others. A "credo" is a personal confession. I take the liberty of making one this morning.

This is a scientific age and undoubtedly the first effect of scientific ways of thinking is to make the world seem gray and cold. It loses the vivacity, the color and charm that it had when spirits and gods and angels and perhaps demons mingled in it—interfering and directing. And yet the new conception has one decided advantage. It makes the world intelligible. We see how things come about. We can put our hand on the causes. We do not grope in mystery and darkness. From such and such conditions or causes we know such and such results come—have and will. For example, when an epidemic of disease arises, we do not grope after some offended deity and seek to win him over by sacrifice and prayer, but we search out the circumstances and conditions in the midst of which the epidemic arose, and by changing them we banish it—perhaps prevent it from ever recurring. There is a kind of sober cheer in getting on to firm ground of this sort. Indeed, I think the time has come for ceasing to lament the fading of the faith in which our fathers were nurtured. A world of order and law is really a

* An address before the Convention of Ethical Societies at the Twentieth Anniversary of the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, May 14, 1905.

better world to live in than the old world—even if not so picturesque; it is one in which we can more truly feel at home. And the real God (if I may say my mind) is the ground and stay of the life of this cosmos, not a special being aside or apart from it—the God of the popular theology is a myth, as much so as Zeus or Wodin; the real God is the orderly universe itself taken on its inner, spiritual side.

This scientific conception that there is an intelligible law of things is the first article of my "credo." This conception gives us a basis of ethics. The world being an orderly system of conditions and results, there must be an orderly system of conditions and results in human life. The life and happiness of men and communities do not come at random any more than anything else; there are certain ways of reaching them—discoverable ways, natural ways, fixed ways; we cannot change them, we cannot substitute other ways for them—they are as much independent of our will as any laws of nature are. Mere bodily health has fixed conditions—and these can be studied as objectively as the laws of the successful working of a machine. The life of man as a whole, the life of society of which any individual life is a fragment, are also subject to law. There are certain things we must do individually, certain things communities must do collectively, if the race is to live and prosper. These things are the objective basis of duty. Duty is the human part of that intelligible law of things which I have said marks the universe as a whole. Whatever helps man, whatever elevates him, whatever lifts him to a fuller, larger life—that is right. Whatever retards, cramps, fetters or undoes him—that is wrong.

Here is the basis of the distinction below, real right and the mere customs, conventions and laws of society.

Real right is harmony with the natural order—it is what really serves man; while the customs and laws of society sometimes reflect simply the interests of one set of men who seek to enforce their will on others. The sentiment for real right is what we call conscience, or the social sense—the instinct for what is good for the whole. The sentiment or instinct is not everything—knowledge must come to its assistance, material power must come to its assistance; it must put itself into effect in all manner of social usages and positive laws and institutions, it must interpenetrate and mold and remold all our life, physical, economic, political; and yet the sentiment is the basis—it is the living spring, ever urging man to turn knowledge and power to righteous account. And so I add to my "credo" a second article—that morality or right is the intelligible law of human things; not the only, but the primal law. By so much as the sentiment of the whole lives in us, by so much fellow-feeling as there is among us—so much truth, loyalty, solidarity, justice—by so much is society in the way of life, in the way of advancing strength. And by so much as men are selfish, each going his own way, without succor for the weak, without fidelity, love, and justice, by so much is society in the way of disintegration, of decay and death. A society may have a favorable material environment and this will not save it; it may have armies and navies and they will not save it; it may possess men of genius, of light and leading, and they will not save it; it may even for a time have a veneer of good customs and institutions—and they will not save it. And all this, not because somebody on high is wrathful with it and bent on destroying it, but because it has not obeyed the essential conditions of life, because, to use familiar language, its members are like "lost sheep, following the devices and desires of their own hearts," instead

of heeding nature's law. "In righteousness is life and in the way thereof there is no death"—it is an old and everlasting truth.

But not only is righteousness the law of life—men have the power to obey the law, and this is my third article of faith. We must distinguish between power and will. A man hugs his comfortable bed of a morning—it seems as if he can't get up. But he can get up as easily as not, if he has a mind to—the trouble is with his "mind to," not with his ability or power. It is so with many a moral task. If you will to, you can speak the truth even when it costs something. If you will to, you can give your money to a poor man or to a righteous cause, as easily as keep it for cigars, theatres, new books, or reinvestment. Sometimes, there is undoubtedly lack of power. Bad habits become organized in us. Even when we will we cannot throw them off at once. Paul's exclamation often comes home to us: "The good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do." And yet there is always some power—and with good will it may grow to more and more. I do not say we are omnipotent—on the other hand I dare not set any limits to the power we may attain, if we diligently cultivate what we have. This is only saying that we must make a business, a religion, of our moral culture. Still further, there is no question that at some time we have more power and more sense of power than at others. It is the mystery of moods. We all know how at times we are ready for anything, to do anything—and at other times are low in our minds, spiritless, and dead. As Matthew Arnold puts it:

"We cannot kindle when we will
 The fire which in the heart resides;
 The spirit bloweth and is still,
 In mystery our soul abides."

Here is a solid bit of truth that underlies the orthodox doctrine of grace. These elevated moods, these moods in which strength and power seem to dwell in us, are attributed to the special working of a Supernatural Hand. But because we may be sceptical of the metaphysical explanation, we need not deny or ignore the obvious spiritual or psychological fact. Doubtless these moods are subject to subtle laws that we shall some day discover, just as we are already discovering the laws that regulate the winds, so that we say no longer (as was formerly said) that they blow as they will and we cannot tell whence they come or whither they go; but even while we are more or less in the dark, the reality of these better moods and their beneficence cannot be questioned—and a scientific and ethical religion, as well as any other, may count on their coöperation in diminishing the arduousness of moral struggle, in lifting man by a sort of grace to higher levels. We cannot, indeed, command the elevated mood, but may we not woo it? May we not at least make ourselves receptive? As we open our lungs to take a deeper breath, so may we not open our souls and invite the airs of heaven to enter in? And so, in one way and another,—by action and by being acted upon,—I believe man can rise into the way of life—I believe that nature gives the race no duties, however high and ideal, that, given time enough, it cannot rise to fulfill.

And now let me add that I believe in the peace and blessedness that come to men and communities when they do put themselves into the way of life. It is true that we have little experience of this peace and blessedness, it is true that the world has little experience of it, but this need not blind us to the fact that the essential tendency of such obedience as I have in mind is to give us an unspeak-

able sense of rest and joy. Have you ever passed a day free from faults of temper, from impatience, from anger, from evil-speaking—a day in which you had only thoughts of love and gentleness toward those around you? How serenely the hours went, how even and happy was your work, what quiet joy was in your heart as the day came to its close! Perhaps you don't often have such days, but if you have only one in a hundred, you know the connection of cause and effect, you know the law and the tendency. Well, this is but an instance. To whatever extent you do the right thing, you have a sense of rest and quietness. It may be in the midst of some public excitement—no matter; if you have spoken a true word, if you have stood loyally to your conscience, a certain peace comes over you. Let others foam and rave, you have no need to. It is equally true of the life of a community—the tendency of laws that conform to natural right is to give ease and quiet; everybody so far feels at rest—even the grasping and the bad feel in time that the general good is better than their good—for they too have a social nature and only in this way is it satisfied. There is so little peace or happiness among men, so little order and quiet in society, because men and nations are studying all sorts of other things than the true natural conditions of life and progress. Each man and each people wants money, wants power, wants to shine in the eyes of others, to see and be seen and have his (or its) part in the pomp and pride and vanity of life—and the great, deep things that make for human welfare and happiness they neglect.

“Riches we wish to get,
Yet remain spendthrifts still;
We would have health, and yet
Still use our bodies ill;

Buffers of our own prayers, from youth to life's last scenes.

"We would have inward peace,
 Yet will not look within;
 We would have misery cease,
 Yet will not cease from sin;
 We want all pleasant ends, but will use no harsh means;

"We do not what we ought,
 What we ought not, we do,
 And lean upon the thought
 That chance will bring us through;
 But our own acts, for good or ill, are mightier powers."

No, happiness and peace come only in one way, but in that way they do abundantly come. It is a poor, ignorant idea, though so common among people to-day who are trying to live without religion, that laws and rules are a restriction on happiness and liberty. Obedience to natural law is liberty—and we only get a sense of freedom and of power when we have rendered it.

"They live by law, not like the fool,
 But like the bard, who freely sings
 In strictest bonds of rhyme and rule,
 And finds in them not bonds, but wings."

The fifth article of my "credo" is suggested by a reflection of Marcus Aurelius. "This hasteth to be," he says; "that other to have been; of that which now cometh to be, even now somewhat hath been extinguished. And wilt thou make thy treasure of any one of these things? It were as if one set his love upon the swallow, as it passeth out of sight through the air!" How can we escape this sense of futility? What is there that will stay with us while life lasts? What is there that may become a part of us, that cannot be taken from us through all the vicissitudes, the disappointments, and even the calamities of our passing days? I know of but one thing—it is the good will, the heart that cleaves to the right.

After all, it is for a man to be a man—that is all. It is for me to own the law of my being—that being which is unintelligible apart from humanity, that law which is the law of humanity—to find it out and never wander from it. Circumstances may hinder me from doing all I would do; but the motive, the principle may be eternal in the heart. Things without us we may not be able to control; things even in human life we may not be able to control—we cannot control death. Our friends must die, we must die—we should not love them too well, we should not love our own life too well. What we can control is our own hearts—what we can do is to bring our hearts into line and loving allegiance with the laws on which human welfare depends. It is, to take a very undignified illustration, like playing a game of whist. Chance has its part in success, but what the real whist-player wants to do is to follow the rules of the game. What the real man wants to do is to act his part as a man. A tornado may sweep him off the face of the earth—that is no matter. An earthquake may swallow him up—no matter. It is for him to do his part, and for the forces of nature to do theirs—at least till human wit knows how to control them. To find out the true human path and then to walk right on in it—that is rest and blessedness, and it is the meaning of human life. Bear lightly, friend, on the aims that most men cherish, but this aim—let your full soul go into it. Our days are an education and the race is only gradually learning, but this is the final lesson. We know not the goal of things, the consummation, the glory to which the universe tends, but this is the way to it—the deep, eternal way.

Let me sum up my "credo":

I believe that in the world there is an intelligible law of things.

I believe that morality is the intelligible law of human life—that is, the *central* law.

I believe that men can more and more obey this law.

I believe in the rest that this obedience gives—the rest, the quiet joy, the blessedness.

I believe in our days on earth as an education, and that they have at last their meaning when the lesson of obedience has been learned.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF MORALITY, AND WHAT IT IMPLIES.*

BY FELIX ADLER

Lecturer of the Society for Ethical Culture of New York.

AFTER the high strains to which we have listened, I shall ask you to bear with me if I attempt in informal speech a task of definition—an attempted contribution to clearness in respect to the distinctive aims of our Ethical Society; and I shall ask you particularly (with a view to the understanding of the points I wish to present), to have in mind the question whether it is consistent for anyone to be at the same time a member of an Ethical Culture Society and of a Christian Church.

It has been said, and abundantly repeated, that the ethical spirit has existed among mankind in all ages. No one is so presumptuous as to suggest that the vast hosts of our predecessors in time have been devoid of the ethical spirit, or that the Ethical Movement is intended to be an innovation in the sense of first presenting to mankind the claims of the ethical life. Again, it has been said that the tendency and tenor of the Christian Church is deeply righteous. And again, it has been said that there is a wider ethical movement in our day, that there are many forces at work seeking to bring about that solidarity and that friendly feeling and that moral enthusiasm of which we have heard this morning.

With these three statements in view, some of us may

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become a trifle confused, and ask—What then is the distinctive aim of these Ethical Societies? The independence of morality is the distinctive feature, as I understand it, of our Ethical Movement.

And if I go back, friends, to my own experience—I will not say of twenty-nine years ago, when the first Ethical Society was founded in our city of New York, but of thirty-four years ago—to the time when, in my student days, it first became clear to me that I could not be a minister of the old religion, and that I must make another choice, I realize that the idea of an Ethical Movement which presented itself to me was that of something new; and new, not in the sense that novelty might have appealed to ambitious youth, not in the sense of attempting to found a new religion; but new in the sense in which one who is sick unto death, and who has tried the old physicians and has had no help from them, hears of a new physician and trusts himself to him; new in the sense in which a shipwrecked crew, their ship foundering and sinking in the wide sea, lay hold on a life boat which is still whole and capable of carrying them to safety—new in that sense. And on the word *new* in that sense I, for one, must insist. And the distinctiveness, the newness, is involved in the title of my remarks—the independence of morality; and I wish to speak of that, very briefly, under four heads.

First then, morality, to my view, is independent in the sense in which dependent means also *subordinate*. That is one meaning of the word. If you are dependent on another, you are so far subordinate to him. If you are dependent on a banker for credit, you are to that extent subordinate to him—subordinate to and dependent upon rules and conditions which he exacts. If you are dependent as a servant upon a master, an employee upon an employer, you are subordinate. The independence of the

moral end means that it is not subordinate to any other human end, but that it is sovereign and supreme above all other human ends. It is not subordinate to the intellectual end, to the scientific end, nor to the æsthetic end; it is certainly not subordinate to the end of material well-being. "Moral, yes," says the merchant, "so far as is consistent with the procuring of wealth;" "Moral, yes," says Aristotle, "so far as is consistent with the attainment of complete science;" "Moral, yes," said the men of the Renaissance, "so far as is consistent with the artistic idea of a beautiful existence;" "Moral, yes," said the Church, "in so far as it is consistent with the acceptance and propaganda of our theological creeds." Even where the idea of righteousness has been nobly set forth there has ever been in the religious teaching of the past another non-ethical factor superordinated above it.

Now the idea that we can go through life without giving theological ends the first place in our allegiance; that we have found something else supremely important on its own account; that apart from the blessings it bestows upon society, righteousness is sovereign, supreme, that is one of the meanings connected with the word *independent* in morality.

There are two attitudes in this matter and I beg you to observe the difference. You may have your philosophical and your religious creed, and you may hold that morality is dependent on your philosophy or your creed; and some one else may hold that morality is dependent on his creed or philosophy, but he and you may agree to let alone, to ignore for the time being, these creeds and philosophies, as you cannot agree upon them. You will pursue in common the thing you and he believe to be important, yet not so important as that which is the principal thing for each of you. That is the one position, but that is not the posi-

tion implied in the word independent. The independence of morality implies a new conception; not that we merely agree to disagree with respect to our philosophical and religious opinions, but that we agree to superordinate the moral aim of life above our religious opinions, that we alter the relative rank of creed and moral life.

The second implication of the word independent is, independent so far as the attainment of the moral end is concerned. In the orthodox Christian Church, in every Christian church that has thus far put forth a body of doctrine, there is assumed a position of moral pessimism with respect to the ability of man to conform to the moral law. This moral pessimism is the corner-stone of the doctrinal system of every Christian church, the conviction that man is insufficient to achieve his moral salvation, that something must happen in the supernatural world, the outpouring of supernatural grace, for instance, in order to set into play those moral forces in man which without the miraculous happening in the supernatural world could not operate. When we assert the independence of morality, we assert, in my view, that man, so far as concerns the effort to achieve the moral end, is not dependent on any happenings in the supernatural world to set in play the operation of the moral forces within him.

Now it is true that there are many persons who belong to the Christian churches and who are at the same time hospitable to the ideas I have just stated. The truth is that the question should not be asked whether it is consistent for such persons to belong also to an Ethical Society. That question obscures the issue. The primary question to be put is whether it is consistent for such persons to remain within the Christian Church at all, whether they join an Ethical Society or not. Is it consistent for them to be where they are disbelieving in that doctrinal

system? Is it consistent for them to remain in a position in which their intellect and their emotions are in conflict? Their connection with the Christian Church is perhaps a matter of sentiment. They still feel the need of the old emotional satisfactions, but they forget that these emotional satisfactions are like fringes on a garment. Can they consistently accept the emotional satisfactions without accepting the doctrinal system to which these emotional satisfactions are attached? I press the question whether they can consistently do so? I am perfectly aware that human progress is not along the lines of logical consistency. On the contrary, the first step in human progress is generally that those who move forward allow for a time two inconsistent positions to remain in their minds side by side, not realizing the inconsistency until they have been ripened by time. It was in this manner that the early Christians, the brother of Jesus among the rest, retained their loyalty to the synagogue, believing it possible to be members of the Christian Church and the Jewish synagogue at one and the same time, and it required several generations to make perfectly clear the inconsistency of that position. But I for my part should not press the inconsistency upon anyone. We open our doors to whoever will come. We cannot be inquisitive; but if the question is put to me—Is it consistent? I cannot help saying that it is plainly inconsistent to belong to two institutions, one of which affirms that character, morality, is dependent on creed, that character and morality and righteousness cannot be achieved without the creed, while the other affirms that character is independent of creed.

My third point is that morality is independent spiritually, in the sense that the deliverance of our moral nature is not dependent on authority. Matthew Arnold has rendered a great service in his book "Literature and

Dogma," in pointing out that the definition of what is right and wrong is to be discovered, to be found, in experience. Matthew Arnold was not the first to make this statement. Kant anticipated him by a hundred years, and others have anticipated him, but for those who wish to acquaint themselves with this thought, there can be no better method of doing so than to read carefully Matthew Arnold's book on *Literature and Dogma*, and what he there says about the road of experience by which we arrive at the distinction between right and wrong. Of course, when we say experience, we throw open the door to the greatest diversity of opinion, because experience seems to show that there have been many conflicting moral standards in different ages and peoples. But here a distinction will come to our aid, which is of vital importance—the distinction between the expert and the non-expert in moral matters. We must be guided and controlled by the expert. Now the expert is one, primarily, who is particularly interested, who gives his time and attention to a particular set of problems, and who, being interested, and giving his time and attention to this particular set of problems, masters details in a way in which the unexpert, who does not attend particularly to this class of problems, will not master them. Among the nations of antiquity the Romans were interested in law, the Greeks in philosophy and art, the Hindoos in abstract speculation, the Persians in poetry and partially, but not wholly, in ethics. Of all the nations of antiquity, the Hebrews alone were expert in the sense which I have defined. They were especially and supremely interested in the problems of conduct; they attended to them more than others, they mastered the details of them, and hence the experience of the Hebrews has had authority which the experience of no other people has had. At the same time we are not limited to the de-

liverances of the Hebrews, because there is a second condition to the validity of moral opinion, and that is, in addition to the interest and the attention, also the width and breadth of experience, and in that the Hebrews hardly excelled. Their experience was narrow, and our experience in modern times is greatly beyond theirs in range and in extension. It may therefore be said that we must combine the supreme interest in conduct exhibited by the Hebrews with the breadth of view and the hospitality to the different problems of different nations and social classes which is characteristic of the modern man. We should not suffer ourselves to be confused by the diversity of moral standards and opinions. This diversity is in large measure due to the subordination of the moral end to the intellectual, artistic or material ends.

Now the last point is in some sense the most important. Morality is independent in the sense that the moral end is not subordinate to other ends—it is supreme, not dependent—in the sense that we must not wait for the happenings in the supernatural world to set in play the moral forces within us; independent in the sense that the specific evidence of what is right and wrong is to be expected from the right kind of experience, and not from revelation; and, finally, independent in the sense that no personality has yet appeared, no religious teacher has yet appeared who has so far expressed the moral ideal that we are to be in a position toward him exclusively of followers. This applies, in my opinion, even to Jesus, great master as he was, master worthy of our deep reverence. He too, in my opinion, plainly shows in his teachings the limitations of the age to which he belonged. And the moral life, the moral end, opens to us boundless vistas of progress, progress not only in the practice of morality, but also progress in insight, in the understanding of the moral ideal.

Therefore I cannot conceive of anyone being consistently a member of a Christian church who discards the doctrinal system, who does not acknowledge Jesus as *the* Master, *the* Teacher, who regards him merely as one of the teachers, perhaps the greatest who has yet appeared, yet as only one of the teachers of the world. As to one who is still a Christian in the sense of acknowledging Jesus as the Master, I cannot conceive of such a person as being also a member of an Ethical Society, the distinctive feature of which is independence, in the sense of non-dependence upon any single master. It may indeed be said by some that Jesus has expressed a moral ideal which for a long time to come will suffice the human race, even if in the future we may expect some genius to arise like him, or even surpassing him; new ideas, like new stars, perhaps will some day shine in our horizon, still for a long time he has expressed the moral truths by which the race must live. Yet that view tends to turn the face backwards, and creates a disposition rather to rest in the insight of the past than to look forward with an expectant eye toward the new truth which is to come. The new stars will not shine unless we expect their coming.

These are the four cardinal interpretations of the idea of independence which I have thought it might be well on this occasion to submit for your consideration. To me they seem to constitute a new departure.

THE RADICALISM OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT.*

BY DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

THAT the Ethical Movement is a radical movement is probably conceded by all, friends and foes alike; but just what the radicalism of the Ethical Movement means—what its motive, its basal principle, its constructive ideal—is perhaps clear to comparatively few people. To many people the radicalism of the Ethical Movement has a purely negative significance; it is a denial of religion, a protest against prayer and praise, a crusade against creeds, a sneer at spirituality; to others still it is a cold, proud philosophy of self-congratulation that we are not like other men “miserable sinners”; while to others it is a beautiful but futile scheme of self-delusion. It uses fair words like virtue and love, but ignores the heavenly power which is the fount of virtue and the Heavenly Father who is the king of love. And so the radicalism of the Ethical Movement is interpreted as proud rebellion and self-deception by its enemies, and it perhaps receives as unworthy interpretation at the hands of many of its friends. I should like, as my contribution to these exercises, to suggest an interpretation of the radicalism of the Ethical Movement diametrically opposed to these views just sketched.

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Radicalism etymologically is the doctrine of going to the roots of things. It is a question of search for basic truths. It probes. It does not accept truth, it discovers it; it does not give its assent to doctrines before it has examined them, just as a savings bank will not lend money upon security whose title has not been thoroughly examined at first hand. Whatever, then, the radicalism of our movement finds rooted in hypocrisy, error, ignorance, or selfishness it condemns, no matter how flourishing the tree that may have grown from those roots. Whatever it finds rooted in love, honesty, industry, liberty, and truth it commends and cherishes, no matter whether the struggling plant may have but just risen above the ground to be choked by the weeds of vice.

From the beginning of the world's history two views of the radical—as a reformer and subverter, as a conserver and destroyer—have been set over against each other. The staunch conservative has said, "You go to the roots of things to cut, so that the flower may fade and the fruit wither"; but true radicalism says, "I go to the roots of things to prune, so that the flower may be fragrant and the fruit ripe and sweet." So from Amos to Socrates, from the Gracchi to Mohammed, from Martin Luther to Count Tolstoy, tens have claimed the radical as a seer, while thousands have cursed him as a seducer.

The measurement of progress for us is not that men have ceased to murder their fellow-men for the opinions they hold, but the fact that slowly and surely, and perhaps not slowly, the number of those is increasing who are willing and able to believe that every moment in the world's history is as epochal as that date four centuries or nineteen centuries ago, which so many have been taught to believe marked the full measure of spiritual truth. When that day shall have come, when men shall have

come to feel that every point is pivotal in history, that every act is dramatic; when their eyes shall be opened, and their ears quick to receive the fresh inspiration; when devotion shall have replaced devotions, and dogmatism shall have been eliminated from our faith; when what is holy shall have replaced what is sanctified, and what is hallowed be replaced by what is truly holy, then the work of radicalism will be done. But that day is still far off. Until that time, what encouragement is there for us who have espoused this creed of radicalism? Much, everyway.

In the first place, there is a sense of largeness, or genuine liberality, in the radical position. Although we are ourselves not accepted as brothers by those who demand a certain intellectual creedal statement, nevertheless we accept all men as brothers, and we see in the exclusiveness of the creedal devotee not hostility, not perversity, not conscious folly, but only a regrettable misconception of that true religion of humanity which must in the end replace what is temporary and local. It is our privilege as radicals to search all stages in the history of the world without any constant pledge to find therein a justification of the doctrines of Amos or Isaiah, or Gamaliel, or St. Paul, or John Calvin. It is ours to see that the oracles of established religion have often been accepted in lieu of calm judgment, that the dictum of the Bible has often replaced meditation on human destiny and human duty, that the church has often been an ark of refuge, an asylum for souls that have been too timid to work through that doubt which comes out at last into light. The institutions of orthodoxy have ever been isles of safety in the sea of human history, and the great majority of voyagers have clung very closely to those shores, while the few Columbuses of the spirit have put out into the

open sea, trusting to the compass of a clear conviction within their own breast. Theirs has been the pure, large air of ocean; theirs has been, in the midst of anxiety and trackless void, that splendid sense of star-girt immensity which ocean gives; theirs has been no hurry over a landing place, no discordant clamor that they should moor their spiritual bark to this firm dogma or that, but rather the calm, sure faith that though

“beyond the bourne of time and space
The flood may bear (us) far,
(We) hope to meet our Captain face to face
When (we) have crossed the bar.”

Nothing else than this broad conception of religion can be truly human in its scope. I have had some experience in pulpits. I have read and heard read very often that invitation of the Apocalypse, “Whosoever will let him come,” but I have found but one society in which that motto of the Catholic Church is put into literal practice, and it is the Society for Ethical Culture. Other institutions say, “Whosoever will believe this creed may come,” “Whosoever will accept this book of discipline may come,” “Whosoever will confess this name may come,” but the Society for Ethical Culture alone says, “Whosoever will *come* may come.”

In the second place, this radicalism which we espouse leads to a large sense of freedom. Having gotten rid happily of the chains of our creeds, we are able to work out our life unimpeded. Our reasoning is in general inductive, not deductive. We have a soul to create as well as a soul to save; we have a process to consummate, and not merely a theory to prove. In the tale of “Pilgrim’s Progress,” Christian, when he arrives at the gate Beautiful, in sight of the Delectable Mountains, feels the burden

roll from his back; so, when we come to the gate Beautiful at the threshold of that lovely land of lives made beautiful by the desire to be holy, the burden of dogmas, which we thought was a sacred burden, rolls from us. Authority, finality, avenging Deity, all vanish, and we heed not the fall of the pack, because there is a response in us to the music of that Easter anthem which Goethe has recorded for us in his "Faust":—

"Thou has destroyed it, the beautiful world,
In thine own bosom build it anew."

So great zeal should be ours. We work no longer as retainers but as freemen. We are independent, and think not of requital and recognition at the hands of the Great King. No man can serve an ideal that is not his own, or work heartily for a belief that is not his own. I can no more serve your ideal than live by the bread you put into your mouth, no more become strong by believing your faith than by watching your gymnastic exercises. Our great Lowell was wrong when he said:—

"'Tis only heaven is given away,
'Tis only God can be had for the asking."

It is just God and heaven, perfection and spiritual harmony, that *cannot* be had for the asking, and that are not given away. They are blessings that must be toiled for, in season and out of season. They are set as a prize on a high place for us to press forward to. In this doctrine of radicalism I see the only incentive to winning that prize. For, starting from the simple theorem that no Holy Spirit is going to save us the labor of separating right from wrong, we have a duty set for all time and eternity.

And so finally we have in this creed of radicalism what

I hardly know better than to call a great cosmic comfort, the conviction, to wit, that the stars in their courses are fighting for our cause. To the radical, I believe that a review of the last century is very pleasant meditation. He sees the world moving to meet him. Though it be a mighty faith that he has to exercise to see it, he sees in every department progress toward his ideal. In science he no longer studies a botany which believes that the Great Spirit descends every spring-time to glue the buds and leaves on the branches of the trees, or that angels fly around the skies bearing the planets in their palms. History has ceased to be the handmaid of religious dogma, and has become the great rationalist, the great right seeker, inquiring of every institution and doctrine and divinity where its origin, whence its charter, what its worth for present mankind. We have searched back into the sects and the great religions of the world until we have found them in their feeble beginnings, and discovered a religion of antiquity that reaches so far back into the dim distance that by the side of it the age of Abraham is modern history. So to whatever page of history we turn, we find this cosmic comfort that the stars in their courses have been fighting for us.

In Ethical Radicalism then, I find not a creed of obstruction, not a proud philosophy, not a vain, mysterious, mystic effusion of spirit which ends in nothing, but a great sense of liberality and genuine zeal, and the sense of challenge to greater effort in the faith that is pledged to search the roots of every doctrine that has blessed our race and every doctrine that has cursed our race.

Plato, in his beautiful dialogue, the "Symposium," gives us this definition of love: "Every man, though he have no music in his soul, becomes a poet when touched by love." I hail, in the touch of true radicalism, something

like this inspiration, something like the coal from the altar that will make the stammering eloquent, and the weak strong when laid on the lips of men ; and I hail that same uplift of spirit in the man who, in spite of all misconceptions and misinterpretation, doubt or patronage, at the cost of all anguish of soul, or the still more bitter anguish of paining the soul that loves it, courageously becomes and remains radical.

THE NEEDS WHICH THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT COMES TO SERVE.*

BY LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

FOR one who has spent more years in the world than months in connection with the Ethical Culture Movement, it will be more modest to speak of the world's need of ethical culture than of the capacity of ethical culture to satisfy that need. I would put the emphasis, then, upon the need in our modern world of that which ethical culture, perhaps, may satisfy.

No earnest student of our American life can have failed to perceive that one of the great needs of our growing and oftentimes threatened democracy is the need of a larger fraternity. We are a people composed of peoples, a nation that has drawn its life-blood from the nations. In spite of our democratic principles, we are composed of classes, and classes that are divided one from another by lines and barriers that seem almost insurmountable; and yet, if we are to be a nation, a common people, there is need of closer contact and more intimate fellowship between all these different incongruous elements which make up our common humanity. The tendencies of our civilization, it would seem to a careful observer, are away from, rather than towards, this fraternity. The lines between classes are being drawn more closely, whether distinguished by financial or social or intellectual standards.

* An address at Tenth Convention of Ethical Societies and Twentieth Anniversary of the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, Sunday evening, May 14, 1905.

There is need in every community in the United States for some common meeting place, which shall bring together people of different thoughts, interests, and degrees of culture, occupying places far apart in the economic and industrial life. The world has many needs, but I can only mention some of them, and try to discover, if I can, the adaptability of the Ethical Society to meet them. First of all, then, I mention the need of a common meeting-place, in the interests of a greater fraternity.

It is one of the illusions of most people that if we only lived up to the light we have, our civilization would be well and we would prosper therein; but the fact remains that we have not the light which we need for our guidance in the great problems of social and industrial life. Of speculations on ethics we have enough, from the standpoint of Christian and Hebrew and evolutionary or scientific thought. We have ethics from the Orient, various kinds of systems; but the fact yet remains that we have not the ethical illumination, the guidance which we need in solving the stern problems of our increasingly stern civilization. One instance of this may be seen in the recent discussion, which has gone on inside the Christian bodies, concerning the use of tainted money for educational and religious purposes. I do not wish to discuss that question, but merely to point out the fact that there is no canon of judgment, no standard which will insure fundamental agreement among equally earnest people who take the same theological position. Dr. Gladden and Dr. Bradford, for example, men of the same fellowship, stand at the antipodes on this question.

There may be ethical principle enough to guide us in the problem of international relationship. But the question of the ethics of war is not met by any deposits of the ethical life, which have come down to us from the past.

You will hear those who argue in behalf of war as a means for the promotion of the cause of Christ. They say in effect, "We have tried to preach the gospel to the heathen, but it does not work; we will now see if we can shoot religion into them."

Turn to the important question of business life. We have ethics in abundance that would seem to regulate the business interests of men and women. Economists will tell you that the purpose of business is to supply a demand. I have heard a man who stands eminent in the business world declare that the principle of business, as carried on, is not based upon that economic dictum, but that the purpose of business is to create and promote a demand, that is, to make a demand for that which may or may not be serviceable.

We have ethics and various ethical systems, but equally devout people will take two or more sides on ethical questions, the solution of which should guide the business man in the conduct of his life. This will illustrate the need, in the midst of our civilization, for ethical illumination, for guidance, and for those fundamental ethical principles by which the individual is to relate his life organically with other individuals.

I want to speak of another need in our civilization, coming more and more to be realized by those who are conscious of the needs of their own personal lives, and that is the need of some kind of ethical self-expression. We have many more good enthusiasms than we know how to make use of. We are better in our private moments than in our public pursuits; we have aspirations and ideals for which there seems to be no occasion in the course of our daily routine. Even though we have these ideals and impulses, they are very vague, because they have never been put into effort, into the task which needs

to be done. The world more and more wins us away from our ideals, and prostrates our higher conceptions of the spiritual nature of man. There is need of some organization that shall help us to put into practical, effective work the higher aspirations which we feel. There is abundant opportunity for humanitarian self-expression; many causes and interests are calling to us all the time. But purely humanitarian interest, to relieve physical sufferings and distress, is not the only need. We realize that by helping others we may likewise help ourselves; that we may thus spiritualize and fulfil the higher interests of our own natures.

Another need of our civilization is that of religious training and development. I am aware that there are now a great many churches. I have frequently said that there were too many,—that it would be better if they were larger and more consolidated. Yet the fact remains that there are a great many people who have no religious associations or affiliations. It was stated at a recent Congress in Brooklyn that in the city of New York alone there are one million people without religious connections of any kind. A religious census of Newark, N. J., taken two years ago, as officially announced by the chairman, himself a minister of an orthodox church, revealed the fact that 50 per cent. of the population has not even a Sunday-school connection with any church. People are thoroughly satisfied, intellectually and morally, with the ideas and ideals of their own acceptance or of their inheritance; yet they need an opportunity to get a different point of view. It is certainly true that there are great numbers in every community without guidance, companionship and co-operation in the interests of the spiritual life.

Does the Ethical Society endeavor to realize and fulfil these needs? I take it from my short acquaintance with

the Ethical Movement, that it does represent, first of all, this movement towards fraternity, and that it does give a common meeting place for people of all degrees of culture, or of social and religious views.

I take it that the first degree, so to speak, may be called the degree of fraternity (and there are those who take this degree and do not pass further) which seeks to relate one's self in ethical interest with people of different views and aspirations and antecedents. The second degree of Ethical Culture—if I interpret rightly the organization—to which perhaps most of those joining in this work are sufficiently initiated already, is intellectual effort. The third degree, into which some of us have been initiated, may be described as the humanitarian degree, for the want of a better word,—the gathering of people in this broader fraternity for the interest of social service—not simply the relief of the suffering, of those physically distressed, but the effort to guide and direct others on their way to fulfilment, and the endeavor to serve the interests of the growing civilization of which the individual is a part. The fourth degree of Ethical Culture, to which some already have been initiated, and for which others are still waiting, is an appreciation of the religious significance of ethical ideals, which opens up to the individual a vista into the unseen and eternal realm, which interprets the significance of life through the majesty of the moral law, which may ground a man in his cosmic relationship, and open to him the mysterious significance of his own life.

Whether or not the Ethical Societies already in existence and to be formed shall satisfy these needs, will depend upon the way in which they meet their opportunities. That those now in existence have met these needs for many people in some measure week after week and year after

year, cannot be doubted by those who know what this Society—as well as the others—has accomplished. The question for us is whether they shall continue to respond to this great need, and to fulfil the want. Certainly the need is apparent. It is the hope of some of us in the Ethical Movement that it will be the means of an ethical awakening of the citizenship of these United States, for the fulfilment of their own best life, for the discovery of those inspirations, those challenges, those high aspirations which spiritualize our poor human existence, and which make men worthy of their source, and worthy heirs of earth.

As I have come recently into this movement, after long and earnest study, I can but give you my word of greeting, and hope that your Society after its twenty years of service, and other societies after an effort during fewer or more years, shall go on to fulfil their true mission, and to satisfy these and similar great needs in the life of our country, of which we are at times perhaps despondent, but for which, we must, if we are loyal, cherish the highest hope.

THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT AS AN EXPERIMENT STATION IN EDUCATION.*

BY ANNA GARLIN SPENCER.

To many students the most interesting period of American history is the transcendental epoch in New England, the American *renaissance*, that blossoming of world-philosophy and poetical idealism on the gnarled roots of Puritan life. Among the noble men and women who made that epoch prolific in reforms was one you will remember who consecrated his service to the building up of the American common school. We are to-day so proud of our educational system that it seems almost incredible when we read of the persecution, lies, abuse, burning in effigy—the fruit of centuries of misunderstanding of the ideal and purpose of education—which greeted Horace Mann in his work. When one asked him, “How is it that you have power to do such great things for your country, at such great sacrifice, when you are so misunderstood and misinterpreted?” Horace Mann, with that superb lift of the head which showed his courage and his hope, replied, “I am sustained by my deep conviction of the improvability of the human race—the infinite improvability.” That was the new thought in the new education. It was easy for the despots of

* Address at the Tenth Convention of Ethical Societies and Twentieth Anniversary of the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, Sunday evening, May 14, 1905.

the middle ages to develop a perfect method of instruction because the purpose and content of their educational ideal were fixed. They could give their whole force to developing a system by which to quickly and surely mould the coming generation according to the standard, the ideal, the conception, the belief, the comprehension of the preceding generation. When, however, the keynote of the improvability of the whole human race was struck, it meant a new purpose and content of education, and consequently some confusion as to method. It is so much more difficult a thing to develop a human being so that he may make of his life the best possible, the best he can conceive, than to shape human beings according to an accepted model. As a portrait painter first puts in a few structural lines to paint a face, so the system sketched in a broad way by Horace Mann, Dr. Samuel Howe and Miss Peabody was but the beginning. Now we are face to face with these tremendous problems of education which grow out of the definite, absolute need, of which we are now more or less consciously convinced, the absolute need of growing a race of developed human beings, who can be free yet reverently bound to law; who can know what personal initiative is and have the liberty to follow out the leadings of their own natures, and yet shall be so centered and poised, so chastened on every side by the influences that make for the highest and truest life, that they can be free spiritually; human beings who can know and obey the law of their being.

For education in this large sense we have to increase its inherited content. There are so many more things that we must learn in order to be cultured now than of old, there are so many more impressions that we must daily and hourly receive from the increasing complexity of life, and these are brought so increasingly near to each

individual by our modern closeness of living, that our educational process is difficult. For this reason the thing we hear most, in confused and confusing tone, is discussion of methods, and curricula, and schedules of hours and things to learn. These all take into account a world of people who, in the old order of life, were never counted in as needing any education. Below the confusion of this superficial talk there is the deep problem of education itself: How can we make spiritual freemen, how can we make personal lives so great, so noble, so strong, so disciplined, that all these increased opportunities may be hallowed, in the finest sense, to the highest use? As the days go on we reach partial solutions, accepting here and there every trifling progress through individual experiments. Below all this must be the endeavor, in all the things that are yet to do, to make social life better, industrial life better, political life better; to make this world a better place to live in, and the forces that surround each individual more conducive to the higher life of that individual. The thing that presses upon us is how to grow better people, how to make finer, nobler, stronger personalities. It is the old problem, the personal problem of the individual life that has been the heart of religion since time began; this that has made every high soul hold the right dearer than all the world beside. And now our difficulty is that all the world of mankind is coming to be counted as individuals, not alone a select few, but all this under-world that used to be buried out of sight. Everyone has to be regarded, to be helped in some way or other to find his life. If his life is low and miserable, we have to think how to make the tenement in which he lives sanitary, or beautiful even; how to flood him with the best literature; how to do everything which may make him able to live like a human being. He will not so live

unless the soul in him is moved. The poet says "it takes a soul to move a body even to a cleaner sty." It is out of better human beings, those more conscious of the great opportunities of their lives, more sensitive to the spiritual currents that run through the universe, that we must build better economies, better states, better homes, finer schools, nobler churches. It is out of this same old stuff—the individual human life, sublime in its purpose, chastened and disciplined as to its conduct, ennobled by an ever-present ideal, which sees that ideal ever "waiting to invite it as it climbs"—it is out of this same old individual personal life that we must build a better world.

I am of those who would try to make this world an easier place in which to be good and noble and cultured, but I remember, and I wish to use my last minute to remind you, that whatever good things you may offer to a human life, it can take only that which it has learned to desire. This is why we are eager to have a movement that is devoted to trying to find out the way in which, with the new aspects of scientific thought and human relationships, we may translate into newer terms the same old gospel of religion, "Be ye perfect," live the life that opens to you as a personality fearlessly and of purpose.

For more than the years this society counts in its celebration to-day, for more than these years I personally have had an intense interest in the Ethical Culture Movement; because it shows a consciousness of its real purpose and of its social end; because it has a distinction of method and a great freedom of educational experimentation. This movement more than any other one that I know of in this country or abroad, has been trying to solve this problem of education in the larger sense; to demonstrate that the infinite improvability of the human race may be not only accepted as a sacred belief, but worked out in

realization, if only we can learn to translate every inherited sacred word in terms of the newest revelation of the divine.

It is for this that we are struggling, not for some small end that is met in our fraternal feeling, or our own home-like gathering of a few. We feel that the time has laid upon the serious-minded of our race this most terrible obligation and glorious opportunity, to make a new vehicle and medium for the old religious spirit, and somehow translate in modern terms this new universe which science has brought before our eyes, in the old spirit of sacred consecration and high development of the personal life.

We would help consciously, devoutly, and effectively in this task.

PREPARATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE ETHICAL SOCIETIES.*

BY JOHN LOVEJOY ELLIOTT.

AFTER having listened to speakers who have discussed some of the larger questions, it may be hard to listen to a pedagogue, one who speaks not of aims but of methods. What I have to say is in the nature of bearing witness, giving to you personal experience.

It seems to me that there are two ways in which great moral changes may be brought about; two ways in which the very finest qualities of human nature may be called forth, the one accidental, the other, sure.

We have all seen some man or woman rise nobly to meet a difficult situation in life. Sometimes, when a man or woman is cast down, is suddenly placed in a position of great responsibility, unlooked for powers show themselves. This is what we may call the accidental conversion or development. The other way is by the slow but surer method of systematic training and discipline. We know all too well that we cannot trust ourselves or others un-weaponed to meet great emergencies. Can we find a system of training and discipline which shall fit human beings for life in this world? It seems to me that the methods of ethical training, for that is but another term for preparation in life, is far behind many other forms of education and discipline. For in-

* An address before the Convention of Ethical Societies at the Twentieth Anniversary of the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, Sunday evening, May 14, 1905.

stance, consider the work required of a young man before he can become a doctor or physician. It is hardly possible for a student to take the necessary work to fit himself in the way which is required of him, and to be through this training before he is twenty eight or thirty years of age. Compare the work which a doctor must do in high-school, university, medical school, training in the hospital, and usually some years abroad before he is equipped to become a physician, with the preparation for life which the child receives in Sunday-school. The doctor works under carefully trained teachers and scientists, the other under amateurs and those who are not sure of their aims and methods; the one extending over a period of fifteen or twenty years, while, if we keep a boy or girl in Sunday-school for five or six years we think we have done well.

We of the Ethical Culture Society, although something has been done in moral instruction, are, nevertheless, far behind in our work. We have been content to imitate more or less the Sunday-schools and training institutions of the orthodox faiths, or, at best, we have tried to adopt the methods of the better day-school teaching. Personally, I doubt if the methods of either or both of these institutions—the orthodox Sunday-school or the day-school—can give us what we want; and the combinations which we sometimes find in our Sunday-schools even are ridiculous. I cannot help questioning whether making a clay map of Jerusalem will very deeply affect the spiritual life of the child. We must go deeper. I would say that there were three ways in which we could work in addition to what we are already doing.

First. We must try to get the methods of moral training into the home. It is practically hopeless for the Sunday-school or the Ethical Culture School to affect

the nature of the child if it is not working in harmony with those at home. The real life of the child is lived at home and not in the school—love, obedience, family relations, which are the first ethical lessons, are peculiarly home duties and virtues. We must try to construct something that will take the place of family worship; we must learn that ethical teaching without the aid of the parents can accomplish almost nothing; unless there is discussion in the home of questions brought out in the Sunday-school; unless there are more family meetings for home readings and for services, the ethical training of little children can be of but little value. What we need as much as anything in moral instruction, is to help the parents with this more formal ethical teaching in the homes.

Secondly. There is self-discipline. We have done but little as yet for the young people in the art of self-discipline, of self-training, teaching them that they must have times for quiet, times for reading, times for self-communion.

Thirdly. We must endeavor to create the spirit of fraternity; we must create among the children and younger people, small groups that will be to them fraternities. Perhaps the strongest influence that there is on any of us for good, is that of a fine public spirit. Usually we teach our children that they must be leaders, we hold up to them the martyr and the hero, and individual excellence, of course, there must be; but as yet we have not fully developed, perhaps not yet fully understood, the power of public or group spirit.

When all is said and done, we must all of us, admit that we imitate more or less those by whom we are surrounded. We are deeply concerned about what other people think of us. We are helped and sustained more than we imagine by the good opinion of our friends. We

must create small societies where the atmosphere will be pure, the members of which will help each other. A most important element in ethical training is its fraternal side. So far, we have been working too much on the individual and not enough on the group.

If names meant anything I would have the name of the Sunday-school changed, calling it by some term which would put in the foreground not instruction, not alone the thought of individual excellence, but which would indicate that which seems to me the most important factor, the factor of public opinion within the group.

CLOSING ADDRESS BY PROF. ADLER AT THE TENTH CONVENTION OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES.

You have been very good, in following these meetings of our Ethical Societies. To-night is the last, and in bidding you good-bye, and in closing our Tenth Conference, I wish only once more to strike the note which it seems to me will best help us, and will best explain us to those who wish to know about us. We are not here merely to criticise. We are not anti-religious, or anti-Christian, or anti-theistic, or *anti*-anything. We know that a great many changes are taking place in the world. Mr. Sprague has referred to the falling off in church attendance. You may have read Dr. Dawson's figures, to wit, that four or five millions of our people, more or less, either are entirely disconnected from any church, or are lax in their connections. Things have changed in this country with enormous rapidity. Ours is a country in which things ripen with great swiftness. And so this great evolution of religion is assuming proportions which I think persons still living in the old religious associations hardly realize. They feel themselves to be occupying the strongholds of public opinion, and so far as the respect of the community is concerned, and seeming public acquiescence, it is certain they do. But underneath their feet and around them the whole American world is changing. Yet it is not this public change that has brought us together, or has been for us the incentive. If I may speak for others, and assume that my own case is typical of theirs, it is rather a personal need. What care you or I in our inner life about

any church—anything that is consecrated—provided it does not serve our purpose? Here we are, face to face with this great world. What will serve us? If the creeds and rituals of the Church serve our purpose, well and good. But religion stands for a terribly real *need*. We have our trials, our disappointments, our bereavements; we have our doubts. We look at the course of history, and see that often the wrong triumphs. We want, in this short life of ours, through the rift of the darkness a glimpse upon the eternal things. We want the eternal things just as much as the Christian wants them. But we want them in such a way as really to serve our purpose. We cannot go back to myths. We cannot accept as the support of life something that is unreal or irrational to us. We need help. We want to get somewhere and somehow beyond the finite a grip on the eternal. And this has been the inspiration and the incentive of the Ethical Movement, at least as far as I can interpret it.

During these last two days there has been a discussion as to whether it would be possible for a person who is a member of a Christian church, also to be a member of the Ethical Culture Society. Let me endeavor to formulate in a word the thought that I have been trying to express. The distinction between the dogmatic position in religion and the Ethical Society's position is this: that every dogmatic church asserts that creed ranks first, and righteousness is dependent upon acceptance of creed; while the position of the Ethical Society is that the moral life is the supreme thing, and that creeds are serviceable and acceptable only in so far as they promote the moral life. I desire to summarize my thought in reference to that as briefly as possible. If there be an earnest, sincere person who says "Yes, I did relinquish the dogmatic view of religion; but I find that the acceptance of the Christian

teaching, putting it in competition with any other teaching, is really most conducive to the moral life. Can I then honestly be a member of an Ethical Culture Society?" I would say to him, yes, provided you are ready to modify your creed, in case some higher type of ethical life can be presented to you. If, recognizing that the type of life presented is higher, you are ready then to dispense with or modify your creed—if it is in such fashion that you hold your creed, then you are indeed a member of an Ethical Culture Society if you desire to be. For we exclude no one. We do not discourage religious belief or philosophical belief; we insist on the importance of it, but hold it to be subservient and subordinate to the life, to the things that help us in living. Does the belief in the doctrine of atonement help you, make you a better man, promote the highest type of ethical life? That is the test. Not so much whether the documents on which it rests were divinely revealed. These are matters of minor interest. Does the creed promote the kind of life which you yourself, as a moral being, recognize to be the best and highest?

I think conventions have their uses. I do not like the word "convention." The word savors of the political jargon. Such meetings between neighboring Societies have their uses. They make us pause and consider the very things that habitually we take for granted; they bring us into contact with one another; they raise us to a high platform from which to overlook our past, and look ahead. In this sense I think our Tenth Convention, the tenth meeting of the Ethical Culture Societies, here on this glad occasion of your Twentieth Anniversary, has been fruitful and satisfying.

ETHICAL RECORD.

RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY.

BY LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE

Associate Leader of the Society for Ethical Culture of New York.

THE creeds of all churches, while rigorously maintained, are held more and more loosely by both clergy and laity. This is evident to anyone who reads the religious press of the day, or the books of representative writers of the various religious bodies. While a formalistic tendency is to be noted among most Protestant Christian bodies, it is also fair to conclude, from the many signs to be observed, that all forms are more and more meaningless to those who observe them. The very thought of prayer and worship is undergoing a complete transformation, which in no small way already saps the sources of sincerity in the heart of the worshipper.

The church in all of its phases is an institution with forms, dogmas and traditions; and for the end of the higher life of humanity. That which constitutes the organization of the church, and that which constitutes its purpose may be said in these days to be in conflict. Some there may be who are indifferent to the purpose, finding their interest only in the organization; but many there are who accept, perhaps with silent protest, the organization of the church for the sake of what they regard as the object to be served by and through the church. In many

rural communities the church is the only association of people for the ends of culture, moral striving and social betterment. In the cities, the work of the churches has so broadened into social and benevolent lines that many who are familiar with its undertakings easily think that much would be missed, even of the little that is now accomplished, were the church to become extinct. It is this consciousness which attracts some, at least, and holds many others, both ministers and laymen, to the work of the church. These people tacitly accept or profess creeds which they do not believe, and perform rites which for them are only partly significant, all for the sake of the service which the church seems to render to the practical, moral interests of individuals and of the community.

The time has been when leaders of the various religious bodies were ardent in defence of the ancient standards, and when they would condemn, and seek to drive from their fellowship any who did not frankly and fully accept the dogmas and forms of the church. The time was also when the voices of radical leaders were loud in condemnation of what they called the insincerity and duplicity of any who even nominally professed what they did not believe, and performed rites the expressions of which their reasons and consciences could not accept. That time has, however, largely passed, and in place of such condemnation from both orthodox and radical leaders, the present witnesses a quiet acquiescence in the increasing indifference to the established beliefs and time-honored interpretations of religious forms.

The utterance of the bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church, delivered in Boston, in October, 1904, is significant in this connection. The pastoral letter of the bishops, while evidently addressed primarily to the clergy of that communion, purposely enunciates a principle

which is applied to all members of that body. The letter says, "If one finds, whatever his office or place in the church, that he has lost his hold upon her fundamental verities, then, in the name of common honesty, let him be silent or withdraw."

That which is most significant in this utterance is the alternative proposed, that of silence or withdrawal. The bishops' approval seems to rest upon those who, if their opinions do not coincide with the standards of the church, simply keep them to themselves.

In an interesting article, in the *Outlook* of September, 1905, the Rev. Dr. Crapsey, discussing "Honor Among Clergymen," vigorously dissents from this demand of the bishops, and reaches the conclusion that the clergyman, so long as he holds what Dr. Crapsey regards as the "fundamental verities," namely, the basic truths given by Jesus himself "in the two great commandments of the law, in the Lord's Prayer, and in the five laws of righteousness as we find them written in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew V: 21-48)," may freely utter his honest thought, and leave his church to decide whether he shall have place in it or not.

An editorial in the *Outlook*, of the same issue, comments upon Dr. Crapsey's article, and while differing with his interpretation of the fundamental verities—holding that they are to be found in the Parable of the Prodigal Son—yet agrees that it is the duty of the clergyman "to preach the truth as he sees it, and to leave those who differ with him to determine whether the difference is so great that they are no longer willing that he should remain a recognized teacher in their fellowship."

If these utterances may be regarded as indicative of the present state of Christian bodies, they reveal the fact that the council of conservatism is, "Keep silent or withdraw

from the church"; while the progressive council declares, "Stay in the church until you are expelled."

A most perplexing and most serious problem, which thousands and hundreds of thousands are to-day facing, is not, however, to be thus easily dismissed. The council of silence, "in the name of common honesty," sounds rather strange, as though common honesty required a man to appear to profess what he does not believe! And the council to stay within the religious fellowship until one is expelled, clearly overlooks the very obligations which every clergyman and church member accepts upon entering into such relationship. The question will not be satisfactorily settled until some reorganization of the church is effected, until those within it who do not accept its teachings shall not be committed to its creed, and so placed in a false light. So long as there remains the wide disparity between the institution and the purpose of the church—the institution fixed and final, the purpose changeable and progressive—there will be many who must face the problem in their own lives.

While such a condition as at present exists shall continue, however, there are ways in which the most honest and most earnest man may employ himself, and find fellowship as helpful as any fellowship may be. He need not join a church, and he need not remain a member of a church the creed or teaching of which he does not fully accept, and the forms of which do not rightly express his spirit. Nay, "in the name of common honesty," he ought not to join or remain a member of a church against whose fundamental verities—to be interpreted by the church and not by him—he is in revolt. But it will still be possible for him, in communities where the church represents the only associated endeavors in behalf of morality and the public good, to find abundant oppor-

tunity to employ himself in such of its work as commends itself to his interest and support. Even in the larger communities, the church will usually gladly welcome the cooperation of those whose sympathy is with its practical efforts, while not accepting its basis of organization.

In practically all communities, however, there are other agencies than the church which seek to conserve the moral interests of individuals and of the community. The man who dissents from creed, teaching and rite, will find no such barrier in his way when he seeks to enter these other forms of activity.

And were all such coöperative effort impossible, a man would still be able to do what his talents and means permitted, for the general good, even were he to work alone. There is too little private effort in this age of organization. Institutions have supplanted private benevolence, private culture, almost private virtue, to no small extent; and what is now needed more than almost anything else is the effort of men and women, in all the reaches of their personal contact, for moral awakening and growth.

What is thus true of the private individual, the layman, is equally true of the minister of religion. For him the problem is magnified by the fact that the church is his life work and his means of support. But for him as for all there are interests higher than vocation and support—interests of the moral life. To him especially the demands of "common honesty" are that he shall not stultify himself, that he shall not appear in a false light, that he shall not surrender what is most sacred in his personality, even for the work he would fain do. Those who commend such a course forget that the end can never justify the means, and prove indifferent to that which is most important in any life, the original, unique content of every spirit, a fact which no organization has a right to ignore, and which no

man has a right to forget or despise. For the minister there are other vocations and for him there are manifold opportunities to serve those ends which he may regard so highly as to be willing to deny his best manhood for their sake.

In the consideration of this problem, the final word upon which has not yet and will not soon be said, the following principles may well be kept in mind :

The end does not justify the means.

A man's well wrought convictions are his sacred possession, more sacred far than any historic standard of belief.

Vows may not be disregarded, at least while one occupies the position and enjoys the privileges which they have secured to him.

The greatest purposes which the church at its best seeks to serve may all be served with or without her agency by those who, because they dissent from her standards and practices, remain without her precincts, or remove themselves from her fellowship.

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BY WILLIAM M. SALTER

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THE PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN.*

BY FELIX ADLER.

I.

I HAVE remarked in a previous discourse that we should act as the physicians of our enemies and seek to cure them of their wrong doing. How much more, then, should this attitude be taken towards those whom we love—towards our children, if we find their characters marred by serious faults.

In discussing the subject of punishment I do not for a moment think of covering the innumerable problems which it suggests. Many books have been written on this subject; prolonged study and the experience of a life time are barely sufficient for a mastery of its details. I shall content myself with suggesting a few simple rules and principles, and shall consider my object gained if I induce my hearers to enter upon a closer investigation of the delicate and manifold questions involved.

The first general rule to which I would refer is never to administer punishment in anger. A saying of Socrates deserves to be carefully borne in mind. Turning one day upon his insolent servant, Speucippus, who had subjected him to great annoyance, he exclaimed: "I should beat you now, sirrah, were I not so angry with you." The

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practice of most men is the very opposite; they beat and punish because they *are* angry. But it is clear that we cannot trust ourselves to correct another while we are enraged. The intensity of our anger is proportional to the degree of annoyance which we have experienced, but it happens quite frequently that a great annoyance may be caused by a slight fault, just as, conversely, the greatest fault may cause us only slight annoyance, or may even contribute to our pleasure. We should administer serious punishment where the fault is serious, and slight punishment where the fault is slight. But, as I have just said, a slight fault may sometimes cause serious annoyance, just as a slight spark thrown into a powder magazine may cause an explosion. And we do often resemble a powder magazine, being filled with suppressed inflammable irritations, so that a trivial naughtiness on the part of a child may cause a most absurd explosion. But is it the child's fault that we are in this irascible condition? To show how a slight fault may sometimes cause a most serious annoyance, let me remind you of the story of Vedius Pollio, the Roman. He was one day entertaining the Emperor Augustus at dinner. During the banquet a slave who was carrying one of the crystal goblets by which his master set great store, in his excitement suffered the goblet to fall from his hand so that it broke into a thousand pieces on the floor. Pollio was so infuriated that he ordered the slave to be bound and thrown into a neighboring fish-pond, to be devoured by the lampreys. The Emperor interfered to save the slave's life, but Pollio was too much enraged to defer even to the Emperor's wish. Thereupon Augustus ordered that every crystal goblet in the house should be broken in his presence, that the slave should be set free, and that the obnoxious fish-pond should be closed. The breaking of a goblet or

vase is a good instance of how a slight fault, a mere inadvertency, may cause serious damage and great chagrin. In the same way an unseasonable word, loud conversation, a bit of pardonable mischief which we should overlook under ordinary circumstances, may throw us into a fury when we are out of sorts. When we have urgent business and are kept waiting, we are apt, unless we keep a curb on our tempers, to break forth into violent complaints, which indeed are quite proportional to the amount of annoyance we experience, but not necessarily to the fault of the person who occasions it. Our business is to cure faults, and in order to accomplish this end, the punishment should be meted out in due proportion to the fault. Instead of following this principle, the great majority of men when they punish are not like reasonable beings, selecting right means towards a true end, but like hot springs which boil over because they cannot contain themselves. We ought never to punish in anger. No one can trust himself when in that state; an angry man is always liable to overshoot the mark; we must wait until our angry feeling has had time to cool. Do I then advise that we administer punishment in cold blood? No, we ought to correct the faults of others with a certain moral warmth expressed in our words and manner, a warmth which is produced by our reprehension of the fault, not by the annoyance which it causes us. This, then, is the first rule: never punish in anger.

The second rule is that in correcting a child we should be careful to distinguish between the child and its fault; we should not allow the shadow of the fault to darken the whole nature of the child. We should treat the fault as something accidental which can be removed. Vulgar persons, when a child has told a falsehood, say: "you liar." They identify the child with the fault of lying, and there-

by imply that this vice is engrained in its nature. They do not say or imply: "You have told a falsehood, but you will surely not do so again; hereafter you will tell the truth;" they say: "You are a liar; *i. e.*, lying has become part and parcel of your nature." In the same way when a child has proved itself incapable of mastering a certain task, the thoughtless parent or teacher may exclaim impatiently: "You are a dunce," that is to say, "You are a hopeless case; nothing but stupidity is to be expected of you." All opprobrious epithets of this sort are to be most scrupulously avoided. Even to the worst offender one should say, "You have acted thus in one case, perhaps in many cases, but you can act otherwise; the evil has not eaten into the core of your nature. There is still a sound part in you; there is good at the bottom of your soul, and if you will only assert your better nature you can do well." We are bound to show confidence in the transgressor. Our confidence may be disappointed a hundred times, but it must never be wholly destroyed, for it is the crutch on which the weak lean in their feeble efforts to walk. Now, such language as: "You are a dunce, you are a liar," is, to be sure, used only by the vulgar; but many parents who would not use such words imply as much by their attitude toward their child; they indicate by their manner: "Well, nothing good is to be expected of you." This attitude of the parents is born of selfishness; the child has disappointed their expectations, and the disappointment instead of making them more tender toward the child makes them impatient. But this is not the attitude of the physician whose business it is to cure evil. We must give the child to understand that we still have hope of its amendment; the slightest improvement should be welcomed with an expression of satisfaction. We should never attach absolute blame to a

child, never overwhelm it with a general condemnation. And in like manner we should never give absolute praise, never injure a child by unlimited approbation. The words, "excellent, perfect," which are sometimes used in school reports, are inexcusable. I have seen the object of education thwarted in the case of particularly promising pupils by such unqualified admiration. No human being is perfect, and to tell a child that he is perfect, is to encourage a superficial way of looking upon life, and to pamper his conceit. The right attitude is to say or to imply by our manner: "You have done well thus far; go on as you have begun and try hereafter to do still better." Such words as these fall like sunshine into the soul, warming and fructifying every good seed. On the other hand, to tell a child that he is perfect induces him to relax his effort, for having reached the summit he may be excused from further exertion. We should correct faults in such a way as to imply that not everything is lost. And we should praise merit in such a way as to imply that not everything is yet achieved, that, on the contrary, the goal is still far, far in the distance. Everything, as I have said, depends upon the attitude of the parent or instructor. Those who possess educational tact, a very rare and precious quality, adopt the right attitude by a sort of instinct. But those who do not possess it naturally can acquire it, at least, to a certain degree, by reflecting upon the underlying principles of punishment.

The third rule is not to lecture children. One feels tempted to say to some parents: "You do not succeed as well as you might in the training of your children because you talk too much. The less you say the more effective will your discipline be. Let your measures speak for you." When punishment is necessary let it come upon the child like the action of a natural law—calm, unswerv-

ing, inevitable. Do not attempt to give reasons or to argue with the child concerning the punishment you are about to inflict. If the child is in danger of thinking your punishment unjust, it may be expedient to explain the reasons of your action, but do so after the punishment has been inflicted. There are parents who are perpetually scolding their children. The fact that they scold so much is proof of their educational helplessness. They do not know what measures of discipline to apply, hence they scold. Often their scolding is due to momentary passion, and the child intuitively detects that this is so. If the parent is in ill humor, a mischievous prank, a naughty word, an act of disobedience sometimes puts him into a towering passion; at other times the same offence, or even worse offences, are passed over with meaningless "don't do it again." The child perceives this vacillation, and learns to look upon a scolding as a mere passing shower, hiding its head under shelter until the storm has blown over. Other parents are given to delivering lengthy homilies to their children, and then often express surprise that all their sound doctrine, all their beautiful sermons, have no effect whatever. If they would pause to consider for a moment they could easily see why their lectures have no effect, why they pass "in at one ear and out at the other." Their lectures on right and wrong are generally too abstract for the child's comprehension, and often do not touch its case at all. Moreover, the iteration of the same ding dong has the effect of blunting the child's apprehension. A stern rebuke is occasionally necessary and does good, but it should be short, clear, incisive. A moralizing talk with an older child sometimes does good. The parent should not, however, indulge in generalities, but, looking over the record of the child for the past weeks or months, should pick out the definite points in which it

has transgressed, thus holding up a picture of the child's life to its own eyes to reinforce the memory of its faults and stimulate its conscience. In general it may be said that the less the parent talks about moral delinquencies the better. On this rule of parsimony in respect to words particular stress is to be laid.

The next rule is quite as important as the preceding ones. It is that of undeviating consistency. Were not the subject altogether too painful, it would be amusing to observe how weak mothers—and weak fathers, too—constantly eat their own words. “How often have I told you not to do this thing, but now you have done it again.” “Well, what is to follow?” secretly asks the child. “The next time you do it I shall surely punish you.” The next time the story repeats itself; and so it is always “the next time.” Very often foolish threats are made, which the parents know they cannot and will not carry out; and do you suppose that the children do not know as well as you that the threat you have been uttering is an idle one? We should be extremely careful in deciding what to demand of a child. Our demands should be determined by a scrupulous regard for the child's own good, but when the word has gone forth, especially in the case of young children, we should insist on unquestioning obedience. Our will must be recognized by the child as its law; it must not suspect that we are governed by passion or caprice. There are those that protest that this is too stern a method, that gentle treatment, persuasion and love ought to suffice to induce the child to obey. Love and persuasion do suffice in many cases, but they do not answer in all, and besides I hold it to be important that the child should sometimes be brought face to face with a law which is superior to the law of its own will, and should be compelled to bend to the higher law, as expressed in

its parent's wishes, merely because it is a higher law. And so far from believing this to be a cruel method, I believe that the opposite method of always wheedling and coaxing children into obedience is really cruel. Many a time later on in life its self-love will beat in vain against the immutable barriers of law, and if the child has not learned to yield to rightful authority in youth, the necessity of doing so later on will only be the more bitterly felt. The child should sometimes be compelled to yield to the parent's authority simply because the parental authority expresses a higher law than that of its own will. And this leads me to speak incidentally of a subject which is nearly allied to the one we are now discussing.

It is a well known trick of the nursery to divert the child from some object which it is not to have by quickly directing its attention to another object. If a child cries for the moon, amuse it with the light of a candle; if it insists upon handling a fragile vase, attract its attention to the doll; if it demands a knife with which it might injure itself, call in the rattle to the rescue. And this method is quite proper for baby children, but it is often continued to a much later age with harmful results. As soon as the self-consciousness of the child is fairly developed, that is, about the third year, this method should no longer be employed. It is important that the will power of the young be strengthened. Now the more the will is accustomed to fasten upon the objects of desire the stronger does it become, while, by rapidly introducing new objects the will is distracted and a certain shiftlessness is induced, the will being made to glide from one object to another without fixing itself definitely upon any one. It is far better to allow a child to develop a will of its own, but to make it understand that it must at times yield this will to the will of the parent, than thus to distract

its attention. If it wants a knife which it ought not to have, make it understand firmly, though never harshly, that it cannot have what it wants, that it must yield its wish to the parent's wish. Nor is it at all necessary every time to give the reasons why. The fact that the parent commands is a sufficient reason.

The rules thus far mentioned are, that we shall not punish in anger, that we shall not identify the child with its fault, that we shall be sparing with admonitions and let positive discipline speak for itself, and that, while demanding nothing which is unreasonable, we should insist on implicit obedience.

There is one question that touches the general subject of punishment and reward which is in some sense the most important and vital of all the questions we are considering. It throws a bright light or a deep shadow on the whole theory of life, according to the point of view we take. I allude to the question whether the pleasures of the senses should be treated as a reward for the performance of duty. A parent says to his child: "You have been good to-day; you have studied your lessons; your deportment has been satisfactory: I will reward you by giving you sweetmeats, or by taking you on a holiday into the country." But what connection can there possibly be between the performance of duty and the physical pleasure enjoyed in eating sweetmeats? Is not the connection a purely arbitrary one? Does it not depend upon the notion that there is no intrinsic satisfaction in a moral act? We ought to see that it is radically wrong to make such enjoyments the reward of virtue; we ought to have the courage to make application of our better theories to the education of our children, if we would develop in them the germs of a nobler, freer manhood and womanhood. I admit, indeed, that a child is not yet sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet morally, and that its

virtuous inclinations need to be supported and assisted; but we can give it this assistance by means of our approbation or disapprobation.

To be in disgrace with its parents ought to be for a child the heaviest penalty. To have their favor should be its highest reward. But simply because a child is most easily taken on the side of its animal instincts, are we to appeal to it on that side? Should it not be our aim to raise the young child above the mere desire for physical gratification, to prevent it from attaching too much importance to such pleasures. The conduct of many parents, however, I fear, tends to foster artificially that lower nature in their offspring which it should rather be their aim to repress. By their method of bestowing extraneous rewards, parents contribute to pervert the character of their children in earliest infancy, giving it a wrong direction from the start.

But, it may be objected, is there not a wholesome truth contained in St. Paul's saying that "he who will not work, neither shall he eat?" Is not our conscience offended when we see a person enjoying the pleasures of life who will perform none of its more serious duties? And should we not all agree that, in a certain sense, virtue entitles one to pleasure, and the absence of virtue ought to preclude one from pleasure? To meet this point let us dwell for a moment on the following considerations. Man is endowed with a variety of faculties, and a different type of pleasure or satisfaction arises from the exercise of each. Pleasure, in general, may be defined as the feeling which results from successful exercise of any of our faculties—physical, mental or moral. A successful rider takes pleasure in horsemanship, an athlete in the lifting of weights. The greater an artist's mastery over his art the greater the pleasure he derives from it. The more

complex and difficult the problems which a scholar is able to resolve, the more delight does he find in study. And the same is true of the moral nature. The more a man succeeds in harmonizing his inner life, and in helping to make the principles of social harmony prevail in the world about him, the more satisfaction will he derive from the exercise of virtue. But the main fact which we are bound to remember is that it is impossible to pay for the exercise of any one faculty by the pleasure derived from the exercise of another; that each faculty is legitimately paid only in its own coin. If you ask a horseman, who has just returned from an exhilarating ride, what compensation he expects to receive for the exercise he has taken, he will probably look at you in blank amazement, with grave misgivings as to your sanity. If you ask a scientist what reward he expects to receive for the pursuit of knowledge, he will answer you, if he is an expert in the use of his intellect, that he expects no ulterior reward of any kind; that not positive knowledge so much as the sense of growth in the attainment of knowledge is the highest reward which he can imagine. And the same answer you will get from a person who is expert in the use of his moral faculty—namely, that not virtue so much as growth in virtue, not the results achieved by the exercise of the faculty, but the successful exercise itself is the supreme compensation. I have used the word “expert” in all these cases, and precisely “there’s the rub.” The reason why many persons cannot get themselves to believe that the exercise of the mental and moral faculties is a sufficient reward is because they are not expert, because they have not penetrated far enough along the lines of knowledge and virtue to obtain the satisfactions of them. But the same applies to the tyro in any pursuit. A rider who has not yet acquired a firm seat in the saddle will

hardly derive much pleasure from horseback exercise. An awkward, clumsy dancer, who cannot keep step, will get no pleasure from dancing. There is no help for the tyro, no matter in what direction he aims at excellence, except to go on trying until he becomes expert.

I have said that each faculty is sovereign in its own sphere, that each provides its proper satisfactions within itself and does not borrow them from the domain of any of the others. Nevertheless, we are constrained to admit the important truth that is contained in the saying of St. Paul. And this truth, it seems to me, may be formulated in the words that, while physical pleasure is not the reward of virtue, virtue ought to be regarded as the condition *sine qua non* of the enjoyment of physical pleasures—at least, so far as the distribution of such pleasures is within the power of the educator or of society. And this proposition depends on the difference in rank that subsists between our faculties, of which some are superior and others inferior, the moral and intellectual faculties rightfully occupying the top of the scale. We inwardly rebel when we see the indolent and self-indulgent living in luxury and affluence. And this not because the enjoyments which such persons command are the proper compensations of virtue, or because physical pain would be the proper punishment of their moral faults, but because we demand that the lower faculties shall not be exercised at the expense and to the neglect of the higher, that the legitimate rank and order of our faculties shall not be subverted. And, applying this idea to the case of children, I think it would be perfectly proper to deny a child that has failed to study its lessons or has given other occasion for serious displeasure the privilege of going on a holiday to the country or enjoying its favorite sports. Everything, however, will depend—as so much in edu-

cation does depend—on the manner; in this instance on what we imply in our denial, rather than on what we expressly state. The denial, it seems to me, should be made on the ground that there is a proper order in which the faculties are to be exercised; that the higher, the mental, faculties, should be exercised first, and that he who will not aim at the higher satisfactions, neither shall he, so far as we can prevent, enjoy the lower. On the other hand, by making physical pleasures—sports, games, and the like—the reward of study, we exalt these satisfactions so as to make *them* seem the higher, so as to make the satisfactions of knowledge appear of lesser value compared with the satisfactions of the senses.

In an ideal community every one of our faculties would be brought into play in turn, without our ever being tempted to regard the pleasures of the one as compensation for the exercise of the other. The human soul has often been compared to an instrument with many strings. Perhaps it may not be amiss to compare it to an orchestra. In this orchestra the violins represent the intellectual faculties. They lead the rest. Then there are the flute-notes of love, the trumpet tones of ambition, the rattling drums and cymbals of the passions and appetites. Each of these instruments is to come in its proper place, while the moral plan of life is the musical composition which they all assist in rendering. What we should try to banish is the vicious idea of extraneous reward, the notion that man is an animal whose object in life is to eat and drink, to possess gold and fine garments, and to gratify every lower desire, and that he can be brought to labor only on condition that he may obtain such pleasures. What we should impress instead is the notion that labor itself is satisfying—manual labor, mental labor, moral labor—and that the more difficult the labor, the higher the compensating satisfactions.

II

IN my last address I endeavored to combat the notion that physical pleasure should be offered as a reward for virtue, and physical pain inflicted as a punishment for moral faults. To-day we are in a position to apply this conclusion to some special questions which it is proposed to take up for consideration. The first of these relates to corporal punishment.

It was in that period of history which is so justly called the dark ages that the lurid doctrine of hell as a place for the eternal bodily torture of the wicked haunted men's minds, and the same medieval period witnessed the most horrible examples of corporal punishment in the schools and in the homes. This was no mere coincidence. As the manners of the people are so will their religion be. Savage parents who treat their children in a cruel, passionate way naturally entertain the idea of a god who treats his human children in the same way. If we wish to purify the religious beliefs of men, we must first ameliorate their daily life. There was once a school-master who boasted that during his long and interesting career he had inflicted corporal punishment more than a million times. In modern days the tide of public opinion has set strongly against corporal punishment. It is being abolished in many of our public institutions, and the majority of cultivated parents have a decided feeling against availing themselves of this method of discipline. But the mere sentiment against it is not sufficient. Is the opposition to it the result possibly of that increased sensitiveness to pain which we observe in the modern man, of the indisposition to inflict or to witness suffering? Then some stern teacher might tell us that to inflict suffering is sometimes necessary, that it is a sign of weak-

ness to shrink from it, that as the surgeon must sometimes apply the knife in order to affect a radical cure, so the conscientious parent should sometimes inflict physical pain in order to eradicate grievous faults. The stern teacher might warn us against "sparing the rod and spoiling the child." We must not, therefore, base our opposition to corporal punishment merely on sentimental grounds. And there is no need for doing so, for there are sound principles on which the argument may be made to rest. Corporal punishment does not merely conflict with our tenderer sympathies, it thwarts and defeats the purpose of moral reformation. In the first place it brutalizes the child; secondly, in many cases it breaks the child's spirit, making it a moral coward; and thirdly, it tends to weaken the sense of shame, on which the hope of moral improvement depends.

Corporal punishment brutalizes the child. A brute we may be justified in beating, though of course never in a cruel, merciless way. A lazy beast of burden may be stirred up to work; an obstinate mule must feel the touch of the whip. Corporal punishment implies that a rational human being is on the level of an animal.¹ Its underlying thought is: you can be controlled only through your animal instincts; you can be moved only by an appeal to your bodily feelings. It is a practical denial of that higher nature which exists in every human being, and this is a degrading view of human character. A child which is accustomed to be treated like an animal is apt to behave

¹ It is an open question whether light corporal punishment should not occasionally be permitted in the case of very young children who have not yet arrived at the age of reason. In this case, at all events, there is no danger that the permission will be abused. No one would think of seriously hurting a very young child.

like an animal. Thus corporal punishment instead of moralizing serves to demoralize the character.

In the next place corporal punishment often breaks the spirit of a child. Have you ever observed how some children that have been often whipped will whine and beg off when the angry parent is about to take out the rattan: "Oh, I will never do it again; oh, let me off this time." What an abject sight it is—a child fawning and entreating and groveling like a dog. And must not the parent, too, feel humiliated in such a situation! Courage is one of the noblest of the manly virtues. We should train our children to bear unavoidable pain without flinching, but sensitive natures can only be slowly accustomed to endure suffering, and chastisement, when it is frequent and severe, results in making a sensitive child more and more cowardly, more and more afraid of the blows. In such cases it is the parents themselves, by their barbarous discipline, who stamp the ugly vice of cowardice upon their children.

Even more disastrous is the third effect of corporal punishment, that of blunting the sense of shame. Some children quail before a blow, but others, of a more obstinate disposition, assume an attitude of dogged indifference. They hold out the hand, they take the stinging blows, they utter no cry, they never wince; they will not let the teacher or father triumph over them to that extent; they walk off in stolid indifference. Now a blow is an invasion of personal liberty. Every one who receives a blow feels a natural impulse to resent it. But boys who are compelled by those in authority over them to submit often to such humiliation are liable to lose the finer feeling for what is humiliating. They become, as the popular phrase puts it, "hardened." Their sense of shame is

deadened. But sensitiveness to shame is that quality of our nature on which, above all others, moral progress depends. The stigma of public disgrace is one of the most potent safe-guards of virtue. The world cries "shame" upon the thief, and the dread of the disgrace which is implied in being called a thief acts as one of the strongest preventives upon those whom hunger and poverty might tempt to steal. The world cries "shame" upon the law-breaker in general, but those who in their youth are accustomed to be put to shame by corporal punishment are likely to become obtuse to other forms of disgrace as well. The same criticism applies to those means of publicly disgracing children which have been in vogue so long—the fool's cap, the awkward squad, the bad boy's bench, and the like. When a child finds itself frequently exposed to ignominy it becomes indifferent to ignominy, and thus the door is opened for the entrance of the worst vices. There is one excellence, indeed, which I perceive in corporal punishment: it is an excellent means of breeding criminals. Parents who inflict frequent corporal punishment, I make bold to say, are helping to prepare their children for a life of crime; they put them on a level with the brute, break their spirit and weaken their sense of shame.

The second special question which we have to consider relates to the mark system. As this system is applied to hundreds of thousands of school children, the question whether that influence is good or evil concerns us closely. I am of the opinion that it is evil. The true aim of every school should be to lead the pupils to pursue knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and to preserve a correct deportment in order to gain the approbation of conscience and of the teacher whose judgment represents the verdict of conscience. I object to the mark system be-

cause it introduces a kind of outward payment for progress in study and good conduct. The marks which the pupil receives stand for the dollars and cents which the man will receive later on for his work. So much school work performed, so many marks in return. But a child should be taught to study for the pleasure which study gives, and for the improvement of the mind which is its happy result. I know of a school where the forfeiture of twelve marks was made the penalty for a certain misdemeanor. One day a pupil being detected in a forbidden act, turned to the teacher and said: "I agree to the forfeit, you can strike off my twelve marks," and then went on openly transgressing the rule, as if he had paid out so many shillings for an enjoyment which he was determined to have; as if the outward forfeit could atone for the anti-moral spirit by which the act was inspired. But how is it possible by any external system of marks to change the anti-moral spirit of an offender? I object furthermore to the marking system because the discriminations to which it leads can never be really just. One boy receives an average of ninety-seven and one-half per cent., and another of ninety-five. The one who receives ninety-seven and one-half thinks himself superior to, and is ranked as the superior of the one who has received only ninety-five. But is it possible to rate mental and moral differences between children in this arithmetical fashion? And above all I object to this system because it appeals to a low spirit of competition among the young in order to incite them to study. "Ambition is avarice on stilts," as Landor puts it. Of course it is better to try to outshine others in what is excellent than in what is vicious; but if the object be that of outshining others at all, of gaining superiority over others, no matter how high the faculties may be which are called into exercise, the motive is im-

pure and ought to be condemned. There is a general impression abroad that men are not yet good enough to make it practicable to appeal to their better nature. But it is forgotten that by constantly appealing to the baser impulses we give these undue prominence, and starve out and weaken the nobler instincts. Whatever the truth may be in regard to later life, it seems to me culpable to foster this sort of competition in young children. Now the mark spirit does foster such a spirit in our schools. It teaches the pupils to work for distinction rather than for the solid satisfaction of growth in intelligence and mental power. Doubtless where the method of instruction is mechanical, where the atmosphere of the class-room is dull and lifeless, and the tasks are uninteresting, it is necessary to use artificial means in order to keep the pupils to their work; it is necessary to give them the sweet waters of flattered self-esteem in order to induce them to swallow the dry as dust contents of a barren school learning. But is it not possible to have schools in which every subject taught shall be made interesting to the scholars, in which the ways of knowledge shall become the ways of pleasantness, in which there shall be sufficient variety in the program of lessons to keep the minds of the pupils constantly fresh and vigorous, in which the pupils shall not be rewarded by being dismissed at an earlier hour than usual from the school, but in which possibly they shall consider it reward to be allowed to remain longer than usual? And, indeed, requests of this sort are often made in schools of the better kind, and in such schools there is no need of an artificial mark system, no need to stimulate the unwholesome ambition of the pupils, no need to bribe them to perform their tasks. Rather do such pupils look with affection upon their school; and the daily task itself is a delight and a suffi-

cient reward. I do not, of course, oppose the giving of reports to children. Such expressions as "good," "fair," and "poor," which formulate the teacher's opinion of the pupil from time to time, are indispensable, inasmuch as they acquaint the parents and the pupil himself with the instructor's general approval or disapprobation. I only oppose the numerical calculation of merit and demerit, and the vulgar method of determining the pupil's rank in the class according to percentages. Under that method the pupils, having pursued knowledge only as a means to the end of satisfying their pride and vanity, relax their efforts when they have gained this ambitious aim. They cease to take any deeper interest in the pursuit of knowledge the moment they have achieved their purpose. The notorious failure of the system, despite all its artificial stimulants, to create lasting attachment and devotion to intellectual pursuits condemns the whole idea of marks, to my mind, beyond appeal.

We pass next to the method for correcting the faults of children which has been proposed by Herbert Spencer in his collected essays on Education. These essays have attracted great attention, as anything would be sure to do which comes from so distinguished a source. I have heard people who are ardent admirers of Spencer say: "We base the education of our children entirely on Mr. Spencer's book." All the more necessary is it to examine whether the recommendations of his book will wholly bear criticism. I cannot help feeling that if Mr. Spencer had been more thoroughly at home in the best educational literature of Germany he would not have presented to us an old method as if it were new, and would not have described that which is at best but a second or third rate help in moral education as the central principle of it all, the keynote of the whole theory of the moral training of the young.

The method which he advises us to adopt is that of visiting upon the child the natural penalties of its transgression, of causing it to experience the inevitable consequences of evil acts in order that it may avoid evil, of building up the moral nature of the child by leading it to observe the outward results of its acts. Mr. Spencer points out that when a child puts its finger into the flame, or when it incautiously touches a hot stove, it is burned; "a burnt child shuns the fire." When a child carelessly handles a sharp knife it is apt to cut its fingers. This is a salutary lesson; it will be more careful thereafter; this is the method of nature, viz., of teaching by experience. And this is a kind of cure-all which he offers for general application. He does indeed, admit at the close of his essay, that, in certain cases where the evil consequences are out of all proportion to the fault, some other method than that of experience must be adopted. But in general he recommends the method of nature, as he calls it. For instance, a child in the nursery has littered the floor with its toys, and after finishing its play refuses to put them away. When next the child asks for its toy box the reply of its mother should be: "The last time you had your toys you left them lying on the floor and Jane had to pick them up. Jane is too busy to pick up every time the things you leave about, and I cannot do it myself, so that as you will not put away your toys when you have done with them I cannot let you have them." This is obviously a natural consequence and must be so recognized by the child. Or a little girl, Constance by name, is scarcely ever ready in time for the daily walk. The governess and the other children are almost invariably compelled to wait. In the world the penalty of being behind time is the loss of some advantage that one would otherwise have gained. The train is gone, or the steamboat is just leaving

its moorings, or the good seats in the concert room are filled; and every one may see that it is the prospective deprivation entailed by being late which prevents people from being unpunctual. Should not this prospective deprivation control the child's conduct also? If Constance is not ready at the appointed time the natural result should be that she is left behind and loses her walk. Or again, a boy is in the habit of recklessly soiling and tearing his clothes. He should be compelled to clean them and to mend the tear as well as he can. And if having no decent clothes to go in, the boy is ever prevented from joining the rest of the family on a holiday excursion and the like, it is manifest that he will keenly feel the punishment and perceive that his own carelessness is the cause of it. But I think it can easily be made clear that this method of moral discipline should be an exceptional and not a general one, and that there are not a few but many occasions when it becomes simply impossible to visit upon children the natural penalties of their transgressions. In these cases the evil consequences are too great or too remote for us to allow the child to learn from experience. A boy is leaning too far out of the window; shall we let him take the natural penalty of his folly? The natural penalty would be to fall and break his neck. Or a child is about to rush from a heated room into the cold street with insufficient covering; shall we let the child take the natural penalty of its heedlessness? The natural penalty might be an attack of pneumonia. Or again, in certain parts of the country it is imprudent to be out on the water after night-fall owing to the danger of malaria. A boy who is fond of rowing insists upon going out in his boat after dark; shall we allow him to learn by experience the evil consequences of his act and gain wisdom by suffering the natural penalty? The natural penalty might be

that he would come home in a violent fever. To show how much mischief the application of the Spencerian method might work, let me mention a case which came under my observation. A certain teacher had been studying Herbert Spencer and was much impressed with his ideas. One wet, rainy day a number of children came to school without overshoes. The teacher had often told them that they must wear their overshoes when it rained; having neglected to do so their feet were wet. Now came the application of the natural penalty theory. Instead of keeping the children near the fire while their shoes were being dried in the kitchen, they were allowed to run about in their stocking feet in the large school hall in order to fix in their minds the idea that as they had made their shoes unfit to wear they must now go without them. This was in truth moral discipline with a vengeance. It is in many instances impossible to let the natural penalties of their transgressions fall upon children; it would be dangerous to health, to life and limb, and also to character, to do so. Pray, understand me well; I do not deny that the method of natural penalties is capable of being applied to advantage in the moral training of children. Namely, as the German philosopher Herbart pointed out many years ago, it can be used as a means of building up the confidence of children in the authority of their parents and educators. The father says to his child: "You must not touch the stove or you will be burned." The child disobeys his command and is burned. "Did I not warn you?" says the father, "do you not see that I was right? Hereafter believe my words and do not wait to test them in your experience." The comparatively few cases in which the child may without injury be made to experience the consequences of his acts should be utilized to strengthen its belief in the wisdom and goodness of its parents so that

in an infinitely greater number of cases their authority will act upon the mind of the child almost as powerfully as the actual experience of the evil consequences would act. Mr. Spencer himself admits, as I have said, that there are what he calls extreme cases to which the system he recommends does not apply. In these he falls back upon parental displeasure as the proper penalty. But parental displeasure, according to his view, is an indirect and not a direct penalty, and to use his own words: "the error which we have been combating is that of substituting parental displeasure for the penalties which nature has established." Yet he himself in regard to the graver offenses does substitute parental displeasure, and thus abandons his own position. There is, moreover, a second ground on which I would rest my criticism. The art of the educator sometimes consists in *deliberately warding off* the natural penalties, though the child knows what they are and perhaps expects to pay them. So far is the method of Spencer from bearing the test of application that the very opposite of what he recommends is right in some of the most important instances. Take the case of lying, for instance, The natural penalty for telling a falsehood is not to be believed the next time, but the real secret of moral redemption consists in not inflicting this penalty. We emphasize our belief in the offender despite the fact that he has told a falsehood, we show that we expect him never to tell a falsehood again, we seek to drive the spirit of untruthfulness out of him—by believing in him we strengthen him to overcome temptation. And so in many other instances we rescue, we redeem, by not inflicting the natural penalty.

The task of moral education is laid upon us. It is not a task that can be learned by reading a few scattered essays; it is often a heavy burden and involves a con-

stant responsibility. I know it is not right *always* to make parents responsible for the faults which appear in their children. I am well aware that the worst fruit sometimes comes from the best stock, and that black sheep are sometimes to be found in the best families. But I cannot help thinking that if these black sheep were taken charge of in the right way in early childhood the results might turn out differently than they often do. The picture of Jesus on which the early church loved to dwell is the picture of the good shepherd who follows after the lamb who has strayed from the fold, and brings it back and carries it tenderly in his arms. I think if parents were more faithful shepherds, and cared for their wayward children with deeper solicitude and tenderness, they might often succeed in winning them back. But even apart from these exceptional cases the task of training children morally is one of immense gravity and difficulty. And how are most parents prepared for the discharge of this task? Why, they are not at all prepared. They rely merely upon impulse, and upon traditions which are often altogether wrong and harmful. They do as they have seen other fathers and mothers do, and thus the same mistakes are perpetuated from generation to generation. Such parents, if they were asked to repair a clock, would say: "No, we must first learn about the mechanism of a clock before we undertake to repair it." But the delicate and complex mechanism of a child's soul they undertake to repair without any adequate knowledge of the springs by which it is moved, or of the system of adjustments by which it is enabled to perform its highest work. They thrust their crude hands into the mechanism and often damage or break it altogether. I do not pretend for a moment that education is as yet a perfect science; I know it is not. I do not pretend that it can give us a great deal

of light; but such light as it can give we ought to be all the more anxious to obtain on account of the prevailing darkness. The time will doubtless come when the science of education will be acknowledged to be, in some sense, the greatest of all the sciences; when, among the benefactors of the race, the great statesmen, the great inventors, and even the great reformers will not be ranked as high as the great educators.

III

IN order that a parent shall properly influence a child's character, it is necessary for him to know what that character is, and what the nature is of each fault with which he is dealing. I feel almost like asking pardon for saying anything so self-evident. It seems like saying that a physician who is called to a sick-bed, before beginning to prescribe, should know the nature of the disease for which he is prescribing, should not prescribe for one disease when he is dealing with another. I do not know enough about physicians to say whether such mistakes ever happen among them; but that such egregious mistakes do occur among parents all the time, I am sure. There are many parents who never stop to ask before they punish—that is, before they prescribe their moral remedies—what the nature of the disease is with which their child is afflicted. They never take the trouble to make a diagnosis of the case in order to treat it correctly. There is perhaps not one parent in a thousand who has a clear idea of the character of his child, or to whom it even so much as occurs that he ought to have a clear conception of that character, a map of it, a chart of it, laid out, as it were, in his mind. The trouble is that attention is not usually called to this important matter, and I propose to make it the special subject of this address.

I am prepared at the outset for the objection that the case against parents has been overstated. There are parents who freely acknowledge: "My child is obstinate; I know it has an obstinate character." Others say: "My child, alas, is untruthful;" others again: "My child is indolent." But these symptoms are far too indeterminate to base upon them a correct reformatory treatment. Such symptoms may be due to a variety of causes, and not until we have discovered the underlying cause in any given case can we be sure that we are following the right method. Take the case, for instance, of obstinacy: a child is told to do a certain thing and it refuses. Now, here is a dilemma. How shall we act? There are those who say: in such cases a child must be chastised until it does what it is told. A gentleman who was present here last Sunday had the kindness to send me during the week a copy of John Wesley's sermons, and in this volume, under the head of "Obedience to Parents," I read the following words: "Break your child's will in order that it may not perish. Break its will as soon as it can speak plainly—or even before it can speak at all. At any rate, as soon as a child is a year old it should be forced to do as it is told, even if you have to whip it ten times running; break its will in order that its soul may live." But by following this line of treatment we may obtain a result the very opposite of that which we intended. Obstinacy in many cases is due to sensitiveness. There are some children as sensitive to impressions as is that well-known flower which closes its quivering leaves at the slightest touch. These sensitive children retreat into themselves at the first sign of unfriendliness or aggression from without. The reason why such a child does not obey its father's command is not, perhaps, because it is unwilling to do as it is told, but because of the stern face, the im-

patient gesture, the raised voice with which the parent accompanies the command, and which jars upon the child's feelings. If such a parent, incensed at the child's disobedience, becomes still more severe, raises his voice still more, he will only make matters worse. The child will shrink from him still more and continue its passive resistance. In this manner obstinacy, which was at first only a passing spell, may become a fixed trait in the child's character. To be sure, we should not, on the other hand, treat these sensitive children only with caresses. In this way we encourage their sensitiveness, whereas we should regard it as a weakness that requires to be gradually but steadily overcome. The middle way seems the best. Let the parent exact obedience from the child by gentle firmness, by a firmness in which there shall be no trace of passion, no heightened feeling, and with a gentleness which, gentle as it may be, shall be at the same time unyielding. But while obstinacy is sometimes due to softness of nature, it is at other times due to the opposite—to hardness of nature, and according to the case we should vary our treatment. There are persons who having once made up their mind to do a thing cannot be moved from their resolution by any amount of persuasion. These hard natures, these concentrated wills, are bound to have their way, no matter whom they injure, no matter what stands in the way. Such persons—and we notice the beginnings of this trait in children—need to be taught to respect the rights of others. Their wills should occasionally be allowed to collide with the wills of others, in order that they may discover that there are other wills limiting theirs, and may learn the necessary lesson of submission. In yet other cases obstinacy is due to stupidity. Persons of weak intelligence are apt to be suspicious. Not understanding the motives of others, they distrust them;

unwilling to follow the guidance of others, they cling with a sort of desperation to their own purpose. These cases may be treated by removing the cause of suspicion, by patiently explaining one's motives where it is possible to do so, by awakening confidence.

Again, let us take the fault of untruthfulness. One cannot sufficiently commend the watchfulness of those parents who take alarm at the slightest sign of falsehood in a child. A lie should always put us on our guard. The arch fiend is justly called "the father of lies." The habit of falsehood, when it has become settled, is the sure inlet to worse vices. At the same time not all falsehoods are equally culpable or equally indicative of evil tendency, and we should have a care to discriminate the different causes of falsehood in the young child, in order that we may pursue the proper treatment. Sometimes falsehood is due to redundant imagination, especially in young children who have not yet learned to distinguish between fact and fancy. In such cases we may restrain the child's imagination by directing its attention to the world of fact, by trying to interest it in natural history and the like. We should especially set the example of strict accuracy ourselves in all our statements, no matter how unimportant they may be. For instance, if we narrate certain occurrences in the presence of the child, we should be careful to observe the exact order in which the events occurred, and if we have made a mistake we should take pains to correct ourselves, though the order of occurrence is really immaterial. Precisely because it is immaterial we show by this means how much we value accuracy even in little things. Then, again, falsehood is often due to the desire for gain. Or it may be due to fear. The child is afraid of the severity of the parent's discipline. In that case we are to blame; we must relax our discipline. We

have no business to tempt the child into falsehood. Again, untruthfulness is often due to mistaken sympathy, as we see in the case of pupils in school, who will tell a falsehood to shield a fellow pupil. In the worst cases falsehood is inspired by malice. It may be said that the proper positive treatment for this fault is to set the example of the strictest truthfulness ourselves, to avoid the little falsehoods which we sometimes allow ourselves without compunction, to show our disgust at a lie, to fill the child with a sense of the baseness of lying, and above all to find out the direct cause which has tempted the child in any given case. As a rule falsehood is only a means to an end; children do not tell untruths because they like to tell them, but because they have some ulterior end in view. Find out what that ulterior end is, and instead of directing your attention only to the lie, penetrate to the motive that has led the child into falsehood, and try to divert it from the bad end. Thus you may extract the cause of its wrong doing.

Thirdly, let us consider the fault of laziness. Laziness is sometimes due to physical causes. Nothing may be necessary but a change of diet, exercise in the fresh air, etc., to cure the evil. Sometimes it is the sign of a certain slow growth of the mind. There are fruits in the garden of the gods that ripen slowly, and these fruits are often not the least precious or the least beautiful when they finally have matured. Sir Isaac Newton's mind was one of these slowly ripening fruits. In school he was regarded as a dullard and his teachers had small hopes of him. Laziness, like other faults of character, sometimes disappears in the process of growth. Just as at a certain period in the life of a youth or maiden new faculties seem to develop, new passions arise, a new life begins to stir in the heart, so at a certain period qualities with

which we had long been familiar, disappear of themselves. We have very little light upon this subject, but the fact that a great transformation of character sometimes does take place in children without any perceptible cause is quite certain, and it may be offered as a comforting reflection to those parents who are over-anxious on account of the faults they detect in their children. But again, on the other hand, laziness or untruthfulness or obstinacy may be a black streak, coming to the surface out of the nethermost strata of moral depravity, and taken in connection with other traits may justify the most serious apprehension, and should then be a signal for immediate measures of the most stringent sort.

I am thus led to the second branch of my subject. I have tried to meet the objection of the parent who says: "I know the character of my child; I know my child is obstinate," by replying, if you only know that your child is obstinate you know very little; you need to know what are the causes of his obstinacy, and vary your treatment accordingly. Or if anyone says: "My child is untruthful," I reply, you need to find out what the cause is of this untruthfulness and vary your treatment accordingly. Or again, in the case which we have just considered, I have pointed out that laziness in a child may have no serious meaning whatever or may give just cause for the most serious alarm, according to the group of characteristic traits of which it is one. On this point I wish to lay stress. If you desire to obtain a correct impression of a human face you do not look at the eye by itself, then at the nose, then fix your attention on the cheeks and the chin and the brow, but you regard all these features together and view them in their relations to one another. Or let us recur to the simile of the physician. What would you think of the doctor who should judge the nature of a disease by some

one symptom which happened to obtrude itself, or should treat each symptom as it appears separately, without endeavoring to reach the occult cause which has given rise to the symptoms, of which they are all but the outward manifestation. And yet that is precisely the incredible mistake which every one of us, I venture to say, is apt to make in the treatment of children's characters. We judge of them by some one trait, as obstinacy, which happens to obtrude itself on our attention, and we prescribe for each symptom as it arises; we treat obstinacy by itself, and untruthfulness and indolence separately, without endeavoring to get at the underlying cause of all these symptoms. The point I desire to make is that in the education of our children it is necessary not only to study individual traits, but *each trait in connection with the group to which it belongs*. Take for an illustration the case last mentioned—that of laziness.

There is a well-known type group or group of characteristic traits, of which laziness is one. The chief components of this group are the following: The sense of shame is wanting, that is one trait. The will is under the control of random impulses, good impulses mingle helter-skelter with bad. There is an indisposition on the part of such a child to prolonged exertion in any direction, even in the direction of pleasure. That is perhaps the most dangerous trait of all. If you try to deal, as people actually do, with each of these traits separately, you will fail. If you try to influence the sense of shame, you will meet with no response; if you disgrace such a child, you will make it worse; if you whip it, you will harden it. If you attempt to overcome indolence by the promise of rewards, that will be useless. The child forgets promised rewards just as quickly as it forgets threatened punishment. This forgetfulness, this lack of coherency in its ideas, is partic-

ularly characteristic. The ideas of such a child are imperfectly connected. The ties between causes and their effects are feeble. The contents of the child's mind are in a state of unstable equilibrium. There is no point of fixity in its mental realm. And the cure for such a condition is to establish fixity in the thoughts, to induce habits of industry and application by steady, unrelaxing discipline, and especially by means of manual training. The immense value of mechanical labor as a means of moral improvement has been appreciated until now only to a very imperfect extent. Mechanical labor wisely directed secures mental fixity because it concentrates the child's attention for days and often for weeks upon a single task. Mechanical labor stimulates moral pride by enabling the pupil to produce articles of value and giving him in this way the sense of achievement. Mechanical labor also overcomes indolence by compelling settled habits of industry, whereby the random impulses of the will are brought under control.

The type group which we have just considered is one of the most clearly marked and easily recognized. It is a type which we often meet with among the so-called criminal classes, where its characteristic features can be seen in exaggerated proportions. Without attempting to analyze any additional types (a task of great delicacy and difficulty), the truth that the underlying fault of character is often unlike the symptoms which appear most conspicuously on the surface may be further illustrated by the following example. I have known of a person who made himself obnoxious to his friends by his overbearing manners and apparent arrogance. Casual observers condemned him on account of what they believed to be his overweening self-confidence, and expressed the opinion that his self-conceit ought to be broken down. But the

real trouble with him was not that he was too self-confident, but that he had not self-confidence enough. His self-confidence needed to be built up. He was overbearing in society because he did not trust himself, because he was always afraid of not being able to hold his own, and hence he exaggerated on the other side. Those who take such a person to be in reality what he seems to be will never be able to influence him. And if we find such a trait in a child, and simply treat it as if it were arrogant, we shall miss the mark entirely. We must find the underlying principle of the character the occult cause of which the surface symptoms are the effects.

Our knowledge of the great type groups is as yet extremely meager. Psychology has yet to do its work in this direction, and books on education give us but little help. But there are certain means by which the task of investigation may possibly be assisted. One means is the study of the plays of Shakespeare. That master mind has created certain types of character which repay the closest analysis. The study of the best biographies is a second means. The study of the moral characteristics of the primitive races—a study which has been begun by Herbert Spencer in his work on "Descriptive Sociology," and by Waitz in his "Anthropologie der Naturvölker"—is perhaps another means; and honest introspection, when it shall have become the rule among intelligent persons, instead of being the exception, will probably be the best means.

I am afraid that some of my hearers, from having been over-confident as educators in the beginning, may now have become over-timid; from having said to themselves: "Why, of course we know the characteristics of our children," may now, since the difficulties of studying character have been explained, be disposed to exclaim in

a kind of despair: "Who can ever understand the character of a single human being?" A perfect understanding of any human being is indeed impossible. We do not perfectly know even those who are nearest and dearest to us. But there are means of reaching at least approximate results, so far as children are concerned, and a few of these permit me to briefly summarize.

Try to win the confidence of the child so that it may disclose its inner life to you. Children accept the benefactions of their parents as unthinkingly as they breathe the air around them. Show them that your care and untiring devotion must be deserved, not taken as a matter of course. In this way you will deepen their attachment and lead them to willingly open their hearts to you. At the same time enter into the lesser concerns of their life. Be their comrades, their counselors; stoop to them, let them cling to you. Observe your children when they are at play, for it is then that they throw off their reserve and show themselves as they are. Some children, for instance, will not join a game unless they can be leaders; is not that a sign of character? Some children will take an unfair advantage at play, and justify themselves by saying: "It is only in play." Some are persistent in a game while others tire of any game after a little while. Others are sticklers for a strict observance of the rules. Observe how your sons or daughters are regarded by their companions; children are often wonderfully quick to detect one another's faults. Try to find out what the favorite pursuits and studies of your child are, by what it is repelled, by what attracted, and to what it is indifferent. Above all, keep a record of your child's development. Do not shun the labor involved in this. You know very well that nothing worth having can be obtained without labor. Yet most parents are unwilling to give sufficient time and

attention to the education of their children. Keep a record of the most significant words and acts of the child. Thus after a while you may have a picture of the child's inward condition before you, an assemblage of characteristic traits, and by comparing one trait with another, you may find the clue to a deeper understanding of its nature.

What I have said about children applies equally to ourselves. I started out by saying that not one parent in a thousand knows his child's character. I conclude by saying that not one man or woman in a thousand knows his or her own character. We go through life cherishing an unreal conception of ourselves which is often inspired by vanity. I am well aware that it is difficult to know one's self, but there are helps in this direction also. We can look over our own past record, we can honestly examine how we have acted in the leading crises of our lives, we can summon our own characteristic traits before our minds—the things that we like to dwell upon, and the things which we would gladly blot out of our memories if we could—and by comparing this trait with that, we may discover the springs by which we have been moved. It is difficult to attain self-knowledge, but it is imperative that we should try to attain it. The aim of our existence is to improve our characters, and clearly we cannot improve them unless we know them.

I have undertaken to grapple with a most difficult subject, but I shall have accomplished the purpose which I had in mind if I have awakened in you a deeper desire to ask yourselves: first, what is the character of my child; second, what is my own character? The most serious business of our lives is to try to find the answers to these two questions.

MIDWINTER JOY.*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

THERE seem to be two kinds of feeling about Christmas. Christian people think that it is a purely Christian festival—a commemoration indeed of the birthday of the founder of the Christian system—and that those who are not Christians, those called “unbelievers,” for instance, and Jews, have no right to celebrate it. They look on the observance of it by any others than themselves as a proof after all of how powerful Christianity is in the world—since people more or less conform to it, though they do not believe it; they think that the tree and the lights and the presents are but an echo of the joy that Jesus, so many hundred years ago, was born into the world. Christmas is the birthday of Jesus, just as February 22d is Washington’s birthday.

And then on the other hand are those Liberals and Jews, who think it a mark of sincerity not to pay any attention to Christmas. If people like ourselves do it, they call it a concession. To the Liberal it seems at best a weakness; to the Jew it seems almost a wrong—since it is paying honor to a religion that has persecuted, and still persecutes, his people, and argues a kind of unfaithfulness and disloyalty to his race.

And yet about the only thing specifically Christian about Christmas is the name. The name is Christian, even Catholic—it means the Christ Mass—and, if we are

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to be strict and literal, Protestants cannot celebrate it any more than Liberals. The Puritans, we know, forbade the celebration of it, and in Massachusetts in 1659 even put a fine on those who were found observing it. But the thing itself is an old heathen custom. Not one of its characteristic and still popular features is of Christian origin. It is a mingled heritage from old Rome and from the Germans. It would no doubt have come down to us if Christianity had never existed. The only difference would be that the church services in honor of the birth of Jesus would not be held. But the presents, the lighted tree, and the general lightheartedness and joy would be with us all the same.

As I have said before, Christmas, like every other festival which takes hold of the popular heart, is a nature festival. It rests on the fact that the sun, after starting on his southward journey and sinking lower and lower on the horizon every day, at last stops this downward course—and after a brief interval, begins to climb again, and each day climbs higher and higher as he makes his pathway across the heavens. On this fact the life of the earth and the life of man depends. Without it, no spring, no summer, no harvest—but only cold and death would be in store for man. This is the basis of the joy of this midwinter time. The festive sentiment, in varying form, was so fixed in people's minds that the church had to accept it and seek to give it a Christian coloring. It put the birthday of Jesus at this time, though every Christian scholar admits that no one knows when Jesus was born, though the most varied dates were assigned by early Christian authorities, and though one of the early popes frankly admitted that the twenty-fifth of December commemorated rather the return of the sun than the birth of

Christ. The solid fact is the natural fact, and just as men recognized it before Christianity existed, why should they not recognize it now though they do not believe in Christianity—and recognizing it, why should they not rejoice and be glad?

As a matter of fact, the real Christmas now is not Christian, save in name. The real Christmas is not in the formal church services, but in the countless homes of the people—in the homes of thousands who never go to church, wherever the brightly-lighted Christmas tree casts its radiance, wherever songs and carols are sung, wherever loving presents are given, or even on the street, when men salute one another with a “Merry Christmas!” It would not be in me to ask any Liberal or Jew to adopt any specifically Christian rite—I would not have any one compromise in his principles or his loyalties in the slightest; but I would have everyone, Gentile or Jew, not fear to come out on human ground and cherish the sentiments and practices of what I might call natural religion; yes, what I wish to bring out and dwell upon to-day is the natural fact on which this old midwinter festival is based, and to show its analogy with other facts of experience, that it is indeed of a piece with life as a whole. The only objection which we can reasonably make to this festival is, it appears to me, to the name “Christmas;” and I, accordingly, shall try to speak of “Midwinter Festival” hereafter. At the same time it must be remembered that this is partly a verbal matter, that custom is very far from keeping the literal significance of words always in mind—nobody thinks now that Christmas means a “Christ Mass”—and hence if I happen to use the common colloquial term for the midwinter festival, I hope and trust that no one will take offence.

The particular charm about this festival is, that it takes place when nature's face is cold and cheerless. The leaves have fallen from the trees, the earth looks brown and bare, or perhaps is covered with snow and ice, the ground is no longer soft beneath our feet, and the air is no longer mild, but instead a sort of rigidity and harshness and inhospitableness settles down upon the outer world. It is as if nature were aging, as if she had exhausted herself, as if she were shrinking and fading. This of itself breeds serious, if not melancholy thoughts. Somehow the end of all things is brought before our minds.

“Fading like a fading ember,
Last of all the shrunk December.
Him regarding, men remember,
Life and joy must pass away.”

Of itself it is not a time of rejoicing, but rather of mourning. And yet in the face of all, there occurs, toward the close of the month, the brightest, joyfulest festival of the year. We see and feel the wintry chill, yet something takes place which makes us disregard and triumph over it. The sun, which has been sinking, sinking to the southward, and so stripping the earth of warmth and life and beauty, sinks, we see at last, no more. The winter, indeed, continues, outwardly nature is the same, yet looking forward we know that the power of the cold is broken, that it will yield to spring and summer in due time. Our joy then has this peculiar quality, that it is in the midst of a time that on its surface would make us sad, that it is mixed with thought and faith, that it is a kind of triumph over what is immediately around us. Very different is the spontaneous joy of a

fair summer day, when we simply yield to the influences about us and drink in the sweet sounds and scents and sights that nature herself provides on every hand. That is a joy of the senses. This, in no small measure, is a joy of the spirit. It is like that of a captive who makes light of his prison walls, not because they are not there, but because he is assured he is to be freed from them. We do not see, and yet we believe. Life and warmth are far away, yet we know the power that will bring them. As if to emphasize the contrast, this midwinter festivity is always in the dark or the dusk, it would mean little in the daytime—it is against the background of the dark, with its gloom and chill, that the lights which symbolize our joy stand out with their warm radiance. No matter how cold without, or how the winds blow, the festive joy is all the same. It is the contrast with all that is forbidding without, I might almost say the reaction against it, the brightness in the midst of the darkness, that makes the charm, the glory of this chief festival of the year.

Let us linger a little over the primitive, natural significance of the day—and then later consider some of its spiritual suggestions.

It is possible that some of us with the artificial training which we have had in the past, object to the simple naturalistic origin which is thus given to the midwinter festival, and still more to the simple, physical origin that is thus assigned to all the light and warmth and beauty of the world. At least it seems like taking from us a beautiful illusion to say that man and all living creatures are dependent on the sun, when we had thought that they were created and sustained by an unseen hand. It seems very like materialism. And yet when we face the real fact—the fact which all our science bears witness to—we

for the first time are able to do justice to that strange, worshipful feeling toward nature which the fathers of the race had, and which we, under the influence of the technical, theological training to which we have been long subject, have practically lost. We no longer see anything wonderful or mysterious about the sun—our sense of wonder and mystery all goes to that supernatural being we call God. Matter of any kind, hot or cold, here on the earth or up in the sky, big or little, has become commonplace in our eyes. We measure it, we weigh it, we think we know it altogether, we place it far beneath us. And yet this matter we look down upon is that by which we live. Our food is matter, and not only is it the sustenance of our bodies—it is the sustenance and life of our minds. How much thinking can we have without our daily bread? How can we aspire or resolve or do save as we take these elements from the world without us and incorporate them in our living structure? The air we breathe is matter. The light of heaven, the heat of the sun, yes, the great burning globe itself, but for which the earth would be a wintry waste—all are matter or the motion of matter. The fact is, matter is not merely what it seems, but vastly more. We are obliged to revise our notions of it. Science itself is making us revise our notions of it. Gradually the old theological idea of it as something inert, dead, soulless and lifeless is being dissipated. Tyndall was one of the pioneers of the new view when he declared that he discerned “in that matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life.” And just to the extent that this view is taken, and matter is seen to have poten-

cies beyond what on the surface appear, it becomes mystical, and our feeling toward it approximates that of the fathers of the race, to whom it was never "mere matter," but full of life and energy and power—indeed, the sun was a living being in their eyes, and in view of the life it begets in us and awakes anew and afresh each year in the world, this seems far nearer the truth than the view that is commonly taken. "All things are full of gods," said one of the earliest Greek thinkers, and in different language modern science is saying much the same. Why fear then to recognize our dependence on the sun; why hesitate to look up and bless it, why fail to praise it—it must be more than fire and smoke, for our life is more than fire and smoke, and yet our life and all earthly life entirely depend on it.

No one will say that this is banishing divinity from the world—it is rather giving divinity to the world, instead of viewing it as a sort of sole occupant of impossible, empty spaces beyond. The real God is the world viewed as alive, instinct with order and law and full of blessing. This God is in the sun, or rather it is the sun, viewed on the side of its magic, hidden potencies—and it is this divine sun, this living sun, this age-in and age-out benefactor of man and friend to all the earth, that we remember with honor, following in the steps of a long and unbroken line of fathers and forefathers of the race, in the midwinter festival to-day. It is the same sun the ancient Romans did obeisance to, the same that the Teutons and the Celts honored in their Yule-tide before they ever heard of Christ; it is the constant sun, the sun whom the clouds may hide but cannot destroy, who does not change though the earth may change, and whose ever-enduring power is symbolized to us in the one kind of tree on earth which keeps ever green.

Such are reflections that come to me in considering the midwinter festival, and that mingle with and heighten my joy. The lights, and the greetings and the presents are cheerful, but something like this is the old-time historical basis of the joy, and this wider outlook, this deeper insight, perhaps becomes men and women when they participate in it. It is sometimes said that this is a children's festival. I do not so regard it. It is and always has been a religious festival—one which has its happy and beautiful side for children and which I wish that every child might have a taste of, and yet which should give joy and an uplift of the spirit to every adult who can stop to think about life and the conditions of life at all. To become conscious of those mighty powers through whose beneficence he lives, and to inwardly bless them would be, I should suppose, a privilege for man. And in these shortest days of the year, these days when if we judged by the senses alone we might think these powers to be fading or under an eclipse, it is a specially happy privilege to victoriously realize that they are still strong and supreme and to utter forth songs of thanksgiving and praise.

Yet this midwinter occasion, if intelligently appreciated, is not without its spiritual suggestions. It means at bottom, to take it broadly and spiritually, that in the straits of life there is always a resource. As in the midwinter darkness there is light and a spring of joy, so in every situation of life that seems at first sight dark and dreary, there is a way out, and happiness ahead. This is but saying—but expressing the faith—that in the moral world as in the natural, the resources of nature are great, that unless we are ourselves at fault fate does not often shut the door of hope upon us. I might illustrate

this in many ways—from our private life, from our social life, from our religious life. I do not forget that the individual must suffer for his own misdeeds, yes, his mistakes—yet aside from this, how rarely is a man prevented from doing in the future better than he has in the past! The world is sometimes hard on those who will not progress, but when a man is ready to advance (I do not mean merely to get more, but to do more) how much room there is for him! Many a time when we are in a tight place, it is our inertia, our lack of enterprise that keeps us there—and if we could but gird up our loins and dare, a way would open to us. It is true that honor and truth may sometimes keep us from advancing in a worldly way, and we may then be in a situation that is darkness indeed—darkness, that is, until we come to see that honor and truth are to be preferred above all else, and that even privation with them is better than abundance without them; for when we see this, light has already risen for us, and the only question is whether we have the courage and nobility to follow it. I cannot deny too, that what men would ordinarily call a still greater darkness may come over us—we may see and feel life itself slipping away from us, and there may be no hope, no chance of rescue from any mortal hand; all, all, may be dark, we may say—until, indeed, we come to see that as there is a good way of living, so there is a good way of dying, until we learn to yield and to submit and to be thankful, and to lose all bitterness, and then this way may seem a very way of light, and we may be peaceful and even happy in following it. By no means, would I say that there is always a way out of our darkness that we would like—I only say that there is a way out and that we may learn to like it—yes, be entirely happy in it.

And it is so with the powers of a society, a community. It takes a great deal to doom a people. It took more than slavery, wrong and curse that it was, to doom America. It will take more than our tragic blunder in the Philippines to shut the door of hope on us in the future. The gods are patient and long-suffering and give ample room for repentance and tears; or if they punish us, as they did in our Civil War, they do not necessarily destroy us. Sometimes we think that a nation becomes effete, so corrupted is it by wealth and privilege on the one side, and by wanton injustice on the other—this might have been thought of the France of the ancient *régime*, with its tremendous and unrighteous inequalities; and then comes as in France in 1789, an upheaval, an agitation of consciences, a conflict, and the people are all alive. Dr. Channing exclaimed, with this instance in mind, we can never say our nature is exhausted—there is infinity of resource in the human soul. Fate is liberal, and there is rarely a darkness so great that there is not a better and a worse way for any people. If we have unprincipled competition in our industrial life, we can check it; if we have trusts and monopolies, we can make them serve the public good; if we have vicious systems of taxation, we can change them; if we have defects in our laws, we can mend them; there is no reason why a people should not live on and progress forever—for there is no necessity of death in their case as in the case of an individual. In dark times of the nation's life, let us never think that this is the end—let us believe the way is open for brighter, happier days.

And this hopeful spirit of the midwinter time applies equally to the realm of religion. Many a man in these days has found himself conducted by his studies into a

period of religious darkness and gloom. If he only had not read and studied he could still be happy in his childhood's faith. But alas! he has eaten of the tree of knowledge and its fruit is bitter. He cannot think of God or heaven, or of the Bible or Jesus, or of anything as he did—and at first he is sick at heart and forlorn. And then comes a period of adjustment. He knows that it is better to be truthful with himself than to deceive himself, and he sticks to his chosen course. He sees that there is much truth left, and perhaps he soon discovers that there is truth that he had not known before. Duty broadens when he discovers its natural foundation, and the world is more wonderful rather than less, as he follows the teachings of science concerning it. It is as great as ever to work for human advancement and he acquires a seriousness and an earnestness in dealing with human interests that would not have been possible had he kept the old view that earthly things are not after all of the greatest account. Many a man, I believe, has found that he grew humanly better—or at least ought to have been—as he gave up the old faith for the new, and that in the long run he became a happier man, too. It was only temporarily a sacrifice, it was really a gain. And so I make bold to say to any one, who finds himself in the dark religiously, Be not afraid! There is more before you than you have left behind. I have a faith—and it is a growing one—that a religion based on science and duty is going to be a grander religion than any the world has known. By letting go the false or the fanciful, we first come to really appreciate the true. I believe there are possibilities of beauty even, of satisfying the sentiments beyond any that have existed in connection with the religions that have long dominated our part of the

world. A new poetry will arise, is arising—a new sacred ritual. Let me give but one illustration of a poem—not the happiest or the best, possibly, but one that shows in the simplest, most direct manner how a truth of science, a revolutionary truth, may blend with beauty and even seem more beautiful than the old fairy-like idea it replaces. They are lines addressed “To a Water-Lily”:

“O, star on the breast of the river,
 O, marvel of bloom and grace,
 Did you fall straight down from Heaven,
 Out of the sweetest place?
 You are white as the thought of an angel,
 Your heart is steeped in the sun,
 Did you grow in the Golden City,
 My pure and shining one?”
 “Nay, nay, I ‘fell’ not out of Heaven,
 None ‘gave’ me my saintly white;
 It slowly grew from the blackness
 Down in the dreary night,
 From the ooze of the silent river
 I won my glory and grace.
 White souls ‘fall’ not, O, my poet,
 They rise to the sweetest place.”

And for an instance of the joyous, worshipful attitude to the universe which the new religion may take, let me give these lines from Whitman:

“Illustrious, every one!
 Illustrious what we name space—sphere of unnumber’d spirits;
 Illustrious the mystery of motion, in all beings, even the tiniest
 insect;
 Illustrious the attribute of speech—the senses—the body;
 Illustrious the passing light! Illustrious the pale reflection of
 the moon in the western sky!
 Illustrious whatever I see, or hear, or touch, to the last!”

And also this in Whitman's "Hymn to Death":

"Prais'd be the fathomless universe,
For life and joy, and for objects and knowledge curious;
And for love, sweet love—But praise! O, praise and praise,
For the sure-enwinding arms of cool-enfolding Death."

And if I might venture to suggest a litany or rather a chant for the future religion, I would suggest such words as these which I take or rather adapt from the sacred book of the Parisees—so simple and frank do they seem to me to be, so fresh in feeling, and so noble in scope:

"All waters, the fountains, and those flowing down in streams,
 Praise we.
All trees, the growing, adorned with tops,
 Praise we.
All living creatures, those which live under the water, and those
 which fly through the air, and all beasts and cattle,
 Praise we.
All lights, showing man the way,
 Praise we.
All stars, the moon, and the sun,
 Praise we.
The whole earth
 Praise we.
The whole heavens
 Praise we.
All is good in its place and season.
 We bless all and rejoice that we live in a world so
 vast (great)."

Friends, I can hardly think of a happier expression of that natural religion which I have sought to commend and on which our midwinter festival is founded, than this. We need not fear that joy, religious joy, will die out of the world, so long as such words can be sincerely

used. Theologies may crumble, but while men can look out on the universe and accept it in a tone like that, religion will remain. I do not lament the loss of the old faith—so may not you! I have still before me this goodly universe, stretching out beyond my utmost ken, and with its fathomless deeps of power—and so have you. I have still the path of duty for my feet to tread in—and so have you. In dark days, I may take comfort in the light that is to come—and so may you. I can still in spirit join in the midwinter festival—and so, I trust, can you. I trust you all can, Gentile and Jew. I speak as I do, not that I love Jesus less, not that I would exclude the mention of his name, or due honor to him, but that I love what is older and greater and grander than Jesus, more. We are all children of the same mother—let us be brethren to one another and keep holy day together.

THE ETHICS OF EPITHETS.*

BY DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

I SURMISE that it would be hard to find a fault more universally or justly chargeable upon us members of the great human family than the fault of calling each other names. By that I do not mean the childish habit of vindictive and abusive repartee, which at first thought we may associate with the phrase "calling each other names." I mean the almost unconscious yielding to the subtler temptation to label people with conventional tags, and then to judge according to the tag, without bothering too much to know the person. We scarcely, even in our sober moments of self-examination and self-discipline, realize how infested we are with this insidious habit. For so many generations, nay, for so many centuries, certain abstract doctrines (theological, political, social) have so absolutely ruled the world, that humanity has been divided by them into categories and castes, sects and parties, like the genera of the botanist or the families of the zoölogist. Despite such glorious eras of promise as the wonderful thirteenth century, the age of the Protestant Reformation, and the unsullied prelude of the French Revolution, it was not till the days which our fathers can remember that the thick walls separating class from class and creed from creed began to totter. That marvelous inspiration to a new conception of the universe which we call the doctrine of evolution, had not to do primarily with the question as to

* A lecture given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia.

whether men had descended from apes. The doctrine of evolution is a principle which penetrates every nook and corner of science, and readjusts all relations of life. It sees the earth and the world in a process of becoming; it beholds the spirit of man as an unfolding moral force; and it scrutinizes all the institutions, beliefs, theories, categories, philosophies of the world as tentative expressions of man's development at certain epochs of time under certain exterior conditions. Consequently, evolution is not only a theory of science; it is also a discipline of history, a method of philosophy, a school of politics, a program of education, a principle of ethics, a religious inspiration.

The manifold problems which vex society to-day are reducible, I believe, to this one statement in terms of the doctrine of evolution, namely: That men are coming to face institutions, customs, traditions, as symbols of progress projected from the human spirit and objectified in history, rather than as self-existing extra-human, supra-mundane realities descending from heaven upon an abject spirit and binding it in the name of divinity. In other words, the centre of gravity of men's spiritual life is shifting from compulsion to comprehension, from fear to reason. The mystery and awe of creation is still with us, to be sure, and will be so long as a green blade shoots up to greet the vernal sun, so long as the human heart leaps with the pulsing of love. But irrational or cruel theories which in the past have pretended to explain this mysterious creation and probe this wonderful heart of man are now being quietly laid aside as inadequate, unconvincing, unreal. We are ceasing to imitate Satan and his imps in one respect, at any rate: we no longer "believe and tremble." We are breaking away from the benumbing tyranny of the Middle Ages in state, society, and church.

We are clearing up that misty Platonic doctrine, which teaches that we grope and wander here on earth amid shadows whose archetypal realities are in a heaven above.

What else does the progressive democracy of the nineteenth century mean but that the theory of the inherent right of men born of certain blood (and generally a very badly tainted blood, too) to rule their fellows by divine sanction has lost its hold and has become rather ridiculous than august in the eyes of disinterested, thoughtful citizens? With all our admiration for sturdy and stable England, did not the anachronistic enthusiasm which accompanied the coronation of her present king rather provoke a smile in us? What does the increasing desertion of long-sanctioned theological tenets signify, but that tradition has ceased to be our master for the enforcement of truth and become our guide in the search for it? And what does the present agitation in the industrial world mean, with all its painful incidents—painful from the ethical as well as from the commercial point of view—what else than that the great gangs of men, by the work of whose hands the necessities and luxuries of our complex modern life are made possible, are being themselves permeated (perhaps largely unconsciously to themselves) with the principle which is at the bottom of our evolutionary theory, namely: the principle of differentiation and individualization; that they are evolving, in other words, from machines to men, and in the capacity of men are beginning to ask the few who possess hundreds of times as much money as anybody can earn, by what right they justify the appropriation of the vast wealth which the many produce?

We have got about four centuries beyond the feudal system in theory. The peasant of the fifteenth century bowed to social oppression as the ordination of a divine

Cæsar and endured religious tyranny as the revelation of a divine Christ. But to-day, no! That mighty inspiration which has revolutionized the study of science to such degree that it may almost be said to have inaugurated the study of science, has also taken hold on the political, social, educational, religious, industrial world. And when it shall have come to its mature expression, it will have worked a revolution beside which the French Revolution and the English Revolution, the Reformation, the Renaissance, and even the rise of Christianity itself, will dwindle into insignificance.

But what has all this disquisition on the evolutionary theory to do with the modest subject of calling each other names? Much, every way! For the very glory of the evolutionary theory is that it ramifies into every remotest nook and corner of life and conditions all our acts, even to the words we utter so lightly and the names we repeat so glibly. For if we realize that we are the responsible people of the earth, not pawns on the chess-board of fate; if we realize that in us and through us the spirit of truth is travailing to its expression, then we shall shake off the torpor of fatalism which pervades our religious and civic life, and awake to the fact that our most important concern is not to get rich nor to get talked about; but to shape our will, our judgments, our affections in such wise that they will give coherency and dignity to our lives. That is to say, we shall *grow*; we shall have to grow—for the one unpardonable sin in the eyes of an evolutionist is stunted growth, stagnation. And we shall realize then that faithfulness in conforming our will, our judgment, and our affections to the truth as our intimate soul reveals it to us has scarcely a subtler or more persistent enemy than the habit of repeating unconsidered epithets.

St. Paul is a teacher whose system of dogma we can by no means find satisfactory to-day. His problems are not our problems; his modes of thought are not our modes of thought. But, nevertheless, St. Paul was a wonderfully keen student of men. He analyzed human nature in a masterly way, shaming its base passions and appealing in words of everlasting encouragement to its noblest impulses and aspirations. In one of those short, pregnant sentences which flash on the reader like an inspiration, St. Paul gives the formula for the ethical life in terms of the doctrine of evolution: "When I became a man I put away childish things."

It is my purpose this morning to suggest how the careless or malicious use of epithets is a trait characteristic of immaturity in a person or in an era, and how, as such, it is a detriment to growth and a bar to the progress of truth. It is pitiable to see a man of mature years with the body of a child, grey hairs and deep-set eyes over the shrunken atrophied limbs. We call that an awful deformity. How much greater the deformity when the soul of the man is still cramped in the narrow mold of the prejudices and violences of childhood! The body is laid away in a few years at most, and in the grave there is no beauty or comeliness—but the soul, we trust, lives on in a larger life—and how necessary that it comes to that larger life itself enlarged and enlarging!

Now, one count against the childish indulgence in epithets is that it is unscientific. The habit of disposing of a man by clapping him into a social, religious, or political pigeon-hole, with the label "infidel" or "socialist," as if that disposed of the man, is most detrimental to an unbiased search for truth. The temptation to indulge in this habit is strong and subtle. There seems to be a sense

of relief in the pert brevity of such phrases as "O, he is a hypocrite," or "He is a populist." Perhaps we are conscious of gaining a reputation for wise discrimination in the eyes of the person with whom we are talking. Perhaps at the same time we are excusing ourselves inwardly, by the same impatient remark, from honestly reflecting whether, and how, and why we ourselves differ from the person so hastily rated. Add to this that ninety-nine per cent. of such statements are made not only not in the presence of the victim of them, but not even in the company of those who are likely to dissent—and the futility of epithets as an aid to the valuation of character becomes apparent.

If anybody doubts the intimate connection between unscientific methods of thought and abundant epithets of abuse, let him read a few polemical treatises out of almost any century up to the last—a passage of arms between orthodox fathers and heresiarchs in the early Church, or a phase of the interminable strife between Emperor and Pope in the Middle Ages, or Martin Luther's interchange of incivilities with Bishop Eck and King Henry the Eighth, or the frenzied campaign of the English Bishops against Darwinism. Everywhere violent denunciation, abandonment of the subject in question for insulting personalities, dismal puns on an opponent's name, heavy witticisms to stir prejudice. One would say that success in the controversy lay in the administration of the completest mud-bath to one's adversary. Beecher used to give this counsel to young ministers: "When you are stuck for something to say in the pulpit, shout." The publicist of the Middle ages could have laid down this rule: When your argument halts, curse your opponent!

We know in our generation how unscientific all that is.

We have abandoned it in our dignified polemics, swinging perhaps to the opposite extreme of studied urbanity in handling the "distinguished scholar" or the "honorable gentleman" whose views we are seeking to overthrow. We realize how such an altered attitude engenders calm, sweet reasonableness, and a scientific spirit in our intellectual life. If any proof is needed to show that the use of epithet and invective is a survival of a lower stage of intellectual life, it is abundantly furnished by the fact that such use abounds most where reason is most absent—where appeal is made to popular prejudices, as in electioneering speeches, for example, or tirades against religious innovators. But though we have largely abandoned the abuse of epithets in our dignified polemic, the temptation still lurks in our private judgments. And here by its unscientific nature it is constantly threatening and hemming in our spiritual evolution.

This unscientific attitude of mind which substitutes epithets for investigation vitiates our ethics in two conspicuous particulars. In the first place, it tacitly assumes that the question at debate is closed, so blocking all further progress; and in the second place, it reacts on the mind which cherishes it, making that mind more stubborn and narrow.

For the illustration of the first of these evils, we need only to open at any page in the history of science. The laborious way to larger truths has lain over a road clogged and choked with popular prejudices, like fallen rotting trunks of forest trees. These prejudices have been nourished chiefly by the ingrained habit of repeating certain epithets, inherited shibboleths, as our war-cries. Truth has been defined in rigid terms; political truth, for example, in the doctrine of absolute sovereignty by the

grace of God; scientific truth in the opening chapters of the Book of Genesis; religious truth in the daring assumptions of Calvinism—and it has taken centuries of time and the sacrifice of rivers of blood for the more adequate hypothesis of science and the more humane interpretation of religion to make their way against this accumulated mass of popular prejudice. The one indispensable condition of progress is open-mindedness. We must be willing to be convinced by every better theory and every proven fact, no matter how dear to our fancied security in final truth. Unstable equilibrium is the normal condition of the sane intellect. Now, the appeal to prejudice by the use of discrediting or aspersive epithets, by its assumption that truth is already wholly discovered in any line of human investigation, is directly opposed to the process of evolution, by which alone our knowledge is being extended and our sympathies are being deepened and enriched. For the old categories which have ruled our world so long are losing their force. Mysterious formulæ, taboos, sacred records, and the like, shall no longer shut off vast realms of knowledge from the inquiry of the human spirit and awe men into blind submission by threats of torture here or hereafter. The world of the spirit, like the world of space, so long thought measurable by our petty mythologies and theologies, has opened into the boundless universe of Newton and Laplace. So that those religious and social conceptions of man which a few centuries ago were universal, are now hardly less pitiable and grotesque than the cosmical theory of the Indian Traveler, whose world was a box and heaven its cover, with the planets running like marbles in fixed grooves.

Moreover, the habit of indulging in epithets to settle questions which ought to be thought out with calm reason,

besides contributing to the impediment of scientific progress, also returns to plague the inventor. Like the missile from the boomerang, an unconsidered epithet comes back upon the man who launched it, and judges him. If it is an epithet of envy, it makes him more envious; if of bigotry, the more bigoted; if of passion, the more incensed. Every time we indulge those unredeemed qualities of our nature by hasty judgments on our fellow men, we fortify ourselves in ignorance and prejudice. Just as the repetition of a story tends to confirm us in the belief of it, so does the loud insistence of our point of view in a controversy tend to blind us until we can see only that narrow section of a subject which we are willing to endorse. So gradually the horizon of a man who calls names grows narrower and narrower until his power of judgment is checked, then cramped, then choked—like that sea-animal which when attacked builds in upon itself with its own shell until it crushes out its own life. I firmly believe that nine-tenths of our jealousy and crabbedness, our ridiculous class hatreds, our private quarrels and our public grievances, are due simply to our being incapacitated, through the long indulgence of prejudices, for putting ourselves in another's place and looking at things through another's eyes. There is a story of an American sailor who was strolling one day in a cemetery at Hong Kong and saw a Chinaman putting a bowl of rice on a new grave. The American asked the Chinaman, with a careless sneer: "When do you expect your friend to come up out of the earth and eat the rice, John?" "When your friend comes up to smell the flowers you put on his grave," replied the Chinaman.

We cannot afford, for our own sakes, to be shut in from large sympathies by the prejudices of our own little party,

sect, or circle. By doing so we close the doors of progress on ourselves; for, as Mr. Emerson has said in his Essay on History, the progress of the intellect (and it is true of all progress, even to material progress) consists in the clearer vision of causes which overlook surface differences. The indulgence in epithets, on the other hand, tends to emphasize and deepen surface differences, obscuring our vision of the great underlying causes which are working the evolution of man.

But, serious as this indictment of the rashness of epithets is, on the score of its unscientific character, a still more serious charge from the point of view of ethics is that the habit is uncharitable. Certain words, from the long tyranny of triumphant theories and creeds, have acquired an odium quite unjustified by their true and innocent definition. For concrete illustration, let me dwell for a moment upon a few religious terms which are passed from mouth to mouth in very glib fashion, even at an afternoon tea. The words "heretic," "skeptical," "agnostic," are generally terminal words. When a man is called by one of the names his case is finished, and with a gasp of pity or shudder of disgust he is consigned to the class of the deluded or the dangerous. He is stigmatized by the name; that is, a mark is put upon him. The word is used not as a help to the sympathetic understanding of his position, but as a term of reproach. But when we come to inquire what these words actually mean, we may be surprised to see that they ought by right to be considered a compliment rather than a stigma. A heretic is a man who chooses for himself. In religion he is a man who chooses for himself what doctrines he will accept as true. Since the Holy Roman Catholic Church early in its development decreed that a man should have no power

of choice as to what doctrines he should accept, the word "heretic" became for the church a term synonymous with rebel—an awful term of condemnation. But surely we are in duty bound to exercise our wisest choice in the most vital matter of religious belief, whether we come to agree with the orthodox doctrine or not; and consequently the term "heretic," understood in its true and primary meaning, is a compliment, not a reproach. Sceptic is a closely allied word. A skeptic is a man who examines. Of course examination ought to precede choice. But the Holy Church forbade examination of its dogmas as presumptuous, except the examination by advocates pledged to their defence. Hence skeptic became and has remained a byword of shame. Agnostic is a new word, a term invented by Mr. Huxley to denote his own attitude toward dogmatic assertions. By it he meant (as he himself explains) a man who refused either through the violence of compulsion or by the temptation of conformity, to say that he knew certain things to be true when he had no valid evidence to substantiate their truth. The word is a plea for the suspension of judgment until more evidence is in; and it ought certainly to be considered commendable and not disgraceful in a man that he is unwilling to affirm the truth of anything that claims to be a fact except on sufficient evidence.

Thus we see that such formidable epithets as "heretic," "skeptical," and "agnostic" are quite free from murderous content after all, and that to use these epithets with the connotation of blame or derision (as the words are almost always used) is not only unjust but also unkind. Time was, and not many centuries ago, when a man suffered the penalty of death for manifesting these commendable traits of religious independence. The spirit of humanity

has so far prevailed that to-day he suffers only odium. The time will come in the inexorable onward march of enlightenment and brotherhood, when they will be reckoned unto him for a crown of virtues.

As in the domain of religion, from which I have chosen my examples, so it is in all the departments of our life. Accidents of birth, locality, early environment, later associates, business routine, the recurrence of social duties, the unremitting application to the rather restricted topic of our profession—all tend to confirm habits of mental exclusiveness. Exclusiveness by its continuance deadens sympathy, and a lack of sympathy in its turn, begets an intolerant spirit. With all the boasted complexity of our modern life, the conditions to success have become so exacting that we are shut up in our little subdivided specialties even more closely than in the days of the journeyman and the apprentice. At the same time, we have lost the modest reticence of the journeyman and apprentice which bade the shoemaker stick to his last. Nowadays boys and girls in their teens are ready with their judgment on subjects which deep thinkers con a lifetime, and the off-hand opinion of a prosperous business man on some question first brought to his attention by the interview of a newspaper reporter is quite likely to carry more weight with the public than the judgment of some competent but obscure student of the question. All this precocity of opinion and undigested judgment strengthens the separating walls of sects and parties, making us more and more unfair to our neighbors and, what is worse, more willing to be unfair. Individuality is a sacred right, like life itself, not to be invaded by the indiscriminate herding of men under broad categories. We never have all the facts needful, anyway, to rate a man spiritually, even though we were

perfect in charity and sympathy. The German proverb wisely says, "To understand all is to forgive all." And our American poet has expressed the same spirit of universal sympathy in the simple lines :

"If every man's internal care
Were written on his brow,
How many would our pity share
Who raise our envy now."

It is a lack of penetration, of imagination, in us which leads to this uncharity of epithets. Here, as in the scientific aspect of the matter, the habit is a serious bar to human development, and utterly out of keeping with the evolutionary conception of life, which calls, above all else, for elasticity of judgment. And here, too, again, as in the scientific field, the habit is disastrous in its reflex action upon the man who practices it. For just as the epithet when used to silence fair argument returns upon the user as a deliberalizing influence, fortifying him in ignorance and bigotry, narrowing his intellectual horizon, diminishing his philosophical vision, so does the epithet used as an uncharitable stigma return upon the user, making him more unsympathetic and unlovely. This is a truth that minds of coarser grain never appreciate. For them injury is an objective thing entirely; something brought upon them by somebody else. But the man of finer grain knows that the worst injury is that which he brings upon himself. By allowing passion or prejudice to dominate his soul, or by admitting the demon of anger into his heart, by cherishing petty resentments and dwelling on narrow ideas, he makes his life unlovely—a thing which no worst enemy outside him has power to do.

That's the evil for whose correction Mr. Emerson bids us go out into open nature, and see how peace and large-

ness shed their eternal blessing on us there. He tells us how Nature receives us when we come out of the hot room where high words have passed, and the fields and woods rebuke us with their calm: "So hot, my little sir!" How foolish our epithets sound out there in the open! How truly one touch of nature makes us kin! How the little surface differences of creed and politics and race are lost sight of in the fundamental sympathies of humanity! How, as we rise to the nobler heights of mental and moral aspiration, the artificial barriers which seemed insurmountable to us, sink into the dead level of insignificance. To the toddling child the board fence at the back of the garden seems to reach to heaven. The boy climbs it, the grown man overlooks it, and from yonder hill or steeple it makes but a line on the ground that one might step over. No, we cannot, for our own sake, afford to indulge in epithets of intolerance. They are the mark of a small soul, the refuge of a conceited soul, the public proclamation of our own spiritual poverty!

What, then, some one may say, are we to have no opinions of our own? Is it a delusion to embrace a cause and stand for it valiantly? Must we forever be hampered in our enthusiasm of conviction by the consideration that others who differ from us may have right on their side, too? By no means! Breadth of view and tolerance of spirit have their counterfeits, like every other valuable quality. Indifference, intellectual laziness, and timidity have often masqueraded in the habits of benign tolerance. But the warning against the ready use of epithets is so far from being a call to sacrifice our principles and opinions, that it is actually a call to establish them. It says not that we are not to hold opinions, but that no opinion is worth holding that cannot be held calmly against every argument

that is brought against it, and with complete charity for all who differ with it. It does not forbid us to have opinions of our own; it only bids us to be sure that the opinions are our own, and not merely our pastor's or our employer's or our favorite poet's or our intimate friend's.

Abandoning the epithet does not weaken our position; it clarifies our vision. "The consciousness," says Mr. Morley, "of having reflected seriously and conclusively on the important question, whether social or spiritual, augments dignity, while it does not lessen humility. In this sense taking thought can and does add a cubit to our stature. For a commanding grasp of principles, whether they are public or not, is at the very root of coherency of character." Hasty judgment, on the other hand, coupled with the hasty, intolerant word, is the greatest foe to dignity and coherency of character.

Nor, again, does this doctrine of self-denial in the use of epithets mean to disguise the fact that there are names corresponding to things that are to be fearlessly used as the proper occasion demands. There are offences which do not admit of palliation, abuses which cry aloud for correction. The man who rises in wrath and slays his brother is a murderer; he who signs a valuable paper with another's name is a forger; he who betrays the trust of widows and orphans is a scoundrel. There can be no mincing of words here. And it is no scholastic quibble that insists on a difference in essence between such hideous facts as murder, deceit, impurity, covetousness on the one hand and the imputed faults of theological dissent, political opinion, and social idiosyncrasies on the other. Let our horizon widen, our culture deepen, our knowledge increase to the farthest bounds, right remains right and wrong, wrong—and beside the moral issue of right and

wrong, the thou shalt not and the thou shalt, there is not, as Carlyle has declared, another issue of first-rate importance in our life. In passing judgment on the great moral issues, it is neither schooled sectarianism nor petty prejudice nor uncharitable criticism that speaks in us—but rather that sense of eternal justice vouchsafed to us by our ethical intuitions and increasingly confirmed in both our philosophy and experience.

The evolution of our intellectual and spiritual life, progressing in this age by such rapid strides, and already in every field of inquiry discrediting so many theories which but a little while ago seemed eternally fixed, can have but one goal. That goal is the liberalizing, the rationalizing, the unifying of spiritual life, until the petty, the insignificant, the artificial, with all their narrowness of conception and bitterness of profession, have passed forever away. Prejudice and uncharitableness are not likely to die out in our generation, or perhaps in our new century. Yet it is our high duty and inestimable privilege to take care that prejudice and uncharitableness die out in our own souls. And we shall find no greater help to their extinction in us than checking the ever-ready epithet that rises to our lips, and asking before we speak it: Is it well-considered? Is it honest? Is it necessary? Is it kind?

THE PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS.*

BY NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in Cornell University.

IT is with mingled feelings of joy and sorrow, pride and shame, sympathy and abhorrence, that we are watching in these days the birth of a new order of things in Russia. A few years ago our hearts were wrung with grief as tidings came of the sad fate of Finland. With one fell blow the Czar of all the Russias had crushed to earth a noble, enlightened and most loyal people; with one stroke of his pen he had blotted out their time-honored rights and liberties. To-day Finland is again free; her autonomy has been restored; and she rejoices in the prospect of a more perfect form of self-government than she had before. It is seldom that history has witnessed so swift a retribution, so prompt a reversal of fortunes, so speedy a return of lost liberty.

When at the end of the eighteenth century the modern world was ushered in with the cry of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," Poland, after a long and proud history, was cut to pieces and divided between Russia, Austria and Germany. From the insurrections of 1831, 1846 and 1864 she reaped only a more and more complete suppression of the privileges at first left to her by Russia. It is not likely that the new régime will bring her autonomy. The House of Hapsburg and the House of Hohenzollern fear too much the effect of an autonomous Poland on their own slices of the unfortunate country. But, unless

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a systematic attempt be made to stamp out all liberalism by a skillful play upon racial and religious prejudices, there is every reason to hope that Poland, too, may find her most legitimate aspirations realized in the redemption of Russia.

Armenia also looks for a return of her former independence. She has suffered long and waited for the coming of a better day. But neither Turkey nor Persia, holding large shares of the old kingdom, would relish an autonomous Armenia just beyond their borders. They may not be able to exercise any pressure themselves; but there are other powers that have good reason to fear any disturbance of the *status quo* in Anatolia. Yet if the struggle for democracy is successful in Russia, Armenia will share in the blessings of a larger liberty. In the Caucasus, the Georgians have long been restive under Russian rule. They, no doubt, are less prepared to appreciate the advantages of modern political institutions than the Finns, the Poles and the Armenians; but, like all mountaineers, they are lovers of liberty, and might profit more from a connection with the empire, with a just representation in its parliament, than by a return to their old tribal organization.

Autocracy has fallen. This is an accomplished fact. Whatever may happen—and the horizon is dark with heavy clouds—Russia will never again be ruled by the will of one man. Constitutional, representative, popular government is taking its place. In this we rejoice. Even if the change should involve the peaceful retirement of the reigning dynasty, there can be no cause for regret in this circumstance. Nicholas II has certainly shown no more fitness for the office of chief magistrate than Louis XVI. It is difficult for a believer in democracy to understand the tender solicitude for the Romanoffs on the part of many of

our own countrymen. Whenever they find a people struggling for freedom and trying to overthrow despotism and oppression, they affect to see only the symptoms of danger, confess lack of confidence in the principle of universal suffrage, and talk oracularly of unfitness for self-government, while their fathers regarded it as a self-evident truth that governments should derive their powers from the consent of the governed.

We sympathize with the just demands that are made for self-government, for a full and unhampered expression of the people's will, for security of person and equality before the law. Let the pendulum swing as far as it can! There are reactionary forces enough in Russia to hold it back. The radical party is at present contending for no rights and privileges that are not dear to ourselves. They ask for the right of habeas corpus, for freedom of speech, of press, and of assembly. In these liberties we find our safeguards. They protest against taxation without representation and against government without the consent of the governed. Our republic owes its existence to such a protest. They believe in the expediency of universal suffrage. So do we. Are they charged with being more or less openly republicans? Ours is a republican form of government and we are proud of it. Are they accused of being opposed to the union of state and church and the compulsory support of religion? With us the state has no religion, supports none, suppresses none.

We are proud of the men who have in a measure succeeded in redeeming Russia from an intolerable despotism. They are not the men in power. The emperor has recently been thanked by the pope for the gracious manifesto by which he has conferred liberty upon his people. This manifesto was wrung from his unwilling hands.

Count Witte has been praised as a benefactor. But he is not a man of convictions, and has no sympathy with the demands for justice and liberty. He is a clever politician who has the merit of seeing which way the wind is blowing and the necessary skill to trim the sails of the ship of state to catch the breeze. But well may we be proud of the students of Russia and of her workingmen. With what a noble enthusiasm the students at the Russian universities have laid down their youthful lives upon the altar of liberty! How they have read, and reflected, and dreamed, and discussed! How zealously they have labored, how cruelly they have suffered, how bravely they have died, that Russia might be free! They have been driven into exile, they have been thrown into dungeons, they have been marched off to the mines of Siberia. Yet they have always been on hand. When a comrade fell, another took his place. At Odessa, they stood in serried ranks as a league of defence about the unarmed Jews until the last man was hewn down by the ruthless Cossacks. All honor to the martyrs! They have not died in vain.

Beside the students, the workingmen have been the chief actors in the drama. They have sought to gain their ends with peaceful means. They made their protest quietly, though with tremendous earnestness; they waited for executive action patiently, though with great solicitude. Before their passive resistance, their ceaseless agitation, their determined pressure, the reactionary forces were obliged to yield. But they would not grant what is essential to the life of a self-governing state. Then the workingmen chose for their weapon the strike. The wheels of industry stopped; all communication ceased; the scanty supplies of the poor dwindled; society was threatened with starvation. It seemed expedient that St. Petersburg should have a "dead day" rather than that the

progress of a people toward democracy should be checked. And lamentable as it is, the strike is better than the guillotine. It is a threat rather than a blow; it involves economic loss, but not destruction of life and property. The Russian revolutionists had been able to select a more humane method of civil war than the French revolutionists. They seemed successful; and those of us who feared the worst, when the blood of the Slav should be stirred, breathed more easily.

Then the bureaucracy and the hierarchy played their last card, resorted to their lowest, meanest, most disreputable trick, to avert the threatening eclipse of their power. Our joy was dimmed, our pride turned to shame, our sympathy was in danger of being swallowed up by disgust. The world was shocked by the accounts of the most horrible atrocities perpetrated against the Jews in Odessa and in eighty-four other towns in the Russian empire. Ten thousand Jews had been massacred in the city on the Black Sea, ten thousand Jews in other places. Infants had been torn from their mothers' breasts and dashed against the stones; children had been cut to pieces in the schools; women had been horribly mutilated, and old men tortured to death. It was enough to turn the milk of human kindness sour. At first the actors behind the scenes were not observed. The Russian people stood discredited. The savage heart of the Slav had shown itself. How could these mobs be entrusted with liberty? What kind of citizens would these brutalized hordes make? Was not any form of despotism that would hold them in check good enough for them, and greatly to be preferred to hazardous experiments in self-government? The subtle, diabolical scheme had succeeded.

Gradually the truth dawns upon us that the crusade against the Jews was quite as much directed against

socialists and liberals of every stripe. By exciting the passions of orthodox Christians the necessary moral support was obtained, while a drunken militia and a reckless constabulary only needed a tip to join in the raids upon the enemies of society. There is good reason to believe that the reactionaries in state and church actually planned an extermination of heretics of every brand compared with which St. Bartholomew's night would sink into insignificance. It is too early to predict how far this horrible policy can be carried out. The deeds already done are dark enough to cast the shadow of doom over mitre and crown.

This wider purpose, however, cannot obscure the fact that the means for accomplishing it was the hatred of the Jew. The occasion for shedding the blood of thousands who were not Jews was the raising of the ghost of Anti-Semitism. The infinite pathos of these recent occurrences in Russia comes from the fact that they but summon up before us the age-long persecution of the Jews, they are but the latest repetition of what, through the Christian centuries, has been characteristic of the treatment of this people. It is this which makes us pause.

Antiochus Epiphanes is generally regarded as the first persecutor of the Jews for religious reasons. He desecrated the temple of Yahwe in Jerusalem; he offered a swine on its altar to Zeus Olympius; he put to death some Jews who refused to sacrifice to the Greek gods. But he seems to have cherished no racial hostility. He conferred many favors on those Jews who welcomed Hellenic civilization. Of a different character was the persecution of Jews in Alexandria under Caligula. It was directed against a large and influential part of the population of this metropolis, speaking the Greek language and permeated with Greek thought. The motives that swayed

Apion and his party seem to have been political and economic rather than religious. That Caligula himself smiled upon the Jew-baiters, while he refused to give a hearing to Philo, the aged philosopher, was probably due to wounded pride, as the Jews failed to accord him divine honors. The cruelties to which the Jews were exposed toward the end of Hadrian's reign were the natural result of a rebellion which brought defeat to the legions of Rome in fifty-two battles and made the authority of Rome of no effect for more than two years. From Hadrian to Constantine the Jew had peace. When Rome became Christian, his sufferings began in real earnest.

Constantius deemed it a duty to persecute Jews, Arians and other heretics; and in the Byzantine empire this continued to be the policy. The Frank was orthodox, and the Jew was ill-treated, as was the Arian. Wherever orthodox Christianity was established as the religion of the state, the Jew was persecuted, expelled, or forbidden to enter. In one respect the coming of Islam improved his lot. He found a welcome in the great Muslim centres of life and learning, in Toledo and Cordova, in Morocco and Kairowan, in Fostat and Baghdad. From these he ventured forth to scatter precious seeds, and rendered yeoman service as an intellectual broker. On the other hand, the conquests of Islam brought grief to the Jews by the reaction they called forth. Wherever the Crusader went, with his pledge to rescue the tomb of Christ from the hands of the infidel, hatred of the Jew followed in his wake. In the centuries during which Europe suffered from the fitful fever of religious enthusiasm for the possession of the holy places, unspeakable indignities were heaped upon those who were still held responsible for the death of man's Redeemer.

The renaissance brought little relief. If the Jew was

forbidden to own land in the days when the soil was laid under cultivation, he was prevented from entering the guilds and plying a trade in the period when industry began to develop. He was forced to live in a Ghetto; he was obliged to become a peddler. He was successful as a money-maker. For the Talmud taught him not to despise small bargains, and to keep accounts. He drew wealth from his persecutors by usury. For Deuteronomy taught him that he might not charge interest on loans to his brothers, but that he might take usury from the stranger. When money was wanted from him, he was fawned upon. But when the debts to him became too heavy, they were cancelled. If he protested, he was beaten; if he insisted upon his rights, he was expelled and his property confiscated. When his presence was inconvenient, false charges against him were set in circulation. He needed Christian blood in his religious services; a Christian child must be slaughtered in order duly to celebrate the Passover. Woe unto him, if an epidemic broke out. Then his blood was often called for to appease the angry deity. From land to land he was driven. He had no abiding place. Every door was shut against him. Even Spain ceased to be a haven of rest to him, when the Moor was driven back to Africa.

The dominant forces in the reformation period were hostile to the Jew. He was still persecuted by the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches. The Anabaptists were friendly. Their leading thinkers voiced the most exalted sentiments of religious toleration. They urged liberty of conscience, of speech, and of worship within a state taking no cognizance of religious differences, and especially deprecated the spirit of animosity to Jews and Turks. But they were drowned in deep waters or burned at the stake, and the Protestant communities were prevented by the compulsory

support of a certain type of religion and the baneful conception of a Christian state from learning the most elementary principles of religious liberty.

It should be recorded, however, that Holland and Hungary, Denmark and Sweden, England and America have treated the Jew with greater justice and fairness than the other nations, have given him opportunities to live his own life, and taken the lead in according him the rights and privileges of citizenship. In these countries legislative action on his behalf has been in response to popular sentiment. Enlightened despots, like Peter of Russia and Joseph II of Austria, by their favors gave a strong impetus to the development of Jewish life in their lands. But their personal attitude was far in advance of the disposition of their subjects, and reforms that do not rest upon the will and convictions of the many have in them no promise of stability.

The rationalism of the eighteenth century ushered in a new era in the history of this people. It is easy to decry as superficial this mighty revolt of human reason against the dogmas, cult, and spirit of orthodox Christianity. It may have been lacking in historic sense; but it was rich in common sense. And it rendered a most useful service to humanity by sweeping away a host of superstitions and prejudices, hoary with age, and laying bare the simple principles of justice too long obscured by them. Where that tendency of thought known as deism or rationalism, *Aufklaerung* or *éclaircissement*, affected social life, a new attitude toward the Jew was noticeable. When Lessing looked for a nobler type of manhood, embodying the catholic spirit of the age, the figure of Moses Mendelsohn rose before his mind to furnish the features of his Nathan, the Wise.

The nineteenth century saw many fetters fall, many un-

just laws repealed, many prejudices pass away. Toward the end of this century, however, there was a new outburst of Anti-Semitism. As though the demon of race hatred knew that his time was short, he hastened to pour out everywhere the vials of his wrath. In Germany and Austria, the populace was incited to attacks upon the Jews in the name of Christianity and Teutonism. In France, the Dreyfus scandal revealed the bitter feeling against this people and the disreputable means to which religious fanaticism and an imbecile *esprit de corps* will stoop. In Rumania, invidious laws were passed, restricting the rights of the Jews in the use of the schools, the holding of property, the exercise of the franchise. In Russia, outbursts of violence, added to cumbersome legal restrictions, forced 800,000 Jews to go into exile; and the ill-treatment of this people culminated in the horrors of Kishineff and the atrocities of Odessa.

Even in countries where this feeling finds no expression in deeds of violence, a social ostracism is often practiced which cannot but be deeply felt. There is an unwillingness to show the ordinary courtesies of life to the Jew, to fraternize with him, to welcome him in the home, to greet him at social gatherings, to invite him to clubs, to stay in the same hotel with him, to eat and drink with him. There is a tendency to snub him, to discount his good qualities, to exaggerate his foibles, to impugn his motives when his conduct is irreproachable, to ridicule his peculiarities and make merry over his sensitiveness, to drive him out of society and reproach him for his exclusiveness.

When we ask what the chief causes are of this persecution of the Jews, it is impossible to avoid the impression that the first and foremost, at the present time, as in the past, is religious intolerance. The Jew rejects the deity of

Jesus. To him Jesus is only a man. He regards the worship of the prophet of Nazareth as idolatry. As a rule, he holds Jesus himself responsible for this idolatrous worship of his person, assuming that he gave himself out to be a god appearing in human flesh. He cannot easily forget what countless sufferings this deified prophet has brought upon his people through the centuries.

On the other hand, the orthodox Christian looks upon Jesus as "very God." With reverence and gratitude he reflects upon the infinite love of God in condescending to be born of a virgin and live upon the earth as a man. With awe and indignation he thinks of the insult offered to the Divine Majesty, the pain given to the compassionate heart of God, by the persistent unbelief and wilful refusal of the Jews to acknowledge the incarnate Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, as their true Messiah and crown him Lord of all. He expects him to return upon the clouds of heaven to wreak vengeance on his enemies, according to the sure prophetic word. But how can he himself afford to act as though he were indifferent to the treatment of his divine Saviour? In the countries where the Jew is exposed to the severest forms of persecution it is still the common belief of Christians that failure of crops, epidemics, and other afflictions, are signs of divine displeasure for sins left unpunished by the community. It is essential for the public welfare that the guilty parties be found and punishment meted out to them in order that the wrath of God may be appeased. Under such conditions, the presence in a community of a large number of men who are regarded as living in open revolt against the Almighty by denying and blaspheming his divine Son is more than sufficient to cause intense fear and anxiety to get rid of the offenders.

It is serious enough, if the general prosperity is en-

dangered by Arians, Socinians, Unitarians, and other Christian heretics. The case of the Jew is aggravated by the fact that through him the Lord of glory was put to death. When the true Messiah appeared, he was murdered by the Jews. It is constantly repeated by Catholics and Protestants alike that the exile from their land and the fearful sufferings to which they have been exposed are the divine punishments meted out to the Jews for the murder of the Christ. Apologists never tire of pointing to the continued existence and wretched fate of this people as an evidence of the divine origin of Christianity, Providence plainly indicating the rejection of the chosen race because it was guilty of deicide.

The orthodox Christian sees evidences of divine wrath resting on this people, not only in its external circumstances, but also in its continued slavery to the traditions of the fathers, its inability to free itself from the tyranny of the law, its insistence upon the letter that killeth, its obstinate love of ceremonies and institutions, such as circumcision, sabbath-keeping, and distinctions between clean and unclean meats. A veil seems to him to hang before the face of the Jew preventing him from seeing in his own Scriptures the real meaning of those Messianic prophecies that have all been fulfilled in Christ.

This orthodox Christian conception of the Jew has broken down so completely under the influence of modern thought that it is only with difficulty we can enter into its inner life and appreciate its natural and inevitable effects. When one has an opportunity, however, to watch the thousands upon thousands of pilgrims who annually come to the sacred sites in Palestine, to see their sincere and unsophisticated faith, their blind obedience to their spiritual guides, their utter devotion to the interests of the church, and to observe the manifest horror with which they look

upon the people they regard as under the curse of heaven, it is easy to understand how the millions they represent can be stirred most profoundly by prejudices that would not move the religiously indifferent masses in our Western nations. But even here it may be seen how powerful the religious motive is. Little children are taught in the Sunday school that the Jews killed Christ, and they have their hearts stirred to animosity against their innocent Jewish playmates. It is rare that the Christian pulpit, in its frequently repeated and minute descriptions of the tragical fate of the Nazarene, has the fairness or insight to discriminate between the conservative religious leaders who were responsible for his death and the mass of his people at the time and in subsequent ages.

These disgraceful religious prejudices are never completely banished until a new and corrected estimate of Jesus takes the place of the conception presented by the ecumenical creeds. It is not enough to recognize, as thoughtful men generally do to-day, that Jesus was a man, born of human parents, subject to the limitations of his birth, his ancestry, environment and age, moving within the boundaries set by nature's laws, and passing away, as every son of man, upon the road that sees no traveller return. The peculiarity of his genius, the radical character of his message, the worth of his principles, the dignity and beauty of his life, his repudiation of all lordship, and his freedom from all messianic ambitions, should be appreciated. That Jesus should have ended his life upon a cross of shame will then appear in the highest degree lamentable, not because he was something else than a man, but because he was so great and good a man. From this point of view it will be seen that the responsibility for the heinous crime is not to be charged against the Jewish people as such, but against that obscurantist army

arrayed against the light whose ranks are filled in every age by men of every race. Whether the prophet of Nazareth was condemned at a regular session of the Sanhedrin or not, whether Sadducees or Pharisees were more culpable in the matter, whether he was crucified by Roman soldiers or Jewish officials, are questions of a wholly subordinate historic interest. Suppose that he was actually sentenced to death by the highest court on a false charge at a somewhat irregular session, that Pharisees as well as Sadducees were implicated in this judicial murder, and that Caiaphas did not scruple any more than Alexander Jannæus to crucify an offender after the Roman procurator had given his permission. Where is the people that has not persecuted its radicals, and put to death men who came to them with new and unpopular truths? Where is the nation whose prophets have not known the fellowship of his sufferings? How many have been hanged, or drowned, or burned to death, in the name of Christ, for no other crime than that they have been in advance of their age, finding new paths of knowledge, struggling for recognition of higher ideals? Should Christians be persecuted to-day for the judicial murders that must be laid at the door of the Church?

If orthodox Christians can see in orthodox Judaism nothing else than antiquated ritual observances and debasing bondage to the letter of the law, they prove themselves sadly incapable of perceiving the real ethical value of the long training in obedience to the law, and equally blind to the manifest tendencies of their own creedalism and sacramentalism. It is indeed greatly desirable that formalism of every type should yield to rational views and true spirituality. But these signs of the maturing life of man do not come by blows and incivilities, by massacre of infants and torture at the stake. They are produced

by study and reflection, by inner discipline and cultivation of the moral sense. The religious attitude of the Jew, whether orthodox or reformed, does not in the slightest measure justify the ill-treatment to which he has been exposed.

Another cause for the persecution of the Jew is racial prejudice. He belongs in Asia. He is essentially an Oriental. With all his power of adaptation, there remains in him something that is foreign, in thought, in sentiment, in life. He is clannish. His interest is centered on his own people. He cares for none but the children of Israel. He pushes his own men to the front, and seeks to give them the centre of the stage. He wedges his way into every place. He claims everything for Israel. So it is said. And there is a measure of truth in these charges. But if the Jew preserves, through a long ancestry and constant relations with his brethren in the East, a strain of Oriental thought and feeling, this is a gain, and not a loss, to Occidental life. We have as much to learn from the East as the East has to learn from us, and the natural mediators perform a most useful service. If the Jew is clannish, who made him so? Who drove him into the Ghetto to live by himself? Who forced him into the street, and shut every door he would enter? Who cast him bleeding by the wayside? Who passed by on the other side without noticing his sores? If the Jew is self-centred, who made him so? Should he be censured for binding up his own wounds? Is not this adding insult to injury?

But he really is not as clannish as his enemies maintain. On the contrary, it may be questioned whether any nation in antiquity had a larger and more generous interest in the other nations of the earth than Israel, and whether any people to-day is more easily moved to enthusiasm for humanity. The prophet of the exile who first seems to have

conceived of Israel as a chosen people also maintained that it was chosen for service, to be a blessing to all the nations of the earth. It was a great Jewish prophet who proclaimed the coming of the kingdom of heaven to earth as a reign of righteousness, mercy and truth. The mightiest movement in modern times for bettering the conditions of man's life on earth, regardless of race, nation, and religion, a movement inspiring millions with the hope of a nobler social order, was fathered by two prophets of Jewish blood, Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle.

Sometimes there is in Israel a reaction against particularism so violent that it carries men to positions almost unheard of in other nations. In coarser natures this reaction shows itself in a curious dread of being known as belonging to the peculiar people, an irrational desire to root up and destroy everything Jewish, a mad participation in calumny and slander of the race, and actual hostility to their own kith and kin. The Jew himself becomes a Jew-baiter of the most pronounced type. In prophetic souls it leads to such a close identification with a just and merciful god, such a passionate devotion to the truth, such an ardent enthusiasm for the welfare of humanity, that the passing of cult and creed, temple and monarchy, law and covenant, church and state, are viewed with calm resignation, if not with eager desire. In view of such personalities as Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Jeremiah, the authors of Job and of Jonah, Jesus and Paul, Ibn Gabirol and Abulafia, d' Acosta and Spinoza, Heine and Lassalle, the charge of clannishness seems absurd. Nor should it be forgotten, because of their faithful care of the poor and needy among their own people, how constantly and generously Jewish philanthropists have responded to calls for relief of suffering or support of benevolent work, regardless of race or religion.

Still another cause for the persecution of the Jew is economic friction, envy and resentment. The Jew is a successful trader. He lends and does not borrow. He practices usury. He holds the mortgages, and pockets as interest most of the proceeds of the poor man's toil. He makes money fast, and loves to display his wealth. He flaunts before the eyes of his rivals the evidences of his economic superiority. So it is said. And there is some truth in these indignant comments. The extraordinary capacity of the Jew for money-getting is not to be denied. But if he is more successful behind the counter than behind the plow or the loom, it is pertinent to ask, Who made him a peddler? Who drove him away from tilling the soil, and forbade him to work at a trade, and forced him to make money his tool and his weapon? Who robbed him of his interest? Who stole his capital? Who cancelled the debts that men owed him? When all other avenues of life were closed to him, is he to be censured for becoming familiar with the one that was left open?

The qualities that have given him the economic strength men envy are in the main such that he need not be ashamed of them. They are thrift and sobriety, caution and watchfulness, industry and persistence like that of the rocks. The Jew, as a rule, is an honest trader. He has learned his craft well and understands the conditions of true success. He has taken a prominent part in the modern organization of commerce and industry; he is conspicuous by his absence among the leaders of crazy finance and the promoters of fraudulent schemes. It is not Jewish but Christian names that have been made a by-word and a hissing by the recent disclosures of disreputable practices in the business world.

When men, in new and favorable surroundings, rise in

a generation from abject poverty to competence and even affluence, it is not to be expected that they will at once acquire the quiet dignity, the gentle manner, and the refined tastes that, as a rule, are the result of careful nurture, for a longer period of time, in comfortable circumstances. It may well be admitted that many Jews in our large cities who have been fortunate enough to escape from grinding poverty and been able to accumulate money have not had time to learn how to use their wealth, are fond of luxury and vulgar in their tastes. But it certainly is not for us in the New World to throw stones on that account. One of the charges most frequently made against us as a people by critics across the sea is that we know how to make money but not how to use it. Nor is it worth the while denying that a certain fondness for gay plumage, a somewhat absurd pompousness, an unmistakable vulgarity of taste, a ridiculous snobbishness, and a pathetic confidence in the "Almighty Dollar," are too characteristic of our mushroom aristocracy of wealth. It is also a noticeable fact that when the hope of progress takes the place of sullen resignation or dull despair, there is often a bending of all energies to the acquisition of the coveted good, an apparent centering of all affections on the medium of social redemption. The new opportunity leads to temporary forgetfulness of the higher things of life. Let us hope, however, that we shall outgrow these defects, as we outgrow the distempers of our childhood, never to be afflicted by them again. One thing is certain: Whether the qualities that have given the Jew his economic strength are such as should be deplored and avoided, or such as should be admired and emulated, there is not the slightest excuse in any of them for either social ostracism or more violent forms of persecution.

The Jew has taken a large and honorable part in every

movement characteristic of our modern world. He has made valuable contributions in every field he has entered, in commerce and industry, in statecraft and political life, in science and art, in ethics and religion. There is little profit in comparing the great men of one race with those of another with a view to deciding their rank, in laying claims and counterclaims for positions of honor. Suffice it that where some important work was to be done, some service of a high order was needed, the man for the occasion was as likely to come from this people as from any other; that considering its size and circumstances it has produced a surprising number of rarely gifted individuals; that the average of intelligence and character is very high; and that its presence in any national life is at once an earnest of progress and liberality and a guarantee of needful conservatism. The presence of a large Jewish element in the Social Democracy is significant. It indicates that the sense of social injustice is as keen in the modern Jew as it was in his forebears, and that the prophetic dream of a better society has as great a fascination to him as of yore. It is also a surety of the peaceful character of socialistic propaganda. The Jew is opposed to every war. He lives on both sides of every boundary line. His presence in our republic is invaluable. He helps to keep us true to our peaceful mission in the world. He can be depended upon whenever our institutions are in peril by sectarian encroachments. Whether orthodox or reformed, he will assist in preserving the secular character of our public schools, and in preventing public funds from being turned to denominational uses. In the struggle of the people for its rights against the self-elected stewards of its wealth, his sense for righteousness, resourcefulness, and tenacity of purpose cannot but be of greatest service. At any time he is entitled to say to his Christian fellow-

worker: "I, too, have had my share in bringing about the things in which you glory; I, too, have borne the heat and burden of the day; and I have labored under circumstances that made my service harder than yours."

In the name of justice we protest from this platform against the persecution of the Jew. We denounce as out of harmony with the principles that should govern our conduct every expression of religious intolerance, every manifestation of racial prejudice, and every form of economic envy or class hatred. In the name of outraged humanity we protest against the indignities heaped upon the Jewish people, the atrocious treatment which has been accorded to it. In the name of social ideals which should be dear to all, and many of which have been born in the minds of the prophets of Israel, we ask all men to remember the bonds of a universal brotherhood.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE COMING INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL CONGRESS.

PLANS are being formed to hold an International Ethical Congress in London next summer, which will be ten years after the first Congress, that gave birth to the International Ethical Union, was held in Zurich. Delegates from many parts of the world will for the second time meet to discuss questions of common interest and to plan common work. Among the important matters it is proposed to bring before the Congress, are the drafting of a constitution for the International Ethical Union so as to provide efficient international machinery, the re-affirmation or revision of the Manifesto, and the large problem of the mission of the International Secretariat including active propoganda on a considerable scale. Several other valuable suggestions have been put forward, such as the provision in Universities of a separate Ethical Chair, the emphasis of the ethical factor in the history lessons, and the making philosophy compulsory, as in France, for all College students. To these suggestions I should like to add two further proposals which intimately concern the Ethical Movement. The first proposal will probably be received sympathetically and possibly may be accepted. The second one, perhaps because of its novelty, may as yet command only passing attention. We will treat the two proposals separately. The first one relates to

The Ethical Movement and Moral Instruction.

Of the interest which the whole Ethical Movement has shown for Moral Instruction, it would be waste of time to say much. Twenty years ago, in 1886, Mr. Salter spoke of "The Duty Liberals Owe their Children," and already

hinted at the system of moral instruction which has generally found favor in the American Ethical Societies. Six years later Professor Felix Adler published his book on "The Moral Instruction of Children," and since that time not only articles and pamphlets by various writers, but a series of volumes by Mr. Sheldon, have been published on the subject. Simultaneously actual moral instruction became everywhere an acknowledged and leading activity of an Ethical Society, and an Ethical Sunday school an important feature of such a Society. In England the Moral Instruction Movement began with the institution of Sunday schools connected with Ethical Societies, and led eventually to the formation of the Moral Instruction League which is now one of the most important educational factors in the country, many thousands of public schools having adopted its Graduated Syllabus of Moral Instruction and many thousands more being now on the point of adopting it. In Germany the interest in the topic has always been keen, and not only of late years have leaflets, pamphlets and books been published on the subject, but quite recently a Secular and Moral Instruction League has been founded by the German Society for Ethical Culture. In Switzerland the Lausanne Society, inspired by Professor Forel, has taken much active interest in the problem, and Dr. Fr. W. Foerster, the late Secretary of the International Ethical Union, who has been for some years teaching in Zurich, published two years ago a monumental work on Moral Instruction of which some 10,000 copies have been sold.

The interest in moral instruction has been almost spontaneous everywhere, a mere hint sufficing for the bringing forward of the question. Yet this very spontaneity has perhaps prevented moral instruction from coming as much into the foreground as it might otherwise have done. The

spontaneity has been valuable in encouraging originality; but it has hindered the several countries from profiting by one another's experiences. There is also lacking that stimulation which would arise from a full knowledge of what is being done in different Ethical centres. Much remains here to be accomplished, and it is to be hoped that the International Secretariat will prepare for the coming Congress a "Report on Moral Instruction" in English, German and French which will succinctly and yet exhaustively deal with what has been accomplished in the matter. The International Moral Instruction Movement should profit by such a report, for we not only want good moral instruction, but the best possible.

Yet given intelligent interest in the subject and in the various moral instruction methods in use, there still remains something important to be done. We ought to advance a further step. The movement in general and every individual Ethical Society in particular should make moral instruction a plank in the ethical platform, and promote its objects locally and nationally, as well as within the homes of members, by the institution of Sunday schools and Ethical Classes. Every new member should be made aware of his responsibility in this matter, and Societies should feel that an Ethical Society, however poor it may be, is the fittest place for experiments in moral instruction to be undertaken, and the source from which the most valuable suggestions as to subject matter and method are to be expected. Poor and few as are the English Ethical Sunday Schools, it is they who have communicated the substance of the Graduated Syllabus of Moral Instruction and have inspired the Moral Instruction League. We want an enormous extension of the Ethical Sunday School Movement, and plenty of deliberate experiments in which to test the various methods.

Every Ethical Sunday School should be an experiment station in moral instruction, and should be aware of the experiments carried on by all the other teaching centres. In this way the Ethical Movement may not only succeed in getting moral instruction introduced into all primary and secondary schools and colleges ; but, what is of crucial importance, in popularizing a system which is sound both as to subject matter and as to method. Let us not forget that morality, like every school subject, may be taught badly.

I would, therefore, suggest as a topic for the International Ethical Congress in London, the question of the international organization of moral instruction. Let every individual Ethical Society the world over be known to take a vital interest in this important problem.

The second suggestion, that of dealing internationally with the problem of

The Ethical Movement and Education,
is not so easily disposed of.

The general ground on which one may be pardoned for urging that the problem of education should be coördinated with that of moral instruction in the Ethical Movement and be given, therefore, a conspicuous place, is of a character that will probably appeal to many of us. Education in itself is a priceless good, especially when the school is guided by moral ends ; but as such it cannot be the special concern of Ethical Societies any more than of other non-educational bodies. There are, however, more strictly ethical aspects to the problem of Education which tend to justify the new attitude and which we must, therefore, enlarge on.

The most obvious connection between the Ethical Movement and education lies in the region of democratic government of the people, by the people, and whatever the

political views of members of Ethical Societies, this connection remains unchanged. If the people possess no character and no judgment, how are they to escape being misled by ambitious demagogues on the one hand, and scheming politicians who wish to exploit them on the other? How are they to avoid following men whose intentions are good enough, but whose judgment is that of idle dreamers? How are they to be prevented from breaking out into panic, from making unreasonable demands, from behaving like children who are incapable of dispensing with guidance at every step? In other words, how without judgment and character, are they to play the part of the good and efficient citizen?

Now the Ethical Society labors to induce all men to become good and efficient citizens; yet how is it to compass its end without the help of a general and excellent system of Education? Surely, in these modern days we can no longer contend that a man has judgment if he has character, or that the good man instinctively knows the right. Accordingly, if we wish to save the people from themselves and from ignorant or scheming leaders, we must insist on a high education for all, an education which will form character, strengthen the judgment, and give every man an idea of his place and duty in nature and society. Short of denying our ethical mission or raising a cry of despair, we are bound to recognize that the Ethical Movement must, as a body, demand, and incessantly reiterate the demand for a thorough education for all, women included. Not otherwise may we hope, as we do hope, to moralize municipal, national and world politics and to promote a lofty tone not only in a few select homes but in whole communities. Education, like economics, is not everything; but it is an indispensable factor in general moral advance.

A thorough system of education will solve many other difficulties besides political ones. If the generality of men were well educated, the nature of most of our daily papers would fundamentally change. They would no longer deal in sensations, they would no longer spread false reports, they would no longer be a standing danger to international concord, and they would no longer be superficial. On the contrary, they would serve high purposes, since otherwise the public patronage would be withdrawn. So, too, with the trashy literature—the Storyettes, Short Stories, Novelettes, half-penny shockers—which is now devoured in enormous quantities because the low education of the majority of the people does not fit them for anything better. The yellow press and the red novel could not subsist in an educated society. On the contrary, as one can see the beginnings of the process already to-day, first-class papers, first-class books, and international amity, would be encouraged, and the consequent ethical benefit would be incalculable.

Nor would the influence stop at this point. Heavy drinking would be severely checked; gambling and betting would decline; mere interest in comfort and luxury would diminish; sensuality would not be nourished; and this because a manifold interest of a desirable kind would deprive these propensities of the congenial soil of mental and physical idleness in which they flourish. On the other hand, art and recreation of a socially healthy character would be loved and sought.

There would also be a reaction on the individuals. The working classes would be far more efficient in their avocations; they would refuse to support an autocratic militarism; they would demand leisure for family and other duties; they would not work in ill-ventilated factories; and they would resent imperious treatment by their industrial

rulers. The whole of industry would accordingly be rationalized and moralized, and no worker would any longer dread unemployment, illness, accidents, old age, or be unable to support himself and his family. Only give character and judgment to the masses and everything would necessarily change for the better. We should have a race of self-relying men who freely coöperate for the purpose of achieving ideal ends. Manifestly, economic revolt is only one way of fighting injustice and establishing the City of Light.

Of course, much, almost everything, depends on the kind of education supplied. If, for instance, as to-day in England, a mechanical education of a few years in the primary school should be followed, as is beginning to be the practice, by some years in a secondary school or polytechnic where commercial and manufacturing ideals are dominant, very little would be gained. Even if a University education were added on commercial lines, which seems to be the new ideal, the democracy would scarcely be fit for the moral task. At the utmost such an education would prove to the masses that it is the wrong sort of education and that quite a different kind is needed to satisfy moral demands.

As ethicists we must, I believe, insist on at least three definite features. The education must tend to form a strong ethical character; it must create the power to judge correctly and quickly; and it must give the pupil a tolerable conception of his place in society and nature. Only the last point need be elaborated. On reflection everybody will admit that he who is to be a director in a nation's affairs ought to have a broad basis of knowledge and not be absorbed in the present moment. He ought to know the story of man and society from the chipped stone implement and the isolated primitive tribe to the machine

age and modern civilization with its intercommunicating countries, and he should be made to feel that we are but "at the cockcrow of civilization" and that strenuous personal and social lives are still as needful as ever. Secondly, a man to be self-reliant and self-respecting, must know his place in the Universe, and thus the stories of astronomy, of geology and of the evolution of life, should become familiar to the children as they grow older. These are the three definite features without which education can achieve but little in the reformation of man and society. If one point may be added, on the side of method, it is that in an age of cheap books one of the highest aims of the school must be to make the children love reading the best authors, so that they might voluntarily continue their education beyond school age. With a good education to start with, a love of what is best in literature, art and science implanted in their breasts, and cheap classics to help, we are likely to gain the results which we are eager to obtain.

At present education is as yet scarcely born. Methods and subject matter have been generally decided on, at least in general practice, by casual experience and by a non-democratic and often anti-democratic ideal; but once the true significance of education is grasped, many things will be altered. Pedantry will be abolished and with it very much that is superfluous in almost every school subject; spelling will be phonetic; the metric or some duodecimal system will be taught everywhere; grammar will be revolutionized; authors will write in some international language so that exchange of thought shall be simplified; and the child will be trained to observe, to experiment, to generalize, and to deduce truths, according to the procedure in scientific investigation. The interest in the Army and Navy will be replaced by that of the School, and to reform the school will be one of the principal objects of na-

tional assemblies. One hundred million pounds a year, as now in England with the Army and Navy, will be accordingly cheerfully voted for educational purposes, seeing especially the productive character of the expenditure.

All, except those who do not believe in the mass of the people ever being capable of possessing character, judgment, and a knowledge of man's place in nature and society, must agree on emphasizing education. Here the theologian and the non-theologian, the individualist and the socialist, the radical and the conservative may unite, for none can doubt the advantage of the people as a whole being well educated. Only he who wishes to exploit the people, can conceivably object to a system of universal education. If to these arguments be added, that our only choice is between an unintelligent and an intelligent ruling democracy, and if we allow, as we must, that democracy is rapidly proving its capacity for developing, it is indubitable that all advanced and ethical sections of thinkers and workers—social reformers of all types included—should devote very considerable attention to the education of the people.

If I have been successful in making a strong case for the absolute and crying need from a moral point of view of a far higher education than the people receive at present, then my suggestion will not seem unreasonable, *i. e.*, that every individual Ethical Society and all the national ethical organizations as well as the International Ethical Union should deal sympathetically and systematically with the educational problem. The Societies should accordingly assist the cause of education from their platforms; they should, as organizations, promote efficient education; they should encourage public libraries, reading rooms, and general lecturing of a high type; they should publish lists of cheap editions of the Classics, including scientific

works ; they should guide the self-education of their members ; and they should forward educational ends through their national and international organizations.

A perfect humanity must mean a highly cultured democracy, and on a perfecting of humanity the Ethical Movement is bent. Through education—moral, scientific and philosophical—lies the road to social salvation.

GUSTAV SPILLER,

Secretary International Ethical Union.

36b Albert Bridge Road, London, S. W.

MASSACRE AND LIBERTY IN RUSSIA.*

BY MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER.

THE topic assigned me in this retrospect of the year is "Massacre and Liberty in Russia." When we speak the word "Russia" we think of that vast empire comprising nearly one-sixth of the habitable earth and nearly one-tenth of the population of the world. We think of its awful contrast of luxury and famine, one-third of its land belonging to the Czar, the richest sovereign in his own name in the world; one-third held by the nobility and landed proprietors, and only one-third left for its nine-tenths of people, the agricultural class and the wage-earners. We think of its polyglot population, at least nine distinct races, one-half of them of white stock and one-half of yellow stock. We think of it to-day, and rightly, as compared with even fifty years ago, as a retrograde nation. The buried germs of constitutional government in its ancient Zemstvos now struggling for a new life. Still more suggestive, its ancient communal village organization in which, as a hint, for some happier future, we do believe, is shown the genius of the Russian people for fraternal associations for social ends.

When we say the words "massacre in Russia" what do we think of? We think first of the awful slaughter of the Jews, the wellnigh incredible survival of middle-age superstition and gross cruelty. We think of that pathetic massacre on the 22d of last January, slaughter of hope-

* An address before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, Sunday, December 31, 1905.

less, unarmed men and women and children, marching with a priest at the head, to beg pity of the "Little Father" in whom they still believed; and we think of what the headlines of the newspapers bring us every morning; the indiscriminate rage of slaughter, class against class, in which neither side recognizes truly friend or foe, innocent or guilty, but only seeks to express the strong uprising of a blind rage against oppression and outrage.

But these things, my friends, awful as they are, are not the most awful massacre which Russia is suffering from.

The *spiritual* massacre, the unique, selective, systematic crime of slaughter by the Russian government, by which, for more than a generation every noble, brave, enlightened, reformatory, progressive spirit, man or woman, in Russia has been silenced or destroyed by the government. That is the most awful massacre, the supreme crime of the Russian government. I know not its like in any recent history.

One of the latest stories is of the pathetic, the cruel death of a gentlewoman, wife of a noble, standing by her own order, doubtless, believing in her Czar, and her church, doubtless, but pitiful and tender, full of charity and sympathy for the poor about her. She took care of one hundred destitute and orphaned children. She tended them, nursed them, taught them out of her loving heart, but that did not save her. When the peasants rose, they killed her, and set fire to her castle, the scene of her charity. What does that mean?

Let me, in the brief moment I have, picture to you for answer, another woman and her fate. More than twenty years ago, Sophie Bardino was summoned before the judges at St. Petersburg, charged, with forty-nine other men and women, with the political crime of teaching the peasants unauthorized by the church. She was a well-

born girl, highly cultured, graduated at the schools of Moscow and Zurich. She took for the protection of her youth the name of the widow Bardino. She went into a factory in one of the most forlorn villages of Russia. She labored among women who were working fourteen and fifteen hours of the twenty-four, and earning seventeen cents a day. She persuaded these women to stop ruining themselves by the strong drink which they took instead of food, and taught them many things in the evening hours. They learned to feel for her a deep affection. For three years she taught these people, and in three years made such a change in that village that the Bureaucracy was suspicious. For thirty years or more, it has been the object of most suspicion to the Russian government when people stopped drinking and began to think.

They arrested this girl. They brought her before the tribunal, with the other men and women arrested for the same crime, that of trying to teach the debased, the ignorant peasantry. By common consent she was made the spokesman of the party. Asked what she would say in her defense, she made the most wonderful and eloquent plea I have ever read. I heard it twenty-two years ago from the lips of the first Russian political refugee with whom I made acquaintance, and I shall never forget it. In the little time I have, I cannot read you that speech, but I have brought you some sentences from it, which bring in that word "liberty" and explain the revolution in Russia.

Rising, with a face pallid from prison torture, but with an eye undimmed and a voice untrembling (as I was told by one present) save from deep emotion, she faced her accusers, and these are some of the words she said:

"Gentlemen, who are my judges, I shall not deny that I have labored as a propagandist in the factory, but I can-

not call myself guilty, for I have done no harm to the community, nor tried to do any. We are accused of destroying the foundations of society;”—and then she makes a wonderful argument opposing that charge. Closing she says, “Are these social conditions moral which divide the citizens into two parties in one of which is nothing but pleasure, while in the other the laborers are dying of hunger? Nor will I confess that we have disturbed the tranquility of society, for no individual efforts can overthrow any form of society which does not carry in its own bosom the seeds of destruction. I know too, any government that exercises despotic power, oppresses the citizens, takes the side of the few against the many, is marching to its ruin. I deny that I have tried to stir up a revolt. I believe that it is only by peaceable propagandism that Russia can be fittingly prepared for the revolution that I know is sure to come. I ask no pity of you, gentlemen, I do not need it, for my conscience does not accuse me. Keep on prosecuting us, let loose your police and your soldiers upon us so long as they obey you, but remember the lessons of history, which teach that the bloodiest repression is powerless against the regenerating current that sweeps away the government that is worn out. I am sure that our nation, which has slept for ages, will in the end awake. Prosecute us then, ye judges and hangmen! Massacre and exile us so long as you have physical force on your side! It is moral force that is opposed to you, and that shall in the end do away with all violence. The force of progress, the ideas of liberty and equality, are working for us, and they cannot be pierced by your bayonets. Gentlemen, I have no more to say. Proceed with your sentence.”

I have brought you this little extract from this great speech of a prophet-martyr of national reform in Russia,

to show why Russian progress toward liberty lacks fitting leadership to-day.

The death of the gentlewoman in the castle at the hands of infuriated peasants whom she had tried to help is explained by the sentence of this youthful prophetess, this wise, devoted, would-be helper in the saving of her race, who suffered two years in prison and nine years of hard labor in the mines of Siberia.

I was told by one who knew this woman, that so noble was her bearing, and so lovely her sympathetic ministrations, that when a brutal Cossack attempted to insult her on the way to Siberia, the woman to whom she was chained, a woman of the street, debased and foul-mouthed, nearly sacrificed her life to protect her innocent sister.

It is because of this unique crime of Russia, this massacre of her best, and wisest, her most self-sacrificing and enlightened, by a selective, systematic process of extermination, that this bloody revolution has come in that unhappy land. Do not be deceived. We may hear again from Russia the ominous words, "All quiet in Warsaw, all quiet in Moscow, all quiet in St. Petersburg, all still along the Baltic." Yet is it true that the government that "is worn out" and has filled its cup of crime to the brim, will be swept away by the "regenerating current" of which that martyr-prophetess spoke, and let us not doubt the issue. Above all, let us free Americans not be so base and ignoble as to fail to give the sympathy of our hearts and whatever else we have to give to these, the righteous remnant in Russia, no matter what excesses and awful horrors may usher in the dawn of the coming day of liberty in Russia.

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT EVENTS.*

BY MR. LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

WHILE our attention of late has been greatly absorbed in interests far from home, and while we have dwelt as world citizens, even upon our own soil, yet we have been called again and again from the thought of the "yellow peril" of the East, and from terrors in Russia, to consider dangers and problems in the United States; and it is my task, in few words, to speak of some of the recent issues in the United States and of their moral significance.

Our problems, in this country, have been unlike the problems of the Orient, or of Russia, unlike the problems even of England in a way, in that they have been primarily, as I interpret them, problems arising from prosperity.

There has been a comparative peace between labor and capital. There has been no great problem of the unemployed, for there has been abundant labor for all. The methods of philanthropy and relief have gone upon their usual course without any unusual appeal for particular occasions. There has been an hitherto almost unknown prosperity in all the ways of industry, in the mines and forests, upon the farms, and in the mills, which have been running at their utmost pace. Prices have been high, and every industry has flourished. The nation has been at peace with the world, and her position among the nations is best accredited by the Peace of Portsmouth, which presents America as a peace-loving power.

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It is out of this prosperity and seeming industrial peace that the American issues have come of late. It is in prosperity, in plenty and not in want, that the interpretation of the problems of American life must be sought. Carlyle long ago bemoaned the fact that in England people had been so busy gaining wealth, that they had forgotten to divide it justly; and what Carlyle saw in the middle of the nineteenth century in England, is becoming more and more apparent to the people of the world, and was never more significantly true than in our own country at the present time. But our problem has not been the problem Carlyle suggested, that of the redistribution of wealth; but rather how to conserve wealth to the interests of all the people; and if we will look at the various interests that have aroused popular agitation, and stimulated the public conscience, we shall find that they all hang upon a single thread, that of the danger of the way in which great fortunes, and the massing of great fortunes in great corporations threaten the interests of the people of America.

I have not time, nor is there need, to rehearse the various recent agitations, but I may mention briefly a few of the more significant, in order to discover what I believe to be the principle running through all of them. The first in point of time, although not in importance, is that people have approached the methods of business life under the topic of what is considered "Tainted Money." The significant fact of this agitation is to be seen in that some of our greatest teachers and leaders of the people have come to raise the question whether interests with religious, educational and philanthropic ends can wisely accept donations from those whose methods in the business world are, at least, questionable, without being themselves compromised by this acceptance.

There has been little practical issue from the agitation

concerning tainted money, and in fact no very clear principles have been discovered through the agitation, but we may note as the underlying factor in this discussion, an awakening, on the part of a few at least, to question the methods by which great fortunes are being built up, and again, of the methods by which vast fortunes are used. The question is raised whether the interests of humanity are wisely served by the use of these methods.

Following close upon the issue of tainted money, and in fact, co-operating with it, came the discussion of what has been termed "Frenzied Finance." A self-confessed frenzied financier undertook to reveal to the public the methods pursued by great corporations in crushing out the interests of individuals, and of lesser corporations. Again there have been no significant results, not even a declaration of principles by which great corporations are to be directed. But the attention of the American people has been called to a great danger, and there has come the beginning of a consideration of the vast interests involved in the organization of great corporations.

More significant than either of these themes, and fraught with greater results, is the recent insurance investigation, with the appalling revelation, before by some suspected, that men who stood the highest in the world of financial management, receiving the unquestioning honors of all people, have not only used for private ends their positions of power and influence, but have deliberately converted to their own private use vast sums of money set apart for widows and orphans; and have turned to the use of their families and pensioners, funds belonging to others; and still more have used these trusted funds for the influencing of legislation, and to make contributions to political campaigns, to the degradation of American citizenship. But the significant result of this investigation

is the beginning of the re-organization of these insurance companies, and endeavor on the part of the better element in them to assert themselves and to control these interests. Perhaps the most significant word has come from a man who has taken the responsibility of one of the larger insurance companies, in a statement to the policyholders, that henceforth the purpose of that particular society shall be, not to be the greatest insurance company, but to be the best, thus calling a halt upon the tendency in our American life to accentuate bigness, even at the cost of greatness. What the results during the coming years may be, remains to be discovered; but the most significant aspect of these agitations is the way in which the public attention has been called anew to the responsibilities of those who represent the interests of great wealth, and to the obligation that the great corporation owes to the community in which it thrives.

These agitations have certainly centered in the financial interest. I turn now to another recent awakening to discover the moral significance of recent political movements. I think we shall see that even the political interest has its centre in the problem of prosperity, that the political awakening has had its centre in the financial problem involved in prosperity. The political awakening goes back a decade and more. First there came a realizing sense of the degradation of American cities, the realization that our American cities were about the worst governed parts of the civilized world. Dr. Andrew D. White long ago declared that nowhere in the civilized world, except perhaps in Constantinople, could such appalling depths of political degradation be found as in the cities of the United States. And, realizing the degradations, some of the leaders turned to consider the causes which they found in the alignment of parties and

in partisan appropriation of spoils. To check this source of corruption civil service reform was instituted, and the holding of office made more a matter of worthiness and efficiency. But it was soon discovered that this was not enough, that there was a danger in the relationship of national and municipal politics, the interests of the city being secondary to the interests of state and national campaigns; and so there came a movement to separate municipal from national politics, carried out in some of the cities by the appointment of a different time for the holding of national and local elections. But it is beginning to be realized that these methods, previously tried, are not sufficiently effective, that instead of governments by parties, we have governments by a few within the party, called the "ring," and not so much by the ring as by the man who is at the centre of the ring, whom we call the "boss." And so there has come a movement throughout the United States, particularly in the great cities, in opposition to bossism. It has come to be realized that the government of our American cities is not a government by parties, nor even the government by one political force against another; but the suspicion, at least, has grown, from consideration of ample evidence, that whatever the party in power, there is an alliance of party bosses with each other, and with the corporations whose interests become their own. It is this situation that explains the uprising in 1905 against the bosses, with instances of which we are familiar in connection with Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and other cities, large and small, throughout the land.

This political awakening itself seems to be in large part due to an interest in the financial well-being of the community, to the feeling on the part of citizens that what they pay in taxes does not go to legitimate ends of public improvements, but to the purse of those who rob the city.

Our citizenship has been measured, in part at least, by the standard of the purse, and it is against the threatened danger to the financial well-being of citizens and of the community, that we have been aroused.

If I interpret rightly the significance of these events, it is that we have become sensitive to our financial rights, and that we have asserted ourselves for their maintenance. In all these discussions the moral interest has been but little considered. In the discussion of the insurance investigation much has been said about the need that the money set apart for widows and orphans should be forthcoming. There has been slight accentuation of the moral degradation implied in the breach of financial trusts. We have not as a people cried out against the wrong, only against the financial danger. We have not held up the lofty ideal of American citizenship, but we have concerned ourselves with the financial danger involved in political corruption. In other words, while there has been a gratifying appeal to the American people on their own behalf, while there has been an appeal, which in the very nature of it must arouse the energies of the community, that appeal has been based upon the desire for financial well-being.

The task that remains for the future is that of seeing the present agitations in the light of moral well-being, until at last we shall regard the violation of a moral principle as more dangerous to our interests than the violation of a financial trust; and regard a wrong done to a community as more threatening to moral welfare than to financial interests. In other words, to realize the demands of the moral life upon all people, and to realize that financial well-being, even, is involved in the issues of the moral law. The task awaiting the coming years is to re-awaken the public to the sense of moral obligation, and to stimulate it to the fulfillment of the moral ends of social as of personal life.

THE REACTION OF THE PUBLIC AGAINST MORAL EVILS.*

BY DR. JOHN LOVEJOY ELLIOTT.

To one who watches as he comes and goes among the people of the city, more especially among those who are known as the working people, those who live in the tenement houses, it has seemed sometimes as though that spirit which puts an individual privilege before a public duty was all powerful. We call it the spirit of graft, and that spirit has been strong everywhere, but particularly is it likely to take hold of those who have not had the advantage of a large and full education. Instincts, the untrained mind, and the daily newspaper are their chief guides, the newspaper influences everyone, but it is the all in all to those who have read nothing else. Then they have their choice of the newspapers and that which appeals to them is that which amuses, that which excites the evil as well as the good in them; and the spirit of graft that has been breathed into the very life of the working man, is a thing that is so heart-sickening that it is utterly impossible to put it into words. They are dependent, too, on their leaders. The crowd, the public, originates no new movement. They are dependent on the strong individual, and the greedy hand of the small man and the weak man has so often been extended, trying to reach that which the hand of the strong man takes.

In a sense, I think, a moral revolt has come and it is like a very breath from heaven. The public seems stirred.

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Long, very long has it been since any great number of men, any state or city has put forth its full power—a class here, a few there, but the full might of public opinion for a long time has not been roused. We who are grateful for it now ask, how long will it last? What will be the outcome? Will it simply be the means of creating some little social scheme, some mere pretense, some patent method of social reform? Will it play into the hands of the "Isomist?" or, as so many are inclined to think, will it merely die out, leaving as a sole record a few besmirched names and a few memories that will bring out the cynical smiles in the future? Will it all die out and leave no real effect?

It may be readily said that this present resentment and stir in public opinion will find expression in laws. Yes, but we know very well how easily laws are made and broken in this country. We are too familiar with the sight of law breaking, from the man going into the side door of a saloon on Sunday all the way up to the man who breaks the inter-state commerce law. Through and through we are used to the sight of law breakers in all classes. The foreign papers say of us that from our highest executive down, no law stands in the way, when we have set our heart on anything, be it power or be it wealth. We have no notion nor any strong faith in the sacredness of law.

But, it may be said, that there have been convictions of evildoers. Yes, it is true that there have been convictions, and we are grateful for them, and we have been taught by them, and have been benefited by them. Certain men have gone to jail, and we are glad of it. Indeed, here in New York, it seems to me that there is almost a mob spirit of resentment. We are familiar, to our shame and infinite injury, with the mob spirit, the lynching, by those who pretend to be enforcing the right. And we have a

little of that mob spirit among us now ; whereas just a few months ago it would have been almost impossible to have gotten certain convictions, to-day it would go hard with almost any man who was brought up before twelve citizens of New York City to be tried on the accusation of having been false to a trust. The public is irritated, it is glad to hear of conviction, and the juries are only too ready to convict a man now as they were too slow before.

Laws will do us good. The convictions will do us good, but it seems to me that one, if he listens, hears a better note. It has been struck very clearly by Mr. Washington Gladden, in his new book ; and one hears it, too, among the social workers, putting aside so much of the cant and fadism, nevertheless in our social training schools and serious attempts at social work, one finds a new and important element. The same thing is found again, in the lives of some men who have gone into politics, who are office holders and among those who are only voters, and that note is this, the emphasis on the duty rather than on the mere rights.

In this country we are very prone to assert our rights. "The right," says the Declaration of Independence, "to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness ;" and the Americans think very largely that their democracy is a means of asserting their right, and that idea of the right is the thing that has been emphasized from the date of the Declaration of Independence down. It is emphasized in our laws, in the legislative chambers, everywhere one hears that note, "It is my right to be the equal of every other man that is in the world." That note of rights has been sounded most strongly.

And now we find that this is not enough. The idea that a man has a right to vote leads behind it by the hand the right to do as he pleases with his vote. If he has a right

to vote, he has a right not to vote and sit home. If he has a right to that vote, many men think it justifiable to sell it and do just as they please. He has a right to run for an office, and he has the right to use that office for a spoil. If we take it from the side of the *duty* of voting, of holding office, it gives an entirely different attitude. If one has a duty, he has a duty to someone, the duty towards the state is the real thing to be regarded, when we consider our public privileges and franchises. And I think, more and more clearly in the life of those who are working in the social cause, in the words and the acts of those who are voting, and those who are doing public work, one hears this thought, that it is *my duty to do these things*. It is my obligation, not simply my privilege.

When we as a people so recognize that we not only have inalienable rights but inalienable duties, then dawns our true democracy, then we will understand really what the American democracy is, but not until we recognize our inalienable duty as well as emphasize our inalienable right will that time come. That is the difference between true and false democracy, and the two elements are struggling for ascendancy to-day.

And when we recognize these duties, then comes another great thing, and that is a sense of the sacredness and the holiness of our land and our government. There are many who affect—there are many who have a real contempt for the crowd, for the majority, yet it is the public whose voice is sovereign and we believe that that sovereignty has been well placed, and yet it is so slightly treated. It seems to me that the spirit that produced the Bible is in this thing. The Bible was produced because men believed that there was something infinitely precious, sacred and holy in the affairs of men. That has been too much lacking with us, and yet deep in our hearts we know

that the sovereign power in this land is a sacred power; deeply and truly we know that; yet it is only through the recognition of our duties towards that power that we can learn to appreciate it. I believe that one hears it and sees it, and feels that sacredness more truly each year, and with that feeling we may greet, not only the New Year, but the new time with gladness and with hope, daring to believe that sometime the voice of the people will be the voice of God.

IMPENDING CHANGES.*

BY PROF. FELIX ADLER.

THE vista of the future is shut out by a curtain, which the forward-reaching mind of man in vain endeavors to penetrate. Our anticipations of future events are for the most part pictures which fancy paints on the curtain, which amuse the eye as long as the curtain is down, but give no inkling of the scenes which shall surprise our sight when the heavy drapery is lifted. And so far as our private affairs are concerned, this ignorance is perhaps an unmitigated blessing. "Who can live with everlasting burnings?" says the Bible. Who but the few heroic souls could live with their own future, if the prospect of it were disclosed? Certain happy turns of fortune, unexpected by us at the present moment would indeed be revealed. Promotions, gratified ambitions, new friendships, surprises of love, children or children's children born to us; the gates of opportunity open that now seem shut! But coupled with these, what grim attendants, what loss, what disappointments, what remote afflictions, what obscure and perplexed sorrows; and at the end, unavoidable by any of us—*Pallida Mors*—Pale Death!—under forms of suffering and physical decay which—how many of us would care to picture! Let the curtain, then, so far as our private fates are concerned, remain unlifted, and let us continue to amuse ourselves if we will by painting pictures of fancy on the curtain.

But as to the larger affairs of mankind, this is not so; there is an inextinguishable desire to look even a little way

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ahead. And this has its positive use, in so far as it enables us to shape our course for ourselves and for those whom we can influence. The question is often put: What course is likely to be taken by civilization during the decades that lie before us? And by the course of civilization and the progress of civilization, is generally understood the course and progress on its material side, the multiplication of inventions and discoveries which will store the arsenals of mankind with new implements of power, power to subject nature to man's uses and to increase the commodities and conveniences of life. Speculation on these topics is rife, and expectation is keyed up to an intense pitch. Already an eminent physician has declared, that the total amount of pain alleviated or prevented by modern methods of dealing with disease exceeds the pain suffered; and bright hopes are held out that the medical profession will score still other and more signal victories, that the cure of such terrible maladies as phthisis and cancer and the like will be achieved, and even that human life may be prolonged beyond its present term. Experts who consecrate their strength to the study of the physical forces, dazzle us with brilliant promise of what electricity as a substitute for steam may be expected to accomplish in the near future. The task of replacing human muscle by machinery will be pushed more and more vigorously, we are told, until beneficent labor-saving devices will relieve the masses of the load of drudgery that has been placed upon them. And the solution of the question of poverty, to which the brain of reformers and philanthropists has thus far been unequal, is expected to come in some measure as a by-product of scientific and mechanical inventions. There are visions also of new modes of locomotion. Goethe's passionate longing to soar through the air like a bird may be fulfilled by the airship. There are even ten-

tative but obstinate beliefs in some quarters that a bridge of communication may be built between our own and other planets—the planet Mars, for instance—so that in time, Tennyson's dream of "the Parliament of Man," may be enlarged to embrace the denizens of other planets than our own, and we may come to speak of a Parliament of the Solar System. Of these dreams or speculations I have little here to say. Some of them may prove to be auspicious precursors of future blessings, shadows cast beforehand of good things to come. Others may be no better than unsubstantial and baseless figments of the human brain.

But what I am here concerned with, is the progress of civilization not on the side of invention and scientific discovery, but on the moral side, and to warn against the disastrous mistake that the two necessarily go together. Mr. James Bryce in an essay on "Marriage and Divorce," after referring to the astonishing advancement of the physical sciences and the industrial arts during the past hundred years, concludes his remarks by pointing to the ominous fact, that *pari passu* with this astounding development we are witnessing in all so-called civilized countries a portentous increase of three social diseases: insanity, suicide, and divorce. There are other indications to show that moral relaxation and even retrogression is quite compatible with material advancement. And the question for us to consider is, what is likely to be the course of civilization on its moral side, and what the signs are—if any there be—that indicate the course of the world's moral development in the approaching lustrums.

Is war likely to cease, or at least to become less frequent? Some weeks ago, when the American and British war-ships were anchored in the Hudson River, I visited one of these modern battle machines. How shapely it

seemed, how white and inviting, how perfect in all its appointments; how innocently it lay in its watery berth, how attractive in its holiday attire! And yet I could not help thinking, as I allowed my imagination to play on the use that might some day be made of these terrible engines of destruction, what an anomaly it all is, and what a fearful indictment against the thing which we smoothly call civilization. As a matter of fact, the progress of science itself has created these new modes of rending human flesh and, despite the tribunal at the Hague, the rule of the multitude and the frightful celerity with which the passions of the multitude find expression, lend but a slight color to the hope that these battle-ships will soon be cast upon the scrap heap.

Is woman likely to make good in civilized countries the position of equality with man which she is everywhere claiming? And, if so, are the precious ideals of gentleness and moral suasion for which womanhood has stood in the past to be combined with the new ideals, and to be carried over, an assured possession, into the coming age? Are the poor at last to inherit the earth? Are the weak to be protected, to be respected; or is exploitation by the strong will to go on, as in the centuries that have preceded?

To these questions who would undertake to give a confident answer? Prediction indeed is the part of fanatics or fools, of those whose assurance is based on inveterate prepossession, of those who fail to perceive the infinite variety of conditions on which the issue of future events depends. But there are certain changes in the moral world which one can clearly foresee, because they are already upon us, and which are impending only in the sense that causes already operative must unfold further. The great problem with regard to these is not one of prophecy,

but of active interference on our part, so that by our own resolute and determined efforts we may turn them in the right direction. Of these impending changes, which indeed are already upon us, there are three to which I wish to call attention.

The first of these changes is, that ideals are everywhere shuffling off their mortal coil, and are left in a state comparable to that of a soul without a body. Not that ideals have as yet lost their power, but they have lost their bodies. Will the world be able to get on with only these disembodied powers? Will the powers retain their dynamic force under such circumstances? Nobody, for instance would be justified in saying that the belief in a triumphant goodness in the world is less in the area it covers, in the intensity with which it is held, than in former times. But the idea of that goodness in things is in many minds no longer conceived to be incarnated in an individual being, to whom one can address supplications and properly sing praise, with whom one can have intercourse—in fine, a being like man, however inexpressibly greater than man. Can men retain their grasp of the ideal after they have lost hold of this human symbol of it? Will not the roses wither when the vase that held them is shattered? To which, of course, the answer is, that if the roses of faith are cut flowers, they will wither without the vase; but that if they are living flowers, they need no vase but only soil—and the soil, the human heart, remains.

And the same change is true in the State. What a god-like Jehovah is in relation to the eternal tendency toward the good in the world, namely, a visible incarnation, that the king is or has been with relation to the ideal of the State. The king in his person represented the majesty, the sovereignty, the empire, the dominion of the larger

body politic whereof we are members, its super-eminent claim upon us, its august title to obedience. The king on his throne, in his purple robes, crowned amid the pomp and ceremony of his court, is the idea of the State personified, visible to men. The idea still remains, but the personification has disappeared or is disappearing. Will the world be able to get on without the prop and support of the images that embody the idea, and give it a palpable nearness? Mankind have always been idolators, in the sense that they worship the higher things of life in the guise of images. Are they ready to lift their eyes to the high heaven where the unincorporated Deity dwells? That is the great question which the future will have to settle.

On the other hand, the change is already upon us. It is not we who have brought about the fading of kingship in religion and politics. The world wakes up—or at least a great part of it—and finds that its old worships, its old royalties in heaven and earth have disappeared, and at the same time the awful dread comes upon us that the world has lost the old before it is yet ready for the new. As a matter of fact, though the ideals are still powerful, it cannot be denied that respect for the superior claims of the body politic is diminishing, and the conviction of the eternal power that makes for righteousness is failing in the minds of many. The idea of God as it was held, the idea of king as it obtained, are but embodiments of ideas which are true beyond and without these incarnations. But is the world prepared to grasp the truth without the help of the embodiments?

There are two ways of apprehending an ideal and convincing one's self that it is a real thing. The one is by the outer sense, the other by the inner sense. The one is by seeing the idea illustrated outside of ourselves, the other

is by realizing it through our own experience. For instance, if you wish to convince yourself that self-sacrifice is not an idea but a real force, a thing capable of being actualized, you may get this conviction by contemplating the image of Christ—the type of self-sacrifice; or you may get the conviction by being yourself a servant and minister, and suppressing your selfish inclinations. The latter is the only way that remains to us, if we have lost the belief in the embodiment. It is the way of to-day, the way of realization through actual inner experience; and hence we speak of the religion of deed as the religion that will most help us, however other forms of religion may help others.

The second great change that is upon us is the tendency to apply the notion of equality, to an extent that has never in the world's history been attempted before. We have had the doctrine of equality applied to citizenship in the form of universal suffrage. We have had the same doctrine applied to the relations of the sexes. The tendency is at present for women to become more and more like men, as far as possible to ignore even the fundamental differences of the sexes. In education, in vocation, even in dress the likeness is emphasized. We have had the doctrine of equality applied to the social classes. The equal distribution of wealth, the complete reduction of society to a level, is the dream of some social reformers. And now we are witnessing the attempt to apply the same idea to nations. There was in ancient times a certain genial host, named Procrustes. He was very glad to entertain strangers, but he had the eccentricity to compel them all to sleep in the same bed, and to fit them to this bed. If they happened to be too short, he stretched their limbs until they had attained to the right dimensions. If they happened to be too long, he cut off their

limbs to make them fit. The spirit of Procrustes is abroad in the present age, and what is called Western civilization is the bed. The example of Japan has persuaded many of the correctness of this procedure. In four decades Japan has put on what is called Western civilization, and has even outstripped nations of the West in military and scientific achievements. At the same time, there are grave fears that the beautiful art of Japan will suffer, in consequence of the ruthless manner in which Western ideas have been introduced; that the tender pieties which mark the home life of the Japanese will suffer and that above all, industrialism and individualism (already in the cruel exploitation of child labor Japan has attained an unenviable eminence) will set its pernicious mark on the Japanese character. The nation, like the individual, owes something to its past traditions, its idiosyncrasies, its temperament, its genius. It cannot put off its genius like a worn-out garment and invest itself with the genius of another nation, without paying the penalties. It cannot lie in the bed of Procrustes without suffering mutilation. In the same manner, the children of the Philippine Islands are now being compelled to learn the English language, a language alien to them and unconfined to their antecedents, and in other ways are being pressed into the American mould. In the same way we are witnessing on a frightfully enormous scale the attempt to extemporize a republic among the Russian people, the great majority of whom are still at heart monarchical, an attempt to transplant bodily into the dominions of the Czar ideals which have elsewhere had their growth, and whose worth is due to their answering the requirements of a totally different environment.

For my own part I am convinced that the doctrine of

equality is being pushed too far. What will be the outcome of the attempt to extend it to every nation and every people? Will there be a reaction; will there, as a result, spring up a recognition of the ethical value of contemporary inequality? Will the direction of men's thoughts change? Will the tyranny of the Procrustean idea be lifted from the modern mind? This is one of the questions concerning which I should like to be informed. At least we can work in the right direction, whether we can change the course of events or not.

And one other change of which I should like to speak is coming to pass among the Western people themselves, the nations of Europe and America, who consider themselves to be in the van of civilization. That is the incoming of the multitude, the accession to power and influence of the masses. I am thoroughly democratic in sympathy, and do not believe that the tide can be turned, or that any attempt should be made to turn it. At the same time, it is idle to disguise the fact that the first effect of the accession of the masses to influence has been productive of much evil. The state of journalism at the present day is one evidence. The newspapers, as a rule are graded down to the tastes and the intellectual standards of the masses. The "yellow journals" so-called, do but reflect the color of the minds of their readers—the love of sensation and exciting news—outrageous overstatements, appeal side by side in the columns of the same newspapers to the better and the worst side of human nature. The state of the theatres is another evidence. So also is the condition of politics. And so also is the spread of materialistic views of life. There has always been corruption, there has always been greed, often more acute in its manifestations than at present; but never has the number of persons affected by the prevailing worship of

external things been so great, because never before have the masses been admitted as they are to-day to a share in the competitive struggle.

Under these circumstances, what is chiefly needed is not retrogression to old conditions, which is both undesirable and impracticable, but a manful attempt to face the new situation and meet its specific needs. And the specific need of the age, with the accession of the multitude to influence, is a new type of leadership, to repress their follies, check their passions, guide the flood into the channels of safety and of true progress. We have no real leaders; that is the radical cause of evils which afflict us. The vast incoherent masses are left to their own instincts, impulse and guidance. The political leaders are distrusted, partly because they are selfish, partly because they are venal. Social leadership is in the hands of the wealthy, whose reign is confined to the world of fashion and manners, and who are both unwilling and incompetent to be leaders in the world of ideas.

It is to the educated class that we must look for leadership, to those whose life is favorable to reflection. It is the more developed that must have pity on the less developed, and take the reins. Thus, for instance, in regard to the moral evils disclosed by the recent legislative investigation into the business of insurance, it is not enough to reprobate the crimes that have been committed, or to put into the pillory the men who have offended. It is above all things necessary to extract and to place in clear relief the positive moral rule that should prevail in fiduciary relations; the rule that no one may enter into transactions with himself, no matter how blameless his intention. This rule must serve as a standard, pledging those who express it, and imposing itself by the authority of its own rightfulness to others. And so in regard to the spread of

divorce, it is not enough to condemn the guilty, or to deplore the excesses and the affronts on the moral sense of the community. It is necessary to bring into clear relief the rule that the social order depends on the expectation of permanency in the marriage relation, and that whatever laws or practices are incompatible with and tend to enfeeble the expectation of permanency are morally wrong.

And it is not enough that individuals should say these things in the press and on the platform. That there may be a change for the better, the educated classes must speak with the gathered force that belongs to collective utterance. Literary societies should pass resolutions on these subjects, should speak out publicly and call what is wrong, wrong. Medical societies and associations of lawyers should speak out. Above all, churches and ethical societies should express themselves as societies.

And here our own Ethical Society has an opportunity and a duty. We too, have not spoken collectively on these great subjects of the moral life. If anyone asks you what the Ethical Society stands for, you will reply that it stands for the conviction that the moral end of life is the highest end; that morality is independent of creed and theory. But apart from these general affirmations, decisive and of capital importance as they unquestionably are, if anyone asks what are the specific moral precepts for which we stand, you may point to the printed pamphlets which contain the utterances of the platform speakers. But these are private and personal expressions of opinion, having no binding force except for him who makes them. There is needed beyond these personal utterances something collective, the binding and pledging of ourselves at least in regard to the great moral issues that are to-day of paramount import, concerning which the need of distinct affirmation, so that the standard

may be fixed for those who waver, is urgent. I trust that some progress in this connection may be made during the coming year, that the Trustees of the Society and the Membership of the Society in special meetings that might be called for the purpose, may take the initial steps toward securing a practical agreement on some of the great moral issues which the platform already stands for, but which the force of the society in its collective capacity shall support and commit itself to.

These are some of the things which have occupied my mind—New Year's speculations and New Year's hopes. It is not so much the particular thoughts themselves as the opening of the outlook that I care for. It is well that we should raise our eyes to the hills to discern "whence our help cometh." And not only raise our eyes, but rise ourselves to the hilltops and take in the prospect. It is well in any case, that we should transcend from time to time the thought of our private affairs that is constantly pressing upon us; of our business plans and anxieties; of our domestic burdens, even the tender and inescapable ones which the love of others offers our hearts and minds. Yes, even these it is well for us at times to transcend, to sink out of sight; and just to think and feel as if we were the human race itself personified; as if the future of mankind were the one concern that is near and vital to us; to throb with the life of our race, and feel the spirit that animates it cleanse and uplift our own. That, it seems to me, is the most fit preparation for the New Year's Eve, a worthy consecration of the change of time. For as Goethe somewhere puts it: "time is my furrow, time is my field"—a field and furrow in which we can sow the seeds of eternal thought and eternal purpose.

MORAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICAN LIFE, IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT REVELATIONS.*

BY FELIX ADLER.

DURING the past summer some very painful revelations have occurred. Some of those persons who have occupied "the seats of the mighty" in this community, have been thrust down from their height, and have been pitifully humbled. Others have come off with less blemished reputations, but will never again raise their heads so high.

We may not gloat over the downfall of the eminent, nor take pleasure in the overthrow of reputations. Rather, I say that we are all humiliated, and as a community disgraced, when those whom we have respected are put into the public pillory. The investigation is not yet at an end, and we do not know to what further depths we may have to descend. But this much is evident: the evils which have been brought into view are but the symptoms of a disease which runs deep into American life. It is not the particular individuals who have suffered in esteem and reputation, but the disease and its profound underlying causes, that we are bound to consider. And we are to consider, furthermore, to what extent each one of us is contributing or has contributed to this condition.

In regard to the recent insurance revelations, I am particularly impressed by two facts. First, by the fact that the peculiarly sacred character of the fund, as being the fund of widows and orphans, the savings which a man lays aside in order to make provision for those who come

* An Address before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York.

after him—I say that the peculiarly sacred character of the fund did not keep it inviolable.

And then, also, there is something else which, in a sense, is even more ominous than outright crime. Crime is doing that which is forbidden when one knows that it is forbidden—sinning against the light. But more alarming even is the moral obfuscation, the sophistication of the moral judgment, the obscuration of the ordinary moral perceptions, which have been revealed in this investigation. As it is written, “If the light in you becomes darkness, how great is that darkness?” One cannot rightly profit by a fund of which he is trustee. That is elementary; that is of the essence of the fiduciary relation. And yet men prominent in financial circles seem to have been quite in the dark as to this A, B, C of morals. One cannot be buyer and seller in the same person—cannot deal with himself in a dual capacity. A Secretary of the United States Treasury, for instance, in case a new treasury building is to be erected, may not at the same time be the contractor to put up that building; he may not as Secretary of the Treasury, deal with himself as contractor, no matter how honestly in his capacity as contractor, he intends to deal with himself in his character as Secretary. And why not? Because it is a general principle in morals that any conduct which, though in particular cases it may admit of honesty, is yet of a kind to involve a violent temptation to dishonesty, shall be prohibited. The Secretary of the Treasury may be an honest contractor, but in such a situation self-interest and the public interest entrusted to him are almost certain to conflict; the temptation to dishonesty is violent, and human nature being as it is, that sort of conduct is rightly regarded with moral reprobation.

Again in regard to contributions to political funds, we find the same amazing sophistication of the moral judg-

ment. A man who stood high in the community publicly admits that he has contributed many thousands of dollars from the funds of the corporation with which he is connected, for political campaign purposes—and he assumes that the public at large will condone or even approve such action. Here, too, we are dealing with elementary matters in morals, with the moral A, B, C. To appropriate the funds of a corporation, of which I am a member, without my consent or knowledge, in order to promote the success at the polls of a political party to which I am opposed, is plainly to rob me of my citizenship, to arbitrarily curtail and neutralize the effect of my opinions on the conduct of public affairs. But aside from this, it is acting in contravention to the general rule which I have just enunciated,—namely, that any conduct which exposes the doer to violent temptation to dishonesty, is reprehensible. For even assuming the contributions to be dictated by honest motives (unfortunately we have reason to suspect and more than suspect the existence and influence of very improper motives), even assuming the president of this great insurance society to have been honestly convinced that a financial peril had arisen, which required that the funds of the policy-holders should go to the support of the party that was engaged in warding off that peril, nevertheless, his action was wholly unjustifiable. The temptations that spring from partisan bias, like those that spring from self-interest, are violent in character; and though in a particular case a man may act honestly despite partisan bias, yet as a general rule partisan bias turns the scale, and therefore no action in which the door is opened to the influences of partisan bias should be sanctioned.

And, finally, we have the most lamentable plea of all: that it is necessary to corrupt legislatures in self-defence; that political blackmailers must be conciliated; that the

head of a corporation, who is charged with the responsibility of protecting the interests of his corporation, cannot afford to wait until the community is reformed politically and the blackmailers are driven from power, but must, when they waylay him, conform to their demand. But the two parties to the transaction create and sustain each other; the corporations engaged in questionable business or using questionable methods sustain the political banditti, and conversely. It seems to me indubitable that the great corporations could throw their case into the court of public opinion and defy the attacks of the political blackmailer, if they could enter the court of public opinion with clean hands, if their own records were unsmirched. It is because they cannot afford to appear in the court of public opinion that they are compelled to give way. There are also, it is true, instances of perfectly legitimate business, suffering annoyance, inconvenience and injury, from the petty persecutions of corrupt officials. But I cannot admit that the annoyance or the inconvenience or the injury constitute a sufficient reason for paying the tribute. It is for the most part cowardice that makes men pay it. If the honest men engaged in legitimate business, who are exposed to these persecutions, were manfully to withstand them, they would soon raise a storm in the community that would sweep the whole bad system out of existence. And, in fine, no one has a right to pay a bribe. Any one who pays a bribe is assisting in spreading corruption. Even if inconvenience and loss are for a time unavoidable they must be endured. For since when is it true that moral duty is obligatory only when duty can be performed without inconvenience and loss?

But, to turn from the consideration of the symptoms to that of the disease itself, I wish to say that what is wrong with us is our ideal of wealth. In this country there has

come to be entertained an ideal realized only by the few. It is estimated that there are, perhaps, between two and three thousand millionaires in the United States. Among these are a few multi-millionaires. The ideal, realized only by the few, is however entertained by the many, and it is this wrong ideal that poisons the fountains of our public and commercial life.

When I say "ideal," there are some who may think that I am indulging in theoretical speculations, which are very remote from the practical concerns of men. Of ideals, people say, we can properly speak, when we discuss religion or art, but there is no connection between ideals and business. That is a great mistake. There is not a business man who has not his ideal. Everybody has ideals. Ideals are the moving forces in the world. What is an ideal? The word "ideal" means an imaginary picture in the mind of what is desirable. And according to our ideals will be our conduct. We all have imaginary pictures in our minds of what is desirable, and they prod us on. Ideals may be fine or gross, but, in every case, an ideal is a picture in the mind of what we should like to be or to have. The main evil in American life is that our ideals need correcting, especially the ideal of unlimited wealth. Suppose I could become an American Croesus, like those whose names are in every newspaper, should I desire to be such a Croesus? Not until I have answered that question *in the negative* have I ceased to contribute to the disease, the symptoms of which are revealed to us in the insurance investigation.

We hear on all sides to-day, from social reformers and from the spokesmen of the working classes, protests against the inequalities of wealth. There is no lack of declamation and protestation against the wrong that a few should have these hundreds of millions, and that the many

should be relatively deprived of goods; the complaint is that the many have not what the few have. But suppose it were possible for all to be as wealthy as the wealthiest now are, would such a state of things be desirable? Not until we can see that that ideal is vicious, and that that dream is sordid, shall we cease to contribute to the American disease. The fallacy is to suppose that those who have these fabulous fortunes have attained the life that is best worth while.

Now what reason have I for saying that that is a mistake, and that we should correct our ideal of unlimited wealth? First, one cannot get the great wealth as a rule without paying too great a price for it. There is a certain road that leads to the golden land, but one must pass through a toll-gate, and the keeper exacts his toll which one must pay; one must do certain things which it would be far better not to do. There may be exceptions, but I think the impression is justified, that as a rule, the great fortunes are not accumulated without grievous wrong-doing, violence, oppression, unfair advantage-taking in some form.

We can all see that in extreme cases we should not care to pay the price of wealth. Suppose it were put to you that you could inherit a great fortune if you would commit a murder, and that you could be assured that the crime would never become known, you would not surely be willing to have the wealth with that condition annexed to it, to be forever after haunted by the sense of the crime you had committed. The wealth might seem very desirable indeed, but you would not take it coupled with that condition. The same is true in a lesser degree of other crimes. In a large proportion of all great fortunes, I fear, there is coupled with the wealth the remembrance of a price paid for it, and for paying which a man must hate

himself. Then it is a thousand times better not to pay that price, not to sign that pact.

In the Bible it is said that Satan took Jesus to the top of a high mountain and showed him all the wealth of the world, and said, "This will I give to you if you will fall down and worship me." That does not mean that Satan wanted him to fall down on his knees and assume the attitude of worship. He wanted him to worship him practically, by doing the things which the devil does. So one can have wealth if one is willing to do devilish things. I am far from saying that this is true of all wealth—that would be an extravagant statement; but I am afraid it is true of most of those fabulous fortunes which seem so dazzling.

Then again when we consider the state of mind of the wealth-getter—I am now thinking especially of the American type of wealth-getter, the man who is continually seeking to get more and more—it does not appear admirable or enviable. The desire for wealth becomes for him a kind of mania; he is in the grip of a passion which gives him no rest; he is the victim of an obsession; he does not truly enjoy life; he has no leisure; his mind moves in a single groove; he is afflicted with what the Greeks called *Pleonexia*, the desire always to get more and more. Avarice is like the grave. The Bible says of the grave that its jaws are always wide open—that it always cries for more, more. It does not seem to me that the man who is afflicted by this disease is enviable. Certain faculties in him are over-developed, but the nobler faculties tend to be atrophied. Especially is this the case with respect to disinterestedness.

The habit of mind developed by the pursuit of riches is the calculating habit, the question always in mind is, What is there in it for me? How much can I gain? The

reference is always selfish. Now it is a curious fact that we cannot exercise any of our noblest faculties unless we are unselfish. It is generally believed that morality and unselfishness are indistinguishable. It is not so commonly perceived that science and art, the satisfaction of our intellectual and our artistic nature, equally depend upon our ability to maintain the disinterested attitude. Disinterestedness is essential to our living the higher life, not only in morals, but in science and in art. The habit of the wealth-getter is such as to make it difficult for him to take this disinterested attitude of mind; and therefore it makes it difficult for him to really enjoy the best things in life, to really obtain the satisfactions not only of the moral life but of the intellectual and artistic life on its highest level. The true man of science is self-effacing. He labors not for pecuniary reward or personal glory; his high aim is to advance truth; he sinks himself in the objective pursuit of truth; his whole life is spent in the effort to increase the fund of knowledge. As soon as any personal consideration enters in, as soon as he descends so as to coin his discoveries into gold, to make that an end, or to win reputation, he pays the penalty. He may be an ingenious inventor, but he will not be a first-rate man of science. The eager haste to get riches, or to achieve a reputation, will often tempt him to publish his fancied results prematurely, tempt him perhaps even to falsify the results; he is likely to become more or less of a charlatan. It is not possible to be a scientist in the highest sense and to be selfish. There is something about science that requires complete devotion and consecration. The same is equally true of art. The great artists have been noted for utter self-denial, for disdain of wealth, contempt for mere popular favors; their one desire being just to win the elusive thing, beauty; to see it and embody it.

We have examples of the most bountiful provision for the advancement of science, on the part of men whose whole lives have been spent in getting riches. The wealth-getter can promote science—thus much grace is granted to him—but he is not likely to take the scientific attitude himself; he cannot obtain the satisfactions which are open to the man of science himself. The humblest teacher in a university, founded by him, has the advantage of him there. He can hang in his gallery the most precious masterpieces of art, but in the understanding and appreciating of those masterpieces the humblest visitor to whom he allows access to his gallery may have the advantage of him. He can pour out his money like water in public benefactions, but often the taint of self-reference does not seem to be quite absent even from these benefactions, and the humblest charity worker in the slums who gives not money but himself is apt to be more beloved than the wealthiest benefactor.

Then there is the social antagonism excited by the fabulous fortunes. Those who possess them feel very keenly the hostility of the public. They wince under the constant hostile attacks of the press and of public platforms. Now it is one of the great boons of life to have the goodwill of our fellows, and it seems that wealth does not secure it. The benefactions of the very rich are catalogued, and they mount up into the hundreds of millions. The sums spent for universities, for libraries, for technical schools, for the most useful objects, are almost incredibly large. And these benefactions are received with a certain praise and formal recognition, and those who give them are flattered. Plots are laid to secure their interest in this or that public cause, but what they do not seem to get is the public goodwill. It is the goodwill, the love, that is wanting. The Bible says that a man may offer up all that

his house contains in exchange for love, but that he cannot buy it. Love is the spontaneous echo in one heart of kindness in another heart. In this respect, despite all their benefactions, our American Croesuses have on the whole failed. Some little kindergartner working among the poor, some sick nurse spending herself in personal service, gains in return for her service more heart-warm love than the men who pour out the millions. There have been but few millionaires around whose bier the people have wept. I would rather have those precious tears than all the wealth of the Croesuses.

I have spoken of the false ideal of unlimited riches. What then shall we say about wealth? Is there any way of marking the limit? Is it not in the nature of wealth itself to lead to boundless accumulation? We must draw a distinction between money and wealth. When we think of money, we are led to extend our possessions boundlessly. There is nothing in the nature of money to check the pursuit of it. The more money you make, the more you want, because money is itself not wealth, but merely the token of it, the counter which you can exchange for wealth; and because it is merely a medium of exchange, there is no suggestion of limitation in it. As soon, however, as one thinks of wealth, there is the suggestion of limitation; because wealth, properly defined, is that which serves as a means to the attainment of human ends. Everything is wealth which as an external means subserves the attainment of human ends. In the very notion of wealth there is implied a subserviency to the ends of life, and there is implied, therefore, a moral limitation; because when one has secured the proper ends of life, he does not require additional means; he acquires only so much of the means as is essential to the attainment of the ends.

There is no objection to the accumulation of wealth, provided it be accumulated as a means. The most ideal person in the world, the prophet, the seer, must have wealth. Some of the bravest effort in the world has been put into the struggle for wealth, especially on the part of the breadwinners of families among the poorer classes. But how to keep that which is a means in its place, so that it shall remain means, and not run away with us as if it were the end—that is the great question.

The answer seems to me to be, to think always of the real ends. To set up money-making itself as an end is the greatest curse. A physician's business is to cure the sick, and incidentally he gains his fee. His main object is not the fee, but to cure the sick. The main object of a preacher, or teacher, is to teach. He requires a salary, and cannot live without it; but he is not working for the salary. With the artist or the writer it is the same. But when it comes to the business man, he often so far demeans himself, so degrades his calling, as to declare "I, the merchant, as distinguished from the doctor, the teacher, or the artist, labor only to make money. I am in business to make money." But has not the merchant a service to render to the community as well as the doctor? Like the physician and the preacher and the artist, the end that the merchant should have in view is to render his service, to build up a first-rate business, to render a perfectly fair equivalent; if a manufacturer, to produce excellent wares, to organize his business in the best possible way, to make his relations to his subalterns as human as possible. Of course he needs wealth, so does the doctor, but that is no reason why he should make that the end of his life as a business man. "The laborer is worthy of his hire," and what is more, the laborer is sure to get his hire. A person who is efficient, who does ex-

cellently well the thing which it his business to do—whether it be brick-laying or teaching or curing the sick, or manufacturing or conducting a commercial enterprise—is sure of his hire. The wealth that he needs runs after him, flings itself at his feet. There is such a demand for efficiency that the efficient man is certain to find hands stretched out, doors open to him on every side.

So the only cure that I can see is a change in the inner view; not allowing ourselves to take a mean, sordid view of our life, not allowing ourself to think that the main part of the day is to be spent in the business of money-making, but to keep prominently before us the ends which are proper for us to realize. Then we shall think of wealth as the means. We are really in business or in the professions, first to do very effectively and very completely the thing that we undertake to do, whatever it be. I think this the foundation upon which all life should be built. I do not care so much for beneficence and philanthropy as for thorough-going efficiency. A man's character, and a woman's too, depends on that; it is the basis of everything. Honest, efficient performance is the first end. You cannot serve society better than by laying bricks honestly if you are a bricklayer; or by building up a perfect organization of your business if you are a business man; or if you are teaching, or engaged in art work, by doing thoroughly the thing you are about. Giving to the poor, taking care of the needy—that is most important and most commendable, but so far as its value to society is concerned, it does not begin to equal the moral value of efficient service.

Other ends of life for which we exist are the support of those who depend upon us, the education of our children, providing moderately for that pleasure and recreation which is essential to maintaining the vigor of life,

and laying by for a rainy day. Then why should we say that we exist or work to make money? We are not really as base as we represent ourselves to be. Money-making is the incident; we are all capable of responding to those other larger ends. If wealth comes to us in excess of our needs, then there are public uses to which we can and should devote it.

This is the thirtieth year of the Society for Ethical Culture. For nearly thirty years I have been laboring in this community, and I will not admit that I have been laboring for an iridescent dream, or for something too subtle to be useful. I want to teach ethical ideals. To have an ethical ideal primarily means that we shall not sell ourselves for something that is cheaper than we are. For the sake of adding to our possessions, we shall not lower ourselves. I have had nearly thirty years of this public work, and in view of the insurance revelations, the materialism around us, the excessive luxury that is spreading everywhere, the lack of simplicity, the lack of self-recollection, the haste, the excitement, the feverishness of life to-day, I sometimes ask myself, is it of any use? Is it not all vanity of vanities, this teaching, this preaching? One stands by the side of the river of life, and there is the current, rushing, seething. What can one do by preaching to change it? I think there is bound to come a change, that our pace is so fast that we cannot keep it up. I think for one thing that the people who are hurt, those who are sacrificed to unscrupulous greed, are not in the long run likely to remain passive, and that there is going to come a counter-move from their side, and that the more they become intelligent about the causes of their troubles, the more there will be protestation and counter-action. The preacher can at least help to modify such movements and keep them sane;

he may help to moderate the force of the counter-movement that is coming.

And then the example of the disastrous effect on the character of the wealth-getter, which is written so large in these recent revelations, ought to produce a change. It ought at least to produce a shock, and lead the wealthy to consider whither they are drifting. Perhaps the preacher can help to point these morals and enforce these lessons on both sides. At any rate, I am quite sure that there never was a greater need for ethical ideals than there is now.

INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL UNION.

REPORT FOR 1905.

THE smooth working of an International Ethical Union is not an easy matter, and it is no less difficult to excite interest in what is accomplished at a far distance. Everything, however, is being done to make the Union useful. The Secretary is in constant correspondence with the Secretaries of the various national organizations, and in England the Council of the English Union has elected a permanent Committee to keep in touch with the International Union. Possibly the example of England may in time be universally followed, and thus an uninterrupted interest be insured in the international work on the part of the national executives, and through them on the part of the individual Societies and their members. This general aim was doubtless promoted by the publication of the last Annual Report in *Ethics*, *Ethical Addresses*, *Bulletin*, *Ethische Kultur*, and *Mitteilungen* of the Vienna Society, the three latter periodicals being supplied to all the members of the French, German, and Austrian Societies. With the same end in view, arrangements were made for exchanges between the above periodicals, and also for the supply to those periodicals of reports and literature from the various centres. Though up to the present the editors have not made use of the material supplied to them, there is reason to believe that in time international news will be a standing feature in the Ethical Press. Further to encourage this, there will be prepared brief monthly reports for insertion in the periodicals mentioned.

The Secretary has been fortunate enough to gather and

to exchange information by paying two visits to Berlin, where he met the German Ethical Executive; by attending the German Ethical Society's Congress in Jena, and encouraging the formation of a German Moral Instruction League; by spending some days, at Professor Felix Adler's request, discussing international matters with him in Germany last summer; and by an interview in Paris with Professor Paul Desjardins, and afterwards with Professor Léon Brunschvicg at Ostend.

Propaganda work has not been neglected. The Secretary offered the International Freethought Congress, which met in Paris in September last, a paper on "The Relation of the Ethical Movement to the Freethought Movement," which was accepted and widely advertised, and it honored the Secretary, who attended the Congress, by electing him as one of two *Assesseurs* at an important meeting.

The main obstacle to propaganda has been the utter want of any literature, and to meet this a series of twelve leaflets has been compiled and written: (1) Constitution, (2) An Ethical Society: How to Form and Conduct One, (3) List of Societies, (4) Ethical Literature, (5) Principles of Ethical Societies, (6) International Manifesto, (7) The Story of the Ethical Movement, (8) To Sympathizers, (9) Moral Instruction in Schools, (10) Who is Ethical? (11) The Ethical Movement Defined, (12) The Aims of the Ethical Society. So soon as the most needed of these leaflets are printed, Friends in India, Egypt, Russia, and many other parts of the world, may be relied upon to spread our ideas and establish Societies. Professor Wilhelm Foerster has already kindly offered to see to the translation of these leaflets into German, and it is hoped that they will be translated into French.

Other literature has also been in preparation, and awaits publication. A short volume, dealing with the main problems of life viewed from the Ethical standpoint, has been written by the Secretary. To supplement the paper contributed to the International Freethought Congress, another has been prepared on the attitude of the Ethical Movement towards religion. Additional pamphlets will deal with Moral Instruction, Labor, Economics, Politics, and like subjects. These pamphlets, which seek to reflect the prevailing Ethical thought, should be as useful within the International Union as for propaganda purposes. With a Movement as widespread as ours, a common understanding needs to be cultivated.

Want of space necessitates the crowding out of many international matters, as, for instance, the establishment of an International Ethical Library. We conclude this portion of the report by urging that, just as a national organization is the very breath of life of the individual Societies in a country, so an international organization is absolutely essential and indispensable if the Movement is not to risk splitting up into innumerable sects and to cease to propagate its views. A national Union unifies, strengthens, and starts Societies; an international Union has the same object, and, since its scope is wider, its importance seems the greater.

AMERICA.

New York.—Apart from the ordinary work of the Society during 1905, two closely-related facts challenge special attention. One is the attempt to found new Societies and gain non-resident members in places where there is no Ethical Society, and the other is the large output of literature. From a circular issued we learn that "frequent invitations have been received to establish

Ethical Societies in other towns and cities; but these opportunities have been hitherto declined, the purpose being to develop in a few centres the ideas underlying the Movement before undertaking a wider extension, in order that depth and strength, rather than superficial magnitude, might be obtained. Certain results of this quiet development have now, however, been secured, and the time seems to have come when a larger extension may be attempted without fear of injuring the finer intent of the Movement." The response is said to be already gratifying. A Students' Ethical Society has been started at Harvard University, and members of other universities are reported to be interested in the Harvard experiment. Mr. Leslie Willis Sprague has just concluded a course of propaganda lectures in Brooklyn, and a Society has been formed in that city. News comes of the likelihood of Ethical Societies being established in other centres. In this connection it is important to bear in mind that in the New York Society there are over half-a-dozen trained men and women capable of taking over the leadership of a Society.

The literature published can only be referred to in a general way. At the beginning of the new year the New York Society issued a Year Book for the first time. It consists of a volume of some ninety pages, the size of the volume alone indicating the varied and important activities undertaken by the Society. Three Ethical leaflets have been published: *A Naming Service*, *The Functions of an Ethical Sunday School*, and an *Ethical Funeral Service*. Ten Ethical pamphlets have appeared, all but a few within last year: *The Basis and Obligations of Ethical Fellowship*, *What the Ethical Culture School Stands For*, *The Aims of the Ethical Society*, *The Origin and Growth of the Ethical Movement*, *Concerning the*

Simple Life, A New Statement of the Aims of the Ethical Culture Societies, The Mission of the Ethical Movement to the Sceptic, The Function of the Festival in School Life, Immortality, Child-Labor and its Evils. And in addition to this, volumes by Professor Adler have been published : *The Religion of Duty, the Essentials of Spirituality, Marriage and Divorce, The Moral Instruction of Children* (new issue), *Life and Destiny* (new issue), *Creed and Deed* (new issue).

The New York Society has about 1,000 members.

Chicago.—The Chicago Society succeeded early last year in raising the full 25,000 dollars for their Henry Booth House, which is to be the centre for the social work of the Society. Before Mr. Salter left, last November, for a year's travel abroad, he had the pleasure of dedicating the building, which was then almost completed. Henry Booth House is situated in a very poor neighborhood, in one of the most crowded tenement-house districts of Chicago, and many eyes are anxiously looking to see the work begin on the larger scale made possible by the possession of a commodious building.

Mr. Salter has published a small volume entitled *Moral Aspiration and Song*. It consists of several parts—"For Private Meditation," "Preludes (for Sunday meetings)," "Responsive Readings," "Songs," and "Closing Words." The number of songs amounts to thirty-six. It is interesting to hear that the Chicago Society is the only American Ethical Society that sings regularly at its Sunday meetings.

The Chicago Society has about 200 members.

Philadelphia.—In May last the Society celebrated its twentieth anniversary, and, to mark and benefit by the occasion, the tenth Convention of the American Ethical So-

cieties was held at the same time and place. To ensure success the Ethical Societies closed their sessions earlier, and thus members and all the leaders were enabled to attend. Among the speakers were Professor Adler, Mr. Salter, Mr. Burns Weston, and Mr. Sheldon, who are the recognized leaders of the New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis Societies respectively; as also Mrs. Spencer, Mr. Percival Chubb, Dr. Elliott, Mr. Muzzey, and Mr. Sprague. Among the weighty pronouncements, those by Professor Adler on the independence of ethics attracted much attention. He thus defined the ethical position: "The independence of morality is the distinctive feature, as I understand it, of our Ethical Movement." "The independence of the moral end means that it is not subordinate to any other human end, but that it is sovereign and supreme above all other human ends." "Man, so far as concerns the effort to achieve the moral ends, is not dependent on any happenings in the supernatural world to set in play the operation of the moral forces within him." "Morality is independent spiritually, in the sense that the deliverance of our moral nature is not dependent on authority." Finally, morality is "independent in the sense that no personality has yet appeared, no religious teacher has yet appeared, who has so far expressed the moral ideal that we are to be in a position toward him exclusively of followers." According to Professor Adler, "it is plainly inconsistent to belong to two institutions, one of which affirms that character, morality, is dependent on creed—that character and morality and righteousness cannot be achieved without the creed—while the other affirms that character is independent of creed."

The increase in the membership of the Philadelphia Society during the past year has been greater than in

any previous year; and the attendance at the Sunday morning lectures has been larger than ever before.

The Society's Sunday school consisted in January, 1905, of 138 scholars, who were taught in fifteen classes.

During the past year the Society secured larger and more central headquarters—which are also the editorial and publication office of the *International Journal of Ethics* and *Ethical Addresses*.

St. Louis.—"During Mr. Chubb's recent visit to St. Louis" (Spring of 1905), the New York Society's *News-Letter* says, "he found the affairs of the Ethical Society there in a very prosperous condition. Mr. Sheldon is bringing the season's work to a close with the feeling that it is the most successful year's work in the history of the Society." The report of the Society for the session 1904-5 shows 310 names of persons who make an annual contribution to the expenses of the Society. In the Sunday school there was an average attendance of about seventy pupils, with an enrollment of about one hundred during the season.

In addition to the Sunday lectures and Sunday school, the following activities are referred to in the annual report: Literature Sections, Men's Philosophy Class, Nature Study Section, Greek Ethics Club, Colored People's Self-Improvement Federation, and Wage-Earners' Club.

ENGLAND.

The progress of the Movement proceeds apace, and it is only the want of funds and lecturers which retards the formation of many Societies. The English Union consists at present of twenty-seven Societies, and several new Societies have come into existence during the last few months. Owing to the increase in the English Union's

work, a General Secretary has been added to the staff, and an appeal for £6,000 for ten years has been drawn up.

Two noteworthy volumes have been recently published through the English Union. The first involved an undertaking of considerable magnitude—the publication of a musical edition of *The Ethical Hymn-Book*, which contains 327 songs and canticles. The second volume referred to was a sixpenny edition of Mr. Salter's well-known book, *Ethical Religion*, which is now likely to be read by many thousands of inquirers. Some 20,000 leaflets have been reprinted, and some 20,000 back numbers of ETHICS have been distributed.

The total number of members in English Ethical Societies at the beginning of 1905 was about 2,500, of which 1,774 belonged to Societies in the Union, and the remainder to South Place Ethical Society, Ethical Religion Society, and a few Societies recently started.

The Moral Instruction League has been making remarkable headway during the year. Through its influence moral instruction is given in more than 3,000 public schools to about 1,000,000 children, and Education Authorities all over the country are considering the scheme of instruction put forward by the League. The *Introduction to the Education Code and Suggestions*, drawn up by the Board of Education, and also the *Prefatory Memorandum to the Regulations for the Training of Teachers (1905)*, show distinct traces, even according to the *Times*, of the influence of the League. To check the League's advance a memorial was sent to all education authorities, signed by the two archbishops, eight bishops, and many eminent men, in favor of Christian moral instruction; but with no sensible effect. The League is now communicating with all the head teachers and all the Training Colleges in the land, and there is an intention to approach the new Gov-

ernment, and to press on it the need of introducing Moral Instruction as a regular subject into all public schools.

GERMANY.

The German Moral Instruction League is now not only an accomplished fact, but a fact of some importance. Though established only a few months ago, it can boast already of 300 members. Among these are 15 professors, 54 teachers, 17 physicians, 10 editors, 14 lawyers, and 22 civil engineers. Two teachers' organizations and two Free Thought Societies have also joined. As signs of the times may be noted the insistent demand for Moral Instruction in the place of theological teaching by the teachers of Bremen, the decision of the Congress of the German Free Religious Societies in favor of secular education including moral instruction, and the sale of over 10,000 copies of Dr. Foerster's Moral Instruction book, *Jugendlehre*, a volume of 700 pages.

The First Public Reading Room in Germany, instituted by the Berlin Ethical Society in a poor quarter of Berlin, has published its tenth annual report. The number of visitors during 1904 was 95,127, the room being open on weekdays from 12 to 3 and from 6 to 10 and on Sundays from 10.30 to 1 and from 5 to 10. The First Public Reading Room, which receives now an annual grant of 4,000 marks from the Berlin municipality, has fortunately not been instituted in vain, for at present it is one of a large number of public reading rooms, of which that established by the Frankfort Society is one of the most flourishing, receiving a grant of 10,000 marks from the municipality.

The Berlin Society's Information Bureau (for those in need) is one of the most respected institutions of Berlin. To give a notion of the extent of its activities, it may be

mentioned that in the last quarter of 1904, 1,253 applications had to be dealt with. Some fifteen officials and some seventy helpers are engaged in the delicate and difficult task of effectively helping the needy. The quality of the work done is beyond praise. The Secretary of the International Ethical Union had the pleasure of lengthy interviews with the Chairman, Dr. Albert Levy, and through his courtesy he had the privilege of making a study of a number of the cases investigated and dealt with by the Bureau.

The German Society for Ethical Culture much deplors the early death of one of its most respected workers, Justizrat Hermann Stern.

AUSTRIA.

Hopes are running high in the Vienna Ethical Society. Latterly the opening of branches at Graz, Linz, Troppau, and other places, has been discussed, and there is every reason to believe that the Austrian Ethical Movement is determined not to lag behind. However, the difficulties put in the way by the public authorities are usually so great that a rapid spread of the Movement is unlikely. Even the Vienna Society, like the German Societies, are only tolerated.

The determination to spread the Movement argues in this case superabundance of energy, for the Vienna Society has been very active during the past year. It has restarted both its Social Group and its Literary Group, and in both groups practical work has been discussed and initiated in a practical manner. A few years of such well-directed activity, and the Vienna Society should become a power in the Austrian capital. Moral Instruction has also, at last, reached Austria, and it is to be hoped that its principles will not be long in claiming general attention.

The Vienna Ethical Society consists now of some 220 members, the one at Qualisch of some forty.

FRANCE.

In the April number of the *Bulletin*, in the preface to the International Ethical Union's Report, there appears a remarkable official statement of the meaning of the Ethical Movement as understood by the *Union de Paris*. "We are bound together by a common principle: to establish a discipline of life in conformity with reason and outside all theology; to illuminate that discipline by free and open discussion; to animate it with love; to render it effective and progressive by mutual support; to teach it methodically; and to realize it in customs and in laws, and even, if justice require it, by a revolution."

The *Union pour l'Action Morale* consisted of the writers and the readers of the *Bulletin*, and was not a Society in the strict sense. The *Union* has now been transformed into an organization, and will henceforth be called *Union pour la Vérité*. The *Bulletin* has ceased to be published, and the publications will be, as heretofore, *Petit Bulletin pour nos enfants* and *Libres Entretiens*, then *Correspondence*, which will regularly appear, and non-periodical publications. The *Union*, in its prospectus, calls itself a Society for mutual philosophical and civic education, and the object is defined as follows:—

- (a) To maintain among its members, by means of training the judgment and character, the perpetual openness of mind which the search for truth and the struggle for justice demands.
- (b) To encourage openly, by personal example and propaganda, the active love of truth and right, and to help to introduce the critical method into every-day life.

The *Union* started in November a fresh series of discus-

sions. These will centre round the problem of Internationalism. Many of the ablest French scholars are taking part in the elucidation of this burning question. The previous course, on "The Separation of Church and State," had an appreciable influence in the final shaping of the Bill on the subject in the French Chamber.

SWITZERLAND.

The Swiss Society for Ethical Culture in Zurich is still in existence, and there is some prospect of its being revived. When the Society started in 1896 it met with considerable success, and only incidental causes led to the suspension of its activities. In a free country, such as Switzerland, there ought to be an Ethical Society with many branches.

The Society at Lausanne, the *Ligue pour l' Action Morale*, is justifying its existence by much good work, even though it has to encounter serious opposition and stolid indifference. At the beginning of 1905 Professor Forel delivered a lecture containing a vigorous plea for an improved system of education which was printed in *La Petite Lutte*. Professor Forel and his Society have shown considerable interest in the forthcoming International Ethical Congress, and it would be most desirable if the Society could send a small delegation.

ITALY.

Professor Levi-Morenos is still in full sympathy with the Ethical Movement, and will attend the Congress if he can possibly arrange it. Unfortunately, no news has yet reached us of the re-organization of the Italian Ethical Movement. Professor Levi-Morenos is to be congratu-

lated on obtaining from the Italian Parliament the grant of an old man-of-war, which he will transform into a floating asylum for the orphans of poor Italian fishermen.

INDIA.

In Bombay there has existed for some years a Students' Brotherhood, whose aims appear to be identical with ours. In the last report of this Brotherhood we read that similar organizations have been recently started in Bandra and Lucknow. The spirit of ethical proselytism is abroad.

An Ethical Society is reported to exist at Lahore.

An influential member of the Indian Civil Service, who was one of the founders of the Bombay Students' Brotherhood, is ready to assist in propaganda work so soon as Ethical literature can be put at his disposal.

JAPAN.

A member of the Tokyo Ethical Society, according to the *New York News Letter*, has reported that the Tokyo Society was organized eight years ago. It aims to promote ethical culture, to build up a strong and refined personality without regard to doctrinal distinction, religious belief, or moral theory. In the beginning of the Association, its influence, no doubt, was limited to a small circle, which met together to discuss ethical questions. It gradually grew, however, to a strong body. Public lectures and discussions on ethical thought and life are held once a month in Tokyo and a monthly magazine of some hundred pages or more is being published.

TRANSVAAL AND NEW ZEALAND.

An Ethical Society exists in Johannesburg and one in Auckland. Details of recent events are wanting.

GUSTAV SPILLER,
Secretary.

19, Buckingham Street, Strand, London, W. C., England.

SELF-HELP IN AFFLICTION.*

BY FELIX ADLER.

ON descending into a very deep well, even at high noon, one either sees the stars in the clear firmament, or, if the sky be overcast, looks upward into obscure night. Such a well is affliction. They say that Truth sits at the bottom of a well. Fortunate for us if Truth sits at the bottom of this particular well.

The subject which I treat this morning is replete with pathos, and yet I would not treat it in a gloomy vein; rather in such fashion that all the embodied joys of earth might be present and not have their lustre dimmed, that happy lovers might be present, and not feel that a shadow had been cast upon their bliss. For somehow we must relate our joys to our sorrows, not pass alternately from one to the other without connecting them. The world is a scene of happiness and unhappiness in strange association. Joy and sorrow keep house together, and must be so joined that each shall be glorified by contact with the other—joy exalted by kissing the lips of sorrow, and sorrow transfigured by gathering upon its face the reflex of the world's joy. I cannot follow this thought out in its detail. I can speak only of one aspect of affliction to-day; but the principal conclusions as to the way we should act in times of trial apply equally to the way we should act in times of joy. The application of the principles I leave to my thoughtful hearers.

The author of the phrase "tainted money," has said that

*An address given before the Societies for Ethical Culture of New York and Philadelphia.

what the world chiefly needs to-day is the conviction that the spiritual things are the real things, that unseen things are more real than the seen. I agree with his statement, but there immediately suggests itself to my mind the further thought that there are two principal ways of laying hold of the unseen realities—of what we call the spiritual realities of life. One way is with the help of a mental picture—mounting a ladder, so to speak, like that golden ladder of Jacob's dream, and seeing in imagination God at the top of it. This has been the way of the religions of the past. The mental picture, however hesitatingly drawn, with whatever misgiving and reserve, due to the consciousness of dealing not with a finite but with an Infinite Being, whose nature is inscrutable and unsearchable, nevertheless stands to the majority of persons as the embodiment of the idea of God. The picture, if one studies it, turns out to be an exalted image of man. Some hold it more grossly, others in a more refined way. Some really think that there is a human-like form behind the clouds, inhabiting eternity; others take it as a symbol which we cannot dispense with, a necessary but inadequate reminder of that Power in things which words cannot describe. But whether taken finely or grossly, the picture is that of a man. The forms which it has taken on have been various. Sometimes it takes the shape of a great commander, halting, as it were, on an eminence, and surveying from afar the dim world armies, the great hosts of good and evil, as they shock upon each other; the commander guiding the advance, checking the retreat, hurling column on column to destruction, according to a plan clear to his own mind, though unknown to those who are in the midst of the fight. Sometimes it has been the figure of a pilot, guiding a vessel on the high seas, as in Tennyson's well-known lines :

“For tho’ from out our bourne of Time and Place
The flood may bear me far,
I hope to see my Pilot face to face
When I have crossed the bar.”

But most often the picture has been the intimate and homely one of a human father. And this mind picture has been and still is of immense service in time of trouble.

But there is another way of laying hold of the spiritual realities of life, and that is by coming into communion with them, by experiencing them as a power which pushes us on along certain paths, a power mightier than ourselves, so irresistibly imposed upon us that we have not time even to look back to see what manner of power it is, or what manner of a face it wears, if it have a face; and this is the method of coming into contact with the ultimate, the unseen reality, that wish to apply to-day to the problem of affliction.

Some persons are half followers of the old method and half followers of the new. They have not clarified their thinking. But there is the greatest difference whether we take hold of the unseen through the help of the imagination, or realize the unseen reality in our experience, as a power urging us along certain paths, which we call moral paths; and the ethical consequences are different, especially when one is oppressed with trouble, when the heart is wrung by affliction. A great many people have lost the old way and have not come into the new way, and so receive no help at all. They simply drift. They are content to leave the principal questions of life unsettled while they devote themselves to minor interests.

There are three appalling evils connected with affliction. The first is the actual pain and suffering; the second is the shadow which it tends to throw over the universe, even to the darkness of utter night, the doubts, the loss of faith

which it engenders; and the third is the prostration, the sense of impotence, which affliction produces. Aeschylus in his "Prometheus" speaks of three Graiae hags, more hideous than Macbeth's witches, embodiments of all that is most undesirable and hostile to mankind. I have just mentioned the three graiae of affliction—the pain, the doubt and the prostration.

Now, as regards the first two, the picture idea of God has been most helpful. It does not make the pain any less, but it helps people to bear it. It does not resolve the doubt, or solve the riddle of the world, but it induces people to be willing to live on without the solution. This service of the picture idea of God depends upon three attributes which are united in the conception of God—omniscience, omnipotence and love. These three attributes must be held together, or the picture idea of God loses its force. As soon as you omit one—omniscience, omnipotence or love—the idea ceases to be of any value. Faith must rivet together these three attributes beyond any warrant which the facts furnish.

A man is about to undergo a hazardous operation, and he must bear the pain because the nature of the case is such that anæsthetics cannot be employed. He must trust himself absolutely to the surgeon. If he has the least suspicion that the surgeon does not know his business, or that, although he knows the science, he is not skillful, or (though the surgeon knows his science and is skillful) a dark suspicion crosses his mind, as it does sometimes the minds of poor patients in a hospital, that he is unkind, and cares little what becomes of the sufferer, his situation is most pitiable. But if he believes that the surgeon is wise and skillful and humane, then he will give himself confidently into his hands, and if he is a brave man he will bear with fortitude the unavoidable suffering. This is the

way in which the believer of the old type trusts himself in the hands of God, the great surgeon, when he cuts into the human heart with the sharp knife of affliction.

But this trust depends upon the belief that the three qualities are united in God. Let anyone question whether God is omniscient, omnipotent or kind, and the old belief ceases to be of use. For instance, one says, If he is God, why does he hurt me so? The answer is that he does it for a good end. But if one says again, If he can do anything he chooses, why can he not accomplish the good end without hurting me so? and the answer is that we do not know. If there arises the doubt that he may not be able to do all he wishes—which John Stuart Mill expresses in his three essays on religion—that God may be kind enough and wise enough, but not strong enough, to do what he will, then there is not much help in such a God. Or perhaps the darker suspicion enters in: He may be omnipotent, and he may be omniscient, but perhaps he is not really very kind. In the Bible we read that Nathan the prophet came to David and rebuked him for his sin in a parable: There were two neighbors, the one was rich, and had flocks and herds without number; the other was poor and had only one ewe lamb. The rich man coveted this single possession of his poor neighbor, and took away his ewe lamb. And God severely rebuked David because he had acted this way. But if we think of God after the human analogy, has not he himself acted in this way? Has he not often taken from father and mother the one ewe lamb? I do not say that that argument is valid, but that is the way the mind actually reasons under the pressure of grief. The human analogy has the advantage of presenting to the mind the Power of this universe in a definite way, as friendly and congenial, like a kind human parent. On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that

the course of events does not always bear out the analogy, at least as far as we can see. The course of things does not seem to be ordered by a being who is kind like a human father. To save the goodness in the conception of God that has come down from the past, it is necessary to say that he is good, not after the human fashion, but in some greater way. But then the human analogy on which we have rested breaks down under an internal contradiction.

And so the second of the Graiae enters in in the guise of scepticism and dark doubt. Worse than the hurt of pain is the thwarting of high purpose. We feel that we are called upon to work for certain ends, to put our whole hearts into the service, and then we see that the course of things often thwarts our highest purposes. A moral leader is taken away, a man like Lincoln, at a time when he could ill be spared. If there is a moral purpose in the world, why was the man removed who was best able, according to our human judgment, to accomplish the morally desirable end. Again, as parents we spend ourselves on the education of our own children, and sometimes when we have brought them to the very threshold of manhood and womanhood, to the point where our labor may begin to bear fruit, disease disables, death removes them. It is not only the suffering produced by loss, but the apparent frustration of moral purpose that causes the perplexity and obscures the spirit. We are commanded to erect an edifice, a temple of the good, and when we have raised the walls a little above the ground, so that we feel encouraged to hope, there comes a cyclone from somewhere, which sweeps down upon the scene of our labor, and lays the walls of our temple in the dust. At such times it is hard to put away the thought that the Power that is back of the cyclone is just as blind as the cyclone itself. So that just as we must say of the Goodness in things, if we are to hold

fast to it, that it is of another kind than human goodness, far transcending it, so we are pressed to say that the purpose in things is other than a human purpose, transcends it, with a wisdom and world-wide aim of which what we call human morality is but a flickering and feeble reflex.

But there is also the third appalling evil besides the pain and the doubt, namely, the sense of impotency, the sense of being utterly broken, a kind of blight or palsy that over-spreads the faculties. And in this respect the picture idea of God of the past has been perhaps least efficacious. The old method of comfort was a sedative method. Where it succeeded best, it created an attitude of quiescence, a passive attitude of the mind. The alternative way of apprehending the idea of God of which I now wish to speak, has the effect of taking us out of the attitude of quiescence and awakening us to action. To think of God as power immediately puts one into a different frame of mind, and the value of not leaving the mind quiescent under affliction, but of starting it into action, is that action is the best cure for suffering. In affliction, power may seize a man and lift him up from the ground where he is lying prone. It commands then: Do something; do not merely accept the fate that smites you! When you are plunged into the sea of affliction, do not float, do not wait for arms to be extended from above to draw you out of the waves; spread forth your own arms, and swim!

But if the point of view that I am here considering is to be helpful to anyone, there is one thing that must be remembered: We must be willing to suffer a change, to become different from what we have been. Unless we pass through trouble, realizing that its efficacy must be measured by a change in us, my thought will not be of any service. As long as we insist on remaining what we were before the trouble came upon us, we are open only for

the old kind of comfort; or, if we cannot go back to the old, we must do without comfort wholly. The hardest thing for people to learn is that they must be changed. They wish to remain just as they are, to maintain the *status quo ante*, whereas the secret of the help that affliction affords is that it can change those who suffer, make them different from what they were. The other method of comfort, as it has touched the mass of men (not as it has touched the rare and exceptional souls, because these in all ages seem to have moved much on the same level), practically said to the believer: You have certain claims, certain aims, retain them. All these claims and aims of yours will be satisfied. The only spiritual change for the mass of believers is the cultivation of enough self-control and humility to make them willing to wait. The only spiritual virtue inculcated into the mass of believers is patience. They are told that in the other world there shall be no more suffering, care or trouble. Dear ones will be reunited; justice shall be rendered; individual hopes will be realized—only they must wait! The point of view for which I am pleading is diametrically opposed to this. The compensation is not in the future, does not need to be waited for, but is immediate, and consists in the change that is going to be wrought in you, namely, your being able to relinquish your individual aims and claims instead of insisting upon their gratification. That change is the compensation.

There are three steps by which this change is accomplished. I shall speak of these steps in succession, and the point of view that I am describing I may characterize (to show its contrast with the traditional view) as "the social point of view." Throughout the world to-day, in politics, economics, industries, there is a movement away from the in-

dividual point of view to the social. In religion it has not yet been adequately expressed, but I am trying here to express it with regard to the problem of affliction. The first step consists in not looking upon our trouble as peculiar to ourselves. We are all disposed to do that. We say, Why am I afflicted? Why am I sick? Why is my child taken? Why am I ruined? That is the individualistic point of view. The first step in the social point of view consists in realizing that one's own trouble is a part of mankind's trouble, that one's burden is a part of the burden of humanity, that one's grief is part of the world's grief. Each one is only bearing his share. One of our modern scientists has indulged in the conjecture that there is a world-organism, of which the stars and suns are members, to which the world stands related as a cell to the body. Whether this be true or not, we are related in that fashion to humanity. We have our individual existence; we are centres of independent life; and yet we are also cells of humanity. We must train our minds to look upon ourselves in that way.

When we consider man, how he has made his pilgrimage upon this globe during the past fifty or one hundred thousand years, what sort of a creature he has been, prophet, enthusiast, poet, or again, madman, savage, buffoon, when we consider what he has endured, the whips of nature that have been laid upon him, the torrents of fire that have been rained down upon him, the torments worse than the nine circles of Dante's hell through which he has been made to pass; and when we compare the beginning with the end, the cave man with the civilized man, we cannot refuse our admiration to this courageous creature—man; we cannot help admitting from the coolest point of view of dispassionate observation, that there has been progress, and progress bought by suffering. When we hold to the so-

cial point of view we cannot help admitting that the suffering of the past has been of use, and when we look about us in the present, we also cannot help remarking that there are burden bearers all around us, we cannot help seeing trouble like our own, often very much greater than our own, in places where we might never have expected it, where outwardly all seems serene and happy. And if we have any generosity in us, we shall be led to say, If everybody is bearing trouble, and if so many whom I had thought supremely happy are really very much worse off than I am, at least I will be a good comrade. I will bear my share without wincing.

Oh, the selfishness of ordinary grief! How people see only themselves, and are ever harping upon their own woes—what they have to suffer, what a cruel fate is theirs—as if they ought to be the exception, as if there ought to be nothing to mar their sunshine! Of course, society is a masquerade, and it is well that it should be. We do not care to wear our hearts upon our sleeves or our troubles on our faces. But he whose eye has once been anointed by the magic of the social way of looking at things will penetrate easily behind the mask; he will see the hidden wounds that are bleeding inwardly, he will hear the stifled sobs. Not that pain plus pain, others' plus mine, subtracts from mine; but the general lot will make me willing to bear my load, to pay my share of the toll which nature exacts from humanity for the privilege of passing along the road of progress.

The second step in realizing the social point of view is even more important, and leads us to a higher plane. It consists in not only seeing ourselves associated with others when we are in trouble, but in fulfilling a social law, and by this I mean doing the things that ought to be done in an objective way.

I can give no better illustration of what I mean than the example of President Harper's behavior during the months preceding his death. A man of vigorous vitality, endowed with an unparalleled appetite for work, whose every hour was crowded with achievement, at the pinnacle of his power, at forty-nine years of age, he suddenly gets notice that his lease on life has expired. And how does he act? He does not repine, as there might be excuse for doing. He does not dwell on the fact that presently all that is mortal of him will be dissolved into dust. He does not say, Why any longer should I take interest in what goes on on this earth? In a few weeks I shall be out of it all. On the contrary, he acts as if he were to live on forever. What is going to happen after he has passed away is of immense interest to him, and he spends his remaining time and strength in working for his university. From time to time he looks at the clock to see how many minutes for work remain, then more eagerly, but still quietly, he spends what is left of strength in doing the things he ought to do before leaving the scene. He acts in this way, not from what is called pluck, which one finds even among ruffians; but because he realizes what it means to fulfil a social law, to act as if his individual existence mattered only in so far as it identified itself and coalesced with those great public interests in which the individual finds the highest expression of his present, the premonition of his future, life. And because he acted in this way, a cry of admiration escaped the lips of all who heard the story of his last days. And even those who dissented from his policy and methods while living were struck with a sense of awe at the manner of his dying.

And in all cases there is ever something that is socially demanded, something which it is right to do, and to fix our eyes on what is right to do will make us public beings instead of lonely, isolated, individual beings.

Is it the wife that is dying? We have had amongst us a beautiful and ever memorable example of behavior under such circumstances. There is something to be done, something socially commanded, to cheer the melancholy hours of the patient, to cherish each grain of strength, to lessen the effect of the darkening twilight of the house upon the children, to save them from the breath of death; to make the last communings between husband and wife strong and sweet. There is something to be done to meet the situation, to prepare the way for the new turn without wincing, without thinking of the suffering which must come. Is it the case of perversity, rebellion or discord among the members of your own household, again there is something to be done, efforts a thousand times repeated to correct, sentinels to be set at the points exposed to temptation, the demons to be subdued in others and in ourselves. We shrink because we wince from the pain involved. But the ethical attitude will help us to treat the pain as negligible, at least as capable of being traversed and transcended. Should you enter a room and behold your child in imminent danger, its clothing on fire, you would rush in without a moment's hesitation and tear the burning garments from its body, and only after all was over would you realize that your own fingers had been burned in the attempt to save it. Thus, in every affliction, in every trouble, if we fix our eyes on what is to be done, we shall not be even conscious of the pain involved in doing it.

This is the social point of view with respect to affliction, letting the power that works in things drive us forward on this moral path, or what I have called the path of social action—identification of ourselves with the burden-bearers of the past and present, and fulfilling the social law.

And lastly, especially for those who are bereaved, there is one other step, and that is, not to wait for the hereafter for reunion with the dear departed, but to give them a present continued existence in the mind, to keep up an ideal companionship with them, to dwell especially on those qualities that were excellent in them, thus making them a good influence in our lives. We cannot associate with the dead, we cannot give and take, but only take; yet what we take is priceless. And this thought of such companionship is not fantastic; many men and women have found it to be real and helpful. Many have been turned from baser lives by the determination to be true and loyal to their holy dead. Many have felt that they must not derogate from their better selves because in their imagination the eye of a father or mother or friend, or perhaps the eye of some innocent, pure child seemed resting upon them, reproaching, rebuking, encouraging, cheering, mutely appealing. Many have become better men and women because they have felt that their whole life must be offered at the shrine of those who are with them no longer in the flesh, but all the more close to them in the inner communion of the heart.

There are these three steps, and they cannot be taken without effort. Comfort for affliction does not fall into our laps as a boon. It must be won. But to him who makes the effort there will come at the last a great peace in the assurance that this world is not a world of chance, nor yet a world of evil; but that the tendency of things is good. Nor need this assurance rest on the belief that there is a Commander-in-Chief, a Father, a Pilot, who is steering and ruling things; but the consciousness suffices that however the world is steered (we know not how), the tendency toward good is real—real because it is revealed in our own experience so strongly and convincingly. And if this

mood becomes permanent, we shall gain the attitude of mind of which Emerson speaks so wisely in his little poem :

“Every day brings a ship,
Every ship brings a word ;
Well for them who have no fear,
Looking seaward, well assured
That the word the vessel brings
Is the word they want to hear.”

The word that the vessel may bring us to-morrow may be loss of worldly goods, or sudden partings, or tribulation in a thousand of its varied guises ; but, no matter what the cargo of the ship, no matter what the word which it transmits to us, it is none the less the word we want to hear, because it is for the best, and we know this to be so, because we ourselves can turn it to account for our truest best, here and now in this brief span of time.

INSPIRATION AND ETHICS.*

BY DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

PERHAPS it would be impossible to find two terms vaguer than those which form the title of my address—*inspiration* and *ethics*. We all know perfectly well what an inspiration is; even into the lives of dullest routine and habitual acceptance of an uninspired program, some moments of inspiration inevitably come—some lifting of the heavy horizon, some opening into a wide vista, through a sympathetic passage in a book or the light on the face of a friend. We know, too, what ethics means; for conscience, though it may be seared and scotched, is the hardest part of man to kill. But we hardly can define inspiration and ethics satisfactorily. So haltingly does language follow thought, that even the poets, for whom nature has opened the treasure house of parable and on whose lips persuasion sits, have agonized to find the winged word which should truly communicate to their waiting brothers the meaning of their visions.

Yet it is good for us to talk of these spiritual concerns of life, however stumblingly and inadequately. Our deliberation together on them may now and then result in some new adjustment of desire and duty which shall be as epochal in a life as the bursting in of spring upon winter. We are so sober and constant in our attention to schedules, prices, tariffs, fashions, menus, statutes, theories, and tenses, while all the time we know that all these things, while they may increase our bank account, or flatter our senses, or widen our knowledge, do not necessarily con-

* A lecture given before the Philadelphia Ethical Society.

tribute one iota to the cultivation or the stimulation in us of that soul-completing, that soul-saving, for which alone—unless men be the joke of some omnipotent Aristophanes of heaven—we exist. We long, with some inextinguishable desire implanted in the human breast to know of destiny. In spite of all the foolish prophesies which have deluded men in past ages, in spite of the naïve completeness of programs of judgment days and the horrible tortures of mind that have been passed through in fear of eternal torture of soul and body in hell—men have still clung with deathless longing to the hope to hear of their destiny. And no wonder! For without this hope, the keenest prudence of successful finance, the sharpest spur to scholarly fame, are but the intensifying to the last degree of the satisfaction which the ox takes in his well-filled crib or the sleek, thin-ankled racer in his promenade before the applauding grandstand.

We need no apology, then for broaching spiritual themes; we brook no reproaching summons to return to the practical. These themes *are* the practical; the *only* truly practical ones of our life.

It is in the confidence of this truth that I ask you, this morning, to examine with me some aspects of inspiration and ethics; to inquire, if we can, what these very real terms mean for us; to discuss whether there be an inspiration of ethics, or an ethics of inspiration; or whether inspiration and ethics be antagonistic and mutually exclusive ideas.

To begin with some attempts at definition: *Inspiration*, meaning literally a "breathing into," is used in at least three very distinct senses, which have an ascending degree of dignity. It means simply a happy or an opportune thought, and in this sense is equivalent to a bit of mental luck. Hunting for a lost paper, we have "an inspiration,"

and remember the pigeonhole into which we tucked the document. Planning a luncheon, the hostess has "an inspiration," and produces something new and tasty in the salad course. In a higher sense, we use the word inspiration to denote some mental or moral refreshment, some aesthetic stimulus. Caruso's Faust, last evening at the opera, was an *inspiration*, we say, though we do not probably earnestly mean that it is going to affect our lives at all. The spirit that a beautiful piece of music or an absorbing book has "breathed into" us is generally one of exultation and recurrent pleasurable memory. It exhausts itself in its own emotion. Finally, there is a third and highest kind of inspiration, which comes upon one like the happy thought, but it comes to affect deeply and permanently the psychical life. Such is the inspiration of the love of husband and wife, the inspiration of a great social call clearly heard and nobly responded to, the inspiration of a passage from a world prophet or a line from a world poet which sets the whole soul vibrating with the thrill of permanent assent. There is no escaping these inspirations, no having done with them, once we are grown to the spiritual stature to receive them. It is, of course, of this third and highest kind of inspiration that I am speaking to-day.

And now, how shall we define *ethics*? The word itself, in the original Greek, with its Latin translation, *morals*, means only custom, usage, disposition. But ethics means much more than this colorless definition to us. It does not describe customs, it regulates them; it does not denote usages, it dictates them; it is not any disposition, but a certain constant disposition.

The word ethics has been rendered hard to realize clearly, because in the first place, it has been used historically to define different schools or theories of moral con-

duct, and psychologically to define one's personal conviction of the right moral conduct. For example, when we speak of the "Hedonistic ethics," that theory which referred the worth of every moral action to its resulting measure of pain or pleasure; or the "Kantian ethics," which was the doctrine of the grounds on which and the ends for which the moral law was binding, we are using the word in its historical or descriptive sense merely. We may, and probably do, firmly believe that the "Hedonistic ethics" are not ethical at all. What is ethics for us in this latter sense is our own conviction, not a descriptive term, but a nominative one. And even in this latter sense, we must be careful to distinguish ethics from other nominative terms. Professor Palmer, of Harvard, in his Noble Lectures for 1899, on "The Field of Ethics," has done this latter task with great delicacy and suggestiveness. Ethics deals with the possible, the desirable, the things which will happen when human conditions are made favorable for them, as over against the sciences which deal with the actual, the determined, the things which happen when physical conditions are favorable for them. But law and æsthetics and religion also deal with the desirable, the possible, the humanly conditioned. How shall we distinguish ethics from these? Well, ethics differs from law in that it values the acts of the individual not solely in relation to his fellows (i. e., in their expression), but also in their intrinsic character, their effect on the doer as well. And, again, ethics differs from æsthetics in that it is concerned not solely with the intrinsic worth of things, their appeal to the appreciation of the individual, their purely emotional quality, but also has its external importance, the strong influence of the act. So ethics stands as the golden mean between the extreme objectivity of the law and the extreme subjectivity of æsthetics. Contrasted with re-

ligion, ethics may perhaps be called the close-range view of duty and destiny while religion is the long-range view: religion is ethics "sub specie aeternitatis;" ethics is religion "sub specie temporis." With this question of ethics and religion we shall have more to do presently. For the rest, the distinctions of Professor Palmer seem to me remarkably helpful in defining ethics in its normative or binding sense, by contrasting ethics with law, æsthetics, and religion. To hazard a positive definition: Ethics is the reasoned conviction of what it is right to do. Having, then, as best we could defined inspiration as a vision coming to us to affect deeply and permanently one's psychical life, and ethics as the reasoned conviction of what it is right to do, let us proceed to consider some of the relations between inspiration and ethics.

First, all worthy ideas and embodiments of inspiration have been increasingly controlled by ethics. We need only examine the history of any of the world's mythologies or religions to prove the truth of this. There is as absolute a necessity laid upon these beliefs and institutions if they are to endure to purge themselves progressively of old error, to reshape themselves according to men's better spiritual promptings, to take on humane and reasoned aspect, as there is for the individual soul to pass through ever-widening spheres of ethical realization if it is not to stagnate in dull decency, or, under the slavery of sense, "reel back into the breast." Mythologies and religions live only so long as they have the sanction of ethics. The gods of Homer are not very admirable beings; they lie and cheat, they wrangle and wanton. They are the creations of an inspiration of fear. The motive in the human mind which called them into being was one of awe before the great powers of nature, of craving for protection from the lightning and the flood. Power was the thing the ancient

god must have; power far above the puny strength of mortals. To his omnipotence were pardoned his moral failings, his craft, his cruelty, his caprice, his prurience. But when the ethical sense of the Greeks was developed through their contact with each other and with other peoples, then their great thinkers grew ashamed of the arbitrary, law-loosed gods of Homer. They measured the divinities themselves against an ethical standard, and judged them as fearlessly as the Prophets of Israel judged the false gods of Moab and Ammon. "When the gods do wrong," cries Euripides, "they are no gods."

Or take the doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture. How completely has it become moralized with the moral growth of the world. There has been a progressive abandonment of features that are inhuman or irrational in the doctrine of scriptural inspiration; the inspired part has been reduced to the *inspiring* part; and even the center and source of the Christian inspiration, the person of Jesus, is becoming more and more an ethical type offered us for appreciation and less and less a theological tenet offered us for subscription. No institution can permanently resist remodelling after the plan of the highest ethical sense of the age. Such resistance would mean voluntary starvation, suicide. The God-intoxicated Spinoza nearly two centuries and a half ago, expressed this truth with wonderful prophetic vision in his theological-political tractate. It was on the occasion of a conditional grant of free speech by the State. "Free speech saving the honor of the State!" cries Spinoza; "the day will come when there can be no such thing as the honor of the State without free speech," when what you grant now as a concession, O ye magistrates, will be your own salvation! Inspirations of the past which have established and objectified themselves in institutions, can maintain themselves on one condition

only: that is, by becoming increasingly moral, by submitting to restandardizing. The power which produced them was an imminent, compelling need in human nature. No less compelling and imminent is the need of to-day which finds these unworthy or insufficient.

But, besides being subject to the control of ethics, all worthy ideas and embodiments of inspiration have also made their appeal directly to the ethical sense and aimed at the accomplishment of ethical ends. Show me a religion that does not seek first of all to make men and women better, and I will show you a vain repetition of ceremony which cumpers the ground and already is writing its own destruction or radical reconstruction. Such were the pagan religion of the later Roman Empire and the papacy of the fourteenth century. Matthew Arnold said that conduct is three fourths of life—but why not four fourths? If conduct means the expression in our life of the ideals which we win from our labored creed, our symbolic ceremony, or our spiritual contemplation, I see no other end but conduct in religion—for certainly there is no article of creed, no ceremony, no rapture of a pin's worth that does not reach some expression in life.

If, then, ethics is both the vital factor in the endurance of inspirations and the final object of all institutions, religions, ceremonies, philosophies founded thereon, ought it not to receive its due recognition as the consummation of human life? How can a controlling motive be subject to the forms it calls into existence or the end be subordinate to the means? And yet ethics has generally been treated only as an appendix to philosophy and a corollary of religion—not as the primal inspiration itself. And those who have stood for the independence, the primacy, the inspiration of ethics have been charged with confusing a derived nature of the spiritual life with the source of spiritual

life itself. A few weeks ago, for example, I read an address of the President of Princeton College to a body of young men, in which he insisted that ethics or morality, is but a by-product of religion. But have there not been many, many immoral acts (as persecutions, enmities, self-justifications, casuistries), proceeding as by-products from this same religion? Where is the criterion of religions outside of ethics? What makes religion lovely in one man and odious in another, if not just the ethical spirit of man himself? I firmly believe that the exact opposite of President Wilson's statement is true—that religion is and always has been a by-product of ethics. Beneath every church you will find a character—"other foundation can no man lay."

This exalted view of ethics is not widely accepted. Ethics is generally allowed to be an accomplishment, but not an inspiration. And arguments with which we are all familiar are brought against the inspirational primacy of ethics.

It is said that ethics is shallow as compared with religion; that it has no sufficient sense of sin; no consuming desire for redemption from this lost world; that it turns into optimistic speculation what ought to be a life and death wrestle for salvation. So Professor Shaw, of the University of New York, in a recent article on "Religion and Morality," says that religion provides a goal for human life, a destiny, and with this possession faith passes far beyond the realm of morality; while ethics, when it attempts to supply an object for man's activity, that end is either purely subjective or narrowly objective in its nature . . . nothing more than some immediate object is presented, and thus great achievement is made impossible. . . . For this reason, religion can only look with distrust upon any system which, like the ethical scheme, works out

its method with such ease and complacency!" That such an idea of ethics is fairly current makes it no less astonishing. An ethical scheme working out its methods with ease and complacency! The only ethical program I know anything about, either from my own convictions, or from the written and spoken words of ethical philosophers, is one of endlessly toilsome endeavor, in which every step of onward progress is purchased at the price of present spiritual travail. So far from its being true that only immediate objects are presented to the ethical apprehension, no single action can be ethical which does not form a link in a reasoned whole of life. And as for the sort of faith which "passes far beyond the realm of morality," the history of ultra-moral religion, with its mysticisms and fanaticisms, its supernatural predictions and judgment day programs, is little calculated to waken enthusiasm in sober breasts. This charge of the shallowness of ethics, of ease and complacency in ethical theories, of the narrowness of an ethical horizon, betrays an utter misconception of what ethics really is, and could be made only from that unfortunate standpoint which regards ethics as an enemy or a rival of religion. Ethics, the reasoned conviction of what it is right to do, rests on insights as profound as human nature itself, and the noble soul is awed no less by the realization of what divine powers within it lie than by the fictions of a hundred of symbols. And so far as the stimulation of the sense of sin is concerned, if that be of such importance as the theologians say, not even St. Paul himself has pointed out the depths of human need more forcibly than Cleanthes, Zeno, and Seneca.

A second criticism urged against the inspiration of ethics is that it lacks humility, that it makes the human mind with its casuistry and logic the measure of all truth, that it is promethean, seeking to force to immediate settlement in

sylogisms the mystic-emotional truths which are man's real inspiration. This criticism also rests, I think, on a misunderstanding of the true nature of ethics, or, rather, on a confusion of its obvious processes with its deep underlying springs of action. Ethics does concern itself constantly and soberly with casuistry, with comparing the degree of righteousness of various actions or cases. It does this because it believes that no power from outside is going to intervene to save a man the moral effort of distinguishing right from wrong. But to conclude from this activity of ethics that it has no great constructive purpose beyond this comparing, analyzing, weighing of acts and motives, is to advance the preposterous theory that all moral machinery acts for the sole end of seeing its own "wheels go round." No class of men in the world, I dare assert, would be more ready than the advocates of the final value of ethics to condemn the assertion that the individual reason, by ardent excogitation and constant casuistry could discover moral truth or induce wholesome inspiration. The word of the old philosopher that "man is the measure of all things," does not win our assent, either in the sense that this individual or that is alone the measure of all things, or that this part of man or that part alone is the measure of all things. We know perfectly well that morality does not belong exclusively or even chiefly to the realm of logic. As many of our best experiences came to us in that higher realm of mental realization which Maeterlinck calls the "mystic reason," so they are established and perpetrated only in that delicate atmosphere of psychical life which is a compound of wide sympathies, honest reasoning, intellectual receptivity, faith in noble intuitions, responsibility for their nurture, and unquenchable hope in their final triumph. But this is exactly what we understand by ethics—for all this enters

inevitably into the reasoned conviction of what it is right to do, and is of value only as it helps to form that conviction.

In the third place, the critics of the finality of ethics deny to it inspirational power on the ground of its lack of imaginative quality; its despoil of the symbol. Ethics lives in the thin air of the actual, they say; it is absorbed in the immediate; it has no power in itself to create an ideal toward which to work, but must work as a helping factor toward the ideal created by a religion with certain symbols. In a word they deny to ethics the power of vision and grant it only the subordinate, derived grace of coöperating with a higher motive in the pursuit of that vision. This objection again seems to me to rest on an entirely inadequate conception of the true nature of ethics. Ethics does despise some symbols, to be sure, else it would not be ethics. But so far from its destroying or denying symbolism as such, it is the very thing that perpetuates symbolism. For by its progressive judgment and condemnation of the inadequate, unprofitable, misleading symbol it saves men on the one hand from bondage to superstition, and on the other hand preserves historic idealism from constant discredit. What else but the ethical sense preserves an ideal through all its unworthy stagnation in partial symbols? Or, to be concrete, what else but a slowly gaining ethical sense has changed such an idea as heaven from Tertullian's fortified pleasure park, over whose walls the exclusive set within exult at the torments of their excluded brothers without, to the modern Christian conception of a state of mind at peace with God and alive to duty? Must I have more symbol of imagination than the world of truly related brothers which ethics lays hold upon in order to claim my dearest endeavor, or to fulfil my highest destiny? I yield to no orthodox Mohammedan in my desire to see the

struggle to preserve faithfulness to an ideal consummated in a lasting, luscious victory in which I may share—but must I for that reason have a heaven of horrors and tables laden with tempting fruits and wines? No Roman Catholic is more anxious than I to be established and cheered in the spiritual life by communion with the souls of just men made perfect in all ages—but does that necessarily imply a wax candle burned in front of a plaster statue of the Virgin Mary, or forms of petition printed in a Book of Hours? The bluest Presbyterian cannot long more than I to know that there is a primal and indefeasible power of right and justice behind the seeming welter of wrong and injustice to which the selfish passions of men have reduced our present world—but must I then trick this power out with attributes of arbitrary injustice, purposes of predestination and preterition, which shame even the average human sense of morals to-day. Does the champion of scriptural infallibility, who wrestles with the task of proving Leviticus useful or the Apocalypse reasonable, prove by that fact that he is more enamored of all that has been divinely virtuous in the world, than the man to whose willing mind and heart these scriptures have nothing uplifting to say? No, it is not true that ethics repudiates symbolism and lives in the thin air of logic. It purifies symbolism by repudiating imperfect symbols, and itself creates, by virtue of its inspirational power, the grandest symbol ever dreamed of—the commonwealth of love.

A final criticism of ethics as a sufficient inspiration to which I would call your attention for a moment, is that it sacrifices that continuity of tradition, that connection with the religious institutions of the past, which makes the very soul of inspiration. It is dangerous to break with history at any point, lest we find ourselves in darkness. I listened the other day to a man who is called brilliant,

telling how he would rather cling to the Episcopalian faith (which he professed), even though he knew that there were errors in it, than to sever connection with so long-established a communion, counting so many saints and scholars, credited with so many works of mercy and righteousness. And I thought such an argument was desperately weak and cowardly: weak because it supposed that one must deliberately hold to an error for the sake of keeping the good which has gone with it; and cowardly, because he confessed he renounced his divine birthright of being saint and scholar himself, by tolerating a single claim of creed that confused his ethics or sparing a single premise or conclusion that offended his logic. The past is for our instruction, not our enslavement. We are far better able ourselves to make a creed than the Westminster Fathers or the framers of the Thirty-nine Articles—and it is not modesty, but cowardice, that denies it. For denying that means to adopt the faithless creed that humanity is retrogressive, not progressive. I see but two eventual attitudes of mind toward the question of the continuity of religious traditions. One of these attitudes gives tradition some inherent authority, binding upon us by virtue of an inspiration beyond our reach to revise or criticise—and ends inevitably in subjection of spirit. It is fundamentally pessimistic. The other attitude gives religious tradition only evolutionary authority, subject to the constant revision of the present ethical sense and judgment—and ends inevitably in the establishment of free spirits. It is fundamentally optimistic. Such interruption of the continuity of religious tradition as this latter attitude brings, is like the interruption of scientific tradition when astronomy was substituted for astrology, or medicine for incantations. Was scientific inspiration lost because men broke with the tradition of an independent fiery principle in matter

called phlogiston? or did science feel itself bound with a gingerly cowardice to go on explaining how in an allegorical sense it might be true that the earth was stationary after men had become convinced that it was moving? Why this assumption that religious traditions, of an age contemporaneous with crude science and crude ethics, are so pure and inviolable? Does history confirm it for the unprejudiced reader, or reason for the devoted thinker? Truly, as Schiller said, "age lends a hallowing halo." But it is none the less our business to "prove all things and hold fast that which is good." Could the invitation be addressed to any other sense in man than his ethical sense?

Ethics is not the foe of spiritual continuity, any more than it is the foe of true symbolism, depth of insight, or humility of judgment. Here again it is, on the contrary, the very life condition of spiritual continuity, for it says, by its primal virtue of inspiration, *all that is good shall live*; all that is not useful shall be done away, because it plagues and hinders and confuses the issue of the truly good.

I do not know whether I have made out a case in your minds for the primacy of ethical judgments, for the inspirational character of ethics; but it seems as clear to my mind as the sun in the heavens at noonday. Ethics has no quarrel with religion—so long as religion is ethical. What ethics clashes with is not inspiration, but the lack of inspiration in religion—fixed dogmas of the past which make demands on our credulity, interfere with normal will activities and confuse moral issues. What it objects to is not faith, but faith in hearsays, which, as Carlyle said truly, "makes real communion impossible." It says to every generation, Do you *now* come to that conclusion through your own faith, or are you supporting a conclusion reached by your father's faith? What it objects to is the kind of inspiration which can be voted by a church council. The

Athenians met yearly and by show of hands elected ten men whom they called "generals." "Fortunate people!" cried Alexander of Macedon, in biting pleasantry, "I have found but one general in all my life—Parmenio."

Ethics does not either wish to reduce human life to tart logic, and "in solid occupation of all reason's summits" affect to despise the man whose intuitions and emotions are precious; but it does maintain that every tradition admitted in direct violation of reason is but a leaven of confusion in our moral life. Ethics is not the foe of symbolism, until symbolism becomes ridiculous. It heartily recommends us to hitch our wagon to a star. But when some ecclesiastical metaphysician comes along and wishes to prove to us that the star is a donkey engine, and insists on explaining to us the wheels and cogs, we smile and turn our backs on the brave mechanic—and earn the reputation perhaps of scoffers. It does not object to the effort to understand truths beyond the province of the syllogism, but it insists that no truth is really understood until it becomes impossible not to shape our lives in accordance with it.

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THE HOPE FOR THE CITY.*

BY JOHN LOVEJOY ELLIOTT.

GRIM and forbidding lies the great desert in the western part of America, beginning on the southern boundary of New Mexico and Arizona, and stretching north through the various States and Territories until it reaches the border of Canada. It is a beautiful place from an artistic standpoint, but it is a hard place from the standpoint of anyone who must live there. The sunrises and the sunsets and the stars are glorious, but for all that touches the life of a man, there is no harder master in the world than this huge, American desert. It is so great in extent, so enormous in its length and breadth that economists have reckoned that if ever that part of the world should be reclaimed that fifty millions of men could live there in comfort as human beings should live. No wonder that the eyes of the Government have been turned with interest recently to that enormous tract, and that they are attempting to build great reservoirs to save the flood waters of the spring. They are trying to dam the rivers that now flow in such narrow courses, and spread them over thousands of acres. In other places individual settlers are digging artesian wells, and as one of those wells goes down, the settler, who may have risked his all in that undertaking is painfully interested in the result. If he succeeds, after going down per-

*An address given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, Sunday, April 15, 1906.

haps a thousand feet below the surface of the earth he may get a first, second or third flow that will bring in great quantities the water from the earth that will transform his hard and barren land into a farm. But it means more to him than that; it means that the hard, dry earth is transformed by the water into crops, into houses, homes, schools and comfort. There is one very interesting thing, and one profound lesson to be learned from these attempts at irrigation, and it is this—*the desert must be made to transform itself*. No settler, however hardworking, would be able to bring enough water in a bucket to irrigate his tract of land. He has to change the position and condition of things that are already there, and he has to do it in a certain way. He must have a great deal of faith, and he has to proceed after a very scientific method. He has to dig deep or go far for his water supply. No matter how hard he worked, no matter how industriously he ran or walked, if he depended on the amount of water that he could bring in a pail he would starve to death on his dry and barren homestead. The art of man must reclaim that great tract of land by the transformation of the things that are there—not by what is brought there from the outside. And as you look over those enormous tracts of land, and dream, like Faust, of the time that may be, when that great wilderness is transformed into a place for homes, one of the most beautiful of all visions that can come will be in your mind as you picture that vast desert, touched by human life, by human genius and happiness and hope and progress.

In our great cities there are certain deserts. If you go to Blackwell's Island, you will find there a desert which

is more dreary, and in many ways more awful than any other desert can possibly be. You go into the hospitals and there you find men and women who are incurable, who never will be any better, who so long as they live must suffer and be sick and burdened with diseased bodies—hundreds of them. You go into the next institution, and there are those who are the criminals—moral deserts—and you look into the faces of the men and women and recognize the dreariness and uselessness of their lives. Go on a little further and you come to the home for the aged. Those who are spending the last of their lives piled into wards, perhaps a hundred or more blind men or blind women in one ward, lying in beds as close to each other as graves. And you leave Blackwell's Island with the sense of a human desert in your mind.

Or, go to see the breadlines, where at 12 o'clock at night bread is given out to those who are hungry enough to sit up so that they may get a little stale bread. You behold lines of hundreds of tramps, filthy, vile to the touch, and you are impressed by the utter wastedness of all that they have lived. They are mostly old men—there are one or two young men, once in a while a woman, but as a rule old men almost ready to die—and you think of the years and years of their lives, and as you see them there before you in an unkempt ragged condition—dirty, wretched, filthy, the outcome of those years of human existence that they have spent—you get a sense of the desert.

Again, you walk through the places of the city where vice flourishes. They are not at all bad places to look at from a physical standpoint perhaps, but they are dreary

enough if you see what is behind those walls. You go along the street, and you see children, little girls just as good and sweet and innocent as those that you have left at home this morning, and you recognize that they are as pure as children always are. "You cannot dissolve a pearl in mud," says Hugo; but you know that the time will come when out from the door of these houses will come the filthy bloody hand of vice, and claim these children for its own. Then you see what is worse than the wilderness.

You go through the places where the majority of the inhabitants of New York live, and from the stench and the darkness and the narrowness and the crampedness you see a desert of homes. Most of the men and women who live there are good people, not particularly educated or refined perhaps, but in character sound and whole, and you perceive in just the material conditions in which they live—the physical desert that surrounds most of the people who live in that city.

When one walks out on the street, he meets the charity-worker and the settlement-worker, and the district-nurse and the health-inspector, each running with his little bucket of water to irrigate the social desert. I would be very much misrepresenting these workers if I led you to underrate the value of what they do. It is the very water of life that they are carrying: medicine that will cure the sick, cheer, help, comfort that will steady the mind that is slipping into dependency. It is hard to overestimate the value of what is done for the individual person or the individual family in this way—it is the water of life though it comes in drops. When you compare the new tenement houses

of New York City with the old; when you recognize that since 1886 the death rate from consumption has been lessened forty per cent. you recognize that an immense amount of work has actually been done. But when you compare the amount of work that has been done with the amount that there is yet to do one says to the optimist: "Yes, Mr. Optimist, you say that we only need to go on building more schools, forming more charity organizations, more social centers and settlements, more country homes, then everything will come out all right." People love to use that expression: "The world is getting better every day, and things are going to come out all right." I must confess that I am not one of those who believe that these activities only need to be increased in quantity, and things will eventually come out all right.

Unless we can change the direction and kind of work that we are doing I do not believe that we will come out all right. And my thought in that matter is this, that charity as it is done to-day is a class movement pure and simple, and in so far as a class movement can it has done good. But I am enough of a democrat to believe that class movements alone will never be entirely effective. It has got to be something that goes a good deal deeper and is infinitely more important than any merely class enterprise can possibly be.

Then when I see the effect of charitable work on the person who does the work, and on the person for whom the work is done I am not satisfied. Take the persons who have been helped by the charitable organization, and those who have done charitable work or lived in settlements for a long time, and do they in their natures really change—are they socialized?

I got a lesson from a group of boys whom I was trying to interest in history. I wanted to show them that they wanted not only to be individuals, but something more, and I took the worst of all social persons I could think of, Nero, and I described at length how this man had murdered his mother. I went into details as to the horrible way he had burned Rome etc.; and after I had gotten through the whole description of this man, I said to one of the boys, "My son, what do you think of him?" Well, he had not been very much interested, he had not gotten the point that I was trying to make. He was embarrassed and I was, and I said, "Well, now, what do you think of this man as a citizen?" "Well," he said, "He never done nothing to me." And that, to a certain extent, is the attitude which we all have.

There is a great lack of a clear point of view among social workers. You find a mental restlessness very markedly among the best social workers. They feel an intense need of something to pin their faith to. It makes a tremendous difference—this lack of faith. Some are driven to nervous wreck and discouragement; it drives others to take up some *ism*,—socialism, singletaxism, or what not—because we human beings are made so that we must have something to pin our faith to. If we cannot see the final goal, if we cannot see our way out, then at least we must have some road, some kind of work which we believe will lead us out of the wilderness.

Now I have to confess that so far I am with the great majority of people in this country in the matter of my faith in the eventual outcome. I assume that most people in America feel that when things get bad enough in this country, the public spirit and public will will always

be able to save us, that when things are bad enough in New York, or Philadelphia or wherever it may be, when things are so bad that they cannot go on public spirit will act with force and power and for good. Kipling describes the American as perhaps no one else has ever described us in his poem "An American." He says how careless we are, how little respect we have for law. But he ends by expressing the belief that the "I" of the American spirit will save us at the last.

"But while reproof around him rings,
He turns a keen untroubled face
Home, to the instant need of things.

"Lo, imperturbable he rules,
Unkempt, disreputable, vast—
And, in the teeth of all the schools,
I—I shall save him at the last."

Lincoln, who understood us better than anyone else in the world, said: "The American Government is founded on public sentiment: whoever can change that sentiment can change the Government just so much." We all believe that the sovereignty should rest where it does, but we have to admit that this sovereign acts very strangely indeed; that in New York, at least, a newspaper can hound the public spirit of the people until they are crazy for a war with Spain, the cause of which they neither know nor care. We must admit that lynch law—also an expression of public sentiment—can drive men into worse acts than beasts perform. Sometimes the public spirit appears in the shape of a fiend, and sometimes in the shape of an angel. It is well to remember what the public spirit meant in 1787 when that spirit triumphed over all the petty, all the mean, all the selfish

and local interests, and made our Constitution and our Nation. What heights more than a hundred years ago were reached! And then think to what depths again it can sink. One wonders how it is possible for anything in the world to be capable of such great differences and changes.

It seems to me as though the private interests of the world were always giving a sort of chloroform to the good public spirit that is in us. You know how it is with yourself. You know how you and I go about our work from day to day, thinking a great part of the time of this or that particular thing that touches us, this increase of salary, or that piece of work, and a great many of us forget, it may be for years at a time, the really important things—the things that touch us and our neighbors and city and nation. One would expect politics to be a natural form of expression for the public spirit, but that too is disappointing. While elections come often enough to suit most of us, they are not frequent enough to hold and keep alive that public interest that is in us on the eve of an election. We need something else. What do you do with the person who is suffering from chloroform? The thing to do is to get him into motion, make him walk and act. It is the same in regard to the public conscience and will. They must be put into motion.

There are certain kinds of social work being done that bode a great deal of good for the future. I will simply take the question of the settlement movement. Not that that is the most important. It is not, but it is the one in which I am particularly interested and the one on which I can speak better than on any of the others, and I will endeavor to show the way in

which it seems to me that that kind of work is going to bring about some things which are of infinite importance to us. Miss Jane Addams says that a settlement is a center of interpretation, where the life of the poor is interpreted to the rich, and the life of the well-to-do is interpreted to the poor. It helps to give you an understanding of another class than your own. But infinitely more than that, when you begin to understand another class than that in which you were brought up, you begin to understand your own class better and yourself better. If you come to know another class better and to work with them, then there begins to be born in you the social person. That is a term which is used a great deal, and it has a profound meaning. There is no term in mechanics, or science, or political economy, which means so much as this—this new self—the social self.

I was taught in college that ethics was a dead science, and that in it as in any other complete science, you could compare that man's and this man's theory of ethics, and find faults in both; and when you had done that the matter was at an end. Whatever may be true in the intellectual realm, we enter a new world in our social life, in recognizing the closeness of men and what one life and class means to another. That kind of thing is like running an irrigation well that brings into use tremendous quantities of intellectual and spiritual power to irrigate the social desert. That which should appal us most is the desert in our own lives—there is so much that is dreary, flat, stale and unprofitable in our existence, so much that is unsatisfactory, so much that we are ashamed of, so much that we are sorry for. When we begin to get a new way of looking at ourselves in relation to others, a

new power in each of us to affect and to be affected, and to influence the action of classes, then there begins to be born a new kind of existence for us—a new life. The best powers of the world, I believe, have not by any manner of means begun to be touched. We are interested in Marconi's work in mechanics, and in a thousand different material fields, and it is all good; but infinitely more important for us, vastly more interesting and alluring, are the new discoveries in ethics—the new methods and ways of living.

Now in neighborhood work—in settlement work if you like—there are beginning to be felt certain great influences, certain spiritual powers that never have been used before. I once saw a kindergarten started for the poor. The children were brought in off the streets; and a Mothers' Club was also begun. The mothers became so interested in their neighbors' children, that they said "we will engage a kindergarten teacher of our own." They gave a ball, took up collections, saved their pennies, and engaged a kindergarten teacher for the children of the tenement houses. Men and women who were more well-to-do were co-workers in this work. Such co-operation is a new type of thing. When the children enter the public schools, the mothers become immensely interested in the schools. But there begins the difficulty. We have no place, no opportunity, for people to express themselves in regard to the public school. We have such a representative form of government, and we are so little truly democratic. I would like to see our city government changed so that people in each locality could express themselves. The mother's life and that of her young child are almost one. The child goes to school,

and then their life begins to separate. If you interest the mother in education while you are educating the child, you develop a great social force, and it is just as possible to do this as it is to teach the average person the multiplication table. The mothers are always the best citizens, but they have no power yet. I do not care in what community it is the mothers are more interested in the public welfare than anybody else. But they have no chance; they are not in any way organized in the work of the district. I can point to many examples to show you that the first people to be touched by a fine social spirit are the mothers. We could organize our school systems in the cities into entirely different and vastly more important organizations than they are, if we simply used the spiritual and intellectual and natural forces that are there in those districts.

I suppose you think me quixotic when I say that I do not believe that charity work will be effectively done until the poor are brought into organic co-operation. We think we are charitable, but I doubt if any of us have ever given our shoes to another man or woman when we wanted them ourselves. I doubt if we have ever brought whole families into our houses and given them beds, or have even given away the food that we and our children were hungry for. And yet the poor are doing that all the time. Get as much money as you can from the rich, organize the well-to-do classes as much as you can, but you will never in the world be able to relieve the suffering of the city until that greatest of all charitable instincts, the charity of the poor for the poor, asserts itself and then you will have the question of relief solved. I believe in charity organizations, but we have not yet be-

gun to touch the greatest field. When the great charitable instincts of the poor are organized, then we will have a real force.

Then there is the question of vice. The property interests of the country are absolutely iron clad. When a man owns a house he can do pretty nearly anything with it. He may use it for vile purposes and make it the most degrading place you can think of. But there is a power stronger than the law and that is public spirit. That is the power that can root out the evil from a neighborhood. When you give the men and women, the fathers and the mothers of the district, the power to express themselves in some kind of effective way, the evil things cannot exist. The power of public spirit is strong enough, and it is the only power strong enough to root out evil from a neighborhood. I have seen it done over and over again. If that sentiment is once organized—that power on which government really rests—it can root out vice. I have never seen a district yet where the mothers and fathers wanted an evil thing to exist in their midst—never yet. And so I feel that we who are in social and political work are just like the people who came first to settle in the new prairie, and who always picked out the worst land. They thought that if they went out on the prairie they would freeze to death. But later they were forced out on the prairie, and there they found the best and richest lands. And so in our social work; we do not at first utilize the best of the social field. Only later we learn where it is. And just as in the material desert, so the human desert has got to reclaim itself. You have got to use the forces that are there. You have got to use your brain and character to sink wells into the com-

munity. You must tap the spiritual and mental forces in the human beings that are there; and that, and that alone, will save that district.

I saw a scene which illustrates what I mean in a little, cheap theatre the other day. Usually the shows are not very interesting, but once a fortnight there is an amateur night. The people of the neighborhood, everyone who can sing or dance, gets up and contests for a prize—\$2 or a gold watch, and the proprietor prefers that you take the watch. It is not an edifying contest. The prize is awarded by the audience. The one who has the greatest amount of applause is the one who receives the prize. The man who has the most things thrown at him from the gallery is the one who leaves the quickest. It is not a particularly pleasant picture. I was there a short time ago in rather a disgusted mood, and then suddenly for some reason I began to feel better and I recognized that from some place a very sweet sound was coming to my ears. It grew louder and stronger and deeper, and then I saw that the singer on the stage had come to the chorus of a popular song, and the people were all joining in. And that note that was struck by this great audience, where each one did not try to force his voice above that of other people but was trying to keep it beneath, was inexpressibly sweet and melodious; and I heard in it the music of the future. It seemed to me that like the amateurs social workers are sometimes ridiculous and pathetic, but once in a while we say a word and sing a song the people like and understand, and then from those for whom we are working comes a note so deep and sweet that we recognize in it the life of the future.

It is possible to stimulate in the masses a power that in sweetness and in strength is infinitely greater than any individual social worker can have. How shall we learn to speak that word or sound that note? By making that stimulation the object of our striking. And so as I go about the slums of the city, disgusted, sick sometimes, those notes of the future's music come yet again to me, and they stimulate in my mind the dream of the City of the Future. Then I say over to myself the old words about the Golden City, where:

“Only righteous men and women
Dwell within its gleaming wall,
Wrong is banished from its borders,
Justice reigns supreme o'er all.”

And then I know that you and I and all social workers are

“—builders of that city,
All our joys and all our groans
Help to rear its shining ramparts,
All our lives are building stones.

And the work that we have builded,
Oft with bleeding hands and tears,
And in error and in anguish,
Will not perish with the years.

It will last and shine transfigured
In the final reign of Right,
It will merge into the splendors
Of the City of the Light.”

AUTHORITY AND ETHICS.*

BY DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

LAST Sunday morning, speaking on the subject *Inspiration and Ethics*, I tried to show that ethics, as the reasoned conviction of what it is right to do has been historically the controlling element and the final aim of all worthy embodiments of inspiration, and is intrinsically the source of the highest inspiration mankind has ever conceived—the commonwealth of free related spirits; that ethics, instead of being the anti-religious, destructive force that many of its superficial critics judge it to be, is, in respect to its deep searchings of the human soul, its inexorable demands on human conduct, its enlistment of every fine activity of human consciousness, its purifying, clarifying criticism of every human tradition and symbol, the most vivifying and constructive element of our life; that ethics is, in a word, when rightly understood, a faith, an inspiration, a religion.

To-day I wish to approach the subject from a rather more personal point of view, and to inquire what is, for us who profess this religion of ethics, the nature of our obligation to it and the charter of its claim to our obedience. In other words, Wherein lies its authority? Is there an authority of ethics, or an ethics of authority, or are authority and ethics mutually exclusive or even antagonistic terms?

And, again, as in the consideration of inspiration and ethics, I would call your attention first of all to some

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definitions. Authority is of various sorts. There is a scientific authority, absolute and irrefragible, purely objective. It appeals wholly to our intellect, and asks the consent of the intellect alone. It needs no persuasion, no moral pressure, no spiritual awakening to convince us of its truths. They appear as soon as our mind grasps them, and they appear with indisputable, axiomatic force. For example, the truth of geometry that the sum of the three angles of any triangle equals 180 degrees, needs only to have its simple demonstration seen to be immediately and forever binding on us. No mood of exaltation or depression, no season of doubt or time of trial, ever make that truth look different to us. So nature's laws act with irresistible authority alike upon the just and the unjust. They pitilessly crush out the life of the saint or the sinner alike who in ignorance or rebellion runs counter to them. Of this objective authority of science I am not speaking to-day.

There is a second kind of authority which enforces, not truths of science through simple appeal to the intellect, but truths of judgment through appeal to the more complex quality of the consent of the will. Such authority is the authority of experts. We believe that what Mr. Edison says about electric batteries, or what George Morrison says about steel bridges is true, because these men have spent years in successful investigation of such subjects.. We trust the opinions of an Elihu Root in law or a Dr. Janeway in medicine as authoritative because we have proof in many instances of the skill of these men. But, after all, this authority of judgment is something that we appeal to only occasionally. It is of inestimable advantage at certain critical moments of our lives, but not

a steady moulding, preserving influence in our whole lives.

It is just this third kind of authority that I wish to discuss this morning—the constant, pervasive, integrating force which lies behind all our thought and action, and compels us to hold to our course through sunshine and storm; which provides us with a purpose, a world-view that makes life worth the living; which kindles in us a fire of devotion intense enough to temper to fineness the good metal in us and to consume away the dross. This is the authority of the moral law in our minds and members. By it we first became distinct, responsible, consistent beings—in a word, personalities.

It is of the utmost importance that we inquire into the nature of this authority by which—unless we are moral feather-balls, tossed by every breath of opinion and whiff of desire—our lives are dominated and regulated. How sordid and material the standards of life are for the great majority; how completely does living exhaust itself in effort to increase both the capacity for and the means of satisfaction of physical comforts and pleasures! So that we have even consecrated to this lowest use of life the very word “life” itself. We speak of “making a living” when we mean earning enough money for the satisfaction of material needs and desires. But that is not really “making a living”—a *life*. There’s many a millionaire to-day that hasn’t begun really and truly to “make a living”! Many a man that can manage a large corporation but cannot govern his own spirit! Many a man whose physical self is admitted to companionship with titles and decorations, but whose spiritual self has not begun to qualify for communion with the real nobility of the

world—its poets and its prophets, its scholars and its saviors. Only by virtue of a great obedience, only through submission to a compelling and indispensable moral authority do we realize the highest quality of life.

Let us trace briefly the advent of moral authority into our consciousness. There comes a day (perhaps it comes with an awful jar of sudden realization, perhaps as the maturing of a slow and even mental development) when we awake from the absolute world-view of childhood to the relative world-view of manhood and womanhood. With the lapse of only a few years the significance of that day is often obscured; but could we get back to it in vivid imagination we should realize how acute its spiritual agony and how epochal its spiritual adjustments were. Till that day everything had been fixed, inevitable, unalterable. Our parents in the flesh seemed as imperishable as George Washington or Robinson Crusoe in the ideal; our house, perhaps a modest frame dwelling, seemed as immovable as the eternal hill behind it. At school, at home we were fed with mental and spiritual food whose wholesomeness we did not question, of whose nourishing quality we formed no opinion. If the taste was bitter now and then, we called it our misfortune but we took our medicine. Then came the fateful day when the infallibility of parent, teacher and text-book fell to the ground. We became, as the old legend of Genesis has it, like gods, knowing good and evil. Constraint was laid upon us to find rules of choice in a bewildering complex of opinions and clamoring authorities. We were confronted with a duty which, unless we failed through weariness or cowardice, was to be henceforth a constant duty throughout life. We suddenly felt the call to vin-

dicating our manhood and womanhood by discovering through patient study and proving through consistent conduct the reasonableness of the faith that was in us.

Two factors are present in the process by which a soul, newly awakened from the absolute to the relative attitude toward life, finds itself: an inward, subjective factor, and an outward objective factor. The inward factor is the complexion which the soul has received from the circumstances of birth, of early training, of environment, of the choice of a business or professional career, of the selection of friends and intimates. Over the circumstances of one's birth and one's training during the most impressionable years of life one has no control whatever. The fact that one is born in America, not in central Africa; in a republic, not in an absolute monarchy; of refined parents, not of sodden criminals; and a hundred other similar considerations, condition one's life through all changes of fortune or choices of conviction.

Thirteen years ago I visited the mosque of Santa Sophia in Constantinople on the occasion of the most sacred feast of the Mohammedan calendar, the Night of Power—the night at the close of the month of fasting, when the spirit of Allah descends into the souls chastened by a long mortification of the flesh—the Mohammedan Pentecost. Standing shoulder to shoulder on the marble floor of the splendid temple, once dedicated (to Holy Wisdom) by the great Justinian, were ten thousand pious worshipers of the god of the prophet; and when the priests' sharp sing-song cry rang through the immense dome, these ranks of worshipers bent forward like a field of corn struck by a strong wind and bowed their foreheads to the marble pavement with a sound which echoed

in the long dim gallery above. As I stood in that gallery with a few other "infidels" and "dogs of Christians," watching the marvelous sight below, it seemed as if I had suddenly become aware of the myriad forms of worship of the myriads of generations of men, and I realized with an awful reality that while every influence of birth, race, early training, mental and moral development made it impossible that I should become the kind of worshiper I saw on the floor below, that single scene also made it impossible that I should continue to be the kind of worshiper that I had been till that night.

So to the inward factor of the influence of birth, training, and environment is added the outward factor of historic institutions. When we first realize the relative value of human judgments in the problems of spiritual truth, we are confronted with a number of historic faiths, symbols, systems, all claiming to be authorities for us—all clamoring for our consent. Here it is a church which claims to be authoritative because it has preserved an apostolic bishopric or because it practices baptism by immersion; here it is a book which claims to be authoritative because its contents have been supernaturally revealed; here it is a doctrine which claims to be authoritative because it has been endorsed by ecclesiastical councils, or a system because it has been accepted by our fathers, or a ceremony, because it has been practiced for a millennium. It is small wonder if the soul stands aghast before the babel of claims, like a passenger just landed on a strange railroad platform and surrounded by a circle of soliciting cab-men.

Now it is not the criticism of the value or the truth of these historic authorities in themselves that is my pur-

pose to-day, but rather a study of our attitude toward them: to determine, if we can, whether that attitude is the ethical one or not. The motive which determines a man's attitude toward these historic authorities may be, in the first place, fear. Overwhelmed by the great mystery of life and destiny which breaks upon his spiritual vision, he may fling himself upon a great millennial institution like the church, because it has a definite answer ready to his despairing cry for assurance of a life beyond the grave. He bows before Cæsar. Absolutism satisfies him, because it relieves him of the responsibility of deciding for himself. He accepts his religion ready-made, for he does not dare to trust himself to make his religion. The languages of the dominion of dogma sanctify in his sight the authority of the institution as the generations of Hapsburgs, or Romanoffs sanctify in the eyes of millions of subjects the authority of royalty. He may know that such authority is supported only by physical force, and that history has again and again convicted it of cruelty, of persecution, of tyranny—that under its baneful workings innocent men have been thrust into Bastilles, and the scaffold erected under the shadow of the high altar. Yet just because it is absolute this authority of fear claims the allegiance of millions upon millions. Nowhere is it analyzed with greater power and insight than in the great dramatists of ancient Greece, and especially in their mighty leader Aeschylus, "It is good," he says in the "Eumenides," "that fear should sit as the guardian of the soul, forcing it into wisdom—good that men should carry a threatening shadow in their hearts under the full sunshine: else how should they learn to revere the right."

Again, the response of the awakened mind to the various authorities which are clamoring for recognition may be prompted by a dread of loneliness, an unwillingness to go out alone whither conviction would lead. There is a type of mind that craves above all else to belong to a large party of believers. What many agree to is true just because many have agreed. The majority as it grows approaches infallibility. The dogmas and systems are truest which can show the greatest cloud of witnesses. The *consensus gentium* is a most comforting and warming phrase. The triple argument of the mediæval church in support of its faith, viz., that it is received always, everywhere, by everybody, becomes a cogent one. It is not the power of the institution so much as its pervasiveness, not its majesty so much as its majority that attracts this class to bow to its authority.

A third sort of response to the objective authorities which claim a man's allegiance may be the result of indecision or mental laziness. The mental and moral inertia of men is simply stupendous. The readiness with which nine out of ten follow the path of least mental and moral resistance makes the real moral leader or the real independent thinker one of the rarest products of society. Although we all know on a moment's reflection that the standards of comfort, knowledge and even common decency which we enjoy to-day could never have been reached had the disposition which finds them satisfying been universal, we still find it most easy to yield to the temptation of believing that a greater necessity for improvement in these things was laid upon our grandfathers than is laid upon us. *We* would not have stoned the prophets! we say, and lo! the stone is in our hand. For

not choosing to improve is choosing to stagnate. And suffering authorities, which have not been proven and tried, to control our own spiritual life is only to give another turn to the rope that binds them on the backs of our descendants.

A fourth disposition, finally, with which we may meet the established objective authorities of creed, church, philosophy, and code is one of excessive modesty. This disposition, because of its resemblance to a fair and manly modesty, is often regarded as a virtue, whereas it is in reality a most grievous fault. Excessive modesty in meeting the claims of authority is simply the surrender of one's birthright, and an insult to such mental and moral discrimination as one possesses. For example, a young man, reaching the crisis of spiritual awareness in his life, meets the problem: Is this or this article of my traditional faith true? His historical study, his moral prompting, his philosophical opinion, all combine to discredit the authority of the article. Still he accepts that authority, proclaims it, teaches it. And his plea is something like this: I do not quite think that true, but I am young, I see many men of sanctity and learning who do apparently think it true. Who am I that I should set up my opinion against theirs? I will call it true, and perhaps later my thought will be clearer and more convincing. So the young man commences his deeper comprehension of truth in a lie. He takes his first step toward mental clarity by justifying mental confusion—and he will as soon reach the larger truth he longs for in that road as he would reach the aurora borealis starting southward from Philadelphia. No, there is a modesty, of course, befitting the young man in his expression of

mental and moral convictions, but that modesty never, never calls upon him to deny his conviction or to stifle it.

This enumeration of the various attitudes of mind toward established objective authorities is not at all exhaustive, but it is full enough to suggest to you the ethical problem involved. Neither is it true, probably, that any one of these attitudes alone fairly denotes the state of mind of the person who accepts the authority weakly. A combination of fear and false modesty, of laziness and loneliness, of any or all of these things may be the cause. But all of these attitudes alike are a direct affront upon the ethical consciousness. They all offer a narcotic instead of a stimulus to the ethical sense; they hush the judgment instead of educating it; they smother conscience instead of refining it; they discourage search, and cut the Gordian knot whose patient untying is the only exercise that can give moral skill and suppleness to our handling of ethical problems. Yet I fear that the vast majority of those who give their allegiance to objective authorities of institutions, systems, and creeds would have to confess to being actuated largely by the motives just discussed.

From this criticism of unethical motives for the acceptance of authorities, I should like now to turn to the positive aspect of the topic and ask what are the marks of an authority which is both the product of and the surety for our highest ethical realization, what is the nature of the authority which lays hold on us with irresistible power, not on which we have to lay hold with apologetic half-truths.

All real authority, in the first place, must be experimental, evolved from our own moral experience and not

imposed in the name of another's. This is not at all to maintain that we are all independent of each other, and that there is no such thing as the transmission of authority. Just as most of our knowledge comes from the testimony of others, so much of what is authority for us comes from the experience of others. Only there is this difference between the real, controlling, permanent authority of our life and the occasional authority of judgment touched on earlier in my lecture. Whereas the authority of Mr. Edison on electric batteries or of Dr. Janeway on lung troubles is valid even for those people who do not know even the elements of the science of electricity or the processes of respiration, the authority of another over me in the spiritual realm can only be through my full conscious participation in his experience—through what Auguste Sabatier has finely called “a powerful moral contagion.” We remake, in other words, and do not simply acknowledge the authority we get from another. Just as soon as conscience wakes to the grasp of a moral problem just as soon as we realize that an enlargement of personality is the only solution for a moral problem, then we see clearly the need for an intimate personal conviction as the only norm of conduct. Then other people's convictions, inherited standards, past authorities appear to us only fragmentary and partial. There is no moral cement by which these fragments of objective authority can be patched together into a perfect whole, any more than the fragments of a broken vase can be patched together into a perfect whole. They have to go into the fire, the fusing fire of experience, to come out entirely recast, reshaped. Authority is a new thing for every human soul, not new in its elements (which his-

tery must largely furnish) but new in its effectiveness. For us, as responsible moral agents to recognize an authority means simply to be aware of the profound affinity existing between that authority and our conscience, to feel that our obligation to obey that authority is our emancipation from error, to be convinced that to resist that authority would be to give the lie to our better nature.

Furthermore, besides being experimental in character real authority must also be social in its aim. I cannot imagine a single compulsion to act well or to refrain from acting ill apart from my relation to a social order. Apart from that relation I should simply cease to be a moral being. Imagine, for example, a Dreyfus in his narrow pen on Devil's Island, only without either the memory of cruel social relations to brood over or, the hope of the resumption of better social relations to look forward to. Is there anything there to which authority could appeal? So the whole intensely individualistic theology of our many generations of ancestors seems to me to invoke an authority which is artificial though awful. Humanity was broken up, by that theology, into billions of sinful units, each with the identical moral problem—namely, to get reconciled, through a certain confession and ceremony, to God; to make his own peace with heaven. So far did this individualizing process go that even little children under ten years old had the quick minds and tender emotions, which should have been trained to enrich their knowledge and appreciation of the society into which they were growing, turned aside to the contemplation of Calvin's God and the authority of his majesty. To save one's self out of the world, not to

save the world through one's self, was the ideal of that system. The authority which it exerted was an authority of fear—and fear is the most anti-social element that enters into the soul of man. Fear blasts communion, paralyzes efforts of coöperation, and petrifies the springs of sympathy. Therefore any authority which appeals to that element in our nature is only the encouragement of an unethical disposition—and hence false.

Again, true and binding authority must be a growing, developing thing, and not a fixed doctrine, theory, or practice. It is born of our experience, and as our experience deepens and widens it becomes constantly both more adequate and more demanding. Just as we outgrow the habits of our physical childhood, so we must outgrow the authorities of our moral childhood. It is as foolish to think of a fixed objective authority for all grades of moral life as it would be to maintain a diet of gruel through all the years of the physical life. I, as a moral agent seeking for a clearer and clearer conception of my duty, am subject to an authority of which the brutish criminal, kept behind iron bars and under the rod of the jailer, cannot have the least idea; and my neighbor in turn, who has travelled far beyond me on the path of self-realization in social service, is privileged to live under a refined and refining moral authority in which I have not yet qualified myself to share. It is the best spirits that know the most of real authority. The fearful authority which the base and brutish tremble before is unworthy to be considered by the free man. Everything that threatens, bullies, forces, or frightens us into a belief or a course of action in the end degrades our soul; all that persuades, wins, draws us is in the process en-

nobling and saving. It is the distinguishing mark of the first kind of authority to be fixed. The authority which rests on force hates the word progress, whether it be the political authority of the Czar and his Grand Dukes, or the religious authority of an infallible revelation. It has ever called new ideas "error and revolt," and visited men of fresh inspiration with persecutions. It has abandoned the field of history (which testifies to progress) for that of dogma. It has elaborated a transcendent philosophy which securely prosecutes its artificial metaphysics above the troubled atmosphere of actual facts. It has marked with cruel jealousy every advance of mankind in scientific knowledge, has branded inquiry as sinful, and stigmatized wholesome doubt (the most salutary mental quality that we possess) as odious moral guilt. It is but a travesty on real authority, which finds its whole dignity and activity in the encouragement of men to enlarge their mental and spiritual vision by every fact of science and every experience of free-thought—

"To shake

The torpor of assurance from our creed,
Reintroduce the doubt discarded, bring
That formidable danger back, we drove
Long ago to the distance and the dark."

And lastly, real authority must be an educative, liberating force in our lives. Human history is a succession of emancipations. Our remote ancestors, little differentiated from the beasts, struggled against red beak and claw to preserve their lives in the midst of wild associates. The cave-dwellers and tree-dwellers, the hunting and fishing tribes of antiquity wrested a precarious living

from their environment. In the classic age of Greece and Rome the conquest of nature had proceeded far, but society was still under bondage to the tyrant and the captain. The Middle Ages marked a progressive emancipation from the tyrant in the growth of the European nations, in trade, in the upspringing of the towns and the beginnings of modern economic theories, but still they languished under the intellectual tyranny of the orthodoxies of Aristotle, the Bible, and the church fathers. The Renaissance and Reformation came to free Europe from intellectual and spiritual bondage, but there followed a period of political bondage with its theories of the divine right of kings, and the privilege of blood. The great battle of the nineteenth century for political democracy will be followed in the twentieth century by a still greater battle for industrial freedom; and still the spirit of man waits and will wait for the end of that emancipation begun in the jungle and the cave. The trend, so far as we can hope, of all this painful process is the perfection of human personalities in a society of harmonious though diverse interests. All that serves this process is authoritative for us, because it is educative; all that hinders this process, though it were sanctified by the ceremonial of a thousand years, is a useless encumbrance on society. Therefore our question to early authority in institution, belief, or practice that claims our assent, must be. Can it serve, does it serve to-day the cause of human emancipation? Or is it only a remnant of an obsolete stage of civilization, and an outgrown philosophy of life? Does it fit the minds of the twentieth century in America, or only those of the fifteenth century in Rome or the first century in Judea? Is it bringing good nour-

ishment to the intelligence and morals of mankind or only adroitly flattering their senses by the beauty of ritual, hypnotizing their imagination by the predictions of eternity? We must never accept blindly, never reject blindly, but always *interpret* authorities—for our spiritual, that is our ethical life, consists in progressing through interpretation after interpretation, towards a consistent, harmonious, complete personality.

The true authority seeks no higher office than that of educator and liberator of the human spirit. The false authority seeks to be the tyrant and the jailor of the human spirit. You may distinguish the true from the false by the determination of the latter to maintain itself at any cost—even by the scaffold and the stake. True authority, like every good educator, labors not to perpetuate itself, but to render itself useless. For where understanding has come instruction has done its work.

Words of our language often contain a picture whose lines have long since faded in common usage, but are brought out again sharp and clear and suggestive by the restoring acid of the philologist. "Authority" is such a word. It is from a Latin verb *augeo* meaning to "increase" or "enlarge." That which increases our knowledge, that which increases our hope, that which increases our faith, our noble aspirations, our devotion to duty, our peace of mind, our depth of sympathy, our hold on life, our control over passion, our love of beauty, our thirst for perfection—whether it be a book, a belief, an institution, a service, a hero or a martyr—that is authority for us, and all else is immaterial.

THE RELIGION OF THE UN- CHURCHED.*

BY NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

CHRISTIANITY is the form of religion that has struck the deepest roots in the life of Europe and America. For more than eighteen centuries the Christian church has exercised a powerful influence on our Western civilization. Other forces have been at work, and their importance should not be underestimated. It would be palpably unjust to give to one institution alone the credit for all the progress made by our branch of humanity since it left barbarism behind. But the unbiased historian will always recognize that the church has been the prime factor in this development. Even though organized movements of dissent have appeared as the most significant manifestations of the church's life, these have themselves been informed by the spirit characteristic of the founder of Christianity, and the work achieved by the progressive elements within the church should, in all fairness, be given as much consideration as the strenuous efforts to prevent even such changes as are implied in a healthy growth.

Since the fourth century of our era the church has had the financial assistance of the state. Jesus himself was opposed to the compulsory support of religion. He criti-

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cised the temple-tax, prescribed in the law, on the ground that, if even earthly kings do not exact tribute of their own sons, the Heavenly Father can still less be regarded as disposed to compel his children to pay taxes for religious purposes. The church has, as a rule, taken a different attitude. It has been willing in many lands to be wholly maintained as a state-institution, and even where, as in our own country, the principle of separation of state and church has been in a large measure recognized, it continues to claim financial aid by compulsory taxation of all citizens in the form of exemption of church-property.

Of more importance is the moral support of the state. The strong arm of civil authority, for the protection of all lawful rights and liberties against evil-doers, has been lent to the church for the suppression of false doctrines and wrongly performed ceremonies. Armies, constabularies, jails, gibbets, and stakes have been offered and accepted for the conversion or punishment of heretics and schismatics. Dissenters have been debarred from the best positions in the state, and only grudgingly accorded their rights as citizens. Even where the state no longer officially recognizes any form of religion, long custom still makes church membership a badge of social respectability, forces invidious Sunday legislation, and seeks to reinstate sectarian teaching in the public schools. The conservative elements in society naturally give their powerful support to the church as a bulwark against radicalism, a guardian of existing institutions, a defender of vested interests, and a teacher of obedience to authority.

In view of these circumstances it is a fact challenging attention and serious consideration that a great part, possibly a majority, of the people in Western Europe and

America is in reality outside the pale of the Christian church. It is not generally realized how large the number is of those who may be said to be unchurched. The fact that there are three million socialist voters in Germany indicates that there are from fifteen to twenty millions, belonging chiefly to what is known as the laboring class, who grow up and live in an atmosphere indifferent or positively hostile to the Christian church. But the unchurched are not confined to any class or political party. They are found everywhere, in the professions as well as in the trades, among the rich and the poor, the learned and the ignorant, the well-disposed and the ill-behaved. The situation is not essentially different in France, and is rapidly taking on the same character in Italy and Belgium. In Holland, traditions of religious toleration, and in the Scandinavian countries, a certain religious mysticism, have to some extent retarded, without being able to prevent, the same inevitable process. The defection in England on the part of the masses is at the present time very marked; and in our own country statistics show that only half of the population is connected, even loosely, with any religious denomination. It should be observed, however, that with us the attitude of the unchurched is one of indifference and distrust rather than of direct opposition to the church. But the estrangement is unmistakable.

What are the reasons for this alienation? It cannot be accounted for by the fact that only a fraction of the population can be accommodated in the buildings erected for worship and instruction. For a greater demand would create ampler facilities; and the general attendance does not indicate that the supply is to a marked degree insufficient. There are apparently multitudes who might oc-

cupy pews in our churches, but who for some reason do not avail themselves of the opportunity.

It is fair that we should consider most carefully the reasons usually given by the church itself for its failure to reach the millions of men and women whose religious condition concerns us at this time. In the first place, the love of money is assigned as a cause. The pursuit of wealth occupies the minds of the rich, the struggle for bread absorbs the thought of the poor. Men are unwilling to make sacrifices of time and means for the sake of religion. They will not give up one day in seven; they dislike the collection plate. They have accustomed themselves to an expensive mode of living, and have become lovers of ease and luxury; or they are filled with envy of the rich and an all-consuming desire to rise from poverty to affluence. In either case, they prefer the worship of Mammon, with the temporal and tangible rewards it promises, to the service of God, with its stern demands of self-renunciation. Avarice and greed hold men aloof from the church of the poor Nazarene.

Another cause indicated by the church is the love of pleasure. Men and women seem possessed with a passion for amusement. Their highest ambition often appears to be to pass their lives in a continual round of entertainments, in eating and drinking, card-playing, singing, dancing, theatre-going, and merry-making of every sort. Such a devotion to pleasure often undermines the foundations of character and leads to a life of reckless frivolity and dissipation. It invariably weakens moral fibre and renders tasteless and undesirable the life of sobriety and unselfish consecration enjoined by the church.

Still another cause that has been assigned is impa-

tience of moral restraints. Men are unwilling to submit to wholesome discipline, to take upon themselves covenants limiting their own liberty for the welfare of others, to accept the counsel and guidance of their elders and the friendly admonition of their brothers. Wise in their own conceit, they reject with wanton haste the accumulated wisdom of the past, the results of age-long experience, and are prone not only to think but to act as they please, regardless of those social conventions to which the church has given a sacred character.

There is an element of truth in these contentions. Thousands of men and women no doubt keep aloof from the church because they are selfish and do not wish to sacrifice of their abundance or of their hard-earned substance, because they love their ease and are loath to give up any part of their leisure, because they are consumed by a morbid craving for amusements and have no vital interest in spiritual things, or because they have thrown off all moral restraints and dislike to associate with people whose lives are governed by strict rules of conduct.

But these are not the chief causes of the prevalent and constantly increasing estrangement of men from the Christian church. In fact, it is not apparent that the teaching of the church on the subject of wealth at the present time alienates or offends those who are most eager and successful in laying up for themselves treasures on the earth, or appeals to and attracts the poor who once flocked around the prophet of Nazareth to hear the good tidings of a better social order. In most branches of the church participation in so-called worldly amusements is not a barrier against membership, and the providing of entertainment for the young is given quite as much con-

sideration as the providing of moral and religious instruction. A strict discipline is no longer characteristic of church-life. Where severer forms of discipline are still in vogue, the objection to them is, as a rule, not inspired by a dislike of moral restraints but by a conviction that many of the things condemned and punished are not in themselves wrong, as in the case of dancing, card-playing, theatre-going, reading of heretical books, or voicing unpopular views. The public opinion within the church counts as a bar to fellowship habitual drunkenness and sexual immorality, but does not condemn in a similar manner avarice and greed, dishonesty and lack of intellectual integrity. While the church stands for a certain standard of private morality, and there is every reason to rejoice in its maintenance of this standard, it cannot be affirmed that the present tendency away from it is caused by the indifference of thoughtless men, and the hostility of wicked men, to an institution laboring with deep interest and earnest zeal to make justice, mercy and truth prevail in all human relations.

The development of science, philosophy, art, and social idealism, and the attitude of the church toward these great factors in our modern civilization, seem to be the main reasons for the growth of so large a body of the unchurched. Science deals directly with the facts of nature and of human life. It gathers, compares, classifies and interprets these facts as links in a chain of development. Its object is not the defense of a theory or a system, but the acquisition of certain and systematized knowledge. It does not know beforehand whither research will lead it; it does not care whether the results of investigation confirm or overthrow established theories. It seeks noth-

ing but the truth; it never supposes that it has found the whole truth. It is eager to know its own errors that they may be eliminated. Millions of men have confidence in the methods of science, and can conceive of no advance in knowledge except through their perfectionment and faithful application.

The church, on the other hand, assumes the finality of the Christian religion, and maintains that "the faith once for all delivered to the saints" can not be altered or improved, though its contents may be unfolded and variously applied. This follows of necessity from its conception of the personality of Jesus. As a result it has been glad to avail itself of vast erudition and carefully trained faculties when devoted to the defense of doctrines whose truth has been unquestioningly assumed, but has never been able to welcome a scientific investigation that took nothing for granted and used all possible means of ascertaining the truth, regardless of tradition and authority. It opposes to-day the scientific study of the Bible as strenuously as it once opposed the scientific study of the stars in the heavens, the fossils in the earth's crust, and the origin of the human species. It continues to demand belief in incomprehensible formulas and impossible miracles, and to offer salvation through prayers, professions, and sacraments rather than through knowledge, example, and moral endeavor. So marked is the contrast between the mental attitude created by the assumption that the final goal beyond which no further advance in knowledge is possible has been reached in the past, in a person, a book, or a creed, and that produced by the spirit of scientific research, that, if a man would minister as a servant of the church to the spiritual needs of

his fellowmen, the multitude of the unchurched, more or less conscious of this difference, almost inevitably are seized with a doubt as to his integrity or his intelligence. This is the pathos of many a noble life; this is the chief cause for the divided sympathy of men outside the church with heretics in the pulpit or before an ecclesiastical court.

Philosophy deals with the nature of ultimate reality, the grounds of knowledge, the motives of action. It is based on the conclusions of scientific investigation; it rests on the observation and scientific interpretation of facts. The philosophy embodied in the Scriptures and the Christian creeds reposes on the estimate of the universe current in antiquity, on a science now abandoned because its generalizations were made from inadequate observation of the facts. The philosophy of to-day is not indifferent to any phase of human thought. It derives strength and nourishment from every fruitful source. It is neither Pagan nor Christian. To it this most important contrast in the religious history of man has lost its significance in a higher synthesis. The church may avail itself of Aristotelian logic or even evolutionary philosophy for apologetic purposes. But those to whom the appeal is made are no longer interested in seeing how cleverly the veil of mystery that hangs before the face of nature may be made into a cloak behind which miracles discredited by reason may conceal themselves, or how ingeniously old formulas may be vested with new meanings never dreamed of by their framers. The vast problems of existence agitate the minds of men more deeply, and in wider circles, than is sometimes supposed. Thoughtful men, whether they are conversant with technical terms and systems or not, are anxious to work

themselves through the perplexing questions to a satisfactory view of the world, and they find it conducive to clearness to have the expression fit the thought as closely as possible. They look out upon the world in a different manner from their fathers, they seek for its inner reality by different methods, they naturally voice their experience in different language, and the sense of a fundamental spiritual difference keeps them without the pale of the church.

Art commands a strong interest. Emancipated from conventional designs, it has learned to seek its subjects in a wider field, has become more secular in character. Through the engraver, the photographer, and the printing-press, the reproduction and multiplication of masterpieces have become possible. In music, the modern man expresses more fully than in any other way the yearnings of his heart, the aspirations of his soul, the things that stir the depths of his nature, the experiences that are too rich for words. The drama has become one of the necessities of life. On the stage the grandeur of human nature is portrayed, its foibles mirrored, its mighty passions shown in motion, its tragedies depicted, its types of character presented, its happier play with circumstance and fate described, its humorous side set forth. To some extent the church has been able to avail itself of the plastic arts, of music and the drama. But the world of thought reflected in the music and the dramatic art of the present age assumes from day to day a more foreign aspect to the view of those who have remained upon the standpoint of the church. There are important moral questions with which the stage deals far more earnestly and trenchantly than the pulpit. The artist whose chief aim is to hold the mirror

up to nature has a solemn message to deliver, while the priest ordained to teach has neither oracle to give nor courage to inquire. Hence, sober-minded men give time and money for the chance of stimulus to earnest thought, while shrines where serious thought is not invited stand empty and deserted.

Profound as is the influence of science, philosophy and art, it is possible that social idealism holds the interest of men to-day in a still stronger grasp. There has been a tremendous change within the last generation in men's attitude to social questions. Millions of men and women no longer believe that present conditions must of necessity be maintained, that institutions hoary with age must live forever, that chattel-slavery and war, industrial feudalism and proletariat, slums and epidemics, sex-bondage and child-labor cannot be abolished. A feeling of hope is characteristic of the masses of the unchurched. It is a larger hope than ever swelled the heart of man since the days when Christianity was young, and strangely different. Then it was the expectation of a deliverer from on high, a heavenly Jerusalem, and an eternal life that filled with radiant joy the poor, oppressed, and persecuted. Now it is the sense of growing strength to break the bonds of tyrannous conditions and make this earthly life for man and woman, old and young, less hampered in its growth, less bitter in its experiences, more healthy, profitable, free, rich, dignified, and peaceful. From the hands of Jove frail mortals wrest the thunder-bolt, and far from being crushed by the weight of such unwonted responsibility, they cheerfully set about to make for themselves a new earth. They have abolished slavery in spite of Plato's approval of this institution, and

its apostolic recognition; and they now demand the abolition of war, a more equitable distribution of wealth, universal education, prevention of disease, political rights and economic freedom for woman. A feeling of despair or resignation in the presence of great social evils has given place to a sense of the possibility and duty of correcting them.

The attitude of the church toward this mighty moral movement has, in the main, been one of indifference, if not of hostility. The great abolitionists whose names our nation now delights to honor were without the church or were driven out, the chief defenders of the shameful traffic in human flesh whose names it is charitable to forget spoke from Christian pulpits. The church prays for the success of arms, excuses the atrocities of war, and raises no protest against the constant increase of armies and navies; while the Social Democracy is the greatest peace organization in the world. In the social revolution we are passing through the church cannot lead; it has no great message to utter, no ideal with which to fire men's hearts; it sees not the distress of their souls; it hears not the cry of the little ones; it offers them stones for bread.

There are indeed in all branches of the church strong personalities, moved by the spirit of the age, and maintaining their integrity in spiritual isolation; and on the borders of Christendom small bodies, scarcely fellowshiped by the church at large, moving resolutely and untrammelled by tradition whither their ideal leads. But the great historic institution owns them not, feels uneasy by their presence, is relieved when they are outside. It will change, no doubt, grow tolerant of present heresies, respectful of some things now spurned, more hospitable

also to new truths and new demands of justice. But it is handicapped by a heavy load of creeds and cultic performances, traditions hoary with age and tendencies too strong to overcome. Therefore the ranks of the unchurched increase.

What is the religious condition of the masses that cannot be reached by the church? They are often characterized by churchmen as without any religion, and seldom think it worth while to resent this judgment. Occasionally, raids are made upon them that they may "get religion." Such revivals sometimes are productive of good results, where the genuine moral enthusiasm of a leader succeeds in arousing slumbering consciences and inspires men with a desire to lead a better life. Often action and reaction are equally deplorable, a morbid sensation setting a false standard of religious experience, and the impulse to moral self-improvement being stifled by an artificial scheme of sacrificial magic and imputed merits. The assumption that those without the church are devoid of a religious life seems to depend on a defective definition of religion. It would appear to be necessary so to define religion as to cover by the definition all those phenomena of man's life that in any age and people have been of a religious character, and not merely the peculiarities of some tribe, or sect, or period.

This consideration apparently requires that we should understand religion to be the consciousness of some power manifest in nature, determining man's destiny, and the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands. In that case, the man who looks into the face of nature, with a deep sense of its mystery, a genuine appreciation of its beauty, a desire to know its inmost truth, a consciousness

of universal law, a feeling of obligation to order his own life in accordance with it, and a longing to shape human society into harmony with its demands, should certainly be regarded as having a religious life, and the great movements characteristic of modern civilization that may have alienated him from the church must be considered as manifestations of the spirit of religion.

But the religious life of the unchurched unquestionably suffers from the effects of too much isolation, too violent reaction, too little systematic training. A lack of spiritual nurture, of guidance and direction, of stimulating fellowship, and of well arranged ethical instruction for the young, prevents a healthy development. There is need of the inspiration that comes from being brought frequently into contact with great ideas, lofty ideals, and worthy examples. Men grow when their horizons widen, their minds pursue expanding thoughts, their hearts respond to generous sentiments, their wills are moved and strengthened by the sight of noble deeds. The dead are more powerful than the living; they are most helpful when through living interpreters they make an intelligent appeal for loyalty to duty and regard for truth. Nature reveals her secrets to the seer's eye; her message, unheeded by the crowd, is caught by the prophet's ear and proclaimed by his consecrated lips. This prophetic mediation is necessary and beneficent. It is perverted, however, when the prophet is allowed to become a dictator, when finality is ascribed to his interpretation of life, and absolute perfection to his realization of the ideal. The interpreters must themselves be interpreted, with discrimination as well as sympathy, reverently and yet critically.

The atmosphere of the church is not favorable to the

development of the spiritual freedom which this requires. A worshiper seeking special favors at the hands of the god in whose power he feels himself to be is not likely to subject the character of this god to a very searching scrutiny. His god-idea remains in some respects behind his ordinary ethical standards, while in other respects it is in advance of his ordinary moral conduct, but his practical relation, emphasized in creed and cult, forbids a recognition of this fact, and tends to conceal it from his own consciousness. Even if the words of the great prophet of Nazareth had come down to us in their original form, and contemporaneous records had preserved to us the immediate impression of his spirit and manner of life, it would be wrong to him and to ourselves to accept any idea of his that should not have the approval of our own judgment or to follow His leadership in any direction whither our own conscience should not lead us. Our loyalty should not be that of a slave to his master, or of a disciple to his only teacher, but that of a free man to one of the great spiritual leaders of the human race from whom it is a privilege to learn. The demand for unconditional surrender of thought and will to "the Christ" does not even imply acceptance of the great moral ideas that seem to have been proclaimed by the historical Jesus, but recognition of a fictitious personality whose teachings possess far less moral value, and whose estimate of himself and his relations to men, besides having no basis in historic reality, is apt to prevent the natural relations which men should sustain to the great teachers of mankind in every age and land, and to the great facts of nature that call for direct interpretation. There can be no doubt, however, that the regularity with which the Christ-idea is held up

before the mind of the worshiper is a source of inspiration.

The masses of the unchurched are in need of regularly recurring opportunities to gain stimulus for the inner life. Having drifted away from the church, they too often stand alone, with none to help them with their problems and their burdens. Though perhaps unconscious of the fact themselves, they resent the unnatural isolation, become bitter in spirit, harsh in their criticisms, negative in their conclusions. Rightly rebelling against obsolete beliefs and superstitious practices, they are not seldom utterly unable to discriminate between the soul of truth and its perishable embodiment, between the insincerity that will not see the new truth, the stupidity that cannot see it, and the conservatism that will not commit itself until it has correlated the new discovery with the truth that hid in the old error. This lack of judgment, found at times in minds of generous proportions, causes them to show a lamentable degree of unfairness in dealing with religious matters. Every prophet is to them an impostor, every priest a hypocrite, every Bible a net-work of falsehood, every system of religion a cleverly devised scheme for holding men in ignorance and subjection. They remain strangers to that true historic understanding which, with a clearer perception of the factors that have been at work in the past, gives a fairer estimate and a more hopeful outlook. Though a single powerful utterance may give an impulse in the right direction that shall be felt for life, the proper spiritual attitude is more likely to be the result of long training, directed by the frequently repeated messages of thoughtful men.

Men need to have the moral aspects of the great ques-

tions of life brought to their attention again and again. These questions concern them as individuals, as members of families, and as citizens. It is not always easy to determine what is the right course of action. To a churchman it may be sufficient that it is in harmony with the officially recognized standards and the assumed teaching of the Scriptures, but he who cannot acknowledge these authorities must seek for principles that seem to him of general validity, or be guided in each case by expediency. The Christian pulpit puts its emphasis upon certain Biblical precepts affecting private morality, affirming their sufficiency for all times, while, as a rule, it maintains an attitude of indifference on the questions of public morality that most deeply agitate the majority of the unchurched. The assumption that the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures can finally settle even the more important questions of private morality is obviously without foundation. The ancient law-books of the Hebrews recognized polygamy, concubinage, and divorce. Jesus apparently condemned divorce, and counseled celibacy. Whether he allowed divorce for any cause, is subject to grave doubt. At any rate, it is absurd to make the happiness of thousands of men and women in every generation dependent upon a moot point in textual criticism. These and similar problems must be settled on other grounds, and there should be faithful guidance in the development of a high type of private morality among those who are without the church.

Equally important in their own way are the questions of public morality. The mightiest organization with distinctly moral aims outside of the church is without a question the Social Democracy. Among its great ideas are

the abolition of war through disarmament and international arbitration, universal education of all grades at public expense, emancipation of woman, and an equitable distribution of wealth. These ideas arouse enthusiasm. They set high aims for propaganda and political action. They send men forth as pilgrims in search of a better land, and fill them with the assurance of things not seen. They are inspiring. No religious life can prosper in the future that has not felt their power.

But the serious limitations of the socialistic movement must not be overlooked. It fails to recognize the importance of the family life; it does not see the educative value of the principle of private property; it puts the emphasis on *rights* rather than on *duties*, on the extension of privilege rather than on the quality of work; it neglects the ethical training that is necessary for life under any régime, and is inclined to adjourn its moral excellences until the downfall of private capitalism. While deprecating war between nations, it instigates war between classes that fundamentally have the same interests, and rather than checking the growth of envy, distrust, resentment, and hatred, is often guilty of fostering these evil sentiments in order to hasten the collapse of present conditions. It asks, not wisely, of what use it is to try to improve the moral quality of men's lives while political and economic conditions are what they are? The overweening confidence in the power of institutional reforms alone to change for the better the characters of men is as deplorable as the naïve assumption that a widespread cultivation of certain domestic virtues will of necessity lead to a desirable ordering of the public life. Careful indoctrination in the respective duties of slave and mas-

ter, and a conscientious development of the spirit and attitude of a slave and the sense of the responsibilities of ownership proper in a master, will not effect the abolition of slavery, or protect the innocent and helpless against the abuse of irresponsible power. Only the conviction that no man has the right to own his fellowman, and determined agitation to abolish the iniquitous institution, can accomplish this result. But neither are the best fruits of individual improvement reached, or the surest guarantees obtained of a profitable life in common, if, in achieving the desired reform, a growing class-hatred is allowed to lead to repudiation of claims long recognized and sanctioned by usage, unconcern about intellectual and moral conditions, educational needs, and future consequences, disregard for the fairer and kindlier methods of settlement, and ultimate resort to the horrors of fratricidal war.

One of the greatest needs of the unchurched to-day is that the splendid enthusiasm for the bettering of the conditions of man's life on earth, which through the socialist propaganda has taken such a hold upon them, shall not be spoiled by the demon of class-hatred, but be purified, directed, and made effective by the spirit of good will toward all men and practical endeavor for the realization of high ideals in the individual and social life of the present day.

In addition to the inspiration and guidance which the religious condition of the unchurched calls for, there is the need of fellowship. There are many who, though they have lost interest in the religious views and practices of the church, retain their membership because the church provides a centre for various social activities, a means of becoming acquainted and keeping in touch with men.

Outside of the church, this need is met by a great variety of clubs and fraternal organizations. Freemasonry may be mentioned as the chief representative of the latter. The Roman Catholic Church is right in feeling a menace to its power in this organization. To large bodies of men Masonry has become a religion, a substitute for the church. While the women may still be held by the confessional, this subtle enemy weans the men away with a rival cult. These clubs and brotherhoods satisfy one phase of the craving for fellowship. What they lack is the community of great and stirring ideas, of spiritual impulses and ideals, so characteristic of early Christianity and of modern socialism. In order that the religious life of the unchurched may develop harmoniously, it seems desirable that there should be large opportunities for social contact and fellowship between those to whom truth, goodness, justice, gentleness, and beauty are vital things, and to whom common aims and aspirations and a similar outlook upon life would give added worth and pleasure to social intercourse.

Possibly the deepest need, however, is that of systematic moral training for the young. The public schools cannot supply such instruction. If they should undertake to teach morals without the customary connection with religious ideas, there would be just opposition on the part of those who find the sanction of morality in a divine revelation. If, on the other hand, they should attempt to present the ethical content of religion, there would be a serious question, whether, under present circumstances, this could be done with the necessary discrimination, or simply lead to the introduction of sectarian teaching, in either case causing offence to many. The methods of re-

ligious instruction in our American Sunday-schools have unquestionably been much improved in the last generation. More attention is being paid to Palestinian geography and history, and this is not without its value. The more important questions of Biblical criticism are still evaded, with the result that, for the most part, the pupils gain little or no conception of the historical place, content and character of the books of the Bible. There is practically no attempt made to teach the young how to distinguish between truth and error in any given Biblical passage, how to choose the good and reject the evil, how to estimate relative worth and to compare Biblical ideas with those found elsewhere. At best instruction is limited to the Bible. The child fares still worse when this field is left for the ecumenic or sectional creeds. The object is very rarely to teach, by precept and example, self-reliance and moral endeavor, but rather to persuade the boy and the girl, while they are still immature, to commit themselves to a theory of life that promises salvation by obedience to external authority, by imputation of the merits of Christ or saints, by sacrifice and sacrament, prayer and profession. As the indispensable condition of all true moral growth is the freedom of conscience to approve or else to condemn, or the establishment of the authority of the judge within, the effects of the doctrine that even what seems most wrong must be right when taught in the Bible can never be wholesome. The chief interests being what they are, it seems vain to look to the church for Sunday-schools providing a well-considered and carefully arranged system of ethical training for the young.


Yet the children of the unchurched have even less attention paid to their necessities in this respect, and are

in reality in a very sad plight. The adult may develop his religious life by eager search for truth, by quiet contemplation, by heroic struggle for the right, by good literature, lectures, representations of art, by helpful contact with his fellows in politics and social activities. But there are millions of little ones in homes over which the church has no influence growing up without the careful moral assistance their tender natures crave, without being rooted and grounded in moral principles by rule and illustration, inspiring example and direct appeal to conscience, will and heart. Who cares for them? They are taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, calculus, Greek, law, and medicine may be, all with great care, according to approved methods, by competent teachers. But who fires their hearts with enthusiasm for the moral and religious heroes of mankind? Who fills their minds with admiration for justice, faithfulness, and goodness; for noble deeds, and graceful words, and penetrating thoughts; for self-respect, and self-forgetfulness, and self-control? Who cultivates in them a sense of reverence for truth and for the patient seekers after truth; a sense of the mystery of nature, and of gratitude to those who have dared to draw aside the curtain and pass into the deep recesses of the shrine; a sense of the sacredness of life, and of a binding obligation to fulfil its law? Who takes things old and new out of the treasures of man's spiritual life to point to them the path of duty and to draw their little feet into it? Who interprets to them, as their intellectual powers grow, in simple language, and with clear insight, the ceaseless efforts man has made to understand himself and his environment, the enduring substance of the hopes he has cherished, the dreams he has dreamed,

the illusions he has entertained, and the slow advance from age to age in grasp of truth and perfectionment of character? Who leads them on from step to step, from grade to grade, with steady aim toward a goal, afar off, yet foreseen, when the young man or woman shall be ready for life's work, with well trained moral faculties as well as with goodly stores of useful knowledge, prepared to achieve, to bear, to serve, and to appreciate? The obvious answer is too disheartening to utter. The number of children involved is so vast, the work to be done for them is so exacting, the knowledge and experience demanded in carrying it out so comprehensive, the harvest so great, and the laborers so very few. Yet the duty must be met. The future of the race depends upon it.

It is bootless to speculate upon the outward forms the religion of the unchurched may once assume, what festivals it will celebrate, what songs it will sing, what scriptures it will indite, what symbols it will use, what temples it will build. The time seems to be at hand when it should gather strength, through unity of forces and proper organization, for the large tasks that lie before it. The inspiration that comes from a more rational estimate of the universe and a higher conception of the possibilities and destiny of human development, and the precious ties of fellowship that might bind together kindred minds pursuing the same great aims in life, should be sufficient for the vast work of education that is demanded. There is room beside the old historic religions for the new religion that has its roots in the universal instincts underlying all, but seeks to press closer to the truth of things, to free itself more resolutely from hampering traditions, and to fashion humanity into fuller harmony with the law of the spirit of life.





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