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# ETHICAL ADDRESSES

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
SIXTEENTH SERIES

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PHILADELPHIA

THE AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION, 1415 LOCUST STREET

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# THE MORAL EFFECT OF GAMBLING \*

BY FELIX ADLER.

THE ethics of gambling may appear to some to be merely an elementary consideration, to which they are willing to give attention only by courtesy. I have not, however, found it so. There are some lessons which the wisest of us need to learn, and which may be gained from a discussion of this subject. In the endeavor to think out the subject, in order to present it to you, I have learned some lessons,—my attitude being as always, not that of one who teaches, but rather of one who seeks to get more deeply into the subject under consideration, and to learn.

Interest in the subject of gambling is indicated in the fact that many persons believe that only the extreme forms of gambling are reprehensible, that playing games of cards for money is perfectly proper so long as the stakes are not too high, that games of chance in the interest of charity are not to be condemned. These facts show how little enlightened such people are with regard to the real harm underlying the practice of gambling. They would be less likely to make these exceptions if they understood how harmful gambling is.

The occasion which calls forth the discussion of this topic is the campaign which Governor Hughes is making against race-track gambling, with the purpose of prohibiting it by changing the penalty from that of fine to im-

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prisonment. I shall, however, devote myself mainly to the larger considerations of the theme.

The forum in which public opinion is formed often seems to me to be like a huge smithy: there is an anvil, there are the bellows, there is the bed of glowing coals, and the din of resounding hammer blows. A great deal of the work done at this forge is mere blast of bellows and noise, and nothing comes of it. Reformers are the blacksmiths, with aprons on, grimy, perspiration trickling from their brows as they wield their hammers upon the iron in hand. But the result of their labor is often insignificant, the most frequent reason for their failure being that the fire is not hot enough, wood or straw and not the slowly burning coal having been supplied, or the fuel was of the right kind but the draught was insufficient. In short, persons who aim at an improvement of some kind often fail in kindling public feeling to the necessary degree of heat. Another, and the most general reason for such failure is, that when the iron was hot the workman at the forge had no adequate conception of the right shape which he ought to give to the iron, and so struck his blows at random only to find, when the iron had cooled, that the instrument which he had fashioned would prove of little service. The main purpose of the public is to supply the bed of coals, the heat; while it is the business of the smithy, the reformer, to have clearly in mind the shape of the instrument which he wishes to form. When the people are excited against an evil they do not scrutinize the method by which it is proposed to remedy it. They cry out that something must be done, that the evil cannot be allowed to continue; and are often ready to fall in with the first measure proposed, which may later appear to have been ill-conceived. Sometimes it is the impossible which is attempted, namely, to re-

form human nature by statutory enactment. Sometimes the aim is feasible, but methods are proposed which invite disaster. Such considerations as these are pertinent whenever a reform is attempted, especially when a law is proposed dealing with one or another of the inveterate vices of mankind. Our present object is to help supply fuel to the fire of public sentiment with respect to gambling. We can trust the stalwart blacksmith, our Governor, to give the right shape to the iron. What he attempts to do commends itself as reasonable and feasible. He does not attempt the impossible, but proposes to check the ravages of a great moral evil, and moreover, to make the law respected. How necessary it is that some such step be taken, and how important that the public opinion of this State should support its Chief Executive in his efforts, it is the purpose of my address to show.

The gambling spirit still pervades all classes of society, from the highest to the lowest. The gambling habit is very widely spread. It is manifested in the crap games of little children, in the pool rooms, in book-making at horse races, in betting in connection with athletic sports and even on the results of Presidential elections, in the card game among the wealthy class, at which large stakes change hands and fortunes are made and lost in a night. A vice that is so widely prevalent must have a deep root in the weakness of human nature. It is our first business to discover this root. The gambling spirit, in my opinion—and this opinion is shared by many thoughtful persons who have written on the subject—is a reversion into a state of mind that characterizes primitive man. The foundations of the habit of gambling are in those primitive conditions over which civilization has spread as a kind of veneer. The general habit of gambling among primitive races is an interesting study. Dice have been



found in the cliff-dwellings of Colorado, in the prehistoric groves of Arizona; and of the one hundred and thirty tribes of whom report has recently been made by the Bureau of Ethnology, not one has been found without implements for gambling. Gambling is found in China and among the Kafirs of Africa. It is a disease of primitive culture, which the so-called civilized man has not yet overcome. "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar," said Napoleon. Scratch a civilized man and you will, underneath, find the remnants of pre-civilized nature—primal lust, cruelties, habits and mental dispositions. Out of those pre-civilized mental dispositions the gambling instinct arises. In the soul of primitive man there would have been found but a feeble echo to the sentiment expressed in Henley's lines:

Under the bludgeons of chance,  
My head is bloody, but unbowed.

It matters not how strait the gate,  
How charged with punishments the scroll;  
I am the master of my fate,  
I am the captain of my soul.

Primitive man was not master of his fate. The extent to which he could through his own effort effect his fortunes was insignificant. He felt himself, in the main, to be dependent on chance, or on what amounts to the same thing—the whim of capricious beings whose will governed the world. He did not await prosperity as the result of his own assiduous attempt at achievement, rather he expected it as an alms at the hand of chance. This is the primitive attitude and it is the gambler's attitude. However different the primitive mind and the gambler's mind may be in other respects, in this they agree.

The reason for this attitude of mind in the case of primitive man is, that the beneficent conception of a



fixed order in nature had not yet arisen. How beneficent this conception is, we who are accustomed to it and therefore regard it as a matter of course, can but faintly realize. Nature to primitive man did not, and so far as he still exists does not, offer a foundation of rock on which to build; rather a quicksand into which to sink at any moment. The objects of nature are for him ruled by spirits, whose shifty moods are from instant to instant incalculable. Nothing in man's environment is stable; the world whirls about him like a wheel—a veritable wheel of chance. If a rock falls upon him and presses him underneath it, it is not gravitation that has caused the fall but some malevolent spirit that has pushed the rock down. If there be an eclipse of sun or moon, it is some evil spirit that seeks to rob mankind of the heavenly light. If he becomes a prey to disease, it is a diseased spirit that enters his body to torture him, and which must be exorcised by incantation and ritual. He has not, in a word, reached the wonderfully beneficent conception that nature is dependable.

For the earliest ancestors of man law was nothing, luck everything. Hence the tendency on the one hand to elaborate religious ceremonies by which to propitiate the irresponsible beings whose capricious will determined man's luck; and on the other hand, the painful effort to ascertain beforehand the turn which the capricious will of these irresponsible beings would likely take, by means of omens, signs and tokens, the flight of birds, the entrails of sacrificial animals, and the like. A large part of the religious customs of primitive man constitutes a systematic attempt to devise ways and means of getting tips on luck.

Coupled with the sense of utter helplessness against the incursions of chance, by way of reaction against this helplessness, the lower primitive races display a strange infat-

uation concerning secret ways by which, if clever enough, one can control the workings of chance. One can but note the strange inconsistency that chance should be thus admitted and yet the belief be held that chance can be controlled. Primitive man, however, was infatuated by the idea that he could control chance; and we find the same infatuation to exist among modern gamblers, who invent systems, despite their constant failure, by which to insure their winnings. Even the haggard and shabby gambler still haunts the gaming-table in the forlorn hope that at last he has found the secret by which to control the elements of chance. In the modern gambler also, is discovered the disposition to trust in omens, as well as indulgence in other superstitious practices, as for instance, the turning of a chair or the changing of one's seat in order to break a run of ill-luck.

The psychological cause for the delusion in the mind of primitive man that a thing admittedly uncontrollable may be controlled, is found in the fact that man is born to conquer and simply cannot accept the fact of impotence. If he be either too indolent or too backward in development to rise from a state of helplessness by legitimate effort, he takes refuge in a vain ideal, a fiction of the mind, fancying himself endowed by fate with power over that which opposes him. In primitive times this delusive potency was thought to inhere in charms and priestly incantations. The extent of this infatuation in the case of primitive men is shown in the fact that they arrogated to themselves powers which no civilized person would for a moment think of claiming. Primitive priests or sorcerers pretended by certain rites and spells to be able to produce rain, to ward off eclipses, to speed or slacken the course of the sun—a remnant of which last mentioned pretension is found in the Bible, in the feat ascribed to

Joshua who is said to have commanded the sun to stand still.

In what way does civilized man differ from primitive man? The answer to this question constitutes one of the lessons which the study of this subject has impressed upon my mind—the facts in the case at least coming into clearer view than before. The progress of man towards civilization is indicated chiefly in two ways. Man becomes sure within a certain territory of the ground which he has conquered and made his own, and here he is no longer a miserable coward. He has learned that Nature is dependable, that the play of gravitation never ceases, that the chemic elements always combine in due proportions, that electricity rushes ever to and from the same pole; that the order in which one phenomenon follows another is governed by unchanging laws; and that in so far as he can ascertain the Nature of these laws he may become the ruler instead of the bondman of nature, by his knowledge promoting his own ends, using the powers of Nature as the Philistines used the blind Samson, to grind their corn and tread their mill. This recognition of the reign of law and the use of man's knowledge of natural law to promote his human ends, and the unceasing endeavor to extend the limits within which the workings of the laws of nature are known, is one mark by which civilized man is distinguished from his uncivilized progenitor. He knows that his footing is sure so long as he walks along the ways of law. He does not crouch but stands erect; he is not timid but has banished fear.

The other distinctive mark of civilized man is the manner in which he deals with the chance happenings that do occur. There is no chance in the sense of uncaused and unpurposed happenings, the outcome of mere caprice; though we are, nevertheless, in many cases, unable to de-

tect the cause, and some of these seemingly haphazard occurrences have a decided effect upon our lives. The attitude of the civilized man—civilized in the moral sense—is that of not wishing to be beholden to chance, so that whenever some chance event flashes, for good or ill, into his life, his effort is to immediately strip the event of its chance character, by incorporating it organically into the plan and purpose of his life. This is true of evil chances as well as the good. The morally civilized person refuses to be overwhelmed by accident, asserting that he is master of his fate. He will not concede that any real evil can come to him except at his own hands. Thus he converts a handicap into a tool, as in the case of blindness—exemplified in those blind persons whom we admire. Unfavorable natural conditions, as those which obtain in the arid plains of the West may be regarded as an evil chance so far as the farmer is concerned. But the wit of man is pitted against Nature's frown, and systems of subsoiling and vast irrigation enterprises convert the evil into a benefit.

This is equally true of the good chances. A truly civilized man is unwilling to be the passive recipient of good. He will regard every good thing that Nature offers him as a challenge for him to better it. Beware, says the philosopher, of accepting favors at other men's hands. Beware also of merely accepting favors at Nature's hands. No benefit that Nature offers can prove a blessing except by the use man makes of it, by some increment which he adds to it. It is sometimes said by religious persons, that unless one believes in an individual God to whom one can express one's gratitude for the unbought blessings which he receives at Nature's hands, the heart is frustrated of its desire to flow forth in thankfulness. I deny, however, that there are any blessings which are



received at Nature's hands. There are goods; but it depends upon us whether we shall turn them into blessings. A beautiful, gracious child is a gift at Nature's hands, which the parents cannot say they have deserved by any merit of their own. What deep feelings well up when this heavenly boon is first laid into the mother's lap! But whether the child shall be a benefit or a woe depends—how utterly does it depend—on the reaction of the parents, on the extent to which they feel and fulfill the obligation to train it and themselves so that they may preserve what in it is beautiful, and foresee and forestall the appearance in it of what is evil. Instead of expressing gratitude by word of mouth, we are to express it by our reactions upon the unmerited opportunities which Nature puts at our disposal. Civilized man refuses simply to receive chance goods; rather he establishes a proprietorship in them, makes them his own by his efforts to win from them the utmost value which they are capable of yielding, and thus enhances their value.

"Health and a day are the gift of the gods." I walk out in the morning, I see the blue sky overarching the park, the delicate fringe of trees lining the horizon, the sun pouring its radiant light over the wintry landscape. Health and a day are a gift for me, if I put the health into my work for that day and for all days, and can import a bit of the sunshine and beauty into my indoor occupations and human relations.

Wealth is a gift of the mine, the field and the factory. But what need to emphasize the fact that the gift is a blessing only, if turned into a solicitation for honest toil that it may be gained, and for social benefits in the using of it.

The twofold attitude of the civilized man is then, first, to eliminate chance as far as possible by the extension of

his knowledge of Nature's law; and, second, to so react upon the good, and the evil, which seeming chance may bring to him as to establish to some extent his proprietorship in them. Windfalls and treasure-troves they may be in their origin; veritable possessions and products of man's will they become through his employment of them.

Having thus reconnoitered the ground and prepared the way, it is easy to point out in what respect the gambling habit marks a reversion into pre-civilized attitudes of mind, and to indicate what causes make the habit so disintegrating at the very base of human character. The gambler takes the very opposite attitude to that which I have described as characterizing the morally civilized man. The gambler disregards law and gives his whole attention to the happenings of chance, so far as they still occur. He is willing to stake his all upon the favor of chance, to rest in mere passive enjoyment of its gifts, instead of so reacting upon such gifts as to minimize the elements of chance, and to establish a real proprietorship. He fails of those reactions on which his moral character, as a human being, depends.

One general observation, however, may be helpful. There is a great disproportion between the badness involved in an act itself, and the badness to which it reduces a man if the act is often repeated. This applies especially to the sins of self-indulgence, which argue a weak character rather than a wicked one. It is often asked, What is there so very wrong in indulging the taste for liquor, in allowing the fire of it to pass through the veins, to mount to the head; reanimating a man, physically and mentally; renewing, however fictitiously, one's depleted energy; opening—in the case of more gifted persons—the gate of dreams, and letting visions in, as Omar Khayyam said; throwing off the scent for the time be-

ing the hounds of care that dog a man's footsteps? There is nothing so wrong in the glass itself; but look at the consequences when once the habit has fastened upon the man, so that he becomes its slave! Look at the sodden sot, the beastly drunkard! Is there any object more repulsive, more an outrage of human dignity? Exactly the same principle applies to the gambler. The curious interest in the fall of the dice, the watching of the turn of fortune's wheel, is not so evil in itself. It is not evil at all, it is just an inferior sort of pastime, a childish amusement. But consider the difference between the single act and the badness of the habit which follows it.

In the case of crimes which imply aggression on the rights of others, the consequences of the criminal act are palpable, the injustice which is done cries to heaven. It is so unmistakable that the wrongdoer can himself hardly fail to recognize the wickedness of what he does. This is evident in cases of murder or robbery; the wounds, the blood, the inanimate corpse in the one case; the loss inflicted, in the other, testify to the crime. But in the case of sins which consist, not in doing violence to the rights of others, but to one's own higher nature—by indulging one's lower self—the same obvious connection does not subsist between the act and its consequences. There is no harm in staking a few pence on a game of cards, just as there is no harm in drinking a glass of liquor; there is only the loosening of one stone and then of another, and after awhile the landslide—the utter ruin. It is just because the consequences are not so apparent that they need to be brought home through the imagination by moral teachers, and that sharp public condemnation of such practices is needed, in order that those who are tempted may be deterred in time by the thought of the social odium attaching to their act. The less apparent the consequences

are at the moment when the sin is committed, the more necessary is it that social condemnation should step in as an artificial substitute for realized consequences. I am not extenuating the sins of indulgence on the ground that each particular sin, considered by itself, contains a minimum of badness. That would be the same as saying that inattention—which is a venial fault, a mere weakness, remains a venial fault and does not become a crime, as, for instance, in the case of a nurse of the sick when through inattention she administers poison instead of medicine to her patient. The fault in her case is not venial, because she has been taught to connect inattention with the destruction of life to which it may lead. My point is, that it is the part of social education, through teaching and stern condemnation, to connect the apparently venial forms of self-indulgence with the consciousness of that to which they lead, and thus open the eyes of the self-indulgent to the real wickedness of their deeds.

It is possible, after this additional explanation, to clearly set forth the inherent badness of gambling, and to state why its effect on character is so completely disintegrating and demoralizing. Obviously considered, the gambler is a shirker—in the colloquial phrase, a quitter. All the civilization that humanity has been able to produce is the result of hard toil. The bridges that span the river, the tubes under the rivers, the great buildings that are erected, the railroads, are all the products of toil. The great discoveries in science, the great works of art are no less the product of persistent toil, of sweat of the brain if not of the brow. No good thing that the race possesses has fallen into its lap; everything has been bought by hard labor. Civilization could not be maintained, much less extended, without this daily recurrent toil. The gambler is a shirker. Let others work, he will live on



the sweat of other men's brows, of other men's brains. There is money about, the token of wealth—wealth produced by labor. Of this money he will get a share without paying for it in terms of toil. He is a parasite, he is a skulker, a train-follower in the army of progress. He will not fight, but he comes in for the spoils. He will reap where he has not sown, and gather where he has not strewn.

It is this that makes him an anti-social creature, a survivor of the lazy savage, of the luck-worshipping, omen-consulting, fetish-worshipping barbarian—a creature justly detested and despised. I am speaking of the person whose life is abandoned to gambling. The same stricture, however, applies in qualified form to the occasional gambler. So far as he is on occasion a gambler, he is on occasion a person who desires to reap where he has not sown, to gather where he has not strewn, to get the fruits of civilization without paying the price in toil.

The number of sophistries which people spin around their self-indulgences are remarkable. These self-indulgences seem to make them stupid as well as bad. Not only does the occasional gambler defend his practice on the ground that it is enjoyable and harmless, overlooking the principle which I have just stated; but he also defends his act by the claim that his victims have previously assented to the game; that the people whose property he has taken in gambling have been willing to stake their property against his own. The same argument is sometimes speciously used by men who try to justify themselves in preying on the virtue of women. They plead that the victim consents. This is about as moral and sensible as it were to say, that a slave willingly consents to his slavery. One's duty is clearly to prevent the slave from consenting to his slavery. The duty of the li-

centious man is to prevent the victim of his passions from willingly becoming his victim. And so of gambling; it is the duty of the occasional gambler to prevent others from willingly becoming his victims.

But why is the effect of gambling so utterly ruinous to the character of the man who becomes addicted to it? The reason is that the more he falls under its malign spell, the less is he disposed to labor, the less possible is it to concentrate his mind sufficiently to perform systematic work of any kind. And work is not a curse, as the story of the Fall in Genesis represents it, but the greatest boon. We work for our subsistence, and to gratify the ambition to rise in the world. But while we are thus working, providing the work be honest, we lay deep the foundations and strengthen the defenses of character. Orderly, persistent, toilsome work, is indispensable to the formation of a sound moral personality. Work establishes system and order in a man's life; furnishes a fixed program which covers the major part of the day. Without such a program man is at the mercy of his impulses, the plaything of moods, tossed about now in this direction and now in that, restlessly discontented with himself and with his environment. Work teaches by enforcing a patient endurance of drudgery; and the willingness to bear drudgery is, as we have seen, the preliminary condition of every worthy achievement. Without achievement there is no self respect; without painful drudgery there is no achievement. Therefore the gambler who hangs about the gate of the temple of Fortuna, the fellow who will not work, is like the lazy savage who has not disciplined himself to work. In the midst of civilization he reproduces the primitive type. His character is disorganized; labor is essential to its solidity.

There are a multitude of other ways in which the

gambling habit destroys character. After a time it exercises a hypnotic influence, becomes an *idée fixe* from the thrall of which a man cannot extricate himself. He ceases to take an interest in anything else. The click of the coin is ever in his ears, the meretricious allurements of the gaming table are ever before his eyes. If he is the father of a family, he sits heedless, absorbed, distrait at the family board. The conversation going on around him fails to hold his attention; he waves aside the cares and anxieties of his wife, the troubles or pleasures of his children. Presently he slinks away from them to seek the gratification of his one master passion in its familiar haunts. This callous indifference to the cardinal human obligations is one of the plainest evidences of the crumbling away of the supports of character. Another evidence is found in the inordinate craving for excitement. In the intervals that elapse between the periods of enjoying the accustomed spicy food, other forms of gratifying the appetite must be supplied. Hence as a rule the use of intoxicants and also licentious living go hand in hand with gambling. The one vice beckons to its sister vices, and the step that leads to the actual commission of crime is soon taken. Such is a brief description of the downward course of the gambler. I believe that I have not exaggerated in the least particular. As to the connection of gambling with crime, the Senior Police Magistrate at London, not long ago, testified that of all the cases of embezzlement that had come up in his court, there was hardly one that had not originated in the gambling habit. Three of the chief inspectors of Scotland Yard have been cashiered because of their connection with the criminals of the turf. The crime of forgery too, in many instances, can be traced to the same source.

The discussion of the gambling evil is by no means aca-

demic in its significance, nor does it relate to one of the minor social diseases which may be dismissed with a passing allusion. It is simply one of the most portentous moral dangers that menace modern society. It originates, as has been shown, in anarchic tendencies over which civilization has spread often only a thin veneer. It is stimulated by the anarchic conditions that accompany modern industrial development. The greed of wealth has been fostered to an extraordinary degree throughout the entire civilized world. The thirst for gold is feverish in the throats of those who have drunk, but cannot get their fill; and this thirst is consuming in those who stand by and see others drinking of the well of riches to which they themselves cannot come near.

The solidity of commercial transactions depends on the extent to which they are based on commercial foresight, and on the taking into account of the calculable factors. A certain ingredient of risk also enters in. The safety and sanity of business depends on the preponderance of foresight over the element of hazard. Where the element of hazard predominates business tends to lose its legitimacy and to partake of the nature of gambling. No one will dispute that there is this tendency in many forms of commercial transaction.

Again, the colossal fortunes that have been amassed in recent times—not without labor and efficiency of some sort on the part of the accumulators, but with a glaring discrepancy between the amount and the quality of the labor and efficiency displayed and the reward gained—have contributed perhaps more than anything else, to create the impression that the prize is to be won by luck, combined with a disregard of old-fashioned moral scruples. Thus the gambling evil is simultaneously augmented from underneath and from above: from under-



neath by the pre-civilized tendencies which have always existed in man, and are but being uncovered; from above by the advance of industrial development which at the present day tends to exacerbate the evil by encouraging a trust in luck rather than in labor. The consequence is that the gambling spirit—whether or not it takes form in the lowest kind of gambling—has become a great danger and is attacking all classes of modern society. The idle rich have always been attracted to gambling as a pastime fitted to charm away their ennui. The idle rich are setting the example, and to-day not a few persons in the middle class are imitating them. The pernicious influence percolates to the lowest social strata. In England, where the evil has increased by leaps and bounds, a Parliamentary committee was some years ago appointed to inquire into its extent. Some attempt was made to learn the facts, and the result is a perfectly heart-rending picture of the havoc that has been wrought among the poorer class by betting, especially on the races. Women as well as men have fallen prey to this desolating fashion, just as among the wealthier class the women are becoming notorious for the desperate lengths to which this passion carries them. But it is especially among the poor that one is called upon to note with pain and horror how this passion controls human nature, deprives it of its human character, and extirpates what are commonly supposed to be the ineradicable better instincts—for instance the instinct of love of a mother for her children. The English records relate the story of an honest, hard-working navvy who had a wife and seven children, whom it was his pride to support in modest decency. Being a capable workman he had never lacked occupation. It was his particular boast that he always paid as he went and that he could look every man in the face because he owed

no man a debt. It had been his maxim, the axiom on which he based his conduct, that the man should earn the money and that the wife should expend it to advantage. He had never had reason in his own experience to doubt the wisdom of this rule. His wife was his faithful companion and the careful mother of their seven children. One day the whole structure of his life was shattered and he was driven nearly crazy. He discovered that his wife had contracted debts to the amount of seventy pounds. On investigation he found that this had all happened within a twelve-month since they had moved into another tenement in a different quarter of the town, where the women of the neighborhood were constantly betting on the races. His wife had been led away by the example of her neighbors. She had ventured a shilling first, and then another. She would take the money from what her husband brought her for household expenses. When that failed, again following the example of her neighbors, she bought clothing and furniture on the installment plan, incurring debts of a large amount, and immediately sold or pawned the articles thus bought and staked the money on the races. Finally the blankets were taken from the children's beds and the shoes from the children's feet, and the drawers which had been stocked with linen were empty. This was the sad condition in which this workman found his home. It is an extreme case no doubt, but extreme cases indicate the nature of the influences at work in other cases that are more moderate. In England they are vastly exercised over the prevalence of the gambling spirit, and the conscience of those of the wealthy class is being appealed to in order to induce them to stop setting the example which is so corrupting to themselves and to the poorer classes whom it infects.

In this country we have, to my knowledge, no reliable

statistics, no Congressional or Legislative committees to institute inquiries into the extent and effects of the gambling evil. We know, nevertheless, that the evil is rapidly spreading and we are aware of the immense harm which it is working. We see the crowds—thirty thousand, forty thousand people—that are carried to the races, attracted not by the noble sport itself. We know how the telegraph carries abroad the news of the betting and the winning, and we know with what eagerness the sporting editions of the newspapers are snatched up; we know how the athletic sports of our young collegians are tainted by the betting which is connected with them; we know that even the elections at which the country determines whom its chief officers shall be are utilized in the interest of gambling; we know of the bridge-whist parties among the rich, and the abuse of hospitality which they sometimes entail; and those of us who have any knowledge of the under-life of our great cities know to what an extent the gambling hells—whatever their designation—are linked with crime in its most detestable forms, and, through the opportunities of blackmail they afford, are corrupting the police force and undermining the foundations of municipal government.

In view of these facts the action of Governor Hughes is to be highly commended. The demand that he makes of the Legislature to pass a law prohibiting betting at the race track and to sharpen the penalty by substituting imprisonment for fines, is made for the sake of the law-abiding spirit itself, since the Constitution prohibits this form of gambling and the Legislature has failed to carry out the constitutional provision. A law existing merely as a dead-letter accustoms the citizens to flout and despise the authority of law itself. But the Governor makes this demand also on account of the terrible social evils, the na-

ture of which I have endeavored to set forth. In consideration of the powerful interests opposed to such legislation—not only the sporting community, but railroads, telegraph companies, newspapers, that profit by the existing state of things and hence will oppose by every means in their power the proposed action, it is essential that public opinion should be keyed up to the highest pitch in this matter, that the forces which make for good citizenship should act with promptness and decision if the fight is to be won. This can only be hoped for if the public are compelled to stop and realize the full gravity of the evil, to feel the extent of the peril that menaces the morals of the community. As a contribution in this direction I have spoken to-day.

By way of appendix there are one or two other points still to be considered. Can a law prohibiting one form of gambling make effective headway against the gambling spirit? It can at least contribute to that effect, because the verdict of public condemnation pronounced upon the practice which is condemned will serve to impress the wrongfulness of it upon the unenlightened conscience, the weak-willed, the self-indulgent natures, and thus to some extent serve as a deterrent. It cannot be expected to act as a panacea. We cannot make men moral by act of Legislature. The deeper change, as all who have reflected upon the subject agree, must be gradual; it can come about only through the development of the social side of human nature, and in the case of the poor especially, through a change in the industrial conditions, so as to lift from their minds the burden of dull uniformity entailed by their present work, and involving their reaction in exciting forms of pleasure; and also by substituting nobler and more moderate diversions for those at present in vogue, such as are furnished by the fine arts



and by innocent and wholesome games and sports. The compressions and the restraint involved in regular labor is as I have shown, an indispensable means of moral discipline; but human nature needs at times to escape from the compression. If genial and truly recreative pleasures are not available, recourse will be had to such amusements as are for the moment offered, leaving behind weariness and disorganization as their after effects. From this point of view the problem of gambling is but part and parcel of the general problem of social progress.

One other question, surely latent in many minds, I must try with a final word to answer. Is it worth while to attempt to deal with gambling in its lower manifestations by prohibitive law or otherwise; or should the attack be centered on those forms of gambling which appear in what is called high finance, in the speculative transactions of the Boards of Exchange, where the word speculation might so often be as well written with the initial *s* omitted? The answer made to this query is, that the great exchanges serve legitimate purposes which must not be overlooked because of the abuses to which they are subject; that their two great functions are to establish prices corresponding to the fluctuations of a vast world market, and to furnish to enterprise the aliment by which it is sustained, bringing together the owner of capital and those who in using it augment it. The pertinent rejoinder to this reply is, that it is not just, because of legitimate functions inherent in the Board of Exchange, to overlook the enormity of its abuses, the extensive scale on which deception is practiced, the falsehoods that are circulated in order to effect prices, the worthless enterprises palmed off on the confiding investor, and like evils. The methods by which this regulative function of the exchanges is performed is certainly crude, and in crying

need of improvement, although the efforts recently made in this direction do not seem to have been particularly wise or profitable.

It is also true that the most frequent and pitiful victims of this form of gambling are not the great speculators who can on the whole be left to take care of themselves, but are persons of medium fortune and even of very scanty means. The worst abuses would be prevented if there were some way of appealing to the intelligence and conscience of the people who are thus despoiled or victimized. The plea is sometimes made that physicians who speculate, school teachers who carry their small savings into the general pool, clerks and saleswomen who risk their earnings, are impelled to do so because their salaries are painfully inadequate for their needs, and especially that the hope of providing for their old age encourages them to risk their all, or at least what they cannot afford to lose. The conduct of such persons reminds one of a story which is included in the collection known as "The Buddhist Birth Tales." There was once a merchant traveling through the great desert. The way was much longer than he had expected, and the water in the barrels which he carried on his camels began to run low. Nevertheless, with much economy and by endurance of privations the supply might have lasted. Suddenly the devil appeared to him and touched his eyes. No sooner had his eyes been touched than he beheld at some distance the most wonderful sight—green meadows, waving palm trees, and the delicious glint of an abundant stream meandering through the fields. Rendered quite irresponsible by this paradisaical sight, and at the suggestion of the devil, he decided to throw away his water-barrels that they might not impede his rapid march towards the scene of plenty beckoning him from the distance. This he did,

and traveled so rapidly that he failed to observe lining the way the bleached bones of other travelers who had preceded him. At last he came to the place which he had sighted, and found that he had been the victim of a mirage, that nothing was around him except the dry hot sands of the desert. And he perished there. He had exchanged his supply of water—meagre but sufficient—for a mirage. This is the answer that common sense gives to the plea of the man with small means who seeks to supplement his salary and to provide for old age by speculation. The answer that conscience gives is more stern than that given by prudence. Conscience says that humanity will never be well off, that the evil spirit of gambling will never be exorcised, until men shall consider it morally shameful to speculate, whether they win or lose; until they realize that they are falling back upon pre-civilized levels whenever they try to obtain the fruits of civilization without paying the price in toil; until they deny themselves, as profane and unhallowed, the gain for which they have not rendered an equivalent in honest work.

# THE SOURCES OF MORAL INSPIRATION\*

BY LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

LIFE means little or much, according to its content. Having life, our concern is to make it full and rich. It is the glad life, the free life, the abundant life that we crave.

"'Tis life whereof our nerves are scant,  
Or life, not death, for which we pant,  
More life and fuller, that we want."

Real life is measured not by place, nor possession; but by the spiritual content of the hours and days. It consists not in full hands and full stomach, but in thoughts, loves, purposes, ideals. These are riches, all else can be but wealth. True life is within, and is lived from within outward.

Bryant, in his youth, sought an attitude towards death that should not affright, and he found that life is a means of preparing for death.

"So live, that when thy summons comes to join  
The innumerable caravan, which moves [along] . . .  
Thou go not, like the quarry-slave at night,  
Scourged to his dungeon, but, sustained and soothed  
By an unfaltering trust."

But to go to each new day with trust and joy; to face, each morning, the familiar round; to heed the summons of duty, the call of the ideal, not as a slave scourged to his task; but as glad children of a free earth, rejoicing in the

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\*The substance of an address delivered before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, at Carnegie Hall, Sunday morning, May 3, 1908.



sunlight, glad in the opportunity—that is the need, and who is there but feels it!

To live life in the sunlight, or to carry the sunlight with us through the periods of inevitable gloom; to meet discouragement with an overflowing confidence, and defeats with the assurance of victory—for this our need, we would find inspiration.

My purpose to-day is to discuss the sources of moral inspiration, and I would do it feeling that to more clearly discern the sources of inspiration will make access to those sources more easy, and their benefit more sure.

We are more familiar with the thought of duty than with the idea of inspiration. Duty holds our feet from waywardness, and constrains us to take the upward path. Duty may make us good, but it hardly makes us glad. If we must choose between goodness and gladness, we shall not long hesitate. Goodness is essential, while gladness is somewhat added. We will keep the commandments of the moral law, assured that otherwise there is no life; but if perchance we may also be glad, we will not turn away.

The sources of duty are primarily in the moral law, which governs human life. The sources of moral inspiration are mainly within our own natures—somewhat added to nature, the overflow of life. We live in a lawful universe, and life is possible only in obedience to the laws of life; and “the wages of sin is death.” But we *live*. If we cannot live beyond the law, we can be greatly alive within the law. Moral inspirations transcend the constraints and restraints of law. They at least rise high in the grooves to which law confines.

The commandment, “Thou shalt not lie,” written in the Decalogue, because first inscribed in the heart of man, rests upon the consciousness that truthfulness is a law of life, to violate which is death. The inspiration to truth-

fulness, begetting true speech, true acts, true thoughts, true impulses, and a true personality, arises not only from the consciousness that truth is obligatory—something owed, an ought; but from an ideal which beckons onward; an ideal born of love, begetting in turn aspiration and hope. There is behind the inspiration the feeling of beneficence. This the poet realized when he sang:

“Think truly and thy thought shall be a fruitful seed;  
Speak truly and thy word shall the world’s famine feed;  
Live truly and thy life shall be a great and noble creed.”

The beneficence of truth, neither restrains nor constrains, but inspires. It makes truthfulness glad, and fills with joy the striver after truth.

What we need in our moral striving is not only a clearer recognition of the commandments of the moral law, but also a fuller realization of the inspirations of morality. Moral commandments are valuable as a deterrent from evil acts. We need the deterrent, but we also need the high impulse to strive for other and higher ends. He who just keeps the law, whether of the State or of the universe, is only a little above him who slightly deviates from the law. He who honestly pays his debts and taxes does somewhat, but whoso feels that what he has he owes, and lives up to that feeling, giving time and thought and money to the service of others, stands upon a higher plane. Moral commandments, moral restraints and constraints, take their rise from the moral law, but moral inspirations have their source in the region of the ideal.

The inspirations of the personal life arise from the dignity and meaning of personality. You and I must keep our inner life clean and pure; we must think only clean and wholesome thoughts, cherish only worthy impulses; we must respect our bodies and keep them strong and free

and without taint; we must master our appetites and subject our passions to the clear judgment of the intellect and the strong rule of the will; we must control our fancies and master and direct our purposes; and we feel the inspiration to strive for these ends, not only because the law of nature requires that we should be in good health and good heart, but more because there is something beautiful about physical and moral cleanliness. There is somewhat deeply appealing in the beauty of a fine nature, as there is somewhat revolting and disgusting in any life that is not finely balanced and mastered by the intellect and spirit.

There are ideals inherent in our natures, by which we instinctively judge the actual attainments of our lives. There are potentialities within us, which so far as we can see are infinite, and which disturb our complacency. "A spark disturbs our clod." These ideals, these potentialities, this divine spark, are the source from which our moral inspirations flow. The eye of Michael Angelo detects in the rude and imperfect block of marble the possibility of the immortal statue of David. So we look upon our imperfect lives, with streaks of sin and taints of blood, and discover a hidden meaning, see the possibility of a nobler creation than the statue of David, the rarest work of art—a living soul.

Within the artist springs the creative inspiration; he feels the impulse to make actual the ideal. So are we impelled, nay inspired, by the vision which we behold of the ideal, to make real and visible to all what we see hidden in the undeveloped soul. More than the artist's inspiration is ours, for we are not only the artist, but also the marble. The imperfection which we feel within us is itself dissatisfied, because we are human, "for aye removed from the brute." We feel that we must strive for perfection. Our

potentialities are germinal, like seeds cast into the soil in May; they swell and grow and press upward towards the light. We are human, and not beasts, not sticks and stones. Our humanity is our inspiration. The heights of humanity, the infinite heights towards which humanity ever climbs, are for us as for all; and the vision of those heights is hope and joy.

To us in our personal living, there comes also the inspiration of other lives, of the great and good who have preceded us upon life's way.

"Lives of great men all remind us  
We can make our lives sublime."

Every noble deed, every generous impulse which any human life has displayed, quickens within us high hope and noble purpose, because we too are human, share the human promise, partake of the general possibility. Because thou art a man, a woman, thou must strive for the moral heights! In the fact of humanity, of personal potentiality and the meaning of human life lies the inspiration for all.

But we have no separate, dissociated life. We are members one of another. The most private thought has public consequence. And in the very fact of relationship, of interdependence, inheres moral inspiration. It is not true as Matthew Arnold sings that,

"The aids to nobler life are all within."

Part of the aids are in the ties which bind us to other lives. One of the strongest impulses which the child feels for the good life is in its desire to please the parent and win parental approval. Rudimentary in the child, this impulse becomes potent in maturity. Larger experience gives a



higher meaning to the pleasure which may be given others, and the satisfaction which their approval affords. Eventually we come to seek one another's good. "For their sakes I sanctify myself," was said of old. For the sake of those we love, we strive for virtue and all good. A high moral inspiration resides in any intimate human relationship, and is rich and potent in proportion as that relationship is founded upon or eventuates in love. The moral meaning of the family, therefore, is found not only in the training which it gives in fraternity, as in preparation for the varied and complex relations of life; but even more in the moral inspiration which family love insures.

Love rises to benevolence, and upon the broader scale of human interdependence it is benevolence that rules. Patriotism and humanity have their roots in benevolence, the kindly wish for other's good. And what were our lives without this quality! The common man dares, endures, and sometimes suffers, sustained by the consciousness that he is conferring benefit upon his fellows. The martyr gladly dies that truth may live, and be enjoyed by others after he is dead. We may feel it a duty to deny ourselves in the interests of others, to forego that others may enjoy, even to suffer that others may rejoice; and very often it is a duty. But it is more than a duty, it is a glad and holy privilege, and whoso does not feel it to be a privilege will render but partial sacrifice. To serve truth, though one should perish; to serve freedom, though in chains; to live, and if need be, to die for the sake of progress and the welfare of humanity—this is noble, and this is highest privilege. As the mother risks her life and gives her years to her child, as the scientist burns the oil of life with his midnight lamp for the gaining of truth, as the patriot lives in trial and dies, perhaps, in battle that his

country may be free; so with all of us the inspiration to high, heroic and worthy action is in the consciousness that we are servants of humanity; yea, that we are permitted to help forward the good, the infinite good, which through human effort, rises into being.

Not only are there these distinctly moral inspirations, such as the call of the ideal within human nature, and the challenge of human love and benevolent desire, but in all of the inspirations of life there are moral elements. Life is animated by many motives, and every motive has its moral quality. Men toil that they may eat, and have clothing and shelter; but they are impelled to toil worthily that their meat may be seasoned with satisfaction, and their clothing and shelter may protect them from inward as well as outward tempests. The needful tasks are done in order that the doer may hear within the rejoicing "Well done." We strive because of need, and because energy must be expressed; but we are constrained to strive for high ends in a worthy way, so that the very strife may itself exalt us. The moral impulse is inherent in every impulse, because life is moral. Morality is not somewhat added to life, but is rather the way of life, the method and spirit by which life is effected; and that way is not only man's way, but is also the way of the universe, of which man is part.

And in this fact one discovers religious inspiration pressing into the heart of the morally striving. There are those who declare that morality is possible only upon the basis of religion, and who define religion as some dogma or speculation about God, and revelation and immortality. The churches seek to maintain and propagate their dogmas as the only security of the moral life. They maintain that without some theology, some ritual, some creed, moral inspiration will cease and morality will suffer. Let

me hasten to agree with the churches in part. For me, too, the highest moral inspiration is in religion—the highest, but not the only inspiration. Lacking religious inspiration, we may still live moral lives, and not only lives constrained to walk the path of duty, but also lives of free, glad, joyous moral effort. We are men, we are human, although the universe were black of meaning, and every hope of the heart a lie. And because we are men we have the inspiration of our human nature.

When Carlyle came to the *Everlasting Nay*, and with the perishing of his childhood faith looked, with remorseless logic, upon the whole universe as a lie, he was saved to a new life, and eventually to a new and nobler faith, by the thought that, although all the universe were a lie, he could be true. He stood upon the fact of his humanity; and there laid the cornerstone of a new temple, in which to cry the glad pæan of the *Everlasting Yea*. Though all the universe were a blank or a deception, human life were still human; each person is endowed with potentialities, haunted by ideals, disturbed by visions, and every life may be lived in loving and helpful relations, not only with a few other human beings, but with the whole of humanity. Were there no other inspirations, here indeed were sufficient. To make our lives pure and noble and helpful, to educe the perfect person hidden in our crudeness, to elicit the ideal from the unworthy actuality of others, to make a society into which other generations should come to more easily win the goal of moral striving, though law were blind and nature purposeless, here were enough to live by and all one would need to live for, and surely inspiration to live well.

Nor can I understand how ought is added to these inspirations and assurances by that which passes current as religion. What moral inspiration is there in the dogma of

the Trinity, or in some speculation about heaven, or in the wrangle over the inerrancy of Scripture, or some tradition of a Chosen People! It is a grave error to confuse these things with religion, simply because through centuries they have served as the outer garments in which religion has somehow been wrapt—and concealed. What those who make this cry are really attempting is not to sustain morality by an appeal to religion, but rather to bolster up their perishing dogmas by an appeal to morality. Morality, instead of being supported by religion, is made to support not only itself, but also that which is not religion, and which could not stand alone.

But, despite this mistaken argument, there is a truth in the claim that a source of moral inspiration is found in the religious consciousness. Our human lives are parts of nature. We are atoms that find place in the universal whole. The highest, though not the only, inspiration arises from the consciousness that certain great movements are going forward through all of life, with which movements we are permitted to take part. The doctrine of evolution is only a new statement of a world-old consciousness. The history of this idea includes the history of religion, of civilization and reform. Every "cause" that has ever appealed to man is testimony to the sense of development which man has ever enjoyed. Whether this sense of development is stated in terms of religion, or philanthropy, or science, the inspiration is the same. Whether our interests are in science, or philanthropy, or democracy, whether we seek truth, or benevolence or freedom, we are inspired by the conviction that these ends are being surely approached, that they are to be attained because they have the forces of the universe upon their side. This conviction gives not only the belief that we ought to strive, but more, the glad sense of privilege that we are permitted to



take part in the movement of life in which every force of the vast whole is pressing forward. The seeker after truth, realizing that slowly but surely the boundary of human ignorance has been and is being pushed outward, rejoices if he is able to win some little conquest of the light, and thus to aid the age-long struggle. He whose soul craves liberty for himself and his fellows, seeing that bondage is slowly but surely broken, and liberty gradually achieved, rejoices if he is able to break one more link in the chains that fetter the human race, and thus push on the universal process towards freedom. So he who strives for a nobler life within himself is inspired by the glad consciousness that every force in nature, and every movement in humanity is pressing for the achievement of a noble and redeemed mankind. He feels his kinship with the sages, the saints and prophets and martyrs of every time and clime; he feels his oneness with the stars and the revolving earth. And the parent who devotes thought and earnest effort to the nurture of a child, aiming to develop the highest and finest life possible to humanity, is one and feels a oneness with the powers of life and nature which have changed the barbarian into the man of to-day, and is still creating, refining, remolding man into higher and holier creation. Whenever we take hold for the good we take hold with forces that make for progress, for the upbuilding of the spiritual life and the ordering of all things so as to effect the absolute good.

This consciousness and the impulse which it gives, is that which is valid in all religions. It constitutes the moral content of every creed and system of faith. Religious dogmas, theological doctrines, attempt to interpret it, but they do not create it. The consciousness of the forces that make for righteousness is the parent of the creeds, not dependent upon them. This consciousness is



more valid than all interpretations of it, and it is possible to all who are not unbelievers in morality. Whoever strives for moral ends, is taught that he is sustained and furthered by the forces of life. And in this feeling and in the thoughts that arise from it, there is inspiration for moral effort. Life is a holy privilege.

“How good it is to be alive!”

Or as another poet sings:

“How good is man’s life, the mere living, fit to employ,  
All the heart and the soul and the senses forever in joy!”

Its privilege is the privilege of growth, of effecting a beautiful and worthy personality, of loving and serving, and striving to effect the moral advancement of others; of helping on the march of progress, promoting truth, justice, love and righteousness in the world; of laying hold of the potencies, the principalities and powers which ever strive for the victory of light over darkness, of truth over falsehood, of good over evil, of spirit over the dull clay. How sacred is the privilege! How glad should be the effort!

## WHAT IS AN ETHICAL SOCIETY? A PERSONAL INTERPRETATION

Delivered before the Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture,  
Sunday morning, October 4, 1908.

BY LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE

THE Society for Ethical Culture is relatively new, and as yet little known even in New York City where this movement originated thirty-two years ago. It is often misunderstood, and not infrequently misrepresented by those who are antagonistic to its aims. Its thought has not yet been completely formulated, nor its work adequately organized. It is to-day, and I for one hope that it will always remain, a movement, and not a sect. Its leaders and members still have much to do to clarify its meaning and develop right methods of activity. In order to understand its deeper significance and larger possibilities, it is necessary that the members of the Society for Ethical Culture should give to it earnest thought and study. But during the thirty-two years in which this movement has been going forward some things, clear even at the beginning, have been largely apprehended and quite fully demonstrated. The purpose, the ideals and the methods of the Ethical Culture Society have become fairly clear to those who have studied its process of development. It seems appropriate at this opening meeting of another season, as we inaugurate another campaign in the interests of the moral life, to give our common thought to a consideration of the objects of our united effort, of the ideals which we hold before us, and of the methods by which we may wisely seek to reach the

ends for which we strive. This is an especially important task, since the program of our Sunday meetings is so varied and inclusive. A number of speakers will, during the coming season as in the past, be heard from this platform, each speaker with a different outlook upon the problems of life. Various topics will be discussed, ranging from the interests of personal morality and private living to the complex social questions which confront the citizen of America to-day. The demands of current problems are so insistent that it is not often possible to keep clearly in mind the interests of the movement which this society represents. Amid the diversity of interests to which the platform directs attention, it may not always be apparent, even to the members of the society, just why the society should exist and exactly what is its function in the life of its members and of the community. Let me then, before taking up the other work of the season, before we all become absorbed in our various interests and tasks, make use of this occasion to speak especially of the society, with the hope of making more clear what it is for which we stand, what it is we strive to do, and in what way we may best go about it.

What is the Society for Ethical Culture? How does it compare with and differ from other organizations? In what way is it related to other institutions of the higher life? In this, as in other communities, there are many agencies of the higher life—churches of many kinds, reform organizations as varied as the social needs, benevolent associations directing effort to particular problems of personal relief, institutions of education and culture for adults as well as for the young, clubs innumerable for purposes widely diversified. And from these varied associations the most insistent appeal comes for the interest and co-operation of every thoughtful and active person.

What place, among these different organizations in behalf of human welfare and better living, has the Society for Ethical Culture? The most often recurring question which one meets is, What need is there for an Ethical Culture Society, which the church or some other social agency does not already fill? To answer this question it is necessary to determine what the Society for Ethical Culture really is.

"Is this another kind of church?" asks the loyal churchman, as well as the person who has reacted upon the churches and wishes no more of them. "Is this another reform club?" asks the worker in social reform, and others who have grown weary of agitation. "Is this a benevolent or charitable association?" asks the man who perhaps is fearful lest his particular charity may have to meet an added competition. "Is this an institution for intellectual culture?" asks the friend of some association for popular education. How, then, does the Society for Ethical Culture compare and contrast with these other agencies of social life? It is concerned with religion, with philanthropy, with education, with reform, even as the church, the charity society, the school and institute, and reform associations are concerned with these important aims in human life; and yet the Society for Ethical Culture is none of these.

The church—every sect and division of the church—is concerned with religion; but so also is literature and science and social reform, and so also is the great majority of men and women. What distinguishes the church, all of the different churches, from other institutions, and the religious sects one from another, is not the manifestation of religious interest, but rather the special interpretation of this interest—the dogma that is professed and inculcated, the rites that are observed, the tra-

dition that is conserved. The Society for Ethical Culture has, I am sure, a deep religious interest; but it does not interpret that interest in a creed or dogma or body of beliefs which are inculcated and enforced. It does not express its religious interest in forms or rites. It does not see religion through the colored light of a tradition which is held to be sacred. If dogma, or a body of accepted and inculcated beliefs, a ritual and ceremony, and a tradition to be conserved, characterize the church—as they surely do—then it is clear that the Society for Ethical Culture is not a church.

But the religious interest, the groping of man for the highest and best in the world and in life, the hunger and thirst for righteousness, the earnest search for and assurance that life “means intensely and means good,” the craving to be at one with the eternal forces and purposes of life—if this is religion, then is the Society for Ethical Culture a religious organization. This passion for the highest and best the Society for Ethical Culture shares with all other religious associations; but this passion for the highest and best is by it differently interpreted and differently expressed. Some of us within the society may believe one thing, some another. We are all free to believe as we may. The only conviction which we share in common is that we must search for the highest and best, that the religious life is an effort and a growth, that the way of religious growth is through moral effort, through the purification of our lives, the development of our moral natures, the perfection of our human relations as members of the family, the community, and of humanity.

The Society for Ethical Culture has, I repeat, a deep religious interest, and its work has a permanent religious significance, at least to those who penetrate to its deeper meaning; but the religious interest is, and consistently so,



not a speculative interest, not a formal or traditional interest, but a moral interest—an ethical attitude, a search for the religious end by moral means, an interpretation of religion through the moral life.

Those who wish a definite theological creed, and a ritual through which to express their religious emotions, and also a body of traditions in which to couch their faith, will not find what they desire in an Ethical Culture Society. For them the satisfaction of their desires lies within the churches. Those who are weary of creeds, religious debates and speculative systems, and empty rituals, will find no such obstacles in their way if they enter the Society for Ethical Culture. Those who feel that religion is an effort to know, to love, and to be the best and highest in life, those who feel that what is really important in any religion is the assurance that good is and will prevail, that the uplift of thought and heart and will is the real service of the church—if the experience of others is any assurance, will find satisfaction in the Society for Ethical Culture. The Ethical Society is not a church, as a church is commonly understood. It is a religious association only in the deeper, finer—the ethical meaning of religion. It is concerned, not with theological speculations, nor with the forms and traditions which have meaning for the churches, but with life, that it may be lived to its highest, deepest, finest and most spiritual meaning. Those who feel that such an attitude towards religion is valid and precious should co-operate in the efforts of the Society for Ethical Culture. And those who feel that such an attitude is no adequate rendering of the religious interest should seek in other ways a satisfying interpretation and expression; for I take it to be the duty of every man and woman to be allied with some effort to enhance the spiritual meaning of life, to be associated with some or-

ganization devoting itself to the interests of religion. The Society for Ethical Culture is content if it can find its own and help them in their needs.

In what ways does the Ethical Culture Society resemble educational associations, and how does it differ from them? We have in Brooklyn a remarkable organization for adult education, one of the greatest peoples universities anywhere existing. Brooklyn citizens may well be proud of the Brooklyn Institute, with its numerous and varied lecture courses given by the most able and most eminent lecturers, and with its systematic class-room instruction in practically every subject which a first class university offers to its students. It is possible at the Brooklyn Institute to secure practically a college education, by using the time that most of us waste apart from our working hours, and for a very small expense. The variety of high class entertainments, many of which are truly educational, offered by the Institute is also no small part of its service to the community. There are other educational agencies which likewise win and deserve the loyalty of the citizens of this community. Not the least of these is the system of free lectures to the people, enjoyed by all parts of the greater city. In the school houses, during several evenings of each week, one may without charge hear some of the ablest lecturers and educators which the country affords.

Is the Ethical Culture Society like these educational agencies? Is its platform to be compared, for example, with that of the Brooklyn Institute? Are the thirty or thirty-five lectures of the season from this platform to be regarded as competing with the three or four hundred lectures the Brooklyn Institute offers to its members? In what way does the Ethical platform differ from other educational platforms?

Our aim is to make this platform in the best possible way educational. We are fortunate in having able and well known speakers address us. But the difference between our platform and others is, first of all, that ours is a Sunday platform, as most others are not. We meet on the day that the community sets apart, not for education, but for refreshment. Sunday is a day for rest, for reflection, for getting acquainted with one's self and one's family and friends. It is a day in which to pause from our labors, studies as well as business, and in a mood of calm and peace not possible in our more strenuous hours to look upon what we are doing, seeing it in a different, perhaps in a clearer and wiser perspective. Sunday is a day for new consecration to the things worth while. It is the aim of the Ethical platform to keep the spirit and purpose of the Sunday holiday, to help make the day one of greater reflection, insight and consecration, to help its members to a deeper acquaintance with themselves and with those to whom they are bound by ties of love and duty, to point the way to the ideal on the day when hearts are most open to its beseeching.

Because a Sunday platform, the Ethical platform is inspirational rather than educational, in the usual meaning of that term. While it stands for truth, it stands especially for the truth of the good life. While it is concerned with culture, it is devoted primarily to moral culture. While it seeks to be educational, it aims to educate towards the ideal, not simply to train the mind, but to develop a clearer perception of moral principles. There are many agencies of culture. This society is the only distinctive agency of ethical culture.

I like the name Ethical Culture. It is the only name I ever cared to be labelled with. I like it because it is descriptive of the purpose and method of the people who

bear it. The churches are less fortunate in the names by which they are known. Judaism describes a racial division rather than any distinctive purpose. Christianity merely indicates the faith that took its rise in the life and teachings of Jesus, called the Christ. The name does not describe the faith, and just what Christianity is has never yet been determined. "Episcopalians" are, so far as the name implies, those who are governed by an "Episcopus," an overseer. "Congregational" implies a form of government, as does "Presbyterian." "Unitarian" indicates merely one aspect of religious thought, the idea that is held of God. The name, Ethical Culture, indicates the central object of its adherents as that of gaining the good life, and implies that the means to the good life is the development of the moral nature. The method of Ethical Culture is educational; but in a different way than is the method of the different agencies of intellectual culture. Ethical Culture appeals not only to reason, but likewise to the imagination, to the emotions and the will. It seeks not only to inform, but also to inspire. The method is educational, but the object is moral—the making of character, the perfecting of the moral nature in its varied life relationships.

While there is then a certain similarity between the Society for Ethical Culture and other educational and cultural institutions, just as there is a resemblance between the church and the Society for Ethical Culture, there is also, as with the church, a distinctive and characteristic difference. Other agencies do not attempt the work for which the Ethical Culture Society exists. Nor does the Society for Ethical Culture seek to perform the function to which other educational agencies give their efforts.

The classes for children which the society conducts are



not to be compared with the work of the day school. Nor is their aim that which characterizes the average Sunday school. We do not undertake to teach mathematics, science, literature or history, as the day schools do. Nor do we aim to teach religious dogmas and the catechism as do the Sunday schools. We do aim, however far our methods may fall short of the desired result, to familiarize the children with the best that has been lived in the past and is being lived to-day, with the problems of life which they are meeting and must later meet, and with the moral principles by which these problems may best be met. We do aim to enlarge their sympathies, and to broaden their understanding, to develop their characters by enriching moral feeling, strengthening the moral will and clarifying the moral judgment and by grounding them in right principles of conduct.

It is hoped that during this season we may have an adult class for the study of the best moral and religious ideals of the Nineteenth Century, as these are embodied in some of the short poems by the greatest poets of England and America. This will, however, not be a study of the poets such as one would undertake with a class at the Brooklyn Institute, or at a university. Rather it will be a study of ideals, motives and inspirations, with the object of clarifying such moral ideals as we ourselves hold, and of inspiring our lives with that which has been inspiring to others.

There will be a class on Sunday mornings, during this season, for the study of the development of moral ideals, as illustrated in the lives of the great leaders of ethical thought from the Greeks to our own day. This too will be, not merely a course in the history of ethical philosophy, such as is given in most colleges, but its aim will be practical, to awaken thought, to inspire higher ideas and



to correct and clarify the judgment with regard to moral principles and courses of conduct. These specific undertakings of the Society for Ethical Culture may best serve to illustrate the difference between it and other agencies of culture and education.

To make clear the difference between the Society for Ethical Culture and other organizations in behalf of the higher life, and to define its relation to these other institutions, there still remains to consider its comparison and contrast with the different agencies of social reform, and the various institutions of philanthropy. For the sake of needed brevity I will discuss these two together. We have in our community reform parties and all kinds of clubs and organizations devoted to particular problems of social reform. We also have various charitable and benevolent associations. There are the Settlements, devoted to the up-lift of decadent and backward sections of the community. There are Friendly Visitors going to the homes of the unfortunate. There are workers for the improvement of tenements, for the abolition of child labor, for the correction of injustice in the relation of laborer and employer. There are agitators who point out the evils of existing social conditions. Socialists prophesy a reconstructed society and work for that reconstruction, by so doing often disturbing the complacency of those who are selfishly indifferent to the evils which others bear. In countless other directions the efforts of good citizens are bent upon the task of making human life truly human, of making social conditions such that a human being may live a human life.

Is the Society for Ethical Culture one more such attempt? Shall we wisely take up some one or more practical issue and agitate and work for specific reform? There are perhaps those within our society who feel that

we are remiss in not pursuing such a course. Is that the way for us in the future?

The Society for Ethical Culture is deeply concerned with social reform. Its purpose, so far as its leaders interpret the movement, is to develop every member into a social reformer. The society in New York has a proud record as a helper, and even as the instigator of many of the great reforms of the past thirty years in this city. Every one of the societies has done what it could, and is to-day doing much. The benevolence of these societies commands the respect of all generous citizens who know of them. And yet the Society for Ethical Culture is not like other associations for reform and philanthropy, nor can it wisely attempt to become like them. Its members are drawn from the various classes of society. Outside of the society they have their different personal interests. Within the society they naturally have their prejudices, born of their particular experiences. We should not all agree on the question of labor unionism, nor on the question of socialism, nor on the matter of prohibition, nor on many other questions which agitate the conscience of reformers. There are other questions, such perhaps as child labor, tenement reform, the purity of politics and the like, which we should unitedly and enthusiastically champion. But for these causes upon which we are doubtless agreed there are other agencies at work, better adapted to achieve the desired end than our society can ever hope to be.

What then is it that the Society for Ethical Culture can do in the way of social reform and philanthropy? It can do that which it is trying to do, and is in a measure doing. It can and does aim to arouse the interest of its members in the vital problems of social reform and philanthropy. It can, and to some extent it does, quicken the conscience

of its members to the suffering, to the needless degradation of their fellow beings. It rightly aims to help in clarifying opinion on these great matters. Above all its true function is to point out the moral issues in these great problems, and to magnify the moral motives that are needed in their solution. It may serve as a dynamo to generate power and enthusiasm to cope with existing evils, and to work for the ideal good. In many ways the society, as a whole, can co-operate with other agencies of social betterment. It does this whenever it is able to send its workers to co-operate with other institutions striving for the reform of social conditions and for the up-lift of humanity. It can attempt to make every member a participant in some way in the work of human up-lifting. It can help to create a public opinion favorable to the right issue of social problems. If it fails in this endeavor, it will surely fail to justify itself to an age which needs every aid in social up-lifting and which is becoming conscious of its need.

The Society for Ethical Culture is not a competing agency of social reform and philanthropy; but its aim is to be supplementary, to do that which is not adequately done by others, to magnify the moral interest in all social affairs and to generate the energy and enthusiasm which shall give the needed power to carry social issues to right conclusions.

In such ways, by strengthening the deeper interest in religion, by helping to cultivate the moral nature, by exalting right ideals and by inspiring practical and wise effort for human betterment, the Society for Ethical Culture seeks to be an aid to the higher life of its members. Such an association may not appeal to all persons. Not all are conscious of these needs, nor are all assured that they are the great needs, nor that our methods meet the

want. But some of us feel that we have found a better way, that the way of life that the ethical attitude points is the way that we would follow. We are few and we may remain few; but we shall be content if our lives are helped on the upward way. Because we feel that what we have is precious we naturally wish to share it with others. We therefore invite all who are like minded to come with us. We do not want those who seek other ends than the ends we pursue to join with us. They would be disappointed if they did. We do want those who feel as we feel and care for the things which we deem worth while to join with us in the effort to attain them.

There are two problems facing us as we take up the work of another season. The first and greatest problem is, how to make our work essential, important and greatly useful to us all, to discover in what ways we may be truly helpful to each other, and to all with whom we are associated. The other problem is, how to develop the interest of the community in our aims and work, so that we may become a larger and a stronger company, more able to adequately represent the claims of morality, the demands of righteousness, in the lives of individuals and in the life of the community.

I come back to you fresh from the rest and change of the long vacation, wiser I hope for the summer's study and thought. I come with a deeper feeling than ever before for the importance of our work, and with a new consecration to the tasks before us. I come glad of the opportunity to put all and the best of myself into this way of service. And I am confident that you will give your thought, your effort, even if need be, your sacrifice to our common work, that it may be adequately supported and fittingly developed.



# ETHICAL RECORD

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## ETHICAL CULTURE—SOME MISAP- PREHENSIONS CORRECTED

BY LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

1. A NOT uncommon impression prevails that the Ethical Culture movement is merely a development of the Jewish religion. The fact is that the Societies for Ethical Culture are not identified with the forms and traditions of any system of religion. They are concerned with the moral heritage of humanity and with the ethical and spiritual needs of men and women, who come to them from many quarters of the cosmopolitan life of the present day. These Societies are proud of their ability to interest and win the loyalty of persons whose previous interests and allegiance have been of the most varied kind. One of the claims of Ethical Culture upon public attention and regard is the fact that it is, alone among religious organizations, an association including persons from practically every religious sect and system.

2. Another misapprehension, which is quite general, is that Ethical Culture is irreligious, is opposed to the development of the religious life and to the expression of the religious aspirations of mankind. It is not uncommon to hear, from those who know Ethical Culture only indirectly, that its people are Atheists and "rank unbelievers." Such an expression doubtless originates in the fact that many persons associate religion with some public profession of a creed, a feature of religious organizations in



which the Ethical Culture Societies are deliberately lacking.

Ethical Culture Societies are, and from the beginning have been, religious organizations. They are religious in that they regard the good life as obligatory, and of infinite and eternal significance. Like Thomas Paine, they would say, "The world is my country and to do good is my religion," only they would go further and say, To be good, to learn what is the good, to aspire to an ever larger realization of the good life, and to help others gain the good life, is our religion. Ethical Culture is religious in that it recognizes moral perfection to be the aim towards which all human progress and every law of the universe is pressing. It is religious in the recognition that the forces which make for righteousness are high and holy, constraining man whether he will or not, and certain in the long run to prevail. The members of Ethical Societies think as they are individually able to think about religious theories. Each for himself defines the ultimate source of life and the final goal of being. Ethical Culture is distinctive in that it interprets religion, not as a set belief, an imposed ritual, a cherished tradition, but as the aspiration for, the struggle to win, the effort to promote the good life.

3. Another common misapprehension is that Ethical Culture is only an emasculation of older religious systems, especially Judasim and Christianity, the appropriation of their ethical principles without accepting the theological and sacerdotal elements which have accompanied these principles in the past. It is thought by many that the ethics of Judaism and of Christianity are only the superstructure which must fall, if the theological foundations are removed. Consequently those who share this misapprehension with regard to Ethical Culture feel that it is a

partial and unstable embodiment of the elements of the moral life.

The fact, however, is that Ethical Culture is an earnest endeavor to substantiate the claim of the independency of ethics. It does not rest satisfied with the moral ideals and commandments of the Old Testament, or of the New Testament, or of the Stoics, the Utilitarians or the Evolutionists. It believes that new moral truth is needed, and is to be gained, not merely through speculation, but primarily through moral effort. It maintains that only as one lives up to his highest light, consecrating his utmost nature to its requirements, shall he see more clearly the outline of the ideal.

4. Ethical Culture is very readily and very naturally misunderstood by those who are concerned with the letter rather than with the spirit of the moral law. Ethical Culture seeks to penetrate to the source of moral action, to put a man right in his fundamental attitude towards life, his own nature, and his fellow-beings. Ethical Culture does not say thou shalt and thou shalt not, after the pattern of the Old Testament Commandments. Rather it seeks to encourage personal responsibilities in the interpretation of moral obligations, to elicit from men an expression of their inmost nature and higher being. It realizes that it is not uncommon for one to so give himself to the fulfillment of minor moral precepts as to fail to realize the major requirements of morality. Honesty, for instance, pertains to business and politics quite as much as to one's more intimate transactions, and if honesty can be realized in the larger interests of life, the spirit which such a realization would express may easily be trusted to effect the same result in the minute requirements of honesty. Purity of heart, again, is of primary importance and should be emphasized rather than an observance of more

external standards of conduct, since the pure in heart will naturally conform to every requirement of purity, whereas those even who conform to some arbitrary standard may fail to fulfill the deeper requirements. The method of Ethical Culture in this respect is more closely akin to the spirit and teachings of Jesus than to the ethics of the Old Testament.

5. Another misapprehension concerning Ethical Culture is sometimes expressed in the statement that Ethical Culture is another sect. It is not an uncommon opinion that Ethical Culture seeks to effect an organization which shall resemble that of the religious denominations. Those who have found their way into the larger social movements of our time may hesitate to ally themselves with an association whose object they interpret as that of building an organization, rather than promoting a social benefit.

The truth is that Ethical Culture is at once religious in its purpose and at the same time distinctly unsectarian in its spirit. The effort of Ethical Culture leaders and members has never been given to the tasks of organization and extension. Ethical Culture is perhaps open to criticism on the ground that it has not vigorously undertaken to affect new organizations through which to extend its influence. Far from being a sect or tending to become a sect, Ethical Culture is, and promises to remain, a movement. Its concern is not to build an institution but to become an agency in affecting the higher life, not only of its members, but of the community and of the age. The members of Ethical Societies rightly feel that their organization, however valid and efficient, is of no consideration compared to the moral interests of humanity. They feel it to be all important that the private and social life should be made through and through ethical and real.

## THE SUMMER SCHOOL OF ETHICS

AT MADISON, WISCONSIN, JUNE AND JULY, 1908, HELD  
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE AMERICAN ETHICAL  
UNION.—MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER, DIRECTOR  
OF THE SCHOOL.

MANY persons associated with the Ethical Movement in this country remember with interest the Summer School of Ethics held several years ago at Plymouth, Mass. The increasing demands of his New York work prevented Dr. Adler from continuing his active efforts for that School, so that for some time, the Summer School of Ethics as a branch of the Ethical Movement was in eclipse.

During the summer of 1907, a two-weeks' session of the Summer School of Ethics was held at Glenmore, in the Adirondacks, with a most interesting and instructive program. From the increased interest aroused by this gathering of leaders of the Ethical Movement, and prominent members of Societies for Ethical Culture, the desire was awakened to carry the School to a locality more accessible to the people than the north woods of New York. The result was the transplanting of the School of Ethics to the seat of the University of Wisconsin, at Madison. The program of the School was carried out with great success. There were two lectures a day for a period of six weeks.

Various lecture courses were given under the following headings:

I. MORAL EDUCATION.—*The Ideals, Principles and Methods of Moral Education, Direct and Indirect*,—a course designed to help school principals and teachers,



Sunday school workers and settlement leaders in the task of character building.

*Systematic Moral Instruction.*—Five lectures by Dr. John Lovejoy Elliott.

*The Psychological Principles of Ethics Teaching.*—Five lectures by Dr. Henry Neumann.

*Ethical Values in Literature and the Festival.*—Five lectures by Mr. Percival Chubb.

*Higher Education in Ethics.*—Five lectures. Ethical Values in History, Dr. David Saville Muzzey; The Art of Morality: the Science of Ethics, Prof. E. B. McGilvary; Vocational Ethics—Men and Women, Professional, Business and Wage Earning Classes, Mrs. Anna Garlin Spencer; The Ethical Training of the Immigrant, Dr. Henry Moskowitz; Ethical Stimulation and Direction in Labor Unions and Mutual Benefit Societies, Prof. John A. Commons.

*George Eliot's Novels and Their Treatment of Personal Relationship.*—Five lectures by Mr. Leslie Willis Sprague.

II. THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT IN ITS GENERAL AND SPECIALIZED FORMS.—*The Ethical Movement*:—a. Its basis, history and aims. b. Its relation to current thought and action. c. The need for Ethical foundation and organization of the social movement. d. The application of Ethical ideals to the family, the state and the industrial order. e. Ethical Societies as aids to personal development.

*Ethics and Ethical Religion.*—Three lectures by Mr. William M. Salter; two lectures by Mr. Percival Chubb.

*Ethical Legacies and Tendencies.*—Two lectures by Prof. Nathaniel Schmidt; three lectures by Dr. David Saville Muzzey.

*The History of the Struggle for the Independence of Ethics from Theology.* Four lectures by Dr. Henry Moskowitz.



*Ethical Interpretation of Contemporary Life and Work.* Five lectures. Rationalism in Religion as a Factor in the Ethical Movement, Dr. Muzzey; The Reconstruction of the Ideal of the Family, Mrs. Spencer; The Reconstruction of the Ideal of the City, Prof. E. A. Ross, University of Wisconsin; The Reconstruction of Ethical Ideals in an Industrial Society, Miss Jane Addams; The Reconstruction of the Ideal of Society, Mr. Sprague.

In addition to the lecture courses, Round Table Conferences were held for the discussion of topics related to the subjects of the lectures.

Evening public meetings with addresses by different speakers were held in the Congregational, Unitarian, Baptist and Methodist churches.

The topics of the evening addresses were:

"Private Property and Personal Morality", "Private Property and Public Morality", "The Church and Public Morality", "Modern Sin and the New Righteousness", "The Race Question and Public Morality."

The authorities of the University welcomed the School with the utmost cordiality, generously placing at its service a beautiful Assembly Hall, in the State Historical Library Building, and afterward offering a larger audience room when the unexpected audiences demanded such extra accommodation.

Three of the professors recommended their pupils to attend several of the lectures of the Summer School of Ethics, giving credit for reports from those lectures in lieu of regular lectures at the University. Several of the professors took part in the regular work of the Summer School and the faculty invited one of the Ethical leaders to give a three-hour-a-week course at the University for credit, as a part of the regular summer session. The attendance was gratifyingly appreciative as well as unex-

pectedly large. The regular lectures of the Summer School ranged in attendance by actual count from fifty-three to three hundred and fifteen, with an average of over one hundred and thirty. The evening platform meetings secured an audience of from four hundred to four hundred and fifty.

The original intention to have students of the School pay a fee was abandoned for the reason that it was the first session at the University and the School was not advertised sufficiently in advance to prevent complications with credit courses at the University. Cards were issued for registration, however, and one hundred and forty-nine persons signed these cards. Thirty-four were residents of Madison, Wisconsin,—ten men and twenty-four women. Of the one hundred and fifty remaining, all were attendants at the Summer Session of the University of Wisconsin and residing outside of Madison, most of them advanced students of mature years.

A careful analysis of signatures and many interviews with the signers of the cards showed that 49 or 50 came to Madison especially for our School of Ethics, or chose the University of Wisconsin rather than any other for their summer session work because our School was there and they could also attend its sessions. Of this number, a majority would, in all probability, have entered as fee students, could all our courses, or a considerable number of them, have given them credit at the University. Of the 115 students of the University attending the larger number of our sessions, the following analysis shows the quality:

Professors and instructors in colleges, 21; pastors of churches and parish assistants, 11; judges of Supreme Court and U. S. District Courts, 2; superintendents of public schools and heads of normal school training departments, 12; social workers, 9; high school teachers, 26.

Of the remaining 34, all were either seniors or graduate students.

The geographical representation will be shown by the following table:

Wisconsin .....	46	Illinois .....	13
Missouri .....	11	Michigan .....	6
Iowa .....	5	Nebraska .....	4
Indiana .....	3	Ohio .....	3
New York .....	3	Kentucky .....	3
Kansas .....	2	Colorado .....	2
North Dakota .....	2	South Dakota .....	1
Pennsylvania .....	1	Minnesota .....	1
Montana .....	1	Washington, D. C. ....	1
New Jersey .....	1	Tennessee .....	1
Virginia .....	1	Washington .....	1
Louisiana .....	1		

Mrs. Spencer's course of sixteen lectures on Social Service, although given at the University, was a part of the Summer School of Ethics, in that it constituted a convenient point of connection and treated a subject especially desired by some of the professors. Twelve students (with two exceptions post-graduate attendants upon the summer session of the University), registered for credit for master's and doctor's degree. After the second lecture, at the request of a number of University people and Madison residents, the lectures were thrown open to the public. A list of lecture attendants was secured mid-way in the course, on cards giving "name, home residence and special interest," with the following result: Twenty-six residents of the city, including 4 clergymen; several social workers and officials of the State Board of Charities and 61 students of the University Summer Session, from towns and States outside of Madison, with a

range of professional interest and geographical representation similar to that already shown by the attendants at the Summer School of Ethics; and nearly 50 names on the two sets of cards were duplicate.

The interest in the Summer School of Ethics was not only widespread but profound in character. All our lecturers were deeply impressed by the response which they received to all their appeals. Mr. Salter's and Mr. Chubb's lectures on the Ethical Movement, the first week, created much discussion and led to three conferences at our headquarters when the people present asked many searching questions. Dr. Elliott's course and Dr. Neumann's were attended by large numbers of teachers, the two professors in the department of education arranging their hours so that their students might attend parts of courses which they felt to be so valuable. The attendance at our School the first week overtaxed the lecture room assigned to us and by the courtesy of the University we were allowed to move to the principal building and to an audience room of a much larger capacity. The distinction was made in this invitation between our "educational and social lectures," and what might be called "the propaganda of the Ethical Movement,"—the latter being cautiously admitted to State University privileges.

Prof. Sellery, however, the director of the Summer Session, realizing that Prof. Schmidt's reputation would secure him a very large audience among the student body, made an exception in his case, although his two lectures were distinctly of our propaganda course. Dr. Muzzey made a very deep impression with his three lectures.

Dr. Moskowitz had a very hard task to compress such great subjects into four lectures, and his hour also came into conflict with a series of very popular lectures given at the University and open to the public; nevertheless, as



the schedule of attendance shows, he held his ground and created an excellent impression. Miss Addams, Prof. Zueblin, Mr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones and our other associate helpers were, of course, cordially received. The public evening meetings were a wonderful success in point of interest and attendance. Dr. Crapsey stayed with us two weeks and assisted in our work.

An interesting feature of the meeting at Madison was the presence of Mr. Shelander, from Tacoma, Washington, Mr. Alfred Martin's successor in the free church of that city. He came on purpose to attend the School of Ethics, and demonstrated his entire loyalty to our movement together with a very clear understanding of its aims and principles. He and Dr. Neumann and Mr. Allinson gave great assistance in the preparation of reports for the press and in other practical details of the work of the School.

Prof. Schmidt's inspiring treatment of the Prophets and of the Gospel of Jesus drew a large audience and created great enthusiasm.

High commendation of the lectures and lecturers of the School of Ethics was expressed by many of the officers and professors of the University of Wisconsin. One declared that "nothing but the highest praise of all our work in Madison had reached his ears." Another said: "Your people will leave a trail of light behind them. You ought to visit every great University in the country. Your idealistic attitude and high inspiration are needed in every educational centre." Another professor said: "This University, which I consider the best of the State Universities, needs just such courses of lectures as you people have given here. A State University must consider the utilities of life; supported by tax, it must render back to the people help in raising the standard of living and improv-



ing all material conditions. It therefore needs all the more that some more spiritual message be brought to the mature students, especially in such a Summer Session as that held at the University of Wisconsin." Another professor expressed himself as "grateful for the impetus the Summer School had given to the movement already started in the University to introduce more ethical study and appeal into the life of the students, especially the undergraduates."

One of the attendants upon the School, a superintendent of schools in a mining town, said: "This is what we want in our city; such work as your lecturers can give is the great need in all our Western towns, especially those like ours where there is no strong church interest and where multitudes of men must be approached on moral grounds, or fail of all association on the higher side of life." Many other important testimonies to the usefulness of our School were given by its regular attendants.

At the close of the School of Ethics, important interviews with the officers and professors of the University were held, and substantial overtures were made by the University for the permanent location of the School at Madison. Arrangements are possible by which two or three of the lecturers of the Summer School of Ethics may be placed on the salaried list of the University and give their lectures in the morning in credit courses: in this manner relieving the treasury of the School and enlarging its sphere of influence. The three o'clock hour, which is a popular one for general lectures, can be secured, (with freedom from conflicting lectures) for the Propaganda Course of the Summer School of Ethics, provided our most attractive subjects and speakers are placed in that course. The facilities of the University in the way of advertising through the Summer Session bulletin,

correspondence with special inquirers through local friends of the Summer School of Ethics, possible interchange of fees on a basis mutually helpful, and other important advantages are within our grasp, if the American Ethical Union decides to establish the School permanently at Madison, Wisconsin.

The national aspects of the Ethical Movement need developing. The American Ethical Union needs a special function in order to realize and express that national sentiment. The Summer School of Ethics offers a specially favorable centre of influence for this nationalizing and universalizing of a movement now confined in official influence and connection to a few local societies. "The Middle West," to quote from one of the professors of the University, "is destined to control to an ever-increasing extent, the political and social life of our country." The University of Wisconsin is considered by many leading educators of the country to stand at the head of all State Universities, and by some is ranked as the most highly efficient University in the country. It has made organic connection with the law-making power in a unique manner, with the result of securing for Wisconsin exceptionally advanced legislation in lines connected with the welfare of the people. It has set the example of a union of "town and gown" for purposes of social betterment which is being followed by other seats of learning, and which, in itself, gives opportunity for ethical appeal and direction unknown in most collegiate centres.

The time is ripe for a conscious, determined, effective effort to spread the ethical ideal and interpretation by means of systematic instruction to adults, in answer to both a conscious want and an unconscious need in American society. The question remains, Is the American Ethical Union able to enter into this great opportunity and use it for the highest purposes of personal and social education?

# THE FOURFOLD PATH OF SPIRITUAL PROGRESS\*

BY PROFESSOR FELIX ADLER.

THERE are four paths that lead in the direction of spiritual perfection. The first of these, the path of physical pain, sickness and poverty, was considered by us last week. Of the second and third, the paths of sin and moral failure, I am to speak to-day.

Perhaps you may wonder that anyone should speak of sin as leading to spiritual perfection. Does not the path of transgression lead to destruction? Is it not written "the wages of sin is death"? Also the objection may arise in your minds, that if sin be a pathway to perfection it might seem to follow that one ought to sin deliberately in order to experience the spiritual growth which sin favors. I shall take up this objection later on, but first let us try to remove certain prepossessions which commonly obstruct insight into these deeper questions.

There is a tendency at present to minimize the seriousness of moral evil. There are those who represent wrong-doing as merely a form of error, who attempt to throw the blame of our back-slidings, and even of outright infraction of the right on outside influence such as education, heredity and the like—over which we have no control. The witness of conscience, which insists that we have power to keep these influences at bay, if we but choose, being disregarded. The wicked are often likened to the sick; wrong-doing is represented as a disease, the

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wrong-doer as an object of pity rather than of censure. I do not think that the facts, if we face them clearly, will bear out this view. Again, the attempt is often made to present the whole notion of sin as an off-shoot of theology, and as dependent upon the belief in a personal God. Take away, it is said, the idea of retribution in another life, of a Judge who will ultimately inflict penalties proportioned to the wrong done, and the sense of sin will disappear. I do not think that this view is correct. Theology of necessity has utilized the notion of guilt and has made much of it for its own purposes; but the sense of guilt is not the product of theology and does not stand and fall with it. It has an independent root in the nature of man. Whether or not we believe in a personal Judge who sooner or later will bring the guilty to book, the guilt itself remains the awful thing it is. What difference does it make whether the everlasting laws, of which we read that they are "written on the tablets of the heart," embody the will of a master architect, or whether they simply express the unalterable nature and tendency of things? If we transgress them, the impiety of the transgression is as great in the latter as in the former case.

The Greeks, who, if any people ever did, possessed the gift of seeing life as it actually is, and who to a singular extent were free from the fault of exaggeration, were yet impressed with the actuality of sin quite as decidedly as were the Hebrews. The mystery of guilt, the horror and the blight of it, constitutes the leading theme in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and elicits from the strings of Greek poetry its deepest music—music so fraught with woe, and withal so sublime and so beautiful, that even the modern reader is affected by it as he is by scarcely any other kind of poetry. The horrible sin of Oedipus the King, and the horrible penalties he paid for it! The



long road he traveled before he might attain to final purification! The impious pity of Orestes! When will these things be forgotten? Enthusiastic Hebrew prophets and Psalmist, carried away by theological bias, might be suspected of unduly magnifying the importance of conscience as a factor in human life. The Greek poets, however, were not carried away by any such bias, and yet they ascribed the profoundest significance to the moral element in man, and described with unequalled art that eruption of nature in us, which is called remorse. Shakespeare, too, in the greatest of his dramas—in *Lear*, *Macbeth*, *Hamlet*, etc.—selects some attempted subversion of the moral order as his theme. Nor does he ever treat wrong as mere error of judgment, nor extenuate it on the ground of extraneous influence. That the notion of sin is a survival of dogmatic theology is a misconception which we must discard from our mind.

But what is to be our definition of sin, and what is the function we are to ascribe to remorse? Sin is a violation of the moral law; and the moral law is the inmost law of our being, is the expression of the ultimate truth and worth in things. To sin is to shut one's self out from true being and from the world of truth and worth. Whether there be such a thing as retribution in a future state we need not even discuss. The wrongfulness of wrong is not enhanced by any pains that may be annexed to it in another life. Further, we can hardly help admitting that the Psalmist is mistaken when he asserts that the righteous flourish like the bay-tree, that the wicked perish. On the contrary, it is often the good man who perishes and the wicked who, to all appearances, flourish like the bay-tree. But the rightfulness of right is not dependent on any temporal benefits that may flow from right conduct. Nor is the authority of right shaken by the absence of



such benefits. As for the reference which many moralists make to the inner hell, the pains of an accusing conscience—this plea, too, can hardly be accepted upon the evidence of the facts. One of the most frequent observations is that wicked men in time become case hardened. The poor conscience, misused and twisted out of shape, after a while loses its sensitiveness and becomes atrophied, though never perhaps entirely so. The unscrupulous transgressor in consequence of his utter disregard of moral consideration, is sometimes able to reach even the very pinnacle of worldly splendor, and yet inwardly he may be haunted by no Eumenides. He may enjoy, rather, if not peace of mind, a certain stolid or defiant self-complacency.

The function of remorse, therefore, cannot be punishment in the ordinary sense of retribution, in the sense of pain inflicted to offset the guilt; but rather in the sense of purification and inward regeneration. Blessed are those, we must say, who are subject to the pains of remorse, and miserable and worthy of the deepest pity those who are not subject to them. In fairy tales we read of men and women being turned into ice, of others changed into stone; and we are horror-stricken when we attempt, in imagination, to take in the idea of human beings, flesh and blood like ourselves, overtaken by such a fate. But in the moral world, also, there are persons who lose their human qualities, who sink into a hard and icy indifference like statues, with respect to their fellow-beings; while others are, as it were, aurified—turned into gold—all their thoughts are of gold, all their more generous impulses are subdued to the one insane craving for gold.

The real question which we have to face is this, Why should there be human beings who are left unvisited by the salutary pain of remorse, the pain which is indispen-

sable to liberation from the baser self, the throes that precede the birth of a better life within; why should anyone, not in revenge for the evil he has done, but in order that he may overthrow evil, be allowed to escape moral suffering? But to this question our finite intelligence can find no answer.

Compunction or contrition, then, is indispensable, but it must be of the right kind if it is to produce its just effects. There are, in particular, two spurious kinds against which we must be warned. One of them consists in regretting, not the sin itself, but the unpleasant consequences of it. Some one has done wrong, is found out, and loses his social position; another perhaps in consequence of a course of dissipation loses his health. Either of these persons when overtaken by the consequences may loudly bemoan his follies, and reproach himself for not having been wise in time. He seems to be penitent but he is not really so, for there is no awakening on his part to the horror of having violated the moral law. The regret expressed applies only to the penalties and not to the sin itself. The moralists of the middle ages coined the word "attrition" to denote repentance which falls short of the moral, in contrast to the complete contrition. Many persons who believe themselves to be contrite are in reality only attrite.

Another counterfeit form of repentance is so speciously like the genuine state of mind as to be sometimes mistaken for it on superficial observation. Indeed it seems at first to be repentance carried to excess! I mean the eager readiness with which moral faults are sometimes admitted and confessed. Barely has criticism been intimated, when the person censured will meet his accuser more than half way, acknowledging even faults to which no reference had been made, cheapening and humbling

himself. But look more closely and you will observe that what the penitent really desires is to forestall further reproaches, to stop censure by acknowledging, even to an exaggerated extent, all the faults that can possibly be cast up against him, to resume normal associations with others by depriving them of the right to refer to past delinquencies.

Not such is the behavior of real contrition. A genuinely moral person conceives an exalted estimate of his dignity as a man, and cannot without bitter mortification admit that this sovereign dignity has been eclipsed within him, that the jewel of the self has been dragged into the mire. A real confession of guilt must be wrested from the reluctant self; must be dragged, as it were, out of the inner truth of one's being, and is accompanied by a convulsion of the whole nature. When confession is easy it is worthless.

One other characteristic of genuine contrition, to which I wish to allude, is the feeling that a moral wrong done is, in a sense, irreparable; that even the sea, which according to the Greeks washes out all stains, cannot cleanse a great moral stain; that one has to keep house with the remembrance of one's guilt, and suffer the accusing presence of it as long as one lives. The fall of a genuinely moral nature is like the crash of a mighty tree in the forest. The marks of evil upon the soul are like the lines which are traced by glaciers on the primeval rock in the ice age. The glaciers have since retreated, the ice age has passed, a warmer climate has succeeded; but the marks remain. So it is with the marks of evil upon the soul.

In what way then does the experience of sin lead to spiritual growth? It leads us to realize, as nothing else can, the awful, the sublime, authority of that very law

which we have violated ; and secondly, if only we manfully struggle to work our way out of the depth, it leads to the discovery that there are in man infinite powers of renewal. The tree falls, but the root may still be sound. The spring of moral endeavor may be dry, but there are perennial subterranean springs from which it can be fed anew. The discovery of the infinite height of the moral nature, and of the infinite resources of the spiritual part of us—this is the harvest we may gather from the seed we have sown in error and in anguish.

And now to go back to the question raised in the beginning, whether if this view holds good it does not follow that we should incur guilt deliberately in order to reap the benefits of penitence. Against that question I would raise the counter question, Is it possible for any human being to avoid falling into guilt? Is it at all necessary to seek out occasions of evil-doing in order to inoculate one's self, as it were, with the disease, and so enjoy a greater immunity thereafter? What a preposterous suggestion ! Surely, no *progressive* man can escape from evil-doing. It is the morally unprogressive who may lead a seemingly blameless, colorless life. They do not go forth to meet the stress of life and to enter into the struggle. They are safe, or seem so, because they shirk. But the progressive man, who strives to reach a higher morality, will find that, in the endeavor to reconstruct his life on a new principle, he is forced to break up old habits which were to him powerful and helpful, and in the effort to form new habits he will find himself vulnerable at many points. In seeking the higher harmony he disturbs the lesser harmonies, and for a time is thrown into disarray. "Es irrt der Mensch so lang er streb," man errs as long as he strives. Strive, therefore, and you will encounter guilt ; but if you strive with the right aim,



namely, that of spiritual growth, you will also experience the healing and renovating power of the very effort you are putting forth. The path of sin of which we have now spoken, is the second path.

In contra-distinction to it, I shall call the third path that of moral failure, by which I would indicate circumstances in which we fail, not chiefly through any fault of our own, but through the fault of others. There are certain moral ends which we can achieve only in conjunction with others. We may be baffled in the attempt to accomplish these ends through the defects of those on whose co-operation we depend. This is a very important chapter in the book of morals, which has by no means received the attention it deserves. Let us consider briefly the nature of this kind of moral failure. We are required to approximate towards moral completeness. Does our success in doing so depend upon the willingness of others to pursue the same goal? Is my moral welfare dependent on the goodness of others? This of course would be a false statement, because a man can always save his soul just by the effort. My salvation, by which I mean my worth as a human being, depends upon the effort I put forth; and to put forth the effort is always within my power. But apart from the effort, the subjective side on which merit depends, the moral results which I may achieve, the degree to which I can by my will make my objective relations to others as high as I would wish them to be—that does depend not on myself alone but on the extent to which others are willing to respond. Suppose for instance you entertain a high conception of what ought to be the relation between a son and a father: perfect confidence, you say should subsist, and friendship, a disinterested desire on the part of the parent to promote



the development of the son along the lines which nature has marked out for him, no attempt to interfere with his true liberty, to interpose any arbitrary veto upon the son's legitimate aspirations. On the other hand, an exquisite camaraderie : gratitude never uttered in words, but evident in mein and act ; a willingness on the part of the younger to draw down influence from the superior spirit of the elder, as the earth draws down to itself the light of the sun ; and the silent and ever-present desire to repay this influence by transmitting it into growth. You set up for yourself such an ideal of the relation in which you would like to stand with your son. Then face the facts as they sometimes are. The son is unresponsive, obstinate, caring more for silly companions than for your society, so that the relations between you and him are reduced almost to bare externals. One of the objects of life is the fulfilling in an ideal way of this parental relation. The ideal is high ; but you fall far short of realizing it, not through your own fault, or not chiefly so, since there is always fault on both sides. Nevertheless you fail. You are prevented from attaining this moral end because the needed co-operation is lacking. Or take the opposite case, the father is solely, or at all events, chiefly at fault ; is dictatorial, selfish ; or perhaps his whole bringing up, the habits of a lifetime, the old-world customs and opinions to which he adheres, render him incapable of entering into and comprehending the life of a younger generation. A gulf has opened between father and son. There may be a yearning on both sides to bridge the gulf, but how difficult is it to do so ; and in the meantime sacred ties of filial piety are endangered, and moral injury results on both sides.

Again, take the familiar example of the conjugal relation upon which the moralist is bound especially to dwell,

because the very closeness of the tie makes evident our dependence upon one another, not only for happiness and comfort in life, but also for moral aid. I remember having read years ago, in Philip Hammerton's book on "The Intellectual Life," of a professional man, a scholar, who married a woman of unimpeachable character. She was perfectly loyal to his interests so far as she understood them, but excessively narrow. She had been reared in the dead atmosphere of a French provincial town, was full of the prejudices of the bourgeoisie, and without a spark of comprehension of the ambitions and aspirations of her husband's mind. She begrudged the time he spent on scientific research, because it failed to add to the income of the family. She discountenanced in every way his liberal views on religion because they stirred up the animosity of their friends and neighbors, and made an obstacle in the way of their social advance. She was an excellent wife and mother according to her lights; but on the intellectual side she was a constant clog and embarrassment to him, and by slow degrees drew him down to her level. The reverse of this picture is often equally true. If the married life is to be led on a higher plane, there must be reciprocal give-and-take, play of mutual influences between mind and mind, as well as between heart and heart. Is it possible to lead this life on the upper plane, if one of the parties be determined to remain on the lower? If not, then does it not follow that this particular moral end of life, an exalted marriage relation, is bound to remain unachieved?

Again, the same holds good of friendship. How many of us travel through life lonely, and because of the loneliness become hardened and remain undeveloped in many ways, simply because we have not succeeded in finding the friend who might shed into our nature the stimulating

and quickening influences which only friendship can give. And the persons whom we call by the name friend—what poor make-shift friends they often are, what a travesty of the holy name by which we call them! It may be said that this whole view of life is misleading and that the fault is always with ourselves. Emerson draws the important distinction between wishing for great friends and being worthy of them. If we were worthy of them, if we had made ourselves worthy of them, the elect of the earth would come to us. We have, after all, the friends whom we deserve. In the case of marriage, if one who is on the higher level had reached a level high enough, the other would be found teachable, would be willing to rise to the higher standpoint, could not in fact resist the upward drawing influences. As to fathers and sons, there could be no permanent bar between them if patience, love and reverence were adequate to the task imposed. If we were good enough we should have no difficulty in making others good. We fail, not because others are hopelessly bad, but because we are so inadequately good. We are a little farther along than others morally, and we wish to get on farther. We are impatient when we discover that they detain us, and we therefore throw the blame on them. We forget that if we were as far along as we ought to be, those who are backward would not remain so, but would willingly follow our lead. All this is undoubtedly true, and especially true, in the more intimate personal relations. Where we are dealing with separate individuals, a friend, a wife or husband, a brother or sister, a father or son, we should make it our rule never to put the blame on others; but to fix attention on the blame that belongs to ourselves. But the same is not equally true in the political and social realm where we are dealing with the short-comings of large numbers of our fellow beings, and

where a change for the better can only come about through the concerted action of multitudes. Even here an individual, a great statesman, an unselfish social leader can accomplish much—there is no telling how much. None the less the limitations of what even the greatest can accomplish are real. And this aspect of the question is one that particularly comes home to us at the present day. We are living in a state of society in which much exists that does not at all comport with our sense of right, in which the weak instead of being spared and protected by the strong, are on account of their weakness often mercilessly misused, and their weakness basely turned to their harm. We eat bread that is baked in the oven of oppression, and clothe ourselves in garments that have been dyed in the purple of sin. We are all involved more or less in complicity with social sin. Such conditions as these have caused some men to flee from a society in which contamination apparently permeates the whole structure, and have induced in others like Tolstoi a somber question. Yet whether we flee or, as we ought, stay in the midst of society, the individual, ardent as may be his desires for the righting of social wrongs, is forced to realize that he cannot alone achieve this purpose. The actual achievement of it depends on the co-operation of others.

What then shall we say is the fruit of the struggle, what the compensation for the failure? In the first place, there is the first-hand knowledge we gain of the authority of the moral ideal, of that ideal which will not let us rest, but urges and constrains us to go on making the effort, irrespective of the outward objective results we may achieve. And secondly, the compensation is that in the course of the struggle we learn to see more clearly what the right relations are, what justice is and what it exacts of us.



What is right marriage, right friendship, right parenthood, right citizenship—in a word, what is the scope and the content of righteousness? If we regard righteousness as the manifestation of the divine, we may say that the fruit of the age-long struggle is the ability to see the form and the shining face of righteousness disclosed ever more clearly, one after another the veils that hide it from us being lifted. The compensation of the struggle is the increasing conviction of the validity and reality of that which ought to be. Are we making the effort to translate our ideals into actualities, never wholly succeeding, yet gaining an increasing knowledge of the nature of that which ought to be, of its majesty and its holiness?

I have often referred to a final goal towards which humanity is progressing, and have sometimes allowed myself to say, with others, that we should try to draw heaven down to earth. But I ought not to leave it unsaid that I do not regard this goal as attainable under finite conditions; that I do not believe there will ever be this heaven on earth. I do not believe in an earthly paradise. An earthly paradise, a paradise of creature comforts may be possible; but not a state of perfection in which all the infinite aspirations of the human soul after perfect knowledge, perfect truth, perfect holiness, perfect righteousness shall be achieved. The effort to create such a state is of priceless value. It gives dignity and worth to human life; but here in the time-and-space world I do not believe that the effort is destined to be crowned with fruition. The Golden City of our hopes is and remains a vision. We are bound to try for that which under finite conditions cannot be realized. That is the inmost paradox of our nature, the eternal and divine within us struggling and struggling in vain to express itself in the temporal and the fleeting.



From this point of view it is possible to perceive distinctly what may be called the tragic element in human life. I look upon the whole story of the human race, with all its aspirations from the beginning to the end, as a sublime tragedy. Let me insist, however, that this is not a pessimistic view. The life of the individual man is too pitifully short to permit him to work out his ideals. The span of three score years and ten—what does it mean? A mere breath, a whisper of the breeze! But the life of the race is likewise too short to permit the attainment of its ends. A few million years perhaps—and what do they signify with respect to endless aims, only to be realized in endless fruition? Long before the goal of perfection can be reached, it is likely that the cosmic forces which operate on this globe, will render it untenable for such beings as ourselves. The life of the human race, just as much as the life of the individual, is too short to be commensurate with the moral purposes. Life in the individual and in the race is likely to be frustrated before it can round itself out into ideal completeness. It is the perception of this that makes the earthly paradise a futile, inadequate goal. It is because of this that I am led to take refuge in the thought, reconciling and satisfying to me, that the whole life of man on earth is a sublime tragedy. For to insist on the true meaning of tragedy, consider what our emotions are as we follow spellbound the development on the stage of some tragic plot. It is ever some great quality that seeks to work itself out and fails; some mighty purpose that is wrecked, some heroic enterprise that is shattered on the rock of finite limitation. Step by step the inevitable doom approaches. The proud edifice of glory, love or virtue falls, and the hero is buried beneath its ruins. But how shall we explain the strange blending which we observe in our feelings? Why is it,

when we are so dissolved in woe, so shaken with pity, that at the very same moment we should experience such supreme exaltation? Why does our breast expand and our eye kindle, and why do we leave the play with elate step and a solemn joy succeeding to the pain? Whence this joy after the pain, nay, this joy in the pain, which is the mark of the effect of true tragedy? It is explained when we consider that the failure which the tragic scene portrays is itself the evidence of something so great that it could not succeed under finite conditions. The jar was too puny to contain the roots of this mighty, towering, far-spreading tree. The shrine was too narrow to confine within itself the presence of the Deity. The cask was too weak to contain the rare, strong wine. And so I say the whole of human life, both of the individual and of the race, that it seems to me in this sense a tragedy—failure upon failure, failure for us singly, after fifty or sixty or seventy years, to live out our ideal; failure for the race in like fashion. Ever new, better, braver and stronger attempts to imprison the ideal in flesh and blood, in space and time; and ever new defeat crowding upon such attempts. But the compensations of the defeat are these: that we grasp more and more firmly the validity of the ideal, and more and more plainly behold its lofty lineaments; that we obtain increasingly what the Bible calls “the knowledge of God,” that is to say, the knowledge, though only in a symbolic fashion, of the existence, apart from that which the senses report, of another and imperishable mode of being.

It would be childish to speak of this as heaven. There is no such thing as heaven. In this universe there is neither up nor down. What we call the sky is a curtain of blue, an illusion of the eye. Beyond that blue there is the solid blackness of the immeasurable abysses of space,

cleft here and there by the burning torches of suns and satellites. The other world is a spiritual world only, a world of the ideal. The function of the failure of all earthly things is to bring home to us that the ideal stands for something which is real, something which in the nature of things is alone ultimately real.

## ECHOES OF THE LONDON CONGRESS ON MORAL EDUCATION

NOTHING of such importance in the field of Ethics has taken place within recent years as the first International Congress on Moral Education held at the University of London, September 25th to 29th of this year. This Congress was organized by the International Ethical Union as a result of a decision reached at the Ethical Conference held at Eisenach in 1906. The work of organization was done chiefly by Mr. Gustav Spiller, the secretary of the International Ethical Union, who early secured the collaboration of Dr. Michael Sadler and other leading educators and representatives of various governments, all of whom have been profoundly interested in the problems of moral education.

The Congress was honored by the good wishes of his Majesty, the King, and met under the patronage of thirteen Ministers of Education, including those of the United States, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, Spain and Japan. The Ministers and Directors of education from many other countries were also present, including China, India, Greece, Holland, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, Barbados, Honduras, Jamaica, New Brunswick, N. S.; Queensland, Australia, St. Helena, Saskatchewan, Tasmania and the Transvaal. Delegates were sent by many universities and by all of the leading educational associations. Among those who contributed papers may be mentioned from England, Professors Mackenzie, Muirhead and Lloyd Morgan; from America, Professors Felix Adler, of Columbia, and Francis G. Peabody, of Harvard; from Italy, Cesare Lombroso; from France, Professors Buis-

son and Boutroux; from Germany Professors Foerster, Munch and Tonnies; from Russia, M. and Mme. Novalevsky.

The splendid success of this remarkable series of conferences is largely due to the untiring efforts of Mr. Spiller and to his official committee who did everything to insure the success of the Congress. The large hall in South Kensington was crowded daily with earnest listeners, many of whom came great distances and at many of the sessions the attendance passed well beyond the one thousand mark. The leading London dailies uniformly presented full accounts of the proceedings, and the fine editorials appearing in the leading London papers indicated a keen interest in this work of moral education.

Fortunately three members of our American Ethical Societies were present at this Congress, and we have had from them interesting accounts of their impressions. From these and other sources we have made the following composite report. To Miss Lida Stokes Adams and Miss E. S. Lowry, of Philadelphia, and to Miss Mary R. Davis, of New York, we wish here to tender our hearty thanks for the material with which they have supplied us.

Miss Lowry mentions as especially interesting and valuable "a model lesson by Mr. F. J. Gould, of Leicester, England, whose paper, 'A Central Conception for Moral Instruction,' had for its text, 'Service,' this being, in his view, the central idea of moral education. The teacher, believing that service is the willing gift of feeling, thought and energy, given in the spirit of friendship, love and respect, will endeavor, first, to awaken admiration for the spirit of service, so that acts and services to humanity, as soon as presented, will be received with a feeling of admiration and gratitude,—the first method of appeal being through the feelings. Second, the teacher will pre-



sent an æsthetic revelation of service through carefully chosen examples from history and imaginative literature. The great religious teachers are eminently noble servants of the race. Reason enlightens action, but has no moral claim unless the action springs from a desire to serve. Third, the teacher, by the analysis of cases supplied by history and daily experiences, will show that "the good will" has not completed its aim until it renders service, nor is any quality to be regarded as moral until it is applied directly to the service of others. Courage, prudence and perseverance should not be characterized as in themselves admirable, since a man may exercise all these qualities in the course of revengeful or malicious conduct. This principle also applies to intellect. After the presentation of his paper, Mr. Gould gave a lesson in direct moral instruction, a class of boys and girls of ten or twelve years old being brought in and seated with their backs to the audience. Mr. Gould requested perfect silence from the audience, so that the children might be as unconscious of their presence as possible, and the lesson was conducted by the use of an outline placed upon a large black-board on the platform, in such a way that the main points of development were clear to the audience from the beginning, and at the same time, served to connect in the minds of the children, the various points made in the development of the lesson. Through the use of historic cases of heroic self-sacrifice in various countries, the idea of service was brought home to the class in such a way that history, literature, science and art all contributed their quota, and the children actually saw how the family, the country and humanity could be served directly and indirectly."

Miss Davis cites the following three points which were

emphasized by the Congress, as deserving of special consideration:

(1) How far is it possible for our Public Elementary Schools to furnish their pupils the precious character-forming influences of a corporate school life?

(2) Is it not indispensable that the teacher of morals should be more fully equipped than is often the case at present, with the knowledge of experience necessary for the task of guidance and of imparting faith in a moral ideal?

(3) Is it not necessary that under the conditions of modern life, more should be done to give educational help and guidance to young people during the years of adolescence?

Miss Adams gives the salient points of the Congress (partly) as follows:

"Distinguished experimenters in education of all nations, of diverse theological beliefs and philosophical opinions, met upon one platform to put forth their theories, to deliver the results of their experiment in practice, to discuss frankly their many unsolved problems, to teach and to learn *in re* the thing of highest importance to the world—how to produce better citizens, worthy men and women, human beings of character development not inferior to that of their minds and bodies.

"This really extraordinary achievement was due to the Ethical Movement, 'which conceived it, organized it, and saw it to a successful issue.' Mr. Spiller, by the courtesy of the International Union of Ethical Societies, devoted himself wholly to this task for the greater part of a year. The Congress was held under the patronage of nearly twenty governments, which sent official representatives, and was presided over by Professor Michael E. Sadler, of Manchester University, whose report in two volumes

of an *'International Inquiry as to Moral Instruction and Training in Schools,'* is a valuable contribution to the subject. About 1,200 tickets were sold, giving the holders various privileges besides that of entrance to the great hall set apart by the University for the purpose, and including the possession of a 400-page volume of the papers communicated—125 in number. This great body of people of many nationalities, each one armed with a big blue book, streaming past the Kensington Museum and into the portals of the Imperial Institute, formed an interesting sight—and this same body of men and women listening eagerly and patiently, tolerantly, deferentially—nay, reverently and sympathetically to speakers of widely different points of view—to Jew and Christian, Catholic, Protestant and Free-Thinker—formed an inspiring sight, a thing giving splendid hope for the future in the indication that before very long differences of theological belief so long and tenaciously held will be sunk in the profounder common interest of securing the right conduct of life for all.

“Professor Sadler made an address of welcome in French, German and English, with graceful reference to the famous contributions of each nationality: naming Arnold of Rugby, Pestalozzi and Vittorino da Feltra, the people’s high schools of Denmark, Adler’s experimentation in the New World, etc. In conclusion, Professor Sadler asked, How far is it possible for our public elementary schools which train the vast majority of our citizens for the future, to furnish for their pupils the precious character-forming influence of a corporate school life? Is it not desirable that the classes committed to the charge of the teachers should be made smaller? Can a teacher individualize more than 30 or 35 pupils? Is it not important that the teacher should be equipped more fully than

is often now the case with the knowledge needed for the task of guiding conduct, and of endeavoring to impart faith in a moral ideal? Is it not necessary that more should be done to give educational help and guidance to young people?

"Professor Adler, the first speaker on the program, opened with the inquiry, 'In what, after all is said and done, does the worth of a human life consist?' To what content or form of activity should we point as giving it a significance outlasting the fleeting moment? Ethical education must embrace human conduct in all its branches. The ethical note should be sounded in all teaching, whether it be manual training, mathematics, history, art or literature. The ethical principle remains always the same, but in the successive stages from childhood to old age, the application of the principle changes. The right ethical training of one stage, fits the trained person to solve the problems of the successive stages. The highest work of a school is to kindle noble ideals of life and duty. Dr. Adler pointed out that ethics is not 'three-fourths of conduct,' or any other fraction of conduct, but controls or should control the whole of conduct, and that the ethical education of the young cannot be planned satisfactorily until a scheme of ethical education for adults has been elaborated. Dr. Adler thus struck the note of humility, as he so often does. Indeed such discussions are possible only where the spirit of humility broods, for no experiment has yet had sufficiently definite results to proclaim itself a model to the world.

"During four days papers and discussions continued on every phase of moral education—its principles, scope, aim, means; on the relation between direct and indirect moral instruction, on the relation of religious and moral education to character-building by discipline, influence and



opportunity; on rewards and punishments, on special problems, on the use of the Bible, literature, history, biology. In fact, the program alone is quite a document.

"Three methods of direct moral instruction were illustrated by the books of M. Jules Payot, Mr. Walter L. Sheldon and Mr. F. J. Gould. These methods may be described as (1) the lecture method; straightforward statement and counsel, (2) the Socratic method; question and answer, and (3) the dramatic method, use of stories and other illustrative material. Mr. Waldegrave discussed the qualities and defects of these methods and arrived at the conclusion that a combination of them is required.

"The French delegates, and they only, expressed officially, emphatically and clearly the theory very comprehensively stated by the secretary of the International Union of Ethical Societies in his paper on "The State and Theological Moral Instruction," viz., that inasmuch as right conduct is something which vitally furthers the well-being of the State, and which therefore the State is compelled to be greatly concerned about, it becomes the duty of the State to make certain that the moral training of the citizen-to-be shall be efficient, 'that every child, no matter what the philosophy or the religion of its parents, shall develop into an adult who will be self-respecting, show good will, and serve the public weal.'

"The growing consciousness of the responsibility of the State (whose very existence depends on the citizens of the future) for the moral as well as the intellectual and physical well-being of its children 'is due to the scientific and social advance which is dominating the best thought of our age.' "

Mr. F. J. Gould says of the Congress in the *Ethical*



*World*: "It was exhilarating to see for four days the stream of French, German, Hungarian, Danish, Russian, American, Dutch, Japanese, etc., visitors pass to and from the assembly. Certain clericals assisted; professors of metaphysics graced the Congress with their collegiate presence. Possibly the general tone of the body may have been more in harmony with theology than the lay spirit. It would not be easy to decide the question, since it had been wisely arranged that no resolution should be proposed, the meetings being purely consultative. But one thing was certain,—there was a powerful mass of opinion in support of humanist ethics, and the theological party adopted a restrained and almost apologetic attitude. At one session only, did the church assert itself with any emphasis, and at the same session, various French delegates made a counter-demonstration on the side of the secular system, while Mr. John Russell, of the King Alfred Society's School, captured the breathless attention of the Congress by his unconditional declaration of abandonment of theism. Not a sound of dissent broke from the Christian part of the audience, and the applause that resounded at the close of his speech was unmistakable and prolonged. \* \* \* \* Women took a conspicuous and valued part in the debates, though the function of the mother in education was properly appraised neither by them nor by the men. A distinct omission from the Congress was that of the working class element. Not a single labor leader attended, but the next Congress will no doubt make amends in these directions. \* \* \* \* The first Moral Education Conference has aroused immense and widespread interest in moral education and has made it a live issue, and it is confidently expected that an international bureau will be established with a *Journal of Moral Education* as a literary organ. The Congress and these

developments of its work will help the West to realize its spiritual oneness as a comity of nations."

"The Ethical Note in the Recent Congress," is the title of Mr. Bridges' contribution to the *Ethical World*.

"One may say that in all the speeches, with the exception, perhaps, of those delivered by official representatives of the Roman Church, the idea of the supremacy of right conduct dominated every other consideration. Only two speeches were devoted directly to the question of the Bible in the school,—one by Canon Glazebrook, the other by Dr. Coit, both speakers basing their advocacy of the Bible on its moral worth."

"Moral instruction, as distinct from training," said the Rev. Canon Glazebrook, "could be derived only from the application of thought to human conduct; hence the school subjects that afforded it were history, literature and the Bible. It was an urgent question whether we could afford to throw away one of these instruments. The papers on history assigned the chief moral value to the later stages of historical teaching; and in all stages the channel through which the moral would come was not the narrative, but the teacher. These were serious deductions from the value of the subject considered in itself, especially since two-thirds of the children left school at the age of thirteen. Literature as a whole was an inestimable mine of moral treasure, but selections for elementary schools had a very different value. England was not less rich than other countries in ballads, songs and prose stories which appealed to the young mind; yet we should regret it if even the best selection were made the main formal basis for the moral teaching of millions. No such selection would be filled with a truly ethical conception of life. But this was the advantage of the Old Testament. Despite errors of fact and varieties of moral standard, it

was penetrated throughout with moral purpose. It was the only book that answered to Dr. Adler's ideal, for it alone recognized the sovereign end to which all lesser ends were means—and that end was righteousness. No aid could be derived from Dr. Coit's ironical plea for Bible-study—ironical it must be, for a moralist would not seriously propose a system of national education which could not but shock the Christian sentiment of the majority; nor would an educationist deliberately defy an elementary rule of educational science—that teaching must be in the main positive. Dr. Coit knew, as all did, that no useful teaching could be founded upon that which was negative, and that no human soul could be touched to any good purpose or noble ideal by a catena of negations. The claims of the New Testament were yet stronger than those of the Old. Ethical teaching without the Parables and the Sermon on the Mount was like a summer's day without the sun."

"Dr. Stanton Coit, in his paper, took the extreme ground of science, and from that standpoint pleaded that the Bible was the best instrument to inspire insight and reverence for righteousness. Thirty year ago it was proposed, by those who held a distinctively scientific position in regard to life and to the universe, that the Bible should be driven from the school. He believed that the Higher Criticism was the best illustration of concrete scientific thinking that the world possessed, and that the higher critics were as devout, and as much in love with the ideal and the personality presented in the New Testament, as the old-fashioned interpreters of the Bible. The controversy of the future would not be 'Bible or no Bible?' but whether the Bible should be taught from the point of view of sociology and psychology or exclusively from that of the metaphysics of the Middle Ages. The future depended on

bringing this new position into harmony with the literary treasure of Judaism and Christianity. There was no such gulf between higher critics and followers of the old method as there was between old-fashioned secularists, who would expel the Bible, and those who counted it literally inspired in every detail. What he urged was that the teacher, having trained himself in the Higher Criticism, should then come to the Bible—as people in the past did—for life, for instruction and inspiration; and such a teacher would find that by the new method he had lost nothing. His (Dr. Coit's) paper contained nothing negative; he had claimed that the young should be trained to look to secondary causes, to the social environment, to the historical traditions of a nation, as the causes, upward or downward, of character—to believe that there was no interposition in moral matters without a human and social instrumentality. There was here no negation whatever. The Bible would give a training in concrete thinking on problems involving that complex of forces that was found in human life. He believed that, in the future, Rationalists and scientific thinkers would be the strongest champions of keeping for the Bible the pre-eminence it had had in the past."

"By general consent, the most interesting session of the Congress was that devoted to the relation of religious to moral training. The ethical and secular point of view was admirably presented in French by M. Buisson and others, and in German by Dr. Penzig; but the words of Mr. John Russell attracted such spellbound attention, and produced so interesting a reply from the Bishop of Southwark, that it seems worth while to reproduce them in full, together with the Bishop's answer:

Mr. John Russell said: "During the Congress a note of



deep personal conviction has often been sounded—a conviction for which I have entire respect, but of which I have little or no understanding. I refer to the statement that the most effective appeal in moral education must always be the so-called religious appeal. I fail to understand that statement—partly because I find the term ‘religion’ so variously interpreted (I cannot help thinking that it would have been good if we had had foresight enough to devote a section of the Congress to a discussion of the meaning of the term), and partly because I have never, even when a student of theology, had experience of the inward vision—I can find no other word—which leads to that deep personal conviction. Let us forget the children for a moment, and think only of ourselves. We shall only ultimately teach them what we ourselves ultimately believe. We shall, of course, in these days, teach our belief whatever it may be, or try to teach it, pedagogically—a word that covers a multitude of ignorances; but if we are honest, and even, perhaps, if we are not, we can only teach what we actually are. In my printed paper I have said that neither in my own striving nor in my teaching do I find any help in revealed religion. In other words, although I believe in goodness and desire goodness for myself and all others, with all my heart, and although, at least in my best moments, I have something within me irresistibly calling out for goodness and all that goodness means—although this is so, I do not believe, I cannot believe, in any personification of goodness, in any personified good; to use the consecrated phrase, in any personal God. Nor can I believe that I, personally, should be helped if I could. Do not expect me to explain this inward driving force; I cannot—nor can you. Nor can any of us explain electricity. My conscience, I am often told, is the voice of God; is electricity, then, perhaps, the hand



of God? I cannot allow myself to say so. I admit the ineffable ultimate mystery; I bow my soul before it; but I cannot invest it with personality, nor can I allow it to rule my life, nor can I in any degree understand those who do. Least of all can I understand those who seek help from this mysterious power in prayer. That power has made me what I am, and I cannot ask it to do more. In an immortal passage in 'Richard Feverel,' George Meredith says: 'Who rises from prayer a better man, his prayer is answered; but that is a communion with self, not with God.' I shall be told that all this, in the last analysis, is a matter of faith; so, too, is the licensing question. Nor can I understand the place of any historical personage in this metaphysical connection. I acknowledge in the founder of the Christian faith a sublime example, the most sublime example, of practical idealism, whose influence is still perhaps the most potent factor in the long, slow process of world-redemption; but I dare not call myself by his name. Does it therefore follow, as great and good men will inevitably say that it does, that, however incorruptible a citizen, as a schoolmaster (unless I confine myself to the three R's, which to any honorable schoolmaster is impossible) I can only become a corrupter of youth? I, less great and less good than these men, am convinced that that is not so, I am convinced that every man's power for good or for evil depends not upon his acceptance of metaphysical speculations, but upon the light that shines in his own conscience and the strength that dwells in his own heart."

The Bishop of Southwark said: "The frankness and honesty of Mr. Russell's speech united us all in respect. All my life I have felt that the great problem of the world is the ascertaining of the true relation of religion and morality to one another; more and more I have felt, as I have surveyed history and the present, that the most deep-

seated and disastrous loss to which life has been liable has been from the misunderstandings and the separations of the one from the other. Therefore such a Congress as this, with the temper that I feel pervades it, is to me a most welcome fact, because I have felt that if we could all come together, respecting one another's convictions, and speaking to one another of our own inner thoughts, not defiantly, but as they may best interpret themselves to others—there lies one of the ways towards the great understanding of the future. One of my German predecessors used the word *Berührungspunkt*. Is it possible to find the common domain of the relation of religion to morality? As a whole-hearted believer in the Christian faith, I find such a common ground. A Christian believes in a faith which is positive, real, distinct; I do not attempt now to indicate its content, but you will grant me that. On the other hand, the Christian also believes that the positive and distinct religion which he has received is more human than any other human thing; that it reaches out in sympathy into contact with all forms of human thought and life; that its business is to be magnetic, to attract all that is moral and all that is religious in the world to itself, and to have insight to discern what is religious and what is moral wherever and in whatever proportion they really exist. Is it not plain that that double duty is a difficult one for the best Christian to discharge? He has with one hand, as it were, to fight for the positiveness, the clearness, and the intensity of his religion; he has, on the other hand, to try to go out as genially, as expansively as he can into the human life around. Will not the difficulty of the faithful discharge of that double duty be always with him when he comes to the complicated questions of practical education? Again, if this Christian view be true, is it not plain that there are two dangers—one, that which besets especially

the Christian or the Church, to contract into itself, to be occupied with that which is distinctive of it, to be for ever affirming its positive religious first principles, and to be as regards all else either forgetful or more or less careless of those things which are its vital correlatives and are congenial to it; and then will there not be correspondingly, and by reaction, a danger in the world at large of all sorts of those bits—forgive the simplicity of the word—those bits, so real, so sterling, so golden, as the Christian deems them, of religion and morality—the *Religiösität* of the last speaker—which we so genuinely acknowledge—the moral ardor of such speeches as those of M. Buisson and Mr. Russell: will there not be a danger, from our point of view, of those who possess these things standing upon them and facing, as it were, inward, and saying, ‘We do not want your religion—we have the good thing, we see it operating on the child’? Then we fall apart; but ladies and gentlemen, the *Berührungspunkt* surely is this common belief of ours in the thing that is good because it is good, in the thing that is truly human because it is truly human. We Christians have a great deal we could say about that. What we know, what our test is of what is truly human, what our scheme is for keeping human nature aiming at its own best—all that we put aside; but the fact is enough: here is the ground we come together on, and in that ground it seems to me that there is very, very much that we can do, if we agree provisionally to keep certain things out of sight—except when, from time to time, as I am afraid I am doing, we feel that it is justice to our own conviction to refer to them and show how with us they come in. We can deal with a large number of practical questions without going to first principles. Mr. Russell need not be always talking of his negation, any more than I of my affirmation. We find a great deal

which we can really handle together; and it is an enormous benefit to the life of Europe—and, in the end, to the Christian life of Europe—that we can do this, not being looked upon as pulling down our flag by one inch by doing so, or as compromising our own principles or faith in the very least degree, any more than some of you who applauded those speakers are compromising yourselves. Let us believe—for I, as a Christian, believe it, and perhaps I believe it a little more than you—that we have a good deal more in common than we think, and that we shall find this out more and more if we come together. One word more—against myself; I think that Christians, with all their enormous services to the moral life of nations, have sometimes been tempted to lay too exclusive stress upon those great truths which they believe themselves to possess, and that they have, in this or that detail of genuine, disinterested morality, been at times outstripped by those who, because they had concentrated on that part of the field and could give their whole energy and faith there, did in it their excellent and splendid work.”

If thinkers so far apart as Mr. Russell and the Bishop of Southwark, together with all those whose point of view lies between these extremes, could meet in the spirit of the Bishop’s speech to formulate a scheme of national education on the ground common to them all, the “religious difficulty” would melt into thin air.



# JOHN MILTON—AN APOSTLE OF LIBERTY \*

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A CYNIC disposed to seek examples to illustrate the thesis that merit and its recognition are somewhat divorced in this world need seek no further than John Milton. It is perhaps even an exaggeration to say that the three hundredth anniversary of Milton's birth was "celebrated" last Wednesday. It occurred; it passed almost unnoticed. I had the curiosity to look through the table of contents of the December number of forty-nine of our leading magazines in the cities of the Atlantic States, supposed to be the centers of culture in America. The list included such publications as *Lippincott's*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, the *North American Review*, the *Century*, *Harper's*, and *Scribner's*. In only one of the forty-nine, the resuscitated *Putnam's* was there an article devoted to the life, works,—or influence of Milton.

And yet this man was one of England's very greatest sons. As a poet, surpassed by Shakespeare alone; as a literary craftsman, surpassed by none. An artist of exquisite taste, a controversialist of tremendous power, a scholar of incredible accomplishments, an idealist of unsullied nobility, a statesman of undaunted courage—Milton combined so many excellences that we have come only

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\*An address before the Philadelphia Ethical Society at Horticultural Hall, Sunday, December 13th, 1908.

a short way in the appreciation of his genius, dwelt on heights so lofty that few men have risen to the levels meet for the contemplation of his motives.

He himself was conscious of a certain remoteness from common comprehension. His ideal, both moral and artistic, laid on him the necessity of dwelling in the Empyrean. In the wonderful invocation to Urania, heaven-born, at the opening of the seventh book of the "Paradise Lost," he confesses to the goddess:

. . . . "Upheld by thee  
Into the heaven of heavens I have presumed,  
An earthly guest . . . . Still govern thou my song,  
Urania, and fit audience find, though few."

Urania has well obeyed the poet's injunction. Few are his auditors. Men praise him, but do not read his poetry. He is renowned not known, rated rather than studied. He is the author of "Paradise Lost," not the interpreter of life. He deals with the passions of angels and demons instead of with the passions of men and women.

Three things especially are lacking in Milton's poetry which the popular taste, and even good popular taste, demands. They are love, tears, and children. Of none of these Milton writes. The great epic of "Paradise Lost" offers as many points for commentary as Dante's "Divine Comedy." I venture to think that a chief reason why Dante societies abound while Milton societies do not exist is that Dante tells of the loves of Paolo and Francesca while Milton reasons of predestination, foreknowledge, and free-will. *Sunt lachrymae rerum*. Tears are the dew that moisten the hard earth until it bears the fruits of noble deeds. Humor is akin to tears. It arises from the contemplation of life's inequalities, the gulf fixed between a noble aspiration and its fulfilment, the apparent

mockery of fate in the face of high resolve. He must dwell close to the heart of man, with all its ambitions, loves, and fears to write such poetry as the heart of man will receive to itself in lasting and affectionate recognition.

Milton chose rather to write of high, transcendent themes. His thought expanded with his infinite universe, until the earth, with all its human frailties and foibles shrunk in his view to that small measure which it filled in the vision of voyaging Satan:

“Far off the empyreal heaven, extended wide,  
And fast by, hanging in a golden chain,  
This pendent world, in bigness as a star  
Of smallest magnitude close by the moon.”

No wealth of imagery, nor skill of versification, nor grace or force of language can make winsome to the world a poem in which the earth has shrunk to so small magnitude that there is no vision of its laughter, love, and tears.

But if men find it harder to love the sublime than the human, it does not at all follow that the sublime is a presumptuous and unwelcome intrusion on our lives. Rather do we need the message of the incorrigible idealist all the more. For sympathy untempered by high principles may easily sink into careless complicity with evil. The hearth is a symbol of human sympathy. It sheds warmth. It burns with the ruddy glow of homely reflection. But for lofty inspirations and cosmic emotions we gaze not on the hearth-fire, but on the quenchless fires of heaven, though distant and cold. We lift our eyes to the stars, and from their constant, shadowless, eternal poise we gather strength.

“His soul was like a star and dwelt apart,  
Pure as the naked heaven, majestic, free.”

None can contemplate Milton without being recalled again and again to the exceeding love of moral excellence. For he was faithful unto death to the standard he set for himself in youth: "He who would not be frustrate in his desire to write hereafter in laudable things must be in himself a poem."

It is not, however, the poetic genius of Milton, nor his great gift of art, nor even his sustained elevation of soul that I wish to emphasize this morning; but rather one aspect of his noble life, his single-minded devotion to the cause of freedom—John Milton, the apostle of liberty.

Let us briefly recall the chief epochs of the poet's life. Born in London in 1608, Milton grew to manhood in the years that saw the development of the tyranny of the first two Stuart kings, James the First and Charles the First. But the gifted child of the muses lived far removed from the wranglings of James' parliaments and the strife of Charles' bishops. He walked in the quiet shades of Christ's College, Cambridge, or dreamed over the organ in his prosperous father's country mansion at Horton, or travelled on the Continent of Europe. These were the days of his literary apprenticeship, and the degree of perfection to which he arrived as master both of Latin and of English verse is shown by the work of the six years, 1632 to 1638, which he passed in quiet retirement at Horton, after his university days. To these years belong his two finest Latin poems, "Mansus" and the "Epitaphium Damonis," the descriptive lyrics "L'Allegro" and "Il Penseroso," the delicious masque of "Comus," and the unrivalled elegy of "Lycidas," pronounced by some competent critics to be the most finished poem in the English language.

Milton was writing choice Italian sonnets and canzone in Florence and Rome, and was planning a trip to Greece



in the summer of 1639, when the news of civil commotion in England reached him. Charles the First and his evil counsellors, Archbishop Laud and the Earl of Strafford, were provoking English freemen beyond endurance. The king had promised to respect the provisions of England's ancient charters, and had signed the new Petition of Rights presented to him by his parliament in 1628. But immediately afterward, in the reversionary fit of passion to which tyrants are subject, he had dismissed his parliament and begun a ten years' period of personal rule, resorting to every shrewd trick and perfidious device his crown lawyers could invent to keep enough money in the royal treasury to make an appeal to parliament unnecessary. He had revived old feudal taxes, confiscated estates, compelled men to be knighted at an exorbitant fee, seized the East India Company's rich cargoes of spices and sold them for his private use. But now he was coming to the end of his rope. Both his treasury and the patience of his subjects were exhausted. A war with Scotland, brought on by his foolish attempt to force the English high church prayer book on the ministers of the Scotch kirk obliged Charles to call parliament to save the royal army from destruction.

Parliament met in 1640, the famous "Long Parliament," and took the affairs of England into its own hands. When the king resisted in arms, the troops of parliament and Oliver Cromwell's "ironsides" shattered the royal armies at Marston Moor and Naseby, seized the king's person brought him to trial, and executed him as an enemy to his country (January, 1649). Parliament then declared England a commonwealth or republic, which in a few years, owing to religious and civil strife between the Presbyterian law makers and the Puritan army, developed into the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell, called "Lord Protec-

tor of the Liberties of England," but in reality as powerful a monarch as ever sat on the English throne.

Milton's Puritan training and sympathies ranged him immediately on the side of parliament, when, to use his own language, their "vigor began to humble the pride of the bishops." He took up his pen as Oliver took up his sword, to combat tyranny in church and state.

"He left the upland lawns and serene air  
Wherefrom his soul her noble nurture drew,  
And reared his helm among the unquiet crew  
Battling beneath."

He came down from the Aonian mount to ascend the political rostra. "I saw," he wrote in his treatise on "Reformation in England," in 1641, "that a way was opening for the establishment of real liberty; that the foundations were laying for the deliverance of mankind from the yoke of slavery and superstition. . . . I perceived that if I ever wished to be of use I ought not to be wanting to my country and church in a crisis of so much danger. I therefore determined to relinquish the other pursuits in which I was engaged, and to transfer the whole force of my talents and my industry to this one important object."

These noble words are the key to Milton's activities during the twenty years of Puritan ascendancy in England from the rejection of the first Charles Stuart by his parliament in 1640 to the restoration of the second Charles Stuart to his father's throne in 1660. The springs of poetry were dried in the fierce heat of political strife. The Pierian groves were abandoned for the lists of battle. No longer graceful lyrics or sweet elegies came from his obedient pen; but pamphlets, tracts, and broadsides, close arguments on episcopacy and church discipline, powerful pleas for the freedom of pulpit and press, impassioned de-

fence of the Puritan chiefs who brought the "man of blood" to prison and the block.

Only now and then does the enthusiasm of this great partisan burst through the medium of virile prose to express itself in the noblest and stateliest form of verse, the sonnet. The praise of

"Cromwell, our chief of men, who through a cloud  
Not of war only, but detractions rude,  
Guided by faith and matchless fortitude,  
To peace and truth thy glorious way hast ploughed;"

the prayer for vengeance for the

"Slaughtered saints, whose bones  
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold."

are themes that transcend the scope and ministry of prose. They are the subjects of two of Milton's most splendid sonnets. To this period also belongs that greatest of Milton's sonnets, on his blindness—a prayer for strength still to faint not in the cause to which he has consecrated his life, and in whose zealous service he has already sacrificed life's fairest gift,

"The sight of vernal bloom or summer's rose,  
Or flocks, or herds or human face divine."

"When I consider how my light is spent  
Ere half my days in this dark world and wide,  
And that one talent which is death to hide  
Lodged with me useless, though my soul more bent  
To serve therewith my Maker, and present  
My true account, lest He returning chide,  
'Doth God exact day labor, light denied?'  
I fondly ask. But Patience, to prevent  
That murmur, soon replies: 'God doth not need  
Either man's works or his own gifts. Who best  
Bear his mild yoke they serve him best. His state  
Is kingly; thousands at his bidding speed,  
And post o'er land and ocean without rest;  
They also serve who only stand and wait."

The holy experiment of Oliver Cromwell failed with his death. The reins of government fell from the weak hands of his son Richard; and England, in a revulsion of feeling against the harsh dominion of Puritanism, welcomed back the son of Charles Stuart with shouts of rejoicing. Why Milton, who had been a conspicuous figure in the Puritan state and had justified the execution of Charles in vigorous language, published abroad in Europe, was allowed to live, can be explained only by the fact that the extreme leniency of the Restoration parliament and the easy-going good nature of the restored monarch spared all those who had not actually taken part in the condemnation and execution of Charles the First.

Now indeed Milton was

“Fallen on evil days and evil tongues  
With darkness and with dangers compassed round.”

His political life was at an end. He had survived his sight, his health, and his prosperity. But, saddest of all, he had survived that hope which twenty years earlier had heartened him to exchange the lyre for the sword of controversy, the hope that through the bold defiance of Hampden, Pym, Eliot, and Cromwell the way to real liberty was being opened and the “foundations were laying for the deliverance of mankind from the yoke of slavery and superstition.” The Puritan ideal of a commonwealth of holiness was trodden in the mud. The Restoration court of Charles II was the most riotous and shameless in all of England’s history. We cannot doubt that Milton in his cheerless retirement at Bunhill had Charles’ court in mind when he described, in the first book of the “Paradise Lost,” those fallen angels who transformed the glory of their Maker into the image of the brute,



“the sons  
Of Belial flown with insolence and wine.”

filling

“luxurious cities, where the noise  
Of riot ascends above their loftiest towers,  
And injury and outrage.”

This third period of Milton's life, from the Restoration in 1660 to his death in 1674 was a period of the return from baffled politics and unheeded prose to the ideal world of poetry. But not the poetry of the earliest period; not graceful Latin hexameters and Italian sonnets; not the lyric of the sprightly and the pensive man; not the dainty masque with its woodland note. The last poetry of Milton is majestic and severe. It is the transcendent vindication, in the wide sphere of universal wisdom, of the eternal justice, order, and liberty that have failed in the narrow realm of England. The court of Charles II had rejected Puritanism: Milton shows that it is still the religion of the court of Heaven. “The ideas,” says Raleigh, “which had gone a begging among the politicians of his time, were stripped by Milton of the rags of circumstance and cleansed of their dust, to be enthroned where they might secure a hearing for all time.” The tremendous power in reserve that pervades the pages of “Paradise Lost” was born of the tragedy of “Puritanism Lost,” of righteousness, of liberty, of decency lost in England. Without his part in the overthrow of the Stuarts, Milton could not have made the overthrow of Satan the mighty tragedy that he did. Without the proud consciousness of having fought his best fight for the realization of his ideal in the state, he hardly could have warmed our hearts to applaud the lonely courage of the Seraph Abdiel,

“Who single [did] maintain  
Against revolted multitudes the cause

Of truth, in words mightier than they in arms.

Among the faithless faithful only he,  
Among innumerable false unmoved,  
Unshaken, unseduced, untterrified,  
His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal;  
Nor numbers nor example with him wrought  
To swerve from truth or change his constant mind."

The finest passages of "Paradise Lost" (and it has passages of unsurpassed magnificence) are thus the product of Milton's twenty years of service to the state. They were forged in the white heat of his passion for the Puritan ideal of civic righteousness as the crowning expression of individual redemption.

It would be a tedious task to attempt to extract from Milton's prose works of the controversial period, and from the noble poems of the later period, the many passages devoted to the advocacy of liberty in state, church, and society: to show how in the "Areopagitica" he raised the first plea heard in England for the freedom of the press, declaring that truth could be trusted to make its own way through the mazes of error, without the help of his Holiness' or his Majesty's censors; how on discovering the "tyrannical duncery" of the church to whose ministry he had been dedicated by his parents, he refused to enslave his soul by submission to the bishops, thinking it better, as he wrote, "to prefer a blameless silence before the sacred office of speaking, bought and begun with servitude and foreswearing"; how, when accused of slandering King Charles in his "Defence of the English People," he replied that he did not hate King Charles, but that he loved Queen Truth. Rather than attempt, however, the compilation of any such anthology of freedom from works which the author himself declared "all written to promote the cause of liberty," I should like to discuss the spiritual

and ethical foundations of Milton's doctrine of liberty, to arrive if possible at the grand principles which guided and sustained him

"In liberty's defence, [his] noble task  
Of which all Europe [rang] from side to side."

First of all, Milton was a dedicated soul. A spirit of rare and constant consecration possessed him from his earliest days. In the "Paradise Regained" (I, 203) Christ speaks words which Milton must have written with autobiographical intent:

"When I was yet a child . . . .  
. . . . my mind was set  
Serious to learn and know, and thence to do  
What might be public good; myself I thought  
Born to that end, born to promote all truth,  
All righteous things."

He was a poor boon-companion. We miss the laugh, the quip, the exchange of hearty nonsense, the quick appreciation of human transports and chagrins which make Shakespeare so companionable a poet. Milton caught the afterglow of the Elizabethan age, as the wealth of his diction, his splendid sonorous verse, and the incomparable grace of his early lyrics show. His biographers suggest that great Shakespeare's cloak may have brushed the fair-haired boy as the bard of Avon was on his way to the Mermaid Tavern, close by the Miltons' house in London. At any rate his mantle did not fall on Milton's shoulders. The "spacious days of great Elizabeth" had yielded to a narrow, brazen age ere Milton grew to manhood. A despotic line of kings, a base and fawning church, a court in which vile favorites or foreign tools made sport of English liberty, aroused the one firm force that stood for manhood, responsibility, and truth in England—the force of

Puritanism. Its champion Cromwell came as England's savior from fraud and frivolity in high places; and under his banner Milton, whose very soul was sincerity and dignity, enlisted.

Much there was repellant and harsh in the Puritan of the seventeenth century; his insufferable familiarity with God, his sanctimonious exterior, his nasal quotations from the Books of Kings, and his insistent tuneless psalm-singing. But behind these graceless expressions of it lay a spirit of tremendous and truthful consecration. Puritanism alone had a program worthy of a great historic state. That program was the realization of liberty through individual and social responsibility—responsibility to God and to the brethren, his saints.

To this program Milton gave himself, with a spirit too fine and free to be led into the inartistic mannerisms of the Puritan ranters, and at the same time too sincere to be repelled by the inartistic accidents of demeanor from the service of the real soul of freedom of the Puritan faith. Though an artist to his finger-tips, though governed in life and thought by the canons of taste which he received through exquisite training in the vanishing graces of the Renaissance, he nevertheless let no dainty disgust with the uncouth exterior of Puritanism alienate him from cooperation with its program. He accepted rough Oliver Cromwell for his strength. He took the instruments his age offered and dignified them by his noble handling. And indeed is not this the very touchstone of consecration to an ideal, that it scorns no instrument that it can shape or help to shape to effectiveness. The man who has the music in his soul will make the rudest bow draw tones of beauty and anguish from the violin which the uninspired dilettantist cannot bring with Sarasate's bow. The true craftsman will make the rudest tool express his bidding.



So the apostle of liberty, when inspired by a consuming devotion to his ideal, will welcome any honest ally and scorn no homeliest and humblest instrument. When some of Milton's critics, like Masson, reproach him for leaving the pure upper-air of poetic contemplation for the din and strife of controversy, for descending from the hill of Parnassus to mount the political stage, they fail to recognize the primal source of Milton's inspiration, his sense of consecration to an ideal.

Among Milton's seldom-read prose works are some meditative exercises which he wrote in choice Latin during his university days at Cambridge. In one of these meditations the young Milton has given us a confession of faith which is the key to his whole future career. "The great Maker of the Universe, when He had constituted all things else as fleeting and corruptible, did mingle up with man, in addition to that part which is mortal, a certain divine breath, as it were a part of Himself, immortal, indestructible; which, after it has sojourned purely and holily for a time on earth, . . . should return to its proper home and fatherland. Accordingly, nothing can be deservedly counted among the causes of our happiness that does not in some way regard both that eternal life and this civil life below." The linking of these two—the eternal life and this civil life below—was Milton's sole consistent task. When he saw the gates of the arena open for the struggle between God and Satan in England, between liberty and despotism in state and church, he entered the field with bold, unrelenting steps, and used the weapons which genius and circumstance put into his hands:

. . . . "The morning radiance rare  
Of his young brow amid the tumult there  
Grew dim with sulphurous dust and sanguine dew;  
Yet through all soilure they who marked him knew  
The signs of his life's day-spring, calm and fair."

Milton did not lose his balanced judgment in his consecrated devotion to the Puritan cause. He was not a Puritan of the Praise God Barebones type. He was not a leveller in the realm of politics any more than in the realm of letters. He knew the worth of genius and its mystery too. He was never led by vain and loud enthusiasms into believing that an ecstatic vision supplied the want of careful training; and never could yield one iota to that envious spirit which in the name of reform would make state or church an engine of despotism to crush out real merit. "To govern a nation piously and justly," he wrote, "is for a spirit of greatest size and divinest mettle. . . . He who would wisely restrain the reasonable soul of man within due bounds, must first himself know perfectly how far the territory and dominion extends of just and honest liberty. . . . The ignorance and mistake on this high point hath heaped up one huge half of all the misery that hath been since Adam."

These noble words introduce us to what seems to me the very spring and source of Milton's doctrine of liberty, namely: that interior freedom which alone can comprehend what liberty in state, church, family, and society means. Only the polished mirror of the soul can reflect the pure light of liberty. Freedom can no more be forced on the unfree within than learning can be forced on the deliberately ignorant, or artistic appreciation on the man who has no sense of harmony in sound or color. The "tyranny of custom from without and blind passions from within," of which Milton speaks, the servile submission to eminent authorities and the timorous dread of departing from old ways; are all the result of cloudiness of moral vision, which distorts true judgment and enslaves the soul. "Being slaves within doors," says Milton, "no wonder that men strive to have the public state governed by the in-

ward vicious rule by which they are governed themselves. For indeed none can love freedom heartily but good men." And again, "The first step in the corruption and decay of any commonwealth is when men cease to do according to inward and uncompelled actions of virtue, caring to live only by the outward constraint of law." And still again, "Real and substantial liberty is rather to be sought from within than from without. Its existence depends not so much on the terror of the sword as in sobriety of conduct and integrity of life."

For us, accustomed to long experience in democratic forms of government, and flooded with a great multitude of treatises on political ethics, this position of Milton may not seem so very remarkable, until we pause to realize that in Milton's day no important nation of Europe except Holland had begun to make experiment of self-government; and, in fact, the new Dutch Republic was scarcely different from a monarchy under the House of Orange. The Puritan commonwealth of 1649 in England was the first attempt at self-government on a truly national scale in the modern world. And he is but a shallow student of history and ethics who can assert that the man who announced the magnificent doctrine of the dependence of a true and lasting democracy on the sole foundations of public virtue wasted his time when he entered politics!

The Puritan commonwealth ceased to be a commonwealth in four short years, to be sure; and in another six years ceased to be Puritan as well. The Stuart came back with rout and revel, and to Milton's sightless vision in the last sad years of life, the cause for which he had sacrificed so much seemed to have gone down in defeat. But only fifteen years after Milton's death, the political and religious principles for which he had contended began to lift their head. The Stuart tyrant was driven from the

kingdom, the immortal Bill of Rights was written, and the champion of Protestantism in Europe, William of Orange, was seated on the throne of England. The men who accomplished the glorious and bloodless revolution of 1689 had Milton to their father. So did the men who accomplished the American and French Revolution of the next century. And so have all political philosophers and reformers who have worked from the fertile moral principle that enduring democracies can be founded only on the firm base of public virtue. "It makes little difference, O citizens," cries Milton in the glorious peroration of his "Second Defence of the People of England," "by what principle you are governed, either in acquiring liberty or in retaining it when acquired . . . unless that liberty which is of such kind as arms can neither procure nor take away, which alone is the fruit of piety, justice, temperance, and virtue shall have taken deep root in your minds and hearts."

Milton believed in the power of the ideal. For him the strength of a land was not in its engines of war or its material conquests, but in the consecration of its men and women to the single and hazardous love of truth. An ordered society composed of disorderly spirits was for him a patent contradiction in terms. Discipline was heaven's first law, a sweet law of inward growth, leading men ever into a larger freedom because it fitted them for a larger appreciation of excellence. The Puritanism, therefore, of Milton was no harsh law imposed from without on his reluctant spirit. It was rather the projection outward upon society of the soul of the man, the expression of his whole being, the incorporation in forms of government of his political aspirations and the symbol in religious ceremonies of his search for personal holiness. Smaller men might put on Puritanism as a badge, displaying its man-



nerisms, copying its idiosyncrasies. For Milton it was not a profession but a faith. He neither cut off his flowing hair nor demolished his organ. He believed that the beauty of Athens need not corrupt the morals of Geneva. He thought that the language of the Renaissance was none too rich a garment for the majestic mysteries of the Puritan faith. For him, to the free all things were instruments of freedom. The unfree might be timorous, imitative, censorious—for they were “slaves within doors”; but the free man is judge of all things and judged of none. Endowed with the triple dignity of Tennyson’s “Oenone,” “self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,” he carries about with him the fact of freedom, and external things do but wait upon his verdict and interpretation.

It seems to me that this condition of liberty, so splendidly exhibited in Milton’s life, is one of the most valuable lessons for us to-day, that we need to be recalled again and again to the eternal truth that freedom is the reward of courage, and that courage is the power of conviction. We are so constantly tempted to put our trust, if not in princes, at least in princely fortunes and royal works. We think we are free because we are powerful, whereas if we are really powerful, powerful in the strength that abides all shock of accident, it is only because we are free. The saving truth that freedom depends directly on ethical competency is illustrated for us amply enough in human society. For example, the weak, dissipated youth who inherits a fortune has that which enslaves him because it gives his disordered passion wider dominion over his life; but the same fortune would be an instrument of freedom to the diligent but impoverished scientist, because it would liberate the struggling life within the man, and give him scope and condition to show what he was worth in the

sense of how much brains he had in his head, not how many dollars he had in his pocket.

"The rank is but the guinea's stamp,  
The man's the gowd, for a' that."

That the man was the gold, that it was really the soul of its men that was minted as the currency of the state, with whatever outward stamp of monarchy or democracy, was a truth to which Milton never allowed himself to be blinded, either by the blaze of Oliver's triumphs or the false glitter of the Restoration court. When most men feared unpopularity, he feared only unfaithfulness; when others sought their associates to discover their standards, he searched his own heart, and needed and accepted no other guide to conduct than the light there revealed.

It is a common place of Miltonic criticism that Satan is the hero of the "Paradise Lost," the one supreme creation of the poet. Now creations in literature and art are in a sense autobiographical. If Milton's Satan stands out in conspicuous strength, it is because Milton poured his own great soul into the Satan. And what is it that makes Milton's Satan great? It is his indomitable spirit of liberty, unbroken and unbent by defeat. The effulgent glory of the archangel had been blasted by foul revolt and turned to blackness; and he with his rebellious third of heaven had been driven over the edge of "Chaos and Old Night" into the deep abyss of Hell, where

"Nine times the space that measures day and night  
To mortal man, he with his horrid crew  
Lay vanquished, rolling in the fiery gulf,  
Confounded, though immortal."

But yet he rises from the lake of brimstone. He perseveres across the burning marl, athwart the fiery blasts of

Hell. Though racked with more than mortal pain, he thinks not of oblivion or relief, but only of some new assault on heaven. He glories in defeat got in the cause of freedom. He is independent now, self-determining, master of his soul. "Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven," he cries. He asks no help from outward things. He spares his glory and his rank in Heaven. He proudly surrenders even the last consolation of misery—hope, and with grim, unrepentant humor welcomes to his blackened breast the whole of Heaven's wrath:

"Which way I fly is Hell, myself am Hell."

Not less proud than this Satanic boast was Milton's consciousness of the divinity, yes, the supra-divinity of the pure and whole mind. Just as the ancient Greek tragedians recognized a power to which even Zeus, father of the Olympic gods had to bow, the awful power of "Fate," so Milton celebrates in the indomitable Satan a power which not even the thunderbolts of Jehovah's wrath have quenched—the power of an inalterable courage to be free.

The theology of all this war in Heaven is foolishness to us: but the allegory is grand. Because Satan is no longer the serious and revered personage he was in Milton's day, but "fallen now in the esteem of his victims as well as in the esteem of his Maker," we lack the imaginative power frequently to appreciate the ever valid allegory behind the antiquated theology. That Satan was cast out of Heaven by the power of Jehovah was nothing, but that he rose from the burning lake by his own power and held his anguished way undaunted over the burning marl was everything. Those tottering, pain-racked steps are the symbol of human progress, the parable of the triumph of the re-

solve of freedom over the proneness and the servitude of despair.

All honor through the ages to this "God-gifted, organ-voice of England," this dedicated, self-commissioned soul, who counted not the cost of liberty in comforts, reputation, friends or foes, but nobly dared himself to be free with every breath he drew and to preach freedom to a travailing and groaning world!



## THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL ASYLUM THREATENED

A FEW words of explanation may be offered of the circumstances which have led to the republication of the two following lectures by Felix Adler and William M. Salter.

The Russian Extradition Treaty of 1893 has made America the unconscious tool of the Czar's autocracy. This possibility was foreseen by such lovers of liberty as George Kennan, Felix Adler and William Salter at the time the Treaty was concluded. Since the ratification of the Treaty, the Russian people have gone through a heroic revolution. In it the blood of martyrs has been generously spilt, while the atrocities perpetrated by the Russian government can only be compared to the exquisite cruelties of the Inquisition.

A policy of treacherous concession brought about the Czar's manifesto of 1905, which proposed to offer some fundamental constitutional rights;—freedom of speech, the right of assembly, and electoral rights. Three Dumas have been formed, each more farcical in its basis of popular representation than the other. The self-sacrifice of the finest flower of the Russian youth has still borne no actual fruits.

The autocracy is intrenched; for in the two years since the Czar's manifesto of 1905, 18,374 persons were condemned for political offences. Of these, 2,717 were sentenced to death. During the months of January and February, 1908, 500 political offenders were executed. An official document, signed by thirty-five members of the second Duma is authority for such heartrending facts as these! From December, 1905, to June, 1906, 1,170 per-

sons in the Lettish region alone were executed without trial. This document further accuses the government of torturing the politicals in order to wring "confessions" from them. The absence of any semblance of legal procedure in these cases is abhorrent to those who have been nurtured in the spirit of our free political institutions. And now, conscious of its security at home, the Russian autocracy has ventured to commit barbarity abroad. It has caused two Russian peasants to be arrested,—Jan Janoff Pouren in New York, and Christian Roudovitz in Chicago. In both these cases, the Russian government has manipulated the harmless treaty of 1893, and in accordance with its "innocent" provisions, has charged them with common felonies. Yet, despite the opinions of some of those most learned in the law, that the defence has supplied ample evidence that Pouren and Roudovitz were participants in the revolution, and that these acts, if committed at all, were of a purely political character, they have been incarcerated in American jails. Whatever may be the fate of these peasants, it is clear that the Russian government is utilizing this treaty to hound its patriots abroad, and to deny them, if possible, our time-honored right of political asylum. A fundamental moral issue is here involved. Hence, the prophetic protests of Prof. Adler and Mr. Salter; and hence the appropriateness of making their addresses available.

# A PROTEST AGAINST THE RUSSIAN TREATY\*

BY FELIX ADLER.

THE feeling of good-will between the United States and Russia is of long standing, and has become, so far as we are concerned, almost a part of our national tradition. It is founded in part on valuable service rendered in the past, in part on more general grounds. Likeness of situation begets sympathy between peoples as well as individuals. The Russian nation, like our own, is a nation in the making. After long ages of subjection to a foreign rule, after centuries of intellectual tutelage and dependence on foreign examples, Russia to-day claims for herself a pre-eminent place among civilized states, and the most ardent of her patriots aspire to add to the world's stock of thought and experience a unique contribution of their own in harmony with the peculiar character and endowments of the Russian race. Already a marvellous literature has been produced which has spread far beyond the confines of their empire. The works of Tolstoi, Tourguenef, Gogol, and many others have been translated into every tongue and are read in every zone, and these are but the fair beginnings, giving promise of mightier developments to follow. The Russian people, moreover, are like our own in this, that they have before them a vast continent to be subdued. The Russian Empire includes half of Europe and Asia, and covers one-sixth of the land surface

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\*An address delivered before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, Sunday, March 26th, 1893.

of the globe. In this immense extent of territory there are boundless vacant spaces to be filled by colonization, latent resources of incalculable value to be developed, and splendid fortunes seem to beckon on the pioneers. Whatever turn affairs may take, this much is certain, that we at the present day are but at the beginning of human history, and that the growth of Russia will powerfully affect, for good or evil, the future destinies of mankind.

Considerations such as these suffice to explain the instinctive sympathy that subsists between the Russian and American people, widely separated as they are, as well in point of space as in manners, habits of thought, and institutions. And, in what I shall have to say to-day, I desire that nothing may be construed as reflecting upon this sympathy, or as intended to lessen the kindly feeling toward a people which, whatever its faults may be, possesses so many generous qualities that challenge respect and admiration. But we are bound to separate between the people and the government.

The occasion which calls forth my remarks to-day is the negotiation of a treaty between the President and Senate of United States and the government of the Czar, under the terms of which an attempt upon the life of the Russian Emperor shall not be considered a political crime, and Russian Refugees in this country against whom a *prima facie* case of complicity in such an attempt can be made out shall be extradited. What is there in the nature of such an agreement, it may be asked, to excite protest? Do we desire that this country shall harbor anarchists? Does any sane man, any man whose moral judgment is not distorted approve of murder? Do we wish that persons who use criminal means for the attainment of political ends, self-constituted defenders of popular rights, shall make this land their asylum? Why, then, should



we remonstrate on behalf of a class of persons so odious and pernicious? Opinions like these one often hears expressed by persons who betray but a superficial acquaintance with the issues involved. In order that the true bearings of this treaty may be understood, it is necessary before all things to examine into the nature of the government with which we are about to enter into these engagements, and to a preliminary sketch of this sort, I have to ask your attention.

Among all the nations of Christendom, Russia is the only one the government of which has remained an absolute autocracy. It is difficult for Americans to imagine how an autocratic government operates, so utterly alien is it to their sentiments and principles. In Russia, the will of one man is law and the source of all law. With the exception of the provincial assemblies, the *Zemstvos*, whose functions are restricted to local affairs, there are no representative bodies that express the will, or even voice the wishes of the people. There exist, indeed, two political organs, the Senate and the Council of the Empire, the names of which might suggest a certain limitation of the autocratic power. But the Directing Senate, founded by Peter the Great, has ceased to direct and has become a judicial chamber solely; while the Council of the Empire, created at the beginning of the present century, is permitted, indeed, to discuss laws, but has no share in their enactment. Its function is limited to giving advice. It cannot even make recommendations to the Czar as a unit, for the opinion of the minority, as well as the majority of its members, must be laid before the Emperor, and it is for him to adopt either opinion, or to disregard both, as he prefers. The Council of the Empire, therefore, is in no sense a check upon the unlimited sovereignty of the Czar. Its members, moreover, are appointed by the Em-

peror himself. They are his creatures, dependent upon his will. How, then, can they be expected to oppose his wishes?

Again, in many monarchical countries, the Ministers—and especially the Prime Minister—exercise a species of restraining influence upon the action of the King. But the Russian Czars permit in their vicinity no Prime Ministers to grow up, and perhaps to overshadow them, as Bismarck overshadowed his King. There is no Cabinet of Ministers. Each minister is independent of his colleagues. He may decide on matters that involve the general policy of the Empire without their knowledge, and is often secretly at war with them. It has frequently been the policy of the Czars to foment these jealousies and rivalries among their immediate advisers on the principle of “divide et impera,” in order to prevent any one of them from gaining an ascendancy which might in the least hamper the full, free sweep of the imperial will.

The Russian system is a kind of paternalism carried to the verge of the absurd. The theory is that the people are children, minors, and that the Czar is their father. A Russian is not allowed to leave the country without having first received the permission of the Czar. A Russian merchant, peasant, or workingman is not allowed to travel for a distance of more than a few miles from his place of residence without father’s permission. The Russian is not allowed to read what he pleases, but, by the imperial censorship, a catalogue is published of books which it is not safe for him to read, just as parents carefully select the reading matter for their children, so that nothing shall fall into their hands which can harm them. The Russian is not even permitted to perform certain acts of charity on his own motion. No one may found a bed in a hospital, nor a scholarship in a school, without first

asking the permission of the government to do so. Under the Emperor Nicholas it is said that no one was allowed even to build a house, if it had more than five windows, without first obtaining the authorization of the Czar. Thus the figure of the Czar everywhere looms up, huge and overawing—like one of those statues of the ancient Egyptian Kings which we see in museums—and fills the whole political horizon.

But, it will be asked, does not the press serve in Russia, as everywhere else, to restrain the abuses of power? Does it not give expression to the wishes of the people, and bring the grievances of the governed to the notice of their rulers? The Russian press can render no such service, because it is itself bound and gagged. The journals are permitted to treat literary and scientific subjects, and to discuss, to a certain extent, the politics of foreign countries. But the moment they touch on domestic affairs, they do so at their peril. The slightest indiscretion will bring upon them the most drastic measures of administrative repression. Sometimes a newspaper appears with many or even all of its columns blank, the copy having been cancelled, by official order, and nothing remaining but the advertisements. Sometimes, on the other hand, the right of printing advertisements is withdrawn, and the journal is thus crippled in its financial resources. At other times, the sale of a newspaper on the streets is forbidden. Or an obnoxious editor is forced, under government pressure, to resign, and, if he should attempt to resist, is quietly sent into exile to reflect, on the frozen shores of the White Sea, or in distant Siberia, on the folly of unseasonable candor. Under such circumstances, how can the press serve as the champion of freedom, or as an agent in the redress of popular wrongs?

Now, what have been the fruits of this system? They

have been such as might be expected, such as a system of this kind can alone bring forth. The finances of the Empire, despite its vast resources, as is well known, are in a precarious condition. The serfs, it is true, have been emancipated by the father of the present Emperor; but how has emancipation thus far profited them? The government has poured seven hundred millions of rubles, in the shape of redemption money, into the lap of seventy-one thousand proprietors. But the great mass of the peasants have not been benefited. A few wealthy persons have been still further enriched. The great multitude has been more deeply impoverished than ever. The allotments of land assigned to them are insufficient for their needs. They are victimized by crafty speculators and rack-renting landlords. Every year one-half the adult male population leave their homes and wander through Russia, a vagrant army in search of labor and subsistence. The famine decimates their ranks, and the cholera finds among them a congenial soil.

A people can only be strong if it be free, and to use freedom aright education is indispensable. The great mass of the Russian people are ignorant, uneducated, and illiterate. The government, perceiving the necessity of raising the educational level of the people, has founded universities and schools. But, by one of those singular contradictions which one meets with so often in this unhappy country, it has withdrawn with one hand what it offered with the other. The love of liberty, that is nourished in the higher educational centres, has provoked the hostility of the authorities. Many a time the universities have been closed, the students persecuted, and the curriculum of studies interfered with and restricted, and while the means which have been provided for popular education are altogether inadequate, the government jeal-



ously debars private individuals from establishing schools which might supply the deficiencies of its own provisions to this end.

In addition to the evils already signalized, corruption reigns to a degree almost incredible. The whole government service is honeycombed with it. A system of police espionage has been devised which penetrates even into the sanctuary of the family. The mails are habitually tampered with, so that even high government officials do not dare to entrust their secret correspondence to the postal service. And, above all, religious intolerance of the fiercest and most unrelenting kind has full sway under the present incumbent of the throne. It is said by those who profess to speak from knowledge that the Emperor Alexander the Third is a man of irreproachable personal habits, of the strictest principles, and fully imbued with the belief in the sacredness of his mission. The powers of an autocrat, when united in the hands of an honest fanatic, are infinitely more to be dreaded than when entrusted to a more worldly and less sincere nature. Every scruple that might plead on behalf of humanity is quelled by the counsels of bigotry. Every obstacle to the execution of those counsels is removed by the possession of despotic power.

Is it to be wondered at that, under such a system, with such a nightmare pressing on the breast of the Russian people, there should have arisen in certain quarters a cry of protest; that, among the young, the hopeful, the intelligent, the students of the superior schools and universities, combinations should have been formed with a view of shaking off the yoke under which their country has suffered so long, and is still suffering. Russian nihilism is the legitimate offspring of Russian despotism. The Russian nihilists are not to be confounded with those insane

anarchists who are bent on destruction, reckless of consequences. The Russian nihilists, it cannot be denied, have been moved by a patriotic motive. In the beginning, their methods were mild and gentle enough. They acted the part, as has been said, of Christian evangelists. They mingled with the peasants. They stripped themselves of the privileges of their superior station. They led the life of hardship and privation. They sought, by teaching and by the spread of literature, to prepare the common people for that better political and social state of which they dreamed. It was only when the authorities, by the employment of the most violent measures, checked this peaceful propaganda, when the Russian patriots beheld their brothers buried in the depths of Russian prisons, or condemned to the horrors of Siberian exile, that one section of them, the extreme section, determined to meet violence with violence. At first, their retributive measures were directed against the agents of the Czar—the Chief of Police and the Governors. And it was when these measures failed to procure relief that their attacks were finally turned against the Emperor himself. In a country like Russia, there are only two ways open by which a change may be effected. The one is to work from below upward; the other from above downward. The one is to disseminate liberal ideas among the people at large and to prepare them slowly for a political transformation. The other is to induce the person in whom the sovereign power is vested to grant of his own accord liberal institutions to the nation. The former way was blocked by the Czar himself. As to the latter, the nihilists might well be tempted to ask how an autocrat who believes that he rules by divine right could be induced to divest himself of even the smallest fraction of his power? Should it be by arguments derived from reason? Should it be by petition

or by entreaty? All these methods had been tried, seemingly without avail. And hence they reached the conclusion that the only way to influence him would be through the motive of fear, that he must be terrified into letting go a part of his power. And it was in this way that a section of the Revolutionists became, in the literal sense of the word, "terrorists." I am not here to discuss, much less to defend their methods. The system of terror which they tried seems not to have produced the results they expected. But it seems to me equally impossible to deny that their actions were inspired by political motives, and that whatever crimes they have committed are to be classified and characterized as political crimes. If, then, the treaty now pending with Russia declares that attempts upon the life of the Czar shall not be regarded as political crimes, but shall be treated as ordinary murder, the position therein taken seems to me an untenable one. This position would be valid in the case of a liberal, or quasi-liberal government like that of Belgium, with which a similar treaty is already in existence. But it is not valid in the case of Russia. For, in Russia, an attack upon the government is an attack upon the Czar, and an attack on the Czar an attack on the government. For the Czar is the keystone of the governmental arch. Nay, he is himself the government, the fountain-head of power, the source from which all authority whatsoever throughout his vast dominions is derived. The rule that nations do not surrender fugitives for political offences is now well established and generally accepted. All that it is necessary to prove, in the present instance, is that attempts against the life of the Czar are dictated by political motives; that those who make such attempts are political offenders, and not ordinary criminals. That this is so, I, for one, cannot doubt. Nor must we make the mistake of

supposing that a refusal to surrender in the least implies the condoning or the approval of the offence or crime in question. The Swiss Republic in 1871 refused, in answer to a request by President Thiers, to extradite the Communists who had fled for shelter to its territory. And this decision was taken not because we can for a moment believe that the members of the Federal Council approved of the methods of the Communists, but because they believed that the actions of these persons, however hateful they might be, were prompted by political motives, and that the right of asylum for political refugees ought to be kept inviolate.

But, it has been said by Lord Stanley<sup>1</sup> that "the principle of non-surrender for political offences being conceded, it is however clear that immunity from punishment should not be granted to those who, not political refugees properly so-called, have committed murders, or other grievous crimes in furtherance of some political object when a state of recognized war or open revolt has not existed." It is contended that "mankind turns with disgust and reprobation from the inhuman use of assassination as a means in the furtherance of a political object." Admitted that this is so. But is not the case of the Russian nihilists altogether a peculiar one? There is a fable which tells that an eagle once seized the cub of a fox and carried it away in its talons, and that the fox in her desperation took a firebrand to throw into the eagle's nest in order to force him to let go her young. Shall we condemn the barbarity of casting a firebrand into the nest of an eagle and forget the cruel act which provoked such retaliation? Shall we have eyes to see only the inhuman methods of the nihilist fox and forget the inhumanities of the autocrat eagle? Shall we forget the silent hosts of martyrs who have wet-

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<sup>1</sup>See for this and following quotations *Moore on Extradition*.



ted the snows of Siberia with their blood? Shall we forget the mental, the moral, and, as some say, the physical torture inflicted by Russian jailers on their victims? Shall we forget the flogging of cultivated men, aye, and women? A hundred blows of the lash on a frail and shrinking woman's form! Shall we forget the barbarous treatment of the Jews whom the gloomy despot, who sits on Russia's throne, is persecuting in obedience to his fancied mission on behalf of the orthodox faith? The heart of every lover of his kind bleeds within him when he witnesses such cruelties as these. We cannot change the course of the Russian Czar. It is not legitimate, we are informed, to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign state. If Russia were a small state, like one of the Balkan Principalities, the whole civilized world would long since have interfered in its internal affairs. But, in the case of Russia, this is impossible. The Czar is too mighty, and we are too far away to bring aught but feeble pressure to bear. But, if we cannot punish the tyrant, neither should we assist in punishing those whom his tyranny has driven to desperation. The fact is that in Russia autocracy and nihilism are engaged in a life and death duel. And we may well take the ground of observing at least neutrality between them. If the Russian government can apprehend those who attack its murderous despotism with murderous weapons, we cannot intervene to save them. But, if those whom it pursues make good their escape to our shores, neither in that case should we interfere to help save the Russian despotism. The Nihilists, moreover, it should be remembered, do not sanction assassination as a political weapon, except under desperate circumstances like theirs. When Guiteau shot the President, the organ of the extreme Radical Party spoke out in the strongest



condemnation of the act, saying that, in a free country, such methods ought not for a moment to be tolerated. The Russian Nihilists have solemnly and repeatedly declared that they will lay down their arms the moment the Emperor grants representative government to his people. Representative government is what they demand. This is the aim which constitutes the objective point of their agitation. But the desire for representative government is a political motive, if ever there was one. And hence, I take the ground that Russian refugees, even when they have been guilty of an attempt on the life of the Czar, should be regarded as political offenders, and, under the rule accepted by all civilized nations, should not be extradited.

"But this argument by no means exhausts the case. Let us not forget that what we are asked to do is not to surrender those whose guilt is established, but those against whom a *prima facie* case can be made out on evidence furnished by Russian officials. In extradition cases the presumption is always in favor of the demanding government, as appears in the fact that the demanding government is allowed to produce documentary evidence and witnesses, while the accused person is not allowed documentary evidence, but must rely solely upon his witnesses. How then shall a Russian refugee in this country procure witnesses to establish his innocence? All that is necessary to extradite him, is that a *prima facie* case be made out against him on such evidence as is furnished by Russian officials. And, therefore, it is extremely important to know what value can be assigned to such evidence."

Now here I am compelled to allude to a very dark side in the picture of Russian life. The curse of Russian life is venality. I quote from Leroy Beaulieu, who lived in Russia, had access to the best sources of information, and

whose work on the Empire of the Czars is considered an authority.

In his second volume he says: "From the time of Peter the Great to that of Alexander the Third the administration, the finances, the army, the whole public service has been a prey to peculation, malversation, fraud and corruption in all its forms. If one desires to be understood by an official, it is necessary, says the proverb, to talk ruble." There is a saying among the people that "in Russia everybody steals." He tells the story of a doctor who was examining a conscript and who said to him, "I know that you are sick and ought to be excused from serving, but unless you pay me I will declare you sound." He tells us that, at the close of the late Russo-Turkish War enormous frauds having been discovered on the part of contractors who had furnished clothing and provisions to the army, the government did not dare to bring the offenders to trial on account of the complicity of high functionaries in the nefarious practices. The ruble, he says, opens the gates of the imperial palaces as well as the bureaus of the lowest employes of the province. Grand Dukes, placed at the head of the army and the navy, hardly inspire more confidence than the ordinary Bureaucrats. Integrity and disinterested conduct are almost always regarded as exceptional. Neither rank nor birth protect from suspicion. Even the immediate surroundings of the sovereign are not always exempt from it. But it is especially the agents of the police that have acquired an evil reputation for bribe-taking and corrupt practices. Many of them are extremely ignorant. In an inquiry instituted at the beginning of the present reign, it was found, that a large number, even of the police of St. Petersburg, could not correctly write their own name. They are under-paid. They wield enormous power—especially the secret police, the

agents of the infamous Third Section which has been abolished in name, but not in fact—and they use their power to terrorize and blackmail the innocent and the guilty alike. Now, it is on the evidence furnished by such officials, or by witnesses controlled and influenced by them, that a *prima facie* case against Russian refugees in this country will be made out. In view of the facts stated, can we have any confidence in evidence that comes from such a source, especially if we remember that it is the interest of the Russian officials to display zeal on behalf of their government by dragging into their net as many of its opponents as possible, be they guilty or not, whenever an occasion presents itself to do so.

But, it has been said on the part of the defenders of the treaty—and the greatest possible stress is laid on this point—that the evidence, in extradition cases, must be such as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive is found, would justify his commitment for trial if the crime charged had there been perpetrated. In other words, if a Russian, accused of an attempt upon the life of the Czar, be found in the state of New York, he may not be surrendered unless the evidence produced would suffice to secure his commitment for trial according to the laws of the state of New York. Granted that this is so; yet the proof required for commitment is much weaker than that required for conviction. The cardinal distinction between commitment and conviction must not be lost sight of. Our magistrates need to have before them only such proof as would justify them in committing. And what sort of proof may that be? Chief-Justice Marshall said, "I certainly should not require the proof which would be necessary to convict a person on a trial in chief. I should not even require that which would absolutely convince my own mind of his guilt. But I ought

to require, and should require that probable cause be shown." Or, as an English Attorney-General put it in the House of Commons, "The laws of this country require that a person shall be committed only on such evidence as, if *uncontradicted*, would lead to the conclusion that he is guilty." Now, herein lies the gist of the whole matter. Extradition in its operation is equivalent to commitment. Commitment is only warranted when the accused person, after he has been committed, has an opportunity of contradicting the evidence which if it remained uncontradicted would have convicted him; or, in other words, if, after commitment, a fair trial is accorded to him. Now this, it seems to me, is the strong point, the ineluctable point, the invulnerable point of our protest against this treaty. *that a fair trial is not accorded in Russia to a political offender after he has been extradited.* Everyone knows what the Russian procedure is in such cases. The person charged with an attempt upon the life of the Czar is summoned before a court martial, or a special commission. He is deprived of the right of trial by jury. At his trial the public are not admitted. The newspapers are not permitted to report the proceedings, or such reports as are allowed to appear are supervised by the authorities. The accused person is not confronted with the witnesses that testify against him, and he is denied the right of appeal. Oh, the inconceivable arbitrariness, cruelty and injustice of such procedure! Of what avail is it then, that the initial part of the proceedings takes place according to all the forms of law in an Anglo-Saxon community, if the latter and graver part of the proceedings takes place in a community in which the safeguards of law are trampled under foot! Of what avail that commitment takes place according to the laws of the state of New York, if conviction takes place according to Russian code! This com-



bination of commitment in America and conviction in Russia seems to me like that hideous being described by poets, half woman and half fish. Fair it is, and gracious, and seductive in the part that emerges above the water, but foul and abhorrent in the part that is concealed from view. So that part of the proceedings which takes place on this side of the water is fair enough and right enough, and therefore has seduced many minds to give their consent to such a treaty as this. But, the part of the proceedings that takes place beyond the waters is brutal and abhorrent. And this is all the more true because, when we have once extradited an accused person, he disappears from our sight. We may never know what has become of him. He may have been executed within twenty-four hours after his so-called trial. He may have been extradited on a charge of attempted murder, which, however, cannot be sustained, and sentenced to death on a totally different charge. He may, if his innocence be so absolutely clear that even a Russian court martial cannot convict him, nevertheless be deported to Siberia by that unique and terrible engine of despotism which is called Administrative Process. And whatever is done is done in the dark, in silence,—we shall never be the wiser for it. We have done our duty toward the Russian Czar. We have extradited the men he wants. He will look to the rest. There is no provision made that the United States Legation shall be notified of the fate of extradited persons. To request such notification would be contrary to international courtesy, since it would seem to imply a suspicion of the judicial proceedings of a friendly power. And here, indeed, the weak point of this treaty is fully disclosed to view. Extradition treaties, it has been said, are based on the principle of good faith. With countries, like Belgium, on whose good faith we can rely, let us

have such treaties ; with countries in which exist the guarantees of individual liberty ; with countries which have the habeas corpus, as Russia has not ; with countries which grant jury trials to political, as well as to all other offenders ; with countries in which, commitment being based on evidence which, if uncontradicted, will ensure conviction, the accused has an opportunity to contradict such evidence and thus escape conviction. But, with a country like Russia, in which all these safeguards are wanting, on whose good faith we cannot rely, I do not see how we can enter into such a compact as this.

There remain two minor points to which I must briefly advert. It has been said, in defence of ex-Secretary Bayard, who entered upon the negotiation of an extradition treaty with Russia six years ago, that its object was merely to accord to the Czar the same protection against murder which is accorded to any ordinary citizen ; that it did not confer any special privilege upon the Czar, but merely assured him the same rights as would be enjoyed by any of his subjects. But this contention ignores the fact that, in Russia, capital punishment for ordinary murder has been abolished since 1753, and that the death penalty is applied solely in the case of political criminals. Hence, it is not true that, by the terms of the treaty, the Czar is merely assimilated to any ordinary citizen, the punishment for an attempt upon his life being severer than that which would follow an attempt on the life of any of his subjects. Even a parricide is not subject to the death penalty in Russia. A czaricide is. And, further, the defence ignores the fact upon which, as I have shown, everything in this argument hinges, that a political criminal is tried in unusual courts. And it is a maxim of International Law, enunciated at the session of the Institute of International Law in 1880, at Oxford, that, in every case,

extradition must not be granted for a crime which has, at the same time, the nature of a political crime and of a crime under the ordinary law, unless the state making the requisition gives the assurance that the person surrendered shall not be tried by unusual courts. It is upon the ground that in Russia political criminals are tried in unusual courts that we rest our protest against the treaty.

But it has been said by some that it is to the interest of the United States to grant extradition to Russia, in order that we may secure extradition in return if the life of any of our Presidents should ever again be attempted by an assassin. To this I reply by asking whether there really exists a parallel between the two countries in this respect. In the first place, let me call attention to the fact that both in the case of Guiteau and Booth the assassins were apprehended before they had had time to escape across the border. There is here a great difference between a country like ours and a country like Russia. In Russia the police are isolated. The people, as a rule, do not lift a finger to aid them in their search. And it is precisely for this reason that so many of the Revolutionists escape. In this country, almost every citizen would constitute himself a special officer of police to pursue and apprehend the murderer of a President. The people themselves frown upon violent methods, either on the part of the governed or of their governors. The people themselves will stamp out such methods if ever it be attempted to introduce them amongst us. But, secondly, even assuming that another Guiteau should have succeeded in making good his flight, should have avoided all those countries with which we have extradition treaties, and should have found shelter in Russia, do we need to learn from the lips of a Russian Empress the humane rule that "it is better to let ten guilty persons escape than to punish one that is innocent."

It is for us to consider whether we are willing to aid in punishing those who may be innocent, whether we are willing to hand over to Russian court martials and special commissions those who will be denied the ordinary means of establishing their innocence. This is the sole question which we are called upon to decide.

It is difficult to imagine what may have been the motives which have influenced American diplomacy in the negotiation of this treaty. It has been suggested by an organ of the late administration in this city that it would be greatly to the interest of the United States to be able to rely on the powerful backing of the Russian fleet in any designs we may have respecting the annexation of Cuba, or of Canada, or of the Islands of the Pacific. It has been suggested by others that the friendship of the Russian government is of importance to us in the Behring Sea controversy. Is then this treaty a Yankee bargain? Are the Refugee-Revolutionists to be thrown as a sop to the Russian Cerberus, in order that he may show his teeth on our side? I cannot believe for a moment that this has been the motive. The admission would be too humiliating.

Is it then ignorance of Russian conditions? This seems, on the face of it, a more probable explanation. It appears to be difficult for many Americans, even for some American statesmen, to realize conditions so utterly at variance with those to which they are accustomed,—methods of judicial procedure so utterly opposed to what we regard as first principles. And what men cannot imagine they are apt to ignore. What they cannot realize they often treat as if it did not exist.

Or has perhaps the uneasy feeling that widely pervades the American people been operative in the negotiation of this treaty, the feeling namely that Anarchism is a pest, that Anarchists are enemies of mankind, that the sooner



we can rid ourselves of them the better ; that, if the Czar of Russia is willing to take them off our hands, we should be glad to deliver them over to him to deal with them as he may see fit ! But this sentiment is most unjust, as applied to the Russian Revolutionists. They are not, as I have already said, to be classed with the Anarchists. Severely as we may censure their methods, they are not enemies of law and order. On the contrary what they aim at is the establishment in their country of law and order, in place of arbitrary and capricious despotism. *What they demand are those same free institutions which we have long enjoyed.* But, even if they were Anarchists of the most detestable kind, I should still maintain that we may not, in their case, set aside, or connive at the setting aside by others of those invaluable safeguards of justice without which the innocent may at any time be merged with the guilty. I should still protest that we ought not to deliver over even Anarchists to a power which will not give them a chance to prove their innocence, if they be innocent ; which will not grant them trial by jury ; which will not confront them with the witnesses that testify against them, which denies them the right of appeal. But, as I have said, the Russian Revolutionists, as a class, are by no means to be stigmatized as Anarchists. They desire freedom. They look to the United States to cheer them on in their attempts to secure freedom. Shall the United States league itself with their oppressors ?

But, it is said, of what use is it to protest ? The treaty is all but signed and sealed. It is true, the treaty has been discussed and adopted in executive session by the Senate. The doors have been closed against the people, and the proceedings have been shrouded in mystery and secrecy. But, with perfect respect for the Senate, I venture to assert that the American people are still the rulers in this

land, and that if the American people are opposed to this treaty and desire to see it abrogated, the Senate will not resist their will. And already, the waters of public opinion are being stirred in this matter. In Boston, old-time abolitionists, whose names have acquired a national reputation, have spoken with no uncertain sound. The Legislature of the state of New York, during the past week, has adopted a resolution condemning the treaty; and some of the most conservative citizens of our own metropolis have echoed this protest. I trust that this agitation will go on. I believe that the public need only to be instructed as to the issues really at stake in order to take the right attitude on this question. I believe that our fellow-citizens will not lend themselves as auxiliaries to the Czar in hunting fugitives on American soil. I believe that the ship does not sail the sea which is destined to carry back such fugitives to the Russian shores. And I denounce this treaty as repugnant to the tradition of American freedom, as contrary to the best interests of civilized mankind, as an unnatural compact between the freest government on the face of this earth and the most arbitrary—a compact which, if it had been signed and sealed a thousand times, will yet be nullified by the indignant reprobation of an enlightened and liberty-loving people.

# AMERICA'S COMPACT WITH DESPOTISM IN RUSSIA\*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

WE have not only duties as individuals, we have duties as citizens. Here in America we are citizens of a free State, and what our government does it is supposed that we do, too, or at least a majority of us. Particularly is this true when our government deals with foreign governments; for in this the people act as a body; we stand before the world as a unit, and we cannot say that our representatives have done so and so, and we have no part in it. If we do not protest, we are supposed to agree. Happily, we may suppose that our government ordinarily does right, that our representatives act wisely, judiciously, more wisely than we, less well-informed, less skilled in public affairs, would act ourselves, and that, as standing in the place of the fathers of the republic, they are animated by the love of liberty and the hatred of oppression. But it is possible that they should err, it is possible that they should temporarily even forget the great principles for which a free people should stand, and when this happens it is not only the right, it is the duty, of the private citizen to protest.

In my judgment such a situation has now arisen. The United States is now entering into a compact with a despotic government which cannot be sanctioned by, and could not have originated with, those who are supremely

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solicitous for the cause of freedom and the rights of man, unless, indeed, they are unaware of what they are doing. I refer to the treaty with Russia. To speak exactly, it is not a treaty with Russia, but with despotism in Russia. The Russian people are not represented in their government; it is not a government by them, but over them; it does not exist by their consent, nor does it serve their interest. Force established it, and force maintains it. The Russian people are not without lovable traits, and nothing that I shall say must be construed against them; could a treaty be made with *them* to protect them from oppression, no one would object; but the aim of this treaty, in which our government has consciously or unconsciously acquiesced, is to make the grip of the oppressor still stronger upon them.

The treaty of which I speak—and which only awaits an exchange of ratifications to become law—is doubtless in its main parts made up of excellent provisions, or such as would be, in case it were a treaty with a civilized and constitutional state. That men should be punished for the crimes they have committed, for murder, robbery, forgery, and the like, and that, if they escape from the country in which they committed them, they should be returned there from the country to which they have fled, is in the interests of civilization. The United States has many such treaties, and should have them, so far as other countries have safeguards by which the accused person is secured a fair trial. But almost all treaties between civilized countries contain also the provision that those guilty or accused of political crime shall be regarded differently, and shall not be returned by the country in which they have taken refuge to the country in which the crime was committed. The crime may be outwardly the same as common crime; it may be taking life or destroying



property, but if it is done in civil war or in the course of insurrection or political commotions, it is placed in a distinct category, and though it may be punished more severely than common crime in the country in which it takes place, it is viewed with different eyes outside. Governments, it is felt, are fallible institutions; they may even be unjust, oppressive, iniquitous; they have not the sanctity about them, that immediate unconditional claim on our respect, which human life, in itself considered, has; offences against them may be serious to the government concerned, but not necessarily to the outside world. In any case the company of modern civilized peoples is agreed that there should be no extradition of political criminals. We ourselves as a people were once engaged in a political crime; our forefathers were guilty of treason to the English government; they killed English officers; had they been unsuccessful, some of them, the leaders, would probably have been executed. But we can hardly regard the crime as a heinous one, nor did the world at large think so at the time. To attack men as representatives of a government is a totally different thing from attacking them as private individuals; to kill from private malice is common murder; to kill to overthrow a government may be wise, may be unwise, may be right, may be wrong—however this may be, it is another sort of act, and is differently treated in the law of nations. The common custom is for the contracting governments to agree to give up ordinary offenders, and either to expressly state, or to imply by silence, that political offenders shall not be given up, leaving it to the government on whom a request is made to say, in any doubtful case, to which of the two categories a given offence belongs.

Now, the treaty with Russia takes it out of the power of the United States government to decide whether cer-

tain offences in Russia belong to the category of political offences or not. This is its language:

"An attempt upon the life of the head of either government, or against that of any member of his family, when such attempt comprises the act either of murder, or of assassination, or of poisoning, shall not be considered a political offence, or an act connected with such an offence."

That is, if an attempt is made on the life of the Czar,—for we may leave out of account an attack upon the head of our own government, as no such offender would be likely to go to Russia for refuge,—and if the offender comes to America, then even if our government—that is, the magistrate or judges before whom the case comes up—is convinced that the case comes properly under the category of political crime, and is not common murder, it would none the less have to call it common murder and to extradite the criminal. It would have no choice, for its hands are tied by the definition of the treaty. It cannot say the crime may be simple murder or it may have a political character, and then proceed to examine the evidence, and, according as it preponderates the one way or the other, give up the offender or refuse to give him up. The United States has already prejudged this question; according to it there is no possibility of an attempt on the life of the Czar that may be properly reckoned a political offence, and no offender of this description that shall not be given up. This is accordingly the ground I take, and I trust it will be distinctly observed. I do not say that attempts on the life of the Czar may not be murder in the ordinary sense, and that offenders of this sort should not be given up (supposing for the moment that Russia is a fit country to treat with at all); I do say that the United States should have the right to sit in judgment upon a given case and say to which category it belongs. Under

the veil of secrecy, under a cloak of darkness absolutely impenetrable until within a few days, it has done (or will have done when the treaty is promulgated) something that no free nation on the face of the earth has been ignoble enough to do (for semi-despotic Germany alone has a treaty with Russia to be compared with it); it has done what England would scorn to do; it has abdicated its sovereign right—a right which a free nation, above all, should sacredly guard—to say whether given crimes are political or are not, and all to the end of showing its sympathy with the Czar,—a man who, were he on the English throne, would (if the old method of punishment continued) have his head speedily laid on the block.

But will some one hold that there *is* no possibility that an attempt to assassinate the Czar should ever have such a political complexion as to anywise extenuate it or take it out of the category of utterly inexcusable crime? I think we should say this (or come very near it) of the Queen of England, or of any President of the United States, that we have ever had, or, I trust, are likely to have; and the government of the United States evidently thinks that its head and the head of the Russian government are on an equality in this respect, for it says, "An attempt upon the life of the head of either government," as if the two were on a par. But to my mind this confounding of unlike personages into which the treaty falls is a part of the disgrace of it. As men the President of the United States and the Czar of Russia are equal, and should have the same protection of their rights; but as President and Czar, the one is a friend, the other a foe, of human liberty. The consideration that is due to our President, or to any head of a constitutional state, is not due to the czar. The crime that would have nothing to extenuate it if directed against Mr. Cleveland or Queen

Victoria, might have something to extenuate it if directed against Alexander III., or any heir of his who rules in his spirit. I say simply "might;" whether there *would* be any extenuating circumstances is a question of fact, not of possibility; any case, if unhappily one should arise, would have to be judged on its own merits. The assassination of Alexander III. might, of course, be as foul a murder as that of President Garfield; but shall we therefore say that it *could* not have a different character? The United States government virtually says so; it says that the assassination of a Czar is *ipso facto* mere common-law murder. Is the government right?

To answer this we have to look to history, and particularly to the Russian situation. The moral sense of humanity has always been shocked at an act of assassination in itself considered, more so than at open murder, since it adds an element of secrecy and of stealth that are peculiarly abhorrent; but almost always it has felt that if the violence was against an enemy of freedom, and was done to serve the cause of freedom, the complexion of the deed was somewhat changed. When we read in the third and fourth chapters of Judges that, to free Israel from subjection to Canaanitish princes, Ehud and Jael resorted to stealth, and with dagger and nail killed Eglon and Sisera, we may condemn the acts; but we do not call them common murder,—and Israel glorified them. In a similar way, according to an apocryphal book, Judith struck down Holofernes, the Assyrian general, first bewitching him by her beauty. Or, if these are instances from barbarous times, what shall we say of the Greek feeling about Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who slew the Athenian general Hipparchus? Harmodius, a beautiful youth, was cut down on the spot, and Aristogeiton was soon captured and tortured to death; yet, when Hipparchus was



expelled they became the most popular of Athenian heroes; their statues were set up on the agora, their descendants were exempted from public burdens, and their names were celebrated in popular songs as the deliverers of fair Athens. Whatever we may think of Brutus's act, however foolish or however criminal we may call it, who will say there was nothing to extenuate it,—that it was utterly execrable, that it belongs to the same category as a murder in a street-brawl? Mankind has passed a different judgment upon it,—at least that part of mankind which has any tincture of the spirit of freedom. So we are accustomed to deal leniently with the legendary deliverer of Switzerland, who shot Gessler from an ambuscade; and with Charlotte Corday, who killed Marat in his bath. The great writer on political science, Bluntschli, says, in commenting on these instances, we excuse the murderer when he commits his deed to free a people from an insufferable tyranny, against which there is no other remedy; when Spinoza's saying is applicable, "One must kill tyrants as one does a mad dog."<sup>1</sup>

In the light of history, then, it will not do to say that a crime against a despot cannot possibly have such a complexion as would justify us in regarding it as different from ordinary crimes against the person. But is not the day of despots over? it may be asked. Is not the Czar simply a good, benevolent ruler, doing the best he can for his poor people?—so that, even granting what I have said, is it not without application to the present case, as in Russia there is no political oppression, any more than in the United States, and assassination of the Czar from political motives is as little thinkable as assassination of the President of the United States? Now, against the

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<sup>1</sup>Politik, pp. 20-21.

private character of the present Czar I have nothing to say, and it may well be that nothing can be said. He is said to be an excellent husband, a loving father, and to have an antipathy to all kinds of untruthfulness, immorality, and frivolity. Even were this not so, his life as a private man is as sacred as that of any other man; and were it assailed as the lives of other private individuals are assailed, the assailant should be returned, if he flies away,—provided, that is, he is sure of a fair trial. But the Czar is not a private individual merely, and with his private life we have nothing to do. Charles I., of England, was an exemplary man, according to ordinary standards,—even benevolent and of great purity of character; but this did not prevent him from being a tyrant. The question is, What is the Czar as the head of the Russian government,—what is any Czar, so long as the present system of government is continued? For the question is not a personal one at all. There is an ethics of government as well as of private life; there are right and wrong ways of ruling, and to rule in such a way as to suppress the liberties of the people is a high crime, according to the conscience of civilization. What is the Czar as the Russian government?—for, according to the Russian Constitution, the Czar and the government are one and the same thing.

The character and methods of the Russian government may, perhaps, best be indicated by stating a few facts. In 1891 \$200,000,000 were spent on the army and navy; \$9,000,000 went to pay the personal expenses of the Czar, and \$2,892,000 were set aside for common schools for over a hundred million of his people. (In that year the United States spent \$140,000,000 on common schools for sixty-five million of people.) There are some assemblies elected by the people, but these assemblies can do nothing

of which the Czar does not approve, so that anything like laws really representative of the people's will do not exist. The press is under strict censorship. From 1865 to 1880 (during the so-called liberal administration of the predecessor of the present Czar), the Press Council gave one hundred and sixty-seven warnings and suspended fifty-two newspapers.<sup>1</sup> There is scarcely an independent, certainly no outspoken liberal, organ to-day. The spirit of Alexander III. is practically the same as that of Catherine II., who, in speaking of Radischev, the first Russian liberal, said that "worse than Pongachev [a notorious Russian rebel] he *praises Franklin*," and who proceeded to sentence him to death for publishing his "Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow," which drew a gloomy picture of the state of Russia at the time, and demanded as a remedy representative government, the abolition of serfdom, freedom of the press and of conscience, open trial by jury, etc. (though the sentence was commuted to exile to Siberia).

Religion is no more free than the press, when it does not please the Czar to have it so. To take one instance, the Stundists are a rapidly-growing sect, numbering already several millions. There is nothing political in their constitution, and they are said to be particularly loyal. Their views are Protestant and rationalistic, with tendencies towards a social but rarely socialistic reformation. A congress of orthodox ecclesiastics a year or two ago came unanimously to this decision with reference to them,—viz., that sermons and propaganda against them were insufficient, and that it was necessary to have the help of the police for the administrative punishment of them. The Czar backs up

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<sup>1</sup>Noble's "Russian Revolt," p. 233.

these bigots; he is practically, if not technically, the head of the church, and punishes those who attempt to leave it. The Stundists he, on occasion, imprisons, flogs, irons, deprives of their civil rights, and exiles to Siberia. The story of the persecution of the Jews is well known to you. Their recent expulsion from Moscow was an almost incredible piece of barbarity. In one quarter of the city it was carried out by foot-police, mounted Cossacks, and firemen. When all avenues of escape had been closed, the whole quarter was ransacked, apartments were forced open, doors were smashed, and every bedroom searched, the occupants being subjected to all sorts of indignities. Then seven hundred men, women, and children were dragged at dead of night through the streets to the police station, and there, without being given time to dress themselves, kept in noisome and overcrowded confinement for thirty-six hours, almost all without food. Such is the benevolent, paternal character of the Russian government.

Mr. Harold Frederic, who tells this in a book published last year with the title "The New Exodus," says that "nobody in Russia dreamed of paying any debt to a Jewish trader or artisan these eighteen months," and that the sums due throughout the empire to individual Hebrews, who have been driven out of their homes, no kopeck of which they can ever hope to see, would in the aggregate mount up to many millions." It is said that the Jews are usurers. A Russian diplomat in Washington, in a recent article in one of our monthly magazines, containing more than one diplomatic equivocation, hints at this when he says that the Hebrew question in Russia is neither religious nor political, but an economical and administrative question. But if so, why does not the government proceed against other usurers? There are plenty of usurers against whom it takes—to use the polite lan-



guage of diplomacy—no “administrative” measures. Yes, if it is anxious to take the load of financial oppression off the backs of its poor subjects, why does it not take itself off?—for it is the worst usurer and oppressor in existence. The peasants have sometimes to pay nearly all they get from the land in the shape of interest and taxes to the government. In fact, this apology from diplomats, from those who know, is, to use ordinary, undiplomatic language, a lying pretence.

And if the peasants are ground down in the country, the workingmen in the cities and towns are little better off. They earn on the average four roubles (or two dollars) a week, and the women two-and-a-half roubles (or one dollar and twenty-five cents), working thirteen to fifteen hours a day, and, if they complain, there are laws rendering participation in strikes punishable with imprisonment. Such is the paternal solicitude of the Russian government for its subjects!

And now, when a Russian of liberal mind protests against all this; when he asks for reforms; when, above all, he tries to enlighten the peasantry or the working-class, and to make them honorably discontented with their lot, what is the result? Three years ago a Russian woman of education, the editor of a magazine published in St. Petersburg, sent a letter to the Czar, calling upon him, in moderate and dignified language, to institute freedom of speech, inviolability of personal rights, freedom of assembly, open courts, ample opportunities for education suited to all capacities, prevention of administrative license, and a national assembly, in which all classes shall be represented by delegates of their own choosing,—these are the only things that would save the state.

"You are an autocratic Czar," she wrote, "restrained only by the laws which you yourself make and alter, or by officials who do not execute them, but whom you yourself appoint. One word from you and there will be a change in Russia which will leave a bright page in history."

She closed with these words,—

"Your majesty is one of the mightiest monarchs of the world. I am only a working unit in the hundred million whose fate you hold in your hands; but, nevertheless, I feel that it is my moral right and my duty to say to you what I have said."

What was the reply of the Czar? She was arrested and sentenced to exile in Siberia. O brave, chivalrous monarch!

A few years earlier there were agrarian troubles in one of the northern districts. Some of the notables of the district were invited by the Czar to explain the trouble, and submit plans for its relief. These men lived a long way from the courts, and did not know that telling the truth was out of fashion. They replied in good faith, saying that the grievances were well founded, and submitted a plan for their redress which entailed the institution of a local elective assembly. What was the result? One and all were arrested; some were sent to Siberia, some to fortresses on the Baltic, and not one of them was again seen in that district.

Alexander II. is called by the Russian diplomat at Washington, to whom I have referred, a "magnanimous sovereign;" he liberated millions of serfs, or, as a clever Washington woman, who has perhaps experienced this diplomat's blandishments, puts it in nervous English, he, "with one stroke of the pen, emancipated all the serfs of Russia." But this great liberator pursued as narrow and oppressive a policy during the last fifteen years of his life as ever his successor has since, and a few months after

his assassination the New York *Nation*, usually careful in its statements, could say that during the two previous years thousands of persons had been subjected to horrible punishment, not only without trial or investigation, but often without being made acquainted with the charge against them. (And against all *this*, unfortunately, the exemplary private life of Alexander II. cannot be appealed to.)

And how does even a traveler fare in the Russian dominions? Those who would like an answer should read Mr. Poultney Bigelow's article in the January *Harper's* on "Why we left Russia," and what a friendly Russian said to him when he expostulated over the indignities he had experienced.

"In Russia we are far ahead of Western Europe," this gentleman explained "We have copied lynch-law from America, only here the government does the lynching. When a man is obnoxious, reads or writes or talks too much, we do not bother about courts and sheriffs. He disappears—that is all. When his friends come to inquire after him, the government shrugs its shoulders and knows nothing about it. He has been killed by robbers, perhaps, or he has committed suicide! The government cannot be held responsible for every traveller in Russia, of course. When a military attache is suspected of knowing too much about Russian affairs, his rooms are always broken into and ransacked. Not by the government,—oh, dear, no! That would be shocking! It is always done by burglars. But, odd to say, the Russian burglars always care particularly for *papers* and *letters*. The German military attache has had his rooms broken into twice in this manner, and to prevent a third invasion he assured the chief of police that there was no use doing it any more; that he really never kept any important papers there. Since then he has not been troubled by official burglars."

But enough of this. Who wonders that, in face of conditions like these, men who love freedom sometimes grow desperate? It is easy for us over here to say, "Agitate peacefully;" but if you agitate ever so peacefully you are none the less in danger of exile or the scaffold. Spread

ideas, we may say, do not use force; but ideas are a crime in Russia, and for a thought, if uttered, the iron heel of the despot may be upon you. Change the laws, we may say, but do not break them; but freemen in Russia have no right to make laws. Petition for a redress of grievances, then; but petitions are unheard, perhaps unread,—or, if read, only to punish you for your insolence in making them. Rise in arms, then; but you cannot rise in arms in Russia. Unhappy people, which way shall they turn? If they become sycophants, all may go well with them. Or if they turn to the peaceful walks of literature, or of science or of art, they may be unmolested. If they give themselves up to charity, and feed the sufferers by famine, they may be sweetly patronized,—and Americans who come bearing alms may be also. Or if they sink to a merely brutish life, content to eat and sleep and labor, and never complain, they may be affectionately treated and called “my poor people,” and be piously told of another world where things will go better with them. But if they breathe a thought of freedom, beware! If they dare be men,—men with live red blood in their veins, “men who their duties know, but know their rights” as well, if they venture an aspiration like that of our forefathers of 1776, or make a demand such as citizens of America make every day, then let them steel their hearts, for dreary exile, or dungeons or death are before them. Men, sometimes the best men, grow mad under such alternatives; they do wild things, criminal things; but if there is a day of judgment, more criminal than they will be those who instituted, carried on, anywise supported, the system of things that drove them mad.

I do not defend, I do not justify, any act of assassination that was ever committed, whether in Russia or elsewhere. I trust I am not without due feeling for the



sanctity of human life, which is one of the foundations of ethics and one of the bases of civilization, but in the light of what has already been stated it is simply monstrous to say that an attempt against the life of a Czar can by no manner of possibility have the complexion of a political crime. What assassinations in the past have had this character and what have now, I do not undertake to say. I do not know the evidence, I could only speak by hearsay. I simply say that if any such act in the future is, in the light of all the evidence that may be brought to bear upon it, not a crime springing from private malice, but really an attempt to overthrow the government,—a government, too, which must be hateful to every lover of freedom, and which ought not to be even countenanced by a free people, save for economic and interested reasons,—then such a crime should not be reckoned as common murder, and should not be extraditable by any country which has risen above the barbarism of giving up political offenders.

In this spirit, then, and with this understanding of what is involved in it, I oppose the treaty with Russia. Is such a position unheard of? Even if it were, it would have to stand on its own merits as a just position; but, as a matter of fact, it is a position that has been practically taken by those two nations that have stood most consistently for freedom in the modern world,—England and Switzerland. In 1858 the Italian patriot Orsini attempted to assassinate the third Napoleon, believing him to be the chief stumbling-block in the way of Italian independence and the principal cause of the anti-liberal reaction in Europe. The maker of the bomb with which the attempt was made was in England. He was, according to the principle of common law, an accessory before the fact and equally guilty with the thrower of the bombs. But

England refused to give him up. We should not have the right to make such a refusal in case of a similar complication with Russia, and Napoleon was a mild despot compared to a Czar like either of the Alexanders. Again, as late as November, 1890, a bench of English judges were called upon to consider the demand of the Swiss government for the extradition of a man who was proved to have shot a member of the ministry during a revolution excited by the liberals in the canton of Ticino. Some evidence was presented showing that the accused was moved by private malice, but the judges held that his act was *prima facie* political, and gave him the benefit of the exception under the treaty. Our treaty with Russia is peculiar in that the Czar has a sanctity thrown about *his* person that no minister of his or official in his government acquires. A crime against him or any member of his family is bound to be common murder, but the same directed against any of his subordinates our government is not obliged to treat as extraditable. The treaty has thus the air of a sort of personal tribute to the Czar, such as those might have arranged who have been guests in his house or otherwise marked with his favor. It is a great triumph of diplomacy, I make no doubt.

Let me also cite one instance in which France acted on the principle for which I am contending. In 1879 Hartman made an attempt to blow up the Czar by a mine under the railway lines at Moscow. He fled to Paris, where a demand was made by the Russian government for his extradition. It is interesting to note that the charge brought against him was that of "damaging public property,"—a common-law offence. The French government was about to hand him over on this charge, when Hartman succeeded, by means of documents in his possession, in showing that his offence was political in its na-

ture; a formidable public agitation followed in his favor, and the government was obliged to set him at liberty. And apart from all particular instances, it is almost universally admitted that each government on whom a demand may be made should have discretionary power in deciding to what category any given crime may belong. France, when under Napoleon III., made three or four treaties with second-class powers, in which it surrendered this power. But America has the unenviable distinction of being the first free people to do this, first with Belgium and Luxembourg in 1882 and 1883, and now with the Czar of all the Russias. England has never done it, and I venture to say never will. When Switzerland was asked by President Thiers in 1871 for the surrender of persons charged with murder, arson, and robbery in Paris during the Commune, it replied that the right of asylum would not be refused to mere political offenders, and that each case would be acted on as it arose, persons demanded being held in custody a reasonable time, till it could be determined whether they were to be classed as ordinary criminals or as merely political offenders.<sup>1</sup> This is the whole principle for which I now contend, and while there may be no practical danger in disregarding it with a constitutional government like Belgium, there is grave danger in disregarding it and tying our hands in dealing with a despotism like Russia. Yes, we have done with Russia what we refused to do with England. In 1886 we refused a treaty with England because it contained a clause providing for the extradition of dynamiters as common-law offenders. As it would appear, our government did not wish to bind itself; it wished to be free to judge of any special case on its merits; but with Russia

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<sup>1</sup>Moore "On Extradition," vol. i., pp. 311, 312.

we are willing to bind ourselves; we are ready to say that no violence *against the Czar* can be anything but a common-law offence. What a strange, unnatural preference!

But there is a more outrageous aspect to this whole business still. We by this treaty agree to hand over to Russia any one who makes an attempt on the life of the Czar as a common criminal; but when he reaches Russia he is not tried as a common criminal,—that is, by a jury, and with the safeguards of ordinary law procedure, but by an extraordinary tribunal. The very same law which instituted the jury deprived the ordinary tribunals of jurisdiction in the case of all crimes against the Emperor and the Empire. These crimes are tried before courts without a jury. The gravest of them may be taken before a special court of the Senate, and as the Senators are appointed by the Czar, the Czar, acting through his creatures becomes at once accuser and judge. Recourse may even be had to military tribunals. A ukase of 1878 gave provisionally all crimes against the state, as against its functionaries, over into the hands of courts-martial. Even this was not sufficient. The ordinary methods of courts-martial were too slow. According to a ukase of 1879, the accused could be tried without previous inquest, and condemned without oral testimony of witnesses. The assassins of General Strelnikof, in 1882, were judged and executed in twenty-four hours. Capital punishment for ordinary crime (murder included) has long been abolished in Russia, it should be observed. But for political crime it has been re-established. We say it is hard to draw the line between political crime and ordinary crime, that murder is murder, against whomsoever committed. Russia does not think so; it is only murder directed against the head or an official of the government that (along with other political offences) is punishable



with death, and political crime (according to the Russian constitution) might be said to be defined as that species of crime which is dealt with by these extraordinary tribunals. Yet the United States government is binding itself to treat as common crime what in Russia would be tried as political crime, and in dealing with which everything is exceptional,—the tribunal, the procedure, and the penalty. The French writer, from whom I have taken this information, Leroy-Beaulieu, says,—

“In thus placing the conspirators beyond the pale of common law, in creating specially for them a Draconian legislation, the Russian government has forgotten that in dealing with other nations it has singularly weakened its demands for extradition, founded on treaties and common law.”<sup>1</sup>

But no; with the government at Washington Russia has apparently not weakened its demands; and we are either so stupid and ignorant, or else so lost to self-respect and to republican traditions, that we have accepted the treaty, and now stand before the world as the sole ally among free peoples of a despotism, the like of which does not exist in the Western World.

The Institute of International Law, which is composed of the great jurists of Europe, took up this very question of political offences at its meeting in Oxford in 1880, and, at the conclusion of a careful and conservative statement, said, “In every case extradition must not be granted for a crime which has at the same time the nature of a political crime and of a crime under the ordinary law, unless the *state making the requisition gives the assurance that the person surrendered shall not be tried by unusual courts.*”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, vol. ii., p. 420.

<sup>2</sup>The italics are, of course, mine. See Moore “On Extradition,” vol. i., p. 313, note.

But Russia tries crimes against the Czar entirely by unusual courts.<sup>1</sup>

I am in doubt whether I ought not to go still further. I seriously question whether we ought to have any treaty at all with Russia for the extradition of criminals. It does not belong to the company of civilized governments. There are no guarantees of fair trial, even for ordinary crime, in its jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> The right of trial by jury does not extend to Poland, the Caucasus, and several other departments of the empire. Russia does not allow our own citizens, who happen to be Jews, to enter its domain, or at least to stay more than a few hours. What has liberal America in common with such an intolerant despotism? Let us have a commercial treaty, if our business interests require one; let us by all means settle peaceably differences about territory, Behring Sea troubles and the like; let us keep up our "historic friendship," so-called, for all it is worth in these regards; but beyond this it may be better for us to have as little to do with Russia as possible, save in so far as we may help her people in time of famine, or as private individuals among us may unite to agitate against her and her shameful barbarism.

Jefferson may have gone too far, but I think he came nearer to the true American spirit than does our degenerate Senate of to-day, when he said (as Secretary of

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<sup>1</sup>It is possible that the Treaty, when given to the public, will be found to contain a statement in accordance with the resolution of the Institute of International Law above quoted. But the Treaty projected in 1887 contained no such provision. On the other hand, Wheaton's "International Law" says, "The United States have treaties of extradition with nearly all civilized nations. These treaties have the common feature of never including, and usually expressly excluding, surrender for political or military offences, or *offences triable by military or summary courts*, and of not including petty crimes and misdemeanors." (Dana's ed., 1866, §115, n. 73.)

<sup>2</sup>*Political Science Quarterly*, Dec., 1892, p. 699.

State), in answer to the demand of citizen Genet for four Frenchmen, who had escaped from a French war-vessel after (an alleged) plotting against the republic,—

“The laws of this country take no notice of crimes committed out of their jurisdiction. The most atrocious offender, coming within their pale, is received by them as an innocent man, and they have authorized no one to seize or deliver him. The evil of protecting malefactors of every dye is sensibly felt here, as in other countries, but, until a reformation of the criminal codes of most nations, to deliver fugitives from them would be to become their accomplices; the former, therefore, is viewed as the lesser evil.”<sup>1</sup>

It may be well to have ordinary non-political extradition treaties with liberal and enlightened countries, like England and France and Switzerland,—possibly with all other countries with whom we have made them,—save Russia. But with Russia the case changes. England, unless I am quite mistaken, has no extradition treaty with Russia whatever, and eleven years ago, as I am credibly informed, when there was talk in London of proposals from Russia for an ordinary, non-political treaty, public opinion would not hear of the project, and it fell through. I cannot help thinking that it would be more dignified, more in keeping with the free spirit of Anglo-Saxon political institutions, for our government to refuse an extradition treaty with Russia, till it becomes a member of the company of civilized and constitutional states. I may be wrong about this, however, and about only one thing am I sure that I am right. There ought to be no such treaty as the Senate ratified on the 9th of February last, and now only awaits the formality of an exchange of ratifications between the respective governments to become binding law. Unless it is different from what it has been supposed to be on the capital point, it is a disgrace to the nation.

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<sup>1</sup>Clarke on “Extradition” (3d edit.), p. 35.

I know I run the risk of being more or less misunderstood in what I have said, though I have tried to make my positions so clear that a wayfaring man, though a fool, could see what they are. I have had a single specific question in mind. I have not sought to solve the problem of Russia, though I am perfectly clear that assassination is no way out, but is as useless and senseless as it is wrong. I have simply asked, *Is an attempt to take the life of the Czar necessarily common murder? Is our government justified in prejudging that question and putting it beyond its power to pass on any particular case as it arises? And is it honorable, is it just, is it even honest, to give up a person who, though not a political criminal in our eyes, is a political criminal in the eyes of Russia, and will be dealt with not even according to common-law justice, where the safeguards are scanty enough, but according to extraordinary justice, where the safeguards are as good as non-existent?* These are the points to which I have spoken and till further light is given me, I am ready to stand by my answers to them. I have spoken as an American, jealous of my country's good name and fame, and indignant when she leaves her queenly place among free and progressive peoples, and stoops to be the cat's-paw of a despot. *Sursum corda*—lift up thy heart, O America, and know that in the scheme of the Eternal Providence thou art made for better things than that.

And yet I cannot keep my thoughts from going to Russia,—not now in anger, not in resentment, but in sympathy and pity. How simple, how innocent the demands of the party of reform there, how heavy and how sullen the weight which opposes them! The very terrorists, the Executive Committee who decreed the death of Alexander II., in a letter which they addressed to his successor a few days after the dire event, only asked for



amnesty to political offenders, for a convention of representatives of the people, for free speech, free meeting, free press, and the right of any electoral platform, and solemnly declared that in case these concessions were made they would abide by the decision of the representatives of the people and no more appeal to physical force. "Believe, your Majesty," they exclaimed, "that as soon as the Czar ceases to be absolute, as soon as he decides to follow the demands of the people, he may confidently discharge his spies and his guards, and burn the scaffolds." And when later in the same year President Garfield was assassinated, the organ of the Russian Revolutionary party (the so-called Nihilists) published on its first page a black-bordered announcement of the death of the President, with the following declaration under it: "Whilst expressing to the American people its deep regret at the death of President James Garfield, the Executive Committee feels it its duty to protest in the name of the Russian Revolutionary party against all acts of violence similar to that just perpetrated. In a country where the citizens enjoy the right of freely expressing their opinions, and where the will of the people not only makes the laws, but chooses the persons who are to execute them,—in such a country political assassinations are the manifestation of despotic tendencies identical to those to the destruction of which we are devoting our lives in Russia. Despotism, whether wielded by individuals or by parties, is equally condemnable, and violence is justifiable only when opposed to violence." <sup>1</sup>

Members of the Ethical Society and friends, unless these words were written by tricksters (which there is no reason to believe), they and such as they are the men

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<sup>1</sup>*Narodnaia Volia*, October 23, 1881.

(and women, perchance) who, under normal conditions, would make the best blood of a state. Who can tell what Russia has lost and is losing by her barbaric and inhuman political methods? What France suffered when she drove out her Huguenots, Russia is suffering by the brave, great-souled men and women she is exiling to dungeons and Siberian snows, or driving to madness and suicide. May a remnant still survive! Let freemen in America arise and give a greeting to their brothers across the sea. Though their hearts are low, though they die, let us give them Hope, and despite the darkness, despite their doubts and their fears, and despite our own, let us cry out with them, "Long live the Russian Republic!"

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## OUR ULTIMATE FAITH\*

BY PERCIVAL CHUBB.

IN the Anglican Church, in which I was nurtured,—and so in its autotype, the Episcopal Church of America,—the congregation used to recite every Sunday its shorter creed, called the Apostles' Creed. On certain special days the longer Athanasian Creed was substituted. I recall from the memories of my boyhood the fact that, whereas the shorter confession was heartily rehearsed by the whole congregation, such was not the case with the longer declaration. Some of the congregation, I remember,—and remember vividly, because my father beside whom I sat in the family pew, was among these,—sat down protestingly, unwilling to be involved in the general assent to this preposterous Creed.

I think of our situation, fellow members of the Ethical Society, as somewhat similar. We might heartily rehearse together our little Basis of Union. But let any one of us elaborate it into a longer confession, and one after another the rest would probably sit down disapprovingly or questioningly. I speak figuratively and hypothetically, of course; for no such assent is ever asked or expected. Any enlargement of the short and simple articles of our common faith by any one of us is a purely personal and gratuitous interpretation, with which the others may or may not agree.

It is nevertheless important that these elaborations should be attempted from time to time by one or another of us. We need continual renewal and confirmation in our

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faith. We need the challenge of new and individual readings of it. We need to register any growth in the apprehension and comprehension of that faith.

We must recognize that our brief declaration of principle carries us but a little way into the heart of the religious problem. Its meaning depends upon its context. Like any precious jewel, it depends for its effect upon its setting and the light in which it shines. It gets its effect and draws its lustre from our general conceptions of life,—the body of truths and opinions by which we live. Or, to use another figure, as the value of the seed depends upon what develops out of it in leaf and flower and fruit, in beauty and fragrance and utility; so does the worth of the little affirmation upon which we join hands and hearts depend upon its rich potencies of implication, and its rootage and fruitage in our own life and character.

As preliminary to outlining some of its implications, as I see them, let me recall one or two formulations of it. That of our parent society reads:

“Interpreting the word ‘religion’ to mean fervent devotion to the highest moral ends, our Society is distinctly a religious body. But toward religion as a confession of faith in things super-human, the attitude of our Society is neutral. Neither acceptance nor denial of any theological doctrine disqualifies for membership.

“The supremacy of the moral end is implied as a cardinal truth in the demand for ethical culture.”

From the statement of the aims and ideals of the St. Louis Society, we glean this:

“The older religious organizations have recognized morality as important, but as less important than right belief—an attitude which has found expression in the phrase, ‘mere morality.’ This order, the Ethical Society exactly reverses, and places right action, action from right motives, first, and all things else, however important, as secondary. It puts the good life before orthodoxy of belief, deed before creed.”

The English Union of Ethical Societies puts the matter thus:

"We seek to advance the good and overcome the evil, not in obedience to the will of a Supernatural Being, but because of the undeniable worth of moral endeavor to social and personal progress. With regard to the problem of the origin of good and evil, and the final purpose of the Universe, we profess as societies, no creed, theistic or other. The Ethical Movement stands for morality without theology, and elevates goodness to the supreme place in the world."

And finally,—not to multiply statements further—we have the simplest and most inclusive formulation adopted by the last International Congress at Eisenach in July, 1906:

"The General Aim of the Union is: To assert the supreme importance of the ethical factor in all the relations of life,—personal, social, national and international, apart from all theological and metaphysical considerations."

These statements are quite plain and simple. There is one dominant note which rings out in all of them: "The supreme and independent importance of the ethical factor." The wording may vary: for "ethical factor" we have "the moral end", "goodness", "right action", "the good life"; but there is common agreement that this one thing, variously called, is first of all supreme, and therefore, secondly, independent—not derivative, not conditional upon anything else.

So, then, we who are members of the Ethical Society, have all agreed that our lives shall find their centre and their star in this one focal principle—a beacon light which no black storm of trial and no stress of intellectual hard weather can extinguish; a principle that must and shall be durable and binding through all our changes of mind as to the nature of soul and body, of God and Immortality,

aye, of good and evil; our final allegiance, our ultimate loyalty.

Simple as this position seems to be, it is fraught with profound and significant implications. It is upon one of these that I wish to dwell now. As I interpret it, this attitude involves a new and distinctive conception of the part which creed or belief, in the more common acceptance of the word, should play in our life. It establishes a new relation between belief and conduct, creed and character.

Let us first get rid of one not uncommon misunderstanding, due to the currency of that misleading phrase, Deed not Creed. We do not establish any opposition between deed and creed. We merely shift the emphasis from the creed side to the deed side of our human equation, and relate both these terms to a middle term, which we may call character or personality. Thus we stand neither for the deedless creed nor the creedless deed. Into the character, giving it something of unity and articulation, enters the creed; out of the character, as its partial expression, flow the deeds. I say partial expression, because no man is fully expressed by his deeds. Thus, a man's confession of faith is not merely his declared creed, but what he consciously *believes* and professes, plus what he consciously and unconsciously *is*, plus what he *does*. Belief, personality, conduct: these three terms, with personality as the central, combining one, are all involved in our position.

Here, I believe, is quite a new type of evangel for those—of whom our membership is almost wholly made up—who find themselves creedless outcasts from the creed-ridden churches, and seek a new religious home. Instead of offering a new creed to replace the old one, the Ethical Movement bids the inquirer take a new attitude towards creed. It says to him, "Be not greatly troubled because

you have lost your creed. Henceforth, creed in the old sense is not to be the pivot on which your life turns. You must loose that old intensity of grip upon creed. Your life, your hope, your peace of mind must depend on nothing so uncertain, so variable, so difficult to gain as a creed. See what you have left behind; look at the motley collection of creeds, Christian and non-Christian, of which yours was one. See how many of them are blood-stained with internecine conflict; see how they have divided race against race and man against man.

"There is something deeper, something more fundamental and more authentic than creed; and that is, moral faith. Out of all times, all races, and all creeds arises in its largest lineaments the self-commending, aureoled figure of the Good Man, the self-authenticating vision of the Good Life—speaking all languages, appealing to all hearts and consciences. Hold by that vision; make that the pole-star in your firmament, and you shall know a new satisfaction and a new peace. And, lo! a great company are with you; the just and the kind, the brave and the true, the lovers of man, the heroes and the martyrs, of all times and peoples. You are folded in the arms of a mighty world-wide Brotherhood of the Faithful."

There is, then, something more ultimate than any creed or philosophical theory of life, to which that theory must submit itself as to a court of last resort—the practical test of its moral workableness, its moral effectiveness, its moral influence and consequence. This point is well enforced in a recent critique of Schopenhauer's philosophy: "I felt," says the critic, "that the Will to Live (the postulate of Schopenhauer's system) even if it were, OUGHT NOT TO BE; and Faith said what ought not to be, cannot be in the everlasting constitution of things; faith that the world is rational, right; . . . faith in what Robert



Louis Stevenson called 'the eternal decency of things.' "

We open the door to misunderstanding, perhaps, if we say that in difficult decisions the intellect is less trustworthy than the conscience; but this is true in the sense that in great crises we have to fall back, not upon any theory or philosophy, however deftly formulated, but upon the total forces of our personality. We have to trust our fundamental sense of rightness, and that sagacity which is more a matter of conscience and heart than a matter of intellect. Let me seek support by citing a sentence from Ruskin. He is commending a phrase of Carlyle, in which that Master of his speaks of "Conscience, and Intelligence its handmaid"; and Ruskin bids the reader especially "observe the order of sequence: perceptive reason (intelligence) is the handmaid of conscience, not conscience hers"; for, he adds, "if you resolve to do right, you will soon do wisely; but resolve only to do wisely, and you will never do right." It is this conscience,—this sense of Duty, as we may translate it, which must underly all our reasonings to make them sound, and ensure their sincerity. So that there was something in what a young college graduate once remarked to me, that the men of his class who had failed in logic were in nearly every instance, not those of inferior intellectual ability, but those who lacked a certain intellectual rectitude. They could not see straight because they were not quite straight, and so looked through a crooked medium, a flawed character.

And now, in order to bring out my meaning, let me at the risk of seeming to break the continuity of my treatment, look for a moment at the effect of this attitude of ultimate reliance on conscience and Duty upon what most men regard as the most precious and important of all convictions, the belief in God. I do so because that consideration is sure to block the way at an early stage in the

argument. "Does this position mean," people ask,—“aye, does it not obviously mean, that the Ethical Movement is an atheistic or agnostic movement?” A recurring accusation brought against it by those who have examined it superficially is that it has banished God from life.

Perhaps the most practical and conclusive answer to be given to these questioners is, that several of its leaders and its public spokesmen—it may be, all—are theists. That fact proves conclusively at least this,—that membership in an Ethical Society, and leadership in one, is not inconsistent with a theistic belief. We have, then, this possibility in an Ethical Society;—it may conceivably be, it may quite possibly be, a body composed entirely of theists, united on a non-theistic basis.

But people are extraordinarily sensitive on this point, and therefore it is well to pursue the matter, and to ask them to try to realize what a dim light is shed upon a man's religious nature and belief by the mere affirmation of a belief in God. Which God? we are at once obliged to ask. Is it the God of battles of the Old Testament, who is so frequently petitioned by belligerent Christendom when it goes forth to war, and is thanked when success attends its armies? Or is it the loving and pitying Father of Spirits, God of Love and Light, of the New Testament, who abominates war, and to whom armed Christendom, alas! so seldom makes appeal? Is it the God of Jesus or of Augustine; of A Kempis or Calvin, of Newman or Carlyle? Is it the God of Pantheism or the God of Monism? the immanent or the transcendent God? Some of these must be false Gods, unless indeed, we may say with “Europe's wisest head,” Goethe, that we need all kinds of Gods to meet our varied needs.

So colorless, then, is the mere affirmation of a belief in God. That belief becomes significant only when it is

given moral content, and is affirmed in behalf of the moral nature and necessities of men. Behind Zeus was the Necessity to which Zeus himself must bow. Behind your God is that controlling conception of Moral Law and Moral Authority to which your God must conform.

Look deep into the motives of pious souls for their passionate insistence upon the belief in the existence of God, and what do we find? What but a way of affirming what is the very postulate of our Ethical Movement? God has meant above all else the sublime assurance that this is a moral world,—a world of moral purpose and moral values. In other words, *God is the authentication of the idea of Duty*. What has been the awful doubt which from before the days of Job has afflicted and blighted the souls of just and holy men? Assuredly the doubt whether the Universe or the power which moved in it, was on the side of their moral strivings and convictions, and had moral intent; whether goodness was provided for in the scheme of things; or whether behind all things was some blind and inhuman power, indifferent to human wrong and sin, and to human suffering for conscience sake.

There is a striking passage in Tennyson's "In Memoriam" which will serve me for illustration here. The cry of the poet's heart in that poem is the very human cry for renewed and everlasting companionship with the lost friend whom he had loved above all souls. This turns to a cry for assurance that love, the most precious gift of life, is provided for in the scheme of things. And still further, it becomes a cry for the more fundamental assurance that there is a scheme of things at all, and not a mere Brute World which is the sport of a "blind Fury, slinging flame." His agonizing doubt is whether this is a world in which what is highest in his own nature is recognized: whether love, and with it other spiritual qualities, is not a

mocking chance-product of the Universe; whether his bereft heart is not the jest of a Nature, "red in tooth and claw with ravin." "If it be so," then says the poet, with profound significance, "what were God to such as I? I would not stay." That is to say, the existence of God is entirely unimportant and negligible *unless God is a form of guarantee for the moral import of human life.*

With Tennyson this great issue, whether the universe takes account of our spiritual strivings, is raised in relation to the problem of immortality. With us it focuses in another of the three conceptions with which religion has concerned itself. Of these ideas,—God, Freedom and Immortality,—the central moral idea of *Freedom* is the most fundamental of all. Without it, the other two are unimportant. Just as Tennyson questions—if Immortality is not true,—What does God matter? so we Ethicists may say; "if Freedom is not a fact, then is God an irrelevancy, and immortality a delusion. If we are mere puppets, what does it matter what kind of God pulls the strings and for how long the farce endures?"

Now, we cannot say that the idea of God is wholly covered by this interpretation of God as the imagined assurance of the reality of Duty, or the moral intent of life (Tennyson himself reminds us of that in other poems: "The Higher Pantheism", "The Ancient Sage"). We can say, however, that the central dogma of our movement—the only *sine qua non* of our faith—does in fact postulate what is to some people the most precious implication of the God-idea: the idea that morality is worth while, because the world seems constituted with an eye to moral values, and on the principle of moral cause and effect. We find Duty, Conscience in our world—whatever else we may find or fail to find. And the idea of Duty, which is the watchword of our Movement, stands,—not



as a little human construction of our own ; but as written by the finger of cosmic power across the sky, spelt by the stars, inscribed blood-red on the scroll of human history, and beaten out by the very pulse beats of the human heart. But whereas the theist insists upon a prior acceptance of a belief in God, as a means of authenticating Duty, we hold that that idea needs no such authentication. It is self-authenticating. For us it has an ultimate validity and authoritative power which is not derivative from any other principle. It is independent of any sanction which a theology or a philosophy may supply.

And so is it in the converse of men,—and here I take up again the thread which I dropped a while ago, the relation of this and other forms of belief to character. Judging by what people *do*, and not what they *say or profess*, the world acts on the principle of relying ultimately on character, as it manifests itself in moral probity or the sense of Duty. A man is judged by the quality of his life, his conduct, his morals, without reference to his creed. The theologian may insist that mere righteousness is filthy rags, if a man be not “saved” in some special theological sense ; he may contend that works without faith are vain ;—but the world in its ordinary dealings judges by character, that is, by a man’s allegiance to duty, regardless of the sanction he finds for that allegiance. To illustrate in homely fashion, we don’t practically care whether our honest grocer is a Catholic or a Protestant, Jew or Gentile, Christian or Mohammedan : we are won by his reliability ; by the fact that he gives full weight and sound values. He has a sense of right and duty. We do not ask whether yesterday’s hero—the brave fireman or the self-sacrificing policeman—was a theist or an atheist, before allowing ourselves to commend his valor ; nor do we excuse the defaulting bank cashier on the plea that he was a

good churchman or Sunday school Superintendent, or was sound in our particular theology. Virtue is for the plain man, its own witness, its own excuse for being; and, as the ancient adage declares, its own reward.

As a matter of fact, most men's creeds give very little clue to their character. A man may be much better or much worse than his creed; for a formulated creed is a mere fragment of us. Robert Louis Stevenson, in a well-known passage, has enforced his contention that the source of a man's joy is hard to hit. We may insist with even more emphasis that the source of his allegiance to virtue is hard to hit. How subtly involved in his character and in his whole life-history are the bonds that bind him inflexibly to what is noble and pure in the face of death, or under the stress of temptation: it may be a great memory or experience, a great failure or a great success, a great love, a whole net-work of attachments to people and things, with pride and dignity and ambition and fear intermixed. In short, every man is at the mercy—not of his creed—but of his character. Whether he proves faithful to his creed will depend upon his character. The great test for him in time of trial is not whether his creed will stand the strain, but whether his character will. Is that strong enough to hold him to his creed?

And if we ask, Why is this? the answer is, because a vital creed is the outcome of character. And now I am not using the word "creed" in its conventional sense; but as strong men and women, who have known some travail of spirit, would use the term. Creed: not something taken on hearsay, inherited from one's parents with the color of one's hair; not something caught out of books, or from one's neighbors, or from the lips of a priest. No, but the thing a man verily believes, because he has put it to the test; the thing he has come at by effort and painful striv-

ing—by great sorrows or by great joys or by terrible wrestlings on the verge of sin; by renunciations, by patient endurance, by the stern discipline of work, by the power of love, by the joy of earth, the Spring's great message of renewal, or the sublime and questioning silence of the solemn stars.

In this sense, every serious man's creed is a much greater thing than he can put into words, or should attempt to put into words. It is something still growing in him, something he is trying to get right, something he is trying to earn, to win out of life and earnest living. More than that, it is something he cannot take by violence; something he cannot instantly or immediately control, something that is the inevitable fruition of his character. So intimate is the connection between creed and character.

We cannot therefore speak of a creed as something we can choose, can accept or reject at will; because we cannot think as we will, nor feel as we will, except within very narrow limits. What we think and what we feel is the result of what we are,—and what we are trying to become. Yes, that is important—what we are, plus what we would be. At this particular moment, I think on any particular point as I *must*; because my thinking depends upon what I *am*,—what I know, what I have experienced, what I have made of myself in my past life, and what I am trying to make of myself. And there is something even more fatal for the time being about our feeling. I feel as I feel, although my mind may condemn my feeling as I do. All I can do when I feel ashamed of my feelings is to hold them in check. Is it not so? Do we not long sometimes to feel other than we do, to respond to some noble thing that fails to move us, or to hate some mean thing that allures us? We may try to cheat ourselves, but we cannot. We must face ourselves as we are, and recog-

nize that to think differently and to feel differently, we must *be* different; we must build up a new self; we must make ourselves over.

That *does* depend upon us, upon our resolve, *our will*. That is why morality turns on the Good Will. For ultimately, it is our wills alone that we directly and immediately possess. "Our wills are ours, to make them thine," says Tennyson: our wills are our own to control and to submit obediently to the laws of life and the behests of Duty. We have power over our acts; and that way lies salvation. "In the beginning was the deed," says Faust. Begin by controlling that, and we may in time remake our world of thought and feeling.

It is when we deal with the subject of the Will that we are tempted to reach down into the depths of moral personality. It is when we face this conception of moral personality that we feel that we have as yet plumbed but a short fathom or two of the deep-sea of moral faith upon which we are launched. We have yet to take the soundings of this conception, to comprehend the wonder of moral power; that sacred and august power in us which at once issues the call to Duty and responds to that call; so that—to alter a word in Emerson's lines,—

When Duty whispers low, "Thou must,"  
The *Soul* replies, "I can."

What is the meaning of this proud assumption of power? What illimitable resources of moral energy do we take for granted in daring to hold man unconditionally to the imperative of Duty? What is this dynamic moral self which we cannot excuse when it fails to respond to Duty? Ah, we have here that "main miracle," as the poet puts it, "that I am I, with power on my own act and on the world."



Modern psychology with its theory of the subconscious ; psychical research, with its gropings after an indestructible spiritual ego,—Theosophy, Christian Science, Mental Healing, the New Thought,—are all attempts to understand and to utilize these deep-seated powers. And because these powers are now coming to be frankly recognized as initially and primarily human and natural, they offer a field for the investigation of the moralist ; for us, therefore. It is for us to learn their nature more fully ; how to make them more vigorous and effective ; how to use them for human redemption, human healing and human service. Too long have they been associated with the magic of supernaturalism. It is time to study them as our normal human endowment. We are in the midst of a great and significant movement which has been aptly characterized as an attempt to naturalize the supernatural ; and, as I read it, we are called on, by virtue of our master-aim, to play our part in that movement.

Did time permit, I should try to round out my argument in favor of the ultimacy of moral faith, by developing two other considerations at which I will merely glance. The first is that because a man's creed is an individual matter, the inevitable expression of his life and character, no two of us can have exactly the same creed. From which again it follows that we cannot make creed the basis of religious union. Surely, this is obvious enough, if we but reflect for a moment on the increasing and bewildering number of theories which compete for our acceptance to-day. We must either go on multiplying sects, or declare for another kind of basis. Our choice is made. We of the Ethical Movement find the basis of the larger fellowship in allegiance to the Good Life. For us, too, "in the beginning is the Deed," born of the Good Will, which is the gateway to the true thought and the wise vision.

The other and last point is this: the philosophy, or, if you please, world-view of a growing man, a seeking mind, an opening heart, grows with him. It must continue to grow. As our knowledge widens, as our experience enlightens and matures our character, so does our view of life alter. What folly to cry halt! and subscribe to a creed as if knowledge had revealed all. Because we grow and because knowledge grows, we must give up the hope of finality in philosophy. We must abandon the proud dream of attaining to absolute and finished truth as to the meaning of life and the universe. We often glibly quote those famous lines in which Lessing says that if God held in his right hand, truth, and in his left hand the endless search for truth;—reverently and humbly he would ask for the gift offered in the left hand. Do we all really ask that? Do we all ask, as above all other things in worth, the power to grow, to progress, to search and search, in order that we may develop without ceasing? At least let us be frank and sincere with ourselves. There are those who cannot rest in the uncertainty of unfinished and still-developing truth. Very well; to them our position will seem vanity and foolishness. Let them look and pass. We make no appeal to them.

Finished creeds were all very well in the little finished, one-world universe in which men used to live—that petty pocket edition of the vast volume which now spreads itself before our eyes. To-day they are impossible. What audacity there is in the claim to compass in our finite philosophies the infinitudes of space and time in which we now live. When we think how vast is the circle of nescience which bounds our small circle of knowledge in this immeasurable and inconceivable universe, of world upon world, and system upon system, how absurd seem

our pretensions to compress the sum of things into the small moulds of our labored philosophies.

The day of those old facile finalities is passing. One may hazard the opinion that the mark of the era ahead of us will be its finer spirit of humility and reserve in these matters. Already the old jaunty familiarity, the old license of affirmation about first and last things, is disappearing. We may notice, for example, in the finer spirits of our age how infrequently they mention the name of God. This is true even of Carlyle and Emerson. Such reticence is a mark of spiritual delicacy, a fine-bred intellectual reserve, a reverent modesty.

Let me close on this note. "All piety begins in modesty," it has been said. To the modesty of intellectual expectation, we may add the modesty of moral obedience and deference. These are the key-notes of our new attitude towards creed. In some ways, the old reliance on creed seems a simpler matter. It is certainly the easier way; for it is so much easier to accept a creed ready-made than slowly, step by step, to work out an ever-widening conception of life for oneself. These old creeds seem such tempting short-cuts to the goal. But there are no short-cuts to heaven,—the heaven of truth and right and love. These flowers of the good life lie along the great highway of our human advance. No, there are no moral short-cuts. The way is plain, but long and arduous; sometimes perilous, yet oftener smooth, lovely and sublime. We all have to traverse it; and we have to begin at the beginning.

Says an Oxford scholar who quietly made a deep impression upon his contemporaries: "I am sure that the principles of all methods for acquiring the mastery over anything are substantially the same. One has got to begin with the alphabet, to become a little child. Instead of

which, it seems to me, one is perpetually beginning with the hardest things,—solving the existence of God before one has ever seen what it means to exist at all. If I had to begin over again, I should like to try to master the elements of a few big things.”

We would try that—master the elements (no more) of a few big things—the biggest thing first. Let us make no random guesses about divine things. Rather let us begin humbly by trying to know what it means to exist, to live, to grow, to fashion a character out of which shall slowly and endlessly blossom a creed, rehearsed less in what we say and profess than by what we are and what we do.



ADDRESSES AT THE FUNERAL SERVICES  
IN MEMORY OF ALFRED R.  
WOLFF, SUNDAY, JAN. 10, 1909.

BY PERCIVAL CHUBB.

HE knows the peace that passes our understanding. Yet it is surely something of the spirit of that peace which is about us now. White-winged Death, when he comes among us, comes silently, and leaves a great silence after him; calm and deep peace.

Out of this close-enfolding silence we may hear the quieter voices within us—too seldom heard in the din of daily life,—bidding us transmute our grief of loss to a means of clearer vision and finer appreciation. And to the eye so cleansed by grief, the grief that is but another name for love, there rises the spiritual image of him who, being dead, yet lives among us—aye, lives now perchance for the first time in the full beauty of his worth.

The image of the personality of him who has lived, still lives, and shall live among us as Alfred Wolff is one which impresses us by its simple wholeness and symmetry. Here is a man, we realize, who achieved a beautiful unity and harmony of life and character in a world that shows so many broken and ill-pieced lives.

He was devoted to his work, ambitious in it, and highly successful in it; but he did not allow it to master him and to demand too much of his time and energy. He enjoyed play and good-fellowship; but he never allowed them to draw him unduly from his family and his home. He loved the intimacies and privacies of the domestic hearth;

but he would not permit them to withhold him from the laborious service of public causes, and the obligations of public duty. All these competing interests he controlled with a master's hand, and held them in happy equilibrium. So he wrought out a character that was whole-souled and well-balanced.

I would fain recall him in this school-home of ours, where he loved to be, as he appeared at the meetings of our executive committee. On his way from his business, which he had left betimes, to the home which he longed to reach, he came among us, always at the appointed hour. With no trace of hurry or strain; the master, it would seem, of a liberal and unstinted leisure; the tan of healthy out-door living upon his kindly, cheerful and eager face, he sat down with us to give of his best thought, his keen and unfailing sense of justice, and his magnanimous fairness to our school life and our school problems. What was so simple and natural at the time becomes for calm retrospection a rare and impressive excellence. To this labor of love he brought the same cheery yet deep earnestness and untiring effort which he devoted to the other interests of his life. And he blended them and fused them with the heat of a pure and sensitive heart.

There was more here—much more—than the light-heartedness of a buoyant and fortunate disposition. One caught the radiance of a deep-indwelling fire of religious feeling. At times the flames leapt forth; they lit up his face; and in their gleam we saw the spiritual passion that was mingled with his other gentler qualities. The fire waned not with time; it rather waxed stronger. This man who was so humanly loving and loveable, so flawlessly honorable, so simply unselfish and devoted, was likewise a man who out of his deepest self was consecrated to the highest ideal of his mind; and he remains transfig-

ured in the memory as an exemplar of that Good Life and an organ of that Eternal Goodness which was the undimmed pole-star of his life.

In the august and solemnizing presence of Death all our little theories as to what it means in terms of philosophy or science, are put to silence. We are face to face with a sublime mystery: that mystery of Death which is also the mystery of Life itself—the mystery of Time and Destiny, of all the joy and sorrow, the sin and suffering the glorious heroisms and the heart-breaking failures, all the disasters and the ruin, as well as the triumphs and the splendors of this miracle called Life. Before these infinite heights and depths of being, we can but bow the head in reverent awe and humility.

We are a people of many minds; some of us without the longing and the hope of other worlds and other and completer lives which our dear dead friend cherished; some of us—and let us not fail to strike this positive note—some of us just as hopeful, just as confident as he that we do but pass on to other tasks and opportunities, though we know not how or where.

But here we all unite, as we always do, on the basis of what is most nobly common to us all—an illimitable love of love and right and an unconquerable hate of hate and wrong; a resolve to strive unceasingly to fulfil that ideal of the Perfect Life which is the vision of our highest moments.

Speaking humanly, in the name of our common faith in the supremacy and lordship of Goodness, we know that the spirit of Alfred Wolff is not dead; nor can it die. Perhaps it is only now that it begins to live among us with full influence. He will be an abiding and hallowing presence within these walls; as he will surely be a blessed and undying presence within the hearts of those who have

shared his love and his nobleness. By his death he deepens in us our sense of the blessedness of the gift of Life, because he used that gift so worthily himself. We rejoice that he was one of us. We will treasure his legacy to us,—the priceless legacy of his life of service and truth—as an inestimable possession.

Aye, he was one of us,—and with pride and the joy of gratitude we say it—one of us for more than thirty years. However much he might have wished at the last to supplement and support our common faith by convictions, which cannot, from the nature of our large and inclusive fellowship, form part of that common faith; however much he might have wished to translate what may well be, and in essentials doubtless is, the private faith of some of us into other terms than those which we use, he was of us because our supreme concern was his. All was but means to that life of holiness which he sought to live as the master-purpose of his life.

He was one of us in all our enterprises; in all our largest and deepest aspirations, in our hopes and fears and trials and conquests. He was especially close to us here in our school, where he was a part, and a great part, of that beautiful human providence which works unseen and often unknown, to better the lives of our children in this beloved school.

So, then, in the name of the school—its governor and teachers, I place upon the perishing mansion of his dear spirit the crowning wreath that is the meed of the good and faithful servant.

And in the name of all, I place these white flowers of a stainless loyalty;—in the name of his professional brethren, who honor him for the power and integrity and height of his career in his chosen calling; in the name of his colleagues in the many good causes which he aided



and championed; in the name of the loving and loyal friends whose love and loyalty sweetened his life; in the name of his most beloved family and kinsfolk—in her name and in their names to whom he was and is and ever will be closest and dearest—as husband, father, son, brother, kinsman; and, as befits this place and this hour, in the name of that spiritual fellowship in which he was one with us of this Ethical Society.

He bore our flag, and set forth among the first on our Quest of the Grail of the Good Life. In him our faith was on trial. He faltered not, nor failed. Like a Galahad, he carried our emblem unstained and untorn. Tenderly we take it from his valiant and trusty hand; and here under its folds, and inspired by his example, we dedicate ourselves as he would wish, to renewed service in its sacred cause.

BY JOHN LOVEJOY ELLIOTT.

A SENSE of unreality seems to pervade this place and time. It almost seems as though we should wake and find it but a dream. The years that have been alone seem real. Memory rules the mind. The spirit of one man pervades all our thought, the spirit of Alfred Wolff, our friend. He had not passed on life's high-way the stone that marks the highest point; for him the shadows still were falling toward the west. While still in love with life and raptured with the world, he grew weary, lay down for a time, and using his burden for a pillow, he fell into that dreamless sleep that kisses down his eyelids now. While he was still full of the joy of life, he passed into silence and into perfect peace. Yet, it is not in the length of years that the real meaning of life is found, and he had used well the time that had been granted to him.

While yet a youth—almost a boy—he had done a man's work. At an age when others are preparing themselves for the work of the world, he was out in the strife, in the struggle, doing the work of a man.

Those early years brought to him strife and labor and stress, but no stain, and though no saint, the record of his life is pure white, stainless as the driven snow.

His is no world-stained record.

Nature had been generous to him and had endowed him with a large free mind. His perception was rapid and his instincts for the right and truth were keen; he had the power that often goes with the unstable mind, and yet wise judgments were ever with him in his counsels. He had the mind that pursued truth—that was rational and scientific. He was a man who thought, who studied and who toiled. Often I have heard him quote those lines from Goethe:

"He who knows not the elements of things  
Will never be master over the spirits of the world."

He knew the elements of things and through his study of the simpler things, he learned the mastery of the spirit: chiefly the mastery over his own spirit. For he was courageous; his nature was touched with the heroic. Rarely, if ever, have we known one who had such power to master himself, whose will was so strong to control himself, so willing in service and so fixed in noble purpose.

I presume that only those here who were associated with him in his work knew how eminent he was. He began his career without influential friends, without special influence of any kind, and worked his way until he stood first in his calling. Indeed, we may say that he created the profession which for nearly a quarter of a century he led in this vast, toiling, busy and building city. There

was not his equal in his line ; perhaps not even his second. And I would emphasize this success because, our friend, Alfred Wolff, was so modest. He went in and out among us here, never for a moment seeking to put himself forward, always retiring, always wanting to give praise to some one else, always seeking the honor for others, never for himself. And so it is strange—and it is to be rejoiced at too—that he won so much honor in spite of himself. He was, as they say, of the happy warrior—

“One who would not stop or lie in wait  
For wealth or honor or for worldly state,  
Him they must follow, on his head must fall  
As showers of manna or not come at all.”

He would not seek wealth and honor, but they followed him because of his clear, human worth, his ability, and the nobility of his work and ways.

Great as were his powers, and large as was the recognition of those powers, that which drew most of us to him was his power to love. I never have known anyone who had a more intense power of loving than he had. Where he loved, there was no limit to the service that he wanted to give. He was fervid when he spoke, as he sometimes did here, with a fervor and a depth, a heat of conviction that knew no limit and no boundary. And yet, he was as sympathetic and as tender as a woman.

I remember the last time that he and Dr. Adler were in this room together. Dr. Adler said that perhaps Alfred Wolff more than any other one person, helped the work in this school, and further he mentioned the unfailing sympathy that went with him along every step that he had taken.

Alfred Wolff loved the beautiful in this world. Particularly the grand harmonies of music moved him. He loved what was noble,—aye, and his nature was akin to

the great open places of the world. He loved the mountains, the open sky, the sun, the stars and the gentle meadows. He loved the sea where his home was, and in all the free places of the earth he was at home.

And under his roof there was a true hospitality. The smile of welcome on his lips was also in his heart.

He supported great causes. The poor people of this city have lost a friend in him. He served in ways that we know not of. Generous was his hand; generous was his heart and his judgment; but not simply in a personal way. He served with those who were first in the cause of philanthropy: he supported all good movements strongly. He helped schools for educating the poor, as well as institutions for feeding them.

His alma-mater—which he honored in his youth—he helped to support and guide in his manhood and in his strength.

This building where we are was in part due to his work and his thought and his labor and his love given for nearly thirty years. He helped to create this school and he loved it intensely, and it was here that he wanted his children to be educated. He loved the place; he loved the cause for which it stands.

When Dr. Adler began his work, Alfred Wolff was one of that little company of men who stood by him and helped him from the first, constantly giving him his support and his love. And that support lasted for more than a quarter of a century. It lasted from the time that Felix Adler began his work until the day and the hour that Alfred Wolff laid down his life.

There is yet another theme—one that is perhaps too sacred for us to dwell upon. He loved his friends intensely, but that love was infinitely intensified for his family. His home was the centre of his life and the well-spring of his



joy—and the dearest aim of his life and his hope. We speak of the holy bonds of matrimony. With him those bonds and that home circle were indeed hallowed; his love for his children, for his brothers, and most of all for her, his wife. He loved that home, and his spirit brooded over it, ever anxious to keep all that was evil away from it. Oh, how that heart did love, with a depth and a fervor that was holy in its very nature! In that circle, and far outside of it, he had the power to help.

When men were in trouble, they came to him and he gave them of his strength. His hand was outstretched and his heart strong in service. Weak men came to him and he gave them help. Those in trouble came to him and those who had degraded themselves, and when the time of trouble came, he was their saviour and he raised them.

The effect of his nature on all of us was to raise the standard, to elevate the tone, to brighten the lot of the life of man. And that, friends, I take it, is the supreme test of a good man. His effect on others was to ennoble, to raise, to purify, and he helped to glorify the common lot of man. The influence of a good man is like the influence of the stars and the sun that are above us. There is a moral law above man's law, above the material law of the world, and the good souls of this world are a part of that moral law. As the sun shines upon the earth, bringing out the life on this planet and causing flowers to bloom, so the light of a good life brings out all goodness. As the moon moves across the face of the waters and draws after it the sea from its depths, so a good man influences the acts of men about him, and they move forward in a tide of goodness that turns not back. And when that light sinks beneath the horizon, its influence is not lost. It abides with us as a fixed star.

He was loving, and in turn he was loved again. Words cannot say how much. I have here a message from a friend:

“For the beloved comrade I send across the sea these words:—Grief wrings my heart at the loss, but pride fills my mind in thinking of the record he has left and of his noble qualities, especially the purity of his heart, like a child’s, preserved through manhood, his splendid intelligence, his tenderest love, his self-sacrificing devotion. I shall miss him sorely, but we must remember the riches bestowed by his life, which death only sets in more radiant relief.”

(Signed) FELIX ADLER.

In the name and at the request of Felix Adler I place upon the coffin of Alfred Wolff this simple wreath. Words cannot contain our love; there was, there is, no truer, kinder, manlier man.

# AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION

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# THE NEW PAGANISM AND THE NEW PIETY\*

BY DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

"In the most high and palmy days of Rome,  
A little ere the mightiest Julius fell,"

the gods had fallen into disrepute. Sensible men no longer believed in the swarm of divinities that were supposed to order human life, regulate the weather, preside over public functions, and bless or blight the corn crops. Good men could have no respect for the tricky Hermes and the lascivious Jupiter. Some men and many women, of ardent æsthetic temperament found a substitute for the old divinities in new gods imported from the conquered provinces—Mithras from Asia, Astarte from Syria, Isis and Osiris from Egypt, and the Druid gods from distant Brittany and Wales. Others sought in the cultivation of a cloistered philosophy or a curious magic to make up the deficiency of a real religion. Spiritual unrest, marked by the extremes of wild religious speculation and cynical religious indifference, vain aspirations for a new order, of which no one seems to be able to predict a line of program or effect the least realization, are visible in all the literature of the late Roman Republic and early Empire. Polytheism was bankrupt. It no longer fitted the intellectual and moral needs of men. It was a religion of infinite division and particularism, suited to localities not to the wide Roman world. It was a survival of

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\*The substance of two addresses delivered before the Ethical Society of St. Louis, in January, 1909.



the days when each object of the puzzling outward world seemed to the savage to be endowed with a spirit like his own. It was a perpetuation of the political system in which each little city or town was an independent religious center, whose aristocracy was its sacred caste, and whose gods were household gods.

Into this distracted, discordant, skeptical, but expectant Graeco-Roman world of discredited polytheism, came a new religion of monotheism. By its condemnation of sensuality and the love of riches, its denial of all ignoble passions and its triumphant preaching of an eternal life beyond the grave, it rebuked the spirit of Epicureanism, and invited to its communion all those who cherished faith in the dignity of the human soul. By its proclamation of a divine revelation and a direct communication through prayer with God, of supernatural virtues won by faith and the power of miraculous deeds, it appealed to the spirits who thirsted for the marvellous and aspired to communion with superhuman strength. By substituting for old rites and ceremonies conducted by a special priesthood, the simple performances of common song, prayer, and evening meal, it attracted those whose reason revolted at the continuance of empty and meaningless altar-worship. By its central doctrine of God's love, universal and unconditioned (for in the Christianity of Jesus, God's love *was* universal), it broke through the old barriers of Jewish and Roman particularism, and provided a faith as wide as the Roman world itself. It offered succor to the poor, justice to the oppressed, liberty to the slave, hope to the despondent, regeneration to the wicked, resurrection to the dying. It substituted the principle of love for the principle of fear as a compelling motive in man's life, and in this it was an immense advance over the religions of the ancient world.

Because it thus redeemed and restored the emotional side of man's nature, opening his heart to new and powerful affections, stimulating his whole being by a great love of God, of righteousness, and of one's neighbor, Christianity came as the salvation of the ancient world. It brought new, fresh blood into the spent veins of the Roman Empire. It made an epoch, a turning point in history. It gave the world a fresh start. It was the duty, then, of every man, woman and child to welcome this new faith, to devote himself to the practice of the new law of brotherhood, to adopt the ethics of the righteous will, and to revel in the hope of a redeemed world.

Yet many held back; many resisted. The Roman priesthood to whom the worship of Jupiter, though soulless and sceptical, was still a profit, called the new religion *atheism*. The self-indulgent patrician who could buy an easy and cheap pardon for his debaucheries from the venal, grasping gods, resented the intrusion of a new divinity who demanded first of all a pure heart, and who could not be bought for money. The timid, whose only idea of religion was the ceremony they had learned to repeat from childhood, feared to let go one faith, however weak, to take another. The very poverty of their faith in polytheism disqualified them from believing in the possibility of a strong faith in Christianity.

Those who through self-interest or fear clung to the old, dead polytheism of the Roman world, were called *pagans*—a name synonymous with "reactionaries" or "ultra conservatives." For the *paganus* was the inhabitant of the *pagus* or "village," where the new religion penetrated late and found hard access. Removed from the centers of thought, commerce, and other human activities, the *pagani* clung to ancient custom and belief, as do the distant rural population of every land to-day. They be-

came the symbol of unprogressiveness and backwardness. Their name was taken to denote opposition to the new religion of progress. *Pagan*, then, means not devoid of God, but devoted to old gods, not godless but god-ridden, not so progressive as to have outgrown God but so retrogressive as not to be willing to give up one's gods, not the man whom independent thought has led into atheism, but the man whom unreflecting conformity has kept in superstition and dogged conservatism. Paganism is not the refusal to conform to the long-established worship, to repeat the ancient creed, to cling to the ancestral faith, to perpetuate the long-established church. Paganism is, on the contrary, the very insistence on these things; the refusal to abandon them when they are inadequate for the task of humanity, the desperate old following of old ways when the travail of choice souls has opened new ways—as Amos and Hosea opened a new way for ancient Israel, as Socrates opened a new way for confined Athens, as Jesus and St. Paul opened a new way for the Roman world, as St. Francis opened a new way for the stale and festering monasticism of the Middle Ages, as Martin Luther opened a new way for the Borgia-cursed church of the Renaissance.

To-day we are confronted by a new paganism—a new refusal in the name of religion to be truly religious; a new closing of the eyes to the path of advancement which humanity must take to deliver it from the philosophical, the moral, the economic bondage into which ignorance and selfishness have led it. He must be singularly devoid of imaginative power who does not see that the incredible achievements of science and the tremendous revolutions in the political world of the last century mean the reorganization of life in every aspect; mean that our methods and our religious creeds are as antiquated, as bungling, as

ridiculously ineffective to-day as our grandmother's spinning-wheels or our grandfather's flint-muskets; mean that our hierarchies and priesthoods, our genuflections and libations are as powerless to reach the real God of mankind, whose name is justice, as the dissolute lace-bedecked dignitaries of the 18th century rolling in their gilded coaches, would be to reach the source of the power of the American democracy.

Where is the courage of our people to come out of the ranks of paganism—of reactionism, of backwardism, of survivalism—and join the ranks of the new faith in humanity? How would it have fared with Isaiah, with Jesus, with Luther, with Wesley if none had dared to believe in a new message—if none had broken away from their father's faith; if all had been pagans—"worshippers of light ancestral," instead of kindlers of the new beacon of humanity! To "keep the faith delivered to the fathers" is an easy, lazy thing. To win a faith for one's self means courage and diligence and independent thought. Jesus told in one parable what he thought of the pagan—the preserver. He was the man who wrapped his talent of silver in a napkin and hid it away, lest some harm or loss should come to it. The modern pagan, who would be shocked beyond measure at the very idea that such an odious name could be applied to him, wraps his faith in the clean napkin of proper responses and orthodox confessions and tucks it under the pew-cushion for safe keeping.

There is a conflict to-day, the greatest, in my judgment, that christendom has yet seen, an issue which dwarfs every crisis the church has met. That issue is between a forward facing and a backward facing humanity. On it is staked the very existence of progress. As in the days of the Graeco-Roman polytheism, the traditional religion



with its orthodox priesthood and its outworn creeds is bankrupt. It has led us into a cul-de-sac. It is vainly clamoring for light, for a new principle of unity. And in this critical era a new path is opened for the religious life—the one important aspect of the life of man. As with the appearance of Christianity, with its message of deliverance from an economy of fear into a regime of love, so now there is at hand a new principle of life, with a message of deliverance from the bondage of imposed creeds and imposed priests into the freedom of the intellect which is science, and the freedom of the heart which is democracy.

The radical program which this new principle of life demands—the tearing up of the old creeds and the disrobing of the priests—is resisted to-day in various ways, as the program of Christianity was resisted in the old world of polytheism. A new paganism like the old paganisms of the Roman Empire rejects the new light and clings to its idols. Fortunately, the sense of human brotherhood has grown sufficiently within the last two centuries to forbid the most summary and drastic form of resistance in the old paganism, persecution. The Roman emperors and governors burned, crucified, tortured, and threw to the lions the Christians of old, on the charge that they were atheists, or godless—which charge means, with different ideas of God from my idea. The spirit of persecution still exists: it is heard in many a sermon and printed in many a book and pamphlet. But it lights no more fires around the stake, thank God! and the restless headsman's ax, that was swinging through its gruesome arc for a good part of the 16th and 17th centuries is hung up to rust in museums.

But there are various forms of compromising paganism, after this robust paganism of the headsman and the bonfire. A party of educated skeptics in the ancient state

said: "The gods are good for a police force. The people have been trained to stand in awe of them. Quench the fires on their altars and you will extinguish the spark of morality and fidelity in the breast of the common man. For us, to be sure, this superhuman authority is not a reality or a need, but the uneducated, the toiler, the man who cannot reason deeply, must have an objective authority clothed with awe and embodied in symbol." The new paganism has the same argument—for it has the same lack of faith in humanity. For nineteen centuries the masses have been kept worshipping fetishes on the pleas that they are not able to worship God. May we not now, after the failure of so many centuries of the feeding of superstition, try what a few years of the wholesome food of fearless and unimpeded encouragement to self-discovery would do for their spirits? I should be ashamed to look my neighbor in the face if I had so poor an idea of men and women of any class as to believe that they could permanently thrive on the spiritual food that I reject. Neither could I find spiritual strength and nourishment for myself in any theory or practice of life that was not also the common experience of humanity, actual or potential. Away with this silly pagan talk about an inferior kind of religion being good for the masses! Nothing but the very highest and best in religious thought and practice is good for any man or woman under heaven; and for my own part I do not believe that there is any man or woman under heaven incapable of seeing and at least longing to practice the highest religion, for the very inspiring reason—so deadly to creeds and priesthoods—that the highest religion is the simplest.

The old paganism, again, defended itself by allegory. Poetry and philosophy were enlisted to refine the gods of Greece and Rome into symbols, so that the form of wor-

ship might be continued with a change of meaning. The old bottles were still good enough to hold the new wine. So the crude old myths were softened into moral stories, and the ancient gods had their fangs drawn, as it were. No form of resistance in the name of the established churches to the advancing tide of science and democracy is more subtle and widespread in the new paganism of to-day than just this makeshift of allegory. The doctrines that offend the increasing sense of righteousness, justice, and scientific thought, are being constantly revamped, reinterpreted, dressed out in one allegorical costume after another, to make them acceptable to as many thinkers as possible. Thousands of minds are timidly clinging to discredited dogmas under the strange hallucination that it is pleasing to God to have the creeds of some centuries ago believed to-day.

But all this is offering a stone for bread and a scorpion for fish. It is starving the spiritual hunger of humanity on husks. It is ignoring the grand march of humanity toward a rational and purely ethical religion. It is the vain and desperate and wicked adherence to creeds, ceremonies, and authorities which have lost their validity and vitality. It is reactionism, backwardness, spiritual rusticity—in a word, paganism!

The new paganism, then, like the old, combats religious progress in the name of religion itself. Its very worship of God hides God from its face. New ways, adventures into spiritual freedom, confidence in present strength to meet present need, trust in the honesty of man's intellect and the essential goodness of his heart, are things anathematized as heresy and dangerous innovation. Everywhere in the religious world we find the apologetic spirit instead of the scientific attitude. A body of inherited doctrine to defend, to explain, to show how it might be par-

tially true, or in a sense true, or symbolic of truth—instead of the original, liberating, hard-won vision of truth itself, taking form in a new, inspiring doctrine of the 20th century in place of the doctrines of the 4th or the 17th century. The apologetic attitude is pagan, it is survivalism, it binds our freedom at some point, it reverses the true intellectual process by which the doctrine follows the reasoning, not precedes it. It pledges us to views outgrown: to an astronomy that antedates Copernicus, to a biology before Darwin, to methods of philosophy and historic theory earlier than Kant and Niebuhr. It tempts the spirit of discord in the mind of the student and the distraction of doubt in the heart of the moral teacher. For who can honestly acknowledge as authoritative that which he recognizes as somewhat discredited? One of two things must follow the imposition of a creed: rebellion or submission. Either state of mind is fatal to spiritual progress. Both are characteristic of a priest-managed orthodoxy—both are pagan.

See, then, with what a crop of pagan weeds our fair garden of religion is still choked and vexed! See the unworthy growths of creed and ceremony and censorship, of priestly privilege and shifting apologetics, to which the sweat of human labor and the dews of the prayers of just men are still being consecrated! We look back to the days of the Roman Empire and instantly see how futile and how backward, how pagan, the attempt to keep alive or restore the discredited worship of Jupiter, Mars, and Venus. We commiserate Julian the Apostate for waging war against the Galilean, and smile at Symmachus begging the emperor not to remove from the Senate-house the altar of victory—symbol of the century-long victorious faith of Rome. We look back to the middle ages and commend every sparse attempt of theologian,



philosopher, statesman, monk, or merchant to break through the secure system of dogma which Rome had bound on the peoples of Europe. We look back to the literal age of Protestantism, and are divided between contempt, amusement and indignation in our souls when we read that Servetus was charged with "inculping Moses and grievously outraging the Holy Ghost" for quoting Ptolemy to the effect that Palestine was a barren community whereas the book of *Joshua* called it "a land flowing with milk and honey"; or when the faithful refused to look at the new satellites of Jupiter which Galileo discovered through his telescope, declaring that as there were but seven churches of Asia, addressed in the Book of Revelation, so there could be but seven planets in the heavens.

All the pompous puerilities, the oblique evasions, the empty ceremonies, the retarding orthodoxies, the repressive hierarchies of by-gone centuries meet our prompt, self-congratulatory, condemnation. We see plainly in this perspective that no plea of age or wealth or revelation or majorities had any right to prevail against a single advance toward clearer thinking or more brotherly living. We see now how rapidly at some epochs of world-history the advance of humanity has changed living faiths into dead creeds, fresh inspirations into embarrassing traditions, prophetic messages into priestly mumblings, true sanctities into empty ceremonies, religion into superstition, piety into paganism.

All past paganism we repudiate, and the prophets of the past we hail with tardy rejoicing. But the paganism which vexes the new piety of to-day—the paganism that *seems* piety to so many thousands under the hypnotic influence of long inherited religious fears and religious customs—have we dared as courageously to eliminate that from our religious thought and action?

If there is any lesson that the immense labors of the 19th century in every field of human thought and action have taught with an indisputable and irresistible finality, it is the lesson of development or evolution. Our forms of social and political life, the historian has discovered, have come to be what they are through a long process of the interaction of human wills; our philosophies and religions have passed through painful periods of transformation and adjustment; our bodies are the long result of nature's careful experiment and refinement; nay, this very seeming solid and eternal earth we live on is alive with strivings and strainings, seeking equilibrium for the incalculable forces at its molten heart, through ruthless readjustments which heed not the lives and works of hundreds of thousands of the inhabitants of its surface. The world which to our grandfathers was a finished, objective, static thing—a six-day time exposure of the changeless mind of the changeless God, has resolved itself for us into a moving picture, an infinitely divisible film whose seeming continuity is really the sum of ceaseless change.

It is as foolish and futile to attempt to exempt any human interest from this scientific reinterpretation as it would be to draw a circle around a part of the shelving beach and say to the advancing tide, "touch all the sand but this." King Canutes of science have placed their throne by the sea and implored the incoming tide not to wet their feet. Canutes of theology have thought they could stem the tide of free thought by imperious orders or frantic persecutions. Political Canutes still heap up dikes of soldiery and awe-inspiring splendor to stay the leveling waters of democracy. But it is all eventually a vain endeavor. Silently, steadily, cumulatively the process of evolution out of old ignorances and superstitions

and despotisms is working in humanity; and we are all either helpers or hinderers of the continuous new-birth of the cosmic soul.

Now, just as in the outward world of nature, we are surrounded by matter in various stages of validity, by dead moons and flaming suns, by stratified carbons and adolescent mammals, so in the spiritual world are survivalisms and prophecies strangely mingled, clattering superstitions and travailing spirit-births. And just as in the scientific world the first requisite of the accepted scholar is a reverential instability of doctrine, a willingness to relearn one's lessons and recast one's theories constantly; so in the spiritual world the inexhaustible riches of human experience and the progressive adjustment of human relations compel the true prophet and servant of his age to cultivate a new and larger piety with the march of time.

The first feature, then, of the new piety, is just this recognition of the continual call for a new piety—for a renewal of piety to express adequately the spiritual life of each advancing, developing generation. For piety is not a recollection but an experience. It can no more be furnished to us out of our father's experience than political liberty, for example, can be guaranteed to us by the sacrifices of a past generation. Liberty is the reward of eternal vigilance: the moment indifference, intimidation, and injustice creep into our public life, that moment liberty is impaired—and impaired beyond the power of Washington or Jefferson or Lincoln to help. Piety is the impassioned consent of the soul to every influence, personal and public, that is making for a stronger, a better, a more humane and honest to-morrow—and the moment that it forsakes the prophetic hopes of to-day for the last millennium's or the last century's creed it ceases to be piety and becomes paganism.

By virtue then of its absolute humanness, of its intimate, indissoluble relation with and development out of the man's progressive experience, piety is itself a progressive conception, a changing thing. And true piety is always to be found in the thick of the struggle of men to interpret and redeem their own ages. Nothing is truly pious that is foreign to that heroic and absorbing struggle. Monasticism, for example, whether in the ancient form of the cloistered body or in the modern orthodox form of the cloistered spirit is the very negation of piety. Aloofness, separateness, detachment from the immediate burning questions raised by the human intellect in scientific study and the interaction of human wills in human society, is the very denial of piety—I care not in whose name it is practised, or how many centuries of conformity it can show, or how many millions of adherents it can muster.

Now the travail of the present age may be summed up in a double formula, in whose terms every essay of the human spirit must be expressed, in whose medium only can things material and spiritual be truly understood and appropriated. To speak to a listening generation, one must speak in those terms. For they were the pass-word to the hearts of men in our century. These terms are *science* and *democracy*.

Science in the complete sense of the term not only investigates with tireless honesty the data, the given facts of the outward world, but it seeks by reflection on its discoveries and by intellectual processes to reduce all these various facts to a unity—to find the laws which govern their operation—to arrive in a word at truth, which is more than a fact or any collection of facts—in that it is their explanation. Science claims not (unless it madly denies its own first principle of receptivity) to have ex-



hausted facts or arrived at final truth. It claims not to have apprehended. It knows in part. It builds slowly, cautiously, solidly. Sometimes it gets far on a foundation that proves to be on sandy ground. It then resolutely sacrifices its seeming gain, and begins toilsomely to rebuild on the solid rock. Without haste, without rest: in the open: four square to every storm of criticism, its structure rises. And looking on the work every son of man can say, "Behold, it is good."

As the passion for truth deepens, and intellectual piety wins its slow dominion, we see more and more clearly that the temple of scientific truth on which men are working in various parts is one temple. We do not yet see the relation of part to part, for we are often working separated by high partitions or jutting angles—but we are coming to know with divine confidence that error in one part of this grand temple cannot be truth in another part: that there cannot be a truth of revelation for example at the expense of the truth of history, that religion cannot thrive on the discredit of geology or astronomy, that piety of heart cannot grow together with impiety of mind.

It is not in a presumptuous assertion to have compassed all truth that the spirit of science thus challenges the dogmas of orthodoxy. Rather is it the increasing certainty of the scientific principle that is the discomfiture of dogma. For the scientific principle can never consciously admit as truth that which clashes with itself. As it is patient, it condemns leaps; as it is logical, it does not beg the question; as it is self-convincing, it does not resort to any methods, cruel or cunning, of persuasion; as it is original, it trusts present interpretations of experience more than any explanations of the past; as it is dynamic, it refuses to let the work of any former generation dispense with the present duty of winning our own

spiritual truth for our own selves. "Only he deserves life," says Goethe, "who daily wins it." Only he is religious who daily builds his faith out of the struggle with life's inequalities, sorrows and shocks.

Does this mean that the past is useless: that the labors of saints, heroes, prophets have gone for nothing: that we are cut off from the inheritance of the ages because we are pledged to the labor of the age? By no means. It is only by sympathetic study of the past that we can at all understand our present. He would be a poor scientist, indeed, who knew nothing of the labors of the pioneers in his field—who contemned them because we have outgrown them. He would be a poor botanist who did not know and honor the work of Linnaeus, a poor astronomer to whom Copernicus and Kepler were only bare names, a poor physician who mentioned Galen only to heap ridicule upon him.

He would be an equally poor scientist, however, who was bound to the formulæ and blindly defended the conclusions of those men of a former age: who accepted any of their ideas or theories as a final truth to be maintained in the face of any later discovery, to be squared and harmonized with any future developments. Reverence for the past is not more necessary to the proper scientific attitude than a large and liberal discontent with the results of the past. It is the spirit of those men who blazed new paths, which makes them our exemplars. The actual paths they blazed may now be overgrown with tangled thorns and brushwood, may be far too narrow for the march of progress, may lead in directions which we see from our more enlightened age to be devious from the goal. We honor those men, not by doggedly fighting our way against all odds over the old paths they blazed, but by taking the example of their courage. Which con-

tinues the work of last autumn's harvest really, the seed now hidden beneath the common soil or the ears carefully hung in the attic with their kernels yellowing? The former is religion, the latter orthodoxy.

Science and orthodoxy are in conflict, and ever must be in conflict because, science in its fundamental principle of development, of growth, of change is the negation of the orthodox principle of fixity, of unalterability, of finality.

But then, another objects, you sacrifice faith in your new scientific religion. What place is there in this constant flux of science for assurance, where is the resting place for the soul, what can I depend upon and live by? This objection, like the former one of despising and sacrificing the immense labors of the past, rests on a misconception of what faith really is. Instead of depriving us of faith the scientific attitude furnishes us with the only faith that can endure. For faith is not, as many believe, assent to a set of propositions about God, Jesus, man, the Bible, the saints, the church, heaven and hell. It is not subscription to a scheme of salvation worked out by the theologians of Alexandria, Rome, Geneva, Dort, and Westminster. The word in both its Hebrew and its Greek roots goes down to a scientific foundation. It means in the Hebrew "firmness," and in the Greek "conviction." Both are personal traits, original, developing out of the individual's consciousness. Neither firmness nor conviction can be lent to a man from without. They have to be evoked from his inner being. Neither can be imposed by any authority. Their counterfeits can be forced on men. Just as a body of police armed with sticks and revolvers can keep the peace, but cannot make peaceful men; so an institution, armed with various powers and privileges can maintain the faith, but cannot give men faith. The only source of firmness and conviction is

the inner force of persuasion, not of *assent to* some theory offered, but of *consent with* some truth experimentally discovered. This consent is as scientific in matters of love, hope, patience, self-sacrifice, peace, as it is in the matter of the properties of carbo-hydrates or planetary orbits. For let us remember again that science is not the narrow preoccupation with material things that some would have it; but rather the search for the laws underlying the unity of man's being, of which his experiences mental, moral, æsthetic, social, aspirational are all phases. Science and orthodoxy are hopelessly irreconcilable. Science and faith are mutually indispensable.

And just here we have another striking confirmation of the implicit character of science and faith in the etymology of two of the commonest words in religious usage. *Holiness* means *wholeness*, the state of unity. Science is striving endlessly toward unity, wholeness, holiness. The whole man in spirit is the scientifically moulded man. He is harmonizing and unifying experience, and so building his faith—his firmness, his conviction. *Corruption*, on the other hand, means literally, *brokenness, fragmentariness*. The corrupt man is the man who has gone to pieces; whose mind is anarchic, confused; who has lost the unifying, is the scientific principle out of his life. Both of these words, as in fact most of the terms of religion, imply an integrating, unifying force in the human soul which tends constantly to self-revelation and self-realization. Expressed in religious language this process is doing the will of God, expressed in scientific language, it is discovering the truth of nature. But both definitions are in the end the same, since God's will is only another name for the most fertile and inspiring truth that we have yet discovered in nature, namely, the power of the idea of unity to enlist all our enthusiasm and our labor.



The new piety of science does not sacrifice real faith then, but engenders and strengthens it. "Except a grain of corn fall into the ground and die it abideth alone." Your doctrines of a past age carefully preserved may hang like clusters of yellowing corn from the attic rafters. But what enters into piety has died that it might live again in nobler forms. Trinities, deities, purgatories, inspired writings, stately liturgies, confessions, creeds, symbols—all have been, and are being, and will be, absorbed by the developing spirit of unity, the spirit of science, in man. All will serve the present age. All will be faithfully studied, bravely criticised, honestly laid aside, as we grow into wider and wider fields of knowledge, and learn better and better the mind of our fellow-men.

These words, "As we learn better and better the mind of our fellow-men," bring me to the second characteristic of the new piety—its democracy. We saw a moment ago that corruption means brokenness—the corrupt man is the man whose activities are not harmonized and ordered, whose character is anarchic—some trend or passion getting undue control, throwing the man into confusion. Extended to the social sphere this idea is very suggestive. The corrupt man is the unrelated man, the man who is broken off from the sympathy with his fellows, the separated, detached, sundered man.

Now, if there is any worst fault of the old piety which was taught our fathers it is just this insistence on getting a man separated from his fellows. To save one out of the world was the end and aim. To be one of the chosen, the select, the predestinated was salvation. The world very early in the history of Christianity was given up for lost—not only hopelessly and irremediably sinful, but actually devoted to consuming flames. The end was expected even by the apostles of Jesus. St. Paul speaks of "we who are

alive," when the great cataclysm comes. Escape was the watchword of early Christianity. Many passages of the New Testament refer to the impending destruction of the world, some describe it. The fathers of the Church still expect the end of the world, though the preparation for it seems to some of them to be rather long, and they are sorry to see the unbelievers in Christ given the opportunity to say, "When is His promised coming." But the long march of centuries has established the Church in the world whose destruction is predicted and ardently waited for. Though to-day only a few scattered sects really expect the long delayed drama of the world's end to take place, still much of the language of that expectation is still current and the prevailing idea of *escape* from the world still exercises a great influence in all Christian preaching and profession. The protest is still heard against the Christian's feeling at all at home in the world.

The doctrine which has so long prevailed of a select few being rescued out of the condemned world—that select few even, according to some of the older fathers of the Church having their joy increased by witnessing the punishment of those who were not saved, is a barbarous, inhumane doctrine, which fits an age of cruel caste domination, not an age of dawning democracy. Identification with humanity and not separation out of it, redemption of the world and not abandonment of it, are the true forms of piety. According to the real meaning of the word, the man who labors to get himself saved out of a failing world, is the corrupt man—like the man who fights for a place in the lifeboat when women and children are waiting, or who tramples others down in his endeavor to escape in a fire panic. The ancient world called the hermit a holy man because he so successfully repudiated the world. For just the same reason the hermit is to-day a

corrupt man. The times have changed. The world may still in large measure lie in the power of Satan—but to-day it is not willingly abandoned to Satan because a better world is almost prepared for the reception of the saints.

What exists beyond this poor struggling travelling world, says the truly religious man of to-day, I confess I do not know. My hopes and loves, my longings and aspirations prompt me to picture an expanding and glorious life beyond the grave. For I find strivings in my soul that are too great for expression in the media which are at my command. But however it may be when I am through with this world, my business now is not to dwell in the imagined heaven but on the actual earth. My whole equipment fits a present earthly task. Eternity is a conception my mind cannot grasp; sinlessness is a state of which I have had no experience; cosmic occupations are not for these human organs, which now are the only ministers of my thought. The future will provide its own things. Oh, the impatience of the human mind to surprise the mind of God and pry into those secrets! For us, such is the steady progress of the idea of democracy, of brotherhood, the earth is growing dearer every generation. Perhaps the new heaven is to be a new earth after all—and those golden streets that saints have been looking away from the sordid earth to discover all these centuries, may be the cleaned streets of our cities, gleaming like gold in their secure and happy light!

The essential fact of democracy, it seems to me, is the protest against the imposition of one man's will upon another. What is sacred in every human being is the capacity of self direction. Not that all are at any time capable of self direction; not that any are always wise in their self-direction. But unless the possibility, the opportunity for self-direction is open wide to a man, that man

can never know what freedom is. Now all through the Christian centuries till the last, human society was organized on an undemocratic basis. The authority of Cæsar and his agents in the Roman Empire, the authority of the feudal suzerain and his greater subvassals in the middle ages, the authority of the national king and his ministers in the so-called modern age—have been successive forms of political tutelage to which the people of the western world have been subjected. From the end of the 18th century till now, however, the principle of self-government, of political self-direction, has been rapidly making its way. As this principle sinks deeper and deeper into the consciousness of men, it must bring, like that other principle of science which we have discussed, a reinterpretation of all human interests in terms vital to its own life.

Religion, like citizenship, has been through all these Christian centuries of empire, feudalism, and national absolutism, a matter of tutelage. The true faith has been handed down to men by a priesthood, like the true patriotism. As the will of the emperor, so the will of the pope; as the will of the feudal court, so the will of the feudal archbishop; as the will of the absolute monarch, so the will of the orthodox court preacher—have been imposed on man's spirit. The faithful flock has been asked to accept, obey, observe: and it has been thoroughly in accordance with their political, their military, their general social duty—which was to furnish a background, a foil for the privileged classes of king, nobles and clergy.

Now that is all being revolutionized, and religion must be revolutionized with it. Although for the moment a new form of privilege—the privilege of great wealth, with all its disgusting parade of vulgarity and cruelty—is in the ascendant, and is quite naturally accompanied by a servile deference to wealth on the part of many of our relig-



ious bodies ; that phase is only a temporary one, and some of the wisest of the privileged ones themselves are beginning clearly to see that the good sense of humanity is not going to endure it many generations, or perhaps many years even. The equilibrium which society is seeking, from the domination of the despot, through the domination of the nobility, through the domination of the plutocracy, is the competent self-direction of the people themselves.

We might dwell on the efforts to introduce spirit of democracy into the industrial world, as shown by various welfare schemes of great employers, profit-sharing, stock-allotments for employes, etc. Or if we had time we could dwell on the great advance in democratic sentiment that is making itself felt in education through the introduction of technical schools, trade schools, night schools, public school lectureships and the like. Everywhere we turn we find progressive spirits wrestling with this great 20th century problem of evolving a competent democracy. The caste idea is vanishing. The conception of the people as great buried foundation on which the pedestal of nobles that supports the monarch shall rest has had its day. In every civilized country of the world to-day the influence of the people is growing stronger, the sentiment of the people is of more and more concern to the ruling powers, the political ideas of the people are being broadened and stimulated by propagandism, sometimes foolish oftener wise, and the industrial condition of the people has come to occupy the very first place in the docket of the national housekeeping.

Of course no religion of the authority of dogma imposed in the name of an institution can fit such a development of democracy as we have been describing. When the whole trend of the age is away from the immoral and

enslaving principle of the imposition of one man's will on another's in politics, industrial education, science and art, that principle cannot prevail in the religious life. Insight replaces authority, not in one department of human life alone, but all along the line. The priest yields to the prophet (whose caricature and corruption he really is). The dogma yields to the ethical judgment. And a man's religion ceases to be regarded as the public profession which he makes weekly or less often and becomes the continuous disposition which regulates his relations with his fellows.

Here again let no one object that the new piety of democracy by its denial of the principle of authority confuses spiritual values and rejects the leadership and guidance of the highest. It is the imposition of authority that democracy combats. Many grades and stages of mental and spiritual development exist and will continue to exist. The reciprocal duty of strong and weak, of learned and ignorant, of righteous and erring, will still be as valid when the authority that has so many centuries claimed a divine sanction has ceased. Wherever we see our ideals realized or approximated there authority exists for us, by virtue of the vision itself, not of any recommendation of it or description of it or theory of it. The courageous soul is *ipso facto* an authority for the weak and wavering; the example of purity and loftiness of character is itself the compelling authority for the sordid and mean man. Nothing can increase this authority of fact. No set of resolutions, or formal pledge or confession of faith or prosecution for heresy. Nothing can increase the authority of the intrinsically superior over the intrinsically inferior.

The authority which the new piety of democracy reveres is as noble and compelling as any distant awe of

mediated revelation. The reverence for that which is now and here is a more saving, redeeming attitude than waiting deliverance from an evil world through a theological intercession at a great White Throne. We are all bound in our new humanitarian piety to the inescapable authority of spiritual excellence. The true strength of every human soul is to be dependent on the better, the purer, the stronger. The agonized confession of the prostrate Queen Guinevere, when she sees King Arthur, her better life, depart "ghostlike to his doom," sums up the meaning of authority for the piety of the new humanity of democracy:

"Ah, my God,  
What might I not have made of Thy fair world,  
Had I but loved Thy highest creature here?  
It was my duty to have loved the highest;  
Surely it was my profit had I known;  
It would have been my pleasure had I seen.  
We needs must love the highest when we see it,  
Not Lancelot nor another."

And this brings me to the last point that I wish to emphasize in the new piety of democracy, as opposed to the old piety of priesthood. As democracy is the denial of tutelage, it is also the affirmation of responsibility; for the two are complementary terms. As it is the rejection of privilege it is also the insistence on equality of opportunity. The old piety, which was developed in an age of tutelage and privilege, naturally treated man as an irresponsible and incapable ward. He was encouraged to believe that salvation had been accomplished for him, and that his duty was to accept the accomplished fact; as a minor signs a legal document whose terms he doesn't understand, but for whose necessity and honesty his guardian has vouched. To Christ's words about his sacrifice of self—which to us are perfectly comprehensible as the

account of a most wonderful and noble self-sacrifice—the imperially minded and feudally minded church gave an elaborate theological interpretation, building up a dogma of vicarious merit which was measured out to selected, predestinated souls—an enervating, discouraging, stultifying doctrine which set a premium on fatalism and spiritual pride. The rediscovery of humanity which is proceeding apace in our century, is rehabilitating qualities of independence and responsibility long discredited. Work, for example, since Carlyle and Ruskin and Emerson preached their gospel, is no longer the shame and disgrace which it was to the Roman noble or the feudal robber. The curse of Adam is seen now to be a blessing. The social economy that produced and still produces Dives and Lazarus, the plunderer and the beggar, is being attacked now by the better social sense of men. As it was once a glory undisguised to belong to the economically elect, the financially predestined, now it is beginning to be a matter for apology to possess many hundred times as much of the world's goods as we could ever earn or can ever use. Mr. Carnegie already confesses that it is a disgrace to die rich. It is not a long step from that to the confession that it is a disgrace to *live* so rich. Mr. Carnegie is simply dealing with the secondary question of distributing the embarrassing millions which are credited to his account. The primary question is one of distributing the newly created wealth of our land so that the poor are not robbed by the crediting of embarrassing millions to the accounts of our Carnegies and Rockefellers. It is the tremendous problem of democracy in the economic world, inspired by this new sense of the worth of the individual and the dignity of his worth, to replace this state of vicarious and fictitious prosperity by real, permeating prosperity; just as it is the problem of democracy in the re-



ligious world, to replace the piety of the vicarious priesthood, by the real, permeating piety of brotherhood. There is in truth, but one problem of democracy—that is to make effective the spirit of solidarity and co-operation in every field of interest: political, economic, educational, industrial, religious. And the labors of all good men in all these fields of democratic endeavor form one grand symphony, which we believe will swell louder and louder till it drowns the hideous clash of greed, and fraud, and ignorance and selfish sin, and brings to earth that harmony of the spheres which finer ears have always caught.

But are not many clergymen in thorough sympathy with these ideas that we have called a new piety? Have not the scientific spirit and the democratic inspiration entered the churches as a leaven? Do we not hear now from the great majority of the pulpits much about honest thought and brotherly love, and little about divine decrees and the program of the end of the world? Why is not our liberal Christianity and Judaism scientific enough and democratic enough to suit the demands of a new piety? Why seek outside the long established church for the means of propagating the new piety?

These are questions which should stand at the beginning, not at the end of a discussion. But I should not feel that I had finished what I wanted to say, unless I tried to answer them briefly. In a word, the church, in all its forms, seems to me so seriously compromised, by its long subjection to now discredited authorities, that it cannot freely run the way of the new piety. It has in the first place a language that has to be endlessly manipulated to make it inoffensive and effective to-day. Such terms as atonement, inspired scripture, the resurrection, the divinity of Christ, predestination, the Virgin Birth, the Trinity, and many more, are all awkward, controversy-

provoking, persecution-stirring formulas which embarrass the church in its humanitarian cause as a ball and chain about the ankle of a runner. The church drags them along, bravely, trying to persuade itself that somehow they are too valuable to be dropped. But to my mind they are like the pack that Pilgrim was carrying in the allegory: and when they roll off the back of good souls there is rejoicing and relief.

Christianity is compromised again, in that it has given answers to great problems, which now are felt to be absolutely insufficient. These answers have been fixed in creeds, and the creeds are still made the test of admission to service in most of the Christian churches. The new piety does not, as some of its opponents claim, ignore the mystery and depth of the questions with which these creeds of christendom deal: man's nature and destiny, the problem of evil in a harmonious universe, the reach of the human spirit for an experience larger than its physical and mental ministers here permit. But the fault of the Christian church in the eyes of the seekers after the new piety is that it has given unverified and unverifiable answers, unsatisfactory and often unethical answers to these great problems and then declared that a man must accept these answers on pain of his eternal punishment. We are asked to call a mystery solved by accepting as answer another mystery just as great. This is an unscientific principle entirely. It is on a par with the "explaining" of the eclipse to the Chinese. A great dragon swallows the sun, they are told. So their question is quieted by the stimulation of their imaginations in another direction. They learn gradually to associate the real fact of the eclipse with the fictitious explanation of the dragon, until the two are so bound together that a doubt of the dragon seems like a denial of the eclipse.

St. Paul committed the same error of confession when he said: "If Christ be not risen our faith is vain." We all know scores of people of the sweetest and strongest faith, who do not believe at all in the resurrection of Christ, the denial of which St. Paul felt would make him "of all men most miserable."

Christianity is compromised further, in that its creeds are a dividing and not a uniting influence. Every creed is made to shut off a portion of humanity from the rest. When the test of piety is made a subscription to some statements which your equally conscientious neighbor cannot agree to, you have a denial of the principle of democracy, and an evil, disintegrating, weakening influence is introduced. Is there any thing on which good men differ so hopelessly as on creeds or on which they unite so heartily as on conduct? Yet the church has steadily maintained that the creed and not the conduct was the primary thing: that the conduct was only a corollary of creed; nay even that good conduct without the creed was offensive to God, as an arrogant attempt to show that we could live a righteous life without the supernatural grace mediated by the church. The new piety of democracy stands for the fusion of good men. That never can be accomplished on the basis of supernatural faith. The existence of a single devoted, self-sacrificing, pure-hearted man outside the communion of the synagogue and church is enough to convict the creed of ineffectiveness as a basis of union for the new piety of democracy.

I know that the spirit prevalent in most of the more liberal communions to-day is one of great sympathy with every scientific and humanitarian advance; that the embarrassing and repelling features of the faith they still adhere to nominally are ignored or mildly set aside in practice, that they are nobly seeking to make the

church an inclusive and reconciling institution in spite of the exclusive and severing influences of its standards. A very distinguished English clergyman on a recent visit to this country said, all the while defending the supernatural and holy character of the church: "What the best men and women of the new generation appear chiefly to want is, first of all, to be assured that the Christian church does not regard any servant of the ideal as outside its pale." But while this sentiment sounds most democratically pious, it proves on the slightest analysis to mean either the surrender of the holy church or nothing. For what have the wishes of the best men and women of a new generation, or of any generation, to do with a divinely established institution, which itself proclaims to them what they need and does not consult them as to what they want! and if the pale of church extends to embrace all servants of the ideal then Abraham Lincoln and Ralph Waldo Emerson and Robert G. Ingersoll and Voltaire and Felix Adler and the Buddha must all be counted members of the Christian church, for they have all been devoted, impassioned servants of the ideal. They all *do* belong to the splendid democratic church of the new piety. And that is the church the liberal English Canon of Oxford was thinking of, most likely, when he spoke of the Christian church as not regarding any servant of the ideal as outside its pale.

The new piety is not hostile to religion, it is not hostile to Christianity, it is not hostile even to orthodoxy and priesthood: it is simply in principle the negation of orthodoxy and priesthood, the completion of Christianity, and the realization (*i. e.*, the making real) of religion. It preserves and cherishes all that is vital or constructive in the faiths of the past: the moral fervor of the Hebrew prophets without their particularism, the unity and ca-



tholicity of the Roman Church without its uniformity and compulsion, the independence of Protestantism without its intolerance. The new piety claims Isaiah and Jesus, St. Paul and St. Francis, Martin Luther and John Wesley, for its fathers and preachers. No word of courage or holiness or brotherhood ever spoken but was a contribution to this new religious birth. No spot on earth too lowly to be its cradle. No type of human mould too mean to be its prophet.

The new piety rises thus like a sweet incense out of the midst of this toiling humanity, born of its tears and laughter, its loves and fears, its joys and its chagrins, its failures and its triumphs. The labors of science build its firmset temple and the sweet converse in love of human voices are its liturgy. It wrests the scepter of man's spiritual destiny from a distant hand and puts it into his own. It sets upon his head the crown of freedom, and sends him forth to meet his generation with the high dedication which the poet guide speaks to Dante on the confines of the earthly paradise:

Libero, sano e dritto è il tuo arbitrio,  
Perché io te sopra te corono e mitrio.

"Free, sane, and upright now thy will,  
Wherefore I crown and mitre thee lord of thyself."

**Statement of Principles of the Philadelphia Society for Ethical Culture, June 1st, 1885. (Adopted June, 1885.)**

1. We believe that morality is independent of theology. We hold that the moral law is imposed upon us by our own rational nature and that its authority is absolute. We maintain that the moral life should be brought to the foreground in religion.

2. We affirm the need of a new statement of the ethical code of mankind. The formulations of duty which were given by the great religious teachers of the past are not sufficient for the changed conditions of modern society. We believe that moral problems have arisen in this industrial, democratic, scientific age, which require new and larger formulations of duty. Hence, a new interest in ethical problems and a profounder study and discussions of them are demanded.

3. We regard it as our duty as a Society for Ethical Culture to engage in works of philanthropy on as large a scale as our means will allow. The ultimate purpose of such philanthropy should be the advancement of morality. When we contemplate the low moral state of society and its indifference to moral aims, we feel called upon to do what we can to raise our fellowmen to a higher plane of life and to awaken within them a deeper moral purpose.

4. We hold that the task of self-reform should go hand in hand with efforts to reform society. The mere fact of membership in an Ethical Society must be regarded as a tacit avowal of the desire to lead a wholly upright life and to aid in developing a higher type of manhood and womanhood than has been known in the past.

5. We believe that organization is indispensable to carrying out the aims of ethical culture and that this organization should be republican rather than monarchical. While we recognize the need of public lecturers, we believe that the work of ethical culture in its broadest sense,—the study, the discussion and the application of ethical principles,—should be carried on as far as possible by the members themselves.

6. We agree that the greatest stress should be laid on the moral instruction of the young, to the end that in the pure hearts of children may be sown the seeds of a higher moral order, that early in life they may be impressed with the worth

and dignity of human existence and that work for social and individual perfection may be carried on with larger and nobler results from generation to generation.

### **Objects of the American Ethical Union.**

1. The General Aim of the Union is: To assert the supreme importance of the ethical factor in all relations of life—personal, social, national and international, apart from any theological and metaphysical considerations.

2. The Special Aims are: (a) To bring the organizations in the Union into closer fellowship of thought and action. (b) To promote, and to assist in, the establishment of ethical organizations in all sections of the United States. (c) To organize propaganda and to arrange ethical lecturing tours. (d) To publish and spread suitable literature. (e) To promote ethical education in general and systematic moral instruction in particular, apart from theological and metaphysical presuppositions. (f) To promote common action, by means of Special Congresses and otherwise, upon public issues which call for ethical clarification. (g) And to further other objects which are in harmony with the general Aim of the Union.

### **AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION.**

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THE following classes of contributing members of the Union, have been authorized by the Executive Committee:

1. Any person paying \$3 a year shall receive **Ethical Addresses**, and whatever free literature is published.

2. Persons paying \$5 a year shall receive in addition to the above the **International Journal of Ethics**.

3. Those paying \$10 or more a year shall receive all the above literature, and be entitled to special privileges in connection with the Summer School of Ethics and the work of the Union.

Checks should be made to the order of the American Ethical Union, and sent to the Secretary, S. Burns Weston, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

# ETHICS IN THE LIGHT OF DARWIN'S THEORY\*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

THE great name of Darwin has been recently much in the public mind. There is no doubt that he has exercised a profound influence in certain fields of thought. No one can look on the world and life after reading "The Origin of Species" and the "Descent of Man" quite as before. If I were to speak of religion, or rather theology, in the light of Darwin's theory, I should have to say that the change was almost a revolution. There is more or less of a feeling that ethics is to undergo a change as the result of a similar cause—that the great laws of natural selection and the survival of the fittest are against some of the sentiments and practices that have been honored and held sacred in the past.

It is well to be quite honest and frank in this matter. It might even be said to be a part of ethics itself to see things as they are. There is nothing too sacred for examination. Things may stand or they may fall—only those ought to stand that can meet the tests of investigation and thought.

The sentiments and practices that are called in question are principally those growing out of the sympathetic instincts. It is said that they go counter to the law of evolution—to the process by which higher and higher species

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\*A Sunday address before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago, March 21, 1909; repeated at Philadelphia, April 4, 1909. The greater part of it is taken from an address delivered in May, 1893, which will account for the lack of reference to more recent statements of opinion.



are developed. This process, as Darwin has analyzed it and described it in language which perhaps will be always associated with his name, is something like this: A struggle for existence is ever going on among living things: in this struggle some are better equipped than others; those better equipped have the advantage, and maintain themselves and perpetuate their kind more successfully than others. As a result of this process going on from generation to generation more and more perfect beings are evolved, the less perfect tending by the same process to be eliminated. This is the meaning of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. Those most fit tend thus to possess the earth.

To pass at once to human illustrations, Darwin observes that among savages the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated and that those who survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of everyone to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. Accordingly there are those who draw the conclusion that philanthropy, charity, *i. e.*, the attempts of the stronger to help the weaker, are against the evolutionary law. Some simply condemn public charity, others private charity as well.

Perhaps, if the logic were thoroughgoing and consistent, not only charity but justice would be condemned,

*i. e.*, when exercised toward those who were not strong enough to get it for themselves. It might be held that people not vigorous enough to assert their rights and powerful enough to secure them, were of an inferior sort and not entitled to consideration. Few go so far as to say this, yet there is a tendency in such a direction. Humanitarianism—the old idea of a man's a man, however disadvantaged and handicapped—is questioned. We see the tendency in the treatment sometimes given to inferior races—in our own treatment of the negro. Justice toward the black man elicits little more sympathy from many than charity. We incline to the notion that every man should take care of himself, and we need not help him. This is, of course, not the result of Darwin's theory—but some give it this interpretation; and Lowell some years ago spoke of the possible "effect of Darwinism as a disintegrant of humanitarianism." An English man of science, Maudsley, has asked: "Are not people nowadays, with their incontinent compassions, their benevolent aspirations and their socialistic longings, making too much account of the individual?"

Professor Sumner, of Yale College, whose point of view comes out in a remark that "every man and woman in society has one big duty—that is to take care of his or herself," questions whether the policeman should even pick a drunkard out of the gutter; and there are other writers of less distinction who say that drunkenness, like licentiousness and other vices, like war, pestilence and famine, in a way promotes civilization, since it is the weaker who are the readiest prey to these vices and by their destruction more room is made for the strong and the capable. One writer tells us that "the question of degeneration under sanitary influences is well worthy of attention and investigation." In accordance with such suggestions one

might think twice before favoring such preventive measures as great municipalities are apt to take, when a visitation of the cholera or other plague is dreaded, for at the worst it would be the relatively less sound and healthy constitutions that would be carried off by the disease—not to mention the fact that those most successful in the struggle for existence, “the rich, comfortable, prosperous, virtuous, respectable,” as Professor Sumner calls them, would probably be able to take themselves off betimes out of harm’s way.

Now unquestionably if such a way of thinking as this became general, there would be a change in our ethics that would be almost a revolution. Our ethics—the ethics of western civilization—is largely a Jewish and Christian product; the views of the Jewish prophets and of Jesus have mainly contributed to make us what we are in this respect. To them tenderness for the weak and help were a primary duty. Christianity carried the doctrine of the sacredness of human life as such, to Rome—and into the empire everywhere, though the best there was in the old pagan philosophy coincided with it at this point—and thence the doctrine has come down to us. But according to the new view that claims the sanction of Darwin, this is sentimentalism. One exponent of it says that it is only a broadened egotism to which the new ethics leads, never reaching to Christian altruism. It is no scheme of liberty, equality and fraternity; but universal brotherhood gives place to the narrow tie of blood, and equality must yield to the claims of birth. The new view “involves a new ethical code, and a very militant and positive one”; it may not be called “a religion, but it might be a banner to fight under and conquer by.” The question is, How far is such a revolution in ethics really justified by Darwin’s theory? I think—strange and almost self-contradictory.

dictory as it may sound to say it—that the new morality, so-called, is in accordance with Darwinism and also that the old morality is in accordance with Darwinism.

There is quite another class of facts than those to which I have referred—facts which Darwin himself brought to notice. Perhaps I may best introduce a mention of them by referring to a difficulty which Darwin says he met with in working out his view.\* The difficulty was the presence of a class of sterile workers—the unfruitful females—among the bees. This seemed at first sight, he tells us, fatal to his whole theory; for it is obvious that sterility is nothing that can be hereditary, and moreover, even the tendency to sterility in a class must be opposed to their success in the struggle for existence. How then on the principles of natural selection and the survival of the fittest account for such a class, and its perpetuation in the community? The thought of the great naturalist was forced to take a new turn, and the difficulty was dealt with in the following manner: Any class of individuals considered merely as individuals, with whom a tendency to sterility existed, would tend to extinction; but is a community, he asked himself, merely a lot of individuals, each one maintaining and perpetuating itself according to its own individual capacity and fitness—is it not, in some sense, itself an individual? For if a community is, in a sense, a whole by itself, competing as a whole with other communities, then the same principles of selection and survival may apply to it that apply to individuals in general. I venture to say that this was one of the most fruitful lines of speculation which Darwin opened. A social standard of selection and survival was

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\*I am indebted in what immediately follows to Prof. C. C. Everett's summary statement in "Poetry, Comedy and Duty," pp. 283-4.



thereby suggested as contrasted with an individualistic standard. In this community of bees, for instance, a class of sterile workers—*i. e.*, those who worked to the exclusion of everything else—were, on the principle of a division of labor, an advantage. A community which developed such a class would hence have a superior chance of surviving and reproducing itself as compared with other communities not so organized. It seems that Schopenhauer long before Darwin had expressed the view that a community of bees develops classes of members adapted to special functions, much as a body develops special organs. A community may be plastic in much the same way that an individual life is, and the variations arising which are for the good of the community, which give it an advantage in the struggle for existence, may thus be selected, transmitted, perpetuated, under the operation of the same law which we ordinarily think of in relation to individuals alone.

And now I think we are prepared to look at morality in a new light. When we speak of men, we ordinarily think of individual men, singly and isolatedly; but morality cannot be understood from this point of view, and the truth is, men do not exist singly and isolatedly, but more or less like bees in a hive—that is, they are parts of a whole, members of communities, tribes or nations. We are led then to look at the sympathetic instincts from a novel standpoint. It may be admitted that if men were individuals simply, struggling against one another, sympathy would be no advantage but rather a hindrance—and that the law of selection would be against it: the race would go to the swift and strong alone. But as matter of fact men have always been members of larger wholes, their individual lot and welfare have always been more or less part of a general lot and welfare, and hence that

which binds the whole together comes to have an altogether peculiar significance.

It is hardly too much to say in the light of Darwin's investigations that the sympathetic instincts are not only an advantage to a community in the struggle for existence, but are a condition of the community's existence. Animals themselves and even insects are sometimes social in their nature and aid one another in important ways. They warn one another of danger; they render one another homely little services—as when cows lick each other on a spot that itches; they defend the weaker members of their group—as when on our western plains the bull-bisons in time of danger drive the cows and calves into the middle of the herd, whilst they defend the outside. Every reader of Darwin's famous chapters bearing on this subject in the "Descent of Man," will remember the instance of the brave baboon he gives, who like a "true hero" came down among his dreaded human foes to rescue a young one of his troop. Here too we read of the Indian crows who fed two or three of their companions who were blind, and of the baboons in confinement who tried to protect one of their number when he was about to be punished. These may be rare instances, but who does not see that the sympathetic instincts thus revealed are in their ordinary exercise the means by which a company of animals are held together and made strong, as against their enemies and whatever obstacles may be in their way? If the bull bisons did not protect the cows and calves, that is, help those who had not sufficient strength to defend themselves, what would in time become of the herd? It is evident that as between a herd or tribe with sympathetic instincts and one in which each member cared for itself alone, natural selection itself would favor the preservation of the former and the ex-

tion of the latter. Of course, there may be animals, for whom it would be of no advantage to be in close association with one another; but, for those to whom it would be an advantage, a variation in the direction of sympathy and the social instincts would tend to be seized upon and perpetuated by natural selection, like any other favorable variation. As Darwin himself puts it, "the individuals who took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers; whilst those that cared least for their comrades, and lived solitary, would perish in greater numbers." Or again, "those communities, which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish most, and rear the greater number of offspring."

Apparently then there is a place for the sympathetic instincts in the world—even in the animal world; and according to Darwin himself. In fact, had the rule always been acted on which the so-called new ethics is proposing, the rule which would say, let the strong and capable care for themselves and not interfere to prevent the weak from suffering the natural effect of their weakness, it is doubtful if the race of man would ever have arisen—yes, it is doubtful if more than a few species of animals would have existed. Sympathy is that which unites man to man and animal to animal, and gives to each member of a group the strength of all. Voltaire hit it right when he represented Nature as saying to man: "You are born weak and ignorant. Help yourselves and help one another." For man, for all beings who live in society, the law of mutual help is as primordial as that of self-help; at least the readiness to help one another is a fundamental requirement of social existence. If a man says, "all should stand alone; I can and those who cannot may as well fall," he forgets the very processes of development by

which the race was made and the elements that have gone into its constitution. Let me quote Darwin again. When, he says, "two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other." Such a tribe would then in the natural course of things spread and be victorious over others. If it should be itself in turn conquered, it could be only (other things being equal) by some tribe more richly endowed with these same moral and social qualities. And thus, as Darwin remarks, these qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused through the world.

Darwinism may thus be looked at in two ways. According to one aspect of it—the one most commonly thought of—it is likely to act as a disintegrant of humanitarianism. According to the other it may, in my judgment, be a most powerful supporter of humanitarianism. Darwinism itself is consistent with both tendencies. For Darwinism, properly speaking, is not an ethical theory, nor does it tell us what is right and wrong, in which case, of course, two opposed moral tendencies could not be equally consistent with it; it simply shows how things arise in the world, more particularly how species arise, and more particularly still the human species and the various qualities of man's body and mind. It is a theory in natural history that it provides us with, not a standard of morals. It places facts before us and the conditions of survival. In a purely individualistic struggle, such and such qualities are needed; in the struggle of a community or people to live, additional or even contrary qualities may be needed. In both cases, the essential principles of Dar-



winism hold good; in both struggles the fittest survive, and variations in the direction of greater fitness are preserved and accumulated. But the fittest in the one case may not be the fittest in the other; in the struggle of an individual for himself a hard and narrow morality may be an advantage, in the struggle of a community, unless the individuals composing it have a morality of a contrasted type, the community will suffer. Which shall one serve, himself or the community? I cannot see that Darwinism gives any light upon that. It simply says that for an individual good one set of variations are useful and are likely to be preserved; and that for a public good another set arose. Certain qualities an individual or a family must have or they will go down; certain qualities a community must have or it will go down—but if an individual does not care for himself, or, what is still more possible, if he does not care for the community, what difference do the facts of Darwinism make to him?

I affirm then that Darwinism does not vitally affect our view of ethics one way or the other. It leaves the old problem of human duty, the question of what is the ultimate highest good to man, essentially where it was before. It is simple confusion to say that it is on the side of those who would have us give up our sympathetic, humanitarian instincts and I echo the remark of Mrs. Carlyle that "it is the mixing up of things that is the Great Bad." Darwin and others, who have studied in his spirit, have indeed shown how imperfectly civilized and humanized our far-away ancestors were, even though they had the social instincts to some extent, but none of them have proposed that we set up those half-human beings as models for us—and so far as the personal feelings of Darwin went, they were plainly on the side of sympathy and pity for the weak and unfortunate. Once, after admitting (in

language that I quoted earlier), that civilization keeps alive many whom savages would allow to perish, and that some degeneration of the race is thereby caused, he adds, that even at the urging of hard reason we could not check our sympathy without deterioration in the noblest part of our nature. And quite apart from Darwin's personal opinion, his theory is quite compatible with what we are wont to regard as the highest morality. An honored teacher of mine, Professor C. C. Everett, once touched upon this aspect of the subject in eloquent language, which I must allow myself to quote. He is speaking of those who would ignore the place and utility of unselfishness in society, and who think that things go best when everyone simply realizes his "one big duty" (as Professor Sumner calls it) of taking care of himself. "Sleek and prosperous selfishness gives a certain element of strength to a society. For a time it may furnish to it a stable foundation. But it furnishes a power of disintegration as well. In times of peril, selfishness will give its money, it will not give its life, for the common cause. It is not the children of a line of ancestors who have been bound together by the golden bands of self-interest that, in a moment of peril, a nation can summon to its defence. It is not those who have learned to repress the natural instincts of humanity, who see no longer the sacredness of human life, who are willing to extirpate suffering by the extirpation of the sufferers,—it is not these that can catch the grand enthusiasm which makes men willing to die before they know whether the good they seek can actually be purchased even at that costly price. I am not comparing these different types of character by any sentimental standard. I am bringing them before the bar of that stern power who is now recognized as the judge of all the earth; and it is in the light of these judgments that

I affirm that he who urges on the authority of Darwinism the hard morality that has been described, has failed to comprehend the working of those laws of which he speaks." \* As I read these words, a passage from one of ancient Israel's prophets came to my mind: "Behold this was the iniquity of Sodom,—pride, fullness of bread, and abundance of idleness; neither did she strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy. And they were haughty and committed abomination before me; therefore I took them away as I saw good." Did Ezekiel too have the feeling that selfish prosperity was disintegrating, that a city which did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy was on an insecure foundation? And what essential difference, I have sometimes been led to ask, was there between the God of the earth in whom the prophet believed and that dread power of natural selection, known and discerned by the science of to-day, which favors and gives long life to good and just communities and puts the mark of doom on bad and inhuman ones?

So far as facts and history go, there is more to show that Darwinism favors unselfishness than there is to show that it favors selfishness. I mean that the powers of natural selection on the whole encourage unselfishness, since only by unselfishness, as shown in patriotism, public spirit, mutual helpfulness, are a people or community made enduring and strong. Individuals may prosper otherwise, but a long line of individuals hardly can—or if they do, it is only because they take advantage of a state of things which men of a different spirit have done most to create and maintain. The tendency of a wise unselfishness is fortifying; the tendency of selfishness, on the other hand, the inevitable out-

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\*"Poetry, Comedy and Duty," pp. 289-290.

come of it, late if not soon, is loosening and disintegrating. It is quite true that with all its public spirit, a community may not maintain itself; but then this result would come from other causes than the public spirit, while selfishly would work directly to that end. Men of the type whom Dr. Maudsley and Professor Sumner would seem to favor might doubtless be supported in a community, but they could hardly make a community; or if they did, it would not be likely to be the victor in a struggle with another community that was made up of those who were knit together by ties of mutual love and service and were inspired by a common enthusiasm. People who are left to themselves in slums, who are forced to live on starvation wages, hardly make good citizens, as would be found out if a community which had many of them had to fight for its life. It is inspiring to fight for one's fireside and home; but the aspect of the matter changes when one has no fireside or home worth mentioning. At least when wars are possible, it pays to be sensitive to the wants of the poor, to be just, to be humane, to be even generous, to obliterate the line so far as possible between the different classes in society; it was perhaps with a shrewd thought of this sort that Napoleon once remarked that the idea of equality seemed to have the sanction of heaven. And even in times of peace, indifference to human wants and needs may be poor policy. Professor Sumner in suggesting the possibility that advancing civilization, instead of raising the victims from the bottom, may crush them out altogether, says that if the slums of the city were turned loose on society, they would very likely be destroyed, either by society or by the strong arm of the law—adding that this is a line of thought never followed by the sentimentalist. Oh, yes it is, but the sentimentalist (so-



called) has a sentiment about the shedding of blood, and he cannot help reflecting on what a lot of energy would be spent in shedding blood that might have been devoted to making the slums impossible. And so which ever way we turn, unselfish interest in the interests of others, seems to be an advantage to a society, or, to use Darwinian language, to be a variation in the direction which natural selection favors.

But for all this I am aware that because natural selection favors a thing, it does not make it right, and I suppose that we can only be happy that natural selection ordinarily works in this direction.

It is the prerogative of man to have a mind which comes to discover things which would be true even if they had not been discovered, and I have a conviction that this holds also of the distinctions of right and wrong. Once with a vision of true principles of action, we know that they would have been true, even if they had not been brought within our ken. Let me illustrate. Darwin says—and if this were taken as an essential part of Darwinism, ethics would be radically changed under its influence—that if men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.\* I can only reply that if human beings should think in this way they would be in the wrong—and that they would be nearer right if they should all consent to die and to put an end to their hive and to all their works rather than live and prosper on the basis of such monstrous practices. These practices may be all right for the bees in their conditions (if there is any

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\*"Descent of Man," p. 99.

proper right or wrong for them at all), but they would not be right for human beings, whatever the conditions. In other words, we have in some way or other risen to the sense of an ideal; it is an ideal born of the social instincts and really represents them in their completion and perfection. It is the ideal of humanity, of the sacredness of each and all, an ideal in view of which there are no worthless members of society (save as there may be those without the social instinct) in view of which the maimed, the blind, the deaf, the incurably diseased, the man with a black skin, and the man with a red skin, all of whatever rank or station or stage of culture, all who have the possibilities of humanity in them are precious—none to be left out of account, none to be carelessly sacrificed, all to be cherished, helped and strengthened to the extent there is need. In the changing life and development of men this ideal has arisen, but it is not subject to change any more—save in the direction of intensifying it and applying it. For man this is good, and it alone is good.

Professor Huxley said, "it is an error to imagine that evolution signifies a constant tendency to increased perfection. That process undoubtedly involves a constant remodelling of the organism in adaptation to new conditions; but it depends on the nature of those conditions whether the direction of the modifications effected shall be upward or downward." There is then, according to this master of science, an "upward and downward" measured by other standards than those furnished by evolution itself, or the survival of the fittest. There is a "perfection" from which evolution may fall away as well as toward which it may rise. Professor Huxley conjectures the possibility of a retrogressive metamorphosis in the future, of a time when evolution will mean adaptation to a universal winter and all forms of life will die out, save

the lowest and simplest organisms. It seems a difficult and almost impossible thought to us—yet if it should come true or should be on the way to come true, we should have to face the possibility that natural selection might sometime favor cruelty rather than what is humane, so that the critical question might be forced upon us whether we preferred to live, ignoring and denying all that made us human, or would choose rather to relinquish our grasp on existence? I have seen speculations about the distant future, picturing life then as brutish, cruel, base, with only enough intelligence left to man to make him, I should suppose, conscious of his misery and shame. Who would wish to live or to have offspring at such a time? Who would not say, Quit with life—save in so far as one could be of help to others? To care for life when one could not remember the ideal, when one could not live humanly, would be unworthy.

“You have too much respect upon the world;  
They lose it that do buy it with much care.”

We have to be prepared for everything in this world and to build on no uncertain hopes. To my mind, it is a mistake to build our ethics on Darwinism or on natural selection—to make simple adaptation to environment the supreme standard and to will life at whatever cost. We will take what comfort we can from Darwinism, we will hope and trust for the future of the world; but the final guide of our action is the pure idea of the mind I have described. When at last the good dawns on us, we can never part with it. If we have to choose between it and life, we choose it. Yes, we belong to it, and in life and death will trust it. This it is to rise to a divine life on the earth, to be divine men—and the strange feeling may come to us that if

“Our bark sinks,  
’Tis to another sea.”

## AIM AND PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE OF CHICAGO

The general aim of the Society for Ethical Culture is to interpret morality in the light of science, to give it reverence and devotion, and to make it a ruling influence in the lives of men.

1. We recognize the truth that the well-being of the state in which our interests are so vitally concerned is intimately bound up with the well-doing of its individual members. We wish in every possible way to strengthen and deepen the foundations of virtue in the private heart.

2. We consider just and rational views of our relation to the Universe in which we are placed to be obviously essential to the proper comprehension of our duty. Where the mental vision is clouded by mists of superstition, no clear conceptions of duty are attainable. We welcome the light which modern science and modern thought are bringing in this realm.

3. The ancient forms of religious belief are undergoing an inevitable process of change. We approve of and would co-operate with all changes which increasing enlightenment and higher moral standards may require.

4. As there are general laws governing man's physical life, upon his obedience to which his physical health is dependent, so there are laws, as yet but imperfectly understood, underlying the life of society, upon obedience to which social security and well-being depend. The study of these laws is of the highest importance, both for the well-ordering of our own lives, and for enabling us to discover the true lines of social advance.



5. Having constantly before us the spectacle of debasement and misery resulting from the violation of these laws, often through ignorance, and realizing how inadequate the methods heretofore employed to cure these evils have been, as shown by the results, we feel that a sacred duty rests upon us, while we seek to correct our own lives in whatever may be amiss, to do all in our power to help the suffering about us, and to lift society to higher levels.

6. While not proposing to teach religion in the sense of a creed about the supernatural (and as little denying it), we do wish to teach and to practise religion in the sense of reverence and awe before the naturally or divinely appointed laws of life. Morality, so understood, is the supremely sacred thing to us; we recognize it as the comprehensive rule of our lives; it makes our religion. We accordingly wish to form a "religious" society.

7. With these convictions and in response to the solemn obligations which they impose, we do hereby unite in an association to be known as The Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago.

8. Our methods shall include lectures and discussions for adults and schools for the young, in which our principles shall be developed, propagated and advanced, and such other means as experience from time to time may suggest.

And we do hereby invoke the co-operation of all who earnestly think and feel with us, sincerely trusting that our union may become an instrument of lasting good to the community in which we live and may at all times faithfully serve the best interests of mankind.

## THE AIMS AND IDEALS OF THE ST. LOUIS ETHICAL SOCIETY

The Ethical Society of St. Louis was organized in 1886 under the leadership of Walter L. Sheldon for the purpose, as stated in its constitution, of bringing "morality into the foreground in religion." The older religious organizations have recognized morality as important, but as less important than right belief—an attitude which has found expression in the phrase "mere morality." This order the Ethical Society exactly reverses, and places right action, that is, action from right motives, first, and all things else, however important, as secondary. It puts the good life before orthodoxy of belief, deed before creed.

Historically the Ethical Society of St. Louis is an outgrowth of the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, founded in 1876 by Prof. Felix Adler, under whose leadership Mr. Sheldon worked for two years. Kindred societies were also organized in Chicago (1880-2), in Philadelphia (1885) and in Brooklyn (1906). These societies, though each is wholly independent of the other, are affiliated in an organization known as "The American Ethical Union." There is also an "International Ethical Union" which embraces kindred societies in England and on the continent of Europe as well as those in the United States. The one bond which unites these widely scattered organizations is the common conviction "that the good life is the supreme object of human endeavor, and that mutual help and combined effort are needed to attain this object."

The need of such organizations is emphasized at the

present time by the fact that, in the light of modern science and historical research, the old creeds, upon which the moral and spiritual interests of mankind have heretofore been supposed to rest, are rapidly becoming untenable, and there is danger that the loosening of the bonds of old beliefs may lead to loosening of the bonds of public and private duty. This danger is increased by the extraordinary material development of our time with which have come increased temptations to subordinate moral welfare to material gain. In politics, in business, and in private life the great need of the time is now and always has been fidelity, courage, character. But in a civilization of ever growing complexity like our own at the present time, with the ever increasing interdependence of its units one upon the other, the primal need of character becomes so great as easily to outrank every other social requirement.

To meet this need, to combat these tendencies, which threaten the health if not the very life of society, and to place conscience upon the throne as the supreme authority, is the aim of the Ethical Society.

In the ethical life, which we seek to foster, lies the germ and promise of all that is highest and best in religion. For "ethics thought out is religious thought; and ethics lived out is religious life." We therefore offer no creed and exact no pledges. If we protect and nourish the root the flower will take care of itself.

That a society with such aims has an important mission and a great future is our abiding faith, and we earnestly bespeak the aid and fellowship of all who are like-minded.

# THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF EASTER\*

BY PERCIVAL CHUBB.

## I.

TO-DAY we would join with the glad world about us in keeping the feast of Easter,—the ancient feast of the vernal equinox, the world-wide festival of early spring.

The heart of man is glad to-day with an ancient joy, a joy which—though he know it not—is more ancient than recorded time. As far back as the memory of our race reaches, spring in the tree and the grass has made spring in the heart and mind of man. As the world about him has broken forth into beauty and song, his own awakened heart has joined in the singing. With rite and carol and dance, with flowers and garlands, he has celebrated the resurrection of new life out of the wasted body of winter: the victory of day over night, of light over darkness, of beauty over desolation. No songs are older and none are sweeter than those which greet the spring:

For lo! the winter is past,  
The rain is over and gone.  
The flowers appear on the earth,  
The time of the singing birds is come,  
Awake! Arise!

Easter, like other familiar names which men would not let die, those of the days of the week and the months of the year—this name has ceased to bring back the vision of one of those fallen divinities whom the White Christ

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\*An address given before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, Sunday, April 11th, 1909.



sent into exile. This name should recall the faded glory of a bright-haired goddess of the spring,—the Teutonic Eostre or Ostara. Among other peoples, the lovely goddess of springtide bore other names. She was the ancient Maia, who rules in our month of May; and Flora, the flower-laden goddess of the Romans. We may discern her blithe features in the Greek Persephone, whose foot-fall awakened the flowers when she returned in the spring to her yearning mother, Demeter, after her winter in the dark underworld. And she survives in later legend as that Sleeping Beauty who, at the kiss of Spring, awakens from her winter sleep into a new and entrancing life.

But it is as the Northern Eostre that she gives her pagan name to the greatest of Christian feasts. She would not die. Christian zeal failed to banish her; Christian scorn failed to degrade her, as other deities were degraded, into demon or witch or evil spirit. Her name lingers, and she still rules the hearts and imaginations of men.

When the early Christians could not stamp out an ancient feast, they transformed it. The pagan temple became a church; the pagan altar the shrine of a saint. As with the Christmas feast of Yule, so with the spring feast of Eostre; it was turned to new Christian uses: it was reinterpreted. The feast of the vernal equinox, which spoke of "life resurgent from the soil," was made the feast of another resurrection—the resurrection from the grave and the underworld of hell of the Christian Saviour of men. The festal interest was transferred to the drama of the betrayal and trial, the cross and passion, the burial and resurrection of the Christ. The Church succeeded in making a highly dramatic episode of its new story; and it has drawn on all the resources of art and music and poetry, of rite and pageant and drama, to make it impressive and grip the human heart.

The ecclesiastical feast of Easter which is being celebrated to-day is, then, a curious admixture of these two things, the assumed historic fact of the resurrection of the Christ, and the deeper poetic and spiritual parable foreshadowed in the old myths and nature-festivals. For the deeper minds it means spiritual regeneration; new birth, after death unto sin. It is a great illuminated version of the central spiritual truth of Christianity, that one must die to live,—die to the lower selfish self in order that the higher universal self may be fully born; die to the natural man of desire and lust and be born into the spiritual man of purified love. Each one of us, according to this view, stands convicted of sin, of imperfection, of weakness; he must have his purgation, his cross and passion; he must die and rise again into a new heaven of purged and purified life.

Now our duty in regard to this current belief is akin to the duty of the Christians in regard to the spring festival which they found. We must re-interpret, purify, deepen, enrich as far as we can. We cannot, we would not, accept the other alternative and ignore the festival. The joy of the season is in us. The pageant of earth's resurrection delights our eyes. The tide of new life which quickens the fruitful body of the great mother flows in us also,—a tide of new energy, new love, and new hope. The parable of resurrection, the wonder of regeneration, appeals to our spirits. We would be cleansed and reborn. We would escape from the winter of hardened sympathy, of frost-bound aspiration, into the spring of revived emotion, of intensified, forward-reaching life. Out of the dust of our dead selves we would bring forth new blossoms of the spirit.

## II.

Now, this work of re-interpretation has both a negative and a positive aspect. About the pearl of great price has grown a shell with its incrustations of ignorance and superstition. The shell must be broken and thrown away. Then the Easter idea will shine forth in its inherent beauty, in its truth and reality, its abiding value and power. This will become obvious as we proceed with our task.

In the first place, all that historical underpropping of the Easter feast, the story painted by the pious artists of Christendom, of a visibly ascending Christ rising towards a visible heaven beyond the clouds where the God-Father and his choir of angels awaits the God-Son—all that drops away: the vision fades from the world of fact as naturally and inevitably as that of Olympus with the Zeus-father and his circling Muses. That one-world universe, triple-storied, in Hell, Earth and Heaven, that flat earth with its above and below—is not the world we know; it is the guess of man's uninstructed childhood. Gone with it is the reality of that story of Man's Fall and Redemption. The great tragedy of the Atonement—that acceptable sacrifice of the son to the father—is but a repulsive survival of the barbaric idea of propitiation by human sacrifice—monstrous, savage, terrible.

Secondly, we may urge that to insist upon these material points is to confuse spiritual values with a vulgar passion for miracle and thaumaturgy. Thus religion becomes hardened and dead in the material fact. And religion must not be the slave of questionable historic fact. We would not, were it possible, stand agape with that little company who watched the miraculous ascent of the risen Christ. That scene, alas! is a sad reminder of the

fact that through the long centuries men have stood looking skyward instead of earthward, dreaming of the life to come instead of grappling with life that is.

However, the fact that miracles are unbelievable is less important to us than the fact that they have not spiritual value and significance. You tell me that Christ turned water into wine; thereby you merely appeal to my childish astonishment: you tell me that he converted hate into love, and you appeal to my spiritual interests and instincts. So is it with this story of the resurrection. Christendom repeats to-day its creed: "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried. He descended into hell. The third day he rose again from the dead. He ascended into heaven." Fact? No fable, childish fable. A parable? Very well; that is quite another matter. Ask me to approach the story as such; ask me to assume the same sort of imaginative attitude which I assume towards the story of the seizure and the resurrection of Persephone, and I may win spiritual values from the story. Here is "truth embodied in a tale, to enter into lowly doors."

"He descended into hell": We think of the hell into which any of us may have fallen, the hell of failure, of folly, of sin; the hell of accusing conscience, of a soul on fire with remorse and contrition; the hell where we may meet the reviling ghosts of our past unworthy, sinning selves. "He ascended into heaven": as we may ascend, new men, cleansed by the pitiless fires of regret, liberated, regenerated. Again we are on the solid ground of spiritual fact. This is a gospel of hope; bringing encouragement to him who shall strive to win

God out of knowledge and good out of infinite pain,  
And sight out of blindness and purity out of a stain .



Or it may be that the hell is that hell of vicarious suffering through a mighty sympathy with one's fellows; that "imaginative woe" (to use Tennyson's fine phrase) which the great Nazarene suffered—pre-eminent as he stands among all the great souls of history in absolute self-identification with those who suffer, who are weary and heavy laden, the unloving and unloved.

Again, just as soon as we leave behind the impossible literal interpretation, and take the imaginative meaning; there is another profoundly suggestive reading of the words of the creed. "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried. He suffered—was crucified—was buried." What great, repeated Promethean tragedy is here! The tragedy of those who loved and labored, and were hated and persecuted and died, that we might live, freer and truer lives. That scene on the cross at Calvary recalls all the great Promethean lovers and sufferers, heroes and martyrs: Socrates and Savonarola: Bruno and Servetus, who have ascended into the heaven of immortal memory and everlasting gratitude.

In the third place, and finally, from our human point of view, we can see no justification for that Christian salutation—"Christ is risen." Let our eyes wander questioningly over the world, and let us take the facts of life as we see them, sincerely and without flinching; and then let us turn back to the great teacher as he stands before us in the Bible narratives. How impossible it is to affirm that the distinctive and crucial things in his spirit and his beliefs are risen in the hearts of men, and rule their lives.

No, the Christ that died and was buried was not the Christ who rose from the dead and ascended into heaven. The Christ who died and was buried was the human Christ. The Christ who rose and ascended into heaven was the ecclesiastical Christ.

Of that human Christ, we must say in the words of the story: "We know not where they have laid him." We know not where to find him, or these cardinal teachings of his, in the hearts and consciences of men. Of that ecclesiastical Christ whose resurrection the churches celebrate to-day, we must say that we cannot recognize in him the features of the peasant prophet, the simple, loving, human, heroic, carpenter of Nazareth.

Why, this was he who admired the lilies of the field as more beautiful than Solomon in all his glory. What is all this pomp of ecclesiastical mummery to him? What all this ostentation of display in our modern civilization?

This is he who bade men take no thought for the morrow, and lay not up for themselves treasures upon earth where the rust and moth doth corrupt. What are these vast revenues, what is this fevered greed of accumulation, this passion of getting and spending to him?

And then, this human Christ is he who bade men love their enemies; resist not evil; do good unto those who spitefully used them. What outrageous mockery, what ridiculous travesty, what palpable infidelity is all this flashing of swords and crashing of cannon about the Christian world! all this restless movement of swelling armies and navies!

If there is anything which the unprejudiced study of the life and personality of Jesus reveals, it is a nature that hated strife and was convinced of the futility of force, that counselled non-resistance and endless forgiveness, who "brooded love and peace like a dove." And yet, daring to call themselves by his name, the great nations of Christendom glare in hate and suspicion at one another, armed for battle, and vie with one another in accumulating the implements of destruction, wasting life and treasure, oppressing the poor with the burdens of this mur-

derous policy. We who are without the pale of Christendom must dare to say that Christ is not risen while these things last. What is fundamental, crucial, in the teaching of Christ—the human Christ—is flouted.

And what strong voices of protest sound from the churches of Christendom? Where are the indignant followers of this prophet of peace and love? We should expect a league of the disciples of the Prince of Peace, who in his name would insist upon an end to this barbarism. No, Christ is not risen. We may not wish that the Christ of peace and love should rise. We may disapprove of his teaching. Very well. Let us be manly, and disown the name of Christ. But if we dare to call our civilization by his name, then let us sincerely face the brute facts of our regimes of force, and sorrowfully but honestly admit in faithfulness to the very spirit of this festal day, "Christ is not risen."

But Christ must rise. The spirit of that great hero must be reborn. Christendom must be born again into his spirit. That is the attitude and the declaration of the great man—greatest perhaps of living Christians—who from his rural home in Russia is trying so hard to re-interpret Christianity to what he believes to be a faithless Christendom. (Significantly, his greatest novel, "Resurrection," bears an Easter title, and is a profound treatment of the Easter theme of re-birth.)

To sum up this negative aspect of the case, we cannot keep Easter in the Christian interpretation of it: first, because we cannot accept the resurrection as historic fact; second, because we cannot permit the confusion of miracle with spiritual values; third, because we cannot say, looking at the life and teachings of the great Nazarene, that Christ is risen in the hearts and consciences of the men and women of our so-called "Christian" civilization.

## III.

Turning now to the positive aspects of the re-interpretation of Easter, our task is largely that of getting back and taking up lost clues. Before Christianity, the Greeks (to go no further back) had an insight into this idea of spiritual regeneration. Some such thought lay in the Eleusinian mysteries, and was conveyed, says a living scholar, "not through doctrine or creed, argument or exhortation, but rather through some form of drama in which the loss and the resurrection of Persephone was the central event, and which, like the Christian drama of the mass, quickened the dormant faith." The idea became clearer still in the later worship of Dionysos, in connection with these Eleusinian mysteries. "His mission," says this scholar (of Dionysos), "was to lift men out of themselves, and by bringing them into communion and association with that . . . which is nobler, higher and purer than they, to purge and renew them. He is the God of the cleansing in the ideal (what more apposite phrase could we have for our purpose?) He is the God of the *cleansing in the ideal*. . . . "As such Thebes sunk in her pollution, calls upon him by the lips of the Sophoclean chorus (in the "Antigone") to "come with cleansing foot over the slopes of Parnassos or over the moaning strait." . . . "Come," we might echo, "come the spirit of Easter, with cleansing foot, into our homes and marts,—purify us, cleanse us, uplift us with thy renewing power."

I must be pardoned if I pass on somewhat abruptly from these general considerations to some specific deductions from them. The keynote is that just touched on—cleansing. "The Dionysiac 'way of salvation' is the way of liberation and cleansing, (not, it is interesting to note,



by "mortification of the body and moral asceticism")." The festival of spiritual re-birth through purification,—liberation and cleansing—shaking ourselves free of the dust of our dead selves—that is the essence of the Easter idea.

We may seem to be dropping into flat prose when we connect this idea with the familiar, homely task of spring cleaning. And yet the process begins here. This is the first step in liberation and cleansing. We would be rid of the dust of the winter; would let the purifying and sweetening breath of spring blow through our homes and habitations; we would bring all we have into the air and the sun; cast away the outworn, repair the damaged. In olden days, people lit great spring fires; well were it for us to do likewise and cast to the consuming flames whatever is outworn among our belongings.

Let us go a step further. This spring cleaning and cleansing may be a liberation still more thorough. It should be the occasion of our getting rid of whatever we have outgrown, whatever is not vitalized by our living use and enjoyment. It should mean the shedding of all the dead matter we have heaped about us.

Our homes tend to become the repositories of a dead past. They reflect old and outworn admirations and interests. Here are pictures we no longer admire, and which no longer minister to our needs and aspirations; books, we would not, if we could, read again; endless bric-a-brac which has been heedlessly acquired, and serves no real and vital purpose in our lives. There should be nothing about us in our homes which is not a genuine source of life. We should rid ourselves of all those things which we have exhausted or which turned out to be bad investments. And what life has not, of necessity had its bad investments, its sincere but unsuccessful experiments?

This is an Easter gospel for an age of acquisition, an age of luxury and accumulation, an age of social toys. It is a gospel for a city that, conspicuous among the cities of the world, is over-furnished, over-dressed, over-fed, and over-amused; a city that needs a drastic spring purgation.

In vain is it that we try to make up for inward poverty of resource by outward display, by the trifles of whimsical and restless taste, by nervous clutching at new distractions. The emptiness of our lives cannot be filled by leaving no empty spot on our walls or on our floors and tables. We have accumulated so many things because we care so little for any of them.

The supreme achievement of the artist is to have nothing on his canvas that does not count,—nothing that distracts or perplexes. He has eliminated every irrelevancy; he has selected only what contributes to produce one strong impression. Our lives are to be gauged by the same standard. We must eliminate from them whatever does not tell, whatever does not help us to live. We must select only what feeds and builds, inspires and leads onwards.

This Easter season then is fittingly the season for those deep interrogations which look towards the liberation and cleansing of our lives. So we may lift our spring cleaning from a mechanical to a highly educational process. It is in such a spirit that we may boldly ask ourselves whether we are feeding our admirations on a few excellent things or dissipating them on many petty things? Is there room, margin, in our lives? Do they reflect the liberality of great interests and express ideal and serviceable purposes? Is our life over-framed: does the setting shame the work?

If so, then let the spring fires blaze, and their flames burn up the discarded toys and frouncings,—burn them

to ashes out of which shall rise, Phoenix-like, new-winged purpose and endeavor. Growth, growth, is the word of the spring. The more we grow, the less we need,—because a deepening appreciation helps us to get so much out of the great simple things.

But this external spring cleaning must involve another inward cleaning—a cleaning of the mind. Our minds accumulate dust as our belongings do, and need even more careful and courageous cleansing than our material possessions. There is a bric-a-brac of the brain as of the home. Our intellectual world tends to be strewn now-a-days with a litter of outworn furniture, and numberless chance accumulations of knowledge and of gossip,—the small change of the book and newspaper world.

Our intellectual investments are often just as reckless as our material; and our ventures just as likely to be unfortunate. We overfeed the mind as we do the body with dainties that fail to make blood and vitality. We yield to intellectual fashions instead of trying to satisfy our own vital needs as these find a focus in some steady life-purpose. What a spring cleaning is needed here also! What a sweeping from the brain of the scourings of newspaper and magazine, of worthless novels and plays, of decadent whimperings and sighings in unclean places. And all the time, the great things stand neglected. The little masters, very little, are read; the great masters are ignored.

And then, what a home of dead, outworn ideas our minds tend to become. How shabby and faded some of our old furnishings. One remembers what Mrs. Alvin says to Pastor Manders in that greatest of modern tragedies, Ibsen's "Ghosts": "I almost think we're all of us Ghosts, Pastor Manders. It's not only what we have inherited from our father and mother that 'walks' in us. It's all sorts of dead ideas and lifeless old beliefs and so

forth. They have no vitality, but they cling to us all the same, and we can't get rid of them. Whenever I take up a newspaper, I seem to see Ghosts gliding between the lines. There must be Ghosts all the country over, as thick as the sands of the sea. And then we are one and all, so pitifully afraid of the light."

"We are so pitifully afraid of the light." Here we reach the ultimate need; the need of cleansing the heart, the desires, the admirations and loves. We are afraid of the light because we do not love the light. Men are fundamentally what they are by virtue of their desires. The civilization about us is, to a large extent, the expression of our desires. Our lives, our homes, our culture, are indexes or desires—and show whether these are many or few, petty or massive, ill-considered and ill-controlled or deeply-pondered and well-ordered. The great disease of our modern life is the haphazard multiplication of wants, unrelated to any governing purpose, not standardized by any principle of value. We squander our admirations and dissipate our desires instead of massing and concentrating them.

Hence, the last and deepest and most difficult purgation to which our Easter celebration invites is the purgation of the desires,—those passions and appetites which may rise by a new spring birth into the pure loves and aspirations which nobly use the intellect and the will in their service. The Greeks definitely and systematically provided for this emotional purgation or katharsis by disciplines that were both physical and spiritual, by gymnastics and by music; but it was by the drama, by tragedy, that spiritual purgation was chiefly effected. It was effected by kindling the emotions of pity and fear, awe and terror, reverence and high earnestness. It was as if the greatest Greeks saw that we must all descend into hell—vicari-



ously, if not personally and actually. We must know that "imaginative woe," of which I have already spoken. If we have no suffering of our own we must enter vicariously into the suffering of the world; if we have no deep sins of our own, we must realize something of the tragic sin of the world. Our light-hearted happiness must become the solemnized blessedness made possible by a profound and delicate sympathy. The testimony of great souls is uniform here.

I shall close by citing in this matter the testimony of the great world-poet who has left us in one of the few supreme poems an instrument for such a purgation,—the story of such purgation—the descent into Hell, the ascent of the steep slopes of the Hill of Purgation, the attainment of the bliss of Paradise. It is our greatest Easter poem.

"He descended into hell." It was at daybreak on Good Friday in the year 1300. After a night of agonized wandering in the dark and tangled wood which represented both his own sinfulness and the corruption of human society, the great Florentine descended into the Inferno and began his conferences with the sinful dead. Virgil conducts him through this awful world that he may understand the nature of sin and the need of repentance.

"The third day he rose again." It was not yet daybreak on Easter Sunday when they issued forth from the fearful place once more to behold the stars,—the morning star of Love and the four stars of the Southern Cross, which symbolize the four cardinal virtues—stars which "made all the sky rejoice in their flames."

For four days now—representing the four periods of the life of man—Dante climbs the hill up which men laboriously climb to purge away their sins, and attain to moral and intellectual freedom.

What are these sins? And how are they caused? Dante's answer enforces the idea already indicated. These sins are in various ways the consequence of disordered love,—that is love which is not ordered according to the values of the objects to which it attaches itself. All our acts are impelled by some love or desire; on the one hand are those things that are perishably evil and on the other those which are imperishably good. Man is prone by his weakness, by appetite and low desires, to turn away from the imperishable good and to prefer the perishable evil. The master task of his life is therefore to order his love aright by controlling and discriminating his desires. The blessed life is the life of pure and well-ordered love. "Blessed are the pure in heart,—the cleansed." It is this Easter process of purgation whereby Dante's own nature becomes purged, and by the record of which he would purge other natures.

It is significant that when Dante has repented, the language he uses is the language of the springtide: "I returned remade, even as young trees renewed with new foliage, pure and disposed to ascend to the stars."

In sum then this spring cleaning and reordering of our world of things, this cleansing and ordering of the accumulations and possessions of the mind, this purgation of the heart, this reordering of love and desire, are the tasks of the Easter-tide—tasks of liberation, enabling us to live with a new vigor and a new joy.

This Festival of Spring is not the festival of accomplishment; it is the festival of promise, of potency, of hope. It suggests perpetual and endless renewal. It suggests that the regeneration of the spirit is not a finished and completed act; but a process, continuous and oft renewed. "Ye must be born again," said the teacher; aye, "again and again," we must add. We cannot achieve a

permanent new birth. We must take our hint from nature, and keep renewing ourselves. There must be returning spring-tides for us; repeated cleansings and liberations. About our lives the dust of our dead selves will gather; it must be shaken from us periodically. It will help in this, as in other concerns of the spirit, to make our definite seasons; to catch the inspiration from nature when she makes all things new; to bathe in her new light, glow with her new warmth; convert the dust of the wintry past into a new garden of spiritual blossoms.

That is the justification for our joining in the jubiliations of the world at the Easter feast. Of this feast itself, we must say in the spirit of the season that it too must be made new; must be reborn in the modern spirit. It is the tendency of old ideas, old rites and symbols to become opaque. The light of inner meaning ceases to shine forth from them. We would see through them to this light. We would look back beyond the empty sepulchre and the ascending Christ, back beyond the Eleusinian mysteries and Dionysiac worship, back beyond the early symbolism of the egg and the lotos lily—to the great primal mystery of life renewing itself from year to year and cycle to cycle—life ever fresh and pure and beautiful,—new life in the earth, with its accompanying new Easter-births of hope and faith, of courage and love in the hearts of men.

# SUMMER SCHOOL OF ETHICS

Under the auspices of the  
AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION

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## OFFICERS OF THE SCHOOL

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## SESSION OF 1909

AT MADISON, WISCONSIN

June 28th—July 31st.

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## COURSES.

### I.

#### THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS.

June 28-July 9. Ten lectures by Mr. Salter on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: their metaphysical view and its practical outcome; an exposition with incidental criticism. (Syllabus supplied at opening of the course.)

Given Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, at 3 o'clock; Hall of State Historical Library.

July 12-23. Ten lectures by Professor Adler on The Philosophy of Ethics applied to the chief ethical problems of our time.

Given Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, at 3 o'clock; Assembly Hall of the University.



## II.

## MORAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION.

(1) Five lectures by Earl Barnes on Relation of Moral Education to Stages of Growth in Childhood.

June 28. Right and Wrong in Infancy.

June 29. The Code of Ethics in Childhood.

June 30. The Transition Time in Beliefs.

July 1. The Aspirations and Struggles of Youth.

July 2. The Settling of Beliefs in Maturity.

(2) Two lectures by Prof. Votaw.

July 5. The Socializing of Church Ethics.

July 6. The Ethical Element in Sunday School Training.

(3) Three lectures by Dr. Elliott on Methods and Materials in Ethics Teaching.

July 7. The Spirit of Ethical Education.

July 8. Direct Ethics Teaching.

July 9. Methods of Indirect Moral Culture.

(4) Ten lectures on Social Education, or the effect of environment upon Personal Character.

July 12. The Social Function of the Family.—Dr. Albion Small.

July 13. The Social Function of the School.—President Van Hise.

July 14. Practical Illustrations of Moral and Social Training in the Public Schools.—Mr. Ormsby.

July 15. Children's Play and the City Streets or The Social Function of Recreation.—Miss Jane Addams.

July 16. The Social Function of the Church.—Mrs. Spencer.

July 19. Social Aspects of Political Organization.—Speaker to be announced.

July 20. Social Value of Racial Co-operation.—Mrs. Celia Parker Woolley.

July 21. Social Progress Against Modern Militarism.—Rev. Jenkin Lloyd Jones.

July 22. The Social Need for More Uniform Ethical Standards in Law.—Speaker to be announced.

July 23.—Social Values in Municipal Housekeeping.—Rev. Caroline Bartlett Crane.

Given Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, at 4 o'clock, Assembly Hall of State Historical Library.

## III.

Five lectures by Prof. Nathaniel Schmidt, on Ethical Tendencies in the Hellenistic World.

July 3. Philo and the Ethics of Hellenistic Judaism.

- July 10. Lucretius and the Ethics of Epicureanism.
- July 17. Dio Chrysostom and the Ethics of Stoicism.
- July 24. Apollonius of Tyana and the Ethics of Pythagoreanism.
- July 31. Augustine and the Ethics of Christianity.

Given Saturday evenings at 7:30 o'clock in the Assembly Hall of the University.

#### IV.

METHODS OF SOCIAL SERVICE: Ameliorative, Reformatory, Preventive and Constructive.

Thirty lectures by Mrs. Spencer, given mornings at the University; fifteen lectures on Principles and Methods, open to the public; and fifteen sessions of Round Table work, open only to students of the University, as follows:

##### DEPARTMENT A.

- June 28. Introductory: The profession of philanthropy; its ideals, methods and opportunities.

Four lectures in Survey of the Field.

- June 29. The Ancient Prison and the Modern Reformatory.
- June 30. The Delinquent Child and Youth.
- July 5. The Defective Classes and how to care for them.
- July 6. The Old Almshouse; The New Charity Organization.  
Two lectures on Classes wholly Dependent.
- July 7. The Pauper: His cost and his treatment.
- July 12. The Normal Child, Dependent or Abused: how to care for him.

Four lectures on the destitute and struggling and how to help them.

- July 13. Condensed study of Charles Booth's Tables. "The Submerged Tenth;" "The Other Half."
- July 14. An hour of "case-work." Personal ministry to individuals in need.
- July 19. The out-of-work, unemployed or unemployable.
- July 20. Personal and Social Uplifts for the employed but poorly paid.
- July 21. Specialties of Social Service; preparation and compensation.

Three lectures on Social Education; or constructive effort toward the acceleration of social progress through widening the area of personal power and efficiency. July 26. The Family; July 27, The State; July 28, The School.

Given Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, at 9 o'clock, at the University. Open to the public without fee.

## DEPARTMENT B.

Fifteen sessions of round-table work. Open only to students of the University who also take *Department A*. To consist of special lectures, supervision of assigned investigations and the preparation of papers to be presented as subject-matter for discussion. Two-fifths credit toward degrees granted by the University to those students taking 30 periods. Hours and place of class work to be announced.

## V.

## PRINCIPLES OF MORAL EDUCATION, WITH THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT.

(1) Sixteen lectures by Dr. Neumann, treating of principles that should determine the scope and method of moral education, with particular reference to the problems of character building.

June 30. Introduction.—The Problem presented.

July 2. I. The Child to be educated.

July 5. The function of experience.

July 7. The place of imagination, judgment, feelings, suggestion and will in character-building.

July 9. II. Educative agencies other than the school, and what the school can learn from them: July 12, The Home; July 14, The Gang; July 16, The Club; July 19, The Community; July 21, The Newspaper; July 23, The Theatre; July 26, The Church.

July 28. III. The School:

July 30. Values in organization and method.

Aug. 2. Values in the curriculum, particularly in literature.

Aug. 4. Direct moral instruction.

Suggestions as to material and method.

Given Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays at the University.

## VI.

## ORIENTAL HISTORY.

(I) Thirty lectures by Prof. Schmidt, on The Political, Social and Ethical Religious History of China, India, Persia, Syria, Egypt, and Western Africa, including outlines of important epochs with their leading personalities, events and movements of thought and life.

Given mornings at the University.

(See Bulletin of University Summer Session.)

## VII.

A series of evening conferences will be held at the headquarters of the School on

- (a) The history, aims and work of the Ethical movement;
- (b) Moral education direct and indirect.
- (c) Social education and movements of social progress; under the leadership of the Director of the School.

Open only to those registered as Special Students of the School.

For further information please address the Director of the School, 33 Central Park West, New York City.

## LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The management of the School of Ethics has secured as Headquarters, the Alpha Phi House, a pleasant and commodious Sorority house very near the University and restaurant. Evening conferences and special consultation hours will be arranged for in this building. A second house will be taken next door where students of the School can be accommodated if able to secure the opportunity early. For details concerning room, board and all local arrangements, please apply to the local Secretary, Prof. W. H. Lighty, Madison, Wisconsin, care of University of Wisconsin.

## SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

## MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION.

A delegate meeting of the American Ethical Union will be held in connection with the School of Ethics on the 10th and 11th of July, closing with a public session at which Dr. Adler is expected to speak on The Ideals, Aims and Methods of the Ethical Movement.

Program to be announced later.

## THE GENERAL AIM OF THE UNION IS:

To assert the supreme importance of the ethical factor in all the relations of life, personal, social and national: to promote moral education, and to aid in ethical clarification of social issues.

## MEMBERS OF THE FRATERNITY OF ETHICAL LEADERS.

Felix Adler	William Mackintire Salter
John Lovejoy Elliott	S. Burns Weston
Percival Chubb	Anna Garlin Spencer
Leslie Willis Sprague	David Saville Muzzey
Henry Moskowitz	Alfred W. Martin

President of the Union,  
 Prof. E. R. A. Seligman,  
 Columbia University, New York City.



## SKETCH OF GENERAL HISTORY, PRESENT ADVANCES AND PURPOSE OF THE SCHOOL OF ETHICS.

In the summer of 1891, the "School of Applied Ethics" held its first session at Plymouth, Mass. Thereafter, sessions, more or less formal in character, were held in New England or in the Adirondacks until 1908, when after a careful canvass of the situation it was determined to emphasize the national significance of the school by holding a session in the Middle West in some geographical and intellectual center of our country. Madison, the seat of the State University of Wisconsin, was chosen for the three weeks' session announced for the season of 1908, at which many of the leaders of the Ethical Movement (represented by the societies for Ethical Culture of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis and Brooklyn) presented an important program. The reasons for this choice of location were the following:

First. Madison is pleasantly situated in the heart of a beautiful lake country, accessible to many summer resorts in Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota. Almost upon the northern watershed altitude, it offers a clear air, good water and many climatic advantages. Madison is conceded to be one of the most charming University seats in America, offering unusual out-of-door attractions of boating, bathing, tennis courts, hand-ball, golf links, beautiful walks and drives.

Second. The University of Wisconsin occupies a conspicuous place among the foremost State Universities of our country. A member of the Moseley Commission characterized it as "one of the first if indeed not the first among all American Universities," and President Eliot, of Harvard, recently described it as "the leading State University in America." Its library is the finest west of the Alleghenys and in some departments of its collections is unequalled elsewhere.

Third. The University of Wisconsin occupies a unique position because of its leadership in social research and its active participation in movements for social welfare. In this respect, its service to the common life in the interest of true democratic advance offers a peculiarly appropriate background for a School of Ethics. The effort to raise the average economic and social condition of the people, and the efforts to inspire individuals with higher ideals and train them in ethical efficiency, must supplement each other in any effective scheme of race development. The special tendencies toward social helpfulness shown by the University of Wisconsin indicated, therefore, to the management of the School of Ethics a possible co-operation mutually valuable.

Fourth. The University has developed in its remarkable extension work an extra-mural University, handsomely supported by appropriations from the State, which has secured for it the title of "the most democratic University in the world." This

also indicates a possible means of extension of the work of the American Ethical Union which makes it worth while to study the methods of this University center.

Fifth. Madison, being the capital of the State as well as the seat of the University, an unusual and helpful connection has been made between scholars and the political life of the people, as shown in the fact that during the past year forty individuals serving the Commonwealth as teachers in this institution of higher learning, have also served the State in applied politics as experts and specialists upon permanent or temporary Commissions. These Commissions on railroad and public utilities, on taxes, and on free library extension, offer valuable points of study for students of the School of Ethics. The Legislative Reference Department of the Library Commission, which has contributed original service in the interest of scientific legislation for the public good, and the State Labor Bureau, which has done notable work in utilizing expert University aid in research and practical effort offer also important opportunities of study. In addition to these the American Bureau of Industrial Research, a private enterprise of national import, is established in the State Historical Library and directed by State University professors. In bringing together a vast collection of original material on the history of labor and social problems, and in the preparation of an authentic and reliable history, a great service is done. This collection includes some of the most valuable treasures extant, and has inestimable value for students of social problems.

Also, the Association for Labor Legislation with its headquarters at Madison, is the American Section of the International Association for Labor Legislation whose headquarters are at Basle, Switzerland. This Association publishes the Bulletin of the International Labor Office, and its work of investigation, and its bureau of information are conducted in co-operation with the Wisconsin Bureau of Labor, the Legislative Reference Department, the State Board of Health, the School of Medicine, and the Political Economy Department of the University.

Furthermore, in the movement for the conservation of natural resources, both State and National, Madison offers a center for comparative study; and in many other ways presents unusual advantages for such mature and earnest students as are naturally attracted to the School of Ethics.

The Session of 1908 was eminently successful in point of interest, attendance, and the representative character of audiences secured. 149 persons signed the cards of registration for the School—of these 34 were residents of Madison and 115 were attendants at the Summer session of the University of Wisconsin residing outside of Madison. Of these 115, 21 were professors and instructors in colleges; 11 were pastors of Churches and pastors' assistants; 12 were superintendents of public schools or heads of departments for training of teachers; 9 were social workers; 26 were high school teachers; and 2 were judges of

Supreme and District courts. 23 States were represented in the registration and many varieties of religious affiliations.

The decision to hold a second session of the School of Ethics at Madison was therefore made on the basis of the encouraging results of the session of 1908. The American Ethical Union in thus announcing its second acceptance of the courtesies of the University of Wisconsin, and in drawing special attention to the advantages accruing from the location of the School of Ethics at Madison, would also draw special attention to the fact that moral education for children and youth is now conceded to be a matter of supreme importance in America and ethical guidance in our social life is sought more earnestly than ever before and therefore, the School of Ethics may and should receive the earnest support of the public to which it appeals. The chief function of the American Ethical Union is to draw together, for helpful conference and co-operative action, those who believe in the supreme validity of the good life, and who desire to aid in meeting the supreme social need for intelligent ethical direction. The School of Ethics constitutes the most important method by which that function may be realized. A cordial invitation is extended to all who "would be of those that help the life of the future" to join the School and extend its influence.

## THE ETHICAL REORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIAL IDEAL.\*

"This is an age on ages telling,  
To be living is sublime."

DESPITE the many criticisms to which the present time is subject, there has surely never been a time in which humanity enjoyed the peace, security and blessings which to-day characterize the common lot. It seems that the times are evil because with the education and progress of recent generations a more sensitive feeling and conscience has been developed in the majority of men and women. Things are evil enough, we all know. There are crying wrongs to be righted, gross injustices to be overcome, needless suffering and shameful sins to which mankind must address itself. But the hope that every wrong shall

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\*The substance of this lecture, delivered extemporaneously before the Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture on Sunday morning, February 28th, constitutes the fourth lecture in a series on Social Ideals. In the preceding lectures of this series, Mr. Sprague had discussed the meaning and value of social ideals, emphasizing that "where there is no vision the people perish," and that ideals are the source of action, the progress of society being dependent upon the common allegiance to right ideals of what society should be and effect. Under "the heritage of social ideals" there were considered some of the watchwords of the recent generations, such as freedom, with its result in a generally accepted individualism; equality and the effort of many to overcome differences in rank, class and condition of the multitudes of men; fraternity, or as Mr. Sprague preferred to consider this aspect of the ideal of society, philanthropy or social beneficence; utilitarian emphasis upon efficiency, with the inevitable result that life should be measured in terms of possession and happiness; and democracy, which Mr. Sprague interpreted as at last not an ideal in itself, but a combination of these other ideals, and their application to the interpretation and organization of the State.



be made right and every evil overcome springs in the hearts of those who conceive somewhat of the great gains which the modern word has, through thought, effort and deepest sacrifice, in these new times accomplished.

The present time is characterized by a profound social awakening. The signs of the time are ominous of change. Expectancy fills the public mind. This awakening is seen in politics. Labor is becoming conscious of its possible political influence. Socialism is ceasing to be merely academic, and is becoming organic and politically aggressive. A great temperance movement, no longer relying upon a mere appeal to persons to be temperate, is gaining legal and political victories, especially in the South and West. Municipal reform has been seizing city after city in its throes during the past few years, and the end is not yet. In various States the dominant issue at the present time is between popular rule and the rule of the party machines

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The forces transforming the social ideal were also considered, and were found to be both practical or material and intellectual or cultural. Such external forces as the modern organization of industry, life in large cities, immigration, and the gradual closing in of the free opportunities of American life, were studied in their relation to various aspects of the inherited social ideal, and the opinion was expressed that each of these factors of the present social life tends to modify or discredit one or another of the older ideals of society. Among the cultural forces of the present day, also, such factors as the science of history, the social sciences, and especially sociology, and such newer outlooks upon social life as are afforded by socialism and social reform, were all seen to make for a discrediting of the older interpretation of individualism, equality, benevolence, and other elements of the older social ideal, with the added contribution of the sense of interdependence or solidarity, which constitutes an important element in the social ideal which to-day commands the loyalty of thoughtful citizens. The result of this gradual transformation was declared to be a wavering and uncertain social ideal, different classes of men, and different thinkers emphasizing partial ideals which often stand opposed to the ideals to which others with equal earnestness give their allegiance. All of these facts point towards the inevitable task of reconsidering and reshaping the social ideal which shall guide the way of future progress.

and corrupt rings. Even the national parties have felt the demand for a different sort of statesmanship than that which has often characterized the recent past. New issues have signalized recent national campaigns, and the activities of the government. Reform is the order of the day, even in politics, and will be the task of the immediate future.

The same impulse is being felt in the business life of America. There has been little less than a revolution in the business world during the past three or four years. The sentiment of the nation has been aroused through the investigation of various large financial institutions, insurance companies, public utility corporations, railroads, and other enterprises, and the efforts on the part of State and National governments to regulate these important concerns for the common benefit of the people has engendered the conviction that a better condition of affairs must be brought about. The average business man without doubt feels the quickening of this general sentiment, and this quickening is shown in the fact commonly recognized that many things which a few years ago the business man would do and consider justifiable or necessary, he to-day will not do or pardon.

A new spirit is also manifest in the educational world. Educators are not to-day leaning back in complacency upon the truly remarkable achievements of past generations, but are feeling deeply the shortcomings of the educational system, and are helping forward powerful movements looking towards the increasing of the efficiency, practicability and serviceableness of education. The effort being made towards the development of industrial education is indicative of the general impulse which educators are feeling. Legislation is becoming more and more vital, whether or not more wise as yet. Industrial

prosperity and social welfare are seen to be the concern of the State, quite as much as the mere protection of life and property.

Not the least significant of the signs of the times is the fact that charity is rapidly ceasing to be a mere palliative, and is striving to become remedial. Sanitary reform at least supplements the building of hospitals, if it does not as yet lessen the demand for hospitals. The conviction is growing that conditions which breed evil must be changed into conditions which will promote the good. The number of special students who are devoting their ardent interest to the study of causes is one of the assurances that a better future awaits mankind, for the way to promote the benefit of man will surely be found. One may hope for, expect, and with earnest courage strive to help achieve a future in which old evils still continuing and new evils still perhaps arising shall not have place.

But, in such a time of impending and portending change there is even greater need than at other times for a definite, illuminating, universally accepted ideal which shall serve society for guidance. Without such guidance progress in reform and reconstruction must necessarily be spasmodic, halting and at best partial. Only the fullest and wisest co-operation can result in permanent reform. Such co-operation can only be had upon the basis of a generally understood and widely shared ideal; for where the ideal is, thither the efforts of mankind will be bent. The one need, involved in every other social need to-day, is the need of a commanding and consistent ideal of and for society. One of the first and greatest tasks confronting humanity is just the task of determining what social ideal shall be upheld, to inspire the efforts and direct the enterprise of mankind.

Ideals, arising as they do out of human reactions upon

economic and social conditions, may be unfolded, unified, made concrete and potent, through the conscious effort of man's reason and conscience. It is here that the task of conscious social evolution should begin. Too long has man been governed by the blind, arbitrary, and slow-working processes of nature. At last, as he is learning to understand the evolutionary process, he is permitted to co-operate with nature and accelerate the working of nature's laws, and guard against the unconscionable waste of these arbitrary laws. The social ideal has hitherto been and still is primarily a mere instinctive reaction of man upon his environment. But the social ideal may be made conscious, and by man's effort be clarified and enriched, so as to more adequately inspire and guide him.

The first need is that the various elements of the social ideal, those which have been handed down from the past and those which have resulted from man's reaction upon new conditions, should be coördinated into a vital and consistent unity. As it is, one and another aspect of the social ideal serves for the guidance of one and another section, class, or part of society. One portion of society lives by the direction of the ideal of individualism, while another portion is inspired by the principle of solidarity. One group of citizens reveres the ideal of fraternity, while another group contends for equality, even without fraternity; and other men care for neither of these elements of the social ideal, but live for quite other ends. We have not so much a social ideal, as a number of different and often antagonistic social ideals, in American life at the present time. And men are divided by their ideals quite as much as by their personal interests and class and race prejudices. The task, therefore, upon which social concord as well as social progress depends, is the task of reconciling the conflicts of different elements of the social



ideal, which is to-day held. This task calls for the efforts of reason. It can only be accomplished by long and earnest thinking on the part of all members of society. It must be true that what is really valid in the ideal of individualism, is valid despite the seeming contradiction which individualism receives from the fact of interdependence or solidarity. What is true in the ideal of utility is just as true when regard is paid to the truth of the ideal of education and culture. Fraternity is no substitute for equality, nor does equality guarantee fraternity; but each is a part truth, which other part truths may help to make a whole truth.

The cry, "not charity but justice," is a valid cry, but it does not and cannot dispute the truth of the ideal of social benevolence. Philanthropy, as a feeling and as a fact, is an indispensable part of any right conception or ideal of society.

Our need, then, as Mathew Arnold phrased the personal problem, is that as citizens all should "see life steadily and see it whole." It becomes those who hold to one or another of the various elements of the social ideal, to strive to see the validity of other elements which fellow citizens cherish with the ardor with which they themselves cling to the ideal they have chosen. The socialist may well try to see the truth that is in individualism, and the individualist to see the truth in the ideal of socialism. The real value of one particular ideal is not known until it is seen in the light of the truth in other partial ideals.

To attempt this task of reconciling the seemingly inherent conflicts in the various elements of the social ideal, one may seek to find just what precious element of truth is contained in each. Analysis is necessary to right synthesis. If we attempt this search for truth we find that

individualism, to take this element first, contains a truth without which any social ideal were but poor. The real truth in individualism is the fact of personal uniqueness. Each human life, like each pea in the pod and every leaf upon the tree, because of what the scientist calls the law of differentiation, is different from every other. This fact of difference is a primal fact of life, and is not to be ignored. The truth in individualism is a moral truth first of all. Each person has a unique life to unfold, a personality unlike every other to develop and save. The course which one should take through life is already charted in his nature. No one, not even all society can wisely direct his course. He can himself discover the way only a step at a time. The course depends upon the development. It is of first importance, even to society, that individual worth, all individual differences should be conserved and furthered, while it is of equal importance that no life should prosper at the cost of others. Despite the age-long spectacle of selfishness, and the many false deductions from the principle of individualism, in which our own time is as rife as any, the fact yet remains that in individualism there is a truth without which both personal and social life would be less than finely human.

So is there a valid truth in the ideal of equality. The demand for equality must not, however, as often it does, lose sight of the primal truth of personal uniqueness. Leaving this truth out of account, there are not wanting those who interpret equality in terms of similarity, demanding like conditions, like opportunities, like possessions for all men. Since, however, persons differ, with an inherent and ineradicable difference, no two children of the same parents being very like each other, it must be that what one needs for the unfoldment of his life might be but injurious to another. It were surely a mistake to

give the same education, the same vocation, the same conditions to persons who are not the same in interests, capacities or needs. Victor Hugo gave the wiser interpretation of the meaning of equality when long ago he said, "Let society do as much for the individual as nature has done." The true ideal does not interpret equality as sameness, but recognizing latent and ineradicable differences in all persons, it only demands that each shall have the rights, duties and responsibilities which are to him what perhaps other rights, duties and responsibilities are to other men. Equality demands above all that none shall profit by another's privation, grow fat on another's leanness, be enriched at the cost of others' poverty. And as thus interpreted, equality is an indispensable element of any right social ideal.

Fraternity, or brotherhood, again is a precious ideal, if it means, as it ought, that despite the differences of men there is yet a common humanity underlying all the differences. It must, however, not leave out of account the uniqueness of individuals, the differences of races and nations, which are to be conserved.

Philanthropy, or social benevolence, as I prefer to call this element of the social ideal, must not be rested upon inequality of opportunity, nor made a cloak for the covering of injustice, but rightly understood and realized, in a way that supplements both individualism and equality, and expresses fraternity, the ideal of benevolence is most valuable. There will always, under any form of society, be those who because of inferiority in ability and skill, or because of injury or misfortune, will be unable to maintain their own lives. To return to Spartan rigor and dispose of the incapable members of society, would be to sacrifice not only the finer feelings of humanity which the long centuries have developed, but it would be to endan-

ger the very life of civilization. The cry against philanthropy, so far as it is a cry against the use of benevolence as a mere palliative, or as a means of helping to conceal the injustices which are so common in our social life, is a valid and needed cry; but in so far as it leaves out of account the inevitable need that the strong should bear the burden of the weak, it is shortsighted and evil. Social benevolence, as an element of the social ideal, complementing other elements, is a necessary and precious part.

The utility ideal, estimating personal life in terms of efficiency, and the value of life in material results, came as a needed protest against the otherworldliness of earlier centuries. It has often, like reactions in general, gone too far, and made it appear that the only end of life is to create, possess, amass things. The hold of this ideal upon the present generation is strong, and does not seem to decline with years. This ideal is, however, false only in its emphasis. A man ought to be efficient. Since he must work, why not work well and successfully? Things are necessary, and there is all too little material wealth in the world. Still, there are other ends in life than mere worldly success. Culture and character are as necessary as wealth. Above all, the utility ideal must not contravene the truth of the ideal of equality and benevolence. If it is to supplement these other elements of the ideal, it must first be corrected by their truth. A virile, efficient, triumphant and prosperous humanity is necessary; but it may also be a just and beneficent humanity. In fact the utmost of prosperity and worldly success must be seen to wait upon the fuller realization of the truths of individualism, equality and beneficence.

In like manner democracy, which is the application of these various ideals to the organization of the state, must rest at last upon the right adjustment of the mutually sup-



plementary truths in these various ideals. Democracy based upon individualism alone is little better than anarchy. Laws that help the strong to greater advantage, and put a premium upon self-assertion are worse than lawlessness. A democracy that should seek to realize equality, without regard to the essential and inevitable differences in human beings, would but set back the progress of society. A state that should lack benevolence, or forget the importance of the truth of the utility ideal, would be far from perfect. But a democratic organization of society, under laws that should safeguard the truth of these various constituent elements of the social ideal—such a democracy is the only means of promoting the approximate actualization of these ideals in the common life. The idea and ideal of solidarity, often held as little more than the crass cry for a material equality, is itself, when rightly understood, the focusing of the various elements of the social ideal into a consistent whole. Solidarity means the socialization of the ideals of life. The fact of interdependence, that, as Mazzini said, “we have no life apart from others,” is the great fact which reveals the inadequacy of any merely personal ideals and proclaims the need of social ideals, of a social ideal in which all ideals, personal and social, shall be unified, vivified, and made potent for the guidance of humanity.

To attempt an expression of the coördination of the various elements of the social ideal in terms of a single personal life rightly related in society, one might express it as follows: an individual conscious of, and attempting to realize and express his own unique qualities, his distinctive personality, always in process of development and never to be fully achieved; pursuing the material means needful for his life and its unfoldment, and using these means when acquired for his highest good; but also realiz-

ing that he has no life in which other human beings, in fact all humanity, is not involved, so that what he is and what he has he owes to others upon whom his being depends; knowing that he is to effect his own good in such a way as at the same time to promote the good of all, helping directly those with whom he is immediately related to the development of their unique personalities, and indirectly through his influence upon the conditions of life under which humanity lives aiding the development of all men, securing to each and all that which they need for the unfoldment of their unique qualities; knowing also, and living to his knowledge, that while different lives have different needs each needs what it needs as surely as his own life needs that which will be for its good, the ideal of equality determining that each shall have its own and none shall have what is another's; certain also that there are many human beings, who from lack of endowment, from misfortune or from some failure which it is too late to prevent, are unable to secure for themselves what their lives require, so that he must seek to benefit others in a special way, giving to them out of his acquirement of wisdom, capacity and wealth. Some such statement of the ideal in terms of the personal life may serve to indicate the practicability of that which I have tried to say.

Stated in social terms, this ideal would mean that society should be so constituted as to afford every individual the fullest and freest opportunity for the development of his or her unique life, in right and helpful relation with others who should be alike free and furthered; a society in which the strong should bear the burden of the weak, to the end that the weak should also become strong; a society in which progress in outward forms should accompany the growing needs of human beings.

The function of the reason in the reorganization of the

social ideal, which we have thus far considered, is, however, only part of the requirement. Conscience must supplement reason, inspire and reënforce it. The moral, as well as the intellectual nature must be brought to bear upon the problem. It is in the deficiency of the moral life that society is most lacking to-day. Other than moral motives are dominant in the present social life. Society has progressed along industrial, scientific and educational lines so rapidly that there has been little energy to give to the moral advancement of mankind. Old standards of morality are inadequate to meet the needs of new conditions of living and working. The old moral sanctions have for many lost their validity through the changes of the intellectual life. As a result, the interest of most citizens in the affairs of society is not so much a moral as a mere material interest. Will it pay? not, Is it right? is the common question to-day.

Even in the reform movements of the day I for one fail to see the moral interest as a dominant concern. The spectacle of poverty, the frightful and appalling spectacle which every great city presents of the multitudes of hungry, wretched, ill-kept men, women and children, appeals to sympathy and pity—the pity of those who cannot in their privileges feel with the poor; and not as it should to the conscience of mankind. The worst fact is not, as Carlyle declared, that men and women are cold and hungry and wretched in body, but rather that through such conditions they are degraded, the light within them darkened, their minds stunted and deformed, their very souls poisoned by the ignominy they suffer. The saddest fact is not that nerves are hurt, but that the human spirit is injured. It is the mere physical suffering that appeals to the sympathy of most persons, and therefore the efforts for relief

are directed merely to material conditions, and are spasmodic and largely ineffective.

In the political degradation of our cities and States that which impresses most citizens is the financial loss caused by boodle and graft. We are concerned that politicians thrive at the public expense, and occasionally indignant that government should be rendered inefficient; but we seldom feel as we should that what is infinitely worse than financial loss and governmental inefficiency—bad as they are—is that the sanctity of government is desecrated, that liberty, procured by the centuries of human suffering and sacrifice, is dragged in the mire.

There is more or less consternation in the business world when it is realized that manipulations on the part of financiers often render investments unsafe, that a man's small savings are endangered, and the funds which he invests in insurance, for his widow and children, are hazarded by the unscrupulous dealings of those in high places. There is reason for the consternation; but bad as is the financial insecurity which recent investigations have revealed, there is something vastly worse, and that is that by such acts on the part of those who speculate with the funds of others, honor is killed and the integrity of man becomes a mere jest. That policies and investments are insecure is not so bad as that men occupying positions of trust, holding in their hands the welfare of many thousands of persons, can stoop so low as to seek a personal gain at the sacrifice of their honor and fidelity.

If one looks at the luxury and extravagance which runs such riot in our city he may be moved to think of the unpardonable waste of that which human labor has created; but he whose conscience is alert will be forced to feel that the evil within evil is that any should so harden their hearts against their brethren, so close their eyes to



others' needs, and be indifferent to the ties and claims of humanity. Not that wealth is needlessly expended, but that humanity is denied, this is the sin of all luxury and extravagant living.

It is not the spectacle of selfishness, nor the social danger of selfishness, but the unpardonable sin of selfishness that should appall us. It is not the danger of greed and graft, but the sin of greed and graft against the eternal principles of justice and humanity which should affright. The evils of the age are violations of the laws of righteousness, of the eternal commandments of the moral law, as well as offences against society. And the way of cure lies not alone in the recognition of the violations of the principles of social economies, but much more in the realization of the rightness of helpfulness and the wrongness of injury.

In all ways, the coördination of the social ideal, the enforcement of the principles of a consistent and harmonious ideal, and the effort to realize the ends towards which such an ideal points, call for the quickening and enforcing power which alone can be had from the enkindled moral sentiment in man. The age needs not only a social awakening, which is already being experienced; but a profound moral awakening, which must come. The right social ideal, and the way which it appoints, inevitably awaits an alert, vigorous and enkindled conscience.

And the conscience will be quickened as all men work for the realization of the ends which they believe and feel to be right. The school of conscience is the school of effort directed by high purpose. Human ideals, personal and social, will develop as they have always developed, out of men's efforts to gain a better life. Every effort made for the improvement of social conditions will help to clarify the vision of what society should be, and point

the way to the higher goal towards which all should strive. That social reform is being undertaken, that social reconstruction is being agitated, that effort is being given to discover and to remedy the evils of the age, is the sure evidence that a larger, worthier, more commanding ideal will be developed, an ideal which in turn will point the way to still higher issues.

That which most retards the reorganization of the social ideal, and the realization of the promise which such an ideal would give, is the partial emphasis and narrow interests of different social classes, even reform parties and sects, as well as the stolid indifference of many men and women to any ideal, and the not uncommon lack of moral vision and impulse on the part of even some who consider themselves to be reformers. A broad and inclusive vision, a deep and fervent moral life—these are the needs of our time. These are the needs of all men and women, and whoso strives to gain these ends shall be counted a friend of man, and shall be a citizen of an enriching and ennobling society.

## WHAT TO BELIEVE

BY WALTER L. SHELDON.

BELIEVE that it is all going to come out right even when it *seems* to be coming out all wrong.

Believe that the strongest thing in the universe is the Strong Will.

Believe that the will is only strong when on the right side.

Believe that the strongest will is the will that first knows how to give in and obey.

Believe that you can make your life all over again and that it is worth your while to try it.

Believe that the grandest thing in the universe is doing what you do not want to do—*just because it is right*.

Believe that the next grandest thing in the universe is *not* doing what you want to do, because what you want to do would be wrong.

Believe that the strongest man in the world is the man who can keep his good resolutions.

Believe that it is worth while working for a Cause the success of which will not be realized while you are alive.

Believe that there is *something else, somehow, somewhere* fighting for you when you take the right side.

Believe that there is something else, somehow, somewhere fighting *against* you when you take the wrong side—not once but *always*.

Believe in war—not war against men, but against a bad *thing*.

Believe that other people have troubles as well as you—and that usually their troubles are a good deal heavier than yours.

Believe that when things are going against you is the time to apply in your conduct and feelings the principles you may have been preaching to others.

Believe in yourself—that there is something sacred in your being, a higher self, and that you *can* live up to the level of that higher self if you make the effort.

Believe in justice—that it *must* conquer, and that its triumph is of more importance than that just *you* should be prosperous and happy.

Believe in law—that there is something sacred about it, whether it be the law of Conscience or the law of the State.

Believe in your fellowman—that there is a man within the man which you are to respect even when you cannot respect the outer man.

Believe in mankind—in the value of those universal experiences recorded in the institution of *law* and *government*.

Believe that the law and government can always be improved and that the Book of Human Experience has not yet been closed.

Believe in your beliefs—believe in them with all your might; but believe in the honesty of other men who may not agree with your beliefs.

Believe that your beliefs will conquer whatever happens, because truth somehow *must* conquer.

Believe that your beliefs will *never* conquer, no matter what happens, unless *you* stand up for them.

Believe in the value of other men's experience and thereby save half your life from being a failure by endeavoring to show that you know more than everybody else.



## A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE BROOKLYN SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE

THE Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture exists and is maintained for the purpose, as stated in its constitution, of promoting the knowledge, the love and the practice of the right. As a further interpretation of its purpose the Society issues the following declaration of principles:

### I. WITH REGARD TO RELIGION.

That the essence of religion consists in an earnest effort to live in harmony with the moral law which governs human conduct.

That morality has its independent foundation in man's moral nature and his perception of the moral law.

That the moral law is absolute and sacred, as intimately involved in the nature of life as are the laws of gravity and motion; and this moral law determines what are the right relations of man to man in the family, in the community, and in all of the affairs of life.

That the effort to learn what are the requirements of the moral law, to realize its sanctity, and to obey its demands, is the most needful of all efforts; and that when this effort is made humbly, earnestly and reverently it is in the truest sense religious.

That the moral codes of all religions of the past and present reflect and interpret different aspects of the moral law—which all religions and philosophies have been concerned to realize—and thereby constitute a part of the

priceless heritage of the present age; but that no religion or moral code embodies all that is contained in the moral law, so that effort is still needed to discover its fuller meaning and significance—the value of different religions and moral codes being that they may contribute to the knowledge and inspiration which are needed for the continued search for moral truth.

That no individual, and no fellowship of individuals will be able to discover and understand the full meaning and import of the moral law; but that in the search for larger understanding of moral truth there is growth and progress, and in the fellowship of moral effort there may best be secured the incentive, direction and help which each individual needs in order to make progress towards moral self-realization.

## 2. WITH REGARD TO MORALITY.

That a supreme, if not the supreme, object of human life is the unfoldment and enrichment of the moral nature.

That commitment to the cause of moral progress is an indispensable factor in moral growth, and that a study of moral principles and of their application to the varied interests and problems of life is necessary for the moral fulfilment of the individual.

That for the development of the moral nature, every individual needs the challenge and assistance of a fellowship of men and women who are also seeking the realization of a higher and fuller morality.

## 3. WITH REGARD TO SOCIAL MORALITY.

That it is the duty of every man and woman to help to perfect the organization of society, upon which the indi-

vidual life is necessarily dependent, and for which each is to the measure of his or her influence responsible.

That a special duty devolves upon each individual in the present age to help to make more moral the human relations which exist in the family, in business life, and in the political organization.

That the fulfilment of these duties depends upon a knowledge of moral principles, and an understanding of the requirements of these principles as they are applied to social relations; therefore, that mutual help is needed in the effort to effect a more moral organization of society.

That to promote the moral good of society one must himself be moral and striving for a larger moral attainment, personal morality being the foundation of public morality and of all social progress.

In harmony with these principles, this Society aims not to antagonize any church, reform organization, philanthropy, or other agency of private or public good; nor primarily to itself achieve specific reforms, about which equally good and wise men are often at disagreement; nor to render particular philanthropic services, for the achievement of which various public agencies exist; but to help, in all possible ways, to realize a clearer understanding of the moral needs and of moral motives in all aspects and issues of the social life, and to inspire its members, and others, with a purpose to personally co-operate with such reforms and social organizations as may appeal to their interests and talents. This Society seeks to be an agency for moral progress, a centre of moral influence, a power for righteousness in the lives of individuals and in the life of the community.

Adopted April 26th, 1909.







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