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THE EUROPEAN WAR

VOL. III.

SEPTEMBER 1915 — MARCH 1916

By
Anthony Arnoux, Ph. D., LL. B.



THE GIFT OF
Prof. F. M. Taylor

F. M. Taylor

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Anthony Arnoux, Ph. D., LL. B.

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FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

THE comparative calm which obtained along this western portion of the end of the western battle front from late in August was not interrupted until the third week of September, when a joint offensive began on the part of both the French and the English. The joint offensive was commanded by Sir John French and General Foch and had as its purpose the forcing of a way between the projection of the line kown as the La Bassee salient and the river Scarpe into the plain of the Scheldt, while at the same time the French, under Gen. Castelnau, opened an offensive to the east of Rheims, between this city and the beginning of the Argonne Forest, with the object of throwing back the German line in this region to the other side of the Aisne River. The entire latter part of the summer the British had been engaged in forwarding supplies of men and particularly large quantities of artillery and ammunition from England, with this offensive in view, and indeed it was necessary for the British to supply themselves amply with artillery since the attack upon the German lines which they intended to launch was of necessity a frontal one which could not be delivered with any hope of success before the defences of the trenches of the existing German position were blown away and holes made therein by the artillery so that the infantry could advance. We will consider the western offensive first and discuss the eastern offensive subsequently.

The battle opened with feigned attacks both on the Belgian sea coast, and on land at points other than the points at which the real effort was intended to be made. On the Belgian sea coast, on September 24, the towns of Knocke, Heyst, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and thef ortifications to the west of Ostend were bombarded by the British fleet, and on September 26, 27 and 30 these places were again attacked, as well as Middelkirke and West-

ende. The object of these bombardments was to create in the minds of the Germans an impression that a landing in force on the Belgian coast, at some convenient point, was contemplated, to which these bombardments were the preliminary, and thus induce the Germans to send troops to the Belgian coast to protect these towns from such a landing.

The feigned attacks on land were upon the German positions in the Ypres salient and to the South of La Bassee. On September 25 the British artillery subjected these positions to a heavy bombardment and this bombardment was followed up with four infantry attacks. The first of these was on the German positions on the east bank of the Ypres-Comines Canal; the second to the South of Armentieres; the third to the north of Neuve Chapelle, and the fourth near Givenchy. The details of these attacks are not of very great moment. The first attack only lasted some three or four hours, and resulted in the British at first gaining some ground, but afterwards retiring to their original positions.

The second attack, near Armentieres, opened at about half past four in the morning and, after lasting until three o'clock in the afternoon, also resulted in the British, after an initial advance, finding themselves obliged to retire to the point from whence they had started. The attack near Neuve Chapelle had little better luck; a German trench or two were won, but no important progress was made. While the attack near Givenchy made almost no progress and need not be given further attention. Of course it should be said that none of these attacks were really expected to gain ground. Their object was to confuse the German commanders as to the point at which the real attack should be launched, and thus prevent them to as large an extent as possible from concentrating the strength of their reserve forces at any one point. This expectation of the British, however, was only met in part, since in spite of the rather naive mentality with which the British commanders credit their German opponents, in this war, at least, they have not been able at any time to mystify them completely, and on this occasion the British commanders did undoubtedly have, to some extent, the effect which they desired, and induced the German commanders to scatter a portion of their reserves; yet enough remained concentrated and mobile to be of paramount importance in the subsequent battle.

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

The line of German defences extending from La Bassee in the north to Vimy in the south were chosen as the objectives against which the real attack was to be hurled. The German line here at the opening of the fight was an irregular one. From the cemetery of Souchez which lies but a little to the east of the village, of the same name, this German line ran along the eastern slopes of the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette and through the Bois à Hasche to the east of Angres and Lievin and along in front of a low range of hills extending from the west of Loos to the west of Hulluch, and the west of Haines, until the line reached the Canal of La Bassee, at a point a little to the west of the road leading from Lens to La Bassee. The general direction of this line was, therefore, north and south, and in fact south of Souchez the line ran almost along the eastern side of the highway running from Souchez to Arras.

An almost straight road connects La Bassee, passing through Lens, with Vimy, and continues to Arras. This road runs along the crest of a line of hills of comparatively insignificant height, but which lift it above the plain to the west. Almost half way between La Bassee and Vimy, to the northwest of Lens, and at the foot of the westward slope of this line of hills spoken of, lies Loos. The ultimate object of the offensive which the British were about to launch was to capture Loos and the line of ridges running northeastwardly from it through Hulluch and Haines, as well as all the Vimy heights which were formed by the southern and highest end of this ridge which culminated at Vimy; the capture of either of which would have compelled the Germans to evacuate the rather important town of Lens and thus have considerably embarrassed them, owing to the resultant loss of control of the railways running eastward from Lens, in maintaining their line from La Bassee to Vimy.

But the progress of an attack to the East of Souchez, and of Neuville St. Vaast, which, as my readers will remember, had been the chief scenes of the intense conflicts in the earlier French offensive in this region, was rendered extremely difficult by the fact that to the east of these two places rose the long ridge of Hill 140, some 400 feet above the plain, which interposed itself as a formidable natural barrier, (made more formidable by intricate works of art and by artillery) to any advance of the Allies in this direction; particularly, as further

north the Germans held a whole system of trenches on the eastern slope of Notre Dame de Lorette and in the Bois du Hasche; to dislodge them from which would have been a work of extreme difficulty since their assailants would have come under the German artillery fire from Lievin, Angres and Givenchy and could themselves command no point of attack on Hill 140. Consequently it was resolved to deliver the main assault on the so-called Loos-Hulluch-Haines ridges which were not only about half the height of the hills northwest of Vimy, but were fronted by an easier country on the west and presented fewer obstacles generally; this phrase "fewer obstacles" is nevertheless to be taken merely as a relative expression.

The plain in front of these ridges was sprinkled with hamlets, mine-heads, and factory buildings of greater or less size, interspersed with slag heaps, and these and the other existing advantages presented by the terrain had been cleverly turned by the Germans into field fortifications bristling with machine guns and surrounded by the inevitable barbed wire defences which made it necessary to take each one of these little forts separately, in many cases only by hand to hand fighting. Certain more prominent fortifications existed as well; for instance, the Hohenzollern redoubt, which has figured so often in the bulletins, was located about three-quarters of a mile to the west of St. Elie on the La Bassee-Lens road, and a little further south, about a mile directly north of Loos, was another redoubt on the crest of the hill, which afterwards came to enjoy almost as much fame as the Hohenzollern redoubt; while, scattered over the western slopes of the ridge of hills in this direction, were numerous chalk-pits which had been fortified by the Germans.

Loos itself contained about 12,000 inhabitants prior to the war, but at the time of this battle was only tenanted by a handful of its former inhabitants. But in Loos, itself, was a bridge known as the "Tower" bridge, whose girders rose to the height of about 300 feet, and commanded the country for 40 miles around the town, which girders were used by the German artillery observers and gave them a considerable advantage over their rivals on the other side, since it enabled them to command the whole country-side without exposing themselves. From Loos to Hulluch on the north the distance is about 3000 yards. As has already been said, northwest of Hulluch lay the Hohenzollern redoubt, but between Hulluch and that fortification were a number of

stone quarries which the Germans had also turned into strongholds.

From here the German line of advanced trenches turned abruptly northwest and ran to a deep and well situated coal pit, whose high and long slag heap extended to within a half a mile of the village of Auchy. From this slag heap the German line ran almost directly north to the La Bassee Canal.

These German trenches were in three lines; the first running to the west of Loos, the second running through the town itself, and the third to the east of the town. These trenches were elaborately constructed and were furnished with electric light from a power station, as well as equipped with a telephone system which enabled the German commanders to keep in communication with all this portion of the lines. The British trenches south of the canal, ran parallel to those of the Germans, and at distances varying from 100 to 500 yards.

The British force occupying these trenches was composed mostly of seasoned troops, though the newly created Welsh Guards and the 21st and 24th divisions of Kitchener's new army, took part in the battle. Their force comprised, in addition to the troops that have been mentioned, the 1st and 2nd army corps under Sir Douglas Haig, as the assailing troops, and the 11th army corps as the reserve, in all, perhaps, from 125,000 to 130,000 men.

In addition to this large force of men concentrated on a comparatively short front of about 6½ miles, the British had provided themselves, during the months that preceded the attack in question, with an enormous quantity of large calibre artillery, and they had also added to their offensive equipment two weapons which were new for them; firstly, retorts for discharging a stupefying gas, and secondly, devices for creating large volumes of irritating and temporarily blinding smoke. In order to use these two weapons to advantage, it was necessary for the British to wait for the opening of their assault on the German positions, for a day whereupon the wind should not only blow from the west but also be of sufficient strength to carry the mixture of gas and smoke these being generated simultaneously across the distance intervening between the place of its liberation and the German trenches.

In theory, this mixture of gas and smoke would have produced a temporary asphyxiation and temporary

blindness, more or less complete, on the defenders of the German trenches; and this condition, once having been achieved, the rest was expected to be comparatively easy.

While waiting for these propitious atmospheric conditions, the British artillery was not idle but pounded away continuously on the German trenches. It was not until Friday, the 24th of September, that a westerly breeze sprang up. This breeze, however, brought with it a fine rain with considerable mist, and this, in its turn, creating mud, neutralized its promise that the succeeding day would be suitable for the assault, since the mud would make the ground very difficult for the infantry to advance over; a fact which should have been taken into consideration by a competent commander, but which, as we shall see later, was not.

CHAPTER II

All the rest of this day Friday, September 24th, the British artillery on the north and center of this front. and the French artillery to the south of it, kept up an unremitting fire upon the German positions, which was not even interrupted by the night, and which was probably as severe a cannonading as had been seen on the western front up to this time.

The Germans, who, apparently, did not suffer very greatly from the effects of this heavy firing, did not reply in anything like the same volume. Towards midnight, the cannonading grew slightly less and this slackening continued until about half past four in the morning. At this hour, the wind had slightly shifted to the southwest and was thus no longer as favorable for the success of a gas and smoke attack as it had been the afternoon of Friday.

The rain was continuing to fall, and during the night the ground had grown much heavier. At half past four the British opened a most intense cannonading. The cannonading of the evening before had been regarded as severe, but its severity was relatively slight as compared with that of the bombardment which now began. Certainly it was the severest artillery assault which the British had ever delivered in the course of their military history and it was probably fully the equal of any artillery assault which had ever been made up to that time in the war, on any front. It is stated that shells were fired along the five mile battle front at the rate of 600 a minute; while the noise was reported to be so terrific in its volume that persons thirty or forty miles from the battlefield heard it distinctly. This cannonading continued unremittingly until about half past five. At this time the British began to use their gas and smoke apparatus, and in the early morning light its clouds could be seen issuing from their trenches, but the wind played the British a trick on the northern portion of their line and carried the gas and smoke above and over Pit No. 8, the

Hohenzollern redoubt, the stone quarries and Hulluch; though towards Loos and Lievin the smoke cloud appeared to observers to have been wafted directly.

At half past six, in obedience to a silent signal, the roar of the British artillery ceased; though that of the French under General D'Urbal, further south in the direction of Souchez, could still be heard thundering; and this continuance of this French artillery, rather clearly indicated that it had not, up to that time, succeeded in plowing a way for the French Infantry through the mazes of the German defences which confronted it.

Very curiously, and for themselves very unfortunately, as the sequel shows, the British high command paid no attention to this apparent condition of affairs on the French portion of the front (the southern), but gave the signal for the assault by the British Infantry, and thus converted what should have been a concerted movement along the whole front by both forces, British and French acting as a unit, into a sole action by the British troops alone. In all probability, this gross blunder had more of an effect on the subsequent unfortunate issue of the battle for the Allies than any other contributing cause, though other contributing causes did not lack.

As said, then, at half past six the signal of the command for the British Infantry to advance to the assault was given, and the soldiers came pouring out of their trenches, their faces concealed in their smoke masks. But hardly had the British made their appearance in the open when so heavy a German fire began that it was at once perceived that the artillery had not made an adequate preparation for the attack, in spite of the number of hours it had been at work; so that the troops were ordered to return to the protection of their trenches and immediately the British artillery reopened on the German positions, in an even more severe bombardment than the one which had taken place earlier in the morning. This bombardment continued for about half an hour, and then, suddenly ceasing, the word to advance was once more given.

Between the Bethune and La Bassee Canal, on Pit No. 8, which, as has been said before, was almost directly in front of the Hohenzollern redoubt, the assault from the northwest made no progress; in spite of the fact that the assailants were veteran troops. The strength of the German artillery fire in this sector of the battle, both from La Bassee to the northeast and from the general

line between La Bassee and Haines, was so strong that it was impossible for any headway to be made, and the British, who fell in thousands, suffered a complete and sanguinary check.

Further south two brigades were thrown directly against the Hohenzollern redoubt and its advance defense Pit No. 8, in a frontal attack. One brigade, attacking the north of the position, devoted itself principally to the Hohenzollern redoubt, while the other, proceeding against the southerly end of the general portion, succeeded in throwing itself between the redoubt and the quarries immediately to the west of the hamlet of St. Elie, on the La Bassee-Haines road. The fighting which took place around the redoubt was extremely violent, as it was also around the slag heap and the buildings of Pit No. 8. Pit No. 8 and its western defenses were eventually stormed and seized by the British, but, in spite of their most desperate efforts, they were unable to penetrate into the defences of the Hohenzollern redoubt. Had the troops operating between the banks of the canal and Pit No. 8 attacking that point from the north succeeded in effecting the capture of the eastern defenses of Pit No. 8, this would probably have necessitated the evacuation of the Hohenzollern redoubt; but as these troops did not perform the task assigned to them, nothing threatened the Hohenzollern redoubt from the north.

Still further south another assault was made in the direction of the quarries opposite St. Elie. Here the British troops advanced rapidly and succeeded in capturing the quarries, and then when these were once in their hands an attempt was made to capture the village Haines to the northeast of the Hohenzollern redoubt. After much hard fighting and heavy losses, some British succeeded in establishing themselves in this village at about eight o'clock in the morning and in maintaining themselves there until five in the afternoon, at which time, being almost cut to pieces by the weight of the German metal which was poured in upon them from the east, and also being almost surrounded by the German infantry, they fell back to their main line.

Another attack struck at St. Elie but was unable to enter the scattered hamlet of a few houses itself, though they did at one time attain its outskirts; which position was reached a few minutes after eight. The German counter-attacks on this portion of the line from St. Elie

northwest grew stronger and stronger and it became apparent that if the British intended to hold the positions which they had won it was evident that they must be heavily reinforced.

With that curious misfortune which has attended all British movements in battle so far, during this war, where the British depend upon their own generals for the strategy and tactics of the fights, it was discovered too late that the reserves of these forces, the 20th and 21st divisions of the new army, had been placed so far to the rear that they could not be gotten up in time to influence the result of the fight. Though ordered to advance at 9.30 in the morning, so far back had they been carefully stationed, that it was nearly noon when the heads of their advancing columns reached a line to the west, approximately five miles from the battle line, and it was late in the afternoon before they reached a point at which they could be of any influence in deciding the battle; and then as usual it was "too late."

Another force, composed entirely of the Guards, was also ordered to reinforce the British battle line on its left wing, but this force of Guards did not reach the line five miles to the rear, already spoken of, on their way to the front, until the first darkness of evening had begun to fall. Still, another division stationed at Bailleul in the south, also ordered up to reinforce the British lines, in this sector, never reached those lines at all.

In the center the British were more fortunate. The force here was composed most largely of the Fourth Army Corps, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and, curiously enough, were in considerable part composed of members of Kitchener's so-called "new army." The advance here began at half past six in the morning, and in the early portion of the advance the British were considerably aided by the gas and smoke which, as has already been stated, was launched before the attack began. In the center the attack on Hulluch was made by two brigades, with one brigade in reserve. The first brigade to the north advanced very rapidly, capturing several guns on its way and in a short time penetrated into the environs of the village of Hulluch. But the brigade advancing south was not so fortunate, since it ran into a considerable extent of wire entanglements which the British preliminary bombardment had not destroyed. This delayed the advance of this brigade until the afternoon. Finally, after hard fighting, a portion of the brigade to

the north succeeded in turning from the north and northeast these wire entanglements and in driving their defenders out, after which the advance of the second brigade was resumed but did not proceed any very great distance before it became involved in the very desperate fighting which was then going on in the outskirts of Hulluch.

Still further south the advance was made by a Highland division, the 15th, which also began its assault at about half past six in the morning. By eight o'clock their southern brigade captured the chalk pits, as well as Pit No. 14 and Hill No. 70, with the redoubt crowning it; thus occupying about half a mile of the central portion of the road between Hulluch and Lens; some advance guards of this force even reached the hamlet of St. Auguste, a mile to the east on the road from Lens to Annay.

The northern brigade, in the meantime, had taken the redoubt on Hill 69, a mile north of Loos, and then, turning south, was assaulting Loos itself. A portion of this brigade, however, turned at the north and came to the aid of the troops in difficulties in the wire entanglements south of Hulluch already spoken of. For the next hour and a half this division in its entirety was subjected to a frightful fire from the German machine guns, located not only in Loos itself, but further east and in the environs of Lens, which played both on their front and rear. Towards half past nine the position of these troops became desperate, but the only reinforcements which could be sent them were a small force of artillery which advanced to their aid from the southwest.

Another brigade of the new army was also somewhat later ordered to the relief of this Highland division, but did not come up to them until long after the battle had concluded.

Further south there had started out about the same time in the morning from their original trenches in Greny two brigades of London Territorials, who were considerably aided in their advance by the smoke and gas which was discharged before their assault. After a hard fight, they dislodged the Germans from their positions on the byroad which led northeast from Greny to the Bethune-Lens road. Particularly hard fighting took place around Pit No. 5, and an old mill, which were located near the point where this byroad joins the Bethune-Lens road. After taking these, these two

brigades crossed the Bethune-Lens road and advanced towards Loos to the northeast. Between Loos and this road, however, was located the cemetery of the town, which the Germans had turned into a veritable fortress armed at every point with machine guns. A long, hard fight ensued here, but finally towards noon the cemetery was carried by storm, and this brought these London Territorials to a point from whence, attacking from the south and west, with the Highlanders simultaneously attacking from the north and east, a general assault upon the town of Loos could be delivered. The Germans, however, resisted strenuously; — not only was there street fighting, but house to house fighting; and the cellars, even, of the houses were turned into impromptu fastnesses: so that it was not until late in the morning, after a struggle of unrelenting bitterness, involving enormous casualties, that the British troops were able to clear the town of their enemies, nor was it till one o'clock that they were in possession of the ruins of the place.

There had been, perhaps, on the western front, up to this time, no single struggle of any size which had been so desperately fought inch by inch as was the combat which took place in Loos this first day of the battle.

CHAPTER III

While these events were taking place on this British portion of the front, the morning of this first day of the battle, to the south of them, on a line, roughly speaking, south of Greny to Souchez and Neuville-St.-Vaast, the French were engaged heavily; but here again an unfortunate incident occurred which seriously compromised the Allied hope of winning the objectives for which they were contending.

It has been previously remarked that when the British started from their trenches earlier in the morning and the sound of their artillery had ceased, the noise of that of the French to the south could still be heard. Prior to the advance of the British, General D'Urbal had notified General French that the French artillery had not yet succeeded in hacking down the German defences to such an extent that neither General Foch nor himself considered it wise to give the order for the French infantry to advance. In spite of this warning, however, that their allies were not ready to advance, and also in spite of knowing that for the general movement to be successful it must advance as a coherent whole and not in disjointed parts, the British persisted in starting their infantry forward at the hour which had been originally fixed. Whose fault this was, cannot be said. But as the British high command has since this battle chosen to ascribe the comparative failure of the movement to the slowness of the French generals in advancing their infantry, it seems well to call attention to the fact that the British had full knowledge that the French were not prepared to advance, when they advanced themselves, and that the consequent exposure of the British right wing to a flank attack, owing to the fact that the French line was not for six or eight hours in that position as regards this British right wing, in which it had been expected to be, was a risk which the British command had taken upon itself.

The French continued their artillery pounding all the

morning and did not attempt any infantry advance until twelve thirty when the infantry was hurled forward on Souchez. On their left, the French charged down the eastern slope of Notre Dame de Lorette, the hill which had been so fought over a few months before, and crossing the Hasche wood to the east of the Souchez-Aix road, pushed its advance as far as the Souchez brook which runs here southwest from Lievin through Souchez to Carency. This advance, however, was not achieved without considerable losses, because not only were these French troops ceaselessly shelled by the German batteries at Angiers, Lievin and Givenchy to the east of them, but also because the Germans had installed many machine gun defences on the battle terrain itself, which took their tribute of the advancing foes before they were stormed and captured.

South of Souchez, the French line advanced in strength on the chateau of Cailul immediately to the south of the town, on the cemetery a little further south, and at a point known as the Cabaret Rouge near the cemetery; while, in unison with this movement, infantry in serried masses was thrown forward down the lower slopes of Hill 119. Extremely hot fighting took place on this front.

The cemetery was taken, lost, retaken and relost; while the infantry on Hill 119 was held up by machine gun fire of such intensity that it was impossible to advance against it; and the batteries on the line of Vimy to the east poured an almost ceaseless stream of projectiles on the French who were attempting to move in its direction. This desperate fighting went on until darkness came and left the French no more advanced than the positions they had attained in their first rush, while Souchez and the cemetery were still in large part in the hands of their enemies.

We will now return to the English portion of the line. In the center, towards one o'clock, the Highlanders and the London Territorials, as has been said, were in possession of Hill 70, with the redoubt on its corner, and the outskirts of the village of St. Auguste, whose position has been herein above described.

The Crown Prince of Bavaria chose this time for launching a counter-attack upon the British in these positions which had been in the hands of the British for so short a time that they had not had a chance to fortify themselves therein. The result was that, having no shelter from the German artillery, they were obliged to give

ground slowly, but with the result that by night-fall they had been forced out of St. Auguste; and Hill 70, as well as its redoubt, had returned to their original possessors.

All this first day the rain had continued, but during the night it stopped and the following morning it was clear. In the center the Highlanders; who had been driven off of Hill 70 the night before and who during the night had made two other counter-attacks without success to recover it,. after artillery preparation again made a desperate attack on the German positions on this hill and had the support of two divisions of Kitchener's new army in this attempt. This attack, however, yielded no better results than the two which took place in the night. Towards noon the Germans, in their turn, attacked the British positions and succeeded in driving them out of Pit No. 14 and repossessing themselves thereof.

At this time the only advantage which the British had gained on their portion of the front was the possession of the village of Loos, and into this village, during the afternoon, they threw a very considerable force of troops. During this second afternoon, attacks were made by the British on Hulluch and at other points on the line, but except northeast of Hulluch where the quarries to the West of St. Elie were again recaptured by the British, they having been previously driven out, there were no changes in position until on the morning of the 26th.

On the French portion of the line, south of the British the French finally succeeded in establishing themselves during the day of the 26th in the terrain to the east of the Hasche wood. Souchez had been completely evacuated by the Germans, presumably owing to the useless cost of defending it, and the German troops which left it had taken up their positions on the western slopes of Hills 119 and 140.

This was all that occurred on the French section of the line that day, involving any change of the respective positions. Continuous hand to hand fighting, however, took place on the advanced lines.

* * *

Monday, September 27, the day broke cloudy and in the afternoon a pouring rain set in. The Germans, who attached great importance to the continued possession of the heights of Vimy which were the real French objective, threw reinforcements of the Prussian Guard into this terrain. The French remained quiet most of the day

preparing themselves for the general attack which they intended to launch the following day.

On the British portion of the front the British Guards division was brought up to Loos. These Guards, comprising two brigades on the advanced line, and a third brigade in reserve, with the London Territorials on their right, were intended to be launched in an attack on Hill 70 and its redoubt, Pit No. 14, and on the woods and chalk pits to the south and also towards the town of Lens which the British were exceedingly anxious to take.

The attack was launched at about 4 P. M. by the Irish Guards. To the south of them the Scotch Guards crossed the road between Hulluch and Loos and attempted to advance to Pit No. 14. A tremendous fight took place. The Scotch Guards pressed on and reached the buildings around Pit No. 14, while the Irish Guards, after many vicissitudes, succeeded in capturing a portion of the territory they had been ordered to take. To the north of the Irish Guards the Coldstream Guards, standing up against intense machine gun fire, managed to advance in the direction of the chalk pits, but by nightfall these troops had been driven by the Germans completely out of Pit No. 14 and its abutments, so that the Guards had only succeeded in capturing a portion of the chalk pits, and, digging themselves in from this position back towards Loos. The attack on Hill 70 was undertaken by the Third Guards brigade. This advance, as soon as it entered the trenches which led upwards towards Hill 70, was attacked by gas, but pressed on until it reached the summit of the hill. Here they were met by a strong German fire against which it was impossible for them to maintain themselves and they fell back to positions below the crest of the hill where they entrenched and remained until evening of the 29th.

To the north of the scene of the Guards' action, on Hill 70, last mentioned, the Germans launched an attack on the British position in the buildings of Pit No. 8, southeast of the Hohenzollern redoubt. Hard fighting ensued, but, in spite of their desperate struggles, the British were slowly forced back and finally in the afternoon obliged to relinquish their position and fall back to the northwest.

The following day, the 28th, the Guards, not being satisfied with the failure of their effort on the preceding day to retake Pit No. 14, in the afternoon made another attack thereon from the southwest, and in this attack

were supported by large numbers of British machine guns whose fire was concentrated on the environs of the pit, particularly to the east, as well as by heavy rifle firing from the trenches behind them. The Guards reached Pit No. 14 after extraordinary exertions, being opposed not only by a very strenuous defence by the enemy, but also by the very heavy condition of the ground. But on reaching this point, the Guards were unable to maintain the ground they had won, so heavy was the artillery fire the Germans threw in upon them, and, consequently, they fell back to their original positions.

With the failure of this attack it may be said that the British portion of the battle of Loos ended. The British had captured, as the net result, the town of Loos, but had failed to capture any of their other objectives, and the satisfaction of the taking of this unimportant (considered by itself) town had cost them, as was afterwards admitted, over 60,000 casualties. To offset this, they had taken perhaps, all told, 3000 prisoners and had inflicted a loss on their enemy of, as far as we are able to judge at the present time, about one-third in casualties of that which they themselves had suffered.

The cardinal fact, however, of this battle, so far as the British are concerned, is that once more the incompetency of the British commanders had been made manifest to the world. It is doubtful whether in any battle in modern history, at least, grosser errors in the most elementary dispositions of an order of battle had been committed by even semi-trained commanders, and it seems in this fight as though every chance wherein a blunder was possible was taken the fullest advantage of. The rank and file fought well and the troops of Kitchener's new army showed a steadiness and courage which, for troops of such comparatively little training, was extraordinary. It seems a great pity that 60,000 of these troops should have been forced to play the roll of a monument to incompetency.

The complete demoralization of the English commanders and of the English forces after the end of this battle is convincingly evidenced by the fact that the next day after an interview between Gen. Foch commanding the French troops and Sir John French, all the southern portion of the battle line held by the British including the town of Loos was taken over completely by the French troops which Gen. Foch sent up from his southerly wing for the purpose.

CHAPTER IV

We will now turn to see what was happening to the French while the events that we have narrated were taking place on the British portion of the front. The whole of September 27th was spent by Gen. d'Urbal in assuming the positions which, as we have seen, the French had succeeded in capturing in their first onslaught on the slopes of Hills 123 and 140 between Neuville Saint Vaast and Souchez and between Souchez and Angres, to the east of Bois en Hâsch.

On the 28th of September a several days' battle began by an attack by the French troops on the Prussian Guards on the westerly side of the Vimy Heights; that is to say, on Hill 140 itself. This attack gradually spread towards the North until it reached the outskirts of Angres. The positions were desperately fought over and the line swayed to and fro, now ground being gained by one side here and there, and almost immediately recaptured by a counter-attack of the other side along the whole length of the front. It is impossible to give more than the outlines of this fighting because the advances were counted in feet almost, were lost so rapidly and possibly again regained. Nevertheless in Givenchy Wood to the east of Souchez the French gained slowly but surely, and when, the offensive finished, about the 10th of October, they had possessed themselves practically of the whole of this wood and had even extended their line a little to the northeast of the wood towards Angres and had succeeded in installing themselves on the westward slopes of Hill 140, after a sustained effort of desperate character lasting over days.

On October 3rd, the Germans opened a severe bombardment of the British front from the southerly end of their line as far north as the La Bassee Canal. This was followed by an infantry attack on the British trenches between the Hulluch quarries and the road leading from Vermelles to Hulluch. While not successful everywhere, the Germans did succeed in driving the British

out of the Hohenzollern redoubt to the northwest of the quarries, and thus repossessed themselves of this important field work.

On October 8th another hard fight with the British took place on the line from Hill No. 70 to the north of the Hohenzollern redoubt. The Germans gained a little, but on the whole the fight can be called indecisive, though both sides suffered heavy casualties.

Thereafter, on this portion of the western end of the western battle front, before the November fogs and rains settled upon the scene, there was no particular activity except on one occasion, towards the middle of October, on the 14th, to be precise, when the British on the line from near Ypres, southeastwardly towards Loos, made an attack preceded by smoke and gas clouds, along nearly the entire front. This attack began early in the morning under favorable conditions of the wind which carried the gas and smoke clouds straight to the German trenches. Under cover of this, the British succeeded, to the immediate north of Loos, in capturing about 1000 yards of German trenches, including the major portion of the Hohenzollern redoubt which figured so prominently in the fighting in this neighborhood in the battle of Loos itself. Towards midnight, however, the Germans rallied and launching a desperate counter attack succeeded in driving back the English to the position which they had held in the morning when this action opened.

Of course during all these autumn months, from Ypres past the great "L" bend of the western battle line to the Champagne, there was more or less skirmishing, some of which occasionally developed into a fight of some local consequence, interspersed with artillery duels. But there were no movements which are of sufficient importance to be gone into in detail. Suffice it to say that none of these activities materially changed the position of the respective battle lines.

In the early days of November, the scheme of having only one General Staff for the French and British forces fighting in France was initiated and Gen. Joffre assumed the supreme command of both forces, but this did not produce satisfactory results. Finally, on the 15th of December, the dissatisfaction caused to Gen. Sir John French by this anomalous situation was ended by his removal from his command, and Lieut. Gen. Sir Douglas Haig was appointed to succeed him. It has been indeed

said that the British authorities had, as early as the end of August, 1915, determined upon retiring Gen. French from his command, but, owing to their inability to agree upon his successor, this intention was not carried out until this time. Gen. French's retirement cannot be fairly said to be in the nature of a disgrace. At the time the war broke out he was the only British General of sufficient rank, whose record in South Africa in the last war in which Great Britain had been engaged, justified even the hope that he was of sufficient military ability to assume the general command in the present war. But General French was essentially a cavalry leader and the campaigns of the west in this war have not been of a character in harmony with his prior experience, and, furthermore, he was hampered in every conceivable way, by those in control of the government at home, particularly in having only quarter trained troops, with even less trained officers, sent to him with the order to accomplish the wonderful results the British nation believed should be accomplished on its behalf.

History will possibly not be hard on Gen. French, and very probably will rate him as better than the average field commander, though almost completely lacking in those qualities of the strategist and of the army commander which the situation in which he was placed called for. His worst fault in his tenure of the chief command of the British troops in France was that he did not seem to have the ability to grow and expand in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the military employment entrusted to him. Sir Douglas Haig, who took up the command in succession to French had shown some ability as a field commander in the operations of the war prior to his appointment to the chief command, and has also the advantage of being ten years younger than Sir John.

After this change, quietness reigned on the whole of this portion of the front for some weeks, which was perhaps natural, since the whole of this Flanders-Picardy front is low ground and much more subject to rain than snow in early winter, so that no great degree of cold being obtained, and frequent thaws taking place, the ground becomes for most of the time, and remains even in the cold season, to a considerable degree, a morass of mud in which it is impossible to move troops or artillery.

Towards the end of December, Great Britain announced the withdrawal of most of her native Indian

troops from the western front. The seIndian troops had been a disappointment. In Great Britain's past fighting with semi-civilized tribes, wherein the fighting was of the so-called open order, and quickly over, the Indian troops had always done their share of the work and had; on many occasions, manifested great bravery, fortitude and endurance; but after the early days of the fighting on this western front, and after trench fighting started in, it became more and more apparent that the Indian troops did not have the morale necessary to stand the continual pounding of the artillery to which they were daily subjected, and they also appeared to be adversely affected by the climatic conditions.

As a result, many of them became afflicted with melancholy, and suicides among them were not infrequent, while others sought to escape from service by blowing off some of their toes or fingers. Indeed, so prevalent did this mutilation become, that the severest forms of punishment were resorted to in order to deter others from following the example of those self-mutilators; but, in spite of all the preventive measures of one kind and another that were attempted, the condition of the Indian troops grew steadily worse and their withdrawal from this front was in large measure forced.

Most of January was also fairly quiet, though there was an increase in the number and size of the semi-occasional skirmishes. Towards the end of January the Germans began an offensive movement northward from Arras which centered around the halfway point of the road leading from Arras to Lens, and extended as far west as a parallel road to the Arras-Lens road running from Neuville-St.-Vaast to Givenchy-en-Gohelle, which latter village is really the eastern end of the two-mile long village of Souchez, which borders a highway running at right angles to the last mentioned road.

All of these places are mining villages, located in a generally flat and very uninteresting country and all have been almost since the early days of the war the scene of almost continuous fighting. Neuville-Saint-Vaast, which has probably been mentioned as often in the bulletins as any other single town on the western front, is about six miles directly north of Arras, and directly to the east thereof is the famous "Labyrinth", so long and so bitterly fought over in the spring and early summer of 1915.

The Germans opened the fighting by a successful

attack on the French positions east and northeast of Neuville, wherein they gained considerable ground and took many prisoners on January 25th, and followed this up on the 31st by taking and holding the La Folie wood, a little further to the northeast of the positions taken on the 25th, thus extending their lines to the north.

The French made valiant counter-attacks during these days, but failed to regain the lost territory. The Germans continued to "nibble" at the French positions all this month and made steady progress in improving their positions, though on any particular day their gains were slight.

Most notable of their advances were, perhaps, the capture by them on February 10th of about a mile front of the French trenches between Neuville-Saint-Vaast and Vimy, which advantage was followed up the next day by the capture of another mile of French trenches to the northwest of Vimy. Subsequently, the interval in the hands of the French between these two miles of trenches was wrested from them, and these conquests united. Other successful nibbles followed. Finally on February 1st the Germans delivered an attack in force against the French trenches stretching north and south nearly parallel to the northern part of the road running from Givenchy-en-Gohelle to Neuville-Saint-Vaast to the east of Souchez, and succeeded in carrying the first line trenches over this whole front and the second line over a portion.

The result of all these advances was that on the first of March, when this record closes, the Germans had pushed their way well to the west of Hills Nos. 140 and 119 and were within a mile of the cemetery at Souchez, thus having recovered approximately three fifths of the territory in this region to the west of Vimy, which the French offensive of late September and October had won.

CHAPTER V

During January there was also some more or less heavy fighting south of the Somme river and in the Ypres sector, but as this fighting had but very minor consequences, it need not be here described.

Elswhere on this long front, during these months, there were numerous small fights. Hardly any of them, however, deserve more than casual mention. On November 7th at Boesinghe there was a struggle of considerable size just at the point where the French army to the east of the English took contact with the British line. Again on February 12th and on February 20th there was fierce fighting at this point, and the Germans succeeded in gaining some ground to the southeast of Boesinghe.

On the British front to the east of Boesinghe, as far as Loos, during this period, only mining and artillery actions took place. In the Ypres salient on December 19th the Germans made a gas attack on the Allied positions on the northeast of the salient, but no ground was gained, though there was some severe fighting. After this episode, the line here relapsed into its accustomed quiet, as far as infantry actions were concerned, until the 11th of February, when the Germans began to bombard the trenches to the east of Boesinghe, which bombardment was continued the next day, and followed by some slight infantry fighting.

On the 13th of February the Germans attacked the Hooge end, the northeastern, of the salient, and blew up a trench which had been much in evidence in the bulletins of the fighting at this point, known as the International Trench, and took possession of it; and fighting went on in this immediate vicinity until the second of March, when the English recaptured it. On the rest of this front from Ypres to Loos, there was continual trench and bomb fighting during the period under consideration, but these skirmishes produced no results of any moment whatever. The only one which deserves mention is the capture of the small village of Friese on

the left bank of the Somme to the west of Peronne, from which, after a stiff fight, on the twenty-eighth of January, the Germans succeeded in driving the French.

Of course it is to be understood that when one uses the expressions "calm" or "quiet" in respect to these fronts that expression is not to be taken in a literal sense. The average civilian, had he been on any portion of this front during the time under review, would have found conditions fully as lively as he would have desired; the constant booming of the artillery, the occasional violent bomb fighting, the trench raids from time to time, and the aerial attacks which both sides made at intervals on each other's positions, would have seemed to this civilian very real activity. Which view would have been to a very considerable extent justified, by the size of the lists of casualties which took place on the "quiet" or "calm" front.

On the whole, however, the end of the six months found the relative positions of the belligerents, on this whole front, unchanged from what they were at the beginning.

CHAPTER VI

IN CHAMPAGNE

From Arras to Alsace, nearly the whole of the month of September passed comparatively quietly; only uneventful clashes either of infantry or of artillery, of not more than local importance, took place. This was, however, merely the traditional calm before the storm.

General de Castelnau, on the 25th of September, began a French offensive on the line extending from Suippes to the west through Perthes-les-Hures and Beausejour to Massiges. This offensive was planned to be executed both chronologically and strategically in unison with the British and French offensive north of Arras which we have already described, and really was intended to be in support of that movement. Delivered in force it was expected that its violence would be such that it would diminish the German power of sending reserves to the other front in that it would create a very urgent call for these reserves upon this Champagne front, which was about 20 miles in length.

On the 22d of September the French artillery began a bombardment of the German first line trenches over this 20 mile front, at an early hour in the morning, and continued this bombardment for sixty hours. While not so severe perhaps as the bombardment on the Loos front, it was the severest which had been experienced on this portion of the line and it succeeded in destroying practically completely the first line of German trenches.

On the 25th, as soon as day broke, the bombardment having continued the entire previous night, the French infantry left their trenches and began a simultaneous charge over the whole front and after only a few hours fighting were in complete possession of the entire German first line of trenches, which had been largely destroyed by the sixty hours bombardment above mentioned, but when this infantry came to attempt an attack on the

second line of German defenses, in spite of their desperate gallantry and their tenacity in advancing, they were unable to progress materially, so that all the gain which was made this day was made in the first short rush. The fighting lasted all day and when night fell the French troops were still in undisputed possession of the first line of German trenches which, during the night, they turned against their enemies and succeeded in consolidating their position preparatory to the assumption of the offensive the next day.

But, in place of the French taking the offensive, on the 26th of September, it was begun by the Germans who launched counter-attacks in great strength on the positions which the French had won from them the day before. These counter-attacks continued all day and were replied to by the French. Some of the fiercest fighting which had been seen even in this well fought over district resulted, and the line swayed to and fro without any permanent gain at any point for either side. Summing up the results of this hard fighting, it may be said here that they were negative, because, while the German counter-attacks checked the French progress and halted the French advance, they gained no ground themselves permanently, so that when the night fell the enemies were in the same relative positions that they were twenty-four hours previously.

The 27th of September was much the same as the 26th; continual hard fighting, oftentimes coming to hand to hand struggles; but, except for slight French gains near Massiges on the extreme right of the French line, there was no change at all in the relative positions of the lines. Up to the conclusion of this day's fighting, the French had captured about 12,000 German prisoners, while the Germans in their counter attacks had taken something like 3,500 French. Both sides had suffered heavy loss in casualties.

On September 28th and 29th bitter fighting continued without intermission and was particularly severe in the neighborhood of Beausejour, southeast of Tahure, and in the immediate northern outskirts of Massiges, but was without result as far as modifying the positions theretofore occupied by the opponents was concerned.

The 30th of September the battle grew fiercer around Massiges. The French captured Hill 191 immediately north of that hamlet, and also succeeded in driving their line forward on the road from Ville sur Tourbe, a couple

of miles to the east of Massiges, about three miles towards the north, and in capturing the village of Cernay en Dormois. The casualties in this fighting were very large on both sides in proportion to the number of men engaged. The same day very hard fighting developed around Souain to the west of Perthes and about three miles to the south of St.-Marie-a-Py, a little to the west of Souain. Up to this time, however, in spite of the lavish expenditure of life, there had been neither strategic nor tactical gains made by either side, and the opponents were still in practically the same relative positions as they were when this determined French attack began. This portion of the Champagne region is called the Champagne Pouilleuse, on account of the character of the soil which, when it rains, is converted into extremely and persistently sticky mud. On two days of the offensive considerable rain had fallen, which made the operations of the troops even more difficult than they would have been ordinarily.

CHAPTER VII

On the first of October the positions reached in Champagne by this fighting were about as follows: The immediate objective of Gen. de Castelnau's offensive had been the railroad running from Bazancourt through Challerange, which railroad connected the army of von Einem to the west and the army of the Crown Prince to the east, and from which railroad the French lines at this time were distant between Dontrien on the west and Manre on the east, four miles to the south on the average. To this railroad from the French lines there was one avenue of approach by the road which leads northward through Auberive, another by a road running through St.-Hilaire-le-Grand, both of which roads join and touch the railroad at St. Souplet. Further east from Souain another road runs north to the railroad at Somme-Py, and a fourth still further to the east runs northward from Perthes through Tahure, and thence westwardly to Somme-Py, and finally by another road still further to the east, which runs from Ville-sur-Tourbe through Cernay to Vosseres. The Germans were in Auberive on the first mentioned road and in Cernay on the last mentioned road, but on the St. Hilaire road they had been forced back to a point near a place called the Epine about half way between St. Hilaire and St. Souplet and on the road from Perthes to Somme-Py, as far north as Tahure. On the Souain-Somme-Py road, the Germans had also been driven back to a point near the Navarin Farm, about half way between Souain and Somme-Py.

From "the Epine" on the St. Hilaire road to Tahure the line of German trenches ran almost due east and west with a salient projecting southeast from Tahure, as far as a point known locally as Trapeze, about one mile to the northeast of Perthes. Behind Tahure was the so-called Butte de Tahure, a hill rising between the village and the railroad, from which latter it was a little over one mile distant. Gen. de Castelnau's primary ob-

jective therefore, was to drive in this salient projecting southward from Tahure and to capture Tahure and its hill.

On September 30th the French made an attack which gained ground on the southerly side of this salient; the Germans replying later in the day with two counter-attacks which were unsuccessful in recovering the lost ground. The next day, October 1st, the French made an effort along the St. Hilaire road, and to the east of it, along a line between Auberive and "the Epine," and gained a very little ground.

That day, and for the next four or five succeeding days, hard fighting went on in the Tahure salient, and violent attacks were made on the Trapeze, and a position known as the "Courtine" to the northeast of it. These attacks, which had no marked result, lasted until October 5th. After this combat the French rested for a couple of days, but on October 7th resumed the attack on Tahure and its hill. A violent struggle raged all day, in the course of which seven German trenches, one line behind the other, were taken between the village of Tahure and the southerly slopes of the hill, which was captured.

The French now being in position to do so from Tahure itself, the next day attacked southeastwardly and captured the Trapeze, taking a couple of hundred prisoners here as well as a large number in Tahure. While this fight was going on in the Tahure region, another rather warm combat took place around the Navarin Farm on the Souain-Somme-Py road, where the French, after gaining some ground and capturing about 500 prisoners, were driven back by machine guns to their original trenches. In the night of October 9th and 10th, the Germans attacked the French trenches east of Navarin Farm, and the next day made a strong effort to recapture the hill of Tahure, but were unsuccessful. The next three days (the 10th, 11th and 12th), were days of continual but isolated combats in the vicinity of Tahure, in which the French made some progress to the north and southeast of this village.

On October 18th, after a three hours' artillery preparation, the Germans made an attack on the French positions between La Pompelle near Rheims and Prosnes to the west of Auberive, with the intention of diverting the French from further attacks on the Tahure front. The following day this artillery attack was resumed and

a gas attack was also made, behind which the German infantry advanced, and succeeded in gaining a foothold in the French trenches. A desperate combat took place which lasted several hours, and towards nightfall the French, in a desperate counter-attack, succeeded in recovering their lost positions. The next day an attack was made on Prosnes in considerable strength by the Germans. The fighting lasted all day, and at first the attack was successful and the French first line positions were taken. But reinforcements came to the French who recovered their lost positions by nightfall. Another hard battle took place near Prunay the next day but was indecisive in its results. In both of these fights the casualties were unusually severe.

On October 22nd another counter-attack was made by the Germans on the hill of Tahure and two days later the French captured the Courtine, south of Tahure and east of the Trapeze, with 200 prisoners, but only held this position until the following day when the Germans counter-attacked and recovered the center of the position and on the 30th of October succeeded in recovering it completely.

On October 30th a general attack was made on a line from the Souain road to Ville Tourbe, by the Germans, whose effort was made particularly to recapture the hill of Tahure and the village of the same name. The artillery preparation for this attack began at 11 A. M. and continued until four in the afternoon, at which time the German Infantry came into action and was successful in recapturing the hill of Tahure and with it about 1,300 French. On the next day, October 31st, this attack was continued, and a violent battle raged along the whole line, but the Germans could make no further headway, and lost some 300 in prisoners.

The following day the attack at this portion of the front was abandoned by the Germans who concentrated their fronts on the French position near Massiges, near "The Hand," south of the Fort of Defeat, and for several days, November 3rd, 4th and 5th, the fighting continued severe around this point, but without particular result. On November 10th, however, the Germans made another effort to eject the French from Tahure village, which was not successful.

From now on until the end of December there was a lull in this section of the front, only broken by a fight

to the east of Auberive on December 7th, and another near Hill No. 193, both of which were indecisive.

On the 27th of December another effort was made by the Germans to capture Tahure, the Maisons de Champagne Farm and The Hand north of Massiges, already spoken of, which positions extend in a line southeast from the hill of Tahure. In this fight which lasted three days the Germans did gain considerable ground in the vicinity of Maisons de Champagne, and captured quite a number of prisoners. Another lull ensued in the fighting, which lasted into the second week in January, though there was some minor skirmishing around Tahure in the meantime.

About the 7th of January a hot fight began near Massiges in this district which developed into a veritable battle lasting four days, in which both sides claimed the victory. The net result appears to have been that the Germans who held the offensive captured a certain number of French trenches and took about 2,000 prisoners, as well as some artillery, though as the fighting was extremely desperate their casualties were very considerable.

After this battle quietness again reigned until the last days of January, when more fighting on a reasonably large scale began, but only continued for a couple of days. This fighting was general all over this front, and appears to have achieved no particularly decisive results, though the Germans took quite a number of prisoners.

Again a period of inaction followed, broken, however, on February 10th by a German attack in some force to the northeast of the Butte de Mesnil, and near St. Marie-a-Py. In this fight the Germans gained considerable ground around St. Marie-a-Py and some ground near Tahure, but made no progress to speak of in the Butte de Mesnil region, though again having the advantage in the number of prisoners taken.

After this fighting quieted down, nothing happened of any importance until February 25th, when the French made a surprise attack on the German trenches south of St. Marie-a-Py, and won these trenches in part taking an appreciable number of prisoners. Not to be outdone however on the 28th of February the Germans started a drive in this region with the much fought over Navarin farm as its objective. This drive succeeded and the entire farm with a mile of French trenches on

either side, fell into the hands of the attackers who also took some fifteen hundred prisoners, besides artillery. The next day the French counter-attacked viciously but unsuccessfully and the Germans remained masters of the field.

In the Argonne forest region to the east of the Champagne positions ceaseless trench warfare went on the whole six months, varied with occasional bombing attacks or the explosion of mines, there being an enormous amount of subterraneous activity. But these forms of fighting though producing a very high casualty list, and calling for great fertility of resource, courage and endurance on the part of the participants therein, do not, as a rule, give rise to incidents of more than very local importance, and hence do not afford material for the chronicler.

CHAPTER VIII

VERDUN

On February 21, 1916, about 7 o'clock in the morning, the Germans began an attack on that fortified area to which we give the name of Verdun, and opened what was to prove one of the longest and bloodiest episodes of the war.

In the early part of the war an effort had been made by the Germans to take Verdun just previous to the battle of the Marne, but had not been long persisted in and also had not been successful. Verdun is one of the two main important strategic points in the whole series of French defenses against Germany. This has been recognized for generations, and the fall of this place into the hands of an enemy, or of an invader, has usually been followed by the rest of France sharing its fate. The town of Verdun gives its name to this defense, which today is really a fortified area of about 200 square miles and not merely the forts immediately surrounding the town, and the citadel. The defenses of this area are thoroughly modern; in fact, had been constructed in the 12 months preceding this attack upon it. The French generals had noticed the results of the heavy artillery attacks against the fortresses of Liege, Namur, Antwerp and Maubeuge which had occurred earlier in the war and had modified and extended the defenses of Verdun to such an extent and in such manner that these defenses became far more capable of withstanding any character of offensive which might be launched at them. One result of this remodelling was that the French line had been pushed out to a very considerable distance from Verdun, the center. When the German offensive of February 21st was begun, the exterior line of such defenses began at Consenvoye on the Meuse, a good 9½ miles, as the crow flies, to the north of the citadel and town of Verdun, and thence ran in an irregular arc eastward through Haumont, the wood of Caures, the wood of Wavrille,

Herbebois, Ornes and Maucourt, where it turned south to Mogeville, the pond of Braux, Hte. Charriere wood, Fromezey, Les Eparges, and thence curved to the westward to St. Mihiel on the Meuse, a considerable distance to the south of the citadel; and thence, running along the arc of a semi-circle, first northwest and then northeast until this line reached to its point of departure.

The course of this western half of the exterior defense line is not traced in detail at this time since nothing happened thereon during the period of the battle of which we shall treat in this volume. When in the next volume we come to treat of the fighting on this line, a detailed description of such western front will be given, and in this next volume there will also be a map of Verdun showing in detail the topography of the surrounding country.

The town of Verdun lies in a bowl, and is surrounded by high hills both to the north and to the east; those to the east, however, drop abruptly to the Woevre plain a little to the east of the line of the railroad running south from Abaucourt to Haudiomont; this line of railway being approximately 5½ to 6 miles to the east of Verdun. On the hill surrounding the town there were originally 16 detached forts and 20 small works, but in the year preceding the attack on it most of these detached forts had been decidedly changed in character and strength and practically the whole series of forts and smaller defenses had been extended and connected with each other until three successive rings of fortifications encircled the town. Between them were trenches, barbed wires, chevaux de friese, mines and every other form of impediment to the attack of an advance, which is known to military science, so that at the time of the attack, Verdun was in all probability the strongest fortified area in the world. The Germans concentrated probably more artillery on this front than has ever been done heretofore, and this battle of Verdun, therefore, became a very interesting test between the strength of the most modern forms of offensive and defensive.

On the morning of February 21st, then, the preliminary bombardment began, and the front along which it took place may be roughly described as along the outer margins of the three woods which stretched on the north of Verdun to Brabant, Ornes, Haumont, Caures and Herbebois. The bulk of this fire came from the forest of Spincourt. The bombardment continued all day with

a ferocity and force which has never been perhaps equalled in the history of the war. From 2 to 4 in the afternoon this bombardment reached its height and about 5 o'clock the German guns lengthened their fire.

The French artillery during the day replied as best it could to the German fire, not only endeavoring to put the German artillery out of action but by a barrage fire to prevent the advance of the German infantry. When the German guns at 5 o'clock, as said, lengthened their fire, the German infantry came out of their trenches in small detachments composed of 15 men, and rushed for the French first line trenches wherein, if fortunate enough to reach them, they established themselves. Behind them, fairly close, came a larger detachment of grenadiers and sappers, and behind these again, but at a much more considerable distance, came the line of infantry. The theory of this attack was that the original party of 15 men would reconnoitre and ascertain the strength of the defense by the enemy which could be expected. The grenadiers and sappers were to rebuild and turn the trench which was then to be occupied by the third element in this attack, the infantry.

This first evening the Germans, by these tactics, secured a footing at many points in the French line, and made that footing good, and at some points they penetrated as far as the French second line of trenches. In the Haumont wood the defense was particularly strong and hard hand to hand fighting occurred at this point and continued for a very considerable time. At six in the evening, however, the Germans had gained a small footing and by eight o'clock they had converted this footing into complete possession of the wood but not without strenuous and desperate fighting.

During the night the French tried a counter-attack to recover the possession of the wood, but this counter-attack was broken up by the use of heavy artillery by the Germans. Behind the wood itself, in the village of Haumont, the French decided to make a determined stand, but the Germans commenced a heavy artillery bombardment of the ground behind them, with the result that they could not communicate with their rear at all, nor were any supplies able to reach them therefrom. Soon after the German artillery also cut them off from the troops on their flanks. Nevertheless, with rare courage, the French continued to defend the place as long as possible.

Towards eight o'clock in the morning the bombardment became even more severe, and at ten o'clock heavier artillery was gotten in position and commenced to shell the village of Haumont itself. In the afternoon, a lucky shot on the part of the Germans destroyed the big armored cement redoubt wherein the French ammunition depot was located. At five o'clock the German infantry moved out to the attack of Haumont in three columns from the north, northwest and east. The French made a gallant effort to hold the place, but the enemy established themselves on their right and left and then concentrated an assault on the center, which gave them no alternative but to retreat, which they did to the south of Samogneux. To the right of Haumont a very hard fight took place in the wood of Caures which was held by two battalions of Chasseurs.

On February 21st the German artillery bombarded this Caures wood with terrible violence, and on the next day this bombardment became even worse. Towards noon of February 22nd the Germans attacked these two battalions of Chasseurs with fresh troops, endeavoring to encircle them, and the fighting became very hard; grenades and the naked bayonet played an important part. Gradually, however, the German grasp on the position became stronger and stronger, and at half past five in the evening the Germans managed to get a gun into a position from which they could enfilade the main point of the defense. This made it necessary for the French to evacuate their position which they did in five columns, which were rather heavily punished, but which succeeded in getting to a place of safety. The wood of Herbebois is the next wood to the east of the wood of Caures. The fighting here was very hard and on the first day, in spite of a very heavy bombardment, the Germans managed to obtain a footing in the first line of French trenches and to capture one of the defensive works of the supporting trench. During the night the French launched a counter-attack in the hopes of driving the Germans out of this point of vantage, which went on until five o'clock in the morning, but which did little but hold the Germans in their position. Close fighting continued all the next day and the Germans made an attack during the night but without particular success.

The following day, the 23rd of February, the Germans launched five attacks on this wood, with little result,

but the Woevre wood, in the meantime, was captured, and, as a result, the French position in the Herbebois wood became untenable, so that at four o'clock the order was given for them to withdraw; which they effected in good order.

On the morning of the 23rd, the Germans had succeeded in driving the French very nearly completely out of the line of woods which formed their first defensive line, besides which the French had been forced to evacuate Brabant and Haumont and the woods of Caures and Herbebois, and had fallen back upon the positions based upon Samogneux, Beaumont, the northern fringe of Fosses Wood, and a smaller wood, the Chaume.

On the morning of the 23rd, the French attempted a counter-attack to recover these positions, which attack was launched from Samogneux, but this counter-attack was stopped by the German artillery which inflicted sanguinary losses on the attackers. Thereafter a very heavy bombardment was opened by the Germans on the village of Samogneux, and the French were obliged, towards evening, to evacuate Samogneux and fall back to the beginning of the northern slope of the very important elevation known as Hill 344. This Hill 344 then became the objective of the entire German attack on this western end of the northern line and the battle for its possession went on all through the night of the 23rd and the day of the 24th, both sides fighting with desperation and determination.

On the night of the 24th the Germans succeeded in getting a footing on the northern slopes of this hill. In the center, after bombarding Fosses wood, the Germans assembled their infantry for the attack on that wood, and the Beaumont Wood to the east of that wood and south of Wavrille; but this concentration became known to the French artillery, who shelled it heavily, dispersing it, and two battalions of French infantry were sent to the northwest corner of Woevre wood.

At this the Germans resumed their bombardment of the Beaumont and Fosses woods, and continued it until about one o'clock in the afternoon. At that time they made an infantry attack which was successful and in a half hour they had driven the French out of Woevre wood, as far as the village of Beaumont to the west and Fosses wood to the east. In another half hour the Germans captured the whole of Fosses wood and drove into the streets of Beaumont, from which after house

to house fighting, the French were driven out. Le Chaume wood, to the east of Fosses wood, was next captured, which resulted in the village of Ornes being given up by the French.

During the night it was quiet. Roughly speaking, the French now occupied the line of heights which extended from the east of Champneuville on the Meuse to the south of Ornes. The German objective had now become the capture of Douaumont, both village and fort, and of the so-called Pepper Hill, south of Samogneux. The Talou Hill, enclosed in the bend of the Meuse, south of Champneuville was impossible for either side to hold, on account of the fact that it was completely exposed to the fire of both artilleries, and it hence became a sort of no-man's land played upon by one or the other artilleries continuously.

The situation had become very grave for the French, and had the Germans been able to bring up immediately their heavy artillery, which the rapidity of their advance had left five miles in their rear, and which, in addition to the distance to be advanced, had to be brought up over a very rough and difficult country, the subsequent history of this Verdun battle might have been different. But to bring up this heavy artillery took practically a day, and this gave the French a respite, which respite they turned to their advantage.

De Castelnau, one of the ablest French Generals, had been hurried to Verdun by Gen. Joffre as soon as it became apparent that the German offensive there was a serious one. After de Castelnau had inspected the situation, he determined to make a stand on the right bank of the river, and therefore, to organize most vigorously the defense of the Douaumont position, and, while occupied, in this day of respite, in thus preparing for the assaults which were inevitably to follow, he called to him, and installed in command of the defense of Verdun, an officer who had already distinguished himself earlier in the war, Gen. Petain. This general had begun the war as a simple colonel, but, as a result of his distinguished conduct in the retreat from Charleroix, had been promoted to Brigadier-General in the autumn of 1914, and had mounted rapidly in grade from that time as a result of very distinguished services, and these finally caused him to be selected as the defender of this all-important position for the French.

CHAPTER IX

IN ALSACE

In Alsace during the six months under review struggle kept up continuously at half a hundred points, but most of these affairs were too scattered in scene and insignificant in consequences, to be here chronicled in detail. The first action of any importance occurred on October 15th, when the Germans, after shelling all the line running for about four miles between the Rehfelsen-Hartmannsweillerkopf and Sidelkopf attacked the French positions with great violence. A desperate struggle ensued and the Germans succeeded in re-occupying the summit of the Hartmannsweillerkopf. A few days later, however, another battle took place in this vicinity, principally directed at the Linge and the Barrenkopf, which resulted in the Germans being again expelled from the summit of the Hartmannsweillerkopf.

On November 7th and 8th there was lively fighting at the Col de Bonhomme, at La Chapelotte, and Le Violu. A long lull then followed which lasted until December 3rd, when a very lively encounter took place near Thann. On the 26th of December the French who occupied the top of the Hartmannsweillerkopf pushed to the east and northeast from their positions on the summit, and gained considerable ground, capturing 1200 Germans. This operation was in the nature of a surprise.

The next day the Germans counter-attacked and recovered the ground lost and themselves captured 1500 men. The artillery fighting in this affair was extraordinarily severe. The French about this time expected an attack to be made on Belfort, and shifted troops to its surrounding region for its defense. But the real attack planned by the Germans was to be made at Verdun and probably the demonstration which they made at this time in the direction of Belfort was merely to draw the French reserves in that direction.

On the 28th and 29th of December another very violent

two days battle took place on the slopes of the Hartmannsweillerkopf. In this the French made progress but on January 2nd the Germans recovered a portion of the ground so lost, and on January 9th captured a hill to the north of the summit of the Herzstein and took some 1100 French.

On the 24th of January the demonstration towards Belfort became more marked and on the afternoon of February 8th a very large German gun, supposed to be at least 15 inches calibre, began to bombard that fortress, and continued this bombardment for the next three days.

On February 13th this demonstration toward Belfort by the Germans became even more developed. An artillery bombardment was opened on February 15th on the French positions at Sept, south of Altkirch, and on February 15th, after this bombardment had lasted rather intensely for three days, the German infantry assaulted the place. The struggle lasted for a couple of days, but, not being a real attack and merely a demonstration, the Germans, after they had accomplished their object of drawing the French reserves to the eastward from Verdun and its neighborhood, ceased the assault. The rest of the month of February was calm on this Alsatian front. For the French, most of the fighting here was done by the well known regiments of Chasseurs Alpins, a picked corps of men who, however, were very badly cut to pieces during the fighting, of which the struggles on Hartmannsweillerkopf were the center, and also had the misfortune to lose their commander, Gen. Seret, a very distinguished and able officer.

We may sum up the results of the six months fighting on the western front, by saying, that there had been no changes in the battle lines during that period, which in any way indicated that it was in the power of the Allies to force back the German lines from the general positions they occupied nor on the other hand were there any changes which indicated that it was in the power of the Teutons to advance their positions more than locally. In short, it looked as though the belligerents on this front had reached a deadlock which would very probably last, with possibly slight modifications here and there on the long front to the end of the war.

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER X

NORTH RUSSIA

On the 1st of September, 1915, the German troops had reached a point on the Gulf of Riga, a little to the west of Schlock, from which their line ran south to Mitau and thence curved to the east to the bank of the Dwina River, whose course it followed, roughly at more or less distance to the west thereof, south to a point on the railroad leading from Ponevesh to Dunaberg, about twenty miles distant from the latter, from whence it ran southward through Vilkomir and along the Svienta River, to a point a little to the west of Kovno. On this line are two important strategic points, Dunaberg at the south and Riga in the north; but of these two, Dunaberg is considerably the most important and indeed it may be said that it was perhaps as important as any other fortress in this portion of Russia and Poland, except Warsaw.

The town itself was not heavily fortified, but the rings of fortifications running around it at a distance of from 8 to 20 miles fortified not only the town but all the territory within their lines. In addition to the importance of Dunaberg as a fortified area, which is a more correct description of it than fortress, it was an important railroad center. Roads and railroads ran from it to the north through Pskoff to St. Petersburg, to the northwest to Riga, to the southeast to Smolensk, to the south to Vilna; all of these were main lines. Several other lines of minor importance radiated from it in various directions and hence its capture would have been decisive of the entire German offensive, not only to the east of Vilna but to the northwest of Riga; and had the Germans been able to take this town, Riga itself would have fallen almost mechanically in a very short time, with the result that they would have established their front for the winter on a strong line easily defended, with even comparatively small forces.

The approach to Dunaberg from the south is guarded not only by works of art, at points advantageously

placed, but the area in which it stands is also protected by a chain of lakes running in a semi-circle from the west southeastwardly and then northeasterly. The principal of these lakes on the south is Gatin, which was the scene of so many arduous struggles in the subsequent fighting. For the Russians to prevent a successful attack on Dunaberg, therefore, from this front, they were merely obliged to retain the necks of land stretching between these lakes, which made their task a comparatively easy one. On the west the line of defense of but 27 miles stretched from Drisviaty, the most northerly of these lakes, to Illkust. On the other side a movement to reach and cross the Dwina River to the east of Dunaberg, which, had it been successfully carried out, would have enabled the town to be attacked from the east along the line of railroad running to Polotsk, was rendered extremely difficult by the line of defense created by the deep and fairly rapid flowing Dwina itself, across which at this point there were no bridges; and the northern bank being the higher of the two, the Russian artillery posted on this bank could make short work of any attempt to construct any ponton bridges across the stream. This movement, nevertheless, was tried several times with such result that any idea of pushing it through to completion was abandoned, and the Germans turned their efforts thereafter to the southern and western fronts exclusively.

By the middle of September, on both of these fronts, the Teutons had thoroughly intrenched themselves and were attempting to advance by sapping in the usual way, while, at the same time massing large quantities of heavy artillery in their rear with an idea of an eventual attempt to storm their opponent's position.

On the 24th of September an assault opened with a heavy artillery bombardment of the Russian positions on the whole front from the Dwina River on the north to Lake Drisviaty on the south, and after this preparation was complete an infantry attack was vigorously pushed. The Germans captured many of the Russian advanced trenches on this front, but were unable to puncture the Russian main defenses. The result was that their advances did not constitute real gains. On the next day the Russians counter-attacked and recaptured the village of Drisviaty on the lake of the same name, which gave them control of the passage between the lakes along the Vilna railroad. The loss of this important posi-

tion by the Germans put an end momentarily to this offensive, which then degenerated into more or less violent artillery duels, accompanied by occasional skirmishes at different points in the line but no concerted movement.

These operations, lasted ten days, and though during their continuation at times each side had the advantage momentarily, the net result at its conclusion was that the gains and losses balanced each other so absolutely that the general situation was [completely unchanged.

On the 4th of October a new offensive began in which the Germans made an attack on the front between Illkust and Lake Sventin, and fierce battles took place around the village of Garbunooke directly south of Illkust and Shieskovo, almost directly south of it, a little to the west of Soirky and Lake Sventin. These villages changed hands several times, the Germans capturing Garbunooke on the 8th of October, only to lose it on the 10th. In the sector around Illkust, however, the Germans again made some gains which put them in a favorable position for future operations against this point.

For the two weeks following October 10th, the fighting languished. Gen. Von Morgen, who had commanded here, was replaced by Gen. Von Lauenstein, and on the 23rd a new offensive opened. This began, as usual, by a violent artillery bombardment of the Russian trenches which lasted several hours, after which the infantry were thrown forward on Illkust. At first the Russians managed to hold their own, but towards evening the Germans drove them back and captured the town. This capture placed the German forces in a favorable position about three miles west of the Dwina River, about two miles north of the railroad running westward to Ponevesh and about ten miles, as the crow flies, to the northwest of Dunaberg itself, to which an excellent road led. On the following day the Germans again attacked to the east of Illkust, and furious fighting continued there without cessation for the next two or three days. This fighting spread to the south, and on October 28th the Germans broke through the Russian defenses at the village of Garbunooke and to the south of it, and succeeded in reaching the forest which lies between the road leading from Illkust to Shishkovo and the Dwina River.

At this point, however, the German advance ceased, as the positions to the east of Illkust were found to be

too strong for the strength of the attacking force and because the Russians started an offensive to the south between Lake Sventin to Lake Illsen, which forced the Germans to withdraw a considerable portion of their forces from the Illkust front in order to hold their positions there.

Between Lakes Sventin and Illsen stretches a sort of swamp interspersed with sand-hills covered with pines, the most important of which were in the hands of the Germans, both to the north and south of the little village of Platonovk which stands about midway between the two lakes. On the western shore of Lake Sventin German batteries were posted on the heights thereon in such a manner as to sweep both the shores and waters of this lake. The Russian objective was to first take these last mentioned heights and then to take Platonovk. The combat lasted for ten days, and each foot of ground was bitterly contested. On the 3rd day the Russians succeeded in capturing the heights to the west of Lake Sventin, but one of these heights was almost immediately recaptured in a counter-attack by the Germans. The Russians rallied and counter-attacked, and after fierce hand to hand fighting, succeeded for the second time in driving the Germans out.

This was followed a day or two later by a movement forward in the center, which the attack on these heights had necessarily preceded. This forward movement, after about five days of hard fighting, succeeded in accomplishing its object, the capture of Platonovk and the hills to the north and south of it, and in driving back the German line about three miles to the west over the whole front, besides taking possession of the western shore of Lake Sventin. But these gains were not made without paying a very large price therefor, since the Russian casualties in this comparatively minor ten days' fighting were admitted to have been in the vicinity of 15,000 to 17,000, while the German losses were only about 10,000. Of these German losses only 700 were captured. The result of this fight was to give the Russians courage to attempt more and towards the end of November, on the 24th, they made an attempt to drive back the Germans near Illkust. This fighting first resulted in the capture of Yonopol by them to the east of Illkust, a point which was of considerable importance to the Germans as they had made several attempts from here to cross the Dwina River. On the

28th of November the Germans launched a counter-offensive on Yonopok which was unsuccessful, and the Russians, after repulsing them, followed them back to their positions and succeeded in capturing the suburbs of Illkust, and afterwards extended their lines both in the village and to the south thereof, but this ground was not long held by the Russians and a couple of days later they were compelled to abandon these positions completely, owing to the strength of the German counter-attacks.

With this episode, serious fighting on this front ceased for the winter, and from the end of December, 1915, until well after the first of March, the period when our record closes, both sides remained quiescent.

On the central portion of this front from Illkust north to a point about opposite Uxkell on the Dwina, little happened during the period under consideration. The Germans made one or two attempts to cross the river, in November, near Frederichstat and Jacobstat, but were unsuccessful therein. After this the Russian winter fell with its full force and the cold and the unusually large quantity of snow put a summary stop to operations here.

On the Riga front, September passed quietly, with the German lines occupying approximately the line from Schlock on the Gulf of Riga to Mitau, thence along the river Ekau to the Mitau-Krutzburg Railroad, which it followed to a point opposite Frederichstat, whence it ran to a point on the Dwina River about half way between Riga and Dunaberg, and opposite Jacobstat. On October 14th the Germans began to develop a general offensive, and on the morning of that day crossed the river Ekau near the village of Grunwald, about 15 miles to the east of Mitau, near the railroad, and a two days' battle followed for the railroad station of Garrosen and that of Gross Ekau to the west and east of Grunwald respectively. The line of this battle finally extended as far as Neugut, considerably to the east of Gross Ekau. At Gross Ekau on October 16th the Germans drove the Russians back a considerable distance and also gained ground near Neugut. Hard fighting followed for several days, and by the 20th of October the Germans managed to break through the Russian line extending from the Dwina River to Neugut and to advance as far as Borkowitz on the river Dwina, a place distant about 14 miles southeast from Riga. The Germans followed up this advantage by advancing northeasterly from Grunwald, and, after forcing their way across the river Missa, which runs nearly parallel to the Mitau-Krutzburg railroad a few miles to the north of it, forced the passage of this

river, and captured the two villages of Plakanen and Repe.

While these things were going on, the Germans, who had reached Boskowitz, moved forward to the island of Dalen, immediately below Riga in the middle of the river Dwina. The fighting, for the possession ot this island, was very severe and both sides suffered heavily. After its capture the Germans attempted to make a crossing of the Dwina river from this island, but were defeated therein, as the Russians to the north of them, on the southern bank of the Dwina and those opposite them on the northern bank of the river, caught them between their two fires and rather severely punished them.

The German center during this time had succeeded in reaching Olai, on the railroad between Mitau and Riga, and a little nearer to Riga than Mitau. Here they halted for the time being. At this time the German line stretched from the Gulf of Riga to Schmerder, Kalnsom, Olai, Plakanen and ended at the Dwina River at a point opposite the Island of Dalen, from which the Germans had retreated, owing to its being under the cross fire of the Russian artillery to the north and northeast.

On the last of October the Germans began a movement on the northern end of their line between the two lakes Kanger and Babit, the latter of which parallels the sea at a distance of about three miles therefrom. In the middle of the neck of land separating this lake from the gulf of Riga runs the river Aa, to the north of which runs also the railroad from Schlock to Riga. The towns of Kemmern and Tchin at the western end of Lake Babit were stormed on the 31st of October, and speedily taken. Thereafter, the fighting spread as far as the town of Ragassen near the northern end of Lake Kange, on the Gulf of Riga. This fighting continued for several days and the Germans were unable to greatly improve their position, although they did advance somewhat to the east of Kemmern. On November 7th half the Russians counter-attacked and succeeded in advancing and in reoccupying the district between Schlock and Lake Babit and in driving the Germans to the westward. On the 10th another battle took place in this region, in which the Russian fleet on the Gulf of Riga took a hand, the scene of the battle being close enough to the shores of that gulf, to permit the guns of the warships to be effective. This battle lasted three days

and at its end the Germans gave ground and falling back, permitted the Russians to recapture Kemmern. The Russian advance continued to the west of Kemmern, the capture of which town gave them complete control of Lake Babit, while they also made progress on the eastern shore of Lake Kange. Desultory fighting continued in this region for the next month, but the attempt to advance upon Riga along the shores of the Baltic was abandoned by the Germans, and from the 10th of November they made no serious effort to again advance to the west between Lake Babit and the Gulf of Riga. From this time forward, until the end of March, the whole Riga front was quiet, the lines remaining without material change all the rest of the winter in the positions hereinbefore described.

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk, which took place on August 25th, the Russian battle line may be divided into three distinct sections, the first of which extends from Vilna to the Gulf of Riga, the principal events of which have been treated of in the preceding chapter; the second runs from Vilna south through the Pripet Marshes to the railroad running from Kovel to Kief, while the third reaches from this railroad to the northern frontier of Rumania.

We will now deal with the central portion which was the scene in the period which is under consideration of the most important events, both in themselves and in their future consequences.

CHAPTER XII

This central section of the Russian front is also susceptible of division, for the sake of both clearness and convenience in dealing with it; the first including the front from Vilna to Baranovitchy, and the second the front from the important railroad junction last named as far south as Dubno, Tamopol, and Czernowitz.

We will now take up the events in the northern sector of the first division of this central section. It will be remembered that in the second volume the account of the campaign in the northern sector finished practically with the evacuation of the fortress of Olita by the Russians on August 28th, 1915, and their retreat to the northeast in the general direction of Vilna. The evacuation of this fortress really resulted in the fall of both Vilna and Grodno. Situated on the Bug River, equally distant from both of these important positions, yet it was so located as to be able to effectually bar any attack upon Vilna from the southwest or of Grodno from the north. After the capture of Olita the next point against which the German forces were thrown was Orany which is situated on the railroad about midway between Grodno and Vilna and almost directly to the east of Olita. As the effect of the capture of this point would be to completely cut off any communication from the Russian army around Grodno and those operating in the north toward Vilna, every foot of the way between Orany and Olita was strongly defended by the Russians, but their struggles were unsuccessful and on the 31st day of August this town fell into the hands of the Germans. Another reason for the strenuous defence that the Russians made of the territory between these two places was that having as we are now informed already made up their minds to abandon Grodno, in the event that it became necessary, which emergency now confronted them, the Russians desired to gain as much time as possible in order to remove the garrison and the supplies of all kinds to the eastward in that fortress, by the railroad which ran to

there from Lida; in the accomplishment of which desire they were partly successful.

As soon as Orany was captured, the German forces in front of Grodno began an offensive move against that fortress. On the day after the attack on Orany, the outer line of four forts to the north of the Dombrovo-Grodno highway was taken by storm, which captures were followed up later in the afternoon of the same day by the capture of fort No. 4, while fort No. 4-A was captured towards dusk. Immediately after the fall of these forts, all the remaining forts of the outer chain of fortifications, to the west of Grodno were abandoned by the Russians. The following day, the 2d of September, the Germans entered Grodno itself and rendered themselves masters of the town after considerable street fighting. On the morning of the 3rd of September, the Russians made a counter-offensive and succeeded in penetrating to the streets of the town itself but were speedily driven out, the object of this counter-offensive being more to protect the retreat of the troops withdrawing to the east, than in the hope of recapturing the place.

The Germans had hardly succeeded in this conquest of Grodno than they began an offensive therefrom towards Lida, located on the west side of the line of railroad running from Vilna to Baranovichy, at the point where the line of railroad running from Grodno to Molodetchna traverses at right angles the first mentioned line. The purpose of this movement being to drive a wedge between the Russian armies operating in the vicinity of Vilna and those operating along the upper Niemen river and the Pripet Marshes. This attempt, however, was not positively successful though some progress was made to the east of Grodno, and this progress had considerable influence on movements further north in and around Vilna.

Vilna was the position, of all those positions in the northern sector of the central front, most important for the Russians to defend; not only on account of its being a great railroad center, but on account of the fact that it was the key position in thei rentire second line, and the loss of which would mean that the Russians would be obliged to fall back still further to the east and eventually take up a position on their third line of defenses which would have the great weakness of being cut into two pieces by the Pripet Marshes. These marshes, as my readers know, form a sort of peninsula, of very difficult

territory running east and west practically through the center of the central section of the Russian front. These marshes grew more difficult to manoeuvre through in proportion as an army advanced to the east. Therefore, if Vilna was captured, and the Russians obliged to fall back on their third line of defense, the Russian army would be, to all practical purposes, divided into two sections, one operating to the north of the Pripet Marshes and one to the south, with such poor and roundabout means of communication between them as to put out of the question any concerted movements. This was, of course, appreciated by the German General Staff.

The first step in the capture of Vilna by the Germans was the successful continuation of the movement which had begun some days before, northeast of Kovno along the Viliya River, and which had reached the Sventa River at a point in the direction of Vilkomir. This movement was originally to the northeast, but, on September 11th, a portion of the German forces engaged therein turned directly east and began to move towards the Vilna-Dunaberg railroad. A day later another force of Germans commenced a movement along the railroad leaving from Ponevesh to Sventsiany, a place located on the Vilna-Dunaberg railroad, a little less than half way between these two places and nearest to Vilna. Simultaneously a third movement was begun by the Germans towards Vilna from the direction of Kovno, directly to the west.

On the 13th the Vilna-Dunaberg railroad was cut at Sventsiany by the Germans and the Russian troops here were driven southwards to the station of Podbrodzie, but the road south from Vilna to Baranovitchy and the road to the east through Smorgon to Minsk were still open, so that it was still possible for the Russians to withdraw their entire force there to the east and south of this fortress city in the event they so desired. From Grodno, as has been related before, an offensive had been undertaken almost immediately after its capture in the very first days of September towards Lida on this Vilna-Baranovichy railroad, which had not met with great success. This movement was resumed on a larger scale, and gradually advanced, and after heavy fighting, succeeded on the 20th of September in capturing Lida itself, and by so doing cut communication between Vilna and Baranovitchy.

In the meantime, while this movement on Lida was

taking place, large forces of German cavalry acting as raiders made a sudden appearance in the vicinity of Smorgon, on the railroad leading from Vilna eastward to Minsk, but these were not in sufficient force for the purpose for which they were intended not numbering more than 20,000 men, and being of course not accompanied to any very great degree by artillery or by infantry, though some few infantry are said to have been brought forward in automobiles to the positions reached by the cavalry, were driven back by the Russians, who thus recovered the use of the Vilna-Minsk railroad. Nevertheless, this movement, in connection with the German control of the Vilna-Baranovitchy railroad and of the railroad from Vilna to Dunaberg, made it impossible for Vilna to be held longer by the Russians, and in fact the Russian army there was in imminent danger of having retreat cut off by the German infantry in large forces which had in the meantime arrived in Baranovitchy from which place they could press on with comparative ease to Minsk, not far distant, as distances go in Russia. At Minsk the Germans would have occupied a commanding position in the rear of the forces defending Vilna and on their only line of communication by rail with the east. It was, therefore, necessary for the Russian commander to escape before Minsk could be occupied, and the only possible line of escape was along this Vilna-Minsk railroad, which, as has been said, had been at one moment lighty held by the German cavalry.

For a long time, the incompetence of the Russian Commander in Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, had been manifest to the most ardent and insidious of his flatterers. Placed at the beginning of the war in command of the largest army the world has ever seen, whose equipment, whose morale, whose discipline and training had become the subject of eulogistic effusions in the military papers of France and England for some years before the war, he had in thirteen months suffered greater defeats perhaps than any general in history, if defeats are to be measured by the loss of men, the loss of artillery, the loss of equipment, the loss of munitions of war, and the loss of territory. In view of the fact that Russia is so vast as to afford unlimited possibilities of retreat for enormous distances, his entire army was neither annihilated nor totally captured, but every other species of military defeat had been inflicted upon it by its foes. Supported, as the Grand Duke was, by

a powerfully subsidized press, not only in Russia but in Great Britain and even to some extent the United States, for a time he managed to sustain himself against the ever rising tide of events, the results of his gross incompetency but ultimately the tide rose too high and he was engulfed.

On the 5th of September, 1915, the Czar issued an order depriving the Grand Duke of his command of the Russian armies; which command the Czar took into his own hands. Subsequently, the Grand Duke was appointed to the Governor-Generalship of the Caucasus, and Commander in Chief of the armies in that region. Later in this narrative his exploits in his new field of action will be considered.

In removing the Grand Duke from the command of his armies, the Czar removed a danger to his throne and to his person, as well, if the rumors which came to us from Russia at that time, and which continued from time to time to come to us, concerning the Grand Duke's ambitions, if victorious, were well founded.

CHAPTER XIII

General Evert who was in command of the Russian armies at Riga in the predicament above outlined, manifested more strategic sense than usual in a Russian General. He so disposed his forces as to hold for a short time the advance of the Germans from the north from Sventsiany and from the direction of Kovno in the west and threw his main forces upon these German forces which had cut the Vilna-Minsk railroad, in the hope of recovering the possession of the same. This hope was not disappointed; the German cavalry were driven back to the south and the line of railroad between the two towns was again completely in Russian hands. This recapture provided a means of escape for the bulk of the Russian army operating around Vilna, and therefore was extremely important both to these troops and to the Empire in its consequences. As an immediate result, the Russian army escaped to the east from Vilna with far less losses than might have been expected from the very difficult situation in which it was forced by the Germans; but the city and fortress of Vilna itself was lost, and with Vilna was also lost the control of the railroad running north to Dunaberg to within a few miles of that town, and of the railroad running south as far as Baranovitchy.

After the fall of Vilna, from the town of Svientsiany to the north between that city and Dunaberg the Germans attempted a movement in the direction of Polotsk, the valley of the Disna river and along the railroad running parallel thereto a short distance south. At the same time another German advance began on the railroad running eastwardly from Vilna to Minsk, and a third on the railroad running from Baranovitchy to Minsk, still further south, the right wing of the German forces here followed the northern end of the Pripet Marshes in a movement to Niesuiz and Slutsk against the Minsk-Bobruisk line. For more than two weeks a violent struggle kept up on the whole of this front and the

Russian losses in opposing these movements, had Gen. Evart not succeeded in the withdrawal of his troops from Vilna, would have gone for naught.

But the necessities of warfare elsewhere induced the Germans to weaken their forces operating in this sphere of action, and ultimately the Germans were obliged to content themselves with occupying a line running south from Vidzy, northeast of Svientsiany through Smorgon on the Vilna-Minsk railroad, whence their line extended southwardly to a point to the east of Baranovitchy on the railroad between that place and Minsk.

After the first of October, the autumnal rains set in, followed as they are in these northern latitudes, by cold weather and by snow, which made the roads, particularly towards the Pripet Marshes, impassable for fresh movements and a long period of practical inactivity followed. Both Russians and Germans dug themselves in and prepared to pass the coming winter in their then positions. Indeed this calm lasted all the winter and well into the spring, and well past the time when this record closes. Of course this does not mean that during this long period at scattered points along the front, from time to time, activities of some sort did not take place; occasionally each side made a reconnoitre attack on the other's position, but these attacks were, strategically or tactically speaking, of no importance, and consequently need not be herein gone into at length.

The Pripet Marshes themselves, which thrust forward like a huge tongue to the west, narrowing as they go, and which separate the northern half of the Russian line considering this line in its whole length from the southern, deserve a word or two of mention. The Pripet River flows through them in the center from west to east, eventually falling into the Dnieper some distance to the north of Kieff, and is about 350 miles in length. From its source to the point where it flows into the Dnieper the difference in level is a trifle less than 150 feet. The valley which it flows through is perhaps 150 miles wide on an average and this valley lies little lower than the country to the north of it or south of it.

The result is that all of the rivers and streams flowing from the north and south which flow into the Pripet have but little current as the change in level in them is barely sufficient to cause their waters to move, and hence, in this flat country, the streams spread very easily from their normal beds. This is particularly true in the spring

and the autumn when the whole of this vast district, 30,000 square miles in area, becomes practically a lake, with here and there islands jutting through it which serve for sites for the comparatively few and miserable towns. At many places these marshes are very deep and the black, slimy underlying mud is known to extend down in places to a depth of 150 to 250 feet. To wander from the beaten path on this soft, treacherous surface is almost positive death. It is only in the winter that movements through these marshes are safe for then the ground is frozen, deep and can sustain traffic across its surface. The comparatively few roads through these marshes, mostly built on piles or like the roads in our backwoods, are formed by tree trunks laid side by side. To add to the other difficulties, much of the territory comprised in the marshes is very thickly wooded with stunted pine, birch and aspen.

The farming population constitutes about 70 per cent of the inhabitants, while racially the majority of the population are white Russians. The people are mostly occupied in bee-keeping, hunting and fishing—some commerce is done in forest products, timber, charcoal, wooden dishes, pitch and bark products, and of course there is little or no manufacturing. Taken all in all this region is perhaps the poorest and most backward in Europe. To the east the fortress of Bobruisk on the Beresina guards the marshes much in the same manner as Brest-Litovsk does on the west.

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk the Teutonic troops who participated in its siege began a march through this very difficult region to the eastward. The main movement was along the line of the railway running from Brest-Litovsk almost directly east to Pinsk, but the advance was slow because the usual difficulties had been greatly increased in the Autumn of 1915 by an unusually heavy rainfall which turned the marshes into more veritable quagmires then usual. However, by dint of perseverance, Pinsk was finally reached by the end of September, and the Teutons established themselves a little to the east of this town for the winter, their line to the northward following the course of the Jasiolda river and the Oginski Canal, to Lipsk on the northern edge of the marshes. But the country behind them was still full of small isolated detachments of Cossacks and other irregular troops of the Russian army who were greatly aided in the guerilla warfare they were waging

by the fact that they had the active aid of the population who were familiar with every by-path leading through the marshes as well as of every foot of the ground.

It was not, then, until the cold season began and the ground became frozen that the Teutons were able to clear the marshes to the west of Pinsk completely of these irregular Russian troops. There was little fighting on a large scale, but there were multitudinous daily skirmishes, particularly to the east of the line of the Oginski Canal and along the Jasiolda River. In this fighting the volunteer Polish legions which had been organized to aid the Teutons by the Poles themselves, greatly distinguished themselves. These conditions always so prevailed to a great degree on the line running south from Pinsk to Nobill and Borana, the two towns at the southern edge of the marshes in the direction of Rovno.

In its general direction this line from Pinsk south followed the course of the Styr River from its connection with the Pripet River at Pogost to the railroad running from Lublin east. But as the distance from Pinsk to the southern boundary of the Marshes was not so great as that from Pinsk to the northern boundary, and consequently there was not so much difficulty in supressing the wandering bands of marauders as there was to the north.

Both to the north and south of Pinsk the so-called "marsh-wolves", composed of peasants and other non-combatants who had been stirred up by the Russian government in a sort of *levée en masse*, were very active; but ultimately the Teutons succeeded in completely clearing the marshes of these pests, from their point of view, turning now to the campaign in the southern sector of the Russian front.

CHAPTER XIV

On August 26, as was narrated in the previous volume, the great Russian fortress of Brest-Litovsk, almost directly north of Lemberg and Cholm, had passed into Teuton possession, and a couple of days before it the town of Kovel, about midway on the railroad between this fortress and the Volhynian triangle of fortresses, Lutsk, Dobno and Rodno, had also been taken by the Austrian cavalry.

The fall of Vlodava and Dorojush completed the piercement of the Russian defenses on the middle line of the Bug. At this time the Russian lines continued to follow, in a general sense, the course of the Bug River south until they reached the point of the joining of the watersheds of this river and the Zlota Lipa in Galicia; the Zlota Lipa running, roughly speaking, thence in a straight line south to the Dniester.

On August 27th the Austrians attacked the Russian positions at Jologury to the southwest of the town of Zlochoff in eastern Galicia and broke through their lines inflicting a severe material and tactical defeat upon them. The result of this operation was that on the next day the town of Zlochoff fell into the hands of the Austrians and the upper line of the Bug was forced. The Russians retreated to Bialykiemen on the other side of the Bug valley. In the meantime another Austrian force had crossed the Zlota Lipa from Brzezany and was advancing towards the Zboroff-Podhaytse line. Still farther to the south another Austrian army was marching directly north towards Buczacz on the Strypa River. It became apparent that the positions of the Russians to the west of Tarnopol had become very seriously involved and the only thing that they could do was to withdraw as rapidly as possible. Their position was complicated by the fact that further south on the Dniester River the Austrians had reached Zaleshchyki and were threatening to envelop the end of the Russian line in the south, and

so the line of the Zlota Lipa was abandoned by the Russians.

A concentric movement by the Austrians on the fortifications of Rovno then developed from Kovel through Lutsk and from Galicia through Dubno. On August 29th a general advance of the Austrians began on the whole line stretching from Bialykiemen to Radziviloff, and fighting continued for three days; the Austrians slowly and surely making progress.

On the 31st of August the Russian line broke and the Austrians captured Lutsk on the northern end of their concentric movement, and crossed the Styr along its whole length as far south as Toporoff, following up this advantage with an advance the next day September 1st, to Brody on the frontier between Galicia and Volhynia, and also along the line of railroad from Lemberg to Dubno. These advances of the Austrian forces, and the general retreat of the Russians to the Olyka-Radziviloff front, which resulted, in the south in Galicia itself, forced the Russians to fall back completely from the north and south line formed by the Zlota Lipa, first to that of the Strypa, the first parallel river running to the east, and eventually to that of the Sereth River which runs north and south slightly to the west of Tarnopol.

During these affairs, many thousands of Russian prisoners besides much artillery and war supplies were captured by the victorious Austrians.

From Lutsk the Austrians continued their advance towards Rovno, almost directly east, and towards Dubno to the southeast. At the same time the main attack struck north from Brody along the Lemberg-Dubno railroad.

On the 7th of September this Austrian force advanced from the southern side of the Ikva River and on the 8th of September the Austrians entered Dubno in triumph.

In the meantime, in the vicinity of Tarnopol, in extreme eastern Galicia, very heavy fighting was going on. The battle here opened about the 5th of September and ended on the 9th. The Russian resistance here was somewhat stronger than on other points on this line, but after three days hard fighting the Russians were forced back to the outer lines of Tarnopol, though the city itself was not carried by the Teutons.

Still further south, at Trembovla, near the Sereth River, situated nearly in the middle of an undulating plain cut up by many small streams, another battle de-

veloped on the 7th of November, and lasted through the 8th to the 9th. This was one of the most important fights in Central Galicia. Here again the Russians were heavily punished but the Teutons were not able to carry through their projected movement to completion, so that the fight may fairly be called an indecisive one.

Still further south in the country district between Trembovla and Tchortkoff another fight took place which began on the 9th of September and which on the 10th of September spread along the whole line from Tarnopol to Lutsk, a front about 50 miles long. This fight lasted with various intermissions, until the 15th of September, and at its conclusion, neither side had modified to any great extent their original positions. Much further intensive fighting took place along the line of the Sereth during the next two or three weeks, but on this line the Russian defense seemed to stiffen and the Austro-Germans were not able in spite of strenuous efforts to force the Russians to fall back from this line of the Sereth river

Coming north again to Volhynia in the beginning of September the Austro-Germans launched an offensive against Rovno which proceeded along the railroad line coming from the northwest leading Lutsk, and from Dubno from the southwest.

This advance was, however, strenuously opposed by the Russians and did not succed in attaining its object, and being rather badly defeated in the country between Lutsk and Rovno, at Klivan and near Olyka it was abandoned. This abandonment gave the opportunity for the Russians who had won the victory at Olyka to make a dash to the west and recapture the fortress of Lutsk on the middle Styr. But their triumph was short-lived and four days later they were obliged to evacuate Lutsk as well as their other positions northwest of Dubno and fall back in an easterly direction.

The line which the Russians now assumed to defend the fortress of Rovno against a new offensive which was being launched from the south by the Austro-Germans and to which they retreated from Lutsk, extended from Rafalovka on the Styr south through Tsartovsky and Kolki, also on the Styr, directly south to the river Ikva. The plan of campaign adopted by the Teutons for the reduction of Rovno included in the north a movement against Sarny along the railroad which leads from Kovel to that place on the eastern side of the Goryn River.

This advance would have carried them, had it been successful, to a considerably shorter line for wintering than the one they ultimately adopted, and by the capture of Serny, an important railroad junction, whence one railroad line ran, as has been said, west to Kovel, another to the east to Keiff, and a third to the north past Stolin and through the Pripet Marshes to the line running north towards Vilna, while a fourth ran directly south towards Rovno, would have enabled them to cut off communication effectually between all southern, eastern and northern Russia, and would have outflanked the Russians at Rovno to the south, which outflanking would have forced the abandonment of the fortress by the Russians without any assault thereon by the Germans. At the same time, another movement against Rovno in the south was developed from the base of the Galician town of Novo Alexinets. The objective of this movement in the south was that in the event it was successful, it would not only threaten Rovno, but would also outflank the Russian positions along the Zlota Lipa and the Strypa rivers further to the south.

At Sokul, 23 miles north of Lutsk, the river Styr runs quite close to the river Stokod, another north and south running tributary of the Pripet. Between these two rivers extends a marshy depression running southeast to northwest which follows the right bank of the Stokod south almost down to the point at which the railroad from Kovel to Sarny crosses this river, the distance between the two rivers at this point being about 30 miles. Between Kolki and Rafalovka, which last mentioned town is a few miles north of the point where the Kovel-Sarny railroad crosses the River Styr, the absence of any marshes on either side of the Styr renders the conditions favorable for launching an offensive, which is also increased by the fact that within this 20 miles stretch are concentrated nearly all the roads and railroads of the region, which adds to its advantages as a departure point for an offensive. For these reasons, then, this 20 miles stretch became the center of the fighting during the autumn of 1915 along the Styr River.

What may be called "the Two Months' Battle of the Styr" began on the 27th of September, 1915, when the Germans, after a hard fight, forced their way across the Styr at Kolki and spread out towards the east, and continued advancing for three days in that direction until finally on the third day they reached the Russian main

defence line which extended, roughly, from Novosielki to Tchernish. On this line, for weeks, the fighting continued, during all this time with comparatively little advantage gained by either side in their desperate struggle. Attacks and counter-attacks followed on one another with almost monotonous regularity, but which at the same time cost thousands of human lives. For weeks, at this time, the several bulletins contained and continually repeated names of the same small towns which are almost meaningless unless the movements are studied so closely on the map as to lose the interest of the general reader. Some few phases of this battle, however, should be given. In the early days of October the Russians made a drive across the Styr near Polonne, where the Kovel-Sarny railroad crosses that river, and drove the Germans from the opposite villages, while, on the same day, near Chartorysk they also made a crossing and established themselves rather firmly on the western bank of the river, and during the next three days were able to push their lines some six miles west of these points. For the next week desperate fighting took place along the river around Kolki, which was the border point between the two forces, the Germans who had advanced east of the river from the Kolki region, and the Russians who had advanced west of the river on the line extending from Rafalovka to Chartorysk.

A very peculiar position had now been reached, in which each side was in a position to and was threatening to outflank the other. This condition of affairs the Teutons promptly remedied by capturing the town of Chartorysk and thereby forcing the Russians to retreat to the Styr and on the northern end of their line to fall back from the west as far as Rafalovka, their departure point on that end of the line. The Russians, however, did not acknowledge themselves beaten and tenaciously returned to the charge. On October 17th, they regained practically all ground lost by them north of Chartorysk, in the days previous, and on the next day followed up their successes by capturing the town itself by storm; the Germans falling back beyond Budka and Rudka. During the next two or three days the Russians pushed up the western bank of the Styr as far as Kamaraff.

On October 25th the Teutons began a counter-offensive on the Lisova-Budka line and in the vicinity of Kamaraff. This offensive was successful in the next few weeks to the extent that the Russians were driven back

in semi-disorder and the town of Kamaraff itself was captured.

On November 10th the Russians were driven out of Budka, and by the 15th of November the entire western bank of the Styr including the town of Chartorysk had returned to the possession of the Teutons, but not for long; as, on November 19, after a desperate battle, the Russians succeeded in getting across the Styr once more and in reoccupying Chartorysk, as well as a village below it. After this recapture of the left bank of the Styr by the Russians, the fighting languished on this front, neither side showing any aggressive spirit. The heavy autumn rains set in and made the country difficult to manoeuvre in; the objectives of the Teuton forces here being unachieved, the operations must be considered a defeat for them.

CHAPTER XV

This condition continued until January, 1916, when the ground having become frozen, the rivers coated with ice, and the marshes solid, for a time hostilities were resumed, and the old battlefields on the Styr around Chartorysk and Kolki to the northeast once more became the scene of animated fighting which at this time extended as far south as Olyka on the railroad connecting Kovel with Dubno. Once more the Russians made a thrust to the westward in the vicinity of Chartorysk, and once more the Teutons took the offensive in the neighborhood of Kolki. This battle, which has been given the name of the "New Year's Battle," raged from about the first of the year to the middle of January, and at its conclusion, when counter-attack had succeeded attack for two weeks, the adversaries stood in practically the same positions as they had occupied at the beginning of this particular series of hostilties. But this draw had not been accomplished without great losses; the Teutons losing, perhaps, 60,000 to 70,000 men, while the Russian losses were admitted by themselves to have exceeded 125,000. Here, as usual, when Teutonic troops met Russian, the weight of casualties was on the Russian side, a fact which can be most largely attributed to the comparative inefficiency of the Russian generalship, and also to the lack of skill which is generally shown by the Russians in the use of the artillery; the quantity of noise made by this arm seeming in general to be the Russian measure of its efficiency.

From this time until past the first of March activities on this front degenerated into strict trench fighting, broken from time to time by an occasional skirmish or more or less unimportant artillery duel of not even local significance.

In the south the German offensive against Rovno, which, as has already been explained, was to co-operate with the one which started around Kolki in the north, did not have even the same rather poor measure of

success as the German offensive in the north. This offensive, as will be remembered, was to be launched along a front which extended, roughly, from Radziviloff to Novo Alexinets, and was to advance with its left wing resting on the railroad from Brody to Dubno, while the right wing moved across country pushing the Russians from their positions to the west of the Vilia River. The country around Novo Alexinets forms the key to the position, and here the Ikva, flowing north, the Horyn flowing northeast and the Sereth which runs to the south have their sources, and their courses are lined with wide marshes which at many points deepen into small lakes.

Around Novo Alexinets itself rises a range of hills about 1300 feet high. To the south of this lies the railroad leading from Krasne, through Zlochoff and Zboroff to Tarnopol, which is the chief center both of railroads and roads in eastern Galicia. From this railroad, as far south as the Dniester, runs a high plateau which is cut at intervals into segments by a number of north and south flowing rivers, running parallel to each other, of which the Sereth and Strypa and the Zlota Lipa are the principal. These rivers have cut for themselves small canyons through the upper soil down to the limestone beds on which the plateau rests, and in some considerable degree therefore resemble the rivers of our own West. Their courses thus make natural fortifications, at intervals, barring an eastern or western advance. At points, these canyons attain a depth of 400 feet, from which some idea of their formidableness as defenses in the hands of a determined enemy can be gained.

At this time the Russians held the left bank of the Strypa and it was the desire of the Teutons to complete their conquest of eastern Galicia before the winter set in, by driving the Russians to the east bank of the Sereth, and thus practically redeeming the whole of Galicia from Russian possession; while it was the purpose of the Russians to endeavor to push their lines further to the west as far at least as the Zlota Lipa, the next parallel western river, and thus place themselves in a position from which in the spring they would be able to attempt to recover Lemberg and a portion of Galicia to the west of them. These two conflicting objectives gave rise to almost continuous fighting along this Strypa River.

In September and up to the middle of October continuous skirmishes and small engagements took place on this front from the heights below Zboroff to almost

as far south as the Dniester. Finally on October 12th a pitched battle developed around the hamlet of Hajvoronka, on the Strypa, at a point where the canyon of that river is 150 feet deep. The Germans who possessed themselves of this village, which lies to the east bank of the Strypa, had erected rather extensive field fortifications to protect it, since it commands important roads both to the east and to the west. After a hard fight, the Germans were defeated and driven out of their fortifications, and in spite of a desperate counter-attack, were driven across the Strypa, and on that same evening were followed across that river by the Russians.

On the following day the Russians improved their positions by spreading to the north and to the south from the bridge-head on the west bank to which, as has been said, they had crossed the previous evening. On the 13th, however, the Germans, having been reinforced, attacked the Russians with bayonets, and after a short brisk fight in which the Russians lost heavily, the Muscovites were driven back across the bridge which the Germans recaptured, and then themselves crossed, also re-taking Hajvoronka itself.

The next fight of any moment took place slightly to the north of Nove Alexinets to the east of Lopushno, and here the Austrians were obliged to withdraw on a three mile front to a depth of about one mile; but a few days later this ground was recovered almost completely.

Late in October the Austrians assumed an offensive north of the Dniester, on the line extending from Zaleshchyki to Buczacz, which resulted in a great battle in the neighborhood of Ziemikovitse on the Strypa. At first this progressed favorably to the Russians who managed to capture Bahovice, and a forest of the same name, to the south of Ziemikovitse; but on November 2nd the Teutons delivered an attack against the village of Ziemikovitse itself, and, after routing the Russians, entered the village.

During the next few days the fighting was fast and furious around this hamlet. The final result was that the Russians lost all the ground that they had gained on the western bank of the Strypa, besides many thousand prisoners; in addition to which, their casualties were much above the normal. This battle ended the serious fighting until the latter part of November when on the 27th of the month the Austrians attempted to cross the Strypa River and gain a footing on its eastern

bank, but in this they were not successful, as the Russians showing a greater firmness and tenacity than they had shown heretofore, in this region, succeeded in repelling the Austrian forces. After this the fighting in this region again became quiet, and remained so until late in December, when the Russians attempted to launch an offensive between the Dniester and the Pruth in the extreme southern end of the front, as it then stood, almost immediately to the north of Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina, which they hoped to recapture by means of this movement.

The space between the Pruth and the Dniester is at this point crossed by a range of hills known as the Berdo Horodyshtche, which forms a natural barrier difficult to cross if well defended. The Russians opened their attack by capturing the village named Toporoutz which lies on the eastern side of these hills on the western side of which is Rarantche; Rarantche being in the hands of the Austrians and the ridge of hills between the two being the bone of dispute. The battle here raged for a couple of weeks, and therein the Russians captured the heights on the north bank of the Pruth which to some extent dominate Czernowitz, and which later on in the year proved of great help to them in the subsequent capture of that place, but the possession of which for the moment proved useless.

After this fight was over, quiet fell upon the line for a time, until the abortive attempt to capture Czernowitz took place in the latter part of January, 1916, in which attempt the Russians wasted 50,000 men and did not achieve their objective.

The only other important fighting which took place on any of this Galician front during the rest of the winter was around the town of Ustsietchko, which lies in the canyon of the Dniester, at its junction with the Dzuryn, which broke out in the early days of February, and lasted about a week, and resulted in the Austrians being driven from their position in the town and losing this important bridgehead. A few days later the Russians advanced as far as Butchatch on the southwest bank of the Dniester from this bridgehead, but an Austrian counter attack here drove them speedily back to the bridgehead where they remained without attempting any further movements until after the time this record closes.

Such, then, is a cursory review, without dwelling unduly upon the daily details, of the Teutonic campaign

against the Russians in Courland, Poland, Volhynia and Galicia, during the autumn of 1915 and a portion of the spring of 1916. There has, perhaps, never been a lengthier battle line fought on for as long a period in the world's history than this one which stretches from the shores of the Gulf of Riga in the north to the northern border of Bukowina in the south; and it is also safe to say that never on so lengthy a line of battle for as long a time were forces more disproportionate in numbers opposed to each other, without the weaker yielding.

The German-Austrian forces engaged varied in numbers during this period from 1,500,000 at the commencement to perhaps 800,000 or 900,000 at the end, and the advances which they made from the Dunajec River in the beginning of May, 1915, until the beginning of March of the following year, were continually made in spite of the opposition of forces at least one and a half times greater in numbers than themselves. Perhaps never before in the world's history has one army taken from another army, so superior to itself in strength, a total of prisoners which equals its own numbers, or inflicted casualties on the stronger army of at least two and a half times the strength of itself the weaker army, or captured 100,000 square miles of territory, including therein all of the principal fortresses of the country of the enemy.

The German triumph in what we may call the Russian Campaign in 1915 was so overwhelming and so complete as to be almost incredible. There has been some talk of the fact that the Russian armies escaped destruction, and some praise has been given to the Russian generals for this feat of withdrawing a greatly superior force from an inferior force and escaping annihilation. The facts, however, do not seem to bear out the theory that the strategy shown by the Russian generals in this campaign merits eulogy of any character. It has been advanced, in excuse of the Russians, that they lacked artillery and ammunition, but those shortages of supplies and arms are not borne out by the facts. For instance the Russian General Radko told Mr. Robert Crozier Long, the eminent English publicist, on the Dunajec itself shortly before the battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, that he had plenty of shells, and Mr. Long adds his own testimony to the fact that most of the Russian retreast in 1915 were not caused by shortness of shell at all.— As Mr. Long saw the whole campaign from the Russian

side, and is stating facts against interest, his testimony which appears on page 603 of the Fortnightly Review, an English publication, of April 1, 1916, seems convincing.

It is natural and human to seek for excuses which palliate defeat, but he will indeed be ingenious, who, in view of all the facts surrounding the Russian debacle of 1915, finds any excuse therefor, which excuses.

CHAPTER XVI

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

After the entry of Turkey into the war, the situation in the Balkans became extremely important to the Allies, not only in relation to the future of the one Balkan State which had joined them — Serbia —whose difficulty with Austria constituted the spark which ignited the flames of war, but also because the Allies had then projected an attack on Turkey through the Dardanelles, in which attack they desired to have the active aid of the other Balkan States,— Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania,— for which reason they concentrated under the leadership of the then Sir Edward Grey. Strong diplomatic efforts upon the Balkan States, with the object of inducing these nations to join their cause.

For a clear understanding of the situation in the Balkans, it is necessary to review briefly the history of all the States therein for the few years preceding the war. Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, had won their independence by the sword from Turkey, of which Empire they originally formed part. This was also true of Serbia and Montenegro. Each of these States, after achieving its independence, developed ambitions totally disproportionate to its size, population or power.

The Rumanians regarded themselves as lineal descendants of the Romans, an ancestry to which, after all, they were perhaps not entitled; nevertheless, this conception of their ancestry led them to dreams of empire over the whole of the Balkans, Turkey and Asia, and the southern portions of the empire of Austria, including the whole of Transylvania and Bukowina, as well as parts of Hungary.

The next State to the south, Bulgaria, also had its dreams of a leadership, or rather of an absorption of all the other States of the Balkans; while Greece, fired by recollections of her glorious history in antiquity, and

by the fact that undoubtedly at one time, when the seat of the Roman Empire was in Constantinople, a Greek Emperor had sat on the Imperial throne and given the law to the then world, was inspired by these noble visions of a glorious past to such an extent that she regarded herself as destined again to see one of her sons seated in Constantinople, ruling over the entire east of Europe and Asia Minor.

Serbia was troubled by similar visions of widespread Empire, inspired by the memory of a more or less fabled past.

These clashing ambitions led several times to wars between themselves, though Turkey was regarded by all these States as their real enemy, and as the first obstacle to be overcome, before their several dreams could have taken even the first step towards realization.

In 1912 this feeling of hostility against Turkey resulted in the formation of what is now known as the Balkan League, wherein Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro combined to attack the Turkish Empire. By means of this fusion of their strengths, these states created for themselves a striking force of approximately the same strength as that of the Turks, but with the added advantage to them of being able to attack Turkey from the east and from the north simultaneously.

In September, 1912, when Turkey was still feeling the severe strain of her war with Italy and the Albanians were rising against her to win their independence by arms and at the same time an internal struggle was taking place within the Empire itself for the control of its government between the Reactionists and Constitutionalists, Serbia and Bulgaria simultaneously mobilized, and Greece and Montenegro followed suit. The result of this action by these states was that in spite of the deterrent efforts of the Powers, war against Turkey followed. This war, while very short, was one of the most sanguinary of modern times, and resulted in the total defeat of Turkey. An armistice was signed on December 3rd, and thereafter negotiations for peace began. But, while these negotiations for peace were proceeding, the Great Powers intrigued in support of their own particular interests in the Balkans, dividing themselves into two groups, one of which comprised Austria and her Allies, and the other Russia and her Allies. As a result of these intrigues between these rival groups and of the difficulty in the division of the

spoils between the original participants in the war dissension arose in the Balkan League and finally Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, making common cause against Bulgaria, a second war broke out in the Balkans.

CHAPTER XVII

In February, 1913, while Bulgaria was thus struggling with Serbia and Greece, the one attacking her from the west and the other from the south, Rumania suddenly discovered that she was entitled to compensation (though what services this compensation was intended to cover is difficult to discover) and demanded it of the nation nearest to her which had benefited by the war, Bulgaria, and on being refused, attacked her. The result was that Bulgaria was compelled to sue for peace on any terms, and the Balkan situation was finally settled by the Treaty of Bucharest in August, 1913, in which Bulgaria was deprived of the bulk of the territory which she had expected to gain as a result of, and which had been assigned to her at the conclusion of, the first Balkan war.

The Treaty of Bucharest, however, did not deprive Bulgaria of her strength, as it should have done in order to have produced a permanent result, and so that kingdom waited, brooding over her wrongs, until a favorable opportunity should come to recover those territories which had been taken from her by Rumania, Serbia and Greece and which she deemed hers rightfully. After the Treaty of Bucharest, Serbia and Greece entered into a Treaty between themselves whereby they bound themselves to go to each other's assistance in the event that either one was attacked by Bulgaria alone in respect to the territories which either had received under the Treaty of Bucharest.

As this Treaty will play a considerable part hereafter in the course of this history when it becomes necessary to consider the subsequent relations between Greece and Serbia, it is well to point out now that the attack contemplated and referred to by this Treaty was an attack by Bulgaria only on either Greece or Serbia, and not an attack by Bulgaria plus any other Power or Powers; had such been the intention, the Treaty would not have failed to express such intention in its terms.

At the time this Treaty was made there was no idea in the minds of the statesmen of either Greece or Serbia of an imminent alliance of Bulgaria with any other Power or Powers, and it was only entered into, therefore, for the single purpose which it stated in its own words.

Bulgaria, it is perhaps needless to say, was even more bitter against Rumania for her sudden and, in the eyes of Bulgaria, treacherous action in attacking her without warning when she was already engaged with two other enemies. Hence it is clear that the relations between Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania at the beginning of the war were the reverse of friendly, and that they regarded each other with great suspicion.

When the Allies started their operations against Constantinople they solicited the co-operation of both Greece and Bulgaria and held before their eyes glittering visions of great spoils to be easily won from their participation in the attack on Turkey's territorial integrity and on her capital.

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, however, who has the reputation of being one of the longest and shrewdest heads of Europe, and is, to a very considerable degree a military leader, doubted the practicability of the Allies' plan for the reduction of Constantinople and was unwilling, for this reason, to plunge Bulgaria into an adventure in which the issue was in his eyes and in the eyes of his military advisors more than doubtful. Particularly, as Bulgaria felt considerable irritation against both Russia and Great Britain for the attitude assumed by them in the negotiations which terminated both the first and second Balkan wars. Consequently, Bulgaria assumed at this time, and maintained for several months thereafter an attitude of strict neutrality.

The results of the expedition against Constantinople and the crushing defeats which Russia experienced in the summer of 1915, confirmed the King of Bulgaria and his advisors in this attitude, and in their opinions after the beginning of the war, but prior however to these two failures, Bulgaria had endeavored to bring about an understanding between Turkey, Rumania and herself, whereby Kavalla on the Aegean Sea in Greece should pass into her possession without a struggle; and also whereby, her claims to Serbian territory in Macedonia, which had been taken from her as a result of the second Balkan war, should be satisfied.

Rumania returned evasive answers to these overtures

and it was impossible to foresee what course she would follow during the war. From time to time it was stated that she was on the point of mobilizing her army with the object of joining the Allies and thereby securing from Austria the Province of Transylvania and the Bukowina, in which provinces of Austria lived a number of Rumanians by race, but who had never been politically affiliated with Rumania from the time that all of this teritory was the Roman Province of Dacia.

King Charles, the then sovereign of Rumania was a prince well versed in statecraft, who had been for more than a generation the most considerable factor in all Balkan problems, and, as long as he lived, his influence was strong enough to prevent Rumania from taking any positive action one way or the other. The prospects of the eventful triumph of any one side of the combatants not being, in his judgment, up to the time of his death, sufficiently certain to justify the risk Rumania would take in entering the war on either side.

On Greece the Allies made much the same demands to join them in their Turkish adventure, but here a situation developed which requires a chapter by itself and which will be treated of some time later. Suffice it, for the moment, to say that Greece did not join the Allies in their attack on Turkey but remained neutral, in spite of tremendous pressure.

In January, 1915, Bulgaria received an advance from German banks of the sum of $15,000,000, a part payment on account of a loan of $100,000,000, arrangements for which had been concluded between Bulgaria and these banks in the summer of 1914.

About the first of February the campaign against Turkey going badly, the British Government gave Bulgaria to understand that her national aspiration as regards the territory taken away from her by the Treaty of Bucharest by which the second Balkan war was concluded was regarded with great sympathy by the British and that Great Britain would use its influence to obtain the making of the necessary recession of territory by Serbia to her, provided that Bulgaria would definitely promise armed co-operation in the operations against Turkey. To counteract this, Germany and Hungary promptly offered, at the expense of Serbia, more territory than Great Britain did, and, furthermore, in the middle of March made an effort to induce Turkey to restore Bulgaria certain territory in Thrace which Bul-

garia had occupied during the first Balkan war but which had been given back to Turkey by the Treaty of London.

Thus matters stood in May, when the Bulgarian Premier made proposals to the Entente Powers which involved secession by Serbia of considerably more territory than the Allies had proposed, and the recession by Greece of certain territories which had not been comprised in their original proposal.

Towards the end of May, the Entente Powers answered these proposals of Bulgaria to a degree, but very evasively, and in the middle of June, Bulgaria made new proposals based upon this reply. At this time, however, the Allies were not in position to promise anything, as they had not completed any arrangements with Serbia and Greece which would enable them to deliver the territories which they had originally promised Bulgaria. To put themselves in a position to do so, they began negotiations with both Serbia and Greece to such ends, but these negotiations being both delicate and difficult, necessarily took considerable time, and they were not ready to reply before August to the Bulgarian proposals of the middle of June. In the meantime, Bulgaria and Turkey had arrived at an agreement, and, as a result of this agreement, certain cessions of territory were made by Turkey to Bulgaria; but, necessarily, until the position of Bulgaria, as regards the Central Empires, became clearly defined, Bulgaria was not to enter into full possession of the territory effected by this agreement.

In the early days of August the Entente Powers replied to the Bulgarian proposals of June 15th, but this reply was merely to throw dust in the eyes of their own people at home, and to conceal the failure of their diplomacy in the Balkans from them because at this time they were well aware of the fact of the agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria, and were very well aware of what the existence of such an agreement meant.

Through the rest of August, pourparlers and diplomatic notes were exchanged between the Entente Governments and Bulgaria to keep up the farce, but these resulted in nothing, as they were intended to do from the beginning.

On September 10th Bulgaria's Premier, publicly admitted that the Turko-Bulgarian agreement already mentioned was a fact, and, about the same time, Bulgaria called to the colors all of the regular Macedonian and

Bulgarian troops, and all Bulgarians of Macedonian or Thracian origin. This alarmed the Allies, and on September 14th, they offered Bulgaria more even than she had originally demanded, but the die was cast, the policy of the government was fixed, which policy was on September 17th approved by the Bulgarian parliament. Next followed a public and official declaration by the Bulgarian Premier on September 20th that an agreement had been signed with Turkey for the maintenance of armed and benevolent neutrality on the part of Bulgaria, to carry out which on September 23rd Bulgaria proclaimed a general mobilization.

CHAPTER XVIII

This mobilization was followed by ten days of intense negotiations on the part of the Allies, but up to this time there is no evidence that Bulgaria intended to participate with her army in the war. What she intended to do, apparently, up to the 3rd of October, was to hold herself ready for eventualities which might arise, either by the actions of Rumania to the north, her bitterest foe, or to resist such coercion, by force of arms or otherwise, as the Entente Powers might choose to bring to bear upon her. But this condition was not to continue long and a more decided attitude was forced upon Bulgaria by the actions of Great Britian and of Russia.

The British action was, perhaps, more ridiculous than serious, and consisted in Sir Edward Grey's issuing to Bulgaria what he termed a "solemn warning," to which the term "sententious" in place of "solemn" could be perhaps more aptly applied, since it was impossible for Sir Edward Grey to give any sanction to this warning, a fact which was known both to himself and to the Bulgarian government. But Sir Edward Grey was and is prone to the theory that words from him possess the quality of being omnipotent in themselves. This view, however, was not shared by the Bulgarians.

Russia took more definite action and on the 3rd of October addressed to Bulgaria the following note:

"Events which are taking place in Bulgaria at this moment give evidence of the definite decision of King Ferdinand's government to place the fate of his country in the hands of Germany. The presence of German and Austrian officers on the Ministry of War and on the staffs of the army, the concentration of troops in the zone bordering on Serbia and the extensive financial support accepted from our enemies by the Sophia Cabinet, no longer leave any doubt as to the present military preparations of Bulgaria.

"The Powers of the Entente who have at heart the realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people,

have, on many occasions, warned Mr. Radoslavoff that any hostile act against Serbia would be considered as directed against themselves. The assurances given by the head of the Bulgarian Cabinet in reply to these warnings are contradicted by facts.

"The representative of Russia, bound to Bulgaria by the imperishable memory of liberation from the Turkish yoke, cannot sanction by his presence preparations for fraticidal aggression against the Slav and Allied peoples. The Russian Minister has therefore received orders to leave Bulgaria with all the staff of the legation and the Council if the Bulgarian government does not, in 24 hours, break with the enemies of the Slav countries and of Russia, and does not, at once, proceed to send away the officers belonging to the armies and States which are at war with the Powers of the Entente."

With this ultimatum Great Britain and France associated themselves. Great Britain probably deeming that something more than the "solemn warning" of Sir Edward Grey had now become necessary.

On the whole, this ultimatum must be regarded as humorous, in spite of that tone of a fond parent talking to a naughty child which Russia chose to adopt in this communication to Bulgaria, wherein, recalling to her memory events of her liberation from the Turkish yoke, (which perhaps are not stated with striking historical accuracy as to the role played by Russia therein) she informed her that "Russia cannot turn fratricidal against the Slavic allied peoples;" meaning thereby Serbia. But only three short years before Russia was not at all disturbed in mind by the assault of this same Slavic people on the very people whose aggression against them she now called "fratricidal." If not "fratricidal" then, when directed by Serbia against Bulgaria, how could the attack become "fratricidal" now when directed by Bulgaria against Serbia? Another highly amusing feature of this ultimatum is that it was sent by a power which up to the time of its sending had proved itself utterly incapable of defending its own territory successfully, let alone attack the territory of others.

The twenty-four hours came and the twenty-four hours went, and Bulgaria, being an independent nation and not a vassal state, took, during this time, the resolution to resist this coercion and pledged herself definitely to the Teutonic Powers to military action against the coercers, and also replied to Russia in a manner

which that power found "bold to the verge of insolence."

On October 15th a demand for their passports was made by the Ministers of the Powers who either signed or associated themselves with the Russian ultimatum, and Bulgaria and the Entente Powers were at war.

But it is to be noted that no definite pledge of military support was ever given by Bulgaria to the Central Powers until after the delivery of this Russian ultimatum, which is certainly as arrogant an attempt by a large Power to coerce a small Power as any whereof modern history holds record, including the demands of Germany on Belgium in the early part of the war.

Thus Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, and soon her troops were on Serbian soil.

This fiasco of the diplomacy of the Allies in the Balkans produced the downfall of one foreign minister: Theophile Delcasse, who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of France and had held that portfolio, with some intermissions, for many years. Delcasse can be regretted; a good hater, a hard hitter, despising hypocrisy and never whining when defeated, in these latter traits of character quite a contrast to Sir Edward Grey, he passed probably forever off the political stage, leaving reputation which will no doubt increase in history.

CHAPTER XIX

SERBIA

At the end of the summer of 1915 the Serbian army, in spite of the epidemic of typhus which raged in Serbia, had succeeded in thoroughly reorganizing themselves after their successful resistance to the Austrian invasion in the early part of the war, and constituted a force of about 300,000. Physically, and in morale, the Serbian infantry is of high quality, while their field artillery was considered by competent observers as of equal quality with the infantry. This artillery had been considerably strengthened by the guns captured from the Austrians in their retreat, in their first invasion of Serbia.

A small international force, under command of Rear Admiral Trowbridge, had been sent to Serbia by the Allies to assist in the defense of Belgrade and the Danube front. This force consisted of a British contingent of four 2-gun batteries of naval 4.7 guns, and some experts in mine work, a battery of Russian guns, two French guns, and a party of aviators. It was supposed that in view of the pledges and promises made by the Allies of Serbia, particularly Great Britain, that if it became necessary this international force would be augmented so as to become a really valuable aid in the defense of Serbia, but this hope was destined to be disappointed, as will be seen in the sequel.

Russia's aid in this Serbian campaign to the Serbs was limited to circulating interesting fiction in relation to an army of 600,000 men assembled by her which at various times were alleged to have started from Sebastapol or Odessa on transports across the Black Sea. Odessa is distant about 250 miles—Sebastopol more—from Varna, their nearest Bulgarian port, which is the nearest port on the Black Sea to Serbia. 600,000 men, with their artillery, ammunition, supplies, etc., would require about 600,000 tons of shipping to transport them. The entire Russian

tonnage on the Black Sea and the Azov Sea on the first of July 1913 was 282,000. It thus became somewhat difficult to see how Russia could have transported by any possibility, with this comparatively small steamer tonnage, by no means all of which was available, 600,000 men and their equipment to Varna under three months time. And it is to be also observed that this computation does not take into consideration the fact that at no time did Russia secure any footing on the Bulgarian coast, though she attacked it several times with her justly famous Black Sea fleet, whereat to land these men and their supplies. The most curious fact in connection with this romance was that the American papers devoted, during its several epochs of currency, column after column to the progress of this fictitious army and the appreciation of what wonders it would accomplish when it once reached the field. Thus, for the thousandth time, in this war evincing either their utter and crass geographical ignorance or their indomitable prejudice which sought to establish as facts in the minds of the people things which the editors knew not to be facts.

During September the Serbian commanders began to notice that there was increased activity on the opposite shores of the Danube and Save, which served, as reference to a map will show, as the northern defense lines of Serbia, and rumors of large troop movements to the north of the Danube, and particularly of a very considerable concentration alleged to be going on at Tamsavar began to be circulated in Serbia. The Serbians, however, were extremely confident that they would be able to repeat their performance of the previous campaign, and that, in the event that this attack was made from the north, it would not be made frontally on Belgrade itself but would be attempted either to the west across the Save River or else from the northeast via Semendria.

As was said in a preceding chapter, Bulgaria mobilized on September 28th; on October 3rd, Russia addressed her ultimatum to her, ordering her to suspend all military preparations to attack Serbia, and on the 5th the Ministers of the Entente Powers at Sophia were handed their passports, which capital they left on the 8th.

On the 11th, at a point near Kniashevatz, to the northeast of Nish, Bulgarian troops crossed the Serbian frontier in the morning, and later on that same day another force of Bulgarian troops also crossed the frontier near Leskovatz to the southeast of Nish.

As has been said, the Serbians did not contemplate any frontal attack on Belgrade itself, and this for a double reason. The Serbian capital occupies a sort of triangle jutting to the north from the general line of the northern territory of Serbia, which is protected by rivers on the two sides projecting northward, but is also of course faced on both these sides, on the opposite sides of these rivers, by territory of the enemy.

Both the Danube and Save here, which join in front of Belgrade, are wide, fairly rapidly flowing streams, and once the bridges were removed the Serbians supposed it to be hardly possible that the Austrians had military skill enough to force their way across these streams. Another advantage was that the southern banks of these rivers on which Belgrade is situated are much higher ground than the northern banks, and thus artillery in position upon the southern bank commands completely the territory forming the northern banks.

The Serbians, therefore, as said before, were overconfident of Belgrade's strength; furthermore, the menacing attitude of Bulgaria at this time induced the Serbians to weaken the force of troops which they had available for the defense of Belgrade, in which city itself only two infantry regiments were left, though 20,000 men were held in reserve a short distance to the south. In addition to the withdrawal of infantry, considerable artillery was also sent to the Bulgarian frontier.

On their side, the Austro-Germans had, during September, assembled about 150,000 men, partly Germans and partly Austrians, the general command of which army was placed in the hands of Marshal von Mackensen who had distinguished himself in the advance into Poland the summer before.

This army was divided into two forces, one of which was destined for the capture of Belgrade and one of which was to penetrate into Serbia via Semendria, 25 miles to the east. The army which was to take Belgrade was under the command of Austrian General Kovess, and that which was to attack Semendria being under that of the German General von Gallwitz. To this force of infantry was joined a large quantity of German artillery. The smallness of this army may give rise to comment, but it must be remembered, from the preceding chapter, that a definite agreement had been arrived at between the Austrian-Germans and the Bulgarians which contemplated the entrance of Bulgaria into the war

and the attack on Serbia from the east as soon as invasion began from the north. This would add another 350,000 men to the attacking force, and this Bulgarian attack would be made on Serbia's most vulnerable line.

We will first trace the outline of the operations in the north. On October 3rd a desultory bombardment of Belgrade began and continued for three days, gradually growing more violent. On October 5 the direct attack opened with great violence and was a complete surprise to the Serbians. Their artillery, such as they had, could only make a feeble reply to the terrific onslaught which was being delivered by the Austro-Germans, and the Serbian artillery was speedily put out of action either by the projectiles of their opponents or because their own supply of ammunition ran out. This bombardment continued severely for one day and wrought great destruction, so that the city was on fire at many points, the front on the river suffering particularly. The electric lights, the telephone and telegraph communications being destroyed as well.

The night of the 6th, the Austro-Germans commenced to cross both the Save and the Danube Rivers, using for this purpose flat bottom boats which had previously been gathered. The principal landing was on the Danube quays on the river front of the city itself, though minor landings were also made to the east and west.

By daybreak of October 7th about 5,000 troops had been successfully transported across the rivers and had, after driving away the Serbian Infantry opposing their landing, established themselves securely upon the Serbian side of the river, where they entrenched themselves during that day. All this day of October 7th the Austro-German bombardment continued with increased fury and destroyed the British guns which had been brought back during the night from positions distant from the town on the Save and Danube from which they had been driven, the French guns also were destroyed. During the night of the 7th and 8th additional forces were transported by the Austro-Germans across the river, and these, by dawn on the morning of the 8th, were practically in possession of the entire river front of the town. Considerable fighting took place in the streets, but in the afternoon, a general retreat of the Serbians and the international force was ordered.

These fell back towards Torlak and on their way encountered the division of Serbian troops which had

been placed in reserve south of the city but which had advanced northward and on reaching a position on the outskirts of the town, found the city completely in the enemies' hands, and so fell back again.

By the evening of the 8th all resistance to the Austro-Germans had ceased and all that night these continued hurrying troops across the rivers so that by the morning of the 9th the city of Belgrade was for the second time completely in the hands of invaders of Serbia.

While these events were taking place at the Capital, on the 7th of October an attack against Semendria to the east began. Gen. von Gallwitz had a large quantity of artillery at his disposition, and this artillery was used without intermission from the morning of October 7th to the morning of October 9th. Under cover of a tremendous fire which was directed from the northern bank of the Danube on Semendria and its environs, a force of Austro-Germans managed to occupy Semendria Island in the Danube directly in front of the town and to install a considerable number of guns there, which also opened upon the town. The Serbian artillery in the town was speedily put out of action and on the morning of October 9th the Austro-Germans succeeded in throwing strong contingents across the Danube and in taking possession of the town after a six hour battle in its streets with the Serbian infantry which fought with great courage and determination, but which was eventually overcome and forced to retreat, after suffering very heavy losses.

Thus in three days two of the northern gates of Serbia had been forced.

At the same time that the attack on these two towns was delivered, simultaneous attacks were begun on the part of the Austro-Germans on Orsova near the extreme east of Serbia, near where the boundary lines of Hungary, Rumania and Serbia meet, and also near the celebrated Iron Gate of the Danube, and to the west of Belgrade on the Save River at Shabatz; while on the western boundary another attack had begun on Vishegrad from Serajevo to the west, the scene of the crime which began the war.

The objective in the attack from Orsova was to unite with the Bulgarian troops which had crossed the border near Negotin, while that from Shabatz was to capture Valievo, the head of the railroad running to the east from Sopot on the main line of railroad running through

central Serbia from Belgrade to Nish; and that from Vishegrad to capture Uzitsha, at the head of another branch of this same line of railroad, which branch ran parallel to and to the southward of the Valievo branch.

The army of von Kovess began advancing, on October 11th towards the south, but the Serbians contested every foot of the way with great gallantry, and it was not until the 20th of October, ten days later, that this army had progressed as far as Leskovatz and Stepoyevatz; the first, 30 miles directly south of Belgrade and the second the same distance southwest, and was menacing Sopot on the Nish railroad where the branch for Valievo runs to the west. The force which crossed the Danube at Shabatz had also moved south and was moving directly on Valievo.

In the center the Teutons, starting from Semendria, moved southward in two columns, one marching directly south, which captured Selevatz, in the valley of the Morava River, while the other had struck southeast and had taken Ranovatz, in the valley of the Mlava River.

The force from Vishegrad did, in its first two weeks' operations, reach Uzitsha, as before stated, the terminus of the southern branch of the Nish Railroad. The force proceeding from Orsova on the northeastern frontier had moved south along the line of the Danube and had succeeded in opening the navigation of this river, whereby it became possible to send ammunition down the river to the Bulgarian fortress of Vidin.

On the Bulgarian frontier, the east front, the Bulgarians had occupied Negotin and Zaitchar to the south, on the River Tunok. Further south near Pirot, northwest of Sofia, on the railroad between Sofia and Nish, about ten miles from the frontier, the Bulgarians had made but slow progress owing to the desperate resistance of the Serbians, and further north, at Kniashevatz, another force was moving to the westward, thus threatening Nish from the northeast, while the force at Pirot threatened it from the southeast.

On the southern end of this eastern front of Serbia the Bulgarians had advanced to the line of railroad running from Nish to Salonika and had cut it at Vrania; by which move they had intercepted communications between the main body of the Serbian Army to the north and the Allied Forces which were now beginning to disembark at Salonika. South of Vrania another thrust

was being made by the Bulgarians which started from Kustendil and which after winning a bloody battle at Egri Palanka had pushed forward close to Kumanovo.

In the far south another Bulgarian force started from Strumitza, moved northwestwardly and after hard fighting lasting till the 20th of October, captured the town of Veles on the Nish-Salonika Railroad, a day or two later.

About the 15th of October the Allied Forces at Salonika made a move forward in two columns; the French moved along the railroad northward in the direction of Krivolak and Veles, where they hoped to arrive before the occupation of the town by the Bulgarians; while the British contented themselves at this time by occupying the railroad from Salonika to the frontier, as far as Ghevgeli, and establishing a line to the eastward from this town to Lake Doiran. The French were about 24,000 strong, and the British about 15,000.

The Allied Fleets, about this time, began to bombard the southern Bulgarian coast towns on the Aegean, and particularly bombarded Dedeagatch heavily but ineffectually.

CHAPTER XX

The next week witnessed fierce combats between the Bulgarians and the Serbians on the eastern front, but it early became apparent that the Serbian Army was not going to be able to defend Nish successfully. At this time Nish was the seat of the government which had been removed thither at the time of the fall of Belgrade, but on October 21st the Serbian government, foreseeing that the situation of Nish was extremely precarious, moved the capital north to Krushevatz, but only remained here two days, removing to Kralievo on October 23rd. The fighting on this eastern front continued violent for the next ten days.

Returning now to the Austro-German Armies advancing southward. The two Serbian Armies, being forced south, continued their brave resistance, but were forced back on the 22nd of October to Mladnovatz, and three days later were again compelled to give ground, this time falling back as far as Topola, which is north of Kraguevatz; a position they only held two days, retiring to the south of Kraguevatz on October 27. Here, after a rather warm fight, in which the Serbians were defeated, the remaining portion of their army fell back as far as Krushevatz on October 27th.

By the capture by the Teutons of Kraguevatz which followed on October 31, the Serbian main arsenal, which, in addition to being an arsenal, was also the site of the only powder factory of importance in Serbia, a hard blow was dealt to the Serbian power of defense. It was from this arsenal, according to the proofs produced at the trial of the assassins of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that the bombs which were used by Cabrinovic, one of the conspirators who had been taken by Major Tankosic of the Serbian General Staff and given to the bomb thrower; and this testimony of the witnesses was corroborated by that of experts on explosives who proved that bombs of the particular character of those used in the assassination of the Archduke were not man-

ufactured anywhere outside of the Royal Arsenal of Serbia.

With the arsenal were taken a vast quantity of military supplies and munition of war, besides some 60 guns.

The weather during these days was very bad, and the Serbian retreat, as well as the Austro-German advance, was conducted under very great difficulties; and in addition to the difficulties caused by the weather, the Austro-German forces pressed so closely on the Serbian rear as to give the latter no respite.

The Serbian Army in the northwest corner of Serbia, during this time, was also in great difficulties, although it occupied the strongest positions on this northern front. Valievo was evacuated on October 22nd, and the evacuation being orderly, the bridges over the Kolubara River were destroyed and all the supplies of the army taken away. For some reason, the Austro-Germans were not ready to seize their advantage, and did not enter the town until October 30th; but then immediately set itself in pursuit of the Serbian Army; which being outflanked on the left, fell back continuously through Mionitsa, Goukosh, Gorni Milanovatz, Rudnik, Blaznava, Bar, Knitch, and Vitanovitse, to Kralievo, the temporary capital where it eventually joined the army, which had fallen back from Belgrade itself.

In this retreat there were continual clashes between the Serbian rear guards and the advance guards of the Austro-Germans; but except at the Ub-Kotselievo lines and one or two places south of this, there was no hard fighting. After the capture of Uzitsha, the Austro-Germans advanced from the westward at Vishegrad and began a forward movement towards Kralievo. In order to protect Kralievo until it could be reached by the Serbian armies retreating from the north, the Serbian army retreating from the east made a stand at Tchartchak, a town on the railroad from Uzitsha to Krushevatz, about half way between the first named place and Kralievo, and here a most desperate struggle took place which lasted for six days; the town itself being captured and re-captured several times. This was probably the hardest fighting which took place in northern Serbia, in proportion to the number of men engaged, the casualties were very great.

However, eventually, the Austro-Germans, advancing from the West with some aid from their forces moving from the north, possessed themselves of the town and

the Serbians who had opposed them began a retreat southward from both Tchartchak and Kralievo in the direction of Mitrovitza, the head of a railroad line running south to Uskub, where it joined the main line to Salonika. It was the hope of these Serbian armies to be able to retreat in reasonable order to Mitrovitza and thence take the railroad south to Uskub, and thence to Ghevgeli, where they would join the French and British troops.

Turning to the eastern frontier. On the 26th of October, the Bulgarians drove the Serbians out of Pirot and captured the town, and on the same day, further south, they entered Veles after a hard fight, driving the Serbians in the town to the westward. The effect of this capture of Veles was to cut off any probable chance of escape for these Serbian armies coming south on the line from Mitrovitza, which has already been spoken of, and this hope was totally extinguished by the capture of Uskub by the Bulgarians, which is the termination of the Mitrovitza branch, the day after the capture of Veles. A part of the forces which captured these two towns turned south and, moving rapidly, reached a point near Prilep, three days afterwards; thus interposing themselves between the Serbians retreating from Veles and Uskub and the British and French forces, and thus finally preventing the junction of which the Serbians and British had hoped it would have been possible to make.

Further north, Leskovatz, on the Nish-Salonika Railroad, was captured by coincident movements north from Vrania and west from Pirot. The effect of this capture was to almost completely surround the Serbian army in this region and to add to the difficulties in which it had fallen.

The Austro-German forces which had captured Kraguevatz, on the 31st of October, were moving south rapidly. Gen. Stephanovitch, commanding the Serbian for cesin Leskovatz, appreciated his position and fearing lest a longer stay in that place would result in his being completely surrounded, on October 4th evacuated the town and began a retreat to the west, crossing the Morava River and directing his march in the direction of Pristina. This retreating army was pursued by the Bulgarians, but its retreat, by forced marches averaging 35 miles a day, was so swift that it outstripped its pursuers and arrived at Pristina safely but in an exhausted condition.

In the meantime, in the north, the Austro-Germans

who, as said, captured Kraguevatz on October 31st, immediately resumed their march south and rapidly approached to Kralievo and Krushevatz. On November 2nd Krushevatz fell into the possession of the Austro-Germans but a few hours after the Serbians who had evacuated it had fallen back in the direction of Kralievo. Kralievo, however, did not prove a safe place of refuge, and on the next day the Serbian Army which had retreated thither, as well as the Serbian government, went south to Rashka.

Rashka, which is only some 30 miles south of Kralievo, was not deemed a safe place for a long stay, and a day or two after its arrival there, the Serbian government moved to Mitrovitza, across the country. By this time the retreat had become that of not only the government and the army, but of the entire Serbian population, and the roads, such as they were, were thickly encumbered for many days with the primitive carts of the civilian population.

For this reason, traveling was slow, and it took the government ten days to cover the comparatively short distance between Rashka and Mitrovitza. At Mitrovitza, however, the government stay was almost equally short, because a force of the enemy advancing from the west occupied Pristina two days after its arrival there, rendering its further stay in this town unsafe.

Consequently, on the same day the Serbian government left for Prisrend, where it arrived the day following, the 16th of November, and where it remained for a little over a week. When Prisrend became unsafe, the government again left and following the River Drin across Albania to the Albanian seaport of Scutari, which city it finally reached on the 30th of November.

Prisrend is remarkable as being the last place where the Serbian government exercised any authority in Serbia; and, a little later on, Prisrend became the center from which the terrible winter retreat of the Serbian population westward, through the Albanian Alps to the shores of the Adriatic, started.

CHAPTER XXI

In the meantime, and while the government was at Prisrend, another Serbian army which had been defeated at Pristina to the northeast thereof, succeeded in moving west from Pristina after their defeat and retreated directly west to Ipek, in Montenegro. Pristina itself was abandoned by the Serbian army there on the morning of November 26th, and in the afternoon of that day the enemy entered it.

The army moving from Pristina towards Ipek reached Ipek on December 1st, but being hotly pursued by their enemy, in two columns, one which moving from the northeast had previously captured Novi Bazar and the other from Pristina, were only able to remain there over the night and on the next day started for Scutari where the Serbian government had preceded it.

The country through which this retreat had to be conducted would have been a difficult country even in summer, but now it was the height of the winter and the lofty mountains were deeply covered with snow. Through their valleys and across their ridges the retreating Serbians made their way for eleven days; finally arriving at Podgoritsa and four days after at Scutari.

Another portion of the Serbian army which was at the time of the beginning of the general Serbian retreat, to the east of Pristina, found itself in a very difficult position; behind it were the Bulgarians pushing up the railroad from Uskub towards Pristina, and threatening to cut the road to Prisrend, which meant that the Serbians' road to comparative safety, through Albania, would be cut off. Before them were 150,000 to 200,000 civilian fugitives seeking a way through the Albanian mountains, and moving with a slowness which, under the circumstances, endangered both themselves and the army behind them. The Bulgarians came up rapidly, and to save their people, this Serbian army, having no other choice, threw itself in the way of the Bulgarians

on the line from Lipliane to Ferozevitch, where, being without artillery, it endeavored to stay the advancing foe by rifle fire. This army fought very gallantly, and not only held the Bulgarians but drove them back for some miles in spite of its insufficient equipment for battle, and continued to withstand them for six days, the gaining of which time gave the opportunity for the refugees, among whom was the King of Serbia, to move a considerable distance to the westward and to attain a position of relative safety. At the end of the 6th day, however, the ammunition of the Serbians gave out and their losses from the enemy's rifle and artillery fire having been very heavy, they began to fall back to the west.

It is impossible to describe this general flight of the Serbians both the armies and the civilian population from their country; it lasted from six to eight weeks in the depth of winter, its line of movement lying through a very difficult country which could supply the flying refugees with neither food nor shelter; and to add to the difficulties, many of the tribes of Albanians through whose territories the line of retreat lay, were hostile to the Serbians and opposed them by force of arms. Among the most unfortunate of all those who were carried away by the stream of this retreat were some 20,000 Austrian prisoners taken in the first invasion, who were driven by the Serbian troops before them to the west. These unfortunates were in even worse plight than their captors, the Serbian refugees themselves, and of the 20,000 barely 5,000, one quarter, survived to reach the shores of the Adriatic.

When the Serbian army reached the sea coast, it may be doubted whether its strength exceeded 60,000. Of the Serbian civilian refugees many thousands had also perished. There is perhaps no episode like this flight of an entire people in modern history. To find anything similar to it we would be obliged to go back to the middle ages.

Towards the end of December, the confused mass of army, prisoners and refugees were practically all in northern Albania, concentrated in the vicinity of Scutari. The troops were gotten together into some sort of organization, and pushed on to San Giovanni di Medua, on the port on the coast to the south where they could obtain some supplies from the outside, and here we will leave them for a time.

While these things were going on in western Serbia, other events of considerable interest were taking place in southeastern Serbia where as has been said the French and English troops had advanced as far as Ghevgeli. These forces were joined here by a comparatively few Serbian troops which had succeeded in evading the Bulgarians by flying southward, and it was resolved by the Allied commanders to endeavor to make an advance to the north in order to attempt to create a diversion which would give the Serbian army retreating to the west towards Albania a chance to withdraw more successfully. Accordingly an advance was made on a line running north from Strumitza, to the east of Ghevgeli. This advance was temporarily successful, and defeating the Bulgarians more than once succeeded in getting up as far north as Krivolak, but the struggle at Krivolak did not last long, as reinforcements soon came to the Bulgarians there, whereupon these took the offensive and the combined forces of French, British and Serbians were driven back again to their point of departure, and even further south along the Vardar, until, at the end of January, the Bulgarian line had arrived at a point well to the south of Lake Doiran and Ghevgeli.

During this time in southwest Serbia the Bulgarians moving from Veles to Uskub, had successfully occupied Kritchevo and Prilep, and finally attained the height of their desires by the occupation of the much-coveted city of Monastir; a few days after which they captured Ochrida. Later on, to the west, on the Albanian border, the Bulgarian lines were advanced south of Monastir and took up a position as far south as an east and west line running through Florina in Greek territory.

It is needless to say that the Serbians felt deeply their practical desertion by the Allies. Not only had they asked for aid as far back as the 7th of July, but latterly had repeated that request, which was particularly addressed to the British. On September 24th Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, had solemnly pledged Serbia that England would assist her without qualification and without reserve. To most people, as to the Serbs, such a broad pledge of support would have meant that, in the event of necessity, military assistance would be offered unstintedly; but it appears that, in putting this interpretation upon Sir Edward Grey's pledge, the Serbians were mistaken, because,

when the necessity for the redemption of this pledge arose, Sir Edward Grey explained that his words meant that "diplomatic support" would be given and had not meant military support at all.

One result of the conquest of Serbia was peculiar. All the officers of the Serbian army who were proved to have been mixed up in the conspiracy which resulted in the tragedy at Serajevo in June, 1914, and also all surviving officers, without exception who took part in the assassination of Alexander and Draga years before, whereby Peter, ex-King of Serbia, came to the throne, were killed during the fighting resulting from the invasion. In this case one may quote with some appropriateness the line:

"The mill of the gods grinds slowly,
But it grinds exceedingly fine."

Subsequent to the punishment of Serbia, the Allies withdrew a considerable distance to the south and concentrated in the city of Salonika, in Greek territory on which they installed themselves, and which they fortified and constituted their base for the problematic future operations for the redemption of Serbia. This occupation of Salonika led them into a series of complications with Greece, since such occupation of this city on Greek territory was without the consent of the Greek government, and, in fact over the protest of that government, to which protest the Allies paid no attention.

CHAPTER XXII

As an aid to the operations taking place in Serbia, in the early days of October, the Austrians opened an offensive from southern Bosnia on Montenegro. This little country, which is a tangled mass of high mountains covered with almost impenetrable forests, which contains no roads in our sense of the word, presents great difficulty to an invader, and defended as it was by a brave though not particularly numerous mountain people, every foot of the way had to be won against guerilla fighting. Under these circumstances, the Austrians progressed so extremely slow in the first two months, that little of practical importance resulted, though, nevertheless, a steady advance took place; but still this was so slow that Austrian troops had not got into a position in Montenegro where they could successfully oppose the retreat of the Serbians westward from Ipek and through Prisrend to Scutari at the time that these retreats took place. In fact, the serious advances in this campaign did not commence really until after the 11th of January, when the Austrians captured Mount Loven, the famous "Black Mountain" whose possession they had coveted for years; and the taking of Cettinje, the capital, six miles distant therefrom followed four days later, January 15th.

On the 18th of January the Austrians captured Antivari, which capture gave them command of Scutari; whose occupation soon followed, and on the 19th Dulcigno fell into their power. At this time the announcement was made that the Montenegrin King had sued for a separate peace.

But it turned out that these negotiations of Montenegro's King looking to surrender were merely a ruse de guerre to gain time to enable him to concentrate his scattered army and to make provision for its retreat in case of need. Under the rules of war in the case of the armistice which was arrived at for a few days as a result of these negotiations, such a course is allowable unless

the armistice is sued to surprise the enemy before he can put himself on guard, which was not the case in these negotiations. Generally speaking, unless the armistice itself contains stipulations to the contrary, each side is authorized, during its continuance, to make movements of troops within its own lines, to receive and instruct recruits, to construct retrenchments, to repair bridges and establish new batteries, and in general, to take advantage of the time and means at his disposal to prepare for resuming hostilities.

This was apparently what the King did in this case, and having accomplished his object, on the 19th of January King Nicholas left the country and joined his Queen and the royal family at San Giovanni de Medusa, whence he embarked for Italy. His stay in Italy was, however, but brief, in spite of the fact that the King of Italy was his son-in-law, and King Nicholas ultimately took up a residence near Lyons, France, where he remained for some time, being supported by an allowance from the French Government.

Many of the Montenegrins, however, particularly those to the northeast and north of Cettinje, were deceived by these negotiations and the towns of Podgoritza, Danilovegrad and Niksic surrendered without resistance to the Austrians; these towns being the only important towns of Montenegro which the Austrians had not occupied before; and all except the very southern end of Montenegro was completely in Austrian possession by January 25th, 1916. To the south, however, a small army under General Milanovitch obeyed the orders of the King and attempted to continue their resistance, even going so far as to take the offensive and attacking the Austrians. The main result of these negotiations was, however, to free the Austrians from any further need of very large forces in Montenegro itself and consequently to enable them to detach enough troops from their army there to form a sufficient force for the invasion of Albania in pursuit of the remainder of the Montenegrin army, and the Serbians, and for the attack of the Italian forces also there.

This the Austrians did and Milanovitch being easily brushed aside the Austrians soon appeared in force to the immediate north of the port of San Giovanni de Medua. By which appearance the Serbian army which, as has been seen before, had concentrated in the neighborhood of this town after its escape from the mountains

of Montenegro and Albania, was compelled to retreat further south. Their retreat began on January 21st, and San Giovanni di Medua and its neighborhood was evacuated by all the forces of the Serbians and their Allies. This retreat was directly south towards Durazzo where these mixed forces arrived safely after a march of several days though losing some men in rear guard actions on the road with the Austrians and in combats with the Albanians who threw themselves across their path to bar their way southward.

From Durazzo a portion of the Serbian army was taken south by water to the Greek island of Corfu which had been occupied "temporarily" by the Allies without the consent of Greece. Another portion, however, was forced to evacuate Durazzo owing to the approach of the Austrian forces advancing from the north and of Bulgarian forces moving from the eastward, and retreated southward to Avlona, another Albanian seaport which at this time was in the hands of the Italians. These forces were somewhat roughly handled on the road, but eventually the bulk thereof arrived at Avlona and were there embarked for Corfu.

The Austrians themselves soon after the taking of San Giovanni di Medua moved southward through Kroia which they occupied on February 5th in the direction of Durazzo and on February 8th made a juncture with the Bulgarians at a point a dozen miles to the northwest of the city, which the united forces proceeded leisurely to surround. Another force of Bulgarians moving from the eastward was met at Elbassan to the southeast of the town on the 12th of February, by which meeting the town was completely surrounded on its land side. There was, however, a large force of Italians in the town, as well as some Serbians, and a force of Albanian tribesmen led by Essad Pasha, who had thrown in their lot with the Entente Powers and the attempt of the Austro-Bulgarian force to draw in the arc of their semi-circle to its center was vigorously opposed, and progress was slow particularly as the Austro-Bulgar commanders having no reason to hurry, refrained as much as possible from exposing their men. A few days before the fall of the city Essad Pasha made his escape. Finally on February 27th the city was taken and with it some Serbian and quite a number of Italian prisoners.

The Austro-Bulgar forces which captured Durazzo, immediately set out for Avalona and being reinforced

by other Bulgarian forces who joined them a short distance to the northeast thereof; an attack against that city was planned, but, owing to the difficulties of the terrain surrounding the place and the consequent cost in life its storming would have entailed was never delivered, though the Italian troops were driven into, and kept in the city itself and its immediate outskirts for the rest of the period under consideration.

In this manner were Serbia and Montenegro completely overrun, their governments forced into exile and their peoples subjected to the rule of the Teutons. Considered from any standpoint the subjugation of these two countries, and the Teuton occupation of this Balkan area had a great influence upon the whole war, both in a military and in an economic sense. Prior to the attack upon Serbia, though Bulgaria and Turkey were allied with the Central Empires, there was no communication possible between them. By the capture of the railroad running from Belgrade to Nish and from Nish to Sophia, a speedy and economical means of communication was opened between these allies, with the result that not only were the Central Empires able to send forward munitions of war, supplies of ammunition and the artillery imperatively needed by her ally, Turkey, to withstand the foe at her door, but they were able to draw from Turkey and from Bulgaria the superfluous quantities of food, supplies which these countries possessed, and of which they themselves stood in need.

Furthermore, and as we shall see in the sequel, not only were they able to relieve Turkey's immediate military necessities, but, by being in direct communication with Turkey and having the opportunity of henceforth sending military stores, supplies and equipment unhindered, they were able to take advantage of the very considerable force of man power which Turkey had at her disposal but of which she had not been able up to this time to make any effectual use, for the reason that Turkey herself did not possess the necessary arms, artillery and ammunition and equipment to put these men upon a war footing.

Another very important result achieved by this opening up of communication between them and Turkey was that it gave the Central Empires access to the rich agricultural regions of Asia Minor, which are not only valuable from the agricultural standpoint, but also from the mineral standpoint. The fertility of the soil of Asia

Minor is proverbial, and this fertility for many centuries has made its possession of extreme importance and value to its owners. At one time it was the important source of food supply of the ancient world, and could be made so of proportionate importance to-day if proper agricultural methods were followed and irrigation introduced. Even under the slipshod methods of cultivation now in use there are produced in Asia Minor from 250,000 to 300,000 bales of cotton a year. At the time the Teutons opened the road through to Turkey the bulk of the cotton crop of 1914 was still at the points of production; no market having existed for it owing to the closing of the ordinary means of transportation. This cotton crop of 1914, plus the crop of 1915, passed into the hands of Germany and had a marked influence not only upon her power to produce explosives (in the manufacture of which some cotton is used) but also in her production in other lines of industry wherein cotton is used.

In addition to cotton, tobacco, coffee, manna, and cereals in very considerable quantities became available, and, more important even in one sense than their present availability, was the fact that there was now practically united to the Central Empires an agricultural region which under proper conditions could produce nearly all of the requirements in most raw materials of the Central Empires for manufacturing and other purposes in the future, and which was so situated geographically as to be beyond the reach or control of the sea power.

In addition to this agricultural production, Asia Minor contains mineral regions of very considerable extent: producing in larger or smaller quantities chrome, zinc, antimony, borax, emery, asphalt, gold, silver, lithographic stones, iron, and above all, copper. Near Diarbekir is located what is said to be one of the largest and most productive mines of this mineral in the world.

This condition of affairs has not only affected and ameliorated conditions in Germany at present, but it also places her in a position where, in the future, she will be to a far greater degree than ever before really independent of importation of many of these agricultural products and minerals from lands beyond the sea, and the consequences arising thereupon to Germany's many-sided industrial development will probably be very great in the years following the war, and not without

consequences of considerable importance to the western and southern states of the United States.

It can be said, without exaggeration, that in this respect alone the Central Empires added in the period of the next eight or nine months not less than one million to a million and a quarter men to their available man power. As will be seen later on in the war, this addition to the strength of the Turkish forces was destined to play an important role not only on the battlefields in Turkey itself, but also along the far-flung battle lines of the Central Empires.

A more immediate result, however, of this power to bring aid to Turkey in the respects above stated, was the abandonment of the British and French operations on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, which had as their objective the capture of Constantinople, and as it subsequently appeared, the transfer of the possession of that famous city to Russia under an agreement which had been entered into between the Entente Powers at the time the operations on Gallipoli Peninsula began. In fact, it can be said that no prior campaign in the war had had as beneficial and strengthening an effect upon the military and economic situation of the Central Empires as did the conquest of Serbia and Montenegro. It is perhaps not too much to state that when the entire war comes to be looked at from a reasonable perspective, from this campaign it will be possible to see the war's ultimate result flow. After this completion of the conquest of Serbia and Montenegro, a temporary administration of the first kingdom was instituted under Bulgarian and Austrian auspices, and of the second under Austrian. The aged King Peter of Serbia, after various adventures finally arrived at Salonica, Greece.

CHAPTER XXIII

DARDANELLES

As was said, in closing the account of the operations on the Peninsula of Gallipoli up to the first of September, 1915, in the last volume of this work, at that time the British and French positions on this Peninsula were, to all intents and purposes, the same as they had been at nightfall on the 27th of April.

No events of importance took place in September on this front. The trench fighting continued as intensely as before, but neither side made any attempt to take a serious offensive at any point. Sniping and bombarding really constituted the entire activity.

On October 8th, Gen. Hamilton reported that there had been an average gain during the month of September of 300 yards along the whole four miles of the Suvla fronts. But public opinion in England was becoming alarmed. The reports of heavy casualties and of a great prevalence of sickness among the troops engaged in these operations had gradually leaked out to the British public, in spite of the attempts to mislead them as to the actual progress of the troops in this campaign by the familiar expedient of chronicling their advances but omitting mention of their retrogressions, and England was genuinely anxious. About the middle of October criticisms of the expedition began to be openly voiced in Parliament, and these grew more insistent and more direct as the replies of the government grew more evasive. At one time an organized effort was begun to take the necessary parliamentary steps to force the government to appoint a select committee to inquire into the general condition of this campaign. But, about the time that that movement in Parliament commenced to be embarrassing, it was announced the government itself had taken steps to ascertain the exact situation.

On October 11th, a telegram was sent by Lord Kitch-

ener to Sir Ian Hamilton, asking him what, in his opinion, would be the loss which would be necessarily involved in the evacuation of the Peninsula. To this, Gen. Hamilton answered that such a step was "unthinkable," with the result that four days later he was recalled and on his arrival in London in October was informed that he had been superseded in his command. His successor was Gen. Sir Charles Monroe.

The new commander left London for the Dardanelles on October 22nd, and pending his arrival, Gen. Birdwood took command. On his arrival at Gallipoli, Gen. Monroe, after a thorough examination of the situation, reported in favor of the immediate evacuation, but with its usual uncertainty of purpose, the Government did not accept his report but vacillated, fearing the political consequences to it of an evacuation, as well as the loss of prestige both to Great Britain and her Allies.

But the storm of criticism continued, and on November 2nd Mr. Asquith was forced to defend the government in a general statement made in the House of Commons in a partial justification of the Dardanelles expedition. This defense was severely attacked, but almost immediately it was made known that Lord Kitchener had been sent to the Dardanelles by the government to examine the situation for himself, which, quieted criticism. On his arrival there in the early days of November, and after going over the whole situation with Gen. Monroe and examining the British positions, Lord Kitchener endorsed Gen. Monroe's recommendation in favor of evacuation.

During October the daily monotony of trench warfare continued on the Peninsula. On the 4th of November the first real fighting, in some time, took place. The Turks attacked the Australians and New Zealanders on the Anzak front about six o'clock in the evening and a brisk fight ensued which kept up for two hours, finally resulting in a repulse for the Turks. On November 20th the sub-marine "E-20," whose exploits in the Sea of Marmora have been heretofore referred to, was sunk in that Sea and its crew and commander captured by the Turks.

On November 15th the British tried an offensive against the Turks entrenched in the Krithia Ravine and were successful in carrying a few yards of Turkish trenches. The Turks, however, counter-attacked on November 17th and regained the trenches they had lost

on the 15th; and on November 21st made another attack, wherein they gained some ground. On November 27th a three days' storm of rain and snow, accompanied by very high winds and extreme cold, fell upon the Peninsula. This was the opening of the winter which, this particular year, came a few weeks earlier than usual. This storm inflicted great suffering upon the Europeans as well as upon the Turks, and was perhaps one of the main causes which opened the eyes of the British military commanders to the fact that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to keep their men on this Peninsula during the winter, living, as they did, exposed to the full force of the elements, and practically without shelter.

On November 30th Lord Kitchener returned to London. From that time until December 21st nothing was heard from Gallipoli. Apparently the campaign had vanished from the face of the earth.

On the 21st of December, Mr. Asquith electrified the world by announcing in Parliament that all the troops at Suvla Bay and Anzac, had evacuated those fronts and had succeeded in removing with them not only most of their stores but 193 guns of various sizes, leaving only seven to fall into the hands of the Turks, and that this result had been accomplished at the cost of a half a dozen wounded men. It appears that this evacuation had really begun about the 8th of December, when the winter stores and miscellaneous articles were first removed. Thereafter all other stores, except a small quantity of ammunition, were removed, and the first embarkation of troops took place. Finally came the embarkation of the guns and the remaining troops. On the afternoon of the last day, December 20th, to deceive the enemy, on the Krithia front, a faint attack was made on some Turkish trenches which were taken and held against Turkish counter-attacks. Very early in the morning of the 21st of December the Australians exploded a large mine on the Anzac front which was fired from the beach where the last troops were embarking.

According to the British story, this also aided in deceiving the Turks, so that it was nearly a day before they ascertained that the enemy whom they had fought for so many months had disappeared. It is true that the Turkish version of this episode does not quite coincide with the English account, but as it is impossible to obtain any convincing evidence either way, it is per-

haps as well for the time to set forth this English version in order to have it upon record.

After Suvla and Anzac were evacuated, the English government and the English press announced that the Krithia front at the extremity of the Peninsula would be held indefinitely; in fact there were many military experts in England who considered that its holding was of immense importance to Great Britain in that it forced the mobilization in the extremity of this Peninsula of a large force of Turkish troops who could have been used to great advantage otherwise. But this was probably a mere pretense intended to deceive the Turks, and incidentally, the British public, because it is now known that the French troops began to prepare to depart as soon as the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac was completed. And in fact on the 29th of December the orders for a general evacuation of Krithia were issued, and embarkation began almost immediately.

On January 4th there were only a few thousand French remaining, and a division of the British had already gone. It appeared, however, that the Turks were beginning to suspect that some movement was in progress, and irregular skirmishing began along the line; consequently, on the night of January 5th and 6th, the evacuation was continued more hurriedly. On the afternoon of January 7th the Turks apparently meditated a general advance; the British perceiving that they were making preparations to leave their trenches. Actually, however, there was only one advance made on the extreme left of the British line where there was a two hour fight of a rather bitter hand to hand character, which ended indecisively, and in which the Staffordshires participated, thus having the honor of taking part in the last actual fighting of the expedition.

That night the evacuation proceeded very hurriedly, on account of the evident disposition of the Turks to attack and most of the artillery was gotten away. The next day was still more disturbed, but finally about three o'clock in the morning of January 9th the embarkation was completed. Seventeen guns were left behind and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, most of this ammunition, however, was exploded from the embarkation points at the last moment.

This version, again, is that of the British. No report has been made by the French, and the Turkish version is that the British suffered very heavy losses on the 7th,

8th and 9th of January, and that in place of their succeeding in burning their stores, these stores fell into the Turks' hands.

In this unfortunate Gallipolian adventure the British lost, in officers: killed 1745, wounded 3143, missing 353; or a total of 5,241. Of the rank and file there were killed 26,455, wounded 74,952, missing 10,901; total 112,308; a grand total of 117,549. To these battle casualties must be added 102,683 sick who passed through the miliary hospitals between April 25th and December 11th, of whom it is said, unofficially, that about 12,000 to 14,000 died. The French losses cannot be accurately stated. In the first place, we do not know with any degree of absolute accuracy how many men the French sent to Gallipoli, though such evidence as we have points to the fact that at various times the French used approximately 200,000 men in this campaign. We know that in the early portion of the campaign, when they disembarked on the eastern side of the Strait and were subsequently forced to re-embark, their losses in the fighting which went on for a couple of weeks on this eastern side of the Strait were very severe; and we also know that their sick list was a large one. If the French losses were, in proportion to the number of men engaged in the campaign, the same as those of the British, they would easily attain a grand total of from 110,000 to 120,000. But as the French are much more scientific fighters than the British, and as their officers know better how to handle and care for troops in the field, it is extremely probable that their losses were not in the same proportion as those of the British. So that if we take, arbitrarily, the figure of 85,000 as the extent of the French losses, we will have a total Allied casualty loss of 303,000; of whom perhaps, all told, from 60,000 to 65,000 were killed in action or died of disease.

On the Turkish side there is much uncertainty as to the losses. The Turks themselves admit a total casualty list of from 65,000 to 70,000, but according to the British and French accounts their casualty list must have been considerably greater than this. If we allow that to an extent this British and French claim is well founded, and add 50 per cent. to the casualties stated by the Turks themselves to have occurred on this front, we will then have in the neighborhood of 105,000 casualties which may be regarded as a fairly accurate figure. Of this 105,000, perhaps 25,000 to 30,000 con-

stituted the total permanent losses. The sickness among the Turkish troops was not very great.

The disproportion between the estimates of the losses of the two sides may give rise to some criticism, but it must be remembered that the Turks were far more accustomed to the climate of the Peninsula than were the invaders, and consequently, suffered less therefrom. The Turks were, on the whole, in this campaign, the attacked and not the attackers, and it is well known that in frontal attacks, as all those on the Peninsula of Gallipoli by the necessities of the terrain were, the attacking party always suffers much heavier casualties than the defending party.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain, in his final summary of the Gallipolian Expedition, in speaking of the retirement from the Peninsula, said that it was "one of the finest operations in naval and military history and would take an imperishable place in British national history." It is hard to see how even a retirement as successful as is claimed by the British from the Peninsula of Gallipoli could be considered in any degree to redeem the colossal blunders of the most ill-planned and ill-conducted campaign in military history, or would relieve those responsible for the childishness shown in the preparation, strategy and organization of the expedition from their responsibility. Three hundred thousand human beings killed, maimed or injured to no purpose because the British Government preferred talking to acting. Such is the best final summary of the Gallipolian campaign.

CHAPTER XXIV

ITALY

The Austro-Italian front during the six months under consideration presents comparatively little of interest. As has been before said, the mountainous character of most of this front prevents any great movements thereon and necessitates the carrying of the hills, mountains and valleys foot by foot in almost hand to hand combats between small bodies of men. The character of the fighting, therefore, while not spectacular, and devoid of any of the magnetic features of the massed attacks on the other fronts is, nevertheless, bitter and sanguinary, but is also extremely difficult to narrate so as to give any consecutive idea of its incidents.

The principal fighting took place on the eastern front in the direction of Trieste, the capture of which city is perhaps the wish dearest to the Italian heart. From the end of August to the middle of October the Italians made quiet but strenuous preparations for a general offensive all along the line from Tolmino where the river Idria joins the Isonzo south, and brought up artillery, ammunition and the other necessaries of war, behind their lines in large quantities. This offensive had three important strategic objectives from the Italian standpoint which were: first, to enlarge the Italian holdings at the position known as the Plava Bridge Head, of which a part was already in Italian hands to the south of Canale, and to the north of Gorizia on the river Isonzo, so that the Italians would be enabled to turn the Monte Santo, a height which protected Gorizia from the north and which could be passed, if turned, along the line of Gargaro, Salcano and Gorizia, then be captured by a simultaneous attack from Salcano to the north and Podgora to the west.

Second, to capture, by a frontal attack, the Austrian lines on the right bank of this river Isonzo from Monte

Sabato in the north to below Podgora on the south. It was evident that as long as the Austrians held their position on the right bank of the river Isonzo it was impossible for the Italians to make any forward movement of any importance, or even to place their artillery in favorable positions to destroy the Austrian trenches. The third object was to gain possession of the northern edge of the Carso Plateau which stretches, roughly speaking, from Merna, almost directly south of Gorizia, to Bagni on the shores of the Adriatic, and which is bounded on the east by that depression to which the name of Vallone is given. The Carso Plateau itself stretches south as far as the road leading from San Daniel to Opcina which is only a few miles to the northeast of the city of Trieste itself. The possession of these three objectives by forces attacking Trieste would be a long step in advance towards the taking of that city.

On October 18th, then, a general bombardment began along the whole of the line above described, and this was followed the morning of October 21st by the opening of the infantry attack.

Considerable criticism has been directed against the Italian high command for not having made this offensive in June or even in the early days of July, since then the Austrians had not had time to strengthen their lines to the extent that they had been strengthened at the time this offensive was delivered. Why it was not done, it is impossible to state, but it was not, and it was not until the end of September, when the commanding General on this front was relieved of his command that really any energetic preparations for the offensive under consideration were made.

Towards realizing their first objective, that is the enlargement of the Italian position at Pragna Bridge Head but little progress was made, though the Italians continued a steady effort for several weeks. They did, however, successfully elongate their lines both to the north and south of the bridge head, but when it came to making progress east thereof they were never able, during the whole period which this offensive lasted, to take the absolutely essential position of Kuk, the possession of which was the first absolutely necessary step towards any serious movement against Monte Santo itself. The fighting all along this line was intense for several weeks, but in spite of its intensity, and in spite of the desperate struggle of the Italians, the Austrian

lines held firm and no tactical progress at all was made.

To the south an attempt to achieve the second Italian objective, that is, the occupation of the Austrian lines on the right bank of the river from Monte Sabotino to below Podgora was conducted obstinately on both sides. For six weeks this fight went on unbrokenly day and night. Attack and counter-attack succeeded each other without cessation and the loss of life was very heavy. On the easterly end of the line, in about the seventh week of the offensive, the Italians, as a result of valiant efforts, did gain some ground and succeeded in working themselves in behind Podgora and also established themselves in the broken and rugged country which lies around Oslavia, and occupied a little village to the east of Podgora which lies opposite Graffenberg, a suburb of Gorizia itself.

Towards the commencement of December the offensive slackened for a few days but again began and continued for another period of several weeks, but in this later struggle the Italians failed to improve their positions, which remained to all intents and purposes unchanged at its end.

North, in the Monte Sabato region, the attacks on that mountain continued almost without cessation from the 21st of October until the middle of January. This mountain, which was the key to Gorizia, and the bridge crossing the Isonzo into Gorizia itself on the north, were heavily fortified by the Austrians, not only on the slopes of the mountain itself, but subterraneously, and constituted positions of very great strength which were tenaciously defended by the Austrians.

On the 3rd of November the Italians had succeeded in working to the westward and northward slopes of the mountain and by a valiant effort, continued during the next three days, they succeeded in capturing the summit of Mt. Sabato, but then a frightful blunder on the part of the Italian Staff occurred, which rendered all the work of the previous weeks by the Italian troops, and all the loss of life which had taken place therein, worthless. When the Italian attacking troops established themselves on the summit, no reserves followed and there were no reserves anywhere near the battlefield which could be brought up in time to be of use in maintaining the position. By an almost criminal oversight on the part of the Italian commanding General, the assault had been dealt by his full force, and in spite

of the fact that the conflict had lasted for three whole days, no reserves had ever been brought up to a point where they could be available to complete the work which the assaulting troops had accomplished.

The result was that the 4,000 men who had forced their way to the top, after suffering frightful losses, were comparatively soon swept back by the Austrians' counter-attack and the hill completely cleared of the Italian forces, so that the positions reverted to where they had been when the offensive was begun several weeks before. This counter-attack which was participated in by Hungarians and Tyroleans, merits some notice, on account of the dogged courage and the *elan* shown by both of these categories of troops.

After this repulse, trench fighting continued for the next few weeks; the Italians gaining a little in this form of combat. Finally they arrived at a point quite close to the bridge crossing the Isonzo to Gorizia, and after holding this for some time, they were able to bring up heavy artillery with which they began to bombard the town itself. From this time on, until the end of the period under consideration, at this point, nothing more but artillery duels between the Italian artillery on the western side of the Isonzo, in front of and to the northwest of Gorizia, and that of the Austrians, on the opposite side of the river, varied by occasional infantry attacks of little importance, took place. These artillery duels were, however, a stand-off, so that the Italians were unable to seize the bridge and force their way into Gorizia.

It will perhaps be remembered that at this time, every now and then, at periods when the artillery attack with the Italians grew more vehement, we were informed by the cables that Gorizia was at the point of falling, but it will also be remembered that the sequel proved all of these several warnings in which our press revelled, of the imminence of the capture of this city, to be false alarms.

While these events were taking place on this portion of the front a vehement struggle was continuing, on the western edge of the Carso Plateau. The villages of Gradisca, Sagrado, Farra and S. Pietro had been captured by the Italians some time before, and it was from these points as a base that their attack was launched against this western edge of the Plateau. This attack was at first directed against Monte San Michele which

lies in the center of the bend of the Isonzo between Gorizia and the sea, Monte San Martino, which lies to the south of Monte San Michele, and Doberdo which is still further south, almost directly north of Monfalcone, with which it is connected by a road. These three heights dominated this edge of the Carso Plateau, hence their military importance. The struggle here lasted for months, and was trench fighting of the most intensive character. One day the Italians capturd a trench, to lose it the next, and thus the line swayed to and fro from the days of early fall until the end of winter. Ultimately some slight progress was made by the Italians towards the Lake of Doberdo which lies between the village of the same name and the Isonzo River; a portion of the summit of Monte San Michele was taken, as well as the western slopes of Monte San Martino, up to the church of the same name.

On the northern boundary of this Carso Plateau is the Visp River and here at this river's western extremity there was another combat which raged all winter, the object of the Italians being to establish themselves on the crest of the northern slope of the Carso Plateau whence they could move eastward on San Michele, thus attacking it in flank. But in spite of arduous and intense combats here very little results were achieved, and with the coming of spring the Austrian first line was only broken at points and the second line was intact.

During all these operations the Italians showed that their knowledge of trench warfare was not as yet sufficiently advanced for them to fight with success against troops even in largely inferior numbers who were accustomed to this form of warfare, while the Italian Staff broke down almost completely in their handling of their men in a manner which would have been highly dangerous had they been faced by equal forces. It is certain that General Cadorna, up to the month of March, could not congratulate himself upon any signal ability that he showed in the handling of his men; nor had this General, up to that time, shown strategic abilities in proportion to the importance of the military rank which he holds.

In some respects, there is a striking similarity between the British and the Italian army. In both cases the rank and file show great courage, willingness; and also, in both cases, these qualities in the rank and file are

rendered of small avail by the rather glaring lack of training of their younger officers and the incompetency of their staffs and their generals.

In the Italian army the troops from the south were not expected to rank, at the beginning of the war, in their military qualities, with those from the north, but curiously enough, actual practice of war proved this supposition false and it can be said truthfully that the southern Italian troops have shown themselves to be very nearly on the same level as those of the north. On the other hand, the Bersaglieri and the Alpini have fully lived up to the rather high expectations entertained of them, and it is doubtful whether there are any troops in any army of greater efficiency, in all senses of the word, than these two rather small and peculiar divisions of the Italian army.

The battle line on the rest of this Austro-Italian front runs, as my readers may remember from the previous volume, either actually among the snow peaks of the higher Alps, or along the mountains forming the southern buttresses of the main chain. While the activity on both sides along this part of the battle line was great, yet it consisted of an infinity of very small engagements impossible to describe, suffice it therefore to say that in spite of this incessant activity continued under the most adverse conditions practically all the period now under consideration, the lines in the spring were practically in the same positions they had occupied at the beginning of autumn. Of course here or there one side or the other had captured this obscure valley or that unknown peak, but these gains were equal on the balance, in spite of the bravery shown by the troops on both sides, in the hand to hand and murderous fighting necessary to achieve such gains.

Some reference must be made to the condition of affairs, during the period under consideration, in Italy's recently conquered colony of Tripoli on the northern coast of Africa. It will perhaps be recollected that at the outbreak of the war Italy had but partially completed the conquest of this colony from its original Arab possessors. As a result of the war, Italy was obliged to withdraw a number of the troops of which she had a large force then, owing to the necessities of the combat elsewhere.

The Arabs, struggling for their independence, took advantage of this, with the result that by spring of 1916

they had driven the Italians out of the interior of the country which they had previously, at points, penetrated to as great a distance as 100 miles, and back to a narrow zone on the sea-shore, wherein the Italians maintained themselves with some difficulty; daily battles being the rule and not the exception. How many men Italy lost in these combats, spread over this period of six months, we do not know, since Italy follows the policy of giving no statistics whatever in regard to her casualties in any of her reports of military operations, but it is rumored that these casualties were severe, and this is perhaps not impossible to believe since Italy lost so very heavily when the Arabs put up such a stiff fight against the original Italian advance to the interior from the sea-shore, a few years before.

CHAPTER XXV

CAUCASUS

As has been already said, in the narration of the events which took place on the Russian front during the period under consideration, the Grand Duke Nicholas, previously Commander in Chief of the Russian armies, was, on Septemebr 5th, relieved by the Czar from that command and appointed Governor General of the Caucasus and Commander in Chief of the Russian Army operating on that front.

To a man of the intense ambition and great personal vanity of the Grand Duke, it was indeed a fall from being Commander in Chief of all the armies of Russia, and potentially master of the Russian Empire, to be translated to this comparatively minor position. Up to this time, the course of events along the Caucasian front had not been very favorable to the Russian armies, and the Russian and Turkish armies were still fighting along what is practically the line of the frontier between their respective countries. The country through which the frontier runs is an exceedingly difficult one to fight in, traversed as it is by precipitous mountains rising occasionally to the height of 12,000 to 14,000 feet, which are divided from each other by steep and narrow valleys. As a general thing, these mountain ranges run east and west, but there are enough bisecting chains to make the whole country a topographical jumble. It was in such regions that the rival forces contended.

During the first three months after the Grand Duke assumed command in the Caucasus, the time was apparently spent by him in preparing for a general offensive which it was, as heretofore explained, intended that the Russian forces should take here in support of the movement of the English up the Tigris towards Bagdad in Mesopotamia. The delay of three months, which had elapsed, however, was fatal to these two movements being simultaneous and the Russian troops did not com-

mence their forward march until after General Townshend's forces had been defeated at Ctesiphon and had retreated to Kut-el-Amara and there been surrounded by the Turks, so that as far as rendering any aid to the first effort of the British to take Bagdad was concerned, the Russian offensive in the Caucasus was unavailing.

It may, however, have been presumed by both the British and Russians that the force which was advancing to the relief of General Townshend from the Persian Gulf would ultimately succeed in accomplishing that object, and the united British forces would then begin a new attack upon Bagdad. But this was still on the lap of the gods, at the time when, on January 10th, the Russians opened their offensive by an attack on the Turkish positions on Lake Tortum at the village of Tew on the northern shores of this lake, and of Ardesh on the southeastern shore.

This Russian attack was successful and the Turks were driven out of these villages. The Russians' right flank continued its advance, and a few days afterwards captured the town of Archava on the coast of the Black Sea. In the center a general attack was launched by the Russians on the 16th of January, on the entire Turkish line from Lake Tortum to a point a little to the north of Melaskerd on the Upper Euphrates, directly north of Lake Van. For three days a battle raged along this line, which resulted on the 19th in the almost total defeat of the Turks who were thrown back along the whole line in the general direction of Erzerum.

The town of Kapri Keuyh was captured on the first day of the battle, together with a number of Turkish prisoners and a large quantity of war material. On the 20th, General Yudenitch captured the fortified town of Hassankala where about 1,200 prisoners were taken, besides a considerable amount of artillery. Hassankala is only about twenty miles from Erzerum and a little less than 15 from the famous Deve Boyen Pass, which has been the scene of many battles in the past for the possession of Erzerum.

Between Erzerum and Hassankala a ridge rises to about 2,500 feet above the small plain, in the center of which Erzerum is situated. On this ridge, guarding the passes through it, were situated some eleven forts located at convenient points on the heights. The Russians first tried to capture these by storm in their anxiety for a speedy victory, but the Turks succeeded

in repelling their attack and in inflicting rather heavy losses upon them. Seeing that even attempted assaults would not succeed in taking the ridge and its forts, the Russians brought up artillery from their rear, which took a couple of weeks and it was not until the 12th of February that the Russian artillery opened upon the forts. None of these forts were modern, and they were, therefore, unable to resist for any considerable period the weight of metal which the Russian heavy artillery poured in upon them.

On the 13th one fort was taken and on the following day another; and on the 15th the remaining forts, which by this time had been pretty well battered to pieces by the Russian artillery, were in such condition that the Russians were able to launch a successful storming attack against them. On the evening of the 15th, then, the ridge with all its forts was in Russian hands. This insured the speedy capture of Erzerum which could be easily commanded by artillery located on these heights. The Turks did not attempt, under these circumstances, the defense of the fortress, in fact had already on the 13th (the date of the capture of the first fort) begun preparations to evacuate the town by moving their supplies and artillery further to the rear, so that when the fortress of Erzerum surrendered to General Yudenitch, on the 16th of January, comparatively little except the fortress itself fell into Russian hands.

At the time it occurred, the fall of Erzerum was looked upon by the Allies as an event of first rate military importance and they expected that its capture would be the means of speedily putting them into possession of all Asiatic Turkey as far to the westward as Sivas and Aleppo, as well as insure the ultimate success of the British movement up the Tigris. But fate, which has in this war played the Allies many tricks, once more disappointed them.

These expectations of the Allies were somewhat justified by the strategic importance of Erzerum which dominates the main highway from the Black Sea into eastern Asia Minor, and is also on the center of the trade route from the Black Sea port of Trebizond into Persia. For many years the Russians have greatly desired to be the possessors of this fortress as it would be an important step forward in their real design which was the possession of Armenia as a whole. It may be observed here that all of the fighting, wherein the Russian right

wing and center had participated in this invasion of Asia Minor, has taken place in Armenia, and that to a very large extent the Russians have been able to profit by the active aid of the inhabitants of this district, who, as is well known, are in a state of chronic rebellion against the control of the Turkish government.

Russia has been in possession of the fortress twice in its history, once in 1829 when, after its capture by General Paskovitch, the Treaty of Adrianople restored its possession to the Turks; again in 1877 when the Russians, under the leadership of the Grand Duke Michael, had surrounded Erzerum but had not captured it, when the armistice in 1878 put an end to its siege, though the town was surrendered on the condition that hostilities should cease. Subsequently another treaty, that of Berlin, returned Erzerum to the Turks.

CHAPTER XXVI

Simultaneously with this Russian attack on the Turkish center which culminated in the capture of Erzerum, the Grand Duke directed attacks on both the Turkish left and right wings, with the effect that the Turks holding the passes southwest and southeast of Lake Tortum were driven completely out of their positions and driven down towards the Doumen Dagh plateau, 16 miles from Erzerum. The Turkish retreat was rather disorderly, owing to the energetic pursuit by Russian cavalry, but the bulk of the forces managed to get through to Erzerum, before its fall, and joined the main body of their army. On the Turkish right an attack was launched from Melashkerd, which moved to the west on the town of Kryskali. Here a hard battle took place, lasting four or five days, which ended in the capture of the town by the Russians; the Turks retreating in an easterly direction towards Mush, a rather important place situated near the eastern Euphrates, northwest of Bitlis.

After the capture of Erzerum itself a movement was launched to the northwest against Trebizond, in two columns, one which followed the direct road between the two places and the other which was to advance on Trebizond by way of Rizeh, and capture a Turkish army which had retreated from Erzerum in the direction of Trebizond, by way of the Chorokh River. These two columns had to pass through very difficult country, a tangled maze of mountains, and their progress was in consequence very slow, as they were greatly impeded by heavy snow in their march through this tangled country.

The column which went by the direct road at the end of February had only reached Ashkala, not half way between the two places, while the column proceeding by Rizeh, after great difficulties arrived at the banks of the Chorokh River at Isbir on the 26th of February, but here it found its further progress towards Rizeh held up

by the Turks who had fortified the lower reaches of the Tchanassdeg Pass which crosses these mountains here at a height of 10,485 feet above the sea level, and which, in addition to the opposition of the Turks, was covered with snow to so great a depth that the Russians were unable to manoeuvre their artillery. The resulting deadlock was continued for a long time.

At the same time that these columns were launched towards Trebizond, a third column was launched towards Erzindjan, to the southeast of Erzerum. This column also had to advance through a country whose very topography rendered it extremely difficult for troops to march through, particularly at this season of the year, and to these natural difficulties was added more or less opposition by the Turks who had by this time somewhat rallied, and showed every disposition to dispute the path of the Russian invaders.

On the first of March this column had reached a point between Erzerum and Mannahatoun, the half-way town as regards Erzindjan, only about forty miles from their departure point.

Turning now to the Russian armies which had been attacking the Turkish right, and which, as has been said, had captured Kryskali, this army advanced therefrom and captured Mush on February 18th, after a not very determined battle. The Russian forces then turned to the southeast, and twelve days later, on the night of the second of March, stormed and captured Bitlis. This town is an important strategic point on account of its position on the main highroad from Erzerum to Bagdad, besides which it commands the approaches to the Tachtale Pass from the south; this Pass being on the extreme eastern spurs of the Taurus range of mountains which end abruptly on the shores of Lake Van. From Bitlis to the nearest point on the Tigris River is approximately fifty miles; and Niesivin, the present western terminal of the Bagdad railway, is 120 miles away. Mosul, the most important city of central Asia Minor, except Bagdad, on the Tigris is, as the crow flies, 150 miles from this place.

To the lasting disgrace of the Russian armies, that portion of the garrison of Bitlis which was captured with the town was put to the sword.

The expectation of the Russians was that they would be able from Bitlis to strike southeast and south against Mosul and Niesevin respectively, and thus not only

capture the terminal of the Bagdad railway and cut the main line of Turkish communication between Bagdad and Constantinople, but also to get behind the Turkish army operating on the Tigris River in the defense of Bagdad, and presumably to advance south from Mosul along the Tigris and join the English force at Bagdad. But as we shall see in our subsequent account of this phase of the Caucasian campaign, in our next volume, the old proverb that "there is many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip" very often proves true.

While these events were taking place in this portion of the Caucasian front, many events of interest were happening in eastern Persia. Prince Henry of Reuss, in the early part of the war had endeavored to bring about a *coup d'etat* in Teheran, the capital of Persia, whereby Persia would, as a nation, join the Turks and their Allies, the Central Powers; but in November 1915, this *coup d'etat* failed and Russian troops advanced from Tabriz southwardly, whereupon Prince Henry divided his forces into two portions and sent one to Kum and the other to Hammadan. The Russian troops entered Teheran after making a virtual prisoner of the Shah of Persia, forcing him to compel Persia to become an ally of Russia. The Russians treated Teheran in much the same fashion as they did Tabriz some years before, and many of the most important men in Persia were hanged or otherwise done to death in the usual humane manner of the Russian Cossack.

After Teheran was purged of its agitators, the Russian troops moved south and occupied Hammadan on December 15, and Kum on the 21st, and made these two places the bases from which they directed their efforts to suppress what the Russians called a rebellion against the legitimate authority of the Shah. Prince Henry and his forces retreated to Kermanshah whence a Turkish force which had been concentrated at Khanikin advanced to his assistance and entered Kermanshah on the 14th of January. The Russian commander at Hammadan, while these things were going on, had sent a strong force of Russian troops to seize Kaghdan which this force occupied on the 15th of January, but on the 16th of January the Turkish regular forces attacked the town, and, after soundly drubbing the Russians, expelled them and drove them a considerable distance to the north, and following up this success, advanced towards Hammadan and succeeded in driving back the Russians to a

considerable distance to the north of Mokshovend, inflicting very considerable losses upon them during this process.

The fighting continued in this region, that is to say, between Kaghdan and Burujird until after the first of March, the Turks having the better of it.

Kermanshah, which is a town of 30,000 inhabitants, is located 150 miles to the north of Bagdad, and became the base of the Turkish defense against a Russian attempt on Bagdad from this direction; but in the middle of February General Baratoff advanced with a large army on the road to this place and succeeded in defeating the Turks in the Bidesurkh and Sakhne Passes, through which the road to the town lies, in a two days' battle. After this defeat, the Turks fell back on Kermanshah itself, but the place was taken by storm on the 26th of February and here again we have to chronicle the same disgraceful act on the part of the Russian General that we had in the case of Bitlis and the Turkish garrison and their Persian allies were put to the sword. This was the limit of the Russian advance in central Persia up to the first of March.

We have heard much of the cruelty of the various belligerent troops in various other spheres of war, but it is extremely doubtful whether those cruelties and those atrocities ever attained one-tenth part of those which characterized the advance of the Russians in eastern Armenia and eastern and central Persia. Certainly in no other field of action have surrendered garrisons been taken out and slaughtered in cold blood as was the fact in this campaign in the case of the two garrisons above spoken of. It is to be hoped that when a general settlement is had at the conclusion of the war that the fate of these Turkish troops will not be forgotten and that in reparation for this deliberate and malicious violation of the rules of war will have a fitting reparation exacted for it. The fame of the Cossack has been the same for many generations. It used to be in France, for years, after the second capture of Paris that naughty children were frightened into obedience by the threat of an approaching Cossack, who represented to the French of that time not a human being but a cold-blooded executioner. The hundred years which have elapsed do not seem to have changed the character of those savages, as has been shown in this war, not only in Turkey and Persia but in Galicia and eastern Prussia.

CHAPTER XXVII

MESOPOTAMIA

In order to completely cripple Turkey, the Allies planned in 1915 a joint campaign against her which would culminate, they hoped, eventually in the capture of Mosul and Bagdad and the control of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which flow southeast of that famous city into the Persian Gulf; thus cutting off her communication with the east, as well as rendering themselves masters of the whole of Mesopotamia, Mosul, Diarbekr and Armenia. To the west of Bagdad the control of the so-called Bagdad railroad would have also been seized. The effect of such a campaign the Allies expected to be a practical paralysis of Turkey, both in recruiting her armies and in her supply of food and metals used in war, in that it would completely interrupt communication between the east and west of the Empire.

In order to accomplish these two results, the Allies planned a simultaneous invasion of Turkey from the Russian Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian through Armenia as far as Sivas, which would necessarily include the control of the Black Sea coast as well. This invasion was to be undertaken by the Russians. Simultaneously with this Russian invasion another invasion by the British was to be undertaken starting from Basra, the seat of that local Sultan whom England, in order to cripple the projected railroad from Bagdad through to the Persian Gulf, in whose dominion the terminal of such railroad to the Persian Gulf would have been situated, had effected an alliance with the Sultan some years before and had, by granting him a yearly allowance, rendered him fully subservient to their wishes. This invasion was to move northwestwardly, having as its primary objective Bagdad, and as a secondary objective the obtaining of control of such completed sections of the Bagdad railroad as was possible.

Had these joint invasions moved with proper cor-

relation, and had they attained anything like the measure of success which the Allies expected, Turkey would have been hit a body blow and would no longer have been able to play a very great role in the war. This strategic conception was good, but as usual, in the execution of their plan the Allies made blunder after blunder.

The British movement to the northwest from the Persian gulf started too soon, and the Russian movement from the Caucasus started too late, with the result that the Turks by defeating the British, as will hereafter be seen, before the Russians were in a position to aid them, frustrated the whole plan.

Having explained the strategic plan of the Allies, we will now proceed to cast a glance on the manner of its execution; taking up first the advance of the English northwest of the Persian Gulf.

The General Staff of India had charge of this invasion and troops were sent to the base previously selected which base was established on Bubian Island, a little to the west of the point where the mingling streams of the Euphrates and Tigris flow into the Persian Gulf. In number this force sometimes is computed at from 100,000 to 125,000 Indian troops, who were joined at the base by a comparatively small force of British not exceeding perhaps 10,000 to 12,000 in number. General Sir John Nixon was the Commander-in-chief of the expedition.

Steamers suitable for the navigation of the Tigris River were provided, and finally, when all was in order, an advance was made up the stream of the Tigris. At the start, and until Basra was reached, there was but little opposition to this movement. From Basra northward, however, the Turks made such opposition as they could, but as they were not provided with river gunboats, or other means of defense against the improvised warships which the British had put upon the Tigris, they could do but very little, and the British forces advanced steadily forward though not particularly rapidly. Kale Sale, Amara, Kumail and Elata were the scenes of some fighting which terminated regularly in favor of the British, but there was no really serious attempt to oppose their advance until September 27th, when the advance division of the British forces, numbering about 30,000 under General Townshend arrived at a point seven miles below the town of Kut el Amara, where the Turks were found to be occupying a strongly intrenched position on both sides of the river Tigris.

This Turkish force was commanded by Nair-el-Din Pasha and consisted of from 7,000 to 8,000 regular troops, and in a large number of irregulars. General Townshend attacked both from the river and from the banks on each side, on September 28th; the fight continued all day, but that night the Turks gave way leaving about 1,600 prisoners and much material in General Townshend's hands and the British resumed their advance.

This Turkish position was a very strong one as is shown by the following description:

"The Turks constructed twelve miles of defences across the river at right angles to its general direction at this point, six miles on the right bank and six miles on the left. The works on the right bank were strengthened by the existence of an old water-cut. The banks of this, ten to twenty feet high, towered above the rest of the flat country and afforded excellent facilities for viewing the deployment of troops advancing to the attack. A strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed a flank attack from that direction. On the left bank the line of defences was cut in two by an impassable marsh two miles broad, so that from the left bank of the river there were first two miles of trenches, then two miles of marsh, and then again two more miles of defences. Much labor had been expended on these defences, each section consisting of many successive lines of trenches, connected by an intricate net-work of deep communication trenches, along which a complete system of water supply pipes had been laid. Everything pointed to the Turkish intention to hold the position permanently."

After being expelled from this position the Turkish regular troops continued to oppose the advancing British and were aided by irregular troops raised among the Arabs and tribesmen of the vicinity, who contested every foot of the way bitterly, and who, while suffering heavily themselves, inflicted extremely heavy casualties upon the British. Nevertheless, the British continued to advance and though it took them the whole of the month of October, and more than half of the month of November, they finally, on November 20th, reached Ctesiphon, 18 miles from Bagdad.

At this place a great battle took place between the Turkish army and General Townshend's forces. The original British account represented the result of this battle as a complete British victory, but the later

accounts do not bear this statement out in the least, nor do general Townshend's subsequent movements.

On the 21st of November General Townshend attacked and captured the Turkish advanced position, using in this fight his entire force of 25,000 men, and took all told some 1,600 Turkish prisoners. The night of the 21st the British bivouacked on that day's battlefield. The following day the main body of the Turkish forces came up and attacked General Townshend forthwith. The battle continued all that day and the next, and General Townshend managed to hold his ground till the morning of the 24th, when having lost fully half his force, he began to retreat in the direction of Kut el Amara, 80 miles in his rear, abandoning much of his baggage.

The Turks followed up the retreating British and forced them to fight almost continuous rear guard actions, in some of which, particularly in one fought in the night of November 30th, the British suffered rather heavily. Finally on December 3rd General Townshend reached Kut el Amara, the scene of his victory in September. The British, not unnaturally, felt extremely disappointed over this misfortune, as this movement against Bagdad was the only purely British operation during the war which had been, even for a time, uniformly successful, and which made fair to crown its achievements by the capture of Bagdad, its objective.

Had Bagdad been captured, it would have had an enormous effect upon the opinion of the Mohammedan world, not only of Turkey-in-Asia, the sphere of action, but also of that of Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt and India. Besides which this capture would have been of the greatest importance from a purely military standpoint. The retreat, however, changed these prospects, into considerable loss of prestige as regards the Faithful of Islam, and therefore has had a considerable influence on the course of events thereafter to the eastward in Asia Minor. Bagdad is also important as being on the highroad to Persia and India. At the same time, the defeat cannot be considered a disgrace to the forces that suffered it; since the difficulties which confronted the British forces in this advance from the Persian Gulf along the Tigris were stupendous and it is really marvelous that they managed to penetrate so far into the very difficult and inhospitable country through which their route of advance necessarily lay. The casualties suffered by the British in this campaign at Ctesiphon (the supposed site

of the ancient Babylon) and the subsequent retreat were very heavy in proportion to their total strength, certainly attaining the large figure of fifty per cent. and perhaps an even greater percentage.

On December 3rd when his entire force reached Kut-el-Amara, General Townshend's total strength was in the neighborhood of 12,000 men. Hardly had General Townshend and his tired troops reached Kut el Amara, when the pursuing Turks surrounded that town. Kut-el-Amara is a rather miserable town of fair size, well situated, in a loop of the Tigris, surrounded on three sides by that river, to withstand a siege. The fourth side is defended by a series of forts, which had been to some extent modernized by the Turks to withstand the British original advance. These forts General Townshend immediately strengthened to such degree as possible for him to do and it was well he did so, for on the 8th of December the Turks having in the meantime brought down artillery from Bagdad, began to bombard the town. This bombardment continued for four days, December 8, 9, 10 and 11, and in the afternoon of December 11th began an infantry assault of the place. But this, after a day's hard fighting, the British succeeded in beating off.

A lull in the fighting for some days, and for about a couple of weeks there were no incidents. Then the Turks perceiving that it would be impossible for them to reduce the place with the artillery they had at their disposal, resolved to storm it, and on the 24th of December began an attack which lasted for three days.

In the course of this attack the Turks succeeded in capturing some of the outer forts of the place but were not able to hold them against the British counter-attacks. The fighting, for these three days, was extremely fierce, according to such accounts as have reached us, and the casualties on each side are placed at very considerable figures, but as there is no certainty in relation to these figures they will not be given here. Suffice it to say, that in spite of their most valiant efforts, the Turks were unable to force an entry into the town and consequently resumed their former plan of endeavoring to reduce the city by siege, in other words, by famine.

A siege in form of Kut-el-Amara then began and continued with the usual incidents of such an operation for the next few months.

As soon as the news of General Townshend's defeat

and his subsequent predicament reached the British military authorities, immediate preparations began to despatch the main body of the British forces, to the south of Kut-el-Amara, on the Tigris, to his relief. General Aylmer was placed in command of this army, which started from Aligherbi on January 6th, and on the night of the 7th came in touch with the Turks, who were in position on both sides of the Tigris two or three miles below Sheikh Saad. The Turkish force was composed of three Divisions, and was under the command of Nair-el-Din. A battle took place on the 8th, resulting in the retreat of the Turks to Orah, 25 miles down river from Kut, heavy rain preventing pursuit by the victorious troops.

General Aylmer halted on the 10th at Sheikh Saad, partly on account of the weather, partly also to get his wounded away. The Turks had meanwhile fallen back to the Essin position, from which General Townshend had driven them last September. Finding that General Aylmer was not coming after him, Nair-el-Din went forward again to Orah, where he took up what is described as the "Wadi position." There he was attacked by General Aylmer on the 13th and driven back to his entrenchments at Essin, six miles down the river from Kut, but owing to the continuance of bad weather, which lasted till the 18th, there was again no pursuit.

The Turkish army then took up a very strong defensive position on the north bank of the Tigris, with its left wing resting on an impenetrable swamp called Durvekie, and his right wing on the river bank. This position was 23 miles from Kut. General Aylmer for some days was unable to attack, owing to a heavy rain which soaked the ground to a great depth and made military movements difficult if not impossible. During this time General Sir John Nixon resigned his command on January 16th and General Sir Percy Lake who succeeded him did not reach General Aylmer until January 26th.

On January 21st the rain having partly held up General Aylmer assaulted the Turkish position above described at Unnu-el-Henna, under conditions which were favorable to the Turks, since their flanks were secured from being turned, which necessitated a frontal attack by their enemies who were forced to advance to that attack over a flat plain, totally destitute of cover of any description. Ordinarily such an attack would

have had no chance of being successful unless preceded by a strong artillery bombardment of the position to be attacked, and this rule held good in the present case. General Aylmer has since asserted that the reason which impelled him to attack without first bombarding the Turkish trenches was the urgency in delivering General Townshend from his critical position at Kut-el-Amara.

This excuse hardly seems a good one, since as subsequent events proved General Townshend was able to maintain himself at Kut for a much longer time than would have been necessary for General Aylmer to have had a sufficient force of artillery brought up the river to him. On the whole it looks as though General Aylmer adopted the old English idea of "mulling through somehow." But this idea has rarely succeeded in the present war, and this battle was not one of such occasions. General Aylmer's forces gallantly charged the Turkish positions and were very badly cut to pieces as a result. The British losses were extremely heavy, 4,000 killed, and perhaps twelve to fifteen thousand wounded, and the Turks remained completely masters of the field. So completely masters indeed that the next day General Aylmer was obliged to ask for an armistice to bury his dead, which was granted. After this battle the British sent for reinforcements, and sat down to wait for their arrival, before making any further serious attempts to advance to General Townshend's relief. On February 4th there was a skirmish of some magnitude, and on February 11th an attempt to push forward to better positions by the British on the right bank of the Tigris, this attempt was however beaten back by the Turks.

General Townshend in the meantime made no attempt, though only 23 miles distant, to abandon his position in Kut, and cut his way through to General Aylmer. The reason for this was that it was not the intention of the British to abandon the Kut position which is a very strong one strategically, situated as it is at the point where the Shatt-el-Hai, connects the Tigris with the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh. According to the British generals the possession of this town by the Turks would enable them to use the Shatt-el-Hai as a route for reaching the Euphrates and turning the flank of the British main position at Kurna.

The British held Nasiriyeh and early in February Sir Percy Lake sent General Brookings up the Shatt-el-Hai to see if that river was clear. General Brookings

advanced a considerable distance up the stream and found no signs of Turkish troops. On his return, however, he was suddenly attacked on February 7th by the Arabs and lost 400 men, besides being compelled to retreat hastily. Later on a punitive expedition was sent against these Arabs. This was the last fighting in this campaign in the period we are dealing with.

In the meantime the Turks continued to hold General Townshend closely surrounded, and bombarded the town from time to time, but the provisions and supplies, as well as the ammunition of the British forces in Kut held out and they were able to repel successfully the assaults upon the town. On the 15th of February the British war office took full charge of this campaign from the India office; when the first of March arrived the situation remained unchanged; Townshend. was surrounded in Kut, 23 miles below was Aylmer waiting for re-inforcements, and between him and Townshend was a strong well placed Turkish army.

CHAPTER XXVIII

AFRICA

The situation in Africa at the beginning of the period under consideration was as follows. The Allies had completely conquered German southwest Africa, where resistance to their forces had ceased. In British South Africa the rebellion had been absolutely suppressed. In the Cameroons, however, fighting was still going on as it was in German East Africa.

CHAPTER XXIX

CAMEROONS

The campaign against this German colony can now be sketched with some degree of accuracy from the beginning, a thing impossible to do heretofore on account of the conflicting reports received therefrom. Lieutenant Colonel P. Maclean in command of a British column, began an invasion from the north, starting from Yola in Nigeria a few days after the declaration of war with the object of capturing Garcia, the northern capital of the Cameroons by surprise. The column reached Garna on August 29th, 1914, but the element of surprise lacked, as it found the Germans prepared for it. One of the forts defending the town was captured but Col. Maclean was unable to hold this fort, and the German attacks on his forces becoming too strong, was obliged to retreat completely, and to recross the frontier losing heavily on the way, among the killed being Colonel Maclean himself. Another column started at about the same time from Ikon on the river Cross, about one hundred miles northeast from the coast with the object of capturing Usanakang some few miles south of the northern frontier of the Cameroons. At first this force was successful and Usanakang was occupied on August 29th, but only held, for a week for on September 6th it was surprised by the Germans, the town recaptured and the British driven back across the frontier. Still another British force crossed the frontier from Calabar, also on the river Cross but nearer the coast, and advanced against the coast town of Rio-del-Rey, where its further progress south was stopped. These reverses stimulated the British to greater preparations, and under Major General Dobell, a force of about 10,000 men was made ready at Lagos, and embarked on transports. In September these transports escorted by the warships Cumberland and Dwarf, appeared off the principal port of the colony Duala, near the mouth of the Sanaga river.

Summoned to surrender, the town refused to, and was bombarded, but after standing this bombardment for four days, did surrender on September 26th, when the expeditionary force was disembarked. From Duala one railway runs northeast to Bare, and another almost directly east to Sende, passing through Edea. The expeditionary force was composed of French and British troops, the French predominating, and after landing the British contingent followed the line of the first mentioned railway, the French the second.

Jabissa was captured by the British on October 14th, Bura on November 15 and Bare on December 15th, the German forces falling back towards Joko, to the east, almost in the center of the colony. The French moving eastward along the line of the railroad to Edea, captured that place on October 6th. After these captures, operations on this west front moved very slowly and it was not till nearly a year later that the British under General Dobell turned south from Bare and reached the Puge river to the east of Edea, while further south the French occupied Makondo. During this time another French column, in which were Belgian troops from the Congo, advanced from Wesso, at the southeastern corner of the colony of the Cameroons, and marching 500 miles northwest reached Sende, the eastern terminal of the Duala-Edea-Sende railroad. The effect of the taking of Sende was to place the possession of all the railways of the colony in the hands of the Anglo-French forces.

All these advances were bitterly contested by the German forces, constant and severe fighting taking place, with the Allied troops suffering severe losses, which, however, as they were in a position to receive reinforcements from time to time, did not halt their forward progress.

After the capture of Edea, the Germans had removed the capital of the colony to Jarmde, to the south of the Sanaga river, in a comparatively elevated area, and to Jarmde the Germans retreated after the capture of Sende on October 24th, 1915, from which place it is forty-five miles distant. To traverse these forty-five miles, however, took the Anglo-French forces over two months, so strenuous was the German defense, although the German forces had been cut off for over a year from any possibility of receiving supplies and munitions of war from the outside world.

Finally, however, on January 1st, 1916, the Anglo-British forces entered Jarmde, and the Germans retreated to the south in the direction of Spanish Guinea, but still unbroken. The Allies then moved to the southward and ultimately the German forces crossed the frontiers into Spanish Guinea, where they were interned. While these events were taking place on the western front, the British were avenging their early defeat on the northeastern front.

Another force under General Cunliffe was organized at Yola, composed of British and French troops. This force at the end of November, 1914, started eastwardly from Yola towards Garna with the intention of capturing that place. The German defense in this field was so strong that it was not till in the late spring that General Cunliffe was able to reach and surround Garna, which then stood a two months' siege, not surrendering till June 11th, 1915. This capture was followed up by General Cunliffe by the taking of Ngaundere further south on June 29th.

From Garna, the two main roads through the colony westward to the seaboard start; one, the northerly, running through Banjo to Bari, and thence by railroad to Duala, while the other, the southerly, runs through Ngaundere, Tibati, to Edea, and thence by rail to Duala.

The British began a movement westwardly along the northerly road soon after the capture of Garna, but it was not until October 24, 1915, that they were able to enter Banjo, about half way to the sea. The French, after the capture of Ngaundere, moved westerly along the southerly road and on November 11th, after nearly a half year's fighting entered Tibati.

The Germans retreating before the advance of these two columns fell back on Joko, a place in the mountainous region of the colony directly south of Banjo and southwest of Tibati, where in spite of all efforts of the British and French to dislodge them, t' ey maintained the very unequal struggle for some time longer.

CHAPTER XXX

EAST AFRICA

As a result of his comparative failure to conquer German East Africa, the British government decided on a change of commanders, and General Smith-Dorrien was recalled, after some months of hesitation, owing to the difficulty of finding someone with whom to replace him.

Officially, General Smith-Dorrien was said to have been invalided home, but actually he was removed. General Smuts, one of the most distinguished Boer generals in the South African war, was appointed to succeed him, but did not begin offensive operations until the middle of February 1916.

In the fifteen months which had elapsed since the British defeat at Tanga in the autumn of 1914, the British forces in German East Africa had merely stood on the defensive, and had not attempted any forward movements. During all this time German East Africa may be said to have been quiet, though from time to time the Germans attempted to raid the Nganda railroad, but unsuccessfully, as the British forces under General Tighe, who had come from India to take the interim command, were strong enough to repel these attacks.

After inspecting the scene of his future labors, General Smuts adopted a plan of campaign and determined on launching an offensive from Mombasa along the line of Voi-Taveta railway, and to this end a concentration of British troops in Mombasa began about the first of December 1915. But owing to the vast distances from which the troops composing this force were drawn, some from England itself, some from India, and some, the larger portion, from South Africa, it was not until the middle of February 1916 that the force was ready to move.

The German commanders had, however, perceived

General Smuts' plan of campaign and had made such disposition of their forces as they deemed would be best suited to oppose the British advance. Altogether the German force comprised about 20,000 men, of which the great bulk were natives. These took up a strong position in the Kitovo hills in the Kilimanjaro district and prepared to dispute the march of Smuts' forces. The position selected was naturally a rather strong one, on the top of a ridge of hills with abrupt slopes, up which slopes General Smuts' troops had to make their way through the very dense pathless woods with which these slopes were clothed.

General Smuts' total strength was about 70,000, of which 20,000 were white troops, and his army was better supplied with artillery, particularly light artillery and machine guns, than were the Germans.

On March 7th, General Smuts seized the fords on the Lumi river as the opening move in his offensive, and these once securely in hand, threw forward General Van de Venter to capture Taveta, which was done on March 9th. General Smuts then rapidly advanced his entire army and with the bulk of it made a frontal attack on the Germans in the Kitovo position. At the same time, General Smuts sent a large force of cavalry from Longido around the north side of Mount Kilimanjaro to outflank the German position and to cut off their retreat.

The frontal battle was bitterly contested and lasted until late in the night, when the Germans learning of the movement of General Stewart's force on their flank, and fearing to be surrounded, fell back on Kahe, whence they retreated still further to positions on the Rufu river in good order. The effect of this retreat was, however, to throw open the whole of the Arusha district to the invaders. General Smuts detached General Van de Venter to occupy this district which he did, capturing Moshi on March 13th, and Arusha itself on March 20th, and Lolkissale a few days later, at which latest place he captured the entire German force in this region, numbering some 500 rifles.

Meanwhile, General Smuts with the main army, followed up the Germans who were retreating southward, and on March 21st attacked them on the Rufu river and after a stubborn fight, drove them out of their positions and forced them to begin another retreat.

In both these fights at Kitovo and on the Rufu river

the native German troops showed great steadiness, almost equal to white troops, and had they been on anything like even terms with the British, the latter would not have won such easy victories. The quality of the German command was also good, and great ingenuity was repeatedly shown in the extrication of the German forces from the danger of being surrounded.

The British were particularly anxious to conquer German East Africa quickly and easily because German East Africa in German hands makes their dream of a Cape to Cairo railroad running wholly through British territory an impossibility.

CHAPTER XXXI

ZEPPELINS

The activity in the air during the period of time we have under consideration increased rather than diminished, but before we take up the accounts of the activities on the Continent of Europe, we will first cast a glance at the zeppelin raids on Great Britain during the period in question. These raids were carried on on a considerable scale during this period, though with what real results we do not know with any certainty since the accounts furnished from the opposing sides differ very materially. The reasons why these discrepancies exist are several: in the first place we may mention the natural tendency of one side to hide all the results accomplished by the enemy. Furthermore, as the zeppelins attacked under cover of night, and, by preference, on moonlight nights, land-marks are elusive and navigation difficult. Hence errors are inevitable, and a commander of a zeppelin may quite consistently assert that he dropped bombs on a town near which he never was, and do so in good faith.

The first of these raids in the period under consideration took place on September 7th, when the eastern counties were visited by two aeroplanes; bombs were dropped and some damage was done. London itself was raided the same evening between ten and eleven o'clock; the outlying districts being the point of attack.

The next evening a serious and concerted raid was made on the very heart of London; in spite of the British denial, there is reason to believe that the damage accomplished was very serious, as well as in some degree important. The casualties on this occasion were the largest up to date, and some of them were very curious. As for instance, one bomb exploded near a passing motor bus in which were twenty people; nine of these were killed and eleven injured. The zeppelin making the attack was the object of unusually hot fire by the air guns and their defenses against these raiders. This

zeppelin was also attacked by four aeroplanes, but escaped unscathed.

One result of this raid was to raise a storm of protest against what was felt to be the very inadequate defenses against this form of attack which the government had seen fit to provide for London. Anti air-craft guns were utterly unable to attain the height at which the zeppelin flew, which gave rise to much comment. The government shortly afterwards appointed Admiral Sir John Percy Scott to take charge of the gunnery for the aerial defense of London.

On the 11th of September a zeppelin flew over the east coast, and on the 12th there was another raid on the east coast, as well as on the 13th. None of these, apparently, accomplished very great results, though there were several casualties in each.

On October 13th, at about half past nine in the evening, another attack was made on the center of London, and the same evening parts of the eastern counties were attacked as well. In London a great deal of damage was done; and even some military, as the British reports admit by inference when they state that "no serious damage was caused to military material." Admiral Scott's air-craft defenses were tried out but did not prove equal to the task of bringing down the assailants. An attempted attack by aeroplanes on these assailants failed because the aeroplanes were unable to locate the sair-hips. Perhaps, however, it would have failed in any event. In London the casualties amounted to 32 killed and 95 injured; while in the eastern counties 24 were killed and 18 wounded. The bombs used in this action were the most powerful which the zeppelins had yet employed.

Agitation again began for better defenses against these aerial visitors, and the government was accused of poorly organizing the defense.

After this, for some three months, there was no further activity on the part of the zeppelins, it is supposed that this quietness was caused by the fact that the weather was so strong as to be unsuitable for them to cross the North Sea.

On January 23rd, 1916, the raids began again. Dover was visited that night, as it was also later on the day following. It is noticeable, however, that these raids were made by aeroplanes and not by zeppelins.

On Monday, January 31st, a large raid was carried

out on the east coast and the Midlands. The raiders on this occasion stayed longer over England than they had at any previous raid, some of them being over the island for twelve hours. The zeppelins entered through Norfolk and across from Lincolnshire to Derbyshire and Staffordshire. Their evident objective was Liverpool, and it is presumed that they thought they had reached that place, instead of which they had reached a town in Staffordshire whose name is still unknown. This town was twice raided during the night, once between eight and nine o'clock, and the second time about one o'clock in the morning. Many houses were destroyed and about 30 people killed, with at least fifty people injured. No precautions had been taken to protect this part of England, and the zeppelins met with no opposition. From Staffordshire the zeppelins then circled through Leicestershire and in a town in this county, whose name is also unknown to us, ten people were killed, besides many being injured. All told, in this raid it appears that 59 persons perished, while 101 were injured. What material damage was done, it was impossible to say. The Germans reported that they had attacked Liverpool and Birkenhead, Nottingham and Sheffield, and the great industrial works on the Humber, but the fact that they reached any of these places was flatly denied by the British.

The greatest apparent result of this attack was to rouse the British people to the urgent need of adequate air defense. Up to this time there had been a tendency to regard the matter as affecting only limited areas on the sea coast and around London, but the Zeppelins in this raid showed their power to travel far inland and far north, and over a country totally defenseless against their attack. Such measures as were thought necessary were then taken to cope with this peril. Another result was to lead to a renewal of the controversy about the advisability of a policy of reprisals.

Sir Evelyn Wood, however, in a letter full of common sense, stated that the principles of morality forbade a policy of reprisals which had as a deliberate object the killing and wounding of non-combatants, maintaining that the killing and maiming of non-combatants was an incidental side of the Zeppelin raids, whose real objective was to inflict damage on the military defenses or the munition factories, etc., of the country; perfectly legitimate objects of attack. The Germans, he wrote, would

not willingly waste one air bomb, after having carried it hundreds of miles, in killing and maiming non-combatants. This is, of course, the view that will be taken by most military men, or in fact by most statesmen, since where injury is inflicted upon non-combatants as collateral to an attack upon a legitimate object of attack, it is the rule that there can be no reprisals undertaken.

The next attack of the Germans was on February 9th when two of their sea-planes crossed the Isle of Thanet, in the mouth of the Thames below London. It is to be noticed that this was the first raid made by sea-planes. This raid, however, did not apparently accomplish very much.

On February 10th, 1916, one of the airships which took part in this raid, on its way back to Germany, suffered some accident and fell into the North Sea with its crew of twenty-two. While in this predicament a Grimsby steam trawler, the King Stephen, discovered it, came up to it and circled around it but refused to take off the crew from the air ship, nor did the Captain of the trawler report the situation of these unfortunate men until reaching port three days afterwards, when a British naval vessel was sent to search for them, but they were never found. The skipper's excuse was that there were twenty-two Germans on the airship and he carried a crew of only nine, and that he was afraid to rely on the pledges offered him by the Germans. This is, taken all in all, one of the most discreditable episodes of the war to the British, since it would have been easily possible for the skipper of the King Stephen to have secured himself in a dozen different ways against any uprising on the part of these men had he taken them on his boat. It is extremely probable, however, that had he done so, in view of his having saved their lives, there would have been no trouble caused by the crew of this airship.

Instead, however, of taking the chance thereof, if chance there was, for the sake of humanity, whereof the British have talked so much during the course of this war, this skipper deliberately steamed away.

On Sunday, February 20th, another sea-plane raid was made on Loestoft and Walmer. Here only material damage, apparently, was done. On the same day still another sea-plane raid took place on the Kentish coast, near Walmer, and also accomplished apparently little real damage, nor did it inflict many casualties.

CHAPTER XXXII

AIR

It would perhaps be uninteresting to fill several pages with a catalogue of all the various air raids which took place during these six months, but nevertheless there were some, which, on account of their size or the importance of the towns attacked, present some features of interest.

Late in September, the 22d, the Allies made a large raid on the city of Stuttgart, the capital of Wurttemberg. Some twenty machines participated in this attack and over a hundred bombs were dropped on the town, particular attention being paid to the Royal palace and the railway station, both of which appear to have been damaged to some extent. Other buildings in the city were also damaged, and the American consulate was struck. But of this, curiously enough, our American papers did not declaim to any extent, thus reversing their procedure on prior occasions of a like character. Several persons were killed as well.

The next really important raid was made by the Austrians on Venice, on October 25th. This raid was on a smaller scale than the one on Stuttgart and was participated in by only about half as many machines. A large number of bombs were dropped, one of which fell on the church of Degli Scalzi; while others fell near, but not on, St. Mark's, doing no damage to the church. On the whole, this raid accomplished very little, though on account of the fact that Venice is such a well known and so unique a city and contains so many art treasures whose destruction or damage would be irreparable, it attracted both attention and criticism.

A couple of weeks later, on November 14th, Austrian machines raided Verona, the Italian military headquarters for northern Italy. While no military damage was done, and comparatively little material damage either, some 30 persons were killed and a considerable

number injured. Five days later Verona was again raided with little result, and on the same day Vicenza and Udine were attacked from the air by the Austrians. In the latter place 12 persons were killed and 27 injured, and considerable material and military damage done.

By way of reprisal for recent Zeppelin raids on London, a large aerial fleet of the Allies made a raid on Treves, on the Moselle, a town containing many very interesting Roman remains, more than any other city north of the Alps. A large number of bombs were dropped but there was little damage done and very few casualties were reported.

On the 23d of January the French city of Nancy was severely shelled from the air by German aviators, over 150 bombs being dropped with comparatively slight results. On the 24th of January the French aviators dropped a couple of hundred bombs on the town of Monastir in southern Serbia, then in possession of the Bulgarians, with what results, however, is uncertain. On this same day Lieutenant Boehme, a noted German aviator, who had brought down many enemy machines and who had distinguished himself in the defense of Freiburg, Baden, against all allied raids in the early part of the war, was killed in an air combat behind the German lines in the vicinity of Argonne.

Freiburg, in Baden, was for the third time since the beginning of the war bombarded by an allied air fleet on January 28th, considerable damage being done and the casualty list was a large one. Two days later, in reprisal for this raid, Paris was raided by the Germans with a large fleet of aeroplanes. Twenty-four persons were killed, twenty-seven were wounded and material damage was done to buildings, etc., in addition to the casualties.

Many minor raids took place during the period under consideration, but the reports of these are so conflicting and the results so comparatively unimportant that any account of them would be wholly unsatisfactory.

During all this time, of course, there was intense and untiring activity among the rival air fleets on the battle line itself, and each day numberless deeds of bravery were done, each sufficiently gallant to deserve a chapter or recital, but unfortunately, except in a very few cases, the bravery and gallantry is buried so deeply in a few dry official words in the daily bulletins that any description is impossible.

One thing, however, may be said and said emphatically:—The aerial services of the several combatants displayed more of the chivalry of war in their dealings with each other than any of the other arms, numerous instances of this chivalry and what may even be called courtesy are well attested. The reason for this is perhaps that the conditions under which aerial fighting takes place are more like the individual combats of the earlier days.

The following interesting statement on this subject by a British aviator is worth reading:—"Though it has been repeatedly stated that chivalry does not exist in this war, this does not apply to the British and German aviation branches. Whether it is the individualism of our work and its novelty, or whatever it is that is responsible, something of the old spirit of knighthood maintains among the riders of the air. When a British aviator has to descend in the German lines whether from engine trouble or because his engine or his planes have been damaged by anti-aircraft guns' fire the next day the Germans report to us his name and whether he survived and if so whether he is wounded. We always do the same. It has come to be a custom."

The reports are made in a manner worthy of airmen and they are the only communications that ever pass between the two foes which watch for heads to snipe at from their trenches. What is called a "message bag" is dropped over the British lines by a German or over the German lines by a British aviator—sometimes when he is in the midst of bursting shells from the anti-aircraft guns. Long streamers are attached to the little cloth bag. These, as they piroutte down to the earth from a height of seven or eight thousand feet, attract the attention of soldiers in the neighborhood and they run out to get the prize when it lands.

It is taken to battalion headquarters which wires the fact on to the aviation headquarters where the fate of a comrade may be known a few hours after he has left the home aerodrome; and, in another few hours, someone in England may know the fate of a relative.

That is one of the advantages of belonging to the flying corps. It may be weeks before his relatives and comrades know whether a man who is missing after a trench attack or counter-attack is a prisoner or dead. Such little kindnesses as this don't interfere with your fighting your best for your cause; at the same time

they take a little of the savagery out of war. Of course, the rule could not apply to prisoners taken in trench fighting—only to airmen. There are relatively few airmen on either side and only an occasional one ever comes down in the enemy's lines."

The neutral countries surrounding the belligerent countries, particularly Switzerland and Holland, had their attention most positively drawn to the absolute lack of international legislation regarding the shipwrecked aviators who came tumbling out of the sky in large numbers into their territory.

International law and the law of various nations have regulated the rights of foreign men of war who are forced to seek a temporary refuge into a neutral port. The foreign warship may repair the damages it has suffered and it may take on board sufficient coal to sail to the next home port. If a German cruiser should suddenly arrive in a Dutch harbor she would be given coal enough to reach Emden, the nearest German port. A British ship would be sent to Harwich. All this is generally understood as an established rule of war. But when a foreign aviator, through lack of gasoline is obliged to land upon neutral territory he is interned for the rest of the war.

Apparently he does not come under the class of the warships, for in that case he would obtain a few cans of oil and would be given a chance to fly home. In the same way, if the flying machine were given equal rights with the warships, a broken machine might stay upon neutral ground in order to get repaired before it once more took to the open sky. In times to come all this may be regulated, but at the present time a number of aviators walk around in Dutch and Danish and Swiss fortresses and express their opinion of a rule which to them seems entirely unfair.

When an aviator lands in the sea and is picked up by a neutral fishing or merchant vessel he may go home freely. If, however, he is picked up by a torpedo boat of a neutral nation, that neutral nation is obliged to intern their involuntary guest. This rule, however, only holds for aviators, shipwrecked mariners seem to go free no matter who saved them. But the aviator who is fished out of his wrecked machine by an official vessel belonging to a neutral navy loses his liberty for the rest of the war, while he would be allowed to go

home if he had waited a few minutes longer for a fishing sloop.

A rather complicated question arises, when an aviator just before he is approached by a naval launch dives from his machine and claims his right to liberty as a "distressed mariner." Unfortunately a ride of several hours upon the choppy waves of the North Sea sitting on the wings of a disabled flying machine seems to produce a state of abject seasickness. And the aviators who might have availed themselves of the technical rights of their case as "distressed mariners" were usually in such an advanced state of seasick indifference that they cared not what happened as long as they were hoisted on board something stable.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE WAR ON THE SEA

During the period under consideration there were no naval battles of any size or importance. The British kept up their patrol of the North Sea unremittingly, but, as we shall see in the course of our narrative, their patrol was sometimes evaded. Except on the Belgian coast, this patrol did not include any offensive operations during the period under consideration and was of a very laborious and monotonous character. The British fleet was considerably expanded during these months in order to meet the heavy calls upon it which this patrol necessitated. Drifters and trawlers for mine sweeping, armed yachts and other similar vessels for patrol duty, motor boats for dispatch carrying, as well as many vessels of new types were added. Most of these, it is true, were added for the purpose of combatting the German submarine blockade of England which was growing to be more of a menace.

On September 6th the steamer Hesperian was torpedoed off the Irish coast, and while not immediately sunk, went to the bottom later, which incident led to diplomatic action by the United States.

On September 24th the Anglo-Canadian, a British horse transport was sunk off Fastnet, near the Irish coast, with some 900 horses on board, but whether by a mine or by a submarine is uncertain.

On October 28th the British lost the cruiser Argyle, under the command of Captain Tancred, grounded off the eastern coast of Scotland and became a total wreck, though there was no loss of life. On November 17th the hospital ship Anglia struck a mine in the channel on her way from France to Dover, and sank with a loss of 80 lives.

On the 30th of December the British lost another cruiser, the Natal, which blew up as a result of an internal explosion in some English harbor, the name of

which we do not know. Her captain and twenty-four other officers, together with 380 men, were killed or drowned. The fate of the Natal reminds one of that of the Bulwark which about the same time, the year before, blew up under somewhat similar circumstances.

In the early part of the six months under consideration there was considerable activity by the British submarines in the Baltic where an attack on the German merchant ships in that sea was begun. During October the British submarines averaged one victim a day among this class of vessels, but this soon ceased as the Germans declined to send forth their ships from the harbors and expose them to this danger. The principal object of this raid on German shipping was to stop the supply of ores and other minerals of like character from Scandinavia into Germany. Later on, the Germans, through mines and other defenses, succeeded in keeping the British submarines out of the Baltic very largely. During the time of their activity, however, these submarines managed to sink three German warships the Prince Adelbert, which was sunk off Libau on October 23rd, nearly all crews going down with the ships; the light cruiser Undine, which was sunk off the south coast of Sweden on November 7th, with a loss of 26 lives; and on December 17th, the light cruiser Bremen and a torpedo boat.

Towards the end of 1915, the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean were largely reinforced and their activity was directed mostly to the merchant ships and transports of the Allies which passed up and down that almost inland sea. In the last three months of the year this traffic was greatly increased owing to the new expedition to Salonica. Several British transports, the Ranazan on September 19th, with 225 Indian troops being lost; the Marquette on October 26th, with 90 lost; the Woodfield on November 2d, and the Merian on November 8th, with 40 lost and 50 injured, were sunk or damaged by these submarines, besides a very considerable number of commercial vessels.

Early in November, further reinforcements to the submarines of the Central Powers in the Mediterranean arrived and signalized their advent by sinking a number of merchantmen off the North African coast. On the 7th of November, the Italian passenger liner, Ancona, on a voyage from Italy to New York, was torpedoed and sunk, with a loss of about 300 lives.

The sinking of the vessel gave rise to considerable diplomatic correspondence with the United States, owing to the presence of Americans on board. On the 14th, another Italian passenger steamer, the Bosnia, was also sunk.

On December 30th the Peninsular and Oriental boat, the Persia, was torpedoed and sunk off Crete, with a loss of 250 lives, which sinking also involved the United States in diplomatic correspondence.

About the same time submarines appeared on the western coast of Egypt and sank the armored auxiliary cruiser Tara, and two Egyptian gun-boats, the Prince Aban and Abdul Moenin in the Bay of Sollum on that coast.

On December 7th the Standard Oil tank steamer was attacked by a submarine off the coast of Tripoli, near where a somewhat similar attack had been made on the Petrolite, another Standard Oil vessel, a few days before. These attacks also provoked diplomatic correspondence on the part of the United States.

Towards the end of the land campaign at the Dardanelles the British and French submarines penetrated into the Sea of Marmora once more and for two or three months were very successful in their operations, damaging a Turkish battleship, a couple of gunboats, a torpedo boat, three or four transports, and quite a number of supply ships of various kinds. Several of these submarines, at various times, entered the harbor of Constantinople itself and attacked shipping tied up to the quays of the city and also the Turkish powder mills at Zeitunlik came in for a measure of their attention. But this work was extremely risky and cost the French four submarines, the Sapphire, the Marriotte, the Joule, and the Turquoise, and also cost the British the same number, they losing the E-15, E-2, E-7, and E-20 during the year.

Towards the end of 1915, the free navigation of the Adriatic by the Allies became of great importance, since the Italians were sending an army across that sea to Albania and the Allies at the same time were moving the Serbian troops and refugees southward to Corfu and Greece. These movements necessitated continual voyages between Italy to the West, and Corfu to the South, and the Albanian coast. The Austrians took advantage of this state of affairs and attacked with their submarine flotilla and succeeded in destroying a number of vessels belonging to their opponents.

In the Black Sea, during this time, both the German and Russian submarines were to some extent active. The German submarines were particularly useful at the time of the bombardment of the Bulgarian fortress of Varna when they prevented the Russian fleet from closing in on the fortress defending the place.

As has already been mentioned in the account of the fighting on the western line, there was considerable activity by the British Navy off the Belgian coast, where the German submarine bases at various points on that coast were attacked. In fact, the English detailed a fleet of eighty minor vessels under Vice-Admiral Bacon for these operations, and curiously enough, here Ericson's invention of the monitor, which had been discarded by the fleets of the world for several years, again came into use, as Admiral Bacon's fleet included 12 of these vessels, six bearing the names of distinguished soldiers, and the other six numbers only. How much damage these attacks on the Belgian coast did to the German ports is unknown; six major attacks being made and eight minor. Naturally, the British say that important results were accomplished, while on the other hand, the Germans report that these bombardments inflicted no serious damage upon these ports.

During these operations the British lost three small vessels, an armed yacht, a drifter and a mine sweeper, and suffered causalties of 34 killed and 24 wounded.

On January 9th, 1916, the British lost the battleship Edward VII in the Channel, through a mine which afterwards became known was one of those planted by the German raider, the Moewe. No lives were lost in this disaster.

Another British war vessel was lost in the same waters a little more than a month later, when the Arethusa also struck a mine and sank, with a loss of ten lives, on February 13th. It will be remembered that this cruiser, when just out of her builders' hands, participated in the fight in the North Sea in which the Blucher was sunk, and indeed was said to have fired the torpedo which sank that vessel. On February 28th, the Maloja, a Peninsular and Oriental passenger steamer, homeward bound, struck a mine in the channel near Dover and was sunk, some forty lives being lost. The mines which sank the Arethusa and the Maloja were also supposed to have been among those planted by the Moewe whose history follows shortly.

During these six months other navies, than the British and German suffered casualties on the sea. On September 28th, the Italian battleship Benedetto Bim was destroyed through an explosion and with the ship some three hundred lives were lost.

On February 13th, the French cruiser, the Admiral Channier, 4800 tons, an old and not particularly formidable vessel, was torpedoed and sunk off the Syrian coast, about 300 men going down with her.

The only spectacular event on the ocean in the period under consideration was the career of the Moewe, the German raider hereinbefore referred to.

On the first of February, 1916, Norfolk, Virginia, had one of the sensations of its history. The Elder Dempster Line steamer "Appam" which trades between Great Britain and West Africa was much overdue, and should have arrived at Plymouth, England, on January 20, 1916, eleven days before. A broken boat bearing the name "Appam," however, had been picked up between Madeira and Gibraltar on January 16th. This circumstance, in connection with her being so long overdue, led to the Appam's loss being considered certain. To the surprise of the world, and more particularly to the surprise of Norfolk, the Appam made a sudden appearance in that harbor on the date above mentioned in charge of a German prize crew which had been put on board of her by the captain of a German raider, the Moewe, after the capture of the Appam by this raider on January 16th, near the West African coast.

The German prize crew had navigated the Appam from this point all the way across the middle Atlantic Ocean in safety, repeatedly passing British merchant vessels and cruisers which by one strategy or another they had outwitted, and brought her in safety into the American port of Norfolk. On board the Appam, in addition to her prize crew, were the passengers who were on her at the time of capture and portions of her own crew and those of other vessels previously destroyed by the Moewe.

The reason why an American port had been selected was that under certain clauses of an existing treaty between Prussia and the United States there was a provision under which the Germans deemed themselves entitled to bring prizes of war into American harbors, and had acted in accordance with their views of their rights thereunder.

The history of the Moewe was most romantic. She left a German naval port towards the end of December 1915, and first crossed over to the Swedish coast, thence following that coast and the Norwegian coast closely until fairly far to the north, whence she had described a great semi-circle around the British Isles, successfully eluding the British cruisers in this portion of the ocean, and had reached the neighborhood of the Canary Islands in the early days of January.

Briefly summarized, during the next two months she succeeded in capturing fourteen vessels belonging to the Allies, of which 12 were English, one French and one Belgian. Eleven of the British vessels captured were steamers: the Anthor, the Traider, the Curbridge, Ariadne, Dromomly, Farrington, Clan McTavish, Appam, Westburne, Flamenco and Saxon, while the twelfth, the Edinburgh, was a sailing ship. The French vessel, the Maroni, was a steamer, as was the Belgian, the Luxemburg. The total tonnage was 57,855.

All of these vessels were sunk, except the Appam which was sent into Norfolk, and the Westburne which was sent into Teneriffe, in charge of a prize crew and also carrying prisoners taken from the various ships captured by the Moewe. These prisoners were landed, after which the Westburne was taken outside the harbor of Teneriffe and sunk.

The raid of the Moewe was even more successful than the raid of the Emden, in point of damage inflicted upon the enemy; as the aggregate values of the cargoes and vessels sunk and captured by her were considerably more than those captured by the Emden. With the Appam, she captured a considerable amount of gold which this vessel was bringing home to England.

One of the most interesting features of her raid was the fight between herself and the British steamer Clan McTavish, one of the Clan Line. The Moewe, which was disguised as a merchantman, by means of canvas screens and other devices, summoned the Clan McTavish to stop; this vessel refused, not knowing, undoubtedly, the character of her accoster, and thereupon the Moewe let fall her screens, exposed her battery of guns, and opened fire on the McTavish. This latter vessel still held on her course, and increasing her speed attempted to escape, replying to the fire of the Moewe guns with the gun she had mounted on her stern as a precaution against submarines. But this attempt to escape was

unavailing, and the Clan McTavish finally stopped and surrendered, being subsequently sunk, and her crew being taken prisoners.

The Moewe finally reached Wilhelmshaven, the German naval port, on March 4th, in safety, bringing some British naval prisoners as well as some of the crews of the other vessels she had destroyed about the time she sank the Appam.

On her return, the Moewe, curiously enough, passed directly through the English Channel and successfully eluded the patrol of British naval vessels therein.

This exploit aroused so much enthusiasm in Germany that attempts to duplicate it were thereafter made.

On February 29, 1916, the British auxiliary cruiser "Alcantra" was doing patrol duty in the North Sea when she sighted a large steamer flying the Norwegian flag with the Norwegian colors painted on her side. The Alcantra halted the "Grief," the name of this apparently Norwegian vessel, which was, in fact, a German cruiser, and asked her name and destination; the answer was apparently unsatisfactory for the British cruiser lowered a boat to board the "Grief" in order to verify the information supplied. But the German vessel, which was disguised as was the Moewe, by false bulwarks, dropped these, thus giving her guns full play and attacked the Alcantra and the boat she was sending to search her. The Alcantra was a ship of over 15,000 tons, while the "Grief" was considerably smaller. But nevertheless, after a fight lasting several hours, the Grief got the better of the combat, one of her shells having struck the rudder of the Alcantra and rendering her unmanageable. The Grief then fired a torpedo at the Alcantra, which sank very shortly thereafter.

In the meantime, another British auxiliary cruiser, the Andes, which had heard the call of the Alcantra wireless, came up and reached the scene of the battle about the time the Alcantra sank. The Grief which had been several times struck by the Alcantra and was on fire, seeing this new antagonist, put off at full speed, the Andes following her as rapidly as possible. The chase was a long one and the Grief attempted to torpedo the Andes more than once, but did not succeed. The Andes, however, wrecked the upper decks of the Grief, driving her crew from her guns, but even then the Grief would have probably escaped had it not been for the fact that a British light cruiser suddenly appeared

to the northward of the Grief in the direction of her flight. At a considerable distance the gunners picked up her range. The Grief of course, did not carry guns of sufficient calibre to combat this new antagonist, and, shortly after the cruiser entered into the fray, blew up with a terrific explosion.

It is supposed that the Grief was laden with mines that were intended to be laid by her on various points of her voyage, and that one of the British shots had reached these mines, thus causing the explosion which brought about her end.

As a result of a meeting of the Privy Council of Great Britain on February 14th, 1916, the British government issued an order on February 29th, whereby the application of a certain British municipal act entitled "The Trading with the Enemy" (Extension of Powers) Act 1915, under what the British called the "Trading with the Enemy" (Neutral Countries) proclamation 1916, was applied to the world in general.

This proclamation first applied to certain subjects of Greece, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and Portuguese East Africa, and all consignments to persons and firms on the statutory black lists which were issued on the same day were forbidden. This was the first public assumption, absolutely without warrant of international law, of that right to control the trade of the world which Britain has always privately practised, and it created a storm of protest from the neutrals whose subjects found themselves on this black list. This subject will, however, be dealt with more fully in the next volume when it will be discussed as regards its subsequent application to the citizens of the United States.

Late in February an official announcement was made that the British and French fleets operating in the North Sea and the Channel would thereafter act as one and be placed under one supreme command.

CHAPTER XXXIV

GENERAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

In the early autumn of 1915, it became apparent to Great Britain that it was impossible for her to continue the policy which she had adopted at the beginning of the war of voluntary military service. Her advertising campaign did not produce, after first enthusiasm had faded, that number of recruits for the army which could make her a factor in the land fighting on the Continent, and though every method had been adopted to draw the men of military age to the colors still these were not coming forward in sufficient numbers and the complaints of Great Britain's Allies at her lack of co-operation with them in the land warfare on the Continent were commencing to be extremely pointed.

In proportion to their population at that time the British colonies, Canada and Australia, had furnished a greater proportion of their men of military age than had the United Kingdom; in September and the early part of October, the slowness with which voluntary recruits joined the army grew even greater, so that it was necessary to adopt some radical plan dealing with the situation under which the field armies could not only be sustained but increased, and the legitimate demands of Britain's Allies satisfied. The natural and normal system which would have been adopted in any other country in the world than Great Britain would have been to have adopted compulsory military service, but many obstacles stood in the way of such adoption.

In the first place, there was the rooted objection of Englishmen of all classes and characters to be compelled to do anything of any kind or nature. In the second place, there was the serious opposition of the workmen class of the population which found political expression through the labor unions and the Labor party. And

finally there was the fear of all the politicians (there being no statesmen at the head of England's government) of the loss of votes to their particular party through taking any definite and decisive action of any kind to meet this emergency. Consequently a quack remedy was applied; which quack remedy consisted of what is known as the Lord Derby Recruiting Scheme. Under this scheme, in every area a local civilian committee was appointed and these committees undertook to procure for the army a minimum supply of 30,000 recruits per week; the number which it was said was necessary to maintain the efficiency of the British army then in the field. As a matter of fact, however, it was subsequently discovered that this figure only represented infantry needs. The theory of obtaining recruits through civilians was to relieve the War Office from any further work of recruiting, leaving it free to concentrate upon the training of these recruits after they had been obtained by the civilian committee.

On the 6th of October, Lord Derby was appointed to direct the operations of this scheme and a general canvassing scheme was adopted. All the men in England, married and unmarried, between the ages of 18 and 41, were divided according to their ages into 46 groups. Certain of these groups were to be what is known as "starred groups"; that is to say, persons reserved by reason of their occupations, or for other causes, from active military service. The unstarred men left were then supposed to be available for military service, after a physical examination. But these unstarred men had two courses open to them, they could either enlist immediately or else could attest to join the army at some future time. During the course of the canvass, the promise was made by the government that the unstarred married men should not be called until all the unstarred unmarried men had been called. This caused considerable trouble thereafter, and nearly caused the fall of the government.

The canvass lasted for nearly two months and it was found that of the unmarried men only about one-half presented themselves, while of the married men approximately three-fifths. The reason why the greater proportion of married men presented themselves was that their service, under the pledge of the government, was postponed until all unmarried men had been called and were in actual service.

Without going further into the details of this remarkable plan which was intended to gild the pill, so to speak, of compulsory service, and create compulsory service under another name, it will suffice to say that the entire plan was a complete and absolute failure, and that the number of men absolutely necessary to maintain the armies of Great Britain at their then strength, was not obtained, and the government was compelled to face the alternative of compulsory military service.

After much hesitation the government did meet the situation by a military service bill which was introduced into Parliament on the 5th of January, 1916. This first military bill was nothing but a measure to compel the unmarried men to do what they had failed to do under the Derby recruiting scheme. Without going into the provisions of this bill at length it may be that this bill was merely a makeshift and that it did not under its terms provide for anything like general military service even from the unmarried men. Furthermore, it provided for local tribunals to which claims for exemption from military service were to made. These tribunals in the future played a very considerable part in weakening an already weak measure. This bill passed the Commons after much negotiation with the labor interests of the country, receiving its first reading on January 6th, and its third on January 26th, becoming law a day or two afterwards, and going into operation on February 10, 1916.

Early in the year there were strong efforts made in and out of Parliament to have the provisions of the military service bill apply to Ireland as well as to the other component parts of the United Kingdom. Ireland having been by the terms of the bill exempted from its provisions, but these efforts were opposed by the government and did not succeed in rallying enough strength to their cause to impart their desires on that government.

A considerable sensation was caused in Great Britain in November by charges made in the House of Lords by Lord St. Davids, that favoritism was rampant in the army, that the British generals were incompetent, and that women were not only exercising far too much influence in the army but were at the front in large numbers, particularly at or near headquarters, on what might be termed pleasure trips. These charges were vigorously denied, but ultimately, at a considerable time, events proved their correctness to a large degree.

Parliament was finally prorogued on February 27th, doubtless much to the relief of the ministry.

A very interesting and rather bitter controversy arose between Sweden and Great Britain in the latter months of 1915. It will be remembered how Great Britain, by a monstrous enlargement of the "continuous voyage" theory as applicable to contraband, had by an unscrupulous use of her naval strength compelled all the smaller powers of Europe, Holland, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland, to submit to her dictation as to the characters and quantities of the foodstuffs and raw materials they should import for their trade and commerce from abroad by sea.

Great Britain had further, in recent months, begun to seize the mails on the high seas, not only those destined for her enemies, but those destined to the above named neutral countries as well. This regime Great Britian now attempted to apply to Sweden, thinking presumably that Sweden being a small nation would not have the temerity to resist the orders of the mistress of the seas.

But though small, Sweden is a robustly independent nation and to her credit, now and hereafter, she not only dared to oppose Great Britain by formal protest but by effective act. Her first step in her resistance was to solicit the co-operation of the United States in taking some action looking to an assertion and an enforcement of the right of neutrals to have their ships traverse the ocean, between neutral ports at least, without interference and in her communication to the United States, Sweden used the following strong, but justified, expressions:—

"The violation of existing rules of international law has, regardless of protests, increased until at present only a few rules, serving as protection to neutral commercial intercourse, are observed by Great Britain, and it is feared that also these remaining few will be violated.

"Of late the British authorities have violated the mail traffic, etc., etc."

However, England's present practise of censoring also first class mail, sent by neutral vessels from one neutral country to another, is an even greater violation of the rights accorded neutral powers by the rules of international law. It is not necessary to particularly point out how contrary this practise is to the stipulations

of The Hague Convention, which stipulations or rules must be considered to have been in existence even before the promulgation of this convention.

The Hague Convention referred to by the government of Sweden, No. XI., in its article 1 of chapter 1, lays down the rule in relation to mail as follows:

"The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its official or private character may be, found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship is inviolable, If the ship is detained the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay."

This convention was ratified by Great Britain.

We have heard so much during this war of the duty of observing The Hague Conventions, in some cases when unratified and consequently not in force, and so much vituperative inspired denunciation in our neutral press of one set of belligerents for not obesrving even such unratified conventions, that the absolute silence of this same press in relation to the violation of the convention under consideration seems strange, unless something which the writer has been unable to discover in these Hague Conventions, makes them in the eyes of that press only binding on the particular belligerent they do not favor.

The government of the United States, at this time, being more interested in sentimentality than with principle, as a reason for decisive action declined to co-operate with Sweden.

Sweden, however, was not discouraged and acting on her own initiative, took advantage of her geographical position, and in retaliation for Great Britain's illegal actions, held up all mail communication of any kind between that country and her ally, Russia; and also prohibited the passage of goods of any kind going between Great Britain and Russia, or the reverse, from crossing Swedish territory. As at this time the only other means of reaching Russia, except by shipping across America to Vladivostock in extreme eastern Siberia, through Archangel, was closed by the ice and would not be open for many weeks, this action was embarrassing for both Great Britain and Russia, and they attempted to solve the problem thus presented, first by negotiations, and second by threats. But Sweden stood firm and finding that the action already taken was not drastic enough, further crippled Great Britain by placing an embargo on all exports of wood pulp to that country.

This action, of course, hit the British newspapers and hit them hard, since about seventy per cent of all the paper on which British newspapers are printed is made from Swedish pulp.

At the date our record ends the situation between Sweden and Great Britain had experienced no modification. Great Britain was talking, the Bear was growling and Sweden was acting. It may be here said, in passing, that the only two neutral countries which have shown in this war that they have normal self respect for themselves are Sweden and Switzerland.

In January, the president of the Bremen Chamber of Commerce officially announced that not a pound of cotton had been used for the last eight months in making ammunition in Germany, and that the substitute was both cheaper and better suited to the making of ammunition than cotton, and that hence, even after the war, the German ammunition factories will not have to use cotton.

This official made the further statement that camphor, which the Germans have been making for some years from American turpentine, could be made more advantageously from another substitute, which would also do away, now and henceforth, with the use of American turpentine.

If the Germans have actually discovered a cheaper substitute for cotton, it is certain to come into general use after the war and will constitute a very severe blow to our cotton growers, which loss, if it occurs, can be directly chargeable to our policy of letting Great Britain do in this war what Great Britain would not let Russia do in the Russo-Japanese war—put cotton on the list of contraband. This result would also give Mr. Lansing the enviable pre-eminence of being that one, of all our Secretaries of State, who inflicted the most injury on his own country whose interests it was his duty to guard.

In the autumn of 1915, the British government began mobilizing the American and other foreign securities in the hands of private investors throughout the United Kindgom for the purpose of either using them as collateral security for loans negotiated in the United States, or the outright sale thereof on the American market. This scheme was partly undertaken to steady exchange between the United States and Great Britain, and partly to raise money for the government.

In the early days of September the pound sterling

had fallen very largely in the New York market; at one time reaching the record low price of $4.55, and though this situation had been immediately eased by large shipments of gold by the British government the exchange market remained nervous and unsteady.

The original owner of the securities either received a promise of the return of his securities at a future day with certain financial advantages in the meantime, or handed them over in return for a fixed price payable at a future day.

Prices of foodstuffs of all kinds advanced very largely in all the belligerent countries during the year. In the case of the Central Empires this advance was a result of bad crops at home in a large measure, and also because the Central Empires were not able to follow the ordinary course in peace times of importing foodstuffs from beyond the seas owing to the British blockade. However, the Central Empires were by no means at or even near the point of starvation or even real scarcity of food in spite of the information to that effect spread broadcast by Great Britain.

In fact, even if the seas were entirely and absolutely closed to the Central Empires it would be impossible to starve them.

This submarine campaign and the use of ships by the government for purposes of the war drove ocean freight rates, during this period, to a very high figure. For instance, in normal times the rate per ton of coal from Cardiff, Wales, to Genoa, Italy, even as late as July, 1914, was seven shillings; in January, 1916, this rate was 75 shillings. The normal rate on grain from the Argentine was 12 shillings and the abnormal rate of January, 1916, was 150 shillings.

These increases in carrying charges had a practical effect, both in belligerent and non-belligerent countries. In Great Britain, for instance, the price of bread per quartern loaf of four pounds rose from 11 cents in August, 1914, to 19 cents in January, 1916. In France, the general rise in prices was greater than in England, and in Italy, very much greater. The neutral countries also saw prices mount rapidly.

On October 28th, the Viviani ministry, which had been in power in France since the beginning of the war, though partly reconstructed at the time the French government fled to Bordeaux in September, 1914, fell from power and was succeeded by a new cabinet organ-

ized by Aristide Briand in which cabinet Mr. Viviani, the former premier, consented to occupy a minor position. Mr. Briand, who is one of the ablest of French contemporary politicians, first came into real prominence in connection with the separation of church and state in 1904-05, in the enactment of the legislation concerning which he played a very prominent role, being, in fact, what would be here called the chairman of the committee which introduced such legislation. Cold, intellectual and practical in his planning, Mr. Briand, once his plan is formed, becomes impetuous and tenacious in its execution. On the whole, it seems only justice to say that in placing Mr. Briand at the head of affairs in the difficult situation in which the country found itself, France chose the best man she had available. And France was obliged to choose a strong, able man for this position the more as her president, Mr. Poincare, is notoriously without stability or balance.

Like France, Italy, to some degree, suffered from a shortage of food this winter of 1915-16. Early in January, however, the government took a census of all the grain in the kingdom and devised a scheme for controlling its price and the method of its distribution. Like measures adopted as regards other foodstuffs largely ameliorated the situation, and prevented too much suffering.

Italy continued at peace officially with Germany during all this period and did not commit any act of war against her until just at the end of the six months under consideration, when on Febraury 28, 1916, she siezed 34 out of the 57 German ships in Italian ports. At this time, however, Italy denied that these seizures were acts of war and claimed that they were merely an exercise of the right of angary.

This right of angary is in international law the right of a belligerent to use neutral merchant vessels and their crews for the purpose of transporting troops, ammunition and provisions, paying freight, and is undoubtedly universally recognized. Those interested in this subject will find a full discussion of the subject in Stockton's "Laws and Usages of War at Sea", article 6.

A couple of weeks before this, Portugal had taken forcible possession of 36 German and Austrian ships in the river Tagus, and had hoisted the Portuguese flag over them. In this case, however, such seizures

differed entirely from the Italian seizures, since Portugal at the time was not a belligerent and consequently had no right of angary. Her act in seizing these ships was therefore an absolute act of war, and thus this wretchedly corrupt and debased land entered the struggle. Such entry need not, however, be viewed as one of the main events of the period we are considering.

There were few or no political events of any importance in Germany or Austria during the winter.

In Russia there were internal troubles of some character, but few of the details have come to us. Sozonoff, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, next to Sir Edward Grey the person most responsible for the outbreak of the war in 1914, fell from power on November 2d.

As early as the commencement of the ill fated Dardanelles campaign, the Allies had turned their eyes on Greece whose geographical situation and whose possession of a veteran army had suggested to them that it would be a very considerable advantage to them if they could be able to secure her co-operation in their projects. With the end in view, various vague and shadowy promises of territory and advantages in other ways were made by the Allies to Greece in an effort to secure her active aid.

But the King of Greece and the generals of the Greek staff were well aware of the difficulties which the capture of Constantinople presented, and after a very careful study of the plan of campaign adopted by the Allies, these qualified men gave it as their judgment that such plan could not be carried through, a decision which the subsequent history of the Dardanelles operations fully sustained.

It has always seemed incomprehensible why when warned by a body of men who not only know the lay of the land but also the Turk from actual experience in fighting, and who were qualified by professional attainments of merit, King Constantine alone as a general being entitled to higher rank, than any general Great Britain had shown up to this time, or since for that matter, of the defects of their plan the Allies did not change it. Particularly as the Greek general staff pointed out the true road through southeastern Bulgaria which any well planned campaign should follow. But they not only did not but they insisted on Greece's participating in their plan without modification.

But this the government of Greece was unwilling to

do, in fact, finally refused point blank to do, arguing that it was the duty of that government not to waste the lives of its subjects on an expedition in which there was only one possibility, failure. In which decision it would seem that the Greek government showed a reasonable and wise discretion, as it was undoubtedly its duty to consider the interests and lives of its subjects first and not to adopt the course of sacrificing these lives in order that Great Britain could save the lives of some British soldiers.

At the end of the second Balkan war a treaty had been made between Greece and Serbia whereby the parties thereto pledged themselves to come to each other's aid in the event that either thereafter was attacked by Bulgaria.

Prior to the attack of the Teutonic powers upon Serbia and before Bulgaria had taken sides in the war, the Allies who suspected her inclinations had sought by territorial bribes to obtain her military co-operation with them or her neutrality. As they themselves had no territory to give her they sought to pay these bribes with territory of Serbia and Greece, Serbia being Russian in fact, though Serbia in name was easily enough persuaded to make the necessary territorial sacrifices, but with Greece it was different.

Venizelos deserves a paragraph by himself. By birth a Cretan, and probably with Italian blood in his veins, he is not in any sense of the word racially a Greek, though since his rise to prominence a mythical descent from an old Athenian family has been arranged for him. By profession he is a lawyer, but by metier a revolutionist and in his younger days in Crete he was the leader of practically all the uprisings which took place in that Island between 1890 and 1910.

In 1910 having exhausted the possibilities of Crete and also having been elected to the Greek national assembly, the Boule, from Athens he transferred himself to the mainland, arriving in the capital at a singularly opportune moment for the display of his undoubted talents for intrigue. The employment of these talents almost immediately earned for him the Premiership. At this time, Greece was in the throes of a wave of reform against the corruption in politics then so prevalent in the country. Cleverly taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded Venizelos not only proclaimed himself in thorough sympathy with this movement,

but put himself at the head of it and rode into power with absolute freedom of action guaranteed to him, and since then has showed himself a stern foe to political corruption of all kinds when exercised by his opponents.

A little later on, the Balkan league against Turkey was formed which carried its plans through successfully, the credit for the formation of which league and for its victory, is modestly assumed by Venizelos. After the war, Venizelos was the most active fermenter of the trouble between Bulgaria and the rest of the league which followed, though it is fair to say that he had had able assistants therein, in the persons of the most venal of Balkan politicians, Take Jonescu, the Rumanian, and Prince Alexander of Serbia.

At the outbreak of the present war, entirely on his own motive and without consulting either the executive or the legislative, Venizelos offered the Allies the armed co-operation of Greece, and from that moment, he became to all intents and purposes a political agent for the Allies.

The first real break between the King and Venizelos arose over the question of the interpretation of the treaty between Greece and Serbia. As has been said, that treaty bound Greece to come to the aid of Serbia if that country were attacked by Bulgaria. Further than this the treaty did not go.

In the autumn of 1915, Serbia was menaced by Bulgaria, Germany, Austria and Turkey. The question arose was Greece bound to aid Serbia because Bulgaria was among those menacing her, or did the treaty only contemplate an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria alone?

Venizelos laid down the principle that as long as Bulgaria was among the menacers of Serbia, Greece was bound to aid her. The King said that the Greco-Serbian Treaty dealt with a Balkan war and a Balkan war alone. It was only to come into force in case either Greece or Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria alone. Clearly it did not refer to and was never intended to refer to the case of Serbia being attacked by two of the great military powers of Europe as well as by Bulgaria.

Had the contention of Venizelos prevailed and the treaty been interpreted in its most literal sense, it would have been equivalent to suicide by Greece, since inevitably Greece, would have suffered much the same fate of Serbia.

A general election was held and the policy of the

King was approved by the Greek people, surely the most interested persons. The Venizelos faction, however, refused to participate in these elections, alleging as their reason for such non-participation that the King had no right to dissolve the Parliament and to proclaim new elections at a time when 300,000 of the voters were under arms on account of the general mobilization of the Greek army. The question as to the right of the King to act as he did of course depends on the terms of the Greek constitution as it actually existed at the time the King so acted, and these are not ambiguous and fully sustain him, as Venizelos then knew and now knows.

But as by this time Venizelos had been taken under the financial protection of the Allies, and was abundantly supplied with money for political purposes, this issue was as good as another, since it permitted him to play the role of the "man of the people" oppressed by a "tyrant king."

APPENDIX I

PRISONERS OF WAR

So much derogatory propaganda in relation to the condition and management of the German prison camps and of the treatment of British prisoners has been made officially and unofficially by the British Government in relation to the condition of these camps and the treatment of the prisoners therein that it seems desirable to deal with this subject to some extent.

In the first place, it may be stated that the government of the United States has from the beginning of the war, from time to time, inspected these prison camps, through its sworn officials, and that these officials have rendered reports in writing, which reports have been printed; all of which reports from the beginning of the war to the close of this period are before me as these words are written.

I have performed the labor, not an inconsiderable one, of reading these reports through, because these reports contain the only credible evidence as to the condition of these camps. The statements which have appeared in the press from time to time are not worthy of belief, inspired by the British propaganda as they have been.

As to the reports themselves, these being too long to quote *in extenso*, I can only state the conclusions which I draw therefrom:

(*a*) Complaints about food. There are many of these almost entirely from the English prisoners. Practically in each camp Mr. H. H. Morgan, Mr. Rivington Pyne, Dr. Ohnesorg (Dr. Ohnesorg and Mr. Jackson having both been formerly officers in the United States Navy), Mr. John J. C. Watson, and Mr. E. L. Dresel (a well known Boston lawyer), made investigations regarding complaints on the part of the British prisoners in regard to the food. It seems worth while, therefore, to set

forth a few of the experiences of these inspectors in relation to that food.

Under date of September 11, 1915, Mr. Jackson reports his visit to the detention camp at Senne:

"There were some complaints as usual in regard to the food. I had arrived in camp just after the mid-day meal was served; while some of the men said that the meat had been bad and they wished I had had an opportunity to taste it, others said that the meat had been particularly good because the officers had heard I was coming. None of them knew that I had actually eaten a plate of their soup and had found it excellent, both palatable and nutritious, and that my visit to this particular camp had not been announced in advance. The menu for the day had been made out at the beginning of the week and could not have been changed after my presence in the camp was known, and I had a bowl of the soup which was left over after the prisoners had been served."

Mr. Lithgow Osborne, under date of October 19, reports:

"CAMP OF ZWICKAU:

After mentioning the British prisoners by name, he continues: "The complaints that the men had to make were in regard to the inefficiency of the meat rations and the quality of the bread. I tasted the soup being prepared at the time of my visit and found it excellent in quality and evidently containing considerable quantity of meat."

* * *

Same inspector at Lauban:

"The British made complaints relative to the quality of the food which they said was dirty and badly cooked by the Russians, though the quantity was sufficient. During inspection of the kitchen I tasted the food which seems not to justify the complaints as to its quality, though it was evident it might become tiresome as a continued diet."

* * *

"GORLITZ:

"The complaint of the seven non-commissioned officers with whom I spoke was concerning the quality of the food. The complaint not sustained by the thorough test I gave the meal then being served."

"FRIEDERICHSFDLTE:

"When I visited the barracks in which the English were all quartered, they were seated at the table eating their mid-day meal. It consisted of thick vegetable soup with portions of meat served separately. I tasted the soup and found it very good, and the meat looked clean and well cooked."

* * *

"LAZARETS AT WESEL:

"Complaints as regards insufficiency of the food by one man out of thirty. Others whom I questioned specially on this subject did not bear out this complaint, although of similar state of health."

* * *

DR. OHNESORG:

"GARDELEBEN:

"They (the British) expressed themselves as dissatisfied with the food. I had tasted the mid-day soup in the kitchen of one battalion, before it was served out and tasted what was left in one of the kettles after serving in the other. The soup was the same, good in both cases."

The real truth of the matter of food in the German prison camps seems to be this: The German cookery and the method of preparation of food generally is very different from that which obtains in England, and therefore to the English the food is unappetizing and distasteful; hence the complaints. It is impractical that the British should expect treatment in this particular which, necessarily, cannot be accorded to them. There are many other complaints which could be gone into in detail, but which can be covered generally by the statements of Dr. Bert W. Caldwell of the American Red Cross publication in the *Military Surgeon* for March, 1916, which deals with the whole subject at considerable length, sufficient quotations from which follow. In presenting this statement of Dr. Caldwell, it may be noted that both Dr. Caldwell's profession, his official connection with an organization such as the Red Cross, and his quality of neutral, entitle his positive statements to a greater degree of credence than should be accorded either to the hearsay statements of the American press, founded upon alleged facts transmitted to them by one of the belligerents, or to the necessarily partisan statements of that belligerent itself.

"Prisoners are of two classes — the civilian class,

which is composed of civilians who were in the enemy countries at the beginning of hostilities, and the second class consisting of soldiers taken prisoners in the different campaigns. The civilian class, comprising men, women and children, were immediately detained at the beginning of the war, and were placed in camps arranged especially for them; although in almost every camp in Germany which has prisoners of war there is a scattering of civilian prisoners to care for as well.

"The great majority, practically all of the civil prisoners in Germany, are detained at the Ruheleben camp near Berlin. This prison camp was constructed especially for them and paid for out of the private fortunes of the Imperial Family. It is especially well located and is constructed with every convenience and safeguard of sanitation. The prisoners of each nationality have buildings assigned to them separately. Playgrounds have been established, theaters and schools instituted, and every provision made for the feeding and for the cleanliness of the camp. The prisoners here detained are arranged into groups of each nationality, and some member of each group is placed as administrative head fo that particular group. The only complaint encountered at the Ruheleben camp was made by some English lads who had over them an Australian sea captain, and they complained and demanded a change of authority because the captain flogged them when they took too many liberties. The administration of this camp is humane and just, and the health and comfort of the prisoners here detained is the first care of the prison authorities. The Kaiser is personally interested in Ruheleben, and members of the Imperial Family visit it frequently.

"The second class, and by far the larger class, is composed of soldier prisoners. Prison camps are located and constructed with these considerations in view in their order: Sanitation (including water supply), guarding, feeding, housing, transportation, and proximity to possible employment of prisoners outside of the prison camp. Another consideration to which great importance is attached, and which is never neglected by the German authorities, is the institution of playgrounds, the establishment of schools, and places and forms of amusement inside of the prison camps. The most discouraging feature which the prison authorities have to contend with is the inactivity and consequent ennui which is

incident to prison life following the excitement and activi y of campaigning. This condition among the prisneors causes the authorities much anxiety, and no measure is neglected that will assist in relieving it. The prisoners are permitted to work in the fields near the camp, or in mines or factories, or on the roads, for which labor they receive a small remuneration, and nine out of ten prisoners welcome with an unconcealed joy any opportunity to do such work as a relief from the confinement and inactivity of the prison camp.

"In establishing a prison camp, a site is selected convenient to transportation routes, easily susceptible to the institution of adequate sanitation, near an abundant and potable water supply, and free of trees. Different areas of ground are utilized, varying, of course, with the number of prisoners which it is intended that the camp shall accommodate. Usually 20 acres of ground is allotted for each five thousand prisoners for prison camp purposes, although in many instances this proportion of ground is smaller. After selecting the ground two barbed wire fences are constructed entirely around the site, about 12 feet in height, with the strands of barbed wire about 9 inches apart. These two fences are located one within the other and are separated from each other by about 12 feet. Between these two fences a smaller barbed wire fence is constructed about 4½ feet in height, with the barbed wire strands running close enough so as to prevent the prisoners from climbing through them, and this smaller fence is constantly charged with a current of high voltage electricity — this to discourage possible attempts upon the part of the prisoners to leave the grounds. At each corner outside the inclosure a mound is built sufficiently high to command the camp, and on top of this mound a rapid-firing gun is placed; while at convenient intervals around and through the camp inclosure guard-posts have been established to assist in guarding the prison camp.

"At the same time that this wire fencing is under construction sanitary installation of water pipes and sewer system is at once instituted, and the latrine system is installed. The water supply is generally taken from the same supply which feeds the nearby city or town, and where such supply is not available it is obtained through a system of driven wells. The water supply is frequently examined in the government laboratories and is quickly condemned upon the appearance of anything

that would threaten the health of the prisoners in camp. The latrine system is the open cement basin system, located usually at the rear or near one corner of the camp. compound. This is covered by seats which are made fly-proof, and the contents generously and frequently treated with deodorants and disinfectants. The basins are emptied frequently and the contents used to fertilize the adjacent fields.

"After the installation of the sewer system and water supply, a kitchen, laundry and bath-house are constructed, and around these establishments the prison camp itself is built. The kitchen is connected with the commissary and is usually under the same roof. The laundry and bath-house are under the same roof, and are equipped with a large disinfecting plant, either a steaming room or autoclave. Both laundry and bath-house are supplied with an abundance of hot and cold water.

"The camps are built following one of two plans. The older plan, which has since been abandoned, consisted of building the prison barracks around a square, in the center of which were located a kitchen, laundry and bath-house, and at one corner the latrine. The area comprised in each square was approximately three acres, and the barracks were built to accommodate between 2,500 and 3,000 prisoners to each compound. The buildings were of wooden construction, built with a slanting roof about 14 feet in height on the inside of the square, and sloping to about 9 feet in height on the outside. The barracks were about 50 feet wide, of an average height of 10½ feet, and divided into rooms of different sizes, usually 60 feet in length and 120 feet in length. These barracks were illy suited to the purposes for which they were built, because there were no openings for light or ventilation on the outside of the rooms, and the only ventilation or light that was possible came from the inside of the square and occasionally from dormer windows constructed in the roof. The result was that all the barracks constructed after this plan were poorly ventilated, poorly lighted and over-crowded. The smaller rooms accommodated about 80 to 100 prisoners and the larger rooms from 160 to 200 prisoners, giving a cubical content and space allotment for each prisoner entirely insufficient for the purposes of health or comfort. This small space was further diminished by the bedding and the dunnage which each prisoner

was permitted to bring into camp with him. The newer and the better plan which is now followed in the German prison camps consists of building the barracks on either side of streets running through the camp. These buildings are of a type that is uniform in dimensions and construction. They are about 14 meters wide by 60 meters long, their roofs sloping either way from a center ridge, and about 4½ meters in height. These barracks are inclosed in a high barbed wire fence in a separate compound, with separate water supply and separate latrine in the rear of the compound and a garbage pit in each compound for the use of the barracks. Each barrack is separated from its neighbor by an intervening space of 80 feet. Each barrack is raised on pillars above the ground about 2 feet. These barracks are generally ceiled. They accommodate, when full, 180 to 200 prisoners, including quarters for petty officers, which are partitioned off in the center of the barracks, and these partitioned rooms accommodate from four to six petty officers. Each barrack is occupied by prisoners of the same nationality. This is made necessary because of the fact that the English insist upon an abundant and free circulation of air, the French do not care for so much and the Russian prisoners do not want any at all. Then the personal habits of each nationality of prisoners are not acceptable to those of other nationalities, and to avoid constant conflict among the prisoners the prison authorities house the prisoners of each nationality in separate barracks. This new type of prison barrack permits of sufficient lighting and ventilation by the construction of doors and windows in the ends and sides of the building as well as apertures through the roof.

"When the prisoners are taken on any front, they are moved back a short distance from the front. If possible, the sick and wounded are segregated and sent to the hospital, and the well detained until they are free from vermin and then are moved on to the prison camps. Upon their arrival at the prison camp they are detained in isolation barracks, which are especially reserved for the reception of incoming prisoners, for a period of fourteen days. In this camp their hair is cut and they are sent to the bath-house and laundry and disinfecting plant every fourth day. They receive a warm water, soap and kerosene bath, their clothes are placed in the steaming-room and subjected to steam at a temperature of 135 degrees Celsius for a period of 30 minutes. Their

surplus clothing and bedding is boiled and washed in the laundry. At the end of fourteen days the prisoners are mustered, carefully examined for vermin and if they are free from insects are sent to the permanent barracks inside the camps. On his admission into the camp the prisoner receives two blankets and a pallet filled with excelsior, which the Germans have found better suited for bedding purposes than straw. He is equipped with two suits of under-clothes, two shirts, two pairs of socks, an overcoat, an outer suit, and cap and a pair of boots. If the clothing which he wears when he comes to the camp is sufficiently good he retains it. In the event that it is not sufficiently good he receives new clothing from the prison authorities.

"The kitchens attached to each camp are well constructed, well equipped, and in excellent condition of cleanliness. The food furnished the prisoners is not of great variety, and seems to me to be insufficient in quantity. It is largely vegetable in character, consisting of potatoes, carrots, cabbage, turnips, of beans, peas, lentils, and other dehydrated vegetables, of meals made from corn, soy beans and peas, of dried fruits, salt fish, and small rations of meat. Coffee is also included. An allowance for each prisoner of 300 grams of bread per day in addition to the regular ration is issued. The unprepared food is of very good quality; nothing is found upon examination that is deleterious in any way.

"It became necessary to prepare the ration in such a manner as would obviate the necessity of the prisoners using knives and forks and other eating utensils. The Germans solved this problem by cooking all of the different articles of the ration together in large cookeries, and issuing to each prisoner this prepared food in bowls, to be eaten with spoons. The Kitchens are all equipped with large cylindrical cookers which are heated with coal, and the food is cooked until it is soft and in a condition to be eaten with a spoon. It is seasoned well and is fairly palatable, but does not afford the variety in preparation or ingredients, nor is the quantity sufficient to afford a well-balanced diet. The prisoners are permitted to receive from home articles of food, which are sent from friends and organizations of their respective countries. The food thus received supplements the diet furnished by the prison authorities. In fact, the English prisoners insist that were it not for the food that they receive from home, they would not be able to live upon

the prison food. On the other hand, the Russians receive very little food from home and yet as a rule the Russian prisoners present a very good appearance of health.

"The feeding problem presents many difficulties, one of which I came in contact with in the camp at Altdam. Among the Russian prisoners taken in this camp are two orthodox Jews. Their religion forbade them partaking of the diet furnished by the Russians or by the prison authorities, and they consistently followed the dictates of their religion with the result that they became emaciated and seriously anemic. The prison authorities were some days in discovering what the trouble was, but finally succeeded, and they at once provided these two prisoners with spirit lamps to prepare their own food with and a diet which is in accordance with their religion. The result was that both these prisoners were improving in health and a pearance daily, and were in a condition to be discharged from the hospital when they were seen.

"In almost all the camps the prisoners were overcrowded. Measures looking to the remedying of this condition were being instituted, and as fast as possible new barracks were being built and new camps located to accommodate the prisoners. The sewage is disposed of by the septic tank system, which seems to meet all the purposes which the situation demands. The garbage is collected in large receptacles located at convenient points in the camp compounds, and such of it as cannot be utilized for the feeding of hogs and other animals is disposed of by burning. The receptacles in every case are fly-proof, and great care is taken to prevent the breeding of flies, either in these receptacles or in any other part within or adjacent to the camp.

"Connected with the prison camp is a well-equipped and well-regulated hospital, under the supervision of a medical officer of the German Army Medical Corps, and assisted by a staff collected from the medical officers of the different nationalities of prisoners. The hospital is sufficiently large to care for the sick of the prison camp. The surgical work of the camp is generally done in these hospitals. Attached to the hospital is an isolation ward for the quarantining of contagious diseases. The hospital corps men among the prisoners are utilized in the personnel of the camp hospital. The medical officers who are detailed from among the prisoners for work in hospitals are treated with consideration

and respect, are housed and fed as become their rank and have all the privileges which officer prisoners of war would have.

"The disease which is most frequently encountered, and one which presents the greatest difficulties of control among the prisoners, is pulmonary tuberculosis. This is undoubtedly contributed to by the close and indifferent housing of the prisoners. In some camps the morbidity from this disease reaches two and a half to three per cent. In fact more deaths among prisoners are due to tuberculosis than from all other causes combined. Next in order of their occurrence are the diarrheal and intestinal diseases, usually not serious in character. Typhus exanthematicus made its appearance in two or three of the camps, causing frightful morbidity and mortality in one. This regrettable occurrence was due to the inhumanity of the prison commandant, who, when typhus broke out in the barracks among the Russian prisoners, insisted upon the English, French and other prisoners occupying the same barracks with the infected Russians, until some eight hundred of the prisoners became infected with the disease and about three hundred of them died. This epidemic, when the commandant was shorn of a part of his authority, and effective measures were established within the camp, was soon controlled, and for the past four months no cases of epidemic diseases were encountered in the prison camps in Germany. Cholera is occasionally imported into the camps from the Russian frontier. These cases are quickly diagnosed, segregated, and the disease prevented from becoming epidemic. Contrary to the general idea, there are few cases of insanity or mental disturbance encountered among the prisoners of war. In one of the larger camps, containing 48,000 prisoners on its rolls, and established for the past ten months, only three cases of insanity have developed.

"Great care of person and clothing is insisted upon by the prison authorities. The authorities in Germany place greater importance upon their laundry and bath-room facilities than they do upon any other institution of their camp regime except their kitchens. To the laundry and bath-house each prisoner must go, with his surplus clothing and loose bedding, at least once a week. There he takes his bath, washes his clothes, and has his clothing and bedding disinfected in the steam-chamber or in the autoclave. The prisoners are frequently

mustered for inspection by the authorities of the camp. Their barracks are inspected regularly, and immediately that one is found to be infested with vermin of any kind, it is abandoned, the bedding burned, the barracks scrubbed and fumigated, the bed-clothing washed and disinfected, and the prisoners isolated in clean barracks until they are free from vermin and are ready to go into clean permanent barracks. Among the thousands of prisoners examined in different camps, and as many beds and beddings inspected, not a single louse or bed-bug was discovered.

"The administration of the prison camps was found, with but the one single exception noted above, humane, just and of high order. For the commandant of these camps some retired officer high in rank, usually a Major-General, is detailed. He has a full staff with him —, his Quartermaster and his Commissary. His medical staff is large or small in proportion to the number of prisoners confined. He has supreme command of the prisoners and prison camp, as well as the command which is detailed to the camp to guard the prisoners. In every instance but one, in the experience of our Commission, the commandant of the prison camp was a man well along in years, kindly, generous spirited, and experienced in the conduct of the work with he was intrusted. As an example, the commandant of the prison camp at Munster, Germany, presents himself. Major-General von Eyd-Steinecker was the commandant. He had the interest of the 50,000 prisoners under his care at heart. He established within his camp a theater which accommodated 650 people, in which comedies and dramas were staged, the parts being taken by the prisoners themselves. He organized schools for the instruction of such prisoners as might desire to take advantage of them, the teachers being selected from among the prisoners of the camp. He maintained a large studio in which were working painters and sculptors of the different nationalities in camp. A large playground was connected with the camp, where football, baseball, running, jumping, boxing and other sports could be indulged in. Without the camp, he had established a large farm where vegetables, potatoes, beans, and other articles of food were raised for the consumption of the camp. In this prison camp was a bank which had deposits aggregating 150,000 marks and which employed 125 clerks, where the funds sent to

the prisoners from home, or earned by them at labor in the fields or mines or factories, could be deposited and later utilized as they saw fit. Each compound in the camp had its own band, and there were three orchestras in the camp at large. The hospital connected with this prison camp was especially well cared for and well equipped. He had instructed his medical staff to examine frequently and regularly the prisoners for signs of tuberculosis, and upon such a diagnosis being made the prisoner was sent to a segregation camp provided for the reception of this class of sick. He had equipped in his camp a large tailoring establishment for the repair and manufacture of clothing, and a large boot and shoe shop, which employed 150 workmen, for the repair of footwear. In another place he had established a factory for wooden shoes, where great quantities of this class of foot-wear were turned out. He enjoyed the respect of all the prisoners in this camp, and without exception the prisoners praised the General and his administration and the care and consideration which he gave them.

"Each camp has its own canteen, where articles of food and clothing and toilet necessities can be purchased by the prisoners at a very low price, the latter being regulated by the German War Office. Each camp has its own post-office, where the mail, letters and packages addressed to the prisoners are delivered, censored, and then turned over to the prisoners. Each package received is opened in the presence of the prisoner himself, and if nothing objectionable is found is at once delivered to him. The staff of this post-office, with the exception of the censors, is made up from among the prisoners themselves.

"The officer prisoners of war are in every case treated with the consideration due their rank. Especial camps have been set aside for them; one of which, at Gutersloh, has every comfort which they could reasonably expect. It was built and designed for a sanatorium and was just completed at the outbreak of hostilities. It consists of twelve large modern stone buildings, three stories in height, and accommodates with ease and comfort the twelve hundred officers who are detained there. Each officer has quarters in keeping with his rank, and each officer of sufficient rank has detached for his service an orderly of his own countrymen. The bedding is good, the kitchen is excellent, and the food is both sufficient in quantity and variety to insure a well-

balanced diet. Although on two days in the week in Germany the use of meat is forbidden, yet on these days in the prison camp for officers at Gutersloh, meat was served at their meals. The officers, too, are permitted to receive delicacies and food from home. Attached to the camp are large fields for football, tennis and other sports. Libraries have been instituted for each nationality. In fact, the whole has more the appearance of a large, over-crowded, rather badly managed club than it does a prison camp. The commandant is very kind in his treatment of these prisoners, is very considerate of their condition, and is extremely popular with all classes of officers under his rule."

It would appear, as far as I am able to judge from the reports of inspection officers of the United States Government, in France and England, of the camps provided for prisoners of war in those countries, that on the whole conditions are as good as they reasonably can be expected to be. Naturally, there are complaints, but in most cases in both these countries, as in Germany, the complaints appear to be ill-founded and to come from that class of prisoners which has been accustomed in their life at home to the least. It is to be regretted, however, that a like statement as to the character of the prison camps and of the treatment of the prisoners cannot be made concerning Russia. One singular thing about these reports from officers of our own government, on the German camps, is that though supplied to practically every newspaper office in the United States, no publicity practically has been given to them. The American press true to its allegiance, preferring to print and moralize upon the necessarily partisan statements of the British government or of British writers of fiction, rather than those of officers of the United States.

APPENDIX II

MISS CAVELL

One event which attracted a great deal of attention at the time of its occurrence in the autumn of 1915, was the execution by the German military authorities of an English nurse, Miss Cavell, at Brussels. So much has been said and written at random about this execution, that it is well to have an account thereof based on the official reports thereon, which official reports emanate from Mr. Whitlock, the United States Minister at Brussels, in whose hands at the time of the outbreak of the war, the British interests in Brussels had been confided and who consequently acted for Miss Cavell. The M. de Leval, mentioned in the report which here follows, is the legal adviser to the American Legation in Brussels. In this report are set forth the proven facts and the law governing the case.

M. de Leval to Mr. Whitlock,
United States Minister in Brussels

REPORT FOR THE MINISTER

October 12, 1915.

"Sir:

"As soon as the Legation received an intimation that Miss Cavell was arrested, your letter of the 31st August was sent to Baron von der Lancken. The German authorities were by that letter requested, *inter alia*, to allow me to see Miss Cavell, so as to have all necessary steps taken for her defence. No reply being received, the Legation, on the 10th September, reminded the German authorities of your letter.

"The German reply, sent on the 12th September, was that I would not be allowed to see Miss Cavell, but that Mr. Braun, lawyer at the Brussels Court, was defending her and was already seeing the German authorities about the case.

"I immediately asked Mr. Braun to come to see me at the Legation, which he did a few days later. He informed me that personal friends of Miss Cavell had asked him to defend her before the German Court, that he agreed to do so, but that owing to some unforeseen circumstances he was prevented from pleading before that Court, adding that he had asked Mr. Kirschen, a member of the Brussels Bar and his friend, to take up the case and plead for Miss Cavell, and that Mr. Kirschen had agreed to do so.

"I, therefore, at once put myself in communication with Mr. Kirschen, who told me that Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped soldiers to cross the frontier. I asked him whether he had seen Miss Cavell and whether she had made any statement to him, and to my surprise found that the lawyers defending prisoners before the German Military Court were not allowed to see their clients before the trial, and were not shown any document of the prosecution. (Similar rules obtain in France.) This, Mr. Kirschen said, was in accordance with the German military rules. He added that the hearing of the trial of such cases was carried out very carefully, and that in his opinion, although it was not possible to see the client before the trial, in fact the trial itself developed so carefully and so slowly, that it was generally possible to have a fair knowledge of all the facts and to present a good defence for the prisoner. This would specially be the case for Miss Cavell, because the trial would be rather long as she was prosecuted with thirty-four other prisoners.

"I informed Mr. Kirschen of my intention to be present at the trial so as to watch the case. He immediately dissuaded me from taking such attitude, which he said would cause a great prejudice to the prisoner, because the German judges would resent it and feel it almost as an affront if I was appearing to exercise a kind of supervision on the trial. He thought that if the Germans would admit my presence, which was very doubtful, it would in any case cause prejudice to Miss Cavell

"Mr. Kirschen assured me over and over again that the Military Court of Brussels was always perfectly fair and that there was not the slightest danger of any miscarriage of justice. He promised that he would keep me posted on all the developments which the case would take and would report to me the exact charges that were brought against Miss Cavell and the facts concerning

her that would be disclosed at the trial, so as to allow me to judge by myself about the merits of the case. He insisted that, of course, he would do all that was humanly possible to defend Miss Cavell to the best of his ability.

"Three days before the trial took place, Mr. Kirschen wrote me a few lines saying that the trial would be on the next Thursday, the 7th October. The Legation at once sent him, on the 5th October, a letter confirming in writing in the name of the Legation the arrangement that had been made between him and me. This letter was delivered to Mr. Kirschen by a messenger of the Legation.

"The trial took two days, ending Friday the 8th.

"On Saturday I was informed by an outsider that the trial had taken place, but that no judgment would be reached till a few days later.

"Receiving no report from Mr. Kirschen, I tried to find him, but failed. I then sent him a note on Sunday, asking him to send his report to the Legation or call there on Monday morning at 8.30. At the same time I obtained from some other person present at the trial some information about what had occurred, and the following facts were disclosed to me:

" 'Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped English and French soldiers, as well as Belgian young men, to cross the frontier and to go over to England. *She had admitted by signing a statement before the day of the trial, and by public acknowledgment in Court, in the presence of all the other prisoners and the lawyers, that she was guilty of the charges brought against her, and she had acknowledged not only that she had helped these soldiers to cross the frontier, but also that some of them had thanked her in writing when arriving in England.* This last admission made her case so much the more serious, because if it only had been proven against her that she had helped the soldiers to traverse the Dutch frontier, and no proof was produced that these soldiers had reached a country at war with Germany, she could only have been sentenced for an attempt to commit the *crime* and not for the *crime* being duly accomplished. As the case stood, the sentence fixed by the German military law was a sentence of death.

"Paragraph of the German Military Code says:

" 'Will be sentenced to death for treason any person

who, with the intention of helping the hostile Powers, or of causing harm to the German or allied troops, is guilty of one of the crimes of paragraph 90 of the German Penal Code.'

"The case referred to in above said paragraph 90 consists in:

"' . . . conducting soldiers to the enemy. . . . . (viz: 'dem Feinde Mannschaften zuführt').

"The penalties above set forth apply, according to paragraph 160 of the German Code, in case of war, to foreigners as well as to Germans.

"In her oral statement before the Court Miss Cavell disclosed almost all the acts of the whole prosecution. She was questioned in German, an interpreter translating all the questions in French, with which language Miss Cavell was well acquainted. She spoke without trembling and showed a clear mind. Often she added some greater precision to her previous depositions.

"When she was asked why she helped these soldiers to go to England, she replied that she thought that if she had not done so they would have been shot by the Germans, and that therefore she thought she only did her duty to her country in saving their lives.

"The Military Public Prosecutor said that argument might be good for English soldiers, but did not apply to Belgian young men whom she induced to cross the frontier and who would have been perfectly free to remain in the country without danger to their lives.

"Mr. Kirschen made a very good plea for Miss Cavell, using all arguments that could be brought in her favor before the Court.

"The Military Public Prosecutor, however, asked the Court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and eight other prisoners amongst the thirty-five. The Court did not seem to agree, and the judgment was postponed. The person informing me said he thought that the Court would no go to the extreme limit.

"Anyhow, after I had found out these facts (viz., Sunday evening), I called at the Political Division of the German Government in Belgium, and asked whether, now that the trial had taken place, permission would be granted to me to see Miss Cavell in jail, as surely there was no longer any object in refusing that permission The German official, Mr. Conrad, said he would make the necessary inquiry at the Court and let me know later on.

"I also asked him that permission be granted to Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, to see Miss Cavell.

"At the same time we prepared at the Legation, to be ready for every eventuality, a petition for pardon, addressed to the Governor-General in Belgium and a transmitting note addressed to Baron von der Lancken.

"Monday morning at 11 I called up Mr. Conrad on the telephone from the Legation (as I already had done previously on several occasions when making inquiries about the case), asking what the Military Court had decided about Mr. Gahan and myself seeing Miss Cavell. He replied that Mr. Gahan could not see her, but that she could see any of the three Protestant clergymen attached to the prison; and that I could not see her till the judgment was pronounced and signed, but that this would probably only take place in a day or two. I asked the German official to inform the Legation immediately after the passing of said judgment, so that I might see Miss Cavell at once, thinking of course, that the Legation might, according to your intentions, take immediate steps for Miss Cavell's pardon, if the judgment really was a sentence of death.

"Very surprised to still receive no news from Mr. Kirschen, I then called at his house at 12.30 and was informed that he would not be there till about the end of the afternoon. I then called at 12.40, at the house of another lawyer interested in the case of a fellow-prisoner, and found that he also was out. In the afternoon, however, the latter lawyer called at my house, saying that in the morning he had heard from the German Kommandantur that judgment would be passed only the next morning, viz., Tuesday morning. He said that he feared that the Court would be very severe for all the prisoners.

"Shortly after this lawyer left me, and while I was preparing a note about the case, at 8 P.M. I was privately and reliably informed that the judgment had been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, that Miss Cavell had been sentenced to death, and that she would be shot at 2 o'clock the next morning. I told my informer that I was extremely surprised at this, because the Legation had received no information yet, neither from the German authorities nor from Mr. Kirschen, but that the matter was too serious to run the smallest chance, and that therefore I would proceed immediately

to the Legation to confer with your Excellency and take all possible steps to save Miss Cavell's life.

"According to your Excellency's decision, Mr. Gibson and myself went, with the Spanish Minister, to see Baron von der Lancken, and the report of our interview and of our efforts to save Miss Cavell is given to you by Mr. Gibson.

"This morning, Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, called to see me and told me that he had seen Miss Cavell in her cell yesterday night at 10 o'clock, that he had given her the Holy Communion and had found her admirably strong and calm. I asked Mr. Gahan whether she had made any remarks about anything concerning the legal side of her case, and whether the confession which she made before the trial and in Court was, in his opinion, perfectly free and sincere. *Mr. Gahan says that she told him she perfectly well knew what she had done, that according to the law, of course, she was guilty and had admitted her guilt, but that she was happy to die for her country.*

"G. DE LEVAL."

Much of the confusion which arose in this case was occasioned by the fact that Mr. Page, the United States Ambassador at the Court of St. James, transmitted all the papers in this case to the British Government before he transmitted them to his own government, as he should have done. As regards the law in the case, it may be said that the German War Code corresponds almost exactly with that of the United States applying to similar facts. The 102nd article of General Order No. 100, 1863, which is the War Code of the United States to-day, is as follows:

"The law of war, like the criminal law governing other offences, makes no differences on account of the difference of sexes concerning spy or traitor or war rebel."

The 98th article is as follows: "All unauthorized or secret communication with the enemy is considered treasonable by the law of war. Foreign residents in an invaded or occupied territory, or foreign visitors in the same, can claim no immunity from this law. They may communicate with foreign parts or with the inhabitants of the hostile country so far as military authority permits, but no further."

Article 90 of the General Order 100 is as follows: "A traitor under the law, or a war traitor, is a person in the place or district under martial law (military government) who, unauthorized by the military commander, gives information of any kind to the enemy or holds intercourse with him."

Article 92 reads as follows: "If a citizen, subject of the country or place invaded, or conquered, gives information to his own government from which he is separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his government, he is a war traitor."

Article 91 of the same General Order is as follows: "A war traitor is always severely punished. When his offence consists of betraying to the enemy anything concerning the condition, safety, operations or plans of the troops holding or occupying the place or district, his punishment is death."

It is thus apparent from these Articles of the War Code of the United States that any person or persons who, under similar circumstances to those in the case in point, had taken similar action or had done similar things, would have been liable to the punishment of death without regard to sex. It must be furthermore remembered, in considering this case, that all countries of the world, except the United States and except, in a minor degree, Great Britain, hold a woman for any violation of the criminal law to the same degree of responsibility as a man, which is also true in cases of violation of military law. This is clearly shown by the fact that France has executed three women during this war certainly, and probably seven. Of the execution and history of two of these women the *London Times* on November 3rd 1915 published the following account:

"On February twenty-seventh last, secret service agents arrested at Bourges a woman calling herself Jeanne Bouvier. She was provided with papers, bearing this name, but after being interrogated, she confessed that the papers were fraudulent and that her name really was Ottillie Voss. She was born in the Rhine provinces of German parentage. She was unmarried and aged 33. For seven years before the war she had lived in the Agen region of Bordeaux, where she had been giving lessons in German.

At the outbreak of hostilities she returned to Germany. Being out of work she accepted employment as a spy, whereupon she was sent to France with orders to visit

Nice, Montpelier, Marseilles and Lyons and to report on important new troop foundations, the frequency of railway military transports, and the direction of the same, the sanitary condition of the army, and the number of wounded; also the debarkation of troops at various ports, especially of black soldiers.

She was likewise particularly instructed to report on the state of mind of the population in regard to the war. She confessed further that she had been given 400 francs ($80) expense money. From February 8th to February 11th she traveled as directed, then returned to Germany, where she was given 160 marks ($40) as an expression of satisfaction with her work.

On February 20th, she returned to France on a similar mission, having been provided with 500 francs ($100) expense money. Two days after her arrest at Bourges she made a full confession, and she was unanimously condemned to death by a council of war on the charge of espionage under Articles 197, 206 and 269 of the Code of Military Justice. On April 20th, her application for a retrial was rejected, and on May 14th, her appeal to the Chief of State for clemency was refused. She was therefore executed on May 16th.

Marguerite Schmitt, aged 25, was arrested at the railway station at Nancy as a suspect on February 17th, 1915. She had traveled via Switzerland from Anoux, near Briey, then occupied by the Germans. After a lengthy examination she confessed that the Germans had sent her to obtain information concerning the presence of British troops, reported as being in the region of Nancy, also concerning divers regiments encamped between Bar-le-Duc and St. Menehould. A friend had put her in relation with the Germans. They had offered her money which she had at first refused, but afterwards had accepted 40 francs ($8.) The Germans took her by automobile to the Swiss frontier. She asserted, that although sent by the Germans, she had not intended to spy upon the French. It was her purpose to tell the Germans upon her return that she had been held by the French as a suspect. Her presence at Nancy refuted this claim. In addition, there was found in her possession, a book of questions to ask, prepared by a German officer. When tried before a council of war, to all questions she replied simply "I am sorry."

She was condemned to death on March 20th, for espionage under Articles 206 and 64 of the Code of

Military Justice and on March 22nd she was executed.

Both before and since these executions there have been other executions of women by the French for offences against military law, and like executions have occurred during the war in Belgium by the Belgians, in Russia, particularly in Poland and Galicia, in fact in nearly all the belligerent countries, though details thereof are not complete.

A fair judgment in all these cases is that all these women who suffered death in rendering a service to their country are in exactly the same position as was, for instance, Nathan Hale who suffered death at the hands of the British during our Revolution, as a spy; that is, heroines to their own country and spies or war traitors to the other side.

Concerning their bravery and concerning the purity of their motives, there can be no dispute, but it is equally true that there can be no dispute as to the fact that they had taken the chances of the occupation in which they engaged; and there should be no legitimate complaint in regard to their having suffered the consequences of these acts. In fact, Miss Cavell's own words, as reported by Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman who attended her immediately before her execution, wherein she told him that she knew perfectly well what she had done, that according to the law of course she was guilty, and had admitted her guilt, but that she "was happy to die for her country"—form the best epitaph, not only for herself, but for all women in like case.

APPENDIX III

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The history of the battle of the Marne, probably the greatest battle in most respects which the world has ever known, is still in many important details shrouded in mystery.

Therefore, to the account given in the first volume of this work it has seemed wise to add the following account written by a competent hand one year after the battle took place and after many incidents previously unknown or disputed had been settled. This account is arranged chronologically by days, and ought to help in giving its readers a clearer idea of the sequence of events, though not perhaps of their proportionate importance.

The battle of the Marne began on September 6th, 1914, yet some of its details will be cleared up only when all official reports and documents are available.

The respective strength of the armies during the battle of Charleroi and the retreat, the number and position of General Maunoury's forces during the retreat, and the preliminary manoeuvres and the number and origin of the reinforcements sent to him during the battle, are disputed questions. The reasons for the sudden obliquing of von Kluck's forces on approaching Paris are also in doubt. Little by little, however, the principal developments of the battle have been established approximately.

Though the execution of their plans had been retarded a fortnight by the resistance encountered in Belgium, the Germans, in their vast circular movement, pivoting on Metz, reached the line of the Sambre and Meuse August 21. The Allies, counting upon several days resistance by the fortress of Namur, took the offensive August 22, with the object of piercing the German lines at the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse and cutting the armies of von Kluck and von Buelow off from the rest of the German forces.

Namur fell in a few hours; the army of General Foch (120,000 men) concentrating behind the center, was not yet ready to go into action, and the plan of the Allies was compromised. After partial successes around Charleroi and on the Meuse, the first division of reserves at Dinant was thrown back and the 3rd corps at Marchiennes sustained a grave reverse, weakening the center, held by the army of General Lanrezac. General Langle de Cary on his right had been checked in the Ardennes, and Ruffey on the extreme right was in difficulties with the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia at the frontier of Luxembourg. On the extreme left the British troops around Mons were violently engaged with superior numbers, constantly increasing and gravely threatening their envelopment.

General French was informed by General Joffre, August 23, that the enemy was sending three more corps upon his left. General Smith Dorrien's 2nd corps was already giving ground. Such was the beginning of the fourteen days' retreat, during which the Allies, covering 140 miles distance, on the left wing fought continual rear guard actions and some important engagements that checked the advance of the Germans and prepared the battle of the Marne according to the plans said to have been definitely fixed August 27th, by orders in Joffre's own hand.

General Langle de Cary obliged the Duke of Wuerttemberg to recross the Meuse and held him there twenty-four hours, retiring only under orders from Joffre that he must be at Launois on the 29th. At Launois and Rethel he held the same forces from August 28 to 31, before continuing his retreat. From his position facing the Ardennes to the front of the Marne, he had fought ten whole days and covered 60 miles with his forces intact.

General Lanrezac attained a success at Guise, but was ordered not to follow it up; the situation was not yet favorable for resuming a general offensive.

The retreat of General French was attended with the greatest difficulties. The Germans, sending over increasing numbers of soldiers by forced marches against his left, necessitated violent and desperate counter attacks. At Cambrai he sustained the fire of the artillery of four corps; he lost 6,000 men from the 23rd to the 26th before being disengaged by a heroic charge of General Allenby's cavalry.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The army of General Maunoury, afterward called the Army of Paris, partly constituted the 26th near Amiens and popularly supposed not to have been in action until September 6th, appears to have gone to the support of the British contingent the 29th, in the region of the Somme, where it administered a severe check to von Kluck's right. The superiority of numbers was too great, however; after every effort the Allies found increasing forces on their left, and the lines extended continually further west. The Germans accupied Amiens and continued on as far as Beauvais. This strengthening of the line and the obliquing of the army of General Franchet d'Esperey (formerly the army of Lanrezac) to the left, created a gap between that army and the army of General Langle de Cary, which was filled by the new army under General Foch, in process of formation during the battle of Charleroi.

Von Kluck's army, whose objective was supposed to be Paris, was officially reported September 4th as obliquing to the south-east, with the apparent intention of neglecting Paris and pursuing his efforts to turn the Allies' left. At the same time the army of the Crown Prince on the left descended along the western edge of the Argonne. There were two theories of the sudden change in the direction of von Kluck's march. One that he was pursuing the enveloping movement; the other, that he had discovered the Army of Paris on his right flank and by a clever dodge to the southeast avoided the menace of being enveloped himself. In the light of later disclosures the first theory seems to be the good one. The oblique movement continued after the partial check at Compiègne and Chantilly by way of Beauvais, Dammartin, Meaux. Senlis and Compiègne were evacuated by them the 3rd—the advance guard reached the region of Provins, 30 miles southeast of Paris and 20 miles south of Meaux.

The "trough" or semi-circle prepared by Joffre's orders was in position, and the German armies had so far marched into it the 5th, that General-in-chief Joffre was able to issue orders for a general attack the next morning, in order of battle as follows:

Maunoury northeast of Meaux, ready to cross the Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and Nay-en-Multien in the direction of Chateau-Thierry.

British army on front Changis-Coulommiers, facing the east, ready to attack in the direction of Montmirail.

Fifth Army of Franchet d'Esperey between Courtaçon-Esternay and Sezanne, ready for attack in the direction of the north.

Seventh Army of General Foch covering the right of 5th army and holding southern issues of the Saint-Gond Marshes.

Offensive by these armies to be taken September 6 in the morning.

The following day Joffre completed his disposition of the allied forces by orders to the 4th and 3rd armies as follows:

Fourth Army of General Langle de Cary—stop movement southward, turn about and face enemy, combining its movements with 3rd army, which was to debouch to the north of Revigny and take the offensive towards the west.

Third Army will attack the left flank of the enemy which is marching to the west of the Argonne.

The formation of the position into which the German armies marched was that of a wide trough; Maunoury and French formed the side toward Paris, Franchet d'Esperey, Foch and Langle de Cary the bottom, while Sarrail's army formed the side towards Verdun in the Argonne.

September Sixth

Maunoury's Zouaves and Moors began the battle of the Marne in the early hours of the 6th of September by recapturing the ridges of Marcilly, Barcy, Chambry, and Penchard—while the 7th corps also advanced to the north.

From dawn the British army and the army of General Franchet d'Esperey were heavily engaged with von Kluck and von Buelow's right. The British, facing a general northeasterly direction, attacked the German line in the angle of the trough. After ten hours' continual fighting the pressure on the British front and that of the 5th army on its right diminished. Hard pressed on his flank by Maunoury, and with his communications threatened, von Kluck was obliged to weaken his center by sending two corps (80,000 men) to the support of the overwhelmed 4th corps on the Ourcq. The withdrawal of these troops was concealed by a particularly violent attack in which were sacrificed a great number of men.

During the afternoon von Kluck was obliged to repass

the Grand Morin and abandon Coulommiers, but succeeded in maintaining himself on the right bank. The army of Franchet d'Esperey also gained ground. The Senegalese riflemen drove the Germans from the village and the environs of Jouy-sur-Morin at the point of the bayonet. Several villages were taken and retaken and the fighting continued by moonlight, the French troops taking three more villages.

The strongest shock of this first day's fighting was supported by the 7th army of General Foch. After resisting the pressure of the first assault, a vigorous counter-attack realized a gain on his left before Mondement. The 4th army of Langle de Cary, though just arrived, also attacked vigorously along the entire front.

The army of the Crown Prince of Prussia had just taken up its position before the Argonne and begun an attack, which Sarrail repulsed.

Dubail, in the Vosges, pushed back the forces of von Heeringen, and de Castelnau held the Grand Couronne de Nancy against the attacks of the Crown Prince of Bavaria.

September Seventh

On the morning of the 7th Maunoury found in front of him not only the single corps of the preceding day but 120,000 men; von Kluck had skilfully accomplished the conversion of his forces and for the moment disengaged his flank and saved the entire German army from disaster.

Several villages were retaken by the Germans and the pressure everywhere was severely felt. The day was saved for the Army of Paris by the 2nd Zouaves around Etrepilly, where the most violent attacks were repulsed, at such cost to the Germans that they found it necessary to burn their dead. The British troops accentuated their advance, punishing severely the cavalry divisions of the Prussian Guard by remarkable charges of the 9th Lancers and the 18th Hussars.

Franchet d'Esperey took at the point of the bayonet Vieux Maisons and Pierrby on von Kluck's left, and after several violent combats crossed the Grand Morin, occupied Jouy-sur-Morin definitely and took up position on the Petit Morin.

Foch, overrun by numbers on his right, held good until the 11th corps weakened; then established his line a

little in the rear of the front Salon-Gougançon-Counatre-Allemand.

The 12th corps of General Langle de Cary's army, heavily punished, was sent to the rear to be reorganized. Six battalions of this corps—the least tried—sustained alone the attack of 25,000 Germans all the evening.

The German attacks were arrested around Sompiers by the 13th division of the 21st corps, which lost its chief, General Barbade, as well as Colonel Hamont and a great many other officers.

The army of General Sarrail and that of the Crown Prince of Prussia continued their duel, without result.

General de Castelnau, before Nancy, having lost the Plateau of Amance, retook it and held it while Dubail in the Vosges maintained his advances.

September Eighth

The morning of the 8th found the position of the wings little changed from the beginning and the Allies' success limited to the gains of the British forces and the Army of Langle de Cary. The fighting had continued all night. The army of Paris, at the extreme left, weakened, but the center held firm by grace of the furious charges by the Algerian and Moroccan troops that created gaps in the enemy's ranks, in each case immediately filled. The day passed in attacks and counter-attacks. Villages were taken and retaken. At the cemetery of Chambry, a great many officers and soldiers of the 3rd Zouaves were killed, and finally the line began to bend back in the direction of Neufmoutiers.

The 4th corps, commanded by General Boelle, brought from Alsace and retarded en route by the exodus of civilians from Paris arrived, one division went to the support of the British troops, the other reinforced Maunoury. The situation of the army of Paris became critical as the result of the retreat of the 14th division of the 7th corps.

The British forces, reinforced by one division of the 4th corps, made further gains, taking many prisoners and several cannon. The Army of General Franchet d'Esperey, after eight hours' hand-to-hand fighting, entered Montmirail and the army of von Buelow, leaving 7,000 dead and a large number of prisoners, was in retreat all along the line.

General Foch, at dawn, declared to his troops:

"The situation is excellent. I order again a vigorous offensive."

The retreat of part of von Buelow's forces before Franchet d'Esperey broke the German line and facilitated the efforts of Foch's army on his right. The key to the heights of Sezanne, the Chateau of Mondement where the Prince Eitel Friederich of von Kluck's staff had conferred and dined with von Buelow, was the center of attack. The artillery drove out the staff, after which the Moroccan riflemen penetrated the park of the Chateau—were driven out, attacked again and were repulsed. A third assault succeeded and in the park lay 3,000 dead Germans, including two generals. Whole battalions of French troops were annihilated there.

Fère Champenoise and Sommesous, after Sezanne, fell into the hands of Foch's army. Sommesous, counter-attacked by the Prussian Guard, remained in their hands only the time necessary for the French forces to reform. Two regiments of the 11th corps charged and drove out the 4th regiment of Grenadiers of the Queen Augusta and the 4th regiment of Grenadiers of the Emperor Francis.

A vital development of the day's fighting was the discovery, by aviators, of a gap between the armies of von Buelow and von Hausen, the effect of von Buelow's retreat, leaving von Hausen's right flank exposed. By an audacious and opportune manoeuvre, General Foch massed his right in this gap under cover of the night, before von Hausen's flank, and threw his adversary back upon the Marshes of Saint-Gond in disorder. The German losses there were heavy.

The army of Langle de Cary was very heavily engaged around Vitry-le-François, where the forces of the Duke of Wuerttemberg counter-attacked fiercely. The artillery fire crossed here over the town of Vitry-le-François, which was partly in flames. At Pargny and at Maurupt-le-Montay both sides lost heavily in hand-to-hand fighting. By a night attack the French infantry took the village of Etrepy, almost entirely burned, and the surrounding region. A little progress was made also to the left of Vitry-le-François.

Sarrail, menaced with envelopment by a combined attack from forces coming from Metz and the Crown Prince's army in front, sent his cavalry against the forces from Metz and continued his infantry attacks in front. Fresh troops from Strassburg resumed the

violent but vain attacks upon the Heights of Amance. The German losses here were extremely heavy, but less than on the Heights of Sainte-Genevieve, where de Castelnau's troops inflicted such losses on the Bavarian reinforcements from Metz that they were obliged to retire upon the village of Atton.

Dubail, obliged to abandon Luneville to the enemy, held them in check elsewhere and retook the summit of Mandroy and Fourmeaux.

September Ninth

The position of the army of Paris, which had become critical the evening of the 8th, had not improved the morning of the 9th. Heavily outnumbered, it appeared little likely that the position could be held without reinforcements. General Joffre ordered Maunoury to resist just the same to the last man. The formation of the line had been so modified that the army of Paris described an angle, one side of which faced the east and the other north. Three thousand men of the 7th corps, pitted against one entire division, began an attack at Marville, and the action became general. During nine hours the battle waged incessantly. Encouraged by news of successes of the other armies, Maunoury's men redoubled their assaults. General Mangin, with the 5th division, by a desperate charge near Acy-en-Multien, hurled back the forces in front of him, nearly destroying the regiment of Madgeburg. Bayonet charges by the African troops relieved the pressure near May-en-Multien, and toward the end of the day the Germans, having lost nearly half of their force, were repulsed all along the line of the army of Paris. The 4th corps of Landwehr was signalled coming to the relief of von Kluck's flank from Rethel. Maunoury's army was exposed to a decisive attack by fresh troops. Maunoury appealed to General Gallieni. The Governor of Paris requisitioned 5,000 taxi-automobiles, drays, etc. and sent 20,000 men to his support across Paris.

Nanteuil-le-Haudoin and its vast petroleum stocks were in flames. The troops, most of them, had been without food for three days—only the Moors, habituated to fasting, seemed capable of further effort. The Germans seemed equally exhausted, for their attacks weakened with the darkness.

The British forces, continuing their progress, threw von Kluck's center back upon the Marne from Vareddes

to Chateau-Thierry; they had gained twenty miles in two days, taking prisoners and booty every hour. After seventeen failures, the British engineers succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Marne at Vareddes, threatening von Kluck's rear. They crossed at La-Ferte-sous-Jouare, at noon in close pursuit. A detachment of cavalry, meeting two squadrons of German cavalry toward Chateau-Thierry, charged through and charged back again. After traversing both squadrons, then charged them again in front. Von Kluck's entire army was now in full retreat, abandoning wounded and material and losing prisoners. The British forces discovered that von Kluck's troops lacked ammunition for their Mausers. Many cannon and prisoners fell into the hands of the British army during the day.

The army of Franchet d'Esperey advanced in unison with the British troops close upon the heels of the enemy, and only the German batteries, posted on the slopes, north of Chateau-Thierry, saved the retreat from developing into a rout. The German losses on this front exceeded even those of the left. At Esternay they left 8,000 unburied dead after four days' fighting. Near Chateau-Thierry they had emptied the reservoir that supplied Paris with water from the Nestles, filled it with dead and covered the bodies with earth.

Foch pushed ahead also with the 7th army after the capture of Mondement, throwing the Prussian Guard into the Marshes of Saint-Gond. A stubborn resistance was offered there in the parts where defense works could be organized. Foch succeeded in taking these works in the rear, driving thousands of the Guard so precipitately from the safe routes that they sank into the slime of the marshes. Several batteries of artillery were lost there and the 7th army took many prisoners.

The army of Langle de Cary, pressed by fresh troops brought from Belgium, maintained its positions, while Sarrail repulsed a violent attack by von Heeringen with the 16th corps.

As the result of the bloody battles of Dieulouard and Saint-Geneviève, Nancy was entirely disengaged and the Bavarians retired from Pont-a-Mousson into the Bois le petre, and Dubai in the Vosges progressed in the regions of Luneville and Baccarat.

September Tenth

The morning of the 10th, General Maunoury was

informed of the general retreat of the armies of von Kluck, von Buelow and von Hausen. Vareddes and Lizy-sur-Ourcq, evacuated in haste, were found crowded with German wounded. At Etrepilly piles of carbonized bodies were seen and dead and wounded were found in all the ravines and thickets, behind hedges and generally at every spot where the soldier seeks protection.

The British troops, continuing their pursuit, took thirteen more cannon and a few hundred prisoners and great convoys of supplies and ammunition. The army of Franchet d'Esperey, in spite of the fatigue of five days' fighting after 14 days' retreat forced its advance and reached the line of Chateau-Thierry-Dormans, taking four cannon, 1,500 prisoners and a convoy of 50 baggage wagons. The losses of von Buelow's army on this front were nearly equal to von Kluck's.

Foch's 7th army, marching on Epernay and Chalons-sur-Marne, took prisoners and booty and supported the army of General Langle de Cary by attacking in flank the forces of the Duke of Wuerttemberg, Langle de Cary entered Vitry-le-François, which was full of wounded, and progressed toward Sermaize. The struggle between the Crown Prince and Sarrail was still undecided. At Triaucourt Sarrail captured ammunition and on the other side of the Meuse the Germans completed the destruction of the forts of Troyon and attacked Sarrail's rear, but were repulsed. They tried to cross the Meuse lower down toward Saint-Mihiel, but the French 3-inch guns destroyed each bridge as soon as thrown across.

The 11th, the army of the Duke of Wuerttemberg, vigorously attacked in the center, gave way and retreated in disorder, while the armies of von Kluck, von Buelow and von Hausen took up positions on the line of the Aisne.

This was practically the termination of the battle, though the army of the Crown Prince held its ground until the 12th, when it began to retire slowly.

The best estimates of the forces engaged placed the Germans at 1,075,000 and the Allies at 1,125,000. The French are known to have lost 60,131 killed. The Germans left 50,000 dead, while 250,000 wounded of both armies were picked up during and after the battle by the Allies' stretcher bearers. The number of prisoners taken is still unknown, but was not large.

APPENDIX IV

STATISTICS

It may be of interest for us now to cast a glance on what this war has actually cost in borrowed money, since that is the only cost of which we can be certain, though there are other costs, such as the amount raised by taxation, and expended on the war, destruction of property, the loss of the productive capacity of the men who are either killed or so maimed or injured as to be no longer self-supporting, besides the loss of production in occupied territories, the decrease in stocks of food, metal and other materials, and the derangement of the machinery of distribution. Then there is the outright loss of property which the millions of soldiers and many millions of other people would have created if they had not been fighting in the ranks or otherwise contributing their skill and energy to the ends of the war. The cost of provisions, the loss and investment of the national savings in things which have only a temporary use such as guns, shells and other munitions of war and war's equipment, which would otherwise have been invested in permanent things. But for these latter losses, there is no means of measurement. At the present time the daily expenditures by the various countries on both sides are about as follows:

Great Britain . .	$27,000,000
France . . .	18,000,000
Russia	16,000,000
Italy	7,000,000
Roumania . .	2,000,000
Belgium and Servia	2,000,000
Entente Allies . .	$72,000,000

Germany	$21,000,000
Austria-Hungary	11,000,000
Turkey and Bulgaria	3,000,000
Central Allies	$35,000,000
All belligerents	$105,000,000

Up to August 1, 1917, which would be the end of a complete three years since the war began, we may compute the war cost as follows:

Direct war cost to	
Great Britain	$16,500,000,000
France	14,000,000,000
Russia	11,750,000,000
Italy	3,900,000,000
Roumania	450,000,000
Belgium and Servia	1,600,000,000
Entente Allies	$48,200,000,000
Germany	$16,500,000,000
Austria-Hungary	9,250,000,070
Turkey and Bulgaria	2,000,000,000
Central Alliance	$27,750,000,000
All belligerents	$75,950,000,000

	Per capita
Great Britain	$351.00
France	350.00
Russia	67.10
Italy	108.00
Roumania	59.30
Belgium and Servia	133.40
Entente Allies	$151.50
Germany	$242.60
Austria-Hungary	174.50
Turkey and Bulgaria	75.50
Central Alliance	$188.10
All belligerents	$163.30

STATISTICS

A complete table of the loans to date follows:

GREAT BRITAIN	
War Loan, 3½%, November, 1914	$1,750,000,000
War Loan, 4½%, July, 1915	2,970,000,000
Treasury bills, approximate	5,100,000,000
Exchequer 5s, approximate	1,750,000,000
Exchequer 6s, approximate	250,000,000
Exchequer 3s, approximate	105,000,000
War expenditure certificates	100,000,000
War savings certificates	100,000,000
Treasury indebtedness on note issues	500,000,000
Anglo-French Loan, 5% October, 1915	250,000,000
Collateral Loan in U. S., 5% August, 1916	250,000,000
Banking credit in United States	50,000,000
Banking credit in Canada	100,000,000
Total, Great Britain	$13,275,000,000
FRANCE	
National loan, 5%, November, 1915	$3,100,000,000
National loan 5%, October, 1916 (estimated)	3,000,000,000
National defense bonds (estimated)	2,800,000,000
National defense obligations (estimated)	400,000,000
Advances from Bank of France	2,000,000,000
Advances B. of F. to foreign governments	250,000,000
Bonds and notes in London	500,000,000
Anglo-French loan, Oct. 1915	250,000,000
Collateral loan in United States	100,000,000
One-year 5% notes in United States	30,000,000
Banking credits in N. Y. (estimated)	50,000,000
Advances from Bank of Algeria	20,000,000
Total, France	$12,500,000,000

STATISTICS

RUSSIA

War loan, 5% October, 1914	$257,500,000
War loan, 5%, February, 1915	257,500,000
Exchequer bonds, 4%, March, 1915	310,000,000
Currency loan, April, 1915	105,000,000
War loan, 5½%, May, 1915	515,000,000
War loan, 5½%, November, 1915	515,000,000
War loan, 5½%, April, 1916	1,040,000,000
War loan, 5½%, November, 1916, (estimated)	1,000,000,000
Treasury bills, 5%, (estimated)	2,000,000,000
Issues discounted in England	700,000,000
Issues in France	150,000,000
Loan in Japan	25,000,000
Three-year 6½% credit in United States	50,000,000
Total, Russia	$6,925,000,000

GERMANY

Imperial loan, 5%, September, 1914	$1,120,000,000
Imperial loan, 5%, March, 1915	2,265,000,000
Imperial loan, 5%, September, 1915	3,040,000,000
Imperial loan, 5%, March, 1916	2,678,000,000
Imperial loan, 5%, September, 1916	2,750,000,000
Securities in United States	25,000,000
Bank loan in Sweden	10,000,000
Total, Germany	$11,988,000,000

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austrian loan, 5½%, November, 1914	$445,000,000
Austrian loan, 5½%, June, 1915	560,000,000

Austrian loan, 5½%, November, 1915	815,000,000
Austrian loan, 5½%, May, 1916	565,000,000
Hungarian loan, 6%, November, 1914	244,000,000
Hungarian loan, 6%, June, 1915	223,000,000
Hungarian loan, 6%, November, 1915	240,000,000
Hungarian loan, 6%, May, 1916	300,000,000
Loan from German bankers	113,000,000
Second loan in Germany	125,000,000
Credit in Germany	60,000,000
Total, Austria-Hungary	$3,690,000,000

ITALY

National loan, 4½%, December, 1914	$200,000,000
War loan, 4½%, July, 1915	200,000,000
Twenty-five year 5s (approx.)	800,000,000
Treasury coupon bonds, 5%	250,000,000
English credit for war supplies	250,000,000
One-year 6% notes in United States	25,000,000
Total, Italy	$1,725,000,000

BELGIUM, SERVIA, TURKEY, BULGARIA, ROUMANIA

Belgium's war cost has been defrayed in the most part by Great Britain and France. No formal loans have been issued, and taxes have been of no service to the Belgian arms, for the reason that Belgium, save for a small strip of territory, is in the hands of German forces.

Servia has been financed by the Entente Allies. No loans have been issued, and the tax collections yielded an insignificant proportion of the cost of that country's warfare.

Turkey has issued three loans, amounting to $350,000,000, which were taken at home and in Germany, and to

a small extent in neutral countries of Europe, like Switzerland. Its war expenditure has been financed in large measure from Germany; a syndicate of German and Austro-Hungarian banks has also helped in the financing.

Bulgaria has been financed chiefly from Germany, by means of special advances. Tax collections and small loans at home have also contributed to the payment for war.

Roumania's late entrance into the war was undoubtedly accompanied by financial accommodation on the part of the embattled group with which that nation took sides. The banks of Roumania have also been called upon for their facilities.

The approximate cost of other wars is given in the following table for the purpose of comparisons with the cost of this:

Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815	$6,250,000,000
American Civil War, 1861-1864	8,000,000,000
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871	3,000,000,000
South African War, 1900-1902	1,250,000,000
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905	2,500,000,000

As a result of these enormous loans made by all the belligerents, their national debts have now gone to figures which formerly would have been deemed impossible and phantastic, but which in August, 1917, will be positive facts about as follows:

Great Britain	$19,850,000,000
France	19,000,000,000
Russia	13,450,000,000
Italy	5,050,000,000
Entente nations	$57,350,000,000
Germany	$18,900,000,000
Austria-Hungary	9,300,000,000
Turkey	950,000,000
Central nations	$29,150,000,000
Grand Total	$86,700,000,000

The figures as regards Germany may differ from this in estimates from some made by others, because most of the American financial authorities, for reasons best known to themselves and perhaps not unconnected with their efforts to sell securities of Great Britain, France and Russia, include in the German national debt the debt of the separate states of the Empire. Now the Empire of Germany is a federation of separate states, in many ways bearing a great resemblance to the United States, and as it is not customary, in stating the debt of the United States, to add the debts of the separate states contracted on their own liability, there seems no good reason why this should be done in the case of Germany, and hence the amount of the debt of the separate states has not been included in the debt of the Empire. This debt forms a very considerable percentage of the total national wealth of the various belligerent countries, and in order that this appropriation can be clearly grasped the following table of the national wealth of the countries at war is given:

United Kngdom	$90,000,000,000
France	65,000,000,000
Russia	60,000,000,000
Italy	35,000,000,000
Belgium	13,750,000,000
Portugal and Roumania	7,500,000,000
Entente total	$271,250,000,000
Germany	$80,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary	45,000,000,000
Turkey and Bulgaria	8,750,000,000
Alliance total	$133,750,000,000
All belligerents	$405,000,000,000

as well as a total of the earning power previous to the war of the same countries:

	Annual Income:	Annual savings:
United Kingdom	$11,250,000,000	$1,875,000,000
France	7,500,000,000	1,250,000,000
Russia	7,500,000,000	1,250,000,000
Italy	4,250,000,000	625,000,000
Belgium and Servia	1,750,000,000	300,000,000
Roumania	600,000,000	100,000,000
Entente nations	$32,850,000,000	$5,400,000,000

Germany . .	$10,500,000,000	$1,750,000,000
Austria-Hungary	6,000,000,000	1,000,000,000
Turkey and Bulgaria . .	1,000,000,000	150,000,000
Central nations .	$17,500,000,000	$2,900,000,000
Total, all . .	$50,350,000,000	$8,300,000,000

APPENDIX V

BULGARIA

Reigning King

"*Ferdinand,* youngest son of the late Prince Augustus of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and the late Princess Clementine of Bourbon-Orleans (daughter of King Louis Philippe), born February 26, 1861, was elected Prince of Bulgaria by unanimous vote of the National Assembly, July 7, 1887; assumed the government August 14, 1887, in succession to Prince Alexander, who had abdicated September 7, 1886. His election was confirmed by the Porte and the Great Powers in March, 1896. Married (1) April 20, 1893, to Marie Louise (died January 31, 1899), eldest daughter of Duke Robert of Parma; (2) February 28, 1908, to Princess Eleonore of Reuss Kostritz.

Children of the King (all of first marriage):—(1) Prince Boris, born January 30, 1894 (heir apparent); (2) Prince Cyril, born November 17, 1895; (3) Princess Eudoxia, born January 17, 1898; and (4) Princess Nadejda, born January 30, 1899.

The Prince must reside permanently in the Principality. The princely title is hereditary. In May 1893, the Grand Sobranje confirmed the title of "Royal Highness" to the Prince and his heir, and this style was recognized by the Porte and by Russia in April 1896. On July 10, 1911, the Grand Sobranje confirmed the title of "King" (Czar). According to the Constitution, the Sovereign must profess the Orthodox religion, excepting the case of the present King.

The civil list is fixed at 1,250,000 leva (francs), besides 830,000 leva for the maintenance of palaces, etc.

Constitution and Government

The Principality of Bulgaria was created by the Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878. It was ordered by the Treaty that Bulgaria should be constituted an

autonomous and tributary Principality, under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, with a Christian Government and a national militia. The Prince of Bulgaria should be freely elected by the pupulation and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the consent of the Powers. On October 5, 1908, Bulgaria declared her independence. The difficulty as to compensation to the Turkish Government in respect of railway claims was arranged by an understanding between the Turkish Government and the Oriental Railways Company, and the Powers have recognized Bulgarian independence, and the title of "King of the Bulgarians" assumed by Prince Ferdinand.

"By the Constitution of 1879, amended May, 1893, and June, 1911, the legislative authority was vested in a single Chamber, called the Sobranje or National Assembly. The members of it are elected by universal manhood suffrage at the rate of one member to every 20,000 of the population. Those residing in the city where the National Assembly sits receive 15 leva (12s) a day (including Sundays and holidays) during session; others, 20 leva (16s) a day with traveling expenses. All over 30 years of age who can read and write (except the clergy, soldiers on active service, persons deprived of civil rights, etc.) are eligible as representatives. The duration of the Assembly is four years, but it may be dissolved at any time by the King, when new elections must take place within two months. Laws passed by the Sobranje require the assent of the King. Questions concerning the acquisition or cession of territory, changes in the constitution, a vacancy on the throne, or the appointment of a regent have to be decided by a Grand Sobranje, elected for the special purpose in a manner similar to that in which the ordinary Sobranje is elected, but with double the number of members.

"Sobranje (elected March 10, 1914): 126 Ministerialists, 51 Agrarians, 21 Socialists, 31 Democrats, 9 Nationalists, 5 Radicals, 2 Zankovists; total, 245 (207 in Old Bulgaria and 41 in the new territories).

"The executive power is vested in a Council of eight ministers nominated by the King.

Area and Population

"The estimated area of Bulgaria (1914) is 43,305 English square miles, and the estimated population, 4,752,997. Of the new population 227,598 were Bul-

garians, 75,337 Pomatz, 275,498 Turks, and 58,709 Greeks.

"By a census taken in December 31, 1910, the population of the whole kingdom was ascertained to be 4,337,516 (2,206,691 males and 2,130,825 females), as against 4,035,575 (2,057,092 males and 1,978,483 females) in 1900. Bulgaria before 1913 was divided into 12 districts (including the 3 districts of Eastern Rumelia).

"The population, divided according to nationality, was as follows: in 1910, 3,203,810 Bulgarians; 488,010 Turks; 75,775 Rumanians, 63,487 Greeks; 98,004 Gipsies, 37,663 Jews, 3,863 Germans, 3,275 Russians, and 61,690 of other nationalities. The present capital is the city of Sofia, with a population (census, 1910) of 102,812. The other principal towns, with population in 1910, are Philippopolis, 47,981; Rustchuk, 36,255; Varna, 41,419; Shumla, 22,225; Slivno (Sliven), 50,598; Plevna (Pleven), 23,049.

"The census returns of 1910 showed the following distribution of public buildings in the country: 1,347 belonged to the State, 34 to the provincial authorities, 1,436 to the municipalities, 185 to the villages, 196 were schools, 426 churches, 534 mosques, 9 synagogues, 264 monasteries, 77 to various societies, 48 to the National Bank, and 65 to the Agricultural Bank.

Religion and Instruction

"The national faith is that of the Orthodox Greek Church, though, in 1870, in consequence of its demand for and acceptance of religious autonomy, the Bulgarian Church was declared by the Patriarch of Constantinople to be outside the Orthodox communion. The church is governed by the Synod of Bishops. There are 11 Eparchies or Bishoprics. The clergy, both Orthodox and of other religious bodies, are paid by the State and also receive fees for services at burials, marriages, etc. Of the population in 1910, 3,643,951 belonged to the Orthodox Church 602,101 were Mohamedans, 40,070 were Jews, 32,130 were Catholics, 12,270 Gregorian Armenians, 6,252 Protestants. The Mohamedans are mostly in the northern and eastern provinces.

"There is a university at Sofia, with three faculties — History and Philology, Physics and Mathematics, and Law. In 1911-12 it was attended by 2,260 students, of whom 217 were women, and there were 70 professors and lecturers.

BULGARIA

"In 1911-1912 the Bulgarian and other secondary schools were as shown in the following table: The non-Bulgarian schools were Turkish, Greek, Jewish, Armenian, American, French and German:—

Description of Schools	Schools	Teachers Male	Teachers Female	Pupils Male	Pupils Female
Gymnasia	47	567	300	10,625	5,862
Lower Middle Class	316	2,111	—	38,973	16,539
Special Technical and Other Schools	155	—	—	4,749	4,744

"In 1913-14 there were 4,589 elementary schools with 5,769 male and 5,031 female teachers and 290,800 boys and 213,963 girls.

Finance

"The estimated revenue and expenditure of Bulgaria for five years were as follows (25 leva=£ (1):

	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915
Revenue	7,137,812	7,610,920	5,765,344	10,279,800	11,027,195L
Expenditure	7,135,818	7,557,200	4,732,832	10,270,504	11,014,648L

"For 1915 the chief sources of revenue were: direct taxes, 2,197,774L, indirect taxes, 4,275,020L. The chief branches of expenditure were: Public Debt, 3,077,856L; War, 2,372,638L; Interior, 544,891L; Instruction, 1,167,263L; Finance, 440,659L.

Defence

"Service is universal and compulsory. Mohamedans are exempted, but like all other exempted, pay a tax. Service in the ranks commences at the age of 20, and is now for two years in the infantry, and for three in the other arms. Reserve service is for 18 years in the infantry, and 16 years in the other arms The reservists are liable to be called out for three weeks training annually.

"After completion of his reserve service, the Bulgarian soldier passes to the Opolchenie (Territorial Army), serving in the first ban for four years (infantry), or five years (all other arms). Finally, the men of all arms pass for two years to the second ban, thus completing a total service of 26 years.

"At the present the Bulgarian infantry is organized in 36 regiments of two battalions, each of four companies; and the artillery in nine regiments of two divisions, each of three batteries of four guns, 12 mountain batteries, and three battalions of fortress artillery. On mobiliza-

(1) Excluding the expenditure for the war

tion each infantry regiment expands to four battalions, and each artillery regiment forms a third division of three batteries. Further, from the large number of reservists of each regiment is formed a reserve regiment of four battalions, and a depot battalion.

"There is one guard cavalry regiment of three squadrons, four line regiments of four squadrons, and six of three squadrons. On mobilization, all regiments are raised to four squadrons and a depot squadron. There are further three battalions of pioneers, one railway battalion, one pontoon battalion, one telegraph battalion, etc.

"The Opolchenie forms on mobilization 36 battalions of the first ban, and 36 half-battalions of the second ban.

"The reservists not required to complete the field units join the depots and are available to make good the waste of war.

"Bulgaria is divided into nine military districts, each of which supplies a complete division to the field army, besides a portion of the independent cavalry, fortress artillery and engineers, mountain artillery, etc., and of reserve troops. The strength of the divisions in peace (eight battalions, six batteries, etc.) is small; but in war, besides the expansion above mentioned a third (reserve) brigade is added, enabling additional divisions to be created—there were fourteen mobilized in the summer of 1913. The peace strength of the Bulgarian army is about 3,900 officers and 56,000 all other ranks, but the field army amounts to about 280,000 men besides line of communications, troops, etc.

"The Bulgarian infantry is armed with the Mannlicher magazine rifle, calibre .315. Cavalry have the Mannlicher carbine. The field gun is the Schneider Q. F. gun of 7.5 cm. calibre. The mountain batteries are armed with the light Krupp 7.5 cm. Q. F. guns.

"The military budget for 1915 was 2,372,638L.

Production and Industry

"Agriculture is the chief occupation of the people. Land is held in absolute freehold by the owners and there is a land tax. The communes hold pasture-land and wood-land in perpetuity and pay no rent, and over such lands the members of the communes have grazing and wood-cutting rights.

"About five-sevenths of the population are engaged in agriculture, most of them being small proprietors holding

from one to six acres. The total area of (old) Bulgaria comprised 23,797,000 acres, of which, in 1913, 8,212,649 acres were cultivated. Of the new area 986 square miles are cultivated land.

"The acreage and field of the principal crops for two years are shown as follows:

	Area in Acres		Produce in Cwts.	
	1913	1914	1913	1914
Wheat	2,539,150	2,669,137	24,392,102	14,141,166
Barley	508,075	539,782	4,949,152	4,013,710
Oats	390,150	383,165	2,721,498	2,345,586
Rye	494,180	533,485	4,474,870	3,685,598
Maize	1,465,850	1,584,740	15,472,246	15,786,978

"The harvest of 1915-16 produced of wheat 1,257,698 metric tons; rye, 193,604 metric tons; barley, 384,714 metric tons; oats, 138,544 metric tons.

"In 1910 there were in Bulgaria 8,669,260 sheep, 1,464,719 goats, 1,606,363 head of cattle, 527,311 pigs, 478,222 horses, 118,488 asses, and 12,238 mules.

Commerce

"The foreign trade follows three main routes: The Black Sea, the Danube and the mainland railway.

"The chief imports in 1913 were: cattle, 211,683L; cereals, 133,952L; metals, 540,060L; machinery, implements, etc., 974,860L; textiles, 1,380,076L; hides, skins, leather, etc., 343,364L. The chief articles of export were: wheat, 816,468L; maize, 172,620L; live stock, 38,412L; silk cocoons, 68,084L; hides, skins etc., 149,720L attar of roses, 306,244L. Other exports are fruit, timber, and tobacco.

Shipping and Communications

"The number of vessels entered at the ports of Bulgaria in 1913 was 11,755 of 3,132,481 tons, and 11,710 of 3,108,505 cleared. The chief ports are Varna and Bourgas on the Black Sea, and Rustchuk, Sistor, Vidin on the Danube.

"In 1914, Bulgaria (including Eastern Rumelia) had 1,486 miles of railway open. Railways connect Sofia with the general European system. New railways are being planned to link the Danube and the Aegean. One is to be 220 miles long and Portalogos will be the terminus at the sea. The other will be a shorter line