EVOLUTION, AND
MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

EVOLUTION

AND

MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

BY

HENRY CALDEEWOOD, LL.D., F.RS.E.

PROFKSSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

MACMILLAN AND CO.

AND NEW YORK

1893

PREFACE

Ix this volume, I have undertaken discussion of the
problem concerning Man's Place in Nature. The
discussion proceeds from the standpoint of Evolution
of Organic Life, as maintained by Mr. Darwin, and by
Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace. The main objects are to
trace the evidence of man's relation to the continuity
of life on the earth, and to describe the distinctive
characteristics of human life itself.

Not without misgivings and apprehensions, have I
undertaken this difficult task. Not without diffi
dence, do I now submit the outcome to criticism.
I fully recognise the demand which science makes
on the teachers of philosophy, and I here humbly
offer a contribution towards its satisfaction. What
ever of failure may appear in this attempt, I may have
succeeded in so far opening the way through the
entanglements encompassing our higher biological
problems. I am not without hope that these pages
may carry help to many who have found it difficult
to reconcile with acceptance of evolution, their

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION

THE Theory of Evolution has given occasion for a more searching
discussion of the problem concerning Man's Place in Nature.—
Nature must be taken as a whole.— Man is the most conspicuous
figure in an organised system of things.— 'Nature' designates
this system.— Man's place can be ascertained only under full
acknowledgment of the laws of evolution.— The presence of life
on the earth is presupposed as an unexplained occurrence-
Evolution cannot be a complete Natural History. —Evolution
is the unfolding of life under the 'action' of Environment,—
The interaction of life and environment has led to results
endless and varied.— These have generally, though not uni
formly, been progressive. — Human history must be traced
within the world-history.— Darwin's accumulated results apply
much more to animal life than to human.— Limits of food
supply. — Adaptation of organism to its conditions. — Conflict,
the inevitable condition of progress.— Large sacrifice of life, a
uniform consequence.— Evolution illustrates laws of organic
growth, persistence of species, and modifications of species. —
Artificial selection, under domestication, illustrates the laws of
Nature.— The accepted inductions of modern science call for
extended interpretation of Nature. —An enlarged view of Cosmic
Causes is a pressing want. — The laws of Heredity. — The
problems of Embryology. —Man's place, the most intricate of
problems.— Its solution must largely affect our theory of
Nature.— In developing his theory, Darwin could not have
done otherwise than give the chief place to animal life.—
Disadvantages of this, when proceeding to the problem of Man's

CONTENTS

PAGE

Place in Nature. — Difference of standpoint occupied by
scientific men, and by those devoted to study of Mind. —
Two modes of Knowing.— Impossibility of the one mode of
research passing into the field of the other.— What we are
now seeking is the true conception of the Cosmic System, . 1-25

CHAPTER II
LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS

NEED for clearing a pathway through Comparative Biology.—
Relations of vegetable and animal life.— The physical basis of
life.— No mechanical or chemical explanation of life available.
—Testimony of Nageli, Huxley, Bois-Reymond.— History of
investigations as to protoplasm.— Professor Sir W. Turner's
sketch of it. — Structure of the cell. — How its life is propagated.
—The germ-cell, or egg, from which organic life springs. — Dis
tinctions of sex, and introduction of two hereditary principles
in the origin of higher forms.— Organic apparatus, muscles,
nerves, and nerve-centres.— Structure accounts for activity. —
The relations of species.— Extending differentiation.— Man's
place among the varied forms of life, 26-37

CHAPTER III
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE

NEED for preliminary statement in order to prepare for more ex
tended inquiry.— The art of speaking illustrates man's
superiority.— The comparative method required, in order to set
human life in contrast with lower forms.— Facts of consciousness
are distinct from organic functions.— Superiority of human
organism. — Resemblance of Anthropoid Apes to Man.—
Primeval man and his place in Nature.— Stone implements, and
their testimony.— Contrast between mechanism and mind.—
Testimony of Embryology. —Testimony of Physiology.—
Development of human organism from the egg.— Dawn of
consciousness.— Two orders of life combined in one, and two

CONTENTS XI

PAGE

modes of observation needful. — Organic apparatus thrown into
a secondary place. Thought taking precedence in the regula
tion of life. — Organism and Intellect co-operate. — Consequent
complexity of human functions. — Physique has not its equiva
lent in mind ; nor has mind its equivalent in physique. —
Self-directed activity under guidance of intelligence.— Animal
passion placed under rational law.— Human organism subject
not only to physical law, but also to moral law. — Rational life
unexplained by science. —Man's place in Nature is determined
by his rational life, 38-69

CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE

THE difference appearing in life's relation to environment, con
sequent on possession of rational power. — Inductions based on
food-supply do not hold in this case, as they do in the case of
animals.— Interaction of organism and environment, though
not broken, is modified. — Human life maintains its position all
over the world.— How man modifies environment. — All rational
life is greater than its surroundings.— Nevertheless, Nature
makes large demands on human effort. — As the secrets of
Nature are discovered, human dominion is being extended. —
In animal life, adaptation is by change of structure ; in human
life, by fresh inductions, and harmonious regulation of conduct.
—Nature itself has become a larger thing by the appearance
of rational life, 70-83

CHAPTER V
HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION

PERSISTENCE of species. —Variation, consequent on adaptation. —
Laws of inheritance provide for persistence of species, along
with transmission of variation. — Heredity secures preservation
of structural gain.— Its basis is the physiological unit, or the

Xll CONTENTS

PAGE

germ cell. — Nothing more marvellous in Nature than develop
ment of the germ cell. — Relation of embryonic life to the parent
life.— Darwin's theory of Pangenesis.— Weismann's theory of
continuity of germ-plasm through successive generations. —
Neither theory seems completely to account for the facts.—
Darwin is strong in natural history ; Weismann in histology. —
Mental life presents an entirely new problem in Heredity-
Can intellectual powers be traced to the germ-cell ? — Close
resemblance between the embryos of animals and of man. —
Can we account for hereditary transmission of mental char
acteristics ? — Difficulty as to where, when, and how mental
phenomena first appear in individual history.— How far the
vital relation between child and parents involves 'mental
inheritance.'— Embryonic life in its relations with mental life.—
Knowledge an acquisition in individual history. Hence, evidence
for heredity in mind belongs mainly to the borderland, where
relations bodily and mental come together.— Uncertainties still
cling to the mode, and to the extent, of mental variation
possible in this way. — That there is a double problem in human
history must be admitted, and this admisssion must make
further demands on research, ...... 84-12]

CHAPTEK VI
SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION

SENSORY discrimination belongs to all life ; rational discrimination
belongs to man only. — Sensibility depends on the nerve system.
This varies in degree according to the complexity of the nerve
system.— Movement is correlated with sensibility. — Sensibility
and motor activity belong to the human organism, exactly as to
lower types of organic life.— Need for a sharp distinction be
tween sensibility and rationality.— Man interprets experience,
so as to obtain a knowledge of things. This is the distinction
of a rational life. The senses thus become instruments in the
service of a higher power.— Rational life classifies acquired
knowledge, classifying objects according to distinct species.
This involves also discrimination of the facts of consciousness,

CONTENTS xjjj

and their classification.- Rational power is self-critical. —Re- P'U'E
sponsibility for our thoughts.— Experimental psychology deals
with the mechanism of thought, explaining only organic
processes which are the expression of thought, feeling," and
purpose. It cannot explain the thought-process itself. All
that is carried into the physiological laboratory belongs to the
physics of thought and action. -Observing, interpreting, self-
correcting, classifying, belong exclusively to Mind.— Knowledge
is the interpretation of individual experience. -Our treatment
of the problems of existence lies quite beyond the functions of
the sensori-motor system, and the action of nerve centres.—
Each intelligent being is a freeman who takes possession of his
own inheritance in the earth. -What he is, he is as a thinker,
who must think for himself. -Testimony of thinkers of opposite
schools, for a twofold life, physical and rational.— G. H. Lewes
Helmholtz, Herbert Spencer, Hallam.-All rational exercise
involves consciousness, and responsibility for self-directed
thought, and for self-regulated action. -Inadequacy of 'mole
cular processes' as an explanation of reflection. -The Mind
cannot think without knowledge of itself, and of its own pro-
*dure' - 122-144

CHAPTER VII
ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

FACTS as to animal intelligence should be taken at their highest
value, in support of evolution. - Wallace's summary of
Darwin's conclusions. -Knowledge of animal intelligence is in-
direct. -Interpretation of sensory impression is the mark ol
intelligence.-The appearance of this power involves the theory
of evolution in difficulty. -The higher mammalia possess intelli
gence. -How shall we account for its origin?— The dog, horse,
monkey, and ape are included. -Generalised knowledge is un-
attained by animal intelligence. -Two types of Mind, a lower
and a higher. -Interpretation of sensory impression cannot be
attributed to animals low in the scale of organism. Yet many of
these have sensory apparatus quite in advance of the higher
mammalia. — Darwin does not consistently restrict to the

xjv CONTENTS

PAGE

higher mammals. -The inquiry is thus involved in confusion.
-The argument from special' sensibility must be withdrawn.
So must the argument from brain structure.— A more rigid
separation of sensory experience from intelligent discrimination
required.— Difference between physical function and mental
action in human life.— Need for more exact use of terms.— The
dog taken as test of animal intelligence.

A searching inquiry as to Instinct is needful.— Animal con
duct impossible to us by the use of our intelligence, cannot be
referred to intelligent power.— A truer conception of Nature
will be reached by more successful interpretation of Instinct.
—Illustrations of Instinct. -Food-supply. —Provision for the
young.— Much of the testimony for evolution drawn from In
stinct must be abandoned. Such surrender is a clear gain to the
theory.— Instinct stands apart from intelligent power. It is
most remarkable in lower forms of life.

The ant, the dog, and man placed in contrast. — A
further test is supplied by domestication. — Use of signs
is the effective test.— Superiority of the dog to the ape,
results from long training of the former.— Human agency
and animal co-operation.— The lower the animal, the more
difficult to direct its activity.— Our intervention for co
operation with animal activity.— In the work of insects, under
standing comes wholly from man.— In working with the dog, or
horse, understanding comes from the animal also. — Training of
animals, a test of intelligence.— Need for constant regard to
their sensibilities in order to apply this test.— Interpretation of
signs is the utmost point reached. There is no search for know
ledge, nor is there an independent intelligence guiding action.
—Difference between training and educating. — How far can
'ideas' be conveyed to animals? ...... 145-256

CHAPTER VIII
RATIONAL LIFE

THE aim is to trace the activities of the rational agent. — Wallace's
treatment of mathematical, musical, and artistic facilities. —
Aim here is to deal with actions common to men, and with the

CONTENTS XV

PAGE

manifestation of rational power in the progress of the race.
—Conception of a self-regulated life. —Government of bodily
activity. — Rational power and physical, correlated. — The higher
functions of human life belong to consciousness. — Rational
interest in environment.— Work ruled by reason.— Modified
action of environment in human history. — Severance of the two
forms of action, physical and mental. — Activity of mind is not
continuous with activity of nerves. — Consciousness of reflection,
and of self-determination of conduct. — How Biology is placed
in view of these facts. — Insufficiency of a theory of Evolution.—
The limits of discovery offer no defence against this conclusion. —
Duality of life in man. — Our certainty as to the two sets of
facts, the organic and the spiritual.— A view of the rational
powers. — 'Man's dignity' appears in control of the animal
nature. — Man's degradation appears in neglect of this control.
— Difference between man and animal.—' Degeneration ' in man.
—Heredity as it bears on responsibility.— Characteristics of
moral life.— Conscience bears witness for an ideal.— Judgment
of our own conduct and of the conduct of others.— Recognition
of the Supernatural. — Comparative Religion. —Christianity re
garded as a historical religion, influential in the life of the race.
— Agnosticism a negative, rather than a positive influence.— The
limits of human knowledge. — Life's close. — Witness for a
Future State. — Sacredness of human life.— Christian thought as
to the Future.— Results of the survey of the whole field of Com
parative Biology. — Significance of Evolution. — Distinctiveness
of human life, 257-342

INDEX, .... 343-352

EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE
IN NATURE

CHAPTER I

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION

FOR scientific thought, the most obvious need is
an adequate representation of man's place in nature.
The general acceptance of Darwin's theory of Evolu
tion gives force to the demand for discussion of this
problem. Whatever differences of opinion as to this
theory may still exist, few naturalists can feel reluct
ant to acquiesce in Wallace's statement that Darwin
' did his work so well that " descent with modification"
is now universally accepted as the order of nature in
the organic world.' *

Acknowledging this, there is need for fuller study
of man's place in nature. The distinctive features of
human life must be depicted, and must thereafter be
interpreted in relation to the wide range of natural
history. This task can be successfully accomplished
only by regarding Nature as a whole, — a unity con
stituted by the most intimate correlation of all its
parts. If man's place is to be thus studied, it must

1 Darwinism, by Alfred Russel Wallace, Pref. v.
A

2 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

be with, the patience of which Darwin set an impres
sive example in his observation of lower forms of life.

In treating of man's position, we regard him as
the most conspicuous figure in a thoroughly organised
system. It is impossible to contemplate human
life as a thing apart or isolated. We must study
man as related to the general scheme of Nature.
By ' Nature ' I mean the whole system of things in
the midst of which we pass OUT lives. ' Nature ' is
often placed in contrast to ' Man/ — and so the term
may at times be used here, — but in the structure of
the main argument ' Nature ' includes man and his
efforts. In developing the argument, it will be re
quisite to include things familiar to all, along with
the latest results of scientific research. Only thus
can we have a solid basis for extended investigation
as to man's place.

Further, as indicating provisionally the attitude
assumed, I hold that no reasonably successful ac
count of the universe can be presented, which does
not accept the more general conclusions of Darwin,
along with results of more recent research, which
have at once sustained, and in some degree modified,
his theoretic conclusions. Whatever limitations are
to be assigned to the theory, we must at least grant
that a law of Evolution has had continual application
in the world's history. How much is involved under
this law may still afford matter for large debate ;
nevertheless, it is generally agreed that a more ac
curate conception of the history of things has been
obtained as the result of the researches in which
Charles Darwin and Alfred Kussel Wallace have led
the way.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 3

How the appearance of life is to be explained is
matter of conjecture. So far as the investigations of
natural historians suggest, we must speak of the 'origin'
of life, not of its 'Evolution.5 Evolution supposes
existence : Evolution, in the history of organism, pre
supposes organic life. There was a lower form from
which a higher had been evolved. Biological progress
results from the fact that life, in each of its forms,
moves towards the perfection of its kind. In natural
history, therefore, life is taken as existing, a reality
already present, given at some earlier stage in the
world's history. Evolution cannot be a complete
natural history ; at most it is a scientific account of
later stages in the history of the universe. Darwin
saw this, and stated his position quite clearly, claiming
one or more primordial forms. Huxley puts the posi
tion strongly against spontaneous generation : ' The
fact is, that at the present moment there is not a
shadow of trustworthy direct evidence that abiogenesis
does take place, or has taken place, within the historic
period during which existence on the globe is re
corded.'1 Nageli, a high authority as to vegetable
life, holds that among known living beings there are
none which could have arisen by abiogenesis.2 The
presence of life supplies the scientific basis on which
Darwin rests, when observation leads him to this de
claration : — ' I view all beings, not as special creations,
but as the lineal descendants of some few beings
which lived long before the first bed of the Cambrian
system was deposited.' 3

1 'Biology,' Encyc. Brit. 9th ed.

2 Mechanisch-Physiologische Theorie der Abstammunyslehre, p. 83.

3 Origin of Species, pop. ed,, p. 402.

4 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

If only this implication be recognised, that the
origin of life lies behind its evolution, we need not
linger to conjecture how many primordial forms it
may be necessary to admit, nor need we inquire as
to the history of the appearance of these. Specu
lative questions may be left in abeyance for the
present. They will assert themselves in good time,
though they are held in reserve^at this early stage.
For commencement, we are restricted to the history
of the existing. Afterwards, speculative thought may
claim its rights.

Granting that Evolution supplies the key to a large
part of the natural history of life on the earth, pro
gress has not been by a single grand movement, as
when the tidal wave rises in the ocean, or as when
the course of the river has been determined by the
configuration of the valley. The law of Evolution has,
indeed, had constant application, but it has not
worked precisely the same results in all cases. En
vironment has presented varying conditions, and the
consequence has been endless diversity in the history
of life itself. The laws providing for evolution have,
however, operated so constantly, that we should not
seriously err, if we were to depict the history of life as
a unity, representing a constant and world-wide pro
gress. Still, adaptation to environment has been
fruitful of varieties. Though ' the struggle for exist
ence' has not been by any means uniform, it has
been sufficiently general to rank as a formative cause.
Exact estimates of its efficiency will bring us to re
stricted areas of food-supply, or areas more or less
crowded with competitors ; but the struggle does not
disappear even when food is abundant, and demand

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 5

comparatively small. As life has multiplied on the
earth, however, demand has increased, and struggle has
become more serious. World-history runs through
this widely extended conflict. Immense sacrifice of
life is the consequence ; but in the midst of all, and
by means of struggle occasioning death very widely,
advance of life has been gained, so that it is reason
able to speak of 'survival of the fittest'; and thereby
improved species have appeared.

Human history must be traced within this world-
history. Humanity is not exempt from the conditions
of progress described. For the members of our race,
as for the lower animals, it has proved true that
variety of surroundings, more or less favourable, has
presented variety of result, as in the history of different
tribes and nations. What is required, therefore, for
an adequate representation of Man's place in Nature
is a more searching scrutiny of his relation to the
general laws of existence.

Wide and careful as was the research of Darwin,
his accumulated results have much more bearing on
animal life, and even on lower types of that, than on
human life and character. Exact conclusions are
unattainable as to the number of lines of biological
advance, and the variations within these lines.
That there has been general advance is beyond dis
pute ; but as the risks to life are many, there are
possibilities of reverse by deterioration. It is accord
ingly needful to allow for manifold deviations. Mr.
Herbert Spencer has properly emphasised this in
saying that : ' Organisms may vary not only in re-
spect_o^_their_structures. but in respect of their ten
dencies to do thisor the other, in all kinds of ways,

6 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

—many or most of the ways at variance with
welfare.' l

The general history of the evolution of life on the
earth presents these two marked phases. First, Life
finds in environment provision for its continuance and
growth. Life thus shows dependence on an inferior
order of existence. Second, Life, in unfolding,
adapts itself to environment, thereby illustrating its
superiority. Life is the key to progress; conflict is
an inevitable condition of life, and out of this conflict
comes general advance. However attractive the
result, there is something startling in the fact that
sacrifice of life belongs to the conditions of progress.
Whatever the moral difficulty here, — and it is par
ticularly great as illustrated in the bitter experience
of men encountering the evils of ' over-competition,' —
there can be no doubt that a law of sacrifice is in
cluded among the conditions of progress. Within
the history of the world's advance, there lies con
tinually a history of enfeeblement and death. Evil
attends on the good. However great the gain in the
world's history, suffering and sacrifice still continue.
Biology is fruitful of ethical perplexities. Yet, through
all this mixture of good and evil, there is provision
for general advance, in the persistence of life. The
inherent tendency to progress, belonging to life in
every form, is the mainstay for thought in seeking
interpretation of Nature. The conditions of the
material world, of organic life, and of moral life
combined, provide for the history of an orderly
universe, the growing understanding of which brings

1 Letter to Dr. Martineau, in Appendix to his Types of Ethical
Theory, 3d ed. vol. ii. p. 570.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 7

ever-increasing reward to scientific research. For
organic life, 'warmth, air, light, moisture, food,' are
' the mightiest impulses which determine the manifold
variety of the forms of living beings.' l When from
organic form we pass to the ethical character in
man, thought proves a grander agency by which a
nobler life unfolds in the world. Through all this,
the law of heredity provides at once for transmission
of variations, and for further advance. Nature, taken
in its highest aspects, appears as a living unity, with a
history ever unfolding in fresh acquisitions. Scientific
controversies, however wide in import, have at least a
common basis in unchangeable laws of progress, ever
deepening their impress on the face of Nature.
Darwin and Wallace, Weisinann and Eiiner are
severed on points of large significance ; but they are
agreed as to the main laws of acquisition, and of in
heritance securing the world's advance.

The great lines of evidence for Evolution of organism
are broadly marked. The laws of growth for in
dividual life come first in importance ; persistence of
species bears its testimony for inheritance ; modifica
tions of species tell of the moulding power of environ
ment ; the records of artificial selection, under the
advantages of domestication, throw a broader light
over the provisions of Nature, whether the records tell
of enduring, or of temporary, deviations from the
normal type. When human intelligence comes on
the field, selecting and regulating results in animal
life, we see still more vividly that progress is the law
of Nature.

1 Organic Evolutionas the Result of the Inheritance of Acquired Char
acters, by Dr. G. Eimer, translated by J. T. Cunningham, p. 22.

8 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Natural History, extended by records of domestica
tion, opens the gateway into a large field of inquiry,
where, since man belongs to Nature, the ' artificial ' is
only an additional phase of the natural. Variation
artificially induced presents the results of superadded
observation and direction by rational life; and this
has been so widely extended, as to be essential to the
system of things interpreted by science. Human
Keason and Will have proved large factors in the
earth's history. Through long ages, the highest life
has been a directing power in the world, determining
the history of subordinate forms. Natural and arti
ficial selection have been combined in preparation
of the system of organised existence with which we
are familiar. The world now is an inheritance from
all that the world has contained. This implies
'natural selection' in its larger sense. The 'art'
employed by man, itself belongs to Nature. This
enables him by selection of conditions to facilitate,
and even to intensify, the action of ' Nature.' ' Arti
ficial selection' is not extra naturam. The dis
tinction between natural and artificial is of obvious
value to us, but there is no cleavage in Nature itself.1

Our accepted inductions need to be harmonised
by extended interpretation of Nature. The history
of the theory of Evolution carries this lesson written
broadly over many of its pages. While strict observa
tion has done vast service, analogy has been allowed
more than its legitimate share of influence ; not un-
frequently the particular has been unduly over-

1 Not without reason does Spinoza protest against the tendency to
treat of man as if his life were imperium in imperio. Ethics 1.
Appendix.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 9

shadowed by the general. Not easily is a full sight of
cosmic causes obtained. Deliverance from danger of
hasty induction must be worked out by persistent re
search, and unshrinking criticism. Division of labour
among naturalists, will provide for attention to every
order of life in our further study of the scheme of
existence. Advance in science deepens our con
viction of the marvellous intricacy of Nature's
methods. Slowly we shall come to learn how tem
porary uses are served, while some advance is being
made towards a general end. ' As individuals grow,
so the whole world of organic forms has grown up
from simple beginnings;'1 and even so, a complex
system of law is now working for much grander
results in ages to come.

If we are truly to know, and, thereafter accurately
to interpret according to knowledge, we must be
contented with a slow elaboration of results. While
analogies supplied by individual growth are valuable,
the complex conditions affecting life over the wide
world carry us far beyond analogical inference. The
conception which a theory of Evolution has made
possible, needs to be sustained by deeper research as
to the cosmic causes, and to be guarded specially
against the fallacy which would find in the less the
cause of the greater. Too readily do we speak of the
lower producing the higher, tending to overlook the
primary truth, that only the mature life produces the
germ, organic life thus testifying by law of heredity
that the greater produces the less. However sur
prising it be that a microscopic germ contains within
it the promise of the normal characteristics of the

1 Organic Evolution, Eimer.

10 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

species, the efficiency of the mature life cannot be
overlooked. The law of inheritance has these two
sides of application ; transmission is the condition of
inheritance. While, then, imagination gathers aid
from the unfolding germ, it must figure things in
harmony with the grand truth, that potentiality
within the germ depends for its action upon poten
tiality operating beyond itself.

The intricacy of embryological problems — such, for
example, as those concerned with development of the
special senses— may illustrate the largeness of demand
on caution and patience. The fact of evolution is
unquestionable. Our general conception of the laws
of advance may be approximately accurate ; but there
remains a large unexplored area of investigation.
We have, indeed, a working hypothesis of great
value; but the further we advance in the work of
interpretation, the more difficult does the task become.
Man's place presents in itself a problem complicated
beyond all other problems in Nature. When we turn
to this problem, our method becomes more intricate
in application, for external observation must be
supplemented by reference to inner experience, while
within our consciousness there is much that points to
conditions hidden even from the rational agent him
self. What is known of human organism by dissection,
and by microscopic inspection of minute structure,
supplies no measure of the activity distinctive of
man. There cannot be a successful attempt to ex
plain human activity by reference to the functions of
animal life. The outstanding perplexity here must
largely influence our theory of Nature itself.

Along with the higher aspects of human activity,

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 11

the date of man's appearance on the earth becomes a
historic question of primary importance for our general
conclusions. Testimony from fossiliferous strata in
the earth's surface has accumulated to support the
view that a much more remote date must be assigned
for man's appearance on earth than had been previously
supposed.1 The first effects of this change have been
revolutionary. One thing, however, stands out clearly.
The reconstructive work following admission of man's
antiquity, must assign to human agency a much
larger place in natural history than current hypotheses
suggest. By this admission, the problem of man's place
in Nature is increasingly complicated. Literary history
bears only a small part of actual history. The earth's
crust is the earliest chronicle of human activity. We
transcend the so-called 'historic period,' continuing
to trace with certainty far beyond it, evidence for
intelligence such as belongs to men now. The dis
tinction between ' historic ' and ' prehistoric ' times
is relative only to our dependence on literary records.
' Historic certainty ' is not restricted to chronicles.
It may even more readily be found independently of
documentary evidence. Far into ' prehistoric ' times
we are conducted in thought by reference to remains
which can be deliberately examined. It is in these
silent regions of unwritten history, as it is over the
wide moors of Scotland, where patches of green
sward mark sites of former homesteads, abandoned by
families whose descendants have sought more pro
mising fields for enterprise. There is, then, no exact
line of demarcation visible between historic and pre
historic times. In more remote periods, measure-

1 The Antiquity of Man, by Sir Charles Lyell.

12 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

ment of time can be only by reference to advance
manifest in the remains of human industry. A chipped
flint for an arrow-head, or a polished stone for an axe,
bears witness for a rational life. Here we have evi
dence of man's presence in the world, as reliable as
any we find in folk-lore, in folios, or in manuscripts.

To fix the date of man's appearance on the earth
may not prove an easy thing : nor is it essential here
that we should be able to do so with exactness. We
judge of epochs by signs of intellectual advance, thus
including many ages prior to those from which written
testimony has come.1 Some see in this large extension
of human history, valuable support for an Evolution
Theory. The earlier the appearance of man, so
much easier, it seems to them, must it prove to bridge
the chasm between animal and human intelligence.
But the force of reasoning flows in the other direction.
Geological records require us to extend human history
beyond the appearance of such an animal as the
dog, to which we now specially refer, for evidence of
animal intelligence. The antiquity of man thus con
stitutes a special perplexity for a theory of evolution,
even while we recognise that ' antiquity' is a rela
tive term, having a meaning for the earth itself, im
measurably beyond the term of human existence.

In the history of our race, we go back to a period
fitly named 'the stone age' (Neolithic and Paleolithic).
Our museums contain arrow-heads and axes supplying
abundant evidence of the antiquity of man. That the
remote age was intellectually a less advanced age than
the later, is true. The tools are of primitive simplicity,
for appliances at command are few ; but along with

1 See Lyell's Antiquity of Man, p. 7, and p. 228.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 13

this poverty of material, there are no traces of poverty
of intellect. Intelligence, here traced as having been at
work in order to produce a sharpened instrument, only
waits for better material, by use of which intelligence
itself will be quickened. Very much has thus been
worked into human intelligence since the stone age,
for understanding has steadily widened its range
by discovery of wealth in Nature. The improved
instruments of successive ages are only indirect testi
mony to intellectual progress; still more valuable
testimony is found in the widening range of language,
in increase of human comforts, and, in later ages,
accumulation of literary treasures. Imagination needs
effort to span these vast stretches of time. There is
a very wide chasm between the stone -axe and the
steam-hammer ; between arrow-heads and a forty-ton
gun ; between the shell-heaps of rude settlers on the
coast, and the scientific inquiries concerning marine
biology. Rational life has held the field through long
ages ; during these it has persistently prosecuted dis
covery ; while so engaged, it has been constantly
utilising fresh knowledge of Nature's treasures. What
is to be said of the origin of this life, is a question
lying behind the manufacture of spear-heads and the
accumulation of shell-mounds. No one suggests that
man found axe-heads and stone-hammers lying ready
to hand.

In developing the theory of Evolution, Darwin could
not have selected any other course than that which
he adopted ; but when an attempt is made to include
man, there is manifest disadvantage, arising from the
fact that the structure of the theory has been deter
mined mainly by study of animal life. Advantages

14 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

for the earlier stages of research thus turn to dis
advantages. ' Animal ' bulks so largely, during elabora
tion of the theory, as to favour a tendency to view the
'rational' in reduced proportions. Comparative biology
is apt to hinder appreciation of perspective. Nothing
can abate our interest in natural history, intensified
as it has been by the problems which Charles Darwin
has presented. But, as soon as we advance to consider
man's place in Nature, we are warned how much of
observation had been previously concentrated on the
lower forms of life. No one can depreciate observa
tions as to ants, and pigeons, and various breeds of
dogs and horses. These observations have greatly
extended our knowledge of the universe. But such
detailed research into conditions of animal life, sugges
tive as it is, carries us far apart from man. Full value
is readily given to it, without ascertaining anything
bearing on the question whether 'natural selection,'
and ' survival of the fittest,' have had much to do with
the history of national life in the world. The leading
workers united in building up the theory of Biological
Evolution, have not been familiar with psychological
inquiry. The intricacies of rational procedure have
not engrossed their interest. Mental philosophy has,
however, had some compensation in this, that com
parative research has opened up new phases of experi
mental psychology, yielding large increase of knowledge
as to the relations of the nerve system to the faculty of
interpretation belonging to rational life, and helping
much towards fuller appreciation of the unity of our
life, while distinguishing the physical from the mental.
Alfred Russel Wallace has clearly shown how many
are the perplexities for Darwin's theory, when the

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 15

attempt is made to account for man's rational powers,
f by gradual modification and development from the
lower animals/1 On the other hand, manifest gain
has accrued from spread of the spirit of observational
science within the province of mental philosophy.
Bain, Spencer, Sully, Ladd, Lloyd Morgan, Komanes,
and many more have laid us under special obligations,
while Wundt and Miinsterberg, and Helmholtz and
Ferrier, have opened up the whole field of experiment
connected with the sensory and motor systems, as
these are related with experience and intelligent
interpretation. Observations have thus accumulated
on the borderland where sensibility meets conscious
ness. Much has here been done in elucidation of
the organic conditions of human experience. But,
valuable as is such work, it leads us only a little way
towards solving the perplexing problems concerned
with man's origin. A fresh survey of 'animated
existence ' is required from the new stand-point
afforded by the theory of Evolution. We need to
see things in true perspective, from man's central
position in Nature. In finding levels for the new
pathway of science, after alluvial deposit has been
cleared off, and the hard clay has been pierced, we
face the mountain.

The difficulties encountered by Darwin at the out
set were largely occasioned by the novelty, even the
perplexing strangeness, of the problem. Common
observation, while including the most serviceable
facts, had not suggested research in the direction
which Darwin took. Ordinary observers sought im
mediate advantages ; did not at all concern themselves

1 Danvinism, p. 461,

16 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

further, not having any direct interest in a construc
tive theory of cosmic causes, conditions, and results.
In this way it happened that special knowledge, care
fully accumulated, had a value for science, unnoticed
by those who considered only market values. Animal
fanciers were gathered into distinct groups. Pigeon
fanciers were commonly a different class from horse
fanciers. Science suffered loss from this severance
of classes interested in improved breeds of animals.
The one set of men were not ' well up ' in the special
knowledge which another set had ' at their finger-
ends.' Observations as to ants ' did not pay/ and
were accordingly held cheap by men of a business
turn of mind. Breeders of pigeons, and dog fanciers,
had sheaves of facts ready to hand, when Darwin was
still absorbed with the formation of coral reefs. But
this circumstance, that common observers were so far
in possession of the facts as serviceable for them
selves, lent valuable support to the scientific observer,
as he came slowly along the track.

When, however, the natural history of rational life
is pondered, the situation of things is considerably
different. We ought to know human life better than
any other : but then, it is much harder to know. Our
whole experience is such as belongs to rational life,
acting within the conditions of organic existence ; and
this experience raises problems entirely new, involv
ing human reason itself in deepest perplexity. It is
comparatively easy to test the limits of muscular
energy ; it is far from easy to measure the possibilities
of a rational life. Few men deliberately face the
problems which rational life raises for itself, about
itself. Of the men who have most patiently studied

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 17

these questions, none have solved them. The number
of theories in mental philosophy is subject of common
remark: the explanation lies in the depth of the
problem. Scientific men and philosophers are apt
to laugh at each other; the laugh goes round; the
problems remain. A steady look into the unfathomed
depths will awaken misgivings as to evolution of
rational life from sensory existence. For a long time
to come, we shall have to speak of rival schools of
philosophy ; one school having more affinity with the
Darwinian theory than the other. The 'Experi
mental,' or Sensational, school of philosophy may with
some warrant be said to have been preparing the way
for Darwin. This is the school which relies mainly
on the laws of association, connected with sensibility,
for interpretation of human experience; it is the
' Sensational ' school which finds the sources of intel
lectual life in feeling. On the other hand, the
' Rational ' school, the ' transcendentalists,' who push
behind and beneath experience in the attempt to
interpret experience, make thought the pre-requisite,
logically and historically, for human experience.
They are regarded by their critics as men who are
boring too deeply, getting into a quite unpromising
region, more likely to find mineral, than to find mind.
This battle of the schools must be fought out here.
The problem of rational life cannot find solution in
observations concerning the lower animals, however
important these may prove.

Whatever be the ultimate award as to the range of
Evolution in the history of life on the earth, there can
be only one opinion as to the high honour due to
Charles Darwin. Preoccupied with the clue he had

B

18 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

found, he manifested a noble determination in tracing
the pattern worked out on the web of life. The first
faint vision of it had an attractiveness known only to
the discoverer. After long gazing upon it, he announced
his conclusion,— Origin of Species by means of Natural
Selection, — origin from allied species not far removed,
involving preservation of favoured races in the
struggle for life. Mr. Wallace, joint-discoverer, has
done a generous and able piece of work in expounding
the theory, and sustaining it by extended illustration
of ' variations in organisms in a state of nature.' l
The interdependence of vegetable and animal life,
long familiar, began to appear in new lights. Form
and colour in leaves and flowers, found new signifi
cance, it being proved that these have attractions for
other eyes besides those of men, and that they guide
the actions of lower orders of life in ways before
quite unsuspected. Miillcr, Horner, Huber, Lubbock,
M'Cook, and many more have enriched our literature
with tributary evidence.

The interdependence of distinct families of animals
was slowly demonstrated by an exceedingly varied
series of observations. The dependence of life on
environment has proved a subject of study fruitful in
suggestion. In this relation, ' the struggle for exist
ence' has come out conspicuously, after having, for
a time, given serious perplexity. The tendency now
is to assign to it even more than the records of
natural history warrant. Observation, when concen
trated on this struggle, is predisposed to overlook
superabundance of supply, where it exists. On the
other hand, Avhen pondering how life feeds on life, we

1 Wallace's Darwinism, see p. 128.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 19

are ready to dwell with amazement on what seems
the waste of life. Just here comes into view the new
induction, 'survival of the fittest/ opening a path
way through a labyrinth of difficulties, even if it be
remarked that the generalisation does not apply to
human life, as it does to animal. Life is everywhere
being tried and tested, and is thus, in course of its
history, developed. Not the death in the world, but
the life in it, becomes again the object most con
spicuous. Life's slowly winding history has begun to
appear distinctly. Death is for the sake of life. This
is the later and grander induction. The system of
organic existence in the world is being deciphered.
In all directions it becomes apparent that if life is
strangely sacrificed, such sacrifice secures that a
stronger life shall emerge to fill a larger place in
nature.

This movement of thought must push upwards,
seeking interpretation of man's place in Nature,
stimulated by all that now lies visible on lower levels.
Man is the croAvning feature in the scheme of exist
ence. How shall we account for his appearance ?
What is his place in natural history ? As he is the
highest, is he also the latest ? When we have traced
man to a remote age, can we account for his appearance
by the history of earlier life on the earth ? How shall
we deal with the 'extremely remote epoch,' 'before man
had arrived at the dignity of manhood,' as Darwin put
it?1 Passing further down the stream of time, after
human agency has become a factor on the scene, has
the progress of lower orders gone on as before, perhaps
even at accelerated pace ? And if so, what is man's

Descent of Man, p. 46.

20 * : EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

place in the midst of all this systematised order ? Is
he product, or agent, or is he in some sense both ?
How has he found his place on the summit of exist
ence, and what has he done since coming to his
heritage ? Certainly his work has been neither of
short duration, nor of small significance.

Science has carried us far beyond elementary
questions here. What we have to seek is a full
harmony of the complex system of existence, — the
true conception of the cosmic system. Accepting as
ample the evidence for Evolution, we still need vastly
to expand our conceptions of Nature. The antiquity
of man, the progress of life on the earth before his
coming, and the progress since, need to be harmonised,
as they have not yet been. In a very large sense it
holds true that the crowning feature is not even man's
nature, but man's work, as that has contributed to
wards the order everywhere visible. A natural history
method, to be true to its conditions, must make
account of the entire range of human history, tracing
human causality as it has been engaged in higher
work than anything achieved in the history of animal
life. Questions of comparative intelligence' of animals
and men, lie in our rear at this stage. We are
advancing into the field of rational agency; we are
coming in sight of the characteristics of a moral life,
in which animals have no part. Action from above
downwards is clearly recognised, when man's agency
is in contemplation. Illustrations of this are all
around. Facts as to 'artificial selection,' which
Darwin found helpful in the earlier stages of con
structive effort, present part of the evidence to which
reference is now made. John Stuart Mill's dis-

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 21

cussions as to the extent to which ' right conduct '
requires kindness to the lower creation present further
testimony. And besides, there falls to be included, a
comparatively neglected region of inquiry, the con
sequences to animal life of the advance of human
civilisation. From the epoch of man's appearance,
the condition of things has been modified quite
beyond anything capable of being explained by study
of organism. It must, therefore, be recognised, as
Professor Huxley has said, as not only ' convenient,'
but necessary, ' to distinguish those parts of nature in
which man plays the part of immediate cause, as some
thing apart.' x The convenience experienced in this
respect by the scientist, springs from the actual order
of things in Nature. Man's place therefore becomes
the chief problem to which all scientific inquiry must
lead.

Evolution through struggle for existence, is only one
item in the history of progress. Without it, we can
not construct any theory of things existing. We
readily admit with Wallace ' the overwhelming im
portance of natural selection over all other agencies
in the production of species.' But it is needful that
we ponder the beginning, the continuance, the con
summation of this process, comprehending all within
a single scheme. We still need a deeper study of
causes and of results. Croll puts the position
admirably, ' The changes or motions in organic nature
which result in an organism,' are ' not to be accounted
for by forces which produce the motion, but by the
cause or causes which direct the operation of the

1 'Struggle for existence'; Nineteenth Century, February 1888,
pp. 165, 166.

22 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

forces.'1 We have only made a beginning when we
have by direct observation ascertained the facts ; we
push further into the heart of things when we dis
cover the processes which work out results ; but we do
not complete our inquiry until we account for the
origin of the movements, the true beginning of all
that occurs, 'the cause or causes which direct the
operation of the forces.' On the other hand, if we are
to seek a scheme of existence as a unity, we must
pass away from investigations as to minute structure,
and as to movements in cell formation, in order to
enter on a fuller study of human life, in comparison
with which all life besides is insignificant. Science
has clearly decided what must be its crowning effort
in the study of Nature, — the solution of the problem
of man's appearance ?

For answer, something more is needed than a
history of human progress,— something larger even
than a history of civilisation,— something wide enough
to include the relations of man to the fixed laws of
the universe, very specially to those laws providing
for Evolution of species. Man is not only among the
animals, but above them. All through his history, it
has so been. The dominion of man must, therefore,
count for a large thing in the history of the earth, at
once modifying, and extending the application of the
laws of Evolution.

The history of mental philosophy must be largely
affected by the absorbing interest of this question. If
interpretation of organic life has instructed philosophy,
as it has, so will philosophy expand and enlarge our

1 The Philosophical Basis of Evolution, by James Croll, LL D
p. 7.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION

interpretation of the whole scheme of biology. The
theory of Evolution has not made good its claims,
without for a time obscuring larger questions. This
is however, only an incidental feature in the progress
of observation and of thought. It is impossible to
widen the range of reflection, yet dwarf the thinker.
The oldest questions are still the newest, and these
are the questions concerning the life, the powers, the
destiny of man. It is impossible that the problems
of philosophy should be of small significance in these
times. Questions that have absorbed the interest of
thinkers even from the days of Socrates downwards,
cannot be cast into oblivion. Inquiries which have
re-appeared from age to age throughout the history
of men, civilised and uncivilised, must have their
acknowledgment within biological science. Thus, the
religious life, which has appeared in all divisions of
the& globe, and in all phases of tribal or national
organisation, must find its logical position in natural
history. Biology cannot at the same time ^ include
man, and exclude prominent characteristics of human
life. ' Science having achieved the extension of its
boundaries, must now give heed to all that has been
enclosed. A greatly extended task has thus been
thrown upon biologists. Those who undertake ex
position of the laws of inheritance, must make full
account of the heritage. Observations as to monkeys
and apes being accepted as within the boundaries,
their permanent value will be determined by their
relation to human faculty, and to the work which the
human family have achieved, from remote ages, in
modifying and enlarging the conditions of life.

If Philosophy has often erred, as Spinoza main-

24 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

tained, by regarding man as impermm in imperio,
as^if all things were to be judged from the stand
point of human desires ; nevertheless, there has been an
actual imperium,—a, true lordship of man throughout
the earth. Neglecting to make account of this, biology
must expose itself to deserved ridicule, on account
of unfinished work. The biologist must include
himself in his view of existence, or else he must be
contented with the narrow field of a specialist, whose
words have value only within a limited range of ob
servation. Philosophy needs like warning. Deliver
ance from merely abstract thinking is a necessity.
This escape must be achieved by philosophy itself,
with reasonable gratitude to biology for forcing on
this reform, for which Hegel resolutely and wisely
pleaded. But the questions, raised at an early date
by Aristotle, of separation and classification of the
sciences, remain to this day. This additional pro
blem we now have for treatment, how are all sciences
to be harmonised in a manner equivalent to the unity
found in Nature. Over this problem, the theory of
Evolution has thrown a broad and steady light.

' Man is a being who doubly presupposes Nature,

j as he is a spirit which finds its organism in an

, animal body, and as it is in the system of Nature that

he finds the presupposition and environment of his

The philosophic spirit is thus in full harmony

with the modern problem concerning man's place in

the cosmos. The problem can be solved only on con

dition of full appreciation of what man is; and for

understanding of this, there must be study not only

™ l P^T'T P™°S°phy of Immannel Kant, by Professor
Edward Caird, LL.D., p. 10.

EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 25

of man's organic life, but of the life of consciousness.
The work of Descartes, in disclosing the conditions
of thought, — still more, the critical philosophy of
Kant, piercing deeper into the essentials of rational
life, — the latest results of ' experimental psychology,'
showing how thought-movements, and nerve-move
ments, coincide and co-operate, — and the best results
reached by Darwin and his followers, must have fair
and adequate estimate, if we are to travel towards a
biological scheme which will hold its place in the
interpretation of Nature.

CHAPTER II

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS

IN order to approach larger problems with some re
gard to natural perspective, we must, at least, trace a
pathway through the midst of the lower orders of life.
We must even linger long enough by the way to
ascertain the results of recent research into the
general structure of organism, and into the hidden
movements essential to organic life. We must ascer
tain what the microscopist has witnessed during his
scrutiny of tissues, and of vital changes within these,
which are invisible to the naked eye. In this way there
will be secured at least a passing view of the common
characteristics of organic life, suggesting the unity of
organism in the scheme of existence.

Inclusion of vegetable with animal life is required,
in order that living material may be contemplated in
all its aspects. A botanist, such as Nageli, has much
to tell bearing on Evolution, as well as such students
of animal biology as Darwin and Wallace. Professor
Burdon Sanderson, in marking out the range of in
quiry, has well said, we must begin with ' the element
ary endowments of living matter, or living material,'
as the latter phrase may apply to a single muscle in
the body, or even to the microscopic hair of a plant.
We are here touching the beginnings of life-history

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS 27

when the relations between organic motion and
exchange of material, are duly considered.1

Though we cannot here linger over these early
stages of investigation, we must carry with us at least
a general conception of scientific results. We must
take ' the physical basis of life/ as Professor Huxley
depicted it in his famous lecture, perhaps giving even
wider range to the phrase. For, if we are agreed
that all science is pointing towards a conclusion
which interprets as a unity the world, material,
organic, and rational, we must begin with the basis
of life, outstretching all that has assumed organised
form. We must see life springing up in the earth.
We must see inorganic material, by subtle procedure
of Nature, transformed into vital tissue.

The hypothesis that life originates under action of
the mechanical and chemical forces operating uni
formly throughout Nature, has been abandoned by
competent judges. The most careful search has
failed to discover spontaneous generation. When,
however, it is considered that life belongs to the
material order, drawing its sustenance from the
material universe, there does not seem to be any in
superable logical difficulty to bar the supposition that
it might originate under physical conditions. All
that can be said with scientific authority is that Spon
taneous Generation, (abiogenesis ; — generatio spon-
tanea), has not been recognised, after most painstaking
search for it. Nevertheless there are some who cling
still to the belief that mechanical and chemical forces
may account for the origin of life. Nageli favours

1 Mayer's Die Organische Bewegung in ihren Zusammenhcinge -m.lt
dem Stoffwechsel.

28 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

this hypothesis ; and it is more natural to one study
ing life-history as seen in the vegetable world, than it
is to one devoted to animal biology. While, how
ever, Nageli favours a ' mechanico-physiological doc
trine of descent/ he admits that among known livino-

o o

beings there are none which could have arisen by
abiogenesis, for the lowest plants have a ' cell-mem
brane, and the mon-era1 cannot live independently, i.e.
without the production from decomposition of other
organisms.'2 Professor Huxley puts the conclusion
strongly : — ' The fact is that at the present moment
there is not a shadow of trustworthy direct evidence
that abiogenesis does take place, or has taken place
within the historic period during which existence of
life on the globe is recorded.'3 There is unbroken
scientific testimony for the conclusion, that life comes
only from life. In all its known forms, life is a
manifestation of descent. Above the material basis
of things, there appears a new start, presenting con
ditions of progress otherwise impossible. We do not
find any explanation of life by reference to ' a certain
disposition of material molecules.' Nor are we helped
by finding that protoplasm,— the physical basis of
life,— contains ' the four elements, carbon, hydrogen,
oxygen and nitrogen in very complex union,' even
though gravitation and moisture and heat are
supplied as attendant conditions. 'If it is certain
that we can have no knowledge of the nature of either
matter or spirit, and that the notion of necessity is
something illegitimately thrust into the perfectly

1 The simplest of all organisms.

2 Mechanisch-Physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre.
' Biology,' Encyd. Brit. 9th ed.

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS 29

legitimate conception of law, the materialistic position
that there is nothing in the world but matter, force,
and necessity, is as utterly void of justification as the
most baseless theological dogmas.' l Yet, let us not
fail to mark that life is material, and that its simpler
processes depend on chemical combinations and
structural adaptations. Hence we naturally speak
of ' living material ' and of organic forms. Whatever
we have to say, or to leave unsaid, as to the mode in
which we may account for the appearance of life on
the earth, unorganised matter is lifted into vitalised
organic form. So obviously is this one of the ' seven
world riddles,'2 to use the phrase of Emil du Bois-
Remond, that we cannot contemplate the new appear
ance, without astonishment at the movement pulsating
with steady regularity. 'The spectacle afforded by
the wonderful energies prisoned within the compass
of the microscopic hair of a plant, which we commonly
regard as a merely passive organism, is not easily
forgotten by one who has watched its display con
tinued hour after hour without pause or sign of
weakening.'3 These energies simply illustrate the
activity constantly going on within the cells, whence
all life-forms are developed. 'It appears to be a
matter of no great moment what animal or what
plant I lay under contribution for protoplasm, and
the fact speaks volumes for the general identity of
that substance in all living beings. I share this
catholicity of assimilation with other animals, all of
which, so far as we know, could thrive equally well on

Huxley's Lay Sermons, p. 158.
Die Sieben Weltraihsel, 1880.
3 Huxley's Lay Sermons, p. 137.

30 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

the protoplasm of any of their fellows, or of any
plant ; but here the assimilative powers of the animal
world cease. A solution of smelling salts in water,
with an infinitesimal proportion of some other saline
matters, contains all the elementary bodies which
enter into the composition of protoplasm, but ... a
hogshead of that fluid would not keep a hungry man
from starving, nor would it save any animal whatever
from a like fate.' l

Let us, however, for a moment suppose some large
advance in scientific knowledge, carrying an explana
tion even of the origin of life. Suppose the secret at
length discovered of the mode in which the forces of
gravitation, with aid of moisture, light, and heat, are
brought to bear on material molecules, so as to
produce the lowest phase of living material. Suppose
a mechanico-chemical theory of the origin of life
were thus obtained, — what then ? Even then, we
have under observation only the very lowest and least
phase of vital movement in the world, a mere speck or
point of living material, a nucleus of vitality, or, at
best, a mass of such material ; and before us rises the
stupendous conception of elaborating out of this the
whole varieties of organism spread over the earth.

Proceeding on the results of investigations dating
no further back than A.D. 1830, 'protoplasm,' the
simplest living material, supplies the ' physical basis
of life.' This soft jelly-looking substance is not
structurally of a simple character, as was supposed
when its existence was first recognised. Professor Sir
William Turner, in his vivid and concise account of
the cell theory, says it consists ' of two parts, viz., a

1 Huxley's Lay Sermons, p. 147.

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS 31

minute network of very delicate fibrils, and an
apparently homogenous substance which occupies the
interstices of the network.'1 This is the basis of all
life. By reference to this AVC are led to contemplate
the two kingdoms, vegetable and animal, as one, for
there is ' an essential correspondence between the
elementary tissues of plants and animals.'2 These two
kingdoms, the one earlier, the other later, are the
outcome of the material energies working in the
natural history of the earth. With microscopic
examination of protoplasm and the formation of a
theory of cell-life, a promising beginning was made
for interpretation of this history. The range of
promise became apparent, when Theodore Schwann
reached the conclusion 'that there is one universal
principle of development for the elementary parts of
organisms, however different, and this principle is the
formation of cells.' 3

A living cell is a nucleated mass of protoplasm,
with or without a membrane for enclosure. It is
not infrequently a closed vesicle, and may vary from
_i_ to siy of an inch in diameter. Such cells
constitute the basis from which the individual life
in the world is built up. Each cell contains a nucleus
which is an elementary organ, the active life-pro
pagating agency; and still within this, there is a
nucleolus which is the minute vital centre of action.
Living material, even in its primary form of utmost
simplicity, is thus strikingly complex. This living

1 The Cell Theory, past and present.— Inaugural address to the
Scottish Microscopical Society, by Professor Sir William Turner,
D.C.L., President, 1890, p. 27.

2 Ibid., p. 11.

3 Microskopische Untersuchungen, 1839.

32 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

centre is the simplest phase in which there appears
an individuality in Nature. With discovery of the
cell as the basis of vital function, Professor Burdon
Sanderson says, ' the mystery which before belonged
to the organism was transferred to the unit, which,
while it served to explain everything, was itself
unexplained.' l This discovery was the reward of the
researches of Kobert Brown, the English botanist,
of Schleiden, and of Schwann. Professor Burdon
Sanderson says of this discovery that it 'seemed to
be a very close approach to the mechanism of life;
but now we are striving to get still closer, with the
same result. Our measurements are more exact, our
methods finer; but these very methods bring us to
close quarters with phenomena, which, though within
reach of exact investigation, are, as regards their
essence, involved in a mystery which is more profound
the more it is brought into contrast with the exact
knowledge we possess of surrounding conditions.'2
Accepting life as the beginning of a new order of
things, the fact is recognised as an essential feature in
Nature, without an explanation of its origin having
been obtained. We are familiar with vital movement,
as movement of individual organism from its own
centre. All that can as yet be said is that 'living
material acts by virtue of its structure.' Descending
as low in structure as a very minute centre, our
knowledge depends on observation of its activity.
The utmost efforts of science are limited to this.
Professor Burdon Sanderson has said, 'if we are not

1 'Mechanism of Life in its Simplest Aspects,' by Professor
Burdon Sanderson. Nature, vol. xl. p. 525 1889

2 Ibid., p. 525.

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS 33

to fall back on that worn-out deus ex machina,
protoplasm/ we ' must use analysis of function as the
guide to the ultra-microscopical analysis of structure.'
The first line of discovery for biology has been opened
by observation of the activity of living cells.

Life is first propagated by division of the cell, ori
ginating a second cell. Beale's observations 1 are thus
briefly described by Sir W. Turner : — ' The elementary
tissues of every living thing consists of matter in two
states, the one an active, living, growing substance,
composed of spherical particles, capable of multiplying
itself.' The other ' is situated peripherally to the
germinal matter from which it is produced; it is
passive, non-living, or dead, incapable of multiplying
itself.'2 The former, Bealo names 'bioplasm'; the
latter, ' formed material.' Beale states that in some
cases the germinal matter corresponds to the 'nu
cleus,' in others to ' the nucleus and cell contents,' so
that the wall or membrane enclosing the cell is the
only non- germinal portion. It was discovered by
Strasburger and Flemming, ' that the nucleus in its
passive or resting stage, consists, in addition to the
nucleus, of threads or fibres, some finer, others coarser,
formed of nuclein, and arranged in a reticular net-work,
so as to form little knots at the points of intersection
of the fibres.' 3 The nuclear fibres play an important
part in the process of cell multiplication. During the
movement which results in the formation of new cells,
the fibres arrange themselves in loops, and form a
spindle-like figure. Each loop-fibre splits up into two
threads. These threads separate and pass to opposite

1 Beale's Structure of the Simple Tissues, 1861 ; Bioplasm, 1872.

2 The Cell Theory, pp. 26, 27. 3 Ibid., p. 28.

34 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

poles of the spindle and form the nuclei of two new cells.
This brief summary represents in outline the results of
the closest observation of procedure in Nature's labora
tory, where expansion of life occurs. ' Young cells
arise from a parent cell by division of the nucleus, fol
lowed by cleavage of the cell protoplasm, so that each
cell is directly descended from a pre-existing cell.' 1

Microscopic cells, such as those described, contain
the living principle in the tissues equally of vegetable
and animal forms. The two kingdoms have thus a
common basis in the protoplasm which is their essen
tial condition. In the fixed order of Nature, the
vegetable kingdom is that which is capable of pro
ducing protoplasm. ' Notwithstanding all the funda
mental resemblances which exist between the powers
of protoplasm in plants and in animals, they present
a striking difference in the fact that plants can manu
facture fresh protoplasm out of mineral compounds,
whereas animals are obliged to procure it ready made,
and hence in the long run depend upon plants.' 2

We follow Nature's line of progression in rising
from the simple cell to the germ cell or egg, which
constitutes the first stage of embryonic existence for
the animal. This introduces distinction of sex in the
work of reproduction. On this higher level, each type
of life springs from a fertilised egg. The ovum is ferti
lised by addition of the spermatozoon. In every such
egg there is nutritive material, and a nucleus which
is the centre of reproductive activity. This nucleus
carries within it the characteristics of the species to
which it belongs, illustrating heredity. Thus, when
differentiation of sex has appeared, each parent con-

1 The. Cell Theory, p. 35. * Huxley's Lay Sermons, p. 138.

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER FORMS 35

tributes to the new life encompassed within the egg.
The fertilised egg passes through its earlier stages of
development in the embryonic state.

From these outlines of the history of life in its
earlier stages, we must pass rapidly towards the more
familiar stages of life subsequent to birth, specially to
the sensory and motor activity belonging to animal
life. Thereafter, we shall advance to the characteristics
of intellectual life belonging to the higher orders of
mammalia. We seek, as early as may be, in course of
this investigation, to deal with marked differences
appearing in organic life, leading onwards to the
history of variations, and to the problem of origin
of species.

On whatever phase of organic life attention is turned,
structure must account for its activity. All organ
ism includes apparatus fulfilling definite functions.
With progress in development, we distinguish muscle,
nerves, and nerve centres. The amount of force oper
ating in development, must in any case be measurable.
Diversities of capacity and of faculty come into view.
From reference to these, discrimination of species arises
In process of these comparisons, a steadily advancing
complexity is manifest in the ascending scale of life.
' When new characters become persistent in a group
of individuals,' and there is ' loss of the intermediate
forms, then we speak of new species.'1 Here we move
into the field of special inquiry regarding relation
of species, and man's place in Nature. Successive
stages of differentiation in organic structure are ob
served. How do new forms of structure arise ? This
is the inquiry which has engrossed the attention of

1 Organic Evolution, Eimer, Cunningham's translation, p. 23.

36 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Darwin and of Wallace. How are new characters
transmitted? This opens to view the differences
between Darwin and Weismann. Under their dis
cussions we are led to consider whether heredity is to
be explained on the hypothesis of pangenesis, every
part of the living organism of the mature life con
tributing to the germ-cell; or on the hypothesis
* that germ -plasm has an independent existence pass
ing from one generation to another, with compara
tively slight modification.

Through the midst of all these inquiries, yet quite
beyond them all, we reach our main problem as to
man and his place in Nature. In doing so, we con
template the life conspicuously the highest on earth,
a life distinguished by the exercise of rational power,
thereby leading to achievements unapproachable by
the highest animal life existing — unintelligible to them
all. At this extreme, far removed from the researches
just sketched as to cell-movement, we have to ask if
it be possible to accept Darwin's view that ' there is
no fundamental difference between man and the
higher mammals in their mental faculties.'1 No
superficial or partial answer can suffice. We desire
to see clearly in what respects man has his inheritance
with the animals, and in what respect, if any, he has
a faculty whose origin is unexplained by his share in
a common heritage of organic life.

In dealing with the great problem of humanity, no
suggestion is made as to the unsuitableness of dis
cussions within the regions of comparative anatomy,
and physiology, and physico-psychology. All these
departments of research are essential to the study of
1 The DcKcc'ttt of Man, p. 66.

LIFE IN ITS LOWER AND HIGHER* FORMS 37

man's place in Nature; but, after all these regions
of inquiry have been exhausted, the distinguishing
features of a rational life await explanation. Science
itself being witness, the superiority of human life calls
for still more searching scrutiny.

Students of philosophy will here gladly welcome
the utterance of Professor Burdon Sanderson, as an
exponent of the scientific position : — ' There is little
ground for the apprehension that exists in the minds
of some, that the habit of scrutinising the mechanism
of life tends to make men regard what can be so
learned as the only kind of knowledge. The tendency
is now certainly rather in the other direction. What
we have to guard against is the mixing of two
methods, and, so far as we are concerned, the intrusion
into our subject of philosophic speculation. Let us
willingly, and with our hearts, do homage to " divine
philosophy," but let that homage be rendered outside
the limits of our own science. Let those who are so
inclined cross the frontier, and philosophise ; but to
me it appears to be more conducive to progress that
we should do our best to furnish profound philosophers
with such facts relating to structure and function, as
may serve them as aids in the investigation of those
deeper problems which concern man's relations to the
past, the present, and the unknown future.' 1

1 Nature, vol. xl. p. 525.

CHAPTER III

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE

THE rule which holds when dealing with the lowest
phases of life, must hold when dealing with the high
est life in the world. Function must determine in
terpretation of life-power. Whatever any type of life
accomplishes must be explained by forces within it,
—the inheritance with which the start is made by
the individual. Everything beyond this must reckon
as individual acquisition to be added to the records of
advance.

Even a general appreciation of human life, as the
crowning problem of Nature, suffices to show the im
portance of an accurate account of its functions.
Whether we do, or do not, favour the hypothesis that
human life can be explained under laws of Evolution,
we are equally committed to the task of obtaining a
full view of the life of our race, as contrasted with
lower orders of life.

To present an adequate representation of human
life is beyond doubt a very difficult task. Admitting
the intimate relations of man and animals, and grant
ing that these are strikingly manifested in analogies
of organic structure, it is clear that the nature of man
surpasses in a vast degree that of the highest animals.
Man has no rival on the earth. This superiority is

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 39

recognised by all ; yet, it is not easily explained by
any one. The immense difference between man and
animal is manifest in the most ordinary human action.
The contrast comes to light under test of any action,
even the simplest. Take the art of speaking. This
quite simple act is indeed a very advanced phase of
action in comparative physiology, but it is possible to the
mere child, so far is the human species even in earliest
years in advance of the fully-developed animal. The
use of speech has in each case a history difficult to
trace, for passing behind vocalisation, and inwards to
brain action, we pass next into consciousness, when we
note thought, purpose, memory, associations, feeling,
and passions. When this complexity of exercise is
considered, we see how it happens that nothing is
more common than inability to explain the manner
of doing the most familiar action. The difficulty does
not in any case concern what is done, but only how
it is done.

Notwithstanding this difficulty, the functions of our
life are well known to us. They include many which
are common to us with the animals, and many more
not within compass of any animal. In some ways it
should be easier for us to enumerate the activities of
man, than to ascertain the habits of animals. The
ordinary susceptibilities and activities of our nature
are known to all. We can tell by experience what a
man does and feels in the daily round of engagement.
Familiarity with function must, therefore, be set over
against our difficulties in interpreting the manner of
their fulfilment. We do not readily agree, if we
attempt to unite interpretation of mode with repre
sentation of function. Actions are familiar ; theories

40 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

as to how these actions are done are fruitful of dis
putation. This familiar fact may prepare us for
perplexities to be expected in seeking a scientific
account of our own activity. The difficulty arises
from the fact, that search soon carries us beyond
observation. The consequence is that criticism of
rival theories of procedure proves difficult even for
highly educated men.

The simplest mode of approach to our problem is
the comparative method, setting human life in con
trast with subordinate types. We shall thus, as far
as possible, escape abstract reasoning, keeping
observation connected with the facts of natural
history, and also assigning full value to the knowledge
of human nature supplied by anatomy and physio
logy. We are not to consider man apart from his sur
roundings. We must be ready not only to say that
nothing human is alien to us ; but that nothing be
longing to any life on the earth is without value in
directing this inquiry. This Avide range of interest is
the more readily maintained, that a uniform plan of
structure is seen to hold for all organic existence.
Accordingly, a large proportion of life-characteristics
are common to all forms of life. We must, therefore,
first be occupied with common features, before
enumerating those special. On this account, we
may find it possible, so far as the earlier part of the
discussion is concerned, to agree with Professor
Huxley's1 suggestion in favour of expressing facts in
terminology applicable to things material. From the
physiologist's point of view, this suggestion is natural.
Words must, however, be applicable to things de-
1 Lay Sermons, p. 135.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 41

scribed. If by and by, we come upon facts of an
entirely different order from those classified under
physiological functions, we shall need an appropriate
terminology to distinguish them. Without this, we
shall not attain to the clearness of statement which
Professor Huxley desires. Indeed, the structure of
language will in itself disclose whether need has
arisen for an extended vocabulary. If 'facts of
consciousness,' — ' phenomena of spirit,' — are quite
different from facts explained by the law of gravita
tion, and also from facts resulting from the activity
possible to apparatus under physiological laws, we
shall need to mark this difference, by additions to the
language sufficient to describe mechanical action. We
shall eventually find it impossible to secure clear de
scription, or effective discussion, without a vocabulary
marking the difference between matter and mind.
Everything here depends upon the range of functions
belonging to human life.

Actions common to all life are fitly described as
'movements' of material structure, open in some
degree to external observation. These movements are
observed by us through our sensory apparatus being
affected by the external occurrence. Looking a little
closer, under guidance of science, it appears that all
visible forms of muscular activity, are dependent on
internal organic action, more or less hidden from
ordinary observation. There is in all organic life, an
apparatus providing for sensibility and movement.
Whether the life contemplated is in the sea, or in the
land ; whether the organism is comparatively minute,
as in the insect, or bulky, as in the elephant ; whether
simple in structure as in the shell-fish, or elaborately

42 INVOLUTION AND MAN'S I'LACK IN NATUHK

intricate as in the liuniiin body, like arrangements
provide for sensibility and motion. In all cases,
there is a two-sided arrangement of nerve litres,

\co-ordinated in a nerve centre. The organism is aeted
upon through its sensibilities; it reacts through the
motor apparatus, ' The primary end and object of
the reception of tlio influences (Nfutuili) of the
external world or environment, is to enable; the
organism to respond to those special modes of in
fluence or stimuli.'1 Kibres on one side provide for
sensibility through contact; fibres on the other side
provide for muscular movement in sympathy with
the earlier nerve movement. According to the com
plexity of the organic structure is a complexity of
correlated nerve fibres.'2

In the human body, we find the most complex
sensori-molor system, working the most elaborately
detailed combination of muscles. The manifold
possibilities of work belonging to the human hand
itself, illustrate well the superiority of human organism.

* Kven here intellectual superiority is already coming
into view, without which the worth of the instrument
at command would not appear as it does in our
common occupations. Wo do not, however, enter
upon this as yet. It is enough here that we remark
the superiority of the human body to all organic
existence around. Kven thus, man has a uni<|ue place.
\\ ilh this superiority of human organism, we need
to observe the similarity in form apparent in apes,
on (his account named man-like apes (Anthropoid).

1 An'imal Lij\ and lnt<il't<jc>i<-c, by IVolYvssor Lloyd Morgan, p. 302.
<J As to comparative structure and functions 1 have written fully
in Relations of Mind and /iiuin, ,'Jrd edition.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 43

Tin's outward resemblance has its counterpart in
similarity of internal structure, including muscles,
nerves, and brain.1 Notwithstanding resemblance in
physique, and even superiority of muscular power in /
some apes, marked inferiority, even in size of brain, I)
separates this animal from man. 'There is a very
striking difference in absolute mass and weight
between the lowest, human brain and that of the
highest ape,' notwithstanding that 'a full-grown
gorilla is probably nearly twice as heavy as a
bosjesnian."'

Judged by the range of its activity, the gorilla holds
a comparatively limited place in the economy of
Nature. Nowhere has the animal asserted dominion ;
temperature has proved a barrier to its migration ;
with vast superiority of strength, it has not held its
own against- the advance of men into the tangled
forests. Notwithstanding advantages of structure,
the animal has never done much in the world. Its
help to us is as slight as the force of its resistance.
As long as we have the horse and the dog to aid us,
the ape and the monkey will be treated as unworthy
of consideration in the economy of life.

If such reference to animal life, taken with the
suggestions of a theory of Evolution, direct attention
to primeval man, and his place in Nature, it will be
obvious at once that, we are being led by a direct
course to signs of intelligence. The traces of man's
presence in the world are traces of work which cannot ,.
be attributed to animals. It is not physique, nor even II
mechanical labour, so much as intellect, which is con-

1 Soo illustrations in ffcltitionti oj ' Mittd and Jirahi, chap. v.
- Huxley's Man'x /Ymv in Xatuir, p. IO'J.

44 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

templated when we look on arrow-heads and stone
axes. At that remote period in the world's history to
which our thought is now being carried, we mark a
point in natural history when a little thought was worth
more than well-developed muscle. Among remains
examined, arrow-heads count for more than skulls, as
evidence of what went on in these times. We judge by
results, and when these are carefully estimated, we
are ready to say with Darwin, ' primeval man practised
i a division of labour.' l

From this point, however, we are enabled better to
present the contrast between mechanism and mind.
It is objectively the difference between the axe and
the man who wields it ; so much is the man above his
tools. Tested again objectively, but this time by
results, it is the difference between splintered wood,
and the expectation of comfort for subsequent use of
it. So also do we recognise the difference between
animal and man. In material language, it is the
difference between muscle and tool, as the latter adds
to working power. The difference does not appear in
grip ; but in the purpose which directs the grasp, as
it formerly directed manufacture of the tool. Neither
the activity of man himself, nor the material symbols
of such activity, can be explained without reference
to rational power. So much is suggested by discovery
of arrow-heads in tumuli, that we are already finding
it impossible to restrict ourselves to language applic
able to material things. We need a vocabulary which
includes ' thought ' and ' purpose/ We cannot get
along without terms applicable to things higher than
flints and muscular power.

1 Descent of Man, p. 50.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 45

Still, we are in no hurry to ' cross the frontier/ and
so get beyond the range of scientific teaching. Full
account must be made of human organism. Eecent
scientific research has shed a flood of light on its
embryonic life, its development, and its functions.
Keeping rigidly to scientific lines for a time, we shall
be able so far to contemplate the physical life alone,
reserving for a later stage of inquiry all that belongs
to rational life. The grand and most impressive
lesson of modern biology is the unity of scheme in the ,
structure of organism. Man is the crowning feature \
in this scheme, essentially a member of the one great
order of organised existence, but conspicuously its
leading member. Let us do justice to his place in the
animal kingdom. His physical nature is built up on
the single plan applicable to all organised existence.
Each individual human life springs from an egg, just
as in the case of lower orders of life; the first movements
in the embryonic life are those of nuclei and proto
plasm preparing for multiplication within the egg, just
as in the history of every species of animal ; the un
folding human embryo passes through similar stages
of embryonic advance as those through which animals
pass ; by a process rigidly conforming to common law,
provision is made for development of vital organs,
formation of limbs, and structure of organs of special
sense. When the moment of birth comes, a perfectly
formed organism is ushered into being, to begin an
existence more independent as a distinct individua-
_ty. What we contemplate here is organism, in its
embryonic and in its infant stages. The most im
pressive lesson which embryology has taught us is,
the general identity of plan which regulates the

46 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

formation of human organism and that of the lower
animals, from the germ to the fully-developed embryo.
We have always classified man as ' animal/ we have
always attributed to ourselves vital organs akin to
those of the lower animals; but now we know that
the method of building up the human organism
is that followed in building up the organism of the
lower animals. The induction is complete which
assigns to man his place in Nature as a consti
tuent member of a harmonious scheme of organised
existence on the earth. Nothing can be allowed to
detract from the vast conception of unity of life on
the earth, to which embryology has conducted us.

From this point, our representation of the charac
teristics of human life must begin. It follows from
what has been said that the beginning is physiological.
Allowing that vital organs belong to us as to the ani
mals, their functions are the same ; so it must be with
the sensori-motor system ; so with the special senses ;
and, so far, with the brain also. There is nothing new
to be proclaimed in all this. We merely state the
commonly received view, accepted in every age, on
the evidence of ordinary observation. The important
advance to be recorded has come from progress of
anatomico-physiological science, disclosing internal
structure and its functions. No one, indeed, ever
thought of suggesting that organs and functions of
special sense were fundamentally different in animals
and in men. The similarity of structure and of func
tion has all along been too obvious to give room for
such a representation. So long as we speak of organism,
organs and their functions are fundamentally alike in
man and in animal. Whether there is in human life

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 47

more than organism remains to be seen. All that is
required of us here is to make account of structural
diversity, specially as this may appear in terminal
arrangements for organs of special sense. There is close
resemblance in embryological development, and again
in the functions of the mature life. Yet each germ-cell,
though unfolding through analogous forms, develops
the life of the species to which it belongs. At the
moment of birth, the distinctive species is manifest.
In the activity which thenceforth begins, analogous
functions, and distinctive functions, are readily
recognised. The functions of the vital organs, of
respiration, digestion, circulation; the functions of
the sensori-motor system ; the functions of the special
senses, touch, smell, taste, hearing, and sight; the
functions of the brain in receiving and transmitting
excitation, are fundamentally analogous. At the
same time, the specialities of the human species
appear in the infant, coming more clearly in view
as infant life unfolds. All this concerns a phy
sical life. Here, therefore, it is sufficient to employ
language applicable to material existence, for we refer
exclusively to physical organs and physical functions.
Let us remember, that organism is, strictly speaking,
a constructed machine, with apparatus adapted to
secure certain ends. When it is added that the
machine is in all cases constructed on a common
plan, it is obvious that this is natural if the several
organisms are to accomplish common ends. This
conclusion is sure, the human body is constructed on
a common plan applicable to animal life. From the
first movement in the fertilised egg, onwards to the
date of birth, the human organism passes through

48 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

stages of development analogous with those of
embryonic life in other animals ; but reaches a more
advanced condition.

From infancy to maturity, it is different. The
unfolding of life discovers a new and distinctive order
of functions, from which we infer a new order of
powers, of which no account appears in embryology,
or even in the physiology of the mature life. The
first stage of development in infancy is entirely
physical, quite explicable physiologically, and capable
of being expressed in terms applicable to material
existence. The only thing to be remarked is, that the
child is much slower in the exercise of the functions
of the special senses. In sight and movement, a
chick is at first vastly quicker than a child. The
reverse appears later. As development progresses,
the barn-door fowl increases in size, gains in muscle
and strength, but does not exercise sight functions
more than at first. For the fowl, food, corn-pickles,
flies, and objects around may stand for the maximum
visibile. For the child, as for the chick, birth is the
beginning of new conditions of nutriment, along with
which there is scope for freer muscular activity.
Beyond this, the difference is remarkable. The
similarity observed in the embryonic life continues
in the unfolding physical life. But a_later stage of
development in the life of the child introduces pheno"
mena altogether singular. These belong to the visible
dawn of intelligence. This comes considerably after
the date of birth, when analogies of animal life are
being left behind. A higher life, with new functions,
begins to show itself. From this point, a new develop
ment proceeds under new conditions. Thought, not

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 49

nutriment, now becomes the leading condition for
development; not knowledge apart from nutriment,
certainly ; but knowledge as additional to nutriment.
Knowledge is the nutriment of a higher life. Even
the young child has a larger place in Nature than
the fully-developed animal. Why does the child
drive the cow, why does the cow not drive off the
child ? How can a boy so early guide a horse ?

Let us now keep as closely as possible to the line of
development in human life. The most important facts
will be found all along this line of observation. The
opening stage of infant development is exclusively
physical ; it is the progress of organism, in adaptation
to new conditions. We are Avont to describe it as the
period of unconscious life. The dawn of intelligence,
of which we have spoken, marks a second and greatly
advanced stage. We also name it ' dawn of conscious
ness/ distinguishing between self and not-self I fear
it must here be confessed that our language is not such
as can be applied to material movement. Accordingly,
we find it natural to begin enlarging our vocabulary,
for we must speak of observing, of directing the
attention, and of reasoning. How can we any longer
speak only of bodily movements, or use language
applicable to these ? We are here concerned with
the dawn of intelligence itself. A true natural
history of human life is dependent on accuracy of
description here. We are parting from physiology,
we are 'crossing the frontier,' — we are reaching
the point where it has become needful 'to guard
against mixing two methods/ We can discrimi
nate as we now do, only by the aid of our own
experiences, never in the smallest degree by the aid

D

50 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

of scientific methods. Here, as Professor Burdon
Sanderson has said,1 homage must be rendered by
physiologists to investigations lying 'outside the
limits of their science.' Homage to 'divine philo
sophy' is in some sense homage to the dawn of
consciousness in the child.

What is meant by this dawn of consciousness
can be understood only by what we ourselves know of
consciousness. We have no recollection of such dawn
in personal history. What we profess to recognise
occurring in infant life, is alleged to bear the descrip
tion given to it, only on the ground of the activity
belonging to ourselves at every moment of our ex
perience. We know what self-consciousness is, and
we remark external signs of its beginning in the life
of the infant. From this slight beginning in the
young life, we can find signs of the unfolding of con-
" scious life, first in ' attention,' with its attendant
varying expression on the countenance; next, in
movement, specially in the outstretching of the hand
towards visible objects, as their nearness is recog
nised; and, by and by, in speech, wilich opens the
channels for communication. The signs which were
at first only visible, are noAv confirmed by audible ex
pression,2 for the ' facts of consciousness.' The life is
not separated from material existence, but is clearly
dependent on physical apparatus and on material
media, for observations and communications. But
apparatus and media are here holding a secondary
place, as only auxiliary ; observations and communi-

1 See p. 37.

2 What is it to a mother when her child proves unable to articu
late ! To what a variety of contrivances does such a trial lead !

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 51

cations are the primary phenomena, peculiar to man.
Pursuing this line of inquiry, we shall find the
characteristics of human life opening out before us,
in a manner making it quite incongruous to speak
of ' animal life.'

Let us take ' observation,' the accredited instrument
of science, and we shall see how ' truth ' is attained, —
how ' knowledge ' becomes nutriment for a higher
life, — how the observations of the child are the pre
cursors of those of the scientific man, — how truly
simple observation is the opening stage in the course
of development belonging to u rational life. Observa
tion somehow widens out into knowledge of difference
and of distance ; and, a little further in advance, it
leads to interpretation of sensory experience. This
is the large meaning we are assigning to observation,
as we describe the functions belonging to the life of
a child. It involves from a very early period notice
of difference, not as the hand or the eye experiences
successive impressions, but as differences are brought
into contrast, and a hold is kept of distinctions,
making them the beginnings of a knowledge of the
external world, and more slowly of a knowledge of
self. From this stage, external objects and occur
rences are full of interest, and ' I/ in the midst be
comes conspicuous as a centre of thought and of action.

Henceforth, organism and intellect co-operate;
these are the conditions of progress within the single
life ; not the one, without the other ; neither organism
without intellect, nor intellect without organism ; but
both in essential correlation. Good food will not
develop a human life, yet such a life will not be de
veloped without food; but, knowledge by difference

52 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

is in some respect even more essential for develop
ment of this young human life. Lack of the one may
bring death ; lack of the other will bring stagnation
of life, even while life endures, — presenting a life
checked and cramped in development. Fit nourish
ment, and healthy action of both organism and
intellect, are the conditions for development of the
human being. There is great contrast between these
two sets of conditions, pointing to contrast in func
tions; but however contrasted, they are invariably
and intimately related in the normal life of man.
Each set waits on the other, and attends on the other,
in order that activity may widen out in accordance
with the laws of development. The one set cannot
be sacrificed to the advantage of the other. A life
physical and a life intellectual, acting in unison, to
gether supply the conditions of a healthy human life.
There is manifest fitness to the powers and possi
bilities of this type of life, when there is adequate
provision for physical exercise and rest, and at the
same time, scope for increasing intellectual activity.
This is the rule of human existence, important for
old and young alike. Throughout early life there is
a great contrast between poor food, and poor educa
tion ; in after life, there appears a large contrast in
comparative results.

Until we have set the two sides of our nature in
contrast, we cannot fully appreciate the complexity of
human functions. The correlation and coherence are
unmistakable ; the antithesis must be seen and under
stood, if we are to appreciate the conditions of our
life. Physique has not its equivalent in intellectual
force, any more than intellect has its equivalent in

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 53

physique. The solidarity of life is certain ; mind and
brain stand in fixed relations ; but the difference be
tween the two, arising out of their distinction, is one
of the things most obvious in human history.
Robustness has not always an intellectual equivalent ;
rational insight has not its physical counterpart.
Even a well-developed brain is not the exclusive
possession of those remarkable for intellectual gift;
its existence is not an assurance for manifestation of
high intellectual functions. Nutriment will not de
velop mind; it cannot take the place of education.
Yet so surely is there some natural correlation be
tween physical and mental life, that poor food is a
hindrance to intellectual advance; though we are
unable to claim that high living is a security for
high intellectual effort.

From the dawn of consciousness, we pass to a more
advanced period when we mark the beginnings of
self-directed life. We are not here fixing any date ;
we are recording the appearance of a new order
of facts, in the unfolding of life. Concentrated
observation and reflection prepare the way for self-
directed activity, whose outcome is ' rational conduct.'
The same rational power here continues at work,
but on a broader basis, and fulfilling a new function
in the government of activity. Regulation of con
duct appears in a manner altogether new, standing
in full contrast with animal activity. There is no
longer need for modifying the statement of contrast
by reference to participation in the functions by
the higher animals. It is, however, of essential
moment for the argument that the statement of facts
here should be clear and complete. A distinct phase

54 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

of life is before us, which it is easy to depict, because
it is familiar to us all, while it is peculiar to human
life. We have to make clear the rational procedure,
which is the pre-requisite for action, and the personal
activity which results from it. This can be accom
plished without entanglement in matters of contro
versy. The rational power at work is the same which
has been concerned in the ingathering of knowledge,
and in the interpretation of occurrences. A wider
rational basis, however, appears now, in the recognition
of laws of right conduct. How this knowledge _of
ethical law has been reached, need not be discussed.
Enlarged scope of action for the rational power is seen
in the application of laws of moral life for decision as
to right conduct. In consequence, we have in rational
life the conception of duty. A further consequence is,
judgment upon past action as right or wrong. Still
later in experience, arises a sentiment of self-approval,
or of self-reproach. These are characteristics of ' per
sonal life.' Every reader is a competent judge of the
accuracy of this account of our moral life. If accu
rate, the scientific importance of the facts enumerated
is unquestionable. These facts must present the
severest test which a theory of Evolution has to
encounter. The conditions of action are changed^when
rational self-direction comes into view. This change
is so great as to amount to a complete contrast with
all that has appeared in lower forms of life. Passion
and appetite have not disappeared : they are present
as before ; but instead of determining conduct, a new
exercise of power has appeared to control them. Life
has here a duality within it, which has not been seen
at any lower stage. Life's history becomes in this

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 55

way a history of conflict, of which no trace has
appeared at any earlier point in natural history. The
struggle between individuals has not disappeared, but
a struggle within the individual life occurs, which has
never been visible in the history of any inferior order
of life.

A new problem noiv arises, an urgent practical
problem for the individual, destined by and by to give
complexity to the scientific problem. The duality
remarked, sets the physical in some degree over
against the rational. This is the key to the struggle
in the life of the individual. Physical movement has
its own origin, and its distinct measurable force.
The rational movement has its origin quite indepen
dently of the physical. Contact with external objects,
sensory experience, muscular power, opportunity for
action, remain in all respects as with the animal.
But thought has a growing power in the history ot
human activity which has now become complex, by
intermixture of physical and rational exercise. There
is one life, but a duality of power within it; one
continuous course of activity, but a duality within that
also. The physical precedes the mental; and again,
the mental precedes the physical. The conditions
of activity are thus greatly enlarged in human life,
and that by appearance of a new and higher power ;
not a mere adjunct expanding to greater amplitude
the power already working, but power which takes
control of that already acting, and this to such a
degree as in many cases to check, and greatly to
restrain, appetite and passion. Human experience
cannot be described in terms of less complexity, such
as expansion of sensibility, or increased variety in the

phases of sensibility. There is an obvious dualism.
Distinct phases of action appear, each having a
distinct origin, the one outer, ,the other inner. The
physical does not originate the mental ; nor does the
mental originate the physical.

The facts enumerated are so familiar, and so
universally recognised, that the brevity of the fore
going description will not be subject of complaint
with the reader. We have restricted ourselves to the
briefest record of facts, guarding against introduc
tion of theoretic controversy. To give vividness to
this description, take human work for illustration, as
admitting of ready contrast with animal work. In
the work done by a man three things are distinguished,
intelligence, vital apparatus belonging to organism,
and tools employed. Intelligence rules the other two,'
thereby determining the value of the work done.
Intelligence in a sense passes into the muscles, and
even into the tools, in order to gain a contemplated
result. Improved tools are not even tools for us until
we understand how to use them. Harness placed on
the horse is the product of human work; 'horse
power ' is only power of muscle, (its equivalent finding
expression in engines); horse intelligence suffices
only for receiving directions from the driver. Brain,
nerves, and muscles belong to the horse; without
them he could not do his work; but these do not
account for accomplishment of the driver's purpose.
If they did, drivers would be dispensed with, because
of the cost of labour.

^ The difference between the tools of prehistoric
times, and our most recent inventions, indicates the
extent to which rational power has been concentrated

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 57

on construction of mechanical appliances. This is
the difference between polished stone for an arrow- or
axe-head, and the modern steam-hammer and tele
graphic apparatus. Thought has brought greater
mechanical force to our aid, turning even the forces
of Nature into service, making less demand on
muscular activity, in order to have freer egress for
human purpose. This is the distinctive feature in
industrial advance. It is thought against muscle;
the outcome shows greater resuTts by improved
instruments. These few illustrations of the part
played in the world by rational power may suffice.

We are now prepared for comparative results, in
the first instance, in view of man's relation to the
animals most associated with him ; and next in view
of the distinction in his own life between functions
physical and rational, expressing the dualism noted
in his life. We seek reliable classification of the
functions, without as yet touching the theoretic
question as to the origin of the differences ob
served.

The warrant for classifying man with animals is
clear. Human organism belongs in all respects to the
system of organic life, moulded on the same plan,
subject to the same laws of health, liable to the same
diseases, endowed with analogous sensibilities and
powers of locomotion. A man depends upon food,
air, and exercise, just as a dog does. In all organism
alike, there is tear and wear, as with machinery ; in
all, combustion by effort ; in all, need for renewal of
energy by nutriment. Physical energy, and physical
work, are strictly analogous through all Nature.
Distribution of life over the globe shows adaptation to

58 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

environment, but no deviation either from the general
plan of structure, or from the laivs of sensori-motor
activity.

Differences in the functions of animal life depend on
differences of structure, involving differences in work
ing apparatus. Capacity of sensory impression, and
power of muscular activity, are common to all. For
these, there is a common dependence on brain and
nerve, all nerve fibres being co-ordinated in a nerve
centre. Nerve centres are more or less complicated
as differentiation of bodily structure is extended. The
more elaborate the bodily differentiation, the more
elaborate the nerve distribution and the more compli
cated the central arrangements. Only in this way
is diversity of function provided for in the animal
structure. Functions depend upon structure. As
these are multiplied, there is variation in terminal
organs of sensibility, and increased complication in
muscular arrangements. Special senses are only
modifications of the sense of touch ; detailed muscular
distribution answers to all diversities in sensibility.1
In this way, a definite conclusion is reached as to
man's physical nature, in accordance with the
inductions of comparative anatomy and physiology.
The superiority of human organism appears in its
structure, not in the conditions under which its
functions are fulfilled. In the scale of organic life,
Man holds conspicuously the chief place ; in the line
of history, his appearance must be accounted for in
accordance with his rank. His superiority in organism
is altogether impressive, as indicated by comparative
size and weight of brain, by complexity of structure

1 I have discussed details in The Relations of the Mind and Brain.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 59

within the brain, and by variety of sensitive capacity
and of motor power. His superiority is not so conspicu
ous in muscular power, as it is in sensibility, serviceable
to rational intelligence. Keliable guidance for com
parative results is found in structure, not in external
form. On this account, comparison between the ape
and man, presenting resemblance striking to the eye,
and available for pictorial representation, is far from
supplying evidence of the approximation of the two
orders of life. Comparisons, founded on internal
structure, are not by any means so suggestive of
affinity. It may be fortunate in many ways that we
have been liberally supplied with pictorial repre
sentations of the ape, for Zoological gardens find
great difficulty in presenting living specimens. The
'Anthropoid' does not promise well for the future.
As to comparative structure, there is accessible
guidance in Huxley's well-known work, Mans Place
in Nature, where the main facts are given. Let us
present the resemblances and contrasts, keeping
comparative intelligence for the present out of view.
When internal structure is the test, in what is the ape
more like to man, than the dog ? Is it not mainly in
form ? The vital organs are analogous ; differentiation
in the muscular system is as great in the one as in
the other. The dog is at least equal to the ape in the
general sensory system, and is superior in sense of
smell ; the brain is well-nigh as elaborate in the dog
as in the ape. Science has not demonstrated great
structural superiority for the ape. The form of body
is more like to that of man, and so in consequence is
the/orm of brain; but, when comparative structure
is considered, a plea for superiority of the ape cannot

60 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

be sustained. A claim for the ape, warranting a much
higher place in the scale of organism, would require
us to indicate functions of the one life which are not
performed as well in the life of the other. There is
considerable contrast in posture, and in locomotion,
as in the life of an animal constantly climbing trees,
(squirrel, monkey, or ape), compared with that of an
animal of similar structure, but habitually moving on
the surface of the ground.

Let us next take comparative structure of ape and
man. In what respects, apart from form, is the ape
inferior to man ? In everything in internal structure
and in function, in which the dog is inferior. In what
is the ape superior ? Only in muscular power. Not
withstanding this superiority, in which many animals
equal the ape, the brain of the lowest savage of the
human family is in structure greatly in advance of
the highest ape.1 In man, there is inferior muscular
proportions with superior brain ; in the ape, superior
muscular power with inferior brain. A theory of
' natural selection by accumulation of slight modifica
tions of structure ' has a clear answer as to the origin
of the difference in form between the ape and the
dog; but the theory has no such clear answer as to
the origin of the difference of intelligence between the
ape and man.

In the field of comparative research, the rational
life of man is the outstanding event for which there is
no adequate scientific explanation. The perplexity
for the theory of ' natural selection ' is that anatomical
structure and physiological law, fail to provide for the
higher functions. Hitherto, we have been able to trace

1 Huxley's Man's Place in Nature, p. 102.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 61

functions to organic structure. By penetrating into
minutest details of structure, watching with micro
scopic aid the faintest movements, and recording, by
help of the finest instruments, speed and volume of
movement, physiological science has placed beyond
question the relations of structure and function.1 But
we are now reaching a point where the light fails,
where the voice is silent. Looking at life, as it is
concerned with knowledge, apart from muscular
activity, we have come to a knowledge, which cannot
be attributed to the sensory system, any more than
it can be attributed to the motor system. Research
into brain structure carries no explanation. Our
nerves can no more explain its origin, than our
muscles can. Physiology never has made any
account of human knowledge, not finding in physical
structure and function anything promising help as
to its acquisition. Research into brain structure has
not helped us towards identification of the source
of physical science.

Localisation of function in the brain has made large
advance. Centres of sensibility have been identified,
so also have motor centres ; and even centres for
vocalisation, providing for the language of dogs
and of monkeys, as well as of men. But there has
been no advance towards localising of ' thought
centres,' such as might produce science. It is true,
and to be specially noted here, that electric excitation
of brain has failed to find the functions of certain
silent' portions of the brain, but these 'silent regions'
are found in the brains of lower animals also, and to

1 See Beale's Idioplasm. Ferrier's Functions of the Brain.

M'Kendrick's Life in Motion.

62 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

none of the animals have we attributed high rational
ising powers.

In marking here the limits of physiological dis
covery, it will be observed that we are seeking only
localisation of functions ; we are not dealing with the
natural history of their appearance. At this stage, I
do no more than remark as a notable fact that science
has not localised reflective procedure. On questions
of comparative intelligence, involving differences be
tween animal life and human, I do not enter now.
These will come in due course. From study of our
own rational power, we shall be better able hereafter
to contemplate animal intelligence. Our single con
clusion here is, that conspicuous phases of ordinary
human activity have not been proved to lie within
range of physiology. The phenomena of sensibility
and of motor activity have been localised in the brain ;
the phenomena of rational life have not been so
localised. Science thus leaves the way open for
our inquiry, whether rational phenomena altogether
transcend the functions of organism. The need for
dealing with this problem is not affected by the
admission that brain is the organ of mind. This
position gives force to the rational demand here
indicated. Looking at the natural history of human
life, Darwin has said : ' As the various mental faculties
gradually developed themselves, the brain would
almost certainly jDecome larger.'1 This seems to me
perfectly certain, under the law that use favours
development. vBut the statement presupposes mind
in active exercise, and brain as an organ directedln
functional activity by a power superior to itself. The
1 Descent of Man, p. 54.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 63

enlarging of brain does not produce 'mental faculties';
but the working of mental faculties leads to enlarge
ment of brain. The line of evidence gives way at a
point critical for the theory.

The whole wide circumference of rational experience
and effort, now stretches before us, — outstretching
nerve sensibility, and nerve control centred in the
brain, — the distinctive characteristic of human life
comes fully into view. We have seen how closely
allied with all animal life human organism is ; we are
now to see how widely severed from all animal life, —
how completely exalted above it all,— is the life which
is distinctively human. We have now lying before
us phenomena which can by no means be attributed
to organism, yet belonging to the ordinary human life.
Rational interpretation of sensory experience marks
the line of separation here; and from this all dis
tinctively human activity opens out. Here we enter
upon a field of activity so vast, that its possibilities
seem endless. Diversities appearing in this region
of activity are completely beyond those variations
occurring in animal life, which have supplied data
for Darwin's theory. A remarkable difference in
scientific classification here becomes apparent. On
the physical side, variations lead to new species; on^
the mental side, variations warrant no such distinctive P
classifications. Rational life is one, whatever its
variations, and this because rational power is the i.
basis for the life, however extensive the variations. [I
Physiological differences are insufficient to disturb
this evidence for the unity of the race. The contrast
between physical life and rational, thus becomes very
marked. Variations in colour of the skin, in character

64 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

of the hair, in facial expression, in measurements of
the skull, in evolutions of the brain, numerous as these
prove to be, are not such as to warrant classification
of new species. Transfer observation to the rational
life. Variations are here incalculably more numerous,
and yet in the midst of them the identity of the
rational power is manifest. Animal variations may
lead to origin of species. Mental differences, even
greater in range, do not break the unity of the
race. We are now contemplating a single order of
life spread all the world over, the laws of whose
development are different from those applicable to
lower orders of life.

All the characteristics of this higher life unfold
from the rational exercise which concerns itself at
once with interpretation of sensory experience, and
regulation of personal conduct. (^ Every thing belonging
to the reflective exercise, to acquisition of skill, to
division of labour, to cultivation of art, to exercise of
literary gift, and to formation of moral character, un
folds from the simplest stage of rational exercise"?)
The line is clear, — and it is a single line, from such a
starting-point as this, — leading all men onwards to the
ultimate problem of metaphysic, the problem of the
Universe itself. For the humblest thinkers, and for
the greatest thinkers which science and philosophy
claim, the conditions of thinking are the same.
Accordingly, it holds true, to a degree quite mar
vellous in view of the great diversity in gifts and
attainments, that the problems raised are identical.
These facts present the evidence that rational life is
essentially one, with no such grounds of severance as
mark off diverse species of organic life.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 65

The facts thus briefly touched are so familiar that
there is no need for entering upon detailed illustra
tion. The contrasts between organic and rational life
become more vivid as they are contemplated. In
organism, there is sensibility to contact at every point
on its surface, response along all the muscles, and
dominion of animal appetite, having for its end satis
faction of animal want. This life has its centre in
the brain. Quite beyond all this, known to us only
m ^consciousness, is the life of reflection. Within
this sphere of higher activity, differences of experience
are observed and compared, conceptions of objects
are formed, inferences are drawn, purposes are shaped,
and the task of self-government is carried on under
guidance of a standard of right conduct. These are
functions of mind. So for as relation to the external
is concerned, whether for knowledge or for action,
brain is the instrument through which mind works,
but not wittingly, not by conscious use of the instru
ment. Intelligence only accepts sensations ; apart
from physiological action, it forms its own volitions.

The chief differences of faculty among men, are
the different measures in which intellectual power
appears in their work. Whether we estimate their lives
by reference to what the men are ; or by differences in
their efforts ; or by the value of their contribution to
a general result, the contrast lies in this— the extent
to which thought goes into the guidance of effort.
Within consciousness are included ordinary under
standing, observation of methods, skilful device, intel
ligent use of appliances, and knowledge of laws and
principles. A man must know his powers, know his
work, and put his best into it. This holds for work

E

66 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

of all kinds. The artist will say wisely : ' I fall back
on this truth, that, after all, the greatest thing about
a picture is its conception — the thought of it.'1 Man
is master of action and of circumstances, as the animal
never is. This Socrates taught, long years before the
Christian era, when he urged his lesson, ' Know thy
self.' This Carlyle also saw and said, even when in
his own scornful way he was protesting against the
Socratic maxim, and at the same time proclaiming that
there are depths in human nature lying far beyond
reach of our sounding-lines. '"Know thyself!" long
enough has that poor "self" of thine tormented thee;
thou wilt never get to " know " it, I believe ! Think it
not thy business, this of knowing thyself. Thou art an
unknowable individual ; know what thou canst work
at, and work at it like a Hercules. That will be thy
better plan. It has been written, " an endless signi
ficance lies in work" ; a man perfects himself by work
ing.'2 Even the common knowledge of ourselves
implied in direction of our daily conduct, may suffice
to guard against the fallacy of interpreting man's
work by reference exclusively to the functions of
organism. Organism is mechanism ; man is more
than a machine. Even if our greatest happiness be
made the basis of preference, it requires a conception
of our good on the whole, if we are to gain it. Hence
the force of J. S. Mill's words : ' It is better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.'3 Food,
drink, and sleep do not include the requirements of
our life; do not provide for its enjoyment; do not

1 Life and Letters of James Smetham, p. 128.

2 Past and Present, Bk. in. ch. xi.

3 Utilitarianism, p. 11.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 67

suffice for accomplishment of what Aristotle described
as the true ' work of man/ energy according to reason.1
Human conduct includes more than the management
of our muscles. Knowledge means more than records
of sensible experience ; more than reaches us through
our_open eyes. 'Right' points to sovereign law
for man, with large range for thought as to its varied
application. The conception of 'the right' supplies
impulse for all the nations, carrying direction for them
all in government and in advance of civilisation.
' The right ' implies constant reference to the super
natural, giving force to the counsel,

' At noon in the bustle of man's worktime

Greet the unseen with a cheer.'2

From these few obvious tests, it will appear that
our life includes much beyond the functions of organ
ism. 'The man who appreciates his position in Nature
will give its proper place, among the prime necessities
of human well-being, to the internal culture of the
individual.'3 We thus recognise the difference between
a strong man and a wise, claiming that wisdom is more
than strength; is, indeed, the true strength of a
man. Strength secured by nutriment is very different
from strength of thought. Man's place in Nature is
determined by his rational life. For a scientific theory /
we need a much deeper appreciation of the functions
of rational intelligence than can be had even by inter- < >
fetation of its ordinary use. We need a science of V
intelligence equal to our modern physiology. The
knowledge of organic structure supplied by the science
of our day, shows it to be marvellous beyond the utmost

1 Nicom. Ethics, Bk. I. ch. vii. 2 Browning's Asolando.

3 Autobiography of J. S. Mill, p. 143.

68 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

conjectures of previous ages. At the same time, it is
impossible to explain man's achievement by reference
to his physical superiority. Intelligence alone makes
him master ; yet must he master himself, in order to
be master in Nature. Otherwise, he may live in base
slavery to passion, in comparison with which the
subjection of animals is reasonable service.

Without entering into minute detail here, \ve include
in this general account of the functions of rational life
comparison of objects, discrimination of qualities,
their classification under common names, formation
of images of things by mental inclusion of common
qualities, formation of abstract conceptions, inductions
of the laws of Nature, and recognition of general
maxims of conduct. This is such an enumeration as
any man would make, including as it does exercises
with which we are familiar in everyday life. We thus
set in position those functions of human life which a
theory of Evolution must include.

Alongside of this let us place Professor Huxley's
enumeration in terms applicable to organic life. ' In
physiological language ... all the multifarious and
complicated activities of man are comprehensible
under three categories. Either they are immediately
directed towards the maintenance and development
of the body, or they effect transitory changes in the
relative positions of parts of the body, or they tend
towards the continuance of the species. Even those
manifestations of intellect, of feeling, and of will,
wrhich we rightly name the higher faculties, are not
excluded from this classification, inasmuch as to
every one but the -subject of them they are known
only as transitory changes in the relative positions of

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN LIFE 69

parts of the body.' l Thus, adherence to ' physiological
language ' illustrates its insufficiency. It is impossible
to comprehend ' all the multifarious and complicated
activities of man' under these three categories, —
maintenance of the body, bodily movements, and
propagation of the species. If ' the manifestation of
the higher faculties ' is not excluded, still the faculties
are unexplained. The main characteristics of mental
activity are even excluded from view. Mental actions
are known in consciousness. But for this knowledge
of them, we could not regard bodily movements
as their 'manifestations.' Besides, only a small
proportion of these exercises manifest themselves
in ' transitory changes in the relative positions of
parts of the body.' On the other hand, mental
exercises are known as distinct from our physical
movements, even when the physical are 'mani
festations ' of the mental. In human activity, dualism
of function is complete ; unity of life is sure. The
difference in nature of the body and of the soul is
apparent in the characteristics of their activity.
The modes in which these actions are known are dis
tinct. In external observation, the bodily activities
are known, the mental are unknown, as Professor
Huxley says. In consciousness the mental activities
are known, the bodily are unknown. Conscious intel
ligence provides for the unification of activity. While
human life, in common with all organic life, is subject
to physical conditions, it has this distinctive char
acteristic, that its regulation as a whole is that of a
conscious rational agent. Organism only belongs to
it, does not include the centre of vital activity. //

1 Lay Sermons, p. 135.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE

IN attempting to secure a full statement of the
phenomena of life, external conditions are best taken
separately. Turning now to environment, our aim
will be to consider what diversity appears here,
because of the contrast between rational life and
animal. ^ The relations of humanity to all else that
appears in Nature are so many, as to demand an en
larged interpretation of ' environment.3 For the life
/ of an Animal, environment has a restricted area.
i Inductions in natural history have been limited
f I accordingly. For human life, environment means
something largely beyond what has been commonly
included. This difference does not arise from any
change in the physical conditions of life, any more
than in its physical basis. The conclusive evidence
for continuity of plan, up the whole scale of organism,
greatly increases the significance of the difference
now to be noted in relation to environment. Air,
light, heat, and nutriment are necessaries of life for
man, as for animals. Every induction fairly drawn
from these conditions is applicable to human life ; but
humanity spreads out over the face of the earth, to
find a larger and freer life than belongs to any of the
animals.

70

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 71

Animals in their natural state are only consumers,
or, at best, and in only a few cases, storers of supplies.
Man is a producer. The formula of life's ^rela
tion to environment must be altered accordingly.
Besides this, man has wants which no animal shares.
Environment proves equal to his enlarged demands^
and even stimulates new desires, as if Nature herself
must have suffered neglect,— must have failed to find
application for her abundance, — if rational life had
not appeared. But for this life, the buried treasures
would have lain concealed throughout the ages;
beauty adorning the landscapes would have had re
stricted value, for lack of emotion to be stirred by
its contemplation.

Inferences based on food-supply now either become
inapplicable, or require to be greatly modified
in the form of their statement. When we reckon
up ' the necessaries ' of life, we do not now think of a
patch of cultivated ground around a homestead. The
wide world has become the area of supply. Men
in remote parts share the fruits of the earth's richest
orchards and vineyards. ' The struggle for existence '
is conspicuous enough in the history of men, but it is
encountered under conditions different from those
applicable to lower orders of life. Difficulties which
tell sorely against animal life, disappear before human
effort; difficulties which oppress mankind, are im
perceptible to animals.

Let us begin with what is common to organic life,
the better to distinguish afterwards what is special to
humanity. In all cases, the history of life is a history
of the interaction of organism and environment. Bare
life is insufficient to work out a history for itself. Life

72 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

must have its nutriment, space for movement, and
conditions under which it can seek satisfaction. With
out these, life must disappear. In the history of
vegetable life, dependence on environment is at its
maximum, supplies being drawn from a comparatively
limited area. Animal life moves over a considerable
space, competing for existing supplies. Everywhere
in Nature, animal life has its work prescribed by
pressur.e of physical wants. In remote depths of the
forest, rarely resounding to the footsteps of men, and
in the great wilderness, the pressure is felt. Here is
the symbol of the common conditions of life, — un
ceasing toil to provide for life's Avants, to ward off
life's dangers. Not always by co-operation, as in
insect life, are supplies found; more commonly by
individual struggle for ascendency over others of the
same species, and by destruction of lower species. It
is with most animals, as with the fishes in a stream,
where the largest are in advance taking the food most
attractive, the others having what is left. In the
history of rational life, there is productive power,
multiplying supplies, and providing for distribution of
commodities. The common conditions of life are not
withdraAvn or altered, so far as dependence on nutri
ment is concerned ; but new conditions of supply are
superadded. Man sows and reaps, toils and gathers.
Multiplication of the fruits of the earth, and increase
of flocks and herds, provide for extension of food-
supply, whilst facilities of transit prove of such value,
that a railroad may deliver from famine.

More exact formula are needed, if these differences
are to be rightly estimated, as bearing on a theory of
natural history. Animal life has its experience

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 73

determined by its sensibility, muscular activity, and
fixed environment. Rational life lifts the physical
into new relations, by multiplication of supplies, and
largely creates its own environment by regard to
possibilities of increase under the laws of Nature.
Search, struggle, and consequently the ' survival of
the fittest,' are characteristic of animal life. Supply
is limited ; craving rules ; and, unwittingly to the
animals, advance in organic life results. Rational
life is not severed from physical need ; but the laws
of Nature are so interpreted and applied as to modify
the conditions. While this remains possible, Nature's
supplies steadily grow, to meet advancing demands,
even though limits of production are clearly within
sight. Supply is no longer restricted to Avhat an
urgent appetite finds ready to hand ; but is prepared
for, produced, and gathered in. Man toils, and waits,
and at times, is rewarded with a hundred-fold. Soil
and seeds, implements of handicraft, and machinery
for working up raw material, are only primary forms
in which, by anticipation, we express food and cloth
ing. The most dependent form of organism, being
linked with a rational life, becomes the least de
pendent. The highest life meets life's demands by
forethought and effort. This gives a new aspect to
natural history, which must greatly modify the
theoretic significance of ' the struggle for existence,'
as it bears on the general problem of life on the
earth.

The appearance of rational life has so widely
affected the natural history of the earth, as to tell
largely on the lower forms of life. Human life
maintains its position all over the world. As man's

74 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

influence extends, the struggle for existence meets
a check previously unknown. Development of life
takes new directions, under a guiding power which is
the main factor in determining results. Only by
making full account of man's work, can we have a com
pleted theory of the evolution of life on the earth.

Man largely modifies, and even makes, his own
environment. In the history of human effort,
society itself becomes an organisation in which
personal rights are sustained and vindicated. Under
co-operation in industrial enterprise, and in the
government of civil life, 'environment' begins to
wear a variety of aspects. For lower forms of life,
environment proves a dominating force controlling
vital movement. Without it, the seed were only a
lifeless thing, dry as a particle of sand. Hence the
prominence of environment in the literature of
Evolution. On the other hand, it is equally clear,
as Eimer has admirably maintained, in pleading for
modification of theoretic teaching as to environment,
that evolution proceeds 'according to the laws of
organic growth.' L While there is no exception to
the law of dependence of life on outward conditions,
it is equally clear that the laws of organic growth
are such as to favour advancing development. There
is double action disclosed, when we speak of the
potency of environment and of the inherent energy
of life. Life itself is the moving power. Environ
ment only fixes the conditions which vital move
ment encounters, and to which it must adapt itself.
Neither does life account for environment, nor en-

1 Organic Evolution as the Result of the Inheritance of Acquired
Characters, by Professor Eimer, of Tubingen.

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 75

vironment account for life. By logical necessity, our
thought must get behind both, for an explanation
of Nature.

We may indeed speak — in a sense we must speak
— of the 'action' of environment, as we do of the
action of life ; but the term is used in quite different
senses in these two cases. Life is greater than
its surroundings, however dependent upon them.
' Nature,' regarded as distinct from life, is, at best, a
mere unproductive wilderness. Environment as a
separate entity is an impossible conception ; life is in
the midst. Thus is our definition of ' environment '
constantly shifting, for as we rise in the scale, environ
ment of life includes even the lower forms of life
on which the higher life feeds. Whatever is yet to
be said as to efficient causes in Nature, the causality
of life itself wears quite different aspects, according
as the life considered is organic or rational. That a
certain mastery belongs to environment, even human
history is ever testifying; but this mastery yields,
before the powers of the rational agent. By in
terpretation of Nature's laws, man makes a new use
of Nature's supplies. He reads the laws of supply, in
the form of inductions as to Nature's potentialities.
Thus he has steadily extended his hold on possessions,
multiplying comforts and advantages, notwithstanding
all the evils which cling to our individual and our
social life.

Still, Nature invariably makes large demands upon
effort, for satisfaction of life's wants. Beyond this,
Nature exacts much even in distribution of her gifts.
While a superabundance of life is provided, much of
it is sacrificed as an essential condition for general

76 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

advance. In one view, the development of life
appears as an end ; in another, a vast amount of life
on the earth appears only as a means to that end ;
and not until the responsible rational life is con
templated, can we speak of life which is an end in
itself, never to be used as a means to an end — not
even under a law of self-sacrifice. Yet so great is
the struggle everywhere apparent, that the life which
survives, works out its deliverance by a supreme
effort. How large is the reading of this law, we
are not yet in a position to make out. Manifestly,
however, sacrifice of life is greater, the lower the life
is in the scale of being; the higher life advances,
the more fully is its preservation secured. In the
case of human life, the law of its preservation has as
sumed even ethical form. Keeping these differences
fully in view, the law of conflict, affecting the his
tory of life itself, remains conspicuous. With large
advantage for our knowledge of the laws of Nature,
has general attention been turned by Darwin on the
struggle for existence. A fuller understanding of the
exactions of Nature, has given a deeper knowledge of
the possibilities of organic development. The harvest
of life has become more varied and rich to our view,
as the result of a wider range of vision. ' Struggle
for existence ' was antecedent by long ages to man's
cultivation of the field ; and harvest had succeeded
harvest in more remote times, as they have in times
more recent. Silent ages had been fruitful in ever-
increasing measure, before the epoch came when
man lifted up his tools on the earth. Ever since
that epoch, the noise of his work has waxed louder
and louder. While lower life still flourishes in the

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 77

solitudes and in the silent regions of Nature, man
goes along the noisy highway, bent on new achieve
ments.

The secrets of Nature are being incessantly trans
ferred to the records of science. Nevertheless, the
more we know, the more impressive becomes the
region of the unknown. When the origin of the in
dividual life has been discovered in the germ-cell, it
is through recesses of the unknown that there comes
at length the familiar form. Concentration on lower
phases of life, has largely expanded our conceptions
of the whole system of life. To the scientific spirit,
the unknown must ever have an alluring power.
Without sense of this, the true value of our inheritance
of knowledge cannot be estimated. The known has
its attraction, only as it stands over against the un
known — the sealed treasury of a future inheritance.

Hence negative positions help to our understanding
of positive. The restrictions of environment show
the potency of living growth. Life's power of adapta
tion to external demands, becomes increasingly sur
prising, as the researches of natural history are con
tinued. The quiet life, long since vanished from its
place in the earth, has left its testimony in the face of
the living. Rational intelligence can read it there, as
plainly as it reads the printed page. Life's power of
adaptation now stands an accepted truth, ever coming
out more clearly to view, as we see life itself in relation
to the background which Nature supplies. As action
and reaction advance, a higher life appears ; and with
this, much of life itself is thrown into the background
of environment, providing for life's need. Organic
advance carries larger variety into the orders of life.

EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

The lower life, being the more abundantly produced
is also largely sacrificed for the sake of the higher.

Domestication of animals has brought to focus
varieties of evidence guiding to scientific conclusions.
The facts so utilised, being generally familiar, need
not have extended reference. Some special line of
scientific observation may best servo requirements
Let us take the changes occurring in ' the young stage
of some osseous fishes,' as those wore traced by Agassiz
Iis observations include changes in the structure of
ishes, changes in the tail, in development of
pigment cells, and transposition of an eye from one
side of the head to the other. These are incidents
in the adaptation of the young of flat fishes to the
modes of life peculiar to the species at a later stage
The change of situation of the eye will strikingly
illustrate the power of adaptation claimed for all life
Young flounders first swim vertically, as most fishes
do and only after a time turn over on their side
While still in the egg, and for some time after
hatching, the eyes of the two sides are placed sym
metrically on each side of the longitudinal axis'
The change of position of one of the eyes, so as to
place both on what is to bo the upper side, is effected
very early m life,' while all the facial bones of the
skull are sti 1 cartilagenous. The first change of
position of the eye to be transferred is its slight
advance towards the snout; this is soon followed "by
slight movement of rotation.' When the young

ot ye™ m,profile> 'th° cye °n the biM side £

now slightly above and in advance of that on the
coloured side. With increasing age, the eye on the
blind side rises h:gher and higher towards the median

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 79

longitudinal line of the head, a larger and larger part
of the eye becoming visible from the coloured side,
when the embryo is seen in profile, until the eye of
the blind side has, for all practical purposes, passed
over to the coloured side.' After this change has
occurred, the dorsal fin 'extends along the head
towards the nostrils,' ' thus finding its way behind the
eye which has come from the blind side,' as if pre
venting return of the eye to the normal position.
These evidences of adaptation stand out quite clearly,
and are the more valuable that they are quite apart
from modifications obviously in the line of evolution.
They afford illustration of environment leading to
adaptation, and heredity providing for continuity of
adaptation in the life of the species. Of the two sides
of the relation, constituted by environment on the
one side, and by life on the other, the laws of organic
growth are most important, leading forward to actual
achievement in life-history. But, the demands of
environment are necessary for calling into action,
and for directing, those forces capable of producing
modification of organism.1

A general view of the relations of life and environ-

1 The record of these observations by Agassiz will be found in a
series of three papers, published in the Proceedings of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the first in 1877, the last in 1882.
The observations on the transference of the eye, are given in the
second paper, published June 1878, in volume xiii. of the Proceed
ings. In the Laboratory of the Marine Biological Association of
the United Kingdom, at Plymouth, my son, Mr. W. L. Calderwood,
Director, has shown me examples of the different stages of transition
in course of development of the fish. Mr. J. T. Cunningham,
Naturalist to the Association, shows very interesting examples of
deposit of pigment cells on the white side of the fish, consequent on
its exposure to light.

80 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

ment, will guard against interpretation of facts exclu
sively by reference to struggle for existence, conse
quent on the relations of numbers to the food-supply.
Granting Darwin's induction that 'a struggle for
existence inevitably follows from the high rate at
which all organic beings tend to increase/1" allowance
must be made for wider modification of organism
than this implies, as well as for limitation in repro
duction as life advances in the scale. Life is too rich
in variety to find adequate explanation of its history
in the mere balancing of numbers with food-supplies.
Life's potentiality, appearing in the laws of growth, of
adaptation, and of heredity, presents attraction for
the most exacting and most daring scientific investiga
tion. In no life is progress to be explained exclusively
by reference to amount of food -supply. Differentiation
goes on more freely and more widely in form, than
this would suggest. Darwin has said that the term
' struggle for existence ' must be used in ' a large and
metaphorical sense'; so must ' environment ' be read
much more largely than could be suggested by mere
dependence on materials for nutriment.

When the distinction between animal life and
rational is specially considered, the difference in
relation to environment becomes more marked than
at any prior stage. Dependence on environment
continues for the highest life, as in the history of
lower forms, but it differs greatly in degree and
manifestation. In the case of the animals, we see
them mastered by environment ; in the case of man, we
witness a mastery over environment impossible in the
history of lower life. Of this mastery, evidence lies

1 Origin of Species, p. 46.

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 81

all around. Cultivated fields, varieties of crop, the
highways, the dwellings, and busy centres of industry,
offer familiar testimony. In a large sense man
originates his own environment. It is to his reproach,
if he is mastered by circumstances. He is master, as
no other living being on the earth can be. Perspective
requires that the commonplaces of our life be con
templated at every point, as they appear in relation
with the facts of animal history. Darwin's observa
tions proved how largely power, in its aspect of
muscular development, determines ascendency; we
must here give prominence to power of a higher kind.
Only thus does the order in Nature become visible.
Everywhere, power in the life affects its own relations
to environment. Continual change thus appears in
application of fixed laws, consequent on higher potency
in the life. Progress ever increases facilities for advance.
Environment is at first Nature's gift; afterwards, it
is what man has made it, by rational appreciation of
Nature's laws. Civilisation reacts on the world itself.
What is a railway in Central Africa, but nineteenth
century civilisation carried into the midst of the
country furthest in the rear ; the results of thought,
contrivance, and skill brought to the doors where
their presence is least expected. Civilisation gives
direct help to those least favoured in the race.
Science and skill are bridging the chasm which severs
barbarian from civilised. Abundance of the gifts of
Nature, lying around the abodes of savage tribes, pre
sents a large part of the attraction to this effort. Chris
tian benevolence moves on the same tracks, but it
comes from greater depths in the soul, and aims at
higher results in the lives of suffering men. Engineer-

EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

ing, engrossed in pioneer work, accomplishes a feat
beyond its own calculations. Working immediately in
the service of commerce, and simultaneously in the
service of a large-hearted humanity, it leads the van of
human progress. After the daring and the endurance
of the explorer, come the best results of mechanical
contrivance; after these, the rivalries of civilised
nations ; after these, all that is best in generous feel
ing and purpose. All progress is thus cosmopolitan ;
yet is it painfully manifest, all along the way, that
there has been ceaseless struggle, untold suffering,
manifold wrongs !

' Struggle for existence ' has in this way a distinct
meaning for each type of life. Each living creature
must seek supply for its own wants, and failing, must
suffer. Domestication of animals has tended to
obscure, not a little, Nature's laws, which are more
manifest as we look abroad on the earth, aided
largely by naturalists who have spent their energies
in discovering the rich varieties of life on the globe.
Entomologists and butterflies are, however, widely
apart, even when most closely associated. The love of
adventure, characteristic of the naturalists of our day,
testifies to the contrast between ' Nature ' in its lower
sense, and in its higher ;— between 'natural selection/
and 'Nature's' higher work, when rational power is
moving over the face of the earth. Rational life makes
a new epoch in the history of environment. Progress
has^ a new history in presence of a new agency.
Rational life in itself, and by itself, discloses a poten
tiality previously inoperative. All ' Nature ' becomes
a_ larger thing, when 'Nature' '"Sdudes humanity.
For long ages, this greater amplitude of being has

THE RELATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT TO LIFE 83

subsisted ; but even now, humanity has only broken
through the surface of things, penetrating a little way
into the secrets of Nature, to find by fresh gain, that
secrets lie deeper still, threatening to baffle the efforts
of men the acutest and most nobly consecrated.

CHAPTER V

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION

THE persistence of species is matter of common obser
vation. Hence the novelty of the thesis which Darwin
announced, and the difficulty of giving credence to
his theory, as if variation were quite as much a feature
in Nature as persistence. When, however, Darwin
stated his contention in these terms, ' that species are
not immutable,' it became apparent that denial of
the persistence of species was not involved. Darwin
viewed organic life on a large scale, contemplating
' the affinities which connect together whole groups of
organisms.' He said, ' I had never deliberately applied
these views to a species taken singly ' ; l and he made
it his chief matter of congratulation that he had
shaken the belief in the separate creation of species.

Laws of inheritance are conspicuous in the order of
Nature. These laws are closely related with variation,
as Spencer has shown.2 In order that there may be
true progress, acquisition must become a permanent
possession. Without a law of inheritance, structural
gain would have been restricted to the individual.
Every life would have been doomed to struggle, as if
nothing had been achieved by progenitors. Depend
ence on ancestors implies gain to offspring from

1 Descent of Man, p. 2.

2 Herbert Spencer's Principles of Biology, i. p. 256.

84

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 85

acquisitions of parental life. Individual life receives
and transmits again. While, however, variations are
possible, sudden changes in the structure of organism
do not appear. ' Natural selection acts only by the
accumulation of slight modifications, . . . each profit
able to the individual under its conditions of life.' 1
The work of the naturalist has thus two sides, the
one to_trace 'the long and graduated succession' of
modifications ; the other to discover the laws of
heredity in accordance with which slight modifica
tions may be transmitted. Variation is one side, trans
mission only the other side of the same movement.
Modified structure ' will impress some corresponding
modification on the structures and polarities of its
units.'2 ' The units and the aggregates must act and
react on each other.' 3

A breadth of fresh light has been thrown over the
difficult problem of heredity, by extended research into
the minute variations that appear in the history of
species, and of families belonging to the same species.
By concentration on detailed illustrations it has
become easier to trace the lines of reproduction. It
has proved possible to mark the rise of slight variations
and to trace their continuance in the life of progeny.
That there are fixed laws of inheritance has thus
become matter of certainty. It seems natural to
suppose that favourable variations in structure would
tell upon the reproductive elements. But a theory
of heredity proves as difficult to make out as a theory
of acquisition. Indeed, the difficulty as to heredity
seems even greater, inasmuch as the action of

1 Origin of Species, p. 211.

2 Spencer's Principles of Biology, i. p. 256. 3 Ibid.

86 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

environment, as external and lying open to obser
vation, greatly aids research, whereas the laws of
heredity belong essentially to those processes of
germinal growth which Nature has concealed. Never
theless, it is certain that the same course of investi
gation which leads first to admission of variation, leads
further to recognition of inheritance.

In view of the leading question before us, — Man's
place in Nature,— as that must be concerned more
particularly with rational power, it is well to mark
that our study of heredity is directed, in the first
instance at least, upon the laws of organic existence.
There is a physical basis on which the laws of heredity
operate. Organism presents at the outset the entire
field of observation, whatever questions as to mental
inheritance may afterwards arise. Structure and
functions include the whole area of research, when
now we turn to the phenomena of reproduction, as
these may explain the origin of individual forms,
bearing visible tokens of parentage.

The physical basis of inheritance is seen in the
cell-life, in the germ-plasm, and the germ-cells, or,
even lower still, in the ' physiological unit.' When
differentiation of organic forms has been somewhat
advanced, the physical basis is extended by the
blending of male and female elements, after which
the growth of the fertilised ovum passes through the
several stages of embryonic life. What was hidden
in the germ-cell is revealed at birth. The potenti
ality of the fertilised ovum is disclosed in the indivi
duality of the newly-born life. This gives in outline
the range of research, as we proceed to deal with the
laws of organic reproduction. Questions as to intel-

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTI N 87

lectual life are quite apart from the present stage of
inquiry.

Considering how far these earlier investigations are
removed from the problem of man's place in Nature,
the conditions of our argument do not require more
extended treatment of the subject here, than will
suffice for dealing with the question of continuity in
natural history, as that may bear on the most
elaborate types of organic structure. We require
only sufficient fulness of treatment to secure acquaint
ance with ascertained facts, and to guard adequately
our later inferences, when dealing with the higher
forms of life, as these give proof of the action of
intelligence.

There is nothing more marvellous in Nature, as a
manifestation of latent potentiality, than the germ-life
out of which an elaborate organism is unfolded. The
more extended the observation directed upon it, and
the more careful the thought given to all the aspects
of vital procedure involved in its development, the
more must the mind be filled with astonishment. A
very minute nucleus is the starting-point for the most
elaborate organism ! The fact is the same, whether
the example taken be the organism of the dog, of the
horse, of the ape, or of man. In the realm of material
existence, ' vital organisation is Nature's masterpiece,
summing up in itself all her other processes.' 1 Every
physiologist grants that ' the fertilised egg is one of
the greatest wonders within our knowledge.' 2 In the
well-chosen words of A. R. Wallace, — ' No thoughtful
person can contemplate without amazement the

1 Process of Human Experience, by W. Cyples, p. 497,
The Law of Heredity, by W. K. Brooks, Baltimore, p. 312.

88 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

phenomena presented by the development of animals.
We see the most diverse forms, — a mollusc, a frog1,

* ^ O'

and a mammal, — arising from apparently identical
primitive cells, and progressing for a time by very
similar initial changes, but thereafter each pursuing
its highly complex and often circuitous course of
development, with unerring certainty, by means of
laws and forces of which we are totally ignorant.'
This is the testimony from the newly-developed
department of embryological science. ' The size of
the particles which are derived from the parents,
called the male and female pronuclei, the potentiality
of which is so utterly out of proportion to their bulk,
is almost inconceivably small when compared with
the magnitude of the adult body.' l This minute
fertilised ovum from which the elaborate organism
springs, apparently a simple sphere with a pin-point
centre as the nucleus of life, is yet complex in
chemical and molecular character, and has within it
provision for unfolding all the features of differen
tiated organism common to its species. What we see
in the dog, the horse, or the ape, when maturity has
been reached, is lying in germ within the ovum from
which the life-development takes its rise. ' The
ovum, in its young condition, is obviously nothing
but a simple cell/ 2 Thus, ' it is in no way necessary
that a germ should have the character of a minia
ture.'3 The marvel is further extended, when it is
added in the words of Professor Huxley, that ' it is

1 Sir W, Turner's Address to British Association, 1889 : Nature,
vol. xl. p. 526.

2 Comparative Embryology, by F. M. Balfour, vol. i. p. 19.

Cyples's Human Experience, p. 490.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 89

very long before the body of the young human being
can be readily discriminated from that of the young
puppy.' 4

Taking next the mature organism which is the
parent life,/ there is within this fully-developed body,
a great y/triety of cells, only a limited number of
which ar/3 reproductive cells. These last constitute a
distinct- order, each having its own individual life, de
pendent, however, for its continued vitality on its place
in the parent life, and liable to modification according
to changes in that life. These reproductive cells, con
taining the promise of the corning generation, depend
for fertilisation on the union of male and female
elements. These in vital combination start the new
life-history. That the nucleus of the male cell
(spermatozoon) penetrates to the nucleus of the
female cell (ovum), has been ascertained. But
observation has not supplied data warranting further
inference, as to distinctive hereditary potency coming
from each parent. With an organism so minute,
and movements so difficult to watch, it is doubtful
whether the data are likely to be found. But it
seems clear from the facts of after life, that heredi
tary influence from both parents can be traced in the
life of the offspring.

In thus briefly stating the characteristics common to
the germ-cell of all species, including its structure and
functions, the ernbryological testimony for continuity
in organic evolution is seen to be striking, As the
seeds of the several plants are distinct in Nature, so
are the germ-cells of the several animals. From each
fertilised ovum there is developed, by progression

1 Man's Place in Nature, p. 67.

90 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

through a series of stages, a reproduction of the
species from which it has come. ' Like produces like.'
The continuity of species is demonstrated in every
birth. However true it is that, in the early period of
embryonic development, the fertilised ova of different
species, pass through transformations startlingly
analogous, the distinguishing features of the species
to which each belongs, are uniformly presented when
the embryonic development is complete. Whatever
the argument for continuity, in respect of homologous
embryonic structure and function, there lies alongside,
equally clear and constant, evidence for the persist
ence of species. Organism continues its own history
all through its procedure for reproduction.

In advance of this, we desire to see into the marvels
of germinal life, if it be possible under microscopic
observation to trace relative stages of progress, in
dicating how variation in the mature life may pass
over as an inheritance.1 Artificial fertilisation, in
combination with ordinary phenomena of embryology,
has helped. Nevertheless, conjecture and specu
lation enter considerably into the whole discussion,
provocative of much scientific controversy.

The new problem is this, How do the laws of
heredity provide, not only for continuity of species,
but for transmission of acquired characters, ' profitable
to the individual under its conditions of life'? While
the law of heredity clearly implies that ' like produces
like,' how does the likeness pass beyond the charac
teristics of the species, so as to include detailed like
ness, and even a reproduction of the minuter features
of organic form involved in family life ? That these

1 J. Arthur Thomson's Theory of Heredity, Trans. R.S.E., xvi. 91.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 91

minuter phases of likeness are reproduced, is certain,
even to the extent of reappearance of acquired
characteristics ; we seek therefore, if possible, to
ascertain how such minuteness of detail is secured.
Must we here be content to say with Darwin ' much
remains obscure,' and will long remain obscure; or,
may we hope to press inquiry further, with reason
able expectation of some addition to our certainties ?
The theory of Evolution of organic life is deeply con
cerned in this problem as to transmission of acquired
characters. That strong testimony for Evolution is
supplied by rapid improvement in the breed of
animals under the care of the stock-farmer, is certain.
The facts are so suggestive as to press onwards this
course of observation. ' The problem for consideration
is the mode in which these germ or reproductive cells
become influenced, so that after being isolated from
the cells which make the bulk of the body of
the parent, they can transmit to the offspring the
characters of the parent organism/ l

The conditions under which an answer to this
problem can be sought are such as to involve the
inquiry in great perplexity. The first thing essential
here is to keep fully in view the facts already
ascertained, having direct bearing on the problem.
As to cell life, we are assured that reproduction is
possible, in the first instance, apart from sexual
differences, by growth of the cell, involving expansion,
and multiplication, by severance of a young cell from
the parent cell, thus starting a distinct individual life
by division (parthenogenesis). Further, it seems clear
that ' the germ-cells after their isolation take no part

1 Sir W. Turner's Address : Mature, p. 52".

92 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

in the growth of the organism in which they arise,
and their chief association with the other cells of the
body is that certain of the latter are of service in their
nutrition.' l These germ-cells are thus distinct centres
of organic life, whose specific function is reproduction
of the species. The laws of heredity are the laws
of the activity of these germ-cells, as that may be
affected by the vitality and functional activity of the
mature body in which they have their sphere of exist
ence. When biological advance is such as to involve
difference of sex, there is the blending of two elements
in the new life, — amphimixis, — from the two parents.
' The act of impregnation may be described as the
fusion of the ovum and spermatozoon ; the most im
portant feature in this act appears to be the fusion
of a male and female nucleus.'2 Forthwith the
combined elements work in unison, involving pro
vision for double agency in the line of heredity.
The after progress may be that of the larva, en
compassed in food-yolk, or that of the embryo
nourished in the womb. At the other extreme of
observation, we are most familiar with the fact that
in the history of families there is in family like
ness the reappearance of the characteristics of both
parents.

Here, then, are the known conditions presenting a
problem of great perplexity. ' A single cell, out of the
millions of diversely differentiated cells which compose
the body, becomes specialised as a sexual cell ; it is
thrown off from the organism, and is capable of
producing all the peculiarities of the parent body, in

1 Sir W. Turner's Address : Nature, p. 527.

2 Comparative Embryology, by F. M. Balfotir, i. p. G9.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 93

the new individual which springs from it, by cell
division and the complex process of differentiation.'1
Much is implied in tracing to such a germ-cell
the beginning of a new individual, of whatever
species. In case of dependence on double parentage,
there is in the single life-movement a two-fold
agency, conveying a double impress, providing for
variation in the life of the offspring, impossible if
reproduction were restricted to development by
division of a single cell.

When the question arises, How is transmission of
variations possible ? the perplexities are the greatest
which gather around any biological problem, for the
germinal force is restricted to a nucleus, whose move
ments are visible only by the aid of microscopic
power. , In view of the minuteness of this cell, the
fineness of nuclear fibres in which movement first
appears, and the vastness of the organism thence
developed, we cannot marvel when we find Weismann .
say, — 'No one of the many attempts to solve the
problem . . . can be regarded as even the beginning
of a solution.' 2 And all this complexity of conditions,
combinations, and movements, be it observed, is
concerned exclusively with the origin of organic
structure, before the large question of intelligence
has even come into view. When this exclusively
organic reference is considered, there is ground for
reasonable surprise when we mark the readiness with
which a histologist adds further complications of
mental life and action. Thus Weismann says, — 'In
the higher organisms, the smallest structural details,
and the most minute peculiarities of bodily and mental

1 Weismann's Heredity, vol. i. p. 167. 2 Ibid., vol. i. p. 167.

94 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

disposition are transmitted from one generation to
another.'1 This inclusion of 'mental disposition'
shows the facility with which a vast inference may be
accepted and stated. Even in face of the gigantic
undertaking of explaining organic differentiation, it
is assumed that the whole manifestations of activity,
even intellectual and rational, are to be traced to the
ovum in which physical life-movement has its rise.
That 'the germ-cell produces all' that belongs, to
organic life, may be accepted as a maxim ; but science
is still a long distance away from any summary of
evidence which can support a wider conclusion. It
may not be unwise, therefore, to subdivide the vast
subject, postponing the problem as to 'mental dis
position,' as well as the still higher phenomena of
rational life. We prefer here, at the outset, to deal
exclusively with heredity in its earliest form, as
beginning in organism, and concerned with the
reproduction of structure and function, characteristic
of a given species.

Taking the problem in this form, there are two
available points of observation, that which looks
towards the mature organism, thence attempting to
think backwards to the germinal form ; and that which
contemplates the germ-cell, tracing thence from the
earliest chemical and molecular movements, the
elaborate course of differentiation. Darwin, as a
biologist, trained in comparative observation of form,
colour, and functions, naturally prefers the stand
point supplied by the mature life, leaning upon
evidence of variation scattered over the annals of
natural history. Weismann, as a histologist, skilled
in microscopic research, naturally passes to the cell

1 Essays on Heredity, vol. i. p. 167.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 95

theory, giving unceasing attention to a field remote
from that in which Darwin was a master. The
choice of standpoint marks an obvious advantage for
Weismann. He is a skilled explorer in the midst of
the intricacies of the early stages of germ -action, and
of development of life during the embryonic period.
These two fields of observation must at length coalesce,
if scientific results are to be reached. Each step in
advance, from whichever side taken, must carry some
promise of reconciliation, for it is impossible to doubt
that all organic variations must be included, and that
all of them are unfolded from the germ- cell within
which individual life begins.

We are still, however, engaged in conjectures here,
and must be content for the present to consider the
balance of probabilities. Darwin adopted the hypo
thesis that the germ-cell receives contributions from
all the cells of the body, and thus contains the germs
of analogous parts for reproduction in the offspring.
This is the hypothesis known as Pangenesis, deriva
tion from the whole, in order to transmission of the
whole. The cell is taken as a miniature of the body.
This theory ' assumes that gemmules are thrown off
from each different cell or unit throughout the body,
which retain the characters of the cells from which
they spring ; that the gemmules aggregate themselves
either to form, or to become included within, the
reproductive cells ; and that in this manner they,
and the characters which they convey, are capable of
being transmitted in a dormant state to successive
generations, and to reproduce in them the likeness of
their parents, grandparents, and still older ancestors.'1
This hypothesis, though conjectural, faces the demand

1 Sir W. Turner's Address, p. 3.

96 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

as to the mode of securing the result. Brooks has
well said: 'A satisfactory theory of heredity must
explain what it is in the structure and organisation of
the ovum, which determines that each ovum should
produce its proper organism.'1

On this hypothesis of Pangenesis, Darwin seeks to
account for transmission of minute variations, along
with those essential to the species. Tracing the laws
of inheritance as these are suggested by comparative
biology, he gives prominence to such points as the
following :— ' Two distinct elements are included under
the term " inheritance,"— some appearing at birth,
some " transmitted through the early years of life,"
which are developed only at maturity, or during old
age.'2 Thus the germ life discloses its potentiality in
the line of growth after birth onwards to maturity.
Even distinctions between successive periods of life are
maintained in this way. ' A new character appearing
in a young animal, whether it lasts through life or is
only transient, will, in general, reappear in the off
spring at the same age, and last for the same time.'3
' Most of our domestic races have been formed by the
accumulation of many slight variations.'4 'All these
cases are intelligible on the hypothesis of pangenesis ;
for they depend on the gemmules of certain parts,
although present in both sexes, becoming, through
the influence of domestication, either dormant or
developed in either sex.'5 From these illustrations it
will appear how much any marked gain in structure
and function must depend on inheritance of acquired

1 The Laio of Heredity, by W. K. Brooks, p. 40.

2 The Descent of Man, p. 227.

3 Ibid., p. 228. 4 Ibid., p. 230. 5 Ibid., p. 231.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 97

characters. The danger here, in respect of method,
is that we are hypothetically inferring unknown
organic procedure, so as to meet the demands of
external observation.

Weismann enters into the hidden mechanism and
its movements, with the view of deciphering the
structural details, and the phases of activity within
the germ-cells, which may carry an explanation of
development both before and after birth. This leads
to the heart of the question, allowing for Darwin's
observations being held in reserve for a time. Weis
mann starts from the generally accepted positions in
the cell theory, here to be carefully kept in view,
that all life begins from germ-plasm, and assumes its
primary individual form in a germ-cell ; that for all
life, germ-cells have a common structure, so that it
is impossible to distinguish species by reference to the
characteristics of these cells ; and yet, that they have,
in their distinctive constitution, the germinal provision
for all that belongs to their species. As to the origin
of these germ-cells, the ordinary hypothesis ' assumes
that the organism produces germ-cells afresh, again
and again, and that it produces them entirely from
its own substance.'1 Weismann denies this. Con
centrating on the severance of these germ-cells from
the other cells of the body, and upon the distinctive-
ness of their function as reproductive cells, he adopts
the hypothesis of ' the continuity of the germ-plasm '
as the causal energy giving rise to individual life in
successive generations. Jager, in discussing Pan-
genesis, had spoken of ' the reservation of germi
nal protoplasm.' The alternatives apparently open,

1 Essays upon Heredity, vol. i. p. 174.
G

98 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Weismann states thus :— ' Either the substance of the
parent germ-cell is capable of undergoing a series of
changes, which, after the building up of a new indi
vidual, leads back again to identical germ-cells; or
the germ- cells are not derived at all, as far as their
essential and characteristic substance is concerned,
from the body of the individual, but they are derived
directly from the parent germ-cell.' 1 The latter alterna
tive is the one he prefers. Weismann's hypothesis is
' that in each ontogeny, a part of the specific germ-
plasm is not used up in the construction of the body
of the offspring, but is reserved unchanged for the
formation of the germ-cells of the following genera
tion.' 2 According to this view, ' the nuclear substance
is the sole bearer of hereditary tendencies';3 these,
on the hypothesis, are not drawn from the parent
body. Acquired variations cannot be transmitted. A
start is obtained only by union of the ' nuclear sub
stance of the male and female parents,'4 'the fusion
of two hereditary tendencies.'5 On this hypothesis,
the germ-plasm becomes the centre of vitality, having
true continuity of existence — a kind of ' immortality,'
he would say. Individual life has thus only its
limited term, advancing to maturity, thereafter yield
ing to decay, and departing without even handing on
acquired variations, ' profitable to the individual under
its conditions of life.' Such, in outline, is Weismann's
hypothesis. He does not claim that it is more than
hypothesis, saying, 'it is possible that continuity of
the germ-plasm does not exist in the manner in which
I imagine that it takes place, for no one can at present

1 Essay upon Heredity, vol. i. p. 170. 2 Ibid., p. 170,

3 Ibid., p. 180. * Ibid., p. 181. 6 Ibid., vol. ii. p. 111.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 99

decide whether all the ascertained facts agree with it,
and can be explained by it.'1

Whatever may be the ultimate verdict on this bold
hypothesis, the value of Weismann's work is such
as must largely influence thought as to the perplexing
problems involved. Little can be done here beyond
stating difficulties which seem still to hang over
the question, and showing some appreciation of the
suggestiveness of what has been written. Darwin is
strong in his array of natural history evidence for
transmission of acquired variations. If that evidence
be carefully considered, it will seem impossible to
deny that acquisitions of one generation reappear in
the next. There is an array of facts which clearly
establish the conclusion. To the force of this testi
mony, theories of the life-history of germ-plasm must
yield. On the same ground, the theory of Evolution
by natural selection is sustained. Natural law pro
vides for organic advance, and with this must be
included heredity, securing continuity of useful acquisi
tions. When, however, we turn to Darwin's theory of
pangenesis,' it seems impossible to extend to it the
same accep nee. To suggest that the result is secured
by all the ceils of the parent body sending gemmules
or germs representative of their distinctive character
to be assimilated and absorbed in the individual germ-
cell, is to present a hypothesis too cumbrous, too
mechanical, too much out of line with the analogies
of cell development, now well ascertained. That a
cell, only a small fraction of an inch in diameter —
and even the microscopic nucleus within that cell —
should be the germ of the most elaborate organism, is

1 Essays upon Heredity, vol. i. p. 1 76. 2 Vide p. 95.

100 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

so astonishing as to baffle conception. To suppose
that inheritance of the characteristics of the species,
and of variations acquired by immediate progenitors,
is secured by planting a representative gem mule within
the germ-cell, is to make too large a demand on
imagination. There seems little doubt that Darwin's
hypothesis as to pangenesis must be abandoned.

When next we turn to Weismann's hypothesis,
there are many serious difficulties in the way of its
acceptance. The chief of these come from the field
of observation occupied by the naturalist. When
Darwin's hypothesis is compared with that of Weis-
mann, each is strong in the field with which its
author is most familiar; each is weak on the side
towards which his research has been least directed.
But Weismann has this great advantage, that his
chosen field of observation places him in relation
with the problems of cell-life. His hypothesis is
favoured in its start by the fact that the germ-cells
are severed from the somatic cells, being set apart
for the function of reproduction. While pangenesis
suffers by diffusion of the work over the body,
Weismann's theory gains by concentrating on these
cells. Too much, however, seems to be made of
' isolation ' of the germ-cells, which certainly are not
severed from the vascular and nerve systems. Allow
ance, therefore, must be made for possible modifica
tions in their structure in this way. The changes
within the nucleus, the sending out of so-called ' polar '
bodies, the splitting of the nuclear fibres, and all
the other characteristics of cellular movements, favour
the hypothesis that the germ-cell contains within
itself, however dependent on the parent body, the

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 101

main secret of subsequent development. There
seems much that is helpful in the suggestion which
Weismann tells us operated on his mind in the
course of his researches. He says : ' The facts of
the transmission of hereditary tendencies from both
parents to the child, together with the fact of
parthenogenesis,1 induced me at an early date to
look for the essence of fertilisation, neither in the
vitalisation of the egg, nor in the union of two
opposed polar forces, but rather in the fusion of two
hereditary tendencies.'2 This last seems to state
exactly what the facts require. At the same time,
the aid here found towards explanation of procedure
of germ-cells, is obtained at the cost of the hypothesis
of isolation of germ-plasm from the action of the
parent body. The fusion of two hereditary tendencies
affords, under the laws of heredity, support for
progressiveness in organic life ; but ' transmission of
hereditary tendencies from both parents to the child,'
implies something more than transmission of the
common characteristics of the species, and thus
requires modification of the hypothesis. This demand
is further strengthened by what is known of the
dependence of offspring on parental vigour, and the
evil consequences to progeny of diminished health
in either parent, as well as by the mass of evidence
affecting the lower animals, accumulated by Darwin,
Wallace, and other naturalists.

Passing now from the sphere of microscopic
research, we next take a more general view of the
phenomena of heredity, as concerned with organic

1 P. 91.

2

Jc. yi.

Essays on Heredity, 2nd edition, vol. ii. p. 111.

102 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

advance in the history of the earth. There are
three main considerations supplying an explanation
of the progress of life. These are the laws of
organic growth, the laws of natural selection, and
the laws of heredity. Under the first, we recognise
the force everywhere operating for biological advance.
Eimer1 has done admirable service in concentrating
on the laws of growth, when attention had become
engrossed with natural selection. In course of his
research, Eimer has brought into prominence, ' inherit
ance of acquired characters,' thus supporting Darwin
against Weismann, who had reduced inheritance
of acquired characters to a minimum. The first
grand impression made upon us in observing the
facts now ascertained is, that all animal growth, as
presented in individual life, tends towards the per
fecting of its own specific form, as it advances towards
maturity. ' An organism is developed according to a
plan which seems at every moment to be in advance
of the stage actually reached/2 The life-movement
has a fixed destination. Persistence of species is
the assured result lying nearest the surface, and just
beneath, appears the evidence that all individual
growth, whatever the species to which it belongs,
tends towards the perfect model of its own order of
life. Thus when we have reached the third con
sideration named, it will appear that heredity is in
its first intention a law of biological advance. Life of
all orders is, in course of the individual development,
unconsciously striving towards a clear gain in

1 Organic Evolution and Laws of Organic Growth, by Dr. G. H.
Theodore Eimer.

2 Human Experience, Cyples, p. 495.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 103

structure and function. Such is the coherence and
solidarity of species, as illustrated in separation of
germ-cells for reproduction, that the acquisitions by
the individual prove gain for the species. If there be,
beyond this, as most of us are now convinced there
is, evidence for origin of species by natural selection,
we are only finding that the first intention expands
into enlarged intention, making provision for a general
organic advance. Whether we are to interpret this
movement according to a quicker rate of progress,
such as Darwin has suggested, or according to a
slower rate, such as Weismann propounds as the
correct time-measurement, the general law of advance
stands out as a leading feature in Nature. Nature's
movement is one of evolution. And even if the
slower time-measurement be thought the more
accurate, there is striking testimony showing that
deterioration has many checks placed upon it, while
progression has not only many safeguards, but many
active supports. The general law thus remains
clear, however many the checks encountered in its
application ; hence the aid we find for interpretation
of Nature's methods in the law of natural selection.
Apparent hindrances are brought into line for service
under the first supreme law of advance. The struggle
for existence, with all its records of superabundant
production of life, and of subsequent destruction of
life, works for development of species as a whole.
When at length heredity is included in its full
significance, accepting Spencer's assumption ' that the
units of which any organism is built up have an
innate tendency to arrange themselves into the shape
of that organism,' the young life is seen to receive and

104 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

preserve all the results of unconscious strivings of
organism towards the perfect form of the species.

Hitherto we have been dealing with biology as
it may be interpreted by reference to the laws of
organism. We have included human life without
reserve, no occasion appearing to draw any distinction,
save that which is concerned with elaborate structural
differentiation. Now we must introduce the out
standing feature of contrast appearing in rational
life.

An entirely new question here emerges connected
with interpretation of the laws of heredity. If we
have touched the limits of organic development, we
have not included the grand characteristic of human
life. We have contemplated heritage as that can be
stated in terms of structure and its functions ; but we
have still to deal with a larger inheritance, the
possession of every member of our race. In this we
find a new feature, giving to individuality a place not
recognised at any lower stage of existence. Each
member of the human race has a rational life, distinct
from that which belongs to physical structure. This
is the difference intended, when we say that reason is
man's grandest inheritance. Granting all that has
been said as to continuity of germ-plasm, there appears,
beyond this, another continuity in conscious life. The
organic does not pass into this, but is ' discontinuous '
with that which is persistent on a higher plane.
Reason belongs to the heritage of the individual,
and is conspicuous above all other characteristics of
human life. We seek, now, the new phases of heredity
to be recognised when this grand distinction is in
cluded. The question is, can we trace heredity in the

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 105

history of conscious intelligence ? The scientific in
vestigations just sketched seem insufficient to reach
this life. The whole scope of that research is seen to
bear on organic action. If ' mental dispositions ' are
introduced, it is only in a casual way; the grand
problem of a rational life has not been definitely
placed in position. If we are referred to ' the proto
plasm of judgment and of predication,' the protoplasm
is unknown, the functions have never been observed.
When, by process of fertilisation, a germ-cell is started
on the movement to issue in the mature structure
belonging to the species, this movement, as organic,
does not provide for anything beyond somatic life. If
more be claimed, it is necessary to demonstrate either
that reflection belongs to the functions of organ
ism; or that new conditions add to and transform
the human germ. Neither Darwin nor Weismann
faces the serious difficulty arising here. Either we
must hold that the egg from which the human in
dividual springs, exhausts the energy belonging to its
nucleus, in somatic results, as in the history of lower
organisms ; or, we must hold that the human egg, or
germ-cell, is somehow different in structure and func
tions from all other germ-cells, so as to provide for
rational life. Biological science is placed in peculiar
difficulty here. The whole tendency of scientific
thought is adverse to the latter hypothesis. The
success of the Evolution theory, as explaining origin
of species, has given additional force to this tendency.
The facts of our conscious life must supply the
ultimate test, just as the facts of natural history, in
the hands of Darwin and Wallace, have proved the
test of hypotheses as to the hereditary principle in

106 EVOLUTION AND MAX'S PLACE IX XATURE

gerin life, when somatic results only were under con
sideration. The histologist cannot work indepen
dently of the psychologist, any more than of the
naturalist. We cannot interpret the early stages of
life, without reference to its advanced stages. In
dealing with the question of origin, we must make
account of what has been originated. In the attempt
to do this in the case of man, a great additional per
plexity is imposed upon biological science. What the
microscopic nucleus provides for in respect of the
physical life is so marvellously beyond possible re
presentation on our part, that it is impossible, without
serious perplexity for biological science, to state even
in outline the vast additional work to be assigned to
the nucleus, if it is held to contain provision for all
the mental faculties. The complexity involved in
the hypothesis of pangenesis,1 great as thac, is, is
simplicity itself, in comparison with the complexity
we have here. Darwin at least concentrated on the
germ-cell, and considered how it may contain the
germ of the mature structure, thinking mainly of that.
But after including all that belongs to bodily structure
and function, we threaten to transcend all available
powers of scientific investigation, when we propose to
seek, besides, in a microscopic nucleus, the origin of
all the powers of rational life. This hypothesis
makes vast demands on faith, which must reckon
heavily against its acceptance.

All questions as to evolution of intelligence in
course of the natural history of life on the earth, must
be reserved for a later stage in this inquiry. For the
present, we deal exclusively with the laws of heredity,

i P. 95.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 107

having application in the germ-cell out of which the
individual human life arises. So long as we are con
cerned exclusively with somatic life, we regard man
simply as a member of the animal kingdom. Our
data are these: the structure of the germ-cell, the
effects of its fertilisation, the union of two hereditary
principles, and thereby the start of organic movement,
which is the opening stage for the development of
individual life. To this origin we trace the entire
somatic results, giving all the characteristics of the
organic life of the species, and, in addition, carrying
evidence of distinctive heritage from both parents.
The organic movement, begun in the germ-cell,
completes itself in the mature embryo. Thereafter,
the young life, under new conditions, develops the
mature organism of the species. In comparative
biology, this completes the movement. If we go
further than this, we advance beyond the scientific
basis afforded by embryology. When we propose, in
the case of man, inclusion of mental powers, there is
need for additional evidence, which must imply either
additional structure, or some explanation beyond the
structure of the germ-plasm. Research into the re
lations of structure and function, has driven from the
field hypotheses such as Jager's postulating a ' soul-
stuff'' coming from 'decomposition of albumen in
various parts of the body.' l To keep the present line
of inquiry perfectly clear, it is necessary to remark, as
an interpretation of the scientific position reached,
that it is not alleged that there is anything strikingly
distinctive in the structure of the human ovum, or in
its dependence on double hereditary principles, or in

1 'Zur Pangenesis,'by Professor Dr. C. Jager. Kosmos, iv. 376, 1879.

108 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

the conditions of embryonic life. On the contrary, it
is held to be beyond dispute that the analogies of
animal life are maintained throughout the embryonic
development of the child.

This being granted, the question of inheritance in
the case of man, is raised into a conspicuous position.
The evidence for inclusion of all that belongs to bodily
life, seems to carry some testimony for exclusion of
the wide range of mental powers. This testimony can
be put concisely, and can be estimated with great
advantage, by reference to recent advances in em
bryology. All the advantages of visibility are gained
by turning to the plates in Balfour's Comparative
Embryology, pp. 265-269; in Darwin's Descent of
Man, p. 10 ; and in Komanes's Darwin and After
Darwin, p. 153. The resemblance between the human
embryo, and the embryos of animal species, is apt to
appear closer than it is. But allowing to the utmost
for this, how small can be held to be the severance,
physically and physiologically ! When we place over
against this, the vastness of contrast presented by the
rational powers of man, this closeness of resemblance
belonging to embryonic development tells against
the hypothesis that the nucleus of the human germ-
cell provides for the rational life as'well as "for the
physical. When the difference between man and
animal has to be accounted for, it Avill be difficult to
maintain the argument for reference of this differ
ence to an embryo in structure so like to the em
bryo of animal species. That there remains great
perplexity as to the inheritance of mental qualities,
is a fact which does not lessen the force of the present
contention. For what is now required is interpretation

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 109

of the appearance of rational power in man. All that
is here urged is, that similarities do not explain differ
ences ; and the closer the similarity in the gerrn-cell
and in embryonic structure, the worse the difficulty.
After we have gathered our illustrations of the law that
like produces like, there remains the question of the
origin of species, and specially the appearance of man.
As before, in judging of the hypothesis concerning
heredity, we had to pass forward to the evidence
gathered by naturalists from the life of animals in
their native resorts, so now we must pass over to the
mature normal life of man, and specially to our know
ledge of the facts of family history, including diversity
of gifts. We agree that varieties appear in mental
faculties, as well as in bodily structure ; and we seek
to know whether variations in mental faculty are
transmitted by mere unfolding of the fertilised germ-
cell. Comparative biologists, because of their sphere
of research, become engrossed in the life-history of
the germ-cell, and they naturally assume that the
complete life of the species, mental as well as physical,
is thus provided for. Nevertheless, Darwin, with
other observers generally, recognises a two-fold aspect
of human life. He affirms ' Man is variable in body
and in mind.' He thus indicates that there are two
distinct classes of facts, and, therefore, two problems,
affecting human life. These two separate problems
certainly do not emerge in our study of cell-life, and
do not appear at all, in tracing the stages of develop
ment for organic life. What must be said as to
animal intelligence will come up for separate con
sideration by-and-by. It is admitted, as to human
1 Descent, p. 47.

110 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

life, that it presents two classes of facts. Can mental
phenomena, with all their variations, be traced to the
germ-cell ?

Notwithstanding the large advance in our know
ledge of embryonic life, a new and still more difficult
problem arises, — where, when, and how do mental
phenomena appear, in process of development of a
human life ? * This problem stands quite apart from
the problem of evolution of life, which must be
treated at a later stage, when we institute comparisons
between animal and human intelligence. The problem
now before us is one concerned with the development
of each individual life. Attention is concentrated on
the appearance of the higher phase of life which is
common to our race. Here direct knowledge fails us.
We are, therefore, restricted to such inductions as
; may seem warranted by familiar facts of our conscious
life. As natural history has modified hypotheses con
cerning germ-plasm, so must consciousness of rational
life modify the theory concerning heredity. Passing
towards a field of conjecture, where we confessedly deal
with the unknown, it is essential that we keep fast hold
on the terms of our problem. Only thus shall we be
warranted in venturing into conjecture, or in cherishing
reasonable expectation of the reliability of our results.

Haeckel's treatment of the subject tends to obscure
the problem. He would find the explanation of
heredity in ' periodic wave-generation of the organic
molecules/ making the reproductive power 'the
equivalent of the memory.'2 A mechanical hypo
thesis does not need memory, and memory at its best

1 See Professor E. Ray Lankester's Advancement of Science, p. 52.

2 Gesammelte Populdre Vortrage, ii. p. 70.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 111

never reproduces anything beyond the imagination of
what has been. Recollection of our youth does not
reproduce it. To attribute to organic structure
unconscious 'memory' of past achievement, and
'perception' of new conditions of existence, as pre
paratory for suitable variation in apparatus, is a
hypothesis which attributes too much to the sen
sibilities of organism, too little to the characteristics
of mental phenomena. In addition to the problem
of organic existence, there is a mind-problem. It is
raised by our own life. Its character is patent
to observation, in the distinction between physical
phenomena and mental, in the contrast between the
life that depends on daily nutriment, and the life
which gains by rational experience. The contrast
belongs to natural history, just as the problem of
'animal intelligence' concerns higher orders of
animal life, to the exclusion of lower forms. In the
development of an individual human life, that which
needs explanation is the appearance of a new order
of activity, distinct from the movement of organic
structure. All physical action is movement of
apparatus ; we localise it according to differentiation
in structure ; the development of separate organs, we
attribute to the unfolding of the germ-cell. In the
entire course of this development, and in all its results,
we trace the application of laws of heredity. ' Like
produces like,' through the fertilised germ-cell. In
the history of this reproduction, however, we do
not find explanation of the appearance of men
tal phenomena. Absence of this suggests that
these do not arise in development of the germ- cell.
We do not find as the result of its development,

112 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

manifestation of intelligence, simpler or more complex,1
as we trace successive stages of organic advance. The
distinction between life physical and life rational first
appears to us in the life of the child after birth. In
attributing intelligence to the child, we recognise that
development by nutrition does not include develop
ment of mind. As food and education are reckoned
apart, and provided for under different charges, so,
when manhood is reached, athletic exercise does
not develop mind, though we admire good physique
the more when associated with a highly-trained
intellect.

When, on these grounds, it is maintained that
mental phenomena cannot be traced to germ-plasm,
a new problem is raised as to the appearance of mind
in the history of the individual life. Beyond this
arises the question whether laws of heredity apply
here, as in the physical life. These are problems of
great perplexity, first for biological science, as they
elude the research of comparative embryology, and
next for mental science, as they carry inquiry beyond
consciousness, and also beyond outward observation.
The presence of mind is certain; the mode of its
appearance in the individual history is unknown. The
fact is sure, its occurrence must be left to stand as a
thing undiscovered. The field of our observation is
thus restricted to the relations of the intellectual life to
parentage, while we seek evidence for heredity in
mind, as in body. All reasoning here must be from
the facts of human experience, towards probabilities
connected with the origin of intelligent life, and with
its subjection to laws of heredity. In default of direct

1 What the facts are will be considered in next chapter.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 113

evidence, we are left to draw inferences from the
mental characteristics of men, recognising first that
which is common to the species, afterwards variations
giving distinctiveness to individual life.

In attempting to reach conclusions attainable in
this way, we see at once that in human life there is
something distinctive in the relations of parent and
child. The common vital relation is implied in the
virtual life-unity of parent and child. Life-unity must,
however, have a larger meaning here, unless we are to
maintain that the higher rational life of the parent
is out of relation with the embryonic life within.
The supposition seems inadmissable. The relation
of the living germ to the parent body may, however,
reasonably supply some analogy, in accordance with
which we may, not unwarrantably, think of the
relation of the child-soul to the parent-soul. The
value of such an analogy is however difficult to
determine. The beginnings of mental life may be
held to belong to the life of the embryo. This
conclusion is not affected by the fact that the dawn
of consciousness — the first intelligent discrimination
of the self from the not-self — which is the first
independent action of a rational life, belongs to a
period considerably after birth. True as it is, that
knowledge, as a conscious possession, begins with
independent experience on the part of the knower,
this does not render it less probable that the
beginnings of intelligent life are responsive to the
experience and action of the mature intelligence of
the parent. It seems improbable — may we not say
impossible — that a mother can give birth to a child
without the heritage of the young life including not

H

114 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

a little that has been dependent on her mental life.
If in reference to organic life, we say, what the parents
are, that the offspring shall be in the order of animal
species, it would seem that by analogy, we may say,
what the parents are as intelligent beings, that their
child shall be in like manner. This seems a legiti
mate reading of continuity in Nature, and if it be, then
it seems to follow that the mother's experience within
the period of vital unity assigned to parent and off
spring, must be to some extent an influence, a very
variable influence certainly, in the history of the
young life. To suppose that the mind-life of the
mother is completely severed from the child-life
nourished in the womb, were contrary to all the
lessons of analogy. Confirmatory evidence is abun
dant, including the wide range of pathological illus
tration.1 On account of the higher characteristics of
the parent life, 'inheritance' in human life must have
some special phases. If, in the natural history of
physical life, the germ-cell is separated and localised
so as to provide for reproductive action: if germ-
plasm may have a certain continuity, in whatever
way, through a series of generations ; and if fixedness
of species is thus perpetuated ; mind-life apparently
must have a distinct origin. Hence 'heritage' here
must have in some respects a wider significance. All
this seems reasonably to follow, even while it remains
impossible to reach definite conclusions as to the
origin of mind. Further, when the relations of parent
and child are considered, evidence of heredity in mind
appears to imply much more direct action of mind

1 The case of Alan M'Aulay, in Sir Walter Scott's Legend of
Montrose, may illustrate extreme cases of this kind.

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 115

upon mind, than occurs in action of the mature
organism on the unfolding germ-cell. In its
beginnings, it seems as if the life of the germ-cell
were in some ways more independent of the parent
life, than the mind-life of the child can be.

Seeking, in harmony with these conclusions, such
evidence as may be available in support of heredity in
mental history, the utmost that can be done here
seems to be classification of mental phenomena, such
as may guide to inference. There is a large mass
of facts to be so classified. Deeper consideration of
these seems required in order to come to some fuller
interpretation of man's place in Nature.

Of these facts, the main body belongs to the border
land, where relations physical and mental come
together under notice. These appear in a variety of
aspects, but the relations of the two sides of our
nature are certain. Heed must be given, however, to
the two modes of knowing, as well as to the dualism
appearing in the single life. We may, therefore, have
to contemplate facts, first from the physical side,
afterwards from the mental side.

All our relations to external Nature supply points
at which variations in physical life, hereditarily trans
mitted, have a bearing on mind-life. Variations in
general susceptibility of the nerve system, and in
structure of the organs of special sense, involve
specialities affecting the whole individual life. Here we
include also the facts belonging to the tangled history
of hereditary disease, and special variations in nerve
and brain, depressing or exciting. These differences
lie strictly within the lines of physical inheritance, yet
they deeply affect personal experience, and must have

116 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

a bearing on conditions of individual responsibility. In
not a few cases they involve demands upon intellectual
and moral control, of an unusually exacting kind.

If next, we take action and experience originating
in individual mind itself, evidence as to transmission
becomes involved in more complexity, and is there
fore more difficult to trace. Here we begin with
rational power as a common possession, taking with
this, all emotion, sentiment, and aspiration depending
on it. We attribute rational powers to all the race ;
at the same time, variations, many and considerable,
appear. The analogy of adaptation to environment
passes to a secondary place, and even in some phases
disappears largely from view. Under sense of a new
demand upon language, we speak of ' mental ' culture,
recognising what ' education ' means, with its special
appeal to understanding and intelligent effort. As
interpreted in our own experience, we are conscious
of reflection, purpose, and sustained effort, all of which
are reckoned among powers common to men. When
inductions become wider, consequences in family and
in national history being included, laws of heredity
seem to find enlarged application. Human progress
is not severed from personal effort; and such effort
does not fail of securing gain more widely than per
sonal life. Always acting through physical life, as
we are bound to say, effects are such as must in
fluence the history of later generations. Even if it
be granted that there is warrant for the opinion
recently expressed, that no great advance is to be
expected in adaptation of human organism to its
environment, there is constant testimony to physical
and mental advance of the race. We witness fineness

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 117

in physique clearly depending on continuous culture
of mind, and reacting on mind-life in wonderful ways.
But, each individual must gather his own experience,
must accumulate his own knowledge, must form his
own character. No one can hand on such acquisi
tions. Nevertheless, the inheritance of each child,
and family group, is largely affected by what the
parents have been. We must deduct results of educa
tion, always great, whether for weal or for woe ; but
after this has been done, heritage counts for much.
Speaking with utmost reserve, this must be attributed
to the closeness of life-relation between mother and
child, as the life of the child represents the union of
two hereditary principles.

When, however, advance is attempted beyond this,
we are largely restrained. Evidence becomes greatly
restricted. Exceptions are too numerous to sustain a
general rule. Granting the value of the evidence
which Galton has adduced, it is significant that he
should regret the title, Hereditary Genius, explaining
that he refers only to natural ability, 'such as a
modern European possesses.'1 In human history,
there are two broad lines of fact, which go far to
restrain general inference as to heredity in intellectual
gift. Genius starts up in many places where
hereditary preparation for its appearance is far from
manifest. So frequently is this the case, as to suggest
that some other law is operating in the history of our
race than our records help us to trace. Again, in the
family history of the highly gifted, it often happens
that children do not illustrate continuity of gift.
Facts, sufficiently numerous and noticeable, hamper

1 Hereditary Genius, 1892, Prefatory Chapter, p. viii., p. x.

118 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

efforts towards induction. Physical inheritance often
so burdens life, as to obscure the range of intellectual
gift in possession; and from a multitude of causes
besides, there is a vast amount of undeveloped talent.
In view of the incompleteness of evidence here,
definite inferences as to heredity in mind seem im
possible. It is certain that useful variation in organism
is transmitted; transmissions of variation in mental
power seem less obvious. There is an independence
in mind history impossible to bodily life.

Some wider induction seems to await us here, 011
account of the unity in which the dualism we are re
marking is involved. Mind is not spiritualised body ;
nor is the human body itself spiritualised matter : but
there is a wonderful unity here, still beyond reach of
science. The soul life is so encompassed by physical
conditions, — is in the history of the unfolding of its
powers so connected with physical aptitudes — is so
dependent on physical sensibility and muscular
activity, for stimulus and outlet,— that possibilities
of mental development must be much more closely
connected with the physical nature than we are as
yet able to ascertain. If organic life has, by slowly
accumulated acquisitions, proved equal to the task
of securing greater adaptations to environment, there
must be some large meaning here in the history of
mind as it has advanced towards extended conscious
ness of freedom and power.

If, then, the origin of mind in the history of the
individual belongs to the unknown, how shall we
think of individual development, so as to keep within
the limits of our knowledge ? With man, germinal
life begins as does the life of the animal ; embryonic

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 119

life unfolds by successive stages of advance similar
to those of embryonic life in animal history; the
ultimate configuration of the body is secured after
the manner which provides for the mature embryo
of other species. But, notwithstanding this closeness
of resemblance, human life from the first movement
of the germ-cell to the moment of birth, is con
joined in life-history with a mature rational life.
As, in personal history, mental life constantly tells
on the physical, so must it tell on the embryonic life
depending upon the parent life. Each life thus owes
its start in the history of its intelligence, as well as of
its organic existence, to the parent life. Parentage
must imply special responsibilities, connected at once
with physique, intellect, and character.

These investigations lead to distinct conclusions,
depending on the difference between body and mind.
All the more familiar laws of heredity are concerned
with the relations of the germ-cell to the fully-
developed organism. These laws provide, more
obviously, for transmission of the characteristics of
species, and next for transmission of variations in
structure. Such laws are applicable to man as to the
lower animals.

But ' man is variable in body and in mind.' Human
life presents a two-fold problem. Have then body
and mind unitedly and equally their origin in the
nucleus of a germ-cell ? Can it be maintained that
the whole range of mental powers, as well as the
physical powers, spring from the minute point of
organised matter ? The close analogy between human
life and animal life, first in the structure of the germ-
cell, and afterwards in all the stages of embryonic

120 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATUEE

development, points to an opposite conclusion. Some
higher origin we must seek, for a potentiality so much
higher than appears in organism. Observation of the
functions of human life has carried us beyond differ
entiation in structure, and beyond division of labour
in physiological functions. Evidence for distinctive-
ness of rational life lies clearly before us. Advances
in moral character, the most important of all varia
tions possible in human life, cannot be transmitted
to the succeeding generation. Each individual must
achieve his own victories; none can hand down such
gains. This marks the presence in Nature of a new
order of life, whose functions transcend those of the
cells and tissues and organs of a highly specialised
animal. Here, individuality, as personality, is subject
to a new order of laws. In accordance with these,
a type of excellence is presented in which the most
highly organised animals have no share. To power
of insight, special to man, an orderly system of exist
ence, unseen by any life lower in rank, becomes visible
in Nature. By use of understanding, of wisdom, and
of rational purpose, the individual forms for himself
a moral character, in which no other life can share.
Limitations of heredity become conspicuous here.
The rational agent may either gain by heredity ; or
he may suffer under the laws of inheritance. As
most differ in their lot, some having, under head of
patrimony, large inheritance in property, others but
few possessions; so have they differences in life-
inheritance. Such differences are in every sense
more serious, as affecting development and experi
ence. Possessions are external, heredity is vital.
The gravest questions of responsibility arise here,

HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 121

first on the parental side, next on the side of the
individual agent, who must accept his vital heritage,
whatever its special features. But the limits to
heredity, secure for every man wide scope for
sustaining some better hope. In normal human
life, heredity settles only subordinate conditions,
leaving open large scope for rational and moral
endeavour. Set inheritance at the extreme of dis
advantage ; it cannot hinder exercise of reflection,
regulation of sentiment, government of disposition,
and formation of moral character. As loss of sight,
or of hearing, or of powers of locomotion, may
restrict the possibilities of effort, so may a lack,
which heredity determines, lower and shorten the
range of potentiality belonging to the life ; but where
the common heritage is secure, intellect and will, the
light of duty can shine, fulfilment of duty can gather
rewards, and the highest excellence of human life is
fully within reach. Again, set inheritance at the ex
treme of advantage, including physical vigour and
gifts of genius ; these are insufficient to secure the ex
cellence of life. Not without personal use of wisdom,
and self-control, and exercise of self-denial, larger
probably than is required in most cases, can the
highly favoured in respect of life-heritage reach to ex
cellence of human life. A man may inherit large pro
perty, and also inherit power to squander it ; he cannot
inherit true greatness. Whether he is to be mean or
to be noble, he must himself decide. A man may be
heir to a great name, but, if he is to escape having it
hang as a reproach around his neck, he must by his
own endeavour, rise to the level on which his progeni
tors previously moved, to their own lasting honour.

CHAPTER VI

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION

COMPARATIVE biology places in contrast the sensory
discrimination possible to all life, and the rational
discrimination characteristic of man. We have now
to seek some closer acquaintance with this difference,
preparing for an instructed judgment upon the
theories concerning the history of life on the earth.
The test is reached here. Thus Darwin reasoned
concerning the data on which a theory of Evolution
must depend : ' If no organic being excepting man
had possessed any mental power, or if his powers had
been of a wholly different nature from those of the
lower animals, then we should never have been able
to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been
gradually developed. But it can be shown that there
is no fundamental difference of this kind.'1

Thoroughness of treatment requires that we keep
in the first instance to broadly marked differences, so
that we may afterwards advance more surely upon
resemblances. The question of 'mental power,' or
' mind ' here attributed to animals, — that is, to some
animals, — Darwin names ' the higher mammals,'—
must therefore be held in reserve for separate
consideration. We start with a broad distinction,
universally recognised. It is the difference between

1 The Descent of Man, ch. iii. p. 65.
122

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 123

sensibility, — the sensitiveness belonging to every
organism, even the lowest, — and the rational power
of man, attaining to generalisation from particulars.
The former belongs to the star-fish and snail ; the latter
belongs to man only. In the first case, we include
the lowest life ; in the second, we exclude all but the
highest. In the mollusc,1 organism, function, and
experience are at the lowest ; in man, all these are at
the highest. Equally sharp is the contrast when
activity is contemplated. In the mollusc, activity
is correlated with sensibility, its end being the
securing of nutriment from the current of water
passing through the body. In man, activity is also
correlated with sensibility, though on a grander scale ;
but there is this difference, that in man activity is
largely concerned with attainment of knowledge and
of right conduct. Our ultimate question is, has the
highest been evolved out of the lowest, through
' numberless gradations.' Our primary problem, here,
concerns the difference between sensory discrimination
and rational. Contrast is at this point the first
requisite for precision. Boldness of outline will abate
the difficulties of an inquiry so vast as that presented
by comparative biology. If biologists propose to
attribute 'mental power' to the mollusc, the dis
cussion as to ' mind ' begins from the first appearance
of life. If biologists propose to attribute mental
power only to ' the higher mammals,' there remains
a preliminary and more general question, as to the
discrimination which is possible to all organism. In
any case, ' ideation ' must be carried to the rear, while

1 Carpenter's Mental Physiology, p. 45 ; Calderwood's Relations
of Mind and Brain, p. 123.

124 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

we contemplate organic sensibility. This is more
widely distributed, and it came earliest. If any one
take sensibility as equivalent to ' mind/ the form of
the problem is changed; the difficulties as to the
appearance of rational poAver continue as before.

If we are to escape play upon words, we must come
to sharp distinctions between sensibility and ration
ality. Familiar facts show a marked severance
between the lower forms of life and the higher
mammals, and a still wider distinction between
simpler organisms and the human species. If
only we make sure that we start our inquiry
with a function common to all life, there will follow
obvious advantages if we contrast that with such
' mental characteristics ' as are common to men. In
following this course, full account must be made of
the continuity of structure and function already
recognised. A man is sensitive to contact as a
mollusc is, and just as a monkey is. Nerve fibre,
nerve cell, and brain, are severally homologous
in structure and functions. Thus far, we deny
nothing to the lowest organism which we claim for
man. Sensitiveness in the organism, succession of
sensory impressions in the history of the life, and
correlation of these with activity through the nerve
centres, are characteristics of all organic life, including
that of the insect with that of the man.

What, then, is it which is peculiar to man ? Jt is
his rational discrimination, in advance of sensory
discrimination. All organism feels contact ancfacts
in response to it. All human life not only does
these two things, but also interprets experience,
thereby forming a knowledge of the things with

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 125

which the sensitive organism comes into contact.
This contrast is bold and sharp in outline. We first
say, it is with the man as with the animal ; we next
say, it is not with the animal as it is with the man.
What is the difference between sensibility, common to
man and the star-fish, and rational discrimination
belonging only to man ? It appears first in the
contrast between successive sensory impressions and
consciousness of difference between past and present
impressions. This contrast visibly widens when
rational power carries its exercise further, accumulat
ing knowledge by generalisation, giving fixedness
to knowledge by use of names, and attaining to
wider inductions, recognising general laws of Nature.
Sensibility as a life-experience is precisely the same
through the whole scale of life from the mollusc to man.
Whether the elements in which life subsists be water
or air, sensibility is stirred by movement of this
element. So it is with the functions of special senses.
Certain movements in the atmosphere distribute light,
others distribute sound; sensibility is the same in
kind for animal life in contact with these atmo
spheric movements. Whatever differences there may
be in terminal arrangements for the special senses,
all life possessed of such special sense depends for
sensibility on an optic or auditory nerve similar in
structure. The strength of evidence for continuity in
structure and function up the scale of organism,
largely increases the difficulty of reaching a scientific
explanation of rationality by reference to structure.

What, then, is observation, as distinct from sensi
bility ? It is interpretation of sensory experience,
when using the senses for rational ends. It stands

126 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

in contrast with sensibility. In observation we pass
from experience to objects. Observation is impossible
without consciousness of the distinction between self
and successive experiences : and also of the distinction
between experience and external objects. Endless
impressions are being made on the senses. Many of
these are not observed by us. The organs of sense
act exactly as when observations are made ; but no
account is taken of the presence and significance of
these impressions. Men may gaze together on the
same scene, yet in no two cases are the observations
the same. It is this difference which creates the
interest of conversation concerning places visited.
What we need is an exact account of this power of
observation, on which all science depends, and by-and-
by a scientific account of its appearance in Nature.
The first problem is here preparatory for the second.

Without organs of special sense, observations by
sight and sound were impossible ; but, even with these
organs, observation involves exercise of a higher power.
Hence our double use of terms in describing what
seems to us a single exercise. There are obviously
two distinct exercises, the one that of the senses,
unconsciously executed, the other that of the ra
tional power, consciously done. Nevertheless, we take
' vision ' as if it were equivalent to ' observation/ simply
because the latter is familiar to us in remarking what
is around. ' Vision ' belongs to all animals possessing
eyes, though 'observation,' in our sense, supplying
conditions of observational science, is impossible to
animals. We properly attribute ' sight ' to the eyes,
and an animal sees just as we do ; but there is besides
a power in use with us, distinct from the organ of

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 127

vision. We see much that we do not observe, and
we observe what an animal does not see. Thus it
is matter of frequent remark that we did not notice
objects which we had seen, and which we would have
noted if our eyes had been directed upon them by
ourselves for observational ends. On the other hand,
when we observe that all the stones in a bank, being
opened for a roadway, have been rounded by the
action of water, we remark what no animal sees.
Thus the structure and function of special sense are
separate from rational power, exercised in observa
tion. We here identify a power not included among
the functions of the sensory system.

In all observation, there is interpretation of the
various effects of sensory impression. We invariably
compare these with the facts, of a past experience.
No explanation of this is found in recurrence or
remembrance of sensations. Without memory, we
could not make and record observations ; but observa
tion is distinct, and puts memory to use, — brings it
into exercise, in order that an observation may be
completed. We make observations only by using
associations of similarity and dissimilarity in judging
of objects. We deal with experiences, like and unlike,
past and present, always recognising outward differ
ences by reference to inward. Without this, there
could be nothing but continuous feeling, or feeling
merely rising and falling. By comparison of im
pressions, we gain our knowledge of things.

In prosecuting observation there is a further
advance. We are always representing to ourselves
the class to which an object belongs. The object
observed is not merely a thing. It is not merely

128 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

large or small, moving or at rest, but it is one of a
class grouped under a common name, selected to aid
us in this work. We keep adding to the value of
classifications as we continue observations. Sensations
are thus seen to be only the first tenants of conscious
ness. In noting their presence, intelligence wakens
up to activity. Sensations are thus lower than
observations, observations being our interpretations
of sensation. This rational activity belongs even
to the childhood of our rational life. There is a
native power in man which uses the special senses as
a mechanic uses his tools. If we cannot with strict
accuracy speak of 'inherited knowledge/ — though
Herbert Spencer thinks we may, — certainly rational
faculty must be described as inheritance, — so much
given to us as the condition of knowledge, just as the
merchant must have his ' stock-in-trade ' for bargain-
making. In the act of observing, we use laws of
thought, specially applying a law of causality so as to
interpret successive experiences. Without these,
observation would be impossible; education could
make no progress ; science could not have a beginning.
Let us attend for a moment to the internal
observation involved in marking the differences in our
own feelings. Though we name this ' introspection/
and often speak of it as if it were a .difficult exercise,
it is common to mankind from earliest years. How a
man felt in given circumstances is a common subject
of remark. Thus we single out differences in our
consciousness. On some of these we have relied, in
affirming differences in objects. We mark successive
phases of experience, much wider and more varied
than these, such as our emotions, which have no

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 129

equivalent in material existence. Qualities of objects
are very different from changes of feeling within us.
Sensory apparatus supplies a connecting bridge
between outer qualities and inner experiences; but
the efficiency of observational exercise, resulting ulti
mately in knowledge of objects, is neither in the
objects, nor in the organic apparatus placing con
sciousness in relation with them, but in the power of
the rational life itself.

Mere sensory experience, in us as it is in animals,
must be assigned a separate place, as physiological, to
be grouped under a distinct classification. Observa
tion, resulting in knowledge of objects, and also in
knowledge of ourselves, stands on the other side. The
efficiency of sensitive structure has been exhausted,
before we distinguish sensations as differing from each
other. Discrimination of feelings thus proves to be
a first step towards distinguishing of things. This is
the familiar fact, constantly presenting evidence of a
function of life beyond organic functions. Without
further aid from organs of vision, and altogether by
reflective exercise, we perceive the rich variety of ex
perience belonging to a rational life. We do not any
longer contemplate observations of external objects
only, but ideas and associations, thoughts and fancies,
hopes and fears. Within this rich amplitude of ex
perience, we exercise power of self-criticism, in use of
which we estimate variously the worth of our thoughts
and reasonings, and judge of the warrant for our
expectations and apprehensions. The subject of
criticism is our own intellectual action, for which we
acknowledge individual responsibility. In this, we
affirm a causality which we do not attribute to sensory

130 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

apparatus, and which cannot be scientifically explained
by functions belonging to terminal organs, nerve
fibres, and brain.

Recognition of rational causality, involving indivi
dual responsibility for one's own thought, becomes a
turning-point in this discussion. The facts to be
explained in human life are now seen in their natural
proportions, invisible at any nearer point of our ap
proach. In order to give a scientific view of man's
place in Nature, we must account for this rational caus
ality, tracing the history of its origin on the earth. The
causality of organic life, and the causality of rational
life, are now seen in contrast. The outcome of the
one is mechanical movement, responding to sensory
impression ; the outcome of the other is thought, first
appearing in observation. For organic life, the
condition of improvement is nutriment ; for rational
life the condition is self-criticism. In the realm of
natural history there are thus two distinct orders of
life at work ; and these are combined in human life ;
they are not continuous : the sensory process is ' dis
continuous.' These two cannot be compared, as if the
higher were only an advanced stage of animal life.
Rational life cannot be judged by muscular develop
ment, as judges decide in a cattle-show. All that
has been ascertained regarding ' rudiments of organs,'
' homologies ' in structure, and ' continuity ' of
organic life, retains its value as a contribution to
natural history; but it has no scientific worth for
explanation of rational causality. Whatever may
afterwards be said about the higher mammals, it is
impossible to maintain continuity of life from the
lower forms of organism up to the rational or reflec-

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 131

tivc exercise, concerned with observational science,
and with strivings towards an ethical ideal.

These outlines of research show how essential for
advance of a true science of Nature is a classifi
cation of the sciences. Whatever the value of our
modern watchword ' continuity,' the need for division
of labour remains with us, as also the need for classifi
cation of functions. Physiology and psychology are
concerned with distinct phases of existence. Beyond
doubt, man belongs to Nature ; but it is impossible to
explain his activity within the area of the natural
sciences. A doctrine of the soul must be distinct
from a doctrine of organic function.

It follows that final results cannot be reached,
through research into what has been named the
'mechanism of thought/ or the physics of thought
and movement. Research of this kind is needful for
a true knowledge of our life. In this department of
inquiry, our obligations to Ferrier, and Wundt, and
Mlinsterberg are very great. But for full interpreta
tion of the causality of human life, as presented in
the ordinary consciousness of the race, we require a
department of science, which shall constitute a true
Psychology, distinct from Physiology. Appreciation
of the facts brought to light by experimental psycho
logy demands this. The facts of consciousness disclose
a vast region of inquiry, lying quite beyond the sphere
of experimental psychology.

All that is carried into the physiological laboratory
belongs to the physics of thought and action. In
vestigation is concerned with the mechanism of sen
sibility and motion, with apparatus whose efficiency
has its explanation in chemical, or molecular, or

132 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

mechanical forces. We are not to be misled by the
title 'Experimental Psychology.' That the pheno
mena of nerve action bring observational science into
relation with the action of a rational nature is clear ;
but this relation implies difference. While all the
phenomena of nerve action are included under experi
mental psychology, all the phenomena of conscious
ness are excluded from this field of observation. This
separation is proclaimed in the mode of inquiry
essential to experimental psychology. Experiments
by electric excitation of the sensori-motor system
contirm this ; as do all experiments depending on
use of mechanical contrivances. The region of inquiry
•is restricted to organism ; the mode of inquiry is
restricted to external observation. So long as we deal
with molecular movements, it is clear that speed or
rate of movement is calculable, if only an instrument
be constructed sufficiently sensitive to record results.
When we turn attention to contraction and expansion
of muscles, observation becomes more simple, because
the structure is visible to all, as it is more massive.
In these relations, a wide and deeply interesting field
of observation has been opened up. The larger
portion of it is concerned with organism ; but it bears
witness, so far as external bodily movements can do
so, to phenomena of consciousness, connected with the
phenomena of organic life, but unexplained by them.
The limits of electric excitation strictly define the
line of severance. Here, as elsewhere, observational
science lays down its own boundaries.

Within the territory of physiology lie all the
phenomena of reflex action. These belong to organic
life of every grade. Beyond these, in human life, there

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 133

are additional phenomena of organic action, allied
with the facts of consciousness. This set includes a
section of the field of ' experimental psychology/ and
warrants the title. Only in connection with human
organism can physical relations to phenomena of
consciousness be studied. And there is this further
and quite unique condition of inquiry, that observa
tion dealing with the relations of consciousness to
organism is restricted to the experience of the
individual observer. The limits of electric excitation
of organism mark sharply the line beyond which
every experimenter must depend upon his own ex
perience. Phenomena of consciousness cannot be in
cluded within the science of organic life.

Let us remark the precise measure of value be
longing to experimental psychology, judged by its
best work. The area of its simplest work is restricted
to organism, dealing wholly \vith reflex action, depend
ing on the one side on sensory apparatus; on the
other side, on motor apparatus. When a sensory
nerve has been stimulated, a motor nerve acts in con
sequence. The later stimulation is the response to the
earlier. Here measurements of time and of force are
possible by aid of suitable instruments. As by
observation of the interval between sight of the flash
of light when a cannon has been fired, and the hearing
of the atmospheric effect, we can measure the rate at
which sound travels, so with reflex action in organism.
If we would irieas"rr> the effects of the prick of a
needle, we must mark the relation of contact with
the muscular response. The chronograph can render
visible aid here. Still more readily can the myograph
aid us in measurement of the contraction and ex-

134 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

pansion of a muscle. But all this observation would
be unmeaning, — would be even impossible, — if there
were not in the observer rational discrimination
dealing with cause and effect, so as to interpret
occurrences. Organism does not provide for such
observations.

Beyond this, in the field of experimental psychology,
lies the inquiry concerned with the relation of organic
functions to the facts of consciousness. Here, as we
have seen, the observer is restricted to individual
experience for the main part of his observations. The
questions raised are of a different kind, for they con
cern the relation of organism to a higher form of life.
On the one side, are variations of sensory experience ;
on the other, discrimination of surface, form, and
colour in objects. Quite beyond this, entirely out of
reach here, is our treatment of the problems of
existence, speculative in their character. Between
the physical and the speculative, there lies a wide
region for investigation, within which may await
us many discoveries of deep interest. To this area
belong such questions as these: — how the higher
emotions and loftier sentiments are related to bodily
functions, affecting rate of circulation of the blood, —
how the rush of sympathetic feeling connects with
physiological action, — how patriotic feeling by its
utterance makes the cheeks glow, — how abstract
thought places restraint on muscular activity, yet
taxes the brain. Throughout, a higher phase of action
is prior to the organic, and even accounts for the
latter. So distinct are the phenomena of conscious
ness, from those movements measurable by mechanical
contrivance, that the former do not come within the

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 135

field of measurement. Hence it is that the instru
ments valued in experimental psychology render no
aid in interpreting the phenomena of consciousness.

The facts of external observation are set on one side,
the facts of rational exercise are set on the other. This
much is implied in the correlated claims of science,
and of philosophy. As the argument for continuity of
lifejsstrong along ^he whole line of research con- ^
cerned wit JTorganTsm ; so is the argument for breach of
strong by failure of physiological science to
phenomena of rational life. Experimental
psychology has become demonstrator of the contrast.
Thus, fresh force is given to the words of Professor
Burdon Sanderson, already quoted : — ' There is little
ground for the apprehension which exists in the
minds of some, that the habit of scrutinising the
mechanism of life tends to make men regard what
can be so learned as the only kind of knowledge.
What we have to guard against is the mixing of two
methods.' The law of induction is the same, but it is
applied in two spheres. The laws of observation are
identical, whether observation is directed upon the
external or upon the internal. But there are two
modes of observation, the one by eye and hand, and
auxiliary senses; the other by direct consciousness
belonging to a rational life. Inclusion of the facts of
rational activity with functions of organism cannot be
maintained. Rational discrimination stands distinct
from sensory discrimination.

Acting according to its own laws, and exercising
gift oT self-criticism, rational power concerns itself
with the manifold forms of existence. It distin
guishes at once the elements of conscious ex-

136 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

perience, and the qualities of external objects. It
seeks for general truth in the midst of innumerable
particulars. It penetrates into the secrets of Nature,
refusing to be checked by any limits, save the
conditions of its own activity. It forms its ideal of
human life ; it carries forward civilisation in the life
of a nation ; it grapples with the scheme of existence
as a whole, making the Universe itself its field of
study. Tto ^atijQnjtl power presents the problem for
humanity, a problem ever widening and enlarging,
as men seek to know more of the cosmos.

Simply by his possession of rational power, every
member "of the race goes forth on his way as a
freeman, taking possession of his inheritance in the
earth. For every man who does not lose his way in
darkness, or through blinding passion — overwhelmed
by life's mysteries, or besotted by animal indulgences
-—a rich possession is waiting, quite above supply of
the common requirements of organic life. Science is
his servant ; literature is his property ; philosophy is
his guide in higher thought ; revelation becomes his
inspiration. Under warrant of abundant evidence,
we distinguish two worlds in Nature — the world of
matter and the world of mind; a world visible to
the eye ; a world invisible to organism — visible only
to rational insight.

Rational discrimination, moving at first in company
with sensible discrimination, at length parts com
pany with aids of sense, moving along its own path,
seeking the invisible, the most abiding. As the
range of observation and experience widens, the life
itself rises, ever finding as it advances a wider
expanse and a greater elevation. Finding within

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 137

itself power of insight, as earlier it made use of
sense, the rational life unfolds, obtaining by its
exercise enlarged visions of existence. Not easily
can we describe the very varied exercises of the
rational soul, citizen of a kingdom other than the
material world. It is vain to speak of ' ideation,' as if
the alphabet of speech were enough to construct a
science of thought. The famous term need not be
cancelled and cast away, it may readily find applica
tion ; but it is too narrow to express the activity of
the rational life. ' Ideation ' is too slight a term to
contain even the primary conditions of human
thought, a term expressive rather of the slighter
exercise of the reason than of its grander efforts;
suggestive of the gathering of broken pieces of
information, rather than of the free movements of a
life daily gathering its reward, in fuller understanding
of the orderly system of existence.

Thinkers of quite opposite schools are agreed
that there is no possible science of Nature which
does not distinguish between the material and the
spiritual, between that which is known by sense, and
that which is known in consciousness. Nature's
testimony admits of no doubt as to the reality of
these separate spheres. There is little need for
calling a multitude of witnesses, but they are within
call in any number. Thus, G. H. Lewes has said :
' The sensible comprises but a small portion of that
external order which is believed to exist.'1 Hence,
he proceeds to distinguish the sensible world, the
extra-sensible world, and the supra-sensible world.
Take, on the other hand, the characteristics of the
1 Problems of Life, vol. i. p. 253.

138 EVOLUTION AND MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

' natural sciences/ and it becomes apparent that they
are sectional in their interpretation of Nature. Here
are the words of Helniholtz : ' The iimof the natural

^

»' sciences is to resolve themselves into mechanics/^" a
j statement repeated in analogous terms by Kirchkoff,
Wundt, and Haeckel, and generally recognised in
the widest interpretation of physics. Within these
boundaries the characteristics of rational life are not
included. Recent advances in physical science are
carrying us towards the conclusion that there is
close connection between electricity, magnetism,
light, and heat. This conclusion gives greater vivid
ness to the essential contrast presented by the laws
appearing in the world of thought. Herbert Spencer
has said, thought leads by the pathway of the Know-
able, to a ' belief in an Absolute that transcends not
only human knowledge, but human conception ' ;
and he alleges that in this belief ' lies the only poss
ible reconciliation of science and religion.'- Or shall
we turn to a literary authority, less concerned with
exactness of scientific distinctions, and more with
the amazing complexity of the conditions of human
life ? Then let us take an extract from Hallam,
when he is treating of Pascal's Thoughts. ' It might
be wandering from the proper subject of these
volumes if we were to pause, even shortly, to
inquire whether, while the creation of a world so full
of evil must ever remain the most inscrutable of
mysteries, we might not be led some way in tracing
the connection of moral and physical evil in man
kind, with his place in that creation ; and especially

1 Popular- Wissenschaftliche Vortrage, 1869.
- First Principles, p. 46.

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 139

whether the law of continuity, which it has not
pleased his Maker to break with respect to his bodily
structure, and which binds that, in the unity of one
great type, to the lower forms of animal life by the
common conditions of nourishment, reproduction,
and self-defence, has not rendered necessary both
the physical appetites and the propensities which
terminate in self; whether, again, the superior en
dowments of his intellectual nature, his susceptibility
of moral emotion, and of those disinterested affections
which, if not exclusively, he far more intensely
possesses than any inferior being ; above all, the
gifts of conscience, and a capacity to know God,
might not be expected, even beforehand, by their
conflict with the animal passions, to produce some
partial inconsistencies, some anomalies, at least,
which he could not himself explain, in so compound
a being/1 These references may suffice to indicate
the general drift of thought, from many Avidely
separated regions, flowing into a common channel.

If only the work accomplished by rational power be
fully stated, it becomes clear that the most thorough
investigations of organic structure and function, fail
to supply a scientific account of human procedure.

Darwin has said that ' The lower animals differ
from man solely in the almost infinitely larger power
of associating together the most diversified sounds
and ideas.' 2 This statement of the contrast is
inadequate. 'Associating sounds and ideas' is a
meagre representation of the ordinary exercises of
mind. Formation of ideas must come before their
association, and when the earlier process is explained,

^ Literature of Europe, vol. iv. p. 45. - Descent of Man, p. 85.

140 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

the later will appear quite subordinate. Is it true, then,
that man has ' almost infinitely larger power of associ
ating sounds and ideas ' than animals have ? Sounds
and ideas may be widely apart. Animals, from birds
upwards, are capable of vocalisation. Birds even exer
cise this power more largely than the higher mammals.
The dog and the horse are poor in comparison in
powers of vocalising. On the other hand, to classify
human language with sound, though not inaccurate,
is to exclude the significance of speech. It is as if
we were to classify a skilful rendering of a sonata of
Beethoven, with the grinding of a corn-mill. Passing
next to ' ideas,' it is doubtful whether animals possess
ideas in any sense analogous to our ' ideas,' which are
representations of objects as distinguished by an
aggregate of qualities. Let us, however, grant all this
to the higher mammals,— a very liberal concession,
surely, — and even then we have an exceedingly
narrow statement of the uses of rational power. Let
us grant further, that Darwin contemplated a much
wider definition of 'idea,' including even our inductive
processes, and general conclusions dependent on these,
for we do talk in a loose way of our ' ideas ' of the
order of things in the universe. Perplexity comes
now from the other side. How can we attribute to
the higher mammals any share in exercise of this
kind ? He who ventures on this suggestion, en
counters the risks consequent on minimising differ
ences, instead of securing the advantages coming
from exact statement of data, and deliberate inter
pretation of procedure. Still greater perplexity lies
further afield. If we grant so much to the higher
mammals, we are granting to them ' mind,' even if it

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 141

be oi a lower type than human intelligence. In doing
so, we admit an essential difference between sensible
discrimination common to all animal life, and in
telligent discrimination possible only to the higher
mammals and to man.

As to our own powers, we have the certainty of ex
perience. We are conscious of our own rational
guidance at once of physical activity, and of thought;
we are conscious of deliberate formation of purpose,
and of voluntary execution of it; we recognise our
responsibility for reflection, for government of passion,
and for regulation of conduct. In accordance with
knowledge of our own powers, we hold our fellow-men
responsible for their conduct. We do not regard even
the highest animals as responsible in this way. For
us, self-knowledge is so distinct from our organism
that we cannot warrantably assign to our organic
functions either responsibility for our wrong-doing,
or the causality of our well-doing. Our personality
is distinct from organic functions which disease may
assail. On the testimony of consciousness, including
rational discrimination of motives, purpose, laws and
emls of action, men of all ages have recognised in
themselves a duality of life, physical and rational, and
have held more or less clearly a doctrine of the
separate existence of the soul. This doctrine seems
tnVonly adequate interpretation of the phenomena
of human, life, distinguishing man from all animal
existence, whether it be lower or higher in the scale
of organism.

A constructive theory of human life formed on
physiological data fails, because of the contrast
between sensible discrimination and rational. When

142 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Professor Tyndall suggests that the actions con
sequent on receipt of a telegram ' are produced by.
or associated with, the molecular processes set up by
waves of light in a previously prepared brain,'1 the
insufficiency of the causality is very marked. There
is a confession of weakness, as there is a confession
of uncertainty, in this alternative, 'produced by or
associated with.' We reject the former, accepting the
latter statement. But, even then, there is not
forthcoming any scientific account of the ' previously
prepared brain.' Waves of light set up molecular
processes, but not reflective processes. When, further,
Professor Tyndall objects to the doctrine of the soul,
alleging that ' adequate reflection shows that instead
of introducing light into our minds, it increases our
darkness,' he appeals to us in these words: 'Try to
mentally visualise this soul as an entity distinct
from the body, and the difficulty immediately
appears.' Is_ not this difficulty an argument against
his contention ' A\Y constantly recognise what we
cannot visualise. \Vlio can visualise flic wind, or tin-
conservation of energy, or the laws of Association?
Knowledge is gathered by other means than by vision.
Professor Tyndall acknowledges that ' adequate re
flection ' introduces ' light into our minds.' When it
is suggested that we attempt to ' mentally visualise '
the soul, does not the suggestion imply extended
surface, form, and colour, as qualities of the object ?
Granting that we are able to 'mentally visualise' a
tree, or a horse, how can we 'mentally visualise'
the mental vision which accomplishes this ? A
further difficulty remains. In the realm of know-

1 Fortnightly Review, November 1877, p. 593.

SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 143

Jedge^tmth. which cannot be ' mentally visualised ' is
ever relatively the grandest. So it is also in the
realm of existence. The life highest in the scale of
being, highest in nature and in function, is a life
which transcends visual representation, — transcends /
even mental vision. It is no argument against the)
existence of the eye, that it cannot see itself.

If any one argue that this virtually leaves the
soul unknown, the suggestion is manifestly erroneous.
Is the eye unknown because it does not see itself?
IsjLt not an axiom of science that existence is known
l>y its manifestations ? Xothing is so well known in
this way, as we are known to ourselves. Yet this
knowledge is distinct from the knowledge we have of
our bodily existence, and is quite apart from the data
included within physiological science. In saying that
rational activity is 'spiritual,' it may be that the
meaning lying nearest to us, is only the antithesis of
the 'material.' But this is in itself a momentous
truth, raising a hard problem for biology, and leading
to great issues in the history of human thought. In say
ing that the soul is spiritual, we say only what stands
in correlation with this other saying, that the body
is material. Both statements apply to man, referring
to the two sides of his nature, manifested together
yet distinctly, the lower referable to structure, the
higher incapable of being so explained; the lower
determined by chemical and mechanical law, the
higher moving in conscious recognition of ethical law.
If it be said, still the essence of the soul is unknown,
we reply, so also is the essence of matter. It is enough
for us that existence is known by manifestation of its
properties. Adopting the well-chosen language of

144 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Lotze, we say, ' In granting that the essence of the
soul is unknown, we do so only in a sense that includes
the impossibility of saying what would be the essence
of anything in the entire absence of the conditions
that are the exciting occasions of its manifestations.' 1

1 Microkosmus, B. II. chap. ii. § 6 ; Elizabeth Hamilton's Transl.,
vol. i. p. 190.

CHAPTER VII

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

AFTER this general account of the rational activity of
man, we return to consider the evidence of intelligence
in animals, specially in the higher mammals. We
have seen that only by prior study of the higher
intelligence can we come to any clear appreciation of
the lower intelligence. Our dependence on conscious
ness for direct knowledge of intelligence is conclusive
as to the line of research.

Our aim here will be to estimate facts at their
highest value, as they may seem favourable to the
hypothesis of evolution of mind as well as of body.
This is the only course by which we may hope to
approximate towards a decision on the relations of
rational life to animal in natural history.

We begin with an extract from Wallace's Darwin
ism: 'Mr. Darwin's mode of argument consists in
showing that the rudiments of most, if not of all, the
mental and moral qualities of man can be detected in
some animals. The manifestations of intelligence,
amounting in some cases to distinct acts of reasoning,
in many animals, are adduced as exhibiting in a much
less degree the intelligence and reason of man. In
stances of curiosity, imitation, attention, wonder, and

K

146 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

memory are given ; while examples also are adduced
which may be interpreted as proving that animals
exhibit kindness to their fellows, or manifest pride,
contempt, or shame. Some are said to have the
rudiments of language, because they utter several
different sounds, each of which has a definite meaning
to their fellows or to their young ; others, the rudi
ments of arithmetic, because they seem to count and
to remember up to 3, 4, and even 5. A sense of
beauty is imputed to them on account of their own
bright colours, or the use of coloured objects in their
nests ; while dogs, cats, and horses are said to have
imagination, because they appear to be disturbed by
dreams. Even some distant approach to the rudi
ments of religion is said to be found in the deep love
and complete submission of a dog to his master.' l

This summary of evidence will prove valuable
for guiding us in the attempt to thread our way
through a vast mass of illustration, so extremely
varied in form as to make classification exceedingly
difficult. The summary is the more helpful that it
has been drawn up as the result of close study of
Darwin's works, by one in the highest sense com
petent for the task. My object will be to estimate
the evidence adduced, seeking to approximate towards
definite conclusions as to the characteristics of animal
intelligence, thus preparing for comparison of it with
human intelligence. In entering upon this division
of the subject, it is to be observed that Darwin in his
' comparison of the mental powers of man and the
lower animals,'- is content to limit the range of
observation by restricting to the higher animals, most

1 Darwinism, p. 461. " The Descent of Man, chap. iii. p. 65.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 147

closely approaching man in physical structure. He
says : ' My object in this chapter is to show that there
is no fundamental difference between man and the
higher mammals in their mental faculties.' l This is
contemplated by Darwin as part of the constructive
argument for the evolution of rational life. It is
also desirable here to keep in view Wallace's own
position, as marking divergence from Darwin at this
point. He says : ' I fully accept Mr. Darwin's conclusion
as to the essential identity of man's bodily structure
with that of the higher mammalia;' yet he finds
himself unable to concur in the further conclusion as
to the essential identity of man's mental nature with
that of lower orders of life. As to Darwin's position
concerning the rational life of man, Wallace says :
' Although, perhaps, nowhere distinctly formulated,
his whole argument tends to the conclusion that
man's entire nature, and all his faculties, whether
moral, intellectual, or spiritual, have been derived
from their rudiments in the lower animals, in the same
manner, and by the action of the same general laws,
as his physical structure has been derived.' 2 As to
the validity of this, Wallace says : ' This conclusion
appears to me not to be supported by adequate
evidence, and to be directly opposed to many well
ascertained facts.'3 Thus the two authors who divide
the honours of working out, quite independently, a
theory of the evolution of organic life by natural
selection, are at variance as to the possibility of in
cluding the rational life of man in the scheme.

As I have elsewhere discussed in detail the evidence

1 The Descent of Man, chap. iii. p. 66.

2 Darwinism, p. 461. :i Ibid., p. 461.

148 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

for intelligence in animal life,1 I shall best meet
the requirements of the present argument by giving
prominence to definite generalisations from the data
supplied. The evidence has been largely accumulated,
and is now generally accessible in literature. There is,
therefore, good reason for anticipating a solid basis of
agreement here, even though the difficulties of the in
quiry are such as to preclude the hope of an exhaustive
discussion. We shall never wholly escape the per
plexities arising from difference between the indirect
mode of knowing how animals act, and the direct
knowledge of our own intellectual procedure. External
observation has no chance of competing on this field
with consciousness of individual experience. Nothing
but defective appreciation of the difference in the
conditions of knowing, can induce any one to suppose
that it is possible to reach conclusions as to animal
intelligence with the certainty attainable as to human
intelligence. We know beyond doubt what are the
characteristics of rational power in man; we can
never know, except by very imperfect inductions,
what powers of intelligence are at work in animal life,
There is, moreover, this additional obstacle to exact
inference, that the certainty as to our own procedure,
over against the uncertainty as to animal procedure,
leads us to reason largely by analogy, without our
having any strict test of the legitimacy of the
analogical inference. All these limitations and dis
advantages must be kept in view, if scientific con-
elusions are to be sought with reasonable hope of
success. Full weight must, therefore, be given to

i The Relations of Mind and Brain, chap. vii. pp. 198-288.
Revised treatment of the question appears in the 3rd edition.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 149

these preliminary statements, in attempting to trace
our path from the shell-fish to man, searching for the
appearance of intelligence.

The initial perplexity attaching to this inquiry is
the Hifficulty of finding a reliable definition, of ' in
telligence,' such as will be accepted by all. inquirers.
This" difficulty is, however, greatly lessened by the
course we have followed in drawing the distinction
between sensory discrimination and rational dis
crimination. There is a clear line of demarcation
here, without regard to which it is impossible to
advance a single step in our research as to animal
intelligence ; and there is this further advantage that
the distinction is matter of general agreement. The
only modification of this claim to agreement arises
from the contention of those who would identify
mind with sensibility, or, in case of regarding these
as distinct, would make them always co-existent in
natural history. Under this hypothesis life and in
telligence are either identical or synchronous. Very
few among scientific observers are prepared for such
a position.1 Darwin separates himself from this
completely, by restricting reference to the higher
mammalia, when he seeks to construct a theory of
the evolution of man's ' mental powers.' This is not
on his part an expedient for restricting the range of
comparison. Such restriction might well be desired
by any one contemplating the serious entanglements

1 So stated, biological theory seems to pass into the monistic
scheme of Hegel, as in a dissolving view. The Universe is interpreted,
not only as the manifestation of creative intelligence, but as the
direct action of intelligence, manifesting itself in gradually expand
ing rationalised forms,

150 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

involved by including the whole range of animal ac
tivity. But this is not the consideration which has
influenced Darwin. His restriction to ' the higher
mammalia ' arises from the structure of an evolution
theory. Within such a theory, evolution of organic
structure from its simplest form upwards, towards a
more highly elaborated organism, constitutes a vast
epoch in the history of progress, carrying within itself,
under operation of natural law, provision for the life of
a later epoch. Ac£&rding to the implications of this
theory, the evolution of 'mind' is a Iate_j3ventj for
which all antecedent stages in natural history_had been
preparing. This is, indeed, the meaning of 'natural
selection.' It is the action of environment on organism,
constitutionally adapted for modification under pres
sure of external demands. This, according to Darwin,
is the key to the progress manifest in the annals of
natural history. Hence the restriction to the higher
mammals, when inclusion of the functions of human
life is attempted. On the other hand, when Wallace
admits his inability to claim that the rational life can
be included within this scheme of evolution, it is
because he fails to find, in the forms of life most
closely allied, sufficient promise to account for evolu
tion of the mental powers of man.

Granting evolution of organic life on the earth,
what account can be given of the appearance of
' mind ' or ' intelligence ' ? In the contrast between
sensible discrimination and rational, we have a
serviceable definition of ' intelligence.' It seems also
as if in advancing into this higher field of research,
we were passing away from organic structure and
its functions, inasmuch as physiology of brain has

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 151

failed to localise rational functions, by planting them
hTstructure. If this be so, the theory of Evolution,
alTan argument for continuity of life, is involved in
serious difficulty, in its attempt to include rational
life. Has not Darwin been over sanguine in his view .
ofjinalogies ? Has not Wallace shown himself more ''
strict In ""adherence to scientific conditions ? How £ s
the" matter stands, will depend on the conclusions
warranted by study of the relations of human intelli
gence to animal life.

In the contrast between sensible discrimination
andlFational, we have a definition of 'intelligence/^
not "only compatible with the theory of Evolution, but
even suggested by it. The scientific view of the
structure and functions of the sensori-motor system
leads forward to a boundary-line beyond which lies a
new phase of activity. In touching the limits of sensi
bility, we forthwith recognise the action of a higher
life. Power of reasoning is the central feature, typical
of this higher order of power. Negatively, 'intelli
gence ' is non-sensible discrimination,— a distinguish
ing of difference to which sensibility is unequal.
Positively, ' intelligence ' is discrimination of the
meaning of sensible impressions. This is its simplest
form of exercise, beyond which lies all that is involved
in dealing inductively with the problems of existence.

That there is in the life of the higher mammalia
more than merely sensible experience, is generally
admitted. We cannot grant higher functions, without
granting higher faculty. Intelligence, even in its
simplest phase, transcends sensibility, involving dis
crimination of the objective significance of sensory
impressions. By this higher exercise, sensible dis-

152 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

crimination is utilised so as to provide a higher know
ledge. Thus, in our own experience, the two powers,
sensibility and understanding, co-operate in securing
a two-fold knowledge, easily distinguished, — conscious
ness of sensation, and knowledge of its significance.
The sensory impression is one thing ; its objective
significance is quite another thing. That the im
pression may be complex does not affect this dis
tinction. 'Any number of impressions from any
number of sensory sources, falling simultaneously on
a mind which has not yet experienced them separately,
will yield a single undivided object to that mind.'1
' The noticing of any part whatever of our object is
an act of discrimination.' - We discriminate objects,
and parts of objects. We contemplate present sensory
experience in the light of past experience. Only in
this way, can the meaning of the present sensory
experience be apprehended. Thus, by a power of
comparison, with memory, and use of the law of
causality, we have a knowledge of the qualities of
objects coming into contact with our organism.
Sensibility is the pre-requisite for such knowledge,
but it is insufficient for its attainment. Sensible
discrimination is the limit of experience for a great
portion of organic life on the earth. With us, it is
otherwise. Consequent on touching an object, or being
touched by an object, we have a knowledge of the
object itself, as a thing separate from other objects
around. The difference between sensible discrimination
and intelligent, is known within the lines of our own
experience. When we touch one object, and im-

1 Text-Book of Psychology, by William James, p. 245.
\Ibid., p. 244.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 153

mediately thereafter touch another object, we feel the
difference; when we say the first object is a chair, the
second a book, this is intelligent discrimination.

Let us, then, put the two forms of definition
together. Intelligence is non-sensible, because supra-
sensible, recognition of difference; a discrimination
transcending sensible experience. Intelligence is
mt^retatkm . pf_ sensible experience jtself, so as to
recognise, Jjts objective significance. The former
definition excludes what sensory apparatus supplies,
treating sensible experience as preliminary to know
ledge proper. The latter makes interpretation of
sensible impressions the simplest phase of intelligent
life. More advanced phases appear in the attain
ing of rationalised knowledge. These definitions
include animal intelligence along with human. A
common basis of intelligence belongs to both. To
man alone belongs the free exercise of rational power,
seeking interpretation of existence, in all its forms
and relations. How much is to be made of this
difference is the next question. The definition of
intelligence is secured by reference to the limits of
sensory apparatus on the one hand, and to our
conscious self-directed mental activity on the other.
Every life which passes beyond sensible experience to
distinguish parts of objects, and the several qualities
of objects, exercises a measure of intelligence. Still
higher than this, is the rational life, proceeding by
inductive process to the recognition of general truth.
The life so exercised gathers knowledge and passes
more or less freely into a sphere of truth, distinct
from that included within the sphere of experience.
That some animals are equal to the lower exercise of

154 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

intelligence, almost all are prepared to admit, what
ever the diversities of opinion entertained as to the
range of intelligent power belonging to animal life.

How far we may extend the group of ' higher
mammalia' to which intelligence maybe attributed,
is a question of great interest here. But it does not
promise to find exact settlement under the conditions
of our present knowledge. For theoretic purposes, it
is enough that we consider the relations of man, as
an intelligent being, to the animals nearest in or
ganisation, and most closely allied by domestication.
The group thus formed is sufficiently large to allow
for an extended range of evidence, and for critical
acumen in its interpretation. Here allowance must
constantly be made for the imperfect knowledge of
animal life attainable by outward observation. The
group of animals contemplated includes the ape, the
-monkey, the dog, and the horse. For our present
object, it is not needful to extend wider. Let us take
the highest in animal life, even with all the advantages
of domestication, and let us compare this with the
normal intelligence of human life.

We are now ready for consideration of Darwin's
argument. The summary given by Wallace, already
quoted, will greatly facilitate reference, and will afford
a reliable test. What we specially desire to reach is
a set of trustAvorthy generalisations as to animal
intelligence. Only after these have been found can we
be in a position to judge of the scheme of Evolution,
as it bears upon man's appearance on the earth.

Under guidance of physiology we have to assign
the full complement of work to the sensory nerves
and correlated portions of the brain and subordinate

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 155

nerve centres. Without this, the terms of the problem
concerning intelligence cannot be stated.

It is generally admitted that sensibility is the only
phase of discrimination possible for the lower forms
of life. This is implied in the reference to the higher
mammals as intelligent. Such reference to the highest
types of animal is in harmony with the form of the
argument for evolution.

Our difficulties are thus considerably lessened, first,
by exclusion of most animals, and also by exclusion
of a large mass of correlated facts in the life of higher
animals and also of men. It is alleged that man and
the higher mammalia are capable of intelligent dis
crimination. At the same time, it is admitted that
there is no deviation from this law, that sensible ex
perience is to be assigned to sensory apparatus. The
key to such experience is physiological function.
Here we are moving upon strictly scientific lines, and
the results have an important bearing on the terms
of the main problem.

The direction to be followed now becomes more
obvious. The phenomena of sensibility being classi
fied and separated, the phenomena of intelligence
alone remain to be interpreted. Let us observe the
bearing of this on life experience. Much in animal
life that is commonly assigned to intelligence, is with
drawn, as having no such significance as has often
been supposed. If the antenna of the ant are more
sensitive than the tips of our fingers, larger power of
discrimination by touch must be attributed to the ant
than to man. That the ant is far below the higher
mammals in the scale of life, involves no detraction
from this acknowledgment of superiority to man him-

156 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

self. Again, inasmuch as the dog has a prominent
olfactory lobe, outstretching the frontal lobes of the
brain, and has greatly more acute sense of smell than
we have, we assign to him superiority to man in this
phase of sensory experience. Thus, when sensory
structure becomes the test of comparison, cross classi
fications are inevitable, involving collateral issues. It
is impossible to distribute capacity of sensibility in
accordance with an animal's position in the scale of
animate existence. Great differences in structure of
sensory organs, and consequently in sensible experi
ence, appear at various points. The examples given
are conclusive. With this is included the inference,
that increased sensibility bears no testimony for in
telligence. Power of discrimination by means of
apparatus, cannot support an inference in favour of
the existence of intelligent discrimination. Sensibility,
even though it be superior to that of humanity, does
not of itself imply power of that higher kind which
we attribute to the higher mammals. The superiority
of touch belonging to the ant, in comparison with
that belonging to the dog, is manifest. On the other
hand, evidence for intelligence in the dog is obtained
by external observation. It is connected mainly with
the animal's interpretation of signs, as when the collie
extends his run at the shepherd's call. This presents
our first generalisation. Sensibility to contact with
external objects is common to "all' organic life on the
earth, and is a thing distinct from intelligence. Differ
ence of sensibility depends upon difference of structure,
and upon nothing besides. There are no data on which
it is possible to modify this conclusion. Morphology
of sensory structure does not guide to a science of

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 157

intelligence. As it is impossible from superiority of
sensory apparatus, and correlative superiority in brain
structure, toTnfer intelligence, so is it impossible from
approximation of structure in the higher mammals to
argue towards similarity of intelligence.

What holds true of superiority of sensory apparatus,
holds of superiority in brain structure. These are cor
related. Whenever sensory apparatus is superior, there
brain structure is correspondingly so. Hence Darwin's
saying, ' The brain of an ant is one of the most mar
vellous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more
so than the brain of a man.' l What the brain of an
ant does, is to provide for the functional activity of the
marvellous differentiated sensory structure appearing
in the antennas, or jointed feelers, projecting from the
head ; and further, to co-ordinate impressions received
by these feelers, so as to direct the activity of the life.
This is true of the ant, just as it is true of the func
tions of brain in every case.2 The same functions are
fulfilled by the brain in the life of the dog, and in
the life of man. All brains are alike in this, that they
provide for functional activity of sensory and of motor
apparatus ; and that they co-ordinate impressions in
such a manner as to provide for bodily activity. The
brain of the ant is marvellous as compared with that
of the dog. When next the resemblance of the dog's
brain to man's brain is considered ; and the still closer
resemblance of the ape's brain to the human brain ;
and when, further, the contrasts of these three are
considered, it does not appear that wTe can account
structurally for the superior intelligence of the dog.

This seriously affects the validity of Darwin's infer-

1 Descent of Man, p. 54. 2 Ibid., p. 6.

158 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

ence from analogies of ' bodily structure.' When re
ferring to the analogy in fissures and folds of the
brain of the orang and of man, and remarking that
they do not perfectly agree, Darwin adds, ' Nor could
perfect agreement be expected, for otherwise their
mental powers would have been the same.' There
is a fallacy here, seriously affecting the whole argu
ment. Inference from structure to intelligence — or
from intelligence to structure — is not warranted on
evidence. Intelligence has not been scientifically
traced to structure, as sensibility has been, as co-ordina
tion of impressions has been, as excitation of motor
action has been. In accumulating evidence for the
doctrine of continuity, we have not been able to in
clude the phenomena of intelligence. These pheno
mena are not even known by study of organism ; and
have not been classified with structural functions.

There is, indeed, little wonder that success in
working out a theory of continuity of organism, has
stimulated expectation that the law of continuity
would yet include intelligence also. But a belief of
this kind has no scientific value. Science depends
on evidence, whereas evidence in support of this
belief is not at command. We have been guided by
embryology, by rudimentary organs, by ' homological
construction of the whole frame ' in bones, muscles,
and sense organs ; by evidence for structural modi
fication under a laAv of 'natural selection,' favoured
by the law improving structure by its use, and by
clear proof in favour of localisation of sensory and
motor centres in the brain. But in all this there
is no trace of evidence in support of the admitted
fact that a measure of intelligence belongs to the

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 159

higher mammalia, or for the fact that rational in
telligence belongs to man.

This is a critical point in the argument. Looking
at a dog's brain, we can tell that the animal has been
capable of sensory experience, and of locomotion ;
and has been distinguished by prominence of the
sense of smell. But, with the evidence lying before
us in this structure, we cannot tell that the animal
was intelligent. The evidence on which we attribute
intelligence to the higher mammals is not included
within morphology and physiology. Evidence for
their classification as mammals is clearly within
the compass of these sciences ; evidence for their
intelligence is not. For this we are dependent
exclusively on observation of the conduct of the
animal under our direction. After we have satisfied
ourselves that the animal understands our signs, and
carries out our wishes, we look in vain within the
structure for evidence of the power of understanding
we observe. Science has no testimony on this point.
Everything said as to brain-power accounting for the
dog's intelligence, rests 011 conjecture, not on scientific
evidence. The argument from brain structure to in
telligence must be withdrawn There is only one line
of advance for a scientific argument for continuity,
that it be shown that the new function has been con
temporaneous with new structure, and that the later
function, having been evolved from the earlier, the
advance has been continuous. On clearest evidence,
sensory experience belongs to all organism ; and
diversity of experience depends on differentiation in
structure. On the other hand, Intelligence is
certainly to be attributed to the higher animals, but

160 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

on what this possession depends, science has no
testimony to offer.

Thus it appears that for study of_ the phenomena
of intelligence, we must pass away Jroni research
into organic structure and function. We must pass
into consciousness. Here alone, direct knowledge is
to be obtained of mental phenomena. The distinction
between the two modes of inquiry is clear, and all
that has been already said as to guarding against the
intrusion of the one into the sphere of the other, is
confirmed. \Ve are studying human experience in
order to reach definite conclusions as to animal
experience. For success, we require a more rigid
separation of sensory experience from intelligent
discrimination, as both appear in human life. So
predominant is intellectual activity in human history,
that it is not habitual with us to distinguish rigidly
between physical and mental contributions to our
experience. But the distinction needs to be rigidly
drawn here. The broad lines of separation are mani
fest in action, such as between food and knowledge,
between muscular exercise and reflective, between
observation of the external world, and the succession
of fancy and feeling in our consciousness. We do
not commonly attempt to trace for ourselves how
much is to be attributed to organism, how much to-
intelligence, when we admire a flower, or express an
opinion, or resolve to check an evil habit. As long-
as the one side is prominent, whether it be physical
or mental, we readily distinguish the one from the
other. But when contributions from both sides
intermingle, we do not easily discriminate, and not
infrequently our entire experience is attributed to

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 161

mind when a large admixture of physical activity
and experience is essential. This arises naturally
from the fact that we have no direct knowledge of
the working of brain and nerve, even when both are
in constant use. Hence we have to distinguish
between what is directly known in consciousness,
though standing unexplained by science; and what
is essential to our experience, yet known only by
scientific discovery, not by experience. The latest
results of physiological science have pressed into
notice the difference between the two phases of
activity, and the need for first explaining each se
parately, in order afterwards to explain their relation.
When we would interpret the action of human
intelligence, and thereby approximate towards some
clearer view of animal intelligence, all that belongs
to the structure and functions of our sensori-motor
system, including the correlated structure and
functions of the brain and subordinate centres, is to
be laid aside as unavailable. The only form of
dubiety hanging over our procedure, arises from
possible undiscovered brain functions, or functions
of inferior central bodies. But, admitting that
science has not yet completed interpretation of brain
functions, since 'silent regions' stand unexplained,
it must be allowed that help cannot come in this
way towards solution of our problem. Direct know
ledge must determine our conclusions. We must
work towards inferences in the light of ascertained
facts. From the knowledge of our own intelligent
procedure, we must attempt an inference adequate for
explanation of what we take to be the intelligence of
the higher mammals ; and in order that the validity

162 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

of such inference may be carefully guarded, we must
distinguish as sharply as possible between physical
function and mental action in human life itself.

Advancing on these lines, we are ready for a
survey of the data on which Darwin relies for
inclusion of mental powers with physical, within a
theory accounting for differentiation of organic life
by natural selection, under laws applicable to the
whole scale of animate existence. Wallace's summary
includes manifestations of intelligence, amounting in
some cases to distinct acts of reasoning, curiosity,
imitation, attention, wonder, memory, kindness, pride,
contempt, shame, rudiments of language, and of
arithmetic, a sense of beauty, power of imagination,
and rudiments of religion. The list is a considerable
one, though compiled with little regard to the
comparative value of the things enumerated. The
evidence adduced must be our guide to interpretation.
We greatly need more exact understanding of the
actions contemplated and of the terms employed.
This may be sought, however, with some degree of
hopefulness, because there is at least a general
concurrence in the statements made. The question
is, how far does the evidence carry us in our trans
ference of the language of man to the experience and
actions of the higher mammals ?

The method to be followed is clear. We must
compare the higher mammals with man, making
their actions the test of possible inferences. On
one side, we must accumulate all the evidence for
intelligence appearing in the life of the animals,
specially that supplied by the observations of natur
alists; and also all testimony as to structure and

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 163

functions of nerve and brain, coming from the
department of experimental psychology. On the
other side, we must present all that consciousness
discloses as to our own intelligent procedure. Careful
comparison of the two orders of life, as far as this
proves possible on the evidence obtained, is the
only course open for scientific inquiry. Comparative
structure of the nerve-systems and brains has been
accurately ascertained. A close resemblance exists
in this respect. A comparison of the actions of an
animal, such as the dog, with the actions of man,
does not involve serious difficulty. Selection of the
dog for the test is warranted on many grounds, as it
is the animal best known to us, in closest companion
ship with us, and the one to which direct reference
is made by Darwin for ' the rudiments of religion.'
The difficulty arising from the indirectness of our
knowledge of animal intelligence is insuperable.
The direct knowledge of our own reflective exercise,
given in our own consciousness, must be the test for
inference as to the intelligence of the dog. Observa
tions of the dog's action must be interpreted by
reference to our observations of our own under
standing and experience. These are the fixed
conditions of the present inquiry. The difficulties
belonging to such a mode of inquiry are many ; but
no easier method is available. On the assumption
that there is some manifestation of intelligence in the
dog, we seek to reach a psychology, or doctrine of
mind or soul, in this animal, which has become the
close companion of man. In this way only, can
advance be made towards the double conclusion we
desire to have explicitly stated, as to what animal

164 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

intelligence includes, and wherein it differs from
human intelligence.

In entering upon this department of comparative
psychology, the question whether psychology is 'a
natural science' must be laid aside as of no importance.
The question concerns nothing more than the matter
of naming, and we shall have to determine verbal
usage according to the conclusions reached. In
dealing with structure, functions, and their scientific
interpretation, the suitableness of our employment of
terms must be settled by the results of investigation.
If any one say that ' natural science ' closes with
application of the microscope, it is certain that
external observations are closed at this limit. On
the other hand, if man belongs to Nature, and
consciousness belongs to man, the study of our own
consciousness lies within the sphere _of natural
science. When from this we turn to judge of
' mental phenomena ' in the life of a dog, we are clearly
in the region of natural science. Either this must
be admitted, or the claim to include man within
Nature must be given up. There is no alternative.
That the inclusion of the whole life of man, bodily
and mental, within Nature, is the only tenable
position, is beyond dispute. The distinction between
external observation and consciousness, as two distinct
modes of knowing natural phenomena, is, however,
rigidly drawn. It is acknowledged that there is no
available mode of bridging the chasm which separates
them. In our own life, they are distinct ; and their
relation to each other can be judged from the facts
of our life alone. The contrast between physiology
and psychology is final, and must regulate biological

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 165

research here. As far as physiology can travel,
organic functions are included; whenever interpre
tations of sensory impressions are detected, ' mental
phenomena' are recorded, and psychology is begun.
All fighting against this severance is vain. If the dog
manifests intelligence, there must be a psychology of/
dog-life. Such a psychology cannot be constructed on[
physiological data, but only on a careful comparison^!
of the actions of the dog with our own actions. The
interpretation will therefore hang entirely upon our
interpretation of the facts of our own consciousness, as
these may guide to interpretation of the dog's actions.
In this way, under demands of comparative biology,
we reach a clear understanding of the distinctive
character of ' mental phenomena.' They are such
phenomena, in whatever life found, as transcend the
functions of organism. In the language of experience,
they are phenomena in advance of sensory discri
mination, inasmuch as they imply its interpretation.
In language applicable to action, they are phenomena
superior to the operation of motor apparatus, including
brain and nerve and muscle, the action of all three
being included within physiology. Among 'mental
phenomena ' these are conspicuous, guiding us in all
inferences as to ' mind ' or ' soul,' — interpretations of
sensory experience, and intelligent purpose, formed in
view of the relations of means to ends. Wherever
vital phenomena show more than action and reaction
6T sensory apparatus : and more than motor activity
in response~to sensory impression and appetite, there
weliave a psychological problem. Such a problem,
we are agreed, does arise in the life of the monkey,
ape, horse, and dog. It must, therefore, be clearly seen

166 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

that this admission is involved in the acknowledgment
of ' animal intelligence.' This is the affirmation that
' intelligence/ in some phase, appears lower than man
in biological history. And this is the admission of
life of an aspect higher than the physical. In effect,
it is the affirmation that the higher mammalia, —
expressly the four species enumerated, — are possessed
of ' mind ' or ' soul ' of some type, akin to that of man,
however inferior it be in the range of its powers. This
is the point to which we have been brought by recent
advances. Scientific observers must recognise the
breadth of their own conclusions, and we must face
the problem which has been raised. That this can
be done without careful scrutiny of our own con
sciousness, is impossible. All those who have been
loudest in the outcry against 'introspection' must
adopt introspection as the sole mode for reaching any
conclusion as to the problem of ' animal intelligence,'
as this has been shaped by biological research.

Two rules of procedure must here regulate us, —
First, ' Animal intelligence ' can be judged of only
by reference to our own consciousness of intelligent
procedure. Second, Animal conduct unattainable by
us, even by the best use of our intelligence, cannot be
referred to intelligence.

Our first aid towards classification of mental
phenomena is to be found in the contrast between
lower and higher orders of life. The exact line of
severance may be difficult to trace, but if the contrast
be granted so far as to set the lower orders of life on
one side, and the higher mammalia on the other, we
have scope for induction. When Darwin undertakes
' to show that there is no fundamental difference

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 167

between man and the higher mammals in their
mental faculties,'1 we recognise this contrast. Con
sistency here will lead to important results. While,
however, Darwin makes the contrast conspicuous
when defining the limits within which he undertakes
to lead proof, he unfortunately does not adhere to
these limits in course of his argument. Such
adherence on the part of an observer so disciplined,
and so exact in statement, would have yielded large
help in the discussion. He has, however, at least
suggested the essential conditions of our inquiry.
Yet these conditions are well-nigh obliterated in his
own treatment of the question, immediately after he
has passed from their announcement. Thus, one of
his first statements concerns ' animals very low in the
scale,' namely, ' that their mental powers are much
higher than might have been expected.' 2 Keference
is next made to 'animals of many kinds, including
birds,' when it is alleged that ' individuals differ
greatly in every mental characteristic.' Forthwith,
he touches the problem concerning the manner in
which 'the mental powers were first developed in
the lowest organisms,' declaring this ' as hopeless an
inquiry as how life itself first originated.' Im
mediately thereafter he passes to animal Instinct.
Founding on the observations of Pouchet,3 he says,
' Those insects which possess the most wonderful
instincts are certainly the most intelligent,' while ' in
the invertebrate series,' fishes and amphibians are
described as ' the least intelligent members.'4

1 The Descent of Man, p. 66. 2 7^. p. 66.

3 Revue des Deux Mondes, Feb. 1870, p. 690.

4 The, Descent of Man, p. 67.

168 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

No true scientific advance can be made by reason
ing conducted on these lines. There are two theories
included, one of which must be abandoned if the other
is to be vindicated. If ' the object is to show that
there is no fundamental difference between man and
the higher mammals in their mental faculties/ it
seems implied that there is a fundamental difference
between man and the lower mammals, else there is no
need for drawing the line. On the other hand, if
' mental powers ' are to be attributed to ' animals very
low in the scale/ we need some better understanding
of what is ' mental.' Is there no fundamental differ
ence between man and such animals in their mental
faculties ? If there be none, the whole range of the
scale is before us, and the evidence must be stated
much more effectively than has yet been done. The
facts to be attributed to the sensori-motor system in
fishes, amphibians, and insects must be distinguished
from those facts in their life which are attributed
to ' mental faculties.' No biologist has attempted this
needful distinction. If only we begin with fishes and
amphibians, and thence move downwards, the hope
lessness of the claim becomes manifest. This arises
from the impossibility of claiming, for animals lowest in
the scale, anything higher than powers of sensibility.

If there were any considerable consensus of opinion
among scientific men, attributing intelligence to
animals very low in the scale, it would be inconsistent
to concentrate on exclusive references such as those
by which Darwin defined his object in the chapter on
'the mental powers of man and the lower animals.' The
definition of intelligence must be explicit, if any scien
tific conclusion is to be reached as to its appearance.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 169

It is scientifically assured that sensori-motor func
tions are not functions of intelligence. Intelli
gence is at least the power of discrimination which
interprets sensible differences. Recognising this
contrast between organic sensibility and intelligent
discrimination, we seek a careful classification of data
on which theoretic discussion may proceed.

Believing that Darwin was correct in limiting his
object to showing that possession of intelligence must
be predicated of the higher mammals as well as of
man. I take it as a correlative position that intelli
gence, as here defined, cannot be attributed to lower
organic life. The implications of this position must,
however, be clearly recognised. It follows from this
that evidence is not available to sustain the conclusion
that fishes and amphibians manifest intelligence. On
the other hand, reference to the wonderful phenomena
of insect life shows that greater powers of sensory
discrimination belong to insects than to fishes and
amphibians ; or even to the higher mammals. In
view of these differences, either there are twro distinct
bases for classification of life supplied by sensory
discrimination and by intelligence, or we must assign
a higher intelligence to insects than to the higher
mammalia. The difficulty here must be deliberately
met. A scientific account of the appearance of
intelligence in the Avorld's history, depends on what is
to be said of the Insects. Has intelligence made its
appearance at this low point in the scale of organic
life ? Does it appear where we have a brain weighing
' a fraction of a millogramme ; ' or was Darwin correct
in bringing the whole discussion to a possession be
longing exclusively to man and the higher mammalia ?

170 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

It is most natural for us, as it is the simplest course,
to attribute to Intelligence the wonderful activity
of the ant. It is certain that without use of our
intelligence we could not accomplish what the ants
do. But, the limits to their work are so marked as
to show the lack of intelligence, and to lead us to
classify their actions otherwise. Lubbock's observa
tions supply marked testimony as to these limits.
Marvellous sensibility accounts for much, and beyond
this, there is action manifestly uninstructed, un
trained, unreflective. Any reserve which seems need
ful in view of the observations of Huber, Lubbock,
Pouchet, M/Cook, and others, must be attributed to
the indirectness of the knowledge attainable by us.
Sensibility and instinct together, apart from intelli
gence, seem capable of accounting for most of the
observations. How ' instinct ' is to be regarded, will
appear presently. The recorded observations are so
many and striking that it is impossible to assign to
them any other than a conspicuous place in discussion
of the problems of animal intelligence. The affirma
tion or denial of intelligence here, becomes a turning-
point, round which definite theoretic conclusions must
gather. If intelligence may with full warrant be attri
buted to ants, the argument for continuity is broken.
We place insects high in intelligence, while we place
fishes and amphibians low. On the other hand, if
we deny intelligence to the insects, we have the most
wonderful testimony to the possibilities of sensibility
and instinct, and on this account the testimony
for intelligence in the higher mammals is greatly
narrowed. Either intelligence appears so low in the
scale of life as to break continuity, or its appearance

ANIMAL AND KATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 171

at the highest stages of organic development is in a
restricted and quite subordinate mode. In any case,
the ant must be regarded as superior in sensibility to
the higher mammals, and even to man, — a conclusion
in itself of large significance as bearing on the
problems of evolution. Observations as to the ant
show that the possibilities of sensible discrimination
are so largely extended, as to suggest a considerable ex
pansion of our conceptions of the area of physiological
functions. As to intelligence itself, our conclusion
brings us back to comparison of the higher mam
mals with man, in accordance with the object avowed
by Darwin in his ' comparison of the mental powers
of man and the lower animals.'

It is now sufficiently obvious that all sensory
phenomena, and all forms of activity traceable to
nerve sensibility, must be placed on one side, in order
that the phenomena of intelligence may be classified.
For accomplishment of this, some closer test of in
telligence is required, by a more rigid application of
the contrast between the two phases of discrimination.
This can best be attained, by proceeding from the
higher life to the lower, that is, from direct knowledge
of mental activity, to inductions warranted on the
basis of an indirect knowledge.

That this may be attempted with some degree of
confidence, we must have full in view all that is com
mon to man, as animal, with the higher mammals,
making account of close approximation in organic
structure. Here, two quotations from Darwin will
render important service. 'As man possesses the
same senses as the lower animals, his fundamental
intuitions must be the same. Man has also some few

172 EVOLUTION AND MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

instincts in common, as that of self-preservation,
sexual love, the love of the mother for her new-born
offspring, the desire possessed by the latter to suck,
and so forth. But man, perhaps, has somewhat fewer
instincts than those possessed by the animals which
come next to him in the series.' 1 Next, as to in
tellectual power, — ' Man, from the activity of his
mental faculties, cannot avoid reflection : past im
pressions and images are incessantly and clearly
passing through his mind.' 2 To separate two distinct
sets of phenomena, thus becomes needful, if valid
inductions are to be reached ; and this demand applies
as much to the higher mammals as to man. This
requirement is to be met by application of the dis
tinction between sense and intelligence, — between
' fundamental intuitions ' of the senses, and ' reflection,'
as Darwin has expressed the difference. For a little,
we leave common instincts, to ascertain what is
common in use of general sensibility of the organism,
and of the special senses ; thereafter, what is common
in respect of intelligence, and what are the special
characteristics of human intelligence.

As to organic sensibility, inference is easy, giving
large experience and activity common to man and
animal. Continuity in structure is obvious ; the func
tions are homologous ; and diversity is to be affirmed
only in accordance with differentiation in organism.
The laws of sensibility and of motor activity are the
same; and whatever differences exist in experience
determined by the special senses, all alike see, hear,
taste, and smell.

As to Intelligence, inference is more difficult, the

1 The Descent of Man, p. 66. 2 Ibid. p. 112.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 173

need being much greater for classification of pheno
mena, and distinction of function. Our inferences
must be from the higher to the lower, — from the
better known to the less known, — from direct know
ledge to the interpretation of the results gathered by
indirect observation. From the inquiry already
passed, it follows that a greater amount of human
experience and activity must be assigned to organism
under physiological law, than is commonly done,
when interpretation depends on the knowledge which
consciousness supplies, apart from knowledge of the
function of the sensori-motor system. The importance
of this will appear from a few illustrations. Take
mechanical skill, in which man immeasurably excels
the animals nearest to him. lindustrial art supplies
examples of the contrast between thought and muscu
lar facility. The man must observe the conditions of
work, must take pains in course of his first efforts,
must shape successive purposes in acknowledgment
of his failures, must acquire muscular aptitude.
Afterwards there is less need for thought. So it is
with vocalisation in early attempts to speak.1 Imitation
of sounds plays a preliminary part ; next, understand
ing of symbols before they can be used ; and there
after, by slow effort, management of the brain centres,
the nerves, and the muscles, with vocal cords of the
larynx, all of which are brought under regulation only
by intelligent purpose to imitate a familiar vocable,
without the slightest knowledge of this elaborate
structure provided to secure this result. From these
forms of effort, it appears that imitation is first
favoured by sensory impression. This is obviously
1 See The Mind of the Child, Part n., by Prof. Preyer, Jena.

1 74 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

common to man and animals, even animals much lower
in the scale than the higher mammals. Passing to
understanding of symbols, we are led to further distinc
tions, involving more obvious approach in the life of
the higher mammals towards human exercise, than
has appeared in the life of lower orders. We are
now crossing the lines between sensory and intelligent
appreciation. Poultry can appreciate a call associ
ated with food-supply — an association powerful in all
animate existence endowed with sense of hearing.
In advance of this, warranting special classification,
the monkey, the ape, the horse, and the dog show
intelligent discrimination by interpretation of signs.
Each of them, however, quickly reaches the limits
of its power. A dog understands vocables as sym
bols of command ; but he does not attempt an
intelligent exercise like the child's, preliminary to
vocalisation. The full explanation of this does not
seem in any case to be physical incapacity, for tho
physical organism of the dog or monkey is equal to
vocalisation, as is organism much lower in tho scale,
extending probably even to fishes and to insects.
From the level of tho birds upwards, vocalisation
certainly expresses feelings of pleasure, want, and
fear. This is well illustrated by Mr. Garner's experi
ments as to the language of monkeys, with aid of
phonograph. The author gives a humorous sketch
of his attempts at definition of the meaning of sounds.1
On tho data now referred to, certain inductions be
come clear : Sensory associations, and power of voca
lisation belonging to organism. With these is in
cluded a phase of memory, with increasing sensibility

1 The ftpeech of Monkey*, by R. L. Garner.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 175

to sound as a stimulant of action. In proof of exer
cise of intelligence, examples are many and familiar,
making it unnecessary to enter upon detailed refer
ences.1 As to human intelligence, evidence connected
with physical aptitude, beginning with human speech
as the expression of thought, passes upwards through
all the acquisitions and achievements connected with
skilful manipulation, and with development of musical
gift and artistic faculty. Within this department of
inquiry evidence is supplied sustaining the conclusion,
that the higher mammals possess a form of intelligence
sufficient for interpreting other symbols, besides the
expressions of sensibility belonging to the natural
life of their species. The dog is conspicuous here,
standing in marked advance of the other members
of the group, monkeys, apes, and horses. This
superiority is the result of companionship with man.
Possibilities of training thus become a valuable test
of comparative intelligence.

From this we pass to an additional group of pheno
mena connected with the social life characteristic
of the several species. This transition somewhat
alters the view of the classifications of animals. In so
far as gregarious tendencies involve a more uniform
and extended manifestation of social feeling, sheep
and oxen take precedence of the higher mammals.
Within the higher group, monkeys take precedence
of the apes ; while horses and dogs supply less valu
able evidence of social feeling. Domestication has con
siderably obscured the range of natural feeling in the
life of both the horse and the dog. These diversities

1 Of details, I have made account in The Rdalion of Mind and
Jirain, chap, vii,

176 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

make an additional demand upon caution in
applying tests. At this point, some advantage to
scientific induction arises from Darwin having
allowed himself to extend observation beyond the
higher mammals. A wide range of sympathetic
feeling is thus included, but under this division of
evidence, marks of intelligence are less prominent.
He says : ' With those animals which live permanently
in a body, the social instincts are ever present and
persistent. Such animals are always ready to utter
the danger signal, to defend the community, and to
give aid to their fellows in accordance with their
habits ; they feel at all times, without the stimulus of
any special passion or desire, some degree of love and
sympathy for them ; they are unhappy if long separ
ated from them, and always happy to be again in
their company. So it is with ourselves.'1 The
accuracy of this account will be at once admitted,
presenting important phases of experience common
to animal and man. What are included under gre-
gariousness are phases of animal susceptibility.
The gregarious is more prominent than the social,
and the social feeling is more prominent than
action of intelligence. Laying aside instincts, not
claimed as evidence of intelligence, and applying the
distinction between sensible and intelligent discrim
ination, intellectual phenomena are here few and un
important. The agreeableness experienced from the
presence of numbers, is a phase of sensibility which
must be referred to organism. There seems no
ground to conclude that this depends on intelligent
discrimination, any more than on special passion.
1 The Descent of Man, p. 112.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 177

Nor docs it appear that wo can otherwise classify tho
danger signal, any more than the passionate defence,
in case of attack. Here we are still contemplating
phenomena of animal life. Uniform association with
the species, leads to uneasiness in separation. The
absence of intelligent discrimination is particularly
marked here. There are few phenomena for which it
seems possible to claim an intelligent origin, or even
as much as can with certainty be described as
intelligent direction. All the characteristic features
of the social life of man are wanting in the life of
animals most gregarious; while all the animal char
acteristics appear down the scale, greatly below the
higher mammals. Some of the insects 'are social,
and aid one another in many important ways;'1
'rabbits stamp loudly on the ground with their hind
feet as a signal ; ' ' animals of many kinds are social,
we find even distinct species living together; for
example, some American monkeys, and united flocks
of rooks, jackdaws, and starlings."2 We do not
suppose that any one claims that these facts warrant
an inference to intelligence. Facts more obviously
approximating towards those of human life are not
conspicuous among animals the most gregarious. As
to this, Darwin bears important testimony, showing
how much is the product of impulse, how little of in
telligent direction. A general and careful survey of
animal life has led him to the conclusion that, ' there
is no evidence that any animal performs an action for
the exclusive good of another species/ 3 Accordingly
the law of natural selection does riot point to advance

1 The. Descent of Man, p. 100. 2 Jl,id

3 Origin of Hpeciw, p. ] 94.

M

178 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

by way of intelligence. ' Natural selection acts only
by slight modifications of structure or instinct, each
profitable to the individual under its conditions of
life.'1 The absence of reference to intelligence is
marked here. ' Survival of the fittest,' taken as the
expression of each successive stage in the history of
evolution, involves organic modification of the social
impulse. Under natural selection, which is one of
the surest inductions of this age, the argument for
continuity of organic evolution depends on the reign
of passion in animal life, consequently implying that
intelligence has not supplied the law of progress in
the natural history of the earth. If, therefore, it be
true, as it obviously is, that under the law of natural
selection there has been continuity up the whole
scale of organic life, it follows that, as we do not on
this line find warrant for severance of lower orders
from higher, the classification of the higher mammals
as intelligent must rest on some other basis than is
supplied in the history of the common struggle for
existence. That struggle has uniformly shown the
power of passion, standing in contrast with intelligence.
We have now reached a point where it is needful
to bring man into contrast with animals low in the
scale. Here we must make room for development of
the difference between Instinct and Intelligence.
This will prepare for more exact conclusions as to
the relations of animal to human intelligence. Until
we have set these two more clearly in antithesis, it
is impossible to make way for reliable inductions.
' Instinct ' cannot be left as an undefined residuum
into which perplexities may be cast — an unexplored

1 Origin of Species, p. 211.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 179

territory where may be a desert or an Eden, but
where all is unknown. The contrast between Intelli
gence and Instinct is in some respects clearly
recognised, even though both terms suffer in general
usage by lack of exact definition. Biologists would
not generally take exception to the statement made
by Darwin, that ' the fewness and the comparative
simplicity of the instincts in the higher animals are
remarkable in contrast with those of the lower
animals.'1 This implies that there is some broad
difference commonly recognised, of such importance
as to exalt the lower animals wrhen 'instinct is
considered, just as we exalt the higher mammals
when ' intelligence ' is the test. This broad contrast
is one of the most helpful things for guidance here.
' Instinct ' is our name for some power not yet scien
tifically explained, determining action, inherent in
organic life, and appearing quite low in the scale of
animate existence. ' Instinct ' stands out clearly as a
source of action, distinct, on the one hand, from sensi
bility, and, on the other, from intelligence. In assigning
its proper value to the statement of Darwin just quoted,
it seems necessary to admit that ' instinct ' makes up
so far, in lower orders of life, for lack of intelligence,
securing results unattainable by means of the recog
nised laws of sensibility, results so surprising to us as
intelligent observers, that we are at a loss to account
for their occurrence. Such instincts are illustrated
in the nest-building of birds ; in care for the young,
as in the insertion of eggs in the heart of a bud which
may supply nourishment suitable for the young life,2
or in the sunning of the pupae by the common ants of

1 The Descent of Man, p. 67- 2 See page 186.

180 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

the British forests; or in the grain-storing of the
' agricultural ant' of Texas. Illustrations are numerous
and endlessly varied. The most outstanding feature
of all that is named ' instinct ' is a marked superiority
in procedure to intelligence itself, as well as to common
sensori-motor activity. Under ' instinct ' we include
a multitude of actions to which this rule clearly
applies. Animal conduct, unattainable by us, even
by use of our intelligence, cannot be referred to intel
ligent power. How natural the remark of Agassiz :
' No one will deny that the honey-comb is constructed
with more art and care than the huts of many tribes
of men.' l Yet we include under ' instinct ' many
actions much more remarkable than the building of
comb. Within its own sphere, superiority must be
granted to intelligence, yet potentiality of instinct
is one of the secrets of lower organism. So much did
Darwin recognise perplexity in this feature of lower
organic life, that he opens his chapter on ' Instinct '
with these words : — ' Many instincts are so wonderful
that their development will probably appear to the
reader a difficulty sufficient to overthrow my whole
theory.'2 Such a result is not to be apprehended.
The general lines of evidence for evolution, appearing
up the whole scale of organism, are such that the
foundations of the theory are exposed to no serious
peril here ; but on this very account the perplexities
of 'Instinct' are the greater. The possibilities of
organism still quite baffle scientific inquiry, and
'instinct' is one of the most startling illustrations
of these possibilities, deserving to be placed alongside

1 Outlines of Comparative Physiology, § 193.

2 Origin of Species, chap. viii. p. 191.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 181

of the marvels of development of the most differen
tiated structure from the germ-cell.

Perplexity is increased by mixing up 'mental
characteristics' and 'origin of the mental powers'
with phenomena illustrative of animal instinct. It
is hopeless to attempt construction of a theory of the
industrial life exemplified in the bee-hive by supposing
that bees know and apply mathematical principles.
Just as unpromising is the supposition that ants have
taught their children how, in turn, they are to take
care of their own young ; or that these same insig
nificant creatures, swarming across the path before
your feet, have invented language, forestalling human
efforts in this direction. We have remarked the
guarded form in which Wallace makes reference to
' the manifestations of intelligence, amounting in
some cases to distinct acts of reasoning in many
animals.' But no one proposes to account for the
astonishing activity of insect life on the supposition
that bees and ants reason out their conclusions, as
men estimate engineering difficulties, and construct
machines to overcome them. Yet the perplexities
connected with insect life are such that Darwin is
induced to say, ' A little dose of judgment or reason,
as Pierre Huber expresses it, often comes into play,
even with animals low in the scale of Nature.'1
Huber is an authority in this department. There
is a delightful simplicity in this ' little dose/ applied
to a brain like a pin-point in its dimensions ; but the
playfulness of the remark tells how truly scientific
authorities have felt unable here to apply scientific
methods. The suggestion is of the dens ex machina

1 Origin of Species, p. 191.

182 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

type, which science rejects. The 'little dose' must
be left to organic chemistry, in a region rather remote
from psychology. Evolutionists facing the problem
of intelligence in Nature will recognise here the
danger to a doctrine of continuity, already pointed
out, and will assign due value to the statement of
Darwin that ' the fewness and the comparative
simplicity of the instincts in the higher animals are
remarkable in contrast with those of the lower
animals.' In view of the facts, we shall not feel
warranted to suppose that the higher mammals have
had ' a less dose ' of judgment or reason. It must be
recognised that 'instinct' is highly characteristic of
lower forms of life. Hence, its supposed relationship
to intelligence must be held untenable, and we must
abandon the attempt to reach ' an accurate notion of
the frame of mind under which an instinctive action
is performed.'

Closer examination of the phenomena must guide
towards a clearer induction. Darwin has well said
that, ' an action, which we ourselves require experience
to enable us to perform, when performed by an animal,
more especially by a very young one, without experi
ence, and when performed by many individuals in the
same way, without their knowing for what purpose it
is performed, is usually said to be instinctive.' This
admirably expresses the general aspects of the ob
servations leading to our common references to
instinct. Difficulty in tracing the several particulars
is admitted in each case; for we are agreed that
actions, named instinctive, often shoAv facility in
achieving results which we could not reach; or, if
the actions are possible to us, they can be done only

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 183

after reflection and training. This constitutes our
difficulty in explaining ' instinctive ' action. Hence
it is that an exact definition of ' instinct ' is impossible.
That which is only partially known to us, and known
only in an external way, cannot be exactly denned.
On this account, general descriptions, such as that
just quoted, must suffice to indicate that we have
identified certain phenomena of organic life which
are not obviously capable of explanation by reference
either to sensibility or to intelligence.

The puzzles of animal instinct are to be attacked
from the side of activity, leading to inference as to
potentiality. We must leave in abeyance, for the
present, the question as to the manner of execution.
Such reservation of the question is warranted by the
admission that instinctive actions are not the result
of experience. The single line of approach must
be recorded' observations of animal conduct. These
are exceedingly varied, and are rich in suggestive-
ness. It is impossible to doubt that a truer con
ception of Nature is to be reached by more success
ful interpretation of animal instincts. At the same
time our prospects of success are greatly restricted by
the fixed conditions of the inquiry. Much more easily
and certainly can we advance towards exposition of the
action of intelligence itself than of instinct. In many
cases, the examples of instinctive action present a
most complex set of relations. Only the results are
known. How the actions are accomplished, is a
question which observational science cannot answer.

Our main dependence must be on classification of
facts, such as may warrant inductions. Such classifica
tion may most readily be formed by reference to the

184 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

ends gained by actions named ' instinctive.' Storage
of food, and provision for young, are certainly the
most conspicuous of these ends. Physiological condi
tions are not only essential, but conspicuously pro
minent. These are phases of sensibility, provided for
by specialty of structure ; sensory experience special
to gregarious life ; physiological conditions connected
with physical wants ; transitory experience belonging
to periods of reproductive activity ; and care of the
young during a brief season of dependence. These are
all closely connected with ascertained physiological
law. So far as appears, references to 'judgment/ to
' little doses of reason,' and to ' frames of mind,' are
unwarranted.

First, we take/ood^ supply. Here we must separate
between competition with rivals, and combined action
for storage. The struggle for possession has already
been conspicuously in view, supplying evidence for
evolution. Combined action for storage is the new
feature. And this appears in the history of lower
forms of life, not in the life of the higher mammals.
This contrast accounts for Darwin's remark that
instinctive actions are more numerous and complex in
the history of lower organisms than of higher. In
study of instinct, we are led beyond the merely
gregarious tendency which induces a sheep to bleat
piteously when it finds itself severed from the flock.
We concentrate on the co-operative tendency, strik
ingly wanting among sheep and higher mammalia,
strikingly present in a hive of bees and in a nest of
ants. In the search for food, and in the eating of it
when found, as in the carnivora, we see only the direct
action of appetite. This is instinctive action in

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 185

its simplest form. It is the expression of organic
need and impulse, in no sense involving intelligence.
It is not dependent upon experience, training, or habit.
This appears in the act of sucking, by the young of all
mammalia, immediately after birth. These actions
are clearly non-intelligent.

When we have passed to the co-operative tendency,
we find ourselves in a new field of observation, and at
the same time, we are concerned with a much more
limited circle of animal life — a circle including lower
orders, excluding higher orders. Facts and spheres
and ends are all well defined, but observations are
more complex and difficult. There is now something
largely in advance of the hunger-appetite. ' Instinct '
here appears as something in advance of a present
organic need, and of the impulse which want awakens.
There is co-operation in work; a combined activity,
concentrated upon a chosen centre for storage. This
involves a veritable organisation of a community,
under common impulses. Under these conditions,
stores are multiplied, and resistance is offered to
intruders who would appropriate what has been
gathered. This complex range of activity is restricted
to animals quite low in the scale of life. This fact
increases our difficulties. The argument for continuity
up the whole scale is independent of all this, sustained
by a wide induction as to organic structure, as that
has undergone modification through struggle for
existence and use of the powers at command. But
ants and bees get over their difficulties in quite
another fashion. Their struggle is that which belongs
to co-operation, and combined resistance to attack.
This is most conspicuous in insect life, and among

186 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

lower mammals, as in the life of the beaver. The
laws of organic existence themselves provide for these
complex methods of co-operative action. These phases
of action do not seem to be the result of ' little doses
of judgment and reason.' They come from organic
impulse more nearly akin to the simple impulse of
appetite ; and are executed in absence of reflective
exercise.

Next, we include provision for the young of the
species. The mysteries of embryonic life are great at
every point in the scale of animate existence. But
when we consider provision for nourishment of the
young, the contrast between larvae and embryonic
forms of life is remarkable. Here also complexity of
procedure appears most striking in insect life. In the
case of the higher mammals there is, in the temporary
dependence of offspring, under physiological provision
for lactation, an almost bald simplicity, in contrast
with the complex arrangements of insect life. These
far surpass, in their provisions for the coming life, all
that is accomplished by the knowledge and foresight
of man. Most striking illustrations are stored in the
annals of natural history. I take a single example as
given by Weismann, when referring to the way in
which the Cynipidcv (Rhodites rosce) deposit their
eggs in the tissue of a young bud. The action of the
mother is thus described ; ' she first carefully examines
the bud on all sides, and feels it with her legs and
antennae. Then she slowly inserts her long ovipositor
between the closely rolled leaves of the bud ; but, if it
does not reach exactly the right spot, she will with
draw and reinsert it many times, until at length when
the proper place has been found, she will slowly bore

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 187

deep into the very centre of the bud, so that the eggs
will reach the exact spot, and here the necessary
conditions for its development alone exist.' 1 This
is one of the most striking examples which can be
selected in illustration of the provision made by in
sects for development of their young. Judged by
the analogies of human conduct, we should regard it
as an example of provision and forethought ; but the
insect's conduct is independent of experience, the
skill and care being manifested only when maturity
prepares for functions of reproduction. The activity
is as clearly distinct from intelligent action, as it is
from mechanical. The young mother provides for
activity of the larvae just as if its conditions were fore
known. When we attribute her action to ' instinct,'
we mean that it cannot be accounted for by appetite,
such as hunger which impels her to appropriate
food for her own want. Her feeling and action, in
this case, belong exclusively to the state of maturity,
being incidental to the period when her eggs are to
be deposited. Under a powerful impulse characteristic
of her state, involving special and periodic phases of
sensibility, involving inducement towards activity in
a single direction, she acts as if intelligence and
purpose were present, accomplishing what intelligence
could not achieve. Impelled by a physiological con
dition, and guided by a special sensibility towards a
single line of action, she ascertains what is unattainable
by man. In the economy of Nature, the life of a
succeeding generation is secured in ample food supplies,

i Weismann's Essays on Heredity, p. 93 ; 2d ed. vol. i. p. 94. For
additional examples, see Mivart's Essays, ii. p. 405 ; and Romanes's
Darwin and after Darwin, p. 293 .

188 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

when she can have no part in tending the young life.
Results depend partly on development of the bud,
partly on the functions of the organic gerai. As it is
impossible to account for the action of the mother by
reference to ' mechanical arrangements of particles in
the germ/ or by ' conditions of tension and movement '
in the organism of the mature insect, or by mere
' shock and impact ' consequent on her alighting on
the bud, though all these things are certainly in
cluded ; so it is impossible to explain the procedure of
the insect by past experience or by processes of
reasoning. There is nothing of the inferential, as
there is nothing of watchfulness over the young life,
such as is witnessed in the case of the mother bird.
The organic impulse, is certainly more akin to ap
petite than to rational procedure, for there is extreme
sensibility, acted upon by the state of the bud. These
conditions secure exact adaptation of means to ends,
and to ends unknown to the worker. Structural
adaptations to functions of the life seem invariably
recognised in the action of 'instinct,' just as in the
simpler actions of our own life, such as the winking of
the eyes, shrinking from pain, changing of posture
when uneasy. Structure and instinct are correlated.
Darwin is obviously correct when he says ' instincts
certainly do vary/ and variations are due to change
in feeling consequent on change of environment.

This whole range of observations as to animal
instinct, and the speculations following, have been
seriously entangled and perplexed by introduction of
the analogies of intelligent procedure. Until we have
separated instinct from intelligence, no trustworthy
advance can be made towards a scientific explanation

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 189

of instinctive action in animal life. There has been
care enough to restrict the significance of instinct
whenever an approach has been made to exact de
finition ; but there has also been unquestioning use of
the whole phraseology applicable to rational action,
just as if no such definition had been reached. There
is general agreement with Darwin's account of the
essentials of instinctive action : ' An action, which we
ourselves require experience to enable us to perform,
when performed by an animal, more especially by a
very young one, without experience, and when per
formed by many individuals in the same way, without
their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is
usually said to be instinctive.' l Some of these
characteristics may, as Darwin says, be wanting in
certain cases, sufficient to allow for variation in in
stinctive action, such as certainly occurs. Biologists
are, however, agreed that instinctive actions are done
'without experience,' and without knowledge of the
purpose for which they are done ; yet so uniformly
as to be included within the conditions providing for
continuance of the species. What is required of us
is, consistency with the admission that the action is
done ' without experience,' and ' without knowledge
of the purpose ' for which it is performed. There
is a surrender of such consistency, when instinct is
classified with ' the other mental faculties in animals
of the same class,' 2 and when it is said ' that several
distinct mental actions are commonly embraced by
this term,' 3 and that variations in instinct imply
variation in 'the mental qualities of animals of the

1 Origin of Species, chap. viii. p. 191.

2 Ibid. p. 191.

190 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

same kind, bom in a state of nature.' 1 If experience,
and purpose, and knowledge of the relation of means
to ends, are to be taken as functions characteristic of
mind, it follows that actions from which all these are
absent cannot be attributed to mental power. This
is the ground on which actions are referred to instinct,
and to this view there must be rigid adherence if we
are to have scientific exactness. There is little hope
of reliable advance in the inquiry as to animal in
telligence, if it be not recognised that Instinct stands
in contrast with Intellect.2 The entire chapter on
Instinct in Darwin's Origin of Species must be read
in altered form, consequent upon deletion of the
references to ' mental faculties.' After this has been
done, the facts remain available, as before. They are
data on which fresh induction may proceed; but
theoretic interpretations, held to be tributary to a
scheme of the evolution of animal intelligence, are to
be discarded. Acquisition of knowledge is not within
the province of instinct. No one speaks of ' instinctive
knowledge.' Examples of 'instinct' invariably pre
sent phases of action : and the actions recorded are
such as are not explained by practice, by acquisition
of knowledge, or by subjection to training. It is the

1 Origin of Species, p. 195.

2 How much of uncertainty as to the method of treatment clings
to all our discussions regarding Instinct may be seen by reference
to the discussions of biologists and of psychologists. Compare
the following: — Darwin's Ori/jin of Species, ch. viii., Wallace's
Darwinism, p. 441. Weismann's Essays on Heredity, with reference
to ' reflex mechanisms.' Romanes's Animal Intelligence, pp. 10-17,
and Mental Evolution in Animals, chaps, xi. and xii. Lloyd Morgan's
Animal Life and Intelligence, p. 422. Herbert Spencer's Psychology,
Part iv. chap. v. Sully's Psychology, p. 481. James's Text-Book
of Psychology, ch. xxv.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 191

absence of knowledge which is the source of astonish
ment to us. We are baffled, when insects are
adepts. From our account of Instinct and of
Intellect, it is clear that each is excluded from the
field of exercise belonging to the other. The one has
an area of activity, the other a sphere of knowledge.
From this it follows that all inductions are faulty
which assume Instinct to be a stage in the history of
evolution of Intelligence. In thus relegating instinct
and intelligence to distinct spheres, there is nothing-
adverse to the acknowledgment that instinct may
appear in the life of the higher mammals, and even
in the life of man. The general conclusion now
reached as to their contrast is, however, sustained
by the 'fewness and the comparative simplicity of
the instincts in the higher animals,' in contrast with
those of animals low in the scale of life.

At this point, much that has hitherto been held to
belong to the argument for evolution is seen to fall
away. Continuity of organic evolution of the whole
scale of life is maintained on distinct lines of evidence,
and the theory is liberated from the perplexity occa
sioned by an apparent breach of continuity con
sequent on attributing intelligence of a special order
appearing so low as insect life. In accordance with
Darwin's suggestion, we again pass up to the higher
mammalia for evidence of intelligence. If this
higher power here appear only in minor form, quite
inferior to human intelligence, yet is the ' animal in
telligence' closely allied with the human, being
clearly in advance of all that appears in the life of
lower animals. The wonders of instinct stand unex
plained. They are referred to animal sensibility, not

192 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

to intelligence. In their highest phases, they belong
to forms of life possessing organs of touch quite
special in their sensitiveness. So far as continu
ance of the species depends on these wonders of
instinct, dependence of the larvse is much, greater
on external conditions, apart from the mother's care,
than is the case in the life of the young of the higher
mammals.

A problem is here left outstanding for the evolu
tionist, which is still of sufficient difficulty to make
us readily appreciate the opening statement of Darwin
in his chapter on this subject : — ' Many instincts are
so wonderful that their development will probably
appear to the reader a difficulty sufficient to over
throw my whole theory.' The difficulty may seem
less puzzling when the problem is more completely
freed from the entanglements which have been
allowed to gather around it, specially when it is seen
that the argument as to animal intelligence must be
dealt with on data entirely apart. On the other hand,
how much of the evidence relied on as favouring
evolution of intelligence must disappear on the same
account, may be judged by reference to a single ex
ample. Darwin reasons thus as to the intelligence
of apes : — ' The anthropomorphous apes, guided pro
bably by instinct, build for themselves temporary plat
forms ; but, as many instincts are largely controlled
by reason, the simpler ones, such as this of building
a platform, might readily pass into a voluntary and
conscious act.'1 The building of a temporary platform
connecting the branches of a tree, so constructing a
resting-place for the night, does not stand high as an

1 Descent of Man, p. 82.

ANIMAL AXD RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 193

example of the many wonderful instincts. It may
possibly illustrate rather the primary aspects of ap
preciation of the relation of means to ends, and may
be assigned to position as a phase of knoAvledge. I
regard this as the more probable view. But whether
we assign it to instinct or to knowledge, the subsequent
argument fails to contribute anything towards the
conclusion accepted. Reason's control of instinct in
our own life does not illustrate instinct. Such con
trol implies pre-existence of reason ; the conscious
and voluntary determination is antecedent, and
manifests superiority of power.

Now at length, after careful survey of lower levels,
we advance towards the height, on wrhich the grand
problems of intelligence become visible. Study of
comparative intelligence now becomes possible. In
the life of higher mammals, with simpler instincts,
we find evidence of a measure of intelligence, bringing
them into closer relations with humanity than is
possible for any other order of life. Intelligent dis
crimination is distinguished from the highest sus
ceptibility belonging to sensory apparatus, whether
characteristic of the general nervous system, or con
centrated in special structure, as in the antennae of
insects.

The problem of Animal Intelligence is one of con
siderable complexity on account of diversity of animal
structure, and variety in the conditions of life. A
group which includes the dog, horse, monkey, and
ape, shows this in a striking way. In structure, the
monkey and ape approximate to man in a degree un-
approached by the dog and horse. The animals are
further severed in respect of apparatus for the special

N

194 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

senses. The dog and horse are far behind the other
two in the sense of touch, far in advance of them in
the sense of smell. Structural differences telllargelyon
the phases of evidence for Intelligence presented by the
several lives. Differences are further multiplied, when
account is made of relations to environment; for
amongst these are great contrasts in range of experi
ence, and measure of contact with human influence.
The conditions of their life have associated the dog and
horse with man ; in the case of the monkey and ape,
these conditions have separated the animals from man.
Such marked differences must have important bear
ings on the lines of evidence available as to compara
tive intelligence. Monkeys and apes may build
platforms up the trees ; dogs and horses ^will find a
bed on easier conditions, having no occasion for use
of intelligence in this matter. Companionship with
man has played a large part with the domesticated
animals, involving special advantages for development
of intelligence. A wild, restless life, excited by
approach of man, and suspicious as to his doings,
speaks to a measure of separation which has no ana
logy in the history of domesticated animals. These
contrasts must be allowed due consideration. The
animals nearest to man in configuration have been
most removed from his influence ; those less like him
in configuration have had most advantage from his
guidance. It will, therefore, seem altogether natural,
if the dog and horse supply clearer evidence of intelli
gence. Such acquired superiority will not warrant
our assigning to domesticated animals a natural
superiority. Evidence as to faculty must be estimated
by strict 'intellectual test, applicable equally to all

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 195

the four animals. This test must be evidence of
an intelligent discrimination, distinct from sensible
discrimination. Evidence of intelligence will most
readily be found in two directions, adaptation of means
to ends in actions natural to the animal, and inter
pretation of signs for guidance of action. We have
thus a general test which can be applied to the whole
range of observations concerned with the natural life
of animals ; and a special test when domestication has
placed an animal in constant and close companion
ship with man. We place first the test of natural
activity under pressure of natural demands. We shall
take next the educational test, when man takes direc
tion of an animal. In the one case, we ascertain what
powers appear when the animal is left to itself ; in the
other, we judge of a capability for development which
would not have been called forth in meeting the com
mon wants of animal life.

Taking first the natural life of the higher mammals,
the range of evidence is not at all so wide and varied
as that drawn from domestication. This is so far
accounted for by the fact, that observations of animals
in the natural or wild state, being much more difficult
and less frequent, must yield restricted and more
precarious results. By way of balancing this deficiency,
it must be remembered that domestication only sets
more vividly in view the power natural to an animal.
We do not originate the characteristics of species.
At best, we can only develop them by supplying such
external aids as superior intelligence may bring
within reach. Hence the ext'ent to which an animal
can understand our purpose, and render to us aid in
work, is a sure test of natural intelligence, allowance

196 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

being made for effects of training in the history of the
species. If acquired variations in structure and func
tion have greatly contributed towards the unfolding
of life on the earth, we may anticipate that the results
of domestication will considerably modify our con
clusions. Activity in their natural state must, how
ever, present the full measure of efficiency in evolution
by natural selection. Development of intelligence by
intervention of higher intellectual power requires
to be deducted, as belonging to a later epoch in
natural history.

When the higher mammals are compared with the
lower, it is clear that a power of Intelligence must be
attributed to the higher, which cannot be credited to
the lower. Phenomena of domestication come to our
aid here, confirming the generalisation. These lead
us to distinguish between our pets, and our helps,
among the animals. We do not gather so much
towards proof of intelligence from our observations of
pigeons and rabbits, as from the activity easily within
compass of the dog and the horse. Additional vivid
ness is lent to the elevation of the higher mammals
in the scale of life, when the dog, highest in manifesta
tion of Intelligence, is placed in contrast with the ant,
highest in Instinct. Apart from knowledge and intel
ligent purpose, the ant goes far in advance of the dog
when acting according to its own life-impulses. By
use of intelligent discrimination apart from instinct,
the dog goes far beyond the ant, and excels all inter
mediate life. The ends of Instinct common to both
animals may be classified under food and shelter. In
these we contemplate ends common to life. Thus reli
able comparison may proceed according to difference

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 197

of method for attaining these ends. Further, in order
that evidence may be carefully examined, it is needful
to narrow observation to the facts of individual life,
without reference to the struggle for existence, and
the play of passion, unfavourable to manifestation of
intelligence in man or in beast. When this is done,
it becomes clear that the ant is restricted in action by
the limits of instinct, whereas the dog advances
beyond this limit, making acquisitions under training.
A physical basis for this contrast is readily found, by
reference to the range of sensibility at the command of
each life. The whole contrast does not, however, seem
accounted for in this way. An animal with such range
of vision as the dog possesses, has many advantages.
Guided by touch, quite marvellous in delicacy, the ant
nevertheless encounters many limitations which do
not restrict the animal guided by sight. Thus, the
consequences to the ant from injury or loss of the anten
nae are serious. Dr. Romanes has described the result
in the following terms : — ' Their removal produces an
extraordinary disturbance in the intelligence of the
animal. An ant so mutilated can no longer find its
way or recognise its companions. ... It is also unable
to find food, ceases to engage in any labour, and loses
all its regard for larvae, remaining permanently quiet
and al most motionless.' Place in contrast with this
animal a blind dog, and in contrast with both a blind
man. By differences in result, we can infer differences
in the measure and kind of power at command. This
test will prove still more exact, if we imagine the dog
deprived of the power of smell, the organ in which he
is pre-eminent, while retaining sense of sight. The

1 Animal Intelligence, p. 142.

198 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

value of differentiation in physical basis for sensible
discrimination is clearly illustrated in the condition
of the dog. But this is not all. There also appears
evidence for possession of Intelligence. We can still
speak to the dog, and observe in him powers of dis
crimination impossible to the lower mammals. For
him, companionship with his master counts for much.
The difference here becomes apparent when we con
sider what a word is to a dog ; for example, the bare
utterance of his name, in comparison with what a word
counts for in the hearing of a rabbit, or in affecting
the activity of an ant. Place in contrast with all
these animals, the case of the man deprived of sight
and of hearing at one stroke, and it will be seen in
what respects life is according to Intelligence.

When now we return to consider the inaction of the
ant deprived of the antennae, nothing is clearer than
the need to modify the reference to ' disturbance in
the intelligence of the animal.' What here seems
most conspicuous is the lack of intelligence, over
against the marvellous power of sensibility. When we
turn to observe the consequences in the life of a man,
following on permanent injury to the nerves of vision,
the painful restriction on his relations to the external
world has over against it, exercise of intellectual power,
rendered more conspicuous. We are at once arrested
by the abiding interests of such a life. We even
receive special lessons, impressive and inspiring, as
to our common work of self-government, from the
life of a Milton or of a Fawcett.

Evidence for animal intelligence becomes still
clearer when we turn to observations connected with
the history of domestication. Though the results

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 199

thus obtained cannot be regarded as belonging to the
natural history of evolution, they are of the highest
value as bearing on possession of Intelligence. Our
observations now become closer, more constant, and
more exact. We ascertain the capabilities of animals
when, in companionship with man, they are aided in
development of intelligence by his guidance and train
ing, even by sharing in his work. There is thus large
gain in passing from natural conditions to artificial.
In classifying together the dog and horse, the monkey
and ape, we are, so far, treating analogies of structure
as secondary, in order that observation may be con
centrated more directly on manifestations of intelli
gence. Each species named gives evidence of a power
of discrimination superior to sensibility. Ability to
interpret sensory experience appears in their recog
nition of some meaning in the word uttered by us.
This supplies distinct evidence of Intelligence, provided
that the word employed be something more than the
reproduction of a sound for food or drink, used by the
animal itself even in its natural state. Sounds natural
to animals as expressive of hunger, or as indicative of
pleasure when food is within sight, afford no testi
mony for intelligence. What we need is some evidence
of advance beyond sensibility, and beyond utterance
of the inarticulate sounds which belong to all animals
above the fishes.

In dealing with comparative intelligence, we may
have to allow to the dog superiority over the ape, so
little does analogy, or even homology, of structure
seem to guide in applying tests of intelligence. On
the other hand, passing from configuration of body to
structure of brain, the form of this organ may differ

200 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

greatly, as appears when the brain of the dog is com
pared with the brain of the ape.1 Yet their functions
are nearly identical, excepting provision for diverse
sensory apparatus. The search for evidence of intelli
gence leads us to put out of account differences of form
in the central organ, and to deal largely with interpre
tation of signs, quite apart from specialties in outward
forms of action. Here, signs of intelligence in the
dog prove even more impressive, because of the fact
that the bodily structure of the animal renders imita
tion of the forms of human action almost impossible.
Some considerable allowance must be made for this,
if we are to be exact in our conclusions. On the other
hand, when comparison here seems greatly to the dis
advantage of the monkey and ape, full value must be
assigned to the long period of the dog's companion
ship with man, which has left a deep imprint on
the species.

Human agency and animal co-operation are now to
be considered in their possible relations to each other,
mainly for the purpose of ascertaining when inter
change of understanding occurs, and to what extent.
This method of inquiry is determined by the history
of life on the earth, since co-operation and domestica
tion of animals have been settled by natural affinities.
The intellectual test warrants us in classifying the
higher mammals as we do. This appears when we
contrast these animals with others lower in the scale.
The lower the animal, the more difficult it is for us
to direct its activity, so as to secure co-operation in
our work. This is a testimony adverse to the inference

1 I have given the illustrations in The Relations oj Mind and
Brain, p. 99, and p. 154.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 201

of intelligence, low in the scale, except in so far as
allowance is to be made for difficulty in communi
cating with such animals. On the other hand/ instinct,'
even such as to awaken our astonishment, offers no
possible aid in our actions. The ant and the bee,
wonderful in instinct, cannot co-operate with us. By
means of our intelligence, recognising adaptation of
means to their ends, we can co-operate with them, in
their efforts, guided as they are by instinct alone. Co
operation with man depends upon a measure of intelli
gence in animals equal to interpretation of his signs
for guidance. In the higher mammalia, structure and
intelligence combine in presenting the conditions on
which man depends for help in his own work. In co
operation with man, the dog can do what the ant cannot
do. This implies first a physical difference. The work
done is the result of higher structure and of muscular
development in the dog. It shows besides, the action
of intelligence. On the other hand, the ant can do
what neither the dog nor man can do, and this
because of specialty of structure and of ' instinct.' To
Instinct, we refer possibilities of sensibility and of
reflex activity, such as do not appear in the life of
the dog. In this respect, the ant is distinctly
superior to the dog, though to the latter we assign A
intelligence. This contrast harmonises with the con
clusion already reached, that Instinct is not guided by
Intelligence nor does it contribute towards evolution
of Intelligence. The two functions stand quite apart.
When these differences are fully considered, it
will be found possible to clear away entanglements
caused by mixing together phenomena of Instinct, and
those of Intelligence. In the same way, it will become

202

clear that there is no explanation of instinct by refer
ence to reflex action alone. And no less obvious will
it seem, that no explanation of instinct is to be had by
describing it as ' memory ' of past achievements in the
history of the species. The key is to be found within
the organism of eacli individual worker. It is a
matter of structure, and belongs to sensory apparatus.
A striking light is thrown across the relations of
human intelligence to animal activity, when we con
sider the conditions of our interference with the activity
of insect life, in contrast with our guidance of the
activity of the higher mammals. We can rationally
co-operate with the insects in the carrying out of their
own work; the higher mammals intelligently co
operate with us in the doing of OUT work. In the one
case the understanding comes altogether from man.
We understand what the insects are doing, and we
bring our appliances to their aid. In the other case,
some measure of intelligence belongs to the animal as
well as to man. This difference is strikingly illus
trated in the management of bees, when aid is
rendered them in the building of their comb, so as to
secure increase of honey. By use of thin plates of
impressed wax, a beginning can be made for a honey
comb which the workers accept as work already done,
and from which they will proceed, as they begin to
bring in their stores.1 This is the method by which
small squares of honey are secured for placing on the
table. Though we cannot aid in the honey gathering,
the bees accept the aid proffered in their task of
storing, thus carrying forward their task more quickly,

1 Cheshire's Bees and Beekeeping, Scientific and Practical, 2 vols.
See vol. ii. p. 182.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 203

as if the preliminary work had been done by them
selves. Closer observation of bees when engaged in
their Avork suggests that what we have hitherto
taken as 'instinct' in building the cell, is a result
rather of the structure and functions of the body.
The wax is secreted by a gland under the plates
laid over each other behind the wings. With this, is
connected a series of very fine fibres or hairs, longer
at the centre, shortened towards the sides.1 When
structure, function, and results are compared, it seems
that the form of the cell arises from the form and range
of mechanical appliances belonging to the worker.

The almost mechanical exactness in the action of
insects becomes exceedingly suggestive. P. Huber
gives a striking illustration in the life of a caterpillar
which makes a very complicated hammock. These
observations have been summarised by Darwin.2 ' If
he took a caterpillar which had completed its ham
mock up to, say, the sixth stage of construction,
and put it into a hammock completed up only to the
third stage, the caterpillar simply re-performed the
fourth, fifth, and sixth stages of construction. If,
however, a caterpillar were taken out of a hammock
made up, for instance, to the third stage, and were
put into one finished up to the sixth stage, so that
much of its work was already done for it, far from de
riving any benefit from this, it was much embarrassed,
and in order to complete its hammock, seemed forced
to start from the third stage, where it had left off, and
thus tried to complete the already finished work.' It
thus seems that functional action and sensory ex-

1 Cheshire's Bees and Beekeeping, vol. i. p. 153.

2 Origin of Species, p. 192.

204 EVOLUTION ANt> MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

perience combine in determining the insect to work.
The difference, in the case of the bees, suggests that
the help given by artificial supplies of wax, co-operates
so as to favour activity in the main function of honey-
gathering and storing. The wax is produced from
the saccharine matter collected, thus being really a
part in a single course of activity.

In the field of instinctive action, we can but co
operate along the lines of an almost mechanical
process. Our intervention is helpful only in cases in
which, notwithstanding proffered aid, the worker has
additional toil by which its energies are engrossed.
We understand and experiment ; the insects work only
under sensory impulse. This supplies contrast to our
observations on the co-operation with us, by the higher
mammals. At best, human intelligence can do no
more than aid the insects in their own work. We
have no evidence of understanding on their part. As
I stood lately by a bee-farmer, in the midst of long
ranges of hives, watching the coming and going, I
remarked incidentally on his working among the bees
with impunity. His reply was, — 'At one time, I
thought they knew me ; but I find it is only I that
know them, for I can work as readily amongst another
man's bees, as amongst my own.'

If from the sphere of instinct, so wonderful in lower
orders, we pass to that of intelligence, the contrast
confirms us in the marking out of its distinctive
characteristics. The dog not only co-operates with his
master as a helper in human work, but his knowledge
of his master and of his master's mode of expressing
his purpose, belongs to the essential conditions of his
activity. The life of the household dog supplies

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 205

constant illustration; the daily work of the 'sheep
dog ' affords still more valuable evidence. The de
lightful stories given by Dr. John Brown, from Rab
and his Friends onwards, supply testimony in most
attractive form. The dog so understands, and so acts
on the understanding, as to become the efficient helper
of man. Practical tests are most valuable here. The
results thus obtained greatly exceed in worth, as a test
of the dog's intelligence, all results gathered from use
of written signs, and refusal of food-supply, until the
proper card for ' food ' had been selected and delivered.
If true value be given to the evidence proving the
dog's dependence on his own master, we shall see at
once the contrast between instinct and intelligence,
and testimony to the limits of ' animal intelligence.'
The interpretation of signs is undoubted ; the animal's
action depends on constant use of quite familiar signs.
Reflectiveness is however entirely wanting. We are
without proof of any such expansiveness of intelligence,
or self-educating power, as appears in every child. How
to explain these differences may be a sufficiently per
plexing problem ; but as the contrast between instinct
and intelligence has been quite broadly marked, so
also now is the contrast made clear between animal
intelligence and man's acquisition of truth.

The value of the evidence for animal intelligence
depends largely on the training the animal has had.
When signs, audible or visible, are employed, aptitude
for training must prove a valuable test of the measure
of intelligence possessed. The animal capable of
this, transcends the sphere of sensible discrimination,
showing itself able to interpret sensory experience,
and to apply such interpretation for its own guidance.

206 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

The highest instinct supplies no such qualification ;
wherever this capability appears, the evidence for
intelligence is conclusive. In our application, how
ever, of the 'educational test,' the variety of con
ditions, under which training can be carried on, needs
to be carefully considered. Diversities of structure,
of temper, and of relations to environment in the free
life of the animal, combine to modify the possi
bilities of training members of the several species.
Regard to animal sensibility is a constant necessity
for successful training, whatever the species. Only
in this way can the conditions be maintained which
favour the action of intelligence. There is in this,
a test for the trainer as well as for the animal. When
the restlessness of the monkey is considered, along
with his natural suspicion, his susceptibility to fear,
and his destructiveness, it is obvious that a much
greater amount of patience, care, and continued
gratification of his natural inclinations, will be re
quired to show the intelligence he possesses, than can
be needful in the case of the dog. Mr. Garner's ex
periments with monkeys supply striking testimony
here. When from the phonograph the sound of
alarm was given, the monkey eating from his hand
sprung at once to the utmost perch, and Mr. Garner
adds 'no amount of coaxing would induce him to
return to me, or to accept any offer of peace which I
could make.' So much is undisturbed confidence
essential for success in training. This single example
shows how complicated the lines of evidence become
on which we depend for conclusions as to comparative
intelligence. Fear and fondness are the two govern
ing forces in animal life. The former must be allayed,

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 207

the latter must be used as our auxiliary, if the test
of training is to be applied. The man who would
govern an animal, must first govern himself.

The results of continued friendly companionship
with man supply the most reliable tests of animal
intelligence. As the dog has been most favoured in
this respect, evidence is most abundant from its life.
This evidence is better gathered from its ordinary
services to man, in carrying, retrieving, pointing, or
driving sheep, than from any attempts at general
education. These serve more to prove the relative
inferiority of his intelligence, than his natural capa
bilities. Evidence, at once familiar and reliable, is
supplied by interpretation of signs for direction of
conduct, such as ' fetch,' ' come to heel,' ' go wide,' and
' go home ; ' and many more, familiar to the collie.
It is better to give less heed to restraints upon
action, and more to full activity of natural powers.
We must, therefore, first find the basis of our observa
tions in the ordinary life of the animal, and after
wards seek expansion of this by reference to domesti
cation. By power of scent, the dog traces his master
in the crowd; intelligence performs no part here.
The same dog hears his name called by his master,
and is at once arrested. Susceptibility performs
here also a necessary part, but there is an association
of the sound with past experience to such an extent
as to involve a higher phase of discrimination.
When the animal is at first arrested, this may be a
purely sensible result, the impression being more
acute on account of development of sensibility by
exercise; but when the call or command of the
master is translated into action, it is impossible to

208 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

account for what has happened without granting that
the sign has been interpreted. This conclusion is
confirmed by reference to multiplication of signs for
direction of the same line of conduct. A whistle
may arrest a dog, but a sign, visible or audible, will
direct his action. Our conclusion is further sustained
by reference to the significance of sound as deter
mined by the usage of the master. ' Go home/ will
send one dog back, but the Gaelic equivalent alone
will be effective in the case of a dog reared in the
Highlands of Scotland where the Celtic tongue is in
common use. Observation affords ample testimony
for this. If we decide on the lines of action to be
followed, keeping by uniform signs for direction, the
higher animals are capable of interpreting signs,
readily attaining fixed associations, and performing
the work required.

Beyond this, habit may accomplish much. Under
this law, action may sink into mechanical routine,
just as happens with ourselves. But if intelligence
is to be used so as to secure development of the
faculty, the whole interest of animal life must be
gathered around what is being accomplished. For
this, the direct living relation of man and animal
must be sustained from day to day, — the man giving
actual guidance, and the animal feeling that he has
some share in the satisfaction following. We can no
more reduce an animal to a working machine, and
yet secure development of his intelligence, than we
can thus secure intellectual advance in the life of a
man. Jog-trot in harness accomplishes little for the
horse, hoAvever much it does for the owner. The load
of stones may arrive at the proper destination, but

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 209

horse-power is the efficient agent, since everything
requiring understanding has been done apart from
the animal. For true development, as for the
animal's best effort at the moment, all favouring
susceptibilities must co-operate. A timid rider makes
the best horse lose the prize. A stranger cannot get
the animal to do what his daily guide enables him
readily to accomplish. The man who speaks to his
horse in familiar accents, who strokes him with an
understanding hand, who makes him feel that some
thing extra is to be done ; and who has leisure, and
care, and living sympathy enough, to make him after
wards feel that he has done his best, will not only get
most out of the animal for the time, but will do much
toward his development. The prize card fastened to
his bridle does nothing for the animal ; the man who
leads him from the course can do everything.

The docility of the dog and of the horse has done
much to aid us in our attempts to estimate their
intelligence. The lack of this quality proves a serious
hindrance to experiments with monkeys and apes.
Mr. Garner has done more service by his own patient
efforts to soothe and guide the monkey, than by his
experiments in the use of established signs of com
munication common to the species. If we attempt to
construct a record of animal sounds, serving as signs
to others, we must include the danger signals of animals
far down the scale. Besides, such signal sounds carry
evidence of no more than nerve susceptibility in their
utterance, and in their effects. This is shown by the
general commotion among barn-door fowls consequent
on the appearance of a hawk, or of any animal resem
bling a hawk, far overhead. Very different, however,

o

210 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

is the significance of sound and sign, in cases where
co-operation Avith man proves possible. Mr. Garner
has supplied admirable testimony in his records of his
dealings with monkeys. I quote here an example
which seems conclusive on the leading questions
involved in claiming intelligence for the higher
mammals. ' One of the most intelligent of all the
brown Capuchins that I have ever seen was Nellie,
who belonged to a dealer in Washington. When
she arrived there, I was invited to call and see her.
I introduced myself in my usual way, by giving her
the sound for food, to which she promptly replied.
She was rather informal, and we were soon engaged
in a chat on that subject, the one above all others
that would interest a monkey. On my second visit,
she was like an old acquaintance, we had a fine time.
On my third visit, she allowed me to put my hands
into her cage, and handle her with impunity. On my
next visit, I took her out of the cage, and we had a
real romp. This continued for some days, during
which time she would answer me on all occasions
when I used the word for food or drink. She had
grown quite fond of me, and always recognised me
as I entered the door. About this time, there came
to Washington a little girl who was deaf, dumb, and
blind; she was accompanied by her teacher, who
acted as interpreter. One of the greatest desires of
this little girl's life was to see a live monkey — that
is, to see it with her fingers. The dealer who owned
the monkey sent for me to come down to her, as I
could handle the monkey for her. I took Nellie from
the cage, and when any one except myself would put
hands upon her, she would growl, and scold, and

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 211

show her temper ; and when the little blind girl first
attempted to put her hands on her, Nellie did not
like it at all. I stroked the child's hair and cheeks
with my own hand first, and then with Nellie's; she
looked up at me in an inquiring manner, and uttered
one of those soft, flute-like sounds a few times, and
then began to pull at the cheeks and ears of the
child. Within a few moments they were like old
friends and playmates, and for nearly an hour they
afforded each other great pleasure, at the end of which
time they separated with reluctance. The little
Simian acted as if she was conscious of the sad
affliction of the child, but seemed at perfect ease with
her, although she would decline the tenderest approach
of others. She would look at the child's eyes, which
were not disfigured, but lacked expression, and then
look up to me as if to indicate that she was aware
that the child was blind.' l

This touching story may well stand as a typical
case, supplying evidence of intelligence manifested by
monkeys, and also by apes, in co-operation with man
and under influence of his training.2 The difficulties
of training the monkey are many, caused largely by
its restlessness of disposition, along with the heritage
which comes to it from ages of wild life. In all such
cases, large value must be assigned to the law of
heredity. Under this law, the disadvantages for wild
animals have been many, as advantages in the history
of the domesticated animals have been great, and
cumulative in effect. If, however, we consider such

1 The Speech of Monkeys,\)y R. L. Garner, p. 83.

2 As to Intelligence of the Ape, see delations of Mind and Brain
p. 252.

212 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

an example as that now given, the evidence of the
power of interpreting signs seems conclusive. Under
neath the temper, petulance, and jealousy, throwing
many obstacles in the way, there is a measure of intelli
gent discrimination, surpassing the familiar functions
of the nerve-system providing for sensibility, and
for co-ordination with muscular power. That intelli
gence is to be attributed to the higher mammals, is
a conclusion sustained on ample evidence. How
wide this classification of animals should be, may
involve serious perplexity for a considerable time to
come. The difficulties encountered in the attempts
to train animals much lower in the scale, are such as
to cast doubt over their claim to intelligence. If
however we limit ' intelligence ' to simple understand
ing of sensible signs, and refer to the results of
training as our ultimate test, it seems plain that
there is a degree of truth in the position of Darwin
' that there is no fundamental difference between man
and the higher mammals in their mental faculties.'
This much seems certain, that there is a common
basis of intelligence by means of which man can com
municate with the higher mammals. This makes it
possible for him to have some measure of companion
ship with these animals, and to train them to under
stand and to execute his designs.

Any claim for community of intellectual life, in a
higher sense, seems discredited by the evidence.
Whenever we pass beyond the interpretation of signs,
to look for independent action of a rational power,
the search becomes fruitless. Only ' negative results '
can be reported. The outstanding characteristics of
the rational life will appear more definitely when we

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 213

come to trace them in outline. But, dealing here
with questions of comparative intelligence, it is
obvious that we must restrict our definition of
'intelligence' to its simplest phase. Only on this
condition do we find common exercise in the life of
animals and of men, to be attributed to common power,
which we name ' mental power,' or ' intelligence,' in
contrast with physical power, appearing in a sensori-
motor system common to all organic life. Allowing
for the facts on which we conclude that there are in
the life of the higher mammals ' manifestations of
intelligence, amounting in some cases to distinct acts
of reasoning,' l these, taken at their highest valuation,
are much beneath what we mean by the powers of a
rational life. So great is this contrast, that the
difference between the brain of the ape, or of the
dog, and the human brain, great as it is, is insig
nificant in comparison with the distance which
separates the lives of these animals from the life of
the ordinary man, even if uncivilised man be taken
as our standard of human capability.

Evidence fails when we look for independent action
of Intelligence in animals. We do not find any of
them in their natural state rise above interpretation
of signs : we do not see in their history, accumulation
of knowledge for its own sake. In their use of means
for attainment of ends naturally desired by them, we
do not find them capable of any considerable adapta
tion, such as would obviate difficulties, still less such
as would increase facilities. Even when, after long
training, an animal has been brought to render great
service by its aptitude, or to perform surprising feats,
1 Wallace's Darwinism, p. 426.

214 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

attainment does not become a starting-point for
higher effort. Left to itself, the animal relapses to a
life which seeks only the satisfaction of animal wants.
It does not appear that effort having for its end the
attainment of knowledge, belongs to animal life,
whether in a state of nature, or under domestication.
These limitations of intelligent action, when compared
with normal action of a rational life, seem to show that
in the contrast between the higher mammals and man,
we are contemplating ' mind/ in two distinct types, a
lower and a higher. Granting a common basis of in
telligence, capable of interpreting sensory experience,
including impressions made by visible and audible signs
and adding to this the results of co-operation ; there
remains a difference of power so enormous, as to
require that a distinction be drawn between ' intelli
gence' and 'reason;' between 'animal intelligence,'
and ' rational power.' A power concerned only with
the relations of interpretation to action, differs widely
from a power of reason (distinctively 'rational
power'), concerned with the relations of experience
to a sphere of knowledge. This difference is such that
we are impressed more by marks of contrast than by
marks of resemblance. As these two phases of power
appear constantly together in our own experience, we
can readily distinguish them. We use a lower power,
when we act upon a given signal, or at the call of
another ; and a greatly higher power when, by process
of reflection, we seek the satisfaction of our own mind
as to the cause of any occurrence, or judge of our
interest in imagined lines of procedure, or of our duty
within given conditions. Nothing at all recondite is
involved in this distinction. Whatever perplexity

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 215

animals may encounter in fulfilling our wishes, there
is for us no difficulty in distinguishing between
observations and reflections. The characteristics of a
higher life are found when, passing beyond interpreta
tion of signs for guidance of action, we seek knowledge
for the sake of knowledge. It is in this latter sphere
we find the gateway to literature, art, science, and
philosophy. These names, indicative of the vast
region of rational activity into which man passes,
are sufficient to warrant the induction that a power
is working here, greatly superior to any power seen
operating in the higher mammals.

A large body of evidence sustaining this conclusion
as to the inferiority of animals, is accessible in the
results obtained by their training. Apart from human
guidance, animal activity is directed mainly by
sensory experience, comparatively little appearing to
warrant the conclusion that intelligence is a regu
lative power. Still less do we find indications that
intelligence is an originating power, to which animal
progress can be traced. There is nothing in the
records of natural history to warrant the conclusion
that any of the higher mammals make any marked
advance in adaptation of means to ends. Neither is
any animal observed to seek knowledge for its own
sake. In most cases, when sensory experience is
unaffected by contact with an object, interest in it
disappears. The 'curiosity' of monkeys awakens
some expectation, as if giving promise of inquiry; but,
when carefully watched, it comes to an end, just as
the application of smell by the dog and horse does,
though the time occupied with the object is longer
in the case of the monkey, on account of the wider

216 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

range of action belonging to vision and manipulation.
Smell is direct and prompt ; sight and touch combined
give more occupation to the animal.1

When next we turn to ' Instinct/ we find this
much more conspicuous in animals lower in the scale,
than intelligence is in the life of the higher mam
mals. This will appear in the contrast between the
ant and the dog. The comparative significance of
this fact is enhanced, when due value is assigned to
Darwin's observation that the instincts of the higher
mammalia are fewer and less complex. If, then, the
life of the higher animals were approximately so
close to human life as to illustrate a preliminary
stage for evolution of rational power, we should
have expected to find in these animals intelligence
operating more markedly than it does in their natural
state, independently of human training. In like
manner, we should have expected a beginning of
liberation from the dominion of ' natural selection.'
Organic advance secured under ' the struggle for
existence,' which is entailed by short supplies,
operates in Nature quite independently of intelli
gence. The operation of the law tells on all life as
dependent on nutriment. A modification of this law,
on appearance of intelligence, is admitted within the
terms of the law itself. ' Natural selection acts only
by accumulation of slight modifications of structure
or instinct, each profitable to the individual under its
conditions of life.' 2 Admitting the law, and also varia
tions in structure and in instinct under its action, —

1 I have examined the evidence in detail in Relations of Mind
and Brain, 3rd edition, pp. 252-258, and 275-280.

2 Darwin's Origin of Species, p. 211,

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 217

both conclusively made out, — it is not shown that the
law is capable of effecting such advance, in structure,
or in life-action, as intelligence implies. Granting
' some degree of variation in instincts under a state
of Nature, and the inheritance of such variations,' as
'indispensable for the action of natural selection,'1
it does not seem that appearance of Intelligence
among the higher mammals is being accounted for.
On the evidence of differentiation, it is not possible
to argue that variations are on the way to intelli
gence, or in any sense preparatory for its appearance.
Still less can such a claim be made on the ground of
'slight modifications of structure,' occurring under
the law of natural selection. It does not seem that
any variation of structure, or any advance in function,
or any manifestation of instinct, has been discovered,
in the history of lower orders of life, which will
account for the appearance of animal intelligence.
After structural variations have been explained, ani
mal intelligence stands unexplained. It is here, as
it seems in testing the evidence, that a limit in the
line of evolution appears. A break comes into view at
a stage lower than the appearance of ' rational life.'

Variation of Intelligence is as certain as is variation
in Instinct, but the one cannot be accounted for
under ' natural selection,' as the other can be. Food
has affinity with structure ; it has only a remote
relation to action of intelligence. Even the success
of an evolution scheme, gives vividness to this con
trast. Intelligence is a phase of life exempt from laws
of nutriment. Mind, even closely related as it is with
body, is superior to laws of nutriment. Until we have

1 Origin oj Species, p. 194.

218 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

lifted the life of intelligence aside from the sphere
within which laws of nutriment dominate action, we
cannot read the terms of the new problem of existence
arising from the* appearance of intelligence in the
world. Those two fields of existence must be dis
tinguished, — the one a sphere within which variations
of structure and of instinct are effected according to
supplies of nutriment; the other a sphere within which
variations of intelligence are effected under the laws
of thought and of reflective self-government. Only
when this distinction is clearly drawn, do we properly
enter upon a scientific treatment of the higher life of
intelligence, and of wider problems presented by the
variations of such life appearing in .nature. Only
thus shall we come full in view of the unsolved
problem of the appearance of ' reason, which is our
noblest and most distinctive feature.' l

Let us stand face to face with the phenomena of
Intelligence, even on the lowest levels on which these
appear ; let us bring to a focus all of these which are
common to the higher mammals and to man ; beyond
these, let us set full in view, as far as we may have
ability to do it, the rational pOAvers characteristic of
the human race. Only then, and thus, do we face
the higher problems of Nature. When this is unhesi
tatingly and persistently done, we may anticipate
surer advance towards a truly scientific view of man's
place in Nature. If only these distinct fields of
observation be well defined, and kept open to view,
we shall be able to estimate the value of the vast
body of facts belonging to natural history, testifying
to intelligence, when we include man in Nature.
1 Wallace's Darwinism, p. 455.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 219

The relations of animal intelligence to human must
to some considerable extent prove the guide of biolo
gists and psychologists in prosecution of a common
task. If Intelligence is accurately described as discrim
ination of the significance of sensory experience ; and
if its product is knowledge, as distinct from muscular
activity, interest must concentrate on the conditions
under which the functions of intelligence are fulfilled,
first, in the life of the higher mammals, and next in
the life of man. The first stage of advance, separates
the sensori-motor activity, attributed to all organic
existence, from the phenomena of intelligence as these
appear in the life of the higher mammals. The next
brings out in full relief the phenomena of intelligence
common to the higher mammals and man. For
adequate description of these, we require a termino
logy not supplied by physiology, since the phenomena
themselves have not been traced to distinctive struc
ture, correlated with circumscribed portions of the
central organ. For the first time, warrant is found
for speaking of ' mental phenomena,' and of ' mind/
as a distinct order of existence in Natue. From this
point, a much more exact understanding needs to be
reached as to our use of terms, if a well-defined body
of evidence is to guide us in judgments concerning
'mental qualities.' It must be shown how 'mental
qualities' differ from, qualities of structure, and of
instinct. We shall thus have fixed the limits within
which the term 'mind' is to be employed, ensuring
accuracy as we seek to distinguish ' mental qualities,'
and 'mental functions.' Afterwards, we shall pass
on towards the 'rational life,' the highest phase of
existence on the earth, endowed with manifold

220 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

faculties. Of the action of these, the best achievements
of animals give no evidence. The outstanding features
of this rational life, spring out of the power to reason
from general principles towards a system atised view
of existence. Testimony for the efficiency of this
power appears in all directions. It is seen first in
mechanical appliances, next in science, afterwards
in unceasing efforts to construct a philosophy of
existence, as a whole.

In tracing the lines of advance, as these are fixed
by distinct phases of life in Nature, it has become
apparent that there is need for large modification in
our forms of discussion and in our use of terms. The
most essential changes required are, Avithdrawal of
references to 'mind' from our descriptions of the func
tions of instinct ; a more exact discrimination of the
higher mammals from subordinate forms of life ; and
a more clearly defined boundary line between ' mind '
in the higher animals, and the rational power distinc
tive of man.

When we concentrate on the relations of the
higher mammals to man, it will specially appear that
more careful account needs to be made of the differ
ence between two modes of recognising mental phe
nomena, the one direct, as in our own experience, the
other indirect, as in observation of the actions of ani
mals. There lies here a wide contrast. This marks a
difference in the exactness, and even in the certainty,
of our knowledge of the intelligence of the higher
mammals. The directness of our knowledge in con
sciousness gives certainty, whereas any such exactness
of statement is impossible, even from our most careful
observations of animal life. The contrast between

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 221

these two modes of knowing, must be constantly in
view. Strict guard must be kept against encroach
ment of the one mode into the province of the other,
such as might induce easy acceptance of analogies
in procedure of the lower and higher life. The need
for this guard has been long insisted upon in the
interests of physiology ; it must now be insisted upon
in the interests of psychology.

The results of our training of animals must afford
the main test of their intelligence. Though there is
no evidence that animals, even the highest mammals,
interpret their own sensory experience, we have
ample proof that the higher animals are capable of
interpreting signs, for direction of their action. This
is obvious in the case of the horse, the dog, the
monkey, and the ape. This capability places these
animals in closer relation with man, than proves
possible for lower orders. After scrutinising in detail
the whole circle of evidence,1 we observe this limita
tion, that the exercise of animal intelligence is
connected with direction of animal activity, not with
acquisition of knowledge. Of this apparent restric
tion, explanation may be sought in our mode of obser
vation, which is restricted to the actions of animals.
But this explanation is clearly insufficient. The
limitation is in the scope of the activity observed.
Call the animal into action, and its intelligence
becomes apparent. Leave the animal to itself, and
signs of intelligence are either wanting, or are com
paratively rare. As instinct always concerns forms of
action, so it is here. When ' intelligence ' appears in

1 For this, I must refer again to The Relations of Mind and
Brain, chap. vii.

222 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

animal life, this also is seen in direction of activity,
though of a new and wider range, admitting of a degree
of co-operation in work with us, provided we direct the
animals in their efforts. But animals do not of them
selves seek knowledge, as a dog seeks what will please
its appetite. It seems as if intelligence were not
dominant power, though existing in the life, and
capable of being used and developed by us. Accord
ingly, we have no success in efforts to educate these
animals, education being distinguished from training.
So long as we seek to have the monkey to imitate our
action, we succeed ; but we do not get much beyond
this. To refer here to the want of articulate language,
is only to illustrate the difference. This want is not
accounted for by absence of vocalising power. What
we are remarking is really the absence of that measure
of intelligence to which information gives interest, as
in contrast with 'curiosity,' or sense of strangeness.
Accumulation of knowledge by exploration and re
flection is hardly, if at all, within the compass of these
animals, even with all the advantages of companionship
with man, continued for long ages. The dog is our
best test here; in its history we have the largest
results of heredity.

The contrast between training and education, here
brought into prominence, has not received adequate
recognition. Intelligence, as seen in an animal, com
monly shows progress in the scope of its activity, not
tentative effort to gain enlarged knowledge. This
throws a serious obstacle in the way of an argument
for continuity, favouring a belief in evolution of the
higher intelligence from the lower. Evidence from
contrivances to reach food; incidents of the chase;

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 223

and experiments in training, all seem to fail in
supplying the kind of evidence required. Training
falls short of educating. Its limits seem fixed by
the measure of the animal's allurement by food and
by caressing, or by the measure of its nerve endurance.
If the animal were not so quiescent afterwards ; if we
saw it engaged in practice subsequently, as if to
advance its own education, apart from inducements of
appetite; if some glearn of the spirit of inquiry ap
peared, we should have more evidence to go upon.
Observation of animals, whether in a state of nature,
or under domestication, has not supplied data of a
helpful kind. A cloud of uncertainty is thus thrown
over all theorising as to animal ' ideas/ ' conceptions/
and ' reasonings.' If we suppose that we can convey an
'idea' to the rnind of a dog, whatever difficulty there may
be in describing the process, let us enumerate a few ex
amples of the ' ideas' so transferred. We communicate
ideas to human intelligence by use of language,by direc
tion of personal observation, backed up by concentra
tion of attention on the part of the recipient mind, and
by conversation allowing for questioning and answering.
How many of these can be employed in our com
munications with the animals ? We doubt if any of
them are available. The sheep-dog, — the Scotch
'Collie/ — the faithful attendant of the shepherd in
the management of his flock, presents the surest and
best test. The action of the animal in collecting and
driving the sheep, when he is under direction of the
shepherd, is a marvel. But what 'ideas' can we
convey to a ' Collie ' ? Can we convey to him an idea
of porridge, or of ' Dog Biscuit ' ; of whiteness or of
hardness; or of anything more than can be appre-

224 EVOLUTION AND MAX'S PLACE IN NATURE

elated by his sense of sinell, and his sight, and his
appetite ? Do we get beyond interpretation of signs ?
The porridge and the biscuit, the white and the
hard, — all influence his susceptibilities; but there is
not sufficient evidence that he has ' ideas ' such as we
have, when we use these terms.

Risks of onesidedness need to be guarded against
here. These may be escaped, by passing from com
parative biology, into a section of our literature dealing
with the characteristics of human intelligence. We
shall thus be placed in possession of descriptions and
definitions bearing on the intelligent life of man,
which were shaped with no other end in view than
that of securing an accurate understanding of our own
familiar mental exercise. Take for example that
section in the history of British philosophy represented
by the names of Locke, Hume, and Reid. The three
names are representative of three distinct phases of
thought, while the thinkers are historically related.
The combination of the three secures several ad
vantages. Locke says the term 'idea' 'serves best
to stand for whatsoever is the object of the under
standing when a man thinks: I have used it to
express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion,
species, or whatever it is which the niind may be
employed about in thinking/ l Hume distinguishes
between impressions and ideas. By ' impressions' he
means ' all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as
they make their first appearance in the soul.' By
' ideas' he means * the faint images of these in thinking
and reasoning.'2 Reid, conducting a polemic against

1 Locke's Essay concerning the Human Understanding, Bk. I. Ch. i.
§ S. • Hume's Human Xatttre, Bk. i. Pt. i. sec. 1.

AN'TMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 225

our regarding ' ideas' as objects of knowledge, instead
of as forms of knowledge, keeps by popular usage in
his definition of the term. He says, ' In popular lan
guage, idea signifies the same thing as conception,
apprehension, notion. To have an idea of anything is
to conceive it. To have a distinct idea is to conceive
it distinctly. To have no idea of it, is not to conceive
it at all. . . . Conceiving or apprehending has always
been considered by all men as an act or operation of
the mind." l

Without touching any of the questions in dispute
between these several thinkers, we have among them
sufficient agreement to supply the test desired. They
are agreed that ' ideas,' such as we have, are the
product of thinking : and that impressions, common
to us with the animals, are excluded, as representing a
simpler preliminary phase of experience. ' Thinking'
is the common term in all these definitions, applied
to the process by which ideas of things, or conceptions
of them, are formed in our minds. By this process is
meant a phase of mental activity which concerns
itself with present and past ' sensations,' — forming out
of these a general conception of an object, of a relation,
or of a law of existence. There is no evidence that
the higher mammals ever form such ideas, far less
engage in this as a familiar occupation. Men are
constantly forming such ideas or conceptions, of which
language becomes the familiar expression. Contact
with an external object makes an impression on the
sensory, but it does not? cause an ' idea/ if by ' idea' we
mean a conception of the thing which has wakened

1 Reid's £{t*ay>i on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay I. Cli. i.
§ 10.

226 EVOLUTION AND M4N'S PLACE IN NATURE

our sensibility. The sensation in our consciousness
consequent on the sensory impression, does not cause
the conception of the thing. Nor is the conception a
faint reproduction of this sensation. Such revival of
sensory impression may well occur in the brain on
every occasion when we think of the object; but our
idea or conception of a thing is made up by ourselves,
by combination in a single representation of many
qualities, recognised by us as belonging to the object.
Often our ' idea' is at fault, and it is rectified, as the
result of wider observation ; but the detection of each
fault, and its correction, belong altogether to more
careful observation and thinking. Thus the 'idea'
cannot be a fainter repetition of sensory impression.
It presents an example, — quite a simple one, — of our
exercise of Intelligence in the processes of observa
tion, comparison, and constructive representation, the
result of which we are able to image or reproduce
at any time.

Hence an ' idea ' is not a copy of any single object ;
conversely, what it is, is not represented by any single
object ; in order to be true to the variety in Nature, it
could not be so represented. Thus, the rational
power originates its own ' ideas,' is strictly the ' cause '
of their appearance, and nothing lower than rational
power, including within this, comparison and induction,
could give us the 'ideas' which are the familial-
possessions of our consciousness. Two things clearly
follow : animal intelligence is of a lower type than
human ; and evolution of the higher from the lower is
not supported by any evidence at command. When
the functions of the two orders are placed in contrast,
the result is adverse to the claims of the theory of

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 227

Evolution. Continuity which had been demonstrated
in the history of organism, has not been traced in the
relations of animal to human intelligence. This
is only another way of expressing the conclusion,
otherwise reached, that sensory impression cannot
cause thought. There is not in the natural history
of intelligent life any evidence pointing definitely
in the opposite direction. There is a mass of con
vincing evidence for organic evolution under action of
environment ; there is none for evolution of human
intelligence from that of animals. For test of this
difference, nothing better can be done than to bring
familiar examples of evolution into comparison with the
ordinary facts of intellectual life. Take a single case
of structural modification, such as the foot of the horse;
take variations such as those seen in the several breeds
of dogs, or of pigeons. With these examples in view,
it is apparent in what perplexity we are involved, even
in attempting to make out analogies. In the one
case, there is a structural basis ; advance can be traced
through successive stages. In the other, we pass from
the sensori-motor system, with brain structure, without
being able to explain the appearance of animal intelli
gence, and in it we find no rudimentary phases of
thought. The utmost found is, transference into action
of the sensory impressions made by signs which we
employ. Functions are now severed from physical
structure. Or, lest this should seem too much, the facts
recognised are not included within observations of
structure, and its functions. In mode of observation,
we are now separated from the whole field of natural
history. This break as a simple fact must be deliberately
stated as a condition of scientific advance. Scientific

228 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

observers insist upon non-interference. Psychologists
must do the same, for there are two modes of obser
vation, though not two methods of induction. The
one is a mode proper to natural history as a science of
organic life, the other proper to psychology as a science
of intellectual procedure. While these two modes of
observation are distinct, the rational basis of pro
cedure in reaching inductions is the same. It is
only because the phenomena of organic action and of
mental are different, that we speak of two phases of
life, two spheres of existence, distinguishing organism
from mind. It is only because ' mental phenomena '
in animal life are restricted to the lowest order
of phenomena in our consciousness, that we are
unable to acknowledge them as 'germinal forms'
from wrhich the higher functions could unfold. There
is not here any analogy such as would place animal
intelligence in relation such as that of the germ-cell
to the mature embryo.

Everything contributing towards scientific induc
tions confirms the distinction we are now drawing.
Take together law and results, in the field of organism.
' Natural selection acts only by the accumulation of
slight modifications of structure or instinct.' We
here recognise the co-action of environment and
organism — pressure from without, inducing action
from within. If we think away the external pressure,
results are unattainable, forms of existence become
stationary. This scientific hypothesis is the product
of the thinker, who has in imagination placed things
together, though they are visible only as things
apart. Take now the rational power concerned in
the elaboration of this theory. Where is the external

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 229

pressure, where its results ? If we surrender external
pressure, do we then part with' ' natural selection ' in
the sense in which we have hitherto used it ? If so,
does the action of thought observed by us, fail to
illustrate the law appearing in the co-action of environ
ment and structure ? To these questions there seems
but one answer — the argument for continuity is unten
able. The law itself does not hold, and ' accumulation
of slight modifications ' is not visible within the
observations.

This conclusion is confirmed when we pass over to
the higher mode of knowing, constantly referred to
in these discussions. Let us now take this distinct
standpoint, in order to consider what is to be under
stood by such phrases as these, gathered within the
limits of a half-page of Darwin's discussion, ' the frame
of mind,' ' several distinct mental actions,' ' mental
faculties in animals,' and ' mental powers ' as these
appear in man.1 Mental actions are classified as
distinct ; how are they distinguished ? Is it not by
absence of characteristics of organic action, and by
presence of characteristics not observed in the sphere
of organic activity ? How otherwise can we account
for classification of actions as muscular and as mental ?
To suggest that the distinction is verbal, not real, is
to run directly into self-contradiction — a landing-
place towards which science must decline to travel.
Let us make good our classification, and Avhat are the
consequences? Negatively, ' mental actions 'are not
produced by structure in response to nutriment and
external excitation ; consequently these actions do not
come under the law of natural selection, under which

1 Origin of Species, p. 191.

230 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

organic results are measured by external pressure.
Positively, 'mental actions' are the expression of a
distinct power in Nature, and the ' several distinct
mental actions ' are dependent on this power.
' Thought ' is the leading power in human life, whose
exercise involves comparison, classification, and induc
tion under laws of thought commonly recognised and
applied, of which the law of non-contradiction is an
example. Taking these tests, ' mind,' in its full sig
nificance, as now described, belongs to man ; ' mind,' in
a simpler phase, belongs to the higher mammals. In
both cases ' mind ' — intelligence in the sense of dis
crimination of the meaning of sensory impressions-
must be pre-supposed as the condition of the actions
described. Their occurrence cannot be accounted for
either by repetition of any structural functions known
to us, or by continuance of external pressure on organ
ism, such as the law of ' natural selection ' involves.

In these attempts to trace the natural history of
Intelligence, we are now warranted in restricting
attention to man and the higher mammals, seeking
some general conclusion as to the relations of these
two orders of life.

In the sphere of intelligence, the difference between
the two gives immense superiority to man. Testimony
is here explicit and ample from those who regard
evolution as all-comprehensive. Special value is to
be assigned to statements from such witnesses, even
when psychological distinctions are not rigidly
observed. Darwin has said, ' It may be freely
admitted that no animal is self-conscious, if by this
term it is implied that he reflects on such points as
whence he comes, or whither he will go, or what is

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 231

life and death, and so forth. But how can we feel
sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and
some power of imagination, as shown by his dreams,
never reflects on his past pleasures or pains in the
chase ? And this would be a form of self-conscious
ness.' l Considering the difference between the direct
knowledge of our own procedure in consciousness,
and the indirect knowledge of the dog's experience,
how can we be sure as to the contents of an old dog's
dreams ? What we know of the physiological results
of life-long repetition of functions along well-defined
lines, warrants a conclusion favourable to re- awakened
sensibilities, giving a physical basis for the sensori-
motor activity, and for the barking, noticed often
in the sleeping dog. Do not such manifestations
belong even more to the comparatively young dog
than to the old dog I Does not his master's voice
readily stir the dog's susceptibilities in the waking
state ? Those things are of more consequence to us for
the purposes of scientific inference, than the occasional
and restricted phases of nerve excitement seen in the
sleeping dog. Besides, all the symptoms described,
including the barking, are produced by electric
excitation of the cortex of the dog's brain. May
we not, on this evidence, conclude that all these
phenomena belong to the sphere of sensori-motor
activity, restricting the interpretation of ' dreams '
accordingly ? To me, it seems that such restriction
is required by the evidence. If so, the claim to
self-consciousness, even in the restricted sense in
dicated, must be withdrawn.

When next we consider how much is involved in

1 Descent of Man, p. 83.

232 EVOLUTION AND MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

denial of self-consciousness, it is admitted that the
animal does not reflect on his prior existence, does not
deal with the problem of life, nor with expectations
of a future existence. Reflection concerned with such
matters belongs to a superior intellect. Accordingly,
Darwin has remarked that ' man, from the activity of
his mental faculties, cannot avoid reflection.' l In one
of his references to human Imagination, connected
with our experience in dreaming, he says, 'The
value of the products of our imagination depends, of
course, on the number, accuracy, and clearness of our
impressions, on our judgment and taste in selecting
or rejecting the involuntary combinations, and, to a
certain extent, on our power of voluntarily combining
them.' 2 Strictly accurate all this is. Can we, then,
attribute to the old dog 'judgment and taste in
selecting or rejecting the involuntary combinations' ?
Does such reflection belong to the higher mammals ?
Denial of self-consciousness is the exclusion of all
this. We here touch something quite distinctive, —
something which cannot be attributed to the old
dog's dreams. We are already moving on some of
the nearer altitudes, unapproached by our best dogs.
Yet, we are only coming in sight of the more familiar
exercises of human intelligence, such as lead Dr.
Romanes to speak of ' the many and immense
differences that unquestionably do obtain between
the mind of the highest ape and the mind of the
lowest savage.' 3

Granting, then, ' the many and immense differences '
between these two orders of Intelligence, the theoretic
difficulty for the evolutionist is proportionally great.

1 Descent, p. 112- ~ Ib. p. 74. 3 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 20.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 233

\\7hether the ape or the dog is to be preferred as the
higher in intelligence, may be doubted. Evidence
does not give a marked precedence to the ape. In
form, it conies nearest to man, and this fact favours
the hypothesis of later descent, and proportionate
superiority intellectually. Besides, his use of the
hand, in grasping things, gives him a marked
structural advantage over the dog or horse. He can
turn round an object, place it in different lights, and
receive from it more varied impressions. But there
are also numerous disadvantages. Thus, we have to
reckon with this consideration introduced by Darwin :
' We should, however, bear in mind, that an animal
possessing great size, strength, and ferocity, and
which, like the gorilla, could defend itself from all
enemies, would not have perhaps become social ;
and this would most effectually have checked the
acquirement of the higher mental qualities, such as
sympathy and the love of his fellows. Hence it
might have been an immense advantage to man to
have sprung from some comparatively weak creature.'1
This reference directly concerns ' the higher mental
qualities' essential to social life. Development of
social life, as distinct from gregarious life, implies
reflective exercise of that order special to man. The
absence of this in the ape, places him at a vast
disadvantage, as Darwin suggests. A large part of
the advantage for the dog under domestication, has
come through affection for his master.

At this point appears the weakness of the reasoning
which would make the lower intelligence the source
of the higher. ' The many and immense differences'

1 Descent, p. 04.

234 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

do not readily find their cause in the inferior nature.
Nor are difficulties much modified by reference to
the influence of external pressure, material and social,
on the life of the ape. Let us assign to animals the
highest powers of intelligence which have been
traced in any case, such as those found in the dog.
We can readily grant to Darwin that ' these powers,
which differ much in different animals, are capable
of improvement.' But, it is impossible to sustain
Darwin's inference, when he adds, 'There seems no
great improbability in complex faculties, such as the
higher forms of abstraction, and self-consciousness,1
etc., having been evolved through the development
and combination of the simpler ones.' 2 ' No great
improbability' is a very guarded expression from a
careful and acute abserver. I think the improbability
much greater that Mr. Darwin realised. The more
the facts are pondered, the greater will the improba
bility seem. ' Development and combination ' stand
on different footing. Persistent use of any power will
develop it, and full advantage must be allowed for
this. But when the possibilities of combination are
considered, difficulties come thickly. Combinations
of sensory and motor apparatus are easy. These in
volve no more than increase in the number of fibres
and cells. In view of the multitudes of both in the
human body, this is an easy conception. But it is
quite otherwise when we consider 'the many and
immense differences that unquestionably do obtain
between the mind of the highest ape and the mind
of the lowest savage.' Improvement of simple facul
ties cannot lead to complex faculties. Advance in

1 'No animal is self-conscious,' above, p. 230. - Descent, p. 84.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 235

acuteness of hearing can yield no more than increased
susceptibility in this one form. If we next introduce
' combination of the simpler ones/ either we are dealing
with mere association, or we have introduced some
higher power, effecting the combination. In the
latter case, the hypothesis of evolution is not sus
tained. Rational power is essential for production of
the results contemplated, and is assumed to be in
operation.

Accepting the guidance of the most ardent Evolu
tionists, we do not escape a sense of the weakness of
the argument. To prove evolution of mind, we must
open a road from sensory impressions to ideas of objects,
and from these to general abstract ideas; and this must
be such a road as the higher mammals could find
for themselves, before man's appearance on the earth.
Here is the essential test of an all-embracing scheme
of Evolution : — to account for interpretation of sensory
experience. Beyond this we seek a natural history
of human thought, constructed on the observational
method, and worked out on conditions supplied by
antecedent existence, accepting the best results of
animal intelligence.

This problem separates us from much that has been
already assured in natural history, strongly favouring
evolution. The facts are quite distinct from those
bearing on structural development. An organ being
given, we trace the history of its modifications through
varying phases of adaptation to circumstances. In
such a case, continuity is demonstrated on observa
tional lines. Again, the facts are quite different from
those illustrating continuity of stimulation along nerve
fibres, onwards through the brain, and onwards still

236

by a set of motor nerves, to the muscles of a limb.
Here continuity in the history of the executed move
ment is manifest. This is illustrated in the action of
all organic life. Again, the facts stand in contrast with
continuity observed in co-ordination within brain-
structure. Thus, double organs of special sense are
co-ordinated so as to give a unified result from the
action of two separate nerve-fibres brought into
relation within the brain. But ' the conception of
an object' is not a continuance of sensory action.
Conceptions of objects do not flow in upon the mind.
They are made up by the mind through action of com
parison, while utilising a past experience. We receive
our impressions ; we make our conceptions. Accord
ingly, Ave see many things of which we form no
conceptions. Conceptions are often reconstructed, as
the result of fresh observation. This severance from
sensible experience becomes more manifest, when
rational inductions are included, as when we recognise
the law of gravitation, conservation of energy, or
natural selection. These things do not arise in con
sciousness, as muscular movements are executed in
response to sensory impression. Thought has a
history very different, requiring a distinct explana
tion.

Here the psychology of evolution seems insufficient.
Darwin has given a considerable gathering of pheno
mena, well summarised by Wallace. A glance may
suffice to show the variety included. Within Part I.
of The Descent of Man, which alone is devoted to ' the
descent or origin of man,' we have extended illustration
of the analogies of animal and human experience and
action. Special value belongs to the facts gathered by

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 237

the observant eye of such a naturalist ; but there is in
their statement neither exact adherence to psycho
logical distinctions, nor concentrated treatment of the
main difficulty. Facts need to be redistributed and
classified. In one group there are actions illustrating
Instinct ; in another, facts showing the Intelligence of
the higher mammals ; in a third the characteristics of
Rational life. Here, we need to fix attention on the
single problem presented by the relations of the two
last groups. When a fair commencement has been
made, by recognising common characteristics in animal
and human intelligence, a dividing line must be
drawn, separating mental phenomena which depend on
exercise of rational power. Without this, the authen
ticated facts lie before us so mixed up, that it is
impossible to handle them with scientific precision.

Wallace's later study, involving revision of the
entire breadth of evidence and argument, has led him
to the conclusion that the moral, intellectual, and
spiritual faculties of man cannot have been derived
' by gradual modification and development from the
lower animals.' Wallace thinks that an erroneous
estimate has been made of the value of supposed
1 rudimentary powers ' in the animal life. The facts
are as Darwin has given them, but they do not show
such analogy with human intelligence as the argu
ment requires. They do not present manifestations
of a power adequate to account for ' the many and
immense differences that unquestionably do obtain
between the mind of the highest ape and the mind of
the lowest savage.' For, as Wallace observes,1 we
must distinguish the facts of our mental development,

Darwinism, p. 463.

238 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

from the facts illustrating evolution of mind in
animals. Our development implies exercise of
rational power; evolution of mind, if demonstrated,
must be achieved independently of rational power.
We cannot assume the action of the power whose ap
pearance we are to explain. The argument as to mind
must be separately developed, and on a basis supplied
by organic structure. This has not been done in such
manner as to support a plea for continuity. Facts
seem to bear us away from the conclusion that ' mental
actions ' are analogous with ' organic.' Wallace has
recognised this, even while accepting the conclusion
that the human body is the product of evolution from
a lower form. ' Because man's physical structure has
been developed from an animal form by natural selec
tion, it does not necessarily follow that his mental
nature, even though developed pari passu with it,
has been developed by the same causes only.' l

Wallace's discussion of the appearance of rational
life in Nature is brief and condensed. The argu
ment against continuity is, however, presented with
much force, in his treatment of the mathematical, the
musical, and the artistic faculties in man. This sec
tional treatment of the multifarious heaps of evidence
has the disadvantage of appearing to cross the line at a
point too far in advance. In any case, we must come
to the essential difference between animal intelligence
and rational. It is, therefore, better to face directly
the single problem, presented by the functions of
rational power, as these are familiar to us. Through
whatever by-paths we travel, we come at length to
this question: can we account for the rationalising
1 Darwinism, p. 463.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 239

power in man by reference to animal intelligence ?
Besides the discussions of Darwin and Alfred Kussel
Wallace, we have more recent contributions of high
value.

Dr. Romanes1 and Professor Lloyd Morgan2 have,
with great deliberation and ability, devoted themselves
to this problem. Dr. Lloyd Morgan specially has
shown appreciation of the perplexities involved in
the discussion.

The scientific problem concerns the origin of
rational power as existing in Nature. Can its appear
ance be attributed to evolution of animal intelligence
aided by a law of ' natural selection ' ? In reiteration
of the terms of our problem, lies our hope for a final
interpretation of the evidence. Let us take, first, the
sensibilities of animals; their sign-giving, as in the
danger-signal common among them ; and the vocali
sation which this involves. All these belong to
animals low in the scale, for which a claim to intelli
gence cannot be vindicated. These actions are, there
fore, permanently excluded, as bearing no testimony
capable of being applied within the natural history
of intelligence. Let us next take interpretation of
sensibility, understanding of signs by which we com
municate with animals, and the results of training, as
these appear in the higher mammals to which we
attribute a lower or simpler type of intelligence. The
appearance of such intelligence among the higher
animals cannot be accounted for by evolution from the
lower forms of life. Sensibility provides for motor
activity and for vocalisation. The area of activity

1 Mental Evolution of Man.
" Animal Life and Intelligence.

240 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

in this case, is completely covered by organic ap
paratus. Experiments for localisation have shown
that application of the electrode to a point in the
dog's brain will induce barking.1 The conclusion is,
that all the phenomena falling short of interpretation
of sensory impressions belong to organism, not to
intelligence.

Let us next take animal intelligence itself, as re
cognised in the higher mammals, placing alongside
of it the rational power of man, with his knowledge
of things, his classification of such knowledge, his
abstract ideas, his generalised truth, his rationalising
of personal conduct, and his organisation of society
under common law. Our question is, Have we war
rant for concluding that this rational power is an
evolution from the intelligence of the dog and ape ?

Inquiry must be strictly confined, for the present,
to the relations of animal intelligence to human
intelligence. Classifications of emotions, as described
by Darwin, included by Wallace, and enumerated in
an extended list by Dr. Romanes, must, for the time,
be set aside as subordinate to the main inquiry. The
significance of these emotions turns on this question,
how far such emotion may be dependent on intelli
gence or independent of it ? To take only these two
examples, fear and anger, it is obvious that experience
of these does not require intelligence. These are cer
tainly forms of experience included under the familiar
feelings of animal life low in the scale. On the pre
sence of such feeling depends common application

1 Terrier's Functions of the, Brain; West Riding Reports, in.,
p. 150. I have given details in The Relations of Mind and Brain,
pp. 99-103.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 241

of the law of natural selection. It will present!}7
appear that our estimates of memory and imagination
must be restricted in like manner. In passing these,
we do not overlook them as characteristics of animal
life. We only fix attention on the action of intelligence
in order to ask the single question : Can Animal Intel
ligence account for evolution of rational power ?

We advance along the single available line, when
we consider the relation of simple ideas to those more
complex, inquiring whether there can be any causal
relation between these two. We ask whether inter
pretation of signs can unfold into the higher exercises
enumerated. We seek to have it decided whether
those effects of training appearing in the intelligence
of the dog, can be regarded as disclosing operations
contributing towards evolution of human intelligence.
Dr. Romanes, drawing upon Locke's discussion of the
question, ' how far brutes partake ' in the ' comparing
and compounding ' of simple ideas,1 has directed
inquiry along the proper line.2 By following this, we
may reach some clear understanding of the relations
of animal intelligence to human. How do the ' simple
ideas ' of the dog, compare with the ' complex ideas '
of man ? The mental exercise of the animal must be
placed alongside the reflective exercise of man. In
this way, we may find it possible to say whether the
simpler has potency for evolving the higher.

Keeping to the terms used by Locke, Romanes
speaks of the ' comparing,' ' compounding,' and ' en
larging ' of ideas ; admitting that the procedure 'Locke
has in view is the conscious or intentional comparing,

1 Locke's Essay, Ch. on Discerning, Bk. n. chap. xi. § 5.
- Romanes's Mental Evolution in Man, p. 28.

242 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE"

compounding, and enlarging that belongs only to the
province of reflection or thought.' l As to the animals,
Locke's positions are these : — ' I think beasts compare
not their ideas further than some sensible circum
stances annexed to the objects themselves.' Those
who have most closely observed the intelligence of
dogs, and have habitually worked with them, will agree
with Locke's statements. Dr. Romanes, however,
thinks that there is a ' comparing and compounding '
of ideas by the higher mammals, though these
exercises do not rise into ' the province of reflection
or thought.' And he regards Locke as favouring this
conclusion. But Locke's statement is in these terms :
— ' though they take in, and retain together, several
combinations of simple ideas, as possibly the shape,
smell, and voice of his master make up the complex
idea a dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct
marks by which he knows him ; yet I do not think
they do of themselves ever compound them and make
complex ideas.' 2 If the reader turn back only a little
way, he will find additional statements of moment.
When dealing with ' considerations concerning our
simple ideas,' 3 Locke identifies such idea with ' any
perception in the mind' consequent on an object
' affecting our senses,' ' which may be taken notice of
by our discerning faculty,' as a ' real positive idea in
the understanding.' And when Locke comes to speak
of ' discerning and other operations of the mind/ 4 in
that chapter from which Dr. Romanes quotes, he
opens the chapter thus, — 'Another faculty we may
take notice of in our minds is that of discerning and

1 Romanes's Mental Evolution in Man, p. 29.

2 Essay, Bk. u. chap. xi. § 7. 3 Chap. viii. 4 Chap. xi.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 243

distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is
not enough to have a confused perception of some
thing in general; unless the mind has a distinct
perception of different objects and their qualities, it
would be capable of very little knowledge.' Let us,
then, consider the natural history of this power of
'discerning and distinguishing between the several
ideas ' in consciousness.

There is a marked difference between that com
pounding which is only association in experience, as
when the dog recognises his master by ' shape, smell,
and voice/ as ' so many distinct marks by which he
knows him;' and the compounding which is the
result of deliberate comparison. What we do attribute
to the dog is the distinguishing of his master by
sight, by smell, by hearing ; for he is clearly guided
by any one of these ; sometimes by one, sometimes by
another. We do not, however, attribute to the animal
the comparing and compounding of these impres
sions; so as to form a conception of the distinctive
qualities which give rise to them. We recognise only
correlated sensory impressions, and their effects in
action. Sensory impressions, carried by molecular
action along the nerve-fibre to the nerve-cell, and
through that to the motor-nerve, and so onward to
the muscle, is a continuous course of action which
we attribute wholly to organism. These are common
functions of organic life. 'Mental phenomena' do
not appear within this area. We do not attribute
intelligence to any animal on the ground of these
phases of action. To identify 'mental phenomena,'
we must get beyond these. Rising above them, we
remark how the animal interprets our signs, when we

244 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

direct his actions. Actions of this kind we attribute
to intelligence, as being beyond the functions of
organism. The intelligence here seen at work is
indeed commonly connected with the excitement
belonging to action. It does not show any beginning
of a power of comparison of ideas and objects. With
out this, Locke says, the mind is 'capable of very
little knoAvledge.' If this be the utmost we can claim
for the animal most highly trained by man, the case
for evolution is not sustained. There does not ap
pear in the facts adequate explanation even for the
appearance of animal intelligence, and still less for the
appearance of rational power of man.

The reference to ' compounding ' of ideas has proved
misleading. Such compounding is not mere agglom
eration, or fusion as by chemical affinity. 'Com
paring and compounding ' are here distinct parts in
a single process. Without comparing there is no
compounding,— no building up of knowledge. We
place together marks known separately. A ' complex
idea' is thus an 'organised' conception, which can
have no place, even in ' germinal form,' except on con
dition of comparison. Without exercise of this power,
the sensibility ends as the impression fades away.
The gate opening to that key which rational power ap
plies, remains barred in face of a humbler instrument.
Before this barred door, neither the natural power of
the animal, nor our power of training, proves sufficient.
Into this wider sphere of rationalised knowledge, none
of the higher mammalia can come. Where sight,
smell, or sound guides, animals can follow without
misgiving ; when general conceptions are formed and
expressed, their powers are of no avail.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 245

Appeal has been made to memory and to language
for help through this barrier, but this is grasping at
supports quite beyond reach. Memory and vocalisation
prior to comparison are of no avail. Neither are
memory and language available when dependent on
it. In the first case, they do not cause comparison ;
in the second, they only retain and express its results.
Such appeals mix up things altogether different,
placing them under common names. ' Memory '
belongs to animals, quite low in the scale, to whom
intelligence is not attributed. Such memory is only
a cumulative result belonging to sensibility, apart
from understanding. The same animals use signal-
sounds, but these express only recurring experiences
of pleasure or fear. Neither is intelligence involved
in these cases, nor is there anything which could
originate it. The 'memory' of which we speak as
peculiar to man, depends on the exercise of thought
for its materials, and so is it with the language we
use, which is the expression of thought itself.

As to the theoretic value of a memory such as that
which does duty in the service of comparison, Dr.
Romanes supplies striking illustration, while arguing
for an opposite conclusion. Connecting with Locke's
reference to ' perception/ as the true type of a ' simple
idea,' Romanes suggests that we use the terms ' per
cept," concept,' and 'recept,' — the first indicating know
ledge from a single sensory impression ; the second,
the combination of a variety of perceptions, — ' a
taking together,' the ' recept' being the recalling of what
has been already present, a ' taking again,' — ' a recogni
tion of things previously cognised.' 1 This use of terms

1 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 36.

246 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

is good, the connection of the three is clear in their
order, and the dependence of the third on the two
first is manifest. ' Recepts ' presuppose ' concepts/
The mind is only ' taking again/ what it had secured
first, by its own effort in constructing the concept.
As concepts are thus presupposed, the waking of ' a
faculty of discernment ' is already implied. Nothing
is in this case contributed by action of memory at
all helpful to an argument for evolution, when the
express aim is to give a natural history of thought.
The power of discernment does not grow out of
memory. In course of its own working, discernment
shows also the action of a higher memory, to which
it assigns a new order of work.

Nor is it possible that Language should account
for the appearance of rational power in the world.
Language is an instrument of thought ; an evidence
of the presence of thought ; a subsequent and conse
quent of the exercise of rational powers. ' The fact of
the higher apes not using their vocal organs for
speech, no doubt depends on their intelligence not
having been sufficiently advanced/ l To appeal to
language is to cross the natural history line at a
point too late to find causes at work capable of
producing rational power. It is only to record as a
fact under observation, that whose appearance we
have to account for. The language which expresses
first our general concepts, and thereafter the re
lations of thought to thought, presupposes thought.
Language is external to thought, an outward product
having no meaning, if there were not first thinking
power to construct both the thoughts and the language.

1 Darwin's Descent of Man, p. 89.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 247

Vocalisation, like facial expression, is a physical
result depending on the action of brain, nerve, and
muscle, and, on this account, belongs readily to mere
organic life, appearing as it does far down the scale.
What is expressed, depends upon what is already
within the life. To refer to barking, neighing, chatter
ing and whistling, as if they might be the source of
human speech, is to expose the argument to ridicule.
Examples of vocalisation they certainly are ; so long
as we speak of them as precursors of speech, we are
within the record; but when we point to them as
efficient in evolution of speech, the best that can be
said by way of excuse is, that we are confounding
vocalisation, mere physical utterance, with the gram
matical structure of language. How widely these
two things are apart may be readily seen. When
Darwin says, ' I cannot doubt that language owes its
origin to the imitation and modification of various
natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and
man's own instinctive cries, aided by signs and
gestures/ l he is speaking of vocalisation, the use of
physical structure for emission of sound. Several
naturalists have gained singular skill in imitating the
calls of animals, finding in this many advantages for
observation of their habits. But this is an acquisition
difficult for a man, because it is a matter of imitation,
not an expression of natural feeling. When Darwin
further says, — ' the same language never has two birth
places,' 2 he is speaking of the history of diverse
tongues, as these involve grammatical structure, and
use of signs liable to modification, in the history of
thought. The first quotation refers to vocalisation as
1 Descent, p. 87. 2 Ib. p. 90.

248 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

a physical process ; the second to naming of things as
a mental process. It is the combination of these two
which appears when written language is spoken. We
cannot err so egregiously as to confound the two
processes. The difference between the vocal cords,
and thought-power, is plain enough. Their com
bination in a single course of action, as in familiar
interchange of thought, cannot mislead us, as if sound
were the cause of thought; or as if thought were
being originated by the vocables falling from our lips.
Vocables vary according to traditional usage, even
when the conceptions expressed are identical. It is
on account of the identity of conceptions, that trans
lation is easy. Thought is the antecedent condition,
finding expression for itself in conventional forms.
Laws of thought are far apart from laws of vocalisation.
The severance is so great that it is impossible to
confound them, as it is impossible that the two forms
of activity should cross each other. Of vocalisation,
physiology gives a scientific account; of thought
procedure, and the laws directing its movement,
physiology affords no explanation. Thoughts are
transitory, as are our utterances. Verlum volat
irrevocabile. Yet words are fixed. The national
language remains, while citizens emigrate or die. But
thought gives to words their significance, as it gives
form to language as a whole, determining the life-history
of its words. It naturally follows, that the instrument
which thought creates is useful in the history of
mental activity. Words are as the tools we use. But
for its utility, the instrument would not be produced.
It will be cast aside, as soon as a better has been
invented. 'A name is a word taken at pleasure to

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 249

serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a
thought, like to some thought we had before, and
which, being pronounced to others, may be to them a
sign of what thought the speaker had, or had not, in
his mind/1 Mill naturally adds, 'Names do much
more than this ; but whatever else they do, grows out
of, and is the result of this.' 2 The name or mark,
however much it may express, does not account for
the thought uttered. Beyond this, vocalising is a
function of organism; various forms of sensibility
and of excited feeling in animal life find vocal ex
pression, in sounds varying according to diversities
in structure. All vocalisation thus belongs to the
history of signs; articulate language is the highest
product in this history. But its life-history, so to
speak, is quite distinct. Yocal organs and their
use do not help us here. We are concerned with
internal causality. The contrast between organic
and mental action is so marked that vocalisation is
reduced to a subordinate position. Physical fear
finds physical expression in animal economy, as in
the scream of the blackbird when a cat is seen
crouching near. Physical joy finds utterance in like
manner, as in the barking of a dog, when his master
starts for a walk. Thought expresses itself in the
naming of things observed. The difference is vast.
What we mean by ' mental,' in contrast with ' organic,'
is manifest here as elsewhere. ' All names are names
of something real or imaginary ; but all things have
not names appropriated to them individually. For

1 Hobbes's Elements of Philosophy, Pt. I. chap. ii. § 4. Moles-
worth's Collected Works, i. p. 16.

2 Mill's Logic, Bk. I. chap. ii.

250 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

some individual objects, we require, and consequently
have, separate distinguishing names ; there is a name
for every person, and for every remarkable place.
Other objects, of which we have not occasion to speak
so frequently, we do not designate by a name of their
own ; but when the necessity arises for naming them,
we do so by putting together several words, each of
which by itself, might be, and is, used for an in
definite number of other objects; as when I say this
stone, ' this ' and ' stone ' being each of them names
that may be used of many other objects besides the
particular one meant, though the only object of
which they can both be used at the given moment,
consistently with their signification, may be the one
of which I wish to speak." 1 The sign which expresses
thought is very different from the sound which is the
expulsive utterance of strong animal feeling. Hence,
in the activity of the rational life, marks and signs
are employed even more widely than vocables. If a
stone-hewer chisel out a stone on the hillside, and
mark it with a stroke of blue paint, in token of
property in the stone, thought and purpose are
expressed by the paint; so it is when the forester
marks with red the trees not to be cut, while others
are being felled ; so it is when sound takes the place
of colour, the only difference being that in the one
case appeal to the understanding is made through
the eye, in the other case through the ear. If we
regard such signs as testimony to the existence of
rational power, we are correct; if we adduce them
as causes of the appearance of thought, we err.
Explanation of the appearance of rational life can

1 Mill's Logic, Bk. i. chap. ii. § 3.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 251

not be found in the history of language. Dr.
Komanes is unfortunate in the prominence given to
language throughout his discussion of the relations
of simple and complex ideas, — of 'percepts' and
' concepts.' He says : ' The word " idea " I will use as
a generic term to signify indifferently any product of
imagination from the mere memory of a sensuous
impression up to the result of the most abstruse gener
alisation/1 His classification of ideas he gives in the
following form : ' By " simple idea," " particular idea,"
or " concrete idea," I understand the mere memory of
a particular sensuous perception. By "compound
idea," " complex idea," or " mixed idea," I understand
the combination of simple, particular, or concrete
ideas into that kind of composite idea which is possible
without the aid of language. Lastly, by " general idea,"
" abstract idea," " concept," or " notion," I understand
that kind of composite idea which is rendered possible
only by the aid of language, or by the process of
naming abstractions as abstractions.'2 The references
to memory and to language are too conspicuous here ;
the references to action of intelligence too slight. If a
c simple idea ' is defined as ' mere memory of a par
ticular sensuous impression,' this so-called ' memory '
may be mere recurrence of excitation dependent on
sensitiveness of the nerve fibres. This is not ' memory.'
Kecurrence of excitation is not recollection. Take, for
example, the dog's smell of food awakening appetite.
If this sensuous impression were renewed with return
of hunger, there would be revived activity of the

1 Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 118. This is the weak point
in H. B. Medlicott's able discussion, The Evolution of Mind in Man.

2 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 34.

252 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

sensory apparatus, such as occurs under physiological
law in the history of any animal. This may explain
what is involved when we speak of a dog ' dreaming.'
Memory 'is the knowledge of an event or fact, of
which meantime we have not been thinking, with the
additional consciousness, that we have thought or
experienced it before.'1 To define a simple idea as a
memory of a sensuous impression is misleading. There
is nothing in the experience of the animal entitled to
be called an ' idea/ no process which can be described
as ' ideation.' Some higher power is needed for the
origin of an idea or image combining qualities in a
single representation. Thereafter, memory may recall
it, with consciousness that we had previously formed it,
and had kept it before the mind. There is ' revival in
the mind of an image or copy of the original event.'
' But such a revival is obviously not a memory, what
ever else it may be ; it is simply a duplicate, a second
event, having absolutely no connection with the first
event, except that it happens to resemble it.'2 That
animals form 'concepts,' or get any further than
the recognition of ' so many distinct marks ' by any
one of which a thing is identified, seems to remain
doubtful. When Mr. Leslie Stephen says that ' a dog
frames a general concept of cats or sheep, and knows
the corresponding Avords as well as a philosopher,' 3
there is no evidence to support the statement. When
Darwin quotes this with approval, as a remark which
' may be extended to the more intelligent animals,'4 he
illustrates facility of faith, rather than the security of

1 James's Text-Book of Psychology, p. 287. 2 Ibid. p. 287.

3 Essays on Free Thinking, p. 82.

4 Descent of Man, p. 89.

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 253

legitimate induction.1 On the same lines, must we
not say that a blackbird forms a concept of a cat ; and
that an insect forms a concept of a ripe bud ? Utter
ances of this class are unsustained by observation, and
create disadvantages for research.

Let us keep to the single question of comparative
intelligence, as illustrated in the dog and in man,
afterwards seeking along this line the origin of ' the
most abstruse generalisation.' Whether the dog does
combine the several characteristics of his master in a
single complex idea, seems doubtful. As Locke said,
these may be ' only so many distinct marks by which
he knows him.' The need for reserve as to inferences
from memory must be admitted. But we may grant
that, if a single sensuous impression may be recalled,
a simultaneous combination of sensuous impressions
may be simultaneously recalled. This is simple in
human intelligence. We form complex ideas such as
'tree,' 'horse,' 'house.' If it be said, as by Sully,
that there is here ' a passive process of assimilation ; ' l
or if we say, with J. S. Mill, that ' the characteristic
visual appearance of an object easily gathers round it
by association, the ideas of all other peculiarities which
have in frequent experiences co-existed with that ap
pearance ;'2 it is only thereby shown with what facility
our intellectual processes are executed. On the other
hand, it seems thereby to become more difficult to
attribute such mental exercise to ' the more intelligent
animals.' There seems more to favour Locke's repre
sentation that the animal has only ' so many distinct
marks ' by which he knows an object. Most commonly

1 Outlines of Psychology, p. 342.

2 Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 403.

254 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

direct sensory impression is supplying a prominent
part, when we remark on the intelligence of the dog.
Amongst our observations there is little to suggest
that he is ' occupied ' with ideas, or guided by complex
ideas. Whatever uncertainty remains here, we are at
least agreed that the higher mammals are capable of
interpreting simple sensory impressions, and this is
certainly a higher exercise than ' the mere memory of
a sensuous impression/ If this statement is warranted
on evidence, it seems to follow that the origin of
animal intelligence cannot be found in the sensori-
motor system centered in the brain. Sensuous im
pressions stand distinct from intelligent discrimination
of their meaning. There is a marked difference in
this respect between the impulse to worry a sheep
which sight of the flock may stir in a dog, and readi
ness to gather them together under order of the
shepherd.

When we turn from these investigations to observe
human intelligence, the difference is such as to involve
us in the utmost difficulty if we attempt to trace the
'rudiments' of the higher intelligence in the lower.
Long ages of training have not lifted the dog to a
place of independent intelligence. The intellectual
process is conspicuous in all our effort. Rational dis
crimination is at work, even in ' passive combinations '
of sensuous 'perceptions' which depend on several
sensuous impressions. We distinguish sensuous im
pressions, and are cognisant of several perceptions in
a single experience. These we blend in one complex
idea. We could not represent tree without including
trunk and branches; or horse without including
form, limbs, and hoofs. When further we contem-

ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 255

plate rational power in full exercise, accumulating ob
servations and advancing towards wider inductions,
animal intelligence presents no causality adequate to
account for its origin. Among the essential character
istics of a self-directing intelligence are application of
laws of thought, self-criticism of thought, use of prior
inductions, and accumulation of knowledge, sustained
by a living interest, practical, literary, scientific, or
philosophic. The powers we are agreed in assign
ing to the higher animals, even on the highest com
putations of them which have been made, offer no
traces of the rudiments of such rational exercise.

This conclusion is strengthened when it is remarked
that the highest achievements of animal intelligence
observed by us are the results of human training.
Man's influence has been at work through successive
ages in development of the dog and horse. When
account has been made of this, difficulties for the
theory of evolution are multiplied. Although monkeys
and apes have the advantage in brain structure and
in powers of manipulation, they have not shown in
telligence coming to the level of our domesticated
animals. On these grounds, it is demonstrated that
the origin of the higher power cannot have been
the lower. Natural history itself fails to sustain
evolution of rational power.

This conclusion is further strengthened by the
testimony of Geology as to traces of the presence of
the dog and the horse on the earth. Hitherto we
have included the results of domestication and train
ing. Now these must be excluded, retaining only
biological conditions, historically antecedent to man's
appearance in Nature. Our observations must apply

256 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

exclusively to the forms of life assured to us on historic
evidence as precursors of this event. Here the records
of Palaeontology supply our only available testimony.
When these determine our conclusions, it is impossible
to find in the horse and dog progenitors of our race.
Our best examples of animal intelligence are thus
withdrawn from the circle of evidence available for
Evolution. For historic accuracy our lines of thought
must be in large measure reversed. In accordance
with the conclusion to which all evidence is certainly
leading, we need a greatly extended view of man's
place in Nature. For it is true, as has been admirably
said by Sir Robert Ball, that ' the advent of intelligent
beings on the globe has certainly introduced a factor
into evolution, the full import of which we are not at
present able to appreciate.'1

1 Fortnightly Review, April 1892.

CHAPTER VIII

RATIONAL LIFE

BY a lengthened course of investigation we have
traced a path through the fields of comparative
biology. Now at length man's place in Nature comes
fully into view. His is a life far in advance of all
that belongs to a merely animal existence; it is a
life separated even from that which most closely ap
proaches to his own. Comparative biology, however
valuable, is insufficient as a guide to a complete re
presentation of human life. Man's life is, indeed,
dependent on environment, as other life is ; but inde
pendent, as no other life can be. His is a life allied
with all organism by his subjection to the common
laws of growth and nutriment ; at the same time, he
moves in a rational sphere where these laws have no
application, and where other living beings can have
no companionship with him.

My aim here will be to present, at least in outline,
the activities of the rational life. It forms no part of
my plan to give prominence to special gifts among
men, representative of possible attainments or accom
plishments, even though these have continual illustra
tion in society. Mr. A. Russel Wallace has done this
effectively by discoursing of the mathematical, the
musical, and the artistic faculties in man.1 It is

1 Darwinism, p. 464 ; v. Weismann's Essaijs, vol. ii. p. 31.
R

258 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

obviously reasonable that such selection of faculties
should be made; for by reference to these a strong
argument can be adduced for the distinctiveness of
human intelligence. But it is more in accordance
with the plan here followed, that the common charac
teristics of human life should be taken as repre
senting most naturally and adequately the comparative
position of man. Accordingly, I here regard man as
man, without being specially concerned with higher
gifts and accomplishments in possession of the few.

A self-regulated life is a unique representation. This
is characteristic of all men alike. We find it in rich
and poor, in cultured and illiterate, in savage and
civilised. The distance which separates the extremes
of civilisation is a vastly extended one ; innumerable
varieties are to be found between ; but all men share
in rational self-direction as their birthright. However
low he be in the scale of civilisation, a man cannot be
treated as if he were irrational, or incapable of being
the coadjutor of his fellow-man, whose accomplish
ments he does not share. To understand the place of
man in Nature, we must observe how truly men move
on the same elevation, possessing common powers of
self-direction, all claiming common rights, all ad
mitting common obligations.

There are many disadvantages to the inquiry as to
man's place in the world's history, from considering
closely and continuously his life in view of its affinities
with the characteristics of animal intelligence. Of
necessity, in such a case, we turn attention away from
the grander features of human life, found even in the
most ordinary, or lowly, or even dishonourable, of
human lives. Contemplated at the distance of remote

RATIONAL LIFE 259

periods, supposed to be those in which were 'the
beginnings of civilisation,' man is regarded as if
through a reversed telescope. We talk of men as if
they were a pigmy race, lower than are found in the
forests of Central Africa. As if by constraint of
logical consistency, we begin to speak of 'the an
cestors of man as, no doubt, inferior in intellect,
and probably in social disposition, to the lowest exist
ing savages,' and we are, quite logically it may be,
impressed with the large acquirements which have
been stored up throughout the long ages which have
elapsed since that 'extremely remote epoch before
man had arrived at the dignity of manhood.' All
this may be not only warranted, but even necessary to
anthropological research ; but it is apt to carry with
it a logical penalty, as if we were chargeable with a
breach of continuity when we describe the elevations
of a rational life. Nevertheless we must speak of
what man is, a thing about which we are at least
more sure than we can be as to what man was. We
must besides pay homage, as aforetime, to the thinkers
of antiquity, who have impressed us all by their force
of intellect. At the same time, we do not wish, as if
under apprehension of straits into which our argu
ment may be brought, to hasten off to the few men of
special gifts, or to chosen men of varied accomplish
ments. We desire to consider such a man as we now
have wherever we meet him, humanity as it exists
in our own age. We seek to describe what a rational
life is in itself, whatever its environments, and how
ever chequered its course in the world. We all
believe that there was a time in the world's history
when animal life held the field. I seek now to describe

260 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

with some precision what the new life was which
appeared in the later times, though at an indefinitely
remote period from our own age, when rational power
took its place, introducing ' a new factor into evolu
tion.'

The conception of a self-regulated life stands in
contrast with animal life, even with the animal life
belonging to man himself. This contrast, if clearly
developed, will present the first stage in our representa
tion of rational life. A development of the negative
side of evidence will enable us to trace one of Nature's
boundary lines, helpful towards adequate survey of
the wide territory of biology. Organism is ruled by
sensibility, and ultimately by environment; rational
life is ruled by neither. This difference breaks the
biological continuity. A theory of evolution here
encounters criticism of a kind altogether different
from anything directed against it at an earlier stage.

The representation of animal life has been placed
before us with considerable amplitude in course of
the preceding investigations. The general interest
awakened by repeated restatement and extended
illustration of Darwin's observations, has made the
public mind familiar with the fixed conditions of
animal life. This proves a special assistance now, in
attempting to trace the lines which sever all animals
from man. There is here some compensation for the
disadvantages just mentioned. The marvels of the
process of organic growth baffle conception ; the
conditions of subsistence and of activity lie open to
observation/and are generally recognised. Sensory
nerves, brain, and motor nerves are the common
possessions of organism. All organic activity is the

RATIONAL LIFE 261

work of brain, nerve, and muscle. This applies to all
animal life, including that of man. Such life as this
is dependent for its continuance on environment.
Nutriment is the condition of subsistence. Out of
this, emerges the ' struggle for existence/ and out of
this, ' survival of the fittest,1 and from this, by laws of
heredity, transmission of acquired characters ; and out
of this, ' origin of species.' We are familiar with this
whole set of combinations; inductions which have
been gained for us by concentrated scientific research.
It is now possible to lift our heads from it all, in
order to consider how it bears on the general order of
things in the midst of which we find ourselves.

o

The first perplexing consideration, threatening to
bewilder for a time, is the fact that this boundary
line includes humanity with animality. The re
presentation is not in any sense a new one. We
had always said that man is an animal ; we had often
said, rather confusedly it is true, mixing up in a single
formula things that differ, ' man is a rational animal.'
The novelty of the situation lies in this, that man's
alliance with all animal life has been established with
a clearness and fulness of representation never before
possible in the history of the world. The long hidden
secrets of nature are disclosed, and behold ! man has
his heritage among the beasts of the field. The dis
covery is, indeed, a large one; the demonstration
has been worked out in minute detail, till no place is
left for doubt. However tedious may be the induc
tions bringing us to new truth, we are wonderfully swift
in our deductions. The conclusion was suddenly
drawn, as if it were ' an intuition ' of science, that man
had been dethroned, dragged from the place of honour.

262 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

It seemed as if an ' unexampled hurricane ' had passed
over the scene, and his abode had vanished. True,
man is apt to be found alive when the hurricane has
spent its force ; he has an awkward habit of building
his abode again, after the old dwelling has been
destroyed, and of walking forth in the quietness of the
evening, to look on the clear sky, bright as aforetime,
just as if nothing singular had happened.

Nevertheless, something not only new, but great,
had happened, in this demonstration of man's heritage
among the animals. The new truth arrests the
imagination. The range of animal inheritance in
cludes man. In embryonic life, he is like to the
animals: strangely like: so closely allied that it proves
difficult to distinguish embryonic man from ape, or
dog, or calf, or even from the rabbit. We are low
enough, indeed, in the scale, when comparisons are
concerned with embryonic history. From the period
of birth, man's distinction is plain enough, it is
true; it seems as if the lost dignity were being re
stored a little, when we see how an infant differs from
a calf. But we cannot part in summary way from
humble associations, for the baby-man does not so
greatly differ from the baby-ape. We are again some
what perplexed as to our ancestors, or, if the question
is not quite so serious, at least as to our kinships.
Even this may not be so serious as it looks, for we
have kinship with all animals, not merely with the
higher, insomuch that kinship is only a question of
' degree,' involving no great elevation for the apes, if
it do not involve special degradation for men.

The fact now to be fully recognised is, that the
boundaries of animal life include man. The

RATIONAL LIFE 263

beginnings of organic life in the egg, the stages of
progress in embryonic history, animal activity de
pending on sensory nerves, brain, and motor nerves,
and even dependence on environment for nutriment
and for manifold conditions of life, all hold as to man.
It does not seem, indeed, that this seriously concerns
the pre-eminence of man, for we are all agreed with
Darwin in speaking of ' the dignity of manhood ; u and
we must make full account of this dignity.

The first manifestation of a self-regulated life, lying
nearest to the field of research which has occupied us
hitherto, is found within the physical sphere itself.
The laws of physical existence do, indeed, apply to
the life of man, for he has his place among the
animals. But the ' dignity of manhood ' begins to
appear even here. This animal life of ours is a dis
tinctively human life, being a physical life rationalised.
Animal life here appears under conditions, and in rela
tions, found in no other case. The unity of our life
must be regarded; the animal and the rational are char
acteristic of the one life. To interpret human activity,
we must remark that the physical and mental are
quite distinct, yet the origin of all the more import
ant activity is from the rational power of man. The
rational life is the loftier ; its activity so far indepen
dent of the lower, that, as Descartes said, we can
think away the body, while that which thinks con
tinues its ordinary exercise. Even to the least cultured
intelligence, among uncivilised tribes, it has seemed
natural to think of the departed kinsman as living
and acting in another sphere.2 Experience of the
difference between manual labour and personal re-

1 Descent of Man, p. 46. 2 Tylor's Primitive Culture.

264 EVOLUTION AND MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

flection, favours such thought. But the truly striking
thing is, the fact that the rational life enters into and
regulates the physical life. There is no exception to
this rule under the normal conditions of human life ;
there is no illustration of it in any other phase of life.
The physical nature of man is subject to physical
law, just as every organism is ; but, in his case, rational
power takes possession of the physical, turning it to
use as its own instrument. This appears in all our
ordinary occupations. It is involved in every case in
which our Will is the source of physical activity,
working out a rational purpose previously formed in
our own consciousness. Pass away from his work,
whatever it be, to consider the man's life, as a whole,
and it is a rational life, even if judged only by
physical manifestations; yea, — and this is still more
striking, — a rational life, even when most irrational.
Indeed, that which we describe as 'irrational' is so
described, only as belonging to a rational life, Avhich
should have been better ordered, — a life which shows
its rationality, even in its irrationality. Take it at
its best, and at its worst, and it becomes clear that
this physical life is quite different from the physical
life of all the orders enumerated in comparative
biology. The difference is that a rational life holds
possession. The animal cannot be irrational, simply
because it is not rational. On this ground, reflection
belongs only to man. There is nothing either new or
strange in his physical life itself. It is a more won
derful organism than any other, more complicated
in differentiation, more intricate in co-ordination, but
the same in model of structure, and function, as all
organism, high and low. Everything possible can be

RATIONAL LIFE 265

said as to homology of structure; every stage in
physical development can be traced in harmony with
those of the ordinary animal life, of any grade you
may select. Thus, during the successive stages of
embryonic life, as we have seen, there is exact analogy
with the embryonic life of the animals. Pass thence
to contrast mature life, in the several cases, and what
do we find ? During this more advanced period of
existence, there is no analogy in the life of the
animals with the rational guidance of the physical
life in man. The separation is complete. Nevertheless,
this difference does not imply that man is separated
from physical law. There is no such modification of
law, nor is there exemption of any physical life from
its dominion. Man is subject to physical law, exactly
as are the oxen, and even as the rabbits of the field.
To him animal wants, and appetites, and passions, are
just what they are to these. But to him, the pro
prieties, the regulations, the restraints, the virtues even
of a physical nature, are realities, and of the highest
significance too. This is a first interpretation of ' the
dignity of manhood.' But for these characteristics
of a sovereign intelligence in the physical sphere, the
power of man's higher life could not become mani
fest, — could not find room for itself, — could not
breathe freely, nor find scope for its energies. What
human life is, we know ; and we are well aware that
it could not be what it is, without its power to take
possession of the animal nature, so as to establish
dominion of reason. All men, indeed, do not practise
rational restraints. We know it. But we lament it,
and we condemn the neglect, as irrational and wrong.
We spend no such lamentation and condemnation

266 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

over the animals. The sense of our rationality saves
us from such a thing. All men know the powers and
responsibilities of a rational life. In accordance with
this knowledge, we think and speak, and regulate
things in society. Hence the difference we make be
tween the sober man and the intemperate. Hence
denial of our hospitality to the man who cannot be
trusted to appear in a condition deserving a welcome.
Self-regulation of physical craving, is a first requisite
of the rational life. It is a power manifestly in pos
session of every man, unless it be sacrificed by irra
tional indulgence. Thus did Socrates keep rigidly to
the interpretation of our nature, when he declared that
temperance is the foundation virtue in human char
acter. This is simply the proclamation of the truth,
that the rational nature must take possession of the
physical, ruling it as a constituent part of a rational life.
In passing onwards to sketch the familiar charac
teristics of intelligent life, as concerned both with
knowledge and practice, I would guard against
abstraction. Let us take life in the concrete, keeping
closely by physical conditions all the while. There is
nothing to gain, everything to lose, by one-sided treat
ment of this many-sided life of ours. Whether, there
fore, we regard man as he moves in a world of know
ledge, or in a world of action, we see the rational in
the physical. Rational power and physical are cor
related in the field of activity. When we deal with
' mental phenomena ' we do not part from ' physical ' ;
we only remark how different they are, while observ
ing that they are closely connected. When we speak
of ' mind/ we do not forget to speak of ' brain/ though
it is best when we are least aware of its existence ;

RATIONAL LIFE 267

but it is impossible to claim that 'brain' in man
essentially differs in structure from brain in the ox, or
in the dog ; or that it has additional functions beyond
those providing for intelligent regulation of physical
action. These brains are too nearly akin to the human
brain to admit of such claim to superior functions
for man's brain, as would account for the superiority
of his life. All the higher functions of human
life belong to consciousness; they are known only
within the hidden realm of experience, which every
man occupies for himself, without entrance of visitors.
To know, to consider, to plan for the future, to shape
a purpose for immediate action, and to execute it in
word or deed, these belong to the individual man, — to
every man, whatever his place among the millions of
the race. They belong to no other being on the earth.
To vindicate this position, there is no need for here
dealing with achievements of scientific research, or
with subtleties of metaphysical speculation, or with
the learning of the Schools, or with any of the
specialised forms of intellectual effort. We are speak
ing of the ordinary man in his ordinary life ; and we
find that for him it is a possibility, even a necessity,
that he know things around, and that he begin early to
gather knowledge, and to practise reflective exercise,
as no animal does. This is the realm of ' mind ' in
human life. To suggest that it is the realm of organic
activity is to hazard a statement not only without
evidence, but in contradiction of it. Take biology
first ; take psychology next. In the region of biology
it appears that, consequent 011 complete dependence
on environment for their gratification, the interest of
the animal life centres in a series of sensations.

268 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

By contrast, the interest of man is in all things
around him, and in all the relations of things, as
distinct from supply of his bodily wants. It is in
this way that Mr. Herbert Spencer1 answers those
who contend 'that psychology is a part of biology,
and should be merged in it.' Throughout biology
proper, ' the organism and its correlated phenomena
practically monopolises the attention.' Hence the
induction, ' The life of every organism is a continuous
adaptation of its inner actions to outer actions.' ' But
in psychology the correlated phenomena of the en
vironment are at every step avowedly and distinctly
recognised ; ' not merely those phenomena related to
the wants of organic life. Hence the propositions of
psychology refer 'to its multitudinous, special, and
ever- varying phenomena.' The rational life concerns
itself with all that is around, surveying the whole
field of existence lying open to contemplation. Man
has an eye for more than meat. On account of this
higher interest, the wants of the organism, though
quite as urgent for him as for the animal, drop into
a secondary place within the sweep of his observation
and effort. Even for the man most removed from
civilisation, for example, for the red Indian, who roams
the forest, and for whom supply of food is the main
concern, — this end of his efforts bringing him into as
close analogy with that of the animal as human life
can be, — that forest has attraction which only rational
power can concern itself with. The forest is his
country ; there are tracts there, and varieties of trees,
and a luring wealth of light and shade, and harmonies
of sound, and places of shelter, and signs of coming

1 Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 134, Pt. ii. § 54.

RATIONAL LIFE 269

changes of weather and season. How different for the
animals which are in a sense part-proprietors, as hav
ing their dwelling and hunting-ground within the
same territory ! Whence this difference ? It is not
merely that the man has a more complex organism ;
that in his frame there are co-ordinations of which no
trace could be found in the captured game. As for
the man, does he not know the whole place ; and if a
fancy crossed his mind that there was some part in it
which he did not know, would he not wish to know it ?
If the civilised man came from his civilisation to
wander in these parts, would he not desire to know
exactly what the red Indian does know ? Would he
not seek his guidance and friendship ?

' One touch of nature makes the whole world kin.'

This is, then, a second phase of the rational life, eager
search for knowledge everywhere. As the organism
craves food, the mind craves knowledge, and feeds
upon it in all its forms, delights in it in all its varieties.
'Organism and the environment which meets its wants'
is too narrow a realm for man. He walks through
the scenes as a free man, desiring to have all nature
speak with him.

On this line there open up to view marked con
trasts in the scope and character of the activity
belonging to a rational life. Let us still keep to the
ordinary life of the ordinary man, including all rational
life without exception. Let us say that a man toils for
his meat, just as the fox does, just as the dog does, just
as these gulls in their flight do. What then is the
difference ? He hungers, as they do ; he hunts, as they
do ; he kills, as they do ; he eats, as they do. The

270 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

animals may do all these things as well as he; — some of
them may manage better than he can. The difference
which severs man from the animals lies beyond the
craving, and the cunning, and the consuming of what
has been captured. We trace it in his plans for the
day, in his preparation of his weapons, in his survey
of the heavens, in his taking of reckonings for direc
tion. He deals with the relations of means to ends ;
he utilises past experience in his reflections over what
has happened; he reaches general conclusions. All
these may for him be preliminary work, before
physical effort quite like to that of the animal ; but
these are the characteristic exercises of the man,
showing within the narrow limits of such a life as that
of the red Indian, what are the possibilities of a life
within which accumulated knowledge reckons for
much more than all animal impulses together, even
when at their most exalted pitch. This marks the
difference in range of meaning when we speak of
'variation' in animal life, and the growing experi
ence of the rational being. The one is physical, the
other is mental. The one is organic modification, the
other is accumulation of knowledge. Let us say,
with Kussel Wallace, ' most animals have such a sur
plus of vitality and strength for all the ordinary occa
sions of life, that any slight superiority in one part
can be at once utilised.'1 The statement does not
seem too strong. But, in its strength, it shows
vividly the two separate lines of advance. In the
life of the animal it is by the way of organic varia
tion ; in the life of man it is by the way of reflection,
accumulating knowledge, extending experience. Gain

1 Darwinism, p. 418.

RATIONAL LIFE 271

for the personal life is always in this way, even when
progress includes some phase of physical advance,
which infrequently is not included.

If we use the language adopted under the scheme
of evolution, we shall see that when taken as the
dominant law, it is applicable exclusively to animals.
' Organisms are acted upon by the environment, which
produces in them definite change.'1 We do not
allege that human organism is not acted upon in this
way. We recognise climatic influences, and physical
results coming from concentrated physical effort,
belonging to some forms of employment. Man is
subject to the laws of organic life in these ways, just
as the animals are. But when we speak of personal
advance, under a dominant law, we speak of progress
by means of observation, reflection, and growing
wisdom. In such a case, the words just quoted have
no application. Yet, it holds for all lower life, that
'organisms are acted upon by environment, which
produces in them definite changes.' The law of
individual advance is distinct in the two cases. In
marking this difference, we part company with all that
has been written as to the action of environment, and
as to 'natural selection.' These have only a slight
bearing on the physique of our race ; they have no
bearing on development of personal life ; neither
upon acquisitions of knowledge, nor upon formation
of character. The rational life takes its course in
dependently of these, acting for itself in accordance
with knowledge, gaining nothing towards its develop
ment by being acted upon by the forces of Nature.
All that men have been constantly saying as to

1 Danvinism, p. 418,

272 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

personal effort, and obligation, and responsibility,
stands unaffected by acknowledgment of evolution as
the leading feature in the history of organic life. This
conclusion becomes the turning-point in the discussion,
and is henceforth to be kept constantly in view.

The full effect of the contrast now brought out, will
be seen if we mark the severance of the two forms of
activity, as these are distinguishable in human ex
perience. The physical activity and the mental are
different, and are known to us as different. Not only
so, they are known to us as separate in source. This
places the contrast in a vivid light, even while it
remains true that there are secrets of physical activity,
obviously those of brain action, which research has
failed to disclose.

In man, body and mind are distinct, while they are
constituents of a single life. This appears in the
distinctness of the sources of action, and in the differ
ence of the laws under which action in each case
proceeds. Observe how the evidence stands. We
take evidence first on the negative side. The activity
of mind is not continuous with activity of bodily
sensibilities. Environment produces sensory im
pressions ; but it does not produce our thoughts, our
plans, our resolutions. These mental actions are not
effected by mere continuity of stimulation along the
sensory line, as if the result reached were something
registered in the brain, or some extended movement
generated there, within certain circles of co-ordination.
The first and readiest hypothesis from the biological
side fails. There is no analogy between the muscular
movement which follows sensory impression, and
mental activity when it follows that impression. The

RATIONAL LIFE 273

one is continuous under the same laws, passing
through the nerve-cells to the nerve-fibres, and con
tinuing onwards to the muscles. The mental activity
is discontinuous. After sensory movement has reached
the nerve-cells, it is not propagated by the aid of
nerve-fibres, or other physical structure. Sensory
impressions end ; intellectual activity comes from a
distinct source. It comes to receive these new im
pressions, in harmony with its own generalisations in
the past. Here is the contrast between man, and
animal. Here also is the contrast between physical
and mental in the life of man himself. An object
moves among the bushes ; the movement arrests the
eye of the cat, and of the dog, and of the man, in
exactly the same way. All three at once turn towards
the moving object. By all three, the movement of
the eye is similarly effected. The movement in each
case is a reflex, dependent on the sensory impression,
and bringing similar muscles into use. We account
for what has happened in the three cases, by reference
exclusively to nerves of sensibility, to nerve-cells
stimulated in the brain, and to motor-fibres brought
into use to work the muscles. But there is no such
continuity of action when thought and purpose are
formed by the man. No action of nerve sensibility
can reach rational generalisation, or work up such
generalisation, so as to originate it. The man remarks
that the movement which has arrested attention is
that of a bird, that the bird is a bullfinch; and
desiring to protect the bird, he calls back his dog, and
drives away the cat. In this course of action, nerve-
cells and nerve-fibres are called into use, just as
before, and these work just as they operate in every

274 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

organism. The vocalising involved in calling the
dog's name : and the muscular exertion in getting
between the cat and the bird, are executed by the
intervention of the brain and motor nerves. In exe
cuting these movements, there has been a discharge
of nerve energy, the ' explosion ' of nerve force from
the central organ, which has set the muscular system
in action. Continually there are incoming nerve-
currents, and outgoing nerve-currents. Everything
of this kind is physical, quite apart from the rational
exercise peculiar to man, and is accomplished by
bodily apparatus, just as are the movements of the cat
and of the dog. The forms of reflective exercise are,
however, discontinuous, because proceeding from a
different cause. The incoming nerve-currents do not
account for the thoughts of the man, or for the
purpose he forms. The subsequent actions of the
man, illustrating his dominion over the animals, are
executed by the nerve power and the muscular, within
compass of the mechanism. In marking that the
thought of the man is not continuous with the move
ment of the incoming current, though correlated with
it in time ; that the action of intelligence is interposed
by the man within his own consciousness ; that the
reflective exercise is not even 'movement' in any
sense analogous with that recognised in activity of a
nerve fibre, we observe that our rational life is distinct
from our physical. It is not subject to the laws
regulating molecular movement of nerve-fibres, and
stimulation of nerve-cells, and 'explosive' discharge
of nerve-energy. This presents the negative evidence.
Let us take, next, the evidence on the positive side.
This is supplied within our consciousness, while we

RATIONAL LIFE 275

carry through our reflections and form our decisions.
We consciously originate, continue, and conclude our
own reflections. Assigning to enviroment and to
organism all that has been indicated above, in the
movement of the bird, and in the sight of the move
ment contemporaneously with the sight of it by cat
and dog, we are, apart from these, conscious of our
own agency in the exercise of intelligence. We
identify the bullfinch, by reference to the class to
which it belongs ; and when, quite instinctively, let
us say, the desire to save it arises, our decision to act
is matter of consciousness. If, instead of this, we had
lifted a stone, and thrown it at the bullfinch; that
also would have been our act, for which we should
have been responsible, whatever the source of the
impulse, simply because we are rational agents. No
one thinks the cat responsible for his spring, or the
dog for careering among the bushes with noisy yelp.
We do not spend our breath on arguments with the
animals: nor do they complain of neglect on this
account. As Erasmus suggested in the Praise of
Folly, we cannot ' call a horse unhappy, because he
was never taught grammar, nor an ox miserable, be
cause he was never taught to fence.' But when there
is a child to hear and understand, we do think it of
consequence to speak of kindness to animals. The
testimony for the rational life is first and supremely,
that of consciousness. Our own knowledge of our
own'activity, gives certainty. Of this knowledge, we
have no explanation apart from our own agency in
the exercise of intellect, for which the functions of
the nerve-system afford us no explanation. Concen
tration of attention, use of past experience, reflection

276 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

as to what is prudent, kindly, or right, are actions
wholly within our consciousness. There is no trace
of explanation of them within the ramifications of the
nerves and nerve-cells. The facts of our own life are
the surest to us, and those selected are quite ordinary
examples. The familiar agency of thought in its
direction of our conduct, is known to us all, even to
those who know nothing of nerve-fibres and nerve-
cells.

Observe now how the argument stands. Nerve-
structure accounts for all that belongs to the sensi
bility of our bodies, and for all that illustrates the
power of our muscles. Structure of brain accounts
for concentration and co-ordination of the two sets of
movements, accomplished by apparatus, such as is
within all organism, and is of uniform structure
within all. Consciousness includes no trace of the
antecedent molecular movements, within fibres and
cells. Consciousness alone gives the knowledge of
our own experience, in the direction of our reflections,
and in the determination of our actions, involving
government of our impulses, and management of our
bodily movements. Physiology includes no trace of
all this. After the molecular movement has reached
its terminus in the nerve-cell or cells, the nerve-
system offers no further contribution to knowledge,
until we come back to the sphere of the muscular
sense. There are thus two distinct phases of activity;
so distinct, that the one is not continuous with the
other, in respect of energy and movement, though
continuous in time. The continuity manifest in or
ganic action is broken, being transcended and supple
mented in human life. Unity of life is undoubted at

RATIONAL LIFE 277

the top of the scale, just as at the bottom of it; but,
when the life of man is considered, unity of action is
no longer traceable by external observation. The
source of nerve activity is within ; that activity does
not originate from environment. This difference is
one of vast significance. Biology has no account to
make, no explanation to offer, of the most potent
agency in Nature. The conscious experience and
activity of man, while it cannot be explained apart
from environment, cannot be explained by it ; while
it cannot be accounted for without continual reference
to the activity of the organism, it cannot be interpreted
as lying within the laws of organic action. The next
stage of the argument follows logically. If we have
not continuity of action in accordance with which
activity of organism can pass over into activity of mind,
— evolution of organism cannot carry an explanation
of the appearance and development of mind. Even as
a member of the physical world, the distinction of
man is not in his organism, but in his power to use
it as he does. This is the testimony for a rational
life, disclosing the vastness of the change in the
world's history, which is consequent on the appear
ance of rational agency.

Consider how biology is placed in view of the de
mand for a scientific account of rational life. It has
claimed that man belongs to Nature, and the claim
is valid ; but it fails to include man's intelligent
activity. Biology is not a completed science of
Nature. It cannot make good its claim to be so re
garded. The science of mind outstretches the science
of biology. Man's life is superior to all animal life,
possessing powers which are not shared by the

278 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

animals; having possibilities and a destiny, peculiar
to himself, — impossible to organic life, even to the
organism which is part of his own being, and which
he uses as the instrument held to the service of his
own rational purpose, uses, however, with endless tear
and wear, telling of its coming dissolution.

This conclusion as to the inability of biology to pre
sent a science of human life, is reached by exhaustion
of all that biology has to offer by way of explanation.
All that has been demonstrated as to the action of
the nerve-system, is accepted, and turned to full use.
Within this is included all that has been ascertained
as to the action of brain. As our knowledge of this
wonderful central organ has extended, it has become
more obvious that it carries no explanation of the
activities of the rational life. As localisation of its
functions has advanced, the difficulties of the biologist
in making good his claim to include the activities of
the rational life have increased. As convolutions
and cells, and intra-cranial relations have been brought
under observation; as the intricate demands of co
ordination within this elaborate central organ have
been considered; as we have contemplated distribu
tion of all the sensory impressions, and transference of
these to the complex muscular system, it has become
increasingly clear, that the demands on the central
organ for maintenance of the integrity of an organic
life are such, that the still more complicated and varied
activities of the reflective life cannot also be concen
trated here. They stand before us unexplained. There
is not even a beginning made with an explanation
of the higher phenomena of the rational life. Biology,
rich in its possessions as to structure and functions,

RATIONAL LIFE 279

is destitute of possessions concerned with the activi
ties of intelligence. The marvels of organism, and
the marvels of the rational life, stand quite apart.
Science by its advance has completed the demonstra
tion of its own insufficiency to account for the rational
power, and for the grand consequences in Nature,
which have followed upon the appearance of rational
life within it.

This demonstration is also the demonstration of
the insufficiency of a theory of evolution. By refer
ence to its terms, as represented in the development
of the egg-cell, in the structure of the mature embryo
according to the originating species, and in the
slow laborious advance of species by slight modifica
tions in structure, the hypothesis is shown to be a
scheme of organic evolution. As such, its insuffi
ciency is demonstrated, by the evidence adduced in
proof of the inadequacy of organism to account for
the activity of the rational life.

The last retreat of the biologist is to say, that he
does not know how much may yet be discovered to
be within the compass of brain power. But consider
of how little avail such a refuge is. It is only an
isthmus lying between two large and well-explored
territories, the well-known organism on the one side,
the well-known life of consciousness on the other.
Science has now penetrated so well into brain struc
ture, that the biologist has only a narrow retreat
within this isthmus, — for a scientific mind, a
poor living-place, every day being narrowed, to the
extreme discomfort of the tenant. We know well
the distinctive characteristics of mental activity, — its
reflective exercise, its concern with all that can be

280 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

known, its regard to the lessons of observation, its
inventiveness in use of instruments, its government
of conduct, its formation of character, its respect for
the rights of others. In sight of this wide and varied
range of activity, the biologist is invited to complete
his conquest, to show us how he proposes to include
this rational power which, in the world's history,
has been traced as far back as we have traced the
abodes of man.

Fortunately, we can afford to dispense with further
historical research, for the problem is that of our own
life. The facts are within reach of every member of
the race. But, even with evidence thus available,
the biologist is badly placed for advance. For, as
Professor Tyndall has effectively shown, the observa
tion which is concerned with structure and functions
of brain cannot pass over into consciousness, any more
than an ordinary man, in directing physical move
ments, can pass over from consciousness to brain action.
There is a chasm between these two which cannot
be bridged. All traces of continuity of action from
the physical side, lose themselves in this chasm and
never reappear. The biologist is halted on the further
side, finding it impossible to cover the intermediate
space. Every man lives consciously on the other side
of the chasm, — is always there, does all his work there,
stores his knowledge there, forms his plans there,
gathers all the largest and most enduring results of
his life there. All biologists are themselves living in
this position. There is no agnostic retreat here. We
know with certainty what our thoughts are, and
what are our feelings and hopes dependent on these,
and what are our efforts after self-control, and what

RATIONAL LIFE 281

is our success in self-government. All this wide field
of effort is familar to us, — much better known than
the latest results of research into the structure and
functions of brain, — and of all this wide and exalted
activity, biologists are unable to give us even a frag
ment of explanation. Those who have spent a large
amount of energy in inveighing against introspection,
must resort to it, even without the consolation of an
alternative. How can we know, save in our own
consciousness? How can we regard our fellow-men
as rational, save by the knowledge we have in our
selves of the exercise belonging to rational life, and
of the manner in which we thereby direct our action ?
' You believe that in society you are surrounded by
reasonable beings like yourself. You are, perhaps, as
firmly convinced of this as of anything. What is
your warrant for this conviction ? Simply and solely
this, your fellow-creatures behave as if they were
reasonable; the hypothesis, for it is nothing more,
accounts for the facts.' 1 And how can we know what
it is to act reasonably, except by our consciousness of
rational reflection, and of guidance of our conduct,
whereby we interpret the words and deeds of our
fellow-men ?

Now we have reached the standpoint, whence a full
view of man's nature may be obtained. In the life of
every member of the race there is duality in unity,
unity in duality. This double aspect of the life can
never be obscured. In the individual there is body and
mind ; two distinct lives, yet one life. The two lives
are, nevertheless, so distinct, that we, as reflective
beings, have no difficulty in contemplating the body

1 Scientific Use of the' Imagination, by Professor Tyndall, 1870.

282 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

as non-essential to the mind. This supplies the first
key to the world-wide belief in a future state. Moral
conditions supply a second. Yet, is the unity in
duality so complete, that human life is never to be
interpreted, can never have its actions fairly judged,
can never have its potentiality truly measured, except
on its admission. There is a double life in one : there
is unity in the double life. A biological representa
tion of man is impossible. There are two distinct
natures, subject respectively to laws of quite different
order. These two, organic and spiritual, are capable
of being unified only by the governing power of
thought, never by the mere energy coming from
organism. Those who represent body and mind as
only two sides of the same thing, see only what
biology presents to view, organism, its laws and func
tions. From this point, the other side cannot be seen.
It does not come into view any more than the other
side of the hill does, to the man who looks upon it
from the plain. The advantage to the tourist is that he
can climb to the summit, and thence see the other side.
But it is otherwise with those who regard man only
from the side of organism. There is no summit with
in reach, and no way through. As we have seen, in
the hopelessness of the attempt to pass from nerve-
action to consciousness, the dualism in our nature
is made conspicuous in ordinary experience. What
has been seen, on the one hand, as to the discontinuous
in the action of physical sensibilities, the terminus ad
quern of molecular movement, and its insufficiency to
produce, or explain, thought, is a view of organic life.
What has been seen, on the other, as to the action
of intelligence, in directing its own reflective

RATIONAL LIFE 283

exercise, and thereby regulating physical action, is
a view of the mental life. There are ' two sides ' of the
nature, certainly, but they are two forms of life, each with
its own distinct centre of activity — brain, the centre of
all organic action ; intellect, the centre of all rational
effort. The brain cannot do what mind does ; mind
cannot do what the brain does. We thus obtain two
visions of human life, incapable of being blended in
any single glance, or of lying within the area of any
scientific observation. We can no more see with the
eye into the conscious life, than we can see into the
consciousness of a fellow-man. On the other hand,
we can no more be conscious of the structure and
working of the organ of vision — the Eye, which Plato
likened to the soul — than the Soul can show itself in
the visible world. Such duality is an altogether new
thing in the history of life. It is new to science.
Biology has no counterpart to show. Of the reality,
there is clear proof. Whatever difficulty there may
be as to the moment in individual life when the soul
appears — whatever uncertainty as to the natural law
regulating its appearance as part of the inheritance of
the race, there is no doubt of its presence. To include
an explanation of the rational life is an obvious part
of the demand on modern science. Only in recogni
tion of this duality, and at the same time in un
reserved acknowledgment of life's unity, can human
nature be understood. ' Two sides of the same thing '
is an impossible representation. It includes no
account of the governing power of intelligence, the
grand distinction of humanity. This order of life
transcends organism and its functions. Equally
impracticable is the representation of man as purely

284 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

spiritual, overlooking the fact that the limits and the
weaknesses of a physical life are component elements
in the life of mankind. Such a duality is man's life,
at once physical and rational, subject to lower and to
higher orders of law, the lower applying to the physical
nature, the higher governing the rational life. This
combination determines man's place in Nature. It
discovers his kinship with the animals; it accounts
for his lordship over them all.

Only by sight of this two-fold nature, harmonised
in the individual life, is it possible to account for
man's place. It is a place occupied from birth, and as
easily held as occupied, unless the man himself set
lightly by the spirit within him, seeing and feeling
and caring mainly for the animal, and that as only
man can do, by using the rational power merely to
minister to the animal nature. It is strangely in the
power of the individual to wreck his humanity.
Nature is too potent to admit of this in animal
economy; Nature has left room somewhere for this,
the peril of the embodied spirit.

Through this inquiry, a way is traced to a repre
sentation of man's life which may be accepted as in
cluding all the facts, doing honour to biology equally
with psychology. It gives a doctrine of his organic
life which does not break it oft' from its place in
the order of Nature, and a doctrine of the soul, which
does not place it apart from the system which is
being wonderfully interpreted in our day, for, in the
midst of it, human intelligence finds unlimited scope
for research.

From this point of view, we take our survey of
human life, still leaving exceptional gifts apart, that

RATIONAL LIFE 285

we may consider the race as a whole. We present
human life in no ideal colours, but, as it commonly
appears, its beauty soiled by contact with the earth.
We take man, low and high, always intelligent, always
moral, commonly religious; and we seek to under
stand his place in Nature. Taken thus, even on the
most commonplace levels, we do not find that any
adequate account of man's appearance is given by
reference to lower orders of life. We do not find in
the 'rudiments' of organic life any trace of the
potentialities of rational life. We quite understand
how Darwin felt warranted to speak of ' the infinitely
larger power ' l belonging to man, in comparison with
that belonging to the lower animals. We rather
wonder at Darwin's conclusion, though we cannot
critically object to it, when he says : ' In what manner
the mental powers were first developed in the lowest /,
organisms, is as hopeless an inquiry as how life itself
first originated."2 We recall, besides, that this difficulty
pressed so much upon Mr. Darwin's mind, as to have
induced him, in his earlier work, to write a statement
so unexpected as this, — ' I may here premise that I
have nothing to do with the origin of the mental
powers, any more than I have with that of life itself.' 3
He began by assuming life ; does it not seem that in
like manner, in order to construct a scheme of human
life, the mental powers must be assumed ? Stronger
support for the theory here maintained, could not be
looked for from a biologist of authority so conspicuous.
After such acknowledgment in both of his more
celebrated books, do the Avords not sound as the

1 Descent of Man, p. 85. 2 Ibid. p. 66.

3 Origin of Species, p. 191.

286 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

expression of settled conviction, stronger even than
the attractions of a favourite hypothesis ?

The characteristics of the rational life are familiar
to us all. They do not need to be described in detail,
so well are they known. The fact constitutes con
siderable part of the difficulty experienced in con
structing such an argument as the present. Still,
there is for us this advantage, that the life to be
described is our own, and that of our fellows around.
It is human life as it appears everywhere in society.
In man, the spirit of observation is perpetually active.
Nature is man's first and most constant teacher.
These eyes, roaming hither and thither, are in the
service of a mind open to the influences of Nature's
beauty and grandeur. In all diversity of situation, of
social life, and of daily occupation, man lives in
constant converse with his fellows. Whatever the
subjects of talk, memory's stores are constantly being
utilised. Man's present is ever full of recollections,
enabling him to live in the heart of past achievements.
' Man, from the activity of his mental powers, cannot
avoid reflection ; past impressions are incessantly and
clearly passing through his mind.'1 In his daily
activity, his classification of objects is a necessity of
his conversation, as he talks of trees and horses, of glen
and mountain, of men and communities. Still further
do we penetrate into the characteristics of a rational
life, when we mark how essentially it is a self-directing
moral life, perpetually making account of things right
and wrong. ' A moral being is one who is capable of
comparing his past and future actions or motives, and
of approving or disapproving of them.' 2 What other
1 Darwin's Descent of Man, p. 112. Ibid. p. 111.

RATIONAL LIFE 287

being makes such drafts on past and future, even run
ning forward in fancy, to condemn what will never 'be
done, in order that achievement may excel that which
has been fancied ? We trace a moral element in all
thought, amongst high and low, civilised and un
civilised, noble and criminal. In the midst of all the
rivalries, jealousies, and antipathies of social life,
presenting an evil side to view, there are constantly
appearing references to right and duty. Thoughts and
words, and pleadings for right, are strangely com
mingled with manifold forms of wrong-doing. What is
the revengeful feeling, bursting out in flame of lurid
passion, but a man's testimony against the wrong
which has been done to him ? How do we account
for such force of passion ? It is not animal passion,
even though there be much of animal feeling associated
with it. There is here only a superficial resemblance
to animal conflicts. There is thought, behind this
rush of feeling ; on the tongue, there is complaint
against a fellow-man, and just complaint ; or, if you
have doubt of this, at least reference to justice, as
sovereign laiv to which every member of the race
is appealing from day to day. To this great rule of
human life, the little child appeals against strength
of muscle which can lift him in the air, and set him
down anywhere and anyhow. To this appeals the
native of ' the dark continent ' against the white face,
who is suspicious, hasty in judging, unfair in punish
ing, having his finger too quickly on the trigger,
under shades of night, — testimony this from the
uncivilised against the bad side of civilisation. To
this appeals the criminal, in the heart of our surg
ing crowds, placed under arrest, if he should be

288 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

condemned on insufficient evidence. To this appeals
every buyer in the market, defrauded by the thrust
ing of adulterated goods into his hands. And to
this does every gentle one make appeal, defrauded in
ways still worse, by false expressions of love, from
whose falseness recoils a blighted life, bearing, through
long and weary years, witness to the cruel wrong which
has been done. Where, along the devious paths in
which man is found, is justice not honoured, at least
by outcry against harsh wrongs ? Is not this other, the
true excellence of life, seen walking more peacefully,
and with large sense of good, in unflinching and
willing acknowledgment of equal rights for mankind
of all colours and ranks and classes ? Not merely with
in sight of the strange medley of ill -doing and well
doing, but in the midst of it, where is ever recurring
sense of wrong, and most earnest striving after right.
Keligion appears, for this is the soul's appeal to the
Eternal, — man's elevation in thought, in feeling, in
hope, when he lifts his eyes to the Father of all.
From under the shadow of all clouds, from the heart
of all miseries, in deepest sense of life's perplexities,
man asks that question, which can have but one
answer, ' Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?'
Along this darkened, troubled pathway, a man rises
into calmer sense of elevation, swayed by desire for
consecration to the righteous and merciful Father of
our spirits, to whom he would have all men gather ;
a penitent, sensible of the presence of ' the power
which makes for righteousness.' It were a poor de
scription of rational life, which did not include all
this. Wherever we be, we have but to turn our eyes
in any direction, in order to see the mystic forms of

RATIONAL LIFE 289

morality, and religion. Through all differences of
race and rank, in all scenes near and remote, these
companion visitors are helping to make the feeble
strong, the strongest noble, lifting even the most
mangled form from depths of self-inflicted injury.

There is nothing easier than to write about the
greatness of human life, yet there are few things more
difficult. I prefer to have a sketch transferred to this
page as it has been touched off by a master hand :

' What a piece

of work is a man ! How noble in reason ! how infinite
in faculty ! in form and moving how express and
admirable ! in action how like an angel ! in apprehension
how like a god ! the beauty of the world ! the paragon
of animals ! ' 1

True to Nature ! Yet is this the description of man
as he is contemplated, at his best, in the ideal, with
regard to his rational power, to his range of thought,
and to the potentialities belonging to a rational life.
It is such a description as we accept when we regard
man in the dignity of his manhood, when in our
consciousness we make account of his higher relations
as a moral aud spiritual being. Such a description,
from the hand of the dramatist, may stand alongside
the philosopher's view, as when Kant describes man's
insight into moral excellence :

' Every example given to me of virtue must first be compared
with the principle and standard of morality, to know if it be
worthy of being elevated to the rank of the archetype or pattern,
and so of course cannot originate in us the notion. Even the Holy
One in the gospel is only recognised to be so, when compared with
our ideal of moral excellence.'2

1 Hamlet, Act n. Sc. 2.

2 Kant's Ground-work of the Metaphysic of Ethics, chap. ii.
Semple's Translation, p. 19.

T

290 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Shakespeare shows his appreciation of the great
ness of the rational being, as he moves in the world ;
yet is that greatness so associated with things lower,
that we do not marvel at the suddenness of the
transition, when, in immediate connection with the
words quoted, Hamlet says: 'And yet, to me, what
is this quintessence of dust ?' We are speaking of
one of whom we can say in the same breath, akin to
the angel, and akin to the animal. And are not the
union of these two natures, and the severance of the
two, the facts which we must mark and ponder if
we are to understand what man is, and are to con
template his possible destiny ?

Does not everything in the life of the individual
depend on how he controls the animal in him, and
develops the rational life ? Is it not through the risks
and possibilities of conflict, that the inherent ' dignity
of manhood ' is seen ? Are not the possibilities con
nected with action of intelligence so lofty, even at
man's lowest, that he contemplates a sovereign rule of
moral life, and accepts this task as belonging to the in
herent responsibility of a rational agent, to govern all
motives in accordance with this rule ? Is it not in
this way, by homage to Conscience, and by exercise of
Will, that our manhood comes into view, making us
all acknowledge its dignity ?

' Give me that man

That is not Passion's slave, and I will wear him
In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of hearts.'

Recognition of this led Plato to say, ' the man having
a good soul is good.' 1 This supplied the central

1 Republic, in. 409.

RATIONAL LIFE 291

position in Aristotle's Ethics, 'deliberate preference
seems to be a test of character, even more than
actions are.' 1 The commonest man you find any
where; the poet, honoured all the world over; and
the profoundest thinkers, in times ancient and
modern, are agreed in acknowledging that the great
ness of man appears in his regard to sovereign
law, securing the rights of all, from the weakest to
the mightiest, and calling upon every man ' to do
justly and to love mercy/

There is no loss of force for our argument when,
passing from this ideal, we are constrained to look into
life's dark perplexities. The darkest things are worse
than the worst in animal life. There is no attempting
of a completed view of man's place in Nature, without
giving prominence to this fact, apparent everywhere,
and nowhere more glaringly than in the crowded city
of our modern civilisation. To some who dwell mainly
on the continuity of all life, a baser phase of human
society may seem natural, a thing which may be
regarded as a ' survival/ the breaking out of the animal
forces, the rumbling echo of the thunderbolt ; and yet
in another aspect, when ' the dignity of manhood ' is
considered, and also the date now reached in the
world's history, nothing can seem more unnatural than
a low aspect of social life in the core of the most
advanced civilisation. ' Survival ' is too easy a way of
meeting the case. We are dealing with a worse than
animal debasement. This is no mere survival or
reappearance of what has been. It is a lower and
more perplexing order of things than science has

1 Nicom. Ethics, in. 2.

292 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

unravelled and described, through observation of lower
forms of life, whether those which have disappeared
or those still continuing. The scientific explanation
is inadequate. The debasement witnessed in man is
impossible in animal life, impossible except when
intelligence magnifies animal .passion, and ministers
to animal indulgence. There is not a trace here of
the normal organic life, any more than there is a trace
of ' the dignity of manhood.' The two natures, the
intelligent as well as the animal, appear even on man's
lowest level, but the better nature has become subject
to the worse, and this has been induced by a course of
self-chosen indulgence.

Let us here assign to scientific testimony the utmost
that can be claimed. In stating at the outset the
'evidence for evolution,'1 we gave from Mr. Herbert
Spencer a quotation which may well be reconsidered
in this relation. 'Organisms may vary not only in
respect of their structures, but in respect of their
tendencies to do this or the other in all kinds of ways,
many or most of the ways at variance with welfare.'
Every one will see that, variation being granted, it
must always imply risk of deterioration as well as
promise of advance. These possibilities go together.
They are, indeed, suggested in the doctrine of 'survival
of the fittest,' which implies deterioration of indi
viduals, and even of some races, leading, it may be, to
their disappearance. This belongs to the plan visible
in Nature, appearing there as a condition of progress.
But this seems to fail in supplying analogy to the
moral evils appearing in human life. In order that
some definite conclusion may be reached here, it is

1 See p. 5.

RATIONAL LIFE 293

important that full value be assigned to the evidence
for deterioration in animal life.

In treating of 'reversion' as a fact noted by the
natural historian, Darwin points to the phenomena of
' arrested growth ' as a phase of reversion, in a measure
an illustration of a lower structural stage.1 It is
doubtful if these facts can be taken as evidence for
reversion. Darwin next refers to variations occasion
ally appearing in human structure, which wear an
aspect of reversion. He refers to occasional peculi
arities in the formation of bone, formation of teeth,
and arrangements of muscles, characteristic of the apes.
These facts have more obvious value, but they are all
variations in organic structure, having no direct bear
ing on the question now before us. This Mr. Darwin
indicates when, at the close of the discussion, he says,
'These various cases of reversion are so closely re
lated to those of rudimentary organs given in the
first chapter, that many of them might have been
indifferently introduced either there or here.' 2 The
only other passage of consequence is that in which
the effects of civilisation on the progress of our race
arc considered. Here it is pointed out that ' although
civilisation checks in many ways the action of natural
selection, it apparently favours the better development
of the body, by means of good food, and the freedom
from occasional hardships. This may be inferred
from civilised men having been found, wherever com
pared, to be physically stronger than savages.' 3 Mr.
Darwin approaches more closely to the present stages
of our argument when he touches on the relations of
civilisation to moral life, remarking, ' in regard to the

1 Descent of Man, p. 36. 2 Ib. p. 43. 3 76. p. 135.

294

moral qualities, that some elimination of the worst
dispositions is always in progress even in the most
civilised nations/1 He is referring to such facts as
these, that ' malefactors are executed, or imprisoned
for long periods;' that 'melancholic and insane
persons are confined or commit suicide;' that 'violent
and quarrelsome men often come to an untimely
end ; ' that ' intemperance is so highly destructive,
that the expectation of the life of the intemperate,
at the age of thirty for instance, is only 13 '8 years,
whilst for the rural labourers of England, at the same
age, it is 40 '59 years ; ' that ' profligate women bear
few children, and profligate men rarely marry,' and
that ' both suffer from disease.' A deliberate survey
of these statements will uphold them all as supported
by familiar evidence. This admitted, it seems singu
lar, in view of the argument for evolution in which
our author is specially absorbed, that he should have
written the introductory sentence in the terms quoted,
— ' some elimination of the worst dispositions is always
in progress even in the most civilised nations.' Would
not this appear the most likely of things under advanc
ing civilisation ? Should not the evolutionist regard
it as one of the things to be expected, and to be ad
duced with prominence, and with all the formalities
of detailed evidence, as contributing towards the
support of his main contention, that the rational life
is an evolution from the organic ? Some elimination
1 even in the most civilised nations ' ! It is an utter
ance of the latent admission that in the midst of
civilisation entirely new conditions have appeared.
It points to the obvious fact that in the midst of

1 Descent of Man, p. 137.

RATIONAL LIFE 295

human life there is a freedom of action which is
absent from animal life. It is preparatory for the
acknowledgment, to be made only a little further on,
that ' with civilised nations/ so far as the moral life
is concerned, 'natural selection effects but little.'1

With this reserve of statement as to civilisation,
there is recurrence to animal life, in a manner which
makes the difference of plane in the two cases more
conspicuous. In immediate connection with the
examples of 'some elimination of the worst disposi
tions' in the midst of our modem civilisation, the
following passage occurs: 'In the breeding of do
mestic animals, the elimination of those individuals,
though few in number, which are in any marked
manner inferior, is by no means an unimportant
element towards success. This especially holds good
with injurious characters, which tend to re-appear
through reversion, such as blackness in sheep; and
with mankind some of the worst dispositions, which
occasionally, without any assignable cause, make
their appearance in families, may perhaps be rever
sions to a savage state, from which we are not re
moved by very many generations. This view seems,
indeed, recognised in the common expression that
such men are the black sheep of the family.'2

The example in animal life is well chosen, fitting
in neatly with the analogy which popular language
supplies. It is impossible to take this gravely. The
familiar phraseology shows how readily we regard
moral deterioration as tending to the level of the
beasts. But, as we have said in stating the facts to
be explained, human degradation is much below any

1 Descent of Man, p. 137. a 76. p. 137,

296 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

thing that appears in animal life. Considering the
quite guarded language employed by so high an
authority in natural history, I do not here deal with
his hypothesis that these distressing exceptional cases
' may perhaps be reversions to a savage state/ specially
in view of the admission that they occur ' without any
assignable cause/ On the other hand, bad disposi
tions in men have no analogy with blackness of wool
in sheep. The example chosen, under obvious allure
ment of current phraseology as to 'black sheep/
proves to be one of the least effective. Black wool
can count for no more than grey hair appearing early
in some cases, an appearance which has little organic
relation with mental dispositions. Grey hairs do,
indeed, not infrequently occur in human life, as a
consequence of deep and long-continued grief; but
this does not happen to be an ' assignable cause ' for
occasional appearances of black wool.

The contrast between man and sheep thus becomes
suggestive of a marked difference in the conditions of
the two lives. So much is this recognised by all, that
treatment in the two cases becomes public testimony
for the contrast we are insisting on between animal
life and rational. Tested by deterioration as it appears
in the two cases, all animal life is placed on one side,
including even the animal life of man himself; all
rational life is placed on the other side.

In watching over any class of animals, when atten
tion is directed to colour of wool or of hair, length of
tail, formation of the head or limbs, length of body in
contrast with compactness of a well-knit frame, the
whole range of observations is concerned with organic
life. They guide selection of stock, in accordance

RATIONAL LIFE 297

with recognised laws of heredity. Physical differences
appear in the human family in like manner, according
to parentage. There is more than analogy here ; it is
a case of homology. Yet there is no one who suggests
that the human family is on this account to be treated
like the animals. We have had such dreams ; they
have even come down to us from an age prior to the
Christian era, a product of Greek thought, in the
midst of its own grievous perplexities. ' Eutopian ' is
the most gentle and merciful criticism in dealing with
them. We have our statistics from domestication in
abundance ; we have in like manner our statistics of
juvenile crime, with traces of inheritance. Our treat
ment of these two sets of figures shows how naturally,
and with what force of reason, we distinguish between
them. We recognise that the first applies to organism
alone ; that the second applies to a life in which mind
and body are united, therefore we attempt to eradicate
the evil. In the animal, inheritance is fixed, eradica
tion is impossible, so that the rule must be to sell
stock, and to buy in fresh stock. In the other case
we neither shut up the young criminal, nor send him
beyond the seas, nor execute him, but send him to a
reformatory school, in hope of bringing him back to
an honourable place in society. This is our witness
to our recognition of two natures in one life. The
results of our juvenile reformatory system prove
the accuracy of our view. Such an illustration will
suffice to show that deterioration signifies two quite
distinct things, as it appears in animal life or in
human; always remembering that animal life is in
cluded within the human, and may involve physical
taint for human organism, as for the sheep.

298 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

The facts to which our thought is now being directed
have received special attention from Professor E. Ray
Lankester, whose discussion deserves consideration.
' Degeneration : A Chapter in Darwinism ' is the title
of the lecture which appears first in his volume of
Essays.1 At the outset, the references are to organic
variations, and are virtually inapplicable to human
life so far as it is rational. Professor Lankestcr's obser
vations are designed to show that ' the process of
natural selection and survival of the fittest ' has not
' inevitably acted so as either to improve and elaborate
the structure of all the organisms subject to it, or
else has left them unchanged, exactly fitted to their
conditions, maintained, as it were, in a state of balance.'2
On the contrary he argues, ' we have as possibilities
either balance, or elaboration, or degeneration.' 3 The
reader will remark how naturally the whole range of
observation is taken as one of ' structure,' and the
reference is made to ' all the organisms.' Nevertheless,
before the close, it appears that this is preparatory
to showing that ' the traditional history of mankind
furnishes us with notable examples of degeneration.' 4
We are here specially concerned with these notable
examples.

The illustrations of degeneration first given are
those supplied by lizards and by parasites. The former
set of illustrations will suffice here. Our author says,
' I may call to mind the very remarkable series of
lizard-like animals which exist in the south of Europe
and in other countries, which exhibit in closely-related

1 The Advancement of Science : Occasional Essays and Addresses,
1890.

2 Ib. p. 22. 3 Ib. p. 24. 4 Ib. p. 47.

RATIONAL LIFE 299

genera a gradual loss of the limbs — a local or limited
degeneration. We have the common lizard (Lacerta)
with five toes on each of its well-grown fore and hind
limbs ; then we have side by side with this a lizard-like
creature, Seps, in which both pairs of limbs have
become ridiculously small, and are evidently ceasing
to be useful in the way in which those of Lacerta are
useful; and lastly, we have Bipes, in which the
anterior pair of limbs has altogether vanished, and
only a pair of stumps, representing the hinder limbs,
remain. No naturalist doubts that Seps and Bipes
represent two stages of degeneration, or atrophy of
the limbs.'1 This is a 'very partial or local atrophy,'
which may help to illustrate degeneration as that may
apply to the whole organism. ' Degeneration may be
defined as a gradual change of the structure in which
the organism becomes adapted to less varied and less
complex conditions of life/2 'Any new set of condi
tions occurring to an animal which render its food
and safety very easily attained, seem to lead as a rule
to degeneration : just as an active healthy man some
times degenerates when he becomes suddenly pos
sessed of a fortune, or as Rome degenerated when
possessed of the riches of the ancient world.'3

That both men and animals are liable to degenerate
is certain; that man is the better for being con
strained to work in order to obtain food, just as an
animal is, must be no less clear; but we have to
inquire whether there is here such analogy as to
bring the cases of degeneration under common laws.
For this purpose, we shall proceed to that part of
the discussion directly concerned with human life.

1 Advancement of Science, p. '26. 2 Ib. p. 26. 3 Ib. p. 27.

300 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

The facts admitted are these. ' High states of civili
sation have decayed and given place to low and
degenerate states:' 'many savage races, as we at
present see them, are actually degenerate and are
descended from ancestors possessed of a relatively
elaborate civilisation ; ' as such ' we may cite some of
the Indians of Central America, the modern Egyptians,
and even the heirs of the great Oriental monarchies
of prse-Christian times ; ' ' degeneration has a very
large share in the explanation of the condition of the
most barbarous races, such as the Fuegians, the Bush
men, and even the Australians ; they exhibit evidence
of being descended from ancestors more cultivated
than themselves.' x The testimony for these positions
will be accepted as sufficient.

In the midst of this discussion, Professor Lankester
introduces references to the race as a whole, the
accuracy of which seems doubtful, in view of the
statements just quoted. He says, 'At one time, it
was a favourite doctrine that the savage races of man
kind were degenerate descendants of the higher and
civilised races. This general and sweeping application
of the doctrine of degeneration has been proved to be
erroneous by careful study of the habits, arts, and
beliefs of savages.' Hence he concludes that ' the
hypothesis of universal degeneration as an explanation
of savage races has been justly discarded.' We are
here directly concerned with degeneration in animals
and in man as illustrated before our eyes. But it is
difficult to see how these two statements hold a place
in the heart of such sentences as have been quoted.
If man can degenerate ; if there are examples of de-
1 Advancement of Science, p. 47.

RATIONAL LIFE 301

generation in tribes now existing; if evidence of
degeneration is spread so very widely over the world
as these references imply, there does not seem solid
basis for an argument against degeneration in the
history of the race as a whole, unless there be some
law to prevent this calamity becoming general ; and
it does not seem alleged that there is such a law.

The hypothesis that degeneration has not touched
the whole race lives in hazardous surroundings. It
may, however, escape atrophy, — it may even thrive, —
by fighting for existence. The dangers are serious,
however. If we consider how 'the great Oriental
monarchies of prse-Christian times' have gone; how
' Rome degenerated when possessed of the riches of
the ancient world;' how 'the immediate forefathers
of our civilisation, the ancient Greeks,' disappeared
from the place of eminence, the hypothesis of a
favoured portion of the race having escaped a disaster
so common, does not seem to have a large reserved
force to bring up. Professor Lankester wisely aims
at giving his countrymen warning of danger. Hence
he says, ' it is well to remember that we are subject to
the general laws of evolution, and are as likely to
degenerate as to progress.'1 Does this not seem to
suggest that all are exposed to the risk, and that it is
therefore possible, under natural law, that all may
have suffered ? Suppose, then, that we turn in the
other direction. Things do not look much better
here. For if ' degeneration has a very large share in
the explanation of the condition of the most barbarous
races,' is it probable that in very ancient times, there
may have been races worse than these ? If this seem

1 Advancement of Science, p. 48.

302 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

improbable, ' the explanation of the condition ' then,
may be as the explanation of the condition now.
Let us, then, next turn to ' our modern civilisation.'
What have we to say of this ? Our author has strong
testimony to give. 'Are all the inventions and
figments of human superstition and folly, the self-
inflicted torturing of mind, the reiterated substitution
of wrong for right, and of falsehood for truth, which
disfigure our modern civilisation, are these evidences
of progress ? In such respects we have at least reason
to fear that we may be degenerate.' 1 This passage,
strong as it is, does not seem too strong, in view of
the facts to be found in the midst of our modern
civilisation. But, this granted, two things seem in
volved, that progress of the race fights against heavy
odds even in our modern civilisation; and that,
as degeneration appears under natural law, the
hypothesis that some portion of our race has escaped,
appears highly improbable.

Our main question, however, is quite aside from
historic hypothesis. We look at the facts of de
generation as these lie open to observation. They
point clearly to two distinct phases of degeneracy, in
accordance with the distinction between animal and
man, and also with the distinction between animal
and mind, in man himself. It does not seem needful
to travel wider than the testimony supplied above.
Professor Lankester does not propose to deal with
degeneration in animals otherwise than as a fact
to be admitted as inevitable under natural law. But
he reasons with his fellow-countrymen, warning them
of a danger to be dreaded and avoided. This aptly

1 Advancement of Science, p. 48.

RATIONAL LIFE 303

illustrates the difference. He speaks directly to our
rational nature. He assumes a special power within
us, implying a marked contrast in the aspects of
natural law. That he emphasises this contrast, it is
not possible to claim ; but what is said is admirably
said, and so concisely, as exactly to serve our purpose
here. 'It is possible for us — just as the ascidian
throws away its tail and its eye, and sinks into a
quiescent state of inferiority — to reject the good gift
of reason with which every child is born, and to
degenerate into a contented life of material enjoyment,
accompanied by ignorance and superstition/ 1 The
language is in every part expressive ; the analogy is
a failure. It is, indeed, possible for degeneration to
happen in the life of man, as it is possible for the
larvial ascidian to lose his tail. But the analogy is so
faulty that the illustration gives vividness to the
contrast of the animal and the rational life. The tail
is not to the tadpole what ' the good gift of reason ' is
to man. When the tadpole ' drops his tail,' he can
not resume it, or have its guiding help more ; when
man rejects ' the good gift,' he does not drop it ; he
continues to use it in some manner ; and, though it is
either in abeyance, or is greatly misdirected, he can
resume its larger use, realising that the power is still
a part of himself, is indeed his ' better-self,' so that
when he reforms, and begins to act more rationally, we
say he has ' come to himself.' We can wish no better
proof of the contrast between man and animal than
science offers here.

When we reason with our fellows, or with our
selves, against yielding to degeneration, our words show
1 Advancement of Science, p. 49.

304 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

that man is in possession of a nature shared by no
animal. With 'the good gift of reason/ as is here
said, ' every child is born ; ' ' to reject ' this good gift
is a man's own conscious and responsible act, not
occurring by force of natural law, as when the sheep
shows a breadth of black wool; not an effect of
heredity purely, even though ' inheritance ' may have
something to do with it; but involving deliberate, con
tinued, responsible action, throughout the history of
which, even down to the lowest degeneration, the
man never parts with his reason, though not infre
quently he parts with his hope.

In carrying forward this argument, I have been
careful to introduce, from time to time, reference to
the animal nature of man. This is at once an obvious
part of the theoretic position here maintained, and is
quite essential for the present stage in the discussion.
Thus it is made increasingly obvious, that it is only
on recognition of two natures, — two orders of life, —
animal and rational, in man, that an adequate repre
sentation of ' degeneration ' and of personal responsi
bility can be founded, or any true reading of heredity,
as it appears in human life. To the bearings of here
dity in a life, at once animal and rational, it becomes
desirable now to give deliberate consideration.

Only by keeping the physical distinct from the
mental in the life of man, and, at the same time, only
by keeping full in view the unity of the life, in
which these two are constituents, is a doctrine of
heredity in human life attainable, in such a form as
can be generally accepted. That there are conditions
other than those of animal life, appears from our ad
mission of responsibility. Man is so much more than

RATIONAL LIFE 305

animal, that the laws of heredity applicable to animal
life, and to his animal life, exactly as to any other,
prove inadequate, and in some senses inapplicable,
when their transference to human life as a whole
is attempted. We shall rirst seek to trace the appli
cation of physical laws to the fullest extent; and
shall thus seek to show wheiv and when their limits
of application are reached.

The physical nature of man comes within sweep of
the laws of heredity applicable to all organism. This
is scientifically the most obvious position, and, on
this account, it has the smallest number of scientific
perplexities attached. The development of the or
ganic life in man, from the fertilisation of the egg
onwards, takes place under conditions analogous with
the development of all organism. There is in each
case ' the fusion of two hereditary tendencies/ showing
themselves clearly after birth. The persistence of
physical inheritance is manifest in every family of
the race. A vigorous parentage gives a vigorous
family : a feeble parentage the reverse. Disregard of
conditions of health will spread an enfeebled life to
the succeeding generation. Crowding of population
in the great centres, life in an exhausted atmosphere,
work in cramped or constrained position, and circula
tion through the atmosphere of deleterious matter,
inevitably lower physical vigour, which must tell on
the physique of the population. An active life, spent
largely in the open air, with advantages otherwise
from residence in rural districts, will show opposite
results, notwithstanding disadvantages from restricted
quantity, and little variety, of food. The laws of
heredity carry forward these results.

u

306 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

Beyond these general aspects of physical heredity
in human history, there are the numerous and pain
ful illustrations of hereditary disease. If an enfeebled
constitution is liable to malady, if it gives lodgment
to the seeds of disease, it is impossible that the germ-
plasm should escape contamination. If we grant the
' fusion of two hereditary tendencies ' in every ferti
lised ovum, this hereditary result is inevitable. The
human race, notwithstanding its elevation in the
scale, notwithstanding all the effective things written
by evolutionists as to ' the flower of the ages,' has not
been exempted, even in the smallest degree, from the
laws of heredity applicable to organism.1 The phy
sique of the parents, whether high or low, must tell
on the children. The law of inheritance is as truly
fixed law, as any other law of physical existence.
The facts, even the most painful which social life
presents, must be regarded and interpreted as facts
concerned with organic life. The conclusions of or
dinary observers, and of specialists, concur in support
of this position.

But it is obviously impossible to end our study of the
subject thus. We have before us abundant evidence
for the distinctness of two natures in man. What,
then, do we mean by responsibility in human life?
We never speak of it in the case of the animals, when
we note long tails, or a tail falling away, or when we
remark on shortened legs, or atrophy among the
lizards of southern Europe. Yet we never fart to
speak of responsibility in human life. Our medical
advisers are, of all men, the most clear and explicit
here. This is their testimony to a two-fold nature

1 On Phenomena of Disease, see Darwin's Descent of Man, p. 7.

RATIONAL LIFE 307

in man. In attributing responsibility, we affirm the
presence of rationality, and the obligation it involves.
We acknowledge power to see and appreciate the
right, to recognise its bearing, and to regulate conduct
in accordance with such knowledge. These are the
conditions on which the appeals of our medical ad
visers rest. Such appeals would be irrational and
unscientific, if specialists were dealing only with an
organic life. The duality of human life is admitted
— cannot be obscured — if specialists advise their
patients, expecting their advice to be followed.

Kesponsibility for our physical condition being
granted, what is the full range of its meaning ; what
are its limitations ? It is impossible to answer with
out adding to the testimony for duality in human
life. Whether you will or no, two sets of phrases
come into use; distinct spheres of application are
found for them. We speak of 'laws of health' as
fixed, and simply to be obeyed ; we speak of personal
resolution, as that which must be formed by each
individual for himself, and must be carried out by
himself, whatever inducements he may have to act dif
ferently. We all know the formulae of the consulting-
room, or of the hospital ward; and we know how
much dependence must be placed on the integrity of
the patient. The diagnosis may be correct ; the pre
scription may be good ; but what if the patient place
it on the shelf ? Where is responsibility then ?

What is here brought to a narrow point, applies
throughout the whole intricate entanglements of our
self-directed activity. The law of heredity has its
reading in human history in accordance with this
duality in human life. This is only one of the many

308 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

phases of the speciality of a rational life. It is, indeed,
an idle dream to suppose that human liberty can
escape the dominion of physical law. It is, on the
other hand, an animating conclusion from scientific
inductions, that rational control of physical impulses
will bring large physical gain. The explanation is
that the life, rational and animal, is one; that the laws
of organism are fixed; and that the government of
reason, in accordance with these known laws of
health, is matter of experience.

The measurement of parental responsibility is like
wise found in the relations of rationality to ascertained
hereditary conditions. Laws of organic descent are
fixed ; the rational agent can understand them, and
can regulate his conduct accordingly. The full
meaning of this, needs to be more exactly expressed,
and more widely understood. Only in this way, can
we escape dangers of ' degeneration,' appreciating and
profiting by the warnings of the Faculty. Only by
recognising, in every department of activity, the rela
tion of rational guidance of conduct to the fixed law
of physical existence, can man's place in Nature
have appreciation, in a manner at once scientific and
practical.

The limits of personal responsibility in relation to
the fixedness of physical law may first engage attention.
The contrast between the physical life and the rational,
will thus appear more fully, and also the unity of the
two forms of existence in one life. The sharpness of
the distinction is readily marked. It is conspicuous
in the contrast between the risk to which all life is
exposed : and the precautions voluntarily taken for its
preservation. This contrast places well within ordinary

RATIONAL LIFE 309

observation the difference between natural law and
rational direction of conduct ; and it may lead with
great sense of security towards reliable discrimination
as to the wider bearings of heredity in the history of
man. For the risks we are not responsible ; for the
precautions all are responsible.

Responsibility connected with knowledge of the
laws of heredity, rests on the parents ; no part of this
responsibility extends to offspring. Much importance
belongs to both sides of this statement. The respon
sibilities of parents are large. Their children's deepest
interests are involved in parental regard to these.
The child unborn will have its future decided by the
character of the stock from which it springs. There
is no law more severe. Physical health cared for and
cultivated by young men and by young women, as if
it were purely a thing of personal interest ; physical
health guarded by husband and wife, as if each were
but guarding the other's good, and sharing in the joy
of it, supply the surest provision for the physical gain
of their descendants. Feebleness may be transmitted,
for which grave responsibility belongs to the parents.
Thus, vigour of offspring may depend on rate of
increase within family history. A mother's strength
abated, will give a younger child a feebler frame, than
an earlier child has inherited. Parents burdened with
grief may extend depression into the life of descend
ants. There are wider reasons for self-command in
times of sorrow, than those of personal consolation.
There is no more serious aspect of responsibility than
that which is traced here as incidental to parentage.
It deserves to be more pondered than it has been. If
there be anything more serious still, it is connected

310 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

with the possibility of transmitting nerve-sensibility
in matters of taste, as in the case of 'alcoholism.'
What is considered as a thing of mere personal grati
fication, cannot be so regarded, if it be possible to
transmit a tainted, or even abnormally excited nerve-
condition. That this is possible, is one of the most
clearly established facts in the record of inherited
disorder.1 Of the physical evils which can be trans
mitted, deteriorated nerve-system is alarming to
contemplate, touching closely on momentous questions
in morals and in national history. Dr. Clouston says
' use of alcohol is unfortunately the most common of
all the causes of insanity.' It is a ' general cause of
all kinds ' of the disease ; and if attention be concen
trated on cases in Britain in which it is directly the
cause of insanity in the individual life itself, 'from 15
to 20 per cent, of the cases of mental disease may,
taking the country through, be put down to alcohol
as a cause, wholly or in part."2 Responsibility for such
evil, and for transmission of taint, depends on the
powers of reflection and self-regulation, possessed by
man, in view of ascertained results of indulgence.

Now Ave pass to the larger and still more urgent
question, introducing the whole range of moral life.
Thus only can we complete the discussion of ' inherit
ance.' Previous discussions are merely preliminary
and preparatory to more extended application.

Each child born has its own distinct life-heritage.
No two moral agents start the race of life on precisely
the same terms. Each successive life, even in the

1 On this subject, full of importance to society, see Lectures on
Mental Diseases, by T. S. Clouston, M.D., Lecturer in Edinburgh
University. 2 IUd, p< 436t

RATIONAL LIFE 311

same family, has a distinct heritage, determined by
varying conditions in embryological life. The common
inheritance is there, — ' the good gift of reason.' Within
the family circle, there is the common family training,
not always equal to all concerned, unfortunately.
A\rithin the distinctive inheritance of each, the
characteristics of nerve-sensibility most seriously
determine the demands on self-control to be made in
after-life. Here are most important considerations.
Kesponsibility does not begin when life begins ; and,
when it arises, it does not include responsibility for
the life-struggle entailed by the type of individuality
inherited. Responsibility for transmitting the inherit
ance cannot be transmitted. Whatever the mysteries
of heredity, they do not include an increase of
responsibility for the inheritor. What holds as to
inheritance of wealth, does not hold as to what is
more strictly 'personal inheritance.' Common re
sponsibility begins with appearance of common
inheritance, in the activity of reason. Special
responsibility for each, begins with the struggle to
master his individuality under the conditions belong
ing to his life. Consider how slowly a child conies to
the consciousness of his own life-task, and you will see
the responsibility of parents and educationists in
training. How much they owe to the individual life
depending on their leading ; how much to the nation,
that these may be good citizens ! When we come to
manhood, or to womanhood, the burden must be taken
on our own shoulders. We are rational. On each
member of our race it devolves to cultivate and use
the effective power of his life ; to battle with the
evil which can be conquered ; to bear bravely the evil

312 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

which must be endured, bringing gain out of
endurance. There is not space for dwelling on this
wide range of action. Our main interest here centres
on ' the evil inheritance,' and on personal relation to
that. Here, where things look darkest, the distinc-
tiveness of rational powers is apparent. This is a
power not within the area of the physical, but capable
of controlling it, so as even, in some degree, to modify
it, by success of rational effort, sustained from day to
day. Interpretation of rational power, and of its laws,
shows that human life, even at its worst, is never so
low as animal life, even when in all visible aspects
it seems lower. There is more hope of a profligate,
than of the vicious animal. Place full in view the
saddest results of heredity, and however bad the
case, the man is not doomed. He has the power
to see the evil, the power to separate it from what
he regards as his true self, the power to struggle
against it, the power to gain the mastery, even if it
be through sore battle, with bitter sense of pain
and peril, waged bravely during a long and very
weary campaign.

There are people to whom this description of moral
conflict in its physical relations will read as exaggera
tion. Fortunate people ! And truly fortunate race
also, even when facing its darkest social .problems,
for the worst types of inheritance are not the common ;
and the worst are not hopeless. The history of progress
is carrying an ever increasing number of the race to a
more favourable starting-point. The lamp of religion
has cheered the most desperate, whose children's
children have opened their eyes on scenes more hope
ful, with only a thin shadow of an ancestor^ sorrow,

RATIONAL LIFE 313

to tell how large a victory had been achieved. Those
who have prevailed over the dangers of an evil
inheritance, are victorious in life, having done not a
little to deliver others from an evil taint, and from
sore struggle. The 'black-sheep' theory is inapplicable.
It is at fault on both sides. It maligns the sheep,
and it does not explain the man. Even when attention
is turned on the lowest levels of human degeneration,
the power of a rational life is undestroyed. The
physical life may be hopelessly enfeebled; profligacy
may disclose Nature's penalty in the paralysis of
manly vigour ; but the best in man is not utterly laid
waste; the penitent's hope is not debarred. Most
bitter of thoughts in the recoil from degradation, is
the thought that the consequences are not concentrated
in one's own experience, and are not closed Avith it.
Even one's children may carry the taint, facing sore
life-conflict as the result of conduct in which they
had no part. They suffer because their parents did
not act a better part. But thought, and fight, and
freedom, are still possible to these belated ones.
The greatness of our Christianity appears in this,
that it meets those who are worst stricken, bringing
them hope and help from God, merciful and
gracious, of whom we ever say — ' Shall not the Judge
of all the earth do right ? '

The reading of heredity, as thus interpreted in re
lation to human life, must have its bearing on human
destiny. Even a wasted life may be a sacred life ; the
body wrecked, the man delivered. This, however,
reckons at best only as some mitigation of the burden
we bear, when the darkest side of human life is con
sidered. We are deeply concerned in the outcome of

314 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

this inquiry, as heredity bears on thought concerning a
future state. A wasted organism is in any case a sad
dening sight; but all organism is doomed to decay.
Death is as constant in its appearance as Life. It makes
an immense difference, however, for the history of a
human life, whether the body is worn out by vice, or
has had its resources exhausted by virtuous labour.
Physical results in these cases bear witness to things
spiritual, bad and good, telling of the character of the
inner life, which is truly the life itself. For we are
' dealing not with the outward man, but with the in
ward, which is the true self and concernment of a
man/1 Though all life ends in death, in the case of each
human life, the character of this end is to be judged by
the moral standard which has been the test of conduct
throughout its course. ' So far as a man is true to
virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity,
and the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned,
so far he is on the side of the Divine administration
and co-operates with it.' 2 It is this truth which has
ruled human thought concerning the Future. All see
rewards and penalties in the present ; we expect them
in the future state. Our inference is drawn from
' the present order of things,' from ' the course itself
of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and
examination.' We contemplate Conscience with its
testimony for the ideal ; self-criticism with its praise
and blame of our own conduct ; indignation with evil
doers who inflict wrong on their fellows ; and the force
of moral sentiment, — the persistence of moral feeling,
—that ' internal sense or feeling, which,' Hume says,

1 Plato's Republic, Book iv. p. 443, Jowett's Translation.

2 Butler's Analogy, Pt. I. chap. iii.

RATIONAL LIFE 315

' Nature has made universal in the whole species : ' l
' Reasoning from the common course of Nature, and
without supposing any new intervention of the Supreme
Cause/ 2 it is clear that the government of the world
deals with distinctions between right and wrong
as fixed distinctions. Rewards and penalties are
distributed accordingly. The Avorst penalties, as the
best rewards, belong not to the body, but to the mind.
Penalty and reward appear in the continuity of the
life- experience. Hence we conclude that moral law is
the expression of the Divine will, and that 'judgment
to come ' is a natural sequence to the present order.
Under force of this conviction it is, that we are con
strained to deal with the deeper ethical problems
connected with interpretation of the laws of heredity,
as these bear on human destiny. If moral distinctions
are the ultimate test of life ; if virtue and vice are
placed in vivid contrast in the present order of things;
how, then, shall it be as to judgment, in view of the
amazing differences of inheritance with which men
start ? The question is one of deep and painful
interest. The answer is to be sought with utmost
deliberation, from readings of the laws of government
in the present order. In anticipation of such a stupend
ous event as a final award on the outcome of human
life, it is safe to maintain the reserve of Hume's
canon, just quoted, to 'reason from the common course
of Nature, and without supposing any new intervention
of the Supreme Cause, which ought always to be
excluded from philosophy.' Even thus, our ethical

1 Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Section I. Green's
ed. of The Essays, vol. ii. p. 172.

2 Ibid. ii. p. 400.

316 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

conclusions seem clear and definite. If ethical dis
tinctions are fixed in the order of Nature, judgment
hereafter will proceed upon these distinctions, as they
are recognised in the present. If the life be con
tinuous, so must be the consequences of its own
action, which has given fixedness to character, and
has extended its results into the history of suc
ceeding generations. But, on the other hand, it seems
manifest that the law of heredity does not throw a
deep and long shadow into the life beyond ; rather it
seems to follow from the facts of the present order,
that there shall be such limits of judgment hereafter,
as there are limits of responsibility here. ' It shall be
required of a man according to that he hath.' Judg
ment is measured by responsibility, and responsibility
includes no more than belongs to personal choice. A
man's actions are his own ; for these only can he be
commended or condemned. Hence, judgment of life
by moral distinctions visible all through its course, is
such judgment as lies recorded in personal conduct
Judgment of our actions is not a thing of weights and
measures, however naturally we introduce the analogy,
'weighed in the balances, and found wanting.' If
there is truth in this analogy, as there is, it lies behind
the symbol; judgment was already fixed when we
weighed, and selected, and determined the course of
our own action. Short of this, there is no re
sponsibility. Where dawning rationality appears,
responsibility begins. This is continually affirmed in
our judgments of our fellows. All this belongs to
ordinary ethical thought. It is implied in the awards
of praise and blame we are daily recording, as we
judge ourselves and others. The tests of a man are

RATIONAL LIFE 317

conduct and character. The demand upon every
man is for righteousness : his ultimate destiny, under
Divine guidance and favour, as illustrated in the
present order, is a perfect righteousness. The religion
of Jesus Christ meets the demands of ethical life, and
the deepest longings of the soul. Progress is the law
of the universe; moral progress the law of human
life. Advance is ever the rule, even while the two
orders of laws, under which human life acts, are
altogether different in nature. Physical law differs
from ethical. Thus all men are placed under common
obligations, in view of the one grand ideal of a moral
life. But when the difference of start is considered—
when the consequences of heredity are included with
in our survey — how different must be the history of
moral progress on the earth ; how different the judg
ments of its varying phases ! The moral life is
rationally required to work towards realisation of its
own ideal ; but this can be done only in facing con
ditions of existence, under which each life-history must
be distinct. In the eyes of the Moral Governor of us
all, a small advance in the battle against an evil in
heritance, seeming to us even more of failure than of
advance, may count for more in the sphere of effort,
than an intrinsically better activity in the life of one
for whom moral progress seems natural and easy, or
comes to be so. When our Lord said, ' It shall be
more tolerable for the heathen in the day of judgment,
than for you,' He implied that future judgment shall
be rigidly according to the conditions of each life, with
all its difficulties full in view. As the struggle of the
battle-field is the key to an army's victorious march ;
the turning-point in human life, is the battle for moral

318 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

freedom. Our life does not quickly clear itself from
such analogies as military conflict supplies. As is the
contrast between allurements to evil, and attraction
towards the good ; so is the contrast between victory
in strife, and quiet achievements in the silent progress
of a life which is moving with accelerated force
towards maturity.

Within such brief compass as this, must be in
cluded our treatment of the darker side of human life.
Degeneration, as it appears in the life of man, is the
worst to be witnessed on the earth ; it is altogether
singular in its character and depth ; and it is apparent
everywhere in the world, nowhere more distressingly
than in the heart of modern civilisation. Yet, this
degeneration does not conceal, does not even obscure,
the characteristics of the rational life ; but, in a quite
vivid and striking way, supplies its own quota of
evidence for the distinction between the life of organ
ism, and the life of the moral agent.

After this discussion of degeneration, we resume
consideration of the normal activity of rational life,
as this appears in the ordinary guidance of conduct by
ethical thought. The contrast between animal life
and human becomes increasingly conspicuous as we
proceed. The search of the animal is for his food.
This is the full meaning of ' the struggle for existence,'
as illustrated in organic evolution. The work of man
only begins with hunger's craving. So it must begin,
however, for it is for man, as for the beast of the field,
a stern necessity that the demands of the physical life
be met. So pressing are these, that we are apt to
speak of them as the ' demands of Nature.' From en
counter with these, there is no escape. But the work

RATIONAL LIFE 319

of man expands, as the range of knowledge and of
intelligent interest widens. Food is not the end of
his effort. If the animal lives to eat, he eats in order
to live ; he even finds life's work in passing from his
meals. Ever as life advances, work carries within it
life's grandest interests. What is even more than this,
work becomes a law for man's life, not by the con
straint of a physical necessity, but by the higher
constraint of rational law. Industry becomes life's
distinction. To the rational agent it seems clear, ever
clearer as he works on, and reflects more patiently,
seeking companionship with wisdom in his daily
pursuits — that the law of his existence is the full use
of his powers.

' Sure, He that made us with such large discourse,

Looking before and after, gave us not

That capability and godlike reason

To fust in us unused.' 1

The duty and dignity of work are manifest. Carlyle
found ready assent for his preaching of the gospel of
work. The people had always recognised it. They
hailed his teaching, because his words had force akin
to the energy of life itself. Everywhere in human
life, it is rational law, not physical, which is pre
eminent. Let the law of justice stand for symbol
here. This is a law whose authority finds acknowledg
ment everywhere ; in rougher fashion, where primitive
conditions of social life prevail; in more formal
manner, where constitutional law reigns. This is a
law which finds homage in popular assemblies ; and
makes a single man strong against intrigue, if only
violence is restrained. This is a law which changes

1 Hamlet, Act iv. Sc. 4.

320 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

the whole aspects of life — turning to condemnation
animal struggle for existence, disregarding, or tramp
ling under foot, the strivings of those weaker and less
favoured. It is a law which breaks the line of Evolu
tion, as it marks the limits of organic action, symbol
of muscular force and animal passion, which by con
trast we call ' brute force.' This is a law which shows
the distinction of the human race, placing within every
life the title to personal rights, and constituting every
man agent in the executive of the moral government,
which predominates in the present order of things.
This is a law by application of which human rights
have been rescued from the cruel hand of oppression.
This is a law which, in the course of the centuries, has
ended autocratic dominion, has broken up the feudal
system, and has prepared the way for acknowledg
ment of the common rights of humanity, with the
common responsibilities of rulers and subjects.

It is only natural that man so placed — so working
under rational law — so guided by light of reason — so
warranted to be judge at once of himself and of other
agents placed with him under ' common law,' so ap
pointed to be a guardian of all life's highest interests,
including the interests of all the animals around
him, should above and beyond Nature, recognise the
Supernatural. These two are rationally conjoined.
There is no morality without law; no law without
government; no share in work and administration, with
out share in pains and penalties; and no fixed order
without Supreme Power, personally sustaining moral
order. It is all clear enough. The whole human race
has seen it, more or less plainly. Hence the Religions
of the world. These, however they may differ, tell us of

RATIONAL LIFE 321

the world's thought. They express it confusedly, when
knowledge is small, and intelligence travels back and
forward on narrow arid short tracks. They express
it more adequately, when thought, having cleared itself
from superstition, has reached a better and fuller
knowledge of the laws of existence, so attaining to
the possibility of ' reasoning from the common course
of Nature/ They express it more purely, when the
dominion of rational law, higher than physical, has
been more fully recognised; when the claims of
humanity are more clearly and steadily owned ; when
the sweep of moral sentiment supplies quick and
warm support for well-doing. None of these Religions
expresses the grand and noble truth otherwise than
inadequately. Human intelligence cannot outstretch
its own bounds. Yet this is a most striking testi
mony to its vast power, that it knows that the First
Cause exceeds all human representation of His essential
greatness. Spirits the clearest, the purest, the noblest
on earth, know this inadequacy of expression of re
ligious truth, whether clothed in feeble language, or
illustrated bravely in deeds of noble consecration, or
formally represented in creeds and organisations. Even
the dullest and the worst of men perceive when the
representation is worthy, and when unworthy. The
world is getting to know that all Religions at heart
are one, and are to be so regarded and treated. In
all of them, man is feeling after the resting-place of
a rational belief; seeking after the Supreme; doing
homage to the Eternal; knowing and feeling the
inadequacy of all that is known and done ; yet antici
pating a destiny exalted above all that is known. In
these investigations, we are chiefly attracted and

x

322 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

absorbed by the unity of religious thought, as a mani
festation of rational life, holding a prominent place
in universal history. But, among the religions of the
world, comparison becomes as needful in our estimate
of general history, as it has been seen to be when
dealing with the various forms of life on the earth.
The sense of this has given volume and value to the
stream of modern thought concerned with Compara
tive Religion. The historic spirit, borne on the surface
of the strong current of scientific thought, has carried
interest, philological, literary, and philosophical, back
upon the earliest phases of religious thought. To
modern thinkers Brahmanism, and Buddhism, the
teaching of Zoroaster and the doctrine of Confucius,
Mohammedanism and Christianity, have together
supplied material for research and reflection.1 To
more general observers, chiefly concerned with the
moulding and marshalling of political forces in
modern times, and with the manifest expansiveness
of rational power, it has become subject of remark
how the Crescent is waning before the Cross. A vast
mass of materials thus placed at command, has
special value for interpretation of the unfolding of
human thought. Towards exposition of this, large
service has already been rendered by competent
scholars, and much more remains to be done, within

1 The Sacred Books of the East, translated by various Oriental
scholars, edited by Max Miiller. Vedic Hymns by Max Miiller, 1891.
Legge's Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Confucianism, 1882.
The Texts of Taoism, Legge, 1891. Metrical Translations from
Sanskrit Writers, by Dr. John Muir, 1879. Chinese Buddhism, by
Dr. Edkins, 1880. Hang's Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings,
and Rdigions of the Parsls, 1878. Sir William Muir's Life of
Mahomet, and History of Islam, 4 vols. 1877,

RATIONAL LIFE 323

lines only recently opened up. The Christian nations
hold the commanding positions in the world, so that
it is impossible to regard the others as offering any
serious competition with them for ascendancy, in
moulding the world's future.

In dealing with man's place in Nature, the lines of
investigation do not include any examination of Chris
tianity as a supernatural religion, but only as a spiritual
force contributing to the advance of the race. We
contemplate it here as a historic religion, whose faith
in the Supreme, whose conceptions of life, whose
motives for action, whose views of future existence,
have wielded a mighty influence in course of the ages.
Our stand-point is essentially that occupied by the
historian, whose position is distinct from that of the
theologian. Gibbon has fitly expressed the difference
between these two points of view. ' The theologian may
indulge the pleasing task of describing religion as she
descended from heaven, arrayed in her native purity.
A more melancholy duty is imposed on the historian.
He must discover the inevitable mixture of error and
corruption, which she contracted in a long residence
on the earth, among a weak and degenerate race of
beings.'1 But Christ stands out distinct from the
Christianity which has had a place in the world ever
since His coming. The Christ of history is a unique
personality; one whose character is a singular em
bodiment of human excellence ; one whose appearance
in the world, it is impossible to explain within the
terms of evolution. Two things stand out clearly,
when His life is set in contrast with other lives : His
superiority to the age in which He lived, and the

1 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. ii. chap. xv. p. 262.

324 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

inferiority to Him of all His followers in all ages. The
Christ of history cannot be regarded as the product
of his age. His influence in the earth has not been
that belonging to worldly dominion, or to political
power ; it has been a spiritual influence, extending by
the force of ideas, and by the agency of a moral and
religious inspiration. Christ has received, at once,
the most intelligent, and the most devout homage of
men, of which history bears record. Around His name
and life have gathered the most searching, uncompro
mising, and antagonistic criticisms that have ever risen
against any leader of men. Such criticism has been
hailed by a large constituency. Even now, when
Christianity has powerful sway in society, we must
admit the truth of J. S. Mill's statement, — ' The world
would be astonished if it knew how great a propor
tion of its brightest ornaments — of those most dis
tinguished even in popular estimation for wisdom and
virtue, are complete sceptics in religion.' l The state
ment is true in both particulars, — as to the scepticism
which exists, and as to the astonishment which would
be aAvakened were it fully known. The one is the
counterpoise of the other, presenting a remarkable
antithesis in human opinion as to the value of religion.
This testimony as to prevailing unbelief comes from
an author who says of himself, — ' I am one of the very
few examples, in this country, of one who has not
thrown off religious belief, but never had it : I grew
up in a negative state with regard to it.' 2 Many
more than the sceptical have shared in sympathy
with adverse criticism of Christianity. Conflicting
sentiments beating against each other at the foot of

1 Autobiography, p. 45. 2 Ibid. p. 43.

RATIONAL LIFE 325

the Cross, bear, each in its own way, testimony for
Christ, for which no adequate explanation can be
found on natural grounds. The devotion to Christ
is reasonable, only if He possessed the excellencies
attributed to Him. If such excellencies were not His,
why has His name not passed away; why has not
criticism been abandoned as needless ?

From conflict of opinion as to the Christ of history,
we pass to results, to ask what witness Christianity
has borne for itself. A great system of belief, expressing
itself in vast organisations spread over the world, gives
large range to criticism, and, at the same time, becomes
more powerful in claiming a favourable verdict, as its
history is prolonged. The influence of Christ's teach
ing is widely felt, specially in many great centres of
modern civilisation, and from these it is radiating into
all lands. If we glance over the centuries which make
up the Christian era, testimony in its favour is seen in
endlessly varying form. It has been a powerful agent
in development of ethical and religious thought.
Take the earliest historic period, when its practical
power began to be felt throughout the Roman Empire :
' A pure and humble religion gently insinuated itself
into the minds of men, grew up in silence and
obscurity, derived neiv vigour from opposition, and
finally erected the triumphant banner of the Cross on
the ruins of the Capitol.'1 Study the chequered history
of Christianity through mediaeval times, and all
through these centuries its power can be traced in the
upheaval of popular discontent against a sacerdotalism
wanting the credentials of purity and lowliness ; and

1 Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. ii.
chap. xv. p. 265.

326 EVOLUTION AND MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

in the outbreak of enthusiasm which answered to the
appeal of Francis and of Dominic. Judged by its
place in our modern civilisation, Christianity has
this grand witness, that under its influence there have
sprung into being manifold forms of benevolence, with
which our modern age has grown familiar. Along
with this, there has appeared in our century, an
expansiveness of Christian zeal, the more striking
that it has flourished in spite of conflict of opinion as
to articles of faith, rivalry of organisations, jealousies
among official representatives of the same organisa
tion, and even an exclusiveness of spirit which has led
the adherents of one Christian Church to unchristianise
the adherents of another. If the historic testimony
for Christianity is strong, it is not that the littlenesses
and meannesses of human nature have not appeared
within it, but that the power of Christianity has
triumphed over them all. If thoroughly unprejudiced
evidence be desired, it may be found in the testimony
of John Stuart Mill, an honest and manly witness:
' Others besides Utilitarians have been of opinion that
the Christian revelation was intended, and is fitted, to
inform the hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit
which should enable them to find for themselves what
is right, and incline them to do it when found.'1 This
is the witness of one who did not wear the name of
Christian; it is testimony from the heart of a man
distinguished alike for honesty, and for a large spirit
of benevolence. Strong as this evidence is, we cannot
speak of Christianity as triumphant. The religions
of the world, as all else existing in it, encounter ' the
struggle for existence.' In the midst of this inevitable

1 Utilitarianism, p. 32.

RATIONAL LIFE 327

conflict, Christianity shows, of all the historic religions,
largest promise of success in vindicating its claim to
be the world's religion.

In this bare outline, I have sketched the religion of
Christ, and the evidence from its wide dominion. It
is the religion at once the most intellectual, and the
most clear in testimony for a pure morality. Its wide
acceptance in the world is in itself a striking witness
for man's place in Nature, proving the existence of a
faith giving large promise for the world's future, and
at the same time a faith which sustains in the human
soul an inspiring hope of greater good within the
Kingdom of Heaven.

Over against Christianity, the best that can be
placed by those who are sceptics in religion is Agnos
ticism, a witness for Ignorance. The strong testimony
in its behalf, coming from the pen of Professor Huxley,
deserves attention. He says, 'Wise men will pro
bably agree to a verdict of " not proven " in respect of
naturalistic theology, taking refuge in that Agnostic
confession, which appears to me to be the only position
for people who object to say that they know what they
are quite aware they do not know.' l We can honour
this position, in consideration of honour done to
knowledge, even in that narrow sense which makes it
depend on the instruments of observational science.
But, there is no finality in it ; it does not supply an
adequate theory of knowledge. Search for causes can
not end where eyesight finds its limits, nor even where
the inductions of observational science offer us sure
footing. Outlook far beyond this, belongs to man. He

1 Prologue to Essays on some Controverted Questions, by Thomas
H. Huxley, F.R.S.

328 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

knows much beyond what observation has disclosed.
To this, human life is constantly bearing witness. A
single illustration may suffice, as presented in man's
knowledge of ideal excellence, towards which moral life
is striving, notwithstanding that no man sees this
excellence presented in any example before him. Our
place in Nature is such, that when we consider the
whole range of organic life, and the position of human
life in the midst of it ; when we think of our conception
of Duty, and of the service this conception has rendered
in the battle for human progress, we must form,
out of these materials, a representation of Nature as
a whole. We must contemplate Nature as an orderly
system, in the midst of which organic life of every
specific type is tending towards the perfecting of
its own form ; while rational life is ever bearing
witness, more or less clearly, even in the midst of in
dividual degeneration, to an ideal of moral excellence.
It is, however, too often true, that the significance of
life's testimony can be read, only as it is written large
over the penalties following upon human folly and
wickedness.

Knowledge must be our guide ; ignorance must be
our warning, against dogmatic assertion, or security
and slumber; reasoning our increasing exercise, in
the spirit of inquiry and expectation. Agnosticism is
unreasoning and unreal, if it be anything more than
acknowledgment of the limit of our powers, whether
they be powers of observation, of induction, of rational
insight, or of ' scientific imagination.' Guided by
Science, we are in possession of a more intimate know
ledge of Nature than has ever before been at command
of men. We are in this way, specially secured against

RATIONAL LIFE 329

misinterpretation of the existing order. Guided
further still by Science, we have come to recognise
marvels all around us. In presence of these, our
ignorance, vast and insuperable, must awaken within
us reverence even for Nature itself, much more for
the God of Nature, showing His power, and manifest
ing His will, in the fixed laws of the Universe.
Kecognising that the search for causes must result in
acknowledgment of a beginning of the existing order,
we are sustained by the whole breadth of scientific
knowledge, in owning the First Cause as the Eternal,
the Self-existent, the Infinite.

If, passing from the field of pure thought to the
field of practice, we meet the tests supplied by human
activity and experience, Christianity and Agnosticism
are placed in contrast. When this is done, it is
plain enough where the advantage lies. Agnosticism
is a negation; in the realm of energy, a restraint,
except as it leads to active and influential criticism ;
having otherwise no place among the world-forces
telling in the history of human progress. Christianity
is a living power, claiming to be judged by its fruits.
It has inspired men with a lofty ideal ; it has helped
them in the struggle against sorrow and sin ; it has
inspired them with hope of immortality.

All inquiry, scientific and philosophic, must close
by admitting the limits of knowledge; by granting
that the mysteries of existence are many and great,
transcending all powers of human understanding.
With all the knowledge which the labours of science
have stored up for us ; with all the thought, analytic
and synthetic, into which philosophy has con
ducted us ; with full sense of the unique service

330 EVOLUTION AND MAN*S PLACE IN NATURE

rendered to our race by Divine Revelation, we con
tinue overawed by the vast range of unexplained
existence. This testimony to Ignorance is the last wit
ness of science ; and to this there is yielded unanim
ous assent, the more ready in utterance, the more
extended in significance, in proportion to the breadth
of knowledge possessed by a man. ' Human existence
is girt round with mystery : the narrow region of our
experience is a small island in the midst of a bound
less sea, which at once awes our feelings, and
stimulates our imagination, by its vastness and its
obscurity.' l A spirit, at once lowly and of large ex
pectation, supplies fit index of the true excellence of a
rational life. Newton, as he neared the close of his
term on the earth, gave utterance to both feelings, as
he said: 'I know not what I may appear to the
world, but to myself I seem to have been only like a
boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in,
now and then, finding a smoother pebble or a prettier
shell than ordinary, while the great ocean of truth lay
all undiscovered before me.' 2 This is the utterance
of a great thinker, of an instructor of the whole race,
who is as a child in spirit, yet presenting the model
of a lofty intellectual life.

Little more remains to be said, as we contemplate
for a moment life's close, on coming towards the gates
of death. Around this closing moment, all life's
mysteries gather in most impressive forms. Nowhere
does man more deeply feel how ignorant he is;
how uncertain as to what the future may contain.
This is a moment which must terminate our relations

1 Three Essays on Religion, by J. S. Mill, p. 102.

2 Life of Newton, by Sir David Brewster, vol. ii. p. 407.

RATIONAL LIFE 331

with Nature ; a moment when we shall take our first
glance on a destiny implied in our moral life here.
Faith and ignorance may then meet in undisturbed
companionship ; faith guiding through ignorance into
a larger knowledge.

Here, on the confines of the Unseen, taking a last
view of rational life in Nature, we are arrested by its dis
tinctive characteristics, parting it from all life besides
which the earth contains. What has been before our
eyes at earlier stages of this inquiry, is recalled now,
as bearing witness to the grandeur of human life.
We have seen life multiplied lavishly, far beyond pro
vision for its sustenance. We have seen ' the struggle
for existence,' carrying much life onwards to inevit
able destruction, while bearing stronger life forward
to higher destiny. We have seen how higher life feeds
on lower life, finding thus its own sustenance. But
in rational life, though embodied in organism, and
also subject to physical laws, in common with the
beasts of the field, we perceive a check placed on
destruction of life, by intervention of some higher and
authoritative law, saying ' Thou shalt not kill.' Some
thing still more impressive appears under application
of this law, for men of all ranks and conditions have
come to recognise that the rule here, makes human
life 'sacred.' So, betimes in human history, when
evil passion has inflicted fatal injury, death's name is
changed to 'murder;' a single act of violence has
made a man 'a criminal.' Is there not some vast
difference of nature, which stamps human life ' sacred,'
as no other life is ? One other feature still is to be
remarked, giving additional force to the impression
made on us, for we see that in the form of moral

332 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

law, we come into relation with the sovereign
authority, or command of the Ruler over all.
Strange also, as we read out the writing telling of
the government of Nature, appears the double relation
of the rational life to law physical and law ethical.
This bodily life of man is, in its relation to the forces
of Nature, exposed to all the risks which assail the
lowest organism, yet has the Ruler of all Himself
interposed to provide for it a special defence. This
witness for moral law we have in man's sense of
solemn obligation. Everywhere on earth some ac
knowledgment of this appears. Violations of this
moral law, as of all other law, there have been, and
there continue to be, else how should we have had
these names ' murder ' and ' criminal/ bearing witness
against iniquity, as they testify to the common
convictions and sentiments of men ? We cannot think
lightly of the extent of murderous violence, nor
underestimate the horror it awakens in those who have
heard details of the cruelty involved. We cannot
overlook in the world's history, the cannibalism which
has existed among barbarians; the horrors of war,
when wholesale destruction of human life has followed
on clash of arms ; the evil aspects of religious fana
ticism, when a fatalistic belief has grasped the sword as
the appointed instrument of destruction for the infidel ;
and, most hideous of all, the cases in which servants
of Christ, himself the gentlest of men, most patient
in judging, have resorted to the most horrible tortures
as a means of bringing back to the faith those charged
with heresy. All these things we read in history, not
withstanding the law which makes human life sacred.
But all through these blackened, dreary records,

RATIONAL LIFE 333

we find witness for the law itself, and testimony
accordingly for the contrast between physical and
rational life. We read this testimony in the cry for
vengeance, when violence has brought destruction into
the home : in the hatred of the tyrant whose power can
not be resisted ; in the profession, most hideous even
when honest, that the good of the soul is sought
through means of the destruction of the body ; most
clearly in our modern condemnation of all injury,
whatever the motives which have led on to deeds of
violence, save where defensive warfare has lifted a
strong hand for guard of human freedom, and for
safety against threats of destruction. Yet in viewing
wrongs such as those enumerated, chiefly the doing of
them in name of religion, and under religious sanctions,
we see reason for speaking of humanity as 'a weak
and degenerate race of beings.' Counter testimony
can, however, be raised for rational progress, when it
is marked, that within all our modern civilisation there
is formal acknowledgment of the sacredness of human
life, and enforcement of its protection, under sanctions
of the State.

When the depths of human thought and sentiment,
out of which such formal acknowledgments arise, are
sounded by us, it is found that with recognition
of personal obligation and responsibility, there exists a
belief that life's testing will be hereafter. We cannot,
indeed, interpret the common horror with which
murder is regarded, without reference to the cruel
sufferings inflicted, and the accumlated sorrows be
clouding the homes and the hearts of kindred; but
we cannot interpret our conceptions of the sacredness
of human life, without reference to belief in future

334 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

existence, and in the solemnities which must con
centrate there. Towards such conclusions as these the
great thinkers of ancient Greece reasoned. Socrates
argued that ' there is good reason to hope that death
is a good,' for either it is a sleep, and in that case
' eternity is only a single night/ or it is a pilgrimage
to another world, in which are ' the sons of God who
were righteous in their own life/ and whose judgment
will be better than that of earthly judges. l Plato
anticipated a future state, saying, when the dead
arrive in the other world, ' they have sentence passed
on them, as they have lived well and piously or not.'
'Wherefore let a man be of good cheer about his
soul, . . . who has adorned the soul in her own proper
jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and courage,
and nobility, and truth.' 2

If, from these heights on which philosophic thinkers
have delighted to tread, we pass down to the lowest
levels on which uncivilised tribes are dwelling now,
we shall see the extremes of thought possible for the
rational life in the world. On this point, a better
witness than Tylor could not be chosen, when treating
of ' Animism ' or ' belief in spiritual beings/ 3 existing
apart from organism, whether these be the ancestors
of the people, or a higher order of spirits. The
general conclusions as to the working of thought
among savage tribes, reached by Tylor, after deliberate
examination, may appear from these extracts. ' So far
as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible
evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual

1 Plato's Apology, 40, 41. Jowett's Transl.

2 Phaedo, 113 and 114. Jowett's Transl.

3 Primitive Culture, vol. i. p. 425.

RATIONAL LIFE 335

beings appears among all low races with whom we have
attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance.' l The
following is his contrast, ' when the several races of
men are looked at ethnographically/ with a view to
ascertain 'the general relations of the lower to the
higher culture, as to the belief in future existence : ' 2
' On the savage side, we find the dominant idea to be,
a continuance of the soul in a new existence, like the
present life, or idealised and exaggerated on its model ;
while on the cultured side, the doctrine of judgment
and moral retribution prevails with paramount, though
not indeed absolute, sway.' 3 With illustrations before
us of Greek thought, prior to the Christian era, and
with such testimony as that of Tylor, depending on the
widest inductions, it seems clear that belief in a future
state is a natural product of reflection, when dealing
with the facts of the present life. If then, we would
complete our view of man's place in Nature, we must
hold that Expectation is as essential to a rational life
as Memory proves to be. Such Expectation is not the
expression of Experience. While it stands related
with experience, it arises out of the conditions of
thought itself, as it bears on the Unknown.

Under the conditions of a rational life, it happens,
that to men all the world over, the gates of death are
not opened and shut on the darkness of a closing tomb.
The body does not seem the man; the link of
sympathy does not seem broken, though the eye be
glazed, and the ear be dull. Even if the body be not
buried out of sight, but placed on the funeral pile, the
expiring flame, which flickers and dies before afflicted

1 Primitive Culture, vol. i. p. 425.

2 Ibid. vol. ii. p. 100. 3 Ibid. vol. ii. p. 101.

336 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

onlookers, does not seem to end all, or to break the
bonds of affection which had grown strong in this life.

With impressive agreement, shared by those far
removed from each other, even ignorant of each other's
language, men have persisted in looking to the gates
of death as also gates of life, — entrance to the path
way leading to another world. Gazing on these dark
portals, Obligation and Responsibility have seemed as
lamps shedding radiance behind and before, on the
Known and the Unknown. If at this crisis in life's
way, there be a stirring of fear, there is also a rising of
hope. To those uttering their parting word on the
confines of the Unseen, an experience so strange is
given, that it appears to them as if they had one foot
in this world, the other in a world invisible.

If there be in the history of rational life, better
thought than this, — clearer and more inspiring, — it is
where Christian thought has sway. It is where men
believe that Jesus Christ 'has brought life and im
mortality to light through the Gospel ; ' — where with
strength of faith they advance ; with brightened eye
they see Him with victor's hand opening the gate of
life ; while their ear vibrates to the tones of a gentle
voice, uttering words long familiar, — ' I am the way,
and the truth, and the life.' This is the grander
utterance, spoken for behoof of our whole race. It is
an utterance meeting the longings of humanity, in
conscious fulfilment of which life is at once enlarged.
The words proclaim ' Continuity of Life ' in a grander
sense than appears in the annals of natural history.
They are the promise of a life, having kinship with
the immortals, and which is itself prepared for fellow
ship with the Eternal Father of the spirits of men.

RATIONAL LIFE 337

Our view of Man's Place in Nature is now com
pleted. Kesearch, extended over the wide field of
comparative biology, has accumulated a large body of
evidence demonstrating the impossibility of tracing
the origin of man's rational life to evolution from a
lower life. There are no physical forces discoverable
in Nature, sufficient to account for the appearance of
this life. The insufficiency of the evidence for its
evolution becomes increasingly obvious, as the de
mands are more exactly ascertained. Animal Intel
ligence shows no effective preparation for Kational
Intelligence. All the best examples of Intelligence
among the animals present results of human training.
These results testify to relations historically later than
those upon which a theory of Evolution can rely.
Nor can the characteristics of rational life be explained
by any possible advance in the structure of nerves
and brain. Neither continuance, nor repetition, nor
recollection of sensory impressions made upon us, can
explain the reflective exercise known in consciousness.
Throughout the preceding investigation, the object
has been to ascertain all facts bearing on the history
of life on the earth, and to seek their interpretation.
Pursuit of this object, has led us to remark the
severance of two distinct modes of inquiry, the one
including the whole range of external existence, the
other including the whole facts of personal experience.
The severance of these two is inevitable and insuper
able. External observation concerns itself with the
wide field of material existence, including all forms of
organic life; amongst these, the animal life of man
himself. It cannot include the functions of Mind.
Internal Observation deals with the complexities of

338 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

consciousness, thereby discovering the powers of a
rational life. It cannot include the functions of
organism, not even of nerves and brain. The contrast
between these modes of knowing, points to contrast
in the phases of existence known. Nature includes
both ; yet Evolution of the higher from the lower, —
the mental from the physical, — is impossible.

The significance of Evolution becomes more con
spicuous, when its natural limits are clearly recognised.
The progress of organic life is thereby seen in its
unity. Its beginnings, its development, and its con
summation, are taken together, showing the coher
ence of organic existence on the earth. Biology is a
natural history of organic life in the Avorld, from its
first appearance till now. This history began, as
Darwin suggested, in primordial forms of the lowest
order ; it closes in the marvellous elaboration of the
human organism, the most wonderful combination of
physical structure and function which Nature contains.
The natural history of organic life finds its inter
pretation in the induction as to Evolution which has
made its lasting impression on our age.

The Rational Life of Man stands out to view on an
eminence completely severed from this scheme of
organic evolution. As an animal life — a type of
physical existence — human life is fitted into the
system of organic life on the earth. As a rational
life — a type of spiritual existence — human life is
exalted above all life besides, severed from companion
ship of animals. Man is a member of an intelligent
order, possessing kinship with all rational beings,
wherever such may dwell, who together constitute a
spiritual kingdom "within creation. As the result of

RATIONAL LIFE 339

the investigations now closed, these two orders of
being, the one organic, the other spiritual, appear in
vivid contrast. The striking fact is, that man belongs
to both. He has his place in a physical system, within
which all is subject to decay and death; he has his
place in a spiritual system, within which is no trace of
death, but promise of continuity beyond the present
state, where there may well be a community of
spiritual existence. 'No fact in Nature is fraught
with deeper meaning than this two-sided fact of the
extreme physical similarity, and enormous psychical
divergence, between Man and the group of animals ' 1
nearest to him in the history of organic life. When
this contrast is steadily observed, we find logical
support for the representation of a Spiritual Kingdom,
having a perpetuity of which Nature itself offers no
promise.

Along with this ' enormous psychical divergence'
of human life from all life besides, we must include
the evidence in Natural History for gradation in the
ascent of being. This is such that the appearance
of mental life is not per saltum, but by transition,
in harmony with the analogies familiar in Nature!
Man does not look upon Nature as if it were merely a
realm of material existence, governed by mechanical
force, to which he is alien. He does not move among
the varied forms of animal life, as a stranger, or as an
adversary, but as one allied to all that breathes and
moves. He does not exercise lordship over all,
without finding near him, in close alliance with him'
higher orders of life, possessing a humbler type of mind,'
through which it is possible for him to communicate

1 Fiske's Destiny of Man, p. 29.

340 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

some share of his purpose, and to introduce the higher
animals to some share in his work. This inferior
type of Mind, recognised as belonging to the higher
animals, cannot be accounted for by evolution from
sensory apparatus, any more than rational power can
be thus explained. Mind in animal is the beginning
of a new order in the history of Nature, as certainly
as was the appearance of organic life itself, at a vastly
earlier period.

Guided by the conclusions reached in course of this
inquiry, — conclusions negative and positive, — destruc
tive and constructive, — we are enabled to form an
enlarged conception of the history of Nature as an
orderly system. Evolution has turned attention on
different phases of the origin of existence on the earth.
It helps us better to see how varied these origins have
been. We have seen that Darwin formally declares
that he has ' nothing to do ' with ' the origin of life
itself ; ' and further, that he has ' nothing to do with the
origin of the mental powers/1 We may be assured that
he had thoroughly gauged the vast range of data at
command, before he formally announced these reserva
tions as to the origins of Life and Mind. In accord
ance with these declarations, is the acknowledged in
sufficiency of a theory of Evolution to account for life
itself, whether it be organic or spiritual. Evolution
stands before us as an impressive reality in the history
of Nature. But this Evolution is only a limited cycle,
within the greater cycle of Being and its History.

Beyond this inference, evidence leads clearly to the
conclusion, in which we gather up the results of our
survey of the orderly system in the midst of which we

1 Origin of Species, p. 191.

RATIONAL LIFE 341

live. There is a Power operating continually in
Nature, which does not come within range of the
observation possible to scientific modes and appliances,
yet to which Science is ever indirectly bearing witness.
This Power has manifested itself at the most impressive
periods in the world's history, first at the appearance
of Organic Life, again on the appearance of Mind, and
again on the advent of Kational Life. At each of
these great epochs commencement is given to a
grander advance than had been possible under
earlier conditions. All Nature testifies not only to
government by fixed law, but also to the action of a
power whose dominion is expressed at once in each
single law, and in the entire system of things as con
stituted at any given period in history, and in the
appearance of new orders of existence, adding to the
complexity of the system as a whole. This power is
no Dens ex mackina. Of the Living Source of all
existence, in the midst of which we move, to which
we belong, and the science of which we rationally con
struct, there is no true conception under representa
tion of a God dwelling apart from Nature. This can
be found only in the representation of a God immanent
in Nature, — immanent, yet transcendent, — transcen
dent, yet immanent. The representation which would
place the Infinite Being 'afar off,' as if He dwelt
apart from Creation, is alien to scientific knowledge,
inconsistent with the records of natural history, at
variance even with the conditions of rational life.
In harmony with thought finding expression wherever
man appears, we recognise the Supernatural within
the Natural. We cannot, indeed, vindicate for hu
manity a general claim to clearness and consistency

342 EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

in thinking of the deeper problems of life. But
even of the common thought concerning the Super
natural, we can say with Kant, ' The track it
pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least
natural, and not only goes far to persuade the com
mon understanding, but shows itself deserving of
respect from the speculative intellect.' This is the
thought expressing itself in some form of the argu
ment from design. It is always in some measure
the logical result of man's regard to causality ; and,
perhaps even more, it is the expression of the religious
sentiment, which, to use the language of Hume in
reference to 'the moral sense,' 'Nature has made
universal in the race.' Of Nature, as interpreted by
Science, there is no key other than is found in re
cognition of an Immanent and Intelligent Cause, in
the midst of all, and concerned with all, that belongs
to the history of Being. This is the First Cause —
the Eternal Personality, — related to the spiritual life
of rational souls, as He can be related to no other
type of existence within the wide sphere of Creation.

INDEX.

Abiogenesis, denied by Darwin,
Huxley, Nageli, 3.

Activity, self-directed, 53 ; range
of, 269.

Agassiz on transposition of the
Eye in flat fishes, 78; on the honey
comb, 180.

Agnosticism, 329.

Amphimixis, 92.

Animal Intelligence, 145 ; sum
mary of Darwin's argument, 145 ;
inevitable perplexities, 148 ; de
finition of Intelligence, 149 ; re
striction to higher animals, 150 ;
distinct from sensible experience,
155 ; deduction from supposed
evidence for, 155 ; analogies of
structure do not warrant analogies
of Intelligence, 158; can be judged
of only from our own experience
in consciousness, 160 ; compara
tive activity, the true test, 162 ;
distinction between lower and
higher animals, 166 ; this has not
been rigidly held, 167 ; exclusion
of phenomena of sensibility, 169 ;
evidence from vocalisation, 174;
from social life, 175 ; phenomena
of Instinct excluded, 178 ; the
main problem, 193; evidence from
natural life, 195 ; from domes
tication, 198 ; from training, 200 ;
contrasts among the higher ani

mals, 209 ; independent action of
intelligence does not belong to
animals, 213 ; contrast between
training and education, 222 ;
' ideas ' do not belong to animals,
223 ; a type of intelligence much
below human intelligence, 230 ;
incapable of reaching general
truth, 241 ; does not account for
the origin of Human Intelligence,
254.

Antiquity of Man, 11.

Apes, their likeness to man, ; 42 ;
their distinction from man, 59.

Apparatus, Organic, 35.

Aristotle, the proper work of man,
67 ; on test of character, 291.

Association, how far it includes
mental actions, 139.

BALFOUR, F. M., the ovum a simple
cell, 75 ; the germ cell, 78.

Ball, Sir R. , on Man as a factor in
Evolution, 256.

Beale on structure of simple tissues,
33.

Bees' ' combing,' building of, 202.

Biological view of man, impossible,
282 ; Psychological representa
tion must be combined, 284.

Biology, how placed as to origin of
man, 277.

343

344

INDEX

Body and Mind, distinctiveness of,
272.

Bois-Reymond on ' world riddles,
29.

Brooks on the fertilised egg, 73.

Browning, acknowledgment of the
Unseen, 67.

Butler on the Divine administra
tion, 314.

CAIRD, Professor E., on Man's
nature, 24.

Calderwood, VV. L., on transposi
tion of eye in flat fishes, 79.

Carlyle on self-knowledge, 66.

Causality, Man's, 21.

Causality, Rational, 130.

Cause directing the operations of
Nature, 21.

Cell-life, 31 ; reproduction of, 33.

Cell, structure of, 33 ; contains
the living principle in the tissues,
34.

Characteristics of human life, 38 ;
studied by the comparative
method, 40 ; depend on rational
power, 64.

Cheshire's Bees and Beekeeping,
202.

Chick, quicker than the child, 48.

Child, the, is slower than the ani
mal in use of the senses, 48 ;
distinctive relations to parentage,
113.

Christianity, place of, among the

religions of the world, 325.
Clouston, Dr., on effects of alcohol,

310.

Consciousness, dawn of, 50 ; as
related to organic functions, 134 ;
its significance, 267.

Croll, on the cause or causes which
direct the operation of the forces
of Nature, 21.

Cunningham, J. T., on action of
light as related to deposit of
pigment-cells in flat fishes, 79.

Cyples on germ-cells, 88 ; on the
place of vital organisation in
Nature, 73; a life germ, not a
miniature, 74 ; on development,
102; Nature's plan of develop
ment, 102.

DARWIN, C., general acceptance of
his theory, 1 ; assumes life as
given, 3 ; deals mainly with
organic life, 13 ; his difficulties,
15 ; honour due to him, 17 ; on
mental faculties, 36 ; primeval
man and division of labour, 44 ;
mind and brain, 62 ; natural se
lection by slight modifications,
71 ; heredity, 96 ; mental powers,
122; difference between animals
and man, 139 ; his object in the
Descent of Man, 146 ; restricts
animal intelligence to the higher
mammalia, 150 ; the ant's brain,
157 ; reflection, 172 ; social
features in animal life, 177 ; the
higher animals have few instincts,
179 ; 'a little dose of judgment,'
181 ; phenomena of disease, 306 ;
origin of life, and of mental
powers unknown, 340.

Death, 220.

Degeneration in the history of life,
298.

Depravity, general, 300.

Destiny of man, 333.

Development of human life, 49.

INDEX

345

Discrimination, Sensible and Ra
tional, the contrast, 124.

Divisioii of cell, as a means of pro
pagation of life, 33.

Dog at least equal to the Ape, 59.

EGG, an, the beginning of all or
ganic life, 34 ; fertilised, 35.

Eimer, laws of growth, 7, 102.

Embryology, comparative, 86 ; its
testimony for continuity, 89 ; its
perplexities for Biology, 105 ; its
relation to intelligent life, 107 ;
argument from resemblance of
human embryo to that of animals,
108.

Environment, in relation to life,
70 ; modified by man, 74 ; ' ac
tion of,' 75.

Evolution, presupposes organic life,
3 ; has not been in a single line,
4 ; great lines of evidence for, 7 ;
logical tests of, 9 ; supplies a
working hypothesis, 10.

Experimental Psychology, 131 ; its
value, 133 ; the Chronograph,
133 ; the Myograph, 133.

TERRIER'S Contribution to Ex
perimental Psychology, 131 ;
localisation in the brain, 240.

Fiske, divergence of man from the
animals, 339.

Flat fishes, transposition of the
eye of, 78.

Forces of Nature, the Cause direct
ing their operations, 21.

Function, as interpreting Struc
ture, 33.

GALTON on Hereditary Genius,
117.

Garner on the speech of monkeys,
174 ; on their sympathy, 210.

Gemmules, 95.

Germ-cell, 34.

Gibbon, on the degeneracy of man,
323.

HAECKEL'S treatment of heredity,
110.

Hair of plant, movements of, 29.

Hallam, on complexity of conditions
of human life, 138.

Helmholtz, on the aim of the
natural sciences, 138.

Heredity and Evolution, 84 ; as
concerned with organic life, 86 ;
relation to embryonic life, 88 ; as
it provides for persistence of
species, 90 ; transmission of ac
quired characters, 90; Darwin's
theory, 95 ; Weismann's, 97 ;
criticism of these, 100 ; heredity
in relation to Mind, 104; simi
larity of animal and human em
bryos, 108 ; variation in mental
powers as illustrating inheritance,
109 ; can each variation be traced
to germ-plasm? 112; vital rela
tion of parents and child, 113;
perplexities as to heredity in
Rational Life, 117.

Hobbes, on names, 248.

Human life, development of, 49 ;
two sides of, 52 ; a physiological
theory of, inadequate, 141.

Hume's use of ' Idea,' 224 ; moral
sense, 314; moral government,
315.

Huxley denies spontaneous genera
tion, 3, 28 ; grants man's causality
as something apart, 21 ; on hair
of a plant, 29 ; on manufacture

346

INDEX

of protoplasm, 34 ; plea for a
materialistic terminology, 40 ;
mass and weight of man's brain
and of the ape's, 43 ; statement of
human activities in physiological
language, 68 ; similarity of em
bryo of man and dog, 75 ; on
Agnosticism, 327.

IDEAS, as they may belong to ani
mals, 140 ; as they belong to
man, 224 ; not copies of single
objects, 226.

Inheritance in human life, 114;
physical, 115; mental, 117.

Intelligence and Organism co-oper
ate, 51.

Interpretation of sensory experi
ence a function of Mind, 63 ; its
implications, 127 ; of personal
experience, 128.

Insects are distinguished for the
number and complexity of In
stincts, 179, 191.

Instinct, 178; the distinction of the
lower animals, not of the higher,
179 ; connected with action, not
with knowledge, 179 ; superiority
to knowledge in the field of
action, 180; cannot be associated
with mental characteristics, 181 ;
its manifestations, 183 ; food
supply, co-operation for, 184 ;
provision for the young, 186 :
analogies of Intelligence, inapplic
able, 188 ; consequent deductions
from testimony for evolution,
191.

on Pangenesis, 97 ; on ' soul
stuff,' 107.
James, W., simultaneous sensory

impressions yield a single object,
152 ; noticing a part, is discrimi
nation, 152 ; memory, 252.

KANT on our knowledge of the

standard of morals, 289.
Knowledge, the nutriment of the

soul, 51 ; range of, 268 ; limits

of, 320.

LANKESTER, Prof. Ray, on degene
ration, 298 ; are all men degene
rate ? 300 ; all in danger of de
generating, 301 ; rejection of the
good gift of reason, 303.

Lewes, G. H., on contrast between
sensory and rational discrimi
nation, 137.

Life, immense sacrifice of, in the
history of evolution, 5 ; depen
dent on environment, 6 ; adapts
itself to it, 6 ; its lower and higher
forms, 26 ; mechanism of, 32 ;
potency of, in relation to envir
onment, 77 ; its close, 220.

Life, Human, development of, 49 ;
superiority of, to environment,
74.

Limits of knowledge, 320.

Locke's use of 'Idea,' 224; com
pound ideas, 241 ; on a dog's
knowledge of his master, 253.

Lotze, on knowledge of the soul,
144.

Lower forms of life, 26.

Ly ell's Antiquity of Man, 11.

MAN, the most conspicuous figure
in Nature, 2 ; his place the most
complicated of problems, 10 ;
antiquity of, 11 ; his rational
life, 16 ; his agency, action from

INDEX

347

above, downwards, 20 ; an imme
diate cause, 21 ; his relation to
laws of evolution, 22 ; presup
poses Nature, 24 ; his place, the
main problem, 36 ; primeval, 43 ;
signs of his intelligence, 44 ; a
member of the one organic sys
tem, 45 ; an animal, 57 ; a pro
ducer, 71 ; his heritage among
the animals, 262 ; his rational
life, 257-336 ; his superiority to
environment, 271 ; intellectual,
moral, and religious characteris
tics, 286 ; his destiny, 333.

Mechanical theory of life, unten
able, 27.

Mechanism contrasted with Mind,
44.

Mechanism of Thought, 131.

Memory, as distinct from 'idea,'
252.

Mill, J. S., kindness to animals, 21 ;
satisfaction for man, 66 ; internal
culture, 67 ; names, 249 ; on pre
valence of scepticism, 324 ; value
of Christianity, 326 ; the mystery
of life, 330.

Mind and Brain, 62 ; and heredity,
104 ; and body, distinctiveness
of, 272.

Morgan, Lloyd, primary object of
sensible stimuli, 42.

Movement, common to all life, 41 ;
dependent on sensibility, 42.

Miinsterberg's contribution to Ex
perimental Psychology, 131.

NAGELI, holds that no life known
to us is of spontaneous genera
tion, 3.

Nature, a unit, 1 ; includes man,

and all man's devices, 8 ; intricacy

of methods, 9.
Neolithic age, 12.
Newton on the vastness of the

Universe, 330.
Nucleus of cell, structure of, 33.

OBSERVATION, External, 51 ; know
ledge of difference, 51 ; distinct
from sensibility, 125.

Observation, Internal, 128.

Organic functions, their relations to
consciousness, 134.

Organic life constructed on one
system, 45.

Organism and Intellect co-operate,
51.

Origin of Species, 35.

Over-competition in the history of
life, 6.

PAL^EOLOTHIC AGE, 12.

Pangenesis, 95.

Parthenogenesis, 91.

Personality, Our, distinct from or
ganic functions, 141.

Personal life, 53.

Philosophy, as related to Science,
17 ; its relation to Biology, 22.

Physical life, as it may be antago
nistic to rational, 55.

Physiological functions, distinct
from the activity of Mind, 39 ;
limits of, 61 ; contrast with
rational activity, 129.

Plato on the good soul, 290; the
true self, 314 ; on the future
state, 334.

Propagation by division, 34.

Protoplasm, 29 ; manufacture of,
34.

348

INDEX

Psychology, Experimental, 131.

RATIONAL discrimination as distind
from sensory discrimination, 122
136.

Rational life, 257 ; its characteris
tics, 257 ; Wallace's discussion oJ
these, 257 ; common characteris
tics here considered, 258 ; a self-
regulated life, 258 ; associated
with animal life in man, 261 ;
man's heritage among the animals,
262 ; rational government of
animal life, 263 ; consciousness,
267; range of knowledge, 268 ;
range of activity, 269 ; superiority
to environment, 271 ; distinctive-
ness of body and mind, 272 ;
sensibility and thought, discon
tinuous, 273 ; reflection and de
cision, 274 ; how biology is placed
in view of the facts, 277 ; the
last retreat of the Biologist, 279 ;
full view of human life, 281 ; a
biological representation impos
sible, 282 ; a representation which
may be accepted by Biology and
Psychology, 284 ; intellectual,
moral, and religious characteris
tics, 286 ; the ideal man, 289 ;
self-control, a necessity, 290;
degenerate man, 291 ; ' rever
sion,' 293; 'degeneration,' 298;
inheritance, 305 ; responsibility,
306 ; as it applies to inheritance,
310; normal action, 318; refer
ence to the Supernatural, 320;
Religions of the world, 321 ; place
of Christianity, 325; Agnosticism,

329 ; the limits of knowledge,

329 ; life's close, 330 ; man's

destiny, 333.

Rational power determines the
characteristics of human life, 64 ;
modifies the struggle for exist
ence, 73 ; its influence in natural
history, 73 ; causality, 130.

Reid's use of 'Idea,' 225.

Responsibility, Individual, 130 ; as
connected with heredity, 310.

Religions of the world, 321.

Romanes, loss of antennae of the
ants, consequences of, 197; sever
ance of human from animal in
telligence, 232 ; on compound
ideas, 241 ; use of ' idea,' 251.

SANDERSON, BURDON, the cell, the

unexplained unit, 32 ; on the

Scientific position, 37.
Schwann on one universal principle

of development, 31.
Science, as related to Philosophy,

17, 37.

Self-consciousness, 50.
Self-directed life, 53.
Self-knowledge, Socrates on, 66 ;

Carlyle on, 66.
Sensori-motor system, 42.
Sensory discrimination, as distinct

from rational discrimination, 122;

interpretation of, 127.
Shakespeare's representation of

man's nature, 289.
Sides of our nature, two, 52.
Socrates on self-knowledge, 66 ; on

the future state, 334.
Soul, the, in what sense known, in

what unknown, 143.
Speaking, art of, 39.
Species, origin of, 35.
Spencer, Herbert, organic variation,
not always advance, 5 ; on in
herited knowledge, 128 ; on the

INDEX

349

Absolute, 138 ; Psychology dis
tinct from Biology, 268.

Spermatozoon, 89.

Spinoza's protest against taking
man as independent of Nature, 8,

Spontaneous generation, unknown
to science, 3, 27.

Stephen, Leslie, holds that animals
form general concepts, 252.

Stone Age, 12.

Struggle for existence, a law of
advance, 6 ; its prominence in
Nature, 18 ; its limitations in
human life, 71 ; various meanings
of, 82.

Structure, as providing for func
tion, 33.

Supernatural, acknowledgment of,
320.

Survival of the fittest, 5, 73.

TERMINOLOGY, Huxley's plea for a
materialistic, 40.

Turner, Sir W. , on the Cell Theory,
31 ; reproductive cells, how in
fluenced, 77 ; on relation of germ-
cell to the fully developed organ
ism, 88 ; on heredity, 91, 95.

Tylor, belief in a future state
common, 263 ; belief in spiritual
beings, 334.

Tyndall, view of human actions,

142 ; knowledge that others are
rational, 142, 281.

UNITY of system in structure of

all organism, 45.
Unknown, the, in Nature, 77.

VARIATION, organic, not always for
advance, 5 ; artificial, in contrast
with natural, 8.

Vocalisation, as a test of Intelli
gence, 140.

WALLACE, RUSSEL, on Darwin's
success, 1 ; joint-discoverer with
Darwin, 18; on overwhelming
importance of natural selection,
21 ; marvels of animal develop
ment, 74 ; on development of
germ-cell, 87 ; summary of Dar
win's argument as to Intelligence,
145 ; evolution insufficient to
account for rational life, 147 ; on
human intelligence, 257 ; on the
higher faculties, 257.

Weismann, on fertilisation, 78 ;
transmission of structural details,
78 ; an adequate theory difficult
to attain, 79 ; on heredity, 97 ;
value of his work, 99 ; mingling
of two hereditary tendencies, 101.

Wundt, Contribution to Experi
mental Psychology, 131.

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