i i)
rIL ^.}0.
A N
EXAMINATION
O F
Dr. Re id's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Senje,
Dr. Beattie's' EJpiy on the Nature and Immutability of Truths
AND
Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Safe in Behcilf of Religion,
By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL. D. F.R.S. THE SECOND EDITION.
Aifome men have imagined innate ideas, hecaufc they had forgot hoiv they came by them ; fo others have fet up ahitoji as many diftindt inll:in6ls as there are acquired principles of aSling.
Preliminary Diflertation to Law's tranflatioa of King's Origin of Evil.
LONDON:
Printed for J.JOHNSON, N=. 72, St. Paul's Church-Yard. M.DCC.LXXV,
Ta Dr. Reid, i)?\ Beattie, and Dr. Oswald.
Gentlemen,
I Take the liberty to prefent each of you with a copy of my remarks on your writings, re- quefting that you would give them that attention which, according to your own ideas, the fubjeft de- ferves.
You cannot be juftly offended at me for treating you with the fame freedom with which you have treated others. If the pub- lic voice, which has hitherto feem- ed to incline to your fide, fhould, notwithftanding, finally determine in my favour, you will be confi- a 2 dered
iv THE DEDICATION.
dered as bold and infolent inno- vators in what, has hitherto been the received doctrine concerning human nature, and in the funda- mental principles oi truth and rea- Jon, But if your tenets be admit- ted, and my objeclions to them be deemed frivolous, I muft be con- tent to cover my head with infa- my, and fall under the indelible dilgrace of a weak or wicked op- pofer of new and important truth.
I fiiould not have written this book, Gentlemen, if I had not meant to call you forth to defend the ground which you have boldly feized and occupied. It is, there- fore, my expeftation, and my wifli, that you would all of you, either jointly or feparately, enter into an open and free difcuffion
of
THE DEDICATION, v
of the queftions which are now before the public. I promife to proceed with equal fairnejs and freedom, acknowledging, with the greatelt franknefs, any miftakes or overfiohts of which I fhall be con-
o
vinced ; and, judging by your profeiTed liberality and candour, I and the public fhall expeft the fame condu6t from you.
Sincerely wifhing you all pofTi- ble fuccefs in your laudable en- deavours to ferve the caufe of truth, virtue, and relinon, thoup-li my writings, and myfclf, fhould be the viftims at their fhrine,
lam, Gentlemen, Your moft obedient humble fervant, J. PRIESTLEY.
Qalne, Au^vjl lo. 1774.
THE
I
THE
PREFACE.
NOTHING could be more unex- pefted by me, but a very few months ago, than this publication. Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the principles of the human viind fell into my hands pre- fently after the firfl publication of it ; but being at that time intent upon my ele6lrical purfuits, and others of a fimilar nature, I did no more than look very flightly into it. Finding his notions of human nature the very -reverfe of thofe which I had learned from Mr. Locke and Dr. Hartley (in which I thought I had fuffi- cient reafon to acquiefce) I did not give my- felf the trouble to read the book through.
It appeared to me to be an ingenious
piece of fophiflry, and had it been written
a 4 for
X THE PREFACE.
to the third volume of my Infiitutes. And there would have been a fufficient propriety in it ; becaufe, if this new fcherae of an immediate appeal to com- mon J'enfe upon every important queftion in religion (and which fuperieded almoft all reafoning on the fubjecl) (hould take place, the plan of my work, with which I had taken fome pains, and which I hoped would be of fome ufe to young perfons, was abfurd from the very- beginning.
Accordingly I made fome notes upon Dr. Ofwald's treatife with this view ; but finding that I had entered upon a co- pious, amufmg, and not uninftiTiftive iubjecl, I determined to confider it more at large. I therefore contented myfelf with a few general remarks upon the fub- je8, and an extraft or two from Dr. Of- wald, in the preface to that third volume, juft to give fome idea of the nature and fpirit of the principles I meant to oppofe ; promifing to difcufs the fiibjeft more at large in a feparate work, in which I might
alfo
T H E P R E F A C E. xl
alfo take fome notice of Dr. Reid, who firft advanced the principles of which Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald had made fo much ufe. This has produced the pre- fent pubHcation, in which I have intro- duced feveral of the remarks and quo- tations contained in the above-mentioned preface ; fuppofing that, as this work is of a very different nature from that, the fame perfons might not be poffeffed of them both.
Thinking farther upon this fubjetl, it occurred to me, that the moft effeclual method to divert the attention of the more fenfible part of the pubhc from fuch an incoherent fcheme as that of Dr. Reid, and to eftabhfli the true fcience of human nature, would be to facilitate the Itudy of Dr. Hartleys Theory. I there- fore communicated my defign to the fon of that extraordinary man, who was pleafed to approve of my undertaking. Accordingly I have now in the prefs an edition of fo much of the Obfervations on Man as relate to the dodrine of aflbci-
atign
xii THE PREFACE.
ation of ideas, leaving: out the doctrine o^ vibrations, and fome other things which might difcourage many readers ; and in- troducing it with fome differtations of my own.
Alfo, to (how the great importance and extenfive ufe of this excellent theory of the mind, I thought it might be of fer- vice to give fome fpecimens of the appli- cation of Dr. Hartley's doctrine to fuch fubjecls of inquiry as it had a near relation to, and to which I had had occafion to give particular attention. And as I had, on other accounts, been frequently re- quelled to publifh the Lectures on Philo- .fophical Criticifm, which I compofed when I v^as tutor in the Belles Lettres at the academy at Warrington, this was another inducement to the publication. For it appears to me that the fubjetl; of criticifm admits of the happieft illullra- tion from Dr. Hardey's principles ; and accordmgly, in the compofition of thofe leclures, I kept them continually in view.
But
THE PREFACE.
xiu
But the moft important application of Dr. Hartley's doclrine of the affociation of ideas is to the condud of human life, and efpecially the bulinefs of education, I therefore propofe to publidi fome ob- fervations on this fubjcfcl, perhaps pretty foon ; and I (hall referve for a time of more leifure, and more advanced age. the throwing together and fyftematizing the obfervations that I am from time to time making on the general conduft of human life and hafpinefs, and on the na- tural progrefs and perfetiion of intellec- tual beings.
This v/ork, if I be able, in any tole- rable meafure, to accomplifh my defign, will contain not merely illujlrations, and the mod important applications of Hart- ley's theory, but may contribute in fome meafure to the improvement and extenfion of it. Speculations of this kind contri- bute to my own entertainment and hap- pinefs almolt every day of my life ; and were philofophers in general to attend to them, they would find in them an inex-
hauftiblc
^w T H E P R E F A C E.
hauftible fund of difqulfition, abounding Avith the moft excellent pra6lical ufes ; more efpecially infpiring the greatefl: ele- vation of thought, continually leading the mind to views beyond the narrow limits of the preient ftate, and filling it with the purefl fentiments of benevolence and de- votion.
1 am fully aware how exceedingly un- popular fome of the opinions advanced in this work will be, not with the vulgar only, but alfo with many ingenious and excellent perfons, for whom I have the higheft efteem, and who are difpofed to think favourably of my other publica- tions. But as they have not difapproved of my ufual freedom in avowing and de- fending opinions in which they concur with me ; I hope they will bear with the fame umformjreedom, and* love of truth, though it fhould lead me to adopt and aifert opinions in which they cannnot give me their concurrence.
As
THE PREFACE. xv
As to the doftrine o^neceffity, to which I now principally ^efer, it may poflibly fave fome perfons, who will think that I would not fpeak at random, not a litde trouble, if I here give it as my opinion', that unlefs they apply themfelves to the ftudy of this queftion pretty early in life, and in a regular ftudy of Pneumatology and Ethics, they will never truly under- ftand the fubjeft ; but will always be liable to be impofed upon, ftaggered, con- founded, and terrified, by the reprefen- tations of the generality of writers, who, how fpecioufly foever they declaim, in reality know no more about it than themfelves. The common Arminian do6lrine o^free xoill, in the only fenfe of the words in which mankind generally ufe them, viz. the power of doing what we pleafe, or will, is the doftrine of the fcriptures, and is what the philofophical do6trine of neceffity fuppofes; and farther than this no man does, or need to look, in the common condud of life, or of re-
lidon.
o
If
XVI THE PREFACE.
If any perfon, at a proper time of life, with his mind divefted of vulgar preju- dices, polfefled of the neceffary prepara^ tory knowledge, and likewile of fome degree of fortitude, which is certainly requifite for the Ready contem.plation of great and intereiling fubie6ls, fiiould chufe to inquire ferioufly into this bufmefs, I would recommend to him, beiides the Jtudv (for the peru/al is faying and doing nothing at all) of Dr. Hartley's Obferva- tions on man, Mr. Jonatho.n Edwards's treatife on free vnll. This writer difculfes the fubjeft with great clearnefs and judg- menr, obviating every Ihadow of objec- tion to it, and, in my opinion, his work is unanfwerable. But the concurrence of the philofophical do6lrine of necejfity with the gloomy notions of Calvin ap- pears to me to be a flrange kind of phe- nomenon ; and I cannot help thinking that had this ingenious writer lived a litle longer, and refle61ed upon the natural connexion and tendency of his fentiments, as explained in his treatife, he could not
but
THE PREFACE. xvii
but have feen things in a very different light, and have been fenhble that his phi- lofophy was much more nearly allied to Socinianifm than to Calvinifm.
In reality, I can hardly help thinking it to have been a piece of artifice in Mr. Edwards to reprefent the do6lrine of phi- lofophical neceffity as being the fame thing with Calvinifm, and the do61rine of philofophical liberty as the fame thing with Arminianifm. Both Arminians. and Calvinifts had certainly the very fame opinion concerning the freedom of the human will in general, though they dif- fered in their notions of it where religion was concerned. In fa6t, the modern queftion of liberty and neceffity is what thofe divines never underftood, or indeed had fo much as heard of. The Armi- nians maintained, in general, that it de- pends upon men themfelves whether they will be faved or not, and the Calvinifts maintained the contrary opinion, af- ferting that it depends wholly upon an arbitrary decree of God. At leaft, this
b was
xviii THE PREFACE.
was the cafe till, in the courfe of the contro- verfy, they were led to refine upon the fubjeft, and at length Mr. Edwards hit upon the true philofophical do6lrine of necejfdy, which I fcruple not to affert, that no other Calvinid ever did before.
Zealous Calvinifts, who regard my writings with abhorrence, will be fur- prized to hear me fo full and earned in my recommendation of a book which they themfelves boaft of, as the flrongeft bulwark of their own gloomy faith. And they mufh continue to wonder, as it would be to no purpofe for me to explain to them why they ought not to ^v'onder at the matter. What I fliould fay on that fubje6l would not be intelligible to them.
Thofe who are not fond of much clofe thinking, which is neceffarily the cafe with the generality of readers, and fome writers, will not thank me for en- deavouring to introduce into more public notice fuch a theoiy of the human mind
as
T H E P R E F A C E. xix
as that of Dr. Hartley. His is not a book that a man can read over in a few evenings, fo as to be ready to give a fatif- faftory account of it to any of his friends who may happen to afk him what there is in it, and expe6l an anfwer in a few fentences. In fa6t, it contains a new and moft Gxtenrive Jcience, and requires a vaft fund of preparatory knowledge to enter upon the (ludy of it with any profped of fuccefs.
But, in return, I will promife any per- fon who fhall apply to this work, with proper furniture, that the ftudy of it will abundantly reward his labour. It will be like entering upon a new world, afford inexhauftible matter for curious and ufe- ful fpeculation, and be of unfpeakable advantage in almoft every purfuit, and even in things to which it feems, at firfl: fight, to bear no fort of relation. For my own part, I can almoft fay, that I think myfelf more indebted to this one treatife, than to all the books I ever read befide ; thefcriptures excepted.
b2 On
XX THE PREFACE.
On the other hand, fuch a theory of the human mind as that of Dr. Reid, adopted by Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald (if that can be called a theory which in fa6l explains nothing) does not, indeed, re- quire much ftudy ; but when you have given all pofiible attention to it, you find yourfelf no w^ifer than before. Dr. Reid meets with a particular fentiment, or per- fuafion, and not being able to explain the origin of it, without more ado he afcribes it to a particular original inJiinEly provided for that very purpofe. He finds another difficulty, which he alfo folves in the fame concife and eafy manner. And thus he goes on accounting for every thing, by telling you, not only that he cannot explain it himfelf, but that it will be in vain for you, or any other perfon, to endeavour to inveftigate it farther than he has done. Thus avowed ignorance is to pafs for real knowledge^ and, as with the old Sceptics, that man is to be reckoned the greateft philofopher who aflferts that he knows nothing himfelf, and can per- fuade others that they know no more
than
THE PREFACE. xxi
than he docs. There is tliis difference between the ancient and thefe modern fcepticSj that the ancients profelFed nei- ther to inid-erftand nor believe any thing, whereas thefe moderns believe every thing, though they profels to underiland nothmg. And the former, I think, are the more confident of tlie two.
Thofe of my readers who have not been much converfant with metaphyfical writers, and are not acquainted widi the artful manner in which fome of them draw coniequences from their docirines, in order to inhance the value of their {peculations, cannot poflibly be a.v/are how much, in the opinion of thofe wliofe fentiments I am oppofing, depends upon the controverfy in which I am now en- gaged. I (hall, thcrei'ore, m order to excite his attention to the fubjecl (befi des w^hat I have obferved of this nature in the body of the work) quote a few paP fages from Dr. Reid's Dedication, which (liow what important fervice he imagined he was doing to mankind by his perfor- mance ; and his dilciples Dr. Beti.t.iie and b 3 Dr.
xxii THE PREFACE.
Dr. Ofwald are not behind their mafler in the ideas they entertain of the value of their refpeclive writings.
He begins with obferving, p. 3, that, though the fubjedl of it had been canvafTed by men of very great penetration and genius fuch as Defcartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkley, and Hume ; yet he has given a view of the human underftanding fo very different from them, as to be apprehen- five of being condemned by many for his temerity and vanity, p. 4.
A whole fyftem of fcepticifm, he fays, p, 5, has been fairly built upon the prin- ciples of Mr. Locke. Then he obferves, p. 6, that if all belief be laid afide, pi- ety, patriotifm, friendfhip, parental af- fetlion, and private virtue appear as ri^ diculous as knight errantry. Upon the hypothcfis that he combats, he fays, p. 8, the whole univerfe about him, body and fpirit, fun, moon, flars and earth, friends and relations, all things without excep- tion, vanilh at once, and, like the hafelefs
Jabrick
THE PREFACE. xxiii
fahrick of a vifion, leave not a track he- hind. He therefore informs his patron, that he thought it unreafonable, upon the authority of philofophers, to admit an hypothefis, which, in his opinion, over- turned all philofophy, all religion, and virtue, and common fenfe. And finding that all the fyftems concerning the human underflanding that he was aC" quainted with were built upon this hypo- thefis, he was refolved to inquire into the fubjeft anew, without regard to any hy- pothefis ; and the leifure of an academical life, p. lo, difengaged from the purfuits of intereil and ambition, the duty of his profeffion, which obliged him to give pre- lections on thefe fubjetts to youth, and an early inclination to fpeculations of this kind, enabled him, he flatters himfelf, to give a more minute attention to the fubjetl of this inquiry, than had been given before.
He concludes with hinting to his
patron, p. ii, who, with many others,
had approved of his fentiments, that in it
b 4 he
xxiv T H E P R E F A C E.
he has juriified the common fenfe and reafon of mankind, againft the fceptical fubtikies which, in this age, have endea- voured to put them out of countenance, and to throw new Hght upon one of the nobleft parts of the divine workmanfhip ; and therefore that his Lordfliip's refpeft for the arts and fciences, and his attention to the improvement of them, as well as to every thing elfe that contributes to the fehcity of his country, leaves him no room to doubt of his favourable ac- ceptance of his Eflay.
According to this view of the fubje6l, the intereft and happinefs of mankind are nearly concerned in this bufmefs ; and therefore it behoves me to proceed with the greateft caution. If I deprive the world of the benefit of Dr. Reid's im- portant fervices, I do them an irreparable injury ; but, on the other hand, if I un- deceive them with refpetl to "he confi- dence they have been induced to put in one, who, notv/ithfiandinghis profeffions, in which I doubt not he is very fincere,
cannot
THE PREFACE.
XXV
cannot in reality be of any ufe to them, I (hall be intitled to fome portion of their gratitude, though I fhould confer upon them no pofitive benefit.
I have a flight apology to make to thofe perfons who have not read the writings on which I have animadverted, for the freedom with which I have fometimes treated them. Thofe who have read them, and have obferved the airs of felf- futhciency, arrogance, and contempt of all others who have treated, or touched upon, thefe flibjecls before them, and the frightful confequences which they perpe- tually afcribe to the opinions they con- trovert (and which are generally my own favourite opinions) will think me to have been very temperate in the ufe that I have made of fuch a mode of writing, as tends to render metaphyfical fpeculation not quite tedious, infipid, and difgufling. At mod I have treated them as thev have treated others, far fuperior to themfelves.
As
xxvi THE PREFACE.
As to Dr. Ofwald, whom I have treated with the leaft ceremony, the difguft his writings gave me was fo great, that I could not poflibly fhewhim more refpeQ. Indeed I think him in general not intitled to a grave anfwer ; and accordingly have for the moft part contented myfelf with exhibiting his fentiments, without replying to them at all. This will probably con- firm him in the opinion ^s^hich he has al- ready expreffed, viz. \\\2X he fees I have notjtudied the fubjecl of this controverjy.
As my remarks on thefe three writers are necefTarily mifcellaneous, I thought it would not be improper to prefix to -them a preliminary ef'ay, on the nature of judgment and reafoning, with a general view of the progrefs of the intellect, efpe- cially with refpetl to our knowledge of the external world. By this means I hope my reader will enter upon the particular remarks with the advantage of a pretty good general knowledge of the fubjed ; but for a more particular knov/ledge of it, I muft refer him to the edition of Hardey
above-
THE PREFACE. xxvii
above-mentioned, and the difTertations that I propofe to prefix to it.
Some may wonder that I fhould be fo fevere on thefe three chriftian writers, and take no notice of Mr. Hume, whofe fo- phiftry, being deemed by them to be unanfwerable on the common principles, compelled them to have recourfe to thefe new ones. And others may even think it wrong that, being a chriftian myfelf, I fhould not join the triumph of my friends, though the vi6tory was not gained with my weapons.
To the former I anfwer, that, in my opinion, Mr. Hume has been very ably anfwered, again and again, upon more folid principles than thofe of this new common fenfe ; and I beg leave to refer them to the two firft volumes of my Injiitutes above mentioned, and efpecially the fecond, which relates to the evidences of chriftianity. Befides, though I have not, in this treatife, anfwered Mr. Hume diredly, I have done it, in fome meafure,
indiredly
xxviii THE PREFACE.
indireEily, when I Qiow that there %vas no occafion to have recourfe to this new mode of defending rehgion, the old being abundantly fufficient.
To the latter I would reply, that I re- Ipett chrilliamty chiefly as it is the caufe of truth, and that the true interell of chriRianity is promoted no lefs by throw- ing dov/n weak and rotten fupports, than by fupplying it with firm and good ones.
After I had announced my intention to animadvert upon Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald, i was told of an anony- mous pamphlet, written to fhow that Dr. Beattie's EiTay on Truth is/ophiftical and fromotive of fcepticifm and infidelity. Though I do not approve of what feems to have been the defign of this writer, i think his remarks are, in the main, ju.fl with refpetl to Dr. Beattie. My obferva- tions are frequently the fame with his.
It is neceffar)' for the fake of verifying my quotations to obferve that I Iiave
made
THE PREFACE.
XXIX
made ufe of Dr, ReitTs Inquiry, third edition, London, 17%; Dr. Beatties EJfay, fifth edition, London, 1774; and Dr. Ofwald!s Appeal, vol. i, fecond edi- tion, London, 1768 ; vol. 2, the firfl edi- tion, Edinburgh, 1772; Dr. Prices Re- viezo, fecond edition, London, 1769; Harris's Hermes, London, 1751.
When no particular volume of Dr. Ofwald is exprelTed, the firll is always intended.
THE
THE
CONTENTS.
Remarks on Dr, ReidV Theory >
TPage HE Introduction • i
SECTION I.
A Table of Dr. Reid'^ inJlinElive ^principles g
SECTION II.
A view of the fever al fallacies by tohich Dr, Reid has been mifed in his inquiry 2^
SECTION III.
Of Dr. Reid'^ objedion to the do&rine of ideas from their want of refem- blance to their corref ponding objeSis 28
SEC-
THE CONTENTS. xxxi SECTION IV.
Page
Of Br. Reid'j objeElion to Mr. Locked divijion of ideas into thofe of fen- fation and refleElion 37
SECTION V.
Dr. Reid'i poftion that fey fation im- plies the belief of the pre/ent ex- iftejice of external ohjeEls, and his view of Berkleys theory particu- larly confidered < 41
SECTION VI.
Mr. Locke'j doElrine not fo favour- able to Berkley i theory as Dr, Reid'i 56
SECTION VII.
A fophifm of Mr. Hume i in piirfu- ance o/Berkley'i theory adopted by Dr. Reid 62
SECTION VIIL
Cafes of the affociation of ideas u^hick had efcapcd the attejition of Dr. Reid — ™ 56
SEC^
xxxii THE CONTENTS. SECTION IX.
Page
Concejfwns of Dr. Reid and, other cir- cuni/iances, which might have led him to have recourfe to the affoci- ation of ideas rather than to his inllin61ive principles 74
SECTION X.
Of Dr. Reid'j principle ^credulity, and his idea of the principles of in- du6lion and analogy 82
SECTION XI.
Of the natural figns of the paffions ^g
SECTION XII.
Of the judgment -we form concerning the feat of pain 92
SECTION XIII. Mfcellaneous obfervations. 96
Remarks on Dr. Beattiei EJfay.
The introduBion ' ..^— 115
SEC-
THE CONTENTS. xxxiii SECTION I.
Page
Of Dr. Beattie'j- account of the foun- dation of truth 119
SECTION II.
Ofthetefimonyofthefhfes 139
SECTION III.
Dr, Beattie'j view ^Berkley'^ theory 146
SECTION IV.
Dr. Beattie J account of the four ce of moral obligation, and of the funda- mental principles of religion — 157
SECTION V.
Dr, Beattie J view of the do6lrine of neceflity, i65
SECTION VI.
The conclufion 187
Remarks on Dr. Ofwald j Appeal.
The Introduction 197
c SEC-
xxxiv THE CONTEXTS. S E C T I O N I.
Page
0/"i'A^ HiRory of Common Senfc 205
SECTION IL
Of the nature, limits, and general ufe of the principle of Common fenfe 213
SECTION III.
Of the fufficiency and univerfality of the principle of Common fenfe — 225
SECTION IV.
Of the natural imperfe6lions and ne- ceffary culture of Common fenfe — 232
SECTION V.
Of the extenfve application of the prin- ciple of Common fenfe to morals and religion 243
SECTION \T.
Of the incroachments of Common fenfe on the province of Reafon — 262
SEC-
THE CONTENTS. xxxv SECTION Vll.
Page
Of Dr. Ofwald'j refutation of the ar- gument in proof of the being of a God. 285
SECTION VIII.
Of the application of Common f en fe to various difquifitions in Morals and. Theology 297
The Appendix,
NUMBER I.
Of the refemhlance between the do5irine of Common fenfe, and the prin- ciples of Dr. Price'j Review of the . quefioiis and difficulties in morals 319
NUMBER II.
Of Mr. Harris'i hypothecs concern- ing Mind and Ideas 334
NUMBER III.
The correfpondence of the author with Dr. Ofwald and Dr. Beattie, re- lating to this controverfy 346
c 2 Intro-
Introduclory Ohfervations on the nature of judgment andrcdSoning, with a general view of the progrefs of the intelleft, xcith refped to the principal fiib] eels of this trcatife,
HEN our minds are firfl expofed to the influence of external ob- jefts, all their parts and proper- ties, and even accidental variable adjuntis, are prefented to our view at the fame time ; fo that the whole makes but one impref- fion upon our organs of fenfe, and con- fequently upon the mind. By this means all the parts of the fimultaneous impref- iion are fo intimately aflbciated together, that the idea of any one of them introduces the idea of all the reft. But as the necef- fary parts and properties will occur more often than the variable adjunfts, the ideas of thefe will not be fo perfeftly aflbciated with the reft ; and thus we fiiall be able to diftinguifli between thofe parts or pro- c 3 perties
xxxviii INTRODUCTORY
perties that have been found feparate, and thofe that have never been obferved afunder.
The idea of any thing, and of its ne- ceffary infeparable properties, as thofe of milk and whitenefs, gold and yellow, always occurring together, is the foun- dation of, and fuppKes the materials for propojiiions, in which they are affirmed of one another, andare/^zz^to be infeparable ; or, to ufe the terms of logic, in which one is made xh^ Jiihjcct and the other the preS.icate of a propofition ; and nothing is requifite but toords to denote the names of things and properties, and any arbi- trary fign for a copula, and the propofition is complete ; as, milk is zchite, gold is yellozo, or, viilk has xvliitenefs, gold has ydloxcnefs. This clafs of truth contains thofe in which there is an univerfal, and therefore a fuppofedneceiTary connetlion' between the fubjeft and the predicate. '
Another clafs of truths contains thdfe' in which the fubjeft and predicate appear,
upon
OBSERVATIONS. xxxix
upon comparifon, to be, in reality, no- thinsT more than different names for the fame thing. To this clafs 'belong all equations^ or proportions relating to number and quantity, that is, all that admit of mathematical demonftration, as, tmice two is Jour, and the three angles of a right lined triangle o.re equal to two right angles. For when the terms of thefe propofitions are duly coniidered, it is found that they do not really differ, but exprefs the very fame quantity. This is, in its own nature, a convi6l;ioa or perfua- fion of the fulled kind.
Thefe two kinds of proportions, being very different in their natures, require very different kinds oi proof ,
The evidence, that any two things or properties are neceffarily united is the conftant obfervation of their union, ft having always been obferved, for in- ftance, that the milk of animals is white, the idea of lohite becomes a neceffary part, or attendant of the idea of milk, c 4 In
xl INTRODUCTORY
In other words, we call it an ejfential property of milk. This, however, only refpecls the miik of thofe animals w'lxh which we are acquainted. But fmce the milk of all the animals with which we are acquainted, or of which we have heard, is white, we can have no reafon tofufpeft that the milk of any new and ftrange ani- mal is of any other colour. Alfo, fince wherever there has been the fpecihc gravity, duftiiity, and other properties of gold, the colour has always been yellow, we conclude that thofe circumitances are necefiarily united, though by fome un- known bond of union, and that they will always go together.
The proper j?^?-^^, therefore, of univer- fal propohtions, fuch as the above, that milk is white, that gold is yellow, or that a certain degree of cold will freeze water, confifts in what is called an induction of particular fads, oi precifely the fame na- ture. Having found, by much and va- rious experience, that the fame events ne- ver fail to take place in the fame circum-
flances.
OBSERVATIONS. xli
fiances, the expedatioii of the fame con- fequences from the fame previous circum- flances is neceffarily generated in oar minds, and we can have no more fufpi- cion of a different event, than we can feparate the idea o^ w/iitene/s irom that of the other properties o^milk.
Thus when the previous circumllances are precifely the fame, we call the procefs of proof by the name oiinduElion. But if they be notprecifely the fame, but only bear a confiderable refemblance to the circum- flances from which any particular appear- ance has been foundtorefult, we call the ar- gument analogy; and it is flronger in pro- portion to the degree of refemblance in the previous circum fiances. Thus if we have found the milk of all the animals with which we are acquainted to be nourilhing, though the natures of thofe animals be confiderably different, we think it proba- ble that the milk of any flrange animal will be nourifhing. If, therefore, the evi- dence of a propohtion of this kind be weak, qx doubtful, it can be ilrengthened
only
xlii INTRODUCTORY
only by finding more fads of the fame, or of a fimiiar nature.
If the truth of a propofition of the other clafs be not feif evident, that is, if the fubjeft and predicate do not appear, at firft fight, to be different names for the fame thing, another terra muft be found that fliali be fynonyraous to them both. Thus, to prove that the three internal an- gles of a right lined triangle are equal to two right angles, I produce tlie bafe of the triangle ; and having, by this means, made it evident that all the internal an- gles are equal to three angles formed by lines drawn from the lame point in a right line, which I know to be equal to two right angles, the demondration is com- plete.
This procefs exaQly correfponds to the method of learning and teaching the fig- nincation of words in an unknown lan- guage, by means of one that is known. I may not know, for inftance, what is meant by the Latin word domus ; but if
I be
OBSERVATIONS. xliii
I be informed that it has the fame mean- ing with maifon in French, with which I am well acquainted, it imm-ediately occurs to me, that it muft have the fame fignifi- cation as hoiife in Englilli. And as the idea of a hoiifc was perfe6lly aflbciated with the word maifon, I no fooner put the word domus in its place, than the idea that was at firH; annexed to the word mai- Jon becomes connefted with the word do- mus. For fome time, however, the word domus will not excite the idea of a houfe without the help of the v/ord maifon; but by degrees it gets united to the idea im- mediately, fo that afterwards they will be as infeparable as the fame idea and the word maifon were before.
In like manner, \7hen fyllogifiis become familiar, the fubjeft and predicate of the propofition to be proved unite, and coalefce immediately without the help of the middle term ; in which cafe the conclufion is as inftantaneous as a (imple judgment. In this manner it is that authority, as that of a parent, or of God,
pro-
xliv INTRODUCTORY
produces inftant conviclion. We firft put confidence in them, and then the moment that any thing is known to have their fan6lion, it engages our affent and acquiefcence.
I may fee no natural connexion, for inllance, between this life and another, butfirmiy believing that the declarations of Jefus Chrill have the fan6tion of diviiae authority, wliich I know cannot deceive me ; the moment I find that he has aflferted that there will be a refurrection of the dead to a future life, it becomes an article of my faith ; and not the leaft perceivable fpace of time is loft in forming the two lyilogifmsjby which I conclude.firft, that what Chrift fays is true, becaufe he fpeaks by commiffion from God; and iecondly, that the dotlrine of the re- furreclion is true, becaufe he has af- ferted it»
In fa6l, hoih prop qfitions 2iwA fyllogifms are things of art and not of nature. The ideas belonging to the two terms
of
OBSERVATIONS. xh
of milk and whitenefs, out of which is formed the propofition, milk is whie, were originally imprefied, as was obferved before, at the fame time, and only formed a (ingle complex idea. So alfo the mo- ment that any two terms coalefce, as lac in Latin, and milk in Englilh, the ideas annexed to the word milk and that of tohitenefs among the reft, are immediately transferred to the word lac, without any- formal fyllogifm.
The word truth, and the idea annexed to it, is alfo the child of art, and not of nature, as v/ell as the ideas annexed to the words fir op qfition 3.nd Jyllogi/m. Ideas coalefce in our minds by the principle of affociation, thefe affociations extend them- felves, and ideas belonging to one word are transferred to another, without our giving any attention to thefe mental ope- rations or affections. But when thefe procefles have taken place in our minds many times, we are capable of obferving them, as well as the ideas which are the fubjecl of them ; and we give names to
thefe
klvi INTRODUCTORY
thefe mental procefTes juftas we do to the afFe6tions of things without ouiTelves.
Thus the perfe6l coincidence of the ideas belonging to different terms, as twice two andifour, and Hkewife the univerfal and neceffary concurrence of two ideas, as thofe of viilk and whitenefs, having been obferved, we make ufe of fome term, truth, for inftance, to exprefs either of thofe circumftances ; for bemg very much ahke, it has not been found necef- fary to diftinguifh them by different ap- pellations.
Since propofitions and reafoning are mental operations, and, in fa8;, nothing more than cafes of the a/fociation of ideas, every thing neceffary to the pro- cefles may take place in the mind of a child, of an ideot, or of a brute animal, and produce the proper affe6lions and aclions, in proportion to the extent of their intelleftual powers. The knowledge of thefe operations, Vv^hich is gained by the attention we give to them, is a thing of a
very
OBSERVATIONS. xlvii
very different nature, jufl as different as the knowledge of the nature of vilion is different from vifion itfelf. The philo- fopher only is acquainted with the llruc- ture of the eye, and the theory of vifion, but the clown fees as well as he does, and makes as good ufe of his eyes.
Suppofe a dog to have been puflied into a fire and feverely burned. Upon this the idea o^Jire and the idea that has been left by the painful fenfationof Z'm?'?^- ing; become intimately alfociated tosrether: fo that the idea of being pulhed into the fire, and the idea of the pain that was the confequence of it are ever after infepa- rable. He cannot tell you in words, that fire has a poioer of burniyig, becaufe he has not the faculty of fpeech ; or, though he might have figns to exprefsj^?*^ and burning, he might not have got fo abftraci: an idea as that of power ; but notwith- ftanding this , the two ideas o^fire and of burning are as intimately united in his mind, as they can be in the mind of a philofopher, who has reflecled upon his
mental
xlvlii INTRODUCTORY^
mental afre61ions, and is able to defcribe that union, or aflbciation of ideas, in pro- per terms.
If you endeavour to pufn the dog into the fire, he will inftantly fpring from it, before he has felt any thing of the heat ; which as clearly fhows his apprehenfion of dano-er from a fituation in which he fuffered before, as if he could have ex- plained the foundation of his fear in the form of regular fyllogifms and conclu- fions. No philofopher, who can analize the operations of his mind, and difcourfe concerning them, could reafon more juftly, more effeftually, or more expe- ditioufly, than he does.
Words are of great ufe in the bufmefs of thinking, but are not neceffary to it. In like manner though the knowledge of logic is not without its ufe, it is by no means neceffary for the purpofe of reafoning. And as the doftrine oi fyl- logijms was deduced from obfervations on reafoning, juft as other theories are
deduced
OBSERVATIONS. xlix
deduced from fafts previoufly known; fo the do6lrine of propojitions and judg- ment was deduced from obfervations on the coincidence of ideas, which took place antecedent to any knowledge of tliat kind.
There is hardly any thing to which we give the name of opinion, or belief, that does not require fome degree of abftrac- tion, and knowledge of what palTes with- in the mind. And the common a6lions of life, which may be analized into opi- nions and reafoning, and which difcover what we call fagacity in a very high de- gree, may be performed without any fuch thing, that is, without any explicit know- ledge of fuch mental affe£lions and ope- rations. Let us, for an example of this, take the belief of an external world. This is thought to be univerfal ; and yet it ap- pears to me to be very polfible, not only that the lower animals, but even that children may not have reflefted fo much as that, properly fpeaking, they can be faid to have formed any fuch opinion.
d When
I I N TR 6 D U CT O R Y
When fenfation firft takes place, tlie'^ child has no notices of any thing but by means of certain impreffions, generally called Jenfations, which objefts excite in his mind, by means of the organs of fenfe, and their correfponding nerves. Suppofmg the fenfes to be perfe6l, and expofed to tlie influence of external ob- je^ls, the child is immediately fenfibldT" of thefe imprefTions ; feme of which give, him pleafure, others pain, and others- fenfations between both. At the fame, time. the mufcular fyftem is peculiarly irritable, fo that thofe mufcles which ^fe afterwards mod perfedly fubje6l to the voluntary power are almoft continu- ally in aftion, but in a random and auto- matic manner, as long as the child is awake and in health.
Let u^ mp'pofe now that His own hand palles frequently before his eye. The imprefTion of it will be conveyed: to th^ ^nind ; and when, by any kind of mecha- hifm (vibrations, or any thing elfe) tliat imprelTion is revived, he will get ^ - •- fixed
OBSERVATIONS. li
fixed idea of his hand. Let now any painful impreffion be made upon his hand, as by the flame of a candle. The violeiice that is thereby done to his nerves will throw the whole nervous and mufcu- lar fyflem into agitation, and will more efpecially occafion the contra6lion of thofe mufcles which are neceflary to with- draw his hand from the obje6l that gave him pain, as Dr, Hartley has (hewn by curious anatomical difquifitions in a va- riety of inftances. Admitting then the principle of the affociation of ideas; after a fufficient number of thefe joint impref- fions, the aftion of drawing back his hand will mechanically follow the idea of the near approach of the candle.
In a manner equally mechanical, de-f fcribed at length by Dr. Hartley, the mo- tions of reaching and gra/ping at things that give children pleafure are acquired By them. And in time, by the fame pro- cefs, the ideas of things that give us plea- fure or pain become affociated with a va- riety of other motions, befides the mere d 2 withdrawing
Hi INTRODUCTORY
withdrawing of the hand and thmftingit forward, &c. and thefe alfo, as well as many circumftances attending thofe ftates of mind get their own feparate aiTociations ; fo that, at length, a great variety of methods of purfuing pleafure and avoiding pain is acquired by us.
When the different impreflions nearly balance one another, the ideas, or mo- tions in the brain, interfering with and checking one another, fome fenfible (pace of time intervenes before the final determination to purfue any particular object, or to ufe any particular method of gaining the objeft takes place. To this flate of mind, when we obferve it, we give the name of deliberation^ and to the de- termination itfelf, that of will. But flill that motion, or connefted train of mo- tions, will take place which is the moft intimately connefted with, and dependent upon the ftate of mind, or impreflions, immediately previous to it.
It
OBSERVATIONS. liii
It will readily be concluded from this, that the more extenfive are the intelleclual powers, that is, the greater is the iiuraber of ideas, and confequently their afifocia- ations, the oftener will this cafe of delibe- ration, OY fiifpence, occur. Brutes are hardly ever at a lofs what to do, and children feldom ; fo that to explain their aftions we have hardly any occafion for the ufe ofthe terms deliberation, volition, or will; the ideas of every pleafurable and painful objeft being immediately followed by one particular definite aclion, proper to fecure the one and avoid the other ; the tendencies to other anions having never interfered to check and re- tard it. Now it can only be during this ftate of deliberation, and fufpence, that we have any opportunity of perceiving, and attending to what pafles within our own minds ; fo that a confiderable com- pafs of intelletl, a large ftock of ideas, and much experience, are neceffary to this reflection, and the knowledge that is gained by it.
d Q We
liv I N T R ODUCTORY
We fee, then, that a child, or brute animal, is in pofTeffion of a power of pur- fuing pleafure and avoiding pain, and, in like manner, a power of purfuing other intermediate and different objetls, in con- fequence of impreflions made upon their minds by things external to them, without their having given any attention to the affe6lions or operations of their minds ; and indeed, confequently, without having fiich an idea as that of mind at all, or hardly o^felf. Some brute animals may poffibly never advance farther than this ; excepting that, their pleafurable and pain- ■ ful imprefTions being affociated with a va- riety of particular perfons and circum- flances, they will neceffarily acquire the rudiments of all th^pojfi^ns, as of joy and forrow, love and hatred, gratitude and refentment, hope and fear, &c. each of which may be as intenfe, though lefs com- plex than they are found in the human fpecies. Indeed they will be more fen- fiblc, and quick in their operations and effefts, from the Vv^ant of that variety -cf alTociaiions Vvliich take place in our mLids,
and
OB S E R V A T I O N S. Iv
^and .which check and overrule one ano- ther.
It is evident, however, that if time and opportunity be given for the purpofe, ^which, for the reafon afligned above, can only be obtained where there is a confiderable compafs of intelleft, and much exercife of it) the affections of our ideas are as capable of being the fubjeQs of obfervation as the ideas themfelves, juft as the attractions, repulfions and va- rious affe6lions of external bodies may be obferved as well as the bodies themfelves. ^ And it is polTible that, at length, no af- feftion or modification of ideas (hall take place, without leaving what we may call ani^^<2 of every part of the procefs. And as we give names to other things which are diftinguifhed by certain properties, fo •we, give the name of mind., fcntient prin- ciple or ijitellecl, to that v/ithin our- felves in which thefe ideas exiilj and tliefe operations are performed.
d 4 At
Ivi IN T R O D U C T O R Y
At firft a child can have no notion of any difference between external objeds themfelves, and the immediate objefts of his contemplation. He has no knowledge, for inftance, of impreffions being made by vifible things on his eye, and ftill lefs has he any knowledge of the nerves or brain. But having given fufficient atten- tion to the phenomena of vifion, and of the other fenfes, he is convinced, firft, that the eye, the ear, or fome other fenfe is neceffary to convey to him the know- ledge of external objefts ; and that with- out thefe organs of fenfe, he would have been for ever infenfible of all that pafled without himfelf.
By attending to thefe obfervations he is likewife convinced, that the immediate objefts of his attention are not, as he be- fore imagined, the external things them- felves, but fome affeftion of his fenfes, occafioncd bv them. Afterwards he finds that his eye, his ear, and other organs of fenfe, cannot convey to him the know- ledge of any thing, unlefs there be a
communication
OBSERVATIONS. Ivii
communication between thefe organs and the brain, by means of proper nerves ; which convinces him that the immediate obje6ls of his thoughts are not in the or- gans of fenfe, but in the brain, farther than which he is not able to trace any thing.
This kind of knowledge is gained by obfervation and experiment, as much as the theory of the eye and of light, though we ourfelves are the fubje6l of the ob- fervations and experiments. And our thinking and afting, in the conducl of life, is as much independent of this branch of knowledge, as the powers of air and light are independent of our knowledge of them.
Having, by this procefs, gained the knowledge of the diftinftion between the immediate obje6ts of our thoughts, and external objefts, it may occur to fome perfons, that, fmce we are not properly cofi/czous, or know in the Jirjl inftance, any thing more than what paffes within "
ourfelves,
jy;jii IN T>R G P U C T O R .Y
-jDurfelves, that is, pyr own fenfations and ideas, thefcjcnay I?e impreflfed upon the 3p[jiin4 without die help of any thing ex- ternal to us, by the immediate agency .of the authoT of our beiqs:. This no philpfopher will fay is impfiffible, but, pf two hypothefes to account for the fame phenomenon, he will confider which is the^ more, probable, as being mare confo- .nant to the courfe ,of nature in other ,refpe6ls.
Half the inhabitants of the globe, for ^Jpftance, may be looking towards the
heavens at the fame time, and all their ; minds are imprefled in the fame rnanner. ,All fee the moon, ftars, a,nd planets Jn
precifely the fame fituations ; and even
the obfervations of thofe who ufe tele- j^fcopes correfpond yrith the utmoft exa6l- v^efs. To explain this, Bifhop Berkley .jfays, that the divine being, attending "vito eaph individual mind, imprefles their . fenforiums in the fame, or a correfpond-
ing manner, without diq medium of any ;i^thing external to them. On the other
hand.
OBSERVATIONS. lix
hand, another perfon, without pretend- ing that his fcheme is impoffible, where di- vine power is concerned, may think, •however, that it is more natural to fup- pofe that there really are fuch bodies as the moon, ftars, and planets, placed at certain diflances from us, and moving in certain directions ; by means of which, and a more general agency of the dfeitry ^than Bilhop Berkley fuppofes, all our minds are neceffarily imprefled in this correfponding manner.
It is fufficient evidence for this hypo- thefis, that it exhibits particular appear- ances, as arifmg horn general laws, which is agreeable to the analogy of every thing . elfe that we obferve. It is recommended by the {dimt Jimp licity that recommends every other philofophical theory, and needs no other evidence whatever ; and I fhould think that a perfon muft have very little knowledge of the nature of philofophy, who (hall think of having recourfe to any other for the purpofe. Dr. Reid; however, not fatisfied with this
evidence.
:lx INTRODUCTORY
* ■
evidence, pretends that the certain belief of the real exiftence of external objetls is arbitrarily conne6led with the ideas of them. The hypothefis of knozving things by means of ideas only, he fays, * Dedi-
* cation/ p. 7, ' is antient, indeed, and has ' been generally received by philofophers,
* but of which I could find nofolid proof.
* The hypothefis I mean is, that nothing
* is perceived but what is in the mind ' which perceives it : That we do not ' really perceive things that are external,
* but only certain images and pi6tures of
* them, imprinted upon the mind, which
* are called imprejfions and ideasj
In fa6l, it is not true that we neceffarity believe the exillence of external objefts, as diJlinU:from our ideas of them. Origi- fjnally, we have no knowledge of any fuch I- thing as ideas, any more than we have of the images of objefts on the retina ; and the moment we have attained to the knowledge of ideas, the external world is nothing more than an hypothefis, to ac- count for thofe ideas ; fo probable, in- deed.
OBSERVATIONS. Ixt
deed, that few perfons ferioufly doubt of its real exiflence, and of its being the caufe of our ideas. But ftill the contrary- may be affirmed without any proper ab- Jurdity. Thus, alfo, the revohition of the planets round the fun bed accounts for the appearances of nature, but the contrary may be fuppofed and affirmed without fubjefting a perfon to the charge of talking nonfenfe. This, however, is the language that is now adopted when any of the diftates of a pretended prin- ciple of common fenfe is controverted; and one of the arbitrary decrees of this new infallible guide to truth is, it feems, the reality of an external world.
Such is the leading principle of that philofophy which I principally mean to combat in the enfuing Remarks on the writings of Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald.
RE-
REMARKS
O N
Dr. REID's INQUIRY
INTO THE
PRINCIPLES
O F T H E
HUMAN MIND.
THE
INTRODUCTION.
THE great bufinefs of philofophy li to reduce into clafTes the various appearances which nature prefents to ouf view. For by this means we ac- quire an eafy and diftinft knowledge of them, and gain a more perfeQ, compre- henfion of their various natures^ relations, and ufes. Nature prefents to our view particular effeEis, in conne6lion with their Jeparate caiifeSy by which we are often puzzled, till philofophy fteps in to our alTiftance, pointing out a fimilafity in thefe effe6ts, and the probability of fuch fimi- lar effe^s arifing from the fame caufe* Having got into this track o^Jimplifyifig all appearances, and all caufes, we are able to predi6l new appearances from their known previous circuraftances ; and B thu»
« REMARKS ON ^
Ihus we add to otif own power, coftvenfi cnce, and happinefs, by availing ourfelves of the powers of nature. ; i *
A very confiderable advance has been made in this truly philofophical and ufe^- ful progrefs with refpeft to the knowledge of the world around us, and the laws by which it is governed. And the know- ledge of our/elves, both body and mind, has likewife advanced in the proportion that might have been expefted from the natural order of our thoughts ; which are firft engaged by an attention to external obje^s before we refle6l upon ourfelves. Something was done in this field of know- ledge by Defcartes, very much by Mr. Locke, but mod of all by Dr. Hartley, who has thrown more ufeful light upon the theory of the mind than Newton did
upon the theory of the natural world. .
it- . t,
But while fome are employed in making real advances in the knowledge of nature, there have always been others poflelTed not always, perhaps, of enyious
T:>ii& but
Dr. R E I D '« T H E O R Y. j
but of kittle and contrafted minds, who, inftead of doing, or attempting to do any thing themfelves, are bufily employed in V^tching the footfteps of others, and ca- villing at every thing they do ; which is I30t without a good effe6l, as it obliges philofophers to ufe greater caution and circumfpedion, to review their fteps, and tread upon furer ground than they would otherwife do. .. -ii
Every difcovery in natural philofophy made by Copernicus, Galileo, and NeW- ^tpn, was difputed inch by inch ; and can we be furprifed that the labours of Mr. Locke fhould {hare the fame fate? As to Dr. Hartley, his day qftrml is not yet come, and one of my views in this pub- lication, and fome others that I have pro- jefted, is to bring it on; not doubting but that it will ftand the teft, and be bet- ter kn own, and more firmly eftablifhed after fuch a fcrutiny .
The fate of Mr. Locke*s principles of
rfie human mind has, however, been rat-
^^m B2 tiher
4 REMARKS ON
ther fingularly hard. The ryftems of other philofophers, after having been fully and- rigoroufly criticized, and then generally acquiefced in, have paffed without much controverfy ; but his, after having under- gone this ftricl: examination from all the learned of his own age, and having been acquiefced in for near a century, has of late met with a more rude, and more per- tinacious fet of adverfaries ; who, inftead of allowing the knowledge of the mind to advance with the knowledge of nature in general, appear to me to be throwing every tiling into its priftine confufion, and ,even introducing more darknefs than na- ^turally ever belonged to the fubje6l.
, riThe outlines of Mr. Locke's fyftem are,
that the mind perceives all things that are
external to it by means of certain impref-
fions, made upon the organs of fenfe ; that
thofe impreflions are conveyed by the
jriierves to the brain, and from the brain
^ to the mind, where they are called y^Tz/i-
^tions, and when recollecled are called
ideas ; that by the attention which the
mindj or fentient principle, gives to thefc
fenfations
Dr. REID's THEORY. 5
lenfations and ideas^ obferving their mu- tual relations, &c, it acquires other ideas, which he calls ideas of refleEiion^ and thereby becomes pofTefied of the materials of all its knowledge. Other things he has adopted, and taken for granted concerning the mind, which are not well founded ; and I think he has been hafty in concluding that there is fome other fource of our ideas befides the ex- ternal fenfes ; but the reft of his fyftem appears to me, and others, to be the
comer ftone of all juft and rational know- ledge of ourfelves.
This folid foundation, however, has lately been attempted to be overturned by a fet of pretended philofophers, of whom the raoft confpicuous and affuming is Dr. Reid, profeffor of moral philofophy in the uoiverfity of Glafgow, who, in order to combat Bifhop Berkley, and the feep- ticifm of Mr. Hume, has himfelf intro- duced almoft univerfal fcepticifm and confufion ; denying all the connexions which bad before been fuppofed to fublifl
■ ^.t*v.r^ >%qi'miV^ . |
be- |
^miim |
|
■i.ia^i |
6K !^ E^'it R K S ON
Hetween the feveral phenomena, poweryj^ and operations of the mind, and fubfti* tuting fuch a number of independenty arbitrary, inflinBive principles, that the very enumeration of them is really tireforae.
^ It IS very pofTible, indeed, and no per- Ibn can deny it, that we may proceed too rapidly in fimplifying appearances, and therefore fuch writers as Dr. Reid are an ufeful and feafonable check upon us. But, on the other hand, fo loofe and in- coherent a fyftem as he would fubftitute in the place of Mr. Locke's, ought not to be adopted without the moft urgent neceffity ; fmce it wants the recommenda- tion of that agreeable^??^/>^*a^, which is (b apparent in other parts of the conftitu- tion of nature. Appearances and ana- logy being fo much againft this fyftem, we are juftified in requiring the flronger evidence for it.
It is impoflible to contemplate fuch a theory of the human mind as that of Dr«
^i-Reid
Dr. H,ElI>'s JHE,Of.Y. ^
Reid with any ratisfa6tipn, and the ftirther ftudy of the fubje6l is thereby rendered exceedingly difguiling and unpromifing. I flatter myfelf therefore, that I may be doing fome fervice to future inquirers, by endeavouring to fhow that this new fyftem has in it a$ little of truth as it has of ^<r^i^^, that we rpay fafely take up the fvbje6l, where Mr. Locke left it, and proceed to attend to what Dr. Hanley has done by following his fleps ; when, if I have any forefight, we (hall fmile at Dr. Reid's hypothefis, or rather (Iring of hypothefes, as a mere puzzle, and Ipojc back upon it as upon a dream. ^ ^^
, r To proceed with as much perfpicuity as I poITibly can in this perplexed fubje6l, I {hall firft prefcnt my reader with a view of all the unconnefted inftindive princi- ples which Dr. Reid pretends to have dif- covered in the mind, and I Ihall then es;- amine, in diftinft fedions, his objections to Mr. Locke's dotlrine, and the founda-t tion he has laid for his pwn peculiar 1>)^« pothefes.
B 4 That
8 HE MA R K S ON -
That I may preferve at the fame time the greateft diftinanefs with refped to - my reader, and the greateft faimefs with refpe6t to the author on whom I am ani- madverting, I fhall enumerate all the pre- tended inftinaive principles of which he has given any accou^^ in this treatife/and Exhibit them in the form of a table, iub- .joining my authorities, in quotations '^from thofe different parts of his work from tvhich I have colkaed them, and alfo numbering the articles, fo that they may correfpond to one another, and be'eafily compared together.
t:ZK _ •
■•-:■' ^*--'-
SEC-
Dr. RE I D's^ t H EO R Y.
S E C T I O N^ 1;
t&{\I
A Table of Dr. Reid's ijifUnMive principles,^
the belief of the prefent-cX' \ irtence ot an obje6l.
fA prefent fenfatlon fuggefts
Memory V^Imaglnation
a Mental affedtlons
^ Odours, taftes," founds, and cer- tain atfections of the optic nerve
4 A hard fubftance
the belief of its pait exiftenw. no belief at all. :
J the idea and belief of our
\^ own exiilence.
M
their peculiar correfporiding fenfations. *
"the fenfationof hardnefs, and the belief of fomcthing hard.
5 An extended fubftance ■ — the idea of extenfion and fpacc.
6 All the primary"
their peculiar fenfations.
the idea of motion.
qualities of bo- dies ^ A body in motion
6 Certain forms ofl
the features, ar- ticulations of the voice, and at- titudes of the body <
7 Inverted images ~[
on the retina J
8 Images in corre-'
fponding parts of both eyes*
9 Pains In any part 1
of the body J He ^Ifo enumeratei the folloivinfr amon^ inftin^ive faculties or principles^ viz.
The parallel motion of the eyes, as nec^fTary to diftinft vilion. Thefenfe of veracity, or a difpofition to fpeak truth. A fenfe of credulity, or a difpotition to believe others. The indudive faculty, by which we infer firailar effedta from fimilar caufes. N. B. All thefe feparate inllinftive principles Dr. Rei4 confiders as branches of what he terms common fenfe.
* Diffcreat Animals are fub]e£l to different laws la this rerpeft.
Aiithmtits
the idea and belief of certain thoughts, purpofes, mid difpofitiuns of the mind.
upright vifion.
fingle vifion.
r the idea of the place where, \ the pain is feated.
lo
II
II
12
lo R.EJ^liAiR: K S O N
si'^^^thorities fir the preceding table.
I, ' CENSATION compels our belief ^xt5*'^-of the prefent exiftence of a
* thing, luemory the belief of its pad
* exiftence, and imagination no belief at '-all^ Thefe are all fimple and original,
* and therefore inexplicable ads of the
* mind/ p. 31.
Ij* The connexion between our fenfa- *iions and the conception and belief of
* external exiftences cannot be produced
* by habit, education, or any principle of t human nature that has been admitted
* by philofophers/ p. 91.
"^^'^ A third clafs of natural figns compre-
* hends thofe which, though we never be-
* fore had any notion or conception of
* the things lignified, do fuggeft it, or
* conjure it up, as it were, by a natural ' kind of magic, and at once give us ^ ' conception, and create a belief of it.
* P* 9^* This clafs of natural (igns is the ^ * * foundation '
Dr. R El D's' THEORY. rt
* foundation of common fenfe, a part of 'human nature which has never beea
* explained.' p. 91. - r
* Senfation, and the perception of exr
* ternal objecls by the fenfes, though very
* diiFerent in their nature, have commonly ' been confidered as one and the fame ' thing.' p. 288. -*^'* "if^. "
* I know that the perception of a»
* obje6l implies both the conception of
* its form, and a behef of its prefent ex-
* iftence. I know, moreover, that this
* belief is not the effect of argument and
* reafoning. It is the immediate effe^ ' of my conftitution.' p. 290. ; v>! -
'2. * The idea of our own exiftence ' precedes all reafoning and experience/ p. 48^ >Toi ■'■
3. See p. 84, quoted below, and hi« treatife paffim. ^i^wn iu Uxii '
B f,tioiK]r>tTor> *
4. ' By
tx R EM A R K S O N
tH4. * By an original principle of our
* -conftitution a certain fenfation of touch
* both fyggefts to the mind the concept
* tion of hardnefs, and creates the be-
* lief of it, or in other words, this fen-
* fatioa is a natural fign of hardaefs.' p. 86.
5. * Space, motion, and extenfion,
* and all the primary qualities of bodies,
* have no rclemblance to any fenfation or
* any operation of our minds, and there-
* fore cannot be ideas either of fenfation
* or reflexion. The very conception of
* them is irreconcileable to the principles •of all our philofbphical fyftems of the
* univerfe. The belief of them is.no lefs
* fo/ p. 3Q2«
* The notion of extension is fo familiar
* to us from our infancy, and fo jcon- ' ftantly obtruded by every thing we fee
* or feel, that we are apt to think it ob- ' vious how it comes into the mind ; but •upon a narrower examination we fbail ;',fimd it utterly^ iiicxplicf»bil^. It is true v.; ■■ ■'' * wc
Dr. R EI D's T H E O R Y. 13
* we have feelings of touch, which every
* moment prefent extenfiori to the mind ;
* but how they come to do fo is the que- *ftion: for thofe feelings do no more re-
* femble extenHon than they refemble
* juftice or courage, nor can the exiftence
* of extended things be inferred frortt
* thofe feelings by any rule of reafoning ; "^ fo that the feelings we have by touch
* can neither explain how we get the no-
* tion, nor how we came by the belief of
* extended things.' p. 96.
6. * The thoughts, purpofes, and dif-
* pofitions of the mind, have their na- ' turai figns in the features of the face,
* the modification of the voice, and th6 ' attitude of the body. p. 87. In thefe ^ natural figns,' he fays, ib. * there is, a«
* in artificial figns, often neither fimili-
* tude between the fign and the thing *" fignified, nor any connexion that arifes ^^ neceffarily from the nature of thingsl' Of thefe particular natural figns he fays, p. 89, that * they are not only efta» *blifhedby nature, but difcovered to us
• by
)4 REMARKS ON
* by a natural principle, without rea^on-
* ing or experience. An infant, he adds,
* may be put in a fright by an angry *■ countenance, and foothed again by
* figns and blandilhments.' i ' . •
hofi See ch. i. fe£lion xi. paflim.
8. ' The correfpondence of certain
* points in the retinae is prior to the
* habits we acquire in vifion, and confe-
* quently is natural and original.' p. 261.
' Since there is a prodigious variety *- in the ftrudure, the motions, and the *• number of eyes in different animals and
* infecls, it is probable that the laws <•. by which vifion is regulated are not i* the fame in all, but various, adapted to
* the eyes which nature has given them.* p. 233. See alfo ch. vi. fetlion xiii. paflim. tAuodi '
' 9. * How do we know the parts of
* our body affeded by particular pains.**
:fdl' ' * not
Dr RE ID'S T H E O ITY. >$
* not by experience, or by reafoning, but
* by the conftitution of nature.* p. 209.
v<1lo. * The parallel motion of the eyes ' we refolve into an original power and
* principle of the human mind, and not
* to be referred to cuftom, to anatomical or mechanical caufes.' p. 185. He alfo calls it a natural vnjiin^, p. 187. But fee ch. vi, fe6lionx. paffim*
•DD.e T// «TfdEn ' 11. * There is in the human mind an
* early anticipation, neither derived from
* experience nor reafoning, nor from any
* compaft or promife, that our fellow-
* creatures %\all ufe the fame figns in lan-
* guage when they have the fame fenti-
* ments. This is, in reality, a kind of
* prefcience of human aftions, and feems ' to me to be an original principle of the ' human conftitution, without which we
* (hould be incapable of language, and
* confequently incapable of inftru6lion/
^. ;;^--, n-^B'^Bfi ybod tijo *
?^ ^ ' The
i6 R E M A R K S O N
' The wife author of our nature has
* implanted in our natures two prin-
* ciples that tally with each other, the
* firft is a propenfity to fpeak truth, and
* to ufe the iigns of language fo as to
* convey our real fentiments, p. 33^.
* Another original principle implanted ' in us by the fupreme being, is a difpo-
* fition to confide in the veracity of
* others, and to believe what they tell
* us. This is the counterpart to the
* former ; and as that may be called the ^principle of veracity, we (liall, for want
* of a more proper name, call this the 'principle of credulity J
12. ' The belief of the continuance ' of the prefent courfe of nature mufl: b& ' the effeft of infiincl, and not of reafon,
* p. 343. All our knowledge of nature
* beyond our original perceptions is got
* by experience, and confifts in the in- ' terpretation of natural figns. The ap- ' pearance of the fign is followed by the
* belief of the thing fignified. Upon this
* principle of our conftitution not only
* acquired
Dr. R E I D 's THEORY. 17
* acquired perception, but alio induftive
* reafoning, and all our reafoning from
* analogy is grounded ; and therefore, •for want of another name, we (hall beg ' leave to call it the indu&ive principle. ' It is from the force of this principle that
* we immediately affent to that axiom,
* upon which all our knowledge of nature
* is built, tbat effe6ls of the fame kind
* hiufi have the fame caufe, p. 347*
* Take away the light of this induftive
* principle, and experience is as blind as
* a mole. She may indeed feel what is ' prefent, and what immediately touches
* her, but (lie fees nothing that is eithet ' before or behind, upon the right hand
* or upon the left, future or paft.' p. 349* '
It will be obferved, that in this table I have connected the name of the thing or circumftance that gives rife to the; corre- fponding feeling by the word fuggefl. This, however, is not to be miftaken for a mere form of contie6lion. Our author tvould have us to confider it in* £t much tAoxt fcriou> light, as a real power of the C mind.
i8 R E M A R K S O N'
JTiind, which had efcaped the notice of all the philofophers who had gone before hiai in thefe refearches. * Suggejlion,^ he fays, p. 49, * is a power of the mind
* which feems entirely to have efcaped
* the notice of philofophers, and to which ^we owe many of our fimple notions
* which are neither impreffions nor ideas, Vas well as many original principles of ;A»belief.'
My reader will, I fufpecl, imagine with me, that this catalogue of original in- ftin6live principles is pretty large, and tJiat when nature had gone fo far in this track, but little could be wanting to ac- complifh all herpurpofes; and that, with fefpcft uxpi'inciplcs, little remained to be donr by an^• other means. But our au- thor. It ferms, thinks differently. * The ;ff original perceptions which nature gives
* are infufficient,* he fays, p. 351, 'for ^^the purpofes of life, and therefore fhe has
* made men capable of acquiring many
* more perceptions by habit.' Now my Yiew m the following inquiry is to relieve
*jp/ dame
Dr. R E I D's THEORY. 19
dame nature of the unneceflary load which Dr. Reid has laid upon her, by afcribing a little more to habit, and to the necelTary connexions and confequences of things than he has done.
When my reader fhall have given fuf- ficient attention to the preceding table, and the authorities from which it was col- lefted, I hope that he, our author, and myfelf, may proceed with a perfectly right underftanding of one another. However, to complete this good under- Handing, and to prevent the poflibility of a miftake, I fhall fubjoin a few more ex- tra6ls, which fhow how perfedly inde- pendent of one another Dr. Reid ima- gined the principles enumerated in this table to be.
.^Tf No man can give a reafon why the If vibration of a body might not have ^f. given the fenfation of fmelling, and the
* effluvia of bodies affeQed our hearing, :? if it had fo pleafed our maker. In like
* manner no man can give a reafon why " C2 'th^-
20 REMARKS ON
"* the fenfations of fmell or tafle miglit *'ubt have, indicated hardnefs, as'vvefl^ais ^'ihat renfaUon which by our coriftitulion ^^ does, indicate it. Indeed no man ca^ '■^conceive lahyfenfation to refemble ari^
* known quality of bodies, nor can aiiy ,^ man fhow by any good argument that
* ,all our fenfatiohs might not have been '• as 'they ate; though no body, or quality *^ of bodies, had ^ver exifted/ p. 841-"'^
-*« Perhaps '#e'hiight hd\^'e b^eh fo Ttiade ■^':is to tafle with our fingers, to fmell with /^ our ears, and to hear by the nofe. Per- ^liaps we might have been fo made as to *^lifaX^fe 'a;ll the perceptions andfenfations '*^ which- we' have without any impreflion ■^ttliide upon our bodily organs at alU'
^''305.-
s
' The perceptions we ha\^ might have ''been immediately corinefted Avith the
* impreffions 6f 'our organs; 'without any
* intervention of fenfation. This laft ' feems^ really to be the cafe in one in- *^ ftance, to wnt, in our perception of the *:'*^'ifible figure of bodies'/ • p. -^o^.
Dr. REID's THEORY. 21
/ We .know nothing of the machinery > *fby means of which every different im- * preflion upon the organs, nerves, and 'brain exhibits its corrcfponding fenfa- ' tion, or of the machinery by means of \ which each fenfation exhibits its corre- ' fponding perception. We are infpired ' with the fenfation, and we are infpired t-with the corrcfponding perception by 'means unknown.' p. 300.
^Our author feems, however, to be' wilhng to provide a decent retreat from his dodrine of original iftinftive princi- ples, by faying, p. 223, *Ifin any cafe
* we fhould give the name of a law of na- ' ture to a general phenomenon, which
* human induflry fhould afterwards trace Mo one more general, there is no great^'
* harm done. The moft general affumei' ' the name of a law of nature when it is
/.difcovered, and the lefs general is cohV **tained and comprehended in it.'
' . But I mud take the liberty to fay, tbat^* iF this ftould happen, harm toill be done'
C3 to
22 R EM ARKS ON
to tne Tiypothefis of that man Who had been fo rafh and unguarded as to advance over and over, fo that no body could miflake his meaning, that a certain law of nature was abfolutely ultimate, which afterwards appeared not to be fo ; who fhould have aflerted that thefe principles zx^Jimple, original, and therefore inex- plicable aEls of the viindy and that they cannot be produced by any prmciple of human nature that has ever been admit- ted by philofophers. This is afferting that it is impoffible to advance any farther 5n theinveftigation ; for who can ever get hdyond^inple, original^ and inexplicable acls of tlie mind.
Mil
The fufpicion that we are got to ulti- mate principles neceflarily checks all far- ther inquiry, and is therefore of great dif- fervice in philofophy. Let Dr. Reid lay his hand upon his breafl, and fay, whe- ther, after what he has written, he would not be exceedingly mortified to find it clearly proved, to the fatisfa6lion of all th^ world, that all the Inflindive princi- ples
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R y. 23
pics in the preceding table were really ac- quired, and that all of them were nothing more than fo many different cafes of the old and well known principle of ojjocid' tion of ideas.
It muft, moreover, be obfcrved, that the table I have given by no means con- tains a view of all the original inftin£live principles which our fagacious author finds in human nature. Thefe are only fuch as have occurred to him in his fuY- vey of the external fenfes. * We have ' taken notice/ he fays, p. 378, * offeveral
* original principles of belief in thecourfc
* of this inquiry ; and when other facul ties
* of the mind are examined, we (hall find
* more which have not occured in the
* examination of the ^\t fenfes.'
It may be faid that, fmcc our author has not finifhed his fchemc, this critique upon it is premature, that we ought firft to hear him out, and that it is not good manners to rife from the table after the firtt courfe though we be not difpofed to C4 partake
U^ REMARKS ON
partake of the fecond. I anfwer, that Dr. Reid's gueRs have already waited ^bout ten years, and that poflibly this account of the firft courfe may induce our hoft to haflen his fecond. To drop all figure : our author's fcheme appears to be already complete as far as it goes, and the evidence of what is before us is altogether independent of what is to come ; at lead there is no hint given ^c^ us of the contrary.
X:f;li \\})i\[
Dr. R E I D> T.H E O R Y, ^r
SECTION II.
A view of the fever al fallacies hy. .which ■ t)r. Reid has been mifled in his inquiry,
T Now proceed to confider Dr. Reid*s ^ objeftions to the great outlines of Mr. Locke's doftrine, and the feveral prin- ciples on which he has founded his own; endeavouring, at the fame time, to fhew, the fufficiency of the commonly received principles for thofe purpofes for which Dr. Reid pretends that they are altogo- (her infufficient, fo as to oblige., him to quit them for others of his own. , '"'^
As my remarks on the Doclors per- formance were made in the courfe of read-, ing him, and thereby things of a different nature will be unavoidably a little inter- mixed (though I (hall take all the care I, can in the arrangement of them) I fliall intro- duce them with diftinftly noting the fe- veral falfe fteps which he has made in the courfe of 1X3 or the ^x'S^x^m fallacies to
which
tS K E M ARKS O N
which he leems to have been fubjed, and which have been tlie.fQurce of the prin- cipal of his miftakes.
1 . Becaufe he cannot perceive any re- femblance between obje6ls and ideas, he concludes, that the one cannot be pro- duced by the other.
2. Becaufe he cannot perceive any ne- cefTary connexion between fenfations and theobjecls of them, and therefore cannot abfolutely demonflrate the reality of ex-* ternal objefts, or even the exiflence of mind itfelf, by the do6lrine of ideas, he reje6ls that do£lrine altogether, and has' recourfe to arbitrary inft:in6ls.
3. He takes it for granted that our ideas have no exiflence but when we are confcious of them, and attend to them.
4. He confounds the faculty of fen- fation with ideas of fenfation.
5. Becaufe we do not know the me- chanifm by which a particular motion^ or
"a let
Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 27-
a fet of connctlcd motions, is performed, he concludes that thofe motions are per- formed by inftintlive principles, and were pot acquired by experience and the affo- ciation of ideas. . a1a>>
6. Suppofing, without any foundation, that certain determinations or emotions were prior to experience, he conckides
that they are inftin6tive.
:;^; lii'v, rt'tvil,. ;5K.r);:j
Let it be noted, that I do not affert that our learned profeflbr is uniform m thefe miftakes, for by fome of my re- marks I think it will appear that he is not perfectly confident with himfclf. ^-''
ii)-\-
•fe: SEC-
REMARKS ON
; SECTION III.
Oj Dr. Reid'j objeaion to the docirine of ideas from their zoant of refemblance to i'iji€}r corrcfponding objects. ^j
Tr\IL Reid objetls to every fyftem ^^ which fuppofcs that the mind re- ceives images of things from without by means of the : fehfes, ■ and. " thinks that they are fufficiently. refuted by the obfervation, that fenfations bear no re- femblance to bodies, or any of their quahties. * The properties of extenlion, ^ figure, foHdity, motion, hardnefs, rough-
* nefs, as well as colour, heat, and cold, ' found, tafte, and fmell, which all man- ' kind have conceived to be the qualities ' of bodies, have not', he fays, p. 147, ' among them all, one fmgle image of
* body, or any of its qualities. I am fure
* that, by proper attention and care, 'I tnay knov/ my fenfations, and be ' able to affirm with certainty what they ' rcfemble. and ^diat thev do not refem-
' ble.
Dr. R E I D' s T H E O R Y. ag
' ble. . I have examined them one by one, f a"nd compared them with matter an3' its ' qualities, and I cannot find one of them
* that confefles a refemblinsr feature.'
'^' S&vcTiy^ confident' is our -author of Ae ftrength of this argument, that he fcruples not to vel]: tfee wjiole of his fyftem., upon it^ "^. "jll^iis/ fays he j 'p. 108, ' I would
* hurtAl]p^ ^prdpofe as 'an experwicntuin
* criicisy by which the' ideal fyHem.muft ' ftand br fall ; and it brings the mattev '' to a fhon iffue. Extenfion, figure, mo-
* tiqn,'.'itiay, any one, or all of them, be
* tiakenfor the fubjeft of this iexperiment, ' Either they are' jc^ei^ of fenfatioHj or
* they are ' not. I/' ahy one of them caiii ' bfe fhOwri to be an idea of fenfation, or 'to have the lead refemblance' to any fen-
* fation. Hay my* hand upon my mOuth,
* and give up all pretenfeto reconcile rca^ *.^n to common fenfe in this mattei*, arid '■ttuft'Tiiffer the ideal fcepticifm to'tri-
* jdhiplx. But if, on the other han4, they
* are not ideas of fenfation, nor like to
' any. fenfation, then the id^al fyflem is a
, ' "rope
"h I
3P R E M A R K S O N
^Tope of fand, and all the laboured argu- *- ments of the fceptical philofophy againft '^- a rnaterial world, and againft the exi- * ftence of every thing but imprefTions ' and ideas, proceed upon a falfe hypo- -* thefis/
Before our author had refted fo much upon this argument, it behoved him, I think, to have examined the ftrength of it a Htde more carefully than he feems to have done ; for he appears to me to have fuffered himfelf to be mifled in the very foundation of it, merely by philofophers liappcning to call ideas the images of ex- ternal things ; as if this was not known to be a figurative exprefTion, denoting not that the a6lual fhapes of things were dcr lineated in the brain, or upon the mind, but only that imprelTions of fome kind or other were conveyed to the mind by
means of the organs of fcnfe and their cor- refponding nerves, and that between thefe imprefTions and the fenfations exifting in the mind there is a real and neceffary, though at prefent an unknown conne6Hon.
I do
Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 31
I do not fee but that by Dr. Reid's mode of reafoning, he might as well deny that the found of a mufical ftring is caufed by the ftroke o^d^pleElrum, or that founds, confidered as tremulous motions of the particles of the air, are produced by bo- dies ftriking againft one another, becaule he can perceive no proper refemblance be- tween the caufe and the effeft, between the found that is produced and the fliape of the thing or things by which the founds are made ; and yet thefe founds vary ac- cording to the bodies that occafion them, and the circumftances that attend their impinging on one another ; fo that, with- out any fuch refemblance as the Do6lor feems to expeft, they correfpond {lri6lly to one another, and the one may be called the proper and necejfary, and not the ar- bitrary (or as Dr. Reid would call it the natural) fign of the other. ^ >
The transferring of this comparifon to the doclrine of ideas is very eafy. If, as Dr. Hartley fuppofes, the nerves and brain be a vibrating fubftance, the ana- ^h i logy
0^ R E M.A R K S O N
logy. jwill hold very nearly indeed ; ,all renfations and ideas being vibrations' ill that fubflance, and all that is properly unknovv'n in the bufinefs being the fimple pov/erin the mind to perceive,, or be af- fe61ed by, thofe vibrations.' And. if, as Locke and pthers fuppofe, matter i'tfelf may be indued with that fentient pow6f^ even that difficulty, as "far as the- preferlt queltion can be afFe6led, is removed. ' '
Our author's doubts are not confined td ideas being produced by eiiternal obje6ls, but affe6l the ufe of the, nerves belonging to the organs of fenfe, and the brain itfelf, as the inllruments of tranfmitting them to the mind, reducing the fuppohtion to a mere probability, .
' It is very probable,' he fays, p. 200^
* that the optic nerve is the inllrUment of
* vifion, no lefs neceffary than the retina.' But it appears tome tl;at, arguing in this manner, .one might doubt of every thing j and that \v-e miglit jufl as well fay, it, is ytry pxQbal^lc on! v that the feet and leg<>
are
Dr R E 1 D 's THEORY. 3^
ate the inftruraents of walking, aS that the optic nerve is only probably the in^ ftrument of vifion.
Iri another place, he does not leave I'oom to fuppofe that it is even probable that the optic nerves are the inllrument of vifion ; calling the hypothefis a mere conje6lure. * From the firft dawn of phi- ' lofophy to this day/ he fays, p. 277, ' it has been believed that the optic nerves ' are intended to carry the images* of
* vifible obje6ls from the bottom of the
* eye to the mind, and that the nerves be-
* longing to the other fenfes have a like
* office. But how do we know this ? We ' Conje61ure it, and taking this conjefture ' for a truth, we confid^r how the nerves
* may beft anfwer the purpofe.* It is agreeable to this that he fays, p. 303,
* We are infpired with the fenfation, and
* If Dr. Reid thinks to reconcile thefe two paflages by faying that by images, in this place, he did not mean impref- Jions in general, but the vtaXJljapes and forms of thing, the IV hole charge is falfe, and he is fighting a chimera ot his own creating.
H
REMARKS ON
' we are infpired with the correfponding
* perception, by means unknown.'
This fcepticifm vrith refpeQ to the doc- trine of ideas, the ufe of the organs ol fenfe, and their correfponding nerves in tranfmitting them, appears to me to be very extraordinary indeed ; and yet, fuch are the caprices of die human mind. Dr. Reid exprefles as much furprize at the prevalence of the common opinion. ' It ' is very flrange,' he fays, p. 201, * that ' philofophers of all ages fhould have ' agreed in this notion, that the images> ' of external objefts are conveyed by the ' organs of fenfe to the brain, and are " there perceived by the mind. Nothing' " can be more unphilofophical. Forfirft,
* this notion has no foundation in fa61: ' and obfervation. Of all the organs of
* fenfe the eye only, as far as we can dif-
* cover, forms any kind of image of its ob- ' je6l, and the images formed by the eye
* are not in the brain, but only in the hot* ' torn of the eye ; nor are they at all per- ' ceived or felt by the mind. Secondly^
Dr. REI D's THEORY, 35
* it is as difficult to conceive how the ' mind perceives images in the brain, as
* how it perceives things more diftant. If
* any man will fliev/ how the mind may ' perceive images in the brain, I will un* ' dertake to (hew how it may perceive
* the mofl diftant obje^ls : for if we give ' eyes to the mind, to perceive what is ' tranfafted at home in its dark chamber,
* why may we not make thefe eyes a little
* longer fighted, and then we (hall have ' no occafion for that unphilofophical fic-
* tion of images in the brain ? In a word, •the manner and mechanifm of the mind 3
* perception is quite beyond our compre- ' henfion.*
In this way of arguing "We might fay that the whole fyftem ofourfenfes, nerves, and brain is of no real ufe whatever ; for it is impoflible to fay how they aft upon the mind, or the mind upon them. But by the fame reafoning we may deny every principle in nature. For when we have traced it as far as we can, we are ftill compelled to flop fomewhere, and to con- fefs our inability to proceed any farther. D 2 I know^
36 REMARKS ON
I know, however, very well, that an eye is the inftrument of vifion, becaufe with- out it nothing can be feen. I alfo know th'it the retina and optic nerve are likewiie necefiary, becaufe. if they be difordered, vifion is flill wantilfg ; and laftly, I am equally certain that the brain is neceflary to all perception, becaufe if that be dif* ordered, thinking either intirely ceafes, or is proportionably dillurbed.
For my part, I knotv no conclufions in philofophy more certain than thefe, and they are not rendered at all lefs certain by our not being able to go a flep farther, (b as to know in what ?nanner the brain, or the aifedions of it, can be the inftru- ment or fubje6l of perception. I may conjecture that the brain itfelf may be the ukmiate caufe, or I may fubftitute fome- tiiing elfe that I may think better adapted to anfwer the purpofe, that is, to fuit the phenomena.
SEC-
Dr. REID's THEORY. 37
SECTION IV.
Of Dr. Reldi abjcElion to- Mr. Lockei divijion of ideas into thofe of faifation and. rtficEhion.
1_I AVING examined one great pillar of our author's fchemej I now pro- ceed to another, of which he likewife boafts great things; but if my reader be able to confider it with perfeft ferioufnefs, it is more than I can expecl of him, for it is more than I am able to do myfelf. It is his objeftion to Mr. Locke's divifion of ideas into thofe oS. fenfaiion, and thofe of rejledion.
* This', he fays, p. 575, '' i.^ contrar}^ to
* all rules of logic, becaufe the fecond ' member of the divifion includes the ' firll. For can we form clear and jul}
* notions of our fenfiuioas any other way
* than by refledion? Surely we cannot.
* Senfation is an operation of the mind, of ' which we are confcious, and we get the
D 3 ' notion
gt R E M A R K S O N
' notion of fenfation by refle6llng upon
* that which we are confcious of. In hke ' manner doubting and believing are
* operations of the mind, whereof we are ' confcious, and we get the notion of
* them by reflecting upon what we are
* confcious. The ideas of fenfation, there-
* fore, arc ideas of refle6l;ion, as much as ' the ideas of doubting or beheving, or
* any other idea wliatfoever.'
This I fcruple not to fay is as mere a quibble, as either the ignorance or the perverfion of logic ever produced, arifing from our author's confounding the pro- per ideas offenfaiion v*'ith the idea o^ fenfa- tion itfelf which is, no doubt, of the fame clafs with the ideas of doubting, believing, or thofc of an/ other operation of the mind ; and fo Mr. Locke would have acknowledged. But the ideas belonging to the clafs of fenfation do not require any fcientifical knowledge of that power, or any refleclion upon it. If this were the cafe, brute animals, having no proper ideas of refleclion, could have no ideas of
fenfation
Dr. R E I D \s T H E O R V. ^9
fenfation. Indeed, it is qaefHonablc whether the bulk of mankind,., who are not philofophers, could have them, and confequently whether they muft not be deflitute of all ideas.
A more palpable blunder than this I think I hardly ever met with in any argu- mentative treatife, and yet this is one of the great engines with which our author aflails Mr. Locke's doftrine of ideas. Dr. Reid might jufl as well fay that houfes and utenjils neceffarily belong to the fame clafs of objefts, and that they ought never to be diftinguifhed, becaufe the former contain the latter.
Befides our author himfelf fuppofes that even human beings may have ideas of mere fenfation fome time before they difcover any power of reflexion, and that this power may difcover itfelf and come into play afterwards. * Perhaps,' lays he, p. 112, * a child in the womb, or for
* fome (hort period of his exiftence, is
* merely a fentient being, the faculty by
D 4 * which
4^ RJ^HARKSON
^ which it perceives an external worJi,
* by which It reiieds on its o/rn thoughts ^ * and e>dP.ence, and relation to other
■ things as w^U ^s its reafoning and mO" ' ral facuhies, unfold themfelves by de- ^ grees ; fo that it is infpired with the va- "^ ' rious principles of common fenfe as with ' the paffions of love and refentment,
* when it has occafion for them.' Let our author fay how this fuppofition of
V fiis could be pofTible, if ideas of fenfation
"^^r were neceflarily included under the head
.^.of ideas of refleftion, when they are here
faid to have exifted prior to the very
power of refleftion, or at lead to any ex-
ercife of that po\rer.
By the way, this hypothelis of the gra- dual unfolding of the powers of the mind , very much relembles the gradual acqui- X Jition of them, from the imprefiions to I which v;e are expofed. I fliould have iliought that Dr. Reid would hardly have ^ Jiad an idea of real powers lying fo long dormant as this notion may require fome ^^pi them to do, while other faculties were f^. awake
DiV R E I D's T H E a R. Y>*4i
awake and vigorous. He wi4i notV-I find, afTert of powers what he'-dcJes o^ ideas, VIZ. that they have no ©xiftence but when they are in ufe andexercife.
SECTION V.
Dr. Reid'j pojition, that fenfaiion im- plies the belief of the prefent cxi/fence of external objects, and his view ^ Berk- ley'^ theory, particularly confidcred,
TJAVING replied to our author's capi- ^ tal obje61ions to Mr. Locke's, or the common hypothefis, concerning fen- fations, ideas^ and objects, I come to conlider what he has fartiicr to advance in fupport of his ov/n. Now one would imagine a priori, that a man w^ho fhould have alTumed the airs and tone that Dr. Reid has o-iven himfelf throudi the whole of this treatife, as if he had utterly demoliilied all the preceding fyfiems of
the'
42 REMARKSON
the mind, and erected another quite diffe- rent from any thing that was ever heard or thought of before, would be able to produce fomething like pojitive evidence for it. But, behold, when we have got to the end of thefe negative arguments, he has, in fiict, nothing more to offer, befides his own very confident affertions (repeated indeed without end, if that would give them any weight) that the thing mull certainly be as he reprefents it.
'' Now though I, who do not pretend to advance any hypothefis of my own, might very reafonably imitate this example.; and, having fhewn the futility of his ob- je6lions to the commonly received hypo- thecs, content rayfelf with leaving things in Jlatu quo ; yet for the greater fatisfac- tion of my readers, 1 fhall make a few more obfervations on the fubjeci: of our author's in{lin6tive principles, felecling for a more particular examination that by which he fays our perceptions necejfarily imply the belief of the prefent exijlence of external ohjeUs* There i^j no one article
oF
Dr. R E I D' s THEORY. 43
of his whole fyftem of common fenfe that he can lefs fcruple to fubmit to this exa- mination; for there is no one thing that he repeats fo often, or feems to triumph in fo much, as this ; imagining that his m.ethod of confidering the fubjeft is an efFeclual antidote, and the only effe^lual antidote to all the fcepticifm of the prefent age.
Now excepting what our author has faid about the abfurdity of Mr. Locke's principles, of which I think I have offered a fufficient vindication, and of the pecu- liarly abfurd and dangerous confequences which he afcribes to Berkley's theory, and which I fhall prefently (how to be no bet* ter founded, all that he fays amounts to nothing more than this ; that he cannot, in his own mind, feparate the belief of the exiltence of external objetls from his fenfations, as thofe of tafte, touch, fight, See. With refpeft to this I would make the following obfervations.
I. There
44 REMARKS ON
1 . There are many opinions which we know to be acquired, and even founded on prejudice and miflake, whkh, how- ever, the fulled conviftion that they are void of all real foundation cannot erafe from the mind ; the groundlefs beliefs and exfjed,aticm-, founded upon it, being fo clofely conneded with the idea of certain circum fiances, tliat no mental power of "which we are polTc/fcd can feparate them.
Though, for indance. Dr. Reid, no doubt, as well as other philofophers, be- lieves the earth to be fphencal, aud con- fequently is fenfible that no one part of its furface can be upper mo fi and another part under it ; or, that if there were fuch a thing as an uppermod part, every part mull become fo in its turn ; yet he always coniiders the place on which he Hands as icondantly uppermod, and conceives of his antipodes as hanging with their heads downwards. Nay he cannot help having an idea of their having a tendency to fall dowjv 5w*o ^^ void fpace below the earth.
Dr. REID^s THEORY. 45
He may talk as a philofopher, but I am confident he conceives and thinks as the vulgar do ; and though in many things our author appeals to the fentiments of the vulgar as the teft of truth, in oppofi- tion to the philofophers, I think he will hardly chufe to do fo in this cafe. He cannot, however, poflibJy feparate in his imagination the idea of a tendency to fall from his idea of the fituation of the anti- podes. Now why may not this be the ^fe with refpetl to Berkley's theory, fo that though we cannot feparate the idea of the real exiftence of external obje6ls and our fenfations ; it may, like the other, be no more than a prejudice, void of all real foundation. As we cannot pretend to diftinguffh between our feelings in thefe two cafes, and one of them we know to be fallacious, why may not the other be fallacious alfo ? There muft be fome otkcr kind of evidence ht^iAts feeling, to prove that it is not fo.
Secondly, This fcheiiie of Dr. Reid's fuppofes that an extraordinary povifion
46 R E M A R K S O N
is made for a ki?id of faith, that is by no means neceflary for the purpofe of it, viz. with refpeft to the conducl of life. For a very high degree of probability, not to be diilinguirried in feehng from abrdutQ certainty, is attainable without it. Now fince it cannot be denied but that the di« vine ocmg leaves us to be governed by a kind of faith iar iriierior to mathematical certainty m things of infinitely more con- feqjfnce (in this, hov.-ever, .1 do not ap* p-al to Dr. Ofwald) it is abfclutely in* credible that he fliould have implanted in us a peculiar inftinclive principle, merely for the fake of giving us a pUiiary con* vi'dion with refpecl to this bufmefs, which is comparatively of s^xy trifling confe- quence.
Thirdly, Our author's fcheme has this farther untoward circumllance attending it, that it fuppofes the divine being to have formed us in fucli a manner, as that we mud necerfarily believe what, by our author's own confeOTion, might not have beeii true. For * no man,' fays he, p. 85,
^ can
Dr. REI D's THEORY. 47
' can {how by any good argument, that
* all our fenfations might not have been
* as they are, though no body or quality
* of body had ever exifted.' Now this I fhould think to be, upon the face of it, fo very unlikely to be true, that no perfon who confiders the cafe can admit of it. For this is very different from thofe de- ceptions which neceflarily arife from ge- neral laws, and to which all mankind are fubje6i; ; but with refpeft to which it is in their power, by the proper ufe of their faculties, to relieve themfelves.
It appears, therefore, that confident as our author is of the truth and importance of his fyflem, he acknowledges it to be founded not on abfolute but relative truth, arifing from his conflitution, which (con- trary to what is advanced by his follow- ers Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald) is effen- tially different from that kind of evidence by which we are fatisfied that two and two are four, which is independent of any arbitrary conflitution whatever.
I wonder
4^ R E M A R K S O K
I wonder it (hould not have a litll(i ftaggered Dr. Reid, to confider that his whole fyRem muft fall at once before the fainted fufpicion, that God may think proper that mankind fhould be fubjetl to deceptions for their good, at which my jDind does not Tnudder, wlien I fee it to be the necefTary confequence of the mofl CJccei-ent general laws. Do we not .^e that the bulk of mankind live and aie in the belief that the fua moves round the earth, and of other tiiiugs in which they are deceived by the teitimony of their fcnfes ? Now let Dr. Reid nl^Agn a. (rood rea/on, why the fame being who permits his creatures to believe that the fun moves round the earth, might not permit thera to beheve that there was a fun, though, ia reality, there ihould be no fuch thing; af the fame time that, by his own imme- diate power, without the aid of any real fcn, he ihould afford them all the benefit o*" Hght and heat which they had falfely a'cribed to that luminary. I allow it to be as improbable as any perfon pleafeSj but the fuppofition is certainly not
diredly
Dr. R E I D' s THEORY. 49 *
clireclly abfurd and impojfible, and this is liie only thing in debate. ' -
Fourthly, I wonder that our author "^ fliould not have attempted fome folution of the phenomena of dreams, reveries, x}S^di vifions upon his hypothefis. In all tliefe circumilances it cannot be denied%' that men imagine themfelves to be fur- rounded with obje6ls which have no real exiftence, and yet their fenfations are not to be diftinguifhed from thofe of men awake; fo that \^ Jcn/atiuns, as Juch, ne- cefTarily draw after them the beHef ofthe prefent exiftence of objc6ls, this belief takes place in dreams, reveries, and vi- fions, as indeed is the cafe ; and if there be a fallacy in thefe cafes, it is certainly within the combafs of pojjihility, that there " may be a fallacy in the other alfo. %
Notwithftanding thefe obvious difficul- ties with which our author's fcheme is clogged, and which a genius of any order lefs than the moji daring would think to be infuperable, nothing can exceed the E confidence
^
50 R E M A R K S O N
confidence with which he exprefTes his fall perfuafion of the truth of it, from the fuppofed impoffibiliiy of beheving the con- trary, or the fupercihous and cavalier manner in which he treats all obje6tions to it.
' I ara aware,^ fays he, p. 291, ' that
* this belief M^hich I have in perception ' Hands cxpofed to the ftrongcft batteries
* of fccpiicifm. But they make no great
* impreifion upon it. The fceptic afks ' me, why do you believe the exiflence ' of the external object which you per-
* ceive ? This belief, Sir, is none of my ' manufa6lure ; it came from the mint of ' nature ; it bears her image and fuper-
* fcription ; and if it is not right, the fault
* is not mine. I even took it upon trufi:,
* and without fufpicion. Reafon, fays
* the fceptic, is the only judge of truth,
* and you ought to throw off every opi-
* nion, and every belief, that is not
* grounded on reafon. Well, Sir, why ' (hould I believe the faculty of reafon
* more th.-n that of perception.^ They
both
Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 51
* both came out of the fame fhop, and
* were made by the fame artifl ; and if he
* puts one piece of falfc ware into my
* hands, what fhould hinder him from
* putting anodier ?'
* Pcrliaps the fceptic will agree to dif- truft reafon, ratlier than give any credit to perception. For, fays he, fince by your own confefiion, the objecl which you perceive, and that aQ of your mind by which you perceive it are quite different things, the one may exift without the other ; and as the objetl may exift with- out being perceived, fo the perception may exift without an objeQ. There is nothing fo fhameful in a philofopher as to be deceived, and deluded, and there- fore you ought firmly to withhold your affent, and throw off this belief of ex- ternal objefts, which may be all delu- fion. For my part, I will never attempt to throw it ofP, and although the fober part of mankind will not be very anxious to know any reafons, yet if they can be of ufe to any fceptic, they are thefe.'
E 2 No^v
52 R E M A R K S O X
Now, as I do not pretend to rank my- felf v/ith thofe whom Dr. Reid will call the foher part of mankind, I frankly ac- knowledge that I have had a little curio- fity to look at thefe reafons.
The firil I find is, that it is not in his power to believe otherwife, which I pre- fume I have confidered fufficiently above.
His fecond argument is derived from the dangerous confequences which ,he afcribes to Berkley's hypothefis, and which he exprefles in that ludicrous and contemptuous manner in which the greateft part of this philofophical treatife is written.
* I think,' fays he, p. 291, ' it would ' not be prudent to throw off this belief, ' if it ^v'ere in my power. If nature in-
* tended to deceive me, and impofe upon ' me by falfe appearances-, and I, by my ' great cunning and profound logic, have
* difcovered the impofbire, prudence
"^ would
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 53
would di6tate to me in this cafe even to ' put up this indignity done me, as qui- ' etly as I could, and not to call her an
* impoftor to her face, left flie (liould be ' even with me in another way. For ' what do I gain by refenting this injury?
* You ought, at leaft, not to believe what ' {he fays. This, indeed, feems reafon-
* able if (lie intends to impofe upon me.
* But what is the confcquence ? I refolve
* not to believe my fenfes. I break my
* nofe againft a poft that comes in my
* way ; I ftep into a dirty kennel ; and
* after twenty fuch wife and rational ac-
* tions, I am taken up, and clapt into a
* mad-houfe. Now Iconfefs I had rather
* make one of the credulous fools whom ' nature impofes upon, than of thofe wife ' and rational philofophers, who refolve
* to withhold allent at all this expence.'
But all this profufion of genuine wit and humour turns upon a grofs mifrepre- lentation of Berkley s theory ; and it is really a pity that what is fo excellent in its kind fliould be thrown away, bv being mifplaccd.
E 3 This
54 RE M ARKS ON
This mirreprerentation and abule is cx- a6lly the conducl of innnv divines, who charge one another will i a6iually maintain- ing the fuppofed confeqnences of their re- fpetlive opinions. But this is no fair con- fequence. Berkley did not exclude from his fyftem fcn/ations and ideas, together with matter, the necejfary conne5iions that fubfift among them or our fiozuer over them. He only afcribed to them a dz/fe- rent origin ; fo that all the rules of con- duct depending upon them are the fame on his fcheme as on ours. Our philofo- phical language only is different.
I fay there is a pod in my way, and I muff turn afide, left I hurt myfelf by running againft it. He, in the fame fitu- ation, is as apprehenfive of danger as myfelf, though he fays he has only the idea of a poft before him ; for if he do not introduce \he idea of avoiding it, he is fenfible that he (hall experience a very painful fenfation, which may bring on other fenfations, till death itfelf enfue. I may fmile at his language, but he is
confiftent
Dr. REID's THEORY. 55
confident with himfLlf, and his fears have as much foundation as mine.
Tliis reprefentation of Berkley's theory, which is common to Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald, and with which they often make themfelves and their rea- ders foohfhly merry, is exceedingly unjufl: ; but when conhdered by philofophers, the laugh mufl rebound upon themfelves.
The third reafon, as our author is pleafed to call it, why he believes in the exigence of a material world, or the evi- dence of his fenfes, is that he does not find that he has been impofed upon by this belief. ' I find,' fays he, p. 293 ' that
* without it I mufl have perifhed by a
* thoufand accidents. I find that without
* it I fhould have been no wifer now than ' when I was born,' &c. &c. &c. But all this goes upon the fame mifreprefentation with the former argument, and is not, in fa6l, at all different from it. Befides, a reafonable degree of evidence, which may be attained witliout tliis extraordinary,
E 4 inftinclivc-
56 RE M ARKS ON
inftinQive, abfolute, and as our author calls it, infpired belief, is juft as ufeful for any real purpofe
SECTION VI.
Mr. Locke'j doclrine not Jo favourable to Berkleys theory as Dr. Reid'j.
TT is by an evident abufe and perverfion "*" of Mr. Locke's do6lrine that Dr. Reid pretends that it is favourable to BiOiop Berkley's notion of there being no mate- rial world ; when, in reality, our author's own principles are much more favourable to that notion than Mr. Locke's.
:' If/ fays he, p. 42, ' impreffions and ' ideas are the only obje6ls of thought,
* then heaven and earth, and body and
* fpirit, and eveiy thing you pleafe, muil ' lignifv only imprelTions and ideas, or ' they muft be words wiuiout any mean-
* kg.'
no.. But
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 57
But it was never" fuppofcd by Mr. Locke, or any other advocate for ideas, that they were more than the immediate obJe6i of our thoughts, the things of which we are properly fpeaking coiifcious, or that we know in the. ji:Ji injtance. From them, however, we think we can infer the real exiflence of other things, from which thofe ideas are derived ; and then we can reafon about thofe objetls, as vrcli as about the ideas themfelves. In facl, ideas being only the ligns of external things, we reafon about the external things themfelves, without ever attending to the ideas which reprefent them, and even without knowing that there are any fuch things in the mind, till we come to reflect upon the fubjefl. In like manner, a perfon may fee perfecllv without ever thinking of his eyes, or indeed knowing that he has any fuch organs.
Mr. Locke would not, indeed, pretend to fuch an abfolute demoyift ration of the reality of an external world as Dr. Reid pleads for ; but neither iii that ftriti de-
monitration
58 R E M A R K S O N
monflration necelTary. It is quite fuffi- cient if tlie fiippofitioii be the eafiefl; hy- potheiis for explaining the origin of our ideas. The evidence of it is fuch that we allow it to be barely poflTible to doubt of it ; but that it is as certain as that two and two make four, w^e do not pre- tend.
Strongly attached as our author is to this material world of ours, let us fee whether his own fyftem, in other refpecls, be fufficiendy adapted to it. Now it appears to me that his notions of mindy ideas, and external ohjcEls, are fuch as are hardly compatible with one ano- ther, that he puts an impaflable gulph be- tween them, fo asintircly to prevent their conneclion or correfpondence ; which is all that the biOiop could wifli in favour of his dotlrine.
' I take it for granted,' fays Dr. Reid, p. 381, ' upon the teRimony of common
* fenfe, that mv mind is a fubftance, that
• is, a permanent fubjcftof thought, and
* my
Dr. R E I IVs T H E O R Y. 59
* my reafon convinces me? thai it is an un-
* extended and invilible (ubtlance ; and ' hence I infer that there cannot be in it any ' thini^that refembles extenfion.' But with equal appearance of truth he might infer that the mindcannot be ^^i'(^c'a' by any thing that has extenfion ; for how can any thing aft upon another but by means of fome common property ? Though, therefore, the divine being has thought proper to create an external world, it can be of no proper ufe to give us fenfations or ideas. It muft be he himfelf that imprefTvi our minds with the notices of external thing's, without any real injlrumentalitv of their own ; fo that the external world is quite a fuperfluity in the creation. If, therefore, the author of all things be a xoife being, and have made nothing in vain, we may conclude that this external world, which has been the fubje6l; of fo much contro- verfy, can have no exiftence.
If then we wifli to preferve this external world, which is very convenient for many purpofeS; we mud take care to entertain
notions
6o R E M A R K S O N
notions of mind and ideas more compati- ble with it than thofe of Dr. Reid.
Our author's fallacious argument from the want of refemblance between our ideas and external obje6ls leads him into many difficulties. It makes him, in feveral refpeRs, allow too much to Dr. Berkley, and to come nearer to him than he is aware. And in fpite of his averfion to the union, and of every thing that he can do or fay, their common principles will bring them together, ' Our fenfa-
* tions,' he fays, p. 305, ' have no refera- ' blance to external obje6ls, nor can w& ' difcover by our reafon any neceffary
* conneclion between the exillence of the
* former and that of the latter. No man,* fays he, p. 85, ' can fiiew by any good
* argument, that all our fenfations might Inot have been as they are, though no
* body or quality of body had ever ex-
* ifted.' He even fays, p. 304, ' that
* when we confide r the different attributes
* of Tdind and body, they feem to be fo ' different, and fo unlike, that we can fmd
' no
Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 61
* no handle by which one may lay hold
* of the other.'
According: to our author, thereforc. Berkley's theory is at leafl; pojfihle ; anri if, as he fays, p. 117, ' fenfations and
* ideas in our minds can referable nothing
* but fenfations and ideas in other minds/ it may well diip^p^dir probable that they are transferred (as Malebranche, I think, fup- pofes) immediately from the divine mind to ours, without any real agency of a ma- terial world. If I could admit Dr. Reid's premifes, I think I could hardly help draw- ing this conclufion from them ; efpecially as nothing can be pleaded for the ex- iftence of this fame material world, but a mere unaccountable perfaajion that it does exift. This perfuafion Dr. Reid fays arifes from a branch of his new common fenfe. But if I cannot difcover or imagine any end or reafon why it fhouid exift ; common fenfe, in its old and familiar acceptation, would tell me that it does not exift at all.
SEC.
62 R E M A R K S O N
SECTION VII.
Afophifm of Mr. Hume'j in purfuance of Berkley'i theory adopted by Dr. Reid.
/^UR author, flruck with a panic fear ^^ of fccpticifm, has been no lefs mif- led and thrown olf his guard by the dan- gerous fophifms of Mr. Hume, than by the innocent ones oFBifliop Berkley.
* The new fftemj by which he means that of Defcartes and Locke, &c. he fays, p. 360, ' admits only of the principles
* of common fenfe as a firft principle, and
* pretends by flrict argumentation to de-
* duce z\\ the red from it. That our ' thoughts, our fenfations, and ever)ahing
* of which we are confcious has a real ex-
* iflence is admitted in this fyflem as a
* firfl: principle, but every thing elfe mufi:
* be made evident by the light of reafon. ' That the rational iffue of this fyflem is
* fcepticifm, with regard to every thing
* excepting the exillence of our ideas,
* and
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R V. 63
' and their necefFary relations, which ap- ' pear upon comparing them, is evident.
* For ideas being the only objefts of
* thought, and having no exiftence but
* when we are confcious of them, it ne-
* cefTarily follows, that there is no object
* of our thought which can have a conti-
* nued and permanent exiflence. Body
* and fpirit, caufe and effecl, time and
* fpace, to which we were wont to afcribe ' an exiflence independent of our thought,
* all are turned out of exiflence by this
* fhort dilemma. Either thefe thinirs are
* ideas of fenfation or reflection, or they
* are not. If they are ideas of fenfation
* or refletlion, they can have no ex-
* iftence but when we are confcious of
* them. If they are not ideas of fenfation
* or refleclion, they are words without any ' meaning.' p. 373.
From this pitiftd fophifin, advanced by Mr. Hume, and deemed unanfwerable by Dr. Rcid, have been derived to us all the inftinclive principles contained in this curious treatife. For being determined
al
64 REMARKS ON
at all adventures to maintain the reality of body and fpirit, caufe and efFe6l, time and fpace, &c. and the old theory of the mind not being, in his opinion, fufficient for the purpofe, a new one muft be found ; and if nothing eife can be had, dill the good things above mentioned muft be re- tained, though we can fay nothing in their favour but tliev are fo becaiife they are Jo, which is Dr. Reid's common fenfe, and his Ihort irrefragable argument.
But if, inflead of fuch a plenary ajfw raiice as only this new common fenfe pro- mifcSj.he would have been content with a reafoncibU degree of evidence for the reality of aJi the things above mentioned, the old Jy, pothehs would have been quite fuffici- ent. It fuits every cafe of fenfations and ideas ; and therefore, according to the re- ceived rules of philofbphizing, has a juft claim to be admitted.
That mind exifls I have tlie very fame rcafon to believe as I have that body ex- jits ; fince it is only by that name that I
diftinguifh
Dr. R E I D's THEORY. 65
diftinguifh that to which certain powers and properties, of which I am confcious, 2i^ perception y memory, will, &c. belong.
I am furprifed that it fhould have been fo readily admitted, that even ideas have no exiftence but when we are confcious of them. We have juft the fame reafon to beheve the identity of an idea, as that of a tree, that of any external body, or that of our own minds themfelves. The idea that I have of my wife or child to-day as much refembles the idea I had of them yefterday, though fome hours of found fleep have intervened, as my houfe of to- day refembles my houfe of yefterday. In this cafe I only judge by the refemblance of my ideas of it ; and if the ideas of my houfe yefterday and to-day were not the fa-me, I fliould have no medium by which to prove the identity of the houfe.
SEC
66 REMARKS ON
SECTION VIII.
Cafes of the ojfociation of ideo^ which had efcaped the attention of Dr, Reid.
Have obferved that one of the fallaci- ous mediums of proof which our au- thor makes much ufe of, in order to prove that we judge and aft from original iri- f[in6l, and not by any acquired power, is our ignorance of the means by which any aftion is performed, and our having made thofe judgments, and performed thofe a6lions, prior to experience. In the former of thefe cafes he draws wrong concliifions from his premiles, and in the latter I have no doubt but he is miftaken with refpeO: to the fa&:s from which he argues. I (hall now prefent my readers with fome inftances of both thefe kinds of fallacy.
* In fome of the voluntary as well as * the involuntary motions' (which Dr. Reid exemplifies by that of the parallel motion
of
Dr. R EI D's T H E O R Y. Gf
of both the eyes, which he fays takes place previousto cuilora, in confequence of fome natural inftinct) * many mufcles,' he fays, p. 187, ' which have no material tie or ' connection, acl in concert, each of them ' being taught to play its part in exatl
* time and meafurc ; yet we fee fuch ac-
* tions no leis (kilfully and regularly per*
* formed in children, and thole who know* ' not that they have fuch mufcles, than ' in the mod fkilful anatomiil and phylio- Mogift;
From thefe premifes we might jufl as well have inferred that we have no fuch mufcles. In fact, our knowledge of the particular mufcles employed in any mo- tion is of no confequence whatever to the performance of it. Nature has fufficiently provided for that in the fimple power of aflbciation, whereby one idea or motion introduces another affociated idea or mo- tion mechanically, and without the exer- tion of any voluntary power in us : and this is equally the cafe whether volition was employed in forming the original af* fociation, or not.
F 2 It
68 R E M A R K S O N
It was my misfortune to have the idea of darknefs, and the ideas of invifible mahgnant fpirits and apparitions very clofely connefted in my infancy ; and to this day, notwithftanding I beheve no- thing of thofe invifible powers, and con- fequently of their connexion with dark- nefs, or any thing elfe, I cannot be per- fectly eafy in every kind of fituation in the dark, though I am fenfible I gain ground upon this prejudice continually.
I likewife fometimes amufe myfelf with playing on a flute, which I did not learn \ery early, fo that I have a perfe6l re- membrance that I exerted an exprefs vo- luntar)^ power every time that I covered any particular hole wnth my finger. But though I am no great proficient on the inftrument, there are fome tunes which I now Ycry often play without ever attend- ing to my fingers, or explicitly to the tune. I have even played in concert, and, as I was informed, perfe6lly in tune, when I have been fo abfent, that, excepting at the beginning, I did not recollect that I had been playing at all. The fame is alfo
frequently
Dr REID's THEORY. 69
frequently the cafe with perfons who are reading.
Now, reaforiing as Dr. Reid does, I fliould conclude that, in this cafe, nofkill, acquired by habit, was employed, but that my fingers were guided by fome ori- ginal inftinftive principle ; and if I had been able to do this earlier than my re- membrance of any thing, I mufthave faid that this was one of thofe powers, which, being latent in the mind, was called forth by proper circumftances. Whereas, I think it more natural to fav, that the aflb- ciation between the ideas of certain founds and the caufe of certain motions of the fingers became in time fo perfeft, that the one introduced the other without any attention ; the interveningexprefs volition, previous to each motion, having been gradually excluded. Fafts of this kind demonftrate that the power of alfociation is fo great, and fo extenfive, that even whole trains and very long trains of ideas, are by this means fo conne6led, that if the firil take place, all the reft will follow of F 3 courfe.
70 R E M A R K S O N •
courfe, without our giving any attention to them, and even while we are attending to other things, and things of a very dif- ferent nature.
* Who,' fays our author, p. 188, Maught
* all the mufcles that are concerned in ' fucking, in fwallowing our food, in
* breathing, and in feveral natural expul-
* fions, to aft their part in fuch regular
* order, and exa6l meafure ? It was not
* cuftom furely.' But in thefe, and many fuch inftances, it is exceedingly probable that the aclions of the mufcles were ori- ginally automatic, having been fo placed by our maker, that at firil they are ftimu- lated and contraB mechanically whenever their atiion is requifite ; and though the mufcles themfelves have no connexion, their nerves are connefted, and they may be fo fituated, that the fame caufes of contra6lion fliall neceffarily affeft: feveral of them at the fame time, or in a certain regular fucceffion. In fom.e of the ac- tions to which Dr. Reid refers, we fee evident marks of fuch a mechanical pro-
grefs ;
Dr. REID's THEORY. 71
grefs ; and more knowledge of nature and phyfiology may lead to the difcovery of more of them ; provided this fyilem of having recourfe at once to ultimate caiifcs does not prevent men from giving proper attention to them.
The f^ces are at firft expelled involim- tarily, and a voluntary power over the mufcles which are fubfervient to that ope- ration is evidently acquired gradually. The fame is the progrefs in the a6lion of blowing the nofe. Children have not, naturally, the lead notion how to do it, any more than they have how to walk. The aftion o^ fucking, I am alfo confi- dent, from my own obfervations, is not natural but acquired ; and fo I believe are all the aftions which Dr. Reid and others, who judge fuperficially in thefe cafes, re- fer to inflinct ; and with refpeft to which I would refer him to Dr. Hartley, who has written exprefsly, and pretty largely upon thefe fubjefts. .
With refpecl to feeing obje£ls erecl by
means of inverted images, Dr. Reid fays,
F4 p. 151,
72 REMARKSON
pi 151-5 that 'the premifes from which
* all mankind are fuppofed to draw the
* concluhon (referring to the Cartefian
* hypothefis) never entered into the minds
* of the far greater part, but are abfolutely
* unknown to them. In order to fee ob? ' je8;S ereft, according to the principles
* of Kepler, we muft previoufly know
* that the rays of light come from the
* obje6l in llraight lines, we muft know ' that the rays from the different points ' of the objeft crofs one another before ' they form pictures upon the retina, and ' laftly we muft know that thefe pidures ' are really inverted. Now though all
* thefe things be true, and known to phi-
* lofophers, yet they are abfolutely un-
* known to the far greateft part of man- ' kind ; nor is it poflible that they wlio
* are abfolutely ignorant of them fhould
* reafon from them, and build conclufions ' upon them.'
I do not know how this may affecl others, but it really furprifes me to hear a man of any underftanding reafon fo very
weakly.
Dr. REID's THEORY. 73
weakly. To feel a thing, to be affected by it, and to be influenced and direded in our future condu6l by that feeling, certainly cannot require that we fhould knoio the connexion there is between the objecls and our perceptions of them ; but (imply that there he that connexion. They who are the moil ignorant of the laws of vilion are neverthelefs fubjeEi to them ; fo that their retinas, optic nerves, brains, and minds are differently affefted in confequence of the rays of light com- ing in (traight lines, crofTmg one another before they reach the retina ; and pic- tures are adually formed there, whether we know of them or not. All men, even the moft ignorant, find by expe- rience which way they muft turn their heads and eyes to look for any obje6l by which they are impreffed ; and thefe al^ fociations are fo frequent, that we pafs immediately and mechanically, from the one to the other ; fo that the moment we perceive an obje6l we throw our heads and dire61 our eyes into the mofl proper pofition for the di(lin6l view of it. If,
for
74 R ^ M A R K S ON
for this purpofe, we find that we muft turn our heads and eyes upwards, we fay the objeft is above us; but if we muft turn them downwards, we fay it is below us, without knowing any thmg farther about the matter.
SECTION IX.,
ConceJJions of Dr. Reid, and other circiim- Jlances which viight have led him to have recourfe to the aflbciation of ideas, ra- ther than to his inftinftive principles.
npHOUGH it is apparent, from the •^ whole of Dr. Reid's treatife, that he has given very little attention to the doc- trine of the affijciation of ideas (far lefs tban its obvious importance demanded) yet in fome cafes, it could not poflibly efcape his notice ; and he has exprelfed himfelf in fuch a manner with refpeft to fome of them as makes me wonder that he did not fee that more ufe might be
made
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 75
made of it, and that the phenomena w^oiild admit of a very eafy explanation, without having recour.'s to his in{lin6live principles : Vv'hich ought to have heeii kept for great emergencies only, nodi deo vindice digni.
I am "particularly furprized that Dr. Reid fhould hefitate to acknowledge that our judgment of the unity of an objeQ: feen with both eyes is acquired, when he owns that we do acquire a judgment w^liich appears to me to be exactly fimilar to it.
He fays, p. 363, that ^ Dr. Smith juftly ' attributes to cuftom that well known
* fallacy in vifion, v^'-hereby a button ' prefied v/ith two oppofite fides of two
* contiffuous finders, laid acrofs, is felt
* double.' He adds, that, * as cuftom - produces this phenomenon, fo a con-
* trary cuftom deftroys it. For if a man ' frequently accuftoms himfelf to feel the
* button with his ftngers acrofs, it will at
* laft be felt fmglc, as I have found by
' experience.'
'j^ REMARKSON
' experience.' Now why may not cuftom do the fame thing with refpect to vifion ? It is evident, from thefe fimilar fatls, that it is within the ^cwt^r of cuflom, and of the affociation of ideas to do it. I can fee no more occafion for naturally corre- fponding points of the retina, than for naturally correfponding places in the fingers.
But he fays, p. 261, ' If fingle vifion ' is the effeft of cuftom, it muft appear
* very ftrange that not one inftance has
* been found of a perfon who had acquired
* the habit of feeing objects fingle with
* both eyes, while they were directed in ' any other manner,' viz. than fo that the centers correfpond. But are not all our eyes fimilar, and arc they not all expofed to fimilar influences ; and what can refult from this but uniformity in our rules of judging by their affeftions P
Our author allows, p. 188, that ' al-
* though it appears to be by natural in-
* ftind that both eyes are always turned
the
Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 77
* the fame way, there is ft ill fome latitude
* left for cuftom. Nature has wifely left
* us the power of varying the parallelifni
* of the eyes a little, fo that we can di-
* reft them to the fame point, whether ' remote or near. This no doubt is
* learned by cuftom, and accordingly we ' fee that it is a long time before children ' get this habit in perfe6lion.' But ac- cording to Dr. Reid's general rule, we ought to have referred this cafe alfo to original inftinft, becaufe we are poftefled of this power prior to any experience that we can remember, and we are not con- fcious of the means by which we exert it, or indeed know that we do any fuch thing at all. Previous to refletlion, we ima- gine that we have ftmply a power of fee- ing diftinclly at different diftances. We are confcious of nothing farther, and therefore, according to this new mode of philofophizing, we may reafonably ac- quiefce in the faft, and call the power original and inftinftive ; in other words, one of the many branches of the new common fenfe.
' Though
78 REMARKS ON
' Though we are not confcious/ lays Dr. Reid, p. 310, 'of the motions wc ' perform in order to ht the eyes to the ' diilance of obje6ls, we are confcious of ' the effort employed in producing thefc
* motions, and probably have fomefenfa- ' tion which accompanies them, to which
* we give as little attention as to other
* fenfations.' But unlefs the diilance be confiderable, we are not confcious of uhng^ny effort at alL Befides, accord- ing to this new mode of reafoning, how can the mind employ the mufcles that are requifite to make this effort, when it has no knowledge of them, or indeed of the nature and mode of atlion of any muf- cle whatever?
As our author generally refers that to inftinfcl; which has been acquired by ex- perience and the affociation of ideas, fo he gives to cuflom and experience what properly belongs to reafoning and judg- ment : thoucrh here alio his ov/n concef- lions might have led him to a right judg- ment in the feveral cafes.
' When
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 79
' Wlien I hear a certain found,' he fays, p. 71, * I conclude immediately v/ithout
* reafoning, that a coach paffes by. There ' are no premifes by w^hich this conclu- ' fion is inferred by any rules of logic.
* It is the effecl of a principle of our na- ' lure common to us v/ith the brutes.' This principle he before called cuftom or experience.
In what diiferent lights may the fame thing be feen by diiferent perfons, accord- ing as their different hypothefes incline them to regard it. In this very mentaj operation, or procefs, in which Dr. Reid can find no trace of reafoning or judg- ment, I think I fee every part of a com; plete ars^ument; and even that facility, and readinefs in paffing from the premifes to the conclufion, which argues, the very perfeftion of intelleft in the cafe. For in my idea it is only in confequence of the mode of reafoning being very familiar., that the mind jumps with fuch rapidity to the final judgment, that it requires fome attention to difcover the medium of propf.
The
So REMARKS ON
The procefs, when properly unfolded, is as follows : The found I now hear is, in all refpefts, fuch as I have formerly heard, which appeared to be occafioned by a coach paffing by, ergo, this is alfo occa- fioned by a coach. Into this fyllogifm it appears to me that the mental procefs that Dr. Reid mentions may fairly be re- folved ; and I am furprized he fhould not have thought fo himfelf, when he exprefsly allows, p. 128, that' the operations of the ' mind may be fo fubtle, that we draw
* conclufions without ever perceiving that ' the premiles entered the mind.' This conceffion, which is a verv juft and rea- fonable one, certainly overturns the very foundation of his argument in the pre- ceding cafe.
In this one cafe Dr. Ofwald, more con- fidently with thefyftem, decides againft his mafter. * The fuppofition, ' fays he, vol. 2, p. 56, ' of a procefs of reafon-
* ing which pafles fo quickly through
* the mind as not to be perceived, is al-
* together arbitrary ; and arbitrary fup-
* pofitions are extremely injurious to truth,
* and
Dr. R E I D 's THEORY. 81 .t
* and give birth to that multitude of chi-
* merical hypothefes by which mankind
* have been milled.'
If a dog can form the fame conclufion from the fame premifes, I would notfcru- ple to fay that the dog reafoned as well and as juftly as myfelf. I fee no reafon to deny brute animals the power of rearon*- ing concerning the objects about which they are converfant. They certainly a6l as confequentially, as if they reafoned.
Again, upon our author's miftaking a feagull for a man on horfeback, he fays, p. 319, ' the miflake and the correftion
* of it are both fo fudden, that we are at
* a lofs whether to call them by the name
* of judgment, or by that of fimple per-
* ception.' In fa6l, thefe things run in- fenfibly into one another.
Laftly, he acknowledges, p. 154, that
* it muft be extremely dithcult to diflin-
* guifh the immediate and natural obje6ls
* of fight, from the conclufions which we
G ' have
82 REMARKS ON
'have been accuftomed to draw from
them/
SECTION X.
Of Dr. Kti^s principle of credulity, and^ his idea of the principles of indudion, and analogy,
T^HAT any man fhould imagine that -*• a peculiar inftindive principle was neceffary to explain our giving credit to the relations of others, appears to me, who have been ufed to fee things in a different light, very extraordinary; and yet this do6lrine is advanced by Dr. Reid, and adopted by Dr. Beattie. But really what our author fays in favour of it is hardly defer ving of theflighteft notice.
* If credulity,' he fays, p. 340, * were ' the effecl; of reafoning and experience,
* it muft grow up and gather ftrength irt
* the fame proportion as reafon and ex-
* perience
Dr. RE ID'S THEORY. 83
' perience do. But if it is the gift of
* nature, it will be the ftrongeft in child-
* hood, and limited and reflrained by ex-
* perience ; and the moft fuperficial view
* of human life fliows that this laft is re- ' ally the cafe^ and not the firft.'
This reafoning is exceedingly falla- cious. It is a long time before a cl i'd hear any thing but truth, and therefore it can expe6i nothing elfe. The contrary would be abfolutely miraculous. Fahe- hood is a new circuniflance, which he like- wife comes to expeft in proportion as he has been taught by experience to expe6l it. What evidence can we poflibly have of any thing being neceflarily connefted with experience and derived from it, be- fides its never being prior to it, always confequent upon it, and exa£lly in pro- portion to it ?
I fhall now confider what our author fays of the nature of reafoning by induc- tion and analogy. * If,' fays he, p. 340,
* a certain degree of cold freezes water
G 2 * to-day.
84 REMARKS QK
to-day, and has been known to do fo in all time paft, we have no doubt but the fame degree of cold will freeze water to-morrow, or a year hence. When I compare the idea of cold, with that of water hardened into a tranfparent folid body, I can perceive no connexion be- tvsreenthem. No rriancan fliew the one to be the neceffary effe6l of the other. No [mail can give a (hadow of a reafon why nature has conjoined them. But do not we learn that conjunftion from experience? True, experience informs us that they have been conjoined in time paft, but no man ever had any expe- rience of what is future ; and this is the very queftion to be refolved. How come we to believe that the future will be like the paft ? Children and ideots have the belief of the continuance of the prefent courfe of nature as foon as they know that fire will burn them. It muft therefore be the effecl of inftin6l not of reafon.'
But
Dr; R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 85
But experience does a great deal more than Dr. Reid here fuppofes. It not only informs us that cold and freezing have been conjoined in time paft, but alfo that what is now \\mt pajl, was once, future ; and therefore that there is no more reafon to fufpeft that cold will not freeze water now, than there was to doubt yefterday that it would freeze it to-day. It is only puzzling the quefliion to confider time as pafl or future in this cafe. We alfo find by experience that we have not hitherto been deceived in our expeftation that the future will be like the paft in former in- flances, and therefore cannot have any fufpicion of being deceived in a fimilar expeftation in other inftances. It is re- ally aftonifhing that any man fhould afk the queftion that Dr. Reid does here,
• How came we to believe that the fu-
* ture will be like the pafl ? It is certainly fufficient to fay in anfwer to this. Have we not always found it to be fo ? and therefore, how can we fufpe^l the con- trary ? Though no man has had any ex- perience of what is future, every man has
G3 had
86 REMARKSON
had experience of w^^at was future. Every ftep that I take among this writer's fophifms raifes my aftonifhment higher than before.
He farther fays, p. 347, ' If any reader
* (liould imagine that the induftive prin-. ' ciple may be refolved into what philo- ' fophers ufuaDy call afTociation of ideas,
* let him obferve that by this principle
* natural figns are not aflbciated widi ' ideas only, but with the belief of the
* things fignified. Now tliis can with no
* propriety be called an affociation of
* ideas, unlefs ideas and behef be one
* and the fame thing.'
This appears to me to be a mere quib- ble, for not only may ideas, properly fo called, but every thing that is mentalj as hdief, and every other operation or af- fection of the mind, and even the imme- diate caufe of mufcular motion, be the fubje6l of affociation, as we fee it to be in faft. Not to fay that beliefs as Dr. Hart- ley has explained it, confiRs of ideas, and
is.
Dr. REID's THEORY. 87
is, in faft, nothing but a complex idea, or feeling.
I could have had no conception that a profefTed enemy to fcepticifra, as Dr. Reid is, fhould himfelf be To fceptical as he is with refpeft to many of the mod uncon- troverted maxims of philofophy. But, indeed, it is no uncommon thing to charge another with our own peculiar failings, and to fee a mote in our brother's eye, when we cannot difcern a beam in our own. And as fcepticifm and credulity go hand in hand with unbelievers, fo they do with Dr. Reid. Where all the reft of the world fee the moft clofely connefted chain of reafoning, he is always ready to fufpe6l that fome link is wanting, and as ready to fupply the imaginary defe6l, not with another link, but with fomethingthat is no proper part of a chain, but fome in- vifible power to keep the two parts toge- ther.
He is fo eager to find arbitrary connec-
iions between objeQs and fenfations, and
G 4 between
88 REMARKSON
between fenfations and judgment, that he fometimes overlooks the moft neceflary connexions of things. He fays, p. 163 that * the material imprefTion upon the
* retina, by means of the rays of light, - * fuggeft colour, and the pofition of fome
* external objeft ; but no man can give a
* reafon why the fame material impreflion
* might not have fuggefted found, or fmell,
* or either of thefe, along with the pofi-
*tionofthe obje6l. And fmce there is ^ * no neceflary connexion between thefe
* two things, it might, if it had fo pleafed
* our creator, have fuggefted one of them
* without the other.' But it is obvious to remark, that then rays of light muft not have been made ufe of, for thefe ne- cejfarily fuggeft both colour and form.
SEC-
Dr. R E I D' s THEORY. 89
SECTION XI.
Of the natural Jigns of the pajfions.
/^NE would think that a manmuflne- ^^ ver have heard of the general prin- ciple of the ajfociation of ideas , who could poflibly take it into his head that certain ■features, modulations of the voice, and attitudes of the body, require any other principle, in order to fuggeft the idea and belief of certain thoughts, purpofes, and difpofitions of mind. Dr. Reid indeed afferts, in proof of this, that ' an infant
* may ^be put into a fright by an angry ' countenance, and foothed againby fmiles
* and blandifhments,' p. 89. Now I have had children of my own, and have made many obfervations and experiments of this kind upon them, and upon this authority I do not hefitate abfolutely to deny the fa6l with refpe6l to them ; and I have no doubt but that the fame is the cafe with refpeft to all other infants ; unlefs thofe of Dr. Reid ftiould be as different front
mine
9» R E M A R K S O N
mine as are our notions of human nature. But nature, I believe, is pretty uniform in her operations and produftions, how dif- ferently foever we may conceive of them*
. Dr. Reid talks of an infant being pert into a fright. On the contrary, I affert that au infant (unlefs by an infant he; {hould mean a child w^ho has had a good deal of experience, and of courfe has mad^ many oblervations on the connexions of things) is abfolutely incapable of terror^ J. am pofitive that no child ever (howed the leaft. fvtnptom of fear or apprehenfion, till he had actually received hurts, and had felt pain ; and that children have no fear of any particular perfon or thing, but ii> tonfequence of forae connexion be- tween that perfon or thing and the pain they had fek. ■ f-», •, ,
If any inilinct of this kind was more .neceffary than another, it would be the dread ofjire. But every body muff have obferved that infants fhow no fign of any fuch thing ; for they will as readily put
their
Dr. REI D's THEORY. ^i
their fiqger to the flame of a candle as to any thing elfe, till they have been burned. But after fome painful experience of this knd their dread of fire becomes one of Dr. Reid's original inflinctive principles, and it is as quick and as effeftual in its operations as the very befl of them.
I, moreover, do not hefitate to fay, that if it were polTible always to beat and ter- rify a child with a placid countenance, fo as never to alTume that appearance but in thofe circumflances, and always to footh him with what we call an angry countenance, this natural and neceffary connexion of ideas that Dr. Reid talks of would be reverfed, and we fhould fee the child frighted with a fmile, and delighted with a frown.
In faft, there is no more reafon to be- lieve that a child is naturally afraid of a frown, than he is afraid of being in the dark ; and of this children certainly dif- cover no fign, till they have either found fomething difagreeable to them in the
dark.
93 REMARKS ON
dark, or have been told that there is fomething dreadful in it.
SECTION XII.
Of the judgment we form concerning the feat of pain,
TT alfo appears to me that a man miifl *^ be flrangely prepofTelTed in favour of inftin6live principles who (hould think of having recourfe to them for diftinguifhing the parts of our bodies affe6led with par- ticular pleafures or pains, when the cafe Vs To eafily explained by the general laws bf affbciation, aided by experience.
' The fenfation of pain,' Dr. Reid fays, p. 209, * is no doubt in the mind, and cant *' not be faid to have any relation, from it§ ' own nature, to any part of the body. * But this fenfation by our conflitution ^^'^gives a perception of fome particular
* part
Dr REID's THEORY. 93
' part of our body whofe diforder caufes
* the uneafy fenfation. If it were not fo, ' a man who never before felt either the
* gout or tooth ach, when he is firft feized
* with the gout in his toe might miftake
* it for the tooth ach.'
Now this, I believCj would be the cafe if a man had never before had any fenfa- tion of anv kind either in his toe or in his tooth. For though Dr. Reid fays that judgments of this kind are antecedent to all experience, I am pofitive he can have no authority from fa6l for the affertion, or for believing that an infant can diftin- guifli the feat of any fenfation, or fo much as know to which of his organs to refer any of them, the firft time that they are perceived. Indeed, there is no fort of occafion for any fuch early knowledge of this kind ; for though the very firft time that a child ftiould make ufe of his ears or nofe, he fhould not know which of them it was that was affefted by afmell or a found, he would foon acquire that know- ledge by experience ; finding himfelf re- lieved
94 R E M A R K S O N
lieved by flopping his nofe when he per- ceived a difagreeable fmell, and by Hop- ping his ears v/hen he perceived a dis- agreeable found.
In the fame manner in which we learn to refer the feveral fenfations to their pro- per organs, we learn to refer pains and impreffions of all kinds to the places from which the nerves convey them. If Dr. Reid has ever made obfervations upon children, he muft have obfer\'ed that they do this in a very imperfe6l manner, making many miftakes, and growing more perfecl in the exercife by degrees.
Even men cannot accurately diflinguilh the part of the body affefted with pain without the afTi fiance of fight, in thofe parts which have not been the feat of any very diflinguifhable fenfation. Let the experiment be made by pricking the part, and requiring the perfon to put the tip of his finger exa6lly upon it, when he is blind- folded.
Of
Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y 95
Of the feat of internal pains mankind in general have very little knowledge. But in this refpeft alfo men improve by obfervation and experience, and thofe who have had the moft experience have the moft accurate knowledge of this kind^ as is the cafe of all other knowledge ac- quired by experience. Let Dr. Reid ap- ply to this cafe his own obfervations con- cerning xh^fenfe of credulity.
From the whole of Dr. Reid's reafon- ing on thefe fubje6ls, one would think that he had never heard of fuch things as nerves proceeding from all the different parts of the body to the brain, all ap- propriated to their refpe6live ufes, fuch as the optic nerves, the auditory nerves, the olfactory nerves, each of which convey fenfations of different kinds, en- tering the brain at different places ; but that the bufmefs of fenfation and percep- tion was performed in fome ftrange arbi- trary manner without them, or any thing of the kind.
SEC-
96 REMARKS ON
SECTION XIII.
Mifcellaneous obfervations.
T Shall clofe thefe animadverfions on Dr. Reid's performance with a few mifcellaneous articles which (hew either the extreme inattention of our author, in condemning others for faults of which he himfelf is guilty, claiming difcoveries which have really nothing in them, or making g:reat boafts when he appears to have been exceedingly ignorant with refpeft to the fubje6l of which he writes, and the hiftory of it.
Dr. Reid joins in the general laugh at Defcartes's argument to prove his own exigence from an atl of his mind, viz. doubting, p. 1 1 . * For he takes his ex-
* iftence for granted in this argument, and
* proves nothing at all.' Yet this author himfelf argues in a manner exa6lly fimilar to this of Defcartes. * No man,' fays he, p. 29, * can conceive or believe fmelling
' to
Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 97
' to exifl of itfelf without a mind, or
* fomething that has the power of fmell-
* ing,' and p. 48, * It appears to be an ' undeniable fa6l, that, from thought or ' fenfation, all mankind, conftantly and
* invariably, from the firfl dawning of re-
* fle£lion, do infer a power or faculty of 'thinking, and a permanent being, or
* mind, to which that faculty belongs.' Though, how this is confident with what he had faid juft before, viz. that ' the
* belief of our exiftence precedes all rea-
* foning and experience,' I do not fee.
Certainly the firfl thing that the mind attends to is not itfelf, but the things that affetl it, or operate upon it. We firfl per- ceive fome property of every thing before we think of the thing itfelf. Let Dr. Reid, or any other perfon, fay how the exiflence of the mind mufl be evidenced but by its affe6lions or operations. Our author even allows that a perfon may have exifled a confiderable time without any power of refleclion, and confequently without having an idea of his own ex- H iflence.
98 REMARKS 0>f
iftence. In reality we fmrle at Defcartfess argument, notbecaufe it is an fnconclufive or improper one, but becaixfe the thing to be proved is fo evident, that it needs no proof.
Our author argues largely, p. 135, in favour of the opinion of the vulgar, that colour is a quahty of bodies. Of this he makes a great parade, as of fome ver^ ferious bufinefs ; but I fhall not argue ihd matter ferioufly with him, becaufe I take' it for granted he has feen optical e±- periments, and therefore cannot poflTibly differ from me except in words. I (hall only obferve with refpeft to the fubjeft, that the vulgar are eafily brought tcr 2it-^ knowledge their miftake, and never fail to( exprefs their furprize, as at a real difco^- very, and what was utterly inconfifterit with their former notions of the matter, when they are fhewn pieces of white? paper affuming all the colours of the rainbow by means of a prifm, without an/ real change in the paper. This has con- vinced every perfon to whom I have evef
(hewed
Dr. "'R E I D 's T H E O R Y. '^^
fheW^d the experiment, that colour is in the rays &f light, and not in the body.
* Nothing,' fays our author, p. 16 J,
* fhews more clearly otir indifpofition to ' attend to vifible figure, and vifible ex- ' tenfion, than this, that, although ma-
* thematical reafoning is nolefs applicable ' to them than to tangible figure and
* extenfion ; yet they have intirely efcaped
* the notice of mathematicians.
By vifible figure, &c. our author means the projection of the forms of external obje6ts on the concave bottom of the eye. But to what purpofi would it have i)een to have taken any pains with the fubjeft, when it can be of no pofTible ufe, and all that we have really any thing to do with are the properties of the things of which thefe images are merely the Jlgns. No ^an who had any thing feri- ous to attend to would ever think of it. I do not remember ever to have feen a more egregious piece of folemn trifling than the chapter which our author calls H 2 the
loo R E M A R K S O N
the geometry ofvijibles and his account of the Idomenians, as he terms thofe imagi- nary beings who had no ideas of fub- fiance but from fight. Befides, our au- thor acknowledges that the figures upon the retina differ exceedingly little from the real figures which they reprefent.
Another afFeftation of originality we fee in what our author fays concerning the idea of hardne/s. ' The fenfation ' of hardnefs,' he fays, p. 83, ' is fo much
* unknown as never to have been the
* objeft of tliought and refleftion, nor to
* have been honoured with a name in any*
* language. May we not hence conclude ' that the knowledge of the human facul-^
* ties is but in its infancy ?'
Now I fee nothing particularly A^ra?, to ufe a pun, in the cafe of this fame idea of hardnefs. Indeed, it is very rarely that we bellow a name upon the idea of any thing. It is very well if the thing itfelf have got a name ; for many are obliged to go without names. But though I fhall
not
Dr. R E I D's THEORY, loi
not take the trouble to look into Mr. Locke forthe purpofe, I make no doubt but that he, and many others, have men- tioned the idea of hardnefs among other abilraft ideas, of much more importance, without confounding it with the hard fub- ftance that occafioned the idea. At lead Dr. Reid's obfervation does not ftrike me as any thing either new, or at all im- portant.
That our author is extremely ignorant of what has been written by others on the fubjeft of the human mind, is evi- dent, not only from his total filence con- cerning Dr. Hartley (whofe name, how- ever, appears to have reached Scotland ; for his work is quoted with fome degree of refpecl by Dr. Beattie) but from his grofs miftake concerning the hints that Newton and others have dropped on the fubje£l.
' About the time of Dr. Briggs,' hej
fays, p. 278, ' the fyflem of the nerves
* was thought to be a ftringed inftrument,
^ compofed of vibrating chords^ each of
H 3 * which
102 R E M A R K S O N
' vfhich had its proper tenfion and tone/ I fhall not explain to our author what kind of vibration w^as fuppofed to affe6t the nerves, that I may give him an op- portunity of getting a httle more know- ledge of his fabjetl by looking into Nev\^- ton or Hartley himfelf. But this I will -venture to fay, that fueh grofs ignorance in a profeffor of this very fubjetl;, in fo confiderable an univerfity, which has hi- therto been diftinguiflied for the real emi- nence of its profeffors in that department, is difgraceful to himfelf and to the uni- verfity. I will even venture to call upon Dr. Reid to name any writer (that has ever had the leafl; fhadow of reputation) who ferioufly maintained that the fyflem of the nerves does refemble ajiringed in- Jirament, compofed of vibrating chords, if any fuch hypothefis w^as ever advan- ced, I own, it has efcaped my notice. The hypothefis of Dr. Briggs himfelf, to which our author probably refers, was very different from this.
To
Dr. RE I D's T H EORY. 103
To trcAJt with contempt, as Dr. Reid docs, every hypothecs that has been pro- pofed, and to offer another ftill more ah- furd, merely to laugh at it, and to turn the whole rubjc-8; into pdicuie, certainly does r>ot,become a philofopher, who means to promote an inquiry into the powers of nature. I can compai;e Dr. Reid's conducl in this cafe to nothing but that of the dog in the mcinger ; for he profefTedly has no knowledge of the fubjetl himfelf, and does every thing in his power to prevent others from knowing any thing about it, or inquiring into it.
To give my reader an idea of our au- thor's talent for ii'ony, and at the fame time to afford him a little refpite from metaphyhcal reafoning, I fhall fubjoin his account of this new hypothefis of the ufe of the nerves. After enumerating and laughing at every other hypothefis, he fay^, p. 278,
* Thefe, I think, are all the engines
" into which the nervous fyllem has been
H 4 * moulded
104 R E M A R K S O N
* moulded by philofophers, for conveying
* the images of fenfible things from the
* organ to the fenforium. And for all ' that we know of the matter every man
* may freely chufe what he thinks fitted
* for the purpofe ; for from fa6l and ex- ' periment no one of them can claim pre-
* ference to another. Indeed, they all
* feem fo unhandy engines for carrying ' images, that a man would be tempted ' to invent a new one,
' Since then a blind man may guefs as
* well in the dark as one that fees, I beg
* leave to offer another conje6lurc touch- ' ing the nervous fyflem, which I hope ' will anfwer the purpofe as well as thofe ' we have mentioned, and which recom- ' mends itfelf by its fimplicity. Why ' may not the optic nerves, for inftance,
* be made up of empty tubes, opening ' their mouths wide enough to receive the
* rays of light which form the image up- ' on the retina, and gently conveying ' them fafe, and in their proper order, to ' the very feat of the foul, until theyjlajh
* 1)1
Dr. R E I D 's THEORY. 105
'in her faceup It is eafy for an ingeni-
* ous philofopher to fit the caliber of thofe
* empty tubes to the diameter of the par-
* tides of light, fo as they (hall receive
* no grofler kind of matter. And if thefe
* rays fhould be in danger of miflaking 'their way, an expedient may alfo be
* found to prevent this. For it requires
* no more than to beftow upon the tubes
* of the nervous fyftem a periftaltic mo-
* tion, like that of the alimentary tube.
* It is a peculiar advantage of this hy-
* pothefis, that, although all philofophers ' believe that the fpecies or images of ' things are conveyed by the nerves to
* the foul, yet none oftheirhypothefesfhew
* how this may be done. For how can
* the images of found, tafte, fmell, co-
* lour, figure, and all fenfible qualities,
* be made out of the vibrations of mufi- ' cal chords, or the undulation of animal
* fpirits, or of aether ? We ought not to
* fuppofe means inadequate to the end. ' Is it not as philofophical, and more in-
* A very expreffive and elegant phrafe.
^ telligiblc:,
loS REM ARKS ON
* J^elligible, to conceive, that as the flo- ' paach receivCvS its food, fo the foi^l re-
* ceives her images by a kind of ner^aus
* deglutition ? I might add, th^ w>e ^i^ed ' only continue this perilialtic motion of
* the nervous tubes from the fenforium to
* |:he extremities of the nerves that ferve ~* the mufcles, in order to account for muf-
* eular motion.
* Thus nature will be confonan,t to her-
* felf, and as fenfation will be the convey-
* ance of the ideal aliment to the mind, fo
* mufcular motion will be the expullion
* of the reciementiiious part of it. For
* who can deny that the images of things
* conveyed by fenfation may, after due
* concoclion, become fit to be thrown off
* ty mufcular motion? I only give hints
* of thefe things to the ingenious, hoping
* that in time this hypothehs may be ' wrought up into a fyftem, as truly philo- ' fophical as that of animal fpirits, or the
* vibration of nervous fibres. To be
* ferious'-rr-T^ — -
To
Dr. R E I D ' s THEORY 107
To be ferious then. By fome perfons all this may be thought very ingenious and clever, the irony delicate, and the ex- prefTion eleganjt. But while fome laugh with the writer, others may be more difpofed to laugh at him, both for his ignorance and his buffoonery. I ftiall only fay that if I h^ve the leafl notion of what the true fpirit of philofophy is, this is the very re- verfe of it ; and thatfuch a mode of writing ought to be treated with indignation and contempt.
Our author's concliifion, as well as his dedication, which, though printed firfl, fup- pofes the book to have been written before it, fhews a perfuafion of his having done great things, though his ftyle is unlike that of Horace or Ovid, Jamque Opus
exegv 'He imagined, I fuppofe, that
he had thrown many new lights upon the fubjeQ: of human nature, by throwing down the old ones erefted by Defcartes ?md Locke.
In-
io8 R E M A R K S O N
* I intended to have examined more
* particularly and fully this doftrine of
* the exiftence of ideas, or images of things
* in the mind, and likewife another doc-
* trine which is founded upon it, to wit,
* that judgment or belief is nothing but a
* perception of the agreement or difagree-
* ment of our ideas, but having already
* fhewn that the operations of the mind '* which we have examined give no coun-
* tenance to either of thefe do6lrines, and
* in many things contradi6l them, I have ' thought it proper to drop this part of
* my defign. It may be executed with
* more advantage, if it is at all neceffary,
* after inquiring into fome other powers
* of the human underflanding.
' Although we have examined only the ' five fenfes, and the principles of the hu-
* man mind which are employed about
* them, orfuch as have fallen in our way
* in the courfe of this examination, we
* (hall leave the further profecutionofthis
* inquiry to future deliberation. The
* powers of memory, of imagination, of
' tafte.
Dr. REID's THEORY. 109
* tafte, of reafoning, of moral perception,
* the will, the paflions, the afFeftions, and ' all the atlive powers of the foul, prefent ' a vaft and boundlefs field of philofophi-
* cal difquifition, which the author of this
* inquiry is far from thinking himfclf able • ' to furvey with accuracy. Many authors
* of ingenuity have made excurfions into ' this vaft territory, and have communi-
* cated ufeful obfervations, but there is ' reafon to believe that thofe who have
* pretended to give us a map of the whole
* have fatisfied themfelves with a very in-
* accurate and incomplete furvey.*
Then fpeaking of what Galileo and Newton have done in the natural world,'- he adds, ' Ambitious of following fuch ' great examples, with unequal fteps, alas
* and unequal force, we have attempt-
* ed an inquiry only into one little corner ' of the human mind, that corner which
* feems to be moft expofed to vulgar ob- ' fervation, and to be moft eafily compre-
* hended ; and yet, if we have delineated ' itjuftly, itmuft be acknowledged that
* the
I'lo REMARK^ ON
'the accounts heretofore given of it were ' very lame, and wide of the truth.'
The fubjefts our author here fpeaks of do certainly prefent a wide field of phi- lofophical difquifition ; and if fo many- new and important truths have occurred to our philofopher and guide in the exa- mination of the five fenfes only, xKis/malL corner of the human nmnd, what may we" not exped; from his farther progrefs? which I hope the learned Benengeli will not fail to relate. Inftinftive principles will then be as common and as cheap — but I forget the proverb — and as many dillinct independent laws of nature Will be found in this mwrocofm of man only, as have by others been thought neceffary for the fyftem of the unrverfe. But what an idea rauft this author, and his admirers Jiave of the laws of nature !
SliouM another genius arife, and dif-- cover as many new laws in the fyftem o^ matter, as Dr. Reid has in the fyftem of mind, we fkall be fo bewildered and
con-
Dr. REID's THEORY. iji
confounded as hardly to retain the ufe of thofe five fenfes about which our author has taken To much elaborate pains. But I hope our knowledge of this part of na- ture is too far advanced to faffer ourfelves to be fo much bewildered and puzzled, as it feems the inhabitants of Great-Bri* tain and Ireland have hitherto been, with the ingenious fpeculations of Dr. Reid.
REMARKS
■ r^\]n
REMARKS
ON - i
Dr. B E AT T I E's ESS AY
O N T H E
NATURE and IMMUTABILITY
O F
T R U ■t H.
THE
INTRODUCTION.
HAVING animadverted fo largely upon Dr. Reid's performance, I fhall have the lefs to fay with re- fpe6l to that of Dr. Beattie, who adopts his general fyftem oiinJlinElive principles of truth, and difcovers too muchofhisy^m^ and manner, which is exceedingly deci- five, and infolent to thofe who think diffe- rently from himfelf ; and he even exceeds Dr. Reid in throwing an odium upon thofe whofe fentiments he is willing to de- cry, by afcribing to them dangerous and frightful confequences, with which they are far from being juftly chargeable.
I believe, however, that Dr. Beattie
wrote his EJ/ay on the Nature and Imviu-
tability of Truth with the very befl inten-
1 2 tion
ii6 R E M A R K S O N
tion in the world ; and that it was nothing but his zeal in the moft excellent caufe, that of religion, which has betrayed him into thefe rafh cenfures, and into a mode of reafoning which I cannot help thinking to be very prejudicial to the caufe of that very truth which he means to fupport, and favouring that very fcepticifm which he imagined he was overthrowing.
I believe farther, and I moft fincerely rejoice in it, that Dr. Beattie's treatife has done a great deal of good to the caufe of religion ; and I hope it will ftill continue to do fo, with a great majority of thofe who are moft in danger of being feduced by the fophiiiry of Mr Hume, and other modern unbelievers ; I mean with Jicper- Jicial iJunkers, who are fatisfied \yith fee- ing fuperficial objections anfwered in a lively, though a fuperii^ial manner. Be- llies, I do think that, infeveral refpe6ls. Dr. Beattie's ilriclures on Mr. Hume are juft; and therefore that they will be an ufeful antidote to the mifchief that might be apprehended from his writings.
But
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 117
.• But there is danger left other perfons, of greater penetration, finding that Dr. Beattie argues on fallacious un- philofophical principles, (hould rejeft at once, and without farther examination, all that he has built upon them. With refpecl to fuch perfons, it may be of im- portance to (how that religion, though affailed from fo many quarters as it has been of late, is under no neceffity of tak- ing refuge in fuch untenable fortrefles as Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald Jaave provided for her ; but that fhe may fafely face the enemy on his own ground, oppofing argument to argument, and filencing fophiftry by rational difcuffion.
In this opinion I am by no means fin- gular. Many judicious perfons, excel- lent fcholars and divines, and whofe me^ taphyfical fyftem is very different from mine, think Dr. Beattie's book by no means calculated to ferve the caufe of truth with philofophical and thinking men ; and that it will be doing fervice to truth and religion to point out the faults 1 3 and
ii8 R E M A R K S O N
and defefts of it. And as I believe Dr. Beattie to be a rtian of candour, I doubt not but he will himfelf take in good part the followinec free animadverfions. If truth be really our obje61, as it is in th^ titles of our books, and we be free from any improper bias, we (hall rejoice in the detection of error, though it fhould ap- pear to have (heltered itfelf under our own roofs. I am very ferious when I add, that fuch a degree of candour and impartiality may be more efpecially ex- pefted of chriftiansy and more efpeciall]^ flill, of thofe who fland forth as cham- pions in the caufe of chriftianity, which is at the fame time the caufe of the moft im- portant truth, and of the moll generous and difmterefted virtue.
To preferve as much order as I well #n in my remarks on Dr. Beattie's per- formance, I fhall firft confider his ac- count of the foundation of truth, and then the feveral particular do6lrines, that he has built upon it.
bbv ' SEC-
Dr. BEATTiE's ESSAV. ng
SECTION I.
Of Dr, Beattie J account of the foundation of truth,
/^UR author adopts Dr. Reid's general ^^ idea of conmion fenfet as the faculty by which we perceive felf-evident truths p. 37, and always confiders it as of the nature of a peculiar kind of injiin6l, ancj very different from Locke's idea o^ judg- ment, in the firft inftance, as refulting from comparing our ideas* This I can- not help thinking to be^ theoretically fpeaking, a very fundamental error, affect- ing the very efjence of truths and leading to endlefs abfurdities.
Had thefe writers affumed, as the ele- ments of their common fenfe, certain truths which are fo plain that no man could doubt of them (without entering into the ground of our aflent to them) their con- du6l would have been liable to very little objection. All that could have been faid 1 4 would
120 R E M A R K SON.
would have been, that, without any n^- ceflity, they had made an innovation in the received ufe of a term. For no per- fon ever ^denied that there are felf-evident truths, and that thefe mufl be afmmed as the foundation of all our reafoning. I never met with any perfon who did not acknowledge this, or heard of any argu- mentative treatife that did not go upon the fuppofition of it. The mofl rigorous reafoners are mathematicians, and they all begin with laying down certain axiomsi diwdi- pojlulatii, which muft be admitted without proof, in order to the demon- ftration of every thing elfe ; and therefore I am really furprized that Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald (hould take fo much pains to prove it. Had the thing been really difpu table, they have faid enough upon thefubjed tobe quite tirefome.
But if we coniider the general tenor of their writings, it will appear that they are faying'one thing and really doing another, talking plaufibly about the neceffity of admitting axioms m general, as the foun- ^ dation
Dr. BEATTIp's ESSAY. 121
dation of all reafo^ing, but meaning to recommend partifiUm\.pqfi.[i.o%s as axioms, not as being fauix4c4 P" the perception of the agreement or difagreement of any ^(ieas, v/hich is the great dociriiie.of Air. Locke, and which makes trtith to. a^^ ■pend upon the' necefiary natiire 01 thingsir to be abfolutCf unchangeable, and ever Lijif ing ; but merely fome unaccountable z?^j Jimciim perfaajions^ depending upon the .arbitrary conftitution of our nature; which makes ail truth to be a thing that is leia^ live to ourfelves only, and confequently to be infinitely vague and precarious.
This fyftem admits of no appeal to r.eafan, properly confidered, which any perfon might be at liberty to examine and difcufs ; but, on the contrary, every man ■ is taught to think himfelf authorized to pronounce deciiively upon every queftion according to his ^rQ^^nifeeliyig, and per- fuafion; under the notion of its being fomething original, inftintlive, ultimate, and uncontrovertible; though, if ftrictly analized, it might appear to be a mere prejudice, the offspring of miflake.
This
T22 R E M A R K S 6 isr
This may appear t6 terfte to bfey 3tfiti all, a bufinefs of metaphyfics only, and si Refinement of no real importance to man* kind ; but it is a miftake that has really Tery ferious and alarming confequences \ for inftead of leading to humility, cau*- tion, and patience in the inveftigation of truth ; it necefTarily ihfpires conceit, and leads to great arrogance and infolfehcd with refpeft to our opponents in contro- verfy, as perfons defeftive in their confti- tution, deftitute of common fenfe, and therefore not to be argued with, but to be treated as ideots or madmen.
Thefe objections aflPecl the ^tMrai fchertie and plan of l3r. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald. My particular obje6l:ion to both thefe writers, as well asi to Dr. Reid, is that they have adopted their elements of knowledge too haftily, and that they hav^ acquiefced in certain maxims, as felf-evi- dent truths, and have treated with great infolence and contempt all endeavours to difprove them ; though fome of thefe max- ims are fo Far from being felf evident, that
m
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 123
in my opinion they are riot true, but capa- ble of a fatisfaftory refutation. At the fa^me time, fmce nio man can pretend to any natural right to Bx the principles of feith for another, they teach unbelievers, and by their example authorize them, to re}c6l the principles of religion by the fame fummary and fuperficial procefs ; as •what appear to them to be, at firft fight, too aMird and ridiculous to be admitted as trtae and divine.
Though I (hall never quarrel with any rrian for the mere ufe of his terms, fmce they are, in their own nature, nothmg ttiore than the arbitrary figns of ideas, I cannot help thinking that the inconveni- cncies above mentioned may attend even the calling of that faculty by which we difcern truth by the name oifenft. By this term philofophers in general have hi- therto denominated thofe faculties in con- fequence of which we are liable tofeelings relative to our/elves only, and from which they have not pretended to draw any con- clufions concerning the nature of things ;
whereas
^.24 . R E M A R -K S ON
whereas truth is a thing not relative, but 'Hbfolute, and real, independent of any re- lation to this or that particular being, or "this or that order of beings. And I think I can evidently perceive that Dr. Beattie •and Dr..Ofwald have both been mifled by this new application of the term fenfi ; Jiaving been led by it to confider all truth as an arbitrary thing, relative to particular beings, and even particular perfons, like the perceptions of any of our external fenfes. In confequcnce alfo of the fame -fundamental error, after having degraded the jiidgment to the level of the fenfes, ,they naturally confider the fenfes as in- titled to the fame refpect, which had ■iifualiy been appropriated to that fuperior faculty by which we diftinguifh truth.
' All that we know of truth or falfe- ' hoo ],' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 196, ' is that "'"our conftitution determines us in fome ''' cafes to believe, in others to difbelieve ; ' &nd that to us is truth which ^s^ feel that
* we muft believe, and that to us is falfe-
* hood which ^Q,feel that we mull difbe-
' lieve.
Dr. ^ B E AT T I E's E S S A Y. 12^
* lieve. If, p. 20I9, a creature of a different ' nature from man were to fay that fnow
* is black and hot, I fhould reply ; it ma^ ' poffibly have that appearance to your
* fenfes, but it has not that appearance to ' mine. It may therefore, in regard to
* your faculties, be true ; and if fo, it ' ought to conftitute a part of your philo-
* fophy ; but of my philofophy it cannot
* conftitute a part, becaufe, in refpe6t of
* my faculties, it is falfe, being contrary ' to fa6l and experience.'
To me this do6lrine appears to be in- tirely fubverfive of all truth ; fince, fpeak- ing agreeably to it, all that we can ever fay is, that certain maxims and propo- rtions appear to be true with refped to our/elves, but how they may appear to others we cannot tell ; and as to what they are in them/elves, which alone is, ftri611y fpeaking, the truths we have no means of judging at all ; for we can only fee with our own eyes, and judge by our own fa- culties, or rather feelings.
If
126 REMATIKS ON ■'
If this be not a fair conclufion from pr. Seattle's reprefentation of the prin- ciples of truth and common fenfe I arft -pot capable of drawing a conclufion. I ^m fure I do not mean to be uncandid. J hope, indeed, and believe, that he will be daggered when he attends to the una- voidable confequences of his do6lrine, fo very unfuitable to a difcourfe on the immutability of truth; becaule it is al- mofl the very thing that he objefts to Mr. Locke, whofe principles he thinks erroneous SLYid dangerous, p. 16, forfpeak- ing of one part of his philofophy he fays, p. 239, ' if it be true, it would go near
* to prove that truth and virtue have at f lead nothing permanent in their nature, ' but may be as changeable as the inclL-
* nations and capacities of men.'
All the reafon that our author afligns why the principle by which we judge of felf-evident truth may.be called di fenfe \^, that fuch judgments are inflantaneous and irrefiftible, like impreflions made upon the mind by means of the external fenfes.
* The term common fenfe,' he fays, p. 45,
* has
Dr. BEATTIE'S ESSAy. 127
> has, in moderrj times, been ufed by
« philofophers to fignify that power of the
"^ jnind which perceives truth or com-
* mands beUef, not by progreffive argu-
* mentation but by an inflantaneous, inr
* ftinclive, and irreft Table impulfe, derived
* ^either from education nor from habit,
* bi^t from nature, afting independently
* on our will, whenever the objeft is pre^
* iented, according to an eftablifhed law ;
* and therefore not improperly called
* ienfe ; and a6ling in a fimilar manner
* upon all, or, at le^ft, upon a great mar
* jority of mankind, and therefore pro-?
* perly called common fenfe^
But fhould we, out of complaifance, admit that what has hitherto been called jW^wm^ may be called y^wy^, it is making top free with the ellablifhed (ignification pf words to call it common fmfe, which in eommpn acceptation has long been ap- propriated to a very different thing, viZv to that capacity forjudging of comm^on things that perfons of middling capacities are capable of.
If
128 REMARKS ON ■■ '
If the determinations of this new prin- ciple of common fenfe be fo inftanta- neous, irrefiftible, and infalHble, as Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald re- prefent, how can we account for all the error there is in the world? When we fee how miferably bewildered the bulk of mankind are,^ one would think that this principle of truth is like the god Baal, W'ho, when he was moft wanted, and ought to have made a point of being pr6- fent, tf -^ffiii his worl^hippers, was afleep, or on a journey, or engaged fome other way. See i. Kings, xviii.
If we apply to Dr. Beattie in this great difficulty he tells us, p. 49, that ' com-
* mon fenfe may^Ianguifh for iwant of ex-J
* ercifcj as in the cafe of a perfon who,.
* blinded by a falfe religion, has been all
* his days accuftomed to diftrull; his own
* fentiments, and to receive his creed from
* the mouth of a prieiL'
Bat if this languifliing of common fenfe refembles the languifliing of any other
fenfe.
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 129
fenfe, I fhould expe6l that the confequence would be our feeing very dimly and ob- fcurely, as with a weak eye, only bear- ing to be ufed with great tendernefs and caution. But though a weak eye can- not bear a (Irong light, and only admits i)f faint and indiflin£l vifion, yet it ex- hibits all things on which it is exercifec} truly, and in their juft proportions, or with- out diftorting one thing more than ano- ther. If a man be fo blind that he cannot fee a houfe, neither can he fee a tree, or any other objeft. I fhould, therefore, expeft that, if a man was fo totally de- prived of common fenfe, as not to be abl^ to diftinguifh truth from falfehood in one cafe, he would be equally incapable of diflinguifhing it in another; and therefore, that the man who fhould put implicit faitk in his prieft would, if he wanted common fenfe, be equally abfurd in his whole con* du6l, which is far from being the cafe - for in other refpe6ls no men think or a6l more rationally than the Roman Catho- lics. How then do the affedions of this common fenfe refemble thofe of the other K fenfes ?
130 REMARKS ON
fenfes ? The analogy appears to me to fail moft eflentially. It does not at all refemble the eye, the ear, the nofe, or any other of the organs of fenfe.
Since Dr. Beattie writes with a prafti- cal, and indeed an excellent defign, let Us confider for a moment, the praBical in- JLuence of this new, and to me ftrange doc^ trine. A man who finds that he thinks differently from the reft of mankind, with refped to any of the principles which Dr* Beattie fhall be pleafed to cdXX primary, SLudJiind a mental (fuppofe the do6lrine of human liberty; or take the cafe of the poor prieft ridden mortal above mention- ed, w^ho may with equal right confider his ow^n principles as fundamental) if he believes, with myfelf, and thofewho have not yet heard of this new principle of faith, that all juft knowledge refults from ajuft view of things, and a comparing of his ideas, and that a habit of juft thinking may be acquired by a courfe of obferva- tion and refleftion duly perfifted in ; and confequently, that if he be in an error, it
is
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 131
is in his own power to fet himfelf right (for that, naturally, he has as good a power of diftinguifliing truth from falfe- hood as his neighbours) a man, I fay, who has thefe views of the nature of truth, and of the faculties by which it is per- ceived, is encouraged to indulge a free- dom of inquiry, and to perfifl in his in- vefligations, though they {hould prove very laborious.
Whereas, if he fliould have read the writers on whom I am animadverting, or Dr. Beattie only, and, in confequence of it, be perfuaded that he perceives all fun- damental truths by fomething that is of the nature of ^fenfc ; he may, indeed, fee reafon to look at any principle pretty attentively ; but if, after giving this kind of attention to it, he perceives that he is not affefted in that inftantaneous, injlinc- live, and irrefiftible manner that Dr. Reid defcribes, he neceflarily concludes that either it was not truth that he was con- templating, or that he is not one of that great majority of mankind who are endued K 2 with
132 REMARKS ON
with the faculty that is neceffary to the perception of it. But which ever of thefe he concludes to be the cafe, he remits his attention, fatisfied that his view of the obje6l is conftitutional and irremediable.
And certainly his determination would be fufficiently countenancedby Dr. Beattie, who fays, p. 47, that * common fenfe ' which, like other inftincls, arrives at ' maturity with almoft no care of ours,
* cannot poflibly be taught to one who
* wants it. You may,' fays our author, p. 47, ' make him remember afet of firft
* principles, and fay that he believes them, ' even as you may teach one born blind
* to fpeak intelligibly of colours and light ;
* but neither to the one nor to the other ' can you, by any means, communicate
* \\\^ peculiar feeling which accompanies
* the operation of that faculty which na-
* ture has denied him. A man defedive
* in common fenfe may acquire learning,
* he may even poflefs genius to a certain
* degree, but the defecl of nature he ne-
* ver can fupply. A peculiar modifica-.
* tion
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 133
* tiori of fcepticifm, or credulity, or le- ' vity, will to tl^ end of his life diftin-
* guifh him from other men.' Then, af- ter mentioning the different ,^^^?-€^^ in which different men are poffeffed of com- Hion fenfe, he fays, p. 48, * Thefe diver- •fities are, I think, to be referred, for
* the moil part, to the original conftitu-
* tion of the mind, which it \s not in the
* power of education to alter.'
Dr. Beattie may imagine, and I believe does, that he is ferving the caufe of God and of truth by fuch views of things as thefe ; but it appears very clearly to me, who have no pretenfions to the common fenfe that he defcribes, that, as far as fpe- culation can go, he is fub verting it all.
I am aware that Dr. Beattie. will re- ply, that this doftrine of his concern- ing common fenfe is only to be ap- plied iofirjl principles. But v/ho is to 4ell us what are firft principles ? The man who has from his infancy laboured iunder a miflake, will imagine his moft K3 - fun-
1J4 R E M A R K S O N
fundamental errors to be firft principles: With a papift, implicit confidence in his* prieft, or holy church, which he takes for granted is the fame thing with faith in God and the bible, a6ls upon his mind asinfiantanedti/lyr £ind irrefiflihly as any of Dr. Beattie's firft principles ; and this principle in the poor papift cannot ap- pear more abfurd to Dr. Beattie, than fome of Dr. Beattie*s firft principles ap- pear to me.
Now who is to help us in this cafe ? Muft we, in good earneft, put the quef* tion to the vote, being previoufly afilired by Dr. Beattie, p. 45, that a. great vid- jority of mankind are poflefifedof the true principles of common fenfe, and there- fore cannot miftake concerning it? But I appeal from a tribunal whofe decifions have been fo unfteady, and may change again ; and think that nothing is fo likely to fervie our purpofe, and the purpofe of truth, as a perfuafion the very reverfe oF Dr. Beattie 's, viz. that the faculty by which we perceive truth is the fartheft
poflible
Dr. BEATTtE's ESSAY. 135
poffible from any thing that refembles a fcnfe ; that every misfortune we do, or may labour under, with refpeft td judgment, is naturally remediable; and confequently that it depends, upon our- felves, as far as any thing of practical importance is concerned, to be as wife, judicious, and knowing, as any other per- fon whatfoever.
V Dr. Beattie feems to place the fame confidence in his external fenfes that Dr. Reid does, which is much more than I can, perfuade myfelf to put in them ; J)i>t with refpe6l to the various inftindive principles of truth which our maker has arbitrarily annexed to them. Dr. Beattie fpeaks fometimes with more caution ; as if he had now and then fome fecret diftruft pfthem. I (hall, with this view, quote what he fays of the foundation of reafon- mg by mdu6iion and analogy.
. ;.■ The mind,' he fays, p. 122, * by its
* own innate force, and in confequence
* of an irrefiflible and inflindive impulfe,
K 4 ^ inferos
t^6 REMARKS ON
* infers the future- from the paft, without
* the intervention of any argument. The •* fea hais ebbed and flowed twice every ^ day in time paft, therefore the fea will
rt* continue to ebb and flow every day ift
* time to come, is by no means a logical y * dedu6llon of a conclufion from premifes. j^ * Reafoning from analogy, p. 126, ' when
- * traced up to its fource, will be found irt
* like manner to terminate in a certain in- ^>* ftinclive propenfity, implanted in us by ^^-* our maker, which leads us toexpeft thai
* fimilar caufes, in fimilar circumftances^,
* do probably produce, or will produce,
- ^ fimilar effeCls. A child,' p. 128, ' who f "^'has been burned with a red hot coal is sf^'cdrefulto avoid touching the flame of ^
' •*k:arldle. And it deferves to be remarked
ft-
«;* that the judgment a child forms ohthefe f-:' occafions may arife, and often does arife, ' previous to education and reafoning, < ' and while experience is very limited.*
^rv-It'ls m this lafl; claufe that Dr. Beattie fhows his caution, and betrays his fufpi- cion of thefe new principles* He does
not
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. M37
wdtfchufe to fay that children judge hi
this manner with no. experience at all^
' ..which, if the judgment was properly ^?^«-
■jiin6iive, ought to be the cafe, (but which
'iiappens to be too notorioufly contrary to
''*fa6l) but only tohen their experience is
■ very limited. But if they had had any
experience at all, it cannot be faid with
-tniththat they \'^tx^ vi'w^ciOMX. education ;
'for experience is the fchool of nature;
lind in this courfe of education we make
much ufe of our reafon, and the power
x>{ ajfociation is very bufily employed*
By the fimple principle of the afTocia- lion of ideas, the idea of the flame of a xandle is intimately aflbciated with the idea of the pain which it has occafioned, in fo much, that ever after they are confi- dered in the clofeft conne6liott, as it were the infeparable parts of the fame thing ; -fo that whatever recals the idea of the 'One recals likewife the idea of the other, • and. a dread of the one cannot be fepa* Tated from a dread of the other.
. i i J I
Suppofing,
ig-S REMARKS O N
Suppofing, therefore, that the child has an averfion to pain, and that he is mafter of thofe aftions by which it is avoided, he will mechanically, and inftantly, draw (back his hand from the near approach of a candle, without any intermediate idea rwJiatever^ ,
};K
' As to Dr. Reids general principle, that :ike laws, of nature xoitl continue (with
which he fuppofes that the mind of a ■jchild is infpired) or, as Dr. Beattie here
cxpfefles it, xh^xJ^lnilar caufes, in Jimilar
cir-cumJianceSt will probably produce fimi- ■lar ejfeds, as a foundation for its con- fcluding that a candle which has burned thim' onc6 will burn him again, it is not
certainly at all probable that he has .the leaft notion of any fuch thing. It is . a Jong tin^ before a child attains to any
fuch general knowledge. Particular fads • are firft difcovered, and general propofi-
tions, or principles, are formed from them. -But according to the hypotheiis of Dr.
Reid and Dr. Beattie, the mind is, prior
tp any experience, either furnilhed with -^.m,oi[i\ii< the
Dr. BEATTIE*s ESSAY. 139
the general maxims, that there are laws of nature, and that thele laws will con- tinue, or elfe with a thoufand particular independent maxims, comprehended un- der that general one. But thefe pro- Vifions are equally unneceffary, when the fimple law of afTociation of ideas fo eafily fupplies the place of them both.
SECTION II.
Of the tejlimony of thefenfes,
'T'HROUGH a degree of fairnefs and ' mgenuoufnefs, for which very fhrewd
difputants are not always remarkable. Dr. Beattie is no lefs unfortunate with re- fpeft to that part of his fyflem which re- lates to the external fenfes , than we have feen him to be in the inftances mentioned in the laft feciion. He fpeaks in general with more confidence than Dr. Reid him- felf does of his faith in his eyes, ears, nofe, tafte, and feeling (though it is pof-
fible
no REMARKS ON
fible that his writing with more ftrength and eloquence upon this fubje6l may only proceed from his having a greater com- mand of language, and not from a ftronger conviftion of mind) but then he inadvertently fubjoins fuch conce[Jion6 and exceptions, as, in faci;, overturn all his preceding do6lrine, and throw us back into all our former dillruft of our fenfes.
* Upon the evidence of the external - fenfes^' he fays, p. 63, ' hearing, feeing,
* touching, tafting, and fmelling, is
* founded all our knowledge of natural
* or material things ; and therefore all
* conclufions in natural philofophy, and
* all thofe prudential confideraticms ' which regard the prefervation of our
* body, as it is liable to be affefted by the
* fenfible qualities of matter, muft finally
* be refolved into this principle, that
* tJnngs are as our fenfes reprefent them.
* When I touch a ftone, I am confcious '*'of a fenfation, or feeling in my mind, ' accompanied with an irrefiftible belief f that this fenfation is excited by the appli- ' - * cation
Dr. BE AT tie's ESSAY. i^t
cation of an external and hard fubdance to feme part of my body. This beUef as certainly accompanies the fenfation, as the fenfation accompanies the appHca- tion of the ftone to my organs of fenfe. I am as certain,' p. 6^, ' that at prefent I am in a hoiife, and not in the open air, that I fee by the hght of the fun, and not by the hght of a candle, that I feel the ground hard under my feet, and that I lean againft a real material table, as I can be of the truth of any geometrical axiom, or of any demon- llrated conclufion. Nay I am as cer- tain of all this as of my own exiftence. But I cannot prove by argument that tliere is fuch a thins: as matter in the world, or even that I myfeif exifl.'
All this is perfeftly agreeable to the new fyftem, and an extremely fhort, eafy, and convenient one it certainly is, for thofe who are not difpofed to take much pains in the invefligation of truth ; but it is certainly not agreeable to nature and fad ; and as the ojd proverb fays, A'atu-
ram
142 R E M A R K S O N
ramfurca licet expeMas, tamen ufque re^ curret ; fo here Dr. Beattie could not help Taying, p. 189, ' A diftempered fenfe, *■ as well as an impure and unequal me-
* dium may doubtlefs communicate fa Ife
* fenfations ; but we are never impofed
* upon by them in matters of con/e queue e*
Now I can eafily conceive how all this might have been faid by Dr. Beattie very innocently, and without the Icall fufpicion that any caviller, like myfelf, could polTibly make any ufe of it to his prejudice ; when, in faft, it effeflually pvertuns his whole ryitem of implicit confidence in hisjeiifesy as the fure guides to truth. For certainly, if they be capa* b'C of deceiving us at all, they are no more to be trulled without fome guard of a different nature. The man who is under the deception has no help from them to undeceive himfelf. Thus if all mankind had jaundiced eyes, they mufl have been under a necelTity of concluding that every objeft was tinged with yellow; and indeed, according to this newfyflem,
as
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 143
as explained before, it would then have been fo not in appearance only, but alfo in reality ; nay this would have begun to be true, when only a great majority of mankind had their eyes thus affe^led.
Our author is, farther, fo very much off his guard upon this unfortunate fub- jeft, as to allow that fome of our fenfes give us information that is contradifted by the teftimony of others, which cer- tainly very ill agrees with his idea of them as infallible guides to truth. . \
'Of magnitude,' he fays, p. iiyp, 'we 'judge both by fight and touch. With
* regard to magnitude we muft, there-
* fore, believe either our fight, or our
* touch, or both, or neither. To believe
* neither is impoflible. If we believe ' both, we (hall contradi6l ourfelves,* and at length he determines in favour of the touch. If we afk why we believe the touch rather than the fight, he fays, p. 177, 'it is in{lin6l, and not reafon, that ' determines me to believe my touch.'
But
144 RE M A R K S O N
But did not he that made the fenfe of feeling make the fenfe of fight alfo ; and if, as our author pretends, he had defigU'- ed that our fenfes, as fuck, fhould give us true information concerning external objefts, would he not have provided that their teftimony fhould have been in all refpe6ls perfeftly confident ? Befides, it is obvious to remark, that if the eye re- quire to be correfted by the touch, the touch may poffibly require to be corre^t^ ed by fomething elfe. Dr. Beattie may fay that the fame common fenfe that bid§ him believe his touch in preference to his light, and to corred the evidence of fight by that of touch, affires him that the touch requires no corre6lion whatever. But this can have weight only with thofe who have faith in this fame com-^ mon fenfe.
I fhould be glad to alk Dr. Beattie, and others who admit it as a maxim, that things are as their ferjes reprefent them t9 he, what a man of common fenfe, and altogedier without e:jiperience (which in- deed
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 145
deed can hardly be the cafe in fa.6t) would fay upon looking at a ftraight flick held obliquely, with half of it under water. Would he not be pofitive that it was bent in the middle ; and would he not have the plain teflimony of his eyes for it ? If you (hould take the flick out of the water, and bid him look at it again, and handle it, would he not affert the very reverfe of Dr. Beattie's maxim, viz. that his eyes had impofed upon him, and that the thing was not as hisjenfes had reprefented it ?
Do not the bulk of mankind believe that the earth is at refl, and that the fun, moon, and flars have a diurnal revolu- tion ; and have they not the teflimony of their fenfes for it ? They certainly think fo. They alfo all believe (as Dr. Reid himfelf pretends to believe with them) that colour is a property of bodies, and yet are eafily convinced that it is a miflake.
If, after all, it really be a dictate of
this new common fenfe, that, notwith-
L ftanding
546 "R E M A R K S O N
flanding all this, things ftill are as onr fenfes reprefent them to be, I think that in thefe cafes our common fenfe is in league with our other fenfes to impofe upon us, and therefore that we are juftified in ex- cluding it, as well as them, from being the teft of truth.
SECTION III.
Dr. Beattie J view of Berkley j theory-^
I
T is curious to obferve how much our acquaintance both with truth and enor refembles the introdudion of the fox to the lion, m the fable of Efop. We grow bolder by degrees, and each encou- rages his neighbour to go a few fteps far- tlier than, himfelf.
The principles both of Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie lead them to rejeft Berkley's hypothefis. Indeed, their whole fcheme appeal's to me to liave been, in a great
meafure.
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 147
meafure, fuggefted by it ; but Dr. Beattie rifes greatly upon Dr. Reid in his tone and emphafis upon this occafion. If Dr. Reid conquered and (lew his adverfary, Dr. Beattie not only conquers, and puts him to death a fecond time, but tramples upon him. Dr. Reid did not vanquifti him till after a pretty hard combat, in which fome fl<.ili and dexterity in the ufe of his weapons was requifite ; but Dr. Beattie does it at once, without giving him an opportunity of drawing in his own defence. Hear his own account of their different modes of conducing this con- troverfy.
' Though it be abfurd,' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 290, 'to attempt a proof of what is
* felf-evident, it is manly and meritorious
* to confute the objeftions that fophiflry
* may urge againfl it. This, with refpe6l
* to the fubjecl in queftion, has been done '' in a decifive and mafterly manner by
* Dr. Reid, w^ho proves that the reafon-
* ings of Berkley, and others, concerning ' primary and fecondary qualities owe all
L 2 ' their
T48 R E M A R K S O N
' their ftrength to the ambiguity of words.' This, then, is the ynanly and vieritorious condud of Dr. Reid ; but being only of relative ufe and importance, and abfurd in it/elf, our author takes a different ground ; which he immediately defcribes. ' I have proved that though this funda-
* mental error had never been dete6led,
* the philofophy of Berkley is, in its own ^ nature, abfurd, becaufe it fuppofes the
* original principles of common fenfe
* controvertible and fallacious ; a fuppo- ' fition repugnant to the genius of the ' tRie' (alias the new) ' philofophy, and ' which leads to univerfal credulity, or
* univerfal fcepticifm, and confequently
* to the fubveriion of knowledge and vir-
* tue, and' — but firfl; guefs reader, if you can, what follows — ' the extermination of
* the human fpecies.' He even fixes the time, very nearly, in which this calami- tous event would take place.
Defcribing what he imagined would follow if all mankind fhould, in one in- ftant, be made to believe that matter has
no
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 149
no exiftence, he fays, p. 281, ' Doubtlefs
* this cataflrophe would, according to our
* metaphyficians, throw a wonderful light
* on all the parts of knowledge. I pre-
* tend not even to guefs at the number,
* extent, or quality, of the aftonifliing dif-
* coveries, that would then ftart forth into ' view. But of this I am certain, that, in ' l^s than a month after, there could not,
* without another miracle, be one human
* creature alive on the face of the earth.'
Dr. Reid fairly encounters his enemy, vanquifhes, flays, and buries him, all in theirproper order ;butDr.Beattiebeginsat once with the laft a6l of burying, without troubling himfelf whether he be dead or alive, thinking the a6l of burying will fuffice for all. This is that curious and fummary procefs which Dr. Ofwald is taking to rid the world of all dangerous errors in religion. Without giving himfelf the unneceffary trouble to argue the mat- ter, except for his own amufement, and that of his readers, he only throws him- felf back in his chair, fliuts his eyes, fees
L 3 them
1^ R E M A R K S O N
them to be abfurd, and the delufion va- nifties. This is indeed fighting with the fpear of Ithufiel, at the touch of which all impoflure vaniflies*.
I fhall quote one paflage more from Dr. Beattie on this fubje^l, in which he exprefles the nature and fullnefs of his perfuafion concerning the reality of the material world, in a manner that is pecu- liarly emphatical, and therefore muft be very fatisfaftory to men of tafte, who can feel the beauties of fine writing. ' That matter has a real, feparate, and
* independent exiftence/ p. 261, 'is be- ' lieved, not becaufe it can be proved by ' argument, but becaufe the conftitution
* The pafTage in Dr. OTwald, to which I here allude, is lb very curious, that I think my reader will not be dif- pleafed to fee it quoted in a note on this part of my remarks an Dr. Beattie, though he will find it quoted again in its proper place. 'Area! believer,' p. 2^5", 'will not defpife
* the well-meant labours of thofe who have endeavoured to ' demondrate the primary truths by reducing their oppo-
* fites to abfurdity ; but knows, that without their help,
* he can, hy afingk thought., reduce thofe chimeras to the
* grolfeft of all abfurdities, namely, to nonfenfe,
*of
Dr. BEATTLE's ESSAY. 151
* of our nature is fuch, that '^s^e mufi be-
* lieve it. There is here the fame ground ' of behef, that there is in the following ' propofitions. I exift : whatever is is ; ' two and two make four. It is abfurd,
* nay it is impoflible to believe the con- ' trary.' Accordingly, he fays, ' I have
* known many v/ho could not anfwer ' Berkley's arguments, I never knew on^ ' who believed his do6lrine.'
I find, however, that I have travelled a little farther than Dr. Beattie, for I have met with a very ingenious man who maintained Berkley's doclrine with great ferioufnefs, and I have known others who have efpoufed the fame opinion'; But perhaps Dr. Beattie may have the indul- gence of the Welch jury I have heard of, who would not believe a man who con- feffed himfelf to be guilty, and fairly ac- quitted him.
My friend and I ufed to debate this fub-
ject, but for want of being acquainted with
the principles of Meffrs.Reid, Beattie, and
L 4 ORv^ald;
152 R E M A R K S O N
Ofwaldjlwasglad topleadfortheexiftence *^ of the material world only as the moft pro- bable hypotlieiis to accouit for appear- ances, and never thought of there being the fame kind of evidence forit, asof two '-and two being equal to four. Had I ^^been acquainted with thefe new princi- ples, I might have faved myfelf a great deal of trouble ; but I am apprehenfive that I fiiould hardly have efcaped a great -=^'deal of ridicule ; and we ought not to forget that ridicule has been deemed the - tejl of truth as well as this new common fenfe. I think with equal reafon, and 1 flatter myfelf that the reign of this new ufurper will not be much longer than that of his predeceffor, to whom he is very nearly related.
In this fome may think that I only
■mean to be jocular, but really I am f^ri-
^^'^ous. Why was ridicide tver thought to
-*^be theteft of truth, butbecaufe the things
^ at which we can laugh were fuppofed to
be fo abfurd that their falfehood was
felf-evident ; fo that there was no occa-
V-^i^'J. fion
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 153
fion to examine any farther ? We were fuppofed to feel them to be falfe ; and what is a feeling but the affection of a farfe? In reahty, therefore, this new doftrine of common fenfe being the ftan- dard of truth is no other than ridicule being the ftandard of truth. The words are different, but not the things. I ffiould be glad to fee fo acute a metaphyfician as Dr. Reid, fo fine a writer as Dr. Beattie, and, to adopt Dr. Beattie's compliment, fo elegant an author as Dr. Ofwald, fepa- rately employed to afcertain the precife difference between thefe twofchemes.
In my opinion the chief difference, be- fides what I faid above, confifts in this, that the one may be called the y^^T^ of truth, and the other xh^feife offalfchood. There is alfo fome doubt whether Shaftefbury was really in earneft in propofing ridicule as the teft of truth. Many think that he never could be fo abfurd. Whereas there can be no doubt but that this triumvirate of authors are perfectly ferious. There is, however, another difference that will
flrongly
i54 R E M A R K S O X ^-
ilrongly recommend the claims of com- mon icnk in preference to thofe of ridi- cule, which is, that this was advanced in fupport of infideiit)% but that in fupport of rehgion. But 1 fhould think that the greater weight we have to fupport. the lironger buttrelfes we fhould ufe.
In remarking upon Dr. Reid, I pointed out the inconclufivenels of the confe- quences he drew from Berkley's hypo- thehs. Dr. Beattie lays llie iame things after him, but with conhderable iipprove- ments in point of diction and energy, and With an air of much greater ferioufnels with refpetl to religion, which appeals to me to have nothing to do in the bufmefs. i do not wonder, however, at Dr. Beattie's zeal in the cafe, when he ima- gined tliat fo much depended upon it, any more than I do at Don Quixote s heroic enthufiafra, when he miftook inns for caftles, a flock of fheep for an army, and a barbers bafon for Mambrino's Jhtelrxiet.
* Sure/
Dj-. BEATTIE^ ESSAY. 15^
• Sure,' fays our author, p. 283, ' the
* laws of nature are not fuch trifles as that
* it muft be a matter of perfeft indifference
* whether wc act or ihink agreeable to
* them or no,' I think if I had not ap- prized my reader of it before hand, he Vould not have gueffed that, in this folemn fentence^ our author had nothing in view but diis fame innocent theory of Berkley; and efpecially if he had not feen, in. the preceding quotation, that the very extermination of the humamjpecies is the confequence of this fame fcheme ; which appears to me to be as complete raving as any thing in Don Quixote hlmfelf.
Our author fardier fays, p. 289, * Berk- ' ley's doctrine is fubverfive of man's mod
* important interefts, as a moral, intelli-
* gent, and percipient being. I doubt ' not,' fays he, ib. ' but it may have over- ' caft many of his days with a gloom, ' which neither the approbation of his *" confcience, nor the natural ferenity of
* his temper could entirely diffipate.*
Now
156 R E M A R K S O N .
Now I can fee no difficulty in conceiving that I myfelf might have adopted this opinion, and yet have been very eafy, chearful, virtuous, religious, and happy, in the full expeftation of a reftoration to a future life, as real as that which I enjoy at prefent, and in circumftances infinitely fuperior. In fo very different lights do we fometimes fee the fame thing, though we are all, at leaft we all think ourfelves, pofleffed of this fame infallible ftandard oftruthj Viz » common f^nfe.
SEC
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 157
SECTION IV.
Dr. Beattle'i account of the four ce ^mo- ral obligation, and of the fundamental principles of religi'on.
TJITHERTO I muft acknowledge "*• ^ that I have not always been able to refift the temptation to divert myfelf with my author's Quixotifm. For, ferious a^ he himfelf has been, his adventures have fometimes appeared laughable enough to me. But I muft now begin to be a little more ferious, becaufe I apprehend the confequences are fo. For our author, af- ter having made his common fenfe the tefi of truth, proceeds to make it the ftandard of moral obligation , exprefsly excluding all reafoning upon the fubjecl.
' They,' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 74, mean- ing mankind, ' believe a certain mode of
* conduct to be incumbent upon them in ' certain circumftances, becaufe a notion
• of duty arifes in their mind when they
* con-
158 R E M A R K S O N
contemplate that condu6t in relation to thofe circumttances. I ought to be grateful for a favour received. V/hy ? becaufe myconfcience tells m^o. How do you know that you ought to do that of which your confcience enjoins the performance ? I can give no further reafon for it but I feel that fuch is my duty. Here the inveftigation muft ftop ; or if carried a little farther it muft re- turn to this point. I know that I ought to do what my confcience enjoins be- caufe God is the author of my conftku- tion, and I obey his will when I acl ac- cording to the principles of my conftitu- tion. Why do you obey the v/ili of God ? Becaufe it is my duty. How know you that ? Becaufe my confcience tells me fo, &c.*
In any other cafe, therefore, if a man JeehxhTii any thing is his duty, or, which is the fame thing with refpeCl: to himfelf, if lie thinks he feels it, he has no occafion to trouble himfelf with examining into the ground of that feeling. He muft
follow
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 159
follow it without hefitation, or referve. So that even the poor prie 11- ridden mor- tal above mentioned will be jufliiied, if, at the command of his ghofily fuperior^ he murders his heretical neighbour ; for had he gone the round of the felf-exa- mination defcribed by Dr. Beattie, it would have been like travelling round the world for nothing but to come to the fame place from which he fet out, Viz./o viy confcience diBates,
Judging in the firft and laft inftancd by TCiQie. feeling, it is impoffible to diftin- guifii the injundions of a well-informed, from thofe of an ill-informed confcience. Many, I doubt not, have felt as real re- morfe upon the omilTion of a fuperftitious ceremony, and have been as unhappy in confequence of it, as they have ever been for the negle6t of the mofl; important moral duty. As, on the other hand, they have felt as real fatisfaftion after confeffing to aprieft, and having received his abfolution, as others have felt from the confcioufnefs of genuine repentance.
i6o R E M A R K S O N
or of a well fpent life. Yea feme, t am perfuaded, have felt as perfe6lly eafy at a Portuguefe ad of faith, as if they had been glorifying God in any other manner.
Not content with this, Dr. Beattie fcruples not to reft all the future hopes and expectations of man, as derived from religion, on the foundation of this lame principle of common fenfe. ' Scep-
* tics,' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 113, 'may
* wrangle, and mockers may blafpheme ;
* but the pious man knows, by evidence
* too fublime for their comprehenfion,
* that his affections are not mifplaced,
* and that his hopes ftiall not be difap-
* pointed : by evidence which to every
* found mind is fully fatisfaftory, but
* which to the humble and tender hearted
* is altogether overwhelming, irrefiftible,
* and divine.'
With whatever feelings Dr. Beattie might compofe this paragraph, it ftrikes me as containing matter that is exceed- ingly dangerous and alarming; letting
afide
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 161
afide all reafoning about the fundamental principles of religion, and making way for all the extravagancies of credulity, enthufiafm, and myflicifmi.
The plenary perfuafion tliat our religf* ous affetiions are not viifplaced, and that our hopes JJiall not be difappointed, evi- dently fuppofes the belief of the being, the perfetlions, and moral attributes of God, and a ftate of future retribution; and what ^i?2^ of evidence has Dr. Beattie fpoken of as overwhelming, and irrejijiible, but this of common ienfe ? the effefts of which he always defcribes in that ftyle, and to which he had before applied thofe very epithets, and others of a fimilar im- port. And yet this common fenfe appears to me, and to others, who feem to be in our fober fenfes> to be very infuflEcient for this purpofe ; though Dr. Ofv/ald has attempted to prove at large, and in de- tail, all the particulars which Dr. Beattie only afferts in grofs. But I am afraid that, after all his pious pains, the evi- dence will be found to be what Dr. M Beattie
i62 R E M A R K S O N
Beattie here fays of it, too fublime for our comprehenjiun.
That our author imagined he had fuffi- ciently eflabhflied fome very important rehgious and praclical principles, is evi- dent from what he fays in the conclufion of his work, where he is reciting his achievements in it. * That the human
* foul is a real and permanent fubftance,' he fays, p. 491, * that God is infinitely
* wife and good, that virtue and vice are ' effentially different, that there is fuch a ^ thing as truth, and that man, in many
* cafes, is capable of difcovering it, are
* fome of the principles which this book
* is intended to vindicate from the ob-
* jedions of fcepticifm.'
Now I do not recolleQ, after reading Dr. Beattie's book through (with how much attention and care let the reader judge) that he has attempted a demons llration of the human foul being a rational and permanent fubftance, of the infinite wildom and goodnefs of God, that virtue
and
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 163
and vice are efTentially different. Sec. by any proper medium of proof whatever ; but only, if he has proved them at all, by an appeal to this principle of common fenfe, which is faid to affure us, without rea/oning, that fuch and fuch dodrines are true.
Alfo, though Dr. Beattie has not taken the fame large field of argument that Dr. Ofwald has done, thinking probably that, after him, it was unneceffary, yet he quotes from him with reipeft, and no doubt with intire approbation (or why did he quote him at all ?) a paflage in which he not only afferts the propriety of defend- ing primary truths on the fole authority of common fenfe, but vindicates the doing of it with a peculiar emphajis, and without much delicacy. And I have already fhewn in what an extenfive fenfe Dr. Of- wald confiders the primary trul:hs of reli- gion, a fenfe with which Dr. Beattie could not be unacquainted.
M 2 Dr.
i64 R E M A R K S O N
Dr. Beattie's quotation, in vindication of his vehemence of expreflion in this- treatife, is as follows, p. 512. * There
* is no fatisfying the demands of falfe >
* delicacy, fays an elegant and pious au- ' thor, becaufe they are not regulated by ' any fixed flandard. But a man of can- ' dour and judgment will allow that the ' bafhful timidity, praftifed by thofe who
* put themfelves on a level with the ad-
* verfaries of religion, would ill become
* one who, declining all difputes, affercs
* primary truths on the authority of com-
* mon fenfe ; and that whoever pleads
* the caufe of religion in this way has a ' right to aflume a firmer tone, and to ' pronounce with a more decifive air, not
* upon the flrength of his own judgment, ' but on the reverence due from all mail- ' kind to the tribunal to which he appeals.
* OJwald's apppeal in behalf of religion,
* p. 14/ Thefe gentlemen, therefore, having difcr^rded all pretences to reafon-^ irg, think themfelves juftified in dif- carding all good maiinersj and in af-
fuming
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 165
fuming an arrogance and infolence which does not become us poor rea- fonerS. A happy privilege truly!
From thefe circumftances it appears to me to be impoflible not to conclude, that Dr. Beattie approved, in the main, of what Dr. Ofwald had written. In- deed, writing upon this fubjeQ, and men- tioning him at all, it behoved him to have guarded his readers againft his dangerous extravagancies, if he had not gone the fame lengths himfelf. His can- did letter to me, however, which the reader will find at the end of this book, makes me conclude, that he does not now approve of Dr. Ofwald's writings ; and I hope that, after more reflexion, he will acknowledge that he has given his ab- furd and dangerous principles too much countenance by what he has written himfelf.
M3 SEC-
)66 REMARKS ON
SECTION V.
Dr. Beattie'j view of the doElrine of neceflity.
A FTER the very fevere and injurious -^ ^ treatment that Bifhop Berkley's amufing theor)'' has met with, it cannot be expefted that the doftrine of necejjity, which, Hke many other very good things, has had the misfortune to fall 'into the hands of fome unbehevers, fhbiild efcape Dr. Beattie's cenfure ; efpecially as, Hke other great truths, removed from the conception of the vulgar (as that of the revolution of the earth upon its axis) it neceffarily Hands expofed to fome plaufible, but fuperficial, objeftions. There is, at the bottom, however, fome- thing fo ingenuous in Dr. Beattie, that notwithftanding the vehemence of his aflertions, he has not been able to conceal evident marks of the impreffion ihat has been made upon him by the arguments of the Neceflarians. Thefe, I doubt not,
have
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 167
have had no fmall influence in determining him= to fhut his eyes Co obftinately, to difclaim all argument upon the fubje6l, and to take refuge in his moft convenient and never failing principle of common fenfe.
Both the thorough fatisfa6lion that Dr. Beattie has in his own principles, and the manner in which he attained and preferves that fatisfa6tion, notwithftand- ing the unaiifwerable arguments (as he can hardly help acknowledging) of the Neceflarians, may be feen in the follow- ing quotations, which I can read and tranfcribe without feeling myfelf more offended than I fhould be at hearing any perfon affert his full conviclion of the .earth Jtanding Jiill ; being fully fatisfied with the evidence that I have of the veiy fuperficial grounds on which his opinion has been formed-
* My intention/ p. 295, * Is to treat
* the doftrine of neceffity as I have
^ treated that of non-exiftence of matter,
M 4 * by
i68 REMARKSON
* by inquiring whether the one be not, as
* well as the other, contrary to common
* fenfe, and therefore abfurd. Both doc- ' trines,' p. 360, ' are repugnant to the
* general belief of mankind, both, not-
* withftanding all the efforts of the fubtleft
* fophiftry, are ftill incredible ; both are ^ fo contrary to nature, and to the condi-
* tion of human beings, that they can-
* not be carried into pra6tice, and fo con- ' trary to true philofophy, that they can-
* not be admitted into fcience ; withdut
* bringing fcepticifm along with them,
* and rendering queftionable the plaineft
* principles of moral truth, and the very
* diftinftion between truth and falfehood.
* In a w©rd, we have proved that com-
* men fenfe, as it teaches us to believe,
* and be allured of the exigence of mat-
* ter, doth alfo teach us to believe, and be
* aflured, that man is a free agent. My
* liberty, in thefe inftances,'p. 295, * Ican-
* not prove by argument, but there is not
* a truth in geometry of which I am more ' certain.' Speaking of the fame thing, he fays, p. 31 1, * Some philofophers
* want
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 169
* want to prove what I know by inftin^l
* to be unqueftionably certain. I am as '■ confcious/ p. 70, ' that fome atlions
* are in my power, and that others are
* not, &c. as I am of my own exiftence,'
I have no occafion to enter into a diA cuffion of this queftion with Dr. Beattie. Indeed, I am precluded from doing it ; for what can it avail to argue with a man who declares that he will neither argue himfelf nor hear the arguments of others upon the fubjeft ? But to anfwer this very pertinacious believer, in fometbing of his own way, I will tell him that, if I 'Were to take my choice of any metaphy^ Heal queftion, to defend it againft all op- pugners, it fliouid be this very abfurd and obnoxious doctrine of neceffity, of the falfehood of which our author is as cer- tain as he is of his own exiftence. There is no truth of which I have lefs doubt, and of the grounds of which I am more, fully fatisfied; and I am likewife fully per- faaded, not only of the perfeft innocence, but alfo of the happy moral injluencs^oi
i7o REMARKS ON
it. Indeed, there is no abfurdity more glaring to my underftanding than the no- tion of philofophical liberty ; and (judg- ing as Dr. Beattie does of Berkley's the- ory) of more dangerous confequence. But I have long learned to entertain no great dread of opinions theoretically dan- gerous, and to repeat what I have faid upon a former occafion, ' Notwithfland-
* ing fome fe6^t:s do, in words, fubvert the
* foundations of all virtue, they have al- ' ways fome Jalvo whereby they preferve
* a regard to it, and in reality enforce it,
* Such a foundation has the God of na- ' ture laid for the praftice of virtue in
* our hearts, that it is hardly in the power
* of any error in our heads to erafe it.' Difcourfe on the Lord's Supper » third edition, p. 107
What could lead Dr. Beattie to quote Dr. Hartley upon the fubje6l I cannot tell^ as he does not propofe to enter into any difcuflion of the queftion, except it was to take an opportunity of contradi6l- ing him in his appeal to experience with relation to it, ^ In all my experience/
fays
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 171
fays he, p. 333, ' I have never been con-
* fcious of any fuch necefhty as the au-
* thor (Dr. Hartley) fpeaks of.' But fo very little attention did Dr. Beattie give to any t hing like reafonivg on this fubjeft, or even neceffary explanations of it, that though Dr. Hartley, in the very pafTage that Dr. Beattie quotes from him, gives a very accurate ftate of the queftion, de- fining philofophical liberty to be a power of doing different things, the motives, or previous circumjtances, remaining precijely the fame, all that our author fays upon the fubjeft (hows that the liberty which he contends for is the power of doing lohat we pleafe, or toill, which Dr. Hartley is far from denying.
It makes me fmile, and I am confident it muft make others fmile, who fliall read both thefe writers, to find Dr. Beattie calling Dr. Hartley a fanciful author. To judge by the ftyle and manner of the two writers, I think any indifferent perfon would fee that ferious and difpaflion te argument was with Dr. Hartley, 2Lnd fancy and imagination wholly with JDr, Beattie.
There
172 R E M A R K S O N
There is fomething very fingular in the manner in which Dr. Beattie treats diis iubject of neceffity ; firft difclaiming all reafoning about it, then, from his natu- ral ingenuoufnefs, not being able intirely to fatisfy himfelf ^vith this condu61, half hinting at fome objections, and fiib join- ing fome half anfwers to them ; then ac- knowledging that the arguments on both lides coine at loft to appear unaiifwerable, p. 362, and fo reverting to his common fenfc again ; jufi; as he did in his account of the foundation of moral obligation, . in which he both began and ended with an appeal to the fame common fenfe.
Among other things, our author gently touches upon the objeftion to the contingency .of human a6lions from the doctrine of the divine prefcience. In anfwer to which, or rather in dcfcant- ing upon which (thinking, I fuppofe, to chuie the lefs of two evils) he feems to make no great difficulty of re- jefting that moft eflential prerogative of the divine nature, though nothing can be
more
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 173
more fully afcertained by independent evidence from revelation, rather than give up his darling hypothefis of human liberty ; fatisfying himfelf with obferving, pv352, that ' it implies no reflection on
* the divine power, that it cannot perform
* impoflibilities.' In the very fame man- ner he might make himfeif perfeftly eafy if his hypothefis fhould compel him to deny any other of the attributes of God, or even his very being, for what reflexion is it upon any perfon that things impoffi- ble cannot be. Thus our author, in the blind rage of difputation, hefitates not to deprive the ever blefled God of that very attribute by which, in the books of fcripture, he exprefsly diftinguifhes him- felf from all falie Gods, and than which nothing can be more eflentially neceffary to the government of the univerfe, rather than relinquifh his fond claim to the fancied privilege of f elf -determination ; a claim which appears to me to be juft as abfurd as that o^felf-ex'tftence, and which could not polholy do him any good if he had it.
Terrified,
174 REMARKS ON
Terrified, however, as I am willing to fiippofe (though he does not exprefs any fuch thing, as he feems to be ready, upon any emergency, v/ith all xh^fang- froid in the world, to ftrike from his creed the doftrine of the divine prefcience) at this confequence of his fyftem, he thinks, with thofe who maintain the doclrine of a trinity of perfons in the unity of the divine eiTence, and with thofe who affert the doctrine of tranfubjiantiation, to ' fnelter himfelf in the objcurity of his fub« jecl ; faying, p. 353, that * we cannot ' comprehend the manner in which the * divme being operates.' But this refuge is equally untenable in all the cafes, be- caulc the things themfelves are, in their own nature, impoflible, and imply a con- tradiction. I might juft as well fay that, though to us, whole underitandmgs are fo limited, two and two appear to make no more xh^xifour ; yet in the divine mind, the comprelienfion of which is infinite, into which, however, we cannot look, and concerning which it is nnpoflibie,
and
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 175
and even dangerous to form conje6lurcs, they may make^ve.
Were I pofTeffed of Dr. Beattie's talent of declamation, and had as little fcruple to make ufe of it, what might I not fay of the abfurdity of this way of talking, and of the horribje immoral con- lequences of denying the fore-knowledge of God ? I fhould foon make our author and all his adherents as black as atheiifs. The very admiffion of fo untraftable a principle as contingency into the univerfe would be no better than admitting the Manichean doftrine of an independent evil principle ; nay it would be really of worfe confequence ; for the one might be controlled, but the other could not. But I thank God my principles are more ge- nerous, and I am as far from afcribing to Dr. Beattie all the real confequences of his doftrine, (which, if he could fee with my eyes, I believe he would reprobate as heartily as I do myfelf) as I am from ad- mitting his injurious imputations with re-
fpe6l to mine.
Not-
176 REMARKS ON
Notwithilandin? Dr. Beattie, confiding: in the foliditv of his own judgment, ftrcngthened by the fanction of a great majority of mankind, is pleafed to call Dr. Hartley a fanciful author, he does vouchfafe. at the fame time, to call him an ingenious and worthy one, which, con- fidering the liorrid confequences he de- duces Irom his pri-iciples, muft argue a great deal of candour. But, indeed, I think it abfolutely impofhble for any per- fon to read his Obferva ions on inan, and not lay down the book with the fulleil conviclion both of the amazing compre- henfivenefs and llrength of his mind (to which the trifling t\M\Qi oi ingenious is very inadequate) and of the piety, bene- volence and reftitude of his heart. All who were acquainted with him join their teliimony to this mternal evidence from his Vvritings.
Without, however, attempting to ac- count for this, or any fafts of the fame kind, our author takes it for granted, p. 473' 35^' that the dodrine of necefhty is
incon-
Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 177
inconfiftent with the firft principles of na- tural religion. After enumerating a number of abfurd and atheiflical tenets, he fums up the whole with faying, p. 317,
' and now the liberty of the human
' will is queftioned and debated. What ' could we expe6l but that it fhould (hare
* the fame fate ?' ' To believe,' fays he, P- 355' 'that the di6lates of confcience
* are falfe, unreafonable, or infignificant,
* is one cenain effe6l of my becoming a ' fatalifi;, or even fceptical with regard to
* moral liberty.' If I could think that this would be the confequence, I (hould be very forry to hear of Dr. Beattie's changing his fentiments on this fubje6l; but we know very little of our own hearts, and what we fhould think, feel, or do, in very new fituations. For my own part, I doubt not but that this very change of opinion which he dreads fo much (if it be not too late for him to bear the fhock that fo total a revolution in his fyftem of thinking would occafion) would bear a very favourable afpe6l on his virtue, and even make him a better man than he is at
N prefent ;
T78 R E M A R K S O N
prefent; though, by all accounts, he is a very good one.
As to the hackneyed objeftion to the doftrine of neceffity, from its being incon^ fiftent with the idea of virtue and vice, as implying praife and blame, it may be fully retorted upon its opponents. For as to their hodHed /elf-detciniining power (were the thing polTible in itfelf, and did not imply an abfurdity) by which they pretend to have a power of a6ling inde- pendently of every thing that comes un- der the defcription oF motive, I fcruple not to fay, that it is as foreign to every idea of virtue or vice, praife or blame, as the grofleft kind of mechanifm, that the moft blundering writer in defence of liberty ever afcribed to the advocates for moral neceflity.
It is true that, (Iriftly fpeaking, the doclrine of neceffity would oblige a man to depart from the common language in fpeaking of human aftions : but this makes no change with refpecl to his conduci»
The
Dr. BE AT tie's ESSAY. 179
The very fame is the cafe with rerpe6t to the doctrine of the fun Jianding ftill, Philofophers ufe the language of the vulgar with refpeft to this fubje6i:, and even think with them too, except in their clofets, and when they are explicitly attending to it. Copernicus and Newton themfelves, I will venture to fay, not only talked of the fun riling and fetting, but, in their ordinary conceptions, had the very fame ideas that a common farmer annexes to thofe words. So alio it is impoflible that, with refpeft to common life, a ne- ceflarian Ihould have any other ideas to the words praife and blame (which how- ever are equally foreign to both the fchemes of liberty and neceffity, philofo- phically and ftriftly conhdered) than other people have, and he will be in- fluenced as much by them. And as to the different views that he will be able to take of thefe things in contemplation, they appear to me only to remove virtue from one foundation to place it upon another, much broader and firmer. Our conduft depends not upon what we think our con- N 2 (litution
i8o REMARKS ON
llitution to be, but upon what it really is. But upon this fubjetl I refer to Dr. Hartley, both for argument, and example.
Upon this, as upon a former occafion, I cannot help obferving what different company I and Dr. Beattie have kept. ' I
* have found,' fays he, p. 344, ' all the
* impartial, the moll fagacious, and wor- ' thy part of mankind, enemies to fatality
* in their hearts.' On the contrary, a confiderable majority of my acquain- tance, men of whofe undeiilanding and hearts not myielf only, but all who know them have the higheft opinion, have been, and are, confirmed necelfarians.
For my own part, if I might be al- lowed to follow Dr. Beattie's example in appealing to my own experience, I would tell him that I embraced the doc- trine of neceffity from the time that I fird ftudied the fubje6l ; I have been a firm believer of it ever fince, without having ever entertained the lead fufpicion of there being^any fallacy belonging to it;
I meditate
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. t8i
I meditate frequently upon it, and yet every confideration of it, and every view of things fuggefled by it, appears to me to give an elevation to the fentiments, the moft exalted conceptions of the great author of nature, and of the excellence and perfection of his works and defigns, the greatefl: purity and fervor to our virtue, the moft unbounded benevolence to our fellow creatures, the moft ardent zeal to ferve them, and the moft unre- ferved and joyful confidence in divine providence, with refpe6l to all things, paft, prefent, and to come.
In (hort, I have no conception that the man whofe mind is capable of enter- taining, and duly contemplating vv'hat is called the do6trine of neceffity, and its genuine confequences, as unfolded by Dr. Hartley, can be a bad man ; nay that he can be other than an extraordi- nary good one. I am confident that I ihall improve myfelf continually by fre- quent 2ind Jieady views of this fabjett, and fuch as are connected witji it, and N3 t)y
i82 REMARKS ON
by being a^luated by them more than I have been. It is true that I had the un- fpeakable happinefs of a very ftrift and religious education; but notwithftanding this, had the do6lrine of necefhty, in: reahty, any immoral tendency, I am po- fitive it would have done me an irrepara- ble injury at the time that I adopted it.
Let Dr. Beattie refleft upon thefe things with the candour that lam willing to think is natural to him, and I doubt not he will feel himfelf difpofed to unfay fome of the harfh tilings that have dropped from him on this fubje6l.
That my reader may enjoy the plea- fure oicontrafi in a higher degree, I fhall fubjoin to this fecliona fewextrafts from Mr. Jonathan Edwards, in which he ex- prefTes his opinion of the unfavourable tendency of the dodrine of pbilofophi^ cal liberty, which he calls the Arminian doftrine with refpc6l to virtue and reli- gion, &c. in his Treatife on free rmll ; which I had not read till after the whole
of
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 183
of this book, and even the preface, ex- cept the paragraph relating to it, was tranfcribed for the prefs.
- :* An^ii^i^n principles and notions,' p. 267, ' when fairly examined, and
* purfued in their demonftrable confe* ' quences, do evidently (hut all virtue ' out of the world, and make it im- ' poffible that there fliould ever be any ^ fuch thing, in any cafe, or that any fuch ' thing fhould ever be conceived of. For
* by thefe principles the very notion of ' virtue or vice implies abfurdity ^nd
* contradi6lion.'
. * A moral neceflity of men's actions,' p. 16, Appendix, * is not at all incon- ' fiftent with any liberty that any creature -■ has, or can have, as a free, accountable,
* moral agent, and fubjett of moral go- ': vernment. This moral neceflity is fo " far from being inconfiftent with praife
* and blame, and the benefit and ufe of ' men's own care and labour, that, on the
* contrary, it implies the very ground and
N 4 ' reafon
184REMARKSON
' reafon why men's alliens are to be ' afcribed to them as then" own, in that ' nanner as to infer defert, praife. and ' blame, approbation and reraorfe of con- ' fcience, reward and punifhment ; and it ' eftabhfhes the moral fyftem of the uni- ' verfe, and God's moral government, in ' every refpecl, with the proper ufe of ' motives, exhortations, commands, coun-
* cils, promifes and threatnings, and the
* ufe and benefit of endeavours, care and
* induflry ; and therefore there is no need
* that the Rritt philofophic truth fliould
* be at all concealed from men. So faf
* from this, the truth in this matter is of ' vaft importance, and extremely need- ' ful to be knov/n, and the more con-
* ftantly it is m view the better.'
' The moral neceflity of men's aftions,' p. 7, ' is requifiie to the being of virtue
* and vice, or any thing praife-worthy or
* culpable ; and the liberty of indifference, ' and contingence, which is advanced in ' oppohtion to that neceffity, is incon- ' fiflent with the bemg of thefe. — If we
' purfue
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. iS5
* purfue thefe principles,' p. 258, ' v/e fhall
* find that virtue and vice are ^yhoIly ex-
* eluded out of the world, and that there
* never was, or ever can be, any fiich
* thing as one or the other, either in God,
* angels, or men/
* The doclrine of necefTity,' p, 3S5,
* which fuppofes a necellary connexion ' of all events, on fome antecedent ground
* and reafon of their exiftence, is the only
* medium we have to prove the being of ' God. And the contrary doclrine of
* contingence, which certainly implies, or
* infers, that events may come into ex-
* iftence, or begin to be, without de-
* pendence on any thing foregoing, as ' their caufe, ground, or reafon, takes ' away all proof of the being of God.'
* It is fo far from being true,' p. 15, ' that our minds are naturally poflelled
* with a notion of fuch liberty as this, (;o ' ftrongly that it is impoffible to root it ' out) that, indeed, men have no fuch
* notion of liberty at all, and it is utterly
* impolhble^
iS6 R E M A R K S O N
* impoflible, by any means whatfoever; ^ to implant or introduce fuch a notion
* into the mind. — The greateft and moft ' learned advocates themfelves for liberty 'of indifference and felf-determination
* have no fuch notion ; and indeed they ' mean fomething wholly inconfiftent ' with, and direftly fubverfive of, what ' they flrenuoufly affirm, and earneftly ' contend for.'
' All the Arminians on earth/ p. 411,
* might he challenged, without arrogance,
* to make thefe principles of theirvS con- ' fiflent with common ienie, yea and per-
* haps to produce any doclrine ever em-
* braced by the blinded bigot of the
* church of Rome, or the moft ignorant ' MuflTulman, or extravagant enthufiaft, ' that might be reduced to more, and 'more demonftrable inconfiftencies and
* repugnancies to common fenfe, and to ' themfelves ; though their inconfiftencies
* may not, indeed, lie fo deep, or be fo
* artfully vailed by a deceitful ambiguity
'of
Br./'BEATTIE's ESSAY. 187
* of words, and an indeterminate figni- '- fication of phrafes.'
How very different is the common fenfc of Mr/ Edwards from the common fenfe of Dr. Beattie I How uniform and infal- lible is this guide to truth !
SEC T I O N VI.
The conclujion,
T^T'HEN I confider the many feem^ v^^rjT ,-i^g^y plain and unequivocal marks df a good intention, and good difpofition in Dr. Beattie, I am puzzled to account for his grofs and injurious mifreprefen- tations of the fentiments of his ad- verfaries, and at the violence with which he is aftuated, bordering fometimes upoa a fpirit of perfecution.
^* The
i8B R E M A R K S O N
* The vulgar,' he fays, p. 49, ' when ' they are puzzled with argument, . have ' recourfe to their common fenfe, and ' acquiefce in it {"o fteadily, as often to ' render all the arts of the logician in- ' effectual ; / am confuted, but not con- ' vinced, is an apology fometimes offered ' when one has nothing to oppofe to the
* arguments of the antagonift ; but the ^ original undifguifed feelings of his own ' mind. This apology is, indeed, very ' inconfiftent with the- dignity of philofo-
* phic pride, which, taking for granted
* that nothing exceeds the limits of hu- ' man capacity, profeffes to confute what- ' ever it cannot believe, and, which is ftill '^more difficult, to believe whatever if *^ cannot confute; but this apology may ' be perfedly confiflent with fmcerity and ' candour, and with that principle, of ' which Pope fays, that, though nofcience, ''it is fairly worth the f even J
.Now what is this but infmuating, nay it is fomething more than infmuating, that all thofe who do not admit this new doc- trine
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 189
trine of the iiifallibility of common fenfe, are pofTefTed of fo much philofophic pride, that they take it for granted that nothing can exceed the limits of their capacity ; that we profefs to confute whatever we cannot beUeve, and to beHeve whatever we cannot confute. But whatever effetl this reprefentation may have upon thofe who, knowing but Httle of men and books, are difpofed to take for granted whatever fuch a man as Dr. Beattie will venture to affert fo roundly, it is a mere chimera of his own brain : and this mode of writing is a mofl; unjuflifiable method of drawing an odium upon his opponents, who, perhaps, have no more philofophic pride than himfelf. If arrogance and infolence be an indica- tion of pride. Dr. Beattie has certainly no fmall fhare of it, though it may hi- therto have efcaped his own fearch.
His tacking the do61rine of neceffity to the end of a lift of peculiarly obnoxious and atheiftical tenets, as if it was the na- tural and neceiTary completion of the \/hole fcheme, in the preceding quota- tion.
i§6 REMARKS ON
tion, is another inftance of his unfairnels, that looks very hke artifice ; and which I think exceedingly unjulHfiable. A lit- tle of irony a.nd Jatyr, and fomething ap- proaching to afperity, may, perhaps, be indulged, as in a manner neceflary to enliven controverfial writing; at leaft it may be apologized for, as almoft una- voidably fuggefted by the heat of debate; but the paffages I have quoted above have a very different and a more malignant af- pe6l.
Dn Beattie's vehemence, and his anti- pathy to diofe who differ from him, though he is quite a volunteer in the controvcrfy, and cannot plead that he w^as heated by any perfonal oppojition, approaches too near to the fpirit of perfecution. At leaft I do not fee how elfe to interpret the fol- lowing paffage, and I earneftly wifh that the ingenuous author would do it himfelf, and help us, if it be poffible, to interpret it without having recouife to fo unfavour- able a comment. * Had I,' p. 20, * done * but half as much as he (Mr. Hume) in
* labour-
Dr. BEATTIE's E S S;A Y. 191
' labouring to fubvert principles which
* oucrht ever to be held facred, I know not
* whether ih.Q friends of truth would have ' granted me any indulgence. I am fure ' they ought not. Let me be treated with
* the lenity due to a good citizen no longer ' than I a6l as becomes one.*
Certainly the obvious conftruftion of this pafTage is, that Mr. Hume ought not to be treated with the indulgence and lenity due to a good citizen, but ought to be puniflied as a bad one. And what is this but what a Bonner or a Gardiner midit
o
have put into the preamble of an order for his execution ? Judging as Dr. Beattie does, by his own ideas of the tendency of principles, exprefled in this book, he will, I doubt not, think feveral of my writings, if they have happened to fall in his way, and efpecially thefe remarks on his treatife (in which I own I have endeavoured to lay the ax to the very root of his fundamental principles of virtue, religion and truth) to be equally dangerous, provided he fhould think them in equal danger of fpreading ;
and.
192 R E M A R K S O N
and, if he be confiftent with himfelf, and think me worthy of his notice, I (hall ex- pert, after a fummary procefs before the tribunal of his common fenfe, to be con- figned to the difpofal of his friends of truth, who may not be equally the friends and lovers of mercy. But, thanks to ti good fuperintending providence, which iRfluences the hearts^ and dire6is the af- fairs of men, our governors either do not entertain the fentimeuts, or are not in- fpired with the zeal of our author.
Dr. Beattie and I muft certainly think and feel very differently with refpeft to many thmgs. His dread of infidel writ- ings, and his apprehenfion of the mifchief they may do, far exceeds mine. * The
* writings of Mr. Hume,' he fays, p. 472,
* notwithflanding their obfcurity, have ' done mifchief enough to make every
* fober-mmded perfbn earneftly wifh that
* they had never exifted.'
Now I, for my part, am truly pleafed with fuch publications as thofe of Mr.
Hume,
Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 193
Hume, and I do not think it requires any- great fagacity. Or ftrength of mind, tcyfee that fuch writings mufl be of great fervice to religion, natural and revealed. They hiVe aHually occafioned the fubjecl to be more thorouglily canvafTed, and con- fequently to be better underilood than ever it was before ; and thus vice cotis funguntur.
In what a wretched flate would chrifti- anity have univerfally been at prefent, loaded with fuch abfurdities and impieties as all the eflablilhments of it contain, (that of Scotland by no means excepted) if it had not been for fuch a fcrutiny into it as the writings of unbelievers have pro- moted, and indeed have made abfolutely neceffary.
Infidelity appears to me to have been the natural and neceffary produce of cor- rupted chriftianity ; but I have no doubt but that this evil will find its own remedy, by purging our religion of all the abfur- dities it contains, and thereby enabling it O to
194 • REM ARKS ON
to triumph over all oppofition. Things are now in fuch a train that infidelity will have every day lefs and lefs to carp at in chriftianityi till at length its excellence .and divine authority will be univerfally acknowledged.
REMARKS
REMARKS
O N
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL
T O
COMMON SENSE
IN BEHALF OF
RELIGION.
Oil
THE
INTRQPUCTION.
THE controverfy in which I am now engaged may perhaps illuftrate the propriety of the old Latin proverb Principiis objla. Dr. Reid's new princi- ple of Common fenfe, or, to give it a name \t.{% ambiguous, and more appropriated to its office, his fenfe of truth, notwith- ftanding the prodigious afTurance with which it was ufhered into the world, and notwithftanding the manifeft inconfiflency there is between it and the fundamental principles of Mr. Locke, concerning the human mind, was fuffered to pafs without any particular notice. I fuppofe becaufe no particular life was made of it. It was confidered as nothing more than a new- fafhioned theory of the human mind, ea^ gerly adopted and cried up by fome, O 3 who.
iqS REMARKS ON
who, in my opinion, were very fuperfi- , cial j'.idges of luch things; while thofe who thought with me, that the whole fyftem was ill founded, did not, I fup- pofe, think it worth their while to make any oppofition to it ; concluding that in due time the futility of it could not fail to be feen through, when it would fall into oblivion of itfelf.
Prefently, however, we find two writers, men of fome note, Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald, (feeing that this new doftrine of a fen/e of trutk was received without any oppofition) beginning to avail themfelves of it for the defence of religion, and of fome peculiar tenets of their own, in the regular proof of which they had been em- barrafTed. Dr. Beattie, indeed, with fome degree of moderation and timidity, and not much in the detail of things ; but Dr. Ofwald with great particularity, and with as much bigotry and violence, as if his principles had been the eftablifhed faith of all mankind in all ages, and not, -as in truth they sue, a thing of'yejlerday.
rinding
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 199
Finding this new power of the human mind to be decifive and irrefiftible within its jurifdiftion, and requiring no aid from reafon, he immediately fets about enlarg- ing its province (as the Englifh govern- ment have lately done that of Quebec) throwing into it, without any regard to reafon or confcience, every thing that he thought of value, and which he had found any difficulty in defending upon ©ther principles.
By this means he has eafed himfelf at ©nee of the defence of all the firil princi- ples, or, as he calls them, primary truths of religion ; fuch as the being, the unity, the moral perfeftions, and providence of God, and a future ftate ; of the evi- dences alfo of chriftianity, and even many of his favourite and leaft defenfible doc- trines in the chriftian fyftem. And, more- over, on this new ground, as from a fanc- tuary, he pours the grolTeft abufe both upon all unbelievers, and thofe who have oppofed them on the principles of reafon ©niy ; treating them alike as fools'or mad- O4 men.
200 R E M A R K S O N
men. Dr. Ofwald's treatife, however, as well as Dr. Beattie's, has many admirers, both north and fouth of the Tweed.
Finding things in this fituation, I own I was willmg to interpofe my feeble en- deavours to put a flop to this fuddeii tor- rent of nonfenfe and abufe that is pouring down upon us from the North, though at the evident rijk of my chdracier, as Dr. Ofwald, vol. 2, p. 328, .will tell me, ^qd laying my account with meeting alh that magifteriai infolence, which he, and in- deed the whole triuynvirate, have boldly affumed with refpecl to others.
But if this tafk (hould not be undertaken by fome perfon, I am afraid we fliall find thefe new principles extending their au- thority farther than the precinfts of meta- phyfics, morals, religion, chriftianity, and proteflantifm, to which they have been hitherto confined. Papifis may begin to avail themfelves of them for the fupport of all thofe doftrines and maxims for wiiich the powers of reafon had proved
infufiicient :
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 20^
infufficient ; and politicians alfo, pofTeffinff therafelves of this advantage, may venture pnce more to thunder out upon us their exploded doctrines of pafFive obedience and non-refiftance. For having now nothing to fear from the powers o^rea/on, and being encouraged by the example of grave divines and metaphyficians, they inay venture to ^flert their favourite max- ims with the greatell confidence ; appeal- ing at once to this ultimate tribunal of common fenfe, and giving out their own mandates as the decifions of this new tri- bunal. For every man will think himfelf authorized to afiume the office of inter- preting its decrees, as this new power holds a feparate office in every man's own breaft. Indeed our author has left the politician but little to do with refpetl to this dodrine, having ranked obedience to the magiftrate among the primary truths of nature, p. 247.
Confidering the very late origin of this new empire of common fenfe, its con- quefts, it muft be confefled, have been
pretty
S02 R E M A R K S O N
pretty rapid ; and as it has fubdued all the regions of metaphyficSj morals, and theology in the fpace of ten years, it may be computed that, with this addition of ftrength, it may, in ten years morcj complete the reduftion of all the'-fevert fciences ; when the whole bufmefs of thinking will be in a manner over, anc} we fhall have nothing to do but to fee and believe.
Now, being no friend to implicit faith; becaufe, perhaps, it has been no friend to me, I am willing to oppofe the farther encroachments of this bold invader, be- fore it be quite too late. And having al- ready made two campaigns in this jufl caufe, as it appears to me, lam now pre-' paring for a third, which I forefee will be more difficult and hazardous than both the former. Nevertheiefs I will not de- fpair ; fince, if I mil, I (hall, at ieaft, be intitled to the epitaph of Phaeton, Mag- nis tamm e:^cidiiciujis.
But,
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 203
But, dropping this figure, I really am much more at a lofs how to anfwer Dr. Ofwald, than either Dr. Reid, or Dr. Beattie, on account of the great inco- herence of his work, and hi^ remarkably loofe and declamatory way of wriring; ©n which account his argument is lb in- volved, that there is hardly any fuch thing as coming at it ; fo that, though I have often faid, that if I have any talent, it is a facility in arrangement, I own that, for once, I have been exceedingly puzzled, and do not clearly fee my way. I fliall proceed, however, in the beft manner that I can ; giving, in the firft place, the hiftory of this new fcience, as deduced by our author ; then explaining the na- ture and extent of it ; after which I (hall fliow more particularly the relation it bears to reafoning, and point out fome particular applications that our author has made of it.
In all this I fhall do little more than fele6i and arrange a number of paflages t;hat I have colietted from our author.
For
?o4 REMARKS ON
for I muft acknowledge, that if he, has epibarraffed me, and taken up my time in the difpofition of my materials, he has made me amends by faving me the trou- J)Ie of making many obfervations. Ir^ facl, I fhall have occafion to do little niore than let our author fpeak for him- felf, only putting his words a little nearer together than he would have done. And as our author feems to have had great fatisfaclion in the firft publica- tion of his work, I hope he will not be difpleafed at this new edition of it. For whatever my reader may think of him, as a reafoner, my quotations cannot fail to verify the character that Dr. Beattie (whofe judgment in this cafe no perfon will call in queftion) gives of him, viz. that he is an elefrant writer.
SEC-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. ^
SECTION i.
Of the Hiftory oj Common fenfc ,
f'T has b^en a great lofs to hiftbry, that ■ tfie pVincipal a6tors in many great idhie^r'einerits have not themfelv^s written the hiftory of them. But Dr. Ofwald has taken fufficient c£jre that there {hould be no cotnplaint of rhi^ kind with refpe^l to ' the late triumph of fcnfe over" reafdri. For though he himfelf is but thte feco'nd iti fucceflion from Dr. Reid, who plahnted arid began the attack, he has taken an opportunity of fully ftating the ground bf the War, and informing us of the pro- grefs that his predecelTor had made in it.
The more fully to explain the rife of this ne\<r fyflem, our author goes back to the times preceding the reformation from popery. Speaking of this popifh dark- nefs, he fays, p. 52, ' Upon confulting
* the facred records, and appealing to
* 'them' (riot redfoning from them) ' one
' half
2o6 -REMARKS ON.
half of Chriftendom were made fenfible of their folly, and (hook off the domi- nion of ignorance and error. They
fplit again into fefts, formed different creeds, and different plans of worfhip and government ; and having been much exercifed in fubtle and hot dif- putes with the Romifh doftors, they entered into contefls of much the fame kind, and in much the fame fpirit, with one another, about their peculiar tenets. Mean time, a fe8; arofe who called the whole in queflion ; and, believing them- felves equally privileged with otliers to found unfathomable depths, they em- ployed the fame fubtlety of reafoning againft religion which contending di- vines had employed againft each other; and the friends of religion, not aware Qf.:.the confequence, did partly from their zeal for the truth, and partly from a habit of difputing, and a confidence * of victory, admit the whole to debate.'
Religion being now, through the fatal imprudence of its belt friends, and the
ableft
Dr. OSWALD'S APPKAL. so;
ableft that the times (which produced no fuch men as Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, or Dr. Ofwald) afforded, become a fubjecl of debate, divines were obliged to rtiake the bed of the arms with which they were furniihed for the engagement. How things were condii6led before the time of Mr. Locke our author does not parti- cularly lay^ but though his writings were univerfally thought to be of great advan- tage to the caufe. of truth and rehgion, yet Dr. Ofwald informs us that he fet out v/rong, and thereby gave the enemy too great advantage.
'Mr. Locke, p. 108, unfortunately,
* derived all our knowledge from fenfa- ' tion or refleclion, intirely overlooking ' another principle, more important than
* them both, and without which they are *ofno avail. Senfation and reflection,' our author fays, * do indeed give occafion ' to all our ideas, but they do not pro-
* duce them. They may, in our prefent
* ftate, be confidered as th^^ne qua non ' to our mod rational and fublime con-
* ceptionsj
2oS R E M A R K S O N
* ceptrons, but are not therefore the poH^f"-
* ers by which we form them. Thefe
* conceptions are formed in us by anothef
* and different power, which Mr. Locke^
* and unhappily, afrer him, the bulk of
* the learned, have overlooked. In this/ ' p. log, he has committed a capital over-
* fight of very bad confequence. He has
* not only put the learned upon a falfe
* fcent^ but has brought the primary
* truths of nature under fufpicion, and
* opened a door touniverfal fcepticifm.'
At this door, fet open by Mr. Locke, Mr. Hume and others have found ad- miffioh. * Hence, p. no, difpiites ' upon the moft important fubj^ds have ' been maintained, to the detrivnefit oF ' rehgion, and the difgrace of the huhian '' tmderftanding ; nor will it be poffibl6
* to put an end to thefe difputes, without ' fearching farther into the powers of th^
* human mind than Mr. Locke has done/
To purfue this curious hiflory a little farther, * Mr. Hume had penetration
* enough/
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 209
* enough/ p. 110, ' to perceive the defe6l ' of Mr. Locke's hypothefis, but had not
* the courage to f-ipply that defeft, by the ' only way in which it could be fupphed.
* Perhaps he fufpefted that philofophers
* would not fubmit to the authority of
* common fenfe, or was himfelf too much
* a philofopher to have recourfe to an ' authority fo vulgar and homely. He ' therefore found himfelf under a necef- ' fity of making the belt account he
* could of the phenomena of nature by ' the received do6irine of the conneftion
* and affociation of ideas ; and it muft
* be owned that his account is extremely ' ingenious.'
' The author of the EJfays on the prin- ' ciples of morality and natural religion^ ' pubhflied Edinburgh, 1751, p. 94, 112,
* alarmed at Mr. Hume's confounding
* rational belief with credulity, and deny-
* ing the connexion between caufe and
* effeft, has faid all that is neceffary in
* confutation of his opinion ; but he has
* -confuted Mr, Hume upon principles too
P ^ muck
210 R E M A R K S O N
* much a-kin to his own. He has recourfe ' to our being fo conftituted that we mufl
* perceive, feel, and beheve certain truths, ' w^ithout laying open the human confti- ' tution, or once attempting to point out ' that in our frame which produces the
* way of thinking, which hejuftly fays is
* unavoidable. That certain perfons are ' fo conftituted is perhaps all the account ' that can be made of odd and fanciful ' perceptions or feelings ; but a more fa-
* tisfaclory account ought to be given of
* the primary truths of nature. He has ' not beflowed that attention on the lead-
* ing power which is due ; nor feems he ' to have reached a true and full view of
* the charafteriflic of a rational beina;/
p. 114.
After thefe grofs blunders of Mr. Locke, Mr. Hume, and the author of the EfTays, it is pleahng to obferve the approach that was made towards the dif- ' CO very of this great principle of common fenfe by Mr. Hutchefon. ' Mr. Hutche- ' fon/ p. 158, * thought that he had made
' a dif-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 211
' a difcovery of a new faculty of the hu-
* man iriind, which he Was intitled to call ' by a new name, and thereby gave of- ^ fence to the friends of demonltration ;
* but in reality this great philofopher had ' only, got a view, and but a partial view
* of common fenfe.'
Behold, however, at length, the great defideratum completely difcovered; and after this ftate of deplorable darknefs and obfcure gueflTmgs, full day light is diffufed by Dr. Reid. * Dr. Reid,' vol. 2, p. 329,
* has put an effeftual ilop to the artifices ' of fceptics, by pointing out three ' powers of the mind, evidently diftinft,
* and eafily diflinguifhed,' meaning per- ception, memory, and imagination ; the operations of two of which imply the belief of the real exiftence of their re- fpeftive objecls. * We have found then,' fays our author, p. 268, ' a fource of ' ideas that has been too long over- ' looked, and in it have found the much
* contefted fource of moral obligation.
* Theology and ethics are now to be
P 2 ' con-
212 R E M A R K S O N
* confidered as a real fcience, founded on ' principles of indubitable certainty ; prin- ' ciples, which, if they are not as much
* regarded, are, however, intitled to equal
* regard with the axioms of the fchools — ' the principles of common fenfe.'
' Of late, p. 168, there has appeared
* All inquiry into the human mind, on the 'principles of common fenfe, by Dr. Reid,
* in which he aives fuch an account of the
* operations of our powers, as fliews it to ' be impoffible for a rational being to
* doubt the reality of the objefts of fenfe,
* and gives us ground to expeft, from a ^ farther purfuit of his inquiry, fuch a dif-
* play of the powers of the Imman mind
* as will render it impoffible for any one
* to doubt of the obvious truths of religion
* and virtue, without being con lifted of ' folly or madnefs ; fo that the triumph of
* truth over error, and of true fcienceover
* falle philofophy may not be vtxy diftant.
* Upon the whole, p. 169, we are ar-
* rived at a period, in which, if it is not
* our
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 213
' our own fault, we may difmifs frivolous ' controverfies, and fettle in the belief of * primary truth upon the moft folid foun- ' dation/
It is my misfortune, or, as Dr. Ofwald fays above, my fault, that I cannot as yet difmifs all controverfy, and fettle up- on this folid foundation.
SECTION II.
Of the nature, limits, and general \x{& of the principle of Common fenfe,
TTAVING feen the hiflory of this great difcovery deduced, with a folemnity worthy of its importance, my reader, if I had not in fome meafure gratified his curiofity already, in my account of Dr. Reid's and Dr. Beattie's performances, would have been impatient to be inform- ed more particularly what this common P 3 fenfe
214 REMARKS ON
fenfe is. I can promife him, however, that though he has leen much, there is more to be feen ; and that he will get new light and information from this and the following fedions.
In the firft place, I fiiall prefent him with Dr. Ofwaid's idea of the nature, \ limitSy and general nfes of the faculty of common fenfe. 1
According to our author, this new- difcovcred faculty is the * leading and fu- ' preme power of the rational mind,' as he defcribes it in the following paffage, in which he alfo mod pathetically laments that it has been hitherto much over- looked and negleded.
' The powers of compounding,' p. 86,
* dividing, and abflra6ling our ideas have ' been unfolded with the greateft accu- ' racy and judgment ; but its leading ' power, that which is fupreme in the ' rational mind, and is its chief preroga-
• tive and charaderiflic, has been much
* neg-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 215
' negle6led. Its objefts are not enume-
* rated, its extent is not known, and its '^ authority is little regarded. For which
* reafon a ftandard of theologic, ethic, ' and political truth is to this hour a defi- ' deratum with the learned. On all thefe
* fubjetls we are become expert reafon-
* ers, but hardly know when or where to
* flop, or how to form a firm and iteady
* judgment/
The great importance of this principle may farther appear from the following cenfure of Mr. Locke. ' There is a ne-
* ceflity of declaring,' p. 70, * in plain
* terms, that Mr. Locke, in his account
* of the origin of our ideas, is guilty of ' an overfight of very bad confequence.
* If, as our author reprefents, we can
* have no ideas befides thofe ariling im- ' mediately from imprefiTions made on our
* organs of fenfe, or our own refle6lions
* upon thofe, then the authority of com-
* mon fenfe mufl go for nothing, and a
* free fcope is given to fcepticifm with re-
P 4 * fpea
2i6 REMARKS ON
' f^e6l to all truths that are not the im« ' mediate objefts of fenfe.*
If we a(k why this new faculty is to be C2\\^A fenfe, or comraon fenfe (for as to a regular definition, that he abfolutely de- clines giving us, leaving us to make it out as we can) he anfwers as follows,
* This characleriftic power of the rational ' mind/ vol. 2, p. iv. Advertifement, ' on ' account of its quicknefs, clearnefs, and
* indubitable certainty, is called fenfe, and
* on account of its being poffeffedin one ' degree or other by all of the rational
* kind, is called common fenfe.' In this I would obferve that our author differs from Dr. Beattie, who only fays that this common fenfe is given to a great majority of mankind.
The great ufe of this common fenfe is that, inftead olhTivmg perceptions or emo- tions for its obje£l, like the other fenfes, it is employed about the more important bufmefs of truth ^ which it fuggefts with- out
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 217
out the help of any proper evidence ; and yet it is the means of making the greatefl and mod in:^ortant dircoveries.
* Mr. Locke unhappily overlooked the •* chief inlet to truth,' voL 2, p. 42. ' That ' difcoveries may be made in the arts and
* fciencesby reafoning will not be denied; ' but that difcoveries more numerous, ' more ufeful, and more certain may be ' made in both by a judicious attention
* to the operations of nature, cannot be
* doubted.' p. 34.
But the mod important ufe of this new principle is derived from its relation to morals. It is * the faculty of diftin-
* guifhing between fit and unfit, right
* and wrong in condu6l.' p. 119.
This principle of common fenfe our author alfo confiders as ' the charac- ' teriflic of rationality* p. 102. ' We
* are not diftinguifhed/ he fays, p. 114,
* from ideots and the lower animals by
* perceptions, feelings, and inftin6live
* emo*
2i8 R E M A R K S O N
' emotions. We have perceptions fpeci-
* fically different from thefe, which the ' lower animals have not,' p. 116, * viz, ' the perception of obvious truth and pal- ' pabie abfurdity,' p. 1 1 7. * Mr. Locke/ p. 179, ' was guilty of a capital overfight;
* in making abifraclion the charafteriftic ' of rationality. There is another faculty
* which makes a yet more perfect diftinBion ' between men and brutes, the faculty, to *" wit, of perceivingand pronouncing upon ' the connexion which fubfifts between ' qualities and powers, and thefubie6i:s to
* which they belong ; of which faculty if
* the brutes were pofleffed, there feems no
* ground to doubt of their power of ab- ' llratling, occafionally, thofe qualities ' »jnd powers, in the fame manner we do.*
So plain is it, that it is this common fenfe that makes the difference between men and the lower animals, that, accord- ingto our author, none but thofewhoare themfelves ideots can doubt of it. ' That
* we are diftinguifhed by a fet of ideas, ^ and a fydem of knowledge fpecifically
* different
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 219
' different from theirs (the brutes) might ' without more ado be appealed to the ' brealt of every man who is above the ' rank of an ideot ; were it not that the
* learned lay us under a neceflity of giv- ' ing them in detail.* p. 189.
It is the poflefTion of this faculty of €ommon fenfe that diflinguifhes men from ideots no lefs than from the lower ani- mals. ' The characlerillic of ideotifni
* confifts in an incapacity to diftinguilh ' between chance and defign.' Vol. 2,
P- 55*
We fhall now confider how this new faculty, is to be diftinguifhed from the old ones, and firfl from intuition ; with refpeft to which we fhall find there has been fome little flu6luation in our author's judgment, which appears to be rather unufual with him.
' The man who from the looks, gc- ' ftures, and fpeech of his adverfary, fees
* rage and rcfentment, which are not,
* ftriaiy
22® REMARKS ON
' ftri6lly fpeaking, obje6ls of intuition, ' has the fame information of thofe paf-
* (ions as he has ofany other reality, which
* he perceives intuitively by his external
* and internal fenfes/ p. 238. ' If I be ' alked whether primary truths are difco-
* vered by intuition, the anfwer will be in ' the negative ; becaufe intuition has been ' confined to our perceptions of the ob- ' vious relations and qualities of being.' But he affirms, at the fame time, that our knowledge of primary truths is equally certain and indubitable as that of intui- tion, p. 238.
Afterwards our author owns that the knowledge we acquire by common fenfe is properly intuitive. ' I was,' fays he, p. 357, ' too fcrupulousonthat occafion.
* Our knowledge of primary truth has an ' equal title with our knowledge of all
* other felf-evident truths to be refolved
* into intuition/
Our author dillinguiflies the informa- tions of common fenfe from thofe of ex- perience'.
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. £2t
perience, as being more certain. ' I do ' not/ p. 361, * found our belief of pri-
* mary truths on experience alone ; for ' experience alone doth not produce cer-
* tainty. The unthinking part of man-
' kind,' p. 363, ' are often governed folely
* by experience in much the fame man- ' ner as children and ideots ; but men of ' underftanding fearch for a more firm ' foundation of their faith. — The vulgar
* are not accurate reafoners. and yet you
* will find that they do not chufe to reft
* in experience alone.'
It has been feen above that our author complains of the author of the Eflaysfor confuting Mr. Hume upon principles too near a-kin to his own. However I muft. own that, for my part, I can fee no mate- rial difference between the fentiments of the author of the Effays, as explained by our author, and thofe of Dr. Ofwald him- felf. ' He has recourfe, Tays our author, p. 112, 'to our being fo conftituted that ' we muft perceive, feel, and believe cer-
* tain truths, without laying open the
^ human
222 RE MARKS ON
* human conftitLition, are once attempting
* to point out that in our frame whicli ' produces a way of thinking, which he ' jultly fays is unavoidable.' Now it ap- pears to me that all the more fatis factory account that Dr. Ofwald himfelfcan give of this part of my conilitution, and all that he and Dr. Reid have done towards laying it open, is merely verbal, viz. giv- ing a 7iame to this unknown fomething, calling it common fenfe . But v/hat addi- tion is this to our knowledge of the fubjea?
Our author appears to be a little em- barraffed about the boundary between the province of reafon and that of com- mon fenfe, in the bufinefs of inferring the laws of nature from the phenomena. This has hitherto been afcribed to reafon, but our author, defirous to find fufficient employment for his new principle, is un- willing to admit of this, except in a quali- fied fenfe. ' It is common to fay.' p. 235,
* that we infer the laws of nature from
* the phenomena ; but that way of fpeak-
' ing
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 225
' ing is not philofophically, nor flriftly
* true. In every juft inference there is a ' reference to fome well known truth, by ' the help of which the inference is made,
* and on the truth of which its judnels ' depends. But there is no truth in na- ' ture by which we can infer thofe realities ' which are not the objecls of fenfe from
* thofe that are. From the appearance
* of fmokc we infer fire. Why.t^ Becaufe
* we know the connection between the ' one and the other. Thus fome general ' truth is always underflood, on the ' knowledge of which the inference de- ' pends.'
But he afterwards favs, ' if any,' vol. 2, p. 36, ' chufe to fay that they infer the ' primary truths from the phenomena, ' we allow the phrafeology, upon condi-
* tion they keep in mind, that the inference
* refults immediately and unavoidably
* from due attention to the objett, and ' without the help of any middle term.
* Or if they chufe to call fuch obvious
* and neceffary deductions reafoning, wc
' will
224 REMARKS ON
* will not difpute about a word, provided ' they allow that fuchreafoningis notfub-
* jeft to the danger of thofe errors and
* miftakes we are liable to in every other
* exercife of the difcurfive faculty.'
Some of the di6lates of this general principle of common fenfe, our author inarms us, are the mathematical axioms ; and the difference between thefe and other primary truths he explains as follows.
* The difference between the evidence
* for mathematical axioms and that which
* we "have for other primary truths is
* merely circumftantial/ p. 139. *^ In
* judging of mathematical axioms you fee
* the ground on which you proceed,
* which you donot fee in judging of many ' other truths, on which we pronounce
* with equal ceVtainty,' vol. 2, p. 324. So that whether we fee the ground on which we walk, or not, we may proceed witli equal confidence, being equally fe- cure from falling.
SEC-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 425
SECTION III.
Of the fufficiency and, univerfality of the principle of Common fcnfe.
/CONSIDERING the very important ^^ nature, high rank, and authority of common fenfe, my reader wiJl be pleafed to be informed of xhe^ fufficiency and uni" verfality of it, and of the confidence with which its diftates may, and ought to be deHvered, whenever fceptical reafoners call them in queftion.
* The principles of good fenfe are (b ' plain,' fays our author, p. 17, ^ that to
* illuftrate and inculcate them is to tire
* the patience, and affront the judgment
* of the reader. The human mind/ p. 8, ' has a power of pronouncing, at firft
* fight, on obvious truth with a quicknefs,
* clearnefs, and indubitable certainty, fi- ' milar, if not equal, to the information
* conveyed by the external organs of
* fenfe. Its exercife begins in children
0 • with
2j6. .RiE:MA R K S O N
* with the firft dawn of rationality, and
* not till, then ; and is ever after enjoyed, ' in fome degree, by learned and un-
* learned, and by every individual of the 'humankind, who is notan ideot, and
* fomehow difordered in his intelle61;uals. ' No man can be at a lofs,' p. 249, * to
* know the propofitions that are the ob- *^je6ls of common fenfe from thofe that
* iare riot^ and to determine with himfelf ' whether he has, or has not, a right to *-f(ifper^4 his judgment.'
Confidering that the di6lates of this common fenfe are fo clear, and likewife univ^rfsbit^Oux author mud not be.cen- furcd' when -he treats thofe who do riot liflen to them with. ^ feverity fuited to their defpera|.e folly and .madnefs ; even though* uppn fome particular occafions be flioujd'ifo far tranfgrefs the fcripture yule, as tp call his brother a/i?(?/.
* Jf yoi^r adverfary,' p. 12, 'have the "*.bo]dr)els tb queftion the truth of firft / prificiplesj pr tp lubftitute chimeras, lji:v/» *inftead \
Dr. OSWALD'S ;APPE:AL. 227
* inftead of principles, you muft necefla-
* rily appeal to common knk ; and if you ' do fo/you mufhfhow him how far he
* deviates from tite ftandard appealed to,
* i. t. in other, words you mult convift
* him of nowfmfe. The harih expreliion *" may and ought to be avoided, but the 'idea conveyed by it muft be kept in
* view. Without that you do nothing.
* Your appeal will be found frivolous
* and unjud:.'
* It is impoffible/ p. 134, ' to obferve
* inferior animals move hither and thither
* by the direction of their appetites and
* inclinations without conceiving the idea
* of that felf-determining power by which
* they a6l, &c. If any one has attended ' to fuch operations, without arriving at
* the knowledge and belief of fuch princi-
* pies of a^lioUj we do not blame the
* dulnefs or flownefs of his apprehenfion,
* but without fcr^jiple pronounce him a
Q 2 So
22S R E M A R K S O N
So abundantly fufiicient are the dilates pf this common fenfe, that in many cafes they even fuperfede allother helpsto truth. With refped to religion more efpecially we are much better without them. They only embarrals and perplex us.
* I fhould not be very glad/ fays our author, p. 353, * to fee a demonftration / of the being and perfeftions of God that
* would ftand the fevereft trial : For a de- ..* monftration equal to any in Euclid could
* add nothing to the belief that every ratio-
* nal being has of it. You may reft
* aflured,' p. 354, ' that the beft proof
* or demonllration of thefe truths is that ' you cannot admit the fuppofition of the
* contrary, v/ithout your being confcious ' of your playing xhefoolox the madman.* He recoramtnds, p. 92, ' ?.lTerting in a ' high tone, t);;;t no demouftration is of ' equal force wiili coromou fenfc, and no
* confutation can ferv^ethe interefl of truth ' fo effeftually, as a plain convi6lion of
* nonfenfe. And therefore/ fays he, • it
* was
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 229
' was the bufinefs of divines and phil.^fo- ' phers to have recourfe to the fimplc de-
* cifion of common fenfe, on rubje61s fo
* plain and important. Too much can
* hardly be faid/ p. 171, 'to perfuade
* men to put lefe confidence in the faculty
* of reafoning, andmore in the faculty of
* judgment than they commonly do.'
Such firm hold have the principles of common fenfe on the bulk of mankind, that no perfon who has any regard to his reputation will ever dare to call them in queftion ; fo that we may be perfe6lly eafy in refting the caufe of religion upon this iblid foundation. * If one incline,' vol. 2, p. 328, * to fet afide the authority of
* reafon' (as diftinguifhed from reafoning^ p. 327) * and deliver himfeif over to fancy,
* he may ufe what freedoms he will with
* primary truths, but not with fafety to
* his ch4ra6ler. One mud either admit
* all obvious trutis, or fall under the im- ' putation of folly and nonfenfe. This \ is learned nonfenfe.' p' Q27j * and fo are
230 R E M A R K S O M
' all the furmifes that can be offered ' agaiiiij: Jricbifcatable truths- •.
Con{i<iering how amply the dilates, of common fenfe are guarded hy their own evidence,, and - the fanftion of all man- kind, in fo niucrH that every rnan mult be confcious that he is playing the fool or tfie madman who ihall prefume to gainfay them, t4hat'hi G^rfot do itwiihfofety to Jus char^cier, *^at every man who heatls"' him ha«' at'. -right to^dl him to Ms f&oe' that he talks- v/)nf€njei and even need not fcrnple t<^' call him ?t. fodi, it is rather wonder fqlthot our author (hould v/ant any other guard for his primary truths? and yet he, as well as Br. Beattie, give^ hints that the* aid of the inagijirate, 2iX\d.^ little wholefome fe verity, might not.be. improper ; provided that, contrary to his expectation, the above mentioned guards fhould prove not to be quite fufficient for fo great and good a purpofe. But, in fa6l, no people have been fo ready to have recourie to perfecution, as thofe
who
Dr. aSWA'L'D's; APP£AL. 231
who have pretended to infallibility. This was the cafe both'with the infallible church of Rome, and the no lefs infallible Calvin. Countenanced by thefe great (Example's, the patrons of common fenf^, which is as infallible as either of them can pretend to be, need not be afhamed to do fts they did. .s.Lj>.'
' All pbffibfe erTmurag^mem,"^ 'feys'onf author, vol. 2f, p.335, *oughttobegiv6il
* to rational and juft, and all manner df
* difcouragement to foolifh and nonfeh-
* fical way of talking. No pleafantry, nb *' vivacity, no appearance of wit atfd hu^
* ttiour, ought to atone .fofnonfenft eft
* any fubjeft, efpecially in th'ofe of th^ ' greateft weight and importance."' ^It ' were even to be wifhed that the civil
* TMgiJtrati were authorized td ^"t a,
* ftigma on palpable abfurdity,''5Vr fub-
* jeds where the honour of God and the
* intereft of mankind are deeply con-
* cerned. But as this might be danger* ' ous, it is alfo unneceffary.*
9.A S E C-
S32 REMARKS ON
S E C T I O N IV.
Of the natural imperfe6lions ani^ectf- fary culture of Common fcnfen^'^'^^ j
T EST the idea which my reader vrill "^ naturally conceive of the power and influence of common fenfe, frotn the con- tents of the laft feftion, Ihould lea4 him to expeft from it more than he will find, it is necelTary, before we procexsdi any farther, to apprize him, that here, as in / many oth. r cafes, (examples of which he will find in abundance in the profecution of his ftudies) fad and experience do not exactly tally with the pifcconceived theory.
He would too naturally imagine that the principle which diRinguilhes every individual of the human race, being the very charaB:eriftic of rationality, which pronounces with quicknefsy dearnefs, and indubitable certainty, on all primary truths, and which was intended by our
maker
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAX. '233
maker to be an almoft infallible diredion, in the whole condud of life , and efpecially in matters of ?'^/z^Z(? 72, would be a fove- reign and efFeclual antidote, or rather preventive, of all error, impofition and vice ; and that upon this foundation the empire of truth and virtue would be le- curely and for evereftablifhed.
But, alas! our authbr, having; fi© doubt for good reafons, given this exer- cife to our imaginations, thinks proper to ■ give us a lelTon of humility, patience, and induftry, by acquainting us, that^ in • fa6l, the di6tates of common fenfe are=very ' little known or regarded in the woiW ; for that, what througli thfe kffer en- croachment of vulgar prejudice onvone fide, and the greater and bolder en- croachments of philofophy on the'^^ther, her authority is almoft annihilated ;"fo t?hat almoft all received opinions and eftabliftied maxims are fundamentally wrong.
All
834 REMARKS ON
All this, however, is eafily explained and accounted for, by a little variation in the idea he had firft given us of this wonderful power: and which, in'f^ft*, only ferves to raife our admiration of it higher than ever. Before hie' <i6\ri:- pared it to ^fenfe in general, now'tti-W- fembles the m oft perfe6^ of all the fenfes the eye, which we have a power of ren- dering quite ufelefs to tis by coveving it with the eye-lid, w^hich nature has;' t6 be fure, provided for that purpofc; !^ft by the too free ufe both of the external afrwi internal eye, we (hould injure them,, and thereby intirely deprive ourfelyes of them. And though no man ever vo- luntarily fhut up his external eyes,' ex- cept to relieve them, and make them more ferviceable to him afterwards ; yet men are almoft univerfally difpofedto do this with refpeft to the eye of the mihcf, taking particular pleafurein thedfverfion which in the country is called blind- mans-hjff.
K\
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 235
. ' As the eye,' fays our author, p. 361, Vhaa ft power of letting m more or lefs * light, fo the mind has a power of ad^ ' -jTHttiing thefe t/uths ia a greater or lefs ' degree at pleafure.*
Again, whereas the other fenfes are
improved by exereife to a certain de-
gitt, this internal fefife is capable of in-
de^uite improve«aeijt, even ad infinitum ;
fatth&t Uipugh die eye and ear admit of no
fenfibie ; iiTiptoveiaajent ftom ten to four-
fcpre yearsf, this eye of the mind is
improved, as our author has found by
comipujtaiion, in an exaft arithmetical
ratio- with the application of it. Forw'ith
the 'Cye.of the mdnd ydu fee every thing
juft a thoufand times better for having
looked at them a thoufand times. A man,
therefore, who has but juft begun to make
ufe of his common fenfe is no more fit to
hold an argument with a man w^ho has
grown expert in t-he ufe of it, than a
man with his naked eyes only can difpute
about the fpots of the fun with one who'
has got a telefcope. The latter fees a
thoufand
236 R E M A R. K S O N .^
• •' - .1'' '■
thoufand thiogsin ©bjefts that the former cannot poffibly fee at alj. How this can be reconciled with the fa6l, of mankind not improving in knowledge, but fome- times going backwards, I leave to our author's i^/m*^ publication on thefubje6l.
* It may feem a paradox/ fays our au- thor, vol. 2, p. 349, ' but it is a certain ' truth that common fenfe, as it is in- * deed more worthy, fo it is nolefs capa* ^tble. of culture than any other of our fa^ ^> Celtics, We do not pretend,' p, 255, '* to xletermine the degree of certainty at ' which he will arrive, for that will be ' proportioned to the degree of rationa- 3*;]3ty of which he is poffeffed ; but he fr<pay promife himfelf fatisfa£lion fuited '6?to- the 6xercife he gives his good fenfe ^sSand probity on this important occafion. ^ This prefcription is no lefs proper for V ^ tl^.e unthinking part of mankind, than af for profelTed fceptics. Many take pri- /innary.ritfuths for granted, without at- >*keflding to their evidence ; who, if they. .fjjtOQk :the trouble of comparing them
' with
Dr. OSWALDll APPEAL. 237
' with the oppofite abfurdities, would be- ' lieve them more cordially, and feel their
* influence upon the temper and manner
* more fenfibly than they do.*
«'^^ He who has diftinguifhed fifty times,*
* vol. 2, p. 346, * between obWous truth
* and arbitrary conceit, pronounces with ' a clearnefs of perfuafion fifty times
* greater than that with which another
* pronounces, who has difcerned the dif-
* ference but once only* and he who ha«
* diftinguifhed a hundred times, pro-
* nounces with a quicknefs and firmnefs ' a hutidred times greater,' &c*
To'improve upon this hint, fuppofe our amhor were to draw up a lift of pri- mary truths, get it printed, and, in order to employ the civil magiftrate in pre* venting rather than punifliing error, let hini compel every child, from the very firft dawn of rationality, to repeat them fifty or a hundred times every morn- ing. We knew before that fuch an ex- ercife would ftrengthen the I'oicey and
now
238 RE WA HCJC SON .:
now we have rearori to think it would contribute no lefs toftrengthen thejttd^^* 7nent. The danger would be left, by this exercife, mankind (hould be too know- ing for their rank in the creation.
This doftrine of Dr. Ofwald's con- cerning the improveablenefs ©f the fa- culty of common fenfe by culture, it may be proper to obferve, is the very reverfe of Dr. Beattie's fentiments on the fame fubje6t. In his comparifon of reafon and common fenfe, p. 47, he fays, that tha former is more in our poxoer than the latter. He adds, * There are few facul- ' ties, either of our mind or body, more
* irtiproveable by culture than that of
* reafoning ; whereas common fenfe, like *''6ther inftin6ls, arrives at maturity with
* almoft no care of ours.' This, and other points of difference, I hope thele learned doftors will fettle between them- felves, before they join their forces for their common defence.
This
Dr. OSWALDS APPEAL. 239
This . opening of the intelledual eye mnll^ iiowever, be a very difagreeable and painful operation ; or, fince the ad- vantages of keeping it open are fo very great, one would think that men would have hit upon fome contrivance to keep them always open. Whereas, on the c<)ntrary, they feem to have got fome ex- traordinary, and mod efFeftual method of keeping their eye-lids down.
* It is,' fays our author, fpeaking oE common fenfe, p. 17, * the gift of heaven., ' but needs to be flirred up ; and has been
* fo long and univerfally neglefted, that ' to give it full exercife, requires more
* attention, and application of thought,, *. than mofl people are willing to beftow. ' The principles of good fenie, ibid, are ^ diametrically oppofite to received opi- ' nions, and eftablifhed maxims.'
■ But, notwithftanding this, common fenfe has more hold of the vulgar, than it has of the learned. ' There are thofe,' p. 274, ' not indeed of the unlearned,
'bwt
240 REMARKS ON
' but among the learned, who diflrefl the ' authority of comir.ou fen^e, and {eem ' to doubt its exiftence ; and fome there ' are who pofitively affirm that there nei-
* ther is, nor can be, any fuch thing. In
* truth, the unlearned are the only peo'
* pie who retain a clear idea of common
* fenfe, and appeal to it as an oracle, and
* the learned only are fceptical. You
* fliall not find a man of fenfe among the
* unlearned who hefitates, and fcarce will ' you find one among the learned who
* doth not. Such are the bleffed effeds of
* modern learning.'
If the too fagacious reader Ihould dif- cover any thing like inconfiftency be- tween this quotation and the preceding, he (houid confider that, though I have brought them together, one of them is taken from p. 17, and the other from p. 274, which are fufficiently diftant from one another. In the following para- graphs our author explains tlie reafon of this departure from common fenfe, both in the vulgar and in the learned.
'As
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 24^.
* As-thc vulgar, through the groflhefs
* of their conceptions, have lame and / confufed ideas of primary truths, fo
* the learned have puzzled themfelves
* and others about them by the arts of 5 reafoning, to which they have been fo l4ong and fo violently attached. So
* that, in fa£t, the common people de-
* prive themfelves of the bleffingg of ' common fenfe by thinking too little, ^and the learned by thinking too much,'
Befides the general defers, and neg- le6ls, relating to this power of common fenfe, it feems to be more efpecially de- fetlive in its information concerning the Jelf determining power, which our author is .refolvcd to preferve, though all man- kind, at leafl both the learned and un- learned, which I fuppofe includes them all, think differently from him on the fubjed. ■ Notwithflanding our averfion ' to frivolous difputes,' vol. 2, p. 208,
* about obvious truths, fomething mufl ' be done to give fatisfaflLon concerning
* a felf determining power. Otherwife
R ^all
^dBzM
«42
REMARKS ON
B
* all that has been faid, or can be faid, in
* favour of virtue, rauft go for nothing ;
* becaufe all men, learned and unlearned,
* bigots or free-thinkers, are not merely
* fceptical, but infidels with regard to the ' reality of this power.* It is, indeed, very ftrange, but not the lefs true, that all mankind (hould be polfeffed of this moft important power, on which all rir- tue depends, and yet that they fliould be fo far from knowing, or fufpeding it, and that they cannot be perfuaded to believe they have any fuch thing. This fomethiftg referables Meniere's Medecin malm luik .
SEC-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. tfJ3
SECTION V.
X)J the extenjive application ofiheprhicipU vf common Jhife to morals and religion.
^T*HIS life is nothing but a fcene of .* §^ys and forrows, hopes and fears ; and" we are continually pafiTmg from thfc one to the other. All this will be fre- quently exemplified by my reader. And as I firft gave him a general view of the bright fide of my pi6lure, and then de- fired him to contemplate the (hade, I fliall now exhibit the bright fide again, and defire him to take a more particular filrvey of it.
We fhall here find that this great oracle of the human breail has pronounced moft diftinftly concerning all the fundamental, do6lrines and duties of morality, compre- hending the whole of natural religion, the evidences of chriflianity, and even the more effential articles of chriftian faith. To tliis, however, we muft fub-
R 2 join
442 R E M A R K S O N
* all that has been faid, or can be faid, in
* favour oF virtue, rnuft go for nothing ;
* becaufe all men, learned and unlearned,
* bigots or free-thinkers, are not merely ' fceptical, but infidels with regard to thfe ' reality of this power/ It is, indeed, very ftrange^ but not the lefs true, that all mankind (hould be poffefTed of this mod important power, on which all vir- tue depends, and yet that they fliould be (b far from knowing, or fufpetling it, and that they cannot be perfuaded to believe they have any fuch thing. This fomethiftg refembleg Moliere's Medecin
SEC-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 5^3
SECTION V.
X)J the extenjzve application oftheprhrcipU vf common finfe to morals and religion.
^ I ''HIS life is nothing but a fcene of joys and forrows, hopes and fears; ^itd'we are continually palfing from the bite "to the other. All this will be fre- quently exemplified by my reader. And as I firft gave him a general view of the bright fide of my pifture, and then de- fired him to contemplate the fhade, I fhall now exhibit the bright fide agairi, and defire him to take a more particular ftirvey of it.
We fliall here find that this great oracle 6i the human breail has pronounced mof!: diftinftly concerning all the fundamental do6lrines and duties of morality, compre- hending the whole of natural religion, t^ evidences of chriftianity, and even the more effential articles of chriftian faith. To tliis, however, we muft fub-
R 2 join
2|4 RE M A R K SON a
join our author's JLift, pathetic, and elo- quent complaints of the fhameful negleft of this principle; and the great folly of philofophers and divines in having re- courfe to the deceitful principle oh'eafon ; 'U'hich, according to our author, may almoft be conlidered as tlie fource of all evil and mifchief ; when every thing they ought, to have wifhed for might have been obtained without any trouble at all, by only applying to common fenfe.
Speaking of the great oudines of mo- rality in general, our author. fays, vol. 2, p. 195^ * The obligations arifmg from -* obvious relations arg the objefts of ' common fenfe.' Again, p. 24, ' Befides ' thofe in{lin6live emotions and feelings,
* which we have in cornmon with the /. Jo wei^ J animals, every individual of the f human jkind; has a perception, which ' idcots and the inferior animals have
* not, of what he owes to himfelf, to his
* offspring, to his friends, and benefac- X tors,. to liis country, aiid to his God. —
* Thofe fae red obligations, which have
* been
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 245
* been the fubje£l of difpute with the ' learned, are objects of fimple per-
* ception and judgment to men offenfe.'
' That magiftrates ought to be obeyed/ p. 247, ' that the workman is worthy of
* his wages, that every one ought to take. ' care of his own, and his family's intereft,
* and that men ought to do kind and ' friendly offices to each other; thefe,
* and the like propofitions, appear obvi- ' oufly true, as the propofitions oppofite
* to them appear obvioufly falfe, to every
* man of common fenfe.'
Such are the diftates of our infallible inftruftor and guide as to the great duties of morality, refpecling this life. If we want to be informed concerning the pQ- culiar JknSions of natural religion, our author affures us, p. 8, that this great principle ' affords men an almoft infal-
* lible dirc6lion in the whole condu6l of
* their lives, and that it was intended hy ' the author of our being for giving us
* intire fatisfa6lion concerning all primary
R3 * truths,
246 REMARKS ON
' truths, thofe of religion in particular ;
* and that our not having recourfe to this ' power is the true caufe of thofe idle dif- ^ putes, which have been maintained of
* late about the truth of rehgion.'
That the being of God ought not to he attempted to be proved by reafon we have infome meafurefeen already, and wefball hear more on that fubjeft hereafter ; we fhall, therefore, proceed to other articles of rehgion. ' To acknowledge the being,
* and difpute the attributes of God, he- ' trays,' fays our author, vol. 2, p. 80,
* great flupidity, or grofs prevarication. Xow for the divine unity. ' A work of de- ' figo,' vol. 2, p. ']^, * indicates one and ^' but one author to a found underftand-
* ing.' With refpe6l to the obligation ta roorjhip and obey God, he acknowledges, indeed, p, 21 6, that ' it would be un- ' reafonable to expect the fame inftinftive ' emotions and inclinations that we have
* to the other offices of hfe. But,* he fays, * \ic have a clear perception of
* thofe obligations, accompanied \vith
^ enactions
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 247
* emotions and inclinations which nearly
* refemble thofe we call inftin6live.'
Speaking of trufting in God, with re- fpeft to things that are above our cont- prehenfion, our author fays, with peculiar cmphafis and eloquence, vol.2, p. 140,
* This, is religion, this is philofophy, this
* is common fenfe. It is n(m/enfe,' fays he, vol. 2, p. 97, * to talk of difficulties ' and embarralfments ariling from a con- ' ftkution of things to which the fupreme
* being gave exiftence of his free choice.* Other divines are content with faying that this conduct is highly unreafonable^
The gfeat difficulty in the theory of natural religion is the proof of 2i future life ; but, happily, that difficulty is now intirely removed. Let us only filence" the impertinence of reafon, and common fenfe will fpeak plain enough, and to the purpofe on this fubje6L ' We do not ' pretend,' fays Dr. Ofwald, vol. 2, p. 296, ' to demonftrate, from any thing that we know of the prefent ftate, that R 4 ' there
248 R E M A R K S O N
* there will be a future ftate of exiftence.V This has been, faid by many chriftian divines, but then they have recourfe to revelation for a fure foundation of their faith in this great doftrine ; but our au- thor can do without this refource.
' We muft,* fays he, vol. 2, p. 306,
* enter a complaint againft the learned of
* both fides, for their injurioiJs manner
* of tieating this interefling and impor- ' tant fubjeft. In place of fetting full in
* the view of mankind, a truth which
* none pretend to doubt of, and about
* which no man can be unconcerned, viz.
* that we are accottntablc to God for our
* condu6l, the friends of religion and
* virtue have ranfacked all nature for
* arguments to prove that we fliall a&u-
* ally be called to account^ and have there-
* by turned the attention of mankind ' from their proper buiinefs to an endlefs
* and fruitlefs difpute, about what is pof-
* fible and impoffible in nature, and may
* or may not come to pafs. Was this
* well advifed? Ifa man is defirous of
* certain
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 24^
' certain information concerning tliis ' great event, let him confult the revel a- ' tion which God has made of his mind. ' Or if he is not fatisfied about that, let ' him confult the fentiments of his own
* heart, about his being liable to account,
* But if he will do neither, your rea-
* fonins ia vain: for the man is a fool.
* and his folly is voluntarv, and there-
* fore incurable, or not to be cured by
* the art of reafoning.'
If my reader will not perufe this para« graph over again, he will perhap*^ over- look the mod excellent diftin^lion witJi*- out a diffsrence, with which the whole compafs of hij reading will ever furnifli him. That we are accountable to God for our conduct, is a truth that no man can pretend to doubt of, or be uncon- cerned about ; and yet all the powers of reafon cannot perfuade the fame man to believe that he (hall be actually called te account. And all the mifchief that has been done by philofophcrs and divines has arifen from their not having attended
to
ft5o REMARKS ON
to the diftinftion between thofe two very different things.
Since this drftinftion is of fuch un- speakable confequence, and has hitherto been intirely overlooked by all divines' and philofophers. it would certainly very much oblige and benefit the world if Dr. Ofwald would give us a difcourfe upon the fubje6l ; inlifling largely and (Irongly on the confideration of our be- ing accountable to God, and being liable io he called to account, but, at the fame time, carefully avoiding every thing that could give us an idea of our ever being iiBnally brought to account. I the lefs wonder at the condu£l of divines in thi^ cafe, becaufe 1 think it muft require nc^ fmafl ingenuity and (kill to do it. But what may not be e:Xpe6^ed from the elo- quence of Dr, Ofwald !
Speaking more paTticularly of So- crates's arguments for a future ftatCj he fays, vol. 3, p. 288, ^ But in that variety * of arguments, advanced by this great
* and
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 251
' and good man, none give fuch faris- ' fa6lion to a plain underRanding, as his
* obfervation to Crito, that the carcafs he ' fhewed fo great concern about was not
* Socrates ; that Socrates was he who
* then difcourfed, reafoned, and gave ' arrangements to his thoughts, and who, ' he faid, would foon give xh^m the flip.
* This is common fenle.'
Deriving fo much information frora common fenfe., and finding fuch effeclaal fan6lions of virtue in it, one would have thought that revelation might have been l^ared ; and many good chriftians would be exceedingly offended at our author for afcribing fo much to nature in this refpeft. But then he makes atonement^ by eftablifhing the evidences of revelation upon the foundation of the fame commoa fenfe ; which, of courfe, fuperfedes all reafining about the matter, and thereby faves thofe good chriftians a great deal of trouble, in inquiring for themfelves, or replying to the impertinent cavils of others.
i j2 REMARKS ON
* Of a revelation from God,' meaning no doubt the Jewifli and chriftian, he fays, p* 55, that * few have any ferious
* doubt, and that no man can difbeheve ' it in any confiftency with common fenfe.* But for the farther ilhiflration of this im- portant fubje6i; another whole volume is promifed us.
As the truth of the fcripture hiftory is founded on common fenfe, fo we may take it for granted that its contents are' agreeable to it. ' The fcriptures,' fays Our author, vol. 2, p. 203, ' are the true,
* if not the only fource of found philofo-
* phy and good fenfe on thefe fubjetls,
* \i^, moral obligation.' By the way, after making good fenfe the fource of fo much knowledge in morals, I do not fee with what propriety our author can call the fcriptures the fource of this good fenfe.
Themanm rin which Dr.Ofwaldfpeaks of * two important truths,' which, he fays, the chriftian revelation fuperadds to our natural notions of religion, which .it has
revived.
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 2^3
• revived, viz. * an ceconomy of grace in ' this life, and an exa6t retribution in the
* next/ is particularly curious. ' One
* cannot conceive/ fays he, p. 254, ' what ^prejudice a man of fenfe can have to ^' this plain do6^rine. And as it was re- ^* ceivedby perfons no wife prejudiced in
* its favour, upon an atteftation in which
* they could not be deceived, one muJi
* reckon all fcepticifm concerning it as ' mere affetlation.' When a man fpeaks of indubitable truths he ought at leaft to ufe intelligible language ; but what our author means by ancEConomy of grace, I really do not underftand.
I now come to prefent my reader with a few fpecimens of our author's pathetic and eloquent complaints on the fubjeft of neglefting this common fenfe, in the defence of religion, natural and revealed, and on divines having imprudently con- defcended to reafon about it, which Wi^ a piece of complaifance as mifchievous as it was unneceiTary. Infidels are a fet. of people with whom it is exceedingly
improper
'i^4 R E M A R K ^S O N
improper for a chriftian philofopher, and much beneath his dignity, to hold any parley.
* Is there not,' fays Dr. Ofwald, p. 364,
* jiift caufe of complaint againft the •f, learned for overlooking diflinftions
* which fel do m cfcape the obfervation of
/the vulgar,, and thereby expofing reli- j
* gion to objections which would be re- m ' jecled with difdain on any other fubjec^ ? * ' Not only the chriRian revelation,',pi: 55,
* but the moral perfections and gbvern- ■' ment of God, yea and the very bfeing ' of virtue, have been made the fubje^ ' of difpute. Free-thinkers are not
* afliamed to publifli their doubts con-
* cerning thefe reahties, divines and phl-
* lofophers have not difdamed to eftablifh
* them. by a multitude of arguments.'
* The pow^r of cuftonr/ vol. 2, p. 152, ' in reconciling the mind to meafures how- ' ever abfurd, which are become familiar, ' is almoll incredible. Should an Indian ' of good fenfe be told, that for feme
' time
Dr. OSWALD'S? APPEAL. 255
^ time paft, men of the greateft eminence
* in the learned world had been employed
* in difputing with one another about thfe
* reaHty of virtue and vice ; whether,
* for inftance, the obhgations of jufticej ' temp erance, gratitude, were nominal^
* fi6litious and fanciful ; or whether We ^ were, indeed, bound to the pratiice of ' thefe and fuch like virtues; that volumes
* have been written on both fides, and ' deep attention given to the controverfy, ' and that each hypothelis had its vo-
* taries ; would the foreignef give credit ' to this report ?
* Yet this condu6l, fo unaccountable ^ to a foreigner, has been continued
* among us without much notice. The ^ fubje6i, it is true, merits the ftri6left
* attention ', the refearches on both fides ' were curious enough, acquifitions of
* fome value were made in the abftra£i
* fciences ; the audacity of one (ide feeraed
* to require a check and the zeal of the ' other was at lead pardonable. But, in
* good earnell; might not that zeaJ, that
* ficute-
256 R E M A R K S O N
* acutenefs, penetration, and compaft of
* thought, have been employed with ' greater propriety, and to more advan-
* tage ? Was there any occafion at all
* for fuch difquifitions ? Mull metaphyfi- ' cians and fubtle difputants be called in
* to evince our obligations to do the
* right and fhun the wrong? Can we,
* without renouncing common fenfe, be f ignorant, doubtful, or even infenfible to
* fuch obligations ? There is need, great
* need, to awaken, revive, and enforce
* them ; but without the influence of
* falfe learning there couLd be no room
* to doubt what every man of common *- underftanding does, and mull perceive
* at firft fight.
How fatal would a Ariel, regard to truth be to a turn for eloquence. All this truly fine piece of declamation would have been loll: to the world, if our author had recollected, that moral obligation lijclf never was a fubjecl of difpute, but only the foundation of this obligation. Let our audior endeavour to recolletl:
tlie
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 257
the names of the writers who ever d^.f- puted whether men were indeed bound tothepradice ofjuilice, temperance, &c.
Thefe complaints refpeft writers chief- ly, but his complaints againft xhtprcachers of tfis gofpei, on the fame fcore, are ftill flronger. ' Wliat is* more to be regretted/ fays Dr. Ofwald, p. 56, ' the preachers ' of the gofpei, forgetting the dignity of
* their charatler, and the defign of their
* office, h-ave condefcended to plead the ' caufe of religion in much the fame man-
* ner as lawyers maintain a difputed right
* of property. Inftead of awakening the ' natural fentiments of the human heart,
* and giving them a true direction, they
* have entered into reafonings about ' piety, juftice, and benevolence, too ' profound to be fathomed by the multi-
* tude, and too fubtle to produce any
* confiderable effe6l. Inftead of fetting
* forth the difplays of the divine perfec-
* tions in the difpenfation of the gofpei,
* fo admirably fitted to touch, to pene- ' trate, and to fubdue the human mind,
§ ' they
258 R E M A R K S O N
' they have entertained their audiences
* with long and laboured proofs of a reve- ' lation from God, of which few have any
* ferious doubt, and which no man can ' difbelieve in any confiftency with com- ^ mon fenfe. May not this be called,
* with propriety, a throwing cold water ' on religion ? and bught it not to be ' confidered as one of the chief caufes of ' that infenfibility to all its concerns of ' which we fo frequently complain ? The ' multitude has been aflonifhed, wife men ' have been afhamed, and good men ^ grieved at this treatment of religion, ^o ' much beneath its dignity.'
Our author intimates, however, that, bad as the cafe is, it is not yet quite def- perate. Accefs to the tree of life is yet open, and common fenfe, this remedy for all our ills, though hitherto fo fhame- fully neglefted, will nc* refufe herfuccour upon proper applicat: -n.
' Till divines and thUofophers,' vol. 2, / p. 221 , ' have abated their ardour for fri-
* volous
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 25^
* volous inquiries, and learned the o.i of ' turning the attention of mankind to ob-
* vious and interefting truth, they have ' no title to complain of the unthinking
* part of mankind. For one may be bold
* to affirm, that multitudes would act a ' better part than they do, if they were ' under better treatment.' Now as Dr. Ofwald's parifh is undoubtedly under this very treatment, I (hould be glad to be informed of the ftate of it. Though his books have, in fome meafure, put all the world under the fame treatment, it is too large a field of inquiry ; and though I have read his performance with fome degree of attention, there may be fome« thing in my particular conflitution that turns medicine into poifon. See p. 372.
' It is apparent,' fays our author, vol. 2, p. 204, ' that if common fenfe had been
* confulted, a controverfy of the moil
* pernicious kind might have been vv^holly
* prevented, or foon flopped. And, if ' men will yet pay the regard that is ' due to common fenfe, they fhall find
$ 2 * them-
26o REMARKS ON
' themleives relieved from embarralTments- ^they have always complained of, and * fee the whole of reli-jion rife to their ' view in that obvious^ plain, and plea- ' fant light, in \rhich the face of nature ' appears when freed from thofe mills and •' clouds by which it was obfcured,'
Laflly, our autlK>r proceeds to give more particular dire6lions concerning what is neceffary to be done by divines towards the reformation of the world, without addreiTmg the reafon of their jjiearers ; which is a thing that they ought, if poiTible, to have nothing to do with. This is to put them under the direftion of God, in the di6lates of common fenfe, if I underdand him rightly, when I put all the paffages together. For there is foraething of the air of myfiicifm in what Ipse fays upon this fubjeft ; and things of that nature do not find the readied: ad- saiffion to my underflanding.
' Till divines and philofophers/ vol. 2, p. 227, * are better fldlled in touching
' the
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 261
^ the fpyings of the human heart than ' they are, or afFe6l to appear, they can- ' not reach the end they propofe ; and ' were they pofTeffed of all the eloquence ' of Greece or Rome, they could not ac- ' comphfh what they ought to have irl ' view, I mean to fave thofe from ruin ' who will not take the trouble of faving
* themfelves ; and in order thereto^ to ' correct and cure the inveterate folly of
* the human heart. There is fomethins^ ' here that demands a deeper attention ' than has been given to it ; fomething too
* that points at a method of forming
* mankind to virtue which has been too ^ much neglefted.
' The great fecret informing men to ' religion and virtue,' vol. 2, p. 232, * if ' it is fit to call that a fecret which is fo ' palpable to common fenfe, and ought ' to have been publifhed to all the world, ' is to perfuade them to refign themfelves
* to God, as docile and dutiful pupils, to
* a faithful and capable tutor. To put
* mankind under a divine dire6tion and
S 3 * ia
262 R E M A R K S O N
^ influence/ vol. 2, p. 229, * ought to be,
* the chief aim of all our inftruftors in
* religion and virtue. For without doing ' fo, all their other prefcriptions will be
* found ineffeftual, and indeed a mere
* projeft. , All partial proceedings ought
* to be difmiiTed, and juflice done to pri-
* mary truths/ Vol. 2, p. 230.
SECTION VI.
Of the incroacliments of common fenfe on the province of Reafon.
T EST Dr. Ofwald ftould blame me '^ for exhibiting his fentiments without any proper refutation, which I have not always done, becaufe I really thought it to be needlefs, efpecially after what I have faid in anfwer to his fuperiors. Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie ; and alfo becaufe I thought it would be doing for my reader what he would very eafify do for
himfelf,
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 263
himfelf, and might rather chufe to do for himfelf ; I promife to^be a little more fe- rious in this and the following fe6lions ; in the firft of which I fhall endeavour to fhow that, as great an enemy as Dr. Of- wald is to reafoning on the fubjecl of morals and religion, he himfelf makes more ufe of it than he is willing to ac- knowledge. For, to make the more of his principle of common fenfe, he has manifeftly encroached upon what has hi- therto been univerfally deemed the pro- vince of reafon.
To prevent all miftake of my meaning I fhall here obferve, that a propofition may be faid to be proved by reafon when a third term is neceffary to fhow the con- nexion between the fuhjeB and predicate of it ; and that a general propofition is proved by an induction of a fufhcient number of the particulars which are com- prized in it.
Thus, when I want to prove that the
three internal angles of a right lined tri-
S 4 angle
864 REMARKSON
r
angle are equal to two right angles, I make another fet of angles, to which I know that the three angles in queftion are equal, and which I can alfo eafily Ihew to be eqnal to two right angles. If I want to prove that any particular perfon is generous, I point out a number of gene- rous things that he has done, which indi- cate that charafter.
If our author will fay that this is not reafoning, I anfwer that then there is no fuch thing as reafoning. This, I will venture to fay, has hitherto been univer- fally deemed reafoning; and if Dr. Ofwald chufes to call it by any other name, he impcTes upon himfelf and the world, by changing the eftablifhed fignification of "words. But, in fad, it will appear, from a paffage that I (hall prefently quote, that Dr. Ofwald has the fame ideas of the nature of reafoning, though he feems very often to have loft fight of them.
That
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 465
That Dr. Ofwald, in many cafes, merely cavils at the terms reafo.n, proof, and demonjlration, and that he mifappHes them, in order to ridicule and explode them, is very evident to me ; and I think it cannot but appear fo to all my readers, who are not quite adepts in this uew fcience of common fenfe, and confe- quently accuftomed to the phrafes and fenfe of terms peculiar to it.
Speaking of the being and attributes of God, he fays, p. 151, ' To whatpurpofe
* demonftrate a truth, to the indubitable ' certainty of which all nature bears telU-
* mony ?' Now excepting Dr. Clark's arguments a priori, which have long ceafed to be fo much as mentioned by divines, all tl-at, in faft, has ever been meant by demonjlrating the being and attributes of God, is to exhibit and ex- plain the teftimony of nature ; by point- ing out fuch marks of defign, power, and benevolence in the conftitution of the world, as prove not only that it had a caufe, but that this caufe muflbe a being
' poffeffed
266 REMARKS ON
poflefled of great power, wifdom, and goodnefs.
Again he fays, p. 197, 'You cannot ' form an idea of God by gazing upon ' his works, without obfcrving their ten-
* dency ; and entering as far as your, ' faculties will carry you into his greats ' wife, and gracious plan.'
After our author has evinced the being. of a God, without the help of reafon, he , proceeds to affert, in the title of the firft chapter of book third, that ' to acknow-
* ledge the being and difpute the attri-
* butes of God, betrays great flupidity, ' or grofs prevarication/ But the man- ner in which he fupports this w^ith refpeft to the particular attributes, is fo like rea* foning, that I own I can fee no difference between it and reafoning. Let the reader judge.
' We acknowledge,' vol. 2, p. 81, ' that
* it is impoffible to avoid the idea of God
* when we look on the phenomena of na-
* ture :
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 267
tufe ; but if we do not content ourfelves with words without meaning, we muft, at the fame time, acknowledge, that it is impoffible for us to form any concep- tion of the immenfe fyftem of nature, without an idea of the immenfity of his power who made and upholds it ; that it is impoffible to trace the endlefs con- nexion and combination ofcaufes con- fpiring to one great defign, without having an idea of the unfathomable depth of the divine wifdom ; that it is impoffible to furvey the multitude of living creatures he has brought into be- ing, which he upholds in being, and protefts from danger, and for whom he makes continual and bountiful fupplies, without acknowledging his immenfe be- nevolence and parental care. And when we recolleft the various fufferings of body and mind, which he has con- neftedwith, and made confequent upon almoft every deviation from moral rec- titude, even in this life, and the natural dread which every guilty perfon has of a more exad retribution in another ftate,
'it
268 R E M A R K S O N
' it is impoITible for us to avoid an idea
* of his tremendous juftice.'
That any perfon (hould be able to write this and call it by any other name than reafimmg I own furpfizes me not a little ;- and I can only compare our author ta the poor man who had fpoken profe all his life without knowing it.
Alfo when Dr. Ofwald fays, p. 338^
* It is nonfen/e to expeft that lead Ihould "' fwim in water/ it is impoiTible that his meaning (hould really differ from that of the generality of philofophers, to whom liis language muft, I araperfaaded, found Tery Itrange. They would fhow, by obfervation and ejcperiment, tkat nothing of this kind has ever happened, and would fay they had then proved that the expectation of its happening was very Mnreafonahle ; but would think it a ftrange abufe of words to call it nonfeitjical. To nonfenfe, as the term has generally been ufed hitherto, no ideas at all can be an- nexed, except fuch as are inconfiftent
with
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 269
with one another ; and we can form as clear an idea of lead not finking in water, as of its finking. What is really noa- fenfe can never become fenfe; but by miraculous power the laws of nature can be fufpended or reverfed.
To enlarge the province of this new principle of common fenfe, Dr. Ofwald manifeftly incroaches upon the province of reafon in other inllances. He exprelTes the greateft poflible furprize and indignation that divines (hould have endeavoured ^ to difcover a medium to ' demon (Irate that we ought to worfloip
* God, to do juftice to men, and to keep
* our paflions and appetites within juft ' and proper bounds,' p. 91. Upon this occafion he fays, as was quoted above,
* No demonflration is of equal force with
* common fenfe ; and no confutation can
* ferve the intereft of truth fo efFeftually ' as a plain conviclion of nonfenfe ; and
* therefore it was the bufmefs.of divines
* and philofophers to have recourfe to
' the
270 REMARKS ON
' the fimple decifion of common fem^e on ' a fubjecl To plain and important.'
I cannot help thinking, however, that it would anfwer a very good purpofe both to define ftriftly what we mean by 7.oorJJiipir,g God, doing jnjlice to men, and bringing our paffions within proper bounds; and alfothat, when thefepropofitions have been defined, intermediate and plainer propofitions may be found, which will ferve to (how the truth of the former. And fuch proofs of thefe moral duties I think have been given by many writers, and I hope have not been impertinently alledged in my Injiitutes of natural and revealed religidu, vol. 1.
I am the more furprized at Dr. Ofwald's obje^lions to the common language of logicians, as he himfelf diilinguiflies very well between fuch propofitions as are felf evident, and fuch as are not. ' No man/ fays he, p, 248, ' can be at a lofs to know * propofitions that are the objetl of com- mon
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 271
* mon fenfe from thofe that are not/ and ' to determine with himfelf where he has, ' or has not a right to fufpend his judg-
* ment. If the evidence of the propo-
* fition under confideration flows from its ' relation to or connexion with fome
/other truth, he has no doubt a right to ' fufpend his judgment till he has inquired
* into that connexion and relation.'
Now furely the propofition that ttx^^z- Jlrates ought to be obeyed depends upon this other proportion j \h^.l the good aftlu fociety ought to be provided for. Or if our author be an advocate for^ natural and " divine right, ftill he muft give fome rea- fon for it. If he refleft at all upon the fubje^l;, he will hardly maintain that fuch a right is/elf evident. This latter propo- rtion then, viz. that the good of the fi ate ought to be cojifuLted, may properly be urged in fupport of the former, that ma- giitrates ought to be obeyed. It is fo much of an argument, that I dare fay nei- ther our author, nor any other perfon
qouldi
272 R E, M A R K S O N
could poflibly avoid it in difcourfing on the fubjeft.
Our author, indeed, admits of a kind of denionJlraUon of primary truths, which, arifes from coviparing them with their op- pojite ahjurdities ; m coniequence of which hefays.p. 255, ' we (hall believe them more ' cordially, and feel their influence more ' feniihiy than we do. A real behever,' he fays, * will not defpife the well meant ' labours of thofe who have endeavoured *' to demondrate the primary truths by
* reducing their oppofites to abfurdity;
* but knows that, without their help, he
* can, by a fingle thought, reduce thefe
* chimeras to the grofieftofall abfurdities, ' namely, to nonfenfe.' Though, there- fore, it is pardonable to demonftrate the being and perfeftions of God, the necef- fitv of obeying magiflrates, &c. he ad- vifes us to fpare ourfelves that trouble, and with more magnanimity appeal at once to the great tribunal of common fenfe. An admirably fhort and decifive
method
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 273
method truly! fomething fimilar to Defoe's Short method luith the Dijfenters ; with this difference, that Defoe was in jeft, but Dr. Ofwald is in moll ferious carnefl.
Such is the force of common fenfe; in my ufe of the word, that our author not only allows of reafoning in others, but falls into downright reafoning himfelf upon feveral fubje6ls, which he had exprefsly ex- empted from the province x)f reafoning, and in the very chapter in the title of which he difclaims reafoning.
' Lord Bolingbroke,' he fays, vol. 2, p. 276, ' who contends fo zealoufly for
* the being and providence of God, is no
* lefs zealous in decrying our natural
* notions of his moral perfe£iions, and
* moral government, together with the
* expeftation we have of an exa6l retri- ' bution of our good and evil a6lions.
* But never was a great genius more ab-
* furdly, or indeed more idly employed,
* For, in fpite of all the arts of logic, of
T * rhetoric.
274 R EM ARKS ON
* rhetoric, of bullying, and of canting,
* prafliced by his Lordfhip, every one ' who beheves there is a God will believe ' that he loves the right and hates the ' wrong; and expeft, ofcourfe, that he
* vvHll reward the one and punifh the
* other/ ■ Now is not Dr. Ofwald's fug- gefting that God loves the right and hates the wrong a proper argument » to prove that' 'he v^'ill reward the one and punifh the other? Indeed, why did he ufe the word therefore, if he was not arguing and proving one thing by means of ano- ther ? If this be not reafoning, and in the neceflary forms, I know not what is.
But, pofTibly, our author might think himfelf fufBciently guarded againfl this objeclion by the manner in which he has exprefiedthe title of this chapter, whicli is ingenious en:>u'gh. 'To maintain,' vol. 2, p. 275, ' a curious debate about a
* future' judgment, when we ought to be
* preparing for fo awful an event, is
* unpardonable folly.' The three next
chap-
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 275
chapters have the title of ' The fame fub- * jeSi continued,'
The objeftion then is not to arguments, but to curious arguments. But how fnall we diftinguifh curious debates from thole that are not curious, and what does our author mean by curious ? A word of fo very vague a meaning is certainly very improperly ufed upon fuch an occafioa as this. If I fhould be allied to point to a fpecimenof cz^n^za reafoning^ I fhould name this very treatife of Dr. Ofwald's.
But the propriety of the title of this fame chapter is guarded in another cu- rious manner. ' It is unpardonable folly/ he fays, ' to maintain a curious debate ' about a future judgment, when we ought ' to be preparing for it.' But whoever denied that tliere was a time to prepare for a future event, as well as {or proving that it will happen, and that thefe two ought not to interfere with one another ? If he meant that we ought never to de- bate, but to be always preparing, it was T 2 unpar-
i'jS R E M A R K S O N
unpardonable folly in him to write his treatife ; mw^hicli he not only debates, but is the occalion of more debating, as the book lam now writing; evidences.
*t»
I have defcanted a little upon the title of this one chapter, or rather of four chapters (which, by the way, is very auk- ward and confufed in point of method) in order to exhibit a fpecimen of Our au- thor's unfair and equivocal manner of writing throughout. By an artful choice of v.ords he makes, upon all occafions, a fpecious harangue, when his pompous aflertions are all the while either nuga- tory, or falle.
As the greateft part of Dr. Ofwald's two volumes confifls of fuch writing as this, I thall, for the more complete information of my reader concerning the nature of it, produce another ex- ample of his artmlly adopting a mode of expreihon which cuts off all re- ply, except that of its being abfolutely trifling ; w^hile he is ufmg all the pomp
and
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. z-j'j
and parade of the moft important obfer- vations.
* To ftate the piimary truths,' p. 315,
* in their native light and ftrength, and in ' comparifon with their oppofite falfities, ' and to fhow, in the cleared, plained
* manner, which ought to preponde- ' rate, was in jullice due to the pubHc.
* But to trace every conceit, of every ' bold projeftor, through all the windings
* of abftrufe and fophiftical reafoning, or
* to offer laborious and minute defences ' of truths which neither require nor ad*
* mit of any, was ill advifed/
I challenge our author to fpecify the writers on whom this cenfure falls, viz. thofe who have traced every conceit of every bold projeBor through all the zuindings of ahjlrufe and fophijiical reafoning, or who have offered laborious and minute defence.'^ of truths which neither required nor admit- ted of any. One would imagine, from reading Dr. Ofwald, that this egregious and laborious trifling had been univerfal T 3 with
278 REMARKS ON
with the infatuated /riends of religion. But let our author name the men, and prove his charge ; or be confidered as having given himfelf ridiculous airs, by cloathing mere calumny in rant.
Indeed, the exceptions which our au- thor himfelf makes to his violent accufa- tions will almofl amount to a full con- futation of his declamatory abufe.
' It was no doubt proper,' he fays, p. 316, •' to detecc the fcandalous fliuffling ' of Col! ins, to expofe the rambling con- ' ceits of Lord Shaftefbur}', the dangerous
* paradoxes of Mr. Hume, and the pre-
* fumptuous boldnefs of Lord Boling- ' broke. It might alfo be fit to take fome ' notice of the quibbles of inferior writers. ^ But to engage the attention of a whole
* nation to a formal difpute between grave ' divines, and writers of this ftamp, about
* the truth of religioUj as if tliis was a point
* yet unfettled, was a mannerof proceeding
* m-uch below the dignity of the fubjeft,
* and from which little good could be ex-
^ peded..
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. ^79
' pe61ed. From the common effe6l pro- *. duced on the minds of the mukitude,. * by attending the pleading of lawyers in ' a. contentious law fuit, one might fore- ' tel the confequences of this ill judged ' meafure.'
Now I really do not know to w^hat kind of reafoning any of the defenders of chri- flianityhave had recourfe, except fuch as was adopted in the controverfies above referred to, and which our author allows to have been proper. And, exclufive of fuch controverfies as he himfelf exprefsly approves, I challenge him to fay w^hen the attention of any zohoU nation was ever engaged to a formal difpute between grave divines about the truth of religion, as if it was a point yet unfettled. This aflertion, I will venture to fay, was made abfolutely at random, and has no foundation in truth. It is a mere rhetorical flourifh, in fupport of a piece of miferable faphiftry.
Our author farther allow$, vol. 2, p. jS,
that * the difciples of Manes were intitled
T 4 ' t.o
28o RE MA R K S O N ^'-^-
' to fatisfriclioii, becaufe/ as he- curioufly enough exprefles it, ^ they founded on
* realities' He adds, *^ but it is below
* the dignity of divines or philofophers to
* fight with chimeras. Thefe antient
* heretics had not the boldnefs of modern ' theorifts,- who fcruple not to refolve
* natural and moral evil into the divine ' will ; but from the fame averfion %\'hich
* all guilty perfons have of bringing the
* charge home to themfelves, they fancied
* themfelves under the necefhty of hav-
* ing recourfe to two gods, the authors ' of all that is good or evil in the world.'
Not to remark upon our author's taking it for granted that all NecefTarians are unbelievers (though the very beft of all the defences of chriftianity has been written by a NecefTarian) I fhall only afk, "whether all who objeft to religion and chriftianity Ao not pretend to found their objetlions on realities, as well as Manes.
The remainder of the paragraph quoted above is not lefs curious, and of a piece
witji
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. fi§t
with the reft of the treatife. * This grofs 5 error/ viz. that of Manes ' is, however, ' long fince extiild, and the friends of ■ rehgion can be under no obligation to ^ prove the unity of God, till at lead
* fome one appear who can fay, with a .^ good confcience, that he fufpeds that
* there are more than one, to whom we
* owe that worfhip and obedience which, is " due, in return for his being and pre- ^ fervation ; and till he affign fome ^ plaufible reafon for his fufpicion.' p. 79.
But can there be no propriety or ad- vantage in reviewing the errors of pafl: ages, and in the confutation of them? May we not hope, by that means, to prevent a relapfe into them ? Can we be too well eftabliflied in truths of great im- portance ? Befides, with refpeft to this very queftion, of the unity of God, has not the church of Rome, the church of England, and even the church of Scot- land, more objecls of fupreme worfliip than one ?
I would
jsS'2 REMARKS ON
I would alfo afk, what the word plau/z- Ue has to do in this tufmefs. If an error be aEluaUy embraced, and fpreads ; muft I defer thje combating of it till fome gyand jury, appointed for the purpofe, fhall vote that it is a plaufible one ? Had thef^ preliminaries been requifite, it is not certain that I fhould have been permitted to anfwer Dr* Ofwald,
I fhall produce but one inftance more of our author's complaints of the cottducl of chriftian divines, who have judged and a61ed differently from himfelf ; becaufe, for once, he names his man. ' Had Dr. ' Clarke/ p. 151, * employed his natural ' good fenfe, which was not inferior to
* his learning, in fetting in a true and full ' light all the ihameful abfurdities of thofe ' who believe there is a God, and behave ^ as if there was none, he would have ' done .more fervice to the interefts of ' truth, than can be done by a thoufand
* demonllrations.'
Bui
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 283
But why may it not be offervice to fet in a ftronorliahtthe abfiirdity of not believ- ing, or affefting not to bblievethat there isa God, as well as of not ading in a manner agreeable to that belief? The latter is certainly as obvious, and therefore is as little neceffary to be infitted upon as the former. But fo great is our author's averfion to reafoning^ that a man muft not touch upon the former, however ne- ceflary, becaufe fomething like argument^ proof 'andi demonjlration may be wanted ;. whereas on the latter of thefe topics a man may declaim as long as he pleafes, writing as Dr. Ofwald does, without any reafoning at all,
Laftly, our author very much mifre- prefents the conduft of they^rr^^^ writers, in order to favour his fyftem, and to de- cry reafoning. * The infpired writers do
* not oflFer any proof of the being and ' perfeftions of God. They tell us that
* the invifible things of him are clearly ' feen from the things which he has
* made, &c. — but never enter into trains
' of
£84 REMARKS ON
* of reafoning, to eflablifh a truth that is
* too obvious to admit of any proof/ Vol. 2, p. s^> 5^*
But how do any divines pretend to prove the invifible power of God othcrwife than by the vifible effe6ls of it ; at leaft I never had recourfe to any other irrgument, and yet I imagine that I have reafoned on the fubje6l. See my Li/li- tutes, vol. 1*
Perhaps our author may think to efcape my aniuiadverfions, by faying that, thotigh the fcicred writers do reafon, they do not enter into trains of rea/bning on the fubjeft. But whether a man ufes trains of reafoning or not, or whether the trains be longer or fhorter is not the queflion ; but whether they reafon at all. In my opinion our author may find both excellent reafoning, and even long trains of reafoning on the being, perfeclions, and providence of God in various parts of the books of fcripture, as in tlie book of Job, tlie PfalmS; and the Prophets. In
my
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 285
my opinion Paul reafoned very clofely on this fubjeft in his difcourfe before the Athe- nian Areopagites. See A6ls xvii. But the facred writers had no occafion to prov(? the being or perfeftioris of God to thofe who admitted them, which was generally the cafe with thofe to whom, or for whom they wrote.
SECTION VII.
Of Dr. Ofwald'i refutation of the argu- ment in proof of the being of a God.
nPHERE is no fubjea on which Df. Ofwald declaims fo frequently, or with fo much veherhence, and feeming /k- tisfaftion to himfelf, as on the want of judgment in divines, in reafoning con- cerning the being of a God ; which he al- ways fpeaks of as ' too obvious and fa- * cred a truth to be fubje6led to the rea- ^ fonings of men,, and that too muqh en-
* courage-
286 ^ ^^., U AAK.,S ^ q. N
,* .courpgement has heen given to, tke ca- / yils of fceptics by, entering into reaion- / ing about it.' Th^fe propontipns are the titles of tvv^o feparate chapters in his .f^c.Qnd vobjipQ, p. 50 and 57.
^ In the latter of thefe chapters he even openly aflumes the chara6le.r oFari atheifl, and undertakes a complete refutation of the Handing argument for the being of a God; in' orders:© fhew that it i^ in- capable of any proper proof: but that the propofitiorr, being neverthelefs true, muft be admitted on the fole authority
-of common fenfe ; not confidjering that if this new principle of common fenfe fhould ever be exploded ; he has no re-
.foiirce left, but muft in good earneil pro-
vfefs-.himfclf an atheift. And thus, like the dog in the fable, by catching , at a
;fhadow, he will have loit the fubitante.
- NoWj as I fhould be very forry for fuch a
- cataftrophe, -I fliall go over the feveral ifeps of this dGmondration alqng with Dr. Ofwald ; in <^de:r . tp coi^yince him, that, notwithftandjng lj.is confident ob-
jedions.
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 287
jeftionSji it is a very g(X)d one, and will bear the ftritlefl examination.
, . .' No proeefs of reafoning/ lays Dr.
Gfwald, voL 2, p- 57, * -can be employed -* in favour of this capital truth, that will ^^ not be found, either falfe or frivolous;
^ or if the premifes are admitted to proof,
* there can be no jull conclufion. The
* piTemifes arfe thefe, a ivbrk that indicates ' defign rritrft be afcribed to an intelligent ' author. The world is a work that in- ' dicates defign,' -&c.-
■ f + r i • ^
From thefe premifes, each of which Dr. Ofwald allows to be juft, though not demonftrable, I think it may/ be clearly proved that the world iniifi be afcribed to an intelligent author, which .is what v/e mean by the term God.'' if' the conclu- ■ fion be allowed to be fairly drawn from the premifes, which Dr. Ofwald does not deny, the argument is certainly complete, whether wc proceed any farther, viz. to prove the truth of the premifes or not. To this, however, our author gives no
atten-
288 il E M A R K S ON
attention ; but only fays it is impofTible to prove the premifes. Let us confider then, in what manner he pretends that neither of thefe premifes can be proved, fo that an unbeliever may be juftified in witholding his affentto them, and con- fequently to the conclufion that is drawn from them.
Off -J'-
' A work that indicated defign muft be * afcribed to an intelligent author.'
This is an abftraft propofition, to which, if the terms of it be defined, I \vill venture to fay that no man can poffibly withold his affent, being really identical and felf-evident. To invalidate this, or jather to evade it, our author abfolutely changes it, and fubftitutes another in its place. For, from an abflracl and univer- faly he makes it 2l particular propolition; aflerting as the reverfe of it, that this par- ticular work, viz. this worlds hears no marks of dejign ; in fupport of which he alledges the trite atheillical fuppofition of the poflibility of it3 havi,ng been pro- duced
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 289
duced by the concourfe of atoms. ' By ' repeated throws of dice,' he fays, vol. 2, p, 59, * one may caft up any number ' called for, within a given time ; and
* therefore any pofTible ftate of nature
* may refult from unlimited revolutions
* of matter.'
Not to fay that this does not amount to a fliadow of an objection to the truth of a propofition, which only afferts that a work which adiially does indicate defign is to be afcribed to an intelligent author ; which, by fuppofition, excludes all idea of chance, it may certainly be faid, on the behalf of the being of a God, that let atoms revolve, ad infiiiitum, and move without a mover, nothing can refult from it but new combinatio-ns , andj^^- tions. ¥ ox powers, fuch as thofe of attrac- tion, repulfion, magnetifm, ele6tricity, &c. could never be gained by it ; there being no conceivable or polTible connec- tion between fuch a revolution, and the acquifition of any fuch powers. It is poflible that the ingenuity of Dr. Ofwald U may
290 REMARKS O N
may fuggeft fomething to an atlieift in anfwer tp this, but I own I cannot. And yet, as if the behever could make no reply to this objetlion, which is both mif- placed and frivolous, he concludes that he had fufficiently invalidated the force of this DLojor propohtion, and proceeds with great confidence to attack the minorj viz. that
* The world is a work that indicates
* defign/
Here, after acknowledging, p. 61, '■ that it is eafy to fliow them (atheifts) a
* connexion of parts and unity of dehgn, ' which they cannot gainfay ;' he yet maintains that, * becaufe they can point ' out fome ftrange and uncouth appear- ' ances, which we cannot explain, they ' have a right to withhold their affent,
* if the cafe is to be determined by reafon, ' and not by the authority of common ' fenfe, But furely, after admitting
* defign in viany things, they cannot poffi-
* bly withold their aflent to thofe things
' having
Dr. O S WA I. D's A P P E A L. 291
* bavins: an intelJiiTjcnt author, whatever
* they may do with refped to the refl.'
If, for inflan^e, it be undeniable, that the formation of the eye, and of the light which fo admirably correfpond to one another, and to the purpofe of giving us notices oF diftant obje6l;s, is an excel- lent contrivance ; it is plain that there muft have been a contriver, or an intelli- gent author of that part of our conflitu- tion, though there fhould be other parts of ^hefamefyflem, the fpleen, forinftance, thd ufes of which we could not explain. So that it appears to me, that the propo- fitlon is completely proved, according to the flriftefl forms of logic.
But our author fays, ' You may uiv ' riddle many difficulties, and give fatis-
* faftion tofeveral objc6lions. You may
* do more. By careful infpeftion, you
* can fhow, to the fatisfaftion of the
* fceptic, that what appeared irregularity
* is regularity in the higheft degree ; that
* feeming difcord is harmony not un-
U 2 ' derflood.
m 4^ V
»03
R E M A R K > O N
derftood, 3ind tliat a kcr.v c ^:emii k 31 beauty in the M\->rks oi u ^^d ; be Ti-ou will noc filcnc^ him. Vou hae lonK^ihiiig farther to explain, and foni* thing ianher ftiU, and cannot givei iiill aniWr to his objedious until )hi e3E|>lain the whole, and that vou cannc do. Good fen^ nequire< *' "♦ *^ ^ fhoui
be contented with iels . .i, bt
he demamis: j^' a;/^ and as you hac undenaken it, you muft gi\^ it withot refenT or hniitation.*
-:c:..-gt:..
So ihat if 1 pro\T that amy thin^ in te world neoe^Tirilv re<juircs fuch an autlir. which Dr. OkVaid himfelf, in the chare- Icr of a iceptKT, a!«ows, I have fiiy pioved all that I propoicd. I will ve- tuoe to (av. that ikj pcrfor ' "'^ ^ ever pr-
pofed the firKtefl demc: n of le
be:!ig of Gcvd, e\^er thoaght of any ihig e. "e : and I even challenge Dr. Ofwal u> name any atheift who expedcd mon
I
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 293
If a man (hould be fo foolifh as to give out that he could explain all the pheno- mena of nature, which he certainly could not do, and (hould acknowledge that he had not demonflrated the being of a God, till he had done it, I do not fee how good fenfc (hould help a man to fee that he had fulfilled his proraife, when it was evi- dent to reafon that he had not done it. If, therefore, a man advances no more than he can prove, which is fuflRcient for the demonftration of the being of a God, an appeal may as fafely be made to rea- fon, as to any thing bearing the name of common fenfe, or any other name that admits of evidence without proof. As, on the other hand, if he advances more than he can prove, I do not think that there is any power in human nature that can oblige us to fay that lie had done what he himfelf acknowledges he could not do.
At the conclufion, however, of all this
miferable quibbling and fophiflry, our au
thor fums up this chapter with the airs
of an acknowledged conqueror. ' Whe-
U 3 ' ther
tg2 R E M A R K S O N
* derRood, and that a feeming blemifh
* is a beauty in the works of God ; but ' you will not filence hini. You have
* fomething farther to explain, and fome-
* thing farther ftill, and cannot give a
* full anfwer to his obje6lions until you
* explain the whole, and that you cannot ' do. Good fenfe requires that he (hould ' be contented with lefs fatisfaftion, but ' he demands proof, and as you have
* undertaken it, you muft give it without
* referve or limitation.'
The propofition, however, propofes no fuch thing. It only afferts that this world muft have had an intelligent author. So that if I prove that any thing in the world necelTarily requires fuch an author, w^hich Dr. Ofwald himfelf, in the charac- ter of a fceptic, allows, I have fully proved all that I propofed. I will ven- ture to fay, that no perfon, who ever pro- pofed the ftrifteft demonftration of the being of God, ever thought of any thing elfe ; and I even challenge Dr. Ofwald to name any atheift who expelled more.
If
Dr. O S W A L D's APPEAL. 293
If a man (hould be fo foolifh as to give out that he could explain all the pheno- mena of nature, %^'hich he certainly could not do, and (liould acknowledge that he had not demonftrated the being of a God, till he had done it, I do not fee how good fcnfc (hould help a man to {^<^ that he had fulfilled his promife, when it was evi- dent to reafon that he had not done it. If, therefore, a man advances no more than he can prove, which is fufficient for the demonftration of the being of a God, an appeal may as fafely be made to rea- fon, as to any thing bearing the name of common Jenfe, or any other name that admits of evidence without proof. As, on the other hand, if he advances more than he can prove, I do not think that there is any power in human nature that can oblige us to fay that lie had done what he himfelf acknowledges he could not do.
At the conclufion, however, of all this
miferable quibbling and fophiflry, our au
thor fums up this chapter w^ith the airs
of an acknowledged conqueror, ' Whe»
U3 'thqr
294 R E M A R K S O N
* tlier the fceptic is actuated by iniper- ' tinent curiofity, afpirltof contradiftion,
* or a vet worfe principle, it mud be ^ owned that, as a difputant, he has a ' right to infift on his demand ; and, on
* being refufed, to withhold his afFent ; ' which he can do ^l^ith the more eafe,
* and with much better grace, in the
* courfe of a difpute, than he could have ' flone, if you had fubmitted the truth to
* his judgment, by a fnnple appeal.* That is, if I beg the queftion, he may, as a
favour f condefcendto grant it.
' It. is furprizing,' continues our author, ' that this inconvenience attending the ' method of argumentation fhould have
* been fo long overlooked by fo many
* friends of religion,, diftinguiflied by their
* good fenfe, as well as bv their learning. ' Yet anv one may recolle6l hmilar in- ' fiances of men of good underilanding,
* difappointing themlelvesin common life,
* by too great eagernef':: to prove truths ' too obvious to admit of proof or de- ' monflration.'
But
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 295
But what had efcaped not only tlie learniii<r, but, what is much more, the good fen fe of all preceding ages, has been
luckily difcovcrcd by our author. To
conclude this fcction with ferioufnefs. I know no parallel to fuch wretched fo- phillry and conceit. And that diny friend of religion (liould thus lend weapons to the common adverfaries, and in their name challenge all the powers of reafon, certainly would not have gained credit before the publication of this work of Dr. Ofwald's. Such are the happy fruits of difcarding reafon, and lubftituting this new common fenle in its place. And yet this is the man, who, upon all occafions, and from the beginning of his two vo- lumes to the end of them, ridicules and infults the greatefl mafters of argumenta- tion.
' Can you tell me,' fays he, p. 375, '* whence it comes to pafs, that our cele-
* brated divines and philofophers blunder
* fo grofsly in an art to which they are fo
U4. ' much
«9S REMARKS ON
' mvch devoted?' But before a man had affe6led this contempt of reafoning, he fliould certainly have known what it was ; which appears not to have been the cafe with Dr. Ofwald. I have ftudied, and I have taught logic, but in no fcholar*s ex- ercife did I ever fee fuch marks of a total ignorance of the plaineft rules of it, as in Dr. Ofwald's critical examination of the argument for the being of God ; and it is evident that in him common fcnfe has not fupplied the place of logicy though he boafts of it's doing infinitely more.
SEC
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 297
SECTION VIIL
Of the application of Common fenfe to va- rious difquifitions in Morals and The- ology.
Tl.T'HEN the idea of this newfenfe was ^ ^ firfl flarted, it had the appearance offomething new and whimfical, indeed, but it threatened nothing ; feeming to be only a new method of explaining the manner in which we give our affent to felf- evident propofitions ; and, provided the proportions were really felf evident, it fignified nothing in prafticeby what means we evince them to be fo.
Going thus backwards, into the obfcure regions of Metaphvfics, could do no great harm, and might prove an innocent amufement to many perfons who had no- thing better to do, or to thofe who chofe to relax from more important ftudies. But when this new power, after thus fecuring its retreat backwards, begins to
advance
298 REMARKS ON
advance forwarcjs, into the regions of fcience, philofophy, and life, fuperfeding reafoning wherever it comes, we begin to mark its progrefs with more attention: for we muft not fufFer her invafion of the right of another. Accordingly I have endeavoured to reprefs tlie inroads which this new power has made on the frontiers of morals and theology ; and now I mufl {how what attempts (lie has made to pe- netrate into the interior parts of thit' country.
To drop this alluiion, which I am not able to CTurry much farther, I propofe, in this I aft feft.ion, to exliibit to my reader the fiimmary proccfs by which our au- thor treats feveral intricate and impor- tant queftions ; as thefpring of aElion in the deity, the diftmciion betxoeen the facul- ties ofmeji and brutes, and the do6lrines, or pretended doclrines, of the divinity of Chrijl, atonemcJit, the neio birth, and pre- dejiination, wnth other fmaller matters. None of thefe Ibbjecls, which have been thought to be very difficult, and which
have
Dr. OS W A L D 's A P P E A L, 299
have exercifed the genius of the ableft men in all nations, occafion the leafl dif- ficulty to Dr. Ofwald. His common fenfe knows no difference of queftions, but decides with equal quicknefs, clear- nefs, and indubitable certainty ^ on every thing that you fliall bring before it. Hear then in what manner our author decides the long and well debated queflion con- cerning the Jp ring ofaElion in the deity*
' The learned of our day/ vol. 2, ' p. 156, ' will have us to think that hap-
* pinels, mere happincfs, is the ultimate
* end and object of the divine govern- ' ment. They confidently affirm that
* a being completely happy in himfelf ' could have no other end in bringing
* creatures into exiftence, than to make ' them happy. But this is unpardonable ' rafhnefs. For if the fole end of bring:-
* ing creatures into being was to make
* them happy, then they could not be in
* pain or mifery for a fingle moment ; be-
* caufe the fupreme ruler could not be
* difappointed of his end in one fingle
* inftance.
Soo REMARKS ON
' inftance, or for one moment of time.
* Plans formed by beings of limited ca-
* pacity may fail in the execution, but no
* defeft can be imputed to him whofe un-
* derftanding is infinite, and whofe power ' without control. This hypothefis, there-
* fore, muft be fundamentally wrong. It
* is plain,' vol. 2, p. 157, * God does not
* all that is pofTible to be done to make his ' creatures happy/
Having thus, contrary to his cuftom, condefcended to overturn by reafon a feheme that was founded on reafon, he eflablifhes another, and, as far as I know, a feheme intirely his own, which cannot fail to recommend it to my reader, on the foundation of common fenfe.
* Common fenfe/ vol. 2, p. 157, * will
* hardly authorize weak mortals to fix
* the ultimate end and objc6l of the
* divine government, but the greatejl ^ poffihle increafe of moral worth feems
* beft to correfpond to appearances, and
* to the dignity ofthefupreme ruler, and,
^ probably.
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 301
' probably, was meant in the laft age by
* the glory of God, and is now exchanged
* for the happinefs of the creature, by
* thofe who favour a more lax theology,
* the tendency of which error is to bring ' down virtue to the rank of a mean or
* fubordinate end ; the place it always
* held with hypocrites and villains of all ' kinds, who regard it no farther than it
* ferves their purpofe.'
Here we fee our author not depending intirely upon the force of his principle of common fenfe, but v/illing to take a little indireSi advantage, by reprefenting his opponents as perfons who favour a lax theology, and who regard virtue no far- ther than it ferves their purpofes. But not to digrefs.
* It is impoffible,' vol. 2, p. lit, ' that
* the deity fhould have any other obje6l ' of his government behdes the exercife
* and enjoyment of his own adorable per-
* fe6lions. — He makes the good happy, Vand the bad wretched, not from any
' fuck
302 REMARKS O N
' fucli political reafons as influence human
* government, but from the eflential per-
* fe6tions of his nature/
One would think that the fcheme which our author adopts, viz. the greatcfl pof- fible increafe of moral worth (which differs materially from the fcheme of rec- titude propofed by Dr. Balguy, or that of xoifdom by Mr. Grove) was liable to the very fame obie6lion which he thought unanfwerable with refpeft to the fcheme of benevolence. For it is as evident that God has not made all his intelligent creatures completely virtuous, as that he has not made them completely happy ; efpecially as our author will not deny that the divine being might, if he had thought proper, have influenced the minds of his creatures, or have originally formed them fo, that nothing could have overpowered their in- clination to virtue. But common fenfe, it feems, declares that, though this ob- jection was fufhcient to overturn the fcheme of benevolence, it is impertinence to urge it againfl this new fcheme of our
author's.
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 303
author's. So eafily does tliis principle decide wliere there feems to be nothing to determine the judgment ; in which it bears a wonderful refemblance to they^^ determining poxoer in man. But hear the oracle.
* Whether God/ vol. 2, p. ^\2, * might ' not have ordered things fo, that men ' would have be^n laid under the fame ' neceffity of regulating themfelves by
* the laws of nature, is an impertinent
* qucflion, becaufe we know he will not.'
However, to give us fome little help to our conceptions, befides this authoritative determination of common fenfe, our au- thor tranfports us into the invifible world of fpirits, and gives us a profpcft that cannot fail to demonftrate the unfpeak- able preference of his fcheme above that of benevolence.
After defcribing a good man having broke loofefrom ilds cuviherfomejlcjh, and efcaped the vanities of life, and being
bi'ought
304 REMARKS ON
brought into the prefence of God, with what he feels then, and what he finds he has to do afterwards, he fays, voL 2, p. 177, ' This is a profpeft we mu[{: al-
* low to be grand ; and whether this, or
* a fucceffion of pleafurable fenfations, is
* the mofl; worthy of the ukimate end and
* objecl of the fupreme ruler, may be fub- ' mitted to every one who is endued with
* the judgment and fpirit of man.'
Let us now appeal to this new oracle on the fubje6l of a much controverted point of divinity, about which profane reafon might have bufied itfelf to no Dur- pofe, and which has much embarrafTed many cjiriftian divines, efpeeially thofe who have received certain emoluments from religious eflabliihments, on the condition of maintaining the fame faith with the all-wife founders of thofe happy ellablifli-
. ments. I now mean the knottv queftion of the equality of the fon of God zvith his
father. Now, by the help of this omni- potent common fenfe, we are able to keep clear of all difficulties, and even to fleer
evenly
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 305
evenly between the two oppofite rc<:ks of the creation and no-creation of the fon of God.
* The fon of God derives life from the ' Father in a manner totally diitcienc from
* creation, and which we neither under- ' ftand, nor have any occahon to inquire
* into, any farther than is neceflary to af- ' fare us, that he is of a rank as much
* fuperior to created beings, as he has
* obtained a more excellent n^me than *,they/ Vol. u, p. 128.
-Now, by the way, I rather fufpe6l that our author's philofophy and fyftematical theology do not perfeftly tally. The Affembly's catechifm, which I prefume our author has fubfcribed, and by which he holds his church preferment, fays that the three perfons in the godhead are of the fame /ub/iance, equal in poicer and glory, which I fhould think to be hardly confiftent with the notion of the fon de- riving hfe from the Father ; however it may be /oftened, or rather oh/cured, by
X faying
3o6 REMARKS ON
faying that this derivation is fomething ef- fentially different from creation. But we may take it for granted that fo pious a man as Dr. Ofwald could not poffibly prevaricate in a matter of this nature, ef- pecially after his own folemn declaration on the fubjeft.
* We appeal to common fenfe, and ' defy them to offer a fhadow of reafon,
* why the man who prevaricates in reli- ' gion fhould not be as much the objeft
* of contempt and abhorrence, as he who
* prevaricates on any other fubjecl of im-
* portance/ Vol.2, p. 115. I fhould be glad, however, if our author would condefcend to clear up the confiflency of his condu6l in this cafe, for the fatisfac- tion of fome v» hofe common fenfe is not fo nice and,diflinguifhing as his, and who cannot fplit fo fine a hair.
With refpeB to the do6lrine of atone- ment, our author's common fenfe decides clearly in favour of orthodoxy, which is a great happinefs, as it faves him the
trouble
Dr. OSWALD'S A F F Z ^v L. 307
trouble oF con^de^^iDg ?ti(1 anfwerin.; a great number of ih re wd objecticns to that: fuppofed doctrine of kripture.
Speaking of the difpenfation of thegof- pel, he fays, p. 50, ' MeiTengers were difpatched to the diiTerent nations, call- ing upon them to forfake their vices and impieties, and to return to God, who was willing to receive them to favour, through the mediation of that divine perfon ; w^ho, having expiated their guilt by his death, has afcended into heaven.' He calls Chrift, vol. 2, p. 98, a perfon of the higheft dignity, who, by a courfe of unparalleled obedience, has merited y in the ftri8:e{l fenfe of the word, favours of various kinds for his adhe- rents, which in no confiftency with wif- dom, equity, or juftice, could otherwife be conferred upon them. Can we fup- pofe,' fays he, vol. 2, p. i5i, * that a good God would fuffer a perfon offuch an amiable chara6ler, and one fo near and dear to him, to undergo fuch exquifite X 2 * fuffer^
3o8 REMARKS ON
' fufferings, if juitice did not make it ne- * cefTary ?'
The doftrines of divine influence, and the new birth have given much exercife to fome inquifitive minds, but as they give no trouble to our author, he won- ders that any bodyelfe (liouldhave found the leaR difficulty in them. Common fenfe can folve thefe difficulties, and much greater.
' One cannot help fmiling,' fays our author, ' at the pitiful (hifts which the ' pretenders to learning go into, to ex- ' tricate themfelves from the embarraff-
* ment they are under with refpeft to
* the operation of the Holy Ghoft, and ' the new birth, which to a man of true ' judgment, creates no difficulty at all/ vol. 2, P' 137. Then, comparing this fupernatural influence to the light of the fun, he fays, ' Why then, may not he, ' Vvith equal eafe, and with equal fafety
* to the order of nature, and v/rihout the
Meaft
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 309
* leaft infringement of any of its laws, pro-
* duce a total change of fentiments and
* inclinations, with* new habits of thinking ' and afting, in thofe who refign them-
* felves to his influence, and conform ' themfelves to his direftion. If this
* fubjeft were explained by the fame ' rules of good fenfe, and true philofo-
* phy, which are employed on fubjefts of ' far lefs confequence, the nerjo birth ' would be equally intelligible with any ' other of the produftions of nature we ' feem to be bcft acquainted with.'
Hitherto our author's common fenfe has always happened to fleer him pretty nearly into the fafe and comfortable harbour of orthodoxy ; but with refpe6l to the do6trine concerning the power of man to do the will of God, I am afraid it will appear to have driven him quite wide of it. For if I have any knowledge of fcholaftic divinity. Dr. Ofwald's doc- trine on this fubjecl is the very reverfe of what the Scotch minifters are obliged to
X 2 fubicribe.
310 REMARKS ON
fubfcribe, as well as to that of the church of Endand.
*o'
' Take one of the vulgar afide/ vol. 2, p. 208, ' and point out to Yiimfome duties
* he neglefts, and fome vices he indulges. ' — He will acknowledge the fact, but ' will conclude that till God work it in ' him he can do nothing. This/ fays he, p. 208, * they are taught to fay.' And fo, if I be not greatly miftaken, Dr. Of- wald himfelf is under an obligation, equi- valent to the molt folemn of all oaths, to teach them.
* To all'^dge the neceflity,' p. 212, ^ of
* an interpolition which we have no reafon
* to expeft, and which one in an hundred
* is not favoured with, is a heinous im- ' piety : for it amounts to nothing lefs
* than a declamation, that the fupreme
* being looks on, and fees ninety nine of
* a hundred perifh for want of an inter- ' polition, which is neceffary to deter- ' mine them to do the right and (hun the ' wrong.'
This
Br. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 311
This is certainly very found Arminian do6lrine, but very unfound Calvinifm. If our author holds his Scotch living, I hope he will explain, in his next, how he can do this, and keep clear of a dan- gerous refinement, and prevarication in matters of religien. Let him take care that this common fenfe do not a little in- terfere with common honejlyi and chriflian fincerity.
The difference between the intelleclual faculties of men and brutes has dccafioned a good deal of difficulty both to philofo- phers and divines ; but on this fubjecl our author is equally clear and decifive as on all the others on which he has favoured us with his opinion. In fiiort, it is Common kn{e. that is the characierif- tic of rationality. Every individual of ike human race has it, ideots excepted.
* If,' fays our author, p. 186, ' Vve ' know any thing at all of the Ipeciiic * difference between our underftcinding ' and that of inferior animals, itmuft con-
X4 ^fift
312 REMARKS O M
' lift in our having perceptions of truth ^ which are imperceptible to them, In>
* ferior animals/ p. 185, ' fly things of
* hurtful appearance, and purfue objefts
* of pleafure and convenience, with the fa-
* gacity and earneftnefs, as if they really
* knew thofe powers in nature by which
* they may be profited or hurt. But that
* they do not know them in the manner ' we do ; and, indeed, that they can have
* no idea of them at all appears from
* hence, that they never make the leafl:
* attempt to employ thofe pov/ers in their
* favour. There are numberlefs occa-
* Rons,' ib. 'on which inferior animals
* could relieve themfelves from danger
* and from death, if they had the leafl
* notion of many powers in nature which
* they could eafily lay hold of. It is
* worthy of notice,* he fays, p. 183, * that
* brutes never thruft one another over
* precipices, into ponds, or rivers, or into
* fire. They may do it by accident, but
* never through mirth, or malice, as chil-
* dren do ; becaufc they have not thofe
* ideas of the laws of nature which chil-
* dren
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 313
* dren have. Who doubts/ p. 186, * that
* many of the inferior animals, under deep
* provocation, would J^urn houfes, and
* do other dreadful afts of mifchief, if
* they had the leaft idea of power in fire
* to confume combuftibles ?*
Our author does not give himfelf the trouble to anfwer many obje6lions, talcing the eafy method of treating them with contempt, as things that are, in their own nature, altogether impertinent, or I could mention feveral. Dogs may not have a fancy for pufhing one another into ponds, or into the fire, thinking perhaps there may be no great diverfion in it, but they mouthe and tumble one another about in a very pretty, and ingenious manner, juft as if they knew as much of the laws of nature as relate to bitino; and tumbling; and fome animals of the mon- key tribe both divert themfelves and plague others, feemingly, with as perfe6l a know- ledge of the natural powers of various inftruments which they make ufe of for that purpofe, as any unlucky young boy
ia
314 R EM ARKS ON
in the world. As far as I fee, brutes both judge and reafon as properly as we do, as far as their idea^. extend. But I mean not to difcufs any of thefe deep fubjefts, but only make fuch obfervations as may tend to illuftrate the fentlments of my author.
The laft article I (hall mention (and I do not know whether Dr. Ofwald, my reader, or rnyfelf, is mod pleafed that I have got to the laft article) is a very fmall one indeed, but nothing can pro- perly be called inconfiderable that relates to this moft wonderful new difcovered faculty of the human mind. So the mofl trifling cuftoni of a new difcovered people engages more attention than the moft folemn and important ones of our old neighbours. And though our author does not, in this cafe, mention any obligation he was under to his principle of common fenfe, it might pof.bly have been of fome indire6l ufe to him in the difcovery.
Moft perfons who have any refpe6l for religion, afk a blcffing on their meat,
efpecially
Dr. OSWALD'S APPEA'L. 315
efpecially when they fit down to dine in a fecial manner ; and perhaps they may think they know the reafon of this cuftom ; but I am now authorized to inform them that they are much miftaken, and that they are not quite fo wife as they fancy themfelves to be. In proof of this hear our author.
' There may be fomething in man's
* conftitution which deftroys the nutritive ' quaUty of bread, and may turn it into
* poifon, which is a good philofophical ' account of the common practice of afk-
* ing a bleflingon our food/ p. 372.
Having now dined very plentifully at the expence of our author, I thank him, for myfelf and my readers, for the enter- tainment he has given us. And that he may make his own epilogue, I (hall con- clude with what he fays of the greatnefs of his fcheme, and his hopes of fuccefs in it. And to (hew my readinefs to adopt my author's fentiments, as far as I poffibly can, I beg my reader would fancy to him-
felf
3i6 REMARKS ON
felf that as foon as Dr. Ofwald has re- peated the following fentences, I alfo Hand up, and, mutatis mutandis, repeat them audibly after him.
* I hope the public will take in good
* part,' p. 390, * this effort I have made
* to check a folly which has retarded the
* progrefs of knowledge in all ages, and
* threatened the prefent age with a per-
* verfion of judgment fimilar to what
* prevailed in that period, when, as Mr.
* Pope fays.
Faith, Golpel, all feem'd made to be difputed, And none had fenfe enough to be confuted.
' It is not poflible/ fays he to his friend, p. 349, * to give at once a new and op-
* pofite turn to men's way of thinking ; but
* as I hope to fatisfy your fcruples in a
* little time, fo I believe that in due time
* the bulk of mankind may be brought ^ to a jull wav of thinking qn this fub- *jea/
THE
THE
APPENDIX.
i
THE
APPENDIX.
NUMBER I.
Of the refemblance between the doBrine of Common fenfe, and the principles of Dr. Prices Review of the qucjlions and difficulties in morals,
I Have mentioned my furprife that none of the authors on whom I have been animadverting fliouid feem to have heard of Dr. Hartley's Obfervations on man, except Dr. Beattie, who appears not to have underftood him, and who pays him the trifling compliment of an inge- nious but fanciful author. I mud alfo exprefs my furprife, though not in the fame degree, that none of them fhould have mentioned Dr, Price's Review of
the
320 R E M A R K S O N
the principle queftions and difficulties^ in Tiwrals, which was publidied in 1758; and which, both with refpecl to the theory of the mind, and the praclical application of it, contains all that is original, and that has the appearance of being juft and ufeful in any of them.
This writer, whofe fuperiority to Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, or Dr. Ofwald, is exceedingly nianifeft, maintains that the underjlcinding is the fource of many of our moft important fimple ideas ; as that of the necejfary conne&ion of ei>£nts in na- ture, the vis inertice of matter, fuljlance, dii- ration, fp ace, infinity, neceffity, equality, identity, contingency, pofjihility , power , and caufation. Sec. and more efpeciaily to this fource he refers our ideas of moral right aid wrong, and of moral oh ligation. It is, he obferves, of the effence of thefe ideas to imply fomethin^g; true or falfe of an object:, and that they by no means de- note the manner in which we are affected by it ; fo tliat they cannot with any pro- priety be referred to that part of our
con-
Dr. PRICE'S R'EVIEW. 321
conftitution which has hitherto been dif- tinguifhed by the appellation olfenfe^
This Tcheme has all the flattering ad- vantages of the new doclrine of common fenfe, without the capital inconveniencies attending it. Like this fcheme, it cuts off", if it be admitted, (and without this no fcheme can have any operation or effe6l) all objeftions to primary moral truths, reft-ing them on a fimple appeal to the faculty of intuition ; and refufing to reafon upon a fubje6l which is maintained to be as evident as the truth of the geo- metrical pofl-ulatum, that if equal things be taken from equal things the remainders will be equal. But this philofopher had more good fenfe than to load his fcheme with the belief of the real exifl:ence of the external world ; and he is more efpecially careful to keep intirely clear of every thing that can reprefent our ideas of vir- tue as arbitrary and precarious, which is the neceffary confequence of this new fcheme
If
322 REMARKS ON
If the ideas of moral right and v/rong &c. be perceived by Tifenfe, it depends upon our arbitrary conllitution that we conceive of them as we do, or whether we perceive them at all ; and we have no method whatever of invefli statin sr whe- ther they have any foundation in the abfo- Inte nature of things. Whereas by making moral ideas the objecl of the underjland- ing or intelle6l, asfiich, the principles of morality become part of the fyftem of necejjary, eternal, and unalterable truth, perceived by the divine being, as by ourfelves, but altogether independent of his will, as well as of all other beings, and things whatfoever; as much fo as the truth of the pojlulatiiin above mentioned, or of the propofition thdii'twa and two viakefour.
To exhibit as di(lin6ily as pofTible this original fcheme of Dr. Price's, with as much of the evidence of it as I can find exprefled, in a fhort compafs, by the author himfelf, I fhall prefent my reader
witl
bf. P R I C E's REVIEW. 323
with the following extra6ls from his very elaborate work*
' I cannot help wondering,' p. 48, 'that ^ m inquiring into the original of our
* ideas, the undcrjlanding, which, though ' not firft in time, is the mod important
* fource of our ideas, fhould have been ' overlooked. It has, indeed, been al- '*'ways confide red as the fource of know- ' ledge ; but it fhould have been more at-
* tended to, that, as the fource of know-
* ledge, it is likewife the fource of nezo
* ideas, and that it cannot be one of thele ' without being the other.'
' The various kinds of agreement and ' difagreement between our ideas, which,
* Mr. Locke fays, is its ofhce to difcover ' and trace, are fo many new fimple ideas, ' of which it muft itfelf have been the
* original. Thus when it confiders the
* two angles made by a right line, ftand-
* ing in any direction on another, and
* perceives the agreevient between them
* and two right angles, what is this agree-
y 2 ' merit
324 REMARKS ON
* merit befides their equality ? And is not
* the idea of this equahty a new fimple
* idea, derived from the underftanding,
* v/holly different from that of the two ' angles compared, and reprefenting felf-
* evident truth ?'
' In much the fame manner in other , cafes, knowledge and intuition fuppofe ' fomewhat perceived or difcovered in
* their objc6ls, denoting fimple ideas, to ' which themfelves gave rife. This is
* true of our ideas of proportion^ of our
* ideas of identity and diverjity, exijience, ' conneBion, ccuufe and effeB, power, pojji- ' hility and ivipojfibility, and of our ideas ' of moral right and wrong. The firft ' concerns quantity, the laft a£lions, the
* reft all things. They comprehend the ' moft confiderable part of what we can ' defire to know of things, and are theob- ' jccls of almoft all reafonings and dif-
* quifitions/
* It is therefore efTential to the under- ' {landing to be the fountain of new
' ideas.
Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 325
* ideas. As bodily fight difcovers to us
* the qualities of outward vifible objecls,
* fo does the underftandino:, which is the
* eye of the mind, and infinitely more ' fubtle and penetrating, difcover to us ' the qualities of intelligible objefts ; and ' thus, in a like fenfe with the former,
* becomes the inlet of new ideas.'
The whole of what Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald have written about the neceffity of acquiefcing in primary truths, and on the inutility and infufficiency of reafon- ing in many cafes, is fo fully expreffed by Dr. Price, that one can hardly help thinking that they muft have read him, and have commented upon him. But he is fo clear and full, though concife, that any commentary was certainly unnecef- fary.
* The fecond ground of belief,' p. 163,
* is intuition, by which I mean the m.ind's
* furvey of its own ideas, and the rela- ' tions between them, and the notice it ' takes, by its own innate light, andintel-
Y 3 ' ledive
}26 R E M A R K S O N
* leclive power, of what abfolutely and
* neceflarily is, or is not, true and falfe, ' confident and inconfiftent, poffible and ' impoflible, in the natures of things. It
* is to this that we owe our beUef of all ' felf-evident truths, our ideas of the ge-
* neral abflraft affe6lions and relations of
* things, our moral ideas, and whatever
* elfe we difcover without making ufe of
* any procefs of reafoning.
* It is on this power of intuition, eflen- ' tial in fome degree or other, to all ra-
* tional minds, that the whole pofTibility
* of all reafoning is founded. To it the laft
* appeal is ever made. Many of its per-
* ceptions are capable, by attention, of ' being rendered more clear, and many ' of the truths difcovered by it may be ' illuftrated by an advantageous repre- ' fenfation of them, or by being viewed in
* particular lights, but feldom will admit
* of proper proof,
* Some truths there muft be which can ' appear only by their own light, and
' which
Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 327
^ which are incapable of proof. Other-
* wife nothing could be proved or known ;
* in the fame manner as if there were no
* letters, there could be no words ; or if
* there were no fimple or undeHnable
* ideas, there could be no complex ideas.
* — I might mention many inftances of ' truths difcernible no other way than ' intuitively, which learned men have
* flrangely confounded and obfcured,
* by treating them as ^\}b]^B.s o^ reafoning ' and deduSiion. One of the m.oft im.por-
* tant inftances the fubje61 of this treatife* (viz. morals) ' affords us, and another
* we have in our notions of the neceffity ' of a caiife of whatever begins to exift, ' or our general ideas of power and con-
* nexion. And fometimes reafon has been
* ridiculoufly employed to prove even our ' own exiftence.'
The writers on whom I have been ani- madverting feem even to have borrowed their language, as well as their ideas from Dr. Price, who alfo ufes the term cammon fenfe, but with much more propriety than Y 4 they
3'28 REMARKS ON
they do. Of this I (hall give tv/o in- fiances .
* The necefTity of a caufe,' p. 31^ 'of whatever events arife is an effential principle, a primary perception of the underftanding ; nothing being more palpably abfurd than the notion of a change which has been derived from nothing, and of which there is no reafon to be given ; af an exiflence which has begun, but never was produced; of a body, for inflance, that has ceafed to move, but has not been Hopped, or that has begun to move, without being moved. Nothing can be done to con- vince a perfbn who profcfTes to deny this, befides referring him to common
Jenfe. If he cannot find there the per- ception I have mentioned, he is not farther to be argued with ; for the fub- je6l will not admit of argument ; there being nothing clearer than the point itfelf difputed, to be brought to con-
■ firm it.'
* Were
Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 329
' Were the quellion,' p. 62, ' what that ' perception is which we have of number y
* diverjity, caufation, or proportion; and
* whether our ideas of them fignify truth
* and reality, perceived by the under-
* (landing, or particular impreflions, made ' by the objefts to which we afcribe them
* on our minds ; were, I fay, this the
* quedion, would it not be fufficient to
* appeal to common fenfe?' This is not ufmg the word fenfe according to the technical philofophical meaning of it, and making it, asjuch^ the tell of truth ; but only appealing to it as another term for 2i plain underjtanding. But it is no un- common thing for commentators to miftake the meaning of their author.
I thought it • right to point out what feemed to me to be the probable fource of wliat has the appearance of truth and reafon, as alfo, perhaps, of the miftakes of the writers on whom I have been ani- madverting ; though I muft acknowledge that I have been led to entertain a very different opinion from that of Dr.
Price/
330 R E M A R K S O N
Price concerning the nature and origin of the ideas above mentioned. For, in- flead of being properly Jimple ideas, as he confiders them, feveral of them appear to me to be exceedingly compUx, or fubftitutes for defcriptions and definitions ; and that at firft view they feem to be fimple for the fame reafon that white is imagined to be a fimple colour, before we have learned how to analize it. As to the idiCdiS o{ moral right and wrong, and moral obligation, inflead of bearing the proper marks of fimple and original ideas, necef- farily refulting from the view of any ob- je6l, they appear to me exa6lly to re- femble ideas compounded of many parts, fome of which are obtained earlier and others later, and which require time per- feftly to coalefce into one. The minds of children are long deflitute of them ; they are acquired ver)^ gradually ; they are at firlt extremely imperfect, but grow more perfeft and accurate by degrees, as their growth is more or lefs favoured by the circumflances to which the mind is expofed : they are fubje6l to great
variations
Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 331
variations in the courfe of our lives ; and in fome minds, thofe ideas are never per- feclly formed, fome incoherent rudiments of them only being obfervable.
I am rather furprized that Dr. Price fhould fee any occafion for fuppofmg the faculty by which we judge of the truth of propofitions, as di{lin6l from fimple perception, to be the fource of ideas ; fmce every perception may be refolved into a propqfition, and therefore necef- farily fuggefts a truth. If I only open my eyes, and get the idea of a white horje, I as evidently perceive a truthy viz. that the horfe is white, as I perceive a truth when I have the fentiment o^ approving a generous aSiion ; and the latter is juft as much involved, and requires to be un- folded, before it can take the form of a propofition, as the former. I do not therefore fee why this very accurate rea- foner (hould con^iA^r feeling and intuition as two different grounds of belief, efpe- cially as he afcribes to feeling the know- ledge of our own exiJlencCi and oj the
feverat
332 REMARKS ON
fever al operations, paffions, andfenfations of our minds, p. 162. It appears to mc to be a diftinftion without a difference to make the faculty by which we judge of thefe things, to be different from that by which we judge of all f elf evident truths, and get our ideas of general ab- ftrad affed,ions and relations of things, our moral ideas, and whatever elfe we difcover without 7naking ufe of any procefs of reafoning ; which, however, we have feen that he afcribes to intuition, as diftin6l i'rom feeling. It equally requires an at- tention to what paffes within our minds, or refleBion, to difcover the operations and pcffions of our minds, as to get ideas o^ general abftra^i aJfe6lions and relations of things. We may live and a6i under the influence of thefe ideas without know- ing any thing about them ; but the fame reflex attention to what paffes within our- felves will equally difcover them all. I do not mean to difcufs this fubje8; with Dr. Price, it being foreign to my prefent purpofe. Some obfervations, however, he reader will find relating to it in the
preliminary
Dr. P R I C E's R E V I E W. 335
preliminary EJfay, and more in the Dijfer- tations prefixed to my edition o^ Hartley s Obfervations on man. But for every thing of this nature I would more efpecially refer my reader to Dr. Hartley himfelf, to whom I am indebted for almofl all my knowledge of this fubjetl;.
NUM^
334 R E M A R K S O N
NUMBER 11,
Of Mr. Harris'^ hypothefis concerning Mind and Ideas,
T Think it not altogether improper, in ^ this Appendix, to take fome flight no* tice of the hypothefis of Mr. Harris (the ingenious author of Hermes) relating to mind and ideas ^ which is fo hke that of Dr. Reid, that it might have been ex- pefted that he would have acknowledged fome obligation to him for it ; or, at leafl:, that (as Dr. Price has done) he would have quoted him, as exprefling fentiments fo very hmilar to his own. The hypothefis is fmgular enough ; but, I believe, fomething a-kin to that of Ma- lebranche ; though, not having ftudied the writings of this French philofopher, I am not able to pronounce with cer- tainty.
If I underftand Mr. Harris aright, all our ideas are innate ; having been originally
im-
Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 335
imprefled upon our minds by the Deity, and being only awakened, or called forth, by the prefence of external objcfts. But unlefs he could have advanced fome more direct evidence for this fyftem than he has done, I think he is hardly to be jufti- fied for treating with fo much ridicule and contempt the hypothefis of Mr. Locke and others, that ideas are properly produced by the aclions of external ohjecls ; there being the fame neceffary connexion between them, as between any other caufes and effefts in nature.
* Mark the order of things,' fays he, p. 392, ' according to their account of
* them. Firft comes that huge body the
* fenfible world, then this and its attri-
* butes beget fenfible ideas. Then, out
* of fenfible ideas, by a kind of lopping
* or pruning, are made ideas intelligible-, ' whether fpecific or general. Thus
* (hould they admit that mind was coeval
* with body, yet till body gave it ideas,
* and awakened its dormant powers, it
* could at bell have been nothing more
' than
336 REMARKS ON
* than a fort of dead capacity ; for innate
* ideas it could not poflTibly have any.'
There is a good deal of humour and fine defcriptioQ in our author's repre- fentation ofths various hypothefes of the ufe of the nerves in conveying ideas.
* At another time,' ibid. * we hear of ' bodies fo exceedingly fine that their
* very exility makes them fufceptible of
* fenfation and knowledge; as if they
* flirunk into intelletl by their exquifite ' fubtilty, which rendered them too deli-
* cate to be bodies any longer. It is to
* this notion wc owe many curious inven-
* tions, fuch 2iS fubtle ether, aniimlfpirits, ' nervous duBs, vibrations, &c. terms
* which modern philofophy, upon parting ' with occult qualities, has found expe-
* dient to provide itfelf to fupply their
* place.*
This, however, appears to me to be an evidence rather of a fine imagination in 6ur author, than of his fairnefs, or ac- quaintance with the fubje6l. He could
not
Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 537
not ferioufly imagine that any perfijn ever fuppofed that matter was capable, by us fuhtilty only, of approaching to the nature of immateriality. All that has ever been fuppofed (and what fatts will fufficiently authorize) is that ideas, and their affedions, are the re fait of certain impreflions made upon the fyftem of the nerves and brain. To prove that this is an unphilofophical hypothecs, Mr. Harris muft (hew, not that we cannot ex^ plain the connexion between thought and this material fyftem, but that there isnofuch connexion, and that the faculty of thinking in man can fubfift without that fyftem ; which I think he will not attempt to do.
Let us now confider the arguments on which his own hypothecs is founded; which, as far as I have been able to col- left them out of what he has written upon the fubjetl:, are the following.
Firft, ideas are of the ejfence of mind,
and therefore, having no relation to cor-
3 poreal
338 RE M A R K S O N
poreal things, cannot be produced by them. ' The nature of ideas,' p. 380,
* is not difficult to explain, if we once
* allow a poffibility of their exiflence. ' That they are exquifitely beautiful, va-
* rious, and orderly, is evident from the ' exquifite beauty, variety, and order, ' feen in natural hibftances, which are but
* their copies or pictures. That they are '. mental, is plain, as they are of the ejfence ^-ofmind; and confequently no odje6ls
* to any of the fenfes, nor therefore cir- ' cumfcribed either by time or place. — But
* the intelleftual fcheme,' p. 394, * which ' never forgets deity, poftpones every
* thing corporeal to the primary mental ' caufe. It is here it looks for the origin
* of intelligible ideas, even of thofe which
* exift in human capacities. For though
* thofe fenfible objefts may be the de- ' (lined medium to awaken the dormant
* energies of man's underflanding, yet
* are thofe energies themfelves no more ' contained in fenfe, than the explofion
* of a cannon, in the fpark that gave it ^ fire.'
But
Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 339
*^^But this goes upon the fuppofition th it mind is of fuch a nature, as that it can have no polhble conne6lion with matter, or be properly afFeded by it, which is contrary to all appearance, if the fubje6l of perception and thought in man be mind. For, judging by the moft obvious fafts, and univerfal experience, nothing is more evident, than that the principle which we call mind, whether it be material or im- material, is of fuch a nature, that it canhe affefted by external objefts, and that its perceptions correfpond to the ftate of the corporeal fyftem, efpecially that of the brain; And there is the fame reafon to conclude that thig affeftion is natural and necejfary, as that the found of a muhcal chord is the natural and neceffary effeft of the ftroke oS. a plectrum. If my eye be open, and a houfe be before me, I as neceffarily perceive the idea of a houfe ; or if fire be applied to any part of my body, I as ne- ceffarily perceive the fenfation of burning, as found follows the flroke above men- tioned. If a due attention to thefe fafts obliges us to alter our notions ohnind, and maUrialifmi the received rules of philo- Z 2 fophi-
340 REMARKS ON
fophizing compel us to do it ; and thefe are certainly a better authority than the mere fpeCulations of metaphyficians founded on no obfervations at all.
I readily adoiit our author's compari- fen of ideas to the explojion of a cannon, and of an external object to difpark that occafionsit ; but I wonder that he fhould make ufe of this comparifon, which, in effeft, overthrows his whole hypothefis. For is not the explofion of the cannon the mechanical effect of the produ6lion of elaftic vapour, and of the increafe of the expanfion of the air, by heat ? If ideas refult from external objecls, in a manner at all analogous to the explofion of gunpowder from the application of fire, I lee no occafion for having recourfe to any immaterial priL-^-plc in man, or for fur : cling that IJeas, as fiich, are fo far cftke ejfence of mind, that chey can .have no relation to time or place.
Mr. Harris, moreover, admits that fenfible objetls may be a medium to a- •waken the dormant energies of mans un- der-
Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 341
derflanding, by which I fuppofe he means ideas J in the firil inftance, and mental operations 2ihe.xw2iY As, Butif fenuble ob- jects have a natural power of awakening ideas, why may they not have a natural power of originally exciting them, in the fame mind ? Let Mr. Harris explain the difference. In both the cafes fome mu- tual a^ion, or ajfe^ion, muft be fup- pofed.
The manner in which our author thinks that he can reduce us to the necefiity of
'^.admitting the derivation of ideas from mind, rather than from body, is fo curious, that I fhall tranfcribe the whole piffage.
1/ Either all minds/ p. 400, * have their
* ideas derived, or all have them original;
* or fome have them original, and fom*
* derived. If all minds have them de-
* rived, they muft be derived from fome- ' thing which is itfelf not mind, and thus
* we fall infenfibly into a kind of atheifm. ' If all have them original, then are all
* minds divine, an hypothefis far more
* plaufible than the former. But if this v-* be not admitted, then muft one mind
Z 3 'at
342 R E M A R K S O N .
* at lead, have original ideas, and the ' reft have them derived. Now, fuppofing ' this laft, whence are thofe minds, whofe ^ ideas are derived, moft like to derive
* them ; from mind, or from body ; from
* hiind, a thing homogeneous, or from
* body, a thing hetdrogeneous ; from ' mind, fuch as, from the hypothefis, has
* originally ideas, as from body, which ' we cannot difcover to have any ide^s ' at all ?;
But it is no more neceflary that bodies •fhould themfelves have ideas,_ in order to excite them in us, than it is neceffary that b. ple^lrum (hould have found in i felf, in orcier to excite it in a: rriulical chord ; or that a fpark of fire fliould con- tain an explofion, in order to produce it, by its application to gunpowder ; and yet pothing but matier ^vidi viotion arc concerned in thefe cafes.
Secondly, Mr. Harris Teems to think his hypothefis neceflary to account for the identity of the ideas of different minds.
* Now
Mr, HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 343
' Now is it not marvellous/ p. 399, ' that ' there fhould be fo exaft an identity of ' our ideas, if they were only generated
* from fenfible objefts, infinite in number,
* ever changing, dillant in time, diftant *. in place, and no one particular the
* fame with any other?'
r ■ But is there not equal identity or .diverfity in external objeEls, as there is in pur ideas of them ? It appears to me that the correfpondence is fo ftri8;, that it amounts to a Sufficient proof of our ideas having this very origin, and no other. Men in the fame fituations, that is, ex- pofed to the fame influences, we have rea- fon to believe, will have the fame ideas, in fimilar fituations they will have fimilar ideas, and in different fituations they will have different ideas, and different in proportion to the difference in their fituations.
Thirdly, our author fuppofes the men- tal origin of our ideas neceffary to ac- count for the correfpondence there is be- V Z 4 tween
344 REMARKS ON
tween the ideas of the divine mind and-
thofe of ours, and confequently to the
, .communication between him and us. ' In
Vfhort,' p. 395, ^ all minds that are, are
* finoilar and congenial, and fo too arc
* their ideas, or intelligible forms. Were
* it otherwife, there could be no inter-
* courfe between man and man, or (what ' is more important) between man and
* God. — Let ideas then,* p. 399, * be
* Origrinal : let them be connate and eflen- ' tial to the divine mind. If this be true,
^* is it not a fortunate event, that ideas of
* corporeal rife, and others of mental, ' (things derived from fubjefts fo totaliy
* didnicl) {hould {o happily coincide in ' the fame wonderful identity ?^
Now, for my part, I fee no great diffi- culty in admitting that the divine being fhould caufe material objects to excite the very fame ideas in our minds, that might come into his fome other way. Befides, with refpeft to' the divine mind, I think it is fufficient, in this cafe, to plead our utter Ignorance of the nature or affe6lions
of
Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 345
of it. This, however, I would obferve, and I think it well deferves the ferious at- tention of Mr. Harris, and Dr. Reid ; that ' if things materidl and immaterial be fo * very remote in their nature, the one ' ^having a relation to time and place, and the other being incapable of any relation 'Ho either, in fo much that they cannot poffibly affetl one another (and upon this notion only can our author deny the pof- 'fibility of external obje£ls impreffing our I minds) and if, as he afferts, all mmds be '"' Jimilar, homogeneous, and co7igenial, mat- ter can no more affe6i;, or be affefted by, ' the divine mind, than it can affeft, or be aiT"6led by ours. Confequently no fuch thing can exift, or, if it do exift, it can- not have been created by God. If I be capable of drawing any confequence, this appears to be a juft one. Let FVlr. Harris or Dr. Reid invalidate it, if they can.
As to the origin and nature of ideas m the divine mind, I 111 uft be allowed to profefs the fame ignorance, as of the ori- gm or nature of his being.
NUM.
346 CORRESPONDENCE WITH
NUMBER III.
The correfpondence of the author with Dr. Ofwald and Dr. Beattie, relating to this controverjy ,
TTAVING thought proper to acquaint ^^ Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwaid, with my intention of animad- verting upon their writings, I fent the fame notice to each of them, at the fame time: together with a printed copy of the preface to my third volume of the In- Jtitutes of natural and revealed religion; and having received anfwers from Dr. Ofw.ild and Dr. Beattie, I have here in- ferted them, with my repUes, for reafons that will fufficiently appear in the perufal of them.
As Dr. Ofwald feems to lay peculiar ftrefs on h'm feventh letter, to which he refers me ; and I am willing to give him all poflible advantage, I have fubjoined the whole of it. But if any body can
think
UflWrn^l^ SWA L D. 347
think it to be of the leaft ufe to his pur-
pofe, or that it exhibits any thing more
than another fpecimen of juft fuch futile
"decla'mation as 1 'have already quoted
'again and again, 1 own he fees more in it
thari I can fee. I think it altogether un-
neceflary to make any particular remarks
upon it. His fifth letter alfo,. I think as
little fati'sfadory. ^ ^^'"2
■.■X ■■.. :•■ '• ' -'t
To Dr. OSWALD.
•-"Reverend Sir,
npHlNKING it right that every perfoti j^J -...(hould be apprized of any publica- .&nin which his writings are criticized, I take the liberty to fend you a copy of a Jlieet that will be foori publilhed, in which I announce my intention to animadvert upon the. principles o^ your Appeal to ■common fenfe*
I am, Reverend Sir,.
Your obedient humble fervant,
J.PRIESTLEY. London t April 28, 1774.
Reverenb
'348 CORRESPONDENCE WITH
Reverend Sir,
T Have received your letter, announcing jf"^ remarks you are to publifti on my Ap- ^eal to common fen/e, with one inclofed {heet, containing thefe remarks for my perufal. This, I own, is gentlemanny ; but I am in no difpofition for accepting the challenge. I fhall, however, point out a few things which may deferve your notice;
Though numbers of high rank for literature in this and the preceding age have aimed at nothing beyond high pro- bability ; and though the evidence offered by Dr. Reidj Dr. Beattie, and myfelf for primary truths doth not give you fatisfa6i:ion, you ought not to be poHtive that no other than probable evidence be- longs to the fubje6t ; but ought to allow that higher evidence, too much neg!e6led hitherto, and of which you have no clear conception, may poIFibly belong to the^ primary truths of religion.
Your
Dr. OSWALD. 549
Your allufion to a lottery ticket is in- decent. The utmoft afTurance arifing from the chance of a thoufand to one, is burdened with a juft and rational dread of difappointment ; but the evidence pe- culiar to the primary truths of religion leaves no room for a dread of difap- pointment, that can be called juft or rational.
When you confult your heart, you will, I hope, find your belief of the Co- pcrnican fyftem different from your belief of the primary truths of religion, and founded on evidence of an inferior kind. The polTibility, at leaft, of error attends the moft complete demonflration ; but no fuch charge lies againft the pri- mary truth of religion; and this circum- ftance is of too great importance to be (lightly paffed over.
I Ihall not promife that the fifth letter annexed to the firft volume of my Appeal on the difference between poffibility,
proba-
350 CORRESPON^DENCE WITH
probability, and certainty, or that the laft book of the fame volume, on the diffe- rence between reafoning and judging will give you fatisfaclion ; but thefe are fubjefts you ought to be acquainted with,' before you pronounce on the evidence which belongs to primary truths.
I fhould be (hy of recommending a^ fecond reading of my Appeal to one who is pofitive that it contains juft nothing; but if you will take the trouble of reading the feventh letter, annexed to the firft volume, you may find that an appeal to common fenfe in behalf of obvious truth may amount to more than people's calling one another reciprocally fools and block- heads.
I thought, and dill think, that divines of eminence ought to have offered fome- thing more than the higbell probability for the primary truths of religion, and that I had a right to complain of their not doing fo, without derogating from
their
Dr. O S W A L D. 351
their merit, or being liable to the imputa- tion of arrogance from thofe who are in the daily exercife of uttering complaints of the mifcondu6l of their fuperiors.
If you know no other evidence for the primary truths of religion than the highefl degree of probability, you cannot be juftly blamed for offering that, and that alone, to thofe under your care ; nor have you the leaft occafion for quarrelling with others, who are pofifefled, or believe themfelves poffefled, of higher evidence ; and I am of opinion you may employ yourfelf with more advantage to the pub- lic by purfuing other branches of fcience, than by deciding rafhly on a fubje6l which I fee you have not ftudied.
When you have thought better of the matter, you will not, I prefume, chufe to publifh the (heet you fent me in the pre- fent form ; but if you do, I (hall expe8: you will do me the jullice of publifning this letter along with it. I have declined
entering
35* CORRESPONDENCE WITH
entering into a controverfy, but this I infift on. I am.
Reverend Sir,
Your moft humble fervant,
JAMES OSWALD.
Mcthven, May 12, 1774.
.ReverenpSir,
MM arioi 'T'HE ftieet I inclofecl was publifh- ed exatlly as it was fent to you, about a fortnight afterwards. Bat if it had not, I fhould not have thought pro- per to have printed your letter along with it, as I do not fee a (hadow of a founda-^ lion in jujiice for your infifting upon it. f Dr Reid, Dr. Beattie, and others, have juft the fame right, and I do rot profefs to be publillier for all the world. The prefs is as open to you, as it is to me; and if you do act tnink proper to have
»* recourfe
Dr. OSWALD. 353
recourfe to it upon this occafion, the fault is not mine. It is poffible, however, that, in my intended publication, I may infert tills letter of yours ; but if you faw it in the fame light in which I do, you would requeft that I would not.
Vou fay yoMfee I have noijludied the /ubjeci ; and this letter alone proves to me that you have not thought fufficient!y upon it, But neither am I a judge of you, nor you of me. The queftion is be* fore the public.
Your friends, I doubt not, think very well of your writings ; and on the other hand mine {among whom I have the honour to reckon a confiderable number ,of the ablell fcholars and divines of this kingdom) think exaftly as I do with re- Tped to them ; and think it very proper that principles which appear to them fp falfe and dangerous Ihouid receive fome check ; that, at leaft, it may appear that p//,,.cJ;iriftians are not fo ready to aba-i- A a, 4on
354 CORRESPONDENdE WITH
doir the only rational defence of reli- gion, lam, e
Reverend Sir^ &^
Calne, May 2i^, i774- ''^'
I might farther obferve ^vith refpe6l to fome parts of Dr. Ofwald's letter, that he places our belief of the being of God^ and of the other prin^ary truths of reli- gion on the fame foundation with that of the external world, th^ evidence of %vhich I think I have (hewn to be not flridly fpeaking demoiiflrative, though it admits of no rational doubt. In like manner what philofopher will fay that the truth of the Copernican fyftem admits of any rational doubt, though there is A pojjibility that it may not be true ? The being of a God I confider as flriftly (i^- monjlrahle, which abundantly fatisfies m6 with refpe6l to it ; though Dr. Ofwald fays, what I have no conception of, that the pojjibility of error attends the viojt complete dcmonjiratian. And' when I ^'^^^ ^'' fuppofc
Dr. OS W A L D. 355
fii^ofe the otber primary truths of reli- gion to be as Httle liable to rational doubt as the truth of the Copernican fyftem, I think no perfon can be of opinion that I do them any injultice.
It V
The reception of the primary truths of religion, and efpeciallyof chriftianity, is reprefented in the fcriptures as depending, in fome meafure, upon men's previous difpofitions and moral chara6lers. As our Saviour fays, John vii. 17. If any man will do his will, hejiiall know of the dodrine whether it be of God. But this could not be the cafe if thefs truths were properly felf-evidcnt, fo that no perfon who had common fenfe could rejed them. No doubt the fcribes and PHarifees, who rejefted Chrift, had common fenfe, as well as the twelve apofllcs ; but their- pride, ambition, and other vices, laid a firong and undue bias upon their minds, and prejudiced them againft him. To ufe Dr. Ofwald's own ftyle, / appeal to p^tt of underflanding, whether it be not A a 2 isi more
hsS CORRESPONDENCE WITH
a more rational account of the matter; to Fay that, in all ages, men reje6l the pri- mary truths of religion, natural and re- vealed, becaufe they are defettiv'? iii moral aifpofdions, rather Inah'm cojnvwft fcyifc.
As to the indecen-cy of my .'allufibn to the do6lrine of chances, I can only fav tliat 1 am not fenfible of it. 7.
Had Dr. Ofwald's book been written in the fame flraln with this letter (in which he fays that, if I know no other eviden<'e ,for the primary truths of religion than the h'ghefl degree of probability, I cannot be juftly blamed for offering that and that alone) I llTiOuld not bave quarrelled with him as he terms it, for advancing what he calls his higher evidence. But 1 appeal to the extrafts that I have given, and to the whole drain of his publication, if his violen md unjuil cenfures of others, for not advancing more than they thought the nature of the cafe admitted, does not
abun-
, rDr. O S W A 1, D. 357
abundantly juftify the manner in which I have vindicated their condu6l, and animadverted upon his.
i)r. Ofwald is pleafed to pay me a com-r phment in faying that * / might employ
* myfelf to more advantage to the pubhc,
* by purfuing other branches of Icience, ' than by deciding rafhly on a fubjeft ' which, he fee^, I have not ftudied.' In return to this compHment, I fhall not
, affront him by telhng him how very little of my time this buhnefs has hitherto taken up. If he alludes to my experiments, I can aflure him that I have loft no time at ^il ; for having been intent upon fuch as require the ufe of a burning lens, I believe I have not loft one hour of fur-ihine on this account. And the public may per- haps be informed, fome time or other, of what I have been doing in thtfany as well &s in the Jhade.
A a 3 Dr»
358 CORRESPONDENCE WITH
Dr. OSWALD'S Seventh Letler.
' 'VT'OU feem to think that a fceptic ;4yill
, make light of the charge of folly
1 that I bring againil him ; but will he
* 'make light of being convi£led of folly ' to himfelf ; for that is what I aim at? ^By appealing to common fenfe, I do ^,not truit the caufe of religion to a mar
* jority of mankind, or.^jto a, certain ,^ number of feleft judges, but to ever)' s* man of fenfe, and to the fceptic him-
* felf ; who, if he poiTeiTes that quality in J*, any tolerable degree, will at length pro- ^>^nounce in favour of religion. Indeed, /ij^ 2L ii}ap,is deflitiue of common fenfe,
^orif, by difeafe, or otherwife, that cha- *^'raclerifLi('al power of the rational mind ./, is fo impaired, as to render him inca- -* pable of diftinguifhing between obvious
* truth and palpable abfurdity, I do not
* fuftain him a judge. But that, I pre- ' fume, is not a common cafe ; for, as
'^ m the praftice of our duty, we often
* find ourfelves urged by oppoiite affec*
tionsa
Dr. O S W A L D. 359
* tions, and may yield to the direclion of 'either, as we chufe; fo in judging on ' plain fubjecls, true and falfc fentiments
* often prefcnt themfelves to our mind, ' in fuch a way as leaves us at liberty to
* adopt the one or the other, as we chufc. ^ Have you not known perfons far gone
* in folly, who fiill retained ^o much dif-
* cernmentj that, upon fome occafions,
* they have caught themfelves fpeaking ' nonfenfe, have bluflied, and turned ' filent ? I can recolletl inllances of per-
* fons, in the beginning of a fever, who
* have told thofe about them that they ' were going to rave, and have a6lually
* flopped themfelves ; and nothing is
* more common than for thofe who are
* getting drunk to perceive the growing ' diforder by the nonfenfe which they ' utter. If, indeed, they go on to drink, ' they will perceive it no longer, but
* turn downright fools, without the poffi- ' bility of being made fenfibie of the
* diforder.
Aa4 *IaI.
360 CORP.ESPONDEN^CE WITH
.jfrj -Si always avoid charging thofe Tault*
i- on the will, which can be fairly placed
-^ to the account of the underftanding :
^. but cannot help thinking that fceplic^
'^^ and infidels might prevent a great deal
;-*.of thct abfurdity they run into on the
a* fubjecl of religion : for, certain difeafed
' caies excepted, the progrefs of folly Ms
f, gradual, and the perfon affefted may
jf* perceive it if he will, or may, in its
4 firR appoaches, be made fenfible of it,
./ by the affiftance of a friend. And I
,* know no greater friendlhip that can- be
,,.* done to thefe people, than to fet the
* difference between fenfe and nonfenft?'
* full in their view : and am perfuadtd -5 that if t}"«is good otfice had been done
^ * to mankind by tlie friends of religion, ., * wheri the controverfy firft broke out, we ,, / had not orUy got rid of fcepticifm lohg
* ago, but alio would have made a greater
* proficiency ill ufefiii knowledge than we
* have done: and I would fain. hope that 2- ' the evil may yet be redreffed, by reftor^
- * ing the authority of common fenfe.
Do
Dr. O S W A L D. 361
' ' ' Do not you think that fomething ought ^'* to be done for the honour of literature.
* and of the age in which we live ? for ' what a fhameful thing is it, that wc
* fhould be found wrangling about firfc
* principles, when difcoveries of truths r* unknown to thofe who came before u«
* might, in all reafon, be expected from
* a people who enjoy our advantages-.
* We laugh at thofe fubtil difputes of
* the fchoolmen, which never could be
* brought to an iffue ; but are not aware ' of aconducl no lefs ridiculous, in writ-
* ing volumes of controverfy about truths
* which no man of fenfe can gainfay.
' I know your zeal for freedom of in-
* quiry, and heartily agree with you ; but
* cannot be reconciled to that filly vanity ' of maintaining either fide of a queftion
* by plaufible arguments ; ^vhich you
* know was firlt introduced by the antient
* fophifts, and brought again into reputa- tion by the Popifh fchoolmen, and is
* now become the chief faculty of modern
* fceptics.
362 CORRESPONDENCE -WITH
* fceptics, and not difcountenanced in the 'manner it ought by men of fenfe and
* learning.
* How often have you and I been dif- ' guRed with idle conceits, chimerical fu.p- *^pofitions, and monftrous paradoxes, in
* favourite authors, which they would not ' have had the boldnefs to offer to the ' public, if men of learning and judgtnent
* had a6led with the fpirit which became
* them ? Do you think there would be
* any harm in obliging men of genius to
* put their opinions to the trial of common ^ fenfc before they obtruded them on the 'unthinking multitude? And if any ? /hould, through petulance and prcfump- '■' tion, nr gleft this neceffary precautioic; ' would it be any prejudice to the intereft
* o{ tPjliTj or of freedom of thought, that ' their grofs ablbrdities, or crude concep- ' tions, "Nvere receive.! by the public with
* that cold contempt, which they are fure ' to meet with in every circle of men of
* fenfe and fpint ? I know no right any
fet
WlV^^r. O S W*X L D. ^63
* fct of men can have to infult the con;-
* men fenfe of mankind ; nor do I fee any
* reafon why the public fhould bear with
* freedoms from writers of any kind, ' which one man of fpirit would not bear
with from another.
c
•inf# l^fi^ef all, I am as diflBdentof myfuc-
* cefs as you can be, both from a fenfe of ' my incapacity to do juftice to the fub*
* je6l, and a fufpicion that mankind chufe
* either to be entertained with fubtil de*-
* bates, or to give up inquiry altogether ;
* but I hope the public will take in good
* part this effort I have made/ &c.
See the remainder of this paragraph at the clofe of my remarks on this writer.
Aberdeen^
^64 CORRESPONDENCE -WITH
''■'■ Aberdeen^ May 27, 1774-
,. Reverend Sir,
I
Received yours of the a^th of April incloflng a printed fheet o^ a. preface not then pubUflied, in which you exprefs y©ur fjifapprobationof 7"/^^ EJfayon Tru^k^ and intirnate your defign of animadverts ing further upon it. I thank you for this early notice of your intentions^ and for the juftice you do me in that part of your preface where you declare that you ■believe me to. be a fincere friend to rcver lation.
The Effay on Trutli is fo well iu-
tended, and its principles fo well founded',
that its author can have nothing to fear
from the animadverfions of a man of fci-
enc^ and candour. If I had not thought
thole principles true, I fhould never have
given them to the world. If I did not
•l^ill tltink them true, I fhould publifli my
recantation to-morrow; or, if I could,
to-day.
All
Dr. B EAT T I ^. ' 3%
-All that you have faid in your pre- face againft me 1 (hall anfwer in few words.
If your meaning, page 5th, fine 19^ h' thai * / reprefent common Tenfe as ' fuperleding almoft all reafonkig about •religion, natural and revealed/- you charge me with a do6liinc which I do not, and never did believe, and which is no where either aflferted or implied in any thing I ever wrote.. ^ ".1 -'":» :.'iiii ri v
..-1 ' IF 'you mean, page 6, lint 20, that
jhave ever^ in word or writing, taught,
or infmuated, that ^religion in general
' (1 fuppofe you mean natuml religion)
* or chriRianity ifa pi&ttitdar, does not
^ adrtrit of a 'ratiOMl and fatisfaftory
^'^jrobfj'yoti'are. Sir, egregioufly miftaken
ih regard to my principles.— My doclrine
i^'oMy this, that all reafoning terminates
In firft principles, and that firft principles
admit not of proof, becaufe reafoning
cannot extend in infinitum; and that it
is abfurdfor a man to fay, that he difbe-
lievcs
S66 CORR£SPONpKNe% V/I.^p
lieves a fiijit principle, ;-*^hichhiii.condu£l fti<rvv'^.that he does notydubelieve.
,> J£ yoti charge vie with fuppofing,
;^ttril^'->teg, and. p;-o:/ideii}^,.p^ ^^i '?"i *ffi,, future, flate, of retr^ution are,ei;heB \,yrUuitively cei^.ain, . or (perta^ird^s of;i^>6 'Janpe, fort, with the c^xioms of geoinq^r.yj^ you .charge me with tl^at which J-ney;^^ beliqyed,: or fuppofed^: and which jpu wili find nothing in my. writings to juftify.
i-.You are pleafed,, Sir, to call coigarrioii fenfe a, pretended new principle. What you may mean by the word coimmnjenfe I know not ; but that which I call com-« mon fenfe, is a real part of the human conftitution, and as old and as eKtenJive as human nature. I ara one of thofe, Sir, who do not like a do6lrine one whit the better for its being new, nor do I think myfelf fagacious enough to difcover in the human mind any tliing which was ne- ver difcoveied there before.
-.j^..--
You
Df. B E A T T I E. 367
You honour mc with the epithet Re- vetendy to which I have no title. I have told the world in my book that I am not a clergyman : but I humbly trnft I am a chriftian ; and permit me to fay. Sir, that I have better ground to believe that piy writings have hurt the caufe of infi* delity, than you can have to infmuate the contrary, which in page 6, I. ly, in your preface you feem to do.
I would have anfwered you fooner, but have been prevented by bulinefs and bad health. ^ .
I am. Reverend Sir,
Your very humble fervant, . 9^
■ 'I
JAMES BEATTIS:.
' is
Sii|,
$68 COS.RESPOKCSNCE WITH
Y'*I^^e ' tte ' lij^erty io ' trouble y6U 6nce ^ more to exprefs the ' plfeciiure I haVe received from' the gre4t franknefs "and generofity that are apparent in tfic letter ypu have done me the honour to write tp 1^/" i wanted no afluraln'ce of the good* tiefs'- of youT intentions ^ ox difpqfttion\ The drain of your writ'ings left me rii room to entertain a doubt on that head. Whether the principles of your Ejfay on truth be well founded, is die only point of difference between us; and as the af- fair will foon be bcfor^e the public^ I (hall not trouble you at prefent with any thing relating to it. As foon as my remarks fhall be printed, and a complete copy of the; book can be made up, it fiicill cer- tainly be forwarded to you.
I alfo engage to fhow the fame frank- nefs and opennefs to conviftion that you profefs, and a perfeft readinefs to retract any thing that (hall appear to be ill
founded.
Dr. B E A T T I E. 569
founded, or too fevere, in my cenfure of
your performance.
#
I may be miftaken, and fee things in a wrong and unfavourable light, but I am far from meaning to cavil, and (hould think myfelf difgraced by taking any fuch advantage as unguarded exprefTions may furniih ; though fomecontroverfial writers, feem to think them juflifiable. And, con^ fidering that your work is in pofTeflion ofj a very high degree of the pubhc efteem,^ that my opinions on fome of the fubje6ls of our controverfy are exceedingly un-. popular, and not likely to be ever other- wife, and that I confider you as a friend tp the caufe that I have myfelf moft. ^ Jieart ; I hope you will have the candour to conclude, that nothing would have induced me to have entered the lifts with you on this occafion, but a lincere and pretty ftrong, though perhaps a raif- taken regard to truth; the fupport of which, how much foever appearances may be to the contrary, is the only me-^ thod of promoting, effedually and lajl- .ingly, every caufe that is truly valuable, and worth contending for.
B b Con
370 CORRESPONDENCE WITH
Confidering the very difrerent lights in which we are apt to view the fame things, in this imperfect Hate, it were to be wiihed that we might all improve this circum- ftanceinto a lelTon of mutual moderation ; and that it might teach us to think as , well as we poflibly can of each other, and efpecially of the moral influence of our refpeciive opinions. To me you appear to have been exceedingly to blame in this refpetl.
Perhaps no two perfons profelTmg chrl-
ilianitv ever thoudit more differehtlv than
you and I do ; which may appear odd in
men of liberal education, and who equally
think themfelves free from prejudice, and
to have be^n earned and impartial in their
fearch after truth. But I infer from your
zjoritings, and the obligation that I imagine
your profefiforfhip lays you under to fub-
fcribe the Scotch confeffion of faith., that
fo the cafe is. Indeed, you feem never
to have had the lead acquaintance with
fuch perfons as myfelf, and my friends in
this country are. But, notwithflanding
this, I hope that a little refledion, aided
by
BOOKS vmiteri hy Br, PRIESTLEY.
2^. Letters to the Author of Remarks onfeveyal late Pub- Vtcat'ions relative to the DiJJenters, in a Letter to Dr. Priejiky, is,
26. An Appeal ro the ferious and candid Prorellors of Chriftianity, on the following Subjecls, viz. i. The Ufe of Reafon in Matters of Religion. 2. The Power of Man to do the Will ot God. 3. Original Sin. 4. Eleiitiun and Re- probation. ^. The Divinity of Chrift. And, -6. Atone- ment for Sin by the Death of Chrifl, the fourth Edition, id.
27. A Familiar Illustratiox of certain PafTages of Scripture relating to the fame Subjeff, ^d. or 3s. 6d. per I>ozen.
28. The Triumph of Truth; being an account of the Trial of Mr. Elwall, for Herefy and Blafphemy, at Stafford AiTizes, before Judge Denton, &;c. the fecond Edition, id.
29. Co.vsiDERATioNS for the Ufe of Young Me.v, and the Patents of Young Men, 2d.
Alfo publilhed under the Diredion of Dr. PRIESTLEY.
THE THEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY;
Confiding of original EfTays, Hints, Queries, Sec. calculated to promote religious Knowledge, in 3 Volumes, 8vo, Price 183. in Boards.
Among other Article?, too many to be eniunerated in an Advertifement, thefe three Volumes will be found to con- tain fuch original and truly valuable Obfervations on the Doftrine of the Afofiefnent, the Pre-e.xijence of Chrift, and the Infpiration of tlx Scriptures, more efpecially refpecfing the Harmony of the EnjangeliJiS, and the Reafoning of the Apofllc Paul, as cannot fail to recomr^end them to thofe Perfons, who wilh to make a truly free Enquiry into thefe important Subjefts.
In the Firfl: Volume, which is now reprinted, fereral Arti- cles are added, particularly Two Letters from Dr. Tkomas" Shaw to Dr. Benson, relating to the Paffaje of the TfraclitCB (hrough the Red Sea.
ERR
r A.
Preface, P. lo, 1. 6, io: JupcrfaLJ, read ^jjouldfuperfedc. P. 2 2 2, 1. I, ^ox are, reader.
290, dele the inverted commas from the word yj'«/*, I. 2^2, to the end of the paragraph.
334, 1. 10, for Z'l?, read Dr. Reid.
^^^, 1. 10 lor adions^ read aHion.
Dr. B E A T T I E. 371
by the candour you fecm to be pofTcfled of, will fhow you the impropriety of the ftyle you have adopted with refpect to fome of the points of difference between us.
I propofe to take the liberty, in my in- tended publication, to infert the letter you have fent me, as I am perfuaded it will do you honour ; and likewife fnow, that whatever countenance your writings may fcem to have given to my charge, you re- ally difclaim the principles I have afcribed to you. Your teftimony will add great weight to my obfervations on that fubject, efpecially in what I fliall fay to Dr. Of- wald.
I am truly forry to hear of your indif- pofition, and wnfhing the fpeedy and per- feclre-eftablifliment of your health, I am, ^ith real efieem, S I R,
Your very humble fervant.
J. PRIESTLEY.
"Calne, June 29, 1774.
Al-'^t
11'^
>^
f
KJ.
I
•71
oflelTed
f the
J ea
^erty ji my in-
ntcr you
d it M'Wl
ccwife fbw, that
your wrings may
my char^ you re-
nciplcs I haxtefcribcd
ftimony v" ' ' ;rcat
^fcrvaiionsoi i<-ct,
vhai I (hall fa^ . j.^.. O^-
ly forr)' to hear of ^ir indif- and wilhing the fpt pcr-
hlinimeniofyour } 1 am,
cftccm, S I R,
Your vcr)' humble for' ^
J. TRIESILEV.
Calfif, June 29, 1771
A Cj>TALoeuE ofT^OOKS written by JOSEPH PxdliSTLEY, LL. D. F. R. S.
AND PRINTED FOR
J. JOHNSON, Bookfeller, at No. 72, St. Paul's Church- Yard, London.
i.rr^HE History and Present State of Electri-
JL city, with original Experiments, illullrated with
Copper Piates, 2d Edit, correfted and enlarged, 4to. il. is.
2. A Familiar Introduction to the Study of Elec- tricity, the Second Edition, 8vo. 2s. 6d.
3. The History and Present State ot Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours, 2 vols. 4to. illuftraied with a great Number of Copper Plates, il. iis. 6d. in Boardb.
4. A Familiar Introduction to the Theory and Prac- tice of Perspective, with Copper Plates, Price 5s. in Bo.'.rds.
5. Directions for impregnating Water with Fixed Air, in order to Cv)mmunicate to it the peculiar Spirit and Virtues of Pyrmont Water, and other Mineral Waters of a fimilar Nature, the feccnd Edition, is.
6. Experiments and Obfervations on different kinds of Air, with Copper Plates, 5s. in Boards.
7. A New Chart of History, containing a View of the principal Revolutions of Empire that have taken Place in the World ; with a Book defcribing it, containing an Epitome of Univerfal Hiftory, the third Edition, los. 6d.
8. A Chart of Biography, with a Book, containing an Explanation of it, and a Catalogue of all the Names inferted in It, the 4th Edition, very much improved, los. 6d.
9. An EfTay on a Courfe of liberal Education of a Civil and AftiveLifei with Plans of Leftures on, i. The Study of Hiftory and general Policy. 2. The Hiftory of England. 3. The Conftitution and Laws of England.
10. The Rudiments of English Grammar, adapted to the L^fe of Schools, is. 6d.
1 1» The above Grammar, with Notes and Obfervations, for the Ufe of thcfe who have made fome Proficiency in the l,anguage, the fourth Edition, 5s,
12, Aft
BOOKS written hy Br. PRIESTLEY.
12 An Essay on the First PsfNcjPLEs of Gover^- ME?:: 'nd on the Nature of Political, Civii^, and Reli- gious- Liberty, the lecond Edition, much enlarged, s^%,
I J. LvsTiTUTES of Natural -nd Revealed Religi- on, Vol. L containing the Elements oi'Nutiiral Rejigion; to whith is picrixed, An Eilay on the betl Method of conwiu- nicanng' religious Knowledge to the Members ur Chriflian Societies, 2s. 6d. fewed. — Vol. IL containing the Evidences of "ho Jewirh and ChrilVian Revelation, 3s. leiycd.^V'ol. in. containing the Docfrines of Revelation, 2s. 6d. leivrd. — Preparing for the Prefs, the Fourth and laft Part of this Work, containing the Corrupt:ons of Chriftianitv. ■ 14. A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters on the S^-ibjed of the Lord's Supper, the third Edition, with Ad- ditions, 2S.
I ?. The Additions to the above may be had alone, is.
16. An Address to Protestant Dissenters on the SubJ^cVof giving the Lord's Supper to Children, is.
17. Considerations on Differences of Opinion" [ amo-igChriftians ; with a Letter to the Rev. Mr. Venn, in
Anfwer to his Examination of the Addrefs to Protelfanf
Dulenters, is. 6d.
• 18. A Catechism for Children and Voung Persons,
the i^econd Edition, 3d.
' 19. A Scripture Catechism, confifting of a Series of
QiJ^l^iions, with References to the Scriptures, inftead of
Anfwers, 3d.
20. A Serious Address to Masters of Families, with Forms of Family Prnyer, the fecond Ediriou, is. 6d.
21. A View of the Principles and Conduct o*" the Pro- testant Dissenters, with refped to the Ci.il and Eccle- lialt':c.:l Conffitui' -n of England, the fecond Edition, is. 6d,
22. A Free Adlkess to Protestant Dissenters, on the Subjeift of Church Discipline- with a Preliminary Dif- courfe cuncerning the Spirit of Chriflianity, and the Corrup- tion of it by falfe Notions of Religio;-;* 2s. 6d.
25. A Sermon preached be: 're the Congregation of Pro- testant Dissenters, at Mill Hill Chapel, in Leeds, Blay 16, 1773, on Occalion of his refignlng his Paftoral Office among them, is. _
24. A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, as itich. By a D?Renter. .\ new Edition, eiilarged and cor- ref>ed, is. 6d. — An Allowance is ii~i:;Je to thofe who buy thiS Pamphlet to give away.
i5. Lct^
^^V ^^^^^^H "'^'^
.Mm^^mki^