



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

A 813,577

EXPERIENCE

BD


181

R53

REV. W. RICHMOND

7

13



BD
181
.R53



EXPERIENCE

A CHAPTER OF PROLEGOMENA

65-916

BY THE REV.

WILFRID ^{John} RICHMOND



LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO., LIM.

PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1896



PREFACE

PHILOSOPHY needs no Prolegomena. Experience, the experience of common life, is its beginning. And the more directly it can go back to this common ground of fact from which all philosophies draw their life, the better its chance of arriving at the universal fact which is the truth.

But philosophy now finds the testimony of experience discredited. Its endeavour is futile, unless the credit of its source is re-established. The current doctrine taught is that whatever else experience may afford to us, it cannot give us the knowledge of reality. The purpose, then, of this "Chapter of Prolegomena" is to deal with this initial obstacle to the progress of philosophy, the doctrine that we cannot know.

Short as it is, I could have wished to make it shorter. The first section, "Feeling," contains the argument which alone justifies the publication of this book—the argument to show that the question, "Can we know reality?" is not met with an initial "No." The two subsequent sections were added because it was judged that the main argument, in defence of the possibility of the attainment of

speculative truth, would be more intelligible if some slight indication were given as to the philosophy to which this argument is a preface. They are no more than sign-posts, showing the direction of future logical and metaphysical work.

This will account, in Section II., for the summary treatment of many logical questions and the apparent neglect of others. To take a single instance, it is assumed without discussion that the normal import of the logical judgment is to make an assertion as to the primary, not the ultimate, reality.

And Section III. is, I fear, still more allusive. On the subjects there hinted at, the analysis of the idea of personality, and the interdependence of the various faculties of personal experience, I hope shortly to have more to say.

I would only add one word on the use of the term "Agnosticism." I have attacked under that name the definite philosophical doctrine that we cannot know reality. But I would not be supposed to undervalue the intellectual humility which is the really vital element in the Agnostic creed, a temper accidentally associated with the doctrine that we cannot know, but, as I believe, more truly justified by the rationalist belief that we can know the length and breadth and depth and height of that which passes knowledge.

I.

FEELING

EXPERIENCE

1. PHILOSOPHY is the desire for reality. We live, the mass of mankind, in a world of realities. We are familiar with real things; we have intercourse with real persons. What is reality? What do we mean by real? Can we find a common element of reality running through all these various realities? Can we gather them all into one, a whole of reality? Can we range them under some one dominant reality? The philosopher has gained his desire only when, in answer to these questions, he believes himself to know the supreme pervading reality of the universe with the same intimate certainty with which we all seem to know the multitudinous realities of ordinary life.

2. What is reality? That is the question of philosophy, asked often in hope, when philosophy is confident, triumphant in the truth of its answer; often, as now, in doubt, agonized or acquiescent, Can we know? Can we be sure that we know anything? We seem to know a whole world of reality; do we really know any thing at all? Or are we compelled to stop baffled behind a veil which hides from us the reality of all we seem to know, and which no aspiration or effort of reason can penetrate or rend aside? If we wish to ask, What is reality? are we bidden to ask rather, Can you know? and met with the Agnostic answer, No, you cannot know the reality of things, or of the world?

3. The Agnostic is commonly understood to be the man who says, We cannot know God—either, We cannot know that there is

Religious Agnosticism, the belief that we cannot know God, is the outcome of Philosophical Agnosticism, the belief that we cannot know reality,

such a Being, or, We can know that there is such a Being, but we cannot know anything about Him. But religious Agnosticism is the outcome of a wider and a deeper doubt. Professor Huxley, who coined the word, has left it on record that, for him, Agnosticism meant that the true answer to the question, Can we know? is, No, we cannot know the reality of things, or of the world. This disbelief in knowledge has an influence as wide and deep as life. Our concern with it here is in the interest of knowledge itself—the baffled desire for reality, whose way to satisfaction is barred by the prejudice, the presumption, that we cannot know.

4. This is the prejudice with which I wish here to deal. The Agnostic way of thinking may be roughly and generally described as



i.e. that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we can only know our impressions of them.


the belief that we do not and cannot know things as they are. We know them only as they strike *us*. We know only our own impressions of things. The real thing may be quite different from our impression. The colours of a sunset or a flower do not look quite the same to you and to me. You can only see them as they appear to you. I can only see them as they appear to me. So, according to this way of thinking, man can only see things as they appear to man. To some other being they might appear quite different. And in themselves we cannot say what they might be.

5. Not all Agnostics would trace this belief,

And this view depends on the Agnostic theory of knowledge,

with Professor Huxley, to the Philosophy of Kant as its origin and justification.*

* HUXLEY, *Collected Essays*, vol. v. Essay vii.



**viz., that know-
ledge begins with
what is given in
sensation,**

But the logical basis of Agnosticism is, I think, to be found in a theory as to the origin of knowledge, held by Kant himself and many of his followers in common with the English philosophers by whom Kant was so largely influenced, the theory, I mean, that knowledge begins with what is given in sensation. The theory is briefly this: When we know, we must know something. When we think, we must have something to think about. Sensation supplies the idea which is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. Sensation supplies the matter on which the activities of thought can work. I proceed to examine in some detail what this theory involves as to the relation of the mind to reality.

6. Knowledge begins with what is given
in sensation. Given to what?
**given, i.e. to the
mind, the subject
in knowledge,** Plainly to the knowing mind.
We begin with that. Know-

ledge is a fact, and wherever there is knowledge there must be something which knows. The mind, that which knows, is called the subject in knowledge. When we say knowledge begins with what is given in sensation, we mean given to the mind, the subject in knowledge.*

7. But given by what? Wherever there is knowledge there must be something that **by the object the thing known;** is known. That which is known is called the object of knowledge. We start with the idea that knowledge is subjective; the problem is to see how it becomes in any degree objective. And when it is said that knowledge begins with

* The word subject meant originally the underlying reality. When we describe a thing, we describe it as having various qualities. It is solid, it is soft, it is white. The subject is the 'it,' that which underlies these various qualities. In the same way here the mind is viewed as the subject of knowledge, that which is described as the knowing thing, that of which we say it knows. In its original philosophical use it stood for the underlying reality of the thing known. It now stands for the underlying reality of the knowing thing, the mind.



what is given in sensation, it is implied that in sensation the mind that knows, the subject, receives some kind of communication from the thing that is known, the reality, the object.*

8. According to the way of thinking which is suggested by the common use of the words

the suggestion being that sensation, at any rate, partakes of the character of that which is not merely subjective, an apprehension of our minds, but objective, a communication from reality;

subject and object, our apprehension of a thing or our view of a matter is objective, in so far as it reaches the sheer real fact of the thing as it is in itself, quite apart from our apprehension of it.

On the other hand, our apprehension or our view is subjective, in so far as it is merely our view, our apprehension, and cannot pretend to reach the reality of the thing in itself. And when it

* The word object originally meant that which is presented to the mind, that which strikes upon the mind. It has come to mean the thing itself that is known as distinct from our impression of it, not that which is presented to the mind, but that *of* which it is a presentation.

is said that knowledge begins with what is given in sensation, since 'what is given' means what is given by the object to the subject, it is implied that there is a certain objective character about sensation, that it brings us into some kind of contact with the objective reality.

9. In explaining, then, what the word 'given' means when we speak of knowledge

the mind and the reality being to start with, on this theory, separate, in such a way as to make their real connection in knowledge difficult to conceive.

beginning with what is given in sensation, we have had to draw out the distinction between that which knows and that which is known, as it is commonly conveyed by the opposition of subject and

object, subjective and objective. And this opposition suggests that knowledge is the relation between two things, the mind and the reality, originally supposed to be so separate from one another, that it is difficult to conceive that they are really brought

together in knowledge, or that we can ever say, We know the reality.

10. We have so far only drawn out the meaning of the word 'given,' viz. the separation from one another of the subject and object in whose relation to one another knowledge

consists. We must now ask, when we say knowledge begins with what is given in sensation, What does 'sensation' mean? And we shall find that the answer commonly given to this question, leaves us, not

This suggestion will be strengthened into the definite doctrine that we cannot know reality, when we have answered the question, What is meant by sensation?

with a vague suggestion, but with a definite doctrine that the mind and the reality are in such wise separated from one another that knowledge is *not* the knowledge of reality. It will clear the way towards defining the meaning of sensation, if we first distinguish from one another certain early stages of consciousness, with the description of which the word 'sensation' has been more or less associated.

11. It is enough to say of consciousness that it means the life of the mind, or any-

thing that passes in and
Consciousness, the forms a part of the life of
life of the mind, the mind. There are various
has three main kinds of consciousness. When
forms—will,
intellect, emotion.

I say 'I desire,' 'I purpose,' 'I will,' I am describing one kind of consciousness—moral consciousness, the state of mind that produces action. When I say 'I see,' 'I hear,' 'I think,' 'I reason,' 'I believe,' this is another kind of consciousness—intellectual consciousness. When I say 'I admire,' 'I hate,' 'I love,' that again is a third kind of consciousness—emotional consciousness.

12. But there is another kind of consciousness, underlying and accompanying

any or all of these, which
Underlying each is not so easy to describe.
and all of these is I shall call it feeling. It
feeling, which we might be described in con-
have now to con-
trast with two
forms of intellectual

consciousness—
perception and
reflection.

trast with any of the three forms of consciousness of which we have just spoken, for feeling stands in precisely the same relation to will and emotion as it does to intellect. But for our present purpose, in a discussion on the beginnings of knowledge, it will be best to describe it in contrast to some forms of intellectual consciousness, and especially to the two forms of intellectual consciousness which concern our present subject—perception and reflection, consciousness about things, and consciousness about ourselves.

13. Both kinds of intellectual consciousness, perception and reflection, are expressed

Perception and reflection are both expressed in judgments, the subject being in the one case the thing, the reality, in the other the I, the mind.

in judgments or propositions, *i.e.* in statements. We never think without virtually or actually saying something about something. That about which we say something is

called the subject. That which we say about it is called the predicate. In judgments of perception, the subject, that about which we say or think something,* is a thing, something distinct from ourselves. In judgments of reflection the subject is always virtually ourselves; *e.g.* if I say 'That is a fire,' this form of words embodies a judgment of perception; if I say 'I perceive a fire,' that is a judgment of reflection.

14. Both of these judgments imply the distinction from one another of the two

In these judgments is exhibited the characteristic of self-consciousness, the correlation of mind and reality, I and thing.

correlative factors in knowledge—the I and the thing, the mind and the reality. In the judgment of perception, its subject, the thing, is a thing only in contradistinction to the self, the I, that is conscious of it,

* See Preface.

and the predicate, the quality by which the subject is described, has a meaning only as describing some relation of the thing to the conscious self. In the judgment of reflection, again, the self is a self only in contradistinction to things, and the phases of consciousness predicated of the self can be described only in terms of the relation of the self to things. In perception and reflection self and reality appear as correlatives, each, *i.e.*, can only be defined in terms of the other. This kind of consciousness, in which self and reality appear as correlatives, is commonly called self-consciousness, consciousness, *i.e.*, of the world in relation to a self. Both perception and reflection, then, are forms of self-consciousness.

15. But before either of the forms of consciousness arose in my mind, expressed in these two judgments—That
Feeling involves that
no consciousness is something warm; I per

of the thing that causes it, or of the self that experiences it; it is not self-conscious, though phases in the stream of feeling are attributed to the self in the judgments of reflection in which they are recalled.

ceive or have a perception of a warm thing—I can recall that there was another form of consciousness, which, now that I recall it, I describe in what is really another judgment of reflection—I felt warm. In this ‘feeling,’ as its memory remains with me, there was no consciousness of a warm thing, or of myself as the subject of the feeling of warmth; there was only the feeling of warmth itself. And that feeling itself was not distinctly detached from other phases of feeling; it was part of a continuous stream of feeling,* which breaks into separate moments or phases as I become intellectually conscious of it, and attribute one and another phase of it to the self-conscious I as its subject.

* See JAMES, *Psychology*, chap. ix.

16. Feeling cannot be *expressed* in language.

It is *described* by the reflective intellectual

Feeling itself is not expressed in judgments; its language would be adverbial, interjectional.

consciousness in such judgments as 'I felt warm'; the relation between the sentient consciousness and self-consciousness being such that

each is internal to the other. I can take intellectual cognizance of this unit of feeling which is also a self, just as there accompanies the most distinctly self-conscious perception or reflection a sentient consciousness of it, which we describe when we say 'I feel that I am perceiving,' 'I feel that I am thinking.' But feeling itself is not expressed in judgments. If it could find expression, its language would not deal in statements, in substantive realities or qualities attributed to them; it would be adverbial, interjectional, like the inarticulate cries of animals or birds.

17. When we say, then, that knowledge begins with what is given in sensation, what

'Knowledge begins with what is given in sensation' should mean, then, that to each act of knowledge there corresponds an antecedent phase of feeling; but it does not mean this.

we ought to mean is this—

knowledge emerges from a background of feeling. To each judgment, to each act of knowledge, there corresponds a previous phase of feeling. The self-conscious

life wells up perpetually from an unself-conscious life. Every experience is a feeling before it is a thought. The subject and object which are set over against one another in self-conscious experience or thought have previously been related in feeling. This is what we ought to mean, but it is not what we do mean.

18. Let us trace out what we do commonly mean when we say that knowledge begins

To explain what it does mean, note

with what is given in sensation. First it is to be noted

that the ordinary man passes his life in judgments of perception ;

that, in theorizing about knowledge, all that we say, and all that we think, is made up of a series of judgments of reflection—‘I feel,’ ‘I perceive,’ ‘I think,’ etc. The ordinary man, on the other hand, in his knowledge of the world in which he lives, in going through the processes about whose nature we theorize, passes his life, for the most part, in judgments of perception. He lives in a world of things perceived. It is about the origin of his judgments of perception that we theorize.

19. When we invite him to theorize about his knowledge, we invite him, so it will seem to him, to turn round upon his world of things perceived, and ask how he comes to have perceptions of them. He begins to look at the matter from this
- when he is asked to inquire into his perceptions, he reflects, ‘I had a perception,’ and asks, ‘How did I come to have a perception?’ and reflects further, ‘Before that I had a feeling.’

point of view. 'I had a perception.' 'How did I come to have a perception?' And having started on his career of reflection with that first reflective judgment 'I had a perception,' he looks, according to his habit in practical life in seeking for causes, to what went before in the history of his consciousness, and, with a fresh effort of reflection, says, 'I had a feeling.' The feeling, then, must have been the cause of the perception.

20. In attributing to the feeling the causation of the perception, he does not observe

But he confuses the feeling, as recalled in this reflective judgment, with the feeling as felt.

the distinction, on which we just now insisted, between feeling itself, feeling as it is felt, and feeling as it is recalled and described in an intellectual judgment—one phase of it, one feeling, being isolated and attributed to the self-conscious subject, as when we say 'I felt warm.' On the contrary, he regards the feeling as being that

which it appears to be in his judgment—something that happens to the intellectual subject, an event in the life of self-consciousness.

21. And so regarding it, he goes a step further, in the endeavour to explain how he

<p>Asking next what caused the feeling, he recurs to the world of things perceived, and says—the object of perception.</p>	<p>comes to have a perception. He had a feeling. That was the cause of the perception. What was the cause of the feeling? He cannot get be-</p>
---	---

hind the feeling, to find something that preceded the feeling in the order of time, as the feeling preceded the perception. He recurs instinctively to the familiar world of things perceived—to the state of consciousness from which he was roused by the first call to reflection. He started from this point, 'I perceived a thing.' The thing must have been there all the time, whether he perceived it or not. It was the thing, then, that caused the

feeling. Knowledge thus begins by the mind receiving from the thing a feeling, say, *e.g.* a feeling of cold, a feeling of resistance, of arrested effort, and hence arises the judgment of perception—Here is a cold, a solid, thing.

22. This is the natural history of Locke's theory of knowledge. Our knowledge of

This is the natural history of Locke's theory of the origin of knowledge. We receive qualities as sensations; we supply subjects, substances.

things is built up out of feelings, modifications of feeling consciousness attributed to a self-conscious subject. These feelings furnish the simple ideas—what we commonly call the qualities of things. *E.g.* the solidity, softness, whiteness of snow, the mind receives as feelings, and from them it infers a thing which is solid, soft, and white.

23. The order of events in this history of a perception is as follows :

- The order of events is—
- (i.) The material thing acts in some way on the bodily organs.
- (ii.) There is some reaction, or responsive change, on the part of these organs.
- (iii.) Feeling expressed in judgment—*I have a feeling.* (iii.) Simultaneously with this there is a change of feeling—a state of consciousness expressed in ‘*I have a feeling of cold, of solidity, of softness.*’
- (iv.) Judgment of perception. (iv.) Out of this material the mind makes a judgment of perception—‘*This is a cold, solid, soft substance.*’

24. Note that the only point of controversy in this history is as to the feeling (iii.). That

(iii.) The feeling being the point in controversy. the natural history of perception begins with action and reaction between material object and organs of sensation is undisputed.

That this is a cause of a change of feeling is a hypothesis which commends itself to us irresistibly. That this change of feeling precedes and conditions a judgment of perception seems indisputable. The point in dispute is as to the feeling.

25. According to the Lockean theory it is the first step in the life of the self-conscious

The feeling as felt is no part of the self-conscious life. The feeling as recalled in reflection is subsequent to perception.

I to say 'I have a feeling of cold, of softness, of resistance, or what not.' 'I feel.' 'I am conscious of a modification in my consciousness.'

In fact in the feeling as felt there is no I, no separation of the self from its feelings, or of the feelings from one another. The judgment 'I feel' does not describe the feeling as felt. It describes it as afterwards recalled by the self-conscious subject, as itself a unit of feeling. And this recalling of the feeling, and describing it in an intellectual judgment,

is by no means the earliest—it is a comparatively late step in the history of self-conscious life. The first step in the history of self-conscious intellectual life is the judgment of perception—‘This is a cold, soft, solid thing.’

26. Note further that precisely here is the origin of the doctrine that we cannot know

And here is the origin of the doctrine that we cannot know reality—where self-conscious life is made to begin with a feeling given from without.

reality. There is the whole difference between a history of perception which says that the correlation of subject and object in self-conscious perception is preceded and conditioned by feeling, in which what afterwards become the subject and object of knowledge are indistinguishably one; and a theory which says, ‘I have a mind, a world of consciousness of my own. Into this world of mine something from outside of it introduces a change or modification. I become conscious

of a modification in my own consciousness. I infer the existence of a thing which caused the change in my consciousness, and which I describe accordingly as having the quality of causing such and such a modification, but of whose real nature, apart from the intrusion of its influence into my consciousness, I know nothing.'

27. This theory of the origin of knowledge has been criticized from the Kantian point of view. The tendency of the philosophy of Locke and his successors was to minimize the activity of the mind, and to represent sensations as building themselves up into knowledge of their own accord. Kant turned round upon this tendency, and, accepting the doctrine that knowledge begins with passively-received sensations, showed that the sensation itself exhibited results of the activity of the mind

The Kantian criticism showed that the 'given' sensation owed all its content to the activity of thought,

exercised upon the material supplied to it. To the matter given in sensation the mind in receiving it supplied the form.

28. The details of the Kantian doctrine are not material to our present purpose. It

bringing this sensation into those relations with other sensations, and with the self, without which it is a mere indeterminate datum.

is enough to point out the upshot of the Kantian criticism; viz., that since every quality is a resemblance, to describe a sensation by a general name is to have classified it, to have brought it into relation with the rest of experience, and that every quality affirmed as present in a given experience is simply as so experienced a relation to the perceiving mind. The simple ideas or sensations—cold, and white, and soft—are the results of comparison of the given sensation with the general context of experience, and they each in themselves describe not a simple ‘objectum,’ but the relation

of an object to the subject or perceiving mind. What is given in sensation, therefore, derives its whole meaning from its interpretation by thought.

29. The ultimate tendency of this criticism may seem to be to eliminate sensation

The given sensation was, however, never eliminated altogether; it was, at most, only—'presented to thought by itself,' an unconvincing version of the facts of experience;

altogether from the history of the origin of thought.

But this result is never reached. It is never reached, e.g., by the late Mr. T. H. Green. "Thought," he wrote,

"has no function except as

co-ordinating ever-new appearances."* And even if "thought begins with what is given in feeling, in the sense that it begins with a manifold of objects presented by a self-conscious subject to itself,"† though the conclusion reached is no longer the doctrine that we cannot know, yet the elevated and

* GREEN, *Prolegomena*, p. 54, § 51. † *Ib.* p. 51, § 50.

inspiring rationalism that results fails somehow to be adequate to the task of "philosophy in relation to life." The conception of a self-conscious subject co-ordinating objects presented to it by itself does not satisfy us as a *rationale* of the knowledge of reality. We are pursued by a paralyzing sense of unreality, due primarily perhaps to our dependence on an imaginary and unaccountable manifold of appearances.

30. And in Kantian philosophy, as it has affected popular thought, the manifold of appearances given in sensation are not presented to thought by itself, they are still a message from an unknown world of reality. Only the more the mind is conceived to be active in shaping the material presented to it into the form of an intelligible world, the more is the message

and for the most part it remained a message from reality, moulded by thought into a knowledge which thereby became still further removed from reality.

of sense from reality falsified in the hearing, and the more are we cut off by the very conditions of knowledge from any, even the most distant, hope of the knowledge of reality. Thought begins with what is given in sensation; but every step in advance from that beginning disguises more and more such semblance of reality as may at first have been conveyed by sense.

31. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as the 'sensation,' the 'appearance,' of

As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as this sensation or appearance represented by the judgment, 'I have a feeling.'

this theory of the origin of knowledge. In the philosophy of Locke it is supposed to be a state of consciousness described in the words, *e.g.* 'I have a feeling of whiteness,' 'I have a feeling of solidity.' In the philosophy of Kant the determinate meaning conveyed by these general terms of sense perception is attributed to the activity of

the mind, and thought begins with what is given in sensation, in the sense that it begins with the presentation to the mind of an indeterminate appearance, qualified and defined by thought. 'I have a feeling,' 'I perceive an appearance.' Qualified or unqualified, determinate or indeterminate, such a consciousness finds no place among the successive stages in the development of knowledge.

32. In the feeling which lurks behind thought, which haunts the judgment of perception like an elusive shadow, in this feeling, there is no 'I.' It is not 'There happens a feeling, there occurs an experience, there presents itself an appearance *to me.*' The 'I' is imported into feeling by the reflective consciousness subsequent to perception. The identification of the unit of feeling with the unit of self-

In the feeling which precedes perception there is no I. It is not an appearance to the self.

consciousness is undoubted; but this does not make it true to represent the feeling as it was felt as a stage of self-conscious life.

33. The first act of the perceptive consciousness, again, does not produce a judgment

The perception is a perception of a thing as having a quality, not of ourselves as having a feeling.

of the type, 'I have a feeling,'

'I see an appearance of white,' but of the type 'There is a white thing.' There is no

such stage in the history of

consciousness as the apprehension of qualities, adjectival attributes, as elements of our consciousness, antecedent to the apprehension of a thing to which they are adjectival. If we try to verify in some actual experience the vagueness of the Kantian indeterminate sensation—A man walking in a fog, who becomes conscious of the proximity of some undefined presence, has no moment in which he says to himself, 'I have a feeling'; his first judgment is 'There is something.'

34. Knowledge arises, then, from a feeling, in which we self-conscious subjects, as lookers

Feeling, then, from which knowledge springs, is as much subjective as objective, and perception, the first act of knowledge, shows subject and object as correlatives.

on, may see the presence of a 'subject' of the feeling consciousness, and of an 'object' by which the feeling consciousness is modified; but the feeling, as felt, is neither subjective nor objective. And knowledge itself begins when a perception arises from this feeling, in which the subject and object, latent in feeling, have started into distinction from one another. The judgment of perception describes the object of knowledge, the 'this' or 'that,' by a relation to the subject of knowledge—the 'white,' or 'soft,' or 'solid,' of sense. The first step in knowledge, *i.e.*, exhibits the subject and object of knowledge as correlatives.

35. What, then, is the answer to our question, Can we know reality? No convincing

To the question, therefore, 'Can we know reality?' the origin of knowledge does not answer 'No.'

affirmation that we can will be made, except in so far as we can answer that other question with which we began

—'What is the reality of the

world?' But, at least, we are not stopped by an initial 'No.' There is no bar to our knowledge of reality in the fact that knowledge takes its birth from a state of consciousness, in which subject and object, mind and reality, are indistinguishably one; nor yet in the fact that the first step in the development of knowledge sets them face to face with one another as interdependent and correlative factors in experience.

36. With the view we have indicated of the relation of sense to thought, the world of mock reality beyond and behind the world we know disappears from the scene of speculation. The world we know resumes its place as real. The presumption against the possibility of knowledge is removed. We can start from experience as it stands. We are not forbidden to think that it is what it appears to be—the revelation of reality.

II
PROOF

i. WE are to look for reality, then, within, and not beyond the field of experience. This is indeed the limitation of philosophy. Experience is the beginning and end of philosophy. We accept, to start with, the fact of experience as it stands. We ask what it involves, what it implies, what it reveals, and philosophy in the end is only the *rationale* of experience discovered in experience itself.

ii. But at this point another question arises about the knowledge of reality. Experience is the beginning and end of philosophy. But the view of experience with which philosophy ends is not the same as the view of experience with which

Experience is the beginning and end of philosophy.

What, then, is the method by which we pass from the beginning to the end?

it began. How does the transition come to be made from the one view to the other—from the knowledge of the primary realities to the knowledge of the final reality—from experience as it presents itself to philosophical enquiry, to experience as it emerges from the enquiry? What is the ‘method’ of philosophy, the ‘way by which we pass’ from the beginning to the end?

iii. The question challenges consideration mainly because there is a kind of knowledge —‘science’—claiming, by its **Science would say,** very title, the prerogative of **‘The method of proof.’** knowledge, and basing the claim on its method—the method of proof. Science professes to be science, because its method is to pass from irrefragable premisses by unimpeachable reasoning to what are accordingly undeniable conclusions. And science would seem to demand of philosophy

that it should not be less than scientific, that it should justify its conclusions by proof.

iv. And knowledge does involve proof. When we say that philosophy aims at the knowledge of reality, the knowledge of which we speak is proved knowledge. That which is known means that which is proved. Knowledge, *i.e.*, is the result of a process starting from premisses, ending in conclusions; starting from beliefs which we are justified in assuming, ending in other beliefs assured as the consequence of the former.

v. But how do we guarantee the transition from premiss to conclusion? Does the *method* of proof give us the guarantee? If we wish for scientific proof, *e.g.* that a certain bacillus is the cause of a certain disease, the rule for the most

And knowledge
does involve
proof.

The scientific
method of
difference supplies
a proof.

certain method of proof would tell us that if a case in which the disease occurs, and a case in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common, except that in the one case the bacillus in question was received into the system, and in the other it was not, this would give us the proof we desire. There is no doubt that this rule indicates the lines on which a certainty, for practical purposes absolute, is to be looked for. But is it the method that gives the certainty?

vi. As a matter of fact, the method does not describe an actual process of thought at all.

But it is not the method that makes the proof.

(1) It is theoretically impossible to be sure that the two cases have every circumstance in common save one. The method is inapplicable to facts; its conditions can never be satisfied.* And (2) if they were satisfied, if the two instances had every circumstance in

* BALFOUR, *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, part i. chap. iii.

common save one, there would be no process from premiss to conclusion. We should have already arrived at the conclusion. The premisses are only a description of the conclusion in different words. It is not the method, then, that gives certainty to the conclusion.

vii. If this is the case in inductive reasoning, in the process of generalization by which science establishes laws, no less may it be shown to be the case in the deductive reasoning by which generalizations are applied. (1) We cannot be theoretically certain that any given individual is a 'man' in the precise sense in which we say that all 'men' must die. The circumstances in which men agree and differ cannot be exhaustively known. The method is inapplicable to facts. And (2) it has been shown in a familiar logical criticism* that the premisses

* That of Mill.

of a syllogism, as formally stated, *assert* the conclusion. Here, again, it is not by the method that the conclusion is assured.

viii. But this is only to say that proof is not mechanical. A method such as the syllogism, or the method of difference, is not a truth-making machine. The conclusion is not proved *by* the method. It is proved in accordance with the method. Even this statement, however, must be interpreted in the sense (1) that the rules of the method describe a standard at which we aim, but to which we never attain; and (2) that if we did attain to it, there would no longer be any process of proof. We endeavour to attain to a collocation of facts, which enables us to *see* the law in the facts. We endeavour to attain to an apprehension of the law such as enables us to anticipate *the facts*. The method only supplies a

The method is
only a guide.

formula as a guide in framing the evidence for a given conclusion.

ix. None the less is it a fact that proof takes place. There is such a thing as proof, reasoning, or connected thought, in which, certain truths being assumed, a truth distinct from them becomes manifest as a consequence of the truths assumed,* and in which it is essential that the conclusion should be (1) distinct from the premisses, but (2) involved in them. We find, as a matter of fact, that when we entertain certain judgments as true, they inevitably point to some further judgment, to a conclusion, which, on a survey of the premisses, it is impossible to deny without also denying the premisses. This is what we mean by proof, and proof, in this sense, is not only essential to our idea of knowledge, but is an actually experienced fact.

* ARISTOTLE, l. c.

x. But the method and its formula are only a general description of such and such a kind of inference. Each particular inference is not valid because it conforms to the method. It is the witness of its own validity.

But each inference is its own warrant. Mediate manifestation is the character of truth.

An inference may be called a self-evident mediate perception. Experience presents us with self-evident mediate perceptions. A method of proof is a description of the way in which, as a matter of fact, truths thus become manifest by means of other truths. This is the nature of experience, the character of truth — mediate manifestation. Begin where you like, you pass from truth to truth. Through the truths you know other truths are evidenced, or reveal themselves to you.

xi. And proof, or mediate perception, *gives, if not* a greater degree of certainty

And proof gives a higher kind of certainty to the conclusion ; than immediate perception, at any rate a higher kind of certainty ; as we may say that an act of self-sacrifice gives a higher kind of pleasure than, *e.g.*, the innocent satisfaction of a bodily appetite. The first instinctive recognition of the character of a person, or the truth of a principle, however free it may be from doubt or hesitation, does not partake of the same certitude and assurance as the knowledge of the same person or principle, through all the various touching points and relations through which its nature and significance are manifest in experience.

xii. Nor is the relation between premiss and conclusion exhausted when we say that the conclusion follows from the premisses. The conclusion reacts upon the premisses, and the conclusion reacts upon the premisses, It is natural

that the premisses of an argument should primarily be regarded as stable and immutable principles, which never add to their content or increase their certainty. But the fact is rather that the original premisses of an argument are imperfectly significant, and provisionally sure; and their significance and certainty are never fully seen except in the conclusions which follow from them.

xiii. There are many and various ways in which the conclusion of an argument reacts upon the premisses. *confirming their certainty, their significance adding to.* The conclusion may confirm the premisses, and make assurance doubly sure; it may amplify their meaning; it may absorb them into a wider truth; it may limit and define their first and vague significance; it may deepen a shallow and inadequate conception; it may *correct the primary* misapprehension of their

purport. The one thing which reasoning never does is to leave the premisses as they were.

xiv. In fact we do not leave our premisses behind. We take them with us. Premiss and conclusion interpenetrate one another. There is a perpetual give-and-take between

them as the argument proceeds. They mutually support and interpret one another. It represents an inadequate view of reasoning to say that we reason *from* premiss *to* conclusion. Rather the premisses are transformed into and reappear in the conclusion. They stand to the argument not so much in the relation of the foundation to the building, laid once for all, and then buried out of sight; rather in the relation of the seed to the living growth of thought, expanding into that which issues from them.

The premiss growing into the conclusion ;

xv. When we say, then, that knowledge

is proved knowledge, we mean that we experience truths by means of other truths,

the secret of the development being found in the conclusion which manifests itself in the premisses.

that one stage of intellectual apprehension carries us to another. But what is the secret of the advance?

What justifies the expansion of the partial view into the completer apprehension? The answer appears to be only that the completer apprehension itself justifies the advance by which we reach it, that the conclusion becomes self-evident in the premisses, and that it is itself the source of assurance in the process by which it manifests itself in them.

xvi. If this be true of proof in general, it will not less be true of the supreme instance

Philosophy, then, supplies the final truth which warrants all other reasoning and its own.

of proof, of the method in which, starting from the primary, partial, superficial view of experience as it is,

we reach the deeper and completer apprehension of supreme reality. Philosophy has been described as the *rationale* of proof. It is, in fact, the search for that ultimate truth of things, the impulse towards whose apprehension is the animating spirit of all reasoning. And philosophy is the supreme instance of proof, the systematic exposition of the self-evidence of that reality which manifests itself in all experience, and in experience as a whole.

III.
REALITY

I. In the foregoing discussions there have suggested themselves two forms of the

What is the reality of the world might mean, then, What is the undeniable reality? or, What is the final reality?

question, 'What is reality?'

(1) What is most undeniably real? What is there in experience which, above all else, declines to be relegated to

an unattainable world of hypothetical existences? And, again, (2) What is the final reality of experience? As experience unfolds itself to us, what does it offer as its ultimate truth, its ultimate reality? What is the reality whose apprehension finally explains the progress, which we find ourselves compelled to make, from the first simple experience towards the unknown goal of some completer knowledge?



II. But philosophy seems bound first at least to indicate its answer to the question in a more obvious form. What is reality? What does reality mean? What is the dominant reality, that to which all others are secondary and subordinate? What element is there in experience which is most vital to experience? What is the reality which carries the utmost meaning of reality? What is it which is pre-eminently real?

But the primary question is rather, 'What carries the utmost meaning of reality?'

III. We need not hesitate, in answer to this question, to point to what may be called, from the point of view of 'Personality,' philosophy, a neglected experience. Apart from the prejudice of philosophical tradition, would anyone hesitate to say that the characteristic reality of the life of man who knows, is personality—*personality* as known to personality, in

personal intercourse and communion—the personality of marriage, and friendship, and social life, the personality which is realized in love.

IV. Philosophy is the analysis of experience, and is tested in the result by the adequacy of its explanation to the experience which it professes to explain. To take an instance. The philosophy which, with Hume, affirms of the persons of experience that they are nothing but bundles or collections of different perceptions, cannot stand this test. On the face of it, the reality of our spiritual experience declines to be explained in terms of bundles or collections of different perceptions.

A reality not adequately accounted for by philosophy, e.g. by Hume,

V. Again, when, in a phrase to which we have already alluded, the world of experience

or, again, by Green. presented to philosophy is described as the manifold object presented by a self-distinguishing subject to itself, we are out of touch with the reality of experience. Some prejudice or presumption has misdirected the energies of philosophy. It is not experience as experienced that is described as presented by a self-distinguishing subject to itself.

VI. Philosophy has, in fact, been haunted by two fallacies, which have tended in various ways to *unrealize* its results.

Philosophy has been unrealized by the Agnostic fallacy,

On the one hand, the fallacious assumption of the unreality of experience, with which we had to do in the earlier part of this essay, has led philosophers to begin with the events of an inner world of consciousness, and, therefore, to end with a world wanting in the true note of experience, as it is,—the *note of intercourse* and communion between

