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THE EXPOSITOR  
VOL. X.

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# THE EXPOSITOR

EDITED BY THE REV.

SIR W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, M.A., LL.D.

*SEVENTH SERIES*

Volume X

HODDER AND STOUGHTON  
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C

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MCMX

BUTLER & TANNER,  
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,  
FROME, AND LONDON.

68253



## ZEUS AND HERMES AT LYSTRA.

### I

Two inscriptions found last summer in the neighbourhood of Lystra throw new light on the circumstances of the visit to that city of Paul and Barnabas, as related in the fourteenth chapter of Acts. A party consisting of Sir William, Lady, and Miss Ramsay, and the writer left Iconium late in May, 1909, to travel in the Isaurian highlands south and west of Lystra. We made a rapid examination of the hilly country which is bounded by Lake Trogitis on the south-west, and on the south and east by the magnificent chasm of the Tsharshemba River, which in ancient times carried the water of Lake Trogitis down to the Konia plain. The region possesses that combination of natural grandeur and fertility which called forth the religious veneration of the early Anatolian peoples, and we were on the outlook for traces of "Hittite" and other worships. No actual "Hittite" remains were found; but two inscriptions which we copied preserve, under a Greek form, traces of the early Anatolian cult of the district, and help us to understand more clearly the circumstances attending the worship of Paul and Barnabas as pagan gods at Lystra.

The first of these inscriptions lies in a Turkish graveyard at Ak-kilisse, a village on the high ground immediately east of Lake Trogitis, a day's ride south of Lystra. This is the site of the ancient Sedasa, one of the  $\delta\eta\muοι$  into which the tribe of the Homonades, which inhabited the region in Roman times, was divided. The name of the  $\delta\eta\muος$  was recovered from an inscription found near the site by

the American explorer, Sterrett.<sup>1</sup> The same explorer argues with much probability that a second inscription<sup>2</sup> found by him near Ak-kilisse also belongs to Sedasa, proving that a temple of the Augusti stood there. Accepting this conclusion, we may claim, in accordance with a practice observed over the whole of Asia Minor, that the worship of the Augusti was set up in the most important shrine of the neighbourhood. This can hardly be other than the temple of Zeus at Sedasa, to which our two inscriptions belong.

The second inscription was found in the village of Balük-laou, which stands at the extreme upper end of the Tsharshemba cañon, about an hour's walk from Sedasa. The stone containing the inscription had been built into the wall of a new Turkish house. When we reached the village a lamb (according to Turkish custom) had just been slaughtered over the corner of the newly-built house-wall, to bring luck to the dwelling. Its blood completely covered the inscription. We had it removed, and copied a dedication of Hermes to Zeus—a combination which made it clear at once why Paul and Barnabas had been called Hermes and Zeus by the Lycaonian natives of Lystra in the first century.

The inscriptions run as follows: I. At Ak-kilisse; the inscription is partly mutilated, but the restorations are certain:

Κάκκαν κ[αὶ	ικίνιος Δ[ιὸς
Μαραμο[ᾶς	· ἱερεῖς.
καὶ Ἴμμα[ν Δ-	

“Kakkan and Maramoas and Imman Licinius, priests of Zeus.”

II. In a housewall at Balük-laou. Half the last line had been chipped away by the mason, who assured us that there had been no further line at the bottom.

<sup>1</sup> *Wolfe Expedition*, No. 240.

<sup>2</sup> *W.E.* No. 217.

Τούης Μ[α-	κατὰ εὐχὴν
κρέϊνος ὁ	ἐπισκευάσαν-
καὶ Ἀβάσκαν-	τες σὺν ὄρο-
τος καὶ Βάτα-	λογήῳ ἐκ τῶ[ν
σις Βρετασί-	ιδίων (ἀν)αλωμ-
δος Ἐρμῆν	άτων ἀνέστ[η-
μέγιστον	σαν Διὶ [Ἡλίῳ

“Toues Macrinus also called Abascantus and Batasis son of Bretasis having made in accordance with a vow at their own expense (a statue of) Hermes most great along with a sundial dedicated it to Zeus the sungod.”

The Zeus of inscription I. is in inscription II. identified with Helios, the sungod.<sup>1</sup> This is an unusual combination, and it depends on a restoration; but the combination is made exceedingly probable by the mention of a sundial, and the restoration *Ἡλίῳ* exactly fits the remaining traces of the last half-line.<sup>2</sup> The mason had just cut away the lower portion of the stone through the middle of the last word in order to bring it into line with the edge of the wall. Had we arrived a few hours sooner, we should have found the inscription complete.

The writer has argued elsewhere<sup>3</sup> that these dedications belong to the latter half of the third century of our era; the names Macrinus and Licinius were doubtless assumed in honour of the Emperors Macrinus and Valerian or Gallienus. They probably spring from a pagan revival following the Persecution of Christians under Decius and Valerian. But the evidence of such cult-inscriptions is valuable retrospectively. The native religion continued to flourish alongside of the Roman state religion and of Christianity, and wherever we find native cults in the early centuries

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, vol. i. p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> Epigraphic copies of these inscriptions are reproduced in the *Classical Review*, 1910, p. 76 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Classical Review*, loc. cit.

of the Empire, we may take it that they are survivals from the period before the Romans entered the country. In the present instance, the close association between Zeus and Hermes in inscription II. is a Graecised form of the relationship of Father-god and Son-god in the older cult. As throughout inner Anatolia, we are dealing not with an imported cult of the Hellenic Zeus, but with a worship, under a Graeco-Roman disguise, of the old Anatolian god.

Rouse, in his book on Greek votive offerings, draws a distinction among the class of dedications of the statue of one god in the temple of another god. Dedications of one god, *considered as a god*, in the temple of another god, are to be distinguished from similar dedications *for purely ornamental purposes*. The meaning of the former class of dedications is uncertain: they cannot have always meant that the two gods were worshipped in common, but they must have both implied, and tended to fix, a close association of the two gods in local myth and ritual. In the present instance, the addition of the conventional title "megistos" makes it clear that it is the god Hermes himself, considered as a god, that is the object of the dedication. Most commentators on the narrative in Acts have pointed out that the scene of Ovid's story of the joint appearance of Jupiter and Mercury to Baucis and Philemon is laid among the Phrygian hills. Ovid places it beside a lake, and his description exactly fits Lake Trogitis. Although this district was somewhat further south than the boundary of Phrygia, it is tempting to suppose that Ovid's geography is not strictly accurate, and that the myth of Baucis and Philemon originated near Lystra.<sup>1</sup>

It is noteworthy that all the dedicators mentioned in the

<sup>1</sup> Professor Ramsay has suggested that the story was located at Tyriacum, N. W. of Iconium; *Historical Commentary on Galatians*; Introduction.

two inscriptions bear native names. They are undoubtedly of the same stock as the common people of Lystra, who spoke "in the Lycaonian language." A short inscription, which is probably the first known document in this language, was copied at Dorla last year, and has been published by Miss Ramsay in her *Preliminary Report to the Wilson Trustees*.<sup>1</sup>

Paul had healed a life-long cripple at Lystra. "And when the multitudes saw what Paul had done, they lifted up their voice, saying in the speech of Lycaonia, The gods are come down to us in the likeness of men. And they called Barnabas, Jupiter (Zeus); and Paul, Mercury (Hermes), because he was the chief speaker. And the priest of Jupiter, whose *temple* was before the city, brought oxen and garlands unto the gates, and would have done sacrifice with the multitudes."<sup>2</sup>

Paul was called Hermes "because he was the chief speaker." This is an adaptation of the ordinary Greek view of Hermes as messenger and interpreter of Zeus. This relationship between the two gains colour from the association between the sungod on the one hand and Hermes with the sundial on the other. Zeus, the Sun, measures out the hours; Hermes, the messenger, by means of the sundial, records the measurement and makes it clear to men.

It is evident from the narrative in Acts that the people who were prepared to worship Paul and Barnabas as gods were not Greeks or Romans, but natives. This is conclusively brought out by the use of the phrase "in the speech of Lycaonia." The language in ordinary use among the educated classes in Anatolian cities under the Roman Empire was Greek; in a few of those cities, and especially, of course, in Roman colonies, Latin also was

<sup>1</sup> p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xiv. 11-13.

understood, and was used at that period in official documents. But the Anatolian element in the population of those cities continued to use the native languages. In the story in Acts a fast distinction is implied, and in fact existed, between the ideas and practices of the Greeks and the Roman colonists and those of the natives. This distinction would naturally maintain itself most vigorously in so conservative an institution as religious ritual and legend. We should therefore expect to find that the association between Zeus and Hermes indicated in Acts belonged rather to the religious system of the natives than to that of the educated society of the colony. And this is precisely the character of the cult illustrated in our two inscriptions. It is essentially a native cult, under a thin Greek disguise. It has been shown in another place<sup>1</sup> that all the names in these inscriptions can only have been the names of natives. The miracle performed by Paul, and his companionship with Barnabas, would naturally suggest to the uneducated natives, who used the "speech of Lycaonia," a pair of gods commonly associated by them in a local cult. The two gods chosen by them are now known to have been associated by the dedication of a statue of one in a temple of the other in the neighbourhood of Lystra.

W. M. CALDER.

### *SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.*

#### VI. SIN AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY—THE ORIGINS.

THE contention of the preceding paper has been that sin, as Scripture and experience represent it, is irreconcilable, not indeed with evolutionary theory within the limits in which science can justly claim to have established it, but with an evolutionary theory which, like Darwin's, pictures

<sup>1</sup> *Classical Review*, loc. cit.

man as having arisen, bodily and mentally, by slow gradations from the animal, and as subsisting through uncounted millenniums in a state of semi-brutishness and savagery. Sin implies relation to God, but here there is no knowledge of God, or possibility of right relation to Him. Sin implies the possibility of sinless development; here such possibility is precluded. Sin implies voluntary departure from rectitude; here it is made a necessity. Sin implies possession of enough knowledge of moral law to enable the moral being to act rightly. Here the glimmer of light in reason and conscience, if present at all, is of the faintest. Sin postulates freedom; here man is a slave to animal impulse and passion from the first.

Assume, however, what Darwinism will not grant, that evolution is not from without, but is from within; that it is purposeful, or directed to ends, not blind; that it is not necessarily slow, but often sudden—advancing by “mutations,” and exhibiting “lifts,” which imply the entrance of new factors—and the problem is essentially changed. Even in this form of evolution it may not be possible to prove that man was pure in origin, but there is now room for such an origin, if the law of moral and religious life can be shown to demand it. It may not prove that man is comparatively recent, but it removes the chief ground for the assumption that he *cannot* be, but must be traced back to an immense antiquity. The question becomes one, not of theory, but of evidence.

The general attitude taken to the *Genesis* narrative of man's creation, temptation, and fall, has already been indicated. While, as was stated, it is not on the basis of this narrative solely, but rather on the whole Scriptural doctrine of sin, regarded as apostasy from God, and transgression of His law, that the present argument proceeds, the importance of the deep truths involved in the Genesis

narrative cannot easily be overestimated. Without this narrative the entire Biblical representation would be truncated—would lack its appropriate beginning. This is quite compatible with a free recognition of the allegorical or figurative dress in which the narrative may be clothed. There are, in truth, and always will be, two ways in which these ancient narratives may be approached. Approach them in one way, and they are readily made out to be a bundle of fables, legends, myths, without historical basis of any kind. Approach them in another, and they are the oldest and most precious traditions of our race, worthy in their intrinsic merit of standing where they do at the commencement of the Word of God, and capable of vindicating their right to be there: not merely, as most would allow, vehicles of great ideas, but presenting in their own archaic way the memory of great historic truths. The story of the Fall, thus regarded, is not a myth, but enshrines the shuddering memory of an actual moral catastrophe in the beginning of the race, which brought death into the world and all our woe.

Modern thought, however, especially as represented by the evolutionary theory, definitely contradicts, it is affirmed, the truths embodied in this old-world chronicle of man's origin, nature, and defection from his allegiance to his Creator.<sup>1</sup> This affirmation, in the light of what has already been advanced, may now be brought to the test. Such questions arise as the following. Is man, in his physical genesis, a slow development from the animal, or is he, in a true sense, a higher creation? Is man, in his mental and spiritual nature, simply an evolution from lower psychical forms, or is he, in a sense true of no other, a spiritual personality—a rational and moral Self? Is man, as existing,

<sup>1</sup> The difficulties and objections are very fully summarized by Dr. Driver in his *Genesis*, Introduction and Notes on early chapters.



an advance on an original brutishness or savagery, and does his past extend through, perhaps, hundreds of milleniums of pre-civilised existence? Or is his origin more recent, and did he stand from the first in conscious moral relations with his Creator? Was man in his origin subject to mortality, or is death an abnormal fact in his history? It will be felt that the answers to these questions cut deeply into the form to be assumed by a doctrine of sin.

1. As helping to place the subject in its true light, a few words may be said, first, on the antithesis so constantly urged between *creation* and *evolution*.<sup>1</sup> Such antithesis is plainly only valid, if by creation is meant a *de novo* act of the Creator in the production of each separate form. Creative activity, on this view, is excluded as much by generation as by evolution. But no one supposes that man is less a creature of God because he owes his existence, mediately, to a long line of ancestors. Creation, however, in the more special sense, denotes not simply the reproduction of existing forms, but the origination of something new, for the production of which powers or factors are required of a higher order than those previously operating. A familiar instance is the first appearance of life, which certainly cannot be explained as the effect of merely physical and chemical forces.<sup>2</sup> It matters little, from the stand-

<sup>1</sup> Thus we read in the art. "Evolution" in *Encycl. Brit.*, viii. p. 752: "It is clear that the doctrine of evolution is directly antagonistic to that of creation. . . . The theory of evolution, by assuming one intelligible and adequate principle of change, simply eliminates the notion of creation from those regions of existence to which it is applied." The Duke of Argyll states the matter more truly in his *Unity of Nature*, p. 272: "Creation and evolution, therefore, when these terms have been cleared from intellectual confusion, are not antagonistic conceptions mutually exclusive. They are harmonious and complementary."

<sup>2</sup> For careful statements of the precise condition of the evidence on this question, see Prof. J. A. Thomson, *Bible of Nature*, Lect. iii., "Organisms and their Origin," and R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, chap. viii., "The Mechanical Theory of Life."

point of Theism, whether the powers in question are viewed as latent in Nature from the beginning, only waiting the proper time and conditions for their manifestation, or are regarded as fresh drafts on the creative energy implicit in the whole process. The essential point is that they are *new* powers, higher in kind, and representing intrinsically a rise on the previously existing order. Such advances or "upliftings" are essential if there is to be "ascent" in nature, and they form no antithesis to evolution but are included in the very idea of that process, as science reveals it.

How closely allied the ideas of creation and evolution are at this point may be shown by two brief quotations. One is from A. Sabatier, whose mind latterly was dominated by the conception of evolution. "At each step," he says, "nature surpasses itself by a mysterious creation that resembles a true miracle in relation to an inferior stage. What, then, shall we conclude from these observations, except that in nature there is a hidden force, an immeasurable 'potential energy,' an ever-open, never exhausted fount of apparitions, at once magnificent and unexpected."<sup>1</sup> On this view, it is plain, the antithesis between "evolution" and "special creation" tends to disappear except in name; what are virtually special creations—new apparitions—are taken up into evolution as phases of it. The second quotation is from Darwin himself, and is adduced by Professor D. H. Scott in the Cambridge volume on Darwin to show that if Zeiller's opinion on the sudden appearance of new forms should be confirmed, "it would no doubt be a serious blow to the Darwinian theory." Darwin wrote: "Under a scientific point of view, and as leading to further investigation, but little advantage is gained by believing that new forms are suddenly developed in an imexplicable

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion* (E. T.), p. 84.

manner from old and widely different forms, over the old belief in the creation of species from the dust of the earth.”<sup>1</sup> Yet the trend of modern evolution is unquestionably to admit that new forms *do* suddenly appear, and *have* appeared on a much grander scale in the past. This leads directly to the questions above proposed.

2. A primary question is, Is man, in body and mind, a *slow development* from the animal, or is he not, in the sense just described, a true *creation*? The relation to preceding forms, on which evolution justly insists, is not denied, but is this the whole? Is there not, also, to be recognised in man a *rise* upon the preceding animal world, which involves the entrance, at least the action, of new powers, operating in a manner more or less sudden, and founding, as happened in the change from the inorganic to the organic, a new order or kingdom in the world? Consider first the *physical* aspect.

Darwin, it has been seen, was wedded to the idea of infinitesimal gradations in the production of species: Weismann contends, against Bateson and others, for the same view.<sup>2</sup> It will, however, be admitted that there is a very considerable consensus of recent evolutionary opinion in favour of the opposite contention. This was one of the points on which Professor Huxley was always disposed to disagree with Darwin. “We have always thought,” he said, “that Mr. Darwin has unnecessarily hampered himself by adhering so strictly to his favourite *natura non facit saltum*. We greatly suspect that she does make considerable jumps in way of variation now and then, and that these saltations give rise to some of the gaps which appear to exist in the series of new forms.”<sup>3</sup> Obviously,

<sup>1</sup> *Origin of Species*, p. 424; quoted in *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 221. Cf. J. A. Thomson, *Bible of Nature*, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Darwin and Mod. Science*, pp. 22 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Lay Sermons*, p. 342. Cf. p. 326: “We believe, as we have said above,

with the admission of "jumps," "saltations," "leaps" in nature, the whole problem of man's origin assumes a new character. Now, the facts of evolution itself seem fast compelling scientific writers to adopt just some such view.<sup>1</sup> Professor J. A. Thomson, e.g., finds "increasing warrant for postulating the occurrence of mutations of considerable magnitude, and holds that "it is very difficult to give a concrete selectionist interpretation of what may be called the 'big lifts' in evolution."<sup>2</sup> He thinks that "man probably arose by a *mutation*, that is, by a discontinuous variation of considerable magnitude."<sup>3</sup> R. Otto likewise favours the idea of the origin of man by "*sprungweise*" development, and remarks: "There is nothing against the assumption, and there is much to be said in its favour, that the last step [*Sprung*, leap] was such an immense one that it brought with it a freedom and richness of psychical life incomparable with anything that had gone before."<sup>4</sup>

that nature does make jumps now and then, and a recognition of the fact is of no small importance in disposing of many minor objections to the doctrine of transformation." Lyell, similarly, was disposed to postulate "occasional strides" in evolution, "constituting breaks in an otherwise continuous series of psychical changes," and thinks that "such leaps may have successively introduced not only higher and higher forms and grades of intellect, but at a much remoter period may have cleared at one bound the space which separated the highest stage of the unprogressive intelligence of the inferior animals from the first and lowest form [why only this ?] of improvable reason in man" (*Antiquity of Man*, p. 504).

<sup>1</sup> See references on last paper.

<sup>2</sup> *Darwinism and Human Life*, p. 203. "It is likely," he says, "that man had his starting-point as a prepotent anthropoid genius." If, however, there is "genius," one seems to have got beyond the "anthropoid" altogether. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 123.

<sup>4</sup> *Naturalism and Religion*, p. 133 (E. T.). It is interesting to observe that Darwin was himself induced to travel a good way on this road. "An unexplained residuum of change, perhaps a large one," he says, "must be left to the assumed action of those unknown agencies which occasionally induce marked and abrupt deviations of structure in our domestic productions" (*Descent of Man*, i. p. 154). Darwin to the end, however, looked with disfavour on abrupt variations as entering to any appreciable extent into the origin of species. Cf. *Origin of Species*, 6th Edit., chaps. vi. and viii.; *Plants and Animals under Domestication*, ii. pp. 414.

Certainly, if such a "big lift" took place in the origin of man, it is not on the physical side only it is to be looked for; the psychical must be included. Since, indeed, it is the psychical which determines the characters of the organism, rather than *vice versa*, it may be held that it is primarily with a rise on the psychical side that the bodily rise must be connected.

In favour of such an origin for man may be urged, in addition to the difficulties already adverted to attending the idea of development by infinitesimal gradations on the principle of natural selection, the standing difficulty of establishing *actual links* of connection between man and anthropoid ancestors, or even in constructing a plausible "phylogeny" for man of any kind. Plenty of dogmatism on this subject, indeed, is often to be met with. But the more cautious writers treat the phylogenies with scant respect.<sup>1</sup> With Schwalbe and Haeckel the ape-ancestry of man is an article of faith: they will hear of no other hypothesis.<sup>2</sup> But Haeckel himself quotes the dictum of Virchow that science cannot teach that man is descended from the ape<sup>3</sup>; and Schwalbe bears witness that an influential group of anthropologists reject this line of descent, and seek for the roots of the human race in other directions,<sup>4</sup> very much

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bateson, *Dar. and Mod. Science*, pp. 188-9. Otto quotes Du Bois-Reymond as declaring "that if he must read romances, he would prefer to read them in some other form than that of genealogical trees" (*Nat. and Rel.*, p. 102).

<sup>2</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, pp. 135 ff.; 146 ff. Darwin is uncompromisingly claimed for the view that "man was descended from the ape" (pp. 135, 147).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 146.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 132-4. Schwalbe instances Cope, Adloff, Klaatsch, etc. Cope derives from the Lemurs. The Dutch zoologist Hubrecht rejects the Lemurs, and argues for derivation from a Tarsiad form (*Descent of the Primates*, pp. 39, 40). Thus, as Schwalbe truly says, "the line of descent disappears in the darkness of the ancestry of the mammals." He thinks we might as well admit at once that "man has arisen independently"! (*Ut supra*, p. 134.)

further back. Even the famous Javan *Pithecanthropus erectus*, if we go by the judgment of experts, is far from establishing the connection of ape with man.<sup>1</sup> The great gulf between man and lower forms stands still unbridged. There may well, indeed, have existed ape-forms much nearer man than any existing species, but even the Javan specimen stands far beneath the most degraded human skulls.<sup>2</sup>

3. The physical development of man cannot, as has been hinted, be dissociated from the consideration of his *mental* and *spiritual* equipment, and here the next question of interest arises—Are man's mental and moral powers simply a development from the mind of the animal, or do they likewise represent a *rise*—in this case, not in *degree* only, but in *kind*—upon the forms of intelligence below him? Evolutionary theory is wont to answer this question, as the preceding discussion would lead us to expect, by assuming that the same causes which are held adequate to explain the bodily development suffice also to explain the higher mental powers which the developed being (*homo sapiens*) manifests. Mind and body, it is granted, go together, not in the sense that mind is an entity distinct from the body—this it would be thought highly “unscientific” to admit<sup>3</sup>—but as implying that any rise on one

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 110. At the Anthropological Congress at Lindau, Sept. 1899, Dr. Bumiller read a paper in which he contended that the supposed *pithecanthropus erectus* was “nothing but a gibbon, as Virchow surmised from the first.” There is, however, little unanimity.

<sup>2</sup> Huxley doubted whether the human adult brain ever weighed less than 31 or 32 ounces (*Man's Place in Nature*, p. 102). The average human brain is 48 or 49 ounces. The brain of the *pithecanthropus* may have been 26 ounces. The heaviest gorilla brain is 18 or 20 ounces. Prof. Huxley, in *Nineteenth Century*, xxviii. pp. 750 ff., endorsed the words of M. Fraipont: “Between the man of Spy [one of the poorest skulls] and an existing anthropoid ape there lies an abyss.”

<sup>3</sup> Haeckel writes: “In strict contradiction to this mystical dualism, which is generally connected with teleology and vitalism, Darwin always maintained the complete unity of human nature, and showed convincingly that the psychological side of man was developed, in the same way as the

side must necessarily be accompanied by a rise on the other. Mind cannot develop in advance of body. A human mind could not be put into a Simian brain, any more than body can develop high brain capacity without mental activity to utilise it. The question is : Is the ordinary evolutionary theory an adequate account of the mental endowment which we know man to possess in distinction from the animals ?

Naturally, if there is reason to doubt whether man, *physically*, is a product of slow continuous development, this doubt must attach far more strongly to his mental development, in which the contrast to the merely animal stage is so much greater. It was the distinctiveness of man's mental powers, above all, which suggested to Lyall the idea of a "leap" which "may have cleared at one bound"<sup>1</sup> the space between animal and man; which forced on A. R. Wallace, with others, the conviction of a "break" at this point, implying the interposition of a creative Cause.<sup>2</sup> The conclusion is more directly reached by concentrating attention on the fact itself that in man mental and spiritual powers are revealed which place him in a different category from the mere animal—which cannot, therefore, by any process of slow accumulation of variations be developed from animal intelligence, but speak to the introduction of something original and higher in *kind*.

That there *is* a distinction between animal and human intelligence amounting to a distinction *in principle* is, in

body, from the less advanced soul of the anthropoid ape, and, at a still more remote period from the cerebral functions of the older vertebrates" (*Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 150). Cf. Schwalbe, *Ibid.* p. 116.

<sup>1</sup> *Antiq. of Man*, p. 504.

<sup>2</sup> Wallace, *Darwinism*, pp. 474-5. So Mivart, the Duke of Argyll, Calderwood, J. Young, etc., with some American and Continental evolutionists. "Break," possibly, is an unfortunate word in this connexion, for the rise may be, as above argued, from within, yet may none the less imply the entrance, or manifestation, of new powers.

fact, conceded by most writers, though, in theory, efforts may be made to effect a passage from one to the other. Round man, as self-conscious, spiritual personality, capable of rising to universal ideas, of conceptions of law and order, of rational speech, of self-directed moral life, of education, progress and religion, a circle is drawn, investing his life with a sacredness which belongs to that of no mere animal. Law, practice and common speech, equally with the language of science, recognise the distinction. Lyall justly contrasts the "unprogressive" intelligence of the inferior animals with the "improvable" reason of man<sup>1</sup>; even Haeckel distinguishes "the power of conceptual thought and abstraction" in man from "the non-conceptual stages of thought and ideation in the nearest related animals."<sup>2</sup> Darwin, Haeckel, and others endeavour to bridge over the immensity of the distinction,<sup>3</sup> and it is urged that the difference between animal and human intelligence is not greater than that between the baby and the full-grown man, between the savage and the philosopher.<sup>4</sup> The argument is palpably fallacious, for in the baby and the savage there resides the *capacity* for development, which is wholly absent in the animal. The essence of the distinction seems to lie in the fact that in man there is the faculty of apprehending the *universal*—of grasping *principles* and *general ideas*—and of giving expression to these in *speech*. Man has "Logos"—reason—and the differ-

<sup>1</sup> *Antiq. of Man*. p. 504.

<sup>2</sup> *Riddle of Universe* (Pop. Edit.), pp. 38, 45.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Schwalbe, *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 120.

<sup>4</sup> This Haeckel, *Riddle*, p. 65, etc. Mr Mallock plays with the same argument (*Rel. as a Credible Doctrine*, pp. 52, 54). Otto justly remarks: "I can *train* a young ape or elephant, can teach it to open wine-bottles and perform tricks. But I can *educate* the child of the savage, can develop in him a mental life equal in fineness, depth, and energy, frequently, more than equal, to that of the average European, as the mission to the Eskimos and the Fuegians proves, and as Darwin frankly admitted" (*Op. cit.* p. 333). Cf. the writer's *God's Image in Man*, pp. 162 ff.



ence which this constitutes between him and his animal predecessors is practically infinite.<sup>1</sup>

In this same principle of self-conscious rationality the ground is to be sought of man's *ethical* distinction from the animals. As conscious of moral law, as capable of setting before himself moral ends, as recognising moral obligations, as exercising freedom in the choice between moral alternatives, man holds a unique position as, not simply a child of nature, but (in Kant's phrase) a member of a "realm of ends"—citizen of a Kingdom of God.<sup>2</sup> The inability of naturalism to explain these ethical conceptions peculiar to man was before commented on. Evolution may show how a basis was prepared for moral life in the social and parental instincts of the lower creation; but moral life itself is something different and higher, and evolutionary theory reaches it only by surreptitiously importing the ethical notions as its exposition advances.<sup>3</sup> On this point Höffding remarks in the Darwin volume: "To every consequent ethical consciousness there is a standard of nature, a primordial value which determines the single ethical judgments as their last presupposition, and the 'rightness' of this basis, the 'value' of this value can as little be discussed as the 'rationality' of our logical

<sup>1</sup> This, too, is generally admitted, however to be accounted for. Haeckel says: "Reason is man's highest gift, the only prerogative that essentially distinguishes him from the lower animals" (*Riddle*, p. 6). Mr. J. Fiske describes the gulf between the human and animal mind as "immeasurable," and says that "for psychological man you must erect a distinct kingdom; nay, you must even dichotomise the universe, putting man on one side, and all things else on the other" (*Through Nature to God*, p. 82). Huxley recognises "an immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of the human form the Simian stirps." (*Man's Place in Nature*, p. 103). The image of God, Dr. Driver says, "can be nothing but the gift of *self-conscious reason* which is possessed by man but by no other animal" (*Genesis*, p. 15).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. J. A. Thomson, *Bible of Nature*, p. 206, "The Man arose, an organism at length rational; to him all things became new—he spoke, and he was moral."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *God's Image in Man*, pp. 141 ff.

principles.”<sup>1</sup> It is here the doctrine of sin is effectively touched, for on every pure evolutionary theory there is a flattening down and changing of moral conception in a naturalistic or utilitarian interest. Freedom, as a rule, goes by the board.<sup>2</sup> Where, on the other hand, these distinctive attributes of man are firmly upheld, the need of a higher explanation becomes manifest. Selfhood, personality, moral freedom, the supreme value of moral ends, require a spiritual basis, and mean, not simply development, but the setting up of a new order or kingdom of being in the universe.

Even the ethical life, however, with its implication of social life, is not the highest thing in man. It is in *religion*, specially in the Christian religion, that the spiritual ground of man's being becomes most clearly manifest.<sup>3</sup> Here evolution altogether fails in furnishing an organ for such conceptions as infinity, eternity, spirituality, applied to the highest object of worship—God. Man is made to know, serve, and have fellowship, in the freedom of sonship, with his Creator; and this is possible only through the possession of a kinship with God, and of those attributes of rationality and freedom which stamp him as bearing the *image* of God. This again is essential as a presupposition for the right conception of sin. The conclusion is that, with every wish to give evolution its fullest rights, it cannot be pronounced adequate to explain the moral and spiritual dignity of man.

4. The question next arising—a hardly less vital one for our doctrine—relates to the *manner* in which man began his career as a moral being—whether, uncounted millen-

<sup>1</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 460.

<sup>2</sup> Cf Hæckel's attack on freedom, *Riddle*, p. 47, etc.

<sup>3</sup> “Man,” says Max Müller, “alone employs language, he alone comprehends himself, alone has the power of general ideas—he alone believes in God” (*Chips from a German Workshop*, iv. p. 458).

niums ago, far down the scale in *brutishness* and *savagery*, or, more recently, in a condition *conformable to his mental nature and destination*, and holding in it the possibility of *sinless development*. On this subject, in inversion of the opinion held in Christendom till almost the present day, evolutionary theory speaks with no bated breath. The positions are coming to be regarded as well-nigh axiomatic : (1) that man is of enormously remote antiquity ; and (2) that, as befits his animal ancestry, he is to be thought of as only slowly emerging from the brute condition, and as existing for untold periods—probably hundreds of thousands of years—in the state commonly known as savagery. There has been no fall of man, but a wonderful *ascent*. As Professor Thomson puts it : “ We are no longer as those who look back to a paradise in which man fell ; we are rather as those ‘ who rowing hard against the stream, see distant gates of Eden gleam, and do not dream it is a dream.’ ”<sup>1</sup> The objection felt to this view is sometimes described as simple prejudice, arising from repugnance to the idea of an ape-ancestry. It goes, however, much deeper. What really staggers one is not a genetic relation to lower forms, but the brute *state* which this is supposed to imply as the starting-point of human development, and the long, revolting history that follows before man attains even the rudiments of moral and civilised existence. The collision here is unmistakable, not simply with Church “ dogmas,” but, as already seen, with the truest, purest, ideas we are enabled to form of God, man, sin, and of the normal relations of man to God.

Is this collision inevitable ? In itself it can hardly be declared to be so, if the theory of man’s origin by insensibly slow gradations (however man arose, it may be very confidently affirmed it was not *thus*) is abandoned, and a different

<sup>1</sup> *Bible of Nature*, p. 226.

mode of origin—call it by “mutation,” “leap,” “break,” or what one will—is substituted for it. No necessity exists, on this hypothesis, for picturing man, on his first appearance, as a semi-animal, the subject of brute passions and unregulated impulses. His nature, as became a moral being, may have been internally harmonious, with possibilities of pure development, which only his own free act annulled. It is not, therefore, in the nature of evolution, but in the mass of evidence which, it is believed, has been accumulated for man’s long antiquity and primitive low and rude condition (palaeolithic and neolithic man),<sup>1</sup> that the negation of this higher view of man’s origin must be sought. Great caution of assertion, however, is needed even here, and it may be doubted how far the fixed assumption of slow development borrowed from evolution is not itself a leading factor in the reasonings about age.

It would be out of place to attempt to discuss at length a subject on most points regarding which scientific experts are themselves widely at variance. But one or two general remarks may be made. It is granted by nearly every one that the old Ussherian chronology, supposed to be based on the Bible, needs extension by many millenniums. On the other hand, the tendency has been greatly to retrench the exaggerated computations of the older geologists, resting on the rate of deposits, human remains, flints, other evidences of man’s handywork. As early as 1888, Professor Boyd Dawkins entered a caveat against such computations, and declared that all, as it seemed to him, had ended in failure.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Thomson says: “From the situations in which palaeolithic implements are found, it is inferred that these must have dropped from their makers’ hands at least 150,000 years ago. . . . But ever so much older than those palaeoliths are the eoliths. They probably take us back to 300,000 years ago” (*Bible of Nature*, p. 191.) He would go back to Miocene times (p. 192). We take leave to be sceptical.

<sup>2</sup> Address to Brit. Association, Sept., 1888.

A well-known case was the deposit of stalagmite in Kent's Cavern. Mr. Pengelly had allowed for this 5,000 years for one inch, or 300,000 years for 5 feet. Professor Dawkins declared that it might have been formed at the rate of a quarter of an inch per annum, "at which rate 20 feet of stalagmite might be formed in 1,000 years."<sup>1</sup> The reasonings of this same high authority against the presence of man in Tertiary times seem conclusive.<sup>2</sup> A fragment of bone, believed to be human, which Professor Dawkins had at first accepted as evidence of pre-glacial man, he afterwards declared to be not human, but ursine, and doubted whether the clay in which it was found was glacial.<sup>3</sup> American geology has tended to bring down the close of the Glacial Age, when undeniably man appears, to a much later date than was earlier supposed,<sup>4</sup> while the relation of man to "interglacial" periods is still involved in much obscurity.<sup>5</sup> The oldest skulls, too, do not support the theory of the slow ascent of man from the ape.<sup>6</sup> There is, one is entitled to say, as little room for

<sup>1</sup> *Cave Hunting*, pp. 39-41.

<sup>2</sup> *Early Man in Britain*, pp. 36, 67-9, 93, etc. Apart from supposed ape-like ancestors, the evidence for Tertiary Man, as at Castenedolo, in Italy, or Calaveras, in California, seems now to be pretty generally discredited (Cf. Engerrand, *Six Leçons de Préhistoire*, 1905, pp. 41-2). On the Miocene *Dryopithecus*, which Gaudry thought might be a flint-chipping ape in the line of man's ancestry, Engerrand writes: "Gaudry at first considered *Dryopithecus* as approaching man, but now he places it among the inferior anthropoids."

<sup>3</sup> *Nature*, June 7, 1877, pp. 97-8.

<sup>4</sup> Leading American geologists date the close of the Glacial Age on that continent from 7,000 to 10,000 years ago. Cf. *God's Image in Man*, pp. 173 ff., 305-6.

<sup>5</sup> In his work, *North America* (1904), I. C. Russell, prof. of Geology in the University of Michigan, states: "We find no authentic or well-attested evidence of the presence of man in America either in or during the Glacial period." (p. 362). Certain "finds" at Trenton, N.J., on which some stress was laid, have been very effectively challenged by Mr. W. H. Holmes, of the American Geological Survey (*Science*, Nov. 1892, etc.).

<sup>6</sup> Prof. Thomson says: "Man's enormous brain, which does not seem to have increased greatly in bulk since Palaeolithic times, marked a new departure" (*Bible of Nature*, p. 194). It is interesting to read that the palaeontologist Zittel "excludes from serious consideration the fossil

dogmatism in this region on the side of science as there is on the side of the theologian. "Primitive Man" is still an enigma.

It must, indeed, to any one who reflects calmly on the matter, appear extraordinary that man should have existed on the earth in a practically unprogressive state for 200,000 or 300,000 years,<sup>1</sup> then suddenly have blossomed out a few thousand years ago into the mighty civilisations excavation has been bringing to light, with hardly any trace of barbarism behind! These civilisations, assuredly, sprang from brains capable of better things than chipping rude flints, and making trifling ornaments, though it is to be owned that some of the palaeolithic men had powerful brains also.<sup>2</sup> The Duke of Argyll properly drew attention to the fact that the rude and degraded races are not found, as a rule, in the original centres of the distribution of mankind, but in outlying parts.<sup>3</sup>

5. There remains, in connexion with man's origin, the solemn question of *immortality*—of man's relation to *death*. Is man, in his spiritual being, capable of withstanding the shock of death? Would he, had sin not entered, have died—as we understand death—at all? The questions are not the same, but it is important to observe that the difficulty which arises here for evolutionary theory is hardly greater on the supposition that the *soul* survives death, than on the view that bodily death is not normal for man. Few will doubt that the animal is mortal. It is constituted for earth.

skeleton of the Neanderthal [one of the more degraded skulls] on the ground that it is of comparatively recent date" (Duckworth, *Morphol. and Anthropol.*, p. 523). Cf. Huxley's verdict, *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 157.

<sup>1</sup> Prof. G. Henslow speaks of man as "on a uniformly low level of barbarism for an incalculable length of time" (*Liberal Churchman*, June, 1905, pp. 222-3).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. on this point the remarks of Dr. Oswald Dykes in his *Divine Worker in Creation and Providence*, pp. 141 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Unity of Nature*, p. 426.

Nothing in its aptitudes or desires points to anything beyond. Assume it to be different with man, as manifestly it is different, and how difficult is the problem that arises! Grant that in man we have a being constituted for immortality, capable of surviving death, we are beyond the question of degrees. A being is mortal *or* immortal; an infinity divides the two conditions. It is with immortality as with sonship to God, insensible gradations afford no clue to the magnitude of the change. It is the *kind* of being that is different. The logic of evolutionary theory, therefore, frequently asserts itself in the denial of a separate spiritual nature in man to which immortality can attach.<sup>1</sup> The question is one which presses hard on those who wish to rescue man from the grasp of naturalism, and secure for him the possession of the Christian hope.

It is a mistake, however, to suppose that immortality, in the Scriptural or Christian sense, is to be identified simply with the survival of the *spiritual* part of man, or an immortality of the *soul*. As truly as in science, man is regarded in Scripture as a *unity*. Body as well as soul is essential to his complete personality.<sup>2</sup> Existence in separation from the body is never regarded as true or perfect existence (Sheol, Hades). Redemption, on the other hand, is never conceived of as redemption of the soul only, but as redemption of the whole personality—body and soul together.<sup>3</sup> “Now hath Christ been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of them that are asleep. For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead.”<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, in the funda-

<sup>1</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, pp. 116, 150. Cf. Haeckel, *Riddle*, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. more fully the writer's *Christian View of God*, pp. 136 ff., 150 ff., 196 ff.; *God's Image in Man*, pp. 46 ff., 249 ff. See also Salmon's Cunningham Lectures on *Immortality*, and Laidlaw's *Bible Doct. of Man*.

<sup>3</sup> See *Christian View*, etc., as above.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 20, 21; cf. Rom. viii. 23. So far as the hope of immortality is found in the O.T., it takes the form of translation (Enoch, Elijah), deliverance from Sheol, resurrection. In this, in the view of the present

mental Biblical view, death, or separation of soul from body in physical dissolution, is not the natural or normal fate of man ; the instinct of mankind, indeed, in its bewailing of the dead, has ever protested against its being regarded as such. With this cohere the testimonies already cited to the connexion of death with human sin.<sup>1</sup>

Against such teaching evolutionary theory, and not it only, raises a violent protest. Death, it is categorically laid down, is a natural law to which all organisms are subject. Man, therefore, must share the fate of other living beings : must grow, decay, die. The opposite view is absurd. But this again raises the question—What *is* Man ? *Is* he a mere animal among others ? Concede to man a rational and ethical nature constituting him a free, spiritual personality ; a religious nature, uniting him in kinship to God ; an *immortal* nature, with capacities destined to unfold themselves through eternal ages ; is it so manifest that what applies to mere animal existence applies to him also ? Does not man found rather a new kingdom and order of existence to which a new law must apply ? Death is not the same thing to him as to the animal. To the animal death is the natural termination of its time-limited existence ; to man, if the spirit survives, it is a rupture, a mutilation, a separation of parts of himself which were never designed to go asunder.<sup>2</sup> Suppose, moreover, that man began, *not*, as evolution assumes, at the low brute stage, but with capacities of moral obedience, and relations to his maker suitable to these, is not the subject lifted out of the region in which

writer, is probably to be found the key to such passages in Job, the Psalms and the prophets, as Job xiv. 13–15 ; xix. 25–27 ; Pss. xvi. 8–11 ; xvii. 15 ; xlix. 14, 15 ; lxxiii. 24 ; Hos. vi. 2 ; xiii. 14 ; Isa. xxv. 6, 8 ; xxvi. 19 ; Dan. xii. 2 (cf. Cheyne, *Origin of Psalter*).

<sup>1</sup> Gen. ii. 17 ; iii. 19 ; Rom. v. 12, etc.

<sup>2</sup> See as above, *Christian View*, etc.



physiology and the other natural sciences have any longer a voice ?

There is yet another question, however, which recent scientific utterances force on the attention—*Is* death a universal and necessary law of living organisms ? It is customary to assume that it is, but the question assumes a new aspect when a biologist of the rank of Weismann is found challenging it, and declaring that “the origin of death” is “one of the most difficult problems in the whole range of physiology” ;<sup>1</sup> that there is no ascertainable reason, apart from what he considers the “utility” of it, why organisms should ever die.<sup>2</sup> In point of fact, he thinks, “an immense number of the lower organisms” do not die.<sup>3</sup> He has coined the phrase, “the immortality of the Protozoa.” Even as regards the higher organisms, in which the conditions of longevity so surprisingly vary,<sup>4</sup> he considers “that death is not a primary necessity, but that it has been secondarily acquired as an adaptation.”<sup>5</sup> It is not necessary to enter into the discussion here : meanwhile it is plain that, if Weismann’s reasonings stand unrefuted, death is *not* an inherent law of organisms, but may well depend on conditions which would not have affected sinless man.

In fine, it is not to be denied that evolutionary theory, great as may be its services, leaves us with the main problems as regards origins as yet unsolved. It is so with regard to man’s own origin. It might be shown that it is so with regard to the origin of sex, the origin of language<sup>6</sup>—if Weismann is right, also with the origin of death. The time has clearly not yet come for dogmatically ruling out the Christian presuppositions of a doctrine of sin.

JAMES ORR.

<sup>1</sup> *Essays upon Heredity*, i. p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 21, 23, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 6 ff., 36 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 518.

## THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE PSALTER.

## PSALM XVI.

A PRAYER for God's protecting care, based on the Psalmist's consciousness of the close communion with God which he enjoys, and of which nothing, he feels, can ever deprive him.

V. 1 is the prayer; *vs.* 2-4 state the ground of the Psalmist's assurance. Yahweh is his sole good, the sole source of his happiness; his only delight is in the company of the faithful; with apostates he will have no fellowship.

1 Keep me, O God: for I have taken refuge in thee.

2 I have said <sup>1</sup> unto Jehovah, 'Thou art my Lord;

'all <sup>2</sup> my welfare (dependeth) upon thee.

3 'As for the holy ones that are in the land,

'they are the nobles in whom is all my delight.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> So Sept., Vulg., Syr. (cf. xxxi. 14, cxl. 6). The pointed Hebrew text has, *Thou* (fem.) *hast said*, implying an improbable ellipse of 'O my soul.' Comp. the same omission of the final ' in the 1st pers. sing. of the perfect in cxl. 13, 1 Kings viii. 48, Ez. xvi. 59, Job xlii. 2 (in which cases, however, the omission is corrected in the Qrê).

<sup>2</sup> So, reading בְּלֵא for בָּל (בל alone, which has been suggested, is not Hebrew). Lit. 'my welfare, all of it,' emphatic for 'all my welfare': see, for examples of the usage, Ps. viii. 8, lxxvii. 4, 6, 2 Sam. ii. 9, Isa. ix. 8, Mic. i. 2, ii. 12, Hab. ii. 6, and *Lex.* s.v. בָּל 1d (p. 481b). For על = (rests, or is dependent,) upon, cf. Jud. xix. 20, Ps. vii. 11 [Engl. 10: see Kirkpatrick's note], lxii. 8 [Engl. 7]; *Lex.* p. 753c. Another suggestion (Houbigant, Hitz., Duhm) is to read בָּל בְּלַעֲרֶיךָ for בָּל בְּלַעֲרֶיךָ, i.e. 'is not *apart from*, or *without*, thee': cf. Symm. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνευ σοῦ; Jer. 'non est *sine* te'; Targ. 'is not given *except from thee* (בר מינך)'; and for בְּלַעֲרֶיךָ *apart from, without* (χωρίς, ἀνευ), Gen. xli. 44. Either of these emendations would express what seems clearly to be the general idea intended, viz. that the Psalmist depends for his happiness upon God. 'Beyond' (R.V.) is a doubtful paraphrase of על; and 'is not *in addition to* (Gen. xxxi. 50) thee' is not a natural way of expressing the idea 'is to be found wholly in thee.'

<sup>3</sup> So, with a very slight change (ואדירי for אדירי), and removing the *athnach* from הַמָּה to בארץ. אִשֶּׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַמָּה is incorrect Hebrew for 'who are in the land': this might be either אִשֶּׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַמָּה or אִשֶּׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַמָּה (Gen. ix. 3, Num. ix. 13, xiv. 8, 27); but the pronoun in such cases never stands at the end, except after a negative (as Gen. vii. 2, xvii. 12, Num. xvii. 5). See my *Tenses*, §§ 198 *Obs.*, 199 *Obs.*; and *Lex.* הוא 2c, 3c, אִשֶּׁר הַמָּה 2c, 3c. For the *st. c.* אדירי before the relative clause cf. Ps. lxxv. 5, Job xxix. 2; and see G.-K. § 130d.

- 4 Their sorrows are multiplied that choose<sup>1</sup> another (God);  
 their drink-offerings of blood will I not pour out,  
 neither take up their names upon my lips.

1. *I have taken refuge.* The figure is one of those expressive ones which we find in the Psalms: he has taken refuge in God, as from storm, or wind (Isa. iv. 6, xxv. 4), or stress of foes (Ps. lxi. 3); he has confided himself to Him; and on this ground he craves His protection. Both the word and the cognate subst. 'refuge' are very common in the Psalms (see my *Parallel Psalter*, p. 454): the paraphrase 'put trust' obliterates the metaphor, conceals the connexion with the subst. 'refuge,' and suggests an illusory connexion with the ordinary word for 'trust.' Comp. the note above, on ii. 12 (January, 1910, p. 37).

2. *Thou art my Lord*—my master or sovereign, to whose service I am devoted: *all my welfare* (for this sense of טובה, lit. *good*, see xxv. 13, cvi. 5, Job ix. 25, xxi. 13 [A.V. *wealth* (= *weal*), R.V. *prosperity*, etc]. *dependeth upon thee*: Thou art the sole source of my happiness.

3. The Psalmist proceeds to express his regard for character, above mere position or nobility of birth: the true nobles, in whose society he delights, are not the wealthy or the powerful, but those who realise Israel's ideal character of 'holiness' (Ex. xix. 6, Deut. xiv. 2, etc.): with apostates, on the contrary, he will have no dealings; he will

<sup>1</sup> So, reading בחרו for בחרו: ב and ט are often confused in Hebrew MSS., and the versions; see my *Notes on Samuel*, p. lxxviii. (where many more instances might have been cited). בחר is a most uncertain word. It occurs nowhere else in a sense suitable here: R.V. 'exchange [Jehovah] for another God' depends on the questionable assumption that בחר has the sense of החיר; besides, not only is there no 'for' in the Hebrew, but even granting that it had that sense, we should expect as its accusative, not the object *taken* in exchange, but, as in other cases, the object *given* in exchange, i.e. Jehovah: cf. Jer. ii. 11 'my people have changed their glory *for* that which doth not profit' (A.V., R.V.); Ps. cvi. 20 R.V. ('changed their glory *for* the likeness of an ox that eateth grass'); Hos. iv. 7 (render similarly 'change *for*': A.V., R.V., inconsistently, 'change *into*,' which would be ל, not ב; for the ב, see *Lex.* p. 90, 3).

not join in their unholy offerings (cf. Is. lxxv. 4), or take up upon his lips (cf. Ex. xxiii. 13, Hos. ii. 17) the names of their gods.

*Drink-offerings of blood.* Some heathen rite is doubtless referred to ; we do not know exactly what. The allusion may be to libations of blood offered by apostate Israelites instead of wine and oil.

5 Jehovah is the share of my portion, and my cup :  
thou holdest fast<sup>1</sup> my lot.

6 The measuring-lines are fallen unto me in pleasant places ;<sup>2</sup>  
yea, I have a goodly heritage.<sup>3</sup>

Jehovah, on the contrary, is the Psalmist's apportioned share, and his cup. The figures are derived partly from the distribution of land among a body of settlers, partly from a banquet at which every guest receives in course his share of refreshment.

For 'portion' (חלק) in the sense of a portion of land, see Josh. xiv. 4, xv. 13, xviii. 5, 7, etc. ; and in the same spiritual sense, of Yahweh, as here, Ps. lxxiii. 26, cxix. 57, cxlii. 5, Lam. iii. 24, Jer. x. 16=li. 19.<sup>4</sup> The figure implies that the 'portion' is one which the Psalmist has received (from God), not one which he has chosen himself.

<sup>1</sup> So, reading תוקיך for תוקיך, which is a *vox nihili* in Hebrew.

<sup>2</sup> Lit. *in pleasantnesses*.

<sup>3</sup> Heb. *my heritage* [read נחלתי for נחלת : G.-K. § 80g] *is fair* (so A.V., m.) *unto me*. Both the verb שפך and its derivatives are very rare in Hebrew (Gen. xlix. 21, Job xxvi. 13 (see R.V. m.), Jer. xliii. 10 R.V. m.) ; but it is common in Aramaic (both Targums and Syriac), where it means not only to be *fair, beautiful*, in a literal sense, but also to *seem fair or good* to ; and it occurs in this latter sense in Dan. iv. 2 (Aram. iii. 32), vi. 1 (Aram. 2), iv. 27 (Aram. 24),—in iv. 27 (where it is rendered, 'be acceptable to'), followed, as here, by על. Here it is used probably in its Aramaic sense, the meaning being not 'is beautiful,' but 'is fair, goodly, pleasing.' On the form חִקְתָּ see Delitzsch on Ps. xi. 6, or G.-K. § 95 n.

<sup>4</sup> In Nu. xviii. 20, where Yahweh says to Aaron, 'I am thy *portion* and thine inheritance,' the reference is merely to the altar-perquisites and other sacred dues, which formed the maintenance of the priests. 'Portion and inheritance' in Dt. x. 9, xviii. 1 (cf. 2, Josh. xiii. 14, 33, xviii. 7) has a similar meaning.

'Cup' is used elsewhere also in a figurative sense (Ps. xxiii. 5). 'The sense is, Jehovah is the portion which has been assigned to me to satisfy my thirst. The desires and necessities of man's higher life are often represented by hunger and thirst, but especially by thirst as the keener and subtler appetite. Thus we read of a thirst for God's word (Am. viii. 11, 12); but especially the longing of the soul for personal communion with God is spoken of as the thirsting of the soul for Him (Ps. xli. 2, lxiii. 1). Conversely the joys of this fellowship are a "river of delights" flowing from the fountain of life which is with God, and from which He gives His people to drink (Ps. xxxvi. 8, 9).'<sup>1</sup> And here Yahweh Himself, as the full satisfaction of the Psalmist's spiritual being, is called his 'cup.'

*Thou holdest fast my lot*, so that no one can snatch it from me. 'Lot,' meaning properly the 'lot' cast (Lev. xvi. 8), is also used metaphorically of the *land allotted* (Jud. i. 3 *al.*); here fig. (cf., of misfortune, Is. xvii. 14, Jer. xiii. 25) of the lot in life which the Psalmist enjoys, i.e. of the blessings, spiritual and material alike, which follow from Yahweh's being his 'portion,' and 'cup.'

6. The '(measuring-) lines' and the 'inheritance' carry on the figure of the 'share of my portion' in *v.* 5. For 'line,' in the derived sense of the territory measured by the line, see Josh. xvii. 5 lit. 'And there fell ten *lines* to Manasseh,' and 14 'Wherefore hast thou given me as an inheritance, one *lot* [cf. *v.* 5*b*, here], and one *line*?'

*In pleasant places* (lit. *pleasantnesses*). Cf. Job xxxvi. 11 (cited below, on *v.* 11), where the Hebrew word is the same. *Heritage* or *inheritance* (the same word in Hebrew) is elsewhere also used figuratively of a person's lot in life: e.g. Job xx. 29, xxvii. 13, Is. liv. 17. The reference might

<sup>1</sup> W. R. Smith, in an interesting article on this Psalm in the *EXPOSITOR*, vol. iv. (1876), p. 348.

be to the outward prosperity and security, which accompany Yahweh's fellowship (Cheyne, Bâthgen); but the context (cf. *v. 5a*) favours the more general view that the 'inheritance' is 'the share which he has obtained among the spiritual joys of God's presence' (W. R. Smith). Or, still more probably, perhaps, a sharp distinction ought not to be drawn; and in *v. 6a, b*, as in *v. 5b*, spiritual and material satisfactions alike are contemplated by the Psalmist.

7. In the joyful remembrance that he has such a possession, the Psalmist breaks out into a strain of thanksgiving—

7 I will bless Jehovah, who hath given me counsel;  
yea, in the nights my reins admonish me.

8 I have set Jehovah continually before me:  
because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved.

*Given me counsel*; viz. in my course of life. Cf. lxxiii. 24 'Thou guidest me with thy counsel.' The 'reins,' i.e. the kidneys (Lat. *renes*), were in Hebrew psychology regarded as the springs of *feeling*; hence, when God is said to try, or see, the 'hearts and reins,' it is implied that he is cognizant of man's emotions and affections, not less than of his thoughts (which were regarded as having their seat in the heart).<sup>1</sup> Comp. vii. 9, xxvi. 2, Jer. xi. 20, xvii. 10, xx. 12; also Ps. lxxiii. 21, Jer. xii. 2, Prov. xxiii. 16. Thus the meaning here is that, at night time, the time of quiet meditation and reflection (cf. xlii. 8, lxxvii. 6, xcii. 2; also iv. 4, lxiii. 6), the emotions, or impulses, of his own breast (as we might now say) move him to respond to the Divine counsel, and follow its guidance.

8. His eye is ever fixed towards Yahweh; and conscious that, as he looks to Him, he is secure in having Him ever at his right hand as his champion and helper (cx. 5, cxxv. 5), he exclaims with confidence, *I shall not be moved*, i.e. not be disturbed in my prosperity,—in the 1st or 3rd person,

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the note on Ps. xl. 6 (April, p. 351).

a common expression in the Psalms to denote material security: x. 6, xv. 5, xxi. 7, xxx. 6, xlvi. 5, lxii. 2, 6, cxii. 6; cf. also xiii. 4, xciii. 1, xcvi. 10 (in these two passages, of the *social* order of the world being undisturbed, in consequence of Yahweh's assumption of sovereignty), civ. 5, cxxv. 1. Is. xl. 20, xli. 7, where it is used of an idol being displaced, and Deut. xxxii. 25, Ps. xxxviii. 16, xciv. 18 (A.V., R.V., in these passages *slide* or *slip*), where it is used of the foot *giving way* (fig. for falling into adversity), shew the sense in which 'be moved' is to be understood.

9-11. With this assurance of Yahweh's protecting power, his heart and spirit exult: he not only lives a life of undisturbed material felicity, but also anticipates the enjoyment of spiritual communion with God, unbroken even by death.

- 9 Therefore my heart is glad, and my glory rejoiceth:  
 my flesh also dwelleth in safety.  
 10 For thou wilt not leave my soul to Sheol;  
 thou wilt not suffer thy godly one to see the pit.  
 11 Thou makest me to know the path of life:  
 in thy presence<sup>1</sup> is fulness<sup>2</sup> of joys;  
 in thy right hand there are pleasures for ever.

9. *Glory* is a poetical expression for the highest and most honourable part of man, his immaterial spirit; so Gen. xlix. 6, Ps. xxx. 12, lvii. 8 (= cviii. 1), and probably vii. 5.<sup>3</sup> His *flesh* also *dwelleth in safety*—an expression often

<sup>1</sup> Lit. *beside thy face*. So xxi. 6, cxl. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Lit. *satiety*, said properly of food; see the same word in Ex. xvi. 3 ('when we did eat bread *to the full*'), Ps. lxxviii. 25 ('sent them food *to the full*').

<sup>3</sup> This is the generally accepted view. It is, however, possible that we should, both here and in the other passages quoted, vocalise (as the Sept. did in Gen. xlix. 6) לֵבֶרֶת, i.e. 'my liver': so e.g. Cheyne in *Enc. Bibl.* s.v. LIVER, and Skinner, in his recently published commentary, in Gen. l.c. The combination of ideas may at first sight seem strange: but in itself there is nothing more remarkable in the liver being regarded as the seat of mental impulses or affections than there is in the kidneys or bowels being so regarded, as they unquestionably were by the Hebrews. The corresponding word in Assyrian, *kabittu*—which, however, is not

used of undisturbed security in Palestine (Deut. xxxiii. 12, 28, Jer. xxiii. 6, xxxiii. 16, Prov. i. 33). 'Flesh' is parallel with 'heart' and 'glory' (i.e. 'spirit') here, as with 'soul' in lxiii. 1, and 'heart' in lxxiii. 26, lxxxiv. 2; it 'does not denote the dead corpse, but the living organism in and through which the soul works; together with heart or soul, it makes up the whole man' (Kirkpatrick). The verse thus describes how fellowship with Yahweh guarantees both inward joy and outward security; his spirit rejoices, his body is secure. The rend. of P.B.V., A.V., *shall rest in hope*, 'beautiful and suggestive as it is, is thus inaccurate and misleading' (Kirkpatrick); the words do not mean that the flesh after death will rest in the grave in hope, but that the Psalmist, while yet alive, dwells in confidence and security, without fear of danger or death.

10. For he feels confident that he will not be abandoned to Sheol, not surrendered by Yahweh, so as to experience the terrors of the huge dark cavern, deep down below the surface of the earth (in the 'lowest parts of the earth,' Ez. xxvi. 20, xxxi. 14, 16, 18, xxxii. 18, 24, Ps. lxiii. 9: cf. lxxxvi. 13 R.V.m., lxxxviii. 6), and its waters (Job xxvi. 5), where impenetrable darkness reigned (Job x. 21-2), and where the voice of praise was hushed (vi. 5, xxx. 9, lxxxviii. 10-12, cxv. 17, Is. xxxviii. 18), which the Hebrews believed to be the final 'house of meeting for all living' (Job xxx. 23 R.V.m.). *To see the pit* (so R.V.m.; Hebrew *sháhath*; not *corruption*, as A.V., R.V.), as xlix. 9: elsewhere to 'go down to the pit' is said (xxx. 19, Job xxxiii. 24; and with another word, *bôr*, for 'pit,' xxviii. 1, lxxxviii. 4, Ez. xxvi. 20, etc.): conversely, when a person escapes mortal danger, he is said to be 'kept back,' 'brought back,'

found with the actual meaning 'liver'—has regularly the sense of *Gemüth*, *mind*, and is said to brighten, rejoice, etc. In English we could paraphrase by 'bosom.'



'brought up,' or 'redeemed' from it (Job xxxiii. 18, 30, Ps. ciii. 4, Jon. ii. 6: cf., with 'Sheol' and *bôr*, Ps. xxx. 3). The hope which the Psalmist expresses is thus not that he will rise again, but that he *will not die*. By *thy godly one* he naturally means himself. If the plural (which is read by the official Hebrew text, and many MSS.) is correct, other devout Israelites, like-minded with himself, will be included; so that the various reading does not substantially affect the sense. The official Hebrew margin, and the majority of MSS., however, as well as all the ancient versions, have the singular, which agrees better with the context. The term 'godly (*lit.* kindly) one' is used often in the Psalms—and occasionally also besides—to denote the pious Israelite: see my *Parallel Psalter*, p. 443 f.

11. The Psalmist's sense of superiority to death is here further drawn out. *Thou makest me to know*—pointest out to me (cxliii. 8)—*the path of life*. The expression occurs more than once in the Proverbs, where it is opposed to the path which leads to death and Sheol, as ii. 18 f., 'Her house (the house of the 'strange woman') inclineth unto death, and her tracks unto the shades'; None that go to her return again, neither do they attain to the *paths of life*'; v. 5 f. 'Her feet go down to death, her steps take hold on Sheol: Lest thou make level<sup>1</sup> *the path of life*, her tracks totter, and thou knowest it not'; xv. 24 '*The path of life* is upwards for the wise, in order to depart from Sheol beneath': cf. xii. 28 'In the *path* of righteousness is *life*, and her pathway is no-death.' In these passages 'life' means more than merely animal life: it means, or implies,

<sup>1</sup> Fig. for, *free from hindrances*, and so step easily upon. Elsewhere lit. (Ps. lxxviii. 50 R.V. m. 'He levelled a way for his anger'); or fig. for, to *make passable* in a general sense (Prov. v. 21), to *free from hindrances*, whether material (Is. xxvi. 7 'evenly [*lit. into an even one*]; G.-K. § 117 *ii*) dost thou *level* the path of the just', or moral (Prov. iv. 26 '*make level* the path of thy feet').

a virtuous and happy life ;<sup>1</sup> in the Psalm it means, or implies, something more even than this, but still something less than the life hereafter of the N.T. ; it is a life of happiness, brightened by a sense of God's presence and favour, a life, therefore, of which it may be hoped that it will not be interrupted by death, but of which this is not expressly affirmed. And so the Psalmist continues, *in thy presence* (viz. during the present earthly life) *is fulness of joys*—joys springing from a sense of God's favour, and from spiritual fellowship with Him ; *in thy right hand there are pleasures* (lit. *pleasantnesses*) *for ever*,—pleasures, that is, abidingly in God's hand, and ever ready to be dispensed by Him, as from an inexhaustible source : cf., for the figure, Prov. iii. 16 'Length of days is *in her right hand* ; *in her left hand* are riches and honour.'<sup>2</sup> As the context shews, the 'pleasures' meant are blessings given by God, especially the delights which are to be found only in Him, in contrast to fleeting and unsatisfying worldly joys. Comp. the same word—except that the form is there the fem.—in Job xxxvi. 11 'If they hearken and serve him, they spend their years in good (i.e. in prosperity), and their days in *pleasantness*,'<sup>3</sup>—where, however, material prosperity seems to be what is principally in the poet's mind.

The idea of a future life is in the O.T. only *nascent*. The ordinary belief on the subject of a future life, shared by the

<sup>1</sup> For the idea of 'life' in the Book of Proverbs, comp. such passages as iii. 18 (wisdom a 'tree of life' to those who lay hold of her) ; iv. 13 ('instruction,' or moral discipline, a man's 'life') ; viii. 35 (whoso findeth wisdom findeth 'life') ; x. 11 ('The mouth of the righteous is a fountain of life') ; xiii. 12 ('Hope deferred maketh the heart sick, But when the desire cometh, it is a tree of life') ; xvi. 22 (understanding a 'fountain of life'). Life in these passages is more than merely animal life : it includes higher elements dependent upon a mental or moral state—wisdom, or righteousness, or inward satisfaction.

<sup>2</sup> The rendering '*at thy right hand*' is contrary to idiom, and incorrect.

<sup>3</sup> So R.V.m. 'Pleasures' suggests a hedonism that is not intended.

ancient Hebrews, was, not that the spirit after death ceased to exist, but that it passed into the underworld, 'Sheol,' the 'house of meeting for all living,' without any distinction between good and bad (Job xxx. 23), where it entered upon a shadowy, half-conscious existence, devoid of interest and occupation, forgotten by God, and cut off from His hand (Ps. lxxxviii. 5 'Like the slain that lie in the grave, whom thou rememberest no more, and they are cut off from thy hand'), and not worthy of the name of 'life': 'For Sheol doth not praise thee, death doth not celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit do not hope for thy faithfulness' (Is. xxxviii. 18). But the darkness which thus shrouded man's hereafter was not unbroken in the O.T.: and there are *three* lines along which the way is prepared in it for the fuller revelation brought by the Gospel. There is, firstly, the limitation (Is. lxxv. 22), or the abolition (Is. xxv. 8), of the power of death, set forth by the prophets in their vision of a glorified, but earthly, Zion of the future. There is, secondly, the conviction uttered by individuals that their close fellowship with God implies and demands that they will themselves be personally superior to death (Ps. xlix. 15, lxxiii. 24, 26, Job xix. 26). And thirdly, there is the idea of a resurrection, which gradually emerges in the Old Testament.<sup>1</sup> Ps. xvi. stands on the same level as Ps. xlix. and lxxiii. In none of these Psalms is the hope more than a 'postulate of faith,' a 'splendid hope, a personal and individual conclusion';<sup>2</sup> it is no generally accepted article of belief. The Psalmist does not speak explicitly of a future life (for *v.* 11 does not refer to it at all<sup>3</sup>); but he

<sup>1</sup> See, on the gradual growth in Israel of the belief in a future state, Dr. Burney's excellent *Four Lectures on Israel's Hope of Immortality*, 1909 (in the O.T., the Apocrypha, and Apocalyptic writings), and the present writer's *Sermons on Subjects connected with the O.T.*, pp. 72-98 (in the Book of Enoch and the Targums).

<sup>2</sup> Kirkpatrick, *The Psalms*, p. lxxviii.

<sup>3</sup> Or, at least, does not certainly refer to it: cf. Kirkpatrick, p. 78.

expresses the hope of superiority over death, grounded on the close personal relation in which he himself stands towards God, and which he cannot believe will be interrupted by death. The hope in Pss. xlix. and lxxiii. is based on the same ground: in contrast to those whose lives are devoted to the world, the writer of each of these Psalms has a conviction that God will 'take' him, and admit him to some greater bliss. But in the full sense of the words used, the hope of Ps. xvi. remained an unrealized ideal. The Psalmist suffered the lot of all other men. The Psalm is thus 'Messianic,' not in being a prediction of Christ's resurrection,—for it is plain that the feelings and hopes expressed in it are those of the Psalmist himself, or, at most, if the plural in v. 10 be the original reading, of himself and other like-minded godly Israelites,—but in expressing an *ideal*—a hope of superiority to death—which transcended experience, and was fully realised only by Christ. Even by Him, however, the hope was not realised literally, but only in substance; for Christ did, in the literal sense of the words, 'see the pit.' It is difficult not to think that the application of the words to Christ found in Acts ii. 25–31. xiii. 35–37 was facilitated by the mistranslations of the Septuagint ('shall dwell in hope,' 'wilt not leave my soul in Hades,' and 'to see corruption'). But the Apostles used arguments of the kind usual at the time, and such as would seem cogent both to themselves and to their contemporaries. As Mr. Edghill says,<sup>1</sup> 'To his [St. Peter's] readers who took for granted the Davidic origin of the Psalter, and who agreed as a matter of course that the Messiah would be the Son of David, such illustrations would have carried considerable force. St. Peter shared their beliefs; he and his hearers were on common ground; and it was to increase their faith that he pressed home the witness of the Old Testament scriptures.

<sup>1</sup> *Evidential Value of Prophecy*, p. 495 f.

It does not follow that the 'proofs' possess for us the same value as they did for the men of that generation. St. Peter had in view the conversion of his own contemporaries; and to secure that end he employed the arguments which he believed to be true, and knew to be effective.' The Psalm contains, like the other similar passages referred to above, a great declaration of the faith and hope of an Old Testament saint: it expresses also an *ideal*, both of fellowship with God, and of superiority to death: but, when we study it in itself, and consider it carefully in its original import, we see that v. 10 will not support the argument which the Apostles built upon it, and that the Psalm cannot be appealed to, in the way in which they appealed to it, as a proof of the resurrection of Christ.

S. R. DRIVER.

*THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH  
GOSPEL.*

XI. THE MINISTRY OF JESUS ACCORDING TO THE FOURTH  
EVANGELIST.

THE story of the ministry of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel differs from that in the Synoptists chiefly in these two respects: (1) Whereas from the Synoptic narratives it might appear that Jesus gathered no disciples about Him until after the imprisonment of the Baptist, the Fourth Evangelist states clearly that Jesus made disciples and entered upon an active ministry when John was not yet cast into prison. (2) Whereas the Synoptists make Galilee and the north the scene of the ministry of Jesus until near the time of His visit to Jerusalem for the Passover Feast at which He was crucified, the Fourth Evangelist represents Jesus as visiting Jerusalem repeatedly, there being five Feasts, including the fatal Passover, which, according to him, gave Jesus occasion to go to the holy city.

Now, as regards the first of these two differences, it must be carefully noticed that the Synoptic narratives, though they do not mention a period of ministry prior to the imprisonment of the Baptist, yet do not exclude the possibility of such. For it is important to observe that the Fourth Evangelist does not locate this earlier ministry of Jesus in Galilee. It is true that he takes Jesus to Galilee after He has gathered to Himself certain of the Baptist's disciples (i. 35-51), and that he records the miracle wrought at the marriage feast in Cana, and also a sojourn of not many days in Capernaum. But we must be careful to notice that there is no *public* activity in Galilee at this time. The occasion of the marriage feast was a private one, and

only His mother, and brethren and disciples are mentioned in connexion with the stay in Capernaum.

From Capernaum our Evangelist takes Jesus to Jerusalem for the Feast of the Passover (ii. 13 ff.), and after this Jesus and His disciples came into "the land of Judaea." Here He tarried with them and they—presumably with His authority (comp. iii. 22 with iv. 2)—baptized. At this time, the Evangelist says expressly, John was still baptizing, for he was not yet cast into prison. This statement reads like a deliberate correction of a possible misunderstanding that might arise from the Synoptic narrative, respecting the time when the public teaching of Jesus began.

Now it is a matter of some importance that we should notice how both Mark and Matthew imply that, before the public Galilean ministry of Jesus began, He was elsewhere than in Galilee, though they do not say where. Mark has: "After that John was delivered up, Jesus came ( $\eta\lambda\theta\epsilon\nu$ ) into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of God, etc." (St. Mark i. 14), and Matthew speaks of a *withdrawal* into Galilee: "When he heard that John was delivered up, he withdrew ( $\alpha\nu\epsilon\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\eta\sigma\epsilon\nu$ ) into Galilee." The wording in Matthew might suggest that it was in consequence of the imprisonment of the Baptist that Jesus withdrew to Galilee. St. Mark, however, mentions the imprisonment only as a point of time, and does not say that it was the reason why Jesus came into Galilee. So then even though the author of 'Matthew' may have intended his words "When he heard that John was delivered up, etc." to give the explanation why Jesus retired to Galilee, we need not regard the statement as authoritative, for he may only have drawn an incorrect conclusion from St. Mark, who is his authority here.

But the Fourth Evangelist gives as the reason why Jesus departed into Galilee that He "knew that the Pharisees had heard that He was making and baptizing more disciples than

John" (iv. 1). These words leave it undetermined whether the writer means that the move was made while John was still baptizing. "Baptizing more disciples than John" might mean baptizing more disciples than John *had* done, and not *was* doing. The reason of the withdrawal of Jesus to Galilee may then be given correctly in the Fourth Gospel, and the time of it, which is left undetermined here, may well be, as St. Mark says, after John was delivered up. Only a too keen scent for discrepancies between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptists will detect one here.

But then we are confronted with the objection that St. Mark, followed by the author of 'Matthew,' places the call of Andrew and Simon Peter, to be disciples of Jesus, after the Galilean ministry had begun, whereas the writer of the Fourth Gospel brings them into discipleship some time before, representing them, as we have seen, as having been previously followers of the Baptist. This seems at first sight a serious objection, particularly as St. Mark was the 'interpreter' of Peter and is reputed to be the reporter of that Apostle's teaching. But I think that it is possible to make too much of the influence of St. Peter upon St. Mark's Gospel. It must not be so exaggerated as to make the Apostle almost the author of that Gospel. And we have already pointed out in the second of these papers how insufficient the account given by St. Mark of the call of Peter and Andrew by the sea of Galilee is to explain their readiness to obey. We must surely prefer here the fuller narrative of St. Luke who had some other source of information on this point than St. Mark's Gospel. It may justly be argued that the story of the miraculous draught of fishes as given by St. Luke (v. 1-11) is the natural prelude to the promise of Jesus: "From henceforth thou shalt catch men." The very fragmentary account, then, given by St. Mark, who depicts Jesus walking by the Sea of Galilee and calling Andrew and Peter



to follow Him, and He would make them fishers of men, needs to be supplemented as in St. Luke's Gospel it is. But there is no reason for regarding this supplement as in any way artificial and the invention of the writer. It has all the appearance of historical truth. Nor, as I have already pointed out, does St. Luke's account suggest that when this incident took place Simon Peter was still a stranger to Jesus. On the contrary, it is more probable than not that Peter already knew Jesus and so had learnt to place confidence in Him, as he shows himself ready to do when he says: "Master, we toiled all the night, and took nothing: but at thy word I will let down the net."

It does not then seem to me reasonable to consider the Fourth Gospel incredible in so far as it brings Simon Peter and Andrew into a position of discipleship with Jesus at a time earlier than the public Galilean ministry. It is a remarkable fact that if we exclude the account given in the Fourth Gospel of the passing of disciples from the Baptist to Jesus then we have no record anywhere of any such thing. It is surely unlikely that he who made it his work to prepare the way for the Christ should not have passed on some of his disciples to follow Jesus.

And before we go on further, it may be pointed out that we have evidence from another source that the ministry of Jesus does not (even in the view of one of the Synoptic Evangelists) date from the imprisonment of the Baptist, but rather goes back to the time when John was still baptizing. I refer to the reported words of St. Peter in Acts i. 21 f., where we read: "Of the men therefore which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and went out among us, *beginning from the baptism of John*, unto the day that he was received up from us, of these must one become a witness with us of his resurrection." The words here italicised seem to me an indirect but not an

uninteresting confirmation of what is reported in the Fourth Gospel respecting the time at which Jesus began to gather disciples about Himself.

But, an objector will say, granting that Jesus may have made disciples prior to His public Galilean ministry, there is a serious difficulty in the way of the acceptance of the account of this in the Fourth Gospel. For the recognition and confession of Jesus by His disciples as the Messiah at this early stage is, in view of the Synoptic narratives, an anachronism. This recognition, it is said, only came later. Moreover, in the Synoptists Jesus is represented as unready to declare Himself to be the Messiah, whereas in the Fourth Gospel the Messianic claim is in the foreground everywhere.

I have already pointed out in the second paper of this series that the recognition of the first disciples of Jesus as the Christ is more a hope than an assured faith, and that the discipline of their training under Jesus was necessary in order that it might pass from the one to the other. Even in the Fourth Gospel itself the faith of the disciples is shown to be of gradual growth (ii. 11, vi. 68 f.). At first it was the belief of hope, and this, as they gained experience, developed into the faith that comes of knowledge.

In reference to the general objection that in the Fourth Gospel Jesus puts Himself forward from the first as the Messiah it may be said that this is an objection which is easily overrated. As we shall see when we come to consider the visits of Jesus to Jerusalem, He did not declare Himself as the Christ to the Jews sufficiently clearly for them. And so late as the last visit but one we find them challenging Him to assert Himself: "How long dost thou hold us in suspense? If thou art the Christ tell us plainly."

It seems to me as clear as anything well can be, if once we accept the Synoptic story of the Baptism of Jesus, that He was fully conscious of His Messiahship before He began His

ministry. And when He came forward to gather disciples to Himself, He must have meant to present Himself to them as the Messiah, to make them 'believe in Him.' That the conception which the people had of the Messiah was a wrong one, and one that Jesus could not entertain, is apparent enough. And as wrong notions manifested themselves, caution was needed—even the Fourth Gospel shows this to have been the case (ii. 24, vi. 15)—and injunctions to silence such as we find in the Synoptists may have become necessary. As Professor Stanton <sup>1</sup> well observes, Jesus "set before Himself a twofold object—to implant in the hearts of men faith in Himself as the Christ, and at the same time to change their conception of the Christ, to prevent His countrymen receiving Him merely as the Christ of their expectation."

It must be borne in mind that the time when Jesus came forward was one of expectation. People were looking for the Messiah, and the preaching of the Baptist must have quickened the hope of the coming of the Christ. Some of the Baptist's disciples then were ready to follow one to whom their master had pointed them. With this little band of disciples Jesus went to Galilee not, as we have seen, to come forward there publicly as a Teacher. At the marriage feast in Cana of Galilee He turns the water into wine. It is interesting, I think, to note one particular in our Evangelist's account of this event. I refer to the hesitation, which Jesus shows, to exercise His power. When His mother tells Him that the supply of wine has failed, He answers her, almost reprovably: "Woman, what have I do with thee? Mine hour is not yet come." Shall He, or shall He not, relieve their want? He cannot unless the right moment has come for the manifestation of His power. Now the Fourth Evangelist tells us nothing of the story of the Temptation of Jesus, as we have it in the Synoptists, but we observe

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, part ii. p. 196.

here a striking agreement between him and them. The author of *Ecce Homo* was right, I think, in making the temptation of Jesus a matter having to do with the way in which He should exercise His miraculous powers. He had refused in the wilderness to turn stones into bread for the satisfaction of His bodily wants. And it seems to me that He hesitates, for the moment, as to whether He shall use His power at the marriage-feast. He must first be assured that His hour has come, and that the occasion is a right one for so doing. There is at first sight an apparent contradiction between the gentle rebuke addressed to His mother and His subsequent readiness to take the course He did. But deliberation was needed. He would not be dictated to save from above. There was only hesitation until the Divine will was clear. Then an immediate response was made.

The miracle then was wrought, and the Evangelist records that in consequence of it, His disciples (of whom we believe he was himself one, and so qualified to speak on the point) believed on Him. They who had joined themselves to Jesus, because of the testimony of the Baptist to Him, were now finding that their allegiance was deserved.

After this event at Cana, whether immediately or not we cannot stay, for the connecting link *μετὰ τοῦτο* does not determine this, Jesus went with His mother and brethren and disciples to Capernaum, for what purpose we are not told, but there is no hint of any public teaching on this occasion. Thence He went up to Jerusalem for the Passover (ii. 13), His disciples accompanying Him (ii. 22). It was on this occasion that, for the first time, He protested against the profanation of the temple. The account of this we have already considered in a previous paper, and we have seen that there is good reason to regard it as historical. The action of Jesus aroused the resentment of 'the Jews' and we see here the beginning of their hostility towards Him,

which thus dates from a very early stage of His public life. For this is His first appearance in Jerusalem since this began. But all were not hostile. "When He was at Jerusalem at the passover, during the feast, many believed on his name, beholding his signs which he did." The Evangelist does not tell us what signs these were. The cleansing of the temple may well have been one of them. But though many were ready 'to believe on His name'—which means probably that they were ready to welcome Him as Messiah—"Jesus did not trust himself unto them." We may read into this statement of the Evangelist the fact that there were false conceptions of Messiahship in the minds of the people in Jerusalem, and these Jesus detected from the first.

It was during the time in Jerusalem that the visit of Nicodemus to Jesus by night occurred (iii. 1-21). There is nothing incredible or at all improbable in this visit, nor do I see any reason to doubt that the *purport* of the conversation, which, indeed, the Evangelist may himself have heard, is correctly reported. I say deliberately 'purport,' for, as has often been pointed out, the style of the writer himself marks even the words of Jesus which He records. Indeed it is not always easy to decide where Jesus ceases to speak, and the reflections of the Evangelist on His words begin. Thus verses 16-21 of this chapter may well be the writer's own comment, rather than words of Jesus.

"After these things"—these events at Jerusalem—Jesus sojourned with His disciples in the land of Judaea (iii. 22) and baptized, while John was still baptizing. And "there arose a questioning on the part of John's disciples with a Jew about purifying" (iii. 25). They come to John and tell him of the activity and growing popularity of Jesus. This gives the Evangelist the opportunity to record the further testimony of His former master the Baptist: "Ye yourselves bear me witness, that I said, I am not the Christ,

but that I am sent before him. He that hath the bride is the bridegroom : but the friend of the bridegroom, which standeth and heareth him, rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom's voice : this my joy, therefore, is fulfilled. He must increase, I must decrease." There seems no sufficient reason for the invention of this incident and we may well believe that it really did occur. The concluding words of this chapter (iii. 31-36) are no argument against it, for they need not be understood as part of the Baptist's answer. Rather do they read like a reflection of the writer.

We now come to the withdrawal of Jesus from Judaea into Galilee. We have already considered the reason which our Evangelist gives for this. The journey to Galilee was made through Samaria, and the chief incident in it is the conversation with the woman of Samaria at Jacob's well. The story of this is told circumstantially and with remarkable detail, and I should find it difficult to believe that it can be invention and not fact. It was in accordance with our Lord's method to use passing circumstances to teach important truths, and in this case He engages the woman in conversation arising out of her employment at the time. The story is, however, open to the objection that Jesus plainly declares Himself to this woman to be the Christ. It must, however, be noticed that He does not so declare Himself until the woman has spoken of the expectation of Messiah among her own people.

We have now reached the time when the public ministry of Jesus in Galilee begins. "The Galileans received him, having seen all the things that he did in Jerusalem at the feast : for they also went unto the feast." So writes our Evangelist. He does not narrate the details of the work of Jesus in Galilee at this time except the single miracle of the healing of the nobleman's son at Capernaum. We cannot decide why he is so reticent about the work in

Galilee, nor why he singles out this particular miracle as worthy of narration. It seems to have been impressed upon his mind that on each of the two occasions when Jesus had come into Galilee He had wrought a sign at or from Cana (iv. 54). But after all why should the Evangelist have told again the story of the Galilean ministry? It had already been written at some length and there was no need to repeat what the Synoptists had already written. It is true that he does later on repeat the story of the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand, and that of the walking upon the sea, but these he introduces, I believe, only because they led up to the discourse in the synagogue at Capernaum. This seems to be the Evangelist's centre of interest in that section of His Gospel.

We are all familiar with the view that the Fourth Evangelist wrote to supplement the Synoptists, and, though this would be an insufficient explanation to give of his purpose in penning his Gospel, we may well believe that there is an element of truth in it. The interest of the Evangelist turns on the belief and the unbelief which the presence and person of Christ called forth. The rejection of Jesus by the Jews, though given in the Synoptic narratives, is inadequately explained. The steps by which the crucifixion ultimately came about are not shown. The Fourth Evangelist is careful to trace the hostility of the Jews from its first beginnings to its culmination in the crucifixion. His Gospel is a historic commentary on his own words: "He came unto his own (*εἰς τὰ ἴδια*) and his own (*οἱ ἴδιοι*) received him not." Not that his Gospel gives only a dark picture of unbelief. There were those who believed, and of them he writes: "As many as received him to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name."

As we have already said, there were five festal occasions

when Jesus visited Jerusalem. The first of these has already come before us. It was a Passover, the first since He had begun to make disciples. The chief incident of it was the cleansing of the temple. The next occasion was after the public Galilean ministry had begun. The feast is an unnamed one (v. 1). It has been conjectured to be (1) Pentecost, (2) Purim, (3) the Feast of Trumpets. Certainty is impossible in the matter. Our Evangelist tells how Jesus on this occasion offended the Jews by healing an impotent man on the Sabbath day. They 'persecuted' Jesus—by reproaches we may suppose. The answer Jesus gave them was: "My Father worketh even until now and I work." They were offended at this saying and now sought to kill Him, because He not only broke the Sabbath but also made Himself equal with God.

Now it has been objected that the manner in which Jesus speaks to the Jews in Jerusalem does not accord with the style of His teaching, as the Synoptists represent it. Indeed, I have heard it said that Jesus' manner of address in the Fourth Gospel is irritating and not worthy of Him. The saying put into the mouth of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, "My Father worketh until now, and I work" is contrasted with His words on a similar occasion: "The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath." And we are told that it is highly improbable that Jesus would have spoken to the Jews in Jerusalem about His Father, as in the Fourth Gospel He does. It is said that the argumentative tone of the Gospel reflects the thoughts of a later time, and cannot be reconciled with the Synoptic teaching. It seems not simple enough, but is altogether too theological.

This complaint is made against the long discourse of Jesus which follows immediately upon the incident we have been considering. But I do not think that we have any right to judge *à priori* how Jesus would speak in Jerusalem. Even



the Synoptists, when they take Him to Jerusalem for the last Passover, put into His mouth very stern and uncompromising words. And I see no reason why from the first Jesus should not have adopted towards the religious teachers in Jerusalem the attitude which the Fourth Evangelist sets Him forth as exhibiting. It is not fair to compare the manner of teaching given by Jesus to the simple folk in Galilee with His manner of speaking in Jerusalem where the conditions were so entirely different. A breach with the authorities there was inevitable from the first. Jesus comes to offer Himself to them for their acceptance and He does not conceal His claims, which run counter to all the prejudices and selfish ambitions of Scribes, Pharisees and Sadducees.

It is not necessary to suppose that the Fourth Evangelist gives us the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus. But we may not unreasonably think that he sets forth the purport of the Master's appeal and claims. It is to be noticed that he does not represent Jesus as coming to Jerusalem and giving out with no uncertain voice: I am the Christ. It would seem that Jesus never so styled Himself in Jerusalem until He was challenged at His trial before the high priest, and then He only did so in answer to the high priest's question. To have proclaimed Himself as the Christ in the face of the mistaken ideas as to the nature of the Messianic office would have been mischievous. But Jesus did come forward acting with authority, as in the case of the cleansing of the temple, and claimed to speak authoritatively in the name of God, whom He calls publicly His Father. He asserts too that His miracles are signs of His divine mission. From the first He claims the allegiance of Jerusalem for Himself, though He knows what the claim is to cost Him.

The discourse then given in v. 19-47, and completed in vii. 15-24, this latter passage having seemingly become dis-

placed from its proper context,<sup>1</sup> marks a crisis in the life of Jesus. He sees that the attitude of the rulers in Jerusalem towards Him is irreconcilable. Henceforth, Galilee is His hope, and the scene of His labours. Apparently He did not attend the next Passover Feast, but He waited until the Feast of Tabernacles was well advanced and then came forward and preached boldly in the temple courts, inviting attention to Himself. He does not now address Himself to the rulers but to the people generally: "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink." There is much speculation among the people as to whether He is the Christ and many were ready to believe on Him. The Pharisees are alarmed by the readiness shown to accept Him as the Christ and they send the temple officers to take Him. These, however, are unable to obey the order, so impressed are they by the manner of Jesus' teaching: "Never man spake like this man." Jesus continues to teach, directing men boldly to Himself as the light of the world (viii. 12). The Pharisees resent the testimony He bears to Himself, and an altercation ensues, which ends in an attempt to stone Him, because He had spoken blasphemy in claiming to be one with God (viii. 58). But He escaped. Then follows the story of the healing of the man born blind, which is told with remarkable vividness and detail, that it is difficult to believe it can be an invention of the writer. The questioning by the Pharisees of the man himself and his parents, and their attempts to intimidate by threats of excommunication are clearly and logically brought out. The man receives his sentence of excommunication and Jesus offers Himself to him as the object of his personal faith (ix. 35-38). Jesus still speaks boldly to the people and asserts Himself as the true leader and shepherd of Israel in opposition to the hirelings who

<sup>1</sup> See *Hibbert Journal* for April, 1909. On two dislocations in St. John's Gospel,

but seek their own (x. 1-18). Many think Him mad and possessed, but some reason more soberly: "These are not the sayings of one possessed with a devil. Can a devil open the eyes of the blind?"

All this happened at the Feast of Tabernacles. The Evangelist does not tell us what happened meanwhile, but he passes at once to the Feast of Dedication, some two months later. "It was winter," he says, "and Jesus was walking in the temple in Solomon's porch." The Jews seek to draw from Him a direct claim to be the Messiah: "If thou art the Christ, tell us plainly." But Jesus refers them to the works He has done, and reproves their unbelief. Again He repeats His oneness with the Father, and they again try to stone Him (x. 22-39).

This is the last time that Jesus comes to Jerusalem until He offers Himself as Jerusalem's King of peace (xii. 12-16). He retires now beyond the Jordan to the place where John had at the first baptized. Here many came to Him; and they said: "John indeed did no sign: but all things whatsoever John spoke of this man were true." And many believed on Him there.

Next follows the story of the raising of Lazarus, the objections to which we will consider later. This miracle, persuading, as it did, so many to believe on Jesus, finally decided the Pharisees to put Him to death. Their opportunity came when Jesus presented Himself publicly before the Feast of the Passover.

Now, whatever objections may be made to the account in the Fourth Gospel of the visits of Jesus to Jerusalem on the ground that they do not fit into the Synoptic frame of events, and that the teaching in Jerusalem does not accord with that in Galilee we have a right to demand that critics should concede that at any rate our Evangelist gives a picture consistent in itself, and that the progress of events is not un

natural. In other words, the events do 'march.' There is no halting. We can see opposition developing; and the final issue flows naturally out of the beginning. The unbelief and hostility of the Jews and their final rejection and crucifixion of Jesus stand out clearly and consistently. But something more will have to be said in our next and concluding paper in answer to objections which are made to the Fourth Gospel on the ground of its inconsistency with the other three.

E. H. ASKWITH.

### AN ANCIENT CHRISTIAN HYMN BOOK.<sup>1</sup>

DR. RENDEL HARRIS has made a notable contribution to our knowledge of early Christian literature by his recent discovery and publication of forty canticles or hymns, which were known in the third century (if not still earlier) under the title of *Odes of Solomon*. Apparently the title is lost in Dr. Harris's MS., but the identification is established by passages of the *Pistis Sophia* in which Odes vi., xxii. and xxv. are quoted in whole or in part expressly as Odes of Solomon. The *Pistis Sophia*, a Gnostic work, is usually assigned to the third century, A.D., and accordingly the Odes (which seem to form a homogeneous collection) may be provisionally assigned to some earlier date in the third century, or, more probably perhaps, to the second century. The language of the MS. is Syriac, but Dr. Harris shows that the Syriac text is a translation from the Greek. Forty second-century Christian hymns! It is a very welcome discovery.

For even now our knowledge of the Christian hymnody of the first 350 years of the Church's life is disappointingly meagre. "The Christian Church," writes Mr. W. H.

<sup>1</sup> *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*, now first published from the Syriac version by J. Rendel Harris. Cambridge, 1909.

Frere, " may be said to have started on its way singing " <sup>1</sup> ; but (apart from the Psalms of David) we know very little about the words of its songs. Pliny in 112 A.D. tells the Emperor Trajan that the Christians were accustomed on a fixed day to assemble together and to sing antiphonally a hymn to Christ as to a God.<sup>2</sup> Of the text of the hymn thus sung we know nothing ; it may have been a Messianic Psalm from the Old Testament ; it may have been the fruit of the Christian inspiration of the first century ; but the knowledge of it is lost for us. Indeed from the first three and a half centuries hardly anything of Christian hymnody is preserved. In Greek there remain the ὕμνος ἑωθινός, " hymn for the dawn," preserved in the Codex Alexandrinus and printed in Swete's Septuagint (vol. iii. pp. 832 ff.), and also the evening hymn, φῶς ἱλαρόν, quoted by St. Basil, *de Spiritu Sancto*, 29, and printed in Greek and English in *Hymns A. and M.* (Historical edition, p. 25). In Syriac the beautiful Gnostic *Hymn of the Soul* survives. These three poems with one or two others have hitherto been for us almost the sole remains (of importance) of the multitude of Christian hymns which were in use before the middle of the fourth century.

But the evidence which proves the existence of early Christian hymns also supplies (in part) the explanation of the loss of most of them. The authorities of the Church were jealous of the use of " Psalms " other than the Psalms of David in public worship. The well-known canon (no. 59) of the Council of Laodicea (363 A.D.) forbids the public recitation of " private " Psalms.<sup>3</sup> The Muratorian Fragment, a damaged document of the beginning of the third

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (Historical edition).

<sup>2</sup> *Epist.* x. 96 [97]. Stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐ δεῖ ἰδιωτικὸς ψαλμοὺς λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ.

century,<sup>1</sup> in distinguishing books which ought to be received into the Church for public use from others repudiates with vigour a certain "new book of Psalms." The reason of this repudiation is manifest, if the corrupt words with which the Fragment closes are rightly read as attributing the *novum psalmorum librum* in part to the pen of the Montanists and in part to that of certain admirers of Marcion the Gnostic. Readers of Tertullian will hold this conjunction of Montanist and Gnostic to be a strange thing, but it is hardly stranger than the meeting of authors in our modern hymn books. Finally in the East we find Ephraim the Syrian inveighing against Bardaisan (Bardesanes the Gnostic) for having composed a Psalter. In prosaic verse Ephraim complains :

"He desired to imitate David and to rival the beauty of the Psalter.

"Being covetous of the same praise he composed like him  
"A hundred and fifty hymns."

No wonder that the authorities of the Church exerted themselves against the use of "new Psalms."

But the action of the authorities would probably have failed, if it had not been forwarded by the nature of these early compositions. The hymns perished, but not merely because some of them were written by heretics or by Montanists. Hymns beyond other religious literature are the expression of feeling, and feeling changes. The earliest Christians, in their "new Psalms," let themselves go to a degree which seemed excessive to later generations. The rich freedom of expression which marked the joyful thankfulness of the first two centuries was checked, when Christian reflection began to give a more restrained and definite form to Christian teaching.

<sup>1</sup> So Zahn.

The

Infantine

Familiar clasp of things divine

seemed too daring, as the Church grew up into riper theological knowledge.

Nor is this all that may be said. If on the one hand the language of early hymns was too bold and too free, on the other hand it was also too cryptic for a later age; indeed expressions which may appear cryptic to us, were signs of an open and familiar vision to earlier Christians. The use of veiled expressions was forced upon the early Church by Pagan opposition and persecution, and presently it became a habit asserting itself even under circumstances which did not require it.

Dr. Harris's newly found canticles fully answer to the description we have given of early Christian hymns. They are in the first place fervent in spirit; they are whole-hearted in thanksgiving; their joy is like that of the first days. They show again the want of restraint in expression which was natural while Christian theology was still in its infancy. Lastly, their language is often symbolic or even cryptic. Though they are certainly Christian, the name *Jesus* never occurs in them. It is very difficult to decide what events of the human life of Christ are or are not referred to. Mystic waters and mystic Divine milk and a mystic seal are mentioned, and yet it cannot be said positively whether there is any allusion to the sacraments or not.

The MS. from which the Odes are taken is but meagrely described by Dr. Harris. "Its age," he writes, "may be between three and four hundred years. . . . In spite of its relatively late date, the text is a good one" (pages 2, 3).

This judgment of the Editor may be correct in general, but seeing that *ex hypothesi* thirteen or fourteen hundred

years intervene between the composition of the Odes and the writing of the MS., it is reasonable to suppose that a good number of errors, including some of importance, have crept into the text during the course of so many hundreds of years. In fact not a few places may be found, in which a slight change of reading is either necessary for the grammar, or advisable for the sense. As a contribution, therefore, to the emendation and better understanding of the Syriac text, a few Odes are given here in a revised rendering taken from Dr. Harris's printed text. Where an emendation is followed a footnote is appended.

Words supplied to fill an apparent gap in the Syriac text are inserted within square brackets. *Italics* are used on the same principles as in the Revised Version of the Bible.

Dr. Harris's MS. is defective at the beginning, and the first of the Odes which is preserved in it is numbered as the Third in the Collection. It tells simply and yet beautifully of the mystical union between the Lord and his follower.

#### ODE III.

1. [With the spirit of the Lord] I am clothed, and they that are His <sup>1</sup> members are with Him.
2. To them do I cling, and He loveth me.
3. (For I should not have known how to love the Lord, if He had not loved me.)
4. Who is able to discern love, but he that is loved ?
5. I love the Beloved, and the Beloved <sup>2</sup> loveth my soul.
6. And where His rest <sup>3</sup> is, there am I.
7. And I shall be no stranger <sup>4</sup> for with the Lord merciful <sup>5</sup> and compassionate there is no grudging.
8. I am united to *Him*, because the *Lover* hath found the Beloved.
9. Because I love the Son, I shall become a son.<sup>4</sup>
10. He that cleaveth to Him that dieth not, shall himself be free from death.<sup>6</sup>
11. And he that delighteth in life, shall live.

<sup>1</sup> Or, my members.

<sup>2</sup> By a slight emendation.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xi. 29 (Syriac).

<sup>4</sup> Heb. xii. 8 (Syriac).

<sup>5</sup> By a slight emendation.

<sup>6</sup> *Lit.* without death.



12. This is the spirit of the Lord which cannot lie, which teacheth the sons of men to know His ways.

13. Be wise, and know, and watch.

HALLELUJAH.

The Sixth Ode is written in cryptic language, and it is not easy to decide to what school of Christian thought it belongs. Dr. Harris repudiates Harnack's suggestion that it is Gnostic. "Neither here," he writes, "nor anywhere else is there anything definitely Gnostic in the book." Harnack's view was based on the latter half of the Ode, all in fact that is quoted in the *Pistis Sophia*; but now that the beginning of the Ode is before us it seems possible or even probable that it is a Montanist utterance, and that the Beatitude with which it closes is intended for the Montanist prophets. Most unfortunately the reading of an important word is uncertain in the opening clause. Dr. Harris gives, "As the *hand* moves over the harp," but the verb which he renders "moves" means rather *to go*, and "hand" as the subject of the verb seems hardly appropriate. If, however, we read *ruḥa*, "the wind," we have a word which fills the gap in the Syriac quite as well as *'ida*, "hand," and the subject matches the verb somewhat better. Moreover the correspondence of "wind" in verse 1 with "spirit" in verse 2 allows full force to the "So, thus" (*hākannā*) which introduces the simile. If such a reading of verses 1, 2 be correct, the Ode begins with a statement of the Montanist view of inspiration: the prophet is passive as the harp, while the Spirit speaks through him. In verse 3 it is explained that as the prophet speaks the merely human element, "strange" to the Divine, is destroyed, so that the words uttered are wholly the Lord's. This was the case (it says) with the ancient Scriptures, from Genesis onwards (ver. 4), and now this same inspiration is renewed in the saints of a later age (ver. 5).

In the last six verses is celebrated the ministerial work of the Montanist prophets. Such, at any rate, is the interpretation offered in this paper of this beautiful but cryptic Ode.

## ODE VI.

1. As the wind<sup>1</sup> goeth in the harp, and the strings speak,
2. So speaketh in my members the spirit of the Lord, and I speak in His love.
3. For He destroyeth that which is strange to *Him*, and all that I speak is the Lord's.<sup>2</sup>
4. For so it was from the beginning<sup>3</sup> even unto the end, that there might not be anything contrary to Him<sup>4</sup>; and nothing shall oppose Him.
5. The Lord hath granted an increase of the knowledge of Himself, and is zealous that the things should be known, which are given us by His grace. And His song He hath granted us, a *song of praise* to His name.<sup>5</sup>
6. Our spirits praise His Holy Spirit.
7. For there went forth a stream, and it became a river<sup>6</sup> great and broad:
8. For it overwhelmed everything, and it . . .<sup>7</sup>
9. And those of the sons of men who would have restrained it, could not restrain it, nor could the contrivances of those who restrain waters.
10. For it came over the face of the whole earth, and filled everything, and all the thirsty upon earth drank thereof.
11. And their thirst was quenched and was extinguished, for drink was given from the Most High.
12. Blessed therefore are His ministers, who are entrusted with His waters.
13. They have given drink<sup>8</sup> to dry lips, and the enfeebled will they have confirmed.<sup>9</sup>
14. And the souls that were nigh to departing they have held back from death.

<sup>1</sup> The Syriac appears to be illegible; Dr. Harris suggests *hand*. *Wind* and *Spirit* are represented by the same word in Syriac.

<sup>2</sup> So the MS.

<sup>3</sup> Syriac, "from *Breshith*" (the opening word of the Hebrew book of Genesis).

<sup>4</sup> 1 Tim. i. 10 (Syriac).

<sup>5</sup> Syriac obscure.

<sup>6</sup> Syriac text has, *a light*.

<sup>7</sup> Text corrupt.

<sup>8</sup> An obvious emendation: Syriac text has, "They have given rest."

<sup>9</sup> So, if Syriac text be sound.

15. And the limbs that stumbled they have set upright and established.

16. They gave life<sup>1</sup> to their dead,<sup>1</sup> and light to their eyes.

17. For each man acknowledged them in the Lord, and they lived by the living waters which are for ever.

HALLELUJAH.

The Twelfth Ode belongs to the group of those which are more definite than the rest in their statement of Christian truth. The singer sings of the Word, the Son of God, the Revealer of God in language which reminds the reader partly of the Epistle to the Hebrews and in part of the Fourth Gospel. The Coming of the Word has brought peace. The singer concludes with a Beatitude on those who acknowledge the Incarnate Word, and through Him the Lord (the Father).

ODE XII.

1. He hath filled me with the words of truth that I might speak for Him.

2. And as a stream of waters truth floweth from my mouth and my lips declare the fruits thereof.

3. And He hath increased within me His knowledge, for the mouth of the Lord is the True Word and the door into His Light.

4. And the Most High hath given Him to His worlds *to be* the interpreter<sup>2</sup> of His own beauty, and the teller<sup>2</sup> of His praise, and the confessor<sup>2</sup> of His counsel, and the evangelist<sup>2</sup> of His will, and the purifier<sup>2</sup> of His servants.

5. For the swiftness of the Word cannot be expressed, and according to Its swiftness so is Its sharpness.<sup>3</sup>

6. And Its course hath no limit, and It never faileth, but It standeth sure; and no [one] knoweth<sup>4</sup> the place of Its descent,<sup>5</sup> nor Its path.

7. For according to . . . ,<sup>6</sup> for It is the light and dayspring of [His] counsel.

8. And by It the worlds spake one to another, and those who were silent became *skilled*<sup>7</sup> *in speech*.

9. And from It came love and concord, and they spake one to another of that which they had, being impelled by the Word.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Syriac text emended slightly.

<sup>2</sup> Syriac text has *seyame*, but wrongly.

<sup>3</sup> Heb. iv. 12 (Syriac).

<sup>4</sup> By a slight emendation.

<sup>5</sup> Or, "alighting."

<sup>6</sup> Syriac, corrupt.

<sup>7</sup> Acts xviii. 24 (Syriac).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Acts xviii. 5.

10 And they know Him who made them, for they are in concord, because the mouth of the Most High hath spoken to them, and through It cometh the interpretation thereof very quickly.

11. For the tabernacle of the Word is a Son of Man, and Its truth is love.

12. Blessed are they who by This One acknowledge All, and know the Lord in His truth.

HALLELUJAH.

The Twenty-third Ode describes the coming of the Word incarnate. For those who are willing to receive it it brings salvation, but those who resist it expose themselves to destruction. Then by a turn of thought strange to us the singer passes on to speak of the written word. The poetry of the Ode suffers, but the necessity of the time forces the writer to claim for the Christian dispensation the same great possession as the Jewish Church possessed. The Hebrew claimed to have a Law written by the finger of God, and the writer of the Ode, a Jewish Christian, claims that Christians too have a book of Divine origin, sealed with the threefold Divine name.

The imagery of the Ode presents no little difficulty to the interpreter. The mixture of metaphors is most perplexing. The counsel of the Lord in the Incarnation is first compared to a letter, but the descent of the letter to earth is compared to the discharge of an arrow from the bow. But the letter is sealed; men fear to break the seal, and the letter escapes from their fingers. It is possible that the book with seven seals of Revelation v. is in the writer's mind, but the sequel of the incident is different. A mysterious Thing receives the letter, and the letter rides upon it. The Syriac word is *gīglā*, which Dr. Harris translates *wheel*. The three verbs, however, which follow describe the operations of harvesting: the "wheel" *reaps*, *cuts down*, and *gathers in heaps* those who stand against it. It is therefore an obvious suggestion that *gīglā* stands in

the place of the cognate Syriac word *maggalthā*, "sickle," either intentionally or by scribal error. If the mysteriously moving thing be in truth a sickle,<sup>1</sup> then it becomes probable that Revelation xiv. 14 is in the singer's mind.

(In that passage the Prophet-seer sees one sitting upon a cloud like unto a son of man and bearing a sharp sickle, with which the earth is presently reaped.) On the other hand it is not improbable that the statement that the *gīglā* obstructed rivers and made a broad way contains a reference to the drying up of the Euphrates, "that the way of the kings that come from the sunrising may be made ready" (Rev. xvi. 12). The obscurity of the whole passage, however, leaves us in serious doubt as to the soundness of the text. Probably the Greek had suffered before the Syriac version was made.

#### ODE XXIII.

1. Joy is of the saints ; and who shall put it on but they alone ?
2. Grace is of the Elect ; and who shall receive it but they who trust in it from the beginning ?
3. Love is of the Elect ; and who shall put it on except those who have possessed it from the beginning ?
4. They walked in the knowledge of the Most High without grudging, *entering into* His joy and the fulness of knowledge of Him.
5. And His counsel was as a letter, His will descended from the Most High,<sup>2</sup> and it was sent as an arrow from the bow, which is shot with strength.
6. And many hands ran (?) upon the letter to seize it and take it and read it.
7. And it escaped from their fingers, and they feared it, and the seal that was upon it.
8. For they had no authority to loose its seal, for the power which was upon the seal was more excellent than theirs.
9. But they who beheld it followed the letter, that they might know where it would alight, and who would read it, and who would hear it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zech. v. 2, where a *flying sickle* appears in LXX and perhaps also in the Peshitta.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps read, "from above."

10. But a rolling thing received it, and it rode upon it.<sup>1</sup>

11. And a sign was with it, *the sign* of kingship and of government.

12. And everything which met <sup>2</sup> the rolling thing it mowed down and brake in pieces.

13. And many of the enemy it destroyed ; and it dammed rivers, and passed over and uprooted many forests, and made a broad path.

14. And that which came upon it (15) was a letter of salvation,<sup>3</sup> that all lands might be gathered together.<sup>4</sup>

16. And there appeared at the head of it the sign<sup>3</sup> which is revealed, even the true Son from the Father Most High.

17. And he inherited everything and received it, and the device of many was brought to nought.

18. But all the rebellious . . .<sup>5</sup> and fled, and all who persecuted became extinct and. . . .

19. And the letter became a great volume written wholly by the finger of God.

20. And the name of the Father was upon it, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, to give counsel for ever and ever.

#### HALLELUJAH.

Dr. Harris points out that the subject of more than one of the Odes is the Descent of Christ into Hades in order to preach and to rescue the spirits imprisoned there. To the examples given by the Editor should be added the Thirty-third Ode, for the only difficulty in the way of this explanation is removed, if we accept " Grace " as a cryptic designation of our Lord.

#### ODE XXXIII.

1. Again Grace hastened and left Hades (corruption), for He<sup>6</sup> descended into it in order to empty it.

2. And He destroyed Abaddon<sup>7</sup> before Him, and brought to an end all his power.

3. And he stood upon a lofty summit (i.e. in Hades) and sent forth His voice from one end of the land unto the other.

4. And He drew to Him all who obeyed Him.

<sup>1</sup> Lit., "it came upon it."

<sup>2</sup> An emendation.

<sup>3</sup> Emendation.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. John xi. 52.

<sup>5</sup> Syriac text, "acted with audacity."

<sup>6</sup> In the Syriac *fem.*, the antecedent being "Grace."

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Rev. ix. 11.

And He did not appear as a malefactor, [5] but He was as a perfect Virgin standing and making proclamation and crying out and saying,

6. Turn ye, sons of men, and live, ye daughters.

7. And forsake the ways of this Hades and draw nigh to me ; and I will enter into you and will bring you forth from Abaddon.

8. And I will make you wise in the ways of truth ; ye shall not be corrupted neither shall ye perish.

9. Hear me, and be ye saved, for I speak among you the grace of God ; and by me ye shall be saved, and shall be blessed.

10. I am your judge, and they who put me on shall suffer no harm, but they shall gain the new world that is incorruptible.

11. Mine elect walk in me, and I make known my ways to those that seek me, and make them trust in my name.

HALLELUJAH.

In conclusion the hope may be expressed that Syriac scholars and students of early Christian history will give their most serious attention to these Odes. Much work remains to be done on the text, but such labour will be worthily expended. These Odes stand very high indeed among the recent discoveries of forgotten Christian literature both for their beauty of form and for the suggestiveness of their teaching.

W. EMERY BARNES.

### *THE EARLY CHRISTIAN TREATMENT OF SIN AFTER BAPTISM.*

THE most primitive form of Christian doctrine held that Christians, as such, were free from sin. They had been born again into a state of sinlessness,<sup>1</sup> and it was their duty to see that they never relapsed again into the dangerous state which they had left ; if they should fail in this duty, it was questionable whether they had any further chance of salvation.

<sup>1</sup> Sinlessness is a somewhat ambiguous term ; it is here used as the equivalent of *posse non peccare*, not of *non posse peccare*.

The best-known statement of this doctrine is in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which was written at a time when the doctrine had become a matter of dispute, and needed clear enunciation. This is especially plain in two passages : (a) in Hebrews vi. 4-8, "For as touching those who were once enlightened,<sup>f</sup> and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and tasted the good Word of God, and the Powers of the Age to come, and then fell away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance." (β) in Hebrews x. 26, "For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more a sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful expectation of judgment, and a fierceness of fire which shall devour the adversaries."

These passages, taken literally, imply the normal sinlessness of Christians, and exclude the possibility of forgiveness for wilful sin after baptism. Nor is there any reason for rejecting the unanimous tradition of early Christian exegesis which explains "enlightened" (*φωτισθέντας*) in vi. 4 as a reference to baptism, especially when it is remembered that Justin Martyr mentions that *φωτισμὸς* was the technical term for baptism (I. Apol. 61).

To the writer of the Epistle to Hebrews, then, wilful sin after baptism was regarded as unforgiveable.

The same point of view was that of St. Paul, but in his Epistles the question is not a matter of controversy, and is only implied or mentioned in passing.

For instance, if we read Romans vi. without the prejudice which comes from our knowledge of history and experience of life, we are forced to admit that St. Paul regarded the condition of the normal Christian as one of sinlessness. "Reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin . . . being made free from sin ye became servants of righteousness," etc., leading up to the final conclusion that



(viii. 1) "there is now no condemnation for those that are in Christ Jesus," because they have been freed from sin. That this is St. Paul's position is obscured too often by a wrong interpretation of vii. 24,<sup>1</sup> which really describes the condition of an unregenerate but distressed soul, fighting against sin until at last it cries out in a rhetorical question, "Who shall deliver me from this body of death?"—to which St. Paul answers, "Thanks be to God! through Jesus Christ." This exegesis makes sense, is that of the earliest commentators, and agrees with early Christian thought; whereas the view which explains it as referring to Christian—as against pre-Christian—experience, introduces confusion into the whole argument, and, though agreeable to later theology and experience is inconsistent with those of the time when the Epistle was written.

The same doctrine of the normal sinlessness of Christians is implied in 2 Corinthians v. 21, "Him who knew no sin He made to be sin on our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him," for whatever the exact definition of the righteousness of God may be, it is at least certain that it is the antithesis of sin, and we have no right to think that "might become" implies a future blessing in face of the many passages which speak of Christians as having already received "righteousness."

Moreover just as in the Epistle to the Hebrews the attainment of this sinless condition is connected with baptism, so also in Romans the introduction to the description of the breach between Christians and sin is vi. 3, "We who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into His death."

<sup>1</sup> This verse and those immediately preceding seem to me to be a piece of the spiritual autobiography of St. Paul, and refer to the time before his conversion. The main difficulty is that the writer makes a large use of the historic present, and that in v. 25 the words *χάρις . . . κυρίου ἡμῶν* are a parenthesis, anticipating the fact of redemption, while the rest of the verse refers still to unregenerate experience.

The common ground for St. Paul and his hearers seems to have been the fundamental Christian doctrine that by means of baptism Christians pass into a new phase of existence: some were inclined to maintain that this set them free to do as they liked, while St. Paul argued that this was not the case. They had, he contended, received the gift of righteousness, which was the antithesis of sin, and therefore they ought not to pursue a line of conduct inconsistent with this great change.

Similarly, if we turn to 1 John, we find sinlessness regarded as the normal characteristic of Christians, though the writer is largely occupied with the fact that there are in practice many exceptions to this normal type. "Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not" (iii. 6); and "Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin" (iii. 8, v. 18) represent the Johannine view of what Christian life might be and ought to be.

Thus there is little room for doubt that the primitive view was that the Christian as such was free from sin, and had the power and was under the obligation of remaining so. It is obvious that this doctrine was sure to come into conflict with the experience of life, and it is the main purpose of the present article to trace the beginnings of the developments in thought and practice due to this conflict between doctrine and experience. But before going on to discuss this point, it will perhaps not be without usefulness to consider the historical antecedents in thought of the doctrine of Christian sinlessness, and the psychological basis which rendered it acceptable.

The historical reason why the Christians regarded themselves as sinless was that sinlessness was in the literature of the Jews, and especially in the Apocalyptic writings, a necessary characteristic of the Messianic kingdom, and the Christians were (no doubt to some extent in a proleptic

sense) members of that kingdom. For instance, in the Testament of Levi (c. 18) we are told of the Messiah, "In His priesthood shall sin come to an end, and the lawless shall cease to do evil . . . and He shall give to the saints to eat from the tree of life, and the spirit of holiness shall be on them." Or again in Jubilees v. 12, "And he made for all His works a new and righteous nature, so that they should not sin in their whole nature for ever, but should all be righteous each in his kind always."<sup>1</sup>

It is impossible to doubt that sinlessness was expected to be a characteristic of the Messianic kingdom "in the last days." "Sinlessness" is the negative method of stating this characteristic, just as "righteousness" is the positive method, and it may be suggested that an attempt to appreciate this fact is far more likely to be fruitful in explaining the meaning of "δικαιοσύνη" in the Pauline Epistles than somewhat academic and barren discussions as to the "forensic" or other character of the word. For it is at least certain that to St. Paul it was already the "last days," and that he regarded Christians as the "saints" who were members of the Messianic kingdom. Thus, however strange it may be to us, in the light of 1800 years of Christian experience, which has shown that Christians are no more sinless than other people, it was perfectly natural in the first generation for those who believed that the Messiah was coming within the limits of their own life, and that they were the members of His kingdom, to believe that they were sinless and could and ought to remain so.

The psychological basis of the doctrine is rather complicated. It turns chiefly on the fact that the word "sin" covered until quite recently, at least in popular thought,

<sup>1</sup> These passages, with others of the same type, from IV. Ezra, the Apocalypse of Baruch, the Apocalypse of Moses, etc., are quoted in Dr. Hans Windisch's valuable and interesting book, *Taufe und Sünde im ältesten Christentum bis auf Origenes*. J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1908.

more than one really separate idea. The best way of making plain the importance of this point for the present subject is by a reference to Prof. W. James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*. It will be remembered that he divides men roughly into two classes: (a) those who are all their lives fairly well contented with the world and with themselves. They know that neither they nor the world is perfect, and that there is an unpleasant background of evil to life in which pain, sorrow and sin are the prominent features. Yet on the whole they are conscious that they are doing their best, and, however much they may state on official occasions that they are miserable sinners, they feel in their hearts that in them there is much health (instead of none, as their lips state); and even when things go most obviously wrong they are constitutionally unable to face the fact, and prefer to believe that somehow "All's right with the world." These are the "once-born"—probably far the greatest number of people belong to their ranks. To such persons sin is—so far as their experience goes, apart from doctrines which they take on trust from others—either the act of consciously doing wrong, or the general imperfection of human nature. The two things are, of course, quite distinct, but are commonly confused. The result of this confusion is that a not too intellectual member of this class can usually be found ready to state (1) that he is a miserable sinner—by which he means that he often makes mistakes and is generally imperfect; (2) that he has rarely if ever consciously seen right and deliberately done wrong. Such statements are only intelligible when one remembers that the history of doctrine is the triumph of words over thought, and that the word "sin" is used in a double signification—sometimes it means human imperfection and fallibility, sometimes it means a deliberate choice of evil rather than good.

Over against this class—the once-born—stands that of the twice-born. These are they who have come to appreciate the background of sorrow in life more clearly than the foreground of happiness. The imperfection of themselves and of the world is a reality which they feel in their hearts, rather than merely acquiesce in with their intellects. Those who have not passed through such an experience can only judge of it from the statements of those who have done so, and have described their feelings in books, such as, for instance, the *Pilgrim's Progress*. Sometimes this outlook on life passes away gradually, sometimes it remains throughout life, resulting in permanent unhappiness, sometimes it degenerates into insanity; but sometimes the sufferer (for so he can only be described) wins through to a higher plane of thought, in which—usually in some form of religion—he finds a higher unifying principle. Such men are the “twice-born” of Professor James’ book, and probably they have a truer and really saner outlook on life than the “healthy-minded once-born.”

Three further points are important for the present purpose. (1) The change from unhappiness to contentment often comes to the “twice-born” with great suddenness, and in connexion with some striking incident or some outward phenomenon; (2) whereas the twice-born are probably a small minority of mankind at any time, the converts to a new religion, or to a new religious movement, belong almost exclusively to that class. The once-born are contented, they are those who “need no repentance”; but those who are suffering seek and find help in religious movements, and in spiritual “revivals.” (3) There is a universal tendency on the part of the twice-born to speak of their consciousness of imperfection and of the dark side of life as a “consciousness of sin,” and of their release from their sufferings as “forgiveness,” or

“getting rid of sin,” or some similar expression. Whether this is the best formula or not is not important for the present purpose, but it is at least certain that the “twice-born” mean by it something which is outside the experience of the “once-born,” and the result is that when, as is always the case with a religious movement which survives and becomes an organized church, the majority of the members are no longer “twice-born, but “once-born,” “consciousness of sin” and “forgiveness of sin” become merely theological formulae instead of a living experience, or in the alternative there is a disastrous attempt to force the experience of “once-born” persons into the mould of the other type.

In the first century there was, as there is now, an unusual number of people who were not, in Professor James' phrase, “healthy-minded,” and the result was, then as now, a period of great religious movement. Of this religious movement Christianity was a part, and the first Christians were probably all “twice-born.” It was therefore perfectly natural that they should look on themselves as set free from sin, as having become sinless, and express this personal experience in language borrowed from Jewish Messianic thought. Moreover they had found peace in their acceptance of Christianity, which began with baptism; it is therefore intelligible that they had a real experiential reason for connecting the attainment of freedom from sin with baptism,<sup>1</sup> and for accepting the dogmatic system which ascribed sinlessness to the followers of the Messiah and regarded baptism as the means of initiation into His kingdom.

<sup>1</sup> It is unnecessary here to enlarge on the fact that this train of thought was facilitated by the general belief in the first century that spiritual—and indeed material—results could be obtained by the use of “names” in invocations, and by the widespread opinion that water was a life-giving substance in more than the physical sense, or at least that it could become so under correct circumstances.

Nevertheless experience of life soon showed that the Christian after all was frequently not sinless,—in whatever sense the word sin be taken. Thus the problem arose, what was to be done in the case of a Christian who relapsed into sin ?

The most obvious suggestion was to repeat the baptism which had originally been the cause of sinlessness. The polemic directed against this suggestion in the passage quoted above from the Epistle to the Hebrews is a sufficient proof that there was a party which made this suggestion, and that it did not find favour in the eyes of those who ultimately gained the day ; but the most important example which we have is the famous heretic Marcion. According to Epiphanius <sup>1</sup> the Marcionites admitted repeated baptism in the case of sin, and he unkindly adds that Marcion himself had been obliged to make use of this privilege. It appears that this arrangement was defended by a reference to Luke xii. 50, " I have a baptism to be baptized with," which was taken to imply a second baptism, as Christ, when He spoke these words, had already been baptized by John the Baptist. It would, however, appear from the same passage in Epiphanius that this repetition of baptism was limited to three times. Moreover, as will be seen later, this was not the only device used by Marcion to deal with the problem of sin after baptism.

According to Ps. Tert. Poem. I. 162, the same thing is true of Valentinus—(*bis docuit tinguī*)—but the evidence of this document is not worth very much.

Probably the suggestion of rebaptism was the earliest, as it is the simplest, method of dealing with the question ; but it was met with a resolute opposition on the part of the Church, and, except for the references to Marcion, the

<sup>1</sup> *Adv. Haer.* I. xlii. 3. Βαπτισθεὶς ὁ κύριος ὑπὸ Ἰωαννοῦ ἔλεγε τοῖς μαθηταῖς βάπτισμα ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι οὕτω τὸ διδόναι πλείω βαπτίσματα ἐδογμάτισεν.

only traces which remain of it are the polemical passages in Hebrews, and the emphasis laid on the *one* baptism in Ephesians iv. 5, and perpetuated—though with a probably different meaning—in the Nicene Creed.

It is worth asking why this natural suggestion of repeated baptism was so generally rejected. Probably because it did not really correspond to psychological fact in the way in which the original baptism did. As was shown above, the fact which gave baptism its importance was that it so often coincided with the turning point in the experience of the “twice-born.” The first Christians had therefore a very specious argument from experience at their disposal when they regarded it as the cause of the change in their lives, and inasmuch as this change was held to be the passing from a state of sin to a state of righteousness, it was easy to identify baptism and the forgiveness of sins.

But though one may use the same word—sin—to describe both evil deeds and the state of unhappiness of the “twice-born” before they find peace, it is quite certain that this is a confusion of thought, and it is similarly certain that the sin forgiven, or got rid of, by the first baptism was as a rule sin in the latter sense, while the sin which gave rise to the problem of sin after baptism was sin in the former sense.

There was therefore a real psychological and experiential difference between the two cases. It was a confusion of thought which led men to argue that what baptism had done once it can do again; and although the Catholic was quite as confused intellectually on this point as was the heretic, his instinct—based on experience, not on logic—was more correct, and made him distinguish the “forgiveness of sins” obtained in baptism as something which could not be given twice,—at least not by the same means.

Still the rejection of rebaptism was no solution of the practical problem. Perhaps the earliest of the other



attempts of which we have clear evidence is presented by the famous verse in 1 John v. 16 f., "If any man see his brother sinning sin<sup>1</sup> not unto death, he shall ask, and He (i.e. the Son of God) will give him life for them that sin not unto death: there is sin unto death, not concerning this do I say that he should make request. All unrighteousness is sin, and there is sin not unto death."

The doctrine implied here is that there is a qualitative distinction between different kinds of sin. Some are deadly—the teaching which the Epistle to the Hebrews seems to hold as applying to all sin—and others are not. These last can obtain forgiveness through prayer, and through the intercession of Christ. "My little children, I write these things to you that ye sin not"—sinlessness is the ideal and normal position which the writer hopes for—"and if any one sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous."<sup>2</sup>

Here we get two important developments of doctrine: first, the distinction between mortal and venial sin; and secondly, the attribution to Christ not only of the function, which was originally that of the Messiah, of cleansing from sin and admitting those who had thus been made pure into his kingdom of sinless saints, but of the perpetual cleansing and interceding for the members of his Church. The changed point of view with regard to the nature of Christians necessitated a corresponding change with regard to the functions of the Christ.

The distinction introduced between deadly and venial sins of course opened up the way to a long, intricate, and very important chapter in Christian doctrine, the discussion

<sup>1</sup> The R.V. puts this translation of *ἀμαρτία* into the margin, and *a sin* into the text; but it is difficult to see any valid reason for doing so.

<sup>2</sup> Or is *δικαιον* not predicative, "we have an advocate . . . who is righteous" ?

of which is outside this article, but it is interesting to notice in passing that it throws an interesting side-light on another question of quite a different type—the text of the Apostolic decrees. The question is whether these originally spoke of “things offered to idols, blood, and fornication” as the “Western” text is, or added also a reference to “things strangled.” Now it is remarkable that the oldest exegesis of the Apostolic decree, except in Alexandria, connected it not with the laws of forbidden food, but with the distinction between deadly and venial sin.<sup>1</sup> At the same time it is by no means certain what deduction ought to be drawn from this fact. G. Resch and, following him, Harnack take the view that the probability is that the “three-clause” Western text is the original form, and that it had originally nothing to do with the food law. The suggestion is that it referred the general moral teaching, common both to Jews and Christians, such as is represented by the “two ways” incorporated in the Didache, and it was afterwards wrongly interpreted in the West in connexion with the doctrine of deadly and venial sins, and in Alexandria in connexion with the law of food, the text being at the same time altered in the latter place by the addition of the words “and from things strangled,” which were originally a gloss on “blood.” On the other hand Dr. Sanday has not been persuaded by this type of reasoning, and the question remains open. Personally I think that G. Resch is right, because the exegesis which reads into the text a distinction between deadly and venial sins seems to me the earliest and most widespread, and to imply the Western text.

Over against this qualitative distinction between deadly and venial as a basis for the solution of the practical problem of sin after baptism, we find an independent attempt in

<sup>1</sup> The best statement of the evidence is, I think, that of G. Resch, in his *Das Aposteldecree*, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, N.F. xiii. 3.

what may be called a quantitative manner. It will be remembered that Marcion, though admitting the principle of rebaptism, imposed a limit on the number of times that this might take place. As compared with the method suggested in 1 John this may fairly be called a quantitative limit to forgiveable sin, and from the Shepherd of Hermas we find that in the Church at Rome, although Marcion's doctrine of rebaptism was [rejected, this quantitative system was introduced, probably even before the coming of Marcion, in order to deal with the practical difficulty of sin among baptized Christians.

Hermas deals with the matter in the third chapter of the fourth Mandate. "I will venture," he says, "to ask one thing more. . . . I have heard from certain teachers that there is no further repentance beyond that, when we went down into the water, and received remission (*ἄφεσιν*) of our former sins." It is clear that even if this be not a direct allusion to the Epistle to the Hebrews, which, as 1 Clement shows, was early known in Rome, it is at least a reference to the same stern attitude towards sin after baptism which that Epistle represents. To this the angel replied, "Yes, that is so; for he who has received remission of sins must not sin again, but live in purity (*ἀγνεία*);<sup>1</sup> but since you inquire into everything, I will explain this point also to you, though without giving occasion to future Christians or those who are faithful (*τοῖς μέλλουσι πιστεύειν ἢ τοῖς νῦν πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸν κύριον*). For these two classes are offered no repentance for sin, but have remission of their former sins. So then for those called before these days the Lord has appointed a

<sup>1</sup> This word indicates clearly the type of sin which loomed largest to the early Christian mind. It also raises the question whether marriage after baptism was contemplated as allowable. Marcion, of course, forbade it; but this was not mere heresy, for it seems probable that Tertullian, even in his pre-Montanist days, did the same, and so probably, much later, did Aphraates.

repentance . . . and to me has been given the control (*ἐξουσία*) of this repentance. But I say to you, said he, after that great and solemn call, if a man be tempted by the devil, and sin, he has one repentance; but if he sin lightly and repent, it is unprofitable for that man, for scarcely shall he live (*δυσκόλως γὰρ ζήσεται*).”

No one would maintain that this passage is in all respects easy to understand—Hermas is not a writer who attains clearness by attention to detail—but the general meaning is tolerably plain. For the future a modification is introduced into the original plan of salvation, according to which sin after baptism was deadly, and a chance—but only a single chance—of efficient repentance is offered to those who have thus sinned. This does not give a direct remission of sins (*ἄφεσις*) as baptism does, but offers the chance of an ultimate remission, if the sinner does not again fall, but remains constantly obedient to the angel of repentance.

It is plain that this conception of repentance is the first step towards the ecclesiastical doctrine of penance, for though drawing a distinction between it and baptism, it nevertheless places it in the same class. We may also guess that there was some special reason for the change, and this is likely to have been some persecution or other crisis which had led to an extraordinary amount of backsliding; but the chronology of Hermas does not allow us to identify this with any certainty; all that can be said is that not long before 140 A.D. is the most generally probable date.

It should also be noted that Hermas is careful not to throw any doubt on the original truth of the stern doctrine previously held: he fully accepts it, but claims to have had a new revelation of an offer made by God in modification of it.

This elevation of repentance to a rank similar to that of baptism was not the only way of dealing with the problem

known to Hermas. He warns his readers against the suggestion of postponing baptism in order to escape the responsibility for a pure life (cf. Vis. 3, 7, 3). Such a suggestion was of course very natural to those who (like the ordinary "once-born" person) are quite well contented with the world as it is, but wish, in order to be safe, to do what is necessary to secure equal comfort in the world to come. Such persons do not in the least cry out to be "released from this body of death"; they wish to remain in it as long as possible; but they believe, on authority, that at death they will pass into a different sphere of life, and they desire to make certain that they are doing what is necessary for their future well-being. If they are told, as they were in the second century, that initiation into the mysteries, whether Christian or Pagan, will secure what they wish, they will be initiated. But let there be no undue haste: the Christian mysteries, at all events, entail an unpleasant asceticism, and had better be postponed as long as possible. Such reasoning, *mutatis mutandis*, is natural to the "once-born" who has been forced into a system produced originally by the "twice-born." It tends at present in Protestant circles to a so-called "death-bed repentance," and to a philanthropy deferred for old age, or distributed later, though more lavishly, by testamentary dispositions. In the early Church it led to deferred baptism. Such a practice was never encouraged in the great Church, though Tertullian in his treatise on baptism (probably written before his Montanist days) was inclined to think the danger of premature baptism greater than that of a postponement. Among heretics the custom was usual enough, and some of them—for instance, the Marcosians mentioned by Irenaeus I. xiv. 4—even practised a baptism of—not for—the dead.

From the conception of repentance found in Hermas to the idea of other sacraments to neutralize sin after baptism

was only a step. Exactly when and by whom it was first taken is more difficult to say. Probably there is much to be said for the view which sees a connexion between this movement and the difference between the original Marcan text of the institution of the Eucharist, and the Matthaean redaction. In Mark we read (xiv. 24), "This is My blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many," to which Matthew (xxvi. 28) adds, "for the remission of sins," while he also changes the preceding "and they all drank of it" into the command "drink ye all of it." It is as nearly certain as anything can be that the earliest view of the Eucharist did not regard it as a means of obtaining forgiveness of sins; while a little later this was equally certainly a prevalent view. May we not see some plausibility in the suggestion that the problem of sin after baptism tended to give a changed importance to the Eucharist, and that the Matthaean text—as contrasted with Mark—shows the change?

A similar suggestion may be made, though quite diffidently, about John xiii. 1–20, which describes the washing of the disciples' feet at the Last Supper. It is, of course, well known that the Fourth Gospel does not describe the institution of the Eucharist, just as it does not describe the institution of baptism, yet few will dispute that it is from beginning to end thoroughly sacramental, and that there are implied references to the Christian mysteries on almost every page. Chapter iii., for instance, is chiefly occupied with baptism,<sup>1</sup> though the word is not mentioned, and the same is true of chapter ix. Chapter vi., again, is a treatment of the Eucharist, and there may be a reference to it in chapter ii. So here also, in chapter xiii., the reference to the Eucharist is quite clear, though only implicit, and I fancy that the real meaning is that it is to be regarded as the means of cleansing Christians

<sup>1</sup> Even in iii. 5 I believe that the reference to water is an interpolation.

from the stains of post-baptismal sin. Baptism was washing (*λούεσθαι*, cf. the *λούτρον τῆς παλιγγενεσίας* of Titus iii. 5), and that could not be repeated; therefore Peter's request—"Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head"—was refused. The disciples had been "washed," they were clean, and of this washing there was no need or possibility of repetition. But even he who has been washed may have need to remove the dust, and thus must "wash his feet." When we find this teaching so clearly glancing at baptism on the one hand, and on the other given on the occasion which was known to be connected with the Eucharist, I think that there is much to be said for the suggestion that it was intended to point to the Eucharist as a remedy for the stain of sin after baptism.

However this may be, and of course the interpretation suggested can never, at the best, be regarded as more than possible, we can certainly see in heretical bodies the traces of other sacramental institutions intended to remove sin after baptism. The history of these is outside the scope of this article: it must suffice to draw attention to two interesting examples.

The Marcosians, in the second century, were in the habit of using a second sacrament, closely resembling baptism, to which they gave the name of "Redemption" (*ἀπολύτρωσις*), and explained all passages in the New Testament containing the word as references to this sacrament (*see* Iren. I. xiv.).

Still more striking is the teaching of the Pistis Sophia a century or less later, which describes a whole series of sacraments or mysteries, and in chapters civ.–cvi. gives a number of rules governing the admission of backsliders to renewed participation in the mysteries, based on the interpretation of Matthew xviii. 21 f. (which enjoins forgiveness "unto seventy times seven") as a reference to sin after initiation into the mysteries.

Thus in the first attempts of the early Church to deal with the problem of sin after baptism we can see the beginnings of the later elaborate ecclesiastical edifice of doctrine and practice. The Johannine Epistles show the beginning of the distinction between venial and deadly sin, which is such an important feature of the later casuistry, the Shepherd of Hermas shows us the origin of doctrine of "penance" which is scarcely less important, and, though less marked, the traces are not wanting of the general development of the doctrine of sacramental cleansing for post-baptismal sin, of which "absolution," the Mass as a propitiation, and "extreme unction" are the surviving results.

Fully to trace the interplay of doctrine and practice, of teaching and experience, in developing these results through each century and in different localities would be an interesting task worthy of a large book,<sup>1</sup> for—to take one example only—it would show how Christian doctrine had come to travel through the whole range of thought, that, beginning by regarding Christians as set free from sin, ended by making them confess themselves as miserable sinners, and introduced not only the distinction between venial and deadly, but also between original and personal sin. Certainly it would be an interesting task: but I believe that I am also right in affirming that any one who undertakes it will miss his opportunity if he do not begin by distinguishing between the experiences of various psychological classes in the spirit and in the style made famous by Professor James.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

<sup>1</sup> A most valuable collection of facts and criticism is available to those who read Dutch in F. Pijper's *Boete en Biecht*.



*SOME FRESH BIBLE PARALLELS.*<sup>1</sup>

In that monumental work *Kusejr Amra*, published in 1907 by the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Alois Musil gives a vivid account of his journeys in the country to the east of the Dead Sea, in which many of the immemorial customs of the desert Arabs are brought to light. Perhaps the most verbally exact parallel to the Old Testament is that which occurs on page 9. In what appears to be an absolutely waterless desert, water may be found by digging amongst the stones of the dry torrent bed. The stones are removed with the hands, though the process is described as digging. The chiefs rarely take part in the work, but the "well," when formed, is always said to have been dug by Sheikh So-and-so. While drawing the water at one such valley the Arabs sang this song:—

Spring up, O well,  
Flow copiously.  
Drink and disdain not,  
With a staff have we dug it.

The words are almost identical with those sung by their Hebrew predecessors on, it may be, the same spot three and a half millennia before:—

Spring up, O well, sing ye to it,  
The well the princes digged,  
The nobles of the people delved  
With a sceptre and with their staff.<sup>2</sup>

On p. 25, Dr. Musil thus describes the return to camp on a dark night: "From a distance the chieftain's tent was easily recognisable, because in front of it blazed a mighty fire, which is carefully fed until midnight is past. The mighty fiery column before the tent announces to the weary,

<sup>1</sup> In the volume of the *EXPOSITOR* for 1903 will be found a paper on "Some Fresh Bible Parallels from the History of Morocco." Those which follow are taken from Arabic sources from different countries.

<sup>2</sup> Numbers xxi. 17, 18.

hungry wanderer where he can seek hospitable reception." This fire in front of the chief's tent is, no doubt, the origin of the story of the pillar of fire by which the Israelites were led in their wanderings.<sup>1</sup>

In 2 Kings xiv. 8 and 11 we read that Amasiah, king of Judah, sent to Jehoash, king of Israel, saying, "Come and let us look one another in the face," and that these two kings looked one another in the face at Bethshemesh. This phrase, "to look one another in the face," is a military technical term, and the cognate root is used in the corresponding voice in Arabic of two opposing armies coming face to face. "When the two armies were drawn up in line of battle (*tarā'a*), the army of 'A'isha numbered 30,000 and that of 'Ali 20,000."<sup>2</sup>

The practice of self-mutilation for the sake of attaining some specific end is not unknown in the West. An example of it among the Arabs is the case of Kosair, who, having cut off his own nose, appeared at the court of Queen Zebba [Zenobia], pretending that the mutilation had been inflicted by his master the King of Al-'Irāk. By this means he was received with such complete confidence that he was soon able to betray her into the hands of the king, whose uncle she had put to death. The mutilation of Kosair became a proverb amongst the Arabs, and as a general rule the injury inflicted would be of a much slighter and more transient description. After the battle of Aphek one prophet bade another wound him, in order that he might pretend to the king of Israel, Ahab, that he had been in the fight; and when the other refused, he cursed him, and bade another man smite him, which he did effectually.<sup>3</sup> It appears to have been deemed an obligation incumbent upon the per-

<sup>1</sup> Exodus xiii. 21, etc.; Nehemiah ix. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Al-Fakhri*, ed. Derenbourg, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Kings xx. 35 ff.

son asked, to do this behest. It is related of Amr Muzai-kiya, who led the migration of the Arabs of the Yemen towards the north in the second or third century, that the cause of his determining to leave was that he observed a large rat burrowing in the dam which retained the water which irrigated their lands. Knowing that this presaged the bursting of the dam, but not choosing to aver his true motive, he ordered his youngest son, the next time he was scolded and chastised, to box his father's ears. The son did as he was bidden and the indignant father, declaring that he could not remain in a place in which the youngest of his children had struck him, took his departure.<sup>1</sup>

Youthful modesty and a respect for one's seniors has ever been a distinctive virtue of the Orient. A good example of this gentle disposition occurs in the account of the execution by Gideon of the two Midianite kings Zebah and Zalmunna.<sup>2</sup> He bade his son put them to death; "but the youth drew not his sword; for he feared, because he was yet a youth." A precisely parallel incident occurred at the punishment of Walid ibn Okbah, the governor of Al-Kufa, for drunkenness. 'Ali bade his son inflict the punishment of eighty lashes, but the latter could not bring himself to do it, and 'Ali therefore executed sentence himself. In Lane's *Thousand and One Nights* (chapter xi., note 26) will be found a statement of the attitude of the youthful oriental to his elders, and of the servant to his master.<sup>3</sup>

To the inhabitant of a poorly-watered country like Palestine the river Euphrates must have symbolised all that was rich and pleasant and easy of acquirement, and the antithesis of everything hard and unremunerative and toilsome. To eastern fancy the Euphrates and the Nile became even greater than they actually were, and, indeed, as broad

<sup>1</sup> *Ibn Hisham*, ed. Wüstenfeld, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Judges viii. 18 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See also Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, vol. ii., p. 160.]

and wide as the sea. Hence in both Hebrew and Arabic one word is used to designate both the sea and the Euphrates and the Nile. The Sea of Babylon (Jer. li. 36) is, of course, the Euphrates, and the sea of Egypt in Isaiah xix. 5 is the Nile. At the present day the names of the latter river above Khartoum, where it divides into two, are the White Sea and the Blue Sea. The Euphrates is a favourite simile with the author of the second part of the book of Isaiah to denote a happy and full life: "Then shall thy peace be like the Euphrates."<sup>1</sup> The English version has, "peace like a river," which is fine, but that is because we at once think of a great river full of water. But it is the Euphrates that is meant, and the Euphrates *in flood*: "And I will spread like the Euphrates peace to her, and the splendour of nations like a winter torrent breaking from its course."<sup>2</sup> A fine description of the Euphrates in flood occurs in the ode of the famous Arab poet En-Nabigha, in which he seeks to propitiate his offended master En-No'man, whose generosity he compares to the great river.

Not Euphrates, when his wave-tops boil, and his billows strew  
his banks on either side with foam,

When every valley, foaming, roaring, full of bruised reeds and  
broken boughs, swells his stream,

And the pilot, in spite of weariness and sweat of grief, through  
fear of him lets not go the helm,

Ever was more generous than he.

Of all the books of the Old Testament none make so universal an appeal as do those of Job and of Ecclesiastes.<sup>3</sup> The best minds of every age and of every race find their deepest feeling expressed in the words of these two books. Indeed, the verse in Job or in Ecclesiastes which has not its echo in one or other of the great eastern literatures must be the excep-

<sup>1</sup> Chap. xlvi. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. lxvi. 12.

<sup>3</sup> The appeal is the same as that made by *Hamlet* in English literature: there is pessimism and mystery.

tion. Only a few striking verbal parallels need be mentioned here. In Ecclesiastes v. 7 we have, "High above the high is a Watcher, and there is a Higher than they"; in the Koran xii. 76, "Above every owner of knowledge is One who knows." Al-Mutanabbi, who is generally considered the greatest of all the poets who composed in Arabic, writes the following couplet:—

Thus men pass away : there is a coming together, then a separating : one is dead and another is born : one is hating, another loving.

My circumstances change, and the nights change with their circumstances ; and I am become grey-headed, but time, the ever youthful, becomes not grey.

The thought and the language are those of the author of Ecclesiastes : "One generation passeth away and another generation cometh : but the earth abideth for ever." "There is a time to be born and a time to die." "Their love, and their hatred, and their envy, is now perished." "Time and chance happeneth to all." "The evil days . . . when the almond tree shall flourish."<sup>1</sup> The same poet says :—

I know that the longest-lived of men is appointed a date of which the furthest term is near.

And Ecclesiastes—

Though a man live many years, and rejoice in them all ; yet let him remember the days of darkness.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps no book has excited so much controversy or given rise to so many diverse opinions as the book of Ecclesiastes, and perhaps no name has received so many etymologies and interpretations as the name *Koheleth*. In these circumstances it can do little harm to suggest two more. The first is that the Hebrew *Koheleth* is the exact transliteration of the Arabic *ka'ilatun*, the feminine participle of the verb *Kala*, to say, and meaning, a sayer, a poetess, or,

<sup>1</sup> Eccles. i. 4 ; iii. 2 ; ix. 6 ; ix. 11 ; xii. 1, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. xi. 8.

perhaps, a poet. The second is a new identification by means of the well-known Gematria. If the numerical values of the letters of the word *Koheleth* be added together, we obtain the number 535 (100 + 5 + 30 + 400). Moreover, Koheleth was a son of David and was king in Jerusalem (i. 1, 12). The only sons of David who were kings in Jerusalem were Solomon and Adonijah the son of Haggith (1 Kings i. 5 ff.). Adding the numerical values of the expression Adonijah ben Haggith, we obtain 543 (1 + 4 + 50 + 10 + 5 + 2 + 50 + 8 + 3 + 10 + 400), or, if we might omit the first consonant of Haggith, as it is omitted in Greek, 535.

The finest verses in the book of Ecclesiastes, verses which remind us of some of the most splendid passages in the book of Job, are those in the twelfth chapter, "Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth," and so on. It must have caused every one a shock of dismay akin to disgust, when he learned for the first time that these verses are a physiological description of the break up of the bodily frame, that the "strong men bowing themselves" are the stooping shoulders, that the "grinders" are the teeth, and "those who look out of the windows" the eyes, that the "golden bowl" is the brain, and the "silver cord" the spinal column. All this is so contrary to Western taste that anything that can help us to escape from such an interpretation must be more than welcome. If one reads a description of an Oriental town in time of plague, for example, that by Richard Tully,<sup>1</sup> the English consul at Tripoli in Africa, of the cholera in that city in the year 1785, it will probably excite in him precisely the same feelings which the reading of these verses, before he was aware of the physiological interpretation, excited. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the physiological explanation is quite in accordance with Oriental literary taste. In the Koran (xix. 3)

<sup>1</sup> *Narrative of a Ten Years' Residence at Tripoli in Africa*, p. 79 ff.

Zecharias speaks of his head being "fiery," meaning grey (cf. the almond tree of Ecclesiastes): "the two lookers" is a common term in Arabic for the pupils of the eyes (Al-Harīri, *Makāmah* xxxvii.); the pre-Islāmic poet Shanfara speaks of his feet as "the two plodders," and so on. A very quaint statement of the physiological or anatomical interpretation of these famous verses will be found in *A Discourse of the Whole Art of Chyrurgerie*, by Peter Lowe, founder of the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow, published in London in 1612.<sup>1</sup>

The fine verse in Job (xxxviii. 41), "Who provideth for the raven his prey, when his young ones cry unto God, when they lose their way for want of food?"<sup>2</sup> is found also in that literary El Dorado, Al-Harīri of Basrah (*Makāmah* xiii.):—

My chicks<sup>3</sup> cease not complaining their misery,<sup>4</sup> of which every day there is a flash.

When the pious soul cries in the night<sup>5</sup> to his Lord, they also cry with tears that flow,<sup>6</sup>

O thou that providest for the young raven in its nest, and settest the broken bone, twice broken.<sup>7</sup>

The expression "to swallow one's spittle" (Job vii. 19) is a metaphor for taking time. It occurs in Al-Harīri (*Makāmah* xv.), where Abu Zaid says, "Let me swallow my spittle, for my road has wearied me," meaning, "Let me rest a little, before proceeding." It is related that Al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144) once said to a person, "Let me swallow my spittle." The other replied, "You may swallow the Tigris and Euphrates," meaning, "Take as long as you like."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An account of the Life and Works of Maister Peter Lowe was published by the late Dr. James Finlayson in Glasgow, 1889. The writer's attention was directed to this work by Dr. Walter W. Coats, minister at Brechin.

<sup>2</sup> Also Ps. cxlvii. 9. <sup>3</sup> Cf. Ps. lxxxiv. 4. <sup>4</sup> Cf. Ps. cxlii. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Ps. xxii. 2. <sup>6</sup> Cf. Job xvi. 20; Ps. vi. 6, etc.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Ps. li. 8., etc.

<sup>8</sup> A student, Mr. A. S. Fulton, has pointed out to the writer a curious expression in Job and its Arabic equivalent. In Job xxi. 24 we read,

In the account of his journey into Arabia, read before the Royal Geographical Society, Mr. Douglas Carruthers mentions that the inferior tribe of Sherrarat are such good shots that one Sherrari is considered equal to three men of another tribe, and that they are left-handed.<sup>1</sup> They resemble in both respects the Israelite tribe of Benjamin (Judges iii. 15 ; xx. 16).

It is related that 'Ali the son of Abu Talib, shortly before his assassination used to say to his followers, "What prevents the basest of you dyeing this with this ?" meaning his beard with the blood of his head. A similar phrase is, "O that this might be laid flat upon this" (meaning the heaven upon the earth) before such and such a (disagreeable) thing should occur. It was used by 'A'isha when she heard that 'Ali had been chosen Chalif, and by 'Abd el-Melik when it was proposed to besiege the holy city of Mecca.<sup>2</sup> This mode of expression does not occur in the Bible, but in *Hamlet*. Polonius says (pointing to his head and shoulder), "Take this from this, if this be otherwise."<sup>3</sup>

It is generally agreed amongst critics that the nineteenth Psalm consists of two independent hymns, "The heavens declare the glory of God" . . . (vv. 1-6), and "The law of the Lord is perfect . . . (v. 7 ff.). The Psalm is in truth one, and it is the oriental counterpart of the famous saying of Immanuel Kant that the two things which impressed him most were the starry heavens overhead and the moral law within.

"His bones are moistened with marrow," as a description of a fat and sleek person. On linguistic grounds it is necessary to read either, "he watereth with marrow his bones," or simply, "he watereth the marrow of his bones." The Arab satirical poet, Al-Farazdak (d. 729 A.D.) thus describes a person who had abused his hospitality and drunk too much wine :—

"Mukhtár passed by us, Mukhtár of Tayy : then he watered a marrow which was parched and thirsty."

<sup>1</sup> *The Geographical Journal*, 1910, March, pp. 235, 237.

<sup>2</sup> *Al-Fakhri* (ed. Derenbourg), pp. 119, 138, 167.

<sup>3</sup> Act ii., Scene ii., l. 156.



There are very many Biblical expressions, both from the Old and New Testaments, in the Korán and in the traditional sayings of Mohammed, but most of these are quotations and reminiscences rather than independent parallels.

T. H. WEIR.

LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.\*

XVIII.

*οικονομέω, οικονομία*.—The wide sense attaching to these words in late Greek is fully illustrated from Polybius by Dean Robinson on Eph. i. 10. We may add a few citations from the papyri. In EP 9<sup>5</sup> (iii/B.C.) an official summons a subordinate to appear before him bringing with him all his writings and official documents—*πάντα τὰ γράμματα καὶ [εἴ τι ἄλλ]λο ὠικονόμηκ[ας] καὶ ὧν πεποίησαι διαγραφῶν τὰ ἀντίγραφα*, and the same general reference attaches to his subst. in EP II<sup>7</sup> (iii/B.C), *ὧν δ' ἂν πράξις γ' οἰκ[ονομιῶν]*, *γράφε ἡμῖν ὑπόχειρα*. The important rescript of the Prefect, BM III. p. 125 (A.D. 104), which offers such a striking analogy to Luke ii. 1 ff., requires all persons residing out of their own homes to return to their homes *ἵνα καὶ τὴν συνήθη [οἰ]κονομίαν τῆ[ς ἀπο]γραφῆς πληρώσωσιν*, "that they may carry out the regular order of the census," while in PP II. 11(2)<sup>2f.</sup> (iii/B.C.=Witk., p. 4) the verb is used of the administration of a sacred office or priesthood, *γίνωσκε με τὴν ἱεροποιῖαν ὠικονομημέ[νον]*, and in 38(c)<sup>60f.</sup> of the management of details in some matter relating apparently to cowherds, *περὶ βούτων ὃν ἂν [τρό]πον οἰκονομήθηι*. In Rein P 7<sup>34</sup> (ii/B.C.) *οἰκονομία* refers to a legal process, *μηδεμίαν οἰκονομίαν κατ' ἐμοῦ ποιεῖσθαι*.

*οἰνοπότης*.—This N.T. compound, Matt. xi. 19, Luke vii.

\* For abbreviations see the February and March (1908) EXPOSITOR, pp. 170, 262.

34, is found in the dream of Nectonabus, LPu<sup>iv</sup>. 21<sup>f</sup>. (ii/B.C.) as edited by Wilcken, *Mélanges Nicole*, p. 584, καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ φύσει ὄντι οἰνοπότη ῥαθυμῆσαι πρὶν ἢ ἄφασθαι τοῦ ἔργου, "and it seemed good to him (i.e. Petesius), since by nature he was a wine-drinker, to take a holiday before he began work." Note οἶνος καινός in *Ostr.* 1142 as the antithesis to οἶνος παλαιός, *ib.* 1129, not νέος as in [Luke] v. 39.

οἶομαι.—For οἶομαι construed with the inf. alone, as in Phil. i. 17, cf. EP 12<sup>1</sup> (iii/B.C.), καθάπερ ὄμιον δεῖν, OP 898<sup>24f</sup>. (A.D. 123), οἰομένη ἐκ τούτου δύνασθαι ἐκφυγεῖν ἃ διέπραξεν, "thinking by this means to escape the consequences of her misdeeds" (G. and H.). In all these passages the underlying idea of the verb seems to be "purpose," as frequently in later Gk.: see Kennedy on Phil. *l.c.*

ὀκνέω.—With Acts ix. 38, μὴ ὀκνήσης διελθεῖν ἕως ἡμῶν, cf. EP 13<sup>7</sup> (iii/B.C.), μὴ ὀκνῶν γράφειν ἡμῖν, and similarly OP 930<sup>1</sup> (ii/iii A.D.).

ὀλιγόψυχος.—The verb occurs in the Ptolemaic papyrus PP ii. 40 (= Witk. 26), quoted above under ἀνδρίζομαι, *Notes vi*.

ὀλιγωρέω.—BU 1095<sup>8f</sup>. (A.D. 57), μὴ οὖν ὀ[λι]γωρ[ήσης] περὶ μηδενός, 1097<sup>15</sup> (i/A.D.), οὐχ<sup>ο</sup> (= οὐχ) ὀλιγωρῶ, ἀλλὰ εὐψυχούσα πα[ρα]μένω.

ὀλοκληρία.—In the N.T. this word is found only in Acts iii. 16, where it is rendered in the Vg. "integra sanitas": cf. OP 123<sup>6f</sup>. (iii/iv A.D.), οὐκ ἔλαβον τὰ δηλοῦντά μοι τὰ περὶ τῆς ὀλοκληρίας ὑμῶν, BM II. p. 297 (iv/A.D.), τὴν ὀλοκληρίαν Κωσταντίου, and especially BU 948<sup>2f</sup>. (iv/v A.D.), εὐχομε . . . τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑγίας σου καὶ ὀλοκληρίας σου χαίριν. To the examples of the corresponding adjective in *Thess.* p. 78 add BM III. p. 30 (iii/A.D.), ὀλοκλήρου οἰκίας καὶ αὐλ(ῆς) *al.*, and of the verb LpP 110<sup>12f</sup>. (iii/iv A.D.), κὰν διὰ λόγου μοι πέμφε εἰ ὀλοκληρ<ε>ῖς ἢ ὡς ἦς ἵνα ἀμέριμνος ὦ *al.*

ῥλος.—OP 936<sup>20</sup> (iii/A.D.), οὐδὲ Φιλόξενον ὄλ' ἐξ ὄλων οὐχ εὔρον, where the Editors render, "I have entirely failed to find Philoxenus," and compare *ib.* 893<sup>6</sup>, οὐδένα λόγον ὑπὲρ οἰασδήποτε ὄλον τὸ σύνολον πράγματος, "no ground of complaint on any matter of any kind whatsoever." For δι' ὄλου, as in John xix. 23, see OP 53<sup>10</sup>, cited under ξηραίνω.

ῥμβρος.—A kind of *term. techn.* in connexion with land which had become waterlogged, (ἔμβροχος) διὰ τὸν ῥμβρον τῶν παρακειμένων ὑδάτων, TbP 61(6)<sup>132</sup> (B.C. 118-7) and often: cf. Luke xii. 54.

ὀμιλέω.—The classical and late Gk. meaning of ὀμιλέω, "converse with," which is found in Dan. i. 19, Acts xx. 11, xxiv. 26, may be illustrated from the vernacular OP 928<sup>5f.</sup> (ii/iii A.D.), ὠμείλησας δέ μοί ποτε περὶ τούτου, "you had a conversation with me once on this subject." Cf. also the *Pelagia-Legenden* (ed. Usener), p. 7<sup>10</sup>, προτρεψάμενος αὐτὸν ὀμιλῆσαι τῷ λαῷ, and the use in MGr. 'δὲν μου 'μιλᾶς; "why dost not thou speak to me?" (Abbott, *Songs of Modern Greece*, p. 108<sup>6</sup>).

ὀμίχλη.—For this N.T. ἄπ. λεγ., 2 Pet. ii. 17, cf. the *Papyrus magique de Paris* 3023-4 (c. A.D. 300), ὁ ἐν μέσῃ ἀρούρης καὶ χιόνος καὶ ὀμίχλης.

ὀμνύω.—Ὅμνύω with the acc. of the person invoked (cf. Jas. v. 12) is very common, e.g. EP 23<sup>8</sup> (iii/B.C.), ὀμνύω βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον, ParP 47<sup>2f.</sup> (B.C. 153), ὀμνύο τὸν Σάραπιν, OP 239<sup>5f.</sup> (A.D. 66), ὀμνύω Νέρωνα Κλαῦδιον Καίσαρα κ.τ.λ.

ὀμοθυμαδόν.—The sense of *unanimiter*, and not merely of "together" to which Hatch (*Essays in Biblical Gk.*, p. 63) would limit this word in the N.T. as in the Gk. versions of the O.T., is supported by such a passage from the *Κοινή* as TbP 40<sup>8f.</sup> (B.C. 117), ὀμοθυμαδὸν ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς σῆς σκέπης, "with one accord claiming your protection" (G. and H.): cf. *Syll.* 329<sup>13</sup> (i/B.C.), ὀμοθυμαδὸν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιδεδωκότων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τοὺς περὶ τούτων ἀγῶνας, *ib.* 732<sup>28</sup>.

In ParP 63<sup>93</sup> Mahaffy (PP III. p. 27) renders it "without exception."

*ὄμοιος*.—A weakened force of this word is seen in TbP 300<sup>13</sup> (ii/A.D.), *ταγῆναι ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀ. τάξει*, " (that this name) may be inscribed in the list of such persons " (viz. the dead). The common use of *ὁμοίως* repeated=*ditto*, may be put here. The phrase *καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, as in Heb. iv. 15 (vii. 15), is found in BU 1028<sup>15</sup> (ii/A.D.) with a gen. dependent on it.

*Ὀνήσιμος*.—To the examples of this name in *Notes* iii. add *Magn.* 242 *τόπος Ὀνησίμου*, 300 *ἡ σορὸς* (=grave), *Ὀνησίμου τοῦ Πανσιμάχου*. Thieme (p. 40) notes that the name is specially common in the case of slaves, though not confined to them, as is shown by the mention of a *γραμματεὺς Μ. Ὀνήσιμος* on a coin of Caracalla's time: cf. also *Ὀνησίμη* in *Syll.* 855<sup>5</sup>, a woman whom a manumitted slave is to serve till her death. Dittenberger's index (p. 89) shows others. Dr. Souter has given us six citations from Roman inscriptions in Dessau.

*ὄνικός*.—Grimm's statement that this adjective is "not found" outside its N.T. occurrences (Matt. xviii. 6, Mark ix. 42) requires correction in the light of the new evidence, e.g. BU 912<sup>24</sup> (A.D. 33), *τὰ ὄνικὰ κτήνη*, NP 23<sup>3f.</sup> (A.D. 70), *ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν ὄνικῶν κτηνῶν ὄνον ἐνα*, and *OGIS* 629<sup>30, 45</sup> (ii/A.D.), *γομοῦ ὄνικοῦ*: cf. also for a similar formation OP 498<sup>7f.</sup> (ii/A.D.), *λίθων κύβων καμηλικῶν*, "squared stones which a camel could transport," cited in *Notes* iii.

*ὄνομα* we reserve, as there is too much material to treat briefly.

*ὄξυς*.—In OP 900<sup>6f.</sup> (iv/A.D.), *εἰς κονδουκτορίαν τοῦ ὄξέος δρόμου*, "for the contract of the express postal service": see the Editors' note, and cf. Rom. iii. 15, *ὄξεις οἱ πόδες αὐτῶν ἐκχέαι αἷμα*.

*ὀπτάνω*.—See *Notes* ii. and add the still earlier occurrence

in ParP 49<sup>33</sup> (B.C. 164–158) = Witk. p. 47, εἰ δὲ δι' ἄλλο τι οὐκ ὀπτάνεται μοι. The verb occurs in the *Papyrus magique de Paris* 3033 ff. (c. A.D. 300), ὀρκίζω σε τὸν ὀπτανθέντα τῷ Ὁσραήλ (= Ἰσραήλ) ἐν στύλῳ φωτινῆ καὶ νεφέλῃ ἡμερινῇ, an interesting reference to Exod. xiii. 21.

ὀπώρα.—For this good vernacular word (Jer. xlvi. (xl.) 10, 12, Rev. xviii. 14) cf. the first century letter of a tax-collector at Oxyrhynchus, where along with much other miscellaneous information he informs a friend, οὐπω πολλῇ ὑπώρα ἐγένετο ἐν Μέμφι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, “there has not been much fruit in Memphis up to the present” (OP 298<sup>38f.</sup>). For the adjective see *OGIS* 234<sup>2</sup> (iii/B.C., πυλαιᾶς ὀπωρινῆς, the autumn meeting of the Amphictyons at Pylae, and cf. Jude 12, δένδρα φθινοπωρινὰ ἄκαρπα, “autumn trees without fruit.”

ὄραμα, ὄρασις.—In ChP 34<sup>ff.</sup> (iii/B.C.) = Witk. p. 30, ἔδο]ξέ μοι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὀράματος διασαφῆσαι σοι ὅπως εἰδήεις κ.τ.λ., ὀράματος refers apparently to a vision granted in sleep: cf. *Syll.* 760<sup>1</sup> καθ' ὄραμα of a similarly granted vision of the goddess Isis. “*Ορασις*” is found in the same sense in the dedicatory *Syll.* 774<sup>2</sup>, Στρατία ὑπὲρ τῆς ὀράσεως θεᾶ Δημητρὶ δῶρον. A curious use of the latter word occurs in *OGIS* 56<sup>56</sup> (iii/B.C.), where it is employed as a title of the daughter-goddess of the Sun—ὄρασιν αὐτοῦ, i.e. “oculum Solis” (see Dittenberger’s note). In an inscr. in *C. and B.*, ii. p. 653, we find εἰς ὄρασιν καὶ εἰς ὄλον τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς τέκνα καὶ εἰς βίον, “face, body, children, life,” all of which are to feel the κατάραι ὅσε ἀνγεγραμμένοι ἰσίν if the tomb is disturbed. Sir W. M. Ramsay thinks the curses are Jewish.

ὀρεινός.—The shortened form ὀρινός, which is read by W.H. in Luke i. 39, 65, is amply attested in the papyri, where the word is regularly used to describe all canals on the borders of the desert, e.g. ChP 25<sup>6</sup> (ii/A.D.), ἐν ὀρινῇ (διώρυγι), “on the desert canal,” and StrP 17<sup>4</sup> (ii/A.D.),

ἐν ὀρινῇ Πατσώντ(εως) Βακχ(ιάδος) with Preisigke's note.

ὄρθρος.—FP 108<sup>10</sup> (ii/A.D.), ὑπὸ τὸν ὄρθρον, "about dawn," the same phrase as in Acts v. 21. Cf. also ParP 49<sup>20</sup> (ii/B.C.=Witk. p. 46), εἴπας αὐτῷ ὄρθρίτερον ἐλθεῖν; and for ὄρθρίζω see Thumb *Hellen.* p. 123, where the dependence of the verb on the Heb. רָצַח in the sense of "rise early" (as Luke xxi. 38) is pronounced very improbable: the word, according to Moeris, is true Hellenistic Gk.

ὀρκωμοσία.—The neuter pl. ὀρκωμοσία is found in *Syll.* 592<sup>29</sup> (ii/B.C.), where the note cites other exx. The easy transference to 1st decl. is suggested by such analogies as ἀντωμοσία.

ὀρφανός.—The more general sense of this word may be illustrated from MGr. as in the distich, *Abbott Songs* p. 226, no. 50, where a lover mourns that his mistress is going away καί μ' ἀφίνει ὀρφανό, "leaving me friendless," the same combination as in John xiv. 18.

ὀσίως.—See *Thess.* p. 24 f., and add ParP 30<sup>25i</sup> (ii/B.C.), ἀνθ' ὧν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὀσίως διάκεισαι. The subst. ὀσιότης occurs *ib.* 14<sup>i</sup>, δι' ἣν ἔχετε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὀσιότητα: cf. *OGIS* 383<sup>19</sup> (i/B.C.), τέρψιν ἀμίμητον ἡγούμενος τὴν ὀσιότητα—the proclamation of Antiochus I.—where it no doubt represents the Zoroastrian *asha*, right. "Ὄσιος is of course common in inscriptions dealing with religion. Note *Syll.* 814<sup>7</sup>, a leaden plate from Cnidus containing an invocation of ὄσια on certain persons if they restore a trust (παραθήκη) and ἀν[όσια] if they do not. The meaning seems to help us for ὄσια Δαυεῖδ in Acts xiii. 34 (from LXX), as does the combination ὄσια καὶ ἐλευθερά in other inscriptions.

οὔς.—OP 237<sup>vi. 22</sup> (ii/A.D.), ὄτα παρέχω ἄνοα αὐτῷ, "I turned a deaf ear to him," cf. Acts vii. 57, συνέσχον τὰ ὄτα αὐτῶν.

ὀφειλή.—See Deissmann, *BS* p. 221, and as further illustrating the "profane" character of this word (*contra*

Grimm) cf. OP 286<sup>18</sup> (A.D. 82), ὑπὲρ τῆς προκειμένης ὀφειλῆς, “in connexion with the aforesaid debt,” and FP 247 (c. A.D. 100) an account which is headed ἔχθεσις Εὐήμερ[είας] ὀφειλῆς, *al.*

ὄχλέω.—While there may be traces of a technical medical use of this word in Acts v. 16 (see Knowling *ad. l.*), there is ample evidence that the word had come to be used quite generally in the vernacular, cf. e.g. OP 269<sup>ii.4</sup> (A.D. 57), ἐρωτηθεὶς ὄχλησον Διόσκορον, “please worry Dioscorus,” with reference to a bond, FP *ostr.* 45 (i/A.D.), μὴ ὄχλει τοὺς Σαμβάτος, “don’t worry the people (or ‘sons’?) of Sambas” (G. and H.), and OP 121<sup>25ff.</sup> (iii/A.D.), τοὺς τέκτονες μὴ ἀφῆς ὄλως ἀργῆσε . . . ὄχλει αὐτοῖς, “don’t allow the carpenters to be altogether idle; worry them” (G. and H.). The adj. is found in OP 525<sup>1f.</sup> (early ii/A.D.), ὁ παράπλους τοῦ Ἀνταιοπολίτου ὄχληρότατός ἐστιν, “the voyage past the Antaeopolite nome is most troublesome.”

ὄψάριον.—With the use of ὄψάριον to denote fish eaten as a titbit along with bread in John vi. 9, 11, xxi. 9 ff., cf. BU 1075<sup>16</sup> (A.D. 57), where after the mention of bread and pigeons we read of a λαγύνιον ταριχηροῦ (= ὦν) ὄψαρίων, “a jar of pickled fish.” For the word in a more general sense see OP 531<sup>18</sup> (ii/A.D.), where a father, after bestowing good advice on his son, adds τοῖς ὄψαρίοις ἐξήλλαξας ἡμᾶς, “you won me over by the dainties.” From the inscriptions we may cite *OGIS* 484<sup>16</sup> (ii/A.D.), τῶν λεπτῶν ὄψαρίων, and the mention in the same document l. 21 of an ὄψαριο-πώλης. The simple ὄψον occurs in HbP 54<sup>26ff.</sup> (iii/B.C.), λάχανα π[αντ]οδαπὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὄψον τι ἔχη[ς], “vegetables of all kinds, and some delicacies if you have any” (G. and H.), and the double diminutive ὄψαριδίον in BM III. p. 196 (iii/A.D.), where the words ὑπὲρ τιμῆς ὄψαριδίων originally appeared after l. 123.

ὄψέ, ὄψιμος, ὄψιος.—See *Proleg.* 72, and for ὄψέ used

practically as an indeclinable noun cf. BM III. p. 183<sup>66</sup> (A.D. 113), ἀπὸ πρωΐας ἕως ὄψέ. Ὁψιμος (cf. Jas. v. 7) occurs FP 133<sup>9</sup> (iv/A.D.), ὁ καιρὸς νῦν ἐστὶν ὀψιμώτερος, “the season is now rather late,” and the adv. in TbP 72<sup>361</sup> (B.C. 114–3), διὰ τὸ ὀψίμως σπαρῆναι. In TbP 304<sup>5f.</sup> (ii/A.D.) we have ὀψίας τῆς ὥρας γενομένης (cf. Mark xi. 11, ὄψε ἤδη οὔσης τ. ὥρας), and *ib.* 283<sup>6f.</sup> (i/B.C.), ὀψίτερον τῆς ὥρας.

ὄψις.—In the proceedings before the Prefect regarding the custody of a child already referred to under *εἰσπηδίαω* judgment was given that as the child in question ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως, “from its features,” appeared to be that of Saraeus, it should be restored to her, OP 37<sup>ii.3</sup> (A.D. 49), with which may be compared the use of κατ’ ὄψιν in John vii. 24. The latter phrase=“in person” occurs OP 117<sup>3</sup> (ii/iii A.D.), κατ’ ὄψιν σὲ παρακέκληκα, “I have urged you in person.”

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THE PLACE OF REWARDS IN THE TEACHING  
OF CHRIST.

I. THE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED TO THEM URGED AS AN  
OBJECTION TO CHRIST'S TEACHING.

IN Luke vi. 35 there is a striking divergence between the Authorized Version and the Revised Version in the rendering of the words *καὶ δανίζετε μηδὲν ἀπελπίζοντες*.<sup>1</sup> The former has "and lend, hoping for nothing again"; the latter, "and lend, never despairing." Those who adopt the latter translation of the words interpret them as referring to the heavenly recompense, i.e., "not regarding what you lend as lost, in view of the reward in store for you in heaven." On this interpretation the meaning of the Revised Version translation stands in striking opposition to that of the Authorized Version. In the one case we are told to hope for nothing, in the other we are urged never to lose hope; in the one case the thought of a return for our generosity is set aside, in the other it is encouraged; in the one case the disinterestedness of the agent's conduct is emphasized, in the other a direct appeal is made to his self-interest.

On the question of the meaning of *ἀπελπίζειν* here the balance of evidence appears to be pretty equal. In favour of the translation "despair," the evidence of contemporary

<sup>1</sup> The reading *μηδὲνα ἀπελπίζοντες* (T.WH.marg., R.V.marg.) is translated variously: R.V.marg., "despairing of no man"; J. Weiss, "robbing no man of hope," or "bringing no man to despair"; Tischendorf and H. Holtzmann, "nemini spem praescindentes." It has probably arisen through the doubling of the initial *a* in *ἀπελπίζοντες*.

Greek and Hellenistic usage is adduced ; while the rendering of the Authorized Version, which may be defended on the analogy of such words as ἀποδιδόναι, ἀπολαμβάνειν, appears to suit the context better. Since the question cannot then be settled on linguistic grounds, can it not, one may ask, be determined by a reference to the general spirit of Christ's teaching? The point in question is no trivial one. It concerns the motive of conduct, a subject which must be of the first importance to one who laid such stress on the righteousness of the heart as Christ, and introduces the question of rewards, a topic upon which He touched with considerable frequency. May we not expect, then, to learn from the teaching of Christ on other occasions what was the position He took up on this question; and where such a clear issue is presented to us as between the translations of the Authorized Version and the Revised Version, ought we not to be able to determine with considerable certainty which is the more characteristic of that teaching? But the remarkable thing is, that when we thus inquire into the general tendency of Christ's doctrine on this point, we find the very same ambiguity as obtains with regard to the translation of the present verse from Luke. Throughout the whole of Christ's teaching there are frequent appeals to two different, we might almost say, two opposite motives. At one time believers are urged to the performance of certain acts in a spirit of entire disinterestedness, at another they are encouraged by the prospect of ultimate gain. On the one hand they are exhorted to put aside all thought of return in their dealings with their fellow-men, on the other they are reminded of the reward with which God will recompense their benevolence, and stimulated by the prospect of it to the performance of duty. So far, then, from being able to draw from the general teaching of Christ

any conclusion as to the meaning of the phrase in question in Luke vi. 35, we find in that verse, with its ambiguous motive, only the reflection of an ambiguity which pervades the whole doctrine of Christ. Not only with regard to lending, but with regard to the whole practice of righteousness, does Christ exhort us at once to hope for nothing, and yet never to abandon hope, urge us to be disinterested in our conduct, and yet at the same time appeal to our self-interest.

A few references will suffice to illustrate this double tendency in the teaching of Christ. First, take some passages which insist upon the disinterestedness of those who practise the righteousness Christ enjoins. The verses immediately preceding the one we have referred to in Luke are in this strain. Here, and in the corresponding passage in Matthew, Christ takes various instances of kindly conduct towards one's fellows, such as loving them, doing good to them, lending to them, and greeting them, and declares that the practice of these kindly offices in expectation of a return at their hands is unworthy His disciples, being on a level with the conduct of the publicans, the Gentiles, and sinners (Luke vi. 32-34; Matt. v. 46 f.). We are to love not only our brethren who may reward us, but our enemies from whom we can look for no return. It is the same lesson that is enforced in figurative form by the injunction to invite to our feasts not our friends or rich neighbours, who may invite us in turn, but the poor, the maimed, the lame and the blind, who cannot recompense us (Luke xiv. 12-14). "It is more blessed to give than to receive," Paul quotes from Christ. Self-denial, not self-seeking, is declared to be the law for the follower of Christ. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it."

But, on the other hand, there are far more utterances

in the opposite strain. Even those passages already quoted in disparagement of the spirit which seeks *immediate* recompence, conclude with the promise of reward in the future. They who do good to those from whom they may look for no return are assured that their reward shall be great, and that they shall be the children of the Highest (Luke vi. 35). They who invite those who cannot invite them again are promised a recompence at the resurrection of the just (Luke xiv. 14). If he who will save his life is warned that he shall lose it, still he who loses his life for Christ's sake and the Gospel's is assured that he shall save it. The whole Gospel of Christ glitters with promise of future blessing. Again and again does our Lord hold forth the prospect of the reward in store for the faithful as an inducement to loyal service. The trials and persecutions which they have to endure are declared to be ground for rejoicing in view of the great reward with which they will be compensated. No act, however trivial, shall be allowed to pass unrecompensed. A cup of cold water given in Christ's name shall not lose its reward. At one time the strict equivalence of the reward to the conduct which secures it is emphasized. The merciful obtain mercy, they who confess Christ are confessed by Him before His Father. At another the excess of the reward over the desert is represented. For what we give we receive good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over. Present renunciation is rewarded with hundredfold recompence now in this time, and in the world to come with eternal life. Open the Gospels where we will, we cannot read far without finding Christ holding forth the promise of the reward prepared for us as an inducement and an encouragement to faithful service.

The apparent inconsistency between these two sets of passages is but superficial and may easily be removed.

It is quite true that in those cases where Christ requires disinterestedness in our conduct He speaks disparagingly of those who look for any immediate recompence for their actions. But what He objects to in this is not the looking for a reward at all, but the looking for it *immediately*. So far from discountenancing the prospect of reward as a motive for action, He goes on Himself, as we have seen, in the next breath to assure those who do not expect the reward immediately that their future recompence will be sure and liberal. From this it appears that the disinterestedness upon which He insists is not so ingenuous as it appears at first. When we hear the injunctions, "Lend hoping for nothing", "Invite those who cannot invite you again", we feel as if the spirit which inspired these exhortations were one which shrank from all thought of self-interest, one to which the very idea of a reward for one's conduct in any shape or form must be abhorrent. But when Christ goes on to assure those who are willing to forgo the immediate recompence that they will obtain a far more liberal one in the future, we feel that that puts a very different complexion on the matter; and whereas we had thought before to find a spirit of sublime unselfishness inculcated, we now recognize that the appeal to one's self-interest is none the less direct because the gratification held before one is transferred to a more remote future. The motive which inspires the agent in either case is the same, the prospect of some recompence for his conduct,—only in the one case he looks for it now and at the hands of his fellow-man, in the other case in the future and at the hands of God. Christ does not appear to disapprove of our doing our righteousness with the view of obtaining a reward for it. He expressly holds out the prospect of the reward the Father in heaven has for us as a motive for action. What He does disapprove of is our expecting

a double reward, one here and another in the future, one at the hands of man and another at the hands of God. That is the point of view from which He criticizes the ostentation of the Pharisees in their religious exercises. He does not blame them for allowing the thought of recompence to sully the spirit in which they perform them—He even speaks of prayer Himself as something for which we may expect a reward!—but for forfeiting their prospect of reward in the future by the fact that they have already obtained it in the admiration and esteem of their fellows. There is, then, no inconsistency between the two sets of passages to which we have referred, in which Christ touches upon this question of looking for a recompence for our conduct. He appears to recognize and thoroughly approve of the practice. He Himself frequently holds before our eyes the certainty and the liberality of the recompence in store for us, as a motive for the conduct to which He would urge us. When He speaks disparagingly of those who do righteousness with an eye to recompence, it is not because they desire payment in return, but because they are content to receive the payment in baser coin. With the choice between the heavenly and the earthly, the temporal and the eternal, before them, they prefer the inferior. However Christ may disapprove their choice and despise the baseness of their preference, that does not alter the fact that, so far as the question is concerned of allowing the thought of recompence to weigh as a motive for conduct, His own position is nowise different from theirs. In both cases this motive is recognized, only that in the one the recompence is looked for immediately and in the shape of some earthly good, in the other in the future and in the shape of some heavenly blessing.

It is an easy matter thus to vindicate the consistency of Christ's teaching. But there is a much more serious

question suggested by the consideration of the place which the subject of rewards occupies in the teaching of Christ, which it behoves us to face. As we have seen, Christ recognizes and approves of our doing our righteousness, to use His phrase, with a view to the reward which we shall obtain in the future. Is this not an unworthy motive to admit? May this not be reckoned as one of the defects which may be alleged against Christian morality—that it degrades the practice of righteousness to a piece of refined self-seeking? Goethe tells us that what fascinated him especially in the Ethics of Spinoza was the boundless unselfishness which shone forth in every sentence of the book, and reached a climax in that wonderful saying, “He who loves God truly must not desire that God should love him in return.” It may be open to question whether unselfishness is any longer to be reckoned a virtue when it reaches such an exalted pitch. But apart from the merits of this extreme conclusion to which the principle of unselfishness is carried, the question forces itself upon us whether the doctrine of Christ, with its appeal to the prospect of recompence as a motive for action, does not compare unfavourably with the ethical system of the Jewish philosopher with its sublime unselfishness. Or again, take this extract from Schiller’s *Philosophical Letters*, which deals with this subject of the prospect of reward: “True, it is ennoblement of a human soul, to sacrifice present advantage for eternal—it is the noblest stage of egoism—but egoism and love divide mankind into two classes, in the highest degree dissimilar, and separated from one another by lines of demarcation which never merge into one another. Egoism sets its centre in itself; love plants it outside of itself in the axis of the eternal whole. Love strives after unity, egoism is solitude. . . . Egoism sows for gratitude, love for ingratitude. Love bestows, egoism lends—it

matters not, before the throne of the Truth which judges, whether with an eye to the enjoyment of the following moment, or in prospect of the martyr's crown—it matters not whether the interest falls due in this life or the next.” What are we to say of the doctrine of Christ in view of these statements? Under which principle, egoism or love, are we to range it? So far as the position taken up by Schiller in the paragraph we have quoted is concerned, there can be no question. Christ's admission of the prospect of recompence as a motive for action clearly brings His teaching under the category of egoism on Schiller's principle of judgment. It is true, as we have seen, that the recompence which He urges His followers to strive after is a nobler one than any temporal advantage, and that its enjoyment is postponed to the next life. But Schiller contends—and is there not justice in the contention?—that that does not make any essential difference in the position, or obliterate the distinction between love, which thinks not of self at all, and egoism, which, in however refined and tortuous a manner, is still seeking its own good.

But, apart from the doctrines of philosophers and thinkers altogether, there are perhaps many who will confess to a feeling of something akin to disappointment at the frequency and the frankness of the appeals which Christ makes to this motive. We do not like to think of the moral teaching of Christ as anything short of the very highest and best. We can tolerate blemishes in the systems of other moral teachers, but not with Christ. Any suspicion of the admission of an unworthy motive, or the acceptance of an inferior standard of morality, pains us. Yet we cannot, perhaps, rid ourselves of the feeling that in respect to this question of rewards the teaching of Christ is open to criticism. It seems to encourage mercenary views of religion. The practice of morality is degraded to a calcu-



lation of profit and loss. Present renunciation is rewarded by future recompence. "Behold we have forsaken all, and followed Thee; what shall we have therefore?"—that question of Peter's seems quite justified from the standpoint Christ takes up in His preaching. Yet what man is there of finer feeling upon whom it does not jar? And when we think of this question being asked not merely by one disciple with regard to his conduct, but by the Christian community as a whole with regard to the whole practice of that righteousness to which Christ exhorts them—and are we not justified in so conceiving it in view of the position which Christ assumed in His teaching?—when we convert the maxim underlying Peter's question into law universal, and imagine the question put generally by all who accept Christ as Master, "Behold we have done what Thou hast required of us; what are we to get in return?" does not this degrade religion to a kind of mercenary policy which robs it of all spiritual worth, and reduce it, in spite of all the specious disinterestedness and magnanimity with which it decks itself out at times, to a piece of sordid self-seeking?

One may hesitate to formulate any such charge against the teaching of Christ. The very thought of such a thing savours of irreverence. But one has the uncomfortable feeling that if the argument were pressed to its logical conclusion, something of the sort might result. At any rate we believe that there are many who will confess to a feeling of regret at the prominence which this matter of reward receives in the Gospel of Christ, many who, while not prepared themselves to admit the cogency of the objections to the moral teaching of Christ which bolder spirits may found thereon, are not capable of refuting them, and are pained at the thought that there should be any *primâ facie* case against the moral worth of a doctrine which

they had always imagined to be not only unsurpassed but unapproached in point of moral sublimity.

I propose to examine more closely the position which Christ takes up upon this question, and to inquire what justice there is in the objections that so readily suggest themselves with regard to it.

First, let us consider the force of the argument that the conduct which Christ contemplates on the part of His followers is not entirely disinterested. We shall not at present enter into any closer examination of the nature of the appeal which Christ makes to our self-interest, and discuss its legitimacy. That we shall consider presently. Meanwhile, let us confine our attention to the fact that Christ *does* make such appeal, that He does not rule all question of the interest of self out of court, and insist upon conduct in which there shall be absolutely no thought of self at all. Is this a defect in Christ's Ethics? Does Christianity compare unfavourably, in this respect, with the Ethics of Spinoza, for instance, with its sublime unselfishness, which Goethe admired so much? When we recall the part which the "effort after self-preservation" plays in the system of Spinoza, it may be questioned whether the doctrine of the Jewish philosopher is after all so free of taint of self-interest as Goethe maintained. But even were the Ethics of Spinoza as irreproachable in this respect as Goethe supposed, it might still be questioned whether it was on that account to be preferred to Christ's doctrine. No doubt the thought of a perfectly pure disinterestedness appeals to one forcibly. We seem here to approach the very summit of moral perfection. But is such sublime unselfishness practically attainable in any system of morals? If we reject the very thought of self-interest in every shape and form, what interest has the self any further in the practice of that morality which is set before it? Does

not the very thought of an ultimate good involve an appeal to our interest, using the word in the highest sense? In the attainment of that good, do we not look forward to the development to the full of all the possibilities of our being? Would not a system of morals which inculcated absolute unselfishness fail to enlist our sympathy? Why should I engage in this course of conduct that is prescribed? Why should I deny myself? Why should I live for others? In order that any such code of morals appeal to me, I must feel that along the line of conduct here indicated I attain more nearly to the stature of the perfect man, i.e., that my own life is developed to richer fulness. And if such tacit recognition of the interest of self is involved in the exhibition even of the most altruistic spirit, then it is evident that there can no longer be any question of an absolute unselfishness untainted by any consideration of self-interest, no longer any question of living *wholly* for others without any regard for self at all. Absolute disregard of self would be suicidal. The suggestion that self-denial is the final duty for man amounts to a contradiction in terms. It may be my duty on occasion to deny myself. But the very fact that I recognize the duty as *mine* involves the acknowledgment of self, even at the very moment that we feel constrained to reject certain claims made on its behalf. Absolute disinterestedness is an ethical fiction. We can no more escape from the self in morals than we can jump off our own shadow. However unselfish the line of conduct we resolve to adopt, in recognizing it as *our* duty, we have asserted the self in the very breath in which we thought to deny it.

It is no objection, then, to the morality of Christ that it is not absolutely disinterested, seeing that the same charge may be brought against any system of morals that can lay claim to practical efficacy. Whether the kind of

self-interest to which it makes appeal is of the elevated nature one would expect, or whether Christ does not condescend, at times, to encourage a baser kind of self-seeking which is little better than sordid selfishness—these are questions which can be answered only by a closer consideration of His teaching to which we now address ourselves.

In proceeding to discuss the tenor of the various utterances of Christ upon this subject, we would direct attention to one characteristic of His teaching which it is necessary to keep in mind in order to avoid drawing false conclusions from His own express statements—viz., His tendency to use modes of thought and speech which it is the result of His doctrine to transcend. However true it may be that He is the Universal Teacher, whose doctrine is not of any particular age or clime, but is destined for all mankind, we must remember that in a very real sense He was the child of His own age, addressing Himself in the first instance to the people of His own nation, and using the language and modes of thought that were familiar to them and to Himself. So far as the vehicle of His doctrine was concerned, He simply availed Himself of the forms of thought and religious imagery supplied by the Old Testament and the later Jewish literature. He used the old forms, but He breathed into them a new spirit; and sometimes the form is no longer able to stand the strain to which it is subjected, the thought is too great for the imagery used to convey it, and it becomes evident that to accept that imagery literally would be to do violence to the thought. For instance, Christ uses the familiar figure of a banquet to express the blessedness of the future life in the kingdom of heaven (Luke xiii. 29, xxii. 30); but He has Himself warned us, by His reference to that life as one in which “they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are

as the angels which are in heaven", that that figure of a banquet is not to be taken literally, or to be allowed to suggest any gratification of sensual desires. Again Christ speaks of Himself as if He regarded Himself as a kind of higher law-giver, sets up His own authority as against the law that was given "to them of old time", and declares that He gives a new commandment to His disciples. Yet nothing is more certain than that that is an inadequate category to describe the relationship in which Christ stands to His followers. Nay, we have but to consider the nature of this new commandment which Christ laid upon His disciples—to love one another—to realize that we are here beyond the province of the law-giver; for love is that which will not be constrained, and a commandment to love is almost a contradiction in terms. In the same way we may find that though Christ uses the figure of a reward in store for those who do the works of righteousness, the thought to which He seeks to give expression is of a profounder and more spiritual nature than can be done justice to by any such simple figure. There is one case, at any rate, in which Christ introduces this figure in which this is manifestly the case, viz., in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard. At the end of the day the labourers receive their wage. Now, the very idea of a wage involves some reference to the amount of work done to secure it. The greater the amount of work, the greater the wage. But in the parable all the labourers receive the same, whether they have worked the whole day or only for an hour or two. Ostensibly this money is paid as a wage for the day's work, but evidently in reality it has ceased to be a recompence for what has been done, and has become, in the case of the workers who were hired later, a free gift. The parable, as Holtzmann says, "kills the idea of recompence even while it applies it." We

seem to be dealing with a case in which the category employed is that of recompence for service rendered, but the thought which Christ desires to enforce is one to which that category proves inadequate. It may be that we shall find something of the same kind in other cases in which Christ introduces the idea of reward. At any rate it is well to utter a preliminary warning against the tendency to take Christ's use of this figure *au pied de la lettre*, and to draw the conclusions which we reach by pursuing the idea to its logical issue.

Keeping these considerations in mind, let us turn now to examine the bearing of Christ's utterances upon this subject of rewards, and inquire whether they are open to objection from the moral standpoint. What is the nature of the objections that may be urged, has already been suggested. The prominence given to rewards in the teaching of Christ lays His morality open to the charge of giving encouragement to selfishness. It involves an appeal to a spurious motive. We should practise righteousness for the love of it, not from the expectation of what we shall get in return. The man who does the right from such a spurious motive does not really do the right at all, for the righteous act in the true sense is not the mere outward action, but the action done under the influence of the proper motive. The fact that Christ holds the prospect of reward before His followers as an inducement to action seems to imply that the worthier motive is absent, for otherwise why hold this inferior motive before them? Where a higher motive for the practice of righteousness is present, the anticipation of the reward promised will be unnecessary; and where it is necessary the conduct will still lack that true righteousness which comes from the worthiness of the motive which inspired it. In fact, Christ's promises of recompence are little better than

direct bribes to the practice of righteousness addressed to those who lack the love of it in their hearts.

These are grave charges. We shall endeavour to meet them in our further discussion of the subject.

G. WAUCHOPE STEWART.

### NOTES ON THE OLD CANAANITE RELIGION.<sup>1</sup>

THE Old Testament, the excavations in Palestine, and the evidence of monuments and inscriptions show that the old Canaanite religion during the latter half of the second millennium before Christ did not differ essentially from that of agricultural and pastoral peoples who depend upon the fertility of the soil. Such communities tend to develop similar conceptions of the relation between animate nature and themselves. The customary rites, the thank-offerings, the regular festivals, the promotion of growth and fertility—these were essential to Canaanite popular cultus both in our period and in the age when its licentiousness brought the condemnation of the prophets of Israel. But it was not accompanied, in our period at least, by any rudimentary mental or material culture. By the side of amulets, talismans and idols we must observe resource in fortification, building and even in tunnelling. The sacred places, which presuppose organized ritual, the crude plaques of the mother-goddess of nature, and the grim sacrifices of human victims give only one side of the picture. On the other side are the diplomatic letters (discovered at El-Amarna) written by the Canaanite chieftains to the king of Egypt, and the less official communications more recently found at Taanach. These reveal a by no means inferior mental ability and a not

<sup>1</sup> Based upon a paper read before the Third Congress of the History of Religions, Oxford, September 1908. See further the *Transactions*, i. 259-262, and the writer's *Religion of Ancient Palestine*.

inconsiderable power of expression, and they furnish important evidence for the complex thought of the age.

Now, Robertson Smith has shown that religious and political institutions formed part of the same social structure. They were for the preservation and welfare of society, so that we have to deal, not so much with formulated laws and rules, as with *practical systems* wherein the reciprocal relations between deities and men were well understood. Religion was the affair of the community, and of such communities the deities themselves formed part. Thus, our classification of acts into religious and secular, or civic, ceremonial, moral and spiritual was unknown ; and one may look in vain for such subdivisions among the prophets of Israel. (Cp. W. H. Bennett, *The Post-exilic Prophets*, pp. 263-266.) Consequently, practical religion being simply a branch of social duty, there was no distinction between offences against the community or its deity, and we can hardly conceive a nature-religion devoid of ethical ideas, however rudimentary or narrow. The essence of the system lay in the recognition of common interests and mutual social obligations. Even in the most primitive races there are certain rules of conduct and tribal morality, and the whole teaching of anthropology warns us not to look only upon the dark side of Canaanite religion. Nor must we form too low an estimate of the nature-deities. If men looked to them for the increase of the soil, they were no mere gods of clouds or flocks ; their loyal adherents appealed to them in all human crises and troubles, in all matters where their joint welfare was concerned. An Egyptian nobleman of about 2500 B.C. records : " I gave bread to the hungry, and clothing to the naked ; never did I judge two brothers so that a son was deprived of his paternal possession." After these noble sentiments he proceeds to relate how he was sent to " hack up " the Nubians, and slew many of the children—



and so forth.<sup>1</sup> A simple illustration, but typical of the fact that, though the system essentially made for unselfishness within the group, there were different standards for those outside it. Thus, while we must recognize the possibility of a certain moral development, it was obviously limited; and its fundamental weakness, as Robertson Smith has said, was its "inability to separate the ethical motives of religion from their source in a merely naturalistic conception of the godhead and its relation to man" (*Rel. Sem.*, p. 58).

In the next place, Assyriological and Egyptological research have proved the underlying identity of thought throughout Western Asia and Egypt. Questions of borrowing or of comprehensive influences are secondary; the primary fact is the common soil—the recognition of common fundamental ideas; and however intelligible this may be in the case of the various Semitic peoples, we cannot exclude Egypt, as any perusal of Egyptian texts will show. It is clear also that this identity in the mental environment manifests itself unintermittently over the Oriental world from our earliest sources to the present day. There is a body of tradition which has been unconsciously propagated generation after generation, and every positive religion has come into contact all along the line with the old ideas and practices which held the field. In the elaborate cults of Babylonia and Egypt, in the priestly and the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, in the Talmudic and Syriac sources, and in modern Palestine itself, the common fundamental ideas appear in a great variety of shapes. Perhaps in no other area is there such opportunity for the *historical* treatment of comparative religion. Sometimes we may trace the progression or retrogression in a single district: the lengthy history of the famous old city of Haran, the points of connexion and divergence between the Baby-

<sup>1</sup> J. H. Breasted, *Anc. Records of Egypt: Hist. Documents*, i. 357 seq.

lonians and the Mandaeans; or we may see in Ḥauran the influence of Hellenism upon the district, or the Arabs of the Šafa inscriptions in the act of adjusting their pantheon. More interesting is the evolution of Mohammedanism and its numerous sects—each founded upon older ideas. We can perceive the Nosairis with their pantheon disguised under Mohammedan names, the Sun and the Moon being the respective heads of minor subdivisions. Indeed, in Jezidis, Druses, orthodox Mohammedans, and in the antique popular religion of modern Palestine, we have living examples of the various forms which the underlying conceptions have taken at one and the same age. Consequently, unless it can be proved otherwise, some variety of standpoint, such as can also be illustrated from the Old Testament, Egypt and Babylonia, was by no means precluded in early Canaan.

Thus, leaving the purely *comparative* method for the *historical*, we have to allow for constant modification; we must distinguish between the persistent and the more temporary features, between the conceptions inevitably inherited and the more accidental growths due to political or individual causes. Hence, we may not take the crudest rudimentary conceptions and reconstruct a Canaanite or pre-Israelite religion. Nor may we evolve from the more noble and desirable elements an abstract faith above the social conditions of the age. Least of all may we adopt the chronological method and assume that the religion *must* have shared any specific characteristics which can be found in those lands which had politically influenced Canaan. The lines of influence were many. Intercourse with Egypt dates back at least to 2000 B.C. and shows itself in the presence of Egyptians at Gezer, Megiddo and the North at that age, and in the introduction of the Astarte of Gebal or Byblos into Egypt. The Hyksos invaders were probably Semitic, and when they were expelled, the Egyptian kings

of the XVIIIth dynasty embarked upon their great campaigns in Western Asia, with the result that in our period the fortunes of Canaan were controlled either by Egypt or by the powers of the North : North Syria, Mesopotamia and the Hittites of Asia Minor.

The question of *Babylonian* influence is very complex. In our period, about 1400 B.C., the cuneiform script and language were used for diplomatic correspondence between Western Asia and Egypt and for more private matters among the Canaanite chiefs. We also find in Canaan such deities as Addu or Adad, Shamash, Sin, Nebo, Nergal, Ninib, and perhaps Marduk—names familiar in the religions of Babylonia and Assyria. Further, although these lands recede somewhat from Canaanite history in this period, there is reason to suppose that some centuries earlier, in the age of Hammurabi, Babylonian supremacy had extended over the Mediterranean coastlands. But although it seems natural to infer that Babylonia exercised a predominating and lasting influence upon Canaanite religion, it is necessary to remember that there are many difficult questions in regard to the relation between Arabia, Babylonia, and Assyria. Arabia, with its old seats of culture, is a little known factor which we cannot afford to ignore. On the other hand, the region of Assyria, Mesopotamia and N. Syria is intimately connected with Canaan by geography, political history and by certain archaeological features. Some of the personal names in Canaan about 1400 B.C., suggest a direct influence from the North, and since we now know that the cuneiform script and language were used even by the Hittites of Asia Minor, Babylonian culture could continue to reach Canaan second-hand. Our available evidence is unequally distributed, and it is inadequate as regards other quarters whose influence claims equal consideration. It seems safer, therefore, to work up from the common prevailing religious conceptions

to the point where we can recognize specific influences than to assume that any specific Babylonian features *must* have left their mark when Babylonia was supreme, and—what is far more important—*must* have persisted, or to infer that whatsoever recurs also in the prolific literature of Babylonia (or of Egypt) was once foreign to Canaan.<sup>1</sup>

We are fortunately able to gain a fair idea of the effect of Egyptian supremacy over the Mediterranean coastlands. The Egyptian conquerors would carry away the sons of the Canaanite chieftains to serve in the royal court ; some of them would be subsequently anointed to their father's positions. Egyptian garrisons and patrolling officials supervised the land. The recognition of the great national god Amon-Re was enforced. About 1500 B.C. Thotmes III. dedicated three cities in the Lebanon district to this god. About 1400 we find Egyptian gods residing at Tunip in the North, where, a century later, Ramses II. erected a statue of his divine self. Notwithstanding the disturbances illustrated in the Amarna letters, or the later movements of the Philistines and their allies, Canaan, in the first half of the twelfth century, was still under Egypt. The Papyrus Harris refers to the sea trade in the Levant, and to the Asiatic tribute ; Ramses III. built a sun-temple in Canaan to Amon-Re, and this "lord of gods, lord of heaven," had three Asiatic cities dedicated to him. But the power of Egypt decayed, and the rule passed into the hands of the priests of Thebes. Nevertheless, as we learn from the interesting story of the envoy Wenamon, about 1100, the supremacy of Amon-Re was acknowledged by the independent Delta state, and, after some argument, by the king of Byblos, who, though unwilling to allow the *political* suzerainty of Egypt, admitted the claim of Amon-Re to be lord and possessor of the sea and of Lebanon.

<sup>1</sup> See further Swete's *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, (1909), p. 74 sqq.

From the Amarna letters we see how slightly earlier conditions in Canaan were transformed by Egypt. Egypt was tolerant to faithful vassals. It accepted the use of the cuneiform script and language. It even adopted the powerful warrior-deities of other lands. The Astarte of Byblos, the Sutekh or Sēt of the Hyksos, the gods Resheph and Baal and the goddesses Anath and Kadesh entered and became popular, and Ramses II., when in Hauran beyond the Jordan, paid homage to some non-Egyptian deity of the district. It appears from this that religious conditions in the Mediterranean coast-lands were solidly established, and that the deities were not pre-eminently Babylonian. We may infer, then, that Egyptian supremacy did not affect the religion of Canaan, except in so far as it involved the recognition of the supremacy of Amon-Re, the "great god," and of the king of Egypt the "good god." For the king was the member of a complicated divine family, the son and champion of the supreme Sun-god, whom he incarnated. He embodied the kingdom, and was the source of its wealth and prosperity. He was the visible god of his people and received their adoration as the Sun-god. He was the great mediator between the worshipping body as a whole and the leading gods. He was the guardian of the cult; the gods were his gods; the temples were his memorial; and when he died he mingled with the gods, still retaining his inferiority to the supreme deity.

The belief that the king was the son and viceroy of the deities was all-pervading. It leaves its mark in many shapes, in many ages; in the prayers and the praises, in myth and history. It appears in the prologue to Hammurabi's code of laws; in the priest-kings and "lieutenants" (*šaknu*) of Assyria; it underlies some of the Old Testament ideas of the real and the ideal king; the belief is active in the Greek age; and the Syrian father Aphraates employs it to support his argu-

ment that Christ was the Son of God (xvii. § 8). It leaves its traces in the insignia, the costume and the toilet ; in the court etiquette and the royal prerogatives ; in the tithe and tribute ; and in the relation between temple and palace. In fact, the divine king is part of the "system" which united the deities, the land and the people. The deity was king ; other nations were the kingdoms of other gods ; the king was the deity incarnate, and both stood in the closest relationship to the people. Ramses II. could be called the "husband of Egypt" (Breasted, iii. 490), and a text of Meneptah declares that from of old Egypt had been the only daughter of Re whose son sits upon the throne (*ib.* 612). Parallels to this conception could be easily found elsewhere. On turning to the letters sent to Egypt by the Canaanite chiefs about 1400 B.C. we find that the land as a whole belongs to the king, whom they love, and to his gods, and the chieftains look for the assistance of both. They acknowledge that the king of Egypt is the god, the Sun, the child of the Sun, the Sun in heaven, the everlasting Sun, whom the Sun loves. These titles recur from Syria to Lachish in the south, but are not used, of course, by the *independent* kings of Cyprus, Babylonia, Assyria, etc.

The king investigated complaints, he was the court of final appeal. The petty chieftains themselves were divided by jealousy and intrigue ; and the supremacy of the external power was practically their sole bond. Indeed, when once they joined in appeal to Babylonia for aid against Egypt, they were promptly warned that their duty lay in allegiance to the Pharaoh ; and when the servants of the king of Babylonia were robbed and slain by Canaanites, this monarch wrote direct to the king of Egypt, "Canaan is thy land—kill the people who slew my servants and avenge (*lit.* bring back) their blood." The position of the Pharaoh as supreme authority finds a parallel in the recognition of the authority

of Mohammed by the Arabian clans who were willing to refer to him questions of right and precedence in which they would not yield to one another.<sup>1</sup>

The Amarna letters are not religious literature, but they illustrate some of the religious beliefs. When, in an Egyptian text, the defeated Amorite and Libyan chiefs cry to Ramses III., "Thou art like the Sun when he rises, men live at thy appearance" (Breasted, iv. 127), a Canaanite chief writes that the king is like the Sun which rises over the lands every day. When, in the same Egyptian text, the captives pray for the king's breath or spirit, the Canaanites affirm in their letters that his breath gives them life, it soothes their heart, they rejoice when it reaches them, for without it they cannot live. The king's breath is life-giving. We read in Egypt that the god Horus gives his breath to the one that follows him; in Assyria, Marduk is "lord of the good breath" which comforts those in distress, and a man prays to his god, "Make thy good breath blow, and make me to be released."<sup>2</sup>

It follows from the structure of the "system" that loyalty to the king and to the gods was identical, and it is interesting to notice that the Canaanites use the same familiar word for "sin" (*hitu*) to denote a political or religious offence. Thus the prince of Byblos ascribes his illness to the wrath of his gods, and confesses his sins to them; while another writer, accused of intrigue complains that he has been slandered (the phrase in Dan. iii. 8), and declares, "I have not sinned, I do not refuse my tribute or the wish of the officer set over me."<sup>3</sup> "Sin" lay in intrigue and disloyalty, and

<sup>1</sup> W. R. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 70. Cp. also the independent Greek city-states, and the deification of the Macedonian kings (E. R. Bevan, *English Historical Review*, 1901, p. 632).

<sup>2</sup> See Breasted, ii. 73; Jensen, *Keilinschr.-Bibl.* vi. 39; and *Proc. of Society of Bibl. Arch.*, xvii. p. 138 seq. Cp. also Ezek. xxxvii. 14, Isa. xi. 4, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Knudtzon, *die El-Amarna Tafeln*, 137, l. 33, and 254.

when the chief of Jerusalem repudiates an accusation of this character, he protests that he is "loyal," using a Canaanite word (*šaduk*) which is practically the Old Testament *šaddik*, "righteous" (Knudtzon, 287). For, the "righteous" man did not conform merely to public opinion or law, he conformed to the well-understood mutual obligations which bound together the "system" whether tribal or monarchical. He adhered to the "manner" (comp. Hebrew *mishpāt*), the customary law or usage of the group, and since in old religion there were mutual obligations between deities and man, we can understand how the conception arose of the righteousness of the Godhead or *his* "loyalty." This, the common legal explanation of the idea leaves untouched.<sup>1</sup>

Ideas of righteousness and sin thus depend primarily upon the character of the social order, and it is interesting further to find in the Canaanite letters that cursing and expulsion are expressed by the word which in the Old Testament means to curse (אָרַךְ). It is used of driving a hostile chief out of a city, while it is also said that the king will expel or curse the man who does not serve him (Knudtzon, 179 and 193). The meaning is essentially the same. Robertson Smith has already observed that the man who defies the tribal obligations has to fear the god as well as his fellow-men; and typical curses, from the epilogue of Hammurabi's laws, or in Egyptian texts (Breasted, ii. 925 seq.), involve severance from the protection of the gods, the state and fellow-men.<sup>2</sup>

If cursing is excommunication, blessing, to judge from the use of the Canaanite word in Egyptian (*b-r-k*), meant recognition, homage or the like. Just as Abimelech of Tyre writes that his lord is the Sun that rises daily according to the decision of *his father* Shamash," in Egypt, Semitic captives cry to Ramses III., "*Thy father* Amon hath put us beneath

<sup>1</sup> See further, *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1908, p. 632, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. the curse of Cain, Gen. iv. 11-14.



thy feet for ever, that we may see and breathe the breath of life, that we may *bless* his temple" (Breasted, iv. 122). Similarly, they pray for the king's breath, that they may *bless* his royal insignia (the double serpent-diadem) and may speak of his might to their children's children. Ramses III. refers to captives offered as "*blessings*," i.e. gifts to Amon (*ib.* 207). This idea of recognition or homage seems to recur in 2 Kings xviii. 31, Isaiah xxxvi. 16.

It may be observed at this point that the fundamental idea of "abomination" involves all that is contrary both to the social group and to its gods. The violation of tombs was an "abomination" to Astarte; Israelite sacrifices were an "abomination" to Egypt. When queen Hatshepsut repaired the ravages of the Hyksos, she removed "the abominations of the great god." Ramses III. cleansed the temples of S. Egypt from all abomination, and records his command "to bring in truth and to banish falsehood, and to cause lying to be an abomination." In the time of Sety I. it is more forcibly stated: "an abomination of the god is the transgression against his people." A practical illustration of the idea is afforded by the great harem conspiracy in the time of Ramses III., when magical practices are called "the abomination of every god and goddess."<sup>1</sup> And this is the anthropological view of irreligion: all that was contrary to the religion of the group—contrary to the clan-god or to clan-custom; all that was private and harmful rather than communal and beneficial; in a word, irreligion was, to use Robertson Smith's term, "anti-social";<sup>2</sup> and in any "system" closely bound together, as that of Canaan was, there were probably standards of religion and irreligion or of orthodoxy and unorthodoxy.

The "system" is also bound up by the Name. The

<sup>1</sup> The references are to Breasted, ii. 303, iv. p. 85, iii. 192, and iv. 454 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 264.

name is the Essence, Nature, Personality ; perhaps, as Robertson Smith has conjectured, it was originally the emblem (*Kinship and Marriage*, 2nd ed., p. 248). In Egypt, as in W. Asia, it was considered indispensable that the Name should be kept fresh ; “ the king dies not who is mentioned because of his achievements,” says Sesostris (i. 503). A dead man would pray for his name to be mentioned, or for libations to be poured out upon the ground in his name.<sup>1</sup> Monuments were erected that the name might live, and memorial tablets were solemnly anointed to benefit dead ancestors. The king of Egypt even sacrificed captives to perpetuate his name.<sup>2</sup> In Egyptian texts we find the familiar thought that the name of an enemy “ shall not be among the living ” ; and Ramses III. boasts of destroying the name of the Asiatic lands, and of obliterating for ever the name of a vanquished chief.<sup>3</sup> In like manner, the prince of Tyre writes that the name of the loyal man is unto eternity, while, as for the disloyal, “ his name will not be in the land for ever.” All vassals took the oath by the royal name, and the name, as an emblem of the king, meant possession. Ramses II. tells the god Ptah, “ I have branded . . . the whole land with thy name, they belong to thy Ka for ever, for thou art the creator of them.” The chieftain of Jerusalem, in turn, acknowledges the supremacy of Amenhotep IV. who had put his name upon the East and upon the West. Possession involved protection, and the same chief writes that the king has put his name upon Jerusalem for ever, therefore the king cannot abandon his territory.

Now the king of Egypt, who stands at the head of this vast system, was not only the incarnation of the Sun-god, the chief of all the prominent deities, he is also likened to the bull. Ramses II. is described as “ the king who shines

<sup>1</sup> Breasted, i. 503, iii. 626.

<sup>2</sup> Breasted, ii. 798a, iii. 410.

<sup>3</sup> Breasted, i. 765, iv. 103, 109.

over Egypt, and his roaring is as far as the circuit of the sun." Egyptian scenes depict the symbolical bull destroying the foe, and the Sun-god Amon himself is called the "bull of the gods." Hammurabi, too, calls himself the sun-god of Babylonia, who caused light to go forth, "the mighty bull" who gores the enemy. Moreover, the god Amon and the Egyptian king have the attributes of a storm or weather-god, and allusion is made in Egyptian texts to their thunder. Similarly, two Canaanite chiefs compare the king to Shamash the Sun-god, and to Adad or Addu the storm-god. The king, writes Abimelek of Tyre, gives his thunder in the heavens like Addu; and while many Canaanite writers call him their Shamash, one addresses him as his Addu.

This merging of attributes in the supreme deity and king is as complicated as the inquiry into the *nature* of the gods. Perhaps it becomes less obscure when we recall that a Pharaoh could be styled "an abundant Nile," or "the great harvest-goddess of Egypt."<sup>1</sup> The gifts of the soil depended upon the sun and the weather; and the weather-god supplied rain and springs, while in his destructive aspect he brought storm, thunder and lightning, and was an appropriate patron of conflicts. Thus the head of the state practically incorporates those powers upon which his land and people depended in peace and in war, and there was a real belief in his ability to control nature, whether directly or through his intimate relationship with the departmental gods. This was by no means confined to Egypt; even the peculiar combination of the sun and weather-god probably was not specifically Egyptian. The Hittite kings apparently called themselves "the Sun," and although the weather-god stands at the head of the Hittite pantheon in the treaty with Ramses II., both the Sun and weather-god could be styled the "lord of Heaven." A personal name in the Boghaz-keui

<sup>1</sup> Breasted, iv. 92 and p. 7d.

tablets designates Addu "king of gods." In Assyria, the kings were identified with the Sun, and the old name Shamshi-Adad shows that the two deities could be closely united. Addu (prominent in the Kassite period) appears to be Assyrian rather than Babylonian; and the combination of Shamash and Addu is perhaps foreign to Babylonia. One Shamash-Adad of Assyria was the son of Ishme-Dagan, "Dagan heard." Dagan was certainly one of the old Canaanite gods, more conspicuous in Assyria than in Babylonia, and it may be doubtful whether the Canaanite Nebo, Sin and Shamash and the goddess Ashirat really prove Babylonian influence alone.<sup>1</sup>

It is perhaps a well-founded impression that powerful warrior-deities were not developed to such an extent in Babylonia as in other parts of Western Asia. I have already referred to their introduction into Egypt. In the XIXth dynasty the Canaanite Baal finds a place there; he is a destructive storm-god, and warlike kings are frequently likened to him. Although the term Baal is properly a title ("lord, owner, inhabitant") applicable to any god, *the* Baal represents that prominent deity Addu, corresponding to the Sutekh or Sēt of the Hittites. It is interesting to find in three tablets from Taanach that one writer invokes "the gods," the second appeals to Addu, while the third calls upon "the lord of the gods." It may be conjectured that the last is *the* Baal or Addu. Whether this Baal included solar elements and was assimilated to the Sun-god is again a matter for conjecture. At all events, specialized deities were not limited in their influence, and among the personal names of our period we find such ideas as Baal hastens, remembers, is high, or is a protection; name of Baal, name of Addu; Addu hears and Addu opens.

Nor does the supreme deity, or *the* Baal, exclude the lesser

<sup>1</sup> On the goddess Shamash, see *Religion of Anc. Pal.*, p. 88.

powers or the local Baalim, even as a system with a supreme king did not necessarily supersede the smaller systems with their heads. The divine Pharaoh would anoint the Canaanite chieftains and acknowledge their gods, even as Ramses III., for example, would look after the local gods of Egypt. In Babylonia, we learn from the inscription of Gudea that the lesser gods were supposed to wait upon the more elevated deities, and there, as in Egypt, the subordinate beings were always venerated among the less exalted ranks of men.<sup>1</sup>

The relation between the members of the smaller group finds analogies in the monarchical system. Nin-lil of Nippur was the mother of the inhabitants of the city, and the Egyptian local chief Kheti regarded his city-god as his father. The members of a group could be called the children of their deity, and the Sinaitic Arabs who dressed their hair in imitation of their god find a parallel in the privileges of the royalty in more advanced societies. In modern Palestine families will sometimes claim descent from a patron saint or weli, often a former sheikh, and the living sheikh may be the guardian of the cult.

But the evidence does not allow us to trace the stages in the social-religious development throughout. At one end of the scale, perhaps, is the totem-system of the Arunta of Australia. The members of each group are of the same essence, recognize no ancestors, but incarnate a spirit which clings around special localities. It is a perpetual reincarnation. At the other end is the monarchical system as I have endeavoured to describe it for Canaan. The king of Egypt *ipso facto* was the incarnation of the national god, a combination of the Sun and Weather-god. His supremacy over Canaan continued until towards the middle of the twelfth century B.C., in the person of Ramses III. And even at the close of that century Zakarbaal rendered homage to the

<sup>1</sup> See further, *Rel. of Anc. Pal.*, p. 96 seq.

great Sun-god Amon who thunders in the heaven. But the day of Egyptian political supremacy was over, and there is a gap between the decay of the Egyptian domination in the XXth dynasty and the *rise* of the Israelite monarchy.

When the Israelite monarchy *fell* the power of the priesthood increased, and the post-exilic high-priest, in princely state, embodied (to quote Robertson Smith) "all the glory of the nation as the kings had done of old."<sup>1</sup> But at the same time the prophets were insisting more emphatically upon the supreme sovereignty of the national god, and in place of the earlier religious *nationalism*, characteristic of the unity of the state, greater prominence was given to the doctrine of *individualism* and *universalism*.<sup>2</sup>

In Egypt, in the XXth dynasty, the priests gained kingly power and in due course claimed to be the divine seed of Re, lord of gods; but the god himself appears to be more prominent in the religion of the individual, and seems to be brought more closely into human affairs. Fuller information upon this is much to be desired.

How Canaan was affected by the changes in the twelfth and following centuries is a problem which lies outside the scope of these notes, and I would only point out that there was no sudden break in the history of Canaanite religion. Moreover, one must claim for Canaan a higher stamp of religion than is usually granted.<sup>3</sup> In common with the popular beliefs in Palestine to-day and the elabor-

<sup>1</sup> *Encyc. Biblica*, art. "Priest."

<sup>2</sup> On this great development, associated with the profound changes in Western Asia during the age of the Assyrian conquests, see *The Expositor*, August, 1909, pp. 104 sqq.; *Amer. Journ. of Theol.*, July, 1909, p. 387.

<sup>3</sup> The gradual development is attested from the archaeological side by Father Hugues Vincent, *Canaan d'après l'Exploration Récente*, pp. 147-151, 201-4, 294-6, 463 seq. We may not find what Father Vincent calls "le fétichisme répugnant" (p. 148), but we must avoid using this term in its popular and incorrect sense (W. R. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 209; comp. A. C. Haddon, *Magic and Fetishism*, pp. 66 seq.).

ate cults of Egypt and Babylonia, it went back to similar fundamental institutions. Finally, modern knowledge has so interwoven departments of research that progress can be ensured only by checking the results reached in one path of inquiry by those in another. Unfortunately, there is an occasional inclination to overlook the value of anthropology, or to suppose that the study of the fundamental institutions is no longer of the first importance. But we cannot sever religious cult from social custom ; and though we may not be prepared to accept every interpretation or every hypothesis of the gifted author of the *Religion of the Semites*, I would venture the conviction that the subject of these scattered notes can only be advanced by following upon the lines laid down twenty years ago by Robertson Smith.

STANLEY A. COOK.

*RELATION BETWEEN CANAAN AND BABYLONIA  
IN THE HAMMURABI EPOCH.<sup>1</sup>*

ACCORDING to the fragments of Berossus, a Babylonian priest who wrote the history of Babylonia down to the death of Alexander 323-2 B.C., the Babylonian chronologists placed the beginning of their authentic history at 2232 B.C. A fragment of Porphyrius preserved in Simplicius places the beginning of the first historic dynasty 1903 years before the first year of the reign of Alexander 330 B.C.; this results in the same date 2233-2. Evidently, then, there was a general consensus of opinion among the Babylonians as to the date of the so-called first Semitic or Hammurabi dynasty. We have now other chronological data which confirm this date, and as we possess the date lists for all of the eleven kings of the first dynasty, their separate reigns can be correctly fixed. Hammurabi, sixth king of this dynasty, reigned 2130-2088; he is generally agreed to be the Amraphel of Genesis xiv., in whose reign the kings of Elam and Larsa made war upon Canaan in the days of Abraham. We are, therefore, for the first time in Old Testament tradition upon apparently safe historical ground,<sup>5</sup> and the question arises, can the characters mentioned in Genesis xiv. be further identified, and if so, what political and religious influences surrounded the father of the Hebrews in Canaan? In regard to the second aspect of the problem I intend to discuss only such influences as may have been exercised by Babylonia on the west or such conceptions as may have been carried from Babylonia to the west.

Let me state briefly those facts which are not undisputed in regard to the first dynasty. We now know that Baby-

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Oxford Society of Historical Theology, October 29th, 1909.



lonia had already seen the rise and fall of several Sumerian and Semitic dynasties before the Hammurabi period. In fact dynastic lists for Ur and Isin exist carrying us back several centuries before the so-called first dynasty. A Semitic dynasty existed at least 1000 years before Hammurabi, and these early Semites, or first invading wave of Semites, came apparently from Arabia or Canaan. At any rate their phonetic system shows distinct traces of Arabic pronunciation and they introduced the Arabian deity Athtar and the Amorite Adad into Babylonia. But if certain indications lead us to infer that the primitive Semitic culture of Babylonia came from the west, the indications of the South Arabian origin of the second wave of Semitic migration are much more numerous. The date at which they actually founded a dynasty at Babylon we have already learned from Berossus. But there were two rival dynasties in Chaldea before Sumu-abu, the Arabian, occupied Babylon, one at Isin, a city still unidentified, and one at Larsa, the Biblical Ellasar, far to the south near Ur of the Chaldees. The Isin dynasty, founded nearly 100 years before the Amraphel dynasty at Babylon, seems to have been Semitic but of the earlier strata. At any rate the name of their first king, Išme-Dagan, contains the name of a Phoenician deity [2306-2286], and their second king Libit-Aštar contains the name of the South Arabian deity Athtar.

The people of Isin, however, seem to have been mostly Sumerian, to judge from the early hymns and liturgies used in the cult of Isin and the names of common people who lived there. This dynasty of Isin was not conquered by the Babylonians until just before the accession of the famous Hammurabi; in other words, it was contemporary with the Babylonian dynasty for about eighty years.

Of the Larsa dynasty, which evidently controlled the

ancient Sumerian cities Ur and Erech, we have no list of kings: the historical situation which I am about to give has been put together from a large number of notices on contracts, some of which have been generally attributed to Sippar, but which I have reason to think came from Larsa.<sup>1</sup> About the time of the founding of the South Arabian dynasty at Babylon a line of kings appears at Larsa who have also South Arabic names, Sumu-ilu, Buntahtun-ilā, and Immerum. One of these names contains the west Semitic divine name, *ilā*, אֱלֹהִים, Biblical אֱלֹהִים, which was evidently a *special* god, not a general name for "god."

So then a west Semitic dynasty had firmly established itself at Babylon before Hammurabi, and a branch of the same people ruled apparently at Larsa, near Erech and Ur. It would, therefore, not be astonishing to find western Semites at Ur. So far as the name Abrām is concerned, it has just been found on several tablets from Dilbat, a short distance south of Babylon<sup>2</sup> all dating from the latter half of the Hammurabi dynasty. There should be absolutely no reason to doubt the Biblical tradition of an Abrām at Ur before the reign of Hammurabi. The name itself is good Arabic. Now shortly before Hammurabi, Eriagu, son of Kurdurmabug, an Elamite, usurped the throne of Larsa. If, as I have supposed, western Semites were ruling in Larsa and Ur, a migration northward to Babylon and Assyria would be natural enough. In fact

<sup>1</sup> I refer to the contracts dated in reign of *Immerum* and *Buntahtun-ilā*, see Ranke, BE, VI,<sup>1</sup> 65 f., and the same author's *Early Babylonian Personal Names*, p. 45, for lists of contracts in the reigns of these so-called usurpers. For the few kings which are known from this Larsa dynasty see Thureau-Dangin, *Sumerisch-Akkadische Inschriften*, 206-221. Immerum is known to have been a contemporary of Sumu-lā-ilu [2218-2183]: he must have reigned somewhere in the *south*, for a certain Sin-rabi [Ranke, no. 5] is a landowner in a contract dated in his reign, and the same person (son of Hubu) acts as a witness under Ilumailā, who certainly reigned in the south, not at Sippar.

<sup>2</sup> Published by me in the *Expository Times*, November, 1909.

the Elamitic conquest of Larsa by the father of Eriagu or other Elamites may well have been the cause for the migration of a certain western Semite Abrâm north to Harran and even west from there to the traditional home of the race. At any rate historical conditions favoured such a movement.

Kudurmabuk's sons, Eriagu and Rim-Sin (the latter bearing a Semitic name) ruled at Larsa, the younger (?) Rim-Sin, succeeded his brother (?) Eriagu<sup>1</sup> soon after the accession of Hammurabi. In other words, Amraphel and Arioch were contemporary kings in Babylon and Larsa [Ellasar] for a short time.<sup>2</sup> It has been commonly supposed that the Semitic kings of Babylon and the Elamitic kings of Larsa were rivals, but as a matter of fact both

<sup>1</sup> It is, of course, possible that *Eri-agu* and *Rim-agu* (Sin) are two names for the same person, in which case all chronological difficulties would disappear.

<sup>2</sup> Rim-Sin was still alive and able to oppose Samsu-iluna after the death of Hammurabi, who reigned forty-three years. Hammurabi claims to have conquered Rim-Sin in his thirty-first year [2100], and in the introduction to the *Code* he claims to be in possession of Ur, Larsa, Erech, Isin, and Nippur, formerly possessed by Rim-Sin. Tablets are dated in Nippur in the twenty-fifth year after Rim-Sin captured Isin, and in the thirty-third year of Hammurabi [Poebel, p. 146j. This would place the capture of Isin in the seventh year of Hammurabi. Five other dates of Rim-Sin are known which, if placed *before* this period, would compel us to date the accession of Rim-Sin as early as the second year of Hammurabi. It is not necessary to suppose that Rim-Sin's dynasty came to an end in the thirty-first year of Hammurabi, for the latter does not say that he *captured* Larsa in the date formula of that year. Hence those years dated as late as the twenty-eighth and thirtieth years of Rim-Sin may well come *after* the thirty-first year of Hammurabi. It is not at all improbable that the five date-formulae known from his reign [see Th. Dangun, *Sumerisch-Akk.-Königs Inschriften*, p. 237] are identical with certain of those dated by the fall of Isin. Hammurabi mentions the capture of Isin in his seventh year, which must refer to its capture by Rim-Sin, who is known to have been in possession of that place for at least twenty-five years before the thirty-third year of H. If Rim-Sin had not been an ally of H., it is unlikely that the event would have been mentioned in an official date in Babylon. Sinnuballit seems to have captured Isin in his seventeenth year, but to have lost it, or at least Isin rebelled and was recaptured by the allies H. and Rim-Sin; the latter apparently attached it to Larsa.

Eriagu and his successor Rim-Sin seem to have been allies of Hammurabi, at least in the early part of the latter's reign. We would then have the following situation. An Elamitic dynasty ruled in Larsa, Ur, Erech and Nippur, whose king Arioch was an ally of the west Semitic king Amraphel in Babylon. The Elamites had displaced western Semites at Larsa, Erech and Ur, so that we must assume hostility between the two west Semitic branches at Babylon and in the south. If we accept the authenticity of the Biblical account of the migration of the Terahites from Ur of the Chaldees, the historical situation would give an excellent reason for this migration. They were forced out by the Elamites aided by the connivance of their own race at Babylon.

That these same western Semites were strong in the south would seem probable from the fact that *Iluma-ilā*, whose name is evidently west Semitic, founded a dynasty in the south after the death of the Elamite Rim-Sin of Larsa. This dynasty, in fact, secured control of the entire south, constantly opposed its kindred in Babylon and survived the fall of the line of Hammurabi.

In Genesis xiv. the kings of Canaan paid tribute to the Elamites in the days of Amraphel. According to that account Chedorlagomar was the Elamite overlord who in his invasion of the west was aided by Arioch of Larsa and Tidal of Gojim, both probably Elamites, and by Amraphel. We have already seen that Arioch of Larsa and Amraphel of Babylon were probably allies. Moreover, the father of Arioch, Kudur-mabug, bears the title "Adda of the land of the Amorite." The Babylonians, in fact, always spoke of Canaan and the west as the Amorite land. It would be difficult to identify Kudur-mabug with Chedorlagomar philologically. *Kutur* in Elamitic means priest. The goddess *lakamar* is well known. In case Elamitic *mabuk*

be another name for the same divinity, then the names would be identical. Professor George Hüsing, of Breslau, has informed me that this is possible but not proved. At any rate, two of the kings, Amraphel and Arioch, can be identified. The identification of Arioch's father with Chedorlagomar is a possibility. As to Tidal, king of Gojim, there seems to be no certain information.<sup>1</sup> An Elamite, Kudur-mabuk, father of Arioch, seems to have held the land of the Amorites under tribute according to his title in the inscriptions of Larsa. We have, however, no evidence in the inscriptions that these Elamites and their ally, Hammurabi, invaded the west. It would seem at least reasonable to accept the Biblical account of Genesis xiv. as truthful, for the support from the inscriptions is so very great. Notice also that the Hebrew tradition defines the period as the "days of Amraphel," and we know that this same Amraphel stood out in Babylonian history as synonymous with a great epoch.

I shall, therefore, regard this point as proved. A group of Teralites, led by one Abrâm, migrated from Ur about 2150 B.C. They belonged to a group of western Semites who perhaps found the Elamitic oppression in the south intolerable, and hence returned to the west.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Pinches published three texts in vol. xxix. of the *Transactions* of the Victoria Institute which refer to the pillage of Babylon by the Elamites. The invading king is called *Ku-dur-KU-KU-mal*, and two other Elamites are mentioned, viz., *Eri-é-a-ku* [var. *cri-é-ku-a*] and *Tu-ud-hul-a*. Pinches and Sayce also find the name of Hammu[rabi] in the text. The reading of the king of Elam as Kudurlagamar offers difficulties, but should not be rejected, since we may be dealing with an ideographic writing *KU-KU-mal* for *lagamar*. Arioch might possibly come from either of the forms given, and Tudhul 𐎧𐎠𐎫𐎠 is exactly what is wanted. My objection to using these texts in this connexion is twofold: (1) The Elamites (so far as we know) did not attack Babylon in the days of Hammurabi, and (2) Babylon is called Karduniaš in one place, a term which came into vogue first in the Kassite period. Prof. Sayce has ably edited these texts in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archeology*, 1906, 193-200, 241-250, and 1907, 7-17.

Western Semites also founded a line of kings in the province of Hana at the city Tirka.<sup>1</sup> From this dynasty the names of three kings have been preserved, Išarlim,<sup>2</sup> son of *Ihū<sup>iu</sup>Kakka*, 'Ammu-rabih,<sup>3</sup> and *Tikulti-mer*,<sup>4</sup> also Šamši-Adad patesi of Aššur, who built a temple to Dagan at Tirka.<sup>5</sup> The latter was a contemporary of Hammurabi of Babylon, and as Hana had passed into the power of Aššur in his time we assume that the three kings ruled before him. 'Ammurabi of Hana must not be confused with 'Ammurabi of Babylon.

I now pass to the religious aspects of the problem. It would seem evident that Canaan or Amorria was in close contact with Babylonia in this period. Semites from the west established dynasties in Hana, Babylon, and in the extreme south, and a portion of them from the extreme south returned to the west. Since we possess but scanty notices concerning the religion of the Terahite branch in the Biblical records the rich evidence from their inscriptions in Babylonia is all the more welcome. I have implied that the whole group came originally from South Arabia, in the region of Sabea, modern Yemen. The Arabian origin of the group must be assumed for two reasons: (1) their proper names reveal the Arabic pronunciation of the sibilants, and the vocabulary used is distinctly Sabean and Arabic; (2) a considerable number of Sabean gods appears in these names.

The Sabean god 'Ammu appears in the name *Hammu-*

<sup>1</sup> Located certainly north of Sippar, possibly near Aššur.

<sup>2</sup> *Revue d'Assyriologie*, iv. 85.

<sup>3</sup> PSBA, 1907, 177. The same king occurs apparently on a tablet published in *Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler*, vii. 204, 'Ammu-ma-rabi, where *rabi* is written *MAH*; he is there called son of Sumuh-rammu. Ungnad reads 'Ammu-ma-el, with which cf. Biblical שִׁמְשֵׁן. If the latter reading be correct we should have the names of four kings of Hana.

<sup>4</sup> Mentioned by Thureau-Dangin RA, iv. 85, but without reference.

<sup>5</sup> ZA, 21, 248.

*rabi*, "Ammu is great," both at Babylon and Hana. This group must have possessed a special god *Ilā*, אֱלִיָּהּ, for the term is found in several names of the period and in a connexion which leaves no doubt on this point. I cite here three names which are decisive: *I-la-ilu*,<sup>1</sup> son of *Abirāh*; "Ila (or Elōah) is god": *Iluma-ilā*, founder of the Sea Dynasty; *Abi-mara-lā*,<sup>2</sup> "My father is the lord Ilā." This is, of course, the same deity that appears in Abrām's god אֱלֹהֵי עֵלְיוֹן,<sup>3</sup> "El most high," or more correctly in the Canaanitish form אֱלֹהֵי, which later took on the general meaning *god*, as in Sabean. The deity survived as a special god in the region of Mecca, and was evolved into a monotheistic conception by Muhammed. Here, then, is one phase of religion which the Terahites had in common with the western Semites who occupied Babylonia. In Genesis xiv. 22 Abrām speaks of a god *Jahweh* as the special name of his god, and uses *El Elion* as though it were a descriptive term; he says, "I have raised my hand unto Jahweh El the most high"; the later Hebrews probably understood "Jahweh, god most high."<sup>4</sup> The god *Ilā*, *Eloah*, seems to have been a special god of the Terahites. If we could prove that Jahweh appears as a god in Babylonian names just as we have *Ammu* and *Ilā*, then the inference would follow at once that both gods Elōah and Jahweh were common property of both the Canaanitish and Babylonian branches.<sup>5</sup> This problem as to whether the Hebrew divinity *Jahweh* occurs in Babylonian inscriptions of the

<sup>1</sup> VS viii. 14, 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 37. Cf. also *Šumma-<sup>a</sup>la-ili-ia*, *Šumma-la-ilu*.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. xiv. 20.

<sup>4</sup> So the Septuagint.

<sup>5</sup> The god *Jahweh* appears in the Canaanitish name *Ahi-iamī*, the writer of a letter to Aštar-wašur, governor of Taanach, near Megiddo, in the fourteenth century. The tablet containing this name is published by Hrozný in Sellin's *Tell Ta'annek*, p. 115.

time of Abrâm is of very great importance in the history of religion. If Eloah occurs why not Jahweh? <sup>1</sup>

If one may judge from the frequency with which deities occur in proper names and from the numerous seals which represent the Amorite god *Adad*, it was this god whom the Babylonian invaders regarded as their patron deity. Now Adad, the Amorite god of rain and thunder, seems to be native in the region of Damasçus and the Lebanon. At any rate he was not prominent in the pantheon of South Arabia. Moreover *Ašrātu*, Canaanitish *Ašērāh*, is Adad's consort in Babylonia and the Babylonians called Adad, "*Amurrū*, or the "Amorite god," simply. The lexicographers interpreted *Ašratū* as "lady of the desert," i.e., the Syrian desert.

Evidently, then, the Semitic group to which the Terahites belonged, although Arabian by race, worshipped Canaanitish gods. Their own records show them in the possession of two gods, Ilā and Jahweh, when they enter Canaan. Now Jahweh occurs along with Adad and Aširat in Canaanitish names in the region of Megiddo before the Hebrew occupation. Their ancestors in Babylonia regarded Adad as their patron deity; they themselves adopted or possessed the related Canaanitish Jahweh. We would expect by all means to find Jahweh in Babylonian names, for there is no reason to suppose that he is later or less important than Adad, Aširat and Dagan, all Canaanitish deities who were adopted and taken to Babylonia by the Arabian migration.

Jahweh cannot in any case be looked for among the Sabean gods, five of whom appear in names of this period. This divine name has not been found in Sabean and the verb יהה, "to be," does not exist in Sabean and Arabic.

<sup>1</sup> The following South Arabian deities are also found in proper names of the period, *Erah*, the moon, *Samsu*, the sun, *Ilimaçihā* [VS viii. 14, 4], *Atar* for *Athtar* in *Ili-atar* [viii. 14, 44].



He belongs to the Canaanite group Adad, Dagan and Ašratu. Curiously these are the only Canaanitish gods adopted into the Babylonian pantheon. Adad was identified with the Sumerian Immer, god of thunder, and Ašratu with Babylonian Ištar. For Dagan the native pantheon had no equivalent. But Jahweh does not appear in the Babylonian pantheon; his character as god of thunder and storms was so allied to Adad that the Babylonians might not have distinguished them. The attributes of Jahweh, as he appears in the oldest documents, remind one strongly of the Amorite god of storm and rains.

The following names occur in contracts of this period. *Ia'-pi-ilu* at Sippar,<sup>1</sup> *Ia-pi-ilu* <sup>2</sup>; *Ia-pi-um*, father of *Hali-ia-um*<sup>3</sup>; *Aštar-ia-pi*, a priest of god<sup>4</sup>; *Ia-u-um-ilu-ma*.<sup>5</sup> It will be noticed that *Iapi* occurs five times; *Ia-u-um* occurs once. The name *Aštar-ia-pi* recently found on a Berlin text evidently rules out the form *Ia-pi*, *Ia'-pi* as a divine name; for if Jahweh were present here we would have the difficult name "Aštar or Ištar is Jahweh." A good Sabeian root יפי, "to succour, help," exists, whose Arabic imperfect would be *ia-pi*; I would therefore translate all these names, "God helps, delivers," "Aštar delivers."

To find Jahweh in *Hali-ia-um* would be difficult, for *ia* is a well-known hypocristic ending used also in *Hali-ia-tum*.<sup>6</sup>

When the Babylonians of the Neo-Babylonian period wrote the names of Hebrews who lived in Exile or who settled in Chaldea they reproduced יה or יהיה at the beginning of names by *ia-a-hu*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cuneiform Texts of the British Museum*, viii. 20 A 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 34 A 4, and Ranke, 17, 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 44, 8. <sup>4</sup> VS vii. 157, 7.

<sup>5</sup> CT iv. 27 A 3. Cf. also *Ia-pa-ilu*, VS vii. 16, 39.

<sup>6</sup> But cf. *Nadbi-iau*, in Assyrian transcriptions, Johns, *Deeds*, etc. vol. iii., Index.

<sup>7</sup> The method of reproducing יה at the end of names by *ia-ma* does not concern us here.

The Assyrians, however, reproduced the name of king Ahaz by *Ia-u-ha-zi* = אִי־וֹהֲזִי. An Aramean of Hamath, where the worship of Jahweh had been borrowed from the Hebrews in the eighth century, is named *Ia-u-bi'di*.<sup>1</sup>

The Assyrian usage certainly favours the identification of *Ia-u-um-ilu-ma* with *Jaweh\*-ilu-ma* or "Jahweh is god." A name *Ia-u-ba-ni* has been found on a tablet of the Cassite period (circa 1450-1300) from Nippur, also another suggestive name, *Ia-u-tum*, possibly an hypocoristic of *Iau*.<sup>2</sup>

I am inclined to think that the name Jahweh is really present in *Iaum-ilu-ma*, in *Iaubani* and *Ahi-iami*, but not in *Iapi-ilu*, nor in *Hali-ia-um*. In other words, the god Jahweh seems to have been known in Canaan before the Hammurabi dynasty, and known in Babylonia at the time of the Terahite migration. Canaanites, who belonged to his cult, lived in Babylonia in the Cassite period, contemporaneous with the Egyptian captivity, and his worship in Canaan at the same time is vouched for by the Taanach tablets.

I see no reason to reject the general scheme of patriarchal tradition where Jahweh appears as god of the Terahites, or Hebrews, in Canaan at the end of the third millennium. He was to them what Adad was to the Amorites, and to him they assigned the great cosmological rôle which the Babylonians assigned to Ninib, the warrior of the gods.

The problems of Old Testament religion must now be carried into a wider field than heretofore. Hebrew tradition takes us back to the age when the Babylonian myths and epics were being written down, and when their great theo-

<sup>1</sup> Contracts in which Israelites appear in Assyria in the eighth century reproduce Jahū by *A-u*; see Schiffer, *Keilinschriftliche Spuren der in der zweiten Hälfte des 8. Jahrhunderts von den Assyriern nach Mesopotamien deportierten Samarier*.

<sup>2</sup> Clay, *Babylonian Expedition*, vol. xv. p. 32.

logical schemes were being worked out. Since the theologians did not adopt Jahweh into the pantheon it is necessary to study their method of treating the parallel god Adad if we wish to gain an adequate idea of the conceptions which the Terahites borrowed from the Babylonians.

It seems clear that Jahweh and Adad were so nearly identical that the Babylonians could not distinguish them. The pre-Mosaic reflections of Jahweh in the Hebrew records reveal him as a god of the mountains who presided over rain and storms. He manifests himself chiefly in thunder and lightning. The animal symbolic of him is the steer. We need not dwell upon this point, which is now generally adopted by students of comparative religion.<sup>1</sup> These are likewise the special characteristics of Adad-Rimmon. He is represented in Syrian and Babylonian art standing upon a steer, hurling the trident lightning and with a huge club; on a few seals he walks over the mountain tops in a way to remind one of Jahweh in the passage, "The mountains shall be molten under him," or "The mountains quake because of him and the hills melt."

Such, then, was the Canaanite conception of this storm god when the western Semites, his worshippers, invaded Babylonia. Here by identification with the Sumerian *Iškur* [Immer] he was taken into the pantheon and received attributes not originally Canaanitish. It is this new Jahweh or Adad who returned to Canaan with the Terahites. They now had a god of the mountains and the storms who had received the impress of Babylonian culture. He becomes a theological and cosmological conception. During his Babylonian sojourn the Nippurian system of theology saw its complete evolution and acceptance. Babylonian culture must have spread to the west; at any rate in the Cassite period the

<sup>1</sup> See an instructive article of William Hayes Ward in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, vol. xxv. 175-187.

Canaanites used the Babylonian language and script. In the Taanach tablets the storm god is written with the Sumerian word. Evidently Babylonian theology spread throughout the west. This influence was directly favoured by the fact that the great western god had been identified with a Sumerian deity.

The Canaanites, having but one great god, attributed to him several theological conceptions which did not properly belong to his counterpart in the pantheon. When they assimilated Babylonian culture the Nippurian Sumerian system dominated all others. About Enlil, the earth god, was grouped a powerful pantheon representing the spring and winter sun, the moon and the planet Venus. The god of vegetation, who sojourns part of the year in the nether world, already formed part of the system, the so-called Tammuz cult. The elements of fire, storm and wind, agriculture, war, science, and industry, all had been spiritualized and adopted into the cults. The firstborn child of Enlil, Ninib, personification of the spring sun, gradually displaces his father as the active principle of creation. The spring sun symbolized the triumph of light over darkness, he became the god of war and champion of the gods. In the primeval conflict he slays the dragon of chaos, creates the world and causes light to be. I cite here a passage from a temple liturgy of that period:—

He who launches the bolts of light, to the word [of his father Enlil]  
gave heed,

He uttered a loud cry, to the word he gave heed ;

To the monster advancing without a lord of order he gave heed.

\* \* \* \* \*

Oh lord of the encompassing net, lord who is self-exalted,

\* \* \* \* \*

Advance, ride forth ; oh lord, ride forth.

\* \* \* \* \*

Oh lord, establish thy foundations, yea, lord, thou alone over  
thy foes.

Thou whose feast is glorious before thee, ride forth.

\* \* \* \* \*

At the cry of fear our lord moaned.

\* \* \* \* \*

Upon the haughty he rained torrents as a storm, he reduced them.

\* \* \* \* \*

The heroic lord who smote on the right hand, and on the left,  
He who launches the bolts of light, smote.<sup>1</sup>

This passage refers evidently to the conquest of *Tiamat* or *Tehom*, dragon of chaos.

The theologians attributed the control of nature and natural forces to Ninib. Although the word of his father is regarded as the source of the divine régime, Ninib becomes the active agent who ensures the divine régime. The father of the gods retires into a hazy pantheistic concept who has no concern with the universe other than to utter the *word*. This nascent monotheism shines throughout the liturgies of the various cults of the Hammurabi period; the mighty Ninib, son of god, seems to have completely overshadowed the other members of the pantheon. I cite another liturgy in this connexion.

Thou who like heaven and earth art exalted,

\* \* \* \* \*

Honoured one who from the womb didst not issue,

What in the deeps, what that thou rulest not ?

What in the deeps, what that increases thee not ?<sup>2</sup>

What of earth and sky that completes thee ?<sup>3</sup>

The terrible stone thou didst smite, the terrible plant thou didst  
subdue.

\* \* \* \* \*

When thou hast cried over the watered valleys, with blood they  
were filled,

<sup>1</sup> The writer's *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, 233-7.

<sup>2</sup> This line is a learned gloss on the previous line. The text has *ib-nu-kum* "builds thee." I am not sure that the translation renders the original correctly. One might find a subtle pantheism here if the word *banū* be pressed to mean *create*, in which case the scribe would mean that nature combines to produce god! This would contradict the following line.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, "fills thee up."

When thou hast cried over the land, thou didst account it heaps of ruins.

Ninib appears as the god of war in the ancient pantheon, but this characteristic was attributed also to Adad especially in Assyria. As such his symbols are the chariot, spear and great net for entrapping his foes. The chariot of Jahweh is not unknown in Hebrew mythology.

Although imitation of Ninib may have been the chief source for the more theological and cosmological ideas attributed to Jahweh, yet the Babylonian *Iškur* [Immer] is the deity to which he was assimilated and from whom he chiefly borrowed. In the priestly schools the native and western elements of the thunder god were not confused, but we may perhaps infer that in popular theology Adad combined both elements, and was transferred to the west as such. A recently published text gives forty-one names or terms descriptive of this divinity. 1. Lord of the hurricane. 2. God of the chamber in Halab.<sup>1</sup> 3. *PA-ŠID*. 4. (*haniš*) *lugal*. 5. (*šugar*) *lugal*. 6. Protecting genius. 7. Adad. 8. Pir.<sup>2</sup> 9. He that advances on the pure waters. 10. The smithy (?)<sup>3</sup> 11. *Damuka*. 12. Creative consort. 13. The princely son (?)<sup>4</sup> 14. The crying storm. 15. *Illahab*. 16. Addu. 17. *Da-[da]*.<sup>5</sup> 18. Tešsub, the Hittite Ramman. 19. The councillor.<sup>6</sup> 20. *Kunzibami*, the Elamitic Ramman. 21. *Buriiaš*, the Kassite Ramman.

<sup>1</sup> Uncertain; *halab* may be an unknown Sumerian word. *Hallab* was a part of Erech; another *Hallab* is known at Babylon.

<sup>2</sup> This name of Ramman, to judge from its position after Adad, may be Aramaic. The existence of an Aramaic god *Bir*, *Pir* has been maintained by Winckler, Hommel and others, and cautiously by Zimmern. Cf. below, *ilu-pir*, l. 30.

<sup>3</sup> The title *zabar-dib-ba* occurs as *zabar-tub-ba* on tablets of the Sumerian period. See especially *Cuneiform Texts of the British Museum*, v. 12218, 8, where a person bears the title *zabar-tub* of Ningirsu.

<sup>4</sup> *dumu-dur*.

<sup>5</sup> *Addu* and *Dada* are designated as western names.

<sup>6</sup> His title in *Suh*.

22. God of Hallab. 23. *Ašširsig*. 24. The thunderer.  
 25. The roarer. 26. *Murtaznu*.<sup>1</sup> 27. The roarer [a Canaanite  
 form of the Babylonian word used in 25]. 28. The raging.  
 29. The tempest. 30. *Ilupir*. 31. The devastator. 32.  
 The lordly. 33. The ram.<sup>2</sup> 34. The mountain crier (?).  
 35. . . . *girgirri*. 36. The hurricane. 37. *Dubur*. 38.  
 Rihab [Biblical Rahab]. 39. *Eššeku*. 40. . . . *akhaš*,  
 an Elamitic name. 41. . . . *aš-du*.<sup>3</sup>

Other epithets of Adad are, "Lord who speaks in the storm," "The storm in the lower regions, i.e., near the earth," "The horned ox," and "Lord of the mountains."

In this list the scribes have analysed the mountain thunder god into his native and foreign elements. The composite Babylonian character includes the Sumerian, Canaanitish, Hittite and Elamite god. This combination must have been made before the Terahite emigration. [The Hittite Tešsub, also a thunder god and scarcely to be distinguished from Adad, may not have reached Babylonia and Canaan until after 2000 B.C.] The above list probably gives an adequate idea of the original character of Jahweh. He is a type of thunder god pre-eminent in the west from Asia Minor to Central Palestine, and it is this god who through the influence of Babylonian theology and the religious genius of Moses became the Biblical Jahweh.

We possess but one hymn to Adad from the ancient period. It is composed in classical Sumerian and reflects the religious ideas of the age when the western Semites invaded Babylonia. This remarkable composition, first translated by me in *Babyloniaca* [1908] and reprinted after

<sup>1</sup> The root *razānu*, here a western gloss on *ramānu*, is unknown; cf. *murtaimu*, from *ra'ānu*, to thunder, a western gloss on *ragānu*, l. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Nuṭurahu*, generally a title of Ea, god of fresh water and the sea. Ramman, as god of pure water, appears in the title <sup>au</sup> *ašur-ziba* above line 9. We have here an explanation of the source of fresh waters in the rains, not in the nether sea as the ancients believed.

<sup>3</sup> Text in CT xxv. 16-7.

my edition by Ungnad in Gressmann's *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder zum Alten Testament* [1909], has been re-edited with some improvement in my *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, 280-3. The Nippurian pantheon represents Adad as the son of Enlil, but this means little more than representing him as one of the agents of a pantheistic earth spirit. I repeat here this entire hymn.

"Glorious Adad" is thy name, eminent god.

"Lord(?) Adad, gigantic steer and glorious," is thy name, eminent god.

"Adad, child of Heaven, gigantic steer and glorious," is thy name, eminent god.

"Lord of Karkar, gigantic steer and glorious," is thy name, etc.

"Adad, lord of plenty, gigantic steer and glorious," etc.

"Companion of the lord Ea,<sup>1</sup> gigantic steer and glorious," etc.

"Father Adad, lord that rideth the storm," is thy name, etc.

"Father Adad that rideth the great storm," is thy name, etc.

"Father Adad that rideth the great lion," is thy name, etc.

"Adad, lion of heaven, gigantic steer and glorious," is thy name, etc.

Thy name doth enthral the land.

Thy splendour covereth the land like a garment.

At thy thunder the great mountain, father Enlil is shaken.

At thy rumbling the great mother Ninlil is made to fear.

15 Enlil addressed his son Adad.

"Who, oh my son, directeth the storm, sendeth forth the storm?"<sup>2</sup>

Adad directeth the storm, sendeth forth the storm.

The storm, like the seven demons (?) flieth; he sendeth forth the storm.

Storm spirit, may thy sonorous voice give forth its utterance; he sendeth forth the storm.

20 The lightning thy messenger goeth before (thee);<sup>3</sup> he sendeth forth the storm.

Who, my son, beareth splendour! what that rageth shall make itself like (thee)?

The foe doeth evil against the father thy creator; what shall make itself like thee?

<sup>1</sup> God of the nether sea, whence, according to ancient speculation, come the waters of springs and rivers.

<sup>2</sup> Read *mu-lu dumu-mu ud um-me-ši-si-sig ud um-me-ši-la-lal*.

<sup>3</sup> Read *igi-šú*.



The little hail thou holdest ;<sup>1</sup> what shall make itself like thee ?  
 The great hail thou holdest ; what shall make itself like thee ?  
 25 Thy little hail, thy great hail, let be upon him.  
 Thy right arm destroy the foe ; thy left arm<sup>2</sup> pluck him  
 away."

Adad gave ear to the words of the father, his creator,  
 The father Adad who went from the house, storm spirit of  
 the sonorous voice,

Who from the house, from the dwelling went forth, the youthful  
 lion.

Who from the dwelling, from the . . . (?) turned away (?)  
 storm spirit of thunderous voice.

The special importance of this hymn consists in the theological implications involved. Here the Sumerian thunder god, originally a minor deity in the ancient pantheon, becomes the warrior son of the father of the gods. In fact, he is already evolved into a god of war ; at least the tendencies to such a conception are clear. He is brought into connexion with the two other members of the trinity, Heaven and Sea, as son of the former and companion of the latter. This sudden growth of the Adad cult, his advance in the pantheon until he becomes a figure capable of developing into a monotheistic conception, must be due to western influence. The western Semites became masters of Isin, Babylon, Larsa and Ur, and at last of Nippur itself. Their god Adad-Jahweh, a god of the mountains, assimilated to the inferior thunder god of Sumer, a land of low plains, caused the latter's advance in the pantheon. The priests could not have failed to assign to him the rôle of Ninib, the creator of heaven and earth. As lord of the *abubu* or storm he was easily worked into the story of the flood as its author instead of *Ninib-Marduk*.

The cult of this god seems to have enjoyed immense popularity among the western Semites who had settled in Babylonia. On the clay tablets which bear record of

<sup>1</sup> Read *na mur-tur-tur-e šu-um-me-ti*.

<sup>2</sup> Read *kab-bu-zu*.

their business transactions the west Semitic witnesses often impressed seals bearing their names and the title, " Servant of the Amorite god," or " Servant of the Amorite gods." <sup>1</sup> Sayce has ingeniously conjectured that the plural, which seems to be a mere variant for the singular, reveals a western tendency to use *gods* for *god*. If the plural on these seals really be the *pluralis majestatis* [*Elohim*], then we must conclude that the form was already current before the Terahite emigration.

## LIST OF CONTEMPORARY DYNASTIES IN BABYLONIA

2306-1712 B.C.		
<i>Isin.</i>	<i>Babylon.</i>	<i>Larsa.</i>
20 Išme-Dagan, 2306-2286 <sup>2</sup>		Gungunu [2300 ?] <sup>3</sup>
11 Libit-Aštar, 2285- 2274.		
28 Ur-Ninib, 2273- 2245		
21 Bur-Sin, 2244- 2223.		Sumu-ilu (?)
5 Iter-kaša, 2222- 2217.	14 Sumu-abu, 2232- 2219.	
7 Uru-imitti, 2216- 2209	36 Sumu-lā-ilu, 2218-2183.	Buntahtun-ilā (?) <sup>4</sup>
$\frac{1}{2}$ . . . . 2209.		Immerun (?) <sup>4</sup>
24 Enlil-bani, 2208- 2184		Nūr-immer (?)
3 Zambija, 2183- 2180.	14 Zabum, 2182- 2169.	
5 . . . . 2179-2174.		
4 Ea . . . . 2173-2169		Sin-iddinnam (?)

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Ahū-wakru*, son of *Ukuša*, servant of the Amorite gods; *Našir*, son of *Dariku*, servant of the Amorite god, VS vii. 5. *Aham-uša*, son *Ibiku-Aštar*, servant of the Amorite gods, VS vii. 11. The form " Amorite gods," occurs also on seals in VS vii. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Four kings preceded Išme-Dagan, who was a contemporary of Gungunu of Larsa.

<sup>3</sup> Evidently an Elamite. The Elamitic invasion of Kudurnakkundi, who pillaged Erech north of Larsa in 2290 (?) according to *Asurbanipal*, may indicate Elamitic supremacy at Larsa and Erech in this period.

<sup>4</sup> Both contemporary with Sumu-lā-ilu.

11 Sin-magir, 2168–2157.	18 Abil-Sin, 2168–2151.	[ <i>Šimtišillak in Elam</i> ]
23 Damik-ilišu, 2156–2133.	20 Sin-muballit, 2150–2131.	[ <i>Kudur-mabug in Iamutbal</i> ]
[Sin-muballit seized Isin in 2133, but loses it to an usurper (?) Conquered by Rim-Sin and Hammurabi in 2123]	43 'Ammurabi, 2130–2088.	Eri-agu, ruled also at Nippur. Rim-Sin 2123–2080 (?)
		-----
		<i>Sea Dynasty.</i>
38 Samsu-iluma, 2087–2050.	60 Iluma-ilā 2079–2020.	
28 Abi-ešul, 2049–2022.		
37 'Ammi-ditana, 2021–1985.	55 Itti-ili-nibi, 2019–1965.	
21(?) 'Ammi-zaduga, 1984–1964.	36 Damki-ili-šu, 1964–1929.	
35 Samsu-ditana, 1963–1929.	15 Iškibal, 1928–1914.	
		-----
	Sea Dynasty rules at Babylon for 167 years.	27 Suški, 1913–1887. 55 Gulkišar, 1886–1832. 50 Pešgal-daramaš, 1831–1782.
		-----
	<i>Kassite Dynasty.</i>	28 Adar-kalama, 1781–1754.
16 Gandaš, 1763–1748	26 Akur-ul-ana, 1753–1728.	
22 Agum, 1747–1726.	7 Melam-kurkura, 1727–1721	
22 Bitiliaš 1725–1704. <sup>1</sup>	9 Ea-gamil, 1720–1712	

S. LANGDON.

<sup>1</sup> End of the Sea Dynasty is here placed in his thirteenth year.

THE "PRIEST" OF ZEUS AT LYSTRA.<sup>1</sup>

II.

THE conclusion reached by the author of *St. Paul the Traveller and Roman Citizen* with regard to the composition of the *Codex Bezae* may be given in his own words.<sup>2</sup> "I believe that the Bezan Reviser<sup>3</sup> made many skilful changes in passages relating to Asia Minor, and some foolish changes in European passages. In some of these cases, the view remains open that the Bezan reading is the original; but evidence is as yet not sufficient to give certainty. The home of the Revision is along the line of intercourse between Syrian Antioch and Ephesus, for the life of the early Church lay in intercommunication, but the Reviser was connected with Antioch, for he inserts 'We' in xi. 28."

According to Professor Ramsay's view the important and distinctive Western readings are either: (a) changes introduced in the second century, or (b) survivals of a primitive text better than that of any of our manuscripts. He holds that there are several places where the Western reading either is the true text (corrupted in the generally received text and in the great MSS.), or points to an original text different from that of any manuscript. Professor Blass's view that the Western Text, as well as the Accepted Text, is from the pen of Luke has not been generally approved; but in his general estimate of the high value of the *Codex Bezae* he is in agreement with Professor Ramsay.<sup>4</sup>

If it be conceded that a Bezan reading which can be shown both to be closer to the facts of the situation, and

<sup>1</sup> I have to thank Professors Sanday and Sir W. M. Ramsay for reading this paper in MS., and suggesting improvements.

<sup>2</sup> P. 27.

<sup>3</sup> In the second century A.D.

<sup>4</sup> See the *Prolegomena* to his *Acta Apostolorum*.

to contain features not likely to have been introduced even by a well-informed second-century Reviser, has some claim to be considered original, the following attempt to appraise the value of the Bezan Text in Acts xiv. 13 may have some justification.

Lystra lay south of the direct road from Antioch to Ephesus, but it certainly was, with Derbe and Iconium on the line of "intercommunication" between the Syrian and the west-Anatolian churches. If Professor Ramsay is right, we may safely assume that the Reviser was acquainted with the circumstances of second-century life at Lystra. It is necessary to keep this *proviso* in mind in arriving at a conclusion concerning the important variations preserved by the Bezan Text in the story of the worship of Paul and Barnabas as pagan gods at Lystra.

The following are the accounts of the incident which concerns us here given in the Accepted Text, and the *Codex Bezae* respectively (Acts xiv. 13):

## Accepted Text.

ὁ τε ἱερεὺς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ὄντος  
πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ταύρους καὶ  
στέμματα ἐπὶ τοὺς πυλῶνας  
ἐνέγκας σὺν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἤθελον  
θύειν.

(Westcott and Hort.)

## Bezan Text.

οἱ τε ἱερεῖς τοῦ ὄντος Διὸς  
πρὸ πόλεως ταύρους αὐτοῖς καὶ  
στέμματα ἐπὶ τοὺς πυλῶνας  
ἐνέγκαντες σὺν τοῖς ὄχλοις  
ἤθελον ἐπιθύειν.

(Hansell.)

Professor Ramsay<sup>1</sup> defends the reading τοῦ ὄντος Διὸς πρὸ πόλεως as being characteristically Lukan in style and expression, and he points out that ἱερεῖς is a better reading than ἱερεὺς, because the Anatolian god Graecised as Zeus, etc., was served by a college of priests, and not by a single priest, at many of the shrines concerning which

<sup>1</sup> *St Paul the Traveller*, pp. 116, 117, and in Art. on "Lystra" in *Hastings' Dictionary*.

we possess information.<sup>1</sup> Inscription I. above proves that at the shrine of Sedasa, whose ritual, as we have seen, presents a striking resemblance to that of Lystra, the god of the district was served by a college of priests. The inscription records a dedication made by three of those priests acting together. These facts do not prove absolutely that there was a college of priests at Lystra, but the presumptive evidence amounts to practical certainty.

This conclusion has an obvious bearing on the text of Acts xiv. 13. The accepted reading in that passage is ὁ τε ἱερεὺς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ τῆς πόλεως. . . . This means that a temple of Zeus stood outside the city wall, on the low ground in front of the city. The case of Ephesus, where the Ἀρτεμίσιον lay below the city and Artemis was called πρὸ πόλεως, is an exact parallel. Professor Ramsay considers it probable that the temple of Zeus at Lystra was also the Augusteum, and here again we may have a parallel in the case of Sedasa.<sup>2</sup> The worship of the Emperors was regularly established in the most outstanding shrine or shrines in or near a city; we find a priest of Tiberius and of Hecate at Tralleis,<sup>3</sup> and a priest of Athene Polias and the Augusti at Phaselis.<sup>4</sup> The goddess Roma, the second figure in the Imperial cult, was similarly received into native shrines—e.g. we find her in the temple of Zeus,<sup>5</sup> or in that of Dionysus<sup>6</sup> at Termessus. There was generally a single priest attached specially to the cult of the Emperors,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ramsay quotes Pessinus and the Milyadic Sabazius. Add Artemis at Ephesus C.I.G. 2963, etc.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> B.C.H. 1886, p. 516. ἱερεὺς Τιβερίου Καίσαρος καὶ Ἐκάτης Σεβαστῆς. Cf. Ramsay, *C. and B. of Phrygia*, p. 53 f.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.G. 4332. ἱερατεύσαντα τῆς προκαθηγετίδος τῆς πόλεως θεᾶς Ἀθηνᾶς Πολιάδος καὶ τῶν θεῶν Σεβαστῶν.

<sup>5</sup> Lanckoronski, *Villes de Pamph.*, etc., ii. 48, 93 (ἱερεὺς) θεᾶς Ῥώμης Σεβαστῆς καὶ Διὸς Σολυμείως.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 49. (ἱερεὺς) θεᾶς Ῥώμης καὶ Διονύσου.

<sup>7</sup> Apart, of course, from the ἀρχιερεὺς of the Province.

but this did not exclude the presence of a college of priests who administered the older ritual at the same shrine. The fact that we often find a single priest honoured in a dedication is no proof that he was the only priest who served the deity specified. Conversely, it is quite possible that where we can show that a college of priests existed, a writer should mention only one of them as representing the deity on a particular occasion, or as taking part in any given act of ritual. If ὁ τε ἱερεὺς were the only reading given in Acts xiv. 13 by all the manuscripts, the discovery of a college of priests at Lystra would not shake its authenticity.

We have seen that Inscription I. probably belongs to the third century, but that its evidence on the ritual at Sedasa has a retrospective bearing. Religious usages under the Empire which were obviously Anatolian must have been handed down from a time anterior to the Roman occupation. If we find Zeus served by a college of priests in the vicinity of Lystra long after native usage had begun to be modified by Roman usage,<sup>1</sup> we can argue that this was part of the original native organisation, and that a similar state of things existed when Paul and Barnabas visited Lystra in the first century of our era.

Having established so much, we must now ask—does the reading ἱερεὺς in the *Codex Bezae* go back to a still earlier account (perhaps that written by Luke), or is it a second century "correction" of an earlier document?

The Bezan Text alone among the six principal manuscripts gives the reading ἱερεὺς; the others are in substantial agreement at this point. Besides giving ἱερεὺς instead of ἱερεύς, the *Codex Bezae* differs from the others in reading τοῦ ὄντος Διὸς πρὸ πόλεως instead of the Vulgate τοῦ Διὸς

<sup>1</sup> In the matter of religious ritual such modification was slight, and probably did not extend further than the institution of Emperor worship, and the introduction of a few Roman deities.

τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, and ἐπιθύειν for the simple θύειν.

Taking the reading *ἱερεῖς* first, if we assume that the original author wrote *ἱερεύς* and that the Bezan Reviser altered this to *ἱερεῖς*, we must produce our explanation of the cause of the change. The only possible grounds for such an alteration are two. Either the Reviser found the reading *ἱερεῖς* in a manuscript other than the one on which he worked, or he knew that a college of priests served the Zeus of Lystra in his own day, and introduced the detail into the narrative because he thought it more correct. On the first assumption, the reading *ἱερεῖς* is older than the Revision; but as this is what we wish to prove, we cannot use it as an argument. The second assumption is possible. It is a well-established principle in New Testament textual criticism that early Revisers sometimes altered passages in order to make the text support the doctrines of the sect to which they belonged, or introduced passages into the text in order to make the narrative more cogent and complete, chronologically or otherwise.<sup>1</sup> Nor can we exclude the possibility that a Reviser may have made such an alteration as that of *ἱερεύς* into *ἱερεῖς*, consciously or unconsciously.

If *ἱερεῖς* were the only detail in which the account given in the *Codex Bezae* differed from the other account (for there are only two) we should have to admit that *ἱερεύς* may have been changed into *ἱερεῖς* by the Reviser and to leave the question of the original reading open. But this is not the only variant. It will be allowed that the three variants in this sentence must stand or fall together. A theory that explains one of them as a second-century alteration must be prepared to explain the remaining two in the same manner.

<sup>1</sup> See Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, etc., p. 24, where instances are given.



We must therefore consider whether the variants τοῦ ὄντος Διὸς πρὸ πόλεως and ἐπιθύειν are likely to be second-century alterations of the corresponding expressions in the other manuscripts. To begin with ἐπιθύειν. The word had a different meaning in ancient ritual from that of the simple verb θύειν. It is used in several places of an offering of incense. An inscription<sup>1</sup> shows that its derivative ἐπίθυσσις was used in this sense, and the verb itself occurs with the same meaning in Diodorus Siculus.<sup>2</sup> The term ἐπιθύσιμα in an inscription of Attica<sup>3</sup> is probably an offering of incense. This meaning was distinct from another signification of the verb in literature, which was "to make a sacrifice over and above another." This may explain the use of the word ἐπιθυσίαι in an inscription.<sup>4</sup> The ἐπιθυσίαι of Demeter are distinguished from her mysteries, and the inscription also contains provision for a "preliminary sacrifice," (προθύειν). In the passage in Acts, Professor Ramsay must be right in taking the word to refer to a sacrifice *over and above the usual ritual*.<sup>5</sup> The ritual in an ancient cult was carefully defined and prescribed; a sacrifice such as that which the priests of Zeus prepared to offer to Paul and Barnabas was necessarily unusual, and the act might very appropriately be described by the verb ἐπιθύειν. The word is rarer, possesses fuller significance, and suits the circumstances better than the simple verb θύειν. It is more likely to be the original reading than to have been introduced by a Reviser.

The remaining Bezan variant is the most important of the three, for we can compare it, not only in its historical

<sup>1</sup> Michel, 735, 142.

<sup>2</sup> Blass, *Acta Apostolorum*, ad loc. Cf. Stephanus s.v.

<sup>3</sup> Dittenberger (2nd Ed.), 587, 295. See Van Herwerden, *Lex. Suppl.* s.v.

<sup>4</sup> *Ath. Mitth.*, xx. p. 242.

<sup>5</sup> *St. Paul the Traveller*, etc., p. 118.

accuracy, but also in its style, with the reading of the Accepted Text. Professor Ramsay has noted that the article with the participle of εἶναι in front of a substantive is a characteristic Lukan expression.<sup>1</sup> The difference between πρὸ πόλεως and πρὸ τῆς πόλεως is highly important. The insertion or omission of the article in a case like this is so easy that literary parallels, in support of either reading, are of little value. Fortunately, we have plenty of epigraphic evidence from Asia Minor, and this is a sure test. Six Anatolian inscriptions and one of Thera<sup>2</sup> contain the expression, and in every case it is πρὸ πόλεως. Originally an adverbial expression (as in τῆς μεγάλης θεᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος πρὸ πόλεως ἱερεῖς<sup>3</sup>) it came to be practically adjectival and is used exactly like an adjective in the expression ἡ γεραίρα τοῦ πρὸ πόλεως καὶ ἐπιφανεστάτου θεῶν Διονύσου, etc., at Thyatira.<sup>4</sup> But, although Suidas gives an adjective προπόλεως, there is no evidence for a form προπόλεως, implying a nominative πρόπολις.

The whole expression τοῦ ὄντος Διὸς πρὸ πόλεως is terser than that given in the Accepted Text. It is truer to Lukan style, and to Anatolian epigraphic usage. The reading τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ τῆς πόλεως is exactly such a simplification as we should expect to result from the Bezan reading. The contrary change would be very unlikely.

Professor Ramsay has pointed out<sup>5</sup> that these variants preserve local touches such as would impress themselves on the memory of the actual observers of the incident. Without supporting any theory of the original recording of

<sup>1</sup> Hastings' *Dictionary*, art. "Lystra."

<sup>2</sup> C.I.G. 2796, (Hecate at Aphrodisias); 2963 (Artemis at Ephesus); 3194 and 3211 (Demeter at Smyrna); 3493, and B.C.H. i. 136 (Dionysus and Tyrimnus at Thyatira); 2462 (Dionysus at Thera).

<sup>3</sup> C.I.G. 2963.

<sup>4</sup> B.C.H. i, 136.

<sup>5</sup> *St. Paul the Traveller*, etc., p. 118.

the incidents of the First Missionary Journey, or of their transmission to the writers of the different accounts, we must insist that these three readings of the Bezan Text are intrinsically superior to the corresponding readings of the other manuscripts; and suggest that they belong to the original account given to Luke.

On this hypothesis, moreover, we can supply a ready explanation of the very early change from *ἱερεῖς* to *ἱερεύς*. This alteration, and its almost universal adoption, was due to a desire to bring the narrative into line with the practice of the Graeco-Roman world generally, where a deity was served by a single priest. The principle "potior lectio difficilior" has an obvious application in this instance. The more obscure and unusual detail was altered to suit the prevailing practice. Professor Blass, who thought more highly of the *Codex Bezae* than most scholars, rejected the reading *ἱερεῖς* on the ground that a deity was represented by a single priest.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, *τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ τῆς πόλεως*<sup>1</sup> has all the appearance of an exegetical simplification of the terser Bezan reading. Lastly, *θύειν* is an obvious alteration made by and for people to whom the ritualistic detail conveyed by *ἐπιθύειν* had lost its importance.

W. M. CALDER.

<sup>1</sup> *Acta Apostolorum*, ad loc. In his edition of the *Libri ad Theophilum*, published later, Blass adopts *τοῦ ὄντος Διὸς πρὸ πόλεως*, after Ramsay.

*SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.*

VII. SIN AND HEREDITY—THE RACIAL ASPECT.

HEREDITY is one of the most interesting, as it is one of the most recondite and baffling, subjects in modern biological science. Heredity, indeed, is not a new discovery, any more than sin is a new fact. Everywhere in nature kind is seen producing its kind with undeviating regularity. Ancestral traits, good and bad, reappear in offspring. But recent science has given heredity a new grounding in the study of the laws of organism, has tracked its operations with a precision formerly unthought of, has built up complicated theories regarding it, and drawn conclusions from it of the most far-reaching character. It is an inseparable part of evolutionary theory in all its forms. In itself, however, apart from this relation, no one acquainted with recent discussions will question that the bearings of heredity on the doctrine of sin are both deep and vital.

Doubtless it lies beyond the province of biological science to tell us anything properly of the nature of *sin*. Categories of nature do not explain moral and spiritual facts. When discourse turns on laws of freedom, moral responsibility, ethical ideals, ends of conduct, responsibility to God, a sphere is entered different from that with which biology has to deal. Yet it is a sphere in which, when regard is had to the constitution and facts of human nature, and the part which undeniably heredity does play in the shaping of character and conduct, very difficult problems arise. Sin, we have seen, stands for something which we distinguish from a result of nature; for which we attach to ourselves and to others a solemn responsibility; which we say *ought not* to have been; which only grows the more lurid in its colouring as we bring it into the light of the divine

Holiness. But then—the question forces itself—can this view of sin be maintained together with the teaching on heredity with which our text-books and much of our current literature are making us familiar? How, for instance, if a major part (some would say the whole) of what we call sin is the result of inherited disposition and tendency,—how, if heredity and environment, the latter itself a product of inherited forces, predetermine for the mass of mankind their place in the moral scale,—how if, as many contend, heredity controls will, while will is without power to modify heredity,—is it possible to represent the existing condition of humanity as abnormal and in contradiction of its true destiny, how vindicate responsibility in the midst of it, how hope to effect the deliverance of the race from it?

A very definite issue is thus raised. It seems plain that if Christianity, retaining its view of sin, is to accomplish anything in the world, it must, while willingly accepting from heredity the idea of a single organic life of the race, and of descent of good and evil traits from generation to generation, join with this something else—the acknowledgment of an inherent law of good and evil in life, of a personality in man from which forces proceed that act upon environment and modify it, and, not least, of a divine redeeming power able to cope with and overcome the worst manifestations of the world's evil. In affirming God and the soul, sin and redemption, Christianity lifts life, with all its strands of racial influence, out of the web of fatalism into which heredity, taken alone, tends to sink it.

To gain clearness on this point, a closer view must now be taken of heredity in its present-day developments.

I. What heredity *is*, every one, in a general way, understands. It is simply, to use words of Weismann's, "that property of an organism by which its peculiar nature

is transmitted to its descendants.”<sup>1</sup> The *fact* of heredity is familiar : it is the *explanation* of it, and the defining of the *limits* of its operation, which science finds puzzling. The first and most obvious thing about heredity is that, in ordinary course,<sup>2</sup> type invariably produces type, yet always with some degree of individual variation ; further, that these variations, with the other peculiarities that go to make up the individual—themselves results of past variation—tend likewise to be transmitted.<sup>3</sup> Men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.<sup>4</sup> Wheat may be relied on to produce wheat ; maize to produce maize ; the eagle an eagle ; the horse a horse ; the man a man. The negro type is reproduced in the negro, the Indian in the Indian. Mental and moral,<sup>5</sup> as well as physical, qualities reappear in offspring, though often curiously distributed, modified, or blended—the qualities of the parents, as Emerson says, being frequently drawn off and “ potted ” in the several members of the family.<sup>6</sup> Sometimes the ancestral quality leaps over one or more generations and reappears in a descendant.<sup>7</sup> Here then is the problem which science sets itself to solve—How is this wonderful result brought about ? What is the *rationale* of it ? As Weismann again puts it : “ How can such hereditary transmission of the characters of the parent take place ? How can a single reproductive cell reproduce the whole body in all its details ? ”<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, i. p. 72. For more elaborate definitions, cf. J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, pp. 15, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Allowance is made here for mutations. Cf. Thomson, *Ibid.* pp. 82 ff.

<sup>3</sup> “ There is the tendency to breed true,” *Ibid.* p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Matthew vii. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Thomson, *Ibid.* p. 248.

<sup>6</sup> *Conduct of Life*, on Fate : “ It often appears in a family, as if all the qualities of the progenitors were potted in several jars,—some ruling quality in each son or daughter of the house,—and sometimes the unmixed temperament, the rank unmitigated elixir, the family vice, is drawn off in a separate individual, and the others are proportionally relieved.”

<sup>7</sup> Thomson, *Op. cit.* p. 132.

<sup>8</sup> *Essays*, i. p. 73.

The answer or answers given by current biology to these questions are very characteristic. In all the leading modern theories of heredity it is taken for granted as a thing self-evident that the only kind of explanation science can entertain must be a “*mechanical*” one: all talk of a living, organising principle, of vital agency, of a “directive force,” is rigorously excluded. Only that can be admitted which can be stated in terms of physics. As Huxley says in an often-quoted passage: “To speak of vitality as anything but the name of a series of operations is as if one should talk of the horology of a clock.”<sup>1</sup> It will be asked below whether—as other eminent biologists contend<sup>2</sup>—this huge assumption is not unwarrantable, does not, indeed, demand the impossible; but it is interesting at present to inquire whether, notwithstanding the rejection of a vital principle, it is found practicable, when an actual theory is attempted, to get on without it, or its equivalent.

Mr. Darwin led the way in this direction in his theory of *Pangenesis*—a theory still spoken of with respect as anticipative of later discovery.<sup>3</sup> The theory, in brief, is, that every cell in the whole organism is continually, at every stage in its development, throwing off minute portions of itself—“*gemmules*,” as Darwin calls them—which, by a mysterious law, find their way to, and get stored up in, the reproductive cell, whence, under suitable conditions, a new organism is produced, containing all the parts of the former.<sup>4</sup> But, setting aside the numberless other difficulties of this “*gemmule*” theory, there is one which even Darwin could not ignore, viz., how, even assuming the parts all safely

<sup>1</sup> Art. “Biology,” *Ency. Brit.*

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Thomson says: “Not a few embryologists, such as Driesch, believe themselves warranted in frankly postulating a vitalistic factor—an Aristotelian ‘*Entelechy*’” (*Op. cit.* p. 417; cf. p. 399).

<sup>3</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, pp. 84, 102, 111.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Darwin, *Variation of Plants and Animals*, II. ch. xxvii.; Weismann, *Essays*, i. p. 78; Thomson, *Heredity*, pp. 406 ff., etc.

housed in the reproductive cell, they manage, streaming in from all sides in countless numbers, to arrange themselves in the precise position and relations necessary to build up the new organism. How is it that each gemmule in this whirl of particles is guided to the exact place it is meant to occupy, and manages thereafter to keep to it? <sup>1</sup> Darwin's answer is given in the phrase "elective affinities." The gemmules have "affinities" which lead to their arranging themselves in the proper order and relations. What, however, is this "elective affinity" but just the organising, directive principle to which exception is taken under another name? As Weismann in criticising it says: "An unknown controlling force must be added to this mysterious arrangement, in order to marshal the molecules which enter the reproductive cell in such a manner that their arrangement correspond with the order in which they must emerge as cells at a later period."<sup>2</sup> As well postulate the vital principle at once.

Mr. Spencer, in his *Biology*, likewise criticises Mr. Darwin, but it is difficult to see that his own theory is in much better case. He rejects "elective affinity," but only to substitute what he calls "polarity." There is, he tells us, "an innate tendency in living particles to arrange themselves into the shape of the organism to which they belong." For this tendency, he observes, there is no fit term, so he proposes this word "polarity."<sup>3</sup> Is there any advantage?

Discarding these theories, Weismann takes another line, based on his doctrine of the "immortality" of the (reproductive) "germ-cell," or of the germ-plasm contained in it.<sup>4</sup> In contrast with the perishable "somatic" or body cells, the germ-cell is absolutely continuous: it divides

<sup>1</sup> The difficulty is not lessened on the (Mendelian) theory of "unit-characters" with which some would correlate Darwin's hypothesis.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays*, i. p. 77.

<sup>3</sup> *Biology*, on "Waste and Repair."

<sup>4</sup> *Essays*, i. p. 209.



and subdivides, but never dies. Each part has in it the peculiar molecular structure, with all the other properties, of the original cells ; it therefore produces, when developed, precisely the same kind of being. Thus he thinks he solves the problem : “ How is it that a single cell of the body can contain within itself all the hereditary tendencies of the whole organism ? ”<sup>1</sup> It may be doubted, however, whether, so far as the essential point is concerned, viz., *how* the germ-cell comes to possess this peculiar molecular structure, and is enabled to give off its infinitely complex molecular structure in its entirety to myriads of derivative cells, we are not left as much in the dark as ever. To explain the rise and growing complexity of germ-structure, we are thrown back on the hypothesis of natural selection working on fortuitous variations, in forms of life originally unicellular, therefore presumably structureless. As to perpetuation, “ fission ” affords no explanation of how the marvellously complex molecular mechanism of the parent cell should divide into multitudes of cells each with the mechanism complete.

It seems, in short, even in these theories, necessary to supplement them by the factor they are so slow to recognise, viz., a soul-life, the presence of a living, organising principle, which is the true agent in building up a structure of a given type from materials which do not originally contain it. Such a principle is not, as sometimes asserted, an imaginary cause, the counterpart of the pseudo-“ horology ” of the clock. Mechanical and chemical forces are only one side of the universe : our own soul-life furnishes us with the type of another. We come back to the sound Aristotelian principle that it is the soul which is the cause of organism, not conversely. If this is conceded, the necessity for these elaborate germ-mechanisms largely disappears : the germ

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* p. 209.

has in it the potency for building up structure where none previously existed. To what but this does Weismann himself come back in his admission of the unsolved mystery in cell-life of "assimilation"—the power, as he explains it, which the organism possesses "of taking up certain foreign substances, viz., food, and of converting them into the substance of its own body?"<sup>1</sup>

II. If, in these discussions, we seem far enough from the doctrine of sin, a remaining step will perhaps bring us within full view of their relevancy. It has already been remarked that heredity hands down not only the specific type, but individual variations. But here the question arises which occupies a chief place in recent discussions on heredity, viz., the possibility of the *transmission of what are called "acquired characters."* Some variations are *congenital*, that is, arise from unknown causes in the organic germ; other characters are *acquired*, or impressed on the organism, in the course of its history, e.g., through external conditions or environment, through use or disuse, through voluntary agency. That congenital variations are or may be inherited all agree; but is it the same with acquired characters? Till within the last twenty or thirty years it was commonly supposed that it was, and evolutionary theory took the fact for granted. Lamarck built his theory of development on the supposed inheritance of changes wrought by use and disuse of parts. Darwin, as time went on, gave an increasing place to the same factor alongside his principle of "natural selection." Herbert Spencer in a manner built his philosophy, especially his psychology and ethics, on the inheritance of acquired qualities. It is through accumulation and registration in the organism of past experiences that he accounts for mental development and the immediacy of seeming "intuitions," as of

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* i. p. 73.

space and time, of ethical distinctions, etc. All this, it is allowed, falls to the ground, if inheritance of acquired characters is denied. In Weismann's words, in the Preface to the lecture in which he propounded the opposite view, in 1883: "If these views be correct, all our ideas upon the transformation of species require thorough modification, for the whole principle of evolution by means of exercise (use and disuse), as proposed by Lamarck, and accepted in some cases by Darwin, entirely collapses."<sup>1</sup> The results of the theory for ethics and theology, it will immediately be seen, are not less serious. Besides cutting at the root of the ordinary belief in inherited evil tendencies as the result of vicious lives in the parents, it no less effectually takes the foundations from the doctrine of Original Sin, or of a hereditary vitiation of nature due to a moral lapse in the beginning of the race. For changes due to human volition admittedly rank as "acquired characters."

III. It is unnecessary to enter into the keen conflict of opinion among scientific authorities on this difficult point: <sup>2</sup> it will be enough to look at the *grounds* and *bearings* of the theory as it affects our present subject. It is important to notice, in forming a judgment upon it, that, with Weismann, the case for the theory, developed with remarkable skill, is based partly, indeed, on *the alleged lack of evidence*

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, i, p. 69. Cf. the following from Spencer, quoted by Prof. Thomson (*Heredity*, pp. 164, 195): "A right answer to the question whether acquired characters are or are not inherited underlies right beliefs, not only in biology and psychology, but also in education, ethics, and politics." "Close contemplation of the facts impresses me more strongly than ever with the two alternatives—either there has been inheritance of acquired characters, or there has been no evolution."

<sup>2</sup> The diversity of view is seen in the volume *Dar. and Mod. Science*. Weismann defends; Haeckel, Schwalbe and others oppose. The *pros* and *cons* are well exhibited in Prof. Thomson's chapter on the subject in his *Heredity* (ch. vii.). Prof. Thomson leans personally to Weismann's view, but admits that the subject is still *sub judice*. The late Prof. G. J. Romanes contests it in his *Darwin and after Darwin*.

for the inheritance of acquired characters, but partly also—indeed primarily—on the doctrine of the continuity of the reproductive germ, and the *necessity of finding a “mechanical” explanation* of the transmission of changes from other parts of the organism—the “somatic” cells—to the reproductive cell, so as to become a constitutive part of the latter. As he says in one place: “Use and disuse cannot produce any effect in the transformation of species, simply because they can never reach the germ-cells from which the succeeding generation comes.”<sup>1</sup> This means that he can conceive of no “mechanism” by which they can do so. The theory, in brief, is, that all changes that are reproducible are in the germ-cell, and in the germ-cell alone; and that this is unreachable by influences from changes in other parts of the organism.<sup>2</sup> It cannot escape notice how deeply an assumption of this kind must colour the treatment of evidence; it is not less obvious that, if the “mechanical” view of the propagation of organism is rejected, the problem assumes an entirely different aspect. If the body is a “mechanism,” as no doubt in some sense it is, it differs from every mere mechanism in the fact that it is *animated*. It is a mechanism self-originated, self-repairing, self-perpetuating. A single life pervades it; every part is in *rapport* with every other; probably no vital change takes place in any part which is not attended by changes in other parts that defy all purely physical explanation. When we can explain, e.g., how the feeling of shame can determine the blush to the face, we may be at liberty to doubt the possibility of an impure thought or

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, i. p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> Weismann puts this briefly: “The foundation of all the phenomena of heredity can only be the substance of the germ-cells; and the substance transfers its hereditary tendencies from generation to generation, at first unchanged, and always uninfluenced in any corresponding manner by that which happens during the life of the individual which bears it” (*Ibid.* p. 69).

base desire leaving its subtle impress even on the germ-cells concerned with reproduction.

One immediate result, it must be seen, of Weismann's theory is to withdraw heredity absolutely from every sphere controlled in any degree by *volition*. It has been generally believed that a man's actions have some influence for good or evil, not only on his own character, but on that of his offspring. Live a vicious life, it has been thought, and you do irreparable mischief, not only to yourself but to your offspring, to whom you transmit, in some measure, your own evil tendencies. This, if Weismann is to be followed, is an entire mistake. Weismann grants, of course, that the effect of vicious habits is a general physical enfeeblement in which, through defective nourishment or from other causes the germ-cells are involved; in this way, indirectly, offspring suffers.<sup>1</sup> But *directly*, neither in body nor mind, it is held, can offspring be affected by volitional acts on the part of the parent. Any changes flowing from these fall, as already said, under the category of "acquired characters," and cannot be transmitted. Further, as human will has no share in inducing, hereditarily, the deterioration seen in so many broken specimens of the race, so neither can any exercise of will help to secure, through inheritance, improvement in the future. There is, if freedom is granted—which commonly it is not—the possibility of reform for the individual; there is the undoubted gain for posterity of a better social environment. But nothing is accomplished directly through the principle of heredity. That moves on its isolated way, unaffected by accidents of external condition, by helping or hindering influences of surrounding, by good or evil determinations

<sup>1</sup> Even this, as critics point out, involves a considerable admission, hardly reconcilable with the general theory. Cf. on a related point, Romanes, *Darwin and After Darwin*, ii. p. 108.

of volition. If it is asked, How then explain the many wrecks of society who do seem to owe their degradation in some degree to the weakened intellects, depraved appetites, and enfeebled wills inherited from parents? the answer is that what is really effect has been mistaken for cause. Volition had as little to do in the parent as in the child with the depraved tendencies that are inherited. By an unfortunate germinal variation with which will had no more to do than with the colour of the hair, the parent was born with an unbalanced nature and strong propensities to vice. Circumstances favouring, he went the road that might have been anticipated. What, now, the child inherits is the congenital tendency, not the later acquired habit. Here, it must be owned, is a theory that cuts deep into the view it has been customary to take of the sin and crime of society, and of society's duty and responsibility in regard to it.

It has been indicated that the *theological* consequences of the Weismann doctrine are no less far-reaching than the *social*. The evolutionary theory of the "brute inheritance," which takes the place of the Church doctrine of "Original Sin," Weismannism does not, of course, touch, though it seriously affects the possibility of a working out of "the ape and tiger" strain from humanity.<sup>1</sup> But the idea of an original pure beginning of the race, and of a defection from the right, with a consequent perversion of the nature, and hereditary transmission of this wrong state to posterity, is in its principle subverted by the Weismann theory. Such a "Fall" as the Church doctrine conceives, and as appears to be taught in Scripture, would at most be a case of "acquired character," and could pro-

<sup>1</sup> Only unfortunately man has not come through the "tiger," and it is becoming even doubtful whether he has descended through the "ape." See last paper.

duce no hereditary effects. The inference is obvious, and has been drawn with exceptional acuteness by Mr. F. R. Tennant in his Hulsean Lectures on *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*. "The question," the writer says, "turns entirely on the possibility of the transmission of acquired modifications as distinguished from congenital variations," and he adds, "The conviction very largely prevails amongst the authorities that unequivocal instances of such transmission have never yet been supplied."<sup>1</sup>

IV. Heredity in the naked, unqualified form in which it is often presented by science, with denial of free-will, would seem to *destroy responsibility* at its base.<sup>2</sup> At first glance the theory of Weismann, in questioning the inheritance of contracted tendencies, might appear to relieve the pressure on posterity. In this light Mr. Tennant is disposed to welcome it. In reality, however, no doctrine rivets fatality on man so completely as this of Weismann's. It does so, as has been seen, by withdrawing heredity completely from the control of will. The tendencies now hereditary were in their origin simply unfavourable variations: a rigorous necessity has ruled the subsequent development; will has no influence at all in changing things from their predetermined course. The question of the degree of evidence for the transmission of acquired characters must be left to the decision of experts, but the issues involved are sufficiently grave to warrant us in asking on general grounds whether there are not considerations that point to the need of at least *some qualification* of the Weismann hypothesis.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 34, 36. Mr. Tennant, with Weismann, urges the seeming impossibility "of conceiving the nature of the mechanism" by which a specific effect on the organism could modify its reproductive organs (p. 17). But is a "mechanical" explanation necessary? Cf. the writer's *God's Image in Man*, pp. 236 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the illustrations in Dr. Amory Bradford's *Heredity*, pp. 81 ff.

The weakness of nine-tenths of the scientific discussions on this subject, one cannot help feeling, lies in the all but complete ignoring of the factor of *personality*, of will, of moral decision, in man. The physical is viewed as a sphere complete in itself, ruled only by mechanical or chemical laws, and any interaction of mind and body—certainly any action of mind *on* body—is rejected as unscientific. Science, it is assumed, can take account only of physical causation: mental concomitants of molecular changes may be noted,<sup>1</sup> but it cannot be allowed that they have the least influence on the train of the physical phenomena. This may be called science, but it is a science which can never accomplish its task; for experience shows that it is the forces emanating from personality which are the most efficient in the making or marring of human life. Organic changes are not the whole. So far as these changes are the results of deliberation, forethought, resolve—as in the execution of a purpose—they cannot be explained if the volitional factor is left out of account. This bears on heredity. The moral forces of life, if good, act as a lever to lift up; if evil, operate as a force to break down. Only a violent misreading of history can affirm the opposite.

The writer has argued elsewhere that probably a mistake has been made in these discussions in stating the alternatives *too absolutely*, as if one must hold either that *all* acquired characters are hereditary (though few will be bold enough to maintain this), or else that *none* are.<sup>2</sup> Is it not possible to make a distinction, and may not the principle of the distinction lie in the fact that some changes in the nature go deeper than others—come nearer the seat of personality

<sup>1</sup> They may be noted, but they cannot be *explained* by the physical causes, which exhaust themselves in the production of their physical effects.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *God's Image in Man*, pp. 236 ff.



—and that these may be transmissible, while more superficial changes are not? Purely *physical* changes, e.g.,—mutilations and the like—enter least deeply into the organism, and commonly, at least, are not transmitted. *Intellectual* acquisitions again—those on which Mr. Spencer chiefly builds—still lie outside the depths of personal life, and do not ordinarily pass to offspring. In the *emotional* life, and life of feeling generally, on the other hand, it is difficult to deny that impressions are sometimes made which go down to the seat of life, and occasionally are transmitted in very definite form. Even here we are outside the properly volitional life—the *moral* life—of man, and it is there, as already suggested, that the deeper effects on character seem to be produced.

There remains the *religious* sphere. To this the same reasonings apply, but with the infinitely intensified significance which belongs to the loss of the soul's true relation to God, and the adoption of a fundamentally wrong principle into the ground of the will. For this, as before seen, is what sin essentially is—not the breach simply of some particular moral precept, as when one is betrayed into an unkind thought or untruthful word, but the exchange of a right relation to God, in which His will is supreme, for an opposed relation, in which God's authority is cast off, and the human will becomes a law to itself. Such an altered relation to God in a primal act of disobedience is the greatest change a nature can undergo, and involves a shock the effects of which we cannot, on the lower plane in which the irreparable damage is already done, adequately realise. Sin has been spoken of in preceding papers as something tragic, catastrophic, in the history of the race: it is thus, also, that experience, with Scripture, teaches us to regard it. The terrible spectacle presented by heredity on its physical and moral sides—the vice, sin, crime, lust,

cruelty, that seem to have their origin in inherited conditions and perverted tendencies—first find an adequate explanation, and is set in their proper moral light, when traced back to an origin in the voluntary turning aside of man from his true life in God. The race is an organism. There is a racial sin and guilt in which the world of mankind is involved,<sup>1</sup> the effects of which it shares, as well as a harm that flows from personal transgression. Heredity is not the denial of this truth, but, in its own way, is the reaffirmation of it.

On the brute-inheritance theory of evolution, which takes the place of the Christian doctrine, it need only be said at present that, if this were the whole, it would in no proper sense be sin at all. "The victim of it," as has been elsewhere remarked, "might groan under it as an all but unendurable cross, but he could never judge of it as the religious man does, when he looks down into his heart, and condemns himself for the self-seeking, impure, and God-resisting tendencies he finds in operation there."<sup>2</sup>

V. When, however, all abatements have been made, it remains that heredity is a *terrible reality* in human life, and that, under its sway, the position of vast multitudes, even in our nominally Christian lands, is so dark as, at times, to appear all but hopeless. It is not simply inherited tendencies, powerful as these are, but that vast complex of influences—itsself largely an outgrowth of heredity—we call "environment," which gives the problem its tremendous magnitude. The hearts of the best often fail in contemplating the difficulties that confront them here; yet they should not fail. On the basis of naturalism a gloomy pessimism may be permissible, indeed inevitable. But Christianity has a better message. For heredity, after

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dormer, *System of Doctrine*, iii, p. 54 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *God's Image in Man*, p. 234.

all, is no blind destiny, binding human beings to their ruin. There are forces of personality that can be invoked to counteract the evil influences of even heredity and environment, and Christianity does not leave man to mere nature in his conflict, else he would surely fail, but brings to his aid supernatural forces powerful enough to cope with the worst evils with which human nature is infected.

Christian duty, indeed, cannot neglect the task laid to its hand of endeavouring to break down the *evil social environment* which, for so many, destroys, from infancy, almost the possibility of growth in goodness.<sup>1</sup> Even here, no doubt, singular exceptions occur—a proof, if one were needed, that heredity is not everything in human life. But they are exceptions, not the rule. No effort, therefore, is to be spared—here Christianity and the social reformer are at one—in improving external conditions, removing temptations, and, as far as possible, securing, if need be compelling, tolerable and decent conditions of existence for every member of the community—specially for the *young*. This, however, of itself only removes obstacles—creates opportunities and facilities. To utilise these, higher forces must be brought into play, appeal must be made to the man himself as a moral and responsible being—to reason, to conscience, to will—to the power which every one has of appreciating the good when put before him. The individual must be trained to feel that he *has* personality—is not the helpless plaything of outside forces, but is called to bend these to his own purposes instead of being bent by them. It is here at once that human weakness reveals itself, and that religion, as already mentioned,

<sup>1</sup> In a powerful passage Prof. Seeley, in his *Ecce Homo* (ch. xix.) speaks of those who from the first hour of their existence are received into the devil's church by a kind of infant baptism, and shows the disabilities under which they labour.

comes with its mighty aid, furnishing man with resources which nature alone could not supply.

If we turn to Scripture, we find both of the truths now asserted—*heredity* and *human responsibility*—strongly emphasised; emphasised, moreover, not as contradictory, but as complementary. In no case is it hinted that heredity is an entail which cannot be broken by individual repentance. Even the seemingly harsh word of the second commandment, “visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children,”<sup>1</sup> is in its context and intention anything but harsh; for, in contrast with the inheritance of loving-kindness to thousands of them that love God and keep His commandments, it refuses to contemplate the entail of penalty beyond the third and fourth generation of them that hate God—a suggestion that judgment is God’s strange work, and that evil in the end may be swallowed up of good. On the other hand, Ezekiel’s repudiation of the proverb, “The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children’s teeth are set on edge,”<sup>2</sup> and enunciation of the opposite principle of individual responsibility, are not in contradiction of the patent facts of heredity, which the prophet elsewhere plainly enough recognises,<sup>3</sup> but supply the balancing assertion that no man will perish for the sins of his fathers who does not make these sins his own, and that the worst entail of a father’s wrongdoings can be cut off by personal repentance and right-doing.<sup>4</sup> Each man, that is, stands or falls at the last by what he himself is, and while the divine judgment can never call that good which is in reality evil—be its origin what it may—the *personal* responsibility of each individual will be measured by the Omniscient with full regard to all the circumstances

<sup>1</sup> Exod. xx. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ez. xviii. 1.      <sup>3</sup> Cf. chs. iv.-vii., xvi., etc.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. chs. xv. 14, 20, etc.; xviii. 14 ff.

of his lot. It will be more tolerable, Jesus says, for Tyre and Sidon, and for Sodom, in the day of judgment, than for those who have received and rejected better light.<sup>1</sup>

What Christianity does for man with its divine help will be considered later.

JAMES ORR.

### *THE LAMB OF GOD.*

AMONG all the haunting phrases of the Fourth Gospel few, if any, are so haunting as the two in chapter i. which bear upon the Lamb of God. Not only do they appear there all of a sudden, and then disappear, but they appear on the lips of a man, who, if we judge by what we learn in the Synoptic record, was wont to use a far more rugged and even ruthless form of speech: "Ye offspring of vipers, who warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" (Matt. iii. 7). "He that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear . . . Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor, and he will gather his wheat into the garner, but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire" (Matt. iii. 11, 12). The spirit of these burning words is clearly that of the old dispensation, "that which was passing away," and Jesus passed sentence upon it when He said, "Yet he that is but little in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he" (Matt. xi. 11). If, then, we find in the Fourth Gospel coming from the same impetuous lips two such words as these, "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world!" and "Behold the Lamb of God!" words touched by what seems to be a very different spirit, breathing the air of another world, we cannot but admit that there is a problem, psychological and critical alike, of deep interest,

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xi. 20-24.

and one that deserves a little more attention than it has received.

It seems impossible to let the two sets of phrases—the Synoptic and Johannine—stand as they are and interpret them without relation to each other, and without any attempt to solve the difference. Are we then to follow the somewhat easy method of the majority of critics and say that the phrases in the Fourth Gospel are not historical, but are simply put into the mouth of the Baptist by the author, who, here as elsewhere, is giving voice to his own faith and the faith of the community, or are we to seek after a better understanding of the title Lamb of God and find perchance that there is a sense in which, as it stands, it is historical, and not impossible even to the thought and speech of the last of the prophets?

Keim, with his usual insight, has laid his hand upon the difficulty when he says that with these words (“Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh,” etc.) the “baptizer with water,” we are to believe, had, after Isaiah pointed to the bloody death of the Servant of God who had now appeared; but we must say not only that a prevision that was wanting to Jesus Himself is still harder to assume in the case of the Baptist, and moreover that the whole earlier Jewish belief concerning the Messiah, even the belief of the disciples of Jesus, even the belief of Jesus Himself, could not brook this *via dolorosa* for the Messiah at all, or only with the greatest difficulty as it came in the course of history, but still more that the Baptist, with his expectation of the Strong One, the Mighty One, the fiery restorer of order in Israel, finally with his subsequent dismay at the path of humility, not to speak of the path of suffering which the Messiah trod, was quite inaccessible to the thought of a suffering Messiah. Thus, then, he cannot have spoken of Jesus as the Lamb of God in the character of a prophet

whose flight outstripped and put to shame himself and Jesus and the entire age.”<sup>1</sup> That is the difficulty, but no solution of it. And Keim has been followed by the majority of writers, among them Heitmüller, the able author of the Gospel of John in *Die Schriften*, who says, “The wonderful word of the Lamb of God could not have been intelligible to his hearers, they did not look for a suffering Messiah and had not learned to refer the song of the Servant of God in Isaiah liii. to the Messiah. Neither the comprehension of its content nor the coining of its form was possible to the Jewish prophet, who had not experienced the paradox of the Cross on Golgotha nor felt its sanctifying religious influences, and had not before him the laborious theological work which had been spent upon this paradox by the first community and Paul. It is the *Evangelist who speaks through the great prophet*. To him it is a sanctifying conviction that Jesus is the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world. Such is the boldness and fervour of his faith that it is a truth with no need of proof that this Jesus stood at the centre of things and was active in the world before John (Logos). Truth is always the same, the prophet John must have known it. Hence he puts it in his mouth.”

That may be said to be the ordinary critical view, and yet one critic of proved ability diverges from the already beaten track of Johannine criticism and supports another view which, to say the least, is full of interest and suggestion. Friedrich Spitta, in his recent volume entitled *Streitfragen der Geschichte Jesu*, presents us with what he calls a modest attempt to start discussion on the image Lamb as applied to Christ, an image which, as he says, is frequently used in literature and art but is obscure in its origin.

In the Apocalypse, as Spitta sets himself to show, the

<sup>1</sup> Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, vol. ii. p. 302.

expression "lamb" is used of Jesus eight-and-twenty times. The actual word is *ἀρνίον*, not *ἀμνός* as in John i. 29, i. 36; Acts viii. 32; 1 Pet. i. 19; nor *πρόβατον* as in Acts viii. 32 in the quotation from Isaiah liii. 7. The word *ἀρνίον* is the diminutive from *ἀρήν*, a nominative which, as Thayer says, is not in use, and means a little ram or lambkin. Spitta thinks that the choice of the word *ἀρνίον* has something strange about it, since the kind of sheep it indicates does not answer to the diminutive form at all. The one passage in the Apocalypse in which *ἀρνίον* is not used of Jesus is chapter xiii. 11: "And I saw another beast coming up out of the earth, and he had two horns like unto a lamb, and he spake as a dragon," where *ἀρνίον* points to the grown horned ram.

When we turn to the first passage in which the term is applied to Jesus we find it impossible to render *ἀρνίον* as lambkin, chapter v. 6, "And I saw in the midst of the throne and of the four living creatures . . . a Lamb standing as though it had been slain, *ὡς ἐσφαγμένον* (slain by cut in throat as in ancient and mediæval art), having seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven Spirits of God sent forth into all the earth." It is a more powerful creature and more capable of defending itself than the ram of Daniel viii. 3, which has two horns and is the symbol of the Persian Empire. The seven horns and seven eyes, far from suggesting a young or undeveloped animal tell of the highest development of knowledge and might. Thus the *ἀρνίον* of the Apocalypse bears certain traces which have faded into the background in the usual conception of "the innocent lamb." The creature with seven eyes and seven horns is the symbol of the ruler who sees everything, and before whom nought can stand. The fifth verse of the same chapter speaks of the lion that is of the tribe of Judah, and however these different forms may



be combined, it is certain that in both cases the war hero is symbolised. Chap. xvii. 14 is in keeping; "these (ten kings) shall war against the Lamb, and the Lamb shall overcome them, for He is Lord of lords and King of kings," and chapter xvi. 11, where men speak of hiding themselves "from the wrath of the Lamb."

Beside this group of qualities another appears as in chapter xiv. 1, where the *ἀρνίον* "stands upon Mount Zion, and with him a hundred and forty-four thousand having His name and the name of His Father written on their foreheads." "These are they which follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth." In chapter vii. 16 we find the same idea, "the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall be their Shepherd," etc. The flock led to the pastures and watersprings, as in Psalm xxiii., has the lamb for its leader instead of the shepherd; it is a picture of a lord or ruler standing at the head of his people and directing them.

At the same time the words *ὡς ἐσφαγμένον*, used of the *ἀρνίον* in chapter v. 6, introduce another idea. The four-and-twenty elders in their song express what is meant by it: "Worthy art thou to take the book and to open the seals thereof, for thou wast slain, and didst purchase unto God with thy blood men of every tribe and madest them to be unto our God a kingdom of priests, and they reign upon the earth." Here, therefore, the lamb appears as victim (*opfertier*) as it does again in v. 12, xii. 11, xiii. 8.

Thus the apocalyptic picture of the lamb has two conceptions in it which cross, viz., that of the lamb as leader and that of the sheep as victim. The latter as applied to the Messiah, says Spitta, is conceivable only under Christian presuppositions; as for the former, it cannot have developed on Christian soil any more than that of the rider on the white horse (chap. xix. 11). It must have its source in Jewish representations of the Messiah.

Its connexion with the idea of the sheep as victim was one in which it did not thrive, since it got no support from the view of Jesus which prevailed in the Church. That it did spring from Jewish sources Spitta seeks to prove by an examination of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch, where, it is alleged, the Messiah appears as an *ἀρνίον* with one great horn. There are other features of resemblance to the lamb of the Apocalypse, and in Spitta's opinion there is no need of further witness of the fact that here we have the original of the *ἀρνίον* of the New Testament. The symbol of the lamb as leader and protector of his people has grown up on the soil of Jewish Apocalypse. There may be evidence for that, although, as we shall see, there is barely evidence enough to claim a positively Messianic use. Spitta maintains, however, that the evidence of the Book of Enoch is confirmed by the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, where the Messiah<sup>1</sup> is represented as Protector and Leader of the flock of Israel, the only difference being the use of the universal term *ἀμνός* instead of *ἀρνίον*.

In coming now to the Fourth Gospel itself we find that right at the beginning Jesus is described as "Lamb of God." This has been taken as proving clearly that the Fourth Gospel can make no claim to be an historical exhibition of the life of Jesus. If one sees in the description nothing but a reference to His atoning passion and death, then that judgment is justified. But from what has already

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. R. H. Charles, 1908. Of Josh. chap. xix. 7-9 Charles says, "When the interpolations in ver. 8 are removed and corruptions amended, it becomes probable that these verses refer to one and the same victorious leader, who symbolised at first by a 'bull calf' (*μόσχος*), is subsequently denoted by a lamb (*ἀμνός*). This leader is in all probability one of the Maccabees." Verse 8, according to Charles, should read, "And I saw that in the midst of the horns a bull calf became a lamb; and on his right (was as it were a lion and) all the beasts and all the reptiles rushed against him) and the lamb overcame them and destroyed them."

been said, it may be seen that the term brings before us other points of view.

Now in dealing with the two verses in which the word *ἀμνός*, lamb, occurs (chap. i. 29 and i. 36), Spitta enters into a minute criticism of the text, following Usener to the point of admitting what he drew attention to, that the two verses stand in two parallel sections, viz., 19-31 and 32-36. But he differs from Usener in his analysis of these parallel sections or "doublets" and thinks that verses 31-32 stand over against verses 33-34.

And I knew Him not : but that He should be made manifest to Israel : for this cause came I baptizing with water. And John bare witness, saying, I have beheld the Spirit descending as a dove out of heaven and it abode upon him.

And I knew him not ; but He that sent me to baptize with water, he said unto me, Upon whomsoever thou shalt see the Spirit descending and abiding upon him, the same is he that baptizeth with the Holy Spirit. And I have seen, and have borne witness that this is the Son of God.

As it is no new section, however, that begins at verse 33 just as little as at verse 31, the question arises, with what does verse 33 connect ? In verse 33 occurs the phrase "The same is He that baptizeth with the Holy Spirit," drawing a contrast between Jesus and the person who baptizes with water and not with the Spirit. In verses 26 and 27 the same contrast is drawn : "John answered them, saying, I baptize with water : in the midst of you standeth one whom ye know not, even he that cometh after me, the latchet of whose shoe I am not worthy to unloose." But it is striking to find appended to *these* words the geographical allusion, "These things were done in Bethany beyond Jordan, where John was baptizing" (ver. 28), instead of a concluding reference to Him who baptizes with the Holy Spirit, and not, like him, with water. In all the three Synoptic parallel passages, Matt. iii. 11,

Mark i. 8, Luke iii. 16 the words, with minor variations, run, "I baptize you with water; but he that cometh after me is mightier than I . . . He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and fire." Spitta is of opinion, therefore, that there is a break in the passage at verse 28, that verse 33 carries on verses 26 and 27, and that the passage, verses 28-32, has pushed into the other and is a "doublet."

But this is not all. It is possible to follow somewhat farther the relationship between these two reports. The geographical notice in verse 28 does not fit in with the preceding words of the Baptist but refers to a definite event. What is that? In verse 19 and verse 24 two embassies to the Baptist are spoken of. Verse 24 has simply *ἀπεσταλμένοι* without the article, translated in the margin of the R.V. "and certain had been sent from among the Pharisees." There is no connexion with verse 19, nor is there any connexion between verse 24 and verse 23.

Those sent from among the Pharisees in verse 24 bring a question which takes its place as a "parallel" beside the question of the priests and Levites. So that, according to Spitta, we have verses 19-23 and verses 28-32 forming one connected piece, and verses 24-27 (with the exception of the editorial additions in verse 25) and verses 33-36 forming another, "parallel to each other." And since in the Prologue, which contains a curious mixture of historic and dogmatic elements, stands verse 15, a parallel to verse 30, though with notable differences, Spitta connects it with the piece or passage ending at verse 36. We have thus two passages, the first composed of verse 15, verses 24-27, and verses 33-36, which tells how John reminds his disciples of the fact that he has already told them of Jesus ("this was he of whom I said"), who, coming after him, is of higher rank than he and how he acquaints those sent from the

Pharisees of Him who walks among them unknown, and of the divine witness given of Him at the baptism. That is the first day. On the second, with the words "Behold the Lamb of God," he refers two of his disciples to Jesus, and they go after Him. The second passage embraces verses 19-23 and verses 28-32, and has also two days. On the first there is the embassy from Judaea, on the second the word about the Lamb of God. There is no reference to the disciples of John. On the first day Jesus is not present. On the second He appears and John speaks of Him as the Lamb of God, as pre-existent, and as endowed at His baptism with the Holy Spirit.

The second passage bears all the traces of a later composition, as these three points in particular prove.

(1) The dove at the baptism, which is absent in the parallel.

(2) The idea of pre-existence, which is not found in verse 15, the counterpart of verse 30.

(3) The word about bearing the sin of the world by the Lamb of God, which does not appear in verse 36.

We are now in a position, says Spitta, to begin to examine the phrase *ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* as it occurs in the Fourth Gospel. It is a mistake to make verse 29 the starting-point, as though verse 36 were but an abbreviation of verse 29. The right starting-point is verse 36 (simply, "Behold the Lamb of God"), and two questions demand an answer.

(1) Is it conceivable that the Baptist could designate Jesus as *ἀμνός* ?

(2) Is this designation in keeping with the historical connexion in which it stands ?

As to the former question, Spitta thinks that he has already given the answer. If the Baptist saw in Jesus the Messiah, he might designate Him as *ἀμνός*, but of course

only in the sense in which in Israel the Messiah was represented by the image of a masterful sheep, not, therefore, as victim, but as lord and leader of His people. What John meant by the metaphor may be gathered with certainty from the expressions of those who were induced to follow Jesus by their master's word, "Behold the Lamb of God." "We have found the Messiah," says Andrew to Peter (ver. 41). Corresponding with that is the word of Philip to Nathanael, "We have found him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write" (ver. 45), and also the word of Nathanael to Jesus, "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art King of Israel." Considering all this, we must admit that the Lamb as lord and leader alone agrees with the context, that on the other hand the Lamb as victim has not the slightest connexion with it at all.

But now there are those who think that the conception of the suffering lamb is one that is characteristic of the Fourth Gospel, and stands not only at the beginning, but also at the end, inasmuch as xix. 36 contains a reference to the body of Jesus preserved from the hands of the destroyer: "These things came to pass, that the scripture might be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not be broken." This passage is found in Exodus xii. 46, where it refers to the paschal lamb, "neither shall ye break a bone thereof." But from another side Psalm xxxiv. 20 may be compared, as Thayer also points out, where the reference is to the righteous man. "He keepeth all his bones; not one of them is broken." Spitta thinks that the Christian community must have seen in the righteous man, suffering much yet kept and cared for by the Lord so that not a bone of him is broken, a more direct anticipation of Christ than in the paschal lamb. Besides, in the Fourth Gospel the Last Supper does not appear as the paschal meal. To date the Last Supper on 13th Nisan and to give as the reason of

this that the death of Jesus coincides with the slaying of the paschal lambs and so bears out the doctrine of "Christ our Passover" (1 Cor. v. 7), this, in Spitta's opinion, is without critical weight. Everything seems to show that xix. 36 agrees far more with what is related of the experience of the righteous man than with what is laid down as to the correct liturgical way of dealing with the paschal lamb; and if this be so, then the whole idea that the Gospel of John is controlled by the conception of the lamb of sacrifice falls to the ground.

But even if it were possible to relate xix. 36 to the paschal lamb and regard the Johannine chronology of the day of Jesus' death as determined by this thought, still the passage i. 29 would not tally with it. For the paschal lamb was in no case a propitiation taking away the sin of the world. One would have to think rather of Isaiah liii., where in verse 7 the servant of Jahwe, in virtue of his dumb and patient suffering, is compared to a sheep, and in verse 12 it is said of him "he bare the sins of many." But in Spitta's opinion the thought of Isaiah liii. has nothing to do with the narrative of Jesus' appearance in John i. and with the words of the Baptist and his disciples concerning Him. In verse 29 the purely Jewish conception of the strong sheep as the symbol of Messiah, King and Deliverer of Israel, has become transformed into the Christian conception of the pure lamb of sacrifice as the symbol of the suffering Christ, the Saviour of the Gentiles and Israel. The Baptist's "Behold the Lamb of God" in verse 36 knows nothing of the thought of the forgiveness of sins.

There is still the Old Testament, and Spitta now proceeds to ask if there is anything in the Old Testament which helps to explain or elucidate the phrase "Lamb of God." Ingeniously he points to a passage which, as he says, has left its mark on mediaeval poetry and on the Catholic Church

even in the present, Isaiah xvi. i, which reads in the Vulgate as follows, "Send forth, O Lord, the lamb, the ruler of the earth, from Petra of the desert to the mount of the daughter of Zion." Here God is entreated to send forth a lamb who is the ruler of the earth to the mount of the daughter of Zion. This lamb sent forth by God could without hesitation be designated ὁ ἄμνος τοῦ θεοῦ. Only the question is, has Isaiah xvi. 1 become not merely for mediaeval hymns and the later Church, but also for Messianic thought in the time of Jesus, the basis of the conception of the Lamb of God? Spitta thinks that this question leads to a problem—the Messianic import of Isaiah xvi. 1, which has not been seriously faced, and in the discussion of which he admits he is open to correction. In Isaiah xv. 9 we read, "I will bring a lion upon him that escapeth of Moab," where the lion, according to Delitzsch, is the lion out of Judah (Gen. xlix. 9), the Messiah. The Targum agrees, and so does the conclusion of the passage Isaiah xvi. 5, as Delitzsch says, in which the thing there described is the lion out of Judah, the menace of Moab. Now Isaiah xvi. 1 is to be estimated accordingly; it is a Messianic passage. The proximity of lion and lamb recalls the passage in Revelation v. 5-6, where there is the same proximity of lion and lamb. Revelation xiv. 1, "And I saw, and behold, a lamb standing on Mount Zion" is equally in touch with the thought of the lamb sent to the mount of the daughter of Zion. Even more important for the determination of our passage is the application made of Isaiah xvi. 1 in Luke xiii. 34-35 (Matt. xxiii. 37-39); Justin, *Dial. c. Tryph.*, 114; Barn. xi. 2 f. The word ἀφίεται, "is left desolate," has nothing to do with the destruction of the city by the Romans; it means, desolate is the place where the Messiah, the Deliverer of Israel, does not abide and work. In Jesus' lips the word can only signify that He now abandons Jerusalem, and therefore leaves it



desolate until He comes again ; it must have been uttered in a situation like that of John x. 22-39, where Jesus departs from Jerusalem and first appears again at the feast where He dies ; “ Until ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.” Isaiah xvi. 1, therefore, Spitta thinks, is understood in a Messianic sense by Jesus Himself. The position is well established that in Jewish literature the sheep became the symbol of the Messiah, the champion and defender of His people in face of the enemy. It is the lamb (אֶזְרָא) which God will send at the end of the days, when the might of the enemy will be crushed and the throne of a ruler planted upon Zion, one ruling by right and with righteousness.

If, then, *ἀμνός τοῦ θεοῦ* may be said to be connected with Isaiah xvi. 1, the question arises, what led John to refer to Jesus in this way ? To answer this question Spitta again sets out upon an ingenious line of criticism.

At the Baptist's word, i. 36, “ Behold the lamb of God,” two of his disciples go after Jesus and ask Him, “ Rabbi where abidest thou ? ” One of the two is not named, the other is Andrew, the brother of Peter, of whom it is recorded in verse 41, “ he findeth first is own brother Simon.” If *πρῶτος* be the reading, it means that of the two who followed Jesus, Andrew was the first to find his brother and bring him to Jesus, while the unnamed later found his brother, who could be no other than James the son of Zebedee. John is the unnamed disciple, although of that it is admitted there is no proof. If, on the other hand, *πρῶτον* be the reading, it refers to the finding of Simon as the first of a series of events which are repeated in regard to other persons. Thus in verse 43 Spitta follows Delff in thinking that Andrew is the subject of *εὕρισκει*, “ Andrew findeth Philip.” The idea that Jesus found Philip instead of his own countryman Andrew finding him, agrees neither with

what is told of Andrew in verse 41 nor with what in verse 45 is told of Philip. The chain in which one disciple reaches out the hand to the other in order to lead him to Jesus is broken in the middle. One may consider this also, that as Andrew in verse 41 says to Simon, "We have found the Messiah," so Philip says to Nathanael in verse 45, "We have found him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write." How does the latter agree if Andrew has not come with Philip to Jesus but Jesus has found Philip? If, then, we must understand "Andrew findeth Philip," we must suppose that the words "He was minded to go forth into Galilee and" are a later insertion. Only when they are removed is the connexion clear.

But the question is, why were they inserted? The answer can be none other than this, that they are required to prepare the way for the introduction of the narrative of the marriage at Cana in Galilee. Spitta works hard to show that this narrative originally stood in another connexion, which he thinks is proved for one thing by the time references "the third day." There are other points over which one cannot linger by which Spitta labours to show that the Cana incident falls out of connexion with John i. Like much else in what cannot but be described as a most ingenious bit of criticism, his points and proofs are not always convincing. But they all lead up to the position that in the original of the Fourth Gospel Jesus did not leave the Baptist in order to make a hurried journey to the marriage at Cana, and then after a few days go again to Jerusalem to the Passover; but from *John in the wilderness Jesus betook Himself straight to Jerusalem*. When, then, the Baptist called after Jesus, who had lingered in his company a while (i. 14-16), and now undertook the journey to Jerusalem, "Behold the Lamb of God," it is scarcely possible to mistake the connexion with Isaiah xvi. 1, where a lamb is

spoken of who is sent from the rock of the wilderness to the mountain of the daughter of Zion. It is in keeping with this that the Baptist, after Isaiah xl. 3, spoke of himself as the voice of one crying in the wilderness. What more natural to the Baptist than to apply this Messianic passage, Isaiah xvi. 1, to Jesus, regarded as the Messiah, who turned His face from the wilderness to Jerusalem? If this be so, then the last question as to the *ἀμνός τοῦ θεοῦ* in John is answered and proof is brought that the use of the title in that situation at the beginning of the public life of Jesus is not only in no way unhistorical or premature, but is in its historically rightful place.

JAMES ROBERTSON-CAMERON.

*(To be concluded.)*

A PLAY ON WORDS IN THE LOGIA HITHERTO  
UNNOTICED.

A NOTE ON ST. MATT. XXIII. 29-31=ST. LUKE XI. 47-48.

So far as the writer can learn, it has never been noticed that the point of one of the sayings of our Lord lies in a play upon the similar sound of two words. This is an oratorical expedient which is by no means rarely used in Hebrew prophecy, which easily escapes the notice of one who is not at home in the language of the orator, and which can scarcely ever, even if noticed, be retained in a translation into another language. It is, therefore, not surprising that the two evangelists St. Matthew and St. Luke have not retained it in this instance, and that it was not to be recognised in the Greek Logia upon which our First and Third Gospels depend.

The saying in question occurs in the discourse against the Pharisees (St. Matt. xxiii. 29-31=St. Luke xi. 47-48). Woe is denounced against the hearers because they build the sepulchres of the prophets. In neither Gospel is the ground of the reproach clearly given. As we read and apply the passage we understand that the fault denounced lies in the paying outward formal reverence to the prophets of old while the spirit of their teaching is neglected. This, no doubt, was the inward intention of our Lord as He spoke, but in neither of the Gospels is it plainly expressed. Rather from the study of the two parallel passages, and more especially from St. Luke, we receive the impression that the act of building in itself, not the building *of the sepulchres* (*αὐτῶν τὰ μνημεῖα* does not occur in the true text of St. Luke xi. 48) is denounced as testifying against the builders ; as St. Luke renders the saying : *Woe unto you ! for ye build the tombs of the prophets and your fathers killed them. So*

that ye are witnesses and consent unto the works of your fathers: for they killed them and ye build. Here it is quite obvious that in "ye build" lies the whole sting of the saying, that it is "the building" which makes them witnesses; yet it is by no means clear how this is so. The common recondite interpretation, referred to later, which no doubt lies behind St. Luke's rendering, cannot be that of the original saying. In a public rebuke of this kind the speaker's point, if it is to have effect, must be clear and incisive.

When, however, we turn the last words of the saying (in St. Luke's form) into Aramaic—the language in which it was spoken by our Lord—we find that *οἰκοδομεῖτε* is represented by the words אַתּוֹן בְּנֵין אַתּוֹן, which so written may be indifferently rendered in English "building (are) ye" or "sons (are) ye,"<sup>1</sup> and even in the spoken language might be intentionally so pronounced as to render the meaning ambiguous.<sup>2</sup> If now we turn to St. Matthew we notice that those whom our Lord is denouncing are said to testify against themselves, "that they are the sons of those who slew the prophets." We at once conclude that there is a play here upon the likeness in sound of the two phrases "sons (are) ye" and "building ye."

I therefore suggest that herein lies the whole point of this "woe." Our Lord with bitter sarcasm deduces from the sound of the word, which described the action of his hearers

<sup>1</sup> The two representatives of the old Syriac version afford an interesting example of this ambiguity in their rendering of St. Luke xi. 48. Syr.<sup>Sic.</sup> reads אַתּוֹן בְּנֵין אַתּוֹן, while Syr.<sup>Cur.</sup> transforms this into אַתּוֹן בְּנֵין אַתּוֹן [and ye the sons (are) ye of those murderers].

<sup>2</sup> "Building are ye" would be pronounced *attun bānain attun* (the *a* in *banain* would have much the same sound as *a* in "all"). For the exact Galilaean pronunciation of בְּנֵין "sons" we are left to conjecture. However, from the word *βοανηργῆς* we may suppose with Dalman (*Die Worte Jesu*, p. 39) that something of an *o* sound was heard in the first vowel; "their sons" would be pronounced *b<sup>e</sup>nēhon*, or perhaps *b<sup>e</sup>nēon* in Galilee, so that the word for "building" might easily be made to suggest "sons" or "their sons."

(their building), the reproach that they were “sons,” sons of the murderers, where the word “son” carried with it all that connotation of community of character and of guilt which it would naturally suggest to the Hebrew mind.

I would, therefore, reconstruct the body of the original saying somewhat as follows :—

“Well do ye bear witness against yourselves that ye are the sons of those who killed the prophets, for they killed them and ye build [וְאַתֶּם בְּנֵי אֲבוֹתֵיכֶם], with a play upon וְאַתֶּם בְּנֵי אֲבוֹתֵיכֶם (vel their sons) ye.” By an intentionally indistinct pronounciation of the last words the point would be driven home in what, to a Hebrew, would have been a most forcible and telling way.

Assuming the truth of this simple explanation of the original saying, it is interesting to note the changes which it undergoes under the hands of the two evangelists.

Taking, in the first place, the text of St. Luke, we perceive that here also *οἰκοδομεῖτε* is the crucial word. One is tempted to suppose that St. Luke had some knowledge of the Aramaic original of the Greek logion which lay before him ; at all events after some reflection we find that he has seized the deeper intention of the saying and has recast its phraseology so as to express the essential thought in a form more suitable to an Hellenic mind. “Ye witness to yourselves that ye are sons of them that slew the prophets” becomes “ye are witnesses and consent unto the works of your fathers,” i.e. the thought of the original is simply expressed in other words ; *οἰκοδομεῖτε* is given something of the significance which it often bears in the Pauline writings, “ye build up, confirm, what they have done” ; the erection of the sepulchre is not a sign of reverence for the prophets, but a monument to their murder and a witness to a character, the natural offspring of the murderers, which spiritually confirms and ratifies the deeds of the fathers.

The builders, in fact, are the *μάρτυρες* of the murder (cf. Acts vii. 58). Though the thought is recondite, we must confess that the problem of rendering the point of the saying in Greek has been solved by St. Luke very skilfully; he has turned what was in Aramaic a play upon sound into a play upon the sense (usual and metaphorical) of the Greek word *οἰκοδομεῖτε*.

The treatment of the saying in St. Matthew is of an entirely different character. The deeper significance of the saying is not seized and the attention of the evangelist is concentrated upon its central clause—"ye witness to yourselves that ye are sons of them that slew the prophets." The rest of the saying is remodelled so as to explain wherein this witness consists. Those whom our Lord addresses are made to speak of those who killed the prophets as their fathers—"if we had lived in the days of our fathers, etc."—thus testifying out of their own mouths that they are the children of the murderers. The building of the sepulchres, the exciting cause of our Lord's denunciation, falls into the background and stands out of vital connexion with the development of the thought of the saying; the stress is laid upon words which the builders use, these it is that call down our Lord's sarcastic comment as He seizes upon the word "fathers." It is strange that Harnack,<sup>1</sup> while noticing that St. Matthew has amplified the saying, should nevertheless have adopted this version, with its somewhat superficial repartee, as the original version. Surely if so obvious an explanation of the clause concerning the witness had lain before St. Luke he would not have given us so difficult a text of the saying as that which we find in his Gospel.

However, although our reconstruction of the original saying is different from that of Harnack, it will be noticed that the general results of his criticism of the characteristics

<sup>1</sup> *Sayings of Jesus*, pp. 97 ff., 138 f.

of the two editors of the Logia hold good also in this instance. Here, also, the first evangelist, while bent upon superficial accuracy in reproducing the text, does not shrink from rather serious interpolation and modification of the sense ; here also St. Luke, while prone to verbal alteration and paraphrase, gives on the whole an excellent representation of the actual meaning of our Lord's words. Harnack has failed to discover the suggested original of this particular saying simply because he does not allow the fact that our Lord spoke in Aramaic to influence his reconstruction of the Greek original used by the evangelists. Fortunately the cases in which this omission would seriously affect the value of his work must be very few in number.

J. R. WILKINSON.



## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PATRIARCHS IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION.

My conviction is that we have the right even now to say that the patriarchs belong to historic reality. I will not explain that sentence here, as I think I have done so sufficiently in my *History of the Kingdom of God*.<sup>1</sup> I will say only this much : The historical ground on which the patriarchs are among the principal figures is not a complete and uniform crystal, but it is a mountain-ridge in which we shall find many old deposits which form a permanent foundation of the earliest part of Israel's historical memories. Therefore I think I may with a clear conscience raise the question as to the significance of the patriarchs in the history of religion. It is impossible, however, to appreciate the historical importance of a personality unless we can fix his position from a backward as well as from a forward point of view.

1. Let us, therefore, first try to settle whether and how the patriarchs stand out from their age and surroundings in the religious-historical aspect.

The old Hebrew historical writings inform us in all their strata, that it was from a religious motive that Abraham separated himself from his ancestors and kindred.

We have the fact clearly stated in these words : " Your fathers dwelt on the other side of the flood in old time (i.e. of the most important river in Hither Asia, the Euphrates), even Terah, the father of Abraham and the father of Nachor, and they served other gods. And I (the divine Being, Jahve) took your father Abraham from the other side of the

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte des Reiches Gottes* (1908), p. 18 f., p. 46 f.

flood and led him throughout all the land, etc.” Therefore, it was from a religious motive that the first patriarch separated even from his nearest relatives. This we are told in Joshua xxiv. 2, etc., a portion of the so-called Elohist stratum of the Pentateuch which from various indications of language and contents,<sup>1</sup> seems to me and to a number of other scholars to be the oldest. With this original testimony there corresponds the well-known passage from the Jehovistic source of the Pentateuch, according to which the call to Abraham ran as follows : “ Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I (the everlasting divine Being) will show thee ” (Gen. xii. 1-3).

The clear evidence of the entire ancient Hebrew literature is in fullest harmony with those oldest express utterances on the position of Abraham in religious history. With what silent eloquence does the testimony of historic facts link itself on in the same connexion ! For if there is any one thing that is firmly established in the history of Israel, it is the fact that the religious separation from other peoples, which is the chief factor in Israel’s peculiar importance in the history of human civilisation, dates from the *pre-Mosaic* age. For Moses (again according to the testimony of the earliest and indeed of all sources) approached his fellow-countrymen with the clearly-expressed declaration that he was the messenger of the God of their FATHERS (Exod. iii. 13 ; vi. 2, etc.). Consequently the national memory of Israel was aware of a connexion between the Mosaic and the patriarchal religious stages, and even such a decided representative of modern criticism as the Strassburg scholar, Charles Piepenbring, has with full justice defended the importance of this historical recollection of Israel in these emphatic words : “ All these traditions (i.e., on the con-

<sup>1</sup> Compare my *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, pp. 203-205.

nexion of the Mosaic religious stage with that of the patriarchs) cannot be mere air-woven inventions.”<sup>1</sup>

According to the direct and indirect evidence of the historical sources, Abraham's importance for the history of religion consists, therefore, primarily in this fact, that within the Semitic branch of the human race to which he belonged he struck out a new and different religious direction. Is it possible to define with greater completeness what this direction was ?

Let us try to do so first on *negative* lines. What a noteworthy fact it is that in all the original records about Abraham there is no mention of any objective image of God ! In an age and environment in which the embodying to the senses of the divine idea by plastic imitations of various kinds of super-earthly or earthly phenomena formed a fundamental characteristic of religious life, a man is brought before us in the original sources who did *not* represent the Godhead to himself in a concrete object. But were not the patriarchs fetish-worshippers ? That fact is maintained in several modern accounts of the history of Israel and the writers think they find proof of the assertion in the statement that when Jacob awoke from his dream about the heavenly ladder he poured oil upon the stone on which his head had lain (Gen. xxviii. 17, etc.). But did Jacob, according to this narrative, “regard the stone as a fetish,” as a dwelling of God from which he believed that his dream had come ? Certainly not. The contrary fact is made clear even in that cry of Jacob, “How dreadful is this place !” He did not cry : “How dreadful is this stone !” and in the whole account we do not find that sentence which even some of the most recent authors<sup>2</sup> have quoted from it, that the stone

<sup>1</sup> Ch. Piepenbring, *Histoire du peuple d'Israel* (1898), p. 47. “Toutes ces traditions ne peuvent pas être tirées de l'air.”

<sup>2</sup> Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 155; and S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religions, etc.* (1903), p. 93.

was for Jacob a house of God. On the contrary, the passage reads : " And this stone shall become, or be, a house of God." If Jacob had regarded the stone as a dwelling-place of God, as a fetish, the passage (Gen. xxviii. 22) which actually has a place in the original record, would be absurd.

But [it may be answered] Jacob did " pour oil upon the stone." Well, that may have been, in the first place, an act of consecration. This symbolic act was often performed on objects and on persons, and it would correspond to the intention of Jacob to make that stone the foundation stone of a house of God. But this pouring out of oil may also have been a sacrifice. That stone, viewed in this sense, may have served the purpose of one of those primitive rock-altars which are occasionally mentioned (see Judges xiii. 19, etc.), and in the parallel narrative (Gen. xxxv. 14) the pouring of oil is actually understood in this sense.

But what of this fact ? We are actually to assume from xxviii. 17 f. that Jacob was a fetish-worshipper, and yet in chap. xxxv. 1-5 we read that when he returned from Mesopotamia he caused the images and amulets which some of his family had brought home from the country to be delivered up to him and buried. Both passages (xxviii. 17, and xxxv. 1-5) belong, moreover, to the same stratum of the Pentateuch.

How could the same narrator have represented the third patriarch as a fetish-worshipper and at the same time have informed us that he caused the images to be buried ? We see then that the religion of the patriarchs, according to the sources, had already risen above the use of images of God.

In characterising, from the *negative* side, the position of the patriarchs in the history of religion, we must make this further remark, that they had been led to hold human sacrifices in abhorrence. Abraham, at the time of his immigration into Canaan, may well have been almost compelled at first to regard child-sacrifice as an act of the deepest devotion

to God. For among the discoveries which have been made during the most recent excavations in Palestine the gruesome discovery of children's skeletons has been one of the most extensive. This observation was made by Professor Ernst Sellin during his excavations at Ta'anek in the plain of Jezreel,<sup>1</sup> but much more distinctly by the English searcher, Macalister, during the excavation at Gezer (south-east of Jâfa).<sup>2</sup> But in this situation, where he was so tempted, the knowledge was made possible for the patriarch that his God did not desire to be worshipped by the actual sacrifice of children, but that for *this* God it was sufficient that man should carry within his soul the highest sacrificial capacity of disposition. Rightly, therefore, has this rejection of human sacrifice been described by several scholars of our own day as a cardinal principle, from the negative side, in the religion of Abraham.<sup>3</sup>

Looked at from the *negative* standpoint, the position of the patriarchs in religious history is characterised, we see, by its elevation above the practice of making images of the divine—how much more above fetish worship—and by its rejection of child sacrifices.

Let us next ask what was, from the *positive* side, the nature of the patriarchal religion. The entire historic consciousness of Israel answers this question as follows:—

The religion of Abraham in its fundamental character was a new positive connexion with God, entered into by the first patriarch, which was to result finally in blessing to the whole human race. So we read in the cardinal words of the Jehovistic passage: "Go out of thy country," etc., "and

<sup>1</sup> E. Sellin, *Denkschriften der Wiener Akademie, philosophisch-historische Klasse*, Band iv., Heft iv. (1904), p. 96 f.

<sup>2</sup> H. Vincent, *Canaan d'après l'exploration récente* (1907), p. 188 f., 191, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Ad. Kamphausen, *das Menschenopfer* (1896), p. 26 ff.; O Procksch, *das nordhebräische Sagenbuch* (1906), p. 342.

in thy seed shall all families of the earth be blessed " (Gen. xii. 1-3). The same meaning is derived from the Elohist passages in which Abraham is called a prophet (Gen. xx. 7) and in which, as already mentioned, he was called upon to leave his ancestors as worshippers of *other gods*, and to emigrate to Canaan (Josh. xxiv. 2 f.)

If we seek to collect secondary characteristics in addition to this fundamental positive characteristic of the patriarchal religion, we find the following : in the conception of God the quality of power stands in the foreground. The sources of the Pentateuch agree on this point. For as the divine sphere opened itself for Abraham with the expression, " I am the Almighty God," etc. (Gen. xvii. 1) so we find that in a very striking way Isaac's conception of the divine Being is in two passages (and nowhere else in the Old Testament) referred to as an " object of fear " (*páchad Jišchāq*, Gen. xxxi. 42, 53).

Further, we learn from all the sources that the first patriarch was conscious of a principle of morality which was religiously directed. For according to the Elohist source Abraham cherished this thought in his mind with regard to an unknown town that the life of a stranger might be held of small account because the fear of God was not in the place. (Gen. xx. 11, " And Abraham said, Because I thought, Surely the fear of God is not in this place, and they will slay me for my wife's sake.") We see how the same relationship between religion and morality is expressed here as in the words of the esoteric-priestly stratum of the Pentateuch, " I am the Almighty God ; walk before me, and be thou perfect " (Gen. xvii. 1).

According to the oldest sources there was this further characteristic in the religious consciousness of the patriarchs that the connexion with God which was established in Abraham was to result in the far future in blessing to the

whole human race (Gen. xii. 3, etc. The words occur five times in Genesis). Finally, we note that in the actions of the man who has entered into a covenant with God, faith and hope, on this patriarchal stage, are conspicuously more prominent than obedience. "Abraham believed God, and He counted it to him for righteousness." The patriarch Jacob cried to the being with whom he had to wrestle in the lonely night at Jabbok, "I will not let thee go, except thou bless me." From the heart of the aged Jacob, too, there was breathed that sigh of prayer: "I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord." But we see most distinctly from the two points last mentioned that the individual views, principles and efforts which meet us in the whole field of patriarchal religion, are merely outstreamings from its central sphere of light; I mean the new and peculiar connexion between God and the first patriarch which was to result finally in blessing to the whole of humanity. This religion of redemption, and with it the founding of the Kingdom of God, is the sun in the religious consciousness of the patriarchs, while the other characteristics—negative and positive—which have been gathered from the original narratives, resemble the reflexions, partly of shadow and partly of light, cast by the satellites of this newly-rising sun.

What *rank*, we may next ask, does the stage of patriarchal religion occupy in the spiritual history of mankind? If we restrict ourselves to the consideration of that principle which may be compared to the sun in the existence of patriarchal religion, no one can deny that the patriarchs hold a very important position in religious history. Who will dispute this fact, if he has once realised how idol-worship and child-sacrifice fled away as dark shadows before the light of the new and unique consciousness of God, and how that light caused the blazing forth both of the principle of a higher, religiously directed, morality, and also the prospect of a

brotherly union of the human race as a religious community? But the final estimate of this importance depends on the answer given to the question as to the *original source-point* of the position of the patriarchs in religious history. If it is permissible to summarise in a single sentence the two answers to this question which have prevailed in recent times in most scientific publications, the matter stands as follows: some derive the peculiar religious position of the patriarchs from the so-called "Bedouin ideal," and others from the contact of Abraham with the Babylonian and Canaanite religions. Let us examine these two attempts at derivation, which are now prevalent.

Some, as we have said, think they can unveil the secret of Abraham's peculiar religious position by directing our attention to the Bedouin-like circumstances of his life. This is the root-idea of the so-called Wellhausen school, as it is represented to-day, for example, by the English scholar Ottley in his book *The Religion of Israel* (1905). He draws out this widely accepted explanation as follows:—

Abraham was "the pastoral chief whose life of wandering in the desert has imbued him with a sense of the irresistible power which lies behind the rugged and stern phenomena of nature around which his lot is cast. In a spirit of awe, of receptivity, of submission to the leadings of his God, he passes from land to land, dwelling in tents, rearing his altar for sacrifice beneath the open sky, shunning the tumult of cities, and sojourning in the broad and silent spaces of the wilderness. This tendency to withdraw from the centres of civilisation and to prefer a life of primitive simplicity is illustrated by the narrative of the call of Abraham"<sup>1</sup> But if it were allowable for us to content ourselves with causes and motives of such a general influence, many originators of a special religion must have arisen among the Semitic shepherds.

<sup>1</sup> Ottley, *The Religion of Israel* (1905), p. 23.



In order that we may judge fairly in this matter, let us try to realise for one moment the picture which Ottley and other adherents of the same school have drawn with regard to the origin of the separate religious position of Abraham. A desert landscape, like others which then existed and still exist, forms the background. A Semitic shepherd, like thousands of others of his class, stands in the foreground; and yet we are to suppose that just this one particular Semitic shepherd appeared as the beginner of a new period of religious history.

Surely we must admit that the causes do not correspond to the effect produced by them! Moreover, the statements about a holding aloof from towns and centres of civilisation do not apply to Abraham. Did not Abraham establish himself at Sicheu and Hebron and near the Philistine capital Gerar, etc.? Was not this the utmost that he could do in the way of approaching towns? Was it possible for him to make his dwelling within these towns? Then again, he accepted the gifts of Pharaoh, and we remember those rich bridal presents which he gave to the messenger he sent out to arrange the marriage with Rebecca. We note also that twice in the life of the patriarchs there is a mention of agriculture,<sup>1</sup> the sign of a settled position.

Generally speaking, it may be said that we completely misunderstand the religion of the Old Testament if we suppose that it demanded a renunciation of property or of the enjoyment of the blessings of nature and the gifts of civilisation. No prophet of the Old Testament religion represented the so-called "Bedouin ideal." It is by an entire mistake that this ideal has been attributed so often in recent literature to the father of the patriarchal religion and the religion of Israel as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Genesis xxvi. 12, and xxxvii. 7.

<sup>2</sup> This point has been elucidated in my "History of the Kingdom of God," pp. 71, 137 and 215, with the entire material relating to this matter which can be found in the sources.

We next ask, What foundation is there for the *second* main theory that has recently been suggested for the derivation of the Abrahamic religion? Was it drawn from Babylonia or from Canaan? In examining this theory we shall not attempt to cover the whole ground, but shall keep in view only the latest publications. In its newest form, this derivation of the Abrahamic religion from a Babylonian origin may be set out as follows: Writers have fallen back on the idea that in Babylonia there were at least "Monotheistic tendencies."<sup>1</sup> But in whom did these monotheistic tendencies show themselves? A ruler like Hammurabi, who was certainly one of the most enlightened intellects of his nation, names four gods in the first three lines of the inscription of his Code.<sup>2</sup> Berossos, a Chaldean priest of *circa* 270 B.C., makes no mention in his Babylonian history of monotheism as forming part of the progressive development of his people. In the Babylonian-Assyrian texts we find only that phenomenon of religious history which we call Henotheism, and which has been observed also in India and Egypt. For the Babylonian or Assyrian worshipper it happened that in one or other situation some figure from his people's Pantheon of divinities advanced into the foreground of interest. For example, a long prayer was offered to the goddess Ishtar, a personification of Venus, but at the close the praying man returns to the standpoint of polytheism. For he says: "May the gods of the universe do thee homage!"<sup>3</sup>

But in recent writings an even stronger emphasis has been laid on the theory that monotheism has been discovered

<sup>1</sup> A. Jeremias in his work, *Monotheistische Strömungen innerhalb der babylonischen Religion* (1904).

<sup>2</sup> The first lines of the Code of Hammurabi read: "When the lofty Anu, king of the Anunnaki, and Bel, lord of heaven and earth, he who determines the destiny of the land, committed the rule of mankind to Marduk, the chief son of Ea, etc."

<sup>3</sup> H. Zimmern, *Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete in Auswahl* (1905), p. 16.

among the ancient *Canaanites*.<sup>1</sup> Every one will naturally recall in this connexion the name of Melchisedek, king of Salem, and priest of the most high God [in a better rendering, “of the highly throned God”]. But among the excavations at Ta’anek a cuneiform letter has been discovered in which mention is made of “bêl ilânu,” the “lord of gods.” This, however, is only a sharpening off of Polytheism to form a monarchic summit such as we find, for instance, in the Greek elevation of Zeus, which did not—we may remark in passing—lead on to monotheism.

We see then that even if monotheism were the most characteristic feature of the Abrahamic religion, it could not have been derived from the religion of Babylonia or Canaan. But the monotheistic faith was not the essential feature of the religion of the patriarchs. The chief factor of the Abrahamic religion lies rather in a new positive connexion between God and man, and this could not have been borrowed from the Babylonian or Canaanite beliefs.

What then was the original source-point of this consciousness of a new positive connexion with God, which forms the essential factor of the Abrahamic religion? The famous Sanserit scholar, Max Müller, says that Abraham followed the same inner voice that speaks to us all.<sup>2</sup> But if we derive the special religious consciousness of the prophetic minds of Israel from the general character and experience of humanity, we land ourselves in a complete inner contradiction. The essential fact in the history of civilisation, of which it is impossible for us to rid ourselves, is that Abraham’s religious position is the foundation stone of the special position which Israel holds in the history of intellectual development. Through it this nation became the religious people of the ancient world, as the Göttingen theologian Hermann

<sup>1</sup> See B. Baentsch, *Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus* (1906), p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Max Müller, *Essays on Religion*, vol. i., p. 353.

Schultz has recently remarked with perfect accuracy. This specific peculiarity of the religious history of Israel cannot be explained by referring to the customary factors of the intellectual history of mankind, as Wellhausen himself has twice expressly admitted.<sup>1</sup>

We are therefore forced to the conclusion that the ultimate source-point of the prophetic religion of Israel which began with Abraham is to be sought in a special experience of the prophets of that people. And is this impossible? Has it been settled that Hamlet was wrong when he said:

“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy”?

In our own century we are less disposed than ever to deny the truth of his words. Our age has discovered in radium an element whose nature and influence have thrown doubt on natural laws which were previously accepted. For radium is warmer than its environment, a characteristic which had hitherto been known to exist only in living beings; and radium sends out rays without losing anything, as far as the observer can see, of its effective capacity. In no previous age has that saying of Hamlet seemed less impossible than in ours. The significance of the patriarchs in religious history is, therefore, a very high one, on account of the extraordinary origin of the patriarchal religion, which history and logic demand, and which, in the present state of human knowledge, cannot be disproved.

2. There is, further, a mutual correspondence between the height on which a phenomenon originates and the elevation of its influence on later times. To the same height from which the head waters descend, the fertilizing influence of their rippling streams ascends. We recognise this partly as we examine the objective course of history, and partly

<sup>1</sup> Wellhausen, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*, 4th edition, 1901, p. 36. ‘We can form no final conclusion as to why Israelitish history, which had an approximately similar origin to that of Moab, should have led to an entirely different result.’

as we watch the human subjects even under the patriarchal religion. Let us pause a moment to consider the thought in these two directions.

(a) If we regard the influence of the Abrahamic religion in the light of the objective course of history this fact becomes clear: The Abrahamic religion, which cannot be wholly explained as having had its origin in finite causes, had also an infinite bearing upon the future.

The beginning in the patriarchal age was followed by the continuation in the Mosaic epoch, the great uprising of the national and religious spirit in the time of Samuel, the partly reforming, partly progressive activity of the prophets from Elijah onwards, etc., and finally by the perfecting of this religion through Christ. This later history of the Abrahamic religion would have been amazing even if it stood in the same relation to the earlier as the stem, the buds and the ripening of the fruit, bear to the seed germ. For what a mighty, impulsive force there must then have been in this seed which manifested itself in such powerful and majestic forms during its later development.

But the real facts are different. One circumstance which has not yet been fully noted and appreciated is that none of the spiritual leaders of Israel derives his message from any predecessor. They all appeal directly to the same divine origin of their mission. The true prophets of Israel do not form a chain whose links are bound together. They are like rays which issue from the same central sun. This is most of all true, I might say, if I dared to make distinctions in degree, in the case of Jesus Christ. For the Messianic image which He represented in word, act and suffering does not correspond in any mechanical way with the outward content of separate prophecies, but is rather an organic development of these, their spiritual realisation, as I think I have proved sufficiently in my *History of the Kingdom of God*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte des Reiches Gottes bis auf Jesus Christus* (1908), § 45.

The unfolding of the patriarchal religion cannot, therefore, be represented as the development of the root impulse of that religion. That development is shown by the original records to have been something different. It is a *continuous* proof of the connexion of the patriarchal religion with a higher world, which carried on that earliest point, fixed by the call of Abraham, to the starry line of a history of redemption, and which reached its final halting-place in Jesus Christ.

(b) Let us ask in conclusion what place the patriarchal religion holds for posterity when we view it in the mirror of the human subjects.

The patriarchal religion was regarded by later generations with admiration and gratitude. The name of Abraham, to begin with, acquired a great celebrity, as was promised in that old prediction of Genesis xii. 2. He has maintained through history that title of honour, "the friend of God."<sup>1</sup> Mohammedans vie with Jews and Christians in praising him. They also call him Chalîlu-allâhi, i.e. the beloved of God.<sup>2</sup> For the people of Israel Abraham was the rock out of whom the nation was hewn like some plastic image; to him, as the fundamental origin, it owed its national and religious existence (Isaiah li. 1 f.). In the diverse ranks of the Old Testament heroes of faith, Abraham, according to the early Christian records, leads the way as standard-bearer, for he "in hope believed against hope" (Rom. iv. 18). With what admiration and gratitude later generations of Christians have looked back to the patriarchs! They could not sufficiently admire the joyful courage with which Abraham obeyed a divine call to become in a far distant region the originator of a new family of the human race. They could not repeat

<sup>1</sup> 2 Chronicles xx. 7; Judith viii. 22; James ii. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Qorân, Sûre iv. 124. Therefore, Hebron even to-day is called *el-chalîl*, the town of the beloved.

too often his expression of disinterested modesty, "If thou wilt go to the left, then I will go to the right," etc., words by which Abraham set up at the same time his monument as a lover of peace. They could not grow weary of gazing at that touching scene in which he interceded even for Sodom and Gomorrah. How often have the words of Jacob, "Lord, I am not worthy of the least of all the mercies and of all the truth which thou hast showed unto thy servant,"<sup>1</sup> found a deep echo in human hearts! Who can count the occasions on which the words of Joseph, "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God,"<sup>2</sup> have strengthened a soul in its struggle with temptation?

It is indeed a sublime image of the religious significance of the patriarchs which gleams forth upon us if we consider it as reflected in the mirror of posterity.

This must, therefore, be the comprehensive judgment we are compelled to form as to the position of the patriarchs in religious history: Even the modern development of source-criticism and the widening gaze which the new discoveries have made increasingly possible for students in the field of comparative research, have not led to any misapprehension as to the broad stream of common material which lies in the various original documents of the patriarchal age. Critics have been obliged to admit the novelty, the amazing elevation, the mysteriousness (defying all ordinary attempts at explanation) of the origin of the patriarchal religion. We may therefore hope that our age also will regard it as an act of historical justice to pay to these old heroes of self-surrender, faith and hope,—these pillars of the truly ideal view of life—the tribute of reverent appreciation.

EDWARD KÖNIG.

<sup>1</sup> Genesis xxxii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Genesis xxxix. 9.

*SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.*

VIII. SIN ORIGINAL AND ACTUAL—THE DEPRAVED STATE.

THE study of heredity in the previous paper brought us into view of the question of what is known in theology as Original Sin. Is there such a thing? What has modern thought to say about it? If there are facts on which the doctrine rests, what are they, and how is it proposed to explain them?

This, it is well known, is the fundamental point in which the Augustinian and the Pelagian types of theology separate—the former affirming, the latter denying, the reality of a hereditary corruption and inborn depravity of nature.<sup>1</sup> Between the two came the mediating view known as Semi-Pelagianism, revived in many forms since, which weakened down the Augustinian (later the Calvinistic) view, and allowed to man's will a remanent spiritual freedom, and share in renewal (synergism). The Arminian controversy, the New England controversy, in which Jonathan Edwards took a notable part in defence of Original Sin, recent discussions in the Ritschlian School—Ritschl himself keenly opposing the doctrine—the new phases of the controversy as the result of the rise of the doctrine of evolution, evince the vitality and abiding importance of the problem.<sup>2</sup>

I. The question *thus lives*, but with a difference. Few will dispute in these days, however they may account for it, that there are powerful impulses in man's nature impeding and thwarting the realisation of the good. Some, indeed, take the matter quite lightly. Sir Oliver Lodge, for example, writes: "As for 'original sin' or 'birth sin' or

<sup>1</sup> For these views see the writer's *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 153 ff.

<sup>2</sup> A recent discussion in criticism of the doctrine is in Mr. F. H. Tenant's *Origin and Propagation of Sin* (Hulsean Lects.) and *Fall and Original Sin*.



other notion of that kind,—by which is partly meant the sin of his parents,—that sits absolutely lightly on him [the higher man of to-day]. As a matter of fact it is non-existent, and none but a monk could have invented it. Whatever it be, it is not a business for which we are responsible. We did not make the world; and an attempt to punish us for our animal origin and ancestry would be simply comic, if any one could be found who was willing seriously to believe it.”<sup>1</sup>

This, however, does not express the deeper temper of the time. The Rousseau theory of the inherent goodness of human nature, with the superficial eighteenth century optimism that accompanied it, is now as good as dead in serious thought. It was before shown how unsparing was the blow which Kant (certainly no monk) struck at this “heroic opinion,” which, he says, “has perhaps obtained currency only amongst philosophers, and in our times chiefly among instructors of youth,” in his doctrine of “The Radical Evil of Human Nature” in the opening of his book on Religion.<sup>2</sup> Pessimism, with all its extravagances, and works like Nordau’s and Zola’s, give lurid prominence to sides of evil in human nature, and monstrosities of vice, the disquieting spectres of which can never again be laid. Pessimism, as one has said, like Macbeth, has “murdered sleep.”<sup>3</sup> A passage from Professor Huxley—bizarre, and to be taken, where needful, *cum grano*—may be quoted as revealing his sense of the awfulness of the reality which Christianity seeks to express in the doctrines we are considering. “It is,” he

<sup>1</sup> *Man and the Universe*, p. 220. Cf. Mr. Campbell’s ch. iv. in his *New Theology*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Abbott’s translation, *Kant’s Theory of Ethics*, pp. 325 ff., 335, 339 ff. No theologian uses stronger language. “That there must be such a corrupt propensity rooted in men,” he says, “need not be formally proved in the face of the multitude of crying examples which experience sets before one’s eyes in the acts of men” (p. 339). He adduces some of the examples.

<sup>3</sup> Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 294.

says, "the secret of the superiority of the best theological teachers to the majority of their opponents that they substantially recognise these realities of things, however strange the forms in which they clothe their conceptions. The doctrines of predestination, of original sin, of the innate depravity of man and the evil fate of the greater part of the race [?], of the primacy of Satan in this world, of the essential vileness of matter [?], of a malevolent Demiurgus subordinate to a benevolent Almighty, who has only lately revealed Himself [?], faulty as they are, appear to me vastly nearer the truth than the 'liberal' popular illusions that babies are all born good, and that the example of a corrupt society is responsible for their failure to remain so; that it is given to everybody to reach the ethical ideal if he will only try; that all partial evil is universal good, and other optimistic figments, such as that which represents 'Providence' under the guise of a paternal philanthropist, and bids us believe that everything will come right (according to our notions) at last."<sup>1</sup>

By general admission, therefore there are impulses and tendencies in human nature at war with goodness. The thing which Original Sin stands for is present in the soul. But dispute arises on the borderland between religion, on the one hand, and science and philosophy, on the other, as to its turpitude, its origin and heritableness, and the degree of its evil. Are these wrong tendencies of the

<sup>1</sup> He adds: "I am a very strong believer in the punishment of certain kinds of actions, not only in the present, but in all the future a man can have, be it long or short. Therefore in hell, for I suppose that all men with a clear sense of right and wrong (and I am not sure that any others deserve such punishment) have now and then 'descended into hell' and stopped there quite long enough to know what infinite punishment means. And if a genuine, not merely subjective, immortality awaits us, I conceive that, without some such change as that depicted in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, immortality must be eternal misery" (*Life and Letters*, II. pp. 303-4).

nature of *sin*, or is sin only in act? Are they hereditary—or how far? What is the explanation of them? The answer of the reigning scientific school has already been indicated. What the Church names Original Sin is, from the standpoint of science, an inheritance of man from his brute ancestry—an inheritance which, in its ceaseless struggle upwards, the race is increasingly throwing off.<sup>1</sup> This is the watchword of human progress.

“ Arise and fly,  
The reeling Faun, the sensual feast ;  
Move upward, working out the beast,  
And let the ape and tiger die.”<sup>2</sup>

These ape and tiger tendencies, it is held, are not sinful until voluntarily yielded to; even then the sin, through the all-enveloping ignorance of the subject, is hardly reckonable. The natural tendency is inheritable; not so, on the newer (Weismann) theory, the effects of the wrong volition. Christianity regards the matter in a totally different light. It sees in the existing perverted condition of human nature, not a natural result—no mere inheritance from the animal—but the baleful effect of a wilful departure from integrity in the progenitors of the race. It brands the state as evil, condemnable, a state of impurity abhorrent to God’s holiness. It acknowledges no laws or powers in human nature capable

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Fiske, *Man’s Destiny*: “ Thus we see what human progress means. It means throwing off the brute-inheritance,—gradually throwing it off through ages of struggle that are by and by to make struggle needless. . . . The ape and the tiger in human nature will become extinct. Theology has had much to say about original sin. This original sin is neither more nor less than the brute-inheritance which every man carries with him, and the progress of evolution is an advance towards true salvation ” (p. 103).

Prof. Huxley says, *Evolution and Ethics, Prolegomena*: “ That is their inheritance (the reality at the bottom of the doctrine of original sin) from the long series of ancestors, human and semi-human and brutal, in whom the strength of this innate tendency to self-assertion was the condition of victory in the struggle for existence ” (*Works*, ix., p. 27).

<sup>2</sup> Tennyson, *In Memoriam*.

of throwing off this evil inheritance through evolution or any natural effort ; but insists on the need of a spiritual renewal through divine agency. No middle path is visible between these two conceptions. It remains to be asked—which is the true one ?

II. It is not desired to cite Scripture in this connexion save as a witness to what a *given doctrine is*, or as any literature may be quoted, in testimony to *abiding facts of human nature*. This is an aspect of the use of Scripture too frequently ignored. Passages are freely admitted from ancient pagan writers, from Scriptures of other religions, from modern literature—poetry or fiction—from religious biographies, from narratives of missionaries and travellers, illustrative of human ideas, beliefs, customs, aspirations, follies, traits of character. But how seldom are the vast stores of experience presented in the Biblical books drawn upon for any similar purpose ! Here is an extensive literature, profound beyond comparison alongside any literature of religion the world contains, picturing human nature on all its sides in its relations to God, and in its ethical workings, yet it receives almost the complete go-by when the question is the scientific study of man's nature in its moral and spiritual relations. As with people who lay aside their Sunday books as too good to be read on week-days, the Bible is relegated to the closets of theologians, and, even when the subjects discussed are the most germane to its pages, is debarred an entrance to the sanctums of scientists and philosophers. Imagine Herbert Spencer introducing the Psalmists or St. Paul into his list of authorities on the subject of moral evil !

Yet, whatever else the Bible is, it contains undeniably the *classical literature* of the world on sin and righteousness, and on the experiences of men in these matters ; its testimony, therefore, ought not to be left unheard. The question here

is not one of adducing "texts" for dogmatic purposes, but of looking at the moral state of mankind in the clearest mirror ever held up to it in time. And what is the picture presented? How does it bear on the subject now under discussion?

Painting mankind in every light and shade, the Bible does no injustice to the gifts, virtues, affections, or religious susceptibilities, even of those whom it refuses to recognise as godly.<sup>1</sup> Will it, however, be denied that, on the subject of sin, its picture, from first to last, is that of a world turned aside from God, in disposition alienated from Him and rebellious, seeking its own ways, and never, till He in grace seeks and recovers it, finding its way back to Him or to holiness? A treatise like that of Jonathan Edwards on *Original Sin* may seem harsh in some of its aspects, but there is no escaping the remorseless logic of its accumulation of the Scriptural evidence on this crucial point. The Bible teaches *the universality of sin*, and the picture it presents unmistakably bears out the charge it brings. The facts are so familiar that it is hardly necessary to dwell on them. Leave aside the story of the Fall—though that, in substance, as said before, is needed to explain what follows,—suppose, if one will, that the Priestly writer (P) "knows nothing" of this catastrophe that lay before his eyes in the J primitive history,<sup>2</sup>—it is still the case that the first picture we get of the world in antediluvian times from both writers (J and P) is "that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually,"<sup>3</sup> that "the earth was corrupt before God, and the earth was filled with violence . . . for all flesh had

<sup>1</sup> Take, e.g., in Genesis, the generosity of the King of Sodom, the courtesy of the sons of Heth to Abraham, the sense of honour of Abimelech at Gerar, the liberality of the Pharaoh of Joseph.

<sup>2</sup> It was before mentioned that Wellhausen assumes P's acquaintance with the history of the Fall in J.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. vi. 5.

corrupted their way upon the earth.”<sup>1</sup> The condition after the Flood is presumed to be not better (“the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth”<sup>2</sup>), and the subsequent history shows it was not. Sodom was only an acute anticipation<sup>3</sup> of the rapidly developing corruption of the Canaanitish nations which led, after a period of forbearance,<sup>4</sup> to their being swept out for their intolerable iniquities.<sup>5</sup> A godly seed was preserved in the line of Abraham, but how much sin interweaves itself with the patriarchal histories! Regarding the Israelites themselves, every one knows how, despite their exceptional privileges, the Biblical narratives are little else than a rehearsal of their ingratitude, rebellions, murmurings, and unfaithfulness to Jehovah. Let one of many passages from the prophets suffice to sum up the whole. “For the children of Israel and the children of Judah have done only that which was evil in my sight from their youth; for the children of Israel have only provoked me to anger with the work of their hands, saith the Lord. For this city hath been to me a provocation of mine anger and of my wrath from the day that they built it even unto this day.”<sup>6</sup> Is this language regarded as morbid? It is not so according to the standard by which the Bible uniformly measures sin. The idolatry, cruelty, immorality of the nations surrounding Israel are pictured in the same prophetic pages.

The testimony of the New Testament regarding the prevalence and malignity of sin, and the hopeless condition of mankind under it, is not less pronounced. Jesus in the Gospels stands over a sick world as the only physician who can give it life.<sup>7</sup> For Him, while the beauty and innocence of childhood furnish a rebuke to the self-seeking ambition

<sup>1</sup> vi. 11,12.

<sup>2</sup> viii. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. xiii. 13; xviii. 20; xix.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. xv. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Lev. xviii. 24-28.

<sup>6</sup> Jer. xxxii. 30, 31; cf. Ezek. ii. 3. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Matt. ix. 12. It is not to be supposed that Jesus accepts the Pharisees as being “whole.”

that excludes from the Kingdom,<sup>1</sup> the seat of sin is still in the heart,<sup>2</sup> and no language is stronger than that in which He pictures the foul streams that issue from this source, "For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, railings."<sup>3</sup> There is no one born of flesh, He teaches Nicodemus, in a discourse the genuineness of which need not be doubted, but needs regeneration.<sup>4</sup> How else, indeed, save through an awful and rooted ungodliness of spirit, explain the rejection and crucifixion of One so holy? The light shone in darkness, but the darkness apprehended it not; <sup>5</sup> "He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not."<sup>6</sup> St. Paul's teaching is too well known to need detailed elucidation. Jew and Gentile are alike under sin.<sup>7</sup> The world, knowing God, parted with that knowledge, and sank into grossest corruption.<sup>8</sup> They that are in the flesh cannot please God.<sup>9</sup> The Gentile condition is vividly depicted: "Being darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their heart."<sup>10</sup> "Among whom we also all once lived in the lusts of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest."<sup>11</sup> Specially valuable, because personal, is the apostle's description of his own experience. "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not. . . . I find then the law,

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xviii. 1-4.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. v. 21, 22, 27, 28, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xv. 19.

<sup>4</sup> John iii. 3-7.

<sup>5</sup> John i. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Ver. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Rom. iii. 9, 19, 20.

<sup>9</sup> Rom. viii. 8.

<sup>10</sup> Eph. iv. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Rom. i. 18 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Eph. ii. 3.

that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man ; but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. Wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death ? ”<sup>1</sup> Here is a testimony which science dare not ignore, any more than any other fact of experience, in its theorising upon sin.

This *universal fact* of sin, so deeply imprinted in the history of mankind, demands an adequate explanation. What is that explanation ? To speak of education, evil example, environment, as causes, save in a secondary respect, is futile. It is, as has often been pointed out, but to explain the evil of the world by itself.<sup>2</sup> The problem remains, Whence this prevailing ungodliness ? this powerful bias to sin ? this disposition in the heart, of which every one is conscious, to go astray ? Why no powerful and victorious counter-strain ? The confession is without exception : “ All we like sheep have gone astray : we have turned every-one to his own way.”<sup>3</sup> Is blame cast on the constitution of nature—of human nature, or of the world ? Then Sir Oliver Lodge would be right : “ It is not a business for which we are responsible. We did not make the world.”<sup>4</sup> Re-

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vii. 18-24. The verbal parallel in Ovid (*Met.* vii. 19) is familiar : *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.* Kant quotes Horace (*Sat.* i. 3, 68) : *Nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur.*

<sup>2</sup> The remarks of Jonathan Edwards are still pertinent on example : “ It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. . . . For, that bad examples are general all over the world to be followed by others, and have been so from the beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description, of that corruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If mankind are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, then how come there to be so many more bad examples than good ones, in all ages ? . . . If the propensity of man's nature be not to evil, how comes the current of general example, everywhere, and at all times, to be so much to evil ? ” (*Original Sin*, Works, i. p. 570).

<sup>3</sup> Isa. liii. 6. A singular corroborative proof is the unwillingness of modern writers to grant even the freedom of Jesus from sin. On this later,

<sup>4</sup> *Ut supra.*



sponsibility rolls back on the Creator, for it is He who has appointed the constitution which works out these evil results. Is it then free-will? But behind "free-will" stands this propensity which apparently issues in free-will being universally abused to sin. Or is it, mayhap, only a temporary handicap, an incentive to progress, from which the race is gradually working itself free? So evolution says, but in the teeth of the experience of the ages. Barbarism does not cure its own evils. Civilisation does not spell freedom from vice—witness the European countries of to-day. The finest civilisations of antiquity ended in moral bankruptcy. One looks in vain to Mohammedan, Buddhist, Hindu lands to work out their moral salvation. We are compelled to probe deeper in our search for an answer to these questions!

III. The problem resolves itself into several parts.

1. A first question is—Does sin consist solely in voluntary *acts* (thus Pelagius and others), or does it inhere also in *dispositions*? Are there sinful dispositions as well as sinful acts? More generally, have dispositions, or states of soul, an ethical quality equally with acts? It is impossible not to agree with Mozley in his acute discussion of the Augustinian and Pelagian positions on this point in his treatise on *Predestination*, that there is a goodness and a sinfulness in dispositions as well as in acts.<sup>1</sup> Our ordinary moral

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, 3rd edit., pp. 62-70. "The general sense of mankind acknowledges what are called good natural dispositions; that some persons have by nature a good bias in one or other direction, are amiable, courageous, truthful, humble naturally, or have a certain happy configuration. . . . It would be absurd to say that such dispositions as these were not virtuous, and that such natural goodness was not real goodness." Similarly, as regards evil: "Amid the obscurity which attaches to this class of questions, something to which mankind had borne large testimony would be relinquished in denying the existence of bad natural dispositions. . . . The general sense of mankind is certainly on the side of there being good and bad natural dispositions" (pp. 64-5, 70-1). See also the writer's *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 156-7. What is here said of good dispositions is not in-

judgments and the usage of language alike recognise the fact. There are affections—benevolence, unselfishness, fidelity, etc., which we unhesitatingly pronounce ethically good; there are contrary dispositions—e.g., malevolence, cruelty, envy—which we as clearly declare to be evil. There are evil feelings, evil desires, evil habits, evil *character*. To these wrong dispositions, and the propensities to evil that go with them, we attach, with the Apostle,<sup>1</sup> the character of “sin.” Even Ritschl, with his uncompromising polemic against hereditary sin, yet acknowledges that the sinful deed reacts on the soul that produces it, and creates a sinful propensity (*Hang*), then a habit, from which results evil character.<sup>2</sup>

2. A deeper question next arises as to the *voluntary origin* of good and evil dispositions. Are we entitled to pronounce those dispositions alone good or evil which are the products of our own voluntary acts? Some take this ground, which seems favoured by what has been said of the connexion of will with morality. Ritschl, e.g., maintains that nothing can be pronounced evil which does not spring from the moral decision of the individual.<sup>3</sup> Mozley, on the other hand, speaks of a “natural and necessary” evil, as well as of a “natural” goodness.<sup>4</sup> Augustine has a view

consistent with that lack of godliness and sin-ward tendency which the doctrine we are considering affirms (cf. Mozley, pp. 56 ff.).

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vii. 13, 14, 17, 20, 23, 25.

<sup>2</sup> “Through actions, according to the direction they take, the will acquires its nature, and develops into a good or evil character” (*Justif. and Recon.*, pp. 336-7, E.T.). This rather conflicts with Ritschl’s objection to original sin as derived from his theory of knowledge, which allows no subsistence to the soul other than in its activities. Permanent character as much as heredity implies a permanent basis.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337: “Only if we discern in the individual action the proof-mark of the independence of the will can we ascribe to ourselves, not merely individual actions, but likewise evil habit or evil inclination.” Kant would explain the evil disposition by a *supersensible* act of freedom; Julius Müller by *pre-existent* volition, etc. On Coleridge’s peculiar theory cf. Mozley, *Op. cit.*, note xii.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 70.

which seems deeper and truer, for it is necessary here to make a distinction between good and evil. Of *good* dispositions—here Mozley is surely right—it cannot be affirmed that they must be voluntarily produced in order to be good. On the contrary, unless the good disposition were there to begin with, there could be no acts of good will at all. It is the old question raised by Aristotle—Is a man virtuous because he does virtuous acts, or are the acts virtuous, because they are the acts of a virtuous man? <sup>1</sup> The latter is surely the correct view.<sup>2</sup> Take, for instance, the supreme command, that we love God and our neighbour. Love to God, plainly, is not the product of acts of love; the love must precede the acts by which it is expressed. Unless there is antecedent love in the heart, how can the acts be loving? How can the command to love be even understood, not to say fulfilled? What is true here is that to constitute character, habits, in the full sense of the word,—to deepen, establish, strengthen, confirm love,—love must be taken into the will, and embodied in action. “Whoso keepeth His word,” the Apostle John says, “in him verily hath the love of God been *perfected*.” <sup>3</sup>

This applies to goodness. But it does not follow that the same law applies to *evil*. Just because it is held that evil is not an original endowment of human nature, but has its origin in perversity, it must be contended that dispositions, so far as they are evil, or the disorder of the soul that makes them evil, are not natural, but have always a *voluntary origin*. That is, what we cannot affirm of primary good dispositions, we must affirm of all evil ones. Here again, however, it is necessary to distinguish. Evil dispositions

<sup>1</sup> *Nic. Ethics*, ii. 4; cf. Luther, *Com. on Galatians*, on ch. iii. 10; Edwards, *Op. cit.*, Works, i. pp. 177-8.

<sup>2</sup> Mozley, *Op. cit.*, pp. 64-5.

<sup>3</sup> 1 John ii. 5.

must have a voluntary origin, but it does not follow that they have this origin, as Ritschl holds, solely in the individual. We are not simply individuals. There is a *racial* life in which, as already seen, all are involved. The voluntary origin of the evil disposition may lie far behind the individual—may go back even to the beginning. This does not destroy its evil character. It is evil through its *very nature*, no matter at what stage in the development of the race it originated. Selfishness, pride, malice, falseness, are evil qualities, and their evil cannot be got rid of by pleading that, to some degree, they are inherited. We do not exonerate a thief when we learn that he has an innate propensity to thieving,<sup>1</sup> or a liar when we are informed that the tendency to lying seemed born with him. We rather judge him to be a *worse* character on this account, though we may allow that he is not personally so responsible as if he had wilfully formed the evil habit. We both pity and condemn him. The place of will here, as before, is seen to be to confirm, strengthen, *fix*, the hereditary disposition. But it may also, under better influences, resist and overcome it.

3. We are thus brought back to the question of *heritableness*, and with it of *responsibility*. The general possibility of the transmission of vitiated tendencies, originating in wrong volition, was touched on in the previous paper, and may receive light in what follows. Traducianism and Creationism have long fought their battles, probably each with some measure of truth, as to the mode of the propagation of a corrupted nature, but their disputes need not disturb our present inquiry. God's concurrence is no more involved in the hereditary transmission of an evil quality than it is in its presence and continuance in the individual soul, however originated; nor, if psychical traits are transmitted from parent to child, as assuredly they are, is any

<sup>1</sup> A form of insanity, like kleptomania, is differently judged,

contradiction implied, unless on a basis like Weismann's, already discussed, in the inclusion in the transmission of elements of perversion and disorder. It is granted that it is impossible to conceive of such transmission, as modern theories tend to conceive of heredity, as a purely physical or mechanical process. The fault here, however, lies with theories which suppose that the transmission of *any* physical characters can be thus explained. Soul-life is more than any subtle, even if infinitely complicated, arrangement of particles.

There remains still the difficult question of *personal responsibility* for inherited evil tendencies—a difficulty to which the remarks formerly made on responsibility under heredity in part apply. Paradoxical it certainly seems to be—yet true as paradoxical—that there is a sinful root in our natures, yet that we are responsible for the sin that proceeds from it.<sup>1</sup> That the tendency is evil even natural conscience affirms; that we are responsible for yielding to it, and embodying it in act, is a not less universal experience. Here, on the other hand, the idea of race connexion, of organic constitution, of corporate responsibility, comes in as against an exaggerated individualism. We are not separable units, but parts of a whole, the abilities and disabilities of which we perforce share. On the other hand, deeper even than race-connexion is the reality of *personality*. The individual is conscious of a bondage, yet knows it is not *fate*, but a power of *sin*—a something which *ought not* to be—from which he seeks deliverance. This carries with it a feeling of responsibility for the sin of thought, word, and deed, which springs from the evil state. It may be a mitigated responsibility, but it is a responsibility; for the act is *his*, and it is *evil*. This irrespective of the ultimate origin of the wrong tendency. In personality at the same time,—this *uninherited*, original part of man's being,—lies

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mozley, *Op. cit.* pp. 56 ff.

the hope of his redemption. Deliverance, it may be said with reverence, would be impossible, if sin had really penetrated to the depths of personality,—if the individual were *identified* with his sin, as is the case in the stage of obduracy,—if it were not possible, so to speak, to get behind the sinful decisions of the will, and present it with a new alternative, that which “the law of the mind”—the better self (*νοῦς*) has held before it from the first.<sup>1</sup> Man’s misery, then, is great, but not so great that he is not redeemable. Sin is at first a principle, a tendency undeveloped; in its development the will is enthralled; but there is a power greater than sin that can break the bondage, if the original enmity is overcome.<sup>2</sup>

IV. In the light of these considerations, we are better able to judge of the *counter-theories* in explanation of Original Sin. If there are really, not simply natural, but positively evil tendencies in the soul,—if there are God-denying tendencies,—if these, in their nature as evil, imply a voluntary cause,—then the “brute-inheritance,” the “ape and tiger” theory of Original Sin is already *ipso facto* condemned as inadequate. The essence of the mystery is untouched. One wonders, as hinted earlier, why “ape and tiger” should be introduced at all. “Ape” characteristics are comprehensible, if man has descended through the apes; but why “tiger,” through whom he has not descended? Or why not extend the list to vulpine, bovine, serpentine, swinish, and all the other animal traits which reproduce themselves as conspicuously in different individuals? Does man, on evolutionary lines, combine all, though descended from none? But even if all animal propensities are accounted for, man’s existing moral condition is not explained.

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vii. 21–3. Ritschl is wrong in thinking that the doctrine of Original Sin recognises no *grades* in sin within that initial separation from God in principle which results from the primal transgression.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. vi. 12 ff.; viii. 1–11, etc.

1. The state in which man finds himself is, it has been seen, one in which the lower desires and passions hold an *undue ascendancy* over the higher and spiritual, and, the spiritual bond that should hold them in check being cut, are themselves, turbulent and disorderly. The higher nature is in "bondage" to the lower. The "flesh" rules. This is not a state which the mere presence of animal propensities can explain to the satisfaction of moral law.

2. It is not animal propensities alone that man is aware of in his nature; he is conscious of principles, tendencies, dispositions, implying reason and will, which are *themselves evil*, and which produce only evil results. St. Paul's list of the "works of the flesh" is recalled here;<sup>1</sup> also Christ's saying, already quoted, on the evils that proceed from the heart.<sup>2</sup> The Apostle speaks of "evil desire"<sup>3</sup> and of "the passions of sin"<sup>4</sup> in the nature.

3. It was found that sin, in principle, is traceable back to a God-denying "egoism"—to a self-will that exalts itself above God and moral law alike. It is this aspect of sin as "ungodliness" on which the supreme stress is laid in Scripture. Man has forsaken his Creator, is ignorant of His character, disobedient to His will, unresponsive to His calls, cleaving foolishly and recklessly to his own worldly and sinful ways.<sup>5</sup> Only familiarity can veil from us the awful heinousness of such a state; only thoughtlessness can hide the

<sup>1</sup> Gal. v. 19-21.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xv. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Col. iii. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Rom. vii. 5. These representations seem opposed to purely *privative* theories of Original Sin, favoured even by Jon. Edwards (*Works*, i. pp. 217-19), according to which man's state results from withdrawal of supernatural gifts, and his being left to the sway of "natural and inferior principles," which then work corruption. On patristic views of Original Sin, see Mozley, *Op. cit.*, ch. v.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., Ps. x. 4; Isa. i. (cf. G. A. Smith *in loc.*); Rom. iii. 18; Eph. ii. 12; iv. 18. Striking historical illustrations of the alternate attraction and repulsion of the idea of God are given in an older work, McCosh's *Method of the Divine Government*, 10th edit., pp. 48 ff.

*marvel* involved in it—that beings made in God’s image, and capable of knowing, loving, and serving Him, should yet repel, shun, dislike, flee from Him ; should resent being reminded of Him, should *wish* to be without Him ! Surely no one thinking rightly will say that this is even *natural*. There is more than naturalness, or even *unnaturalness* in it—there is *sin*, guilt.

The explanation of such a perverted moral condition it goes far beyond the province of “ evolution ” to furnish. It points to a world-wide defection traceable back to disobedience in the beginnings of the race.

JAMES ORR.

### *THE PLACE OF REWARDS IN THE TEACHING OF CHRIST.*

#### II. EXAMINATION OF CHRIST’S TEACHING ON THE SUBJECT IN VIEW OF THE OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST IT.

THERE is one point in connexion with the rewards which Christ holds forth, which may tend to differentiate them from the vulgar reward referred to above, which becomes a direct bribe to virtue—viz., that they are almost always referred to as rewards laid up for us *in heaven*. It is true that in answer to Peter, who speaks of the great privation he and his fellow-disciples have endured, Christ declares that “ there is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for My sake, and the gospel’s, but he shall receive an hundredfold *now in this time*, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions ; and in the world to come eternal life ” (Mark x. 29f.). But it is evident from the terms in which Christ refers to the restitution to be made that it is no material



recompence that He has in view, while that significant addition "with persecutions" to the promise of earthly reward warns us against understanding the promise in any gross sense. As a general rule, however, when Christ refers to the reward which His followers will secure, it is of the next life He is thinking, of the blessedness in store for them in the kingdom of heaven. Now, it may not seem to make much difference, at first, so far as the legitimacy of the introduction of the idea of reward into the sphere of morals is concerned, whether we conceive this reward as to be enjoyed in this life or the next, as an earthly or a heavenly reward. And undoubtedly, from the point of view of a morality which abhors all consideration of self-interest and esteems that conduct alone which flows from a love which is totally regardless of self—from such a point of view, for instance, as Schiller takes up in that quotation we gave from him above—it makes no difference whether the reward looked forward to is to be enjoyed in this life or the next, whether it is in material or spiritual form. But we have seen reason to doubt whether any such theory of morals can maintain itself. It is no defect in Christ's teaching that He has resisted the attractions of any such visionary and impracticable theory of morals. We may disregard the criticism, then, that may be brought from this point of view, that it makes no difference whether the reward be earthly or heavenly, and consider whether any such objection holds from the standpoint of practical morals. But, even from this less exalted standpoint, it may be contended that there is little difference between the moral attitude of the man who looks for his reward immediately and that of the man who is willing to wait for it hereafter. And, without doubt, that criticism is valid against a misconception of what Christ means when He speaks of the heavenly reward, with which we are not

unfamiliar. There are many Christians who have no higher conception of the heavenly treasure than a store of good things, similar in nature to the good things of earth, only that their enjoyment is transferred from earth to heaven. They give up now in the hope that they will obtain hereafter a rich recompence for what they forgo. What the nature of the recompence to be made to them is, they do not attempt, perhaps, clearly to define. But it may, I think, without injustice to them, be alleged that it is very questionable whether they have clearly realized the essential difference between the earthly and the heavenly treasure, whether they have endeavoured to purge their conception of the heavenly recompence of all taint of materialism, whether, above all, they have laid to heart the vital fact that, the heavenly treasure being spiritual in its nature, the all-important matter is the presence on the part of him who is to participate in it of the spiritual capacity to appreciate it. But these are the essential features in the Christian conception of the reward as a heavenly reward in contrast with an earthly; and where they are absent, even though the reward be still described as heavenly, in the imagination of the person who looks forward to it, it has ceased to deserve the title, and is really only a form of earthly enjoyment transferred from earth to heaven.

But are we justified in thus characterizing the reward which Christ holds before His followers? Does the fact that Christ speaks of this reward as in heaven warrant us in stripping it of all material characteristics, and describing it as a state of spiritual bliss? Evidently the view we take of this question will determine largely our position as to the teaching of Christ on this subject of rewards. If the heavenly treasure is something external, a store of good things laid up for us in heaven, to be enjoyed apart from any higher spiritual capacity on the part of

the participant, then the exhortation to the practice of righteousness under the prospect of enjoyment of this reward is simply a piece of bribery. Whereas, on the other hand, if the heavenly recompence consists of that spiritual bliss which we have suggested, bliss to the enjoyment of which the spiritual condition of the participant is matter of supreme importance, then this will go far to meet many of those objections which are urged against the prominence Christ gives to this question of rewards. Now, we must beware of the danger of reading our modern ideas into the sayings of Christ, and of treating all the imagery of His eschatological utterances as mere accommodation to the modes of thought of His hearers. But, if there is danger on this side, there is danger also on the other, and it may be questioned whether the reaction in modern exegesis against the tendency to spiritualize the words of Christ has not gone too far in the way of literal interpretation of statements about the future life, to the prejudice of the spiritual truth underlying them. It has been maintained by Titius that "many sensuous functions, which we exclude from our conception of a heavenly life, were not excluded by Jesus." But, even were we to admit this, we should still contend that it would be to do grave injustice to the spirit of Christ's teaching to fasten upon the sensuous element in the future life and dwell upon it, as if it were matter of prime importance. For instance, take the figure most frequently employed by Christ to express the blessedness of the future life—the figure of a banquet. Is it the case that Christ actually regarded that banquet as a reality? Was He in earnest when He spoke about sitting down to table and drinking wine in the kingdom of heaven? Suppose for the moment that He was, though we do not believe so. Would one be justified in laying any stress upon the sensual pleasures to be enjoyed

at that table? Do they bulk in Christ's mind at all when He presents this picture to His hearers? Or is it not rather the case that the banquet to which He refers, even though He regards it as a reality, is introduced merely to suggest the rich blessedness of the kingdom of God, regarding which the saying of the Apostle surely truly expresses the mind of the Master, that it "is not meat and drink; but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost"? And the same thing holds in other cases. There may be difference of opinion as to how far Christ actually intended those sensible features, in the pictures He paints of the future, to be taken seriously. But even if He did, we know enough of the general spirit of His doctrine to understand that these sensible features are not dwelt upon for their own sake, as if any enjoyment of sense could be conceived to form an integral part of the blessedness of the kingdom, but are employed merely as aids to the imagination in its contemplation of the bliss of that future life of which, again, it is in the spirit of the Master that the Apostle quotes that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him."

What, then, do we find when we turn to the various utterances of Christ regarding the rewards in store for the righteous? What is the general tenor of His teaching? Is it such as to justify our criticism of those who think of the heavenly recompense as a store of good things, in nature not essentially different from the good things of this earth, to the enjoyment of which they look forward as compensation for their renunciation of these latter? There are some passages that seem to lend plausibility to that view. Christ speaks about a treasure in heaven, about being rich towards God, about receiving "good

measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over." The rich man is reminded that having received his good things on earth, he cannot expect to enjoy them in the next world. And, again, there are the passages in which Christ speaks of differences of rank and position in the kingdom of heaven, some sitting on thrones and judging the twelve tribes of Israel, some sitting at His right hand and at His left hand in the kingdom, and the passages to which we have referred where the figure of a banquet is employed. In these cases Christ certainly does use language which, if taken literally, would justify those materialistic expectations of future reward to which we take exception. But the general tenor of the rest of His teaching provides us with a standard by which to test any such false conclusions. Generally speaking, it is the kingdom of heaven itself that Christ sets before His followers as the great reward to which they may look forward. It is no Mohammedan paradise which He promises them. Certainly He emphasizes the blessedness of the heavenly life. It is so rich that one may well esteem no present sacrifice too severe in order to secure it, so transcendent that even the most miserable on earth may well be congratulated on their prospect of enjoying it. But it is the blessedness not of supreme delight but of ethical perfection, the blessedness of that life in which the will of God is perfectly done. One would have expected as much from the whole tone of Christ's preaching, and there are several express utterances of His in this direction which leave no doubt upon the point. One favourite way of describing it with Him is to call it "life," or "eternal life." Its blessedness, which on other occasions is suggested by the figure of the Messianic banquet, is represented in more ethical terms when it is said of the pure in heart that they shall see God, or of the peacemakers

that they shall be called the sons of God, or of those that love their enemies that their reward shall be great, for they shall be the sons of the Highest. How much the ethical enters into Christ's conception of the blessedness of the kingdom is shown by the injunction to seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, righteousness being here regarded not as an antecedent condition to participation in the blessedness of the kingdom, but as part and parcel of that blessedness. In the same way the promised blessing held forth to them that hunger and thirst after righteousness is that they shall be filled therewith.

These statements may not be very numerous, but there can be no question as to their importance. We feel that we have here the true ring of the gospel of Christ, that where there appears to be any divergence between the tenor of these utterances and that of others which take a less exalted standpoint, there can be no hesitation as to which more faithfully represents the true view of Christ. When we weigh their significance, they suggest conclusions regarding the position which Christ takes up on this question of rewards which go far to meet the objections which have been urged against His doctrine. Let us note some of these conclusions.

First, if the reward is ethical in character, if it consists in the attainment in richer fulness of that moral perfection after which we are striving here, then evidently the objection that may be urged against the introduction of the idea of reward in religion, on the ground of its being an external attraction, falls to the ground. For the rewards of Christ are no such external attractions. They are no things to be bestowed by another in return for a certain performance. To see God, to be called the sons of the Highest, which, we must remember, is no mere empty title,

but suggests actual elevation to this rank and dignity, to be filled with righteousness, to have eternal life—these are no extrinsic attractions under the prospect of which the practice of righteousness loses anything of its purity. The objection to the introduction of the hope of reward into religion that it tends to encourage unworthy motives, and that there is danger of one's doing the right not from love of it but from the hope of reward, evidently fails altogether to find application here. For the rewards Christ promises are not such as appeal to the cupidity of human nature. Before one can be attracted by them, one must already love for its own sake that righteousness, of the fuller attainment of which they give promise. And not only do they fail to make appeal now to those who lack the truly religious spirit, they are of such a nature as to be enjoyed hereafter only by those who have the spiritual capacity to appreciate them. In this connexion the saying of Christ holds good, "Unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." The blessedness of the kingdom of heaven is no gift which may be handed to us by God, no store of good things which we may simply receive at His hands. It is a spiritual experience, and for that spiritual experience there is necessary a certain spiritual capacity on our part. So that even if one were to attempt to do the righteousness Christ requires of us from no higher motive than anticipation of the recompence promised, one would learn to one's cost that the effort had been vain, for where the inward love of righteousness is lacking, there the necessary condition for the appreciation of the recompence is lacking also.

We may remark in passing that the moral teaching of Christ with regard to rewards is safeguarded against such

objections as we have been considering on another side, from which we reach conclusions similar to those we have now been dwelling upon. The side to which I refer is the importance assigned to the inward motive, to the righteousness of the heart, in the doctrine of Christ. The rewards Christ holds forth are promised to those who do the works of righteousness. But what are the works of righteousness in Christ's eyes? Never the mere external works apart from the spirit in which they are done. It is the spirit that prompts them that gives them their worth in the sight of God. The two mites of the poor widow are reckoned a richer contribution than the offerings of the wealthy; the sins which one cherishes in one's heart as equally heinous with those of outward conduct. It should hardly be necessary to defend the teaching of one who preached this doctrine from suspicion of admission in any form of a base motive. To those who contend that Christ's doctrine of rewards tends to encourage the practice of righteousness from an unworthy motive, it should be sufficient to reply that the practice of righteousness from an unworthy motive is in Christ's view a contradiction in terms, for it is the motive that gives the act its righteous character, and where the motive is impure the act is unrighteous.

But to return to the conclusions which we would draw from the utterances of Christ regarding the rewards in store for the righteous in which the ethical character of these rewards receives prominence, there is another feature which emerges on a closer examination to which we would direct attention. In many of His sayings about them Christ emphasizes the correspondence between the conduct which secures the reward and the nature of the recompense. The merciful obtain mercy; the forgiving are forgiven; they that confess Christ before men are confessed by Him



before His Father in heaven ; they that humble themselves are exalted ; they that lose their life shall find it. There is more here than the observance of a quantitative equivalence between the service and the reward. Such quantitative equivalence, indeed, does not obtain. Christ expressly points out, on occasion, how far the reward exceeds the service that secures it. He who renounces for the sake of the kingdom of God receives manifold more, according to one Gospel a hundredfold, for his recompence even in this world, and in the next everlasting life. He who is faithful over a few things is made ruler over many things. The fact that the reward is out of all proportion to the service is made the theme of one of the parables, "The Labourers in the Vineyard." The equivalence that prevails between the service and the recompence is, then, not quantitative but qualitative. But the fact that it *is* qualitative, that there is a certain correspondence between the nature of the service and the character of the recompence it secures, suggests some reflections of considerable interest. Evidently the recompence which Christ holds before us is no arbitrary reward which bears no inner relation to the nature of the conduct which secures it. It is rather the development to fuller perfection of that love of righteousness that inspires it, the crowning with success of the effort that finds expression in it. In its most general aspect, as we have seen, the reward may be described as the kingdom of heaven itself. Now, as all the various forms of service which secure the reward are but different modes in which the same effort finds expression, the effort to advance the kingdom of heaven, we reach the conclusion that the general idea underlying all these various promises of recompence in the gospel of Christ is this—that God will not disappoint the earnest efforts of those who strive for the advancement of the kingdom, but that they may

labour on in the assurance that in the end their endeavour will be crowned with success, and they will be permitted to participate in the final realization in heaven of that kingdom in whose interest they have worked on earth. That is the general principle underlying Christ's position on this question of rewards. I do not say that in all the cases in which He places the service and the reward in a relation of equivalence to one another we can trace the action of this principle. Yet there is usually some inner principle of connexion. When we are told that he that humbleth himself shall be exalted, for instance, we feel that there is something more than a merely verbal correspondence between the act and the reward promised to it. Underlying the promise there is the recognition of the truth that the spirit of self-humiliation is that which most truly exalts a man in the sight of God, even as the glory of the Son of Man was revealed in the humility of His service. Or when we are told that he that loseth his life shall find it, we feel that here we have no promise of an arbitrary reward, but that the finding of the life is but the triumphant vindication of the spirit which inspired the self-sacrifice. Or again, when we read that the merciful shall obtain mercy, that the forgiving shall be forgiven, we feel that there is a peculiar fitness in the promise of these blessings in these cases, for mercy and forgiveness are no things we can receive at the hands of God, but spiritual experiences which demand a certain spiritual capacity on the part of those who are to undergo them, and where the spirit of mercy and forgiveness is wanting on the part of man, there can be no true participation in these blessings at the hand of God. So much is it the case that the reward Christ promises is but the fuller realization of the spiritual blessedness which the earnest striving after righteousness brings with it, that it is sometimes

difficult to say whether it is the future or the present life that Christ has in view when He speaks of the recompence which righteousness secures. For instance, are we to think of the exaltation which accrues to him that humbleth himself as reserved altogether for the future life? Is it going too far to fancy that Christ, who felt that He asserted His own dignity by the humility of His service, and taught that that which was exalted among men was abomination in the sight of God, should have meant His disciples to realize that by humbling themselves in the spirit of love they were in the truest sense proving their moral greatness? Again, when we read in Luke the promise to those who love their enemies and lend hoping for nothing, that their reward shall be great, and they shall be the children of the Highest, this seems to point to future recompence and status in the kingdom of heaven; but in Matthew, where we are urged to love our enemies that we may become the children of our Father in heaven, who proves His Fatherhood by the unconditionedness of His love, the end set before us seems to be something within our reach even now. And while we recognize that most of Christ's utterances about eternal life in the Synoptic Gospels have originally an eschatological significance, it may be questioned whether the advance made by the author of the Fourth Gospel in representing this eternal life as something within our reach now is so great as is sometimes represented. Undoubtedly Christ did not think of the blessedness of that heavenly life as beginning only in the hereafter. When we recall, for instance, the terms in which He speaks of those whose names are written in heaven, declaring that even now they received power to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy, so that nothing should by any means hurt them, we can well believe that though He looked for the full blessedness of

that eternal life in the future, even as He looked forward to the coming of the kingdom in its fulness in the future too, still, as He could declare that already that kingdom was among His hearers, so He must have felt that already, in their performance of the righteousness of the kingdom, His disciples had a foretaste of the blessedness of that eternal life which they were to enjoy in its fulness hereafter.

There is one other point in connexion with Christ's teaching about rewards to which we must advert in order to understand the place they occupy in His doctrine. We have seen that misgiving has been excited in some minds at the prominence given to this subject as unworthy the ethical sublimity of the doctrine of Christ. But there is another ground on which Christ's position on this question may cause hesitation. It seems to conflict with the direct tendency of Christ's own doctrine on a point of the first importance. In holding before His hearers the prospect of recompence, He was appealing to a motive which played a chief part in the religious life of later Judaism. But the whole aim of His teaching was to set aside the conception of the relation between God and man on which the position of later Judaism in this connexion was based. The relation in question was conceived to be a purely legal one. By the strict performance of the law laid upon him, man was entitled to certain blessings at the hand of God. On the other hand, failure to fulfil that law brought certain retribution in its train. "The promised reward and the required performance," says Schürer, "these are the two poles around which everything revolves." God was regarded as the great Judge who would deal with every man according to his works, rewarding or punishing in strict equivalence to the merit or demerit of the individual. But if this is the foundation on which rested this doctrine of recompence,

which Christ received as a legacy from His religious predecessors, what place was there for it, we may ask, in His teaching? Was not the whole tendency of that teaching in the opposite direction? Did He not set in place of the great Judge strict to mark iniquity, giving to every one in exact proportion to his desert, the loving Father, who delights to shower down His blessings upon His children apart altogether from their deserts and gives freely of His good things to the unworthy and the sinful? Is not the idea of merit upon which the Judaistic hope of reward rested utterly abhorrent to the whole spirit of the gospel of Christ. Has He not expressly set it aside in His parable about the servant returning from the field, "So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all these things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do"? We do not earn the kingdom of God. *Gratis* we have received. It is the Father's good pleasure to give. We must receive the kingdom as a little child. It will hardly be disputed that in such sayings we have the characteristic tendency of the gospel of Christ. Yet the doctrine they set forth is fundamentally opposed to the whole conception of man's relation to God on which the position of later Judaism on this question of rewards was based. How then, we may ask, can Christ retain the prospect of recompence in His teaching while denying the ground on which that prospect was based?

In answer to that question it must be recognized that the idea of reward in the teaching of Christ has no longer the same place and significance as it had in the teaching of later Judaism. If we have to choose between making some modification, even though it be considerable, in the strictness with which we interpret the figure of a reward when introduced in the teaching of Christ, on the one

hand, and departing even in the slightest degree from our assurance of the Fatherly love of God, which showers down its blessings with a lavishness absolutely unconditioned by the desert of man, on the other, there can be no hesitation as to which alternative we must choose. Whatever happens, nothing must be permitted to obscure the freedom of the divine grace. If there is any incompatibility, then, between the two sides, it is on the question of rewards that the qualification will have to be made. Christ Himself leads the way in respect of breaking away from the strict application of the idea of reward which He introduces. He employs the figure at times where it is inadequate to do justice to the thought He desires to enforce. We have seen one instance of this already in the case of the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard. This parable is specially interesting in the present connexion because it brings into juxtaposition those two elements in the doctrine of Christ respecting whose compatibility we are in doubt, the idea of recompence and the assurance of the divine grace. And not only does it bring them together, it does so in criticism—at least so we may reasonably conjecture—of that legal conception of man's relation to God in which the idea of recompence played such an important part. It cannot be said that their compatibility is demonstrated. While both are to appearance retained, the idea of recompence is virtually set aside, for the payment that is made to the labourers last hired is no longer in the strict sense a recompence for work done, but a present bestowed of the generosity of the master. And what happens in connexion with this parable may be regarded as typical of what takes place throughout the whole teaching of Christ. Whenever the idea of recompence, which Christ uses freely in the course of His preaching, comes into conflict in any way with the freedom of the divine

grace, or threatens to cast any shadow on the spontaneity of the divine love, then it is no longer to be taken in the strictness of the letter, but is to be regarded as one of those forms of speech employed by Christ, which prove inadequate to the thought He sought to convey. Already we can see the tendency to rise above the category of reward in those passages in which Christ emphasizes the transcendence of the recompense over the desert of those who obtain it. And when we come to examine more closely several of Christ's sayings in which He introduces the idea of reward, even when a strict equivalence seems to obtain between the conduct and the reward it secures, it will be found that while, so far as outward form is concerned, He seems to be still at the point of view of His contemporaries with their expectation of a recompense strictly proportionate to the merit, in spirit He is really far apart from them. For instance, when we read among the Beatitudes the promise to the merciful that they shall obtain mercy, we need but to reflect what is the nature of the blessing held forth—mercy for their own transgressions—to realize how far Christ is removed from the point of view of those who felt that they were entitled to claim a reward for their merit at the hand of God. Again, when we hear Christ promising a reward to those who pray, we experience a feeling of disappointment to find Him apparently countenancing any such unspiritual view of prayer, according to which it is regarded as a work of righteousness performed in anticipation of promised recompense. But here again, it would be to do grave injustice to Christ to take His reference to reward in the strictness of the letter. He was using the language of His contemporaries, but He breathed into it the purer spirit of His own doctrine. And while the thought of reward suggested to the Pharisee those unspiritual views of man's relation to God against

which the whole teaching of Christ was a protest, we may well believe that to Christ, with His profound conviction of the Fatherly love of God, the thought had lost all those unworthy associations which attached to it in contemporary usage, and was selected by Him as a suitable figure by which to bring home the assurance to His hearers, that no true effort after righteousness would be suffered by that God to be lost, but that to every faithful servant of the kingdom the blessedness of attainment would be vouchsafed at last. In this sense the assurance that our prayers shall find their reward loses all its offensiveness.

Briefly to sum up. We have noted the prominence which the prospect of reward receives in the teaching of Christ. In spite of certain sayings in which the hope of immediate recompence is set aside, it is undoubtedly the case that Christ laid the fullest emphasis on the prospect of future reward, and freely recognized it as a worthy motive of conduct. From two different sides objection has been taken to Christ's position on this subject. First, it has been urged that this is a base motive to which to appeal, and that the righteousness practised under the influence of it is unworthy the name. And again, it has been contended that this anticipation of recompence is an anomaly in the doctrine of a teacher who opposed so vigorously the legal conception of man's relation to God, and made the Fatherhood of God the central doctrine in His preaching. We have discussed these objections, and while we may admit that they are cogent enough against the idea of a reward in its cruder form, whether as a bribe to the practice of virtue or as the payment to which man is entitled for his service, they did not seem valid against the manner in which the idea of reward was introduced in the teaching of Christ, where the lofty spiritual tone of the rest of the doctrine at once ruled any such sugges-



tions out of court. We have noted what is the general tendency of those passages in which Christ emphasizes the prospect of reward in heaven—to encourage men to the practice of righteousness by the assurance that the God in whose service they are working will not fail to crown their labour at last with success, and that in the blessedness of the kingdom of heaven they will attain the end after which they have been striving on earth. Whether this may be called a reward in the strict sense of the word, may be open to question. We are not concerned to defend Christ's retention of the term; and if the word connotes those unworthy ideas to which we have referred, we will readily admit that strictly speaking there is no place for the idea of reward in Christ's doctrine. What we *are* concerned to defend is not the name but the thing Christ would suggest by the name. That is no excrescence in Christ's doctrine: it is a vital truth of His gospel. It is nothing to be regretfully retained and shamefacedly put away into the background: it is the very pride and boast of the religion of Christ. Take away from Christianity what Christ holds forth to men under this hope of reward, and you rob it of all power of appeal to the heart of men. As Jülicher puts it: "To reject the reward which Jesus has in His mind is virtually to reject the mercy of God, the kingdom of heaven, comfort, God-sonship, or to require that morality shall renounce all connexion with religion. A love without faith and hope—this Jesus never wished, this did He least of all think possible."

G. WAUCHOPE STEWART.

*SKINNER'S "GENESIS."*

THERE is perhaps no book in the Old Testament that has felt the quickening touch of the modern spirit more powerfully than Genesis. From the first it has remained in the centre of critical interest. The progressive solution of the problem of the Hexateuch has, in fact, consisted mainly in an increasing appreciation of the complex literary and religious characteristics of Genesis. And this has influenced our whole attitude to the book. The exegete no longer finds himself compelled in the interests of religion to declare war with Darwin, or to attempt impossible harmonies of the naïve tales of Genesis with the dry, clear records of archaeological research. He gladly avails himself of the light that streams so richly from ethnic history and folklore; but he seeks above all to penetrate to the peculiar genius of these fascinating chapters, and to read them sympathetically as deposits from the earlier stages of revelation,—reflections of Israel's awakening thoughts on God and man, with dim memories of the childhood of the race, and glimmering foregleams of the perfect day that was to dawn.

From this point of view several notable studies of Genesis have recently appeared in Germany and England. But there still seemed to be room for a fresh handling of the subject in the light of the latest investigations. Dr. Skinner's volume in the "International Critical" Series aims at supplying this need. It must be said at once, the work is supremely well done. In every respect the new Commentary is worthy to stand alongside of the greatest of its rivals. It would be difficult, indeed, to overpraise either the minute, exact scholarship and comprehensive knowledge which are stamped on every page, or the keen psychological and religious insight, the transparent honesty of statement, and the admirable

balance and sanity of judgment that make the book so educative to the open-minded student of the Scriptures. As far as his path lies clear before him, Dr. Skinner leads onward with strong, sure step. But when he reaches the limits of certainty, he walks with characteristic caution, content to suggest the probable lines of future progress, and not allowing himself to be beguiled by any *ignis fatuus* into critical bogs and quicksands.

This caution comes into frequent evidence in the treatment of the text. Not that Dr. Skinner holds a brief for the Massoretic scholars, or attempts in any way to gloze over corruptions. He is frank even to a fault, and appreciative of every honest effort to get nearer to the original. But he has no love of change for change's sake. The general superiority of the Massoretic text he valiantly defends alike against the more radical criticism of the school of Budde, whose "ingenious transpositions and reconstructions of the text" seem to him "too subtle and arbitrary to satisfy any but a slavish disciple" (p. 3), and against the strangely perverse attempt of "the more recent opposition" represented by Dahse and Wiener to prove the Massoretic text "so unreliable that no analysis of documents can be based on its data" (p. xxxv.). In his most caustic vein he observes: "Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction; and, however surprising it may seem to some, we can reconcile our minds to the belief that the M.T. does reproduce with substantial accuracy the characteristics of the original autographs" (pp. xxxvi. f.). Alongside, therefore, of an unhesitating acceptance of much of the treasure-store of conjectural emendations accumulated by a century's criticism of the text, we meet with guarded phrases like: "The addition (of the Greek Septuagint) is adopted by Ball, and the plural proves at least that it rests on a Hebrew original" (p. 22), "one is tempted to substitute the rare  $\text{וַתִּדְבַּר}$ , as in v. 11" (p. 24),

"the Greek inserts at this point," etc. (p. 25), where a less scrupulous critic would be inclined to alter without compunction.

This carefully judicial habit of mind lends all the greater weight to Dr. Skinner's pronouncements on the "higher critical" question. Here he shows no hesitation. "My own belief in the essential soundness of the prevalent hypothesis," he says in the Preface, "has been confirmed by the renewed examination of the text of Genesis which my present undertaking required" (p. viii.). In the course of the volume he finds occasion once and again to break a lance for this hypothesis, especially against the three most recent champions, whose appearance has been hailed so widely as having given the final *coup de grâce* to criticism. In two pages of piercing sword-play he exposes the fatal weakness of Dr. Orr's defence, showing how he really concedes the whole case against criticism, while seeking to save the situation by the "flimsy hypothesis" of "recensions" and "collaboration," and sweet-sounding phrases like "essential Mosaicism" and "relative antiquity" (pp. xl.-xlii.). We have already quoted one of the sardonic sentences in which he disposes of Wiener's attempt to evade the problem by a frank abandonment of the reliability of the Hebrew. His *critique* of Eerdmans' novel principle of analysis, and its results, is equally keen. "A more bewildering hypothesis it has never been our lot to examine, and we cannot pretend to believe that it contains the rudiments of a successful analysis. There is much to be learned from Eerdmans' work, which is full of acute observations and sound reasoning in detail; but as a theory of the composition of Genesis it seems to us utterly at fault" (p. xliii.). Having had occasion recently to subject Eerdmans' *Studien* to careful examination, the present writer can thoroughly endorse this judgment. So far from lightening the darkness that

still broods over much of the problem, the new *Komposition der Genesis* makes confusion worse confounded.

While firmly persuaded that the main lines of progress have been well and truly laid, Dr. Skinner is far from the opinion that the last word has been said by criticism. Like most investigators since Wellhausen, he recognises that the documents J and E are not homogeneous products of a single mind and age, but composite narratives of diverse origin, that in fact "the symbols J and E must be taken to express, not two individual writers, but two *schools*, i.e., two series of narrators, animated by common conceptions, following a common literary method, and transmitting a common form of the tradition from one generation to another" (p. xliv.). This complexity is most apparent in the early chapters of Genesis, where recent commentators have pointed out various different strands in the narrative. But in so fine a region of analysis, the work is necessarily intricate, and the results hypothetical, in the extreme. Dr. Skinner follows mainly the lead of Gunkel in disentangling four broken threads of narrative: (a) an early nexus of crude tales scattered throughout the chapters, viz., the semi-polytheistic fragment of the Fall story preserved in iii. 20-22, 24, the older genealogical line of descent from Cain (iv. 17-24), the mythical tale of the *liaisons* of the angels (vi. 1-4), and the story of the Tower of Babel (xi. 1-9), which he assigns to the rough core of Yahwistic tradition (J<sup>i</sup>); (b) a cycle embracing the more refined narrative of the Fall which covers the main part of chaps. ii. and iii., the torso of the line of Seth, with its attribution of the beginnings of Yahwe worship to Enosh (iv. 25 f.), the interposed notice of Noah's birth (v. 29), and the story of his vine-culture and accompanying drunkenness (ix. 20-27),—together representing a somewhat more advanced stage of moral and religious reflection (described as J<sup>e</sup>, from the apparent use of the Divine

name *Elohim* at the beginning of the narrative); (c) the more consecutive history of the Flood, with its sequel in the dispersion of the race, and the Table of Nations, in the Yahwistic sections of chaps. vi. 5–viii. 22, ix. 18 f., and x. 1 ff. (i.e., in the main, Budde's J<sup>2</sup>, which Dr. Skinner distinguishes by the more colourless label of J<sup>d</sup>); and finally (d) in a place by itself, as a wandering element of tradition from another age and origin, although in its present literary form closely moulded after the exquisite narrative in chap. iii., the *saga* of Cain and Abel (iv. 1–16), described as J<sup>r</sup>, apparently because introduced here by the Redactor of the completed Yahwistic document.

To this elaborate scheme Dr. Skinner appends the characteristic *caveat*: "Such constructions, it need hardly be added, are in the highest degree precarious and uncertain; and can only be regarded as tentative explanations of problems for which it is probable that no final solution will be found" (p. 4).

In his analysis of the patriarchal traditions, too, Dr. Skinner follows the clue given by Gunkel in his separation of Hebron and Beersheba elements in the Abrahamic narrative in J, the different sources being respectively described by the labels J<sup>a</sup> and J<sup>b</sup>. The former of these he finds linked by "certain affinities of thought and expression" with the J<sup>o</sup> of the primitive history, as well as with the parallel traditions which the Yahwistic narrative has associated with the name of Isaac in chap. xxvi., suggesting that in these elements we have "fragments of a work whose theme was the history of the Yahwe-religion, from its commencement with Enosh to its establishment in the leading sanctuaries of Palestine by Abraham and Isaac" (p. 241). On the other hand, the Beersheba cycle (J<sup>b</sup>) has its affinities with E, pointing to the following "tentative hypothesis" regarding the formation of the Abrahamic legend. "The tradition crystallised

mainly at two great religious centres, Beersheba and Hebron. The Beersheba narratives took shape in two recensions, a Yahwistic and an Elohist, of which (it may be added) the second is ethically and religiously on a higher level than the first. These were partly amalgamated, probably before the union of J<sup>h</sup> and J<sup>b</sup>. The Hebron tradition was naturally indifferent to the narratives which connected Abraham with the Negeb, or with its sanctuary Beersheba; hence the writer of J<sup>h</sup>, who attaches himself to this tradition, excludes the Beersheba stories from his biography of Abraham, but finds a place for some of them in the history of Isaac (pp. 241 ff.).

We cannot follow the analytic process into further detail. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the general viewpoint. Dr. Skinner puts forth his hypothesis "with great reserve." In certain respects it may have to yield to closer criticism. But there can be little doubt that we are carried forward on helpful lines. For the new light it sheds on the religious complexion of the narratives, too, the advance movement is to be welcomed. It has become the fashion in many quarters to describe the documents JE as "prophetic" narratives. In so far as the name is employed to distinguish them from the priestly elements in the Hexateuch, it may be "sufficiently appropriate." But the implication so often drawn, that the narratives are influenced by the ideas of the literary prophets, or at least move in the same religious world, Dr. Skinner rejects as "entirely erroneous." The documents yield us the traditions handed down, generation after generation, in various circles of the people. And if both are "pervaded by ideas and convictions which they share in common with the writing prophets," this but supplies a fresh proof of the essential loyalty of the prophets to the pure faith as it came through Moses and the fathers. "The decisive fact is that the really distinctive ideas of

written prophecy—the polemic against foreign deities, the denunciation of prevalent oppression and social wrong, etc.—find no echo in those parts of J and E with which we have to do” (pp. li. f.). In this judgment we entirely concur, and feel that the misleading term “prophetic” ought now to give place to some other description more in harmony with the character of the narratives.

The sources of the traditions are manifold. In the early chapters we are mainly pointed back to Babylonia. The origins of the Creation narrative in chap. i., of the genealogical tree in chap. v., and of the Flood story in both its recensions, are clearly to be read on the Babylonian Tablets recently brought to light and deciphered by the self-denying labour of Assyriologists. And apart from these, numerous other reflections of Babylonian ideas are to be traced throughout the chapters. In various notes appended to the different sections Dr. Skinner discusses the relation of the Biblical narratives to their Babylonian analogues, and convincingly proves the dependence of the Israelite traditions on the far earlier records of the East. The question as to the probable date, or dates, and channels of Babylonian influence he dismisses somewhat curtly. The view which Gunkel has brought into such prominence, that the mass of Babylonian tradition entered the current of Palestinian life during the period of Babylonian supremacy prior to the Tell-Amarna epoch, and thence passed through Canaanite channels of influence to the conquering Israelites, at the beginning of their national development, he regards as inconclusively proved. But the opposite theory, which explains the phenomena as the result of a gradual process of assimilation, chiefly during the historical age, is equally open to objection. We are left, therefore, with a *non liquet*. “When we consider the innumerable channels through which myths may wander from one centre to another, we shall hardly expect



to be able to determine the precise channel, or the approximate date, of this infusion of Babylonian elements into the religious tradition of Israel" (p. x.). We confess we should like to have reached some more definite conclusion, and we trust that Dr. Skinner may yet help us to determine the broad lines of transmission. Meantime, we must express our warm appreciation of the noble words in which he vindicates the spiritual supremacy of Israel even in those regions of thought in which she stands most indebted to foreign influence (cf. pp. 6 f., 51 f., 178 f., etc.).

When we pass to the patriarchal stories of Genesis, we come at length into contact with the broad stream of Israel's own traditions, though even here there may be traced an admixture of Canaanite and Egyptian influence. This will be noted in due course.

On the question of the historical value of the narratives Dr. Skinner speaks with no uncertain voice. In Genesis we have the old legends of Israel, with a distinct vein of myth in the early chapters, and considerable evidence of mythical colouring even in the patriarchal traditions. But to apply such terms to the narratives is by no means to dismiss them as insubstantial dreams. Legend is the deposit of popular tradition "working freely on dim reminiscences of the great events and personalities of the past, producing an amalgam in which tradition and phantasy are inseparably mingled" (p. iv.). Myths are properly "stories of the gods, originating in an impression produced on the primitive mind by the more imposing phenomena of nature" (p. viii.). Both of them are thus invaluable as revelations of the soul of the people, their early thoughts of God and man, and the types of character which represent their moral aspirations. But legend also enshrines the memory of real historical personages and events which made an impact on the nation's inner life (pp. iv. ff.). In his classification of legendary motives, Dr.

Skinner again follows the lead of Gunkel. The more recent ethnological theories, which find in the legends distinct reflections of tribal movements, he handles with great caution. There is a true principle at the root of the method. But legend necessarily contains so large an element of idealisation that it is most unsafe to build exclusively on this source. The various traditions which relate the patriarchs to Mesopotamia most probably bear witness to early migrations of Hebrew tribes from thence. And "if there be any truth in the description of legend as a form of narrative conserving the impression of a great personality on his age, we may venture, in spite of the lack of decisive evidence, to regard Abraham as a historic personage, however dim the surroundings of his life may be." But for more authentic historical records of the primitive age we must patiently abide the slowly accumulating testimony of archaeological discovery (pp. xi. ff.).

From the detailed exposition of Genesis a few salient features may be singled out for further remarks.

Of the three possible constructions of the opening verses of chap. i., Dr. Skinner prefers the least favoured by commentators, that, namely, which treats v. 1 as the time notice to the following, and finds in v. 3 the proper sequel: thus, "When God began to create the heavens and the earth, the earth was waste and void, etc. Then God said, Let there be light." In any case, "creation" does not imply the calling forth of the raw material of the Universe "ex nihilo," but the "creative" process unfolded in the chapter. Dr. Skinner deals quite frankly with the various unscientific ideas to be met with throughout, a feature which we might reasonably expect in a product of the pre-scientific age. But he lays just emphasis on the unique religious character of the cosmogony,—the classical expression it gives to the monotheistic principle, and the lofty dignity with which it invests

man as "the crown and goal of creation,"—entitling it "to rank among the most important documents of revealed religion" (pp. 5 ff.).

In the story of Paradise, and the "immortal allegory" of the Fall, he finds equally profound religious ideas. In his interpretation of the "knowledge of good and evil" he combines the views of Wellhausen—that the knowledge here regarded as evil is that "which is the principle of human civilisation," viz., "insight into the secrets of nature, and intelligence to manipulate them for human ends"—and Gunkel—that it is simply "the enlargement of capacity and experience which belongs to mature age," of which the instinct of sex is a typical illustration" (pp. 95 f.). We must confess that even the reference to Christ's idea of childhood does not reconcile us to the latter view. Nor does the undertone of sadness which runs through much of these early chapters appear to us to rise from a "condemnation of the cultural achievements of humanity" in themselves (p. 96). The grave mood which the narrative assumes in such sections as the story of the Flood, for example, seems to be the direct outcome of ethical considerations. And the moral interpretation still impresses us as the most adequate here. But after all the difference is one of detail. For in the next page Dr. Skinner strikes as high a note as the most zealous defender of the distinctively ethical view, when he describes the God of Genesis iii. as "a Being infinitely exalted above the world, stern in His displeasure at sin, and terrible in His justice; yet benignant and compassionate, slow to anger and 'repenting him of the evil.' Through an intensely anthropomorphic medium we discern the features of the God of the prophets and the Old Testament; nay, in the analogy of human fatherhood which underlies the description, we can trace the lineaments of the God and Father of Jesus Christ. That is the real *Protevangelium* which lies in

the passage: the fact that God tempers judgment with mercy, the faith that man, though he has forfeited innocence and happiness, is not cut off from fellowship with his Creator" (p. 97).

As we have noted, the Biblical story of the Flood is traced to a Babylonian original, the most natural explanation of which "is after all that it is based on the vague reminiscence of some memorable and devastating flood in the Euphrates valley." But the real value of the story again lies, not in the modicum of historical fact that may be extracted from it, but in the moral and religious ideas that shine through the whole,—the clear recognition of the ethical motive, and the pervasive influence of the monotheistic idea, as contrasted with the vague morality and the "picturesque" but vindictive and capricious polytheism of the Babylonian version (pp. 178 ff.).

The old poem of national curse and blessings (ix. 25-27) is read by Dr. Skinner, as by practically all modern commentators, in the ethnographic sense. Shem is undoubtedly the representative of the family to which Israel belonged, and Canaan as clearly the *eponymus* of the pre-Israelitish inhabitants of Palestine. The problem thickens, however, when we pass beyond these elements of certainty. Who is Japheth? And what historical situation is reflected in the poem? Dr. Skinner has a clear eye for the difficulties involved in Wellhausen's identification of Japheth with the Philistines, and Budde's suggestion of the Phœnicians. He commits himself to no definite theory on the subject. We are pleased, however, to observe that his inclinations tend towards the Amarna epoch as the most appropriate background for the poem. He is dubious about the identification of Japheth with the Hittites, suggesting rather the Suti or Amurri. But all such surmises must necessarily remain

in the air, until the monuments throw more definite light on this whole period (pp. 156 f.).

We have already dealt with Dr. Skinner's analysis of the Abrahamic legend, and indicated his personal views regarding the historical reality of Abraham. These have been reached, not as the result of archæological research, for the monuments have so far yielded us nothing directly bearing on the personality of the patriarchs, but simply from the outstanding impression the heroic figure of Abraham makes on the mind. "It is difficult to think that so powerful a conception has grown out of nothing. As we read the story, we may well trust the instinct which tells us that here we are face to face with a decisive act of the living God in history, and an act whose essential significance was never lost in Israelite tradition" (p. xxvii.). The remaining patriarchs are vaguer figures. Isaac is but a feebler reflection of his great father. Jacob's history is mainly an amalgam of tribal movements,—though Dr. Skinner leaves open the question of his historical existence. With the figures of Lot and Esau the traditions of Israel are enriched by a blend of Moabite and Edomite folk-lore. The fathers of the twelve tribes are evidently eponyms. To what extent their adventures preserve the memory of real historical events may always remain obscure. In the case of Joseph the old national tradition has been intermixed with elements of Egyptian story, and worked up by popular imagination into the first and finest example in the Old Testament of what may be called "novelistic" narrative, the adventures of this "ideal character" being bound together "by the dramatic unity of a clearly conceived plot, the unfolding of which exhibits the conflict between character and circumstances, and the triumph of moral and personal forces amidst the chances and vicissitudes of human affairs" (p. 440). In his elucidation of these entrancing chapters, Dr. Skinner's psychological

insight and literary appreciation are seen at their best. Students of Genesis will long turn to his illuminating expositions with delight.

We are conscious that we have but touched the surface of a great work. We trust, however, that we have been able to give some idea of the consummate ability, judgment and sympathy with which it has been done.

ALEX. R. GORDON.

### *THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.*

#### XII. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE HISTORICITY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL CONSIDERED.

THERE can be no question about the independence of the Fourth Evangelist. His account of the visits of Jesus to Jerusalem is certainly not derived from the Synoptists, and even in regard to his subject matter on ground common to the Synoptic narratives and himself, a careful study shows that he did not merely repeat what the Synoptists say. He tells the story his own way and tacitly corrects them. The most striking correction of all concerns the date of the crucifixion. Whereas the Synoptists make the Last Supper a passover, and put the crucifixion on the 15th of Nisan, St. John says that the Supper was *before* the feast of the passover and he puts the crucifixion on the 14th of Nisan. Schmiedel allows that if the Fourth Evangelist is right in this, then his Gospel is to be regarded as correct all through, so crucial does this point seem to him to be. Schmiedel, however, thinks the Evangelist is wrong, and he refuses to regard this Gospel as history in any true sense of the word.

Professor Burkitt is also strongly opposed to the historicity of the Fourth Gospel, but it is a remarkable fact that he

considers the writer of it correct in his dating of the crucifixion. Schmiedel's concession then that the Gospel is to be credited if the author is right on this point is one that cannot be assumed to be granted by opponents generally.

It would take up too much space if we were to attempt to answer in detail all the various objections which have been urged against the Fourth Gospel as history. We may, however, single out some of the most important ones.

Professor Burkitt writes<sup>1</sup>: "The discrepancy between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptic narrative, i.e., St. Mark's Gospel, comes to a head in the story of the Raising of Lazarus. It is not a question of the improbability or impossibility of the miracle, but of the time and place and the effect upon outsiders." There is no room, he tells us, for the miracle in the historical framework preserved by St. Mark. "Is it possible that any one who reads the continuous and detailed story of Mark from the Transfiguration to the Entry into Jerusalem can interpolate into it the tale of Lazarus and the notable sensation that we are assured that it produced? Must not the answer be, that Mark is silent about the Raising of Lazarus because he did not know of it? And if he did not know of it, can we believe that, as a matter of fact, it ever occurred? In all its dramatic setting it is, I am persuaded, impossible to regard the story of the Raising of Lazarus as a narrative of historical events."

In answer to this criticism it may be said, first, that 'discrepancy' is not an appropriate word to use. If of two writers of the history of a period one narrates and the other omits a particular event, it cannot properly be said that there is a discrepancy between them. Secondly, it may be questioned whether the story given by St. Mark of the time from the Transfiguration to the Entry into Jerusa-

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 221 ff.

lem can fairly be described as 'continuous and detailed.' It certainly is not so if the Fourth Gospel be historical ; and it is simply a prejudging of the whole matter so to describe it. Thirdly, I can see no reason for supposing that if the miracle of the Raising of Lazarus really took place, St. Mark must have known of it.

In comparing the Fourth Gospel with the Synoptists one must ever remember that account must in all fairness be taken of all three of them, and not only of St. Mark. While it is generally recognised now that the author of 'Matthew,' and St. Luke used St. Mark, or what is practically the same as our St. Mark, it is clear that they had other sources of information, one of these being that which is commonly denoted by Q. The use of St. Mark and Q alone will not fully account for St. Luke's Gospel, though of course it is very difficult to decide how much of it falls outside these two sources.

Now, if we had St. Mark's Gospel only and knew nothing of the others we might suppose that when Jesus left Galilee (St. Mark x. 1) it was to go almost direct to Jerusalem for the Passover. Of course, if the Fourth Gospel be historical, this was not the case. And I venture to say, that if St. Luke's Gospel have any historical value independently of its connexion with St. Mark, there is room for the course of events as St. John gives them. It is, I readily allow, extremely difficult to extract from St. Luke's Gospel a chronological sequence of events, but it seems to be clear that, according to this writer, after Jesus had "stedfastly set His face to go to Jerusalem," when "the days were being fulfilled that he should be received up," a good deal happened which from St. Mark's narrative we should never have imagined. I contend that it is not only the Fourth Gospel which requires us to refuse to regard the story from the Transfiguration to the Entry into Jerusalem in Mark as



‘continuous and detailed.’ St. Luke’s story is inexplicable if we so regard it.

If we are to do justice to all the documents, we must not begin by assuming the completeness of St. Mark. My contention is that his Gospel is incomplete and needs to be supplemented from other sources. St. Mark does not say that when Jesus removed from Galilee and came into “the borders of Judaea [and] beyond Jordan,” He did so merely *en route* for the Passover Feast at Jerusalem. St. John’s Gospel leaves plenty of room for a stay in these parts between verses 21 and 22 of chapter x., and again in x. 40 it is expressly said that after the Feast of the Dedication Jesus “went away again beyond Jordan into the place where John was at the first baptizing; and there he abode.” It was from this place that, according to our Evangelist, Jesus was sent for, when Lazarus of Bethany was sick.

If the story of Lazarus in the Fourth Gospel be not historical, then the Evangelist has made very skilful use of an incidental notice in St. Luke, where Martha and Mary are named and their dispositions contrasted (x. 38–42). It is worthy of note that, although St. Luke does not name the village where these sisters lived, the visit of Jesus to their home falls in that section of the Gospel which follows upon the time when He had stedfastly set His face to go to Jerusalem. The place which it occupies in the Gospel, immediately after Jesus had spoken the parable of the Good Samaritan, itself suggestive of the neighbourhood appropriate to it, makes us feel that the village may well have been Bethany, which is the home of Martha and Mary according to the Fourth Evangelist.

Schmiedel exhibits some impatience with the Evangelist because he distinguishes the Mary of whom he is speaking as the one “which anointed the Lord with ointment and

wiped his feet with her hair." As the record of this anointing only comes later in the Gospel, Schmiedel considers it inappropriate to give this description before the incident of the anointing has been told. But this surely is hypercritical. The story of the anointing at Bethany was already known to those for whom our Evangelist wrote, and there seems to me to be nothing strange that when he mentions a woman bearing so common a name as Mary he should distinguish her as he does here.

Professor Burkitt recognises the wonderful dramatic setting of the story of the Raising of Lazarus. If the story be fiction, as we are asked to believe, this wonderful narrative must be set down to an extraordinary artistic power possessed by the writer. To this we must ascribe the contrast between the behaviour of the two sisters, which is so entirely in keeping with their dispositions as depicted in St. Luke. To this too must be due the graphic description of the despondency of Thomas: "Let us also go that we may die with him." We mark how entirely this agrees with the character of this Apostle as it is incidentally but consistently portrayed elsewhere in the same Gospel (St. John xiv. 5; xx. 24, 25). The fact that the portrayal is incidental, and by-the-way, has to be taken account of. It is easily explained if it be true to life, and a description of life; but not otherwise.

Dr. West-Watson, the Bishop of Barrow-in-Furness, has recently suggested<sup>1</sup> that though the miracle of the Raising of Lazarus is not recorded by any of the Synoptists, the fact of the miracle may offer an explanation of the question put to our Lord by the Sadducees on the subject of Resurrection, and also of the eagerness of the authorities, according to Matthew, to make the tomb of Jesus secure by the sealing of the stone.

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Theological Studies*, January, 1910. Note on The Peraean Ministry.

A rock of offence, second in formidableness only to the story of the Raising of Lazarus, is the anachronism of which the Evangelist is supposed to be guilty in placing the Eucharistic teaching given by Jesus a year too soon. In the third of these papers we referred to Schmiedel's objection that the meaning of the Eucharistic Supper is given a year before its time. This fact, taken in conjunction with the statement of the Evangelist that five hundred, if not a thousand, Roman soldiers go backward and fall to the ground before Him, whom they were to arrest, at the words "I am he," and with the weight of the spices applied to embalm the body of Jesus, is sufficient, according to Schmiedel, to prove that the Gospel has no historical value.

We have seen, however, that Schmiedel would forego even these objections if the Fourth Evangelist be right, as we have good reason to think that he is, as to the date of the crucifixion. Perhaps then this objection to the Eucharistic teaching is not quite so formidable as some would have us think.

Professor Burkitt goes even beyond Schmiedel in his opposition. Schmiedel objects to the meaning of the Eucharistic supper being given a year before its institution, but Professor Burkitt says: "It is evident that 'John' has transferred the Eucharistic teaching to the earlier Galilean miracle." Now I contend that this last is unfair criticism. It is true in a sense, as Schmiedel says, that the meaning of the Eucharistic supper is given a year before it was instituted. I say that *in a sense* this is true. It would be more accurate to say that a year before the institution of the Eucharistic supper, teaching was given which, when the Supper was instituted, served to give it meaning. But no reference is made to the Supper in St. John vi., so that the Evangelist is not guilty of an anachronism.

But Professor Burkitt goes further, and in so doing trans-

gresses the facts of the case, when he speaks of the Evangelist having transferred the Eucharistic teaching from the Last Supper to the earlier Galilean miracle. For where in the Synoptic story of the institution of the Lord's Supper do we find Eucharistic teaching? The Eucharist is then instituted, and the commandment is given to observe it, but there is no record of any teaching about it, except so far as the words, "This is my body" and "This is my blood" can be described as teaching. I have contended in a previous paper that these words which our Lord then used imply some previous teaching, such as we find in St. John vi., for their explanation.

Professor Burkitt says that the Fourth Evangelist by omitting the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper, "creates a false impression of the scene." He writes:<sup>1</sup> "The origin of the Christian rite of the common sacramental meal must have been known to every moderately instructed Christian, certainly to every one who would undertake to write an account of our Lord's life on earth, and we cannot suppose the Fourth Evangelist to have been ignorant of it. When, therefore, we find him writing an elaborate account of this last meal, including the announcement of the impending betrayal, in which, nevertheless, there is no mention of the epoch-making words of Institution, we can only regard his silence as deliberate. He must have deliberately left out this exceedingly important incident; and thereby, so far as the mere narrative of facts is concerned, he creates a false impression of the scene."

It is difficult to see how the Evangelist creates a false impression, seeing that, as Professor Burkitt allows, the origin of the common sacramental meal was known to every moderately instructed Christian. The Evangelist does not say that the Eucharist was not instituted at the Last Supper.

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 224.

He is simply silent on the point, deliberately silent, as Professor Burkitt says ; for why should he re-write what was already so well known ? He tells us a great deal about the Last Supper which otherwise we should not know, and I can see no reason to doubt that what he records is fact and not fiction. I think there is some truth in the idea that the Fourth Evangelist made it his aim to supplement the other Gospels. Surely we should be thankful for the additional information, rather than feel annoyance because of the absence of repetition of what we already knew. It is an abuse of words to say that the Evangelist, by omitting the account of the institution of the Eucharist and yet giving our Lord's sacramental teaching, preparatory to it, a year before, is guilty of a deliberate sacrifice of historical truth.

Again, Professor Burkitt accuses our Evangelist of giving a false impression respecting the Baptism of Jesus. "The descent of the Holy Spirit upon our Lord at His baptism by John is the commencement of the Ministry according to St. Mark. By this act, according to some early theologians, such as Aphraates, He received from the Baptist the sacerdotal gift. But the Fourth Evangelist will have none of it. The scene at the Jordan is indeed recorded by him, and John testifies to the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus ; but the central incident, the actual baptism of Jesus by John, is altogether left out. If the intention of the Evangelist had been to tell us what happened, if his intention had been to make us believe in Jesus because of what happened, such an omission would be nothing short of disingenuous."

This criticism seems to me strange indeed. The first statement is not correct, for St. Mark represents the ministry of Jesus as beginning after John was delivered up, so that it cannot accurately be said that, according to him, the baptism of Jesus is the commencement of the ministry. It is the Fourth Evangelist who makes the ministry begin at an

earlier time. And it is quite misleading to say, as Professor Burkitt does, that the baptism of Jesus is altogether left out in the Fourth Gospel. It is not described in detail, it is true. But, as I have already pointed out in the second paper of this series, it is implicit in the narrative. For it seems quite clear from the Baptist's words in i. 33 that the spirit descended upon Jesus at the time of His baptism: "*He that sent me to baptize with water, he said unto me, Upon whomsoever thou shalt see the Spirit descending and abiding upon him, the same is he that baptizeth with the Holy Spirit.*" "The central incident" is not the baptism, but the descent of the Spirit. This the Fourth Evangelist does not omit. His intention *is* to tell us what happened, whatever may be said to the contrary. He himself, as we have seen, came first to Jesus in consequence of the testimony of the Baptist to the descent of the Spirit which he had himself witnessed.

Objection is also taken to the miracles in the Fourth Gospel. Not but what there are miracles in the other Gospels, but the Fourth Evangelist is thought to carry the miraculous to excess. He certainly does not record a great number of miracles, but those that he does relate are considered to go beyond corresponding ones in the other Gospels. Thus Lazarus is raised from the dead after he has lain in the grave four days, whereas Jairus' daughter was raised shortly after death, and the widow's son at Nain before burial. The man at the pool of Bethesda had been thirty-eight years in his state of infirmity, and the blind man to whom Jesus gave sight had been blind from his birth. As regards these last two instances, we cannot say whether or not they go beyond miracles of healing given in the Synoptists. They tell of blind men to whom sight was restored, and blindness is blindness whether it dates from birth or not.

Schmiedel contends that the miracles in the Fourth Gospel

are symbolic and nothing more. Symbolic they well may be, and indeed plainly are, but the question is whether they are fact or fiction. If they are fact, the exactness of statement which we find in this Gospel may be explained by the writer's personal knowledge and information. If they are fiction and symbolic, a meaning must be found for the details. We may ask, What is the symbolism of the four days during which Lazarus had lain in the tomb? Schmiedel interprets the thirty-eight years of the malady of the sick man at the Pool of Bethesda in this way: For this length of time the Israelites had been obliged, as a punishment for their disobedience to God, to wander in the wilderness, without being permitted to set foot in the promised land. The sick man then represents the Jewish people, and in the five porticoes of the house in which he had so long hoped for a cure we may easily recognise the five books of Moses!

One would like to have an interpretation of the five and twenty or thirty furlongs that the disciples had rowed (St. John vi. 19) when they saw Jesus walking on the sea. Unfortunately here the number is not exact. But this gives some latitude for interpretation! It is much to be wished that Schmiedel would add this detail to the symbolic interpretation he gives of the miracle of the walking on the water. Of this he says<sup>1</sup> that it is certainly meant to serve to support the belief that at every celebration of the Lord's Supper, Jesus is really near to His people. The use of the word 'certainly' (*Sicherlich*) is certainly not justified. And such loose writing does not serve to commend Schmiedel's position in regard to the Fourth Gospel.

It must be allowed that some of the miracles that our Evangelist records are symbolic. They are speaking parables. This is plain from the words, "I am the Resurrection and the Life," in the story of the Raising of Lazarus, and

<sup>1</sup> *Das vierte Evangelium*, p. 79.

from the Lord's declaration, "I am the bread of life," following upon the feeding of the five thousand. But this only raises the miracles to a higher level. It makes them signs in a high and spiritual sense. But they are no signs at all if they be mere fiction.

Another objection raised is the difference between the manner of Jesus' teaching in the Fourth Gospel and that in the Synoptists. The latter abound in parables which are wholly absent in St. John. But it is absurd to suppose—and indeed the Synoptic writings themselves settle the point—that Jesus had only one method of teaching, viz., that by parables. That He employed this method widely is clear enough from the Synoptists, but there was no need for the Fourth Evangelist to repeat the parables which were already well known. Why should we doubt that Jesus made use of discourse as well as of parable ?

But it is complained that the manner of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel is unsympathetic and repellent. His way of addressing the Jews could not fail to turn them against Him. It must, however, be remembered that in this Gospel we are shown Jesus in the presence of those who opposed Him more than is the case in the other Gospels. And there are stern denunciations of Scribes and Pharisees even in the Synoptists. It is not possible to infer from the manner in which Jesus spoke to the simple folk in Galilee how He would address the religious authorities in Jerusalem. In the Synoptic narrative He is not represented as speaking smooth words to them. Perhaps there are some who think that Jesus ought to have made a compromise with the Jewish authorities instead of being so unbending. But the Fourth Gospel shows how impossible such a thing was. The claim of Jesus to come from God, whom He called His Father, was resented by the Jewish leaders from the first. Jesus had nothing to gain for Himself personally by pressing the claim.



The opposition is determined from the beginning and He plainly foresaw the issue of it. A stern protest against mercenary and legalistic religious views had to be made, and strife was inevitable. The opposition of the Jews in the Fourth Gospel arises from the action of Jesus in cleansing the temple when He said, "Make not my Father's house a house of merchandise," and from His supposed violation of the Sabbath, in justification of which He says: "My Father worketh hitherto and I work." This saying is thought to be provocative and possibly also to be ill-advised. But the question really is whether the claim of Jesus was true or not. One may be forgiven for suspecting that some of the opposition to the Fourth Gospel arises from a belief that it was not.

The question of the historicity of this Gospel is a crucial one. It is perfectly true that the Person of Christ as the Fourth Evangelist sets it forth does not go beyond what St. Paul in his Epistles represents it. But it would be a serious loss to us if we were deprived of the assurance we gain from the Fourth Gospel, if it be historical, that one who had lived in such close intimacy with Jesus in the days of His flesh came to believe in Him as the author of this Gospel does. His prologue sounds the keynote of what his faith in regard to Jesus Christ was. The answer to the question of the historical value of what is recorded in the Gospel as fact is the answer also to the question whether that faith was justified.

With this remark I bring this series of papers to a close, thanking those who have given me kind words of encouragement as the several papers have appeared, and hoping that they may prove of some use to other workers in the same field.

E. H. ASKWITH.

*THE LAMB OF GOD.*

WE may now ask if there are any expressions in the teaching of Jesus which are akin to the conceptions of the Messiah as Lamb. In all the four Gospels frequent reference is made to sheep and flocks. As in the prophetic literature the people are represented by Jesus as a flock of sheep. The phrase "the lost sheep of the house of Israel" occurs twice in Matthew x. 6, xiv. 24, and it is illustrated by the parable of the lost sheep in Matthew xviii. 12; Luke xv. 4, 6. In Luke xii. 32 we read, "Fear not little flock," and in the shepherd similitudes of John x. Jesus describes His followers as "My sheep," with which we may compare John xxi. 15, "My lambs," "My sheep."

There is a suggestion of sheep as strong, masterful creatures in Matthew vii. 15, "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves." Here only sheep can be meant which lead the flock ("*als Widdler.*") Similar ideas lie behind the word of Jesus to the Apostles: "Behold I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves" (Matt. x. 16; Luke x. 3). Luke has expressly the strong masculine word *ἀρνας*. Here, as in Matthew vii. 15, the apostles are represented as sheep in the midst of wolves not to characterise the danger of the position into which they are sent, but rather to show how the service which they are to render to the flock is distinguished from that which the wolves do to the flock; as God-sent leaders they are to lead and guide the flock instead of oppressing it as the false prophets do. As Luke has the strong word *ἀρνας*, so in keeping therewith is the phrase in Luke xxii. 35, 38, "And he that hath none let him sell his cloke and buy a sword," which does not suggest the image of sheep led to the slaughter, or of lambs defenceless among wolves; but rather that of rams able to fight. Thus Jesus

describes His emissaries, His missionaries, as leaders of the flock ; and if He does not characterise Himself by this image, this is because the image of the shepherd can be more fruitfully applied to His activities : of seeking the lost (Matt. xviii. 12, etc. ; Luke xv. 4, etc.), reviving the faint (Matt. ix. 36 ; Mark vi. 34), risking his life for the sheep (John x. 11).

Is there, then, no roundabout way in the utterances of Jesus from the image of the shepherd to even the beginning of that of the slain lamb, the lamb of sacrifice, which in later times pushed the image of the strong lamb into the background ? Spitta thinks there is none. The Synoptics as well as the Fourth Gospel always speak of the death of the shepherd. In Matthew xxvi. 31, Mark xiv. 27, we read, " I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered abroad." But the shepherd's death is not to the advantage of the flock, and there is not even a hint that the shepherd takes upon himself willingly the fate of death. It is different in the shepherd parables of the Fourth Gospel. In John x. 11 we read, " The good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep." The hireling fleeth, betakes himself into a safe place, instead of staking his life in conflict with the wolf. When Jesus came up to Jerusalem to the feast of Tabernacles, though according to chapter vii. 1 He had to leave Judaea for Galilee on account of the murderous designs of the Jews, He showed that He staked His life for His own. That and other occasions of facing the hostility of His enemies justify His being compared to a shepherd who does not flee from the wolf, but like a hero assails it. The phrase *τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν* has thus the meaning, as in xiii. 37, xv. 13, of staking life, not of giving up life. It goes ill with the sheep if the shepherd loses his life in battle with the enemy.

Another way of interpreting the phrase is found in x. 17, 18a, " Therefore doth the Father love me, because I lay down

my life that I may take it again. No one taketh it away from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again." Here the phrase means to "give up," "surrender," as the antithesis "to take it again" proves. The author of verses 17, 18*a* regards the death of the shepherd as an offering on behalf of the sheep. Spitta thinks that he thus abandons the clear meaning of the parable. The words at the close of verse 18, "this commandment received I from My Father," are referred to the giving up and the taking again of life. But how, asks Spitta, can the latter be understood in the sense of a command imposed by God? In verse 16, on the other hand, there is mention of a command laid upon Jesus, "them also I must bring." Accordingly verses 17, 18*a* are to be taken as an elaboration of the original text of John. Just as in chapter i. 29 the reviser of the Gospel introduced the later dogmatic conception of the sin-bearing lamb of sacrifice, so here he has expanded the thought of the shepherd courageously adventuring his life for the sheep into the thought of his sacrificing his life for their sake, a thought which contradicts the parable. But this reviser has done nothing else than what exegesis still does, when it explains the kindred words of Matthew xx. 28, Mark x. 45, "The Son of Man came . . . to give his life a ransom for many" as referring to the saving effects of Jesus' death. In the connexion in which they stand the words speak not of his death, but of his service, and should be understood from this point of view. They recall Genesis xlv. 33, which reads, "Now therefore let Thy servant, I pray thee, abide instead of the lad a bondman to my lord, and let the lad go up with his brethren," where the question is not of his death but of his willingness to give himself as a bondman. To give oneself as bondman that the many may be set free is the highest example of service. Jesus made Him-

self the servant of His people in order to deliver them that were bound in the bondage of Satan.

There remains but the Last Supper as a point of possible connexion between Jesus' own utterances and the image of Him as the Lamb of sacrifice ; but the Last Supper is not meant to be the Christian paschal meal, and has originally no connexion with the death of Jesus at all. Spitta here merely repeats the conclusion which he reached in an earlier work upon the Last Supper.

If, then, to conclude, there is no approach in the words of Jesus to the image of the slain lamb, and if in the other writings of the New Testament, with the exception of the Apocalypse, which is a motley mixture of Christian and Jewish elements, there is not a trace of the image of the lamb as leader, at what point did Christian reflection set about making the image of the lamb of sacrifice out of that of the lamb as leader ? It cannot be said with certainty. John i. 29 has clearly been influenced by Isaiah liii. 7, " As a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and as a sheep that before her shearers is dumb, yea, He opened not His mouth." And the same passage is connected in Acts viii. 26 with the conversion of the eunuch. The transference of the image of the suffering servant of Isaiah liii. to that of the historical Jesus was easily accomplished in Christian doctrine and without much reflection. Here, chiefly, lay the opportunity of transforming the warlike into the patient suffering lamb.

This change could not come about so easily, where the death of Jesus was regarded from the point of view of sacrifice. The Book of Hebrews is dominated all through by the idea of the death of Jesus as a sacrifice, the one sufficient and effectual sacrifice. Here, however, Jesus does not appear as the lamb of sacrifice, but as the High Priest who offers His own blood, like the shepherd who sheds his

blood for his sheep. That is intelligible enough. In the sacrifices of the Old Testament, which appear as types of the perfect sacrifice of Christ, the lamb as animal of sacrifice is not mentioned at all, but only the bull, the goat, the calf (cp. ix. 12 ; x. 4). The sacrifice of Christ could not possibly be symbolised by a lesser animal as victim. Even the relation in which the blood of Christ is brought to that of the sacrifice of the covenant of Exodus xxiv., in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the words of the institution of the Lord's Supper, gave no occasion to present the sacrifice of Jesus as that of an innocent lamb ; there the question is of bullocks.

On the other hand, the paschal lamb offered a point of connexion. In 1 Corinthians v. 7, 8 Paul uses the preparations for the feast of Passover as symbolic of what the Corinthians should do : " Purge out the old leaven, etc." " For our Passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ." As to the passage 1 Peter i. 19, its interpretation depends on whether one finds therein a reference to the history of the paschal lamb (Exod. xii.) or to the picture of the patient servant of Jehovah (Isa. liii.). There are points which seem to have reference now to the one and now to the other. If in such connexions Christ appears as the antitype of the paschal lamb, yet this one trait is not so fraught with meaning as that it alone could have given rise to the general conception of Christ as the lamb. Even the feature mentioned (Isa. liii. 7) does not in itself possess the power of creating the strongly defined image of the Lamb of God. In the one case as in the other the question is of comparing Christ with the lamb so far as it lets itself be slain without any wish of its own, and gives up its blood for the deliverance of men. From these comparisons the strong conception of Christ as lamb could scarcely arise, the conception which the Apocalypse sets before us, and which is presented in the

word of the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God" (John i. 36).

We have shown where it has its origin. To it have attached themselves in Christian literature the conceptions of the patient lamb and the blood of the paschal lamb. In the New Testament Apocalypse the two views stand side by side, yet relatively unharmonised. There is no need of any further attempt to show why the earlier view must succumb to the later. In the measure in which the death and resurrection of Christ became the central ruling point of Christian doctrine, the conception of the guiding and protecting activities of the Messiah and the corresponding image of the lamb as leader of the flock must needs retire.

Spitta rounds off his discussion with the remark that the kindred representations of Christ as lamb and as shepherd serve as the typical expression for the widespread sentimental view of the person of Jesus, which regards Him as a really passive, tender being, giving Himself up patiently and meekly to His destined sufferings. In the representation of the shepherd the weak caressing of the lambs and the will-less dying for the flock have no place in the words of Jesus, but rather the leading of the sheep, the toilsome search after the wanderer, and the heroic conflict on their behalf against their enemies; likewise in the representation of the lamb, it is not the meekness, the passivity, the uncomplaining, quiet, patient suffering which originally are brought to expression, but, on the contrary, the activity of one who goes before the flock and whose strong horns are raised against the foe. If Christianity is often felt to be as if it were forbiddingly effeminate, this does not go back to Jesus or to the image of Messiah adopted by Him, which is above all things manly. And in keeping with that is the record given by the earliest tradition of the life

and suffering of Jesus before it was altered by later interpretations of Old Testament types.

One hopes that out of an able, if somewhat difficult, discussion with very little of the grace of style to commend it, one may have been able to present some at least of the points that are fresh and helpful. One cannot but have sympathy with the author's aim to rebut the charge of effeminacy sometimes brought against Christ and Christianity. There is no ground, as he shows, for the charge, so far as the sayings of Jesus are concerned, and so far as the representations upon which the charge is based are concerned, when these are fully and fairly understood. Without any of Spitta's learning, but with a great deal more than Spitta's force, the latest advocate<sup>1</sup> of "Orthodoxy," with these leaping words, flings himself upon the same anti-Christian charge that Christ "was a gentle creature, sheepish and unworldly, a mere ineffectual appeal to the world." "Instead of looking at books and pictures about the New Testament, I looked at the New Testament. There I found an account not in the least of a person with his hair parted in the middle, and his hands clasped in appeal, but of an extraordinary being with lips of thunder and acts of lurid decision, flinging down tables, casting out devils, passing with the wild secrecy of the wind from mountain isolation to a sort of dreadful demagoguery, a being who often acted like an angry god and always like a god. Christ had even a literary style of His own, not to be found, I think, elsewhere; it consists of an almost furious use of the *à fortiori*. His 'how much more' is piled one upon another like castle upon castle in the clouds. The diction used about Christ has been, and perhaps wisely, sweet and submissive. But the diction used by Christ is quite

<sup>1</sup> G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, pp. 269-270.



curiously gigantesque ; it is full of camels leaping through needles, and mountains hurled into the sea. Morally, it is equally terrific ; He called Himself a sword of slaughter, told men to buy swords if they sold their coats for them. That He used other even wilder words on the side of non-resistance greatly increases the mystery ; but it also, if anything, rather increases the violence. Here we must remember the difficult definition of Christianity already given. Christianity is a superhuman paradox whereby two opposite passions may blaze beside each other"—the writer means fierceness and gentleness, the lion and the lamb.

That is an effective, an almost hyper-effective answer to the view which Spitta contests. In his own way, as we have seen, a way which will, perhaps, appeal to many rather than the other, Spitta sets himself to prove that it is a mistake to represent Christ as in any true sense a quiet, docile, passive creature, a lamb in the sheepish, sentimental meaning of the word, a victim with no will of its own. For what the image of the lamb suggests rather, as the sources show, is not passivity, but activity ; not submissiveness, but supremacy ; not dumb subjection, but fearless leadership ; the victor more than the victim. Spitta has done a service in sifting out the elements contained in the image and in giving value to an element which has often been forgotten out of deference to another. It may be questioned, indeed, whether Spitta has always ground enough for the statements or arguments upon which he builds up his contention. It is far from being a matter of agreement, e.g., that there are two parallel accounts in the first chapter of John—a point upon which, naturally, the critic lays a great deal of stress. No doubt there are indications, lying on the surface, of two narratives, perhaps an earlier and a later, and there is the difficulty of

understanding how the Baptist could possibly speak as he speaks in i. 29 of the Messiah, in terms of suffering and sacrifice which are terms of later experience and reflection. That difficulty, along with the other, do seem to lend some support to the hypothesis of parallels. The hypothesis is fundamental to the discussion, as it enables the critic to distinguish, as he thinks, between a Jewish and a Christian usage of the title Lamb of God and to trace the former to its source in Jewish literature. But if the hypothesis itself is open to question, so also is the attempt to establish a connexion—at least a Messianic connexion—with the Book of Enoch. It is true that in the imagery of the Book of Enoch reference is made to the horned lambs or rams, and in chapter xc. 9 we read, “And I saw till horns grew upon those lambs, and the ravens cast down their horns; and I saw till a great horn of one of those sheep branched forth and their eyes were opened.” The horned lambs are the Maccabees and “in the great horn,” as Charles says, “it is impossible to find any other than Judas Maccabaeus.”<sup>1</sup>

Spitta contends, however, that it signifies the Messiah, and supports his contention with a line of criticism which proves that the Messiah appears not merely after but before the judgment, and is the conqueror referred to in the text. On the other hand, Charles shows<sup>2</sup> that the Messiah is described as “a white bull to mark his superiority to the rest of the community of the righteous who are symbolised by sheep. . . . He has absolutely no function to perform, as he does not appear till the world’s history is finally closed. Accordingly His presence here must be accounted for through literary reminiscence, and the Messiah-hope must be regarded as practically dead at this period. The nation,

<sup>1</sup> *The Book of Enoch*, R. H. Charles, 1893, p. 251.

<sup>2</sup> *Book of Enoch*, pp. 30, 31, 258.

in fact, felt no need of such a personality so long as they had such a chief as Judas." Here is a wide difference between Charles and Spitta, which the latter can scarcely be said to overcome by his argument that the reference to the "white bull" is an addition, a doublet, etc. His argument is highly problematic. One may therefore doubt whether there is evidence enough in the Book of Enoch to allow of it being used as the direct source of the *ἀρνίον* of the New Testament. But even if Spitta fails to make good his critical findings, or some of them, it can scarcely be denied that there is evidence of a Jewish and a Christian usage of the title "Lamb of God," and Spitta has done well to distinguish them.

May we not say that there is continuity between them and not contradiction, that each needs the other as parts of one whole? Is it not just the paradox of Jesus that He is both victor and victim, leader and led? Granted that Spitta's main contention is established, that the thought underlying the image of the Lamb is that of leadership, and that this is the thought in the Baptist's mind<sup>1</sup> and the utterances of Jesus, yet that does not prevent other thoughts or other images flowing to it and fusing with it in the powerful solvent of Christian experience and reflection. There is nothing more significant in the New Testament than the way in which forms widely different from each other and remote in their origin are found combining together in order to express as adequately as possible the overpowering conviction of the worth and meaning of Jesus. Under the constraining inspiration of His Person we see the writers feeling out after the largest and most commanding symbols of their own and other times

<sup>1</sup> The point is not referred to by Spitta, but might not this give a fresh sense and setting to the Baptist's question in Matt. xi. 3?

and forcing them into the mould of their emotion and belief. It is one of the miracles of His Person that it exhausts all forms but is exhausted by none. It marvellously holds together a mass of antitheses which otherwise fly apart and never fuse. "What most of all impresses me in the man Christ Jesus," once wrote Martineau, "is a singular harmony of opposites, a union of contrasted attributes which I nowhere else behold or hear of." Now we find this union of contrasted attributes, this harmony of opposites from the first in the consciousness and afterwards in the utterance and action of the Person Himself. Thus the voice at the Baptism, "Thou art my Son, the Beloved, in whom I am well pleased," blends the ideal king of the 2nd Psalm and the servant of the Lord of Isaiah xlii. As it has been well put, "it was His own figure, His own calling and destiny that rose before Him in the ideal king of the Psalmist and the lowly servant of the Prophet; it was His inmost conviction and assurance from this hour that both ideals were to be fulfilled in Himself. The voice of God addressed Him in both characters at once."

It was in this consciousness of Himself, and because of it, that Jesus entered on the work which the Gospels describe. Towards the end it comes vividly into view. Thus the last of the sections in Mark dealing with the Messiah and the Cross contains the striking reminiscence, "And they were in the way going up to Jerusalem, and Jesus was striding on in front, and they were amazed, and they that followed were afraid." Thus pre-occupied, absorbed, intent, as we are told, "He took again the twelve and began to tell them the things that were to happen unto him." Deliberately He addressed them yet again on the one absorbing theme. He was conscious there was a divine necessity in the things at hand, and He sought to enlighten the disciples concerning it. One indication that even yet they

did not understand is shown by the request of James and John. Their minds were pre-occupied too, but with *other* "things." "Grant unto us that we may sit, one on thy right hand, and one on thy left hand in thy glory."

He accepts, as it has been said, "their implied homage to Him as the King" but He comprehends as they do not the way which leads to the throne. It is, of course, the way of service culminating in sacrifice. "Verily the Son of Man—who is to sit on the throne of His glory—came not to be ministered unto but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many." We have seen that Spitta compares this passage with Genesis xlv. 33, but the same idea, as Dr. Denney says, is found in Psalm xlix. 7; Job xxxiii. 22, and "pervades Isaiah liii., where there is the same contrast as here between one and many—the one Righteous Servant and the many whom He justifies and whose sins He bears at the cost of giving His life for them" (Isa. liii. 10–12). It was only carrying service to its utmost limit when He gave His life a ransom for them. "The ideas were not new, the new thing was that He felt they were to be fulfilled in *His* Person and through *His* Passion."

But one need not proceed any farther along this familiar line of thought. Enough that in His own consciousness of Himself Jesus brought and blent together the conceptions of ideal king and lowly servant committed to death. He is both victor and victim. He carries the spirit of the king into His death as servant. His necessary death is a death of freedom, a death in which He does not cease to be leader though led to the slaughter. Spitta may be quite right in contending that John i. 29 is later than John i. 36, that "Behold the Lamb of God" simply, in the meaning he gives to the phrase, is quite conceivable as uttered by the Baptist, but it is going too far to say that the other phrase, "that taketh away the sin of the world,"

is the importation of an idea alien to the Fourth Gospel, and that the last Supper has no reference or relation to the death of Jesus at all. Professor E. F. Scott, in his able study of the Fourth Gospel, seems to agree with Spitta when he says that in John i. 29 "we have nothing but a vague concession to the earlier doctrine" (the Pauline doctrine of forgiveness and atonement). "Against the single text in which Christ is regarded as the great sacrifice for sin, we have to set the whole Gospel, which not only leaves this idea to a side, but moves in a world of thought quite alien to it." I rather think that that is less than the truth, and that the phrase "taketh away the sin of the world" represents that deepening or broadening of the Christian consciousness through the illumination of the Spirit "guiding into all the truth" by which it drew together in a way the Baptist could not do, and fused in one, ideas or images which, though known to prophecy and later thought, became possessed therein of a new and rich significance. And as such it has a fitting place in the Gospel. It would be strange indeed if the Fourth Gospel, whose thought is kindred to the thought of Paul, should have nothing to say as to the sacrificial nature of the death of Christ or as to its connexion with the fact of sin. Spitta may rule out chapter x. 17, 18a, but that and chapter i. 29 are not the only passages—if our appeal is to passages—which bear upon His death. Have we not a striking allusion in the author's comment on the counsel of Caiaphas (chap. xi. 50 f.), "You do not take account that it is expedient (*συμφέρει*, profitable, of advantage) for you that one man should die for the people and that the whole nation perish not. Now . . . he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation, and not for the nation only, but that He might also gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad." It is a comment, one would think, the Evangelist would

never have made unless his mind had been familiar with the thought of the saving significance of His death.

May we not claim, further, that we meet with the same thought in connexion with the new birth in chapter iii. and in connexion with the Supper in chapter vi. ? There is the statement in the former that "as Moses . . . even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth may in him have eternal life," which the Evangelist in chapter xii. 33 tells us Jesus used to signify "by what manner of death He should die," and in the latter there is the statement that "as the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father ; so he that eateth me, he also shall live because of me," which points to the connexion, the mystical connexion, between the life of the Christian and the death of Christ. We have not only these and other allusions in the Gospel to the saving import of the death, but in the First Epistle of John, which cannot be separated from the Gospel, belonging as it does to the same tendency or school of thought, we find a series of declarations which point in the same direction. As, e.g., in the great passage in the fourth chapter, "Herein was the love of God manifested in our case, that God hath sent his only begotten Son into the world that we might live through Him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins" (1 John iv. 4-10). It is Jesus Himself and not His blood or His death that is described as "propitiation." The same designation occurs in 1 John ii. 2, and in iii. 5 it is said, "Ye know that he was manifested to take away sins," the term "take away" being the same term as in John i. 29. No doubt the emphasis in the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle is not so strong upon the relation of Jesus to sin and the sinner as in the Synoptics and Paul, but it will not do to say that in the Gospel with which we must connect the

Epistle this side of His activity almost disappears. "Christ is the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," He is the Son of Man uplifted on the Cross. He is the *ἰλασμός*, the source of which is God Himself; Who is faithful and righteous to forgive the penitent and cleanse from all unrighteousness.

From all this it may emerge that the title Lamb, as applied to Jesus, is touched with the richness and variety of Christian experience itself. It cannot be limited to the one aspect which Spitta labours to define. That aspect needed to be defined, it needed to be brought back to a position of prominence, it needed to be reaffirmed in view of the one-sided prominence of another aspect. The "Lamb" tells of the Leader, the Protector, the hero-king, one who is conscious both of His duty and worth to others, but naturally and of necessity other allusions bearing on the lamb of sacrifice were drawn into contact and mixed with it in the anxiety of men to find the most complete and comprehensive expression of their faith in Jesus. Yet the lamb of sacrifice in Christian theology has tended to absorb the lamb as leader, an exaggeration which finds no justification in the teaching of Jesus or the theology of John. Just as in Jesus' consciousness there was a harmony betwixt the conceptions of ideal king and lowly suffering servant, so in the term or title Lamb there is a similar commingling of opposites, lamb as leader, and lamb as led; lamb as victor, and lamb as victim. He does not lay aside His leadership in being led, nor His power to vanquish, in becoming a victim. Rather in being led to death He rises to the climax of His activity, in giving Himself as victim, He obtains the victory which is virtually the life of the world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> F. Spitta returns to the same theme in his more recent work, *Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*, 1910.



It was impossible but that in the extraordinary expansion of thought, the extraordinary assimilation of opposites, which Jesus brought about in men's minds, the conceptions of lamb as leader and lamb as victim should come together and coalesce. But the one should not be lost in the other. Each is an element in the whole. It is possible to give such emphasis to the lamb as victim that the lamb as leader is lost to view. It has to be admitted that this is often what has happened through the ages of Christian theology. But Christ has other relations than to the fact of sin. Sin does not cover the whole activity and purpose of His life and death. It does not cover the whole extent of the title Lamb. It is just as much an extreme to say that His career had no relation to sin as to say that it had no relation to anything but sin. We must preserve the balance. Perhaps the author of the Hebrews brings us as near as possible to the whole truth when he says, "How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through Eternal Spirit offered Himself to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God." Christ is not only the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, but also the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne; He shall be their Shepherd, and shall guide them unto fountains of waters of life.

JAMES ROBERTSON CAMERON.

## LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.\*

## XVIII.

*ὀψώνιον*.—This word is fully illustrated by Deissmann *BS* 148, 266, and it is sufficient to add one or two instances of it that have since appeared. Thus in the parental letter *OP* 531, cited above under *ὀψάριον*, the writer continues, l. 20 ff., ἀπὸ τοῦ σοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸ ὀψώνιον σου καὶ τῶν σῶν ἐξοδίασον ἕως πέμψω, which the Editors translate “you must pay for the provisions of yourself and your household out of your own money, until I send you some,” while in *OP* 744 (B.C. 1) εἰάν εὐθύς ὀψώνιον λάβωμεν ἀποστελῶ<sup>1</sup> σε ἄνω they translate “if I receive a present soon I will send it up to you.” In *OP* 514<sup>3</sup> (ii/A.D.) it occurs in a receipt ὑπὲρ ὀψωνίου, “on account of salary”: cf. *TbP* 391<sup>20</sup> (A.D. 99), τὸ δὲ ὀψόνιον τοῦ μαχαιροφόρου, “the salary of the sword-bearer.” To Deissmann’s examples from the inscriptions Thieme (p. 31) adds *Magn.* 116<sup>54</sup> (time of Hadrian) ὀψωνίου, “wages” for the cultivation of arable land. And finally in *GH* 63<sup>4</sup> (iii/A.D.), εἰς λόγον ὀψωνίου, the Editors suggest the word may mean “interest,” and compare *BU* 69<sup>71</sup> (A.D. 120), ἄς καὶ ἀποδώσω σοι τῷ ἔγγιστα δοθησομένῳ ὀψωνίῳ (on which cf. *Proleg.* <sup>2</sup> or <sup>3</sup>, 75).

*παιδάριον*.—The latitude of this word, formally a diminutive, is well seen in its record. In *Syll.* 797 (ii/B.C.) τὸ π. ὃ Ἀννύλα κύει is of course an unborn child, while in *Tobit* vi. 2, 3, it describes a young man who can drag on shore the magic fish that is to supply the safeguard for his marriage. In *BU* 1079<sup>15</sup> (41 A.D.), ἐγὼ παιδάριν εἰμί comes in an earnest plea addressed to a Jew moneylender,

\* For abbreviations see the February and March (1908) *EXPOSITOR*, pp. 170, 262.

<sup>1</sup> Note the interchange of 1st plur. and sing. and see *Proleg.* 86 f.

and designed (not very confidently) to soften Shylock's heart. In Witk. p. 85 (ii/B.C.) a mother congratulates her son and herself because he is learning *Αἰγύπτια γράμματα* and will soon be able to teach τὰ παιδάρια in a school. BM iii. 177<sup>5</sup> (8 B.C.), where 12 dr. are entered as paid παιδαρίωι ὑπάρνω ἀγέλῃ, implies a boy old enough to look after sheep.

παιδεύω.—BU 846<sup>11</sup> (ii/A.D.)—the abject appeal of Antonius Longus, an illiterate soldier, to his mother—gives παιπαιδεύμαι in the sense “I have been taught a lesson,” but a gap in the context makes it not quite clear.

πανήγυρις.—The word is common in inscriptions relating to *res sacrae*, but seems to have remained in ordinary use. Thus BU 1074<sup>9</sup> (iii/A.D.—official) . . . ]εῖναι οἱ καθ' ἐ[κάστην πα]νήγυριν ἀγωνοθέται πειθαρχήσουσιν. OP 41<sup>1</sup> (iii/iv A.D.), . . .]αρίας πανηγύρεως οὔσης opens (fragmentarily) a very incoherent report of a public meeting. FP 93<sup>11</sup> (161 A.D.), χωρὶς ἀγορῶν σὺν πανηγύρεσιν, “with the exception of markets and festivals.” OP 705<sup>35</sup> (200 A.D.), καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὴν τῶν ἐπιεικίων ἡμέραν ἐκάστου ἔτους πανηγυρίζοντας. “Festal assembly” would apparently render the word best in Heb. xii. 23.

πανοπλία.—In *Syll.* 652<sup>26</sup> (early iii/A.D.) the *ephebi* are ordered to be reviewed at a religious festival in Attica [ἔχοντας] τὴν πανοπλίαν. The incorrect optative in this very formal inscription is the hallmark of archaising style; but the word apparently continued in ordinary use.

παντελής.—The New Testament only has this word in the phrase εἰς τὸ παντελές, Luke xiii. 11, Heb. vii. 25: so BM iii. p. 161<sup>11</sup> (212 A.D.) a man sells some property ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν εἰς τὸ παντελές. This would support a temporal meaning in Heb. *l.c.*—“to save *finally*,” which suits well the πάντοτε that follows: so long as our Intercessor lives

our *σωτηρία* is assured. In Luke *l.c.* the meaning is like that of *παντελῶς* in Witk. p. 40 (168 B.C.), *π. ἀηδίζομαι*, "I am in utter distress": so in LIP 26<sup>2</sup> (iii/B.C.) the land is *π. ἀπηργμένη*, "entirely uncultivated" (edd.).

*παντοκράτωρ*.—Cumont *Les Religions Orientales* p. 267 quotes a dedication from Delos, *Διὶ τῷ πάντων κρατοῦντι καὶ Μητρὶ μεγάλῃ τῇ πάντων κρατούσῃ* (*B.C.H.* 1882, p. 502): see the whole note on this attribute of omnipotence assigned to the Syrian and Phrygian deities. On the word see Deissmann *B.S.* 283.

*παραβολεύομαι* is cited by Deissmann (*Licht v. Osten* 55) from an inscr. of ii/A.D. which is under no suspicion of appropriating a coinage of a New Testament writer.

*παραγίνομαι*.—Allusion was made in the EXPOSITOR for May, p. 413, to Harnack's description of this word (*Sayings of Jesus*, p. 86): he asserts that it is "a choicer (*gewählter*) word than ἦλθον." This is true to about the same extent as it is that *arrive* is "choicer" than *come*. It is quite superfluous to quote passages for this extremely common word, which occurs some thirty times in Witkowski's little volume of Ptolemaic private letters, four of them being in letters marked as of men "non eruditorum."

*παράδεισος*.—The most essential features of this foreign word cling to it in its wide popular use and pass on into the applications found in the Bible. The Modern Persian *pālēz* means a garden, as does *παράδεισος* from the earliest records we have of it in Greek. The Zend *pairi-daeza* is a walled enclosure—the cognates of its two elements would produce *περίτοιχος* in Greek. A garden of fruit-trees (protected presumably by a wall) is the general idea of it as seen in the papyri, where it is very common. Thus we have PP ii. 22, *εἰς ἀλλότριον κλῆρον ἢ π. ἢ κῆπον ἢ ἀμπελῶνα*, bringing together "plot or orchard or garden or vineyard." In BM iii. 69 (211 A.D.) there is a payment on

account of an *ἐλαιωνοπαρά*<sup>s</sup>—an olive orchard. In PP i. 16 (2),<sup>7</sup> (230 B.C.) Mahaffy translates τὰ γενήματα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων μοι π. “the produce of my parks,” but the mere mention of *produce* shows that “orchards” are meant. From Genesis to Revelation fruit-trees are an essential part of the imagery connected with Eden. Milton’s picture brings in the wall as well. And this part of the word’s connotation suits strikingly the thought of that “fold” of God over whose jasper wall “great and high” the “first grand Thief” shall never climb! See further *Notes* ii and Deissmann *BS* 148.

*παραθήκη*.—See *Notes* iii for three exx. of this form. Add BU 520<sup>5</sup> (Jan. 172 A.D.) ὁμολογῶ ἔχω π[αρά σοῦ] ἐν παραθήκῃ 300 dr., to be paid back in May–June. TbP 387<sup>4</sup> (73 A.D.) has ἐν π. in the same formula; 392<sup>19</sup> (134 A.D.) has [καθ’ ὁ]μολογεῖαν παρα[θή]κης, “by a contract of deposit.” In the same sense may be cited BM iii. p. 170<sup>13</sup> (134 A.D.) and 175 (fin.) a century later: this last promises to repay [κατ’]ὰ τὸν τῶν παραθηκῶν νόμον, another parallel to νόμος in Romans vii. 2. *Syll.* 814<sup>4</sup>, a leaden tablet found in the temple of Demeter at Cnidus (Audollent *Defixiones* p. 5 cites authorities for dating it ii/i B.C.), devotes to Demeter and Kore and the other infernal gods τοὺς λαβόντας παρὰ Διοκλεῦς παραθή[καν] καὶ μὴ ἀποδιδόντας ἀλλ’ ἀποστεροῦντας. A special use is seen in *Syll.* 848<sup>3</sup> (ii/B.C.), where Asandros of Beroea ἀνατίθησι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Πυθίῳ ἐλευθέραν ἐμ παραθήκῃ Εὐπορίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ παιδίσκην καταβεβληκυῖαν 200 dr. (The reader of Deissmann’s *Licht v. Osten* will remember his striking pages in which he applies to New Testament exegesis the custom of emancipation by sale to a god.) Here Dittenberger remarks that the practice is varied: ἐμ π. implies that the freedom of Euporia is committed as a charge to Apollo’s care. This might be used to illustrate the R.V. text in 2 Timothy i. 12. But it seems highly

improbable that the identic phrase should be used with solemn reiteration thrice (1 Tim. vi. 20 ; 2 Tim. i. 12, 14) and have a totally different meaning in one of the passages, especially where *παράθου* in 2 Timothy ii. 2 stands as its key. The passages we have cited will suffice to show how strongly the common use of this word must have coloured Paul's application. The parables of the Talents and the Pounds were in his thought, and a more terrible curse than Demeter and Kore could inflict on those " who restore not but keep back " the sacred deposit placed in their care.

*παράκλητος*.—For its verb very many citations may be made: we give at present only illustrations of the verbal. BU 601<sup>12</sup>, a very illiterate letter of ii/A.D., shows it in a sentence well supplied with *δυσνόητα*. Krebs gives it *Ἐὺ οὖν ποιήσης γράψον μοι περὶ τῆς οἰκίας, ὅτι τί ἔπραξας, καὶ τὸν ἀραβῶνα τοῦ Σαραπίωνος παρακλος* (i. *παράκλητος*) *δέδωκα αὐτῷ, καὶ γράψον μοι περὶ τῆς ἀπυγραφῆς* (i. *ἀπογ.*). In the previous sentence the writer says she has deposited in Demeter's temple the *καλαμεσιτὰ ἀσπαλίσματα* (query " bonds written with a pen " ?) *τῆς οἰκίας*. Does she mean *παρακληθεῖσα* by her *παράκλ(η)τος*, i.e. " on being summoned " ? The negative of the verbal occurs in *OGIS* 248<sup>25</sup> (reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, 175–161 B.C.) " that the Demos (of Athens) may. . . show that it honours those who benefit itself and its friends *ἀπαρακλήτους*," i.e. uninvited. See Deissmann's note (*L. v. O.* 242 f.) where he rightly lays stress on the borrowing of the word in Hebrew and Aramaic as evidence of its popular use. Dr. Hastings in his *D.B.* gives an excellent summary of the facts, though we demur to his suggestion that Aquila and Theodotion could have been influenced by a prevalent (mis)interpretation of John.

*παρακολουθέω*.—Witk. p. 63 (=ParP 46<sup>19</sup>, 153 B.C.)

gives this word at the end of an appeal of Apollonius to his brother Ptolemaeus to examine personally into his grievance against a third party: νομίζω γὰρ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρακολουθήσαντά σε τῆι ἀληθείαι πικρότερον \* προσενεχθήσεσθ' αὐτῶι, "when you have investigated the truth you will deal with him most severely." This comes nearest to Luke i. 3, where it is quite possible to render "having investigated all the facts afresh," according to the other meaning of ἀνωθεν: the verb suits this or the RV rendering equally. A weaker sense, to "follow" a matter intelligently with the mind, occurs in *Syll.* 790<sup>90f.</sup> and an inscr. quoted in Dittenberger's note, in both with the accusative, also in PP ii. 39 (g)<sup>13</sup> οἶμαί σε παρακολουθεῖν. StrP 22<sup>20</sup> (iii/A.D.) has π. meaning "to follow, result": Preisigke quotes TbP 28<sup>2</sup> (c. 114 B.C.) and BM i. p. 202<sup>48</sup>—add Rein P 18<sup>15</sup> (108 B.C.). This is probably the meaning in [Mark] xvi. 17 (unless the simplex is read with W.-H. *text*)—"these signs shall result for those who have believed." Finally for 1 Timothy iv. 6, 2 Timothy iii. 10, we may quote *Syll.* 664<sup>9</sup> (i/B.C.), [παρ]ηκολουθηκέμαι αὐτὰς τοῖς ὑπ[ὸ τοῦ] δήμου ἐψηφισμέ[νοις].

παρακούω.—HbP 170 (247 B.C.), the conclusion of a letter, ends φρόντισον δὲ ὅπως μηκέτι ἀπὸ τούτων παρακούσει ἡμῶν ἵνα μὴ ἀντὶ φιλίας ἔχθραν [ποώ]μεθα. τούτου γὰρ οὐνεκεν πρὸ πολλοῦ σοι γράφω. The meaning and construction are like Matthew xviii. 17. *Syll.* 256<sup>24</sup> (c. 200 B.C.), ὡς δὲ ἐπιβαλόμενοι παρη[κ]οῦσθησα[ν]= "were refused." In *Par. Magique de Paris* 3037 διὰ τὸ παρακούειν αὐτόν= "because of his (Pharaoh's) refusal to hear."

παραλαμβάνω.—For this common word only a brief note is needed at present. It is the usual expression for receiving anything but money, for which ἀπέχω (aorist ἔσχον) is regularly used. Its correlative, as in the New Testament,

\* Cf. Matt. xxvi. 75.

is παραδίδωμι : thus *Syll.* 588 (ii/B.C.), an immense account of ἀναθήματα in the Temple of Apollo at Delos, begins τάδε παρελάβομεν ἐν τῷ ναῶι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος παρὰ ἱεροποιῶν (named predecessors in office of those who make this inventory), καὶ παρέδομεν τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἱεροποιοῖς (names follow). Wileken *Ostr.* i. 109 quotes a few instances of ἔλαβον in receipts with its "synonym παρέλαβον" in one place : on the relation of παρέλαβον to ἔλαβον in John i. 11 f. see *Proleg.* 115.

παραμένω is common, but we only quote one special use. In PFi 44<sup>19</sup> (158 A.D.) parents offer in lieu of interest for a loan the services of their son [παρα]μένοντα τῷ Δημητρίῳ κ[αὶ ποιοῦν]τα τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα αὐτῷ. Vitelli notes that "παραμένειν (cf. παραμονή) is a common euphemism for serve" : he quotes the will of Gregory Nazianzen, αὐτῇ παραμεῖναι τὰς κόρας μέχρι τοῦ τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς χρόνου. Such a nuance would heighten the force of Phil. i. 25, and still more that of Jas. i. 25—the "service" of a "law of freedom" is a striking phrase. For other exx. cf. TbP 384<sup>21, 32</sup> (A.D. 10—a boy apprenticed to a weaver for a year) *Syll.* 840<sup>9</sup> (100 B.C.—a slave boy manumitted, but to stay, with his master till he dies), etc. The service is clearly free : Vitelli's "euphemism" must not be pressed too far.

παραμυθία.—BU 1024, a long legal report of iv/v A.D., mentions in vii.<sup>12ff.</sup> an old woman who sold her daughter πορνοβοσκῶ, ἵνα δυνηθῶ διατραφῆναι. The girl is murdered, and the mother demands that the murderer παρασχεῖν αὐτῇ εἰς λόγον διατροφῶν ὀλίγην τινὰ τοῦ βίου παραμυθίαν : the word seems to have developed into "the comforts of life," as with us—it is at any rate "consolation" in a money form that the old wretch wants.

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## *DIVORCE AND THE LAW OF CHRIST.*

UNFORTUNATELY, a good deal of Christian thinking has to be done in regard to certain matters that are not pure, or lovely, or of good report. One of the most persistent of these unpleasant topics is Divorce, which, so far from having been disposed of by centuries of controversy, has re-emerged as one of the most urgent of our social and moral problems. Protestantism has a special responsibility for the guidance of modern opinion on the subject, inasmuch as the overthrow of the mediaeval conception of the indissolubility of marriage was due to its influence, and it is under a consequent obligation to make clear the line which divides justifiable relaxations from a license at once inconsistent with Christian principles and prejudicial to the best interests of society. An additional reason for reverting to the question is that recent criticism seems to have weakened the Biblical position from which Protestantism was wont to combat the rigour of the Roman Catholic law of divorce as a tyrannical perversion of the mind of Christ. The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether marriage can be held to be dissoluble on Christian principles at all, and if so what are the grounds of divorce which may be safely allowed by public authority. But it may serve to elucidate the issues to touch first on the salient features of the earlier periods of conflict.

### I. THE EPOCHS OF CONTROVERSY.

It is a significant fact—significant as showing how vitally ethical interests are bound up with the marriage-law, that

even the periods which had a preponderant interest in doctrinal controversy had their passionate contentings as to the nature and limitations of divorce.

The first phase of conflict was due to the collision between the ideals of the Church and the law of the Roman Empire. In the period before Constantine, liberty of divorce was practically unlimited, and even after Christianity became the religion of the Empire, the tension was little diminished. Constantine, it is true, so limited the grounds of divorce as to approximate to the law of the Church ; but his successors felt themselves compelled to yield to the pressure of an unsubdued pagan spirit, and from the sixth to the ninth century the civil law again tolerated divorce by consent. But however its relations with the Empire might vary, and whatever might be offered by way of compromise, the Church held tenaciously to its doctrine that adultery alone justifies the termination of a marriage-union. "The other causes of divorce which were recognised in civil law were never admitted by the Church. Those accordingly who carried out a divorce according to the license of the civil law, and contracted a second marriage were regarded as bigamous persons by the Church, and subjected to penalties under canon law " (Suicer, *Thesaurus*, i. p. 885). The only writer of the period who pleads for the recognition of additional grounds is one whose credit, which would otherwise be respectable, has seriously suffered from the attachment to him of a barbarous name which suggests that he appears among the fathers under false pretences.

"It is not a valid marriage," says the so-called Ambrosias-ter on 1 Corinthians vii., "which is without the fear of God, and therefore it is not sin for the spouse who is put away on account of God to contract marriage with another. . . . For if Ezra made all believing wives and husbands to be put away, so that God was not angry but well-pleased if they took

others from their own race, how much more will one be at liberty, in the case of an unbeliever departing, to marry at will a person of one's own persuasion."

As to re-marriage after divorce, even in the case of the innocent party, there was difference of opinion. The rigorist view was first voiced by Hermas. "What then," he inquires of the angel, "shall the husband do if the wife continue in adultery?" "Let him divorce her," saith he, "and let the husband abide alone; but if, after divorcing his wife, he shall marry another, he likewise committeth adultery" (Pastor, *Mandate* iv. 1). An early canon may be quoted to the same effect: "As for those who overtake their wives in adultery, the same being young men, and believers and forbidden to marry, it was resolved that as far as possible they be advised not to marry again during the lifetime of their first spouses (Synod of Arles, A.D. 314). St. Augustine argued at length in support of the view in *De Conjugiis adulterinis*, and indeed seldom lost an opportunity of advocating it. On the other hand, there is a catena of patristic passages which sanctioned re-marriage in the specific case, and a series of synodical decisions which at least imply permission; while it is certain that the liberal construction was largely operative in Christian practice (Cosin, *Argument on the Dissolution of Marriage*, Works, iv. p. 489 ff.). This view, natural as it was, and the obvious suggestion of the passages in St. Matthew, would doubtless have prevailed had not the rigorist attitude been re-inforced from other quarters. One factor making in the opposite direction was the disparaging estimate of marriage which made it appear to be in the interests of sanctity to discourage it on every colourable pretext (Athenagoras, *Plea*, c. 34). Another factor was the valuation of marriage as a sacrament, which was held to imply that a married person, though divorced, could no more be allowed to form a second marriage

than a baptized person, though apostate, could again receive baptism. (*Augustine, De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*).

In the end the Western Church succeeded in establishing the principle of absolute indissolubility. It even carried the point—for which the Eastern Church made no stand—that adultery merely justified a separation from bed and board, and not a dissolution of the bond. And in this matter a tribute must be paid at least to the courage of the Roman Catholic Church. It may sometimes be unduly compliant with human infirmity, but it is not easy to mention instances in which the Protestant Church has made so bold a stand against the tendencies of the natural man which lie on the debatable ground between morality and immorality. On the other hand, in pressing to an extreme the principle of indissolubility, it had been guilty of an error of judgment which forced it into crooked courses, and even tended to undermine the institution which it had set itself to safeguard. The necessity of divorce in some shape had to be conceded, and the Church had recourse to the expedient of dissolving marriage on the ground of nullity *ab initio*. A system of impediments to marriage was elaborated of so far-reaching a kind that while it was certain a person could not be nominally divorced, it was also difficult to be sure that he had ever been validly married. “None could be surely knit and bounden, but it should be in either of the parties’ power and arbiter, casting away the fear of God by means and compasses to prove a pre-contract, a kindred and alliance, or a carnal knowledge, to defeat the same” (32 Henry VIII., c. 38).

2. In the Protestant controversy with Rome it was maintained, as against the doctrine of absolute indissolubility, that the bond of marriage is dissolved in the case of adultery. “I marvel,” wrote Luther, “that they should compel a man to be celibate who has been separated by divorce from

his spouse, and not allow him to take another wife. For if Christ allows divorce in the case of fornication, and compels no one to be celibate, while Paul would have a man to marry rather than to burn, He seems to allow the taking of another wife in room of the divorced" (*De Captivitate Babylonica*). It was also generally held by the Reformers that I Corinthians vii. 15 justified divorce with re-marriage in the case of malicious and prolonged desertion. On this point Calvin and Beza agreed with Luther and Melancthon, though the Lutherans went further in their definition of desertion, which came to include conspiracy against the life or the chastity of a spouse. Cranmer expounds the law on Lutheran lines in the abortive *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*. Possibly John Knox opposed the recognition of desertion, for in the First Book of Discipline mention is made of adultery only as a ground of divorce; and it may have been due to the weight of his opinion that the General Assembly hesitated to follow the continental reformers, and dissociated itself from the Act of the Scots Parliament which in 1573 legalised divorce for desertion. By the middle of the seventeenth century, opposition to the extension had died down in Scotland. The Westminster Confession, which allows desertion, was approved as in nothing contrary to the doctrine of the Church. Curiously enough John Forbes, of Corse, the most distinguished theologian of the Episcopal school, in his *Theologia Moralis* not only recognised desertion, but included in it, in the extreme Lutheran fashion, attempts to corrupt or pervert a spouse.

On a first impression one may have an uneasy suspicion that the Reformers unconsciously acted as the tools of human lawlessness in its reaction against the salutary restraints of an uncompromising divine law. And no doubt there were those who knew and cared nothing about justification by faith, who welcomed the Reformation simply

because it brought with it facilities of divorce and re-marriage. But it is unquestionable that the amendment was on the whole ethical in result as it was in intention. To force men to acquiesce in a legal provision as divine which they felt to be unjust could not be in the interests of religion. Still less could it make for morality.

3. The present position of matters in Christendom is chaotic. The civil law of the different countries reflects every position intermediate between absolute inviolability and divorce at will. Within the British Empire the extremes are represented by the law of England, which allows divorce for the capital cause only, and recent colonial legislation, notably in New Zealand, which has emulated the larger license of the later Lutheranism; while the Scottish law occupies the comparatively conservative standpoint of allowing malicious desertion, but that only, as an additional ground. Christian opinion is practically unanimous in opposition to the neo-paganism which rejects the conception of marriage as essentially a permanent institution, but its force is weakened by the inability to agree on a base of offensive and defensive operations. To some it seems that the middle ground of Protestantism is so difficult to maintain that the ultimate issue will lie between the mediaeval ideal and the re-nascent paganism. But it does not follow that a position is unsound because of its polemical difficulties. Strategical advantage is not one of the criteria of truth or right. And in spite of the difficulties, there is no task which Protestantism can discharge with a stronger certainty of being in the right than to maintain a policy which strikes the mean between Rome's tyrannical administration of the Christian law and the subversion of marriage as contemplated in some phases of emancipated modern thought.

## II. THE NEW TESTAMENT GUIDANCE.

Jesus spoke of divorce because it served to illustrate His attitude to the Mosaic law, because He was questioned about it, and because as a preacher of righteousness He was offended by the injustice and inhumanity of the existing system. The distinctive feature of the Jewish system was that the husband could divorce his wife at his discretion. He did not require to prove a case before a tribunal, but could put her away with the same right with which he alienated a piece of property—the only condition being that the transaction was registered in a “bill” granted to the woman. As for the grounds on which he might proceed, this was an ethical question on which different advice was tendered him by different schools.

“The school of Shammai says, ‘No one shall divorce his wife unless he shall have found in her something scandalous (*quid inhonesti*),’ the school of Hillel says, ‘Even if she have burnt his food,’ Rabbi Akiba says, ‘Even if he find another more handsome.’ The decision is according to the opinion of Hillel” (*Tractate Gittin of the Mishna*, Ed. Surenhusius, iv. p. 538).

In the parallel passages Mark x. 1–12, Matt. xix. 1–12 Jesus declares that marriage is essentially a permanent union, and not dissoluble at will. To the objection that the Jewish practice had Mosaic sanction, He replies that this was a concession which was an innovation, and was not in accord with the original purpose as declared in creation. According to the divine purpose it is a union in which a strength and constancy of affection are required surpassing even filial affection, and in which also the most intimate union takes place—and these carry with them the obligation of permanence. According to three of our witnesses Jesus affirmed the permanence of marriage in absolute terms:—

“And he said unto them, Whosoever shall put away his

wife and marry another, committeth adultery against her; and if she herself shall put away her husband and marry another, she committeth adultery ” (Mark x. 11-12).

“ Every one that putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery, and he that marrieth one that is put away from a husband committeth adultery ” (Luke xvi. 18).

“ But unto the married I give charge, yea, not I, but the Lord, That the wife depart not from her husband (but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried or else be reconciled to her husband), and that the husband leave not his wife ” (1 Cor. vii. 11).

According to two passages in Matthew Jesus qualified the prohibition of divorce in the case of adultery, “ But I say unto you, that every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress, and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery ” (v. 31-2).

“ I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery, and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery ” (xix. 9).

If these passages be taken as they stand, and if we proceed on the assumption that any inconsistency in the Biblical record is ruled out by inspiration or divine superintendence, the natural construction is that they lay down a general rule accompanied by a particular exception. There is some uncertainty as to the readings, especially in Matthew xix. 9, (the last clause of which is discredited), but the work of purely Textual criticism leaves the significant addition of Matthew untouched. It was maintained by the Protestants that we have here an illustration of the familiar fact that a saying may be recorded by one Evangelist more briefly and generally, by another more fully and particularly. The briefer state-



ment by itself may be misleading—e.g., the “Blessed are ye poor” of Luke vi. 20 (Forbes, *Theologia Moralis*, vii. 14). The Roman Catholic contention is that Mark x. 12 and Luke xvi. 18 are decisive, and that any interpretation of the Matthew passages which would weaken their force is inadmissible. “It is true that the evangelists sometimes omit or add what other evangelists have not omitted or not added, but they never omit so as to falsify the sense; otherwise the evangelists would have deceived those to whom they transmitted their gospels” (Bellarmine, *De Sacramento Matrimonii*, i. 16). What intelligible meaning, then, is to be attached to the language in Matthew? St. Augustine suggests that Christ drew a distinction because the case of a man who marries again after divorcing for adultery is less heinous than the case of another who has proceeded on a lesser ground, but that the former is an adulterer all the same. (*De Conjugiis adulterinis*). Logically this may be tenable, but it does as much violence to the plain intention of the words as to argue from “Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish” that there was no ground for holding that though they repented they should not perish (Cosin, *Argument*, p. 490). The Roman Catholic solution is that Christ absolutely prohibited divorce as involving dissolution of the bond and permission to re-marry, but that he allowed a separation from bed and board in the case of adultery. To this it seems a fatal objection that the distinction was unknown to those whom Jesus addressed, and that He used the term ἀπολύειν which suggested divorce as they knew it.

But if on the older basis of controversy the Roman Catholic view of absolute indissolubility was untenable, it appears to have been strongly re-inforced by modern criticism of the Synoptic records. There is an increasing disposition to doubt that the words in Matthew which allow the exception are authentic words of our Lord. The misgivings are not con-

fined to one school, but have been shared with Holtzmann and Wellhausen by men of so conservative instincts as B. Weiss (*Matthæus-evangelium*) and Salmon (*The Human Element in the Gospels*). There is, to begin with, a certain antecedent probability against the exception, in view of Christ's inculcation of the spirit of unflinching constancy in love, and of forgiveness unto seventy times seven. If Hosea did not divorce the faithless Gomer, but laboured to seek and to save that which was lost, it seems unlikely that Jesus prescribed a lower standard. Further, it is not in the manner of the Sermon on the Mount to mention exceptions to the ethical rules of the Kingdom. He who said, "Swear not at all," "be not angry with your brother," "resist not evil," "judge not," may be readily supposed to have said in the same uncompromising fashion, "thou shalt not divorce." Further, it is much more likely that a hard saying of Jesus was toned down in the oral tradition or by the Evangelist, than that, if the exception was originally mentioned, it was allowed to drop out of an authoritative history. There is an interesting parallel in the addition "without a cause" in the condemnation of anger in Matthew v. 22, though with the difference that the latter emendation was made by certain copyists of Matthew's Gospel, while the former may be supposed to have taken shape in the original text. These considerations are supported by recognised results of Synoptic criticism. Matthew uses Mark as one of his sources, and when, as in this case, he handles his source with considerable freedom the preference must be given to the earlier witness. He is also dependent on the primitive document now cited as Q; and as Luke also utilised Q, but does not give the exception in xvi. 18, there is reason for thinking that it was wanting in his second capital source as well. It may also be urged as a proof of the inferiority of Matthew's report that it gives the question of the Pharisees in a form

(xix. 3) which deprives it of its point as a means of "tempting" him, although it suitably leads up to the introduction of the exception on which the Evangelist laid stress.

It is an objection to the conclusion thus suggested that it goes counter to the theory that what is of cardinal importance in Scripture has its trustworthiness guaranteed, if not by verbal inspiration, at least by a conjunction of inspiration and providence. In any case, it would be a very decided innovation if the Church were to administer Scripture on such a conjectural basis. But waiving this objection, we ask, what follows if the conjecture be sound? Simply that we have before us one very important factor that has to be taken account of in dealing with a very complicated problem. There are other maxims of our Lord's ethical teaching, as has been observed, which are stated in equally unqualified form, and which admittedly are limited by other considerations when they come to be translated into practice. In certain cases the limitation arises from the competing claims of some other form of duty—as when the obligation to forgive injuries is qualified by the duty which we owe to society of aiding in the punishment of crime. Sometimes there is an unexpressed condition which governs the maxim—as in the condemnation of anger, where the A.V. addition "without a cause" is, if spurious, at least intelligent and ethically sound. Or again, a precept of Christ may claim absolute authority over His professed disciples, while yet it may be no duty of the civil power to attempt to impose it compulsorily on society at large. In the matter of oaths the civil power has even thought it necessary to make compulsory a practice which the Christian ideal seems to condemn. And in the case of divorce all of the limiting considerations which have been mentioned fall to be taken into account in judging of the lawfulness of the addition to Christ's assumed principle of the absolute indissolubility of marriage. There are

numerous occasions where the question involves a conflict of duties—when, for instance, there is on the one side an inoperative sentiment of loyalty to a violated union, and on the other the claim made, if not by a man's own interests, at least by those of his children, for the advantages of a full home-life. This also has a tenable view, though it is inconsistent with considerations that have been touched on, that the exception was so obvious Jesus could take it for granted, and that Matthew's Gospel only made explicit what the primitive Church had understood all along. With more confidence it may be affirmed that this is an instance in which a principle which has a place in the Christian ideal neither can nor should be embodied in legislation. It may be true, it probably is true, that all divorce is inconsistent with the Christian ideal, but it is another question how far the state ought to make that ideal compulsory on a community containing many non-Christian elements. "Political and outward order," as Calvin says, "are widely different from spiritual government" (on Matt. v. 31). The laws of the Kingdom make no mention of rights, but it is an elementary duty of the state to uphold the rights of its citizens; and it cannot reasonably refuse, while dispensing justice in regard to other wrongs, to accord redress to those who have suffered the extremity of injustice in marriage. The Church, as legislating for professed Christians, may make stricter laws, but it too ought to leave it to the arbitrament of the individual conscience as to whether a member should seek legal redress for this particular wrong which amounts to a subversion of the union. The exception in Matthew was, therefore, properly made if the law of Christ was not to be administered in an unintelligent and tyrannical spirit.

St. Paul has already been cited as a witness to the ethical maxim of his master, but it appears that he also recognised that it could not be made fully operative as law even in the

Christian society. After appealing to the authority of Christ in support of the general principle, he gives his own opinion in regard to a special case of hardship.

“ Yet if the unbelieving depart, let him depart, the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God hath called us to peace ” (1 Cor. vii. 15).

The passage is not too explicit ; but what is certain is that the apostle is conscious of making an important deliverance, and one which has the appearance of conflicting with the teaching of Christ. This observation rules out a group of interpretations which reduce the counsel to something commonplace or even trivial—as that the deserted spouse is to accept the situation, or to refrain from worrying about it. The true meaning appears on a comparison of the language with that of Romans vii. 2 and 1 Corinthians vii. 39. In these passages it is said that a woman is bound to her husband while he is alive, but that if he be dead she is loosed, and free to marry another ; and when in 1 Corinthians vii. 15 a deserted spouse is declared not to be under bondage it would seem (the same idea being conveyed by *δέδεταί* and *δεδούλωται*) that the deserted is placed on the same footing as a widow. That the apostle here contemplates a dissolution of the bond of marriage was common ground in the Protestant controversy with Rome—though it is disputed by a large body of Anglican opinion, and by some modern Lutherans. But on the Roman Catholic view “ the Pauline privilege ” was strictly limited to the case of a marriage contracted outside the Christian pale, and followed by the conversion of one of the spouses to the faith, and the desertion of the unbeliever. The justification given is that infidel marriages, “ though valid, are not sacraments, and, therefore, are wanting in the most potent ground of indissolubility ” (Bellarmine, *op. cit.*). The attempt to support this distinction by an appeal to the sacramental character of Christian marriage

is difficult to meet—less because of the strength of the argument than because of its intangibility ; but apart from this it is not easy to see how desertion by a heathen spouse in Corinth is differentiated from desertion by a modern heathen who is a Christian only in name. “ The apostle,” as Luther says, “ allows an unbelieving spouse to be put away, and leaves the believer free to take another ; why should not the same hold good if a nominal believer who is actually an unbeliever, deserts his spouse—especially if the desertion be final ? ” (*De Capt. Babylon.*). That St. Paul only mentioned the deserting unbeliever may well have been due to the fact that desertion did not occur at the time in Christian marriage.

The common feature of adultery and malicious desertion is that they frustrate one or more of the chief ends of marriage, and thus constitute a wrong for which the injured spouse is entitled (if so desirous) to redress ; and the justification of allowing divorce in these cases is that it can be granted, as experience shows, with a balance of advantage to society. There are, however, other forms of grave injustice which are experienced in marriage ; and the question arises whether these also can be safely allowed as grounds of divorce. Many of the older Protestant writers pointed out that the category of desertion may reasonably be held to include the complete alienation of affection which issues in attempts to take away the life, to corrupt the morals, or to destroy the faith of a spouse (Forbes, *op. cit.*) In the modern literature of Christian ethics it is commoner to lay down some such principle as that “ where the essential bond of marriage is broken, where matrimonial fidelity is destroyed in its roots, but also there only, divorce is lawful ” (Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, iii. p. 42). From both points of view the extension seems to follow naturally and even necessarily. The difference is only superficial between desertion and such offences as habitual drunkenness and

aggravated cruelty. The latter may even constitute the more heinous wrong, by so much as sins of omission are worse than sins of commission ; and the mere departure of a spouse may be a lesser injustice than a course of life which involves a wife in moral contamination, and tends to the corruption of the children. On the other hand, no one who values the stability of marriage will lightly throw over the doctrine of the Westminster Confession that nothing but adultery or wilful desertion is cause sufficient of dissolving the bond of marriage (xxiv. 6). In these cases Scriptural warrant can be pleaded. It is also of some importance that Scotland, which has adhered to the strict Scriptural basis, is almost the only country in which there is no agitation for change—the exceptions giving sufficient relief to prevent a sense of injustice, while there is no evidence that they have affected the popular estimate of the sanctity and the normal permanence of the marriage union. It is also an important consideration that the capital offences of adultery and desertion are easily judged, while the kindred violations of conjugal duty emerge in degrees of heinousness which must in many cases leave the verdict to the discretion of a tribunal.

### III. THE LIMIT OF RELIEF.

It is a vital ethical interest of society that marriage should be recognised as essentially a life-long union. This is one of the gains of civilised man which is safe-guarded by the experience and the public opinion of the modern world, as well as by its religious forces. Hume gives reasons in support of it from the standpoint of common-sense—that the interests of the children demand permanence, that the knowledge that it is for better or worse lays a solid basis for friendship, and that “nothing is more dangerous than to unite two persons so closely in all their interests and concerns without rendering the union entire and total” (*Essay*

on *Polygamy and Divorce*). It is the usual doctrine of the ethical schools that an important end of marriage is to serve as a school of character, and that its moralising influence is largely dependent on the provision that its obligations are recognised as permanently binding. The argument is further strengthened by the Christian doctrine of the spiritual equality of the sexes, which gives the woman a title to be treated as a full personality. In view of the importance of upholding the stability of marriage it is, therefore, the duty of the legislator to see, not only that relaxations are jealously considered, but also to maintain a popular sentiment favourable to general indissolubility. It is highly desirable that the view should be upheld and fostered that divorce proceedings carry with them, at least for one party, a semi-criminal stigma ; and that the occasion of the divorce is one which is condemned by the representatives of the general conscience. This consideration requires us to draw a clear line of division between those grounds which are of the nature of vice or crime, and those which are of the nature of calamity, including enforced desertion, insanity, prolonged sickness, childlessness, incompatibility of temper. The strongest case can be made out for allowing insanity, as the incurably insane may be regarded as dead ; and to concede the right of re-marriage to the other spouse might have no more adverse effect on popular opinion than the re-marriage of a widower. Childlessness has been allowed as a ground of divorce—it was sanctioned for a time in Prussia ; but it frustrates only one of the ends that are embodied in the worthy conception of marriage ; and what is lacking to the completeness of such a union may be supplied by the discovery of a higher bond of union, either in the too rare expedient of adoption, or in some form of philanthropic service. It is true that many cases of individual hardship arise under this general head, but the sum of these constitute



a lesser evil than the disintegration of the idea of marriage that is involved in conceding mere calamity as a ground of divorce. From the Christian point of view calamity has the character of a providential discipline, which in many cases has to be submitted to as the will of God, working for good to those who endure in faith and patience. The calamities of married life, in particular, as distinguished from its grave injustices, instead of provoking to revolt against the bond, are a summons to sympathy, forbearance and helpfulness. To allow them as a justification of the termination of marriage is disloyal to the Christian view of life and of God's hand in its trials and duties.

W. P. PATERSON.

*EZRA AND THE PRIESTLY CODE.*

THE Wellhausen school of higher criticism assumes that most of the laws of the Pentateuch are of post-exilic origin. They are supposed to belong to the so-called Priestly Code. It is generally accepted that this Code was composed in the Exile by the descendants of the priests of the temple at Jerusalem. If a new order should be established in Judah a full and precise Code was needed. Therefore the priestly scholars composed an historical-legislative Code, intended for the laity. It contained a brief summary of the history of old Israel in order to explain the origin of the sacred institutions, but was mainly of a legislative character. It is supposed that this Code was brought to Jerusalem by Ezra. On his arrival, however, he found it impossible to promulgate the law which he had brought with him. The political situation was uncertain as "the holy seed had mingled themselves with the people of the land." By the arrival of Nehemiah and the restoration of the walls of Jerusalem a new order was created. With the aid of Nehemiah Ezra succeeded in persuading the population of Jerusalem to bind themselves to keep the laws contained in (what was said to be) the book of the laws of Moses" (Neh. viii. 1), but what was really the book written by Jahvistic priests in Babylon. If we except Exodus xiii., the Book of the Covenant and the Decalogue and the "Law of Holiness" in Leviticus xvii.–xxvi., nearly all the laws contained in Genesis—Numbers are assigned to this Code. It is admitted that it received many additions after Ezra's date, but they did not introduce new principles and are only to be regarded as modifications and additions demanded by experience.

The narrative of the promulgation of the Priestly Code is

found in Nehemiah viii.-x. A careful examination of Nehemiah x. shows that things are not so easy as most critics assume, and if we enter into a comparison of the narrative with the alleged priestly laws we meet so many difficulties, that we can hardly assume that the suppositions of the Wellhausen school of criticism are right.

### I.

According to Nehemiah viii. 1 sqq., Ezra read in the Book of the law of Moses from early morning until midday in the presence of the men and the women, and of those that could understand, on the first day of the seventh month. And all the people wept as they heard the words of the law. We easily understand why they were deeply impressed by Ezra's lecture. The first day of the seventh month is New-year's day. This day is of the greatest importance for the Israelites, for it is the first day of the period of decision, which runs from the 1st unto the 10th of Tishri. In this period the fate of all individuals is destined by Jahve, who sits in heaven before the opened books, in which all the acts of men are recorded. The final decision about the destiny of every man is taken on the 10th of Tishri ; until this day there is hope for the repentant Israelite that he may induce Jahve to give a favourable decision. (Hence until the present day the Jewish greeting on New-year's day is *leshana toba tikkateb*, your name may be written down for a good year.) The reading in the Book of the Law revealed to the population of Jerusalem their shortcomings and sins. Therefore they wept and mourned. Nehemiah and Ezra explain to them that this is a new departure, that they must celebrate New-year's day in the usual way by eating and drinking and sending portions.

On the second day they found written that they should dwell in booths in the feast of the seventh month. Now

they proclaimed in all their cities and in Jerusalem, "Go forth unto the mount and fetch olive branches, and branches of wild olive, and myrtle branches, and palm branches, and branches of thick trees to make booths as it is written." Then the feast of the tabernacles is celebrated, and on the eighth day was a solemn assembly, according unto the ordinance.

In Nehemiah viii. 15, "as it is written" is supposed to refer to Leviticus xxiii. 39 sqq. If we compare both chapters we find that Leviticus xxiii. 40 cannot be the text referred to by Ezra. For here it is prescribed to "take on the first day of the feast the fruit of goodly trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of thick trees and willows of the brook, and ye shall rejoice before the Lord seven days." In Nehemiah viii. 15 sqq. the booths are built of the branches which the people fetched from the mount. In Leviticus xxiii. 40, however, no booths are made of these branches, as is apparent from the fruit of goodly trees, which could be hardly used for the building of tabernacles. In Nehemiah viii. the booths evidently are built before the beginning of the feast, for the first day of the feast of tabernacles is a Sabbath (on the first day shall be a solemn rest (Lev. xxiii. 39) and no work was permitted, but in Leviticus xxiii. 40, the fruit and branches must be taken on the first day of the feast.

The fruit and branches mentioned in Leviticus xxiii. 40 are to be carried by the Israelites in their hands, when they dance and rejoice in the courts of the temple. It is a well-known story that they threw these fruits at the high-priest Alexander Jannai, who was despised by them. Until this day every orthodox Jew will take his branch (*luláb*) and fruit (*ethrog*) and wave them in the feast of tabernacles. The tabernacles, however, are ready before the first day of the feast.

There is no text in the Old Testament where we find

the law Nehemiah viii. 15 refers to. We cannot suppose that Ezra would have misunderstood his own law. So we can only conclude that the law of Ezra was not preserved for us.

We arrive at the same conclusion in studying the 10th chapter of Nehemiah. The people entered into a curse and into an oath to walk in the law of God, which was given by Moses, the servant of God, and to observe and do all the commandments of the Lord our Lord (Neh. x. 30). Then in Nehemiah x. 38-40 we are told that they bound themselves to avoid mixed marriages, to keep the Sabbath and the other holy days and the Sabbatical year, to pay yearly the third part of a shekel for the temple-service, to bring the wood needed for the altar, to bring the first-fruits and the firstborn and to pay tithes.

It follows from Nehemiah x. 35-37 that these obligations were mentioned in the Law of Ezra, for there we find the formula "as it is written in the law." Evidently some of the prescripts of the law of Ezra, which were of great practical importance, are here specially mentioned.

The first of these obligations is "not to give our daughters unto the people of the land, nor take their daughters for our sons." We understand that this obligation is specially mentioned, if Ezra was prevented from promulgating his law by the mixed marriages of the Jewish population of Jerusalem and Judah. But it is very strange that we do not find a law against these marriages in any part of the Priestly Code. Mixed marriages are forbidden in Exodus xxxiv. 16, Deuteronomy vii. 3. Both places belong to the Deuteronomic literature, Exodus xxxiv. 12-16 being a Deuteronomic insertion. How is this to be explained if the Law of Ezra was the main part of the present form of the Priestly Code?

The next obligation is not to buy victuals on a Sabbath or on a holy day. We do not find a prescript about this in the Priestly Code, as we expect. The Hebrew word

for "victuals" (*makḳachoth*) used here does not occur in any other Old Testament text. Where the Priestly Code deals with the Sabbath it forbids to do any work, and if it enters into detail it only forbids to kindle fires (Exod. xxxv. 1-3), but the buying of victuals nowhere is mentioned.

The third obligation is "to let lie fallow the seventh year and the exaction of every debt." The technical term used in Nehemiah x. 32 is שָׁמַר "let lie fallow." It occurs also in the law about the Sabbatical year in the Book of the Covenant, Exodus xxiii. 11, but we do not find this word in the Priestly Code, nor does this Code contain a law about the Sabbatical year. Leviticus xxv. 1-5 deals with this subject but it belongs to the so-called Law of Holiness (P<sup>1</sup>) and is supposed to have been written long before Ezra. Its expressions are quite different from the technical terms used in Nehemiah x. 32. The "exaction of every debt" reminds of Deuteronomy xv. 1-3. About this subject the Priestly Code does not contain any law.

It is generally accepted that the fourth obligation is based on Exodus xxx. 11-16, which is assigned to P. "We bound ourselves to charge ourselves yearly with the third part of a shekel for the service of the house of our God" (Neh. x. 33). Exodus xxx. 11-16 mentions a charge of half a shekel. Critics, therefore, assumed that Nehemiah x. 33 referred to an older form of this text. Originally Exodus xxx. 11 sqq. would have mentioned also one-third shekel. The increasing costs of the service would answer for the demand of half a shekel. Others supposed that the value of the shekel decreased and explained the half-shekel in this way. We have only to read Exodus xxx. 11-16 and we see at once that we need not trouble ourselves about the solution of the difference, for Exodus xxx. 11-16 does not deal with a yearly charge, but with a charge which is to be paid only once,

viz., as the people is numbered. "This they shall give, every one that passes over to them that are numbered, half a shekel, after the shekel of the sanctuary, half a shekel as an offering to the Lord . . . to make atonement for your souls. And thou shalt take the atonement-money . . . and shalt appoint it for the tent of the meeting, that it may be a memorial for the children of Israel before the Lord, to make atonement for your souls."

The people is numbered (Num. i.). It is a well-known fact that the Israelites believed that it was very dangerous to number the people (2 Sam. xxiv. 1, 10). So we fully understand that half a shekel is given to make atonement. Of course this amount was given only once. So the Israelites themselves have interpreted Exodus xxx. 11-16. In 2 Chronicles xxiv. 6-9 we find a reference to this text. The temple was in need of repair. Then the king told the high priest Jehoiada to require of the Levites to bring in out of Judah and out of Jerusalem the tax of Moses the servant of the Lord and of the congregation of Israel for the tent of the testimony. So they made a chest and set it without at the gate of the temple. And all the people brought in and cast into the chest. Thus they gathered money in abundance. It is astonishing to see that many critics have explained this tax of Moses as a yearly charge.<sup>1</sup> Evidently it is a charge only made for once, when there is no other way to pay the necessary restoration of the temple (cf. 2. Chron. xxiv. 14, "When they had made an end, they brought the rest of the money before the king"). Evidently Nehemiah x. 33 has nothing to do with Exodus xxx. 11 sqq., and also here we look in vain for the corresponding text in the Priestly Code.

<sup>1</sup> So A. Kuenen *HcO*<sup>2</sup> 301. J. Wellhausen, *Proleg.*<sup>3</sup> 82, 162. C. Siegfried, *Ezra, Neh., Esther*, 114. T. Witton Davies, *Ezra, Neh. and Esther* (The Century Bible), p. 248.

In Nehemiah x. 34 it is said that the money is gathered for the shewbread, for the continual meal offering and for the continual burnt-offering [the offerings] of the Sabbaths, of the new moons, for the feasts, for the holy things and for the sin offerings to make atonement for Israel, and for all the work of the house of our God.

The shewbread is called in P *lechem panim*, here, however, it is called *lechem hamma'areket*. Again we do not find the term we expect.

The continual meal offering and the continual burnt-offering is usually explained as referring to the daily offerings. If this interpretation is right we do not find in the Priestly Code any law to which Ezra could refer here. In the pre-exilic period, as the daily offerings were paid by the king, a burnt-offering in the morning and a meal offering in the evening are mentioned (2 Kings xvi. 15). But there is no priestly law which prescribes these offerings. In the later additions to the Priestly Code (Exod. xxix. 38-42, Num. xxviii. 3-8) two daily burnt-offerings are mentioned, one in the morning, and one in the evening.

There is some difficulty in the Hebrew text, the words "the Sabbaths" and "the new moons" standing by themselves. It is possible that the preceding words "and for the continual burnt-offering" are to be taken as an irregular status constructus, as the Revised Version assumes, which translates "for the continual burnt-offering of the Sabbaths and the new moons." In this case the meaning of the verse is that a continual meal offering was brought every day, but that a continual burnt-offering was offered only on Sabbaths and new moons. Then the difference between Nehemiah x. and P would be still greater. But it is not certain that the text is to be explained in this way. In any case it is to be admitted that Nehemiah x. 34 does not agree with the laws of the Priestly Code.



Besides putting themselves under these obligations "the priests, the Levites and the people cast lots for the wood offering to bring it into the house of our God, according to our families, at times appointed, year by year, to burn upon the altar of the Lord our God, as it is written in the law." Again, there is no text, neither in the Priestly Code nor in the Pentateuch, which prescribes to bring wood for the altar. If Ezra promulgated the Priestly Code we certainly would not miss this important commandment.

The last of the obligations we find in Nehemiah x. 36 sqq. They promised "to bring the firstfruits" of our ground and the firstfruits of all fruit of all manner of trees, year by year unto the house of the Lord, and also the firstborn of our sons and of our cattle, as it is written in the law." This may refer as well to the Book of the Covenant (Exod. xxii. 28, 29; xxiii. 19) as to Numbers xviii. 11-20 (P). In both places it is commanded to give the firstfruits and the firstborn. As none of the other obligations corresponds to the laws of the Priestly Code it is probable that no allusion to Numbers xviii. is to be found here.

The last words "as it is written in the law" obviously are a final clause as in verse 35. Nevertheless the text runs on. The construction of the sentences, however, shows that the last part of verse 37 and verses 38-40 are later additions to the text. Verse 37*b* repeats verse 37*a*, saying, "and to bring the firstborn of our cattle and our flocks unto the house of our God, unto the priests that minister in the house of our God." This repetition shows that this part of the verse must be of younger origin. It points out that the firstborn are to be delivered into the hands of the priests in the temple and not offered in any other way—for instance, by giving them to the priests living in any of the towns of Judah. Probably the verse combats this custom, as it is expressly stated that the

“priests that minister in the temple” are entitled to them.

Verse 38*a* is a repetition of verse 36.<sup>1</sup> It says that the firstfruits are to be delivered into the hands of the priests and brought to the chambers of the temple. Instead of the Infinitive with  $\text{ב}$ , as in verses 33–37, the Imperfect, “we shall bring,” is used. This also proves that the verse does not belong to the original text.

Verses 38*b*–40 deal with the tithes. Verses 38*b*, 39 disagree with the narrative of Nehemiah xiii. 4–13. Verse 40 tries to explain this and is a “secondary gloss.” Verse 38*b* says, “(we will bring) the tithes of our ground to the Levites, for they, the Levites, take the tithes in all the cities of our tillage. And the priest, the son of Aaron, shall be with the Levites, when the Levites take tithes: and the Levites shall bring up the tithe of the tithes unto the house of our God, to the chambers, into the treasure house.” Here the tithes are given to the Levites, who live in various places all over the country, and the tithe of the tithes is transported by the Levites to the treasure house of the temple.

In Nehemiah xiii. 4 sqq., it is told that the priest Eliashib gave some chambers of the temple to Tobiah. Formerly these chambers were used for storing the meal for the meal offerings, the frankincense, and the vessels and the tithes of the corn, the wine and the oil, which were given by commandment to the Levites, and to the singers and the porters. This happened during the absence of Nehemiah. After his return he cast forth all the things of Tobiah out of the chambers and cleansed them. Then he perceived that the parts of the Levites had not been given to them, so that the Levites and the singers, that did the work,

<sup>1</sup> There is no difference between *reshit* and *bikkurim*, as some critics assume. From Exod. xxiii. 19, Numb. xviii. 12–13, Deut. xviii. 4 it follows that both terms are used promiscuously.

were fled every one to his field. Nehemiah contended with the rulers. Then brought all Judah the tithe of the corn and the wine and the oil into the treasuries. Nehemiah made four faithful men treasurers and their business was to distribute among their brethren. In this narrative the tithe of the tithe is not yet known. The tithe is not paid to the Levites in the various cities of the country, but the tithe is brought by all Judah to the treasury. This shows that x. 38, 39 does not belong to the original text. x. 40 tries to harmonise, and explains, "for the children of Israel and the children of Levi shall bring the heave offering of the corn, etc., unto the chambers."

It is probable that in verse 38 the words "and the tithe of our ground for the Levites" and the last words of verse 40, "we will not forsake the house of our Lord," belong to the original text. But all the rest of verses 37-40 is addition. This implies that the prescripts of the Priestly Code concerning the tithes were not yet known. If this had been the case Nehemiah xiii. 4 sqq. cannot be explained, for we cannot assume that Nehemiah would act against the law. Numbers xviii. 26 prescribes that the Levites shall take the tithe of the Israelites. They shall eat it in the places they live in (ver. 31) and they shall give a heave offering of all their gifts to the priests (ver. 29), a tithe of the tithe (ver. 26). In the time of Nehemiah only those Levites that ministered at the temple received tithes, which were brought to Jerusalem by the people. The other Levites had to live on the proceeds of their fields. Probably the tithes were only given partially to the Levites, as it is prescribed in Deuteronomy xiv. 27. If the whole Jewish population of Jerusalem and Judah had brought the tithes of corn, wine and oil to the temple, these goods could not have been stored in one large chamber (Neh. xiii. 5), where, besides the tithes, were also placed

the meal for the meal offering, the frankincense, the vessels, and the heave offerings for the priests.

In Nehemiah xiii. 1-3 it is narrated that they found written in the book of the law that an Ammonite and a Moabite should not enter into the assembly of God. This is forbidden by Deuteronomy xxiii. 3 sqq., but not in the Priestly Code.

Summing up in conclusion, we state that five out of the six obligations which are mentioned in the original text of Nehemiah x. do not correspond to P, and that the sixth one may as well correspond to the Book of the Covenant as to P. So there is no room for the theory of Wellhausen and Kuenen. We have to agree with Professor T. Witton Davies, who has also arrived at the conclusion that "Ezra's torah corresponds neither to our Pentateuch nor to the Hexateuch, and still less to any one of the recognised Hexateuch sources (JE, D, P)."

We now proceed to an inquiry into some of the laws of the Priestly Code.

## II.

It is supposed that the Priestly Code was written by the priests in the exilic and post-exilic period. But we cannot enter into a closer investigation without discovering several features which point to a pre-exilic origin of at least some parts of the Priestly Code. It is impossible to give here an exhaustive treatment of this subject. But some instances may show the weakness of the current theory.

In a previous article on the Passover and the days of the unleavened bread (*EXPOSITOR*, November, 1909) I dealt with Exodus xii. 1-14 that is supposed to be of post-exilic origin and is assigned to P. We found that the post-exilic rites of the Passover, as known from Ezra vi.

and 2 Chronicles xxx. and xxxv., were different from the rites mentioned in Exodus xii., and were compelled to assume that Exodus xii. 1-14 must be assigned even to the pre-Deuteronomic period. For the arguments I refer to EXPOSITOR l.c. pp. 453, 454, and *Alttestamentliche Studien*, iii. 115-119 (Giessen, 1910).

This is not the only instance of pre-exilic elements in the laws assigned to P. Exodus xxv.-xxix. contain the legislation about the tent of the meeting. The present form of these chapters certainly alludes to the temple of Zerubabel. Jahve commanded Moses to make a candlestick with seven branches. We know from Zechariah iv. that such a candlestick stood in the second temple, for there it is the symbol of the daily cult in the temple. In the temple of Solomon were ten candlesticks (1 Kings vii. 49) and no candlestick with seven branches. So there cannot be much doubt about the fact that Exodus xxv. 31, sqq. implies the existence of the second temple. But besides the candlestick with seven branches in this chapter (ver. 6) and in Exodus xxvii. 20, is mentioned a lamp with only one light, and in these verses this lamp is the only one burning in the tent. This lamp is called *ma'or*, the candlestick is called *menorah*. Most scholars identify those lights and assume that *ma'or* is only another name for the *menorah*. But it follows from Leviticus xxiv. 1-4 that they are wrong.

The verses Leviticus xxiv. 1-3 are complete by themselves. "The Lord said to Moses, Command the children of Israel that they bring unto thee pure olive oil for the lamp (*ma'or*) to kindle a light to burn continually . . . it shall be a statute for ever throughout your generations." These last words are a final clause. Verse 4 shows that the candlesticks of the second temple had more lights, and explains verses 1-3 as follows: "He shall order the lights

upon the pure candlestick (*menorah*) before the Lord continually." It is obvious that verse 4 is a later addition. This implies, however, that verses 1-3 are older than the exilic or post-exilic period. We find that the various texts which mention the *menorah* in Exodus xxv. sqq. always mention its lights (plural), cf. Exodus xxv. 37, xxx. 7, xxxix. 37, xl. 4-25; Numbers viii. 2. The *ma'or*, however, has only one light (singular), Exodus xxv. 6, xxvii. 20; Leviticus xxiv. 2. Furthermore the place of Exodus xxvii. 20-21 shows that the original text of Exodus xxv. sqq. must have been a much shorter one. The verses deal with the oil for the lamp and have nothing to do neither with the preceding verses nor with the following chapter, describing the construction of the tabernacle and the holy garments of Aaron. They belong to Exodus xxv. 6. This original form must be of pre-exilic origin.

Another pre-exilic element we find in Leviticus i.-v., the legislation on the offerings, that is generally assigned to P. In the first chapter the regulations concerning the burnt-offering are given. The man who wishes to sacrifice a burnt-offering "shall lay his hand upon the animal that it may bring mercy upon him and make atonement for him. And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord. And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood round about upon the altar. And he shall flay the burnt-offering and cut it into its pieces. And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put fire upon the altar and lay wood in order upon the fire. And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall lay the pieces, the head and the fat, in order upon the wood that is on the fire which is on the altar, but its inward and its legs, shall he wash with water, and the priest shall burn the whole on the altar." The man, who brings the sacrifice, slaughters. He kills the animal, flays it and cuts it into pieces. The priest presents the blood and

burns the offering (ver. 4 sqq.). The same regulation we find in i. 11-12, iii. 2-5, 4, 13, iv. 15, 24, 29, 33.

If these regulations originated in the post-exilic period they must agree with the religious practice of this period. In those days the Levites officiated in the temple as helpers of the priests. Their functions were subordinate and consisted, for instance, in the slaughtering of the sacrifice. According to Ezra vi. 20, the Israelite himself was not entitled to kill the sacrifice, the priests and the Levites killed the Passover for all the children of the captivity. See also 2 Chronicles xxx. 16, xxxv. 6, 10 seq. 1 Chronicles xxiii. 31 says that the Levites must offer all the burnt-offerings, and 2 Chronicles xxix. 34 supposes that only the priests were allowed to flay the burnt-offerings. In the days of Hezekiah, however, the sacrifices were so numerous that they had to be assisted by the Levites. The laymen had nothing to do. This agrees with Ezekiel xliv. 11, "The Levites shall be ministers in my sanctuary . . . they shall slay the burnt-offering and the sacrifice for the people." In the post-exilic period the Levites took the place the laymen held in the pre-exilic period. In the days of Ezra and Nehemiah many Levites lived in Judah (see Neh. vii. 43, viii. 8, ix. 4 seq., x. 9). According to Nehemiah xi. 18, 284 Levites lived in Jerusalem only.

Nevertheless the Levites are not even mentioned in the priestly legislation on the sacrifices. They do not occur in Leviticus 1-5. We can only understand this if we assume that these chapters are to be assigned to the pre-exilic period.

This implies that the kinds of sacrifice described in Leviticus i.-v. cannot be regarded as inventions of the priestly scholars, who liked to meditate on the ritual ceremonies. The sin-offering usually is supposed to have its origin in a more intense sense of sin in the exiles, who attributed their exile to Jahve's divine wrath. If our

theory is right we shall have to admit the sin offering into the pre-exilic religion of Israel and to regard it as an old kind of sacrifice.

Another consequence of the pre-exilic date of Leviticus i.-v. is that the priesthood of Aaron and his sons appears in the pre-exilic tradition. Perhaps it is not superfluous to remember that the common analysis of the Hexateuch assigns Deuteronomy x. 6 to the Elohist writer. In this verse and in Joshua xxiv. 33 (also assigned to E) the priesthood of Aaron and his son Eleazar is mentioned. So this cannot be an objection to the probability of our theory.

Exodus xxix. deals with the hallowing of Aaron and his sons. The chapter contains some regulations which must be older than the post-exilic period, as they do not suit in the least the supposed monotheistic tendencies of the Priestly author and his school. One young bullock and two rams must be sacrificed. As the second ram is killed Moses "shall take of its blood, and put it upon the tip of the right ear of Aaron and upon the tip of the right ear of his sons, and upon the thumb of their right hand, and upon the great toe of their right foot, and sprinkle the blood upon the altar round about" (ver. 20). What is the meaning of this ceremony? Scholars feel mostly inclined to explain it as an innovation of P, who intended to hallow in this way the organs of hearing, of action, and of going in order to consecrate all the acts of the priest. He must go into the temple and act, but he must also listen to the Lord (Bäntsch, *Exodus*, 251. Strack, *Exodus* 257 a.o.). This explanation of the ceremony, however, does not satisfy. We expect that both ears will be hallowed and not only the right one. If the priest gives his blessing he uplifts both hands, therefore the blood should have been put on both his thumbs. The hallowing the right foot is wholly inexplicable, as the going is no holy action at all.



Furthermore, it is very strange that the leper is to be hallowed in the same way as Aaron and his sons (Lev. xiv. 14). We can hardly assume that he too should have holy ears, hands and feet in order to hear the word of the Lord and to act in holy ceremonies. Benzinger (*Hebrew Arch.*<sup>2</sup> 358) supposes that the ceremony symbolises the covenant made here between Jahve and his priests. But there is no instance of a covenant made in this way, and we do not understand how the same ceremony can be applied in the case of the leper, Leviticus xiv. 14.

The ceremony reminds us of one of the ways in which evil spirits are expelled in the Persian religion. In the present time it still exists, as may be seen from S. Ives Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion to-day*, p. 152. If the head is touched by some sacred object the spirit flies into the breast; if the breast is touched he seeks refuge in the arms; if the hand is touched he goes into the legs, etc. At last he leaves the body by the little toe. Obviously the touching of the ear, thumb and great toe are parts of this ceremony, that appears here in a concised form. This explanation of the ceremony fully agrees with all we know about the ideas "holy," "clean and unclean." The man who is to be devoted to Jahve and who is to be anointed with the sacred oil must be perfectly free from any impure influences or elements. These ceremonies of exorcism usually accompany the sacred rites (cf., for instance, the original interpretation of baptism). Obviously in Exodus xxix. 20 the hallowing of Aaron is preceded by this ceremony in order to purify him. So we understand that the leper is to be purified in the same way as the high priest and his sons. Illness is supposed to be caused by evil spirits that are to be expelled. If this is the right interpretation of the ceremony in Exodus xxix. 20, it is highly improbable that the monotheistic priestly author classed this custom

with the ritual regulations of his code instead of abolishing it.

Perhaps the school of Wellhausen will answer to this objection, that the priestly author did not invent the ritual prescribed in his code, and argue that he was wise enough to reform all heathenish rites into Jahvistic customs. But this answer would be insufficient, as it is obvious from the situation, supposed in Exodus xxv. 29, that these chapters are inconsistent with the narrative of P as reconstructed by the critics. They assign the last part of Exodus xxiv. to P. In Exodus xxiv. 18, "Moses entered into the midst of the cloud and went up into the mount, and Moses was in the mount forty days and forty nights." If P wrote Exodus xxv. 29 Moses received the communications of Jahve whilst being in the mount. But in Exodus xxv. 40, xxvi. 30 and xxvii. 8, Moses is not in the mount. He was there or shall go there, according to the translation of the verb as Perfect or Exact Future. "And see that thou make them after their pattern, which *has been shewed* thee in the mount (or will have been shewed thee)." Obviously Moses is not in the mount as this is said to him.

According to the school of Wellhausen the narrative of P did not contain the Decalogue nor the Book of the Covenant. Now the "Eduth" means either the Decalogue or a part of the Book of the Covenant. Wellhausen interpreted Eduth as the Decalogue, Bāntsch supposed it to be a part of the Book of the Covenant. In both cases we fail to understand how the term "Eduth" can appear in these chapters (xxv. 16-21), for the readers (the Priestly Code is supposed to have been intended for the laity) could by no means guess what the Eduth was that Moses should place in the ark.

It is generally accepted that one of the principal aims

of the priestly author was to increase the revenues of the priests. They were to have the flesh of the sin and guilt offerings, which were not known in the older legislation and the invention of which is largely to be explained as one of the means of enlarging the priestly revenues. They received the shoulder and the breast of peace offerings, instead of the shoulders and the two cheeks and the maw of Deuteronomy xviii. 3, etc. But we learn from 2 Kings xii. 17 that the sin and guilt offerings were by no means an invention of the post-exilic priests. The money that was given to the temple was used for paying for the repair of the house, but the money for the guilt offerings and the money for the sin offerings was not brought into the treasury of the temple ; it was for the priests. So it is by no means an innovation of P when Leviticus vi. and vii. entitles the priests to the flesh of these sacrifices. The common interpretation of 2 Kings xii. 17 is that no offerings are meant and that in certain unknown cases a penalty was to be paid to the temple. But the plural "chattaot" shows that the money was to be used for offerings or was to be paid instead of bringing a sacrifice.

An inquiry into the structure of Exodus xxix. and Leviticus vii. shows that these chapters are of a composite character. In the original form of the chapters the priests received only the breasts of the peace offerings. In Exodus xxix. Moses acts as priest. In verse 26 "he shall wave it before the Lord and it shall be his portion." In Leviticus vii. the ordinary priest shall do this and receive the breast as his share. In a later period the priests demanded also the shoulder, as is shown by Leviticus vii. 32. But this verse is additional, for it uses the second person instead of the third person of the preceding verses. In Exodus xxix., also, an addition is inserted (vers. 27-29) in order to emphasise that the priest is also entitled to the shoulder.

The breast is certainly no greater portion than the shoulder, the two cheeks and the maw of Deuteronomy xviii. 3. If P had enlarged the priestly revenues in such a way he would have fouled his own nest. If we really must assume that the share of the priests was steadily enlarged in the various codifications of Israelitish law then it is more reasonable to assign the original form of Exodus xxix. and of Leviticus vi. and vii. to the pre-deuteronomic than to the post-exilic period.

Finally, I refer to the laws about clean and unclean in Leviticus xiii.-xv. They are assigned to P. It is supposed that they are incorporated in the Priestly Code by one of the priestly authors in Palestine. They deal with leprosy of men, clothes and houses and with sexual uncleanness. If a man is suspected of leprosy he must be brought to the priest, and the priest shall look on the plague. In some cases the priest shall look on him a second time after seven days. At garments and at houses suspected of leprosy the priest shall look several times, each time being seven days after the former time. If at last he finds that the plague has not spread he shall declare the garments and houses clean. The leper that is healed must bring some sacrifices as described in Leviticus xiv. His right ear, right hand and the great toe of the right foot shall be touched with the blood of one of the sacrifices and after that with oil. A living bird shall carry away the uncleanness into the open field, being dipped in the blood of another bird, that is mixed with water, cedar wood, etc. The priest is supposed to live near the temple for (Lev. xiv. 11, 16, 20, 23) he must bring the sacrifices before the Lord.

If the priestly authors after Ezra are to be made responsible for these laws, we fail to understand how they could make these laws work. In the post-exilic period the temple at Jerusalem was the only legal sanctuary.

But it was impossible that every case of leprosy should be shown to the priest at Jerusalem, or that the Jerusalem priests should travel all over the country to inspect houses suspected of leprosy several times, with an interval of seven days between each time. The supposition of the law is that the priest is near at hand. We understand this law if we assume that it is a law for the priests at the various sanctuaries existing in the pre-exilic time, but we certainly cannot admit that the priests of the second temple would have invented such unpractical laws. Moreover, the symbolical ceremonies are rather heathenish. The bird that carries the uncleanness into the green field reminds us of the ceremonies mentioned on the Babylonian tablets with magical texts. The plague of leprosy was always much dreaded in Israel and existed in the pre-exilic period as well as in later times. This implies that there must have been regulations concerning this illness, and there is nothing that prevents us from assuming that these regulations are preserved in Leviticus xiii. and xiv., as they suit much better the pre-exilic time than the period in which the offerings could be only sacrificed in Jerusalem.

In Leviticus xv. 14, 29 it is also demanded that an offering be sacrificed in the sanctuary, and as here things are dealt with that are common, we cannot suppose that this law originated at a time in which it could not be obeyed.

It would be unwise to deny that the Pentateuch contains later additions that were written in the post-exilic period. In the first part of the book of Numbers, for instance, there are many additions that can only be explained by the religious customs of these times. But the current theory about the exilic and post-exilic origin of all the laws assigned to P cannot be maintained. The greater part of the laws of P must be much older than is usually assumed.

It is very remarkable that our canon does not contain

the Book of the Law that Ezra is said to have brought with him. I think that this is an argument for the thesis that the greater part of the laws contained in our Pentateuch are older than Ezra. It seems that only the additions to these laws that were inserted in the manuscripts have been admitted into the canon. If we think of the great honour in which Ezra was held by the successive generations of priests and scribes it is astonishing that his book is lost. If even his laws are not handed down to us, it will be safe not to underrate the antiquity of the laws preserved by the Israelitic traditions.

B. D. EERDMANS.

*JOB'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE  
FUTURE STATE.*

EVERY serious-minded person has at one time or another debated it in his own mind, "If a man die shall he live again?" Is life after death possible or does the grave end all? But in spite of the much argumentation, the remarkable thing is how little we really know upon the subject, how little we really have to tell to one another, and to support ourselves. The greatest of our English dramatists has written on that "something after death." But the something after death he calls an "undiscovered country." He calls it, and he rightly calls it, a destiny from which no traveller returns. Another has written in a similar strain,

"Strange, is it not, that of the myriads who  
Before us passed the door of darkness through  
Not one returns to tell us of the road  
Which to discover we must travel too."

Let us not, then, in taking up the problem of immortality and the future state expect too much. We are not to suppose that if we have been at sea on the subject before,

we shall be able to make up our minds once for all and never hereafter be troubled and uneasy. It is unlikely that we shall arrive at any such positive and triumphant conclusion.

This Arab prince who sat on his ash-heap was a man of flesh and blood like the rest of us. He had his hopes but he had his doubts. He had his trusts but he had his fears. The immortality and life of the Gospel might in his case be compared to a beacon that burned with varying brightness. Sometimes it shone. It shone as the sun in the sky. At other times it flickered like a candle that would have seemed capable of being extinguished and blown out by the faintest breeze. And the utmost that we can expect from his utterances are hints, suggestions, aids to faith, evidences, helps. We must not think that we are going to get formal arguments. We must not think that we are going to have it proved with the certainty of a mathematical proposition. That was not his way.

## I.

### *The Argument from Analogy.*

In the first place, he makes use of a simple nature illustration. It was noticeable, then as now, that when the trees are cut down, the stumps, if they receive rain and are watered begin to put out new shoots. Indeed, when they have been hacked down to the earth and the very roots would appear to have decayed and rotted, they cling so tenaciously to life that on the most trifling provocation, the mere "scent of water," they will bud and blossom and continue to live with the freshness and vitality and vigour of former times. Hence he says—or rather he does not say it, he draws back just when he seems on the point of saying it; but he certainly suggests it, let us say that he says it, he could not have come so close to it and not have seen it—

just as there is<sup>1</sup> hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again ; so there is hope of a man, if he dieth and giveth up the ghost, that he will continue to live in some altered sphere of existence elsewhere. It was an "argument" from analogy. And have we not all had our imagination kindled and fed by such arguments ? Have we not all, for example, had our attention called to the caterpillar on the green blade ? What a wonderful transformation takes place there ! We perceive it at first able to enjoy the life of a limited world. Then it dies to live a larger, fuller life. Through the metamorphosis of the chrysalis it becomes a butterfly. And when we see it spread forth its wings and fly in the sunshine we could hardly believe that out of a thing so miserable there could come a creature so lovely and fair to look upon. You would not believe it did you not with your own eye watch it. It is impossible in its first state to imagine the hidden possibility it has got and which in its future state it is capable of having developed and brought out. Ergo : what can be done in a caterpillar may be done in a man, may it not ? Nature offers many similar analogies. With every recurring spring time do we not find the truth set forth in parable, we die to live ? The autumn is the period of the yellow leaf. It is the time of change and decay. It is the time of dissolution. It is the time of death. But when the earth revolves with the processes of the sun, we find that nature undergoes a strange and curious resurrection. It is clothed upon. All things become new. There are abundant signs and evidences of activity and productivity and life and growth and progress. Such analogies may not convince the reason and lay the spectres of the mind. Even Job did not feel inclined to press his. When he is on the point of suggesting the comparison between man and the tree that sprouts

<sup>1</sup> xiv. 7 ff.



again, he draws back and does not actually say it. He goes off to give <sup>1</sup> another which is less favourable to his earlier point of view. The analogy of the sprouting tree is immediately followed by the "counter-analogy" of the dried-up river. Job seems to be balancing their relative worth and is not yet able to make up his mind between them. Canon Cheyne lays great stress on the next verse <sup>2</sup> as proof positive that for ordinary mortals no resurrection was entertained. They were incapable of being "roused" from the endless sleep that awaited all. But since Job's views are so much in solution, one must be chary of fastening on any single statement to the neglect of others and treating it as if it were his last and only word upon the subject.

Taken for what they are worth, then, and studied and meditated upon, the favourable analogies help us to live and to believe that there is a life beyond this one. When we have thoroughly persuaded ourselves that the whole world proceeds upon the principle that we shall not all die but we shall be changed, when we have seen it not only in the case of the caterpillar becoming butterfly, but when we have seen it in the case of the tadpole becoming frog, it does not die but it is changed; when we have seen it in the hundred similar cases of metamorphosis which the experts on crustacea and amphibious creatures furnish us with—we shall have our faith quickened. We shall begin to take our belief in immortality more seriously. We shall begin to ask, is it likely that man should be the exception to the general rule? Is it not more likely that under the guidance of such a wonderful Creator, he should not die but be changed and have immortality "put on" in place of the mortal shape and form that he has shed?

<sup>1</sup> xiv. 11 ff.

<sup>2</sup> xiv. 12.

## II.

*Man's Claim on his Creator.*

But Job did not leave it there. He has another line of thought running through his utterances. It seemed to him incredible that the God who had been at such trouble and pains to make him, should at the hour and instant of death proceed to unmake him.<sup>1</sup> "Thine hands have framed me and fashioned me. Wilt thou bring me unto dust again?" Was it for this that His creating processes had been exerted? Was it simply to vex him? Was it simply to visit him with troubles and bodily sores and mental perplexities? Surely, he would not despise and scorn the work of His hands. I cannot think, he virtually says in the <sup>2</sup> locus classicus, that it was for this purpose that my days were determined and the number of my months. Thou hast appointed the limits of my life but it was not with that end in view. If I am to be snuffed out like a candle in a few years' time, why can you not leave me alone? Why do you watch me and take notice of me and send me sorrow? Thou art a great God. Thou art an All-Wise and All-Loving Creator. It is not becoming of you to take such a mean advantage of me. Will you employ all the divinity and power that is yours by right <sup>3</sup> to harass a driven leaf? Or will you employ it <sup>4</sup> to pursue the short stubble that is scattered by the breeze? It sets him thinking. It does not seem worthy of the God he has worshipped or like His general character for goodness. There must be something wrong with the argument. But what that something is, he is not quite able to say. Still—what if death does not end all? <sup>5</sup> What if a man at death

<sup>1</sup> x. 8.<sup>2</sup> c. 14.<sup>3</sup> xiii. 25.<sup>4</sup> xiii. 26.<sup>5</sup> xiv. 14. The famous phrase, "if a man die, shall he live?" is felt by some to be a break in the consecutiveness of the thought. What goes before does not prepare for it. What follows does not develop it. Hence

should live again? That would put a new complexion on it. It would enable him to suffer without complaining in the present and give God an opportunity in the future of making up to him what he had missed and had to do without. Job did not get beyond this and he would not appear to have held it with any particular strength of conviction. He might be said to have "faintly trusted it." He "stretched out lame hands of faith" for it. But in so far as he held it at all he was a man before his time, and we may be grateful for his suggestion?

For what is it? What is it that he has spoken but an ancient way of putting the modern argument that we have some claim on God. Even as He has all claim on us, we have some claim on Him and particularly when by the unfairness of this world the wicked escape. He is under obligation to remember us and provide a future state where He will be able to redress the balance and give us the chance that we do not have now. He made us. We are the work of His hands. What would we think of a human father that said to the five year old he had called into existence and reared thus far, "Now then, my child, you must look after yourself and get along as well as you can. I wash my hands of you." We would not think very much of him and we would set the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children on his track and get him to do his bare duty. Then when the child grew to boyhood and from boyhood to youth and young manhood, if he tried to slip his responsibility and

the conjecture has been offered that the phrase was, in the first place, a marginal note made by some early copyist or reader and that in the course of time it slipped into the text and came to be read along with the rest. This explanation would seem, however, to be hardly necessary. If we imagine the passage in which the words stand to be one of those "lyric monologues" Canon Cheyne speaks of, if Job was less talking to his "comforters" than soliloquising and thinking aloud, we can well believe such a question might start into his mind without much to lead up to it and without his being there and then drawn to attempt an answer.

did not direct his steps and guard him from evil and give him a chance, even then, we would think that he had done less than might be reasonably expected of him. It is even thus that Jesus Christ taught the Fatherhood of God, and it is even thus that Job anticipated it. We are the work of His hands and now that He has made us, He must and He will stand by us. It is to His credit that He should. If He is *Le Bon Dieu*, if He is a God that is true and fair and honest and honourable, He cannot trifle with us. He cannot make little of our misery, but will give us some return for the misery we have been in. These are very human ways in which to speak about God. Our Calvinistic forefathers might have been shocked to have it stated so. But we are learning at the feet of Jesus to begin from human ways when arguing for the Divine. They are less likely to lead astray than anything else. And if God is a Father who accepts His responsibility for us all, He must have a better life in store in which all the accidents by which we are presently perplexed shall be put right and we shall see that He has been leading us all along the toilsome way.

This was keenly felt by George Eliot in her early days. "Her own filial piety was sufficiently manifest: but of the converse obligation, that of the claim of child upon parent, she was wont to speak thus strongly. "There may be," she would say, "conduct on the part of a parent which should exonerate his child from further obligation to him: but there cannot be action conceivable which should absolve the parent from obligation to serve his child, seeing that for that child's existence he is responsible." I did not at the time see the connexion between this view and the change of a fundamental nature marked by Miss Evans's earlier contention for our "claim on God." The bearing of the above on orthodox religion I did not see. Some time ago, however, I came across this reflection, made by a clergyman

of the Broad Church school—that since the *claims* of children had, in the plea for schools, been based on the responsibility of parents towards them, a higher principle had been maintained on the platform than was preached from the pulpit, as the basis of the popular theology.”<sup>1</sup> This was in 1841.

“Janet,” said a Calvinistic minister to his old retainer, “you know well there is nothing in you worthy of salvation. Now suppose at the last, God should let you drop into hell—what would you say to that?” “Minister,” replied Janet, “I have thought it all over: I believe that God will do with me just what He has a mind to do. But this I know: He made me: I am the work of His hands: and if He puts me down into hell, He will lose more by doing it than I shall by bearing it.” Our British insistence on constitutional monarchs has banished from our minds the belief in Turkish despots or irresponsible rulers either in the heaven above or on the earth beneath.

### III.

#### *The Darker Side.*

But the evidences are not all “for.” They are partially “against.” If there is light ahead, the vision and the view are frequently blurred by darkness. Job is much too honest not to see this. “And yet,”<sup>2</sup> he says, as his soul wrestles with the hostile suggestions of the physical world. And yet! Look at the most permanent objects of the universe. The mountains! They fall and perish. Even the rocks are capable of being shifted out of their place. “The flowing of the rivers” are sufficient to wash the stones and wear them away. What is man upon the face of the earth but a tiny pin-point, a speck, an atom, a molecule? How can

<sup>1</sup> Cross's *Biography of George Eliot*, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> xiv. 18, Genung's translation.

he expect to escape the general destruction? Why should he expect to escape it? One is set thinking of what was written by that intrepid Alpine climber who was first to scale the heights of the mighty Matterhorn. A day may come, he declares, when the Matterhorn will have passed away or be reduced to a heap of shapeless atoms. That will be all that there will be to mark the spot where the great mountain stood, for even at this moment he noticed, "atom by atom, inch by inch, yard by yard, it yields to forces that nothing can withstand."

Then for us, too, like the rest of the world that has gone before, there is hastening on that fight which we all must fight and fight to lose. Death itself is a mighty avenger. Who has not witnessed the havoc that it makes in homes? <sup>1</sup> It prevails over some frail mortal and he passeth. Quickly his countenance is changed to the pallor of the sheets he lies on. He is taken away to corrupt in the grave and rot. When his children rise to distinction he never hears of it. When they are brought low he cannot bear their burden. The concerns of the living are veiled and kept hid from the dead. This is the gloomy strain in which he brings up to its finish his chapter on immortality.

It is very certain that people share these sentiments yet. There are some who dwell continually on what argues against the future state and never seem to weary pointing it out to us. They say the mind will not survive any more than the body. Why should it? Is it not obvious that our mental capacities "increase and fade" with our physical ones? When the one grows, does not the other? The young man who is in the vigour of health and alert and active, does he not enjoy the best of intellectual vigour, and when the body fails, is there not a sad falling off in other ways? Is the old man's judgment not less sound?

<sup>1</sup> xiv. 20 ff.

Is the old man's memory not less retentive? Is the old man's acuteness not less sharp? There is, of course, only one answer to such questions. Hence it is argued, body and soul go together. The two are mutually dependent. The fate of the one must be the fortune of the other. When the body is buried in the grave, the soul will be snuffed out along with it. No notice is taken of the fact that men like William Ewart Gladstone, for example, have notwithstanding physical illness had their wits about them and been in full possession of their faculties. No notice is taken of the fact that sceptical scientists like Professor Tyndall have believed that between body and mind an "impassable gulf" was fixed. It was absurd to talk of the one necessarily sharing the same fate as the other. No notice is taken of the fact that it may be just because the physical instrument through which thought expresses itself has become impaired and weakened, that it has to wait for a new instrument when it will express itself with all the vigour that ever it did and greater than ever. These facts mean much to us. By them is our faith in the future state quickened and renewed. And in the strength of them we believe that our beloved whom we have lost awhile have gone to larger spheres where they will be able to display all the qualities that we admired them for and grow better than ever we knew them. "And yet," others say, "it is the opposite arguments that prevail with them on this matter. Like body, like soul, at death both are at an end.

It need hardly be said that the familiar passage which begins,<sup>1</sup> "I know that my Redeemer liveth," does not contribute much to the subject under discussion. The words are regularly read at the Funeral Service, and by reason of their constant use in this connexion they have in the long

<sup>1</sup> xix. 25,

ages been charged with Christian sentiment and experience. Indeed, there is no reason why we should not continue to use them and read them, so long as we see clearly what we are doing. They have been "fulfilled" in the sense of being filled full with larger meaning. But it is another matter when they are considered as one of Job's utterances. The passage, certainly, gives us no ground for believing in the resurrection of our human body. This is a view which only found support from the Authorised Version of the English Bible and the plentiful supply of italics tells its own tale. Even the marginal readings of the Revised Version warn us off such an interpretation. The only sense the last line of verse 26 is capable of bearing, according to the general agreement of scholars, is that which makes it refer to a disembodied state. "Apart from my flesh," "without my flesh shall I see God." The word "redeemer" which is the Hebrew *gō'ēl* has a long history. It was originally the "avenger" and particularly the next of kin in a primitive tribe or clan. He, when a kinsman in the flesh had been murderously put to death, undertook to avenge his blood and kill the man-slayer. This was the meaning adopted by the historian Froude for example. But his brilliant essay on the Book of Job, though it remarkably anticipates the methods of modern criticism and some of its findings, was written before the critical results were fairly established. It leaves in consequence much to be desired. A maturer criticism decides in favour of a divine *gō'ēl* rather than a human one. It calls attention to the fact that there is no suggestion of Job being about to come to a violent death and in the case of natural death there would be nothing for the relative, under the primitive law, to avenge. Then *gō'ēl* is freely used in the Second Isaiah of God. <sup>1</sup> "Thus saith the Lord, thy redeemer." And again, <sup>2</sup> "Our

<sup>1</sup> Is. xliv. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Is. lxxiii. 16.



Redeemer from everlasting is Thy name." This gives the conclusion that Job believed his *Divine* avenger to live, or perhaps better, as the Revised Version margin suggests, his Divine vindicator. This living Divinity would make short shrift of the charges the superficial comforters had brought in against him and establish his innocence. Then it is not much satisfaction to a poor mortal asleep in Sheol if he cannot be present when his character is vindicated and witness the chagrin of his enemies. Hence Job's mind steadily advances to the point of perceiving that *he* will "see God." Canon Cheyne, however, qualifies this. He does not think an endless Vision could have been anticipated. Consistently with what has gone before it could only have been intended that "the unbodied spirit of Job should for a moment be transferred to the upper world," and how this momentary transference is to take place is left unmentioned. It is not much that the critics will concede to us. What they grant, they grant grudgingly.

The only justification for taking up the dark side along with the bright side is that the two together, bright and dark, are the general experience of mankind. It was the experience of Job, as we have seen. He saw the light that lighted the way to dusty death and illuminated the vistas of eternity that lay beyond it. He saw it. But he had to contend with clouds of fog and darkness that rolled up his sky and at times well-nigh obscured his vision. Similarly, if we had been born to be devils we would not have had this difficulty. We would not have had the two sides to look at. We would only have had the dark side. And we would have arrived at the cynical conclusion that this life is a banquet where we are all at liberty to eat, drink, and be merry because the next life is a coffin. Then if we had been born to be gods we would not have had that difficulty either. We would not have had the two sides to look at. We would have

only had the bright side. And the doubts and the mists and the fears would have utterly vanished away. But we are neither. We are not God. We are not devil. We are not even angelic beings and we cannot dwell in the "eternal light" because that is "theirs and theirs alone." We are but frail mortals, and so long as we are in this body pent and burdened with our mortality we must be prepared for intervals of darkness succeeding our moments of light. Myself, personally, when I am asked, Do you believe in the Christian doctrine of immortality and the future state, I often feel inclined to say yes and no. My convictions are not always equally strong within me. They vary. They rise and fall, like the tides. They ebb and flow. I find the belief at one time takes firm hold upon me. At another, if I must confess it, it is weak and uncertain. It becomes a problem and an effort to hold it at all. I thank my God that I have stood upon the mount of vision. I have seemed to see former friends in a happier home than ever this earth gave them and only waiting for me to join them and be happy with them. I have seemed to see students who were cut off at their studies, able to prosecute them afresh and under more favourable conditions. I have seemed to see the wearied rested and the invalids restored and in their right mind. I have seemed to see preachers who were taken hence before their work was well begun preaching, as St. Peter expresses it, to the spirits in prison. I have seemed to see in that land of pure delight many things that mingled with my thoughts and made me walk the footway of this life with a firmer tread and a surer step. These were my best moments, I feel sure. And I pray the Father of Lights that He will let the light of eternity stream in upon my soul from more to more. But I should not be honest in making that statement if I did not acknowledge that I have had and do still have my doubts. What these doubts are, why I have doubted, to what extent

and in what respect I have doubted, need not be stated, because I do not conceive it to be the preacher's business to preach his doubts. It rather is to preach the few practical certainties and convictions that he has to live by. "And yet," I have them. There is my little bit of personal confession. The reader may compare my experience with his own and see whether he is not in the same pass concerning it.

## IV.

*The Way out of Darkness.*

When these dark moments assail us, however, when we are in doubting castle, when we are a prisoner of Giant Despair and longing for the key of hope that Christian plucked from his bosom, we can do what Job did not do and could not do. We can read the good report that has gone out of Jesus Christ. He did not prove the soul immortal as a professor of mathematics might prove a proposition of Euclid on the blackboard. He did not argue for it as a philosopher might or as an argumentative preacher would. No, when He had these dispirited disciples round about Him in the upper room, He did not have resort to any of these devices. He made them feel it. "He lifted them out of time and made them feel eternal," says Emerson. He had that influence upon them. And if we read the written records that have come down concerning Him, He will produce a similar result upon our minds and spirits. As we imbibe the spirit of the Speaker, as we reach His point of view, as we follow Him from step to step, as we realise that this was the living conviction of the Purest and Best that ever lived and breathed, the Man at one with God, and who was so anxious for His conviction to be published and made known that He sealed it with His blood, when we come at that conclusion the instinct for immortality will assert itself.

"Read to me," said Sir Walter Scott to his son-in-law

as he lay dying at Abbotsford. "What shall I read?" inquired Lockhart. "How can you ask? There is but one book for me now." Then his son-in-law took down the New Testament and read the fourteenth chapter of John. "Let not your heart be troubled. Ye believe in God, believe also in Me. In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you." And when he had read that, the dying man lifted himself up in his couch and said, "Well, this is a great comfort. I have followed you distinctly and I *feel* as if I were yet to be myself again." It is a fine thing to have this assuring word from so great and so good a man as Sir Walter Scott; but what the New Testament did for him, it can do for us. The instinct for immortality will thrive and grow and flourish, if that influence of Jesus be upon us. And when it is not green pastures that we walk through, but when we have to descend into the vale of deep darkness, we will fear no evil because Jesus has gone this way before us and His voice through the darkness says that there is light beyond and all is well.

FRANK Y. LEGGATT.

### *SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.*

#### IX. SIN AS GUILT—THE DIVINE JUDGMENT.

HITHERTO, though constantly implied in what has preceded, the character of "guilt" in sin has not received any independent investigation. The feeling of guilt, indeed, in weaker or stronger degree, is an element in the consciousness of every moral being who knows himself as a wrong-doer. It is there naturally and spontaneously, a spring of disquiet and remorse, neither waiting on theoretical considerations for its justification, nor capable of being

got rid of by theoretical reasonings the most subtle and plausible. All serious literature treats it as a terrible fact, and finds its weirdest interest in depicting the agonies of the guilt-afflicted conscience, and in tracking the Nemesis that surely awaits the transgressor.<sup>1</sup>

Still, the idea of guilt depends, for its proper apprehension, on presuppositions in the general doctrine of sin, which had first to be made good before the nature and bearings of this idea could be intelligently approached. If guilt is a reality, and not simply a deceptive play of consciousness with itself—an illusion, disease, or figment of the mind—it seems self-evident that certain things about it must be postulated. There must be assumed the existence and freedom of the moral agent, the reality of moral law, with its intrinsic distinctions of right and wrong, some authority, be it only in society, to which the wrong-doer is accountable for infringements of that law—in religion, the existence of God as Moral Ruler and Holy Judge of men. Suppose, on the other hand, the view taken—as it is taken by some—that man has not real freedom, that, in words of Mr. Spencer before quoted, freedom is “an inveterate illusion”<sup>2</sup>—suppose, again, it is held that sin, or what is called such, is a natural and necessary stage in man’s development—a step to the good,—which seems the implication in most metaphysical and evolutionary theories,—suppose it is thought, as by many, that good and evil are but relative to the finite standpoint, and have no existence for the Absolute or for the universe as a whole, or, as by naturalism, that morality is only a social convention, and moral ideas the product of casual association and education (“homo mensura”),—suppose, finally, the Per-

<sup>1</sup> “Raro antecedentem scelestum

Deseruit pede poena claudo.”—Horace, *Odes*, iii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. his *Psychology*, i. pp. 500 ff.

sonality, Holiness, or Moral Government of God is denied, or the idea of "law" is held to be inapplicable to the relations of God to men,—it seems plain that the logical ground is taken from the conception of "guilt" in any serious sense. The term either ceases to have meaning, or is weakened down to the expression of an affrighted state of the individual feeling, without any objective reality to correspond. There is "guilt-consciousness," as a subjective experience, but not a "guilt" of which God and the universe must take account.

Is "guilt," then, a reality, and in what does its nature consist? How is it related to the divine order of the world, and to that "judgment of God" which, St. Paul assures us, "is according to truth against them that practise" evil? <sup>1</sup>

1. In asking, first, what "guilt" is, we may start, with Mr. Bradley, in his older book, *Ethical Studies*, with the idea of "answerableness"—*imputability*.<sup>2</sup> The sense of guilt arises, primarily, in connexion with the acts which a man imputes to himself as proceeding from his own will in the exercise of his freedom.<sup>3</sup> These, if wrong, i.e., involving the transgression of some principle of duty, he attributes to himself as their cause, feels that he is "answerable" for them, takes blame to himself on their account, and is conscious that he deserves blame from others. As conditions of such self-reprobation, certain things, as already hinted, are implied—the agent's consciousness of his self-identity and freedom, some knowledge of moral distinctions,

<sup>1</sup> Rom. iii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. 3 ff. What is it to be morally responsible? "We see in it at once the idea of a man's appearing to answer. He answers for what he has done, or has neglected and left undone. And the tribunal is a moral tribunal; it is the court of conscience, imagined as a judge, divine or human, external or internal" (p. 3).

<sup>3</sup> Hence the use of *atrla* for guilt, in such phrases as "to hold one guilty," "to acquit of guilt."

the awareness that he *ought* to have acted otherwise than he has done, a perception of demerit in the act he has performed.<sup>1</sup> The sense of guilt, therefore, originates in a *moral judgment* of a condemnatory kind passed by the agent upon himself for acts which he knows to be wrong.

Attention must now be fixed more particularly on this idea of *demerit*, or *ill-desert*, attaching to the wrong act and to its doer. Hitherto we have been dealing with sin as something in its nature intrinsically evil—opposed in principle to the good, a source of disorder and impurity, hateful in its manifestations, ruinous in its spiritual results. In this light sin bears the aspect of a *disease*; is something foul, malignant, repulsive, the cause of disturbance, misery, and death. Thus also it appears in Scripture. It is uncleanness, impurity: the abominable thing which God hates.<sup>2</sup> To this aspect of sin some, in their inquiries, would almost entirely confine themselves, ignoring everything which involves what they regard as a *legal* or *juristic* element. But there is another aspect of sin which accompanies all these internal phases of it. Besides possessing the character now described—because, indeed, of its possession of this character—sin has the quality of *evil desert*—of *punishableness*.<sup>3</sup> Sin is not simply a hateful, it is likewise a

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Bradley puts the matter thus: "The first condition of the possibility of my guiltiness, or of my becoming a subject for moral imputation, is my self-sameness; I must be throughout one identical person. . . . In the first place, then, I must be the very same person to whom the deed belonged; and, in the second place, it must have belonged to me—it must have been mine. . . . The deed must issue from my will; in Aristotle's language, the ἀρχή must be in myself. . . . Thirdly, responsibility implies a *moral agent*. No one is accountable who is not capable of knowing (not, who *does* not know) the moral quality of his acts" (*op. cit.*, pp. 5-7).

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Ps. xiv. 3; Is. vi. 5; Jer. xlv. 4; Ezek. xxxvi. 29; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Eph. iv. 19; v. 4; Jas. i. 2; Rev. xxii. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kant, *Crit. of Pract. Reason* (Abbott's trans., *Theory of Ethics*, pp. 127 ff. "Finally, there is something further in the idea of our practical reason, which accompanies the transgression of a moral law—namely, its *ill-desert*" (p. 127).

*condemnable* thing ; not something only that *may* be punished, but something that *deserves* to be punished<sup>1</sup>—that could not emerge in a morally-constituted universe and be lawfully passed over as indifferent. This character of the evil desert of sin asserts itself instinctively in every conscience ; as conscience develops and grows more sensitive it asserts itself only the more unconditionally. Our feeling regarding a wrong act is, not only that it is something which we blame ourselves for, and are perhaps ashamed of, but something, further, for which we may justly be called to account, and made to *suffer*.

The distinction here made between sin as disease, and sin as entailing evil desert, is one which, as earlier noted, presents itself likewise in ordinary ethical theory. Some schools, it is well known, prefer to look on virtue on the *æsthetic* rather than on what is sometimes called the *juristic* side. Virtue is, in this view, the beautiful (*τὸ καλόν*), the harmonious, the lovable in character ; vice, by contrast, is the inharmonious, the turbulent, the irregular, the morally ugly and repulsive. Thus, e.g., in Plato and Shaftesbury. Other moralists, as Kant, start from the side of law, and, emphasising the judicial function of conscience, dwell on the evil desert and punishableness of transgression. One view has regard more to the quality of character ; the other to the acts in which character is expressed. Both aspects, however, have their rightful place in a complete view of the facts. The prejudice against a “forensic” view of morality may easily be carried too far. Universal

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Bradley says : “ What is really true for the ordinary consciousness ; what it clings to, and will not let go ; what marks unmistakably, by its absence, a ‘ philosophical ’ or a ‘ debauched ’ morality, is the necessary connexion between responsibility and liability to punishment, between punishment and desert, or the finding of guiltiness before the law of the moral tribunal. For practical purposes we need make no distinction between responsibility, accountability, and liability to punishment ” (*op. cit.*, p. 4).



speech endorses the conception of conscience as a court of arraignment for the evil-doer ;<sup>1</sup> and heavy and unrelenting, often, are the sentences which this court pronounces.

The relation of guilt and punishment waits closer examination, but one current misconception may here be guarded against. One reason why the term "juristic" is an unfortunate one in this connexion is, that it conveys, or is apt to convey, the impression that ill-desert belongs to, and takes its origin from, statutory law ; that it is enough, therefore, to brand the *legal* standpoint in religion as low and imperfect to get rid of the notion of a judicial dealing with sin altogether. Ritschl, e.g., in denying punitive justice to God, proceeds on this idea.<sup>2</sup> Certainly, however, it is a mistaken one. The presence of law is, indeed, presupposed in ill-desert ; but ill-desert itself, as an inherent quality of the sinful act or disposition, cleaves, by an intuitive "value-judgment," to the consciousness of wrongdoing prior to any recognition of it by prescriptive law. If it were not already there, law could not make it. It would be there, were that conceivable, even were there no power or authority to call to account for it. Statute law itself, with its imperfect justice, is not an arbitrary thing, but rests, or professes to rest, on principles of right which depend on conscience for their sanction. It would be truer to say that the inner tribunal of conscience is the model on which courts of law are founded, than that it is they which furnish the pattern, and give sanctity to the decisions, of conscience.

Even to the natural consciousness, therefore, guilt is a terrible and woeful reality—not a feeling or alarm of the transgressor's own heart merely (a *guilt-consciousness*),

<sup>1</sup> Rom. ii. 15.

<sup>2</sup> In this theory of Ritschl's, see below. In criticism, cf. Dorner, *Syst. of Doct.*, E.T. iv., pp. 60-3.

but a guilt that is objectively *there*, and has to be taken account of by the wrong-doer himself and by others. Thus it is regarded in the secret judgments of the soul; thus it is treated in the moral estimates of men by their fellows; thus, when it takes the form of "crime" against society, it is judged by human law.<sup>1</sup>

This, however, still leaves us far outside the full *Christian* estimate of guilt. If guilt has this serious character even in ordinary ethics, infinitely more is its ill-desert apparent when transgression is lifted up into the *religious* sphere, and judged of in its proper character as *sin*. Sin, we have already seen, is much more than simple breach of moral law; it concerns the whole spiritual relation to God. In this higher relation, its demerit is measured not only by the law of conscience<sup>2</sup>—at best a weak and pale reflection of the divine judgment,—but by the majesty of the Holiness against which the offence is committed, the absoluteness of the divine claim on our obedience, and the potency of evil perceived to be involved in sin's principle, trivial as may seem, on our lower scale of judging, its immediate manifestation. For here, again, is a fallacy to be avoided. In measuring the evil of sin, we are too apt to be misled by what, in our levity, we call the insignificance of the act (untruth, selfishness, unforgivingness, displays of anger, etc.<sup>3</sup>); our judgments are unhappily out of proportion

<sup>1</sup> Cf. T. H. Green, *Works*, ii., pp. 489 ff. Mr. Green perhaps errs in seeking the ground of punishment too exclusively in the harm done to society, but he insists strongly on the punishment being a *just* one—one truly *deserved*. "It demands retribution in the sense of demanding that the criminal should have his due, should be dealt with according to his deserts, should be punished justly. . . . When the specified conditions of just punishment are fulfilled, the person punished himself recognises it as just, as his due or desert, and it is so recognised by the onlooker who thinks himself into the situation" (pp. 491-2).

<sup>2</sup> 1 John iii. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Christ's estimate of these things (Matt. v. 22; vi. 15; xii. 36, etc.).

because our own standpoint is habitually so far below the level of a true spirituality. It seems to us dreadful, no doubt, that a man should commit forgery, or betray a trust ; but the fact that any one's (or our own) heart is alienated from God, and insensible to His goodness ; that the spiritual balance of the nature is upset—the flesh strong, the spirit weak ; that things below, not things above, enchain the affections,—in brief, that the *centre* of life is a wrong one, and that, judged by the standard of *holiness*, almost every thought and act invite condemnation,—this appears to us not so very evil, and occasions comparatively little concern. It is precisely these standards of judgment, however, which religion inverts, and which we, too, must invert, if we are to see things with God's eyes. It will hardly be denied, at least, that, in the Christian Gospel, the demerit, turpitude, ill-desert of sin throughout assume this more awful aspect. The sin of a world turned aside from God is there judged, not by human, but by divine, standards. Guilt is a reality not to be gainsaid. "All the world" is "brought under the judgment of God."<sup>1</sup> A condemnation rests upon it, which no effort of man's own can remove.<sup>2</sup> This, however, introduces us to a further circle of conceptions, the nature and legitimacy of which must now be considered.

2. Sin is *punishable* ; this belongs to its essence. But what is the ground of this connexion between sin and punishment ? How is punishment itself to be regarded in its nature and end ? And what place has this conception in a religion like the Christian, which proceeds on a principle of *love* ?

Eliminating from punishment, as one must do, the idea of personal vengeance—the simple requiting of injury with injury—the question comes to be : Is punishment *retributive*,

<sup>1</sup> Rom. iii. 19, ἰπρόδικος.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. iii. 19, 20, 23, etc.

i.e., due to sin on its own account ? or is it only *disciplinary* or *deterrent*—a “ chastisement ” inflicted from a motive of benevolence, or a means to the prevention of wrong-doing in others ? The latter is the “ eudaemonistic ” or “ utilitarian ” view of punishment so severely criticised by Kant.<sup>1</sup> As, however, no one denies that punishment may be used, and in God’s providence largely is used, for disciplinary ends,<sup>2</sup> the question really turns on the other point of the acknowledgement or denial of its *retributive* aspect. This, on various grounds, is contested. Dr. Moberly, in his interesting discussion of the subject in his *Atonement and Personality*, takes what may be regarded as a mediating view. He grants that punishment *may* be retributive, but holds that its primary purpose is disciplinary, and that only as it fails in its object of producing inward penitence does it acquire the retributive character.<sup>3</sup> But this is a difficult position to maintain. To be productive of any good, disciplinary suffering must always, in the first instance, be recognised as *just*, as *deserved*—one’s *due*, and in reasonable proportion to the offence. That is to say, it must include the retributive element.<sup>4</sup> Neither is it easy to understand how a punishment *not* at first due on its own account, can afterwards become retributive simply through its failure to effect a moral change. *Solely* retributive, in contrast with previous moral uses, or more *severely* retributive, with increased hardening in sin, it possibly may become ; but

<sup>1</sup> Cf. passage above cited.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. ii. of the Book of Hosea is a fine example of how God’s severest judgments on Israel had an end of discipline and mercy.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, ch. i. “ This purpose of beneficent love is, we may venture to suggest, the proper character and purpose of punishment ” (p. 14 ; cf. p. 24). It is allowed that in human justice the retributive aspect is primary ; but this, it is said, belongs to it “ not as it is justice, but as it is human . . . to the necessary imperfectness of such corporate and social justice as is possible on earth ” (p. 9).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the remarks in W. F. Lofthouse’s *Ethics and Atonement*, p. 102.

essentially the retributive character must have inhered in it from the beginning.<sup>1</sup>

Objection is taken to the retributive aspect of punishment on the ground that God, in Christ's revelation, is no longer looked on as Judge, but as *Father*. Ritschl, going deeper, would deny punitive justice to God as contradictory of His character as love.<sup>2</sup> Neither objection can be readily sustained. St. Paul also, while upholding retribution,<sup>3</sup> knew well that God was Father; <sup>4</sup> Jesus, revealing the Father, gave sternest expression to the truth that God is likewise Judge.<sup>5</sup> God is indeed Father: Fatherhood is expressive of His inmost heart in relation to a world of beings made originally in His own image. But Fatherhood is not the whole truth of God's relation to the world. There is another relation which He sustains than that of Father—the relation of Moral Ruler and Holy Judge—Founder, Upholder, Vindicator, of that moral order to which our own consciences and the whole constitution of things bear witness,—and it is this relation which, once sin has entered, comes into view, and claims to have its rights accorded to it.<sup>6</sup> It was not as Father that St. Paul wrote of God, “Then how shall God judge the world?”<sup>7</sup> “The wrath of God is

<sup>1</sup> This is partially conceded in the use of the word “latent” (on p. 14). Another difficulty for Dr. Moberly is that, as he rightly holds, the “penitence” he desiderates is “impossible” apart from the saving interposition of Christ (pp. 44–5). But an aspect of punishment (the disciplinary) which is dependent on redemption cannot be thought of as primary; unless, indeed, it is contended that there would have been no punishment of sin, had grace not entered.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the writer's *Ritschlian Theology*, pp. 110, 146–9.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. ii. 3–11.

<sup>4</sup> God is “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3), “our Father” (Eph. i. 2), “the Father from whom every family in heaven and earth is named” (Eph. iii. 14), etc. In a wider regard all are His “offspring” (Acts xvii. 28).

<sup>5</sup> Matt. x. 28; xi. 22, 24; xii. 36–7; xxi. 44; xxiv. 35, etc.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. on this T. G. Selby, *Theology in Modern Fiction*, on Geo. MacDonald, pp. 151 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Rom. iii. 5.

revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.”<sup>1</sup>

What, then is the ground of the punishment of sin? It would lead us too far afield to enter into what may be termed the metaphysics of this difficult question. May it not be enough at present to say, what the foregoing has sought to make clear, that transgression, as in principle a break with that moral order of the world on conformity which all claim on life and its blessings depends, carries in itself the forfeiture of right to these blessings, and the desert of their opposite, loss and pain? Thus Kant would put it;<sup>2</sup> religion goes deeper in seeing in God's will the last principle of that order, and in sin the turning of the creature will from God in violation of the fundamental demand of moral law, unison of will with God. How then shall it be that a divine Holiness shall not react against transgression?

One thing certain is that the presence and working of a retributive justice in men's lives and in the history of the world have ever had a place among the deepest and most solemn convictions of the noblest portions of our race. The Bible need not be appealed to: its testimony is beyond dispute.<sup>3</sup> It is ever, indeed, to be remembered that in this world retribution never acts alone,—that it is crossed, restrained, on all hands, by an abundant mercy,<sup>4</sup>—is counteracted by remedial and redemptive forces,—is changed even where grace prevails (here is the truth of Dr. Moberly's

<sup>1</sup> Rom. i. 18. It is interesting to observe how St. Peter combines and yet distinguishes the two notions: “If ye call on Him as Father, who without respect of persons judgeth according to each man's work” (1 Pet. i. 17).

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e.g., the Fragment of a “Moral Catechism” in Kant's *Methodology of Ethics* (Semple's trans., Ed. 1869, p. 290 ff.).

<sup>3</sup> Isaiah: “Say ye of the righteous, that it shall be well with him. . . . Woe unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him,” etc. (ii. 10, 11); Jesus and Jerusalem (Matt. xxiii. 32-9); St. Paul has been already cited.

<sup>4</sup> “His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering” (Rom. iii. 4).

contention), as far as it continues, into the discipline of a loving Father.<sup>1</sup> But retribution, nevertheless, stern and terrible, there is, interweaving itself with every strain of sinful existence ; this universal conscience testifies. It is the underlying idea in the Hindu solution of the inequalities of life—the doctrine of transmigration ; it is the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine of “ Karma ”—that invisible law of moral causation infallibly binding act to consequence, even in the production of a new being, when the original agent has ceased to be at death ;<sup>2</sup> it is the dread background to the sunny gaiety of ordinary Greek life (Erinnys, Nemesis, Atē), and lends their atmosphere of terror and abiding power over mind and conscience to the great creations of Greek Tragedy (Oedipus, Antigone, Orestes, etc., not, as will be seen after, without their softer note of mediation and forgiveness<sup>3</sup>) ; it is equally the informing soul of modern tragedy (Macbeth, Hamlet ; in Ibsen), and of a great part of our nobler fiction (e.g., Geo. Eliot, Hawthorne<sup>4</sup>), even of fiction that is less noble (Dumas, Zola, Balzac, etc.). It is the implication of Schiller’s “ The history of the world is the judgment of the world ” ; of Matthew Arnold’s all too impersonal “ Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.” All this, falling though it does below the height of the Christian conception, with its Personal Holy Ruler of the

<sup>1</sup> Heb. xii. 5 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics* (Works, ix. pp. 61–2), connects the idea of “ Karma ” with heredity. It is really very different—an abstract, impersonal law, which has no relation to biological transmission. Its persistence past death Huxley speaks of as transmission “ from one phenomenal association to another by a sort of induction ” (p. 67).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Plumptre, *Sophocles*, *Intro.*, p. lxxxiii.

<sup>4</sup> This part of the subject is well illustrated in the book above named, T. G. Selby’s *Theology in Modern Fiction* (Fernley Lects., 1896). One thinks here of the teaching of George Eliot’s *Silas Marner*, *Adam Bede*, *Felix Holt*, *Romola*, and of Hawthorne’s *Scarlet Letter* and *Twice Told Tales*. Mr. Selby says of George Eliot : “ Working through all her plots is a stern, intelligent, unforgetting principle of retribution which brings even the secret things of darkness into judgment ” (p. 9).

world, and its law of righteousness, stretching in its effects into the life beyond, is a witness, impossible to be explained away, to the reality of a law of moral retribution, inbuilt inexorably into the very structure of our universe.<sup>1</sup>

3. Sin, it has been seen, in its very nature, cuts the bond of fellowship with God, but, further, as entailing guilt, creates in man a feeling of alienation and distrust, and calls forth a reaction of the divine Holiness against itself—what Scripture speaks of as the “wrath” (ὀργή) of God—which expresses itself in “judgment” (κρίμα; “condemnation,” *κατάκριμα*), or punishment. The punishment of sin is no mere “fate,” or “destiny,” or impersonal, self-acting “law,” without connexion with a moral Will, as in popular writing it is often represented, but has in it and behind it the intensity of a divine righteousness. The thing to be firmly grasped here is, that this is no arbitrary relation of God to the sin of the world. It is grounded in His very nature, and cannot be laid aside by any act of will, any more than the moral law itself can be reversed or annulled. Sin is that against which the Holy One and Upholder of the moral order of the universe, *must* eternally declare Himself in judgment. To do otherwise would be to deny that He is God. This, however, again gives rise to important questions as to the *manner* and *forms* in which the divine judgment takes effect, and on this point, in view of certain one-sided tendencies in current thought, a little must now be said.

It is a true, if not a complete, thought, that a large part of the punishment of sin—therefore, one form of the judgment of God—lies in the *immanent action* of God in the laws He has established in the worlds of nature and of mind. The first and often least bearable part of the punishment

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Huxley's strong words on the punishment of at least “certain actions” were quoted in the previous paper.



of sin is *internal*,—in greater offences in the miseries of conscience, the pangs of regret, the horror, shame, and self-loathing, that make the guilt-laden soul a hell,—but always in the moral and spiritual degradation, discord, and bondage that sin inevitably brings with it. Illustrations might be endlessly multiplied—the class of works already mentioned abound in them—of the mental torture which the consciousness of guilt can inflict.<sup>1</sup> Not in the inner life of the soul only, however, but *objectively*, in nature and society, the transgressor encounters the punishment of his misdoings. Law is at work here also. Wrong-doing puts the transgressor out of harmony with his environment, as well as with himself, and plunges him into countless troubles. Nature, as Butler said, is constituted for virtue, not for vice, and transgression brings the wrong-doer into collision with its order. Witness, e.g., the effects on health of the indulgence in sinful passions (envy, malice, etc.), or of a life of vice. Society is in arms against the man who violates its laws, or even its proprieties. Everywhere, despite apparent exceptions,<sup>2</sup> the saying is verified, “the way of transgressors is hard.”<sup>3</sup>

It is therefore an important truth that God judges sin through the operation of spiritual and natural laws. But this truth, as already suggested, is in danger of becoming a

<sup>1</sup> Two examples may be taken from antiquity:—

Juvenal, in his 13th Sat. (191-8), asks: “Yet why suppose that those have escaped punishment whom conscience holds in constant fear and under the noiseless lash—the mind her own tormentor? Sore punishment it is—heavier far than those of stern Caedicius or Rhadamanthus—night and day to carry one’s own accuser in the breast.”

Tacitus in his *Annals* (vi. 6) depicts the guilty agonies of Tiberius. In a letter to the Senate the emperor writes: “What to write you, conscript fathers, or how to write, or what *not* to write, may all the gods and goddesses destroy me worse than I feel they are daily destroying me, if I know.” “With such retribution,” adds the historian, “had his crimes and atrocities recoiled upon himself.”

<sup>2</sup> Ps. xxxvii. 35-6; lxxiii. 12-20.

<sup>3</sup> Prov. xiii. 15.

serious error when it is turned round to mean that laws, automatically acting, *take the place of God* in His judgment of sin, and exclude His personal, volitional action in connexion with it. This idea of inherent, "self-acting" laws, which take the punishment of sin, as it were, out of God's hands into their own, needs to be protested against as an undue exaggeration of the truth of God's immanence.<sup>1</sup> Laws are, after all, but God's ministers, and God remains the supreme, personal Power, acting above as well as within spirit and nature, omnipresently governing and directing both. Even in the internal punishment of sin, it is not always remembered, when self-acting laws are spoken of, how largely a personal element enters into such experience in the sinner's consciousness of the hostile judgment passed on him by others. It is this personal element of the disesteem of his fellows which, not infrequently, enters most deeply and with most withering effect into his soul, drying up its springs of happiness and rest. More terrible is it, in relation to God, to realise that it is not self-acting laws the sinner has to do with, but a Holy Judge, whose searching glance no transgression can escape, and who "will bring every work into judgment, with every hidden thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil."<sup>2</sup>

In nature, again, it is not simply self-acting laws which the transgressor has to deal with. We fail of a complete view if, with Martineau and others, we think of nature as a system of physical agencies which moves on its unbending

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Dale in his work on *the Atonement* (Lect. viii.) criticises this theory of "self-acting" moral laws in its relation to forgiveness as expounded by an older writer, Dr. John Young, in his *Life and Light of Men*. "God simply looks on. The vast machine of the moral universe is self-acting." Cf. Mr. Selby's remarks on recent views in his *Theol. of Modern Fiction*, pp. 168 ff. He justly says: "A God who has put a huge body of inviolable natural or moral laws between Himself and His creatures is imperfectly personal" (p. 168).

<sup>2</sup> Eccl. xii. 14.

way without any regard to moral character.<sup>1</sup> Nature, equally with mind, is the sphere of a divine providence. It is not simply that the sinner suffers through his collision with the established natural order; but nature, under the direction of God, takes up a hostile attitude towards the sinner. This, which is undoubtedly the teaching of Scripture,<sup>2</sup> is surely the truer view philosophically as well as religiously. Laws alone do not explain nature. To explain the actual course of nature there is needed, besides, what J. S. Mill, borrowing from Dr. Chalmers, called the "collocation" of laws—the manner in which laws are combined and made to work together.<sup>3</sup> To this is due the fine threadings and conjunctions in life which, with other factors, make up what we rightly speak of as its providential meaning for us.<sup>4</sup> Things, in other words, do not fall out by hap-hazard; they are part of a divine ordering that takes all the conditions—natural and moral—into account. The agencies of nature, therefore, can well be used, and are used, of God, as His instruments in the punishment of sin.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*, p. 105: "The physical agency of God . . . can take no separate notice of human life and character, nor of the differences which distinguish us from each other in our lot and in our mind. . . . An administration which, still intellectual, is unmoral, and carries its inexorable order through, and never turns aside, though it crushes life and hope, and even gives occasion to guilt and abasement.

<sup>2</sup> Deut. xxviii. 15 ff.; Is. i. 4 ff.; Hos. ii.; Amos iv.; Rev. viii., etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Syst. of Logic*, Bk. iii. 12. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. McCosh, *Method of Div. Govt.*, Bk. ii. ch. 2. "The inquiring mind will discover designed combinations, many and wonderful, between the various events of divine providence. . . . What singular unions of two streams at the proper place to help on the exertions of the great and good! What curious intersections of cords to catch the wicked as in a net, when they are prowling as wild beasts! By strange, but most apposite correspondences, human strength, when set against the will of God, is made to waste away under His indignation, as, in heathen story, Meleager wasted away as the stick burned which his mother held in the fire" (p. 198).

Mr. Selby, illustrating from George Eliot, says: "The gathering up of all these tangled threads after years of oblivion implies an over-watching providence of judgment in human life" (*op. cit.*, p. 52).

4. The word in which Scripture sums up, comprehensively, the penalty of sin is “*death*.” “The wages of sin is death.”<sup>1</sup> Death, in this relation, certainly includes a moral element; it has sin behind it as its cause.<sup>2</sup> The intimacy of spiritual and physical is maintained here also. The real dying is *inward*,—the result of disobedience, severing from fellowship with God, and issuing, save as grace prevents, in corruption and subjection to evil powers.<sup>3</sup> Death is not, therefore, simply physical dissolution. On the other hand, it seems impossible to deny that physical dissolution,—the separation of soul and body, in contradiction of man’s true destiny<sup>4</sup>—is, in the Scriptural idea,<sup>5</sup> included in it. The meaning of death for man, in its scientific relations, was considered in a previous paper, and need not be further dwelt upon. With death, however, in its universal prevalence,<sup>6</sup> and, as involved in this, the whole question of hereditary evil, is connected another dark and difficult problem, the possibility of a *hereditary or racial*, as distinct from a purely individual, *guilt*. From what has been said in elucidation of guilt, it would seem as if the very nature of guilt lay in its being individual. I cannot be guilty of another’s sin. On the other side, the fact has to be faced that, because of the organic connexion—the *solidarity*—of the race, the penalties of transgression rarely are confined to the individual transgressor, but overflow on all connected with him. They descend from generation to generation,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vi. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. ii. 17; iii. 19; Rom. v. 12.

<sup>3</sup> On death as spiritual, cf. John v. 24; Rom. viii. 6; Eph. ii. 1, 5; v. 14; 1 Tim. v. 16; 1 John iii. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the writer’s *God’s Image in Man*, pp. 53, 251 ff.

<sup>5</sup> This is contested by many, e.g., by Principal E. Griffith-Jones, in his *Ascent Through Christ*, pp. 174 ff. But fair exegesis cannot get rid of this idea of Paul’s teaching (Rom. v. [12; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, etc.]). Ritschl grants that Paul taught the doctrine, but holds that Paul’s thought is no rule for us (*Justif. and Recon.*, E.T., p. 359).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Rom. v. 12–15.

<sup>7</sup> Exod. xx. 5.

even to the extent of the inheritance of a polluted nature, and, on the above showing, of universal subjection to death.

How is this antinomy to be solved? It plainly cannot be on the ground of pure individualism. It was before seen, however, that the individual point of view is not the only one; the *social* and *racial* aspects of man's existence have likewise to be regarded, and these entail responsibilities.

(1) It is to be recalled that, while personal guilt, obviously, there can be none for the acts of another, this does not preclude even the innocent from the suffering of *painful consequences* which are truly the penalties of that other's transgression.

(2) Next, it cannot be denied that, while purely personal action entails only individual responsibility, there are *public* and *corporate responsibilities*, in which all concerned must take their share, though the acts by which they are affected are not their own. A firm is responsible for the defalcations of a clerk or of one of its own members; an employer is responsible for his servant's carelessness; a nation may be involved in prolonged war through a rash word spoken or a blow struck. There is not here, indeed, a sharing of the guilt, but there is of the *liabilities* which the wrong act entails—a fruit of the common responsibility.

(3) A deeper case is where, besides outward association, there is *kindredship in disposition* with the transgressors—participation in, and heirship of, the *spirit* that prompted the evil deeds. Jesus held the Pharisees responsible for the deeds of their fathers, of whose spirit they were partakers. He spoke of the blood of all the prophets coming on Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup> The French Revolution, as depicted by Carlyle, is a modern illustration of the same avenging law.

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxiii. 29-39. On the same principle we speak of the sin of *the world* as crucifying Christ Himself. The Jews cried: "His blood be on us and on our children" (Matt. xxvii. 25).

Guilt, accumulating for centuries, discharges its terrible load upon a later generation. In these cases continuity of spirit knits the generations together into one guilty whole.

All these principles, it may be held, meet in their application to the *race*. Guilt, as well as sin, has a racial aspect. The race is not innocent. Sprung from a sinful root, itself gone far astray,<sup>1</sup> it shares in the disabilities which sin entails. Without prejudice to individual responsibility, we can speak of a common "guilt" of humanity.

5. The great, the solemn, inquiry yet remains—Does sin's penalty exhaust itself in this life? Or is it carried over into *the Beyond*, and with what issues? Does death end all? The question must here be reserved, but it is that on which everything depends for a satisfying solution of the moral problems of the world. There is, it has been seen, a divine moral administration in this life,—a judgment of sin, inward and outward, continually going on,—but the mind is easily contented which can regard this temporal dispensation of God's justice as either perfect or final. The manifest incompleteness of the earthly system of things, in relation both to the good and to the evil, is, in fact, the loudest plea for a Hereafter, and one of the strongest reasons for believing in its existence. The present, too, it is needful again to remind ourselves, is a Day of Grace even more than a scene of Judgment. A remedial system is in operation, the bearings of which on sin are manifold and far-reaching. Rarely, if ever, is sin permitted to work out its full effects; never, in this life is it visited with its full penalty. This, manifestly, is not final. A day is awaited when the veil will fall, when everything will be revealed in its true light, and meet with its due reward. Gospel as it is of all-embracing love, Christianity joins with conscience in announcing "judgment to come."<sup>2</sup>                    JAMES ORR.

<sup>1</sup> Is. liii. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xxiv. 25; Rom. ii. 5, 16; 2 Cor. v. 10; Heb. vi. 1, 2, etc.

*A MISINTERPRETED MIRACLE.*

CERTAIN of the Scripture narratives appeal to the astronomer as coming within the border of his own special studies, and chief amongst these is the account of the wonder that is recorded to have taken place during the battle of Beth-horon ; that first great decisive battle of the world which gave the possession of the Land of Promise to the children of Israel. May it be permitted then to an astronomer to explain how this particular narrative strikes him when viewed from his own standpoint ?

The astronomical interest of the tenth chapter of the Book of Joshua centres upon verses 12 and 13, for they have been taken to mean that the earth's rotation upon its axis was arrested for several hours, so that the setting of the sun was delayed beyond its proper time for quite half a day. The words ascribed in the record to Joshua at the supreme moment of the day are :—

“ Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon ;  
And thou, Moon, in the valley of Aijalon,”

and the great majority of commentators have assumed that the day was far spent when Joshua thus spoke, and that fearing lest darkness should intervene before the Israelites could overtake their flying enemies, he ordered the sun, which he saw over Gibeon on the skyline, to remain there without setting, “ until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies.”

Yet in spite of the very general agreement of commentators, it is certain that the narrative forbids us to conclude that Joshua's words were spoken at or near the time of sunset, and this from the most simple of astronomical considerations.

It would have been quite natural for the Hebrew general

to speak of the sun as being "upon Gibeon," if at that moment he were far to the east of the city, and he saw the sun in its downward course just about to be hidden by its walls and towers. As a rule the celestial bodies do not appear to have any fixed relation of place with respect to objects on the earth. Thus, for instance, no one here in England could possibly associate the position of the September noon-day sun with any hill or building or city. If we were looking over London from Highgate Hill, we could not think or speak of the sun at that time as being either "upon" St. Paul's or ourselves at Highgate, since it would be obvious that he was just as much "upon" one part of the landscape as another. But at his rising or setting the sun does seem to be associated with the objects near it on the horizon, and would be so described with perfect naturalness.

There would then be no difficulty about the ordinary view if the sun alone had been mentioned, but Joshua addressed not only the sun but the moon. The moon, to him, was "in" the valley of Aijalon.<sup>1</sup> But as he must have been to the east of Gibeon to see the sun setting over it, he must also have been to the east of Aijalon which lies to the west of Gibeon. The moon, therefore, as well as the sun, must have been setting, but no one has ever seen the sun and moon setting together or rising together. For they can only be thus apparently close together when the moon is nearly "new"; that is to say, when it turns its dark side towards the earth. At best only the very thinnest arc could be illuminated under these circumstances, and this could not be detected in such close proximity to the sun. The mention, therefore, of both sun and moon, and each of them as apparently connected with some landmark, proves conclusively that it was not near sunset when Joshua spoke.

<sup>1</sup> The difference in the prepositions in the English versions is not in the Hebrew.



Yet the interpretation of the narrative that is commonly accepted is based on the assumption that it was so ;—that the day was far spent and the sun about to set.

Some commentators have taken a very different view, surmising that the incident happened soon after sunrise, since it is stated in the ninth verse that :—

“ Joshua, therefore, came upon them suddenly ; for he went up from Gilgal all the night.”

They suppose that Joshua’s victory was of the nature of a night surprise, and that he broke in upon the Amorites shortly before daybreak.

If the incident took place shortly after sunrise, Joshua seeing the sun “ upon Gibeon ” must have had that city to his east. The moon then “ in the valley of Aijalon ” might have been to his west, opposite to the sun, and, therefore, full and just about to set. Under such conditions the moon can be seen in full daylight easily. But this hypothesis has serious difficulties of its own. First, it is hard to see how Joshua, coming from the camp at Gilgal which is far to the east of Gibeon, could, shortly after daybreak, be some distance from Gibeon to the west. Next, there would seem no reason why he should wish the day to be prolonged when he had it all before him. But the most serious objection is one of a strictly astronomical character.

We moderns in our great cities lead such artificial lives, and are so far removed from contact with nature, that the ordinary man is apt to think that the sun may be anywhere in the sky, and the moon at the same time anywhere in relation to it. It is not so. The position of the sun in the sky is strictly determined for every moment of every day. It follows in its apparent course a rigidly defined path, and never departs from that imagined circle in the heavens which we call the ecliptic. And the path of the moon is as strictly defined as that of the sun, though it is not confined to the

ecliptic but oscillates for a short distance on either side of it. If then the moon appeared as if about to set behind the valley of Aijalon, whilst the sun had just risen from behind Gibeon, those two places must have appeared to the observer to be almost exactly opposite to each other, and Joshua must have been standing very nearly on the straight line joining them. But the valley of Aijalon lies about  $17^{\circ}$  N. of W. from Gibeon, so that to Joshua, when he spoke, the moon must have seemed to "bear" about  $17^{\circ}$  N. of W. and the sun about  $17^{\circ}$  S. of E. At the time of the equinox the sun rises due east, and, if the moon be then at the full, this will set not far from due west. From the autumnal equinox onward to midwinter the sun rises further and further south every day, and by consequence the setting place of the moon when full is further and further north. The day of the year which would be indicated by the sun rising over Gibeon whilst the moon was setting in the valley of Aijalon would be about October 30, of our present calendar. Later on in the year the sun's place of rising would be too far to the south, but after the winter solstice it would move north again and the conditions indicated would be satisfied a second time on or about February 12. At or about these two periods, and these two periods only, could sun and moon have held the supposed relation to each other.

But the month of February was already past before the battle of Beth-horon. Israel had passed the Jordan at the time of flood; that is to say, in early spring. They then kept the Feast of the Passover, which was observed at the first full moon after the spring equinox, corresponding roughly to our Easter. After the Passover came the taking of Jericho, the campaign against Ai, and the pilgrimage to the mountains Ebal and Gerizim for the reading of the Law. This not improbably took place on the anniversary of the original giving of the Law from Mount Sinai, and would,

therefore, correspond nearly to our Whitsuntide. The tribes then returned to Gilgal, and when there the Gibeonites made their fraudulent treaty with them which led swiftly on to the battle of Beth-horon. For since Beeroth, the most northern of the Hivite cities, was only four miles from Ai, and Gibeon, their chief city, only six miles from Jerusalem the headquarters of the Amorite league, it is certain that the events between the return of the Israelites to Gilgal and the battle of Beth-horon cannot have been spread over several months, but must have occupied only a few days. We may be sure, therefore, that the events recorded in the tenth chapter of Joshua took place during the very height of summer.

But, as we have already seen, the sun during the summer months could not be observed as bearing  $17^{\circ}$  S. of E. at its rising, nor for similar reasons could the full moon have been seen as setting  $17^{\circ}$  N. of W. If the sun had alone been mentioned in reference to some geographical position the question would have been indeterminate, but the mention of the moon, also with a definite geographical reference, defines the conditions within narrow limits, and it is certain that the sun cannot have just risen "upon Gibeon," any more than it can have been just about to set "upon" it.

There is, however, one other position in the sky, and one only, which the sun may hold in which it may naturally be spoken of as being "upon" a given locality; it may be in or near the zenith of that place. And this third use of the term is the most natural of all. For if the sun is above us, right overhead, so that a man can cover his shadow with his foot, then indeed there is no doubt about its relation to us; it is "upon" us; it is "upon" the place where we are. Joshua, therefore, must have been at Gibeon when he spoke, with the sun overhead.

And if we turn to the thirteenth verse, we find this fact definitely stated: "So the sun stood still in the midst of

heaven"; in the "halving" of the heavens, that is to say in its very centre. It was high noon in the middle of summer, and as Palestine is a sub-tropical country, it was probably within  $10^{\circ}$  or  $12^{\circ}$  of the zenith. In such a position, it could never occur to any one, least of all to those who were actually experiencing its scorching power, to describe the sun as other than "overhead." It was "upon Gibeon," "upon" Joshua.

Joshua was at Gibeon and it was noonday. Knowing thus approximately the time of day, and the place where the observation was made, it is possible to deduce the astronomical significance of the moon appearing to be "in the valley of Aijalon." I have worked out this problem elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> and it is sufficient to say here that it appears that the battle took place on or about the 21st day of the fourth Jewish month, which in that particular year almost exactly corresponded to July of our present calendar. The sun, therefore, had risen at five that morning, and, as it was noon when Joshua spoke, there were still seven hours before it would set. The moon was near, but had not yet passed, its third quarter, that is to say, it was about half full. It had risen soon after eleven o'clock on the previous evening, and had lighted the Israelites during the greater part of their night march up from Gilgal, and it would set in about half an hour.

What then was the meaning of Joshua's command?

"Sun, be thou silent upon Gibeon;

And thou, Moon, in the valley of Aijalon,"

for it is well known that the margin gives the literal meaning of the verb, which corresponds to our own word "dumb," being formed to imitate the sound made when a man closes his lips on his speech. It has, therefore, the general mean-

<sup>1</sup> *Astronomy of the Bible*, pages 362-365. See also *The Observatory*, for 1904, January, vol. xxvii., page 57. "Note on an Early Astronomical Observation recorded in the Book of Joshua."

ing of “to cease,” “to be quiet,” “to desist.” The word occurs again in the next verse:—

“And the sun was silent,  
And the moon stayed.”

The word “stayed” is correctly translated, though it might be better rendered as “stopped.” But the parallelism of Hebrew poetry obliges us to take it here as a synonym of the first verb, and indeed it also is sometimes rendered “to cease.” Both sun and moon ceased from something that they had been doing before. The passage may, therefore, be rendered thus:—

“Sun, cease thou upon Gibeon ;  
And thou, Moon, in the valley of Aijalon.  
And the sun ceased,  
And the moon stopped,  
Until the people had avenged themselves upon their  
enemies.

Is not this written in the Book of Jasher ? ”

Joshua then commanded the sun to “cease upon Gibeon.” To cease from what—from moving or from shining ? There can be no question as to which of the two he must have desired. There never could have been any question in the mind of any man who was himself in the position of the Hebrew captain. The highland of southern Palestine in summer is one of the hottest countries of the world ; the sun was right overhead pouring down its pitiless rays upon him. The last thing that he could have wished would have been to fix the sun in that intolerable position. The only meaning that can be ascribed to the words, “Sun, cease upon Gibeon,” is that it should cease from its shining ; that it should close its rays as a man closes his lips ; that it should “be dumb.”

And we know that this actually did take place. For we

learn from the eleventh verse that, as the Amorites fled from before Israel, "The Lord cast down great stones from heaven upon them unto Azekah and they died: they were more which died with hailstones than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword." A mighty hailstorm, such as is here indicated, involves that the heaven was covered with clouds, and the temperature suddenly lowered; the size of the hailstones implies that the lowering of temperature was extreme. The great heat was replaced by sharp cold.

This hiding of the sun and moon is referred to in the beautiful prayer of Habbakuk where he says:—

"The sun and moon stood still in their habitation,  
At the light of Thine arrows they went,  
And at the shining of Thy glittering spear.  
Thou didst march through the land in indignation,  
Thou didst thresh the heathen in anger."

It is quite clear in this passage that "stood still" does not correctly express the meaning of the Hebrew word, as it would be in contradiction to the verb in the next line. As in the xviiiith Psalm, the arrows of Jehovah are the hailstones, the lightning His glittering spear, and the passage should be rendered:—

"The sun and moon ceased in their habitation,  
At the light of Thine arrows they vanished."

The meaning of the chief occurrence of this great day is now clear. Joshua, seeing the extraordinary efforts which his troops had already made,—for they had been seventeen hours on the march,—and feeling the oppressive heat of the sun, was anxious for that heat to be tempered. The Lord answered his prayer and much more than answered it, for not only did He deliver the Israelites from the oppressive heat, but He sent the hailstorm which overwhelmed their enemies; and it was this incident that so greatly impressed

the chronieler, and moved him to the twice repeated comment, "the Lord fought for Israel."

This was the chief incident of the day; the marvellous faith of the servant of the Lord, which impelled him to speak to sun and moon as if full authority over them had been given into his hands, and the instant and gracious response on the part of the Lord who was not offended with his servant as if he had been presumptuous, but "hearkened unto the voice of a man," and "fought for Israel," obeying, as it were, a human command.

This was the most remarkable incident of the day; it was not the only one. For it is written, "The sun ceased in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day." The sun's "silence," its "ceasing," was one thing; its "hasting not to go down" was another. The "going down" of the sun is the work of the afternoon, of the half-day from noon till sunset, but we are told that in this case the going down lasted not for half a day, but "about a whole day." The sun hasted not in his movement, but went down slowly, twice as slowly as its wont.

The usual mode of reading this passage supposes that the stopping of the sun was the stopping of its motion, not the stopping of its shining, and that it was actually arrested in the midst of heaven, or that, astronomically speaking, the earth ceased to rotate on its axis. This interpretation is contradicted by the rest of the passage, which distinctly asserts that the sun went down,—i.e. it was not arrested. It is true that it went down slowly, it "hasted not" in its going, but it went down, and later on we find its setting recorded.

What is meant by this slackening of the sun's movement? How did the Israelites recognise that the sun, which was probably clouded over and invisible to them most of the afternoon, was moving more slowly than its wont? How

did they recognise that that afternoon was drawn out so as to be equivalent to "about a whole day?"

We find it recorded in verse 10 that: "The Lord discomfited the Amorites before Israel, and slew them with a great slaughter at Gibeon, and chased them along the way that goeth up to Beth-horon, and smote them to Azekah and unto Makkedah." The route from Gibeon to Makkedah, through the Beth-horons is nearly thirty miles, and this by itself is a full day's work for an army on the march, without allowing for any fighting. Yet it was accomplished between noon and sunset, and this distance marched was the only means that the Israelites possessed for measuring the flight of time. Thirty miles march was to them "about a whole day," the two were convertible terms; and "the sun hastened not to go down" whilst they made that march.

If it be asked, "Was this march a miraculous one?" I do not know that we have the means for giving a decided answer. The achievement was certainly extraordinary, but it is not quite clear that it was superhuman. When the Israelites heard the confident shout of their captain, and saw the instant change in the aspect of the heavens which followed it, there must have been a great uplifting of their spirit, over and above the revival of their physical energy at the sudden cooling of the air. Men can do great things when they are convinced that the Lord is with them indeed.

The Israelites were mightily strengthened; that is clear whether we regard that strengthening as having been miraculous in the strict sense of the word, or as the result of natural causes, though combined in an extraordinary manner. And we must assume this strengthening to have taken place whether we suppose, as I have done, that the day was lengthened only in relation to the march accomplished by the Israelites, or, as in the usual interpretation, that it was lengthened in absolute duration. In either case the achievement of the



Israelites was the same ; between one sunset and the next they climbed a mountain, marched sixty miles and fought a battle. On the one theory the two sunsets were separated by twenty-four hours ; on the other by about thirty or thirty-one. But whichever of these two hypotheses be correct, the marvel which impressed the sacred historian so much, was, not that the march of a whole day was accomplished within an afternoon, but that the Lord had "hearkened to the voice of a man," and had "fought for Israel." At Joshua's word, He had brought it about that the sun was darkened in his going forth and the moon did not cause her light to shine, and He had smitten more of the Amorites with His hailstones "than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword."

This is, then, the way in which the narrative, examined astronomically, impresses me. I gather from it that at noon of a hot day, in the middle of summer, the Hebrew captain found that his projected task was less than half accomplished, and that his men, exhausted by their past efforts, and by the oppressive heat, were unequal to fulfilling the part which remained. Part of the Amorite host had been vanquished at Gibeon, but evidently much the larger part had escaped and were making good their flight by the way of Beth-horon. In this emergency, Joshua commanded the sun to "be silent," that is, to forbear from its fierceness. His command was answered ; for no doubt the mighty hail-storm which caught the Amorites in the steep descent of the Beth-horons was accompanied by a complete clouding of the sky, and a great lowering of the temperature, which would be felt far beyond the range of the actual hail-burst. Refreshed and encouraged by the sudden coolness, the Israelites continued the pursuit, and traversed in the seven hours of the afternoon a distance which under ordinary circumstances would have been the work of an entire day. In that new

strength they were enabled to overtake their enemies, though the latter had evidently a considerable start in the race.

I do not think that the earth was arrested in its rotation on its axis, or that the sun remained fixed in its apparent position in the heavens for several hours. I do not think it is reasonable to suppose that Joshua desired anything of the kind, or that, attentively read, the actual words of the narrative will permit that interpretation to be put upon them.

But there is another point in which the narrative impresses me very strongly. The two most important astronomical facts are both told us in two different ways. The two statements are in perfect accord but could not have been derived the one from the other.

We are told explicitly that it was noonday in high summer, for "the sun was in the midst of heaven." We also learn this implicitly, but certainly, from the statement that Joshua commanded the sun to "be silent upon Gibeon," and the "moon in the valley of Aijalon."

We are told explicitly that the Israelites chased their enemies from Gibeon to Makkedah by way of the Beth-horons, a distance of some thirty miles. We know from our own experience that this is a whole day's march for an army. We are also told implicitly that this full day's march was accomplished whilst the sun was in its going down, that is to say, in the afternoon, the half-day.

It is difficult to give an adequate expression of the force which these correspondences, especially the first, have to an astronomer. The introduction of the moon in Joshua's command seems at first sight to be irrelevant; indeed, it has been widely supposed to have been introduced by the author of the war song, quoted from the Book of Jasher, merely for poetic effect, to round off the parallelism characteristic of Hebrew poetry. This cannot have been so. If

the reference to the moon had been inserted by the song writer merely for poetic effect, it would most assuredly have been given some astronomically impossible position. Astronomers know well that if astronomical details are not inserted from direct observation, and at the time, they are bound to betray themselves as "faked." Our poets, novelists and artists almost always fail when they attempt to give a realistic effect by the introduction of an astronomical detail. One example from a familiar poem by Tennyson, a poet who was most careful and accurate in his scientific details, may suffice. In the second part of the "May Queen," the dying girl is represented as saying:—

"Last May we made a crown of flowers : we had a merry day ;  
Beneath the hawthorn on the green they made me queen of May ;  
And we danced about the maypole and in the hazel copse,  
Till Charles' Wain came out above the tall white chimney tops."

But on May Day, when Charles's Wain "comes out," it is right in the zenith, and the May Queen, "dancing round the maypole or in the hazel copse," could never have associated its seven stars with the chimneys of the village houses, for the stars were "upon" her ; they were right above her head.

The mention of the moon as in the valley of Aijalon, irrelevant as it may seem, can be explained in only one way. Joshua actually did utter those very words ; probably because, at the very moment when his scouts reported to him the escape of the greater part of the Amorite force, he looked in the direction of his retreating enemy, and caught sight of the moon which had lighted him in his night march up from Gilgal. He may further have intended to express by the form of his command that he wished the clouds, for which he yearned, to cover the sky from zenith to horizon, and hence to hide not only the sun but the moon as well. Incidentally the mention of the moon shows that at the moment when

Joshua spoke, the storm cloud had not begun to rise. Just as when Elijah's servant watched from Mount Carmel, the storm would come up from the west, from the sea, and the moon would be hidden first of all, before the "heaven was black with clouds and wind."

Joshua must have uttered his command both to sun and moon just as we have the words recorded ; neither reference can have been put in haphazard by some later writer. The war song from the Book of Jasher must have been composed at the time, possibly on the very evening after the battle, but certainly whilst all the circumstances were fresh in the minds of those who had taken part in the great events of that day.

So too with the prose chronicle. It could not have fitted in so precisely with the poetic record—for it fits as the one half of a tally does with the other,—unless it also had been strictly contemporaneous with the events which it recorded. If the chronicle be multiple, then all of the records from which it is compiled must have been written at the very time of the events. When or how the complete Book of Joshua took its present form is a different question, but the astronomical evidence renders it clear that it preserves to us here, in the tenth chapter, records which were made at the time of the Battle of Beth-horon, and preserves them unaltered.

E. WALTER MAUNDER.

*THE INFLUENCE OF PERSECUTION  
ON CERTAIN NEW TESTAMENT WRITINGS.*

OUR Lord, in the course of His teaching on persecution, warned His followers when persecuted in one city to flee to another.<sup>1</sup> Of the same tenour is the instruction given to the Twelve (and to the Seventy) to leave a place, where they were not received and could not obtain a hearing, and to depart to another, shaking off the earth beneath their feet as a testimony against their persecutors.<sup>2</sup> They were not to rush on to the sword's point, but to exercise prudence in their calling, seeking another entrance where the first was closed in their faces. Paul and Barnabas, we learn, carried out this instruction to the letter, when maltreated at Pisidian Antioch: "they shook the dust of their feet upon them and went to Iconium."<sup>3</sup>

Despite instances which suggest the contrary, it would appear that during the early centuries of the Church's history the spirit of this command continued to be obeyed. There was on the whole no disposition to court destruction at the hands of the Government. We find a Christian church in Asia Minor registered as a guild of *πορφυροβάφοι*, "dyers in scarlet": it was only to the initiated that the word, with the accent secretly changed, became *πορφυρόβαφοι*, "dipped in the crimson blood of Christ." It has been repeatedly shown, too, by Sir W. M. Ramsay, and most recently in the *EXPOSITOR*,<sup>4</sup> that throughout the life and death struggle between the Empire and the Church, ending in the compromise of the fourth century, Christianity employed cryptic symbols and language on stone. All the learning and insight of a modern savant have been required

<sup>1</sup> Matt. x. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Mark vi. 11, and parallels; also Luke x. 11 = Matt. x. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Acts xiii. 51.

<sup>4</sup> 1910, I., p. 482.

to reveal the import of certain words and symbols, which would either convey no meaning or a wrong meaning to pagan readers. It has for some time appeared to me that certain characteristics of the New Testament itself may fittingly be explained in a similar way.

It is now beyond dispute that the books of the New Testament are for the most part written in the colloquial Greek which was understood by more persons than any other language in the Roman Empire. Within the New Testament itself there are of course various degrees of culture. It is a far cry, for instance, from the exquisite rhythmical prose of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews to the rather low-class Greek of St. Mark's Gospel or the ungrammatical jargon into which the writer of the Apocalypse so often falls. But our general statement remains true. And yet there is a difference, or rather there are differences, from the ordinary colloquial Greek in these books. There is first the majesty of their theme to mark them off. There is next the Semitic background, most marked in the sayings of Jesus and in the Apocalypse, but present elsewhere also. The subtle aroma may, in fact, be said to pervade almost the whole of the New Testament, though its actual effect on the diction has been commonly overrated in the past. What would most strike the pagan reader would be the mysterious word *Χριστός*. This he would be apt, as indeed some Christians also were, to confuse with the well-known slave name *Χρηστός*,<sup>1</sup> which, like the other slave name *Ὀνήσιμος*, is in origin an adjective meaning "serviceable," "useful." But there is still another point which would mystify the ordinary reader even more, and that is the use at times of what might almost be called "cabbalistic" language. It is our thesis to suggest that this was used

<sup>1</sup> I am reminded that in pronunciation the two words would be practically indistinguishable.

intentionally in the case of certain New Testament writings, which belong to an age of persecution, in order that neither the writers nor the first recipients should fall into the hands of the government and be punished. The writings where it seems to me that this can be especially traced are the First Epistle of Peter, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Apocalypse, and the Epistle of James. It will be convenient to take these in that order, and to state in each case briefly and without much argument the situation to which it seems best to assign each.

The date of the First Epistle of Peter has been a good deal discussed. I have no hesitation in adopting the view of Sir W. M. Ramsay that it belongs to the period 70 to 80.<sup>1</sup> Against the tradition that Peter and Paul perished together in Nero's time there are several serious considerations. The counter-tradition that Peter ordained Clement is earlier than the tradition of a joint martyrdom, and it comes direct from Rome itself. Again, it is too often forgotten that Paul was a Roman citizen, and that Peter was not. Their entirely different political status suggests that they perished under entirely different circumstances: certainly, the law would require Paul to be beheaded, but a mere subject of the Empire like Peter would naturally be crucified. We are too apt to see Peter through the spectacles of the New Testament or those of the Roman Church, and to forget his legal status. Finally, the fondness for coupling saints, which has been so well illustrated by Dr. Rendel Harris in his *Heavenly Twins* and other works, has operated here too, and there is no more reason to accept the tradition of the simultaneous deaths of Peter and Paul, than there is to accept the other tradition that the two sons of Zebedee perished together, a view which lands us

<sup>1</sup> There are most cogent arguments for this date which cannot be repeated here.

in far greater difficulties than it solves.<sup>1</sup> Considering Peter, then, as the writer or the *auctor* of the First Epistle which bears his name, we regard it as written, in his capacity as the inheritor of Paul's work, to the Asia Minor churches north of the Taurus range. That the Epistle was written in a time of persecution is, I think, universally admitted: there is no need to quote passages. But why the strange address at the beginning? It is hardly adequate to explain it on the ground that the Christians are the new and true Israel and the inheritors of all the blessings promised to the old Israel. That is a truth which requires to be insisted on. Everything good in Judaism was by that time the property of the Christian Church, the Greek Old Testament included. But why not address the communities as Paul would have addressed them? The Epistle is even rather Roman than Jewish in general tone. For the strange address we find adequate explanation in the fact that Judaism was a *religio licita*, and that the Epistle pretends to be addressed to Jews, so as to hoodwink officials of the government into whose hands it might fall, either on its way to Sinope or in the course of the circular tour taken by the carrier. This, too, will be a sufficient explanation of the mysterious cipher 'Babylon' in chap. v. verse 13, which to a pagan would be absolutely incomprehensible. The beginning and the end of a letter were the special means of identification, and it is clear that the author has been very successful in concealing the real destination and purpose of his letter.

A similar explanation seems helpful in the case of the Epistle to the Hebrews. That this is an epistle, and not a theological treatise, is quite evident from such personal

<sup>1</sup> See Burkitt's *Gospel History and its Transmission*, last chapter, for the best that can be said for the view of the joint martyrdom of the sons of Zebedee.



references as "ye have not yet resisted unto blood" (chap. xii. 4), and the allusions in the last four verses of the Epistle. The view that it was addressed to Rome seems to me most probable, also that the writer and other Italian Christians<sup>1</sup> are in exile to escape persecution. I have no view as to the identity of the author, except that he was probably a Jew, but consider the work to be of about the same date as the First Epistle of Peter. The absence of all address at the beginning, so remarkable in the case of a letter, is best explained by the view that the Epistle was written at a time when it was not at all safe for Christians to send letters to one another concerning their religion, and that it never had an address. The immediate recipients knew quite well who had written it, but, as it arrived in a time of stress and strain, the identity of the author soon ceased to be known, and in the West no name but that of Barnabas was anywhere attached to it.

But of all New Testament books the Apocalypse has most to do with persecution by the Roman State, and here surely we have the most signal examples in the New Testament of the use of cipher and cryptic writing. For, apart from the use of the cipher "Babylon" (xvii. 5), which we have seen in First Peter, there are the numerous references to the Roman Empire, which are of a puzzling character, no doubt chiefly, if not entirely, because the writer intended that they should be so to all but the initiated. Surely nothing could be more significant of this than the question of the "heads" (xiii. 3, etc.), and therewith the question of the date of the work. It appears to the present writer that the latter question has been finally settled in favour of the Irenaeian date, about 96 A.D., the close of the reign of Domitian. If this be the date, some explanation must be found

<sup>1</sup> Chap. xiii. verse 24.

to suit the indications which suggest an earlier period. The author may have deliberately chosen to write as if he were referring to times past, in order to avoid legal action against him. For, if Nero were attacked in Domitian's time,<sup>1</sup> there was no danger for any one in doing so. At the death of an Emperor, all his "acts" became null and void. For instance—and this is a point to which New Testament students have hardly paid enough attention,—the edict of Claudius expelling the Jews from Rome in 50 A.D., would become null and void in 54, on the accession of Nero: in that year the Jews must have thronged back to Rome.<sup>2</sup> It would be quite easy for the author to attack Nero. The Christians in the churches of the Roman province of Asia would understand quite well to whom reference was intended, namely Domitian; and indeed there is a way to make the enumeration suit him, the method of counting only those emperors who bore the title Augustus. This title to the Christian, of course, was a name only to be ascribed to God. We do not, however, need to resort to this explanation; we are at liberty to regard the sacred number *seven* as in this case simply a round number. The obscurity of the whole work is such that no case in a law court could be founded on it.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, the Epistle of James gains in clearness, if we suppose some such situation in its case. The present writer is of the number who feel that they must regard it as a product of the second century. The author may have borne the name James, as he was almost certainly of Jewish birth;

<sup>1</sup> The number of the beast (xiii. 18) undoubtedly refers to Nero.

<sup>2</sup> Amongst the few facts we can tell about the early history of the church of Rome, it is at least interesting to be able to say that all the effective members of it from 50 to 54 were Gentile.

<sup>3</sup> There are well-known cases of authors in Tiberius' time, who were prosecuted for *maiestas* on the ground of statements made by them in their books.

or the Epistle may be really a pseudepigraph. Egypt would seem to be the most likely place for the production of such a work, with its considerable wealth of learning both sacred and secular. The address of the Epistle is very nearly alike to that of First Peter, and yet it cannot be addressed to Jews exclusively. The marks of persecution are in this case not so clear, but the " trials," " testings," " provings," which form such an important part of the author's subject undoubtedly include those of persecution. The opposition also between the poor and rich has a direct connexion with persecution, because the rich, who are farther away from the kingdom of heaven, are in closer touch with the persecuting authorities, both for reasons of wealth and interest. Indeed, the second chapter explicitly refers (verse 6) to " the rich, who lord it over you, and themselves *drag you before the courts*": they also " malign," " speak falsely of " the noble name ' Christians ' (verse 7).<sup>1</sup> This last verse is best understood of evidence given by the rich against Christians in humble circumstances in cases of trial for Christianity.

Meantime, this inquiry need not be pushed farther. Yet I venture to think that it has offered to us an explanation of a peculiar characteristic of the early Christian writings, when brought into comparison with ordinary productions of equal or nearly equal culture, belonging to the period within which they were written.

ALEX. SOUTER.

<sup>1</sup> See also the eloquent judgment on the rich (chap. v. verses 1-6).

*THE OUTLOOK IN NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.*

It is serviceable, from time to time, to get a competent survey of what has been done and of what remains to be done in any department of research. Especially when the principles and methods change, as they must do, to some extent, in any living branch of study, the entire aspect of things may become so altered in the course of a few years that it is essential for the student to take his bearings with the help of those who are actively and prominently engaged in the same enterprise. The changed outlook in recent New Testament criticism is more easily felt than defined, and it is therefore useful to get such estimates as have recently been published by Professor J. Weiss (*Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart*; Göttingen, 1908) and Paul Fiebig (*Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Forschung in der Gegenwart*; Leipzig, 1909). Fiebig's essay is partly a reply to some points in the lecture of his predecessor, but each has independent value. As any one familiar with the previous work of both scholars might expect, Weiss emphasises the rhetorical and structural element in Paul's epistles (pp. 11 f.),<sup>1</sup> while Fiebig's main plea is for a better knowledge of the Jewish and rabbinic background to the New Testament. These idiosyncrasies do not, however, affect the general interest of the essays. That of Weiss, in particular, has a wide scope and leaves no problem of the subject untouched. He begins by emphasising the importance of textual criticism, especially for the study of the Gospels. This must be clear to any one who has been following the recent movements of research

<sup>1</sup> One of his parallels from the *diatribé* literature is particularly apt. With 1 Cor. vii. 17 (*δέδεσται γυναικί· μή ζήτει λύσιν· λελύσαι ἀπὸ γυναικὸς· μή ζήτει γυναῖκα*) he compares the saying of Teles, the Stoic philosopher of the third century B.C., *γέρων γέγονας· μή ζήτει τὰ τοῦ νεοῦ· ἀσθένης πάλιν· μή ζήτει τὰ τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ . . . ἀπορος πάλιν γέγονας· μή ζήτει τὴν τοῦ εὐπόρου δίαίταν.*

into the Old Latin and the Old Syriac versions, which indicate the possibility of reaching a Greek text over a century older than the earliest Greek uncials. A few pages (pp. 8 f.) on the language of the New Testament qualify some of Deissmann's principles and results.<sup>1</sup> Then come ten or eleven pages on exegesis. Weiss bewails the present lack of interest in exegesis among theologians as well as among preachers. "The modern theologian as a rule has no time, or at any rate he believes he has no time, to trouble himself with various interpretations or a number of possible renderings; what he wants is to be furnished at once with one translation of a passage, one interpretation, one view. In many theological circles the interest in exegesis has fallen to zero." This is in part due to honest reasons, e.g. a reaction against the older method which deployed one theory against another in successive sentences, headed by the forbidding *Gegen*. Partly also we may account for it by the contemporary popularisation of historical criticism and theology, which demands results rather than processes. But, Weiss frankly confesses, if the publication of a popular commentary like his own *Schriften des N.T.* is to delude students and ministers into the idea that they can afford to dispense with scientific editions of the New Testament, he would almost wish it had never been written. The object of his commentary, he protests, is to prepare the way for the use of such larger editions, not in any sense to supersede them. Nothing can be more deceptive than to go off with the idea that only one interpretation is possible in every case and that no further problems of the text await inquiry.

The problems of introduction get only eleven pages

<sup>1</sup> E.g. "Der griechische Papyrusbrief, der an Feinheit, Wärme, und Gedrungenheit des geistvollen Ausdrucks sich auch nur mit dem Philemonbrief messen könnte, soll noch gefunden worden" (p. 10).

(32-43), and most of these are concerned with the Gospels. Weiss does little more than recapitulate the conclusions of his earlier volumes. John the Presbyter, Paul's successor in Asia Minor, is given the authorship not only of the seven letters in the Apocalypse but of the three Johannine epistles and of the "Grundschrift" of the Fourth Gospel; the latter was subsequently edited by the author of chapter xxi. As for the Synoptic Gospels, Weiss still adheres to the view expressed in his *Älteste Evangelium* pp. 72-74, that Mark's Gospel must have been written between Peter's death and 70 A.D. The data of chapter xiii. are held to preclude any date subsequent to the fall of Jerusalem. But, while the Gospel is earlier than Matthew and Luke, the author is "not a primitive collector of materials from early, luxuriant tradition; he employs, arranges, and edits, with conscious purpose, an older tradition which has already a history behind it. Mark's Gospel is not a spring, but a reservoir" (p. 41). The problem thus opened up is that which Wendling and Wellhausen have done so much recently to explore; Nicolardot, in his *Les Procédés de Rédaction des trois premiers Évangélistes* (Paris, 1908), has also extended the inquiry to Matthew and Luke. Weiss does not enter into the details, but he makes the further suggestion that the influence of the Johannine text upon the Synoptists can be traced not only in passages like Matthew xxvii. 49, and Luke xxiv. 12, but in passages where Mark stands alone. This hypothesis is legitimate, but it is precarious. No evidence of such conformation occurs in the history of the text; it must have been extremely early, and, for the most part, the hypothesis is not absolutely necessary to explain the phenomena in question.

The bearing of these critical results upon the problem of the life of Jesus (pp. 43-48) is defined as a corroboration of the view that the nucleus of the genuine evangelic tradition

goes back to a Palestinian basis, and reveals a real religious personality. Weiss makes short work of Kalthoff and Jensen. "You cannot refute a man who denies the existence of the sun!"<sup>1</sup>

A few pages (48-55) on the relation of the New Testament to contemporary religion, Oriental and Greek, conclude the essay. They do not contain anything of special moment. Weiss contents himself by defining his general position in these words: "The elements of Christology were all taken over from pre-Christian religions, but it was owing to the influence of the personality of Jesus that a doctrine of Christ ever arose; the Christology of the church after all voiced the faith of the church, that is, its gratitude and love to Him who had sacrificed Himself for it and furnished it with the assurance of the love of God."

One of the remarkable features of recent New Testament research has been the rôle played by scholars from outlying provinces, like Blass, Wendland, Soltau, Reitzenstein and Klein. This feature is emphasised and welcomed by Fiebig. He begins by pointing out that New Testament criticism is simply historical criticism directed towards the New Testament, and then proceeds to magnify his calling, or rather the calling of the New Testament student, in a way that will reduce most people to despair. Dr. Johnson's programme of what an editor of Shakespeare ought to read before essaying his task helps to explain why he never fulfilled his own promise, and Fiebig's prospectus is of an equally deterring character. The New Testament is written in Greek. Therefore the student must acquaint himself not only with the papyri but with the Greek and Latin literature of the age, under the guidance of men like Dieterich

<sup>1</sup> This was written, of course, before A. Drews published his sensational attempt to prove, on Jensen's lines, that Jesus is a creation of mythological romance.

Deissmann, Wendland, Heinrici and Reitzenstein. The New Testament is a Christian book. Therefore he must also specialise in the Christian literature down to c. 300 A.D., instead of accepting the results of Zahn and Harnack. The New Testament is written for the most part by men who were born Jews; therefore the vast Jewish literature must be mastered, canonical, apocalyptic, Hellenistic and Talmudic. Fourthly, the New Testament is an Oriental book, and the New Testament scholar must learn Syriac, Aramaic, the Egyptian dialects, Arabic, and even Armenian! *πρὸς ταῦτα τίς ἰκανός*; it is impossible, Fiebig admits, for one man to be an expert in all these fields; so much he concedes to human weakness. Such an attempt would land in hopeless dilettanteism. But one line at least must be mastered in so thorough a fashion as to qualify the student to estimate the work done elsewhere. Fiebig closes by appealing for the addition of at least two New Testament chairs to the ordinary curriculum, one for Talmudic, the other for Oriental, studies.

Of the two pamphlets, Fiebig's is obviously more concerned with questions of method. It is a plea for academic reorganisation rather than a survey of actual procedure. J. Weiss writes with a closer eye to the real problems of the science. What is common to both is the increasing prominence given to problems of historical and textual criticism, and the retrogression of interest in the questions of literary criticism which up till ten years ago would have bulked largely in essays of this kind. This is a feature of the modern outlook in New Testament criticism which is quite remarkable. It is a passing phase, due largely to the influence of the *religionsgeschichtliche* method. But when it passes, these literary questions will be resumed on broader lines than have hitherto been followed as a rule in monographs upon the subject.                   JAMES MOFFATT.



## SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY

### X. SIN AND THE DIVINE REMEDY—ETERNAL ISSUES AND THEODICY.

UNCHECKED in its development, sin could only issue in complete moral and spiritual ruin—in final separation from God and blessedness. Its end is death: not spiritual and temporal only, but eternal.<sup>1</sup>

It has been seen, however, that sin is never in this world left to work itself out in full degree to its fatal results. From the commencement another strain is discernible in human history, working for the counteracting and overcoming of sin's evil: that of Divine Redeeming Mercy. Butler, in his chapter on "Mediation" in the *Analogy*, justly adduces nature itself as a witness to this beneficent side of the divine administration.<sup>2</sup> We speak of the "inexorableness" of nature; but in nature's benignant operations<sup>3</sup> and stored resources how much there is of an opposite character—kindly, remedial; powers that fight against disease, assuage pain, repair waste, heal injury! Nature speaks here with the same voice as grace. But grace, in the active sense, is never absent. The severest theologians have always recognised the presence of powerful restraining influences of God's providence and Spirit in the hearts and lives even of the wickedest of men.<sup>4</sup> Else earth would already have

<sup>1</sup> Matt. vii. 13; x. 28; xxv. 46; Rom. ii. 8, 9; Phil. iii. 19; 1 Thess. v. 3, 9, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* Pt. ii., ch. v.

<sup>3</sup> Ps. xxxiii. 5; Matt. v. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Calvin, *Instit.*, ii. 2, 15, 16; iii. 14, 2; Edwards, *Original Sin*, Pt. i., ch. i. (Works, i. pp. 146-7).

become a hell ! It is needful, therefore, before proceeding to speak of the last issues of sin, to look briefly at the remedial provision made for it.

1. This mercy of God to our sinful world is, in Christianity, connected with *the Person* and *mediatorial work* of Jesus Christ. In that "eternal purpose" of God, "which He purposed in Christ Jesus,"<sup>1</sup> is to be sought the presupposition of God's whole dealings with sin from the very first—some would say even of the permission of sin ;<sup>2</sup> of His long patience with sin's woeful developments and infinite provocations ;<sup>3</sup> of all forgiveness and blessing bestowed upon the penitent. This truth, if admitted, has already important implications. Conceive of Redeemer and redemption as one may, if the necessity of a divine interposition for the saving of men is conceded in any form, it is implied that, apart from such interposition, the world is "perishing,"<sup>4</sup>—that, if the grace it brings is rejected, nothing stands between the sinner and utter spiritual ruin. There is need of clearness here, for, even among those who admit that, in some sense, Christ has come for salvation, it is not uncommon to find the idea entertained that, although He had not come, or, having come, should be disregarded, things would not turn out so ill after all. This is not the teaching of either Christ or His Apostles. Christ's claim to be Saviour is absolute. He is not a *help* simply to a world in trouble, but the world's only, though all-sufficing, hope.<sup>5</sup>

Is Christianity, however, upheld in this assertion of *the necessity of mediation* ? On many grounds it is declared that it is not. (1) On general grounds, from the divine character, for if God is merciful, as His works and our own hearts pro-

<sup>1</sup> Eph. iii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Dorner takes this view. Cf. *Syst. of Doct.*, iii. p. 58 (E.T.), etc.

<sup>3</sup> Acts xvii. 30 ; Rom. iii. 25.

<sup>4</sup> John iii. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Acts iv. 12.

claim Him to be, why should not repentance be sufficient ? Is Fatherly love not ready, without anything further, to receive the returning prodigal ? Will God, if repentance is genuine, not forgive ? (2) On metaphysical grounds, for sin, it is thought, as a stage in a dialectic process, holds in itself the principle of its own cure. (3) On scientific grounds, for evolution, it is believed by some, infallibly works through its own laws for the overcoming of evil, and the perfecting of good.

(1) In the *first* form of objection two things are overlooked. One is that repentance is not something that springs up spontaneously in the sinful breast : God Himself must take the initiative. If He does, and the sinner still does not repent, what then ? But, next, is the case so entirely simple even as regards the divine initiative ? This is assumed, but is certainly neither proved nor reasonable. Herrmann, in his *Communion with God*, while criticising the Church doctrine, warns against the idea that forgiveness, on God's part, is a mere matter of course. "The fact is rather that to every one who really experiences it, forgiveness comes as an astounding revelation of love."<sup>1</sup> Sin has broken the bond of fellowship between the soul and God : compelled the withdrawal of God's favour ; entailed guilt and condemnation. Does all this count for nothing ? Are there no interests to be conserved in God's re-entering into gracious relations with the sinner ? Christianity at least does not look on the matter in this light. Guilt as an awful reality is there, and has to be dealt with *somehow* even in the counsels of forgiveness.

(2) The *metaphysical* objection turns on the idea that sin, as the negative stage in a necessary movement of spirit, carries in it the principle of its own remedy in the positive impulse to a return to goodness—the "negation of the nega-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 194.

tion." The idea is stated with a touch of picturesqueness in a sentence already quoted from Dr. E. Caird : " The turpitude of the waters only proves that the angel has come down to trouble them, and the important thing is that, when so troubled, they have a healing virtue." <sup>1</sup> How little, however, any innate dialectic of spirit can effect to remove the consciousness of guilt, break the power of sin, and restore to holiness and peace, is illustrated for all time in the classical experience of St. Paul (" O wretched man," etc.<sup>2</sup>), which multitudes of seekers after righteousness since have endorsed as their own.

(3) The *evolutionist*, while not, indeed, necessarily an optimist,<sup>3</sup> still, in his faith in invincible laws of progress, raising nature and humanity to ever higher levels, *ought* to be, and in his hopes for the future of the race generally *is*, one. The typical prophet of evolutionary optimism is Mr. Herbert Spencer, who, in his chapter on " The Evanescence of Evil " in his *Social Statics*,<sup>4</sup> seeks to bring his proof of a coming perfection to the exactitude of a mathematical demonstration. One or two sentences may suffice to show the line of his argument. " All evil results from non-adaptation to conditions. In virtue of an essential principle of life, this non-adaptation of an organism to its conditions is ever being rectified." <sup>5</sup> " Finally all unfitness disappears." <sup>6</sup> " Thus the ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain—as certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith ; for instance, that all men will die." <sup>7</sup> Was

<sup>1</sup> *Evol. of Rel.*, i. p. 231.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. vii. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Huxley, e.g., is often profoundly pessimistic. Cf. his art. " Agnosticism," in *Nineteenth Cent.*, February 1889, pp. 191-2 (*Works*, v. p. 256).

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.* ch. ii. pp. 73 ff.

<sup>5</sup> P. 74.

<sup>6</sup> P. 79.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* History, it is admitted, cannot prove this thesis. " But when it is shown that this advance is due to the working of a universal law ; and that in virtue of that law it must continue until the state we call perfection

any human soul ever persuaded or helped to goodness by such abstract formulizing on the automatic action of laws into which no spark of ethical motive enters? What, one asks, are "fitness" and "unfitness" in this connexion? Is the "fitness" which survives, and the "unfitness" which perishes, necessarily that of moral character? More deeply, what produces the moral "fitness" assumed to be preserved? Have human will and obedience to higher law no share in it? Who that reads history with impartial mind can fail to see that the moral victories of the world have been gained, not by the automatic working of laws such as Mr. Spencer describes, but by voluntary endeavour, inspired by lofty purpose,—by blood, by tears, by sacrifice, by fidelity to high ideals at cost of every earthly advantage?—in brief, by the way of the *Cross*; the very opposite of the road, as Mr. Huxley has trenchantly shown,<sup>1</sup> by which cosmic evolution travels.

2. An essential characteristic of Christianity, as providing a divine remedy for human sin, is that its salvation is not due to man's own efforts or devisings, but springs, in a *truly supernatural* way, from God's *free love and grace*.<sup>2</sup> It is a "gift,"<sup>3</sup> a "heavenly" thing, as Jesus called it to Nicodemus,<sup>4</sup> in contrast with the "earthly" fact of sin, for

is reached, then the advent of such a state is removed out of the region of probability to that of certainty" (p. 78).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. his *Evolution and Ethics* (*Works*, vol. ix.).

<sup>2</sup> Neander says in the opening of his *History of the Church*: "Now we look upon Christianity not as a power that has sprung up out of the hidden depths of man's nature, but as one that descended from above, when heaven opened itself anew to man's long alienated race; a power which, as both in its origin and its essence it is exalted above all that human nature can create out of its own resources, was designed to impart to that nature a new life, and to change it in its inmost principles" (i. p. 2, Bohn's trans.).

Cf. Dr. P. T. Forsyth in his *Person and Place of Jesus Christ*: "Jesus was for the Apostles and their Churches not the consummation of a God-consciousness, labouring up through creation, but the invasive source of forgiveness, new creation and eternal life" (p. 58).

<sup>3</sup> Rom. v. 15 ff.; vi. 23.

<sup>4</sup> John iii. 12.

which it is the remedy. In its nature, a salvation which is to go to the root of the world's evil must obviously fulfil certain conditions. It must be *historical*, that is, attest itself as real, and be actual and apprehensible, as entering into man's life in time. It must embrace a perfect *revelation* of the character and will of God, restoring the knowledge which man's sin-darkened mind has lost,<sup>1</sup> and adding new disclosures of God's grace. It must embrace *reparation* for the wrong done to the divine Holiness through sin—a dealing with the world's accumulated *guilt*. This carries with it a demand for repentance and confession of sin on the side of man. It must embrace *spiritual powers* adequate for emancipation from the *dominion* of sin, and the imparting of a new capacity for holy and loving service. It will reveal God, set man right with God before His holy law, restore to holiness. These are old-fashioned thoughts, but they are the essence of what Christianity claims to be and to do as a religion of redemption. Doctrinally, they are summed up in the words, Incarnation, Atonement, Renewal by the Holy Spirit. These, however, are not presented to the mind in Christianity as mere doctrinal abstractions. The living centre of everything in Christ's religion is Jesus Christ Himself, Son of God and Son of Man, in whom the revelation of God is made, reconciliation is effected, new life is bestowed.

In this, its aspect of a *supernatural economy* of redemption, Christianity comes already into direct collision with that "modern" view of the world, the fundamental principle of which, as formerly seen, is that nothing can be admitted into history which does not proceed on purely natural lines. The collision, as was to be expected, is experienced, first, in regard to the *Person* of the Redeemer. It seems plain that, if salvation, in the comprehensive sense above described, is to be achieved for an entire race,—if God is to be per-

<sup>1</sup> i. 21 ff.

fectly revealed, guilt with its attendant condemnation cancelled, complete fellowship with God restored, the Person by whom this work is to be done can be no ordinary son of man. Doctrinal discussion aside, He who is to undertake this work must stand in a unique relation to God the Father ; must be Himself without sin ; must, while man, achieving His victory by moral means, possess powers and sustain functions nothing less than divine. This, too, impartial exegesis hardly any longer disputes, is the representation of Jesus given in the Evangelic records, and in the Epistles and remaining writings of the New Testament. The Christ even of the Synoptic Gospels is, Bousset freely grants, as truly a supernatural Being as the Christ of St. Paul or St. John.<sup>1</sup> He is the Christ of apostolic faith. Only, by this school, the historic truth of the picture cannot be conceded. Christ must, at all costs, be reduced within the limits of simple humanity. Supernatural claims and attributes must, by the various devices known to criticism, be ruthlessly stripped off.<sup>2</sup>

It was pointed out in the opening paper that one direction in which this "modern" spirit more recently manifests itself is in the growing tendency to deny even the *moral perfection*—the "sinlessness"—of Jesus. Nature has never in human experience produced a sinless Personality. On the other hand, if a sinless Being, such as Jesus is claimed to be, has really appeared in history, He is a mira-

<sup>1</sup> "Even the oldest Gospel," Bousset says, "is written from the standpoint of faith : already for Mark, Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous eternal Son of God, whose glory shone in the world" (*Was wissen wir von Jesus ?* pp. 54, 57).

<sup>2</sup> This is the attitude of the whole new "historical-critical" school to the history of Jesus in the Gospels. Bousset, Weinel, Wernle, Wrede, Schmiedel, are examples. With much that is reverential in the spirit of these writers, one cannot go the length of Dr. Sanday in seeing in their teaching a "reduced" form of Christianity (*Ancient and Modern Christologies*). It seems rather like the removing of the corner-stone from the Christianity of the New Testament.

cle, a marvel, only to be explained by a creative act of God.<sup>1</sup> No wonder, therefore, the modern spirit stumbles at such a palpable contradiction of its first principle. It is not enough to deny the Virgin Birth; in consistency the Virgin Life must follow it.<sup>2</sup> This step, accordingly, as before shown, is now very generally being taken. But the attempt to class Jesus with the sinful world which He came to save—to accord to Him less than complete moral perfection—cannot succeed. The facts are too mighty for it. If there is one thing that stands out clear in the Gospel narratives, it is the perfect unity of thought and will of Jesus with the Father—what Ritschl calls His “solidarity” with God in will and purpose.<sup>3</sup> Jesus betrays no consciousness of sin; does no act which gives [occasion to any one—even to the Prince of Evil<sup>4</sup>—to charge Him with it. He distinguishes Himself as Saviour from the world of sinners He came to save. The impression which His life produced on those who knew Him best—the same which the picture in the Gospels produces on us still—was that of perfect holiness. “He did no sin.”<sup>5</sup> He was the undimmed image of the perfection of the Father.<sup>6</sup>

Here then, in Jesus of Nazareth, is the appearance of a *Sinless One* for the first time in history. The fact is of unspeakable significance for redemption. It is not simply that sinlessness *qualified* Jesus for His work as Saviour. What is of greater moment is that here, in the New Head of the race, is already realised the reversal of that “law of sin and death”

<sup>1</sup> The writer has sought to establish this connexion in his work on the *Virgin Birth of Christ*.

<sup>2</sup> This is a remark of Prof. A. B. Bruce: “With belief in the Virgin Birth is apt to go belief in the Virgin Life, as not less than the other a part of that veil that must be taken away that the true Jesus may be seen as He was—a morally defective man, better than most, but not perfectly good” (*Apologetics*, p. 410).

<sup>3</sup> *Unterricht*, p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> John xiv. 30.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Pet. ii. 22; 1 John iii. 5; cf. 2 Cor. v. 21.

<sup>6</sup> John xiv. 9.



that reigns elsewhere universally in humanity. A new order of being has begun. The pledge of a Kingdom of God is given. Herrmann justly dwells on the immediate certitude of God's Holiness and grace produced in us by the fact that one like Jesus belongs to this world of ours.<sup>1</sup> It guarantees everything else that is needful for salvation.

3. In reconciling men to God, introducing them, through forgiveness, to a life of sonship, and renewing them to holiness, Christ's aim was, and is, to bring in that *Kingdom of God*, or realisation of God's will in a perfected moral fellowship of humanity,<sup>2</sup> which, it was before seen, is God's own last end in the creation and government of the world. For this end Christ lived, died, rose again, and now exercises a universal sovereignty in providence and grace.<sup>3</sup> Most who accept the Christian standpoint will agree that such statements correctly describe the work which Christ came to do; the point where difficulty arises for many, both within and without the Church, is with regard to that aspect of Christ's reconciling work commonly spoken of as the *Atonement*.<sup>4</sup> By not a few the idea of atonement is repudiated altogether; more frequently the term is retained, but in a sense which deprives it of its older connotation of an act by

<sup>1</sup> Through Jesus, he holds, we have the irrefragable certainty that God is present to us, and communes with us—"A God so holy that He at once strikes down the sinner, and yet also forgives him, and reconciles him to Himself by His own act" (*Com. with God*, E.T., p. 26; cf. pp. 79, 80). There are, however, elements in this reconciling work which Herrmann leaves out of account.

<sup>2</sup> "Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth" (Matt. vi. 10).

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xxviii. 18; Eph. i. 20-3; Heb. ii. 9, 10.

<sup>4</sup> The term "atonement" in the one place in which it occurs in the A.V. of the N.T. (Rom. v. 11) is correctly rendered in the R.V. "reconciliation" (*καταλλαγή*). Theologically it is used, as also in the O.T. (Lev. iv. 20, 26, etc.), for the act by which sin is "covered" (*כִּפֶּר*) and its guilt put away before God. This, in the N.T., is accomplished by Christ's death, to which a propitiatory, reconciling virtue is ascribed. (Rom. iii. 25; Eph. ii. 13-17; Col. i. 20-2; Heb. ix. 26-8; 1 Pet. i. 18, 19; 1 John ii. 2; iv. 10, etc.).

which the guilt of human sin is vicariously expiated. Detailed theological discussion is not here relevant, but a few words may help to set the subject in its true light.

That Christ has "put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself"<sup>1</sup> and through His death has "reconciled" men to God<sup>2</sup>—still, however, under the condition of a spiritual appropriation of His saving act through faith<sup>3</sup>—seems plainly enough taught in the New Testament. Of "theories" purporting to explain the significance of this redeeming act probably not one is without its element of important truth.<sup>4</sup> That atonement, while outward in form, is spiritual in essence; that its virtue lay, not in the mere endurance of suffering, but in the *spirit* in which the sacrifice was offered; that it involved (with Maurice, Erskine, Robertson, etc.) the perfect surrender of a holy will,<sup>5</sup> (with Bushnell) vicarious sympathetic suffering,<sup>6</sup> (with McLeod Campbell, Moberly) intercession and confession of sin—the word "penitence" should be avoided, (with Ritschl) the final proof of fidelity in vocation,<sup>7</sup>—this all may be assumed without argument. The point in which theories of this class separate themselves from the older "satisfaction," "governmental," and "penal suffering" views is in the refusal to recognise that the atonement of Christ has any *judicial* aspect—any relation to *guilt*, or to the *punitive* will of God in His dealing with that guilt. Apart, however, from the fact that, on any fair reading of the New Testament, it is hardly possible to deny that this aspect of Christ's reconciling work is a prominent one—if, indeed, it is not placed in the very forefront,—may it not be contended that, in the nature of the case, if the view previously taken of sin is correct, there is in these judicial theories also an element of truth which ought not to be

<sup>1</sup> Heb. ix. 26.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Cor. v. 18-21; Col. i. 20-22, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. iii. 22, 25, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the writer's *Christian View of God*, Lect. viii.

<sup>5</sup> Heb. x. 7-10.

<sup>6</sup> Heb. ii. 14-18; iv. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Phil. ii. 8.

overlooked? If the world, indeed, lies under a divine condemnation through its sin,—if the “wrath of God” is revealed against its unrighteousness and ungodliness,<sup>1</sup> is not this also an aspect of its condition which any true and complete view of atonement must take account of? In meeting on behalf of humanity the whole attitude of God to sin, as it is presumed Christ did, can the punitive attitude—so real and awful—be ignored?

Should this be deemed strange? Were it requisite it might readily be shown how deeply the aspect of atonement now indicated answers to a need of the human heart which has manifested itself in all ages, and still reveals itself in human experience.<sup>2</sup> How constantly in literature, when a great wrong has been done, do we meet with the *desire to atone*—to make amends—to undo, as far as that is possible, the wrong of the past, and so relieve the burden that rests on conscience.<sup>3</sup> It is felt to be not enough to repent,—even to know oneself to be forgiven,—there is the longing to be at peace with one’s own sense of right—to lift off the load of self-

<sup>1</sup> Rom. i. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Neglecting the cruder superstitions of lower religions, the O.T., with its strong sense of sin, might again be appealed to as witness. It is not in the sacrificial law only (whether that is earlier or later does not affect its testimony here; if late, it shows only the more convincingly the craving for atonement generated by the consciousness of sin); but in prophetic writings also (cf. Isaiah’s cleansing in his vision, ch. vi. 5-7; the prophecy of the Servant, ch. liii.; Zech. xiii. 1).

<sup>3</sup> The note is a deep one in Greek Tragedy. C. Plumptre’s *Sophocles*, p. lxxxv. :—

“One soul, working in the strength of love,  
Is mightier than ten thousand to atone.”

In *Prometheus Bound* (Mrs. Browning’s trans.), Hermes says—

“Do not look  
For any end moreover to this curse,  
Or ere some God appear to accept thy pangs  
On his own head vicarious, and descend  
With unreluctant step the darks of hell  
And gloomy abysses around Tartarus.”

Various literary illustrations are given in C. A. Dinsmore’s *Atonement in Literature and Life*. Their number might be largely increased.

condemnation, of deserved condemnation by others, that cleaves to the sense of guilt.

This is one side of the matter ; another is, the desire, in that strange unity that links human beings together, to atone, as far as possible, for the *sins of one another*, specially of those nearly related to us ; to make amends on their behalf. In the absolute sense—in relation to God and His perfectly holy demand—it is obvious that no one can thus atone either for his brother or for himself.<sup>1</sup> Much less can he atone for the sin of a whole race. Only One can be thought of as capable of sustaining such a task—the Holy One Himself, who, uniting in His own Person both Godhead and manhood, perfectly represents both,—who, knowing what the sin of the world is to its inmost depths, yet voluntarily identifies Himself with the whole position of the world under sin,—who, entering fully, as McLeod Campbell would say, into the mind of God about sin, yet, under experience of sin's uttermost evil in death, and with full consciousness of its relation to sin, yet maintains unbroken His unity of spirit with God,—who, acknowledging the righteousness of God's judgment on sin,<sup>2</sup> renders in humanity a tribute to this righteousness so complete, that, to hark back on a thought of Anselm's in his *Cur Deus Homo*, all the guilt of the world cannot countervail against it !

There is, it is granted, a mystery in an atonement such as Christ alone could make,—an act which was His, yet which can truly be ascribed to humanity so far as it spiritually identifies itself with it,—which human formulas must always fail to compass, even while the truth they imperfectly convey, viz., a reconciliation in which the imputation of guilt and the condemnation attending it entirely disappear, is

<sup>1</sup> Ps. xlix. 7 ; cxxx. 3 ; Mic. vi. 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> McLeod Campbell speaks of the " Amen " which went up from Christ's humanity to God's judgment on sin in his experience of death (*Nat. of Atonement*, cf. chs. vi., xi., xii.).

felt to be most real. As casting light on the *racial* aspect of this work accomplished for humanity, aid is afforded by that idea of the *organic unity* of the race found to be so important in the discussions connected with heredity. If the fact of organic connexion renders possible the suffering—even the ruin—of many through the sin of one, is it not, as St. Paul argues,<sup>1</sup> the necessary counterbalancing thought that righteousness and life may come through the obedience of One ?

4. The view of Christianity as presenting the divine remedy for sin connects itself, not simply with the truths of Incarnation and Atonement, but with the fact of the *Resurrection*, as the pledge of victory over *death*, and source of a *new life* for all who accept the salvation which Christ brings. The reality of Christ's Resurrection is here assumed.<sup>2</sup> It is the needful completion of what precedes ; the commencement of the new era of exaltation and subjugation of opposing powers ; the prelude to the gift of the Spirit. Without resurrection, if man is to be redeemed in his whole personality—body as well as soul—the remedy would be imperfect, for the " enemy," death,<sup>3</sup> would still retain his hold over both Redeemer and redeemed. Is the " sting " really taken from death<sup>4</sup>—that supreme contradiction of man's nature and destiny, as dissolving the union of spiritual and corporeal which differentiates man's position in creation<sup>5</sup>—if death still retains its unbroken sway, and spirit and body remain eternally apart ? Justly, therefore, in both Old and New

<sup>1</sup> Rom. v. 12-21.

<sup>2</sup> The evidence is discussed, with reference to recent thought, in the writer's work, *The Resurrection of Jesus*.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 26.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 55.

<sup>5</sup> It has already been argued that death is unnatural to man—a mutilation, a rupture, a separation of the parts of his compound being, not contemplated in his creation. Cf. the writer's *God's Image in Man*, pp. 251 ff.

Testaments, is death's "destruction" regarded as the goal of God's redemptive action.<sup>1</sup>

Death, with Christ, is for the sake of life. His risen life He shares with His people. Removal of sin's guilt and condemnation—the Pauline *δικαίωσις*—with its forgiveness of the past, is not the whole. Provision is needed for the *renewal* of man in the core of his personality—for deliverance from sin's *power*. The rule of sin in the soul must be met and broken through the mightier power of "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus."<sup>2</sup> Christianity is a religion, therefore, of Regeneration and Sanctification—of an Indwelling Spirit—acting, indeed, not magically, but through appropriate moral and spiritual agencies.<sup>3</sup>

In this possession of the Spirit, in turn, is embraced the whole hope of the future.<sup>4</sup> As death, commencing in the loss of the soul's true life in God, has its outward concomitant in physical dissolution; so, in the new life imparted through Christ, lies the germ of future resurrection.<sup>5</sup> The immortality (*ἀφθαρσία*, incorruption) held forth in the Gospel as "brought to light" through Jesus Christ<sup>6</sup> is no mere prospect of ghostly survival in some Sheol-like condition of semi-existence, but a true "life everlasting" in God's own presence in holy perfection of both body and spirit.<sup>7</sup> Of this immortality Christ's Resurrection is the immutable pledge.

5. We are thus brought back, though on a higher plane,

<sup>1</sup> Is. xxv. 8; Hos. xiii. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 26, 54-5; Rev. xx. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. viii. 2; cf. vi. 8, 14, 22.

<sup>3</sup> The Word, the Church, means of grace generally. These are not further considered here.

<sup>4</sup> Eph. i. 13, 14; Col. i. 27.      <sup>5</sup> Rom. viii. 2.      <sup>6</sup> 2 Tim. i. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Rom. viii. 23; 1 Cor. xv. 42 ff.; Col. i. 22; Jude 24.

Huxley's words, previously quoted, may be recalled: "If a genuine, not merely subjective, immortality awaits us, I conceive that, without some such change as that depicted in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, immortality must be eternal misery" (*Life and Letters*, ii. p. 304).

to the point at which the discussion was broken off in the last paper—the question of the *Life Beyond*, and have still to ask, in view of the issues which that question raises, how far any light is cast on the vexed problems of what is called *Theodicy*—the vindication of the ways of God in His permission of sin, and government of the world of mankind under it.

For the Christian, as just seen, the question of *immortality* is solved once for all in Christ. Christ is the *Theodicy* for him. The problem of sin is solved, in his case, by a redemption. Suffering and death meet with their infinite compensations.<sup>1</sup> Life has its adequate end.

On natural grounds the question of life beyond death is much less easy to deal with. It has already been shown how serious is the break in modern thinking with the belief in immortality.<sup>2</sup> By many the belief is openly and uncompromisingly parted with. To others it is a vague and uncertain hypothesis. Science is alleged to discredit it;<sup>3</sup> others, who cling to the belief, seek a quasi-scientific support for it in spiritualistic phenomena.<sup>4</sup> The reason for disbelief is often to be found in the particular philosophical or scientific theory adopted: Darwinism has peculiar difficulties in this respect.<sup>5</sup> Frequently, again, denial has its root in a low view of human nature, and an inadequate conception of immortality itself. Only as man is regarded as made in the image of God, and life as having a moral end, is

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. iv. 17: "Our light affliction, which is for the moment, worketh for us more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."

<sup>2</sup> See EXPOSITOR, February, 1910.

<sup>3</sup> Prof. James's Ingersoll Lect. on *Immortality* vividly sets out the difficulties from the side of science. Haeckel treats immortality as one of the superstitions science has to destroy.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge, in his *Man and the Universe*, pp. 189 ff., presents considerations of this sort. He has, however, better reasons, and seeks to do justice to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection (p. 160).

<sup>5</sup> See EXPOSITOR, July, pp. 22 ff.

the argument for immortality felt to be cogent.<sup>1</sup> Mere continuance of existence without anything to give that existence content or value can awaken no enthusiasm and inspire no hope.<sup>2</sup>

The arguments on which it is customary to rely in support of belief in a future life need not here be enlarged on. Chief stress is laid on the whole make of man's being as needing for its development and perfecting a larger sphere than the earthly life affords.<sup>3</sup> On this ground Kant includes immortality among his "doctrinal beliefs," intermediate between theoretical proof and mere opinion.<sup>4</sup> J. S. Mill was specially impressed by the fact that only under the influence of this hope do the human faculties find their largest play and scope—life is relieved from "the disastrous feeling of 'not worth while.'" <sup>5</sup> Science may not prove, but, as both Mr. Huxley and Mr. Mill admit, cannot *disprove* immortality.<sup>6</sup> It is enough to advert to the point which

<sup>1</sup> It was from their sense of fellowship with God that O.T. believers derived their confidence that He would not let them perish (Pss. xlix. 15; lxxiii. 24-26, etc.; cf. Heb. xi. 13-16).

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Huxley, in an interesting letter to Charles Kingsley, takes the ground of neither confirming nor denying the immortality of man. He sees no reason for believing in it, but has no means of disproving it. The idea has no attraction for him. (*Life and Letters*, i. pp. 217 ff.). But see below.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Tennyson (*In Memoriam*), but specially Browning (*Pauline*, etc.), as poetical exponents of this thought.

<sup>4</sup> "In the wisdom of a supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul" (*Krit. of Pure Reason*, p. 501, Bohn's trans.).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the whole eloquent passage in *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 249. Notwithstanding Mr. Huxley's disparagement of the hope of a future life in his letter to Kingsley, he sometimes expressed himself very differently. Mr. Mallock, in his *Is Life Worth Living?* (pp. 128, 171-2) quotes him as saying: "The lover of moral beauty, struggling through a world of sorrow and sin, is surely as much the stronger for believing that sooner or later a vision of perfect peace and goodness will burst upon him, as the toiler up a mountain for the belief that beyond the crag and snow lie home and rest." And he adds that, could a faith like this be placed on a firm basis, mankind would cling to it as "tenaciously as ever drowning sailor did to a hencoop."

<sup>6</sup> Huxley, as above; Mill, *Three Essays*, p. 201. The staggering diffi-



mainly concerns our present inquiry—the manifest *incompleteness of the earthly life*, regarded as the scene of a *divine moral administration*. Professor Huxley, indeed, in his aggressive mood, will admit no inequality, no injustice, needing redress. Everything is “wholly just.”<sup>1</sup> This, however, is a manifest exaggeration. Grant a moral government of the world, moral probation and discipline, a justice that gives every one his due, and on the side neither of goodness nor of evil is it possible to claim that the issues of conduct are exhausted in this life.<sup>2</sup> Immortality becomes a postulate of the moral nature.<sup>3</sup>

It is only in accordance, therefore, with its claim to meet the deepest needs of man’s conscience, that Christianity proclaims that life on earth is *not the end* for any. Not for the good—the Christ-like—for they depart to be with their Lord, which is “very far better”;<sup>4</sup> not for the bad, for they pass, with their evil, into a world where just recompense of their deeds awaits them. After death, it is testified, “cometh judgment.”<sup>5</sup> Theodicy, too, has its place, for with the close of time—at what interval it would be presumptuous to inquire<sup>6</sup>—is associated, in Christian teaching, a yet more public manifestation and vindication of the divine righteousness (*dies irae, dies illa*)<sup>7</sup>—a day when,

culty, of course, which belief in immortality has to encounter is the fact of death itself, which seems a palpable contradiction of such a destiny. The genuine Christian view meets this difficulty with a denial that death is natural to man, and presents a Gospel which proclaims a victory over death.

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Kingsley, above quoted. “The absolute justice of things,” he says, “is as clear to me as any scientific fact” (*op. cit.*, i. p. 219).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Browning, *La Saisiaz*: “There is no reconciling wisdom with a world distraught,” etc. (*Works*, xiv. p. 178).

<sup>3</sup> Thus Kant (cf. Abbott’s trans., *Kant’s Theory of Ethics*, pp. 218 ff.). Carrying out this idea, Kant finds in the Christian doctrine of the Kingdom of God the conception “which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason” (p. 224).

<sup>4</sup> Phil. i. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Heb. x. 27.

<sup>6</sup> Mark xiii. 32.

<sup>7</sup> Matt. xxv. 31 ff.; John v. 29; Rom. ii. 5–11; Rev. xx. 11–15.

all secrets of men being laid bare,<sup>1</sup> judgment will be passed on each "according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad."<sup>2</sup>

6. When "Theodicy" is spoken of, it must be apparent in *how modified a sense* that great word can be employed of any grasp of the divine purposes attainable by man in time. Has the road we have travelled, then, been utterly without result? That it would be equally unwise to affirm. Numerous as are the perplexities that still crowd upon us, the master-key to their solution, at least, is given when it is discovered that sin is an alien element in the universe, and that it is balanced, in God's grace, by a redemption which means its final overthrow, and the establishment in its room of a Kingdom of God, already begun, growing to triumph, and awaiting its perfection in eternity. Only it is to be acknowledged that our lights on these vast matters are in this life "broken," refracted, partial;<sup>3</sup> that it is but the "outskirts" of God's ways we can discern.<sup>4</sup> Till that higher standpoint is reached where, as just indicated, the light of the Great White Throne beats on the unrolled scroll of God's providence, and the principles of His unerringly wise government are disclosed to the world that has been the subject of it, glimpses to steady our thoughts, and guide our feet amidst the shadows, are the utmost that can be asked or hoped for.

(1) Theodicy has mainly occupied itself with the question of *physical* evil—the apparent recklessness and cruelty of nature, still more the misfortune, pain, sorrow, and misery of human life—that dark region in which Pessimism finds its perennial text. It was pointed out at the beginning how closely connected the problem of physical evil is with that of moral evil—how large a part of the solution of

<sup>1</sup> Rom. ii. 16.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Cor. v. 10.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Job xxvi. 14.

the one is found in the solution of the other.<sup>1</sup> Not, however, entirely. The world, even physically, is not in the condition we should expect were it *morally* in a state well-pleasing to God.<sup>2</sup> Is there no bond of sympathy between man and his physical environment? Scripture here has its own point of view in the idea of an arrested development—a “vanity” (*ματαιότης*) or profitlessness—to which even nature is subjected through the sin of man.<sup>3</sup> But it holds out hope also for creation, “groaning and travailing in pain until now,” of a share in the coming redemption.<sup>4</sup> This is its theodicy.

(2) The *permission of sin* is, and remains, a dark riddle. It is not an adequate answer to the difficulty to say—Man is free. This is true, but it is not *all* worlds in which freedom would have been abused, and the problem is that, foreseeing the abuse, God created *this* one.<sup>5</sup> The ultimate solution lies, we must believe, where Christianity places it, in the larger results in glory to God and good to man,—the nobler virtue attained through conflict and temptation, the loftier holiness and higher reward of those who “overcome,”<sup>6</sup> the diviner blessedness of sonship in Christ,—that accrue from its permission. Sin has appeared; redemption is God’s answer to it, and vindication of His allowance of it.

(3) But does even this, in view of all the facts, furnish

<sup>1</sup> EXPOSITOR, January, p. 57; cf. *Christian View of God*, 194, 217 ff., where the question of physical evil is discussed at length.

<sup>2</sup> Interesting illustration is afforded in a long note in Luthardt’s *Saving Truths of Christianity* (pp. 330 ff. E.T.), drawn from various writers.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. viii. 20; cf. Gen. iii. 17, 18.

<sup>4</sup> Vers. 19–22; cf. 2 Pet. iii. 13; Rev. xxi. 1.

<sup>5</sup> It is a daring speculation, but the thought is one which forces itself—Could a universe have been created in which, at some point, in the exercise of freedom, sin would not emerge? If not, divine wisdom has to do, less with the permission, than with the ordering of how, when, where, under what conditions, this entrance of sin shall take place, and how it shall best be overruled for good when it does appear.

<sup>6</sup> Rev. ii. 7, 11, 17, 26; iii. 5, 12, 21.]

us with more than the *beginnings* of a theodicy? If there is a Kingdom of God already begun on earth, vast numbers yet to be gathered into it,<sup>1</sup> a perfection beyond imagination to be attained in the future, this is unspeakable gain. But what of the *cost* of this result in the vast multitudes meanwhile left outside—of the countless generations that have never known, or still are in ignorance of, the grace that saves? Do they perish? If they do, where is the theodicy? If not, what is their fate? A problem this, when all has been said that can be said of the wide extension of God's mercy to those who fear Him and work righteousness in every nation,<sup>2</sup> according to the light they possess,—even to far more imperfect seekers, with inferior opportunity, of discrimination in judgment according to degrees of responsibility (light, talent, heredity, environment),<sup>3</sup>—of the justice of the retribution falling on those who choose evil rather than good,<sup>4</sup>—which baffles, with our present knowledge, a complete solution. The elements of a solution are wanting; the calculus fails us for dealing with it.

Some would seek a solution of the problem in the thought of *universal salvation*. Thus Origen of old;<sup>5</sup> thus Schleiermacher;<sup>6</sup> thus modern advocates of the "Larger Hope." These deem it the only solution congruous with the divine love and Fatherhood. Calm reason, however, not to say regard for revelation,<sup>7</sup> forbids us to take refuge in this tempting conclusion. The possibilities of resistance to

<sup>1</sup> Rev. vii. 9, 10.      <sup>2</sup> Acts x. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xi. 20-24; Luke xii. 46-7, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Huxley's words quoted in EXPOSITOR, Sept., p. 210, may be again referred to.

<sup>5</sup> *De Principiis*, iii. 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Der christ. Glaube*, sect. 163.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Christian View*, p. 391, 530 ff. The strongest Pauline passages are perhaps I Cor. xv. 21-28, and Eph. i. 10, but exegetes like Meyer and Weiss will not allow that they teach universalism. Cf. Meyer, *in loc.*; Weiss, *Bib. Theol.*, ii. pp. 73, 107, 109.

God and goodness in the human will, of which history in this world affords such terrible examples, cannot be made light of.<sup>1</sup> Character tends to fixity, and wills that have resisted God's goodness in this life are not likely to be readily subdued to penitence by His severity in the next.

The alternative theory to which some resort of *annihilation* of the finally impenitent, though not without important advocates,<sup>2</sup> is equally inadmissible as an attempt to solve a moral problem by a *tour de force* which has in it no elements of a real solution. In its more rigorous form, it sweeps into extinction the vast majority of the race ; supplemented, as it is in Dr. E. White, by a doctrine of *second probation*,<sup>3</sup> it extends evangelization into the future on a scale for which no warrant exists either in Scripture or in reason.<sup>4</sup> Every ray of exhortation and appeal in the New Testament is concentrated in the present,<sup>5</sup> and judgment in the future is always represented as proceeding on the basis of the deeds done in the body.<sup>6</sup>

The theory of an *extended probation* commands the sympathy of many as providing for the case of those who have had no opportunity of learning of the Gospel here.<sup>7</sup> With it Dr. Dorner connects the view—in which lies the principle of his theodicy—that every soul must have the opportunity of definitive acceptance or rejection of Christ.<sup>8</sup> As usually presented, the theory goes, as just said, beyond

<sup>1</sup> Farrar, in his *Mercy and Judgment*, grants : " I cannot tell whether some souls may not resist God for ever, and therefore may not be for ever shut out from His presence," etc. (p. 485). But if one soul may be thus finally lost, why should not ten, a thousand, a million ? The principle is here admitted on which the chief difficulty turns.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Rothe, Ritschl (hypothetically). <sup>3</sup> *Life in Christ*, Ch. xxii.

<sup>4</sup> The " destruction " Scripture speaks of takes place at the *Parousia*, not, as in Dr. White's theory, ages after.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Cor. vi. 2. <sup>6</sup> 2 Cor. vi. 10 ; Rev. xx. 12, etc.

<sup>7</sup> The theory is advocated by theologians like Dorner, Oesterzœe, Martensen, Godet, and by many among ourselves.

<sup>8</sup> *Syst. of Christ. Doct.*, iii. pp. 69 ff. ; iv. pp. 408 ff.

the limits of Scriptural evidence, and tends seriously to change the centre of gravity of Gospel presentation.<sup>1</sup> What is true is that, in eternity, all must be brought into the light of Christ; whether for condemnation or for salvation the event will determine. The result may be *revelation* of character—of the will's inmost bent—rather than change of it. Many in that day may be found saying, in the prophet's words, "Lo, this is our God; we have waited for Him," though the "veil" till then had been upon their minds.<sup>2</sup> The problem, too, of unformed characters may find solution then in definite decisions. Yet on all this how little can we know?

Beyond lie *the eternal ages*, the secrets of which, known only to God, it is equally presumptuous and vain for man to attempt to penetrate. The veil, in Scripture, falls on what seems to be a duality, yet not to the exclusion of hints, even more, of a future final unification—a gathering up of all things in Christ as Head—when God is once more "all in all."<sup>3</sup> Such language would seem to imply, at least, a cessation of active opposition to the will of God—an acknowledgment universally of His authority and rule,—a reconciliation, in some form, on the part even of those outside the blessedness of the Kingdom with the order of the universe.<sup>4</sup>

Here, without our presuming further, the subject may be left to rest. It becomes too vast for human thought. An Apostle's words are the fitting close: "O the depth of the

<sup>1</sup> The obscure passage, 1 Pet. iii. 18–20, is a very precarious foundation for it. Cf. the apposite remarks on Geo. MacDonald's "Gospel in Hades" in Selby's *Theol. of Mod. Fiction*, pp. 158 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Is. xxv. 7–9.

<sup>3</sup> Acts iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 24–28; Eph. i. 10; Phil. ii. 9–11.

<sup>4</sup> Theologians have often spoken of the last judgment as compelling the acknowledgment of God's righteousness in the minds even of the condemned. In this may lie the germ of the ultimate submission to the divine order which the above passages seem to anticipate.

riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments and His ways past tracing out! . . . For of Him, and through Him, and unto Him, are all things. To Him be the glory for ever. Amen.”<sup>1</sup>

JAMES ORR.

### HAS DR. SKINNER VINDICATED THE GRAF-WELLHAUSEN THEORY?

IN the September number of the EXPOSITOR Professor A. R. Gordon makes certain references to my work in the course of an article entitled Skinner's *Genesis*. Those references could not have been made if certain material facts had been known to Dr. Gordon and present to his mind, and accordingly I desire by the courtesy of the Editor to state those facts as briefly as possible. In doing so I shall be careful not to attempt anything like a second review of Dr. Skinner's book or a reply to any of Dr. Gordon's other points, because I have answered Dr. Skinner at considerable length in an article that I have sent to the October number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and need not here repeat myself. This article, therefore, is limited simply to my own defence to Dr. Gordon's criticisms.

In January 1909—and I may say at once that the dates are of some importance—I published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* an article dealing with Astruc's celebrated clue. In addition to other facts I pointed out that the Versions, and notably the Septuagint, did not always agree with the Massoretic text of the Divine appellations in the book of Genesis. Certain features in the discussion were most material to the argument. First, instead of contenting myself with a single text of the Septuagint, I employed the materials given in Field,

<sup>1</sup> Rom. xi. 33, 35.

Lagarde and the larger Cambridge Septuagint. This enormously increases the number of variants, and in many cases we are able to say definitely from our Hexaplar information that the new variants represent the text of the Septuagint as found by Origen. To take four simple instances. We learn from Field that in Genesis ii. 4, 5, 7, 8, Origen found 'God' only in his text and added *Kύριος*. In ver. 4 A has both words while Lucian<sup>1</sup> keeps the original Septuagintal text. In ver. 5 these two authorities change places, in ver. 7 they both read 'God' only, in ver. 8 both follow Origen in reading both words. Now it is obvious that in all four cases there are Septuagintal variants which are entitled to consideration, though a scholar who used Swete only or Lagarde only would suppose that there were only two such variants (verses 5 and 7 or 4 and 7 according to the text he used).

Secondly, I anticipated that the objection might be taken that the Septuagintal variants were purely internal to the Greek Version and did not represent a different Hebrew text. Accordingly I produced evidence in a number of passages to show that Septuagintal variants had support either from extant Hebrew variants or from Hexaplar notes which left no room for doubt (e.g. the testimony of Aquila, who, as is well known, was most scrupulous in this matter), or from the Samaritan Pentateuch. This evidence clearly proves the existence of a large number of variants that go back to the Hebrew.

Thirdly, I expected that another objection might be raised. It might be claimed that the Massoretic text was in all cases superior to the Septuagint and its ancestors. I therefore produced a number of passages in which for one reason or

<sup>1</sup> I use this term to denote Lagarde's text without prejudice to the questions raised by recent discussions. That text certainly represents a recension with readings of intrinsic value, whether or not they be the readings of Lucian.



another internal evidence proved a Septuagintal variant to be superior to the Massoretic reading.

One other point only of the long discussion in that article need be noticed here. In Genesis x. 19 we read the words "as thou goest toward Sodom and Gomorrah, Admah and Zeboiim." Such language could only be used when there were in existence places so named. If I asked to be directed to some part of London nobody would to-day inform me that it was on the way to Tyburn. Similarly nobody would have defined boundaries by reference to places that never had existed or had been destroyed and submerged some thousand years before his time. As the places mentioned were destroyed in the time of Abraham, the notice must have been originally composed during or before his lifetime. In the Oxford Hexateuch it is assigned to a late stratum of J, i.e. to a writer who is supposed to have lived some thousand years after the latest date at which it can have been composed, and it is regarded as being later than xiii. 10, though the author of that passage lived when those places had already been destroyed.

It will be seen that these facts are very material to the analysis and dating of the Pentateuch. Once it is shown that the division into sources has been effected on the basis of an incorrect text and has led to results that are not correct to within a thousand years, a considerable breach has been made in the critical position.

This article attracted some interest. In the *Expository Times* for May, 1909, the Rev. A. P. Cox asked certain questions about it, pointing out that I had adduced "evidence to show . . . (2) that the versional variants rest on divergent Hebrew texts . . . and (3) that the variants are, in some cases at any rate, demonstrably superior to the readings of the Massoretic Text." Dr. Skinner replied in the same number. He said that the Septuagint differed from the

Massoretic text of Genesis in forty-nine instances, and he argued that the presumption was in favour of the Massoretic Text. Further he thought it reasonable to expect that Jewish scribes would observe the distinction between Elohim and the Tetragrammaton more carefully than the Greek copyists, and he attached significance to the fact that in the cases of difference there is an enormous preponderance of instances where the LXX. has 'God' as against the Massoretic Tetragrammaton, "the preference for the common word being as marked as it is intelligible." In spite of Mr. Cox's allusion to my article and of the direct reference to my evidence "that the versional variants rest on divergent Hebrew texts and are in some cases at any rate demonstrably superior to the readings of the Massoretic Text" Dr. Skinner passed over these very material points in complete silence, nor did he in any way refer to the additional variants I had obtained from the Hexapla and the other materials.

Two replies were made to Dr. Skinner. In the *Expository Times* for July, 1909, I published a note from which I extract the following, adding the necessary references to the reprint of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* article in the volume form.<sup>1</sup>

"In Gen. xvi. 11 an explanation of the name Ishmael is given in which the Tetragrammaton is used. But the Lucianic LXX., the old Latin and one *Hebrew* MS. read *Elohim*.

"1. Dr. Skinner says it is reasonable to expect that Jewish scribes would be more careful in this matter than Greek copyists. But this instance shows that the variant is a *Hebrew* variant; for the mistakes of *Greek* copyists could not possibly influence a *Hebrew* MS. I therefore submit that little reliance can be placed on this argument. For numerous other examples, see [*Essays*, pp. 14-15, 36 f. = *Bibliotheca*

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism*, London, Elliot Stock; Oberlin, Bibliotheca Sacra Company.

*Sacra*] pp. 128–130, 150 ff. ; and for a further body of evidence drawn from the support of other Versions, see [*Essays*, pp. 15 f. = *Bibliotheca Sacra*] pp. 130 f. Once the fact that the Greek rests on Hebrew variants has been established in a number of cases, a presumption arises that it does so in other cases where no independent testimony is preserved ; and a case is made for further investigation.

“ 2. Dr. Skinner further thinks that significance attaches to the fact that in a great majority of instances the LXX. substitutes God for the Tetragrammaton of M.T. To this there seem to be two answers. (1) If we regard the Tetragrammaton as original in all cases of difference, this canon must make us suspect M.T. wherever any Version substitutes it for *Elohim* or some other word ; and I admit that in all such cases a question does arise. But in Genesis this, of course, means that the Tetragrammaton will have to be introduced into numerous passages of ‘E’ and ‘P.’ (2) In some cases where there are differences the *Elohim* of the Versions is demonstrably preferable to the Tetragrammaton of M.T. I instance Gen. xvi. 11, where the name *Ishmael* requires *Elohim* in the explanation (cf. *Israel*, *Peniel*). The Tetragrammaton would require *Ishmayah* as the name. Here, again, other instances will be found on [pp. 16 ff. of the *Essays* = *Bib. Sac.*] pp 131 ff. Consequently we cannot hold that the variants are all due to a desire to avoid the Name of God. It would rather seem that some readings are due to a tendency of M.T. to substitute the Tetragrammaton for *Elohim*.

“ 3. Dr. Skinner says that the LXX. differs from M.T. in forty-nine cases. But in an enormous number of passages some Septuagintal authority, e.g. Lucian in Gen. xvi. 11—sometimes only a single cursive—differs from the ordinary LXX. reading. By comparing extant Hebrew variants which confirm some of the Septuagintal variants, I have shown

([*Essays*, p. 36 f.=*Bib. Sac.*] p. 150 f.) that importance attaches to these. Has Dr. Skinner included all such cases in his forty-nine ? ”

I was also careful to confront Dr. Skinner with Genesis x. 19, of which I have spoken above.

No answer was made to this note, but in the *Expository Times* for September, 1909, Professor N. J. Schlögl published an independent reply to Dr. Skinner. He had studied Genesis i. 1—Exodus iii. 12 with all the texts and arrived at the following figures, which should be contrasted with Dr. Skinner’s 49. The Tetragrammaton alone occurs 148 times in the Massoretic Text of this passage, and in 118 places there are variants—either Elohim alone or both words together: Elohim alone occurs in the Massoretic Text 179 times and there are variants in 59 of these cases: both words together occur 20 times in the Massoretic Text, and there are variants in 19 of these cases.

No word of reply has been published by Dr. Skinner or any other member of the school to these notes, although over a year has now elapsed since the last note was published.

Then came Dr. Skinner’s *Genesis*. The preface is dated April 1910, i.e. it was written at least seven months after the publication of Dr. Schlögl’s note, at least nine months after the publication of mine and fifteen months after the appearance of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* article. The book itself was of course written before the preface, but it contains references to the *Cambridge Biblical Essays* which appeared as late as October, 1909, and one reference to the *Expository Times* for November, 1909. No notice whatever is taken of the facts and arguments put forward by Professor Schlögl and myself in the *Expository Times*. The discussion proceeds on the basis that there are only forty-nine or fifty variants in Genesis, and that there is no evidence of Hebrew variants. Nor, again, does Dr. Skinner discuss the

passages where I had shown the inferiority of the Massoretic readings. Thus the variant in Genesis xvi. 11 is not even noted. It must be remembered that Dr. Skinner is professedly answering the *Bibliotheca Sacra* article in which I have taken all these points and that his attention had been publicly called to each of these three matters on two occasions in a controversy to which he was himself a party. As already pointed out, Mr. Cox and I had both insisted on the Hebrew evidence and the intrinsic superiority of some of the Septuagintal readings : recognising that his number forty-nine was quite erroneous, I had warned him by my question in the *Expository Times* and Dr. Schlögl had openly corrected him. There are other curious points in Dr. Skinner's treatment of this matter, but they will be found discussed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. Here I am only concerned to show that he has said no word of reply to the matters with which he has been confronted. Nor, again, has he dealt with Genesis x. 19, and apparently assigns it to a date 1100 years too late. This is my answer to the criticism of Dr. Gordon on my work :

“ He [Dr. Skinner] is frank even to a fault, and appreciative of every honest effort to get nearer to the original . . . The general superiority of the Massoretic text he valiantly defends . . . against the strangely perverse attempt of “ the more recent opposition ” represented by Dahse and Wiener to prove the Massoretic text “ so unreliable that no analysis of documents can be based on its data.” In his most caustic vein he observes : “ Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction ; and however surprising it may seem to some, we can reconcile our minds to the belief that the M.T. does reproduce with substantial accuracy the characteristics of the original autographs.” . . . This carefully judicial habit of mind lends all the greater weight to Dr. Skinner's pronouncements on the “ higher critical ” question. Here he shows no hesitation. <sup>1</sup> My own belief in the essential soundness of

the prevalent hypothesis,' he says in the Preface, 'has been confirmed by the renewed examination of the text of Genesis which my present undertaking required' . . . We have already quoted one of the sardonic sentences in which he disposes of Wiener's attempt to evade the problem by a frank abandonment of the reliability of the Hebrew."

It is obvious that to Dr. Gordon "the renewed examination of the text of Genesis which my present undertaking required" in a sentence written as late as April, 1910, meant an examination which took account of all the facts adduced by those whom Dr. Skinner purported to answer; but, as has been shown above, it has in reality meant nothing of the kind. In fairness to Dr. Gordon I desire to say that in my opinion the interpretation he has put upon Dr. Skinner's language was the only natural interpretation, and although it has involved some injustice to me the responsibility for this does not lie with him.

One other matter that affects me is involved in Dr. Gordon's article. He speaks of "the three most recent champions, whose appearance has been hailed so widely as having given the final *coup de grâce* to criticism." This sentence glances at my *Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism*, since the American publishers advertised it as "The *Coup de Grâce* to the Wellhausen Critics of the Pentateuch." In reply to Dr. Gordon I would point out that the volume consists of two parts: the first five chapters deal with the narrative portions of Exodus—Deuteronomy, and Astruc's clue is treated in that connexion: but the second part contains a discussion of the first three chapters of Wellhausen's *Prolegomena*, and this part is very largely responsible for the terms of the advertisement. Dr. Skinner does not even profess to reply to any portion of my discussion other than the first chapter. He is naturally and properly unconcerned with the rest of the first part which does not

touch Genesis directly. There is no reason to suppose that he had seen my last chapter when he wrote.<sup>1</sup> He never mentions it, and where he does cover the same ground he shows no acquaintance with my work. Thus he writes of the supposed Priestly document, "it is particularly noteworthy that the profane, as distinct from the sacrificial, slaughter of animals, which even the Deuteronomic law treats as an innovation, is here carried back to the covenant with Noah" (p. lx.). Yet I have pointed to the following (amongst other) instances of non-sacrificial slaughter in literature which these critics regard as pre-Deuteronomic: Gen. xviii. 7, xxvii. 9-14, xliii. 16, Exod. xxi. 37, Judges vi. 19 (the making ready of the kid), 1 Sam. xxv. 11, xxviii. 24, 1 Kings xix. 21.<sup>2</sup> Nor again does it fall within Dr. Skinner's scope to deal with the main charges which justify the terms of the advertisement. "Is it possible that in our own days a reconstruction of the history of Israel that rests on a neglect to examine the available evidence and an inability to distinguish between a mound and a house should have found world-wide acceptance? The ordinary higher critic and the ordinary conservative alike would answer in the negative. The critic would say that the question was too preposterous to require an answer; the conservative would regard it as suggesting an idea that from his point of view was too good to be true. Yet if either will be at the pains of carefully studying the sixth chapter of this volume together with the book it criticises, he will perhaps realise that the answer to the question must ultimately be in the affirmative. Here, again, I know from private communications that when pressed with the main arguments put forward in the present discussion higher critics have no reply; but, so far as I am aware, no public attempt has ever been made on their side to deal with

<sup>1</sup> It appeared first in October, 1909, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays*, 175-178.

my points.”<sup>1</sup> Dr. Gordon must not be understood to mean that Dr. Skinner has dealt with these matters.

It may be added that in spite of this very direct challenge no reviewer of the book—and the authors of signed notices include Professors Addis, Eerdmans, König and Toy—has hitherto met these charges. The emphasising of a well-known proverb by Drs. Skinner and Gordon has come very opportunely for my purpose. *Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction.*

HAROLD M. WIENER.

### *THE EARLIEST CHRISTIAN TEACHING ON DIVORCE.*

OWING to circumstances very far removed from the scientific study of historical theology the question of the earliest Christian teaching on divorce is at present a more than usually living question among those who are interested in the ethical teaching of the Christian church. There is therefore a special reason for an attempt to gather up the evidence of the New Testament, and of such literature of the earliest period as is important for influencing our judgment on the true interpretation of the Gospels.

The earliest teaching concerning divorce in the New Testament is to be found in 1 Corinthians vii. The chapter is too well known for it to be necessary to quote it at length. St. Paul is discussing the case of “mixed marriages,” and lays down the rule that the Christian is not bound to leave a heathen husband or wife unless at the desire of the latter. “If the unbeliever separate, let him separate; the brother or sister (i.e. male or female Christian) is not enslaved in such a case.” St. Paul does not say anything definite as to the question of re-marriage in this case, but it is extremely improbable that he would have countenanced

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, preface.



it, as at the beginning of his statement he says that if a wife be separated from her husband she is to remain unmarried, or to be reconciled to her husband. As he uses the same word here for separation as he does when speaking of the mixed marriages, and as this is the only case of separation to which he refers, it is almost certain that this was the case which was before his mind when he prohibited the re-marriage of those who had been separated from their husbands.

For part of his advice St. Paul claims the authority of the Lord, and it is extremely important to notice that this part is precisely that which refers to the general rule of the permanence of the marriage state, and the prohibition of re-marriage in case of separation. "Now to those who are married I enjoin—not I but the Lord—that a wife do not separate from her husband, and if she be separated let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband, and that a husband do not put away his wife." It is surely more reasonable to look for the origin of this command of the Lord in some incident preserved in the Gospels than to suppose that St. Paul is referring to some special vision or revelation made to himself. Such a passage is to be found in each of the Synoptic Gospels, and twice in Matthew, and without trying to identify any one of these places with the injunction referred to by St. Paul we are safe in assuming that they and he refer to the same tradition. The passages in question are Mark 2-12; Matthew xix. 3-9; Matthew v. 31-32, and Luke xvi. 18.

The consideration of these passages brings us into the middle of the Synoptic question, and a glance at them shows that we are here in the presence of one of those valuable sections in which we have the evidence of Q as well as that of Mark. It is fortunately unnecessary at the present time to argue that if we wish to know the

original teaching of Christ we must get behind the Gospels to their source, for this truth is now generally recognised; the first thing, therefore, to do is to inquire into the original form of Q and of Mark.

The Marcan version is found in Mark x. 2-12 and in Matthew xix. 3-9.

MARK X. 2-12.

And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation<sup>1</sup> "He made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; And they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh." What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter. And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall leave her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery.

MATTHEW XIX. 3-9.

The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that the Creator at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning<sup>1</sup> it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his without the reason of fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery.

<sup>1</sup> Or perhaps this should be translated, "But according to Genesis." The word *κρίσεως* is doubtful, and *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* means "in the passage known as 'the beginning.'" See Wellhausen *ad loc.*

The text of this passage in Matthew, though doubtful in some details, is free from any variant which affects the interpretation, but in Mark there are in verses 12 and 11 two points which may be of greater importance. These concern (*a*) the order of the verses, (*b*) the phrase used to describe the divorce of the husband by the wife.

As to the order of the verses it is noticeable that Syr. S and cod. Ev. 1 transpose them so as to put the case of the woman who leaves her husband first. Of course the evidence is not great, but as the tendency would certainly be exactly contrary to this, it must be allowed that transcriptional probability favours this reading, and it is very remarkable that St. Paul in 1 Corinthians vii. 10, when claiming the authority of the Lord for the permanence of the marriage tie, similarly places the case of the wife before that of the husband; it is an attractive guess that St. Paul took this order because it was traditionally that which the Lord had used, and that Syr. S and cod. Ev. 1 preserve the same fact.

The question of the phrase used for the divorce of the husband by the wife is rather a curious example of the way in which textual criticism answers historical difficulties. The objection has often been made that the divorce of a husband was impossible in Jewish law, and it has been argued that this is a later interpolation in Mark. But the textual evidence throws a new light on the facts. In D. latt. syr. the word used is not "dismiss," but "leave" (ἐξελθεῖν ἀπὸ), and the whole question of Herodias was quite precisely that of a wife who had "left" her husband. There is, therefore, much to be said for the view that Mark wrote "dismiss" when he referred to the husband and "leave" when he referred to the wife, and that the Alexandrian scribes who made the **NB** recension made the word used of the wife correspond to that used of the husband, while Syr. S, which has "leave" in both cases, reversed

the process and made the word used of the wife apply also to the husband.

In Mark, then, we have an account of a conversation between Jesus and the Pharisees on the question of divorce in which he laid down the rule that divorce was not permissible either for husband or wife, and it is possible that the case of the wife originally was placed first. The fact that the case of the wife is mentioned at all (and still more, of course, if it be placed first) suggests the historical background which probably ought to be supplied to this incident and the nature of the trap which the Pharisees were preparing. The case of Herodias, who, as has been already pointed out, had actually left her husband, was still present to the minds of the Jews, and it was a dangerous thing for any one too openly to express his opinion of wives who left their husbands, in view of the way in which Herodias had acted, and of the other matrimonial complications for which the house of Herod was notorious. Interference in this matter seems to have cost John the Baptist his life, and the Pharisees no doubt hoped to entangle Jesus in the same difficulties by eliciting from Him an uncompromising statement on the question of marriage and divorce. It is scarcely necessary to point out that if this incident was implicitly concerned with Herodias, it is easy to understand why, if that be the true text, the case of the wife is put first.

But are we right in supposing that Mark represents the original Marcan narrative, or is it possible that Matthew has on this a point preserved the more original form? In the absence of any controlling version in Luke a decisive answer is impossible, but it would be contrary to all we know of the methods of the redactors of the Synoptic Gospels to suppose that Matthew is really preferable. The only points on which a serious argument has been set

up in favour of Matthew are the opening question in which, according to Matthew, the Pharisees asked whether it was allowable for a husband to put away his wife *κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν*, and the excepting clause which recognises infidelity as a reason for putting away a wife.

It has been suggested that *κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν* refers to a dispute among the followers of Hillel and those of Shammai as to what was a legal reason for divorce, but it is quite unnecessary to suppose that this must have been the original setting of the incident. It is quite as likely, even supposing that a reference is intended to Hillel and Shammai, that this was the guess of the redactor, or, as I am inclined to think, it is possible that it has no reference at all to Jewish customs, but refers to some early Christian discussion which had gone on much the same lines.

Far more important is of course the exception in the Matthaean version made in favour of the divorce of an unfaithful wife; and the question has always been raised whether this may not have been the original saying of Jesus. It will, however, be easier to answer this question after having considered the narrative in Q. This is found in Matthew v. 31 f. and Luke xvi. 18.

MATTHEW V. 31-32.

It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.

LUKE XVI. 18.

Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.

It is generally admitted that these passages undoubtedly come from Q, and one sees at once that the phenomena are precisely the same as in the Marcan document—a

conditional prohibition of divorce in Matthew and an unconditional prohibition in the parallel narrative. It is unnecessary for the present purpose to inquire whether Q or Mark is the more original, whether they are independent, which is the earlier form, or any of the other questions which at present are so much to the fore in the discussion of the Synoptic question; the only point is which is the more original form of both Mark and Q,—the conditional or the unconditional? To this the answer cannot be doubtful. If the original form was conditional, it is extremely improbable that Mark (i.e. our Mark) and Luke should both independently remove the conditional clause; but if the original were unconditional, it is not improbable that the redactor, who for his own reasons inserted a condition in one source, should be consistent and insert it in the other as well. Mark, therefore, claims the unconditional form for the Marcan document, and Luke claims it for Q, so that the conditional clause in the Matthaean version is marked down as the work of the Matthaean redactor and does not belong to the original text of either source. It is of course true that this result is only probable and not certain. The possibility is open that Mark and Luke independently omitted a conditional clause, which was originally both in the Marcan document and in Q; but this possibility is opposed by every sort of critical probability.

The result, therefore, of applying the methods of Synoptic Criticism to the sayings about divorce is that Jesus appears to have unconditionally prohibited it; and this agrees with the independent evidence of St. Paul. In fact there are few things in the Gospels which are so strongly attested, according to the standard of modern criticism, as the condemnation of divorce by Jesus. Nevertheless the redactor of our first Gospel thought it desirable to insert the con-

ditional clause allowing divorce of the wife for infidelity ; and the question which we have to ask is whether we can throw any light on the reasons which may have influenced him in this direction. For this purpose it is plain that the evidence of Tertullian and later writers is too far removed from the Gospels, and also is too much affected by their text to give much help. Fortunately, however, we possess in the Shepherd of Hermas a clear statement on the question of divorce, which is at least not openly based on the authority of the Gospels, and although no doubt somewhat later than the redactor of Matthew it is sufficiently close to him in date to throw considerable light on the motives which may have influenced him in inserting the conditional clause.

The evidence of Hermas is found in the fourth mandate in which he narrates the following conversation between himself and the Angel of penitence : " I said to him, Sir, suffer me to ask thee a few things. Say on, quoth he. Sir, quoth I, if one have a wife that is faithful in the Lord, and he find her in some adultery, doth then the husband sin if he live with her ? During ignorance, quoth he, he sinneth not ; but if the man come to know of her sin, and the wife repent not but continue in her fornication,<sup>1</sup> and the husband live with her, he becometh guilty of her sin and a partner in her adultery. What, then, quoth I, should the husband do if the wife continueth in this passion ? Let him put her away, quoth he, and let the husband remain single ; but if, when he hath put away his wife he marry another, then he likewise committeth adultery. But if, sir, quoth I, after the wife hath been put away, she repent and desire to return to her own husband, shall she not be received ?

<sup>1</sup> The interchange here of *μοιχεία* and *πορνεία* is worthy of note in view of the rather artificial difficulties which have been made as to the meaning of the latter in the Gospels.

Yea, verily, quoth he, if the husband receive her not he sinneth, and bringeth great sin upon himself. He that hath sinned and repenteth must be received; yet not often, for to the servants of God there is but one repentance. For the sake of her repentance, therefore, the husband ought not to marry. Thus the case standeth with both wife and husband. And not only, quoth he, is it adultery if a man defile his flesh, but whoso doeth things after the similitude of the heathen likewise committeth adultery. So, then, if a man continue in such deeds and repent not, refrain from him and company not with him; otherwise thou also art a partaker of his sin. For this cause are ye bidden to remain single, whether husband or wife, for in such matters there may be repentance.”

It is plain that this passage deals with the problem implied by the conditional clause in Matthew—the unfaithful wife of a Christian—and like Matthew, or rather in agreement with the implication of Matthew, Hermas enjoins separation. The gain to the interpretation is that Hermas explains the principle and defines accurately the duty of a husband towards his separated wife. Unfortunately it is not possible to say with certainty whether Hermas ought to be regarded as comment on, and interpretation of Matthew, or as the beginning of a Christian Praxis, which was ultimately codified in the final text of Matthew, and given authority by being placed in one of the Sayings of the Lord. In favour of the former view is the fact that Matthew as a whole is certainly earlier than Hermas, though there is no evidence that Hermas was acquainted with it.<sup>1</sup> In favour of the latter is the fact that Hermas

<sup>1</sup> I attach comparatively little importance to this: Hermas does not quote, for he is relying on the authority of the Spirit, whose direct revelations he records, and also because for the most part he is dealing with new problems, which could not be settled by an appeal to the *Λόγια*, whether *Λόγια* be taken to mean the Old Testament or the Oracles of the Messiah.



gives his teaching as a fresh revelation, hitherto unknown. It must also be remembered that though we may feel tolerably certain that Matthew as a whole belongs to the first rather than to the second century, we do not know anything definitive about the last redactors, either as to their number or their date, and the fact that there is no trace of a text of Matthew omitting the clause is insufficient to prove that such a text never existed. But in the absence of evidence it is necessary to leave this point open and to consider later on what the importance may be of the doubt concerning it.

How, then, can we summarise the evidence of Hermas as to the causes which led to the introduction in the Roman church of the second century of more definite rules concerning the separation of husbands and wives? The primary cause was the clashing of two rules of life, and the necessity of finding some way of reconciling them. On the one hand it had been enjoined upon Christians not to divorce their wives, and on the other hand they had been forbidden to live with immoral persons. St. Paul, for instance, had written on one occasion that his converts were "to have no company with fornicators," and he explains in 1 Corinthians v. 11 that what he means is that they should not keep company: "if any man that is named a brother be a fornicator . . . with such a one no, not to eat." Thus it was as much against the teaching of Christianity to live with an immoral person as it was for a husband to put away his wife. If, then, a wife or a husband became immoral the two rules were in open conflict, and the practical question had to be faced. The answer of Hermas was that the law concerning morality must take the precedence, but that the person offended against must remain single in order to be able to receive back the guilty party in case of repentance. According to a true definition

this is of course no divorce at all, for it is of the essence of divorce that it takes with it freedom to remarry : indeed this seems always to have been understood even among the Jews. The practice advocated by Hermas is what we should call "desertion" or "the refusal of conjugal rights" rather than divorce.

What is the bearing of this on the question of the causes which led to the conditional clause in Matthew and the true interpretation of it ? It depends partly, but not to so great an extent as might have been supposed, on the view taken of the relation between Hermas and Matthew. If it be supposed that the conditional clause in Matthew is a comparatively late interpolation, that it represents the result of ecclesiastical practice, and sums up a rule which was probably introduced, and certainly expounded, by Hermas, it is clear that we must interpret the conditional clause in Matthew to mean the same thing as Hermas' advice. That is to say it enjoins on the husband of an unfaithful wife the duty of separating from her, but does not set him free to marry again.

If, on the other hand, Hermas is expounding Matthew we have still two good reasons for thinking that we must interpret Matthew in the same way : first because Hermas is, on this theory, much the oldest interpretation which we possess of Matthew, secondly it is usually safer to interpret an ancient document, the meaning of which is obscure, by the analogy of another which is clear, than by *a priori* considerations taken from our own point of view, or even by a strictly grammatical and logically correct exegesis. The Gospels were not written by scribes who were logically correct and consistent in expression, and therefore an entirely correct and consistent logic often ends in exegetical confusion, which would have been saved by paying more attention to contemporary documents.

If we accept this, we are forced to the conclusion that the only intention of the conditional clause in Matthew was to relieve Christians from the necessity of living with unfaithful wives, and it was not meant to give them the freedom of re-marriage. The possibility, of course, is not absolutely excluded that Hermas was limiting a too wide interpretation of Matthew, but this possibility is rendered very improbable by the general trend of his statements. The main question, it will be remembered, was not whether a man might marry again, but whether it was sinful to live with an unfaithful wife. If Hermas had been primarily concerned with the question of re-marriage this would have been put in the foreground, but as it is no unprejudiced reader can study Hermas without receiving the impression that the new element in his treatment was the teaching that it is the duty of the husband to leave an unfaithful and impenitent wife. If (which personally I doubt) the Church of Rome was acquainted with the conditional clause in Matthew, it is probable that it was not regarded as a command so much as a permission, and Hermas was engaged in the task of maintaining that it was a definite command intended to reconcile the prohibition of divorce with the prohibition of intercourse with immoral persons.

To sum up, the result of investigating the early Christian teaching as to divorce is to show that the original teaching of Christ and of St. Paul was an unconditional prohibition of divorce or separation. The conditional clause in Matthew does not represent a genuine saying of Christ, it was introduced in consequence of the practical difficulty which arose when it was perceived that the prohibition of divorce sometimes conflicted with the duty of Christians of avoiding the company of immoral persons, and it was not intended to convey any permission to remarry.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

*THE FOUR EMPIRES OF DANIEL.*

CONCERNING these Empires there has occurred within recent years a change of opinion which can only be compared to a landslide. Nothing seemed more irrevocably established, a few years ago, than that these four were Babylon, Medo-Persia, Greece, Rome. Every schoolboy knew that in point of fact these *were* the four great Empires of ancient history, that the descriptions given of them tallied roughly with this order, that Christianity came to the front in the days of the fourth, and in a certain concrete form superseded it as the power which shaped the course of history. That seemed to almost everybody so clear as to be beyond cavil, so decisive as to exclude reasonable question. All this mass of opinion has gone and left hardly a trace behind. One may search in vain for any commentator of weight who ventures to say a word in defence of the old opinion. Probably Dr. Driver's "Daniel" in the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges gave it the *coup de grâce* for the mass of English students. The mere fact that this volume was published in 1900, whereas no volume of the Pentateuch has appeared yet, shows conclusively that no hesitation was considered justifiable, and no caution necessary, with respect to the modern criticism of Daniel. To have said so much seems to convict myself of mere folly in challenging a position held with such confidence and by such a general agreement. If I venture to do so, I must at least indicate at once the grounds on which I go. It is not because I dissent from the modern view of the Book of Daniel as a whole. I am as much persuaded that it is an historical romance written about the year B.C. 166, as any one can be. I perceive with discomfort—but am bound to admit—that the author of this delightful book was but

imperfectly acquainted with the past history of the world, and was not at all acquainted with its future. He was indeed a noble spirit, and one who did splendid service to the cause of true religion; but his history and his prophecy were alike erroneous in detail. There never was any such person as Darius the Mede; Antiochus Epiphanes did not perish in the way foretold; the Kingdom of the Saints did not come at all after the fashion, or even in the sense, of his prediction. Be it so. I am sorry. But one must be honest before all things in dealing with the Word of God, and the facts do not seem to admit of further controversy.

Admitting therefore the substantial accuracy of the modern position as to Daniel, I am obliged to reject the account given of the Four Empires because it is inconsistent with that position. It is so under two main heads. First, the Median Empire (which has to do duty for the second) existed neither in history nor in the imagination of our author. Second, this author, writing about B.C. 166, could not possibly have been ignorant of the Roman Empire or left it out of view.

I. That no separate Median Empire ever existed is acknowledged by everybody. That the author of "Daniel" believed it to have existed is a mere imagination of the commentators who have to make up the four without Rome, and can find no better way of doing it. It is, of course, true that our author represents "Darius the Mede" as taking the kingdom from Belshazzar. He also speaks vaguely in chap. viii. 20 of the "kings of Media and Persia." What was in his mind exactly concerning Darius and other "Median" princes cannot now be determined. But it is obvious that he knows nothing about any Median Empire, distinct from and prior to the Persian. The kingdom of Belshazzar was to be given to the "Medes and Persians" (v. 28). Darius is bound by the law of the Medes and Per-

sians (vi. 12). The necessity for Michael to withstand the angel-prince of Persia dates from the first year of Darius the Mede (xi. 1). Whatever mistakes he may have made (and the Greek historians seem to have made mistakes very similar) our author never suggests that there was more than *one* Empire between that of the Chaldeans and that of the Macedonians. Kings of different nationalities may rule a kingdom in whole or in part without imparting their own nationality to the kingdom. That the second Empire had a dual, or quasi-dual, character is made quite clear, but the Empire itself is invariably treated as one. No one (unless under the tyranny of some theory) can possibly mistake this in the vision of chap. viii., which is quite the simplest and easiest in all the book. Its imagery is, in fact, so transparent as to call for no ingenuity, and to permit of no controversy. It is an axiom of interpretation that we ought to start from what is simple and easy, and work on to what is more obscure. We must therefore in interpreting "Daniel" put ourselves right first and foremost with chap. viii. Now in this chapter there are two beasts, a ram and a he-goat, typifying the second and third Empires. The beasts (I repeat) are two, only two. The ram is as palpably and emphatically one beast, and one empire, as the he-goat is. It is impossible to argue that our author was only thinking here of the Persian Empire as distinct from and subsequent to the Median. For the quasi-dual character of the Empire is clearly intimated. The ram, although obviously one and only one, has two horns, and these are always understood of the two peoples, the Medes and the Persians, who formed the fighting strength of Cyrus, whose names were constantly bracketed together in speaking of his empire. It is gratuitous and unwarrantable to cut the ram in two because he has two horns, and call the first half of him "Median Empire" and the second half "Persian Empire." The horns

may stand for kings or dynasties which ruled (with some diversity of name and race) the one Empire, or they may stand for peoples or influences which prevailed within the Empire ; but they cannot with any sort of propriety be interpreted of successive Empires. To do so is to obliterate the beast in favour of the horns, whereas it is obvious that the two horns belong to the ram and the ram is one. The imagination, therefore, of a "Median" Empire in Daniel goes to pieces at once against the great outstanding features of these visions. For in all of them the Empires (however pictured) are great and solid realities which succeed one another, not by any process of "peaceful penetration," but by some kind of catastrophe. Immense, overwhelming, irresistible, and (above all) definite, they go upon their way, separate and contrasted. No one can doubt that this is the *main* effect of the visions, and to this main effect all detail *must* be subordinate. The Babylonian, the Medo-Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman Empires *were* as a fact thus separate and contrasted. Each of them had not only an existence but a character ; each was a type. To intercalate a Median Empire which never existed, and to which the writer never alludes as a separate thing, is to attribute to him a misreading of history in comparison with which all inaccuracies of detail sink into insignificance. It is the more gratuitously unfair because he is at pains to shew that he knew of the quasi-dual character of the second Empire (see chaps. viii. 3 and vii. 5), and does in fact emphasise it very cleverly. No one, in fine, could ever have dreamed that the ram with two horns, the bear raised up on one side, was anything but the Persian (or Medo-Persian) Empire, unless he had been driven to it by the supposed necessity of putting the Roman Empire out of view. Many lamentable experiences have taught us to regard with great suspicion these solutions of Scriptural problems which com-

mentators accept because there seems no other way out—accept, and then defend by arguments which cannot really seem to them to have any independent value. Thus it appears that the second Empire must after all be the (imaginary) Median Empire, not the (actual) Medo-Persian, because in chap. ii. it is said to be “inferior” to the Babylonian. But who does not see that Daniel’s language throughout this chapter is in the highest degree honorific as far as Nebuchadnezzar is concerned? If one had to criticise it coldly, one would have to say that it was grossly exaggerated. A universal empire is attributed to Nebuchadnezzar “wherever the children of men dwell.” In the dream-image he was “this head of gold,” superior, no doubt, to the breast of silver which came next, but even more superior to the brass and iron which followed. Certainly the kingdom of Nebuchadnezzar is consistently represented as finer and more splendid than any subsequent kingdom, which is, historically speaking, quite untrue. But from the Scriptural point of view it is quite intelligible and quite right. It was not only Daniel’s part to use the language of conventional flattery, where no moral principle was at stake; it was also the author’s part to magnify the power before which the City and Temple of the living God had gone down, the power which was itself to go down before the faith and courage of the servants of the living God. There can be no question that he thought of Nebuchadnezzar’s power and glory as of something vaguely vast and splendid, the like of which was never seen again. In short, whatever his four Empires are, the “Median” is not one of them; that is a hopelessly artificial solution, which ought to be put aside resolutely as unsound and unworthy.

II. In the second place I venture to maintain that a man of any intelligence, writing in Palestine about the middle of the second century B.C., could not be ignorant of the



Roman power, and could not leave it out of sight. When the Old Testament critics move down the date of "Daniel" to this period, they must not forget what it involves. The battle of Magnesia was fought in lesser Asia in the year B.C. 190. It was one of the most sweeping victories ever won by the Roman arms, and created an enormous sensation. It was evident to "all Asia and the world" that there was no Kingdom or Power upon earth that could stand for a moment against the overwhelming strength of Rome; it was especially evident that all the fragments of Alexander's Empire lay prostrate at her feet. True it is that after Magnesia Rome recoiled for a time from the consequences of her own victory. She did not choose, for good reasons of her own, to gather in the spoils. She left the East to its own disorders, but only as a cat which is not hungry leaves alone the mouse which it has seized. Who does not know the story of how the Roman legate met Antiochus Epiphanes in the full tide of his victory over Egypt, ordered him to quit the country, and (when he tried to gain time) drew a circle round him with his stick, and insisted on receiving a definite submission before he stepped outside? Does any one suppose that an incident like this did not come to the general knowledge? Wherever Antiochus was feared and hated—and nowhere more than in Palestine—this amazing humiliation would pass from mouth to mouth until it was known everywhere. The king of beasts—he with the great iron teeth—had but to make one step in advance, and the progeny of the leopard fled snarling or grovelled fawning at his feet. Rome might be quiescent in B.C. 165, but no writer about world-empires then could possibly leave Rome out of account. She was manifestly the greatest force upon earth, and as manifestly destined to make an end of all the rest. It is not a question of revelation or of prophecy; the only question is whether the author of "Daniel" was

a man of ordinary intelligence to appreciate the political facts of the actual situation.

I do not doubt that these considerations would be held decisive on every hand if it were not for one thing, and that one thing is the Little Horn. It will not do to allow the Little Horn of this book to be anything whatever but Antiochus Epiphanes, who was the enemy *par excellence* of the Jews when "Daniel" was written. Now the Little Horn is in chap. viii. (as in history) an offshoot of the Empire of Alexander; and in chap. vii. he is as definitely a product of the fourth Empire. It follows that the fourth Empire is the Grecian, and that *two* other Empires must, by some sort of ingenuity, be arranged between it and the Babylonian. No doubt the Little Horn is (in its primary sense) Antiochus Epiphanes. Let that be granted. But it is a fact that while Antiochus was of the progeny of the leopard as far as his origin and his title are concerned, yet in personal character and in the matter of religious policy he belonged to Rome; he was a true offshoot of the Fourth Beast. This Antiochus spent all his youth as a hostage in Rome, where he mixed with the most prominent of its citizens, and became thoroughly naturalised. There can be no question that he came back at last full of Roman ideas to assume the crown over the dominions of his ancestors, with their strange medley of inhabitants. It was a form of Hellenic culture which he tried with so much determination to force upon his subjects; but it ought to be observed (for it is of the essence of the matter) that behind the Hellenic culture, which was already common, more or less, to all the civilised world, there lay Roman ideals and Roman methods. It was from Rome, not from any Grecian state, that he fetched the most distinguishing feature of his policy, and *the* one which brought him into hopeless conflict with the Jews, the imposing, viz., of a common religion—a state religion—upon

the very varied populations of his kingdom. The Zeus Olympios of the Greek writers, the "abomination of desolation" set up upon the altar of burnt offering at Jerusalem on December 15, B.C. 168, was the Jupiter Capitolinus whom Antiochus had learnt to worship at Rome as the supreme deity of the Empire. It is true that Rome was at that time only in process of becoming an "Empire" (in the stricter sense); she had not then developed that appalling practice of state-heathenism, of Caesar worship, which brought her subsequently into that long and bitter conflict with the followers of Christ. But the germ of it, the principle of it, was there; it lay in the remorseless demand of the state to be supreme, to receive unqualified obedience, in every department of life, including religion; it lay in the accepted ideal of a patriotic unity which involved a certain uniformity of worship. Strangely enough, it was reserved for a Grecian prince, a foster-child of Rome, to develop this ideal along the exact lines which were afterwards followed, with such dreadful consequences, by Rome herself. Hence the very peculiar position occupied by Antiochus Epiphanes in the religious history of the people of God, and therefore in the Bible. He was at once a product of what Rome (the Fourth Empire) *was*, and an anticipation of what she *was going to be*. For if we turn from the scattered notices of Antiochus in the classical writers (which do not really tell us much) to the picture drawn of him by the hand of a contemporary in the book of Daniel, the distinctive features of his policy come out quite clearly. In the first place he was at bottom *irreligious* (xi. 36). In the second place he was essentially an innovator in religion, practically deposing the ancient deities of his land in favour of Mars and Jupiter (xi. 37-39). In the third place he was a blasphemer, practically identifying himself with the Supreme Deity whom he forced upon his people, and thus (indirectly, but really) claiming religious

worship for himself. That is not charged against Antiochus by any of the secular historians who make mention of him. In all probability it would not touch them at all closely; they would not see anything dreadful in it. But it is directly asserted by the Jewish writer in xi. 36-37; it is indirectly (but none the less strongly) implied in the stories about Nebuchadnezzar's image of gold, and Darius's decree, in chaps. iii. and vi.; and it is emphatically borne out by the coins which have come down to us. Antiochus Epiphanes *did* identify himself in a certain sense with the Jupiter Capitolinus for whom he challenged the religious veneration of all his subjects; he *did* assume the conventional insignia of deity; his very title of Epiphanes ("manifest in the flesh") seems to express as much. What lay at the root, therefore, of the whole activity of Antiochus—as far as the Jews were concerned—was precisely that Caesar-worship, that religious exaltation of the state as embodied in its head, which exposed so many generations of Christians to torment and death at the hands of Imperial Rome. We may say, if we like, that Antiochus was a freak, that he was like one born out of due time, because he anticipated the settled and developed policy of Rome two hundred years later. All the same, he learnt his principles from Rome; they were her's, although in him—thanks to certain peculiarities of his position and character—they ripened and fruited earlier than they did upon the parent stem. The Roman satyrist of a later day complained that the Orontes had emptied itself into the Tiber; but the citizens of Antioch under the drastic rule of Epiphanes might have lamented with as much justice that the Tiber had diverted all his waters into the Orontes. In these facts, which were to a considerable extent within the ken of the author of Daniel, we may find an adequate explanation of the apparent confusion about the Little Horn. In chap. viii. he springs out of

the third (or Grecian) Empire ; in chap. vii. out of the fourth (the Roman) Empire. Both were true : by birth he was a Greek, and by sovereignty a successor of Alexander ; by education, by temperament, by deliberate policy, he was a product of the Rome that was, an anticipation of the Rome that was to be.

Whether these conclusions are right or wrong, they belong entirely to the sphere of historical criticism. It remains to add something from the point of view of theology, something to vindicate the " Scriptural " character of the book. At present its character in that respect is practically gone. One has to admit, with whatever secret uneasiness and chagrin, that what purports to be history is not historical, and what appears to be prophecy is not prophetic. The writer has no insight even into the immediate future. Living on the very eve of the Maccabean rising, he had no inkling of its brilliant character or of its ultimate success. Foretelling the death of Antiochus, he foretold it all wrong. What he predicted was merciless persecution and slaughter endured with indomitable patience, a sudden and spectacular interposition of the Powers of Heaven, an end of all secular things, and the timeless kingdom of the saints. What really happened was an armed resistance on the part of the Jewish patriots which turned out surprisingly successful, the casual death of Antiochus in some obscure expedition to the East, the slow winning of religious and political liberty by a mixture of very heroic fighting and somewhat crafty policy. Precisely because of this remarkable discrepancy the book is in complete harmony with Christian thought and the Christian apocalypse. Our Saviour not only deprecated, but forbade any appeal to the sword. Persecution was to be met by patient suffering, not by armed resistance. Deliverance would come, not from soldiers or statesmen, but from God Himself. Everybody

knows that such is the whole tone and tenour of the Revelation. The two Apocalypses are in perfect harmony both as to the conditions which they accept, and as to the deliverance—the dénouement—which they expect. The destruction of the Little Horn, or of the beast with seven heads and ten horns, is not of man or of any ordinary combination of circumstances, but of God. He that endureth to the end shall be saved. As it was under Nebuchadnezzar and under Darius of old, as it was under Antiochus Epiphanes later, so it should be under Nero, or that other Nero Domitian. Men had only to endure and be faithful; at the supreme moment they should see the salvation of God.

This was, as a fact, the teaching of Christ and of His apostles. This was, as a fact, the attitude of Christians throughout those terrible ages of persecution for which the sacred writings were (in so great a measure) the designed preparative. We owe it to that attitude that the civilised world is at least nominally Christian to-day. Had they flown to arms against Nero or Domitian, as the Jews did against Antiochus, all would have been lost.

Here, then, we may find (in part) the inspiration of "Daniel." The author was no historian and no prophet; but he was moved so to treat the struggle against Antiochus, and so to treat Antiochus himself, as to bring them into closest touch with the Christian conscience and the Christian experience. In his splendid stories from Jewish history, as in his astonishing visions, he sets forth the eternal truth that the tyranny, the cruelty, the presumption of man are bound to go utterly to pieces against the Powers of Heaven. In the days of the "Little Horn" (originally Antiochus, afterward in a very true sense Nero or Domitian or some other representative of the Fourth Beast) men needed this lesson more than any other. Doubtless they will need it again. The power of the irreligious state intruding itself

into the domain of conscience will surely reappear in some form or other. For the attitude of the state is ever liable to be determined by the (practical) negation of God, the negation, viz., of One infinitely superior to itself, Whose claims limit its own, Who rules and will rule in the kingdom of men.

RAYNER WINTERBOTHAM.

### *HISTORIC CHRISTIANITY AND THE MYSTICAL SENSE.*

THERE have always been in the Christian Church a certain number of people—necessarily a small minority, but a minority of the very best—who have based their belief in the Gospel, less on external testimony than on the inner witness of their spirit. They have held that where through moral effort the spiritual nature reaches a certain level of development, faculties are aroused which respond to the realities of the spiritual world as truly as our bodily senses respond to material things; and that just as the world of colour and sound would grow round the man born blind and deaf if those faculties in him could be awakened, so all Heaven grows round the man whose inner sense begins to respond to its wonderful and glorious vibrations.

If we place a gold coin in a closed wooden box the ordinary eye will, of course, see nothing but the wood, but under the X-rays the wood which before alone appeared real now seems only a shadow, while the coin invisible before is now seen as the only solid reality.

Let us imagine a number of people endowed with what we might call X-rays sight. They would move about among their fellow-men, yet they would be largely living in a different world. Their actions would seem strange to others

and their motives unintelligible. If one of them wrote about the things he saw his book would be as incomprehensible to the majority as the Gospel of St. John is to the majority of higher critics. Their opinions on the book would be chiefly useful as indicating the limitations of their own faculties.

In like manner, the things, which to the world seem real, were to the Christ only shadows, while the things which were real to Him were invisible to the world. "I stood," He says in the beautiful saying attributed to Him in the Logia, "in the midst of the world and in the flesh was I seen of them, and all men found I drunken and none found I athirst, and my soul grieveth over the sons of men because they are blind and see not."

Perhaps it was inevitable that even in the Christian Church the position of the mystic should be most persistently misunderstood. It is a mere matter of history that the prevailing attitude towards him on the part of the ecclesiastic has invariably been that of Balaam to his ass.

The conduct of the beast was to the Prophet incomprehensible. She turned aside from his way, she thrust his foot against a wall, she fell down under him, *because she saw and he did not*. The mystic has always been more or less beaten with the rod of ecclesiastical authority. "I would there were a sword in my hand, for now I would kill thee," has often been the aspiration of Church conclaves. Yet Balaam was saved by his ass, as Christianity has been kept alive by mysticism.

It is obvious that it is only a minority who could truly say with the Apostle, "We look not on the things which are seen, but on the things which are not seen," and it is necessary in the economy of the Church that the majority, who cannot, as yet, so look on the world and life, should



not be neglected. The distinction between them and the provision which should be made for both is strongly and repeatedly emphasised by our Lord.

“To you it is given to know the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven, but to them it is not given.”

“He that hath ears to hear let *him* hear.”

He provides for both classes ; knowledge of the mysteries for the developed few : parables for the undeveloped many. To both He reveals Himself according to their powers of seeing.

Man is like a house with two fronts. On one side of his being he faces the material world where all is perishable and transitory : on the other side he looks out on the world which is real and spiritual and eternal. It is of course from the latter that he must ultimately welcome the real approach of the Christ. But just because in the earlier stage of his development his consciousness is centred on that side which looks out on the phenomenal world of shadows, because to him at first that alone seems real, because he cannot yet hear Him who on the other side of his being—far within—stands at the door and knocks, the Eternal Christ projects Himself into human history and approaches him by the pathway of the bodily senses, and so we have what we call the historic Incarnation.

It is useful in this connexion to recall Plato's wonderful allegory of the Cave. He imagines some men chained so that their faces were always turned towards the inner wall of the cave and all they knew of the outer world was just what they saw of it in the shadows projected on that wall.

They themselves and all that they saw became identified in their minds with the shadows that they cast. The only world they knew was a world of two dimensions. To their stunted and impoverished minds it alone was real.

Then he imagines one of them escaping from his chains and learning to know the three-dimensional world in its reality and not only through its reflections on the wall, How could such a man, if he rejoined his companions, make clear to them the nature of the real world which he himself had come to know ?

That surely was just the problem of the Christ. Here was a world where the faces of men were turned fixedly toward the phenomenal and the unreal, and whose hearts were set on shadows. How could He bring them to turn and look the other way, to face the spiritual, to know the eternal and the true ?

He would approach them by the way of the senses. He would reveal Himself under conditions of time and space. He would project Himself into history. He would mingle with them in the shadow life of earth. He would win their confidence and love. He would tell them of the real world—His world—the Kingdom of God. He would speak to them of that He knew and testify of that He had seen. He would seek to wean their affections from earthly things and bid His nearest followers sell all that they had and follow Him homeless from place to place till His Presence became the one unchanging factor of their lives. *Then* He would tell them of approaching departure. He would say to them, “ A little while and ye behold Me no more (‘ with the wondering gaze of the bodily senses ’), and again a little while (when the shock of the sense of loss is past—when you have turned your faces towards the world which is spiritual and real) and then you shall *see* Me. Then you shall never lose Me more. . . . And now,” He would say, “ go back to your fellow-men and do for them what I have done for you. Hold before them my historic life ; teach them to know Me ‘ after the flesh ’ ; tell them about My world ; testify to them that ‘ the things which are seen are tem-

poral, and the things which are not seen are eternal.' Then they too will come to turn their backs on history—not repudiating it—not denying it—God forbid—why should they kick down the ladder by which they have climbed?—but transcending it, till they too will be able to say, 'If in the past we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know Him so no more.'"

The historical bears a similar relation to the real that the map, say, of Scotland does to the country itself, with its mountains and valleys, its fields and its lochs. It is as true a representation as can be given on a piece of paper. It is accurate indeed but inadequate, suggestive, not final. We must look beyond it to that which it represents. Knowledge of the land itself may enable us to transcend its use, but it will never justify us in repudiating its accuracy or denying its practical value. Nay, may we not say that it can only be through knowledge of the original that we can ultimately be able to verify the accuracy of the map?

The Tabernacle which was the shadow of the heavenly things was glorious to every Hebrew but one, and that one was Moses, who had seen the heavenly realities of which it was but the dim reflection. None the less, and more than all the rest, Moses knew its value.

But it may be said, "Does not this imply that the historic life of Christ is merely a parable? To which we may answer, "Yes, it is God's parable, and *God's parables are written in history.*"

It is necessary to emphasise this point in view of what has been written by some modernists and by some exponents of "The New Theology." The Life of Christ is history, but it is not merely history and not mainly history. "To them that are without" indeed it is history only, for "to them all things are in parables," but to those whose faces are turned to the eternal it is the manifestation to the eyes of men of what is going on all the time.

Perhaps no one has drawn this distinction more powerfully or more beautifully than Browning in the words which he puts into the mouth of the aged and dying St. John in the great poem "A Death in the Desert."

"To me that story—ay, that Life and Death  
Of which I wrote 'it was,' to me, it is:  
—Is, here and now! I apprehend nought else.  
Is not God now in the world His power first made?  
Is not His love at issue still with sin,  
Visibly, when a wrong is done on earth?  
Love, wrong, and pain, what see I else around?  
Yea, and the Resurrection and uprising  
To the right hand of the Throne—

. . . . .  
These are, I see:  
But ye, the children, His beloved ones too.  
Ye need——"

And then he describes an optic glass he once wondered at by means of which things which to the unassisted eye appeared "lying confusedly insubordinate" became at once distinct and small and clear.

"Just thus ye needs must apprehend what truth  
I see, reduced to plain historic fact  
Diminished into clearness proved a point  
And far away: ye would withdraw your gaze  
From out Eternity, strain it upon time,  
Then stand before that fact, that Life and Death,  
Stay there at gaze, till it dispart, dispart,  
As though a star should open out, all sides,  
Grow the world on you, as it is my world."

The mystical deals with the real, the timeless, the eternal. The historical is the reflection of the real under conditions of time and space.

Now the value of this postulate is that it gives us a right in dealing with the Gospel history to take an *à priori* point of view. It makes intelligible our definite refusal to treat the story of the Life of Christ as mere ordinary history to be submitted unconditionally to the dissection of critics

with such facts and faculties as they can bring to bear upon it.

It has been truly said that "Nothing is less real than history." Merely historical events recede into the past and diminish in importance to us as the years go by. How far away, for instance, is the Boer War and the Battle of Colenso! "What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba?" asks Hamlet. But the events of the Life of Christ never recede and never diminish in importance. And why? Because they are more than history. They are eternal truths made manifest in time.

You travel in a railway train by night. Houses flit by you and trees and villages. You see them for a moment, and then they are lost in the darkness behind. But the moon flies face to face with you all the way. It is as near you at the end of your journey as at the beginning. Again we ask why?

Because it is lifted up out of the Earth's sphere. So with the Cross of Calvary, so with the Resurrection of the Christ. They are as near to us to-day as to our forefathers a thousand years ago: they will be as near to our descendants a thousand years hence as they are to us.

"I," said Jesus, "if I be lifted up out of the earth (*ἐκ τῆς γῆς*) will draw all men unto Me."

The truths of which these events are the outward expression can be apprehended as really by the awakened intuitional faculty as the historical events themselves can be grasped by the human reason. Reason verifies what Faith sees, and common sense teaches us to approach the investigation rather to verify than to explore. Let us put this in the form of a fable.

An eagle and a mole once had an argument about what was happening a mile away. The eagle saw and bore witness; the mole travelled half a mile to investigate and died an unbeliever. The eagle having seen could not fail

to have an *à priori* opinion about what the investigation would reveal. This was denounced by the mole as being quite contrary to all the canons of impartial research.

Thus we claim for mysticism that it gives us a renewed hold upon the facts of the Life of Christ.

“O foolish men,” says Jesus to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus, “O foolish men and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken. Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things and to enter into His glory?”

If they ought to have expected it before it happened it would seem to follow that something else beside historical criticism ought to have a say in the question whether it happened or not.

Reason is to Intuition what touch is to sight. We generally touch things with an *à priori* expectation at the back of our minds. Impartial investigation with the finger tips is a thing practically unknown. And yet how useful is the sense of touch!

“Is that a dagger that I see before me?” says Macbeth,  
 “The handle towards my hand, come let me clutch thee.  
 I have thee not and yet I see thee still.”

The sense of touch frees us from taking up our time with “daggers of the mind and false creations.”

Even such a help is the reason applied in criticism to the intuitions of faith. All the mystic claims is his right to see and to expect—the right—nay the duty of the Christian to adopt the standpoint enjoined by our Lord when He said, “Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things?”

We grant at once the need of verification and the high utility of the critical sense. But verification is one thing and exploration is quite another. There is all the difference in the world between examining in the light and groping in the dark. Intuition is in most people an opening and

as yet untrained sense, and without verification it is not to be absolutely relied on ; but criticism without intuition, criticism which resolves to ignore the *à priori* point of view to which our Lord refers, *that* is hopeless blindness, and “ if the blind lead the blind ” where will they both end ?

When the spiritual faculties of the most developed men—the poets and the prophets of our race—reach a certain level they begin to see the eternal truths in great flashes of intuition, which flood the soul with light. Then they look for that timeless truth to be reflected in time. They look backward into history, and if they do not see it there, then forward into the future in the spirit of prophecy.

If I drop a coin on the floor I do not look to see *if* it is there. I know it is there and look to find it.

But it may be said “ that theory is all very well for those with mystical insight, but what about the majority ? ” Well let us frankly recognise the distinction and provide for both. That again is Bible teaching though strangely ignored.

“ We speak wisdom,” says St. Paul, “ among them that are perfect.” But he provides for the others too. He feeds the “ babes in Christ ” with milk.

That surely is the real significance of the distinction made by the risen Christ to St. Peter “ Feed my lambs ”—“ Feed my sheep.”

His standard of maturity was not a physical one.

Let us spend less time in trying to convince the reason of that which transcends it and spend more in developing the spiritual faculty by which alone it can be apprehended.

“ Spiritual things are spiritually discerned.” “ If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine.”

It is not faultless syllogisms that we need but awakened faculties. We have no quarrel with Biblical criticism, though we may sometimes feel that the primal curse on the serpent

lies somewhat heavily on those critics who, while possessing scholarship, lack insight.

If we may go back for a moment to what was said a little ago that reason with all its machinery of criticism and investigation is to intuition what touch is to sight, it will be plain that while we give pre-eminence to the latter we readily acknowledge the value of both. What we utterly condemn is the tacit assumption of some critics that our faith in historic Christianity depends on what they can find out from their old manuscripts.

It would be equally reasonable to claim that since optical illusions are possible all our knowledge of this world must be acquired through the finger tips.

Biblical criticism may brandish its results and its theories in the face of the ecclesiastic and frighten him out of his wits, but for the mystic it has no terrors. The anchor of his faith has never been grappled to merely external testimony, but—to use the great mixed metaphor of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews—“entereth into that which is within the veil” and beyond the senses and the reasoning of men.

Now if the events of the Life of Christ are the reflection in time and space of great eternal truths, then we can understand His own calm certainty that His every step was in the path marked out for Him, why He seemed to move according to a chart along an inevitable path, and why these events correspond with and appeal to the spiritual experience of the spiritual man in every age. In this spiritual correspondence we find the ultimate basis of belief.

The eternal truth that “Jesus Christ cometh (keeps on coming) in the flesh” is narrowed down through the “optic glass” of history to the Birth in Bethlehem, and finds its counterpart in the individual life of man when, in the words of St. Paul, “the Christ is formed” in him.



The age-long struggle of love with sin is expressed and manifested in the Cross of Calvary and reproduced in the individual experience of those who are "crucified with Christ."

And so we might watch Him pass from His Passion to the Resurrection "power of an endless life"—to His Ascension or withdrawal from the physical "that He might fill (or interpenetrate) all things" and so come nearer to all, and then think of Him as no longer chained to form, no longer external to us, but seeking entrance from within and manifesting Himself to us, and in us, and through us.

Thus the Life of Christ becomes clothed to us with new and living power. It is no longer mere ancient history, but the revelation of present and eternal truth.

"And warm, sweet, tender, even yet  
A present help is He;  
And Faith has still its Olivet  
And Love its Galilee."

H. ERSKINE HILL.

### *THE CAREFULNESS OF LUKE.*

#### II. PETER'S CONVERSION.

THE account of St. Peter's vision at Joppa (Acts x., xi.) has been treated by most commentators slightly and scantily. There are difficulties in regard to its position, besides greater difficulties in its exposition. On the one hand, it has hardly been placed in relation to its antecedents; on the other, we have so few materials for judging of its consequences, so far as the history of the Acts records them, that the critical nature of the turning-point in St. Peter's life marked by the vision is considerably obscured for us. We do not easily obtain the impression that the vision marks a kind of "conversion" in the Apostle. It seems to occur near the end of his active life.

Let us endeavour to place ourselves in St. Peter's position as marked by St. Luke, remembering that Luke-Acts is one work rather than two companion works.<sup>2</sup> His readers would remember that he had recorded of Simon that his call had come in the Lord's words, uttered some two or three years before, "Launch out into the deep . . . from henceforth thou shalt catch men"; that he had been named Peter, and chosen to be of the Twelve, among whom he was mentioned first; that he had witnessed miracles of the Lord, and was one of the three selected disciples; that he had made the great confession at Caesarea Philippi, "Thou art the Christ of God," and been present at the Transfiguration; that he had said, "Behold we have left our own belongings and followed thee"; that he had been sent to prepare the Passover; that at the Table his *conversion* had been foretold (Luke xxii. 32); that he had denied his Lord; that he had "risen up and ran to the tomb, and looked in and seen the fine linen cere-clothes (*τὰ ὀθόνια*, see below) left alone, and had gone home wondering at that which was come to pass."

In all this there is only just enough to prepare us for the prominent place that Peter is to fill in the first twelve chapters of Acts. He is the leading character in the first twelve chapters, after which he appears but once, at the Council of Jerusalem. Now though it is true that the literary effect of the parallel arrangement of Acts is more artistic because the parallelism (Peter i.-xii., Paul xiii.-end) is not too rigidly observed, still it would not have lost anything if St. Peter's latest Acts had been brought on to the stage. And yet again there is a loss of proportion in the fact that his preaching to the Gentiles is announced only in x. 34 foll., repeated xi. 17 foll., and mentioned xv. 7, and not once again. Is it not obvious that what is required for the completion of

<sup>2</sup>This has been well shown by Zahn, *Einl.*, ii. § 60.

the unity, or rather the symmetry, of Acts is the subsequent record of Peter's preaching among the Gentiles, if not also to the Gentiles? This record, we may suppose, would have been, or actually was, contained in the third and concluding history of Luke following after Acts xxviii. Two topics which this concluding history would have contained are mentioned by the writer of the Muratorian Fragment, "the suffering of Peter, and Paul's departure from the city (Rome) to Spain."

And there is another reason why we are apt to miss the cardinal importance of the story of St. Peter's conversion. Possibly it may not be given by St. Luke in the chronological order of its occurrence. It has been shown elsewhere<sup>1</sup> that St. Luke appears to have arranged that Acts i.-xii. should illustrate each separate verse of Psalm cxlvi. in the LXX version, and for a particular reason. It can hardly be a fortuitous coincidence that for the title and the ten verses of that Psalm there are sixteen illustrations supplied in Acts i.-xii. by way of "fulfilment" of prophecy. In this fact, then, taken in conjunction with others of the same kind,<sup>2</sup> we observe the undercurrent of St. Luke's mind. He and his contemporary Plutarch followed the same method of "Parallel Lives," but St. Luke based his parallelism not merely on the comparison and contrast of two eminent historical persons, but also on the original parallelism of the prophecy and its fulfilment.

It seems to follow from these considerations that St. Luke was not entirely bent on following the chronological order of events: it might sometimes have to make way for the prophetic order of fulfilments. And his freedom in point of chronology is just what we are left to infer from his peculiarly loose way of recording marks of time in Acts i.-xii. This looseness has not been understood by some commentators,

<sup>1</sup> *St. Luke the Prophet*, pp. 320 foll.    <sup>2</sup> See EXPOSITOR for June 1909.

and they have accordingly charged the author with ignorance of his dates. "And in these days" is an expression that occurs often (i. 15, vi. 1, viii. 1 [singular], ix. 37, xi. 27). This seems to be vague. But is it ignorance? Again and again we are left desiderating a definite mark of time. The "conversion" of Saul was subsequent to Stephen's death, but did it precede the "conversion" of Peter? was it subsequent to Philip's preaching at Samaria? These are perhaps questions that cannot be definitely answered. But do they imply ignorance on the author's part? may he be justly charged with carelessness or ignorance in regard to his order generally, if it can be shown, as I venture to think it can, that he had other reasons for grouping his narratives than chronological considerations?

First of all there were geographical considerations, if we may infer anything from (Acts i. 8) the successive widening of the circles of witness—Jerusalem—Judaea—Samaria—the rest of the world. Next, there were biographical considerations, touching the very essence of the Church, more particularly after the untoward disagreement between St. Peter and St. Paul, which St. Luke set himself to reconcile first in person and then in literature.<sup>1</sup> Thirdly, there were also prophetic considerations, for St. Luke was a prophet, most jealous of the traditions and rules of prophecy, and he wished to indicate the successive waves of fulfilment that broke upon the sands of Jewish thought. To one who was thus bound by a threefold duty, to say nothing of a fourth, that of artistic treatment of his subject, it was an indispensable condition of writing that he should have a free hand in point of chronology, without being too rigidly bound by his own profession in the preface to his Gospel, that he would *write in order* (Luke i. 3). To that profession I hold that he was quite true.

<sup>1</sup> See *St. Luke the Prophet*, chapter v.

However, in the case of Acts x., xi., apart from its order, the main argument likely to be advanced is that the "conversion" of St. Peter is a misnomer, because he was converted already, and that since we find traces of his previous "conversion," that is his conviction of the universality of the gospel of Jesus, it is vain to find room for his conversion at such a late time as that which Acts x. and xi. indicate. This contention sounds rather plausible, and may seem to suit two opposite classes of interpreters—the conservative, who resent the idea of St. Peter being converted or needing conversion so late in life, much later than the time when he had accepted Christ; and the critical, who are not sure that the author of Acts quite knows his own subject and has mastered his own authorities.

Let us ask, then, what is meant when earlier in Acts (iv. 11) we find Peter asserting, "This is the stone that was set at nought *of you* the builders . . . there is no other name under heaven given *among men* whereby we must be saved." Here he speaks to the Jewish authorities as "you" and contrasts their view with the universal human need, which he asserts. He has broken with the authorities who rejected Jesus as the Christ. He is persuaded that the name of Jesus is given among *men*, not among the Jews only, and salvation is open to others besides Jews. And in ii. 39 he had said, "To you is the promise, and to your children, *and to all them that are afar off, whomsoever* the Lord our God shall call." And this latter saying in his speech at Pentecost could not be chronologically later than the vision at Joppa. Consequently it has been urged that the idea of the admission of the Gentiles to the Covenant of God in Christ was in Peter's mind before his vision, and so the vision was not of cardinal importance.

Now it may be admitted that this conviction was in his mind, and that the Scripture of the old Testament was on his lips to quote, and yet it would not of necessity follow

that he had the resolution of heart and will to apply the full grace of God in practice. The gulf between theory and practice may have required a vision to bridge it. It is one thing to know what holy Scripture has taught concerning the grace of God in Christ, and quite another thing to let it work, especially when the work is all uphill.

But this is not a sufficient explanation, for it does not touch the real practical difficulty, which was of the gravest kind, concerning circumcision. It would be an error to suppose that Peter's speeches in Acts i.-iv. imply that his mind was then open to our modern conceptions of the Christian Church. He had always maintained the ancient requirement of circumcision for every Jew, and there is nothing to show that he ceased to maintain it for every man who confessed Jesus to be the Christ. Of the 3,000 souls at Jerusalem who were baptized after accepting his word (ii. 41), every male had been circumcised and owned the Temple as his place of worship. His hearers were all Jewish, for though in the first portion of his speech (ii. 14) he had included in his address *all dwellers in Jerusalem*, he quickly narrows his audience to *men of Israel* (so iii. 12, 22), and finally to the inner circle of *brethren* (29). God is "the God of *our fathers*" (iii. 13). "*In Abraham's seed* shall all the families of the earth be blessed" — Abraham, to whom God gave the Covenant of circumcision, is represented by his "seed" Jesus (in name identical with Joshua, who circumcised the people), the *prophet* of whom Moses said that "every soul that does not hear him shall be destroyed from the people" (23). Baptism was up to this point of history well known: it was grafted upon circumcision; it coexisted with it; and no man could see that it was ever destined to supersede it. We must be careful not to read into the mouth of the Peter of Acts i.-iv. what we know of his acts and sayings after Acts x. And that is just what in our modern way of thinking we find it difficult

not to do. The law was still the same for all, "Except ye be circumcised after the custom of Moses, ye cannot be saved" (xv. 1). It seems clear, then, that the state of Peter's mind before the vision at Joppa was, by the nature of the case, one of embarrassment in regard to the necessity of circumcision in the near future.

But in the days that preceded and followed the first Christian Pentecost "visions of glory crowded on the soul"—visions associated with the fulfilment of prophecy. One lesson that the risen Lord Himself impressed on the disciples was to enlarge their understanding of prophecy. "Then *opened he their minds* to understand the Scriptures (Luke xxiv. 45), and He did this by means of the spirit of prophecy which He quickened in them. The Argument from Prophecy, as it has been sometimes called, is the one and only argument on which the Church made headway at the first. The Argument from Prophecy put one and one together (*συνβιβάζοντες*, Acts xvi. 10), and said, Jesus is the Christ because Moses prophesied of Him as his successor; Jesus is the Christ because the Christ was to be rejected by the builders of the Jewish state, and Jesus has been rejected by them; Jesus is the Christ because Christ was David's son, who could not die, and Jesus fulfils that prophecy: Jesus is the Christ because Christ's time should be marked by particular signs and wonders, and Jesus fulfils those prophecies too. Then, further, the tower of Babel had been a type of confusion of tongues, and it had been followed now by its antitype in the "building of the Palace of the Great King," the Church, with its unification of the language of praise.<sup>1</sup> Then, too, the first Adam had his antitype in the second Adam (1 Cor. xv. 45). The first creation had its antitype in the new creation (Gal. vi. 15). The garden of Eden had its antitype in the Paradise of God,

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller explanation of the Pentecost narrative may I refer the reader to *St. Luke the Prophet*, chapter viii. ?

with its tree of life, whose leaves should heal the Gentiles (Rev. xxii. 2). And the deluge had its antitype in Christian baptism (1 Pet. iii. 21).

*Antitype* is a term that occurs but twice in the New Testament,—once in 1 Peter iii. 21. It means that of two corresponding events or names, the later one, denoting the “fulfilment,” connotes what is substantially blessed and true; and more, that it restores things back to the original state and recovers the forfeit. Baptism is a *restitution* of the injury done by the Deluge. The Paradise of God *restores* the blessing lost in the first Eden. The new creation in Christ restores the obedience lost by the first Adam. Thus *antitype* is the precise equivalent of what is to us a somewhat incomprehensible term, “restitution”—“the restitution of all things, of which God spake by his holy prophets” (Acts iii. 21). Now if we take 1 Peter iii. 21 along with Peter’s speeches (Acts i.-iv.), we find that the two together throw some of the desired light upon Acts x.

The problem in his mind was concerning Baptism, “which doth now save us.” Was it henceforward to supersede circumcision? To supersede it in a day, absolutely? It is hardly possible for us to realize the immensity of such a revolution of Jewish thought as this, such a breach with the historic past. The fact is we do not attempt to realize what the idea involved. Abraham, Moses, Joshua (Jesus), were identified with God’s ancient covenant, of which circumcision was the proof and token. Let that be removed, and what remained? Did the Argument from Prophecy remain? It had led them to Jesus, but Jesus (Joshua) was seen to be one of the pillars of circumcision when he “rolled away the reproach of Egypt” at Gilgal (Josh. v.). The Argument here would seem to turn back upon itself and be consumed. Then what value remained in the Bible as a record of God’s chosen people? Stephen had paid with his life the price of saying



that "Jesus of Nazareth would change the customs that Moses delivered to us," and it seems most probable that his pointed and powerful speech was cut short by tumult before he could deal at length with Jesus as Moses' successor (vii. 45) in that impatient audience. Did not Stephen's example show that Jewish orthodoxy was as fully determined to champion the custom of Moses as any Jewish reason could be to listen to the Argument from Prophecy? Was there the least hope that the upholders of baptism in place of circumcision would be allowed access to the synagogues? But failing this, was there any prospect of their being able to move the Jews to the Gospel of Jesus? and was there any means whatever within their reach for touching the Gentiles except through the Jews?

All this is mere human reasoning, it is very much *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, but it might represent something of what was passing in St. Peter's mind. "His not to reason why, His but to do or die"; so it may truly be said; but reasoning after the event is allowed to the historian, even when reason before it and in it would have been treason in the actor. Marvellous to relate, the revolution of thought did take place by the power and the everlasting purpose of God: the Argument from Prophecy still took effect: circumcision was superseded: and the vision at Joppa was the turning-point in the life of one of the two chief agents.

The solution of the problem lay in the consideration and combination of texts of Holy Writ preparatory to the vision. In other words the vision, like all other visions of the New Testament, was based upon suggestions that came direct from the Old. There are two passages which St. Peter revolved in his mind in order to draw the guidance of revelation from them: the second portion of Isaiah, and the account of Noah's deluge. The impress of the former is strongly shown in both his speeches and his epistle: the

latter has left its mark upon 1 Peter ii., iii., and the vision.

In 1 Peter ii., iii., the underlying thought of Isaiah liii. is obvious and familiar :

1 PETER.	ISAIAH liii. (LXX.).
ii. 21. Christ <i>suffered for</i> (ὑπέρ) you.	4. (my servant) is <i>put to pain for</i> (περί) us.
iii. 18. Christ <i>suffered</i> (or <i>died</i> ) for (περί) sins once for all.	5. He was <i>wounded for</i> (διὰ) our sins.
ii. 22. Who <i>did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth.</i>	8. He was <i>led to death.</i>
ii. 24. Who <i>himself bare our sins</i> , that we having <i>died to sins might live unto righteousness: by whose stripes ye were healed.</i>	9. <i>Transgression he did not, nor guile in his mouth.</i>
ii. 25. Ye were like <i>sheep going astray</i> , but are now <i>returned to the shepherd and bishop of your souls.</i>	12. <i>Himself bare the sins of many.</i>
	10. If ye give (?) for <i>sins</i> , our soul shall see a <i>long-lived seed.</i>
	5. <i>By his stripes we were healed.</i>
	6. We all as <i>sheep went astray.</i>
	lv. 7. <i>Return unto the Lord.</i>
	lx. 17. I will make thy <i>bishops to be in righteousness.</i>

From these suggestions in the context of Isaiah liii. adopted in 1 Peter we turn to Peter's speech at Cornelius' house, and we find the same train of thought based on the same part of Isaiah.

ACTS x.	ISAIAH.
36. <i>preaching the gospel of peace through Jesus Christ.</i>	lii. 7. Of him that <i>preacheth the gospel of the report of peace.</i>

## ACTS X.

## ISAIAH.

38. God *anointed him with the Holy Spirit* and power. Who went about doing good and *healing* . . .
39. and we are *witnesses* of all that he did.
42. He commanded us to *proclaim* . . . to bear *witness* that *this is he*.
43. To him bear all the prophets *witness*, that every one that *believeth* on him shall *receive forgiveness of sins*.
- lxi. 1. *The Spirit of the Lord* is upon me, because he *anointed me* to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me *to heal* . . .
- xlili. 10. Become ye my *witnesses* . . . that ye may *believe* and understand that *I am*.
- xlili. 9, 11, 12. Who will *declare* these things? *I am God* . . . and there is *none that saveth beside me* . . . Ye are my *witnesses*.
- lv. 7. Let him *turn unto the Lord*, and he shall *receive mercy*, for he will greatly *forgive your sins*.

But the context in Isaiah (liv. 8) contains a reference to Noah which would not be overlooked by St. Peter: "In a little wrath I turned my face away from thee, but in eternal mercy will I have mercy on thee, saith the Lord who rescued thee. *From the water of the days of Noah* I have this, as I swear unto him at that time, that I would not be angry with the earth any more for thee . . . nor shall the covenant of my peace be removed." Mercy—salvation—water of Noah—baptism: that is the sequence of ideas. And accordingly we find in 1 Peter iii. 20 the reference to "the ark into which few, that is eight, souls (entered and) were carried safely through (destruction) by means of water: which (in your case as) an antitype now saves you—baptism . . ." In this sentence, reading the nominative *ō* we get a far stronger

meaning than by the dative  $\phi$ , and though the grammar is somewhat loose, the looseness seems to be chiefly due to the peculiarity of the thought, which regards *water* first as the destroying type and next as the restoring antitype. If, then, the water of the flood is essentially the same water as that of Baptism, only regarded antitypically, we may expect to be told what "fulfilment" can be found for the Ark. In 1 Peter iii. there seems to be none, for it would be a strangely forced interpretation to say that the fulfilment was "the good conscience," in the abstract. But now if we turn to the very brief account of the vision at Joppa, we shall see that the "vessel as it were a great *sheet* ( $\delta\theta\acute{o}\nu\eta$ —could not this term for a linen cerecloth (see above) remind Peter of the empty tomb, as though 'we were *buried with him by baptism into death* Rom. vi. 4, Col. ii. 12, and raised through faith in God who raised him from the dead'?) let down by *four corners* upon the earth, in which were found all *the four-footed things and creeping things of the earth and fowls of heaven*," is in fact the fulfilment of the Ark.

There is also perhaps a reminiscence of Genesis ii. 10, "And a river proceedeth forth out of Eden to water Paradise: thence it divideth into *four corners*" ( $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\alpha\rho\alpha\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ ). For the previous words to these deal with the tree of knowledge of good and evil ( $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\ \gamma\iota\omega\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\acute{o}\upsilon$ —a singular expression for "knowing intuitively what can be known experimentally of good and evil"), which, as it happens, offers some slight resemblance to the expression in 1 Peter iii., the interrogation of a good conscience towards God ( $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\eta}\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ ).

The Ark was a black vessel, (Gen. vi. 14), the sheet was white, the Ark contained representatives of *all animal life*, described in Genesis a dozen times over in nearly the same terms as the contents of the sheet. The Ark was a *vessel* ( $\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$ ) not precisely as we speak of a seagoing vessel, but

as anything fashioned or *prepared* (κατασκευαζομένης, 1 Peter iii. 20) is a vessel. St. Paul, after his conversion, is a "vessel of election" for God's purpose (Acts ix. 15). Noah no sooner left the Ark than he built an altar of *sacrifice* (θυσιαστήριον): so was Peter commanded to arise and *eat after sacrifice* (θῦσον καὶ φάγε). The four corners of the sheet betoken the four quarters, the furthest ends of the earth; but in the same context of Isaiah (lii. 10) we read, "*all corners of the earth* (πάντα ἄκρα τῆς γῆς) shall see the salvation that cometh from our God." And (liv. 2), "broaden the place of thy tabernacle and of thy *curtains* . . . spare not, lengthen thy cords." And his reply, "Never did I eat *anything common and unclean*," is based upon the verse (lii. 11), "Stand off, stand off, come forth thence, and *touch not the unclean* (ἀκαθάρτου), come forth from the midst of her, be ye *separate*, ye that *bear the vessels of the Lord* (ἀφορίσθητε οἱ φέροντες τὰ σκεύη κυρίου)," where St. Peter would probably interpret "vessels" as "bodies sanctified to the Lord": see Barnabas Ep. 21. There is a bitter reminder of this in St. Paul's own later language (Gal. ii. 12) concerning Peter's conduct at Antioch, "*he separated, fearing them of the circumcision*. The text from Isaiah lii. 11 is exactly that which Peter would probably have pleaded in his own excuse. The sheet descended *thrice*, and this cannot fail to recall the sending of the dove from the Ark *thrice*.

Here it may be mentioned that the association of the dove with the baptism of Jesus rests entirely on the "fulfilment" of the water of the deluge in that of baptism as the antitype.<sup>1</sup> *The dove is Noah's dove*. It has no direct relation to the Holy Spirit, but only to baptism, as the antitype of the deluge. There is perhaps no passage in which the commentators have to this day laboured so heavily at sea, as

<sup>1</sup> For the import of the words "*as it were a dove*," see *St. Luke the Prophet*, p. 301.

this of the appearance of the dove in the Baptism. They have failed to put the dove in her proper relation to the Holy Spirit because they have not observed her relation to Noah's Ark; and that is because they have not observed the relation of baptism to the deluge, as understood by the Christian Prophets,—a relation that St. Luke and St. Peter did not labour because, being themselves identified with the prophet's point of view,<sup>1</sup> they took it for granted as known to their contemporary readers. At least St. Luke was concerned to supply the needs of Theophilus.<sup>2</sup> We have no right to exact of him the satisfaction of all the needs of the twentieth century.

One modern commentator, speaking of the Spirit employing form, says: "The tongues were appropriate when the Spirit was given by measure to many. The dove was appropriate when the Spirit was given in His fulness to one." This observation had been previously made by the Neuchatel commentator, the late F. Godet, who says: "The *fertilising and preserving incubation* of the dove is an *admirable* type of the life-giving energy whereby the Holy Spirit develops in the human soul the germs of a new life." Comment on such a comment is needless.<sup>3</sup>

The time will come at length when commentators will see that *appropriateness* is non-existent when things are not related to each other. It rests upon the *ipse dixit* of the commentator. Meanwhile we hardly need to be content

<sup>1</sup> This point of view was almost entirely lost by the time of Tertullian, who does, however, retain a sense of the ancient type (*praecedentis figurae*) of the water of the deluge (de Bapt. 8).

<sup>2</sup> Zahn, *Einkl.*, ii. § 60.

<sup>3</sup> Not less unfortunate is the reference made by some commentators to Philo (Quis rer. div. hae. 25, 48), who carefully distinguishes the allegorical meanings of the *περιστέρα*, "the tame and gregarious pigeon," and the *τρογών*, "the solitary turtledove." The Gospels and Gen. ix. all speak of the pigeon, which to Philo symbolises human wisdom, while the turtledove is divine, "the word (or reason) of God."

with the explanation that a sheet was appropriate to the vision at Joppa.

Moreover, that the appearance of the dove at the Baptism of Jesus is the appearance in a trance is evident from the introductory words, "the heaven was opened," preceding the visible portion and the audible portion of the revelation : and here the resemblance to Acts x. is of the closest kind. St. Luke knew very well what he was describing. The *praying—heaven opened—a voice—an object descending*—nothing can possibly be gained by obscuring these common features of the two narratives, one of which, the Petrine, is definitely called a trance. Nor would any apology or defence be needed on behalf of that which is seen and heard in a trance, as it would be if "the Spirit employed form." We may compare the frequent alternation of "I saw" and "I heard" as the expressions descriptive of the state of trance in Revelation vi. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12—to mention only one chapter of that book.

Lastly, to return to Acts, it is observable that not only is the vision at Joppa the prelude to the (Acts x. 48) baptism at Caesarea in the name of Jesus Christ, but the language of God's blessing to Noah and his sons, "*Grow and multiply*" is exactly reproduced in "The word of God *grew and multiplied* (Acts xii. 24), following on the slightly different formula, "The word of God *grew and* the number of the disciples *multiplied* in Jerusalem greatly" (vi. 7.) The connexion with baptism is implied in each case, as it is in ii. 41, 38. Once more the sequel of baptism is the "fulfilment" of the sequel of the Deluge.

E. C. SELWYN.

*GRACE AND FREE-WILL : THE TEACHING OF THE  
GOSPEL AND OF THE RABBIS CONTRASTED.*

BEFORE it is possible to contrast the character of our Lord's teaching on Grace and Free-will with that of contemporary Rabbinic teaching on the subject, it will be necessary to give in outline what this latter was.

I.

Indissolubly connected with the Rabbinical doctrine of Grace and Free-will is that of Works, the two cannot be separated, that will be obvious ; therefore some reference to the doctrine of Works is unavoidable. It is only in a few isolated passages that divine grace is referred to in Rabbinical writings ; for example, in *Yoma 39a* we read : " If you do not commit a sin three times (i.e. if you resist the temptation to commit a sin on three occasions), God will keep you from committing it for ever " ; in the same tractate, *38b*, it is said : " For him who would pollute himself the doors are open ; he who would purify himself is helped " ; and again : " Our Father and King, bring us back in perfect repentance unto Thy presence " (*Ibid. 39a*). But passages like these are quite exceptional. The existence of divine grace is not denied, but neither is it regarded as indispensable for the fulfilment of works. The Rabbis were always strong believers in man's free-will ; it is, with them, wholly a matter of man's free choice whether he does good or evil ; he can be good if he chooses, and no one but his contrite heart is his advocate before God if he does evil. In *Yoma 38b* we read, for example, " If a man has the chance to sin once or twice, and he resists, he will not sin again " ; the power of that resistance is not by means of divine grace, but by means of man's



own strength and free-will. Or again, in *Shemoth rabba* xxv. 12, it is said: "The period of the redemption depends solely upon repentance and good works"; but here again neither repentance nor good works necessitate the action of divine, prevenient grace. Man's free-will, therefore, is the prime essential; divine grace does not, *per se*, lead men to do what is right; repentance is brought about by man's free-will, and by that alone. God accepts repentance in man, but He has had nothing to do with its appearance in the heart of man; it was what is called the *Yetser ha-tob*, the "Good Tendency" or "Bias towards good" (one of the constituent parts of man's nature), that called forth repentance. That this was the contemporary Rabbinical teaching in New Testament times may be seen at once by recalling such a passage, for example, as Romans ii. 4: *Despisest thou the riches of His goodness and forbearance and longsuffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?* It is clear that St. Paul is here combatting the prevalent teaching among the Jews; that he has these latter especially in view is proved by verse 17. What has been said receives both emphasis and illustration from the Rabbinical doctrine of *Zecuth*. This word means, in the first instance, "purity" or "cleanness"; in the Targums the verb means "to be righteous," and also "to be justified";<sup>1</sup> in the present connexion its root ideas may perhaps be best expressed by the two words, "satisfaction" and "claim"; that is to say, the man who has kept all the commandments of God has *Zecuth*, i.e. he is in that state of righteousness which is attained by having *satisfied* all the divine demands made upon him, and therefore he is in a position to *claim* his reward from God; he is a "righteous" man, and therefore "justified" in the sight of God. But he has become so in the

<sup>1</sup> See Levy, *Chaldäisches Wörterbuch*, s.v.

strength of his own free-will ; if the divine grace has played any part in bringing about this state, so much the better, but it was not an indispensable need. " There is, according to Jewish teaching, a kind of ' account current ' kept by the Almighty respecting every Israelite ; the credit and debit columns in this divine account-book are balanced up every day (Cf. *Kethuboth* 67*b*). Every good action is written down to a man's credit in this species of banking account, and every evil deed is put down on the debit side ; according as to whether the balance is on the credit or debit side of the account, a man is justified, or the reverse, before God ; and therefore, as it is said in *Kiddushin* 40*b*, a man is judged ' according to that which balances,' i.e. according to which side of the account is greater. . . . But all that a man does to swell the credit side of his account is due to his own initiative ; as already pointed out, it is not the grace of God that leads men to do good works, but their own free-will ; man takes the initiative, and by his good works justifies himself in the sight of God. The following passages will further illustrate this. ' When Mar Ukba lay a-dying, he asked for his account ; it amounted to 7,000 Zuzim,<sup>1</sup> i.e., this was the sum total of his almsgiving. Then he cried out, " The way is far, and the provision is small (i.e. he did not think this sum was sufficient to ensure his justification in the sight of God) ; so he gave away the half of his fortune, in order to make himself quite secure (*Kethuboth* 67*b*). Again, concerning a righteous man who died in the odour of sanctity, it is said, in *Tanchuma*, *Wayyekhel*, i., ' How much alms did he give, how much did he study the *Torah*, how many *Mitzvoth* (" commandments ") did he fulfil ! He will rest among the righteous.' Significant, too, is what is said in *Baba*

<sup>1</sup> A Zuz was the silver denarius (called *dinar* in the *Mishna*) and was equal to 9½*d.* of our money.

*Bathra* 10a, namely, that God placed the poor on earth in order to save rich men from Hell.”<sup>1</sup>

## II.

This represents, in outline, the essence of the Rabbinical doctrine on the subject under consideration. Let us now consider Matthew xxv. 1-30, containing the parables of the Ten Virgins, and of the Talents.

The former of these gives purely Jewish teaching, and has nothing specifically Christian about it as far as Grace and Free-will are concerned; this will come out clearly when we contrast it with the teaching on this subject contained in the parable of the Talents.

In the parable of the Ten Virgins the *final* attainment of the Kingdom (parabolically spoken of as the entering-in to the marriage-feast) is represented as due only to the will-power of men (i.e. parabolically spoken of as the Virgins). The invitation to the feast once given, all else is left to individual effort; those who exercised their will aright, namely the five wise virgins, are able, owing to their foresight, to enter in to the marriage feast; the five foolish virgins, who, through sloth or through a non-realization of their responsibility, did not exercise their will aright, are excluded. In each case it is a question of Free-will, and there is not the slightest indication in the parable of the existence of anything corresponding to divine help or guidance. Regarded from this point of view it will be instructive to quote a parable from the Midrashic literature in which Free-will, again, is seen to be the dominating factor, and in which there is not the slightest indication of anything corresponding to Grace; the parable is directly connected with “the life to come,” which is mentioned

<sup>1</sup> Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* p. 247 ff.

in the context. Rabbi Jehudah ha-Nasi<sup>1</sup> tells it, saying :<sup>2</sup> " There was a certain King who made a feast and invited travellers and strangers to it. He sent them word : ' Wash ye, make you clean, and anoint yourselves, and wash your clothes and prepare yourselves for the King's feast.' But he appointed no time (for the feast). Then they that were wise among them prepared themselves, and sat down at the entrance of the King's house ; for they said : ' In the King's palace there is no lack of aught, nor (shall we see) signs of preparation, for the feast is always ready.' But they that were foolish among them prepared not themselves, for they said : ' No feast can be made ready without much ado, and the gathering of that which is required in food and provisions ; we need not therefore prepare ourselves until we see the feast being made ready.' And they went and joined their friends, and were concerned with nought but the things of every day, forgetting all about the King and his invitation. . . . Suddenly the King's command came forth : ' Let all come to the feast ! ' And the King's servants made haste and compelled all to enter in as the King had commanded. Then they which had prepared themselves came in fine and fit apparel ; and they which had not prepared themselves came in unwashed and dirty. And the King rejoiced because they that were wise had fulfilled his command and done honour to the royal palace : but he was wroth with those that had spurned his command and polluted the royal palace with filthy garments. Then the King said : ' They that did prepare themselves for my coming, and were ready when I called, shall come and shall sit down at the King's table ; but they that did not prepare themselves shall in

<sup>1</sup> Grandson of Gamaliel, he died in 135 A.D. ; see Strack, *Einleitung in den Talmud*, p. 97 (4th ed.).

<sup>2</sup> The parable is not a literal translation, but is rather an adaptation of the original.

no wise partake of my feast.' And they which had not prepared themselves were about to go away ; but the King said : ' Nay, but those (that did prepare themselves) shall sit down at my feast, and eat and drink ; but these (that did not prepare themselves) shall stand upon their feet and look on, ashamed and in anguish.' Thus (shall it be) in the life to come, as saith Isaiah : '*Behold my servants shall eat, but ye shall be hungry,*' " lxv. 13 (*Wajjikra Rabbah* xxiii.).<sup>1</sup>

It will have been noticed that this parable, like that of the Ten Virgins, contains nothing corresponding to Grace ; in each, Free-will is the one element of importance ; and, so far as this is concerned, there is identity of teaching between Christ and the Rabbis. The real contrast between His teaching and that of the Rabbis comes out in a number of points in the parable which immediately follows, namely that of the Talents. The main importance of this parable, in the present connexion, lies in the fact that it teaches the need of Divine Grace, as well as of Free-will. The keynote is struck at the outset, where it is said that the lord delivered his goods to his servants ; such a proceeding is unheard of in worldly relationships ; no man in his senses would deliver over his possessions to his dependants in this way ; but the absurdity of the idea, from the human point of view, is just what our Lord wished to emphasize ; and this is enhanced by the fact that it is to bondservants (*δουλοί*), " slaves," to whom the talents are given, and also by the further fact that the sums given are immense. Of course, generally speaking, the details in the parables must not be unduly pressed, but in the present case the point of the parable turns upon these details ; one must consider the conditions of the times, and the effect upon the

<sup>1</sup> This is a Midrash on *Leviticus*, belonging to the seventh century A.D. but containing much early traditional matter.

first hearers of the parable ; bondservants had no right to expect, nor did they expect, to make free with their masters' goods ; and the sums mentioned, in view of the value of money in those days, are very great. Evidently, our Lord's intention was to impress upon His hearers that, in the parable, what was offered was of immense value, and that it was unattainable for them if they relied upon themselves for it ; it could only come from one who was in all respects their superior, and from one who was benevolent in the extreme, for nothing that the bondservants might have done could have given them the right to claim such a reward as this ; and therefore what their master did was of grace. The contrast between the virgins who took their own lamps and procured their oil themselves and whose ultimate success depended *solely* upon their own individual action—the contrast between these and the bondservants who possessed nothing and were able to do nothing until the bounty of their lord enabled them to make a start, is sufficiently obvious. But then, further, it is interesting to see the attitude of these bondservants when their lord comes and makes the reckoning with them : “ he that received the five talents came and brought other five talents ” ; in thus bringing back the whole, this servant takes no honour to himself, nor does he regard any part of it as belonging to him—a striking illustration of our Lord's words (also spoken in reference to the subject of Grace and Free-will) : “ When ye shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants (*δουλοί*) ; we have done that which it was our duty to do ” (Luke xvii. 10). It is the same thing with the second ; in proportion to what he has received he brings forth ; but he has only done his duty, owing to the help he has had, and thus, realizing his indebtedness, he makes no claim for reward ; he *is* rewarded, like the

other, and the reward is equal in proportion, nevertheless it is not given on account of deserts, but of grace.

But how about the servant who hid his talent? Of him it is said: "Thou wicked and slothful servant . . . cast ye out the unprofitable servant into the outer darkness"; the essence of this wickedness would be described in theological language as the spurning of "prevenient Grace" and the consequent non-exercise of Free-will in the right direction.

One last point; it is our Lord's comment on the parable in the words, "For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away." These words have often been misused; in the light of the parable in reference to which they were spoken, one may paraphrase them thus: Every one who has received grace, and uses it, shall have abundance of it through the exercise of his free-will; but he who does not use the grace that has been given him, from him shall be taken away that grace which, if taken advantage of, would have enabled him to use his free-will aright.

### III.

One can understand the objection that may be raised that some points here have been unduly pressed for the purpose of a particular interpretation, so that something further must be urged in order to try and substantiate what has been said.

In view of the teaching of Judaism on the subject of Free-will, Works and Justification, we are justified in seeking, and in finding, *very frequently*, teaching about Divine Grace in the words of our Lord. This whole subject was one which formed, and still forms, one of the fundamental differences between Judaism and Christianity; its very practical nature

made it the more vital. It is impossible to exaggerate the inadequacy of Judaism in this, from the Christian point of view ; for while Judaism taught that salvation could be attained through the accumulation of works wrought by man's free-will, our Lord said : " Without Me ye can do nothing." Once realize the central part played by Grace in the divine economy as taught by Christ, and we shall expect to see it contained implicitly or explicitly in many of His sayings.

One of these may be briefly referred to, as it is another and very striking example of the subject we have been dealing with ; it is the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard, a parable called forth by St. Peter's words : " What then shall we have ? " The sequence of events which led up to the utterance of this parable is, very briefly, as follows : A certain man comes to our Lord, and asks what he must do to attain eternal life ; in reply, he is told to keep the commandments ; the sequel almost compels us to regard this reply as ironical ; however, the man says he has kept them all, and adds : " What lack I yet ? " Our Lord answers that he is to sell all that he has, and give to the poor ; but when the young man heard this he went away sorrowful, for he had great possessions. That is, as it were, the first scene ; it forms the *raison d'être* of the words that follow, in which Christ emphasizes how difficult it is for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven : " It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God." These words are meant, in a realistic way, to express the idea of impossibility ; it is the beginning of the lesson which the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard is intended to teach, for in reply to the question, " Who then can be saved ? " our Lord says : " With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible," words which, if they mean anything at all, mean the indispensable



need of divine grace. There follow then the words of St. Peter, and it was these words which were the *immediate cause* of the parable : “ Lo, we have left all, and followed thee ; what then shall we have ? ” In reply, Christ tells of the reward which shall belong to all who have given up anything for His sake ; but what is of paramount importance is to notice that *included in this reply* are the words : “ But many shall be last that are first, and first that are last ; for the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, . . . ” and the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard follows. The whole parable, that is to say, is included in the reply to St. Peter’s question : “ What then shall we have ? ” For the Apostle’s words imply that he had a right to expect a reward for the good deeds which he had done. This was of the very essence of Judaism ; it was one of those things, which, as we have already seen, constituted an element of fundamental antagonism between the Covenant of the Law and the Covenant of Grace.

It is impossible to go into the details of the parable here, but the salient points in it are as follows :—

The householder is represented as one in an independent position from the point of view of the labourers. This fact is obvious when one considers the conditions of the time, when the respective positions of rich and poor were so entirely different from that of modern times. Nowadays, moreover, although there is a very distinct dependence on the part of the workman upon his employer, it is nevertheless of an utterly different character from the relationship that existed between the two in Judæa at the commencement of the Christian era. Extremely obvious as this is, it nevertheless needs emphasis in order that one may insist upon the fact that the householder as represented in this parable is independent of the individual labourer. This is further implied in the words which speak of other labourers stand-

ing idle in the market-place, as well as the householder's rebuke : " Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own ? " Since, therefore, the householder is wholly independent of the individual labourers, the *advantage* of their being employed lies with them ; each individual labourer must consider himself fortunate in being employed, and thus placed in a position in which he is enabled to win a livelihood. That is to say, the householder is conferring a boon on the individual labourer by employing him, it is an act of grace on the part of the former. Further, we read of the householder going out to seek other labourers at the third, sixth, ninth and eleventh hours ; this fact shows that, for the purposes of the teaching of the parable, the supply of labour is represented as more than equal to the demand ; and this, therefore, further emphasizes the independence of the householder as regards the individual labourers. Another point of importance is the unusual proceeding of giving the same payment to all the labourers, whether they had worked all day or only for an hour. The murmuring of those who had worked all day is quite comprehensible, for under the ordinary circumstances they might well feel justified in expecting that each man should receive payment according to the amount of work done. It is, of course, urged in reply to this that each labourer made his special arrangements with the householder, and that therefore the payment which others received was no concern of his ; but it must be allowed that in the ordinary conditions of life it is manifestly unfair for a man who has worked all day to receive no better payment than he who has worked for an hour only. But, of course, the whole purpose of this parable is to place before men conditions which are not those of the world's every-day life. To explain the parable by saying that it teaches that the quality of work done is of more value than the quantity is beside the mark, for there

is nothing to show that the work of those labourers who had laboured all day was in any sense inferior in quality to that of those who had only worked an hour ; indeed, this explanation is directly excluded by the householder's answer to the murmurers. The key to the whole is our Lord's own comment on His parable : " So the last shall be first, and the first last." <sup>1</sup> The murmuring of the labourers was justified from their (unenlightened) point of view ; but they are represented as forgetting, or not considering, the antecedent fact that their being employed at all and being thus placed in the advantageous position of being able to earn a livelihood, was due to an act of grace on the part of the householder. It would have been easier, no doubt, for those labourers who had only worked one hour to realize this ; but one and all, the last as well as the first, were partakers of that which was a real advantage to all, namely, the privilege of working for the householder ; in this respect an act of grace was shown to all alike. Whatever was done *in* that service was of quite subordinate importance as compared with the *fact of being* in it ; and the capacity of serving the householder arose of course only by virtue of having been taken into his service, no matter *when* ; that is the point of the words : " The last shall be first, and the first last."

Now it happens that we have an extremely interesting parallel to this parable in the Midrashic literature, a parable which was spoken by a Rabbi Sera in his funeral oration over Rabbi Bun,<sup>2</sup> who lived at the beginning of the fifth century A.D. ; the parable, which occurs in the Midrash *Shir ha-Shirim* (*Song of Songs*) to vi. 2, is as follows : " There was a king who had a vineyard, and he hired labourers to care for it. Among these there was one who was far more able than the rest. When the king noticed this he took

<sup>1</sup> See the EXPOSITOR, April 1908, pp. 338 ff.

<sup>2</sup> A shortened form of Abun (= Abin).

him by the hand and strolled about with him all over the vineyard. When even was come the labourers came to receive their hire ; then also that very clever labourer came forward to receive his hire together with the others ; and the king gave to him the same hire as the others received. Whereupon the labourers murmured, and said, ‘ O lord our king, we have laboured the whole day, and is this man who has only laboured two or three hours to receive equal hire with us ? ’ ‘ Wherefore murmur ye ? ’ replied the king ; ‘ he has done more work in those two or three hours than ye have done during the whole day ! ’ ” The parable is told in order to illustrate the fact that Rabbi Bun fulfilled more *Mitzvoth* (“ Commandments ”) in the twenty-eight years of his life than many a grey-headed worker at the *Torah* (“ Law ”) in a hundred years.<sup>1</sup> The same parable occurs in *Bereshith Rabba*, lxii., and in *Midrash Koheleth*, on v. 12. The contrast between the Rabbinical and the Christian form of the parable—for it can scarcely be doubted that both go back to a common source—is highly instructive ; the whole point of the Rabbinical form is to emphasize the quality of works, which are accomplished by the exercise of man’s free-will ; while the whole point of the Christian form is to emphasize the inefficacy of Works apart from Grace.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Abodah Zara*, 17a : “ One man earns heaven in how many years and another in a single hour ” (quoted by Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, p. 184

## LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.\*

## XIX.

*παράπτωμα*.—TbP 5<sup>91</sup> (royal ordinance of 118 B.C.) ordains that the measures used by revenue officers shall be tested, and they must not exceed the government measure by more than the two [. . .] allowed for errors, τῶν εἰς τὰ παραπτώματα ἐπικεχωρημένῳ[ν . . .]—the edd. suggest two hundredths of a χοῖνιξ. A “slip” or “lapse,” rather than a wilful “sin,” is the connotation suggested, but, of course we do not propose to define the word from this one occurrence.

*παράσημος*.—The construction in Acts xxviii. 11 is made clear by BM II p. 99<sup>2</sup> (A.D. 15), ἧς παράσημος ἴβις: we must translate it “with the Dioscuri as figure-head,” π. being a noun. PP ii. 20, τὸν λέμβον ἐφ’ οὗ ἡ πόρτις gives us an alternative expression. LIP 22 and 23 (220 B.C.) concern two ships belonging to the queen (Wilcken *Archiv* v. 226) which has no figure-head (ἄχαρακτος).

*παρεδρεύω*.—In *Syll.* 521<sup>35</sup> (100 B.C.) the ephebi at Athens are commended because they παρήδρευσαν ταῖς ἐκκλησι[αῖς ἀπά]σαις ἐν ὄπλοις—they “attended” the meetings in arms, but were not allowed yet to speak or vote. The Latin *assistere* is a close equivalent. The newly discovered “historian” of the Trojan War, Dictys the Cretan, tells us (*Tebtunis Pap.* ii. p. 14<sup>22</sup>) that τῇ πυρᾷ παρήδρευσεν Αἴ[ας], “kept vigil by the pyre” of Patroclus.

*παρεῖσδύω*.—StrP 22<sup>30</sup> (iii/A.D.), οὐδεμίαν παρείσδυσιν ἔχεις, “you cannot creep in, for the woman has been in possession for a long time”: the sense is just that of Jude 4. Another compound of *παρὰ* + *εἰς* with the same connotation

\* For abbreviations see the February and March (1903) *EXPOSITIO*, pp. 170, 262.

is seen in *παρεισφέρω*, which the edd. render "smuggle" in TtP 38<sup>14</sup> (113 B.C.): see *Notes* ii.

*παρουσία*.—See *Thess.* on II. ii. 9. It is needless to add further citations to show how the word suggested a *royal visit*: the point is well worked out in Deissmann's *Licht vom Osten*, pp. 269–273. Professor Wilcken, in the new number of his *Archiv* (v. 284), notes a late papyrus which shows that Christians (of a sort) of vi/A.D. were conscious of the technical meaning of the word: P. Aphrod. Cairo no. 3 has a petition for the *παρουσία* of a *dux*, ἦν (sc. ἐξουσίαν, i.e. the *dux* himself) ἐκδέχομεν πρὸ πολλοῦ, οἷον οἱ ἐξ ἄδου καταδοκοῦντες τὴν ποτε(?) τοῦ Χ(ριστο)ῦ ἀνείου θ(εο)ῦ παρουσίαν!

*πενιχρός* may be chronicled as occurring in BU 1024 viii<sup>12</sup>, the law report of iii/iv A.D. recently mentioned: the old woman is described by the judge as *πενιχρά καὶ πρεσβύτης*, and further as one ἣτις διὰ τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὴν πενίαν τὴν ἑαυτῆς θυγατέραν τῆς σωφροσύνης ἀπεστέρησεν. The word was thus the adjective naturally linked with *πενία* in educated speech \* some two centuries later: it was not presumably an out-of-the-way expression when Luke used it (xxi. 2).

*περιέχω*.—For the intransitive use (as in I Pet. ii. 6) we may quote OP 249<sup>24</sup> (80 A.D.), ὡς περιέχει. In BM iii. 216<sup>13</sup> the Emperor Claudius says ἡδέως ἔλαβον σύμβολον περιέχοντα τῆς ὑμετέρας πρὸς με εὐσεβείας, which would illustrate the transitive use of Acts xxiii. 25 in the Syrian text; but the other can be more abundantly paralleled. Thus *Syll.* 929<sup>21</sup> (ii/B.C.), καθότι τὰ . . . γράμματα περιέχει, also <sup>51</sup> τοῦ δόγματος περιέχοντος, "running thus" (words follow): the latter might however be "including (the following words)," but we should in that case rather expect

\* For the illiterate *θυγατέραν* has its *ν* erased, and in any case may be assigned to the reporter.

τό to introduce the quotation. Other exx. of *ὡς περιέχει* may be cited. In *Syll.* 929<sup>75</sup> *περιεχόμενον* is pass. (c. dat.) = "surrounded": Luke v. 9 is near this, "fear encompassed him."

*περικεφαλαία*.—PP iii 140(a)<sup>3</sup> has the word in some accounts, *π. καὶ θήκης ν*, "60 dr. for a helmet and a sheath." It appears also in *Syll.* 522<sup>29, 30</sup> (iii/B.C.), where it is first prize in a javelin-throwing contest, together with three *λόγχοι*, and for the best *καταπαλαταφέτης* together with a *κόντος*.

*περιούσιος*.—The appearance of ]*περιουσι*[ between hiatus in P Herm 32 is tantalising, as there is no indication in this tiny fragment what the meaning may be. The verb *περιεῖναι*, "to survive," can be illustrated; and the noun *περιουσία* occurs in FP 20<sup>13</sup> (imperial rescript, iii/iv A.D.), *οὐ διὰ περιουσίαν πλούτου*, "not owing to a superfluity of wealth."

*περιποιέω*.—AP 34 (d)<sup>2</sup> (c. 157 B.C.), *πλεῖόν τι περιποιούμενοι τῷ βασιλεῖ*, *gaining* more for the king: the same constr. and meaning is seen with the active in OP 58<sup>9</sup> (iii/A.D.) and 279<sup>3</sup> (i/A.D.). In FP 111<sup>8</sup> (A.D. 95-6) *τῷ αἰτίωμα περιεπύησε* is rendered by the Edd. "shifted the blame," in accordance with what seems to be the natural meaning of the context. In support of this undoubtedly unusual meaning for *π.* Dr. Hunt thinks that *σοι* must be understood, and refers us to the somewhat similar passage in Isocr. *Areop.* where the common reading is *μεγάλην αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιποιούσιν* (*ποιούσιν* Blass, *περίάπτουσιν* Cobet), and to Polyb. v. 58 5, *αἰσχύνης ἣν περιποιεῖ νῦν τῇ βασιλείᾳ*. The noun *περιποίησης* appears in Rein P 52<sup>2</sup> (iii/iv A.D.), where the editor notes that it means "soit acquisition ou production, soit conservation": here he doubtfully selects "production." In TbP 317<sup>26</sup> (174-5 A.D.) *τὸ τῆς π. δίκαιον* is rendered "claim of *ownership*,"

which may be set by Ephesians i. 14, where the "ownership" is *bought back* after alienation.

περιτέμνω.—To Deissmann's pages (*BS* 151-3) may be added now the various information to be gathered from *TbP* 291ff.: see especially the introduction to no. 292, and references there. The whole series of documents relating to the priests of Socnebtunis shows circumcision to have been in Egypt the necessary ritual preparation for the office of priest. The conception of Israel as a nation of priests is well illustrated by this connotation of the rite in a neighbouring land: we can recognise moreover how "uncircumcised" means so clearly "unclean," when we see the rite specially reserved to a class whose business it was to be capable of entering the presence of the gods.

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.

GEORGE MILLIGAN.



*JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH IN ST. JAMES AND  
ST. PAUL.*

It is probably beyond us absolutely to reconcile what St. James and St. Paul say on justification. The harmonist has to aim at clearing away apparent verbal, superficial discrepancies that the divergence which ultimately comes to view may be the more instructive. But it will not be right simply to take St. Paul's statement as the standard, and square in St. James how we can. While St. Paul's is the longer, more formal, fully reasoned exposition, St. James is not one whose words may be estimated according to their quantity or their formal completeness of argument or statement.

The point is well worn by controversy, but that at least witnesses to its importance, and the more one knows of the popular Christianity of England the greater does this seem here and now.

I should put it, then, that St. James as much as St. Paul accepts the doctrine of justification by faith. They differ in that St. Paul recognizes but one sort of faith exhibited in various ways but radically one; St. James, two things which may be called faith, a dead faith and by implication a living faith, whose vitality has to be tested, attaching justifying force exclusively to living faith. Assuming we are to harmonize, we must either say St. Paul would disown the dead faith of St. James from being faith at all, or make them mean different things by justifying.

“What doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith, but have not works? can that (R.V.) faith

save him ? ” This abrupt beginning has, no doubt, some reference to the faith of *v. 1*. But obviously there is a major premiss understood, which the man introduced assumes and expects his hearers to grant, i.e. Faith saves men. Does St. James grant it? His argument shows that he does, provided it is not carelessly interpreted. Or we may say he distinguishes, but introduces the distinction gradually. For he himself answers for the man not having works, but puts into the man’s mouth the claim to faith, not committing himself at first to affirm or deny that he has faith, but after an illustration from ineffectual sympathy concludes that what the man has is dead faith, faith dead in itself. It is not that faith without works is insufficient, that it needs the co-operation of something else for joint efforts to effect salvation. It is not a barren parent to have as adopted children the works of the law or of morality. It is dead in itself quite apart from the question of works, though it is the absence of works that betrays this. Practically, his view is, a living faith does save a man, a dead faith cannot.

In *v. 18*: “ Show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works.” It is plain he is speaking of a faith and of works vitally connected; and of that office of works which is to bear witness to the existence of faith.

In *v. 19*: In place of living faith and its fruit works we have the intellectual belief of demons and their shudder or horror. St. James does not say *φοβούνται*. Fear is indeed in itself a neutral word; but when the object is God it so uniformly stands for willing submission to awe of God’s majesty, that St. James avoids the word. Such a fear would be work. The outcome of the will is work, and there is no work where there is no will. But the horror, the thrill of the skin from external irritation of the nerves, is wholly

passive, even where it is a gracious symptom. The faith of the demons is a dead faith devoid of work though not devoid of result.

*vv. 21-24*: The case of Abraham. The intimate and inseparable connexion of faith and works is shown by St. James actually alleging Abraham's justification by works as a fulfilment of the Scripture which said he was justified by faith. Working is here little more to him than faith in energy.

So in *v. 24*. "A man is justified by works and not only by faith." He does not say partly by works. So far as they are mentioned at all, it is wholly by works. And yet it is not *and not by faith*, but *and not by faith only* (*μόνον*). For the explanation we have to look to the context. Faith occupies the whole ground as truly as do works. It is not merely the antecedent of works, the source of which works are the stream. It does not give birth to work, and then abdicate or vanish. It lives in work, though this may not be the Apostle's application of the figure of body and spirit.

*v. 25*: "Well, anyhow, it stands to reason that a harlot was not justified by works." Certainly she was. Her faith was a practical faith. She received the messengers, and sent them out another way. There is nothing intrinsically good in that action regarded alone, but it was a work, and that work the fruit of faith.

St. James gives two concrete instances of justifying works; and it is to be observed that they are not good works, like clothing the naked, feeding the hungry, preaching the Gospel. Child killing and treachery are *primâ facie* evil works, it is only by reference to their motive faith that they become good, and assume a justifying character.

*v. 26*: "As the body without the spirit is dead, etc." The strangeness of the illustration shows how faith

predominates, occupies the whole field in St. James' view. Living faith is everything, both body and spirit. He cannot imagine works in their doing, except as a function of faith. To say that a man is justified by works is to say he is justified by the action of faith. All good works are to him works of faith; and we might say, as St. Paul knows only one faith, so it is natural to St. James to think of all work as good work. Ἔργον and ποιεῖν and their cognates are almost solely used by him of what is good: to say a man is ποιητῆς ἔργου is itself a praise. The only exceptions are ii. 9, ἀμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε, and v. 15, ἀμαρτίας πεποιηκώς. (Cf. iii. 16, πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα.)

For some further notes on the passage.

v. 14: Μὴ δύναται ἡ πίστις σῶσαι αὐτόν; Σῶσαι shows that the ὄφελος expected by the man was σωτηρία, otherwise there might be various profitable effects falling short of salvation; i.e. it points to the assumption of a general law, Faith saves.

The benefit in question further on, vv. 21-25, is not salvation, but justification. St. Paul seldom connects salvation with faith, and not in his great argument; (Acts xvi. 21, 1 Cor. i. 21, Ephes. ii. 8, Rom. x. 9, 10; cf. 1 Tim. i. 16, Gal. ii. 20.) Elsewhere it is proportionately more frequent. Acts xv. 11, 1 Peter i. 5, 9, Heb. x. 39, and ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε of the Gospels, which must sometimes refer to more than bodily healing, Luke vii. 50, xvii. 19.

vv. 15-16: This is not an example of faith without works; it is an illustration from the analogous case of good feeling not issuing in works. The εἶπη of v. 16 is parallel to the λέγη of v. 14. In both cases the verb is assumed to represent some actual feeling or state of mind behind the saying; but the feeling in the second case has nothing necessarily to do with faith.

v. 20: θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, κ.τ.λ.: Perhaps "Hast thou a

mind to know, or art thou blind because thou wilt not see?" as Bengel: "Sane *inanes* homines nolunt scire et dissimulant." Only the wilfully thoughtless (*κενός*) can fail to see what may be called tautological truth. The statement contains its own proof, or at least the beginning of it. "Art thou willing to recognize that faith apart from works is without work; that what does no good does thee no good?" ἀργός used with conscious reference to its derivation as in 2 Peter i. 8, οὐκ ἀργούς οὐδέ ἀκάρπους; and ἔργα practically identified with the form of salvation.

v. 22: ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ. Only in this word *συνήργει* are faith and the works of the faithful regarded as apart. One would have expected rather ἐνήργει ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ. But the figure is difficult anyhow. *Συνήργει* involves doing of ἔργα, works of faith alongside of works of the faithful. Dr. Scott, in the *Speaker's Commentary*, prefers the rendering, "wrought with him in his works"; and maintains it by forcible arguments. This would not seriously conflict with the rest of the passage, but makes Faith too much a thing external to the man, and it is difficult to take τοῖς ἔργοις otherwise than dependent on *συνήργει*. Alford makes St. James in the last verse of the chapter view faith as the body and obedience as the spirit. Here then he understands "Faith wrought with obedience." But even if in the final verse obedience is the spirit, the living faith is thought of as body and spirit together, and as in this v. 22 the co-operating faith must be living faith, obedience must be in it and not a fellow-worker outside.

Knowling quotes a preferable interpretation of Benschlag's.

St. James views works here in a different way from elsewhere. These are not works in their doing, for in that they are inseparable from faith; but works already done and now producing their sequence of effect under the control

of God alone; and yet forming providentially new material for the exercise of faith. Abraham's faith won him a son; here was a new field for his faith, which ultimately gave room for its crowning work, the offering of the willing victim in assurance of Resurrection. St. James, then, in quoting Genesis xv. 6, is fully aware of its relative date, as is shown indeed by *ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφή*, as if it were the fulfilment of a prediction; he regards Genesis xv. 6 in its place as the applying to an undeveloped state of things a sentence which awaits the verification of development. So with Christ the *τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸν καὶ τελειωτὴν*, every victory led to and furnished a field for a wider and more strenuous conflict, until in the Cross and Resurrection He became *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τετελειωμένος*.

*ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη*. This argument assumes justification by faith, for he regards Abraham's justification *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων* as proved when he has shown that the *ἔργα* were ancillary to the perfecting of his faith.

Both St. Paul and St. James seem to regard the justification of Abraham in Genesis xv. 6 not merely as a declaring him righteous with respect to that particular act of belief, nor only as regards his whole character and actions up to that point, but as regards his whole life and character absolutely. If so, the real difficulty is in the first verse of Genesis xxii., "God did tempt Abraham." Why, if He knew him to be already righteous, was there need to do so? At this point it seems to me the real difference comes in between the two Apostles. It is a matter that comes up in several places of the Old Testament, but perhaps not elsewhere in the New. It may point to a graduation of the Divine energy which not only logic but the very blaze of the Christian revelation conceals to us. God is regarded sometimes as omniscient, sometimes as acquiring knowledge experimentally; in

Genesis, as at Babel (xi. 5), Sodom (xviii. 21); in 2 Chronicles xxxii. 31, of Hezekiah; in Isaiah lxiii. 8, of Israel (as implied); and strikingly in Psalm cxxxix. : for that in a great part of it dwells on God's omniscience, but ends with the Psalmist's prayer that God may know him not only by searching but by testing, a paradox from which the Prayer-book translator has so far shrunk as to avoid the word *know* in *v.* 23.

The justification which St. James is thinking of is that sort to which is applied the unsatisfactory word *forensic*. For in *v.* 18 works are spoken of as evidence; and in the case of Abraham the works and obedience are in answer to a test; a test is not meant to create what is not, but to demonstrate what is.

The natural feeling with which St. James started seems to have drawn no practical distinction between faith and works; cf. St. Matt. xxi. 31, 32. He finds in possession aphorisms, Faith saves and Faith justifies, and has no intention of dislodging them, but for that very reason is less guarded in wording his argument in a way which an inattentive hearer may take for disparagement of faith, or anyhow an exalting of works at the expense of it. St. Paul for a certain purpose contrasts faith and works; St. James has no contrast between faith and works, but between no works and works, between a working faith and an unworking faith.

Faith without works is dead, given of course time for working, allowing it time to draw, so to say, its first breath. The connexion between faith and works assumed or pointed out by St. James must be closer than mere consistency and correspondence. What is Faith? Is a definition to be expected? In what terms can it be defined? Into what elements can it be analysed? To what points more surely fixed can it be referred? Faith, Hope and

Charity are classed together by St. Paul. Of these it is clear that ἀγάπη is incapable of definition because ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν. Then it is reasonable if not inevitable to infer that Faith too is elemental, not to be analysed or defined any more than an individual. This is borne out by such a discussion of the word πίστις as is in Sanday and Headlam's *Romans* p. 31 sqq.; the manifold uses and applications suggest some deep principle which comes to the surface or exhibits itself in various ways. A feature in Scripture points the same way. In the mention of faith the sequence of thought is sometimes not easy to follow, or at least not obvious. Thus Numbers xx. 12, at first sight one would have said the words of Moses and Aaron certainly showed faith, however censurable on other grounds, and that the fact proved it. So in Matthew xvii. 20 the disciples seem to have made the attempt in the full expectation and, as we might say, belief that they could cast out the evil spirit. In Luke xvii. 5-10 the Lord's answer is quite unexpected and the connexion of the following parable difficult.

But if Faith cannot be defined, it does not follow nothing can be said about it. Much may be said to identify and distinguish and describe it, the circumstances under which it acts, its method of acting and the results, as in Hebrews xi. 1. ("Not a logical definition of faith, but a description of its practical effect": Rendall *ad loc.*) But I think it impossible to question that it is a dependence upon or committal unto God or Christ of the whole man. If it were questioned, it might not be easy to demonstrate that it engages the whole man, but I venture to say that the Christian conscience revolts at anything less.<sup>1</sup> Faith

<sup>1</sup> "Faith is not an intellectual assent, nor a sympathetic sentiment merely. It is the absolute surrender of self to the will of a Being who has a right to command this surrender. It is this which places men



accepts God as the one principle of light and knowledge and so believes His word; it accepts God as good, and so reposes trust in Him; it accepts Him as Lord and commits the will to Him, submits the will to Him to will the things He wills, but something deeper offers the will itself to Him to be animated and inspired from the divine source. Will is involved in all energy of faith in believing and trusting as well as in obeying. In the case of obedience it is the will to do His will that is involved in Faith. Will is man's contribution to work. God giveth it a body as it may please Him; and if the will is to do His will, the body He gives it is a good and righteous work accepted as evidence of the faith from which it proceeded. Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved. Lord is not merely an honorific title, nor indicates only that He is able to do what is looked for, but reminds the inquirer that inherent in belief is obedient service of the Lord Christ. This committal of the will to God is not a lapse into passivity, not mere resignation. God is omnipotent apart from any concession on man's part. It is an active adoption of God's will as the man's own, actively carried on so far as lies within his power. To offer the will to God is not to destroy it, but to exercise it *κατὰ θεόν*. Then we might say that Faith without the spirit of obedience is not real faith, but the word used by St. James is not *unreal* but *dead*.

It is so universally agreed that *δικαιοῦν* is to acknowledge as just and not to make just, it might seem hopeless to say a word on the other side. (Perhaps we may call the first the *subjective*, and the second the *factitive*, meaning of *δικαιοῦν* and such verbs.) When it is pointed out that the regular force of the termination added to an adjective stem

in personal relation to God, which (in St. Paul's language) justifies them before God. For it touches the springs of their actions."—Lightfoot's *Colossians*, p. 187.

is factitive, as τυφλοῦν, *to make blind*, the answer is that the case of adjectives of moral meaning, as in ἀξιοῦν, ὀσιοῦν, δικαιοῦν, is an exception. But why is it an exception? Because a moral quality cannot be imparted from outside, and so the form is left available for the next nearest meaning. Morals depend on the man's willing action. If a man is not by his voluntary goodness ὁσιος, it is inconceivable that he can be made so by external action. But this inconceivableness is at the bottom of all St. Paul's argument. It is implied by the necessity of the death of Christ. It was the impossibility of justification by any conceivable method (My will is perverse, nothing in me can straighten it, nothing outside me can work it) that was the awful burden on St. Paul's mind before he found a practical solution in Christ. His insatiable thirst was for a real righteousness. Was he one to be satisfied with anything but reality?

Then grammatically the assertion is not entirely true. There are forms in which the sense of *make* is available even with moral meaning, and consequently is used.

(1) The deponent uses must be derived from the factitive meaning; Psalm xvii. 26, ὀσιωθήσῃ parallel to ἀθῶος ἔσῃ, ἐκλεκτὸς ἔσῃ, διαστρέψεις *thou shalt behave piously*; Psalm lxxvii. 8, 37, ἐπιστώθησαν,<sup>1</sup> *they turned out actually faithful*, Sir. xxvii. 17, xxix. 3; and probably occasionally from δικαιοῦν, as Isaiah xlv. 25 ἀπὸ κυρίου δικαιοθήσονται, for there is nothing in the context to suggest accusation or acquittal and the previous verse speaks of actual righteousness; so Sir. xviii. 22, μὴ μείνης ἕως θανάτου δικαιοθῆναι, xxvi. 29, xxxiv. 5, Gen. xxxviii. 26 (cf. Gal. ii. 16, 17). The natural English renderings would be *proved, showed themselves, were found*; but these, according to

<sup>1</sup> The Vulg. has indeed *nec fideles habiti sunt*; but the translator was not clear about the word rendering verse 8 curiously *non est creditus cum Deo spiritus eius*, a confusion with ἐπιστεύθη.

modern idiom, are only formally subjective. And the same is true of the Greek in the instances last quoted. Even granted the *δικαιοῦν* formally subjective, the judge is assumed to judge correctly, and the whole weight of meaning is thrown on actually existing righteousness. Connotation is always apt to follow denotation; and as *δικαιοῦν*, to regard, comes from a *δικαιοῦν*, to make (imaginary if you will), so is it ready to revert if need be to the original and natural force of the termination.

(2) In the reflexive use the inconceivableness of meaning clearly does not arise; and so we have Psalm lxxii. 13, *ματαίως ἐδικαίωσα τὴν καρδίαν μου*, where a subjective or forensic force would be quite inapplicable (cf. Jer. iii. 11).

*ἀξιοῦν* is always subjective; but here the meaning of the adjective itself naturally appeals to a judgment.

Then though the factitive sense of *δικαιοῦν* was excluded generally by unsuitableness, it was waiting there and ready to press in.

In Revelation xxii. 11 no one, apart from MS. authority, would hesitate to call *δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω* the gloss on *δικαιωθήτω*; but as (if I may judge with all diffidence from Alford's Apparatus Criticus) *δικαιωθήτω* is in any case an early reading, the argument for my purpose is stronger if *δικαιωθήτω* was substituted as familiarly bearing the meaning of *δικ. ποιησ.* than if it were original and standing in need of a gloss.

The forensic meaning of *δικαιοῦν* would start from the factitive; it would be originally *to make δικαίος*, only *δικαίος* according to a forensic standard. And taking the forensic meaning of the verb as subjective (which no doubt it becomes, i.e. *δικαιοῦν*=to hold or treat as absolutely *δικαίος*), it is only one branch of the subjective meaning. The word forensic is strictly suitable when *δικαίος* has the negative meaning of *not guilty* after accusation or suspicion

of guilt, as in Matthew xxvii. 19. But *δικαιοῦν* has also the meaning to regard as positively and actively righteous, as Romans ii. 13, *οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται*, where, on the one hand, the meaning must be subjective, for the doers of the law are just already and do not want making just, and on the other there is no suspicion of guilt to set aside. Still, as a rule, the subjective meaning of *δικαιοῦν* more naturally goes with the negative *δικαίος*, to declare not guilty. Where the thought is of positive active righteousness of actual men it would commonly, if the word allowed it, be more obvious to take a factitive sense, to make righteous.

Man has a continual debt of activity to God, and in the uninterrupted discharge of that debt, or at least in the spirit which leads to its uninterrupted discharge, *δικαιοσύνη* consists. Therefore to those to whom activity is possible there is no being negatively *δικαίος*, not guilty, without being actively righteous. There is apart from Christ a justification of sin at once factitive and forensic (as in classical use) provided in the original course of nature. It may be called a degenerate case of justification, *Ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκνεῖ θάνατον*, and *ὁ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. It is not naturally beneficial to the justified, nor does it naturally justify God as the Creator of what has to be destroyed. But St. Paul has to show how through Christ it is adopted into the salutary process so as to help on both these ends.

There are places in St. Paul where it would be more natural were it allowable to take *δικαιοῦν* of making absolutely righteous. Romans iii. 26, *δικαίον καὶ δικαιοῦντα*, suggests that the righteousness conferred on man is like God's. Romans iv. 25, *διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*, connected with Christ's Resurrection, is more naturally of positive righteousness. The *δικαίωσις* which is the abolition of guilt is rather associated by St. Paul with Christ's death. If so, the

subjective sense would have little force: it would be rather with a view to making than with a view to declaring righteous. So in Romans, v. 18, in spite of the parallel *κατάκριμα*, the *δικαίωσιν ζωῆς* (as opposed to the *δικαίωσις θανάτου*, Romans vi. 7) is more naturally understood absolutely. One might add Romans iv. 5, *τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἄσεβῆ*, for *ἄσεβῆς* is not a word of forensic associations. Or again in Romans viii. 29, 30, the forensic sense seems hardly to fit in with the elevation of the passage, "Whom he did fore-know, them he did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son . . . and whom he did predestinate, them he also called, and whom he called, them he regarded and treated as blameless and innocent, and whom he thus exempted from suspicion of guilt, them he also glorified." This does not fill out the *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνας τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* as one would have expected.

But no doubt St. Paul's use of *δικαιοῦν* is as a rule the subjective use. This (i.) because the justification with which his argument is specially concerned is the initial, the transition from guilt to innocence which naturally calls up to the mind a tribunal and a judge. But (ii.) still more from his feeling of a personal character and object in *δικαιοσύνη*. The only fault indeed he finds explicitly with the righteousness of the law is that it is not practically forthcoming; but there is a feeling running through that it is at the best a cold impersonal dead righteousness, not worth calling righteousness beside that which is to the living God, that there is no true righteousness of the creature but such as is to God. I would word it that with St. Paul *δικαιοῦν* means to make forensically, subjectively, relatively righteous, but relatively to God. And relatively to God is to him identical with absolutely; so the distinction between forensic and actual, between make and regard, is merged. It is possible to pass

without interruption from one to the other. But it is not as if mere will (so far as human intelligence can conceive) could make justice. Justice is not an independent standard to which God perfectly conforms; it is the expression of His will. But it is (if our thought may be exercised in such things) an element of the Divine character which can be revealed to our minds and approved by our judgments apart from the assurance of His personality. It can be exhibited in the creature, and when we say that God is just we mean that as far as we can compare different circumstances (and that is a very great limitation), the whole of His doings, whether we know enough to perceive this or not, does answer to that element justice of which we have already some real if imperfect knowledge.

I wish to maintain that the conclusion reluctantly reached by SH. that justification (in St. Paul's view) works by a fiction is not a sound conclusion, and to enter no more than absolutely necessary on the office of the Atonement in it, or on other points connected with it as the place in it and effect of Holy Baptism.

While thinking that arguments above adduced for a factitive sense of *δικαιοῦν* are worth consideration, I would not rest on that but rather on the necessity that what God does must be done in truth, and what He pronounces is incapable of fiction, and the certainty that this was the belief of St. Paul; and further, as pointed out by Newman (*Justification*, p. 84 sqq.), that the voice of the Lord is mighty in operation. "God's word is the instrument of His deed. When then He solemnly utters the command, 'Let the soul be just,' it becomes just." When God justifies the ungodly it is as when Christ heals the sick and raises the dead; the men cease to be ungodly, sick or dead who were previously denoted by these defects.

SH. say "The facts of language are inexorable . . .

*δικαιοῦν*, *δικαιούσθαι* have reference to a judicial verdict and to nothing beyond." This is rather beyond their own facts ; it is straining language to speak of judicial verdict in connexion with, e.g., Luke vii. 29. But a judicial verdict may be viewed from more than one point. But is it reasonable because St. Paul brings in a figure from human society to tie him down to the details of circumstance ? A judicial verdict declares a man just according to the standard of the local polity. God as judge speaks it with regard to His own standard. A human court excuses the fallibility of its verdicts by the inevitable imperfection of human insight. It cannot be so with God. On any standard human or divine those may fairly be classed among *δίκαιοί* who come under any one, not necessarily more than one, of these heads. (i) Those who never committed an *ἀδίκημα*. (ii.) Those who having done so have made it good, whether by compensation, or by exhausting the punishment due. (iii.) Those who having done so have got rid of the spirit of *ἀδικία*, and have gained, or been given by change of mind, the internal character of *δικαιοσύνη*.

As to (i.) it is naturally impossible that those who have committed *ἀδικήματα* should be classed, except by fiction among those who have not. Yet it is not clear but what this is divinely possible, not by undoing the past, but by separating the personality of the man from the past as by death and resurrection. But without insisting on this, in what ways is the *ἡδίκηκὸς* distinguished from the *δικαίος*. Answering to (ii.) he has incurred a debt to those outside him, whether to God or to His creatures ; and to (iii.) he has injured himself becoming burdened with a sense of guilt, and acquiring in greater or less degree the character and habit of *ἀδικία*. There is no common-sense impossibility in God remitting the debt to Himself, and compensating to other creditors their loss, nor again in the man coming to a better mind and getting

rid of the feeling of guilt. It is common experience that assures us of the difficulty of these things; and Christian doctrine and St. Paul's teaching are on the same side, aggravating the estimate of the debt, and instead of difficulty showing impossibility, apart from means held in reserve by God which could neither be anticipated nor imagined, nor now more than practically apprehended.

Then (ii.) though the figure of debt is not one applied by St. Paul to sin, he has what bears on this as in speaking of purchase and redemption. But it may be better not to dwell here but to go on to

(iii.) The just man is one possessing the character whose proper outcome is just actions. He has not of necessity performed just actions; time to do so may be wanting, the opportunity have not yet arisen. When it does arise, he may change and act unjustly and become unjust instead of just. The performance of just actions is the only criterion human witnesses can have of a just character, but we cannot deny to God an immediate discernment. Without then restricting God's justification to this third method, I take it that at least therein may be seen how God can justify without fiction. From two sides the mercy of God is set free to act in truth, on the side of Christ by death and resurrection, on the side of man by faith. There is a necessary attraction of God upon the being; unbelief resists it, faith abstains from resisting. But it has no instrument through which to act. The old nature, the flesh, as it is called, from what has become its dominant element is tainted; its members are incapable as yet of being even *ὄπλα δικαιοσύνης τῷ θεῷ*, much less, as they were meant to be, the natural organs of home-bred righteous energy. So though faith is righteous, as far as it goes, it is not more than latent potential righteousness; and, moreover, has as yet no active conquering force to convert from evil into good the ungodliness of nature in



which it is imprisoned. And here parenthetically of faith before Christ. It is clear that then principles were not exhibited, in a sense mystical truth such as St. Paul teaches is not meant for exhibition; but then the mercy of God was content with provisional arrangements not of lasting use except that they deferred inevitable results till Christ should come. There was the seed of corruption, the severance from God and from life; but dissolution had not of necessity proceeded far; there was, as there is, much in human nature that was relatively good, though it was separated from the only end in which it could be radically good, being incapable of love towards God.

But faith, in spite of its evil surroundings and its own imbecility, is, so far as it goes, good, though not meritorious, and it is not in God to destroy good. It comes from what in man is central, inmost, deepest, most personal, all-pervading, and it is directed towards God the Author of all good. While hardly itself actual *δικαιοσύνη*, it is such as could, if it pleased God, without fiction *λογισθῆναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. It is at first an empty hand held out to receive, a channel into and through which goodness can flow and flow on; in it the Almighty will graciously recognize an appeal for means of expression, instruments of effect, relief from the imprisonment of the old nature, in short, life. The thing is not too hard for the Lord, but it is no ordinary evoking even of Almighty power. To the faith which looks to him he sets forth His Son not only for the relief and abolition of guilt, but for the supply of a new nature in which righteousness can properly be expressed, a righteous nature because it is the nature of Christ become communicable. Faith in Christ, which is the form of faith in God now takes, is not itself union with Christ. The union is the gift conferred in answer to the appeal of faith; for I suppose we may fairly say from St John i. 12, "To them that

believe on his Name gave He power to become children of God." The first act of union must necessarily be to alienate the old nature, to divest the person of it before he can put on the new. This is the death spoken of in Romans vi. as in some way identified with the death of Christ; it is the first step in justification, involving the abolition of guilt, but not in itself as yet the actual saving process; it would, so St. Paul implies in 1 Corinthians xv., have no beneficial effect but that it is followed by resurrection, necessarily followed by a resurrection in some mysterious way one with the Resurrection of Christ, a new birth, the investing with a new nature. The old remains indeed severed but not yet removed. It is now in the sight of God a circumstance external to the man, but pressing very closely. It may furnish instruments for his service of God, or may exercise a foreign tyranny, or become a wilfully assumed ally; to it in its severance from God, as to forbidden ground, he may choose to return, instead of abiding in the new, and may make it the region of his acting and willing though no longer a home; for the old relation of the man to it, natural and divinely originated, is broken irreparably.

Faith was used by God as an instrument of uniting the man to Christ. Whether or no we may say he could not, anyhow apart from that he would not, have effected the union. The continuance is equally necessary to the maintenance of the union at least in this life. Galatians ii. 20, *ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*: or 2 Corinthians i. 24, *τῇ γὰρ πίστει ἐστήκατε*; or Romans xi. 20, *τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ ἐξεκλάσθησαν σὺ δὲ τῇ πίστει ἔστηκας*; or Hebrews x. 38, *ὁ δὲ δικαίος μου ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται καὶ ἐὰν ὑποστείληται οὐκ εὐδοκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐν αὐτῷ*.

We might have expected that God, all-seeing and fore-knowing, would only at the first accept that faith which He either saw or at least foreknew would persevere. But it is

clear both from St. Paul and other New Testament writers, and from our Lord Himself, that it is not so. Three times (1 Cor. x. 1-13, Heb. iii. 7-iv. 11, Jude 5) the destruction of the people in the wilderness after their acceptance as the people of God is applied for warning to Christians, and therefore almost of necessity as a pattern of what does take place in the Christian Church. The use of the imperative (*Abide in Me* (John xv. 14, 1 John ii. 28) and the hypothetical *If ye abide* (John xv. 5, 7, Romans xi. 22, Col. i. 23) recognizes the possibility of not abiding. But, above all, our Lord's illustrations from fruit-bearing vegetation, the parables of the Sower and the Seed and of the Vine, show that that life, which is meant to be permanent in a man, may be received and the man actually live and grow in it, and yet fail of permanence in it. The fruit in an ordinary way is that which contains the seed. To insist on this is so accordant with New Testament analogy that it ought not to seem fanciful. At least in the parable of the sower we have to think of the fruit both as that which the plant gives up from itself to the planter, and as that which contains the perpetuation of life.

We are in the neighbourhood of profundities, but it is a question of popular theology which has brought us there. I wish to avoid them while recognizing their existence; to trace the shore, so to say, of the deep waters, but not attempt to sound their depths. It seems necessary to draw, in the case of human beings a distinction of person and nature in some respects like the one familiar in the doctrine of the Incarnation. The Catholic expression of that doctrine is wholly true and necessary to the Church, but it can only express truth up to a certain point. I would not offer the distinction in human beings generally as more than, so to say, the convenience of a rough outline, with which we may note in filling up the details how far they coincide. Per-

sonality is an elemental, insoluble idea. On it turn the questions which no one can answer, and from it come, in all appearance uncaused, the causative energies which defy calculation or prediction. Human personality can only be defined as that which the dress of human nature will fit. It is, we may think, apart from its manifestations, i.e. its workings, inscrutable to every created intelligence. Nothing is hidden from the Divine omniscience. In that God knows whether the faith which appears is an ingrained characteristic, or accidental function of the person; and it may probably be, too, that He also perceives a difference of the embryo which nothing short of Divine perfection of insight could penetrate to discern. But the creature's explicit knowledge goes on in time and is dependent on manifestations; and as it is part of the glory of God to justify His ways to created beings, the faith has to be tested whether it is genuine by workings. The *τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως* of James i. 3 and of 1 Peter i. 7 seem to allow this expression, but St. Paul words it not that the faith is tested but that the man is tested with regard to the faith. 2 Corinthians xiii. 5, *ἑαυτοὺς πειράζετε εἰ ἔστέ ἐν τῇ πίστει, ἑαυτοὺς δοκιμάζετε*. Previous to testing the man is faultless, the possibility of evil latent does not prevent his being rightly regarded as just till he acts otherwise. "Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day thou wast created till iniquity was found in thee." In strange contrast to the initial, inexplicable uncertainty of what may come from personality is the persistency of character which it ultimately either acquires or develops. Adam was created *δικαίως*, i.e. both innocent of actual sin and with a nature suited to operate *δικαιῶς*, but he had to be tried personally whether he accepted that state and nature. In the case of the man justified in Christ, the facts which make for standing are stronger, for the nature of Christ is more powerful for good; but so, too, are the facts

which make for falling, for by comparison Adam's temptation was external. He then, too, after the fair start he is now enabled to make, has to be tested whether he personally wholly and permanently adheres to Christ, whether he has root in himself. This phrase of St. Matthew and St. Mark, to which it is hard to give an exact meaning either in the literalness of the parable or in its interpretation, does somehow convey to our minds the idea of personal persistency we want to express. At what point the character of persistency or otherwise is established in the person, God only knows and can see; for all others absolute knowledge has to wait till the testing is over. Faith justifies and saves, but does not itself convey the assurance of ultimate salvation. There is some difficulty in the wording of 1 John v. 17, but from the whole passage it is clear that assurance is the gift of love and perfect assurance the gift of perfected love; and this is confirmed by a comparison of John v. 24 with 1 John iii. 14; for in the Gospel the passage from death unto life is ascribed to faith, in the Epistle the knowledge of it to love.

What then is the faith which justifies, places in the justified state (such expressions are allowable, though what is meant is rather evokes the justification of God), and yet which needs to be tested? It is one thing to speak for direct personal edification, and another to enter on a question of more or less abstract theology, though I hope this may be not otherwise than edifying in its way. But in the former case faith is required in its fullest form, that is no faith which aims at a minimum of expression, while as a matter of theology there may be use in dwelling on the very small amount which God will accept. Speaking with the greatest reserve, I should say faith can take many forms, or rather may be exercised and exhibited in a variety of ways, intellectual belief, action on belief, obedience, trust. Where faith is

shown in any one way, there being in no other way wilful unbelief (and this applies to the faith of the Church presenting infants), it is accepted and receives the answer of grace, which will strengthen the receiver in enduring the test whether his faith is good in all directions and whether it is tenaciously held. Abraham's faith in Genesis xv. 6 was exercised on a limited point. It was the intellectual acceptance of God's prediction of an apparently improbable fact which would be to His honour. The event proved that that act of belief proceeded from a universal immovable faith. Until the sacrifice of Isaac his justification brought him present peace and friendship with God and a clearer-sighted trust for present and future ; but it did not give him assurance concerning his own self for the future (we do not know in what form this question would have presented itself to him), until in standing that great test his faith attained full stature.

The view maintained here is that the justification of St. Paul is a making just, or at least involves a making just, and that by no remote deduction, whether or not from the grammatical meaning is a minor point, but what God says must be. And it is not a mere conferring of innocence as regards the past. That would be justification only for the dead, and would come in due course without Christ, for the living it would leave the future blank. But it is the imparting of a righteous character, a capacity for righteous action i.e. for good works, and this from an engrafting in Christ ; so that the righteousness and the good works may with equal correctness be described as the works of Christ and the works of the believer, just as we may properly say the tree bears the fruit or the branch bears the fruit. They are as truly the believer's works and doings as any doings whatever, good or evil, godless or indifferent, can be the doings of a man. In them his personal agency is exercised and stirred up

to the full ; all the principles of agency, will, belief or knowledge, counsel or resolution are there exercised, but in the way of faith in God through Christ. There is a view which recognizes the importance of good works, but, contrary to St. John xv. 2, 6, regards them as the necessary effect of the vital union with Christ. The believer is not to aim at doing them himself, Christ does them, not he. This is to regard the regenerate nature as devoid of the highest and deepest energies, it is a sort of Apollinarian mutilation. Christ does them and he does them. "He that believeth in me, the works that I do shall he do also." As in so many cases, the relation of the believer to Christ is assimilated to the relation of the Son to the Father. "Whatever things [the Father] doeth, these doeth the Son in like manner"; and this comes soon after that verse St. John v. 17, *My Father worketh hitherto, and I work*, which implies that the Son's is as truly and as fully agency as the Father's. We have indeed, *I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me ; I laboured, yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me*. These are parallel to *My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me. The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's which sent me. The Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works*. Will any one deny that Christ was in the fullest sense the doer of them, that what He said and taught He spoke with full and intelligent assent, by free act and willing intention ? *He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit* is in its measure parallel to *I and my Father are one* ; and so the believer's agency is sometimes identified immediately with the agency of God. (Phil. ii. 12, 13, Heb. xiii. 21.)

F. W. MOZLEY.

*THE SHORTER FORM OF ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO  
THE ROMANS.*

IF it were certain that the Epistle to the Romans had never existed in any other form than that in which it is now known, there would be no more certain point in the whole complex of historical problems connected with the Pauline Epistles than that it was written from Corinth just before St. Paul left that city to take alms to the Church at Jerusalem. But it is well known that there is quite a large amount of evidence which points to the existence of an early short recension of the Epistle, and in the following pages an effort will be made to do three things: (1) to give a statement of the main reasons why the existence of this short recension is practically certain; (2) to explain the theory, at present very popular, which connects this recension with Marcion; and (3) to suggest an alternative theory.

*The existence of the short recension.*

The proof of the existence of a short recension of the epistle resolves itself into the treatment of the reference to Rome in the first chapter, and of the two last chapters. It is probably best and *methodischrichtig* to begin by showing why there is reason to believe that there was once a text which omitted the two last chapters, and then to go on to give the reasons for thinking that this shorter form had no reference to Rome.

The most widespread evidence for the omission of the two chapters can be found in the ordinary Latin chapter divisions given in the *Codex Amiatinus* of the Vulgate and in many others (Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate*, p. 357, mentions at least 48). This system gives Romans as divided into 51 chapters: the last but one (No. 50) is entitled *De periculo contristante fratrem suum esca sua, et quod non sit regnum dei esca et potus sed justitia et pax et gaudium in*



*spiritu sancto*. This clearly covers Romans xiv. 15–23. The next and last (No. 51) is *De mysterio dei ante passionem in silentio habito, post passionem vero ipsius revelato*. This equally clearly covers Romans xvi. 25–27 and nothing else. In other words, it implies a text of the epistle which ended with chapter xiv. *plus* the doxology which we usually read at the end of the epistle.

Moreover, proof is not wanting that this conclusion is just. There is found in some MSS. a sort of concordance or harmony of the Pauline epistles, which arranges under reference to the chapter numbers the parallel passages which deal with the same questions. The references to Romans are usually missing; but according to Corsen<sup>1</sup> the full text is preserved in a MS. at Murbach which gives 43 headings from Romans. These are given according to the Amiatine chapter divisions, and the two last are *Quod regnum dei non sit esca et potus, ad Rom. L. ad Cor. pr. XI.*, and *De abscondito sacramento a saeculo, ad Rom. LI., ad Eph. IX., ad Coloss. III., ad Tit. I., ad Heb. II.* This can scarcely be explained except on the hypothesis that a short recension was used. Even if Corsen be wrong in believing that the *Codex Murbacensis* belongs to the same system as the other MSS. which omit Romans, this inference is not changed.

For myself I cannot see any possible answer to this argument, and the attempts of Zahn and Riggenbach to maintain that the Amiatine capitulations are defective have little or no strength.<sup>2</sup> It is not as though the Amiatine system

<sup>1</sup> It is, however, necessary to add that the point is not quite simple. I think Corsen is right, but those who find the point important should read not only his articles, *Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Römerbriefes* in the *ZNTW*, 1909, 1 and 2, but also Dom Donatien de Bruyne's *Une concordance biblique d'origine pélagienne* in the *Revue Biblique*, 1908, pp. 75–83.

<sup>2</sup> Zahn, *Einleitung in das neue Testament*, i, 280 f. (2te aufl.), and Riggenbach in the *Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1892, pp. 526 ff., on *Die Textgeschichte der Doxologie, Rom. 16. 25–27*. The full text of the "concordance" can be found in Vezzosi's edition of the works of J. M.

was only found in a few MSS. ; those mentioned by Berger are probably not a twentieth of the whole number, and there seems to be no reason to doubt the obvious conclusion drawn from the facts by a whole series of scholars who have agreed in thinking that the Amiatine capitulations point to a short recension, though they have differed widely enough in their explanation of the fact.

It is obvious that the Latin version implied by the Amiatine capitulations is not the Vulgate, but was ante-Hieronymian, and further traces of the existence of the short text can be found in Latin in Cyprian and in Tertullian. In the case of the former the evidence is merely the dangerous *argumentum e silentio*, but is a very strong example of its kind. In his *Testimonia* he gives a collection of texts from every possible source arranged according to their community of meaning, so as to serve as an arsenal of proof-texts for various dogmas. It is certainly a fact that he does not clearly quote anything from chapters xv. and xvi. of Romans, and each must judge for himself whether this can be accidental. The main point is, that in Test. iii. 68, 78, 95, Cyprian musters the passages enjoining the duty of avoiding heretics, under the three headings, 68 *Recedendum ab eo qui inordinate et contra disciplinam vivat.* 2 Thess. iii. 6. 78. *Cum hereticis non loquendum* Tit. iii. 10 f. ; 1 John ii. 19 ; 2 Tim. ii. 17. 95. *Bonis convivendum malos autem vitandos* (1 Cor. xv. 33). Why does he not quote Romans xvi. 17, "Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which are causing the divisions and occasions of stumbling, contrary to the doctrine which ye learned, etc." ? It is instructive to note that in the spurious *de singularitate clericorum* (Cyprian, ed. Hartel, appendix, p. 212), 2 Thessalonians iii. 6 is quoted and a few lines further down Romans xvi. 17,

Thomasius, i, 489, and the Amiatine capitulations in Tischendorf's edition of the *Codex Amiatinus*.

which shows how naturally any one who knew Romans xvi. would have used it in this connexion. It seems to me exceedingly probable that Cyprian had the same short text<sup>1</sup> as the Amiatine capitulations and that this text must be provisionally regarded as having obtained in Africa in the third century. The evidence of Tertullian is, if anything, stronger; for not only is there the same *argumentum e silentio* in the fact that he nowhere quotes chapters xv. and xvi., but in *adv. Marcionem* v. 13 he quotes Romans xiv. 10 and says that this verse comes "*in clausula*," i.e., in the closing section of the epistle. It is true that he is contrasting the end with the beginning, and Hort (cf. Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, p. 335) argued that this need not imply the absence of the two last chapters. This might be admitted if it were not for the other evidence for a short recension; as it is, the natural interpretation of the facts is that Tertullian, like Cyprian, used a short text of Romans. Moreover, though it be true that the *argumentum e silentio* is much less strong in the case of Tertullian than in that of Cyprian, because he quotes so much less, it is noteworthy that Romans xv. and xvi. are so full of passages opposed to the doctrine of Marcion that it is suggested (by Sanday and Headlam and by Corssen) that the short recension is a Marcionite production: yet Tertullian never alludes to these passages, either to throw at Marcion or to comment on his excision of them,—and he was by no means disposed to pass over Marcion's emendations (real or supposed) in silence, even though he endeavoured to answer the heretic out of his own text.

Thus there is good reason for believing that in Africa, in the second as well as in the third century, the Epistle to the Romans was used in a short text which omitted chapters

<sup>1</sup> The same, that is to say, in extent. It is not probable that the text used by the maker of the Amiatine capitulations was African.

xv. and xvi. The Amiatine capitulations were made for a similarly short text, and suggest that this recension was closed by the doxology which we usually read in Romans xvi. 25–27.

It is, however, improbable that the Amiatine capitulations represent an originally African text. Rigggenbach has shown that in the summaries given the text of the epistles is sufficiently closely followed to enable us to identify its character. It is not African; and it is not Vulgate, but represents the European type which was current in Italy before the days of Jerome. Moreover it must have been an early European type, for Ambrosiaster, who represents the later form, did not use the short text. Thus we have early European as well as early African evidence for the short recension. It is at present impossible to say whether there was originally one or more Latin versions; so that we do not know whether this agreement between African and European Latin ought to be taken as representing one or two Greek originals. It is, however, in any case, clear that the evidence takes us back to the second century in Africa, and probably also in Europe.

Another witness, but a suspected one, to the same short text is Marcion. For our knowledge of this fact we are indebted to Rufinus' translation of Origen's commentary on Romans xvi. 25–27. He says, *Caput hoc Marcion, a quo scripturae evangelicae atque apostolicae interpolatae sunt, de hac epistola penitus abstulit; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo loco ubi scriptum est "omne autem quod non est ex fide, peccatum est (xiv. 23) usque ad finem cuncta dissecuit.* The meaning of this passage is one of two things. Clearly it implies that Marcion removed the doxology altogether (*abstulit*), but there is room for doubt as to what he did with the rest of the epistle. What is the meaning of *dissecuit*? The obvious meaning, which is nearly always adopted, seems to be "cut away," but the objection, first made, I think, by Hort, is that this is not

the true meaning either of *dissecuit* or of the Greek which it may be supposed to represent—*διέτεμεν*; it ought rather to be translated “separated off.” This argument gains strength if we try to distinguish between *abstulit* and *dissecuit*. It is perhaps impossible to decide the point; if *dissecuit* be used loosely, it means that Marcion cut away not only the doxology, but also chapters xv. and xvi.; if it be taken strictly, it means that Marcion separated Romans xv. and xvi. from the rest of the epistle, and cut out the doxology which came at the end of chapter xiv. Probably the former view is right, and the difference between *abstulit* and *dissecuit* is to be explained as merely due to a desire for variation.

No MS. exists in any language which preserves the short recension in a pure form; but traces of its influence on the history of the text are obvious. In the Epistle to the Romans as it stands at present in critical editions the arrangement of the contents of the last three chapters is as follows: (1) xiv. 1–23 is devoted to the question of the propriety of observing a distinction between lawful and unlawful food; (2) Romans xv. 1–13 continues the argument on more general lines; (3) Romans xv. 1, 4–33 is chiefly concerned with St. Paul's plans for the future; (4) Romans xvi. 1–20*a* is a list of greetings to members of the Church to which he writes, and a commendation of Phœbe of Cenchrea; (5) Romans xvi. 20*b* is a benediction; (6) xvi. 20–23 is a postscript of greetings from companions of St. Paul; and (7) Rom. xvi. 25–27<sup>1</sup> is a closing benediction. It is clear that there is no serious break in thought between xiv. 23 and xv. 1, and that the doxology is in a natural place at the end of everything. Yet in the Antiochene text represented by the great majority of Greek MSS. the doxology comes not at the end, but between chapters xiv. and xv. Moreover, it is certain that this represents an early text, which was adopted, to use

<sup>1</sup> Rom. xvi. 24 is omitted by the R. V. and all critical editors.

Westcott and Hort's expression, by the "Syrian Revisers," because we have the express evidence of Origen that this reading was that of some of the texts which had not been corrupted by Marcion: "*In nonnullis etenim codicibus post eum locum quem supra diximus, hoc est, Omne autem quod non est ex fide peccatum est, statim cohaerens habetur. Ei autem qui potens est, etc.*," though he was also acquainted with others which put the doxology at the end of the epistle, and, like modern critical editors believed that this was the right place for it. The same text was used by Chrysostom and Theodoret, so that, leaving out the Latin version for the moment, it would seem as though the Eastern text outside Alexandria had the doxology after chapter xiv., and that in Alexandria it was moved to the end of chapter xvi., though in the time of Origen the MSS. known to him differed on the question.

The history of the Latin text on this point is not easy to follow, owing to our almost complete ignorance of the Old Latin text of the epistle. The facts, however, seem to be these: there were in Latin before Jerome three types: (1) with the doxology at the end of the epistle, used by Ambrosiaster, probably owing to Alexandrian influence; (2) with the doxology after xiv. 23, *Codex Guelpherbytanus* and a fragment at Monza<sup>1</sup> (cod.  $\frac{1-2}{9}$ ); and (3) without any doxology, used by Priscillian and found in *Codex Ambrosianus* E. 26. It is also probable that the archetype of the Graeco-Latin MSS. DEFG ought to be added either to the second or third of these categories.

The most probable solution of these facts seems to me to be that the earliest type of Old Latin had the doxology after xiv. 23 and that the texts of Priscillian and Ambrosias-

<sup>1</sup> For the fullest statement of the facts about this MS. see Dom D. Bruyne, *Des deux derniers chapitres de la lettre aux Romains*, *Revue Bénédictine*, 1908, p. 423 ff.

ter represent the Spanish and Italian attempts to emend an obviously difficult reading. It is, I think, an illustration of the fact that, with the exception of the Alexandrians, the Greeks were less apt to be struck by textual difficulties than the Latins.

It will now be possible to sum up the probabilities of the case with regard to the doxology. It is very improbable that this was originally anywhere than at the end of the epistle, wherever that was: therefore all the MSS. which insert it after xiv. 23 are really evidence for the existence of the short recension, and confirm the witness of Tertullian, Cyprian and the Latin capitulations.

Moreover, it is exceedingly unlikely that any scribe who had the short recension before him, and also knew the long text, would pick out the doxology from xvi. 25-27 and insert it after xiv. 23: he would have added the whole of what was lacking in his text. Therefore it is improbable that the doxology really belongs to chapter xvi. at all; it is more probable that the short recension originally closed with the doxology,<sup>1</sup> while chapters xv. and xvi. ended with the "Grace" followed by a postscript. The textual history of the doxology seems, then, to be explicable as the result of the various efforts of scribes to combine these two. The simplest method was simply to add chapters xv. and xvi., leaving the doxology where it was. This was the course followed by the Antiochene text, and possibly by the archetype of DEFG. A slightly different method was to begin the transition from one text to the other just before the doxology, thus omitting it, and this is the course followed

<sup>1</sup> Dom Bruyne raises the interesting question whether the doxology was not preceded by the "Grace" (xvi. 20*b*). It appears to have been so in the Monza MS., and this would help to clear up the residuum of difficulties concerned with the text of xvi. 20*b* and 24,—a point which I have thought it unnecessary to deal with above. Perhaps Dom Bruyne is right; but the evidence is small. In any case, the point is not of the first importance for the general problem.

by Priscillian. A third course, taken in Alexandria, or at least in circles known to Origen, consisted in moving the doxology from xiv. 23 to the end of the epistle, and this was also done by Ambrosiaster and Jerome. These are the three principal methods, and all the other textual variants seem to be combinations and conflations of them.

The most important conclusion from these results is that there are no longer extant any pure MSS. either of the short or of the long recension; granting the existence of the short recension, it is plain that it now only exists in conflation with the long text, and similarly the existence of the doxology in almost all MSS. is a proof that the long text has been contaminated by the short. The only possible witnesses to the long text, uncontaminated by the short, are Priscillian and MSS. known to Jerome (cf. his comment on Eph. iii. 8); but it is by no means certain that these do not imply omission of the doxology rather than the use of a text which never had it.

In any case, there is, I think, quite convincing proof that in the second and third centuries a short text of Romans was widely used, though it was universally abandoned<sup>1</sup> by the official texts of the fourth century.

It is necessary to go on to show that this short text probably omitted the references to Rome in the first chapter. For this there are three direct witnesses, Origen, Ambrosiaster and *Codex Boernerianus* (G), and the last probably represents in this case the archetype of DEFG.

The evidence of Origen is given directly in *Codex Athous Laurae* 184, a MS. which E. von der Goltz discovered in

<sup>1</sup> It would perhaps be true to say that the process of extinction had already begun in the third century. Origen's text shows clear signs of the short recension, but he certainly regarded the longer text as the only right one, and attributed the short form to Marcion. No doubt the text changed at a varying pace in various places. The short recension seems to have lasted longer in Africa and perhaps in Italy than in Alexandria.



1897<sup>1</sup> to contain a text of the Epistle to the Romans made from the last Greek of the commentary of Origen. This MS. gives, it is true, the words ἐν Ῥώμῃ in Romans i. 7 and 15, but the scribe has been honest enough to add a note to the effect that this was not in his original “ τοῦ ἐν Ῥώμῃ οὔτε ἐν τῇ ἐξηγήσει οὔτε ἐν τῷ ῥητῷ (i.e., the section of text at the head of the comment) μνημονεύει.” The unexpressed subject of this sentence<sup>2</sup> is of course Origen. Von der Goltz is, however, probably mistaken in thinking that this reading is not confirmed by the Latin text of Origen made by Rufinus. It is true that the words in dispute come in the text, but, as Lightfoot pointed out long ago in *Biblical Essays*, p. 287, the comment does not imply them.

It is possible that Origen knew MSS. containing the word ἐν Ῥώμῃ, but it is at least certain that he preferred to follow others which omitted them, and it is therefore probable that this was the old Alexandrian reading as distinguished from the later recension found in our extant MSS.

Similarly the evidence of Ambrosiaster claims the omission of ἐν Ῥώμῃ for the European Latin, for he says, “ *Quamvis Romanis scribat, illis tamen scribere se significat qui in caritate Dei sunt.*” Again, it is true that the text accompanying the comment is *qui sunt Romae in caritate Dei*, but from the comment it is clear that the word *Romae* is a later addition of the scribe, and that the text commented on is *qui sunt in caritate Dei*, which represents in Greek τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ. This is actually the reading found in G, which seems here to have the original text of the archetype of DEFG, while D (if one judge from a comparison of the Latin d and of the copy E), had the conflate reading which is now found in

<sup>1</sup> E. Freiherr von der Goltz, *Eine textkritische Arbeit des zehnten bzw. sechsten Jahrhunderts*, in Gebhardt and Harnack's *Texte und Untersuchungen, neue Folge*, ii., 4, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> The same note, but without any explanation, is found in MS. Bodl. Roe 16 (Cod. Paul 47).

the text of Ambrosiaster, *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ᾿Ρώμῃ ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ*. This is also found in *Cod. Amiatinus* and *Fuldensis* of the Vulgate : either they represent the opinion of Jerome, or are introducing Old Latin readings.

Thus the absence of the words *ἐν ᾿Ρώμῃ* from the oldest form of the European Latin is as certain as their absence in some Alexandrian MSS. Seeing that the same type of Latin is, through the Latin capitulations and the evidence of the doxology, one of the chief witnesses for the existence of the short text,<sup>1</sup> it is reasonable to think that the omission of *ἐν ᾿Ρώμῃ* was a characteristic of the short recension; this conclusion is strengthened by finding Origen witnessing both to the omission of the two words, and also to the existence of MSS. which, by their treatment of the doxology, point to the short recension, is supported by the fact that Codex G, which omits *ἐν ᾿Ρώμῃ*, also implies a knowledge of the short form, and would be absolutely proved if Corssen be right (as I believe he is) in thinking that the reconstructed original of DEFG shows that a different textual character in chapters xv. and xvi. from the rest of the epistle,—for it would then be direct evidence that in MS. of the short recension the reference to Rome was wanting.

All the available evidence seems to show that the short recension of Romans was widely known in the second century, and that it was not universally supplanted by the longer form until after the third; the question then arises whether the same can be said for chapters xv. and xvi., and, if so, whether they ought to be regarded as genuine Pauline writings directed to the Church at Rome, or—whether Pauline or not—intrusive matter.

It is well known that—quite apart from the question of the short recension, doubts have been raised as to chapter xvi.

<sup>1</sup> I can find no satisfactory evidence either way as to the African text of Rom. i. 7. Cyprian never quotes the verse.

Here, it is said, we have much more probably a short note of commendation from St. Paul to the Church at Ephesus. Doubtless there is much to be said on this matter, but I must content myself here with a reference to Zahn, Riggenbach, or Sanday and Headlam, and the expression of my belief that there is no reason to doubt the tradition connecting chapters xv. and xvi., or that both of them were—in some way—sent by St. Paul to Rome.

In this case the problem is to account for the existence of two texts, both equally genuine, in the sense that all the whole sixteen chapters were written by St. Paul.

*The "Marcion hypothesis."*

The most popular solution at present is certainly that offered by Sanday and Headlam, and recently supported with a wealth of learning by Dr. Corssen, to the effect that the short recension was made by Marcion. The arguments for this view are that Marcion undoubtedly did alter the text in some way in order to suit his own purposes, and that it is possible to find passages in Romans xv. and xvi. which may have offended him, so that he cut those chapters off altogether. In any case, he certainly had a text which omitted the doxology, and probably also the two last chapters. The weak point of the argument is not so much in regard to chapters xv. and xvi., as to the omission of the reference to Rome. It is said that Marcion wished to manufacture a general treatise on Christianity instead of a letter to a single Church, and therefore omitted ἐν Ῥώμῃ. But there is no evidence in favour of this, and in the Marcionite prologues<sup>1</sup> the epistle is described as *ad Romanos* in the usual way, which is, of course, no proof that Marcion read ἐν Ῥώμῃ in i. 7, but at least shows that he did not try to

<sup>1</sup> See Dom Donatien du Bruyne, *Prologues Bibliques d'origine Marcionite* in the *Revue Bénédictine*, 1907, p. 1 ff.

treat the epistle as a general treatise. Therefore, supposing that Marcion used the short recension, it is, so far as the omission of ἐν Ῥώμῃ is concerned, more probable that he used it because he found it already existing than that he manufactured it.

Moreover, in the Marcionite Prologues there is a difference of reading between the various manuscripts as to the place from which *Romans* was sent. The majority say from Corinth, as is the usual tradition, but some say from Athens. Corssen is inclined to regard the latter reading as original, and I believe that he is right, for it is easy to understand how Athens came to be altered to Corinth, but the reverse process is unintelligible. The tradition naming Corinth is generally recognized to be an obvious (and correct) deduction from chapters xv. and xvi. ; if this be so, is it not probable that the tradition mentioning Athens is based on a text, known as it is to have existed, which omitted these chapters ? In this case it would seem more likely that Marcion, the author of the Athens tradition, used the short recension because he found it already in existence, than that he fashioned for the first time. If he had known—but rejected—chapters xv. and xvi., he would surely have chosen Corinth rather than Athens.

Finally, there is the objection that, if it be true that Marcion made the short recension, the influence of the Marcionite text must have been much greater than has hitherto been recognized. This may be the case ; but if so, it is exceedingly important for the history of the text of the Pauline epistles

Various other theories have been invented by various critics to account for the existence of the short recension ; but they have for the most part had but a short and feeble existence, and are now decently buried in the pages of Zahn and similar books. One of the simplest was suggested by

Bishop Lightfoot,<sup>1</sup> who thought that St. Paul may have made the short recension himself in order to give a general account of his position in the controversy between Jewish and Gentile Christians. To this theory the decisive objection is the improbability that any one who was not animated by dogmatic prepossessions, as Marcion is supposed to have been, would ever have split the epistle at xiv. 23. The natural divisions are after xi. 36 ; xiii. 14 ; or xv. 13. Moreover, it is doubtful whether it is on general grounds so likely that an originally local letter was turned into a general treatise, as that the reverse took place.

*An alternative hypothesis : the priority of the short recension.*

Ought not more attention to be paid to the possibility that the short recension is the original form of the text which was afterwards expanded? This view was suggested, in a complicated and somewhat fantastic form, by E. Renan in the introduction to his *L'Apôtre Paul*, and was decisively criticized by Lightfoot in the Essay just mentioned. Yet after all Lightfoot only answered Renan's form of the hypothesis, and I should like to plead that a hearing should be given to a simpler one, as an alternative to the popular Marcionite hypothesis.

The main features of the problem which must be taken into account are two : (1) there was from as early a time as evidence on textual points reaches an epistle to the Romans which stopped at Romans xiv. 23 with or without (I think probably with) the doxology, and without any reference to Rome in chapter i. ; (2) nevertheless, chapters xv. and xvi. are clearly genuinely Pauline, and are never found except as a continuation of the other chapters. I suggest, as a working hypothesis, that the short recension represents a

<sup>1</sup> *Biblical Essays*, pp. 287 ff. It is perhaps not unnecessary to note that this is a reprint of the articles often quoted from the *Journal of Philology*, 1869-71.

letter written by St. Paul at the same time as *Galatians*, in connexion with the question of Jewish and Gentile Christians, for the general instruction of mixed Churches which he had not yet visited. It had originally nothing to do with Rome. Later on he sent a copy to Rome, with the addition of the other chapters to serve, as we should say, as a covering letter.

The arguments in favour of this hypothesis may be formulated somewhat as follows. Assuming that St. Paul first wrote an epistle which in i. 7 read<sup>1</sup> τοῖς οὖσι ἐν . . . ἀγαπήτοις θεοῦ, κλήτοις ἁγίοις, and ended with xiv. 23 and (possibly) the doxology, what are the probabilities as to its date, the place from which it was written, and the Christians to whom it was addressed? Dealing with the last point first, it is clear that there is nothing whatever to indicate any one community, though the general tone points to those in which Jewish and Gentile Christians came into contact with each other. We have to deal with a general epistle, devoid of address, or of concluding greetings. That is to say, exactly the same phenomena as are found in the best text of *Ephesians*. In that epistle the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ are omitted by the critical editors, and the generally received explanation is that it, which we call *Ephesians*, and Marcion called *Laodiceans*, was originally designed exclusively for neither of these Churches, but was a circular epistle in which the name could be filled in according to circumstances. As companion letters to *Ephesians* we have *Colossians*, and *Philemon*, and it would seem that *Ephesians* is the general epistle to the Christians in Asia, *Colossians* an epistle to a special Church in that province, and *Philemon* a private note to an individual Christian either in Colossae or a neighbouring town. The connexion in thought between *Ephesians* and

<sup>1</sup> I reserve the justification of this reconstruction of the text to the end of the article.

*Colossians* is scarcely plainer than that between *Romans* and *Galatians*, and if we take the short recension, the parallel is almost perfect. Why should it not be, then, that *Romans* was originally a general epistle written by St. Paul at the same time as *Galatians*, to the mixed Churches which had sprung up round Antioch, and further on in Asia Minor? In that case we should have another instance of St. Paul's custom of writing a general epistle, and supporting it by a series of letters to the separate Churches<sup>1</sup> in the district for which it was intended.

If this argument be sound, it follows that if you can date *Galatians* you can also date the short form of *Romans*. The date of *Galatians* is no easy problem: but there seems to be a growing consensus of opinion that it ought not to be placed far from the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem. My own view is that it was written before the Council, but soon after is a more popular view. In any case, the circumstances can probably be roughly described thus. In the fifth de-cennium of the first century the two main centres of the Christian Church were Jerusalem and Antioch; in the former the community was essentially Jewish, held to the Jewish law as a matter of course, and had not at first contemplated the possibility of the admission of Gentiles to the Messianic kingdom. The episode of Cornelius finally convinced the Christians of Jerusalem that this possibility was to be reckoned with, and they were theoretically persuaded that the Gospel ought to be preached to the Gentiles. But the problem as to the relation of Gentile converts to the law had never struck them as a practical question: naturally, it was thought, a Gentile who became a Christian would accept

<sup>1</sup> *Galatians* is of course not a letter to a single Church as *Colossians* was. But it was sent to a sharply defined and probably comparatively small circle of Churches—Lystra, Derbe, Iconium being the chief if not the only ones.

the customs of the Jewish Christians who were the original members of the Messianic kingdom. In Antioch, on the other hand, the majority of the Christians were Gentiles, who saw no necessity for accepting all the obligations of the Jewish law, and distinguished between what the original Christians did because they were Christians, and what they did merely because they had been born Jews.

Thus came into existence the two parties which ultimately discussed their differences in Jerusalem. We know from the *Acts* that the Jerusalem Christians, once they saw the gravity of the situation, sent representatives to make propaganda in Antioch and in the daughter churches of Antioch, such as those of Galatia. It is also clear that this campaign was stoutly resisted by St. Paul. Is it not practically certain that *Galatians* belongs to this period and was written to the Galatians in answer to the efforts of the emissaries of the conservative party at Jerusalem,—whether before or after the Council is for the present purpose less important,—and is not the short recension of *Romans* exactly what he might have written at the same time, as a general epistle to be circulated in the neighbourhood of Antioch? <sup>1</sup>

So far there is not much difficulty, and probably no one would deny that, if the present text of *Romans* did not exist and we had only a short form with no reference to Rome, and neither of the two chapters which are now at the end, the similarity of thought to *Galatians* and of form to *Ephesians* would be regarded as sufficient proof that the theory just set out is *primâ facie* probable.

The difficulty is to show that this *primâ facie* probability is not destroyed by chapters xv. and xvi., and that a reason-

<sup>1</sup> The idea has struck me that the title *πρὸς Ῥωμαίους* may possibly have been attached to it from the beginning. *Ῥωμαῖος* does not mean an inhabitant of Rome, but a member of the Roman Empire, and it might have been used in this sense in Antioch. But I attach no importance to this suggestion.



able hypothesis can be suggested which retains the advantages of this theory, and yet explains how the two chapters in question came to be attached to the epistle so as to form the long recension.

Sanday and Headlam (who fully accept the existence of the short recension) have long ago pointed out that no theory is satisfactory which does not recognize a connexion of thought between chapters xiv. and xv. This is incontrovertible, but the conclusion which is drawn by them from the fact is unnecessarily far-reaching. They argue that therefore no theory can be accepted which does not regard the short recension as later in time than the long one. If this were the case, I think we should be forced to accept the Marcionite hypothesis with all its important consequences as to the history of the text and the value of existing MSS. But it is not necessary to accept this reasoning. An alternative theory is that St. Paul himself sent a copy of the "short recension" to Rome when he was in Corinth, and added the last two chapters as a "covering letter," in which he naturally took up and expanded the theme which was found at the end of his enclosure. A more or less imaginative reconstruction of the circumstances would be the following:—St. Paul was in Corinth, on the point of departure for Jerusalem, when he was told that Phœbe of Cenchrea was going to Rome, and would like an introduction to his friends in Rome. This was the occasion of his sending a short letter introducing Phœbe and explaining his plans for visiting Rome on his next journey. But he knew through Aquila that in Rome there were difficulties between the Jews and Christians.<sup>1</sup> Now this was just the subject which had been

<sup>1</sup> This is not imaginative, but a legitimate deduction from the statement of Suetonius that the edict of Claudius, which led to Aquila's withdrawal from Rome, was due to an uproar among the Jews—*impulsore Chresto*. How Christianity reached Rome we do not know: but the evidence of Aquila and Suetonius shows that it did so before the year 50 A.D.

the cause of his writing the "short recension" some years previously, so he enclosed a copy and made his "covering letter" begin in such a way as to carry on the thoughts with which he had ended formerly.

The only objection that I can see to this hypothesis is St. Paul ought to have described in his covering letter the contents of his enclosure. It is true that would have been more natural, especially had he been using modern paper and envelopes. But I take it that what happened was that St. Paul told Tertius to make a copy of the "short recension" and then dictated the remainder. If the Romans wished to know any more about the form of the document, and why it so plainly consisted of two parts separated by the doxology, they must ask Phœbe, or quite possibly Aquila knew the facts about the short recension already and would see what St. Paul had done.

The history of the epistle after it reached Rome is another problem which can never be solved with certainty, yet I think that we can form a fair guess. The growth of the *corpus Paulinum* is practically unknown to us. All that we know is that in the second century the progress of collecting Pauline epistles was going on in more than one place, so that in one locality there was one order, in another something different. That is to say, at an early period churches began to exchange copies of St. Paul's epistles, not because of their intrinsic value as letters, but because they were Pauline. It was for that reason that the Epistle to Philemon came into the canon. Considerably earlier than this must have been the time when the letters were copied not simply because they were Pauline, but because they dealt with important subjects. During this time no epistles are more likely to have been copied than *Romans*—in the short form—and *Ephesians*, and as a matter of fact there is no epistle, except perhaps *1 Corinthians*, which is so well attested in

the subapostolic period as these two. A scribe in Rome would be likely to copy the short form of Romans down to the doxology after xiv. 23, but not to go on to add the "covering letter"; thus the short form would come into circulation from Rome, and it is also probable that other copies were circulating in the East which were from the beginning independent of the Roman tradition. As soon, however, as the emphasis of interest came to fall not on the contents but on the authorship of the epistles the tendency was to copy and circulate everything which was Pauline, and so in future copies of *Romans* made in Rome the "covering letter" would be added, and the original form of the "long recension" (with the doxology still in the original place after xiv. 23?) would come into circulation, copies of the short recension would be amplified by the addition of the fresh material, and the complicated textual process described at the beginning of this article would begin. A parallel to this process may probably be found in 2 Corinthians. The remarkable book of Dr. Kennedy ought, I think, to convince every one who takes the trouble to study its pages that this epistle is really a combination of the fragments of two letters,<sup>1</sup> copied out in order in Corinth at a time when interest in anything Pauline had become a dominating feature of Christian literary activity. The interval evidence is here much stronger than it is in *Romans*, but on the other hand there is no trace of any textual evidence. It is perhaps interesting to ask why the textual tradition should be less strong in the case of 2 *Corinthians* than in that of *Romans*. Probably the answer is to be found in the

<sup>1</sup> J. H. Kennedy, *The Second and Third Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians*. Methuen & Co., 1900. I fancy that this learned book has not generally received the recognition that it deserves. In spite of a certain obscurity of style, it seems to me to be far away the best book on the subject in any language, and to state the case in a way which avoids the objections usually made to the Vier-Capitel-Hypothese.

independent circulation of the short form of *Romans*, and in the fact that 2 *Corinthians* seems to come into general use much later than 1 *Corinthians*—Dr. Kennedy suggests only after the Epistle of Clement drove the Corinthians to look at their archives and find various fragments of an almost forgotten correspondence.

That the theory which is suggested as to the history of the Epistle to the Romans can never become more than a possible hypothesis is, of course, obvious, nor would I venture to claim that it has self-evident probability. But the fact that a "short form" did exist in the second and third centuries is certain, and has to be dealt with somehow. The theory which holds the field is that of a Marcionite recension: feeling that this is unsatisfactory, I have ventured to suggest an alternative which, though not simple, seems to me to do more justice to the facts, which are also not simple, and to be supported by the analogy of other epistles.

It only remains to deal with some subordinate points which could not be discussed advantageously in the course of the main argument.

(1) What was really the original text of Romans i. 7? We have in the oldest authorities a choice between *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπήτοις θεοῦ*, and *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ*. I suggest that the original was *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν . . . ἀγαπήτοις θεοῦ*, with a blank for the name of community (just as seems to be the case in *Ephesians*). If the name were not filled in and the blank space not left we should get in connected script **ΤΟΙΣΟΥΣΙΝΕΝΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΙΣΘΕΟΥ**, and a very natural correction would be the removal of the **ΤΟΙΣ** before **ΘΕΟΥ**. If this be not so, I think *ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ* is probably the right reading and *ἀγαπήτοις* a stylistic emendation, though the point is difficult to decide.

(2) An advantage of the theory suggested is that it enables us to bring *Romans* and *Galatians* chronologically together,

and to have fewer doubts as to the true date of *Galatians*. It may be said in general that the most obvious lines of argument tend to place *Galatians* before 1 *Corinthians* and close to the Apostolic Council, but there has always been the difficulty that *Galatians* is so like *Romans*, and *Romans* seemed to be fixed after 2 *Corinthians*. This has been felt especially by Lightfoot and Askwith, and their arguments have never been answered but only put aside. If, however, *Romans* i. to xiv. be separated from xv. to xvi. the position is turned, and we can bring *Galatians* and *Romans* i.–xiv. together without difficulty.

(3) It may be said that the early date suggested for *Romans* i. to xiv. is negatived by a comparison between *Romans* xiv. and 1 *Corinthians* viii. This is a really serious point, but I think that the argument can and ought to be turned. *Romans* xiv. implies a difference of opinion about food in general; this is the situation implied by the Apostolic Council, and by the episode of St. Peter in Antioch, which ought probably to be placed just before the council. To my own mind it is most easily explained (as in *Galatians*) if it be placed before the agreement represented in the Apostolic decrees. On the other hand, 1 *Corinthians* viii. is not concerned with food in general, but with *εἰδωλόθυστα* and the practical working of the Apostolic decree against *εἰδωλόθυστα*, and this is the background against which the whole chapter must be placed in order to be understood. Placed against this 1 *Corinthians* viii. is intelligible,<sup>1</sup> and *Romans* xiv. is obscure—at least not to me—but it becomes clear as soon as it is placed against the different background which is earlier than the Apostolic decrees.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

<sup>1</sup> I would, however, guard myself against seeming to admit that the Apostolic decrees represent a Food-law,—but that is another question, and not a short one.

## PSALM XLV.

THE purpose of this paper is to propose a point of view<sup>1</sup> from which some of the most prominent difficulties in the exegesis of this song of love seem to disappear.

The following four are the most obvious questions:

(*a*) Is there any royal marriage known within the horizon of either Israel or the Jewish community to which this Psalm might contain a reference?

(*β*) Is this style and are the words used in this poem possible with reference to an Oriental monarch and his bride?

(*γ*) What may be said about the subject(s) speaking here?

(*δ*) How is it possible to account for its reception in the Canon?

It is notoriously difficult to answer the first question. The fields of Eastern history down to the later Ptolemies have been thoroughly explored apparently without adequate result.

The second problem, the question about the peculiar character of the style of this Psalm, is also of some importance. There are here no protestations of humility and obedience, such as might be expected even from the highest official in the court of an Eastern prince. The tone of the whole is conspicuously chaste and restrained—approaching rather to being as familiar as could be in the circumstances.

<sup>1</sup> After this article had been written out, but before its being published here, its main point was anticipated by a short study in the German *Zeitschr. für die alttestl. Wiss.* (xxvii. pp. 26–32), by Rev. Dykema, of Rotterdam, Holland. I gladly mention this coincidence as a corroboration of the theory here proposed. There are, however, several points which have received here a fuller treatment, though a minute statistic carefulness, such as e.g. appears in Prof. W. S. Pratt's contribution to the *Journ. of Bibl. Lit.* (xix. 2, pp. 189–218), would have been out of place.

The highest title given to the king is the simple, *mighty one*. The rest of the poem never goes beyond a mere, "thou" or, "the king." The familiar character of this song is especially visible when the royal spouse is spoken to: "Hearken, O daughter." This is a language so unceremonial that one would think it could never be safely used by any one but the king himself or his equal.

From here is but one step to the third of our difficulties: what may be said about the subject or subjects speaking in this Psalm? An attentive reader soon feels something shifting in the point of view from which the incidents of this royal marriage are described by the poet. This question is often a problem of some difficulty. One thing, however, seems to be certain, that this "song of loves" cannot be classed as a *Gemeindepsalm*, viz., as a hymn in which the Jewish community is the idealized subject, which is supposed to utter its hopes, fears and feelings through the medium of a particular poet.

If one might venture, to illustrate the difficulty of this third question, an attempt to a new rendering of *shir yēdīdōth*, then the sense of *yēdīda*, a beloved one, would admit a parallel to Luther's translation, "Song of the Brides," viz., "*song of the bride's maidens*." This, being a not impossible, though by no means in itself necessary, translation of *yēdīdōth*, would provide us with a proper subject for the utterances contained in this marriage-psalm. The *yēdīdōth*, recognized as the escort of the bride, might be identical with the "*honourable women*" of verse 9a. Yet, if this be the case, the use of "daughter" when the queen is addressed by them seems still to involve some difficulties.

Another instance of the importance and intricacy of this third question is the curious fact that the poet thinks it appropriate to advise the queen that she should *worship* her husband as her *lord*, while he himself does not even

indulge in ceremonial language when speaking of the king. It is not easy to conceive how anybody in an Oriental court could ever obtain such an exalted position as this author must have occupied and yet at the same time give this public and unveiled utterance to his views on the occasion of a royal marriage.

These points may perhaps be sufficient to suggest that it is not possible to hold the view that this Psalm is an epithalamium composed by a Jewish courtier unless one is ready to face some serious difficulties.

How such a song has become part of the Bible is a question rather difficult to answer when holding the position just mentioned. Perhaps this problem also may be reduced to something more approaching to its real proportions, if the following point of view is accepted for a working hypothesis: *this Psalm is indeed an epithalamium, but of the same type as the Song of Songs.*

It is perhaps worth while to make an attempt to apply this key to the intricacies of our Psalm by giving a translation—following the Revised Version as nearly as convenient—accompanied by such notes as the working hypothesis suggests or may serve to its support.

One of the established results of the research in Bible lands and the study of life and manners of the Semites of to-day is the discovery of a very close analogy between the festivities, ceremonies and songs of a modern wedding feast among Syrian peasants and the scenery suggested by the Song of Songs. The songs in Canticles have appeared to be genuine “songs of love,” a collection of popular wedding songs, which by allegorical interpretation, or simply owing to the metaphorical use of “Solomon,” were received into the Canon.

Such a song our Psalm may also be.



## PSALM XLV.

For the Chief-Musician; set to "Lilies"; of the Korahites, a "Maschil." A song of loves.

1. *My heart overfloweth with a goodly matter :  
I am speaking what is done by a king ;  
My tongue is the pen of a ready writer !*

For the enigmatic *mēnaššeah*, the rendering *conqueror* might have been adopted here instead of "chief musician." It could have been derived from the meaning which the verb *nšh* is known to have in Late Hebrew, Phoenician, Aramaic and Syrian, viz. "to conquer." The versions, Aquila, Theodotion, Symmachus and Jerome, agree in ignoring the modern translation,<sup>1</sup> *Chief-musician*, which is supported by 1 Chronicles xv. 21, and the possibility of some connexion with a musical instrument of a somewhat similar name which was found in ancient Egypt. Yet, the rendering suggested above only then holds good, if we are allowed to neglect the fact that it would not be suitable<sup>2</sup> in fifty-four other Psalms and in the solitary text Habakkuk iii. 19. On the other hand, the term *conqueror* seems to be specially fit for the bridegroom in an Eastern marriage when one thinks of the *sword-dance* and of the warlike terms in which the bride is depicted as a "castle," or an *impregnable fortress*. Therefore it is worth while to compare Song of Songs, ch. iv. 4; vi. 4; vii. 4; viii. 10.

<sup>1</sup> Baethgen, *Comm.*, pp. x. xi. "As is evident from the different translations given by our most ancient witnesses, neither the meaning nor the vocalization (partially at least) of this word was fixed in antiquity, and even now *no explanation* has yet *attained to certainty*. . . . Olshausen's objection against the *current* interpretation, viz., that it is rather too self-evident that the chief-musician should get such a notice . . . is at any rate not to be undervalued."

<sup>2</sup> Neubauer, *Stud. bibl. und Eccl.* ii. p. 57, in a monograph on the titles of the Psalms. "From all these different expositions of the titles of the Psalms it is evident that the meaning of them was early lost . . . the only remaining resource when all traditional matter is exhausted, is the critical method, which, however, on the present subject has as yet made no considerable progress."

The Revised Version of *shîr yēdîdôth* by "A song of loves" suggests a fem. plur. for the abstract idea, which makes the conjectural emendation *yēdîdûth* superfluous. Dalman's *Neuhebr, und Aram. Wörterbuch* gives for *yēdîdûth* also *Auserlesenes*. Yet from the point of view adopted here there is something acceptable in the rendering "*beloved ones*," viz. bride's maidens. This rendering would suggest in quite a natural way by whom out of many persons acting in an Oriental wedding-feast this song, "For the Conqueror," was to be sung.<sup>1</sup>

The next point is the rendering of the Hebrew *ma'asai lemelekh*. This requires strictly: "*my deeds to a king*," two disconnected words yielding no sufficient sense. The Revised Version veils the difficulty by its comparatively free rendering: I speak "the things which I have made touching the king." The Masoretic view is represented by Revised Version margin: "I speak; my work (is) for a king."

Baethgen's Commentary<sup>2</sup> 1897 (Nowack's *Handkommentar zum A.T.*, p. 127), makes the equation *ma'aseh*: '*asah* = ποιεῖν: ποίημα.

This is ingenious but does not quite prove that *ma'aseh* = ποίημα, in the sense of a *poem*. It is difficult to say how much support is given to this rendering, "I sing my poems to a king," by the testimony of the versions (Field., *Hexapla*, ii.; p. 161, note 7: Theod. ? Aq. Symm. ? ?). One is tempted, therefore, to read with an early Syriac witness<sup>2</sup> *ma'aseh lemelekh*, "deed of the king," with the ה auctoris, just as *shîr leDawûd*, "A Song of David." This reading represents but a very slight altering of the radicals *m.'s.y.*,

<sup>1</sup> As it is *not* the purpose of this paper to *test* the theory, which is assumed, everything which fits in is accepted. The reader who is interested in the subject will easily discover and eliminate what seems weak to him.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Diettrich. *Išo'dath's Stellung*, etc., p. 147.

the semivowel *yodh* being replaced by a *he*. *Yodh* and *he* are very similar in ancient Semitic character, consisting both of a sloping stroke with three cross bars. The only difference is, that in the *yodh* two of the cross bars are at the left-hand side of the main stroke, while the bottom one is formed at the right-hand side, often only by a curve of the sloping stroke to the right. The *he* is identical in form except that the three cross bars are all at the left-hand side. The difference between the two, which is considerable in the sacred square character, thus almost vanishes in the original hand. And, moreover, it is a well known fact how loose the ancient MSS. were in the use of the additional semi-vowels.

If the text is thus read, the harshness disappears—for the Masoretic rendering, “I speak; my work (is) for a king,” is rightly judged by Baethgen to be “less natural”—and the resultant sense is quite clear. The *ma'aseh lemelekh*, is the “deed of the king,” viz., the *winning of the bride*. The conquest of this “fortress” is the very topic of the wedding festivities. Cf. Song of Songs, ch. ii. 4; iii. 6, 7; vi. 10; viii. 8, 9.

2. *Thou art fairer than the children of men ;  
Grace is poured upon thy lips ;  
Therefore, God hath blessed thee for ever !*

The description of the bridegroom in the Song of Songs is somewhat more elaborate, yet chapter v. verses 10–16 are just on this line, especially if one accepts the more recent view that by the phrase “grace is poured upon thy lips” the author of our Psalm is referring to *loveliness* in a general sense. This reminds one of Song of Songs v. 26 :

His mouth is most sweet, yea he is altogether lovely.

One may account for the fact that the concluding line, “therefore God hath blessed thee for ever,” cannot be

paralleled from the Song of Songs by observing that in the Psalm the bride is not speaking, as is the case there. This is of some slight importance, since "the blessing" in this case is of course the union with the beloved one. It would not be easy to contend that the bride could naturally use these words, "Therefore, God hath blessed thee for ever," with reference to herself.

3. *Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O mighty one,  
Thy glory and thy majesty ;*
4. *And in thy majesty ride on prosperously.  
In behalf of truth and rightful meekness !  
Let thy right hand teach thee terrible things.*
5. *Thine arrows are sharp ;  
Peoples fall under thee ;  
In the heart of the king's enemies !*

In the third verse the address "O mighty one" is rather restrained. A subject speaking to his king at such an occasion and on such a topic might be expected to go further in eulogies. This phenomenon, however, is quite natural if the "king" is the bridegroom in an ordinary feast.

The second line gives considerable trouble to every commentary. The Masoretic text provided us here with a noun in *statu absoluto* while the vowels are midway between the so-called "absolute" and "construct states" viz., 'ānwā, which is not 'ānāwā, but ought to be perhaps 'anwath. If we translate 'anwath *ṣedek* by "rightful meekness" and remember that in the same line 'ēmeth, "truth," means rather "trustworthiness," it seems that these words can convey a sense which points to the relation between husband and wife in an Eastern household—a relation which more often was not one of equality.

The "riding on" of the bridegroom seems to be no

unusual phrase. A parallel, e.g., is to be found in No. 293 of the *Συλλογὴ δημοτικῶν ᾠσμάτων* of Aravandinos.<sup>1</sup>

Γιὰ ἔβγ', ἀφέντη, ἔβγα, σελλώσετε τὸ γρίβα  
βάλλτ' ἀσημένια σέλλα, σκιάλαις μαλαμματένιαις,  
βάλλτε καὶ 'ς τὸ λαιμό του μαλαμματένιο γκέμι,  
νὰ καββαλκέψ' ὁ Ρήγας νὰ πάη νὰ φέρη νύφη,  
νύφη καὶ κυρανύφη κί' ἀρχοντοθυγατέρα.

Here the bridegroom is exhorted to saddle his grey horse with a silver saddle, golden stirrups and bridles, in order to ride on, to fetch a bride, a noble bride, the daughter of an *ἄρχοντας*.

The martial character of verses 4*b* and 5 in our Psalm has a parallel in Song of Songs iii. verses 7*b* and 8 :

Threescore men are about it,  
Of the mighty men of Israel  
They all handle the sword,  
And are expert in war.  
Every man has his sword upon his thigh,  
Because of fear in the night.

The bride also is spoken of in warlike terms : chapter vi., 10, she is “terrible as an army with banners.”

Something of the same sort with reference to the bride is also found in Greek nuptial songs from Epirus in the collection quoted above, No. 311, l. 5, entitled : *Πρὸ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ γαμβροῦ*.

Γιὰ ἰδέστε τὴν πῶς περπατεῖ  
σὰν ἄγγελος, μὲ τὸ σπαθί.

Another martial phrase occurs in No. 301.

Ὅλοι διάλεξαν σπαθιά, μαχαίρια  
διάλεξ' ὁ γαμπρὸς τὴν κάλλια νύφη.

This mentioning of the bride, walking like an angel with the sword, or of the bridegroom's escort with “swords and

<sup>1</sup> Σ. δ. α. ὑπὸ Π. Ἀραβαντινοῦ . . ἐν Ἀθήναις, ἐκ τοῦ τυπογραφείου Πέτρου Πέρρη, 1880, p. 187. The old-fashioned spelling of the Modern Greek is due to the original.

daggers," may be *purely rhetorical*, but this is just what may be the case in our Psalm. Here also this style is due to custom. The metaphors of the "castle," etc., with reference to the bride, naturally give rise to these further elaborations, just as in the parables of the first three Gospels often a simile is drawn further than necessary and even serviceable. Similar digressions occur in Homer and may be easily found elsewhere. Moreover, these lines have a background in the ceremony of the *sword-dance* in its various types performed in Syria, Palestine and Egypt either by the bride or by young people from the neighbourhood. Cf. Song of Songs, ch. vi. 10, 12*b*.

6. *Thy throne shall be for ever and ever,*

*A sceptre of equity the sceptre of thy kingdom shall be ;*

7. *Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated wickedness,*

*Therefore hath Jahveh thy God, anointed thee*

*With the oil of gladness above thy fellows.*

In this translation of verse 6 the current rendering "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever" has been replaced by the conjectural emendation of Bruston, Giesebrecht and Wellhausen, also mentioned by Baethgen and Duhm, who, admitting that *ēlohim* stands for an original *jahveh*, consider that both give a break in the continuity of the sense—a sudden turn from the glories of the "king" to those of God—while the results of the "king's" victories are missing. They propose therefore a slight alteration: יהיה, *jihjeh*, "shall be," instead of יהוה, *Jahveh*, by which change all difficulties are removed.

The well-known replacing of *Jahveh* by the name *Elohim* in the so-called *Elohistic* parts of the Psalter is visible also in the second line of verse 7 and adds strength to the position above mentioned.

That it is the bridegroom, the metaphorical and not a

real monarch, who is spoken to in this pericope appears from the words “*above thy fellows,*” which are especially fit when the author thinks of a bridegroom in the middle of his escort, and especially unfit to the position of an Eastern prince acquiring a new addition to his harem. It would be very nearly high treason to speak of “*fellows*” in such a connexion. Distinctly in favour of this view is the fact that the Song of Songs furnishes an exact parallel of this locution in chapter ii. 3.

As the apple tree among the trees of the wood,  
So is my beloved among the sons.

This analogy is, moreover, endorsed by other parallelisms between the next verses and other parts of the Song of Songs.

That the husband’s “*sceptre,*” his *ῥαβδός*, has a real sense in an ordinary household may be shown by another instance from modern Greece, a “*Chorus of Maidens,*” No. 40 in the collection of Aravandinos :

Ἐμπᾶτε τοιούτραις ᾿ς τὸ χορό  
Τώρα ποῦ ἔχετε καιρό  
Γιατὶ ταχὺὰ παντρεύεστε  
Σπιτονοικοκυρεύεστε.

“Go, maidens, to the dance, now that you have time, for soon you will be married and be made housewives.” . . .

᾿Σ τὸ σπίτι ὁ ἄντρας θὰ σᾶς κλῆ  
Καὶ θὲ ἰὰ παίξῃ τὸ ραβδί  
— Δυὸ ἄκραις ἔχει τὸ ραβδί  
Καὶ θ᾿ἄχουμε κι᾿ ἄλλο κλειδί.

“Your husband shall shut you in the house and shall play the stick !”

“The stick (they reply) has two ends, and we shall have another key !”

8. *All thy garments are myrrh, and aloes, and cassia ;  
Out of ivory palaces stringed instruments have made thee  
glad.*

9. *King's daughters are among thy honourable women,  
At thy right hand doth stand the " shegal " in gold of Ophir.*

A good parallel of this eulogy on the bridegroom is furnished by Song of Songs, ch. iii. 6, 7, 11:

Who is this that cometh up out of  
The wilderness like pillars of smoke,  
Perfumed with myrrh and frankincense,  
With all the powders of the merchant ?

Compare also Song of Songs, ch. v. 5, 13, etc., and " the king's chambers " and " banqueting house " in chapter i. 4; ii. 4.

Even the " king's daughters " have a parallel in Song of Songs, ch. vi. 8, 9.

There are threescore queens, and fourscore concubines,  
And maidens without number,  
My dove, my undefiled is one;  
She is the only one of her mother. . . .  
The *daughters* saw her, and called her blessed;  
The queens and the concubines, and they praised her.

The " honourable women " are as easily explainable on our working-hypothesis as on any other theory, perhaps even better. The *yedidoth* of the Psalm's title and the *yeqaroth* here may both be found in the female court of the " king and the queen " during the so-called " king's week."

The much debated correction of *benoth melakhim biqerotheikha*, " king's daughters are among thy dear ones," into *benoth melakhim beqirotheikha*, " king's daughters are in thy walls," viz., thy palace, seems to smoothen the sense, but is not affected by and does not influence in any direction the general interpretation of this Psalm as it is given here on assuming our working hypothesis.

It may seem worth while to add another instance from Eastern life to illustrate the metaphors from royal surroundings applied to a bride and her marriage. In Aravandinos' *Συλλογή* one finds the following lines in No. 285,



a poem which has the long-winded title *Εἰς τὴν ἐν τῷ θρανίῳ τοποθέτησιν τῆς νύμφης*.

Βασίλισσα τῶν γυναικῶν, σουλτάνα τῶν κυράδων  
στολίδι τῶν ἀρχοντίσσων, διαμάντι τῶν νυφάδων,  
ἄσπρ' εἶσαι κι' ἄσπρη φαίνεσαι, κι' ἄσπρ' εἶν' ἡ φορεσιά σου,  
κι' ἄσπρα λουλουδία φύτρωσαν αὐτοῦ 'ς τὸ κάθισμα σου.  
'Εσ' εἶσαι πύργος μὲ γυαλιά, κασσέλα μὲ σεντέφια  
ἐσ' εἶσαι τὸ καλλίτερο ἀπ' ὅλα σου τ' ἀδέρφια.  
\* Ἀγγελοι σου ζωγράφισαν τὸ καγγελόφρυδό σου  
καὶ τὸ κοντύλι ἔσταξεν ἐλγὰ 'ς τὸ μάγουλό σου . . .

These lines seem to provide, moreover, one more parallel of nuptial phraseology of a martial character; cf. l. 5 *πύργος μὲ γυαλιά*, a tower (or castle) with window panes (or something else made of glass). In English they run:

Queen of women, sultana of the honourable women,  
Ornament of the paiseses, diamond of brides,  
Thou art white and thou showest white, and white is thy garment,  
And white flowers blossom where thy chair is put.  
A tower art thou with glass, a coffer with mother-of-pearl;  
Thou art the fairest of all thy sisters  
Angels have painted thy angelic eyebrow  
And a pencil has drawn a mole on thy cheek. . . .

Parallel evidence is found in the Song of Songs, Chap. iv. 4:

Thy neck is like the tower of David builded for an armoury  
Whereon there hang a thousand bucklers,  
All the shields of mighty men.

This refers to strings of coins worn as a necklace, while the Greek parallel has glass-pearls in view. Other analogous passages are:

Chap. vi. 4: Thou art beautiful . . . as Tirzah, comely as Jerusalem, terrible as an army with banners.

Chap. vii. 4: Thy neck is like the tower of ivory, etc.

Chap. viii. 10: I am a wall, and my breasts like the towers, etc.

All this is metaphor of the same conventional sort as our Psalm gives.

In the second half of verse 9 the word *shegal* is usually

rendered "queen." This gives some difficulties in the supposed situation: the king in presence of the queen receiving a maiden who is to be the queen. There are several ways out of these difficulties; but, in the first place, there is a possibility which makes them superfluous. The only place where, in Hebrew, the obscure word *shegal* occurs, is Nehemiah, ch. ii. 6:

ii. 6. And the king said unto me—the *shegal* also sitting by him—for how long shall thy journey be?"

From these two instances Nehemiah ii. 6, Psalm xlv. 9, is to be derived that the *shegal* is (*a*) a person of highest standing, belonging to the immediate surroundings of the king, while (*β*) the sex remains undecided. *Shiglōn*, "a concubine," may be of the same Hebrew root *šgl*. This gives a presumption in favour of the hypothesis that the *shegal* is a feminine member of the royal family. Which member this may be is a matter of speculation—though the range of possibilities is narrowed by the fact that the person who bore this name obtained an extremely high position<sup>1</sup> in the court, almost equal to the monarch.

If one might venture a guess based on what seems to follow from our Psalm and Nehemiah ii. with a view to Oriental family life, it might seem probable that the *shegal* is the *queen-dowager*, the mother-in-law of the future queen. This explains the situation, the "familiar" address and general tenor of the style, cf. v. 10, "Hearken, O *daughter*." This could not be said by anybody else. Moreover, the

<sup>1</sup> In biblical Aramaic (cf. Dan. ch. v. 2, 3, 23) ܫܓܠܐ seems to mean "queen" as distinguished from ܫܓܠܐܢܐ "a concubine." The late Hebrew שִׁגְלוֹן and the replacement of שִׁגְלוֹן as obscene by the verb שִׁגְלוֹ does not accord too well with this view. But even if the word *šēgāl* has no other meaning than "queen" this is no objection to the fact that in this case the "queen-dowager" may be the subject speaking.

following verses contain precepts such as are usually given<sup>1</sup> by an Oriental mother-in-law to the *νύμφη*.

If in this second half of the Psalm it is really the *mother* of the "king" who is speaking, while in the first half we have the *yedidoth*, it is of some importance to note among other small touches the fact that they speak of "a king," while the mother pleads the cause of *the* king. With regard to Nehemiah ii. there is nothing strange in the fact that the king was accompanied by the queen-dowager when speaking to Nehemiah. Parallels are available from ancient Rome to modern China.

All this is confirmed by the following parallel from the Song of Songs, ch. iii. 2 :

Go forth, O ye *daughters of Zion*, and behold the "king" Solomon  
With the crown wherewith *his mother* hath crowned him  
In the *day of his espousals*  
And in the day of the gladness of his heart.

Here again we meet the *two* "subjects speaking" in our marriage song, viz. the "daughters of Zion" on one hand, and the "king's mother" on the other.

It may seem that the first three difficulties mentioned in the beginning of this article are now adequately dealt with. There is no special royal marriage to which this Psalm fits, since this whole scenery is due to the conventional style and customs of an Oriental marriage.

There is no difficulty, therefore, in the "familiar" and unceremonial language.

The curious uncertainty about the subject speaking in this "song of loves" disappears also if the interpretation given above hold good.

<sup>1</sup> In the four vols. which have appeared till now of Professor Politis' *Collection of Modern Greek Proverbs*, one may find sufficient information from every-day life with regard to the power of an Oriental mother-in-law over the *νύμφη* and specimens of the "precepts" alluded to above and elsewhere.

10. *Hearken, O daughter, and consider and incline thy ear ;  
Forget also thy own people, and thy father's house ;*
11. *So shall the king desire thy beauty,  
For he is thy lord, and worship thou him.*
12. *And the daughter of Tyre (shall be there) with a gift ;  
The rich among the people shall intreat thy favour.*

The words "O daughter" always give some difficulty unless they are pronounced by the mother-in-law of the bride. On this assumption they are quite natural both in a royal marriage and in one which has only a metaphorical right to this title—in the latter case, however, they are still more suitable. The same holds good with regard to the use of "lord" and "worship thou him"—here it is indeed difficult to see whoever could dare to advise a future queen in the presence of the king and the court in such a way. Everything goes even more smoothly if an ordinary marriage is the scene of this advice and the bridegroom's mother the person speaking in verse 10 *sq.*

With regard to this relation between the bride and her mother-in-law, it may be worth while to quote some more lines from Greek marriage songs, No. 303: *Εἰς τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τῆς νύμφης ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς οἰκίας (καθ' ὄδον).*

- Ξένο μου πουλί, ξένο μ' ἀηδόνι,  
ψὲς ποῦ ἦσουνε, ποῦ θὰ ἦσαι βράδν ;  
— ψὲς κοιμήθηκα 'ς τὰ γονικά μου,  
βράδν 'ς τοῦ γαμπροῦ, 'ς τὰ πεθερικά μου.
- 5 Ξένο μου πουλί καὶ χελιδόνι,  
τί στοιχάζεσαι, τὶ συλλογιέσαι ;  
τήρα τὸν γαμπρό, πῶς σε κυττάζει,  
τήρα πῶς πετάει καὶ καμαρόνει.

My dear foreign bird, my foreign nightingale,  
Where were you yesterday ? where shall you be this evening ?  
Yesterday I slept in the house of my parents,  
This evening in my husband's, at my parents-in-law.

5 My dear foreign bird, my swallow,  
 What are you thinking? what are you pondering?  
 Look on your bridegroom, how he does look on you,  
 Look how he gallops and shows his valiance.

So in No. 286 an instance occurs parallel to the lines quoted above from the Song of Songs:

1. 11. Χαρὰ ἔς τὴν μάνα τοῦ γαμπροῦ, τὴν πεθερὰ τῆς νύφης  
 ὁπῶκαμε τέτοιον υἱὸν ζευγάρι τέτοιας νύφης.

Joy to the mother of the bridegroom, the *mother-in-law* of the bride,  
 Who has made such a son a pair with such a bride!

The *crowning*, though not by the mother of the bridegroom but by the *παράνυφος*, is still in use in Eastern life, cf. No. 313: Ἐν τῇ στέψει, l. 5: στέκετ' ὁ παπᾶς νὰ τὰ βλογήση—κι' ὁ παράνυφος νὰ στεφανώση. The priest stands there to bless the pair, the paranymp to crown them.

13. *The king's daughter is within all glorious:*  
*Her clothing is wrought in gold,*  
 14. *She shall be led unto the king in broidered work,*  
*The virgins her companions that follow her*  
*Shall be brought unto her.*

The Revised Version restores *v. 13a* as “the king’s daughter within (the palace) is all glorious.” This is not strictly necessary. These words may be thought to refer to a garment “wrought in gold” which she wears underneath a loose mantle of “broidered work.”

All this—the “gold,” the “embroideries,” the “virgins her companions”—has its parallels in Greek nuptial songs. Χρυσὰ χτένια, golden combs; χρυσὰ μαλλιὰ, golden hair; χρυσὸ καμᾶρι τοῦ σπιτιοῦ, golden dearest of the house; βασίλισσα τῆς γειτονίας, queen of the neighbourhood. Cf. No. 312, l. 6: σοῦ τάξει κι' ὁ καλὸς σου ὀλόχρυσο μαντύλι, Your dear one sends you also a handkerchief wrought in gold.

In the songs on the dressing of the bridegroom it is also "gold and silver" everywhere.

In *v. 14b* there is again what may be a striking personal note: "shall be brought unto *thee*"—not that the virgin companions are to be concubines to the "king," but the bride and her friends are *mūba'oth*, viz. "escorted" or "led" by the rest of the bridal procession.

15. *With gladness and rejoicing shall they be led,*

*They shall enter into the king's palace.*

16. *Instead of thy fathers shall be thy children*

*Whom thou shalt make princes in all the earth.*

17. *I will make thy name to be remembered in all generations,*

*Therefore shall the peoples give thee thanks for ever and ever.*

The topic touched in verse 16 is such a one as can be best admitted when the mother of the bridegroom is speaking. Another point is the exalted phrase, "whom thou shalt make princes in all the earth." This is too huge an assumption to fit easily into the hypothesis of a *real* royal marriage, but it gives a better sense when it is understood that a mother is speaking here and glorifying the offspring of her son in conventional style. There is a contrast between the simple "king," "queen," "thou," "he," and this high-pitched "princes in all the earth," which is made more comprehensible by admitting the working hypothesis assumed here.

One may think verse 17 to be a response of the bride to the "king," or to his mother, though it might better be a conclusion of the words spoken to the bride by her mother-in-law. Traces of liturgical adaptation are suspected in these concluding verses, but not necessarily, nor are they easily detected.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the *Z.a.t.W.*, xxvii., p. 28, *vv. 14-17* are supposed to have been sung by a chorus, 2-19 the poet is speaking, while (p. 31) *v. 18b* is explained as a doxology added by an ancient adherent of the Messianic interpretation.

The fourth difficulty mentioned in the first part of this article is, how to account for the reception of this "song of loves" into the canon. If one looks up the *Critici Sacri*, vol. iii. (ed. Amstelaedami and Ultrajecti, 1698) col. 251, the first words of the first commentary are these: "According to both Hebrews and Christians, this Psalm treats of the 'Messiah,' though to some it seems to ask an interpretation with reference to Solomon, who was a type of Christ."

This "Solomonic" interpretation may have been very old and have been the cause of its admission. But a Messianic view of its contents is also a probable and sufficient explanation of the fact. The frequent mentioning of a glorious king, combined with the exegesis of יהיה in l. 7 not as a verb but as representing the Name—therefore later on replaced by אלהים—must suggest to all who are living in a certain conception of the Psalter that the Messiah was its subject.<sup>1</sup>

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#### FURTHER NOTES ON THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

THE synoptic problem which has of late engaged the speculation of some of our keenest and most laborious students is still unsolved. It has opened out many different lines of research, but even the one point claimed to be settled—the priority of St. Mark's Gospel—must still be regarded as uncertain and not free from difficulty.

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Justin Martyn (ed. Otto<sup>3</sup>). *Dial. c. Tryph.*, cc. 38, 56, 63, 76, 86, 96. This Psalm furnished a series of testimonies to the effect that Christ is βασιλεύς, κύριος, προσκυνητός, θεός, χριστός, (= κεχρισμένος). Also Cyprian's *Testimonies*, II. 3, 6, 29: Christ is *sermo, Deus, rex in aeternum regnaturus*. Cyprian quotes our Psalm to this end along with passages from the *Song of Songs* in *Epist.* lxxv. ch. 12. Parallel passages occur in the *Testimonies* of Gregory of Nyssa (ed. Zacagni) and of Dionysius bar Salibhi.

It has, of course, been obvious from the first that some kind of relationship exists between the Synoptic Gospels, so that the problem itself is an old one. Recent investigation, however, has shown more conclusively than before that the whole, or almost the whole, of St. Mark's Gospel has been absorbed in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke. But this 'absorption' does not by any means involve identity of words or expression. The differences, indeed, in parallel passages are in some cases very difficult to account for on the theory that St. Matthew or St. Luke had before him the Gospel according to St. Mark in the form known to us. At the same time it is undeniable that the presence of special words or phrases can only be explained by the supposition of a common source.

A few instances may be cited to illustrate the differences and the identity of parallel passages—Matthew iv. 18-22; Mark i. 16-20. The call of the first four Apostles.

In this passage we have nearly absolute identity in the words of our Lord: *δεῦτε ὀπίσω μου, καὶ ποιήσω ὑμᾶς γενέσθαι ἀλιεῖς ἀνθρώπων.* St. Matthew omits *γενέσθαι* in his report, a slight change, but one to be noted. For the rest Matthew changes Mark's *ἀμφιβάλλοντας* to the more specific *βάλλοντας ἀμφίβληστρον.*

Matthew ix. 1-5; Mark ii. 1-7. The cure of a paralytic. Here St. Matthew's account is brief, and omits several points of interest recorded by St. Mark. The quotation of our Lord's words is identical.

Matthew xii. 9-14; Mark iii. 1-6. The man with a withered hand. Here also a part of St. Mark's report of much interest is omitted by St. Matthew. The parallel is again close only in our Lord's words, with the remarkable exception of the rare verbal form *ἀπεκατεστώθη* (was restored) which is common to the triple tradition and is strong evidence of a common source in Greek.



Matthew viii. 18, 23-27; Mark iv. 35-41. The stilling of the storm. Here there are expressions and even words of our Lord peculiar to Mark. It is difficult to believe that 'a compiler' with this record before him would have failed to transcribe the words of Jesus, and the vivid descriptive touches in Mark.

The same remarks apply to the narrative of the Gadarene demoniac which follows. St. Matthew's account is much shorter, but there is no trace of the copyist here. Matt. viii. 28-34; Mark v. 1-20.

Matthew xxii. 37-39 and Mark xii. 30, 31. These parallel verses contain our Lord's answer to the Scribe's question: "What is the first commandment of all?" The triple report coincides, except that Matthew omits the words *ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ἰσχύος σου* (with all thy strength), and, with St. Luke, uses the preposition *ἐν* instead of *ἐξ*. It is a small divergence of this kind which tends to disprove that the author of the first Gospel was a copyist of Mark. For in that case why should the serious omission have been made, or the change from one proposition to another? This is a typical example of which several instances could be cited, all exhibiting unnecessary changes, and certainly such as no writer in the second century with an apostolic exemplar before him would venture to make.

These instances, chosen almost at haphazard, suffice to indicate the conditions of the problem. Exact identity in part even to the inclusion of an extremely rare verbal form, and, on the other hand, diverse language in describing the self-same event, and particulars given in the proto-evangelium not transferred by the copyist or compiler to his own work.

In considering the solution of the problem another fact must be taken into account, namely, the parallelism of the order in which the events belonging to the 'Marcan tradi-

tion' are recorded in the three Synoptic Gospels. This fact will be apparent by a glance at any harmony of the Gospels, and needs no elucidation. It is shown in an interesting way by comparing Matthew viii. 1-4 with Mark i. 40-45, where the parallelism interrupted after Matthew iv. 25 by the insertion of the Sermon on the Mount is resumed immediately after the sermon, which St. Mark does not record. This parallelism of order proves as distinctly as verbal parallelism a relation of origin between the Synoptics.

The two points, therefore, may be considered together. In regard to the order and sequence of events, although, as has been said, the order of the Marcan tradition is on the whole followed in the other Synoptics, it is more than probable that St. Mark himself was following a recognised order of delivering the Gospel. A great deal is implied by the expression *ἡ διδαχὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων* (Acts. ii. 42). The evidence of the Synoptic Gospels and of the Epistles goes to prove that there was not only a definite Apostolic scheme both in the order and subject matter of instruction in the life and teaching of Christ, but also a consensus in regard to doctrinal teaching.

Some such scheme would be needed for successfully carrying out the system of catechetical instruction which we know to have existed in the earliest days of the Christian Church. Traces of the synoptic order in outline appear as early as in St. Peter's speech on the Day of Pentecost. That discourse is evidently compressed and abbreviated, and in verses 22-24 of chapter ii. of the Acts we have a short but clear indication of the synoptic order : 1. The Gospel of the childhood is suggested by "Jesus of Nazareth" ; (2) "Approved by mighty works" expanded would be a narrative of the Ministry ; (3) The words "ye did crucify and slay" comprise the Passion and Crucifixion. (4) And the Resurrec-

tion and Ascension are briefly noted by "Him God raised up."

The same order is virtually set forth in our Lord's converse with the two disciples on the way to Emmaus. The importance of that oral gospel according to Christ Himself seems to have been somewhat overlooked in discussing the origin of the synoptic order. All the elements of a synoptic gospel are comprised in that wonderful fragment of our Lord's own gospel, the first part drawn from the lips of the disciples by the questioning of Jesus, the rest given by His own interpretation of the Old Testament Scriptures and by His own evidence of the Resurrection. Other oral gospels preserved in the Acts, and such summaries as are found in the Epistles<sup>1</sup> point to the same general form of delivery. The fact, therefore, that the order and sequence of Mark are followed in the other Synoptics does not of itself prove that the writers of the first and third Gospels had St. Mark's Gospel before them.

But if the form of the Gospel was determined by Apostolic teaching, it is reasonable to suppose, indeed it may be regarded as an established fact, that its contents emanated from the same source.

In order to arrive at a probable solution of the synoptic problem it is necessary to recall as clearly as possible the circumstances in which this unique literature arose.

After the Day of Pentecost, Jerusalem was filled with enthusiastic disciples of Christ. Some had known Him in the flesh. Far more had only heard of Him by report, but were eagerly desirous to learn of His life and doctrine from His chosen Apostles. That this desire was met we learn from the passage in the Acts already referred to (ii. 42) and from Hebrews ii. 3. The 'teaching of the Apostles' would

<sup>1</sup> See Rom. i. 3, 4; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4; 2 Cor. xi. 4; Gal. i. 6, 7; 1 Tim. vi. 20.

take the form of lectures following, it would seem, a prescribed order, and there is no doubt that the pre-eminent position of St. Peter would attract the most numerous hearers. Among the most capable and intelligent of those hearers it is safe to include Barnabas and his cousin, John Mark. These, together with thousands of other students and disciples, would set forth to divers lands with gospels stored in their memories or copied in papyrus rolls. Among them were the many evangelists who "took in hand to draw up a narrative concerning the matters fulfilled in the ministry of Christ, even as they delivered them which from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word" (Luke i. 1, 2).

These narratives of the gospel, thus carried far and wide, would bear the same relation to each other as the notes taken by different students at a Professor's lecture. At certain points the Apostles' words would be exactly reproduced, at others the sense only would be given, and here and there discrepancies would be found difficult to reconcile. A diligent and careful historian would examine various accounts, as St. Luke certainly did, and select that which appeared to be best attested.

As time went on one or more of those gospel narratives would approve themselves as more vivid in description and more authoritative than the others, and would be widely accepted. This is the kind of pre-eminence which the Gospel according to St. Mark attained. And if we try to imagine further the circumstances which led to its incorporation in the first gospel, it is quite possible that St. Matthew in the course of his missionary travels should find St. Mark's Gospel, or one nearly corresponding to it, used as the catechetical form of instruction in the Churches of a district in which he was evangelising. He may well have been unwilling to disturb the use of such a gospel, either in regard to the sequence or selection of events. But as an Apostle and eye-

witness he had much more to add. Hence an edition of St. Mark revised in the light of fresh research would be enriched and supplemented by the Apostle's personal recollections of the words and works of Christ. It is in such circumstances that we venture to conceive the origin of that part of the Gospel according to St. Matthew which is common to St. Mark. It is a hypothesis which explains at once the occurrence of identity and of variation in the parallel passages of the two Gospels.

II. Passing now to the other sections of the first Gospel, (a) that which is commonly designated as "Q," and which is common to the first and third Gospels; and (b) the section which is peculiar to this Gospel, we cannot discover that recent criticism has suggested any insuperable bar to the traditional belief in St. Matthew's authorship, or to fixing its date before the destruction of Jerusalem.

These sections contain some of the most profound and interesting of our Lord's sayings, and incidents of deep significance and value, which it is difficult to believe would have been put forth and accepted unless they had been stamped with Apostolic authority. They contain, for instance, the whole of the Sermon on the Mount, and in that the claim to revise and deepen the enactments of the Levitical law, the regulation and discipline of the whole of life, involving rules for prayer and fasting (Matt. v. 21 *fol.*), and they contain some of the most treasured parables and some of the most significant miracles. The section known as "Q" presents throughout striking and remarkable parallelisms between the first and third Gospels, but verbal differences abound, sufficient to show independent research or independent translation from an Aramaic original on the part of St. Luke. A single short example will illustrate this: compare (1) Matthew xviii. 12 with (2) Luke xv. 4. (1) *τί ὑμῖν δοκεῖ; ἐὰν γένηται τι ἀνθρώπῳ ἑκατὸν πρόβατα, καὶ πλανηθῆ ἓν ἐξ*

αὐτῶν, οὐχὶ ἀφήσει τὰ ἐνενήκοντα ἐννέα ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ πορευθεὶς ζητεῖ τὸ πλανώμενον; (2) τίς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ὑμῶν ἔχων ἑκατὸν πρόβατα καὶ ἀπολέσας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἓν οὐ κατάλειπει τὰ ἐνενήκοντα ἐννέα ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ καὶ πορεύεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπολωλὸς ἕως εὔρη αὐτό;

It will be noticed that there is here a singular identity of meaning, combined with such difference of expression as can hardly have been made by either evangelist having before him the precise words of the other.

The single tradition of St. Matthew or that part of the Gospel which is independent of the other Synoptics is about one-eighth of the whole of the Gospel attributed to him. Besides the passages in the Sermon on the Mount peculiar to the first Gospel and the parables and miracles already referred to, this section contains St. Matthew's account of the Virgin Birth, the flight into Egypt, the charge to St. Peter (chap. xvi.), the arraignment of the Pharisees (chap. xxiii.), and several incidents of the Passion and Resurrection and of the days after the Resurrection.

Whatever theory may be formed in regard to that portion of the first Gospel in which St. Mark is substantially incorporated can it be said that any convincing arguments have been advanced against the authenticity of the remaining portion of the Gospel comprising "Q" and the single tradition of St. Matthew? Against the Matthaean authorship of the Gospel it has been argued: (1) that these sections do not read like a translation, (2) that it is not possible to discern in them the vivid narrative of an eye-witness.

(1) This objection rests on the assumption that "Q," at any rate if by St. Matthew, must be a Greek rendering of the Aramaic *logia* mentioned by Papias as composed by St. Matthew (Eus. *H.E.* iii. 39). But this is an unproved assumption. It is quite possible, it is indeed probable, that St. Matthew, like many of his compatriots, was equally at

home in Greek and Aramaic. St James, the Lord's brother, probably spoke in Aramaic, but the Greek of his Epistle has few if any indications of a foreign element.

(2) The question of descriptive vividness is one of style which cannot be decided by argument ; but most readers of the Gospel will admit that there is no lack of narrative power, not only in the report of many parables peculiar to this Gospel, but in introductory passages to sayings of our Lord unreported in the Marcan tradition.

The reproduction of the Sermon on the Mount as reported in St. Matthew's Gospel, with its wonderful beauty and regularity of form, alone proves consummate skill, and points to the inner discipleship of the writer, who has handed down this precious legacy to the Church.

At the same time it may be asked whether it is common experience that the eyewitness of an event describes it as a rule more graphically than those who have received the report from others.

It is the Macaulay or the Freeman who writes the brilliant and picturesque description and not the Norman Chronicler or the contemporary Bishop Burnet, of whom it is said : " To literary style or to eloquence he had no pretension." What one expects from the eyewitness is not so much picturesque description as careful observation of small incidents which might not be thought worthy of notice by the later historian. Of this there are many instances, especially in the closing scenes of St. Matthew's Gospel.

It would, however, be unreasonable to allow *a priori* arguments of this kind to prevail against the traditional evidence of the Matthaean authorship of the first Gospel. while evidence of precisely the same kind is admitted to establish the authenticity of the second and third Gospels.

A further point may be thought worthy of consideration. If the writer of the first Gospel be reduced to the level of a

'compiler' or 'redactor' his Gospel will be an exception to all the other books of the New Testament, each of which by a more or less conscious act of selection carries with it the authority of an Apostle or of one writing directly under the influence of an Apostle.

It is far more probable that the abundant collection of our Lord's sayings and parables which enrich the Gospel of St. Matthew should have been put on record by one of the inner circle of the disciples who were continuously with Jesus, than by one of those who were only occasional hearers.

In regard to the question of date, no really convincing argument has been advanced to disprove the contention either that the Marcan section of the first Gospel or "Q" were put on record before the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. As to St. Mark it will be sufficient for our purpose to cite the words of Archdeacon Allen, one of the foremost of those critics who repudiate the Matthaean authorship of the first Gospel. Dr. Allen writes of St. Mark's Gospel: "For myself I believe in an ultimate Aramaic original and I see no reason why such an original should not have appeared before the year 50 A.D. The Gospel might well have appeared in Greek about that period, and then have been used by the author of the first Gospel" (*Expository Times*, July, 1910).

The other sections of St. Matthew's Gospel, and in particular that part now designated as "Q," bear every sign of contemporary authority, and, as Dr. Allen conclusively shows in the article referred to, the objections made to an early date of the first Gospel on the ground that it "reflects an advanced stage of ecclesiastical development" rest on a pure hypothesis and have little weight."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Plummer places the date of this Gospel shortly after the fall of Jerusalem. If this were so, it is manifest that the prediction of that event in the



If the early date of the Gospel be admitted—a most important point in the settlement of the Synoptic problem—it is difficult to see why the traditional ascription of the Gospel to the Apostle St. Matthew should not also be maintained. It is a tradition which falls in with the probability of the case. It is to say the least more than probable that one at least of the Apostles who gave lectures at Jerusalem should have himself put forth a gospel. And of the Apostles who is more likely to have written accounts of the ministry of Christ than St. Matthew the publican, who from his calling was almost necessarily bi-lingual? But we are not left in doubt. Whatever bearing the Matthaean *logia* of which Papias speaks may have on the Greek Gospel the fact of their existence and their vogue proves at least a capacity of authorship in St. Matthew. And when this *a priori* probability is strengthened by the direct evidence of Irenaeus (*Hær.* III. i. 1) and a catena of succeeding writers, the traditional claim of the first Gospel to apostolic origin is at least as strong as that of the second and third Evangelists to the Gospels which bear their name.<sup>1</sup>

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twenty-fourth chapter was at any rate not committed to writing until after its fulfilment. It is an easy and obvious step to suggest that the words are not predictive at all and were never uttered by our Lord. But is it conceivable that words of such profound importance should be falsely attributed to our Lord in the lifetime of St. John and of other disciples who had known Christ, and yet pass unchallenged? But if the words were uttered by our Lord why is it necessary to doubt their publication before the siege and fall of Jerusalem?

<sup>1</sup> It is tempting to note in connexion with this question that the last result of Homeric criticism is to claim the reality of Homer's personality and the authenticity of the Iliad. Professor Mackail writes: "The Canonical Iliad issued as an authorised version at Athens in the sixth century B.C., which is to all intents and purposes our Iliad, is also to all intents and purposes the original and only Iliad, the work of Homer."—*Lectures on Greek Poetry*.

*THE PROMISES OF REWARD.*

THE question<sup>1</sup> raised lately about Christ's Promises of Recompense is so vital, not to Christianity only, but to the ethical principles which underlie religion, that it deserves earnest consideration. It is easy to show on this point in the utterances of the Christ a certain—"ambiguity" is hardly the term, but a certain—discrepancy, which, so far as we have the very words spoken, cannot be explained away.

The imagery used, on those occasions, when rewards are promised "(thrones, kingdom, etc.\*)" may be merely Oriental. The promises do not appeal, like a Mohammedan Paradise, to lower appetites: and, inasmuch as they are not immediate, they demand a greater subordination of self. Still the alloy of what S. T. Coleridge called "other-worldliness" is there; they sound mercenary. But no collation of the words of Christ can be complete without including the whole scope of His life and death. He came—it cannot be repeated too often—not to found a school of philosophy, nor even to lay down rules for conduct; but by deed as well as by word to combat the Principle of Evil, which makes havoc in the world. The Oliveyard, the low hill of Self-sacrifice, let alone the daily walk of the Saviour, reveal the essence of His Message, the real "Wesen" of the Gospel, unselfishness. "Tolle crucem." This self-renouncement He exacted again and again from would-be disciples. He never bribes nor bargains. How then can we understand His promises of reward?

The teaching of the Christ was always germinative, progressive, and, though meant for all times and places, in the first instance personal. The seed, not the full-grown plant, was dropped into the soil; it was to ripen by degrees; the precept was invariably suited to the capacity of the

<sup>1</sup> EXPOSITOR, Nos. 103, 104. Essays by the Rev. G. Wauchope Stewart.

hearer. As the greatest of thinkers taught long ago, there must be due regard to the *ποῦ, πότε, πῆ, πῶς, κ.τ.λ.* "The rich young man," for instance, whose stumbling-block was his "great possessions," was told to "sell all and give it to the poor." Yet parable after parable tells us to be good "stewards" under God of our money. Sometimes, accordingly, the hope of ultimate reward was needed as a help, as a stimulant, as a "stand-by."

"—*pueris olim dant crustula blandi  
Doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima.*"

—*Horat.*

Perhaps, if we could date the several occasions, we should find the rude fishermen of Galilee and others led on, step by step, away from the dreams of self-aggrandisement, which even "the beloved disciple" had at first.

Man never acts from a single motive. The saint confesses that self will intrude into his purest aims. The good soldier fights for king and country, but he draws his pay. Doctor or clergyman works for love, but takes the fee. The artist is not less devoted to his art because he gets his living by it. So He, who "knoweth whereof we are made," provides reward and punishment, *not as the main motive*, but for a counterpoise to the weight of temptations. The Ideal is there all the time; unattainable in its perfection, yet never to be lost sight of—single-minded devotion of self to what is higher than itself, higher even than the highest altruism.

So far I have tried to suggest, as succinctly as I can, some considerations which seem to lie very near the root of this great question—How are we to understand the Promises of Recompense from the lips of Christ? If there is any force in what I have said, others more competent than I will be able to educe adequate conclusions. It is not by accepting *en bloc* what has been worked elaborately

out by others, but by assimilating for ourselves the principles in question and by our active participation in the search that each one of us can hope to contribute a something towards arriving at the truth.

There is another aspect of the question, "Does Christ hold out the promise of reward at last to His followers?" which must not be left out of sight. It is an integral part of the question; or, more exactly, it is the same question viewed from another side.

For, indeed, hope and fear in the microcosm of human nature are analogous and correlative, each to the other. As we instinctively wish for that, which is the opposite of what we dislike, so we dread what is the opposite of what we wish for. All the tangled, many-coloured play of the emotions, which surge within us, contending with one another till they are reduced to order by the reasonable control of the Will, may be summed up under the twofold heading of hope and fear, of attraction and repulsion. It is as natural to shrink from punishment as it is to long for rewards.

What has been said already about Reward as a secondary and subordinate motive, applies equally to Punishment. If the Christ invariably makes self-renunciation the test and foundation-stone of true allegiance, and yet on occasions encourages and stimulates those who need it by a bright vista of reward hereafter, so it is about punishment. As He will not have in His ranks the mercenary, who fights only or chiefly for what he can get, so He will not have the slave crouching in fear of the lash. Xavier's beautiful hymn is the motto of the true servant.

"Not for the sake of winning heaven,  
Nor of escaping hell."

They serve from gratitude. They love Him because "He loved them"; the "beauty of His holiness" is to

them a magnet irresistible. Self must take a secondary place. He who "would have *all* men come to Him," that they may "have life," nevertheless warns us that he "who seeks to save his life shall lose it."

Temperaments vary. One of the commonest mistakes in legislation is to prescribe indiscriminately, as if men were all of one pattern. None is a duplicate, a facsimile of another. But discrimination is a special feature of the Christ in His intercourse with men. Surely it was an outcome of His perfect sinlessness, this insight into character, this quick understanding of all who come near Him. He read their thoughts, saw through their motives, could anticipate what each would say and do. He "needed not that any one should tell Him."

If the soul is absorbed by mundane cares, it must be startled by the trumpet-peal of doom before it can hear the Message. Oriental tropes, such as the "undying worm," the "quenchless flame," may wake the dormant sense of right and wrong; but, like the promises of reward, these threatenings are only the first step on the ascent to heaven.

When the traveller on the snow-mountains sinks down in the drowsiness which means death, his comrades use violence to him, lest he wake no more. Sin benumbs and paralyses the Will. Some there are constituted so happily that their conscience responds quickly to the Voice of God. In others, from temperament or some other cause, the appeal has to force its way as through a thick wall. Even a pagan moralist can tell us

"Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore."

But human nature in its frailty needs to be reinforced by subordinate motives against temptation. And, be it remembered, they to whom the Gospel was first of all addressed needed it, in those days of fiery trial, even more than we.

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## OPERA FORIS.

## MATERIALS FOR THE PREACHER.

## XIV.

GALATIANS iv. 16. *So then (ὥστε) am I become your enemy, because (ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν) I tell you the truth ?*

Both Blass (*Rhythmen der asianischen und römischen Kunstprosa*, 1905, p. 210) and Könnicke (*Emendationen zu Stellen des NT*, 1908, pp. 29-30) change ὥστε into ὡς δέ, and read the sentence as a statement, not as a rhetorical question. Zahn and Mr. Rendall, though retaining ὥστε, similarly refuse to take the sentence as interrogative. But the so-called consecutive ὥστε with the indicative offers no great difficulty, and the proposed alteration does not give any better sense to the passage. Taken as a reproachful question, it runs thus : " After all our happy relations, my trust in you and your devotion to me, has it come to this, that I am (judged by you to be) your enemy because I have dealt faithfully and plainly with you (i.e. on my previous visit) ? " Paul cannot reproach himself with any undue severity in this case. He had to point out the failings and errors of his friends for their own sakes, and he had done so in love (cp. Eph. iv. 15), without any trace of personal feeling. The Galatians could not plead the excuse of their friend having shown temper. They were guilty of a childish petulance in attributing hostile motives to the well-meant remonstrances of their apostle. They could not conceive of a friend being obliged to differ from them for their own sake, and their wounded pride rebelled against any reflection being cast upon their conduct. Compare <sup>1</sup> the preface to Baxter's *Reformed Pastor*, in which he observes : " It is the sinful

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Terence's *Andria*, Act i. Scene 1, 40-41 : " Hoc tempore obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit."

unhappiness of some men's minds that they can hardly think well of the best words or ways of those whom they disaffect ; and they usually disaffect those that cross them in their corrupt proceedings, and plainly tell them of their faults. They are ready to judge of the reprover's spirit by their own, and to think that all such sharp reproofs proceed from some disaffection to their persons or partial opposition to the opinions they hold. But plain-dealers are always approved in the end ; and the time is at hand when you shall confess that those were your truest friends." <sup>1</sup>

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Galatians iv. 18 :—*It is good to be affected at all times, and not only when I am with you.*

The precise sense of the words is not quite certain, ζηλοῦσθαι being rather ambiguous. But they may fairly be taken, in general, as a protest against instability of character. The Galatians, Paul says, were all right so long as they had their apostle's strong influence bearing upon them. But when that was withdrawn, they relapsed. Their religion was too much a matter of association and companionship.

It is some credit to be influenced by a good man. Susceptibility to a fine character and admiration for a strong nature should count for much. But this ought to produce eventually a strength of personal conviction which can stand by itself, and such a result is the aim of every influential man. He seeks to create not adherents of his own opinion but continual followers of the truth. Genuine religion must be more than an enthusiastic devotion to the person of anyone who first impresses us with a sense of the reality of God. However powerful may be the impression he makes, faith must strike its roots deeper than personal admiration or the acceptance of another's lead. Otherwise our character

<sup>1</sup> Zahn thinks that Isa. lxiii. 7-9 was in Paul's mind. A better parallel would be 1 Kings xxi. 20.

simply becomes an echo of the last strong personality with whom we have been thrown in contact ; and as a strong influence is not always identical with a wise and sound impulse, the character lacks any steadfast and continuous principle. This, says Paul, is *not good*.

Galatians vi. 3 and 7.

The twofold province of self-deception, in relation to the wrongdoing (*a*) of others, and (*b*) of oneself.

(*a*) After speaking of the duty of Christian forgiveness, Paul sharply adds a word against the danger of censoriousness. *If a man think himself to be something, when he is nothing, he deceives (φρεναπαταῖ) himself.* If he prides himself upon his own integrity, in contrast to the stained and broken character of a brother, he is making an immense mistake. He is the dupe of his own folly. It is self-deception to plume oneself upon being holier than one's neighbour. That is only to feed one's vanity, which is an empty nothing. It is an entire delusion, says Paul, for the religious man to entertain a lofty self-esteem, or to foster a sense of his own exceeding merit by dwelling censoriously upon the lapses of his brethren.

As Sieffert and Zahn point out, it is not necessary to refer this verse to verse 1, as if verse 2 were a parenthesis. The error denounced in verse 3 includes the idea that a man is superior to the duty of laying himself alongside of his erring brethren, being too good, forsooth, to associate with them. The self-delusion consists in the feeling that he can afford to look down on them and also to hold aloof from them.

(*b*) Similarly, with regard to a man's own wrongdoing. *Be not deceived (μὴ πλανᾷσθε),* the apostle insists ; no pretences will prevent the law of retribution overtaking a man, for all his fine words and position. *Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.* The religionist deceives himself if he imagines that an exception will be made in his



favour, on account of his standing in the Church or formal attendance upon ceremonies. This is entirely to misconceive the character of the God with whom he has to do. Neither excess nor indolence will be overlooked, and it is a sinful self-delusion to think otherwise.

There is a close connexion between the two forms of self-delusion. The man who so mistakes his own position as to look down with the eyes of a Pharisee upon his erring brethren is very likely to cherish the idea that his own errors will be leniently treated, if not overlooked, by the God to whom he imagines that he stands specially close.

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Hebrews ii. 8 : *Now we see not yet all things subjected to him.*

It takes no faith to see and state this. The fact is patent. It is a vision of sad reality which requires no transcendental insight but only a pair of eyes.

“ One thing appears to me—  
The work is not complete ;  
One world I know, and see  
It is not at His feet.”

Yet the Christian outlook includes a further hope. *We see not all things under His feet.* That is the pathos of faith, and it may develop into an actual pessimism. But, if we are Christians, there is something which we do see, and that is *Jesus crowned with glory and honour.* The revelation of His person and purpose is a re-assurance, amid the apparently chaotic and adverse facts of the present world-order. These are not all that they seem, and they are not the total reality of existence.

\*            \*            \*            \*            \*

Hebrews x. 4 : *For it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins.*

To a modern these words have an antiquated sound. The

world of ideas which they suggest has passed so entirely away that we look back upon the stage they represent as a stage far below us, so far, indeed, that it is barely conceivable. But they were originally the apex of a long ascent. The quiet decisiveness and even scorn with which the writer sets down this conviction breathe a feeling of relief, after the long centuries of persistent and unavailing sacrifices. Humanity is drawing breath after a prolonged nightmare. The primitive ritual of purification was based on the belief that the blood of animals could wipe away sin, "because the animal that has been consecrated by contact with the altar becomes charged with a divine potency, and its sacred blood, poured over the impure man, absorbs and disperses his impurity." Thus, as Dr. Farnell continues (*The Evolution of Religion*, pp. 120 f.), the cognate idea of the pure heart was "not necessarily wholly ethical," as yet, but often "co-existent with the ideas of sin that do not clearly recognize moral responsibility or the essential difference between deliberate wrong-doing and the ritualistic or accidental or involuntary sin." "The final point is reached when it is realized that the blood of bulls and of goats cannot wash away sin, that nothing external can defile the heart or soul, but only evil thought and evil will. This purged and idealized concept will then in the progressive religions revolt against its own parentage, and will prompt the eternal antagonism of the prophet against the ritual priest, of the Christ against the Pharisee."

JAMES MOFFATT.

## LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.\*

## XX.

*πιάζω*.—The sharp differentiation in meaning between this verb and *πιέζω*, of which it is said to be a Doric form, is an interesting semasiological study. Thayer quotes Theocritus iv. 35, *τηνὲ καὶ τὸν ταῦρον ἀπ' ὄρειος ἄγε πιάξας τᾶς ὀπλαῖς*, "there he brought the bull from the mountain, seizing it by the hoof." Wessely (*Patr. Orient.* iv. 2, p. 132 f.) gives *ληστοπιάστης*, "preneur de malfaiteurs," from a Rainer papyrus of the time of Diocletian: he says the word is known from other papyri of the Roman period. From a later period comes *πιάσαι* = *λαβεῖν* in BM II. p. 328<sup>76</sup>, cited by C. H. Muller in *Archiv* i. 439 as characteristic of the transition period from ancient to modern Greek: its date is 616 A.D. MGr *πιάνω* in form and meaning tells the same tale. Now *πιέζω* in Luke vi. 38 = *press down*: cf. Micah vi. 15 (Grimm), *πιέσεις ἐλαίαν*, and *Syll.* 422<sup>7</sup> (iv/A.D.), *μήτε ὁ βουλόμενος κεχρηῆσθαι δι' ἄγροισιν [ὑπ]ὸ τῆς ἀπειρίας πιεζείσθω*. On *Syll.* 587<sup>304</sup> (iv/B.C.) Dittenberger says that *πιεστήρ* means elsewhere *torcular vel prelum*: here it represents some use of a *μοχλός*, but the root meaning is still *pressing*. Thumb (*Hellenismus* 67 n.) accepts W. Schmid's view that *πιάζω* has merely been assimilated to the numerous verbs in *-άζω*. If the differentiation took place in one dialect—say that of the bucolics of Sicily—we can understand the word's passing into the *Κοινή* as a kind of slang loanword, while *πιέζω* lived on awhile with its old meaning.

*πλεονέκτης*.—See *Notes* iii. and *Thess.* p. 20. In *Syll.* 418<sup>133</sup> (iii/A.D.) *πλεονεκτήματα* are simply *advantages*, with *ἐλαττώματα* in antithesis. But the whole family keeps

\* For abbreviations see the February and March (1908) *EXPOSITOR*, pp. 170, 262.

regularly the desiderative force which is curiously absent from its etymology: *πλεονέκτης* = ὁ θέλων πλεον ἔχειν, but it is hard to say whence the crucial *θέλων* comes—*αἰσχροκερδής* raises the same difficulty. *Πλεονεξία* in ParP 63<sup>68f</sup>. (ii/B.C.)—*μηδεμιᾶς ἐν τούτοις μήτε φιλοτιμίας μήτε πλεονεξίας γενηθείσης*—keeps company with *φιλοτιμία*, which here represents a “grasping ambition.” In *Ἡ Musonius* p. 72 (Hense—a citation kindly supplied us by Dr. Souter) it is linked with *βία*: *ib.* p. 90 (cited in *Thess.*) it accompanies *ἡδονή*, a remarkable parallel to the New Testament association with sins of the flesh, based on a saying of Jesus (Mark vii. 22) and repeated by at least three different New Testament writers.\* Bunyan’s instinct rightly made Pickthank name together among Beelzebub’s friends “my old Lord Lechery, Sir Having Greedy, with all the rest of our nobility.” That *πλεονεξία* is a true vernacular word may be illustrated by its appearance in the rather ill-spelt petition OP 67<sup>19</sup> (338 A.D. “aggression”) and in the illiterate letter FP 124<sup>24</sup> (ii/A.D.—tr. “cupidity”).

*πληρώω*.—The original meaning may be illustrated with the phrase in *Syll.* 633<sup>20</sup> (ii/A.D.), *ἐὰν δέ τις τράπεζαν πληρῶι τῶι θεῶι, λαμβανέτωι τὸ ἡμισυ*. Grimm’s “Hebraistically” must of course be banished from the construction c. acc. of the thing in which one abounds: cf. PFi 27<sup>3</sup> (iv/v A.D.), *πεπλήρωμαι παρὰ ὑμῶν τὸν φόρον*, “I have been paid,” a sense which becomes very common. Thus *Syll.* 737<sup>48</sup> (ii/A.D.), *ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πληροῖ* (sc. *τὴν ὀρισθεῖσαν εἰς οἶνον φοράν*); BU 1110<sup>11</sup> (5 B.C.), *ἡ μὲν Ἀπολλωνία* (sc. *συνχωρεῖ*) *ἀπεσχηκέναι παρὰ τοῦ Ἀ.*, over which has been written the correction *πεπληρώσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ*, with the acc. *τροφέια*.† Apparently

\* 1 Corinthians v. 10, 11, Colossians iii. 5, for Paul—also (as we believe) Ephesians v. 3, 5, iv. 19. Add Hebrews xiii. 5 and 2 Peter ii. 14.

† Schubart notes “read *τροφέιαι*: the writer has forgotten that he altered *ἀπεσχ.* into *πεπληρ.*” But this does not seem likely when *τροφέια*

we must amend Gradenwitz's note (*Archiv* ii. 100) that this meaning was mostly late, although also classical. Another of Grimm's "Hebraisms" is equally unfortunate, the use of  $\pi$ . for *time*: cf. TbP 374<sup>10</sup> (131 A.D.),  $\eta\varsigma \acute{o} \chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \mu\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\omega}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\theta\eta \acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma \tau\acute{o} \delta\iota\epsilon\lambda\eta\lambda\upsilon\theta\acute{o}\varsigma \iota\delta \acute{\epsilon}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ , "of which the period of the lease expired in the past 14th year" BM iii. 136<sup>10</sup> (44 A.D.),  $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omega\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\omicron\upsilon \chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta\acute{o}\tau\omicron\iota\omega$ , etc. The common New Testament use of  $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\nu$  for "accomplishing" a duty may be largely paralleled. Thus BM iii. 125<sup>25</sup> (104 A.D.),  $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \tau\eta\nu \sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\theta\eta \text{[οἰ]}\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu \tau\eta\text{[ς ἀπο]}\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\eta\varsigma \pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\sigma\omega\sigma\iota\nu$ . A Spartan inscription in the *Annual of the British School at Athens*, xii. 452, dated provisionally by Mr. H. J. W. Tillyard in i/A.D., has  $\delta\varsigma \xi\acute{\xi}\epsilon\iota \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \tau\eta\nu \tau\omicron\upsilon \xi\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\upsilon \tau\epsilon\iota\mu\acute{\eta}\nu, \pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\nu \tau\acute{\alpha} \acute{\epsilon}\iota\theta\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$ : the editor cites CIG 2336,  $\pi. \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\nu \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon\rho\gamma\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$ .

$\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\rho\omega\mu\alpha$ .—This important word is not very common in the "profane" vernacular, but it is well attested in one meaning. *Syll.* 326<sup>40</sup> (c. 107 B.C.), an inscription from near Sebastopol, has  $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambda\alpha\beta\acute{\omega}\nu \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \tau\acute{\omega}\nu \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\mu \pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\sigma\iota \tau\rho\iota\sigma\acute{\iota}$ ="three shiploads." From Egypt, at the other end of the Greek world, comes PP ii. 9 (iii/B.C.), where the word occurs thrice for a *gang* of men (one passage cited by Deissmann *BS* 110). This we may assume to be the normal secular meaning. It is practically that of Romans xi. 25: taking a parable from modern conditions, we could say that the mill or the shipyard is short-handed—the *full tale* of hands is to be made up some day. The very common word  $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\rho\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$  does not occur in the New Testament, but its restriction to commercial phraseology accounts for this. That  $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\rho\omega\mu\alpha$  should take its place as a *nomen actionis* (as in Rom. xiii. 10) is not strange, as the *-σις* and *-μα* nouns are drawing together a good deal:

itself is an alteration (from  $\delta\rho\alpha\chi\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha$ , which is erased): the two corrections are simultaneous.

the shortened penultimate of *θέμα, κρίμα, χρίσμα* etc., due to the analogy of the *-σις* words, illustrates the closeness of association.

*πνίγω*.—The nursery acrostic TbP 278<sup>40</sup> (i/A.D.) *πνίξωι ἐματόν, ῥιγῶι γάρ*, “I will choke myself, for it is cold (G.H.),” gives us the word in an elementary stage of educational achievement.

*ποία*.—This word is still in use, though *χόρτος* replaces it in the New Testament. It appears in the LXX, and in *Syll.* 803<sup>121</sup> (iii/B.C. from the Asclepieum), where a man with an injured eye sees the god *ποίαν τρίψας ἐγχεῖν εἰς τ[ὸν ὀφθαλμόν τι]*. Also in LIP 5<sup>3, 13, 29, 37</sup> (iii/B.C.) the *πωολογία* is mentioned, rendered by Crönert and Wilcken *Grünernte*. (Does *πῶα* for *ποία* belong to a Hellenistic sound-change that gives us *δῶη* for *δοίη*?) We feel half persuaded towards an unorthodox view of James iv. 14,\* rendering “for your life is a green herb, for you are a vapour. . . .” Two metaphors succeed each other naturally, each introduced with *γάρ*: we can imagine James watching the sun burst out after heavy rain—the green herb which would so soon fade (ch. i. 11), and the steam that rises for a few minutes from the drenched soil. But we are fully aware of our temerity!

*πόλις*.—In the second Logia fragment (OP 654<sup>21</sup>) Blass suggested the restoration *ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ ἡ πτό[λις (sc. τοῦ θεοῦ)]*. It may be worth while to note that this ancient by-form of *πόλις* does occur in three ostraca of the reign of Caligula (Wilcken *Ostr.* 380–382), as a proper name: it recalls the fact that *πτόλεμος* also survived in the royal name *Πτολεμαῖος*. Obviously the support derived from such a phenomenon is but slender. The distributive force which *κατὰ πόλιν* obviously has in several Lucan passages, and

\* Retain the double *γάρ*, one of which would easily fall out when the *ποία* was misunderstood—the texts differed as to which should be dropped.

in Titus i. 5, is to be set against the very different meaning of the same phrase in sundry documents of the new collection from Alexandria (reign of Augustus). Schubart, who edits the documents in BU iv. part 6, notes (*Archiv* v. 38) that in a good many papers relating to the hire of a nurse it is stipulated that the child shall be kept *ἔξω κατὰ πόλιν*, that is, outside the house of the person who gives the child in charge, but "in the city" of Alexandria. The phrase may be added to many others with article dropped after a preposition, but required by the sense: see *Proleg.* 82.

*πολιτάρχης*.—The title is known from inscriptions, as well as from Acts xvii. 6, to have been in use at Thessalonica and elsewhere: see E. D. Burton's monograph in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* for July 1898, where he prints seventeen inscriptions, with two more in which the title *πολιτάρχης* or the verb *πολιταρχέω* is plausibly restored. Of these 14 belong to Macedonia (5 of them to Thessalonica), 2 to Philippopolis in Thrace, and one each to Bithynia, Bosphorus and Egypt. To these we can now add OP 745<sup>4</sup> (c. 1 A.D.), where the edd. name only *one* inser. and do not apparently know of the one from Egypt. This is, however, only of iii/iv A.D.—a fact which accounts for the false quantity *πολιταρχῶν* that mars its versification. It is clear from Burton's citations that the title was essentially Macedonian. It would be brought into Egypt naturally by some early Ptolemy, but it is odd that it should be there at all and appear so seldom.

*πολίτευμα*.—For *citizenship* or *franchise*, as in Philippians iii. 20 (R.V.), cf. *Syll.* 238<sup>3</sup> (219 B.C.): King Philip orders the authorities at Larisa, until he shall have found others *ἀξίους τοῦ παρ' ὑμῶν πολιτεύματος*, to pass a vote giving *πολιτεία* to Thessalians or other Greeks resident in the city. In 214 B.C. Philip sends a further rescript, *Syll.* 239. Here he

says (l.<sup>7</sup>) that there are some States, ὧν καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὅταν ἐλευθερώσωσιν προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα: he warns the Larisaeans to restore εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν those whose names they had erased. It seems that πολιτεία here is the actual *franchise* in the abstract, πολίτευμα being a less technical, more general word, rather like our *community* in its capacity of becoming either abstract or collective. Our other quotations all favour *community* or *commonwealth* (cf. R.V. *marg.*) CIG 5361 (13 B.C.), τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ π. ἡμῶν Ἰουδαίοις, and again π. τῶν ἐν Βερενίκῃ Ἰουδαίων. Syll. 552<sup>13</sup> (late ii/B.C.), τῶι σύμπαντι πλήθει τοῦ π., *ib.* 472<sup>6</sup> (i/B.C.), ὅπως . . . ἡ πόλις . . . αὔξη τὸ π. τῶν προγόνων, i.e. (as Dittenberger notes) “may make the State greater and wealthier than their ancestors left it.” In a rescript of Alexander the Great (*ib.* 150<sup>3</sup>) πολίτευμα δὲ εἶναι ἐν Χίῳ δῆμον=“that the *constitution* in Chios should be a democracy”: this last example comes very near πολιτεία in another meaning. OGIS 192 (i/B.C.), three officials put up a monument ὑπὲρ τοῦ π. Schubart in *Archiv* v. 107 gives a papyrus example and promises a discussion later. See also Hicks in *CR* i. 6 f. The verb we must postpone, but it is tempting to quote Syll. 325<sup>25</sup> (i/B.C.—an inscription full of suggestive parallels): τοῦτο βουλόμενος ἐμφαίνειν, ὅτι τοῖς εὐσεβέστατα καὶ κάλλιστα πολειτευομένοις καὶ παρὰ θεῶν τις χάρις καὶ παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετηθέντων ἐπακολουθεῖ—both Acts xxiii. 1 and Philippians i. 27 get some light from the parallel.

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.

GEORGE MILLIGAN.



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