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Faith and philosophy





F A I T H

AND

P H I L O S O P H Y :

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

**HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST
IN CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES.**

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FAITH
AND
PHILOSOPHY:
DISCOURSES AND ESSAYS

BY
HENRY B. SMITH, D.D., LL.D.

EDITED
WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTICE
BY
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“Sehr schmerzlich hat mich der Tod von HENRY B. SMITH berührt. Ich habe ihn als einen der ersten, wenn nicht als ersten Amerikanischen Theologen der Gegenwart angesehen; festgegründet im Christlichen Glauben, frei und weiten Herzens und Blickes, philosophischen Geistes und für systematische Theologie ungewöhnlich begabt. Müchte doch etwas in dieser Hinsicht aus seinem Nachlass veröffentlicht werden.”—DR. DORNER, of Berlin.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTICE.

THE death of HENRY B. SMITH was felt to be an almost irreparable loss to the best culture and learning of our country. Whether regarded as a theologian, as a philosophical thinker, or as a general scholar and critic, he was confessedly one of the most accomplished men of his time. Such was the opinion of him often expressed by those best qualified to judge, both at home and abroad. And had his life and health been spared a few years longer, he would no doubt have furnished to the world, in ripe productions of his pen, still more substantial reason for this high estimate. As it is, with the exception of his elaborate and invaluable *History of the Church of Christ in Chronological Tables*, his writings consist chiefly of occasional discourses, essays, and reviews. But although occasional and more or less fragmentary, they discuss some of the most important and vital questions of the age; and they do it with such exhaustive power, that in several instances the discourse, or essay, might readily be enlarged into a book, with no other change than that of greater fulness of statement and illustration. The opening paper of this volume, on the Relations of Faith and Philosophy, and that on Church History, may serve as examples. The strong points in each case are so vividly presented; the principles involved are set forth with such distinctness; the discussion is so luminous and complete, that a whole treatise on the subject could hardly add to the force of the argument.

A conviction of the superior quality and permanent value of Dr. Smith's writings has led to the present selection. It is called *Faith and Philosophy*, because that title fitly indi-

icates its general character. Almost everything in it belongs to one or the other of these two noblest spheres of human thought. And Dr. Smith was entirely at home in them both. He delighted to grapple with the hardest problems of speculative science; and he did so with an ease that showed how congenial they were to the native bent and temper of his mind. He delighted still more to discuss the most difficult questions of Christian faith; and he did so with a spiritual insight, a breadth and vigor of thought, a wise discrimination and a zeal for truth, which showed him to possess the genius, as well as the culture and learning, of a finished theologian. The following pages bear witness to all this, and not less to the fine literary skill, logical acumen, and admirable sense, with which he was wont to enforce his opinions on these high themes.

This volume contains a portion only of his miscellaneous writings. There is ample material for a second series, should one be called for; and it would include some of the best things he ever wrote.*

Several of these papers have already made their mark in history. It is enough to mention the first two, together with the seventh. The oration at Andover and the Inaugural Address on Church History, formed an epoch in the intellectual life of scores of earnest young men preparing for the sacred office, or just entering upon its duties. Nor were they read with less eagerness by some of the ripest thinkers and scholars of the land. I will venture to quote from one of these, the eminent historian of the United States.

“Your orations (writes Mr. Bancroft, then almost a stranger, but ever after a warm and honored friend of Dr. Smith), your orations are admirable. Especially was I pleased and instructed by your inaugural address. In Church History you have no rival in this hemisphere; and you know I am bound to think history includes dogmatics, and philosophy, and theology.

* E. g., *The Problem of the Philosophy of History*, a Phi Beta Kappa address at Yale College; *A Plea for Christian Colleges*; *The Ultimate Supremacy of the Kingdom of Redemption*; *Limits of Religious Thought*; and a beautiful discourse on æsthetics, still in manuscript.

“In the Andover oration I might perhaps find some room to object to the extent to which you carry the doctrine of deference to authority. We may light our candle by another’s, but faith, to be of value, must be living; and to be a living one, must be approved by the heart and by reason. . . . I must again say how much I have been delighted with the spirit, manner, and learning and earnestness of both addresses. I know no one in the country but yourself who could have written them.”

The Andover address was immediately reprinted by the eminent house of T. & T. Clark, in Edinburgh, where it attracted much attention.* A friend writing to Prof. Smith, in 1859, thus alludes to it: “I believe I mentioned that Sir William Hamilton, and also the late Rev. Dr. John Brown, made particular inquiries respecting you, and expressed a hearty admiration for your address on the Relations of Faith and Philosophy. Dr. B. had it republished, so I was informed.”

Of the paper on *Christian Union and Ecclesiastical Reunion*, this at least may be said: It struck the key-note of the great reunion movement in the Presbyterian Churches, and pointed out the sure and only way to its happy consummation. No essential feature of the event but what was distinctly outlined in this truly irenical, large-hearted, sagacious, and Christian-like discourse.

It is hardly needful to speak in detail of the various papers which compose this volume. They will sufficiently explain and speak for themselves. As may be seen at a glance, they embrace a very wide range of topics and of thought. They discuss some of the oldest and some of the newest questions of speculative philosophy, and some of the oldest as well as newest questions of Christian ethics and divinity. But whatever the topic—whether a novel theory of the day or one of

* It was accompanied by the following note: “The form of the spoken address is retained in this paper, because a change in this respect would demand a change in the whole structure and arrangement of the discussion. The tone of the piece was necessarily kept rather popular than scientific. The exigencies of the occasion must be the author’s plea for the slight notice given to many important points, which must needs be introduced, though they could not be formally debated.”

old, standing problems of human knowledge—it is always discussed in the light of great principles, in the interest of truth, and with the manly freedom, earnestness, and candor that become a Christian scholar. The discussion is sometimes relieved by touches of that piquant wit and dry humor, which lent a peculiar charm to Prof. Smith's conversation and even to his theological lectures. It is also enlivened, here and there, by a somewhat sharper tone, called forth by what he regarded as a wanton, ruthless assault upon his Master and holy things. The power of polished ridicule and sarcasm was, indeed, one of the most effective weapons in his mental armory; but he used it sparingly, knowing very well how easily it is mistaken for an angry or hostile temper. If his intellectual thrusts are occasionally keen and pierce even to the quick, it is because they are the thrusts of a master of the controversial art, who, seeing his lawful advantage, feels bound to use it for the truth's sake. But no man was ever freer in spirit and intention from the low, petty motives of partisanship, whether theological or of any other sort. His whole mental and moral being was cast in a large, generous, catholic mould; and he looked with abhorrence upon the prostitution of great questions of Christian truth and duty to mere sectarian or personal issues. This was one secret, doubtless, of his extraordinary influence, and of the esteem and admiration felt for him by so many, who differed with him radically in matters of opinion.

Had he himself prepared these papers again for the press, he would have subjected them to a careful revision, and perhaps have modified, here and there, the form, if not the thought. Possibly he might have omitted some passages altogether. He was always striving after greater clearness, exactitude, and force, as well as fairness, of expression. Fortunately, a number of valuable corrections and emendations were found in his own handwriting, and have, of course, been adopted. When they first appeared, some of the following discussions were exceedingly helpful to minds struggling with the difficulties of modern thought, or resisting the assaults of

modern doubt and denial. It is hoped that, in this new form, they may fulfil again the same kindly and gracious office. Their author understood, as did few others on this side of the Atlantic, the magnitude of these difficulties and the terrible energy, as well as strength, of these assaults. But he never faltered in the conviction that they could and, in due time, would be overcome by the victorious power of Revealed truth. His divinity and his philosophy both centred in Christ; his theories of man, of history, and of the world centred also in Christ; for him all the dearest interests of humanity, and those eternal verities which once ravished the soul of Plato, and have ravished the souls of the greatest saints and sages ever since, had their source and centre in Christ; and so he was sure that in Christ as the creative, upholding, and redemptive Logos, the human mind will find at length "the Sabbath and port of all its labors and peregrinations."

Meanwhile he watched the signs of the times with an eager eye, and not without anxious foreboding. Again and again he recurs to the subject. "No man who loves the Christian faith" (such was almost the first sentence of his address at Andover, in 1849), "no man who is alive to the spirit of the times, as every man ought to be alive, can have failed to feel, to see, or to forebode the coming of a conflict between the mightiest powers that sway the destiny of man." During the quarter of a century which intervened between the Andover address and the article on *The New Faith of Strauss*, the conflict had fully come, and that article unfolds its character, and shows how deadly is the strife, and how vast the issue. The "new faith" is that in blind, o'ermastering Force which is above all, and through all, and in all, in place of the old faith in God, the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord. And its practical effects are thus impressively depicted in the closing part of the article:

"A generation drugged with such a fell delusion will change the face of the earth. Especially in our own country, where material prosperity is so rife and seductive, and material necessities are so urgent and constant—if to these be

added the concentration and impetus of a scientific and aggressive materialism, and our whole theory of life be transmuted by its incantations—no imagination can forecast its perils and no wisdom curb its riotous excesses. For nothing will be sacred to it; there is no hallowed word it will not scoffingly transform; there is no institution of church or state it will not destroy and reshape; the only law it knows is the tyrant's maxim, that might makes right. Neither strength nor beauty can be in its sanctuary. Let the race be thoroughly taught in this new creed, blinded to the supreme light of reason and the imperative obligations of conscience, indifferent to God and to eternal life, and it will be ready to perish. To the most cultured, life will be only a narrow realism; for the mass of mankind there is left chiefly a fierce struggle for wealth and power and pleasure, with the survival of the strongest. And this New Faith is, after all, but a revival of the oldest form of the most degrading unbelief; it cuts off the wings of the soul, drags it down to earth, and extorts from it the reluctant and despairing confession, that all that is left it is a dogged purpose to submit to annihilation, as do the beasts that perish. If a brute could become conscious, it could not have any less religion."

This Introductory Notice may fitly close with a brief sketch of Prof. Smith's life and character. HENRY BOYNTON SMITH was born in Portland, Maine, November 21st, 1815. Portland was not less remarkable for its social culture and intelligence than for those natural beauties, that render it one of the most charming spots on the Atlantic coast. Here, in the midst of the happiest influences, his boyhood was spent. At the age of fifteen he entered Bowdoin College, where he graduated in 1834. Among his classmates or contemporaries in college were Cyrus Haulin, Peleg W. Chandler, Daniel R. Goodwin, William H. Allen, Samuel Harris, John A. Andrew, Benjamin Fordyce Barker and others, whose names have since become widely known and honored. His theological studies were pursued at Bangor and Andover, and,

later, at the universities of Halle and Berlin. While in Germany he devoted himself with enthusiasm to philosophy and church history, as well as divinity. His teachers regarded him with singular interest and affection, treating him less as their pupil than as their friend and equal. In Berlin he was often a welcome guest at the house of Neander, who showed him great kindness. At Halle his relations with Tholuck and Ulrici were especially intimate; they loved and treated him as a younger brother. With some of his fellow-students and of the young theologians he also formed ties of friendship, which remained fresh to the day of his death. Kahnis, now so distinguished as professor of theology at Leipsic, and Godet, the eloquent and accomplished Swiss theologian, were of this number.

He returned to the United States, not only enriched with the best thought and culture of Germany, but quickened in his whole intellectual and spiritual being by contact with its great thinkers, its noble Christian men, and its beautiful domestic life. After a year of service as an instructor at Bowdoin College, during the absence of President Woods in Europe, he was ordained in 1842 to the charge of the Congregational Church in West Amesbury, Massachusetts. In this little village he spent five happy years, devoting himself assiduously to his pastoral work, and winning more and more the love of his people. From 1845 to 1847 he also gave instruction in Hebrew at Andover, supplying the place of his friend Prof. Bela B. Edwards, then absent in quest of health. In 1847 he became Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. In 1850 he received a unanimous call to the chair of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, in the city of New York. It was not without a severe struggle of mind that he at length accepted this call. He was a devoted son of New England; his position at Amherst was most congenial to his tastes, and many friends whom he loved and honored, urged him not to leave it. But after long deliberation he decided that it was his duty to come to New York; and he never saw any reason

to question the wisdom of this decision. He entered the Presbyterian Church to become one of its most honored teachers and leaders ; but his filial affection for New England continued strong and pure to the last. In 1855 he was transferred to the chair of Systematic Theology. Here is not the place to speak of his relations to the Union Theological Seminary, or of the inestimable services he rendered to this institution. In 1859 he founded *The American Theological Review*, which in 1863 became united with the *Presbyterian Review*, under the title of *The American Presbyterian and Theological Review*. This again, in 1871, was united with *The Princeton Repertory* under the name of *The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review*.

Professor Smith revisited Europe in 1859, and again in 1866. Toward the close of 1868 his health became so much shattered that he was obliged to abandon all work and flee for his life. In February, 1869, he went abroad with his family, and spent a year and a half in Germany, in Italy, and in the lands of the Bible. Returning in 1870, better, yet not well, he resumed his work in the seminary. But toward the close of 1873 he was prostrated by a new attack of disease, and on the 13th of January, 1874, he resigned his chair. He was at once made Professor Emeritus, and afterwards Lecturer on Apologetics. During the next three years he carried on the struggle for life with extraordinary resolution, and with a hope that would never yield. In the autumn of 1876 his strength had so rallied, that the Board of Directors appointed him to deliver the Ely Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity. He was in the midst of his preparation for this course, which he was intensely anxious to deliver, when death overtook him. He entered into rest on Wednesday morning, February 7th, 1877, in the sixty-second year of his age. He had been fast ripening for the mortal event. Those who knew him most intimately had, of late, often observed in him an unusual tenderness, humility, and sweet gentleness of spirit ; he seemed to cling closer and closer to Christ ; his prayers were full of holy fervor and unction ; and his religious talk, in

the fellowship of his Christian brethren, was at times marked by a tone of wondrous elevation, beauty, and pathos. "His last public utterance" (writes his pastor, the Rev. Dr. Vincent) "was in the prayer-meeting at the Church of the Covenant, on the evening of November 1st, 1876. The subject for the evening was one of the Pilgrim psalms, the 122d: "Jerusalem is builded as a city that is compact together. Pray for the peace of Jerusalem." He rose, and taking up the thought of what Jerusalem had been to the church of all ages since its foundation, he dwelt upon the love and longing which had gone out to it from the hearts of the pilgrims in its palmy days, from beneath the willows of Babylon, from prince and devotee and crusader, touching here and there upon salient points in its history, until, with the warmer glow of emotion stealing into his tremulous voice, he led our thoughts to the Jerusalem above—the Christian pilgrim's goal—and the rest and perfect joy of the weary. The talk was like the gem in Thalaba's mystic ring—a cut crystal full of fire. Perhaps something of his own weariness and struggle crept unconsciously into his words, and gave them their peculiar depth and tenderness."

His funeral took place in the Church of the Covenant, on the afternoon of February 9th. The assembly was such as is seldom seen in this country, and testified that a very remarkable man had passed away. It represented whatever is highest and best in American culture and scholarship.

At a preliminary meeting of the clergy of New York and vicinity, voice was given to the common sentiment in a most appreciative minute, and in brief addresses full of love and admiration. From the absent also came very touching tributes. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of quoting a few sentences from one of them. Upon going abroad in 1869, Prof. Smith had expressed the wish that in the event of his death, his old and dear friend, Dr. Park, of Andover, might speak at his burial. Dr. Park was unable to be present, but he thus expressed his feelings in a letter to Mr. Wm. Allen Smith:

“If, however, I had been able to reach New York I could not have spoken at the solemnity. I could not have commanded my power of utterance. I felt unable to speak for a long time after I heard the sad news. . .

. . . It is now about forty years since I first saw your father. It was in my study, a few feet from the spot where I am now writing this letter. I distinctly remember his spiritual face, his ethereal body, his tones, his words. One of his sentences I have often repeated. I thought it a remarkable sentence for so young a man. He was then about to sail for Germany.

“It seems to me that he does not need much change in order to have a spiritual body in heaven. It seems *natural* for him to be in the spiritual companionship of that upper world.

“Among all the friends whom he will meet there none will receive him more gladly than his admirer, B. B. Edwards. How often and how affectionately Prof. Edwards was wont to speak of him! The two were kindred spirits on earth and will be forever.

“I do so heartily regret that I failed to see him when I was in New York twenty months ago. I desired to ask him many questions, some of which he was the only man capable of answering. I have this winter desired to propose some other questions to him, and I do not know any man who can answer them as well as he could. In certain departments of study he had traversed ground which few persons in this country have ventured upon. Is all his learning to perish with him? By no means. As he will live, so will his learning live. He will be a rich treasure in the world of treasures. ‘The kings of the earth do bring their glory and their honor unto it.’

“I trust that Prof. Smith has left numerous manuscripts in a fit state for publication. I hope that in some form his system of theology will be published. The substance of it will be, doubtless.

“Alas! how many reflections come into my mind at the thought that his earthly activity has ceased. How many reminiscences of Tholuck, Kalmis, and many other German friends to whom he introduced me! How they loved him, even as a son or a brother!”

Some of the most grateful and affecting tributes to his memory came from those who had no sympathy with many of his theological views. One of them in particular I cannot refrain from quoting. It does equal honor to the writer and to his departed friend. In a letter written on Saturday evening, February 10th, the day after the funeral, the Rev. Henry W. Bellows, D.D., of this city, thus refers to the “great and glorious scholar” by whose bier he had just been standing:

“The depth and breadth of Prof. Smith’s theology and piety, the unaffected charity of his sympathies, his modesty under the crown of learning and philosophy which he so

manifestly wore, his entire freedom from low ambition of place or name, his gaiety of heart in weary invalidism, and the vigor of his soul so set off by the frailty of his body—all these rare and precious characteristics—I, with thousands of others who have a nearer right to avow them, shall ever cherish and lament to lose.

“How it belittles our sense of human recognition and estimate to think how feebly the general public knows what a treasure has dropped from the world, and how poor it leaves the church and the scholarship of America.

“Excuse my seeking this means of relieving my own sorrow, and of making you the receiver of this feeble testimony to the worth and dignity of the honored saint we have just buried.”

From beyond the sea, also, came tokens of the same heartfelt sorrow. Prof. Smith had great admiration for Dr. Dorner, of Berlin, whom he regarded as, at present, “the leading scientific evangelical theologian of Germany.” In a letter to Prof. Briggs, of the Union Seminary, dated May 30, 1877, Dr. Dorner gives utterance to the feeling with which Prof. Smith was regarded in the land of Luther. An extract from this letter will be found on the title-page. From Switzerland, too, came a similar voice. The following is from a letter of Professor Godet, of Nenchâtel :

“La première fois que nous nous sommes rencontrés, c’était à Berlin, chez notre père spirituel, l’excellent Neander. J’ai appris alors à connaître en lui l’un des jeunes chrétiens les plus aimables, l’un des *gentlemen* les plus chrétiens que j’ai jamais rencontrés.

Plus tard j’ai eu la joie de revoir M. Smith en Suisse. Devenus professeurs l’un et l’autre, nous causâmes naturellement de théologie, et j’ai appris alors à connaître l’un des esprits les plus profonds, les plus judicieux et les plus perspicieux que j’ai jamais rencontrés. Il dominait chaque sujet et me dominait en en parlant.

En apprenant la mort de cet homme éminent, j’ai eu le sentiment bien profond : voilà un citoyen rentré dans sa patrie !”

Of Prof. Smith’s personal and social qualities, his manly simplicity, his unpretending, modest ways, his genial and generous sympathies, his quiet mirth, his quaint, delicate

humor, his love of books and all good fellowship, his catholic spirit, his high-toned sense of truth and justice, his patriotic zeal, his kindly interest in young men, and readiness to serve them, his devotion as a friend, his sweet domestic affections—of these and still other attractive features of his beautiful character, there is no room to speak at length. But they are enshrined in many hearts, and will never lose their fragrance. The memory of them, and of that library with which, in so many minds, they are indissolubly associated—how very pleasant it is, and always will be!—"Who can forget that room, walled and double-walled with books, the baize-covered desk in the corner by the window, loaded with the fresh philosophic and theologic treasures of the European press, and the little figure in the long gray wrapper seated there—the figure so frail and slight that, as one of his friends remarked, it seemed as though it would not be much of a change for him to take on a spiritual body; the beautifully moulded brow, crowned with its thick, wavy, sharply parted, iron-gray hair, the strong aquiline profile, the restless shifting in his chair, the nervous pulling of the hand at the moustache as the stream of talk widened and deepened, the occasional start from his seat to pull down a book or to search for a pamphlet—how inseparably these memories twine themselves with those of high debate and golden speech and converse on the themes of Christian philosophy and Christian experience."* What other library can ever seem like his, and where is the Christian scholar to fill his place? When shall we look upon another Henry B. Smith?

"That friend of mine who lives in God."

G. L. P.

NEW YORK, October 23, 1877.

* Dr. Vincent, in *The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* for April, 1877.

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THE RELATIONS
OF
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY.*

ALTHOUGH the very name of your society might seem to indicate the subject of your anniversary addresses, yet I have been deterred from taking sacred rhetoric as my theme, partly by the memory of the orations of former years, and partly because I have supposed that he who advocated the claims of this art ought, in his own person, to exemplify its power. And I feel justified in adventuring upon a graver topic, because this is consistent with your own precedents; because I am convinced it is equally befitting the occasion; and because it is more congenial with my own pursuits.

We meet as believers, as students, perhaps as teachers of the Christian faith. We are rationally convinced that in Christianity is the highest truth, and that in the orthodox system, which has formed the substance of Christianity through its advancing and victorious centuries, we have the best human exposition of the divine revelation. In proportion, then, to our love for this system, and to our love of all truth, will be the depth of our interest in the assaults made on our faith, whether by depraved passions or by elevated intellects.

No man who loves the Christian faith as it ought to be loved, no man who is alive to the spirit of the times in which he lives, as every man ought to be alive, can have failed to

* An address before the Porter Rhetorical Society of Andover Theological Seminary, at its anniversary, Sept. 4, 1849.

feel, to see, or to forbode the coming of a conflict between the mightiest powers that sway the destiny of man. There may, indeed, be those to whom, through grace, it is given, in the ripeness of an impregnable conviction, or in what Milton calls the "undeflowered and unblemishable" simplicity of a guileless and unquestioning faith to live in unruffled serenity; ever to see the guiding star and never to feel the insurgent billows. Blessed are they in the repose of their faith; intolerant of the spirit of the hour, because conscious of having the truth which is eternal. But most of us, if not ourselves assailed by doubts, or if through divine love delivered from their thralldom, cannot fail to see the ravages they are making upon others, and minds, too, of noble as well as of ignoble mould and temper.

We see the orthodox system, and Christianity itself, superseded by ethical, by social, and by metaphysical systems; we see it losing not only its traditionary, but also its intellectual hold, over many a sincere mind. Its sacred language is converted to profane and philosophic use. Its venerable symbols, the lawful heritage of the church, won by ages of conflict, are made to yield a new sense. Social reforms are made the media of indirect, when not of open attack. Each new science puts in its claim to modify some part of the sacred record. Our American propensity to submit all opinions to new examination, and all institutions to new experiment, favors such tendencies. The current English philosophy, when it does not pass Christianity wholly by, pays it but a distant reverence; the French philosophy is at the best vague in its admiration; the German speculations threaten its annihilation. Many who do not definitely doubt, are still half-conscious of

"That first slight swerving of the heart,
Which words are powerless to express."

Christianity is to them no longer the sun which rules the day, revealing all things in their true light, and guiding man through the waking hours of his hard and varied toil; but

like the paler moon it comes, when at all, in borrowed brightness, clothing all objects in an uncertain light, admired by the more susceptible, and having for its chief office to guard the hours of our repose. As the ardent and versatile Lamennais has represented it, before the intellect and science of the age, our faith is now arraigned, as was once its regal founder before the representative of the mightiest power of ancient times; and it is met on all sides by the question: Art thou a king? And how shall it show that it can really respond, I am the king of truth; in me is the highest truth, the wise philosophy?

The subject to which we are thus led, the Relations of Faith and Philosophy, is one which lies at the heart of all the questions of our times, and forms their sum and strength, their "pith and puissance." Let me then ask your sympathy in the boldness, if not your approbation of the wisdom of the attempt to unfold the characteristics and the true relations of faith and philosophy. Let me hope that our faith receive no detriment, even if your reason receive no instruction; and if the hand fail of its steadiness, still believe that the heart was right.

It is proposed to conduct the discussion by first describing the characteristics of faith and philosophy; then, by showing their opposition; next, by inquiring whether they are really exclusive of each other; and if this should seem not to be the case, by stating in conclusion, what we conceive to be their relative position, and the rightful claims of each.

I. Faith, in its widest usage, designates a conviction in the reality of things unseen and eternal; in a more religious sense, it is trust in God and God's word; in a more specific and theological meaning, it embraces the articles of belief drawn out into a definite system; in its most specific and evangelical sense, it denotes that full reliance upon Christ, by which we become partakers of the salvation which he alone has purchased for the human race.

In all these senses, excepting the first, it has certain marked traits, by which it is distinguished from philosophy. It rests

upon authority, upon good, upon the highest authority, but still upon authority,—confirmed, indeed, by experience, but it is the authority, and not the experience, which is ultimate and supreme. That authority is divine and decisive; it is the very word of God recorded in the Scriptures. As face answers to face in a glass, so does faith to the Bible, which it receives, both in history and in doctrine; and it is not so anxious to harmonize the parts as to imbibe the whole. It connects all things directly with the providence of God; to this it is ever submissive. It is content with miracles, and it accepts mysteries; it says, God alone is wise; here we see as through a glass, darkly; there we shall know as we are known. With the scholastic it has sometimes been willing to say, I believe, because it is impossible; or, with Lord Bacon, “By how much any divine mystery is revolting and incredible, so much the more honor do I render to God in believing it; and so much the nobler is the victory of our faith.” In such self-forgetful trust it finds, too, a deep delight, as well as a sure support. In Scripture and in prayer, there are rivers of pleasure, fountains which never fail, peace unutterable. Unregenerate is the heart that has never known such moods; unsanctified the soul that does not ever sink to its rest upon them. All doubt is merged in this exulting confidence; it flits only over its surface, as the breeze sweeps the luxuriant field of grain; nay, it may but serve to quicken faith with a sublimer energy, to add volume and exhilaration to its deep-felt joy. And as doubt does not enfeeble, so danger does not awe it; for omnipotence is with it. In death also it may delight, for it will then be delivered from sin, its only real enemy; it will be wholly sanctified, its only real good; and through eternity it will ever behold the face of Him, with whom every fibre of the soul’s inmost life is intertwined.

Such is faith; it is called a life, and it is worthy of the name of life, it is so full and satisfying. The man who has it would as soon doubt whether his body were animated by the life of nature, when he is conscious of the movements of

its muscles in their most strenuous efforts, and of the full delights of nervous sensation, as he would doubt whether his soul were a partaker of spiritual life, when its powers are expanded to their utmost intensity of action and of blessedness, by the gracious truths which centre in the person of our Lord.

Turn we now to philosophy. This is the product of human thought, acting upon the data given by the world without or the world within, and eliciting from these data principles, laws, and system. It is not the whole of human knowledge, but a special mode of that knowledge, the knowing things rationally; the knowing them in their ideas, their causes, their successions, and their ends. Common experience gives us things in their isolation and independence; philosophy in their similarity, harmony, and unity. It starts with facts, but with them abides not; it seeks for law, for all law, for the laws of matter, of mind, and of the universe. It demands necessary truth, eternal and immutable laws; by these it judges all things, and a severe logic is the instrument by which the test is applied. It does not like exceptions, it is intolerant of mysteries, it abhors contradictions. It strives to account for things, for all things. It seeks a harmonious whole. It may begin with wonder, as both Plato and Aristotle taught; but it ends in system, as both Plato and Aristotle have exemplified. And in proportion to the comprehensiveness, consistency, and exactitude of the system, is the aspiration of the philosophic intellect satisfied. What faith is to the believer, that, as has been said, his system is apt to become to the philosopher. He exults in it with a keen, intellectual delight. The laws of nature become to him the elder oracles, which have a voice to him that questions them, though silent to all others; which are ever profound, and ever present. In the calm and sure order, the unwearied and inflexible processes, the successive developments of nature and of the race, in the unseen yet irresistible laws of being and of motion, many a philosopher finds all his ideal realized; he calls this system of things infinite and divine;

loving law, he forgets the source of its energy; resting in his system, he thinks not of God.

So diverse are faith and philosophy. The one is a simple act of a trust; the other a reflective process; the one rests in facts and persons, the other in law and system. The former says, I must believe in order to know; the latter, I must know in order to believe, and then, it not seldom adds, there is no need of believing. This says, it is so, using the language of authority; that asks, how is it so? using the language of inquiry. Revelation is the boast of faith, reason of philosophy. The latter in second causes forgets the first, the former would even abolish the second, that it might magnify the great First Cause. Philosophy ignores providence so long as it can find a law; to the eye of faith, even miracles are a welcome evidence of the personal energy of God, breaking in, with wise design, upon the too fixed order of a sinful world. The former would rather confess ignorance than belief; the latter, though ignorant, ever trusts. Prayer is the delight of the one, the enigma of the other. In reading the passage: "He that hath the Son, hath life;" philosophy asks, who is the Son; what is his relation to the Father; is it inherent, or in the manifestation alone; what is this life; is it figurative or essential: while faith welcomes the inspired words with glad assent, they are the very words it needs, its heart is attuned to their gracious import. The one knows no love too great for Jesus, the other is willing to make him a partaker even of human sinfulness, that it may be exalted above the necessity of trusting in him. And, to sum up all in a word; faith sees God everywhere, especially in the Scriptures: while philosophy so long as it can find law and system, asks not for God. Law is the word of the one, God of the other; and these are their two extremes.

II. Such being their contrasted characteristics, it is hardly possible but that they should sometimes take the attitude of extreme opposition.

Faith, then, jealous for the honor of her God, and feeling

that her all is at stake, approaches philosophy with the mien of one inspired by a divine impulse, and says :

I have nourished and brought you up, and you have rebelled against me ! From the old traditions of the race you received those primal truths which you now claim as the birth-right of human reason. Greece had them from the Orient, where they were cradled. Germany from the gospel it has renounced. You have always been an ingrate, denying your very parentage : you have always been a rebel, defiant of authority ; you have always been a sceptic, doubting the best accredited facts. Aiming after unity, you are facile to deny the obstinate facts ; seeking for universality, you call partial knowledge universal ; the real unity and universality are found only in God, whom you banish from your systems. Of all heresy and division you with depravity have been the fruitful parents ; from the times of the Gnostics to the times of the Germans, you have vexed the church by irreverent questions, which no man is able to answer. Strong only in undermining, you have never been able to make a system which could survive the " shock of time, the insults of the elements," the providence of God and the might of his church. Your towers have been as Babel, on the plain of Shinar, and the act of building has been ever followed by the confusion of tongues. From pagan lands, unillumined, you came in the name of Aristotle, and brought subtle sophistries, and, in the name of Plato, ideal reveries, and substituted these for the simplicity of the gospel. Into the depths of materialism you have seduced the heaven-born soul ; to the heights of idealism you have carried man, borne on visionary pinions ; and in the depths you have found only a sepulchre, and from the heights discerned only an unfilled and trackless void. In the pride of reason, you forget the reality of sin. You weave around man a labyrinthine web, and leave him there without a clue, to die without a hope. Nature you rob of its vital energy ; instead of a kind providence, you give us only an un pitying law ; instead of a Redeemer, an abstract system, which has neither life nor love. Under your iron,

icy reign, crushed are the heart's best affections, unsatisfied its deepest wants; gone, forever gone, its most needed consolations. All the glorious forms with which grace environed us, you have touched with your magic wand, and they have shrivelled, like the leaf before the frost: you leave us only this poor, shifting world: you leave us to despair.

For us, then, there is no possibility even of a truce. It is war and only war: it is faith *or* philosophy; a disjunctive proposition, a vital dilemma. And you, born of groping reason, must submit to my celestial rights.

Challenged by such an adversary, philosophy, ever ready to respond, takes up the word, and, as is her wont, begins in a more modest, and ends in a more confident tone:

“ Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like reason
To rust in us unused.”

In your unwise zeal, you charge all philosophy with the extravagances of the few, forgetful of the services of the many. In the flush of a new system, I may have been your opponent; maturer thoughts have usually made me your ally. Without my aid how could man know, without my weapons how defend, even a revelation. When yourself attacked you use me in your defence, if you do not rely upon bare assertion or unwise denunciation. Without me you are a mystic or a fanatic. In the early church I aided in expelling superstitions; I sharpened your weapons, and burnished your armor. The precision of your theological terms is owing to my logic; your accredited formulas of doctrine could never have been built up without my hard toil. Those systems of theology which have been your boast and your defence are among the ripest products of philosophic culture. When the apostle speaks of the “opposition of science, falsely so called,” does he not imply that there is a science, truly to be so called? And that same God who gave to man the illumination of his Spirit, did he not also give the light of reason, and give rea-

son first, and reason always, and reason unto all: and, even if it be granted, that the highest joys of the heart are found only in submission to his revealed will, yet it must also be conceded that the chief delight of reason is in philosophy.

Thus would philosophy speak in the language of apology; but it has other words when it accepts the formula faith or philosophy. And there are four chief tendencies of our times in which its deliberate and conscious opposition to faith is manifest.

The first is that in which all certainty is found in the facts and laws of the material world. The laws and analogies of nature are forced to explain the laws of mind and of morals. Ethics and metaphysics are subordinated to what is dogmatically called positive science. To conform to natural laws, and not to transgress them is esteemed the great end. Law has no sanctions excepting the direct consequences of obedience or transgression. The harmony of man with nature is the great ideal, is the perfect state. There is no law reaching beyond this life. This world is the boundary of all real human hope and of all well-founded human fear. All else is doubtful.

The second form utters its oracles in a higher mood; it recognizes justice and love and the brotherhood of the race as great ends. It would relieve the wretched; give man his rights; introduce a new social state. It is animated by humane principles, and seeks great moral, though worldly ends. These it believes in; these it judges to be effective and sufficient. It has faith, but a faith which centres in humanity, and not in a personal God or an incarnate Redeemer. It seeks a kingdom; but is a kingdom which is to be of this world, though it is not yet in the world. Its heaven, the only one which is certain, is to be realized on earth.

There is a third tendency more religious in its language, and which may be and is combined with these others, though as a tendency it is distinct. God, it says, is to be loved and served; he can be loved. But, it is argued, if I have

that love which is the very essence of all religion, what need I more? How can it aid or mar this love to believe in a Bible, a Trinity, an external atonement and such long confessions of doctrine? The state of the heart is all. You call the Bible inspired, so am I; you call it a revelation, I have one within, more constant and persuasive. Such a mind contemplates the grand and distinctive realities of the Christian faith, as we gaze upon the sculptured gods of a Grecian temple; we may be lost in wonder and enraptured by their beauty; but they have for the soul no divine reality, as object of faith and love; they are memorials of an antiquated superstition; we have thought and felt above and beyond them, we cannot find our whole selves in them.

The fourth form of philosophic unbelief is the pantheistic; and this combines in itself elements from all the others. Here philosophy, as though conscious of its full power, asserts its absolute supremacy. By the assumed universality of its principles, the undeniable comprehensiveness of its aims, the rigor of its logic, and the steadiness of its processes; by its high ideal character; by its claim to be the result of the concentrated thought of the race, and to contain in itself all that is essential in the Christian faith, and to give the law and the explanation to all other sciences; this system seizes with an almost demoniacal power upon minds that would laugh to scorn the dreamy fantasies of the East, that see the rottenness of bare materialism and that feel something of the inherent might of Christianity. Never did a philosophical system take such an attitude towards the Christian faith; it does not make it a superstition, as did atheism; it does not neglect it, as does our popular philosophy; it does not scout its mysteries, as does an irrational common-sense; nor does it attenuate it into a mere ethical system; but it grants it to be the highest possible form of man's religious nature, it strives to transform its grandest truths into philosophical principles; it says that only one thing is higher, and that is pantheism. It claims to have transmuted Christianity into philosophy, and to stand above it, triumphant,

dominant, exultant. And thus it is the most daring, subtle, consistent, destructive and energetic philosophy which ever reared its front against the Christian faith. It has the merit of recognizing the grandeur of Christianity; it has the audacity to boast that itself is more sublime. It professes to have systematized all thought; to have possession of the aboriginal substance and the perfect law of its development; to be able to unfold all our ideas in their right connections, and to explain nature, mind, art, history, all other philosophies, and also Christianity. All this, it says, is but the unfolding of its own inner life. It weaves its subtle dialectics around everything, that thus it may drag all into its terrific vortex. It has a word for almost every man excepting for the Christian established in his faith. By the very extravagance of its pretensions it seduces many; by its harmony with the life of sense it attracts those who love the world; and by its ideal character it sways such as would fain be lifted above the illusions of sense and the visions of imagination, and the contradictions of the understanding, into a region of rarer air where reason sways a universal sceptre. Its system includes all things. God is all things; or rather all is God; he that knows this system knows and has God. And it claims that it thus gives a higher idea of deity than when he is limited by a definite personality; assuming, without any philosophical ground, that personality is in its very nature finite, and cannot be connected with infinite attributes. It professes to give man a system which shall make him wise and it is with the oldest temptation, ye shall be as gods.

Thus does philosophy, in its most daring mood accept the alternative, philosophy or faith; and it gives us the choice between Christ and Spinoza. And this is the great alternative of our times.

III. Leaving these two powers, for the present, in this attitude of opposition, we next inquire whether they can be rationally held to be utterly exclusive of each other.

It is said, for example, in faith is the only certainty; all philosophy is dangerous; the natural tendency of scientific

research is against revelation ; man is so depraved that though a true philosophy were a great good, it is irrational to expect it.

And it is undeniable that much modern speculation, both physical and metaphysical, is opposed to revelation ; and that all systems and principles which would explain nature without a God, and man's destiny without Christianity, so far as they logically lead to these results, are an unmixed evil and ought to be exposed and opposed.

But how opposed ? Philosophically, or otherwise ? He who will answer this question fairly will take the only correct ground. It is, we will say, an objection to the personality of God. How shall we meet it ? Shall we simply assert that we believe in the divine personality ; that the Bible speaks of God as a personal agent ? Or shall we not rather strive to show on the strictest philosophical grounds that the idea of a personal God is the most rational ; that without it we cannot really explain the origin or the order of the universe ; and that it is a mere assumption to assert, that personality is in its very nature finite—since it is the finiteness of man's attributes, and that alone, which gives the finiteness to his personality. But if we do this we are entering upon a philosophical discussion. And would it not be unfortunate to have taken at the outset a position against all philosophy, which would only serve to throw doubt over our own argument ? Is there not ground for a calm distinction between philosophy and and false philosophy. We may deny the possibility of a perfect system ; we may show that faith is necessary ; yet, is it not unwise to doubt, or to seem to doubt, or to say anything that would imply that we ever thought of seeming to doubt, that we might attain entire certainty on some points, and those, too, the most important which man can discuss ? Is not any other position suicidal ?

And therefore do we maintain that our ground should be, that faith and philosophy are not inherently opposed, but inherently at one ; and that this should be our pervading sentiment, influencing our theology, our philosophy, our preach-

ing, our every-day discussions; and that this is a position of prime necessity, now more than ever.

For, if this be not so, the bitterest sneers of a Hume were all true; fortified is the balanced satire of a Gibbon. He who lately wrote in a widely circulated Review: "that almost all sects have agreed to divorce religion from reasoning and to exalt faith by contemning philosophy, and that they thus have left all works of divinity in the hands of one class of writers and of one class of readers," might maintain his vituperation by our own confessions. Can that which is the dextrous and sinister policy of our enemies be a prudent position for ourselves?

If this be not so, then we give over the whole field of modern scientific research, both in nature and in mind, entire and unguarded, to be the grand arena, the pride, the honor and the power of infidelity. We virtually say, that to its benefit shall enure the fruit and glory of the sciences. And thus many minds, not faithless, yet not believing, who know that science has gained and garnered up some solid truth, are only repelled from a candid examination of the truths of our faith.

If this be not so, then, further, it is difficult to see the wisdom of that constitution of our being by which we are made cognizant of rational truth, as well as susceptible to the authority of religion.

If this be not so, then do we, in virtue of this constitution, deliver over the human mind to perpetual uncertainty, to an intestine war. And such a war is not like the conflict between sin and holiness, for sin is that which ought not to be, and in overcoming it, man is restored to himself as well as to his God; but, in the other case, prime elements of man's essential nature are set at variance, the foes are they of his own household; and they are contending not upon points of inferior moment, but upon the most vital interests of man. And so we are in danger of leaving it to be inferred with the schoolman, that one may hold to a truth with all the energy of faith, which is opposed by all the arguments of reason.

We shall oscillate like the German who declared: "philosophy plunges me into the arms of faith, and faith sends me back into the arms of philosophy; my spirit is a ball playing between these two extremes." If the soul for a moment be delighted with the enrapturing visions of faith, the next thought will be, these gorgeous palaces may be dissolved, and leave only a wreck behind. And thus the mind will be more ready to infer that all things are uncertain than that faith alone is sure, it is better prepared for scepticism than for trust, if it cannot hold, as an unassailable conviction, that reason and faith may be reconciled.

But this position is not only inconsistent with the rightful claims of reason, it is also repugnant to the real necessities and nature of faith. While it makes us traitors to the one it only dishonors the other. A faith which we do not believe in the very depths of our hearts to be rational, to contain in itself the sum and substance of all philosophy, is a faith which no thinking man can rationally hold; and if he holds it irrationally, it cannot long maintain its sway. "Faith may precede intellect," as Augustine says, but it involves intellect. It has its grounds, reasons and relations. "It appears to me a negligence," are the words of Anselm, "if after we are confirmed in the faith we do not study to understand what we believe." If a Christian man does not really hold that his system of faith has a firmer basis, a nobler end, a more puissant energy, that it solves more vital problems, and is adapted to man's nature in a fuller sense than any other system, that it is the highest reason as well as the only redemption, and the highest reason because the only redemption, he virtually confesses that a greater than Christ is here. We rob faith of one of its strongest persuasions if we do not claim that it is perfectly rational.

Faith, too, has its extremes and perils; and philosophy is needed as a counteracting element. It may degenerate into formality, or be sublimated into mysticism, or glow with fanatical fire. As faith without works is dead, being alone, so faith without knowledge may be superstitious, being unchecked.

The divine Spirit alone can indeed save from this and every error, into which man's blind and passionate nature is prone to fall ; but does he not often do it, by raising the calm voice of reason, the limitations of reflection, and the power of system against the erratic impulses of an unregulated belief. Knowledge without faith is indeed cold ; but faith without knowledge is often blind. It may become the servant of passion, and speak the language of bigotry, if it have not reason for its handmaid. Faith may be likened to the element of heat, whose central source is above, and whose subtle agency pervades all the parts of this wondrous whole—the generator of life, without which all that grows would decay, and all that lives would die ; while reason, like the other element of water, stands at the two extremes, to guard the life which only heat can generate. When the heat becomes excessive, water evaporates, and in this very process envelopes, innocuous, the fiery particles, which else would consume every living thing, and so it guards life at this extreme ; and when winter comes, water congeals, and, in its very congelation, sends out its latent warmth to animate the forms that otherwise would perish, and so it guards life at this extreme also. And even thus, it seems to me, we may say of human reason, that it has a two-fold office in the guardianship of faith ; from the extreme of formality it may quicken it into a new life by the stimulus of argument, and, by unfolding the symmetry and sublimity of the creed which is repeated with cold lips ; and, in the other extreme of unhallowed glow, it may guard it, not only by the restraints of prudence, but also by the pervading and calm influence of a profound and clear exhibition of all the parts and checks of the Christian system.

We may add, that an intimate persuasion of the inherent unanimity of faith and reason has been a prominent trait of the grandest intellects of the Christian Church. Philosophy they have repelled by philosophy. Such was Augustine, when he refuted the vain pretension that man could regenerate himself, not on grounds of Scripture alone, but from the depths of the human consciousness. Such was Anselm

of Canterbury, when, at the hour of the sacred vigils, there was revealed to him his sublime speculation upon the being of God; or when, with holy zeal, he wrote upon that high argument, why did God become incarnate? and first, on rational grounds, showed the necessity of an atonement. Such too was that holy French recluse, that sublime ascetic, who felt as hardly did another of his age, the intense conflict between faith and reason, because he had both in their fullness, and who, in immortal fragments, has left us a sketch of a philosophical apology for Christianity, which has never been completed, because Pascal has had no successor. The wisest of English Christians, while he elaborated with patient thought, through many years, his unsurpassed vindication of Christianity, on the ground of the Analogies of nature, was ever animated by the conviction, that there must be harmony in all the works of God, that in their origin, their principles and their aims, nature and Christianity are in unison; and that this can be rationally evinced. And him—the mighty man of our New England theologic host, when, with capacious intellect and whole-souled love, he meditated, in the fairest village on the banks of our noblest river and in his remoter missionary retreat, upon those two great problems, which have given their distinctive character to all our subsequent theological discussions, upon the Nature of True Virtue, and the Freedom of the Human Will, what impulse moved him, if not the necessity of bringing the subtlest researches of human reason into harmony with the truths which lie at the basis of all piety. Without philosophy how could he have attempted the reconciliation of divine sovereignty with the consciousness of freedom: without deep speculative insight how could he have discerned, as no one did before him, the radical identity of virtue and religion. Intellect and faith acted together in him, distinct, yet as consentaneous as are the principle of life and the organic structure in our animal economy.

Thus, on various grounds, we have contended that it is no sound sense to say that faith and philosophy are foes. On the highest grounds it is false; on the lowest, it is bad policy.

It is unwise to do it even in the heat of discussion, even when opposing a fatal error, even to gain an urgent end. For we should be obliged to recant before the first rational man we encountered in calm debate.

Nor do we forget either man's depravity, or the dangers of philosophy. Man is depraved—alas! that we should say it, man is depraved; human passions are the source and defence of many a false system: but I am afraid to allow to depravity the fearful advantage of claiming for itself full possession of our intellectual natures, as well as of the wish and the will; for the evidence of depravity is increased when we show that it is against a man's own reason; and we lose one of our most potent means of assailing it when we grant that reason is its bulwark and not its foe.

And philosophy, too, is dangerous; all philosophy is dangerous. But the simple, sober fact in the case is this, that there are some dangers which can be avoided only by being incurred, and by pressing right through the danger to the victory. And there is one peril that, in our times, is more imminent, and that is, the opposing so dangerous an enemy as is false philosophy, by the only weapons to which it is invulnerable.

Our philosophical infidels are calm men, men of nerve; their infidelity is not fed by their passions alone, nor is it vented only in execrations. They are men of thought and system. They do not feel the force of a bare assertion; they yield to no popular clamor; they fear no ecclesiastical denunciation. They are scrutinizing; and profoundly conscious of holding principles which deliberately exclude the realities of the Christian faith. They accept the philosophic horn of the dilemma, philosophy or faith; until they can see that the formula should read, faith and philosophy.

IV. And it is with this formula that we make our transition to the fourth part of this discussion: and that is, an attempt to exhibit the real relations and the rightful claims of faith and philosophy. To say that both have rights, and that we should attempt to reconcile them, is only to gain a clear field for the most important portion of our work, the

adjustment of their respective claims, of their relative supremacy. And if the limits of the occasion make it necessary to omit much of great importance, they may perhaps allow a statement of the points most needing consideration.

And it may be well at the outset to disown some vague attempts at reconciliation which only smother the difficulties. Thus to faith is assigned one whole sphere, God and the Bible; to philosophy another and a distinct department, nature and the human mind. But philosophy has an intense interest in God and the Bible, and faith cannot do without man and providence. Neither the dispute nor adjustment is territorial.

Nor can we any better say, that revelation gives us all our ideas of God: and that philosophy must accept them, without anything further. For this either takes revelation in so broad a sense, that a philosophical infidelity might be based upon it; or else it puts man in a position in which we cannot see how a revelation could possibly be made to him in an intelligible manner. A revelation takes for granted that he to whom it is made has some knowledge of God, though it may enlarge and purify that knowledge.

In point of fact, faith and philosophy are employed about the same great subjects, God, man, providence and human destiny.

1. But though employed about the same great subjects, we say that they are employed about them in a different way; and that the difference in the mode results from a difference inherent in the nature of philosophy and faith. And this is the first aspect in which their relations are to be considered.

What then, we ask, is philosophy? what does it seek? what are its limits? And we answer as before, philosophy is a mode of human knowledge, not the whole of that knowledge, but a mode of it; the knowing things rationally; the knowing them in their causes, their relations, and their ends; the knowing them in the harmony and completeness of a system. It being only such a mode of knowledge, the materials, the substance, the facts must, from the nature of the case, exist before the philosophy, and be taken for granted

by the philosophy, and be the limit and the test of the philosophy itself. These exist independently of philosophy, and their reality is, of course, to be attested on independent grounds. The facts of the material or of the intelligible world are the prime materials of all philosophical systems; and without them no system can be constructed. There is one thing, then, against which speculation is fruitless, and that is the majesty of fact, of all facts of the outward or inward world properly attested. Philosophy may explain and systematize realities; may show their rational grounds and connections; but it is not within its province to annul an item of history, any phenomena of nature, or any facts of consciousness. If it endeavor to falsify any reality, duly attested by sense, by internal consciousness, or by valid testimony, it is committing high treason against the majesty of fact. It may seek the rational grounds of all that is, but in doing this it assumes that what is, is; and so far as any system is inconsistent with what is, so far it is false; and so far as it cannot rationally explain what is, so far it is incomplete. And of all philosophy, Scotch or German, ideal or empirical, the independent realities of nature, of mind, and of history are not only the substance and the strength, but also the abiding test; taken for granted as such in all discussions.

If this be so, we ask next, what is faith, what does it claim to be, in what does it rest? Faith, internally, is a state of trust; but it is always trust in something external. Its real character can only be determined by stating its objects. And the Christian's faith reposes, as we before said, upon a revelation, an historical revelation, a revelation historically attested, attested by miracle and by prophecy; a revelation recorded in a volume which claims to be inspired. It is not primarily a system of doctrines, nor a confession, nor a speculation; but it is a grand historical economy, a manifestation of God and his purposes, an annunciation of supernatural truth by natural agencies, by prophets and teachers, and, last of all, by Jesus Christ; a manifestation forming a part of human history, connected and progressive through thousands of years.

And all this series of revelations comes to us in the Scriptures, which gives us both the facts and the divine interpretation of them. Christianity thus claims to be a real revelation of God, made in the best form in which we can conceive a revelation to be made, and made for the highest ends for which a revelation can be made, made to give the highest and most needed knowledge, made to redeem mankind. And this whole historic revelation bears with steady and concentrated aim upon one person, himself an historical personage, himself a man, in whom it is declared that heaven and earth are reconciled, that the great problems of human destiny are solved. And thus the Christian religion presents itself as adapted to man's highest wants in an exclusive sense, and with redeeming efficacy. This is the first aspect of the Christian economy; and here is the primary basis of faith.

But this is not all; for faith claims an internal evidence, as well as an historical basis. Man is a believer, made to trust. The infirmities of his finite, and the necessities of his sinful condition, make faith necessary to the attainment of the great ends of his being. And the Christian finds in his own heart a profound experience, which fills and satisfies his soul, and which is entirely responsive to the substance of the divine revelation, as recorded in the word of God. And here is another series of facts, reaching through thousands of years, embracing men of every clime and degree, the sage and the simple, the civilized and barbarian, the young and the mature, the living and the dying, who all, with one consent, testify that in this revelation they have found their solace and support, that it is the source of the highest activity and blessedness of all their powers. And in the experience of believers also, all converges around the same divine person, who is the centre and the crown of the historic revelation.

Nor is this all. That revelation, historically so grand in its origin, and confirmed by human experience, has also entered into and controlled the whole course of human history and of human thought, since the coming of Jesus of Naza-

reth. And here is another series of facts. History is the grand test of truth ; it does not lie, for it is the ever unfolding providence of God. It is more authoritative than mere speculation, for it gives us the highest reality. And in history the Christian system has existed as a real and permanent power ; it has been the centre of man's noblest thoughts and strongest feelings, in his most cultivated state, for eighteen hundred years ; it has controlled the destinies and led the march of the nations ; from its bitter contests it has ever emerged with added lustre, as though endowed with immortal energy. It is superior to defeat. Its power is now more intense and diffused than ever before. And thus is Christianity not only an historic revelation, and an internal experience, but also an organic, diffusive, plastic and triumphant force in human history ; and in this history, as in the revelation, and as in the experience, the centre around which all revolves is the person of Jesus Christ.

Nor yet is this all. This revelation has another aspect, which has already been hinted at, but which requires a fuller statement. If man were entirely satisfied with the course of nature—with being born, living, and dying ; if he had no sense of sin, if he had never sinned ; he would not be ever asking those sublime questions, to which nature is deaf and reason is dumb. But he knows something of God, of law, of death and of eternity, and he would fain know more ; for here are inquiries in comparison with which all the secrets of nature are not only insignificant but patent to our gaze. Now it is the grand claim of the Christian revelation that it answers these vital questions, that it solves all the great moral problems of human destiny. For each enigma, so dark to reason, it has a definite and an authoritative response ; for all the great moral problems of our destiny it offers a solution ; and the solutions are given in the person and work of Christ ; they all meet in the same radiant centre, in whom the revelation converges, in whom the believer finds his blessedness, and to whom all subsequent history has brought its loyal tribute.

This, then, is the primary aspect in which the Christian faith is to be viewed: as an historical reality, confirmed by experience, influencing history, and professing to solve the greatest questions of our destiny, and all centering in Jesus Christ, a personal object of faith and love, the very manifestation of God here upon the earth.

This being so, what is the attitude which philosophy from its very nature, if we have correctly described it, must take towards the Christian faith? Philosophy can annul no fact; it must bow to all realities properly attested. It may strive to undermine the basis of faith by historical criticism; to prove that the experience of believers is contrary to right reason; to show that history may be otherwise interpreted than as centering in Christ: and that there are other and better solutions of the problems of our destiny than those which Christianity offers: it may strive to expel Christ from the human heart and from human history. Should it succeed in throwing doubt upon the evidences, there remains the experience; should it make experience seem a delirium, there remains the history; should it cast suspicion on the history, there still remains the broad ground that to all the great problems of our destiny, philosophy cannot furnish a better decision than that which faith bears on her lips, one more consonant with man's best hopes, more elevating to his whole nature, more rational in itself. So that until philosophy can overthrow the pillars of our revelation, and prove our inmost life to be all a delusion; until it can find some other centre of convergence and divergence for the whole history of our race than the city of Jerusalem, and the middle cross on Calvary; until it can resolve the questions of our fate with a higher argument than Christianity presents: it is obliged to leave to faith all the vantage ground, all the supremacy, which an historic and experienced reality may confer.

And here, under God, is the hiding place of the strength of faith. Its is the majesty of a revealed economy; the profoundest experience of the human heart is with it; the might of history testifies unto it; it, and it alone, gives the key

which unlocks the mysteries of our moral being. These are the things which make it stronger than any excogitated system. Thus it is intertwined, as no mere speculation can be, with education, with the family, with human institutions, with the organic structure of society, with the deepest wants of the human heart, with its most permanent convictions. And thus is the Christian revelation, considered as a grand, historic, experienced economy, centering in one person, distinct from all other pretended revelations; and here do we find our warrant for drawing the distinction broad and clear. As soon as a revelation is resolved, as by some recent writers, into intuitions, so soon does faith lose its strongest means of defence against the assaults of philosophy.

Human reason may indeed inquire whether the voice which speaks be delusive or divine; it may test the truth of revelation on historical grounds; it may ask whether its doctrines be in harmony with, or contradictory to moral truth, to our essential ideas and necessary convictions; it may inquire whether the problems it proposes to solve be real or only imaginary; but having answered such preliminary inquiries, it has no shadow of a right to go to this revelation, and dictate to it what it shall tell us of God's nature, or what shall be the method of the revelation or of the redemption, any more than it has a right to go to that other reality, nature, and prescribe its laws and limit its elements. In both cases man is to study and to learn. Viewless as the life of nature, Christianity, like that life, is a diffusive, penetrating, and shaping agency; it moves majestically according to its divine laws, and knows not the control of human reason. It is simple as is light to the eye of the child, it is profound as is light to the eye of the sage, it is blessed as is light to all, it is darkness only to those who see not the light.

2. The statements we have thus far made upon the relative claims of faith and philosophy rest on the assumption that both parties admit the existence of a personal God, and the possibility of a revelation. The relation of the two is entirely different, when philosophy would undermine these cardinal

points on which revelation rests. And here is where philosophy can be met only by philosophy. It is as unphilosophical for faith to be dogmatic here, as it is for philosophy to be dogmatic in the face of a recognized reality. If we cannot construct the foundations and the outworks of the Christian system, on impregnable grounds; if we cannot show the possibility of miracles and of a revelation; if we cannot prove, absolutely prove the existence of a wise, intelligent, personal and providential Ruler of all things, then we are merged in infidelity, or given over to an unfounded faith. If we cannot settle these points on the field of open discussion, we cannot settle them at all.

The way of meeting sceptical positions on these questions is not by saying that they are repugnant to faith, but by showing that they are opposed to sound reason; is not by saying that they are German and transcendental, but by being very bold and yet more wise, and claiming that they are not only German but radically unsound; not only transcendental, but essentially unphilosophical. And if one cannot conscientiously say this, he had better say nothing at all about it.

The wise method is to expose the principle which lies at the heart of all this modern infidelity, and to show that the principle is really unphilosophical and incomplete. And that principle may perhaps be said to be, that we have given a rational account of things when we have reduced them to abstract ideas, or great principles; to laws, whether physical or ideal; that physical causes, antecedents and consequents, are the great end of philosophic inquiries; in short, that law and system are sufficient to account for the energy, the order, and the ends of the universe. This is the prime falsehood coiled in the heart of all these infidel schemes; this is the point to be met; and against it we must show that this principle does not answer the most important questions; that it gives only order and system, and does not explain the origin even of that; that it only answers the question, what are the constituents, and what the succession of things; that it does not answer the question, Whence are they? nor the question,

How came they so to be? nor yet the question, What is their final cause? And these are as important and as philosophical questions as are those which concern abstract law and fixed succession.

When, for example, an enthusiastic naturalist, who knows something of nature and little of logic, thinks that by means of the fire-mist and an assumed law, he can show how all things are developed out of the mist, up to man and down to his system, and all without a God,—shall we deny that there are order, and development, and a vast unfolding series in creation; or, shall we not rather say, conceding the order and development so far as they are verified, that the more the order, and the vaster the development, the greater is the need of an intelligent cause and an omnipotent energy? When modern explorers in history find reason and law and progress in its course, if we deny the reason and the progress, how can we vindicate Providence on any historical grounds: if we accept them, how may we not use them to show, even to the objector, that history has a guiding hand? And even when the pantheist brings forward his boasted system, and asserts that he has got the primal substance and the universal law, by which all things may be developed, and attempts to exhibit their relations and connections and ends; whether is it wiser to say that reason is proud, that we cannot see relations and make systems, or, granting the reality of harmony, order and law, and the need and use of pointing them out, still to claim that to infer pantheism is philosophically false; that this system, with all its pretensions, accounts fully only for the succession and order of things; not for their rationality, since conscious reason alone is truly rational; nor for their energy, since mind alone is powerful; nor for their origin, since will alone can really bring into being; nor for their wise ends, since reason, power, and will are necessary to bring a rational end out of a blind universe. Philosophy must here show that the idea of a personal Creator, himself uncaused, is most rational, and is the only basis of the unity and energy of the universe.

Thus on the great questions preliminary to a revelation, we claim that philosophy has an exclusive voice, and that this is a point necessary to be insisted on in defining the relations of faith and philosophy.

And here we would not, for a moment, be understood to imply that the actual belief of men in God's existence and government is dependent upon such scientific analysis and proof: it is no more dependent on this, strictly speaking, than is man's belief in an external world on the refutation of idealism. Man was made for God, and all man's powers, in their right use, tend toward their great Author. Here is the actual stronghold of such belief against all sceptical systems. And when the belief is questioned, an argument for it may be derived from these tendencies; yet not hence alone, perhaps not most convincingly, in a philosophic point of view, as against the sceptic.

3. Having thus stated, in general terms, what we conceive to be the relations of these two powers in respect to the substance and to the foundations of the Christian system, claiming for faith the priority in the one, and for philosophy in the other; it becomes necessary to speak of their relations within the precincts of the revelation itself.

For though philosophy must, in the first instance, receive the revelation properly authenticated; yet, by virtue of its office in giving a systematic form to our knowledge, it may still render essential and needed service to faith.

And this is the same thing as saying that we need systematic theology. For systematic theology is the combined result of philosophy and faith; and it is its high office to present the two in their most intimate conjunction and inherent harmony. The whole history of the church gives us, in scientific theology, the best results of the conflict, and examples of the union of the highest faith and the wisest philosophy. In short, systematic theology may be defined, as the substance of the Christian faith in a scientific form. And our whole previous discussion bears upon this point as its culmination and result.

Systematic theology, by our ablest divines, is recognized as a science, both theoretical and practical. It is not a mere arrangement of the facts and doctrines of the Bible in a lucid order: it is the unfolding of them in a scientific order; it is not a series of unconnected doctrines, with the definitions of them, it is the combining of doctrines into a system: its parts should not only be coördinate, they should be regularly developed. It should give the whole substance of the Christian faith, starting with its central principle, around which all the members are to be grouped. It must defend the faith and its separate parts against objections, and show that it is congruous with well-established truths in ethical and metaphysical science. And in proportion to the philosophical culture of the theologian, to the comprehensiveness of his principles, will be his ability to present the Christian faith in a fitting form. While it is partly true, that he who seeks for theology in philosophy is seeking the living among the dead; it is wholly true, that he who seeks for theology without philosophy is seeking the end without the instruments. We may be well assured that there is a statue somewhere in the block of marble; but the pick-axe, and the drill, and eyes that have no speculation in them, can never find it; it needs instruments of the finest temper, a hand of the rarest skill, guided by a mind able to preconceive the symmetry of the perfect shape.

The necessity of systematic theology we put, then, on the broad ground that we need a reconciliation between faith and philosophy. Simple faith might have been sufficient for the first ages of the church, though it was not; we live in an age of controversy, surrounded by minds drenched with objections to orthodoxy, among people who, whatever else they have asked, have always asked a reason; to defend our faith, to commend our faith, we need systematic theology. Let us never cease to pray that the age of perfect faith may come; that it come more speedily, let us arm ourselves for the contest. As well might a general lead a straggling troop of even patriotic men against marshaled and disciplined battalions, as we encounter the closed and firm phalanx of our foes without

a compact army of even the sacramental host of God's elect. Systematic theology is necessary so far, and just so far, as there is any meaning in the contest between faith and philosophy; just so far as we have anything to say, consistently and definitely, in defence of Christianity. Its necessity is indeed not vital, as is that of faith in the heart: it is not of universal educational necessity, as are preaching and teaching: but it is necessary so far as we need leaders thoroughly trained, able to define and defend the truth, to show its harmonies and relations. It is not necessary, as is the circulation of the blood, but like the knowledge of that circulation, which is important to all, and indispensable to the expert. It is necessary so far as the mind needs system and science at all, so far as a science of the highest objects is yet more necessary, so far as a science of the highest objects for the most urgent and practical ends is most necessary. It is necessary so far as it is a delight to the mind to see the fair proportions of its faith depicted in their symmetry; and surely, never is the soul better prepared to feel the deepest emotions of reverence and of trust, than when it has gazed upon the grand outlines and internal symmetry of the system of redemption. He who thinks highly feels deeply. From long meditation on the wonder of the divine revelation, the mind returns with added glow to the simplicity of faith.

We do not, then, feel the force of the objection to doctrinal theology that it is unfavorable to a life of faith. A technical system may be, but that is because it is technical. Mere formulas may be, but we should not hold any truth as a mere formula. And least of all does this objection apply to our New England systems; these have been held by the heart quite as much as by the head; no theology has ever insisted with such unrelenting earnestness upon the necessity of inward experience. Not written in catechisms, it has been engraved on fleshly tablets. We have not only discussed, we have also experienced almost everything; from conscious enmity to God, to the profoundest submission to his will; from the depths of a willingness to be condemned, to the

heights of disinterested benevolence ; from the most abstract decrees of a Sovereign, down, almost, to the power to the contrary ; we have passed through the very extremes of doctrine, and known them to be real by our inward experience. We have not so much transformed spirit into dogma, as we have transmuted dogma into spirit. We have never, never forgotten, that the begetting in man of a new life was the paramount end of all theology as of all preaching.

Nor are we sure that we understand the force of the objection to doctrinal theology, derived from the allegation that language is inadequate to embody spiritual truth ; for though this be annihilating, yet it seems to us that it cannot be proved true, unless we utterly divorce language from all thought and feeling. It is of the very office of language to express what is consciously working in the soul ; language is the express image of spirit. As soon as the mind is raised above the obscure state of spontaneous feeling, or the rude perceptions of sense, it begins to express its feelings and indicate its perceptions in audible language. In its whole training, words, thought or uttered, are the great instrument, as well as the result of its progress. And so it comes to pass, that though language be not life, yet there is not a deep or delicate emotion, not a subtle distinction or large concatenation of human thought, not an abstract principle or a simple idea, which language by simple words, by imagery, by definition, by description, or by system, is not adequate to convey. And though single words, when taken singly, may have many a sense, yet the single words only give us the separate parts of speech ; but take language as a whole, put the word in a sentence, qualify it by adjuncts, limit it by its relations, define it by logic, fix it in a system, and the single word may have such an immovable significance, that no other term can be exchanged for that simple sound. It may have had its origin in the regions of sense ; but by the action of the soul upon it, it has been transfigured ; it has passed through all inferior stages, and at length has been claimed by faith or reason for its exclusive use ; so that only a philologist knows its earthly

origin, and to all others it is the apt and direct symbol of the highest ideas of reason, or the loftiest objects of faith.

And for the objection itself, we might be the more anxious, did we not find in the exquisite grace of the language of the accomplished thinker who has propounded it, that his own theory is practically refuted by his own eminent example. None more skilful than he to express the subtlest moods of mind, the most delicate analogies of thought; no one who better exemplifies the fact, that the sublimest objects of Christian faith, and the tenderest play of Christian feeling may be so fully expressed in human language, that the only hearts unmoved are those themselves devoid of feeling and of faith.

In proceeding now to state, as concisely as we can, the mode in which faith and philosophy are to be harmonized in Christian theology, so that this shall be truly their nuptial state, we say, first of all, that that only can be a true system, which contains the very substance of the Christian faith; which gives us the very heart of the revelation in a systematic form. Hence the absolute necessity of Biblical study, as the prime condition; hence, too, he only who knows the inward power and reality of faith can be a true theologian. This results from the very fact that the Christian economy is both an historical and an experienced reality. "He is the best divine who best divines" the spirit of the Scriptures; and he alone has the power of divination whose heart is responsive to the oracles. In a higher sense than can be asserted of anything else, it holds true of the Christian faith, that "it can be really known only as it is truly loved." The illumination of the spirit is as necessary as is the light of reason. Both the cherubic and seraphic virtues, in the old interpretation of them—the spirits of wisdom and the spirits of love, must preside over the work.

But, on the other hand, only the philosophic intellect can grasp the prime principles, can see the relations of the parts, can guard against inconsistencies, can show the harmony of the system with the powers of the mind, with ethical truth,

and with our necessary and essential ideas. It alone can grapple with the real problems, and show how the Christian faith solves them. Without it, the interpretation of Scripture would be careless when not obscure. It alone can regulate and correct the definitions of doctrine; it alone can impart shape and comprehensiveness to the system.

Thus we have the substance of the system, that is, the revelation; and the power which is to shape this substance, and that is the philosophic mind. But now come up the most important and decisive questions: whence are we to get the principle, and what is the principle, which is to be the central influence, and the controlling energy of the whole system? And here is where the inquiry really hinges about the relative supremacy of faith and philosophy. Is philosophy to bring this principle with it from ethics, from mental philosophy, or from natural religion; or is it to take it from the revelation itself? And here perhaps is also the point on which turns the controversy between those who seem to contend on the one hand all for system, and on the other all for faith. If a system of Christian theology be a true expression of the Christian faith, there can be no incongruity between the system and the faith; we shall not be forced either to change spirit into dogma or dogma into spirit; for in the doctrine we shall have the expression of the spirit: we shall be lifted above the misery of saying that we must be all doctrine or all life, all formula or all faith: and while we insist that faith is the essential thing, we may also be able to see that a true theological system is one of the noblest boons which faith can have, as well as a want of the Christian intellect.

All theological systems, now, which have any distinctive influence or character are based upon some ultimate principles, by which the arrangement and even the definitions of the doctrines are controlled. Consciously or unconsciously, they are under the power of some dominant idea, which determines the shape of the separate parts.

Thus, the compact and consistent system, comprised in the

Westminster Assembly's Catechism, rests, indeed, upon the basis of the divine sovereignty, but this sovereignty is further modified by the idea of a covenant relation; and this it is which may, perhaps, be said to give shape to the exposition of the leading doctrines in the consistent Presbyterian church, so far as their views are different from the general orthodoxy.

Our New England theology has its basis in the same general idea of the divine sovereignty, drawn out into a clear and articulate system of decrees, giving us the very anatomy of religion in its most abstract form. And such anatomy is necessary; if we believe in a God and are consistent thinkers, we cannot avoid believing in a sure and divine system of things: thus alone can we keep alive the idea of the divine agency and government, without which all theology would be unsupported. But besides the decrees, we have had two other modifying influences in our systems, which have given them their most distinctive character, and which have both come to us through the discussions of Jonathan Edwards, though they might easily be shown to be no arbitrary development of the Calvinistic system. What is the Nature of True Virtue, and what is the real Freedom of the Human Will in connection with the divine sovereignty: are the two questions which have chiefly determined the character of our theological systems and parties. Our views on these points have given character to our theology and our preaching on many of the most important articles of the Christian faith. It is here that we have had a distinctive character, an original theological cast; it is here we have made "advances in theology." Our systems have indeed contained all the doctrines, from the Being of God to the life everlasting; but our pressure and force have been on these radical inquiries. We have met and not shrunk from the absorbing investigations which are forced upon the mind when it asks about the harmony of the doctrines of Christianity with ethical truth, and with indubitable facts of mental science.

But now we have fallen upon other times; and other in-

quiries are brought home to us. We are compelled to meet questions, to which our theories about sovereignty, virtue, and free-agency can give no definite response. Men are asking, what is Christianity as distinct from an ethical system? Who and what is Christ, that we should love and believe in Him? What is his nature? what his relation to God and to us? What is his place in the Christian system? The questions of our times, in short, do not bear upon the point, whether the doctrines of the Christian system are in harmony with the truths of ethics and of mental philosophy; but rather upon the point, what is the real nature of Christianity, what are its essential characteristics? And no theory of ethics or of freedom can answer these questions.

To meet the wants of our times, then, we must endeavor to get at that principle which gives its definite and distinct character to the Christian economy.

And it is here we claim, as a matter of philosophical justice also, that philosophy is not to bring this principle with it, but is rather to seek it in the Christian system itself. This is the dictate of the Baconian, of the Aristotelian induction. This is necessary in all science. To find the principles of optics, we study light. To find the laws of the mind, we study mind. To know Christianity, we must study Christianity. To get at a living Christian theology, we must have the central principle of Christianity itself.

We state our position again. The principle which is to give shape to a theological system ought, on the strictest philosophical grounds, to be taken from the Christian economy itself; so that what forms the substance and vitality of Christianity shall be the centre of our theology also; this principle is not to be sought in ethics, or in nature, or in the will of man, but only in the revealed will of God.

And *where* we are to seek for this principle, who can doubt? The central idea of Christianity, as a distinct system, can only be found in Him of whom prophets did testify, evangelists write, and apostles preach; whose life was the crowning glory of humanity, as his death was its redemption;

and from whose death and from whose life influences and blessings have streamed forth, constant and inestimable; in Him, whose nature, more wonderful than any other, unites the extremes of humanity and divinity; whose work, more glorious and needed than any other, reconciles heaven to earth and earth to heaven; and whose dominion is as intimate in its efficiency as it is eminent in its claims and beneficent in its results. He is the centre of God's revelation and of man's redemption; of Christian doctrine and of Christian history, of conflicting sects and of each believer's faith, yea, of the very history of this our earth, Jesus Christ is the full, the radiant, the only centre—fitted to be such because He is the God-man and the Redeemer: Christ—Christ, He is the centre of the Christian system, and the doctrine respecting Christ is the heart of Christian theology.

For, if theology be the science which unfolds to us the relations of God and man; if the Christian revelation contains the full and authoritative account of these relations; and if in the Christian revelation the wealth of the divine manifestation and the wants and hopes of man are all convergent upon Jesus Christ; and if it be philosophically just to seek the central principle of Christian theology in that which forms the heart and life of the revelation—where else can we find this animating idea excepting in the Person of Jesus Christ? And that which constitutes the prime and peculiar characteristic of that Person, that it is the union of humanity and divinity, will most naturally be taken as the prime characteristic of the system which centres in Him.

And with that glorious Person all the other truths of our faith are inherently connected. The distinct personality of Christ is the starting point, from which to infer the reality of the distinctions in the Godhead; atonement and justification centre in Him; our very spiritual life is hid with Christ in God; if we believe in him we are born of God; we are to be changed into the image of Christ; the sacraments of the church testify of Him until He come. And a theology which finds its centre in such a Being, cannot be a barren, abstract

system; but it gives us a direct and personal object for our faith and love. Thus, and thus only, does Christian theology express the Christian faith in its perfect form.

This position—that in Jesus Christ is to be found the real centre of the Christian economy, and that here its distinction from any and all other forms of religion is chiefly to be seen, lies at the basis of all theological systems which acknowledge a real revelation and manifestation of God in the person and work of his only Son. It is at the very head of the whole theology of the Reformation; from reliance upon an outward church, there was a return to faith in Christ, as the only ground of justification. To have Christ, to have the whole of Christ, to have a whole Christ, is the soul of our Puritan theology; the rest is foundation, defence, or scaffolding.

This principle is also in entire conformity with the dictates of Christian experience; it is demanded by that experience. Whatever the theology may have been, whatever the conflicts of sects, the name of Jesus has touched the tenderest and deepest cords of man's heart. You may cut a man loose from almost all the distinguishing doctrines of our faith, and he will still cling to the very name of Christ, as with a despairing energy. So vital is Christ in Christian experience, that many are withheld from speculating upon his nature by the unspeakable depth and tenderness of their love for Him.

Thus it is wherever Christ is truly known and loved. And it is a cause of devout congratulation, and an occasion for the most auspicious hopes, that in that land where infidelity has reached its most daring height, both in criticism and in speculation, there is also, in opposition to this infidelity, the strongest and most intelligent attempt to bring out this distinctive characteristic of the Christian system, in its philosophical and theological bearings. The later German Evangelical theology, in its return from a cold rationalism and its opposition to a daring and logical pantheism, is especially distinguished by the fact, that it is feeling more and more deeply the importance and reality of the doctrine respecting Christ, as expressing the prime principle of the Christian faith. One of the

loveliest and most sagacious of all these evangelical men, Dr. Ullmann, in an admirable article on the Real Nature of Christianity, thus writes: "Christianity first appears in its distinctive nature and in its full objective character, when all that is embraced in it is referred back to the personality of its founder, considered as uniting humanity with divinity. * * * Thus viewed, Christianity is in an eminent sense something organic; in its very origin it is a complete, spiritual, organic whole; from a personal centre it unfolds all its powers and gifts, imparting them to humanity and uniting men under Christ in a divine kingdom. From this central point, and only from this, everything else receives its full significancy; doctrine, as the expression of a real life, attains its full power; * * * atonement and redemption receive their objective basis and confirmation."

These are not the words of a solitary thinker in that land of scholars and thoughtful men. They express the views common to the best German divines, the most philosophical and the most Christian. Pressed on all sides by the foes of our faith, they have taken refuge in its very citadel. They have been forced to bring out the distinguishing characteristic of Christianity in the boldest relief. They have made the doctrine respecting Christ to assume its philosophical and theological importance. They have found in it the middle ground between dogmatism and mysticism, as well as a sure counteraction to all ritualism. Here is their bulwark against pantheistic and deistic abstractions. By means of it they are able to meet the man who makes Christianity a mere republication of natural religion, or who resolves it all into an ethical system. And though in some of their theologians this view may be connected with unsound or vague speculation; though others may use it chiefly to favor some mystical views about the efficacy and nature of the sacraments; yet it certainly is equally consistent with the highest orthodoxy, with any orthodoxy which does not rest in bare formulas.

And in this connection, and in this reverend presence, I may not refrain from offering my humble tribute to the mem-

ory of that man, much misunderstood, who led the German Christianity, in its returning course, to our Lord—to Frederic Schleiermacher, a noble and a venerable name! His it was to infuse into a critical and cold rationalism the fervent and almost mystic love to Christ which has ever burned in the hearts of the Moravian brotherhood; his it was to make Christ and his redemption the centre of one of the most skilfully developed systems of theology which the Christian church has known; his it was to draw broad the line between philosophy and Christian theology; his it was to impart such a true, profound and continuous influence to many critical, speculative, and believing minds, that ever since that impulse, and in consequence of it, they have been coming nearer and nearer to the full substance of orthodox Christianity. If he is sometimes called pantheistic, it is only because he made the feeling of dependence to be the germ of all religion. To him must indeed be ascribed the modern revival of the vague heresy of the Sabellians; he is not free from the discredit of undervaluing many important historic facts of our Lord's life; with his views of the atonement we disclaim all sympathy; many were his errors, but much was his love to our blessed Lord. By making Christ and his redemption the centre of Christian theology, we are fully persuaded that he rendered an invaluable service to the Christian science of his native land, in the time of its greatest need.¹

Permit me to say that on this point I am the more ready to bear my unambitious yet grateful testimony to the merits of Schleiermacher and of the theological science of that land of intellect, because in the present state of our popular criticism upon German theology and philosophy, I believe it to be an act of simple justice, due to them and to the truth. In the name of the republic of letters, in the name of all generous scholarship, in the very name of Christian charity, I dare not refrain from testifying, that the indiscriminate cen-

¹ Those characteristics of Schleiermacher's system which have given to it its really beneficent influence, are only obscurely brought out in Mr. Morel's unsound *Philosophy of Religion*.

sure of all that is German, or that may so be called, is a sign rather of the power of prejudice than of a rational love for all truth. A criticism which describes a circumference of which one's ignorance is the generating radius can only stretch far beyond the confines of justice and of wisdom. A criticism which begins by saying that a system is absolutely unintelligible; which, secondly, asserts that this unintelligible system teaches the most frightful dogmas, definitely drawn out; and which concludes by holding it responsible for all the consequences that a perverse ingenuity can deduce from these definite dogmas of the unintelligible system; is indeed a source of unintelligent and anxious wonder to the ignorant, but it is a profounder wonder to every thoughtful mind. A criticism which includes the Christian Neander and the pantheistic Strauss in one and the same condemnation is truly deplorable. Let us at least learn to adopt the humane rules of civilized warfare, and not, like the brutal soldiery of a ruder age, involve friends and foes in one indiscriminate massacre. Germany cannot give us faith; and he who goes there to have his doubts resolved, goes into the very thick of the conflict in a fruitless search for its results; but even Germany may teach us what is the real "state of the controversy" in our age; what are the principles now at work more unconsciously among ourselves. And can we, in our inglorious intellectual ease, find it in our hearts only to condemn the men who have overcome trials and doubts to which our simple or iron faith has never been exposed; who have stood in the very front rank of the fiercest battle that Christianity has ever fought, and there contended hand to hand with its most inveterate and wary foes; and who are leading on our faith—as we trust in Christ so will we believe it! to the sublimest triumph it has ever celebrated?

When, Oh! when, will scholars and Christian men learn that orthodoxy can afford to be just, to be generous; and that in this age it cannot afford to be otherwise; since it thus loses its hold over the minds which are open to truth and foes chiefly to bigotry. When shall we learn that it is quality and

not quantity which gives its value to all criticism ; that to stigmatize whole classes by opprobrious epithets, by names "of uncertain meaning yet of certain disparagement," is the impulse of an unlettered zeal, which inflames the worst passions of our foes and arouses only the spurious ardor of our friends. When shall we learn the high lesson, that in our present conflicts, it is not nations, or men, or even parties that are to be conquered, but only error and sin ; and that the victory belongs not alone to us, but to truth, to righteousness, and to God.

We have said, that the German Christianity, by the urgency of the pressure of the unbelieving systems of the times upon it, has been driven to the position, that all Christian theology centres in the doctrine respecting Christ, as to its very citadel. This principle, we have claimed, lies at the heart of all true Christian theology and Christian experience. We add, that it is eminently adapted, when brought out in its fulness and fitness to counteract some of the extreme tendencies among ourselves, as also to present Christianity in its rightful attitude towards an unbelieving world.

No one moderately acquainted with our theological and philosophical discussions, can have failed to note the influence of one strong tendency, bringing our speculations and doctrines to concentrate upon a single point, upon man's internal state. Everything is judged by its reference to man's soul and its powers. We may call it the vast, subjective process of modern theology and philosophy. This tendency has its rights and necessity ; it is perhaps a mark of Protestantism ; it is more fully seen in Calvinism than in Lutheranism ; it is a very distinct trait of many New England movements. And if most noticeable in those who have carried our systems to their extremes, or who have become aliens to the orthodox faith, we ought not to avoid feeling a deep interest in it, as a sign of the times ; and we are bound to see how the general mind is working, whether it be centrifugal or centripetal in respect to ourselves. In this tendency, too, may be something of our strength ; but here also is much of our danger.

We can only rapidly indicate some of its signs. Christianity is viewed rather as a system intended to cultivate certain states of feeling, than as a revelation to build us up in the knowledge of God and of Christ. The nature of man's affections is more fully discussed than the nature of Christ. Faith is defined, not as once by its objects, but by its internal traits; and if it be called, trust in God, the emphasis is laid on the trust rather than on God. The efficacy of prayer is sometimes restricted to the believer's heart. The whole process of regeneration has been explained without reference to divine agency. Sin is viewed chiefly as a matter of individual consciousness, and less in its connections with the race and with the Divine purposes. The atonement is regarded as a life and not as a sacrifice; it is defined by its relations to us and not by its relations to God; and many who call it a declaration of the divine justice explain no further. Justification is pardon; and pardon is known by a change in our feelings. Nor with these doctrines does the process end. The Incarnation is a vehicle for the communication of a vague spiritual life; the Trinity is resolved into a mere series of manifestations, which do not teach us anything of the real nature of the Godhead; it is like a dramatic spectacle, and when the drama has been played out, the persons retire, and leave us not a higher knowledge of God, but stronger and warmer feelings; as in a parable, the moral lesson is the great end.

Some of our philosophical tendencies are in the same line. Mental philosophy is studied, as if all philosophy were in knowing the powers of the mind; it is made the basis of theology. Self-determination is the great fact about mind and morals. Personal well-being is the great end, even when we act in view of the universal good; the sum of ethics is happiness, and this happiness in its last analysis is viewed as subjective and not as objective. Man becomes the measure of all things; not the glory of God, but the happiness of man is the chief end. God is for man, rather than man for God; and, as in the infancy of science, the sun again revolves around the earth.

Thus the grand, objective force of truth and of Christianity, and of Christian doctrines, their reality in themselves and as a revelation of God, are in danger of being merged in the inquiry after their value as a means of moving us. If anything will move us as much, it is as well as Christianity. "We for whose sake all nature stands," is something more than poetry. A restless, morbid state of feeling ensues, different from the calm composure which hearty faith in a revelation is adapted to inspire. Men will be perfect at once; not merely strive to be so, which none can do too earnestly; but believe that they are so, which none can be too cautious in affirming. And the essence of their perfection is found in an intention of the will, of which they must be always conscious or else their perfection is without evidence.

Thus in various ways this tendency shows itself. We have hinted at some of its extreme forms, identified with no one party or school. It is an avaricious principle. All that is not directly convertible into moods of mind, it will hardly allow to be current coin. The massive theological systems of past ages, so large, and careful, and intricate, are conceded to be imposing, but are felt to be cold and uncomfortable; we are not at home in them. The Bible, the church, Christ, the historic revelation, fade away one after another; all that remains in the last result is an internal revelation or an internal inspiration; religion is merged in a vague love to an abstract divinity. And where this state of mind has come, pantheism lieth at the door.

Now, that this subjective tendency has its rights, as well as its force, that without internal experience all else is vain, that the letter kills if the spirit be not there, no one can rationally deny. That our chief dangers lie in the extremes of this tendency, is equally undeniable. That there must be a reaction from this extreme is manifest from all history, from the very laws of the mind, from the very signs of the times.

The question for us to weigh, then, is this: how shall we both encourage and restrain this mighty current?

Some would bid us back to the rites and forms and alleged

succession of a visible church ; but let the dead bury their dead ; let us rather arise and follow our Lord. We have outgrown the power and the necessity of the beggarly elements. As Dr. Arnold said : " the sheath of the leaf is burst ; what were the wisdom of winter, is the folly of spring."

Shall we insist with new tenacity upon our old formulas ? But words and formulas alone have but slight force against such an in-wrought and potent tendency. And they are no effectual guards against heresy, since, as has been well observed, heresy can as readily enter, and does as often couch itself under the guise of old terms as of new. Let us rather seek to know the real sense of the formulas ; let us come to have a deeper sense of the grand realities of our faith.

To come to these is our safety, our defence. To see and feel and know what Christianity really is in its inward and distinctive character ; to study those central truths which lie at its foundation ; here is our strength. Let us come unto Jesus. When Christ is to us more than a doctrine, and the atonement more than a plan ; when the Incarnation assumes as high a place in revealed, as creation does in natural theology ; when the Trinity is viewed not as a formula, but as a vital truth, underlying and interwoven with the whole Christian system ; when from this foundation the whole edifice rises up majestically, grand in its proportions, sublime in its aims, filled with God in all its parts ; when we feel its inherent force streaming out from its living centres ; then, then are we saved from those extreme tendencies which are the most significant and alarming sign of our times ; then, then are we elevated above those lesser controversies which have narrowed our minds and divided our hearts. Here also we have a real inward experience as well as an objective reality ; for the best and fullest inward experience is that which centres in Christ ; and the centre of the experience is then identical with the centre of the divine revelation.

Never are we so far from having any abstract ethical or

metaphysical principles exercise an undue influence; never are we so far from a too fond reliance on self and never is self so full and satisfied; never are we in a better position for judging all our controversies with a righteous judgment, or nearer to the highest Christian union; never do the divine decrees shine in so mild a lustre, so benignant with grace, so solemn and severe in justice; never can we be more wisely delivered from the material attractions of an outward rite, or from the ideal seductions of a pantheistic system; never is doctrine so full of life, and life so richly expressed in doctrine; never does systematic theology so perfectly present the full substance of the Christian faith in a truly scientific form; and never are philosophy and faith so joined in hymeneal bonds, where they may "exult in over-measure," as when Christ is set forth as the living centre of all faith and of all theology, in whom the whole body is fitly joined together, compacted by that which every joint supplieth. Here, if anywhere, we may discern,

"Concord in discord, lines of differing method
Meeting in one full centre of delight."

Having traced, as far as we may, the course of the blood in the veins of the system, and scrutinized the delicate and intricate organism by which it is diffused through every part, we are better prepared to go back to the grand arterial structure, to the great central heart, where resides the life-imparting energy; and there, too, we shall learn whence comes the blood which courses through the veins. Having the necessity, we need not want the flexure. Having the anatomy of the Christian system, let us have also its physiology; for physiology is the science of life.

We have thus gone over the ground proposed, imperfectly, rapidly; and yet have been only too long for the occasion. We have spoken of the characteristics, the opposition, the reconciliation, and the respective rights of Faith and Philosophy. We have, then, maintained the positions, that their full reconciliation is the true aim of systematic theology.

whose office it is to present the substance of the Christian faith in a scientific form, and in harmony with all other truth; that the central principle of the system, as of the revelation and of the believer's consciousness, is to be found in the Person of Christ; and that such a view of Christianity will encourage whatever is healthful, and restrain what is noxious in the prevailing tendencies of our times.

And now, in conclusion, we say, the Christian system, thus viewed, gives us all that philosophy aims after, and in a more perfect form; that it also gives us more than philosophy can give; and this more than it gives is what man most needs and what reason alone never could divine. And, therefore, we conclude that it is not within the scope of the human mind to conceive a system more complete, richer in all blessings.

It gives us all that philosophy aims after, and in a more perfect form. For, in a harmonious system of Christian truth, nature, with all its laws and processes, is not denied or annulled; it is only made subservient to higher, to moral ends; its course is interrupted for a nobler purpose than a fixed order could ensure; and thus a higher dignity is imparted to it than when we consider it as only a mere succession of material changes. And its very order and harmony are best explained when regarded as the product of infinite wisdom and benevolence, acting with the wisest and most benevolent intent. All ethical truth and all great moral ends, human rights and human happiness and a perfect social state, are included in the Christian system as truly as in philosophy; and a new glory is cast around them when they are made integral parts of a divine kingdom, established in justice and animated by love, which is not only to be realized here upon the earth, but is to reach forward even to eternity. Moral principles and ends thus retain all their meaning and value; but they are made more effective and permanent when contemplated as inherent in the nature and government of a wise and holy God, and as the basis and aim of an eternal kingdom. We thus have not merely a perfect

social state here, but a holy state, animated with the very presence and power of God, forevermore. All that natural religion can prove or claim is retained, all that an internal revelation and inspiration ever boasted itself to have is allowed by the Christian system; but the truths of natural religion are fortified by a higher authority; and the inward revelation is illumined by a clearer light, when it is seen in the brightness of that express manifestation of God in the person of his Son, whose teachings have both chastened and elevated all our views of God and of religion.

< Thus may Christianity give us all that philosophy can give, and in a more perfect form.) But it also gives us more; and this more that it gives is what man most needs, and, unaided, never could attain. God is infinite, man is finite; how, then, can man come unto and know his Creator and sovereign? Man is sinful and God is holy; how can a sinful man be reconciled to a holy God? how can a sinful nature become regenerate? Man is mortal, as well as sinful; how can he obtain certainty, entire certainty, as to a future life and his eternal destiny? Here are the real and vital problems of human destiny; before them reason is abashed, and conscience can only warn, and man can only fear. The urgency, the intense interest of these questions no thinking mind can doubt; the uncertainty and timidity of human reason, when it meets them, are almost proverbial. If these questions are not answered, if these problems are not solved in Christianity they are absolutely answered nowhere. And precisely here it is that we contend that the Christian system has a permanent power, and a perfect fitness to man's condition; for you cannot name a vital problem of our moral destiny which it does not profess to solve, and to solve in a way beyond which human thought can conceive of nothing greater, and the human heart can ask for nothing more; in a way which is to the simplest heart most simple, and to the highest intellect most profound. The highest ideas and ends which reason can propound are really embraced, the deepest wants which man can know are truly satisfied, the sharpest antagonisms

which the mind can propose, are declared to be reconciled, in the ideas, the means, and the ends which are contained in that revelation which centres in the Person of Jesus Christ our Lord.

For, the highest idea which man can frame is that of a union of divinity with humanity; this is the very verge of a possible conception for the human intellect; and in the Person of our Saviour we have this idea realized in all its fulness, and with such a marvellous adaptation to human sympathies that they are made the very means of drawing us within the hallowed sphere of the glories of divinity. Through Jesus Christ, and Him alone, does finite man come to the Infinite I am.

The highest moral problem which we can know is contained in the question, how can a sinful man be reconciled to a holy God? Here is absolutely the highest moral antagonism of the universe. And in the sacrificial death of this same Person, our great High Priest, this highest moral question is presented to us as entirely solved, and solved in such a way, that the sense of sin is not lessened but heightened, and the majesty of the law not impaired but made more glorious. While in the regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit we have the means of applying the benefits of this atonement in such a way to the heart of the sinner that his very love of sin will at last be wholly eradicated.

The highest kingdom we can conceive to exist is one which aims at the holiness of all who belong to it, which has love for its common principle; which has for its head a being who unites all human with all divine perfections; who has himself suffered for all the members of this kingdom and in their stead; and who will reign over and within them, not only for this life but also for that which is to come. In such a kingdom all are bound together by the strongest ties for the highest objects. And such is the kingdom of which Jesus Christ is the head and redeemed men the body.

And all these questions are solved, these ideas realized, these antagonisms adjusted, and this kingdom is established in one and the same Person; all this system is concentrated

in that God-man, who came from heaven to earth that he might raise us from earth to heaven, who adapted himself to our infirmities and necessities that He might be made unto us wisdom and righteousness, sanctification and redemption.

And, therefore, dare we assert that beyond the idea of such a system, centering in such a Being, human thought is impotent to advance and the human heart has nothing real to desire; it satisfies all within us which is not sinful, and it is its crowning glory that it subdues our sinfulness itself. Such a system brings together, recapitulates, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth; and by such a Person, all things are reconciled to God, by him, the apostle says, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven.

Whence, whence came to our sinful race the idea of such a Being, of such a kingdom? Has man's reason framed it; and the human imagination, hath that gendered it? With cold eye and heart I might gaze on the face of nature in her grandest or her loveliest scenes; with intellectual delight I may scan the principles and follow out the deductions of an abstract scheme of philosophic speculation; with sublime wonder I may follow the astronomer as he describes the laws and order of firmaments and systems radiant in their solar light; I may feel all my human sympathies enlisted by any philanthropic scheme which would bring justice and love into this world so full of oppression and hatred; but when I think of the wonders of our Saviour's Person and of the glories of his redemptive work, of all his love, his love for me a sinner, his love to all so great that He could die for all, and of that blessed and perpetual kingdom which his blood has purchased and of which He is the ever living Head; when, in some rapt moment, my heart can realize this in all its fulness, then, if ever, is my whole being filled with the profoundest emotions of awe, of gratitude, and of love. Never is the soul so conscious of its full capacities of thought and feeling, never does it throb with such unwonted and divine life, as when it has most fully grasped the majestic reality of the Christian

faith, as a wondrous and harmonious whole, tending to the highest imaginable end, and centering in that glorious Being who unites divinity with humanity and reconciles heaven with earth.

In comparison with the fulness, fitness, and sufficiency of such a system, the most colossal structure which pantheism ever reared is but as a palace of ice, cold and cheerless, contrasted with that heavenly city, whose gates are pearl, whose streets are gold, thronged with a company innumerable and exultant, vocal with the melodies of the redeemed, of which the Lamb is the light, and God the glory.

NATURE AND WORTH
OF THE
SCIENCE OF CHURCH HISTORY.*

IN addressing the Directors of the Union Theological Seminary and this respected audience, upon an occasion of such solemn interest to myself, and so closely connected with the welfare of the institution which they guard and cherish, I would, if possible, forget my own unfitness for the office to which I have been called, and accept its duties in the name and for the sake of the Great Head of the Church. It is the history of his church which I am to teach. And if the guidance of his wisdom is needed at all times by all his disciples, it is especially needed by his ministry; yet more by those called to train men for his ministry, and in some peculiar respects by one who is to narrate the history of his kingdom to its future preachers in our age and country.

The history of the church is not the straightforward narrative of the fortunes of an isolated community with inferior ends in view, but it is an account of the rise, the changes and the growth of the most wonderful economy the world has known, embracing the most comprehensive purposes which human thought can grasp. It has maintained itself in the historic progress of the race, as has no empire. It has been aggressive, attacked, progressive and diffusive as has no other community. It has moved through States, intertwined itself with institutions, changed politics, shaped national and indi-

* An Inaugural Address, delivered before the Directors of the Union Theological Seminary, February 12, 1851.

vidual character, affected all moral and social interests, and been interwoven with the whole web of human destiny. He who would know the principles which have really controlled human thought and action, will, if he be wise, explore the records of that kingdom which has had the longest duration and the strongest influence. On human grounds alone it may challenge the most earnest study of every thoughtful mind. But this history is invested with a solemn, a sublime interest, when it is viewed as the record of a divine economy, established in an apostate world, centering in the incarnation of the Son of God, and having for its object the redemption of the race, through the might of the Holy Spirit. As such, it contains the most antagonistic elements. For, though the origin of this kingdom be divine, and though its consummation will be the glorious and untroubled manifestation of God's grace and wisdom, yet, between the origin and the consummation there is a theatre of strife, where the strongest energies of good and ill, all the forces of a supernatural, and all the forces of a natural kingdom wage perpetual warfare. It is in the vanquishing of mighty and subtle foes that the kingdom of Christ has shown its superior and supreme authority. There is progress, but it is progress through conflict. There are the victories of faith, there is also the partial success of unbelief, there is advance in spiritual freedom, there is the exaltation of spiritual despotism; there are enemies without, and feuds within; there is the growth, there is also the perversion of Christian doctrine; there is the church separate from the world, and the church contending against, submissive to, and domineering over, States and empires; and all this, not in one land, or one century, but from East to West, through many centuries, in the most puissant nations of the earth. And if it is chiefly in the conflicts of the race that we are to read the destiny of the race, then through these, its mightiest conflicts, may we be taught, that he who would reach forth his hand to grasp the solemn urn that holds the oracles of human fate can find it only in the Christian church. And if Lord Bacon could say in view of the visible creation:

“ God forbid that we give forth the dream of our fancy as the model of the world, but may he rather vouchsafe us his grace that we may indite a revelation and true vision of the march and signet of the Creator impressed upon creation ;” much more ought he, who explores the revelations of God in his new and spiritual creation, to feel the constant need of that divine illumination which can alone enable him to distinguish what is from God and what is from man, what is transient, and what is worthy of lasting veneration ; which can alone enable him to get above all these contests, so as to read their meaning, and so to read their meaning as to see the march and signet of redemptive grace impressed upon the moral history of our earth.

While the position of a teacher of Church History is thus, from the nature of the case, always responsible and arduous, it is especially so to one who is called to discharge the functions of this office in our age and in our land. There are advantages, indeed, as well as disadvantages, but both the advantages and the disadvantages increase the measure of his toil. There is an accumulation of historical materials, and this is an advantage ; but they are more than sufficient to task the freshest powers in the longest life. There are now better digests of the materials than were even imagined possible, half a century ago, but the teacher must verify their details and try their principles. The presumptuous and ignorant assaults of a base philosophy against the Christian church, have well nigh spent their force ; no sane and instructed mind would now dare to represent it as injurious to humanity, as the work of priestcraft, as a complex of endless and useless logomachy, and as sterile of all rational interest. These vulgar objections had their origin in schools which imagined that matter was more intelligible than mind, and in countries where the history of Christianity was identified with the progress of Romish corruptions ; and they now live only in the souls that are the fitting receptacles of the veriest dregs of human thought. They have been refuted in part by the very progress of Christianity, as well as by a better philoso-

phy, and a more comprehensive view of man's history. But these larger views of human history bring with them still graver duties to the historian of the church, because most of them assign to the church a subordinate position in the development of the race, and thus impose the necessity of giving a more philosophical character to the exposition of that history, so that it shall be seen to embrace all, as well as the spiritual interests of humanity.

There are also disadvantages in the study of this branch of learning, springing from our systems of education and national habits of thought. As a people, we are more deficient in historical training than in almost any other branch of scientific research. We live in an earnest and tumultuous present, looking to a vague future, and comparatively cut off from the prolific past—which is still the mother of us all. We forget that the youngest people are also the oldest, and should therefore be most habituated to those “fearless and reverent questionings of the sages of other times, which,” as Jeffrey well says, “is the permitted necromancy of the wise.” We love the abstractions of political theories and of theology better than we do the concrete realities of history. Church history has been studied from a sort of general notion that it ought to be very useful, rather than from any lively conviction of its inherent worth. History is to us the driest of studies; and the history of the church is the driest of the dry—a collection of bare names, arid facts, and lifeless dates. It is learned by rote, and kept by mnemonic helps. Whole tracts of its course realize to us the notion of the philosopher in Addison, who used to maintain the existence of tenebrific stars, whose peculiar office it was to ray out positive darkness.

Its sources are buried in the dust of alcoves, and when exhumed, it is seldom with the insignia of a resurrection. They are investigated for aid in present polemics, not to know the past but to conquer in an emergency; as if one should run over American history only in view of incorporating a bank, or passing a tariff-bill. While we all confess that there are sources of sublime interest in the study of the visible heavens,

and that no research is too deep into the successive strata of the solid earth, we are slow to believe that in the course of human history, we are to find the revelation of the sublilities of a spiritual kingdom, and the registry of the successive epochs of that new creation, in which divine wisdom and love are manifested and mirrored forth, as they cannot be in the orbits of lifeless stars, or in the growth of the unconscious earth.

While I attempt, then, as a subject appropriate to the occasion, to set forth the Nature and Worth of the Science of Church History, I would also crave the indulgence of this audience to my seeming exaggerations of an unfamiliar theme, in the belief that its inherent dignity will commend it to their favorable regard.

And I propose to speak in the first place, of the nature or true idea of the science of church history ; and, in the second place, to show its worth as a part of theological training, especially in our times.

I. The nature of the science of church history. What is, then, church history as a science ? What is the true idea of this branch of theological learning ?

The different departments of theological study are usually and most appropriately grouped under the four divisions of exegetical, doctrinal, historical, and practical theology. The scope of each branch is well defined by the term applied to it. Historical theology embraces all that pertains to the historic progress of the church, under the historical point of view. Doctrines and polity as well as external facts belong to it, yet not as doctrines and not as polity, but as the history of doctrines and polity, reproducing them with impartiality and critical sagacity in the order in which they have really existed. The church historian ought indeed so to teach, as, by his instructions, to confirm soundness in faith and attachment to ecclesiastical order ; he ought to apply to history at all points the test of that word which alone is inspired and authoritative ; but in order to do this, his first duty is to present the facts themselves in the order of their occurrence.

Then he may judge them in their bearings on the great ends for which the church was instituted. And all the facts in both the external and internal history of the church, its progress and its reverses, its constitution, doctrines, and ritual, its theologies, and its spiritual life, its effects on nations and the influence of races upon itself, its contests with human thought in all the phases of philosophy, its bearings on social, moral, and political well-being, its relations to art and culture, all these points fall, in their historical aspects, under the department of historical theology, they constitute the materials of the science of church history.

What is, then, the true idea of this science? We may answer this inquiry by considering these three points: that it is history, that it is church history, and that it is the science of church history.

1. It is, in the first place, history with which we have to do; and the history of the church falls under the conditions and laws, and has the dignity of all history. It is what has been transacted on the theatre of the world in its past centuries through human agencies, made known to us by means of monuments and testimony. It is a body of facts, but specifically of facts about the human race. It is with man that history has to do; we can talk of a history of animals or of nature only by courtesy. It is with men collectively that history has to do, and not as individuals; historical personages are historical because they are the actors in events which affect the general good. The life of an individual is a biography; the life of a community is its history. And such a history is made up of a *series* of events, an orderly succession, no one of which can be understood except in its connections with the rest. And it is a series of events containing all the great and permanent interests of humanity. Human history in its real character is not an account of kings and of wars; it is the unfolding of the moral, the political, the artistic, the social, and the spiritual progress of the human family. The time will yet come when the names of dynasties and of battles shall not form the titles to its chapters. And the

events of history are great, because they are freighted with the weal and woe of States, with the social and moral welfare of mankind. Historical facts have not only an existence in space and time, but they have also a moral life, they are instinct with the vitality of human interests. The whole movements of past centuries, and the whole momentum of centuries yet unborn may meet upon a single plain, a single day, a single will. And of such epochs is the history of our earth made up in its majestic course, as the historic races of the human family have come one after another into the van of that uncounted and ever advancing host which started from its cradle in the East, swarmed through the plains of the Orient, skirted all the outline of the Mediterranean, toiled with slow advance from southern Europe even to its Northern shores, leaped the flaming walls of the old world, and now finds its largest theatre in this our Western continent, whither all nations, tribes and tongues are congregating, bearing with them the elements, from which, it may be, the highest destiny of man is to be wrought out.

The greatness of history consists then, essentially, in these two things: that it is a body of facts, and that these facts are a means of leading us to a knowledge of the great realities of human welfare, and of the actual development of the race under the pressure of all its vital interests. Its solidity is in its facts; it is above the sphere of mere speculation, as much as is nature, though it is a proper and the highest object of speculative inquiry. And it is impossible to get at a comprehensive view of man's nature and destiny, without the lights and monuments of the past. The most speculative nation of modern times, in its reaction from the unsatisfying results of its universal and abstract philosophical systems, has thrown itself with ardor into the most elaborate historical investigations. The most imposing pantheistic system which was ever framed, the most compact and consistent, was bereft of its power, chiefly in its attempt to reconstruct the moral and religious history of mankind in conformity with its desolating principles. It fell upon this stone and was broken.

It touched the monuments of time and became impotent. Fiction may be great, but history is grand. Philosophy is noble, but history is its test.

It is now the province of the historian to revivify the past. Its successive periods are to live again upon the historic page. "Even what from its antiquity is but little known," says Harris in his *Hermes*, "may, on that very account, have all the charm of novelty." It will have this, if the historian gives us, not dead facts, but living men, and broad human interests. Of that high art which thus makes the past present and the absent real, Gibbon is the greatest English master, though his vision reached only to the confines of the central kingdom of our earth. The historian is also to reproduce events, so that we may read them better than did the very actors in them; for he who is fighting in the thick of the conflict sees but a small part of the movements of the army, and even the general who directs the host cannot foresee the results of his victory or disaster. But in the results the historian is to read the causes. He is to teach us the events in the light of their principles and laws. These he is to seek out with a patient, a sympathizing, a reverential and a truly inductive spirit. And his true office is not completed, if he gives us only partial principles and laws, but only as he gives us those which truly explain the greatest results of the greatest events. It is indeed true that historical causes are so manifold, that nothing is easier than to build up some brilliant and partial theory, and cite facts in its confirmation, but it only requires a more thorough study of history to disclose the deception, just as it only needs an open vision to see that a Grecian temple, or a Gothic cathedral or a phalanstery is not the whole of the landscape, though it may engross the meditations of some rapt enthusiast. He who thus reads history in the light of all its impregnable facts, to get from them its laws, will be led along to see that human motives and interests do not embrace the whole of it, but that it is also the sphere of a divine justice, and the theatre of a divine kingdom.

2. And this leads us to our second point, and that is, that the subject of our science is not only history, but church history, that is, the record of the progress of the kingdom of God, intermingling with and acting upon all the other interests of the human race, and shaping its destiny.

That man looks with limited or with sealed vision upon the annals of the human race, who does not descry, running through all its course, underlying it, and prominent above it, the workings of a spiritual kingdom, whose influence, in one or another form, has defined the metes and bounds of history. To the rest of history it bears the same relation that the granite does to the earth's strata, it is both deepest and highest, it supports by its solidity beneath, and juts out in its sublimity in the loftiest summits.

The character of a people is shaped in part by its geographical position, whether along the lines of rivers, or among the mountains; it is formed in part by the influence of climate, and in the same climate, by diversities of race; political institutions serve to make men submissive or independent; social influences act with keener energy, reaching to the very fireside; more potent still are strictly moral causes, the degree in which right or wrong is practically applied; but that which shapes the whole character, and determines the final destiny of a people, that which has always done this, and from the nature of the case must do this, is its religious faith. For here are the highest objects acting on the deepest and most permanent wants of the human heart. And in the whole history of man we can trace the course of one shaping, o'er-mastering and progressive power, before which all others have bowed, and that is the spiritual kingdom of God, having for its object the redemption of man from the ruins of the apostacy.

This kingdom gives us the three ideas in whose light we may best read the history of our race, and they are sin, holiness, and redemption.

If we could but fully realize the majestic simplicity of this kingdom, its spiritual nature and sublime intent, if we could

make present to us the full idea of it, which is not an idea alone, but also a reality; if we could see that holiness is the great end of our being, and that sin is its very opposite, and that redemption is for the removal of sin, and the establishment of a holy kingdom, then were we in the right position for reading, in their highest meaning, all the records of our race.

To narrate the history of this kingdom is the object of church history. And it brings us at once to the very centre and life of all history. By its light we may discern the very structure of human history, even as it is said that the anatomist may dissect the Brazilian fire-fly by the light which it emits. It runs through the chronicles of recorded time, from the beginning even until now. It has educated the race. It was revealed in the first promise; it survived the flood of waters; it was made a special covenant in the family of Abraham; the law given on Sinai was to prepare for its full manifestation; the Jewish people was secluded that it might bear it safe in type and prophecy, and in their very lineage, in the midst of the corruptions of Pagan idolatries; the heathen nations came under one empire, and through them was diffused one language, that they might be prepared for its complete advent; and it was brought to its full establishment, and invested with all its functions and powers, when the Son of God became incarnate, that He might die for our redemption; and from this, the era of the Incarnation, this kingdom has gone on, conflicting and conquering, with each century, binding new trophies upon its victorious brow, adding strength to its loins and swiftness to its feet; and now it remains, still militant, hopeful as in its earliest youth, and wiser in its matured vigor, diffusing far and wide its innumerable blessings, and bearing in its divine powers and sacred truths the hopes and destiny of the human race.

The true idea of church history then embraces these points: God has made a revelation of himself to man, having for its object the redemption of man. "What education is to the individual, that is revelation to the race." This revelation is

made in a real, instituted, historical economy. This economy centres in the Person and Work of our Lord, who is the living Head of a new creation. Of the life, the doctrines and the growth of this new creation, the elect church, he is the source, through the energy of his Spirit. And the history of the church tells us how far the redemptive purposes of God have been accomplished in the actual course of human events. That history, in its actual course, has been a connected series, all its facts being bound together by their common reference to Christ and his kingdom. That history has been a developing process, not only in the way of external diffusion, subduing the nations, not only in its external politics, changing to meet the exigencies of the times, not only in the application of its principles more deeply and sharply to all the relations and institutions of society, but also in its doctrines which have been unfolded, defined, and systematized, so as to ward off objections, and to bring the Christian system into harmony with all other truth as a scientific whole. This developing process is not arbitrary, but it has its laws, and also its tests, both of which it is the duty of the historian to set forth. He is to exhibit all the elements which constitute the Christian church, in their just relations, doctrines, polity, spiritual life, and external events acting upon each other, and all working together in the unfolding of the kingdom of God. And this history does not stand alone; it is a part of universal history, containing its central and controlling elements; so that as a mere matter of historic justice, he who would study the records of the race with a humility like that which animates the true minister and interpreter of nature, will find impressed upon them the principles and laws of that supernatural kingdom, whose final glories shall be hymned in anthems of exulting praise in that heavenly realm where the triumphant church shall celebrate the centuries of its jubilee.

This is the general idea of church history. And here I cannot forbear citing a passage from the works of the elder Edwards, our greatest American divine, which, taken for all in all, is perhaps the most remarkable he ever penned, and

which shows the clearest insight into the real nature of the Christian church. In his letter to the Trustees of Princeton College, when they invited him to their presidency, he says: "I have on my mind and heart a great work, which I call a History of Redemption, a body of divinity in an entire new method, being thrown into the form of a history, considering the affair of Christian theology, as the whole of it, in each part, stands in reference to the great work of Redemption by Jesus Christ; which I suppose to be of all others the grand design of God and the summum and ultimum of all the divine operations and decrees; particularly considering all parts of the grand scheme in their historical order; the order of their existence or their being brought forth to view in the course of divine dispensations, or the wonderful series of successive acts and events; beginning from eternity and descending from thence to the great work and successive dispensations of the infinitely wise God, in time; considering the chief events coming to pass in the church of God, and revolutions in the world of mankind, affecting the state of the church, and the affair of redemption, which we have an account of in history or prophecy, till at last we come to the general resurrection, last judgment and consummation of all things, when it shall be said: 'It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end;' concluding my work with a consideration of that perfect state of things which shall be finally settled, to last for eternity. This history will be carried on with regard to all three worlds, heaven, earth and hell, considering the connected, successive events and alterations in each, so far as the Scriptures give any light; introducing all parts of divinity in that order which is most scriptural and most natural; a method which appears to me the most beautiful and entertaining, wherein every divine doctrine will appear to the greatest advantage, in the brightest light, in the most striking manner, showing the admirable contexture and harmony of the whole." In this most striking sketch, which is only partially carried out in Edwards's Posthumous History of Redemption, and in which the very

involutions of the style show the pressure of the ideas that are struggling for utterance, we have an outline of the history of the church, as noble as any man ever sketched, as yet unrivalled in the English tongue, and which, of the men of his age, Jonathan Edwards alone could fully conceive: *solus sed sic sol.*

3. The third point necessary to an understanding of the true nature of our subject is, that church history is to be exhibited in a scientific form. It is history, it is church history, and it is the science of church history. It ought to be studied in a scientific method, in accordance with true scientific principles.

That exhibition of a subject, properly called scientific, consists essentially in this—that its facts are brought under their legitimate laws or principles, and that they are viewed in their connections with the causes which have produced them, and the ends to be accomplished by them. The basis of all science is facts; the first process is to bring these facts under their appropriate general laws. Many philosophers, especially in the natural sciences, stop here, neglecting both the efficient and final causes, scouting them as metaphysical, or banishing them to what they esteem a barren theology. This view not only limits science, but it favors pantheism. And it is essentially unphilosophical, for the inquiry after the really efficient causes, and the ends of phenomena is as philosophical as the inquiry after their immediate antecedents.

And what we here claim is that the history of the Christian church ought to be presented in a scientific method. As so presented, it is one of the noblest objects to which human thought can be directed. And this is now of special importance, in consequence of the prevalence of partial and unchristian speculations about the history and destiny of the human race.

The time is past when history could be viewed as a bare narrative of events, without any purpose or deductions. Everybody now-a-days speculates about events, more or less, well, badly or still worse. That style of treating history too, which

consisted in explaining all great events by merely personal motives, is tolerably antiquated, as if the Reformation broke out because Luther wished to marry Catherine von Bora, or Mohammedanism sprang up because Mohammed was ambitious and had visions in epilepsy. It has even been found that steam, electricity, gunpowder and printing are not sufficient to account for the whole of modern civilization, and we only wonder at the enthusiastic admirer of the typographic art, who exclaimed: "Be not deceived, Luther was great, but Gutenberg was greater." All thinking men must and will seek for higher and better causes for the great events of time. At the same time, many a brilliant and partial generalization of the facts of history, which protrudes some social or political object as the great end of the race, is seducing even earnest and thoughtful minds from the simplicity and sublimity of the Christian faith. And hence we say it is well to present the history of the church in a truly scientific way, that the superiority of Christianity may be evinced. Church history is now to be conducted and taught in comparison and contrast with the false philosophy of history. And, as thus taught, it is the best philosophy of history which can be written, the best vindication of the ways of God with man. It is the true philosophy of human history.

What is necessary to such a view of it we will proceed to state in the light of that definition of science which has been already given. According to this, the scientific exhibition of the history of the church would consist in the presentation of all the facts that concern the kingdom of God in Christ, in their orderly succession, with their causes, whether proximate or ultimate, and in their bearings on the divine purpose for the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ, which purpose will be fulfilled in the perfect fellowship of a divine kingdom, where justice shall adjust and love harmonize the relations of all its members.

For the sake of distinctness, it may be well to bring out more definitely the points embraced in this statement.

Church history rests upon a broad basis of facts, given in

the Revelation on which it reposes, or in the course of its history. This is the basis of the science.

These facts are to be presented, as they occurred, in orderly succession, grouped around the signal epochs in which the combined interests and relations of the church have undergone some decisive change. Such points of convergence and divergence are, for example, the age of Constantine and the Reformation. This would give us the real historic course and main epochs of the history.

Here, then, we have a series of events, comprising the great and decisive interests of the human race. The inquiry next suggested is, what are the principles and laws upon which this development has proceeded, what are the actual principles, and what is their inherent worth? The proximate principles, now, are unquestionably the motives and feelings of the actors in the events. But the motives of the actors are determined by more general causes, inherent in the times and the institutions in the midst of which they live and act.

And in determining these more general causes, Christian philosophy runs counter to all naturalistic or pantheistic schemes. The latter find them in an impersonal reason, in universal ideas, in human interests or rights, in abstract laws, in social impulses. The former refers them ultimately to the purpose of God, to a real personal providence, to an Incarnate Redeemer, to the living agencies in a divine kingdom. The one makes them to be from God, the other from reason; the one speaks of a real manifestation of God, the other of an advance in human freedom. The latter equally with the former must concede the actual existence of the church and its history; but he tries to explain this history without God, or Christ, or the Spirit's influences, and without assuming the reality of the truths which centre in this kingdom. Christian philosophy does not deny that men are animated by ideas of justice and freedom, by political and social rights, for this were unwise and contrary to fact, but it says that the facts of history are not fully and rationally explained by

them alone, that they demand more than this. It does not deny that there is in history a mixture of causes, some good and some evil, but it says that the overruling ones have been for good, and chiefly through the church of Christ, and wholly through the providence of God. It claims that the very facts of church history, which all must grant to be a part of human history, cannot be rationally accounted for, excepting on the supposition of the historic reality of the grand revelation of God in Christ and his kingdom.

Abstract ideas, or human interests, or both combined, will not account for the rise and growth of such an economy as is the Christian Church. It has been admirably said: "There is one symbolical book of the Christian faith, which will ever do despite to the attacks of a negative criticism, and this is the history of the world. In proportion as historical investigations are elaborated into an universal historical science, in the same proportion will Christ be acknowledged as the eternal and divine substance of the whole historical life of the world, and his sacred person will greet us everywhere on the historic page, as it also greets us everywhere in the Scriptures of our faith."*

But to explain aright this historical progress of the church, we need a test as well as a cause; we need to ask for the value and authority of the facts. For without such a test we are in utter confusion, and must take all as it comes, for better or worse. We may become the prey of any system of delusion under the vague notion that it is a part of the historical development. Rome might claim us, for she has been developed; all the systems of philosophy might claim us, for all the systems of philosophy have been developed; all the sects in Christendom might invoke our homage, for all the sects in Christendom have been developed; all the parties out of Christendom might claim us, for all the parties out of Christendom have been developed. And if we were divided among them all, little of faith or reason would be left to us.

No idea more vague or unsubstantial has ever been more

* So, for substance, Professor Braniss of Bonn, in his *History of Philosophy*.

current than has that of a mere development. It is not merely pernicious, it is also worthless, unless we can show what it is that is developed, what are the laws that regulate the development, and what are the tests by which it is to be tried. And here is where the philosophy of history must differ from the philosophy of nature. In studying nature we may be content with generalizing the facts, thus getting at its laws; although a rigid and complete method would compel us to carry our speculations still farther. But in studying history, in the investigation of moral causes, we need a test by which to try the facts and the principles; for sin is in history as well as holiness, error as well as truth, man as well as God. We need a test, and one not taken at random, but approved as such by the very course of history itself.

And to the believer in a divine revelation, such a test is given in the sacred Scriptures. By its truths and doctrines all history, and especially the history of the church, is to be judged. And that this test is not an arbitrary one may be inferred, not only from the proof of the inspiration of the Bible, but also from the actual course of human history. As a matter of fact, the truths revealed in the Bible have been the touch-stone which has tried men's spirits. Human speculation has not gone beyond, has not even fathomed its wonderful revelations. It has been the historical arbiter of Christian controversy. Its perversions have been judgments, and its truths light and life. It is a marvellous thing to see the supremacy of this Revelation in the actual course of human history. It is instructive to read the history of the church, and all human history, by its light. For, as a matter of simple fact, the whole history of the church might be summed up with saying that it consists in pouring into the human race the treasures of this volume, there to germinate, until the kingdom revealed in word and promise shall be fully manifested in its reality and power.

To complete the philosophical view of Christian history, one additional point is needed, and that is the exhibition of the end or object to which the history is tending. Of any-

thing living and spiritual, we do not have the true conception, until we know the end for which it was made, as well as the actual course and laws of its growth. We understand man fully only in the light of the ends of his being. We have no intelligent apprehension of the true nature of the Christian church, until we see not only the course and laws of its history, but also *how* the whole course of its history bears on the great object for which it was instituted. That object is the bringing the race back to union with God, through the grace of Christ, by the influences of the Spirit, and in the fellowship of men one with another. And this object can only be achieved by the application of the principles of God's kingdom to all human relations and institutions, bringing them all under its divine supremacy, in accordance with justice and in subordination to love. It is the bringing all inferior ends into subjection to the highest end, it is the making the laws of a divine kingdom supreme over all laws. Church history shows how far this end has been actually accomplished, and it ought to make us both wise and earnest in carrying on the church still further towards the same great object.

In the greatness and grandeur of the end which Christianity thus holds out to man, the superiority of the Christian system over all other systems is most fully manifested. It embraces more than they all, and what is more adapted to human wants, and what is more consistent with the facts of history. For the most current and fascinating of these schemes represents some purely human or social interests, some organization for the promotion of "humanitarian" ends, as the great object for which the race has been toiling, as the grand secret so long hidden in the womb of parturient time, with which she has been in travail these six thousand years, and of which she is soon to be delivered. But never was there so long a labor for so slight a progeny. This toil of all the nations, these conflicts of the church, this slow advance through strife, only to issue in the securing of political rights, and a better social state! If any view could lead us to despair of Providence and of man, it is such a view of human history as

this. All the great labors and conflicts of the past have been for unreal objects. And this is the view of those who believe in man alone, and in the supremacy of reason; they are the very ones who find the least of truth in history, and nothing of permanency in the church, which still has been made up of rational men.

But while protesting against such philosophemes and such a view of human history, as essentially defective, and contrary to fact, we should also be careful not to err on the other extreme, and deny human rights and human reason, and be indifferent to social progress. It is a dishonor to the church to suppose that it can be indifferent to these questions. One of the ends of Christianity, not its highest end, but necessary thereto, is to elevate reason, to secure freedom, and to enhance all social blessings. To take any other ground is to leave Christianity in the background. The Christian church must set itself right with these, or it loses its hold of the age, as did Rome, three centuries ago. It must show its superiority to all other systems, chiefly by showing that only on its basis can human rights be safely adjusted, human welfare promoted, and a higher social state introduced among mankind. Christianity is designed to make this world fairer, and wiser, and happier. It must show its supremacy, by laboring for all human interests with the wisest zeal and the calmest energy, and the most assured conviction, keeping them subordinate in theory and in life, to the one comprehensive purpose which includes all the others, and that is, redemption from sin. Without haste, but without rest, earnestly, yet wisely, protesting against all that is unjust, and laboring for its eradication, with an intense sympathy for all who suffer, and bear the burdens, and know the wretchedness of our mortal life, giving with the largest charity, having the very spirit of self-sacrifice in heart and in life, ever working for truth and righteousness, and believing that they will come, using, as has been said, the very ruins of our earth, to build up the temple of our Lord,—in such a spirit, and with such ends, must the church of the redeemed labor, if it is to set forth the inherent superiority of

the Christian system; and under such aspects must it be viewed, that it may realize the full idea of the kingdom of Christ, as a holy society exhibiting, the manifest glory of the supreme God in the redemption of mankind from *all* the consequences of the great apostasy.

Such is the sublime view of the great objects at which God is aiming, and of the final destiny of the race, which is given us in the Christian church and its history. All the interests of the human race are garnered up in its comprehensive purposes. It has principles so universal and efficient, that they alone can reconcile the conflicts and restore the disorders of our fallen state. It gives us the most elevated and inspiring view of the ultimate destiny of the human race. It gives us not a speculation, but a real historical economy; not a merely projected scheme, but one which has endured and conquered, one which has thus far approved itself as adapted to human wants and to human welfare. It gives us a kingdom which reaches forward through the world, beyond the world, even to the eternity of our being. It is a kingdom, too, in which are first adjusted the highest antagonisms, as the means of harmonizing all our lesser conflicts. It gives us agencies sufficient to carry all these ends into fulfilment. This kingdom, reposing for its foundation upon the purpose of the Father, centering in the God-man, divine and human both, animated by the living energy of the Holy Spirit, adjusting the relations between a holy God and a sinful world, intended to reconcile men with each other as well as with God, and having for its object the final redemption of mankind,—such a kingdom is as far superior in its majesty and rightful authority to any merely philosophical speculation about the destiny of the race, as fact is superior to theory, and as a divinely-revealed system is superior to the one-sided excogitations of the poor sciolist, who talks as if humanity were all, and as if his own speculations were the first light that has ever illumined the earth.

This exhibition of the great ends to be wrought out by the church completes the scientific view of its history, and gives

to its fulness and roundness; that which was from the beginning in the purpose of the Father is that which is realized in the end in the kingdom of his Son. And thus the circle is completed, the end returns to the beginning, and God is all in all.

And if the inquiry about the ends for which the race was made is a necessary inquiry, if no science can be complete which does not answer it, and if that science is best, which answers it from the point of view which embraces all the relations of man, then, on the basis of the Christian revelation, may we erect the best science of human history, for here we know by the sure word of prophecy, what is the great end set before the human race.

Such a scientific view of the history of the church as is that, whose outline we have thus attempted to sketch, gives us the real philosophy of human history, and that, too, not on speculative but on historical grounds. That there is such a philosophy not all the vagaries and delusions of infidel speculations should lead us to deny. They should rather induce us to use the old prerogative of our faith, that of turning the weapons forged in the camp of its enemies, into the means of its own defence and victory. They should lead us to show that that view of human nature and destiny, which is given by the light of Christianity, is immeasurably more comprehensive and elevating, more friendly to real progress and rights, more accordant with the whole welfare of mankind, and more consistent with all the facts of history than any scheme which infidel speculation is capable of projecting. Until any one can propound a system, which shall propose to do more, and what is more needed, than the redemption of a sinful world through an incarnate God, in an eternal kingdom, whose blessings are bestowed on all who will accept them, the supremacy of Christianity as a system must needs be conceded. And this is our confidence—either Christianity is to go on, and do its work, and redeem the race—or it will be superseded by something higher and better, and if so,—by what?

And it is our conviction that if any would really study the

history of our earth in a truly philosophical and docile spirit, even if he began from the merely human point of view, asking only what has actually approved itself as best and highest to man, that he would be led through the race above the race; that from the very facts of the case he would come to the recognition of the existence, and authority and need of just such a kingdom, and of just such a view of human history, as is given us in the records of the Christian church. If any do not come to such a result, it is because they do not study history in a truly inductive spirit, or else they study it with some preconceived bias against Christianity. Those who think metaphysics to be the highest of blessings, and abstractions to be the great realities, might come to different results. But this is because they have neither reverence for facts, nor a right method of interpreting them. They do not study history to learn, but to try their own schemes upon it. They destroy the substance of the facts to make out their theories. There was once a statue of Isis, veiled, in the hall of a priest's temple at Memphis. His son, longing to see the face, struck off the veil with hammer and chisel, and found only a block of raw, shapeless stone. And this wise child is no unapt representative of those who study history without reverence, and without taking into account the fact that man is a religious being; they may strike off the veil of the divinity, and then say there is no divinity there; but they have not studied the statue, they have only tried the power of a hammer and a chisel. If we reverence the divinity that is in history, we shall see it through its veil, we shall feel and know its power, we shall see that there is a divinity which shapes man's ends, rough-hew them as he may.

I should be doing a silent injustice to the memory of a venerable and beloved teacher, if I closed this part of my subject without acknowledging my indebtedness for a right view of church history to the teachings and writings of the most eminent church historian of our day, the venerated and beloved Neander. His favorite motto, inscribed under his likeness, was—Now we see through a glass darkly, but then

face to face. In this spirit he lived and studied, and now, we trust, he sees face to face, taken, alas! too soon, as we vainly say, in the midst of his gigantic toil upon his incomparable history. Still can we see that familiar and bent frame, that countenance so Jewish in outline, and so Christian in expression when he let out upon you the full light of his eyes, usually veiled. The records of the Christian church were the study of his life, and his works are a monument to the dignity of its history. He explored the dark mines and brought to light radiant treasures. He united the most laborious research, with the most genial sympathy for all that is human, for all that is Christian. We almost forget that he may have been too lenient, when we remember how easy it is to be too intolerant. We think less that he fails in the graphic narrative of detail, because we feel so deeply the richness of that spirit, which could make the whole of Christian history so dear to our hearts, and so elevating to our faith. While we would ever judge his particular opinions only by the highest standard, we would speak of himself as we ought to speak of a man, who passed through all the conflicts of his age and country, and kept firm and high his conviction of the supernatural origin of Christianity, and had a living sense of Christ's grace, and in all his life and writings exemplified the power of that faith which overcometh the world, and of that charity which is the greatest of the virtues. And the unobtrusiveness of his studious life has been equalled only by the extent of his growing influence. His memorial shall not depart away, and his name shall live from generation to generation.

II. The Worth of the Science of Church History. If the view we have given of the science of church history be correct, we can hardly over-estimate its value for all who are interested in the great problems of human destiny, and especially for those who are to be the preachers of the gospel of Christ, in our age and country.

1. And it has, in the first place, an inherent dignity. It is valuable for its own sake.

If a man was made to know, so that all knowledge is good, then must that history be of an elevating influence, and most worthy of regard, which reveals to us what the race is for, what it has been and is to be, and which brings us into the heart of all its conflicts. There is something admirable, worthy even of our wonder, in seeing the might and progress of a spiritual kingdom in a sinful world. There is no history to be compared with it in its intrinsic interest and grandeur. Beginning among the hills of Judea, it went forth amid the chaos of pagan idolatries, and within a century its churches were planted, in spite of persecution, in all the chief cities of the Roman empire. It became strong through suffering. The succession to its chief churches was, as Ranke says, a succession to martyrdom, as well as to office, but the succession was always full. It fought in the shade, only because the air was filled with the arrows of its foes. It became so strong in Rome, that neither a Nero nor a Decius could quench its fires in blood. The persecutions of a Diocletian through the whole empire, only served to reveal its hidden might. As Dante says of the Pope, that his adversity was great, until he became great in his adversity, so was it with the early church; and when it became great in its adversity, and the emperors could not suppress it, then they bowed before it. It had existed in the catacombs, but under Constantine it was established upon the throne of the Cæsars, and its worship was celebrated in the basilicas of Constantinople. It changed the whole face of the ancient world. When the northern barbarian hordes desolated the empire, the church was consolidated and prepared for their coming; so that although Italy was laid waste, the kingdom of Christ subdued these fierce foes unto herself. This irruption of the North upon the South, was the providential means of spreading Christianity from the south to the north of Europe. The church converted the Teutonic races, which, under its auspices, have been the regenerating element in modern civilization. When the balance of the political power of Europe was transferred from the south to the north, the Papacy of the south resisted and

subdued the imperial encroachments, in that long strife between Guelph and Ghibelline. It gave to Europe strength to resist that Moslem zeal which strove to scale its battlements. It inflamed the prowess of that honorable yet corrupt chivalry, which showed both its might and its blindness, in regaining the sepulchre of our Lord. Through its very successes, the church had now become almost inebriated; and in the pride of its power, it usurped the place due only to its Head. Yet, even in the night of the middle ages, its scholars were giving needed shape and precision to its theological systems. The learning which it brought from the East, awakened a new spirit of inquiry; its despotism provoked national resistance; its Pelagianism called out the spiritual prowess of the heroes of the Reformation, and the old Gospel was spoken anew in their mother tongues, to the waiting nations. Rome was left in the south; and, among the free and investigating nations of the north, the church exhibited itself in new forms, to meet the exigencies of that new spirit which was spreading among the people. It was a new trial for the Christian church, whether it could maintain its authority in the midst of freedom of thought and of philosophical research. And Protestantism has proved to us that it can,—the thoughtful Protestantism of the Lutheran churches, and the aggressive and advancing Protestantism of the Reformed churches. To the latter was vouchsafed the office of maintaining the supremacy of Christianity among the freest, the most commercial nations of the earth. The aggressive and progressive portion of modern church history belongs to this branch of the church. And nobly has it fulfilled its office, both in the old world and in the new. Calvin, once said the greatest living German historian, was the virtual founder of the United States of America. And here the Christian church still lies at the basis of our institutions, and sustains them by its power, which we feel the less, because it is so equally diffused. It has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. That sacred kingdom which began its contesting course at the city of Jerusalem, and passed

victorious from Asia to Europe, and from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, which crossed the Atlantic in adventurous barks, has extended itself through the length and breadth of our land, and is now planted on the borders of the vast Pacific, to carry back, it may be, the treasures of its grace, from island to island, in a returning course, to the continent and the hills whence it first sprung, and fill Jerusalem with a higher praise.

And what other history can tell such a tale, or know such marvels, such conflicts, and such victories?

And there is not only this, its external life,—there is also its hidden, spiritual life,—there are its spiritual heroes. It has its array of martyrs and confessors. There is the refiner's fire, and in it the molten gold. It perpetually renews the story of the burning bush that is not consumed. It tells us of those who have taken poverty for their pride, and, for the good of souls, gone to the ends of the earth. It tells us of those who "have done things worthy to be written, and written what is worthy to be read." There are rivers of peace, gently flowing, "life, love and joy still gliding through;" through its whole history runs the river of God, whose depths are ever peaceful, though its surface be torn by the storms. And thus, from the history of Christ's church we may draw such spiritual lessons, that it shall be to us indeed a "book of holy doctrine," nourishing our hearts in the truth and love of God.

2. Another point of view under which the value of church history may be considered, to which our limits allow us only to advert, is its bearings on the vindication of God's providence in his moral government of the world. The strongest objections to God's providential rule, are on the field of history; and in the history and progress of the Christian church, with the aims it has in view, we have our best basis for a reply to the objections. Without the light of Christianity, human history is dark indeed, and hardly intelligible to any serious mind. And though difficulties may be left even from the Christian point of view, yet the most perplexing questions

are solved, and solved not in the way of bare possibility and speculation, but on the ground of actual facts, on the basis of a revealed economy, which is full of blessings and of grace for the human race. This gives us points that "throb with light," in the midst of all the darkness. God's government of the world is thus seen to vindicate itself. As the scientific study of nature has given the best reply to the well-known Lucretian objection, "stat tanta prædita culpa," so the thorough study of history will reveal to us a wisdom in the divine dealings, which is the best answer to inconsiderate objections to the moral government of God. But we cannot dwell upon this topic further, because for our present objects it is more needful to consider a third aspect under which the value of church history may be considered.

3. And that is, its general doctrinal bearings. Church history comprises the history of doctrines. This is its more important portion. It gives us the real internal life of the church. And it is a field more fruitful in interest than is almost any other portion of this history. Here we have that greatest of controversies, between philosophy and faith, of which all external conflicts are but the symbol. Here we are taught how Christianity approves itself as the highest reason. Here, too, we see that

"Truth crushed to earth shall rise again,
The eternal years of God are hers ;
But Error, wounded, writhes with pain,
And dies among his worshippers."

It is animating to follow this record, and note the stadia of that grand process through which the church has been passing, in order to come to a full comprehension of God's revealed will, and to reconcile the verities of Christianity with all other known truth. Each age has here had its special office. It is as if no one period had been able to grasp the full meaning of revelation ; the first age was devoted to the Incarnation and the Trinity ; the next to sin and grace ; the next more especially to the polity and the sacraments ; the age of

scholasticism to a systematizing of the previous labors. The Reformation brought out into bold relief the doctrine of justification, and the true idea of the church, while it delivered the church from an usurped ecclesiastical authority, and it produced the largest body of symbols and confessions. Then came the period of the conflict of Christianity at all points, even to its foundations, with criticisms and philosophy, its contests with all the forms of infidelity, and the great attempt in the midst of which we now stand—to reconcile the whole of Christianity with all the thoughts and interests of the race, to bring all our knowledge of human and divine things into one self-consistent system.

And whoever reads this inspiring record in a right spirit, will find it to have a two fold value; it guards against heresy, and it confirms the essential truths of Christianity.

It is a preservative against error, according to the maxim, "forewarned, forearmed." Many an objection made against what are called the formulas of doctrine, would vanish, if the history of those formulas were known. And, in fact, they cannot be thoroughly understood excepting in the light of their history, which tells us the reason for almost every word in the chief definitions. The formula then becomes full of life. If it is seen how Arius, and Pelagius, and Sabellius, were conquered, we shall give less heed to the attenuated repetition of their thrice slain objections. It is a wise saying, "that only he who is able to trace an error to its roots, can tear it up by the roots." If we get at the roots, we need not spend so much time on the new sprouts of heresy. We shall thus be less apt to quake at every objection to the truth, and we shall have more of that calmness which is one prognostic of victory.

Of equal service is the history of doctrines, in confirming us in the truth. If, in the year 1384, Wyckliffe could write, "Truly aware I am, that the doctrine of the gospel, may, for a season, be trampled under foot, and even suppressed by the threatenings of Antichrist, but equally sure I am that it shall never be extinguished, for it is the recording of the

truth itself," much more may we say this now, with a faith confirmed by the history of almost five subsequent centuries. There have been, and there will be conflicts; but those truths which are both old and new, which are always and never old, which are always and never new, have still maintained their vantage ground. Those very truths, against which human reason has brought the subtlest objections, the Incarnation, the Trinity, Atonement, Justification and Regeneration, those very truths, which to the superficial view seem contrary to reason, because they are above mere natural reason, are the ones which have received the strongest additional confirmation, in the progress of doctrinal discussion, which have approved themselves as fundamental in the Christian system. Thus, for example, the doctrine respecting the Person of our Lord, the union of the human and divine natures in his sacred person, that central doctrine of Christianity, has been assailed by every imaginable objection; some have denied his divinity, at the expense of his humanity; others, his humanity at the expense of his divinity; others still, have feigned a nature neither human nor divine; some have confounded the natures; others have divided the person; every form of philosophy, in each successive age, has done battle against this most vital and most comprehensive truth—and almost every form of philosophy has come at last to pay it obeisance. It has maintained its hold, so that in every century men have bowed at the name of Jesus, with such love and faith, as none but a suffering God-man could inspire. And the history of this truth reveals to us its sublimity and authority, and shows us the great practical end to be gained by a review of past controversy, and that is, in the mutations of human opinions to see the immutability and progress of divine truth.

4. This study of church history is of importance, not only in these general doctrinal aspects, but also, in the fourth place, in its application to present controversy.

We live in an age and in a country of sects and controversies, and this is not so bad as an age of indifference or of

spiritual bondage. Sects are better than coercion, and controversy than thoughtlessness.

But this variety of opinions imposes the necessity of a broader theological culture, so that we may know the grounds of difference and the points of agreement. The study of the history of opinions contributes to this.

All present controversy has a tendency to sharpen and limit the vision; the study of history has a tendency "to inbreed within us," what Milton calls, "that generous and Christianly reverence one of another, which is the very nurse and guardian of Christian charity." It gives a position above the controversy which is of inestimable value, especially to him who is involved in the controversy. Thus can we best distinguish between the essential and the contingent.

All intense doctrinal discussion has, likewise, a tendency to run back upon metaphysical distinctions, and to make these appear of too great relative importance; and as these distinctions are not so readily apprehended by the popular mind, there is a strong disposition on the part of the polemic, for the sake of popular effect, really to misinterpret his opponent, and to say that he denies the whole of a truth, when he only objects to some one of the forms in which it may be stated. And this, too, in forgetfulness of the fact that phraseology, which to the popular mind is definite, has become indefinite among theologians through the stress of controversy. The study of doctrinal history does not make any one less scrupulous in the use of terms, but rather more so; and it also shows the value of nice distinctions, and that is, that they are rather scientific than practical; and it makes one averse to the petty and easy art of the unscrupulous polemic, who appeals to popular prejudice to sustain a cause which he is in danger of losing in argument. He, who knows the full history of controversy, will be as little disposed as any one, to tamper with the truth for the sake of novelty; he will see the wisdom of the forms in which it is embodied; but he ought also to acquire such breadth of vision, that he will not unnecessarily exalt minor points of difference, even for

the sake of displaying his own orthodoxy. It is easy to gain the notoriety of a polemic—little knowledge is needed to that; it is easy to exalt the difference between Old School and New, between Presbyterians and Congregationalists; but it is wiser and better to work together for our common good, and against our common foes. A state of things in our American churches, which should lead to more serious collisions between those so substantially at one as are Congregationalists and Presbyterians, which should annul that old Christian freedom and brotherhood, which made transitions from one to the other easy and unnoticed, could not be too much deplored. Far distant be the time, when it can be said, that he who would go from hence thither cannot, neither ought any man to come hither from thence.

But the controversies among Protestants are not those in which church history has the most solid and needed lessons to convey. There is the still more important and urgent controversy between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic communions. While the political power of Rome is dying out at the heart, its spiritual claims are exalted at the extremities. And from the very nature of the Romish polity, this spiritual includes a political claim, wherever it can be enforced. Its dignitaries may praise republicanism, and toleration, and rights of conscience, and the social compact, in republican cathedrals and in the halls of Congress; but, behind the rights of man are the rights of the church, the toleration they invoke is for them and not for mankind, the inviolable conscience is the Roman Catholic conscience; and, above all social compacts, is a sovereign and infallible church. They catch the popular ear by words, which, when interpreted in the light of their full system, are abhorrent to the popular ear. It may be, that they will yet be plagued by their own inventions, and that what is policy in the leaders may become conviction in the followers.

And this church invites us to a conflict, which cannot long be put off. It throws down the gauntlet, and boasts of our decline, perverting the facts of modern history, as it forged

donations and decretals of old. And there is need among our ministry of a more thorough study of its real character, for the flowing lines by which we now vaguely define its differences from us, are not the real lines on which the battle is to be fought. Rivers are said to be good for the boundaries of peaceful States, but bad for the defence of armies. If we would learn the real power and strategy of Rome we must away from the rivers, to its hills and encampments.

The strength of Rome is in its completeness and consistency as an organic system. The Roman Catholic system is the most comprehensive, subtle, self-consistent, flexible and inflexible polity, which the mind of man ever wrought out for purposes of spiritual and temporal authority. Its parts are knit together. Doctrines, polity and rites—they are all members of one body, an organized, aggressive and zealous spiritual hierarchy, whose claims run through all the relations of life, trespass upon the sanctity of the family, unbind the oaths of political allegiance, and know no human or civil rights, which are not subordinate. From the cradle to the grave it accompanies each of its members with its mystical sacraments. It changes its astute policy at each emergency; as has been said, “it neutralized Aristotelianism by scholasticism, printing by art, the Albigenses by the Franciscan order, and a Luther by a Loyola.” It is wise even to wiliness, and when it seems to succumb, it is just preparing to strike. It has something of that insatiable variety which Cicero attributes to nature, and also of that complex order, which modern science finds everywhere in nature. It can afford to be inconsistent for a moment, that it may be consistent in the end; it can outbid any other system with both the populace and the politician. It is by turns servile and despotic. And its systematic power is rivalled only by its zeal, and its zeal is not greater than is its adaptedness to almost all moods and classes of mind. It awes by its power those whom it cannot enchant by its flatteries; it is harmless to the submissive, meek to the inquiring, and intolerant to every adversary. It appeals to all the senses in its varied rites; it charms the understanding by the consist-

ency of its system, and it subdues reason itself by its claims to infallibility. It is seductive to the barbarian, and alluring to the imaginative; its later converts have been among cultivated minds, who have lost sympathy with human rights, and despaired of reason, and were glad to submit to a venerable authority, which was strong through its traditions, and unflinching in its aspirations. And all its policy and efforts look forward to one great end, that of a spiritual domination, embracing all the great temporal interests; the supremacy of a single see, having its seat in that ancient, venerable Rome, which, having conquered the whole of the old world, and been supreme in mediæval times, would also give the law to the whole modern world, and make of Rome the centre of the earth.

While the strength of the Roman Catholic system is thus to be found in its consistency, and completeness and pliancy as an organized whole, the arguments in its favor, and its means of defence against assault are chiefly on historical grounds. From the nature of the case, its claims to unity, infallibility and supremacy, stand or fall with its tradition. This open foe of all our Protestantism, and this covert foe of all our civil rights can be thoroughly undermined only on the historic field. The wisdom of the Reformers was seen as conspicuously in the production of the *Magdeburg Centuries*, as in any other of their works, and the *Annales* of Baronius, with all its continuations, have not filled up the breaches which were then made in the Roman bulwarks. A superficial study of history may be favorable to the Papacy, but a thorough exploration reveals the gaps in its assumed successions, destroys the figments of its traditions, shows the arts by which it came to power, and the gradual rise of its corruptions until Christ was hidden, and Christianity externalized and materialized, and the whole ecclesiastical system wrought out under Pelagian views of human nature and carnal views of Christ's spiritual kingdom. And the modern portion of that history exhibits the judgment that has been passed upon this usurping hierarchy. Even if, on historical grounds, Rome

might prove itself fit for the middle ages, on the same grounds it can be proved unfit for the modern world. What might have been catholic in mediæval times, is sectarian in modern times. Its history since the Reformation contains an argument against it as strong as is that derived from the record of the growth of its previous corruptions. Under the ardor of the attack, it did indeed at first exhibit the revival of missionary zeal; but its Eastern missions have died away, and its churches in South America are among the most corrupt forms of Christianity. In Europe, its intolerance has provoked all the great religious wars; it has armed the Inquisition with new powers; it has published the decrees of Trent; and it has produced, denounced and welcomed back the society of the Jesuits. The decrees of Trent and the Jesuits are the great products of Rome since the Reformation; and in these decrees it has petrified itself in its doctrinal corruptions, and in the Society of Jesus we have a body, all whose spirit does violence to the sacred name it bears. In our own country we might have more hope of its reform, were it not that its leading advocates are so thoroughly hostile to our general spirit as a people, and so ultra-montane in all their tendencies.

And it is also worthy of remark, that in all the great contests of Christianity with its modern foes, Rome has kept in the background. Once it led. But from the very nature of its system, it is not able to meet manfully the questions between science and revelation, between philosophy and faith, between the past and the present. The honor of these conflicts has been given to Protestantism; all the controversies between materialism and pantheism on the one side, and Christianity on the other, have been conducted under Protestant auspices. Rome does not know how to reconcile Christianity with popular rights, nor reason with revelation. It cannot do this on the basis of its system. It has said something about these things, but it has not discussed them. It can enforce duties, but it cannot recognize rights. It does not know man as man. Nor does it know, nor is it able to

satisfy the highest spiritual wants of man. It is not fitted to grapple with the great social problems of modern life. And while the whole of modern society is stirred to its depths by these great questions, which must be met and answered, this venerable hierarchy, in its great councils, is busying itself most intensely with that most important theological inquiry, upon which so much can be said and so little known—the immaculate conception of the virgin.

A review of the whole history of the Roman Catholic Church is thus one of the best means for refuting its claims, showing us that what it attempts in theory never has been realized in fact; that if, in its grandeur, it be like the venerable cathedrals in which its service is chanted, it is also like the greatest of these cathedrals in another respect, and that is, it has never been completed,—as also in another point, that however grand they are, they are not large enough to hold, nor strong enough to bind that spiritual Christianity, which rests in Christ and not in the church, in justification and not in works, and which is ever favorable to human reason and to human rights.

5. That same history of the church, which may thus be of use in respect to present controversy, is also of value in preparing us for the future. It has a prophetic office. It bids us look forward to the progress of the church, and to the unity of the church.

“It is a maxim in the military art,” once said Napoleon, “that the army which remains in its entrenchments is beaten,” and eminently does this hold true of the moral conflicts of the race. And as we read the record of the past victories of the church, we realize more fully its missionary character, and acquire greater confidence in the reality of the scriptural promise that the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ.

And for the future unity of the church, as well as for its missionary expansion, the study of church history may serve to prepare us.

If any lesson is written broad and deep upon the whole

course of Christ's militant church, it is this, that the unity of the church is to be the consummation of the church, and not the means of its consummation. This unity is to be attained by means of its inward life, and not by means of its outward forms. External unity is not Christian union. Nothing is more conspicuous in Christian history, than the disdain with which external forms and successions have been treated when they cramped the spiritual power and progress of the Christian church. Nor is such unity to be found in a sacrifice of faith to feeling, though without the feeling it cannot be realized. There must indeed be more of Christian charity, and a more whole-souled faith, living in the great spiritual realities of God's kingdom in Christ. But there must also be—and here is where the study of the doctrinal history of the church has its important bearings—a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole course of Christian theology, so that each sect and each doctrine may be judged in the light of the great central truths of the Christian system, and receive its true relative position. Put the church question, and the sacramental question, and the inquiries concerning divine sovereignty and free agency; put the doctrines of atonement, and justification, and regeneration, in their real relations to Christ the living Head; exalt his person and work, and his intimate relations to believers; make him the centre of our systems, as he is of our faith, as he is of the divine revelation, as he is of the history of the church, as he is of the whole history of our fallen race, as he is of the whole kingdom of God in time and in eternity, and we are advancing farthest and fastest towards that unity of the church which is to be its hallowed consummation. And that he is this centre, the whole history of his church, next to the Scriptures, gives the most convincing evidence.

In the spirit in which I have now attempted to set forth the nature and the worth of the science of Church History, it will be my aim to teach it, as the Lord may give me strength, in training in this school of the prophets such a min-

istry as our American churches now need. If ever churches needed a thoroughly trained ministry, it is our American churches in their present position and conflicts. If all the wisdom and fulness of the Christian system ever needed to be poured into the very heart of any society, ours is that society,—so united in a few great political and religious convictions, and so divided on all other points. Though the mariner has a richly-freighted bark, and all the powers of steam, and even the terrestrial magnet, he needs more than ever the stars and the sun, and the best instruments of science to tell him where he is. No theological education can be too thorough for our ministry, which does not interfere with the higher moral and spiritual qualifications for the ministerial work. And the most thorough intellectual discipline does not do this, though an inferior culture may. For the most sublime truths of the Christian system are those which have the greatest practical efficiency; and the most comprehensive study of these truths will enable the preacher to apply them most directly and wisely to the heart and life, and such study alone can qualify him to answer all the objections which he must encounter. Only he who knows the times in which he lives, can act upon the times; and only he who has studied the past, can know the present, and act wisely for the future.

We need a ministry trained for conflict and discussion, and trained through investigation and discussion; for on the field of open controversy all the great questions which come thick and fast upon us are to be adjusted. We need a ministry qualified to refute error by showing its grounds, and to advance truth by displaying its symmetry; which can meet argument by argument, a vain philosophy by a higher wisdom, novel speculations by showing either that they are too novel or too antiquated, pretended ecclesiastical claims by pointing to the gaps in the succession, and the assumptions of an infallible church by the documents that prove its fallibility. We need a ministry which shall be conservative without bigotry, and progressive without lawlessness; which shall neither nail the

conscious needle to the north, nor strive to walk without the needle's guidance; which shall hold the truth in its fulness, and the truth in its simplicity, and the truth in its symmetry, and the truth in its power; which shall sympathize with all human wants and woes, and which above all temporal wants shall labor for the spiritual welfare of immortal souls; which shall be ready to live and to die for the church as the body of Christ, and for Christ as the Head of the church, and for all men for the sake of Christ and his kingdom.

We need a ministry filled with the powers of the world to come; living in the grand realities of God's spiritual kingdom, and really believing that it is the Lord's; that he hath not forsaken it, that he will not forget it; that though a woman may forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb, yet God will not forget his Zion. Behold, he says, I have graven it upon the palms of my hands, and thy walls are continually before me. Fear not, for I am with thee. I will bring thy seed from the East, and gather thee from the West; I will say to the North give up, and to the South keep not back; bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth.

THE REFORMED CHURCHES OF EUROPE AND AMERICA

IN RELATION TO

GENERAL CHURCH HISTORY.*

THE two well-known sayings, that "history is philosophy teaching by example," and that "the historian is a prophet with his face turned backwards," suggest important lessons as to the value of history and the functions of the historian. For history contains a philosophy, and the historian alone has all the data of rational prophecy. Only he who knows what has been, can understand what is, or can anticipate what is to be. If we cut ourselves off from the past we shall be disowned in the future. The facts of history are one of the surest tests of our speculations about the final destiny of the human race.

A sense of the dignity of history, and the consciousness of an historic destiny, are impressed upon all great nations, upon all great personages. The Greeks and the youthful Alexander, the Romans and the imperial Cæsar, the Papacy and the grasping Hildebrand, the Franks and the lordly Charlemagne, the Germans and Luther strong in faith, the French and Napoleon strong in will, the English with the sagacious Pitt, and our own land favored with the wise Washington, have all felt the ardor of this historic inspiration and have changed the face of the earth. And those

* An address delivered by request of the Presbyterian Historical Society, before the General Assembly at St. Louis, Mo., Monday evening, May 21, 1855.

who follow the march of these nations and study the biographies of such men, tracking them consecutively down the long evolution of historic time, must be led to the ennobling conviction, that history has its rational as well as personal aspects, its divine plan, disclosed while the warp and woof are woven together by the flying shuttle of time.

The fluctuations seem human, but the tide is made by celestial influences. One advancing plan pervades all; as has been nobly said by England's present laureate:

“ Yet I doubt not thro' the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns ;
Not in vain the distance beacons ; forward, forward, let us range.
Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of change.”

Even the genealogy of the historic muse, in the ingenious and graceful fable of the old Greek mythology, shows some sense of this commingling of divine and human elements in history. Clio, like her sisters, those ideal representatives of the various arts and sciences, is the progeny of Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, and of Apollo, the god of wisdom. This signifies that all the arts have a divine wisdom for their father, and are under memory's fostering care; for without memory the sciences would have no continuous and accumulative being, and without a divine impulse they would have no inner life. And Mnemosyne herself is the daughter of Uranus and Gaia, of the heavens and earth; it is her office to retain and transmit what may be known of the one or the other. Born of such a parentage, Clio is depicted in a sitting posture, as befits her calm office, displaying an unrolled scroll, and pointing to an open chest filled full with parchments. These are her treasures, the perpetual memorial of the divine and human acts, which make up the record of history.

The order and end of history are of divine origination, the chief instruments and agencies are human. The composer does not make the laws of music, he works in obedience to them; nor do men make the law of history, or shape its

ends, they but work out the eternal and o'ermastering plan. It is only by an illusion that men believe that they construct history. History is the work of God; his greatest work in time. Its seemingly isolated and fragmentary events are parts of one connected and orderly series, of which the divine providence is the method, human welfare the chief subject, and the divine glory the last chief end.

It is only when the whole of human history is thus viewed, as one series, one connected plan, that we can understand its real dignity, or that it can claim for itself a place among the sciences. Its lessons are then more than those of mere moral examples for our imitation; they are the lessons of a divine wisdom, they instruct us in the weightiest problems of human destiny. History as a mere chronicle of facts has indeed its value; as the biography of individuals, it has its charms, its warnings and its inspirations; as the biography of nations, it is an earnest and serene moral teacher, discoursing ever of justice, more true and wonderful than any drama; but history, as the biography of humanity, binding together all the empires and races that have peopled the earth, in one unfolding plan, reaching already through six thousand years of time, centering in one kingdom, which began in the beginning to be consummated only at the end, progressive, conflicting, never subdued and ever victorious, the only kingdom which has survived all change and has the high augury of final supremacy, human history when thus viewed is more than human, it is divine, bespeaking an omniscient and omnipotent author, rehearsing his power and proclaiming his glory. The course of nature has been called "the art of God;" the course of history is his highest art, as much loftier than nature as spirit is better than matter, and as spiritual are superior to physical ends.

Such is human history in its real and sacred aspects, thus first unfolded, in record, promise and prophecy in the Word of God. All Pagan literature has nothing, in grandeur and completeness, to be compared to this vision, this sublime conception of the human race, as one in origin, one in destiny, the theatre of the divine work of redemption. Augustine, the

greatest teacher of the Latin church, first felt to its full extent the grandeur of this idea, which he sets forth as the plan of history in his "City of God," an immortal work, composed in reply to the heathen taunt that Christianity had ruined the earth, amid the downfall of the old Roman empire, and in the beginning of the new Latin civilization. He daringly proclaims that the City of God, the home of the elect, is to subdue Rome and the earth; that the prophecies of Scripture foretell the fall of both the ancient and the modern Babylon.* Bossuet, limited by his Roman Catholic prejudices, took up the same theme. It was expanded to still fuller proportions in Jonathan Edwards' "History of the Work of Redemption," written in the beginning of our new American civilization, and sketching with masterly outline, though imperfect in historic details, the whole of human history as a divine theodicy, a real body of divinity, which is from, for and to God, centering in the person of Christ and the work of Redemption. In this redemption, and here alone, is to be found the centre of unity to human history; the race is viewed in its two prime and fundamental relations to the first and to the second Adam, and all converges upon the idea of a redemption, prepared, purchased and applied, running through the whole of man's history, to its consummation in eternity. This general idea is indicated in the motto to Hase's manual of Church History, which declares, that "the Lord of the times is God, the turning-point of the times is Christ, the true spirit of the times is the Holy Spirit." The great Swiss historian, John Von Müller, gives the results of his life-long labors, extracted, he says, from 1733 authors in 17,000 folio pages, in the striking confession, that "Christ is the key to

* Augustine, in the second book of his "Retractationes." (ii. 43,) gives the following account of the origin of this work :—"Interea Roma Gothorum irruptione, agentium sub rege Alarico, atque impetu magnæ cladis eversa est; cujus eversionem deorum falsorum multorumque cultores, quos usitato nomine Paganos vocamus, in Christianam religionem referre conantes, solito acerbius et amarius Deum verum blasphemare cœperunt. Unde ego exardescens zelo domus DEI adversus eorum blasphemias, vel errores, libros de *Civitate Dei* scribere institui."

the history of the world. Not only does all harmonize with the mission of Christ ; all is subordinated to it." "When I saw this," he adds, "it was to me as wonderful and surprising as the light which Paul saw on the way to Damascus, the fulfillment of all hopes, the completion of all philosophy, the key to all the apparent contradictions of the physical and moral world ; here is life and immortality. I marvel not at miracles ; a far greater miracle has been reserved for our times, the spectacle of the connection of all human events in the establishment and preservation of the doctrine of Christ."

It is, we conceive, one of the most wonderful facts about the sacred Scriptures, that, from the beginning, they have held up this vision of the kingdom of God in Christ to elevate man's faith and enlarge his charity. No other book, not deriving its materials from this source, has such a comprehensive and connected view of the course and destiny of our race. Infidelity has never been able to cope with the argument from prophecy, which gathers corroboration with each revolving century. It is precisely the most daring and universal of the inspired prophecies which has been receiving constant fulfillment. This is an unexampled wonder. God in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, is the burden of the Bible, and it is also the burden of history. He whose mind is filled with this ennobling idea knows the soul of prophecy, which is the substance also of history.

All history is thus in its inmost nature religious. It centres in the church of Christ. And hence, as members of his church, we must feel a special attraction towards whatever concerns the past, the present or the future fortunes of that church. Its history, wisely and largely understood, lifts us far above any merely sectarian sympathies, while it also deepens our interest in the narrative of each part in its relations to the whole. He who loves the whole, loves also each part, and cares for it for the sake of the whole. And the history of the whole church cannot be known without the records of the parts. No true general history can be written unless preceded by a series of minute and local investigations

It is the necessity of historical investigation, that chronicles, biographies and monographs should go before the summary; they give the data for the true inductions. One of the chief reasons why we have not a good general history of any part of Christ's church in our own country is, that we have so few complete local histories; the stones have not yet been made for the arch. The Presbyterian churches of our land have, in a special manner, too long suffered in general repute from this neglect. Other churches have pursued a wiser policy. Had our Calvinistic churches a history at all to be compared with that of Bancroft for the United States, it would place us on our proper vantage ground. Where portions of our history have been written, it has been, alas! too often in a controversial spirit, for the exigencies of debate, a spirit which unconsciously sacrifices our broad characteristics to some special peculiarities or party ends. And hence it is, that no German or English church historian has ever even begun to understand the true position and character of the Reformed Churches of our land, which lead the van in the grand, progressive march of the kingdom of God, as it goes on to subdue this continent. You never met a European who could comprehend the actual working of our church system, either in doctrine or polity. And one reason is, that we have been so busy in doing the work, that we have not found time to make a book for his instruction.

The Presbyterian Historical Society, in whose behalf I have the honor to address this General Assembly, was instituted to meet this need; to supply the materials for such a history, and to stimulate the spirit of historical investigation through all the Presbyteries and local churches of our communion. It has wisely brought together the representatives of different branches of the great Presbyterian family of our land, which will lead, we trust, to a feeling of closer sympathy, to a sense of community in great things, thus lessening the sharpness of conflicts in lesser things. The increased conviction of a common historic basis will bring us nearer together. Let it be more than a republic of letters; let it in-

crease our sense of brotherhood. History should lift us above local and personal animosities, and party names. That history which is above our feuds is our truest history. It should make us feel that union is better than discord, that the whole is more than the part.

The influence of the Presbyterian Historical Society should be felt through all our churches. We need, as a people, more of the historical spirit, especially of the spirit of church history. If to our youthful energy we could add the wisdom of the past, we have a "combination and a form indeed to give assurance" of our power. Our political historians, our State Historical Societies have outstripped our churches. In our different States and Territories there are now twenty-eight distinct historical societies, several of which have published ample and valuable collections. Even the Territory of Minnesota has already issued four annual historical reports. Wisconsin and Iowa are beginning their work. The historical society of the State in which we are now assembled, has a noble field to cultivate. Several denominations, the Episcopal, the Baptist and the Congregational, are moving in this matter. Let them stimulate the Presbyterian churches to a healthful rivalry. Let these too exalt, not unduly, their own history. Let them, also, pay a fitting tribute to the memory of their fathers and founders. Though we may not think it quite time to appoint our historiographer for the whole church, let every Presbytery see to it, that each local church prepares its own history. Let old mansions be ransacked for documents; let periodicals, newspapers and pamphlets be carefully collected by some zealous antiquary, such as every Synod should have. We need for all parts of the church more of such sketches as those of Drs. Foote and Hill; of Hotchkiss, for Western New York; of Dr. Davidson, for Kentucky and Virginia; and of the Old Red Stone, by Dr. James Smith. Of the individual churches, too, we should collect the authentic records, extending back to the time of their origination. Light will thus be thrown upon the true character and composition of these churches; as is exemplified in the elaborate

and able history of the First Church of Newark, by Dr. Stearns ; in Dr. Murray's account of the Church of Elizabethtown ; Tuttle's, of Madison ; and Sherwood's, of Bloomfield. Only with such preparations can we be brought to a full knowledge of the facts, from which we may deduce the principles which have shaped our history. Neither the first schism of 1741-1758, nor the second great schism beginning in 1837, can be understood without patient and impartial investigations. The important history of the relations of the Presbyterian churches to the other churches of our country, their influence on us and ours on them, is also as yet unwritten. The publication of such documents as the Minutes of the Convention of Delegates from the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, and from the Assembly of Connecticut, held annually from 1766 to 1775, not only throws light on our relations to the New England churches, but it serves to bring out some of the hidden causes, not yet fully appreciated, which led to our separation from the mother country.

The Presbyterian Historical Society ought also, in all appropriate ways, to facilitate the preparation of biographies of the worthies who have built up and honored its churches. Even of Makemie there is no adequate memorial. The lives of the pastors of the first Presbyterian churches of Philadelphia and of New York deserve an ample record. Witherspoon, the patriot, who also defended the claims of moral philosophy against a New England writer ; Davies, that great preacher ; Gilbert Tennent, that soul of fire ; Wilson, Dickinson and Blair ; McWhorter and Burr ; Blackburn, Mason, Griffin and Richards ; these are surely worthy of some lasting testimonials. Let us have their biographies as we have those of Rodgers, of Alexander and of Green. To the history of the Log College should be added that of Nassau Hall and other colleges.

The doctrinal as well as ecclesiastical history of our churches is still to be composed : it is peculiar, and calls for subtle distinctions as well as a catholic spirit. It cannot be measured accurately or fully by any standard of the old world. We need a point of view which may comprehend Rodgers and Tennent,

Wilson and Green, Richards and Alexander, the Westminster Confession and the elder Edwards. The expected publication of the whole correspondence about Dr. Bellamy's call to New York, will doubtless throw light on that interchange and conflict of doctrinal views between the different parts of our country, which has served to give its special shape to our theology.

And were it too much to expect that the different Presbyterian churches might also gather together the collected writings, so far as they can now be recovered, of their ablest divines, and issue them after the manner of the admirable Parker Society of England, and the Wodrow of Scotland? And we should be doing a good work if we could also issue a monthly Bulletin, after the manner of the admirable Bulletin now sent forth, richly freighted, by the "Society for the History of French Protestantism," under the honorary presidency of M. Guizot, now in its third year, and which has rescued many a valuable Huguenot document from oblivion.

It is only after such ample preparations and research, that we can expect a complete history of Presbyterianism for our whole country. The laborious investigations of Dr. Hodge, in his able, but incompleted "History," might then be carried on to more definite conclusions, in which there would be a more general agreement. A complete ecclesiastical and doctrinal history of these churches, if it did not prove a bond of union, should at least promote a closer fellowship and sympathy.

We might thus be doing our part towards the preparation of a work, more needed than almost any other in church history, which should set forth the true character of the great Calvinistic or Reformed Churches of the Reformation, in their relations to the general history of the whole Christian Church. The history of these churches still remains to be adequately written; the aggressive and progressive portion of modern church history belongs chiefly to them. They are leading on Christianity, both in doctrine and polity, to its greatest and widest triumphs. The breadth and depth of this movement, its relations to Romanism and Lutheranism,

to Arminianism and Socinianism, to Episcopacy and Independency; its great varieties, with the same substantial type, in the many and strong nations where it found foothold; its alliance with politics and influence upon them; its combination of the conservative and reforming elements; the energy with which it has applied and is applying Christian principles to all the relations of life and society; the vigor with which it has developed the most complete ethics in connection with the noblest divinity; and the relation of this whole movement to the final aim and destiny of the Christian Church, present subjects of high contemplation to every thoughtful mind.

It is but a slight outline that we can here present of the characteristics of the Reformed, or Calvinistic, especially of the Presbyterian Churches. We will glance at these traits as seen in their European origin, in their planting and growth in our own land, and in their relation to the general history and final aim of the Christian Church.

The grandeur of the majestic Hallelujah chorus in Handel's Oratorio, is said to be seen in the fact, that though composed for a limited number of performers, it swells and grows to more magnificent proportions and effects, as the voices and instruments are multiplied and reduplicated, until it becomes a voluminous tide of enthralling and resistless harmony. And so, too, the grandeur of the principles of the Reformed Churches is attested by the still more conspicuous fact, that they are as applicable on a broad, as they were on a narrow theatre, to nations as to individuals, to the present even more than to the sixteenth century. Increase of years, of numbers, and of countries, has only served to give them expansion, maturity, and energy. The new world is and has proved to be a better, because it is a broader sphere, for testing, among the most varied influences, the full efficacy of the system of doctrine and polity with which Calvin transformed Geneva.

The great Reformation of the sixteenth century was "the salvation, because it was the restoration of Christianity."

For two hundred years this European revolution was growing in secrecy, with here and there an occasional throe, pre-announcing this great birth of time. It was a comprehensive political, social, popular, and intellectual, as well as a deep spiritual movement. Even Roman Catholic writers have ceased to depict it as a merely sudden explosion, and trace back its causes to the heart of the middle ages. The scholastic system, that combination of ecclesiastical traditions and Aristotelian logic, had failed to give a satisfactory theology. A new psychology supplanted the Aristotelian metaphysics; the inductive was added to the formal logic, making new premises in theological discussion. The Papacy, that real anti-Christian power, had become a persecuting and extortionate despotism. The motto of the Waldenses, "*Lux in tenebris*," proved prophetic. From the heart of Europe came up that solemn invocation, not unheeded:

Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints, whose bones
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold!

Ringing in many a silent hour were heard by the attentive ear the warning bells of those godly churches, which Rome had vainly tried to root out, even as it is said that sailors in the Caribbean seas still hear the lingering chime of the bells of a submerged island.

Our Lord issued forth, as with a new resurrection, from the sepulchre where they had laid him. With a deeper spiritual experience, the faithful came again directly to the Saviour. The "formal" principle, that the Scriptures are our only rule of faith and duty, and the "material" principle of justification by faith alone, were placed in the front of the battle against the novelties of the Papacy. To these two principles, says Hagenbach, the Reformers added the "social" principle, in new vigor, whereby they formed their churches on the basis of the universal priesthood of believers. The old faith and the old charity became new again. The Reformation, says Guizot, "recalled religion to the laity." Responsibility for belief was no longer left to the care of a priestly caste.

Though the Reformation, under God, began with Luther in the power of faith, it was carried on by Calvin with greater energy, and with a more constructive genius, both in theology and in church polity, as he also had a more open field. The Lutheran movement affected chiefly the centre, and the north of Europe; the Reformed Churches were planted in the west of Europe, all around the ocean, in the British isles, and by their very geographical site were prepared to act the most efficient part, and to leap the walls of the old world, and colonize our shores.

Nothing is more striking in a general view of the history of the Reformed Churches, than the variety of countries into which we find their characteristic spirit, both in doctrine and polity, penetrating. Throughout Switzerland it was a grand popular movement. There is first of all, Zwingli, the hero of Zurich, already in 1516 preaching against the idolatrous veneration of Mary, a man of generous culture and intrepid spirit, who at last laid down his life upon the field of battle. In Basle we find Oecolampadius, and also Bullinger, the chronicler of the Swiss reform. Farel arouses Geneva to iconoclasm by his inspiring eloquence. Thither comes in 1536, from the France which disowned him, Calvin, the mighty lawgiver, great as a preacher, an expositor, a teacher and a ruler; cold in exterior, but burning with internal fire; who produced at twenty-four years of age his unmatched Institutes, and at thirty-five had made Geneva, under an almost theocratic government, the model city of Europe, with its inspiring motto, "*post tenebras lux.*" He was feared and opposed by the libertines of his day, as he is in our own. His errors were those of his own times: his greatness is of all times. Hooker calls him "incomparably the wisest man of the French Church;" he compares him to the "Master of Sentences," and says, "that though thousands were debtors to him as touching divine knowledge, yet he was to none, only to God." Montesquien declares that "the Genevese should ever bless the day of his birth." Jewel terms him "a reverend Father, and worthy ornament of the Church of

God." "He that will not honor the memory of Calvin," says Mr. Baneroff, "knows but little of the origin of American liberty." Under his influence Geneva became the "fertile seed-plot" of reform for all Europe; with Zurich and Strasbourg, it was the refuge of the oppressed from the British Isles, and thus indoctrinated England and ourselves with its own spirit.

The same form of faith was planted in the German Palatinate, modified by the influence of Melancthon, receiving an admirable exposition in the Heidelberg Catechism, and the writings of Ursinus, and forming the German Reformed Church. Holland accepted the same system of faith with the spirit of martyrdom; against Charles and Philip, against Alba and the inquisition, it fought heroically, under the Prince of Orange, of imperishable fame. In contending for freedom in religion it imbibed the love of civil freedom; which it brought also to our shores; and though Guizot does not once name Holland in his History of European Civilization, we can never name it but with honor and gratitude; itself oppressed, it became the refuge of the oppressed. In England, God overruled the selfish policy of Henry VIII. to the furtherance of the Gospel; the persecution of Mary, 1553-8, sent forth the best of England's blood to Zurich and Geneva, there to imbibe more deeply the principles of the Reform, and to bring back the seeds of Puritanism, which germinated in spite of the High Court of Commission and the Acts of Uniformity of 1559 and subsequent years. The Universities were Calvinistic in their most vigorous period, when Bucer and Peter Martyr taught in them a pure faith. "The Reformation in England," says the Christian Remembrancer (1845), "ended by showing itself a decidedly Calvinistic movement." "The Reformation produced Calvinism; this was its immediate offspring, its genuine matter-of-fact expression." And need I speak of Scotland, where the towering form of John Knox, also taught in Geneva, stands out severe in doctrine and morals, in vivid contrast with the loveliness of the frail and passionate Mary? Her chivalry could

not stem the tide. Presbyterianism prevailed, never to lose its hold of the Scotch nation. Their "fervid genius" was well pleased with this strong theology. Tenacity like that of the Burghers, and of the Anti-Burghers, both New and Old Light, and the indomitable spirit of religious independence, go with them wherever they go. The Free Church battles in the nineteenth century for the principles of its sires. The Solemn League and Covenant reappear in our own land, transferred from religion to politics in the Mecklenburg Declaration.

The same spirit which elevated Switzerland, Holland and the British Isles, broke forth in the reforms of Spain and Italy, to be strangled in blood. In France we read its saddest tale in that dark night of St. Bartholomew, lighted by lurid fires, while not a star of heaven shone, for which Rome by order of Gregory XIII., sung its *Te Deum*, from whose baleful influence France has not yet recovered, and which could not be expiated even by the horrors of its revolution. That revolution was but the catastrophe of the drama, begun in the revocation of the edict of Nantes; "the feet of the avenging deity," says a Greek proverb, "are shod with wool." Those high-minded Huguenots, nobles and artisans, cast out from France, were scattered through Europe, and have added lustre to our own history. The names of the Prince Condé, and the Admiral Coligny, of Beza praying at Poissy, in the presence of the royalty and nobility of France, of Jurieu and Amyrant, of De Mornay, D'Aubigné, and Henri Estienne will be remembered as long as Christian chivalry and learning receive their meed of praise.* Something of their spirit

* A tardy justice is beginning to be rendered in France to the deeds and worth of the Huguenots. Other countries have hitherto appreciated them better than has their native land. M. Haag, "*La France Protestante*," Sayons, "*Études littéraires sur les écrivains français de la Réformation*," Coquerel, "*Histoire des églises du désert*," Lalanne's "*Memoirs of Agrippa D'Aubigné*," and especially Weiss, "*History of the Protestant Refugees*," in Mr. Herbert's version, with the researches of Mr. Charles Reid, are among the works which are contributing to elucidate the history of the French martyrs.

lingered long in France in Jansenism, adorned by Pascal's virtues.

These general historical statements make it apparent, that the principles of the Calvinistic churches were more widely diffused than those of the Lutherans, and among the most vigorous nations. Lutheranism was in the centre, but the Reformed Churches begirt the whole of Western Europe, to the English isle,

That precious stone, set in the silver sea
Which serves it in the office of a wall.

But that sea which was England's wall, became to these churches the highway for the propagation of the Gospel, opening a path for their feet. Lutheranism had its *ne plus ultra*; Calvinism its *plus ultra*. The former soon settled down at peace with princes; the latter was always in difficulty with the rulers of this world, ever contending and advancing. The one has been well termed the Church of the theologian, the other the Church of the people. Both were Presbyterian, as was all the Reformation, excepting the Anglican, but the Lutheran insisted more on territorial and consistorial, and the Calvinists more on Presbyterial and congregational rights. The former after Melancthon, had but one type of doctrine; the Reformed had greater diversities, with the same general features. The one retained the sacramental theory, the other subordinated it to electing grace. Montesquieu says, "that each believes itself to be most perfect, the Calvinists believe themselves most conformed to what Jesus had said, the Lutherans to what the apostles have done." The one dwelt chiefly on the sovereignty of God, the other on the wants of man. The Calvinists, says Schweizer, contended against the Paganism of Rome, and the Lutherans against its Judaism. The former has ever applied the standard of the Scriptures with more unsparing and exclusive rigor, to all society and all life; the latter, absorbed in science, pays less heed to the life. The one has led a more secluded life, the other has done stern battle on the open sea. Each has its reward.

Lutheranism has been speculative and stationary, Calvinism thoughtful and aggressive. Calvinism has its roots in a deeper practical necessity than Lutheranism, as it also has had a more penetrating and reforming power, working its way through many nations.

Three points characterize the Calvinistic movement, and give to it a special supremacy in modern church history: its theological system, its organizing power, and its practical efficiency in applying the Gospel to the whole of life.

The theological system received by the Reformed Churches was a revival of Augustinianism, without its unhealthy leaven of sacramental grace, and a return to the special form of scriptural truth, inculcated by Paul, in the Epistle to the Galatians, and in that to the Romans, "still," says one, "an epistle to the Romans of our times." It applied the formal principle, that the Scriptures are our only divine rule, with an unwonted energy. As the barons of England said to Henry III., that "the laws of England should not be changed," so said the Reformers of the laws of God. They viewed all as from, for and to God. They elevated the doctrines of grace on high. They bowed in deepest submission only to a sovereign will.

With the same solid and severe general cast of doctrine, in all the countries where these elect ones emerged into this new life, they combined a much greater variety in incident and detail, than the sister Lutheran churches. This has been, contrary, perhaps, to the general impression, a signal mark of the Calvinistic movement. It was most prolific in varied systems of theology, and in a rich symbolical literature. Such symbols are needed by the church, and will always be, for a threefold office: as a bond of union; as a testimony and confession; and as an instrument of teaching; not superseding but expounding the Word of God. Of such confessions, all the Reformed countries produced eminent examples, in fullness, and doctrinal consistency far in advance of the simple symbols of early times, and these still remain, the historical basis of our churches. While Rome bound itself hand and foot to mediæval corruptions at the Council of Trent; while

the Lutherans were consolidated by their Formula of Concord (1577); in all the other countries of Europe, the Calvinistic system was in substance confessed, by many a Swiss council, by the French, by the Germans at Heidelberg, by the Scotch, by the English in the XXXIX. Articles, by the Dutch at Dort, and last and best of all, in the Westminster Confession, made by the combined wisdom of England and Scotland, immediately received in New England, adopted by the Presbyterian churches of our land, and never superseded,—the ablest product of this symbolical movement, containing the best results of the controversies between Romanism and Protestantism, and among the Protestants themselves. It was composed with the greatest care, under direction of the Long Parliament, submitted to them 7th December, 1646, and sent back for “proof texts.” Goodwin, Lightfoot, Calamy, Selden and Evelyn, and the Scotch Henderson, Gillespie, Rutherford and Baillie, with much prayer and earnest study of the Scripture, made it what it is.

The general theological system of the Reformed Churches, first fully expounded in Calvin’s Institutes, carried to its most detailed exposition in Geneva by Beza and Turretin, moved on steadily between the two extremes of Autinomialism and Arminianism. It received a more historical and less scholastic character from the Dutch theology of the Covenants, through the labors of Cocceius and Witsius. From the too exclusive predominance of the idea of the “Covenants,” it has been redeemed in Scotland and especially in our own country, in subsequent discussions. It is a singular fact that the revival of Calvinistic theology under Edwards in our own land, was coeval with its decline on the continent of Europe; since the middle of the last century, no great Calvinistic works have been there produced until the most recent times. In Scotland, England and our own country, its fortunes have been different; the English race and language seem more favorable to its spirit. But everywhere it has been signalized by comprehensiveness and acuteness, with occasional excesses, indeed, in the revival of merely Jewish ideas and polity. It insisted in a special

manner upon the unity of the Old and New Testament dispensations. By its early and careful separation of natural and revealed theology it was probably saved from the rationalism of Germany; its manly thought kept it from degenerating into "pietism." The respective provinces of reason and revelation it has always carefully defined and guarded. It is rescued from scholasticism by its deference to the Word of God. Divine sovereignty and human freedom are its two poles, while midway between God and man stands the person of Christ, and his mediatorial work, applied not directly through sacraments but by the internal efficacy of the Holy Ghost.*

With these theological characteristics of the Reformed Churches, their polity harmonized; the one seems made for the other. This ecclesiastical polity is equally removed from Prelacy and Independency; from that prelacy which annuls the rights of the churches, and from that independency which in the part forgets the whole. Prelacy annuls and independency isolates, the single church; the Reformed Churches have ever striven to retain both the unity of the whole and the relative freedom of each congregation. The theory of prelacy resolves the essence of the visible church into the Episcopate; with the theory of independency there cannot be construed a united church, a proper church government for the whole body, any more than the theory of the rights of

* A competent history of the theology of the Reformed Churches is a desideratum in English literature. Joshua Wilson's "Historical Inquiry concerning the Principles, Opinions, etc., of the English Presbyterians," second edition, 1836, contains some valuable historical materials. In Germany, the discussions and writings of Schweizer, Ebrard and Schneckenburger have thrown new light upon the progress and influence of the Calvinistic system in Europe, and have made its elements of power more fully felt. Gass, in his "History of the Protestant Doctrinal Theology," Vol. I., published the last year, has done it more justice than previous Lutheran writers. Schweizer's "Glaubenslehre," and especially his "Protestantische Centraldogmen," Vol. I., though strictly necessarian, are composed with great ability and research. In Ebrard's "Christliche Dogmatik," the sections which narrate the history of the Reformed Theology are of much value and interest. But none of these works know anything about the Scotch and American systems.

man can give us the idea and functions of the State. A true theory of the church avoids both these extremes.

There is the invisible church, the true church, which according to all Protestant consent, is the communion of the faithful, in Christ with each other. There is also the visible church, a body of believers having the Word and Sacraments. As necessary to the well-being, though not to the being of each church, there are its officers, its presbyters and deacons; a church with its presbyters gives the unit of the system, which is constituted throughout on the representative idea. Such a constitution adopted by the Reformed bodies, was but a revival of the primitive practice; not an innovation, but a renovation. Cut off the superinduced hierarchy, and in all the church you would still have presbyters and presbyteries; such as Hilary and Jerome describe as the primitive condition. Comparatively independent presbyteries still lingered in the third century in Africa, as Cyprian testifies.

But besides these features of the Calvinistic polity, there was developed under its influence a remarkable self-organizing spirit, which it has carried with it wherever it has gone. In this it is strongly contrasted with the Lutheran system. It has a kind of social instinct. It made churches of covenanted believers, such as had not been known since the apostolic times. The general influence, too, of Calvinism has been, in the main, for union among Protestant bodies; it has been coöperative as well as aggressive. The ideas of confederacy and of federal union were ingrained through the "Covenants" into the leading Reformed Churches. By these it has controlled and shaped States as well as made Churches. The union of church and state in the old world has prevented the full effects of this Reformed influence from being felt; but our land has inherited and applied it in the fullest measure.

With such a theology and such a polity we might anticipate the third trait of the Reformed Churches, their aggressive and reforming influence. To apply the whole of Christianity to all the relations of life, and thus to regenerate society, is that portion of its work which has given it the most marked and

popular historical influence. It has transformed the theory of despots, "all for, and nothing by the people," into the maxim, "under God, all for, and all by the people." Under God, "*salus populi, suprema lex.*" Its theology and polity both adapt it to be a practical system. It would transform the Christian faith into the Christian life. Hence it insisted upon the purity of church membership, reviving the ancient discipline wherever the State would allow. It asks for Christian obedience to the great law of Christian love, which is the only universal solvent. It insists upon the rights of believers, and the headship of Christ, above all contravening human authority. It contended first for civil, for the sake of religious freedom. The whole Reformation was a battle for the rights of national Churches against the Supreme Pontiff; Calvinism, taking a step in advance, has also been ever contending for the rights of individual bodies of believers against the domineering claims even of a national church. This problem Europe is still trying to solve; this problem this country has left behind it in its onward march. Here was the soul of the Puritan movement of England. The Puritans cared as little as any men for the tippets and cape and vestments, which Elizabeth,—shall we say? with a kind of feminine instinct—and her bishops, with another kind of instinct, sought to impose upon them. But they did care for the rights of God's people, for these they contended, and won the battle, not so much for themselves as for us. And we venerate their manly independence! Had they been less stern, we had been less free! A saintly halo adorns their rugged lives! They have found the glory they sought not, and found it because they sought it not.

And in contending for religious, they purchased for England and ourselves the boon of civil freedom. Many, with superficial judgment, find an inconsistency in their unqualified devotion to the divine sovereignty, and their zealous assertion of human rights. But there is a logical as well as an historical connection; obedience to God made them fearless toward man; God's sovereignty decrees man's freedom. Kings are to do

the behests of the Almighty ; by them princes decree *justice*. Christ is the only Head of the Church ; and for Him his people are to live and die. Civil freedom is necessary for religious ; and religious precedes civil ; here as elsewhere, religion went before politics. Hence, the Puritan love of liberty long repressed, sometimes forgotten for a moment by themselves, but still a sacred fire in their very souls. The instinct of despots all over Europe was speedily arrayed against the Calvinists. Louis XIV. and Philip II. turned against them with fire and sword ; James I. averted his face from the Puritans. It was not a godless freedom for which they contended, it was liberty in law, first the law of God, and then the laws of man. A recent Roman Catholic defamer of the Calvinists in our country has said, "that they denied to all men, all natural rights, assuming all rights to have been forfeited by the fall," that they "contended for liberty only for the elect." But it is the principle of his own church, put into the mouth of those whom he traduces, in the face of the uniform historic testimony, that civil freedom here and in all Europe has ever followed in the wake of the Reformed Churches. History is the grand revealer of the real soul of any system.

The practical power of the system of the Reformed Churches is also seen in the energy with which they have pressed all moral reforms, so far as the state of society would admit. Their reforming influence extended not only to doctrine, but also to life ; not only to private life, but also to the purity of the church ; not alone to the purity of the church, but also to the whole well-being of society. The purging and aggressive part of modern church history, belongs peculiarly to them. Christ is present as of old in his church relieving the distresses and ministering to all the wants of men, breaking the bonds of the oppressed, raising the lower to the higher, sending the Gospel to the ends of the earth. The ethical side of Christianity, which Rome neglected, has been developed with most consistency by the same bodies, which in theology are so comprehensive, and in polity so efficient. And the triumph of the Gospel in time is completed, when and only when such reforms are

completed; to carry Christian faith and love into all the relations of life *is* the earthly triumph of the Gospel.

These three leading characteristics of the Reformed Churches of Europe admirably prepared them for the great work, which, under divine providence, was set before them in advancing the history of the Church of Christ. That work was not chiefly to be performed in Europe, but in our own land. Their theology, their polity, and their reforming spirit, were to be transported to a wider sphere, where, comparatively unimpeded by tradition, and custom, and prejudice, no longer "cribbed, cabined, and confined," they might have room and verge enough to work out anew and yet more widely the grand purposes of redeeming love. In all the countries of Europe these men were prepared, and from all the countries of Europe they came, in the appointed time, to colonize our shores. It is no accidental circumstance, in Providence, that it was precisely and chiefly from the Reformed Churches of Europe, that our temperate zone was peopled; and that the tone of thought and manner was given by them to our land in its infancy and prime. We received the winnowed wheat of Europe's fields. The men most deeply imbued with the spirit of Calvinism were our sires. The Puritans and the Huguenots were so far in advance of their own native countries, in theological, ecclesiastical, and consequently in political ideas, that they must needs be persecuted at home. And their persecutions drove them hither, to found a new and mighty republic. Cromwell could not give a commonwealth to England, but we received it. The Genevese polity could not reshape France, but it formed the Huguenots for us. The noble Robinson must leave Scrooby, and enjoy the hospitality of Holland, that he might train his pilgrims, Brewster, Bradford, and Carver, to take possession of New England. These men lived, not for themselves, but for us; not for us, but for God.

This is the real central point of view for understanding our own history. It was planted by a colonization such as has been never before known. It was not for politics chiefly, it was not for commerce, it was for the church of God to ad-

vance Christianity yet another stadium in its course, that our fathers came hither from all these nations. Christianity in its first era subdued unto itself the old Greek and Roman civilization, took the spoils of the ancient world, and got the basis for its theology through its prolonged discussion of the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and Divine Grace. The same Christianity in its second and mediæval era subdued the German world, and brought kings and nations in subjection to an ecclesiastico-political authority. But Christianity is not only a system of doctrine, is not only an ecclesiastical system, it is also a working system, given to redeem the earth. And hence in its last stadium, under the regenerated Anglo-Saxon race, it is to reform the whole life by the mighty power of divine truth and faith. The application of the whole of Christian theology, through and by the church, to the whole of society and life is the problem, which Calvinism grasped as never before, and to which this land was given, that it might work the problem out. Rome vainly tried to reduce the temporal to the spiritual, through an organized corporation, usurping the functions of Christ; we are working at the same task in a more spiritual method. Europe since the Reformation has also been vainly trying to apply Christianity to the whole of society, by the union of Church and State. We are engaged in the same work in a different way, abolishing this union, and working directly through the church upon society and individuals, and not through the state. This is our peculiarity; this is in the very genius of Calvinism; and thus is our church history connected with the whole plan of God. For this was our country reserved, and the elect ones of Europe sent here. Our country is the product of the Reformed Churches of all Europe.

How wonderful it seems, that in the course of divine Providence, this Western world, so long hidden, should have been unveiled and disclosed, at the very time that Europe was preparing for the Reformation: how much more wonderful, that its central portions should have remained still unsettled, for more than a century, waiting for the results of the con-

flicts of the Reformation, reserved to receive and develop the principles engendered in these strifes! For such a land, prophecy had longed! The vision of an El Dorado, of a new Atlantis, has cheered the wisest of our race. The vision was dissipated, the reality disclosed, when the New World was discovered. Some expositors find it foretold in the Scriptures, that speak of the land overshadowed by the eagle's wings. Lord Bacon reads in Seneca (*Medea*, act ii. v. 375 sq.) a prophecy of it, where he describes an age "in which the ocean shall dissolve the bonds of things and a great land appear, and there shall no more be an Ultima Thule." Erik the Red, from Iceland, visited its Vineland, now New England, five centuries ere Columbus came in his frail, adventurous bark, comforting himself, as Hakluyt says, "with the thought, that the land had a beginning where the sea had an ending." He, too, died not knowing all that he had found; but he took possession of it, in the name of the Catholic Church. And the Southern islands and coast, and the Northern limits and lakes of our country, the St. Lawrence, Canada, and Acadia, Penobscot, and the shores of lake Huron, the whole of the Mississippi Valley, up to the Falls of St. Anthony, and down to its mouth, were settled under Roman Catholic auspices. The adventurous Jesuits were sagacious and indefatigable in planting missions; even a Fénelon probably labored in New York to propagate the faith of Rome.

But not to Spain, nor to France, nor to the Papacy was our land to be given; they surrounded the country but neglected its centre. That was to be colonized under other auspices. Charles I. and Laud would have a hierarchy at home, and the Puritans came to New England. The Presbyterians of Scotland, dragooned by Claverhouse, were sent as bondsmen to our Middle States, and from their martyr seed sprang up armed men in our revolution. The Huguenots, expelled from France, made their first attempt, under Calvin's and Coligny's influence, to settle this country in Brazil in 1555; next in Florida, then in New England; and they infused something of their chivalric spirit from Maine to Georgia, ever honored

in the names of Legaré, Bowdoin, Boudinot, and Nash Le Grand. The pretensions of Anglican Episcopacy, too, nourished here the seeds of opposition to England: the Archbishop of Canterbury virtually claimed under England to be, what a Pope had called him "*Alterius orbis Papa*,"* and resistance to him became among all our Puritans, resistance to England. Through what wonderful and hidden causes runs the cause of Divine Providence. We were made great and free by the influences which would have destroyed our sires, had they not resisted, but yielded. What Providence meant in all these incidents is seen in the result. Thus does history extort from Providence its secrets and disclose them to man in his own progress in freedom and virtue.

The summary of the European history, since the Reformation, in its bearings on our own is then briefly this. The Reformation found in the Calvinistic movement its most decided and complete expression, in doctrine, in polity and in relation to life. The heart of the conflicts of the European States was in this Calvinistic struggle, consummated in Puritanism; this is the central point of view from which to read the European history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To those nations in which this movement attained its greatest strength, its most decided character, was committed by Divine Providence the office of colonizing and building up the States of our confederacy. The conflicts which Calvinism engendered in these nations had their issue in this emigration to our land. Their men of faith and zeal, those in whom the principles of this movement were most

* This title appears to have been first given to Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, as a compliment, by Pope Urban II. (1087-1099); thus Gervase, monk of Canterbury, writes, "Tantum ejus gratiam habuit, ut eum (Anselmum) alterius orbis papam vocaret (Urbanus Papa). Cf. Twysden, "Historical Vindication," p. 22. That the pretensions of the Anglican Church fostered the seeds of our Revolution appears from the "Minutes of the Convention of Delegates from the Synod of New York and New Jersey, and from the Association of Connecticut," from 1766 to 1775, published some years since at Hartford. A leading object of this Convention was to consult respecting the Anglican project of making Episcopacy predominant.

ripe, persecuted yet not east down, came from all these European States to found new States in a new world, and here to continue the succession and the progress of the history of Christ's kingdom, even to its ultimate triumphs. They came from England, Scotland, France, Holland, and the Palatinate, and settled in New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Carolinas and Georgia, unconsciously forming the elements of a new and mighty Christian nation. Northern and Western Europe was the nursery of the trees which God planted there to be transplanted here.

How apparently insignificant the incidents, and yet how varied and complicated, which have served to make us what we are. To ascribe great events to little causes is an art by which some historians elicit a cheap wonder, and seem to cast irony on the whole of history; as when it is said that only a cobweb kept Mohammed's pursuers from capturing him in his cave of refuge. But all great events are somewhere small in the details and analysis. The real wonder is, that out of such petty circumstances, the greatest results are worked out: and, because they are so slight, to weave them together into one plan demands a divine power and skill. It is not the blind goddess of chance who can make these grand combinations. Great events are those, and only those, which embosom great thoughts and principles. The play of every human passion may be a gossamer filament in the web or woof of human destiny. And men are great in history, not chiefly by the force of intellect, not by foresight of all the consequences of their acts, but by the depth of their moral convictions, and by the fact that even their insignificant deeds are part of a divine plan;

And in such indexes, although small pricks
To their subsequent volume, there is seen
The baby figure of the giant mass
Of things to come at large.

Thus has it been in a most conspicuous manner with the facts of our earlier, as illustrated by our subsequent history.

This is also strikingly apparent in the foundation and progress of the Presbyterian Churches of our country.

These Presbyterian Churches have retained the great general characteristics of the Reformed Churches of Europe as we have already sketched them ; but they have developed them in a peculiar way, with new combinations and under freer auspices. That they have been, or must be, conformed to any one type of European Calvinism, to the exclusion of others, is contrary to their history and spirit, and the whole circumstances of their origin. Each of our larger religious bodies has been made up by a fusion and compromise of elements, nearly, but, in very few cases, wholly the same. This is a great law of Providence in accomplishing great things ; it combines in a new form, for higher efficiency, already existing elements. Races sundered in the old world are here reunited ; they intermarry and forget their feuds. The sectarianism of Europe is the catholicity of America. The smallest bodies of the old world are the largest here. If all parties remained here, just as they are in Europe, we should have no America. The very separation of Church and State, into which Calvinism here grew by an internal, as well as external necessity, would of itself alone produce great changes. This separation was what all the great Reformers Calvin, Luther and Melancthon, desired, but were unable to effect in Europe. We have in consequence a greater multiplicity of sects ; but we have also less jarring of these sects, and a gradual growth of a more liberal Christian spirit, in spite of many sectarian diversions.

The dividing line of the Presbyterian, as of the whole ecclesiastical history of our country, must be taken with our political independence. All before this is preparation, the cradling and youth of our churches. What they truly were in spirit and polity has since become manifest. To attribute to our manhood, what were the errors and needful restrictions of youth, or the prejudices of our state of tutelage, is to do injustice to ourselves, to history and to divine Providence. The separation from the mother country was the stroke that

burst the shell, and showed what we really were. By that event, the divorce of Church and State was fully inaugurated in principle. The consummation of that divorce, and its incalculable influence upon the whole character of the Church, we are now experiencing. Christianity stands as it has never yet stood, upon its own vantage ground. We are proving that it is self-sustaining; that it needs not the secular arm to stay it up; that it works most efficiently as it works of and for itself.

In the period of our preparation, the most significant circumstance, as far as it affects Presbyterian history, is, that while the chief regions of our land, New England, New York and Pennsylvania, were settled by other religious bodies, and chiefly for religious ends, the Presbyterians came, and were at first dispersed through the different colonies, without any favor from any colonial government, but rather opposed, and that they grew and came together in spite of manifold discouragements. New England was colonized by the Puritans, and their church polity was fostered by the state; so that their civil and religious history is interwoven. But the Presbyterian Church history, from the beginning, is the history of a church, and not of a Church and State. In New York the Dutch and Episcopalians grew with the favor of the reigning powers. The Friends in Pennsylvania, the Roman Catholics in Maryland, the Episcopal Church in the Southern States were all cherished by the colonial governments. But the Presbyterians from England, Scotland, Ireland and France, came and were scattered, chiefly through the Middle States, and found none to help them. Their hardships made them stronger, wiser, and also more ready for the Revolution. They were as the sheep scattered among the mountains, until at Rehoboth the first congregation was assembled. Francis Makemie was laboring at Accomac, in 1690, though he had previously preached to any he could find in the dispersion. He was a man abundant in labors and devotion; of dauntless energy, whom the imprisonment and the fine of £83 7s. 6d. of the New York governor,

for his endeavors "to subvert the Queen's ecclesiastical supremacy" could not deter; and, in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, he preached comfort and strength to those whom the Scotch persecution, between 1660-1668, had brought hither. As the Presbyterian congregations were gradually formed, in the early part of the eighteenth century, they drew together men of different origin, but of kindred faith, Scotch, Irish, English, Welsh, French and also emigrants from New England. The first Church of Philadelphia was organized in 1701, under Jedediah Andrews, from New England, to whom Makemie bequeathed his "black camlet cloak." The churches at South Hampton, Long Island, and at Newark, and several in East Jersey had been already formed chiefly from the New England emigration. From the nature of the case, the individual churches were first formed, and became, as in apostolic times, the elements of the ecclesiastical system. The Presbytery of Philadelphia was organized in 1705; it was expanded into the Synod in 1717, consisting of twenty-nine ministers, about half of whom were from New England, and half of Scotch and Irish origin. The Covenanters and Seceders, following the stricter tradition, remained chiefly apart. By the Adopting Act of 1729, the Westminster Confession and Catechism were received, as they had already been in doctrine in New England for eighty-one years, "as being in all the essential and necessary articles, good form of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine," and it was enjoined that none should be admitted to the ministry who did not declare their "agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession." Scruples about articles not essential were to be waived.

From this point the churches rapidly advanced, and with the increase of emigration from Ireland and Scotland. This is not the time to discuss the influences of the Great Revival, which added so largely to the growth of the body, increasing the ministry from forty-five to one hundred, killing the theory of an unconverted ministry, and rooting out Antinomian

views; nor to dwell upon the labor of the Tenments; the Log College of Neshaminy; the founding of Princeton and other colleges; the old division between Philadelphia and New York, the schism of 1741, and the fortunate and Christian reunion and healing in 1758, by which the church was consolidated afresh, previous to the Revolution, and prepared for the formation of the General Assembly in 1789, beginning its new and riper history, with that of our Republic. With scarcely an exception, all the Presbyterians were republicans; their church polity was in harmony with republican principles.*

And since then the growth of the Presbyterian Church has been of an almost unexampled rapidity, keeping pace with the mighty progress of our whole land. It has stood upon the basis of the Westminster Confession. Into old forms it has infused a new life. It has proved itself able, in doctrine and polity, to meet the new demands, without sacrificing its real spirit. It has labored for the education of all, especially for the ministry. As much as any ecclesiastical body in the land, it has shown itself able to combine, in just proportions, the conservative and progressive, the old and the new. It has borne its faithful testimony in favor of all true reform, and against all sin. In Foreign and in Home missions, it has girded itself for the task laid upon it. As a whole, it has sought for union and Christian fellowship among the divided sects. Especially has it recognized its fellowship with New England, in its Plan of Union and in much of its theological spirit. The works of the elder Edwards, with the Assembly's Shorter Catechism, are a kind of spiritual bond between Presbyterians and Congregationalists. Conflicting elements and tendencies have also come from thence into our churches:

* The Mecklenburg Declaration of the Convention of North Carolina, framed on the pattern of the Solemn League and Covenant, was adopted in May, 1775. The Synod of New York were the first ecclesiastical body to counsel open resistance to England. Dr. Witherspoon well represented the whole body, when he said on the floor of Congress, "in the very nick of time;" "of property I have some, of reputation more; that reputation is staked, that property is pledged on the issue of this contest."

the problems which they raise, both in doctrine and in polity, have not yet been fully worked out. But this much at least the occasion not only allows, but demands, that we should say, that the Presbyterian Churches have no controversy, and no cause thereof, with the New England theology and the New England polity, when the former does not substitute a merely ethical system for that of the Westminster Confession, and when the latter does not degenerate into a mere ecclesiastical independency.

Of the various and complicated influences which led to the division of 1837, since which time both branches of the Presbyterian Church have nearly doubled in numbers, and of our present position and conflicts, the occasion forbids me to speak. Nor would I say a word which might serve to embitter an unhappy strife, or to rekindle the fires of an old jealousy. In a more comprehensive faith and a larger charity, may the children forget the separation of their sires. But this at least, I may express as my heartfelt conviction,—that in a body constituted as is ours, and in our land, no extremes of measures or of theory can find a permanent influence. Individuals may demand an unlicensed liberty; individual theorists may press some doctrine of human freedom in an absolute sense, and some theory of virtue, so as to seem to exclude the vital necessity of personal faith in Christ: some partial and local tendencies may deny all moral connection between the race and Adam, and resolve justification into pardon, and deny that Christ's merits are a strict and proper *moral* ground of our acceptance; some bold theorists may substitute an abstract ethical system for the truth as it is in Jesus; but such cannot be the character of the theology which our churches require, and it is alien to the whole spirit of the theology which all the Reformed Churches of Europe and our own land have confessed. Nor can it meet the demands of our country and of our times for a living system of divine truth; for such a system as may be the bread and water of eternal life for our land and for the whole earth. The truth is, we have outgrown some of our old discussions, and are

better able to appreciate them; and we are in the midst of movements and influences which demand that we rally anew on the old foundations, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone.

And this leads me to the concluding part of this discussion, and that is, the bearing of the system of faith and of the whole spirit of our churches, upon the great ends for which the Christian Church was established; upon the accomplishment of the divine purposes in the kingdom of Redemption; upon the problem of the final destiny of the human race. How does our land, how does our system stand in relation to this ultimate and all-absorbing question?

If I have given a correct representation of the character of the Reformed Churches, they have grasped the grand features of this historic problem with a more definite aim, and with a larger promise of success than any other portion of the Christian Church.

The solution of the problem of the world's history is to be found in the right answer to the question,—What is the final destiny of the human race? The answer to that question is to be found, and can be found, only in the Kingdom of God in Christ, which is the centre and sum of history. The end of that kingdom is, the redemption of the world through Christ, to the glory of God the Father. This end can only be attained, as the whole Christian system penetrates and is applied to the whole of human society and life. The real solution of the problem of all history is to be found at last in the practical sphere, the sphere of life. And as we have said and seen, the very idea of the system of the Reformed Churches centres and culminates in its practical efficiency. Here is the test and proof of its real greatness. And this land, cut off from the embarrassments, while reaping the full heritage of the past, was given to it, that it might work this problem out. The reform of the whole of society, by the religion of redemption, the transformation of society into the kingdom of Christ—this is our great work; and in this work are found the aim and sum of the whole history of the race, the solu-

tion of the chief historic problem. This point has never been raised anywhere as it is now in our land. To this, our theology, our polity, and our life, are tending. To make society Christian, to bring all around Christ and in subjection to Him, seems our highest destination, above all that mere ethics or civil power can effect.

And what a commanding geographical position has been given us for this work, as to no other people. Rome was only in the centre of the Mediterranean sea, we are in the same relative position to the two oceans, the middle way, between the ancient world of Asia, and the modern world of Europe. Our territory is nearly twice the extent of that of the Roman empire in its palmyest days. And what a stupendous theatre, commensurate it would seem with the grandeur of our lot! It needs but to come from the Atlantic to St. Louis to be oppressed with the boundless magnificence of our material basis and means. One day carries us, as on the wings of the wind, through the cities and villages and wheat fields of New York; the next we vex the waves of one of the noblest of our inland seas; the third transports us through the heart of majestic forests; the fourth we are swept along over prairies so vast as to bewilder the imagination vainly attempting to recall them, and so fertile, that they may give sustenance to a nation; and even then we have not yet come to the centre of our continent, we have only reached its central, living stream, the mighty Mississippi, with twenty thousand miles of navigable tributaries; and all along this course are those towns and cities, hardly less wonderful than the country in which they are planted, instinct with life, with all the appliances of civilization brought to the very fireside, and St. Louis at the end fitly crowning the whole; and all this unequalled magnificence of lake, forest, prairie and river is but the material substratum,—the noblest foundation of the highest civilization. And why was all this reserved, until now? What destiny is commensurate with such an opportunity? What wonderful purpose of divine Providence, hidden for ages, is

to be accomplished in the centre of this new world, which is also older in a large part of its geological structure than any other portion of our earth? What a solemn, yet inspiring, trust is committed to the people of our land!

But the working out of the great problem of human destiny demands not only a fitting theatre, but also, that upon that theatre should be concentrated and brought together the representatives of the leading races, and of all the leading moral, social and religious tendencies, out of which the end is to be elaborated. And these, too, we have, as never yet had another people. More tongues are spoken within our borders, than ever Rome compelled to subjection. More races are here congregated than ever met under the same equal government. The extremes of black and white; the Asiatics already swarming on our western coast; the native Indians; and also the Caucasian in its three leading varieties of German, Celt, and Anglo-Saxon; and in the midst of these the tone is given, the march is led, by that one of them which never yet has faltered a step in its onward course, which like wheat can migrate to all climes, and is not like rice confined to one, the only race of such tenacity and versatility that those belonging to it, after the age of thirty, can change their abode and whole professional sphere and be successful,—a race which combines the leading traits of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and is animated by the law and the faith that came from Judea. Why were these races so brought together as never elsewhere, in the long course of human history?

And here too are leading representatives of the greatest moral, social, political and especially religious tendencies, out of whose conflicts the final issue of human history is to be evolved. I speak not merely of the number of our sects, but of the great tendencies of our times. By the very character of our government, and especially by our separation of church and state, these tendencies are able to press forward to their ends, as nowhere else.

These tendencies may, perhaps, be classified as five: the

Humanitarian, comprising the democratic and social movements; the Scientific, striving to subjugate nature to the service of man; the Speculative, whose aim is to construct a rational account of man's relations and destiny; the Ritualistic, insisting more upon the external organization and rites; and the Evangelical, instinct with the spiritual life of the Christian system. All these tendencies are here earnest, alert, contesting, striving for the supremacy. Each has its men of thought, its men of fire, its conscious aim. Each at some points is opposed to all the others; each at some points is forming alliances with the others.

The battle seems likely to rage chiefly between three—the Humanitarian, the Ritualistic and the Evangelical, each of which has its complete theory, and puts itself as the acme of human destiny. The other two, the Scientific and the Speculative, must be subservient to one of the others; and there are significant signs of a combination of these, with the Humanitarian tendency, in opposition to both Ritualism and Evangelical Christianity, on the basis of pantheism. The great question for us is, to which of these three great powers, the Humanitarian, the Ritualistic or the Evangelical, is this land to be given; which of them offers the real, practical solution to the problem of human fate?

The Ritualistic tendency culminates in the Roman Catholic pretensions; the Humanitarian view makes the reorganization of society its great end. The former says, that the end of history is to bring all mankind under the dominion of an organized hierarchy, subject to the See of Rome; the other, that that end is to be found in the subjugation of nature to the service of man in a perfect social state. The one has its truth in the idea of a universal kingdom of Christ, and its falsehood in its ritualism and Anti-Christian Papacy. The other has its truth in the conception of a perfect social state, and its falsehood in the denial of Christ's church, and by some, even of immortality. The Evangelical view has the truth of each, without the falsehood of either. It would bring all to Christ and make his

kingdom to be the perfected social state for man here and hereafter.

Both of these other tendencies are alien to our predominant spirit as a people; both are chiefly fed from foreign sources, the one from the Celtic, the other from the Teutonic stock; is it not our destiny to receive and to transform them both by the infusion of an Evangelic Anglo-Saxon seed? The one is Anti-Protestant in nature, the other retains of Protestantism only its outer, human, political side. The former nullifies, the latter deifies, human reason and human rights. Each is opposed to the other; both are opposed to us; we are to oppose both that we may win both. The one is strong in its reliance on the past, the other courts the future; the one claims divine tradition, the other our human sympathies. Both insist on compact organizations; the one tends to a religious, the other to a social despotism, merging the rights of the individual. Philosophy is the idol of the humanitarian, the voice of Rome is the oracle of his opponent. Both claim infallibility, the one of reason, the other in the interpretation of tradition. Both have great mastery over different phases of the popular mind; both give full play to minds astute, energetic, politic and strenuous. The last word of the Roman Catholic is, the word Papacy, and it rallies its followers around the standard of Mary of the Immaculate Conception; the last word of the Humanitarian is the word Pantheism, and it summons its hosts under the banner of Socialism.

Is the end of human history, and of our own, to be found in either of these, or, in that reformed faith, given to our land in its earliest prime, and which has made us strong enough to receive and to contend with these hostile powers?

We would attempt no vain, we would rely upon no human prophecy. We single out no one branch of the Reformed family of churches as the inheritor of the spoils of all time. But this at least may be said, that in this land the true church has ampler means for diffusion than anywhere else, secured by that religious freedom which is our national instinct, the very apple of our eye; that here, too, all the material and social

influences which make the basis of the state, may also help on the progress of the Church ; and that here, as yet predominant in moral power, is that sublime system of faith, in which our land was baptized by the blood of our sires, and to which we pray that it may be given by the peaceful victories of our sons. It is a faith which is the soul of that divine Kingdom of Redemption, eternal in the counsels of God and ever present, since the fall, in the history of man. It is the oldest of traditions as well as the most living of inspirations. Not for tyranny, not for anarchy, not for the Papacy, not for pantheism, was our land planted and builded. But rather may we be animated by the grateful vision, that between these foreign powers and extremes, the people native to our shores, as also those with us of all other lands who imbibe our true spirit, gathering strength and unity from the spectacle both of the dangers and of the reward, shall advance in that magnificent career set before them, as never before another people pressing through the hosts by which they are on either hand assailed, and subduing them both unto itself, the one by the majesty of divine truth, and the other by the power of its human sympathies. Thus may we show, that there is that which is mightier than any hierarchy, that there is that which is more fitted to man's needs than any merely social organization. Thus may it be our lot to combine and reconcile in one kingdom all of divine authority and all of human needs. Thus may we prove, that the last and best word for the human race is not the name of any Pope, is not the ideal of any Pantheism, but is the name of Him, who is both God and man, our great High Priest and Saviour, to whom belong power and honor, dominion and might, and of whom it is recorded, in the sure word of that prophecy which never yet has failed, that unto Him every knee shall bow and every tongue confess that He is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

THE IDEA OF
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AS A SYSTEM.*

FRIENDS AND BRETHREN OF THE UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY:—It is now eighteen years since our Institution was established, to provide the means of a thorough theological training, with the special facilities which this great community present. Its founders called it the “Union” Seminary, “because,” as they said, “it was designed to commend itself to all men of moderate views and feelings, who desire to live free from party strife.” It stands upon the common ground of the larger Evangelical Churches of our country, the Westminster Confession of Faith, which has been here inculcated with a filial but not a blind devotion; not in the servility of the letter, but in the freedom of its real spirit. The Presbyterian polity has been taught, but never with a sectarian intent. Our beloved Seminary has proved itself to be wisely constituted; its sons are a brotherhood dispersed all over the earth; our churches regard it with increasing favor; and the Great Head of the church has given to us in unwonted measure that missionary spirit, which is a pledge of His real presence, since it fulfils His last command.

Five years ago you called me to the chair of Church History, and now you invest me with the functions of a teacher of Systematic Theology. Would that I might carry into this new position the spirit which animated my predecessors;

* Inaugural Address delivered on occasion of his induction into the chair of Systematic Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, Sabbath evening, May 6, 1855.

something of the keenness and faithfulness of the lamented Dr. White, as well as the various learning and true Christian liberality of him whom I immediately succeed.*

The two departments which I thus successively fill are truly kindred to each other. They should ever go hand in hand. The most diligent investigation of Christian History is one of the best incentives to the wisest study of Christian Theology. The plan of God is the substance of both; for all historic time is but a divine theodicy; God's providence is its law, God's glory is its end. Theology divorced from history runs out into bare abstractions; history separated from theology becomes naturalistic or humanitarian merely. The marriage of the two makes theology more real and history to be sacred. In God's Book they are fused; its theology glows with historic life; truth and fact, light and life are blended. God reveals himself in historic facts. All history and all theology meet in the person of the God-man, our Saviour. The life of history and the light of theology should ever go together, as an early Christian apologist said, "Life is not real without knowledge, nor is knowledge safe without life; they must be planted together like the trees of Paradise." †

Among the wisest and best of our own and other lands, there is a strong reaction from that extreme subjective and rationalistic tendency, which sneered at the history it was ignorant of, and never spoke of the ancient creeds and of the symbols of the Reformation but in disparagement. We are witnessing the resurrection of this sacred legacy; the venerable Augsburg Confession was readopted two years since, by as thoughtful a body as ever met in Germany. In the midst of our own contending factions, many are pondering the wiser formulas which avoid our abstract extremes. The old faith and the new philosophy, both, indeed, have their rights; the struggle of all times between the conservative and the progressive, will doubtless continue until the wealth of eternity

* The Rev. James P. Wilson, D.D., the eminent pastor of the South Park Church, Newark, N. J.—ED.

† Epistola ad Diognetum.

shall become the heritage of time. The real question is, whether the whole of the past can be so wrought into the life of the present, as to become the guarantee of the future. Bare external tradition is lifeless: the utterly new is formless; what we need is eternal and historic truth born fresh in the living soul. "Not fixedness nor revolution," says Ullmann, "but evolution and reform" is the motto for our times. Paul argued, that Christianity was older than the Judaism which it supplanted. The early Christian fathers contended, that Christianity is both old and new. If its truths are not unchangeable, then they are not of God: if they are not unfolded and applied only in successive stadia, they are not for man. The perfect transmutation of that truth which is ever old into that life which is ever new, is the problem of history and the triumph of Christianity.*

Thus is it also with Christian Theology. Its life must be from above, and its roots in the past, if it is to bear those leaves, which are for the healing of the nations. Every vital system has received its substance from the Scriptures, which are to us the source and test of divine truth; its historical connections have been with the received symbols; and the philosophical speculations of the times have given it shape. Scriptural divinity becomes historical, and historical theology becomes systematic. To combine and reconcile these three, the Word of God, historical divinity, and philosophical truth, is the great problem of scientific theology. It will find its

* The conflict between the conservative and progressive elements in Christian Theology, as in other sciences, runs back into the two positions; that all fundamental religious truth is eternal and immutable; and, that this eternal truth is revealed and appropriated, only by successive stages in the history of the world. Eternal verity enters into the processes of historic growth. The Scriptures contain that verity; the history of the church is its gradual appropriation by the human race. This is the view even of the old Christian apologists of the second and third centuries. Thus Arnobius says: "If the antiquity of authors be required, ours is that of God himself." And Eusebius, speaking of the accusation, that Christianity was a new religion, adds, "So much the greater marvel, that it has already subdued the earth." Compare other citations, in Bolton's "Evidences," a valuable collection of the arguments of the early apologists.

solution when the whole of Scripture shall be reproduced in the history of the church, and shaped by a wise philosophy, under the light of the central idea of God's own revelation. And a system thus constructed, will be adapted to the two great ends of scientific theology, the advancement of the science itself, and practical use in the service of the church and ministry.

So far as the limits of the hour allow, let me invite your thoughts to the subject which the occasion demands, and to which these remarks tend; that is, the Idea of Christian Theology as a System. It will be my object to attempt an exposition and vindication of the true conception of Systematic Theology, with its application to some existing controversies and speculations.

What is the radical idea of Christian Theology as a science? How is it distinguished from other departments of truth, natural, ethical, or metaphysical?

In answering this inquiry in the way of description, and not yet of stricter definition, it may be said, that Christian Theology is the exposition of the facts of a divine revelation. This is its special characteristic. It has to do with a real, extant economy, with objective realities, as much as the natural or social sciences. Its ultimate ground is above and beyond nature: but this supernatural has been made manifest in an historical and recorded revelation. The original ray of super-natural light has broken upon our earth, irradiating it with seven-fold forms of beauty, which are our blessing, and which we are to study, if we would know the nature of the light. The theologian is to be "deep in the books of God," as the naturalist in the book of nature; both are to divest themselves of fancy and to become interpreters; each studies a realm independent of him in its original, its facts, and its laws. The science of nature has advanced apace because its eminent explorers have studied that kingdom with an humble and reverential spirit; they have reported the visions and marvels which the telescope has descried in the sublimities of space, and the microscope unveiled in the most delicate structures.

And one of the reasons—is it not so? why theology has been less fruitful, is, that we study ethics and not divinity, our own wills, and not the will of God, and expect in psychology to find the kingdom of God. But the registry of God's wisdom is in his own revelation.

An unreal spiritualism makes man the measure of all things, and decries an historical and recorded revelation. It would evolve all truth out of man's unilluminated reason. But the idealism of Berkeley would be as adequate an organon for the study of nature, as such a subjective Christianity for the study of theology. The valid being of nature is presupposed by the naturalist; the historical reality of Christianity is at the basis of Christian theology. Neither nature nor Christianity "borrows leave to be" from human reason or from human wants.

There is, if we may use the phrase, a Christian realism, which is the life of theology. All things are made according to the pattern in the mount. All that is, according to the Calvinistic system, pre-existed in the divine mind in idea and purpose. All true knowledge is a participation in these ideas. All our theology has its ground in the imperishable facts and truths of the Christian economy, pre-existent in the divine mind, having an objective reality and validity, and revealed, not in words alone, but in deeds and in power, and by the Holy Ghost. To speak in the profound words ascribed to one of Britain's almost unknown poets,

" Words are men's daughters, but God's sons are things." *

The perpetual Providence of God the Father, the Incarnation and Redemption of Christ the Son, Regeneration and Sancti-

* This line is found in Dr. Madden's "Boulter's Monument," a poem, published in Dublin in 1745, revised by Dr. Johnson. Mr. Croker says, "Dr. Madden wrote very bad verses. The few lines in 'Boulter's Monument,' which rise above mediocrity may be attributed to Johnson." Mr. Jas. Crossley, in "Notes and Queries," vol. iii. p. 154, thinks this line must be from Johnson, and says, that it is in allusion to Genesis vi. 24. But the only allusion is in the two words, "sons" and "daughters;" the idea is quite different.

fiction by the Holy Ghost, the Church and its Sacraments - these are not mere abstract truths, they are truths of fact. the intellect can never learn them by definitions alone, the whole soul knows them through revelation and experience. Unless this be so, our theology is not the ally, but the victim of philosophy; it is but a rope of sand, though it look as strong as a cable and be as fine as the wire-drawn steel. The spirit of nominalism, resting in words and definitions, eats out the core of theology; appealing only to the intellect, it cannot maintain itself against either naturalism or pantheism, for with both of these, words are but symbols of realities. "The lip," says Shakespeare, "is parcel of the mind;" and in all valid theology, each doctrine is parcel of the objective, Christian system. You cannot cut off a twig from a tree, and bid it bud, and blossom, and rejoice. If we lose the inward sense of the reality of God's kingdom in Christ, as our basis, our theology is a mere system of intellectual philosophy, and poor at that; its divinity is all gone; regeneration is an act of human choice; the atonement becomes an expedient or a spectacle; justification is making just or pardon; union with Christ is first a figure and then a figment; the Church is a voluntary society, and not the body of Christ: and theology is on the high road to humanitarianism.

Even Plato might teach us better wisdom; for there ran among the Greeks, says Ficinus, a proverb, that he had three eyes; one for natural things, one for human, and the third for divine realities, which last was in his forehead, the others being under it. This spiritual vision is the first and last requisite of the Christian student, who would read the things of the Kingdom of God, which the natural man knoweth not, which are only spiritually discerned.

Such is the general basis of Christian theology: it is an exposition of the realities of a divine revelation. What are, now, the interior traits of the system itself, which give it the character of a real science?

Theology begins, when men begin to reflect upon religion: it is the science of religion; religion is the subject of which

theology is the science. Christian theology is the science of the Christian religion; to construct a system of Christian theology we must know the essential idea of the Christian religion. Three inquiries, then, here demand our consideration: What is religion? What is the Christian religion? What is the science of the Christian religion?

A well-nigh universal experience affirms that man is a religious being. Only a materialistic philosophy can ascribe religion to external influences alone or chiefly. Calvin says: "We put it beyond controversy, that there is in the human heart, by natural instinct, a sense of divinity, which cannot be destroyed." "Atheism," declares Nitzsch, "is the attempt not to be religious." Men are impelled to worship, as they are to society, more than they are to science, art, or culture. And all religion implies a sense of dependence on a higher power, and of obligation to its behests. Its etymology teaches us, that it binds the soul.* Plato calls it a "likeness to God, according to our measure." It includes in its true idea, both the vision and the love of deity. It demands the highest energy of all our powers of intellect, heart and will; and because the highest and combined exercise of all our powers is only in religion, we say that man was made to be religious. Union between the soul and God is, then, the essence of religion, communion of the soul with God is its expression. And here is the specific difference of religion from ethics, science, or art. Without the divine presence in the soul, real religion is as impossible as were flame without fuel.

Union and communion with deity must, then, be also included in the idea of the Christian religion. But to answer our second inquiry, What is the specific idea of Christianity? we need to know how it is distinguishable from all other modes of worship. What makes it the perfect religion for mankind.

This idea, now, cannot lawfully be taken from ethical or

* Lactantius Inst., ii., 10. Hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo et religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non, ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo.

intellectual philosophy, nor from anything outside of Christianity itself, annexed to it or imposed upon it. The scientific botanist classifies the plants only by their internal structure. This idea must give us some real principle, some *truth of fact*, involved in the very being of Christianity. It must, so to speak, be the soul of the body of divinity. It must enable us to define the inherent nature of Christianity by its ultimate ends, for thus only do we truly know any science or being. If the Christian system have such a principle, then we may have a science of Christian theology: if it have not, then systematic divinity must lack the strictest unity and method.

The salient aspect of Christian faith in Scripture and in history, is one and simple. It is the religion of Redemption. Its great end or object is to provide redemption for an apostate race, else exposed to remediless woes. It proposes to restore that union with God which was lost by the fall. There is the first Adam, the head of our ruin; and there is also the second Adam, the head of our redemption. That God is in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself—this is the keynote of the Christian dispensation, its luminous and life-giving message. All religion is the union between man and God: the Christian religion is a reunion, a reinstated fellowship, a redemption.

And this redemption centres in the person and work of Christ, the one mediator between God and man. In his mediation is, then, to be found the central principle of this divine economy. It may be called the Mediatorial principle, for mediation between a holy God and sinful man is the essence of his work: or it may be termed the Christological principle, as it represents to us the person of Christ, the God-man. In its fullest statement it includes both incarnation and redemption; for both as incarnate and as redeeming, Christ is our Mediator. In the fact of the incarnation of the Son of God for our Redemption, may be said to be the grand principle of the Christian faith, its centre of unity. He was made like unto us, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest, in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people.—Heb. ii. 17.

This principle gives us the specific idea of the Christian system as distinguished from other religions and from mere ethics. Here it is on its independent basis, as a rock, as a tower, as a refuge, as the city of our God. It gives us a fact and not a theory, a person and not an abstract doctrine. And it has for itself an unrivalled fulness and consent of testimony.

Heathenism bears witness to it; for, when "religion grew rank on pagan soil," * there glimmered through all its idolatries and sacrifices a strange, unearthly light, wandering in the fitful search for an Incarnate Saviour. Here, too, the Jewish faith has the substance of its ceremonial shadows, its anti-type; and, as has been finely said, "its spirit of prophecy expired with the Gospel on its tongue." The Scriptures have a wonderful unity, for all its books give us the one person of our Lord. Human history has no other centre of convergence and divergence than the cross on Calvary, and no other prophetic end than the kingdom of Immanuel; and thus is Christ the life of all history. The profoundest experience of the human soul utters itself in one song of divinest melody, where, in the words of a Father of the church, "there is music, not indeed according to the measure of Terpander, but in the eternal measure of a new harmony of the new name of God." † Philosophy in its highest exponents bows to the idea, when not to the fact of Redemption by an Incarnation; Hegel avows, that Christianity, in the doctrines of the Trinity and the union of the finite with the infinite, has the essential elements of speculation; and Schelling confesses, that "the Incarnation is the principle of all philosophy." All vital theological systems, as they are based in the Trinity, so do they centre in the mediation of Christ. Consciously or unconsciously they pursue that plan which makes the Trinity the foundation, each separate truth a column, each connecting truth an arch, and Christ the dome that crowns the whole.

* Schelling, cited in Neander's Church History, i., 176.

† Clement of Alexandria.

while the work of the Holy Spirit, like the ascending spire, leads us towards heaven. In the jarring creeds, the name of Jesus is the one celestial language amid the terrestrial dialects; it gives the universal tradition—*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est*. What religious principle, what idea has a parallel supremacy and authority! Thus does history confess, that there is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus.

The most accomplished of England's comparative anatomists, Professor Owen, has shown that the same type runs through all the gradations of structure in the animal kingdom, which are but modifications of one and the same fundamental form. He hence infers, that a divine mind must have planned the archetype. "Guided," he says, "by this archetypal light, nature has advanced with slow and steady steps amid the wreck of worlds, from the first embodiment of the vertebrate idea, under its old ichthyic vestment, until it became arrayed in the glorious garb of the human form." The analogy holds, with surpassing cogency and completeness, of the central idea of the Christian system and of its divine authority. The yearnings of Paganism, the struggles of history, the contests of the schools, are but immature and anticipatory efforts to realize that idea of Mediation through an Incarnation, which came to its perfect embodiment in the person of Christ. This is the archetypal idea by whose light alone we may read the spiritual history of our race. And it is as impossible that man could have invented this idea, the inner law and life of his history, as it is that each animal could have made his own structure and all animals their analogous structures. It is God's idea, for which the race was made.

Such is the mediatorial principle of the Christian system, its distinguishing characteristic, centering in Christ crucified for our sins, according to the Scripture. And having thus attempted to answer the two inquiries, as to the nature of religion, and of the Christian religion, we are led to our third question, What is the science of the Christian religion? What is the idea of Christian theology as a system? If we

are correct in the statements already made as to the nature of the Christian religion, then we must here say, that Christian theology is that exposition of the Christian faith, in which all its members are referred to the Mediatorial principle as their centre of unity and bond of cohesion.

Each distinct science has some supreme principle to which its subordinate classifications are referred : it becomes a science only when it has seized its central idea. The whole course of the history of theology may be regarded as a series of attempts to obtain such a principle, as an independent basis. It began with rude generalizations. The doctrines of the Bible were discussed in successive portions, coming out for fifteen hundred years, almost in the order of systematic theology ; the whole history of Christian doctrine is, so to speak, one consecutive body of divinity.* The simple creeds of the early church are perhaps to be referred back to the baptismal formula as their common origin ; in them history and doctrine are blended. Augustine, in his "City of God," attempts a more comprehensive view ; John of Damascus, in the eighth century, sums up in a rude compilation the theological movement of the Greek Church in his "Exposition." The "Master of Sentences" in the twelfth century, made a scientific digest of the Latin tradition, which became the basis of the scholastic systems, that reached their acme in the "Summa" of Aquinas, a work still unsurpassed in mere logical arrangement and distinctions, and fitly compared to a Gothic cathedral. The method followed in these systems was the logical, proceeding from the more general to the more concrete subjects, united with the topical, which states each doctrine in a distinct form, according to the tradition of the church.

* The order of these discussions, by which the contents of the Scriptures were reproduced in the living consciousness of the church, was, first the doctrines of the Trinity, and the Incarnation, giving the basis of theology ; then, the relations of human nature to divine grace, in the Pelagian controversy ; next the work of Christ, in Anselm's treatise ; then, the systematizing of the results in the scholastic systems ; while, in the Reformation century, the doctrines of justification by faith, and the doctrine respecting the nature of the church, fitly crowned and concluded the series.

Such was the legacy which the middle ages bequeathed to the Reformation in systematic theology. But the inductive soon began to complete and supplant the logical method. The Reformers went back to the original source of theology, in the Divine Word. Faith in Christ is the soul of Protestantism, and the person and work of Christ the real centre of its theology, which came to its fullest expression in the doctrine of justification by faith alone. It was, however, in the Dutch Reformed school that the traditional method was first thoroughly superseded by the theology of the covenants, which, though pressed to some unscriptural conclusions, marring the fulness of grace, did yet grasp the idea of systematic theology with a firmer hand, and applied one central notion, that of the *Covenants*, to all parts of divinity.* With the logical it combined the historical method, following the order of the divine dispensations, though in some of its extremes it subordinated both logic and history to the covenants. It put Calvinistic theology, as a system, far in advance of all others. And hence its influence, even upon politics and government, in the ideas of compact and federal union. The Westminster Confession felt its power, though it has also a freer method.

In reaction from a too exclusive theory of divine sovereignty, others begin their systems in the reverse order, with man rather than God, sometimes making God to be but an indefinite extension of man, and theology a mere adaptation to human wants. Schleiermacher makes the Christian consciousness the source of all theology. Some follow simply the order of a creed or catechism. Speculative minds, like Leydecker and Marlicenecke, find in the idea of the Trinity the basis of the arrangement, separating the persons in a too marked manner. Others, again, give us a mere ethical theory as the beginning and end of theology, which has led many to deny all system, excepting a convenient classification of proof texts, without any internal method.

* Compare Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, I., and Schweizer, I., "Central-Dogmen."

These cursory historical statements may serve to make it apparent that the course of Christian theology has been a constant search after an independent principle and basis; and, also, that no system can stand in a just relation to historical theology, unless it combine the logical and historical methods in subserviency to some one overmastering idea, which shall give unity to these methods and to the system itself. The logical order demands that we proceed from the general to the concrete; the historical, that we follow the course of the divine dispensations; the organic method combines these, with a reference of all parts of the system to its centre of unity.

The mediatorial principle of the Christian religion is this centre of unity: it enables us to combine the advantages of both the logical and historical methods with a stricter unity than either or both can give. For, to Christ, as Mediator, all parts of theology equally refer. He is both God and man, and also the Redeemer. The logical antecedents of his mediation are, therefore, the doctrine respecting God, the doctrine respecting Man, the Fall, and consequent need of Redemption, as also that Triune constitution of the Godhead, which alone, so far as we can conceive, makes Redemption by an Incarnation to be possible. Thus we have the first division of the theological system, the Antecedents of Redemption, which is also first in both the logical and historical order. Its second and central portion can only be found in the Person and Work of Christ, his one Person uniting humanity with divinity, in the integrity of both natures, adapting him to his one superhuman Work, as our prophet, priest, and king, making such satisfaction for sin, that God can be just and justify every one that believeth; and this second division of the system follows the first in both the logical and historical order, giving the peculiar office of the Second Person of the Godhead, the Purchase of Redemption, the Christology of theology. And in like manner the same mediatorial idea passes over into the third and last division of the system which treats, in proper logical and historical order.

of the application of the redemption that is in Christ, to the Individual, to the Church, and to the History and final Supremacy of the Kingdom of God both in time and eternity. Union with Christ through the Holy Spirit is here the dominant fact; his Union with the Individual, whence justification, regeneration, and sanctification, for our life is hid with Christ in God; his Union with the Church, which is his body, here, as Gerhard says, "like Christ subjected to the cross that it may in the future life with him be glorified." And this scheme of divine realities, and not of mere abstract doctrine, is ultimately to be referred to the counsel of Him, of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. It gives us the true end of God in creation, which can only be, in any profound philosophical, not to say theological aspect, the making the essential glory of the Trine God to be extant and manifest in space and time, in a system which subordinates happiness to holiness and man to God.

When we thus claim that the central idea of the Christian system, which binds its parts together in a living unity, is to be found only in Christ, we do not of course mean that this is a principle in the sense that the rest of the system is to be logically deduced from it, as when in mathematics from the definition of a circle all deductions about it are derived; nor yet, that in the order of time Christ precedes all; but simply, that the mediatorial principle is the centre of unity to the system, to speak with Nitzsch,* "its middle term." We mean that all parts of theology, as already indicated, can be best arranged by its light; all that goes before leads to it, all that comes after is its application. In redemption prepared, purchased, and applied, we have the whole of Christian theology.

* System der christlichen Lehre, § 56, s. 116. "Wir nennen daher die Einheit dieses Systems einen Mittelbegriff d. h. einen solchen, der zunächst auf gewisse *Voraussetzungen* führt ehe er eine Auseinandersetzung zulässt." The knowledge of the Trinity, he says, has its root in the knowledge of the Son of God, although Christ himself can be known only through the preliminary knowledge of God, "a relation always recognized, but never fully drawn out among Christian divines."

The mediatorial principle is the constitutive and regulative idea of the whole system. It is as flexure to the joints, as marrow to the bones, as life to an organism, as man's spirit to man's body, as God's spirit to the universe.

Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem.

It makes theology living. It is a principle which is also a fact, as really as the principle of life is also a fact in all organized beings. While strictly Scriptural, it also enables us to combine with itself the prevalent logical and historical methods in the science of theology, and it gives us the rationale, the real inner law, by which to explain these methods. Taken from Christianity itself, it expresses its inmost spirit. Under its influence theology is seen to be, not divine alone, not human alone, but both human and divine. It gives us God and man in its analysis; the God-man, in its synthesis, and man reunited to God in its application. Over all the doctrines of the Bible it casts a hallowed light, so that we see them in both their divine and human aspects. Vinet felicitously remarks, that "the Gospel has put into the mouth of God the saying, 'I am a man, and nothing human is foreign from me.'" Niedner, the most philosophical of the living German church historians, admirably declares* that the "redemptive system has the character of a divine humanity; for in it what is necessary has become possible, the highest has come nearest to us, the most universal becomes most personal; all in it is at the same time measured in both a divine and human way." †

* Studien u. Kritiken, 1853, 5, 854: applied to the individual and society.

† Dr. Julius Müller, in his admirable article, "*Dogmatik*," in the "*Real-Encyclopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*," after speaking of the contrast between what is historical and what is rational, that the former gives us only relative, while the latter aims at absolute truth, adds, that in the Christian system, centring in the redemption that comes through Christ, the God-man, we have both combined, and the antagonism between the historical and rational reconciled. It is, he says, in the essence of this perfect revelation, "that the conflict between that which reason seeks, viz.,

And the great conflicts of the church, as well as the living consent of its teachers and thinkers, testify to the supremacy to the Mediatorial principle of an Incarnation in order to Redemption. "Deus descendit ut assurgamus"—is both the battle-cry and the triumphal hymn of the sacramental host of God's elect. Christianity achieved its first great victory over the Greek and Roman Paganism, and subdued their civilization, by the fact of the doctrine of an Incarnate Saviour. By divine prescience, and, as it were, by an inward necessity, those truths of the Trinity and Incarnation, which rationalism discards, were first developed in the church, as the historic basis of its theology: and before them the heathen deities shrank back abashed, dazzled with excess of light. Then began what Buchanan called "the luxation of the joints of heathenism;" and since then, as our most eminent American historian has well said, "the idea of *God with us* dwelt and dwells, in every system of thought that can pretend to vitality." And so, too, the second great victory of the true church over the paganized Christianity of mediæval times, was achieved by calling forth the Son of God in his radiant glory from the sacraments in which Rome entombed him, and offering his living person to the faith of the believer. And in its third and present contest with a subtle and relentless pantheistic infidelity,—the real intellectual paganism,—that original sin of human reason, the whole Christian faith lives or dies, as ever of old, in all its other conflicts, with the doctrine of an Incarnate Redeemer; here is the only citadel not stormed, though oft beleaguered.

the absolute truth, and that which history gives, viz., relative truth, is abolished. Here we have individual historical facts restricted by space and time, and yet absolutely true, unconditionally valid, the measure of all other knowledge in the religious sphere." "Hence the scientific exhibition of the Christian doctrine can maintain its historical character without losing sight of its office of teaching what is absolutely valid and true in religion; for the Christian religion is itself historical fact, the absolute fact of history." This gives its striking and solitary peculiarity to the science of Christian religion as compared with other sciences.

The living and dying confessions of the heroes of our faith, its men of thought and men of fire—for the Christian heroes have been both, sealing their words with deeds—at test the mighty power of the doctrine of the cross. Origen and Athanasius, Augustine and Anselm, Pascal and Edwards,—

“The dead but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns,”

with an innumerable company, unite, as such men have united in nothing else, in confessing the matchless power that comes from our living Lord. From ancient, mediæval, and modern times their testimony crowds upon us. Irenæus of Lyons, the greatest name of ancient Gaul, declares that the Son of God was made man, and “recapitulated in himself the long exposition of humanity,” that he “might accustom men to see God, and that God might dwell in man.” Tertullian, that fiery and exuberant soul of Northern Africa, whence came the earliest Latin Christian literature, affirms, “that Christ assumed a human soul, to save man in himself, because man could not be saved except by him, and while in him.” Cyprian, the dauntless bishop of Carthage, asserts, “that what man is, Christ would be, so that man might be what Christ is.” Origen, the glory of Oriental literature, avows, “that there was in Christ an intimate union of humanity and divinity, so that humanity might become divine.” Athanasius the Great, the Father of orthodoxy, the victor for Christianity at Nicæa, affirms against the Greeks, as a “rational” truth, “that the Logos alone could restore to man the divine image,” and, yet more boldly, that “God was in man, that men might be made as God.” St. Austin, the prince of Latin teachers, and whose name was second only to that of Paul in the Reformation, also confesses, that “God became man, that men might be as God,” and he is so entranced with the vision of the glories of redemption, that in spite of the guilt of sin he could exclaim: “O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere redemp-

toem!"* Anselm, too, who leads the scholastics and is the ablest of the archbishops of Canterbury, in his treatise, *Cur Deus Homo*, evinced the "rational necessity of redemption by an incarnation, since neither man nor angel could effect the work." Luther, the hero of the spiritual conflicts of the sixteenth century, asks, in tender wonder: "Is not that a great thing, that God is man, that God gives himself to man and will be his, as a man gives himself to his wife and is hers," and tells us, that he "who receives Christ's manhood has also his godhead." John Calvin, a name still feared and disparaged by effeminate thinkers, whose posthumous influence has been even greater than was the measure of his earthly toils, proclaims, "that it was meet that the Son of God should become to us Immanuel, that we might have the firm belief that God is dwelling with us," and, that "Christ is the mirror in whom we may without deception contemplate our own election." And it is Lord Bacon, whose philosophy is better known than his more profound theology, who has left it on record, that God is so holy and pure, "that neither angel, man, nor world, could stand, or can stand one moment in his eye, without beholding the same in the face of a mediator;" "here," he adds, "is the true ladder fixed, whereby God might descend to his creatures, and his creatures might ascend to God." And, not here to make more than a passing allusion to our own Edwards and his history of Redemption, the whole recent evangelical Theology of Germany, all its great men who have fought its fiercest battle with our faith's subtlest foes, unite with one consent in the main position of Schleiermacher, that "the specific element of Christianity is found in a fellowship with God, conditioned by the redemption that comes through the God-man."

In farther vindication of this idea of Christian theology it

* Richard a Sancto Victore repeats this, as follows (See Dorner, *Christology*):

O certe necessarium Adæ peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!
O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem!

may be said, that our faith is seen to be the highest and best of systems, independent of philosophy, yet containing the wisest philosophy, when it is planted upon the rock, Jesus Christ. Both in theoretical completeness and practical efficiency, in its adaptation to all man's wants, the system which has Christ for its centre stands alone and unequalled. The theoretical problem of the highest system for human thought, and the practical problem of the most efficient system for human action, are solved by the Christian faith, when seen in its symmetry and felt in its power, as recapitulated in the person of the Son of God.

A complete system of truth must embrace both God and man, both time and eternity. It must have its ultimate grounds, beyond which our thoughts cannot reach; its ultimate ends, solving the problem of the final destiny of humanity; and it must contain in itself the powers, by which it can achieve the ends which it forecasts as needed and best. These tests of a real and final system of truth apply, we hold, to the Christian system, viewed as centring in the person and work of Christ, and to that alone.

It has its ultimate grounds, beyond which thought cannot penetrate. In the Divine being and agency; in the Trine subsistence and manifestation of the Godhead; in the intimate relations of nature and man to God, the creator and preserver of all: in the union of the infinite with the finite by that Incarnation, which is the groundwork of all revelation: in these, not to mention other truths, the Christian system has the firmest ontological foundation, where all human thought may rest in that mysterious awe, which is essential to religion and inseparable from our finite capacities.

It has also its ultimate ends, comprising the final destiny of all that is created. Its principles reach from the inmost centre to the outmost periphery of human thought, desire, and wants, embracing the eternity of our being. Imagination cannot penetrate beyond its eternal kingdom; no principle can supersede or surpass its universal love, which subordinates to itself all other moralities. All the rightful

interests of man, each in its several integrity, may be retained in this kingdom, if subordinated to its last end, the glory of God in redemption. And in that comprehensive end are comprised the wisdom and love of God the Father, the fulness of grace that is in Christ the Son, and those gifts of the Holy Ghost, which form a royal priesthood, a peculiar people, an eternal fellowship between God and man.

Nor is this all. For the same system is able not only to state, but to solve the great problems of human destiny, thus evincing its superiority to mere philosophy, and its inherent rationality. For the problems of the union of the finite with the infinite, of the reconciliation of a holy God with a sinful race, and of our personal and immortal destiny, which philosophy can only state, the Christian system solves. The full perception and conviction of this great fact about Christianity would end, and this alone can terminate, the unnatural war between philosophy and faith. For philosophy and faith are set at variance only by sin, and kept in discord only from not seeing Christ as he is! Philosophy and faith! both are from God; the one may desecrate the end, and the other gives us the means; the one states the problems, which the other solves; philosophy shows us the labyrinth, and Christ gives us the clue; the former recognizes the necessity of redemption, the latter gives us the redemption itself. The two at variance! When every Christian knows, what one has said, that "when we speak the language of the Bible, we speak our mother tongue;" at variance! only when philosophy goes "sounding on its dim and perilous way," averting the heart from Him who of God is made unto us wisdom, as well as, and because, righteousness and redemption; at variance! only as the light of the sun is at variance with the heat of the sun, or as the light and heat of the great ruler of the day are at variance with the lesser lights that rule the night: at variance! only as redemption is at variance with sin, eternity with time, the Incarnation with creation, and the God of grace with the God of justice! at variance! even, and only, as a true answer is at variance with a solemn question, as the solution of a

problem is at variance with the problem itself; since all that Christ proposes and does is to solve, in a practical, living method, the absorbing problem of the relation of man to God and of sin to redemption. For this end was he born, and for this cause came he into the world, that he might be the King of the eternal truth.

And the inherent superiority of the Christian system is also manifest in the fact, that it contains the efficient powers by which it can achieve the ends, which it declares to be best and needed. Theology, unlike philosophy, is a practical as well as a theoretical science; its object is to transform the Christian faith into the Christian life. How impotent is speculation, how mighty is faith, in doing the work which both know to be of vital necessity! Christianity fulfils its own prophecies; it proves its divine origin by superhuman victories. Every opposing religion, and every arrogant philosophy, it has overcome in its resistless march, and from them all, one after another, has been heard the expiring cry, wrested, it is said, from the apostate Julian: "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean!" It is more than realizing the vision of Cicero, in his "Laws," that the "whole world is to be esteemed one community of gods and men." * Through our earth it is diffusing the principle of justice, as it also here first made charity to be the greatest of the virtues. It has ennobled womanhood, sanctified childhood, spiritualized manhood, and opened to all the gates of endless life. It helps us to "strip off our fond and false identity," and "woos and clasps us to the eternal spheres." It has brought the kingdom of God to the very vision and heart of man. It touches our deepest and tenderest feelings, and makes us strong for conflict or submission. It awakens, that it may still the sense of guilt. It relieves our untold sorrows, and imparts those hidden joys no tongue can tell. Its inmost efficacy is seen in the formation of a holy mind, in the transformation of a sinner into a loving child of God, a marvel which

* De Leg., Bk. i., c. 7.

neither science knows, nor art can imitate. And in the race, as in the soul, it creates new and higher wants, and satisfies them. Its promises irradiate the future, as its beneficence has blessed the past. Human rights and human wants demand its triumphs. The world travails and sighs for redemption, so that perpetual war may issue in perpetual peace; that oppression and caste may be abolished; that labor may be guided by moral law and not by the soulless rule of supply and demand; that our politics may be patriotic and just; that the terrible inequalities of social life may be eradicated, the hungry fed, the naked clothed; that the physical may be for the moral, and the moral for the spiritual; that our humanity may be one brotherhood, in Christ our elder brother and our King. All this is pledged in the triumph of his kingdom, foreshadowed in the promise of its millennial glory. And though some expositors, adhering to the letter, put that glory in a merely sensual and Jewish form,—reminding us of Milton's sarcasm, that "what to the Jew is only Jewish is for the Christian Canaanitish," yet, that it is to be a kingdom in which Christ shall reign and redemption be completed, is ensured to us by the faithful pledge of Him who has promised, and is alone able to effect, that grandest of consummations, that brightest vision of the race,—the ushering in of that "sacred, high, eternal noon," in which the kingdoms of the world shall become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ.

We may crown and conclude our positions as to the theoretical and practical superiority of the system that centres in Christ, by the statement, that its practical efficacy is due to those very truths in which it is theoretically the most sublime. It has its power in the Trinity, Incarnation, the Atonement, Justification, and Regeneration. Its virtue is gone if you take from it the single idea of reunion with God through Christ; here is its simplest lesson contained in its grandest fact. Angels desire to know it, while children learn its power. That same system which is objective in the highest spiritual sense in its institution and authority, is also subjective in the

most intimate manner in its workings and application, and the truths whereby it is the one, are the instruments whereby it is the other. "God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him might not perish, but have eternal life:" here is the whole sublime and simple system, its source, its central truth, its power, its promise, its appeal and its felicity; it is all given us in this amazing fact which leads us more than any other to stand in awe before ourselves and God.

From this attempt at an exposition and vindication of the true nature of systematic theology, we pass to its application to our own times and controversies. Our limits, however, will allow us to refer only to the theological and not at all to the humanitarian or pantheistic tendencies of the day.

Those current dissensions, which unhappily divide our churches, have started from the Westminster Confession of Faith as their common historical source. This Confession is the ablest and ripest product of that Great Reformation, which was so fruitful in symbolic literature. The Calvinistic or Reformed portion of the Protestant Church had the most prolific spiritual progeny of this kind. While the same type of theology runs through the Swiss, German, Dutch, Scotch, and even the Anglican Reformed bodies, they also have a greater variety than the sister Lutheran churches. The Westminster Confession was the last of these larger Confessions, for that of Savoy in its doctrinal parts is almost verbally the same; it was produced in the most vigorous period of English theology, by as grave and discreet an assembly as was ever convened in Europe. No creed, excepting that of Trent, was composed with such deliberation; none of modern times has had so wide and deep an influence. In the New England and the Presbyterian Churches of our land, none has superseded it. Other influences have helped our prosperity; but at its basis has been the system of faith, popularly known as Calvinism, but which is higher and better than any name of man, and which has come down to us through a long line of elect ones,—Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles; Augustine,

whose symbol is a burning heart ; the profound Anselm, and the subtle Aquinas ; Luther, the hero, and Calvin, the constructive genius of the Reform ; Pascal, who, with Calvin, made the French language to speak divinity ; South, the keenest wit, and Leighton, the most spiritual thinker, of England's palmiest days ; Knox, the fiery herald, and Chalmers, the exuberant orator of Scotch divinity ; through Baxter and Bunyan, Owen and Howe, Edwards and Bellamy. It is a system which has always been the language of prayer when not of theology ; its essence is found in that invocation of Augustine, which first stirred the polemics of Pelagius : " Give, O Lord, what thou orderest, and order what thou wilt." It dwells fondly upon the high articles of the divine majesty ; its aim has ever been to

" — assert eternal providence,
And justify the ways of God to men."

In holy awe and love, it always says, by the grace of God I am what I am ; the only limit it puts upon the divine grace, is in the divine wisdom, not coercing the sinful will. It begins and ends with the adoration of one of old :—" Thou art the Lord of all Thou hast created ; with Thee stand the causes of all that is unstable ; with Thee abides the immutable origin of all that is mutable ; with thee lives the eternal reason of all that is irrational and temporal."*

This general system of belief, earnest chiefly for the truth, austere chiefly towards sin, zealous in revivals, missions, and reform, has shaped our thoughts and manners. In its essential features it is doubtless held by many, whose terms and definitions are at variance. Our prominent, diverging tendencies, are, perhaps, better classed as theological and ethical, rather than by the invidious contrast of orthodoxy and hetero-

* *Tu autem Domine, qui et semper vivis, et nihil moritur in te, quoniam ante primordia sæculorum, et ante omne, quod vel ante dici potest, Tu es, et Deus es, Dominusque omnium, quæ creasti ; at apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant cause ; et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines ; et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiternæ vivunt rationes.*—August. Conf. i. 6.

doxy. Polemical, and especially ecclesiastical zeal, has added fuel to the strife of words, dividing those who ought never to have been sundered. We see eye to eye, when we look into each other's hearts, and still that tongue, which an apostle calls an evil member. Quintilian might teach us, that "it should be esteemed among the virtues to be ignorant of some things." Socrates makes Alcibiades confess, that he is most dogmatic about what he half knows and is half ignorant of. We might be both wiser and better by following the inspired sayings: Be not many masters; and Charity is the bond of perfectness.

Our doctrinal disputes may be traced back to the influence of the so-called New England Theology, coming into the Presbyterian Churches with that time-honored interchange of ministers, which has so widely blessed and united our whole land. These discussions, on the surface, refer to the greater or less tenacity with which the "ipsissima verba" of the confession are insisted upon; but they have also a deeper ground.

In the Theology of the elder Edwards many find the seeds and summary of the strife. And he was a man, take him for all in all, we have not looked upon his like again; simple yet profound; subtle and comprehensive; humble yet ardent; of an intense spirituality and the keenest polemic sagacity. Had his general culture been equal to his spiritual insight, and his historic learning to his dialectic skill; had he speculated upon the objective facts as earnestly as upon the subjective aspects of the Christian faith; had he elaborated a whole system, instead of detached, yet vital portions; he would have bequeathed to us a more unrivalled fame. Yet still his wisdom is seen, not only in what he says, but in his failing to say some things. Sundry extreme positions are extracted from him by inference, not by testimony; it is what his expositors think he ought to have said, and not just what he did say. Thus fares it, for example, with the philosophemes, that all that is moral is in exercises; that the power to the contrary is the radical idea of freedom; and that virtue has ultimate

respect to happiness. Neither the divine efficiency, nor the human efficiency, into which the New England controversies afterwards degenerated, can be justified from Edwards, any more than from our Confession of Faith. His object in his polemic treatises is to vindicate the Calvinistic system, as scriptural and rational, against the Arminian philosophy; his object in all his works is to magnify that new and spiritual life, which he knew so fully from his own ripe experience.

His Theory of the Nature of Virtue has been stigmatized as a covert utilitarianism; but this is a grand misconception of an elevated speculation; it is utilitarian, neither as making virtue consist in a tendency to happiness, nor, as making virtue to have an ultimate respect to happiness. Benevolence, or love, with him has respect to all good, and ultimate respect to the highest good, that is, in his view, to holiness and not to happiness.* His departures from the letter of the Westminster Confession are an enlargement and not a violation of its spirit, in a more comprehensive view of the end of God in creation; a deeper analysis of the nature of virtue; a more careful discrimination between natural and moral ability and inability; and a vindication of the fact, that imputation is mediate instead of immediate, or, that what is real in the relation between Adam and his posterity, and between Christ and his people, is at the basis of what is legal.

* This is Bellamy's authentic interpretation: "The good of being in general, which is the object of benevolence, is not the partial, but the complete good of being in general, comprising all the good that being is capable of, by whatever name called—natural, moral, spiritual. It is the sum of all good." Bellamy on this point represents the views of Edwards more correctly than have many others. See Bellamy's Life, in the last edition of his Works. The position that benevolence, in the system of Edwards, has ultimate respect to happiness, is not borne out by any consistent interpretation of his treatise on the Nature of True Virtue, and it is wholly inconsistent with his positions in his kindred work, "The End of God in Creation." His theory is, that virtue consists essentially in benevolence or love; in love to all that is, according to its dignity and value; in an impartial love, which seeks all the good of all that is, with ultimate respect to the highest good, or holiness. This love takes two chief forms, the love of benevolence and the love of complacency.

His leading works may all be grouped around one idea: *man in his relation to divine grace*. The state of man without grace is set forth in his treatise on "Original Sin," the most scriptural and profound disquisition on that theme in the English tongue: of the relation of sovereignty to free agency in the bestowal of grace, he treats with unmatched logic in his work on the "Freedom of the Will;" into the soul, as possessed of grace, he gives a ripe insight in the essays upon the "Religious Affections," and the "Nature of True Virtue," in the former in its practical bearings and in the latter in its ultimate theory; and the results of grace in application to the whole system he sets forth, theologically in his grand treatise on the "End of God in Creation,"—which he makes to be the divine glory manifest in the divine works, and, under its historical aspects, in his "History of Redemption," in which all of God's works and ways, all theology and all history, are exhibited as centering in the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.

The immediate school of Edwards, whom Nassau Hall made its president, was soon divided, as is the case with the followers of most great men, into two parties, both faithful to him, where he enlarged the thought of theology, but both raising new questions. Bellamy annihilated the logic of the Antinomians; Smalley elaborated most carefully the distinction between natural ability and moral inability. Hopkins adds the epithet "disinterested" to benevolence, and once alludes to the possibility of resolving all that precedes choice into a divine constitution, though he does not teach the dogma of an uncorrupt human constitution. That sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and that a willingness to be damned is the best ground for the conviction that we never shall be, were consequences deduced from his theories. Emmons, in the spirit of Berkeley's nominalism, resolves the soul into a series of exercises, and of course holds that all sin consists in sinning; but he held as strongly that the direct divine efficiency is the source of all exercises; and many who plead his authority, adopt his exercises without their efficiency. Justi-

fication he consistently resolves into mere pardon. Next comes the notorious distinction into the men of Taste and the men of Exercise; the former resting upon the authority of the elder Edwards, Bellamy, Smalley, Burton, Dwight, and possibly Hopkins also; the latter, really derived from the younger Edwards, but resting in the abstractions of the logical Emmons. But this original and as yet unwritten theological movement found its extremes, chiefly in the consequences urged upon the two theories of divine efficiency and of disinterested benevolence.

These led of course to a violent reaction, bringing up the counter poles. The reaction from the theory of divine efficiency led to the theory of an ultimate human efficiency in all that can be termed moral; our choice, and that alone, it was said, constitutes morality in man. Disinterested benevolence stirred up the impulse of self-love, which was taken out of its proper place as a mere psychological fact and made to be the basis of an ethical theory, the main-spring of moral action. The soul was indeed reinstated in its native rights, as a real substance, but the exercise theory was retained as ultimate in ethics, and the direct divine efficiency banished to unknown recesses. The metaphysical paradox, that sin is the necessary means of the highest good, was supplanted by the theological paradox, that it may be that God could not prevent all sin in a moral system. On the general basis of the Scotch philosophy, a consistent theory was constructed, if we only allow the ultimate formula in ethics to be this—that the will always chooses happiness with plenary power to the contrary. It is an ethical and not a theological theory; God's agency as a moral governor is always external to choice. It is a theory of pure individualism, set over against a scheme of unqualified sovereignty.

That in both of these extreme tendencies there is a deviation from the wise tradition of Calvinistic theology, and also from the Fathers of New England theology, I need not stop to prove or argue. Neither on an abstract divine efficiency, nor on an equally abstract ethical theory, have our confes-

sions or systems been founded as their ultimate idea. And it is in its bearings upon the whole system of Christian theology as a *system* that I would speak of this ethical theory. In giving shape to Christian theology, and the final statements of Christian doctrine, especially in respect to nature and grace, are we to apply the test of such an ethical theory? Is ethics to say the last word, to give the final definition? This is the vital question at the heart of these discussions.

It is not to be doubted that all doctrines should be held and stated so as not to conflict with a true psychology and a valid ethics. Ethical truth has a relative value in the Christian scheme. But if intellectual and moral philosophy be the ultimate standard, are we not forced to the inference that in the controversy between philosophy and faith, philosophy or the intellectual form of truth is the final arbiter? Nor need we doubt that if we have a moral system, profound enough, like that of Edwards, to cover the methods and ends of God's real system, it would not matter much whether we called it a moral or a theological scheme. But the case is different when we assume some merely naturalistic system as the touchstone by which to try the Spirit of God. When, for example, God's whole government is vindicated by the fond fancy of a power to the contrary, so far as that is distinguishable from the power of choice, and which is never exercised, nor can be, without losing its identity; and when the whole of virtue is made so abstract, that nobody ever did or can experience it; when happiness is made its ultimate object, and that, too, a happiness which in its last analysis must be a form of self-love, and which, if it become, as self-love, the direct object of virtuous choice, would give us the very essence of sin; and when the whole anthropology and soteriology of the Christian system, and its theodicy too, are made to rest on such barren abstractions, we have come, I think, about to the end of ethics, and if we make it the beginning of theology we shall soon find its end in its beginning. Not in such lean abstractions was the hiding-place of the strength of the theology of the fathers of New England.

That was hid with Christ in God ; holiness and not happiness, God's will and not man's, was the soul of their system.

To illustrate the bearings of such a moral system upon the scheme of Christian truth, let us suppose it drawn out in more articulate statements, and conduct it to its inferences, holding only logic responsible for the same, and not meaning to apply either the principles or the deductions to any man or body of men, but only to systematic theology.

God, let it be said, governs all his moral creatures by and in a moral system ; Christianity is essentially such a system. A moral system is one administered by moral law. A moral law is a rule of action addressed by sanctions and motives to moral agents. A moral agent is one who chooses with plenary power to the opposite, which power is available even for holiness without grace. Choice of the general good or happiness is the whole of virtue, and merits eternal happiness. Choice of a less good is the whole of sin, and deserves eternal punishment. The whole of moral government is restricted and confined to such exercises of choice. Nothing else can have moral terms properly applied to it excepting such conscious choices.

Let us suppose, now, such a scheme applied as the ultimate standard to the Christian system, as contained in the Bible, in our experience, in our confessions. Let the express or implied understanding be, that the facts and truths of the Christian faith are to be modified so as to meet the requisitions of such an ethical theory.

The idea of the Christian system, as we have seen, is contained in the fact that it is the religion of Redemption, centering in the person and work of Christ. It supposes a race lost in sin, and for a general ruin it provides an equally general atonement made for us by Christ, and applied in our justification, regeneration, and sanctification, through the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit.

What part of this Christian system is ejected from the moral sphere by such an ethical theory ?

It of course excludes all original sin ; it was made to do

that. It is idle and fallacious to apply any terms, which have even a lingering shade of moral quality about them, to our native condition, since conscious choice alone makes morality: not even a "sinful" bias can be left. It also follows, that God's moral government, as such, has nothing to do with the race, but only with individuals. The theory also excludes the influences of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification from the sphere of morality in us, so far as these are not the objects of conscious choice; for it says, that choice of the highest good, and that alone, is holiness.* It also excludes all spontaneous affections and desires, so far as not absolutely under the will's origination and control. And hence it has been consistently said, that a man's will may be wholly for God, and all his affections tending to the world and self. The regeneration of infants is impossible, or else there are two kinds of regeneration, one of which is moral and the other not. Native depravity, as a moral state, is impossible, or else there are two kinds of depravity, one of which is moral and the other not. All the influence of the race upon or in us, all the influence of Divine Grace upon or in us, all the influence of our own natures and affections upon or in us, are absolutely excluded from our moral sphere, so far as these are not our choice, with full power to the contrary. And what have we left, but an abstract series of exercises, the very shadow of ourselves, as our moral realm? In the popular mind, what we do, and not what we are, becomes the standard of character. The fatal defect of the whole scheme is in defining what is moral, ultimately by its cause or desert, and not by its nature.†

* See Julius Müller's Address on Pelagianism, in the "Deutsche Zeitschrift," 1854.

† Such results as those which Müller urges in opposition to this theory, are inevitable, when the canon, which Edwards lays down so carefully, is disregarded, "that the virtue or vice of the dispositions and acts of the soul lies not in their cause, but in their nature." So soon as we make the ultimate test of our definitions to be the cause of the acts, that is, the will's choice, or the desert of the acts, and not their inherent nature, the above conclusions seem to be inevitable.

How, too, can the atonement and justification be brought under this ethical system? Can one being act for another, in such a sense, that his merits may be the moral ground of the other's justification? If he can, then the whole of moral government is not found in each one's individual choices, which seems to overthrow this whole system. Consistently with such a system, it would seem that we must say, that justification can only be on the ground of each man's own choice, as holy or as containing the germs of holiness; and does not this annul the doctrine of justification by faith? Even if we say that Christ satisfied public justice, the question still remains, does his work belong to a moral government, or not? If it does, then is there not more included in a moral government, than each man's individual choices? If it does not belong to a moral government, where does it belong? Is it physical, or is it to be resolved into mere sovereignty? Or are there, somehow, two kinds of moral government? Paul says, Christ was made under the law, that he might redeem them that are under the law: Pelagius says, "God makes us men and we make ourselves just."

When this same theory makes the atoning work of Christ to be a merely governmental scheme, it fails to answer the question: *How* does the atonement satisfy the ends of public justice? What are these ends, which it satisfies, and how does it satisfy these ends? If public justice be taken as equivalent to benevolence, and benevolence be defined as having ultimate respect to happiness, it is difficult to see, how a proper theory of the atonement can be constructed on this basis. All that remains is, to consider the atonement as a means of moral impression. But how can it produce even this moral impression, unless it be considered as satisfying the demands of the divine holiness?

The whole penalty of sin, from which Christ redeems us, it is claimed by this theory, is eternal death, meaning thereby solely the infliction of the full penalty of the law in a future life. There is then, of course, no instance of the infliction of

any proper punishment for sin in the present life.* God does not govern men here by any actual punishments. This appears to be more consistent with the theory of Combe's Constitution of Man than with the arguments in Butler's Analogy. How, too, on this system, can God be said to exercise a proper moral government over nations? Does not God, as a moral Governor, punish nations here?

On the assumption of the same theory, that man, without Divine Grace, has adequate power to make to himself a new heart, the old and careful distinctions between natural and moral ability and inability lose all their value, for in these it was always implied, that on account of our moral inability our natural ability was not available for holiness, without grace. To sunder the natural ability from the moral inability violates the whole aim of these distinctions. While to will is present with us, yet how to perform that which is good we find not, excepting by grace. Not to press the position, that perfectionism is the logical result of this theory, let us suppose, by way of test, that the assumed power, without grace, is actually exercised. Would it, could it, be a holy choice, without divine influence? Does not religion in its very essence imply a union of the divine with the human? Without the presence of God in the soul, all that we can choose is an idea of God or Christ, or some abstract general good; and is not this the very essence of a pantheistic religion? It is not enough here to say, with the pagans, "*non sine numine*," for every religious act must be from, through, and to God.

So far as this theory also makes happiness to be the ultimate object of virtuous choice, it suggests various questions. Is not its only consistent form the theory of self-love, since all happiness in the last result must be a subjective state?

* With a singular inconsistency, it is said, that Christ did not in any sense endure the penalty of the law, because he did not suffer remorse; and at the same time it is said, that the whole of the penalty is in the future life. Do not men suffer remorse here? Is it here not a penalty, and in the future world is it a penalty?

In this form does it not substitute a mere psychological for an ethical fact? Does the virtue of love to God consist in an ultimate choice either of His happiness or of our own? How does the atonement of Christ meet the demands of such a happiness theory? Did He satisfy public justice; and is that the sum of such subjective happiness? How can happiness be shown to be the only good? Are there not different kinds of happiness? What makes moral happiness to be best, and to be different from all other kinds? And when we have answered the last question, are we not beyond any mere happiness theory?

Such are some of the results which seem to follow when such an ethical system is made the measure and final test of the system of theology. All that is objective and vital in the Christian system is relegated from the moral sphere. Christianity is a sort of outside scheme and expedient, and not an experienced reality. From such ethical abstractions you cannot derive a single Christian truth. A system of theology constituted on this basis, is, at the beginning and end, a mere system of ethics. Instead of Christian truth we get metaphysical unreality, *stat nominis umbra*; we have a ghostly form without flesh or blood, in place of the radiant person of the Son of God. The vital power of the Incarnation and the Atonement is gone: for the theory leaves both outside of the strict moral sphere. The terms of specific Christian truth may be retained, but their soul is eaten out by a strange fire; they may be used in deference to the ear and to the "memory of the heart," but the intellect is warned against them. A parasitic naturalism is meanwhile feeding its own life with the grace which it supplants. Besides all that such ethics can give us, we must have the whole of Christianity too, if we would be Christians.

These results, we think, follow, when an ethical system usurps the supremacy in the construction of Christian theology. We do not mean to intimate that any evangelical men accept these consequences; only avowed rationalists can do this. Nor do we deny to ethics an appropriate place in the system of

theology and in preaching. Even the extreme ethical theories have helped to counteract some vicious ultraisms, to check some excesses, and to lop off some excrescences. They are counter to some extreme contraries. Antinomianism is rebutted by the position that holiness is necessary to real faith. "Unregenerate doings" have been supplanted by the Gospel call to immediate repentance. The antipodes to an arbitrary will of God is an equally arbitrary will of man. A metaphysical ability is set over against an equally metaphysical inability. Self-love has its claims against the demand that we should be willing to be cast off for ever. A supralapsarian theology reacts into the irrational dogma that sin is no part of the divine plan. From the abhorrent notion that infants are actually condemned to eternal death for Adam's sin, some have found relief by saying that infants are only animals. The one extreme, that God does all for himself, as self, calls up the other, that God's whole aim is the happiness of his creatures. None of these extremes can be held or preached. Such ethics and divinity counteract each other. The real power of our theology is not found in either, but rather in giving us a Gospel which can be preached; in its call to immediate repentance under the influences of the Holy Spirit; in its offer of eternal life in Christ to all on the ground of his atonement made for all; in its doctrine of grace rather than of ability; in its exaltation of the spiritual rather than of the natural; in its love and not self-love; and in its harmony with rather than in its deviations from the older confessions.*

* The true New England theology is not to be held responsible for such an ethical theory, as the ultimate theory in theology, or as the controlling theory in constructing the system of theology. Such a theory is abstracted, and not deduced, from the fathers of New England theology; it is really taken from a philosophy which runs counter to their real spirit, and is imposed upon them by an arbitrary logic. Through their speculations are to be traced two entirely distinct tendencies; the one, the highest-toned Calvinism in the matter of Divine Sovereignty; the other, the formulas of natural ethics. But it was the doctrine of Divine Sovereignty, and not mere ethical truth, which was at the basis of their systems and gave the tone to their preaching.

When such an ethical system comes out of its proper place, as a counteracting agency to an equally abstract theology, and usurps authority over the whole realm of Christian truth, we say it has mistaken its office and place. It can have something to say only in a narrow sphere of theology, the point where divine and human agency come together, with the application of the Christian system, taken for granted, to the heart and life. When it assumes more than this, we bring against it the whole objective force of the Christian revelation, and say, thus far, and no farther. Then, if we would not make Christ the bondsman of nature, we are obliged to say, that these ethical formulas are not our ultimate truths ; that they give us practical and not essential verity ; that its phrases are popular and not scientific, the language of the understanding and not of the reason, of the common ear and not of divine oracles, nor of scientific theology. The terms of our older creeds are sometimes spoken of in a patronizing way, and we are told that we may be allowed to use them, if we will be careful to explain them by the light of the advanced state of intellectual and moral philosophy in the nineteenth century. But it is at least doubtful whether, in such phrases as original sin, justification by faith, and union with Christ, there is not more of the solid simplicity of both theology and philosophy, than in the position, that we must choose the highest happiness of the universe as our supreme good, with full power to the contrary. Such ethics, as compared even with the Apostles' Creed, is an essentially superficial affair, made on the basis of philosophy which abjures metaphysics, and finds all truth in common sense.

Nor can such an ethical system satisfy man's profoundest wants, or solve the real problems of his destiny. It answers the high questions of our fate to the ear and not to the heart. It is mute before our deepest experience, of conscious guilt for our radical sinfulness, and of joyful freedom in a holiness which our wills did not and could not originate. It makes morality and religion a surface matter ; not what we are, but what we do, becomes the standard. In the Bible, if seen at all, it is only as flitting on the surface of here and

there some solitary texts. In historical theology it is not at home excepting with Arius, Pelagius, and the Arminians; and in the Christian symbols, from Nice to Westminster, it is found only as a contingency. And in the conflicts of Christianity with its present subtle forces, if we plant our theology on such a basis, we cannot withstand the pressure of the pantheistic idealism on the one extreme, or of solid materialism on the other, or of the historical tradition in which the Papacy claims its power. For such an ethical system does not meet the speculative demand, which pantheism tries to satisfy; nor has it a body of facts to oppose to the material realities; and it is wholly cut off from the line of Christian development which Rome vainly pretends to be its own. It does not give us that objective, historical basis, nor that mysterious depth and awe, nor those physical relations of both sin and redemption, which are essential to the permanency and authority of the Christian system. Here are conflicts and questions our fathers dreamed not of; what might have satisfied their exigencies, taking as they did the whole of objective Christianity for granted, cannot meet the necessities of our contests with the combined forces of spiritualism, materialism, and traditionalism.

In assigning this position to ethics in its relations to Christian theology we are borne out, not only by the growing convictions of sober thinkers among ourselves, but also by the verdict and methods of the whole evangelical school of the recent German theology. They have grappled with the questions just beginning to agitate us. Whatever their other differences, they have all renounced the position that ethics can lawfully give shape to the truths of Christianity. Schleiermacher, Neander, Müller, Tholuck, Dorner and the authors of recent treatises in doctrinal theology, Twisten, Ebrard, Thomasius, Martensen, Liebner, and Hoffmann, make Christ and his redemption the centre of the system, as contrasted with any ethical scheme.

And here is the true point of contrast and comparisons between a system of theology which finds its constructive

principles in ethics, and one which finds these principles in Christ. It is in what we have endeavored to vindicate as the true idea of a system of theology. By scripture, by history, by all the symbols of our faith, by all the avowals of spiritual experience, the Christian system is proved to be more than, and distinct from, any mere scheme of moral government. It can subordinate ethics to itself, but it cannot subordinate itself to ethics without self-annihilation. It is theological and not ethical, in its inmost nature. It is a system of divine realities, having an objective validity as well as a subjective influence. All in it is from, for, and to God; the triune deity is at its foundation, manifested and revealed in the whole of history, and centering in the Incarnation. Resting on this basis, the Christian system views the human race, not as a mere collection of separate units, but as existing in two prime relations, that to the first, and that to the second Adam. The whole Christian doctrine of sin runs back to our union with the first Adam in the fall; the whole Christian doctrine of redemption runs back to our relation to the second Adam, which is the Lord from heaven, in his Incarnation and Atonement. And these relations are spiritual and moral, and not merely physical; they are thus set forth in the fifth chapter of Paul's epistle to the Romans, which contains the final revealed facts on both these points, and the heart of the difference between Christianity and ethics. A moral system gives us, at the utmost, man as he might be *in puris naturalibus*; the Christian system starts with man in his real position, lost and needing redemption. The former runs back only to our acts of choice; the Gospel rests in our union with Christ: the freedom of the one is the bare power of choice, the freedom of the other is in a glad submission to Jesus. The one knows only pardon for sin, the other reunites us to Christ, by real, yet mystical bonds, and thus justifies as well as pardons: the righteousness of the former is constituted by our wills, the righteousness of the latter is of God through faith in Christ alone. The one vindicates God's government on naturalistic grounds, the

other by means of God's own plan. The Gospel rests in facts and submits to mysteries, "ungrasped by minds create;" ethics would make all clear to the understanding by a logical definition. The working power of ethics is in the sense of duty; the weight of the Gospel is in its supernatural truths, in the sense of sin, in the love of God, in the love of Jesus.

"Talk they of morals! Oh! thou bleeding Love,
The maker of new morals to mankind;
The grand morality is love to Thee."

The one makes the good of the creature to be the end of the system, the other the glory of God made extant and supreme, that God may be all in all. The one is a psychology; the other is a Christology.

You have called me, Fathers and Brethren of the Board of Directors of this Seminary, to the responsible post of a teacher of Christian theology, at a time when there are increasing divisions within the Church, both ecclesiastical and doctrinal, and when the powers of superstition and unbelief are assailing our common Evangelical Christianity. To allay its internal contests, and to oppose its inveterate foes, the Church needs to come nearer to Christ. As He is the restorer of our peace, so should He be the restorer of our science and theology. I have spoken my mind frankly on some of the great topics which agitate and divide us. I have spoken with the deepest conviction as to what is our vital need. I may have crossed some prejudices, and have pleased no extreme and no partisan; but I have spoken only against a system, and not against parties or men. To mediate between our extremes is our vital need, and such mediation can only be found in Christ, and not in an ethical system. As the central idea of the whole Christian system is in mediation, so should this be the spirit of our theology, the spirit of our lives. There is a higher unity, which is not the indefinite middle between the two extremes. There is a golden mean, where discord is lost in concord. The pendulum, as it

oscillates from end to end, ever passes over its centre, while it moves the hands of time. There is a common orthodoxy, as well as these embittered antagonisms. Whatever partisans may say, we are not forced to be either Antinomians or Arminians: we are not left to the alternative of blind fate or irrational contingency; we are not shut up to a divine efficiency which makes God the author of sin, or to a human efficiency which makes man the author of holiness; to an imputation of Adam's sin without personal participation, or to a denial of all moral connection between the race and its head; to saying, that all sin is sinning, or that all sin is in its essence a passive state; to the dilemma, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, or that God could not prevent it in a moral system; to a theory of the atonement which makes it either a spectacle or a bargain, a mere means of moral impression or the literal infliction of the strictest distributive justice; to a wholly external or a merely internal justification; to a redemption without regeneration, or a regeneration without justification; to the alternative of a theory of virtue which makes happiness its end, or to a theory which makes it consist in a merely abstract rectitude; to a Trinity without unity, or a unity without the Trinity; to an exclusively immanent or a merely manifested Trinity. Nor yet, in fine, are we left only the choice between a theology of the covenants and a bare moral system. These extremes annul each other, and prepare the way for Christ. Between them He is, as it were, crucified afresh, as of old between the two malefactors; it is in Him, and not in them, that the Church is to trust; it is in Him, and not in them, that the life of the soul and the light of theology are to be found. Both the divine and human elements of theology centre and are harmonized in the person and work of the God-man. He is the only mediator: He is the only reconciler. For every soul that trusts in Him he solves the whole problem of sin and of redemption; in every living heart he is doing every day and hour, what our theology has been seeking after, wandering, alas! so far from Him. The organon of Christianity, of

theology, of history, of the universe, is to be found in Him, if found at all. And when our science returns to Him, when it comes and rests in the Divine word, the Divine Reason, the Divine Reconciler, then we shall have a complete philosophy, and a complete theology, and they shall both be one. For, as Lord Bacon has said, in the very spirit of the wisest induction, all things "in time and eternity have respect to the Mediator, which is the great mystery and perfect centre of all God's ways, and to which all his other works and wonders do but serve and refer." And, as a higher inspiration has declared, He is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last; His goings forth have been ever of old; it pleased the Father that in Him should all fulness dwell; and in Him all things are to be made new, a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.

And when the system of Christian theology shall be seen by the eye of science, as well as by the eye of faith, to be rooted and grounded in Him, then shall it be redeemed from neglect, and elevated again to its true position, as the queen of the sciences, their sacred port. Every base thing of human passion, and every high imagination of unsanctified reason, has raised its front against the holy majesty of divine truth. She has been dishonored, defamed, yea, despised. Every crude science has entered the lists against her. The records of the solid rocks of earth, and the registry of the hosts of heaven, have been invoked to bear witness against her reverend rights. Literature, science, and art oft think themselves not "poor enough" to pay their homage unto her, who, as Queen of the Sciences, once sat in the seat of princes, and gave laws to the state, and wisdom to philosophy, and ruled the wisest of our race in their inmost thoughts and being! Now, like her Divine Master, she seems to have descended for a time from her regal state, and laid aside her robes of majesty, while the long pomp of worldly principalities and powers is passing by, regardless of her venerable honor. Yet, with proud humility, never can she forget or disown her celestial origin and rights, but still, with the voice of

eternal love and wisdom, calls ever as of old in the name of Christ : Come, learn of me ; I am the way and the truth and the life ; come, ye weary, and I will give you rest ; come, ye lost, and I will give to you salvation ; come, ye discordant sciences, and I will teach you a celestial concord ; come, all dispersed by the confusion of mortal tongues, and learn the imperishable language of the immortals. For this I left my native sphere, and chose thy earth my place of exile, for thy good, that I might give to science its last principles, to art its highest themes, to literature its divinity, to man his God, to the race its redemption, that thus through Christ all things might be reconciled unto God, whether they be things on earth or things in heaven.

THE NEW LATITUDINARIANS OF ENGLAND.*

CHRISTIANITY and philosophy, faith and reason, have been in a constant process of conflict and of attempted adjustments. In this contest, the aim of philosophy as opposed to Christianity has always been to show, that the alleged Christian facts and verities are not final or real; that they are only partial and imperfect statements of more universal truths which reason is to substitute for them. The victory of reason would then, of course, banish Christianity into the realm of the mythical or the imaginary. The aim of Christianity, on the other hand, has been to defend the revealed faith, as containing the best, the final, and the necessary system for the human race. And the victory of Christianity would not annul, but only rectify human reason; it would, in fact, consist in showing that reason itself demands such a specific revelation to solve the ultimate problems of human nature and destiny. Thus far in this warfare, the Christian faith has been the stable as well as progressive party, while infidelity has been always changing its front, and prophesying some future victory. But the weight of historic reality and historic progress has remained with the Christian Church, which has never even remained in its old entrenchments, but

* From the *American Theological Review*, for April, 1861. Recent Inquiries in Theology, by *Eminent English Churchmen; being* "Essays and Reviews." Second American, from the second London edition. With an Appendix. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. Frederick H. Hedge, D.D. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1861. Pp. xiv. 498. *The Westminster Review*, No. CXLVI. Oct., 1860. Art. 1, *Neo-Christianity*.

has been always planting its standards in the camps of its foes.

Each of these two contesting parties claims of course, when consistent, to have a final and universal system of truth. But this system has been, in each successive age, a different one with the opponents of Christianity, while the Christian system has always stood firm upon certain simple and well-defined positions. Every new system of philosophy, metaphysical, moral, or physical, represents a new stadium in the progress of human thought, in the knowledge which man has of himself or of the natural world ; and each successive system, when thoroughgoing, has claimed to be ultimate, and has baptized itself with the name of human reason. In order to make good its assumptions, it must of course enter into conflict with that one religious system, which has the historic prestige and position, and which also claims universality ; and the character of this philosophic assault has varied with the postulates of each philosophic system. But the nature of the Christian defence has been unvarying on all the main points on which it rests and must rest, as the one divine system of redemption. Though the doctrines and polity of the Church, internally, have been subject to change of form and re-statement, to meet heresies, schisms, and objections, yet, as against infidelity, the attitude of Christianity has been uniform, simple, and unchanging. It has always claimed to be a specific, divine revelation, supernatural in its origin, announced in prophecy, attested by miracles, recorded in inspired Scriptures, centering in the person and work of the God-man, and having for its object the redemption of the world from sin. It presupposes a personal God, and anticipates a future state of reward and punishment. On these positions it has always stood : here it has been exclusive—exclusive, just because it is a final and universal system. As soon as it abandons these cardinal positions, it abandons its claim to supremacy and ultimate authority, and is resolved into some more general movement, into some philosophic generalization. Its revelation is specific, and not to be resolved into general reason ; its Book is in-

spired, and no other book is thus divinely inspired ; its prophecies are out of the category of historic conjectures or morbid clairvoyance ; its miracles are above and beyond the course of nature ; its Redeemer has, as the God-man, a specific and unmatched dignity, and there is no other such union of divinity and humanity ; and his is the *only* name given under heaven amongst men, whereby we must be saved. The Christian faith claims, and has always claimed, that there are limits here which cannot be passed, without passing outside of the sunlight into a penumbra or the shades ; that the mere abstract and generalizing notions which philosophy would substitute for these realities, are ghostly shapes, without essential vitality or reality. They lack the signature of life : there is no divine breath within them. They are the masquerades of imagination, and not the living forms of real truth.

The constant aim of infidelity, on the other hand, its tenacious purpose in the midst of all the changes of philosophic systems and methods, has been, and must be, to bring down the Christian faith from this position of supremacy and universality ; to show that on these points the Christian system has no specific and unrivalled eminence. We speak of infidelity here of course in its higher forms and aspirations ; of an infidelity which is not content with incidental and fragmentary criticisms and objections, but which really grapples with the subject in its larger relations ; of an infidelity which tries to answer the question, What is the highest, truest, and final system for man ? The aim of such infidelity has ever been to eliminate from all the specific Christian truths their fixed import ; to resolve the facts of revelation, inspiration, prophecy, miracle, redemption, incarnation, and regeneration, into some more general and abstract notions. A philosophic unbeliever resolves revelation into intuition, miracles into the course of nature *plus* myths, inspiration into genius, prophecy into sagacious historic conjectures, redemption into the victory of mind over matter, the incarnation into an ideal union of humanity with divinity realized in no one person, the Trinity into a world-process, and immortal life into the perpetuity of spirit

bereft of personal subsistence. He takes the wondrous volume in which all these truths and facts are embodied and embalmed, and which on that very account is the unique wonder and the very marvel of all literature, and demands that it shall be interpreted just like any other book, not merely in its words but in its inmost sense ; that its histories, its prophecies, its miracles, its sacred truths, shall be subjected to the standard by which we try the words and explain the sense of Herodotus and Plato, of Virgil and Tacitus, of Dante and Bacon. All in it that is supernatural, all that discriminates it as a specific revelation, is to be adjudicated by natural laws and reason. And the philosophical unbeliever knows full well that, if this radical point is gained, he has gained his cause ; that he has resolved specific Christian truth into something else,—into his own system ; and that it is that system which is left, while Christianity has been sublimated in the process ; for no one can resolve these specific truths and facts of Christianity into mere general ideas or idealizing formulas, without annulling their nature, and robbing them of their formative principle, just as a plant or animal loses its specific vital force when decomposed into its inorganic elements. Especially has the whole form and pressure of modern unbelief run in this direction. It has come to its most distinct expression in the conflict between Christianity and Pantheism. It has come to consciousness in this contest ; for, to absorb the concrete in the abstract, to deny real being to any thing individual and personal, to resolve specific truth into spiritual ideas as its last expression, is the whole method and art of pantheism ; and hence all this anti-Christian movement runs into it by a kind of logical necessity.

The significance of the volume of *Essays and Reviews* which we have put at the head of this article, is in the fact that this general tendency is supposed to be here represented by men of high position in the Church of England, where we have not been wont to look for such things. If these Essays had been published by avowed unbelievers, they would not have made any stir. There is nothing new, nothing that has

not been said a hundred times before, either in the way of criticism or of theory. Many of the same objections have been made and answered in every century of the Christian church. Far abler attacks upon Christianity have also been made even in England, to say nothing of Germany, without discomposing the steadfastness of Christians, without enlivening the hopes of infidelity. But this volume, a series of disconnected essays, is in its fourth edition in England, and in its second, under a more definite title, in this country, and has called forth comments from all the leading reviews of both countries. Whence this eager interest in a volume with so unpretending a name?

A part of it is owing to the position of the authors in the world of letters and in the Church of England. Dr. Temple is Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, and Dr. Arnold's successor as Head Master of Rugby, one of the most important schools in England; Dr. Rowland Williams, a graduate of Cambridge, is Vice-Principal and Professor of Hebrew in St. David's College, Lampeter, a training school for English clergymen; Baden Powell, lately deceased, was Professor of Geometry in Oxford University; Mr. Wilson, vicar of Great Stoughton, was one of the four tutors who remonstrated so strongly against No. XC. of the Oxford Tracts for the Times, as containing principles inconsistent with subscription to the Articles, and he now advocates the lowest terms of subscription; Mr. Goodwin, a graduate of Cambridge, refused, it is said, to take orders, from an honest conviction that his views were inconsistent with the clerical profession; Mr. Pattison and Mr. Jowett are both teachers in Oxford; the latter is Regius Professor of Greek, and is exerting an influence second to that of no other man in educating the young men of that University; Mr. Pattison has just been elected rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. Several of these writers had contributed to previous volumes of Oxford Essays. Dr. Temple wrote there on National Education, and now writes on a wider theme, the Education of the World; Professor Powell wrote on Natural Theology, and here assails the Evi-

dences; Mr. Wilson's previous essay on Schemes of Comprehension is followed by his present theory of a "Multitudinist" church; Mr. Goodwin advances from the Papyri of Egypt to the Mosaic Cosmogony. Dr. Rowland Williams attained repute by his "Dialogue on the Knowledge of the Supreme Lord, or, Christianity and Hinduism," published in 1856. Dr. Jowett's commentary and essays on Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans foreshadowed many of the views which he here distinctly announces. Professor Powell's previous works on science and revelation contained substantially the same principles, though stated perhaps in a more shaded outline. These writers, then, represent, at least in a fair degree, the present tone of thought and criticism prevailing in certain highly cultivated circles in England, particularly in Oxford. The work has been said to represent the so-called Broad Church party; but Stanley, Maurice, and Kingsley have certainly not yet avowed some of the more objectionable views contained in it; and neither the philosophy of Coleridge, nor the theology of Charles Julius Hare, has any representative among these seven champions of "a liberal faith," which the American editor describes as "reverently listening, if here and there it may catch some accents of the Eternal voice amid the confused dialects of Scripture, yet not confounding the latter with the former; expecting to find in criticism, guided by a true philosophy, the key to revelation: in revelation, the sanction and condign expression of philosophic truth."

Another source of the interest felt in these Essays is derived from the connection of the authors with the venerable University at Oxford, which for the past thirty years has been the chief seat and citadel of that form of Anglican theology, most opposed to Protestantism and Rationalism. The Tractarian movement was to restore the faith; it has ended in strengthening Rome on the one hand, and evoking this rationalistic reaction on the other hand. This was well nigh inevitable. For tradition cannot solve the questions raised in the nineteenth century: the episcopal succession

does not necessarily confer either the learning needed to reply to criticism, or the grace which is superior to doubts; the claim of sacramental grace rather provokes than disarms the spirit of free inquiry: the consent of all the fathers of the ancient, and even of the Anglican, church does not meet the inquiries raised by the perpetual conflict between the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-nine Articles: and even if the authority of the church be proved harmonious with the authoritative Scriptures, there still remains the question between revelation and reason. The Oxford school appealed first and last to church authority: the Evangelical school responded by an appeal to the authority of the Bible; and now, their conflict has called forth an adversary to both, with which neither is able to cope, appealing to the authority of Reason as ultimate. Thus it must be, where criticism and reason are ignored. The attempt to suppress them, by arbitrary authority, gives them new life and strength. Oxford now listens to Jowett and Temple, and has just ceased to hear the voice of Powell; thirty years ago, it was hearing Newman, descanting on the development which led him to Rome, and Pusey, pressing baptismal regeneration by the authority of tradition. And much of the force and influence of these Essays are found in their constant opposition to the revival of patristic, and even mediæval authority in the teachings of this university. The denial of the right of private judgment is bearing its legitimate consequences in this reaction. Reason revenges itself for the degradation, which tradition would fain impose upon her.

The interest begotten by these bearings of the work is heightened by the variety of subjects discussed, and the evident unity of aim in the midst of this variety. A prefatory note informs us, that the authors "have written in entire independence of each other, and without concert or comparison." But they probably knew each other pretty well, and were drawn together by elective affinity, if not in the form of a premeditated plan. The subjects here discussed, if fully treated, would each require at least a volume of itself. They

enter into the very heart of the most important theological and philosophical questions of the age. Earnest minds are debating them in Germany and America, as well as in England. Opinions uttered about them by men of standing and culture are welcomed, discussed and repeated. Dr. Temple leads the way with a theory of the Education of the World: Dr. Williams follows, rehearsing with an almost blind idolatry the speculations of Bunsen about primeval and Jewish history, and applauding his vague theories of Christian doctrine: Professor Powell scouts all the external evidences of Christianity, and denies the possibility of miraculous intervention: Mr. Wilson professedly discusses the project of a National Church, but really aims to show that Christian history and doctrine are so uncertain that the church must be sacrificed to the nation: Mr. Goodwin is content with trying to prove that the Hebrew Cosmogony is irreconcilable with modern science: Dr. Pattison, formerly, it is said, of Newman's school, reviews the tendencies of Religious Thought in England, in the first half of the eighteenth century: and Mr. Jowett, in altogether the best written essay of the series, vindicates such an interpretation of Scripture as would annul every creed of Christendom, not even excepting the Nicene formula. In this great variety of subjects, treated by men of mark and position, there is a source of attraction, enhanced by the common aim running through all, least apparent in the contributions of Drs. Temple and Pattison. That aim is to show, that the external evidences of Christianity are insufficient; that its sacred Books are not specifically inspired; that the histories contained in these Books are to be judged as we would any other histories, and in many parts are incredible; and that the doctrines of historic Christianity are to be resolved into more general truths, into more philosophic and rational formulas, if they are to retain their hold over the minds of this generation.

In the course of every great debate on vital questions, there will spring up a class of men, men of thought and culture, too, who are in a state of uneasy equilibrium between

the two parties, alternately accepting some of the general (though none of the extreme) positions of both parties, and fairly unable to decide between the two. They are not adapted either to the work of destruction or reconstruction. They are impotent to believe, or to disbelieve. They are, it may be, connected with the historical church by education, and general assent, and social position, and yet they feel the force of critical difficulties and philosophic doubts. They would not undermine Christianity, and still they cannot defend it. If they publish Essays and Reviews, revealing this oscillating condition, we naturally feel all the interest in them, that we do in a man hanging upon the edge of a precipice. And of course such essays must be fragmentary and not systematic: disintegrating and not constructive: throwing their influence on the side of doubt, even while disavowing unbelief. They will be made up of half errors and half truths. They will state the difficulties, it may be the arguments, on both sides, but as a problem to be solved, for they have no solution to offer. They have no consistent system, either of unbelief or of belief. They abandon the old fortresses, and have built no new ones, but are on the march in search of an encampment from night to night. And they will very probably say, that such essays and reviews "illustrate the advantages derivable to the cause of religious and moral truth, from the free handling, in a becoming spirit, of subjects peculiarly liable to suffer by the repetition of conventional language, and from traditional modes of treatment;" and they will find sympathizing friends to praise their "frankness, breadth and spiritual heroism." But yet, after all, truth is better than free inquiry; the goal is more than the course; faith is more solid than doubt. And when the subjects concern the highest welfare of man here and hereafter, when the issues are so momentous, and when the strife is hottest, what we want to hear is the voice of assurance and not the words of doubt. Such men of no system, neither believers nor unbelievers, are not the men for the times; they deceive themselves if they think they are helping Christianity: and if they

know they are not helping it, but helping to undermine it, they are practising a real, even if unconscious, deception upon others. Let them come out frankly, and say just what they believe or disbelieve : if they cannot do this, they are not yet fit to speak the needed word at such times. They have no right to sow the teeth of dragons in the garden of the Lord, and in his name. And when they tell us that these subjects "are peculiarly liable to suffer from the repetition of conventional language, and from traditional modes of treatment," did they really suppose, that the "conventional language," and "traditional treatment," were all on the side of orthodoxy ? did they never find anything of the sort, among doubters and critics and unbelievers ? We will venture to say, that, taking the history of belief and unbelief down through all the centuries, there is more that is "conventional" and "traditional," in the language and objections of infidelity, than can be found in the Christian literature—more stale repetition of cant phrases, of uninvestigated objections, of mere verbal difficulties. This must be so : for Christianity has been always been put on its defence : and to defend, there must be some investigation, while to attack often requires only a phrase. And this volume illustrates the point very fully : for all through it, by almost every essayist, points are assumed as proved which are still in debate, stale objections are urged without the hint that they have been replied to. The whole book in fact is a series of assumptions, on almost every particular point of criticism and difficulty, that the acts are closed, the charges proved, the verdict rightfully pronounced, and that the culprit has nothing more to say ; although its authors must be aware, that there is not a difficulty or objection which they have repeated (there is not a new one in the whole book), that has not been replied to in some form, and to which the defenders of Christianity are not ready to reply. And the chief peril of the times, as they must be equally aware, is not on the side of traditional and unquestioning belief. The age is not at all in danger of believing too much. Criticism is not mute : reason is not too

humble. The men of science are in no particular danger of being overwhelmed by ecclesiastical dogmatism. Inspiration and revelation are not accepted on mere traditional authority. Belief in uninvestigated dogmas is not our most imminent peril; bibliolatriy is not the disease of the age.

These Essays also serve to illustrate the state of criticism, theology, and speculation in the most venerable and renowned of the English universities. The English nation is pledged to Protestant Christianity, and its universities have been esteemed among its strongest bulwarks. Have they so cultivated learning and science as to be ready for a great emergency? When the contest between Christianity and philosophy which has been going on for fifty years in Germany as never before, passed across the Channel (to pay back the debt which German rationalism owed to that English deism, from which it received its impulse), would it find these sequestered retreats of learning fully prepared to meet the objections, and repel the foe? If these Essays are to be taken as any indication of the state of theological learning, we think that every unprejudiced reader will echo the strong language of Professor Hussey in a recent sermon before the university, who "solemnly warned his hearers that the study of theology was dying out." In point of fact, the criticism and theology of England are outside of its great schools. No volume that we have recently read illustrates so fully the danger of half learning: the facility with which men who have not been thoroughly trained in the whole debate and conflict, can innocently assume that objections are irrefragable, and ignore all replies. Most of the writers have apparently derived their objections and their learning from German sources: and thus show the danger of beginning such studies, without pressing through them. Jowett echoes to the school of Tübingen, accepting its principles, and not avowing its inferences. Williams repeats Bunsen. But Baur and Bunsen both had developed theories, which their disciples are not quite ready to accept. They take the premises and avoid the conclusion. They appropriate the doubt, and refuse the

theory which makes it consistent. And, then, they have got just so far into this German criticism and philosophy, as to learn the difficulties, without studying the replies. Dr. Pusey quotes Luther's saying about his adherents, "that they were like Solomon's fleet, some of them bringing back gold and silver, but the younger only peacocks and apes." Thus fares it with many students of German science. The men who are now leading the theological and philosophical investigations of that country are men who have passed through profounder difficulties, and more thorough criticism, than these Oxford essayists seem to have yet suspected; they have weighed the difficulties with boldness and freedom, and have come out, in spite of them, into the clear light of revealed truth. But all this class of men, the best and brightest lights of Germany, are not known or studied by the Oxford reviewers. That Delitzsch, Keil, Kurtz, Hävernick, Bertheau, and Hengstenberg have gone over all their Old Testament difficulties; that Olshansen, Ebrard, Tholuck, Lange, Stier, and even De Wette, Meyer, and Lücke, have replied to many of their New Testament criticisms, they do not seem to have suspected. They can give up even the Gospel of John, though such "traditionalists" as Hase, De Wette, Meyer, and Ewald cling to it. They follow Strauss in excluding all prophecies from the sphere of credibility: though he allows, as they will not, that the Scriptures profess to contain them. They reduce the Christian doctrines to the minimum of accordance with reason, though such men as Neander, Nitzsch, Julius Müller, Dörner, and Rothe, and even Schleiermacher allow their reason to be instructed by revelation. They have not got far enough into German theology and philosophy to have any knowledge of those positive constructions of the Christian system, which are meant to reconcile faith and philosophy: they have just got far enough to feel the doubt and difficulty; but they have not enough necessity of believing, or necessity of systematizing, to carry them to a positive position. Not one of them has any definite theory of Christianity as a complete and final system. Jowett comes the nearest to it in

some vague intimations about the incarnation. Dr. Temple may have more positive views, but they are not stated. Williams is all afloat with Bunsen. Powell talks about a sphere of belief, but is positive only on the subject of natural laws. Past theories are to them obsolete, and the future is conjectural. In Christian antiquity they find no guide; in the history of English theology no certainty; from Germany they import only criticism; the Scriptures give no resting place; and their own reason has not as yet found any solution of the difficulties or answer to the problems. They give up Scripture history, prophecy and miracles: they abandon the canon: they are to verify Scripture by criticism and reason: and what reason gives as ultimate, they do not tell us. Is such a work as this the best that English university culture can give in the great conflict of the age? Are such men the worthy successors of Cudworth, Bull, Waterland, Butler, and Horsley? Have they even as consistent a position, are they as worthy of being the teachers of the land, as Samuel Clarke, Lardner, and Paley? for these last did not abandon the outposts. But these new comers ask us to give up all the old defences, and they do not give us any other. We are willing to hear an open adversary, with a system which sweeps the field: we want to hear those Christian advocates of the faith, who know what they believe, and what they can affirm and defend. But we cannot learn much from those who only object and never affirm, who criticise on principles that undermine the whole fabric of Christianity and yet are not keen enough to see, or bold enough to avow, those principles; whose faces are turned to the Church, and whose arms are vigorously rowing their boats in the opposite direction. If they adopt the criticisms of Tübingen, let them avow its principles: for the criticism is worthless and nugatory, except as connected with the system. If they use the art, and do not know the science, they are yet learners and not fit to be teachers. Their criticisms are valid, if there is no miracle, no inspiration, no specific revelation. Their criticisms are invalid, if there be inspiration, revelation, and redemption.

And there can be no compromise here. It is either fact or myth. And the Christian Church has a right to know, which of the two, its teachers hold the Bible and Christianity to be.

Do we, then, object to the posture of inquiry, criticism, and debate? By no manner of means. We are willing to grant, and even to welcome it; it has its appropriate sphere. There are difficulties about Scripture history, chronology, and the application of its words to doctrinal statements subsequently framed, which require study and examination, and yet await a final decision. Some of them it may not be possible to decide at all; we may lack the necessary materials or links in contemporaneous history. There are difficulties about the authorship of certain books, which may leave that question in suspense. Any and all fair and candid statements of such doubts and difficulties, and any help towards a solution, we cordially greet. But what we do object to is, that professed Christian teachers should assume that these contradictions are all proved, and that the defenders of the Bible have nothing reasonable to reply; and that they should do this without even noticing or refuting replies already given. What we object to still more definitely is, that they should conduct their whole criticism on underlying principles which they do not care or dare to avow, or cloak those principles in ambiguous phrases that mislead the unwary and enchant the initiated; for they are either ignorant or conscious of the bearing of these principles. If ignorant, they have no right to speak with authority; if conscious, they speak only to delude. There are, in short, several previous questions which they ought to have settled for themselves, before writing such a book for the public: the questions as to the possibility and reality of inspiration, miracles, prophecy, incarnation, and redemption. If these questions are settled in the affirmative, much of the special criticism of the Essays would fall at once to the ground. If they have answered these questions to themselves in the negative, then, as honest men, they ought to have told us so. If they are undecided, they ought not to

conduct their special criticisms as if all these points had been decided in the negative.

An examination of the individual Essays, so far as our space allows, will confirm these general statements about their method and principles. We cannot of course enter into detailed criticism. Many of the assertions so recklessly made in a single sentence, would require a dissertation either to prove or to disprove them. But the substance of each dissertation may be so far given, as to vindicate our general judgment about the men and the book.

The Head Master of Rugby opens the volume with the most comprehensive subject embraced in it, viz.: The Education of the World. Progress is the law of the spiritual creation. Man is only man by virtue of being a member of the race. The race, like the individual, has its childhood, youth, and manhood. "First come Rules, then Examples, then Principles. First comes the Law, then the Son of Man, then the Gift of the Spirit" (p. 6). The result of the Jewish education (the Law) was monotheism and chastity. When the Son of Man came, he found the world prepared by four races, each of which had a distinct character. "The Hebrews had disciplined the human conscience, Rome the human will, Greece the reason and taste, Asia the spiritual imagination" (p. 22). Christ, as the great example (aided by Greece, Rome, and the early church), then taught and moulded all these into one church. The power of this example declining, the "freshness of faith" being lost, "we possess in the greater cultivation of our religious understanding, that which, perhaps, we ought not to be willing to give in exchange" (p. 28). We come under a law "which is not imposed upon us by another power, but by our own enlightened will." We outgrow past creeds, and learn "to have no opinion at all on many points of the deepest interest." "The principle of private judgment puts conscience between us and the Bible, making conscience the supreme interpreter where it may be a duty to enlighten, but where it can never be a duty to disobey" (p. 51). Even the doctrinal parts of the Bible "are best studied by consider-

ing them as records of the time at which they were written, and as conveying to us the highest and greatest religious life of that time." In "the maturity of man's powers, the great lever which moves the world is knowledge, the great force is the intellect" (p. 55). But, at the same time, Dr. Temple concedes and implies, that a supernatural revelation in Christ is the great moving power and principle even in this ulterior education. He is more definite on this point than almost any other of the essayists. His theory has, we think unjustly, been identified with that of Comte; but he nowhere asserts that positive science is the only or final means of culture, to supersede all others. He represents the race, indeed, as a "colossal man, whose life reaches from the creation to the day of judgment;"* but the culture of this man is to be by and through a revelation, given once for all, and in one passage said to be "infallibly" given.

The difficulty about his theory (if it can be so called), is found in the fact that many of its most important points are so vaguely stated, that they might easily be pressed into the

* The *Westminster Review* says that this "colossal man" theory is adopted from Auguste Comte, "without acknowledgment and perhaps unconsciously;" and that "it is a flagrant instance of the habit now prevalent amongst Churchmen (though rare in this book) of snatching up the language or the idea of really free-thinking men, and using them for their purposes in a way which is utterly thoughtless or shamefully dishonest." But the accusation should rather come from the other side, for this idea of the colossal man was suggested by Pascal, and borrowed "perhaps unconsciously" by Comte. In his *Pensées* (Partie I. Art. 1, suppressed in the first editions, De l'Autorité en Matière de Philosophie), Pascal writes: "De la vient que, par une prérogative particulière, non seulement chacun des hommes s'avance de jour en jour dans les sciences, mais que tous les hommes ensemble y font un continuel progrès à mesure que l'univers vieillit, *parce que la même chose arrive dans la succession des hommes, que dans les âges différents d'un particulier. De sorte que toute la suite des hommes, pendant le cours de tant de siècles, doit être considérée comme un même homme qui subsiste toujours, et qui apprend continuellement*; d'où l'on voit avec combien de l'injustice nous respectons l'antiquité dans ces philosophes; car, comme la vieillesse est l'âge le plus distant de l'enfance, qui ne voit que la vieillesse de *cet homme universel* ne doit pas être cherchée dans les temps proches de sa naissance, mais dans ceux qui en sont les plus éloignés?"

service of a rationalistic construction of history. He seems to have no thorough knowledge of the subject he discusses, or of the bearings of some of his statements. What he attempts to present, is a general plan or scheme of human history, from the beginning to the consummation of all things; in other words, a philosophy of history. Some of the best minds of the age, philosophers and historians, have been and are at work on this vast problem. Every new system of philosophy brings this within its scope, as one of its tests. The chief works on the subject Dr. Temple does not seem to have consulted. Even Bossuet's and Schlegel's schemes are superior to his. Herder's is much more genial and complete. Hegel's (translated into English) is more comprehensive. Comte's is more thorough in its grasp of the real problem. That any one should suppose that, under the figure of the education of a single man, and under the three categories of law, example, and principles, the whole course of history could be comprised and mastered, shows that fancy has the mastery of judgment; that symbols are substituted for ideas; and that in the form of history its soul and its substance are lost sight of. The idea is evidently taken from the best mode of training boys at Rugby rather than derived from the open vision of history itself. Whole nations and empires, Egypt, India, Turkey, are entirely omitted from, and cannot be brought under, his scheme. Nor is the notion of education itself, on which all here depends, analyzed or defined. Education *in* what? Education *to* and *for* what? These are certainly radical, as they are unnoticed inquiries. The legal period is described as one of restraint; but law has an end or object, and is not merely a disciplinarian. Example doubtless instructs; but, what does it and ought it to instruct us about? The highest stage is that of principles; but what are these principles? Conscience is to be supreme, and reason is to guide; but what are the dictates of this supreme conscience? What are the ideas and laws of this guiding reason? None of these questions are touched upon; and hence the whole theory is nebulous. The shadow is perpetually mistaken for the substance. A law of

external growth is stated in figurative guise; but what it is that is growing, and what it is to grow to, we are not told, excepting in those general phrases which a naturalist might utter as sonorously as a Christian, for each can put his own contents into them. What confusion of thought, for example, in the statement (p. 32), "that the New Testament is almost entirely occupied with two lives—the life of our Lord, and the life of the early church;" as if one should say, that Xenophon's writings were occupied with two lives—the life of Socrates and the life of the Greek nation. Who can get any adequate idea of what was going on in the middle ages, from being told (p. 49), that the church "was occupied in renewing, by self-discipline, the self-control which the sudden absorption of the barbarians had destroyed"? Have we touched the essence of the Reformation in the position, that it taught "the lesson of toleration?" It doubtless did that in part, but that was a very small part of its work. And when we are assured that, in these last days, "the great lever which moves the world is knowledge, the great force is intellect," this, if taken strictly, is the common talk of the commonest unbelief; or, if it is not to be taken strictly, the writer did not appreciate the force and bearing of his own words. This would be a poor lesson even for the pupils at Rugby. What a contrast between Dr. Arnold, with his high moral and Christian enthusiasm and vigorous statement of substantial truth, and Dr. Temple, with his indefinite and immature speculations upon the most important themes! The one knew so much of history, that he hardly ventured to speculate upon it; the other gives us airy phrases instead of either facts or ideas. By his very indefiniteness he prepares the way for the definite doubt which follows in the next essay.

This second treatise is by Dr. Rowland Williams, who believes in Bunsen and does not believe in the Bible; or rather, he believes in Bunsen's Bible, excepting that he is obliged to "smile" now and then at some superstition about Jonah's personality, and the possibility of particular prophecies, to which the Baron still clings. To those who know anything

of the estimate in which Bunsen is held at home in criticism and philosophy, this obsequious veneration of Dr. Williams for the Chevalier is really amusing, especially when coupled with his undisguised contempt for anything that has any odor of orthodoxy. Bunsen, it seems, is "the man who, in our darkest perplexity, has reared again the banner of truth, and uttered thoughts which give courage to the weak and sight to the blind." This may describe Bunsen's effect upon himself; but it is the only testimony of the kind we happen to have met with. "Our little survey," he adds, "has not traversed his vast field, nor our plummet sounded his depth;" and then, fairly unable to restrain the sacred fire, he breaks out in metre:

"Bunsen, with voice like sound of trumpet born,
 Conscious of strength, and confidently bold!
 Well feign the sons of Loyola the scorn
 Which from thy books would scare their startled fold.
 To thee our earth disclosed her purple morn," etc.

"But ah! not dead, my soul to giant reach," etc.

Of Bunsen, in many relations, no right-minded man can speak in other terms than those of admiration and unfeigned respect. He was full of noble impulses; he had the highest love for freedom of speech and of conscience, which he bravely defended; he opposed, even at the loss of high station, the reactionary policy of the Prussian court. His learning was varied and ample, and no one can read him without being stimulated to thought and investigation; and he has but just left the world, with the cheering words of simple faith upon his dying lips. The vague speculations in which he so much delighted, were exchanged in the decisive hour, for the hallowed Christian forms of speech which his philosophy was always tempting him to abandon. He was deficient in just those very qualities for which Dr. Williams lauds him. He was not a judge, but an advocate. He worked in the mine, and not in the mint. He collected (not without the assiduity of others) a vast mass of materials, which he could not reconstruct into order. On the most slender basis of facts, he would

sometimes rear the most extravagant of hypotheses. A single piece of pottery in the mud of the Nile, induced him to elongate by ten thousand years the life of the race. His reconstructions of history were made by imagination, and not by induction. His philosophy of history lacked thoroughness and precision. And in respect to Christian doctrine, he was perpetually hovering between the words of the creeds and the formulas of Hegel. His attempt (in his *Philosophy of History*) to resolve what he calls Semitic speech into the language of Japhet (that is, orthodox formulas into Hegelian abstractions), is one of the most curious illustrations of the process by which concrete realities can be sublimated into barren abstractions. And in all these things, his English disciple echoes the great master, as if he were under the spell of an enchanter's wand.

His essay is simply a résumé of the results of the idealizing school of modern criticism, as to the history and doctrines, the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures. No proof is attempted. He seems to think the whole matter is decided. Where he is not willing to make direct assertions, he throws out wanton insinuations.* The tone of self-conscious superiority affected in this Essay is not supported by anything contained in it. We need only refer to a few points under the heads of history, prophecy, and doctrine, to show the conclusions to which the rationalistic tendency must lead. The introductory statements are devoted to generalizing the ideas of revelation, inspiration, miracle, and prophecy, so as to rob them of their specific import. A faith, to whose miraculous

* Dr. Williams has since written an "Earnestly Respectful Letter to the Lord Bishop of St. David's, on the Difficulty of bringing Theological Questions to an Issue;" to which Dr. Thirlwall replied in a calm and convincing manner, and drew out a "Critical Appendix," which, by as cautious and candid a review as the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, is characterized as "one long-drawn quibble;" adding, that "no one of his opinions is manfully stated, expounded, justified or repudiated." Though he takes shelter, as a reporter, under Bunsen, yet the whole tone of the Essay, unless it is, what the *Westminster Review* terms "a mere mystification," allows no doubt about his adopting its main positions.

tests reason and conscience "must bow," is declared to be "allied to priestcraft and formalism, and not rarely with corruptness of administration or of life." By arbitrary hypotheses as to the time necessary for a supposed development, he carries back the race at least twenty thousand years. But when we look for the facts to warrant this extension, what we find is an inquiry as to how long it took French to grow out of Latin, and Latin out of its original crude forms. If it took two thousand years for this, how long must it have taken to form the Hebrew from its primitive germs? The arithmetic is certainly not very exact. The Pentateuch is of course declared to be a gradual growth "from a Bible before our Bible;" it came to its present form about one thousand or seven hundred before Christ. That previous documents may have been used in its composition might be conceded, without denying its Mosaic authorship; but Dr. Williams reasons upon it, as if Kurtz, and Hengstenberg, and Keil had never written on the question, or noticed all the arguments by which its genuineness has been assailed.* He abandons the prophecies of Daniel, transforming them into mere history or conjecture, without condescending to refer to the replies of Auberlen and Hävernick. In fact, he gives up all prophecy, excepting "perhaps one passage in Zechariah, one in Isaiah and one in Deuteronomy on the fall of Jerusalem;" though even

* Some of his incidental explanations are exegetical curiosities. The "avenger of the first-born" becomes "a Bedouin host." The passage of the Red Sea is "poetry." Some criticisms show lack of thorough study. He makes *sagans* (officers) in Is. xii., 25, to be a Persian word, though Fürst denies it. He argues against the genuineness of the last part of Zechariah, though De Wette himself recanted his doubts, and Hävernick has replied minutely to all the objections. He translates Psalm ii., 12, "Worship purely," instead of "Kiss the Son," though this rendering is rejected by the most eminent scholars, Gesenius, De Wette, Ewald. Compare Brit. Quarterly, Jan., 1861, which also refers to his proposed translation "mighty God" (Is. ix. 6, as "strong or mighty one,"—asking how it comes to pass, that *el* here alone in all Hebrew books should "be translated *one*." Equally curious is his emendation of Psalm xxii., 17, viz., "like a lion," instead of "they pierced,"—purely conjectural, and "in the face of all MSS. and ancient citations." Ibid., p. 25.

these "few cases tend to melt, if they are not already melted, in the crucible of free inquiry," and what is left is certain "deep truths" and "great ideas." Even the Messianic interpretation of the 53d of Isaiah is rejected (p. 80), although for seventeen centuries only two interpreters (excepting Jews), and both of these professed unbelievers, gave it such a non-Messianic sense. Bunsen makes it refer to Jeremiah, and Williams to Baruch, or rather to the "collective Israel." This last interpretation, as Hengstenberg has unanswerably shown, is most violent, has no analogy in the Old Testament, and demands the most unnatural personifications; as when it is said, "he made his grave with the wicked and with the rich in his death." Even a kind of spiritual clairvoyance as to particular future events, to which Bunsen adheres, is rejected by his disciple. Consistently with these views (if not their source), he denies any specific inspiration, making it to be "the voice of the congregation." "Our Prayer Book is constructed on the idea that the church is an inspired society." "If any one prefers thinking the sacred writers passionless machines, and calling Luther and Milton 'uninspired,' let him co-operate in researches by which this theory, if true, will be triumphantly confirmed" (p. 87). But surely he must know, that orthodox theologians do not look upon inspired men as "machines," or refuse to recognize the human element in the Divine word. Is there no possible medium between the mechanical theory of inspiration, and the rejection of all specific inspiration?

It is this theory of general, in distinction from specific inspiration, which is at the basis of Dr. Williams' method of interpreting prophecy: for if there be real prophecies in the Scriptures there must be a divine inspiration: if there be no inspiration, there cannot be any prophecy. The whole runs back, of course, into the underlying theory, that there cannot be any direct supernatural interference, to control the naturalistic order of development. It is only on the assumption of this development hypothesis, only on the exclusion of supernaturalism from history, that these interpretations become

plausible. Strauss and his followers lay it down as a canon of interpretation, that there cannot be either miracle or prophecy, and interpret accordingly; although they grant, that the books themselves claim to contain both miracle and prophecy. This is a much easier, and a more honest course, than to try to make out, that the books themselves do not claim to have supernatural contents. There are three ways of procedure here: one is, to say that the narrative contains prophecies, and is true; another, that it claims to contain prophecies, but, as there cannot be any prophecy, that this claim is false; another is, that it does not claim to contain prophecy. Rationalism, so far as it still pays a lingering deference to the Scripture, while denying the reality of prophecy, tries to make out the latter point. But here it is opposed, by the plain intent of the Old Testament; by the counter testimony of Christ and the apostles in the New: by the almost unanimous verdict of Christian interpreters; and also, by the concessions of unbelieving interpreters, who say, that the Scriptural writers undoubtedly claim prophetic inspiration, but that the claim is absurd. If Dr. Williams should take this latter ground, of course his task would be easier; for now he is obliged to reconcile a belief in Scripture, with an unwillingness to believe in prophecy; and the only way in which this can be effected is, by trying to show that after all, there are no proper predictions in the Bible. And though there are "some doubtful passages" remaining, yet he thinks that these will "melt away," and leave only "great ideas." He cannot consent to give up the Bible wholly; and yet he interprets it on principles which undermine its authority, and make it to be the most enigmatic, if not contradictory, of books. In contrast with such a specimen of half-learning, and of vacillating views, it is refreshing to turn to the most recent work of one of the best and ablest of German scholars, who is above all suspicion of being a bigoted adherent of the letter of Scripture and of tradition, and whose learning and exegetical skill far surpass Bunsen's, to say nothing of Dr. Williams. Professor Tholuck in his work on *The Prophets and their Prophe*

cies,* reviews the whole subject in a philosophical manner, yet unfettered by naturalistic hypotheses. And the result of his studies is, that these prophecies cannot be interpreted "as the utterance of subjective religious aspirations; and that the very course of history has impressed upon these declarations the stamp, and confirmation, of an objective and supernatural inspiration." On the score of mere testimony, such a declaration outweighs any authority that can possibly be ascribed to the opinions of either Bunsen or his Anglican disciple. Bertheau has recently published a series of essays (in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1859, 1860), which evince a thorough study of the subject. Professor Fairbairn's work, issued in Edinburgh, 1856, on *Prophecy, its Nature and Functions*, ably refutes many of the positions so confidently advanced in these Essays, as the final verdict of criticism.

But it is in the sphere of doctrines, that Dr. Williams utters the most extravagant opinions, fully illustrating that anti-Christian tendency, which we described at the beginning of this article—resolving the realities of faith into mystical and unmeaning generalities. He speaks (p. 89) of "that religious idea, which is the thought of the Eternal, without conformity to which our souls cannot be saved." Justification by faith is "peace of mind, or that sense of divine approval, which comes of trust in a righteous God, rather than a fiction of merit by transfer;" it is "a verdict of forgiveness upon our repentance." Regeneration is "an awakening of forces of the soul." Resurrection is "spiritual quickening." Gehenna is "an image of distracted remorse." "Heaven is not a place so much as fulfilment of the love of God." "The incarnation is purely spiritual." The fall of Adam "repre-

* *Die Propheten und ihre Weissagungen. Eine apologetisch-hermeneutische Studie von A. THOLUCK.* Gotha, 1860. Delitzsch in his *Prophetische Theologie* stands on the same general ground. Hengstenberg's examination of all these prophetic passages is so thorough, that even the rationalists of Germany confess that refutation of him is essential for the vindication of their interpretations. To ignore these replies after the manner of Dr. Williams, would make them at once lose caste in the republic of letters.

sents ideally the circumscription of our spirits in limits of flesh and time, and practically the selfish nature with which we fall from the likeness of God, which should be fulfilled in man."

But this application of "ideology" to doctrines comes to its most remarkable results in his speculations (following Bunsen, in part) about the Trinity. Ultimate is "the law of thought;" this law is "consubstantial with the being of the Eternal I AM. Being, becoming, and animating, or, substance, thinking, and conscious life, are expressions of a Triad, which may be also represented as will, wisdom, and love; as light, radiance, and warmth; as fountain, stream, and united flow; as mind, thought, and consciousness; as person, word, and life; as Father, Son, and Spirit." "The Divine Consciousness or Wisdom, consubstantial with the Eternal Will, becoming personal in the Son of Man, is the express image of the Father; and Jesus actually, but also mankind ideally, is the Son of God. If all this has a Sabellian, or almost a Brahminical sound, its impugners are bound, even on patristic grounds, to show how it differs from the doctrine of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, and the historian Eusebius." We apprehend that few persons have read this doctrinal exposition, without some slight sense of bewilderment, and suspecting at first that their own eyes must be somewhat blurred. Not even Bunsen himself was ever quite so involved. Language is fairly turned topsy-turvy; and thought, logic, and history are equally defied. Sabellianism is clearness itself in the comparison. To call it Brahminism is absurd. It is most like the logical pantheism of the school of Hegel; but no Hegelian was ever yet guilty of concocting such a jumble. While we have entire respect, and even sympathy, for those views of the Trinity and Incarnation, which find in these mysteries substantial truth and rational elements; and while we also believe, that that view of the divine nature which makes it inconsistent with the Incarnation and Trinity is philosophically imperfect as well as Scripturally incorrect; we cannot find in such caricatures as this anything that minis-

ters either to faith or knowledge. It shows, that the author had read just enough of Bunsen, and perhaps Hegel, to be confused and overawed. Let us look at it a moment. The "law of thought" (not thought itself) is consubstantial (not merely identical) with the Being of the Eternal I AM; *i. e.*, the law of thought is of the same substance with the being. Can any body tell what that means? What is this law of thought (which is also Being)? It is given in a series of triads—which are, of course, meant to be coördinate—according to which it appears that the first one in the triad may be called, either being, or substance, or will, or light, or mind, or person, or the Father; the second one is, becoming, or thinking, or wisdom, or thought, or word, or the Son; the third is, animating, or conscious life, or love, or warmth, or consciousness, or life, or the Spirit. By what process of consistent thought can these terms be thus used? How can the first be 'mind,' or 'person,' without presupposing the 'thought' of the second, or the 'consciousness' of the third? Can any just distinction be traced between the 'mind' of the first, the 'thought' of the second, and the 'consciousness' of the third? If the first is already 'person,' what means it, that consciousness is relegated to the third member? And the confusion becomes still more palpable, when our philosophical theologian goes on to assure us, that the "divine consciousness or Wisdom" ('consciousness' was just before the third, and 'wisdom' the second, but now they are identified) "consubstantial with the Eternal Will, becomes personal in the Son of Man." But "person" had already been given as an equivalent for the first member of the Triad; now it seems, that though there was "person," there was not any thing "personal," until the Son of God appeared. And then, too, how is 'consciousness' the same as 'wisdom,' and how are either or both 'consubstantial with will'? We confess, that we have not the least idea what the writer means. He intimates, that it might be called Sabellianism; but Sabellianism, though an inadequate, is a perfectly well defined theory, *viz.*, that the original deity (Monas), through and by the Logos, becomes

Son and Spirit (one interpretation says, Father, Son and Spirit), in the manifestation. What has that theory in common with such a farrago of words? And when Dr. Williams proceeds to say, that his notion "does not differ from the doctrine of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, and the historian Eusebius," he either betrays his own profound ignorance of the subject, or is imposing on the ignorance of his readers. There is almost nothing in common. Justin Martyr identifies the Logos with Christ, and illustrates the incarnation by the relation of speech to mind, but he rejects the illustration from the sun and its beams. Origen held that the Logos (Son) is God, is personal, and subordinate; and he introduced the phraseology of an 'eternal generation'; but he carefully avoided everything that looked like a physical emanation. Tertullian speaks of a Trinity of one Divinity, the Father, the Son and the Spirit; and he uses the illustrations of fountain, stream and river, of root, branch and fruit, purely as comparisons. In the theory of Hippolytus, the Logos is the sum of the divine reason, and issues forth as a distinct hypostasis to create the world. The clear head of the historian Eusebius made him inclined to Semi-Arianism, which is at the utmost remove from all such mystical theorizing as Dr. Williams attributes to him. And whatever uncertainty there may be about the opinions of some of these teachers of the church in relation to the formulas subsequently elaborated, there can be no doubt, that none of them ever adopted a theory which either identified thought and being, or made the Trinity to be equivalent to a logical process.

Inspiration having been resolved into general illumination, prophecy into sagacious anticipations, and the Christian dogmas into ideology, we are prepared for the next step, taken by Professor Powell, in his *Essay on the Evidences of Christianity*, viz., the denial of the validity of all external corroborations of a revelation; and the assertion of the impossibility of miraculous intervention. His previous works on the *Order of Nature in Reference to the Claims of Revelation*, and on the *Spirit of the Inductive Philosophy*, contained the principles

which are here applied in a more popular and discursive manner. As we have been promised a review of his general position in respect to the Evidences, we give only an outline of his positions. He asserts that the main appeal of the writers on Evidence in the seventeenth century was "to the *miracles* of the Gospel;" to mere external testimony, the testimony of the senses; and assumes, that the progress of physical research has nullified all possible valid evidence from this quarter. But Mr. Pattison, in this same volume, says, that until 1750, "the *internal* evidences" were most insisted upon in England; that "the main endeavor was to show, that there was nothing in the contents of revelation which was not agreeable to reason" (p. 286). And it is a fact, verified by the whole history of theology, that the internal evidences have always been most insisted upon, wherever Christian doctrine has been most firmly held, that the most orthodox have most relied on this argument; and that those writers who have dwelt more exclusively on the external evidences (as Paley and his school) have been comparatively indifferent to specific Christian truth, and a vital Christian experience. A formal church relies on external authority; a formal creed is apt to insist on the outworks, as if they were the citadel. There was also another reason, why so much stress was laid on miracles in the last century. Though they are not the only, or the highest evidence, they are yet essential to the Christian system as a supernatural and historic revelation. After Hume's speculations, miracles became in England, and even on the continent, a test question as to the reality of a divine agency, not limited or circumscribed by the fixed succession of events in nature. The real question was, not merely that of evidence to a revelation, but whether deism or even atheism was to triumph over Christian theism. Is there—as Mr. Powell expresses it, "only the invariable operation of a series of eternally impressed consequences, following in some necessary chain of orderly connection?" The belief in Providence was at stake, as well as the belief in a revelation. The ultimate question was as to the very idea of God; whether he is bound to the order of nature, or is above it, and may control

and direct it to some wise moral end? Hume could not believe in a miracle because he did not believe in God. The battle was nominally about the evidences, but really about the question, whether there are efficient causes producing, and final causes shaping, the order of the universe.

Professor Powell's position as to miracles, in connection with the Evidences, is, that if they were "in the estimation of a former age, among the chief *supports* of Christianity, they are at present among the main *difficulties*, and hindrances to its acceptance" (p. 158). The believers in miracles, he says, are possessed by certain prepossessions and prejudices, by which they interpret testimony, and get out of it a great deal more than it can possibly contain. But Mr. Powell has no such a priori principles, excepting perhaps this one—viz., that the order of nature cannot be interrupted. "The entire range of the inductive philosophy," he says, "is at once based upon, and in every instance tends to confirm, by immense accumulation of evidence, the grand truth of the universal order and constancy of natural causes, as a *primary law of belief*, so strongly entertained and fixed in the mind of every truly inductive inquirer, that he cannot even *conceive the possibility of its failure*." This is really a deification of natural law. It confounds, as Mr. Powell does throughout his disquisition, the rational principle of causality, with the empirical facts of orderly sequence. The "primary law of belief" is, that there can be no event without a cause. "The universal order and constancy of *natural causes*" is no primary belief at all. This order may be violated, without violating the principle of causality. This is conceded even by John Stuart Mill, who says in his *Logic*—"A miracle (as was justly remarked by Brown) is no contradiction of the law of cause and effect; it is a new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause. Of the adequacy of that cause, if it exist, there can be no doubt." This single position upsets the logical force of Mr. Powell's whole argument. He has no thorough understanding of his own position. In his zeal to establish it, he even

goes so far as to deny that the omnipotence of God can be proved from natural theology, saying (p. 128) "that it is entirely an inference from the *language of the Bible*, adopted on the *assumption* of a belief in revelation." But if these natural attributes of God are proved only by revelation, how can the revelation itself be proved? Professor Powell does not mean, we suppose, to deny the being or perfections of God; he expresses (p. 129) a dissent from "the first principles" of Emerson and Prof. Newman; he even admits the fact of a revelation. But all this only makes the confusion of his argument still more hopeless. Even Hume and Mill would admit the possibility of miracles, on the supposition that there is a God. But Mr. Powell believes in a God and denies the possibility of miracles. His objections to the proof by testimony have been often refuted; they are not as sharply put as in the writings of Hume; and they lose their chief force, if his principles about the inviolability of natural laws is unsound. His idolatry of mere physical law is carried to a greater extent than in almost any modern writer of repute, outside of the schools of materialism and "positivism." He speaks of the "*inconceivableness* of imagined interruptions of the natural order, or supposed suspensions of the laws of matter" (p. 124); he talks of "the universal self-sustaining and self-evolving powers of nature"; he perverts Professor Owen's Address before the British Association, so as to make it sanction the theory, that "creation is only another name for our ignorance of the mode of production"; he advocates, more categorically than Darwin himself, the law of "natural selection," and the hypothesis that "new species can be originated by natural causes." He even implies (p. 150) that "ultimate ideas of universal causation" can be "familiar only to those versed in cosmical philosophy in its widest sense"; which is the very reverse of the truth, since universal causation cannot be found in cosmical, but only in rational philosophy. He asserts that "in nature and from nature, by science and reason, we neither have nor can possibly have, any evidence of a Deity

working miracles; for that we must go out of nature and beyond science."

And yet with all this, strange as it may seem, Prof. Powell seems to admit a positive revelation, and the necessity of religious faith. It sounds like the irony of Hume (though we cannot believe that it is so), when he reduces the whole matter, in the clearest statement found in his involved and repetitious essay, to the alternative, that an alleged miracle is, either, a physical event, and so to be explained by physical laws alone; or, an event "asserted on the authority of inspiration," in which case "it ceases to be capable of investigation by reason, or to own its dominion. It is accepted on religious grounds, and can appeal only to the principle and influence of faith." His whole argument goes to show, that a scientific and reasonable man cannot accept it on the latter grounds. And yet he affirms that "intellect and philosophy" "admit the higher claims of divine mysteries in the invisible and spiritual world"; that "reason and science conspire to the confession, that, beyond the domain of physical causation and the possible conceptions of *intellect* or *knowledge*, there lies open the boundless region of spiritual things, which is the sole dominion of faith" (p. 143). Such statements, now, prove irresistibly one of two things: and in either case this dissertation is robbed of its force as an argument. Either Prof. Powell admits a real revelation of spiritual truth from a Divine Being, addressed to faith, which we may and must rest in; or he does not. If he does admit this, then his argument against the possibility of miracles falls to the ground; for he has correctly stated (p. 159) that the "real question, after all, is not the mere *fact*, but the *cause* or *explanation* of it." If he does not admit this, then his whole argument is needless: for he had only, in that case, to say, I do not believe in a God, and therefore cannot believe in a miracle. If he does not believe in a God, his essay is an intentional and barefaced deception. If he does believe in a God, the foundation of his reasonings is undermined. And at the very best, he leaves such a dualism between philosophy and

faith, between science and religion—a dualism so broadly stated, so totally unreconciled, as to show, that he has not thoroughly studied the relations of this vital subject. To state the relations of the two is the great problem to which his discussions should have converged. He does not investigate his problem at all. No Christian believer can accept the dilemma as he puts it. Every unbeliever will welcome his positions as really proving that physical science is supreme, and that faith is essentially unreasonable. He banishes all revelation to the sphere of subjective experience, and thus deprives it of all objective or historical validity.

The same unwillingness or incompetence to deal with a great subject in its larger relations, is shown in the fourth Essay, on the National Church, by Henry Bristow Wilson, B.D., Vicar of Great Stoughton, Hunts. The subject suggested by the title is the great question of the union of church and state, which is at the heart of European and British politics. Can there really be a National Church in the present state of opinion in England? Is not the dissolution of the unnatural union of church and state necessary to the salvation of Christianity? What are the respective principles, rights and position of the church and the state? These are grave and fundamental inquiries, with which Mr. Wilson intermeddled not. He brings the whole matter down to individual and local interests—to the question of personal subscription to the Articles. He wants to find out how he can hold the opinions he does hold, and remain Vicar of Great Stoughton. And his argument is a good one, provided he can interpret the terms of subscription in the same way as he interprets Scripture and the creeds. He accepts the whole of Scripture, interpreting it as symbol and allegory and parable, doubting its history, and idealising its doctrines: he can accept any creed, putting it through the “ideological process;” and there is therefore no logical difficulty in his subscribing to the Articles. By an ingenious, not to say Jesuitical, mode of explaining them, he shows very clearly how a person can at one and the same time deny and confess

the fundamental points of belief. And this same person was one of the Four Tutors, who on the 9th of March, 1841, published a Protest against the notorious Tract XC., saying, "that the modes of interpretation suggested in that Tract, evading rather than explaining the sense of the Thirty-nine Articles . . . are inconsistent with the due observance of the Statutes;" asserting that this Tract "has a highly dangerous tendency," and "puts forward *new and startling views* as to the extent to which that liberty may be carried."* It is really humiliating to trace the process by which he defends the subscription of himself and others of like mind. He is obliged to assent to the Canons (5 and 36) of 1603, which assert that those are "worthy of excommunication" "who affirm that any of the Thirty-nine Articles are in any part superstitious or erroneous;" but he suggests that they may be 'inexpedient' and 'unintelligible,' without being 'erroneous;' and that "without being *superstitious*, some of the *expressions* may appear so." In interpreting the 36th canon, which reads, 'he *alloweth* the books of articles, . . . and *acknowledgeth* the same to be agreeable to the Word of God,' he resorts to the subterfuge of explaining 'allow' in the feeble, modern sense of 'acquiescence' or 'submission,' instead of the undoubted sense of 'approve,' in which it is there used; and so, too, he asserts that one "may *acknowledge* what he does not maintain . . . meaning only that he is not prepared to contradict;" and that "agreeable to God's Word" means, "they have the same sense in the Articles that they have in Scripture, or do not contradict it;" and then he interprets Scripture as "parable, poetry or legend," as "literal or allegorical," as containing "inadequate statements," and "dark patches of human passion and error." He can undoubtedly receive the Articles just as he receives the Bible: the same principles of interpretation that apply to the one will do for the other. But does not all this show that these principles of interpretation enfeeble the moral

* See 'Certain Documents connected with Tracts for the Times,' No. 90, Oxford, 1841; cited in the Quarterly Review (London), Jan., 1861.

judgment? Ought not Pascal's Provincial Letters to be circulated anew? If all this be "allowable," another clause must be added to the old satire about the Church of England: it not only has "a Popish Prayer-Book, an Arminian clergy, and Calvinistic Articles," but also Rationalistic Interpreters.

From the statements and intimations which Mr. Wilson gives about his views, we do not wonder that he feels uneasy under the yoke of subscription, and is very much tempted to defend his main position, that "a national church need not, historically speaking, be *Christian*." Some of his opinions, as incidentally or expressly avowed, are: that the sacred writers often give us "their own inadequate conceptions, and not the mind of the Spirit;" that many of the Scriptural prophecies, applicable to things already past, "have never been fulfilled;" that the world was in no special need of a revelation when Christ came (p. 175); that the doctrines of the New Testament "were for the most part applicable only to those to whom the preaching of Christ should come;" that the Gospels contain "legendary matter and embellishment;" that there is no trustworthy Old Testament history before the taking of Jerusalem by Shishak; that the first three Gospels are irreconcilable; that John's Gospel was not by the Apostle; that "St. John's view was much narrower than St. Paul's," and Paul's charity was more ample than John's; that the resurrection may be denied, and a man still be Christian (p. 184); that excommunication in the primitive church was only for immorality, and that that church was 'multitudinist;' that a Book may be canonical and not inspired (p. 197); that there were in the apostolic church 'very distinct Christologies' (p. 201); that Calvinists must believe that "all others than themselves" "belong to the world;" that Arian, Pelagian, Lutheran and Calvinistic views are all to be merged into the ethical and moral; that the idea of an 'isolated' individual salvation, 'the rescuing one's self,' 'the grace bestowed on one's own labors,' 'the crown of glory,' and 'the finality of the sentence,' 'unfit men for this world, and prepare them very ill for that which is to come;' that

the 'application of ideology to Scripture, to the doctrines of Christianity, and to the formularies,' though Strauss 'carried it to excess,' is yet the great means of insuring unity and peace, and that 'liberty must be left to all as to the extent in which they apply the principle.' By this ideology, Jesus is 'Son of David,' 'Prince of Peace,' and 'High Priest,' all in the same way, not as fact, but in 'idea': the '*incarnation* of the divine Immanuel remains,' although the 'angelic appearances' are 'ideal' (p. 228). But what is to keep any one from idealizing in the same way the 'incarnation' (if this word does not already do it), and the resurrection, and the atonement, and the life everlasting? And, in fact, all that he leaves of the Scriptural doctrine of a future state is, as expressed in the concluding sentence (p. 232), the hope that "all, both small and great, shall find a refuge in the bosom of the Universal Parent, to *repose*, or be quickened into higher life, in the ages to come, according to his will." And thus here again we have the same tendency, as to both fact and doctrine, carried out with even greater assurance, and more boldly avowed, which indicates the real position of these essayists in the present conflict between rationalism and Christianity. Mr. Wilson adopts, in fact, every principle of criticism and interpretation contained in Strauss's Life of Christ, and the writings of the Tübingen school. If he is not aware of the inevitable tendency and logical results of these principles, he is deplorably ignorant of the themes on which he writes; if he is aware of them, and is still a believer in positive Christianity, he is betraying the cause, which in his position he ought to defend: if he cannot defend it, he is bound as an honest man to say so, and give up his position and emoluments in the church which fosters him while he is enlisted in its subversion.

It is no wonder that, holding such views, and holding on to the church, he is anxious to 'multitudinize' it—to resolve it into a mere moral society, with only ethical ends in view. A "national church," he says, "need not, historically speaking, be Christian. . . . That which is essential to a national church

is, that it should undertake to assist the spiritual progress of the nation and of the individuals of which it is composed, in their several states and stages." * What his project amounts to is this—ethics and ideology shall be nationalized, and called a church. But the establishment of such a church is the abolition of the church; it is the baptism of scepticism with the name of the church; it is the overthrow of historical Christianity. Scepticism, he virtually says, is so widely diffused that, if we are to have a national church, it must be on a basis which will admit sceptics; otherwise the church cannot be national. And when this alternative is presented to the English people, we doubt not that they will denationalize the church, rather than nationalize rationalism. It is better to save Christianity, than to continue the union of church and state at such a fearful cost. 'Multitudinism' is a sign of latitudinarianism, and not its remedy.

The contribution of Mr. C. W. Goodwin to this volume is the least ambitious of the series; it does not pretend to give the writer's dicta and judgments on all the most important questions of the day in forty or fifty pages: it confines itself to the Mosaic Cosmogony, considered "as the speculation of some Hebrew Descartes or Newton, promulgated in all good faith as the best and most probable account that could then be given of God's universe" (p. 277). He disposes of the difficulty, "that the writer asserts so solemnly and unhesitatingly, that for which he must have known that he had no authority," by suggesting, that "modesty of assertion" is the peculiar quality of "modern habits of thought," the result "of the spirit of true science." Perhaps Mr. Goodwin and the men of modern science are more "modest" than Moses and the

* Mr. Wilson wants to have the clergymen of the Church of England as exempt from the obligation to subscription as are the laymen. The Christian Remembrancer, Oct. 1860, p. 345, says, that persons professing themselves members of the Church of England may in private life hold what they please, "for they are never obliged to express their assent either to articles of religion or formularies of faith; and so the clergyman who was under the same law of liberty might be allowed to believe anything or nothing."

prophets : although we confess we should hardly have inferred as much from the present volume. The object of this essay is to expose the utter futility of all attempts to reconcile Genesis and Geology. This is achieved by taking for granted that Genesis means to teach truth in a scientific way ; that it must be literally interpreted ; and that Geology has arrived at final results about Cosmogony. Nothing in the way of fact and argument is advanced which has not been long familiar to the scientific and Christian world—nothing which has not been examined in the works of Hugh Miller in England recently, in the *Archaia* of Dawes, and in the treatises of President Hitchcock and Dr. Tayler Lewis in our own country.

Dr. Mark Pattison's essay on the *Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750*, is a valuable and historical investigation, chiefly upon the great Deistical Controversy, in which England led the way. The general external characteristics of this dispute, the points made, the principles debated, are candidly stated, and illustrated with much of curious learning. That age is described as "destitute of depth or earnestness ; an age whose poetry was without romance, whose philosophy was without insight, and whose public men were without character." As far as deism and the Christian evidences are concerned, the point insisted upon is, that the defenders of Christianity made up a 'conventional' case. Up to about 1740, the main object was to show the reasonableness of Christianity : during the latter part of the eighteenth century, the argument had chief respect to the external evidences. The Wesleyan reaction was chiefly in the sphere of personal experience. A wider reactionary movement began with the publication of the *Tracts for the Times*, 1833. The argument during the last century was upon the whole favorable to Christianity : it left the matter in about this position, that "there were three chances for revelation, and only two against it." But Dr. Pattison makes out a stronger case against the theology of the last century than the facts fully warrant ; it is not fairly described as a "home-baked theology," or an "Old Bailey theology, in

which, to use Johnson's illustration, the Apostles are being tried once a week for the capital crime of forgery ;" nor is it true, "that the more they demonstrated, the less people believed." Locke, Bentley, Berkeley, Butler, Samuel Clarke, Warburton and Paley have not, even among the men of Mr. Pattison's school, their peers in strength and acuteness of intellect, in vigor of ratiocination, in candor of judgment, in general learning, or in polemic power. By the force of intellect—for they did not find much of religious sensibility in their age to appeal to, they rescued England from the prevalence of deism and infidelity ; they overcame at home the rationalism which made such havoc when it crossed the channel. With one single exception, that of Hume, they were stronger and abler men than any of which infidelity could make its boast. The Anglican Church, and England itself, owes them a debt of profound gratitude and of lasting homage. Were they now living, or men of equal learning and power, these Oxford essayists would have to talk with bated breath. They did not, indeed, discuss the questions which modern criticism and pantheism have raised ; but they did discuss, point by point, every argument which Toland, Collins, Shaftesbury, Woolston and Hume advanced ; and they did this in a manly English way, scorning subterfuge, and not taking advantage of their position in the Church to undermine its foundations. They did not pretend to have an absolute system even of Christian truth ; but they had a system, and knew just how far they could be positive. They did not appear before the public to insinuate scepticism under the guise of historic candor, nor to marshal all the difficulties against revelation in strong array, without suggesting any solution. They did not, like Mr. Pattison, review the past history of the Evidences for Christianity only to show that these evidences were entirely inadequate ; nor close such a review of the most important questions that can be debated, with an intimation, that we cannot find a sufficient basis for revelation, either in Authority or Reason, or the Inward Light, or in self-evidencing Scripture, or in a combination of the four. This negative result, we

suppose, is what gives to this historic review a place in these Essays and Reviews.

The last tract in the series is on the Interpretation of Scripture, by the Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. It is beyond all question the most thoughtful, carefully written, ingenious and subtle essay in the book. Its grace and charm of style, its tender and often sad tone, its felicity of statement, its suggestive art, give it a kind of fascination. It perpetually reminds us of a skilful surgeon, who holds the sharp knife in a firm but tender hand, and speaks most persuasively when he knows that he is cutting most deeply. It has none of the arrogance of Williams, or the dogmatism of Powell, or the assurance of Wilson; but it is at the same time more insidious than any of them, and equally undermines all positive faith, not only in creeds, but also in the inspired authority of the Sacred Scriptures. What the essay apparently has in view is, to rescue Scripture from arbitrary and dogmatic interpretations, so that we may really know just what it means to say. But suppose we have ascertained that point—would Mr. Jowett accept its statements as final and authoritative? He certainly could not receive its statements about historic facts, as having any more authority than those of any other book, for he finds inexplicable contradictions. Would he then rest in its doctrinal results as a finality to faith? He cannot do this, for he denies any infallible inspiration. Why then is he so anxious to get at the real sense and meaning of the word? It is to him the record of a past age, a testimony as to what Paul and John believed; but even Paul and John, he says, did not claim a specific, supernatural inspiration. "For any of the higher or supernatural views of inspiration there is no foundation in the Gospels or Epistles" (p. 379). The "idea of a progressive revelation" is the only one which suits the case: a revelation imperfect and even erroneous in some of its earlier stages and forms of statement; a revelation which is constantly "enlarged" by the progress of science—enlarged of course in this way, that the science supersedes the written word: for

“revelation and science reconcile themselves the moment any scientific truth is distinctly ascertained” (p. 383). There is not, then, there cannot be, any final revelation, until science has arrived at its final conclusions. All that precedes is a process of development. There cannot be any binding and ultimate authority in the written Word, even if criticism accomplished its full work upon it, and told us just what it means. The seeming object of the essay is not its real result. It professes to wish to rescue Scripture from perversion; but the argument is so conducted, that, even when thus rescued, it has no supremacy of authority. The principles on which he would have us interpret the Book forbid our receiving it as the Word of God.

The substance of the argument is this. No book has been interpreted in so arbitrary and confused a manner as the Bible. Creeds and opinions of later origin are interpolated into its very words. All sects see themselves in this volume—which is thus a mirror rather than a standard. And in fact, Mr. Jowett grants, that they can all find something in it to support their views, and consequently that so far they are not altogether wrong. Unitarians, who deny Christ's divinity, have perhaps less support than most of the others, though at the same time Trinitarians certainly cannot find the Nicene or Athanasian creed in John or Paul. It is plain that diversity is not got rid of, by saying, that the Scriptures themselves give a basis for it. What then is the intent? Not to show that they are all equally right, but all equally wrong; that some hint of their views, but no one of their systems, is found in the Bible. The chaos of creeds has its roots in the Scriptures, but the Scriptures do not decide anything definite about any of them. No creed in Christendom, not even the Nicene, has proper Scriptural warrant. That is, if we hold to the Bible, we must give up all the creeds; but if we do, what have we left? Why, a book which sanctions something in all these perplexed confessions; and something which has no final authority.

The natural principles of interpretation which Mr. Jowett

propounds, so far as they are sound, have been very familiar to the scholars of this country. The words of Scripture have a proper historical and philological sense, which the interpreter is to find. The general laws of language apply here. And Mr. Jowett also admits that the analogy of faith, in a general sense, is a correct principle of interpretation; and he concedes a remarkable unity in the diverse books of Scripture. But when he comes to apply these general principles, he makes assumptions and assertions, which presuppose, not only that we are to interpret the Bible according to grammatical laws applicable to other books, but that we are to subject its sense and teachings to the same rules; that is, we are not to interpret it as an inspired book, but simply as a book; and we are not to apply its truths in any other way than we do any other truths. We are neither "to adapt the truths of Scripture to the doctrines of the creed;" nor to adapt "precepts and maxims of Scripture to the language or practice of our age." We are to "interpret the Scripture like any other book," although "there are many respects in which the Scripture is unlike any other book" (p. 416). If this canon, thus broadly stated, means anything, it means that in the business of interpretation we are to leave out of sight the question or fact of inspiration, as determining what authority we shall concede to the declarations of the book. It is true, that as far as the meaning of the words go, we are to interpret Scripture as we do other books; that is, we are to try and understand just what its words mean. But this is a very different thing from the position, that, having ascertained its meaning, we are to judge or decide about its truth or falsity, in the same way that we do what is found in other books. Here is where revelation and inspiration come in with a controlling influence. Yet Mr. Jowett perpetually confounds these two things. Thus—Scripture contains prophecy and records of miracles; we are to interpret the account, the words, according to the laws of language; but are we to explain the miracle and prophecy as matters of fact, just as we would those same records in an uninspired volume?

Scripture, say these literal interpreters, cannot (e. g. in prophecy) have a twofold sense; but why may not the same words have a twofold or more application? We are to interpret Scripture by its own genius and character, just as we do other works by their particular genius and character; but what is this genius or character? The real question, which Mr. Jowett perpetually keeps in the shade, is not as to the rules or methods of interpreting language; but is as to the authority of the words, supposing their sense ascertained. And in this point of view the question of inspiration is fundamental, and the fact of inspiration is a guide in interpretation. Mr. Jowett's theory allows him to hold that there are prophecies unfulfilled (Jerem. xxxvi., 30, Is. xxiii., Amos vii., 10-17); that there "are probably no quotations from the Psalms and prophets" in the Epistles, "that are based on the original sense or context;" that alleged miracles were not really performed; that there are irreconcilable contradictions* in the Gospels; that the Old Testament attributes to God actions at variance with the New; that the personality of the Holy Ghost is figurative; that original sin has its support only in "two figurative expressions of St. Paul." In fact his whole theory as to the origin and character of the Gospels would prevent him from drawing final teachings from its reports of our Saviour's words. The result of criticism, he declares, is "that we can no longer speak of three independent witnesses of the Gospel narrative;" we need not try to "reconcile their inconsistencies," all we need do is to put them "alongside of each other" (p. 405). It is in fact, he says, not "easy to say, what is the meaning of 'proving a doctrine' from Scripture;" . . . "when we balance adverse statements, St. James and St. Paul, the New Testament with the Old—it will be hard to demonstrate from Scripture any complex system either of doctrine or practice" (p. 404). It would be unjust to Mr. Jowett not to add, that in several passages he implies a belief

* He has discovered a discrepancy in the accounts of Matthew and Luke as to the original place of abode of Joseph and Mary (Matt. ii., 1, 22; Luke ii., 4).

in the divinity, and divine authority of Christ. He says, that "he made the last perfect revelation of God to man" (p. 426); and that "it is one of the highest tasks in which the labor of a life can be spent, to bring the words of Christ a little nearer to the heart of man" (p. 419). But he also says, "that we cannot readily determine how much of the words of *our Lord* or of St. Paul is to be attributed to Oriental modes of speech."

The real intent and inmost sense of this Essay are found in the general position, that all definite creeds are unscriptural; that Scripture does not contain a body of doctrine, but only certain general spiritual or moral truths; that "the distinctions of theology are beginning to fade away;" that "the universal and spiritual aspects of Scripture" are to be taught, "to the exclusion of exaggerated statements of doctrines which seem at variance with morality." The world has been taught no real truth, but only "scholastic distinctions" by the successive theological systems. "It is, perhaps, true that the decision of the Council of Nicaea was the greatest misfortune that ever befel the Christian world: yet a different decision would have been a greater misfortune." All this development has really taught us nothing about the sense of Scripture: we are to cut down the tree, its branches, and its fruit, and refer to the undeveloped germ, where all is embryonic and indistinct. But why do this? Would the world probably not be likely to go through the same process again? How strange this succession of systems, if they all end in naught. How contrary to the idea of providence; how inconsistent with a belief in the presence of Christ in his church by his Spirit! After eighteen hundred years, all we can do is just to begin again. This seems to be Mr. Jowett's idea; but with his view of Scripture it is utterly unphilosophical and impracticable. On his fundamental principle of a developed and progressive revelation, it is reactionary to the last degree. Neither he nor any one else can thus go backward. We must go forward with the church, or outside of it. We must press through the diversity to a higher unity, which shall not be any less positive, any less doctrinal, any less systematic than

what has gone before ; but more comprehensive, more complete, more practical. Faith is not to be sacrificed to morals, nor doctrine to life. We cannot do without either. Christ is "the truth" as well as "the life." And if we do not have a rounded and definite system of Christian truth, if it is all to be merged in life or indefinite spiritual truths, the Christian church will inevitably succumb before the progress of philosophy. Systems, in the long run, carry the day. If Christianity cannot be presented as a system of truth, it cannot be so presented as effectually to repel the profoundest infidelity of the age. And this Mr. Jowett does not seem to see or feel at all. And yet he is gliding along in this very current. All his arguments and reasonings against doctrines and against the Scripture are based on the principles of a system which controls him almost unconsciously. If his theories are good, they prove a great deal more than he wants or means to have them prove. He advocates certain principles and methods : and it will not be long before some one will be found to draw the legitimate conclusions. It will not take a long time to see, that the solution of the problems which press upon the age is not to be found by resolving Christian truth into a halo or a fire-mist, into a vague spirituality or an indefinite life. For then it is confronted with two compact and well-defined systems, idealism and materialism (positivism), which are fighting with conscious aim the battle for supremacy, and by which Christianity will be resolved into figure or myth, unless it can show that it contains the truth of both in a higher, a perfect, an absolute form.

It is not surprising that these Essays and Reviews, avowing such opinions, and based on such principles, should have aroused unusual attention. Their general reception in England is what might have been expected from a people that honors manliness, as one of the cardinal social and public virtues. With scarcely an exception, the leading organs of public opinion have declared against the inconsistency of such views with an honest adherence to the Church of England. And the fact, that these writers seem to think that they can

still remain connected with this church shows, that their principles of criticism may have reacted upon their moral sense. Such methods of interpretation as are here applied to the Bible and the Articles will unconsciously enfeeble the judgment. And if these principles obtain a recognized lodgment in that church, its destiny is easily foreseen. It cannot become "multitudinist;" it will only hasten the inevitable rupture of church and state. Nor do we believe that the English people will be seduced from its loyalty to Christianity by such arguments and principles. The underlying principles are those of extreme idealism, the logical consequences of which are found in the pantheistic theory of the universe. But the English mind is essentially practical and historical. It cannot sublimate facts into ideas: it cannot thrive on abstract truth. It needs only to see the real basis of all this criticism and speculation, to disown its validity. For the same process of destruction and reconstruction here applied to Christian fact and doctrine logically leads to the rejection of all that is supernatural, to the denial of a personal God, of immortality, and even of freedom and distinctive moral obligation. It overturns the whole received system of Christian truth; the shadowy form of Christ, which is still revered by some of these writers, only needs a bolder criticism, on the same basis, to be itself resolved into a mythical personage. It also implies and involves the destruction and reconstruction of the state as well as of the church.

The article in the *Westminster Review* presses the matter to such conclusions. It does indeed represent the defection as more serious and entire than the Essays warrant. It does not make sufficient allowance for the possible unconsciousness of the writers as to the character and results of their principles; but it understands the bearings of these principles themselves, and asks, "how soon will the Hebrew Scriptures take their place upon the book-shelf of the learned, beside the Arabian and Sanskrit poets?" "Of what use can it be to talk of articles and liturgy, or of creeds, to a Protestant church which has been robbed of the written word from which they are all

deduced?" It says that, "in their ordinary, if not plain sense, there has been discarded the Word of God—the Creation—the Fall—the Redemption—Justification, Regeneration, and Salvation—Miracles, Inspiration, Prophecy—Heaven and Hell—Eternal Punishment and a Day of Judgment—Creeds, Liturgies, and Articles—the truth of Jewish History and of Gospel narrative—a sense of doubt thrown over even the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and Ascension—the Divinity of the Second Person, and the personality of the Third. It may be that this is a true view of Christianity, but we insist in the name of common sense that it is a new view." It correctly judges that the "very essence of the discussion" is in the question, "not, what is the true theory of revelation, but *what is its true extent?*" Is there a specific, or only a general, revelation or inspiration? If the specific be denied, the argument of the *Westminster Review* is conclusive; if it be maintained, the criticisms of the Essays are undermined. "They are our friends, who have introduced this doctrine of ideology."

Its own general theory is given by the *Westminster Review* in "the conception of development"; this idea, it says, is what has led these authors to write such a book, and this idea, too, it asserts, is dissipating all past faiths, and preparing the race for another religion, "the outgrowth of human thought." "Step by step the notion of evolution by law is transforming the whole field of our knowledge and opinion. . . . Two coördinate ideas pervade the vision of every thinker, physicist, or moralist, philosopher or priest. In the physical and the moral world, in the natural and human, are ever seen two forces—invariable rule and continuous advance; law and action; order and progress; these two powers working harmoniously together, and the result inevitable sequence, orderly movement, irresistible growth." It is in such orderly growth that "we find the one grand analogy through the whole sphere of knowledge." Yet, at the same time, "no rational thinker hopes to discover more than some few primary axioms of law, and some approximating theory

of growth. Much is dark and contradictory." But still, the law remains, and sweeps away Christianity, and leaves positive science alone in its stead.

This is the theory of the *Westminster Review*, which it would substitute for the theistic and Christian idea of the universe. And we urge against it the same objection, which it so strongly urges against the *Essays and Reviews*—it is not fairly and honestly stated in its fundamental principle. We suppose that fundamental principle to be really Comte's theory of positivism, viz.:—that materialism is the ultimate philosophical system, and that all we can know is by induction from external phenomena. This is the only theory, which gives consistency to the positions of the *Review*. Why was it not distinctly avowed? Why does the writer complain of the Oxford men for not being willing to state all they hold, when he himself shows the same reserve? If the theory is not atheistic, it is pantheistic. But neither atheism nor pantheism is distinctly proclaimed. Why not? Again, the "two ideas" of "order" and "progress" explain nothing, give us nothing ultimate: and so the whole theory is a form without substance. Order and law presuppose something, some forms of being, some substances, which are subject to this order and these laws. "Development" is a word without contents—until we are told *what* it is that is developed; what is the *law* of the development; and *to what* the development leads as its consummation. And yet this philosophical reviewer, on a height of speculation above all the thinkers of the Christian church, presents us with a theory, which is to supersede all the past, and does not tell us a single word about the only points which could make the theory intelligible. He covers up all the difficulties in such words as "law," "order," "progress," "development." Manifestly, he has got to go through a few more categories, before he can pretend to having a system of ultimate truth. What is it, that is developed: is it ultimately, matter or spirit? What are its laws: are they those of the spiritual as well as of the material world, or are they only the law of physical

sequences? In what is the development to issue, in the conquest of nature, or in a kingdom of God? Whence this development? Is its origin to be sought in the blind forces of nature, in unconscious spirit, or in a personal God? If in either of the former—can he tell us, how the rational can be produced by the irrational, wisdom by a blind force, and personality by unconscious spirit? And if the origin of all this development, of all this law and order, is to be sought and found only and ultimately in a conscious, personal intelligence, then all of the reviewer's arguments against supernaturalism, revelation and inspiration, are worthless. For he who believes in a personal God cannot doubt the possibility of revelation, inspiration, incarnation, and redemption, in their specific Christian import: he cannot believe that natural law is all, and that supernaturalism is a fiction.

THE
THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF EMMONS.*

PROFESSOR STUART, of Andover, once wrote an essay in the *Biblical Repository* to show that Arminius was not an Arminian. And eminent divines are now busy with the inquiry whether Dr. Emmons was an Emmonsite. Did he really hold to those definite and peculiar views which are popularly associated with his venerable name? Or, are his sharp, doctrinal statements to be taken in a feminine rather than a masculine sense? to be called metaphorical and not literal, popular and not exact, Biblical in contrast with scientific? Of course, all that is necessary to make out that Dr. Emmons was not an Emmonsite, is to interpret his definite formulas in an indefinite sense, for the essence of his system is in its definiteness. Keen logic and exegetical skill can do very much with such a flexible material as human speech. Words are susceptible of a great variety of significations. Interpret all the leading terms in a very general sense, and it can easily be shown, that the most extreme men, when rightly understood, really mean just about what common mortals are always saying. A trifling difference of phraseology is all that is left. And perhaps this is the way in which theological controversy is to come to an end, viz. by interpreting everybody indefinitely. If the whole

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THE WORKS OF NATHANIEL EMMONS, D.D. *Edited by* JACOB IDE, D.D.
Boston: Congregational Board. 6 vols.

MEMOIR OF NATHANIEL EMMONS; *with Sketches of his Friends and Pupils.* By EDWARDS A. PARK. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1861. 8vo, pp. 468.

region is levelled, no mountains are left. But whatever may be in store for us in the indefinite future, it is hard to overcome our prejudices as to the past, and still more difficult to reverse the verdict of history. There are, to be sure, some signal instances of a revision and reversal of contemporary judgments. We might admit, with Hegel, that Aristotle was a profounder metaphysician than Plato; with Müller, that Augustine held to human freedom in its profoundest sense; with Cousin, that Pascal was subject to the torture of doubt; Mohammed may not have been a mere impostor, nor Cromwell a fanatical rebel, nor Henry VIII. a cruel tyrant; but still we must confess that we find it difficult to believe, that the "Wise Teacher and Royal Preacher of New England" (as the Rev. Thomas Williams calls Emmons) did not hold certain very distinct and even peculiar views upon divine efficiency, human exercises, submission, justification, and the grounds of the rewards of Paradise. And in fact, it seems to us, that just so far as the peculiarities of his system are explained away, Emmons himself is explained away. Another personage takes the place of that simple, venerable, and rigid form. The three cornered hat, small clothes, and bright knee-buckles are replaced by a loose coat, flowing pantaloons, and a soft and easy hat of modern material and fabric. Just so far as he is thus modernized, he forfeits the special rank which has been ascribed to him in the development of New England theology. If his distinct and distinctive propositions are reduced to the terms of a less severe system, his reputation as a clear and logical thinker also suffers detriment. For this emasculating process has chief respect to the vital points of his theory, those upon which he thought and preached most constantly and urgently. His "consistent Calvinism" is contained in them. Here he claimed to be Calvinistic, and not merely "Calvinistical" or "Calvinisticalish." It has been intimated, that if he had lived now, he would have expressed himself in the modified modes of his apologists; but the proper business of an expounder of Emmons, is with Emmons as he was, and not with Emmons as he might

have been under the light of our "improved" ethics and theology.

We propose, then, in vindication and elucidation of his real system, to present its characteristic features, in comparison and contrast with the earlier and later forms of New England theology, and particularly to show the conditions under which alone it can be considered as a self-consistent scheme of divinity. Incidentally it may appear, that those cannot be considered as valid Emmonsites, who discard the radical features of his system; and that those who retain only his "exercise" scheme, and who deny his "divine efficiency" theory, deny that which alone made, or can make, the exercise scheme consistent with genuine Calvinism. It is reported that a distinguished preacher once said to the venerable recluse, "Well, Dr. E., you and I agree, that all sin and holiness consist in exercises." "Yes," was the quick and searching response, "but we differ as to where the exercises come from."

After the full account given by our valued contributor, Dr. Pond, in the last number of this Review, we need add but a few words about Dr. Emmons's life and his most recent biography. The Memoir of Emmons, by Dr. Park, exhausts the subject, leaving nothing to be desired in the general portraiture of the man, his ways and surroundings. It is the most entertaining, ingenious and finished piece of ecclesiastical biography which New England has as yet sent forth in honor of her religious patriarchs. Minute divisions and subdivisions, sections and subsections, and even the aid of numbers and letters, give an almost mathematical accuracy to the arrangement of the book, as if it were written in the demonstrative method. The details are elaborated with nicety; the lights and shades are handled with consummate skill; the general as well as the particular relations of the theologian and his theology are unfolded and set in their place. Careful logic and practised criticism watch over all the details, and fit each part of the narrative into its appointed place. If the object were to represent the Franklin divine, with needed explanations, as being upon the whole the best type of New

England theology, polity, ethics, and practical divinity—that object could not have been more felicitously and acutely attempted. His chief biographer has certainly failed in his main purpose, if the reader is not convinced that Dr. Emmons is the Coryphæus of modern Congregationalism, as a system of independency in polity, and as a theory of exercises in ethics. The resources of English adjectives are put to a severe test in the contrasted descriptions, and varied encomiums, of his multiform traits of character. His idiosyncrasies and his large humanity, his habits as a pastor and student, his peculiarities of dress, manner, and conversation, his theological system in all its ramifications, and his style and method as a cogent preacher of divine truth, are set forth in such an attractive exposition, that even those who dissent most strongly from his prominent speculations must still reverence and admire and love the man. And even though it may not be made evident that he is a better and truer representative of the substantial orthodoxy of New England, than is Edwards, or Belamy, or Smalley, or Dwight, or Hopkins, or Woods; all candid readers will confess, that in clearness of statement, consistency of logic, tenacity of phraseology, and especially in sharp and curt sayings, he is surpassed by none of his peers. He defined more sharply, and stuck to his definitions better, than any preceding New England divine. Though he wrote no formal body of divinity, but only sermons or essays in the homiletic form, he undoubtedly had a system thoroughly thought out, and carefully stated to obviate objections. Herein was his superiority; and it is of this very superiority that he is robbed, when he is interpreted as speaking more concisely than precisely, more intensely than plainly, more nervously than perspicuously, on the distinguishing features of his scheme. And to subject him to the metaphorical method of interpretation is peculiarly inapt, for he himself is the most literal of our divines; his main positions are put as tight and tough, as clear and clean, as language can make them. He interprets everybody else in the most literal and obvious sense; he never allegorizes. Scripture he explains with the

simplicity of a child, and talks of the most supernatural themes as other people talk about men, and trees, and daily events. He holds to verbal inspiration, and literal interpretation, where others are staggered, or take refuge in a double sense. But he knew nothing about a double sense. He tried to say just what he meant; and if he had meant to say what his interpreters allege, he undoubtedly would and could have used the very words which they substitute for his strict formulas.

Dr. Emmons was the keenest of the old school divines of New England, and in some points the forerunner of its new school. He believed in the divinity of Christ, the Incarnation, and the Trinity—rejecting, however, in opposition to Hopkins, the eternal generation of the Son, and even stigmatizing it as “eternal nonsense.” He carried divine sovereignty to its acme, while he maintained that man has natural ability to frustrate the divine decrees. He pressed the divine efficiency to an extreme which few Calvinists have dared to do, making it extend, as creative, to all events and all the acts of the creature, sin not excepted; and at the same time he held to the entire freedom and responsibility of the creature. So strictly did he believe that the glory of God is the great end of creation, that he also asserted that sin is necessary to the greatest good, and that a willingness to be lost is the chief test of regeneration. His ethical theory enforced an impartial and disinterested benevolence as the essence of true virtue—a benevolence so comprehensive as to include all the good of all beings, and so disinterested that all self-love, if not repudiated, is merged in this universal good-will. Of the “five points” of the Calvinistic system, excepting that of a limited atonement, he was so constant an advocate, that they formed the staple of his Sunday afternoon inferences from his Sunday morning’s discourses. The decrees he declared to be the fundamental doctrine of “the *Gospel* ;” he *proved*, that “it is absolutely necessary to approve of the doctrine of reprobation, in order to be saved” (ii. 402). He held that depravity, in consequence of Adam’s sin, is universal and

total ; that the Holy Ghost literally creates in the renewed a new heart and a right spirit ; and that those thus renewed will persevere to the end, obtaining, however, the blessedness of heaven as a reward of their obedience, and not of Christ's. And thus does Emmons hold, as no one ever did either before or since, some of the extreme positions of both old school and new school. He is a supralapsarian Calvinist in all that concerns God, and the boldest of theorists in all that concerns human activity, carrying ethics and anthropology to the most startling results. He said of himself, at the age of ninety-three : " I go with the old school of New England divines half way, and then turn round and oppose them with all my might. I go with the new school half way, and then turn round and oppose them with all my might."

The essential points of his system are contained in three words—God, *efficiency*, *exercises*. The formula of his distinct and comprehensive scheme may, perhaps, be said to be this—*God, by direct efficiency, produces all events and exercises for his own glory*. Efficient and final causes are the metaphysical factors of his theory ; the material and formal causes (as Aristotle would call them) he neglects or denies. On the one hand is an absolute decree, on the other hand are events and volitions ; and the nexus between them is the immediate agency of God. And yet he says volitions are free, because God makes them free—it is their nature to be free ; and man is responsible for them because they are his. Each volition is as distinct as an atom ; it is, and must be, either wholly holy or wholly sinful ; and as holy or sinful, it is inherently worthy of reward or penalty. The moral and personal being of every child of Adam, begins with these volitions—and, in fact, all that we know or can conceive about the soul, is that it is identical with its exercises. Some of the theological bearings and consequences of these extraordinary positions will come out in the sequel ; but no one read in the history of theology can fail to recognize their peculiar character and scope. They indicate a mind of unusual keenness and penetration, subtle and scholastic, clear and con-

secutive. Emmons is, in fact, the schoolman of New England divinity; like the scholastics in logical acumen and fearless questionings; like them, too, in shrinking from no possible results of his logic; like them, in neglecting induction, and making deduction the royal road to truth; unlike them in his strong moral convictions and practical vigor of statement and appeal; and yet, again, like some of them—most resembling John Scotus Erigena, in the universality of his view of God's agency, bordering sometimes on consequences akin to pantheism—yet not pantheistic, for no theologian ever had a deeper sense of God's personal being and will, and of his entire distinction from the creature; no theologian ever pressed the idea of creation from nothing more sharply and even exclusively. Some of the recent attempts at elucidating his theology do not adequately emphasize these bolder and profounder aspects of his theory; his apologists seem anxious to smooth them over, to palliate them, to adapt them to the tastes of an enfeebled divinity, to a popular craving for the humanities and ethics—as if the substance of theology were to be found in moral philosophy, its adjuncts and inferences. But Emmons himself had no such weaknesses. He was every whit a theologian; and his moral philosophy and psychology (the latter rather barren at the best) were the handmaids and servitors of his lordly divinity. Such expounders hardly do full justice to the “grand old man;” they have not caught the inmost spirit and vital sense of his system.

The position of Dr. Emmons in the theological systems of New England is worthy of careful consideration. Isolated and peculiar* as he seems to be, his scheme is vitally interwoven with antecedent theories, and it has effected subsequent

* The late Dr. Woods, of Andover, in his essay on the Theology of the Puritans (p. 13) says: “Dr. Emmons considered himself as an innovator on the settled theology of New England. He professedly dissented from several of the doctrines contained in the Catechism, and Confession of Faith, and in the writings of Edwards. He often mentioned the fact, that but a few, comparatively, embraced his peculiar views. He hoped it would not always be so.”

speculations. Intimate relations of affiliation or contrast connect him with the older Calvinism, with the previous divines of the Edwardean school, and with the subsequent forms of New England divinity. He agreed with the school of Edwards in rejecting the direct imputation of Adam's sin, but he advanced beyond most of his predecessors in virtually resolving all imputation into an abstract divine constitution—a matter of sovereignty rather than a moral procedure. The “covenants” followed of course in the same line. He symbolized with the younger Edwards and Hopkins, and opposed the older Calvinism, as to the extent of the atonement—proclaiming it to be universal in its provisions, and recognizing in it a satisfaction to the general justice of God; but he is far from resolving it into a means of moral impression—for he says that it was “necessary entirely on God's account”; and that “nothing can make atonement for man's sins, which does not express the *same* vindictive justice of God, which he expresses in the penalty of the law.” In contrast, however, with both Edwards and Hopkins, he denied Christ's active obedience in relation to our justification, and identified justification with pardon. In opposition to the whole consensus of Calvinism, and to Edwards, Bellamy and Smalley, and following out sundry hints and speculations of Hopkins, Emmons denied the received doctrine of original sin, and reduced all sin to sinning—making, however, the first sin of each descendant of Adam to be coëval with the existence of his soul, and to be a consequence of the Adamic transgression. Taking up the hypothesis of Edwards and West as to identity and the divine causality, (*viz.*, that the identity of any created existence consists merely in the fact that a divine constitution makes it to be the same at each successive moment)—he was led to the inference, that the divine power, by an immediate agency, actually brings into being every event and every exercise, each distinctly by itself—the most thorough-going atomism, extended to mind as well as matter, surpassing even the idealism of Berkeley,* to which it is near akin. In dis-

* Professor Park, in his *Memoir of Emmons*, “recalls” the statement he

tion, too, from the older Calvinism, and in harmony with Edwards, the Franklin divine defined virtue as the love of being; following Hopkins, he called it a disinterested love; combining it with the doctrine of submission to the divine will, he drew the inference, which he supposed Paul enforced, when he declared himself willing to be accursed from Christ, for the sake of his brethren. No mediæval mystic, no French quietest, dared to make a willingness to suffer the tortures of the lost the condition of obtaining the bliss of the redeemed. And this profound mysticism was preached in the baldest prose, and proved by the keenest logic, and inculcated upon men and women in the church on Sunday, and in the conference meetings on other days of the week; and many, many a New England soul, through this torture has found its ecstasy. And this is the ethical theory which some Calvinists even now do not scruple to call—utilitarianism! * Yet, again, opposing

had previously made, that Emmons was a Berkeleian, having since heard, that Emmons had said he thought he could refute Berkeley's arguments. Emmons, perhaps, did not hold, that ideas are all; but the fundamental character of his system is eminently Berkeleian—the same view of God as immediately producing all that is external—the same individualism—the same nominalism—the same denial of the possibility of finding or conceiving any essence or substance, besides and beyond the qualities and activities of objects, etc. In what the Germans would call their theory of the universe, both Emmons and Berkeley were of the same mind.

* No philosopher ever insisted more distinctly than Emmons upon the "essential and immutable distinction between right and wrong" (see his Sermon, thus entitled). "As virtue and vice, therefore, take their origin from the nature of things, so the difference between moral good and moral evil is as immutable as the nature of things, from which it results." "The difference between virtue and vice does not depend upon the *will* of God, because his will *cannot* make nor destroy this immutable difference. And it is no more to the honor of God to suppose that he cannot, than that he can, perform impossibilities." In another sermon on the Moral Rectitude of God, he presents the whole matter in a most felicitous style. "It is the *moral nature* of benevolence, that renders it *morally* excellent; and it is the *natural tendency* of benevolence to promote *happiness*, that renders it *naturally* excellent. It is the *moral nature* of selfishness that renders it *morally* evil. And it is its *natural tendency* to promote *misery*, that renders it *naturally* evil. The *nature* of benevolence is one thing, and its *tendency* is another. The *nature* of selfishness is one thing, and its *tendency* another.

the older Calvinism, and in conjunction with the Hopkinsians, he preached natural ability and the necessity of immediate repentance, in deference to his exercise theory, sharpening the statements on both points; still, however, fighting the Arminian self-determination, and inculcating the strict irresistibility of divine grace. In the theodicy, Calvinism has generally been content with leaving the ultimate ground of the divine permission of sin an inscrutable mystery; but this did not satisfy the restless questionings of the school of Edwards, in their endeavors to fathom the ways of God. Dr. West, of Stockbridge, declared that sin was a necessary means of the greatest good. Dr. Hopkins wrote a treatise entitled, *Sin, through the Divine Interposition an Advantage to the Universe* (that is, as overruled, and not in its own nature). And Emmons, bolder than the rest, not only, with Hopkins, denied the palliative of "permission," to which most Calvinists clung, but also made God the efficient cause of sin, intrepidly asserting, "that there was the same *kind*, if not the same degree of necessity in the divine mind, to create sinful, as to create holy beings," viz., that he might display his justice and his grace. And thus he carried out to its sharpest extreme, in prosaic and logical terms, what even Augustine and Calvin veiled in the language of feeling and of faith:

"O felix culpa, quæ talem et tantum
Meruit habere Redemptorem!"

These general statements as to the historical relations of Emmons, make it evident that he gathered together, and sharpened out, several scattered theories of New England divines on special and important points, in which they some-

The *nature* of benevolence is *immutable*, and it cannot be altered by the Deity. The nature of selfishness is *immutable*, and cannot be altered by the Deity. But the *tendency* of benevolence, and the *tendency* of selfishness may be altered." He even goes so far as to say, "If it were supposable that benevolence should have a *natural* tendency to promote *misery*, still it would be *morally excellent* in its *own nature*. Or if it were supposable that *selfishness* should have a *natural tendency* to promote *happiness*, still it would be in its *own nature*, *morally evil*."

what deviated from the Calvinistic tradition, while, at the same time, he pressed certain fundamental articles of the Reformed theology, severed from their organic relations with the whole system, to logical results, from which even the strictest Presbyterians recoiled. He himself says that he early threw away his "crutches," and took to making "joints." The "crutches" were what he also calls the "wens and protuberances" of Calvinism—e. g. original sin, imputation, inability, limited atonement, etc. The "joints" consisted in dovetailing what remained of Calvinism into the New England speculations about virtue, the will, ability, the atonement, etc. His Calvinism was concentrated into the doctrine of "divine efficiency;" the new elements were, for the most part, brought under the word "exercises." To "joint" this "efficiency" and these "exercises" was the problem. The solution was in the position that the divine efficiency creates the exercises. That is—the divine efficiency is the constructive idea, and the theory of exercises is the regulative factor of the distinctive theology of Emmons.

Before showing how the two were conjoined, it may be well to add a word upon the relation of Emmons to the older Calvinism; his relation to later theories will best come up by and by. Calvinism, in its historical growth, has assumed a variety of forms; it has been prolific in systems. Running through them all is the theory of the divine sovereignty, or predestination, viz., that the will of God is the source and end of all things. The earlier Calvinism (and Luther, too) was penetrated with this idea. But it was soon modified by the theology of the covenants, which relieved the dogma of the absolute decree, and introduced historical transactions and elements. The plan of God (this is what the theory of the covenants, in substance, said) is not one of arbitrary will and sovereignty, it rather involves, in its essential idea, moral compacts on the basis of right and rights. The Confession and Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly contain both these elements—the sovereignty and the covenants. Emmons discarded the covenants, and constructed his system on the

basis of the divine will. Hence he is called a hyper-Calvinist. The Calvinism, too, of this country and of Scotland, has been infralapsarian; Emmons was a supralapsarian—the most consistent form of the unrelieved doctrine of divine sovereignty. And so the Presbyterians, as a general rule, heartily opposed Emmons, both as a hyper-Calvinist and as an Arminian; the former in respect to sovereignty, the latter in respect to sin, ability, the atonement, and related points. No thorough-going Presbyterian was ever willing to say, that God creates sinful exercises; that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that all sin and holiness consist in exercises; that man has the natural ability to frustrate the divine decrees; and that justification means only pardon. And, whether from a deficiency in logic or piety, or for some other reason, none of them were ever willing to be—"lost," even for the glory of God.

The constructive idea of the system of Emmons is that of the Divine Efficiency. Predestination and decrees are his strong points. Professor Park, in his analytic survey of the "Formative Principles" of this theology, introduces the "Loveliness of God," as the first characteristic of the system. But such is not the general and the most obvious impression made by his writings. The "supremacy" of God, which his biographer states as the second characteristic, would be first suggested to most minds. We are also told, under another distinct head, that his system illustrates "the Duty of Union with God," and that this is, in fact, "the *principium*" of his teachings; but this idea of union is quite incidental to the main scope of his theorizings, and not at all a capital characteristic. The absolute, supreme, irresistible, all-embracing, all-producing, all-sustaining energy of the divine will, making every event and act march to the music of the divine glory, is unquestionably the predominant idea of this most "consistent" of Calvinists. The emphasis is always upon power, and divine power; God orders all things after the counsel of his own will, for his own glory. And the peculiarity of his theory is in so far identifying the divine decrees and the divine agency,

as to assert that what God decrees, he does. The divine agency is always and ever an immediate, productive, creative energy. Preservation is a continual creation. The agency of God, he says, consists "in nothing before his choice, nor after his choice, nor beside his choice. His willing or choosing a thing to exist is all that he does in causing it to exist" (Works, iv., 379). He is the "universal cause." "It is his agency, and nothing but his agency, that makes men act and prevents them from acting" (iv., 272). "He exerts his agency in producing *all* the free and voluntary exercises of every moral agent, *as constantly and fully as in preserving, and supporting his existence*" (iv., 383). All men's "motions, exercises or actions must proceed from a divine efficiency" (iv., 366). "Mind," he says, "cannot act any more than matter can move without a divine agency." In short, the divine agency is simply the divine creative energy, at work in all events and all actions. In harmony with this view, the divine providence and government are represented as only the immediate agency of God producing whatsoever he will for his own glory. God, he says, "governs the moral as well as the natural world, and both by a positive agency, and not a bare permission." Second causes have no efficiency in themselves.

This, now, is a very simple and a very comprehensive theory. It is also a very mechanical and arbitrary hypothesis. It is taken from the sphere of the natural forces, and transferred without qualification to the sphere of providence. Efficient and final causes are the working factors; and the efficient produces the final cause. The fundamental conception is that of simple causative energy or force, universalized. It rests on the thesis, that the laws of nature (extended by Emmons to the moral world) are solely modes of the divine operation. How Emmons handles the matter is strikingly seen in a "familiar conversation," reported by his biographer: "Do you believe," says Emmons, "that God is the efficient cause of sin?" "No." "Do you believe that sin takes place according to the usual laws of nature?" "Yes."

‘What are the laws of nature, according to Newton?’ ‘They are the established modes of the divine operation.’ ‘Do you approve of that definition?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Put those things together.’” Now all this may be very ingenious; and there are only two objections to it. One objection is, that the laws of nature are *not* merely the established modes of the divine agency; and the other objection is, that sin cannot be said to take place simply according to “the usual laws of nature.” If it did, sin would be as much a law of nature as is gravitation. The theory—supernatural and theological as it undoubtedly is—is strongly naturalistic in its prime postulate. And the progress of the natural sciences, recognizing in nature living, organizing principles, as well as mere dynamic agencies from without, has dissolved the spell of this Newtonian formula, once so highly prized. Even as a theory of nature it is imperfect.

The biographer of Emmons has another way of explaining the theory of efficiency. Conceding (p. 387) that Emmons says that “God is the only efficient cause;” and that he also says, that “man is not the efficient cause” of his own acts; he meets the difficulty by the assurance, that “efficiency” has an entirely different sense in the two cases. According to this explanation, it seems, that when this “exact” divine says that “God is the only efficient cause,” he means by “efficient,” “*independent* ;” and when he says, that “man is not the efficient cause” of his choices, he means by the same word, “efficient,” something totally different, viz. : “*producing a volition by previously choosing to produce it.*” * We had no idea that the word “efficient” had such a variety of significations; and the curiosity of the matter is, that in neither of these cases (the test cases of the system) does

* “The objector asks: Does not Emmons affirm that man is not the efficient cause of his own choices? He does, sometimes; but *then* he means by efficient cause, that agent who produces a volition by previously choosing to produce it.” “But, rejoins the critic: Does *not* Emmons affirm or imply that God is the only efficient cause in the universe? He does. But here he uses the word *efficient* as denoting *independent.*” (Memoir, p. 387.)

“efficient” mean anything like what it is usually supposed to mean. In the one case it means “independent,” but that does not necessarily involve the idea of power; in the other case it means an absurdity, a merely fictitious power. This explanation is doubtless well meant; but, as the careful and precise Emmons would say, it is “clogged with gravelling difficulties;” and we do not wonder that the biographer felt compelled to add “that his language on this theme is more nervous than perspicuous, more compressed than precise;” though we are still unable to divine how such use of language is any more “nervous” or “compressed,” than it is “perspicuous” or “precise.” And Emmons does not merely use the word efficient; he also employs a great variety of kindred terms. For example: “The Deity, therefore, is so far from *permitting* moral agents to act independently of himself, that, on the other hand, he puts forth a *positive influence* to make them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as he pleases.” “Positive influence” here means the same as “efficient;” can it be translated by “independent?” He adds: “Such a dependent creature could no more produce his own volitions than his own existence.” Man’s dependence is described as “universal and absolute.” In fact, in enforcing this favorite theme, our logical and metaphysical theologian uses all the exact and scientific terms and phrases applicable to the subject. By interpreting his most definite phrases in an indefinite sense, there is some danger of obscuring his otherwise luminous utterances.

Another way in which it is attempted to obviate the objections to this obnoxious doctrine is in the statement that Dr. Emmons did not mean to teach “the mode in which God secures the fulfilment of his decrees,” but only the fact, that he does secure the fulfilment. But this reply (Memoir, pp. 417–419) seems to overlook the real point of the objection. Conversant as was Dr. Emmons with the decrees of the Most High, he would doubtless have shrunk back from the position, that he knew how God creates all events and volitions. But the real objection is, that he identifies the divine

agency in respect to all events, and all actions, whether good or bad. *How* he acted we do not know; but Emmons says, that, whatever be the mode, "his agency was concerned in *precisely the same manner* in their [men's] wrong, as in their right actions;" and "that there was no possible mode in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts." (We were about to underscore these last words, but, upon reflection, think that it is quite unnecessary). Now, though Dr. Emmons did not know just how God produces these volitions, yet one thing he did know, that he produces them by his direct efficiency, by immediate interposition, that in short He creates all sinful, as well as all holy volitions. But this leads us to the next topic in order—that is,

The agency of God in producing sin. His theory on this vital question is simply an application of his scheme of efficiency. The theodicy of this single-hearted and single-eyed divine is as simple, straightforward, unambiguous, unshrinking as is his conception of the divine agency. Sin is necessary to the greatest good; God, to manifest all his glory, must produce sin; this he does by creating sinful volitions. If men "need any kind or degree of divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind in doing evil" (ii, p. 441). "He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act, but he made them act. He not only exhibited motives before their minds, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives" (ii, p. 441). In the case of Saul, we have a more definite analysis. After saying, that there was "a necessary and infallible connection between Saul's actions and motives," he adds, that "this certain connection could be owing to no other cause than a secret divine influence on his will, which gave energy and success to the motives which induced him to execute the designs of Providence."* In the same sermon it is

* Sermon on Man's Activity and Dependence Illustrated and Reconciled.

said, that "on this theory it is as easy to account for the first offence of Adam as for any other sin," which is undoubtedly a fact. After disposing of all other possibilities as insufficient, he adds: As these and all other methods to account for the fall of Adam *by the instrumentality of second causes*, are insufficient to remove the difficulty, it seems necessary to have recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose that God wrought in Adam both to will and to do in his first transgression." "Satan placed certain motives before his mind, which by a divine energy took hold of his heart and led him into sin." In the same way it is argued that we can "*easily* account for the moral depravity of Infants." After showing that depravity cannot be "hereditary," he finds the "easy" solution of the supposed difficulty in the statement, that "in consequence of Adam's transgression, God brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants he forms them with moral powers, and makes them men in miniature. And being men in miniature, he works in them both to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts, in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists." (By the way, we should like to have a thorough-going Emmonsite, if such there be, tell us, whether such an infant, whose sin is coeval with his moral being, has the natural ability to resist this agency of God in producing his first sin? If not, does not the natural ability fail at the fatal and decisive juncture?) In short, his doctrine is that "there is but one true and satisfactory answer to be given to the question which has been agitated for ages, *Whence came evil?*—and that is, *It came from the First Cause of all things*" (ii., 683). And all these statements, which might be indefinitely multiplied, are reiterated in the most emphatic manner, and personally applied in the famous Pharaoh sermon,* leaving no doubt,

* God, he says, "determined to operate on his [Pharaoh's] heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded for him,

one would think, as to the real sentiments of this plainest and simplest and most literal of preachers—or, as Emmons used the phrase,—of this “sentimental preacher,” meaning a man who, like Paul, preached plainly and metaphysically at the same time. The amount of the matter is this—that he uniformly avoids making any distinctions as to the mode of the divine agency. He identifies that agency in the material and moral world; he identifies it in respect to both sin and holiness. He makes no distinctions upon the points where the theologians of all ages have been most perplexed and most careful, viz., the different modes of the divine operations. God in his view always acts as a sheer creative energy. Sin is the product of the divine efficiency.

But yet we are informed, on venerable authority, that the views of this straightforward divine, who wrote “plain sermons for plain people,” have been, on this point, extensively misunderstood and misrepresented. His general doctrine of divine efficiency, and the natural interpretation of his language, as above cited, undoubtedly favor the current misapprehension. Logic demanded of him to make just these statements; and he made them. But we are told, that he said God “created evil,” because the “Bible” used this phrase-

and procured him respite, God stood by him, and moved him to exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and governed all the exercises of his mind, from the day of his birth to the day of his death. This was absolutely necessary to prepare him for his final state. All other methods, without this, would have failed of fitting him for destruction.” One of the most ingenious parts of the Memoir is the running commentary given by Dr. Park (pp. 409–411) to these hard sayings, transferring them *εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, interpreting them as Biblical and intense; illustrating one of his own criticisms, that such explanations are “at the expense of Emmons’s immaculate reputation for perspicuity”; and also giving point to an anecdote which he repeats, about a preacher who took for his text, “God hardened Pharaoh’s heart,” and announced as the proposition of his discourse, that the Lord did not harden Pharaoh’s heart; and on leaving the church was asked, “Which his hearers must believe, his sermon or his text?”

ology. Is it not rather to be said, that he used the Biblical phrase, because it is so pertinent and exact? He says "texts ought not to be adduced to explain *first principles*, but first principles are to be adduced to explain and establish the sense of every text of Scripture;" and the first of all his first principles was undoubtedly that of the divine agency. And why, too, did he not lay equal stress on other words and phrases of the Bible, which suggest an entirely different view of God's agency in respect to sin? Manifestly, because these phrases were not so congruous with his radical theory. And, yet again, Emmons on this point does not merely quote the language of Scripture; quite as frequently he uses the most precise scientific and metaphysical phraseology—'cause,' 'produce,' 'make,' 'efficient cause,' 'positive influence,' 'immediate interposition,' 'without the instrumentality of second causes,' and the like. The philosophical vocabulary of his age has hardly a word or phrase, denoting direct causal agency, which he does not apply to the case of God's relation to sin.

We are also assured (Memoir, p. 405), that when this 'ardent' and 'intense' logician tells us "it is extremely difficult to conceive how he [Adam] should be led into sin without the *immediate interposition* of the Deity," that by 'interposition' is here meant only "an interposition of new influences, or a *change* of the former influences." But "immediate interposition" is surely more than "influence"; it is the direct agency of God, which Emmons *defines* "as the willing or choosing a thing to exist" (iv., 379). And so, too, when this "perspicuous" theologian affirms that Adam's sin cannot be accounted for "by the instrumentality of second causes," we are told (p. 405), that "he means the mere *influence of motives, etc., without any attendant and governing agency of God.*" How much the slight, "*etc.,*" so carelessly thrown in, may be meant to mean, we cannot of course conjecture; but if it does not mean a great deal more than all the rest of the passage, this interpretation reduces "second causes" to a very insignificant affair. Did not Emmons mean to include the

will, as well as motives, in these second causes? He himself says, "there is no *possible* way in which God could dispose men to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volition in their hearts." Which shall we believe, the definite dogma or the indefinite interpretation? Such explanations dint and blunt the edge of our acutest divine's sharpest sayings.

Another attempt is made to obviate this fatal difficulty in the scheme of this most "consistent Calvinist," by resolving his theory of divine agency into the more general doctrines of decrees and providence (Memoir, p. 407). Thus, when Emmons says that God makes Adam's posterity sinners "*by directly operating on the hearts of children, when they first become moral agents*" (ii., p. 263), this is interpreted as meaning, that "the divine *agency* keeps pace with the divine *determination*; that the *providence* of God embraces the same *principles*, and has the *same extent*, with the decrees of God; that there is no more objection to the doctrine of divine *efficiency* securing the *occurrence* of all things than to the doctrine of divine *purposes* securing the *certainty* of all things." This seems plausible, until we reflect that it does not touch the point of the difficulty. The difficulty is—that God is said to make men sinners; the reply here suggested is, that there is no more objection to his making them so, than to his decreeing to make them so; which of course is true. There is the same difficulty about his decreeing to make them sinners as about his making them sinners. The real question is, whether God does decree to *make* them sinners by his own act? Is God's providence simply and solely God's direct agency? In short, if 'providence' and 'certainty,' in this explanation, mean the same with 'agency' and 'efficiency,' the difficulty is not answered, but only reaffirmed; and if 'providence' and 'certainty' mean anything more extensive than 'efficiency,' then the explanation is inconsistent with Emmons's fundamental doctrine.* The

* "None can have a full and just idea of the universality and perfection of divine providence, without considering God as governing all moral agents in all their moral conduct, by a powerful and irresistible influence. It is a

turning point about his system is in this very question, whether providence is to be resolved into efficiency, or efficiency into providence. He says the former, and this apology interprets him as meaning the latter. But, "to vouch this is no proof, without more certain and more overt test."

One of the tests of the way in which a system is really held, is the mode in which objections to it are met and answered. The same objections were made to the theory of Emmons, while he yet lived, as are now strongly felt and urged. Did he reply to them as his present defenders reply? If so, he held the system as they defend it; if not, not. Thus we are assured that he "neither used nor tolerated the phrase" that God is "the author of sin." * Though this denial is not con-

gross absurdity to suppose that the providence of God is more extensive than his agency, or that he ever governs men without exerting a positive influence over them." (Emmons's Works, iv., 372.)

* A venerable and distinguished Massachusetts divine, after reading the article of Dr. Pond in our last number, sent us a communication on this point, from which we make a few extracts, omitting some of the quotations from Emmons, which we have already made. "Dr. Pond says: 'Dr. Emmons is charged with holding that God is, in the strictest and most proper sense of the term, the *author of sin*. But this is an unfounded allegation. That the providence of God is somehow concerned in the existence of evil, he certainly did hold. But he believed, that every man is the responsible *auctor* or *actor* of his own sin; and the phrase, *God the author of sin*, he never used.' But the English term *actor* is not derived from the Latin word *auctor*, though here very shrewdly used as synonymous with it; *author* is derived from *auctor*. Let it be, then, that God is not the *actor* of man's sin; yet in the opinion of Dr. E. he is the *auctor*, the *author*. For what is the meaning of *author* 'in the strictest and most proper sense of the term?' Dr. Webster, in his Dictionary, defines author as 'one who produces, creates, or brings into being;' also 'the beginner, former, or first mover of anything; hence the *efficient cause* of a thing.' Now what is the language of Dr. Emmons in respect to the cause of sin? Is it not in its plain, obvious meaning the same, as if he had said, 'God is the *author* of sin'? The following are his words: 'Moral agents can never act, but only as they are acted upon by a divine operation.' (Works, iv., 357, ed. 1842.) 'Adam's first sin was a *free*, voluntary exercise, *produced* by a divine operation in the view of motives.' He represents God as the *efficient cause* of all the wicked actions of men; for he says, 'Whether men have a good or *bad* intention in acting, God has always a good design in *causing* them to act as they do' (iv., 373). 'The Deity is so far from permitting moral agents to

tained in any of his published writings, yet we can readily accept it, because the word "author" is ambiguous; and he uses only unambiguous phrases. Thus he certainly was wont to defend outright, without qualification, the position that "God is the efficient cause of sin;" and the only difference of the two phrases is that the latter expresses his real idea more definitely. On page 454 of the Memoir is a reported conversation of Dr. Emmons on this very topic; and the amount of it is, that instead of retracting or modifying his statements, he reiterates his position in various forms; as, e. g., "God's will is creative;" he has only to put forth a volition, and the event takes place;" his "will was creative" when he "willed sin to exist." And then, explicitly: "My theory is that *God causes moral evil in the act of willing it.*" Here are certainly no "ambages or circumgyrations;" he marches right up to the mark, and does not qualify by even an "immediate interposition" of "influences," and "motives," and other psychological and providential phenomena. So, too, when pressed by the objection, that if "God produces our moral exercises,

act independently of himself, that he puts forth a *positive influence to make* them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as he pleases' (iv., 361). There can be no mistake of his meaning, that God *causes* the actions of all men, the most wicked as well as the good, for he said just previously that God must necessarily determine beforehand 'how he will *work* in us both to will and to do,' and 'how we shall will and do through every period of our existence.' Thus, too, he asserts, that 'the criminality of men does not consist in the *cause* of their evil desires, affections, designs, and volitions, but in their evil desires, affections, designs, and volitions themselves (iv., 374). After reading this plain language of Dr. Emmons, and much more in the same strain, as to God's being 'the cause' of all the wicked actions of men and of the devil and his angels too, for his words as quoted include 'all moral agents' in the universe as being '*made to act*' in every instance 'just as God pleases;' and after reading also his sermon 'on the Scriptural Account of the Devil,' I feel constrained to remark, that he has written a very good sermon on the devil, but a very bad sermon concerning God; for he well maintains from the Scriptures the personality and agency of the devil; but he ascribes to the agency and efficiency of God the *production* of the sin of the devil and of all the sin in the world, whereas God himself warns us by his Apostle James, 'let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God,' and teaches us by his Apostle John, 'he that committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning.'"

then they must be his," he responds, that "there is no foundation for this conclusion, since our moral exercises are *productions* of the divine *power*, and not *emanations* of the *divine nature*;" that is, all that he excludes is pantheism (Sermon on Man's Activity, etc.); he allows that God's power produces them, but says that they are not of the same nature with God—and this is his chief defence. He likewise asserts, that "it is as consistent with the moral rectitude of the Deity to produce sinful, as holy exercises in the minds of men. His operations and their voluntary exercises are totally *distinct*." Undoubtedly; but still he holds that the "exercises," though distinct, are produced by God's "operations." In another passage he meets a kindred difficulty by suggesting that "God's secret will respects one thing, but his revealed will respects another;" his secret will, whereby he ordains and produces the sin, respects "the taking place of things;" his revealed will, in which sin is prohibited and condemned, has respect "to the moral quality of things." "Sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another" (iv., 292). And he therefore concludes, that God, with entire consistency, can both produce and punish sin. Now, it is indeed true that a distinction can be made between the "nature of sin" and the "taking place of sin;" but no distinction can be made between the act of sin and the taking place of sin—especially on Emmons's theory, which makes all sin consist in act. And, he expressly asserts, that each act of sin is produced by God, and that each act of sin is in its own nature sinful. "Put these two things together." And even though it be alleged, that it is produced by God for his own glory—this only makes the matter still worse. For the glory of God is in his holiness; sin is the opposite of holiness; the opposite of holiness is then necessary to holiness. The distinction at the basis of his argument is illusory. But such argumentation shows what a terrible power there may be in logic to blind the minds of even the best men in respect to the most awful and vital themes. The sharp logician is tempted to mistake an abstract distinction for a real difference. But our object here

is not so much to debate this point as to show how Emmons defends his system, in contrast with the mode adopted by some of his advocates. His defence uniformly presupposes that divine efficiency is ultimate and absolute; his modern defenders suppose that this efficiency is to be explained away. They say that by efficient he means independent, but he says that efficiency is a productive energy; they say his phrases are Biblical, and he defends them as exact; they resolve his efficiency into providence, he resolves providence into efficiency; they suggest a double sense from which his simple common sense would have instinctively recoiled; they interpret his most definite propositions as "forceful rhetorical turns;" and the turns are "forceful," and they are "rhetorical," but they are also strictly logical. Emmons, in short, rests ultimately upon a theological basis, and his advocates upon certain assumed ethical maxims.

And yet it is claimed, that he held to "Exercises" as well as "efficiency." "The Exercise Scheme," says Dr. Ide, "is by common consent his." And this leads us to the next point in discussion—the other half of the system. While he brings his Calvinism under the term Efficiency, he defends under the name of Exercises those views in mental and moral philosophy which the pressure of some New England speculations had led him to adopt. And here are several of his most startling positions; those in which he is at war with the Calvinistic tradition. He is as strenuous, logical, and dogmatic on this side as he is on the other. He counts his postulates to be axiomatic. He fully believes them to be not only consistent with, but deductions from his stern Calvinism. He does not think that he is holding two schemes, but only one. And our general position here is this—that whoever adopts his Exercise Scheme must, if logical, also adopt his main inferences from it; and that his exercise scheme is made Calvinistic only by theory of Divine Efficiency. In all this, the Franklin divine is by far the most logical and consistent theologian that New England has produced. In relation, too, to tendencies current in his times, his positions were carefully

and consistently taken. He wanted to defend Calvinism equally against Antinomianism, Arminianism, and Universalism. His exercise scheme was to extirpate the Antinomians; while the divine efficiency, in combination with the exercises, was to root out all Arminians and Universalists.

What now are these Exercises on which so much depends? “Exercise” is the generic word, by which Emmons denotes all mental and moral states, or rather acts; for he does not recognize a spiritual state, which is not an activity. Some interpret him as implying, that the soul itself is only these exercises. Each exercise, he says, is simple and single, produced, of course, by the divine agency. The moral exercises, those of the heart or will (which Emmons does not sunder),* are termed Volitions. These Volitions, and volitions alone, have a moral character; each one of them is either perfectly holy or perfectly sinful. † There is no character in anything preceding these volitions (in any antecedent taste, bias, principle or disposition), for the cogent reason, that there is no such taste or bias, about which we can know or affirm anything. Each of these volitions, still further, is created perfectly free; and a man that has them can do as he has a mind to. Volitions, and volitions alone, are the subjects of moral approbation or disapprobation, of reward or punishment. God’s moral government knows nothing about anything else.

Such being the character of these voluntary acts—several “interesting” conclusions follow. (1) There is no original sin, in the sense of hereditary depravity. Adam committed the only strictly original sin that this world ever knew. That is, the only mere man, who, according to the doctrine of the church, had no original sin, is, according to Emmons, the only one who ever had any. “All sin is sinning.” (2) There was original righteousness, in the strictest sense, in Adam. God

* The Taste men first made the articulate distinction between the heart and the will. See Burton’s Essays (a book too little known), pp. 19, 53, 84, *et passim*.

† Hopkins also said (System, i., 129): “Every Moral action is either perfectly holy or perfectly sinful.”

created him holy. "It is agreeable to the nature of virtue, or holiness to be created." (See his Sermon on the Primitive Rectitude of Adam.) He adds, that holiness is "something which has a real and positive existence, and which not only *may*, but *must* be created." "Adam could not be the efficient cause of his own volition." "God not only *might*, but *must* have created Adam either holy or unholy." (3) There is, and can be, no imputation, either of sin or of righteousness. Each man, or rather, each volition, stands or falls for itself alone. Men are indeed "constituted" sinners in consequence of Adam's sin; but solely in virtue of a divine, sovereign "constitution," and not at all as a moral, still less as a legal procedure; for all that is moral is in single volitions, and not in any generic constitution.* So, too, by the strictest parity of reasoning, there cannot be any imputation of Christ's righteousness—for all holiness is in the individual volitions, and in nothing else. (4) It equally follows, in the way of logic, that justification is simply forgiveness or pardon, and does not include or involve any title to eternal life. (5) The theory itself expressly declares that each volition must be perfectly holy or perfectly sinful. This, to be sure, is against all consciousness, and could never be proved, either from Scripture, or by induction. But the logic demands it—and if the facts do not correspond, so much the worse for such very illogical facts. Some other "entertaining sentiments," as Hopkins would call them, might be deduced from this same theory; but these are enough to exhibit the character and bearings of the speculation, and to warrant a more particular inquiry into its grounds and reasons.

Materialists hold that the mind is a modification of matter—matter acting in certain modes—the substance, however,

* In his own singular phraseology: "By constituting Adam the public head of his posterity, God suspended their holiness and sinfulness upon his conduct. So that his holiness would *constitutionally* render them holy, and his sinfulness would *constitutionally* render them unholy." *Constitutional* here means a sovereign constitution or plan of God. In modern Hopkinsianism constitution is used for what is human, in old Hopkinsianism for a divine arrangement.

being distinct and distinguishable from its activities. Almost all ancient and modern spiritual psychologists agree in the positions, that the mind or soul is a simple essence, having its proper qualities or faculties, and that its activities or exercises are the manifestations of this essence and these properties. That is, both materialists and spiritualists make a distinction between the substance and its qualities, and between both of these and their activities or exercises; and this seems agreeable to common sense and the nature of things. Almost all, too, carry this distinction out in such a way, that they say of any beings or substances, existing in time, that the essence is or may be before the manifestation; that the activity is the product of, and of course is possibly subsequent to, the essence, attributes or tendencies. Distinguishable in thought, they may also be in the order of time—so far forth as they are finite. The peculiarity, now, of Emmons's metaphysics and psychology on this point is, that he refuses to recognize, or at least to apply, these fundamental distinctions. He identifies the soul with its energies; tendencies with activities; taste or principle with exercises; the heart with the will; the will with volitions; and, in the last analysis, essence with phenomena. The popular and bungling phase about his theory is, that he maintained that the soul is a chain or series of exercises.* Professor Park (Mem., 412) attempts to shield him on this point from the felicitous and well-aimed shaft of the New Haven professors (cited, *ibid.*, p. 420); but all that his quotations prove is—that nobody could use the English language and be consistent with such a theory. And in fact, the theory is demanded by the whole spirit of Emmons's theology. If there was anything which

* Dr. Dwight, it is well known, wrote an able sermon on this theme. It is generally supposed that Emmons was meant; but we recollect seeing some years since, a statement that the President of Yale had in mind somebody nearer New Haven—the younger Edwards. If this be so, it shows that in the Exercise Scheme, as well as on the Atonement, and the happiness theory of ethics, and the position that man has physical ability to overcome his moral inability, the younger Edwards, unlike his father, was a forerunner of much modern Edwardianism.

he hated with a pure theological odium, it was Arminianism ; if there was anything which he loved with an intense theological affection (next to his moral love for God and his neighbor) it was Efficiency and Exercises—efficiency in behalf of God, and exercises in view of man. Now if he could only contrive to make this love and this hatred work into one system, he might well say, speaking theologically, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith, henceforth, etc. Such an accomplishment was worthy of a strenuous theory, even if a point were strained in making it. The main difficulty was in reconciling his love for Exercises, with his hatred to Arminianism ; and this on two points. Arminians held, with him, that all sin and holiness are in exercises ; they also held, being seduced thereto by common sense, that there is a soul with all its power and tendencies, before the exercises ; and, since there is no sin except in exercises, they concluded—being heretics, that such a soul, before it acted, was in an innocent or neutral state. Now it would never do for a strict Calvinist to grant this—and yet, says Emmons, all sin is sinning, and all holiness is active love. Here is the emergency, and “the giant” (as Professor Park calls him) showed himself equal to the task. He just said—God creates volitions—and the thing was done : Gioberti’s formula, *Deus creat existentias*, is not more keen. That is—no tendencies before acts, for if there were, those tendencies must be neutral,* which leads to Arminianism ; but, if there may be a soul before an act, then there may be tendencies before activities—consequently, no soul before an act ; but, there must be a soul before an act, if the category of essence and attributes be rational and ultimate—consequently, this category must be ignored.† And in all this, Emmons is emi-

* Hopkins preceded Emmons in the attempt to explain what came before the exercises as a “neutral” ground ; but he at last seemed inclined to resolve it into a mere divine constitution. Emmons saw that this was the only consistent course.

† “We are conscious,” says Emmons, “of having perception, reason, conscience, memory, and volition. These are the essential properties of the soul, and in these properties the essence of the soul consists ; we can

nently "consistent." To be sure, a fundamental idea of the human mind is set aside, and one application of the law of causality is slurred over—but what is that, compared with the rout of the Arminians, and the triumph of supralapsarian Calvinism, combined with a steadfast adherence to the Exercise scheme? His theory is, that God creates the soul in creating its exercises; that he brings every descendant of Adam into being a sinner, in consequence of Adam's sin. Man's personal and moral being, and his sinning, are simultaneous. "It is impossible," he says, "to conceive of a corrupt and sinful nature, *prior to*, and *distinct from*, corrupt and sinful exercises." Why not? Not merely, as is now held, because all sin must consist in act; but for the profounder reason, that the very soul consists of activities. He saw that he could not, as a good metaphysician and logician, defend the former position without advancing the latter. Here was his strategic point.

In other words, though Emmons denied original sin, yet he did it in an entirely different sense from that of modern Hopkinsianism. He did it on the basis of a wholly different metaphysic and psychology. Holding that there was no soul except in volitions, he could afford to say, there is no original sin, for the conclusive reason that his theory does not recognize any moral and personal being, of whom such original sin could be predicated. (What might possibly become of the fœtus, if it died before it got a soul, is here the unanswered question.) He could very well say, and did say, that as soon as there is a real human being, it is sinful, because it is created in the act of sinning—the soul is caught in the very act. And thus his theory enables him to be very strenuous about the connection between Adam's sin and ours. But the whole state of the case was entirely altered, when Berkeleianism was supplanted by the Scotch philosophy, and the distinctions between the soul and its exercises, between tendencies and voluntary

form no conception of the soul as distinct from these properties, or as the foundation of them." "All we know about body are its properties; and all we know about mind are its properties."

acts, between the heart and the will, were reinstated in their rational right. The Exercise scheme became another scheme, in its sense, its bearings, and its results. It was cut loose from its Calvinistic moorings; it was divorced from the divine efficiency. The divine element was eliminated, and the human will, in the construction of the system, took the place of the divine will. Modern Emmonism is thus as different from the old scheme as democracy from imperialism, or Congregationalism from the papacy, or psychology from metaphysics, or ethics from divinity, or the human will from the divine. The same phrases may be used, but there is another sense; there may be, to outward seeming, the same eyeball, but another soul looks out; the hands feel like the hands of Jacob, but the voice is the voice of Esau.

This same point is also illustrated by Emmons's theory of Natural Ability. He undoubtedly made very sweeping statements about ability. He must do so, if any room was to be left for human freedom and responsibility in face of the divine efficiency. If men would only accept the efficiency he could afford to talk strongly about their exercises. He emphasized the abstract possibility of a different volition from the one actually created. Thus there was a seeming freedom left. He exaggerated ability in phrases, just as he exaggerated efficiency in fact. But it is after all a shadowy realm. And his attempts at reconciliation are equally ingenious and unsatisfactory. His "joints" are the nice juxtaposition of atoms, rather than the junction of an organism by vital nerves and living bands. Here, too, his formulas are simple and comprehensive; God creates volitions; volitions are in their very nature free. "The Deity by working in men both to will and to do lays them under an absolute necessity of acting freely" (iv., 351). God's "acting on men's hearts and producing all their free voluntary moral exercises, necessarily makes them moral agents" (iv., 385). The first volition of every created agent must have had a cause altogether involuntary"; it "not only may but must be created." Adam, for example, "could no more produce his own volitions than his own exist-

ence. A self-determining power is an independent power, which never was, and never could be given to Adam." To objectors he replies thus: "I teach that God creates within us free moral exercises. Can they say, that exercises which are *created free* are not free? One of my opposers once said in a sermon, that an exercise which is not self-originated cannot be voluntary, and if it is made free, it is not free. But this man was by birth an Irishman." Does not the divine who thus replies to the "Irishman" seem to imply, that if *he* says they were "created free," that that settles the matter, and the difficulty? His statements in respect to ability, too, are equally emphatic with those about the freedom of volition. "Every sinner is as *able* to embrace the Gospel as a *thirsty* man is to drink water." They "are *as able* to do *right* as to do *wrong*." "Men always have natural power to frustrate those divine decrees which they are appointed to fulfil" (iv., 304). And this he conceives to be consistent with the position, that men "cannot originate a single thought, affection, or volition independently of a divine influence upon their minds" (iv., 397).

How, now, are these resolute statements about dependence and freedom, ability and inability to be understood? Does Emmons mean to teach the current doctrine of self-determination, of self-originated choices? He expressly repudiates it, as Arminian. Does he mean to teach, that man, before action, has a faculty of will, which is the cause of volition, so that volition is its proper effect? This he expressly denies under two aspects. He, in the first place, identifies will and volition: will, he says, "never properly means a principle, or power, or faculty of the mind; but *only choice, action, or volition*." And, in the second place, he denies the position, that free agency consists in a power to originate voluntary exercises: "many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God" . . . who "is the primary cause of every free voluntary exercise in every human heart." And then he adds,—which

shows us just how the whole thing stood in his mind: "But this is consistent with man's *having* [not producing] free voluntary exercises, which is *the essence of free agency*." That is, if we only *have* them, no matter how we come by them, they are still free. He sharpens this position: "A power to act without choosing to act would be of no advantage to them, if they possessed it. But they do not possess such a power, neither does God possess such a power." The possession of this power is the emphatic point in the modern theories of the will, where it is represented as essential to praise and blame, to holiness and sin. But the metaphysics and psychology of Emmons, as well as his efficiency scheme, are irreconcilable with this view. Freedom with him is simply an attribute of a given volition; given a volition, it is free, whatever be its cause.* His view of freedom is so low, that he even says, *that animals are free agents*: "*The animal creation are free agents because they act of choice*" (iv., 380). That is, free agency is found as really in the natural, as in the spiritual sphere. Hence all that is necessary to freedom, is to have a volition produced—no matter how. Hence, too, he could, and did, say, that God's producing these volitions lays man "under *an absolute necessity of acting freely*." He also said, that volitions "are virtuous or vicious in their own nature, without the least regard to the cause by which they are produced" (see his whole argument on Adam's Primitive Rectitude, Works, iv., 447 sq.): but some of his disciples say just the opposite, viz., that unless we produce them, with full power to the contrary, they cannot be praiseworthy or blameworthy.

His theory of "physical" or natural ability (not of "power

* Hopkins held the same view. "Herein consists man's freedom, that his choice is a choice. or his will a will. Although he be not the cause, original mover, or efficient agent of the choice, yet it is his, being produced in him" (System, i., ch. iv.). What do modern Hopkinsians say to his position, that persons "may be moral agents, and sin, without knowing what the law of God is, or of what nature their exercises are, and while they have no consciousness that they are wrong"? (i., 339).

to the contrary") runs back of course into this theory of freedom. He generally uses the word ability in an external sense, as meaning the power of doing as one pleases. Sometimes, however, it denotes with him the abstract possibility of a different choice. But choice itself, he distinctly says, is dependent on something else besides this natural power: "Two things are absolutely necessary in order to men's acting; one is to be able, and the other is to be willing. By being able is meant a natural power to act; and by being willing a moral power to act" (iv., 305). And this "moral power" is what God confers in "producing" the exercises. If both are "absolutely necessary," then the natural power without the moral would seem to be insufficient. But he is not always faithful to this view. He sometimes talks as if the natural power alone were sufficient, or as if the natural ability could produce the moral power.* He presses this point verbally so as to demand the advanced position, taken by some of his followers. His natural ability had in fact no hold, or substance, no background to support it; a possible volition without a real will and a real soul, was a mere abstraction. But as soon as a soul with all its powers and capacities was brought in, the whole aspect and bearings of the theory were altered. The divine efficiency was driven back. Though Emmons's own doctrines of philosophical necessity and divine efficiency kept him from affirming a self-determining power of the will; yet he so exalted natural power, in theory, that it became proud and boastful, broke loose from the divine efficiency, and set up for itself. In breaking loose from divine efficiency it also broke loose from Emmons. In hypostatizing a real faculty of will, in affirming self-determination, in asserting that natural ability of itself is enough (as simple power) to account for the voli-

* One sentence strikingly illustrates the curious results to which his novel phraseology sometimes led. "If they [men] were willing as well as able to defeat his [God's] purposes, they certainly would defeat them" (iv., 305). It is usually thought that wicked men are quite willing to, but cannot; Emmons says, they can, but are not willing. What sort of an "ability" is that?

tion, the new scheme is unfaithful to the real spirit of Emmons; it retains his phraseology and alters its sense; it keeps the exercises and denies the efficiency that produces them. The modern theory demands a pause, as it were, between the divine agency and man's act, so that man may have a chance to choose; while Emmons says, the divine agency makes the volition. The human will, instead of the divine, is the constructive idea of the new system. And yet, it is pretended that the systems are the same on the essential points. Just as if Emmons, and men of his stamp, spent their days in exalting the human will! The difficulty with him was in reconciling human freedom with his main dogma of divine efficiency; the difficulty with the moderns is to reconcile even decrees and providence with their dogma of the power to the contrary. God was the soul of the one system; man is the measure of the other.—And as to Emmons's mode of reconciling dependence and free agency, to which two of his most noted sermons are devoted—the process consists in stating clearly and sharply both points, God's universal agency, and the freedom of volitions, and then saying, that the divine efficiency creates the volitions free. In one passage, he also says, that the two truths cannot clash, because they fall under the cognizance of different faculties—the dependence under “reason,” and the freedom under “common sense.” But this is a merely external remark. The chief solution is, in the simple doctrine of efficiency. This is no solution, it is simply assertion. We cannot accept it, even though he also asserts, that the denial of it is “either open infidelity or impious blasphemy” (iv., 386).

The most startling, yet logical, application of the Exercise scheme is, however, to the doctrine of Justification, in relation to the rewards of a future life. The atonement of Christ, it says, directly procured only the forgiveness of sins. Justification consists in this forgiveness. Emmons held indeed to the Protestant doctrine that justification is “the gift of the giver,” and not “the reward of the worker;” but he held this just because he limited justification to pardon. Hopkins re-

tained both the active and passive obedience of Christ ; * Emmons not only denied the active obedience, but he also denied that justification confers a title to eternal life. He shrunk from no conclusions which his exercise theory imposed. Dr. Spring, of Newburyport, and most of the older New England divines here parted company with him ; † but he stuck to his thesis (the title of one of his sermons)—*Holy Obedience the Only Title to Eternal Life*—not because obedience “ merits ” life, for the creature cannot merit anything of the Creator, but because it makes us “ worthy of approbation ; ” it is a “ reward of grace.” There is an “ essential difference,” he says, “ between the ground of God’s justifying [pardoning] men, and the ground on which he rewards with eternal life.” “ He forgives them solely on *the ground of Christ’s atonement*, but *he rewards them solely on the ground of their good works.*” The contrary opinion is “ not only an error, but a palpable

* Hopkins says : “ The law could not be fulfilled by Jesus Christ, without his suffering the penalty of it, and obeying it perfectly.” “ Atonement consists in fulfilling the *penal* part of the law by *suffering* to provide the way for *pardon* only ; while *meritorious obedience* is such conformity to the preceptive part of the law as procures *positive righteousness*.” The remission of sins, he asserts, would be “ a very partial redemption ; ” it was therefore necessary that Christ should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead, that by his perfect and meritorious obedience he might honor the law in the preceptive parts of it, and obtain all the positive favors and benefits which were needed.” “ When a sinner is justified he is *pardoned* on account of the *atonement*, and *accepted* as a just one, on account of the *meritorious obedience* of his substitute ” (System, i., pp. 468, 198–9, etc). Emmons, on the contrary, was averse to the phrase—“ the merits of Christ.”

† In connection with this matter, a good anecdote is told in the Memoir (p. 456) of the following “ laconic, magisterial and patronizing ” epistle, sent to Dr. Emmons : “ May 1st. My dear brother, I have read your sermon on the Atonement, and have wept over it. Yours affectionately, A. B. C.” To which he at once replied : “ May 3d. Dear sir, I have read your letter, and laughed at it. Yours, Nath’l Emmons.” The divine who wrote this epistle is understood to be Dr. Griffin. We are assured, on direct authority, that there must be some mistake about this anecdote ; that Dr. Emmons, on being questioned about it, said, that though he received from Dr. Griffin a letter on this subject, he did not reply to it. He also said that the amount of the letter was that the doctrine of his (Emmons’s) sermon on the Atonement “ robbed the believer of half his Saviour.”

absurdity." And on his exercise theory, it is so. For, if all that is moral, all that is the subject of moral judgments, praise or blame, reward or penalty, is in individual volitions, and in these alone, then it *is* a "palpable absurdity" to say that Christ's merits can confer on other beings "a title to eternal life." In logic, "holy obedience is the only title to eternal life." He is right in saying that "there is no propriety in using the term *merits of Christ*." This, to be sure, cuts deep into the Christian system; but it is the inevitable and inexorable logic of the theory. The same definitions that define away original sin are also incompatible with the proper doctrine of justification. Adam and Christ stand together. If Adam's sin is only the "occasion" of our sin, then is Christ's righteousness only the "occasion" of our righteousness. If there is no moral nexus in the one case, there can be none in the other—on the "consistent" exercise theory. Though Emmons sometimes concedes that Christ's death is the "occasion" of God's granting innumerable favors to mankind, yet, speaking strictly, he says: "God grants regenerating grace to whom he pleases, as an act of mere sovereignty, without any particular respect to the death or atonement of Christ." Such a statement as this, in connection with his view about our "being rewarded solely on the ground of good works," is a sad illustration of the power of an unbending logic, when based upon a partial theory. It emphatically indicates, that Christ has not that central and comprehensive position in this theoretic scheme, which he has in the Scriptures, and in the experience of believers. We say, in the *theoretic scheme*, because we would not for an instant imply that Emmons did not fully believe all that the Scriptures assert about Christ. But his theory obliged him to assign to Christ only the position of removing the obstacle to forgiveness, and then to let a mere moral system (the exercises, as containing all that is moral) run on its own course—having indeed respect to Christ, as, in the divine decree, the occasion of blessings, but not as their meritorious source and ground. The matter lay in his mind thus: the sinner must first get through with the decree of elec-

tion, and then he may trust in Christ. Thus in his compendious statement of his own views, we read (Memoir, p. 428): "That sinners must exercise unconditional submission to God *before* they can exercise faith in Christ." Love and repentance both come before faith in Christ (Memoir, pp. 366-7). In his dread of Antinomianism, he ran into the counter extreme. As his exercises lacked a psychology, so was his theology deficient in its Christology.

The two other points that characterize the system of Emmons, he shares with the body of the old Hopkinsians, as they are usually interpreted, viz., that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; and that unconditional submission, in the form of a willingness to be lost (damned), is the fitting test of regeneration. As the divine agency is the efficient cause of all events and acts, so is the divine glory the final cause or end of the system; and the ultimate reason for the existence of sin is, that it is necessary to manifest the full declarative glory of the Most High: sin is in this sense the necessary means of the greatest good. And if that divine glory demands our everlasting condemnation, we must be submissive to it: if need be, we ought to be willing to be condemned forever. And thus Emmons did not falter or waver in his logic. He was thoroughly consistent with his fundamental assumptions in all their deductions. In apology for his position about sin as the necessary "means" of the greatest good, it is suggested, that by "means" he only means "occasion" (Memoir, p. 403). But the word "occasion" seems too indefinite to express his accurate meaning. Though he did not assert that sin is the direct means of good, in its own nature (it could not be this, since it is essentially evil), yet he certainly did maintain that it is necessary to the full manifestation of the glory of God—so necessary, that God created it for this end. His plain position is, "that there is the same kind, if not the same degree of necessity in the divine mind, to create sinful, as to create holy beings;" that "all the goodness of God in all its branches could not have been displayed, if natural and *moral* evil had not existed;" and again, if God

meant to display all his goodness in creation, he was obliged to bring into being objects upon which he might display both his justice and mercy" (iv., 254). Does the indefinite word "occasion" express the sum of these statements? Nor is this all, for he even goes so far in his inferences as to say (iv., 374), that though men are bound to repent of their own criminality, yet, "since all their sinful conduct may be ascribed to God, who ordained it for his own glory, and whose agency was concerned in it, *they have no reason to be sorry that any evil action or event took place.*" He illustrates it by the case of Joseph's brethren, who, when they saw the good accomplished by the selling of their brother, "could not have been sorry for this, without being sorry for God's conduct," etc. This is surely sufficiently explicit, and it shows that he could hardly have used the term "occasion" to express his own position in its real sense. So, too, as to the "willingness to be damned," as the phrase runs. He did not, we are told, really mean to say "damned;" he only said "lost"—a milder word, of the same import. This theory is also resolved by his defenders into the general duty of submission (the caption under which the Memoir discussed it is, "Harmony of Disinterested Submission to God with Love to Self"). Very true—it is submission, but it is submission, not in a general, but in a very definite and peculiar form—at war with the primary instinct of self-love, as well as with the benevolence and grace of the Gospel. God never demanded of any creature to be willing to be lost. And no ingenuity of deduction can warrant such a terrible questioning and torture of the soul. It is a logical rack, and not a scriptural test. The most ingenious explanation of the theory is that of Emmons himself in his reply to Stuart (Memoir, pp. 397-400); and his argument shows that he included in this test not only the willingness to suffer pain, but also the willingness to be in a "*future*" state of "disobedience and rebellion." And this settles the matter as far as Christian consciousness and the Bible are concerned. It is a self-subversive and revolting test of a regenerate condition. The test includes a bribe; for, if we are willing to be lost, we never

shall be. And this fearful test is the inexorable logic of the combined efficiency and exercise schemes.

And this rigid and consistent scheme was not confined to the closet of the student, and the discussions of a theological class, but it was enforced as the measure and standard of religious experience; it was made the touch-stone of the new life. Emmons himself, we are told, "adopted the new theology and experienced the new birth at one and the same time" (Memoir, p. 37); and the disciples were as the master. In this too he was a faithful exponent of some New England tendencies; the most abstruse and metaphysical dogmas have there been worked into the heart and life, as nowhere else in the world. The abstractions of theological systems have been the turning-point in the renewal of the soul. No other people ever passed through such a process. And not more than one generation, even of New England men and women, could bear the scrutiny of the searching dogmas of Emmons. They were too much even for regenerate human nature, as yet sanctified only in part. And if too bitter for saints—what must they have been to sinners, inclined by nature to Arminianism and, by unenlightened common sense, to Unitarianism? There were in those days other sharp men in New England besides the orthodox. Orthodoxy in their view became identified with the dogmas that God is the author of sin, that men should be willing to be cast off forever, and the like hyperboles of hyper-Calvinism. Not only so, Emmons also gave into their hands some of the strongest arguments against the older Calvinism. They took his exercises and discarded the all-controlling efficiency; they adopted his ethical maxims, divorced from his rigid supernaturalism. He averred that all that is moral is in exercises, so did they. He denied imputation and the covenants, inability and limited atonement, and they were agreed. He said the rewards of heaven are for our personal obedience, and they thought this very natural. They chimed in with his abstractions, about its being as easy to repent as to walk or eat. He made the essence of virtue consist in impartial love; and on this point Channing also

followed Hopkins. His theory made this love to be the essence of the new birth, and heterodox men said they had this love, and of course were born again. Emmons brought everything about Christ in his relation to us, excepting pardon alone, under the head of sovereignty, and "liberal" thinkers brought pardon, too, under the same category. He subordinated the exercises to the efficiency, and they subordinated the efficiency to the exercises. He believed in the Trinity, the Incarnation, the decrees; but they said, if they could only have holy love (the essence of the new life) without these hard doctrines, that they hardly thought them essential to salvation. No Emmonsite reasoned in this way, but there were many in New England, who were repelled from orthodoxy by the logical consequences of the efficiency theory, and who were confirmed in heterodoxy by the logical inferences from the exercise scheme—each of course being taken, unfairly to Emmons, by itself alone. But heretics cannot be expected to be comprehensive; heresy, in its etymology, is something "taken"—a part taken,—and the whole left.

The truth is—as our whole exposition shows, there were in Emmons two systems, both held in the most extreme and logical form. Sir James Emerson Tennent, in his work on Ceylon, says, that in the chameleon there is an imperfect sympathy between the two lobes of the brain and the two sets of nerves which permeate the opposite sides of its frame. One side may be fast asleep, while the other side is wide awake; and the poor creature cannot make them act together. There is a like imperfect sympathy between the efficiency scheme, and the exercise theory, of Emmons. They are not organically unified. They are not really harmonized, but held together, not by a rational idea, but by the force of will—his own will (subjectively), and the will of God (objectively). *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. His conception of the created universe is that of a series of perfectly distinct events and exercises, produced at every instant by an immediate, divine energy. It is an atomic naturalism engrafted upon an extreme and arbitrary supernaturalism. The conception of anything akin to a real

organism, or a proper development, is entirely wanting. The unity of the race is not a real historic continuity, but an arbitrary divine constitution. And then, in constructing the system, all events and exercises are, in effect, parcelled out, doctrinally, under the two rubrics of divine and creature agency. One set of doctrines sets forth the divine agency; another set of doctrines sets forth the human activity. And both cover, where they concur, the same subject matter, which is at one time viewed as all divine, and at another time viewed as all human. And the only union between the two, which Emmons knows, is found in the divine efficiency itself. He did all that a man of the greatest keenness could do, in his attempts at mediation on this basis. But his mediations are unreal, formal, and abstract. Thus, as we have seen, sovereignty and free agency are reconciled, by saying, that God creates the volitions free; God is defended from the charge of being the author of sin, chiefly on the ground, that "sin is one thing," and "the taking place of sin" quite another thing; though God's sovereignty and his moral government are said to cover equally all acts, yet so sharp a distinction is made between them, that it is claimed God as a sovereign can create a moral act, which, as a moral governor, he is bound to punish. By asserting, that the same act is, in one aspect, "wholly the product of divine energy," and, in another aspect, "wholly the act of the creature" (being made his), Emmons seems to think, that he has solved the problem of dependence and free agency—"a seeming difficulty which runs through the whole Bible" (iv., 371). But this is simply statement and distinction, not solution or reconciliation. He confounds clear, abstract distinctions with the truth itself. A definite, intelligible proposition is his ideal—and also the reality. As if theology, like mathematics, were a science of definitions and deductions! But in such a system, so clear and paradoxical, one of the antagonistic elements must get the upper hand, and the other be subjected with a strong arm; one must be the reality, and the other an illusion. And there can be no question, that in the logical results of this theory,

the reality is in the divine agency, and that the alleged freedom and power of the creature is an unreal and vanishing factor in the victorious and irresistible march of the divine decree. Freedom and responsibility could only be saved by a revolt against his hyper-Calvinistic necessarianism; by a psychology, which should give a real human substratum to the volitions. In his theory the volition was made perfectly free, natural ability was strained to the utmost so as to endure the pressure of the divine agency; and the tension between the efficiency and the exercises became so intense, that the two snapt asunder and parted company. His dogma of divine efficiency was left with himself, and his ethical and voluntary exercises went on their way rejoicing, under other auspices. And he himself stands alone in New England theology, to show us what a great man can do and say, when he attempts impossibilities—that is, when he attempts to make both the divine agency and human freedom absolute. If the feat could be performed, it was in the way he attempted it. If anybody wishes to hold the essence of Calvinism, that is, that the will of God is all in all, together with the essence of Arminianism, that is, that the will of man is absolutely contingent, it can only be by exaggerating Calvinism into the position that the divine will creates the human exercises. Calvinism must be exalted into hyper-Calvinism, or else the exercises will land us in an entirely different system.

This would be made still more evident, if we could follow out the system of Emmons, in its influence on subsequent speculations. Our discussion has already been so protracted, that we must here confine ourselves to general and brief statement.

As we have seen, in deference to his ethics and exercises, he parted company with certain traditional dogmas, inwrought into the Calvinistic bodies of divinity—viz., imputation, the covenants, original sin and hereditary depravity (including the organic and moral unity of the race), and justification under the relation of conferring a title to eternal life. Now, it might easily be shown, that these doctrines, thus excluded

(shearing them off as "fag-ends"), are for the most part the very doctrines by which historical Calvinism has endeavored to mitigate or avoid the pressure and logical conclusions from the strictest theory of divine sovereignty—so that the procedures of God in respect to sin and salvation should not seem to be the acts of arbitrary sovereignty, but the regulated and ordered course of a moral system, intended for the whole race. These doctrines are the ones by which the awe-inspiring decree (*horribile decretum*—in Calvin's sense, not "horrible" but fearful) was relieved from the stigma, that it made God the author of sin, and, in an equally arbitrary way, of redemption. But Emmons's "exercises" compelled him to reject all imputations and covenants. Strictly taken, they left no place for any other than a merely moral or legal system—unless the divine sovereignty were enforced with redoubled emphasis. Being a Calvinist, he chose the latter course; and hence, of all Calvinists he is most strenuous about predestination, election, reprobation, and the affiliated doctrines. In short, he made his exercises Calvinistic only by the violent process of representing them as the product of the direct agency of the Most High. He retained of Calvinism chiefly that doctrine which is most easily perverted, and represented it in the form most liable to perversion. Such was his position in relation to the old Calvinism.

But this "giant, with a hundred athletes in his train," as the *Memoir* strikingly describes him, also produced a decided effect upon the old Hopkinsian school; he rent it in twain, into the men of Taste, and the men of Exercises (all mighty men); and this provincial phraseology denotes an important distinction. The larger part of the Hopkinsians were not ready to sanction the position, that all that is moral is in Exercises, in Emmons's sense, that is, in Volitions (volition with him including the affections, and being equivalent to heart). They distinguished between heart and will, feeling and action, the ground or source of the exercises, and the exercises themselves. They held, with Edwards, that there is a 'principle' or 'foundation' for the exercises or volitions, and that this 'taste' or

'principle' is the real seat of moral character. They had a better psychology than Emmons. Here stood Burton, to whom we have already referred.* And this too was the ground of the venerated Dr. Woods of Andover, who receded from the peculiar phrases of the school, in proportion to the enlargement of his experience as a teacher of theology. It was a kind providence for the New England churches, that when the violent abstractions of 'efficiency' and 'exercises' were waging such warfare, and leading to such results, a man like Dr. Woods was called to the chair of theology in the seminary at Andover. He is emphatically the 'judicious' divine of the later New England theology. He educated a generation of preachers, who had neither crotchets nor airy whims. And Moses Stuart, too, with all his versatility, became a rich blessing to the churches, by training their preachers in the more thorough study of the whole truth, as revealed with open face in the inspired Word.

But the extreme positions which Emmons deduced from both his Efficiency and Exercise schemes led to a more radical dissent and reaction. As we have seen, his "consistent Calvinism" emerged in the three dogmas—that sin is the product of the divine efficiency, that it is necessary to the full manifestation of the divine glory, and that, for the sake of this glory, men should be willing to be "lost." On the other hand, his exercise scheme led to the inferences, that all that is moral is in volitions (excluding original sin), and that man has natural ability to repent, etc. But this natural ability, as we have stated, still needed to be backed up by a soul—and these volitions cried out for a real human nature as a sub-

* One of the ablest of these Taste men was Judge Nathaniel Niles, of Vermont, who, it is said, was the rival of Dr. Burton in the honor of being the founder of the Taste school. How strongly the men of this stamp were opposed to the peculiarities of the Emmons school is seen in an acute pamphlet, now little known, entitled: "A Letter to a Friend, who received his Theological Education under the Instruction of Dr. Emmons, concerning the Doctrine which teaches that Impenitent Sinners have Natural Power to make themselves New Hearts. By Nathaniel Niles, A.M." Windsor, 1809. It is one of the most valuable relics of this controversy.

stratum. The peculiarity of the reaction that ensued (chiefly in the New Haven school) consisted, in the first place, in the introduction of such a psychology, giving to the exercises a living source and centre—and, then, in arraying the exercise scheme against the doctrine of the divine efficiency. The Connecticut divines as a whole never favored the tendency represented by Emmons; Bellamy, Smalley, and Dwight opposed it, and Dr. Taylor brought the discussion, in the sharpest way, to direct issues. He adopted the exercise scheme, so far as it asserted that all that is moral is in acts of the will, defined natural ability as implying full “power to the contrary,” and made self-love to be the germinant principle of ethics. He not only reinstated the human soul in its native rights (reuniting the dispersed exercises, the *diaspora*, in a living, personal centre), but he also affirmed, with the Taste men, the existence of susceptibilities, tendencies, dispositions, antecedent to voluntary action. But as he also held that all that is moral is in voluntary action, he of course said, that these tendencies and dispositions have no moral character; and here he left the Taste men. This changed the whole aspect of the old exercise scheme. He could, and must, now say what the old Hopkinsians never did, or could say—that a complete human nature exists for a time, be it more or less, in the descendants of Adam, in a neutral moral state. This was the very position which the old Hopkinsians, Emmons included, were always striving to avoid, as utterly inconsistent with the Biblical representation of the effects of the Adamic transgression. So, too, he brought his theory of the will, as essentially the power of contrary choice, to bear against the dogma, that God creates free volitions. His Scotch psychology demanded a pause, as it were, in the direct divine agency, so as to give the faculties of the soul a chance to work out the volition—intellect, feelings, and will preceding the first moral choice. The volition no longer came through the will of God alone, but also through the agency of the human powers coming to the point of decision. And as he made self-love the spring of all voluntary action, and happiness its end, so too he mightily opposed the

inculcation of a willingness to be damned; for in his view this implied the annulling of the primary instinct of human nature. Nor could he consistently hold to the Hopkinsian theodicy, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; he levelled against it, not only the precepts of the divine law and the prescriptions of the moral sense, but also, and chiefly, the doctrine of natural ability, transformed into the power to the contrary. He formally denied the old theory, and affirmed, that sin is not necessary, but incidental to the best system; and that it is incidental, because a free agent, having the power of contrary choice, may sin, in spite of Omnipotence. Thus skilfully did this acute theologian bring the exercises of the Emmonsian theology to bear against its dogma of efficiency; he used its left hand to disable its right hand. He took the attitude of fair and square antagonism to the three main positions of the older theory. The dogma of divine efficiency he confronted with the theory of human efficiency; disinterested benevolence in the form of a willingness to be damned he opposed by making self-love the root of moral action; and, so far was he from asserting that sin is necessary to the greatest good, that he affirmed that it was better accounted for by saying, that even Omnipotence may not be able to prevent all sin in a moral system. Thus while the divine will is the constructive idea of whatever is peculiar in the one system, the human will, moved by self-love, is the constructive idea of all that is peculiar in the other system. The antagonism is sharp and complete on all the main points. The attempt in each scheme is to frame a system on the idea of will—the difference being, that in the old school an omnipotent divine will, and in the new school a contingent human will, is the prime factor. And the result of the whole controversy was to show the inadequacy of each to the proposed task. Each system led to conclusions at war with the Scriptures and Christian experience, and this, too, on just the points most characteristic of the respective theories. The one could not free God from the charge of being the cause of sin, made sin necessary to the declarative glory of the Holy One, and exacted of man an

impossible test of regeneration, at once unreal and full of torture to the soul. The other system so exalted the power of the human will, that it became, in the power to the contrary, an unreal abstraction; it denied the "categorical imperative" of duty, by resolving right into happiness; and it defended the divine permission of sin by limiting the divine omnipotence. Each was strong in refuting, neither in building up. Each shows very clearly that the peculiar views of the other cannot be maintained.

Dr. Taylor, in this controversy, took the only consistent course, and did not aim at any unreal compromise. He never thought of representing his system as identical with the one he was opposing, bating a difference of phraseology or emphasis. He knew perfectly well that he could find some of the germs of his own theory in the minor key of the old school; but he did not intimate that they habitually sung their tunes on this key. He knew, too, that the way in which antagonistic systems are developed is almost always just this—that what is subordinate in the one becomes supreme in its opposite. The change of relative position is indeed all; but then, too, it is quite enough. It is the only logical attitude which related thoughts, that suggest each other, can assume even in opposite systems. The contest is always for supremacy and not for annihilation.

Hence, too, it is possible for modern Hopkinsians to quote many a passage from the old divines, which seems to favor their views, while it is still true that the systems are entirely different in their spirit, methods, results, and sympathies. What an old-fashioned Emmonsian made supreme in the scheme is now made subordinate; and what he made subordinate is now made supreme. That is all. The impression made by the Memoir of Emmons is, that he held to exercises definitely, and to the divine efficiency indefinitely; the impression made by a volume of Emmons's sermons is, that he held to both definitely, and subjected the exercises to the efficiency. His propositions about God bear the stamp of inherent life and reality; if there is anything essentially un-

real in his system, it is in his propositions about man. He did indeed uphold the three radicals (now so-called) of the New England theology, viz., that all that is moral is in exercises, that ability is equal to, and limits, obligation; he held them, but he held them in check. He spent his toilsome and thoughtful life in elaborating a system to show, that though God's agency is always creative, yet man may still be free; he had no idea of a system which says, that because man is free, God cannot be the immediate efficient cause of human volitions. The old system affirmed, that God creates all events and acts; that he created Adam holy; that he creates sinful acts; that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that we must be willing to be lost in order to be saved; it also affirms that there is no soul (conceivable) before the exercises; that the exercises are either wholly holy or wholly sinful; and that holy exercises are the only title to eternal life. Modern Hopkinsianism denies that God creates sin; it denies that he creates holiness; it denies that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; it denies that we must be willing to be lost in order to be saved; and it also affirms, that there must be a soul and tendencies before volition; that this soul is in a neutral moral state; and that it is not luminous to say, that Paradise is the reward of our works. And yet, it is insinuated that the systems are the same, because both equally hold, that all that is moral is in exercises, and that ability is equal to obligation. But to discard all the former positions is to discard Emmonsism; and to affirm the latter, is to affirm, not the essence, but the accidents, of the old Hopkinsian theology. The resemblance is verbal, the difference is radical.

The theological system of Dr. Emmons is undoubtedly one of the most original and instructive in the history of theological science in this country. His biographer has led us to love and honor more than ever that simple, noble, acute, and consistent man. He spent his days and his nights in the unwearied search for divine wisdom. He failed in constructing a complete system of truth, because with his data and

factors, it was a sheer impossibility. With Dr. Pond, we may say: "Read Emmons; by all means read Emmons"; but so read him as to see, that neither in the divine efficiency, nor in human exercises, neither in mere sovereignty, nor in mere ethics, can we find the formative or central principle of Christian theology as a science. For the one leads to an arbitrary determinism on the divine side; the other must ascribe an equally arbitrary self-determining power to man. But no such abstractions, on the one side or the other, however clearly stated, and no definitions based on them, can satisfy the demand for a system of theology at once Scriptural, rational, and conformed to Christian experience. Neither is theology to be sacrificed to anthropology, nor anthropology to theology. The centre of Christian divinity is not in God, nor in man, but in the Godman. Christian theology is essentially a Christology, centering in facts, not deduced from metaphysical or ethical abstractions. Neither God's agency, nor man's will, can give us the whole system; but, as Calvin says, "Christ is the mirror in whom we may without deception contemplate our own election." Above the strife of the schools rises in serene and untroubled majesty the radiant form of the Son of God, the embodiment and reconciliation of divinity and humanity.

CHRISTIAN UNION

AND

ECCLESIASTICAL REUNION.*

FATHERS AND BRETHREN:—It is just three-quarters of a century since our first General Assembly met in the city of Philadelphia. The little one has become a thousand. The Presbyterian Church then numbered 188 ministers and 419 churches; from these have sprung, under different names, more than 5,000 churches, 4,500 ministers and 500,000 communicants, representing a population of two and a half or three millions. Our growth and history have been determined, we trust, by a Divine wisdom, whose counsels never change and never fail. And the oracles of that wisdom still teach us the lessons needed for the present hour, in the words by which Paul describes the final unity and perfection of the church, in his epistle to the EPHESIANS, the fourth chapter, at the thirteenth verse: *Till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.*

Though the Son of God, says the apostle, ascended on high that he might fill all things, yet he condescended to give to men a regal ascension gift, that of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. And the end to be attained by

* A discourse delivered at the opening of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, in Dayton, Ohio, May 19, 1864. In necessariis unitas; in non necessariis libertas; in utrisque caritas. [Dr. Smith was the retiring Moderator.—ED.]

this gift is, that all the church become one in faith and knowledge, and so become one, that it shall be, as it were, the earthly counterpart of the Redeemer. Christ is one person, divine and human, and so is the church, which is his body, to be one in him. As the end of the first creation will be realized, when it becomes the unclouded mirror of the internal glory of the Creator, so the end of the new creation, which is grounded in the incarnation, will be reached, when it becomes the express image of the Incarnate God, when it comes to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ. This is the prophetic hope, the ideal end, of the church of our Lord.

This we say is the ideal of the church, not as contrasted with what is real, but as expressing its true idea, its inmost life, one of its formative elements. Its very growth, if it be healthful, must be a growth in union and towards unity, just as a plant is held together while it grows by a more intense unifying power at the heart of its life. The church in its essence is a spiritual organism, vitally united to Christ, and all its atoms are ensouled by the common life of one and the self-same Spirit, as all the branches, leaves, flowers and fruit of a tree are made one by the common sap. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body. It is as contrary to the true idea of the church that its parts should be schismatic and warring, as it is to the true idea of a full-grown man, that his eye should say to his hand, I have no need of thee, or, again, the head to the feet, I have no need of you. And though this "note" of the church applies in an eminent sense only to the radiant bride, the New Jerusalem, yet it is also the instinct of her deepest life even while militant here on earth, that she may at last appear before her divine bridegroom, having no spot, nor wrinkle, nor any such thing, and receive from his loving hands the seamless robe and the victor's crown.

And never did this great fact of the essential oneness of Christ's church and of the especial duty of the ministry to labor for it, need to be more wisely pondered and emphati-

cally urged, than in the present state of Protestant Christendom, and in view of the relations of the church to the other great interests of human life and society as developed in our own country. In the rivalry of sects we are apt to lose sight of the prime social instinct of the Christian life. The unity of the church is idealized, while its disintegration is realized. The only idea of the visible church which many seem to have is based on the theory of a social compact, long since abandoned by the best thinkers in relation even to politics. Terms of communion have been adopted so narrow and local, that they foster only dissension. The union of the church has become a figure of speech, a theme of sentimental rhapsody; its consummation is postponed to the millennium. And then, as Christian fellowship must find some expression, the organizing and aggressive vigor of the Christian life has been transferred to other institutions, which often take the proper work of the church out of its hands, and use their power against itself. All this, too, is but a part of a general tendency which shows itself in the state, as well as the church. The vicious sophism, that "the world is governed too much," has borne its fruits in secession and rebellion. Discord costs more than concord. Our nation is now vindicating its unity by the costliest sacrifices. Let the church of Christ heed the lesson, scrutinize the disease and inquire for the remedy. And it is already doing it. Many true hearts in different communions feel the burden of these evils. Weary of strife, they ask for peace. In view of past feuds and bitterness, their speech is low out of the dust. And though this longing for union is as yet chiefly in the form of feeling, yet feeling precedes action. Sentiments may seem to be evanescent flowers; but all fruit is only a full grown flower. By inspiring such longings, the great Head of the Church may, in his own garden, be preparing a golden harvest. We are then heeding his promises, and may ask for his guidance, when we consider the subject of Christian Union and Ecclesiastical Reunion, to which our text invites us. And we propose to speak of it, first, in its more general aspects, as the

goal and consummation of the church; and then, in its particular relation to ourselves and those with whom we are most nearly allied.

1. Our first topic is Christian Union; not uniformity, nor even unity under one government, but union in its wider relations. While those speculations and plans which look to an immediate reunion of all the several branches of the church, must still be regarded as impracticable and illusory, yet tendencies to union will increase with the sound and vital growth of the church. If union and even unity is to be the consummation of the church, then its progress must be in that direction.

It would be profitable, did our time admit, to inquire into the leading causes of those divisions and subdivisions by which Christian union has been frittered away. As long as there is imperfect knowledge or imperfect love there is an element of discord; for ignorance and sin isolate and divide, while wisdom and love are universal and tend to unity. Besides this general cause, two potent and fruitful principles of division and alienation may be traced through the history of the church, strongly contrasted, yet both working in the same direction; the one, the lust of ecclesiastical domination, the other an extreme individualism. The former enforces conformity to external rules in matters non-essential, and so runs into spiritual despotism; the latter sets up the individual will, often under the name of conscience, in opposition to the general will and the historic order. The one calls itself conservative, the other progressive. The former materializes the idea of union, as if it were a mere outward conformity; the latter idealizes it, as if it were only a vague spiritual state. The first puts the church into circumscription and confines it by rites and ceremonies; the second is often reckless of all outward and visible forms and order. The one is more objective and was rooted in the ancient church; the other is more subjective and works subtly in modern society. Each has its relative rights; each, left to itself, rushes into evil; the problem is, their mutual conciliation in one complete system. Both the

centripetal and the centrifugal forces must be combined if the church is to revolve in a true orbit around Christ, the central sun of our spiritual system.

And both these tendencies in their extremes infallibly lead, from opposite causes, to dissension and disunion. Rome illustrates the one: the history of many Protestant sects the other. The reformers opposed Rome because it put the centre of unity in the Papacy instead of in Christ. They denied that there could be, or that there ought to be, any one central, organized hierarchy for the whole church throughout all the world, since this inevitably leads to trampling on national and personal rights. And so the reformation formed distinct national churches. These, in their turn, through the baleful union of church and state, imposed a yoke on the conscience which our Reformed or Calvinistic churches were especially unable to bear. Erastianism provoked dissent. Dissent, in its turn, multiplied divisions, some of which doubtless had a providential reason and necessity, and contributed to the accelerated diffusion and definite application of Christian truth; while others are based on arbitrary or trivial grounds. But so it is that both these opposite principles, representing external unity and an arbitrary individualism, have tended in the same direction, engendering schisms.

Nor is it easy to frame even a theoretic scheme on which the fragments can be restored to their lost union. The idea of one universal, visible government for all the churches in all the nations, seems to be as visionary as that of a universal monarchy or republic. And even as to the churches in the same country, there is only one plain and easy way by which they might all be united, and that is, by becoming—Presbyterians, or Baptists, or Episcopalians, or Congregationalists. But this is like telling the hand to become a foot, and the eye to become an ear. Unless all past experience be a delusion, the church can never be reunited on the basis of any claim or pretension, which is the exclusive possession of any one of the branches, especially if it be a principle, which, like the papacy, the apostolic succession, or the necessity of any one

mode of baptism, involves the refusal of church rights and fellowship to other denominations. These are bars to the very possibility of reunion.

And then, too, supposing the union of the churches effected, there still remains the great unsolved question of the relation of the church to the state—the central problem of human history in view of the final destiny of the race. All our present theories and adjustments are simply provisional. And well is it for us that we are not now called upon to do anything more than meet present emergencies, and keep these two great forms of human society and life in a state of external amity. At the end it seems probable that one must be virtually resolved into the other.

While such difficulties attend the final and complete solution of this momentous subject of church union, it is still some comfort to think that each of the larger branches of the church has done and is doing a great and needed work, that each division and corps has some especial task assigned it. Spiritual union must precede external unity; and so, in proportion as all labor for the one end in the same spirit, will they be coming nearer together, marching toward the common centre, with one ensign full high advanced above all other banners of the sacramental host, bearing that One Name, under which alone can be ascribed the words: *In hoc vinces*. At the same time, much may be done and is now doing to mitigate the evils of dissent and to draw Christians nearer together. In the rapid multiplication of sects we have about reached a point where we must choose between disintegration and reunion. The atoms have triumphed over the forces, but they are now beginning to feel the power of elective affinities. Points of difference are neglected, and points of agreement are magnified. And several broad general tendencies are working in this direction.

One of these is, the characteristics of the later revivals with which our churches have been favored. These have been of a more mutual and co-operative character; the laity have taken a more active part in them; the unity of the

Spirit has been increasingly felt. When churches are lifeless they are more under the sway of mechanical forms. Cold binds together in rigidity; heat fuses the particles. A higher temperature produces a finer temperament, especially if One sits by who purifieth the sons of Levi and purgeth them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord a sacrifice of righteousness.

And is not the power of mere sectarianism losing something of its tenacity and rigidity? Are any of us as sectarian as we were twenty or thirty years ago? If even in the sphere of our natural life it can justly be said that "the enmities are mortal, and the humanities are eternal," much more does this hold true of our spiritual life. Polemics die, but Christ liveth forever. Sects are transient; the church abides. Local and personal feuds are soon forgotten. The lines become more flowing; the curve takes the place of the triangle. Sidelong influences are insensibly creeping in. The members of the different denominations are coming to look more alike. Each judges the others more charitably, and itself less egotistically. Without recommending any indiscriminate laxity either of doctrine or of observances, we may hail such tokens as auspicious. We judge our neighbors better when we know them better; and we now compare our differences better than ever before. Some of our divisions, imported from the old world, are becoming historical anachronisms and accidents. The Arminianism of the Methodists is of a very different type from what the Calvinists of Europe used to call the "gangrene;" for it is full of the flame of evangelism; and our Calvinism has been enlarged by the theology of Edwards. If Antinomianism and Pelagianism are found here in our orthodox churches, they have certainly improved in their style of preaching. It is increasingly felt that each branch of the church represents some important aspect of the Christian faith or life, which the others may have kept in the background. This one is more logical, that one more emotional; another is more historic, still another is more individual; one is absorbed in doctrine, another is zealous for work; while all may be

living for Christ and his church. Each may learn from the others, as they grow into one Spirit.

And for each and all a great point would be gained, provided they could unite, not only in works of general philanthropy, but also in some stated religious observances, commemorative of the grand historic facts of the Christian faith, in which they all agree, and which cannot be appropriated by any one branch of the church; such as the birth, the death and the resurrection of our Lord, and the giving of the Holy Ghost. For these festivals antedate, not only our divisions, but also the corruptions of the papacy; they exalt the Lord, and not man; they involve a public and solemn recognition of essential Christian facts, and are thus a standing protest against infidelity; they bring out the historic side of the Christian faith, and connect us with its whole history; and all in the different denominations could unite in their observance without sacrificing any article of their creed or discipline.

This tendency to union is also aided in this country by the very genius of our republic. Democracy is often thought to be but another name for the triumph of individualism and anarchy; but this is a superficial and unhistoric view. Democracy makes each individual concerned for the general good; and so it has more and higher interests in common than any other form of government, and tends almost irresistibly to unity. It gives to each man the deepest interest in government and law; it must have united action; it needs railroads, steamboats, and telegraphs, to abolish space and time, that men all over the land may at the same time think and act together. With one exception, we are a more united people now that we stretch across the continent, than were our fathers when they just fringed the Atlantic coast. There will and must be union here; and if while the state is blending all races, the church continues to split up into fragments, it will inevitably lose its power, in face of the mighty and impetuous interests which are now organizing to subdue this hemisphere. And a republic like ours, where church and

state are separated, offers facilities for Christian union and reunion such as can nowhere else be found. Externally everything favors it—the spirit of the people and the open pathway. We are far beyond the European complications, and may dare hope that here the reunion and pacification of our Lord's divided church may be inaugurated with large promise of success.

And even our present national conflict is teaching us a like lesson. We are passing from the Iliad to the Odyssey of our republican history (and under our Ulysses too), in an awe-inspiring and deadly battle between the rational principle of man's right to freedom, and the despotic maxim that might makes right; and also between the instinct of national life and the heresy of secession, which means national death. All our people and all our churches have felt the thrill of patriotic ardor inspired by the renewed and intense consciousness of that national unity, which is mutely foretold by our very geography and by our common relations to the other nations of the earth; they have all received a new baptism, a baptism of blood, the sign and seal of our republican regeneration. And so they have been bound together as never before; not only by common hopes and common fears, by common exultation in the hour of victory and common mourning at the loss of so many of the bravest and best of our country's sons, whom it will take another generation to replace; not only in the ministrations of Christians of every name among the sick, the wounded and the dying, in our many hospitals and on our many fields of battle, where they have all spoken the same lessons from the same Book; not only because chastisement and afflictions have wrought in all our hearts a calmer faith and a serener temper, which flees from the voice of discord and longs for the one thing needful; but also because, as we have seen the awful result and retribution of the spirit of disunion and hatred in the state, we have read a deeper lesson of the priceless value of Christian fellowship and brotherhood; so that in these throes of agonies of our mortal strife, our minor differences have been forgotten or buried out of

sight, and our immortal faith and Christian charity have been vivified and enlarged.

Another and more urgent call to union comes to us from our common interest against a common foe, which is assaulting the very citadel of our faith. Infidelity is no longer wasting its strength in skirmishes and partisan warfare; it is concentrating its subtle and malign power in a comprehensive and organized campaign. Its two extreme and contrasted forms, materialism and idealism, or atheism and pantheism, are reduced to well-defined systems, which are striving to ally themselves with modern civilization and modern democracy. Each claims to be the final system for man—idealism in the name of the deductive process of demonstration, and materialism in the name of the inductive philosophy; while Christian theism attempts to hold and reconcile both these methods. Philosophical and historical criticism are at work to undermine the faith. The *Essays and Reviews*, the Colenso controversy of England, Renan's *Life of Jesus*, and Strauss's new elaboration of his *Life of Jesus* for more popular effect, are but the beginnings of a contest which has been long foreseen, and in which the whole of historical Christianity, the Bible, the church, and all the doctrines of our confessions of faith are at stake. Is the Bible the same as all other books, only the most popular? Is the church on the same plane with all other institutions, only the most diffused? Is Christian experience the product of religious imagination? Is the incarnation the process of humanity in history, the Trinity a formula for an abstract law of thought, and the very name of God but another name for the Absolute Unknown? These are the questions. A resolute attempt is making to blot Christianity out from the record of living history, to resolve its facts into myths, its miracles into jugglery, its doctrines into ideas, its God-man into a vague moral hero. And this infidelity will strive for the possession of our land as for no other, in the full consciousness that thus it holds the future in its grasp. Here then is a controversy in view of which we cannot afford to spend our chief strength in mutual criminations and doe-

trinal logomaehy ; for it concerns our common Christian heritage, lying back of all our ecclesiastical and sectarian disputes. It must here draw Christians nearer together, as it is already doing in Germany, France, and England.

And Romanism too, should the designs of the cool and wary Emperor of the French be carried out in Mexico, may exalt itself anew in this Protestant land. The Latin and Anglo-Saxon races may here come into deadly conflict on a similar issue to that which in Europe has kept them asunder for three centuries. Other governments of Europe too, as well as the Papacy, would be glad to stay the onward course of this Protestant land ; and some may be even willing to sacrifice their love of Protestantism to their dread of our growing power.

And both these contests against infidelity and against Romanism are not only arguments for Christian union, but also lead us to the real source and centre of such union, that is the adorable person of our Lord. His is the only name which can conquer them and unite us. In proportion as the different branches of the church rally round him, and make him to be the centre of their whole system, in that same proportion do they live one life ; for the church is, in its essence, the body of Christ. Our text declares that we are to become one through the knowledge and faith of the Son of God. There is no other way to a living and permanent union and reunion ; all other projects know not the word that solves the enigma. No church is ready for union until it is full of Christ. The whole pressure of modern thought and theology is just in this direction. When our theology, our preaching, and our very lives, say that Christ is our all in all, then we shall meet and flow together. And that blessed reunion will come, even though our eyes here on earth may not see its resplendent glories ; for the Head of the church has pledged his unfailling word. And it shall be as much higher than the oneness of the old, even of the apostolic church, as perfect sanctification is higher than unconscious innocence. An old fable tells us that the majestic form of truth once walked the earth, but

was dismembered, and that the sundered parts are wandering up and down in ceaseless, weary search, each for the others, since each is still and ever instinct with the old common life ; and it is this instinct which impels to the search, and the very search thus contains a prophecy of the reunion of all the fragments in one radiant form at last. And so shall it be with the riven body of our Lord ; for each separate member is still vital with the memory of the old and loving union, and it will never be at rest until it finds all the others ; and bone shall come to bone, and flesh to flesh, and it shall all be clothed upon with the grace of an endless life ; and it shall be fairer than any of the sons and daughters of men, all glorious without and within, holy and without blemish ; love shall distil from its lips, and its words shall be like celestial music ; and it shall bear upon its placid brow the victor's wreath, and in its hands the victor's palm ; and all this shall it be because it is the bride of the Lamb ; and the bridegroom will array his spouse, for whom he gave his very life in ransom, with light like unto a stone most precious, even like a jasper stone, clear as crystal, and lead her into the temple of God ; and she shall live with him and serve him in that heavenly city, and go no more out forever.

2. Such anticipations of the final state and the perfected union of the church of the Redeemer, may well inspire our hearts and guide our thoughts, as we now pass from the more general to the more particular branch of our subject ; from the hope of final union to the question of the reunion of those who are called by the same name, and who have the same standards of faith and order. All arguments for Christian union have here more direct application, and are heightened by special inducements ; while many of the inherent difficulties of wider projects become irrelevant and unsubstantial. And whatever the difficulties, nevertheless, says the apostle, whereunto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.

It is, of course, the reunion of the two main branches of the Presbyterian church in this country which most directly con-

cerns us. The question is one of direct practical moment. Some think the full time for action has come; all think it wise to discuss the subject in its various bearings. The General Assemblies that met last year inaugurated, for the first time, a truly fraternal correspondence under the happiest auspices. Good men all over the land are praying for entire reconciliation. If it can be effected, its influence on the broader question of Christian union can hardly be over-estimated; for these two bodies are made up to a large extent of the most solid, energetic, patriotic, wealthy, and liberal part of our population, extending through the whole land, east and west, north and south. United they might form the most effective Christian organization on the continent.

At the same time we must look the difficulties as well as the encouragements full in the face. This is one of the cases in which it is easier to feel right than to act just right. Several grave questions will be raised. What were feasible for two local churches or presbyteries, may not be as easy for two widely extended denominations. And, besides, a second marriage between parties who have been divorced (whether legally or not) must be a sober, discreet, and rational union, not quite so spontaneous as the first, and heralded by repentance and forgiveness. Better defer the renewal of the bonds, than come together for strife and debate and to smite with the fists of wickedness. Better not try to tune the instruments to the same key, if there is danger of breaking the strings. But still, whatever may be the difficulties, there are none which cannot be surmounted, if we are all ready to act in the spirit of that famous maxim, of obscure and uncertain authorship, but of profound Christian import: *In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in utrisque caritas.**

* This saying has been attributed to Augustine, to Vincens of Lerins, and several other ancient writers. Richard Baxter, in 1679, eulogized it, ascribing it to a "pacifactor" whom he does not further name. Dr. Frederick Lücke, in a learned treatise on its "Age, Author, Original Form and True Meaning," published at Göttingen, 1850, reviews the history of this famous phrase, and ascribes its authorship to Rupertus Maldenius, a Lutheran divine of the first part of the seventeenth century, who wrote a *Parænesis*

Such a reunion implies three prime conditions. The first of these is, that there be a spirit of mutual concession. Each must recognize the good there is in the other, for each has of right a pretty good opinion of itself, and neither can afford to lose its self-respect. An open and manly union on equal terms is all that either side can ask or accept. There is to be no capitulation; neither is victor, neither is vanquished, except by the spirit of love. The second condition is, that both accept in its integrity the Presbyterian system of church order as distinguished from other systems. On this ground, the other branch of our church has had its chief stability and strength, and here, for a time, we attempted unreal compromises and adjustments. The third condition is, that the reunion be simply on the basis of the standards, which we equally accept, without private interpretation; interpreted in their legitimate grammatical and historic sense, in the spirit of the original Adopting Act, and as "containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." My liberty here is not to be judged of another man's conscience. Any other view not only puts, for all practical purposes, the Confession above the Scriptures, but also puts somebody's theological system above the confession.

Pre-supposing these conditions, let us now look somewhat more critically at our points of difference, yet with an irenic and not a polemic intent; mindful also of our responsibility to our only Master for the preservation and defence of the truth and the trust committed to our especial guardianship. For he that provideth not for his own house is worse than an infidel.

Every powerful organization known in history has been shaped and moved by the influence of contesting and almost opposite forces. Progress through and by conflict seems to be the law of human life. Even the naturalist finds it difficult to unfold the order of nature, without implying the ex-

Votiva pro Pace Ecclesiat. This is also reprinted entire in Lücke's work. In the *Studien und Kritiken*, 4s Heft, 1851, Lücke further defended his position against the claims set up for Frank, a Reformed theologian.

istence of inert atoms as well as living forces. The conflicts of law and liberty, of the conservative and progressive elements of society, enter into every civic debate, as do sovereignty and freedom into all theological disputes. The chief problem of government, whether in the state or in the church, centres in the adjustment of rival forces. As long as they can work together in any organism it is made more effective; for diversity in unity is essential to progress as well as to symmetry. The wheel is ever striving to fly from the axle which reduces the momentum to harmony and use. But, on the other hand, when the colliding powers become exclusive and unrelenting, there must be division to avoid the greater evils of anarchy and despotism. An attempt to secure a cast-iron uniformity shivers a sensitive fabric into mere fragments.

The history of the Presbyterian church in our land illustrates these principles. When united it grew apace because it contained such energetic and diverse elements. The tension at last became so violent, that rupture was inevitable without such concessions as neither party was in the mood to make. The causes of the rupture were intricate and manifold, some of them running their roots into our colonial, and even our European ancestry. Some persons who are fond of ascribing great events to little causes, who explain the discovery of the law of gravitation by the falling of an apple, say, it was all owing to the ambition and personal disputes of a few party leaders; and they propose, as a sure remedy, to let these combatants die out, and then have the new generation settle the dispute on easy and agreeable terms. Just as if personal ambition and theological eagerness belonged only to the fathers, and the children had no part in such frailties. It may yet be found, that something of the old Adam is still lurking in our young Melanethons. At any rate, they might profitably be put upon a course of Presbyterian history, adapted to beginners, if only to learn how complex are the causes, theological and ecclesiastical, historical and even political, out of which our division was engendered. A mouse cannot beget a mountain.

Our common Reformed faith was planted in New England by a population singularly acute, practical, and homogeneous; and there it assumed the form of Congregationalism. The same faith was later established in the middle and southern colonies by a more diverse emigration, from New England, as well as from Scotland, Ireland, and England; and there it took on the form of Presbyterianism, unsupported by State patronage. Our first Presbyteries and Synods were nearly equally divided between New England and the other emigrants. The Adopting Act of 1729 recognized these differences, and allowed them "only about articles not essential or necessary," implying that there are such articles in our standards. The scattered churches rallied around this centre, and the circumference grew. The Great Revival of the middle of the last century brought out the differences. Old Side and New Side, New York and Philadelphia, were separated for sixteen years; but they readily reunited in 1786, since they differed chiefly about men and measures. A Plan of Union, acceded to by the New England churches, was framed in 1801, to combine Presbyterianism and Congregationalism in one system; and under this plan, the fast growing West was gathered in large numbers into the Presbyterian Church. The harvest was great; the reapers were many and human, and began to contend for the spoils. New England theology was also felt as a modifying and aggressive power, warring against imputation, inability, and a limited atonement. Geographical and semi-political issues fanned the flames. The antagonistic forces began to show their teeth. The highest courts of the church became the arena of conflicts that disturbed their judicial imperturbability and senatorial serenity. The will of a majority was at length substituted for a judicial process, and the church was divided. And now for twenty-six years each side has gone on its way, and each has prospered. New England and the other branch of our church, both proposed to absorb us; and, in fact, the one did pick up some who outran us, and the other, some who lagged behind. But we were able to march on, and save our cannon and baggage, and

clothing and small arms ; and as we marched we reorganized, and consolidated, and did some good service, especially against a lax theology, a loose independency, and the fearful evil of American slavery. And we have still, from our peculiar central and intermediate position, a great work to do. This position is so well defined and so advantageous, that we can leave it only in deference to a plain call of Providence, and that we cannot leave it, if it involves any surrender of the essential principles for which we have contended and which have given us stability and advantage.

Even this rapid and imperfect recital may suffice to indicate the variety and difficulty of the questions raised by the project of reunion. They run all along the lines of our past history. Some of them have to do with theological questions, inherited from the scholastic Calvinism of Europe, while others turn upon mooted points of modern ethics and psychology. There is even an ethnological problem, growing out of the necessity of Americanizing foreign elements. There are differences on the theory of moral reform, especially as to the true attitude of the church about our great national sin of slavery, that foe of our ecclesiastical as well as of our political peace, that skeleton in our feasts of charity. And then we come upon the question of mixed and pure Presbyterianism, and what each is, which leads on to the relation of the church to voluntary societies. There are also doctrinal variations, partly as to the strictness of subscription to the confession, partly on specific heads of doctrine. And, in fine, there are the perennial and generic conflicts between the men whose intellects, as Newton says, need to be weighed with lead, and the men who need to be plumed with feathers ; between the agile and the stagnant ; between the historical and the logical ; between the theological and the ethical ; between idealists and realists, Platonists and Aristotelians. For such tendencies run through all history, and their representatives spring up in every human institution, because they stand for what is inextinguishable in human nature and in human needs.

Several of these issues are obsolete. All of these difficulties are mitigated. The division has been in some respects of benefit to both sides. Our branch of the church is much closer to its standards, taken even in the strictest interpretation, than it was a quarter of a century ago. Has the other side so far abated what was thought to be its exclusiveness, that we can now meet on equal terms on the same platform? The question is not, whether there are no differences. Taking both of us, as we now are, the question is, can we agree to differ? Let us scan the mooted points.

Some of these, we say, are obsolete or of no account. The question of races, the contest between the New England, and the Scotch and Irish elements, is no affair for compacts; the difference runs in the blood. It may be settled by social intercourse or intermarriage. Then the Plan of Union, as implying any compact between us and New England, is twice dead and plucked up by the roots; the rights of the few remaining churches formed on this plan would of course be respected. The matter of co-operation and voluntary societies is no longer formidable. Our own action has decided our policy in respect to education for the ministry. The extraordinary "Rules" of the American Home Missionary Society, virtually cutting off our churches from the aid of an association, in which we had, to say the least, equal and time-honored rights, has compelled us to take all our feeble churches under our own care. As to foreign missions, both the American Board and the Assembly's Board deserve and will wisely use all the funds that can be contributed to this object, and that, too, without jealousy or rivalry. For other philanthropic charities, Presbyterians have always been glad to unite with Christians of different names, who labor for the needy and afflicted in times of peace or war. The practical questions that might arise between the Committees or Boards of the different Assemblies could probably be readily adjusted. The most serious point would perhaps be as to the unwieldy size of the reunited Assembly; and this might call for a more limited representation, and end in giving to our

highest judicatory more strictly the character of a court of appeals.

There remain, then, the two subjects of our doctrinal differences, and of Presbyterianism as a polity and in its practical aspects. And these we ought to consider with such wisdom and love as not to revive past bitterness, or put a stumbling-block in the way of reunion.

The Presbyterian system has always showed a marked affinity with a vigorous and logical system of theology. Accepting all the immemorial doctrines of the Church (as the Incarnation, the Trinity, and Redemption), it has also been especially attached to that system of grace, unfolded by Paul and advocated by Augustine, which makes the divine sovereignty the basis and the divine glory the end of the whole economy; and which views the human race under the two generic aspects of the headship of Adam in respect to sin, and of the headship of Christ in relation to redemption. This system, though at first in substance adopted by the leading reformers, even in England,* has come to be designated as the Calvinistic. Its best and fullest expression is found in the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, which in doctrine are solid, in definitions distinct, in scope comprehensive, in form dignified, full of holy awe before the divine Word, and adapted to the edification of mature believers. The two main tendencies of historical Calvinism, that which emphasizes the divine sovereignty, and that known as the theology of the covenants, are therein impartially represented, neither exclusively.

Our differences centre in part upon the interpretation of this Confession. An Old School man is popularly understood to mean one who thinks that he adopts every jot and tittle of

* Calvin's Catechism was ordered to be used in the University of Cambridge as late as 1578. Bucer and Peter Martyr were called by Cranmer to Cambridge and Oxford. Bishop Jewel, in 1562, wrote to Peter Martyr about the Articles: "As to matters of doctrine, we have pared everything away to the very quick, and do not differ from you a hair's breadth."—*Zurich Letters*, 2, 89.

these elaborate standards, the *ipsissima verba*, just as they stand. A New School man is one who accepts them—not “for substance of doctrine,” that is not our phrase, but—as “containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures,” which is the only form of assent demanded. We receive the Confession, not as a rule of faith and life, for this only the Scriptures can be; but as containing our system of faith, in contrast with Arminianism and Pelagianism, as well as Socinianism and Romanism. We accept it in its legitimate, historical sense, as understood and interpreted through the history of our Church. Both branches of our church also stand in the same general relation to other schemes of doctrine; both preach the same law and the same gospel, and train up their members in the same system of faith and the same order of Christian life. Our differences are of degree and not of kind; not of Yes and No, but of more and less; not of good and bad, but of good and better. Especially is this the case among our laymen, whose vocation is practical Christian work rather than to ply questions that gender strife.

And may we not differ in some points of technical theology, and still be substantially at one? Cannot charity find a conjunction, where a logical polemic interjects a disjunctive dilemma? Doubtless a well-trained controversialist may

“chase

Some panting syllable through time and space,”

and worry his opponents and weary his friends; but sober and candid men will look upon it as a gymnastic recreation rather than as a needful fight for the faith once delivered to the saints. The questions between us are about shades of orthodoxy, and do not reach to the dilemma, orthodoxy or heterodoxy. Men may agree in doctrine and differ in philosophy. “All error,” says a church father, “is not heresy, though all heresy is error.” Let each side explain its own meaning, and the black spot will often fade into a penumbra. Questions that are important in a class-room, may be irrelevant as to a public confession of faith. Certain extreme

speculations are doubtless ruled out by both the spirit and the letter of our confession; as, for example, that God is the author of sin; that happiness and not holiness, man's happiness and not the divine glory, is the end of the system; that the atonement is an expedient for moral impression; and that man is able of himself, without divine grace, to repent and turn unto God. But those and kindred errors were emphatically rebuked by the Auburn Convention, which denied that they were held by our ministry. And as to the points really in dispute, it will be found that the substantial ground as to each and all of them is also common ground.

Thus it is, we believe, in respect to the five points, which we are debating, as our forefathers also summed up their controversies with the Arminians in the famous Five Points. Our points are, the imputation of Adam's first sin, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, the nature and limits of the atonement, ability and inability, and Christian perfection. Other questions, as of the eternal generation of the Son, are not now much pressed; and few in any of our churches would be disposed to deny the doctrine of the eternal Sonship.

As to the imputation of Adam's first sin, we may differ on the question whether it be immediate or mediate, or both; we may say with Augustine and Calvin and Edwards that the sin is imputed to us because it is ours; or with the scholastic Calvinist, that it is ours because it is imputed to us; one man may be realistic and another man may be nominalistic in his philosophy; while we all agree that there is a proper imputation, that certain penal consequences of the great apostasy are reckoned to Adam's posterity by virtue of their union with him; that from these evils no member of the race can be delivered, excepting by divine grace; and, also, in the practical belief that for original sin, without actual transgression, no one will be consigned to everlasting death.

On the imputation of Christ's righteousness, one side may note its resemblance to the imputation of sin, and the other its points of difference; one may view it more in its relation to grace, and another to the satisfaction of justice; one may

distinguish between the active and passive obedience, another may hold them together in the unity of Christ's person and work ; while all agree, that justification is an act of God's free grace, whereby he pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us and received by faith alone.

The controversy as to the nature of the atonement, whether it be a satisfaction to the distributive or the public justice of God, is substantially adjusted, when the terms are strictly defined ; when distributive justice is restricted to the idea of rendering to each one according to his personal desert, and public justice is viewed as having ultimate respect to holiness, and not to happiness ; and when the atonement is defined, not as a government expedient, or a means of moral impression, but as a satisfaction as well to the inherent justice of God as to the holy ends of the divine law. And as to the limits of the atonement—if we do not raise the intricate questions of the order of the decrees, and the specific terms of the covenant of redemption, little more than a verbal dispute remains, so soon as we agree that the oblation made by Christ is sufficient for all, is to be offered to all, enhances the guilt of those who reject it, and also had special respect, in the comprehensive divine purpose, to the salvation of the elect.

Even upon ability and inability, the sharpness of dispute is lulled, since the definitions have become so refined that they express metaphysical abstractions rather than theological facts. One man may seem to deny all ability of any sort, and even imply that there is no capacity in man to make any other choice than the one actually made ; another may put the ability in a power of opposite choice, which he confesses is never exercised. The former seems to deprive man of all moral agency ; the latter seems to imply that it is practicable for man to repent without divine grace. Edwards and Smalley by their distinctions meant, that neither natural ability taken by itself, nor moral inability taken by itself, tells the whole truth about man's condition, but that both together tell the whole truth. The sinner must be led to feel both his respon-

sible guilt and also his absolute need of divine grace. Our confession affirms the "liberty of second causes," and restricts the inability to "the spiritual good accompanying salvation." And so we may all give heed to the exhortation to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in us, both to will and to do of his good pleasure.

And as to the fifth and last point of difference, that of Christian perfection, I think that by this time we are all well agreed that we have not already attained, nor are already perfect; but this one thing we may do, forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before, we may press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Jesus Christ.

For, after all, Christ alone can be the author of our peace, and make of both one, breaking down the middle wall of partition. When we can read our differences in the light of his wisdom, and adjust our conflicts in the spirit of his love, and shape our doctrines by the illumination of his Spirit, we are no longer at variance, we are already one; we are no longer ignorant, we are already wise. When the skeleton of our theologies is clothed upon with his life, and becomes like his matchless and radiant form, when theology is christologized in all its parts, and finds its central principle in the God-man, our Saviour, then we shall know the full reality of all which else we vainly strive to utter. For it holds true in theology, as in the Christian life, that "he who knows Christ knows enough, though he knows not other things, and he who knows not Christ knows nothing, though he knows other things."*

Though we may not have attained to this measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ, yet this review of our points of doctrinal variance may make it manifest, that our separation is more technical than real, in the letter and not in the

* Qui Christum noscit, sat scit, si cætera nescit;
Qui Christum nescit, nil scit, si cætera noscit.

This saying is also reported in another form :

Hoc est nescire, sine Christo plurima scire;
Christum si bene scis, satis est, si cætera nescis.

spirit. Controversies are very apt to leave the body of the church in the middle and the disputants at both ends. We are gravitating towards the centre. Our very division has lessened and not widened the breach. We need only say of our points of difference what Principal Cunningham said of a kindred discussion: that there is nothing in the Confession which precludes men from holding, or which requires them to hold, either of the contrasted positions.* Our ground has always been that both parties may and ought to live under our standards in peace and quietness. We do not object even to those of the most straitest sect, provided that, concerning zeal, they do not insist upon persecuting the church. But if it be claimed that the only basis of union is our acceptance of the theories of external imputation, unqualified inability and a partial atonement, even if we held to these dogmas we could not accede to the terms; for they annul the very principle of a broader ministerial fellowship, without which no reunion could be lasting. We cannot afford to enter a communion which would exclude Edwards and Dwight, Richards and Woods. But let us rather hope that time has taught lessons of a higher faith and a larger charity, and that both sides only wish for such a victory of truth as is also the victory of charity.†

Our Presbyterian system is also, in fine, an organized form of church government, as is connoted by its very name. The enduring and growing vigor of this polity, and its just combination of the two elements of order and liberty, are attested by its whole history, as well as by a comparison of it with other schemes of church government.

The churches that sprung from the reformation have been organized in four forms; as episcopal, territorial, presbyterian, and independent. Episcopacy was tried in England; independency chiefly in England and this country; territorialism in Germany (essentially presbyterian, but hampered

* See Dr. Cunningham's review of Sir William Hamilton on Philosophical Necessity, in the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, 1858, p. 211.

† Augustine: Non vincit nisi veritas: victoria veritatis est caritas.

by the maxim, *ejus regio, ejus religio*); presbyterianism alone penetrated all the reformed countries. Presbyterianism as contrasted with episcopacy means, that bishops are not necessary to the being of the church; as contrasted with the Lutheranism of Germany, it means, that the ministry alone ought not to rule the church; as contrasted with independency, it means, that the individual churches are to be organized in permanent tribunals by a regular system of representation. This system has its examples in Scripture and in the apostolic church; but it comes to us, as the heirs of the Reformation, from the organizing genius of one of the greatest men of the sixteenth century, the tercentenary of whose decease falls within the period of the sessions of our Assembly, and whose name demands of us and of the Christian world a grateful recognition and eulogy.

John Calvin died in Geneva, not having quite reached the fifty-fifth year of his life, at eight o'clock on the evening of May 27th, 1564. He was the best systematic divine of his century, and the most lucid expositor of the Scriptures; sought out for counsel by the wisest of all lands; resolute as a reformer and unbending as a disciplinarian; * indefatigable in trial though borne down by many infirmities; knowing more of life's duties than of its recreations; devoted to his adopted city which he regenerated, and to the church of God for which he lived, until he ended by a peaceful death his apostolic labors, having fought a good fight and kept the faith. His enemies said he was "a man of ice and iron;" Melancthon, Farel, and Beza loved him with a confiding affection. He was a man of spare but wiry frame, of keen yet calm visage, of an inflexible will poised on truth and ever pointing to duty like the magnet to the pole, with an eagle eye that saw afar yet saw minutely, and his device was a hand holding a burning heart.† He never spoke or wrote much

* Yet he says of himself, in his preface to his Commentary on the Psalms, in words which he repeated on his dying bed: *Ego qui natura timido, molli et pusillo animo me esse fateor.*

† Calvin used two seals, one before 1550, and the other afterwards. The

about himself; for he was one of the few men so absorbed in his work that he esteemed self as a very little thing. He reformed Geneva; his influence pervaded Switzerland, and reached to Germany, Holland, England, and Scotland; he organized the Reformed Church of France; he was, says Ranke, "the virtual founder of the United States of America;" he was, says even Renan, "the most Christian man of his day in all Christendom." Both in French and Latin he was master of a clear and cogent style, striking straight at the point like an arrow winged to the heart of the ring. His unmatched Institutes procured for him from Melancthon the title of "the theologian;" but it may well be doubted whether his polity was not his greatest and most enduring work. His name and fame stand out more eminent and sharply defined as time recedes, just as the loftiest mountains seem to be more distinct and prominent in a distant than in a near view. Well may we venerate his memory. And would that all the Reformed Churches might honor him by resuming anew their common historic name, by learning from him more thoroughly the nature of the church, which he so carefully defined, and by living in his spirit for that union of all Protestant churches which was ever so near his heart.

His church polity emphatically organized the reform, and gave it a bulwark against Rome. Other polities were shaped by the times; his shaped the times. He drew his principles from the Word of God and adapted them most wisely to his epoch. He insisted on the universal priesthood of believers and the parity of the clergy. To him alone belongs the credit of introducing ruling elders* into the government of the Re-

only difference was that in the former the heart was held in the left hand; in the latter it is in the right hand, offering it to God, with the letters J. C. Luther's seal was a rose, in which was a heart, and on the heart a cross.

* Henry, *Das. Leben Calvin's*, 2.85. Of the reformers, "Calvin was the first to advocate the pure presbyterian constitution, the influence of which was afterwards so signal." Neither Zwingel nor Farel appointed ruling elders. Calvin advocated their election in the first edition of his Institutes, 1535.

formed churches, thus securing its popular and representative character. At Geneva they were in the consistory twice as many elders (*seniores plebis*) as ministers. Though the Genevese church and state were more closely connected than he wished, yet he did not allow the church to interfere in respect of doctrine. This was committed to Synods, which were also intended to check the license of merely individual judgments. And thus, like a wise legislator, he organized the church on a basis combining authority with popular rights. And in point of fact Christianity was saved at the Reformation, not only by a revival of faith and the restoration of religion to the laity; not only by putting the Bible as the rule of faith into the hands of the people; but also by being organized into a church system at once popular and efficient. For only that which is organized can do the real work of life and society. Calvin had the deepest sense of the rights and dignity of the church, of which he said, "we must regard it as one mother and stay in it until we have laid aside the body, and come to be like the angels."

The Presbyterianism which he did so much to shape and consolidate, has had an eventful and honored history (never yet fully set forth), identified with the progress of mankind and of the Christian church, especially in those nations that have been in the van of the world's historic advance, contending for civil and religious freedom, and earnest in applying Christianity not only to the heart and the life, but also to the reform of society and the state. Modified here and there in some of its details, it has preserved intact its essential traits, and showed its power by its ever fresh adaptation to new times with their new wants. Wherever established it put its impress upon the character of the people, because it had a character of its own.

In our own country, freed from entangling alliance with the state, this polity has been found to correspond admirably with the genius of our institutions. Our church, made up by representatives from different countries, has to some extent reunited here those who in the old world were sundered.

And so we have had an American Presbyterianism, not fashioned after any one foreign type. But yet there are certain characteristics essential to the system which must be retained and insisted on, especially in view of a possible and stable reunion of our now divided churches.

One of these is, that a definite polity and a definite creed go together; they act upon and shape each other. To a large extent it must hold good, that, as is the polity so will be the creed, as the creed so the polity. But upon this I need not enlarge.

Presbyterianism implies a high appreciation of the inherent dignity and rights of the church of Christ, as a visible institution, armed with spiritual power. As every system must have its own practical habit, so, too, the church should direct its proper ecclesiastical work through agencies wisely adapted to the times. And the signs of the times are teaching us, that we need strong organizations to do Christ's work, to repel infidelity and error, and to stand like a rock amid the insurgent pressure of the material, political and humanitarian tendencies that characterize modern society.

Every living system too, must have appropriate means for its own growth and discipline. A church ought to grow from within, and not by mere accretions from without. Individualism relies upon the conversion of adults in occasional revivals. The church should rely most upon the nurture and growth of its own children. Baptized children are church members. They ought not to be received to the communion by the same formula proposed to the unbaptized. And it may well be questioned whether it is not desirable in the case of all to return to the older and simpler mode of reception, and disuse the local confessions of faith, which were first made for independent churches not united by any common symbol; bearing this too in mind, that our standards are not to be applied to private members with the same strictness that they are to the officers of the church.

Our Presbyterian system has also a well-defined historical relation to the civil as well as the religious progress of man-

kind. The Confession enjoins obedience to lawful magistrates. Our history is lighted up with noble deeds and costly sacrifices for civil as well as religious liberty. Our church has been patriotic to the core, and with entire unanimity, during our present fearful national conflict. It has borne unqualified testimony against the twin political heresies in which this Titanic rebellion originated—the right of secession and the rightfulness of the system of American slavery; for the first annuls the possibility of a stable state, while the other is at war with the prime instinct and principle of a republican government. Our branch of the church has remained faithful to the noble Presbyterian “deliverance” of 1818, made long before our rupture and never repealed. Our very division is to be traced, more directly than many suppose, to an apprehended collision on this vital question.*

And our reunion depends, more perhaps than on any single cause, upon our becoming one on this old basis. The God of the oppressed, who in ancient days commanded his people once in fifty years to proclaim liberty throughout all the land, unto all the inhabitants thereof, has taken this great cause for a time out of the hands of politicians and out of ecclesiastical courts, and submitted it, by his right as the God of battles, to the dread arbitrament of war. Secession and slavery are identified; the union and freedom are identified. Long has the contest been waged. Every defeat of our arms, and every month's delay, have but increased the certainty of the final overthrow of that system of oppression which, if any ever was, is “to destruction sacred and devote.” And when the year of jubilee for that down-trodden race has fully come, and the measure of our chastisement is full, then—in our re-

* The Assembly which met at Newark, N. J., adopted a report on slavery, drawn up by Judge Matthews, which indicates that the differences on this point are rapidly diminishing. The declaration of 1818 is reaffirmed in the strongest terms. The rebellion, it is said, “has taken away from every good man, every motive for the further toleration of slavery.” “In our present situation, the interests of peace and of social order are identified with the success of the cause of emancipation.” “The measures taken by state and national authorities, for its extirpation, are cordially approved.”

stored national union more puissant than even before, renewing its youth like an eagle, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race—then too, in the restored union of our churches, bound closer than ever before, the grounds of their disruption forever removed—may we extol and magnify that exalted justice tempered by an infinite love, which laid upon us such bitter and costly sacrifices for our discipline and welfare, that we might be purified in the furnace of affliction, and prepared for the coming of the Son of man.

FATHERS AND BRETHREN! Commissioners to the General Assembly: We have come up to our Annual Assembly to consult for the peace and prosperity of Zion. No question can come home more closely to our hearts than that of Christian Union and Ecclesiastical Reunion. It is enforced by the best memories of the past, by our best hopes for the future. The consummation may be delayed, but we believe that it will surely come. Those that have the same name and the same history cannot forever remain apart. We have too many precious memories in common. The honor and glory of our historical Presbyterianism equally belong to us. We recall with just pride its eventful story, its noble deeds, its struggles for civil and religious freedom, its grand old theology and solemn covenants and confessions, its reverend names of theologians and spiritual heroes, of martyrs and of saints, its works of evangelical faith, its missions that have stretched across the continent and made the circuit of the globe. These are our common heritage, a part of our very life-blood, glowing in our whole present consciousness. We have the same historic roots and the same sturdy trunk; we bear the same leaves and flowers and fruit; and we differ, not as one tree differeth from another tree, but as the branches of the same tree planted in the garden of the Lord.

If we cannot reunite on the basis of our common standards, what prospect is there of reunion among any of the divided sects? And if we can but be reunited, what a wide pathway is open before us, what a magnificent work of Christian evangelism—among the teeming population of our western prai-

ries ; in our ample territories with their untold wealth of silver and gold ; in the new-born states that skirt the broad Pacific main ; among the freedmen of the South still to be educated for freedom ; among the diverse races of foreign birth, flocking even now in crowds to our ports, and who can be moulded into one people only by our common American Christianity ; over all the broad expanse of this imperial republic, which will be ambitious for material gain and earthly conquest, as never was another people, if it be not penetrated and fashioned by the gospel of Christ as never was another people, and which was baptized into Christ by our godly sires in its earliest prime, that it might lay the glories of its youthful strength, and the conquests of its manly prime, and the fruits of its world-wide commerce at Immanuel's feet, and help to carry the tidings of his salvation to the ends of the earth.

We have met to consult for the peace and unity of the church, while the nation is aflame with the blaze of civil war, and every battle of the warrior is with garments rolled in blood. Ofttimes the very air seems laden with human grief and speechless woe, and the burden weighs insupportably upon our souls ; but above all these heavy clouds of wrath there is a serener sky and a pitiful Father. Weeping endureth for a night ; joy cometh in the morning ; and at times the light of the morning seemeth to dawn as when the sun riseth upon a morning without clouds. Peace must come after war ; after disunion cometh union. And where can men better consult for peace and union, than in an assembly of the church of the Lord Jesus Christ, who is himself not only Lord of lords but the Prince of peace ? Speaking the truth in love, we may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ, from whom the whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.

And let our prayer be unto Him, who of old did lead his

people like a flock, by the hand of Moses and Aaron, the God of the covenant ; and unto Him, who gave himself for his church, that it might be holy and without blame before him in love ; and unto the Holy Spirit, the giver of concord and the living bond of spiritual unity ; that He would so fill our hearts and minds with divine charity, that we, renouncing all false and wicked ways, may never more profane his holy temple with strife and uncharitableness, but may walk before him in love, and be at peace with all who love his name ; that thus may be fulfilled in us our Lord's priestly petition, that his disciples might be one, "as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they may also be one in us." So may we duly laud and magnify that grace which triumphs in our weakness, and helps us when we are lowly in heart, and which alone can make us to be of one mind—the grace of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, world without end. Amen.

HAMILTON'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.*

IN the excellent and convenient Boston edition of the Lectures of Sir William Hamilton, we have the philosophical legacy of the ablest representative of the Scottish school of philosophy, and one of the most illustrious thinkers of the nineteenth century. Incomplete as he has left many of his works, they yet give abundant evidence of that logical acuteness, firm grasp of thought, and historical learning on recondite themes, which have made his name famous. His new Analytic is not fully developed; but his Lectures on Logic are the most complete treatise on that subject in English literature. His Philosophy of the Conditioned is not systematically unfolded; but its principles are laid down in a distinct and definite manner, and in sharp contrast with the German speculations. His Notes to Reid's Collected Writings are a store-house of acute criticism, and multifarious and precise learning, and have made Reid's works to have a double value; few authors find such an editor. His articles in the *Edinburgh Review* on metaphysical subjects, accomplished a work to which hardly a

* From the *American Theological Review* for January, 1861.

REID'S COLLECTED WRITINGS. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 3d ed. 1852.

DISCUSSIONS IN PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, ETC. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON. New York. 1853.

LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON. Edited by Rev. H. L. MANSEL, and JOHN VEITCH. In Two Volumes. Vol. I., *Metaphysics*. 1859. Vol. II., *Logic*. 1860. Pp. 738, 751. Boston: Gould & Lincoln.

parallel can be found in periodical literature. They made all England conscious of the philosophical relation of the Scotch to the continental schools. When others were dumb with amazement or trepidation in view of the transcendental schemes of Teutonic speculation, this intrepid and acute thinker presented himself within the lists, and threw down the gauntlet against all comers—to vindicate, on philosophical grounds, the philosophy of common sense in face of the proud pretensions of the philosophy of the absolute. His name and fame, in the annals of philosophy, are identified with this work. Besides this, as a teacher of philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, he revived the study of logic and metaphysics at a time when logic was neglected and metaphysics every where spoken against; and he created an enthusiastic school, which has able advocates in England and America, as well as in Scotland. His system has now become a part of the history of philosophy; and it deserves to be studied, not only because he was one of the most vigorous of thinkers, but because his speculations bear upon the relation between the Scotch and the German schools, and enter into the very heart of the controversy between philosophy and faith.

The events of Sir William Hamilton's outward life were few and simple; nor are his published works voluminous in comparison with those of most of the great thinkers. He was born in Glasgow, March 8, 1788, a descendant of a noble family. In the University of Glasgow, he stood first in philosophy. Becoming a student in Oxford (Balliol College), he there attained an unrivalled knowledge of the ancient systems. As a candidate for honors in 1812, he professed himself ready to be examined upon all the extant works of Greek and Roman philosophy—Plato, Aristotle, the New-Platonists, etc. With the chief scholastic systems, and the works of Descartes and Leibnitz, he was already familiar. He began the practice of law; but general learning was his chosen field. His first contribution to philosophy was a series of papers against the phrenological hypotheses of Combe, read before the Royal So-

ciety of Edinburgh in 1826, the fruit of a minute investigation of craniological facts. In 1829 appeared his first elaborate metaphysical article, against Cousin and all the Germans, pronouncing the philosophy of the Absolute to be an hallucination; and laying down his fundamental position, that our ideas of the Infinite and Absolute are negative, the product of an imbecility of the mind. In 1830, in the *Edinburgh Review*, he published an essay on the Philosophy of Perception, reducing Reid's doctrine to a more definite statement, and severely criticising the philosophy of Brown. In 1833 he wrote his article on Logic, exposing the inaccuracies of Whately, and other writers, and showing a marvellous acquaintance with the literature of the subject. In these three articles, the fundamental positions of his philosophy are already stated. His system was matured; and he was prepared to enter upon the post of Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, to which he was chosen, not without a hard struggle, in 1836. Sixteen years before he had been an unsuccessful candidate for the professorship of Moral Philosophy, to succeed Dr. Brown—John Wilson being elected in his stead. He addressed himself with ardor to his new office, and in two years wrote out his courses on Metaphysics and Logic, in substance as now published. This great task could only have been performed on the basis of such a preparation as he had made in almost all departments of learning. He infused a new spirit into the lecture-room, and trained his students to independent thought: "*On earth there is nothing great but man; in man there is nothing great but mind*"—was the motto, which each one saw on entering his class. He was now in the fulness of his mental vigor; and began at once an edition of Reid's works, first published in 1846, and not yet completed, breaking off in the midst of a note. The Supplementary Dissertations gave a new phase to the philosophy of common sense, and illustrated it with prodigal learning.

In these Dissertations, and in the articles already referred to in the *Edinburgh Review*, we find the height of his speculative development; what is added in the notes to his Lectures

is chiefly in the way of explanation and defence. His metaphysical system, as such, was never fully carried out. The most of an attempt in this direction, is perhaps found in the Appendix to his Discussions on the "Conditions of the Thinkable Systematized; an Alphabet of Human Thought." His general theory of knowledge is there applied to the principle of Causality, as it had been to the Infinite and Absolute. The same work contains all his other chief papers—on Collier's Idealism; on the study of Mathematics, rating it below logic as a mental discipline; a series of articles on Education, in which the abuses of the English system are unsparingly exposed; a thorough discussion of the authorship of the *Epistolæ Obscuro-rum Virorum*, etc. But with all his vast learning, dialectic skill, and critical sagacity, he has left us only fragments of the system which he intended to rear. Parts of the edifice are complete; the whole is incomplete; and the architect is no more. It may be, that on his principles, the task was superhuman. On moral philosophy, we find only a few scattered hints; æsthetics, as a science, he never seems to have studied; of metaphysics, as distinct from psychology, he does not give any clear conception; to the philosophy of history, there is scarcely an illusion in all his works; on the relation between philosophy and faith, a topic to which all his speculations seemed inevitably to lead him, there are only the most general and indefinite statements. Where he speaks of theological points with confidence, it is usually apparent that he had not made them matters of thorough study. Nothing can be more incorrect, e. g., than his strong statements about the Assurance of Faith, as being the essence of the Protestant doctrine; * and on the relation of freedom and decrees, he does not get beyond the commonplaces of popular instruction. And, in fact, on the general principles of Hamilton's system,

* See the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, October, 1856, for a thorough refutation of Sir Wilham's misconceptions and misstatements on this point. He even went so far as to say, that the doctrine of assurance being abandoned, there remained only a verbal dispute about justification between Roman Catholics and Protestants.

as we may see in the course of the discussion, it is well-nigh impossible to construct a *science*, either of ethics, or of theology; for absolute right and absolute being are to him simply inconceivable; and all that can remain in either department is a body of practical and regulative truths, but not a science, based on an idea. With all of Hamilton's immense learning, too, there are parts of the history of philosophy itself with which he does not show any thorough acquaintance. He studied Aristotle minutely; but Plato he seldom cites, partly, perhaps, because he felt no sympathy with the spirit of his system. For the same reason, it may be, Coleridge is almost studiously ignored, though Coleridge was exerting in England an influence almost as great as that of Hamilton in Scotland; they represented respectively the two poles of speculative thought. Even Comte and the positivists are hardly ever named by the Scotch logician. In German philosophy he had studied Kant, and received from him an ineffaceable impression; but the other great German philosophers he most certainly had not studied. His statement of Schelling's system is exaggerated and incomplete, even in relation to Schelling's youthful speculations; and that Schelling had a different system in his maturer years, seems to have escaped Hamilton's notice. His references to Hegel's scheme are also very vague and unsatisfactory, and not such as to indicate any thorough acquaintance with his whole system.* The works

* In his *Discussions*, p. 31 Note, Hamilton says, that Hegel's whole philosophy is founded "on a violation of logic," for "in positing pure or absolute existence on a mental datum, immediate, intuitive and above proof (though in truth this be palpably a mere relation, gained by a process of abstraction), he not only mistakes the fact, but violates the logical law, which prohibits us to assume the principle which it behoves us to prove." Are we, then, to prove logically the very first principle in philosophy—the fundamental point? If so, how can we ever start? What can we start from? Further, how is the principle of "pure, absolute existence, a mere relation?" Is it not, in its very nature, above all relations? And, besides, how is this to be reconciled with what Hamilton himself says about "Existence" in his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, p. 548: "Philosophers who allow a native principle to the mind at all, allow that Existence is such a principle. I shall therefore *take for granted* Existence as the highest category or condition of

of those Germans who have most vigorously opposed the pantheistic speculations, he seldom cites; in fact, he uniformly speaks of the philosophy of the Infinite and Absolute, as if no German, or anybody else could attach any other than a pantheistic sense to these cardinal terms; they mean with him either pantheism or nothing. But yet, his learning in other directions, and, on special subjects, was beyond any of his English contemporaries, and, in some departments, it probably exhausted all the main sources. And his critical power, his logical subtlety, his skill in definition, his comparison and classification of differing theories, are always admirable, and have been seldom, if ever, surpassed.

In these general aspects, and in these high intellectual qualities, the reputation of Hamilton is insured. He has taken his place in the illustrious line of those great men who have given their days and nights to the search after wisdom. He is identified with the progress of logical and metaphysical science. His personal position and reputation among the lovers of wisdom is elevated and unquestionable. But the chief interest that attaches to him, or to any great thinker, is not personal or local. It is in respect to his position upon the fundamental problems of human speculation; it is upon the inquiry, what has he done for the solution of the highest questions about human knowledge and destiny. Where is he to be here ranged? Has he told us anything new, and anything better than his predecessors, upon the relation of thought to being, upon the relation of philosophy to faith? Have fundamental truths been made more clear, have the final questions been more sharply put and

thought. . . . No thought is possible except under this category. . . . All thought implies the thought of Existence. . . . Let Existence then be laid down as a necessary form of thought." He here explicitly "assumes" the very thing, which, as found in Hegel, he declares to be "a violation of logic." His statements are almost identical with those of the German philosopher on this very point. But, of course, it makes all the difference in the world whether such a principle be assumed by a Scotchman or a German. It is "necessary" to the former, but "a violation of logic" in the latter. It is common sense in the one, and the pride of reason in the other.

better answered, in his system than in those which have preceded him?

And here, too, in relation to some parts of the system of philosophy, his merits are of the highest order. In the science of logic he was unrivalled. He purified it of much adventitious matter, and viewed it exclusively as the science of the laws of thought as thought, that is, as a purely formal science. He also, under this aspect, made additions to it, which, we think, are theoretically correct, even though practically they may not be found of great utility; particularly in respect to the thorough quantification of the predicate in both affirmative and negative propositions.* And though behind his whole conception of logic, as a formal science, there still lies the inquiry as to the relation of logical laws to real truth and being (which he nowhere formally discusses); and though, as we shall see, he applies these mere logical laws to the solution of metaphysical questions in a way hardly consistent with his own principles; yet still the science, of which Kant † declared, that since Aristotle it had not gone backward and could not go forward, has been enlarged and purified by the sharp researches and discrimination of the Scotch logician. On the question of Perception, too, in reference to skepticism and idealism, and in its relations to the qualities of external bodies, he has made additions to philosophy—stating all the theories more explicitly and comprehensively than had before been done. And whatever doubts may rest upon the details of his own theory, ‡ his vindication of an immediate knowledge of the external world, and his modification of the doctrine of consciousness to meet this fact, and his exposure of the different schemes of hypothetical and representative perception, are learned, thorough and valuable additions to philosophical science. Had he but applied the same general theory of knowledge to the “intelligible” or

* See his conclusive reply to objections in the Appendix to his Lectures on Logic, pp. 539-546.

† *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorrede, p. viii.

‡ Compare an able article in the *Princeton Review*, April, 1860.

supersensible world, that he did to the material and sensible, he would have been kept from some of the most serious difficulties and objections to which his metaphysical system is now exposed.

It is of this, his metaphysical system, that we propose more particularly to speak. The relation of thought to being is the ultimate problem of metaphysical speculation. What are the ultimate and necessary truths of human reason? and, is there a reality corresponding to them? These are the two chief questions of metaphysics, as distinguished from psychology, which investigates the mind and its powers; and from all empirical science, which studies and classifies external phenomena. And the vital point with any system of philosophy is upon these fundamental inquiries.

Hamilton, now, on these points professed to stand, generally, on the basis of the Scotch philosophy—admitting certain ultimate principles of belief, and contending for the veracity of immediate consciousness in its affirmation of their objective, as well as subjective, validity. He illustrated these positions with profound learning; defined the doctrine of common sense; showed that it was legitimate, and how it was to be applied; and set forth the criteria by which its principles are to be tested. (See the Dissertations appended to Reid's Works.) So far, so good. But was this the whole of his system? Did he simply retreat and purify Reid and Stewart? Did he even accept these principles as they did? Their ultimate philosophy was in them. Was Hamilton's likewise? Many seem to think so; although somewhat startled occasionally by what he says about "the imbecility of the mind" as a source of many of its ultimate truths; about the Infinite as a purely negative notion; about Time and Space as subjective conditions of thought; and especially about causality (a pet test of the Scotch ultimate in philosophy) and substance, as expressing the powerlessness of the mind to think rather than any positive thought. But the fact is, that, underlying all of Hamilton's statements as to the principles of common sense, there is a theory of knowledge, entirely dif-

ferent from any previously recognized in the Scotch school, and derived chiefly from the system of Kant, of which he was a thorough student. This theory came out in connection with Hamilton's criticisms of the philosophy of Cousin and the Germans. In order to refute the pretensions of the transcendental philosophers he took positions, which, we believe, really undermine the main principles of the Scotch systems, as rational and ultimate. In attempting to rebut the philosophy of the Unconditioned, he left the philosophy of the Conditioned without any basis in man's rational nature.

Instead of the philosophy of common sense, which bids us rest with an unquestioning assurance upon the fundamental laws of belief, he has given us a system which reduces all thought to contradictory propositions, both of which are utterly inconceivable, yet one of which, he says, we must accept; which resolves "conceptions" of the infinite and the absolute into mere negations; which declares that philosophy "is at best the reflection of a reality we cannot know," and that "the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar—*To the unknown and unknowable God.*" With the philosophy of the absolute, in his interpretation of it, he declares that he so far agrees, "as to make the knowledge of *nothing* the principle and result of all true philosophy:

" *Scire Nihil—studium quo nos laetamur utrique.*"

He makes philosophy to be ultimately a "philosophical nescience," and exalts the "imbecility" and "impotence" of the mind into a "great principle," by which some of its most important phenomena are to be explained, and which, he says, has been "strangely overlooked." This is the grand discovery of his system; herein he is original. And yet, he was not himself a nihilist; he was, on the contrary, a firm believer in an infinite and absolute God, and, so far as can be judged from incidental allusions, in the cardinal doctrines of the Christian system. He even insisted upon the impotence of thought, that he might exalt the necessity of faith—and faith, too, not merely

in a religious, but in a psychological, point of view. In the hopeless contradictions into which reason is plunged by an inexorable logic, he also descried a logical necessity for deciding in favor of one of the alternatives ; and this decision he apparently construes as an act of belief, sure indeed, but inscrutable. And thus he endeavored to save his system from the sceptical consequences which a mere rationalist would have deduced from it. If he taught that philosophy ended in ignorance, it was in order to enforce the lesson, that blind belief is the beginning, if not the end, of human wisdom. It is a delicate and difficult matter to annul reason as to the objects of faith without undermining faith. And the main question respecting Hamilton's system is, whether the method and arguments by which he reduced reason to utter contradictions do not also prevent the possibility of a rational faith ? In undermining the rationalists, has he not also undermined the believer ? Over the grave of reason can he erect any other than a sepulchral monument to faith ? If the infinite and absolute are annihilated, reduced to nothing, in the eye of reason, has not the eye of faith also lost the very objects of its vision ? This is the point to which our disussion leads ; but to come to it in an intelligible way we must first expound the Hamiltonian theory of knowledge.

And perhaps we cannot better introduce this matter than by a statement of Hamilton's relation to Kant's theory of knowledge. The object of Kant's Criticism of the Pure Reason was twofold ; on the one hand, as against the sceptics (Hume and others), to show that there are in the human mind *a priori* (or transcendental) elements of knowledge, and that these are found in the sphere of sense, and in the laws of the understanding, as well as in the ideas of reason. The mind, by an internal necessity, is compelled to recognize these. On the other hand, as against the dogmatist, Kant's position was, that even this transcendental (that is, *a priori*) knowledge does not attain with entire certainty to the nature of things, to things as they are in themselves. We can, by reason, neither demonstrate, nor yet disprove, the real being

of objects corresponding to the ideas of reason. That is, the ideas are necessary, but the objects are still to be sought for. The proof of their existence is to be on other grounds. Yet, at the same time, if this proof can be found in any other way, there is nothing in reason to contradict it, or incompatible with it. On the contrary, since reason has these ideas as its vital and necessary substance, if we can in any other way make out the proof that there are objects corresponding to these ideas, reason itself will welcome them, for these objects are the counterparts of its own ideas. These ideas, now, are those of the Infinite, of the Absolute, of God, of the Soul and its immortality, of the World as a real existence, etc. In his Criticism of the Practical Reason, Kant then gives the proof, on moral grounds, of the real being of God, the world, etc. This is the positive part of his system, by which he sought to fill up the void which pure reason left in the universe. But Kant's theory, notwithstanding these qualifications, has been generally esteemed, in England and Scotland,* to be unsatisfactory, and even to lead to scepticism; and this, because it denied to reason a valid authority in the premises, threw the burden of proof upon our moral nature alone, and thus left an apparent schism in the soul. His system seems to throw discredit upon the three grand ideas of God, the soul, and the world, and to annul the possibility, so far as reason is concerned, of the three corresponding sciences, Theology, Rational Psychology, and Cosmology. And in this

* Also in France. Thus Cousin, in his *Philosophie de Kant* (p. 318): "Nous avons fait voir que la Critique de la raison pure, mal tempérée par celle de la raison pratique, n'est qu'un scepticisme inconséquent." De Remusat, in his *Essais de Philosophie* (p. 419 sq.), gives a correct general view of the position of Kant: "Son scepticisme est d'un genre particulier. Kant nous défend également de douter, et d'affirmer, de douter pour notre propre compte, et d'affirmer pour le compte de nature. . . . Kant ne dit pas que les croyances objectives soient nécessairement des erreurs; ce sont plutôt des croyances sans titres, des inductions gratuites, que de mensongères apparences. Bien plus, illusions ou vérités, elles sont inévitables, naturelles, indispensables; le sens commun en vit. . . . Le scepticisme de Kant est plein de foi," etc.—Comp. *Zeitschrift f. Philos.* 1860, p. 242.

sense, too, it was further developed in the subsequent German speculations.

How now does Hamilton stand related to this theory? He simply adopts all that Kant asserts about the limits of reason, but finds fault with him for not going far enough. He regards "as conclusive," Kant's analysis of Time and Space into conditions of thought.* But he says, that in making a distinction between Reason and Understanding, he is grievously at fault. "Why distinguish Reason from the Understanding, simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently apparent that the unconditioned is conceived only as the negative of the conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one." Further, Kant "ought to have shown that the unconditioned can have no objective application, *because it had in fact no subjective affirmation*—that it afforded no real knowledge, because it contained nothing even conceivable—and that it is self-contradictory, because it is not a notion either simple or positive, but a *fusculus of negations*," etc. In another Fragment (p. 647 of the *Metaphysics*) Hamilton speaks thus: Kant "endeavored to evince that pure Reason, that Intelligence, is naturally, is necessarily, repugnant with itself, and that

* *Discussions*, p. 23 *et seq.* The editors of Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, in the Appendix, p. 647, have given "Fragments from Early Papers. Probably before 1836," in which Hamilton says that his "doctrine holds . . . that Space and Time, as given, are real forms of thought *and conditions of things*;" and that Kant's doctrine reduced them to "mere spectral forms, which have no real archetype in the noumenal or real universe." But Kant certainly held them to be "real forms of thought," and the *Discussions* say, that his analysis of them into "conditions of thought" is "conclusive." If Hamilton now held, as this Appendix declares, that they are also "conditions of things," how could he regard Kant's analysis as "conclusive?" Either this Fragment must be of an earlier date (before 1829, when the article on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned was published), or Hamilton is quite inconsistent in his statements. Besides, Kant did not assert—the very spirit of his philosophy as *critical*, prevented him from asserting—"that space and time have no real archetypes" in the external world. Some of his critics (as Fries and Apelt), interpret him as allowing their external reality.

speculation ends in a series of insoluble antilogies. In its highest potence, in its very essence, thought is thus infected with contradictions; and the worst and most pervading scepticism is the melancholy result. If I have done any thing meritorious in philosophy, it is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of these contradictions, in showing that they arise only when intelligence transcends the limits to which its legitimate exercise is restricted; and that within these bounds (the Conditioned), natural thought is neither fallible nor mendacious."

These extracts make it apparent, that, as far as our intelligent nature is concerned, the philosophy of Hamilton is a more thorough-going scepticism than that of Kant. He would abolish the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding, simply because his theory leaves nothing for Reason to do, except to gaze upon a blank, to meditate upon a negation. The German left the unconditioned, real in the eye of reason; the Scotchman, abolishing the object, finds no need of the organ. With the latter, the unconditioned has not even "a subjective affirmation." What reason, then, can he give for charging Kant with scepticism, which does not rebound with fatal accuracy upon himself? Does not he also hold, "that thought in its highest potence is infected with contradictions"—and contradictions, too, that involve the absolute negation of the unconditioned? If these contradictions led Kant to "the worst and most pervading scepticism," how can they do otherwise with Hamilton? His plea here is curious. He avoids the scepticism by saying, that these contradictions only show that "intelligence has transcended its legitimate exercise." Of course, there cannot be any scepticism about the unconditioned, if we have no idea of it; this is nihilism and not scepticism. No contradiction remains, when one of the terms is abolished. The procedure, though violent, is conclusive. But, as between Kant and Hamilton, the matter stands simply thus: Kant, affirming the subjective necessity of the unconditioned, leaves room for proof, on any other grounds than that of Pure Reason, of a reality corresponding

to the idea;* but Hamilton, resolving the unconditioned into an "inconceivability," a "negation," leaves no such room; if you attempt the proof you have not got anything positive to prove. You want to prove the existence of God as unconditioned. Kant says you may, because the unconditioned is a reality in thought; Hamilton must say, the attempt is futile, because you are to prove something utterly inconceivable, a nonentity to thought. We do not agree with Kant's view of the unconditioned, as having merely a subjective rational necessity; we do not see why Pure Reason may not give us the objective, as much as the Practical Reason; why the former is any more subjective than the latter. But yet it seems to us that Kant's position is every way preferable to Hamilton's. The latter is here not only not Scotch, but more Kantian than Kant himself, on the very point most open to objection in the German system. Kant, allowing that Pure Reason asserts the subjective validity and necessity of our highest rational ideas, left room for practical reason to affirm their objective validity, and for a reconciliation of the subjective and objective. Hamilton, denying the subjective authority, and even reality, of these ideas, making reason to deny them, leaves no chance for our moral nature to affirm them, without setting itself in opposition to our rational nature. All that Hamilton can affirm, at the utmost, is, that we believe in "the incognizable and the inconceivable;" while Kant could say, we believe in the objective reality of that which reason also stamps as necessary and true to itself.

But the views of Hamilton, as a consistent and logical thinker, run back into his general theory about the powers of the mind and the nature of knowledge. His metaphysical

* Thus Kant in his *Prolegomena zur Metaphysik*, iii., § 60, says: "These transcendental ideas, even if they do not directly contribute to a positive knowledge (of what is objective), are still of service in annulling the insolent assertions of materialism, naturalism, and fatalism, which contract the field of reason—and thus they gain a foothold for our moral ideas, beyond the sphere of mere speculation." Now this advantage, restricted though it be, is just what is forfeited on the basis of Hamilton's theory.

system rests upon his psychology and his logic; and, in fact, his logic determines his metaphysics.

The first point in his psychology, significant of the character of his system, is his denial of any real distinction between the Reason and the Understanding; not merely a denial of the propriety of applying these terms to different functions, or relations, of the intelligence (for the word is here of small account), but his denial that there is any such specific difference in the mode of our intelligent or intellectual activity, as may be denoted by these words. Accordingly, he calls upon his class at one time to remark, that he avoids the use of the term "idea;" his words for the highest acts or objects of thought are "concept" or "notion." His reason, now, for abolishing this distinction is hinted at in the passage above cited from his Discussions; he will not allow reason to be a distinguishable capacity, because its alleged objects (the Infinite and Absolute, etc.), are merely negations of thought; and we do not, of course, require a special power to know a negation—"the knowledge of contradictories is one."

But does he not, it may be asked, allow the existence of a capacity to apprehend necessary truths, and call by the name of Common Sense, or the Regulative Faculty, what others call the Reason? And does he not expressly identify the two? (See *Metaphysics*, p. 277, 285, 681.) And does he not also call this the *locus principiorum*? He does this: but, under what restriction and condition? Simply, under the restriction, that the highest capacity of the intelligence shall be "cabin'd and confin'd" to the conditioned: and that all the unconditioned shall be thrown out as a negative quantity. If Kant had only done this, he says, he would have attained to the true philosophy, and modified all his categories (*Discussions*, p. 25; *Metaphysics*, p. 681), and "given a totally new aspect to his *Critique*": which is undoubtedly true.

Does he not also, it is inquired, recognize the existence of universal and necessary truths, and even "anxiously" insist upon them? There is no room for doubt here, either. But he introduces a "new" kind of necessity, which "all preceding

philosophers " have overlooked, viz., " a negative necessity," a necessity springing, not from the mind's power, but from its powerlessness; and under this negative necessity, which simply means, that the mind cannot think them, he puts the substantial elements of reason. Thus in his *Metaphysics*, p. 526, when discussing the principle on which our ultimate cognitions are dependent, he grants that " the quality of necessity " is what discriminates a " native from an adventitious notion." But " it is evident, that the quality of necessity in a cognition may depend on two different and opposite principles, inasmuch as it may either be the result of a power, or of a powerlessness, of the thinking principle." Mathematical truths, the " notions " of existence, space and time, and the logical rules, are positive. " But besides these there are other necessary forms of thought, which by all philosophers have been regarded as standing on precisely the same footing, which to me seem to be of a totally different kind. In place of being the result of a power, the necessity which belongs to them is merely a consequence of the impotence of our faculties." And then he goes on and applies this to space and time, as infinite or absolute, and to causality; and says it likewise applies to the idea, or, as he would say, " notion " of substance. All these, and kindred truths, belong to common sense, simply under the category of imbecility and inconceivability. Is this good, sound, old-fashioned Scotch philosophy? And he is here almost right in intimating, that " all philosophers " have had an entirely different view. Most, even of the empirical philosophers, have been content with trying to prove that we have no faculty by which we can know the highest spiritual truths; but here is a more dexterous method; if all the appropriate objects of the faculty are annihilated in the view of reason, all that remains for any supposed faculty to do is to gaze upon an empty void—certainly a very unprofitable performance, even for a philosopher. The very grandeur of the human mind, by the consent of the greatest thinkers and theologians of all times, has been made to consist in its power of knowing the real being of an Infinite and Absolute First Cause. Its weak-

ness has been put in the capacity of fathoming what it yet knows as the most real and positive of beings. But Hamilton transforms its power into a powerlessness, its grandeur into an imbecility.

And there is here a great underlying question, with which he never grapples, though it is cardinal in psychology. Is it not of the very nature of Reason to have an immediate knowledge or vision of spiritual truth and being, even as perception gazes upon and knows directly the phenomena of sense? Is not the knowledge of spiritual things as immediate and as real (to say the least) as the knowledge of material things? If in perception, as Hamilton so cogently shows, we are immediately cognizant (even conscious of) an external reality; are we not also cognizant, in as direct a way, of what is above the limitations of time and sense? He has proved, that no fictions of ideas intervene between perception and its objects. The same theory of knowledge, applied in the spiritual domain, would lead to a like inference as to the truths and facts, which he so violently banishes into the sphere of negations—as if they were the products of a logical art, born of the principle of contradiction. On any consistent theory of knowledge, the ideas of reason are no more subjective than the perceptions of sense. All knowledge implies an object as well as a subject. Human reason is not the seat, so much as it is the organ, of principles; just as sense is not the seat of phantasms, but the organ by which we know phenomena. By a higher right than can be claimed in the philosophy of perception for a real knowledge of its objects, we may also claim, that reason beholds its objects with an unveiled face. The phantasms of the schools have been swept away from the theory of natural vision; but those other phantasms, the abstractions of sense mistaken for the realities of reason, still remain to perplex our vision and our philosophy.

The bearing and relation of the Hamiltonian theory will become still more apparent, when we consider his more precise statements about thought or knowledge. They are all shaped by the same bias; and they are in the main consistently shaped.

In the Appendix to his Discussions (p. 567, sq.) is an articulate statement of the *Conditions of the Thinkable Systematized: Alphabet of Human Thought*, containing his "matured" views. All thinking is here distributed first of all into Negative and Positive. Thinking is *negative* (i. e., "a negation of thought") when existence is not mentally affirmed=Nothing. This negative thinking is of two kinds, inasmuch as the one or the other of the conditions of positive thinking is violated. These conditions are *non-contradiction* and *relativity*. Violating the condition of non-contradiction, we have the *really impossible* (nihil purum). Violating the condition of relativity, we have the *inconceivable* (nihil cogitabile); "what may exist, but what we are unable to conceive existing. This impossible, the schools have not contemplated." It is under this last, that the unconditioned, the absolute, cause, etc., come. They are simply inconceivable—impossible to thought. What now is *positive* thinking or thought? His general statement is, "Thinking is Positive (and this in propriety is the only real thought), when *existence* is predicated of an object." It can be brought to bear only under two conditions: 1. *Non-contradiction*; 2. *Relativity*. As to the first, Non-contradiction—this condition is insuperable; it is a law of thought as well as of things. To violate it, gives the impossible; to satisfy it gives only the *Not-impossible*. It involves three laws: the logical laws of *Identity*, *Contradiction*, and *Excluded middle*. That is, there is no thought, no thinking, excepting as conformed to the laws of logic; the logical laws are the metes and bounds of thinking. The other condition of positive thought is *relativity*—"the conditionally relative, and not the absolutely or infinitely relative." This is not a law of *things*, but of *thought*; "for we find that there are contradictory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought, as possible." Under this come (omitting the divisions) the necessary and primary relations of Self and Not-self, Substance and Quality, Time, Space, and Degree, and a host of contingent or derivative relations.

Such is Hamilton's general theory of knowledge, apart from its application to particular points. It is repeated substantially in the same form in different parts of his Works—with additional illustrations in his *Metaphysics*, p. 526, *seq.*, 679–681, and *Logic*, Lectures v. and vi.; it is also at the basis of Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*, and of his *Lectures on the Limits of Religious Thought*. It is the theory of knowledge, on the ground of which all thought of the Infinite and Absolute is demonstrated to be impossible. This particular application of it we do not yet consider, but would now only inquire whether this be a correct theory of all thought or thinking.

In this theory it is supposed that all possible knowledge is included. And what the theory amounts to is this—that all real thought is either logical thinking, or the thought only of relations. If the logical laws are violated, we have the *really impossible*: if the law of relativity is violated, we have the *impossible to thought* (*nihil cogitabile*). As far, now, as the logical laws are concerned (resting on the principle of contradiction, or rather, of non-contradiction), these can only give a necessity of thought, but cannot give a knowledge of existence. As Hamilton himself says, the argument from Contradiction is “negative, but not positive; it may refute, but it is incompetent to establish. It may show what is not, but never of itself, what is.” And further: “It analyses what is given, but does not originate information, or add anything, through itself, to our stock of knowledge.” In short, it may be a negative test, but cannot be a positive source of knowledge. If I want to find out whether I have an idea of anything as existent, or as real, logic cannot tell me: the appeal must be to what is before or behind all logic, that is, to immediate consciousness. All that these logical laws can do, is to keep me from applying contradictory predicates to any existence. But the materials upon which logic works must all be taken from some other source than itself. *Knowledge* is not derived from these logical laws; ideas are not; truths are not; intuitions are not, etc. This is so evident, as soon

as the nature and province of logic are correctly grasped, that it would hardly be necessary to dwell upon it, had not Hamilton (as may appear in the sequel) himself urged these logical laws beyond their strict and proper application.

The other form or mode of positive thought is that of *relativity*, or the knowledge of relations. And in Hamilton's scheme, as he himself expounds it, this mode of knowledge is the only real knowledge of existence which man can have. Here is the grand assumption contained in this Alphabet of Human Thought. All *affirmation of existence* which the mind can make, all that it can conceive to exist, is in relations, is that which is relative. All else, all but relations, it is in the very nature of thought impossible to think—that is, to *affirm that it exists*. He does not merely say that the mind cannot grasp or comprehend anything but relations; but he says, that thought cannot affirm the existence of anything but relations. All else is “impossible to thought.” This assumption is the underlying principle of the whole theory. In its nature and consequences it deserves a careful consideration.

It is difficult to say just what Sir W. Hamilton means by the proposition, that all our knowledge is only relative. Sometimes he uses it as equivalent to the statement, that we can know only what is related to us (subjective); sometimes as meaning, that we can know only relations, or phenomena—in distinction from knowing the essence or substance; sometimes, and most frequently, he means by it, that we can be cognizant only of the relative, the finite, the phenomenal, in distinction from, or in opposition to, a knowledge of the absolute and the infinite. In his summary about it (*Metaphysics*, p. 104) he says “that knowledge is relative; 1°. Because existence is not cognizable, absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes. 2°. Because these modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties. 3°. Because the modes, thus relative to our faculties, are presented to, and known by, the mind only under modifications determined by these faculties themselves.” On p. 102, in introducing the subject, he says: “That whatever we know is not

known as it is, *but only as it seems to us to be.*" And in the Appendix, pp. 688, 689, he has a further statement of the "doctrine of Relation," written in connection with a proposed Memoir of Mr. Stewart, in which he states (in substance) that "every Relation supposes at least two things, or, as they are called, terms thought as relative;" that "a relation is a unifying act—a synthesis; but it is likewise an antithesis;" and that "relatives are *severally discriminated*; inasmuch as the one is specially what is referred, the other what is referred to"—the relative and correlative; and further, "that relations always coexist in nature and in thought"—so that "*we cannot conceive, we cannot know, we cannot define the one relative, without, pro tanto, conceiving, knowing, defining also the other*;" and this he says, is "equivalent to a declaration that the Absolute (the non-Relative) is for us incogitable, and even incognizable." In another passage (*Discussions*, p. 574) he makes the knowledge of the relative to be a synonym for a knowledge of "the conditioned, the phenomenal, the finite." Taking these various statements together, what is the purport of the doctrine that we know only the Relative?

So far as it asserts, in general terms, that we can know only what is related to us and our faculties, it is doubtless true, and almost a truism. All knowledge implies and involves a relation between the subject known and the object known. The act of knowing can be construed only under this relation. But this manifestly decides nothing as to the character of the objects known; it has nothing to do with the propositions, that we can know only relations and not substances, or, that we can know only the relative and not the absolute. It only says, that we cannot know anything, be it relations or substances, the relative or the absolute, without an act of knowledge in relation to it. In knowing the absolute, for example, a relation between us and the absolute is implied—that is the relation of knowing. It amounts to saying, that we cannot know anything without knowing it.

But let us advance another step. The doctrine of relative

knowledge may also mean, that what we know is known only under the modifications imposed by our faculties themselves, that is, the subject determines the object. This is carried to its extreme in the statement of Hamilton (above), "that whatever we know is not known as it is, but *only as it seems to us to be.*" The doctrine of relative knowledge then means, that we do not know any thing as objectively real, but simply as having a subjective validity and worth. But Hamilton's doctrine of perception, that we are immediately cognizant of the objective, is, it seems to us, opposed to this. And the true theory of knowledge is also opposed to it. To be sure, we know only through and by our faculties; but may not our faculties be such as to give us a direct, an immediate knowledge of objective reality whether material or spiritual? The medium is transparent. This is the case with all intuitions. In all real knowledge the object determines the subject, as much as the subject the object. The mind can know what is entirely different from itself; and this Hamilton himself concedes, when arguing about perception. (*Metaphysics*, p. 351, 401, *seq.*) The position, "that whatever we know is not known as it is, but only as it seems to us to be," also resolves, in its very statement, all knowledge into an illusion, and a conscious illusion to boot. We know that we know only the seeming; how can we know this, unless we also know that there is a difference between the seeming and the real? and how can we know that there is a real, if all that we know or can know is only a seeming? Subjective idealism is the only consistent result of this theory of knowledge. And, at any rate, granting the theory, it is still something very diverse from the positions, that we can know only relations or only the relative. It does not begin to prove either of these positions. For, though the mind can know only in a knowing relation, and though it can know only under the modification of its faculties—the whole question remains, Are these faculties such that they can be cognizant objectively only of relations or of the relative? And even if it were shown that we could know only relations, it is still to be proved that

we can also know only the relative (in distinction from the absolute).

Can the mind, then, know only relations of objects? That is the next possible sense of the theory of relative knowledge. The proposition here is in respect to relations among the objects of knowledge, and not to the relation between the subject knowing and the object known. But here, again, very different affirmations may be confounded and need to be distinguished. The mind is cognizant only of the relations of objects; this may mean, that as all objects are related to each other, the mind knows the objects only in these their relations; or it may mean, that the mind knows only the relations of objects, and not the objects themselves—only the phenomena and not the essence or substance.

That Hamilton, under relative knowledge, included the first of these, is apparent from his scheme of relativity (*Discussions*, p. 567), where substance and quality, degree, etc., are adduced as instances of relativity; from his express statement (p. 569) that “the relations of existence” (that is, the relations “in the object of knowledge, the thing thought about”), are what he refers to. And here what is true in the theory is perhaps to be found. All the objects of existence and of knowledge are presented to us in relations; no object in being or in thought is isolated, is unrelatd. And we know the objects, too, in part, in a great measure it may be, in and through these their relations. But this does not prove that we know only the phenomena and not the substance, only the activity and not the agent, only the relations and not the objects. And this last proposition is the one which the theory requires. In reference to and against it we urge the following considerations.

It does not follow (1) from the position, that in all knowledge there is a relation of the knowing subject to the object known. There may, there must, be such a relation; but, then, why may not the relation as well be a direct one between the knower and the object, as between the knower and the relation? (2) An immediate knowledge of relations is just as difficult to be conceived as an immediate knowledge of the

objects. If we can know relations directly and simply, there is nothing in the nature of knowledge to prevent us from knowing the objects as well. While, if all knowledge is reduced to subjectivity (if the subject determines the object), we can no more know objective relations truly than any thing else; and yet Hamilton implies that we can truly know these relations. (3) The knowledge of the relations of things is, in many cases, precisely the most difficult and inscrutable part of all our knowledge. Thus, the relation of self and not-self, that of substance and phenomena even, that of subject and its attributes, the relations of body and soul, the relation of time to eternity, of bounded to absolute space—here are some of the most difficult and inscrutable questions which perplex philosophy. (4) It is utterly inconceivable that we should know a relation, when in ignorance of what is related (i. e., of the related objects). It is the objects themselves that go to make up the relation. Such knowledge would be like a knowledge of the copula between a subject and predicate, while ignorant of the subject and predicate themselves. In the very relation the nature or character of the objects related is expressed. And Hamilton, when treating of the doctrine of relations by itself (*Metaphysics*, p. 689), as we have already cited him, says: “The relations (the *things* relative and correlative) as relative, always coexist in nature and coexist in thought. . . We cannot conceive, we cannot know, we cannot define the one relative, without, *pro tanto*, conceiving, knowing, defining also the other.” (5) Applied to the relation of substance and phenomena, of essence and attributes (as when it is said we know the phenomena but not the substance), the very law of relativity is violated, when we say that we know the phenomena and do not know the substance, for these are mutually related terms. And since the phenomena reveal the substance or essence, we certainly know as much about the essence as we do about the phenomena. If, in any case, the essence were fully expressed in the phenomena, we should know the full essence. As applied to mind, we certainly have a direct knowledge of self in every act of consciousness. And

as applied to material or external objects, we have a distinct conception about each individual, quite different from its phenomenal activity. (6) Hamilton's definition, oft-repeated, of *positive knowledge* is inconsistent with this theory. That definition is, that positive thinking is the "*affirmation of existence.*" Thinking is POSITIVE when *existence* is predicated of an object." Now, we do mentally predicate existence of substances and essences, as well as of phenomena; we do this so distinctly and necessarily, that we say the phenomenal is only phenomenal, and contrast it with a permanent, underlying nature or essence, which we know to be there. So that, in fact, our *positive* thinking is of the substance and not of the phenomena. Else were this whole universe to us an "insubstantial pageant."

The other form in which the relational theory of knowledge is held is, that we know only the relative in distinction from the absolute. "We think," says Hamilton (*Metaph.*, p. 689), "one thing only as we think two things, mutually, and at once; which again is equivalent to a declaration that the Absolute (the Non-relative) is for us incogitable, and even incognizable." The general question here suggested as to the knowledge of the absolute, and whether this be only negative, we cannot now enter upon. We concede, that an absolute which is not related to us and to our powers of knowing, we cannot know, any more than we can know a relative, which is not related to us. A non-relative, in this sense, is of course incogitable. It may also be true, that we cannot know the absolute apart from the relative—a merely abstract absolute; the knowledge of the two may be indissolubly connected. But the real question is, Can we know the absolute as well as the relative? Can we affirm, in positive thought, the existence of the one as well as of the other? And as to this we might ask, how can we know even the relative, without having an idea of the absolute? Are not the two terms correlative? It seems to us, that so far is it from being true that we know only the relative, that the fact of the case is, we could not say *relative*, unless we also thought *absolute*; the former word implies the

latter just as much as effect implies cause. And when we come to the heart of the matter, it will be found, we think, that the absolute is that which is most positive in thought, and that the stigma of negation is rather to be applied to the relative; for all that is relative implies a negation. But we cannot now pursue this point any further.*

The Hamiltonian theory of knowledge, as we have seen, divides all thought into negative and positive; makes all positive knowledge, all that is thinkable, to be simply and solely of the relative, the conditional, the finite, the phenomenal. All else is really impossible, or impossible to thought. Of course, then, all that distinguishes God from the creature, is at least impossible to thought—it surpasses the bounds of conceivability. All the predicates by which God is defined, in distinction from the phenomenal, express inconceivabilities, are mere negative notions, indicate the absence of thought. This is the case with the terms infinite, absolute, first cause, sub-

* Hamilton quite uniformly, bating occasional inconsistencies, uses the words absolute and infinite, not only as logical contradictions of each other (so that, e. g., if God be absolute he cannot be infinite), but so that both are logical contradictories of the relative and finite; that is, as pure negations, non-relative, non-finite. And he everywhere implies that this is their only sense. So that, if they should be taken as positive, the relative and the finite would be negated, would be lost in them. We may speak of this more fully hereafter. Dr. Hickok, in his *Rational Cosmology*, Chapter I., examines the idea of the Absolute in a thorough manner, and makes the necessary distinctions between the absolute in the understanding, and the absolute as given in the reason. Professor Ulrici, of Halle, editor of the *Zeitschrift f. Philosophie*, one of the most vigorous opponents of the pantheistic schemes, in a review of Hamilton (*Zeitschrift*, Bd. 27, p. 62), says, that taking the absolute as purely negative, it is of course incogitable; but he adds that here is the very question, namely, "Whether it be a mere negation, or whether the negation here is not a mere consequence of the positive contents of the idea of the absolute. We may maintain the latter. We hold that the absolute is not conditioned by any thing else, and so far it is the unconditioned, but yet only because it is itself the *positive* condition of every thing else." And he says that Hamilton's own principle that "consciousness is only possible under plurality and difference," necessitates the inference "that the relative and conditional, as such, cannot be thought without distinguishing it from the independent and absolute which condition it (i. e., the relative), and therefore are themselves unconditioned."

stance or essence ;—immensity, eternity, self-existence, independence of being, etc., must also fall under the same category of inconceivability. And not only so, but many of the fundamental beliefs of the human mind, those principles which formed the very substance of the common sense of the Scotch school—all of them, in short, which do not express mere phenomenal relations, come under the same category. In respect to some of them (Cause and Substance, and even Free Will), Hamilton concedes this ; and in respect to others, the same arguments and reasons apply.

It becomes, therefore, a most important inquiry, in estimating the philosophy of the conditioned, how the sceptical results, which seem to lie so near at hand, are to be avoided. By banishing all these truths from the sphere of reason and thought, the absolute philosophy was refuted, was annihilated. But still Hamilton was a Scotchman, and believed in an infinite and absolute God, in the immensity of space and the eternity of time, in cause and substance, in free will and motion. To his intellect they were merely inconceivable, mere negatives. But still they *were*—they were *real*—they were forms and modes of being. His philosophy, his logic, said *no* to them ; but something else in him was always saying *yes*. What is that something else ? He could not be a sceptic, still less a nihilist, even though his intellect was perpetually saying, *nihil purum* or *nihil cogitabile*, to the infinite and the absolute cause.

And the way in which he tried to get out of this difficulty, so as to affirm what he denied, and deny what he affirmed, seems to us to be one of the most remarkable feats, or rather succession of feats, to be found in the annals of philosophy. He was like a strong man bound by his own logical withes ; and the vigor and dexterity of his powers are nowhere more conspicuous than in the hopeless attempts and desperate theoretic shifts to which he had recourse. He could not, and would not, accept the simple affirmation of reason, of consciousness, as to the real being of what is absolute, of cause, substance, and the like ; but believing in them still, he must somehow or

other make this square with the position that they are negative and inconceivable. He did this, partly in a psychological way, and partly in a logical way.

Psychologically, the way he met the difficulty was this. He hypostatized the imbecility of the mind into a function, and its powerlessness into a power, and made the very impotence of thought to be the source of all these fundamental ideas. By this arduous process, he seemed to think, that what is negative in thought, might still be held as positive in belief; that what is logically inconceivable, might be made the firm foundation of religion and ethics. Reason, he says, does not here deceive, for reason has nothing to do in the matter; it is all out of its province. To reason it is indeed all night; but the very imbecility of the intellect ushers us into the presence of the most august truths, the very negation of thought gives us the most positive and real of our beliefs. And he rather prides himself on this discovery; he not unfrequently boasts of it as something which has escaped "all preceding philosophers." That we do him no injustice in these statements, will be seen from a few citations. In the *Dissertations*, p. 23, he says: "By a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality. In his *Metaphysics*, p. 526: "The imbecility of the human mind constitutes a great negative principle, to which sundry of the most important phenomena of the intelligence [*sic*] may be preferred." In the same connection, speaking of "necessary forms of thought," he says there are some which "all philosophers" have regarded as positive, but "which seem to me to be of a totally different kind. In place of being the result of a power, the necessity which belongs to them is merely a consequence of the impotence of our faculties;" and then he applies this to space and time, cause, etc. (Yet still he verbally implies that they "are necessary forms of thought.") In another passage, p. 681, he says: "These and such-like impotencies of positive thought have been strangely

overlooked." In the same work, p. 548, even "*the Conditioned*," it is said, is to be viewed, "not as a power, but as a powerlessness of the mind;" but this is so strange a position, that we are half inclined to think there must be a misprint in the text. Once more, in the *Metaphysics*, Appendix V., speaking of Kant's conclusive analysis of Judgments, into *analytic* and *synthetic*, Hamilton says, that "he omitted a third kind . . . which do not seem to spring from a positive power of the mind, but only from the inability of the mind to conceive the contrary." And these "negative, synthetic judgments," he adds, are equivalent to the Common Sense of Reid. The truths, then, which Reid derived from Common Sense, Hamilton derives from this impotency of the mind to conceive either them, or the contrary of them. Would Reid have regarded this as a valid support of his theory?

But besides this imbecility, or impotence of the mind, as the source of its most vital beliefs, Hamilton also has a logical method of arriving at the same result. Logic, in fact, shows us how the mental imbecility can perform the operation. And here is where the theory becomes stranger than fiction; but it is so often reiterated, that we are compelled to believe that its author held it to be perfectly valid. The phenomenon to be accounted for, let us recollect, is this: All positive thought leaves the Infinite and Absolute Cause, Substance, etc., a blank, a negation; but yet we believe in them. The absolute philosophy is annulled by the negation; how is the Scotch faith to be saved? To leave it all in the position of "a negation of all thought" would look too much like nihilism; but yet, in "thought" there is no means of rescue. Is there not some method left? Yes, there is one such. Positive thinking is realized under two conditions, viz., the logical laws (*non-contradiction*) and *relativity*. If the logical laws be violated, we have a mere impossibility. But if the law of relativity be violated, we have, not an absolute impossibility, but only an incogitability (*anihil cogitabile*). But the measure of thought is not the measure of being (of course not, but is it not the measure of any possible knowledge of being to us? But we

let that pass). Now—if it can be demonstrated, even though we cannot conceive it, that this “incognizable and incogitable” Infinite and Absolute must still *be*—then, we may save the belief, though we deny that positive thinking has anything to do with it. And it is the attempt at such a logical demonstration of the real being of what we cannot conceive to be, which makes the specialty of Hamilton’s system. Most persons would have thought it much simpler just to say, the mind compels us to such belief. That, however, in Hamilton’s system would leave the belief in just a contradictory relation to the thought. But if the logical law of non-contradiction itself compels to the belief, then the triumph of logic is complete; and the Scotch philosophy is saved, while the German absolutists are annihilated. And Hamilton prepares for this consummation in various ways; he makes, e. g., different sorts of necessary ideas—one sort being derived from the mind’s impotency; he proposes a new division (as we have seen above) of Kant’s synthetic judgments—a “synthetic negative,” etc. But the consummation itself we must give in his own words: it is announced not infrequently as “a grand law of thought,” which is to solve the difficulties inhering in the philosophy of nescience.

The first hint of it is in the article on Cousin (*Discussions*, p. 22): “The conditioned is the mean between two extremes—two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which *can be conceived as possible*, but of which, on the principle of Contradiction and Excluded Middle,* *one must be admitted as necessary*.” The mind, it is added, “is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other, as equally

* The law of Contradiction is this: we cannot affirm and deny the same predicate of the same subject at the same time. The principle of Excluded Middle (i. e., the middle between two contradictories) is this, that of Contradictory predicates we can only affirm one of an object; if one be affirmed, the other is denied. It is the principle of disjunctive judgments. The first law (Non-Contradiction) says, *Alpha est, Alpha non est*—both propositions cannot be true. The law of Excluded Middle says, *Aut est Alpha aut non est*—one of these assertions is true, the other not. Hamilton’s *Logic*, 62, *Metaphysics*, 526.

possible ; but only, as unable to understand as possible either of two extremes ; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true." In the Appendix, p. 569, speaking of Relativity, as a condition of positive thought, he says : " We should not think it as a law of *things*, but merely as a law of *thought* ; for we find that there are contradictory opposites, *one of which*, by the rule of Excluded Middle, *must be true*, but neither of which can by us be positively thought as possible." (Under this come, not only the Infinite, but also *substance*, " which cannot be conceived by us, except negatively " (p. 570) ; *time*, as infinite or eternal, and even " time present is conceivable only as a negation ;" so, too, *motion* ; *space*, as either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded ; *degree*, as either absolute or relative ; and even *cause* is resolved into this " impotence to conceive either of two contradictories.") These same positions are frequently reiterated. In the *Metaphysics*, p. 527 : " Now, then, I lay it down as a law which, though not generalized by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to phenomena : That all that is conceivable in thought, lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must. For example, we conceive space—we cannot but conceive space. . . . But space must be either bounded or not bounded. These are contradictory alternatives ; on the principle of Contradiction they cannot both be true, and on the principle of Excluded Middle, *one must be true*." This is then applied to both the maximum and minimum of space ; and to time, under the same categories. This, he further says (p. 548), is the " Law of the Conditioned"—" that the conceivable has always two opposite extremes, and that the extremes are equally inconceivable ;" a law " which, however palpable when stated, has never been generalized so far as I know, by any philosopher " (p. 552). The same law is applied to Causality, at length ; but of this we cannot now speak further. One other extract will complete our materials for forming a judgment of this theory. Speaking of the law of Contradiction

(Appendix to *Metaphysics*, p. 680), he says, if left to it alone, "we should be unable competently to attempt any argument on some of the most interesting and important questions. For there are many problems in the philosophy of the mind, where the solution necessarily lies between what are, to us, the one or the other of two counter, and therefore, incompatible alternatives, neither of which we are able to conceive as possible, but of which, by the very condition of thought, we are compelled to acknowledge that the one or the other cannot but be; and it is as supplying this deficiency, that what has been called the argument from Common Sense becomes principally useful." And then he adds, that this principle of Contradiction has two forms; one, the *Logical*, is well known; the other—"what may be called the *Psychological* application—while it necessarily declares that, of Contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be, still bilaterally admits that we may be unable positively to think the possibility of either alternative. This, the psychological phasis of the law, is comparatively unknown, and has been generally neglected." And then follow the usual illustrations about Existence, Space, and Time.

To this scheme it were needless to deny the merit of great ingenuity, and even subtlety of thought. It is, at least, carrying the logical laws to their extreme limits of application; even if it does not surpass these limits. It seems at first sight to save, what Hamilton's general theory of knowledge left hopeless. Though, at the same time, the attempt, by logical thinking upon what cannot be thought, to demonstrate, that we must believe what we cannot conceive, would have deterred any less skilful thinker. And has he not after all been caught in the meshes of his own logic?

In considering this theory, we leave out of account several assumptions involved in it, which are liable to objection—or at least open to debate. One of these is, the general statement as to what constitutes positive thought—that it is found only in the sphere of the relative and finite. If positive thought consists, as Hamilton says, ultimately in the affirma-

tion of existence—why may it not be applicable as well to absolute as to relative being? Another query would be as to the terms “thought” and “knowledge”—whether they can be lawfully restricted in the same way. Still another point would be as to the nature even of “negative thinking”—whether the “negation of thought,” in respect to any object, does not involve a denial of the real being of that object, so far as it is possible for us to know anything about it.* Nor will we stop to comment on the statement so often made, that “all which is conceivable in thought, lies between two contradictory extremes, which are both equally inconceivable;” though it is difficult to see what this statement about “what is conceivable” (even if true) has to do with the case. It does not in the least affect the logical inference about the two contradictories; the conceivable is certainly not, in Hamilton’s view, the *Excluded Middle* between these contradictories; for all that the law of Excluded Middle says, is, that of two contradictory predicates, we can only affirm one, and must deny the other.

But to come to the demonstration itself, viz., that the principle of Contradiction and Excluded Middle proves that there are cases of contradictory opposites, one of which must be true, but both of which are equally inconceivable, as e. g., that space is either bounded or unbounded—both inconceiva-

* In a note to the second Edinburgh edition of his *Discussions* (not found in the American edition, but cited by Calderwood, p. 63), Hamilton says: “It might be supposed that Negative thinking, being a negation of thought, is in propriety a negation therefore of all mental activity. But this would be erroneous. . . . Even negative thought is realized only under the condition of Relativity and Positive thinking. For example, we try to think—to predicate existence in some way, but find ourselves unable. We then predicate *inconceitability*, and if we do not always predicate, as an equivalent (objective) *non-existence*, we shall never err.” Calderwood, in the connection, shows the inconsistency between this statement, and Hamilton’s previous strong assertion—that in all cases of negative thinking “*the result is nothing.*” If positive thinking be the affirmation of existence—negative thinking must mean “that existence is not attributed to an object.” And how negative thinking can be no act of thinking, and yet a “mental activity,” it is certainly difficult to divine.

ble, one necessary: or, as Hamilton abusively contrasts the terms, space is either *absolute* (completed) or *infinite* (never can be completed); it cannot be both (by the law of contradiction), it must be one (by the law of excluded middle); yet both are equally incogitable. To this process, and its conclusion, we urge the following objections:

(1.) The demonstration is a logical one, and of course must involve a positive judgment, and *positive thought* in the conclusion. The principle of Contradiction cannot be applied except as there is both an affirmation and a negation. In drawing the conclusion, we affirm in thought one of the contradictory predicates. Space is either unbounded or bounded. If we decide for the unbounded, it is a positive affirmation that the unbounded is. And Hamilton himself can hardly state his case without implying the positive *thinking* which his theory denies. He calls it a "judgment," negative indeed, but still a "synthetic negative judgment." He calls it "*a law of thought*" "to think the unknown" (*Metaph.*, p. 97), and then says (p. 99): "It is no object of knowledge." He makes it to be a "necessity" of thought, although it be also negative. Thus admitting the process to be correct, it refutes his own position, that the thought in the case is merely negative.

(2.) But according to the terms of the proposed demonstration, it is utterly impossible that there should be such a judgment, as he declares to be logically necessary. The state of the case is this: we have two absolutely contradictory, and entirely inconceivable, predicates (the absolute and infinite, in his sense) to be applied to a given object. Now, if both are inconceivable, we cannot make any distinction between them. Both are to thought mere negations—that is, one and the same thing, or rather—nothing. Consequently they cannot be compared—still less put as contradictories. Thought sees a black blank in both, and consequently cannot decide between them. There is no case for adjudication. But if there be a case, then the inconceivabilities must be conceived, positively thought, as different, and distinguishable from each other. If

they are, or can be, so thought, then, one at least of the contradictories is not a mere negative. So that either the process cannot be conducted, or the theory of negative thought is baseless.

(3.) But even supposing that their inconceivability did not prevent a decision—and that, on the principle of Excluded Middle, one of the contradictories must be true—logic could never tell us *which of them to take*. All that it can do is to put the dilemma before us, and say, between two negations of thought, two inconceivabilities, make your election. Space is limited or unlimited; time has or has not a beginning and an ending;—neither is conceivable, both cannot be true, one must be true. But which is true? Suppose I say “limited,” and my neighbor says “unlimited.” What here decides? Logic is speechless. It deserts us at the crisis.

But we make the decision, it may be said, by belief, by common sense; and this is what the doctrine of common sense means. But if this be so, then manifestly, the logical laws are not final, the law of excluded middle does not say the last word; there is a power above it, which is to declare, and which must declare, which of the two contradictory alternatives is true, and which is false. Logic merely brings the case before this higher tribunal. You may call that ultimate arbiter, Common Sense, or Intuition, or Reason; but it is there, and says the last word, and forms the final judgment. And that judgment is the positive affirmation, that real objective truth belongs to one, and only one, of the alternatives. And as we have got to come to this at last, why not start with it? This logical bifurcation simply serves to set the decisions of reason and common sense in an indubitable light. As far as affirming the real being, the reality, of either of the opposite poles is concerned, it is simply a grand impertinence.

(4.) But that we must show more fully. Hamilton's process here is a violation of the very nature of formal Logic, according to his own definitions and statements. We do not now speak of logic in the higher sense in which some use it, as in-

cluding the laws of being as well as of thought, but of logic as Hamilton always uses it, as the science of the laws of thinking. Used in this sense, it is impossible that it should give us objective reality; it has nothing to do with that. As Hamilton says, the argument from contradiction is "negative, not positive; it may refute, but it is incompetent to establish. *It may show what is not, but never of itself what is.* It is exclusively Logical or Formal, not Metaphysical or real; it proceeds on a necessity of thought, *but never issues in an Ontology or knowledge of Existence.*" Here the metes and bounds of logic are fairly and fully stated. But in applying the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle to the instances in hand—instead of limiting the application to the point, that thought must not violate, and must be conformed to, these laws, he makes these laws to determine ontological truth. He says, e. g., that the law of excluded middle declares, that one of the contradictory alternatives must be true in fact. But how does the proposition, that space must be either absolute or infinite, prove, that either absolute or infinite space *is*, and still more, which of them it is? any more than the proposition, that the soul must be either mortal or immortal, proves the being of the soul, or its mortality or immortality?*. If the law of contradiction be applied, it gives, at the utmost, the not-impossible, but not the real.

(5.) Still further, even if none of these objections hold, yet the logical bifurcation, in the alleged instances, in the sense in which Hamilton uses words, is not exhaustive—his dilemmas do not include the whole—his predicates do not embrace all the possibilities. We here refer particularly to his use of the terms absolute and infinite, as contradictory, and as exhaustive. Using, as he does, *absolute*, in the sense of a completed whole, and *infinite*, as meaning a whole that cannot be completed, he

* Hamilton, in stating the law of Excluded Middle (*Logic*, p. 59) seems to prepare the way for the use he makes of it in the *Metaphysics*, saying, that "it announces that condition of thought which compels us, of two repugnant notions, which cannot both *coexist*, to think either the one or the other as *existing*."

not only sets these two words in entire opposition (in this usage being himself in opposition to almost all philosophers), but he does not recognize the *positive infinite*, and the *unlimited absolute*; these do not come within his dilemmas. Space, e. g., he says, is either bounded, or unbounded (the latter in the negative sense, that we cannot find its bounds, or cannot conceive it as made up of limited parts). But space, as positive immensity, he does not consider. It is not true, that space is only either absolute or infinite (in his sense), for there is a third possibility (and this is the real idea) viz., the space is above and beyond all limits. And this positive idea of infinite space is, in fact, what enables us to decide between the contradictory alternatives which he presents. So, too, of Time, of Cause, of Substance, etc. And, besides, this whole mode of ratiocination, which puts the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, in the position of logical contradictories, is abusive, and may easily lead to dangerous consequences—compelling us to swallow up the finite in the infinite, or the infinite in the finite. Instead of opening the way to faith, it may open the door to scepticism.

And, now, as to the support which this argumentation gives to the philosophy of Common Sense, to Faith, to Belief, in short, to Religion—what must we say? As to its relation to Common Sense, the amount of the matter is this: if Common Sense be the real, final arbiter, this logical process is superfluous; but if this logical process be final, Common Sense is dethroned of all its Scotch dignities and exaltation. For, if this Common Sense was anything, it was positive thought, affirming ultimate and absolute truth. It was not an impotency, but the highest positive power, of the human mind. But in the Hamiltonian system, it has got to decide between alternatives, both of which are “a negation of all thought.” It puts us in the position, as he himself expresses it—that “our capacity of thought is peremptorily proved incompetent to what we necessarily think about;” and, can language express a more violent contradiction?

This whole scheme undermines Common Sense, or Common Sense undermines the scheme. The case is the same with Belief.* This system annuls Belief, or Belief annuls the system. For the system calls upon belief to decide affirmatively in favor of an absolute negative; it leaves to belief no positive object of thought. Still further, how can the belief be construed, excepting as affirming the existence of that which is believed; if this existence be affirmed, it is positive thought, according to Hamilton's own definition of positive thought; if the existence is not affirmed, the belief is negative. But if the belief in an absolute being affirms its real existence, if positive thought be indispensably involved, then, too, all positive thinking is not of the relative and the finite. In short, if in belief there is thought, the system is refuted; if in belief there is no thought, belief is annihilated. And what a wonderful work belief is called upon to perform! It is called upon to decide between two equally inconceivable and absolutely contradictory positions; to decide, that one of these inconceivabilities has a real existence, and the other not; and to do this without any thought whatever. Its decision must not, cannot be, a *thought*; for if it is, the theory is exploded. And the final dilemma is this: if the object of faith be purely negative and incogitable, it is also incredible; if it is credible, it cannot be merely negative and incogitable. The "intellectual intuition" of Schelling is reason itself, when compared with a blind faith in negations.

The bearings and relations of this system become of still higher importance, when viewed in respect to Religion. For,

* Very few statements as to the nature of Belief occur in Hamilton's works. In his *Logic*, p. 377, he says: "Knowledge is a certainty founded upon insight. Belief is a certainty founded upon feeling." P. 385: "We cannot believe without some consciousness or knowledge of the belief, and, consequently, without some consciousness or knowledge of the object of belief." But he dismisses the question of the relation of knowledge and belief, simply saying, that it is "one of the most difficult problems of metaphysics." And in his *Metaphysics*, the amount of what he says is, "that belief precedes knowledge."

according to it, all the predicates by which we define God in contrast with the world, express what is utterly inconceivable, mere negative thought, and even "the negation of the very conditions under which thought is possible." There is a wide chasm between belief and reason—and no bridge spans the gulf. Faith is on one side—the intellect is on the other; and what the intellect declares to be negative, faith declares to be positive. On these principles, the conflict between faith and reason is one that can never be adjusted. And this negation of thought in respect to deity, it should be remembered, is not merely in respect to him as infinite or absolute, but it extends equally to him as cause, as substance, as creator; it does not concern merely his relations to space and time, but also his relations to the world as the product of his power. For this negative thought, when logically carried out, as Hamilton himself now and then seems to intimate, covers the case of all our primary beliefs, excepting the laws of logic, the axioms of mathematics, and time, space, and existence as finite. These latter beliefs are positive; but *all other beliefs are negative to thought*. This is the inmost sense of the Hamiltonian system. It makes metaphysics impossible, except as a science of the phenomenal; ethics impossible, except as a classification of duties; cosmology impossible, except as it is merely inductive; and theology impossible, as the science of the sciences.

In our examination of Hamilton's system in this article, we have confined ourselves to his general theory of knowledge, without investigating its application to particular ideas and truths. If his general theory be shown to be unsatisfactory, it will be more easy to judge about the particular instances. When opposed, it has generally been by refuting him in respect to particular ideas; and many who have done this have implied or conceded the truth of his general principles about knowledge. But the core of Hamilton's system is in his theory of knowledge. This is neither Scotch nor German; it is a cross between. Its German elements refute its Scotch common sense; its Scotch sense is irreconcilable with its ex-

treme Kantianism. It is the ingenious attempt of a strong intellect to extricate itself from metaphysical difficulties by logical laws. But neither metaphysics nor theology can allow, that logic is either the source or the measure of the fundamental truths of human reason.

DRAPER'S

INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE.*

THE subject of this work is of the highest importance, and beset with great difficulties. Any scholar who should give a complete account of the intellectual development of Europe would win a noble guerdon in the fame of the achievement. It demands a union of the highest intellectual powers, with a scholarship adequate to sweep the whole realm of literature and thought. Such a development must comprise at least an outline or summary of what has been accomplished by the human race in the way of grasping and solving the great problems of human destiny. Whatever science, art, religion, morals, and politics have done or are doing for the race, is to be set forth in order. Few scholars have the encyclopedic attainments, combined with powers of analysis and generalization, adequate to master and marshal this vast accumulation of materials. Those familiar with the progress of literature are aware that the production of such a work has been the aim of the most comprehensive learning, and of the loftiest philosophical speculations, in Germany, France, and England. Each recent system of philosophy has had this in view. The various, almost innumerable, productions on the history of civilization, of literature, of art and the arts, of the different branches of science, of philosophy in all its departments, and

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of morals and theology, are contributions to this result. And masters in the sphere of thought have endeavored to combine all these in one general view, which should exhibit the rationale and the end of human progress. The elaborate researches and speculations of Schelling and Hegel, of Comte and Buckle, and of many others, bear upon this question, attempt to solve this problem.

One of the most striking facts now, about this new work of Dr. Draper, is, that he seems to ignore, or to be ignorant of, all that has been done by previous explorers. Ever since the time of Vico, and in every cultivated nation, there have been men of the ripest qualifications devoted to this task, and yet they are here hardly recognized even by name: Condorcet, Herder, Schlegel, and Guizot, besides Schelling and Hegel, Comte and Buckle, are not mentioned in this treatise. Even Mr. Dove's work on the *Theory of Human Progression* contains a more careful scheme, better worked out, than the one here presented.

It may be said, that the scheme is new, that the theory is original, and therefore could not receive much aid or elucidation from the labors of others. But so far as we can get at the theory of Dr. Draper it seems to us, in its main drift, quite identical with that which Comte, Buckle and Mill have been elaborating for the last quarter or third of a century; though it is not so carefully or logically stated by him as by either of these three masters of positive science. Differing from them in some points, his tendency is in the same direction. Human progress in general is confounded with progress in the so-called positive sciences. The substance of the age of reason, according to him, is an increased knowledge of the laws and forces of nature, brought into the service of man. In morals, theology, and metaphysics, he sees no progress, and finds no hope for the future. In fact, all the ground of intellectual progress which seems to him to remain is in the advance of physiology. And this he indicates as the main discovery and fruit of his researches. This position is so strange, that it deserves a somewhat fuller examination. Here, to

leaves the broad ground of other positivists, and defines and circumscribes his main object. Comte and Buckle make induction from facts subject to the senses to be the main instrument of progress, but they do not condition the advance of intellect upon any one science; Dr. Draper finds in physiology the source, test, and law of the intellectual development of Europe.

In the Preface he announces his theme: it is "a history of the progress of ideas and opinion from a point of view heretofore almost entirely neglected." "Social advancement is as completely under the control of natural law as is bodily growth. The life of an individual is a miniature of the life of a nation. These propositions it is the special object of this book to demonstrate." "No one, I believe, has hitherto undertaken the labor of arranging the evidence offered by the intellectual history of Europe *in accordance with physiological principles*, so as to illustrate the orderly progress of civilization, or collected the facts furnished by other branches of science with a view of enabling us to recognize clearly the conditions under which that progress takes place. This philosophical deficiency I have endeavored in the following pages to supply." "Seen thus *through the medium of physiology*, history presents a new aspect to us. We gain a more just and thorough appreciation of the thoughts and motives of men in successive ages of the world." The same general propositions are reiterated at convenient stages throughout the volume, which is in fact only an expansion of the last chapter of the author's *Physiology*. How far are these views original? How far are they true?

The propositions are these three: the life of the individual is completely under the control of natural laws: society, made up of individuals, is under the control of the same laws: and these laws are physiological. Hence, physiology is the science of the sciences—all development is to be explained by it.

By Is the life, now, of each individual, under the control ¹sim-
 ers. ¹and solely of natural laws? Is that a demonstrable pro-

position? Has Dr. Draper proved it? No; he just assumes it as an axiom, as if it were incontrovertible; and he nowhere examines or defines it more specifically. And yet, in his own view, everything hinges just here. He seems to identify the whole life of the individual with his physical life. Physical life, bodily growth, physiology, if you please, is under the control of natural law, or rather, is a part of the system of natural laws. But is there nothing more in man to be developed than his bodily structure, his anatomical and nervous system? The latter may be first developed, it may be the substratum of the other developments; but is it identical with these other developments? In short, has man a soul as well as a body, and a soul distinguishable from his nervous system? If he has, and if that is developed, and developed according to its own laws—then the whole theory of the book is null. And the author concedes that man has a responsible, immortal soul. This concession is fatal to his theory. He says (p. 589), “while man agrees with inferior beings in the type of his construction, and passes in his development through transformations analogous to theirs, he differs from them all in this, that he alone possesses an accountable, immortal soul.” Further (p. 594): “Animals remember, man alone recollects. Everything demonstrates that the development and completion of this instrument of intellection has been followed by the *superaddition* of an agent or principle that can use it.” “From the silent chambers and winding labyrinths of the brain the veiled enchantress looks forth on the outward world, and holds the subservient body in an irresistible spell.” Now if there be in man a soul distinct from the body, a soul which uses the body only as an instrument, a soul with an immortal destiny, then we say that there is no sense or reason in the position, that the whole development of man is under the dominion of bodily or physical laws. On the contrary, reason demands of us the assumption, that the soul may have its own law of growth and progress equally with the body. Physiology is not, and cannot be, all; there is also a psychology—there is a psycho-

logical as well as a physiological development even of the individual life.

And this is still further evident as soon as we come to a closer analysis of the growth of the individual man. By what physiological laws can you explain perception, memory, imagination, logic, and reason? What analogy even is there between the processes of reasoning and any physiological process that can be named? A body, in this life, may be needed for all these mental operations; but the operations are quite distinct from any of the laws of bodily growth and development. The mind does not grow in the same way that bones, flesh, and nerves grow. The law of the one cannot be the law of the other. What is there in the nervous system that resembles the phenomena of consciousness—the distinction of subject and object? Can our ideas of universal and immutable truth be derived from aught of which the senses are directly cognizant? In sensation itself is there not an element which cannot be deduced from any properties of the nerves as a material substance? Nay, in the very idea of natural law itself, as constant and orderly, is there not a factor, which reason alone, and not the senses, can recognize? And when we attempt to educate and develop the soul of the individual in art, in morals, in religion, even in science, are we not obliged to resort to very different methods from those we make use of in training and unfolding his bodily powers? Where then is the sense of saying, that the laws which control man are bodily or physical or physiological?

This first proposition then of Dr. Draper's book is unproved, and is inconsistent with his own concessions. That it is original, we suppose neither he nor anybody else would dream of asserting. It is the common-place of all materialistic philosophy. It can be proved only as materialism is demonstrated.

The second proposition is, that society, being made up of individuals, is under the control of the same laws with them. Individual and social life, he tells us over and over again, "are physiologically inseparable from one another; the

course of communities bears an unmistakable resemblance to the progress of an individual ; man is the archetype or exemplar of society." Nations, like individuals, are born, proceed through a predestined growth and die. One comes to its end at an early period, and in an untimely way ; another, not until it has gained maturity. One is cut off by feebleness in its infancy, another is destroyed by civil disease, another commits political suicide, another lingers in old age. But for every one there is an orderly way of progress to its final term, whatever that term may be" (pp. 615-16). "The march of individual existence shadows forth the march of race existence, being, indeed, its representative on a little scale." "A national type pursues its way physically and intellectually through changes and developments answering to those of the individual, and being represented by Infancy, Childhood, Youth, Manhood, Old Age, and Death respectively" (p. 11). And upon this general view, the author rather prides himself, as his consummate work : "Whoever has made the physical and intellectual history of individual man his study, will be prepared to admit in what a surprising manner it foreshadows social history. *The equilibrium and movement of humanity are altogether physiological phenomena.* Yet not without hesitation may such an opinion be frankly avowed, since it is offensive to the pride, and to many of the prejudices and interests of our age" (p. 2). This is what he calls "primordial law."

It is difficult to believe, that any scholar at this day can imagine that there is in this general scheme the slightest degree of novelty ; or, that it helps us one jot in understanding the intellectual development of the human race. Certainly from the time of Pascal this idea has been one of the common-places of literature. Vico brought it out distinctly in relation to each nation, marking the stages of growth and decay. All historians of any reflection have made use of it. The analogy is on the very surface of things. You have mastered all there is in it, just as soon as you have said to yourself that nations and races begin to be, grow, become mature and pass

away. This is one of the most trivial reflections which school-boys are taught. And the analogy with the individual life is just as common and tells us just as little. The analogy holds about as well of animals and plants, as it does of men: these all have a beginning, a youth, a maturity, and at last die. A fact common to botany, zoology, and history, can hardly be a very special fact in history, or tell us much about its laws and order.

How much does it tell us? Only what nobody ever doubted, or ever could doubt: that all that exists in this world, in space and time, has had and will have a beginning, a growing and an ending, in the individual form in which it is here manifested. And when we have learned that, what have we learned about the specific nature, characteristics and growth of that which thus appears and thus passes away? Why, just nothing at all. We have still to find out all that from a study of the objects themselves in their interior structure. The analogy does not help us here at all. What the plant is, what the animal is, what man is, what society is—what are the laws and developments of each and all these—we are still to discover from a particular examination of each by itself. The analogy is then, just good for nothing, as a help in the most important part of our investigation.

Is human society, as a whole, under the same laws as the individual, and under no other? How can we answer this question? Manifestly only by studying society itself, as developed in different times, races and nations, and seeing whether there is that in the whole which is not in the parts; or, rather, whether anything is developed in the social state, in nations, in races, which could not, and would not, be developed by the individual alone. Society may come and go like individuals; but in coming and going it may unfold powers, capacities, and ends which the individual alone could never attain unto. All men may be alike in living, growing, and dying; but that does not prevent one man's history from being a very different sort of development from that of another. Society may live, grow, and die like the individual; but then its development may

have resulted in something more than can be comprised in this abstract formula for transient existence in time and space. This physiological law, protruded with such parade of science, as the culmination of thought, is in fact one of the most barren schedules of human progress that can well be excogitated.

Society is indeed made up of individuals, but there is that developed in the combination which could not be developed in the parts. Even chemistry might teach us that atoms combined produce entirely different results from what they ever would, or could, in their isolation. Doubtless there is that in each atom which fits it for such combination ; but yet the combined result is a new and different product. Still more must this be the case when the elements brought together are human souls, with all their boundless capacities and infinite possibilities of union, conflict, and adjustment. The result must be such as we can find no strict analogy for in the individual life. Even in the narrow sphere of the family, in its relations of parents and children, brothers and sisters, there is an unfolding of the moral nature and of the affections, of the principles of love and duty, such as the merely individual life cannot attain unto. And in the ordering of human society, in its government, laws, and institutions, in the progress of art, science, and religion, and in the aims which every great nation has in view, there are principles, means, and ends involved, which far surpass any possible analogies drawn from the individual life, and still more from physiology. And when we come to the vast and unfolding drama of human history, as this has been developed in the successive races and nations that have led the march in this grand and solemn procession, there are and must be, principles, aims, and ends that will forever elude the grasp of him who tries to hamper and contract our vision by crude formulas about "physiological laws." Schelling has well said that "There can only be a history of such beings as have before them an ideal which can never be realized by the individual alone, but only by the race as a whole."

The analogy between individual and social life also fails in another aspect. All individuals die; nations rise and fall; but individuals and nations are not all that we have to consider in history. There are also the different races, and there is also the race as a whole. The races of men do not die out, as do the separate nations. With few exceptions, they reappear under other national forms, and perpetuate their life from age to age. And the human race, as a whole, has had, and must have, a continuous being until the great end of its creation and historic growth is reached. Now, it is just with this progress of the race as a whole that the philosophy of history and the law of its development have to do; and it is just here that the analogy with the individual life cannot be carried out. There is as yet no decay, but rather progress, of the race as a whole. And this there must be if we can have any general scheme of human history. And even when particular nations lose their geographical boundaries and limits, and are said to die out, this is true only in a very partial and limited sense. Their descendants mingle with, and help to make, other nations. Their laws, literature, arts, and science survive, and become the property of other generations. And there is thus a continuous life of the human race, which abides in the midst of all the changes of the individuals. What is natural and physical decays; what is moral and spiritual survives, and shapes the future.

This analogy, then, between the individual and social life, and the attempt to explain all history by such an analogy, must be barren and fruitless. It can only issue in eliminating from the life of the race its most essential and important developments and ends. It narrows our view of man's whole historic career. It is difficult to reconcile it with the view that Providence is educating the race for moral ends, by means of a moral government, and that the physical is subordinate and subservient to the moral. In fact, as we shall see, the author excludes the moral element from his theory of the progress of the race.

The third proposition of Dr. Draper's theory is, that indi-

vidual and social life is under the control of physiological laws. History is to be read by the light of physiology. The history of "the intellectual development of Europe," it is claimed, is here written for the first time "in accordance with physiological principles." "The equilibrium and movement of humanity are altogether physiological phenomena." To show this is the main object, that it is shown is the grand pretension, of the volume. The author has written a work on physiology of considerable repute; and this is the complement of that work, treating of man in his social relations, in the light of physiological principles. This claim struck us as so unique that we have examined the volume with special care, in the hope of finding some light cast upon the bewilderment into which we must confess the project cast us. We could not at all understand what the writer meant, and we have searched for explanation and evidence. But our investigations have been utterly fruitless. After reading the volume, its arguments, its summaries, we are still as much in the dark as ever. It will scarcely be credited, yet it is still a fact, that there is not in the whole work any attempt to explain what is meant by applying physiology to history; there is no enumeration of the "physiological principles" by which history is to be elucidated; there is no proof, and no attempt to prove, at any point or juncture of the historic series, that the development has been of a physiological sort. And, upon reflection, we think we can see a reason for this; and that is, that it could not possibly be proved; that there is no way by which it can be shown, and that there are no facts to show, that history is a branch of physiology—that historical laws and physiological laws are identical. In the first place, the author has not proved this thesis; in the second place, he could not if he tried; in the third place, if he did, it would lead to a variety of absurdities.

He has nowhere, we say, proved his prime position—that history moves according to physiological laws. The only appearance of an attempt at this is found in a few passages, in which he repeats over the formula about Infancy, Child-

hood, Youth, Manhood, Old Age, and Death, as applicable to societies and nations as well as individuals; and, as if parallel with this, the division of the progress of Greece and Europe into periods of Inquiry, of Faith, and of Reason. But the analogy here is of the slightest. Infancy may be credulous, childhood inquiring, youth believing, manhood rational. But are the laws by which childhood is led to inquire, or youth to believe, the same with the laws by which the body of the child is made and the physiology of youth is developed? The physical transition from youth to manhood is in accordance with certain well-known physiological laws regulating the growth of the body. Now, is it these same laws, and no other, which regulate the transition in a nation from the age of faith to the age of reason? Is there anything in the age of faith which resembles the structure and laws of the human body when that body is in its youth? Is there anything in the age of reason which resembles the structure, functions, and growth of the human body when it is about forty or fifty years old? Is reason developed out of faith by the same process by which a man of forty-five is developed out of a man of thirty-five years of age? Physiology, as Dr. Draper treats it, in his manual on that science, is "a branch of natural philosophy," and is divided into two parts—"statical physiology," containing "the conditions of equilibrium of an organized form," and "dynamical physiology," or the "development" of the organized form, its "course of life." Until history can be resolved into some definite organized form, with members and functions physically connected, it can never be shown that it is only "a chapter in physiology." As soon as it is attempted to make the analogy strict and scientific, it evaporates into a fancy.

Not only does the author thus neglect the proof of his cardinal position, but, we add, he could not possibly prove it if he tried to do so. No human ingenuity is sufficient to show that history is controlled by physiological laws. All that there is in it is the simple fact that the human beings who go to make up history are in part animals, and, so far forth, each

one of them is under the laws of physiology. But that the historic laws are the same with the physiological laws which shape their bodies, is a very different sort of a proposition. Take, for example, any of the main interests of society on whose progress the welfare of the body politic is conditioned, and try to find out the amount of physiology which is contained in it. There are in history, says the author, "five intellectual manifestations to which we may resort—philosophy, science, literature, religion, government." Now, what physiological principles are illustrated and exemplified in the progress of mankind in any one of these higher intellectual manifestations? The growth of philosophy, for instance, is conditioned upon the discovery and organization of ideas and truth. What physiological law is illustrated by the processes of induction and deduction, which are necessary to the unfolding of truth? What is there akin even to the inductive formula in any of the laws by which the nervous system is fashioned and grows? What physiological law is exemplified in those intuitions by which we recognize, and rest in, ultimate and universal truths? Do we pass from the premises to the inference in a logical argument in the same way in which digestion is carried forward in the bodily system? The subjects compared are manifestly so disparate that we cannot conceive of even a fugitive analogy, much less of an identity, between them. So, too, it is with literature, religion, and government. The fundamental ideas in each are entirely different from the fundamental idea of physiology, and consequently the laws of their growth or development must be different. The idea of animal life is the germinant idea of physiology; the idea of God is the essential idea of religion; the idea of justice is the controlling idea of government; and until it can be shown that animal life, God, and justice are all identical, it cannot be shown that physiological laws control the progress of religion and of government.

And this also in part establishes our third remark upon this remarkable scheme, that is, if it were proved that physiological laws are the same as the laws of history, we should be

landed in a variety of absurdities. One absurdity is this—that physiology is the queen of the sciences; that all art, ethics, politics, and religion are but branches of the science of animal life. For if physiological laws make and control all historical developments, then whatever appears in history is but an efflux of this stream of animal life. We should have to reform all our processes of education, and all our theories in art and morals, to say nothing of religion. The central idea of philosophy would henceforth have to be that of the growth of a physical germ. Instead of discoursing of the laws of beauty, we must talk about the physiology thereof; instead of enforcing the moral law we must enjoin obedience to physical law; instead of commending religious duties to the conscience we must insist upon our physiological duties. The category of physical development must displace that of an immutable rectitude. And how would the other sciences fare in the light of such a theory? Can they, too, be reduced to physiology? Might they not also set up equally good claims to such universality? Why not just as well attempt to explain all history on chemical, or astronomical, or mathematical principles, as on physiological? We recommend the attempt to the experts in these sciences, not doubting that they can show as many and as good reasons in their favor, as this volume adduces in support of its physiological hypothesis about the intellectual development of Europe.

Such are the main propositions of this volume, so far as it lays claim to originality; and we have dwelt upon them more fully because they fall in with some tendencies of the times which the author may not wish to favor, but which such vague and unscientific treatment of the most momentous theories surely encourages. There may be in some religious thinkers what scientific men call cant and prejudice; but there is also among some of the devotees of science a flippancy in talking about moral and religious truth which is far more detrimental to the best and highest interests of man. Religious convictions have a strong background in the nature and necessity of reli-

gion itself. Religious truth is vital ; scientific truth is valuable. Science will vindicate itself ; the tendencies of the times, the progress of investigation, favor it. We have no quarrel with it, and no fear of it, in its proper sphere. But yet it must learn and know its own metes and bounds, and not obtrude its partial principles into other and different spheres. Just as soon as it takes up the assumption that natural science is all in all, that induction is the only road to truth, that all history and progress are conditioned by physical laws, and these alone, just so soon it arrays, and must array, against its pretensions, not only the religious convictions and belief of the race, but also the prescripts of the moral sense, and likewise that instinctive belief in the reality of spiritual truth, which has led the greatest thinkers of every age to elaborate systems of metaphysics. We are far from classing Dr. Draper with those sceptical materialists who deny moral truth, the immortality of the soul, the being and government of God, and the beneficence of the Christian faith. There are incidental statements scattered through his work which imply that he holds to these. But yet the undoubted drift of his theory is to encourage those speculations which run in a different direction, and enthrone physical laws as supreme. His better nature may here be inconsistent with his philosophy ; but it is with his philosophy that we have to do in criticising his labors.

And there are several points in which this tendency is manifested, besides the main theories on which we have already commented. One is in expressly subordinating the moral to the intellectual, denying in fact the reality of a proper moral development of the race. A kindred error, involved in this, is, that he makes intellectual development, especially in the domain of the natural sciences, to be the aim and issue of the whole historic course. He also casts contempt upon all metaphysics, properly so called, taking the position that metaphysics is to be fashioned and reformed by physiology.

As to the subordination of the moral element in human progress, the broad ground assumed is, " that the aim of Na-

ture is not at moral, but intellectual development." "The intellectual has always led the way in social advancement, the moral having been subordinate thereto. The former has been the mainspring of movement, the latter passively affected. It is a mistake to make the progress of society depend on that which is itself controlled by a higher power. In the earlier and inferior stages of individual life we may govern through the moral alone. In that way we may guide children, but it is to the understanding of the adult that we must appeal" (p. 591). What the author means by "moral" and what by "intellectual" it is somewhat difficult to say, for he nowhere defines the terms; but taking them in their ordinary sense, we have here the theory of Comte, Buckle, and the positivists expressed in an unqualified way. How a believer in God and a divine government, and in man's immortal destiny, can advocate such a view we cannot conceive. Morality, from its very nature, sets before us as our ideal the great end of human life—a life of love to God and love to man, of justice, truth and righteousness. The objects for which states labor, in their highest functions and aims, are essentially moral objects. Unless intellectual and scientific progress contribute to the development of human rights and the establishment of justice, freedom, and civil equality, they fail of their best end, and may only entail evil upon society. In constructing a scheme of human life and of human society, the intellectual must subserve the moral, for the moral includes the great and permanent interests of mankind. Still more emphatically is this the case, when we turn from human to divine government and laws. By the consent of the conscience and reason of the race, God is essentially good and holy; and to diffuse goodness and establish righteousness is the great end of creation. Nobody can believe that God's chief end for man is to develop his intellect. Even Plato taught that to escape evil we must be like God, and that to be like God we must be righteous. God's government of his rational creatures is essentially a moral government; and as soon as we doubt or deny this there remains for us no God to love, worship and obey, but

only some blind force or unconscious and impersonal reason. Only materialism or pantheism can consistently subordinate moral to natural or intellectual ends. It is indeed true that there is not in human history such a development of new moral principles, as there is of new scientific facts and laws: but this rather attests the glory of moral truth, and proves the real dignity and worth of human nature. New moral truths are not discovered, any more than new intuitive truths are discovered; for these prime principles are the original endowment of man as a moral and rational being. But there are as conspicuous and new applications and developments of moral truth in the progress of society, as there are of scientific and of intellectual truth. The truths are unchangeable in their nature and evidence, but ever varying in their applications to human society and life. Human rights, justice among men, forms of government, the principles of benevolence and charity—are not these advancing in their application to society as the race advances? Is not here very much of the real progress of the race to be found? Dr. Draper tells us that moral motives are for “inferior stages” of culture, for children and youth. But what kind of a culture is that which leads a person to put the moral virtues, such as justice and love, below intellectual attainments? In spite of the positivists we must still hold, that a man may know all chemistry, geology and even physiology, and yet if he have not charity he is nothing. The fallacy here seems to consist in this, that because science brings to light some new facts and principles, and morals remain immutable in their nature and obligations, therefore there is progress in science and none in morals. But in the development and application of moral truth there may be as conspicuous progress in human society as there is in the growth of the knowledge of physical laws. Bishop Butler might still give a few useful hints even to men of science: “Knowledge is not our proper happiness. . . . Men of deep research and curious inquiry should just be put in mind not to mistake what they are doing. If their discoveries serve the cause of virtue and religion in the

way of proof, motive to practice, or assistance in it, or if they tend to render life less unhappy and promote its satisfactions, then they are most usefully employed; but, bringing things to light, alone and of itself, is of no manner of use any other-wise than as an entertainment or diversion." (Butler's Works. Sermon xv.)

Kindred with this theory, is that which makes intellectual development, especially in the domain of science, to be the aim and issue of man's historic career. The refutation of the above scheme in fact includes the refutation of this. We do not doubt that the physical sciences are to advance and prosper, and contribute to the well-being of mankind. We welcome every addition to this stock of human knowledge, and neither condemn nor fear its progress. Natural philosophers are aiding in the great work of giving man dominion over nature. But to make such conquest of nature the great end of the race is to restrict our view of man to his earthly and temporal condition—to cut him off from God and immortality. Dr. Draper makes "the improvement and organization of national intellect" to be the aim of the social progress of great communities, and chiefly through and by the advance of science. This he insists upon in the last chapter of his work, in a curious and artificial comparison of Chinese with European civilization, as if these were the two great types. There is a double error here: one, that of making intellectual development the main thing; another, that of confounding intellectual progress with the growth of physical researches. Of the former we have perhaps said enough. As to the latter, it shows in a striking way, how a proficient in one branch of investigation is inclined to assign to it an undue prominence. The author's whole argument runs into the conclusion, that the age of reason is identical with the age in which the positive sciences are most fully developed—that reason is unfolded fully and consciously only or chiefly through the progress of physical discovery. That some intellectual faculties are fostered and developed by the study of the natural sciences is indisputable. But the intellect of

man has a wide scope. It includes the art of reasoning; but we do not always find our most expert logicians among the geologists and physiologists. It embraces imagination also: but our highest poets are not necessarily deep in anatomy. Intellect, too, should be conversant with ultimate truths; yet we cannot say that the natural sciences directly contribute to elucidate such truths. The highest effort of the intellect must be in the attempt to construct a complete system of truth, to organize the realm of ideas in one scheme. Of that scheme, the natural sciences may give an important part, but yet not the most important. To reduce all reason and intellect to the attempt at understanding physical law alone is to degrade and not ennoble human nature. Such a reason would not be reason in any recognized or intelligible use of the term.

In harmony with this theory is Dr. Draper's contempt of metaphysics, and his strange assumption, that future metaphysical systems are to be written on physiological principles alone. In giving his sketch of the Greek culture he introduces a superficial account of the Greek philosophy, evidently drawn from second-rate sources. But in his whole narration about European civilization, he totally ignores its mental, moral, and metaphysical sciences. A man who can write a history of "the intellectual development of Europe," and say nothing of the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza, pass over Leibnitz and Kant with a word or two, utterly neglect Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, not refer to Cousin, and pass by in silence Reid, Stewart, Mill, and Hamilton, must have a very singular notion of the task he has set before himself. In fact, the last part of his work is really not much more than a sketch of the progress of the natural sciences. He says himself, "the reader has doubtless remarked that, in the historical sketch of the later progress of Europe given in this book, I have not referred to metaphysics, or psychology, or mental philosophy. . . . It is only through the physical that the metaphysical can be discovered." This deficiency, if there were no other, stamps the volume as really worthless in

respect to its professed object. For the intellectual history of Europe is in great part summed up in its psychologies and metaphysics. The author might just as well write a physiology without alluding to the circulation of the blood, or a botany without allusion to sap. It would be no more of a blunder. And from the specimens he has given us of his knowledge and acumen about metaphysical systems, we are inclined to think that there is some reason for this silence. He does not know or understand these great speculative attempts of modern thought. He is not able to grapple with the subjects which they present. Thus his account of Kant is all a mistake. He ascribes to him the view (p. 172) "that there is but one source of knowledge, the union of the object and the subject—*but two elements thereof*, space and time." This is an inexcusable blunder. So, too, in his speculations on the criterion of truth, he comes to the conclusion, "that in the unanimous consent of the entire human race lies the human criterion of truth." What a valuable criterion! With all deference to the author's scientific knowledge, we must say that he is not the man, qualified by either his attainments or his grasp, to pass sentence on the works of the great thinkers of modern Europe, to scoff at metaphysics, or proclaim the decrepitude of theology.

He intimates, indeed, that metaphysics is to be reformed by physiology. This crops out in several passages. But the idea is not further developed. We wish he would undertake the task. We should like to see the result. Metaphysics on physiological principles would certainly be a novelty. Metaphysics is the science of truth and being: physiology is the science of natural organisms. Has the author any idea of what he means when he says, that all truth, all ideas, the philosophy of being, can be evolved from physiology, and developed on strictly physiological principles? We should just as soon think of developing the moral law from geology, or constructing the science of government by means of botanical principles.

There are some other incidental points in this work which

we had intended to comment upon, but we can only make a passing reference to them. His judgment on Lord Bacon is absurdly unjust, describing him as "a pretender in science, a time-serving politician, an insidious lawyer, a corrupt judge, a bad man." His judgment on the Baron of Verulam may perchance react on himself, that "with the audacity of ignorance, he presumed to criticise what he did not understand." Of Milton's *Paradise Lost*, we are told that, "a Manichean composition in reality, it was mistaken for a Christian poem." His account of the early Christian controversies, the Athanasian and Augustinian, is loose and incomplete—giving the mere surface of the matter; as is the case too with his allusions to the scholastic theology, and the central question of nominalism and realism. He repeatedly discredits miraculous interventions. His sketches of early Christian and mediæval history do not betray any acquaintance with the latest and best literature of the subject. He talks of the "grim orthodox productions of the wearisome and ignorant fathers of the church." His estimate of the value and power of the Mohammedan influence is greatly exaggerated. It is only in the account of the progress of the natural sciences, and in some of his speculations, analogies, and groupings in this department, that the volume can be considered as having added to our stock of knowledge, or can be recommended for use. In its main theory and aim it is a mistake and a failure, and in some of its principles it favors pernicious tendencies.

Theology and metaphysics have interests to guard, as sacred, to say the least, as those of the positive sciences. Both these high branches of thought have their own history, their fitting methods, their proper domain. Science also has its rightful sphere, its appropriate methods, its legitimate principles and results. It is to study and interpret nature. Let it do its work well and thoroughly. But it has no right to impose its processes and principles upon the spiritual world. Spirit cannot be explained by matter, nor the laws of spirit by the laws of matter. Physiology is excellent and useful in its place: but it is not ethics, it is not metaphysics, it is not theology—

nor does it give the law even to history. History includes it, but it includes a vast deal more, the development of man's whole nature, under a divine guidance, towards the highest moral and spiritual ends. And this development and these ends are to be explained, if at all, not on physiological, but on moral and spiritual principles. Providence, and not natural law, controls the course of history and determines the destiny of the race.

WHEDON ON THE WILL.*

THE conflict between freedom and necessity has agitated all schools of philosophy and theology. Fate and chance, necessity and contingency, divine sovereignty and free will, foreknowledge and self-determination, certainty and power to the contrary, law and liberty—all these contrasted phrases indicate different forms of the same radical problem. The whole question centres in the application of the universal and rational idea of causality to the acts of the Will. Is the Will wholly and purely cause, or does it come under the law of cause and effect? The intricacy of the inquiry makes it difficult; its vital issues make it momentous. The government of God, and the responsibility of man are equally involved.

At the outset, each of the two factors, divine sovereignty and man's free will, seems to have for itself sufficient evidence. In simple and direct consciousness no embarrassment is felt; but in the reflex consciousness of the philosophic mind there come up conflicting speculations, which either imperil human responsibility or impugn the divine majesty. The problem is, to reconcile the two; or, at least, so to state each that the other shall not be deprived of its rights. And here confusion is apt to arise, whether from poverty of language, inaccuracy of thought, or positive inability to grasp the hidden connections of things so diverse and so profound. It may be, that from

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THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL AS A BASIS OF HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AND A DIVINE GOVERNMENT. By D. D. WHEDON, D.D. New York. 1864. pp. 438.

the nature of the case, we cannot fully master the consilience of law and liberty, until we can fathom, not only the depths of human consciousness, but also the mystery of the divine agency. And this sole thought, rightly weighed, will dint the edge of many a sharp definition. Man's freedom may be so defined, as logically to exclude even foreknowledge; God's agency may be so defined, as to imply that he is the efficient cause of all human volitions. And though we cannot penetrate the interaction of the two, yet we may see when either is ruled out by the very terms in which the other is propounded. Though we cannot solve a mystery, we may appreciate a logical contradiction. The problem is not a simple one, to be answered by an analysis of one series of similar facts; but it is in the highest degree complex, reaching to the very poles of the moral universe. No one is prepared to discuss it, who has not an awe-inspiring sense of the divine majesty, as well as a deep conviction of the difficulties that environ the ultimate moral preferences of a responsible human will.

We are apt to imagine that the acts of the will are simple, and easy of definition. As revealed in immediate consciousness these acts are simple, being the direct expression of personal power; but the will, in its supreme preferences, contains the most complex and subtle elements of our moral life. The will, in fact, brings our whole being into concentrated expression. At the basis are the generic elements of human nature; these are individualized in a distinct moral personality; and the person, putting forth power, especially in the form of choice or preference, is the Will. It is only logically that the will is distinguishable from the man or person; really, it is never so. And all the other so-called powers or faculties of the mind converge here; they run into, and so complicate, the will's energy. It is usually said, that the intellect acts first, and then the feelings, and then the will; and this to a certain extent is true, as in formal, deliberate choice; but this is far from comprising the whole of the will's agency. For a subtler analysis indicates, that it is rather below than on the surface of the other powers of the mind—next to the very

person; and that it is implicated in all putting forth of power, whether internally or externally. Its chief function, however, is in choice; and this is in the two-fold form of immanent preference and executive acts.

In the idea, and in the act of choice, it is of course implied that there may be (not that there always are) two or more objects or ends in view; that between them election is to be made; and that; so far as the general capacity of choice is concerned, there is a natural possibility of electing the one or the other. But the actual choosing is dependent on other conditions than this possibility of different elections; it includes as well, and by an equal stringency, motives, opportunities, and the moral bias, or antecedent state, of the will itself. These all help to constitute the volition. And, as a matter of fact, the generic bias of the will, its moral habit, determines the special volitions, until some great crisis comes. Every human being is in such a state in respect to sin, until he is led, and only by divine grace, to think upon his ways and come to his right mind. And this moral inability of the sinner to repent and turn unto God, without the impulse and aid of divine grace, is as certain as any fact in man's spiritual history. In human consciousness it is reconcilable and reconciled with the deepest sense of responsibility and guilt; so that it is only the logic of sophistry, and not the voice of consciousness or conscience, which sets the two at variance. Whenever man is religious, and so far forth as he is religious, he feels and knows his need, especially as a sinner, of entire dependence on God's grace for renewal and redemption. And when his trust in that grace is most absorbing, when his will and the divine will flow together, then, too, he has the highest conscious sense of freedom; for his whole soul goes out in unimpeded love to God; he has found the metes and measure of his moral being, and in the highest moral necessity is conscious of the highest moral freedom. Sin is a bondage of the soul; and in holiness alone is its perfect liberty reinstated.

These now are patent and substantial facts about human nature, and man's moral experience and history, which every

theory of the will is bound to recognize. They bring out some of the main points in the perennial controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, which Dr. Whedon has renewed in his treatise on the Freedom of the Will. The author is well known as the able and diligent editor of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, and is looked upon as the acutest representative of the theology of the Methodist Episcopal Church. His book, nominally an essay on the Will, is really an advocacy of Arminianism and an attack on Calvinism. And he brings all Calvinists, old school and new school, in New England and in all branches of the Presbyterian church, under the same condemnation. It is rather amusing to see Princeton and Andover, Bangor and New Haven, swept into the same drag-net; all classed as "necessarians." The utmost he will concede to the Calvinistic advocates, even of "power to the contrary" is, that they are "crude freedomists." He will not admit them into the full Arminian fellowship unless they are prepared to say, that the "power to the contrary" has actually been exercised, or, that they do sometimes choose from the weaker inducement; or, that God simply foreknows and does not foreordain—for, after all, it is the divine decree which most gravels a consistent Arminian. Yet still we think, the author is rather hard on some who have gone as far as they could in his line, and only stopped just short of absurdities and contradictions. He seems to think that there are but two words in the whole discussion, *freedom* and *necessity*; that these have invariably the same sense—which of course he defines; that there is no debatable land between; and that Arminians have the monopoly of freedom while Calvinists are fixed bound to fate. This is about the upshot of his argument. Even when a Calvinist says that by "necessity" he means only "certainty," Dr. Whedon retorts that by "certainty" he must mean only "necessity." He cannot get quit of the notions, that Calvinism is the same as pure necessity, and that predestination means that God is the author of sin. Nor will he allow to Edwards and his school the benefit of their own nice distinctions and emphatic disclaimers. Taking his prominent terms

in an isolated way, he never thinks of making joints, or of harmonizing antagonisms; and so he finds it hard to understand such processes in other minds. More than half of his volume is devoted to a perversion and attempted refutation of the "necessarian arguments," especially those of the elder Edwards. For each new advocate of Arminianism must still storm that citadel—though it has been so often demolished. But every fresh "freedomist" is dissatisfied with the work of his predecessors, and has to provide himself with new weapons, that is, a new set of definitions, which have not yet run the gauntlet of the Calvinistic logic. Our new knight thinks that "self-determining power of the will" is an infelicitous expression; that "liberty of indifference" is inapt; that "contingency of volition" excites misapprehensions; that "power to the contrary," implies what it should not; and comes into the contest, armed cap-à-pie, in a complete panoply of new and strange words, phrases, and definitions, which bristle defiance.

An author has an undoubted right to make his own definitions; and a writer of authority may now and then introduce a new and needed term, which will be welcomed to the language. But Dr. Whedon's volume is fairly disfigured by *verba insolentia*, and awkward, not to say barbarous, phrases; * such as "freedomism," "volitionate," "volitivity," "motivity," "intuity," "definiting," "certained," "mustness," "transgressoriness," "resultant cause," in the sense of the cause producing the result; "free to alterities," "eternal, divine, free volitivity," and the like. Such grotesque novelties and freaks of expression add nothing either to the purity or the force of style. They are needless, especially in the case of an author who is often clear and concise in his definitions and arguments, and who is quite able to express his definite ideas in good old English undefiled. They obscure the thought and embarrass

* We referred to a few of these in the July number of our Review, which the *Methodist Quarterly* for October comments on with slight courtesy, and some inaccuracy; saying, e. g., "The phrase 'equilibrical will' does not occur;" but it is found in the table of contents, p. 7, "Indifference is equilibrical will."

the attention. To read this work intelligibly, we have to learn a new Arminianese dialect, which in a condensed form runneth somewhat after this fashion: "Freedom is the power of alternate choice, otherwise called pluripotential causality; while necessity is unipotent and automatically resultant from inalternative particular causation; the will, as an uncaused cause, is necessarily free to alterities; its volitivity may be from pure intuity whatever be the motivity; in a true equilibriumal or equipollent cause there cannot be any mustness, for no one can really volitionate where there is non-existence of power but to a fixation."

One assumption underlies our author's reasonings, which demands a moment's consideration; and that is, that Calvinism as a system stands or falls with the doctrine of "philosophical necessity," as expounded by Edwards; as if that metaphysical dogma had a quasi symbolical authority. This is far from being the case. The essential Calvinistic tenet is that of the divine purposes; "philosophical necessity" is but an adjunct of the system, employed to elucidate some aspects and relations of the divine decree. It has, in fact, been denied by many, who have still held to the general Reformed theology against both Lutherans and Arminians. The late Principal Cunningham, of Edinburgh, maintained in an elaborate essay, that the Westminster Confession neither requires nor forbids the holding of that philosopheme. And many divines of our own country, both old school and new school, have, on different grounds, dissented from some of the phraseology and arguments of the sage of Northampton. Since he wrote there have been great changes in the state of the question. Edwards himself would have written in a different tone against the evangelical Arminianism of the Methodist church as represented by Dr. Whedon, from that which he assumed towards the cold and rationalizing Arminianism of his own times, which denied original sin, and special grace. Had he been opposing pantheism he would unquestionably have modified some of his positions and illustrations. Few persons now-a-days would accept all his definitions as final.

He does not carefully distinguish between the different usages of the word 'cause;' he seems to limit freedom too exclusively to executive volition; at times he implies that the whole causal power, producing volition, resides in the motives; his conception of causation (in conformity with the philosophy of his day) is derived from the sphere of mechanics rather than from that of living or spontaneous forces; and he is so in earnest in arguing against the self-determining power of the will as to neglect that element of self-determination which is undoubtedly found in every personal act. But still a critic, who can see no essential difference between "D'Holbachian atheism and Edwardean Calvinism;" who says that the system of Edwards is "accordant with the worst forms of Universalism and Parkerism in our own country;" and who cannot even master his distinctions between natural ability and moral inability, is but ill prepared to do justice to a work, which has received the homage of high eulogy and sharp assault from many of the best minds of the last hundred years. With all its minor drawbacks, the system which Edwards espoused is still, in its essential features and necessary connections and relations, what the great Bradwardine of old called it, in the title of his famous book, the *Causa Dei contra Pelagium*. For Arminianism logically demands Pelagianism. It is only, as we shall see, by a fortunate inconsistency, or rather by a complete disregard of his theory of freedom, that Dr. Whedon is able to maintain his orthodoxy when he comes to the main problems of the theodicy. Vaunting his notion of freedom, even in the title of his work, as the only "basis of human responsibility and a divine government," he is forced to ignore it, when he encounters the knotty questions about the divine prescience, the guilt of original sin, and the vindication of the divine justice in view of sin; and to put the whole stress of his solutions on an entirely different basis. Freedom is supplemented by a "gracious ability," and justice itself, it is argued, demands the system of redemption. And so this book, just because it is sharp and strenuous, illustrates more fully, perhaps, than

any single product of this school, the inevitable tendencies and inconsistencies inherent in the Arminian system, which stands, logically and theologically, between Calvinism and Pelagianism, having some of the main difficulties of both, without the consistency of either.

Dr. Whedon's work is divided into three Parts. Part First is entitled *The Issue Stated*: Part Second considers the *Necessitarian Argument*: Part Third is devoted to the *Positive Argument* for the writer's own theory. This arrangement involves the necessity of frequent repetitions, and the inconvenience of refuting the "necessarian" on the ground of the writer's theory before that has been fully established. But the argument after all hinges on the definitions of terms and the correct statement of the issue. And if an author in his definitions assumes the point in debate, or misstates the ground of those whom he opposes, the apparent victory may be both easy and unprofitable.

What is the Will? Edwards says it "is the power to choose." Dr. Whedon, replies "choice is a word as obscure as will." But choice certainly indicates the chief mode of the will's action, and is less "obscure" than Will, since it is directly known as an act in consciousness. His own definition is that "Will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intellectual act." But are not "conscious author" and "an intentional act" quite as "obscure" as choice? Can there not be an unconscious act of the Will? What room is left on the basis of this definition for making a distinction between the immanent preferences and the executive acts of the Will? Is the will all act? Has it no permanent states? This definition also neglects the essential element of "choice," which is, however, brought in afterwards when our author says (p. 18) that he always "uses volition and choice interchangeably." Choice, he adds, is "a volition in view of some perceived preferability" in the object. His peculiar usage of terms now begins to appear. "Volitions are neither voluntary nor involuntary, but volitional;" "a voluntary volition is impossible." That is, he

calls the direct act of the will "*volitional*," and "the consequent act of the body or mind *voluntary*." But this is arbitrary, and contrary to the best usage and the common sense of the English tongue. To say that volitions are not voluntary, and that voluntary acts are not acts of the will, is to confuse the established meaning of words, and multiply vain distinctions.

In what does the Freedom of the Will consist? In all definitions of freedom there is a certain inadequacy in language to reproduce the precise fact of consciousness. The terms ought to be perpetually interpreted, not by looking at them logically, but by reading them psychologically. Freedom is born and lives in consciousness. It is known only in and with choice or preference. External freedom is the power or opportunity of doing as one pleases. Internal freedom is found both in the capacity and in the exercise of choice; it is in and of the will, because the will can and does choose. The will, in the act of choice, is free, not only from external coercion and inward necessity, but also *in* the choice actually made. It is free in what it chooses, as well as in respect to what it does not choose.* There may be a free choice when only one object is before the mind; but, as different objects or motives are usually presented, the choice of one involves the refusal of the others, as also the possibility, so far as the natural capacity is concerned, of taking another instead, the other conditions of volition being complied with. But the cardinal point in the will's freedom, that on which responsibility chiefly hangs, is the fact that the person is consciously free *in* the choice actually made.

And this is the point which Dr. Whedon and other Arminians strangely overlook, in their anxiety to vindicate a free-

* "Every free act is done *in* a state of freedom, not *after* such a state. . . . It will not suffice that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue and coexist with the act, the soul remaining in possession of Liberty." Edwards, p. 42. Dr. Whedon, p. 187-8, comments on this, but fails to invalidate it. Our references to Edwards are to the second volume of the New York edition of his works.

dom, which is abstract and illusory, a freedom which is not, and cannot be, realized in any act of the mind, but which remains a perpetual negation. He says that freedom is "exemption." But this is a narrow and partial view of it. There must, he insists, be freedom "to the act," that is, no impediment; and freedom "from the act," that is, another act may be put forth "instead;" but freedom *in* the act he does not recognize. In his usage, as we have already seen, a "voluntary act" is not free (not "volitional"). The freedom all went before the "voluntary act," and expired in giving birth to it, so that the voluntary act is in fact necessary and not free; it is the effect of the will as a cause, and "nothing that is caused can be free." Thus his whole definition of freedom reads: "an unrestricted power to put forth in the same unchanged circumstances a different volition *instead*" of the one "in the agent's contemplation." This definition of freedom has chief respect to a volition not put forth. And this, we say, is a negative idea of freedom. It allows no place for the vital distinction between *formal and real freedom*.

Freedom, as thus defined, consists in, is identified with, the "unrestricted power" of "putting forth a different volition." And this power is not merely the "natural ability" conceded by the school of Edwards, but something radically different. It is, in Dr. Whedon's view, a creative energy. Arminianism, driven by force of logic from its old phases of "a self-determining power of the will," "liberty of indifference," and the like, is coming to represent the will's action as that of pure causality in the form of a creative act. "Every free agent," says our author* (p. 42) "is thus an original creator, even out of nothing." The will is an "uncaused cause," and it "creates, brings into existence, shapes and limits, and in all these senses necessitates and governs its volitions." It is a kind of cause "different from all others," in this respect—that

* The same view is indicated in the title of Mr. Hazard's recent work "Every Being that Wills, a Creative First Cause."

all others are "unipotent," while the will is said to be "pluripotent." A natural cause, under given circumstances, can act only in one direction; it is unipotent." This is necessity, viz., "the impossibility of the opposite." But the will is "a pluripotent or alternative cause," and is as capable of acting in opposite directions, as a "unipotent cause" is of acting in one direction. Whatever may be the feelings, motives, or state of the mind, the will is equally adequate to the opposite. It can act against all possible counter motives, and by its action even transform the weaker into the stronger motive. And such a causal capacity is said to be essential to freedom and responsibility.

That man in willing is a proper, efficient cause of his own acts, we do not contest; nor yet, that motives are the occasional and final, and not the efficient causes of volition. The direct efficiency is in the man and not in the motives. And when man chooses in one way there is no natural impossibility, but rather a natural possibility, of a different choice. He weighs, deliberates, decides; and he can decide for one or the other as seems to him best. He has all the natural and moral capacities and powers, which qualify him to choose between different objects or ends. And he chooses as he does, not because he must, not because he cannot do otherwise, but because he sees no sufficient reason for, or has no hearty pleasure in, doing otherwise. And all this is entirely different from any conceivable natural necessity, or "impossibility of the opposite." But Dr. Whedon is not content with this; he will not stop at the end. He hypostatizes in the will a causal energy, a creative capacity, a "pluripotent power," which distinguishes it from all other kinds of causation. But this seems to be an unreal abstraction.

Not to anticipate criticisms, that must be reserved for other points, we do not see that this elaborate discrimination between "pluripotent" and "unipotent" cause, solves any real difficulty, or gives any distinct idea. It is an artificial way of stating an illusory distinction. In one sense all forces are "pluripotent," as they may act, or be made to act, in a variety

of directions. The forces of the organic world have a greater variety than those of the inorganic; animals are more "pluri-potential" than vegetables, and men than animals. And man has the capacity of choosing among and between a fertile variety of objects or ends, to which he is correlated by the complexity of his endowments; especially of deciding between the behests of reason and conscience, and the cravings of natural desire. But this capacity of choice is in no sense a double power; it is in its very nature one and simple. There is, and can be, only one undivided energy of choice, in however many directions it may turn. Even supposing that another end were chosen instead of the one that seems most desirable, it is the same capacity that makes the election. The alleged distinction indicates no real difference. And as to its being in any proper sense a "creative" energy, producing an opposite volition of its own motion, the whole idea is simply preposterous. No such thing was ever done. It is a vain imagination. To suppose it realized by man is to annul the distinction between divine and human power.

So that, upon the whole, this invention of a new kind of cause to suit the exigencies of the Arminian theory of freedom is needless and unprofitable. It is an attempt to state what eludes statement. This eccentric and pretentious "pluri-potential cause," though rather formidable at first sight, turns out in fact to be only our old Arminian acquaintance, "the self-determining power of the will," brought out for a fresh airing, with a new *alias*, having been so thoroughly exposed under his former names, that he finds it inexpedient to appear in them any longer. But his new and high-sounding appellative (reminding one of the pompous titles given to petty German potentates), has not changed his nature. He is still as supple, Protean, and disputations as ever, representing the ghost of an idea, and ever striving to elude the infinite series, into which Edwards banished him, by hiding in that intermediate state between thought and fancy in which he was begotten of old.

The general conditions "of volitional action" are reduced

by Dr. Whedon to these three: “an Object or direction of action, Mental Comprehension, and Motive.” “Motive is a usual antecedent of action,” but its “strict universality” is doubted (pp. 71, 139). Then (p. 87) it is formally asserted that the maxim, “like causes ever and always produce like effects,” is “inapplicable in the volitional sphere.” And so we are prepared for “*the crucial question*,” viz.: the Cause of Particular Volitions. The whole theory of the book hinges here; it stands or falls with the author’s view of the will as a causal power.

“What causes (determines) the will to put forth the particular volition and no other?” The question is not, how it comes to act at all, but “Why it exerts such an act and not another?” Edwards concedes that the activity of the nature of the soul enables it to be the cause of effects, but says “*that alone* is not the cause why its action is *thus* and *thus* limited, directed and determined,” as is the case in every particular volition; and that, therefore, besides * the general capacity of election, there must be particular reasons or motives to account for particular volitions. But Dr. Whedon says, in italics, “*an alternative power or cause is an alternative thing, and accounts for the coming into existence of either one of several effects*” (p. 90). And he adds, that “*so and at once and for all, the crucial question is answered.*” When pressed with the inquiry, What causes the will to produce any particular effect? he replies, in capitals and italics, “**Nothing whatever.**” And this for the reason, that “*every complete cause produces its effect uncausally*” (p. 92). Such is the theory, and upon it we join issue.

(1) The will, in and of itself, is not a complete or adequate cause of any particular volition or effect. This seems to be sometimes conceded by Dr. Whedon, when he speaks of the

* Dr. Whedon, commenting on these statements, says that Edwards here teaches that motive is “the absolute cause” of the volition; but when Edwards says that active nature “alone” is not the cause of the particular volitions, he rather implies that it, as well as the motive, has a hand in the matter.

will "*in its proper conditions*," as "an adequate cause," and says that "a general power is not adequate to the effect," and "that another part of the power" is to be supplied. But if these conditions furnish a part of the power, the will is not in itself a complete cause. The will may be called the efficient cause, but this gives only the general possibility of action, until the occasional and final causes are added, and these are not of the will, but constitute the motives or reasons of the act. An efficient cause and an adequate cause are by no means identical. A volition is no more accounted for by its efficient cause than would be the building of a house by the general activity of the workmen, without brick or mortar. To account for any particular volition, there must be that in the cause corresponding with the particularity in the effect. The principle of life in a seed must contain a formative element as well as a vital force, in order to be able to produce any particular kind of plant. No definite act can be constructed in thought without relation to some end or object. No event or phenomenon can be produced by a bare, general efficiency. Else, from matter, force, and motion, according to Herbert Spencer's revival of the old, godless speculations, might be evolved the universe of particular existences.

It seems to be supposed, that, because the idea of cause is simple, all effects can be accounted for by simple power alone. Cause is indeed simple in idea, but when we come to its actings, it is, as Plato says of the beautiful, "very difficult." The relation of cause and effect is as complex as the frame of the universe. The most elaborate of the Aristotelian distinctions is that between power in possibility and power in act. Man (*in potentia*) may be viewed as a possible cause of either of several effects; but to pass from power to action requires other conditions or causes, which help to constitute the effect.

(2) And if the will, in itself, is not a complete and adequate cause of any one particular effect, then an "alternative power or cause," granting its existence, can no more account "for the coming into existence of either one of several effects."

The same reasons in part apply here as above. If no one effect can thus be accounted for, then no other can be. Which ever alternative is taken, there is still a particular determination which cannot be explained by any mere general efficiency. Dr. Whedon seems to imagine that there is a special virtue in an "alternative cause," somehow making it adequate of itself to particular, and even "alternative" particular volitions. The difficulty however is not lessened, but repeated. Neither can be accounted for, and so either cannot be. The impossibility is just reduplicated. And such "alternativity," under the circumstances, must be cruelly embarrassing. It is bad enough to be obliged to put forth any one volition without any particular reason; but to decide between two opposite volitions, without any particular reason for either, is worse than the case of the traditional jackass between the two bundles of hay; for the jackass had at least the satisfaction of having each of its eyes filled with the vision of an equal good; and though it doubtless died between the two, yet, if it had chosen either, for the particular election there would have been a special inducement.

There is still subtler difficulty about this complete power-to-either. The will is equipoised, in that it is an equally complete or adequate cause of either. It takes one: then there was a complete and adequate cause for the other, which cause, though complete and adequate, resulted in no effect. Dr. Whedon notices the matter (p. 94), and says in reply, "particularity coming into existence is itself exclusive of all counter." Very true, if it does come into existence. But why does this "particularity" come into existence, rather than the other, since there was a complete and adequate cause for either? We do not see but that the best way of settling the difficulty would be let both come into existence. That would give us the logical absurdity full blown in act and fact.

(3) the question is: "What causes the will to produce any particular effect?" Dr. Whedon replies: "NORMING *whatever*. For complete cause needs nothing to cause it to produce its normal effects." But the reason here assigned gives

the slip to the question. It is true, if we have an adequate cause (or causes) we do not need anything more; but the question happens to be, Whether the will, as an alternative cause, is thus adequate even to opposite volitions; and Dr. Whedon's answer assumes this point as settled. By saying that "nothing whatever" causes it to produce any particular act, he leaves us only the will's blind energy as the cause. And as these "particular effects" cover all the sphere of the will's action, we are landed in "nothing whatever," as the root and ground of moral agency. What causes a man to be honest, rather than to steal? "Nothing whatever." What caused Adam to fall rather than to remain holy? "Nothing whatever." What causes a sinner to repent rather than to abide in sin? "Nothing whatever." And so of all other possible alternatives. Such a will is, to borrow one of the phrases of the book, "a blind, insensate, projectile will."

(4) Our author asserts (p. 87) that "in the volitional sphere" the maxim that "like causes ever and always produce like effects," is "inapplicable." This law, more carefully stated, viz.: that *the same causes in the same circumstances produce the same effects*, is at the basis of the whole inductive process. Without it, all uniformity is impossible. It is not a result of induction, but its ground; it is a universal rational principle, one mode of stating the law of causality. It is so universal, that it is not violated even in a miracle. Dr. Whedon says, it applies only to nature. But how does he know that? By assuming that it does not apply to the will, he makes the will's action a point blank contradiction to all law and all certainty. It is not even a miracle; it is a caprice.

(5) And yet he claims that this theory is in harmony with the "law of causality." The law of causality is, that *for every event or change of existence there must be a cause*. His theory, he urges, does not violate this law, because for every specific volition he assigns an adequate cause, that is, an act of the will. This is good as far as it goes. But how about the act of the will itself? What is the cause of that act? Why, *nothing whatever*; it is uncaused. Of course, then, it is an act

without a cause ; and of course, it *does* violate the law of causality, which avers, that *every* event or act must have a cause. We must give up the law of causality, or give up this theory of the will. It is absurd to say, that anything in the universe can be uncaused excepting the Great First Cause. All that exists in time and space must be under the law of cause and effect ; or else we cannot prove that there is a Creator. No act can be uncaused without being absolute ; and no act can be absolute and remain human. Or rather, such an act is neither human nor divine ; for God in all his particular determinations must act in accordance with the highest and best of reasons ; his being is uncaused, but his purposes are grounded in truth and holiness. Such a power, begetting an opposite volition of its own spontaneity, is incogitable ; a wanton, wilful imagination ; a sheer anomaly.

Profound thinkers, like Kant, Schelling, and Julius Müller, who suppose that man's original sin can be accounted for only on the assumption of preëxistence, also hold that the sin was engendered in a "timeless" condition ; and this, in part, so as not to interfere with the law of cause and effect which rules in all that exists under the limitation of time and space. But the theory of our author leaves the human will, even in its temporal limitations and conditions, in its every act, face to face with the abyss of nothingness. It breaks up the continuity of that law, on which the whole created universe depends.

Nor does it avail, in refuting objections, to say with our author (p. 105) that "the difficulties on both sides are identical," since the nature of cause is "a mystery." For in the one case the adequate cause is assignable ; in the other, it is not. In the latter case, "nothing whatever" is said to be the cause of the act ; in the former, a sufficient reason for the act is recognized. One is a mysterious something, the other is a mysterious nothing.*

* Edwards discusses at several points this question of an uncaused cause. Thus, Part 2, Sec. 4, is on the question, whether Volition can arise without a cause, through the Activity of the nature of the Soul. He says "the

(6) There is a wide difference between a logical possibility and a real possibility. Granting even the logical possibility of stating and conceiving such an "alternative power," such an "uncaused cause," it would still be a mere abstraction; and the confirmation of consciousness and experience would be necessary to establish its real possibility, to say nothing of its reality. Because an absolute causative energy is conceivable, it does not follow that it exists in us. Power to the contrary may be stated and conceived; but is it ever realized? If it is exercised it is annulled; and so its exercise is really inconceivable.

And is there not, after all, an essential illusion involved in ascribing such attributes and qualities to the Will, as if it were isolated, and distinct from the man? An absolute and uncaused efficiency of the Will, means an absolute and uncaused efficiency of the man. For the will is only the person choosing, acting. Into its choices there must perforce enter, not merely the form of personal agency, but also its vital substance. No choice is or can be abstract—hovering, as it were, in equilibrium above our souls. All in us that prompts to action, desire, feeling, conscience, the soul's bent, are concentrated and expressed in the will's energy. It cannot be otherwise, unless we can separate the person from his feelings and affections. These can no more be kept out of the will than they can be kept out of the man. And any scheme of the

activity of the soul may enable it to be the cause of effects, but it does not at all enable or help it to be the *subject* of effects which have no cause." In the previous section he examines the point, whether "the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things, by reason of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot;" and he argues that this involves the contradiction, that such a "particular nature of existence is a thing prior to existence, and so a thing which makes way for existence, with such a circumstance, namely, without a cause or reason for existence." And he further shows against Mr. Chubb (p. 123) that this Arminian notion, that the acts of the will spring "from nothing, implies necessity, for what the mind is the subject of without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as to any hand that free-choice has in the affair," etc.

will's agency which does not recognize this must be unreal and abstract.

And so we may conclude that the crucial question, "*What causes the Will to produce any particular effect,*" has not been "at once and for all answered" by saying, "*Nothing whatever.*" If that be the only answer, then say nothing whatever about it.

On the theory that "nothing determines the Will," it is, of course, verbally easy to evade the Infinite Series, to which Edwards reduced the Arminian self-determining power. There is no series, because in every act of choice we start with nothing. Dr. Whedon says "the tail of the series is cut off;" and he might have added, that he cut it off right behind the ears; for the head is gone as well as the tail. His supposed act of the will is an absolute beginning, an uncaused cause, projected of its own accord out of nothing. The will is determined by nothing; that answers all difficulties, except those contained in itself.

What is the Relation of the Will to Motives? Motive, comprehensively considered, is whatever leads or induces the mind to act. In the last analysis all motives are internal. The strongest motive is identical with the bent of the mind at the indivisible instant before choice, in relation to the choice. The will, as a capacity for choice, is a form without contents; it is a blind force, which receives vision and direction only from the reason, the feelings or the conscience. Motives are not the efficient cause of volitions. They furnish the material, the occasion, and the end or object of the action; and are absolutely necessary for this. The will furnishes the efficiency, and the form of choice. But the form is to be filled with contents ere volition can be consummated. As soon, now, as it is agreed that motives are not the efficient cause of volition, the doctrine that the will chooses according to the strongest motive (or in whatever similar phrase it may be expressed), is one of the most harmless and reasonable positions that can be taken as to the law of moral agency. No phraseology about it may be free from all ambiguity; but the object

is to state a general law, in contrast with the position, that the will is arbitrary, merely self-determined, cut loose from reasons. Choice for reasons lies between caprice and fatalism; it is in contrast with chance, rather than cognate with necessity.

The question here is not as to an "impossibility of the opposite;" but simply as to a matter of fact, to be determined by an appeal to conscious experience. The position that the will is as the greatest apparent good, decides nothing as to the intrinsic value of the motives; it does not assert that any particular class or classes of motives always control volition; nor does it even affirm that the mind, at the moment of choice, is conscious of the fact, that the motive yielded to is the stronger. It only says, that in reviewing our past decisions, we find, as a matter of fact, that they have uniformly been in accordance with what at the instant solicited the will most strongly. There may have been at the same moment the consciousness of the possibility of a different choice; but that does not alter the fact that the actual choice was, on the whole, in view of what, for want of a better phrase, is called the greatest apparent good. And this never interferes, but rather harmonizes with the sense of freedom and responsibility.

But the object of the Arminian, in consistency with his assumption of the autonomy of the will, is to avoid any such general statement. Even when he grants that the will always acts, and must act, in view of motives, he tries to make out that it sometimes decides for the weaker against the stronger; or that the will gives its strength to the motives; or that the power to the contrary has actually been exercised in some cases. He insists upon it, that if the will always chooses according to the stronger inducement, that this is but a refined form of necessity. Yet he must needs concede, that all the instances covered by his seeming cases, are, at the utmost, but exceptions to the general law or fact. Or even if he does not grant this, he will, we suppose, be willing to say, that he has sometimes, if only by way of variety, chosen according to the greatest apparent good. When he did so, was it either

disagreeable or fatalistic; did it upset for the time all his notions of morality and responsibility? If it works well in some instances, why not in many? why not in all?

Even if the will can, or does choose the weaker instead of the stronger motive, we cannot see what is gained, whether on the score of freedom, or of responsibility, or of the morality of the act, or in the way of defending the divine government. Certainly nothing on the score of freedom; for a man is no more free in yielding to a weak motive than to a strong one—but rather subject to the charge of caprice. Nor on the score of responsibility is there gain; for the responsibility attaches to the freedom. Nor is the morality of an act heightened when it is done without sufficient desire or love for it. And as to the divine government, even supposing that God foreknows that a man, under the circumstances in which he is placed, will choose from the weaker instead of the stronger motive, God is just as responsible, and neither more nor less so, if he sees he will choose from the weaker, as if he foresees he will choose from the stronger motive.

It is said that motives cannot be compared—that certain classes of motives are incommensurable. But if they cannot be compared how can we decide among or between them? However different they may be, they certainly agree in the characteristic of appealing to the will as reasons or inducements. The difficulty here is simply that of finding some common and unambiguous term which will express just this fact and no other. Cheap criticisms may be made on the phrases “sufficient reason,” “greatest apparent good,” “what seems most desirable,” and the like; but the fact still remains, that the action of the mind, unless it be contingent or capricious, can be reduced to some such general scheme or law. When we come to the last point which separates the idea of will from that of caprice, it is that the former acts with reasons, and the latter without. To call such a choice “fatalism,” is to allow no middle term between fate and chance.

Dr. Whedon endeavors to reverse the relation of will and motives; and he does this on inconsistent grounds. He main-

tains that we must not only have, but exercise the power of contrary choice; that the will does sometimes choose from the weaker motive; that it may at times choose without a motive (pp. 139, 190); that the will "projects volition;" and in fine, that it is the will itself which gives to the motive its comparative strength. But if the will can, of its bare spontaneity, just "project a volition," why not give up the whole doctrine of motives altogether; it would vastly simplify, if it did not annul, psychology and ethics.

His main point, however, is, that "the so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence which the will assigns to it in its action." Again (p. 79), "the last dictate of the understanding does not decide the will;" but "the dictate of the understanding becomes the last by the act of the will." And (p. 363), "the will, in and by choosing, brings the particular motive on account of which it acts, into the last antecedency to its choice." All this strikes us as more ingenious than thoughtful. Why does the will decide to make a given reason or motive the last? Not, we suppose, because it happens just then to be in view of the mind, for that would be childish. It either has a sufficient reason for stopping the series of motives, or it is wanton wilfulness. Again, "the strength of a motive" is said to be "the prevalence the will assigns to it;" but this is preposterous; for when the will acts, the motive, as a motive, expires; it is no longer a motive, it is incorporated in a volition; and we can no longer talk about either its strength or weakness as a motive. The discussion, by the very force and sense of the terms, is limited to the state antecedent to choice; and to slip the motive out of that state into a new mode of being, where it loses its identity as a motive, is to evade the question by logical legerdemain. Yet again, the act of choice cannot change the character or force of the inducement: all that choice does is to appropriate it. If the motive was the weaker at the instant of appropriation, the appropriation does not make it stronger. If a man chooses five dollars instead of ten, his choice does not make the five more than ten.

Once more, if the will can be supposed to give, by its election, a greater comparative value to the motive than it had before, this must be on account of some peculiar quality or state of the will, additional to its mere power of choosing, which quality is imparted to the motive. That is, the will is not a naked power of choice, but has a moral bias or character. But this would be inconsistent with Dr. Whedon's whole theory of the nature of the will. A will that can give strength and character to a motive, is a will that contains perception and feeling, as well as power—that is, it is the man himself, and not merely one of his faculties.

Our author further illustrates his position by the doctrine of probabilities, to show that the will may and does act from the weaker motive (p. 130). "The chance may be improbable, and yet prove successful. So the volition calculably improbable, may become the actual." But, in point of fact, in the so-called contingencies (as in dice), about external facts or events, the actual result is mathematically certain to an omniscient eye. The contingency is found only in our ignorance. How, then, can this answer the purpose of showing that strict law does not rule in the sphere of the will? If the analogy is meant, however, to apply only so far as the result is uncertain to us, then the will is a synonym for chance, and the point of comparison must be, that volition is haphazard, and may from mere chance fall on the lesser probability—which undermines all rational ideas of freedom and responsibility.

If freedom wanes as motives increase in intensity and permanency; if "a law of invariability in choice be pure necessity" (pp. 38, 220); then God is less free than man; and Christ had less freedom than any other man; and the sinner's guilt decreases as his sin increases; and the virtue of saints is diminished as they grow in grace and holiness.* There remains no possibility of reconciling freedom with law. The great fact of consciousness, that the highest moral freedom

* Comp. Edwards on Will, pp. 113-4, 132-3.

and the highest moral necessity concur, remains forever inexplicable.

It is commonly said that all men have the same mental and moral constitution ; but we have sometimes doubted this when reading these anomalous Arminian speculations about the will and freedom and responsibility. Look at the attributes of that contradictory capacity, which they call a Will, and judge if it be essential to moral agency and responsibility. It brings forth all its acts out of nothing by its own uncaused and motiveless efficiency ; it can at times act without motive, and even without emotion or feeling (p. 44) ; it is able to make, by its bare power, the weaker motive strong, and the stronger motive weak ; it is not and cannot be free, unless it sometimes exercises a power to the contrary, without any sufficient inducement ; it is under the law of natural necessity if it always chooses what on the whole seems most desirable ; while it determines everything, it is itself determined by nothing, and cannot be determined by anything without annulling its very nature ; it cannot be governed, and in proportion as it is governed ceases to be responsible ; by its bare wilfulness, it can make any reason or motive to be " the last ; " and, in fine, in view of any chance impulse afloat in consciousness, it can " project itself," in the twinkling of an eye, right athwart our habitual mental and moral states, and so change us, by its arbitrary " alternativity," that we become the opposite of what we are or wish to be, with no power to let or hinder. Such a lawless capability is nearer akin to omnipotent chance than moral necessity is to fatalism. It is safe only while shut up in the technical language of abstract metaphysical treatises. An arbitrary " pluripotential cause," though it may claim to be the very essence of morality and responsibility, when it really appears in flesh and blood is furnished by society, in self-defense, with a safe retreat.

The idea of Necessity, as defined in this work, is equally abstract and one-sided with its definitions of freedom and cause. Freedom means only " exemption ; " Cause is only " efficiency ; " and Necessity signifies only the utter " impos-

sibility of the opposite." This definition of Necessity is so fixed in Dr. Whedon's mind, that he seems incapable of appreciating the careful distinctions made by Edwards, and on this score does him manifest injustice. Necessity, in fact, is one of the most difficult of the categories, and requires the most delicate handling. "Philosophical Necessity" is perhaps an unfortunate phrase to use in discussions on freedom; but Edwards expressly repudiates the sense in which his critic quite uniformly ascribes it to him. He says the vulgar usage makes Necessity to mean that "it is impossible it should not be;" but that, as he uses it, "metaphysical and philosophical necessity is *nothing different from certainty*." And he adds: "It is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true." That is, a proposition which affirms something to be true, presupposes that there is a full and fixed connection between the things signified by its subject and predicate; the proposition could not be true unless there were such a connection; and this connection is certainty or philosophical necessity. Wherever there is certainty, there is philosophical necessity. The things signified by the subject and predicate may be connected in very different ways; the connection may be metaphysical, logical, physical, or moral—but provided it be certain, it is philosophical necessity. Dr. Whedon cannot understand this. He says: "Edwards here does *not* certainly say what he means;" but he *does* say just what he means. Whedon continues: "He surely cannot mean that necessity is the connection itself, but a quality of the connection." And yet Edwards *does* mean that the "full and fixed connection" is the necessity; the two ideas of "full and fixed connection," and "philosophical necessity or certainty," are identical. This appears from the instances Edwards gives (pp. 11, 12), which relate to very different things, yet all agree in having the common element of certainty, though the ground of the certainty in each case is different. To adduce some cases: we say, *e. g.*, God is infinite. This is one case of such neces-

sity or certainty: there is a full and fixed connection, in the nature of things, between the subject 'God,' and the predicate 'infinite.' Again: Dr. Whedon misunderstands Edwards; this is another instance of philosophical necessity or certainty; the connection of the subject and predicate is certain—because it relates to a fact already past, and not because there was a natural impossibility of the opposite. Again, the proposition: (God will judge the world—is another instance; it is certain, because connected with what is in itself certain, the divine justice and purpose. Edwards labors this point so as to make a plain distinction between natural necessity, and that kind of necessity (certainty) which alone holds good of moral subjects and acts. In the former—the opposite cannot be; in the latter, though the opposite might be, yet it will not be, because the given fact or event is certain to occur. In natural necessity, the event takes place, even though the will be opposed; in moral necessity, the will itself chooses, prefers, and so its opposition is ruled out by its own act. Dr. Whedon says, this is "only a deeper necessitation" * (p. 42); but there must be some stopping place, and when we have come to a free preference, this is about the end of the matter, unless a voyage up the infinite series, or a "projected volition," seems more desirable. And Edwards himself makes a formal statement of the point in its relation to Moral Inability, entirely at variance with Dr. Whedon's constant misrepresentation of his views: "Therefore in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able but a being willing." (See Part I., Sec. 4.)

But this leads us to consider the author's cognate misrepresentations of Edwards's distinctions between Natural

* Our author (p. 210) writes: "Securing my volition in order that he may secure my voluntary sin and consequent damnation, is about the poorest piece of sneaking despotism that one could attribute to an omnipotent evil." This comes out in connection with criticisms on Dr. Pond and Dr. Nehemiah Adams; but nothing they have said warrants any one in ascribing such views to them.

and Moral Ability and Inability. To apprehend these distinctions is vital to the understanding of the New England theology. Dr. Whedon flatters himself that he has "riddled Edwards's entire theory of Moral Inability," but he has only riddled his own target. He says that by Moral Inability Edwards means "volitional powerlessness," "non-causality-in-will;" by "Moral Ability," "the power to will;" by "Natural Ability," "the power to obey the volition;" and that this natural ability is "a power outside the will," a "post-volitional power of fulfilling the volition." Thus "a man wills to strike by *moral ability*, and the arm executes the blow by *natural ability*." This, now, is a complete tissue of mistakes; these definitions are all framed for and not by Edwards, and seem to indicate either a natural or moral inability on the part of the critic to understand the most common-place points of the New England divinity. Thus, under Natural Ability are uniformly embraced all the capacities and powers of a moral agent, including the will itself—it is the possible reach of our natural powers of mind and body, under the circumstances and conditions of our being. It never means any such nonsense as "a power outside of the will to fulfil its volitions." It includes what Whedon, confounding the two, says "moral ability" means, that is, "the power to will." But Moral Ability, besides the power of willing, also involves the idea of an immanent preference of the will for the object chosen. Every man has natural ability, that is, all the capacities and powers necessary to moral agency; but no sinner has "a moral ability" (in the sense of Edwards) to love God, because his heart is averse to him. Thus an Edwardean would just reverse the proposition of Dr. Whedon (p. 243): "Where there is no *moral ability* there can be no *natural ability*," and would and must say, in consistency with his standard definitions, "Where there is no *natural ability* there can be no *moral ability*," for the natural is the logical and psychological *prius* of the moral. So, too, in the usage of this school, "Moral Inability" cannot mean "volitional powerlessness;" but it always and only signifies

“the opposition of *inclination*, or the want of inclination ;” it is an inability arising from the moral bent or state of the individual. The sinner, though endowed with all the capacities and powers of moral agency (his natural ability), is morally unable to repent and believe without divine grace, and this inability has its root, not in any natural impotence, but in the perverse and depraved state of his will. One object of the distinction between natural ability and moral inability is to show that the sinner is responsible and guilty, while also needing the aid of divine grace ; so that both the obligation to immediate repentance and the sense of dependence upon God may be equally enforced. These plain and familiar distinctions become so senseless and confused under Dr. Whedon’s manipulation, that his criticisms on Edwards are well-nigh unmeaning. One might as well attack Euclid after defining a circle as a figure bounded by three lines and containing three angles. It is much easier to refute Edwards on the basis of these interpolated definitions than to attack him on his own ground. His careful and refined discriminations being set aside, there is no end to the logical absurdities that may be worked up and out ; only, nothing is demolished excepting some crudities, for which nobody but the critic is to be held responsible.

We are obliged to omit several points, on which we wished to comment, that we may come to the test question, in a theological point of the view, of the theory of freedom here advocated ; that is, the certainty of the divine foreknowledge of such future events as are dependent on free agency. Dr. Whedon begins by saying, that foreknowledge must precede foreordination, because the former belongs to “the intellect,” and the latter to “the will ;” and we all know that God’s intellect, like man’s, must act before his will. But—not stopping to inquire what would then be left for foreordination to do—it is a serious misunderstanding to say, that foreordination is restricted to the divine will or the divine agency. God foreordains whatever comes to pass, as it comes to pass ; and so, not only his own acts, but the acts of his creatures, are included

in his eternal plan, with all the circumstances and qualities of these acts, just as they eventuate in time. In one sense, foreknowledge may be said to precede foreordination; that is, God knew what he was to ordain (in the order of thought and logic) ere he ordained it. But this is not the question in dispute, though Arminians sometimes like to think that it is. The foreknowledge of future events as certain being conceded, the question is, what is the ground or reason of that certainty. To foreknow them as certain, implies that they are certain. What makes them thus certain? The Calvinist replies—that they are certain because contained in the divine plan or purpose (i. e. foreordained). Dr. Whedon replies, in substance, that they are certain because they are certain, while he advocates a view of freedom, which logically excludes such certainty.

He says (p. 271) that “our view of free agency does not so much require in God a foreknowledge of a peculiar kind of event, as a knowledge in him of a *peculiar quality existent in the free agent.*” This “peculiar quality” is that of “alternative causation.” The agent is “an uncaused cause,” of “equipollent ability” to decide either way, at every instant of action. It is “determined by nothing” in “all its particular volitions.” How, then, can even omniscience foresee what its particular action will be? The more God sees into the very “peculiar” nature of such a cause, the more will he know that its acts must be uncertain. It is a pure *either-or*; and the deeper it is inspected the more *either-or* must it seem to be. How can any being foreknow the particular acts of (p. 217) “a self-centre, capable of projecting action, which, without the intrinsic nature of chance, would be *as incalculable as the most absolute chance itself?*” Who can read that riddle? Dr. Whedon says that “foreknowledge must take care of itself,” and, that “he shall not enter into that inquiry.” Foreknowledge will, doubtless, take care of itself; but then, on our part, we also ought to take care not to cherish a theory of the will, which excludes the logical possibility of such foreknowledge, even while we may grant that we cannot know just

how God foreknows. One form of the *scientia media*, advocated by the Spanish Jesuits in controversy with the Jansenists, was much more consistent than such Arminianism; denying that God foreknows the actual event, but asserting that he knows and provides for all possible contingencies.

Yet Dr. Whedon advocates a kind of certainty; though his statements about it are so various and conflicting, that it is almost impossible to derive from them any consistent sense. This will appear from a comparison of his different utterances. Thus he says: "Whether there be any foreknowledge or not, it is *certain* that there will be *a one particular course of events and no other.*" He adds that "*freedom* in every individual case *implies* that of several possible volitions, *one and no other* will take place" (p. 274). He says of certainty, that (p. 57) "its primary meaning is subjective. It exists in the mind rather than in the object." He also concedes, that there is a "pure certainty," which is "the futurition of the event," and which implies that "it will be," though "power exists for it not to be." At the same time, he maintains, that "certainty" cannot be "previously made" (p. 282); and that God's foreknowledge does not even "*prove* events to be certain" (p. 298). To complete his view we must also adduce the positions, that certainty "is simply futurition, and *takes its existence from the shaping of the free act and from nothing else*" (p. 778); and that "*all its reality receives its existence from the doing reflected backwards*" (p. 229).

These diverse statements seem to be not only irreconcilable among themselves, but also in part with his theory of the will. He has defined the will as a free alternative cause, all whose particular volitions are determined "by nothing." It is an "uncaused cause." How, now, does such freedom "imply" that "one and no other volition" will take place in all possible circumstances? How can the "freedomist," as the logical result of this theory, in our author's words, see and say, that there is one vast "free, certain totality," which he can survey "with perfect ease and consistency"? Is it not a bold venture, to claim that such freedom implies such certainty? It

does imply that one or another event will take place, but how can it signify that "one *and* no other will take place"? Does uncertainty imply certainty? Will calling shifting sand a rock, make it a rock? These different statements confuse a very simple matter. If an event *will be*, it is certain; if God knows that it will be, he knows that it is certain; and so his knowing it as certain implies or "proves" that it is certain. Such knowledge does not indicate, or make, the ground of the certainty; but it presupposes the certainty. But if, as Dr. Whedon says, certainty "*takes its existence* from the shaping of the free act, and from nothing else," then, the certainty cannot be until the free act has been; that is, there is no previous certainty; that is, God cannot foresee the act as certain, because it is not certain until it is done. Such a certainty, *post eventum*, is no certainty at all in the sense of the question. It is a mere evasion of the point in dispute. Who ever doubted that an event was certain after it took place?

Our author's position, in fact, amounts to this—that there is and can be no anterior ground of certainty, either in the laws of moral agency, or in the nature of things, or in the divine plan; but, a future event is certain because it is certain! We do not wonder that he felt compelled to say "foreknowledge must take care of itself." The point of mystery in the Calvinistic system is, how an act can be free and yet be embraced in the divine purpose; but this does not involve any such contradiction as is contained in the two positions, that God foreknows all future events as certain, and, that certainty "takes its existence from the shaping of the free act, and from nothing else." We may believe in a mystery, but who can accept both parts of a logical contradiction?

In his discussion of the divine decrees, Dr. Whedon habitually misrepresents the doctrine of predestination as held by the chief Calvinistic authorities. He represents it as "an act of the divine will;" as "producing the event;" as "embracing only the divine actions." Accordingly he claims that a "permissive decree" is Arminianism, and not Calvinism. He asserts that Edwards quits his ground, when he ascribes

sin to a "privative cause," and not to the direct divine agency (p. 427). But every student in theology knows that Calvinism makes a broad distinction between what God decrees and what he does; the confounding of the two is found chiefly among a few hyper-Calvinistic supralapsarian divines. The best theologians, from Augustine down, and the leading Confessions of Faith, have quite uniformly repudiated the positions, that God is the author of sin; that he is as directly the efficient cause of sin and damnation, as he is of holiness and salvation—producing each equally for his own glory; while they have, with equal unanimity, maintained that the decree in respect to sin is permissive, and that the agency of God in respect to sin is privative rather than positive. Such cheap and stale controversial imputations are refuted by the facts and documents of historical theology.

In applying his theory of the Will to the divine mind, our author does not flinch from the logical consequences which are wrapped up in it. Thus he says (p. 316): "God is holy in that he freely chooses to make his own happiness in eternal Right. *Whether he could not make himself equally happy in Wrong is more than we can say.*" Again (p. 317): "And how knows a finite insect like us that in the course of ages the motives in the universe *may not prove strongest for divine apostasy to evil.*" Again (p. 318): "Our reliance in this case depends more upon the firmness of *our faith* than upon the firmness of the *object of our faith.*" This reduces our reliance upon the divine character to mere subjective belief, without any adequate objective ground. The essential of holiness of God gives no sufficient basis of certainty. "The alternative power" of the will must be maintained at all hazards; for if it fails in relation to God, it fails in its highest application. Moral necessity and perfect freedom cannot coexist even in the divine mind. Rather than give up "freedomism," the possibility of "the divine apostasy" must be admitted. And so the theory judges itself.

Dr. Whedon is graciously pleased to say (p. 315), that "these same Edwardses every now and then have a lucid in-

terval." The compliment may be reciprocated. Arminianism is reputed to be an inconsistent system. An eminent New England divine is said to have kept it out of his parish by frequent citations of sound Pauline views from noted Arminian authors. The latest defender of the system continues the illogical succession, being frequent witness against his own speculations. Thus he asserts the certainty of events, and recognizes no ground of certainty. Sometimes the will is represented as the sole adequate cause of volition; and yet he concedes (p. 158), "that without motives there is no adequate power for the volition to be." He contends strongly against the "non-nsance" of the power of contrary choice; and yet says (p. 175) that "while there is a power that *each should not be*, yet each and all *will be*, in its own *one way*, and not another instead" (p. 275). Freedom is declared (p. 38) "to be contradicted by the law of Invariability," while it is also conceded that God is free, though invariably holy; and that men are free in sinning, though they invariably sin. At one time it is asserted (p. 216) that to be "able to predict which way a person will choose from knowing him *perfectly* is more than any one is able to affirm;" and contrariwise (p. 272) it is argued, that "God is certainly to be conceived as able to know just what acts the creature will put forth," because he "perfectly knows" the capacities of free agents. The fact of the divine government of free agents is granted; and yet it is broadly laid down (p. 184) that "government, just so far as it goes, implies limitation . . . non-existence of power but to a fixation." "To ensure the certainty of a free act is absurd, because contradictory" (p. 227); and, per contra, "powerful temptation often insures that, sooner or later, the sin will be freely accepted."

These inconsistencies, however, become more noteworthy, in relation to the doctrines of the primeval rectitude of Adam, original sin, the impossibility of self-regeneration, and the absolute need of the atonement. For Dr. Whedon is an evangelical Arminian, and cannot resort to the shifts and explanations in vogue in unsanctified ethical systems. He defends

Whitby on freedom, and denies Whitby on sin. And so he is in a place where two seas meet; where opposite dangers threaten.

Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis
Obsidet.

In his chapter on Uniformities of Volition, he seems to grant as much as the strictest advocate of inability need demand, the existence of a "total spiritual depravity," requiring even "the injecting the possibility of a spiritual motive." "Men may be so absorbed in their plans as to cease to be free alternative agents, yet their responsibility remains." His most explicit statements, however, are on the Responsibility of Obdurates.* Here he concedes that "the superinduction by the sinner's own free act, or course of action, of necessity upon himself to sin, destroys the excuse for that necessity." This of course implies that he is responsible for continuing in sin, as well as for bringing himself into such a state. How, then, is it congruous with what is elsewhere and often asserted, that guilt attaches only as long as the will is in a state of "volitional alternativity"? Necessitation and responsibility are over and over again declared to be incompatible (p. 203); but yet in the case of every descendant of Adam, there is "a necessity lying back of the freedom," and insuring the "free appropriation" of original sin; and he adds (p. 339) that "it is in this fact that the *freedom* and universality of this fall are found to be reconciled." He allows that in Adam "there was a created and necessitated righteousness before choice" (p. 394), which, however, was wholly unmeritorious; and that the "holiness of saints in heaven is none the less rewardable because it has become necessary" (p. 387); as also that "sin-

* In a note (p. 327) the following slip occurs: Edwards selects as cases "of *necessitated guilt*, the *Will of Christ*, the *Divine Will*, Obdurates," etc. In another note (p. 206) he refers to "a tribute paid by fatalism to freedom, just as hypocrisy is said to be the compliment which *virtue pays to vice*," which not only reverses the saying, but implies that freedom is vice and fatalism virtue. An author who undertakes to write down the Calvinistic theology should be more careful in his style.

ners finally damned are none the less responsible.” However much such inconsistencies impair the logical coherence of the treatise, they give welcome evidence that our Methodist brethren will not abandon these cardinal doctrines, however enamoured they may be of their impracticable theory of free will.

These contrasted positions, however, are not held without an attempt at adjustment. And the ingenuity of the latest and most strenuous defender of the Arminian system is here put to its severest test. To meet some of the exigencies of the case, he distinguishes (p. 388) between a holiness which is meritorious and one which is not; and, in like manner, between a sin which deserves punishment and a sin which does not. But his chief point is that the atonement is the means of “reëlevating man to the level of *responsibility* lost by the fall.” Redemption “antedates probationary existence;” “grace underlies all our moral probationary freedom.” And this grace God was in justice bound to bestow. Ability being lost by the fall, “a gracious ability” must needs be imparted. And thus the difficulty is supposed to be met.

The system of redemption has, doubtless, important and even essential bearings upon the theodicy, or the vindication of the divine government in respect to the existence of sin. And in a certain sense, what may be called a gracious ability is imparted to man, through the divine favor. But if it is of debt, it cannot be of grace. It cannot be said to be necessary to make man responsible, without undermining both the system of law and the system of grace. Especially is it inconsistent with the whole previous argument of this book as to man’s freedom and responsibility. The object of the author has been to show that responsibility attaches only to acts of free-will, done with full power to the contrary. He claims that such free-will is inalienable from human nature; that with this capacity every man is born, and so, and so only, made a moral agent. How, now, does this native power of alternative choice stand related to this new and “gracious” ability? Here come up several interesting possibilities and difficulties. We are now conscious, it is said, of having the

perfect power of alternative choice. Is this our "gracious" ability? or is it our natural free-will? If it is the natural capacity of choice, how can it be said that responsibility was lost by the fall? If it is not natural, but "gracious" ability, wherein does it differ from the natural? And if the natural capacity is really clean gone, what becomes of the whole argument of this elaborate treatise? Still further, our author assures us that every human being is under a "necessity" of "freely appropriating" his native depravity; and that when he does so, he becomes "responsible" for it. This "free appropriation," is it made by our natural ability, or by this "gracious" ability? If by the natural, then the gracious was not needed to make men responsible; if by the gracious, then the immediate effect of the grace is simply to enable man to commit a sin, which otherwise he could not have committed, to make him responsible for what otherwise would have been only an irresponsible state. Besides, if the native will is a "pluripotential cause," what can be added to that by a gracious ability? It cannot, we suppose, be more than "pluripotential," and so it is needless; while if it is less than "an uncaused cause," man rather loses than gains by the exchange. And yet he cannot have lost this "uncaused cause;" for it is his very will. Is it then possible that these two abilities coexist in all of us? Are we ever conscious of them as distinct from each other? How can we distinguish the one from the other? We cannot see our way through the matter.

Perhaps we may be helped by some further statements of our author, about the relation of these respective abilities to the Old Law, and the New Law (p. 336). God, it appears, gave to man the old law, which Adam transgressed. Adam's descendants being involved in the common ruin, God gave them, through the atonement, a new law, less strict in its terms, and furnished them also with this gracious ability, adequate to the demand of the "intermediate" dispensation, though not to the demands of the old law. How will the case then stand? Granting that man's native free will was

not adequate to the demands of the old law, why might it not still have been equal to the requisitions of the new and lighter dispensation? But waiving that point, we do not quite understand whether, when man now sins, he sins only against the Gospel, or also against the law? If only against the Gospel, how can the law condemn him? And if against the law, how is he responsible, since his new and gracious ability is not commensurate with the demands of that law? And this gracious ability is also, in fact, inadequate to meet even the demands of the new law. It is given to man at the dawn of his moral existence, and yet all men sin against it. All mankind fall from this grace. A gracious ability enables them to fall from grace. We need not wonder that Arminians talk about *believing* in falling from grace, as if it were an article of their creed. Our author says, in conclusion, "Man is never responsible for a law he cannot meet; Christ's death and the new law are *demanded* by his case; and (*sic!*) all sin infringes against the new law and the old." And this sentence forcibly exhibits the height of the inconsistencies of the whole theory. The new law is demanded by equity, because man could not keep the old; but when he sins against the new, his sin also infringes upon the old, though he has been removed from its jurisdiction. And so we have two kinds of ability, and two kinds of law, and two kinds of punishment, and two kinds of moral government; and the whole makes a labyrinth, strikingly illustrative of the clearness and consistency of Arminian theology. Calvinism may be a sharp and hard system; but it takes no position, from which it can fairly be inferred that we are "damned by grace."

Nor have we yet reached the height of the theology propounded in this volume. For it is also maintained, that, not only is man's plenipotentary will under a necessity of appropriating native depravity, and responsible because it freely accepts it; not only that the atonement imparts to every man at the start a gracious ability (and, some say, justification and regeneration also), which enables him freely to keep or freely to sin against the new law; but also that there are

“millions,” in Christian as well as in heathen lands, whom the Creator is still bound to save, because they never came up to the level of “moral responsibility.” These are not infants, whose salvation we all concede, but “irresponsible adults” in Christian lands, incasted in “irresponsible sins.” Such persons cannot, “by the law of moral equation,” be “excluded from the kingdom of heaven any more than infants” (pp. 346, 347). If it were only meant that persons having little light may be saved, on condition of repentance and faith, according to the light they have, this would be common ground. But it is argued that they must be saved, because they are “irresponsible.” This is hazardous teaching, on the basis of any moral or theological system. But it becomes anomalous, as well as perilous, on the ground of the general theory of the book, that all these persons have a perfectly “alternative will,” supplemented by a gracious ability; that they were all, if not justified and renewed in their infancy, yet brought into existence under a probationary system of grace, against which they have sinned; and yet, in spite of all this, that they are still in an irresponsible state, and must be saved as a matter of equity. Such teaching undermines all rational basis for responsibility and runs far in the line of advocating universal salvation on the ground of equity.

In fine, the whole argument of this volume, so far as it rests the “theodicy” upon the peculiar theory of Will herein advocated, is a conspicuous failure. It is claimed that “freedomism” is the only basis upon which the mysterious problems of man’s condition can be solved, in harmony with the rectitude and goodness of the divine administration. But when the author comes to the knotty questions, he does not, and he cannot, untie a single one of them by means of his theory of the will. He is obliged to find a wholly different clew to guide him through the labyrinth. He lays a foundation, and erects the superstructure on a different foundation. He makes certain premises, and his conclusions are drawn from entirely different premises. He launches a craft on these troubled metaphysical and theological waters, and the

fore part beats about without any sort of connection with the after part, and the after part floats about without any sort of connection with the fore part; and no rudder can steer both parts through these vexed waves into the same haven.

This is manifest as soon as the matter is distinctly put. He abandons the possibility of reconciling the certainty of the divine knowledge with the fact of freedom; he cannot conceive or state any ligature between them. Both certainty and freedom are asserted and unreconciled. So, too, in accounting for the sin of the race, he grants that it is freely appropriated by a necessity, before which the will is really powerless. And so impotent is the native capacity of the will, that God is obliged to give to all men "a gracious ability" in addition. So that here, again, "freedomism" quails before the difficulty. It is further asserted that God's goodness can be vindicated in the matter of sin only as he provides an atonement for all, which of course implies that it is not of him that willeth, but of God that showeth mercy. An "alternative cause" gives no aid here. Thousands of irresponsible, adult sinners, are also to be saved all over the world, as a matter of equity, because their inalienable freedom was not able to bring them up to the condition of responsible guilt. Of what avail, then, is their free-will? The author's theodicy declares that God must provide redemption for all mankind, not merely on the score of grace but also of equity; and for the reason, that men have not power to avoid the common ruin into which they are plunged. What connection is there between such a theodicy and the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as a power to the contrary? And thus the vaunted freedom of the will, which was to form the only basis of a divine government, breaks down and is discarded at every step; and the whole weight of the solution of the problems of the theodicy is made to rest on entirely different grounds. By this process, the theory is doubtless here and there benefited, some cardinal points of doctrine are crudely held and stated; but the logic of the book, as a defence of Arminian freedom against the Calvinistic theology, is sadly out of joint.

On several of these vital questions, Dr. Whedon does in fact come so near to the positions even of extreme Calvinists, that we have been tempted to think that he has an irenic as well as polemic intent. His inconsistencies on many points—*e. g.*, original sin, regeneration, the inability of fallen man to renew himself without grace, the absolute need of redemption, and the primitive rectitude of Adam—indicate very clearly that his theory of the will sits lightly upon him, when brought into conflict with these fundamental doctrines. His book contains snatches of opinion from the most opposite schools. Sometimes he is almost Augustinian in his views. Again he reminds us of the subtle speculations of the old Hopkinsian divines. He bases his theodicy, in fact, not on the human will, but on the divine goodness and justice. A more thorough study of Calvinistic theology, and especially of the New England discussions, may possibly lead him to see that this whole ground has been traversed before, and by disputants more keen and logical than have as yet arisen in the ranks of Arminian divines.

The Methodist Episcopal Church of this country, rapidly increasing in numbers, wealth and general intelligence, has a great future before it, and is, we trust, to do good service in the common cause of evangelical religion. Its theology is a commingling of Arminianism and sound evangelical truth. Its preaching is full of the cross of Christ. It insists constantly on the necessity of divine grace. But it has a traditional horror of Calvinism in all its forms. When it learns to understand our doctrines more clearly, and to state its own more consistently, we shall doubtless come nearer together. But its present theology contains irreconcilable elements. If it is consistently shaped by such a theory of the Will as is advocated in this volume, the logical result must be the denial of original sin as well as of the doctrine of the decrees of God; and its strong assertions about depravity and the absolute need of divine grace must be modified in the sense of the Pelagian system. But if it is steadfast to its doctrines upon man's native sinfulness and dependence upon divine grace, it

may, on the other hand, modify its speculations about freedom, and come into closer harmony with the unquestionable historical sense of the eighth of its articles of Religion, entitled *Of Free-Will*, adopted from the Church of England, which declares, that “the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith, and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.”

RENAN'S LIFE OF JESUS.*

AN old Jewish proverb runs, that "The secret of man is the secret of the Messiah." Man knows what he is, and is to be, only as he knows the Son of God. In him, the enigma of human destiny is resolved. And this is the testimony of history, as well as the pledge of revelation. For eighteen hundred years, millions of living and believing hearts have hailed Jesus of Nazareth, as the head and Redeemer of the race, the incarnation of divinity. Ancient history converged to his cross; modern history has received from him its organizing law. In him, human thought, too, has found the solution of the problem of human life, the disclosure of the divine theodicy, the reconciliation between God and man, the centre of the whole drama of history, even to its consummation in a kingdom which shall know no sin, and have no end. The facts of Christ's life, testimony, death, resurrection, ascension, and regal dominion, are the substance of the faith of the church; without them Christianity itself has no vital power or independent being.

This historic supremacy of Jesus is incontrovertible. It is as real as religious life and faith. Christ can no more be expelled from the course of history than the sun from the circle of the sky. Scepticism about Christ is also scepticism about history itself; unbelief in him is unbelief in the con-

* From the *Am. Presbyterian and Theological Review* for January, 1864.

VIE DE JESUS, par ERNEST RENAN, Membre de l'Institut. Septième édition. Paris, 1863. Levy frères, pp. lix., 459.

LIFE OF JESUS. By ERNEST RENAN. Translated from the original French by CHARLES EDWIN WILBOUR. New York: Carleton, 1864. 12mo. pp. 376.

trolling ideas by which men have been inspired, and in the chief objects for which men have hitherto lived. And such is the mysterious fascination which still issues from his transcendent person, that even the incredulous are drawn to him against their very will. He has power over them. To take the veil from his form is dimly felt to be like taking the veil from the master of our fate, and reading the profoundest meaning of our earthly life. Here is the urn of destiny; and that urn holds no dead ashes. His power over men is still the power of a living personality. To every thoughtful mind, believing or unbelieving, he is the ideal of humanity, the Son of Man, and, as no other, the very Son of God. The vehemence with which his claims are denied implies a covert apprehension that they may still be real. Where faith is lost, reverence is cherished. Not to bow before his matchless worth is to be faithless to humanity, if not to divinity itself. His influence is the marvel of history.

This, to say the least, is a wonderful spectacle, and puzzling to the sceptic. All the logic, the criticism, and the philosophy of naturalism, and of pantheism, cannot suppress this spontaneous homage to the unrivalled spiritual excellence of Him, who is supernaturalism itself in the midst of human history. And the problem infidelity has to solve is this: How can the recorded facts, attesting his character and work, be explained, or explained away, and still leave room for reverence? Not in the miracles alone, but in the whole life of Jesus, supernaturalism has its stronghold. Here, and here alone, all is to be won, or all lost. If Christ's whole life can be interpreted on the basis of naturalism, and he still remain the moral hero of humanity; if such faith in him can be retained while prophecy and miracle are annulled, then the battle of infidelity is substantially gained. Can the Life of Jesus be reconstructed, so as to wear even the semblance of reality, while all that is marvellous and superhuman is eliminated from it? May we believe that he introduced "the eternal religion of humanity," that he is worthy of the love of all pure and aspiring souls, that he

himself is the holiest and best of earth's sons—while denying that he was more than man, and while also asserting that the whole of history proceeds according to fixed natural laws, and that there is no interposition of a divine will and wisdom in the midst of the affairs of men? To do this is the object of Renan's *Life of Jesus*. And as each country of Europe has its ideal of woman, which it depicts as the glorified Madonna, so each representative critic will impersonate in the character of Jesus his own ideal of humanity. In this new apocryphal gospel we have this ideal delineated by a poetic pantheism, of the French type.

And what is here at stake, let us recollect, is not the bare criticism of ancient documents, lighting up obscure and insignificant facts of a long-buried past; not the deciphering of parchments to unveil forgotten men, for whom we have no living sympathy; not the rectification of dates or events, affecting only the secular fortunes of the race; but, upon the criticism of the records of our faith, hangs the whole question between naturalism and supernaturalism—whether God has appeared incarnate in history; whether faith be fact or fancy, truth or myth; whether there is an assured economy of redemption; whether the problems of human destiny are still an unsolved riddle, or have been definitely resolved. Are all our annals those of time and man alone, or have we a testament of the divine will? It is a question about facts and faith, which still inspire the human race with living energy, and which cannot be obliterated without drawing darkness over the heavens and the earth. So that all the special pleading, by which Renan and Strauss claim that we are to deal with the Gospels as we do with Homer, Herodotus, and Livy, misrepresents the whole state of the case. Indifference here is nascent unbelief. The whole of early Greek and Roman history might be rewritten and affect no vital interest. But the facts about the life of Christ are of eternal moment; the whole relation of God to man is involved; the whole question between faith and unbelief. Here it is to be decided, whether man has had any

illumination from above to light up the dim and perilous way of life.

Such being the issue, infidelity will put forth all its art and strength in beleaguering the citadel of our faith. By universal conviction and concession this is found in the life and character of Jesus. And the Influence of Renan's work is, doubtless, to be attributed in part to the instinctive eagerness with which we watch the progress of a decisive battle in a great cause. The most learned of French orientalisks, the most polished of French critics, the acknowledged master of a fluent and penetrating style, ingenious and original in combinations, he essays to reconstruct the biography of Jesus on purely naturalistic principles. His immediate success in France is doubtless to be ascribed, not only to the grace and brilliancy of his descriptions, but also to the low estate of Biblical criticism in that country. The replies to it thus far, with the single exception of an article by DePressensé, have been deplorably unavailing, strong chiefly in anathemas. The learned public was taken at unawares. All that the recent French literature can exhibit upon this subject, is a translation of Strauss by the academician Littré, an essay on Matthew by Réville, articles by Scherer and others in the Strasburg Review of Theology, and two recent volumes by d'Eichthal on the first Three Gospels; and all these are the products of a negative criticism, without any rejoinders. The apathy of the Roman Catholic clergy, except in denunciation, proves them unfit to meet such a want. Men are unprepared to meet the difficulties which Renan urges with such oracular confidence; and he is very careful not to give any hint of the replies that have been made to the positions he assumes as incontrovertible. He professes to extract fact from legend, and to have presented, as never before, a living biography of the real Jesus of Nazareth, dissipating the halo of prophecy, and the nimbus of divinity, and the fiction of the supernatural—leaving only the sacred anreole that encircles all genius. His life is described in its earlier scenes as an

idyl—in its issue as a dark tragedy, succeeded by a divine worship. It is, in fact, a romance, of which Jesus is the hero—and a romance impossible to all, except French taste and art, heightened by scenic effects, and exciting surprise at every step by its novel and fictitious associations and combinations. It is an ingenious parody, a brilliant caricature of the life of the Son of Man, as given in the gospels. Denying the supernatural element in Christ, and exalting the natural to the height of the most impassioned eulogy, it gives an impossible character—in fact a dual Jesus, with the conflicting elements and traits unreconciled. It shows the utter impossibility of constructing the life of Christ in its integrity, denying the supernatural, and leaving the natural intact; for the supernatural is not the costume of Jesus, in which he was arrayed as in the fashion of his times; but it is his life, it is Himself. Deny him this, and, like a phantom, he vanishes from the stage of history.

Before proceeding to the work itself, we add a few words respecting the author. Joseph Ernest Renan, born at Tréguier, Brittany, Feb. 27, 1823, was trained for the priesthood in the Seminary of St. Sulpice, studying three years at Issy, and two in the great Seminary at Paris. Soon estranged from the Roman Catholic church, he devoted himself chiefly to the study of the oriental languages. In 1847 he gained a Volney prize for an essay, expanded into a history, of the Semitic Languages (now in its fifth edition), following methods of German scholarship. Another essay on the study of Greek in the Middle Ages was crowned by the Institute, of which he became a member in 1856, succeeding Augustin Thierry in the Academy of Inscription. His work on the Origin of Language is largely used by Ferrar in his volume on that subject. A literary mission to Italy furnished him with the materials for a learned historical essay on Averroes. His translations of Job, and the Song of Songs, deal with these books as literary compositions. By a dissertation in the Academy, 1859, on Primitive Monotheism as peculiar to the Semitic race, he provoked a lively discussion. His contribu-

tions to literary periodicals have been collected in two volumes of Moral Essays, and studies in the History of Religion. In 1869, under an imperial commission, he explored Tyre, Sidon, Mt. Lebanon, and other localities of Syria; and here too, he sketched the outline of his life of Jesus: "I had before my eyes a *Fifth Gospel*, torn but still legible, and thenceforth, throughout the recitals of Matthew and Mark, in place of an abstract being, who one might say never existed, I saw an admirable human form, living and moving." After his return from his Phœnician researches, he was appointed Professor of Hebrew in the College of France, but his introductory lecture avowing his belief that Jesus was only a man, "a victim to his idea, and rendered divine by his death," aroused such vehement opposition, that the course was interdicted. The full plan of his projected work on the "Origin of Christianity," embraces four volumes, to the era of Constantine. This Life of Jesus is the first book.

To appreciate aright the construction and criticism of such a volume, we need to know something of the speculative principles of the author, since these determine his particular statements, and throw light on all the outlines. This is particularly necessary in the case of a writer, who is often so poetic and nebulous, just where we want definiteness. We look out for the solid earth, and find ourselves floating in a sparkling cloud. This volume presupposes all the principles that underlie and shape it, and does not prove any one of them. Sometimes there is a conscious reserve, even when the tone is most oracular, as if the priest were willing to hide the penetralia with a veil of mystery. He is, in fact, much less explicit here than in some of his previous essays. The work is essentially a criticism of religion, as well as a biography. Is the author a Christian, or a deist, or a pantheist? Sometimes he seems to imply, that he holds the same general views about God and his relation to the world that Jesus proclaimed. Is this really so?

In his famous letter on the Chair of Hebrew (p. 24), he says: "The course of humanity is the direct resultant of the

liberty which is in man, and of that fatality we call nature. There is no free being, superior to man, to whom we can attribute an appreciable part in the moral guidance, any more than in the material management of the universe." That is, there is no Providence in history. In the same letter, he writes: "We feel ourselves to be in mysterious affinity with our Father, *the abyss*." And yet he eulogizes the religion of Jesus, as "the religion of the race;" the simplest utterance of that religion is in the words: Our Father—and this is his frightful parody. In the *Revue des deux Mondes* (1860, p. 374), he avows further: "As to myself, I think there is not in the universe an intelligence superior to that of man." Of course, then, it is impossible for him to find in Jesus the manifestation of such a superior intelligence; Jesus cannot be to him anything more than man, since all that is superhuman is zero. In the light of such an avowal, too, what shall we say again of his assertion, "that Jesus had the highest consciousness of God, that has been in the bosom of humanity." Did his consciousness teach him that his Father was not superhuman? Renan's praise of Christ may be a lure to the unwary; but it can hardly confirm his oft-repeated vaunting of the delicacy and conscientiousness of modern science, as contrasted with the oriental vagueness about moral distinctions. Suppose his volume bore on its title-page either of those two phrases: "My Father the abyss," or "There is not in the universe an intelligence superior to that of man." They are not on the title-page, where they ought to be; but they are the soul of the book, its deadly poison. They are the postulates of his pantheistic philosophy. And not only are they his postulates; they are also simply assumed. He nowhere attempts to prove or vindicate them. He takes them for granted as the result of modern thought. He reasons from them, as other men do from intuitive truths. He believes in "positive science," and will admit no fact unless established; and yet he assumes that there is no personal deity, and on this assumption he writes a Fifth Gospel on the life of Jesus of Nazareth. To reckon it even among the apocryphal

Gospels is to give it too high a place, for the authors of those legends still believed in God.

This denial of a supermundane intelligence, the position, as he elsewhere phrases it, that "the infinite exists only when clothed with finite forms," that "the absolute outside of humanity is a mere abstraction," that "it becomes a reality only in humanity," is, for the most part, carefully obscured in the *Life of Jesus*. The author asks, in one passage (p. 73), whether the men who have had the highest knowledge of God, "have been deists or pantheists? Such a question," is the response, "has no sense. The physical and metaphysical proofs of the existence of God would have left them indifferent. They felt the divine in themselves." This pantheistic tendency is more distinct in his *Etudes* on Feuerbach (p. 418): "God is, and all the rest but seems to be." "God, Providence, and immortality are so many good old words, perhaps a little tiresome, which philosophy will interpret in senses more and more refined, but which it never can replace with advantage." God "is the category of the ideal," as "space and time are the categories of bodies." Concerning immortality, he says, "the soul is immortal, in that it believes in immortal things." The human race, after unnumbered ages, "may arrive at the absolute consciousness of the universe, and, in that consciousness, at the awakening of all that has lived." This is rather the verbiage of a pantheistic ambiguity, than the light and immortality brought to light in the gospel.

Of course, the supernatural and miraculous are denied. That is his *Etudes* (p. 205): "Not from any one mode of argument, but from the totality of modern science, comes this immense result, that there is no supernatural." "All law is simply the law of nature, whether physical or moral." So convinced is he of this dogma, that in the Preface to the same volume (p. 11), he coolly remarks: "The fundamental question on which religious discussion turns, the question of the fact of a revelation and of the supernatural, *I never touch upon* . . . because the discussion of such a subject is not sci-

entific, or rather, because science, in its independence, supposes it to be previously resolved." He cannot be a "controversialist or polemic;" he has "no taste or aptitude for such work." "The essence of criticism is in the negation of the supernatural." But when did science learn to assume the whole question in debate, and criticism to assert and not prove its principles? What value has such science; what authority has such criticism? Positive science allows no magisterial dictation. This lofty tone of superiority may impose upon the credulous, and be hailed with delight by the anti-supernaturalists; but it also betrays a conscious weakness, at least, an unwillingness to grapple with the high questions in debate. Such oracles, contradicting the voice of humanity, denying the essential elements of all religious faith, may make a sensation by their audacity, but can produce no rational conviction. They appeal to a baseless prejudice as really as the visionary and the fanatic.

In the Preface of his *Life of Jesus*, M. Renan returns to the topic, with the assertion, that "in the name of uniform experience we banish miracle from history." "We maintain as a principle of historical criticism, that a supernatural narrative cannot, as such, be admitted; that it always implies credulity or imposture; and that it is the duty of the historian to interpret it, and to seek out what part it contains of truth and what of error." A miracle, he claims, has never been proved; the tests of modern science have never been applied. But what would tests avail with a man, who, like Renan, denies "any intelligence superior to that of a man." He could not be convinced, even though one should rise from the dead, without abandoning this hypothesis. He might see a prodigy; but he never could recognize a miracle—a work of divine power, introducing, for a moral end, phenomena counteracting and surpassing the mere laws of nature. If God be a conscious, personal intelligence, he may thus intervene; if man's moral wants demand such a revelation, the intervention becomes probable as well as possible. If the super-human work is performed by one in whose testimony we can

confide, it becomes credible. It does not violate the law of causality; it only interrupts for a wise end the mere natural sequence of phenomena. It is nature, used by divine will and intelligence, to promote a moral end. The alleged uniformity of experience against the miraculous virtually assumes the point in debate. Natural sequences are not inviolable. A personal will violates some of them every day. An absolute will may violate all of them, and not contradict any rational truth. The uniformity of nature is not an absolute truth; it is not a primal dictum of reason. The absolute truth is that of causality; and the law of causality is not violated in a miracle. A new cause introduces new effects. And as to the miracles of the Gospels, we have, in the testimony of Christ and the apostles, a higher authority than that of any possible congress of savans, judging by the eye of sense. If Christ can be believed, the supernatural has appeared in history. Which is more credible, the affirmation of Christ, or the denial of Renan? We know this is not a scientific question; but all that Renan gives us on this point is an improved negative. And this immense assumption is not only the basis, but also the constructive idea, of his reconstruction of the Life of Jesus.

From the underlying principles, we pass to the sources of the work. Here again the author spares himself much trouble, and the reader much fatigue, by telling us that his plan forbids any long dissertations on contested points. He assumes as proved all the contradictions and inaccuracies he pleases, and never considers the counter testimony. Authorities are cited in the notes; though we are often quite at a loss to trace the connection between the text and the evidence.* Even where no miracle is involved he sometimes "feels" that the narratives are "legendary," as *e. g.*, in Christ's weeping over Jerusalem, and the account of the

* *E. g.*, Luke "exaggerates the marvellous," iv. 14; he "is totally ignorant of Hebrew," i. 31; he is "a democrat and Ebionite," as is seen in the parable of Lazarus! In another place (p. xlv.), he is sure that some of Luke's recitals are "invented."

penitent thief. No principles of criticism are stated; it is subjective like and dislike, a "gentle solicitation," as he says, of texts, till they are accommodated to his use. In what he receives and what he rejects, he is as arbitrary and fickle as a despot. Of strictly critical apparatus, as scholars understood it, there is scant use. Strauss, Réville, Nicolas, the *Revue de Théologie*, are referred to in a general way. Strauss is his master as to results, though not in theory; but Strauss is a critic, and Renan is only a literary dilettante, in comparison. Of the prolific literature of Germany on the subject, for the last thirty years, he takes no notice. Neander, Lange, Ebrard, Hase, Wieseler, Ewald, and Baur with his school, are not named. He seems unconscious that replies have been even attempted to some of his most significant conclusions.

In his *Etudes* he distinguishes between his general view of the Gospels, and the theories of some recent critics. The old rationalism, he affirms, was too dry, too negative in its results, deficient in poetic sentiment, and illogical in accepting some supernatural narratives and rejecting others. Strauss, with all his energetic destructiveness, writes too much under the influence of "theological ideas," and has not full freedom of historical criticism. His Hegelian idealism, too, is displeasing, if not unintelligible, to the French critic. But this idealism gave to Strauss a clearly defined scheme as the basis of his detailed criticism; Renan does not feel the need of this. In point of learning, intellect, and consistency, the Teutonic work is immeasurably superior to the light and airy French romance. The Gospels that have borne the brunt of the catapult, need not shrink from the flight of the arrow. Strauss's mythological process, Renan concedes, does too much violence to facts, leaves too little substance to the Gospels, and puts their origin too late—in the middle and last part of the second century. Renan believes that they were all composed in the first century, and that they contain "legends" rather than "myths;" they are *legendary biographies*, like the lives of Francis d'Assisi and other mediæval saints. "The evan-

gelical" ideal was the result of a transfiguration and not of a creation. He, of course, rejects the arbitrary position of B. Bauer, that they are intentional fabrications. But it is singular that he does not even seem to be aware of the peculiar character assigned to these documents by the school of Tübingen, which regards them as literary productions, written in the post-apostolic period, and representing great tendencies, parties and conflicts. Baur and his followers have wrought out this theory more elaborately, and with a greater degree of learning and criticism, than have been expended on any other infidel hypothesis. Yet there are no indications that Renan has any conception of such a historical and critical method. And, indeed, his whole view of Jesus and his work is radically different from that of either Strauss or Baur. Strauss resolves the supernatural into myths; Baur considers the narrations as representing ideas and living contests; both bring down the dates of the written documents at least a century later than Christ; both work out in consistency the pantheistic theory on which they proceed; and both thus try to avoid the necessity of supposing that Christ and the apostles were deceivers or self-deceived. But Renan allows the substance of the Gospels to have the character of contemporaneous authorship and testimony; and so brings himself into direct contradiction with the authority of the founder of Christianity. Representing Christ, too, as the ideal of the race, he is obliged to attempt the difficult task of reconciling his moral pre-eminence with his belief in miracles, which "always imply imposture or fraud." He adopts the pantheistic scheme of the German critics, and denies that theory of the origin and growth of Christianity, which is alone consistent with the scheme. On critical and philosophical grounds, his position is illogical and untenable.

Five sources of the Life of Jesus are enumerated—the Four Gospels, the Apocrypha of the old Testament, Philo, Josephus, and the Talmud. Philo he calls the "older brother" of Jesus, although he denies that those words of John, which most nearly resemble the Philonic speculations,

contain the authentic teachings of Christ; nor does he make any account of the great difference between the impersonal Logos of Philo and the living Word of John. The Talmud furnishes occasional illustrations; most of them, however, must have been of later origin (since Renan puts the redaction of the Talmud between A.D. 200-500); and his attempt to make out a connection between the words of Jesus and the teachings of Hillel, lacks all historic confirmation. Still more imaginative is the suggestion of his relation to Parsism. Among the Old Testament Apocryphal books he ranks the prophecies of Daniel, in defiance of the whole Jewish tradition; and these books themselves probably fall within the first two centuries of the Christian era.

The decisive documents are of course the Four Gospels. And here, whatever be Renan's inconsistencies, it is worthy of note that he finds himself compelled, by undeniable historical testimony, to assign all these palmary records to the first century, and to view them as containing substantially the words, testimony, and authority of Jesus and his immediate disciples. This is a concession of high moment; and the more valuable, as it is adverse to his special theory with its inferences. Luke is a compilation, carefully studied, written soon after the destruction of Jerusalem, (see xxi. 9, 20, 24, 28, 32, ch. xvii. 36); the same author wrote the Acts of the Apostles. Matthew and Mark have not as marked an individuality, yet they were certainly written before Luke. They grew up in this wise. Matthew (as Papias testifies) gathered the sayings of Jesus, and Mark, facts and anecdotes. "These little books were sent round, and everybody transcribed on the margin of his copy the words and parables which he elsewhere found, and which touched his feelings. The most beautiful thing in the world thus proceeded from an obscure and wholly popular elaboration." And it is with such a free and easy story that the French critic disposes of the elaborate investigation of the best critics and scholars about the origin of the Gospels. Nothing can be more simple; a child might have

thought of it. Is the highest criticism satisfied with such a childlike theory? There is no ground for it in any tradition, and it is opposed to the well-nigh unanimous verdict of scholars, believing and unbelieving, who find a plan and order running through these "booklets."

As to the fourth Gospel, Renan admits, on the whole, its authenticity—perhaps it is from the "Presbyter John"—yet alleges that the character of Jesus is retouched and reconstructed, and his discourses remodelled, as Plato reports Socrates. It is a "bizarre" Gospel, containing some precious documents and facts that could have come only from an eye-witness, and stated much more accurately than in the other Gospels, but where "according to us," "the character of Jesus is in many particulars falsified." It was written after the others, because in these John was not made prominent enough; and contains "indications which put us on our guard against the good faith of the narrator;" "the interpolations of an ardent sectary," "abstract metaphysics," &c. It betrays rivalry with Peter, "and a particular hatred to Judas." Of the discourses here reported, Renan assures us, with his self-possessed divination, that they are often "pretentions, tiresome, badly-written tirades," stuffed with "the aridities of metaphysics," "shades of abstract dogmas," "perpetual argumentations due to the phantasy of the artist." Even in the unmatched intercessory prayer of John xvii., he finds "factitious processes, and the gloss of rhetoric." In such terms does he discourse of those effulgent and gracious words, the light and comfort of the church, the wonder and study of the most elevated and spiritual minds of all times. This certainly illustrates his own competency as a critic of spiritual things; they are to him nebulous and mystical. All that is not to be measured by naturalism is banished to the shades of fiction. He assumes such insight as to be able to say, "that the real words of Jesus reveal themselves as soon as they are touched; we feel their vibrations in this chaos of unequal traditions." And so he assures us, that these mystical opinions came not from Jesus,

but from the syncretism and Gnosticism of Asia Minor, which affected the opinions of the narrator. There is an "absolute contradiction" between these discourses and those reported in the other Gospels. But yet M. Renan considers the sixth of John as mysterious as any, to be in the main a true report; and elsewhere says that Jesus had no proper sense, especially in the latter part of his life, of his own "proper individuality," and personal distinction from the Father. That is, he uses the most elevated statements of the Johannine discourses, in an exaggerated representation, while declaring that they are not authentic. He dimly feels that the full character of Jesus cannot be drawn, excepting by the aid of these sublime words. The alleged contradiction vanishes even in its own representations.

In these results as to the general nature of the Gospels, especially the fragmentary and purposeless character of Matthew and Mark, Renan is in conflict not only with the uniform tradition of the church, but also with the best established results of modern criticism, both orthodox and unbelieving. Eusebius says (*Hist. Eccl.* iii. 24), that "Matthew, having previously preached to the Hebrews, when he was about to go to others, having committed to writing his Gospel in his own native tongue, filled up by his writing what was wanting in his presence to those from whom he set out." Papias affirms that Mark was Peter's interpreter, and wrote accurately all that Peter mentioned (*Routh, Rel. Sacr.*, i. 13). Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen confirm this. Luke, says Irenæus (*Adv. Haer.*, iii. 1), was "the follower of Paul, and set down in a book what Paul used to preach." Each Gospel, further, had a particular object, which gave to it its unity. Matthew set forth to the Hebrews that Christ fulfilled the old dispensation in its types and prophecies. Mark addressed the Roman world in the name of Peter, with exact and graphic details. Luke wrote his Gospel and the Acts to exhibit in order unto all nations the life of Jesus and the early triumphs of the apostles. John filled up what remained, and recorded the

deep mysteries of the person of Christ in their most spiritual revelation. And thus, as Irenæus says, "the creator Word, who sits upon the chernubim, when manifested to men, gave us the Gospel in a fourfold form, while it is held together by one spirit." Our author does not debate the question of unity in variety. To the arguments of Ewald for John, he makes no allusion; nor yet to the thorough-going theories of Tübingen, which ascribe to each Gospel a specific tendency and distinctive character. He is a quarter of a century behind these German researches.

What now, is the historic value of these documents, and how are they to be used? * "They are not biographies in the manner of Suetonius, nor fictitious legends in the manner of Philostratus; they are *legendary biographies*. I willingly liken them to the legends of the Saints, the lives of Plotinus, Proclus, Isidore, and other works of the same kind, where historical truth, and the intention of presenting models of virtue are combined in different degrees. The inexactitude, which is one of the traits of all popular composition, is here particularly felt." How, then, are they to be used? on what critical principles? What is the method which is to organize this chaos into form? How extract the gold from the dross? To these vital questions we have vague answers. If we take what is "incontestable," we get only some slight, "general lines;" there remain but a few meagre facts. But this would be quite inadequate. Hence we must have coloring and filling up, which if not literally accurate, may yet be "more true than the nude verity," truth "raised to the height of the idea." This process will doubtless make a romance, if not a biography; a panorama of dissolving views, if not a veritable picture of real life. The sentiment and taste of the writer take the place of the results of criticised historical

* Renan makes no use of the Apocryphal Gospels, which he rightly describes as "flat and puerile amplifications." He naïvely remarks that the "Gospel according to the Hebrews," and that "according to the Egyptians," "in the state in which they come to us," "are inferior, in critical authority, to the reduction of Matthew, which we have."

evidence. Renan's ideal is transferred to Jesus. "Something of divination and conjecture must be allowed," in resuscitating these grand souls of the past. "A grand life is an organic whole, which cannot be constructed by the simple agglomeration of minute facts." The power of genius, its rapid intuitions, its organizing quality, are required. Especially is this needed, because, as he elsewhere tells us (p. 450), "In every line we see a discourse of divine beauty, fixed by reporters who did not comprehend it, and who substituted their own ideas for the truths only half grasped." The critic must manifestly be superior to the apostles, and know more perfectly the very mind and words of Jesus. To ensure the utmost impartiality, too, the historian "must have once believed in the religion, and now no longer be a believer." Scepticism fully qualifies him for the work.

Illuminated by such insight, inspired by the principles of naturalism, and aided by the resources of a prolific imagination, M. Renan will attempt what heretofore has been esteemed impossible, a reconstruction of the living person of Jesus, in its purity and radiance, in all "its colossal proportions," yet divested of the supernatural elements, with which it has been hitherto associated. Paulus, Strauss, and Baur may demolish, but he essays the higher work of building up. German criticism has left us, instead of the living Jesus, a myth, or an impostor, or an abstract idea, or historic tendencies. But the dry forms of criticism are to be clothed upon with flesh, and breathe an immortal life. And such a reconstruction, after all, must be one of the decisive tests of the possibility of the infidel hypothesis. The power of Jesus is too personal and living to admit of its being resolved into a metaphysical abstraction, and his character is so pure and sacred, that he cannot be called an impostor and a charlatan, without provoking a spontaneous indignation. Can, then, Jesus be depicted as the moral hero of humanity, the ideal man, the Son of God, and yet all his life be interpreted on the principles of naturalism, all prophecy and miracle denied, and his celestial birth and divine honors swept from the rec-

ord? Can the supernatural be reduced to the accidental, the divine to a sentiment, the miraculous to a costume—and the living personality remain unmarred in its purity and supreme in its moral and typical significance? Can the majestic person remain intact, despoiled of all the attributes that class him with the divine, and retaining all the perfections which make him the model of the highest human excellence, at once the exemplar and leader in the moral history and conflicts of our race? Will the result be history and not invention, fact and not fancy, an ethical idea, or a moral impossibility? The Church has its ideal—the Godman, living a life perfect in holiness, combining all human with all divine perfections, dying for the redemption of the race, rising from the dead, ascending to the right hand of the Majesty on high, and there wielding his regal sceptre—the fulness of Him that filleth all in all. And when a naturalistic criticism can substitute for this matchless person, another radiant though earthly form, equally consistent with facts, and equally harmonious in itself, then its highest work will have been achieved; and then, and not till then, may it begin to vaunt that supernaturalism has been expelled from the annals of the race. And this is the task which Renan undertakes to accomplish.

The very first line of the biography proper is significant. “Jesus was born in Nazareth, a little city of Galilee.” Matthew and Luke tell us that he was born in Bethlehem (Matt. ii. 1; Luke ii. 4, 15). Luke iv. 16, says, that he was “brought up” in Nazareth; but this, says Renan, is “a legend,” got up to support his Messiahship. Starting on such a solid basis, the narrative proceeds without saying a word of the annunciation, the miraculous conception, or the flight to Egypt. The “first impressions” of the young child are depicted in the manner of a skilful colorist, and with a minuteness surpassing that of the apocryphal gospels—offering a striking contrast with the silence of the “sources.” What the Gospels state is here omitted, what they omit is here described. It is a supplement to the canon. Jesus was brought up in comfortable

circumstances; yet there was a want of taste about the house; the furniture was scant, consisting chiefly of a mat, some bolsters, a few earthen vessels, and a painted chest—just as we find them now in Nazareth. The family was quite large. Jesus had several brothers and sisters, though even M. Renan does not know what became of them. Nazareth was a delicious sojourn; its environs are charming; the people are amiable, and the women noted for their beauty, of the Syrian type, marked “by a grace full of languor.” The whole horizon is noble, and the perspective radiant. Reared in this enchanted circle, the cradle of the kingdom of God—where Christendom ought to erect a great cathedral—Jesus felt the full influence of those grand and smiling scenes. He attended the common schools, but not the higher instruction of the scribes, learning to read and write, though it is doubtful whether he knew the original Hebrew, or the Greek. His principles of interpretation were those of the Targums. Yet he was by no means ignorant—though in his times the uneducated had the best chance of being original. “His mind preserved that perfect freshness, which is always enfeebled by a varied culture.” The Old Testament Scriptures made a vivid impression on him, especially Isaiah and Daniel, and perhaps the Book of Enoch. Of the state of the world, even the neighboring provinces, he knew nothing; and so he might more easily believe in the visionary Messianic predictions. He thought of courts as places where people “wore fine garments.” He believed in the supernatural—though Lucretius had said at Rome a century before that there was nothing in it; he had evidently never read Lucretius. He even believed in devils, and ascribed nervous diseases to demons. He also always held, though science denies its possibility, that he had intimate relations with deity—“beautiful errors—the principle of his force.” He lived in a world of his own (his family do not seem to have had much regard for him), preoccupied with an idea, to which everything else must be sacrificed. It was an heroic epoch. The Jews, under foreign sway, were fermenting with the hopes

and visions of a Messianic kingdom. Jesus drank in the inspiration, untroubled by our modern egotism or scientific doubts. He had no dogmas, but only aspirations. "Those mountains, that sea, that azure sky, and the broad plains . . . were to him the certain symbol, the transparent shadow of an invisible world, of the new heavens." Galilee is the "true court of the Song of Songs, of the melodies of the beloved." "The fairest tapestry of flowers; the most graceful of animals; mountains unsurpassed in harmony of outline; fresh waters, and fruits; the graceful shade of the vine and the fig-tree; excellent viands and delicious wines—all are here." "Let the austere Baptist preach Repentance; why should the companions of the Bridegroom fast; joy will make a part of the kingdom of God." And so "the nascent history of Christianity is a kind of delicious pastoral; a Messiah at the marriage festival, the courtesan and the good Zaccheus called to the feasts; the founders of the kingdom of heaven a procession of paranymphs." Does the kingdom of heaven, then, border on the realm of Venus and Bacchus?

These descriptions of romantic scenes give an air of sensuous reality such as the novelist covets. The impression of the locality is heightened; but the moral aspects of the biography are lowered. As in the paintings of Claude, the human is sacrificed to the picturesque. The central figures are seen in a false light. Such sentimentalism about the picturesque is a modern fancy; it is unknown to Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans. Nature had no such shaping power over the visions of the Son of Man; rather, on the contrary, did he use nature for moral and spiritual ends, to illustrate truths and to show forth his power. Hence he derived images of celestial things, types of invisible realities. His relation to nature was that of its lord, and not of its pupil. Such idyls are inconsistent with the real spirit of the Gospels.

This sentimentalism is presented under yet other aspects, wrought out with studied art, and suggesting by evanescent hints more than meets the ear. "An extremely delicate sentiment for woman did not keep Jesus from exclusive

devotion to his idea. He treated them like sisters. . . . Only it is probable that they loved him rather than his work; he was, without doubt, more loved than loving. Thus, as frequently happens in very elevated natures, his tenderness of heart was transformed into an infinite sweetness, a vague poesy, a universal charm." "His voice had an extraordinary gentleness." "An infinite charm exhaled from his person. His lovely character, and, doubtless, one of those ravishing figures, which sometimes appear in the Jewish race, made around him a circle of fascination from which no one could escape." He attracted prodigals and lost women; "these tender souls, finding in their conversion to the sect a means of *facile rehabilitation*, attracted themselves to him with passion" (p. 187). "Women, in fact, received him with *empressement*. He had with them those reserved ways, which make a very sweet union of ideas possible between the two sexes" (p. 151). "By his pure and mild beauty he calmed the troubled organization of Mary of Magdala." Even the description of the doleful night of Gethsemane is sullied by the suggestion, whether Jesus may not then have recalled the memory "of the young maidens who might have consented to love him? Did he curse his bitter destiny which forbade him the joys conceded to all others?" This is not criticism, it is not history, it is the sheer fiction of a sensuous fancy, outraging the undeflowered sanctity of the only celestial virtue this world has known. It is not Jesus, but his biographer, who is degraded by these wanton fancies.

Similar levity is elsewhere found in this romance. Our Lord is called "the charming doctor." Some of the most affecting incidents, containing the deepest spiritual truths, are interpreted in the sense of mere naturalism. When Jesus says to the Pharisees, 'Publicans and harlots come into the kingdom of God before you,' this is commented on as a cutting satire on them "for not following the good example of the *filles de joie*." When he says to the sons of Zebedee, 'I am not come to destroy souls, but to save;' this is "a fine irony." He speaks to the woman taken in adultery, "with the fine raillery

of a man of the world." Spiritual conflicts, repentance and faith pass for nothing. Like a man of the world, the author interprets with the eye of sense, explaining the spiritual by the natural. There are constant repetitions about Christ's "amiable pleasantries," "secret humor," "fine railleries," "exquisite mockeries and malign provocations;" balanced by allusions to his "insipid argumentation" (in respect to the resurrection, Matt. xxii. 23); "the feebleness of his arguments, as judged by the Aristotelian logic;" and his "finesse in extricating himself from embarrassing questions." His denunciations of the Pharisees are described as "that Nessus tunic of ridicule," "which he wove with divine artifice," "chefs-d'œuvre of high raillery," "traits worthy of the Son of God; only a god knows how to kill after this sort." Jesus, it seems, was satirical, but not logical.

Upon the whole, in this earlier period of his ministry, Jesus is described as a simple, pure enthusiast, absorbed in ideal visions. These were "chaste days, in which the voice of his Father resounded in his bosom with the clearest tones. Then, for some months, perhaps a year, God truly dwelt upon the earth." He proclaimed a pure religion, such as we find in the sermon on the Mount. "True Christianity was then founded, and never more perfect than at this moment. Jesus added to it afterwards nothing enduring. What do I say? In one sense he compromised it; for every idea to succeed has need of sacrifice; we never come immaculate out of the strife of life." "Without miracles could he have converted the world?" "Had he died at this stage of his career there would not have been in his life the page which now wounds us; greater in the eyes of God, he would have been unknown to man, lost in the crowd of great unknown souls, the best of all; the truth would not have been spread abroad, nor the world benefited by the immense moral superiority with which his father had endowed him." Hillel taught as pure a morality as Jesus; but Hillel did not found Christianity. To found a religion, there must be miracles and a Messiah. As this is impossible, the claim thereto involves imposture or

delusion. Therefore the Son of God must fall from his ideal excellence, if he is to be the head of a new religion. The pure moralist is to be transformed into an exorcist, a thaumaturge, a false Messiah. The pastoral ends, the tragedy begins.

This whole conception of an abrupt change in the part that Christ was enacting is a mere imagination of the artist, dishonoring Jesus, and false to history. It is the product of fancy steeped in the sharp contrasts of the drama. It is a desperate attempt to construct the life of a supernatural being on naturalistic principles. This necessarily involves the sacrifice of Christ's purity. Yet that sacrifice must not be so entire as to make of the hero a charlatan and an impostor. He must then be depicted as the victim of necessity, as drawn into the plot against his will. Of this there are no indications or hints in history itself. Hence the facts must be set in new lights, and testimony defied. Texts, as the author says, must be "gently solicited," until they suit his theories, and reproduce his *ensemble*. But is not this what Renan is fond of calling *une critique mesquine*? The unity of Christ's life is destroyed. We have two persons and not one; a Jesus of ideal purity, and a Jesus sullied by the stains of earth; the one moral and upright, the other a man of artifices and collusions; the one lost in divine reveries, the other inveigled in the strife and deceptions of life; the one joyous and simple, the other severe and violent; the one an ideal with no historic power, the other the man who moved the world by fictitious miracles and visionary claims to an unreal Messiahship. And yet he would have us believe that such a dual Jesus is the "greatest of men," whose "religion contains the secret of the future!"

M. Renan dates the beginning of this phase of Christ's career from the time of his intercourse with John Baptist. He not only deliberately inverts the whole relation between them, as given by the Evangelists, but he says that their statements are "an after invention" (p. 202). This is certainly an odd sort of criticism, attributing to the New Testa-

ment writers such alterations as he himself makes, as if they, and not he, were writing to prove a theory. He represents Jesus as following the Baptist's example, learning from him how to guide a popular movement. There is a kind of rivalry between them; Christ "imitates" John, and "recognizes him as his superior." John's influence was more "hurtful than useful." The ideas of Jesus about the kingdom of God were changed; it is no longer a mere ideal, but it is to be set at work. No more a "delicious moralist," he became "a transcendent revolutionist;" or rather he was both an anarchist and an idealist. He is the Son of Man foretold by Daniel, and is to rescue the world from the dominion of Satan. He gave himself up to fantastic, apocalyptic dreams, and allowed himself to be called Messiah, though at first somewhat "embarrassed" by it. Henceforth "he marched on, possessed by an idea more and more imperious and exclusive, with a kind of fatal impassibility, in the way traced by his astonishing genius and the circumstances of the times." By the lake of Tiberias, in Bethsaida and Capernaum, he found simple fishermen and villagers, who readily credited his words. By "innocent artifices" he induced, for example, Nathaniel, Peter, and the Samaritan woman, to believe that he knew the secrets of their lives. The people thought that he talked on the mountains with God, and that angels ministered to him. They gathered around him, and he opened his mouth in parables. They were poor; and he told them that rich people went to hell, and that the reign of the poor was at hand. The kingdom of God is for them and for children, "for heretics and schismatics, publicans and sinners. Happy they who share in this divine illusion!" He disdained everything but the religion of the heart; when he told the Samaritan woman, that "the Father was to be worshipped in spirit and in truth," "he was truly the son of God," "speaking for the first time in the world the words on which will rest the edifice of eternal religion." *

* In this narrative Renan rejects a verse out of the middle of it, John v. 21, because Christ there says, "religion is of the Jews" (p. 234).

The first preaching of Jesus at Jerusalem (described in ch. xiii., which gives a vivid picture of the state of parties in that city), resulted in a failure, and he, by reaction, became "a revolutionist of the first degree." The law must be abolished, and he is to do the work. The kingdom of God is to come, but with violence. He may die in the attempt, but will return in glory with the angels. He allowed himself to be surrounded with a halo of legends; fictitious genealogies made him to be the Son of David. A cycle of fables, "the fruit of a grand, spontaneous conspiracy," invested him with transcendent attributes. Though he did not declare himself to be a literal "incarnation of God," yet "he did not have a very clear notion of his own personality. He is his father; his Father is he." He assumed royal prerogatives—to forgive sins, to be the judge of the world. "There was to him no supernaturalism, for there was no nature. Intoxicated with the infinite love, he forgot the heavy chain which holds the spirit captive, and leaped with a bound the abyss, for most men impassable, which the mediocrity of the human faculties traces between man and God" (pp. 246-7). If Renan is here describing a mere man, from the naturalistic point of view, is he not describing an enthusiast, a fanatic? All his rhetoric cannot gloss the fatal insinuation, that Christ was dazed and giddy. And the whole view is unreal and false. No human being was ever more conscious of a distinct moral personality than Jesus of Nazareth. And the mode in which Renan still tries to rescue his character from obloquy, in the face of these fatal pretensions, is equally unworthy. He says that in such matters we must not look for "logic and sequence." Jesus needed to be accredited; his disciples were enthusiastic, and clamorous for signs. "For us," adds the writer, "profoundly serious races, conviction means sincerity with oneself. But such sincerity has not much meaning among the orientals, little accustomed to the refinements of the critical spirit. Good faith and imposture are words, which, to our rigid conscience, are as opposed as logical contradictories." "History is impossible, if we do not admit

that there are different degrees of sincerity." "All great things are done by the people; the people can be led only by lending ourselves to their ideas." "He who takes humanity with its illusions, and seeks to act on it and with it, should not be blamed." "We shall have a right to be severe on such men, when we have accomplished as much with our scruples, as they with their lies." In another passage (p. 283) he suggests, that these apocalyptic fancies made Jesus "strong against death, and sustained him in a struggle, to which without this he would, perhaps, have been unequal." In passing judgment on such a representation, there is no need of circumlocution or euphemisms. It is utterly disgraceful and disingenuous. It assails the very honesty and credibility of Jesus. It makes success the standard. It is the essence of Jesuitism. The apology is as superficial as it is ignominious. The worst ethics of the French stage cannot surpass it. Nobody but a Frenchman could, after this, still idolize his hero as the perfection of humanity. And in the midst of such profligate representations, to interject phrases about "*our* profound seriousness," "rigid conscience," and "absolute sincerity," in contrast with the delusions and falsity attributed to Jesus, is to carry to its height a base invention, from which every right-minded man will instinctively recoil, and which every true believer in Christ will stamp as blasphemy. Better for Jesus, as a mere man—a thousandfold better, to have died unknown, than to have lent himself to impostures which he must have known to be false, to a conspiracy founded on a lie or a hallucination.

But this is not all, nor the worst. The part of the Messiah made it necessary that Jesus should also give himself forth as "an exorcist and a thaumaturge." Charlatanism must complete the work begun in hallucination. Renan freely confesses that Christ and his apostles believed in both prophecy and miracle, as the only evidence of a supernatural commission. The prophecies he passes over lightly, with his usual facile criticism, as casual and verbal, instances of "artifices of style rather than serious argumentation." Miracles

were generally expected by both Jews and Gentiles. Faith and prayer were thought to have power over nature. Jesus shared in these views; "in the access of his heroic will, he thought himself all-powerful." But we must not judge him "too severely," by our "modern" rules and higher science. He and his disciples were in a state of "poetic ignorance," at least "as complete as that of St. Clara and the *tres socii*." Yet, the number of alleged miracles may have been exaggerated. "Scientific medicine" had not found out, "that the contact of an exquisite person is often worth all the resources of pharmacy." Exorcism was frequently practised; and the possessed were "nervous people." Some things, too, seem to M. Renan, in defiance of the Scriptural testimony, to indicate that Jesus "became a thaumaturge only late and against his will;" "the *rôle* at times is disagreeable to him." In one passage (p. 264), he speaks of the "*bizarrierie*" of Jesus in wishing to keep his miracles secret; in another (p. 322), of his not doing them in public, because he "reserved for simple souls the means good only for them." But yet he grants, that "acts which would now be considered as signs of illusion or madness had a large place in the life of Jesus. Must we then," he asks, "sacrifice to this ungrateful side the sublime side of such a life?" But how can we help it? Who that is "profoundly serious" and "absolutely conscientious," can echo the words of our author, "the exorcist and the thaumaturge are fallen, but the religious reformer will live forever"—when the reformer and thaumaturge are one and the same? It may require faith to believe in the Jesus of the Gospels, but it certainly requires credulity to believe in the Jesus of Renan. In no particular case does he attempt a detailed explanation, excepting in that of the raising of Lazarus (pp. 359, 360). Jesus had been ill received at Jerusalem, his cause seemed wavering; some desired manifestation was needed: his followers demanded a striking miracle. "He was in this impure city, *no longer himself*. His conscience, by the fault of others, and not by his own, had lost something of its primitive limpidity. Despairing, pushed to the wall,

he no longer belonged to himself. His mission imposed it on him, and he obeyed the torrent." The family at Bethany adored him, would do anything for him: Lazarus may have had himself entombed (and these tombs contained quite comfortable niches); Jesus appeared, called Lazarus—and "he came forth." "Faith knows no other law than interest in what it believes true." Lazarus and his sisters projected this pious fraud: Jesus consented: "Besides, death was in a few days to restore to him his divine liberty, and tear him away from the fatal necessities of a part, which every day became more exacting, more difficult to be sustained." This requires no comment. The Son of Man is playing the part of an impostor.

We need not follow out minutely the close of this awful tragedy of a sublime genius and hero, brought under the full power of these terrible delusions, and making his descent to a pagan hades, to rise again only in the belief of a credulous church. No literary genius, no graphic pencil, can surpass the grand simplicity of the gospels, or do more than borrow from their unmatched narratives. Jesus presses onward to his fate, surrounded by the apocalyptic visions, of what Renan calls "the fantastic kingdom of God." He loses gradually "all sense of individuality;" his self-abnegation becomes mystical and fatal. In the Last Supper, the ideal became so prominent and absorbing, "that the body counted for nothing; his disciples were to eat his flesh and drink his blood." Believing in the approaching end of the world, he taught the most complete asceticism; "the cessation of generation was a sign of the kingdom of God." "Despising the same limits of human nature, he demanded of his disciples that they should love only him, live only for him." A "fire was devouring the roots of his life." He was "no longer the fine and joyous moralist of other days, but a sombre giant, whom a grandiose presentiment threw more and more out of the pale of humanity" (308). Sometimes, says our author, we are tempted to believe that he deliberately formed the purpose of letting himself be killed, as a means of forwarding his kingdom; his

death was to be a sacrifice to save the world. "His reason at times seemed troubled; the grand vision of the kingdom of God, flaming before his eyes, made him giddy." "Pressing and imperative, he allowed no opposition." "His native gentleness seemed to have abandoned him; he became rude and bizarre." "It was time for death to come and loose the knot of a situation of the extremest tension, deliver him from the impossibilities of a path which had no outlet, and, by rescuing him from a too prolonged trial, introduce him, henceforth sinless, into a heavenly peace."

He must justify the proverb, that a prophet is not to die out of Jerusalem, and so he goes again to the city of David, provoking hostility by his terrible denunciations of the rulers. Then comes the desperate attempt to revive his power by the miracle at the tomb of Lazarus. In the anguish of Gethsemane "perhaps he doubted about his work. Terror and hesitation laid hold of him, and threw him into a faintness of spirit worse than death itself;" but soon his "divine nature reasserted its supremacy." He was betrayed by Judas, whose conduct showed more "*maladresse* than perversity"—the defamer of Jesus may well be the apologist of Judas. The scenes of the trial and judgment are skilfully grouped and narrated. Before Pilate, there is "the grand equivocal" about his being a king. The final cry, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' may mean, "that he repented of suffering for so vile a race." But on the cross "he commenced his divine life." "Thy work is finished; thy divinity is founded;" "thou art so far the corner-stone of humanity, that to tear thy name from the world shall be to shake it from its foundations. Between thee and God men will not distinguish." Did he rise again from the dead? Renan defers the full consideration of this question, and only says, that "the powerful imagination of Mary of Magdala here played a chief part. Divine power of love! sacred moments when the hallucination of a visionary gives to the world a resuscitated God!" But it is not by sentiment, and exclamation points, and vague rhetoric, that such a question can be answered.

Is the Christian church founded on the dreams of a visionary?

M. Renan attempts in conclusion a statement of the element of the pure religion founded by Jesus, rejecting *ad libitum* all that is mysterious and supernatural. In none of its doctrines as here described, is it above the measure of natural religion; and even the doctrine of immortality is fatally obscured. In the teachings he praises there is little that is specific, those that he rejects have given life to Christianity. What he insists on is, the right of all to worship God, involving in germ the separation of church and state; the final victory of the poor and oppressed; "the empire of souls." This religion has no dogmas, but is full of sentiment. He accepts of Christ's teachings only certain abstract and vague phrases, and rejects the concrete truth. By such a process, any one might detect an "eternal beauty" in the wildest dream of the veriest fanatic. A canon for such interpretation is suggested in one passage: "A sort of majestic divination seems to have kept Jesus in a sublime vagueness, embracing at once different orders of truth." Thus the definite may easily be resolved into the indefinite. The actual is sublimated into the ideal, and this ideal is to be worshipped. It is contained in a very few vague words: "absolute purity," "liberty," "royalty of spirit," "perfect idealism;" this is "the kingdom of the ideal God"—even so, of the *ideal* God. The foundation of such a kingdom was the peculiar work of Jesus. Only a man "of colossal proportions" could have given it impulse and authority. Yet, "the honest and sincere Marcus Aurelius, the humble and mild Spinoza, not having believed in miracles, were exempt from some of the errors which Jesus shared." Our modern "delicacy" and "absolute sincerity, have given us a new ideal of morality." But still Jesus is "an inexhaustible principle of moral renovation." We may call him "divine, in the sense that he caused the race to take the greatest step towards the divine." "In him is condensed all that is good and elevated in our nature. He was not impeccable; he conquered the same passions which we

combat; no angel of God comforted him, excepting his good conscience; no Satan tempted him, excepting that which each one bears in his heart." "There never was a man, excepting perhaps Sakhya-Mûni, who to such a degree cast under foot family, the joys of the world, all temporal care." Whatever else may happen, "Jesus will not be surpassed. His worship will forever be rejuvenated; his legend will call forth tears without end; his sufferings will melt the best of hearts; all the ages will proclaim, that among the sons of men, no one has been born greater than Jesus."

In such eulogy ends this romantic Gospel. Such praise throughout the work, is the wonted and artistic refrain of the ingenious master of style, who knows the full power of contrasts in heightening the effect, and whose most subtle and envenomed suggestions, qualifying the purity of Jesus, are always followed by a lofty pæan, proclaiming a pagan worship of an earthly hero, all whose supernatural claims are rejected, and whose character is sullied by the worshipper himself.

Such a romance, constructed with a view to striking contrasts, will have its run with those who prefer the æsthetic to the ethical, and who are sentimental in their tastes and naturalistic in their philosophy. It is eagerly caught up in France and Italy, where there is no Biblical criticism, and where the merely literary public are easily seduced by graces of style and exquisite descriptions, and are not at all averse to furtive innuendoes. Beyond the Rhine, German scholars unite in the opinion, that it is superficial in its criticism and its philosophy. Frenchmen, for the most part, know only the alternative of the Roman Catholic dogma or infidelity. But Protestantism has developed both philosophical insight and a higher critical spirit. It appeals to conscience and the religious sense. No Protestant, in Germany, England or America, can retain faith in such a contradictory hero as Renan depicts. Only pantheism and sentimentalism combined can imagine or venerate such an ideal.

The value of the work as a critical reconstruction of the

life of Jesus is nullified by its enormous and undebated postulate of the impossibility of the supernatural. Here it is more dogmatic than any dogmatics of the schools, assuming that the entire faith of the race has been an illusion. It is, to use a German phrase, a "tendency-book." As really as the Clementina were written in the interest of Peter, is this work composed in the interest of pure naturalism. And even in respect to the details, there is no such criticism as is found in Strauss and Baur. No new difficulties are urged; and all the old discrepancies are taken for granted. It pretends to be impartial, and it ignores all that has been said for the historic credibility of the Gospels; it claims to be uncontroversial, and means by this, that the defenders of Christianity are no longer worthy of being heard. The author is entirely free and easy in handling his sources, taking what suits him, rejecting what he does not fancy, showing much sleight of hand in the shuffling of texts, and ending all debate by an appeal to his power of divination. In general, he pays but slight heed to the chronology of the events, and the difficult questions here involved, not even in the case of the last week of our Lord's life. He assumes, without authority, that Jesus had a band of disciples before he was baptized of John; that he had sisters married at Nazareth; that Peter had children, and the like. He implies that, during the life of Jesus, there was community of goods among the disciples. He knows that John was not at the cross, though John says he was (p. 422); he accepts (p. 191) a spurious addition of Marcion to Luke, because it gives him a chance to sneer about Christ's leading women and children astray from their families. It is, also, a literary and not a philosophical work. Were the writer more learned and more scientific he could not be so oracular. His general principles are shadowy and intangible. Words and phrases take the place of definite conceptions. The descriptions are beguiling, but the narrative lacks moral depth. Even in a heathen point of view, Renan is an Epicurean dashed with Cynicism rather than a Stoic. His love of satire and irony, refined sarcasms, finesse and equivocate,

and his dexterous allusions to forbidden thoughts, stimulate the fancy at the expense of candor and truth. The book cannot be read without the risk of marring the moral sense.

Another fatal defect impairs and clogs the portraiture. For M. Renan not only denies the supernatural, but he is blind to the spirituality of Christ's character and work. His idealism is cloudland and dreamland, as far removed from the spirituality of the Gospels as is materialism itself; in fact, his idealism does not rise even to the height of the Greek insight. Plato had a loftier vision of the world of ideas, and Socrates a stricter moral consciousness. Christian spirituality is neither an airy abstraction, nor modern "table-turning spiritism;" it is neither Docetic nor Ebionitic. It is essentially ethical. Vague sentimentalism about a merely ideal world is pantheistic, and annuls moral distinctions. That Christ came to save a lost world, that sin is a fact and redemption needed, and that the life of Jesus is to be interpreted in this light, seems never to have dawned on Renan's imagination. As well might a life of Cromwell be written without saying a word of Puritanism, or of Napoleon without allusion to the old régime and the new imperial democracy. According to our biographer, the relation which Jesus bears to history is merely that of a moral hero, living and dying to testify that men have a right to worship an ideal God just as they please. He is not brought into relation with the great moral problems of human life and human destiny. The whole wealth of thought and experience contained in the Incarnation and the Trinity,* the anthropology and soteriology of the Christian system, is to our author a sealed book. Paul would say to him "that the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." He is not above the Greek commingling of

* "The representations of the *Inconorata*, or Mary, placed between the Father and the Son, receiving the crown from the hands of the first, and the homage of the second, are the true Trinity of Christian piety." Renan's *Etudes*, p. 411. Note.

sense and spirit, the classical ideal of beauty of form, which Christianity came to supersede. His idea of immortality is that of an indefinite progress of the race here on earth. His consolations, as in the dedication of the volume to "the pure soul of his sister Henriette," are not those of the Christian faith, but of heathen tenderness and vagueness. The highest literary and æsthetic culture may only blind the mind to the light that comes from an incarnate and redeeming deity. Alas! for the generation that can receive such a book as its Gospel. It is abandoned to naturalism and pantheism, and nothing can save it but a moral revolution.

Considered as an argument to uproot faith in the supernatural, the work, as already intimated, is embarrassed by its concessions about the general authenticity of the Gospels and the time of their composition. This is conceded by the *Westminster Review*. Renan must either admit more, or deny more, about the credibility of Jesus and the apostles. Strass, Baur, and the German negative critics in general are too acute to expose themselves to such damaging concessions. For Renan is forced to the point blank denial of the testimony of Jesus, and of Peter, Paul, and John. If he denies their testimony—there remains only the alternative, that Jesus was a deceiver or self-deceived. And in either case, how can he be the ideal hero of the human race? The book leaves us the choice between the testimony of Jesus, and the dogmatism of M. Renan.

To other consequences logically involved in his general views, we can advert only in brief terms. One of these is, that the Christian church, as it has historically existed, was founded, not in what is real and permanent, but in what is unreal and illusive, in the life and words of Jesus. It was not the ideal moral hero, as here depicted, who gave the impulse to history, but Jesus, the Messiah, the Son of God, crucified for our sins and raised again for our justification. It was not Jesus, the sentimental moralist, and the "transcendental idealist," who conquered the old Greek and Roman world and became the corner-stone of modern history, but the

Christ, who is the head and fulness of what our author calls "a fantastic kingdom of God." The "legendary" has made history. The church has been adoring a hallucination. Fiction has ruled mankind, and fact has had no power for good. The central history of the race has been a mockery and a delusion. Was there ever a more terrible satire upon human nature and human history! It is the theory of despair. And yet this is the inevitable result of that naturalism, which is carelessly accepted by many minds who will not see its desolating consequences.

But, again, according to the philosophy of this work, it appears that eighteen hundred years ago, ideal excellence lived for a time here on earth, divine virtue was embodied in human form. Yet it was ineffectual for good, and succumbed to the harsh necessity, which forced it into deception and imposture, that it might obtain power. And ever since, for eighteen centuries, figments and fables have ruled the race. Now, man is recovering this lost ideal, and it is prophesied that it will yet rule the nations. But who can tell? May not the race be condemned to chase phantoms age after age? What rational hope have we in the past for any law of progress in the future? Especially when, with M. Renan, in defiance of the whole law of development, we put the unsurpassed ideal so far back in historic time. His theory is reactionary in the extreme, and against all the laws of naturalism. For, if we grow from nature up to spirit, the garden of Paradise must be in the future and not in the past, and the ideal of the race must be realized, not in what has been, but in what is yet to be. Neither in Sakhya-Mûni * nor in Jesus ought we to find the ideal and the real blended, nor the prolific fulness of genius embodied and exhausted. M. Renan must, if consistent, embrace a profounder faith or a subtler and more logical infidelity. The Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer will not satisfy the demands of the positive philosophy or the theory of naturalistic development.

* "The legend of Buddha Sakhya-Mûni is the one which most resembles that of Christ in the mode of its formation." Renan's *Etudes*, p. 175.

Yet, again, according to our author's assumptions and implications, the pure morality and simple religion of Jesus were not adopted by the church in its creeds, and did not give to it its life and power. Another theology, centering in the metaphysical doctrines of the Incarnation, the Trinity, Redemption, Regeneration, and the Judgment, took its place, shaped Christian thought and life, and conquered the earth. Whence came this other system? Not from Jesus; but from his apostles, especially from John and Paul, and their patristic interpreters. These, then, are the real authors of the Christian system. Why, then, deny them their proper honor? Why not say at once, that in actual influence and power, there have been greater names in history than that of Jesus of Nazareth?

Apart from these logical difficulties, inseparable from its general theory, this life of Jesus, judged as a work of art, by a merely poetic or æsthetic standard, has signal defects in its idea and execution. There is no definite central idea by which the parts are vitalized and shaped; it lacks the *vis formativa*, the germinant energy of a high ideal, and unity of type and life. Strauss reconstructs the life of Jesus by an abstract idea; but he is faithful to it. Renan is inspired by a vague notion of the fancy. His ideal man is of a low and indefinite type. It is an unreal ideal. It requires no great powers either of criticism or of imagination—with the Gospels open before us—to construct such a naturalistic romance. Imagine a pure youth lost in revery, degrade all the higher attributes which the "sources" ascribe to him, stamp as legendary whatever is beyond vulgar experience, and then let him sacrifice his youthful purity and simplicity to gain credence and power, and die a victim to his own infatuated claims—and you have Renan's moral hero. Neither a great drama nor an epic could be constructed on such a scheme. The hero is constantly declining in his power over the reason and conscience. The aim, in high tragedy, must be to represent the hero as retaining his virtue in the midst of all the contradictions and assaults of a gainsaying world. He should

be greatest in virtue when he comes to act upon men. Death should be brought upon him, not by his own hallucinations and collusions with imposture, but by his inflexible righteousness, struggling against sin, and superior to fate. This is the ideal in action, and no other ideal can claim the moral homage of the race.

The life and character of Jesus, as here portrayed, are also full of such violent improbabilities, as make it impossible to retain unity of idea and effect. These contradictions are forced upon the author by the exigencies of his naturalistic theory, and they show that that theory cannot be carried out. The Christian church has always attributed to the Godman the greatest variety of contrasted traits, and in these found one secret of his greatness; but these contrasts have not involved moral contradictions, they are all reconciled in the unity of our Lord's person, and in his work. But such a being as Renan depicts could never have existed; no sane imagination can grasp the conception in concord and unity. It is two men in one, two lives under one mask. For the hero whom he delineates, on the one hand, has "his throne in the conscience," and "can never be replaced by a superior ideal," while, on the other hand, he had not that "sincerity with oneself," which is a characteristic of our modern "seriousness," and "good faith and imposture" "were not to him the absolute contradictions which they are to us;" he is "the universal ideal," yet the "mild Spinoza was exempt from some of the errors which Jesus shared;" his "dominant quality was an infinite delicacy," and "his reign shall have no end," but the times in which we live are characterized by "a delicacy of morals and an absolute sincerity," "such as the orient never knew;" "all ages shall proclaim him the greatest of mankind," yet "our principles of positive science are wounded by the dreams" which his programme contained; he believed himself to have the power of working miracles, while miracles "always imply credulity or imposture;" "in him is condensed all that is good and elevated in our nature," although he "despised the sane limits of human na-

ture," and at times seemed "out of the pale of humanity," showing "signs of illusion or madness;" "the whole of history is incomprehensible without him," "he made religion take a step in advance to which no other can be compared," and yet "his reason was at times troubled," and he was made "giddy" by apocalyptic fancies; he "lived in the bosom of the Father by constant communications," while there is no Father outside of the world (excepting "the infinite abyss") with whom any one can have communion; "his worship shall be perpetually rejuvenated," yet that worship thus far has centred in the "legends" and the "impostures" by which his purity is marred; "we all owe to him that which is best in us," and yet are told that at "all times he yielded much to opinion, and adopted many things with which he did not agree, because they were popular;" at the double point of view of meditation and action, "he is without equal, his glory will remain entire and be ever renewed," but when he came to act and was opposed, he "was no longer himself," and in his last hours "terror and hesitation" overcame him; though he was the wisest and best of men, he "never had a clear notion of his own personality;" "his beauty is eternal," yet "that which made the grandeur of Jesus in the eyes of his contemporaries is to us a stain upon his ideal, a trait by which that ideal loses its universality," and that stain is found in his own pretensions to thaumaturgy and the Messiahship; and, to sum up all, in the author's own contrast, "the thaumaturge and the prophet shall die, the man and the sage remain. . . . Here is the living God, here is he whom we must adore"—and this pretended "prophet" is the same being as this "sage," and this "thaumaturge" is also "the living God, whom we adore." Similar contradictions are found in his destiny to those in his character. He was to restore to the world its lost moral ideal, and his success was achieved only by marring the ideal itself; he was as unparalleled in his incredible hallucinations, as in his virtue, and without his hallucinations his virtue could have had no abiding influence; he died as the moral hero of the race, and

yet that death was brought upon him, not by his purity but by his unreal pretensions; the cup he drank in Gethsemane was the bitterness of disappointed hope; the agony of the cross was his regret, because "he was suffering for so vile a race;" and yet by means of that death he was made "stainless and divine"—henceforth "to be worshipped by all ages as the greatest of mankind." Can language utter sharper moral contradictions, or imagination depict a more impossible figment?

But, still, from these gross inconsistencies one conclusion of moment leaps to the front, and that is, the impossibility of reconstructing the life of Jesus on the basis of naturalism, leaving his moral personality untarnished. This is the moral of Renan's book; and, if offences must needs come, it is well that so much talent and skill should be put forth to make this grand conclusion plain. To deny the supernatural is easy, to disprove it is difficult. Here is the battle-ground of the times. The supernatural has been chiefly argued in relation to miracles; but there is a higher form of it, and a weightier question, that relating to the person of our Lord as its embodiment and incarnation. This book, if it proves anything, proves that naturalism cannot reconstruct, without falsifying, the life of Jesus. By no possible art can the "legendary" be sundered from the historical in the gospels, and the history still command our homage. And though Renan slurs over inquiry, he cannot evade the remorseless logic, which gives the dilemma—supernaturalism or imposture. Nor can he himself, with all his positivism, escape the vestigia of supernaturalism, imprinted upon the human consciousness by a divine hand, and revealed in universal longings for an ideal world, even when all living faith seems well nigh extinct. The "infinite abyss" over which he lingers in awe, his aspirations for immortality with all their vagueness, the desperation with which he still clings to Jesus as the ideal of the race—all this is the hunger of the soul for spiritual bread, its instinctive gasping for a breath from the divine Spirit. The shadow of the supernatural is still upon him. All the won-

ders he rejects are as nothing, compared with the wonder of an infinite cause and an absolute spirit. Supernaturalism is necessary to every great man, to every great nation. Renan himself tells us, that China is stationary because it has no sense of the supernatural. Take away from modern Europe, from France itself, the divine ideas contained in its creeds and churches, take away from any people its faith in God, and there is left only chaos and dark night. As long as such faith is retained, Christ will remain the ideal man; when faith in the supernatural is gone, Jesus of Nazareth will also lose his hold upon the reverence of mankind, and be classed with the visionaries of the race.

And to this we add, concluding our argument, that the incongruities and contradictions which Renan finds in the life of Jesus, are all reconciled on the basis of the received faith of the church. Naturalism must find Christ inexplicable and paradoxical. It can neither explain his nature, nor his acts, nor his words, nor his historic position and influence. But in the faith of the church, the ideal and real are blended, the earlier and later words of Jesus are harmonized, his profoundest teachings made luminous, his mysterious death seen to be necessary to his divine office, while his resurrection and ascension complete his work and explain his historic triumphs. The universe is no longer, as in the theory of Renan, on its dark side an "abyss," and on its side of light the phantom life of transient human beings; but the infinite One and the finite world are united and reconciled in one complete system, whose centre is found in the person and work of an incarnate deity. Nothing in all literature and all philosophy equals this sublime and radiant idea, the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ our Lord. It is written on the open page of the divine oracles, it is impressed upon the soul of the believer, it is drawn out in the theologies of the church, it is hymned in penitential and jubilant psalms, in its substantial lineaments it is omnipresent in the history of the world, it unites time with eternity, and it explains the

marvellous and controlling power of the Son of God in the annals of our race, whose highest destiny is to be found in coming to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.

The Jesus depicted by Renan is a figment of naturalism, a conception that can neither be imaged forth nor realized; it has the outward forms and framework of human life, but within there is not even an immortal personal consciousness. We have, in the last analysis, only the shadow of death. And here is the essence of naturalism. The Jesus of the Gospels, of the Epistles, and of the church, is human and divine, is king and priest in an eternal kingdom, is the Saviour of the world, is the lord of life. And this is the essence of supernaturalism. And naturalism must expel Christ from the heart and the church, from the conscience and the life, before it can expel supernaturalism from human history.

THE NEW FAITH OF STRAUSS.*

IN 1835 David Friedrich Strauss, then twenty-seven years old, and a *repetent* at the Tübingen University, published his *Life of Jesus*. In this he gathered together the scattered criticisms of rationalists and others upon the gospel narratives, combined them into a system by the aid of the mythical theory, rejected all the prophetic and miraculous elements as visionary and unhistorical, and summed up the results in a lifeless portraiture of the man Jesus, and a Hegelian construction of the Christian system, as false in fact but true in

* From the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review*, April, 1874.

The Old Faith and the New: A Confession by David Friedrich Strauss. Authorized Translation from the Sixth Edition, by Mathilde Blind. American Edition, two vols. in one. The Translation revised and partly rewritten, and preceded by an American version of the Author's "Prefatory Postscript." [By J. Fitzgerald.] New York: Henry Hoit & Co. 1873. Our references, for convenience, are made to this edition.

Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntniss von D. F. Strauss. Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1873. s. 374.

Ein Nachwort als Vorwort zu den neuen Auflagen seiner Schrift: Der alte und der neue Glaube von D. F. Strauss. Bonn: E. Strauss. 1873. s. 47.

Strauss, l'ancienne et la nouvelle Foi, par A. Vera, Professeur de Philosophie à l'Université de Naples. Naples: Detken & Rocholl. 1873. p. 362.

H. Ulrici [Professor zu Halle], Der alte und d. neue Glaube, von D. F. Strauss. Reviewed in Fichte and Ulrici's *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, vol. xvi. pp. 286-392. Also separately issued.

D. F. Strauss' alte und neue Glaube, und seine literarischen Ergebnisse, von Dr. L. W. E. Rauwenhoff, Prof. an der Universität zu Leiden, und Dr. Fr. Nippold, Prof. an der Universität Bern. Leipzig und Leiden. 1873. s. 246.

Der alte und neue Glaube von Strauss, kritisch gewürdigt von Dr. Johannes Huber, Prof. d. Philosophie zu München. Nördlingen. 1873. s. 96. Reprinted from the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung.

an ideal or rather a pantheistic acceptance. His main critical canon was—all that is supernatural is unhistorical or mythical. Master of a clear and trenchant style, penetrating and unsparing in his criticism, especially of the shifts and subterfuges of the older rationalism, helped on by the flood-tide of Hegelianism just then sweeping in, his work made a deep impression and aroused a prolonged controversy. Orthodox and rationalists sprang to their arms to resist the bold invader. The work was translated in England by Marian Evans ("George Eliot"), and republished in this country, but it did not make any great impression upon English theology. In Germany it was successfully combatted, especially in respect to the "mythical" hypothesis, and was soon superseded by the more advanced and solid thinkers of the school of Baur of Tübingen, which traced back the supernatural factors of the Christian system, not to a popular myth-making propensity, but to the great social and religious tendencies of that fermenting and formative period, full as it was of conflicting agencies, and instinct with the germs of a new era in the development of the human race.

For some years Strauss was kept busy with the controversies he had kindled, preparing meanwhile his so-called *System of the Christian Faith* (2 vols. 1840-1), in which he applied the Hegelian theory of development by antagonisms to the Christian doctrines, denying them in the sense of the church, and affirming their truth only in a metaphysical or ideal sense, resolving in fact the Christian system into an *a priori* philosophical scheme in the pantheistic sense. In 1839 he was elected professor of theology in Zurich, but was kept out of his chair by a popular insurrection—though retaining for life half of his salary. He was married to a once celebrated actress, Agnese Schebert, and divorced. In the revolutionary period of 1848, he failed in an attempt to be elected to the noted Frankfort Parliament, which died of much talking; but he was chosen to the Diet of Wurtemberg, where he surprised his adherents by his strong advocacy of the conservative side; and in his very latest work he

is decidedly monarchical, taking special pains to disparage republican institutions, especially those of our country. Having in his own conceit resolved the life of Jesus into a myth, and the faith of the church into a barren scheme of speculation, he betook himself to literary and biographical investigations, gaining some æsthetic applause, especially by a memoir of the old German knight, Ulrich von Hutten, and a critique on Voltaire, first read to the Crown Princess of Prussia; varying these historical studies with occasional piquant criticisms upon the inconsistencies of the followers of Schleiermacher, and the "half-truths" of Schenkel and the rationalistic *Protestant League*—contending keenly and justly that they ought to go further with him and fare worse. Ten years since, finding himself left in the background by the steady progress of the school of Baur, he wrote a "Life of Jesus" for the German people, to give so far as possible a delineation of what was still left of the person of Christ after all this remorseless dissection. In this he still holds Christianity to be "a spiritual and moral power that rules the earth;" that what it has given us "we cannot do without, nor can it be lost;" that Jesus stands in the foremost line "of those who have given a higher ideal to humanity," realizing in his own person what he taught to others. But still the outline is wan and shadowy and the homage faint. In his declining days,* when preyed upon by a fatal disease, he felt impelled by the undying "genius" within him to give another "impulse to progress" (pp. 14, 15 of his Preface), by writing this new *Confession*, in which he casts aside the associations and restraints of custom and tradition; honestly renounces all deceptive accommodations; denies to Jesus any decisive part or place in man's religious and moral life; and concludes that "a fantastic fanaticism" is his chief characteristic, so far as we know anything about him. This is, indeed, only the logical result of his whole life's work, and it is well to have it plainly put.

* Since this was written, news has been received of his decease at his native place, Ludwigsburg, Feb. 9, 1874.

Infidelity sometimes "serves the law it seems to violate." Logically and ruthlessly carried out, it reveals its inmost nature, and sets before the vacillating half-believers just where their scepticism tends. A thorough-going and uncompromising atheism or pantheism may thus unwittingly render essential service to the Christian faith. In putting forth its full strength it may unvail its essential impotence. Thus this last volume of one of the ablest modern antagonists of our faith shows the utmost that can be said against it, without reserve or qualification. It exhibits the old and the new faith in their sharpest antagonism. We see what we must give up if we abandon Christianity, what we have left if we accept the new belief. It is, said Strauss, in substance, Atheism or Christianity: there is no logical middle ground. This is the vital sense of his "Confession."

And this is a great point gained in the whole argument. The issue is definitely made. Visors and masks are raised. The sentimental semi-infidels are forced to face the storm. Some scientific men, who talk vaguely and plausibly all round the only real questions in debate, will be obliged to leave rhetoric and use logic, and boldly meet the inevitable consequences of their own principles. For Strauss has, at last, no reserves, no concealments; he has dared "the uttermost." Vague phrases find their clear statements. Unreal compromises are brushed aside. What others whisper to the coterie, he proclaims from the house-tops. Those who reject a personal God (he argues), must accept a blind and godless evolutionism. It is, with him, God or Darwin: "the choice lies only between the miracle—the divine Creator—and Darwin" (i. 204). "Everything or nothing."

His work is entitled "A Confession," not in the sense of the older confessions, like that of Augustine, depicting the wrestling of the soul with the powers of sin and unbelief; nor even like unto that of Rousseau—a frank revelation of a struggling natural life, beset by temptation; but an account of the progress of a desolating creed, until idealism is merged in materialism, and pantheism in atheism. It is not a work of re-

search, or a scientific criticism ; still less an inspiring revelation of ennobling struggles and aspirations ; but rather a dissection of the slow and fatal process of spiritual death—of the utter extinction of all that philosophers and divines have called spiritual life—the life of God in the soul of man. As compared with his previous writings, his critics see in it a double apostasy—an apostasy from his veneration for the man Jesus, involving the loss of an ideal for the race ; and a philosophical apostasy from the dizzy heights of pantheistic transcendentalism to the earth-born theories of modern materialism. While confessing the substance of the accusation, he prefers to call his change a progress. In respect to the person of Jesus, he at last confesses that he formerly tried, in a forced and artificial way, to save his semblance as an ideal ; but now he sees that this is unnecessary and inconsistent ; that if his theory and criticism be true, Jesus must have been a dreamy, misguided, self-deceived enthusiast or fanatic. And, in fact, after one gives up all the gospels, denies prophecy and miracles, robs Christ of his sinless humanity, ejects him from his central place, and scorns his living personal power—what matters it whether or no he still apply to him a few adjectives of sentimental adulation. If he is not the Saviour and head of the Church, he is the most daring fanatic the world has known. Some of Strauss' keenest thrusts are against those who pay to Jesus a merely verbal homage. The accidents are worthless when the substance is gone.

His philosophical apostasy is most fully exposed in the work of Prof. Vera, of Naples, an Hegelian of the old right wing—one of the very few of that type now left. He covers 362 pages, hinting at more to come, with an exposure of this philosophical rebellion against the acme of human reason as attained and set forth in Hegel's "Logic" and "Encyclopædia." He is indignant and diffuse, occasionally as eloquent as a philosopher ought to be ; and though he comes a generation too late to show that Hegelianism has solved all riddles and is a finality in human speculation, yet he has certainly

succeeded in proving that Strauss is a one-sided expositor of the great German dialectician, and that in his last work he has fallen, like a modern Lucifer, from the empyrean of pantheism into the slough of the most unmitigated modern materialism.* The criticism of Prof. Ulrici of Halle, cited at the head of this article, is entirely devoted to an exposure of the philosophical pretensions and contradictions of Strauss, without any reference to his theological dogmas. It is an acute and able examination. He claims that the "New Faith" is destitute of any tenable philosophical basis. "We maintain," he says, "that Strauss' new work is nearly equivalent to an avowal of philosophical bankruptcy on the part of its famous author." (p. 266 of the *Philosophische Zeitschrift*.) This, we think, he fully establishes; and he is a veteran in these conflicts. His profound work, "God and Nature," contains a thorough examination and refutation of all the recent materialistic and semi-materialistic theories, and is well worthy of being translated. There is no volume of equal value, on this debate, in the English literature. The short treatise by the distinguished old Catholic, Prof. Huber, of Munich (who was associated with Döllinger in producing the far-famed letters on the Vatican Council), is a skilful, popular exhibition and refutation of the main positions of the "New Faith." Prof. Ranwenhoff, of Leyden, argues from the standpoint of modern Christian liberalism, taking the ground that Strauss should have represented that, and not the primitive or the orthodox creeds, as containing the essence of Christianity—a position which Strauss has shown to be untenable. The recent literary criticisms on Strauss, from all parties, are reported in sum in Prof. Nippold's essay in the same volume.

* Vera is perhaps the clearest and most enthusiastic interpreter of Hegel outside of the Empire. His "Introduction to the Philosophy of Hegel" gives an intelligible and systematic exposition of the system. He has also translated Hegel's "Logic," his "Philosophy of Nature," and his "Philosophy of Spirit."

But this volume of Strauss is not merely a confession; it is also the confession of a "New Faith"—and the word *faith* is here emphatic and significant. In the "Postscript" (p. xxv. of the translation, p. 33 of the original), written after the fourth edition of his work had appeared, he says: "Its title was purposely chosen so as to contrast with the Old Faith, not a new knowledge, but a New Belief. For in shaping a comprehensive view of the whole universe, to be put in the place of the equally comprehensive faith of the church, we cannot rest satisfied with what is *established by strict induction*, but we must also append many things which, on the basis of such induction, are required by thought in the way either of presuppositions or of logical consequences." This is a very valuable sentence. With "presuppositions" and "consequences" much may be done. The system which is to succeed Christianity still rests on belief and not on scientific demonstrations. And this is a fact, however much and conveniently it may be ignored. As the case now stands, notwithstanding the confident boasts of some "scientists," it is still one faith against another faith, and not science against faith. It is a blind faith in a blind force and an unverified law of evolution; in contrast with a sublime faith in an absolute, rational, conscious Spirit, as the ground and author of the whole finite universe.

Strauss is too clear-headed to claim that inductive science has explained, or can fully explain, the universe. Some scientific sciolists abroad, and their echoes in this country, pretend that the issue is the blind faith of theologians against the accredited demonstrations of science. But the truth is, that there is not an established fact or principle, verified by strict induction—by induction held sternly to its clear and narrow method—with which any postulate or dogma of the Christian system can be shown to be at variance. The real conflict is between the metaphysics and logic of some "scientists," and the metaphysics and logic of almost all the great thinkers as well as the theologians of the human race. All that induction *can* do, as scientific, is to observe phenom-

ena and sequences *in* nature, and put them into convenient generalizations. As soon as it transcends this narrow sphere and "feigns hypotheses," it becomes, as induction, illegitimate: its leaders talk metaphysics without knowing it, and often without any special vocation. The best of them but repeat, in a vague way, the speculations of Zeno and Lucretius: some of them are akin to the Buddhists. No induction has yet established, or can it ever do this, the non-existence of the supernatural, the impossibility of miracles, or any one article of an atheistic creed. There are no facts to show that there is no power above nature to which it is subordinate. Evolution itself, as an absolute law without a God, is absolutely unverified; and, as an historical fact, it is not proven. On the question of the origin and destiny of the universe—on the first cause and last end of the successions of being—science, like Christianity, still rests in belief, if it has anything to say. It can, at the utmost, only put one theory against another, and for its own theory it cannot appeal to any induction which has yet been made. And no mere inductive philosophy can ever rise to the height of this great argument.

This work is then the Confession of a New Faith, but it is more than this: it is an attempt to combine all the elements of opposition to Christianity and religion into one system, and it indicates the process by which the old is to be transformed into the new. This comes out more definitely in the Postscript (which is also a preface) than in the body of the "Confession;" and it is one of the most significant points in the whole discussion, foreshadowing the future.

Two systems of philosophy, roughly classed as Idealism and Materialism, each with a distinctive method, the deductive (or speculative) for Idealism, and the inductive for Materialism, have always more or less prevailed in the civilized world, and are usually regarded as antagonistic, as subversive the one of the other. Idealism, with its purely rational ideas or data, when exclusive or one-sided, tends to, and is completed in, the pantheistic theory of the universe; and herein

Germany has led the way—and this was Strauss' starting-point in his earlier writings. Materialism beginning with the other pole of being, external phenomena (including also sensations), and applying the strict inductive method, gravitates with equal force toward atheism, and denies infinite and absolute being. This tendency has shown itself chiefly in France and England. The principles of the two systems are opposite, their methods different, and they have been in constant conflict with each other, united only in their conscious opposition (when strictly and exclusively held) to the Christian faith—which, as a general rule, has retained elements from both the systems, and made use of both methods. But in the most recent developments of philosophy, in both these schools, there are patent signs of a union between them, especially in view of the destructive warfare against Christianity which both are waging. Idealism (pantheism) confesses that it cannot construct the universe by *a priori* ideas, not even with the seductive aid of the Hegelian logic. And, on the other hand, the most thoughtful scientific men are conceding that beyond and above (or within) the phenomena of the senses there is infinite and absolute being (see, for example, Herbert Spencer); that all forces are modes of one force; that all that lives shares in one life; that all phenomena may and must be evolved out of some primal fount of life and being. This tendency of the sensational school and of the inductive philosophy is most definitely expressed in the theory of evolution; for no evolutionist can rest in transient phenomena—he must refer all changes to one persistent force, all grades of being to one primitive genus—in Platonic phrase the *εἶδος* to the *γένος*. Many evolutionists who started as materialists, do not yet clearly see this drift; but it is the inevitable metaphysics of the theory. In this way induction leads on to metaphysics, materialism joins hands with idealism. Slight concessions will bring the two parties together. The opposite methods run into each other: the materialist traces back his inductions as far as the microscope can reach—and discerns beyond, by the very necessity of thought, an

illimitable force, real though unconscious; the idealist begins to construct his scheme by the deductions of pure reason, but as soon as his infinite emerges into the finite, he needs the microscope as well, and the aid of the inductive process. Thus both reach to and meet in a point where the unfathomable, the infinite, the "unknowable" (why not say the supernatural?), either as substance or power, or both in one, inevitably strikes upon and balks their vision and their comprehension; while, at the same time, both agree that for all practical aims and needs this world gives us all—that the hereafter is an unreal ideal. They equally deny all that is supernatural or miraculous—a personal God, the immortality of the soul, a specific revelation. Christ is to both a visionary, not merely a man like other men, but a dreamy enthusiast; and Christ's church is the one great obstacle to progress and civilization. Christianity has played its part out to the final act and we are on the verge of the catastrophe. Christian theology, too, say both pantheist and atheist, is wholly unreal: it is to take its place with the ancient mythologies. Both hold and concede that besides our mundane experience—beyond the track of time on which the race is marching—there is for us only an unconscious, non-rational, non-moral force or background of being from which all things proceed by necessity, to which all things tend irresistibly. They equally maintain that behind us is but an infinite force, void and nameless, and before us only an unfathomable abyss; and for us, only this world and this life. Why, then, should they not make common cause against that Christian faith which fills the past void with an Infinite God, and the future darkness with a divine and eternal kingdom, and makes this world the theatre of the grand drama of an Incarnation of Love!

And the real power of Strauss' book consists in his insisting upon this compact, and showing how it may be carried out. If it has any influence it will be in this direction. In assigning his reasons for resuming, after a long interval, his theological and philosophical polemics, he says (p. x.) that the late

“developments of science had put him in a position by bringing together the scattered trains of thought, of giving an impulse to progress—and also to scandal.” His aim is to combine the results of theological criticism “with those attained especially in the natural sciences.” The latter have been striving to explain “the origin of the universe in all its manifoldness, and in all the stages of its progress up to man himself, without calling in the help of a Creator or the intervention of miracles.” “What then becomes of the personal Creator, who is supposed to have miraculously called the universe into being, and then the various orders of living things?” “What becomes of the church, whose system of faith is based upon a miraculous beginning, a violent disruption, and a renewed miraculous resumption of the development of the world and of the race?” *

Such is the general and common object of both tendencies; to be carried out by a scientific union of the two, and by a com-

* Here and elsewhere we have somewhat altered the translation, which as a whole is rather indifferent. It is often constrained, and sometimes indefinite, and occasionally wrong. There is little of the grace and point of the original. *Leichtgeschürzte Schrift* (a writing loosely knit) is rendered “a compendious work” (p. iii.); *Schwindel* is *fraud* (p. xxvii.); *das Universum* is generally given as *Cosmos*, which is hardly adequate; Strauss calls Christ’s resurrection a “world-historical *humbug* :” it is translated (p. 83) a world-wide deception; the Sun is called “he” and the Moon “shè,” which is neither German nor English; *derartige Zumuthungen* becomes “kinds of claims on their reasoning faculties” (p. 15); *Bedenken* is given as “reflections,” instead of “scruples.” On p. iv. Strauss says that those who deny Christ’s divinity “might still find shelter from the attacks of the old orthodox in the party of the *Protestanten-Verein*” (Schenkel, etc.), but the translation reads—“he would secure himself against attack from the side of the orthodox of the Protestant League;” and then puts an innocent query in a note, viz., “What then is heterodoxy?” On p. 168, “the cosmic conception of ancient Christianity” should read, “the Christian conception (or idea) of the universe.” On p. 171 the translation runs: “The unity of the All is obviously but a conclusion deduced from analysis;” the German is, “*Dass das All nur eines ist versteht sich von selbst, ist nur ein analytisches Urtheil,*” and should be rendered, “That the All is only one is self-evident, for it is only an analytic judgment.” An “analysis” and an “analytic judgment” are two very different things. *Fechter* (p. xviii.) is a misprint for “Fechner.” Why is Renan so often printed Rénan?

bined attack on all the articles of natural religion even, as well as on the special doctrines of the Christian faith. The union of idealism and materialism for this baleful end is most distinctly set forth in § 62, vol. ii., pp. 19, 23, of the translation. (§ 66 of the original—for the sections are needlessly altered in the translation.) Strauss has been trying to show—as we shall consider further on—how motion may be resolved into life, and life into sensation, and proceeds thus :

“ If any one here finds a distinct and rude materialism, I will just now say nothing against it. In fact I have always tacitly regarded the antagonism between materialism and idealism (or however the view opposed to materialism may be designated) as a verbal quarrel. Both have their common foe in the dualism of that idea of the universe which has ruled the whole Christian era, dividing man into body and soul, his existence into time and eternity, and setting an eternal Creator over against a created and transient world. To this dualism both materialism and idealism are opposed, because they strive to derive the totality of phenomena from a single principle, to construct the world and life out of one piece : that is, *monism* is common to both. In this, one starts from above, the other from below. Materialism constructs the universe out of atoms and atomic forces, Idealism out of ideas [*Vorstellungen*—re-presentations] and idealistic forces. But if they would fulfill their task, the one must descend from its heights down to the lowest sphere of nature, and to this end be controlled by careful observations ; the other must take into account and solve the highest spiritual and moral problems. . . . Each of these methods, strictly carried out, leads over into the other. . . . Hence, I think that both these systems should reserve their weapons for that other real and still formidable foe, treating each other, as confederates, with respect or at least with courtesy. . . . The overbearing tone, sometimes like a schoolmaster, again like an inquisitor, which some philosophers like to assume towards the natural sciences, is quite as blamable, and even unwise, as is on the other hand the coarse abuse of philosophy with which materialists rather amuse than edify us.”

On the other hand, he claims that scientific men should “ not relegate metaphysics into the lumber-room with astrology and alchemy.” Its “ moulting ” time is passing away ; its “ plumage ” will grow again. Now it is chiefly occupying itself with its own history. And the naturalist needs it to instruct him ; for “ the most delicate instruments with which he is now working, the concepts of force and matter, essence and mani-

festation, cause and effect, etc., can be accurately shaped only by metaphysics, and applied only by logic; and on the ultimate questions about beginning and end, limits and the illimitable, purpose and casualty in the world, philosophy is indispensable." The present state of scientific investigation, too, exhibits signs of a reaction from "the coyness with which it has treated speculation." The "general interest in Darwinism is owing to the infinite perspective which it discloses." "The speculative philosophy of nature did indeed embrace a cloud instead of a Juno, and hence brought forth no fruit; but the theory of Darwin is the first child of the marriage, as yet only secret, between natural science and philosophy." And this, as he goes on to show, is because that theory will expel from nature all the evidences of design, and all trace of the supernatural—leaving only an unconscious development.

Such is the programme, clearly defined. Idealism and materialism (deduction and induction) are to become one; and to become one, we add, by the theory of Evolution. A destructive historical criticism, striving to annihilate Christianity by a denial of the supernatural, is to clasp inseparable hands with the natural sciences, resting on the same negation. The pantheistic intuition is to be left in the rear, scientific investigation comes to the front; evolution connects and combines the two in one formidable host; and the common object of their hostility is the Christian church. Around and against the very citadel of our faith are encamped the two beleaguering armies. Though hitherto opposite and opposed, why not extend their lines and unite? Herod and Pilate were once made friends, though before they had been at enmity with one another.

This is the "New Faith" against the "Old." And the argument of the work consists in showing how far, in the present state of criticism and science, this result may be said to be attainable, or at least foreshadowed. It is, in fact, chiefly foreshadowed by lines largely drawn from the speculative imagination. For Strauss has a spirit of divination: when facts fail, and gaps yawn, he predicts. Again and again

he says to an incredulous generation, "Very well ; but others will come who will understand them [the new theories], and who will also have understood *me*." (ii., 19.) He closes his Postscript with the words of an exalted self-consciousness: "The day will come, as it came for the 'Life of Jesus,' when my book shall be understood—only this time I shall not live to see it." His oracle, unlike the Delphic, utters no uncertain sound. If it had been more ambiguous, it might have been quite as likely to be fulfilled.

The general plan is carried out in the body of the work by proposing four questions: 1. "Are we still Christians?" 2. "Have we still a Religion?" 3. "What is our Conception of the Universe?" 4. "What is our Rule of Life?"

The "we" here is limited and oracular. It is first of all, he says, "a simple I who speaks, apparently occupying a singularly isolated position;" but he speaks in the name of "a multitude who call in question the need of a distinct society like the church, by the side of state and the school, of science and art, the common property of all." This "we," as appears from subsequent avowals, does not stand for a society, or in fact for any large number of mankind—but only for those who deny God and immortality, and think the church to be the greatest foe to human progress. It does not stand for scientific men as a class, but for some "scientists;" not for speculative philosophers as a body, but for those of them who would fain construct a universe for themselves. And it is meant to exclude all who have any faith in Christianity or even in natural religion. These are the "we" represented in the questions; and, as addressed to them, the answer cannot be equivocal. His purpose, he adds, is not (p. xxxii.) "controversy with those who differ, but an understanding with those who agree with us." He would not disturb the "faith of any one." And yet his book is an attempt to subvert Christianity and all religion. He innocently expresses his surprise and annoyance at the attacks made upon him from so many quarters. Such martyrdom is histrionic.

As compared with his previous writings, the tone of his

discussions is lowered; in becoming popular, he is often well-nigh frivolous, after the manner of the French infidelity—as if he would rival Renan in this field as well as in politics. It is an appeal to the eager ear of the men of the world, rather than to the men of thought. Science is popularized for the multitude—why not also pantheism and materialism? Among the middle and lower classes of Germany there is a growing infidelity, based on a practical materialism; and to them Strauss, the idealist, addresses himself in a style adapted to secure their applause. He is willing to help on a reckless infidelity by rude thrusts and bitter sarcasm. He brings forward no new fruits of scholarly investigation; every objection he urges against Christ and the gospels is familiar to students, and has been ably met by the Christian apologists of Germany and other lands. There is a plausible array of hackneyed difficulties, enforced by a skilled rhetoric. He appeals to that class of persons of whom Bishop Butler says, “that Christianity is to them not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious.”

Yet it must be conceded that he reserves his bitterest scorn for those half-way believers, those covert infidels, who deny the essential doctrines of Christianity and still profess to receive it: who deride the supernatural, and, through custom or from interest, pretend to uphold the faith. “Christian worship,” he says (i. p. 55), “this garment cut out to fit an incarnate God, looks slovenly and shapeless when a mere man is invested with its ample folds.” If Christ were only a man, “how could he dare to use such tremendous words as, ‘I and the Father are one; who seeth me seeth the Father also.’ . . . We should lose our faith in the soundness of his reason, if compelled to believe that in prayer he reminded God of the glory he had with him before the world was.” (i. 56.) In attending the services of a Free Congregation in Berlin he found them “terribly dry and unedifying. I quite thirsted for an allusion to the Biblical legend or the Christian calendar. . . . After the edifice of the church is demolished, to go and give a lecture on the bare, imperfectly

levelled site is dismal to a degree that is awful. Either everything or nothing." (ii. 118.) That is his stern alternative—*everything or nothing*.

I. ARE WE STILL CHRISTIANS?

This question is disposed of in less than a hundred pages, by exhibiting the main articles of the Christian faith, and the recorded facts of the gospel, in a crude, disjointed, and distorted form—as these have been represented by their opponents rather than by their wise defenders. He knows nothing but objections to the faith; hardly in a single instance does he notice the replies. He first describes the dogmas, following the order of the Apostles' Creed; and any candid historian must say that his representations of them is a travesty. The Trinity is but a mathematical puzzle—"how one can be three and three one;" the narrative of the creation is to be taken as simply literal; the fall involves all of Adam's posterity—so that none, even of infants, except the baptized, can be saved; the atonement is a commercial transaction, "revolting to every principle of justice," resting on a "barbarous conception," a "perfect jumble of the crudest conceptions;" the Person of Christ "savors of mythology, only that Greek incarnations appear to us more felicitously invented than this Christian one;" all are damned but a chosen few—"the number of the reprobate infinitely exceeds that of the elect." (i. 37.) And so on through many a dreary page. All this is in striking contrast with the idealizing of Christian doctrine found in Strauss' earlier works;* and it is so manifestly perverse that we need not dwell upon it.

Of course it is impossible to go into a detailed reply to Strauss on the Gospels; but we may say a word as to his general method. The Gospels, in their present form, he holds to have been written long after the recorded events; in the case of John, toward the middle of the second century. In criticising them he peremptorily challenges every passage

* Vera, in his volume on Strauss, §§ 3 to 5, develops this point at length.

which contains anything prophetic or anything miraculous: because the supernatural has no existence for a philosophical critic. He does not condescend to notice the arguments for the genuineness and authenticity of the documents—that case is no longer *sub judice*; he settled it in his “Life of Jesus.” He claims that there is no important fact about Christ, or noteworthy saying ascribed to him, of which we can be wholly sure. “We cannot make sure of the sayings and teachings of Christ *on any one point*, whether we have his own words and thoughts, or only such as later times find it convenient to ascribe to him.” (i. 66.) “So many and such essential facts in the life of Jesus are *not* established, that neither are we clearly cognizant of his aims nor the mode and degree in which he hoped to realize them.” “A being with distinct features, capable of affording a definite conception, is only to be found in the Christ of faith and of legend.” (i. 90.) “Not because of what he was, but because of what he *was not*, . . . has he been made the central point of a church, of a worship.” (pp. xxvi.–vii.)

And yet, when Strauss would say anything to the discredit of Christ, expose his local “prejudices,” represent him as the “victim of delusions,” or an “enthusiast” (i. 92); prove that his death took him “by surprise” (p. 78); depict him as holding that he would actually “be enthroned in the clouds of heaven;” and set him forth as no more sinless than other men (p. xxvii.), he appeals to these same untrustworthy gospels as giving sufficient evidence.* Their testimony against him may be received; their testimony for him is invariably rejected. “He cannot be,” says Strauss, “the centre of our religious life, for our knowledge of him is too fragmentary; he cannot be the support of that life, for what *we do know* about him indicates a person of fantastic fanaticism.” (p. xxvi.)

The inevitable results of this arbitrary criticism are most

* Several of these points rest in fact chiefly on the Gospel of John, which Strauss holds to be the least authentic of all as a biography. Renan, who urges like objections, assigned a much higher place to this gospel; and Strauss reproached him for it.

fully exhibited in what he says about the Resurrection of Christ. He declares (i. 82), "that it has not the slightest foundation. Rarely has an incredible fact been worse attested, or one so ill-attested been more incredible in itself. . . . Taken historically, *i. e.*, comparing the immense effect of this belief with its absolute baselessness, the story of the resurrection of Jesus can only be called a world-historical humbug."* Christ's teachings and influence, he adds, would have been all lost but for this "humbug:" they "would have been blown away and scattered like solitary leaves by the wind, had they not been held together and thus preserved by a superstitious belief in his resurrection." This "humbug" was the foundation of the Christian Church!

The critical method (if so it can be called), by which such results are reached, is clogged with fatal defects, even as a method. It rests on certain presumptions or unproved postulates, which alone gives to it a seeming force; and if applied elsewhere as here, it would lead to utter historical scepticism. To all candid and even stringent criticism, as applied in a true historic method, no one need object. Criticism has its rights. But it has no right, while professing to be impartial, to prejudge and predetermine the results by its illegitimate assumptions.

Strauss assumes, and nowhere establishes, the non-existence of the supernatural. His undemonstrated major premise is—that there is no God, that there cannot be any supernatural agency anywhere in the universe: just as Hume's argument against miracles rests on the same silent pre-conception. This preamble determines the method. It is really valid only for pantheists and atheists, also for some deists. It does not rest on science, nor is it controlled by testimony: it rests on, it is controlled by, disbelief. This negation of belief, and this alone, makes it seem destructive. The non-existence of the

*So the original. The translator has seen fit to modify this audacious statement into the phrase—"a world-wide deception." Strauss, to show his repugnance to the fact, transferred a revolting word from the English; but the English translator must needs tone it down.

supernatural—that idol of an atheistic generation—makes the whole undermining process an easy work. In fact, there is no need of demolishing a building when the foundations are swept away. If there be no God, Strauss is right—the whole case is exhausted: all the rest is a vain show of argument. If there be a God—then all that is supernatural in the Gospels is true, if established by unimpeachable and sufficient historical evidence. A criticism based on a covert atheism is forcible only for atheists. And the pretension that only pantheists and materialists can be impartial—that they alone seek the truth for its own sake—that other people only have prepossessions and prejudices, is too preposterous to need refutation. The impartiality which Strauss extols is simply indifference or hostility to all religious belief.

This criticism, so far as we can now consider it, is especially unfair and unsound in its application to two main points: 1. To the Christ of history; 2. To historical Christianity.

1. *In respect to the Christ of history*, it is not true, on any recognized canon of historical evidence, that “there are,” as Strauss asserts, “few historical personages of whom we have such unsatisfactory information as of him.” (Preface, p. xxvi.) If true, it would certainly be a most extraordinary result in respect to the only man who has won and kept the love and trust of the race for eighteen centuries; and whose *personal* influence is unparalleled and greater now than ever before. It is a wild imagination, and not a result reached by the ordinary tests of historical credibility. In respect to no ancient personage are there so many historic documents and so nearly contemporaneous. What do we know of Zoroaster and Confucius, of Alexander and Caesar, of Solon and Socrates even, compared with the biographies of Jesus of Nazareth? Sakhya-Mûni (Buddha) is the favorite modern rival, set up by modern infidelity in comparison with Christ; * as Apollonius of Tyana was the counterpart among

* See Strauss, § 23 of translation.

the ancient heathen opponents of Christianity—and the heathen made out a better case than the moderns. The life of the founder of Buddhism is vague, fragmentary, and merely traditional; his doctrine is indefinite and obscure; but he was a pantheist and nihilist—and hence he is glorified as a saint by the “new faith.”

The infidel case against the Christ of history is made out only by an arbitrary rejection of all the records. When it is assumed that all that is wonderful in the gospels must be unhistorical, a legend of tradition, and in fact that no testimony can establish these facts—such torture may extract the conclusion that we know almost nothing about Christ; for there is hardly anything recorded of him unmingled with a supernatural element. Concede the possibility of a divine revelation, and all is simple and clear; deny this, and the most wonderful history in the world, the most artless and sincere, credited by the race as no other story has been, becomes visionary and fantastic—such a mingling of wilful delusion and blind credulity and wide-spread collusion and fraud as is without parallel and beyond imagination. One might as well take out of Dante’s *Divine Comedy* all the supernatural elements, and then declare that epic to be a failure, as take from Christ’s life its superhuman characteristics, and draw the conclusion that there is hardly a word or deed of his of which we are sure.

The dates of no writings have been so recklessly tampered with, on purely subjective grounds, and on mere technicalities of evidence, against the general consent of historical testimony, as have those of the Gospels, and several of Paul’s Epistles. But give to this destructive criticism the fullest sweep, bring the first three gospels, as we now have them, down to the latter part of the first century,* and we have

* Even among Baur’s disciples there are significant indications that the day is past of wild hypotheses as to the date of the Gospels. The gospel of John, which Strauss did not give up until the third edition of his “Life of Jesus” appeared, and which Baur assigned to the middle of the second century, is said by Keim, in his *Life of Christ*, to be not later than 110 to

still the Acts of the Apostles, four Epistles of Paul which no one doubts (Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Galatians), epistles from Peter and James, the Revelation—and some of the Apostolic Fathers: and all these testify to all the essential facts and doctrines of our faith; notably, in the case of Paul, to that “historical humbug” on which “Christianity is built”—the Resurrection of its Founder.* Nowhere in all ancient testimony can the line be drawn between fact and legend, between a genuine early tradition and an assumed later accretion of myths; for there is no external evidence whatever that the so-called legends and myths were of a later date. Blot out remorselessly all the records of the first century, and they are all recoverable in the writings of the Fathers and other witnesses of the second and third centuries—as something handed down to them. And then, too, there is the attestation of a history which can never be reversed—the history of the church itself, its undeniable faith in the very facts and doctrines which are found in our earliest records; its heroism and its marvellous victories; and all confirmed by such a cloud of witnesses as is found for no other series of facts in human history. And in all and through all are the facts of Christ’s life, which became the creed and tradition of the church and gave to it its power. Christianity has a history; the infidel theories are essentially unhistoric. Deny the miracles of Christ’s life, and the miracle of the Church abides. Resolve the history into a myth, and still the fact remains, that the idea of a sinless, crucified and risen Saviour has ruled the earth and shaped its story.

Such *a priori* criticisms of historical characters and events must lead, wherever applied, to historical scepticism. No

115; Ewald and Weizsäcker date it at the close of the first century. Renan still holds to its partial authenticity. The first three gospels are assigned to the first century by Köstlin, and even by Volkmar and Hilgenfeld. Holtzman puts them between 70 and 80. Outside of the most advanced critics there are still greater concessions. See, for example, the later editions of Meyer’s commentaries; and such treatises as that of Tischendorf: “When were our Gospels written?” etc.

* See the admirable book of Westcott on the Gospel of the Resurrection.

man can forecast history by mere speculation, nor can he undermine it by arbitrary canons, by personal and subjective pre-conceptions. Personal scepticism begets historical scepticism. There may be hallucinations in a critic as well as in Christ and his apostles and the whole Christian church. The real question at issue is the reality of the supernatural: admit it, and Strauss' argument is worthless; deny it, and it is superfluous.

This Straussian critique, however, is not merely a denial of the divine element in Christ and his work; it necessarily leads to a degradation of the human. Of course any such ideal humanity as Schleiermacher depicts, and as Strauss once seemed to adopt, is denied. Jesus is to him no longer "the great religious genius of the race;" in no sense is he still the consummate flower of humanity.* The aureole with which he has been glorified by many an infidel is completely dispersed; modern science has disenchanted the race of even this lingering delusion. Goethe could say: "In the Gospels there is the reflection of a majesty, radiating from the person of Christ, of so divine a character as never elsewhere appeared upon the earth. If I am asked whether it is in my nature to pay him reverential homage, I reply, undoubtedly! I bow before him as the divine revelation of the highest principle of morality." But Strauss consistently denies his moral perfection: this "disappeared with supernaturalism, and is henceforth to be reckoned only as a delusion" (p. xxvii.). Even his moral precepts, it is declared, were all anticipated; many virtues he ignored, while some he could not exemplify (p. 95). Strauss tests the worth of Christ's precepts by their bearing upon commerce and property, civil life and state laws, science and the arts, rather than by their relation to the

* In Strauss' essay on "The Permanent and Transient in Christianity" (the forerunner of Theodore Parker's noted sermon with that title), he advocates "the worship of genius as the only worship which remains for the cultivated class of our days." Of Christ he there says: "As humanity can never exist without religion, so it can never exist without Christ. . . . And this Christ, so far as he is inseparable from the highest form of religion, is historical and not mythical, an individual and not a mere symbol."

permanent religious and spiritual needs of the race. It is even doubtful, he says, whether it was "not Paul rather than Jesus" who preached a Gospel "for the race" (p. 68). "We cannot be certain whether he did not at the last lose faith in himself and his mission" (p. 88). Of his nature we "catch only fitful glimpses" (p. 90); he was at the best an "enthusiast" and even "a fanatic." If he were only "a human hero," and "nursed the expectation" of deliverance from the power of death, then in his very crucifixion we see that so "enthusiastic an expectation but receives its deserts when it is mocked by miscarriage" (p. 90). And herein Strauss is consistent: for there is no middle ground. If Jesus be not the incarnation of divinity, he is the most daring enthusiast, deceiving or deceived, the world has known.

He does not even leave to him that inspiring influence, that majestic power, which belongs to the heroes and geniuses of the race. In such men there is always an element which cannot be deduced—the magic of an august personality. Creative geniuses transform the world. They are impossible until they come upon the stage, the unprophesied prophets of the future, who supersede tradition and give an impulse to history. But in the mythology of Strauss all the benignant and transforming power of Christianity is represented by no real hero or sage, but by one who became great "not for what he was, but for what he was not." The greatest epoch in human history was evolved from the most delusive and incredible fiction which the human imagination ever invented.

2. *In its Relation to Historical Christianity*, the critical method pursued by Strauss is equally unsound and fallacious. It rests, to a large extent, upon a fundamental misconception of the real nature of the Christian church, as a part of human history. To distort and caricature certain dogmas; to sweep a drag-net through the conceits and aberrations of fathers and schoolmen and some human creeds; to set the Scriptures aside and cite the very puerilities of doctrinal tradition: all this only shows that even the historic creed of Christendom must first be perverted in order that it may be vilified;

but it does not touch the living essence of the Christian church.

For Christianity is not founded in creeds or dogmas. To a certain extent Hume's sarcasm is true, that "Christianity is not founded in argument." The facts of our faith antedate its dogmas; the dogmas do not make, but express, the facts. All the human creeds that were ever framed are but partial, fragmentary expressions of the great original—reflected and broken lights of that one Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. The living reality is in historic facts, which have shaped every syllable of the records and every formula of Christian doctrine.

Christianity—would that we could see and grasp this vital point!—Christianity is not a creed, not a dogma, not a system of theology, but it is essentially historic fact—a sublime, incarnated spiritual reality—the most real historic power which, for centuries (in its elements from the very beginning), has controlled the grandest evolution upon the earth—the historic development of the human race. It is as unrivalled and unique in human history as is the sacred Person of its head and centre; it is, as the faith of the church declares, the living presence of that Person in history itself. The living Christ stands first and central, and then his apostles, and then the church, and then the simple creed, and then the canon, and then the conflicts, and then the dogmas, and then the systems of theology, and so on through the centuries: and in and through all a living, spiritual power, comparable only to the life of nature. And last of all come they also who say that its very substance is found in crude and contradictory dogmas, which can be upset by a sneer! And this Christianity, so sublime as an objective fact, becomes subjectively a renovating power—the life of God in the soul of man—the mysterious consciousness of an unearthly presence in the soul—God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself—the highest form of spiritual life—no more dependent upon theories and critics than is the health of the body upon the speculations of physiologists and pathologists. And this

victorious historic faith, and this internal spiritual conviction, are no more made in the way which such criticism represents than the life of the earth or its evolutions by the theories of geologists and "scientists." A state cannot be overthrown by refuting the schemes of publicists, for the state lives and grows by its own law. And Christianity was made by the Maker of history. Those who are constructing and reconstructing it, and attempting to demolish it by refuting some human theories about it, might about as well claim that they can reconstruct and demolish the visible universe by a new theory, which refutes the dogmas of all the speculative world-builders who have gone before. Vast material forces, guided by divine power and wisdom, control the development of the earth; equally vast spiritual forces guide and guard the course of history and the destiny of Christianity. A scheme for its demolition and reconstruction, drawn up by the new prophets, is quite akin to the political pronunciamientos and paper constitutions of Communists and Internationals—what the latter are to the state the former are to the church.

The very law of Evolution itself (at least so far as it has been at all verified) when applied to human history, might at least give as much probability to the further development of Christianity as to its extinction. Christianity has undeniably been evolved in human history, and has in fact largely organized it. It has all the criteria of a development as these are given by evolutionists themselves—inward force, natural selection, survival of the fittest. Who knows its reserve of might? its latent possibilities? The experience of the past would seem to favor the confident prediction of greater marvels yet to come. Or if, again, evolution may in any case be so far arrested or completed, that it can stop, for example, with man as the summit and acme of creation (which is taken for granted by Strauss and others), then why may it not have reached its height, so far as religion is concerned, in Christianity? If it may carry on man, substantially as he is, to a more perfect development, why not the Christian system also? Who can set bounds to its indefinite possibilities? May it

not be so applied as to give a rational conviction, that that august Christian faith, which is by common confession the highest form of religion, may go on conquering and to conquer? And even now, while it is abandoned by some theorists, dizzied by excess of speculation, and by some "scientists," blinded by excess of matter—it is planting its churches at the ends of the earth. What weapon fashioned against it has yet prospered? From what decisive battle-field has as yet gone up any other cry than that memorable one, so true in fact even if of doubtful origin, which went up of old from the defeated, despairing, and expiring heathendom: "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean!"

This Straussian construction of Christian history makes any philosophy of history well-nigh impossible—especially as a development or evolution. It not only sacrifices all profounder views of history, but it must make the whole religious history of mankind—which is the centre of all history—to be a delusion, a mockery, ending only in despair. For eighteen centuries, as nobody can deny, Christianity has virtually ruled the course of empire: and now it is discovered that it was begotten by hallucinations and sustained by a "world-historical humbug." Not only has there been no progress, there has been retrogression. The end returns to the unshaped beginning; the last word left us is the pantheism and nihilism of the Buddhist creed. What hope for a race, all whose highest aspirations and deepest experiences are delusions of the imagination? What possible progress in the future to those whose whole past has been an insane folly? Can a mad-house cure itself? Such a history violates every law of progress and even the theory of evolution itself—so far as it seeks for reason in the facts, so far as it would fain construct a philosophy of history. Strauss contrasts what, by a vicious use of the word, he calls "the dualism" of Christianity with the monism—the one essence—of Buddhism, to the discredit of the former. By this "dualism" he only means that in the Christian view man has both body and soul, that his existence is in both this world and a hereafter, and that the universe embraces both a

Creator and the creature. This point comes out more fully further on; and we need here only say, that without some such dualism there can be no movement of being, no possible separation between the Infinite All and its finite manifestations, no history whatever.

Strauss's answer, then, to the first question: "Are we still Christians?" can be only this (i. 107): "If we would have our yea yea, and our nay nay, in short, if we would speak as honest, upright men, we must acknowledge that we are no longer Christians." This is, of course, the answer that must be given by an honest and consistent pantheist or materialist. And it leads him on to his second question, underlying this first:

II. HAVE WE STILL ANY RELIGION?

Logically, this question precedes the first one. For if a man has not any religion (as this is usually understood), he of course cannot "still be a Christian." If Strauss had only put his answer to the second query as a caption to the first, the irrelevancy of the previous discussion would be too apparent. Logically, too, his third question comes before both the second and first, viz., "What is our idea of the Universe?" for he says, that it is pantheistico-materialistic. And any one holding this theory cannot of course have any definite religious belief, and still less can he be a Christian. So that, as a scientific structure, the whole book is disarranged. The plan is subjective, rhetorical, and for popular effect. If "we" do not believe in a personal God and immortality, if "we" are pantheists and materialists from conviction, we cannot say that we have any real religion, nor miss the simplest lessons of the Christian faith. But his object is to lead the reader on by degrees from the more common forms of unbelief down to its most daring extremes. And especially is it designed to show—first, that some of the grounds on which Christianity is rejected (especially its supernatural elements) lead right on to a denial of God and eternal life; and secondly, that a

denial of the latter lands us inevitably in pantheism or materialism, or both in one. The sense of his argument is—if Christianity be denied, so must it be with a personal God; and if God be denied, we must be godless evolutionists. Or, in other words, he says, give up miracles and there need be no creator, for creation is the greatest of miracles; give up a creator, and all we have left is a development without beginning or end.

His question now is: Have we still any Religion? His answer, reduced to its lowest terms, is: We pantheists and materialists can have no religion, excepting a feeling of dependence on the universe.

His discussion of the origin, nature, and reality of religion must be confessed to be somewhat immethodical and miscellaneous. He knows that Hume was “undoubtedly correct” in ascribing its origin not to a “desire for truth” and knowledge, but to a “selfish craving for material welfare;” while he tells us on the same page (i. 109) that brutes do not have it, any more than they have “what we term reason;” yet brutes undeniably have a craving for material welfare. He adds that the “Epicurean derivation of piety from fear has incontestably a great deal of truth in it.” Man, too, first personifies the forces of nature. As he advances in culture, his “moral constitution also comes into play” (where does it come from?), and so he “tries to protect himself” “not only against others, but against his own sensuality and weakness as well, by placing in reserve behind the dictates of his conscience a commanding God” (p. 114). Thus reason and conscience are plausibly slipped in as factors; but how about the logic of it? Polytheism, he assumes, is the primitive form of religion. Among the Greeks it “developed a richer life” than monotheism could have done. Monotheism came in first among “a wandering clan,” the Jews; the idea of one God gave it concentration and force (pp. 117, 118). The “modern idea of God has two aspects, the Absolute, and the Personal;” “the former came to us from the Greeks, the latter from the Jews;” and yet he concedes on the same page (121) that “the

Jew conceived of Jehovah as absolute, so far as he had the capacity!" Christianity "intensified the personal element;" the more tender the relation comes to be, the more personal is it—"for a tender relation can only subsist toward a person, at the least *a fictitious one*" (p. 122). But philosophy, notably the Copernican astronomy, has "dissolved" this figment of personality, since it leaves no place in the universe for the throne of God, the retinue of angels and the heaven of the blessed (pp. 123-4). The same philosophy has also shown that it is absurd to pray to any superior being. Kant proved that prayer can only have a subjective effect; and Strauss says (p. 128), it is only "playing a game with one's self." Some of the proofs of the being of God are next slightly traversed—the argument for design being postponed to the next main question; the conceptions of God in the recent German speculations are noticed: then follows a discourse on immortality, which of course is denied, the argument being concluded with the assertion of Tertullian, quoted and misapplied: "Nothing is incorporeal but nothing." (In the translation, *incorporeal* is given as "immaterial.") Strauss then comes back to the question about the nature of religion—assenting to Feuerbach's position that it is engendered by our "wishes" (if we did not wish for something we could not be pious), modified by Schleiermacher's definition of it as "a feeling of absolute dependence;" and concluding that religion so far from being a high "prerogative," is but a weakness "of man's childhood"—displaced by the growth of knowledge, "as the domain of the Red Indians of North America, which, however much we may deplore it, is year after year reduced into constantly narrowing limits by their white neighbors" (p. 161). Yet religion is not wholly extinct—the feeling of absolute dependence on "the all," "the universe," abides; but it is a religion which "will hardly produce a form of worship or even festivals" (p. 165). With an unavailing protest against Schopenhauer's inference—that if this be all—a mere blind submission to an unconscious and un pitying Power, this universe "is worse than no universe

at all"—he concludes, in substance, that all that science leaves of religion is submission to necessity.

Three points claim at least a passing notice—all that our limits allow: 1. The Origin of Religion; 2. Its Proofs; 3. Its Nature and Destiny.

1. *The Origin of Religion.* To ascribe the origin of so universal and powerful a sentiment, to fear, with the Epicureans, to a selfish craving, with Hume, to the personification of natural objects, as in ancient mythology, or to unfulfilled "wishes"—is, in the first place, unhistorical, for in all extant beliefs there are found other and higher ideas than can be derived from these trivial and accidental elements; in the second place, it is unphilosophical, for it gives no adequate account of the undeniable influence of reason and conscience, which, as essential elements of human nature, must at least have co-worked in producing the highest forms of human life and experience; and, in the third place, it is logically fallacious, because in order that fear and desire may lead to religion, it is necessary to presuppose in human nature some longing for, or anticipation of, a higher than a mundane end or object, at least latent in the outward world. Brutes have fears and desires, but no religion.

Professor Ulrichi, in his acute reply to Strauss,* says: "Not fear, but the question about the causes of phenomena, of good and evil events, this spontaneous question, springing out of man's own nature, and forced upon him by natural events and the natural conditions of his life, and which first makes and proclaims man to be man—this is also at the same time the direct source of religion." "The rational law of causality, the idea of cause, the consciousness of a dependent and conditioned existence, involve and demand, not only the conception, but the acceptance, of a last and highest cause, which is not itself the product of any other cause. The very conception of *conditioned* existence is possible only when we distinguish it from its conditions; and *that which conditions*, in and of

* Philosophische Zeitschrift, as cited above, pp. 290 and following.

itself, purely as such, is necessarily unconditioned." "Children still personify lifeless objects, not from fear, for they personify those which are grateful as well as those which kindle aversion:—but because they consider all objects that act upon them as living, ensouled, active agents, since they know no other causes than those springing from will and wish."

The origin of such a vast historic power as religion can never more be deduced from the inferior tendencies of human nature—just because man has higher tendencies. It is like ascribing the origin of the state to fear and force, without taking into account the inherent need of social organization and moral order. If man in distinction from the brutes (as Strauss concedes) has reason and conscience—these must, at least, be factors in the formation of religious belief, not come after it, but enter into it. Reason instinctively searches out the ground, origin and connections of phenomena: conscience testifies to moral law and a moral government. In sinful beings, both reason and conscience awaken a sense of guilt, and of the need of expiation; so that in all historical religions we find sacrifices as well as worship. In these and kindred elements are to be sought the origin of religion in human nature; these alone explain the actual religious history of the race. And there still remains the question of a primeval revelation.

2. *The Proofs of Religion.* These, so far as Strauss considers them, comprise chiefly a criticism of the arguments for the Being of God, and for the Immortality of the Soul. The evidence derived from man's nature, from the inherent bent of the soul, and from the history of belief, are silently passed by. The usual proofs of the divine existence he calls "old-fashioned scientific artillery."

The first one he takes up is the so-called "cosmological argument," resting on the rational idea "that everything must have a sufficient cause." Nothing that we perceive is self-existent; each owes its origin to something else—and so on until we reach and rest in the idea of One Being, uncondi-

tioned, uncaused, necessary in contrast with all that is contingent—the First Cause. To this Strauss replies, that it does not give us a “personal” God, and that it does not give us a cause of the world outside of the world. “If everything in the world has its ground in another, and so on, *ad infinitum*, we do not arrive at the conception of a *cause*, of which the world is an effect, but of a *substance*, the accidents of which are individual existences. We do not attain to God, but to a universe resting upon itself, ever the same in the eternal changes of the phenomenal world” (i. 134).

We leave for the moment what is said of the divine personality to track the other point raised. That form of the cosmological argument here presented concludes from changing phenomena to an immutable cause. It is based on the category of cause and effect, and not on that of substance and accidents; but Strauss, by a logical subterfuge, substitutes the latter for the former. When we ask for the cause of phenomena, it is no answer to say that the phenomena are accidents, and that the substance of these accidents is all the cause they have. The substance of a man is quite a different thing from the cause of a man’s acts. We ask for a cause only when there is a change in time, an event. Still further, the inference of an eternal substance is at least as illogical as that of a First Cause—if the latter conclusion cannot be drawn, neither can the former. Still less can it be inferred that this substance reposes on itself and abides unchangeable, for if phenomena are the accidents of this substance, then the substance is changed in the accidents, for the accidents are its own. The fact is, that, in the cosmological argument, the two categories of cause and effect, and of ground and manifestation, are often confounded; and they ought to be kept asunder, since they are essentially unlike. The argument itself is strictly only an analysis of the idea of being into necessary and contingent, and of the idea of cause into absolute and relative. But Strauss’ conclusion virtually denies that the idea of cause can be at all applied to the infinite and absolute Being, and this is both unproved and unreasonable.

Ulrici (p. 293) forcibly remarks that "Strauss confounds the *notion* of causality with causality as a *law of thought*. The notion of causality may be transferred into that of substance, at least with the help of some plausible windings and perversions. But this is absolutely impossible with causality as a law of thought. This law *compels* us, whenever there is an event, a change, to assume that there is also a cause different from the effect, even in these cases where we cannot know the cause. The cause must be *different* from the effect, otherwise we should not have two things, cause *and* effect, but only one—there would be *no* cause. In virtue of this law of thought we are not able to conceive an infinite series of causes and effects, but we *must* presuppose a cause which is not a mere effect of something else, but a pure, last and hence unconditional cause, else we should have *only* effects but no cause; but an effect without a cause is inconceivable. . . . A universe which remains the same in the eternal change of phenomena is a *contradictio in adjecto*, for that which changes does *not* remain the same, and a changing manifestation, without an essence manifested in it, and changing with it, is no manifestation, but an illusion."

Of the other arguments for the being of God, Strauss here alludes in passing to that from design, referring all instances of design to an unconscious instinct (as if that very instinct were not a part of the problem); deferring, however, the further discussion of it to that part of his treatise in which he exhibits the bearing upon it of Darwin's theory of evolution. The moral argument is dismissed in a summary way. He holds to no absolute morality—it is made by man. Kant's elaborate proof is refuted with a sneer. Singularly enough, no notice at all is taken of the ontological argument—the profoundest of all, and needed to supplement and complete the others. Only by the union of the ontological argument with that from design, etc., can we arrive at all the elements which enter into the idea of God—especially the two factors of absoluteness and personality. The ontological argument establishes the necessary existence of an absolute and infinite

being, who is also cause: the various forms of the *a posteriori* argument prove that that cause must be a conscious, rational and moral intelligence—in short, personal.

But Strauss, while acknowledging that the common “conception of God has two sides, that of the absolute, and that of the personal” (i. 121), also advances the hackneyed pantheistic objection, that “personality is a limit” (p. 123), while God of course is illimitable. When we endeavor to conceive of “an absolute personality, we are merely dealing with an idle phantasy” (p. 140). But wherein lies the contradiction, or even the inconsistency, of applying the two ideas to the same Being? Surely they are not logical contradictories; are they contradictory in fact? This can only be shown by defining them with care. The absolute is an adjective and not a substantive: it is a predicate of pure Being—and means that pure Being is complete in and of itself, and absolved from all limitations, and from all conditions not contained in itself. Personality is ascribed to pure Being considered as spiritual being; and means that such an absolute Being is and must be self-conscious, rational and ethical, for that is the only idea of spirit that we can possibly frame. What contradiction, now, is there in asserting that such a spiritual Being may also be absolute, or complete and unconditioned? None whatever.

The contradiction seems to emerge only when we substitute some other idea for that of absoluteness—and especially when we attempt to conceive of absolute spirit by a notion or image really derived from space considered as illimitable. An ingenious German once wrote a pamphlet to prove that space is God. The All, or the Infinite, put into the forms of space, may be imaged forth as inconsistent with the Personality: but the Infinite viewed as spiritual is entirely different. Spirit cannot be defined by space—excepting negatively. God is not space-filling in the way of extension. God, say the old divines, is not *extensive*, but *intensive*—just because he is pure spirit.

The same confusion of space with spirit also appears in the

kindred popular pantheistic hypothesis, that the Infinite or Absolute must embrace all that is—even the finite and relative. It is true that illimitable space includes all finite extensions. But this is not true of any predicate of Spiritual Being. Omnipotence is not limited by excluding weakness; nor can Omniscience be enlarged by including ignorance; nor is holiness marred by repelling sin instead of embracing it; nor is God limited in his being because Satan is not identified with his very essence. To confound spirit with space, to define the absolute by spatial forms alone, is to annul rational distinctions. It is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*.

Strauss also denies immortality as well as a personal God; and in this is consistent. He long ago declared that a belief in immortality was "the last enemy" which speculative philosophy had to overcome. In his last work he adduces only the most common objections; dismissing the subject (ii. 214) with the remark, that "he who cannot help himself in this matter is beyond help, is not ripe for our standpoint." We need not, and cannot now, follow him in the reflections that conduct him to his desolate conclusion. Only, we may perhaps ask, how, as a consistent evolutionist, he can so confidently deny immortality? Who knows all that may be latent in this illimitable process, which has neither beginning nor end, whose purposes are all blind, whose aims are unfathomable, whose possibilities are exhaustless? Why may not the race be further developed? Why must "the diapason close full" in man upon this earth? Why may there not be a disenthralled and spiritualized humanity? With the evolutionist's formula of—"the slightest changes and the longest periods"—very much may be imagined. If man can be produced from an ape, and an ape from a clam (ascidian), and a clam from a nondescript, low-lived Bathybius,—a soul from the soulless, and life from the lifeless,—why may not man himself be further developed into a higher form of spiritual life? Because, says Strauss, "Nothing is incorporeal but nothing."

But Paul replies, "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body."

"What if earth be like to heaven,
And things therein be each to other like
More than on earth is thought!"

3. *The Nature or Essence of Religion.* Religion always and everywhere denotes some relation, real or supposed, between the world and what is thought to be above the world; between mankind and some superior being or beings; in the most general terms, between man and the world as relative and finite, and the ground or cause of the world as absolute and infinite. The universe of being is necessarily conceived, in the last analysis, as embracing both the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative; and all religion is, and must be, found in a conscious relation, on man's part, between these two poles of being. No analysis can get beyond these factors; a final analysis must comprise these factors. And this analysis rests upon and reveals a difference, a contrast, between the Infinite and the finite, between God and man. What is common to them is the pure idea of being—both together make up the universe of being; but, as compared with each other, the Infinite and finite, God and the creature, must be conceived of and defined by totally different predicates—*e. g.*, the absolute and relative, the illimitable and the limited, the conditioned and the unconditioned, etc. Though different, they are yet related to each other, and necessarily so. Man's consciousness or knowledge of this relation is expressed in religious reverence, love and worship—herein is his religion. And thus religion always implies an *essential* difference between its object and its subject—between God and the creature. As soon as the two are *identified*, are viewed as only *one* in substance or essence, all real difference vanishes and religion becomes impossible.

Strauss' conception, now, of the nature of religion, is based on the *monistic* or pantheistic assumption about the universe—that the Infinite and finite are but one in essence—that

their essential difference is an illusion. He cursorily reviews the opinions of recent German philosophers (pp. 135-147), disparaging Kant's rigid monotheism, calling Fichte and Schelling "mystics" and unscientific, because both of them in their latest works disavowed some of the pantheistic tendencies of their youthful speculations, and finding that even Hegel "bequeathed a riddle to his expounders and a subterfuge to his adherents" (p. 137), because he defined the aboriginal substance as "subject or spirit"—thus leaving room for "the idea of personality." None of these, he thinks, attained to the true conception. In Schleiermacher's reduction of religion to a "feeling of absolute dependence," coupled with Feuerbach's derivation of it from man's "wishes" (p. 155), he finds the needful factors: "what man would be but is not, what he would have but knows not how to get—this creates for him his God." Not in "dependence" alone, but also in "the need of acting against it and vindicating his own freedom" do we detect the true nature of religion. That is, says Ulrici, he derives it "from two diametrically opposite sources."

"Our religion," adds Strauss, "is no longer that of our fathers"—a belief in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. It is "a knowledge of the world"—of the All, the Universe." In this world we find a constant proceeding of "the higher from the lower, of the refined from the rude." "We regard the universe as the source of all that is rational and good." And yet with a difference! "We can no longer view the world as the work of an absolutely rational and good personality, but as the *laboratory* of the rational and good. It is not planned by the highest reason, but *unto* the highest reason. And we *must* concede, too, that what is in the effect is also in the cause—what comes out must have been in. But it is only owing to the limitation of our human conceptions that we make such distinctions, for the universe is both cause and effect, both external and internal, at once and together" (p. 163).

This last statement touches the vital point and tests the whole matter; for if we know that the universe *is* at once

both cause and effect, both internal and external, or, in other words, both infinite and finite, so that there is no real difference between them, why is it that we "must" distinguish between cause and effect as really different? Our knowledge of the identity would be the dominant idea and forbid such a conclusion. On the other hand, if we "must" distinguish between cause and effect, how can we ever come to know that this is due to "limitation of our faculties," and that "in the universe" they are identified and confounded? If this argument does not establish the identity of being, it does illustrate the identification of contradictions—well-nigh of logical contradictories. If the assumption of the identity of cause and effect be valid, then we cannot really in thought distinguish them; if we cannot really distinguish between cause and effect, we can never more prove that there is absolute being as well as phenomena; while, if we "must" distinguish between them, it follows that, if this would "be the laboratory of what is rational and good," it must have been "the work of a wise and good cause;" that if it be "planned *unto* the highest reason," it must have been planned *by* the highest reason.

Strauss, in the later editions of his work, thus goes on: "We stand here at the limits of our knowledge; we gaze into an abyss we can no farther fathom. But this much at least is certain—that the personal image which there meets our gaze is but a reflection of the wondering spectator himself." "Even the conception of the Absolute to which our modern philosophy is so partial, easily tends again to assume some kind of personality. We, in consequence, prefer the designation of the All or the Universe: not overlooking, however, that this again runs the danger of leading us to think of the sum-total of phenomena, instead of the one essence of forces and laws which manifest and fulfil themselves. But we would rather say too little than too much."

Beyond "the lowest depths" which German speculation has hitherto reached there is, it seems, a lower deep—and in that abyss a deeper contradiction. "The personal image

which there meets our gaze is but a reflection of ourselves." But is it an "image" that the believer gazes on? Is it not rather an Infinite and Perfect Being—the Absolute Spirit? We are the "image" and there is the reality; the two are as different as the Infinite and finite—and we *know* that they are so. But this abyss of being, adds Strauss, is not fitly called "the Absolute"—for to that term an association of "personality" still clings; it is better to call it "the All or the Universe." Schelling, in his earlier pantheistic stage, defined it as the "identity" of being; Fichte as "the moral order;" Hegel as "spirit," not substance, and "spirit as subject." But all these designations are inadequate to the needs of the new faith; it goes deeper still, and "the Universe" is the last abyss. Religion in the last analysis is only a feeling of dependence on the Universe. Even here, however, there is "a danger"—for we must "not think of the sum-total of phenomena," but "of the one essence of forces and laws which manifest and fulfil themselves." This one essence is the Universe.

We have not the German original of this passage, which is not in the fourth edition; and the English translation in which it appears is from the sixth. But presuming it to be correct we have here a wonderful phase of this dizzy speculation. "The All" in which we rest, it is implied, is "not the sum-total of phenomena," but "the one essence of forces and laws manifested" in these phenomena. That is, in fine, by Strauss' own concession, "the All" to which he comes is not the All of being. The Universe to which we bow does *not* include the universality of beings; the "sum-total of phenomena" is "not to be thought of," but only the "one essence of laws and forces." That is, in the ultimate "Universe" on which we depend, the essence is to be distinguished from the "sum-total of the phenomena;" and only in this essence can we find the supreme reality.

Strauss here seems to come into contradiction with the whole method of argument he has been employing against the theists; and to insist upon a distinction which favors the

theistic rather than the pantheistic view, viz., that the ultimate essence is one thing and the phenomena another, and that the two are not to be identified or confounded.

For, he has been all along arguing that religion is a sense of dependence on the All, the Universe. This All, this Universe, now, what is it? How much does it embrace? Only three answers seem possible: 1. The Universe is "the sum-total of all phenomena"—*i. e.*, it is all finite phenomena infinitely extended, without beginning or end. 2. The Universe is one essence or substance, including both the Infinite and finite, the absolute and relative, the illimitable and the limited, the eternal and the temporal, cause and effect, etc., all in one. This allows a phenomenal difference, while it asserts an ultimate identity of these opposites. 3. It may also be said, that though the Universe comprises both the Infinite and finite, the absolute and relative, yet these are not identical; so that the Infinite is the ground, source, cause of the finite; and they are one, not in essence, but simply as parts of the universe. This is the theistic view.

The first of these views is the materialistic; it denies the reality of the Infinite; the Infinite is simply the indefinite—it is made up by the aggregation of finites. This Strauss and all pantheists must deny. The second is the proper pantheistic view—the one Strauss has been advocating all along against theism; and, according to it, the Infinite and finite, essence and phenomena, cause and effect, must be identified in ultimate Being; so that religion can only be a sense of dependence on the Infinite as *including* the finite, on the essence as comprising the phenomena. But this Strauss seems to deny when he says, that we must not think of the "sum-total of phenomena," but of the "one essence." In striving to avoid the absurdity of putting all shifting phenomena into the absolute, and thus overwhelming it with contradictions, he is compelled, on the one hand, to the absurdity of implying that the Universe does not necessarily include the finite as well as the Infinite, and is therefore not all-embracing; and, on the other hand, to a conception as to the difference between

essence and phenomena, which gives to the theist one of his sharpest weapons against the pantheistic theory of the ultimate identity of all being. Thus the monotony of his cheerless abyss is disturbed by a contradiction.

And in this abyss is the very substance of the New Faith—the combined creed of pantheists and materialists as to the essence of Religion. All past belief is a delusion; the only abiding religion is a blind submission to a blind Necessity—a feeling of absolute dependence on an unfathomable abyss of being, into which no ray of light ever penetrated. Welcome, then, the Buddhist Nirvana or the materialistic annihilation. Schopenhauer would seem to be right: the universe is one grand mistake, better had it never existed; pessimism is our last refuge; this is "the worst conceivable universe."

But Strauss again appears inconsistent, and says that the pessimists are "melancholy-mad," and involved in "glaring contradictions," and he tries to dislodge them by applying an old sophism, viz., "If the world is something which had better not have existed, then too the thought of a philosopher, as forming part of this Universe, is a thought which had better not have been thought. The pessimist philosopher fails to perceive how he, above all, thus declares that his own thought, viz., that the world is bad—must be a bad thought; but if the thought which declares the world to be bad is a bad thought, then it follows naturally that the world is good" (p. 167). Yes, until the pessimist with his relentless logic pursues him still further by saying—your conclusion, that the world is good, is also itself a part of the same bad world (which is your major premise), and it is therefore a bad conclusion. So that, after all, the world is as bad as it can be, and is none the better for your short logic.

The sum of Strauss' "Confession" thus far is then this: In his criticism and argument he assumes his conclusion from the very start, viz., the truth of the pantheistico-materialistic theory of the universe, negatively stated—that there is no supernatural, no God above the world, no immortality beyond

this life. This assumption pervades, and, of course, being unproved, vitiates the whole process. With this determined pre-conception he easily shows that the gospels are mythical, that Christ is an enthusiast and a fanatic, and that all religions are superstitions: but the proof is formal and not substantial; the process is not a construction but a destruction, pulling down the structure and leaving a wreck and a chaos. The real life of our Lord is denied in the assumption; and all the rest is like the dissection of the dead, which may be scientific, but leaves only disintegration and decay. The One Perfect Man is robbed even of his human excellency: the one costly pearl of human history is rudely crushed, and its dust mingled with the undistinguishable clods of earth. Of the Person of Christ, in which even Hegel found the centre and turning-point of man's whole history, there remains only an unsubstantial image, his visage marred more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men. And all religion, too, by the same destructive process, is undermined and denied: its fanes and temples, reared in grandeur by every race and every generation, are depicted as the products of delusion, the strongholds of superstition, the citadels of the foes of civilization, and they must all be razed to the ground. Not even a vague belief in a benign supernal power, not even a vestige of the inspiring hope of eternal life, can be absolved from the common fate. And logically, too. For if there be no supernatural, then, argues our unflinching materialist, there cannot be any miracle; if no miracle, then no Christ; if no Christ, no church. And not this alone: for if there be no miracle, then no creation, for that is the most stupendous of miracles: if no creation, no personal God or Creator, and no hereafter. Outside of the world, above the world, all is naught. And in the world necessity and chance, under the name of evolution, rule in all and through all, and leave us infatuated with fate, and gazing into the unfathomable depths of an abyss. And this is the upshot and essence of the new faith.

In working out this comforting belief, Strauss, in striving to

combine his former pantheism and his new-fledged materialism into one scheme for the edification of posterity, outbids most other pantheists and materialists (as becomes a progressive reformer); for he out-Hegels Hegel and out-Darwins Darwin. Hegel left "spirit," and "spirit as subject," as the essence of the Absolute; Strauss substitutes "the All or the Universe." Darwin allowed three or four germs and a creator to start the series of evolution; Strauss thinks them needless, and besides, he says, they virtually upset the theory; in which he is right. Dubois-Reymond cannot see how a sensation can be produced by mechanical laws; but Strauss says it must be; and though we have not yet seen it done, somebody will see it, or do it, by and by. It may be doubted whether many scientific men will be willing in such a bold way to supplement their physics by these pantheistic metaphysics. They are usually hard-headed and sharp-eyed men, who see what they do see and know it, and know very little of such a Universe as that of Strauss, which abides unchanged though it is ever changing, which ever rests and never remains at rest, and which is in itself both cause and effect, and substance and accidents, in one, and at the same time. When it comes to making transitions and filling up gaps, most scientific men hesitate where they have no facts to go on; but not so a genuine *a priori* pantheistic German reconstructionist; he is most bold where they are most modest; the fewer his facts, the wider his generalizations; and when the facts give clean out, he has the field all to himself, with the very largest liberty for his *a priori* transcendental reconstruction of the Universe.

The character of a Belief, especially of Religious Belief, is largely determined by the nature of its object; and, as is its character, so in the long run will be its influence. What, then, must be the inevitable character and influence of this New Belief, which is to supplant Christianity and all existing religions? Its ultimate object is a blind, unconscious Force, without vision, without reason, without righteousness, without will, without love; producing all, foreseeing naught; moving by a necessity which is but another name for chance, and by a

chance which is but another name for necessity—for a blind necessity is a necessity loaded with caprice. In “this enormous machine of the universe,” says Strauss (ii. 213), “amid the incessant whirl and hiss of its jagged iron wheels, amid the deafening crash of its ponderous stamps and hammers, in the midst of this terrific commotion, man finds himself placed helpless and defenceless, not secure for a moment that on some unforeseen motion a wheel may not seize and rend him or a hammer crush him to powder. This feeling of being abandoned to fate is at first really horrible. But of what avail to delude ourselves about it? Our wish cannot remake the world, and our understanding shows us that it is in fact such a machine.” And the only consolation he can suggest is, that we should get accustomed to feeling resigned and happy.

Such, then, according to the New Faith, is wisdom, and here is the place of understanding. The abyss saith, It is in in me. It is in that awful depth, in those Blind Forces. And this is the substance of that “rational” belief, the last and highest product of “scientific thought,” which is to reform and supersede that effete superstition called Christianity. An unconscious Universe instead of the Father of all; Fate instead of Providence; a sheer submission to destiny instead of love to a holy and wise and loving God; the laws of nature instead of the law of righteousness; self-reliance instead of pardon and trust; the law of evolution instead of an Incarnate Redeemer; and in place of immortality utter oblivion. All religion, all morality must be refashioned; for all ideas of reason, yea, and reason itself, all ethical precepts, yea, and conscience itself, can have no absolute and permanent worth; since they are but evanescent and necessary products of that o’ermastering Force, which is above all, and through all, and in all. And as no man can grasp its nature, so no man can foresee what may or may not be yet evolved out of the recesses of its unfathomable, unconscious and irrational being.

A generation drugged with such a fell delusion will change

the face of the earth. Especially in our own country, where material prosperity is so rife and seductive, and material necessities are so urgent and constant—if to these be added the concentration and impetus of a scientific and aggressive materialism, and our whole theory of life be transmuted by its incantations—no imagination can forecast its perils and no wisdom curb its riotous excesses. For nothing will be sacred to it; there is no hallowed word it will not scoffingly transform; there is no institution of church or state it will not destroy and reshape; the only law it knows is the tyrant's maxim, that might makes right. Neither strength nor beauty can be in its sanctuary. Let the race be thoroughly taught in this new creed, blinded to the supreme light of reason and the imperative obligations of conscience, indifferent to God and to eternal life, and it will be ready to perish. To the most cultured, life will be only a narrow realism; for the mass of mankind there is left chiefly a fierce struggle for wealth and power and pleasure, with the survival of the strongest. And this New Faith is, after all, but a revival of the oldest form of the most degrading unbelief; it cuts off the wings of the soul, drags it down to earth, and extorts from it the reluctant and despairing confession, that all that is left it is a dogged purpose to submit to annihilation, as do the beasts that perish. If a brute could become conscious, it could not have any less religion.

But all history and analogy show, that there is a *vis medicatrix* in human nature itself. In a great crisis there is a great reaction. One extreme often evokes its opposite. The height of materialism rallies the reserved spiritual forces. There is in man a spiritual consciousness as well as a natural consciousness. Reason and conscience—whatever may be the theory as to their origin, are now essential elements of human nature; and few will deny that religion is also. If there be, as Plato taught, any real vision of eternal ideas; if there be, as all history testifies, any sense of a reality above the shifting phenomena of the senses; until man's deepest convictions about righteousness, and sin, and the need of forgiveness, and

his faith in God and immortality can be rooted out; these undying instincts of humanity will assert their rightful supremacy, and cry out for some Divine Deliverer, as did the race of old in the catastrophe of an expiring heathendom, when it had been first stupefied and then maddened by the same awful theory of the Universe, from which it was delivered only by the triumphs of Christianity. For the very idea of God, and above all his love and worship, impress upon man the profound belief, that though born of earth he is the offspring of the skies—the earth-born child of a heavenly Father.

We must defer a discussion of the other two questions of the "New Faith." As to the two already examined, "Are we still Christians?" and, "Have we still any Religion"—if we may take them as addressed to modern civilized society as a whole, and not merely to an exceptional class of unbelievers—the answer still would be: "Our yea, too, is yea, and our nay nay, when we humbly and reverently declare, that the belief in God the Father, and in his only Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, is to-day the profoundest belief of the human soul."

CONCLUSION.

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